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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

At the Council on Social Work Education annual program meeting in
Chicago in 1975, The Journal sponsored a session on <u>Sociological Theory and
Social Work Education.</u> The Journal had originally planned to publish the four
papers and the ensuing discussion as a monograph. However, circumstances
prevented this and we therefore present the four papers as part of this volume.

Two papers, one by James E. Herrick and the other by Roger McNeely and
John Oliver, deal with aspects of social work education. Mr. Neely and Oliver
presented a version of this paper at the C.S.W.E. meeting in Phoenix in 1977.
The paper by Larry Northwood was originally presented at the Sociology and
Social Welfare session at the American Sociological Association meetings in
Chicago in 1977.

Asoke Basu presented his paper at the C.S.W.E. meeting in Phoenix
in 1977.

Gandy and Bridges paper on creative restitution was accepted for publica-
tion by The Journal in 1977.

Grinnel and Kyte's paper concerns the confusion about expectations for
social work faculty in medical schools.

SYSTEMS THEORY

by

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        Recently I found in my mailbox an announcement that recent ad-
vancements in "Human Behavior Science" could now make me a "Winner"
in my varied relationships with others. Self-understanding, happiness,
and personal success could now be gained through a new perspective on
life. The brochure explained:
        About 2 years ago, a new theory exploded in the world of
        Human Behavior research. It is called General Systems
        Theory—and it is a totally new way of looking at humans
        and their environments. The idea is that each of us lives
        at the heart of a dynamic system. Everything you do (your
        input) produces a reaction from others (feedback). As a
        result, each one of us can change the entire system just
        by changing our input.   (emphasis original)
It would cost $126 for twelve tape cassettes to show me how to put
this new research to use and become a winner.
        Scholars and practitioners who are doing anything at all useful
relative to social problems as they are popularly perceived will be
familiar with the periodic appearance of the hucksters, using their
ideas as bait for a quick profit. In fact, the arrival of the profi-
teers may be looked upon by some as a form of flattery and a reassur-
ance that we are doing something useful. Others may see it as the
price that must be paid for innovation. "If you can't stand the hoak-
am," Bertram Gross once paraphrased, "get out of the kitchen. That's
where new ideas are cooked up." (1968) Still, to extend the metaphor
a bit, test kitchens usually use better ingredients than do mass pro-
duction lines. Finding the all-beef patty under the ketchup, onions,
pickles, and oversized bun is not always easy. What's cooked up may
be convenient, but it is not always nourishing.
        Systems Theory has generated a lot of excitement in the last
decade. It has also spawned more than its share of pitchmen, enough
so that it is in danger of being discredited before its genuine po-
tential in many fields of practice has been fairly tested. Wearing
the double halo of Science and Corporate Efficiency conferred by its
association with the aerospace industry and the Pentagon, it has been
enthusiastically offered to Federal and State governments (Chartrand,
1971; Hoos, 1969 & 1972) as well as private individuals and organiza-
tions as a way of solving complex social problems like mass transit,

crime, and welfare dependency. As with any situation where expectations are raised (at high cost in contract fees) and then left unfulfilled, the reaction may indict basic ideas and intemperate applications alike.

Let us, then, look more closely at the history and logic of systems theory and try to assess its strengths and weaknesses as a guide to social work practice. Remembering Gross' admonition, we must be tolerant of the confusion and error that are part of the ferment of innovative thinking and yet wary of its intoxication. To change the metaphor from food to drink: Getting too high makes one a dangerous driver and an easy mark. This is, after all, the practitioner's special problem. He or she must deal daily with the lives of real people, not imaginative constructs. After a yeasty session with intoxicating ideas, theorists can always sit in the back seat and sing; but the practitioner is the one who has to get behind the wheel and drive safely home.

A BRIEF HISTORY

Systems theory as we know it is a product of the late 1940's, but its intellectual background goes deep into the nineteenth century. This history is worth knowing about because it provides insight into some of the perils of systems thinking.

Systems theory's inspiration in both classic and modern periods is strongly biological. The comparison of society to a biological organism spawned several generations of sociological theory and laid the groundwork for the systems idea. The first generation was led by the English sociologist Herbert Spencer. It became known, after the 1859 publication of Charles Darwin's Origin of the Species, as "Social Darwinism." (This label itself is a good example of intellectual opportunism, because Darwin had little to do with the social applications of his biological ideas.) The purpose of comparing society to a biological organism was to emphasize the complexity, interdependence, and evolutionary adaptability of a society. For Spencer, this led to the conclusion that the only kind of social change possible was that which took place at the glacial pace of biological evoluation. Planned intervention in social problems by legislators and other do-gooders was both unnecessary and doomed to failure by the unanticipated consequences of disturbing "natural" processes.

More recent organismic sociology has repudiated the crudeness of Social Darwinist politics, but its tendency to respect the status quo and distrust change has persisted. Many find a definite connection between the organismic analogy and these political conclusions. Thus, the relative simplicity of this earlier formulation is an aid to understanding the logic of organismic thinking. Of particular interest is the argument between conservative and liberal wings of American

Social Darwinism, represented by William Graham Sumner and Lester Ward respectively, over the differences between biological and social organization. (See, e.g., Hofstadter, 1955) Ward argued that human intelligence allowed intervention to improve on the wastefulness of nature. Social organization was the result of "synergy," the combination of "genetic" (biological) and "telic" (human choice) forces. This argument previews a current argument in systems theory. (Buckley, 1967, 13)

The second intellectual generation in organismic thinking is dominated by Emile Durkheim, a French sociologist of the 1890's. Durkheim downplayed the evolutionism of the Social Darwinists and did not despair of constructive intervention in complex socieities. He was, however, supremely concerned with order and structure. He was convinced of the dependence of people on an organized society cemented by agreed-upon norms and values.

