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Popular Perceptions of the Relationship between Religious and Ethnic Identities: A Comparative Study of Ethnodoxy in Contemporary Russia and Beyond

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POPULAR PERCEPTIONS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELIGIOUS
AND ETHNIC IDENTITIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ETHNODOXY
IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA AND BEYOND

by

David M. Barry

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Submitted to the
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Department of Sociology
Advisor: Vyacheslav Karpov, Ph.D.

Western Michigan University
Kalamazoo, Michigan
August 2012

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
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David M. Barry, Ph.D.

Western Michigan University, 2012

The relationship between religion and ethnicity is well documented. However, previous studies have usually approached the relationship by focusing on the converging of two ‘objective’ social categories, religion and ethnicity. In doing so, the subjectivity, or the actor’s own understanding of the interplay between religion and ethnicity is typically neglected. This study fills this gap by exploring *popular perceptions* of group identities and the affiliation with imagined ethno-religious communities. To accomplish this, the concept of ethnodoxo, first developed by Vyacheslav Karpov and Elena Lisovskaya, is applied that captures the belief that affiliation to an ethnic group’s dominant religion is essential for constructing and maintaining a group’s identity. The empirical component of this study examines the scope of this belief system and how its beliefs correlate with people’s socioeconomic characteristics as well as with other social, religious, and political orientations.

The study of ethnodoxo focuses on post-communist ethnic Russians. The conflation of religion (i.e., Russian Orthodoxy) and ethnicity in Russian history makes this an ideal context. However, similar ethno-religious relationships are explored among other ethnic and national groups in Russia and beyond as well, thereby providing a comparative dimension to the analysis. Data from a Russian

National Survey (2005) and several cross-national survey programs (i.e., International Social Survey Programme and World Values Survey) are used to test these relationships. Two major conclusions can be drawn from these analyses. First, the belief that an individual must affiliate with their ethnic group's dominant religion is wide spread and deeply embedded among most ethnic Russians. Moreover, there is evidence of such ethno-religious linkages beyond ethnic Russians as well, spanning different religious traditions, political economies, and socio-historical contexts. Second, belief in this specific ethno-religious ideology is associated with social, religious, and political orientations that emphasize intolerance, xenophobia, and protectionism. In sum, these findings support the usefulness of the concept of ethnodoxo as a valuable explanatory tool for understanding the popular perception of ethno-religious relationships and offer insight into the role of religion in modern society.

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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

The relationship between religion and ethnicity is well documented. For instance, the significant role of Catholicism in Ireland, Eastern Orthodoxy in Russia and Greece, and Hinduism in India is often linked with each respective ethno-national category. Moreover, ties between ethnicity and religion have been important factors in establishing group identities, affecting the way members of such groups perceive themselves and others. For example, post-colonial boundary-making in the Middle East and Africa were often based on these characteristics (e.g., Hindi India and Muslim Pakistan). In fact, failure to consider the effects of ethno-religious relationships when constructing borders has resulted in significant conflict (e.g., Kurds in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey). Moreover, global trends of religious growth (e.g., spread of Pentecostalism in Latin America and Asia, Islam in Europe and North America, Western churches in Central and Eastern Europe) further demonstrate the important role of religion in many modern(izing) societies.

Studying the Relationship between Religion and Ethnicity: The Problem

However, efforts to study these relationships have usually examined religion as one component, of many, that comprise ethnic categories. This approach is problematic for two reasons. First, other types of ethno-religious relationships, such as the ethnic marker of religious traditions (e.g., Irish Catholics) or the symbiotic relationship between religion and ethnicity (e.g., Greek Orthodox), are ignored. Second, approaching religion and ethnicity as social categories fails to take into

account the on-the-ground, taken-for-granted understanding of what it means for individuals to belong to such communities.

The purpose of this study is to fill these gaps. To do this, a conceptual apparatus is used which emphasizes the subjective identification of individuals to religious and ethnic communities. Grounded in social identity theory, this concept (first created by Karpov and Lisovskaya, 2004, 2007, 2008; with continued development by Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry, 2012) offers a unique approach toward understanding the relationship between religion and ethnicity that is often ignored in the literature. A complete theoretical development of the concept, and its operationalization, was made in a recent paper by Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry (2012). As defined in Chapter III, this concept refers to a belief system that emphasizes affiliation to an ethnic group's dominant religion as essential for constructing ethnic identity. However, the central purpose of this study is not to reiterate these efforts. Instead, the goal is to examine the social sources and correlates of this belief system.

In other words, this study explores the extent to which adherence to this belief system exists and its association with other beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. This is an important step for establishing this concept as a viable theoretical device, which can be used to explain many cases where religion and ethnicity are conflated. For the purpose of this study, one such case setting is investigated: post-communist Russia. As detailed in Chapter IV, the conflation of religion (i.e., Russian Orthodoxy) and ethnicity throughout Russian history makes this an ideal setting to test the scope of this concept. Yet, the usability of this concept is not limited to contemporary ethnic

Russians alone. Considerations for applying the concept beyond ethnic Russians are also investigated.

Outline of Study

This study includes both conceptual and empirical components. First, previous efforts that have investigated the relationship between religion and ethnicity are examined and critiqued, thereby identifying gaps in the literature of which the current study fills (Chapter II). Based on these commonly overlooked areas, a detailed discussion and theoretical development of the concept used in this study is offered (Chapter III), thereby providing an important foundation for this study's empirical component. Next, a contextualized background of the case study chosen for applying this concept, post-communist Russia, is described (Chapter IV). Finally, the hypotheses, operationalizations of concepts, and methods for administering the empirical analyses are outlined (Chapter V).

In order to assess its usability as a relevant and meaningful concept, a wide empirical investigation is pursued. First, a descriptive analysis of ethnic Russians exhibiting this particular ethno-religious identity is made (Chapter VI), illustrating its multi-dimensionality and level of acceptance among most ethnic Russians. Then, six investigations are administered that examine the association of ethno-religious linkages across different social, religious, and political orientations, beliefs, and behaviors. The social determinants of adherence to this belief system are explored (Chapter VII), thereby presenting a social profile or demographic make-up of individuals that espouse such beliefs. The remaining chapters, and the bulk of this

study, explore the relationship between adherence to this ideology and other orientations, beliefs, and behaviors, including religiosity (Chapter VIII), perception of nation and nationalism (Chapter IX), political life and affiliation (Chapter X), attitudes towards two social issues: attitudes toward abortion and homosexuals (Chapter XI), and level of religious tolerance and xenophobia (Chapter XII).

Completing these tasks does two things. First, the spread of adherence to this belief system demonstrates the usability of the concept applied in this study. Second, the relationships between adherence to this ideology and social, religious, and political orientations depicts such ‘believers’ as exhibiting certain characteristics, mainly as intolerant, xenophobic, and anti-West. The consequences of these patterns are discussed in each chapter and connected in the final discussion (Chapter XV).

However, the application of the concept is not limited to this one case study. In fact, it is projected that this concept may be used to understand ethno-religious relationships in many contexts, across different religious traditions, ethno-national histories, levels of modernity, and geographical locations. Preliminary investigations apply this concept in contexts outside of contemporary ethnic Russians. In particular, Muslims that currently live in Russia are examined as exhibiting similar ethno-religious characteristics (Chapter XIII). In addition, a dimension of this concept is analyzed by examining religio-national relationships cross-nationally and trends of such linkages over time (Chapter XIV). The analyses conducted in these two chapters provide tentative support for the usability of this concept in explaining the relationship between religion and ethnicity across a diversity of contexts and settings.

Finally, this study finishes with a discussion assessing the results from these analyses and summarizing the main conclusions (Chapter XV). In short, not only is the concept justified as a useful theoretical framework for which a specific ethno-religious relationship may be understood, but also the structure and dissemination of the ideology (i.e., its plausibility structure) is discussed. Finally, a note on religion, as a main contributing component to this concept, is described in terms of its role in modern society.

As outlined in the next chapter, the result of this investigation contributes to both specific gaps in the literature on ethno-religious linkages as well as larger considerations regarding identity to social groups, the role of religion in modern(izing) societies, and, more generally, the processes and sources used to construct and maintain our social world.

CHAPTER II: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELIGION AND ETHNICITY: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

While the link between religion and ethnicity is often noted in the literature, few have provided explicit conceptual frameworks from which to understand this relationship. The following is a review of key efforts emphasizing the link between religion and ethnicity.

Classical Understanding

The relationship between religion and ethnicity has long been noted in the social sciences. Weber emphasized the importance of religion for differentiating groups of people within nations (1961). Durkheim described religion as providing social cohesion and order for groups of individuals with shared consciousness (1915). In addition, Durkheim's concept of collective representations refers to beliefs and values shared by a collective, as exemplified in religious ideologies that provide sources for social solidarity.

Traditionally, however, religion and its influence in society was seen as an "artifact of an outmoded past" (Smith, 1978). For many post-Enlightenment thinkers, religion was a major force in human civilization, but it had become unnecessary in the modern world. Instead, new meaning-systems were developing to replace traditional religions. Comte, Rousseau, Voltaire, Diderot, and Robespierre all saw the traditional 'outdated' and 'irrational' belief systems as being replaced by 'rational' 'scientific' meaning-systems (Dunn, 1987). In addition, the rise of the nation-state

spurred the idea that nationalism and national identity would replace traditional ideologies like religion (Durkheim, 1915; Smith, 2001, 2003; Dunn, 1987).¹

Yet, these projections have largely been unfounded. In recent decades, conventional wisdom has been more likely to acknowledge the presence and influence of religion in modern society, than its absence. While proponents of secularization still exist, few hold the absolutist belief that it is a universal and inevitable outcome of modernity. Therefore, contemporary social scientists are more likely to explore how, not if, religion influences other realms of society. The relationship between religion and ethnicity has become one such area of concentration.

Contemporary Conceptualizations

According to Abramson, “religion is invariably an aspect of the ethnic group” (1979, p.9). In particular, Abramson described four manifestations of the ethno-religious link (1980). First, religion can be the main foundation for ethnicity (e.g., Jews, Amish). Second, religion may be one of many ethnic foundations (e.g., language and territory are also influential among Greek and Russian Orthodox). Third, many ethnic groups may be linked to one religious tradition (e.g., Irish, Italian,

¹ The idea that other forms of meaning are replacing religion harks back to original understandings of secularization. While Durkheim emphasized the importance of religion for providing social cohesion, he predicted it would eventually give way to civil religions, based on more scientific ways of thinking. First coined by Rousseau (*The Social Contract*), civil religions refer to meaning-systems that support, legitimate, and maintain a national culture. The concept of civil religion has been adopted by many scholars to describe the substitution of religion by other meaning systems. In particular, see Robert Bellah’s work on civil religion in the United States (2005).

and Polish Catholics). Finally, religion and ethnicity may refer to the same, usually marginalized, distinctive tradition (e.g., Gypsies, Native Americans).

Hammond and Warner applied Abramson's first three types, what they termed 'religious fusion,' 'ethnic religion,' and 'religious ethnicity,' in their study of American immigrants and their ties to host-countries (1993). Yang and Ebaugh also used this schema to explain how an immigrant's social status can affect their religious and ethnic linkages (2001). However, for Yang and Ebaugh, Abramson's typology is incomplete. It does not consider ethnic groups with nontraditional religious identifications; nor does it explain how religion can be emphasized by ethnicity.

Indeed, Abramson's work is limited by mainly focusing on religion as a component of ethnicity. Yang and Ebaugh resolved this issue by employing Greeley's two-directional typology. Greeley asserted, "there is a two-way flow of influence between religion and ethnicity" (1971, p.47). On the one hand, religious identity is pronounced based on ethnic identity (e.g., Irish Catholics in Ireland). On the other hand, ethnic identity is pronounced based on religious identity (e.g., Irish Catholics in the United States).

Accordingly, there are two main emphases in the body of literature dealing with the link between religion and ethnicity: understanding religion through ethnicity and the preservation of ethnicity through religion. Based on the limitations of these emphases, a third approach is discussed, which is particularly useful for this paper.

Understanding Religion through Ethnicity

According to Greeley, “ethnic groups provide subdivisions and sub-definitions within the various religious communities” (1971, p.46). He considers world religions (e.g., Catholicism) to be too large a category for a “quasi-communal identification,” which thereby requires further delineation to make sense of (e.g., Irish Catholic, Polish Catholic, etc.). Similarly, Kipp discussed how although universalist religions promised “the possibility of transcending ethnic and national differences,” most have frequently “spawned new communalistic discord within polities” (1993, p.67).

Even Abramson saw the relationship between religion and ethnicity as a dual movement. Again, Abramson’s typology on the relationship between religion and ethnicity includes one form – what Hammond and Warner term ‘religious ethnicity’ (1993) – that describes many ethnic groups attached to one religion (1979). Again, the multi-ethnic makeup of the Roman Catholic Church exemplifies this form. In this way, Roman Catholicism is supra-ethnic and supra-national, including multiple ethnicities and nationalities. However, this is not to say that individuals accentuate their religious identity while ignoring their ethnic or national identities. Indeed, an individual’s ethnic/national identity can be just as prominent. In fact, the relationship between religion, ethnicity, and nationhood may be strongly intertwined, providing different varieties of the broader religious tradition. This is the case, for instance, among Irish and Polish Catholics.

While evidence of this ethno-religious form is common, illustrated by the multi-ethnic and multi-national Catholic Church, it is nonetheless ideal-typical. While

differences certainly exist between Irish, Polish, and Italian Catholics, they also share many similarities being members of one transnational religious institution. This should not be overlooked. In addition, this formulation may quickly become too inclusive as one could argue that any *reasonably-sized* ethnic group that identifies with a religious organization should be included.

For instance, Protestant and Catholic missions to Latin America, Africa, and Asia have resulted in a growing Christian population. The CIA World Factbook estimates that in South Korea alone, Christianity is now the dominant religion (26.3%), surpassing Buddhism (23.3%) as the traditional faith.² Certainly this adds to the ethnic and national diversity of such established Protestant and Catholic churches. Furthermore, and making matters more ambiguous, one could argue that converts in general should be included under this ethno-religious classification. For instance, what of American Buddhists or Ukrainian Mormons? They too provide ethnic and national diversity to these religious organizations.

This probably goes beyond the original intent for this typology. This particular form, as described by Abramson and others, seems to refer to *significant proportions* of ethnic and/or national groups attached to a single religious organization. In this way, Korean Protestants, for instance, may be included, but not the relatively small number of American converts to Buddhism or Ukrainian converts to Mormonism. Therefore, this typology of ethno-religious relationships implies that such groups have large enough populations that substantive generalizations can be made. Not all Irish are Catholics, nor are all Koreans Protestants. But, each group

² Source: 1995 census

makes up significant proportions of the general population, making analyses of such groups more meaningful.

Exactly what those sizes should be remain elusive. For instance, should such groups hold a majority status, or can 'religious ethnicities' be used to describe large minority groups as well? Below, I suggest that an answer to this question may come from the study of actors' own perceptions of the ethno-religious links rather than from objective demographic characteristics of such groups.

Preserving Ethnicity through Religion

Most literature on the relationship between religion and ethnicity approach the interaction, using Greeley's typology, as a unidirectional flow: religion as preserving ethnicity. Abramson's typology illustrates this amplification. For Abramson, religion serves ethnicity in three ways: 1) as a force for defining ethnic boundaries, 2) as a factor for narrowing or separating ethnicity into sub-groups, and 3) as a factor for enlarging ethnic boundaries and identities (1980).

Smith also understood the relationship between religion and ethnicity in this way. For Smith, religious community could either "divide an ethno-linguistic population" or "erode ethnic differences" (1991, p.7-8). In either case, religion may be used as a major source for preserving ethnicity. Thus, religion serves ethnicity as a resource that can either maintain or divide a group of people based on distinguishing symbols, practices, and beliefs. This relationship between religion and ethnicity is well documented. According to Hastings, before the arrival of universalist faiths (e.g., Christianity, Judaism, Islam), religion was "essentially ethnic or local"

and “provided both the mythic core in the particularization of each local ethnicity, and a universalizing bridge in its networking with wider ethnic circles” (1997, p.175). After the appearance of a universalist religion, religion was no longer ‘ethnic-specific’ (1997). Herberg similarly described the relationship between religion and ethnicity in the United States (1956).

Formally, religion had been but an aspect of the ethnic group’s culture and activities; it was merely a part, and to some a dispensable part, of a larger whole; now the religious community as growing increasingly primary, and ethnic interests, loyalties, and memories were being more and more absorbed in and manifested through this new social structure (Herberg, 1956, p.47).

Specifically, Herberg thought identity distinction in the United States would eventually be based on Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish affiliations. While most contemporary scholars agree that Herberg’s projection is unfounded, noting the great religious and ethnic diversity in the United States, identity based on both ethnic and religious sources is still evident. Others have also noted the important role that religion plays in constructing and maintaining ethnicity. For instance, Rex acknowledged the religious element as central to the Punjabi Sikhs in India, thereby providing ‘overall unity’ (1997). In short, this approach emphasizes religion as a vital component of ethnicity. As discussed below, this approach is particularly prevalent in studies on immigrant groups.

Preserving Ethnicity through Religion among Immigrants

Understanding the role of religion as essential for ethnicity is especially important for immigrant studies. For example, Smith discussed the importance of religion and ethnicity for immigrants when settling in the United States (1978).

According to Smith, migration to the United States created three alterations to the relationship between religion and ethnicity: 1) “a redefinition, usually in religious terms, of the boundaries of peoplehood,” 2) “an intensification of the psychic basis of theological reflection and ethnoreligious commitment,” and 3) “a revitalization of the conviction” (1978, p.1161). Similarly, Greeley emphasized the in-group/out-group dynamic as an important characteristic inherent in the relationship between religion and ethnicity, as evident among immigrant groups in the United States.

But another element, or perhaps another aspect of the same element, is that presumed common origin as a norm for defining ‘we’ against ‘they’ seems to touch on something basic and primordial in the human psyche, and that... much of the conflict and strife that persists in the modern world is rooted in such differences (Greeley, 1971, p.42).

Many others have noted the use of religion in maintaining ethnicity among immigrant groups. Hartman and Kaufman explored the connection between religious and ethnic identities among Jewish immigrants in the United States, noting how the synagogue had become a source of ethnic, as well as religious, support (2006). Yang and Ebaugh examined how immigrant’s majority or minority status in their home or host country influences the relationship between religion and ethnicity (2001). Hammond and Warner used Abramson’s typology to understand religious and ethnic linkages among immigrants to America and their ties to home countries (1993). Building on Hammond and Warner (1993), Min (2010) also explored the relationship between religion and ethnicity among American immigrants. Min concluded that Amish, Jews, Eastern Orthodox and others have preserved their ethnicity not simply through religion, but through religious and ethnic practices and rituals in the home versus participation in congregations (2010). Similarly, Mitchell argued that religion

provides authentic religious substance, not just mapping out identities, to the normalization of ethnic identity in Northern Ireland (2005). Thus, religion can be an important source for ethnic groups to preserve their uniqueness, thereby differentiating themselves from others.

Two Ways of Maintaining Ethnicity through Religion

Some have provided further insight into *how* the maintenance of ethnicity through religion occurs. In particular, two areas are usually emphasized when exploring these roots: collective memories and geographical ties.

Smith discussed the importance of myth-making in order to maintain ethnic communities. This is accomplished through a joint venture of both religious and civic entities to develop narratives for preserving the particular culture.

And over all this heritage of cultural difference stand the ‘guardians of the tradition’, the priests, scribes and bards who record, preserve and transmit the fund of ethnic myths, memories, symbols and values encased in sacred traditions commanding the veneration of the populace through temple and church, monastery and school, into every town and village within the realm of the culture-community (Smith, 1991, p.28).

In particular, Smith acknowledged two dimensions of myth-making: myths of *origins* (where a group comes from) and myths of *election* (in what way are people in a group ‘chosen’) (2008). According to Smith, as myths are created and transmitted, so too are they territorialized. The ‘territorialization of memories’ occurs when “memories and history of a community are linked to specific places, namely, the ‘naturalization of community’ and the ‘historicization of nature’” (Smith, 2008, p.35). For Smith, this process creates *ethnoscapes*, or ethnic communities that are rooted in specific

historical homelands. Israel, for example, plays a very meaningful role in constructing group identities, traditions, and histories for many Jews, regardless of ever living or visiting the region.

Since religion plays such a vital role in myth-making and, therefore, the construction of ethnoscaples, important geographies can become sacred, what Smith termed the ‘sanctification of the homeland.’ This is accomplished when certain territories have *experienced* important religious events (Smith, 2008). For instance, conflict between Muslims and Hindu nationalists in Ayodhya, India has largely been about (re)claiming the area as holy ground for both groups. The area is considered the birthplace of the Hindu deity Rama. During the Mongol raids of the sixteenth century, a Hindu temple was supposedly demolished and replaced by a Muslim mosque until Hindu nationalists too destroyed it in 1992. Smith termed such groups with conflated geographical, religious, and genealogical ties as ‘sacred communion of the people’ (2003). In other words, a *sacralization of ethnos* is established that combines a group’s history, particular geographies, and lineage with its dominant religion.

Similarly, Hervieu-Leger (2000) distinguished between two forms of religious and ethnic attachments: *natural* (i.e., territory and ancestry) and *symbolized* genealogies (i.e., shared beliefs, traditions, and histories). Both forms can overlap as individuals identify with groups based on shared geography and familiar ties as well as common beliefs, customs, and histories. Others have also noted myth-making and ties to significant geographies as key elements in the preservation of ethnicity through

religion. For instance, Hastings described religion as providing a 'mythical-core' in the 'particularization of local ethnic circles' for early civilizations (1997).

A Constellation of Ethno-Religious Constructions

While an important step, Greeley's two-way approach, and its subsequent application in the area of study, is limited to two directions: ethnicity defining religion and/or religion preserving ethnicity. Hervieu-Leger's efforts provide additional development by exploring the many (if not infinite) combinations, or constellations, of ethno-religious constructions. For Hervieu-Leger, the 'dual movement' between religion and ethnicity refers to "operating both through the ethico-symbolic homogenization of traditional religious (confessional) identities and through the neo-religious recharging of ethnic identities" (2000, p.161). This approach toward the relationship between religion and ethnicity includes negotiations between both sources of identity. Hervieu-Leger described such processes as "renewed forms of mobilizing and inventing a common memory, from symbolic material taken from the traditional stock of historical religions, but equally from the resources offered by profane history and culture" (2000, p.162). In other words, group identities are created and legitimated by using aspects of multiple sources, which include to varying degrees, religious and ethnic traditions, histories, and beliefs.

In this way, religion and ethnicity are sources that are weighted differently from group to group. For instance, one ethnic or national group may emphasize religious affiliation, over belief or practice (what Hervieu-Leger terms 'belonging

without believing'), as an essential component of their ethno-national identity. This is exemplified in Scandinavian countries like Finland where affiliation to and confidence in the state Lutheran church is high (78.5% and 73% respectively) but prayer (41% pray less than once a year or never) and church attendance (6% attend monthly or more) is relatively low.³ On the other hand, an ethnic or national group may emphasize religious beliefs as a particularly important attribute. For many Americans, the belief in God is an essential requirement for being 'truly' American (Hecló, 2007).

In sum, the relationship between religion and ethnicity for Hervieu-Leger is a negotiation between the two that is, pulling from both sources of identity, continuously being recreated and transformed. In addition, Hervieu-Leger's understanding of the relationship between religion and ethnicity emphasizes the desire for group maintenance and survival.

Thus the ethno-religious element (re)constitutes itself and develops in modern societies to a point at which the contracting membership of traditional religions intersects with the various attempts to invent or reinvent an imaginative hold on continuity, whereby a group or a society discovers new reasons for belief in its own permanence, over and beyond the perils that threaten its existence or over and beyond the atomization that constitutes a multiple threat to its own cohesion (Hervieu-Leger, 2000, p.162).

In other words, elements from ethnic and religious sources can be used and/or recreated to provide old and new meaning for a group, thereby legitimating their very existence. Similar to Durkheim's collective representations, the shared belief and affiliation to such ideologies provide meaning and order to a group's social life and

³ Source: International Social Survey Programme, Religion 2008

approach toward world-building. This is an important consideration that will be discussed later in terms of plausibility structures as defined by Berger.

Conclusion

In short, efforts to conceptualize the relationship between religion and ethnicity are few and far between. Such linkages are often understood as either religion reinforcing ethnicity or vice versa. The first formulation (i.e., understanding religion through ethnicity) is unclear regarding the proportion necessary of an ethnic group to be included. The second formulation (i.e., religion preserving ethnicity) limits the role of religion to a (sub)component of ethnicity. However, Hervieu-Leger's formulation gives equal weight (or, at least, the possibility of) to both religion and ethnicity as sources of identity. In this way, a *constellation* of ethno-religious relationships may be formed depending on how different elements of each source are used and constructed.

Still, there is a significant gap in this literature. Typically, previous work has approached the relationship between religion and ethnicity as just that: the converging of two socially constructed categories (i.e., religion and ethnicity). Therefore, up until now, these efforts have utilized a top-down approach. In other words, scholars define and apply concepts and note how they intersect. In doing so, the subjectivity, or an actor's own understanding, is ignored from the analysis and conclusions about them are drawn based on broader generalizations of particular groups, processes, and patterns. This study fills this gap by focusing on *popular perceptions* about group identities and the imagined affiliation to ethno-religious communities. To accomplish

this, the following chapter develops a theoretical framework on a specific concept that captures this phenomenon.

CHAPTER III: THEORETICAL FOUNDATION

As the previous chapter shows, the relationship between religion and ethnicity is well studied. However, few have attempted a specific conceptual framework that focuses on the popular perceptions of this relationship. In other words, how do individuals understand their affiliation to religious and ethnic communities, and their perceived overlap? In order to fill this gap, I utilize a conceptual apparatus that captures popular understanding of the link between religion and ethnicity. In short, this is accomplished by framing the conflation of religion and ethnicity in terms of *identity*.

According to Erik Erikson, identify is the fifth stage of psychological development where individuals are first confronted with questions about who they are and their relationship with others (1968). Erikson understood identity as, “a process located in the core of the individual and yet also in the core of his communal culture” (1968, p.23). There are two major theoretical frameworks that have been developed to understand identity: *identity theory* and *social identity theory*. Influenced by George Herbert Mead (1934), identity theory focuses on the individuals’ self-perceived roles and relationships based on social characteristics like race, class, gender, and religion (Stryker and Burke, 2000). Under identity theory, religious and ethnic identities are one of many roles individuals can have that structure interactions and social networks.

Stemming from Leon Festinger’s work (1954), social identity theory stresses the social categories individuals perceive membership to. As Tajfel wrote, “...social

identity will be understood as that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (1978, p.63).

Furthermore, this approach is concerned more with inter-group interactions and normative processes of self-evaluation within these groups, what Tajfel and Turner term *social categorization* (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). In other words, individuals are always self-evaluating based on the normative expectations of a particular group. An individual's identity, according to social identity theory, is based on these social comparisons.

While both theoretical foundations offer insight into the way individuals understand themselves in relation to others, social identity theory offers a more relevant base for this study. Again, identity theory focuses on individuals' roles whereas social identity theory examines popular affiliation to social groups and categories (e.g., religion and ethnicity). In this way, social identity theory can be used to show how individuals perceive membership to groups that conflate religious and ethnic identities.

Religious and ethnic identities interpreted through social identity theory refer to membership to 'imagined communities' (Anderson, 1983), or large intangible social groups like religions, nations, and ethnicities. According to Anderson, imagined communities are different from small everyday social communities and networks, by evoking a sense of comradeship where individuals hold a sense of connectedness with other members, despite not ever actually interacting with them (1983). It is in this way that they are imagined. But the normative regulation held on

members of an imagined community is just as palpable as with networks and communities that include face-to-face interaction. Individuals feel pressures of conformity and social desirability as members of a large imagined community just as they do in smaller more intimate groups. Therefore, it is important to understand what these normalizing forces are and how powerful they can be. What follows is a more thorough description of religious and ethnic identities as depicted in the literature.

Religious Identity

Based on Linton's (1936) and Parsons' (1982) separate efforts on social roles and statuses, the literature has traditionally defined religious identity as a social role that is either achieved or ascribed (e.g., Berger, 1967; Wuthnow, 1998; Cadge and Davidman, 2006; Peek, 2005). Accordingly, an individual's religious identity may either be an innate quality or a choice made later in life. Usually, this sort of identity refers to self-described membership to a particular religious group, organization, and/or tradition. However, many conclude that this dichotomous approach is restrictive in scope. For instance, Peek offered a third form of religious identity, religion as *declared*, as exemplified by post-9/11 American Muslims (2005). This refers to individuals who, sometimes abruptly, declare a religious identity in response to a major event or situation. In this way, Peek described many American Muslims affirming their religious identity in the wake of 9/11 (2005).

Recent literature has provided some conceptualizations of religious identity that are more relativistic in nature. These definitions are contextually grounded, and

vary based on cultural and historical idiosyncrasies. Roof explored ‘spiritual seeking’ among Baby Boomers in the United States (1999). Wuthnow examined ‘spiritual shopping’ as a consequence of America’s religious diversity (2005). Ammerman located ‘Golden Rule Christians’ across American’s congregations (1997). Cimino and Smith studied ‘secular seekers’ in secular humanist movements in the United States (2007). In short, these conceptualizations go further than religious identity as religious affiliation and take into account the context-specific nuances that are related to popular self-perceptions of what it means to be religious in a particular setting.

While this literature includes many approaches toward understanding how individuals identify religiously, they are not exhaustive. First, the traditional conceptualization that religious identity is either ascribed or achieved is largely ideal-typical, which fails to take into account the blending of both and/or variations over a life course. In other words, the traditional approach is largely static, thereby ignoring the dynamic and complex nature of such identity. For instance, an individual may grow up with a particular religious identity, as indicated by affiliation with a familiar faith tradition, but may make choices later in life to alter that identity. Second, the nuanced conceptualizations as described briefly above, provide authentic explanations of religiousness in context-specific circumstances but are therefore limited in explanatory power to the particular setting. Therefore, few have offered a conceptualization of religious identity that captures authentic religiosity, while at the same time, not be limited to a particular setting. While Davie’s ‘believing without belonging’ (1990), John Wolffe’s ‘diffusive Christianity’ (1994), Michael Epstein’s ‘minimal religion’ (Epstein, Genis, and Vladiv-Glover, 1999), and Lyudmila

Vorontsova and Sergei Filatov's 'just Christians' (1994) are exceptions to this trend in the literature, their broader empirical support is lacking.

Based on this literature, religious identity is best understood as a dynamic attribute that has both personal and structural sources of influence. In this way, I understand religious identity as having three possible forms: religious identity as *achieved*, *ascribed from below*, and *ascribed from above*. Just as Linton and Parsons described religious identity as achieved, and others with more nuanced interpretations (i.e., Roof's 'spiritual seeking' and Wuthnow's 'spiritual shopping'), religious identity can be, in part, a personal choice. However, religious identity can also be an ascribed attribute as well. Usually, when we talk about religion as ascribed (per Linton and Parsons) we imagine individuals growing up in familiar religious traditions (i.e., ascribed from below). But there is another kind of ascription not often discussed, one where individuals are influenced by larger, supra-individual forces (i.e., ascription from above). In other words, there can be instances where cultural norms influence the religious identity of individuals. This can manifest formally, through official political decrees (e.g., Christianization of Europe), or informally, through the cultural norms and values of a society. Social identity theory is especially useful in depicting religious identity in this third form. Again, social identity theory emphasizes individual identity as conforming to the norms and expectations of a particular social category. In this way, individuals may present a particular religious identity because it is socially and culturally accepted. It is important to note that these are ideal types, where all three may exist simultaneously.

Ethnic Identity

As described above, ethnic identity is best understood as the perceived membership to an imagined community. For many, ethnic communities have particular characteristics that differentiate them from other social groupings. Abramson described ethnic groups as having six main characteristics (1979). Ethnic groups are 1) comprised of individuals that share a common history 2) are culturally and socially distinct, 3) are social units in a broader system of social relations, 4) are larger social units than familiar, kinship, or other locality groups, 5) may have different meanings in different social settings, 6) and have names and labels that make sense and are understood by members and nonmembers alike (Abramson, 1979). Others have provided similar conceptualizations of ethnic identity. Smith described ethnic communities as “human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity” (1997, p.27). These efforts have become prominent resources for studying ethnic identity, and its relationship with other social characteristics (e.g., Yang and Ebaugh, 2001; Hammond and Warner, 1993).

For the purpose of this study, I also understand ethnic identity as perceived affiliation to imagined communities with a shared culture, history, and geography. However, I propose further delineation in terms of the sources of meaning used to maintain and legitimate ethnic identities. Unlike religious identity, ethnic identity is usually depicted as fixed. In other words, it is far easier to change religions than ethnicities. Ethnicity, commonly linked with (and at times equated with) race, is rooted in genealogical attributes that are naturally ascribed. Abramson’s and Smith’s

separate definitions illustrate this point in their emphases on shared history and ties to a common geography. Therefore, it rarely makes sense to talk about ethnic identity as an achieved characteristic. Although choice has little to do with ethnic identity, sources of meaning used to define ethnic identity, like religious identity, may be ascribed from below and above. On the one hand, ethnic identities can be maintained by familiar groups, immigrant enclaves, and other close-knit communities. On the other hand, ethnic identities can be maintained through the cultural norms and expectations of a particular society. Again, social identity theory is particularly useful in understanding how the latter occurs. Consequently, individuals perceive their identity to an ethnic community based on self-comparisons to the norms of a community.

Ethnodoxy: Defining the Concept

Based on the theoretical foundation of social identity theory and the conceptualizations of religious and ethnic identity outlined above, I will investigate the conflation of religious and ethnic identities. Few have explored the conflation of such identities in these terms. Straughn and Feld's study offered a similar approach by exploring the 'symbolic boundaries' that are established based on religious and national identities in the United States (2010), but the conceptual development of this theoretical model was limited. Also missing from the literature is a conceptualization that encapsulates the *popular* perception, as understood using Schutz's 'postulate of adequacy' (1977), of individuals' ethno-religious identity. According to Schutz,

...human action must be constructed in such a way that a human act performed within the real world by an individual actor as indicated by the typical construct would be understandable to the actor himself as well as to his fellow-men in terms of common-sense interpretation of everyday life (1977, p.237).

Therefore, Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry's (2012) efforts toward developing a comprehensive theoretical model that may be applied across different contexts, explaining different forms of ethno-religious relationships, is unique. The purpose of this section is to summarize the theoretical development of this concept, thereby establishing a foundation for the rest of the study.

This concept, termed *ethnodoxy*, was developed based on popular perceptions of the relationship between religious and ethnic identities. According to Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry, ethnodoxy is a "*belief system that rigidly links a group's ethnic identity to its dominant religion and consequently tends to view other religions as potentially or actually harmful to the group's unity and well-being and, therefore, seeks protected and privileged status for the groups' dominant faith*" (2012, p.14). (Earlier versions of this definition are given by Karpov and Lisovskaya, 2007, 2008). While similar to Abramson's 'ethnic religion' category (Hammond and Warner, 1993), which acknowledges religion as one of many contributing attributes (e.g., language and territorial origins) to ethnic identity, ethnodoxy differs by focusing particularly on the binding and mutually dependent relationship *between* religion and ethnicity. In other words, to be a member of a particular ethnic group, one *must* also adhere to its' dominant religion and vice versa.

The theoretical framework of ethnodoxy includes three levels of analysis (Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry, 2012). On a micro-level, social identity theory is

used to explain individual's self-perceptions as members of large, intangible imagined communities. On a meso-level, Converse's (1964) ideas on mass belief systems and Lippy's (1994) idea of popular religiosity are helpful in understanding the nature of ethno-religious ideologies. On a macro-level, Hervieu-Leger (2000), Berger, Davie, and Fokas (2008), Casanova (1994), and Taylor (2007) are referenced in order to understand the role of religion, and its link to ethnicity, in modern/modernizing societies. Together, these three approaches provide a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between religion and ethnicity not yet seen in the literature.

The Conflation of Religious and Ethnic Identities

On a micro-level, social identity theory is used to explore the nature of self-identification to groups that espouse ethnodoxy. Doing so highlights two important elements of ethnodoxy. First, ethnodoxy refers to the popular perception of individuals' ethno-religious identity. In this way, ethnodoxy is a belief system.

Second, ethnodoxy is exclusive by nature. Specifically, ethnodoxy includes the belief that in order to be part of a particular ethnic group, one must also be a member of that groups' dominant religious tradition, and vice versa. Additionally, ethnodoxy implies an active attempt to secure an advantaged social and political position for a particular group. These exclusive and protectionist aspects of ethnodoxy are best understood using Tajfel and Turner's concept of social categorization (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Social categorization "sharpens intergroup boundaries by producing group-distinctive stereotypical and normative perceptions

and actions, and assigns people, including self, to the contextually relevant category” (Hogg, Terry, and White, 1995, p.260). In other words, social categorization refers to the perceived creation of in-groups and out-groups. According to ethnodoxo, membership to in-groups or out-groups is determined based on both, an individual’s religious and ethnic identities.

Ethnodoxo, Mass Belief Systems, and Popular Religiosity

On a meso level, ethnodoxo can be understood in terms of subsystems and institutions. In particular, Converse’s ideas on mass belief systems and Lippy’s work on popular religiosity provides useful models for analyzing the ideological make-up of ethnodoxo. According to Converse, “however logically coherent a belief system may seem to the holder, the sources of constraint are much less logical in the classical sense than they are psychological – and less psychological than social” (1964, p.5). In other words, mass belief systems are formed and followed, based not on reasons that are logical or rational, but because they psychologically make sense and, even more importantly, are influenced by the social conditions and context of a particular time and place. Therefore, as Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry suggest, “beliefs rigidly linking faith and ethnos can be expected to form coherent ideological syndromes because they reflect shared historical experiences of ethno-religious groups” (2012). In addition, the role of elites may be especially important for creating and disseminating such ideologies to the wider public. “Put simply, popular beliefs may hold together because they happened to be connected in an elite ideology designed for mass indoctrination” (Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry, 2012).

Lippy's work on popular religiosity further contributes toward understanding the ideological consequences of ethnodoxy. According to Lippy, "in all societies there exists a perceivable difference between what religious authorities and sanctioned religious institutions promote and what ordinary people are actually thinking and doing" (1994, p.8). What people are 'actually thinking and doing' refers to popular religiosity. Lippy conceptualized popular religiosity as follows:

There is a central zone of religious symbols, values, and beliefs – many of them provided by official, formal religious traditions – that comprises the totality of religion in a culture. But what is held in common may not receive systematic articulation or even rational justification by the religious elite of any one tradition, let alone by the ordinary people of a culture. As individuals draw on this central zone and on subsidiary zones, they erect for themselves worlds of meaning, they create identities for themselves, they engage in the age-old task of religion by finding a way to make sense out of their lives" (1994, p.10).

In other words, people take and (re)create elements from both 'central' and 'subsidiary' sources of religious traditions to make sense of their everyday lives. As Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry point out, popular religiosity may not be 'theologically correct' or, using Converse's construct, logically coherent. But, it may make sense given the social and historical conditions of the particular context. In this way, ethnodoxy is similar to popular religiosity as it refers to the everyday understanding of identity that pulls from both ethnic and religious sources. "Thus, popular religiosity can be seen as a link between religious traditions and folk ideologies that conflate ethnic and religious identities, even if the ideologies contradict official theologies" (Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry, 2012).

Ethnodoxy and Modernity

One of the tasks in this study is to investigate the sources and consequences of ethnodoxy with other religious, political, and social attitudes and behaviors. Doing so will provide a comprehensive analysis that tests the usability of this concept for understanding a particular relationship between religion and ethnicity. Not only does this offer empirical support for the existence of ethnodoxy as a ‘real’ phenomenon; its scope of influence in society can also tell us something about the role of religion in modern/modernizing societies.

In recent decades, scholars of religion have increasingly moved away from classical understandings of religion in society (i.e., secularization paradigm) toward more nuanced approaches. This has resulted in the re-evaluation, and at times rejection, of the secularization thesis and the development of new conceptualizations for understanding the role of religion in modern society. Indeed, one can no longer expect the inevitable decline of religion as civilizations ‘modernize.’ Instead, as many scholars now suggest, dimensions of religion can transform, decline, and grow simultaneously.

For instance, Casanova noted three possible modes where secularization may occur: institutional differentiation, individual belief and practice, and the privatization of religion (1994). Accordingly, secularizing processes may exist in some, but not all, of these dimensions. In fact, as Karpov posited, counter-secularizing processes – what he and Berger (1999) term *deseccularization* – may occur in some dimensions as secularizing processes occur in others: “counter-secularization’s component changes may develop incongruently, be differently paced, and coexist with secularizing

trends” (Karpov, 2010, p.17). Others have similarly described such processes (e.g., Greeley, 2003).

The different counter-secular movements that can occur are particularly relevant toward understanding the significance of ethnodoxo in modernity. According to Taylor’s (2007) three-stage periodization of society, the role of religion transitions from a vertically distributed hierarchy (Ancien Regime), to a source of horizontal integration (Age of Mobilization), to the individualistic pursuit of spiritual self-expression (Age of Authenticity). As Taylor described, counter-secularizing movements can have a particularly powerful role in cultivating ethno-national solidarities, especially during the Age of Mobilization (2007). However, as Karpov (2010) and Karpov, Lisovksaya, and Barry (2012) noted, the role of religion in ethno-national unity (e.g., ethnodoxo, religious nationalism) is just as evident during the Age of Authenticity (i.e., today) as before. In response to Casanova’s (1994) assumption that, at least in contemporary Western Europe, religion has lost this ability to nationally unify, Karpov suggested that “this assessment may not apply to less and unevenly modernized settings where the mobilization agenda remains relevant for segments of society and political elite” (2010, p.269).

Evidence of this is not so difficult to find. For instance, Russia, India, Ireland, Turkey, etc. are societies where, formally or informally, nationhood is linked to a particular religious institution. Even in the United States, some have noted the Christian component in American national identity (Straughn and Feld, 2010; Hecl, 2007). In this context, examining the scope and consequences of ethnodoxo is crucial

for understanding the role of religion (both its secularizing and counter-secularizing movements) in modern and/or modernizing societies.

The Plausibility of Ethnodoxy

It is important to place the concept of ethnodoxy as a belief system into greater context. And, like all belief systems, they must be disseminated and maintained in order to survive. Berger's concept of *plausibility structures* may be particularly helpful in explaining how this works. For Berger, "each world requires a social 'base' for its continuing existence as a world that is real to actual human beings. This 'base' may be called its plausibility structure" (1967, p.45). In short, plausibility structures are the taken-for-granted set of social processes that make up the norms and expectations of our social world. Berger continued, "the firmer the plausibility structure is, the firmer will be the world that is 'based' upon it" (1967, p.47). Therefore, if the plausibility structure is accepted and not questioned, all elements in the social world which it maintains is also accepted.

As such, the plausibility structure of ethnodoxy (i.e., what makes ethnodoxy plausible, accepted, and taken-for-granted) has both religious and ethnic sources. In other words, adherents to ethnodoxy may pull from their identity to religious and/or ethnic communities in order to present themselves as 'normal' members of society, or distinguish themselves from 'others.' For instance, ethnic Russians may draw from their Orthodox affiliation to demonstrate what 'truly' makes them Russian. Likewise, ethnic Russians may base their 'Russianness' on ethnic foundations – i.e., being born Russian.

While intentionally searching for hard-fast empirical evidence of plausibility structures may be difficult, identifying its manifestations are still feasible. As discussed in greater detail in Chapter XV, this paper examines the structure and dissemination of ethnodoxy from above (i.e., objective) and below (i.e., subjective). Doing so shows that ethnodoxy is spread and maintained by both elites (above) and the everyday interactions between individuals (below). By exploring the plausibility structure of ethnodoxy, this study contributes to a more general understanding of the taken-for-grantedness of the social world, or *nomos* according to Berger, in contemporary Russia.

As so defined, the concept of ethnodoxy may be useful in explaining the relationship between religious and ethnic identities in many contexts. For instance, ethnodoxy may be particularly relevant in post-communist Europe. The collapse of the Soviet Union has resulted in the need for groups of individuals to reconstruct, reinvent, and create new forms of identity, many of which can include religious and ethnic elements. Many studies have indicated the relapse to traditional institutions, in this case the Russian Orthodox Church, during unstable periods of social change. Furthermore, recent nationalist and pro-Slavic movements (exemplified by the Putin administration) reach back to traditional sources of Russian identity, thereby making the boundaries between Russian and non-Russian identity more distinct. The following chapter further describes the case of post-communist Russia as an ideal setting to apply ethnodoxy.

