12-1996

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Moral Theory and Moral Life

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This paper was originally presented as The Distinguished Scholar Award Lecture, January 25, 1996.

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The Ethics Center thanks the Distinguished Scholar Award Committee, Professor Ernst Breisach, chair, for allowing us to print this paper.
One of Shakespeare's plays mentions Young men, whom Aristotle thought Unfit to hear moral philosophy. Aristotle is well known for saying that moral philosophy is not for the young. In fact, he doesn't think it is for many adults either. The many, as he puts it, "do not abstain from bad acts because of their baseness but through fear of punishment." If Aristotle is right about this, what can philosophy say to the many?

For Aristotle, as well as many others, moral philosophy (or ethics) is a rather rarified subject. Although it seeks to understand moral life at its most fundamental level, supposedly only a rather select group of thinkers is equipped to join the search--these are philosophers, those whose business it is to formulate, defend, and critique moral theories.

Today, however, this view is being challenged from a variety of quarters. Philosophers find themselves invited to sit down with lawyers, doctors, nurses, social workers, engineers, business managers, and many others to
talk about ethics. Ethics centers are cropping up in colleges and universities across the country—including here at Western Michigan University. Ethics is a "growth industry," and philosophers seem to be on the leading edge.

Now, this has to make those who share Aristotle's view of moral philosophy a little uneasy. Here is a clear invitation to widen philosophy's audience; but how can philosophy deliver the goods if moral philosophy is as difficult a subject as Aristotle thinks and if, for most people, the bottom line is, "Will I be punished?"

My answer is that those who side with Aristotle on this matter are mistaken. They exaggerate moral philosophy's inaccessibility. No doubt there are parts of moral philosophy that are relatively inaccessible--especially those parts whose literature is addressed nearly exclusively to professional philosophers. Some of this is not only inaccessible, but also not terribly relevant to moral life. However, there are large parts of moral philosophy that are accessible--or they would be if only philosophers would attempt to make them so. This is the invitation lawyers, doctors, nurses, engineers, social workers, accountants, journalists, managers, and others are currently extending to
philosophers. What should help those philosophers willing to accept this invitation is the fact that it isn't just philosophers who are quite capable of rather sophisticated philosophical reflection about morality. My own view is that those who share Aristotle's view underestimate the ability of those who have not heard "lectures on moral philosophy" to understand whatever light moral philosophy might shed on moral life. This underestimation extends to children as well as adults.

In any case, in recent years a growing number of philosophers have accepted the invitation from others to help them sort through practical moral problems. I welcome this changing role of moral philosophers ("ethicists"). However, while this role is changing I think it is important to pay close attention to the lessons that might be learned about philosophy, not just those that might be learned from philosophy.

The best way I can clarify what I have in mind is to launch into some autobiographical remarks. I'm one of those professional philosophers who has tried to bridge some of the gaps between moral philosophy and the everyday world in which we live. For the past couple of
decades my work has focussed on four areas: moral theory in the standard philosophical sense (ethics); practical and professional ethics; moral development; and the philosophical thinking of children. I will say a little bit about each of these interests of mine. For a time I thought of these as four rather different areas of interest—united more by the fact that I was interested in all of them than that they are somehow connected with each other.

However, the 18th Century philosopher Thomas Reid has been instrumental in helping me see unity among the diversity of interests I've been pursuing. I will cite a passage from Reid's *Active Powers of the Mind* that I think underlies most of what want to say in this talk:

By the name we give to it [the theory of morals], and by the custom of making it a part of every system of morals, men may be led into this gross mistake, which I wish to obviate, that in order to understand his duty, a man must needs be a philosopher and a metaphysician.² Notice that Reid does not say that philosophical reflection is not needed to understand one's duty—
only that one need not be a philosopher and
metaphysician.