The amazing "Generation of the 90's" (Hughes, 1961) contained many who contributed to contemporary sociological theory, but it was Durkheim who had the most impact on American mainstream sociology of the mid-twentieth century. This became the third generation of organismic sociology and is generally known as Structural-Functionalism. Though functionalist sociology is discussed elsewhere in this volume, its major features must be recalled here because they are part of the context of systems theory in social work. One of the influential books in the development of both systems theory and functionalist sociology was W.B. Cannon's The Wisdom of the Body (1932). The concept of homeostasis, coined by Cannon, is one of the key difficulties in the application of systems theory.

Homeostasis is the tendency of a biological organism to seek and keep some kind of operating balance in its internal processes, or, at least, to keep processes within certain limits. This concept, when added to the Durkheimian concentration on a social order based on an integration of structured norms and values, leads with unfortunate ease to the conclusion that internal social change is largely self-regulatory. Thus, we come back to the general area of Spencer's "hands-off" attitude. It also leads to an identification of disorder with disease, something Durkheim encouraged by his references to social "pathology." If social change takes care of itself in the "body politic," then groups advocating conscious planned intervention in social processes or planned restructuring of society will be viewed with suspicion. Indeed, radicals may be seen as a social disease. They may even appear to be diseased themselves and in need of therapy to restore their mental, and our social, health. If social workers take this viewpoint, they may find themselves taking very repressive roles in society.

Functionalist sociologists and their critics have argued about these issues for some time. (see particularly Demerath and Peterson, 1967; Reynolds and Reynolds, 1970) It is just one example of the

practical implications of models. More will be said as we discuss the
details of systems thinking. It is important, however, to know at the
outset that systems theorists do not face the dilemmas of homeostasis
all by themselves. They've had a lot of company and can perhaps learn
from others' struggles. Failure to appreciate the long history of the
organismic analogy results, I think, in an underestimation of its dif-
ficulties in practice.

Organismic sociology is one of the contributors to modern systems
theory. Information theory[1] and cybernetics are the others. Informa-
tion theory is a mathematical development which arose from the need to
measure the capacity of electronic communications equipment. The need
to measure, in turn, seems to have come from the desire, in the post-
war period, to sell this equipment to buyers concerned with relative
capacity to broadcast. This hardware concern was met by the applica-
tion and development of a kind of probability theory first used in
thermodynamics to describe the movements of gases. (This is where the
concept of "entropy" first enters. About this, more later.) Informa-
tion theory did not stay confined to the world of mathematicians or
electronics engineers. The possibility of its application to biology
was immediately grasped. W. Ross Ashby's Design for a Brain (1952) was
the culmination of several years of considering the human organism as
an information processing machine. Norbert Wiener's Cybernetics (1948)
is a related effort, popularized later in The Human Use of Human Beings
(1950).

The possibility of a new, comparative understanding of humans
and the most sophisticated of machines through the mathematics of in-
formation probabilities brought systems theory into being. Ludwig Von
Bertalanffy was one of those most impressed by the potential of the
systems concept for bridging the distance between social, organic, and
mechanical knowledge. He coined the term General System Theory in 1937
while part of a philosophy seminar with Charles Morris at the Univer-
sity of Chicago, though he didn't publish the idea until after the War.
Organization, he felt, was the key to understanding the world. The
various components of the universe, be they atoms, people, or societies,
were less important than the way they were put together. Thus, an
organism might be just one example of an "organized system." (Rapoport
in Buckley, 1968,xx) A society might be categorized as a kind of "com
plex adaptive system." (Buckley, 1967, 5) The real excitement of sys-

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1. In classic Information Theory, "information" refers only to the
capacity to send messages. Received and stored information is not in-
cluded in "information." Hence, Communication Theory has arisen as a
broader, less strictly mathematical, field of study. You can get into
trouble, in some circles, by using "information" and "communication"
interchangeably.

tems theory, particularly the idea of General System Theory,[2] was that
it was not just another variety of organismic sociology, but that it
promised to be a basis of unification of all the sciences. Moreover,
the basis of this unity was not just another metaphorical comparison,
but one where structural isomorphism (sameness of shape) might be es-
tablished and where mathematical precision could be employed to nail
it all down. This is indeed an intoxicating idea. Imaginative social
work scholar/practitioners were understandably drawn to it along with
others from many fields. But what, specifically, has the systems no-
tion to offer social workers beyond the promise of eventual unification
of the physical and social sciences at the most abstract of levels?
Can it provide any concrete guidance to the complex reality that social
workers experience daily?

THE USES OF THEORY
     It might be worthwhile to ask at this point: What can a social
worker reasonably expect from a theory? Theories are more or less sys-
tematic assemblages of terms or concepts and relationships that offer
explanations. They are frames of reference, organized or unorganized,
that we refer to for guidance, consciously or unconsciously, in devel-
oping some trans-situational basis for action. They involve generaliza-
tions that go beyond individual situations and yet are not so general
as to be untestable. An example of the latter problem are horoscopes
whose predictions are vague enough to fit almost any event that does
occur. Sociological theories, because they are concerned with the more
abstract and general levels of social organization, often have this
problem. General Systems Theory, we have seen, is particularly abstract
because it seeks the organizational similarities of such a vast range
of being: physical, organic, and socio-cultural.
     Even at the higher levels of abstraction, theories are useful to
practice in that they help organize and sort out from the many possible
things going on in the world those things most likely to be important
in a particular situation. They sensitize one to look for things that
might not otherwise be noticed. They suggest what should be focused
on and what is peripheral. Hopefully, this selective, hierarchical,
explanation will get down to the level of individual situations so that
some guidance to action is possible. Also, this guidance ought to be
so phrased that one can judge after the event if it worked or failed.
Sociological theories are often frustrating to social workers because
they provide too little specific guidance to action. Freudian psychol-
ogy, on the other hand, has a good deal to say about practice. Its
problems relate to its prescriptions being constructed so that they

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2. Though Bertalanffy reserved the singular form for his General theory,
this usage has not been widely adopted. Systems theory will be the
phrase used here.

can't be judged right or wrong. Any event or outcome can fit into the diagnosis. Rosenhan (1973), Goffman (1961) and others have shown, for example, how easy it is to interpret current and past behavior of an ordinary life into a pathological pattern. The practitioner, then, has the vexing problem of deciding what is true and what will work. Doing controlled research is not usually within his or her range of options. And, for a variety of reasons we have no space to discuss, he or she cannot often use the research of others to provide a guarantee of successful action. The best one can do is know something about how to ask the right questions (theory) and how to recognize good answers when they appear (methodology).