CHAPTER IV: CONTEXT: RESURGENT ORTHODOXY AND RUSSIAN IDENTITY AFTER COMMUNISM

Post-communist Russia is an ideal setting to apply the concept of ethnodoxy. The collapse of the Soviet Union required a re-evaluation of elements and sources used to define and maintain a cohesive cultural identity. As many have noted, the ideology maintained by the Communist Party traditionally had this role, infiltrating social, spiritual, and political spheres. According to White, Wyman, and Kryshstanovskaya,

For 70 years the USSR was dominated by 'the party.' Although the law placed no restriction upon their number, only a single political organization – the Communist Part of the Soviet Union – had a legitimate existence, and that party, under the 1977 Constitution, was the 'leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system, of all state and public organizations (1995, p.183).

With its dissipation at the end of the twentieth century, new sources of meaning were required. For many, the rehabilitation of two traditional sources of Russianness was pursued. First, the Russian Orthodox Church reemerged as a socially, politically, and spiritually influential institution. Second, the marking of ethnic boundaries was also revitalized as a way to define what it means to be Russian. As described below, these trends are not mutually exclusive, but have fused together to promote a specific understanding of Russian identity. In this way, the aim of this chapter is to provide a descriptive account of the resurgence of religion, ethnicity, and their linkages in contemporary Russia.

Regulations on Religion in Russia: A Brief Summary

Before examining the relationship between religion and ethnicity, it is important to understand the historical conditions and consequences that have led to the current religious landscape. This section summarizes the main socio-political changes that have occurred, influencing the post-communist religious landscape we see today.

During the course of the Soviet Union, official atheism was established and substantiated, at first, by Lenin's 1918 law on the separation of church and state and, later, a stricter 1929 Stalin-era law on religion. Khrushchev continued the "antireligious drive" with the "dream of leading the USSR to full and true communism by 1980" (Davis, 2003, p.33). By the early 1960's, the Brezhnev 'period of stagnation' was free from the "agonies of the Khrushchev attack" but, nonetheless, brought "slow erosion of the church's institutional resources" (Davis, 2003, p.47). By the 1980's, the reformative years of the Gorbachev-era resulted in dramatic social, economic, and political changes, which included new ways of looking at religion in society.

A key event triggering a mass re-interest in religion, particularly Russian Orthodoxy, was the upcoming Millennium celebrations in 1988. This year marked the 1000-year anniversary of the Christianization of Kievan Rus'. In 1980, committees were formed to begin preparations. A few years later, property was returned to the ROC including the Danielovsky monastery compound, Moscow's oldest monastery (Marsh, 2011). The celebrations of 1988, and the preparations leading up to it, became an important moment for believers. According to Marsh,

“the millennium of the baptism of Rus’ became an opportune moment not only to reflect on the nation’s long attachment to the Christian faith, but also to redress the state for a greater sphere in which to practice that faith” (2011, p.113).

Indeed, by 1988, Gorbachev had met frequently with ROC leaders and announced that a new law on religion would be enacted. As both Gorbachev and representatives of the ROC, like archbishop Kirill of Smolensk, would agree, this new law would echo Lenin’s 1918 law on the separation of church and state but also guarantee religious freedoms of belief and organization. In 1990, the law on ‘Freedom of Conscience and Religious Belief’ was issued for the Russian Republic. As Marsh described, “This very liberal law introduced legal religious equality for the first time in Russian history, including the establishment of a secular state and a true separation of church and state” (2011, p.123).

However, this new chapter of religious freedom would not last long. By 1993, attempts to amend the 1990 law by restricting rights for foreign religious organizations while granting special privileges to ‘traditional’ Russian religious faiths was approved by the Supreme Soviet (i.e., legislative branch) but vetoed by President Yeltsin. Soon after, Yeltsin dissolved the parliament and passed a liberal constitution that guaranteed religious freedom and separated church and state. In the years to follow, however, regions throughout Russia took it upon themselves to construct stricter laws on religion. By 1997, a new legislation draft was proposed, and eventually signed by Yeltsin, dramatically limiting the religious freedoms so briefly enjoyed.

The 1997 'Law on Religion' included two important dimensions. First, Russian Orthodoxy was identified in the preamble as the foremost contributor to Russian culture and spirituality. Second, the law categorized religious organizations into three groups: traditional, non-traditional, and sects. Traditional religions are those faiths with historical precedence (more than 50 years) in Russia, including Orthodoxy, Judaism, Islam, and Buddhism. These faiths are granted special privileges and status such as access to funding and property. Non-Traditional religions are registered religious organizations operating in Russia for less than 50 years while sects are religions faiths not recognized by the state. All religious organizations were required to register by 1999 in order to be officially recognized. Despite the failure of many Orthodox parishes to meet this deadline, Marsh notes "it was the non-Orthodox churches failing to making re-registration that were targeted for dissolution" (2011, p.130). The preference of Russian Orthodoxy over other religious organizations was now official.

The implications of this legislature are dramatic. The unequal distribution of both material (e.g., funding, property) and non-material (e.g., title, status, legal proclamation of Russian Orthodoxy as national spiritual identity) resources has resulted in a religious monopoly. According to the religious economy theory, religious diversity should provoke religious activity. Thus, as Pankhurst pointed out, the monopolization of religion by the Russian Orthodox Church "bodes ill, in general, for the vigor of religion in Russia in the future" (1998, p.135). Froese similarly described the effects of this socio-political history on the religious landscape.

The story of religion in the Soviet Union is essentially about the dramatic rise and fall of an atheist competitor and the religious market that was left in its wake. Interestingly, years of religious repression have given rise not to new levels of religious freedom but a return to pre-communist relations between church and state. (Froese, 2004, p.73).

Indeed, as the following literature shows, the monopolization of religion in post-communist Russia has produced a religious landscape with relatively low religious belief and behavior but high levels of affiliation (to the ROC) and intense ethno-religious identity.

The Resurgence of Religion in Post-Communist Russia

Assessing the role of religion in post-communist Russia has included a variety of approaches. Generally, two major trends can be identified in the literature. The first include studies that provide descriptive analyses of religious resurgence. These are usually projects that use newly accessible survey data to depict the blossoming religious landscape in contemporary Russia. A second trend includes structural issues of religion in society. These projects consist of discussions on institutional regulation and cooperation, public policies of religious freedom, legitimation and maintenance of Russia's religious markets, and effects of globalization. Below is a brief summary of the conclusions found in both trends.

Phrases like the 'rise of religion' or 'religious resurgence,' which describe the opening of a religious market as clearly and obviously apparent in post-communist Russia, have often appeared in scholarly and popular literature (e.g., Greeley, 1994; Tomka, 1995; Burgess, 2009). Citing newly accessible survey results, the dramatic increase in indicators like religious affiliation was perceived as evidence of a

religious resurgence in Russia (Greeley, 1994; Dunlop, 1996; Mchedlov, 2005). However, studies soon noted the complexity of the situation (Mchedlov, 2005; Marsh, 2006; Davis, 2003; White and McAllister, 2000). For instance, while rates of religious belonging were certainly increasing, religious behavior and belief were curiously lower (Mchedlov, 2005; Marsh, 2006). As Greeley noted, the understanding of religion in post-communist Russia required a more nuanced approach: “While surveys may sketch some of the dimensions of the reemergence/rebirth of Russian religion, they cannot substitute for a richer and denser deep description of what is happening” (2003, p.119).

While theoretical analyses of the ‘rebirth’ of religiosity in Russia are not lacking, those equally supported by empirical evidence are. For example, Mikhail Epstein’s conceptualization of religiosity in post-atheist Russia, termed ‘minimal religion,’ provides an initially attractive contextualized explanation of religion but lacks empirical support (Epstein, Genis, and Vladiv-Glover, 1999).⁴

Another prominent trend in the literature includes systemic investigations of institutionalized religion. Such studies span a variety of issues ranging from current depictions of Russian religious markets, gauging religious freedom and pluralism (in both policies and individual attitudes and behaviors), institutional relationships between Church and state, and effects from globalization on the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). This literature largely depicts the religious landscape in

⁴ According to Epstein’s idea, contemporary Russians have, despite a nonreligious upbringing, acquired a particular religious identity. This identity is contextually post-atheist, rooted in the individual, and unattached to traditional religious institutions (Sutton, 2006). Although contextualized to the particular history and religious traditions of the setting, Epstein does not provide empirical evidence to support his argument.

contemporary Russia as monopolistic, highly regulated by the state, and protectionistic.

Indeed, despite many projections that religious pluralism would envelop across post-communist Europe, Sarkissian found more evidence of relapses to century-old traditional ethnic-churches. Using the Governmental Regulation Index, he found that in many Orthodox countries government regulation over religion increased, the largest occurring in Russian between 1992-2002 (Sarkissian, 2010). According to Sarkissian, increased religious regulation negatively affected religious pluralism. Similarly, Froese finds the religious landscape in post-communist Russia as, contrary to classical religious market theories, containing a budding religious monopoly due to the historical context of the Soviet Union (2004). For Froese, the impact of Soviet atheism on religious markets and the role of religious regulation in the post-communist era have both led to the flourishing of traditional churches.

The rise of a powerful monopolistic traditional church in post-communist Russia (i.e., the ROC) has influenced other realms of social life, both culturally and politically. According to Knox, Russian Orthodoxy has become a key component in post-Soviet Russian national identity, regardless of religious belief and behavior, and a major resource for rising levels of Russian nationalism (2008). Similarly, Burgess noted the emergence of the traditional relationship between Church and state (historically termed *symphonia*) (2009). In short, the presence of the ROC in contemporary Russia has become a serious defining element for contemporary Russian identity. Filatov and Lunkin noted the ROC worldview as maintaining a 'Russian civilization' (2010). Likewise, others have explained how the

‘regionalization’ (Danilova, 2009) or ‘jurisdictionalism’ (White, 2007) of Eastern Orthodoxy maintains isolated and particularistic religious institutions promoting xenophobia and mono-culturalism.

In sum, the religious situation in post-communist Russia is complex. Individuals certainly have more accessibility to different religious sources today than ever before. However, institutions and policies that restrict non-traditional religious influences, both formally and informally, exist. The consequences of these conditions has produced and maintained a specific representation of Russian identity as intimately tied to Russian Orthodoxy.

Russian Ethnic and National Identity

Along with the collapse of the Soviet Union came the disintegration of an official *unethnic* approach toward identity. No longer united under one party and ideology, Russia’s diverse ethnic and national makeup resurfaced. As territories across Central Asia, Eastern and Central Europe reclaimed independent sovereignty, the mono-national empire was quickly dissolving, revealing the ethnic and cultural diversity it had tried to suppress and assimilate for so long. As ethnic minorities in newly formed territories and states had ample space to (re)construct ethnic and national identities, ethnic Russians were also faced with the challenge of rebuilding their new identity. What did it mean to be Russian after so much had changed, both spatially (i.e., geography) and culturally?

Russian ethnicity is well studied. Tolz distinguished between Russians’ ethnic and civic identities (1998). While civic identity denotes citizenship and territory,

ethnic identity refers to, “culture, religion, language, and a common ancestor of a dominant nationality...” (Tolz, 1998, p.993). Similarly, Simon interpreted nationality as *Rossiiskii* (civic) and *Russkii* (ethnic). Interestingly, *Russkii* is more commonly used in contemporary Russian language (2000).

Despite the analytical separation of these ideal-types of identity, Russian ethnic identity clearly has overlap with national identity (Tolz, 1998). I pursue both forms of Russian identity as part and parcel of what it means to be ‘Russian.’ Indeed, civic and ethnic components of Russian identity are far from mutually exclusive. Instead, both sources of identity are frequently re-affirming the other. This may be described as a dual movement of identity maintenance and legitimation between civic and ethnic sources. For instance, civic institutions (i.e., the state) may use ethnic sources of identity (e.g., shared history, common customs, languages, etc.) to produce and preserve national identity. Likewise, civic institutions can support ethnic identity by providing protection and privileged status to ensure its survival.

This relationship between civic and ethnic forms of identity highlights the dynamic nature, and complexity, of Russian identity. This study explores how religion (i.e., Russian Orthodoxy) has become a vital component of both ethnic and civic sources of identity. Ethnically, Russian Orthodoxy has long preserved Russian traditions and customs. Civically, the Russian Orthodox Church has become an important institution for the contemporary (re)construction of national identity.

Ethnodoxy in Contemporary Russia

Many scholars have noted the historically intimate relationship between religion and nationhood, often viewed as the *symphonia* between Church (i.e., Russian Orthodox Church) and state (e.g., Marsh, 2007; Turunen, 2007; Agadjanian, 2001; Krindatch, 2006; Berger et al., 2008). Davis described the pivotal role played by the Russian Orthodox Church in establishing and protecting Russian identity throughout the Mongol reign, conflict with pagans, Muslims, and other 'invading' groups. For Davis, the Church is instrumental in post-communist nation-building today (2003). Others have similarly found that the relationship between religion and state survived Soviet atheism. Franklin described the resilience of religion as follows: "the relation of religion to national identity has re-emerged powerfully in the post-Soviet years as a cultural issue, as a matter or representation, of debate over cultural form, of the material, visual, and verbal environment of Russia" (2004, p.106).

Additionally, religious identity in Russia has been described as being an intrinsic, or ascribed, attribute. Kaariainen and Furman wrote, "Orthodox religion tends to be seen as a given birthright, rather than a chosen faith" (2000, p.67). Despite religion being officially repressed for more than seventy years, religious identification has become a significant and perceivably innate component of what it means to be 'truly' Russian. In fact, some argue that being religious has less to do with religion, and more about being Russian. Marsh and Froese stated, "In the end, Russia emerged from communism with no strong religious identity other than their historical and national connection to the Orthodox traditions" (2004, p.145).

A palpable manifestation of ethnodoxo in contemporary Russia is the ethno-religious pronouncement among political and religious elites in popular discourse. For instance, typical to Vladimir Putin's rule has been personal loyalty to the ROC and a public depiction of the Church as rightfully aligned with the state. Once again, the ROC has an active role in government matters, spanning military ceremonies (e.g., blessing of secret nuclear codes, submarines, military posts, etc.), monopolizing religious guidance for the military, to everyday consultations between Church leaders and state representatives (Blitt, 2008). Putin often consulted with church leaders like Patriarch Aleksey II concerning state matters illustrating the blossoming relationship between the Church and state. According to Putin, the "revival of the [C]hurch's unity is a crucial precondition for restoring the unity of the entire Russian world, which has always seen Orthodoxy as its spiritual foundation" (Russia and CIS Presidential Bulletin, 2007). In a meeting with Russian Orthodox clergy in 2007, Putin stated:

Russian Orthodoxy has a particular role in our country's history, in the formation of our statehood, culture, morals and spirituality... Today, we greatly value the [ROC's] efforts to return to our country's life the ideals and values that served as our spiritual references for so many centuries...

...The [S]tate and the Church have ample scope for working together to strengthen morality and educate the young generation, and of course, to preserve our country's spiritual and cultural heritage (Putin, 2007).

Indeed, the ROC has become, encouraged by key political leaders like Putin, an integral part of post-Soviet political and social life.

At the same time, both Putin and some Church leaders have shown considerable interest in revitalizing the once united 'Russian world.' Politically, this refers to maintaining, informal or formal, influence in ex-Soviet states. Thus, the

recent ‘color revolutions’ (in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan) have added significant friction to such efforts. For the Church, this refers to Kievan Rus’, a similar geography once under the influence of the ROC. Patriarch Kirill has described the important role of the Church, and the tradition of Russian Orthodoxy in general, in the unification of the Russian world. “I believe that only a united Russian world can become a strong actor in global international politics – stronger than any political alliances. In addition, without coordinated efforts by the state, the Church, and civil society we shall not achieve this goal” (Kirill, 2011, p.64). Kirill also explained how the Church is not limited to one ethnicity:

The Church is not called Russian on ethnic grounds. This name indicates that the Russian Orthodox Church performs its pastoral mission among peoples that accept the Russian spiritual and cultural tradition as the basis of their national identity – or at least as an important part of it... At the foundation of the Russian world lies the Orthodox faith... (2011, p.58-59).

Furthermore, recent political events in Russia has provoked an apparent (re)evaluation of the relationship between the Church and state. Following protests concerning the 2011 parliamentary elections, which suspected fraudulent voting practices resulting in a United Russia (Putin’s supporting party) victory, many ROC leaders appeared, surprisingly, critical of the results as well. Patriarch Kirill has stressed the importance for members in a free society to have the right to protest, heeding the state to seriously consider these complaints. Father Chaplin, a historically conservative state sympathizer, told reporters that if evidence of fraud exists, it would be analyzed: “If there are proven facts, then of course we’re going to examine them, present them to the church hierarchy and discuss them with the Central Election Commission and other government bodies” (Kishkovsky, 2011). All

of these comments depict the Church aiming to appear supra-ethnic and supra-national, intending to serve not just ethnic Russians, but all historically 'Russian' peoples.

However, given the socio-political culture of post-communist Russia, the alliance between the government of the Russian Federation and the Russian Orthodox Church should not be taken-for-granted. Indeed, the privileges enjoyed by the ROC, as outlined earlier in this chapter, are more indicative of a sympathetic, not critical or superior, relationship with the state. Indeed, while political leaders like Putin and religious leaders like Kirill describe intentions that appear unifying and inclusive, the findings in this study depict the populace of ethnic Russia as more in line with protectionism and xenophobia, both politically and religiously.

Conclusion

Undoubtedly, the relationship between religion and ethnicity is evident in post-communist Russia. Despite nearly eighty years of official atheism, religion has resurfaced as a powerful source for (re)constructing ethnic and national identities. Furthermore, recent public policies have substantiated the importance of Russian Orthodoxy to the nation's history and memory. Despite some intentions to unify a 'historical Russia,' both politically and religiously, the monopolization of the ROC has resulted in an intimate relationship with the state. Accordingly, these conditions make contemporary Russia an ideal context to apply the concept of ethnodoxo, an ideology espousing ethno-religious exclusivity, superiority, and protection. The following chapter explains how this is accomplished.

CHAPTER V: EMPIRICAL TASKS AND METHODS

This chapter lays a foundation for an empirical study of ethnodoxy. In particular, ethnodoxy is applied in the case of post-communist Russia. As the preceding chapter detailed, this setting is ideal due to the historical relationship between religion and ethnicity. However, the explanatory power of ethnodoxy is not limited to this one case. In this way, preliminary investigation into ethnodoxy beyond contemporary ethnic Russians is also made, thereby providing useful analytical comparisons.

The empirical component of this study is outlined as follows. First, hypotheses are formulated based on the theoretical considerations of ethnodoxy and the socio-historic context of post-communist Russia. Second, the sources of data used are described. Third, key variables and their measurement are explained. Fourth, a brief comment on the statistical tests and types of analyses is offered. Finally, due to the comparative nature of this study, key considerations regarding comparative research methods are discussed.

Main Hypotheses

Based on the concept of ethnodoxy and the context of contemporary Russia, I propose the following main hypotheses that will direct the empirical component of this study. As this study unfolds, more specific projections are discussed according to each module.

First, a micro-level of analysis emphasizes two major components of ethnodoxy: popular identification to ethnodoxy and the exclusive and protectionist nature of ethnodoxy. According to the theoretical framework of ethnodoxy described earlier, adherents perceive membership to an imagined community that views affiliation to their ethnic group's dominant religion crucial for identity construction and maintenance. Based on the particular socio-historical context of post-communist Russia, which include a traditionally strong ethno-religious identity, *I expect a majority of ethnic Russians to share ethnodox views.* Furthermore, the exclusivist and protectionist characteristics of ethnodoxy, as understood using social identity theory, suggest that adherents to ethnodoxy may hold intolerant beliefs toward other groups. In particular, I expect to find widespread anti-West sentiment associated with ethnodoxy (against foreign states, Western churches, and cultural influences), which would indicate the emergence of strong in-group/out-group boundaries inherent in ethnodoxy. Therefore, *I project that as levels of ethnodoxy increase, then levels of intolerance will also increase.* This includes Orthodox, and, in particular, Western groups and institutions.

Second, a meso-level of analysis examines the ideological characteristics of ethnodoxy. Converse's understanding of mass belief systems underlines the importance of socio-historical context, over logical constraints, in determining why people follow ideologies. Similarly, Lippy's idea of popular religiosity emphasizes the notion that adherents of belief systems may hold attitudes and views that are not 'theologically correct,' but instead compliment the conventional, or popular, disposition of a particular socio-historic context. Therefore, *I expect to find social*

and political attitudes of adherents to ethnodoxy to align with, despite possible Orthodox doctrinal contradiction, the values and beliefs of ethnodoxy. Stemming from this is the idea that adherents of ethnodoxy may not view religious belief and behavior as essential as religious affiliation. According to the key beliefs of ethnodoxy, religious affiliation is necessary while having specific religious beliefs and/or pursuing specific religious rituals and behaviors are not. This is in line with Lippy's idea of popular religiosity, which refers to the everyday understanding of an ideology by choosing aspects of said ideology that make social and cultural sense. Therefore, given the unique socio-historic context of post-communist Russia, *I suspect that adherents of ethnodoxy will have weak indications of traditional religiosity (i.e., religious belief and behavior), but high levels of religious affiliation.*

Finally, the macro-level of analysis explores the role of religion in modern/modernizing societies. Research has frequently shown (e.g., Norris and Inglehart, 2004; Berger et al., 2008; Chalfant and Heller, 1991; Albrecht and Heaton, 1984) that religiosity is lower with individuals who exhibit 'modern' characteristics (i.e., urban residents, educated, higher income, and younger). Therefore, based on this conventional understanding of religion and modernity, *I expect that individuals who exhibit modern characteristics will have weaker indicators of traditional religiosity.*

However, as some have noted (e.g., Karpov, Berger, etc.), counter-secularizing processes can also occur in modern societies. While traditional religious adherence (i.e., belief and behavior) may still be lower for individuals exhibiting modern characteristics, other manifestations of 'being religious' may still exist. As

discussed earlier, social elites have had a historically significant role in disseminating and maintaining ethno-religious ideologies (Taylor, 2007; Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry, 2012). This is just as relevant in modern/modernizing societies as it was earlier (Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry, 2012). As such, although indicators of traditional religiosity may be weaker, other indicators of religiosity emphasized by the components of ethnodoxo (affiliation with the dominant religion, religious exclusivism and protectionism, support for close church-state relationships, etc.) may be strong. Therefore, *I expect to find that individuals exhibiting modern characteristics will still be highly supportive of ethnodoxo.*

Data

The primary data used in this paper comes from a collaborative study funded by the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research (NCEEER) in 2004-2006.⁵ A multi-stage national probability area sample was designed covering the diverse regions throughout Russia. A survey questionnaire was administered to 2,972 adults via in-person interviews.⁶ Oversampling key Muslim regions (Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Dagestan) was conducted in order to obtain sufficient data from Muslims (see Karpov and Lisovskaya, 2007, 2008).

⁵ This study utilizes data collected from the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research (NCEEER). The NCEEER is not responsible for the views expressed in this study.

⁶ These interviews utilized a specifically designed questionnaire and were conducted by trained interviewers from the Moscow-based Institute for Comparative Social Research. This Institute was purposely selected for its experience in conducting research in Russia and other post-Soviet states.

The most recent national identity modules conducted (1995 and 2003) by the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) will also be utilized.⁷ ISSP is a cross-national collaboration of social surveys used to measure various topics pertaining to the social sciences. The analysis of these surveys is important for two reasons. First, this data is used to further validate some results from the primary data source. Second, these cross-national survey programs can be used to investigate the applicability of ethnodoxo in other contexts outside of Russia. In doing so, the key questions in this study are placed in a broader comparative context.

The selection of cases differs for each data source. The main portion of this study investigates ethnodoxo among ethnic Russians. For this analysis, respondents who claim Russian as their ethnicity in the Russian national survey were selected. However, preliminary analyses are administered that explore ethnodoxo among other groups, in and outside of Russia, as well. An investigation of ethnodoxo among Russia's Muslims necessitates the selection of respondents that identify as Muslim in the Russian national survey. Furthermore, a cross-national analysis of ethno/national-religious relationships is made. Therefore, selecting cases in ISSP National Identity surveys involved deciphering respondents who identify with the respective country and ethnic group of interest.

⁷ This study also utilizes data collected from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). The ISSP is not responsible for the views expressed in this study.

Variables

The empirical component of this study is to investigate the scope and correlates of ethnodoxo among contemporary Russians. To accomplish this, the relationship between ethnodoxo and other social, cultural, political, and religious beliefs, attitudes, and values is examined. In particular, individuals' level of ethnodoxo is analyzed in relation to levels of religiosity, nationalism, political orientation, attitudes about popular social issues, religious intolerance, and xenophobia. Doing so will provide a comprehensive depiction of the embeddedness of ethnodoxo as a popular ideology, and its correlates across other social, cultural, and religious orientations. In addition, preliminary analyses will explore ethnodoxo beyond the case of contemporary ethnic Russians. This will offer tentative results as to the existence of similar ethno-religious relationships across different groups and societies. Using survey items from the 2005 Russian national survey, the following section reviews how these variables are operationalized.

Ethnodoxo

Based on their conceptualization of ethnodoxo, Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry offer an operationalization of the concept (2012). In particular, they provide a series of six core tenets that adherents to ethnodoxo may hold. The first tenet, termed 'inborn faithfulness,' refers to the intrinsic belonging to a group's dominant faith, despite authentic religious belief or behavior. Lippy's view of popular religiosity provides a helpful foundation for understanding this belief. The next two tenets illustrate the in-group/out-group dynamic of ethnodoxo best understood using social

identity theory. ‘Exclusion of apostates’ refers to the idea that members of a group who convert to another faith tradition are no longer *true* members of the ethnic group. On the other side, ‘marginalization of converts’ refers to the belief that members of other ethnic groups cannot be *truly* faithful, regardless of their authentic religious beliefs and behavior. The last three tenets of ethnodoxo exemplify the exclusivist and protectionist characteristics of this ideology. A sense of ‘religious superiority’ may be held over other religious traditions and ethnic groups, emphasizing its xenophobic nature. A ‘presumption of harm’ may also be held, which sees other faiths as potentially harmful. Following this, a group may ‘seek protection’ by securing a privileged and protected status. Although these components remain the same in every application of ethnodoxo, the specific indicators created to measure these components are context-specific.

For instance, the measures used in this study were previously created for the 2005 Russian national survey. Based on Karpov and Lisovskaya’s in-depth interviews with clergy and lay believers, survey measures were created that captured popular beliefs about ethno-religious relationships among everyday ethnic Russians. These measures were matched with the central components of ethnodoxo as developed in its conceptualization described above (see Table 1). This method of operationalization epitomizes what Schutz described in his ‘postulate of adequacy’ (1977), making concepts congruent with people’s everyday understanding, and addresses issues of functional equivalence discussed in more detail below.

As Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry (2012) admit, adherents to ethnodoxo may only hold a combination of these beliefs. This is an important consideration when

Table 1. Operationalization of Ethnodoxy for Survey Research in Russia (Russian National Survey, 2005)*

Components of Ethnodoxy	Propositions
<i>Inborn faithfulness</i>	A Russian is Orthodox in his/her heart even if s/he was not baptized and does not go to church.
<i>Religious superiority:</i> <i>in comparison with other faiths</i>	Russians, even though they are poorer than western peoples, are spiritually richer and stronger in their faith.
<i>in comparison with fellow-believers of other ethnicities and nationalities</i>	Other nations also have Orthodox churches, but only in Russia can one find the true Orthodox faith
<i>Exclusion of apostates</i>	A Russian who converts to another faith (e.g., Catholicism or Islam), is no longer truly Russian
<i>Marginalization of converts</i>	A non-Russian (e.g., an Azerbaijani), even if s/he is baptized and goes to church, will never be truly Orthodox
<i>Presumption of harm</i>	Western churches functioning in Russia undermine the traditional faith of the Russian people and do the Russian people harm

* Adopted from Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry, 2012

determining where ethnodoxy is applied, and raises a number of questions. How many beliefs must be held for the concept of ethnodoxy to have any explanatory power? Are some beliefs considered more crucial than others, or are they weighted equally? How does the socio-historic context influence which aspects of ethnodoxy are supported? Furthermore, what proportion of a population must adhere to ethnodoxy, including whatever combination of beliefs deemed sufficient, for this particular ideology to be considered dominant? Obviously, not all members of a society must adhere to every tenet in order for ethnodoxy to hold *true*. However, if

the idea of ethnodoxo provides a *good-fit* for explaining certain beliefs, attitudes, and values for a significant proportion of individuals, then its application is considered useful. Exactly what those requirements are may seem subjective, but by grounding findings in the literature and supported by a firm theoretical foundation, I believe such judgments can be made.

In short, these questions illustrate the need for practical applications of the concept of ethnodoxo. While Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry (2012) provide a theoretical breakdown of ethnodoxo, pragmatic issues such as these, may only crop up during empirical application of the concept. Therefore, one of the tasks of this study is to identify such considerations and address any limitations that exist. In the end, the variability of the concept of ethnodoxo is, in fact, a virtue, providing enough structure to depict a cohesive social phenomenon while at the same time, acknowledging the differences in ethno-religious contexts.

Religiosity

The concept of religiosity is often understood as having three separate dimensions: religious *belonging*, religious *belief*, and religious *behavior* (e.g., Berger et al., 2008; Davie, 1990, 2000, 2007; Hadaway and Marler, 2005; Mocabee et al., 2001; Smidt, Kellstedt, and Guth 2009; Steensland et al., 2000). While this study also utilizes this approach, a fourth dimension is included: *attitude toward* religion. This refers to the self-described perception of religion and what role it has or should have in society. Regardless of a person's religious affiliation, belief, or practices, any individual can have an understanding of what place the institution of religion has or

should have in their society. An individual's attitude toward religion captures this often-ignored dimension. Each dimension of religiosity is operationalized with the following commonly used indicators.

Keeping in line with Schutz's 'postulate of adequacy,' religious belonging is operationalized using self-described indicators of religious affiliation. Respondents are asked whether they identify as a religious person and, if so, which religious organization they identify with. If respondents answer Orthodox, they are asked to further specify. Responses include: Christian, Orthodox, Moscow Patriarchate, Old Believer, Russian Orthodox Church outside of Russia, or unsure.

Religious belief is operationalized using measures of core monotheistic and central Christian beliefs. Measures of monotheistic tenets include belief in God, belief about God, belief that God created the world, belief in life after death, belief in heaven, and the belief in souls. Indicators of core Christian beliefs include: belief that Jesus existed, belief in the resurrection of Christ, belief that he was the Son of God, belief in miracles and the respondent's opinion of the Bible.

Religious behavior is operationalized using common measures of religious activities found in the literature. These measures include frequency of attendance to religious services, frequency of prayer, and frequency of reading the Bible.

Again, attitude toward religion in society is an important dimension of religiosity often ignored in the literature. This variable is operationalized using the following items: importance of religion in life, confidence in Russian Orthodox Church, reliance on authority of traditional religions, and approval of Russian Orthodoxy being taught in school.

Perception of Nation

In exploring the scope and consequences of ethnodoxo, an important area to consider is the relationship between ethno-religious identity and the perception of one's nation. In this study, the perception of nation has two dimensions: respondent's opinion of Russia in a global context and individual levels of nationalism. Accordingly, this concept is operationalized using two survey indicators. First, respondents are asked if they view Russia as part of Europe, and inevitably Western. Second, respondents are asked how proud they are of being a Russian citizen. The latter measure is frequently used to operationalize the idea of nationalism in survey research.

Political Orientation

Similarly, the relationship between ethnodoxo and political orientation, attitudes, and affiliation will also provide insight into the ideological embeddedness, maintenance, and legitimation of ethnodoxo. In this study, political orientation refers to an individual's political membership, behavior, and views. In particular, political membership is operationalized by respondents identifying their political party affiliation and which they most agree with. Political behavior is operationalized by indicating which party a respondent would vote for. Finally, political views are operationalized by respondents indicating their position on a conservative-liberal scale, how much confidence they have in their president, how much confidence they have in political parties, and their views about democracy.

Social Attitudes

Attitudes toward social issues will also be addressed. Two particular social issues will be explored in this study: approval of abortion and rights of homosexuals. Attitude toward abortion is operationalized using four situational indicators for approving abortion: approve of abortion if the pregnancy is dangerous for the woman, if the child is expected to be born with defects, if the woman is not married, and if the couple no longer want children. Rights for homosexuals is operationalized with three indicators: right for homosexuals to speak publically about same-sex marriage, right for homosexuals to teach in universities, and the inclusion of books about legalizing same-sex marriages in public libraries. By investigating the relationship between ethnodox and attitudes toward key social issues, a better understanding of the consequences of ethnodox beliefs on other everyday social issues is achieved.

Religious Tolerance and Xenophobia

This study will also explore religious tolerance and xenophobia. In particular, attitudes toward Muslims, new churches, and Western influences are assessed. Opinions about legal rights for religions in general are also addressed. This will highlight the exclusivist and protectionist nature of ethnodox and its relationship with social and cultural tolerance and xenophobia.

Attitudes toward Muslims and new churches are operationalized by asking respondents if they would allow a church or mosque to be built in their community, preaching in public, publication and distribution of literature, respective religious schools, teaching respective religions in secondary schools, preaching on television,

religious charity activities, or the collection of money for respective religious needs. Ethnic Russians appear to be more tolerant of Muslims than new churches. Opinions about legal rights for religions in society is operationalized by asking respondents if all religions should have equal rights or if certain religions should have special privileges.

Finally, attitudes toward Western influence is operationalized by asking respondents if democracy leads to disorder in society, if Western governments try to weaken Russia, if life would be better with more cooperation with the West, and if attempts to arrange life according to Western standards is harmful.

Ethnodoxy among Russian Muslims⁸

In order to assess the applicability of ethnodoxy among other groups such as Muslims that currently live in Russia, a series of five context-specific indicators were created. These include the importance of prayer for being a Muslim, whether a person who converts to a non-Islamic religion is still truly a representative of their nationality, whether a Russian person can truly be a Muslim, whether Orthodox churches undermine Muslim regions, and whether the authorities of Muslim regions should protect them from anti-Muslim threats. Just as underlying themes, or factors, of ethnodoxy were explored among ethnic Russians, data reduction techniques are also administered on indicators of ethnodoxy for Russia's Muslims. This will provide

⁸ To be clear, Russian Muslims refers to Muslims that were living in Russia while the 2005 Russian National Survey was administered. As discussed earlier, these respondents were selected only if they affiliated with Islam.

further insight into the applicability of the concept of ethnodoxo between two groups within the same social setting (i.e., post-communist Russia).

Religion and Ethno-National Identity

Similarly, a preliminary analysis of ethno/national-religious relationships outside of Russia is administered. This will allow for further discussion regarding the application of ethnodoxo across multiple contexts and provide evidence of ethno-religious relationships in modern/modernizing societies. Ethnodoxo outside of Russia is operationalized using a particular indicator included in both ISSP National Identity modules (1995 and 2003). Specifically, the survey asks respondents if it is important to be affiliated to the dominant religion of that country in order to be a true citizen. While this one indicator does not capture all the components of ethnodoxo, it does provide tentative insight into its main essence: the belief that affiliation to a national or ethnic group's dominant religion is necessary for its identity. Therefore, it should be noted that findings from this inquiry is not definite evidence of the existence of ethnodoxo in other countries. However, the idea that religious affiliation is understood as a crucial element for an individual's national/ethnic identity, throughout the world, does present significant empirical proof that supports the general idea of ethnodoxo and that the role of religion is still a very powerful aspect of identity construction in modern/modernizing societies.

Social Determinants

The variables of social determinants used in this study include: sex, age, level of education, level of income, and place of residence. The inclusion of these variables has two purposes. First, a social profile of adherents to ethnodoxy, and their social determinants, can be obtained. An overview of these variables and survey measures in the Russian national survey is as follows. Age cohorts were categorized into four classifications: 30 years or younger, 31-45, 46-60, and over 60. Level of education was classified into three groups: incomplete secondary education, completed secondary education, and incomplete higher or higher education. Place of residence was categorized as rural (population of 10,000 or less) or urban (more than 10,000). Income was measured by asking respondents to answer an open-ended question regarding their household monthly income. To simplify, I located the median income value (6,000 rubles) and created two categories: low and high income.

Second, based on the frequency distributions of these variables, categories can be created that highlight what is traditionally understood as modern versus non-modern characteristics in the literature (i.e., higher education, higher income, urban residence). Such a categorization (i.e., modern versus non-modern) can offer important analytic distinction when exploring the scope of ethnodoxy among elites, and on a macro-level of analysis, in terms of the role of religion and counter-secularizing processes in modern/modernizing societies.

Statistical Techniques

Two main statistical techniques are used in this study. First, a data reduction technique (i.e., principle components analysis) is conducted on key ethnodoxy measures (seven for ethnic Russians and five for Russia's Muslims) in order to gauge the degree of inter-correlatedness between items. Such tests will show if multiple dimensions of ethnodoxy exist and highlight underlying themes, or factors. Furthermore, these tests will provide a useful comparison of the different forms of ethnodoxy between ethnic Russians and Russia's Muslims. In addition, principle component analyses is used throughout this empirical investigation in order to capture underlying themes (or factors) for a variety of variables (i.e., religious tolerance, social attitudes, etc.).

Other statistical tests used in this study include generating frequency distributions of key indicators described above and the cross-tabulation of these items with indicators of ethnodoxy. These tests are used to create portraits of what Russians believe, how they behave, and what elements are used to form their identity. In doing so, patterns among individual's ethnodox beliefs and other beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors are assessed.

A Note on Comparative Research Methods

A major part of this study is comparing ethnodoxy between different groups within Russia and cross-nationally. This requires some discussion on the nature of comparative research methods and the techniques adopted for this study. This section

outlines the major conceptual distinctions of comparative research, issues of functional equivalence, and challenges concerning analysis in comparative research.

Case versus Variable-Oriented Approaches

Comparative methods of analysis are usually distinguished between case-oriented or variable-oriented approaches. Ragin understood the case-oriented approach as 'causal-analytic,' focusing on and interpreting specific cases across multiple settings (1987). The variable-oriented approach is theory centered, emphasizing generality over the complexity in cases. "In a typical variable-oriented study, the investigator examines relationships between general features of social structures conceived as variables" (Ragin, 1987, p.55). In other words, unlike case-oriented approaches, which emphasize the context-specific nature of only a few cases, the variable-oriented approach evaluates the relationships of particular characteristics across several societies or countries.

Many consider the variable-oriented approach dominant in comparative research (Abbott, 1997; Bradshaw and Wallace, 1991). Moreover, these two approaches are used interchangeably with quantitative (variable-oriented) and qualitative (case-oriented) labels, further accentuating the divide (Ragin, 1987; McMichael, 1990). However, some have argued against this polarization in methods. For instance, Bradshaw and Wallace suggested that, "although the variable-based approach is most commonly used when many different cases are involved, it may also be employed in case studies" (1991, p.157). Similarly, the goal of this study is to combine both approaches. Obviously the exploration of ethno-religious relationships

between groups within Russia and cross-nationally indicates a variable-oriented approach. However, the contextualized background provided for comparative cases (e.g., Russia's Muslims) typifies a case-oriented approach. By combining both approaches, a context-rich background is coupled with a rigorous empirical analysis, yielding a comparison that is thorough and far-reaching.

Issues of Functional Equivalency

A crucial issue in comparative research is to ensure that concepts have achieved functional equivalence. "The most fundamental methodological issue is whether the concepts employed in the analysis are truly equivalent" (Kohn, 1989, p.84). In other words, while words or phrases may appear the same (or translated similarly), their meanings can vary dramatically over time and space. In fact, "the same variable may be indexed by a variety of items, and different items may be the most appropriate indicators in different settings" (Verba, 1971, p.315). Therefore, considerations must be made in order to account for such functional nonequivalence. Verba offered two possible solutions regarding this challenge.

One solution... is to attempt to define the frame of reference as precisely as possible, which is simply to say that the questions should be precise and unambiguous. An alternative technique, often useful in cross-national research where the possible frames of reference are uncertain, would be to allow the respondent to set his own (1971, p.322).

The issue of functional equivalence is clearly problematic in the operationalizing of concepts. For instance, "a misleading translation may create not only nonexistent entities but spurious analytical problems, as well" (Keesing, 1985,

p.204).⁹ Therefore, it is imperative that measurement items are both developed and administered appropriately to ascertain accurate information from intended populations.¹⁰ The functional equivalence of concepts may be achieved better if variables are broken down into component parts, or multiple measures: this “allow[s] one to test whether the alternative items cluster together and can be assumed to be indeed measuring the same thing” (Verba, 1971, p.320).

The process of operationalizing the concept of ethnodoxy reflects these considerations. As described earlier, the concept of ethnodoxy has been broken down and operationalized into six, non-context-specific, component parts. Doing this has ensured that while measures might differ across groups, cultures, and societies, the thematic essence for each component is the same. Then, precise measurement items were constructed, based on specific beliefs of everyday ethnic Russians, which were then matched with each component of ethnodoxy. A similar process was administered when creating measures of ethnodoxy specific to Muslims living in Russia. In this way, the functional equivalence of ethnodoxy is achieved by allowing the concept of ethnodoxy to be broader than any one ethno-religious context, but

⁹ Hill has acknowledged different levels of comprehension of religious measures for certain populations. For instance, some measures of religiosity are too abstract for children, poorly educated adults, and some clinical populations (Hill and Pargament, 2003). Stirling, Furman, Benson, Canda, and Grimwood’s study on the role of religion and spirituality among social workers in New Zealand provide an excellent example regarding the re-development of measurement items and use of experts in modifying questionnaires for different contextual settings (2010).

¹⁰ Traphagan’s effort on studying religion cross-culturally exemplifies this importance (2005). He argued that if contextual specificities are not considered, than erroneous assumptions are usually made. For Traphagan, a Western Christian-Judeo approach is often used when studying religion in other settings (e.g., Japan). Termed *cultural imperialism*, this is usually performed unknown to the researcher but with suspicious findings nonetheless. Thus, Traphagan urged all comparative researchers to thoroughly consider such obvious threats to internal validity.

operationalized based on the socio-historic context of particular ethno-religious relationships understood in everyday life.

Analyzing Comparative Data: Similarities versus Differences

The analysis of comparative data can have different conceptual emphases. Kohn distinguished between two basic types of research findings: emphases of similarities or differences. “One that looks for statistical regularities and another that searches for cultural or historical differences” (Kohn, 1989, p.78). For Ragin, similarities and differences are closely related to functional equivalence:

Identification of underlying commonalities often does not involve a simple tabulation and analysis of common characteristics. Investigators must allow for the possibility that characteristics which appear different (such as qualitatively different systems of incentives) have the same consequences (1987, p.47).

Verba also commented on the comparability of results: “Such similarities and differences are always subject to challenge that they are not ‘real’; that that which seems similar is not really similar that that which seems different is not really different” (1971, p.310).

Thus, researchers should be sure that their results imply *functional* similarities or *functional* differences. For Ragin, the use of statistical techniques has had major benefits in variable-oriented data analysis.¹¹ Statistical techniques have allowed researchers to study more cases at a time, provoked more caution when constructing

¹¹ However, Ragin favored the comparative method over statistical methods for four basic reasons: 1) the statistical method is not combinatorial, 2) the comparative method aims to explain for all instances of a phenomena, 3) the comparative method is not restricted by the limitations of sample sizes and tests of statistical significance, and 4) the comparative method requires knowledge of each case (1987).

generalizations, and offer useful options of statistical control (1987). However, “while statistical control allows investigators to make broad statements with relatively little data, these broad statements are possible only because very powerful simplifying assumptions have been made” (Ragin, 1987, p.64).

Verba argued for a data analysis technique, termed ‘bootstrap operations,’ in order to produce contextual comparisons (1971). Based on Duijker and Rokkan’s ‘second-order comparisons’ (1964), bootstrap operations perform multi-level comparisons of variables that are substantively related within a social context (Verba, 1971). This can control for contextual discrepancies, thereby increasing content equivalence (Verba, 1971).¹²

These considerations are applied in this study as well. For instance, functional similarities and differences are identified among different forms of ethno-religious relationships. Second-order comparisons can be made by first locating differences within groups/societies, which are then used as functional equivalents for cross-group/society comparisons. In other words, ethno-religious relationships are initially examined within ethnic Russians, Russian Muslims, and within Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox countries. Then, the differences found within groups/societies become the frame of comparison between groups/societies.

¹² *Bootstrap operations* and Rokkan’s *second order comparisons* focus on comparing values of a certain measure from certain subgroups cross-nationally, versus direct individual-level variations cross-nationally. “Thus, for instance, the frequency of a specific measure of participation is not directly compared among systems, but rather, participation rates for various groups are compared within individual systems – with the differences among groups forming the focus of cross-system comparison” (Verba, 1971, p.328). Of course, the selection of groups used in analysis should be theoretically justified in order to achieve meaningful content equivalence.