The importance of Reid's warning is
illustrated by one of my early forays into
professional ethics. In the summer of 1979 I
participated in a two week workshop on
engineering ethics at the Illinois Institute of
Technology. The workshop consisted of 12
engineering faculty, 12 professional philosophers,
and a small group of discussion leaders from
engineering, business, government, and
philosophy. The engineers were eager to find out
how they might introduce their students to ethics
in an engineering context. The expectation was
that philosophers (sometimes referred to as
"ethicists") could help. Engineers have "tools of
the trade". What philosophers' "tools of the trade"
might be helpful? the engineers asked. It was
rumored that, at the conclusion of a similar
institute a year before, the engineers presented
each philosopher with a plastic tool box filled with
plastic tools. Surely, the engineers in our group
admonished us, we could do better than those
philosophers!

As if to prove the point, a well-known
philosopher gave an opening lecture on moral

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relativism and moral absolutism. As he spoke, I thought how helpful this would be for my Introduction to Ethics students. Very nice. The lecture concluded. Time for questions or comments. The chair of the department of civil engineering at one of the top engineering schools in the country made the first comment: "What were you talking about? I didn't understand anything you said. What do all those 'isms' have to do with engineering?" An overstatement—but one with a point. Philosophers and engineers do not talk the same language when they employ their "tools of the trade." Our lecturer talked straight philosophy, making no attempt to place his remarks in an engineering context.

So, what is the solution to this problem? One familiar to philosophers is to push harder at trying to enlighten others about the "isms" that are trademarks of the profession. My heretical view is that this is starting at the wrong end. Trying to frame moral problems in terms of the "isms" of philosophy often comes at the price of not understanding those problems well. I will illustrate the danger with another example from the engineering ethics workshop.

A famous engineering case study is the
Goodrich Brake Scandal, as reported by Kermit Vandivier, a technical writer for Goodrich in the late '60s. Vandivier claimed that he and others were told to falsify data about the testing of a new brake system for Airforce jets. Ralph Gretzinger, the test lab supervisor, was portrayed as caving in to management's demand. At first he said he would have nothing to do with it. In the end, however, he changed his mind, citing the difficulty of finding new employment at his age (42) and his need to keep up his house payments and pay for his children's college education.

Here is a problem in engineering ethics--no doubt about it. How should it be characterized? Philosophers may be tempted to bring an "ism" into the discussion. In fact, this is just what a well-known text on professional ethics does. Chapter 1 is entitled "Egoism." It consists of the Vandivier article plus readings from philosophers Thomas Hobbes and Joseph Butler. Now, while I admire these philosophers very much, it seems to me their writings do not fit the example very well. The selections focus on two questions. First, is all human motivation fundamentally and inescapably self-interested? An affirmative answer is called psychological egoism. Second, is morality
grounded exclusively in self-interest? An affirmative answer is called ethical egoism.

How do these concepts relate to the Goodrich case? Take Gretzinger's situation. A plausible reading might go like this. His first response is that it would be wrong to falsify the data. But he is pressured from two directions. On the one hand, his superiors are telling him he must falsify the data. Bucking them means challenging their authority, and he may wonder if he would be disloyal. This may pose a moral conflict for Gretzinger. Does he have the right to refuse? Although he may fear what will happen to him if he refuses, this is by no means his only concern. So far, self-interest, then, is only part of the picture.

On the other hand, Gretzinger is concerned about his home and his children. If he loses his job, what will happen to them? It is disturbing that Gretzinger never seems to ask whether risking a pilot's life due to brake failure is a reasonable trade-off for house payments and college tuition. Even so, it takes several steps to show that his concern for his children is just another form of self-interest. Furthermore, Gretzinger may be asking "Why be moral?" as much as "What's in my
At this point it might be objected that Goodrich itself could be viewed in egoistic terms—Goodrich the corporate egoist, willing to take short-cuts in order to obtain lucrative contracts. I don't reject the analogy out of hand. But it must be noted that this is an analogy. Hobbes and Butler are talking about human motivation, not corporations. Furthermore, even if it can be argued that a corporation can be a giant egoist, it by no means follows that the individuals within the corporation are similarly egoistic. In fact, successful corporate egoism may depend on the commitment of individuals within the corporation being devoted to causes larger than themselves. I may have to make considerable self-sacrifice in order to do what is best for the corporation.