It is my contention that systems theory, like most macro-level theories, is not likely (at least at the moment) to provide concrete, proven guidance to practice. It is, and will probably continue to be, used as a frame of reference for practice, organizing within its broad scope a variety of micro-practical theories and techniques. (see, e.g. Anderson & Carter, 1974) Let us proceed to look at the kinds of questions systems theory encourages us to ask, the ones it doesn't ask, and the general direction it takes us. In the process, it will, I hope, become apparent why systems theory in practice has been such a mixed blessing and is so easily exploited by the profiteers.

CHARACTERISTICS OF SYSTEMS

The usual definitions of a system are simple and general: "a totality of elements in interaction," or "the dynamic interrelatedness of components," (Buckley, 1968, xxiii-xxv) or "a whole which functions as a whole by virtue of the interdependence of its parts." (Rapoport in Buckley, 1968, xiv) Two salient characteristics of systems theory are prominent in these definitions: a concern for wholes and for interrelatedness. From the first concern derives the problem of establishing boundaries: what is part of the system and what is not? What is outside the boundary of the system in question is labeled "environment." Allied to the second concern, interrelatedness, is the problem of "homeostasis." It is often assumed, particularly by social work systems theorists, that the major process characterizing the relationship of components of a system is the homeostatic tendency, mentioned earlier, of seeking balance or at least smoothness of operation. These are all, as we have seen, legacies of organismic sociology. The advent of cybernetics brought the idea that the key to interrelationships and their balancing tendencies was information. Thus, analysis of "messages" and "feedback" revealed important things about organization of both living and non-living systems. The basic concept of system, then, directs our attention to problems of wholes and their parts, their boundaries, their major processes (chiefly, homeostasis), and the information exchanges that drive these processes.

To this list must be added two other concepts from the Post-War

interplay of biology and information theory. "Entropy" is the assumed universal tendency of systems toward disorganization, randomness, and chaos. "Equifinality" is the assumption that there is always more than one way to arrive at a given end. These are the concepts we must now examine.

Before we proceed, however, we must note a preliminary problem of theory-building that systems theory makes especially important. Though analogies, models, and metaphors are ubiquitous in theory-building, systems theory makes analogizing a major indoor sport. This is both legitimate and dangerous. Walter Buckley points to the shift in biological theory from concern with substance to concern with organization as a major inspiration of systems theory. This means that outwardly dissimilar things can yet embody similarities in operation. "The major goal of the General Systems Research movement is to trace out...structural similarities, and structural differences, between 'substantively' different systems." (1967, 3, emphasis original) Similarities are not to be taken for granted. They are to be tested, not assumed. Ida Hoos' indignant comment on attempts in California to use aerospace systems analysts to tackle social problems is worth mention here:

> In the real world, there appears to be about as much jus-
> tification for committing society's sundry malfunctioning
> systems to the care of a systems analyst whose sole claim
> to expertise is technical as to call a hydraulic engineer
> to cure an ailing heart because his speciality is pumping
> systems. Although the term 'system' can be applied to
> both space hardware and social problems, the inputs are
> vastly different, as are the controls and objectives.
> (1969, 23-24)

The interesting potential in the discovery of structural similarities between systems of different orders remains in the realm of poetic metaphor until the practical limitations of those similarities are carefully spelled out.

WHOLES AND HOLISM

The encouragement to look at things as wholes is one of the most widely appealing aspects of systems theory to social workers and other practitioners. The tendency of social work to concentrate on one-to-one interventions using psychological theories has diminished in recent years and a counter tendency which tries to consider the influences of larger social structural forces is gathering support. Systems theory offers the promise of eventually being able to relate micro-social problems to macro-social forces.

When advocates present the merits of a systems approach, they often cite examples where important things were left out, thus rendering

the result laughable or disastrous   or both. (Halpert, 1968) No one
wants to be accused of ignoring some important factor. Moreover, as
said earlier, it is good that social workers are wrestling more openly
with problems of large-scale organization. Nonetheless, beyond initial
sensitization to the "big picture," one must ask whether a systems
approach can help us include all the _right_ elements. Obviously, not
everything is relevant. Nor are all relevant factors of equal impor-
tance. To get an idea of what kind of factors a systems analysis is
likely to regard as important, we will have to look further.
    It is worth noting that, in practice, systems analysts seem to
have as much trouble as anyone else in including all the significant
facotrs. Robert Boguslaw, whose experience among systems theorists
leads him to compare them with the nineteenth century utopians, says:

    The history of utopian design efforts seem to reveal a
    high correlation between the use of rigorous rationality
    within a system design and the omission of significant
    elements from the system model. (1965, 64)

An example of this myopia is the creation of a criminal justice evalua-
tion system proposed for the State of California by an aerospace firm.
It was based on conviction statistics, ignoring all current reserva-
tions about such statistics as an index of crime, much less a defini-
tion of it. (Hoos, 1970, 209-213)
    Another worm in the apple of wholism is the peril of going to
the opposite extreme and trying to regiment everything into an over-
arching plan whether it fits or not. City planners have been accused
of this vice. (See, particularly, Sennett's provocative argument, 1970,
87-95.) Even systems theorist C. West Churchman laments that "...large
systems are unaesthetic; they are neither beautiful nor interestingly
ugly. They are boring, plain, uncreative, abominable, smelly, gray,
tasteless." (1968, 198) Thus, we have problems both with leaving too
much out and putting too much in, and practitioners of systems analysis
don't seem to have any special claim to solving them yet.