Conclusion

In sum, utilizing elements from both case and variable-oriented methods will provide a contextually rich analysis without comprising the number of cases. In addition, recognizing the importance of functional equivalency, in conceptualizing, operationalizing, and analyzing data, will ensure that more meaningful comparisons are made. But, before comparative analyses can be conducted, it is vital that we understand the spread and social make-up of individuals who believe in ethnodoxy for the first case-group: contemporary ethnic Russians. This is accomplished in the following two chapters.

CHAPTER VI: THE SCOPE AND STRUCTURE OF ETHNODOXY IN POST-COMMUNIST RUSSIA

Before investigating associations of ethnodox with religious, social, and cultural beliefs and values, the scope and structure of ethnodox should be examined. In other words, what does ethnodox look like for contemporary ethnic Russians and how prevalent is it? The following chapter accomplishes this in two ways. First, dimensions of individuals' beliefs in the seven core tenets of ethnodox are analyzed. Second, a data reduction technique is administered on the indicators of ethnodox, testing for underlying themes or patterns that may exist across these beliefs.

Frequency Distribution of Adherence to Ethnodox

As described earlier, Karpov and Lisovskaya created a series of seven indicators to measure levels of ethnodox for a 2005 Russian national survey. The frequency distribution of these indicators (see Table 2) provides preliminary insight into the prevailing perceptions of an ethno-religious link among contemporary ethnic Russians. While adherence varies across each ethnodox belief, a majority of ethnic Russians agree with all but one core tenet. In fact, 75% or more of respondents adhere to at least three of the seven items.

Clearly, these results illustrate the importance of an ethno-religious relationship in contemporary Russian identity and provide tentative confirmation that the concept of ethnodox may be useful in understanding this phenomenon. The most popular belief is that a Russian is always Orthodox (85% of ethnic Russians agree). In addition to such a staggering proportion who agree, the mass

Table 2. Frequency Distribution of Ethnodoxy Beliefs among Ethnic Russians

Measure	Frequency	Percentage
No longer Russian if converted from Russian Orthodox Church to another religion	480	34.3
Only in Russia can one find 'true' Russian Orthodoxy	768	54.8
Non-Russian can never be a real Russian Orthodox	689	49.2
Western churches undermine Russians and their traditions	761	54.3
A Russian is always Orthodox	1195	85.3
State should protect Russian Orthodox from opponents	1055	75.3
Russians are richer in their soul and stronger in their beliefs than Western nations	1065	76

n=1401

adherence to this belief is important for two reasons. First, the notions of being Russian and being Orthodox are clearly conflated, indicating the prevalence of an ethno-religious identity. Second, the use of the word *always* (*всегда* in Russian) in this item portrays the absolutist nature of ethnodoxy. In other words, it does not matter what changes an ethnic Russian makes in his or her life, even if one is not baptized and does not go to church, if you were born an ethnic Russian, then you were born Russian Orthodox.

The second most popular ethnodox belief item refers to the xenophobic nature of the ideology. Indeed, 76% of respondents agreed that Russians are spiritually richer than Western nations. This illustrates the 'us' versus 'them' dynamic by suggesting Russian's superiority in comparison with the West. This spiritual

superiority is clearly taken-for-granted among most contemporary Russians. In line with Slavophile mentality, such a wide spread of belief points to a perception of Russia as a civilization superior to the ‘West.’

The third most popular belief reveals the protectionist nature of ethnodox. More than 75% of ethnic Russians agreed that the state should specifically protect Russian Orthodoxy from its opponents. As discussed later, individuals that are not particularly religious, in the traditional sense, support this idea as well. It is also worth noting the exclusivist aspect of this belief. The ‘opponents’ of Russian Orthodoxy referred in this questionnaire is not clear. Does this refer to religious opponents, political opponents, or something else? Even more important, are the opponents of Russian Orthodoxy the same as opponents of the state?

The prominence of other ethnodox beliefs may answer these questions. A majority of ethnic Russians (54.3%) believe Western churches are particularly harmful to Russian traditions and way of life. Taken with the second most commonly held ethnodox belief (i.e., Russians are spiritually richer than the West), it would appear that most ethnic Russians identify Western-affiliated religious organizations as a main opponent for which they seek protection from. These considerations are further explored in Chapter XI, by investigating the relationships between ethnodox and religious tolerance and xenophobia.

The next set of beliefs illustrates what was described in Chapter II as the sacralization of ethnos. For instance, over half of ethnic Russians (54.8%) believe that only in Russia can one find ‘true’ Russian Orthodoxy. Moreover, nearly half of ethnic Russians (49.2%) do not consider non-Russians to be ‘real’ Russian Orthodox.

These beliefs illustrate what Smith termed ‘sanctification of the homeland’ (2008) by restricting the authenticity of a religion to a particular geographical region.

Tied to this is the idea that ethnic groups are intimately linked with a particular region, termed ethnoscapas (Smith, 2008). If ethnoscapas are ‘sanctified,’ then members of an ethnic group that convert to another religion may be ethnically ostracized. Although far less accepted compared to the other six beliefs, the idea of sanctified ethnoscapas is prevalent among many ethnic Russians. Indeed, more than one third of ethnic Russians (34.3%) believe that a person is no longer Russian if they convert to a different religion. The consequences of this are important as it implies ethnic identity is not as fixed as suggested in the literature. Instead, ethnicity is dynamic, dependent on meeting certain qualifications as so defined by popular perceptions.

The above analysis provides an initial insight into the belief in ethnodoxy and its wide spread among most contemporary ethnic Russians. Furthermore, these beliefs illustrate the different analytical components of ethnodoxy described in Chapter III. While the separate components of ethnodoxy are important for establishing a clear structure of this ideology, there may be broader, underlying themes that exist among these beliefs as well. To test this, factor analyses were conducted and are discussed below.

Underlying Themes of Ethnodoxy among Ethnic Russians

In order to check for underlying themes (i.e., factors) that may exist among ethnodox beliefs, factor analyses (i.e., principal components analysis) were

conducted. The first factor analysis revealed a model with one factor.¹³ In other words, all seven beliefs loaded under one theme. This is, of course, important as it suggests that these items capture the general essence of ethnodoxo. However, this model explained less than half of variance. A second factor was detected with an eigenvalue near 1.0.¹⁴ Therefore, a two-factor model was tested. As expected, the results revealed two separate factors. In other words, two separate underlying themes appear to exist among the seven items. Below, Table 3 presents the rotated component matrix of ethnodoxo indicators. As the results from this analysis show, each item was strongly correlated within one of two factors. Compared to the initial one-factor model, this two-factor model explained more variance (nearly 53%) and was so adopted as the better fit.

In short, these two factors suggest two different dimensions of ethnodoxo. The first factor, hereafter termed *soft* ethnodoxo, links with items that signify a broader understanding of ethnodoxo.¹⁵ Indeed, as described above, these are beliefs that are more widely held by a large majority of ethnic Russians. While still evident of ethnodoxo as exclusive, protectionist, and absolutist, these items are more vague and less rigid compared to the other four. The second factor, hereafter labeled *hard* ethnodoxo, denotes a stronger, more direct, sense of ethnodoxo. In other words, the second factor deals with items that imply a stricter, more absolutistic, and exclusivist

¹³ This analysis used Kaiser criterion of extraction (eigenvalue greater than 1.0)

¹⁴ The conventional threshold in principle components analysis is 1.0. However, oftentimes a second factor may be extracted if the eigenvalue is relatively close. This is the case for conducting the second model.

¹⁵ *Soft ethnodoxo* includes the following variables: “The State should protect Orthodox beliefs of Russian people from their opponents”, and “A Russian person is always Orthodox even if he/she is not baptized and does not attend church”, “A non-Russian will never be a genuine Orthodox”, and “Even if Russians are poorer than western nations, they are richer in their soul and stronger in their beliefs.”

Table 3. Rotated Component Matrix of Ethnodoxy Indicators

Variables	Factor I (Soft Ethnodoxy)	Factor II (Hard Ethnodoxy)
No longer Russian if converted from ROC to another religion	-.050	.799
Only in Russia can one find 'true' Russian Orthodoxy	.444	.554
Non-Russian can never be a real Russian Orthodox	.218	.679
A Russian is always Orthodox	.648	.129
Western churches undermine Russians and their traditions	.389	.510
State should protect Russian Orthodox from opponents	.704	.287
Russians are richer in their soul and stronger in their beliefs than Western nations	.790	.056
<i>Eigenvalue</i>	2.738	.967
<i>% Variance</i>	39.1%	13.8%
<i>Total variance explained: 52.9%</i>		

relationship between religion and ethnicity.¹⁶ While fewer respondents adhere to the beliefs of hard ethnodoxy, a sizeable majority still claim adherence. In sum, a majority of ethnic Russians agree with most ethnodox beliefs. More respondents align with soft ethnodoxy, which shows general consensus that being Russian and being Russian Orthodox are intimately inter-related and that this relationship should be preserved. A smaller proportion of ethnic Russians adhere to the belief of hard

¹⁶ *Hard ethnodoxy* includes the following variables: "Western Churches preaching in Russia undermine Russian traditional beliefs and harm Russian people", "If a Russian person [converts to another faith] not Orthodox, he/she stop being a real Russian", "Other nations also can follow Orthodoxy, but only in Russia one can find true Orthodoxy",

ethnodoxy, a stricter and firmer understanding of an ethno-religious identity. The differentiation of ethnodoxy as hard and soft should provide analytical utility. Thusly, respondent's varying dimensions of ethnodoxy may be related to other religious, social, and cultural attitudes, beliefs, and values.

Conclusion

The analyses conducted in this chapter reveal two important characteristics of ethnodoxy as applied to post-communist ethnic Russians. First, ethnodox beliefs, as operationalized in the preceding chapter, are adhered to by a majority of ethnic Russians. This suggests that the application of ethnodoxy on this particular context is a worthwhile pursuit. Second, factor analyses revealed two underlying factors, or themes. The first factor, soft ethnodoxy, includes beliefs that are more widely accepted, capturing a more general understanding of ethnodoxy. The second factor, hard ethnodoxy, includes beliefs that are stricter and less popular. Still, both factors contain items that capture the exclusivist, protectionist, and absolutist nature of this ideology and are shared by a majority of contemporary ethnic Russians. The existence of two factors illustrates the multi-dimensionality of ethnodoxy among ethnic Russians. As subsequent analyses show, this may not be the case for all contexts. The next step in generating a social profile of ethnodox adherents is to investigate its social determinants. This is accomplished in the following chapter.

CHAPTER VII: THE SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF ETHNODOXY

Now that the scope and structure of ethnodoxy among contemporary ethnic Russians has been developed, a social profile of its adherents can be made by investigating its social determinants. In this way, a demographic makeup of adherents to ethnodoxy is explored. Additionally, modern/non-modern categories are constructed based on key characteristics of respondents in order to determine how ethnodoxy fits in a modern/modernizing society. Accomplishing these tasks will provide a clearer depiction of ethnodoxy as a popular ideology, and its followers, before exploring its relationship with other beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors.

As defined earlier, ethnodoxy is a belief system. Previous research on social determinants of religion can help develop hypotheses about belief systems related to religion, such as ethnodoxy. After I review the existing literature on the social determinants of religion, I develop and test hypotheses pertaining to the social characteristics of adherents to ethnodoxy. Furthermore, a categorization of respondents into modern/non-modern groups is performed in order to further understand the place of ethnodoxy in a modern society.

Background: Social Determinants of Belief Systems

The social determinants of religiosity are well documented. Although usually left as a subsidiary concern, patterns identified among the social attributes of religiosity are crucial in understanding the role of religion in society. Research has frequently presumed that religiosity is lower with individuals who exhibit 'modern'

characteristics (i.e., urban residents, educated, higher income, and younger).

Accordingly, individuals exhibiting the opposite qualities are generally found, or presumed, to be more religious (i.e., rural residents, less educated, lower income, and older). In fact, this is the very basis for many proponents of secularization. Simply, the more ‘modern’ individuals are, or a society for that matter, the less religion is sought.

On the individual-level, it is often presumed that older, lower income, less educated, and rural residents are more religious than their opposites. Many have noted the negative relationship between level of education and religiosity (Albrecht and Heaton, 1984).¹⁷ Place of residence has also been linked to religiosity, where rural residents are usually depicted as more religious (Chalfant and Heller, 1991).¹⁸ Levels of religiosity based on differences across age and sex have also been commonly cited. Berger, Davie, and Fokas explored the historically different roles of women across Europe and the United States as influencing their religiosity (2008). Additionally, they noted that, “older people are more religious than the young on all conventional indicators...” (2008, p.114).

These findings apply to contemporary Russia as well. According to Norris and Inglehart, “religious attendance in post-Communist societies being relatively strong among women, the less educated, and the less affluent...” (2004, p.124).

Furthermore, Norris and Inglehart explored cross-national societal-level differences

¹⁷ However, as Albrecht and Heaton noted, the issue is usually more complicated as findings vary across denominations, religious traditions, and dimensions of religiosity (e.g., church attendance is often positively related to level of education) (1984).

¹⁸ While the relationship between urban/rural place of residence and level of religiosity has been noted, Chalfant and Heller find that geographical location (i.e., East, West, Midwest, South, etc.) has greater explanatory power, particularly in the United States (1991).

of modernization and development with levels of religiosity. According to their ‘security axiom,’ as societal security increases (operationalized using the Human Development Index), the need for religion as a source of support decreases (2004). Others have also noted societal-level relationships between religiosity and societal instability (Bruce, 1999), ontological security (Kinnvall, 2004), and general uncertainty (North, 2005). In short, the relationship between social attributes (e.g., sex, age, education, place of residence, and income) and religiosity have become so taken-for-granted that their use in empirical studies are often limited to control variables, leaving their influence as invariably assumed.¹⁹

Based on this literature, one should expect a similar relationship between ethnodoxy and social attributes of modernity. Since ethnodoxy emphasizes the importance of religious affiliation, I expect individuals exhibiting modern characteristics (younger in age, educated, urban dwelling, and higher income) to show lower levels of ethnodoxy as well. Also based on this literature, I expect females and older individuals to show stronger inclinations toward ethnodoxy. Therefore, based on the hypotheses stated earlier and this literature on the social determinants of religiosity, *I expect individuals exhibiting modern characteristics (i.e., urban dwelling, higher educated, higher income, younger) to show weaker levels of ethnodoxy (Hypothesis 1a). Additionally, I expect females and older individuals to show stronger levels of ethnodoxy (Hypothesis 1b).*

¹⁹ There are, of course, many exceptions in the literature that highlight the complexity and, in some cases, reversed relationships between social attributes and religiosity. For instance, Beeghley, Van Velsor, and Bock noted this in their study on socio-economic status and religiosity in the United States: “despite stereotypes of religion as the haven of the poor and oppressed, lower socio-economic status whites in the general population are least likely to participate in organized religion” (1981, p.403).

A Social Profile of Adherents to Ethnodoxy

Table 4 shows the social breakdown of respondents that self-identified as ethnic Russians. A majority of respondents were female (62.3%) and living in urban areas (76.4%). Nearly a fifth of respondents have not completed a secondary education, more than half completed a secondary level of education, and a quarter have some higher education. There was a fairly even distribution of age across four cohorts (22%, 23.4%, 25.6%, and 29.1% respectively). While over a quarter of all respondents refused to identify their income level, over a third were above the median income and over a third were below. This social profile of respondents will be crucial for understanding the relationship between ethnodoxy and modernity. As described below, the distribution of respondents across these categories will be used to distinguish individuals exhibiting modern versus non-modern attributes.

Next, associations between indicators of ethnodoxy and indicators of social demographics were analyzed (see Tables 5a-b). An initial glance shows the popularity of most ethnodox beliefs, despite social variations. Just as the general frequency distribution of ethnodoxy indicators depicted, more ethnic Russians adhere to soft ethnodox beliefs. However, a near majority of respondents still agreed with all but one indicator of hard ethnodoxy. The following is a breakdown of social determinants between the two dimensions of ethnodoxy.

Data show statistically significant associations of ethnodoxy with most social categories (see Table 5b). In short, females, younger cohorts, individuals with secondary education, and urban residents show higher levels of ethnodoxy. These results show that the social determinants for adherence to soft ethnodoxy are more

Table 4. Frequency Distribution of Indicators of Social Determinants

		Frequency	Percentage
Sex	Male	528	37.7
	Female	873	62.3
Age	30 or younger	308	22
	31-45	328	23.4
	46-60	358	25.6
	Over 60	407	29.1
Education	Incomplete secondary	282	20.1
	Secondary	769	54.9
	Incomplete higher, Higher advance	350	25
Residence	Urban	1070	76.1
	Rural	331	23.6
Income	High	517	36.9
	Low	483	34.5
	Missing	401	28.6

n=1401

complex and, at times, contradict the customary expectations about ‘modern’ individuals as less religious. Fewer relationships were statistically significant for hard ethnodoxy. Income and age are significantly related to three of the four variables of hard ethnodoxy and gender with one. Overall, large proportions of ethnic Russians, regardless of variation in social attributes, adhere to some degree of ethnodoxy.

While these results illustrate some patterns that can be explained using the assumed modernist approach (e.g., the effects of low-income), other findings show a far more complicated and contradictory situation (e.g., curvilinear relationship with education

Table 5a. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Social Determinants and Indicators of Ethnodoxy

		Hard Ethnodoxy				Soft Ethnodoxy		
		No longer Russian if converted from ROC to another religion	Only in Russia can one find 'true' Russian Orthodoxy	Non-Russian can never be a real Russian Orthodox	Western churches undermine Russians and their traditions	A Russian is always Orthodox	State should protect Russian Orthodox from opponents	Russians are richer in their soul and stronger in their beliefs than Western nations
Sex	Male	37	48.8	48.7	51.7	81.6	68	74
	Female	32.6	58.4	49.5	55.9	87.5	79.7	77.2
Age	Older than 60	35.6	59.2	55	61.4	88	80.1	77.4
	46-60	36.9	55.3	49.7	55.8	87.4	75.7	78
	31-45	35.7	53.9	46.6	49.4	84.7	74	75.6
	30 or younger	28	49.4	53.5	48.4	79.9	69.8	72.4
Income	High	33.1	52.9	49.6	57	87.1	78.7	79.7
	Low	37.2	60.8	52.3	58.3	87.3	78.9	78.5
Education	Incomplete higher, or higher	28.6	48	44	51.5	80.3	68.6	73.4
	Secondary or technical	36.9	57.6	50.8	54	88.1	78.5	77.2
	Incomplete secondary	34	55.7	51	58.5	84	75.2	76.3
Residence	Urban	31.7	53.3	48	52.2	84.8	74.2	77.7
	Rural	42.6	59.8	52.9	61	86.8	78.9	70.7

Table 5b. Levels of Significance for Associations between Indicators of Social Determinants and Indicators of Ethnodoxy

		Hard Ethnodoxy				Soft Ethnodoxy		
		No longer Russian if converted from ROC to another religion	Only in Russia can one find 'true' Russian Orthodoxy	Non-Russian can never be a real Russian Orthodox	Western churches undermine Russians and their traditions	A Russian is always Orthodox	State should protect Russian Orthodox from opponents	Russians are richer in their soul and stronger in their beliefs than Western nations
Sex	χ^2	5.789	17.244**	2.648	3.637	11.229*	28.625***	2.653
Age	Gamma	-.032	-.074***	-.086***	-.116***	-.144**	-.164***	-.079
Income	Gamma	-.048*	-.121**	-.039	-.046**	-.156**	-.138***	-.042
Education	Gamma	.002***	.028***	.027***	.011***	.074**	.095***	.030
Residence	Gamma	-.120**	-.084***	-.060***	-.133***	-.104	-.169***	.052*

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

and higher rates among urban residents). Further analysis of the modern/non-modern split within ethnodoxy is necessary.

The Relationship between Ethnodoxy and Modernity

In order to further explore the compatibility of ethnodoxy and modernity, a comparison between individuals that exhibit modern versus non-modern qualities is made. This can be difficult, particularly in survey research, as surveys are often limited in time, scope, and repeatability. For instance, there are unfortunately no survey items measuring ethnodoxy two hundred years ago, which would help compare modern and non-modern contexts. Instead, empirical tests of ethnodoxy are limited to the cross-sectional survey used in this study. However, there are statistical procedures that can help with this challenge. For instance, traits of modern and non-modern societies can be recorded on the individual-level as well. Individuals who are well educated, earn higher incomes, and live in urban areas can be considered exhibiting more modern characteristics and individuals who have little to no education, earn lower incomes, and live in rural areas can be seen as considered exhibiting non-modern traits. Based on this basic conceptualization, individuals are separated into these two groups as long as they exhibit these characteristics. Then, we can examine the adherence to ethnodoxy for each group. While less than perfect, this technique is sufficient for the scope and limitations of this project.

Three survey items were used to create modern/non-modern categories: level of education, personal income, and place of residence. Based on the response items described in the previous chapter, these categories were constructed as follows. The

'modern' category includes respondents who had an incomplete or completed higher education, earned more than the median annual income (6,000RUB), and lived in an urban area (population of 10,000 or more). The non-modern category includes respondents who had an incomplete secondary education, earned less than the median annual income, and lived in a rural area (10,000 or less). The frequency distributions of respondents who meet either criterion are presented in Table 6. Due to the extreme nature of each category, the sample size is reduced for both groups. However, there are still a sufficient number of cases to conduct a meaningful analysis.

The nature of each category accentuates the extreme characteristics of the modern/non-modern spectrum. Administering a crosstabulation test between these categories and indicators of ethnodox will suggest what kind of variation, if any, exists between the level modernity and the adherence to ethnodox. As shown in Table 7a, the results from this analysis are telling. Overall, there are more adherents to all but one ethnodox belief among respondents who were placed in the non-modern category. In particular, adherence to hard ethnodox was higher among respondents exhibiting non-modern versus modern characteristics, and compared to proportions of all ethnic Russians (see Table 2). Differences between non-modern and modern categories are relatively small, but statistically significant. The correlation matrix between modern/non-modern categories and ethnodox factor scores show similar results (Table 7b). These associations are statistically significant and in a negative direction (non-modern characteristics are correlated with stronger soft and hard ethnodox) but are relatively weak. In short, these results support the hypothesis that indicators of modernity are negatively associated with indicators of ethnodox.

Table 6. Frequency Distribution of Individuals Exhibiting Modern/Non-Modern Attributes

	Frequency	Percentage
Modern	131	9.4
Non-Modern	98	7

Again, this is unsurprising based on the literature regarding the social determinants of belief systems.

However, one should not ignore the high adherence to ethnodoxy among individuals exhibiting modern characteristics as well. Nearly three-quarters or more of these respondents adhere to soft ethnodoxy and almost half agree with all but one of the hard ethnodoxy tenets. Clearly, despite slightly lower proportions compared with their non-modern counterparts, a large proportion of modern individuals hold the same exclusive and protectionist beliefs about their ethnic and religious identity. In sum, the results from this test illustrate the spread of ethnodoxy among contemporary ethnic Russians. Regardless of modern/non-modern variations and the conventional expectations surrounding the relationship between social profile and religiosity, adherence to ethnodoxy exists and is extensive across socio-economic groups.

Conclusion

As discussed in Chapter II, a traditional view of the relationship between religion and modernity has been one-sided. Historically, most scholars expected the need for religion to wane as societies became more modern. However, contemporary social scientists, both proponents and opponents of secularization, have acknowledged the complexity of the issue. The role of religion largely depends on

Table 7a. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Modern/Non-Modern Characteristics and Indicators of Ethnodoxy

	Hard Ethnodoxy				Soft Ethnodoxy		
	No longer Russian if converted from ROC to another religion	Only in Russia can one find 'true' Russian Orthodoxy	Non-Russian can never be a real Russian Orthodox	Western churches undermine Russians and their traditions	A Russian is Always Orthodox	State should protect Russian Orthodox from opponents	Russians are richer in their soul and stronger in their beliefs than Western nations
Modern	32.9	44.3	44.3	54.2	84	72.5	77.1
Non-Modern	41.8	55.2	53	58.6	84.7	73.5	72.5
<i>Gamma</i>	.005*	.060***	.005***	.016***	.027	.000***	-.086**

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table 7b. Correlation Matrix between Modern/Non-Modern Characteristics and Ethnodoxy Factor Scores

	Soft Ethnodoxy	Hard Ethnodoxy
Modern/Non-Modern Characteristics	-.071*	-.167***

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

the particular context. What I term *varied* religion, refers to the relativistic and contextualized nature of religion in society. Berger, Davie, and Fokas noted the way religion is accepted in the United States differs from Europe due to different historical backgrounds, intellectual traditions, and institutional maintenance (2008). Hervieu-Leger (2000) and Davie's (2000) work described religion as having multiple forms of social memories that can conflict, converge, and compliment each other. The idea that religion's vitality can take different forms depending on a particular context (in space or time) is captured in Eisenstadt's concept of *multiple modernity*: "The idea of multiple modernities presumes that the best way to understand the contemporary world – indeed to explain the history of modernity – is to see it as a story of continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs" (2000, p.2). In short, the role of religion is just as relevant today as ever, albeit in different ways depending on the particular setting. Religion is not an absolute entity that either does or does not exist. It includes multiple forms and dimensions, declining and/or growing at the same time. In addition, religion does not exist inside a vacuum. It interacts with, influences, and is influenced by other social phenomena.

The empirical data in this chapter show the intricate relationship that religion can have with ethnicity in modern society. As the results from frequency distributions illustrate, the acceptance of ethnodoxo, a rigid ethno-religious ideology, is widespread among contemporary ethnic Russians. Further analysis concluded that, despite some variation, belief in ethnodoxo is prevalent across differences in social characteristics. Of course, it is interesting that individuals exhibiting non-modern characteristics had higher proportions that believed in the tenets of ethnodoxo; and

this is not all that surprising given the conventional literature on the subject. But, what is of greater interest is that the difference between these two extreme categories was relatively small, despite being statistically significant. Overall, individuals exhibiting modern characteristics were nearly as ethnodox as their non-modern counter-parts. I suspect this is evidence of what Karpov (2010) called desecularization and Taylor (2007) described as counter-secularization; ethno-religious relationships that are constructed and maintained in order to unify and solidify members in society. Evidently, urban individuals who are highly educated and wealthy also espouse ethnodox beliefs. Whether they are the actual disseminating agents is a question explored later.

Further analysis regarding the scope of ethnodoxy and its consequences across other beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors is necessary to continue this investigation. The next chapter begins this task by exploring the relationship between ethnodoxy beliefs and religiosity.

CHAPTER VIII: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELIGIOSITY AND ETHNODOXY

Since ethnodoxy links ethnicity with religion, it is logical to explore the relationship between religiosity and ethnodoxy beliefs. This chapter briefly examines religiosity among contemporary ethnic Russians and then focuses on the relationship between religiosity and ethnodoxy.

The Role of Religion in Ethnodoxy

On the surface, evidence of ethnodoxy might imply the general importance of religion in society and that traditional indicators of religiosity would also be strong. If affiliation to a particular religious tradition is vital for a group's identity, one might expect religious belief and behavior (normatively defined) to be important as well. However, as more recent efforts in the sociology of religion suggest, rarely is *being religious* a clearly defined concept. Indeed, contemporary scholars seem anxious to conceptualize the role of religion in society as complicated, varied, and contextualized. For instance, Davie's 'believing without belonging' (1990), John Wolffe's 'diffusive Christianity' (1994), Roof's 'spiritual seeking' (1999), Wuthnow's 'spiritual shopping' (2005), Ammerman's 'Golden Rule Christians' (1997), Cimino and Smith's 'secular seekers' (2007), Michael Epstein's 'minimal religion' (Epstein, Genis, and Vladiv-Glover, 1999), and Lyudmila Vorontsova and Sergei Filatov's 'just Christians' (1994) all exemplify nuanced approaches toward understanding the idiosyncratic nature of religiosity in modern society.

Religious identity in contemporary Russia is no different. While earlier studies have noted the so-called ‘rise of religion’ in post-communist Russia, most now acknowledge the complexity of the situation. Despite a strong presence of the Russian Orthodox Church in public life, religiosity measured as individual-level beliefs and behaviors is relatively low (Mchedlov, 2005; Marsh, 2006). Indeed, affiliation to the Russian Orthodox Church has become a key component of Russian national identity, regardless of religious belief or behavior (Knox, 2008). Warhola and Lehning used the term ‘monocultural Russ-centrism’ to describe Russians as identifying with Russian Orthodoxy but exhibiting weak theological foundation (2007). Borowik explored Orthodoxy in multiple post-communist societies and concluded that religious identification has more to do with being a part of Orthodox tradition than actual religious belief or practice (2006).

If identification with religious traditions has more to do with the act of affiliation than religious belief or behavior, how is religious identity defined? In sum, the guiding research question for this chapter is: *how is the popular understanding of religiosity related to to ethnodoxy?* The following chapter contributes to the study of religion by providing both a conceptually rich and empirically sound analysis that uses subjective understandings of religious identity, ethnic identity, and their overlap.

Hypotheses

Based on the theoretical framework of ethnodoxy and on previous studies, the following hypotheses will guide the empirical analysis of this chapter. First, since ethnodoxy is rooted in the idea that affiliation to an ethnic group’s dominant religion

is essential, I expect that *a majority of ethnic Russians affiliate with Russian Orthodoxy (Hypothesis 2a)*. Second, as the literature suggests, *indicators of religious belief and behavior should be markedly lower than that of religious affiliation (Hypothesis 2b)*. Moreover, since affiliation with the ROC is expected to be high, I also project *that a majority of ethnic Russians will trust religious institutions, especially the Russian Orthodox Church (Hypothesis 2c)*.

Likewise, I expect indicators of religiosity to be related to indicators of ethnodoxo. Based on the conceptual foundation of ethnodoxo, *I expect levels of religious affiliation (i.e., with the Russian Orthodox Church) to have a positive relationship with indicators of ethnodoxo (Hypothesis 2d)*. However, as the literature on contemporary Russian religiosity denotes, adherents to Orthodoxy may not have strong religious beliefs or high levels of religious behavior. Therefore, *I alternatively expect no relationship between indicators of ethnodoxo and religious belief and behavior (Hypothesis 2e)*. Nevertheless, according to the conceptual underpinnings of ethnodoxo, adherents should hold their religious institution in high regard, seeking protective status and privilege. Therefore, *I expect ethnodoxo to be positively related with trust toward religious institutions like the ROC (Hypothesis 2f)*.

Religiosity of Ethnic Russians

This section explores four dimensions of religiosity: religious belonging, religious belief, religious behavior, and attitude toward religion in society. Religious belonging is operationalized using self-described indicators of religious affiliation. Respondents are asked if they identify with a religious organization and whether they

identify as a religious person.²⁰ If respondents answered Orthodoxy, they were asked to further distinguish their Orthodox affiliation. The frequency distributions of these indicators are presented in Table 8. While only 55.5% of respondents identify as a religious believer, 84% identify as Orthodox. Of those, however, only 11.5% further identified with particular Orthodox affiliations (either Moscow Patriarchate, Old Believers, or Russian Foreign Orthodox Church). Most respondents simply re-identified as either Orthodox (31.1%) or, more broadly, as Christian (37.2%).

Accordingly, there is tentative support for the hypothesis that a majority of ethnic Russians identify with Russian Orthodoxy. This support wanes as the threshold for what constitutes affiliation to Russian Orthodoxy shifts. In understanding religious affiliation, is it necessary for members to identify with the Moscow Patriarchate or are vague, umbrella terms (e.g., ‘just Christian,’ ‘just Orthodoxy’) sufficient? I have approached this by relying on subjective sources for understanding social phenomena. In other words, keeping in line with Schutz’s ‘postulate of adequacy,’ if individuals perceive membership to Russian Orthodoxy, Orthodoxy, or the Moscow Patriarchate, then that identity is significant for them and has consequences on other attitudes and values.

Religious belief is operationalized using measures of core monotheistic and Christian beliefs. Frequency distributions of each indicator are presented in Tables 9

²⁰ Clarification regarding the difference between the ‘non-believer’ and ‘atheist’ response items is necessary. Beyond post-communist Russia, and its subsidiary states, these terms may appear redundant. In the context of post-communist states, however, these labels refer to two very different affiliations. In particular, identifying as an atheist in countries such as Russia includes a connotation that goes beyond not believing in God. In addition, this is a political and cultural identity, retrieving the unique socio-historical context of post-communist countries. Therefore, individuals identifying as a ‘non-believer’ are probably those who may not believe in God, but who do not want associate with the charged label of atheism.

Table 8. Frequency Distribution of Indicators of Religious Belonging among Ethnic Russians

		Frequency	Percentage
Religious Person	Believer	777	55.5
	Undecided	318	22.7
	Non-believer	193	13.8
	Atheist	76	5.4
	Not sure	37	2.6
Religious Affiliation	Orthodox	1175	83.9
	Protestant	6	.4
	Muslim	1	.1
	Buddhist	1	.1
	None	196	14
	Not sure	22	1.6
Orthodox Distinction	Christian	521	37.2
	Orthodox	436	31.1
	Moscow Patriarchate	152	10.8
	Old Believer	9	.6
	Russian Foreign Orthodox Church	1	.1
	Not sure	56	4
	Missing	226	16.1

n=1401

and 10. Monotheistic tenets include belief in God, belief about what God is, belief that God created the world, belief in life after death, belief in heaven, and the belief that souls exist. Descriptive analyses of religious belief show the paradoxical nature of religiosity among ethnic Russians. For instance, only 68.2% believe in God despite 84% affiliation to Russian Orthodoxy. Further belief in core monotheistic

Table 9. Frequency Distribution of Indicators of Religious Belief among Ethnic Russians (Monotheistic Tenets)

		Frequency	Percentage
Belief in God	Yes	956	68.2
	No	273	19.5
	Not sure	172	12.3
Concept of God	Personal relationship	286	20.4
	God is impersonal force	484	34.5
	Don't know what to believe	339	24.2
	Nothing exists	196	14
	Not sure	96	6.9
God created the world	Agree	783	55.9
	Disagree	404	28.8
	Not sure	213	15.2
Belief in life after death	Yes	444	31.7
	No	676	48.3
	Not sure	281	20.1
Belief that souls exist	Yes	882	63
	No	345	24.6
	Not sure	174	12.4

n=1401

tenets are even more wavering. Barely half believe that God created the world (55.9%) and less than half believe in life after death (48.3%). Indicators of core Christian beliefs include: belief that Jesus existed, belief in the resurrection of Christ, belief that he was the Son of God, belief in miracles and the respondent's opinion of the Bible. Although most ethnic Russians believe in core Christian doctrine, a sizeable number do not or are unsure. Around 40% of respondents do not believe in

Table 10. Frequency Distribution of Indicators of Religious Belief among Ethnic Russians (Core Christian Tenets)

		Frequency	Percentage
Belief that Jesus existed	Agree	960	68.5
	Disagree	286	20.4
	Not sure	154	11
Belief in resurrection of Christ	Agree	777	55.5
	Disagree	424	40.2
	Not sure	199	14.2
Belief that Jesus is the Son of God	Agree	910	64.9
	Disagree	277	19.7
	Not sure	213	15.2
Belief in miracles	Yes	692	49.4
	No	519	37
	Not sure	190	13.6
Opinion of the Bible	Word of God	316	22.6
	Written by people	456	32.5
	Collection of wise thoughts	149	10.6
	Collection of ancient legends	174	12.4
	Not sure	305	21.8

n=1401

the resurrection of Christ or religious miracles and one fifth do not believe Jesus was the Son of God or that he existed at all.

Indeed, despite the fact that an overwhelming majority of ethnic Russians claim a religious belonging, far less believe in basic Christian and monotheistic tenets. Possibly evidence of what Hervieu-Leger (2000) called ‘belonging without believing’ (reversing Davie’s [1990] ‘believing without belonging’), these findings

shed light on what being religious means for contemporary ethnic Russians. For the purpose of continued investigation, monotheistic and Christian belief items were consolidated to create two indices. Table 11 presents the frequency distributions for these two items. Surprisingly, ethnic Russians seem to hold a higher number of Christian rather than monotheistic beliefs.

Religious behavior is operationalized with commonly used measures found in the literature. These measures include frequency of attendance to religious services, frequency of prayer, and frequency of reading the Bible. The frequency distributions of these indicators are presented in Table 12. Of note, 35.5% of ethnic Russians never attend church services, 42.5% never pray, and 58.3% never read the Bible. Initially, these results show the paradoxical nature of religiosity among ethnic Russians concerning their religious behavior as with their beliefs. But, further investigation into the unique socio-historic context of Russian Orthodoxy in post-communist Russia, and throughout Eastern Orthodoxy in general, can explain these findings.

The fact that church attendance is markedly lower for Russian Orthodox, compared to other European believers, is often noted (Kaariainen, 1999; Knox, 2005) but rarely explained. According to the rational choice model, stricter commitment demanded from churches produce fewer 'free-riders' and, hence, a more active and devoted church population, thereby increasing the likelihood of its survival (Iannaccone, 1994). Some have used this model to explain why church attendance is so low in Russia (e.g., White and McAllister, 2000). Simply, the ROC does not expect/demand strong attendance from its members. Indeed, despite an increase in

Table 11. Frequency Distribution of Monotheistic and Christian Belief Groups

		Frequency	Percentage
Monotheistic	Few	605	43.2
	Some	329	23.5
	Many	467	33.3
Christian	Few	496	35.4
	Some	460	32.9
	Many	444	31.7

n=1401

Table 12. Frequency Distribution of Indicators of Religious Behavior among Ethnic Russians

		Frequency	Percentage
Frequency of church attendance	Weekly	53	3.8
	Monthly	107	7.6
	Several times a year	326	23.3
	Yearly	166	11.8
	Less than a year	251	17.9
	Never	497	35.5
Frequency of prayer	Every day	293	20.9
	Weekly	173	12.3
	Monthly	113	8.1
	Several times a year	164	11.7
	Yearly	63	4.5
	Never	595	42.5
Frequency of reading the Bible	Weekly or more	58	4.1
	Monthly	57	4.1
	Several times a year	123	8.8
	Yearly	69	4.9
	Less than once a year	276	19.7
	Never	817	58.3

n=1401

number of open churches and new clergy, the rate of attendance remains low (Kaariainen, 1999), suggesting that religious practice is not an essential part of being Russian Orthodox. Likewise, Eastern Orthodoxy has traditionally discouraged active Bible reading on the part of lay members. Metropolitan Kallistos of Diokleia, a titular metropolitan bishop of the Greek Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarchate, offers a concise explication of Bible reading in Eastern Orthodoxy: "...we interpret Scripture through and in the Church. If it is the Church that tells us what is Scripture, equally it is the Church that tells us how Scripture is to be understood" (Kallistos, 1992). Many others have also noted this patristic tradition in Eastern Orthodoxy (e.g., Arseniev, 1964; Bartholomew, 1994; Bell, 2008; Breck, 2006). This may also be a consequence of decades-long suppression of religious activities, leaving the mind the only safe place for religious expression. Michael Epstein acknowledged this notion, suggesting that religion was submerged into the 'subconscious' during atheist communism, to be released and transformed into multiple variations of religious expression today (Epstein, Genis, and Vladiv-Glover, 1999).

...What was repressed and excluded during the Soviet epoch was precisely religious consciousness, which occupied the sphere of the unconscious in place of the baser instincts of hate, aggression, cruelty and destruction, ousted from it, transformed into consciousness, and promoted into ideological doctrine (Epstein, Genis, and Vladiv-Glover, 1999, p.345-346).

Again, weak religious practice among affiliates of Russian Orthodoxy is well documented. While these findings may not depict ethnic Russians as strong religious believers in the traditional sense, this is not to say that religion as a social institution is not still powerful and influential. As discussed later, Davie's idea of 'vicarious religion' is useful for understanding this phenomenon.

Attitude toward the role of religion in society is an important dimension of religiosity often ignored in the literature. This refers to the self-described perception of religion and its role in society. This variable is operationalized using the following items: importance of religion in life, confidence in Russian Orthodox Church, and reliance on authority of traditional religions. The frequency distributions for these indicators are presented in Table 13. Over half of ethnic Russians do not consider religion as very important in their lives, despite 84% affiliating with the ROC. However, nearly three-fourths of ethnic Russians have confidence in the ROC and over half rely on the authority of traditional religions. These seemingly contradictory results illustrate the popular attitude toward religion in society as one of functionality. In other words, religion as an institution, which requires specific beliefs and behaviors, is not as important for ethnic Russians, demonstrated by high proportions of disbelief, inaction, and general importance of religion in one's life. But, religion is also considered by most ethnic Russians to be an essential component of post-communist society. It serves as a fundamental source for identity and is trusted and relied on as a source of authority. Continued discussion on the functions of religion is provided at the end of this chapter.

The Relationship between Religiosity and Ethnodoxy

The second empirical task of this chapter is the investigation of the relationship between religiosity and ethnodoxy. This is accomplished by correlating indicators of religiosity with indicators of ethnodoxy. The results from this analysis are presented in Tables 14-17. The wide popularity of ethnodoxy across varying

Table 13. Frequency Distribution of Indicators of Attitude toward Religion in Society among Ethnic Russians

		Frequency	Percentage
Importance of religion in life	Important	652	46.5
	Not important	710	50.7
	Not sure	39	2.8
Confidence in ROC	Trust	1,042	74.4
	Distrust	276	19.7
	Not sure	83	5.7
Rely on authority of traditional religions	Agree	748	53.4
	Disagree	406	29
	Not sure	247	17.6

n=1401

levels of religious belonging, belief, behavior, and attitudes about religion in society is evident. Not surprisingly, higher proportions of ethnic Russians, despite differences in religiosity, adhere to soft over hard ethnodoxy. Again, this confirms the idea that ethnodoxy is a deeply embedded ideology among contemporary ethnic Russians. Nonetheless, these findings show some variability as well.

In terms of religious belonging (see Table 14), a high proportion of respondents adhere to both soft and hard ethnodoxy, regardless of how religious someone considers himself or herself. Even among atheists, 54% believe a Russian is always Orthodox and between one-quarter and one-third adhere to other indicators of ethnodoxy. Greater proportions of unbelievers adhere to ethnodoxy as nearly one-third or more adhere to hard ethnodoxy and over half agree with beliefs of soft ethnodoxy. Respondents who are undecided and, of course, believers exhibit the largest proportions of adherents to ethnodoxy with 75-90% adhering to soft

Table 14. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Religious Belonging and Indicators of Ethnodoxy

		Hard Ethnodoxy				Soft Ethnodoxy		
		No longer Russian if converted from ROC to another religion	Only in Russia can one find 'true' Russian Orthodoxy	Non-Russian can never be a real Russian Orthodox	Western Churches undermine Russians and their traditions	A Russian is always Orthodox	State should protect Russian Orthodox from opponents	Russians are richer in their soul and stronger in their beliefs than Western nations
Religious person?	Believer	39.6	61.9	50.9	61.9	90.6	84.7	82
	Undecided	35.2	56	52.6	51.6	89	76.4	78.3
	Unbeliever	18.7	38.9	43.6	39.4	72	52.8	63.2
	Atheist	22.4	25	32.9	30.3	54	34.2	43.5
	Unsure	18.9	40.5	48.6	45.9	75.7	70.3	64.8
		χ^2	73.777***	122.013***	85.915***	88.679***	166.528***	196.549***
Orthodox affiliation	Christian	38.2	62	51.6	59.7	90.2	85.1	83.3
	Orthodox	38.1	56.4	54.8	53.4	91.5	80.1	77.8
	Moscow Patriarchate	41.5	59.8	50.7	74.4	90.8	86.2	77
	Unsure	23.2	50	46.4	50	89.3	60.8	73.2
		χ^2	38.483**	30.982	31.512*	46.925**	34.577*	38.832**

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

ethnodoxy and over half agreeing with most indicators of hard ethnodoxy. Results among respondents who already claim affiliation to Orthodoxy are somewhat similar. Regardless of Orthodox affiliation, most adhere to soft ethnodoxy, while around half of respondents adhere to hard ethnodoxy. Of particular interest, however, is that a much larger proportion of respondents identifying with the Moscow Patriarchate (74.4%) agree that Western churches undermine Russians and their traditions. Accordingly, this might imply that the intolerant, xenophobic, and exclusionist nature of ethnodoxy is strongest for those respondents who are more religiously certain, at least in terms of belonging. Whether the same pattern is true among respondents with stronger doctrinal belief, more religious activity, and more positive attitudes about the role of the ROC in society, requires further analysis.

As presented in Table 15, the relationship between religious beliefs, both general monotheistic and core Christian tenets, and ethnodoxy are relatively straightforward. In short, larger proportions of respondents with more religious beliefs adhere to ethnodoxy. Likewise, respondents with fewer religious beliefs also show weaker levels of ethnodoxy. The results are the same for both sets of religious beliefs. Despite the variation in religious beliefs, however, a majority in each group adheres to both soft and hard ethnodoxy. In sum, while most respondents agree with the core tenets of ethnodoxy, religious belief and adherence to ethnodoxy are still positively associated.