What does my objection to framing the Goodrich case in terms of egoism come to? There really are two problems. First, when we sort through the moral issues the Goodrich case actually raises, the relevance of self-interested concerns is only one element. Second, psychological and ethical egoism are both reductive theories. Psychological egoism, for example, takes the vast range of seemingly diverse
springs of action under a unifying principle, claiming they are all variations on the same theme. Ethical egoism performs an analogous function in moral thought. It is very easy for discussions of such theories to take on life of their own--the result being that the original ethical problems are quickly forgotten.

A note on my own predilections. Perhaps if I thought that egoistic theories themselves had some credibility, I would take a more sanguine view of their relevance to the practical issues. However, I am not attracted to them. Pointing out their shortcomings, however, does almost nothing, as far as I can tell, to shed light on how the issues should be resolved in the Goodrich case. For example, Gretzinger's puzzlement is not about whether self-interest trumps all else. It is about a) what it is right to do in this situation and b) whether he should do what is right, assuming he knows what would be right.

I am not claiming that philosophical reflection on egoism, utilitarianism, Kantianism or the other 'isms' of moral philosophy are useless or should be avoided. What I am questioning is their immediate relevance to the problems of life--here the problems of moral life. Trying to fit such
"isms" on to the issues of moral life is, I think, quite often a mistake—at least if it is done so at the outset. My bias, if you like, is to have moral theory be issue-driven rather than trying to place issues in a procrustean bed framed by one's favorite "ism".

But, the moral theorist may object, what do you offer in place of the standard big three—egoism, utilitarianism, and Kantianism? Without a unifying grounding principle, doesn't everything simply hang arbitrarily in the air? At this point another "ism" rears its head. The alternative to a comprehensive, unifying theory is intuitionism—which supposedly advocates uncritical reliance on ungrounded and, for all we know, arbitrary "intuitions." W.D. Ross, a very sensible moralist in the early part of this century, is often caricatured as an intuitionist of this sort.

Ross adopted the pluralist view that there are many sources of duty or obligation—fidelity, reparation, gratitude, beneficence, self-improvement, not injuring others, and so on. But since he refused to arrange these hierarchically, with one consideration grounding the rest, critics charged him with incoherence. What happens when these "intuitions" conflict? What if keeping
a promise requires me to harm someone? Without an overarching principle, critics complain, there is no way of resolving such conflicts. So, Ross's "intuitionism" seems to break down just when our puzzlement arises.

There is not time to explore this issue in detail here. I can only suggest an alternative approach that, it seems to me, avoids denigrating ordinary moral thought and at the same time rejects the demand for an overarching theory. Thomas Reid insisted that morality "is the business of [everyone]; and therefore the knowledge of it ought to be within the reach of all."³ As I've already mentioned, central to his view is that one does not need to be a philosopher or metaphysician to understand how one should conduct oneself. He did not mean that moral reflection and systematic thinking are unnecessary. Reid acknowledged that, for a variety of reasons, even self-evident truths can escape our understanding for our entire lives.

However, his point is that, although moral systems, as he puts it, "swell to great magnitude," this is not because there is a large number of general moral principles. He says that, actually, they are "few and simple." Moral systems swell
because applications of these principles "extend to every part of human conduct, in every condition, every relation, and every transaction of life." If this is right, then applying even a relatively small number of principles is bound to be a complex affair—especially as one's experiences broaden and deepen.

To illustrate what Reid means, consider Forest Carter's Little Tree, a six-year-old American Indian child. Little Tree notices a little girl with no shoes and seemingly little else by way of possessions. He tells his grandmother, who makes some moccasins for her. Little Tree presents the moccasins to the girl, much to her obvious delight.

So far, so good. But the story now takes a surprising turn. The little girl's father asks her where she got the moccasins. She points to Little Tree. Then the father whips her hard on the legs and back with a switch, makes her take off the moccasins, and he returns the moccasins to Little Tree, saying: "We'uns don't take no charity...from nobody...and especial heathen savages." Later Little Tree's grandfather comments on the episode:

On the trail, Granpa said he didn't
bear the sharecropper no ill. Granpa said he reckined that pride was all he had...howsoever misplaced. He said the feller figgered he couldn't let the little girl, ner any of his young'uns, come to love pretty things for they couldn't have them. So he whipped them when they showed a liking for things they couldn't have...and he whipped them until they learned; so that in a little while, they knowed they was not to expect them things.