BOUNDARIES
    The definition of a system requires knowing what's in and what's
out. Part of what's outside the boundary of a system (its environment)
may be another system. Therefore, careful definition must proceed any
systems analysis. The fact that systems theory forces the social
worker to make such an analysis is a positive contribution. It forces
not only some awareness of "the big picture" but also some _self_ examina-
tion. Am I part of the impinging environment forcing the client(s)
to adapt or am I part of an effort, in concert with the client(s), to
alter the impinging environment?
    The difficulty with the definition of system boundaries is that
they are probably always very arbitrary. Where is the "edge" of a
nuclear family, dividing it from an extended family, friendships, work

requirements, community ties, political demands, etc.? But sensitivity
to this problem is an advantage. If one is wary of the definition of
boundaries, one may avoid the related problem of assuming too quickly
that various systems are self-contained or self-regulating, or that they
should be.

INTEGRATION
        One of the greatest problems of systems theory, as amply demon-
strated by its ancestry in organismic sociology, is the tendency to
assume that parts of something defined as a system are related to each
other without some attempt to see that they are. It is one thing to
be on the alert for subtle interconnections and unanticipated conse-
quences. It is quite another to assume, as did the conservative Social
Darwinists, that things were so completely and bafflingly intertwined
that society should be left completely free of planned direction or
change. In taking social work out of the temptation to assume that
most problems are individual/psychological ones, will systems theory
produce a crop of neo-Spencerians who, while recognizing the social
nature of many problems, find them so complex that they despair of
solving them and go back to individual therapy as the only profitable
use of their talents?
        A related problem with a similar conservative outcome stems from
the exaggeration of the importance of the varied parts of a system
for its survival. If everything in a society is "functional," that is,
supports the operation of the system in some way, then to change or
eliminate any part may threaten the survival of the system. This leads
easily to a conviction that everything that exists in a given social
order is necessary and ought to be defended against attack. Thus may
an overestimation of integration result in an automatic defense of the
status quo. (for a presentation of this problem by the most articulate
defender of functionalist sociology see Merton, 1968, ch. I)
        A more likely risk is the possibility of overstating not how
much things are interrelated but how much they should be interrelated.
This is perhaps another way of discussing the problem of rigidified
holism. Alfred Kahn says quite bluntly: "Proponents of decentraliza-
tion, community control, and participatory administration could find
their activities in conflict with a systems emphasis." (1973, 146)
Is integration an unqualified good and is it the task of social work
to increase it? Can all parts of a system be successfully integrated?
If not, must we alter the very definition of "system?" In a hetero-
geneous society, how much integration is necessary to survival or to
the maximum satisfaction of its citizens? Are there situations where
too much integration could pose a threat to either of these goals?
        Alvin Gouldner has suggested that the latter situation is quite
possible and that "de-differentiation" and "functional autonomy,"
the factors Kahn seems to believe are warned against by systems theory,

-454-

might not only be helpful to the operation of a society but may become
the only way of saving a system in a threatening environment. Noting
such examples as the work of Goffman on the tendency of people to re-
sist total integration (1961), Gouldner suggests that the organization
of a social system may be shaped as much by the conflicts and tensions
between parts as by their harmonious interaction. (in Demerath & Peter-
son, 1967, 160) He goes on to describe situations where parts are not
only not fully integrated but where actual reduction in integration
may be required for system survival. A looser, simpler re-grouping may
be necessary to adapt. Community control of social services, Federal
revenue sharing, ethnic pride, job enlargement and worker control on
the assembly line may decrease integration and heighten disorder but
benefit society in the long run. "In short, limited increases in ran-
domness, by way of structural de-differentiation, may be the ultimate
defense of systems in the face of extremity." (Gouldner in Demerath &
Peterson, 1967, 166) Richard Sennett's The Uses of Disorder offers a
similar argument, on both personality and community levels, for the
importance of de-regulation and an increase of uncertainty, variety,
and conflict for the nurturance of personality and communal growth.
(1970) (For a related concern, see section on VARIETY below.)

HOMEOSTASIS AND MORPHOGENESIS
        Another hotly contested issue in the history of organismic sociol-
ogy is the concept of homeostasis. As noted earlier, the assumption
of a balance-seeking tendency in societies analogous to the self-regu-
lating properties of biological organisms has led to conservative
political conclusions that parallel those stemming from an overestima-
tion of the importance of integration. With a few notable exceptions
(Lathrop in Hearn, 1969, 51; Stein, 1974, 38. Stein disagrees with my
assessment of social work consensus.), most social work systems theo-
rists assume the central importance of homeostasis. (Janchill, 1969;
Kramer & Specht, 1969, 27; Meyer in Kahn, 1973; Shafer in Hearn, 1969,
32; Nelsen, 1972, 631) It is also widely used apart from the rest of
the systems concepts in such contexts as psychoanalysis, family therapy,
and crisis intervention. (e.g. Wood in Strean, 1971, 50; Scherz in
Roberts and Nee, 1970, 229; Rapoport in Roberts and Nee, 1970, 276)
Walter Buckley, however, goes to great lengths to show that the concept
of homeostasis must be transcended if systems theory is to be useful
in understanding social life (1967). It is ironic that, while this
book is often cited in the social work literature, Buckley's argument
seems to have had so little influence.
        Buckley observes that, "...whereas mature organisms, by the very
nature of their organization, cannot change their given structure be-
yond very narrow limits and still remain viable, this capacity is pre-
cisely what distinguishes sociocultural systems." (1967,14) The pro-
cess of elaborating or changing structure he calls "morphogenesis."