The relationship between religious behavior and ethnodoxy (see Table 16) offers a similar depiction. In general, larger proportions of respondents adhering to ethnodoxy attend church and pray more frequently. Nonetheless, even those

Table 15. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Religious Belief and Indicators of Ethnodoxy

		Hard Ethnodoxy				Soft Ethnodoxy		
		No longer Russian if converted from ROC to another religion	Only in Russia can one find 'true' Russian Orthodoxy	Non-Russian can never be a real Russian Orthodox	Western Churches undermine Russians and their traditions	A Russian is always Orthodox	State should protect Russian Orthodox from opponents	Russians are richer in their soul and stronger in their beliefs than Western nations
Monotheistic Beliefs	High	39.2	62.7	46.9	58.2	88.5	83.1	83.8
	Some	36.8	57.4	52.8	62.3	89	81.2	79
	Low	29.1	47.3	48.9	46.9	80.3	66.1	68.4
	<i>Gamma</i>	.137**	.219***	.050***	.166***	.165***	.240***	.205***
Christian Beliefs	High	43	60.1	48.4	63.3	88.8	86	83.1
	Some	33.1	61.9	52.8	55.8	91.5	80	80.2
	Low	27.7	43.3	46.6	44.7	76.6	61.5	66
	<i>Gamma</i>	.204***	.245***	.099***	.233***	.269***	.354***	.237***

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table 16. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Religious Behavior and Indicators of Ethnodoxy

		Hard Ethnodoxy				A Russian is always Orthodox	Soft Ethnodoxy	
		No longer Russian if converted from ROC to another religion	Only in Russia can one find 'true' Russian Orthodoxy	Non-Russian can never be a real Russian Orthodox	Western Churches undermine Russians and their traditions		State should protect Russian Orthodox from opponents	Russians are richer in their soul and stronger in their beliefs than Western nations
Frequency of church attendance	Weekly/monthly	39.4	62.5	51.9	56.3	88.1	81.3	78.8
	Several times a year	40.8	62.6	51.2	58.6	90.2	83.8	83.1
	Yearly/less than a year	37.9	57.6	50.3	57.3	89.7	81.8	80.1
	Never	25.4	44.9	46.1	48.3	77.6	62.5	67.2
<i>Gamma</i>		.170***	.226***	.112***	.126***	.195***	.260***	.157***
Frequency of prayer	Everyday	40.3	61.1	53.6	66.6	87.7	86.7	83.6
	Weekly/monthly	40.9	60.5	50.4	57	90.9	81.8	80.1
	Several times a year/yearly	36.2	62.6	50.3	53.7	90.3	78.4	81.9
	Never	27.4	46	46	47.3	79.5	56.3	68.1
<i>Gamma</i>		.167***	.205***	.132***	.203***	.240***	.305***	.189***

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

respondents who are religiously less active exhibit strong levels of ethnodoxy. For instance, a large majority of respondents who never attend church (77.6%) or pray (79.5%) still believe that a Russian is always Orthodox. While religious behavior is related with adherence to ethnodoxy, these results again confirm the spread of this ideology across such variations.

Likewise, the relationship between ethnodoxy and attitudes about religion in society further emphasize the general embeddedness of this ideology among most ethnic Russians (see Table 17). In fact, most ethnic Russians who do not consider religion to be very important in their lives still consider religion to be an important component to their ethnic and national identity. Even a majority of respondents who do not rely on the authority of traditional religions and who are not trusting of the ROC, seek state protection for Russian Orthodoxy and considers Russians spiritually richer than the West. Clearly, the scope of ethnodoxy transcends the variations noted across religious belonging, belief, behavior, and attitudes about religion in society. While these differences are important, the key finding revealed from this analysis is that a majority of ethnic Russians, regardless of their religiosity, believe that being Russian Orthodox is inextricably linked with being Russian.

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was two-fold. First, a profile of religiosity among post-communist ethnic Russians was constructed. In an area of research where many studies have purported the resurgence of religion, it is vital that a thorough empirical investigation into the multi-dimensionality of contemporary Russian religiosity is

Table 17. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Attitudes about the Role of Religion in Society and Indicators of Ethnodoxy

		Hard Ethnodoxy				Soft Ethnodoxy		
		No longer Russian if converted from ROC to another religion	Only in Russia can one find 'true' Russian Orthodoxy	Non-Russian can never be a real Russian Orthodox	Western Churches undermine Russians and their traditions	A Russian is always Orthodox	State should protect Russian Orthodox from opponents	Russians are richer in their soul and stronger in their beliefs than Western nations
Importance of religion in life	Important	38.2	58.3	49.2	58.6	89.3	82.9	80.6
	Not important	29.8	51.3	48.5	51	81.7	68.3	72
	Not sure	48.7	61.5	59	43.5	84.6	76.9	71.8
	<i>Gamma</i>	.105**	.131**	.059**	.140*	.278***	.318***	.205**
Rely on authority of traditional religions	Agree	39.7	60.4	53.7	61.2	90.7	84.9	83
	Disagree	31.8	51.2	47.8	50.2	80.5	66.7	73.3
	Not sure	21.9	43.7	37.6	40.1	76.5	60.4	59.1
	<i>Gamma</i>	.310***	.251***	.254***	.288***	.385***	.428***	.373***
Confidence in ROC	Trust	36.6	60.2	50.6	58.2	90.6	82	80
	Distrust	26.1	39.1	44.2	47.1	69.2	58.4	67.1
	Not sure	31.3	39.8	48.2	29	72.4	48.2	56.6
	<i>Gamma</i>	.198***	.359***	.155***	.314***	.545***	.499***	.335***

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

made. The results from this analysis are both expected and surprising. High rates of religious affiliation, as identified in previous studies, were confirmed in this analysis as well. However, the issue becomes more complicated when respondents are asked to further define their Orthodox affiliation. Nevertheless, as projected in the first hypothesis, a large majority of contemporary ethnic Russians claim some affiliation to Russian Orthodoxy.

In terms of religious belief and behavior, however, the results suggest something more complicated. As expected in the second hypothesis, adherence to religious belief and rates of religious behavior were markedly lower than rates of religious affiliation. Indeed, while nearly 84% identify with Russian Orthodoxy, only 68.2% believe in God and barely 10% attend church once a month or more. Of course, this may be explained due to the idiosyncrasies of Eastern Orthodoxy and the socio-religious landscape of post-communist Russia. Nonetheless, the marked difference between respondents' religious affiliation and their religious beliefs and behavior attests to a unique role of religion in contemporary Russia. Additionally, and in line with the third hypothesis, the low proportion of ethnic Russians that viewed religion as important in their lives, coupled with high percentages that trust the ROC and rely on it as a source of authority, further demonstrates the role of religion, in particular the ROC, more as a public identity in society rather than a spiritual resource of individual salvation.

The idea that religions serve different functions in society is well documented. For example, Abramson identified six major functions of religion: 1) a source of support during grief, 2) transmission of knowledge, 3) means of social control by

legitimizing certain norms and values, 4) religious prophecy can supply reform and social change, 5) personal growth and development, and 6) a source of group identity (Abramson, 1980). In any given society, religion may provide some combination of these functions. Davie's notion of 'vicarious religion,' a conceptualization of the role of religion in society that stresses the function of traditional religions as public institutions, captures this idea.

It is in this context, moreover, that the nature (as well as the role) of Europe's historic churches becomes apparent, the more so if seen in a comparative perspective. It becomes increasingly clear, for example, that European populations continue to see such churches as public utilities maintained for the common good, a situation quite different from that in the United States (Davie, 2005, p.143).

Clearly, a similar understanding of religion's function can be applied to post-communist Russia. Based on Abramson's typology, Russian Orthodoxy is perceived by the public as serving certain functions. According to the empirical results in this chapter, one of the most important (if not the most essential) functions of religion is to serve as a source for creating group identity. This is particularly important in terms of substantiating the application of ethnodoxo in post-communist Russia. On the other hand, low levels of religious belief and behavior suggest that a primary role of Russian Orthodoxy has not functioned, at least not commonly, as a form of personal piety. Nevertheless, the following chapters show that Russian Orthodoxy, as embodied in the ROC, also provide other functions as well. For instance, the position of the ROC both socially and politically, coupled with its high public opinion, allows for the transmission and maintenance of certain types of knowledge and, subsequently, capabilities for social control to occur. This becomes especially

apparent regarding the role and influence of the ROC on social attitudes toward homosexuality, abortion, and the cultivation of anti-West sentiments.

The second empirical task in this chapter was to investigate the relationship between religiosity and ethnodoxo. The results from this task were less complex. Despite some variation across levels of religiosity, most ethnic Russians adhere to some dimension of ethnodoxo. Unsurprisingly, larger proportions of adherents to ethnodoxo were respondents that were more certain about their religious affiliation, held firmer religious beliefs, attended church and prayed more. These results support the projections discussed in the beginning of this chapter. In fact, respondents who were more certain about their religious affiliation, more religiously active, and expressed strong institutional support for the ROC, had higher rates of support for xenophobic and anti-West ethnodox beliefs. For instance, while only 53.4% or 59.7% of respondents who distinguished their Orthodox affiliation as either Orthodox or Christian (respectively), nearly 75% of respondents who identified as a member of the Moscow Patriarchate believed that Western churches undermine Russians and their traditions. In addition, a higher proportion of these respondents believed that the state should protect Russian Orthodoxy from its opponents. Could this imply that respondents who have a more intimate, clearer notion of their Orthodox identity also have more xenophobic and anti-West sentiments? Does a closer, more interactive relationship with the ROC and its leaders contribute to the transmission and legitimation of such beliefs?

To investigate this further, the following analysis examines respondents who exhibited these characteristics more closely. Specifically, respondents were selected

if they further identified their Orthodox affiliation as Moscow Patriarchate, attended church once a month or more, held trust in the authority of traditional religions, and were confident of the ROC (see Table 18). Differences in levels of ethnodoxy in these groups are striking. Respondents with more certain Orthodox identity have larger proportions of adherence to ethnodoxy than respondents who are less certain, less active, and less trusting of the ROC and its authority in society. Even more importantly, respondents who have more certain Orthodox identity have significantly higher proportions that carry ethnodox beliefs that espouse xenophobia, protectionism, and anti-West sentiments. For instance, 85.7% of respondents with more certain Orthodox identity, versus 75.3% of their counterparts, believe that the state should protect Russian Orthodoxy from its opponents. Additionally, 78.5% of these respondents, versus 54.1% of less certain respondents, agree that Western churches undermine Russians and their traditions. Evidently, ethnic Russians that are more religiously certain, have a deeper understanding of their religious affiliation, higher rates of institutional trust in the ROC, and have higher proportions that adhere to ethnodoxy, especially to the tenets that are xenophobic, protectionist, and anti-Western.

Whether the church and its agents are directly, or indirectly, disseminating these beliefs, attitudes, and values is a question requiring further empirical analysis and contextual consideration. Subsequent chapters dealing with intolerance and xenophobia in contemporary Russia and Russian Orthodoxy will contribute to this discussion. At this point, it is worth noting the relationship between active and more certain members of Russian Orthodoxy and their adherence to ethnodoxy. Clearly,

Table 18. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Certain/Less Certain Orthodox Identity and Indicators of Ethnodoxy

	Hard Ethnodoxy				Soft Ethnodoxy		
	No longer Russian if converted from ROC to another religion	Only in Russia can one find 'true' Russian Orthodoxy	Non-Russian can never be a real Russian Orthodox	Western Churches undermine Russians and their traditions	A Russian is always Orthodox	State should protect Russian Orthodox from opponents	Russians are richer in their soul and stronger in their beliefs than Western nations
Certain Orthodox Identity	50	64.3	42.9	78.5	85.7	85.7	78.5
Less certain Orthodox Identity	34.2	54.7	49.3	54.1	85.4	75.3	76.1
<i>Gamma</i>	.388	.275	.013	.500*	.380	.557*	.196

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

the ROC has an important role, not only in the so-called post-communist 'resurgence of religion,' but also in the ethnic, national, and political spheres as well. In this way, the next two chapters tackle the scope and consequences of ethnodoxo regarding national and political identity, attitudes, and values.

CHAPTER IX: ETHNODOXY AND PERCEPTION OF NATION

There has been no lack of interest in nation-building, national identity, and nationalism in post-socialist Europe since the fall of communism. Some of these studies have even mentioned the role of dominant religions in nation building (e.g., Bruce, 1999; Herbert and Fras, 2009; Knox, 2008; Merdjanova, 2000; Roudometof, 1999; Sarkissian, 2010; Tomka, 1995; White, 2007; and Warhola and Lehning, 2007). However, religion is often reduced to a sub-component of other forms of identity. This chapter deepens this area of research by focusing on the symbiotic bond between religion and ethnicity (i.e., ethnodox), and its association with nationhood. This is important because conceptually, ethnodox emphasizes a relationship between ethnicity, religion, and nationhood, particularly in the Russian case where the distinction between ethnicity and nationhood is often blurred. For instance, ethnodox beliefs stress the role of the state to protect Russian Orthodoxy and compare the nation of Russia with Western nations. Therefore, the central question for this chapter is: *how is ethnodox related to perceptions of nationhood?*

The influence of religion on nationhood is not an uncommon theme in the literature. For instance, many scholars have noted the relationship between religiousness and nationalism in times of uncertainty. North argued that humans create institutions (e.g., religion) to manage knowledge, which in turn, reduces uncertainty (2005). Kinnvall explored evidence of the relationship between religion and nationalism as a way to confront insecurities brought on by rapid change (e.g., globalization) and conflict (2004). Norris and Inglehart suggested that their ‘security

axiom' best describes why levels of religiosity increased in some unstable post-socialist societies (2004). Even Bruce, in defense of his secularization thesis, posited that the areas of vibrant religious life were usually caused by ethnic and national conflicts (1999). To sum up, religion has been used as an important identifier and resource for the construction of national identity, particularly in social climates of unrest, instability, and uncertainty.

In addition, many studies have noted the importance of dominant and national religions for nation building in post-communist societies. Merdjanova discussed the historically close relationship between religion and nationalism in Eastern Europe, and conceptualized nationalism as a functionally successful political religion based on Kauffman's six functions of religion (2000).²¹ Roudometof differentiated between citizenship (citizen of state) and nationhood (which includes ethnic, citizenship, and religious foundations) and emphasized the prominence of nationhood in Eastern Europe (1999). Sarkissian explored the close relationship between religious organizations and nationhood, concluding that both can reaffirm the other (2010). As exemplified in the Russian case, this relationship can provide moral legitimacy to the state and resources to the Church. Similarly, Tonka noted the role that religion has played in providing moral and ideological substance after the collapse of the Soviet Union (1995). He described religion as replacing the 'ideological void' leftover from communist atheism. White also described the importance of the Russian Orthodox Church in maintaining national religious, moral, and ethical values throughout Europe

²¹ Kaufmann's six functions of religion include: identity creation, guide behavior, overcoming unforeseen events, encourage social integration, offer cosmic perspective, and to distance people from their world (Merdjanova, 2000).

(2007). Clearly, religion has played an active role in (re-)constructing nationhood and providing ideological substance in post-socialist Europe.

The purpose of this chapter is to further explore this relationship. This is accomplished by investigating the symbiotic relationship between religion and ethnicity, and its association with nationhood. As the previous chapters demonstrated, belief in an ideology that links religious and ethnic identities is widespread and deeply embedded among post-communist ethnic Russians. This suggests that the conflation between religion and ethnicity plays a role in constructing both ethnic *and* national identity. Therefore, it is vital that the ways in which these beliefs relate to popular perceptions of one's nation are analyzed.

Conceptualization and Hypotheses

Anderson defined the nation as “an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (1997, p.44). I have employed the idea of imagined communities earlier as useful models for understanding large, intangible social groups that individuals perceive membership to such as religions and ethnicities. But Anderson constructed the concept explicitly as a way to make sense of the nation and national consciousness, or nation-ness. Again, such social entities are imagined because no member will ever actually meet every other member. They are communities because they, nonetheless, evoke a degree of comradeship. They are limited because they have boundaries regarding what is and is not part of the community. Finally, they are politically sovereign, or having recognized authority over a particular territory. In short, the nation for Anderson is more than a social trait

(like sex or age). Instead, identification with a nation is similar to 'kinship' or, for Anderson, even religion, which can induce feelings of integration, belonging, and, subsequently, norms and values.

Based on this definition of nation, national identity refers to the self-described affiliation with a particular nation. As described in Chapter III, social identity theory can help explain individual membership in large intangible social entities such as national, ethnic, and religious groups. Again, social identity theory stresses the preservation and legitimation of large social groups through the creation of norms and self-evaluation, which maintains what it means to be a member. Doing so establishes the boundary between in-groups and out-groups. In terms of national identity, this is accomplished, in part, by comparatively evaluating nations. For instance, how does Russia and being Russian compare with other nations? Do Russians consider being Russian exceptional and distinct, or do they view being Russian as part of being European and Western?

Nationalism, on the other hand, is usually referred to as an ideology, or a belief system based on loyalty toward one's nation. According to Guibernau, nationalism has a "dual character as a political doctrine and as a source of identity for individuals living in modern societies" (1997, p.133). In this way, nationalism is based on, firstly, identity to one's nation. Identity involves boundaries, based on norms and expectations, between in-group and out-group. Hence, Guibernau describes nationalism as "an ideology of inclusion and exclusion at the same time" (1997, p.134). Secondly, nationalism is an ideology, a system of beliefs that espouse loyalty to one's nation. For Guibernau, this includes an emotional dimension. "By

strengthening the consciousness of belonging to a group with common objectives, nationalism may arouse deep feelings of love or indeed hatred” (1997, p.134). In this way, the perception of one’s nation is, on the one hand, a deeply personal identification and, on the other hand, a link to something much larger than the individual.

In terms of ethnodoxo, understanding the perception of nation by ethnic Russians is particularly important. While ethnic, religious, and national identities are, theoretically, distinct; in actuality, their overlap and conflation are common. Therefore, in order to understand one facet of ethnodoxo, we must understand the others. In other words, to understand how ethnic Russians perceive themselves ethnically and religiously, we must understand how they understand their national identity and nation-ness.

Based on the literature on nation and nationalism, two dimensions of the relationship between ethnodoxo and nationhood are specified and explored. First, popular perceptions of Russia in the global community are assessed. Due to the exclusive nature of ethnodoxo (i.e., only in Russia is there a true Orthodox and only a Russian can be truly Orthodox) and the aforementioned consequences of a strong link between religion and nationhood, I expect ethnodoxo to be linked to strong perceived boundaries between Russia and Europe, and Russia and the West. In other words, *ethnodoxo should have an inverse relationship with perceptions of Russia as European and Western (Hypothesis 3a)*. Second, levels of nationalism (indicated by how proud respondents are of being a citizen of Russia) are addressed. Since ethnodoxo emphasizes a clear conceptualization of what it means to be Russian, I

expect that adherents to ethnodoxy also have a clearer and more pronounced national pride. Therefore, I expect *nationalism and ethnodoxy to have a positive relationship (Hypothesis 3b)*. As these hypotheses are empirically tested, a clearer understanding of the relationship between religion, ethnicity, and nationhood in contemporary Russia is obtained.

Perception of Nation among Contemporary Ethnic Russians

For the purpose this study, the *perception of nation* includes two dimensions: the opinion of Russia as European and Western and levels of nationalism. This concept is operationalized using two survey indicators: viewing Russia as part of Europe and inevitably Western and how proud the respondent is of being a citizen of Russia. The frequency distributions for these indicators are presented in Table 19.

The frequency distribution of the first indicator of popular perceptions of nation among ethnic Russians illustrates a diversity of opinions. In short, ethnic Russians are spread regarding their opinion about Russia being European and Western. Of note is that nearly a third are unsure of their opinion on the matter. The second indicator, 'proud of being a citizen,' is often used to capture levels of nationalism. A strong majority (78%) is proud of being a citizen of Russia. Clearly, there is an uncertain and perhaps even paradoxical perception of Russia and its place in the global community. While most are proud of being Russian and believe Western influences are undermining, views of Russia as European or Western are less confident.

Table 19. Frequency Distribution of Indicators of Popular Perceptions of Nation

		Frequency	Percentage
Russia is a European country and will be part of the West	Agree	459	32.7
	Disagree	555	39.6
	Not sure	387	27.6
Proud of being a citizen of Russia	Proud	1093	78
	Not Proud	238	17
	Not sure	70	5

n=1401

Before further analysis is conducted, one limitation regarding survey measurement is noted. In particular, the first indicator measuring the perception of nation (i.e., 'Russia is a European country and will be part of the West') may be seen as a double-barreled question because it implies Russia as both European and, eventually, Western. While obviously Europe is commonly considered Western, the category 'Western' includes countries outside of Europe, specifically the United States. Given the historically fragile, if not at times hostile, relationship between the United States and Russia, including both categories in one measurement item might be problematic. In short, respondents may consider Russia European but not Western because it implies a relationship with the United States. Of course, without testing this item as separate survey questions, this consideration is only speculative.

However, the use of this indicator still outweighs this limitation as long as it is understood as providing a preliminary, partial insight into attitudes toward Russia more generally, and its position in the international community and other national networks. This harks back to the definition of nation and national identity described

above. Do Russians consider themselves exceptional regarding their national identity, or part of a larger, collegial community of nations?

The Relationship between Perception of Nation and Religiosity

Part of the conceptual framework of ethnodoxo emphasizes the importance of religious identity. It is vital that adherents affiliate strictly with their ethnic group's dominant religion and seek a protective status from its opponents. In the case of contemporary ethnic Russians, ethnodoxo implies involvement from the state to provide this protection and preservation. In this way, the popular perception of Russia as a nation is a crucial element for adhering to ethnodoxo. This section explores how the perception of nation is related to levels of religiosity and, subsequently, ethnodoxo.

As noted in the literature, the relationship between nationhood and religiosity is often strongest in climates of uncertainty and instability. The socio-historical context of contemporary Russia is one such example. Almost twenty-five years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation has experienced its share of political, economic, and social volatility – including financial crises, political corruption and suspected election fraud, suppression of the media, etc. According to North and others, institutions like religion are established that help bring solace to individuals during such moments of insecurity. Moreover, a link between religion and nationhood can be created that provides further reassurance and confidence among citizens living in an unstable society.

To investigate this expectation, Table 20 presents results from a crosstabulation between nationalism and indicators of religiosity. For simplicity, an indicator of each dimension of religiosity was chosen (belonging, belief, behavior, and attitude about religion in society). The findings from this analysis are telling. A larger percentage of respondents who exhibit religious qualities are also proud of being a Russian citizen. In particular, respondents who believe in God and admit that religion is important in their lives show substantially higher percentages of nationalism. In sum, these findings show a positive relationship between religiosity and nationalism. Based on the literature, it is expected that such relationships are established due to the volatile socio-political environment that individuals must navigate. However, confirmation of this would require comparative analysis. For the purpose of this study, it is important to note the relationship between religiosity and nationalism as a crucial element of adherence to ethnodoxo.

The Relationship between Perception of Nation and Ethnodoxo

Again, the concept of ethnodoxo emphasizes a relationship between ethnicity and religion. However, as operationalized in post-communist Russia, ethnodoxo also stresses the important role of the state as well. If adherents to ethnodoxo seek state protection for their ideological beliefs, what is the popular perception of their nation? In this way, it is imperative that we investigate the empirical association between ethnodoxo and perception of the state. This is accomplished by correlating the two indicators measuring perception of nation with the indicators of ethnodoxo. The results from this analysis are presented in Table 21.

Table 20. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Religiosity and Nationalism

		Proud of being a Russian Citizen		
		Proud	Not Proud	Unsure
Religious person	Believer	81.3	13.8	4.9
	Undecided	79.6	16	4.4
	Unbeliever	67.9	27.5	4.7
	Atheist	69.7	26.3	3.9
	Unsure	64.9	18.9	16.2
<i>Gamma</i>		.200***		
Belief in God	Yes	81	14.4	4.6
	No	70.3	25.3	4.4
	Unsure	73.8	18	8.1
<i>Gamma</i>		.205***		
Frequency of attendance	Weekly or more	88.7	3.8	7.5
	Monthly	86	9.3	4.7
	Several times a year	80.4	16.9	2.8
	Yearly	84.9	9	6
	Less than once a year	76.9	17.9	5.2
	Never	71.8	22.3	5.8
<i>Gamma</i>		.202***		
Importance of religion in life	Important	83	12.3	4.8
	Not important	73.8	21	5.2
	Unsure	71.8	23.1	5.1
<i>Gamma</i>		.239***		
Authority of traditional religions should be relied on	Agree	81.3	14.4	4.3
	Disagree	78.6	18.7	2.7
	Unsure	67.2	21.9	10.9
<i>Gamma</i>		.208***		

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table 21. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Perception of Nation and Indicators of Ethnodoxy

		Hard Ethnodoxy				Soft Ethnodoxy		
		No longer Russian if converted from ROC to another religion	Only in Russia can one find 'true' Russian Orthodoxy	Non-Russian can never be a real Russian Orthodox	Western Churches undermine Russians and their traditions	A Russian is always Orthodox	State should protect Russian Orthodox from opponents	Russians are richer in their soul and stronger in their beliefs than Western nations
Russia is a European country and will be part of the West	Agree	36.4	54.2	48.6	53.4	86.7	75.2	77.3
	Disagree	35.9	62.3	55.3	61.8	88.8	80.2	81.3
	Not sure	29.5	44.7	41.1	44.7	78.6	68.5	66.9
	<i>Gamma</i>	<i>.166***</i>	<i>.157***</i>	<i>.141***</i>	<i>.155***</i>	<i>.199***</i>	<i>.132***</i>	<i>.190***</i>
Proud of being a citizen of Russia	Proud	34.8	55.4	49.2	55.2	86.9	75.9	78.8
	Not Proud	32.4	53.4	50	53.8	79	73.5	66.4
	Not sure	32.9	50	45.7	42.9	81.4	71.4	65.7
	<i>Gamma</i>	<i>.096**</i>	<i>.085</i>	<i>.067***</i>	<i>.113**</i>	<i>.244**</i>	<i>.083</i>	<i>.284***</i>

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Generally, these findings are reminiscent of previous analyses. Overall, a larger proportion of respondents, regardless of their perception of nation, adhere to soft ethnodoxo over hard ethnodoxo. In fact, over half of respondents, and in most cases over 75%, adhere to the beliefs of soft ethnodoxo. Over one-third of respondents, and in most cases over 50%, adheres to the beliefs of hard ethnodoxo. In short, these findings support the running theme that ethnodoxo is an existing ideology for most ethnic Russians, despite differences in social demographics, levels of religiosity, and even perceptions of nation.

Nevertheless, there is some variation across different perceptions of nation that are worth noting. For instance, for every indicator of ethnodoxo but one ('no longer Russian if convert to another religion'), a higher proportion of respondents adhering to ethnodoxo disagree with the statement that Russia is part of Europe and the West. Similarly, a higher percentage of respondents adhering to ethnodoxo are proud of being a Russian citizen. These results should not be surprising given the nature of ethnodoxo to foster preservation of traditional religions through protection of the state as well as anti-West attitudes. Indeed, it is in these belief items that we see the highest level of discrepancy.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to explore the relationship between ethnodoxo and popular perceptions of nation. As operationalized for the contemporary Russian case, the concept of ethnodoxo includes attitudes toward

Russia as a nation, and its relationship with the West. Therefore, it is imperative that a deeper understanding of adherents' disposition toward their nation is obtained.

By completing this task, two major conclusions can be drawn. First, the relationship between religiosity and nationalism confirms expectations from the literature that describe the creation of institutions, like religion, as meaningful sources of knowledge and comfort during times of societal uncertainty. Second, adherence to ethnodoxy, while generally widespread across variations of popular perceptions of Russia, is similarly higher for respondents with more anti-West and nationalistic orientations. Not only do these results confirm the hypotheses set at the beginning of this chapter, but they also suggest the establishment of ethnodoxy as a very real belief system, related to levels of nationalism and national superiority, that may be used as a source for stability and direction in an otherwise unstable environment.

While the analyses in this study portray attitudes, beliefs, and values for post-communist Russians in 2005, these findings can provide tentative insight for understanding the social, political, and religious climate of Russia in 2012. For instance, when this paper was written, Russia was experiencing significant social and political change surrounding the 2012 presidential elections. The prospect of, and eventual, re-election of Vladimir Putin as president spurred public discontent and protest against the apparent fraudulent and corrupt political system. As described earlier, Putin's popular nationalist agenda has emphasized Russian-ness, speaking particularly to ethnic Russians, as having historical and traditional roots (which include a religious element) and self-reliance in terms of its relationship toward and dependence on other nations. Therefore, the results from this chapter, which show

that ethnic Russians are anti-West, patriotic, and that their perception of nation and level of nationalism vary according to the adherence of ethnodoxy, may help explain Putin's popularity and re-election.

Of course, the conditions of the current presidential election and the search for genuine public opinion about Putin, his agenda, and attitudes about the functionality of the political system in general, are complicated and beyond the scope of this study. Instead, the conclusions from this chapter further exemplify the embeddedness of ethnodoxy among contemporary ethnic Russians and the scope of its manifestation, including the perception of Russia and levels of nationalism. As the next chapter demonstrates, the consequences of ethnodoxy are felt in the political realm as well. Tied intimately with the perception of Russia, political orientations of contemporary ethnic Russians further illustrate the importance of ethnodoxy.

CHAPTER X: ETHNODOXY AND POLITICAL LIFE

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the political climate in Russia has attracted both popular and academic attention alike. Many studies have provided useful assessments of political life in Russia, highlighting the social and political orientations and attitudes of its citizens. The goal of this section will be to contribute a meaningful exploration into the relationship between ethno-religious identity and popular political sentiment. The main question for this chapter is: *how is ethnodoxa related to popular attitudes and perceptions of political institutions and conditions?* Doing so will not only provide a better understanding of political views of ethnic Russians, but may also shed light into current happenings surrounding the 2012 presidential election.

Traditionally, the relationship between religion and politics has been an important element in understanding our social world. According to Weber, the relationship between institutional religion and political organization can take three forms: theocracy, hierocracy, or Caesaropapism (1921). Curiously, as Flere noted, Weber did not include a mode that emphasizes the separation of church and state as a possible institutional arrangement (2001). Therefore, Weber's typology is incomplete as exemplified in constitutions among nation-states throughout the world, which emphasize the official division between religion and politics. However, the relationship between religion and politics is complex, including both official and unofficial dimensions. So, even when religious and political institutions are officially differentiated, unofficial or latent relationships may still be present. Many studies

have explored the relationship between religion and politics despite the legal separation between both spheres (e.g., Casanova, 1994).

This dynamic is evident in the case of contemporary Russia as well. The 1997 Law of Religion defines Russia as a secular country with no state religion. In addition, this legislation sanctions the freedom of any religious group to organize and practice within the country. However, the reality of this separation between religion and state is far more complicated. For instance, some religious groups have been given special privileges. In the preamble, Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism are singled out as having special historical significance to Russian. Furthermore, Russian Orthodoxy is described as especially contributing to Russian history and culture.

As described in Chapter IV, the Law of Religion categorizes religious groups into three tiers: *religious sects* are small and are unable to register with the government; *non-traditional* religious organizations must have at least ten members, can register with the government, but can not use the 'Russian' label until 50 years of existence; and *traditional* religious organizations are those religious groups that have been in Russia for more than 50 years. There are many examples of traditional religious organizations, particularly the Russian Orthodox Church, as receiving special advantages and privileges over non-traditional religious groups (Marsh and Froese, 2004). So, while Russia is officially a secular society unattached to a state church, specific interests have been maintained, especially with the ROC, emphasizing a close relationship between religion and politics. Basil described three approaches toward understanding the relationship between church and state in Russia:

traditional, separatist, and cooperationist views. The traditional view maintains a tight church-state relationship, the separatist perspective calls for a separation between Church and state, while the cooperationist approach envisions an accountable and sincere collaboration between the two. For Basil, neither has been fully supported and each offer a unique set of advantages and disadvantages (2009). Nevertheless, at this point it is enough to note that religion and politics are not as distinct as would officially and legally appear.

The purpose of this chapter will be to gauge how closely religion, ethnicity, and politics are related. In doing so, two main dimensions of political life are explored: 1) individual political orientations and behavior and 2) attitudes toward systemic political trends. While there has been interest in post-communist political life, few have purposefully explored the influence of religion and none investigating the relationships between ethno-religious linkages and political life.

Individual Political Orientations and Behavior

Conceptually, the following analysis explores individual political orientations and behavior that include political party membership, support for political parties, and voting tendencies. The development of a multi-party system in post-Soviet Russia has not been without obstacles. While the existence of multiple political parties has proceeded, support and active membership has not corresponded. Based on a 1992 survey, White, Wyman, and Kryshchanovskaya stated, “parties are widely believed to be playing a role of little significance in Russian politics, and that there is little interest in their activities” (1995). In addition, while the public certainly had varying

social and political views, these were not proportionally reflected in the existing political parties. In other words, Russia had a “political system without parties” (White et al., 1995). Moser explained the weak upstart of political parties and low membership based on three historical conditions: 1) an underdeveloped civil society, 2) the sequencing of founding elections, and 3) communist-era antiparty attitudes (2001).

Accordingly, many have questioned the *integrity* of democracy in Russia. The Freedom House downgraded Russia to the ‘Not Free’ category and the Duma (parliament) has been described as ‘tamed’ (Litvinovich, 2003) and ‘toothless’ (Orttung (2008), some suggest that democracy in Russia has been ‘derailed’ (Fish, 2005). However, Russia’s multi-party system, albeit weak and volatile, is for some, the only proof that some version of democracy still exists in Russia today. Brader and Tucker note that the very existence of multiple political parties is evidence that at least some form of democracy is still present (2009). Furthermore, based on their 2006 survey-based experiments, political parties were significantly influential in terms of cueing voters about popular policies. Therefore, while the political climate has forced many to question the integrity of democracy in Russia, the fact that multiple political parties exist and influence voters should not be overlooked.

In general, most research has used an objective approach toward understanding political parties and voting in contemporary Russian. For instance, Kunicova and Remington investigated how differences in the way Duma representatives were elected affected floor votes (2008). Ishiyama and Shafqat examined changes in political party identity after the collapse of the Soviet Union

(2000). Dawisha and Deets analyzed voting behavior based on the institutionalization and normalization of political learning brought on by previous elections (2006). By exploring membership to and support for political parties in Russia, I will contribute to this literature by assessing popular perceptions (i.e., subjective) of affiliation and support to political parties. In addition, the association between religion and political life will be addressed. As Dawisha and Deets noted, it is vital that the complexity inherent in background influencers in candidates and voters alike, such as ethnicity and religiosity, must be acknowledged in order to obtain a clearer understanding of political life in contemporary Russia (2006).

Attitudes toward Political Institutions and Democracy

In addition to individual affiliation and support for political parties, it is important to understand popular perception of Russian political life in terms of institutional and societal trends. Doing so offers a comprehensive depiction of political life among ethnic Russians, and its popular reception. This is accomplished by exploring attitudes toward political institutions and opinions about the influence of democracy. While both areas have been covered in the literature, rarely do previous efforts investigate the relationship between ethno-religious and political identities. This chapter contributes to the following literature base by filling this gap.

Attitudes toward Political Institutions in Contemporary Russia

In order to understand popular attitudes toward public institutions in contemporary Russia, the unique cultural and historical context must be considered.

The following review summarizes major efforts at understanding post-communist attitudes toward and confidence in political institutions.

Based on institutional theory, Mishler and Willerton combined cultural explanations to understand differences in public support for Yeltsin and Putin (2003). While institutional theory emphasizes institutional performance (in this case, the presidency), cultural explanations refer to Russia's historical orientation toward authoritative leaders to explain Putin's increase in popularity. In short, Mishler and Willerton found evidence of both, what they termed a 'dual political culture' (2003). Following Oliver's efforts on deinstitutionalization, Batjargal used institutional theory and cultural explanations to compare networks of entrepreneurs in China and Russia (2007). In short, he found that due to deinstitutionalization processes leading to an institutional void left by the collapse of the Soviet Union, new rules and norms have been created, dissolving old networks and relationships but accruing overall low levels of trust. Batjargal's investigation highlighted the unique cultural psyche among Russians, grounded in mystic and transcendental traditions of Russian Orthodoxy, which has made them "more tolerant of uncertainties and comfortable absorbing mutually exclusive and contradictory thoughts and mental positions" (2007, p.401). This idea may be problematic however, as most contemporary Russians do not practice Orthodox mysticism.

Others have similarly noted the influence of cultural factors on public trust, or rather distrust, of institutions in contemporary Russia. Indeed, as described in Shlapentokh's study, Russians hold an everyday taken-for-grantedness that no one should be trusted (2006). As noted journalist Yulia Kalinina wrote, "lying and

deception has become a norm of life,” and, rather extremely, divided Russians into two types of people: those who deceive other people and those who fail at doing it (2005). Rose described this normalization of distrust as a “pervasive legacy of communist rule,” resulting from the repression of all aspects of social life by the one political machine (1994, p.18). Based on this historical context, Shlapentokh provided survey evidence depicting Russia as “a country, much more than any other, that mistrusts almost all social institutions in the country and political institutions in the first place” (2006, p.155). Indeed, the general distrust in social institutions has apparently become normalized in Russian culture. One of the tasks in this chapter will be to explore this assumption further. In particular, public trust/distrust toward political institutions (i.e., president, political parties, government) is examined, contributing to a fuller understanding of the political orientation, attitudes, and behaviors among ethnic Russians and how these characteristics are related to ethnodoxo.

Attitudes toward Democracy in Contemporary Russia

In addition, it is essential that popular perceptions about democracy and its consequences are assessed. As discussed in preceding chapters, attitudes toward the West and its influence are important elements making up ethnodoxo. Attitude toward democracy, then, becomes an obvious manifestation of such influences. The following review explores previous efforts aimed at explaining popular perceptions of the West and the role of democracy in post-communist Russia.

In general, most research shows a decreasing interest in the West, democracy, and integration with Europe as manifested in public policy and individual political agendas. In Chandler's comparative study of attitudes toward welfare reforms between Russia and Latvia, Russian leaders were found to be less open to Western-oriented policies (2001). In their comparative analysis of attitudes toward Europe and the West in Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, White, McAllister, and Valentina (2010) described Russians as unsurprisingly pro-Slavic, more likely to regret the demise of the USSR, and more interested in unification among the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In addition, Russia's political influence in Ukraine and, especially, Belarus are felt as 'Europeanness' in such countries has declined over the past decade (White, McAllister, and Valentina, 2010).

Such depictions of Russia as against, or at least uninterested in, Western democracy have largely blamed the pro-nationalist Putin administration. In fact, as Rivera and Rivera noted, Yeltsin's Russia was far more democratic, compared to other post-communist states, than most research speculates (2009). Indeed, Russia during the 1990s had, as Brader and Tucker described, "all the trappings of a newly emerging democracy: unpredictable elections, competing political parties, a parliament capable of opposing the president and a vibrant (if at times biased) media" (2009, p.844). By the end of his tenure, support for Yeltsin had dramatically declined due to weak presence in the Duma, a stagnated international reputation, unfinished conflict in Chechnya, and an erratic personal life (Mishler and Willerton, 2003). Moreover, mass discontent of the economy, made worse with the 'Ruble crisis' in

1998, further contributed to the increasing skepticism of democracy in Russia and a move toward more authoritarian alternatives.

By the end of the 1990s, other options were becoming increasingly popular. (In fact, even as early as the 1996 presidential elections, Yeltsin's triumph over the communist nominee, Gennady Zyuganov, is still contested to this day.) Specifically, Putin's strong and well-received pro-nationalist agenda ushered in a new era for Russian political life. Not without struggle, as Warhola and others described, Putin pushed for 'monocultural Russocentrism,' insisting on a strong Russian Orthodox-national identity as exemplified in the proposal for Orthodox culture courses in public schools (Warhola, 2007; Warhola and Lehning, 2007).

Putin's restoration of a traditional pro-Slavic, and anti-West, Russia has been well documented. For many, this has become a zero sum issue. Either, Russia adopts Western liberal democracy, or retains its 'outdated' and incompatible authoritarian traditions (Levinskaya, 2007). According to DeLue, this problem is best explained in terms of public memories. For DeLue,

National identity is in large part predicated on shared, public memories that not only point to common cultural and historical realities but to the publically legitimated moral values that each individual should accept as the basis for being a citizen in good standing in a given society (2006, p.403).

In short, DeLue suggested that low levels of tolerance and liberal attitudes of justice in Russia are due to weak public memories of radical injustice maintained by the authoritarian nature of Russia's political climate (2006).

However, some say that Russia's traditional ties to authoritarianism and openness to Western liberalism are not mutually exclusive. In their analysis of presidential popularity in post-communist Russia, Mishler and Willerton found

evidence of a dual political culture; one that has ties to values of traditional authoritarian culture, but which provokes citizens to hold leaders individually accountable for their performance, thereby exhibiting a liberal ideal of strong public opinion (2003). As Rivera and Rivera note, a prominent explanation as to the foundation of Russia's autocratic tendencies has been due to its relationship with Eastern Orthodoxy (2009). Prodromou explored the doctrinal compatibilities between Orthodoxy and democracy, highlighting external and internal signs of pluralization (2004). For Prodromou, Western democratic pluralism has been portrayed as absolute and universal, whereas in reality, there can be many different ways for societies to achieve democracy, tolerance, and freedom of rights (2004). Indeed, Agadjanian and Rousselet examined Metropolitan Kirill's negotiation between traditional (Orthodox) and liberal values (secular globality) in the face of globalization (2005). Kirill has called for a combination of both inside each nation. In other words, an internalization of this combination within each national, or regionalized (Danilova, 2009), Orthodox Church, would allow 'progression' but within the control of each Church (Agadjanian and Rousselet, 2005). Clearly, the role and perception of democracy in Russia is complicated. Moreover, the Church has added to the complexity by instilling contradictory positions on such issues. In this way, it is vital that on-the-ground perceptions of democracy and the West are understood, and how these views correlate with ethnodox beliefs are examined.

Hypotheses

Again, the purpose of this chapter will be to explore how adherence to ethnodoxy is related to political orientations and attitudes. Based on previous research, the following hypotheses are projected. Membership to political parties will be assessed but mostly in a descriptive capacity. Based on the literature, *I do not expect high levels of affiliation to or support for political parties (Hypothesis 4a)*. However, because of Putin's strong popularity and nationalist agenda, I expect that *individuals who adhere to higher levels of ethnodoxy will affiliate with and support political parties and leaders with pro-nationalist tendencies (Hypothesis 4b)*. Based on the literature emphasizing popular distrust in social institutions, *I expect that most ethnic Russians will be distrusting of political institutions (Hypothesis 4c)*. Finally, due to the particularistic nature of ethnodoxy, which includes exclusive definitions of being 'Russian' and 'Orthodox,' I expect there to be a positive relationship between ethnodoxy and anti-West/democratic attitudes. In other words, *if levels of ethnodoxy increase, then levels of support for anti-West/democratic political parties and leaders will also increase (Hypothesis 4d)*.

Frequency Distributions of Indicators of Political Orientation

In this study, political orientation refers to individual political membership, behavior, and views. In particular, political membership is operationalized with respondents identifying their political party affiliation and which they most agree with. Political behavior is operationalized by indicating which party a respondent would vote for. Finally, political attitudes are operationalized with respondents

indicating how much confidence they have in their president, political parties, government, and their views toward democracy. The frequency distributions of these indicators are presented in Tables 22 and 23.

Interestingly, most ethnic Russians (94.2%) are not affiliated with any particular political party. However, while over half of ethnic Russians (51.5%) do not agree with a political party, many do admit to agreeing with political parties (36.8%). Specifically, the largest proportion of respondents who agree with political parties (17.6%), agree with United Russia. Again, it is important to note that United Russia is the supporting party for Vladimir Putin. The second and third most popular political parties are the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR). However, most would vote for United Russia in the next elections (23.4%) while 16% are against all political parties, 16.8% would not vote, and 20.6% are unsure altogether. Interestingly, more respondents would vote for United Russia than admit to agreeing with the political party. As described later, this is indicative of a political culture that maintains change and individual impact as generally futile.