What has Little Tree learned? That giving to those in need is wrong? Hardly. What he has learned is that one must pay careful attention to the larger context in which giving takes place. In some instances it may do more harm than good. This may never have occurred to Little Tree before. It was beyond his small world and, likely, beyond his imagination. However, the lesson he learned put together several things for him: scarcity of goods, giving, kindness, the infliction of pain, coping, and pride. He had some understanding of each of these, but not in these particular relationships to one another.

Little Tree also learned something else, with broader implications. Little Tree recounts,
"Granpa said he didn't fault me fer not catching on right off." His grandfather told him that he had the advantage over Little Tree of having seen something similar a few years earlier. He saw a father whip two of his daughters when he saw them looking at a Sears Roebuck catalog:

Granpa said that feller took a switch and whipped them young'uns 'till the blood run out of their legs. He said he watched, and the feller took the Sears Roebuck catalog and he went out behind the barn. He burned up the catalog, tore it all up first, like he hated that catalog. Granpa said then the feller set down against the barn, where nobody could see him, and he cried. Granpa said he seen that and so he knowed. Granpa said ye had to understand. But most people didn't want to--it was too much trouble--so they used words to cover their own laziness and called other folks "shiftless."

So, Little Tree learned several things--that things are not always what they seem; that one might, nevertheless, be able to understand (which is not necessarily to approve); and that we have a tendency not to make the effort to understand.
Thus, initially assuming others are (or should be) like us, we may exaggerate the differences that we first notice between ourselves and them. Little Tree has also learned that, while helpfulness is important, one may have to work hard at getting that right.

It looks as though Little Tree has made some moral progress. However, if we try to cast this in terms of an absolutist perspective, we will find it difficult to make sense of this. From the absolutist perspective, Little Tree's understanding is far from adequate. He has just learned that, although giving is sometimes good, it may misfire in quite serious and unfortunate ways. It is not clear how general Little Tree's understanding is at this point. If anything, he is now more cautious—less likely to generalize too quickly, more likely to want to examine the particular circumstances more thoroughly. Yet, he does not necessarily have a more general perspective from which to evaluate his progress. Giving to others in need is still good, but not unqualifiedly.

So, we might better say that Little Tree has gained a lesson in critical thinking. His eyes have been opened to new possibilities, and he now sees his moral world somewhat differently.
commendable behavior (giving to one in need) has proven to be problematic. Normally unacceptable behavior (whipping a child--for accepting a gift!) is seen as understandable, however flawed. Is Little Tree now hopelessly confused? Has he lost his footing because of this unexpected turn of events? There is little reason to suppose either. As narrator, Little Tree conveys the sense that he has increased his understanding. It is not that giving to others in need is not good; it is simply not an unqualified good. This is because it can bring harm with it.

As Little Tree and the rest of us try to give our moral lives a semblance of order, Thomas Reid offers some useful advice. He compares a system of morals to "laws of motion in the natural world, which, though few and simple, serve to regulate an infinite variety of operations throughout the universe." However, he contrasts a system of morals with a system of geometry:

A system of morals is not like a system of geometry, where the subsequent parts derive their evidence from the preceding, and one chain of reasoning is carried on from the beginning; so that, if
the arrangement is changed, the chain is broken, and the evidence is lost. It resembles more a system of botany, or mineralogy, where the subsequent parts depend not for their evidence upon the preceding, and the arrangement is made to facilitate apprehension and memory, and not to give evidence.

All of this has important implications for how we characterize moral development. On the botanical model, access to ground level moral understanding need not be an all or nothing affair. Its range and complexity can be a matter of degree. Understanding how different, ground level moral considerations are related to one another can be a matter for moral discovery (and dispute) without our having to say that those whose picture is incomplete have no understanding of morality at its most fundamental level. I believe it is important to keep this in mind when addressing moral issues in business, the professions, and other applied areas. Philosophers and non-philosophers alike can be expected to contribute to the discussion at the deepest level.

It is also important to keep this in mind
when discussing moral issues with children. I want to say a bit more about this by mentioning some of my work in Philosophy for Children. This will complete the last link in the chain of my interests I mentioned at the beginning of this talk.