(1967, 58)
     Those social workers who have accepted homeostasis as an essen-
tial and useful part of systems theory may be aware of the intellectual
difficulties this raises and the political conclusions it invites.
Some seek to mitigate the problem by the use of a term like "dynamic
equilibrium." Others reject equilibrium and homeostasis entirely in
favor of the term "steady state." Anderson and Carter, who seem fully
aware of the difficulties of homeostasis, define steady state merely
as the tendency of a form of organization to persist over time. They
stress morphogenesis and even argue, following Buckley (1967, 160),
that tension is normal, not pathological; that it is not reduced auto-
matically; and that it may even be produced by a properly functioning
system (1974, 18-20). Nevertheless, the term "steady state" remains
vulnerable to the same static associations and, hence, debilities as
the earlier terms. Its very origins tie it to Cannon's homeostasis
(1939, 24).
     The reason why social workers should be wary of equilibrium,
homeostatic, and steady state metaphors are simply stated, yet they may
remain for many unconvincing. To be aware of the status-quo orienta-
tion of such conepts is often considered enough to innoculate users
against unwitting conservatism. Yet the history of organismic sociol-
ogy suggests this is not enough. Many have read Merton's eloquent
argument that functionalism is compatible even with a Marxist view of
social change. This includes, among other things, an indictment of
Cannon's attempt to apply homeostasis to societies. (in Demerath &
Peterson, 1967, 40) Yet these arguments have not saved functionalist
sociology from regular use as an instrument of the status quo. (In
addition to Demerath and Peterson, 1967, see also Reynolds and Reynolds,
1970, on this issue). It may well be that in cases like this, theore-
tical models of whatever construction and logic yield to larger poli-
tical forces. Yet I suspect that there may be powers of association
and subtle persuasion in our theoretical constructs that themselves
compel us to move in certain directions and that this can affect the
wary as well as the unwary. Some concepts it is better to throw out
than try to repair.

SURVIVAL
     Survival is the prime value in biological organisms. Integration
and homeostasis are usually justified in terms of their contribution
to survival. Indeed, those who oppose homeostasis and argue for the
utility of less integration, often do so on survival grounds. Gould-
ner and Buckley, for example, defend autonomy, morphogenesis, or de-
differentiation by pointing out their greater adaptability. It is
worth considering at this point, if only for a minute, whether this
part of the orgnaismic analogy is appropriate at the level of social
organization. Should survival be the supreme value here? Should all

-456-

organizations and associations be maintained, and is it the social
worker's duty to work for their preservation? Is it possible that
some might outlive their usefulness or that others should never have
been born?

We should all be familiar with the tendency of organizations to
perpetuate themselves even to the detriment of the purposes for which
they were organized. Charity drives frequently spend more on the costs
of organization than on the charity itself. Perhaps it is too much to
expect the Cancer Society to resist metamorphosis into the Ingrown
Toenail Foundation once a cure for cancer is found. Nor is it likely
that heads of Federal agencies will be seen trooping into the Presi-
dent's office asking to be disbanded. Nonetheless, a theoretical
orientation that places too high a value on organizational survival
might be a dis-service to those concerned with the social welfare of
society.

ENTROPY

The introduction of the concept of entropy into social work seems
to me a good example of accepting an analogy without checking on its
empirical plausibility (is it really present in social systems?) or
its metaphoric utility (what does it inspire us to think about?). En-
tropy is a concept drawn from classic thermodynamics and has most
relevance to the distribution of particles in gases. The notion enters
systems theory for two reasons. First, entropy was linked to informa-
tion by the physicist Leo Szilard, defining both in terms of probabilit
This mathematical formulation of entropy was the basis of the work of
Claude Shannon of the Bell Telephone Laboratories and others in the
creation of modern Information Theory. A second reason for the popu-
larity of entropy in systems theory is, I suspect, that Norbert Wiener
was not only fascinated by its application to information theory but
saw in Schrodinger's argument that life is counter-entropic a metaphor
for the indeterminacy of modern science. His popular book The Human
Use of Human Beings (1954) contains a recurring theme of heroic man-
kind struggling to create knowledge and order against the tide of en-
tropic chaos. Thus, entropy appealed to early systems theorists be-
cause of the neatness with which the unity of the sciences could be
demonstrated if this concept could be applied to physical, biological,
and social realms,[3] and because of the noble role it assigned to hu-
manity. Despite this, I think it is a deadend for social work on both
counts.

Empirically, the counter-entropy assertion is impossible to prove
in biology. Lila Gatlin, a biophysicist at Berkeley's Space Sciences

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3. Wiener does warn the reader in his introduction that he hasn't
checked the limitations of this analogy. (1954, 12)

Laboratory, maintains that taking the measurements necessary to establish an entropy difference between higher and lower organisms would probably kill them. "I think," she says, "our classical notions of entropy as they have come to us from presently established 'laws of physics and chemistry' are totally inadequate in dealing with the living system. (1972, 22)

On the level of social organization, the concept of entropy is at best confusing. The things that are metaphorically associated with entropy—chaos, randomness, decay, disorganization, "running down"—may often be found in the company of supposed counter-entropic factors. The mushroom growth of suburban tract developments in the Post-War period brought a good deal of chaos to governments, school districts, and social service agencies. Finding in all of this a demonstration of the Second Law of Thermodynamics is a fruitless undertaking.