Unsurprisingly, most (75.8%) ethnic Russians distrust political parties and the government (53.8%). At the same time, 75.6% of respondents trust the current president (i.e., President Putin). Therefore, it would appear that although political parties are weakly supported and negatively perceived, the opinion of President Putin is mostly positive. Furthermore, a majority of respondents (53.3%) believe that democracy leads to social disorder. These results suggest that most ethnic

Table 22. Frequency Distribution of Indicators of Political Orientation and Behavior

		Frequency	Percentage
Political party affiliation	United Russia	16	1.1
	LDPR	9	.6
	CPRF	15	1.1
	Other	7	.5
	Not member	1320	94.2
	Not sure	34	2.4
Political party most agree with	United Russia	247	17.6
	LDPR	60	4.3
	CPRF	110	7.9
	Other	92	7
	None	721	51.5
	Not sure	90	6.4
Political party would vote for	United Russia	328	23.4
	LDPR	77	5.5
	CPRF	135	9.6
	Other	113	8
	Against all	224	16
	Would not vote	235	16.8
	Not sure	289	20.6

n=1401

Russians support President Putin and his pro-Slavic agenda while, simultaneously, being rather intensely anti-government and distrusting of the political system.

These findings are not surprising given the context described in previous literature. Clearly, post-communist Russians are unsure of the dependability of political institutions, but at the same time supportive of Putin and his agenda. As described in previous chapters, Putin has been anything but silent regarding his vision for Russia that reconstitutes traditional sources (i.e., ROC) for (re)creating contemporary ethno-national identity. In line with the concept of ethnodoxo, Russian

Table 23. Frequency Distribution of Indicators of Political Attitudes

		Frequency	Percentage
Trust in President	Trust	1059	75.6
	Distrust	290	20.7
	Unsure	52	3.7
Trust in Political Parties	Trust	211	15.1
	Distrust	1066	75.8
	Unsure	124	8.9
Trust in Government	Trust	548	39.1
	Distrust	753	53.8
	Unsure	100	7.1
Democracy leads to disorder	Agree	746	53.3
	Disagree	477	34
	Unsure	178	12.7

n=1401

Orthodoxy has been one key resource emphasized by Putin and is illustrated by the intimate relationship with the state and the ROC. Therefore, it is important to understand how ethnic Russians perceive their ethno-religious identity and what patterns emerge regarding their political orientation.

The Relationship between Political Orientation and Ethnodoxy

Investigating the relationship between political orientation, attitude, and behavior and adherence to ethnodoxy is essential for gauging the relevance and embeddedness of ethnodoxy among contemporary ethnic Russians. Indeed, the political sphere becomes an integral part of ethnodoxy, both directly and indirectly.

Directly, a major tenet of soft ethnodoxy is the belief that the political state has the authority to and should act on protecting and preserving the Russian Orthodox Church. This despite the legal separation between church and state as exemplified in the national constitution, which titles the Russian Federation as a secular state. Indirectly, soft and hard ethnodox beliefs establish boundaries between Russia and Western nations and churches, by demonizing the West and upholding a clear and strict definition for being Russian and Orthodox. These are important considerations as they coincide with then (and once again) President Putin and his pro-Slavic political agenda. Therefore, the following analyses explore the relationship between political characteristics of contemporary ethnic Russians and their adherence to ethnodoxy. In short, these analyses show that political variations among respondents coincide expectantly with levels of ethnodoxy, supporting the hypotheses above.

General Patterns

This section explores the relationship between political orientation, attitudes, and behavior with indicators of ethnodoxy. The political characteristics used in this analysis were described in the preceding section. The measure of political affiliation will not be included in this analysis since a large majority of respondents identified as either a non-member or were unsure (96.6%). Therefore, inclusion of this indicator would not be meaningful.

As presented in Table 24, most ethnic Russians, despite differences in political party preference and voting behavior, adhere to the tenets of soft ethnodoxy. In addition, a large proportion, if not a majority in most cases, adheres to the tenets of

Table 24. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Political Orientation and Indicators of Ethnodoxy

		Hard Ethnodoxy				Soft Ethnodoxy		
		No longer Russian if converted from ROC to another religion	Only in Russia can one find 'true' Russian Orthodoxy	Non-Russian can never be a real Russian Orthodox	Western Churches undermine Russians and their traditions	A Russian is always Orthodox	State should protect Russian Orthodox from opponents	Russians are richer in their soul and stronger in their beliefs than Western nations
Which political party do you most agree with?	United Russia	38.5	58.7	54.3	56.3	89.9	83	84.2
	LDPR	28.3	53.3	46.7	55	81.7	76.7	78.3
	CPRF	26.4	64.5	60.9	67.3	91.8	83.6	80
	Other	43.5	48.9	50	58.7	79.3	71.7	69.9
	None	33.3	52.3	44.9	52	83.4	72.5	75.2
	Unsure	33.3	56.7	55.6	50	86.7	75.6	67.8
	χ^2	95.448***	73.466*	88.633***	107.786***	104.080***	100.109***	91.407***
Which political party will you vote for in the next election?	United Russia	37.8	60.1	54.3	57.9	90.9	81.7	83.5
	LDPR	29.9	51.9	42.9	48.1	81.8	75.3	76.6
	CPRF	28.1	65.2	64.4	67.4	91.9	81.5	80
	Other	43.4	50.4	52.2	59.3	84.1	73.5	69.9
	Against all	32.1	50.4	45.5	51.8	86.6	72.3	75.9
	Will not vote	30.6	51.1	44.3	52.3	79.1	70.2	74
	Unsure	35.3	52.9	43.6	47.4	81.3	72.3	69.6
χ^2	117.894***	110.749***	129.598***	117.849***	135.599***	100.606***	101.580***	

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

hard ethnodoxy. Similar to previous findings, most ethnic Russians, regardless of their social, religious, or political characteristics, adhere to the tenets of ethnodoxy.

However, some important differences still exist and should be explained. For instance, individuals who exhibit stronger political involvement, regardless of which party they affiliate with, also have larger proportions of adherents to ethnodoxy. In particular, respondents who agree with and vote for United Russia and CPRF have the highest percentage of adherents to both soft and hard ethnodox beliefs. The belief in ethnodoxy among CPRF supporters is especially interesting given the importance of religious affiliation. Indeed, almost 92% of respondents who agree with and vote for the CPRF believe that a Russian is always Orthodox. In fact, supporters of the CPRF have much larger proportions of respondents who adhere to hard ethnodoxy than United Russia supporters. For example, 67.3% of respondents who agree with the CPRF believe that Western churches undermine Russians compared with 56.3% of respondents who agree with United Russia. Similarly, 67.4% of respondents who would vote for CPRF adhere to the same hard ethnodox tenet versus 57.9% of respondents who would vote for United Russia.

Initially, these results seem ironic given the historical link between communism and atheism. In fact, communists in Russia have moved closer to the ROC, especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union. According to Verkhovsky, “It cannot be said that the ROC approves of the programme of the CPRF; but in the second half of the 1990s the ROC and the CPRF and other ‘communist-patriotic’ organizations even had joint semipolitical structures” (2002, p.334). Therefore, perhaps a better explanation has more to do with differences between political action

and apathy than which political party one adheres to. This idea is further developed in the next section.

A second dimension regarding the political climate in post-communist Russia is trust in political institutions and attitudes toward democracy. As previous literature suggests, institutional trust is relatively low. While many have offered different explanations, most agree that the unique histo-cultural context of Russia as maintaining a tradition of distrust. This idea is exemplified in the frequency distributions of confidence in political institutions described in the previous section. It is worth noting that while a majority of respondents are distrusting of political parties, their government, and democracy in general, most trust the president (at the time, President Putin).

Table 25 presents the results from the crosstabulation between attitudes toward political institutions and democracy and indicators of ethnooxy. Respondents who are trusting of the president and political parties clearly have slightly larger proportions of adherents to both soft and hard ethnooxy. Confidence in the government shows similar patterns for some, but not all, of the indicators of ethnooxy. Finally, respondents who agree that democracy leads to disorder also show larger percentages of adherence to ethnooxy. Not surprising, adherents who are unsure about their confidence in political institutions and attitude about democracy also show the lowest percentages of adherence to ethnooxy. Therefore, it appears that more *certain* respondents, regardless of whether they trust or distrust political institutions, also have higher percentages of adherents to ethnooxy than respondents who are *less certain*. As the findings in Table 24 suggest, there is a

Table 25. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Attitudes toward Political Institutions and Democracy and Indicators of Ethnodoxy

		Hard Ethnodoxy				Soft Ethnodoxy		
		No longer Russian if converted from ROC to another religion	Only in Russia can one find 'true' Russian Orthodoxy	Non-Russian can never be a real Russian Orthodox	Western Churches undermine Russians and their traditions	A Russian is always Orthodox	State should protect Russian Orthodox from opponents	Russians are richer in their soul and stronger in their beliefs than Western nations
Confidence in President	Trust	34.4	56.3	49.5	55.2	87.9	77.4	78.1
	Distrust	34.8	51	47.6	53.1	77.9	70.3	70.7
	Unsure	28.8	46.2	51.9	42.3	73.1	59.6	63.5
	<i>Gamma</i>	.039	.144**	.046	.099***	.349***	.212***	.219***
Confidence in Government	Trust	33.4	57.3	48.9	53.5	86.3	77.9	76.1
	Distrust	34.4	54.7	50.6	56.7	85.7	75.6	77.6
	Unsure	38	42	40	41	77	59	64
	<i>Gamma</i>	.040***	.138***	.072***	.067***	.105*	.163***	.075***
Confidence in Political Parties	Trust	34.1	63	57.3	53.6	87.7	80.1	79.1
	Distrust	34.5	54.2	48	55.6	85.7	75.8	77.3
	Unsure	32.3	46	45.2	44.4	77.4	62.9	59.7
	<i>Gamma</i>	.112***	.225***	.174***	.132***	.197***	.235***	.245***
Democracy leads to disorder	Agree	38.3	61.8	55.1	63.5	88.2	80.7	81.1
	Disagree	31	49.5	43.4	45.3	83.6	73	73.2
	Unsure	25.8	39.9	39.9	39.9	77.5	59	62.4
	<i>Gamma</i>	.196***	.239***	.199***	.294***	.229***	.290***	.271***

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

greater difference between respondents who are politically engaged versus disengaged than between respondents supporting different parties in terms of adherence to ethnodoxy. Perhaps, the same is true for institutional trust. In other words, does being more certain about trusting, or distrusting, political institutions correlate with greater adherence to ethnodoxy than actual differences between trusting and distrusting? The following section will explore these considerations.

The Relationship between Political Support and Ethnodoxy

As discussed in the previous section, the differences in political orientation, behavior, and attitudes is clearly related to variability in adherence to ethnodoxy. But, these findings may be less about differences in party politics, and more about political action/inaction. This section explores political action versus inaction among contemporary ethnic Russians, and how it relates to adherence to ethnodoxy.

By selecting out respondents from both extremes (politically engaged and politically disengaged), we can examine this idea further. Politically engaged refers to respondents who agree with some political party and who would vote in the next election. Politically disengaged refers to respondents who do not support or vote for any political party. Table 26 presents the frequency distribution of two groups. As shown, each category has a sizeable number of respondents, making continued analysis worthwhile.

Next, we can compare these groups in terms of attitudes toward political institutions, democracy, and adherence to ethnodoxy. Table 27 presents the crosstabulation results of each group with trust in political institutions. Clearly,

Table 26. Frequency Distribution of Indicators of Politically Engaged/Disengaged Groups

	Frequency	Percentage
Politically engaged	466	33.3
Politically disengaged	396	28.3

Table 27. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Politically Engaged/Disengaged Groups and Indicators of Trust in Political Institutions

	Trust in President	Trust in Political Parties	Trust in Government	Democracy leads to disorder
Politically engaged	78.9	23	42.7	55.6
Politically disengaged	67.2	7.3	30.1	55.8
<i>Gamma</i>	.258***	.377***	.203**	.017

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

respondents who are more politically engaged, also have greater trust in the president, political parties, and the government. According to the previous literature on the culture of distrust in Russia, these results are not surprising. However, it is important to note that even among the politically disengaged, trust in the president is strong. Furthermore, there is basically no discrepancy between the politically engaged/disengaged regarding the belief that democracy leads to disorder. Again, this affirms the idea that while many ethnic Russians may not be particularly politically engaged or trusting of the political system, support for Putin and anti-West rhetoric is high.

Finally, the relationship between politically engaged/disengaged and adherence to ethnodoxo projects a similar pattern. As shown in Table 28, politically engaged respondents have higher proportions adhering to ethnodoxo than the

Table 28. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Politically Engaged/Disengaged Groups and Indicators of Ethnodoxy

	Hard Ethnodoxy				Soft Ethnodoxy		
	No longer Russian if converted from ROC to another religion	Only in Russia can one find 'true' Russian Orthodoxy	Non-Russian can never be a real Russian Orthodox	Western Churches undermine Russians and their traditions	A Russian is always Orthodox	State should protect Russian Orthodox from opponents	Russians are richer in their soul and stronger in their beliefs than Western nations
Politically engaged	37.1	57.9	53.9	58.4	87.8	80.5	79.4
Politically disengaged	32.3	54.8	44.2	50.8	82.1	70.2	74.2
<i>Gamma</i>	.124*	.143**	.173***	.135**	.190**	.200**	.117*

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

politically disengaged. Not surprising, the largest variation between groups (80.5% versus 70.2%) was found in the belief that the state should protect Russian Orthodoxy from its opponents. In other words, respondents who are politically engaged (at least, in the established political system), have higher proportions of respondents adhering to ethnodoxy. The consequences of this are important. Beyond just having social and political views and opinions, if adherents to ethnodoxy are more politically engaged, then more decisions, voting behaviors, and other political actions are made by individuals who adhere to the xenophobic, particularistic, and protectionist tenets of ethnodoxy.

At the same time, regardless of these differences, large proportions of the politically disengaged adhere to ethnodoxy too, confirming its deep embeddedness across different political temperaments. Indeed, the key finding here is the widespread belief in most ethnodox tenets, despite adherent's political conviction support, and intensity.

Conclusion

The main task in this chapter was to explore the relationship between political conviction and belief in ethnodoxy. According to the literature, contemporary Russians are commonly portrayed as politically apathetic, based, in part, on a traditional culture of distrust in social and political institutions. Despite this general description, the empirical analyses administered in this chapter provide deeper insight into the political life among ethnic Russians. For instance, while it is true that most ethnic Russians do not officially affiliate with a political party (96.6%), 36.8% still

agree with one and 46.5% will vote for one. Clearly, contemporary ethnic Russians may not be as politically apathetic as popular discourse suggests.

However, this is not to say that a culture of distrust and pessimism in the political system does not exist. Indeed, the above results depict this, as a majority of Russians do not trust political parties or the government. I believe this is a more accurate explanation for low formal political affiliation (i.e., party membership). Furthermore, the strong presence and influence of United Russia as the prevailing political party contributes to popular feelings of insignificance and triviality regarding individual political behavior. Simply, there is no other option.

While the data used in this study depict a 2005 cross-section, these themes still resonant today. In particular, the 2011-2012 parliamentary and presidential elections have stirred countless debates about current Russian political life. United Russia and its presidential nominee, Vladimir Putin, have achieved unsurprising victories. While pegged as corrupt and fraudulent in the West, the outcomes of these elections are understood differently for many ethnic Russians at home. For instance, Svetlana Babaeva, a senior analyst with the US Bureau of the Russian News Agency (RIA Novosti), explained Putin's recent triumph in March 2012 as follows:

First, he performed a very aggressive campaign, and, regardless of all that so-called administrative approaches, that was really campaign. The second reason is that those -- his rivals, whose names were permitted on the ballot, were not so attractive for a large number of voters. And the third reason, which is very important, that the fact is, just because of many people are not happy and satisfied with Putin anymore, that does not automatically mean that they're ready to vote for any other candidate. That's the point (Babaeva, 2012).

In short, support for Putin, at least according to Babaeva, is more a surrender of options than genuine desire. Babaeva continued, "Putin strangely preferred numbers

instead of getting legitimacy” (2012). Again, this is indicative of a public that is politically interested and trapped rather than unconcerned and apathetic.

Another way to read Babaeva’s interpretation of Russian political expectations is that Putin’s platform resonated for a majority of ethnic Russians. The fact that a majority of respondents in 2005 (75.6%) trust the president despite distrusting political parties and the government further indicates Putin’s popularity and influence. As described in detail earlier, Putin’s pro-Slavic agenda, which emphasizes Russian solidarity through traditional sources and anti-West sentiments, has remained popular. The results from this chapter support this. Despite differences in political conviction, a similar proportion agrees that democracy leads to disorder. In addition, most ethnic Russians adhere to the tenets of ethnodoxo. Since ethnodoxo beliefs highlight clear boundaries regarding who is and is not Russian coupled with anti-West rhetoric, Putin’s continued support is not all that surprising.

As this paper unfolds, I posit that ethnodoxo has become a popular worldview for most contemporary ethnic Russians. In other words, for ethnic Russians, the adherence to ethnodoxo is part of what it means to be a normal member of society. As Converse (1964) noted, it is not important that elements in a belief system are ‘logically coherent,’ but that they psychologically and socially make sense. In other words, so long as a worldview is understood as plausible by its adherents, and thereby normalized in popular perception, the logic is irrelevant.

The analyses in this chapter found that a majority of respondents who agree with and support the main communist political party (CPRF) adhere to ethnodoxo. On the surface this is paradoxical and illogical since ethnodoxo stresses the

importance of religious affiliation, contradicting the conventional ideology of a traditionally atheist socio-political group. However, based on Converse's ideas, the tenets of ethnodoxo have become such an integral part of the general worldview for ethnic Russians, that adhering to it is simply a given, despite it's illogical consequences. To recap then, ethnodoxo has become part and parcel for what it means to be Russian, despite differences in religious and political orientations. A further indication of its scope is made evident as popular attitudes toward contemporary social issues are investigated. Specifically, the following chapter explores opinions about abortion and homosexuality and how these attitudes are related to ethnodoxo for contemporary ethnic Russians.

CHAPTER XI: ETHNODOXY AND ATTITUDES TOWARD POPULAR SOCIAL ISSUES

As the previous chapters depict, the belief in ethnodoxy resonates with most ethnic Russians, despite differences in social demographics, religiosity, perception of nation and nationalism, and political orientation. This chapter continues this investigation by exploring attitudes toward key social issues – specifically, attitudes toward abortion and acceptance of homosexuals. Both social issues have become popular topics in public discourse, highlighting the apparent clash between a residual Soviet-era culture and a growing post-communist pro-Slavic nationalism. For instance, the Russian Orthodox Church and first lady Svetlana Medvedev have become key figures in the campaign against an open abortion culture normalized during the Soviet Union. The issue of homosexuality in Russian society is no less socially, politically, and religiously charged, exemplified in the banning of gay rights demonstrations in Moscow during 2011. Even more recently, a new city law in St. Petersburg banning ‘homosexual propaganda,’ and supported by the ROC, has received widespread criticism within Russia and beyond. Clearly, understanding popular perceptions of key social issues like abortion and homosexuality is an important element when making sense of contemporary Russian identity.

Although some have investigated attitudes toward popular social issues in post-communist Russia, these are usually descriptive assessments aimed at determining if Russian political policy and public opinion are becoming more or less open to Western liberalism. Few have specifically explored public opinions of social issues like abortion and gay rights in post-communist Russia, fewer yet have

intentionally examined the relationship between religiosity and opinions toward key social issues, and none (that this author is aware of) have specifically explored the relationship between religious and ethnic identities with attitudes toward social issues. This study fills these gaps in the literature by investigating the relationships between religiosity, ethnodoxy and attitudes toward two key social issues: attitudes toward abortion and rights for homosexuals. The central question for this chapter is: *how is adherence to ethnodoxy related to attitudes toward key social issues such as acceptance of abortion and rights for homosexuals?*

Social Issue One: Attitudes toward Abortion

The relationship between religion and attitudes toward abortion is well documented. It is not surprising that religion is often used as a resource when making decisions about defining life and when or if to end it (Stephens et al., 2009). Cochran et al. noted the considerable literature on religion and abortion, and contributed with a study emphasizing the influence of personal religiosity, religious affiliation, and spouse's affiliation on attitudes toward legalizing abortion (1996). In their 2009 study, Stephens et al. also acknowledged the impact that personal religiosity has on decision-making concerning abortion for American believers. However, they also note the complexity of decision-making, and that influencers (such as religion) rarely function in a vacuum. Instead, multiple sources of influence can exist simultaneously, and oftentimes conflict. For instance, Stephens et al. found evidence that a balance is often struck among American believers between religious and secular morality, what Audi called a 'theo-ethical equilibrium' (2005). Therefore, it

is important to note how sources of influence like religion interact and exist within a larger paradigmatic framework.

Similarly, Emerson described worldviews as essential structures that frame individual's reference-points, thereby directing them in decision-making (1996). In the United States, for instance, religion influences attitudes toward abortion as moderated through a specific worldview (i.e., conservative vs. liberal). Others have also noted the idea that religion as a source for decision-making, exists and interacts within broader worldviews. For example, Dillon's study on abortion attitudes across Catholic Europe described the Catholic Church as drawing more heavily on cultural, rather than doctrinal, sources of legitimation (1996). Similarly, Minkenberg's analysis concluded that differences in religious *heritage* mattered more than levels of religiosity on abortion policies across Europe (2002).

In this way, religiosity, however perceived, can be one of many sources of influence. For Emerson, worldviews are multi-dimensional including, in the case of abortion, religion, sexuality, and morality (1996). Similarly, Peterson recognized the interaction between multiple sources of influence existing within a single plausibility structure (2001). In particular, he focused on the correlation between religion and education in affecting attitudes toward abortion. In this way, it is easy to assume that other sources of identity may be just as important. In particular, I suggest that ethnodoxo has become an important factor related to attitudes and opinions about abortion in post-communist Russia.

Attitudes towards abortion in post-communist Russia, or post-communist Europe for that matter, have been scarcely explored in Western academia. Besides a

few exceptions, most attention concerning abortion has focused on public policies rather than personal attitudes (e.g., Dillon, 1996). Only one study, that this author is aware of, investigates popular perceptions in the post-communist ‘abortion culture’ (i.e., Karpov and Kaariainen, 2005). Karpov and Kaariainen’s study has provided a unique insight into popular attitudes toward abortion and the influence of religion. In short, they explain the normalization of high acceptance rates toward abortion as remnants of the Soviet past. Unlike other industrialized societies, abortion is “not an issue subject to moral judgment; rather, it is still seen as a justifiable, “normal” option for resolving personal family problems” (Karpov and Kaariainen, 2005, p.28). Indeed, even personal religiosity (i.e., affiliation with Russian Orthodoxy and church attendance) is weakly associated with opinions toward abortion. Thus, the Church’s firm stance against abortion appears unpersuasive.²² These findings suggest that abortion attitudes have become “deep-seated in the post-Soviet mentality” (Karpov and Kaariainen, 2005, p.29). Therefore, the source of decision-making regarding abortion has less to do with religion, and more to do with the greater worldview among contemporary ethnic Russians. One task in this section is to explore this projection.

²² According to the *Bases of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church*, “The Church sees the widely spread and justified abortion in contemporary society as a threat to the future of humanity and a clear sign of its moral degradation. It is incompatible to be faithful to the biblical and patristic teaching that human life is sacred and precious from its origin and to recognize woman's free choice in disposing of the fate of the fetus.” Again, for the full text of the Bases Social Concept, see <http://www.mospat.ru/en/documents/social-concepts/>

Hypotheses

Based on this review of the literature, including conventional wisdom regarding the relationship between religion and attitudes toward abortion and findings from Karpov and Kaariainen's analysis on abortion attitudes in Russia, I offer two hypotheses to guide further analysis. First, despite overwhelming research to the contrary, and following Karpov and Kaariainen's findings, *I expect personal religiosity to be associated weakly, if at all, with attitudes toward abortion (Hypothesis 5a)*. Following the literature concerning the multi-dimensionality of worldviews as moderating multiple sources of decision-making, I suspect ethnodoxy to be associated with attitudes toward abortion. Again, while religion is not expected to be a strong influence toward abortion attitudes, the argument in this paper is that the relationship between religion and ethnicity (i.e., ethnodoxy) is becoming a legitimated component of the general worldview for many contemporary ethnic Russians. Part of this ideology is a more prominent role of the Church, which adamantly opposes abortion. Therefore, I project that *increased levels of ethnodoxy are associated with less accepting attitudes toward abortion (Hypothesis 5b)*.

Operationalizing Attitudes toward Abortion

Attitude toward abortion is operationalized using four situational indicators for approving abortion: approve of abortion if the pregnancy is dangerous for the woman, if the child is expected to be born with defects, if the woman is not married, and if the couple no longer want children (see Table 29). Ethnic Russians adamantly support abortions if the pregnancy is dangerous (78.2%) or if the child is expected to have

Table 29. Frequency Distribution of Indicators of Attitudes about Abortion

		Frequency	Percentage
If pregnancy is danger to woman	Approve	1095	78.2
	Disapprove	191	13.6
	Not sure	115	8.2
If child is expected to have defects	Approve	1070	76.4
	Disapprove	180	12.8
	Not sure	151	10.8
If woman is not married	Approve	531	37.9
	Disapprove	596	42.5
	Not sure	274	19.6
If couple does not want more children	Approve	713	50.9
	Disapprove	457	32.6
	Not sure	231	16.5

n=1401

defects (76.4%). A smaller majority approve of abortions if the couple no longer want children (50.9%). However, most ethnic Russians are disapproving of abortions of the woman is not married (42.5%).

Clearly, these distributions tentatively support the idea that most ethnic Russians are accepting of abortions under at least three conditions. Just as Karpov and Kaariainen posited, such high acceptance is probably a residual effect from the ‘abortion culture’ cultivated during the Soviet-era. Simply, abortions were considered a ‘normal’ solution to financial and personal predicaments, where having an unwanted child may be more burdensome. However, more than two decades have passed since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Therefore, an important question is whether this same ‘abortion culture’ is thriving and by what agents of dissemination, or fading and why. The following analysis will contribute toward understanding these issues.

Religion and Attitudes toward Abortion in Post-Communist Russia

According to the literature described above, religiosity is often related to negative attitudes toward abortions. However, Karpov and Kaariainen's study found that religiosity (specifically, religious affiliation and church attendance) was weakly associated with abortion opinions. They concluded that attitudes toward abortion were probably influenced by a Soviet-era 'abortion culture' rather than religious institutions and dogma.

Table 30 presents the results from crosstabulating indicators of religiosity with indicators of ethnodoxy. Religiosity was operationalized using three commonly used measures: 1) whether a person considered themselves religious, 2) how many core Christian beliefs they held, and 3) how often they attended church. As these findings indicate, religious belonging, belief, and behavior is clearly related to less accepting attitudes about abortion. For instance, religious believers are less accepting of abortion than religious non-believers, larger proportions of respondents who hold fewer religious beliefs are more accepting, and higher percentages of respondents who attend church less often are also more accepting.

However, in line with Karpov and Kaariainen, these relationships are weakly associated, probably due to the overwhelming majority of ethnic Russians that are accepting of abortion for each of these conditions. In other words, while the level of religiosity may matter, the more significant finding is the still widespread acceptance of abortion twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Clearly, the Soviet-era abortion culture is still being disseminated and maintained today. By exploring

Table 30. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Religiosity and Attitudes about Abortion

		If pregnancy is danger to woman	If child is expected to have defects	If women is not married	If couple does not want more children
Religious Person	Believer	75.4	72.7	34.2	46.1
	Undecided	83	81.8	44	56.6
	Unbeliever	80.3	81.9	41.5	60.1
	Atheist	85.5	85.5	48.7	60.5
	Not sure	67.6	59.5	21.6	35.1
χ^2		27.962***	32.016***	38.159***	29.872***
Core Christian Beliefs	Many	76.8	71.2	32.3	44.4
	Some	77.4	76.5	39.1	51.3
	Few	80	80.8	41.7	56.3
	<i>Gamma</i>	-.073	-.189***	-.179***	-.162***
Church Attendance	Weekly/monthly	68.8	63.1	28.1	36.9
	Several times a year	81	78.5	41.1	51.8
	Yearly/less than yearly	81.3	77.9	37.6	50.4
	Never	76.7	77.9	39	55.1
	<i>Gamma</i>	-.028**	-.122***	-.099***	-.145***

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

the relationship between ethnodoxy and attitudes toward abortion, further insight into this phenomenon is provided.

Ethnodoxy and Attitudes toward Abortion in Post-Communist Russia

By investigating the relationship between ethnodoxy and attitudes toward abortion, a deeper understanding of what contemporary ethnic Russians believe and

how they construct their identity is obtained. Particular to popular attitudes about abortion, I purport that there are conflicting worldviews in contemporary Russia. On the one hand, accepting attitudes about abortion are legitimated by a Soviet-era system of beliefs and values that normalized abortion as an accepted choice for dealing with unwanted financial and family predicaments. On the other hand, the belief in a firm Russian identity that links religious and ethnic heritage (i.e., ethnodoxy), accentuates the role of the Church and, therefore, opposes the act of abortion. As discussed later, examining how these two ideologies coexist is crucial for better understanding larger worldviews maintained by ethnic Russians today. But first, this chapter continues by examining how beliefs in ethnodoxy are related to attitudes about abortion.

Table 31a presents the results from crosstabulating indicators of ethnodoxy with attitudes toward abortion. While there is some variation among adherence to ethnodoxy across differing attitudes toward abortion, these patterns are weak and not widespread. In other words, while there are some relationships where a larger proportion of respondents who disapprove of abortion adhere to ethnodoxy (e.g., if pregnancy is a danger to woman and the belief that a Russian is always Orthodox), this is not a general finding. Instead, the proportions are relatively similar, and usually a majority, across most relationships between attitudes toward abortion and the belief in ethnodoxy. Correlating ethnodoxy factor scores with abortion factor

Table 31a. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Attitudes about Abortion and Indicators of Ethnodoxy

		Hard Ethnodoxy				Soft Ethnodoxy		
		No longer Russian if converted from ROC to another religion	Only in Russia can one find 'true' Russian Orthodoxy	Non-Russian can never be a real Russian Orthodox	Western Churches undermine Russians and their traditions	A Russian is always Orthodox	State should protect Russian Orthodox from opponents	Russians are richer in their soul and stronger in their beliefs than Western nations
If pregnancy is danger to woman	Approve	34.2	54.8	48.9	55.2	85.3	76.5	76.5
	Disapprove	37.7	62.3	56.5	54.5	91.1	77.5	75.9
	Not sure	29.6	42.6	39.1	46.1	75.7	60	71.3
	<i>Gamma</i>	.066***	.070***	.037***	.116**	.051***	.171***	.082
If child is expected to have defects	Approve	34.5	55	50.7	56.4	86.4	76.5	77
	Disapprove	33.9	58.3	47.2	47.8	85	77.2	71.7
	Not sure	33.1	49.7	40.4	47.7	78.1	64.2	74.2
	<i>Gamma</i>	.081***	.061***	.151***	.165***	.175***	.152**	.106*
If woman is not married	Approve	37.3	56.5	53.9	55.2	86.3	75	76.8
	Disapprove	35.2	57.4	48.7	56.4	86.2	79.5	79.5
	Not sure	26.3	46	41.2	48.2	81.4	66.8	66.8
	<i>Gamma</i>	.143***	.118***	.156***	.065***	.100***	.084***	.111***
If couple does not want more children	Approve	35.8	54.4	50.4	53.6	85	74.8	76.7
	Disapprove	32.8	60.6	51.2	57.3	88.2	78.8	79.4
	Not sure	32.5	44.6	41.6	50.6	80.5	70.1	67.1
	<i>Gamma</i>	.109***	.067***	.112***	.027***	.046***	.037***	.100***

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

scores showed similar results (see Table 31b).²³ The correlation between abortion attitudes and soft ethnodoxy is statistically significant but weak and not significant with hard ethnodoxy. Therefore, the key finding here is that, regardless of differences in abortion opinions, the adherence to ethnodoxy is prominent among most ethnic Russians.

In fact, I submit that the Soviet-era abortion culture is waning, and giving way to new discourses about abortion. No longer does the Party ideology monopolize decision-making about issues like abortion. Instead, the collapse of the Soviet Union has resulted in many sources of knowledge that can influence decisions about such issues. Table 32 provides percentages of abortion attitudes in post-communist Russia over time. While a majority of respondents are accepting of abortion in two situations for over two decades, clearly, these proportions are changing. Indeed, percentages of respondents that approve of abortion for both scenarios have dropped as much as 20%. For each situation, respondents are becoming less accepting of abortion for either reason.

Specifically, I suggest that ethnodoxy and, therefore, the Church have become prominent sources of knowledge and identity, influencing social issues like attitudes toward abortion. As proposed throughout this paper, the belief in ethnodoxy has become a widespread and salient ideology spanning social, religious, and political attributes. Since ethnodoxy requires direct identification with the dominant religious institution, in this case the ROC, it is not surprising then, that more conservative positions toward social issues like abortion are disseminated across the wider public.

²³ An abortion factor score was created by administering factor analysis on all four items measuring abortion attitudes. All items loaded under one component (.735, .793, .735, and .768). Eigenvalue was 2.299 and explained 57.48% of variance.

Table 31b. Correlation Matrix between Abortion Attitudes and Ethnodoxy Factor Scores

	Soft Ethnodoxy	Hard Ethnodoxy
Abortion Attitudes	-.078**	.032

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Social Issue Two: Acceptance of Homosexuals

As with the literature on abortion, research on acceptance of homosexuals in society has often included the influence of religion. As the following review illustrates, however, very little attention has been given to post-communist Russian attitudes toward homosexuals and the influence of religiosity. The aim of this section will be to explore the role of religion and its relationship with ethnicity (i.e., ethnodoxy) toward acceptance of homosexuals.

The role of religion as an influencing factor for individual acceptance of homosexuals in society has been well documented. As Tridico, Armstrong, and Barry note,

Opposition to homosexuality has been a central tenet of many orthodoxy wings of established religions... Through the identification and condemnation of a minority sexual identity sector, organized religion has set the parameters for acceptable and unacceptable principles and actions. Thus, homosexuality could be regarded as a direct assault on the traditions of most faiths and attempts to gain tolerance or acceptance of homosexuality have been met with resistance to forceful opposition (2009, p.1).

In this study, Tridico et al. investigated the difficulties inherent for gay rights movements to receive legitimacy and overcome heterosexism in societies where majority religious organizations share similar outlooks with the state toward

Table 32. Frequency Distribution of Indicators of Abortion Attitudes Over Time in Russia

	1991	1998	2008
Not wrong to have an abortion if serious defect in baby	83.6	71.9	70.8
Not wrong to have an abortion if very low income family	81	70.9	60.6

Source: ISSP Religion I, II, and III

homosexuality (Tridico et al., 2009). The strengthening relationship between the Church and state in contemporary Russia epitomizes this scenario.

Others have also explored how the cultural and societal contexts influence attitudes toward homosexuals. Adamczyk and Pitt investigated differences in cultural contexts and how they are associated with particular attitudes toward homosexuals (2009). By distinguishing countries as either ‘survival’ or ‘self-expressive’ culturally oriented, Adamczyk and Pitt found that in more self-expressive countries (e.g., the United States), religion has a greater influence on attitudes toward homosexuals. On the other hand, more self-expressive countries have more diverse opinions toward homosexuals but are overall more accepting than countries that are survivor oriented. Schulte and Battle analyzed how different social and cultural identities influence individual perceptions about homosexuals (2004). In their study of religion, ethnicity, and attitudes toward homosexuals in the United States, they found that religion was always a significant factor while ethnicity was significant when acting as a proxy for religion (e.g., ‘Black Churches’). In this way, Schulte and Battle alluded to, knowingly or not, the idea that while religion is an important source for

individuals generating opinions about homosexuals, it is done so in a complicated context that can include other factors (e.g., ethnicity).

In short, the literature is not without research on the relationship between religion and attitudes about homosexuals. Most, however, describe religion as an independent and static attribute, rarely approaching it as dynamic and interacting with other social attributes. In fact, much of the literature on religion and attitudes toward homosexuals apply qualitative methodologies,²⁴ due to small sample sizes and accessibility, which make analyzing the relationship between multiple variables difficult.

In addition, few have attempted to explore conditions and popular attitudes toward homosexuals in contemporary Russia. Healey's efforts (2001, 2002) have largely focused on Soviet-era policy and same-sex prostitution. He described the historical ebb and flow of Russian public policy regarding the criminalization of homosexual behaviors. As Healey explained, the decriminalization of homosexuality during revolutionary Russia became a standard for progressive sexual politics (2002). However, between 1933-34, Stalin recriminalized homosexuality due to, according to Healey, supposed Nazi infiltration of homosexual circles as well as social cleansing of 'anomic' identities (2002).

Soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union, homosexuality was re-decriminalized in 1993 and de-pathologized in 1999 (Kon, 2010). No longer was homosexuality, at least in writing, legally defined as a disease or unlawful. However, as Kon described, these re-evaluations of homosexuality occurred rapidly compared

²⁴ For example, see LaSala and Revere's (2011) study on social and cultural hindrances for gay rights movements in Estonia and Wolkomir's (2001, 2006) studies on ex-gay and gay affirming Christian groups in the United States

to Western societies with little to no justification (2010). By 2002, Putin's nationalist agenda followed increased levels of xenophobia and homophobia. Kon's analysis of results from multiple national survey programs found that in 2003 and 2006, more than half of respondents had hostile attitudes toward homosexuals.²⁵ In 2007, 41% of respondents thought homosexuals should be criminally prosecuted.²⁶ Clearly, public opinion is not very accepting of homosexuals in contemporary Russia, despite official legislation guaranteeing some level of protection. However, according to Graupner's analysis on sexuality policies across Europe, this is not surprising (2008). Graupner found that despite formal protection of homosexuals in many European and trans-European constitutions, the reality of enforcing such agendas are quite difficult. In fact, only in areas with corresponding public attitudes and high levels of social development is putting these policies in action probable (2008).

The Russian Orthodox Church has become a major player in demonizing homosexuals for the vices of society (Kon, 2010). According to the *Bases of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church*,

[The Church] believes homosexuality to be a sinful distortion of human nature, which is overcome by spiritual effort leading to the healing and personal growth of the individual.... [T]he Church is resolutely against the attempts to present this sinful tendency as a norm and even something to be proud of and emulate. This is why the Church denounces any propaganda of homosexuality. Without denying anybody the fundamental rights to life, respect for personal dignity and participation in public affairs, the Church, however, believes that those who propagate the homosexual way of life should not be admitted to educational and other work with children and youth, nor to occupy superior posts in the army and reformatories.²⁷

²⁵ Results from data collected by the Levada Center and Public Opinion Foundation.

²⁶ Results from data collected by the Levada Center.

²⁷ For the full text of the Bases Social Concept see: <http://www.mospat.ru/en/documents/social-concepts/>

Unlike the Church's seemingly limited influence on popular opinion toward abortion, it appears more persuasive about issues of homosexuality. In addition, this excerpt emphasizes the unwillingness to allow rights for homosexuals (i.e., presence in schools, work with children and military), something not considered for women who choose to have an abortion. As social issues, attitudes toward abortion and homosexuals have distinct qualities. An important difference is the point of reference. Abortion largely concerns the individual with very little to no inclusion of others as part of the 'problem.' Attitudes toward homosexuals, however, refers to a *social* problem and whether such individuals should be treated the same as 'normal' citizens. Survey questions about abortion often refer to the conditions individuals would accept for the act to occur, not if a woman having had an abortion should be treated equally. In this way, the issue of homosexuals in society is in fact a question of tolerance and the willingness to accept members of a social 'out-group.'

Therefore, this becomes an issue of identity; what does being a 'true' Russian mean in terms of attitudes toward social out-groups like homosexuals? According to the theoretical tenets of ethnodoxo, the ROC has become an important source of Russian identity. While previous efforts offer important insight into the issue of rights and treatment of homosexuals in contemporary Russia, very little is discussed regarding popular attitudes and none, that this author is aware of, explore the influence of religious and ethnic identity. The following empirical analysis aims to fill this gap.

Hypotheses

Based on the preceding literature review and context of contemporary Russia, I offer the following hypotheses to guide this analysis. I expect personal religiosity to be associated with acceptance of homosexuals as outlined in the literature.

Accordingly, *I suspect high levels of personal religiosity to be related to disapproving attitudes toward homosexuals in society (Hypothesis 5c)*. In addition, I expect ethnodoxy to be inversely associated with acceptance of homosexuals. In other words, *I project high levels of ethnodoxy to be related to disapproving attitudes toward homosexuals in society (Hypothesis 5d)*.

Operationalizing Acceptance of Homosexuals

Acceptance of homosexuals is operationalized using three indicators: the right for homosexuals to speak publically about same-sex marriage, the right for homosexuals to teach in universities, and the inclusion of books about legalizing same-sex marriages in public libraries. Table 33 presents the frequency distributions for these measures. In short, a majority of ethnic Russians are opposed to homosexuals speaking about same-sex marriage in public (69%), the inclusion of books about legalizing same-sex marriage in public libraries (61.9%), and allowing homosexuals to teach at the university (53.6%). Clearly, ethnic Russians are far less accepting of homosexuals than they are of abortion, social issues that are commonly described as being related in the literature.

As described above, the socio-historic context of Soviet and post-Soviet Russia can help explain the legacy of public policy about homosexuality. But,

Table 33. Frequency Distribution of Indicators of Attitudes about Homosexuals

		Frequency	Percentage
Allow homosexuals to speak publically about same-sex marriage	Allowed	244	17.4
	Prohibited	967	69
	Not Sure	190	13.6
Allow homosexuals to teach at university	Allowed	376	26.8
	Prohibited	751	53.6
	Not Sure	274	19.6
Allow books about legalizing same-sex marriage in local library	Allowed	319	22.8
	Prohibited	867	61.9
	Not Sure	215	15.3

n=1401

usually these efforts have failed to specifically investigate public opinion about this issue. As with the issue of abortion, the role of religion is commonly cited as a major factor for influencing attitudes about homosexuality. Therefore, it will be considered in the following section. Then, acceptance toward homosexuality will be explored in terms of its relationship with indicators of ethnodoxo. Administering these empirical analyses will contribute to the sparse literature on public perception of homosexuality in contemporary Russia while further exploring the scope of ethnodoxo across other social attitudes.

Religion and Acceptance of Homosexuals in Post-Communist Russia

Public positions against homosexuality in society among key figures in the Church emphasize the role of religion on this issue as well. However, the public pronouncement about the ‘dangers’ of homosexuality from religious leaders, unofficial or official, is one issue. The popular perceptions and acceptance of

homosexuality is a different problem and, as the previous literature review denotes, an area largely under-researched. The following analysis contributes by exploring the relationship between religiosity and popular acceptance of homosexuals.

Below, Table 34 presents the crosstabulation results between indicators of religiosity and acceptance of certain rights for homosexuals. As expected based on the frequency distributions above, most ethnic Russians prohibit rights for homosexuals, regardless of differences in religiosity. However, some variations still exist. For instance, a larger proportion of religious believers would deny rights for homosexuals compared to unbelievers and atheists. A higher percentage of respondents who hold more religious beliefs are not accepting of rights for homosexuals than those who have some or few beliefs. Similar results are seen among avid church attendees as well. Curiously, however, respondents who attend several times a year have larger proportions of respondents that would deny rights for homosexuals than any other group, even those attending weekly or monthly. Moreover, in some cases, respondents attending church infrequently or not at all are less willing to grant rights to homosexuals.

This finding goes contrary to conventional wisdom about the relationship between church attendance and attitudes toward social issues like homosexuality and abortion (especially in the United States). I propose that this is probably an artifact of the unique social demographics of contemporary Russia. For instance, rural churches were usually the first to close and the last to re-open after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the allocation of church restoration funds was often directed toward urban versus rural churches (Davis, 2003). Thus, surveys show that rural

Table 34. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Religiosity and Attitudes about Homosexuals

		Prohibit homosexuals to speak publically about same- sex marriage	Prohibit homosexuals to teach at university	Prohibit books about legalizing same-sex marriage in local library
Religious Person	Believer	72.6	57.5	66.7
	Undecided	67.6	50.3	59.4
	Unbeliever	65.3	50.3	53.4
	Atheist	51.3	42.1	46.1
	Not sure	62.2	40.5	59.5
χ^2		19.377*	18.934*	24.770**
Core Christian Beliefs	Many	74.1	61.7	70.3
	Some	70	53.5	61.5
	Few	63.5	46.6	54.6
	<i>Gamma</i>	.159**	.170***	.188***
Church Attendance	Weekly/monthly	65	45.6	59.4
	Several times a year	76.1	61.3	67.5
	Yearly/less than yearly	68.3	54.9	61.4
	Never	66.2	50.1	59.4
	<i>Gamma</i>	.064*	.043**	.052

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

residents have larger proportions of non-attendees than urban residents, typically because there is no church to attend (Table 35). Moreover, urban residents are more likely to be higher educated and younger, attributes that are often associated with more tolerant attitudes toward homosexuals. All of which makes the finding about church attendance and attitudes toward homosexuals less surprising. Beyond the scope of this paper, the consequence of church attendance in post-communist Russia is one area of research lacking thorough examination.