I first began to explore the idea that children are capable of serious philosophical thinking in 1979 when I was invited to visit my daughter's fourth grade class once a week to discuss philosophical ideas. As I visited with other fourth and fifth grade students, I discovered I had vastly underestimated their interest in and aptitude for philosophical thought. We had splendid discussions about logical relationships, the relationship between the mind and brain, whether machines can think, whether all questions have answers, the relationship between dreams and reality, what we can know as distinct from merely belief, what fairness is, and so on.¹⁰

Three things especially stood out for me in my discussions with children. First, I was impressed by the incredible range of philosophical ideas they were able to explore with considerable sophistication. Second, I was surprised at how little I had to contribute myself. Essentially my role each time we met was to read a few
paragraphs from philosophically suggestive children's stories, and occasionally ask questions to help facilitate discussion. Typically, my task was to start the ball rolling and then step out of their line of fire.

Third, although the discussions the children engaged in were philosophically sophisticated, none of the standard philosophical jargon was introduced. We discussed metaphysical questions but never used the word metaphysics. Instead we talked about whether the mind is real, whether everything that is real is in space, whether all questions have answers, and the like. We discussed epistemological questions but never used the word epistemology. Instead, we talked about what the difference is between knowing that something is true and simply believing that it is true, what counts as evidence, whether all good reasons for believing something is true is evidence in support of it, and the like. In fact, we didn't even use the word 'philosophy.'

One thing that was very evident is that the 8-11 year olds with whom I exchanged ideas already had a rather well developed sense of fairness. Favoritism, taking more than one's fair share, not taking turns, listening to only one side
of the story, jumping to conclusions, and a host of other examples are readily volunteered as kinds of unfairness. These are staple fare in the lives of children from a very early age on—in school, on the playground, and within their family structures. That young children, like the rest of us, may more readily recognize unfairness in others than in themselves does not mean that they do not understand what fairness and unfairness are. That they will later extend their conceptions of fairness and unfairness to situations they cannot now understand very well (e.g., taxation)—and that they will discover conflicts with other fundamental moral values—does not imply that they do not now have access to morality at its most basic level.

William Damon (The Moral Child)\textsuperscript{11} cites considerable evidence that children younger than two are capable of sophisticated empathic responses to the suffering and misfortune of others. By age four many are able to distinguish among moral, conventional, and prudential rules using the same kinds of principles as adults.

Gareth Matthews (Philosophy and the Young Child and Dialogues With Children) provides a wealth of examples of children's moral thinking. He emphasizes the importance of
paradigms:

A young child is able to latch onto the moral kind, bravery, or lying, by grasping central paradigms of that kind, paradigms that even the most mature and sophisticated moral agents still count as paradigmatic. Moral development is then something much more complicated than simple concept displacement. It is: enlarging the stock of paradigms for each moral kind; developing better and better definitions of whatever it is these paradigms exemplify; appreciating better the relation between straightforward instances of the kind and close relatives; and learning to adjudicate competing claims from different moral kinds (classically the sometimes competing claims of justice and compassion, but many other conflicts are possible).\textsuperscript{12}

In a view like this, children as well as adults can be acknowledged to share some ground
level understanding of morality. And, although adults may typically have the upper hand in regard to breadth of experience and understanding, there is no warrant for entirely excluding children from the adult world of morality.

If the thought that young children might be capable of imaginative and provocative moral thought seems far-fetched, consider an example provided by Matthews:

IAN (six years) found to his chagrin that the three children of his parents' friends monopolized the television; they kept him from watching his favorite program. "Mother," he asked in frustration, "why is it better for three people to be selfish than for one?" Matthews suggests that this may be an incipient challenge to utilitarian thought. At the very least, it should be conceded that Ian has a rudimentary grasp of two fundamental moral concepts: fairness and selfishness.

I have tried to illustrate how my work in professional and applied ethics, moral psychology, and the philosophical thinking of children has affected my work in philosophical ethics. I am not
necessarily opposed to attempts to construct comprehensive, coherent moral theories. However, I think this must be done with great caution--and with a special eye on the reductive qualities that typically are trademarks of the "isms" that populate moral philosophy.