The definition of entropy and information in terms of mathematical probability does seem to have empirical use in biology, where Gatlin applies it to the genetic coding process of DNA, and in information engineering, as discussed earlier. But this, Colin Cherry reminds us, is the highly technical realm of "information capacity /which/ may be defined strictly on a mathematical basis, without any of the vagueness which arises when human beings or other biological organisms are regarded as 'communications systems.'" (1966, 41) The concept of entropy, she concludes, "...is one of considerable difficulty and of deceptively apparent simplicity." (216) She even suggests "...that in true communications problems the concept of entropy need not be evoked at all." (217)

Even if the empirical utility of entropy in biological and social systems is quite narrow, it might be justified on metaphoric or sensitizing grounds. William Gordon discusses entropy's utility for social work in the context of interchanges between systems and their environments. For "growth and development" to take place, entropy must be "extracted" and exported to the environment or otherwise redistributed. Social work, presumably on the side of growth and development, may then be defined as trying to reduce entropy. (in Hearn, 1969, 11) This exposition is consistent with classic thermodynamics, but its application to society is less than clear. It calls forth visions of people with wheelbarrows dumping some kind of gooey substance outside the city limits. Gordon does not offer his own vision, but more serious examples can be posited. There are individuals and families that maintain their internal functioning by causing chaos around them. There are coporations whose prosperity is built on environmental disruption. One can think of nations preserving internal order, covering over problems of poverty and inequality, through hatred of an external enemy. These are not, however, inevitable, much less attractice, ways of solving problems. Gordon, I'm sure, would want social workers to carry out entropy exchange with minimum disruption to the environment. Still,

to define social work's goal as the redistribution of entropy seems yet another dubious proposition. It is another step, like homeostasis, toward the over-valuation of order. It further suggests that all growth must be purchased at the price of chaos somewhere else.

EQUIFINALITY

Into this list of potentially dangerous analogies I'd like to interject one that seems quite benign. "Equifinality" is the postulate that "the same state may be reached from different initial conditions and in different ways." (Lathrop quoting Bertalanffy in Hearn, 1969, 59) To put it more humbly: "there's more than one way to skin a cat." This has a good bit of empirical support and provides social workers with increased sensitivity to alternatives. It may also provide decreased anxiety about diversity. For an occupation frequently hemmed in by larger and more powerful social structures, this is probably a good thing.

VARIETY

Related to the concept of equifinality but less widely attended to by social work theorists is the stress on variety that appears now and then in systems theory. Both equifinality and variety are derived from the emphasis on complexity in the organismic analogy. Complex organisms with a variety of parts seem to be more adaptable to new situations than simple ones. One group of social workers analyzing urban organizations from a systems perspective cite Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety: "...an adaptive system must produce at least as many effective responses as the number of demands made by the environment." (Baker, Broskowski, and Brandwein, 1973, 67) Buckley (1967, 90-92) illustrates the survival value of variety in a culture with examples from a Baja Indian group. Homogeneity in a community or society may provide integration and stability, but it may limit the resources available to meet changing circumstances.

The appreciation of diversity and variety in society is a classic theme in at least one part of social work tradition. The legacy of Jane Addams may get new reinforcement if social work systems theorists choose to develop the side of the organismic analogy that stresses the value of variety rather than the side which, following Spencer, sees the organism as too complex to encourage in either the direction of variety or sameness.

FEEDBACK AND CONTROL

Perhaps the most promising, and also the most difficult, aspect of systems theory for the social work practitioner is the topic of "feedback" and its implications for power and social control. Here the organismic background to systems theory has contributed less than has information theory. The self-regulating capacity of certain ma-

chines, from simple thermostats to more complicated self-aiming anti-
aircraft guns, were the inspiration of Wiener's choice of labels for
his own brand of systems theory, "cybernetics," derived from the Greek
word for "steersman." The process by which this self-regulation took
place was called "feedback." Feedback presumes the existence of cer-
tain maintenance criteria, the ability to monitor operation enough to
sense when the criteria aren't being met, and the ability to take some
corrective action.

Like homeostasis, this cybernetic kind of "self-regulation" needs
careful scrutiny. The first complicating factor we find is that there
is feedback and there is "pseudo-feedback." Not every circular rela-
tionship qualifies as feedback. Simple organisms eat and reproduce.
If there is a lot to eat, tney reproduce more, which means they eat
more and reproduce more. But they do not cultivate food and do not
regulate their population according to the food supply. If the food
runs out, they die. The difference is that there is no control, no
self-regulation, no corrective action. On the social level, the cycle
of poverty might be an example fo pseudo-feedback. As with the organ-
isms, one condition affects another which returns directly or indirectly
to affect the original. Living in a poor neighborhood means getting
a poor education which means getting a poor job which means having
poor resources which means living in a poor neighborhood which means...
Racial discrimination operates the same way.

Let's take one further example. An actor, through the "feedback"
of his audience and critics, is judged to have given a poor performance.
This may affect his self-confidence which leads to another, even worse,
performance. What seems to distinguish these human "vicious circles"
and "deviance amplifications" from "true feedback" is that the reac-
tions, according to Buckley, are "blind" and not controlled. (1967, 69)
It looks, however, that the difference is that some were helpful and
some weren't. The actor couldn't correct his performance problems,
but he probably thought about them. Those involved in poverty and
discrimination may indeed not know what they are doing, but they may
also not want to do anything differently. Those wno have some control
of the situation may have an interest in not taking corrective action.
This should be kept in mind as we proceed. (see Buckley, 1967, ch. 5)

Even if we use the term "feedback" to cover only those situations
where error can be monitored and the "right" corrective actions taken,
there are still further levels of feedback effectiveness. The thermo-
stat is tne standard example of feedback. It can control the furnace
to maintain a pre-set range of room temperature. What if the depletion
of fuel or its inflated price requires conserving or rationing? We
must redefine "room temperature" by changing the setting on the thermo-
stat. Most error-regulated systems can't do more than maintain a pre-
determined steady state. They can't completely restructure themselves
to meet radical changes in the environment. Even a thermostat that

would redefine its "comfort zone" according to information from a monitor of fuel reserves could not change over to solar heating.

We must remember, then, that there are different levels of cybernetic "self-regulation" and that there are many points where human redefinition of goals may be crucial. If we wish to apply a cybernetic model to human society, we must remember that the "self-regulation" is us and that reorganization does not take care of itself. It is always important to know who is doing the defining and redefining of goals and of success.