Table 35. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Church Attendance and Place of Residence

	Rural	Urban
Monthly or more	9.4	12
Several times a year	19.7	24.4
Yearly/less than yearly	25.8	31
Never	45.2	32.5
<i>Gamma</i>	<i>.191***</i>	

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

The relationship between religiosity and acceptance of homosexuals in society is not that surprising given the previous literature and the socio-historic context of Russia. Furthermore, as illustrated in the preceding chapters, the ROC has become one of the most trusted institutions in society, thereby providing a significant resource of knowledge on perplexing modern social issues such as homosexuality. Indeed, affiliation to Russian Orthodoxy has become an important element for being Russian today. The next section continues this investigation by exploring the relationship between attitudes toward homosexuals and indicators of ethnodoxy.

Ethnodoxy and Acceptance of Homosexuals in Post-Communist Russia

As with attitudes toward abortion, it is important that exploring social issues like acceptance of homosexuals in society be done in order to better understand what it means to be Russian in contemporary post-communist society. Again, previous chapters show that belief in ethnodoxy is generally salient across social, religious, and political attributes. However, some variations exist according to common differences cited in the literature along with the unique socio-historical context inherent in the

Russian case. The relationship between attitudes toward homosexuals and ethnodoxy is no different.

As presented in Table 36, large proportions of respondents, regardless of their attitudes toward homosexuals in society, adhere to ethnodoxy. However, a higher percentage of respondents who prohibit rights for homosexuals also adhere to soft and hard ethnodoxy. Given the Church's clear public and doctrinal opposition to gay rights, the relationship between anti-homosexuality and ethnodoxy is not surprising. Furthermore, acceptance toward homosexuality may be understood as a human rights issue specific to the West. Rahman discussed this in his study of gay Muslims, noting sexual diversity as "antithetical" to non-Western cultures (2010). Therefore, due to the anti-Western element inherent in ethnodox beliefs, acceptance of homosexuals could be considered anti-Russian and just another negative influence from the 'soulless' West. In fact, the largest gap between respondents who allow and prohibit rights for homosexuals resides in the belief that Western churches undermine Russians and their traditions.

To further test this idea, Table 37 presents crosstabulation results between indicators of anti-West sentiments with attitudes toward homosexuals. Clearly, a higher percentage of respondents who oppose democracy and agree that Western influences are dangerous, also prohibit rights to homosexuals. In short, negative attitudes toward homosexuals in society are evidently linked with anti-Western sentiments as well as beliefs in ethnodoxy. As developed in the theoretical foundation of ethnodoxy in the beginning of this study, a key component in this belief system is the strict understanding of who is and is not Russian. Any characteristic or

Table 36. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Attitudes about Homosexuals and Indicators of Ethnodoxy

		Hard Ethnodoxy				Soft Ethnodoxy		
		No longer Russian if converted from ROC to another religion	Only in Russia can one find 'true' Russian Orthodoxy	Non-Russian can never be a real Russian Orthodox	Western Churches undermine Russians and their traditions	A Russian is always Orthodox	State should protect Russian Orthodox from opponents	Russians are richer in their soul and stronger in their beliefs than Western nations
Allow homosexuals to speak publically about same-sex marriage	Allowed	27	46.7	41.8	42.2	79.5	65.6	73.4
	Prohibited	37.3	57.2	52	59.5	87.8	79.6	78.4
	Not Sure	27.9	53.2	44.2	43.7	80	65.8	67.4
	<i>Gamma</i>	<i>-.090***</i>	<i>.010***</i>	<i>-.034***</i>	<i>-.034***</i>	<i>.020***</i>	<i>.001***</i>	<i>-.077***</i>
Allow homosexuals to teach at university	Allowed	29	49.7	44.7	46.3	83.5	73.4	73.7
	Prohibited	40.5	58.7	54.6	60.7	88.3	78.7	79.2
	Not Sure	24.5	51.1	40.5	47.8	79.6	68.6	70.4
	<i>Gamma</i>	<i>.250***</i>	<i>.145***</i>	<i>.209***</i>	<i>.191***</i>	<i>.234***</i>	<i>.194***</i>	<i>.176***</i>
Allow books about legalizing same-sex marriage in local library	Allowed	24.8	48.6	38.2	45.5	81.5	69.6	76.8
	Prohibited	38.9	57.4	54.9	60.3	87.7	79.7	77.9
	Not Sure	29.8	53.5	42.3	43.3	81.4	66	67.4
	<i>Gamma</i>	<i>-.057***</i>	<i>.001***</i>	<i>-.013***</i>	<i>-.058***</i>	<i>.012***</i>	<i>-.045***</i>	<i>-.125***</i>

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table 37. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Anti-West Sentiments and Attitudes against Rights for Homosexuals

		Prohibit homosexuals to speak publically about same-sex marriage	Prohibit homosexuals to teach at university	Prohibit books about legalizing same-sex marriage in local library
Democracy leads to disorder	Agree	58	60.5	57.6
	Disagree	30.8	28.8	30.7
	Unsure	11.2	10.8	11.8
	<i>Gamma</i>	<i>.227***</i>	<i>.201***</i>	<i>.152***</i>
Arrange life to Western standards is harmful	Agree	58.4	61	58.8
	Disagree	29.1	27.4	28.8
	Unsure	12.5	11.6	12.3
	<i>Gamma</i>	<i>.210***</i>	<i>.186***</i>	<i>.172***</i>

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

trait outside the mold set by elites disseminating these beliefs – i.e., pro-Slavic political and ROC religious leaders and platforms – is not included and instead demonized. Such rigid understanding of the social, religious, and political attributes of Russian identity thereby necessitates an investigation into the tolerance of ‘others.’ In this way, the next chapter explores dimensions of intolerance and xenophobia among adherents to ethnodoxo.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to explore popular attitudes about key social issues and how these perceptions are related to beliefs in ethnodoxo. To accomplish this task, attitudes about abortion and rights for homosexuals in society were

analyzed. The results from these analyses provide greater insight into the everyday perceptions of contemporary ethnic Russians rarely discussed in the literature. Based on the unique socio-historic context of the Russian case, opinions about abortion and homosexuals appear to stem from two existing, and sometimes conflicting, ideologies. On the one hand, a residual Soviet-era ‘abortion culture’ remains in effect, albeit waning over time. As Karpov and Kaariainen (2005) described, this ‘abortion culture’ maintained the normalization of abortion as an accepted solution to burdensome financial and personal situations. On the other hand, the post-communist resurgence of pro-Slavic nationalism, based partly on the increased influence of the ROC, is adamantly opposed to the act of abortion and perceives homosexuality as a sin worth criminalizing.

These two ideologies more obviously conflict concerning the issue of abortion since homosexuality has been negatively viewed during both communist and post-communist Russian history. However, as the analyses in the chapter suggest, the Soviet-era ‘abortion culture’ may be fading. For instance, proportions of Russians that accept abortion for any reason have decreased over the past 20 years by as much as 20%. Another way to explore this trend is to examine support by age group. Table 38 presents crosstabulation results between age group and indicators of attitudes toward abortion and homosexuality. Although the relationship is weak, older cohorts clearly have more accepting attitudes toward abortion. Whereas, cohorts born at the end or after the collapse of the Soviet Union, display less accepting attitudes about abortion. The exact opposite is true for attitudes about homosexuals. Indeed, younger cohorts are far more accepting of rights for homosexuals in society. This

Table 38. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Attitudes toward Social Issues and Age

		30 or less	31-45	46-60	Over 60	Gamma
Attitude toward Abortion	If pregnancy is danger to woman	23.1	24.1	25.4	27.4	.136
	If child is expected to have defects	23.8	24.5	24.6	27.1	.183**
	If women is not married	23.5	23.5	27.9	25	.083*
	If couple does not want more children	23.8	26.9	26.6	22.6	.154***
Attitude toward Homosexuality	Allow homosexuals to speak	36.5	24.6	28.3	10.7	-.170***
	Allow homosexuals to teach	29	28.7	23.4	18.9	-.159***
	Allow books about legalizing same-sex	33.5	27	26.3	13.2	.195***

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

table identifies two main patterns. First, the Soviet-era ‘abortion culture’ is subsiding, being replaced by systems of belief less accepting of abortion. Second, younger cohorts of ethnic Russians hold more liberal views about rights for homosexuals. Further illustrating this second pattern, Table 39 presents the results from crosstabulating indicators of anti-West sentiments and age groups. Accordingly, younger cohorts are more accepting of democracy and Western influences than older respondents.

While further analysis concerning attitudes toward Western influences is pursued in the next chapter, the results above offer important insight into the current make-up of ethnic Russians, their attitudes about social issues, the ideological

Table 39. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Anti-West Sentiments and Age

		30 or less	31-45	46-60	Over 60
Democracy leads to disorder	Agree	38.3	48.5	56.4	65.6
	Disagree	47.7	42.7	31.3	19.2
	Unsure	14	8.8	12.3	15.2
	<i>Gamma</i>	.210*			
Arrange life to Western standards is harmful	Agree	36.7	51.5	57.8	66.6
	Disagree	48.4	34.5	28.2	17.4
	Unsure	14.9	14	14	16
	<i>Gamma</i>	.221*			

* $p < .001$

frameworks from which these beliefs have been based, and how these ideologies are changing. The empirical evidence discussed in this chapter suggests that ethnodoxo is becoming a more widespread source for generating opinions and attitudes about social issues among contemporary Russians. This is shown in the relationship between religion, and more specifically the importance and role of the ROC, ethnodoxo, and attitudes toward abortion and homosexuals in society. While the belief in ethnodoxo is held by a majority of contemporary ethnic Russians, regardless of orientation toward social issues, the variations that do exist confirm the hypotheses proposed earlier. Religion is weakly associated with attitudes toward abortion, but nonetheless related. Further evidence suggests that the Soviet-era ‘abortion culture’ is waning, and being replaced with new systems of belief. As this paper purports, one such ideology is a pro-Slavic, ROC supported, nationalist ideology. Indeed, the belief in ethnodoxo is similar across attitudes toward abortion, confirming the limited influence of the traditional ‘abortion culture.’ In terms of attitudes toward rights for

homosexuals in society, both religiosity and adherence to ethnodoxo are related to negative orientations.

In short, the findings in this chapter continue to confirm the conclusions in this paper, which posit that a new ideological framework is being created during the aftermath of the Soviet Union. This ideology, i.e., ethnodoxo, draws from traditional conceptualizations of Russian identity, linking religion, ethnicity, and nationality as compulsory characteristics for what it means to be Russian today. Furthermore, these results contribute to the idea that ethnodoxo has become an important component of a worldview for many ethnic Russians.

CHAPTER XII: RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE, XENOPHOBIA, AND ETHNODOXY

The issue of tolerance and xenophobia is of particular interest when examining the ideology of ethnodoxo. Again, ethnodoxo is a belief system that separates individuals into in/out-groups. For instance, an individual is either ethnic Russian and affiliated with Russian Orthodoxy, or something else. This may result in special treatment for the dominant religion, ethnicity, and nationality, while viewing all others as inferior. Particular to the ideological framework of ethnodoxo is the separation of individuals and groups based on religious affiliation. Therefore, it is pertinent that this analysis investigates the tolerance of other religious groups. Furthermore, ethnodoxo depicts the West as harmful and an influence that threatens the traditions of Russia. Therefore, xenophobia is addressed by exploring popular opinions about the West and its influence on Russia. The central question for this chapter is: *how is ethnodoxo related to indicators of religious tolerance and xenophobia?*

Religious Tolerance in Contemporary Russia

The last fifty years has been a crucial period in tolerance research. Studying tolerance toward out-groups is conceptually and empirically epitomized in Samuel Stouffer's *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties* (1955), which set the stage for future research. According to Stouffer, tolerance referred to the allowance of civil liberties to social out-groups. While follow-up studies have complemented (e.g., Davis, 1975; Cutler and Kaufman, 1975; Williams, Nunn, and St. Peter, 1976;

McClosky and Brill, 1983), challenged (e.g., Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus, 1979, 1982), and expanded (e.g., Sniderman, Tetlock, Glaser, Green, and Hout, 1989; Mueller, 1988; Armstrong and Karpov, 2010) Stouffer's findings, his conceptual approach to tolerance has generally remained the same: the emphasis of civil liberties as a way to gauge political, religious, and social tolerance of out-groups.

For the purpose of this study, I will approach religious tolerance similarly. In particular I refer to Karpov and Lisovskaya's conceptualization of religious tolerance (2007), which builds on Stouffer's work on political tolerance along with Zagorin's definition of religious toleration. According to Zagorin, religious toleration "implies religious freedom in some measure" and is based on the principle

...that society and the state should, as a matter of right, extend complete freedom of religious belief and expression to all their members and citizens and should refrain from imposing any religious tests, doctrines, or form of worship or religious association upon them (2003, p.7).

Coupled with Stouffer's approach toward political tolerance as the willingness to grant civil liberties, Karpov and Lisovskaya developed the following definition. Religious tolerance is "the willingness to grant religious freedom to people and groups of other faiths" (Karpov and Lisovskaya, 2007 p. 883). Based on the tasks in this chapter, Karpov and Lisovskaya's definition of religious tolerance is used to better understand the creation of boundaries between in/out-groups as specified by the tenets of ethnodoxo. Doing so further contributes to the exploration of the scope of ethnodoxo among contemporary ethnic Russians.

Research on religious tolerance has often explored the influence of religiosity toward dispositions of ethnic, social, and religious out-groups. While some have hesitated when making the link between religiosity and tolerance (e.g., Kunovich and

Hodson, 1999)²⁸, most agree that the relationship is strong regardless of religious, ethnic, temporal, or spacial context (e.g., Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Hello, 2002; Glock and Stark, 197; Allport and Ross, 1967)²⁹. While this body of literature has provided important contributions to the field, few have explored the relationship between religion *and* ethnicity and its influence on religious tolerance. This study fills this gap by examining the relationship between adhering to ethnodoxo and religious tolerance among contemporary Russians.

The literature on religious tolerance in Russia includes two main emphases: doctrinal (i.e. what does the Russian Orthodoxy Church have to say about religious tolerance) and socio-political (i.e., what does public opinion and policy say about religious tolerance). Often, these issues are framed for gauging how compatible Russian Orthodoxy is, and Russia in general, with Western democratic ideals (e.g., Levinskaya, 2007; Stockl, 2006; Borowik, 2006).

The doctrinal emphasis refers to issues of religious tolerance relating to official Church positions, theological interpretations, and the role of the Church in Russian society. For instance, Papademetriou examined early and contemporary illustrations of Orthodox Christianity as basically tolerant of other faiths, “especially

²⁸ In their study, Kunovich and Hodson examined the relationship between religiosity (i.e., church attendance and religious beliefs) and ethnic intolerance in Croatia. Against conventional thought, they found no causal relationship between religiosity and ethnic intolerance. Instead, they posited competition for resources, conflict, and the polarization of groups to be the more likely causal mechanism (1999).

²⁹ Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Hello examined the relationship between religiosity and ethnic prejudice in eleven European countries. They concluded that Catholics and Protestants were more prejudiced than the non-religious. In addition, church attendance and religious belief increased the likelihood of prejudice, while religious particularism decreased the chances (2002). However, Glock and Stark efforts on anti-Semitism in the United States does emphasize the influence of religious particularism inherent in Christianity toward religious intolerance (1973). A final example rests in Allport and Ross’s study on the relationship between religiosity and prejudice in the United States. While they also note the relationship between church attendance and prejudice, they also found it to be curvilinear. In addition, they point out how differences in religiosity, *extrinsic* (someone who uses religion) versus *intrinsic* (someone who lives their religion), may also influence the level of prejudice (1967).

among the monotheistic religions” (2002, p.105). As Papademetriou explained, Patriarch Metrophanes III of Constantinople “issued a sharp condemnation of the maltreatment of the Jews in Crete in an encyclical written in 1568” (2002, p.105). More recently, Patriarch Bartholomew offered the following statement to the United Nations: “From an Orthodox Christian perspective, the virtues of diversity and tolerance provide the fundamentals for a Christian life” (1994). Stockl noted the ‘westernization’ of Orthodox theology as indicated in the adoption of ‘modern’ (in the Western sense) liberal ideals (2006). However, some consider the Church to be too firmly rooted in a religiocentric past memory to be compatible with modern day issues of diversity, pluralism, and tolerance (Levinskaya, 2007). Thus, as Walters succinctly wrote, the ROC is faced with two possible scenarios: “outward looking or inward looking” (2007, p.853).

In addition to analyzing Church positions, official or unofficial, on issues of tolerance and pluralism, the everyday and popular acceptance or rejection of such views is also examined. Indeed, the existence of genuine religious tolerance among contemporary Russians is a complicated issue. As Bahry, Boaz, and Gordon noted, even “people who profess democratic values (*demophiles*) appear to be all too willing to deny rights to groups they dislike” (1997, p.484). Verkhovsky’s study on Russian Orthodox nationalists, although in no way representative of all ethnic Russians or adherents to Russian Orthodoxy, highlights how the ideology of this group “focuses both on its principal enemy, the Antichrist, and on those enemies subordinate to the Antichrist: Jews, Catholics, the West, the New World Order and so on” (2004, p.127). As some have pointed out, the basis of intolerance may have more to do with the

particular social context than on doctrinal creed. For instance, Bahry et al. argued that unwillingness to grant basic civil rights, even among *demophiles*, is best explained as a logical and rational approach in an unstable political climate (1997).

Karpov and Lisovskaya also acknowledged the importance of socio-political conditions in order to understand religious intolerance in contemporary Russia (2007, 2008). Results from a Russian national survey showed levels of intolerance to be highest among ethnic Russians residing in non-Muslim regions as well as in the tumultuous Caucasus. They concluded that intolerance in this case has more to do with “reactionary ideological influences and regional socio-political conditions than with Orthodox and Muslim core religious beliefs and practices” (2008, p.361).

However, religious intolerance is not limited to Muslims. Karpov and Lisovskaya found that “Western Churches are the out-groups least tolerated by both the Orthodox and Muslims” (2007, p.891). In addition, “only a minority of the self-identified Orthodox and Muslims would allow Jews any religious activities” (Karpov and Lisovskaya, 2007, p.888).

Clearly, religious (in)tolerance in Russia is a complicated issue. On the one hand, most literature describes a highly intolerant religious landscape for anyone not Russian Orthodox. On the other hand, some describe the ROC and its theology as inherently tolerant, celebrating the ideals of diversity and pluralism. One of the tasks in this chapter is to further explore these issues by examining surveys of actual attitudes rather than normative statements.

Hypotheses

To do this, two non-Orthodox religious groups are analyzed. Muslims were chosen as an example of a traditional non-Orthodox religion and Western churches as an example of a new and foreign non-Orthodox group. Based on the literature, I expect ethnic Russians who affiliate with Russian Orthodoxy to have overall intolerant attitudes toward non-Orthodox religious groups. In particular, *I expect most ethnic Orthodox Russians to deny the rights of religious freedom for Muslims and Western churches (Hypothesis 7a)*. According to the theoretical foundation of this study (i.e., ethnodoxo), which emphasizes in-group preference, special privileges, and status, *I expect individuals with high levels of ethnodoxo to have high levels of religious intolerance (Hypothesis 7b)*.

Operationalization and Frequency Distributions of Religious Tolerance

The first task in this chapter is to explore attitudes of religious tolerance and how they are related to ethnodoxo. In particular, attitudes toward Muslims, new churches, and opinions about legal rights for religions in society are addressed. Given the focus on tolerance toward religious out-groups, respondents were selected based on two characteristics, self-identification as ethnically Russian and Russian Orthodox. In this way, the following analysis explores attitudes from respondents who share a key characteristic of ethnodoxo (i.e., self identification as ethnically Russian and Russian Orthodox). Attitudes toward Muslims and Western churches are operationalized by asking respondents if they would allow a church or mosque to be built in their community, preaching in public, publication and distribution of

literature, respective religious schools, teaching respective religions in secondary schools, preaching on television, religious charity activities, or the collection of money for respective religious needs.

Tables 40 and 41 present the frequency distributions of these indicators. In general, ethnic Orthodox Russians appear to be more tolerant of Muslims than of new churches. Specifically, most respondents would allow the construction of new mosques (56.6%) but not churches (58.1%), charity activities for Muslims (62.8%) but not for new churches (46.7%), and the collection of money for Islamic religious needs (48%) but not for new churches (58.3%). However, a majority of respondents are less willing to allow Muslims to preach in public (57.1%), on TV (51.8%), or to allow the teaching of Islam in public schools (74.4%). Respondents are even more unwilling to allow new churches these same rights (70.5, 66.6, and 80.4% respectively). These preliminary results depict ethnic Orthodox Russians as less tolerant of Western churches compared to Muslims, but generally intolerant of both. Furthermore, these results correspond with findings from previous studies as well (Karpov and Lisovskaya, 2007, 2008).

Opinions about legal rights for religions in society is operationalized by asking respondents if all religions should have equal rights or if certain religions should have special privileges. Frequency distributions of these indicators show paradoxical results (see Table 42). While a majority of ethnic Orthodox Russians agrees that all religions should have equal rights (52.1%), most believe the Russian Orthodox Church should be granted special privileges (73%) while Islam should not (78.9%). Further puzzling is the distribution of respondents when asked if all

Table 40. Frequency Distribution of Indicators of Willingness to Grant Rights for Muslims

		Frequency	Percentage
Allow new mosque in city	Allow	754	56.6
	Prohibit	433	32.5
	Unsure	144	10.8
Allow preaching Islam in public	Allow	393	29.5
	Prohibit	760	57.1
	Unsure	178	13.4
Allow Muslim literature	Allow	580	43.6
	Prohibit	598	44.1
	Unsure	164	12.3
Allow Islamic schools	Allow	586	44
	Prohibit	577	43.4
	Unsure	168	12.6
Allow teaching of Islam in schools	Allow	177	13.3
	Prohibit	990	74.4
	Unsure	164	12.3
Allow Islamic preaching on TV	Allow	447	33.6
	Prohibit	689	51.8
	Unsure	195	14.7
Allow Islamic charity activities	Allow	836	62.8
	Prohibit	338	25.4
	Unsure	157	11.8
Allow Islamic fundraising	Allow	639	48
	Prohibit	502	37.7
	Unsure	190	14.3

n=1331

Table 41. Frequency Distribution of Indicators of Willingness to Grant Rights for New Churches

		Frequency	Percentage
Allow new church in city	Allow	384	28.9
	Prohibit	773	58.1
	Unsure	174	13.1
Allow preaching new religion in public	Allow	232	17.4
	Prohibit	938	70.5
	Unsure	161	12.1
Allow new church literature	Allow	320	24
	Prohibit	851	63.9
	Unsure	160	12
Allow new church schools	Allow	283	21.3
	Prohibit	886	66.6
	Unsure	162	12.2
Allow teaching new church in schools	Allow	109	8.2
	Prohibit	1070	80.4
	Unsure	152	11.4
Allow new church preaching on TV	Allow	259	19.5
	Prohibit	887	66.6
	Unsure	185	13.9
Allow new church charity activities	Allow	534	40.1
	Prohibit	622	46.7
	Unsure	175	13.1
Allow new church fundraising	Allow	376	28.2
	Prohibit	776	58.3
	Unsure	179	13.4

n=1331

Table 42. Frequency Distribution of Indicators of Willingness to Grant Religious Rights

		Frequency	Percentage
ROC should have some privileges	Agree	971	73
	Disagree	250	18.8
	Unsure	110	8.3
Islam should have some privileges	Agree	114	8.6
	Disagree	1051	78.9
	Unsure	166	12.5
All Russian traditional religious should have equal rights compared to foreign religions	Agree	490	36.8
	Disagree	612	45.8
	Unsure	229	17.2
All religions should have equal rights in Russia	Agree	694	52.1
	Disagree	493	37
	Unsure	144	10.8

n=1331

traditional religions should be granted special privileges. Nearly 20% were unsure, while the remainder are split between agreeing (36.8%) and disagreeing (45.8%). While requiring further analysis, these results may signify a clash between genuine attitudes toward non-Orthodox religions and the social desirability to allow all groups the same rights and freedoms in society. Interestingly, respondents were first asked if they thought all religions should have equal rights. Then, they were asked if the ROC, Islam, and traditional religions in general should be granted privileges. The initial ‘tolerance’ among responses in this first question (i.e., all religions should have equal rights) may be the result of respondents unwilling or hesitant to admit that certain religious groups should be treated differently but were more ‘certain’ when asked directly about specific faiths.

The Relationship between Religious Tolerance and Ethnodoxy

Clearly, ethnic Russians that identify with Russian Orthodoxy show intolerant attitudes toward other religions, both traditional religions in Russia like Islam and, especially, foreign religious groups. These results are not particularly surprising given the tenets of ethnodoxy. This section explores the relationship between religious intolerance and adherence to ethnodoxy more closely.

Since the task of this section is to examine general attitudes of religious tolerance, the indicators described in the previous section (i.e., willingness to grant rights to Muslims and new churches) were tested for underlying themes and compiled into one variable. To do this, principles components analysis was administered for both sets of items. A single underlying factor was extracted for each group, suggesting one general theme (i.e., religious intolerance) is captured for each set of items (see Table 43). This is important as it implies that despite the different types of rights in question (i.e., freedom of speech, religious publication, religion in schools, etc.), ethnic Orthodox Russians approach them similarly for both Muslims and Western churches. The two factor scores (again, one for tolerance toward Muslims and another for tolerance toward Western churches) were correlated with indicators of ethnodoxy (see Table 44).

Measures of tolerance toward both Muslims and Western churches are significantly correlated with measures of both soft and hard ethnodoxy. The negative association implies that as soft and hard ethnodoxy scores increase, the factor score for religious tolerance decreases. These findings confirm the expectation concerning the relationship between religious tolerance and ethnodoxy. For both traditional and

Table 43. Component Matrix for Indicators of Tolerance toward Muslims and Western Churches

Variables	Rights for Muslims	Rights for Western Churches
Allow new mosque/church	.777	.838
Allow preaching in public	.754	.824
Allow religious literature	.856	.878
Allow religious schools	.816	.852
Allow teaching religion in public schools	.564	.668
Allow preaching on TV	.762	.849
Allow religious charity activities	.765	.757
Allow religious fundraising	.812	.842
<i>Eigenvalue</i>	4.713	5.327
<i>Total variance explained</i>	58.9%	66.6%

Table 44. Correlation Matrix between Measures of Religious Tolerance and Ethnodoxy

	Tolerance toward Muslims	Tolerance toward Western Churches
Soft Ethnodoxy	-.105*	-.179*
Hard Ethnodoxy	-.108*	-.168*

* $p < .01$

foreign religious groups, ethnic Orthodox Russians are not particularly willing to grant religious freedoms and rights. Furthermore, these attitudes are associated with respondent's adherence to ethnodoxy. In conclusion, this analysis demonstrates how rigid boundaries are created based on the characteristics emphasized according to the ideological framework of ethnodoxy. Regardless of the historical presence of a religious group, a non-Orthodox is non-Orthodox and is therefore non-Russian. This

notion of rigid boundary making is continued in the next section by focusing on xenophobia and attitudes toward the West.

Xenophobia in Contemporary Russia

Closely linked with religious intolerance are attitudes of xenophobia.

According to Pain, xenophobia refers to “various expressions of intolerance towards groups which are perceived in the public consciousness as ‘strangers.’ The term xenophobia itself signifies fears, suspicion, and ill will (i.e., phobias) towards strangers” (2007, p.895). Indeed, targets of xenophobia and religious intolerance overlap in the case of Western churches. Furthermore, xenophobic trends in contemporary Russia are commonly described as being rooted in Russian Orthodoxy.

Sarkissian noted that while there are countless benefits that stem from a tight church-state relationship, which include religious education and property rehabilitation, there is also evidence of increasing right-wing, xenophobic, fascist, and nationalistic attitudes (2010). White also discussed rises in xenophobia due to Orthodox jurisdictionalism, where expansion of exclusive ethno-national identity is linked with Orthodoxy across Europe (2007). Similarly, Turunen explored evidence of Orthodox monarchism in Russia, which emphasizes the element of messiahism implying ethnic Russian Orthodox as the ‘chosen people’ (2007). Filatov and Lunkin described the exclusive and privileged status of the ROC as emphasizing the worldview of maintaining the ‘Russian Civilization’ (2010). As described by Pain, current trends of xenophobia among ethnic Russians are due to political, economic, and social instability during the ‘traumatic transformation’ of the late twentieth

century; where “traditionalism is intensified, and manifestations of xenophobia become commonplace” (2007, p.902). Pain continued,

Thus, we see that the process of consolidation within these ‘primordial’ communities can cause an upsurge in xenophobia, since the same social-psychological mechanisms used to distinguish the in-group from the out-group during the initial stages of the process of consolidation are at the same time at the root of xenophobia as well (2007, p.902).

Others have similarly noted the link between traditionalism and xenophobia in contemporary Russia. For instance, Plekon understood contemporary Orthodox traditionalism to be “more akin to fundamentalism,” resembling similar extremist tendencies and xenophobic attitudes toward out-groups (2010). According to Plekon, fundamentalists of Russian Orthodoxy have historically “decided to distance themselves from Western culture, politics, and society, existing as a remnant or enclave, awaiting the fall of the Soviet regime, the return of the monarchy and ‘Holy Russia,’ the seamless unity of church and state they idealized” (2010, p.203).

Father Georgii Chistiakov’s insight on the clash between religious tradition and modernity is especially revealing. According to Chistiakov, a “modern religious society in Russia” has emerged, which is “xenophobic, closed, and highly intolerant of other faiths and the West in general” (2006, p.13). For Chistiakov, the new Orthodoxy has become a ‘substitute ideology’ in place of the failed Communist paradigm, viewing others as the “bourgeois, enemy civilization in opposition to us” (2006, p.13). In this way, Christianity is used as a mask – “not rooted in the life of the divine service, the life of prayer, and the generally mystic life of Eastern Christianity” (Chistiakov, 2006, p.13) – to maintain a pure Russian national identity.

While doctrinal interpretation by Orthodox leaders and scholars is important, understanding the popular perceptions about religious influences toward tolerance and xenophobia is vital. Although some have explored xenophobia among everyday Russians, usually these efforts focus on attitudes toward minority groups within Russia. Ziemer's study on minority groups in southern Russia uncovered tactics developed for these groups to survive a racist and xenophobic environment (2011). Specifically, such groups have broadened their identity by creating a supra-ethnic label, "Caucasian brotherhood," in order to close the gap between majority and minority groups (2011). Based on national survey data, Alexseev's empirical examination of xenophobic attitudes in contemporary Russia is particularly interesting (2010). Alexseev concluded 1) ethnic minorities are less hostile to migrants than ethnic Russians, 2) among national-level minorities, titular ethnic groups are more intolerant than non-titular ethnic groups, and 3) tolerance and intolerance are asymmetric and intolerant attitudes are usually "stronger and stickier" (2010). Thus, according to Alexseev, what forms of intolerance and xenophobia do exist in Russia today, may be difficult to remove.

As these studies show, xenophobia in contemporary Russia is clearly linked with particular facets of Russian Orthodoxy. The collapse of the Soviet regime has provoked a resurgence of traditionalism (Chistiakov, 2006), a historically reminiscent definition of national identity (Plekon, 2010), and the strict delineation between in/out-groups (Chistiakov, 2006; Pain, 2007). As many of these authors have noted, the West has epitomized such an out-group, 'enemy,' or 'stranger.' These depictions are familiar given what we know from Chapter IX on popular perceptions of Russia

and levels of nationalism. The last task in this chapter is to further explore xenophobia among contemporary ethnic Russians, the relationship between such attitudes and religiosity, and its association with ethnoodoxy.

Hypotheses

While this literature offers insightful depictions on tolerance and xenophobia in contemporary Russia, most studies focus either on doctrinal interpretations and official Church positions (e.g., Plekon, 2010; Pain, 2007; Dzhалoshinsky, 2006) or are empirical assessments of hostility toward out-groups residing *within* Russian territory (e.g., Yaz'kova, 2006; Ziemer, 2011). Few have explored xenophobic attitudes toward groups *outside* of Russia.³⁰ This study fills this gap by examining popular perceptions of the West among contemporary ethnic Russians. Based on the research described above, *I expect most ethnic Russians to exhibit high levels of xenophobia toward the West (Hypothesis 7c)*. Furthermore, the literature depicts Russian Orthodoxy as a contributor of current xenophobic attitudes. Therefore, *I project a positive relationship between indicators of religiosity and xenophobia (Hypothesis 7d)*. In addition, the conceptual apparatus used in this study (i.e., ethnoodoxy) implies a particularistic and exclusive understanding of out-groups, identifying the West as especially harmful. Therefore, *I predict that if levels of ethnoodoxy increase, then levels of xenophobia toward the West will also increase (Hypothesis 7e)*.

³⁰ One exception is Alexseev's study on xenophobia among both ethnic and ethnic non-Russians (2010). However, this project focused primarily on attitudes toward specific minority groups, not, as I have in this paper, assessing popular perceptions of the West.

Operationalization and Frequency Distribution of Attitudes toward the West

Attitudes toward Western influence is operationalized with the following survey indicators: if democracy leads to disorder in society, if Western governments try to weaken Russia, if life would be better with more cooperation with the West, and if attempts to arrange life according to Western standards is harmful. Since this analysis focuses on general attitudes about the West, and not particular religious traditions, respondents that identified as ethnic Russian were selected. Table 45 presents the frequency distribution of these indicators. Generally, ethnic Russians appear to hold negative perceptions of Western influence. A majority of respondents believe democracy leads to disorder (53.3%), that Western governments try to weaken Russia (68.3%), and that attempts to arrange life in Russia according to Western standards is harmful (54.3%). However, a large proportion of respondents were either unsure (18.7%) or agreed (35%) that life would be better with more cooperation with the West. It seems that while current perceptions of the West are clearly negative, there is some willingness to admit that Western influences are not all harmful.

The Relationship between Xenophobia and Religiosity

As indicated in the literature, the Russian Orthodox Church is commonly described as hesitant, if not combative, against Western influences. Seen as a threat to the traditional Russian way of life, this hesitation has long been present throughout Russian history. Therefore, it should not be surprising that individuals who think

Table 45. Frequency Distribution of Indicators of Anti-West Attitudes

		Frequency	Percentage
Democracy leads to disorder	Agree	746	53.3
	Disagree	477	34
	Unsure	178	12.7
Western governments weaken Russia	Agree	956	68.3
	Disagree	253	18
	Unsure	192	13.7
Life will be better with more cooperation with West	Agree	490	35
	Disagree	649	46.3
	Unsure	262	18.7
Attempts to arrange life according to West is harmful	Agree	760	54.3
	Disagree	434	31
	Unsure	reli14.8	14.8

n=1401

highly of the Church and identify religiously, may also adhere to anti-West rhetoric.

This is the supposition explored in this section.

To do this, the relationship between indicators of religiosity and anti-West attitudes is analyzed. In particular, four items measuring common dimensions of religiosity were included: if the respondent considers him/herself religious, number of conventional Christian beliefs held, frequency of church attendance, and, since the hypothesis guiding this analysis emphasize the influential role of the ROC, how much confidence a respondent has in the Church. Table 46 presents the crosstabulation results from this analysis. In general, these results do not offer conclusive empirical support for the hypothesis that respondents with strong religiosity are more

Table 46. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Religiosity and Attitudes toward the West

		Democracy leads to disorder	Western governments weaken Russia	Life will be worse with more cooperation with West	Attempts to arrange life according to West is harmful
Confidence in ROC	Agree	54.2	68.9	45.8	55.8
	Disagree	52.2	69.6	51.4	53.6
	Unsure	44.6	55.4	36.1	37.3
	<i>Gamma</i>	.068**	.076***	.058**	.130***
Religious person	Believer	54.1	71.2	45.9	57.7
	Undecided	53.5	64.5	45.6	52.8
	Unbeliever	56.5	66.8	49.2	50.3
	Atheist	36.8	63.2	42.1	44.7
	Unsure	51.4	56.8	54.1	35.1
	<i>Gamma</i>	.033	.099	.002	.122*
Christian beliefs	Many	52.5	72.7	43	57.4
	Some	53	67.4	47.4	54.3
	Few	54	64.9	48.2	51.4
	<i>Gamma</i>	.010	.097	.018	.089
Frequency of church attendance	Weekly/monthly	48.1	69.4	40.6	58.1
	Several a year	59.2	70.2	48.5	54.6
	Yearly/less than a year	51.3	66.4	42.9	54.2
	Never	52.5	68	49.5	52.9
	<i>Gamma</i>	.012	.031	.021	.037

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

xenophobic. In fact, some relationships depict the opposite. Let us examine these relationships separately.

One would suppose that of all the indicators of religiosity, a respondent's confidence in the ROC would show the clearest relationship with anti-West sentiments. This is not necessarily the case. Indeed, respondents who are confident in the ROC have only slightly larger proportions that hold anti-West attitudes compared to those who are not confident or are unsure. In fact, respondents untrusting of the ROC have a higher percentage that believes life will be worse if Russia cooperates with the West. The relationships associated with this particular indicator of xenophobia are continually perplexing, as seen below.

In terms of whether respondents consider themselves religious, support for the hypothesis that strong religiosity is related with xenophobia is unconvincing. While self-described believers have larger proportions that think Western government weaken Russia (71.2%) and that attempts to arrange life according to the West is harmful (57.7%), the difference between respondents who are undecided, unbelievers, and even atheists in some cases, are not considerable. In fact, unbelievers have the largest proportion (56.5%) that believe democracy leads to disorder and respondents unsure of religious belonging have the highest percentage (54.1%) that think life will be worse if Russia cooperates with the West.

Similar contradictory results are found among the relationships between Christian beliefs and anti-West attitudes. Although respondents who hold many Christian beliefs have the largest proportion that believe attempts to arrange life according to the West is harmful (57.4%) and that Western governments undermine

Russia (72.7%), the differences between respondents who hold some or few beliefs are negligible. Moreover, respondents with few Christian beliefs have the highest percentage that believe life will be worse with more cooperation with the West (48.2%) and that democracy leads to disorder (54%). Further inconsistent is the relationship between church attendance and anti-West attitudes. Respondents who never attend have the highest percentage that believe life will be worse without more Western cooperation (49.5%) and the differences between those who attend are not very revealing. For instance, compared to those who attend more regularly, respondents who attend several times a year have the largest proportion that believe democracy leads to disorder (59.2%). Finally, frequency of church attendance does not seem to matter regarding the belief that Western governments undermine Russia or that attempts to arrange Russian life according to the West is harmful.

In short, the results from this analysis does not support the hypothesis that religiosity has a positive relationship with xenophobia. In most cases the relationship is inconclusive, or even negative. This is not to say, however, that these findings do not still say something about contemporary ethnic Russians. In fact, these results say a great deal about most ethnic Russians as having anti-Western attitudes, regardless of differences in religiosity. In other words, xenophobic attitudes appear to have less to do with religious conviction and/or influence from the ROC, and more about being generally ethnic Russian. As the preceding chapters show, ethnodoxo has become a prominent ideology among contemporary ethnic Russians. Therefore, I suspect that the relationship between xenophobia and ethnodoxo will be far more apparent.

The Relationship between Xenophobia and Ethnodoxy

As the previous chapters show, ethnodoxy has become a widely accepted belief system among most ethnic Russians today. Again, the belief that being Russian Orthodox is necessary in order to be ‘truly’ Russian, and vice versa, is held by a majority of Russians, regardless of social, religious, or political orientations and attitudes. In particular, respondents with different levels of religiosity were shown to agree with the tenets of ethnodoxy. In other words, even respondents with weak levels of religiosity adhere to ethnodoxy, despite the importance of claiming a religious identity as part and parcel for being Russian. Indeed, the role of religion in ethnodoxy is limited. While it is important in terms of initial affiliation (i.e., to be Russian is to be Orthodox and to be Orthodox is to be Russian) and the maintenance of that relationship (i.e., state protection of the ROC), other traditional dimensions of religiosity (e.g., frequency of attendance, belief, and even confidence in the Church) seem superfluous.

The results from this chapter confirm this idea. Although the Russian Orthodox Church has traditionally taken positions against Western influences, the level of religiosity among contemporary ethnic Russians does not seem to matter in terms of anti-West attitudes. Indeed, xenophobic attitudes are held by a majority of ethnic Russians, regardless of the level of religiosity. Therefore, I argue that xenophobic and anti-West orientations are perpetuated by a different belief system. Specifically, I suggest that ethnodoxy has become such a belief system and that, while certainly influenced by religious sources (i.e., Russian Orthodoxy), is a separate ideology that includes beliefs about the West as harmful and a threat to the traditions

of contemporary ethnic Russians. The following section explores the empirical evidence that can support this idea.

In order to do this, indicators of xenophobic attitudes and indicators of ethnodoxy were crosstabulated. The results from this analysis are presented in Table 47. In short, two themes can be extracted from these findings. First, a majority of ethnic Russians, regardless of attitudes toward the West, adhere to all indicators of soft ethnodoxy and most indicators of hard ethnodoxy. Nonetheless, some differences exist across variations in anti-West sentiments. Second, spanning each indicator of xenophobia, respondents that agree with anti-West statements have the largest proportion that adheres to every tenet of ethnodoxy. In other words, some adherence to ethnodoxy is held by a majority of ethnic Russians, no matter their perceptions of the West. However, what differences there are in perceptions of the West and its influence on Russia is associated with ethnodoxy in a positive direction.

Clearly, ethnodoxy has become a powerful ideology and source for understanding the world. The relationship between ethnodox beliefs and xenophobic attitudes about the West confirm the breadth and depth of these beliefs across contemporary Russians. However, these findings do not completely ignore the influence of the ROC concerning these matters. As the previous literature depicts, the prevalence of negative opinions about the West and its influence among popular Church leaders certainly carries some weight. Simply, the results in this section depict the Church as a source of xenophobia but working as part of a much broader ideological framework, i.e., ethnodoxy. As demonstrated in the first section of this chapter, religious intolerance was also found to be associated with ethnodox beliefs.

Table 47. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Attitudes toward West and Indicators of Ethnodoxy

		Hard Ethnodoxy				Soft Ethnodoxy		
		No longer Russian if converted from ROC to another religion	Only in Russia can one find 'true' Russian Orthodoxy	Non-Russian can never be a real Russian Orthodox	Western Churches undermine Russians and their traditions	A Russian is always Orthodox	State should protect Russian Orthodox from opponents	Russians are richer in their soul and stronger in their beliefs than Western nations
Democracy leads to disorder	Agree	38.3	61.8	55.1	63.5	88.2	80.7	81.1
	Disagree	31	49.5	43.4	45.3	83.6	73	73.2
	Unsure	25.8	39.9	39.9	39.9	77.5	59	62.4
	<i>Gamma</i>	.196***	.239***	.199***	.294***	.229***	.290***	.271***
Western governments weaken Russia	Agree	37.7	60.7	51.8	62.7	88.3	79.4	80.6
	Disagree	27.3	49	48.2	36.8	82.6	71.5	71.1
	Unsure	26.6	33.3	37.5	35.9	74	59.9	59.4
	<i>Gamma</i>	.222***	.325***	.179***	.389***	.325***	.307***	.338***
Life will be worse with more cooperation with West	Agree	37.1	61.6	55.9	63.8	87.5	79	81.7
	Disagree	33.9	52.2	45.7	48.2	88.4	75.1	75.3
	Unsure	27.9	42.7	38.9	42.4	74	66.4	63.4
	<i>Gamma</i>	.139***	.100***	.092***	.060***	.274***	.106***	.139***
Attempts to arrange life according to West is harmful	Agree	38.2	61.6	54.2	64.5	88	80.1	81.1
	Disagree	30.4	48.8	44	45.6	85	73.3	73.5
	Unsure	28	42.5	41.5	35.3	75.8	61.8	62.8
	<i>Gamma</i>	.198***	.234***	.175***	.345***	.239***	.263***	.281***

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Therefore, these analyses depict a belief system that creates, maintains, and legitimates rigid in/out-group boundaries, based on religious and cultural/national foundations.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to explore the relationship between ethnodox and attitudes toward perceived out-groups for ethnic Russians. According to the basic tenets of ethnodox, this analysis focused on tolerance toward non-Orthodox groups, both domestic and foreign faith traditions, and attitudes toward the West and its influence on Russian society. As a result, these analyses provide insight on the rigid boundaries that are created and maintained, separating in-group from out-group according to ethnodox beliefs. As hypothesized, the results from this investigation depict ethnic Russians as generally intolerant of non-Orthodox religious groups and Western influences. While many studies note the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church on perpetuating these attitudes, the findings in this chapter depict a phenomenon far more complicated. For example, while religious conviction and trust in the ROC were at times related to more xenophobic attitudes, this pattern was not always significant, thereby making the influence of religion and the ROC less compelling. Instead, the influence of religion and the Church may be better understood as part of a broader belief system – specifically, ethnodox.