I suggest we follow Thomas Reid's advice. He rejects those theories of morality that go "beyond the common sense of mankind in general," complaining that they "have made little progress and rather have rendered a subject, clear and obvious to the multitude, obscure and doubtful by their philosophical subtleties." Moral philosophy, he urges, should try to "strike the minds of men with the importance of the subject matter and move their hearts."14

As for the proper role of theory, Reid says:

There is in Ethicks as in most Sciences a Speculative and a practical Part, the first is subservient to the last.15

While Reid insists that "the practical Part of Ethicks is for the most part easy and level to all capacities," he does not underestimate the obstacles to clear-headed thinking in our practical circumstances:
There is ... no branch of Science wherein Men would be more harmonious in their opinions than in Morals were they free from all Bias and Prejudice. But this is hardly the case with any Man. Mens [sic] private Interests, their Passions, and vicious inclinations & habits, do often blind their understandings, and bias their Judgments. And as Men are much disposed to take the Rules of Conduct from Fashion rather than from the Dictates of reason, so with Regard to Vices which are authorized by Fashion the Judgments of Men are apt to be blinded by the Authority of the Multitude especially when Interest or Appetite leads the same Way. It is therefore of great consequence to those who would judge right in matters relating to their own conduct or that of others to have the Rules of Morals fixed & settled in their Minds, before
they have occasion to apply them to cases wherein they may be interested. It must also be observed that although the Rules of Morals are in most cases very plain, yet there are intricate and perplexed cases even in Morals wherein it is no easy matter to form a determinate Judgement.  

In his essay, "A Plea for Excuses," J.L. Austin says of ordinary language that, while it may not have the last word, we must remember that "it is the first word." A similar remark might be made about ordinary moral understanding. Experience and reflection can correct, modify, or add to the moral understanding that begins in childhood, but Thomas Reid might say, it cannot totally displace it. Even so, as he points out, when it comes to morality, there's plenty of work to do--more than enough for a lifetime.

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Endnotes


2. Reid, Thomas, On the Active Powers of Mind in Philosophical Works, Vol. II, with notes by Sir William Hamilton (Hildesheim: Gekorg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1895), p. 643. I have retained Reid’s 'men' rather than opting for a gender neutral revision. However, I should add that Reid was certainly ahead of his time in outspokenly advocating the moral equality of men and women.


4. Ibid., p. 642.


6. Ibid., p. 97.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., pp. 97-8.


10. Transcripts of many of these conversations can be found in my Philosophical Adventures With Children (Lanham, Maryland: University


15. Ibid., p. 110.

16. Ibid., pp. 110-111.

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No.3, August, 1996
The Ethics Center: Tenth Anniversary
David H. Smith
Indiana University
and
Douglas Ferraro
Western Michigan University
Michael Pritchard
Western Michigan University
Joseph Ellin
Western Michigan University

VOLUME X

No.1, December 1996
Moral Theory and Moral Life
Michael Pritchard
Western Michigan University
Fall 1996 Schedule

September 17
Joannne Lynn, M.D., M.A., M.S.; Prof. of Health Care and Medicine; George Washington University Medical Center

“Illusions of Individual Decision Making Equity”

“The Challenge for Physicians in End of Life Care”

September 19
Nicholas Dixon, Ph.D.; Prof. of Philosophy; Alma College

“The Morality of Intimate Faculty-Student Relationships”

September 20
Nicholas Dixon

“The Adversary”
Method in Law and Philosophy

October 8
Joseph Ellin, Ph.D.; Prof. of Philosophy; Western Michigan University


October 17
Holly Sklar; Author, Activist; Boston

“Creating Peace By Working for Economic Justice”

Winnie Veenstra Peace Lecture

November 4
Dianne Vaughan, Ph.D.; Prof. of Sociology; Boston College

“The Challenger Launch Decision: The Ethical Implications”
November 8

Author Kohrman, M.D.; University of Chicago

"From Baby K to Baby Messenger: Who Ought to be Making These Decisions?"
MEMBERSHIP

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Lithograph on Front Cover:
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