INFORMATION

As we've seen, in the initial formulation of systems theory, one of the factors common to machines, organisms, and societies was the use of "information" as a key to organizational operation and adaptation. Messages of some sort were transmitted through the feedback process, connecting the components of the system and guiding it through the vicissitudes of the environment. This flow of communication illuminated the patterns of organization, identifying the centers of control and their peripheral subordinates. We have also seen how the concept of information was defined by Information Theory in ways that made its use in non-mechanical contexts much more difficult. We are accustomed to use the term in ways closely identified with "meaning" and "knowledge" rather than as a mathematically defined broadcast potential divorced from actual human communication. As with much of the original language of systems theory, the more carefully information was defined, the less portable it was across the different realms of organization. Nonetheless, in its original, broader sense, we may gain at least metaphoric use in examining social organization in terms of information.

Bystepping Information Theory, at least for the time being, we are free to ask a number of questions about how communication comes about, how the meaning of messages comes to be defined, how organization itself may be defined by who communicates with whom, how hierarchy is established by the direction of communication, and how power is wielded by the shaping and withholding or denying of information. The consideration of complex organization and, particularly, the nature of organizational power is something that seems to me particularly salient to social workers.

Few of us would deny the ubiquity of power, yet we find it easy to ignore. Social workers, often in an in-between position, need this awareness, however painful, as part of their jobs. They must be acutely conscious of the power they hold—however benevolently—over their clients, the power their agencies have over them, and the power the larger political system has over their agencies. More important, they need to go beyond this recognition, which can lead to resignation, and learn to find the ways whereby they, their clients, and fellow citizens can reclaim some share autonomy and resist the oppression of bureaucracy, greed, and misgovernment. (for one sensitive to this see Polsky in Hearn, 1969)

-461-

see Polsky in Hearn, 1969)

The consideration of information and its socially defined meaning leads us back into the basic study of what the structure of society is all about. (Buckley, 1967, 92f) Social workers may have little time for these questions once they are in the field. But periodic reconsideration of basic questions in light of practice experience is indispensible if our knowledge of social problems is to improve.

The consideration of information as the clue to complex organization may produce some much more immediate insights. As a small example, it suggests that normally powerless people may exert some influence in the hierarchy. Secretaries and janitors, the most lowly people on most corporate totem poles, may not have much initiative power, but they can exert a certain amount of veto power. They know things about the organization that the vice-presidents don't; and, if they want to, they can obstruct implementation of policies and generally make life miserable for many more highly placed individuals. I'm reminded of the professor who, after a few weeks of misdirected mail, erroneous classroom assignments, lost travel vouchers and supply orders, and delayed paychecks, decided that he was sorry he'd insulted the departmental secretary. Most Senators are busy enough that they have little time to research the bills their Committees are working on. Therefore, they are extremely dependent on the information supplied by their staff members for day-to-day votes. This can be a tremendous amount of power for an un-elected and frequently very young person. This is not to say that the power of underlings is at all comparable to that of the top executives, but it is not negligible either. Most important, tracing information through the organizational hierarchy can be the start of a greater understanding of organization itself.

Seeing information as power itself may expand our appreciation of social problems on the societal level, too. The fact that major oil companies are the only source of information on energy reserves makes it impossible for anyone to refute claims of shortages. Yet we must be careful not to think that this is the only kind of power in society. After all, if the organizational superordinate doesn't like the information the subordinate is providing, he (or she?) can always fire the whole staff. There are ways to get at oil companies, too.

CONCLUSION

If systems theory is so broad that it allows both conservative and radical interpretation of the same situation, is it any good at all as a guide to practice? Is it anything more than a stylish veneer for a perspective derived elsewhere? Or is it a hip Sears catalogue that we can buy from, higgledy-piggledy, as our whims and budget allows?

It is undeniable that systems theory throws a wide net; it was intended as such. Moreover, its intellectual heritage is diverse enough to have made the many interpretations contained within its hos-

pitable boundaries inevitable. Still, I think that there is a coherent
and consistent systems theory that can be of some definite help to
social workers.

The reason I spent time on the historical origins of systems
thinking was to get a clearer idea of which themes seem most likely to
gain empirical support and where concepts are likely to lead in prac-
tice. Not all the concepts currently associated with systems theory
are essential to a systems perspective. The systems garden is lush
enough to permit considerable weeding and pruning without killing much
that is vital. Mindless bouquet-gathering is neither necessary nor
advisable.

The systems framework is purposely of the highest abstraction.
The idea that possessed its founders was to find structural and organi-
zational unity in all the sciences. The difficulties systems theory
has experienced owe much to the fact that its proponents simply assumed
similarities to be there rather than examining possible similarities
closely in practice. Some biological concepts may be appropriate to
society and some may not be. The mathematical definitions of engineer-
ing may fit some biological or social phenomena and not others. Anal-
ogies from social organization may or may not describe things in other
realms. Unification of the sciences wasn't expected overnight.

To the practitioner with problems a little more immediate than
scientific unification, there still may be use in a carefully construc-
ted, and probably stripped-down, systems perspective. The example set
by Walter Buckley a decade ago still merits following. Even without
further modification, it has much to offer social workers. With a
reasonable model of this sort one can then begin to examine the lesser
known territories of daily human suffering with some kind of map. A
map without a lot of details on it is annoying but better than no map
at all. It is also a useful supplement to one's memory of where one
was last week.

In the process one must 1) always be aware of the potential
biases of the map or model from examination of its logic and the his-
tory of its past use, and 2) test rather than assume the existence of
each reference. Then systems theory may indeed inspire some new in-
sights within an organized framework that will extend their benefit to
greater and wider successful application.