The idea that religion and religious organizations play a smaller than expected role, particularly in Russia, in impacting attitudes of tolerance compared to larger, socio-cultural structures has already been noted. Karpov and Lisovskaya described

the socio-political context of Russia as having a greater influence on religious tolerance than actual religious doctrine (2008). Father Georgii Chistiakov described post-communist Orthodoxy as a ‘substitute ideology,’ replacing the communist ideological system, which continues to maintain the same intolerance and xenophobia against the West. Chistiakov’s argument depicts the new Orthodoxy as a mask, hiding the ‘true’ authentic, tolerant, and accepting theological tradition. In other words, the religious doctrine of Russian Orthodoxy should not be blamed for the perpetuation of intolerance and xenophobia. Instead, it is the popular application and perceived function of Russian Orthodoxy and the ROC in contemporary Russia that should be of focus. As previous chapters illustrated, affiliation to the ROC is an essential component for a large majority of ethnic Russians when defining what it means to be Russian, religious belief and behavior less so. In this way, the role of religion becomes a sub-component of a much larger and broader ideology, i.e., ethnodoxo, which influences the identity and attitudes of contemporary ethnic Russians. Part of this system of beliefs is the element of boundary making between cultural and religious in/out-groups and state protection from perceived threats. Religious rhetoric can and has certainly fueled these beliefs, but does so as part of the wider belief system of ethnodoxo.

The consequences of this are obvious. The recent political climate, as described in Chapter X, exemplifies a popular pro-Slavic and anti-West platform. As Vladimir Putin regains the presidency, the relationship between the US, West, and Russia are revisited. While these are certainly important questions that have been explored, and will continue to be so, in both academic and popular discourse, there

are more fundamental questions that are often overlooked. For instance, what is the impact of an emerging belief system like ethnodoxy on the everyday lives of contemporary ethnic Russians? In other words, how does an ideology such as ethnodoxy, which accentuates elements of intolerance and xenophobia, impact the lives of the individuals themselves?

In Chapter XI, analyses provided tentative insight into the changing attitudes and, as I argued, shifting ideological worldview regarding the acceptance of abortion. If ethnodoxy is becoming a major system of beliefs shared by most contemporary ethnic Russians, then evidence of its growth may be found in the changing trends of other attitudes as well. While the longitudinal data on tolerance and xenophobia among everyday ethnic Russians is limited, the World Values Survey can provide some tentative insight. Tables 48 and 49 present percentages of Russians that answered questions relevant to understanding everyday attitudes about social out-groups over the past twenty years. Table 48 displays percentages of all Russians, while self-identified Orthodox Russians were selected and percentages presented in Table 49 to provide comparison.

The indicators in this analysis include which types of individuals/groups respondents would not want as neighbors and whether respondents trusted individuals from other countries. Relevant to this chapter, I focused on attitudes toward Muslims and immigrants/foreigners. In 1990, 15.5% of Russians and 17.9% of Orthodox Russians mentioned Muslims as individuals they would not want as neighbors. This percentage decreased only slightly by 1999. More interesting is the sharp increase in percentages of both Russians and Orthodox Russians that specified immigrants and

Table 48. Measures of Tolerance Xenophobia for All Russians Over Time (%)

		1990	1995	1999	2006
Mentioned not wanting as a neighbor	Muslims	15.5	NA	13.7	NA
	Foreigner/Immigrant	11.8	11.9	11.4	31.5
Trust in someone from another country/nationality	Trust	44.5	NA	NA	39.9
	Neither	27.9	NA	NA	NA
	Distrust	27.5	NA	NA	60.1

Source: World Values Survey

Table 49. Measures of Tolerance and Xenophobia for Orthodox Russians Over Time (%)

		1990	1995	1999	2006
Mentioned not wanting as a neighbor	Muslims	17.9	NA	14.4	NA
	Foreigner/Immigrant	13.2	12	11.6	31
Trust in someone from another country/nationality	Trust	44.9	NA	NA	41.3
	Neither	22.8	NA	NA	NA
	Distrust	32.3	NA	NA	58.7

Source: World Values Survey

foreigners. In 1990 only 11.8% of Russians and 13.2% of Orthodox Russians mentioned immigrants/foreigners, which changed very little over the next decade. By 2006, however, 31.5% of Russians and 31% of Orthodox Russians identified immigrants and foreigners as individuals they would not want as neighbors. In sum, while opinions about Muslims as neighbors have changed relatively little, negative attitudes about foreigners as neighbors increased dramatically since 2000.

Respondents' trust in individuals from other countries was also revealing. In 1990, 27.5% of Russians and 32.3% of Orthodox Russians distrusted someone from another country. By 2006, that percentage increased to 60.1% and 58.7% respectively. Of note, the 2006 wave did not provide respondents with a 'neither'

response item, thereby forcing fence sitters to choose. While this may have provided slightly different results, the dramatic increase (e.g., percentages more than doubled for Russians) is compelling regardless. Clearly, attitudes toward foreigners have become increasingly more intolerant since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, these trends are relatively similar for both Russians writ large and Russians affiliating with Orthodoxy. This may not be surprising given the immediate ‘revival’ of religious affiliation that has been noted in this paper and the general literature.

These analyses provide only a glimpse into possible trends of intolerance and xenophobia that appear to be occurring among most post-communist Russians. Nonetheless, these results are convincing and, taken with the other findings from this chapter, clearly depict the spread and depth of an ideology that maintains and legitimates such attitudes and positions. Indeed, the dissemination of ethnoodoxy, from religious and political leaders, not only influence popular perceptions of external, supra-individual, matters such as foreign relations and political agendas, but also the everyday lives of individuals regarding who they would live near and what types of people they would trust.

This is an important concern as it speaks to a change in how most Russians fundamentally think they should live their lives, which influences the way they interact with other groups in and outside of Russia. For instance, Muslims residing in Russia (the second largest religious tradition) are one group with which ethnic Russians have historically had volatile relations. Like ethnic Russians, Russian Muslims have also constructed strong ethno-religious identities. The next chapter

explores how ethnodoxo may be applied in the case of Russian Muslims, thereby noting the similarities and differences between ethnodoxo for ethnic Russians.

CHAPTER XIII: BEYOND ORTHODOXY: ETHNODOXY AMONG RUSSIAN MUSLIMS

The application of ethnodoxo in this study has been used to describe a majority of ethnic Russians that claim Russian Orthodoxy as an essential part of their ethnic identity. However, ethnodoxo may be applied to understand ethno-religious linkages among other groups as well. The next two chapters explore how ethnodoxo may be applied on non-Orthodox groups in and outside of Russia. For instance, adherents to Russia's next largest religious tradition, Islam, have been similarly depicted as exhibiting strong ethno-religious attachments. At a seventh of the national population, enclaves of Russian Muslims reside throughout the country. Data for the analyses conducted in this chapter come from the same 2005 Russian National Survey. Again, oversampling key Muslim regions (Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Dagestan) was conducted in order to obtain sufficient data from Muslims (see Karpov and Lisovskaya, 2007, 2008). Table 50 presents the frequency distribution of Russian Muslim respondents and their proportion within predominantly Muslim regions throughout Russia. The purpose of this chapter is to examine how ethnodoxo may be conceptually useful in explaining the ethno-religious link for Russian Muslims as well.

Table 50. Frequency Distribution of Russian Muslims by Region

	Frequency	Percentage
Tatarstan	165	47.8
Dagestan	298	91.7
Kabardino-Balkaria	246	75
Bashkortostan	126	39

n=835

Background on Russian Muslims

Islam has always had an important place in Eurasia. According to Kopanski, “The Muslims of CIS are proud of fact that when Slavs, Ruses and Scandinavian Varangians were still heathens, Islam was embraced *en masse* by the non-Slavic people in Daghestan, Khazaria and Itil-Ural in 922” (1998, p.194). Throughout Russian history, the close contact with Islam along Russian borders generated both conflict and cooperation (Jersild, 2000). In contemporary Russia, the presence of Islam is just as ‘problematic.’ For instance, while the population of ethnic Russians is decreasing, the population of ethnic minorities that have traditionally affiliated with Islam is increasing (Shlapentokh, 2007). The consequences of these trends are important for understanding majority/minority relations and how this influences the shaping of ethnic and national identities.

Some believe that rises in individuals declaring Islamic affiliations in Russia is due to the growth of Russian Orthodox fundamentalism (Kopanski, 1998) as well as responses to conflict in predominantly Muslim regions (e.g., Bosnia, Chechnya) where Russian support and special treatment of Orthodox adherents over Muslims is evident (Shlapentokh, 2007). This Islamophobic and, as described in the preceding chapter, intolerant and ethnocentric movement has provoked the unification of Russian Muslims. For instance, Kopanski referred to the pan-Turkic solidarity found in Tatarstan and Boshkortostan where the idea of a confederation of predominantly Muslim regions is prevalent (1998). Similarly, Shlapentokh noted, “the resurrection of interest in Islam has often merged with rising ethnic nationalism” (2007, p.55).

The increasing interest in and unification of Russian Muslims might suggest the presence of ethnodoxy. However, the application of this concept is different for Russian Muslims than it is for ethnic Russians. This difference lies mainly in Islamic doctrinal self-representation as supra-ethnic/national. Horowitz described Islam as “not just a religion but a national identity that may take different forms. Islam is a collective identity that, in many forms, competes to be the legitimate unit of political self-determination,” and continued,

Islamic national identity claims to be universal – to be necessary and exclusive. It claims to supersede and ultimately to erase alternative sources of national identity, such as ethnicities, regional institutional structures and patron – client networks, and other religions. Those holding legitimate power have no right to appeal to any other collective identity (2007, p.914).

In this way, affiliation to Islam is the ultimate identity for Muslims, overriding ethnicity, nationality, etc. This is an important attribute when attempting to understand Russian Muslims through the conceptual framework of ethnodoxy. Again, ethnodoxy is the belief that a group’s ethnicity is strictly linked with that group’s dominant religion. Based on Horowitz’s understanding of Islamic identity, if an ethnic group’s dominant religion is Islam, then their Muslim identity is superlative while all other sources of collective identity (i.e., ethnicity, nationality, etc.) are secondary, if not irrelevant. In the case of ethnic Tatars, for example, one cannot apply ethnodoxy in the same way as with ethnic Russians. In other words, it is erroneous to say that ‘only a true Tatar is Muslim, and only a true Muslim is Tatar.’ Instead, a more accurate statement would be that ‘ethnic Tatars are one of many groups of people that are, above all, Muslim.’

Others have also noted this characteristic of Muslim identity. According to Shlapentokh, “[Muslims] vehemently discard nationalism as a dangerous idea that could just separate Muslims from each other. It is not race/ethnicity but common beliefs that unite or separate people” (2007, p.55). For Warhola and Lehning,

...what unites ‘ethnic Russians’ – a sense of national self-awareness based on ethno-linguistic and cultural moorings – is conspicuously absent among Muslims, for whom religion is the common unifying factor, even though religious practice may be marginal or absent altogether (2007, p.938).

Therefore, as these authors suggest, Muslim identity stresses religious over ethnic or national affiliations.

The presence of a religious identity that spans different ethnic and national groups has particular ramifications on their status in contemporary Russian society. Shlapentokh provided three possible models for Russian Muslims as their growth continues in the face of Russian Orthodox extremism. First, Russian Muslims can move away from being the ‘younger brother’ and strive for equal status with ethnic Russians. Second, Russian Muslims can move even higher and become the ‘older brother’ of ethnic Russians, initiated by taking the lead in global affairs. Finally, Russian Muslims can enact Islamization in parts of Russia, particularly Tatarstan, which calls for “a loose federation with Moscow or even complete separation” (Shlapentokh, 2007, p.56). The Putin administration’s application of the first model (i.e., Eurasianism) has been challenged by some, pushing for either the second or third model. According to Shlapentokh, “some of them, the radical Islamists, for example, reject not only the leading role of ethnic Russians and their Orthodox faith, but the very existence of a Russian – and consequently Orthodox – centered civilization of Northern Eurasia” (2007, p.58).

Clearly, Muslim identity is more a matter of religion than ethnicity. But, the suppression of other collective identities by an ultimate religious one is an ideal type. Other collective identities surely matter in the everyday lives of minorities as they interact with individuals from majority and other minority groups. Warhola and Lehning noted the importance of ethnic boundaries among Russian Muslims:

The ethnic and religious divides in Russia are thus complex. Perhaps the most salient characteristic is that among ethnic Russians there is a multiplicity of religious orientations along both confessional (Orthodox, Baptist, etc.) and behavioral lines. Among Muslims, however, there are somewhat similar lines of division, plus the significant divides along ethnic, ethno-linguistic, and regional lines (2007, p.935).

Similarly, Marsh explored the importance of religious and ethnic identities in post-communist conflicts: “From Chechnya and Nagorno-Karabakh to Bosnia and Kosovo, groups with cross-cutting ethnic and religious attachments have engaged in some of the bloodiest and most impassioned conflicts that the post-Cold War has seen” (2007, p.811). Particularly relevant to this paper, Karpov and Lisovskaya explored empirical evidence of ethnodoxo among Russian Muslims and its relationship with intolerance towards Orthodox Russians (2008). They found that adherence to ethnodoxo influenced religious intolerance greater than traditional religiosity (conventional religious belief and practices) (Karpov and Lisovskaya, 2008).

In short, these studies show that while religion is certainly an essential source of identity for Russian Muslims, ethnicity and nationality still matter, albeit in different ways. This chapter explores these issues by applying ethnodoxo to the case of Russian Muslims. Doing this will show the versatility of the concept beyond Orthodox Russians. After which, the similarities and differences of ethnodoxo

between Russian Muslims and ethnic Russians are discussed. Of note, the purpose of this chapter is not to replicate Karpov and Lisovskaya's extensive analyses explaining the influence of ethnodoxo on religious intolerance (2008). Instead, this chapter provides a more descriptive profile of adherents to ethnodoxo for Russian Muslims and how the characteristics of ethnodoxo compare with ethnic Russians.

Hypotheses

Based on this literature, I suspect the application of ethnodoxo to be relevant in explaining ethno-religious linkages for Russian Muslims, but different compared to ethnic Orthodox Russians. For instance, in their study, Karpov and Lisovskaya found that ethnodoxo was more strongly associated with intolerance for ethnic Russians than Russian Muslims (2008). In other words, different aspects of ethnodoxo are highlighted for ethnic Russians compared to Russian Muslims. Therefore, *while I expect there to be evidence of ethnodoxo among Russian Muslims, I suspect different components of ethnodoxo to be emphasized when compared with ethnic Orthodox Russians (Hypothesis 8).*

Operationalizing Ethnodoxo for Russian Muslims

In order to assess the applicability of ethnodoxo among Russian Muslims, a series of five context-specific indicators were specifically created based on the five central components of ethnodoxo (see Table 51). These items include the importance of prayer for being a Muslim, whether a person who converts to a non-Islamic religion is still truly a representative of their nationality, whether a Russian person

can truly be a Muslim, whether Orthodox churches undermine Muslim regions, and whether the authorities of Muslim regions should protect them from anti-Muslim threats. For the purpose of this analysis, respondents were selected if they identified as Muslim.

Table 51 presents the frequency distribution for these variables. Russian Muslims adamantly agree that you do not have to pray to be Muslim (80.8%) and that authorities of Muslim regions should protect against foreign threats (60.1%). However, most do not believe that Orthodox churches undermine Muslim regions (65.1%) and are split regarding attitudes toward converts to other religions and whether a Russian person can be truly Muslim. Therefore, a tentative comparison between ethnic Russians and Russian Muslims would suggest that ethnodoxy is stronger for the former.

The next step in testing the usability of ethnodoxy as a concept that explains the ethno-religious relationship among Russian Muslims is to decipher the relationships between its indicators. Doing this will determine if these indicators are measuring the same phenomenon, or capturing multiple phenomena and should be removed from the model. Principle component analysis was administered to accomplish this task as it identifies underlying themes, or latent factor(s), among indicators, as was done with the indicators of ethnodoxy for ethnic Russians. The results from this analysis are presented in Table 52. In short, only one factor was extracted. This result has two major consequences. First, each of the five indicators loaded together in one common factor, thereby allowing each item to remain in the

Table 51. Operationalization and Frequency Distribution of Ethnodoxy among Russian Muslims

Ethnodoxy Component	Propositions		Frequency	Percentage
<i>Inborn faithfulness</i>	Do not have to pray or attend mosque to be Muslim	Agree	712	80.8
		Disagree	76	8.6
		Unsure	31	3.5
<i>Exclusion of apostates</i>	Converts to non-Muslim religion are no longer representative of nation	Agree	419	47.5
		Disagree	295	33.5
		Unsure	105	11.9
<i>Marginalization of converts</i>	Russian person will never truly be Muslim	Agree	329	37.3
		Disagree	386	43.8
		Unsure	104	11.8
<i>Presumption of harm</i>	Orthodox churches in Muslim regions are harmful	Agree	152	17.2
		Disagree	574	65.1
		Unsure	93	10.6
<i>Religious superiority</i>	Authorities in Muslim regions should protect Muslims from opponents	Agree	529	60.1
		Disagree	182	20.6
		Unsure	108	12.3

n=819

model. Second, the fact that all five indicators loaded in one factor suggests that each item is capturing a dimension of the same underlying theme. It is important to note that this factor structure was not strong (explaining less than half of the variance), but can still offer insight into the relationship between religion and ethnicity for Russian Muslims.

Unlike the factor model for ethnic Russians, which identified two separate factors (hard and soft), ethnodoxy among Russian Muslims is expressed in one. The

Table 52. Component Matrix for Indicators of Ethnodoxy among Russian Muslims

Variable	Component
Do not have to pray or attend mosque to be Muslim	.480
Converts to non-Muslim religion are no longer representative of nation	.643
Russian person will never truly be Muslim	.725
Orthodox churches in Muslim regions are harmful	.731
Authorities in Muslim regions should protect Muslims from opponents	.737
<i>Eigenvalue</i>	2.246
<i>Total variance explained</i>	44.925%

unidimensionality of ethnodoxy for Russian Muslims is indicative of a different form or version of ethnodoxy when compared to ethnic Russians. Whether the concept in general is a weaker ‘fit’ for explaining the ethno-religious link for Russian Muslims is less apparent.

Ethnodoxy among Russian Muslims

The tentative finding from the previous section is that ethnodoxy among Russian Muslims is not as widespread compared to ethnic Russians. However, a majority of respondents do agree with some of the statements indicating ethnodoxy. Therefore, a more determined investigation is pursued, providing a better understanding of the Russian Muslims for which ethnodoxy makes sense. This is done in three parts. First, the social demographics of Russian Muslims exhibiting ethnodoxy are explored. Second, the religiosity of these Russian Muslims is

analyzed. Third, the relationship between religious tolerance and adherence to ethnodoxy is examined. Completing these tasks will offer a comprehensive depiction of Russian Muslims that affiliate with some dimension of ethnodoxy, thereby showing the usefulness of this particular concept outside of ethnic Russians.

Social Determinants of Ethnodoxy among Russian Muslims

Tables 53 and 54 present the crosstabulation results of social demographic variables and indicators of ethnodoxy among Russian Muslims. In terms of region, more respondents agree with the first item of ethnodoxy (prayer and mosque attendance are not necessary to Muslim) than any other item, regardless of location. However, there is a sizeable difference in percentages based on region for the other four items. While 52.4% of respondents in Bashkortostan agree that a Russian person will never truly be Muslim, only 22% of respondents agreed in Dagestan. The fourth item (Orthodox churches are harmful) is relatively unpopular across each region but has the strongest support in Kabardino-Balkaria (26.2%) and Dagestan (21.4%). For the last item (authorities should protect Muslims), 70.6% of respondents in Dagestan agreed while only 53.2% of respondents in Bashkortostan felt this was necessary. In short, some dimension of ethnodoxy exists in each region but the aspect most emphasized may vary. A look at the socio-historic context of each region may shed light on this finding.

In particular, the ethnic make-up and location of each region may provide some explanation toward these differences. Table 55 illustrates both the geographical location and dominant ethnic groups for each region. In short, regions in western

Table 53. Adherence to Ethnodoxy for Russian Muslims by Region (%)

	Do not have to pray or attend mosque to be Muslim	Converts to non-Muslim religion are no longer representative of nation	Russian person will never truly be Muslim	Orthodox churches in Muslim regions are harmful	Authorities in Muslim regions should protect Muslims from opponents
Tatarstan	93.9	53.4	46.6	12.9	60.1
Dagestan	78.6	46	21.8	21.4	70.6
Kabardino-Balkaria	89.6	59.6	49.2	26.2	66.7
Bashkortostan	91.1	38.7	52.4	8.9	53.2

Russia (Tatarstan and Bashkortostan), typically identified as European Russia, have larger proportions of ethnic Russians. Whereas regions in the North Caucasus (Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria), bordering Georgia and Azerbaijan, have smaller percentages of ethnic Russians. Accordingly, these differences may impact the adherence to some ethnodox beliefs over others. For instance, regions located in the North Caucasus have larger proportions of respondents that believe authorities in their region should protect Muslims and that Orthodox churches are harmful. Moreover, these regions have smaller proportions of respondents that hold inclusive definitions of being Muslim (i.e., prayer or mosque attendance is unnecessary).

The demographic makeup of Russian Muslims that adhere to ethnodoxy offers further insight into the application of the concept outside of Orthodox Russians. In general, adherence to ethnodoxy did not vary across sex, age group, or place of residence. However, adherence to the last three items of ethnodoxy does vary

Table 54a. Crosstabulation of Indicators of Social Determinants and Indicators of Ethnodoxy for Russian Muslims

		Do not have to pray or attend mosque to be Muslim	Converts to non- Muslim religion are no longer representative of nation	Russian person will never truly be Muslim	Orthodox churches in Muslim regions are harmful	Authorities in Muslim regions should protect Muslims from opponents
Sex	Male	85.9	52.7	41.4	19.4	67
	Female	87.9	49.8	39	17.8	62.4
Age	Over 60	89.3	52.3	45.6	22.1	71.8
	41-60	87	55.8	39.1	18.1	61.4
	31-40	87.5	47.4	40.5	17.2	62.5
	30 or younger	84.8	49.8	37.2	17.9	65
Education	Incomplete higher, higher or advanced	85.3	54.5	33	14.7	56
	Secondary or technical	86.9	49.8	41.7	18.5	65.3
	Incomplete secondary	89.5	51.6	45.2	25	75
Income	High	86.2	62.1	45.5	17	53
	Low	92.7	45.8	42.7	17.1	74.2
Residence	Urban	88.8	52	40.5	16.7	57.2
	Rural	85.1	50.4	39.8	20.4	71.7

Table 54b. Levels of Significance for Associations between Indicators of Social Determinants and Indicators of Ethnodoxy for Russian Muslims

		Do not have to pray or attend mosque to be Muslim	Converts to non- Muslim religion are no longer representative of nation	Russian person will never truly be Muslim	Orthodox churches in Muslim regions are harmful	Authorities in Muslim regions should protect Muslims from opponents
Sex	Gamma	.076	-.076	-.087	-.053	-.120*
Age	Gamma	.089	.031	.000*	.057	.039
Education	Gamma	-.093	.070	-.082**	-.083	-.176**
Income	Gamma	-.321***	.330***	.087	-.058	-.390***
Residence	Gamma	.154	.034	-.004	-.117	-.282***

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table 55. Ethnic Make-up of Predominantly Muslim Regions in Russia

Region	Location	Ethnic Group	Percentage*
Tatarstan	European Russia	Tatar	53.2
		Russian	39.7
Dagestan	Northern Caucasus	Avar, Dargin, Kumyk, and Lezgian	74.6
		Russian	3.6
Kabardino- Balkaria	Northern Caucasus	Kabarday and Balkan	69.9
		Russian	22.5
Bashkortostan	European Russia	Bashkir and Tatar	54.9
		Russian	36.1

* *Source:* 2010 Russian Census

according to level of education. Not surprising, given the literature discussed in Chapter VII, lower education is related to a higher percentage of respondents adhering to ethnodoxy items. For all but one item, low-income is associated with higher proportions of adherents to ethnodoxy. However, respondents that agreed converts to a non-Muslim religion are no longer representatives of their nation had overwhelmingly higher incomes (62.1% compared to 45.8% for low-income respondents). In general, the relationship between social demographic variables and indicators of ethnodoxy did not yield very significant results. This implies, like ethnodoxy among ethnic Russians, that adherence to ethnodoxy for Russian Muslims does not vary based on differences in social makeup, but does by region.

The Relationship between Religiosity and Ethnodoxy among Russian Muslims

Next, the relationship between religiosity and ethnodoxy among Russian Muslims is assessed. As with ethnic Russians, religiosity is an important aspect of ethnodoxy, regardless of the case being explored. Nonetheless, differences in level of

religiousness and how religiosity is related to ethnodoxy may exist according to each group. The following task will explore this further. Three indicators of religiosity were selected for analysis: belief in God, frequency of attendance to Friday services, and whether a respondent practices Ramadan. As described in Chapter V, comparative research requires that a functional equivalence among concepts and their operationalizations be reached. Comparing Orthodoxy and Islam necessitates this consideration. Therefore, these three items were chosen as functionally equivalent measures of religiosity for Russian Muslims as belief in core Christian tenets and frequency of church attendance are for Orthodox Russians. Table 56 presents the frequency distribution of these indicators. While a majority of Russian Muslims believe in God (87.9%) and, to some extent, fast during Ramadan (68.7%), most never attend Friday service (55.4%). As with ethnic Russians, understanding what it means to be religious for Russian Muslims is not a simple answer.

The relationship between religiosity and ethnodoxy among Russian Muslims provides further complications (see Table 57). Adherence to ethnodoxy does not seem to differ based on belief, or doubt, in God and those who fast during Ramadan have generally higher percentages that adhere to ethnodox items. The association between attendance to Friday services and ethnodoxy is not as clear. Respondents who never attend or attend infrequently have comparable, if not higher, percentages of adherents to ethnodoxy than those attending more often.

Table 56. Frequency Distribution of Indicators of Religiosity among Russian Muslims

		Frequency	Percentage
Belief in God	Yes	774	87.9
	No	48	5.4
	Unsure	59	6.7
Attend Friday service at Mosque	Weekly	251	28.5
	Monthly	51	5.8
	Several times a year	68	7.7
	Yearly	23	2.6
	Never	488	55.4
Fast in Ramadan	Yes, completely	284	32.2
	To some extent	322	36.5
	No	275	31.2

The Relationship between Tolerance and Ethnodoxy among Russian Muslims

Next, the level of religious tolerance among Russian Muslims is examined. As in the analysis of tolerance for ethnic Russians, two groups have been selected: a traditional Russian faith (i.e., Russian Orthodoxy) and a foreign religious group (i.e., new churches). Russian Muslims were also asked questions about willingness to extend rights to these groups. Tables 58 and 59 present the frequency distribution of these items. In general, Russian Muslims are relatively tolerant of Orthodox in society. For instance, 72% would allow an Orthodox church to be built in their region, 71% would allow Orthodox charity activities, 65% would allow Orthodox fundraising, and nearly half of respondents, or more, would allow Orthodox to publish literature (55%), preach in public (44%) or on TV (49%), and open Orthodox schools (53%). While Russian Muslims are not particularly keen to have Orthodoxy

Table 57. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Religiosity and Indicators of Ethnodoxy for Russian Muslims

		Do not have to pray or attend mosque to be Muslim	Converts to non- Muslim religion are no longer representative of nation	Russian person will never truly be Muslim	Orthodox churches in Muslim regions are harmful	Authorities in Muslim regions should protect Muslims from opponents
Belief in God	Yes	87.4	51.7	38.9	20	66.2
	No	87	52.2	58.7	6.5	58.7
	Unsure	81.1	43.4	41.5	9.4	47.2
	<i>Gamma</i>	.163*	.111	-.055**	.359*	.276*
Attend Friday service at Mosque	Weekly	76.3	54.7	30.5	25	69.1
	Monthly	87.8	61.2	42.9	30.6	83.7
	Several times a year	90.2	54.1	39.3	18	54.1
	Yearly	89.5	68.4	21.1	21.1	42.1
	Never	91.9	47.1	45.8	13.9	62.6
	<i>Gamma</i>	-.427***	.106	-.138**	.163**	.102**
Fast in Ramadan	Yes, completely	80	53.3	36.7	26.7	74.8
	To some extent	88.8	52.7	46.7	16.7	60.9
	No	92.2	47.1	40.2	12.2	58
	<i>Gamma</i>	-.330***	.070	-.030***	.180***	.225***

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

be taught in their schools (50% against), they are generally tolerant of Orthodox, especially when compared to new churches.

Indeed, Russian Muslims, not unlike ethnic Orthodox Russians, are less willing to allow rights for new churches. As illustrated in Table 59, more than half of Russian Muslims prohibits every right for new churches. Clearly, intolerance toward new, non-traditional religious groups is a trait shared by both Orthodox and Muslims in Russia. These results correspond with the findings from previous studies (Karpov and Lisovskaya, 2007, 2008). As is discussed later, this may be explained by the majority/minority dynamic inherent in Orthodox-Muslim relations.

Moreover, intolerance towards Russian Orthodox and new churches differs by region. Tables 60 and 61 show attitudes toward Russian Orthodox and new churches for Russian Muslims by region. As with adherence to ethnodoxy, Russian Muslims residing in the North Caucasus (i.e., Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria) have higher percentages of intolerant attitudes than respondents living in European Russia (i.e., Tatarstan and Bashkortostan). Clearly, the location and demographic make-up of these regions impacts the views and beliefs regarding religious tolerance and ethno-religious identities for many Russian Muslims.

Regardless of region, however, Russian Muslims are more tolerant of Russian Orthodox than new churches. The tolerance of some but not others poses an interesting problem concerning the application of ethnodoxy among Russian Muslims. Again, the in/out-group notion of ethnodoxy creates the threat of opponents and, therefore, the need for protection. This component of ethnodoxy was evident among ethnic Russians, but may not be as pervasive among Russian Muslims. In

Table 58. Frequency Distribution of Indicators of Tolerance toward the Russian Orthodox among Russian Muslims

		Frequency	Percentage
Allow Orthodox to build church	Allow	632	71.7
	Prohibit	145	16.5
	Unsure	104	11.8
Allow Orthodox to preach in public	Allow	384	43.6
	Prohibit	331	37.6
	Unsure	166	18.8
Allow Orthodox to publish	Allow	485	55.1
	Prohibit	239	27.1
	Unsure	157	17.8
Allow Orthodox schools	Allow	466	52.9
	Prohibit	250	28.4
	Unsure	165	18.7
Allow public schools to teach about Orthodoxy	Allow	254	28.8
	Prohibit	436	49.5
	Unsure	191	21.7
Allow Orthodox to preach on TV	Allow	435	49.4
	Prohibit	275	31.2
	Unsure	171	19.4
Allow Orthodox charity activities	Allow	626	71.1
	Prohibit	115	13.1
	Unsure	140	15.9
Allow Orthodox fundraising	Allow	577	65.5
	Prohibit	166	18.8
	Unsure	138	15.7

n=881

Table 59. Frequency Distribution of Indicators of Attitudes toward New Churches for Russian Muslims

		Frequency	Percentage
Allow new church to build church	Allow	190	21.6
	Prohibit	551	62.5
	Unsure	140	15.9
Allow new church to preach in public	Allow	120	13.6
	Prohibit	605	68.7
	Unsure	156	17.7
Allow new church to publish	Allow	164	18.6
	Prohibit	554	62.9
	Unsure	163	18.5
Allow new church schools	Allow	120	13.6
	Prohibit	585	66.4
	Unsure	176	20
Allow public schools to teach about new church	Allow	72	8.2
	Prohibit	650	73.8
	Unsure	159	18
Allow new church to preach on TV	Allow	136	15.4
	Prohibit	576	65.4
	Unsure	169	19.2
Allow new church charity activities	Allow	259	29.4
	Prohibit	449	51
	Unsure	173	19.6
Allow new church fundraising	Allow	203	23
	Prohibit	508	57.7
	Unsure	170	19.3

n=881

Table 60. Attitudes toward Russian Orthodox among Russian Muslims by Region (%)

		Tatarstan	Dagestan	Kabardino- Balkaria	Bashkortostan
		<i>European Russia</i>	<i>Northern Caucasus</i>	<i>Northern Caucasus</i>	<i>European Russia</i>
Allow Orthodox to build church	Allow	87.9	60.7	63.4	84.9
	Prohibit	6.7	25.2	22.8	1.6
	Unsure	5.5	14.1	13.8	13.5
Allow Orthodox to preach in public	Allow	55.8	36.6	26	68.3
	Prohibit	30.3	46	50.4	9.5
	Unsure	13.9	17.4	23.6	22.2
Allow Orthodox to publish	Allow	75.8	48.3	34.6	74.6
	Prohibit	13.9	35.9	39.8	5.6
	Unsure	10.3	15.8	25.6	19.8
Allow Orthodox schools	Allow	74.5	46.6	34.1	65.9
	Prohibit	13.9	35.2	44.7	7.9
	Unsure	11.5	18.1	221.1	26.2
Allow public schools to teach about Orthodoxy	Allow	26.7	24.2	27.2	41.3
	Prohibit	52.7	57.7	52.8	27
	Unsure	20.6	18.1	19.9	31.7
Allow Orthodox to preach on TV	Allow	62.4	44.3	35.8	61.9
	Prohibit	23.6	37.6	41.1	14.3
	Unsure	13.9	18.1	23.2	23.8
Allow Orthodox charity activities	Allow	91.5	63.4	59.8	78.6
	Prohibit	.6	21.1	18.3	3.2
	Unsure	7.9	15.4	22	18.3
Allow Orthodox fundraising	Allow	77.6	52	68.3	70.6
	Prohibit	11.5	30.2	19.1	7.1
	Unsure	10.9	17.8	12.6	22.2

Table 61. Attitudes toward New Churches among Russian Muslims by Region (%)

		Tatarstan	Dagestan	Kabardino- Balkaria	Bashkortostan
		<i>European Russia</i>	<i>Northern Caucasus</i>	<i>Northern Caucasus</i>	<i>European Russia</i>
Allow new church to build church	Allow	25.5	18.8	19.5	23.8
	Prohibit	54.5	70.5	69.9	46.8
	Unsure	20	10.7	10.6	29.4
Allow new church to preach in public	Allow	19.4	10.7	10.2	17.5
	Prohibit	61.8	78.2	74.4	50
	Unsure	18.8	11.1	15.4	32.5
Allow new church to publish	Allow	31.5	16.4	8.9	21.4
	Prohibit	49.7	70.5	74	46
	Unsure	18.8	13.1	17.1	32.5
Allow new church schools	Allow	20.6	11.4	8.5	17.5
	Prohibit	55.5	75.5	74	49.2
	Unsure	24.2	13.1	17.5	33.3
Allow public schools to teach about new church	Allow	7.3	8.1	8.5	7.1
	Prohibit	72.1	80.9	74.8	60.3
	Unsure	20.6	11.1	16.7	32.5
Allow new church to preach on TV	Allow	21.8	13.4	10.2	16.7
	Prohibit	57	73.2	72.8	51.6
	Unsure	21.2	13.4	17.1	31.7
Allow new church charity activities	Allow	40	27.2	24.8	26.2
	Prohibit	39.4	57	59.8	40.5
	Unsure	20.6	15.8	15.4	33.3
Allow new church fundraising	Allow	28.5	17.4	28.5	17.5
	Prohibit	47.3	67.1	60.6	49.2
	Unsure	24.2	15.4	11	33.3

order to address this problem, the following empirical task tests the relationship between tolerance and ethnodoxy.

In particular, this analysis correlates tolerance toward both Orthodox and new churches with ethnodoxy among Russian Muslims. To do this, principle components analysis was administered, as was done with tolerance items for ethnic Russians, on a set of tolerance items for both groups (i.e., Orthodox and new churches). The component matrix for both tests is presented in Table 62. As shown, every item loaded to one factor for each group, thereby suggesting that one underlying theme exists (i.e., religious tolerance). Then, these factor scores were correlated with the ethnodoxy factor scores. These results are presented in Table 63. Although the relationships between ethnodoxy and tolerance toward Orthodox and new churches are weak, they are both statistically significant and, interestingly, associated in a positive direction. In other words, as ethnodoxy increases, so does tolerance toward both Orthodox and new churches.

Initially, this relationship between ethnodoxy and tolerance may be surprising. Again, ethnodoxy stresses the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ thereby creating rigid in/out-group boundaries, and instilling an element of fear and threat toward any possible opponents. For ethnic Russians, any non-Orthodox group (albeit Western more than Muslim) is seen as such a threat. For Russian Muslims, however, Orthodox influences are tolerated more compared to new churches. This may be explained due to Russian Muslim’s status as both a majority and minority group. On the one hand, Russian Muslims are clearly an ethno-religious minority group within Russian society writ large. On the other hand, the regions analyzed in this chapter

Table 62. Component Matrix for Indicators of Religious Tolerance

	Tolerance toward Orthodox	Tolerance toward New Churches
Allow group to build church	.718	.807
Allow group to preach in public	.851	.917
Allow new church to publish	.893	.918
Allow religious schools	.825	.911
Allow public schools to teach about religion	.750	.901
Allow group to preach on TV	.846	.910
Allow group charity activities	.869	.874
Allow group fundraising	.791	.841
<i>Eigenvalue</i>	<i>5.377</i>	<i>6.277</i>
<i>Total variance explained</i>	<i>67.217</i>	<i>78.464</i>

Table 63. Correlation Matrix between Tolerance and Ethnodoxy Factor Scores

	Ethnodoxy among Russian Muslims
Tolerance toward Orthodoxy	.158*
Tolerance toward New Churches	.249*

* $p < .01$

have focused on predominantly Muslim areas in Russia (as depicted in Table 50).

Therefore, the Russian Muslims residing in these regions are in some sense members of groups with both minority and majority status. In addition, the fact that ethnodoxy, while in differing ways, has been empirically tested as a useful conceptual device to

explain the ethno-religious linkages for both ethnic Russians and Russian Muslims suggest that strict boundaries exist and define what it means to be Orthodox and Muslim. Simply, Russian Muslims do not see Orthodox as a threat because for both groups, being a 'true' Orthodox or Muslim isn't just religious, but ethnic too.

The influence of the West and other new churches is a different problem for two reasons. First, these are groups with no historical presence in Russia. As described in the literature, while the presence of Islam in Russia has not always been peaceful, it has existed for centuries and become an important part of the country's history. Western churches are new, unknown, and carry the direct mission of proselytizing. Thus, intolerant attitudes from both Russian Orthodox and Russian Muslims are hardly surprising. Second, new churches do not include the ethnic component. In fact, a motive for missionizing in foreign countries is the idea that ethnic or national backgrounds matter far less than religious conviction. For instance, American and Russian Seventh Day Adventists are both Seventh Day Adventists, no one being 'truer' than the next. This characteristic of new churches is problematic for Russian Orthodox and Muslims, where ethno-religious groups are no longer clearly defined. In short, the threat of conversion to another traditionally Russian faith (either Orthodox or Islam) is relatively smaller compared to the new risk posed by Western churches.

To conclude, intolerance is not as emphasized for Russian Muslims adhering to ethnodoxy compared to ethnic Russians. The dual status of Russian Muslims, as both majority and minority group, may contribute to this difference. Finally, in the next section I suggest that differences in forms of ethnodoxy between ethnic Russians

and Russian Muslims stem from the supra-ethnic/national/civilizational quality of Islam.

In Comparison: Ethnodoxy among Ethnic Russians and Russian Muslims

While ethnic Russians and Russian Muslims share similar attitudes toward new churches, the overall form or type of ethnodoxy is still different for both groups. In this section I explore the differences in ethnodoxy between ethnic Russians and Russian Muslims and offer tentative explanations for these variations.

Methods of Comparative Analysis

As discussed in greater detail in Chapter V, certain methods should be adopted when conducting comparative analyses. Again, comparative analyses are usually defined as variable-oriented or case-oriented approaches. As I explained in Chapter V, the comparative analyses in this study emphasize elements of both approaches. For instance, certain variables (e.g., indicators measuring ethnodoxy) are used to describe phenomenon for each case or group. At the same time, a socio-historic background is provided, thereby grounding the results in a context-specific foundation.

Oftentimes, the same variable(s) cannot be used to measure the same concept across different cases. This is especially true in cross-cultural research. For example, in attempting to understand the level of religiosity between Christian and Muslim groups, frequency of prayer would fall short due, in part, to differences in expectations about how often members of each group should pray. The concept of

ethnodoxy is no different. Therefore, it is important that measures, while different, be included that capture the main components of ethnodoxy with the results from analyses compared on these levels. By doing this, a functional equivalence of measures is reached whereby the indicators, albeit formally different, are capturing the same general essence of a concept. For example, the indicators measuring ethnic Russian attitudes about the presence of Western churches and Russian Muslim attitudes about the presence of Orthodox are items capturing the component of ethnodoxy termed 'presumption of harm.'

By looking at groups and cases on this component level, a comparison is more easily reached. This approach is similar to Verba's 'bootstrap operations' (1971), which is based on Duijker and Rokkan's 'second-order comparisons' (1964), where variables that are formally different are compared on higher levels of analysis in order to achieve functional equivalence in substance. The task of this section is to administer similar comparisons by exploring the differences in ethnodoxy between ethnic Russians and Russian Muslims.

The Variability of Ethnodoxy

As outlined in Chapter V, Karpov and Lisovskaya operationalized ethnodoxy into five different components: 1) inborn faithfulness, 2) religious superiority, 3) exclusion of apostates, 4) marginalization of converts, and 5) presumption of harm. Again, while the measurement items may differ across each group, the general essence captured is the same.

By examining the adherence, or lack of adherence, for each component across both groups, a reasonable comparison of ethnodoxo is obtained. To do this, frequency distributions are compared between ethnic Russians and Russian Muslims in terms of adherence to indicators measuring these five components of ethnodoxo (Table 64). For both groups, inborn faithfulness is strongly supported. Indeed, over 80% of respondents from each group adhered to the idea that one's ethnicity is intimately tied to that group's dominant religion. The idea that a group's religion is more superior than others, thereby requiring special privileges, is also supported by a majority from each group. The remaining three components of ethnodoxo, however, receive different levels of support between ethnic Russians and Russian Muslims. For instance, while ethnic Russians have a larger proportion of respondents that adhere to the marginalization of converts and presumption of harm components, Russian Muslims have a higher percentage of respondents that adhere to the exclusion of apostates. These differing distributions of adherence to the components of ethnodoxo tell us a few things.

First, this distribution illustrates the variability in form that ethnodoxo can have. Ethnodoxo is a multi-dimensional concept that stresses different components. Therefore, it is not surprising that certain components will be more popular for some groups than others. This does not make ethnodoxo any less relevant in explaining the ethno-religious link found in groups, just different.

Second, since groups will find some components of ethnodoxo more appealing than others, based on case-specific idiosyncrasies, a question raised is how are each components weighted? In other words, does each component have the same

Table 64. Adherents to Components of Ethnodoxy for Ethnic Russians and Russian Muslims (%)

Ethnodoxy Component	Ethnic Russians	Russian Muslims
Inborn faithfulness	85.3	80.8
Religious superiority	76/54.8	60.1
Exclusion of apostates	34.3	47.5
Marginalization of converts	49.2	37.3
Presumption of harm	54.3	17.2

significance and influence indicating the presence of ethnodoxy, or can they be weighted differently and, if so, how? For instance, if presumption of harm is viewed as a more essential component for ethnic Russians than Russian Muslims, then the fact that ethnic Russians have a larger proportion of adherents to this component (54.3% versus 17.2%) becomes less meaningful – or at least, meaningful in a different way.

Simply, the differences should be accounted for when conducting a comparative analysis. So, let us take a look at the components that differ the greatest. Ethnic Russians have higher percentages of respondents that adhere to the marginalization of converts and the presumption of harm. In other words, the idea that non-Russians cannot be ‘truly’ Russian or Orthodox and that external groups and influences are harmful is seen as more important for ethnic Russians than Russian Muslims. Whereas Russian Muslims have a larger proportion of respondents that adhere to the exclusion of apostates, or the notion that converts to a non-Muslim faith are no longer representatives of their nationality. As described below, the different

emphases among each form of ethnodoxy may be indicative of each group's minority/majority status and/or the idiosyncrasies of each faith.

Conclusion

The task of this chapter was to explore the concept of ethnodoxy outside of Orthodoxy. To do this, contemporary Russian Muslims were selected, a group that has been described as exhibiting similar ethno-religious linkages. Based on survey items constructed specifically to measure ethnodoxy within this group, the analyses in this chapter offer a unique insight into the relationship between ethnicity and religion among Russian Muslims often overlooked.

First, an assessment of social demographics depicted ethnodoxy as not varying across sex, age, or place of residence and only slightly across income and education. However, some pattern exists regarding the particular region of Russian Muslims, where respondents in the North Caucasus are noticeably less tolerant of Orthodox than respondents in European Russia. The results from investigating the relationship between religiosity and ethnodoxy were inconclusive. Belief in God and the likelihood of fasting during Ramadan mattered little but attendance to Friday services had an unexpected association with ethnodoxy. Finally, given the importance of the in/out-group element and boundary making of ethnodoxy, religious tolerance was addressed. Russian Muslims are relatively tolerant of Orthodox and markedly less so toward new churches. Again, this finding is in correspondence to the findings in Karpov and Lisovskay's studies (2007, 2008).

Finally, ethnodoxxy for Russian Muslims was compared to ethnodoxxy for ethnic Russians. The findings from this analysis show that different forms of ethnodoxxy can exist, stressing different components of ethnodoxxy for some groups over others. One form of ethnodoxxy stresses the maintenance of the status quo (i.e., for ethnic Russians), by restricting growth (marginalization of converts) and guaranteeing a group's traditional and 'rightful' position in society (presumption of harm). The other form of ethnodoxxy (i.e., for Russian Muslims) emphasizes the important link between faith and nation (exclusion of apostates).

Taken together, the findings from this chapter not only depict two forms of ethnodoxxy, but one that is also less embedded. For instance, overall adherence, beside one component of ethnodoxxy, is weaker for Russian Muslims compared to ethnic Russians. Moreover, principles component analysis showed that the indicators of ethnodoxxy for Russian Muslims loaded into one factor compared to two factors for ethnic Russians, suggesting a multi-dimensional quality for the latter. What is more, the factor structure for ethnodoxxy among Russian Muslims explained less variance (45%) compared to the factor structure for ethnodoxxy among ethnic Russians (53%). These results suggest that ethnodoxxy for ethnic Russians is more widespread as well as having a more complicated structure than ethnodoxxy for Russian Muslims.

Based on the literature review above, this may be explained by understanding the supra-ethnic/national quality of Islam, which views Muslims as Muslims first and all other social identities as less important. Certainly ethnic and national identities matter, along with their relationships with religion (as indicated in the presence of a form of ethnodoxxy), they simply matter less so compared to other groups like ethnic

Orthodox Russians. To conclude, ethnodoxy is a relevant conceptual device for explaining the ethno-religious link among Russian Muslims, but in a different way compared to ethnic Russians. Of course, the application of ethnodoxy is not limited to the setting of contemporary Russia either. The next chapter offers a preliminary glimpse into tentative evidence of ethnodoxy across cases outside of Russia.

CHAPTER XIV: BEYOND RUSSIA: RELIGIOUS AND ETHNO-NATIONAL IDENTITY IN CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Is ethnodoxo a context-specific phenomenon, which exists due to particular sets of social conditions inherent in settings like Russia? Or, are forms of ethnodoxo apparent elsewhere? As shown in Chapter XIII, the concept of ethnodoxo is not limited to explaining ethno-religious linkages among ethnic Orthodox Russians, but can be used, albeit differently, to explain a similar relationship among Russian Muslims. Therefore, this theoretical device has the potential to be applied in other contexts as well. In this way, the final task of this study offers a preliminary investigation into other contexts where ethnodoxo may be applied.

Ethnodoxo Beyond: Two Ideal Conditions

As discussed in Chapter III, the link between religion and ethnicity has been noted across different religions, ethnicities, nations, and time periods. Accordingly, such relationships can take different forms, varying across contexts and groups. For instance, the relationship between religion and ethnicity is different for Irish Catholics in Northern Ireland than Protestants in the United States. The reasons for such variability are many and depend on the specific context, such as historical dominance of a religious tradition in society, legal regulations and religious rights, and ethnic and national diversity.

This study has focused on a particular type of relationship between ethnicity and religion. Ethnodoxo is an ideology used to explain a specific type of ethno-religious link, one that includes certain components, albeit in different ways as seen

in the previous chapter. Therefore, it is important to note that ethnodoxy may be a useful explanatory device for some groups but not others. Up until now, this study has provided evidence for two groups where ethnodoxy can be applied successfully: contemporary ethnic Russians and Russian Muslims. This shows that each group, while emphasizing different components, is aligned with the basic ideological essence of ethnodoxy. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the scope of applying ethnodoxy in settings outside of Russia. In doing so, two 'ideal' conditions where ethnodoxy may exist is examined: 1) the establishment of a national religion and 2) modern histories that include official atheism.

The Influence of (Un)Official National Religions

The first condition that may be ideal for the development of ethnodoxy is whether a society has established, officially or unofficially, a national religion. On the one hand, societies that designate a religious organization as the *official* religious institution of the state may be a relevant setting for the adherence of ethnodoxy. According to the fundamental components of ethnodoxy, adherents to this belief system view the relationship between religion and the state in intimate terms. For instance, ethnodoxy includes the belief that the state should protect the ethnic group's dominant religion from possible threats of its opponents. This has been demonstrated in this study as in the case of the Russian Orthodox Church in contemporary Russia.

However, some societies may not have officially selected national churches, but may be described as unofficially affiliated with a particular religious faith. The United States may be depicted as such a case. For instance, Hecló's analysis of

whether or not America is a Christian nation uncovered several possible ways one could answer this question (2007). For instance, three-quarters of Americans identify as Christian, but less than half say religion is important in their lives and even less attend religious services. Furthermore, Christianity has undoubtedly played an important role in American history and is viewed as part of our national heritage, but Hecla argued most Americans lack actual doctrinal knowledge about their 'faith.' Therefore, depending on the popular conceptualization of what it means to be religious and its relationship with other identities, societies without clearly defined national churches may still be perceived as having national religions. Simply, if the public perception of a nation is associated with a particular religious faith, then it is so in its consequences, regardless of genuine religious belief or behavior.

Finland offers another illustration of this problem. Officially, Finland recognizes the Evangelical Lutheran Church as its national church. However, according to the most recent ISSP Religion module (2008), 41% of Finns pray less than once a year or never and only 6% attend church monthly or more. At the same time, 73% of Finns have confidence in the Church and 64% believe religion has the right amount of power in society. This contradiction in popular perceptions of religion in society among Finns highlights two important considerations. First, the role of religion in society undoubtedly has multiple functions. This has been discussed in some detail earlier and addressed again in the next section. In short, the case of Finland demonstrates the role of religion as having less to do about authentic religious beliefs and practices, and more about serving as a public utility.

Second, regardless of societal-level self-descriptions (i.e., official decrees about the relationship between religion and the state), the on-the-ground, popular perceptions of everyday individuals are the best source of information when determining whether ethnodoxo is a viable conceptual apparatus. For instance, if one were to make a judgment about the role of religion in Finland based only on the fact that it has an established national church, assumptions about religious belief and behavior may be misleading. Similarly, assumptions about the separation between church and state in the American constitution may not provide the best depiction of the importance of religion for most of its citizens. A task in this chapter is to acknowledge these considerations when exploring societies with ‘good-fit’ characteristics for applying ethnodoxo as a useful concept.

Consequences from Established Atheism

Another ideal condition for ethnodoxo is whether a society has experienced official atheism in recent history. Of particular interest are the conditions and occurrences that develop after official atheism has been discarded, requiring new perspectives and attitudes about the role of religion in society. Investigating the role of religion in these circumstances has been discussed. Jurgen Habermas’ (2008) and Charles Taylor’s (2007) separate efforts on post-secular religiosity along with Mikhail Epstein (Epstein, Genis, and Vladiv-Glover, 1999) and later, Jonathon Sutton’s (2006) work on post-atheist religion explored resurgent religion in previously atheist settings. Common among all these approaches is how the role of religion is shaped and viewed in a previously anti-religious setting. Referring to the

emergence of religion in post-socialist societies with small numbers of believers, Grace Davie asks: “Why, for example, are the churches so important that they are worth the all-too-evident effort to re-establish them?” (2005, p.142). Clearly, the role, or perhaps function, of religion is far more complicated than meeting the spiritual demand of religious believers.

For example, Davie explained how the function of religion in Europe is different compared to the United States. In Europe, religion is increasingly seen as “public utilities maintained for the common good” (2005, p.143). Berger, Davie, and Focus have also acknowledged this comparison, stating “Europeans, as a consequence of the state church system, regard their churches as public utilizes rather than competing firms” (2008, p.35). In this sense, the role of religion provides certain needs that are not necessarily related to genuine spiritual or religious growth. This may include the maintenance of community services (e.g., food pantries, homeless shelters, etc.) or, due to the traditionally close relationship between church and state in Europe noted above, the role of ethnic or national identities. In other words, national churches historically prevalent across Europe fill a traditional role of identity to a larger community not present in the United States.

This traditional role of religion becomes particularly important for post-atheist societies. For example, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, many newly sovereign states, including the Russian Federation, had to (re)construct national identities that distinguished peoples from a once unified communist state. For many, traditional religions were an obvious source for ‘remembering’ pre-atheist identities. As Davie noted, many were ‘vicariously religious’ where religious practice was not as

important, and could be achieved by proxy through others (2005). Again, the ideological components of ethnodoxo do not stress religious practice or belief as much as affiliation and the belief that religious and ethnic/national identity go hand in hand. It is in this way that the conditions of a post-atheist society may be conducive for the existent of ethnodoxo. Simply, post-socialist societies may be more 'interested' in (re)establishing traditional religions as a component of newly forming and transforming ethnic and national identities.

Hypotheses

While this analysis is largely exploratory, some initial hypotheses may be generated, based on the above discussion, to better guide an empirical analysis. Since the concept of ethnodoxo emphasizes a strict relationship between an ethnic group and its dominant religion, *I expect societies that have established official national churches to exhibit higher levels of religio-national relationships (Hypothesis 9a)*. In addition, *I expect societies that experienced official atheism to exhibit higher levels of religio-national relationships (Hypothesis 9b)*. In short, I do not expect the specific religious tradition to be as significant a predictor of ethnodoxo as the socio-cultural environment and conditions for religion in a particular society. Therefore, *I project the relationship between religion and national identity to be unrelated to a particular faith tradition (Hypothesis 9c)*.

Operationalizing the Linkage between Religious and National Identity Cross-Nationally

Unfortunately, cross-national data capturing ethno-religious identity is few and far between. Moreover, no survey program includes indicators measuring the breadth of ethnodoxy as conceptualized in this paper. However, the International Social Survey Programme's National Identity modules (1995 and 2003) include one item that emphasizes the relationship between religious and national identity. This item captures the importance of identification to a society's dominant religion as a component of national identity. While this one survey item does not encapsulate all the dimensions of ethnodoxy, it does measure its main essence: the inextricable link between ethno-national and religious identities.

Based on this one indicator, a tentative profile of possible settings where ethnodoxy may be further tested is made. As described above, particular note is made regarding patterns among societies that have national religions and/or churches and shared atheist histories. It is also important to note that, due to the nature of the ISSP survey indicator, this analysis is limited to the dominant ethnic/national groups and the perceived relationship with that society's dominant religious tradition. No conclusions can be made regarding minority ethnic and national groups. In addition, for many countries included in the survey, the dominant religion may be expressed as either a particular ethno/national church (e.g., Russian Orthodoxy in Russia, Catholicism in Ireland) or more broadly (e.g., Christianity in the United States).

Despite these limitations, the findings from this analysis offer a valuable description of settings where some form or variation of ethnodoxy may exist, thereby providing further evidence of its theoretical relevance and applicability. Moreover,

the breadth of the ISSP survey program includes countries throughout the world, including Europe, North America, Central and South America, and even parts of the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. In this way, the following analysis offers a comprehensive study of the relationship between religious and national identity across different religions, cultures, and histories.

Findings from a Cross-National Analysis on the Relationship between Religious and National Identity

This analysis includes three empirical tasks. First, a descriptive account provides a preliminary profile of religio-national relationships throughout the world. Second, countries are selected based on the presence of a national church to test the first hypothesis. Similarly, and third, countries with atheist pasts are selected to test the second hypothesis.

Preliminary Profile

The empirical analysis in this chapter explores a particular item in the ISSP National Identity modules. In short, respondents are asked if they believe affiliation to the dominant religion in their country is important to their national identity. Table 65 presents the percentage of respondents from each country that believes this is important. Overall, it appears that the general importance of religion in national identity construction is not limited to contemporary Russia. Many countries throughout the world, spanning a variety of dominant religions, governments, and cultures, show evidence of this relationship. In fact, over 50% of respondents believed affiliation to the dominant religion was an important component for their

Table 65. Percentage of Respondents that View Affiliation to Dominant Religion as Important for their National Identity

Country	Year of Study	Dominant Religion	Important (%)
<i>North America</i>			
United States	1995	Christian	53.7
	2003		65.9
Canada	1995	Christian	24.5
	2003		54.1
<i>Central/South America</i>			
Chile	2003	Catholic	54.1
Uruguay	2003	Catholic	28.8
Venezuela	2003	Catholic	71.3
<i>Africa</i>			
South Africa	2003	Christian	79
<i>Western Europe</i>			
Austria	1995	Christian	54.2
	2003		53.2
Denmark	2003	Christian	33.2
Finland	2003	Christian	22.9
France	2003	Catholic	17.5
Germany (West)	1995	Christian	33.8
	2003		37.2
Germany (East)	1995	Christian	21.7
	2003		13.3
Great Britain	1995	Christian	35.5
	2003		34.8
Ireland	1995	Catholic	54.4
	2003		57.8
Italy	1995	Catholic	52.3
Netherlands	1995	Christian	7.3
	2003		13.1
Norway	1995	Protestant	21.4
	2003		20.3
Portugal	2003	Catholic	65.6
Spain	1995	Catholic	46.8
	2003		44
Sweden	1995	Christian	17.4
	2003		17.2
Switzerland	2003	Catholic	39.2

Table 65 cont.

Country	Year of Study	Dominant Religion	Important (%)
<i>Eastern/Central Europe</i>			
Bulgaria	1995	Christian	71.1
	2003		76.2
Czech Republic	1995	Christian	22.2
	2003		29.3
Hungary	1995	Christian	35.9
	2003		43.2
Latvia	1995	Christian	35.3
	2003		22.5
Poland	1995	Catholic	52.7
	2003		74.9
Russia	1995	Orthodox	39.7
	2003		58.3
Slovakian republic	1995	Christian	27
	2003		49.7
Slovenia	1995	Catholic	33.8
	2003		32.4
<i>Asia/Oceania</i>			
Australia	1995	Christian	31.4
	2003		37
Japan	1995	Buddhist or Shinto	26.5
	2003		25.4
New Zealand	1995	Christian	30.2
	2003		37.5
Philippines	1995	Catholic	82.9
	2003		84.4
South Korea	2003	Christian	41
Taiwan	2003	Buddhist	26
<i>Middle East</i>			
Israel (Jews)	2003	Jewish	84
Israel (Arabs)	2003	Muslim	23.7

national identity in 15 of the 35 participating countries across both waves. Clearly, the application of ethnodoxo in other settings is more than relevant. In addition, this provides evidence that while the role and function of religion may certainly differ throughout the world, it is still perceived as an important institution regardless of religious faith, type of government, or geography.

Importance of a National Church

The first hypothesis proposed in this chapter was that countries with established national churches should show relatively stronger linkages. Table 66 presents six countries with officially recognized state churches. As illustrated, these countries vary according to geography, histories, and, to a degree, religious traditions. One may note that besides Bulgaria, all other national religions stem from Reformed Christianity. While many countries that are predominantly Catholic have large portions of the population that view religion as an important part of their national identity (e.g., Venezuela, Ireland, Poland), the Roman Catholic Church is best described as a transnational institution, not officially associated with a particular political entity. Many Protestant and Eastern Orthodox organizations, however, are not.

Yet, the selection of churches in Table 66 does not conclusively support the first hypothesis. For instance, while most Scandinavian countries have national Lutheran churches, with relatively high affiliation, less than a third believe religion is important for their national identity. In fact, Bulgaria is the only country with a nationally recognized church with a high percentage of respondents adhering to this belief. Coupled with the findings from this study on Russia, one might wonder if there is something essential about Eastern Orthodoxy and/or the unique socio-political history shared by such countries.

Table 66. Selected Countries with Established National Churches

Country	National Church	Religious Affiliation (%)*	Religion Important for National Identity (%) (1995/2003)**
Russia	Russian Orthodox Church	15-20 ³¹	39.7/58.3
Bulgaria	Bulgarian Orthodox Church	82.6	71.1/76.2
Denmark	Evangelical Lutheran Church of Denmark	95	NA/33.2
Finland	Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland	82.5	NA/22.9
Great Britain	Church of England	71.6 ³²	35.5/34.8
Latvia	Evangelical Lutheran Church of Latvia	19.6	33.5/22.5
Sweden	Church of Sweden (Lutheran)	87	17.4/17.2

* Source: CIA World Factbook

** Source: ISSP National Identity

Impact of Atheist History

The second hypothesis proposed was that countries having a legacy of official atheism would show particularly strong relationships between religion and national identity. As much of the literature purports, many of these societies have turned to traditional sources of identity after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia exemplifies this notion as detailed throughout this paper. But, what of other countries with similar histories?

³¹ CIA World Factbook explains that this percentage is over 'practicing worshippers' and admits that a far higher percentage affiliate with the ROC.

³² Percent includes all self-identified Christians

Table 67 lists countries that have experienced official atheism. Of course, not all countries share the same history of oppressed atheism. For instance, despite attempts to establish widespread atheism in Poland, the Catholic Church remained an important aspect of Polish life (Froese and Pfaff, 2001). Of the eight post-Soviet countries included in the survey, five (Russia, Slovakian Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland) have populations with nearly half or more adhering to the belief that religion is important for their national identity. The Czech Republic, Latvia, and Slovenia have one third or less of respondents adhering to this belief. Moreover, the type of religious tradition does not seem to make a difference as exemplified with Catholic Poland.

Based on this preliminary analysis, it may be that having an atheist history somehow influences a stronger relationship between religion and national identity. Just how this happens is beyond the scope of this study and would require case-specific analyses that investigate the role of religion before, during, and after communist control. For instance, the role of religion was particularly important in Poland during the Soviet era. The Catholic Church played a vital part in anti-communist movements and was a sanctuary in both religious and socio-political capacities. Doing so clearly generated a powerful bond between religious and Polish identity as Soviet forces infiltrated Polish life and society. But, the same effects are not seen in other countries like Latvia or Slovenia. Czechoslovakia is an interesting case as its post-communist division is seen in the proportion of respondents exhibiting religio-national identities. Regardless of the context-specific conditions that have led to the construction of such indicators of ethnodoxy, the fact remains that across

Table 67. Selected Countries having Atheist Past

Country	Period of Communist Control	Religion Important for National Identity (%) (1995/2003)*
Czechoslovakia		
Czech Republic	1948-1992	22.2/29.3
Slovakian Republic		27/49.7
Bulgaria	1944-1989	71.1/76.2
Hungary	1947-1991	35.9/43.2
Latvia	1944-1991	35.3/22.5
Poland	1945-1990	52.7/74.9
Slovenia	1947-1992	33.8/32.4
Russia	1917-1991	39.7/58.3

* Source: ISSP National Identity

today's modern societies, the role of religion has become an essential component of many national and ethnic identities.

Conclusion

Based on the preliminary analyses conducted in this chapter, evidence of relationships that link religion, national identity, and, at times, ethnicity are found throughout the world, spanning different religious traditions, socio-political histories, and geography. Tentative findings show that an association between countries with established national churches and high levels of religio-national relationships is inconclusive. Whereas a pattern may exist between countries that have experienced official atheism and relationships between religion and national identity. Of course, further analysis is required to substantiate these claims.

Overall, the important finding for this chapter is that such relationships are found in other contexts outside of Russia. Moreover, it would appear that these relationships are not weakening, but are in many cases growing stronger. Since the data sources used in this analysis include two waves, a crude longitudinal comparison may be conducted to extract the percent change between 1995 and 2003. Doing so will show possible trends of the breadth of this relationship. Table 68 presents these percentages. Of the 23 countries included in both survey waves, 16 show positive changes among respondents who view religion as an important component to their national identity. Moreover, many of these trends show dramatic increases. For instance, views in Canada increased by 120%, 80% in the Netherlands, and 84% in the Slovakian Republic. Countries showing negative trends were comparatively smaller. The largest decrease is found in Latvia (-36%) and East Germany (-39%), while all other decreases were less than 5%. In short, these findings show that not only is the importance of religion for national identity held across many countries, but these views appear to be gaining popularity over time.

Again, the findings in this chapter are tentative, and limited to the data and type of measures available at this time. While the survey item used to measure this relationship does not reflect the multi-dimensional structure of ethnodoxo, it does indicate a fundamental essence of the concept. As a result, societies where the relationship between religion and national identity are strong may present a relevant case for the application of ethnodoxo in continued investigation. In doing so, the preliminary findings in this chapter, coupled with the extensive application in Russia,

Table 68. Percent Change of Importance of Religion for National Identity between 1995 and 2003

Country	Percent Change
<i>North America</i>	
United States	22.7
Canada	120.8
<i>Western Europe</i>	
Austria	-1.8
Germany (West)	10.1
Germany (East)	-38.7
Great Britain	-2
Ireland	6.25
Netherlands	79.5
Norway	1.1
Spain	-6
Sweden	-1.1
<i>East/Central Europe</i>	
Bulgaria	7.2
Czech Republic	32
Hungary	20.3
Latvia	-36.3
Poland	42.1
Russia	46.9
Slovakian Republic	84.1
Slovenia	4.1
<i>Asia/Oceania</i>	
Australia	17.8
Japan	-4.2
New Zealand	24.2
Philippines	1.8

Source: ISSP National Identity

demonstrates the obvious relevance and usefulness of ethnodoxa as a concept that can explain ethno/national-religious relationships across many contexts and settings.

CHAPTER XV: DISCUSSION

The purpose of this study was to test a concept that explains a specific relationship between religion and ethnicity. This concept (i.e., ethnodoxo) refers to the belief that affiliation to an ethnic group's dominant religion is essential to their ethnic identity. In this way, ethnodoxo is a belief system, by which a particular ideology that links religion and ethnicity is maintained. A specific setting was identified, i.e., post-communist Russia, as exhibiting ideal conditions to apply and empirically explore this concept. Not surprisingly, a majority of ethnic Russians adhere to some dimension of this belief system. Furthermore, empirical analyses conducted throughout this study demonstrate the depth and breadth of this ideology, spanning across demographic, religious, social, and political differences. At the same time, ethnodoxo was found to be associated with social, religious, and political orientations and attitudes. To summarize, these analyses showed a relationship between ethnodoxo and xenophobia, nationalism, and social and religious intolerance. In this final chapter, I discuss the consequences of these findings. In doing so, I offer some important considerations about the maintenance and legitimation of ethnodoxo (i.e., its plausibility structure) as a popular ideology, its dissemination, and speculations about its survival.

The Embeddedness of Ethnodoxo

As the study shows, the scope of ethnodoxo, across social, religious, and political orientations, is extensive. However, some variations also exist, particularly

with differences between soft and hard ethnodoxo. Again, the conceptual differences between soft and hard ethnodoxo are best characterized in terms of strictness and level of exclusivity. Whereby, hard ethnodoxo evokes a stronger sense of rigidity, exclusiveness, and protectionism than soft ethnodoxo. In general, at least half of respondents, regardless of a particular religious, political, or social orientation, adhere to indicators of soft ethnodoxo. For instance, religious believer, non-believer, and atheist alike, nearly half of respondents in each category agreed with most statements of soft ethnodoxo. Similar results are found across political and social orientations as well. In short, adherence to soft ethnodoxo was high (from 50-90%), no matter the level of nationalism, political orientation, attitudes about abortion and homosexuals, and level of religious tolerance and xenophobia.

At the same time, statistically significant relationships between indicators of ethnodoxo and most indicators of religious, political, and social attitudes and behaviors were found.³³ Not surprisingly, levels of ethnodoxo were particularly higher among believers and those who believed in God (82-91%), but were similarly high regardless of church attendance and the belief that religion is important in one's life. In addition, higher levels of intolerance towards Muslims and, especially, Western churches were associated with the adherence to soft ethnodoxo. Likewise, stronger anti-West and nationalistic attitudes and orientations were also related to soft ethnodoxo. In short, these analyses show that overall most ethnic Russians adhere to soft ethnodoxo. But, some variations exist, as expected based on the components of ethnodoxo.

³³ While most relationships between variables are statistically significant at the .001 level of significance and had a positive direction of association, it is important to note that the strength of association was usually weak to moderate.

While fewer share belief central to hard ethnodoxy, the proportion and characteristics of its adherents is still noteworthy. For example, similar to adherents of soft ethnodoxy, religious believers and believers in God had high levels of affiliation to hard ethnodoxy (nearly half or more). At least one third of respondents, in some cases as high as 70%, agreed with statements of hard ethnodoxy, regardless of variation in religious, political, and social orientations. Yet, there were also significant patterns associated with demographic, religious, and socio-political differences. For instance, religious intolerance, xenophobia, and nationalistic attitudes and orientations were also associated with adherence to hard ethnodoxy.

These results uncover the existence of a sweeping and deeply rooted facet of contemporary Russian identity. No matter the particularities in religious, political, and social attitudes and behaviors, most ethnic Russians hold that affiliation with Russian Orthodoxy is important, even indispensable for their ethnic identity.

At the same time, the empirical analyses conducted in this study show that adherence to ethnodoxy is associated with specific religious, political, and social attitudes and behaviors. Again, nearly every relationship between indicators of ethnodoxy and indicators of religious, political, and social attitudes and behaviors was statistically significant. The strength of associations varied from weak to moderately strong.³⁴ In short, the level of adherence to ethnodoxy is related to more intolerant, xenophobic, and nationalist dispositions. This is not surprising given the ideological foundation of ethnodoxy.

³⁴ For instance, the relationships between indicators of soft ethnodoxy and opinions about the West weakening Russia were positively associated at moderate strength (gamma coefficients were .216, .303, and .311), demonstrating higher levels of adherence to ethnodoxy as anti-West beliefs increased.

Clearly, ethnodoxo is a relevant and useful concept that can help us understand a specific relationship between religion and ethnicity in post-communist Russia. Indeed, the embeddedness of ethnodoxo among most ethnic Russians suggests that it is maintained and legitimated in everyday life. In other words, adhering to ethnodoxo has become, quite immediately, a normalized and taken-for-granted way of understanding one's identity in contemporary Russia. The ramifications of this are crucial. How, or from whom, is this ideology disseminated, maintained, and legitimated? How likely is ethnodoxo to remain such a popular belief system? While these questions go beyond the scope of this study, I offer some considerations by exploring ethnodoxo in terms of its plausibility structure.

Maintaining the Plausibility of Ethnodoxo in Contemporary Russia

Indeed, this study has presented empirical evidence supporting the popular acceptance of ethnodoxo among most ethnic Russians. The expansive embeddedness of ethnodoxo suggests that it plays an important role in the way that most ethnic Russians understand their social world. In this way, one may ask how ethnodoxo is spread and maintained? This section draws on Berger's notion of plausibility structures to further explain the structure and dissemination of ethnodoxo.

Two Considerations about Plausibility Structures

As discussed in Chapter III, a plausibility structure refers to the 'social base' inherent in any social world, which provides order and meaning to social life (Berger, 1967). Specifically, Berger described plausibility structures as both providing

meaning to a social world and the particular processes that maintain and legitimate a belief system. In other words, plausibility structures are the taken-for-granted norms and expectations, as well as the interactions and processes, which legitimate a particular system of belief. Although somewhat vague (e.g., are plausibility structures meaning-systems, social processes, or both?), the essence of this concept may still be useful in understanding how a belief system is popularized.

Again, I argue that ethnodoxy has become a belief system that is normalized in the everyday lives of most ethnic Russians. For example, according to the empirical analyses in this study, most ethnic Russians identify with Russian Orthodoxy, consider non-Russians as incapable of being 'truly' Orthodox, and adhere to certain beliefs that promote the preservation of Russian Orthodoxy from its opponents. Therefore, a plausibility structure exists (including specific norms and processes) that has transmitted, maintained, and legitimated ethnodoxy as a prominent, taken-for-granted ideology. To better understand the plausibility structure of ethnodoxy, I offer two important considerations.

The Relationship between Plausibility Structures and the Social World

The first consideration highlights the relationship between plausibility structures and the social world. According to Berger, plausibility structures have a dialectic relationship with the social world, one influencing the other. Therefore, the *stability* of one can greatly impact the other. Berger talked about this in terms of 'firmness.' In short, the firmer the plausibility structure, the firmer the social world and vice versa. But, this is an ideal type. A plausibility structure or social world that

is *absolutely* firm, does not require legitimation for its' existence. In other words, if every individual in a society views their social world in exactly the same way and in complete conformity, no reasoning is necessary to explain why things are the way they are. According to Berger, individuals will always doubt, question, and propose change, thereby requiring the legitimation of, or attempt to legitimate, a plausibility structure and, therefore, social world. In addition, any given society may have multiple belief systems, each with plausibility structures that can conflict or overlap, which necessitates legitimation in order to distinguish between 'right' from 'wrong,' 'accepted' versus 'unaccepted,' and so on.

This aspect of plausibility structures is particularly interesting in the case of post-communist Russia. In short, this is a setting where large-scale societal transformations have been taking place in a relatively short amount of time. Empirical evidence of these transitions is exemplified in Chapter XI, whereby new discourse about abortion, including a ROC influenced set of beliefs, seem to be replacing the once widely supported Soviet-era abortion culture. Thus, plausibility structures must also sustain threats to 'firmness' or 'stability' over time, in addition to conflicting social bases. Although further investigation is required, I suggest that ethnodox is increasing in influence and scope as a popular worldview for most ethnic Russians. Indeed, the ISSP National Identity surveys show that 20% more Russians believe that being Orthodox is important for their national identity in 2003 than 1995. Clearly, ethnodox has become an increasingly popular source of world-construction. Just how popular and enduring ethnodox will continue to be is an important question and one discussed further below.

Plausibility Structures based on *Nomos* over Logic

Finally, plausibility structures may not always be logical. Similar to Converse's understanding of mass belief systems, plausibility structures may not be logically coherent. This consideration is not specifically described by Berger, but is important nonetheless. In short, the maintenance and legitimation of a plausibility structure is less about making rational sense as it is about normal and accepted beliefs and behaviors. For instance, Berger refers to a few historical contexts that emphasize the influence of religions, such as Christianity and Islam, on constructing and preserving plausibility structures. Social worlds based on Christian and Islamic plausibility structures have historically been in conflict for the perceived sake of societal (even civilizational) preservation and survival, despite doctrinal emphases of peace and tolerance found in both theologies.

As discussed in Chapter XII, many have acknowledged the disconnect between Russian Orthodox doctrine and practice in terms of social and religious tolerance. On the one hand, Orthodox theology can be interpreted as embracing acceptance, pluralism, and other democratic ideals (e.g., Bartholomew, 1994; Papademetriou, 2002; and Stockl, 2006). However, popular attitudes of Orthodox are rarely depicted in this way. Instead, the findings in this study show that affiliating with ethnodoxy in Russia today is associated with attitudes of social and religious intolerance, xenophobia, and generally negative attitudes about democracy and the West. While seemingly illogical and paradoxical, this is an essential element of ethnodoxy and held by most ethnic Russians. Again, the issue is not that these beliefs

and behaviors make rational sense, but that they fulfill the expectations and norms generated and maintained by individuals according to how they understand their social worlds.

In this way, the plausibility structure of ethnodoxo includes processes and interactions that stress popular beliefs about what it means to be Russian and Orthodox, and less about maintaining genuine theological, or civic for that matter, doctrine. Again, evidence of such interactions have already been detailed as exemplified in public addresses by prominent religious and political elites, who have stressed the relationship between the Church and state and the important role that Russian Orthodoxy has played, and should continue to play, for Russian identity.

The Dissemination of Ethnodoxo

Clearly, the wide acceptance of ethnodoxo among most ethnic Russians indicates the importance of this ideology today. While this is in itself a crucial finding for understanding post-communist Russian identity, one must ask from where do such ideologies originate? The purpose of this section is to offer some preliminary considerations about the dissemination of ethnodoxo, particularly in the case of post-communist Russia.

The Function of Society: Meaning and 'Order'?

According to Berger, we create our social worlds (i.e., 'world-building') so that it has meaning and order (1967). Indeed, a function of any society is nomization, or establishment of a meaningful order upon reality. Furthermore, constructing and

legitimizing a social world is done collectively with others. “In other words, the cultural world is not only collectively produced, but it remains real by virtue of collective recognition. To be in culture means to share in a particular world of objectivities with others” (Berger, 1967, p.10). In the case of contemporary Russia, for example, the combined efforts of ethnic Russians that share similar beliefs and practices regarding their identity as Russian together create a particular social world that has substance and structure for them. This way of understanding how social worlds are constructed is empowering. In short, all members of a society have some influence toward the creation and maintenance of their social world.

However, as I described above, this ‘order’ may not be based on logical and coherent foundations. Lippy also discussed this idea regarding popular religiosity. For Lippy, popular religiosity refers to “the blending of beliefs and practices from many sources to create a personal world of meaning” (1994, p.9). But, as Lippy argued, because popular religiosity pulls from multiple sources of knowledge, it lacks order and organization.

The syncretism of popular religiosity and its lack of organization mean not only that individuals may espouse some ideas that the religious tradition with which they may personally identify would condemn but that they may simultaneously espouse beliefs that would seem contradictory (Lippy, 1994, p.11).

In this way, I argue that systems of meaning such as popular religiosity in fact provide meaning and *perceived*, over rational, order. Members of a society construct and maintain their social world by giving it meaning and order in terms of what makes sense to them, not necessarily based on logical constructs from the particular system of which they use. This is an important consideration when trying to

understand how, and from where, dominant belief systems like ethnodoxo are created and disseminated. In short, if social worlds are based on social norms and popular expectations over sources of logical meaning, where do these norms and values come from?

Again, Berger's explanation seems to emphasize a *quality of authenticity* that each member contributes, in both the internalization and collective externalization, when constructing and maintain a particular social world. This quality of authenticity refers to individuals constructing social worlds that are genuine and original. However, the idea that each individual member is authentically building a shared social world is not complete. All of us are social beings, existing in relationship with others and influenced by those interactions. Instead, I suggest that there are also external sources from which world-building stems.

The Flow of Influence and Power in World-Building

Indeed, it is naïve to think that all members of a given society are creating and maintaining a popular social world in complete authenticity. Instead, external sources of meaning surely influence the norms and expectations by which individuals understand and create their social worlds. Steve Lukes' work on power and decision-making may shed some light on this issue.

Lukes' (2005) thesis adds to the conventional two dimensions of power (i.e., decision and non-decision making) by providing a third dimension which emphasizes the role that cultural norms and values play in influencing individuals' decision-making. In short, individuals make decisions about their attitudes, beliefs, and

behaviors based on what is socially acceptable and normatively ‘right.’ Moreover, these norms and values are often based on particular political and social agendas and movements that aim at instilling a dominant cultural ideology. For example, when elites such as Patriarch Kirill make public announcements like the following, specific knowledge is transmitted which can greatly influence attitudes and behaviors *en masse*. “Political situations come and go and change, but those ties, which span centuries, always survive. Orthodoxy is an important factor of national self-identification both for Russians and for Greeks” (Kirill, 2012). In this way, external sources of meaning, often including specific social and political agendas, may contribute greatly to the process of world-building.

Karpov’s work on desecularization offers further insight on the origin to such agendas and movements that influence individuals’ decision-making. According to Karpov, the process of desecularization can be carried out by actors ‘from below’ or ‘from above’ (2010). As Karpov explained, both models are ideal types and can occur simultaneously in a given context. In short, desecularization from below, or on the grassroots level, requires a “high level of mass involvement” and substantial resources including both material (e.g., financial) and political support (Karpov, 2010). As soon as actors gain a significant amount of influence, a ‘desecularizing regime’ is instilled. This refers to “a particular normative and politico-ideological mode in which desecularization is carried out, expanded, and sustained” (Karpov, 2010, p.24). This regime includes four main objectives: 1) establishing the scope of transformation, 2) securing ‘institutional arrangements’ by which power and influence is maintained, 3) creating a particular method to enforce the transformation,

and 4) instilling an ideological source for legitimating this transformation (Karpov, 2010).

This construct may be used to explain other societal transformations beyond desecularization. In particular, this model may be used to explain the spread of ethnodoxy in post-communist Russia. Although a more comprehensive application is better suited for another study, a few considerations are offered highlighting its usability. As described in Chapter IV, the collapse of the Soviet Union created large populations of people, once united (at varying degrees) under the same socio-political ideology and worldview, in need of new sources of meaning and perceived order. Many groups reverted to traditional, pre-Soviet, foundations of meaning to (re)create their group identity and construct a new shared social world. For instance, in the Central Asian country of Kyrgyzstan, traditional practices such as bride kidnapping, which was illegal during the Soviet Union, have increased dramatically since the 1990s. Furthermore, such ‘rememberings’ often included an increase in the importance of, comparatively, religious institutions. The rise of ethnic Russian affiliation to Russian Orthodoxy is a case in point. Clearly, individuals, from below, have actively sought such systems of belief and meaning in order to (re)create new social and cultural identities. Furthermore, the rapid spread of accepting such systems of meaning is evidence of high levels of mass involvement.

On the other hand, there is evidence that these societal transformations are influenced from above as well. As discussed throughout this study, relationships between the Russian Orthodox Church and the state, Slavophile socio-political agendas carried by Putin, United Russia, and other key religious and political leaders

and groups have further contributed to the creation, maintenance, and legitimation of a post-communist Russian society based on the ideological foundation of ethnodoxo. As such, 1) the scope of this transformation appears societal-wide, 2) is fueled by *symphonic* relationships between the Church and state, 3) is enforced both formally through policy (e.g., privileges for the ROC) and informally through the norms and values that are 4) perpetuated by a spreading ideology that emphasizes strict in/out-group boundaries, secured social and political status, and fear of external threats.

This application of Karpov's below/above model is rudimentary, necessitating further investigation; however, these basic considerations nonetheless offer tentative support to its usability. Continued analysis should expand on these considerations.

Ethnodoxo and the Fortitude of Belief Systems

Again, an important theme in this study, if not the main empirical finding, is that ethnodoxo has become a prominent ideology that most contemporary ethnic Russians identify with. While ethnodoxo is not the only ideological system that individuals may adhere to, it seems that it has become a main one. Therefore, it is important to explore how ethnodoxo fits with other 'competing' ideologies and to speculate the likelihood of ethnodoxo remaining as prominent as it appears to be.

In particular, at least two other worldviews exist that resonate for many contemporary Russians. Both of them, along with ethnodoxo, can be important for understanding what it means to be Russian and what the norms and expectations surrounding this identity are. The first is adherence to social and political agendas inherited from communism and sustained by communist and other left-wing

movements, groups, and political parties. More than two decades after the official disbandment of the Soviet Union, communist ideology and its adherence through formal and informal institutions (e.g., political parties, popular publications, public demonstrations, etc.) still exist. As discussed in Chapter X, the CPRF is the second most supported political party. Furthermore, other Soviet-era orientations remain (e.g., as demonstrated by the residual ‘abortion-culture’ described by Karpov and Kaariainen [2005] and explored in Chapter XI). Clearly, a worldview influenced by Soviet communism is still an important source of identity for many contemporary Russians.

A second worldview that can be a source of identity for Russians today stresses a more accepting relationship with the West, particularly with Europe. Compared to ethnodox and communist perspectives, this last view is best described as a general worldview, rather than a specific ideology per se. Whereas ethnodox and communism are more structured belief systems (e.g., manifested by particular institutions and organizations), a pro-West worldview is a less homogenous set of ideas about Russian citizenry and the perception of Russia as a positive contributor to Western civilization. Adherence to a ‘Western’ worldview is shown in this study as exemplified in younger cohorts more likely to have positive attitudes about the West, democracy, and civil rights toward out-groups than older cohorts.

The fact that multiple sources of identity exist is crucial in understanding post-communist Russians specifically. After nearly a century of ideological monopolization, having more options for individuals to choose from makes understanding what it means to be Russian more nuanced. In addition, having

multiple systems of belief and meaning requires some degree of competition for legitimation and, therefore, acceptance. In this way, a discord exists when an ethnodox person believes being Orthodox is essential for being ethnically Russian while the pro-West or communist may disagree (albeit there are neo-communists who also identify as Orthodox). At the same time, ethnodox and communist individuals may have more exclusive views about being Russian while a pro-Western understanding may be more inclusive, if not supra-national.

Referring back to Berger, only when belief systems have a “monopoly on a society-wide basis, that is, as long as it can continue to utilize the entire society as its plausibility structure,” does it reach a state of complete ‘firmness’ or ‘stability’ (1967, p.49). Based on this notion, each of these worldviews are competing for acceptance and survival. The question then becomes, how likely will the persistence of ethnodoxy be?

Answering this question is beyond the scope of this study. However, a brief glimpse into Russian history may provide some insight. While the Soviet-era consisted of the establishment and maintenance of one ideological system, pre-Soviet Russia was far more diverse. In fact, Russia during the nineteenth century looked more like Russia today in this respect.

For instance, Hosking described two particular groups that had very different approaches toward understanding what it meant to be Russian. On the one hand, ‘Slavophiles’ held that

...Russia had its own rich cultural heritage, derived from Byzantium and transmitted by the Orthodox Church. Russia had actually preserved the integrity of the Christian faith, which the West had lost, thanks to the popes’

greed for secular power and to the countervailing but equally sterile individualism and rationalism of the Protestants (Hosking, 2001, p.275).

This group, not unlike the ethnodox described in my study, understood the special role of Orthodoxy and was particularly skeptical of the West. On the other hand, ‘Westerners’

...looked forward to Russia’s becoming the most advanced European civilization in the next stage of history, borrowing from Europe but at the same time transforming its own youthfulness and inexperience into a blessing which would enable it to offer leadership (Hosking, 2001, p.277).

As detailed in my study, evidence of more positive attitudes about the West, particularly toward Europe, was also expressed by many contemporary Russians. The point of this observation is not to imply that this is evidence of some cyclical periodization of history. Instead, I suggest that the identities, beliefs, and attitudes held by individuals are far more enduring than we may think. This is especially true when those orientations become essential for the creation of social groups. Again, this is not to say that the ethnodox of today are virtually the same as nineteenth century Slavophiles or the same for Westerners. However, at the very least, the similarities in worldviews do show the fortitude of our ideas and beliefs.

The longevity of ethnodoxy is difficult to predict. In line with Berger, the more ideologies in competition, the harder maintaining and legitimating ethnodoxy as the status quo will be. If these ‘competitor ideologies’ are somehow restrained, thereby creating yet again another ideological monopoly, then the survival of ethnodoxy seems more likely. Recent events seem to point to the latter. Indeed, it is not uncommon to see ‘outspoken’ Russian journalists, business entrepreneurs,

politicians, or even musicians detained due to remarks or actions critical of the ROC and its role in the Russian state.

Moreover, the apparent institutionalization of ethnodoxo in Russian society poses important moral questions about the consequences of this belief system. On the one hand, an ideology that stresses rigid in/out-group boundaries creates a strong sense of unity and solidarity, which can be particularly helpful in times of societal change and uncertainty. On the other hand, ideologies that stress intolerance and xenophobia are often associated with injustice and human rights issues. Just how ethnodoxo will play out, in and outside Russia and in all its forms and variations, will continue to be an important area of study.

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APPENDIX:
HSIRB APPROVAL LETTER



Date: December 1, 2011

To: Vyacheslav Karpov, Principal Investigator
David Barry, Student Investigator for dissertation

From: Victoria Janson, Interim Chair

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Victoria Janson".

Re: HSIRB Project Number 11-11-29

This letter will serve as confirmation that your research project titled "A Conceptual and Empirical Analysis of Popular Perceptions toward the Relationship between Religious and Ethnic Identities: A Comparative Study of Ethnodoxy in Contemporary Russia and Beyond" has been **approved** under the **exempt** category of review by the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board. The conditions and duration of this approval are specified in the Policies of Western Michigan University. You may now begin to implement the research as described in the application.

Please note that you may **only** conduct this research exactly in the form it was approved. You must seek specific board approval for any changes in this project. You must also seek reapproval if the project extends beyond the termination date noted below. In addition if there are any unanticipated adverse reactions or unanticipated events associated with the conduct of this research, you should immediately suspend the project and contact the Chair of the HSIRB for consultation.

The Board wishes you success in the pursuit of your research goals.

Approval Termination: December 1, 2012