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INTERACTIONIST THEORY, HUMAN BEHAVIOR
SOCIAL WORK AND SOCIAL WORK EDUCATION

By

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Much explanation of human behavior is based on assumptions about animal behavior. Two major contemporary theories, Behaviorism and Freudianism place major emphasis upon the human being as animal. Many middle-level theories have no reference to man's distinctive social characteristics. However, social explanations of behavior do have a heuristic advantage in the study of human functioning and "social pathology."

Symbolic interaction theory operates on the assumption that man lives in a symbolic environment as well as in a physical (animal) environment. Symbolic learning emanates from the social processes men experience. Symbols represent personal meanings, values and associated feelings.

In symbolic communication, one person, seeking to elicit specific behavior from another, selects a symbol from his "library." The individual believes that he has chosen the one symbol likely to create the desired behavior. He encodes the symbol into a "signal" and broadcasts the signal by some means of communication. He may use speech, writing, or some non-verbal act, and he may not broadcast the signal perfectly.

Then the receiver tries to decode the signal into a symbol, by retrieving what he thinks are the appropriate meanings and values. If the symbol has approximately the same meaning and value to both people, the desired action may occur. Becuase each person associates the symbol with his own meanings and values, which are based on his past social learning, much depends on whether both people have had similar past social learning.

"Meaning" refers to the way in which people actually use a particular term in their behavior. A "value" is a learned attraction or repulsion which the individual relates to a particular symbol or meaning. A "symbol" represents an incipient or telescoped act in which the later stages (involving elements of both meaning and value) are implied in the first stage.

People learn symbols by interacting with other people. We can view symbols as having common or shared meanings and values for most people in a society. This provides the society's "mainstream population" with a quality of "consensual validation," even though the

consensus of understandings is never complete. Mainstream people share many common norms and ideals. Norms are direct guides to positive acts or values. Ideals are what the individual says or believes he would like to do. Norms sometimes coincide with ideals. Even when ideals do not coincide with norms, they provide guides to behavior as "remote goals to be reached indirectly."

Much adult behavior is learned from symbolic communication of norms and ideals rather than from direct trial and error. A culture is an elaborate set of meanings and values tied to symbols and shared by others in society. Culture guides human behavior. By learning the culture, men are able to predict each other's behavior most of the time and to gauge their own behavior to the way they expect others to act. A society is possible only when common symbols and expectations exist.

However, a person does not act in predeterminable ways even though his actions are purposeful and voluntary. Each person acts according to his "definition of the situation." He has to interpret other people's behavior and to make a personal assessment of what is "right and proper" at the moment.

People interpret symbols emotionally as well as intellectually. When a person makes a rational, substantive "definition of the situation" he also makes an affective definition of the situation. Ideally, the affective definition deals primarily with deciphered meanings rather than feelings. The effective system can operate in one of a number of ways:

1. As a support of the rational analytic system

2. As a diversion from the rational analytic system

3. As opposition to the rational analytic system

4. As a neutral process

The way in which the emotional system operates can affect the way a person decides to behave, the sharpness of his perception, the way he chooses to decode other people's signals, and the success with which he chooses the symbols he transmits. So feelings are important because they can augment or impede a person's encoding and decoding abilities. People also use feelings when they decide what experiences and interactions to have in the future.

To the interactionist, social organization is the end product of behavior patterns which evolve from people's attempts to achieve goals. No two people define situations identically, and people are always re-interpreting their situations, so behavior is always changing.

Interactional "stabilities," which come from a shared culture,

give people a behavioral referent. From the interactionist view, a fully functional person is one with an adequate repertoire of roles, role behaviors, norms, symbols, and role equipment.

The fully functional person has tested these roles in experiences within the "mainstream" of societal interaction. In such a "competent" person the variety of symbols, meanings, values and other role equipment are adequate to secure a reasonable "fit" in communication with most other persons in his society. This "actor" has, thereby, earned so complete a sense of security in his role competence that he is able to balance a sense of personal autonomy with a countervailing sense of responsibility to others and society. This is what might be described as the most highly developed level of normative behavior.

The deviant, from the interactionist view, is someone with problems of communication and understanding. Interactionist theory defines deviance as more than an abnormality on the part of an individual or individuals. Instead it posits that failures of communication, past and present, cause the individual to construct a definition of the situation which is much different from other peoples' definitions of the situation. Such conflict of "definitions" is a product of the communications and understandings of more than one person. People become "more than animals" by a process of socialization which moves through psychogenic, blockage and word stages. In time a person gains a personal sense of "reality" which is established and maintained by the consensus of the groups which have meaning to him. "Objective reality" differs from "consensual reality" in that it is validated by accepted "experts" over a period of time. Learning occurs primarily in relation to significant others. The significant other is someone with whom the individual participates in role reciprocity. These significant others encourage and constrain each other's behavior through validation or non-validation of each other's acts. Only from a sense of congruity of meanings with significant others does one derive "social security." Therefore, the meanings used by significant others have strong affective or expressive significance, and define the intensity of relationships. The significant other serves as a model for the individual and helps shape the individual's self-concept. This self-concept is basic to self-esteem.

Developmentally, behavior precedes meanings and feelings. The individual's ability to communicate with himself enables him to consciously construct his behavior beyond rote performance. As the individual observes the behavior of others he arrives at hypotheses about the motives of others. Motives are a category of meanings. Continued consideration of other peoples' motives is a necessary process for social interaction. Interpreting other peoples' behavior helps the individual define who he is, and where he stands. In a sense, motives can be interpreted as rules or guidelines of interaction

and have been labeled "interactional hypotheses." These hypotheses can be either instrumental or terminal. Instrumental hypotheses make possible the mutual exploration of motives for the planning of future interactions. Terminal hypotheses interpret the behavior, meanings or feelings of others in such a way that interactions between the self and others are distorted, constrained or prevented. The individual who is unable to arrive at workable instrumental hypotheses, or who has learned distorted sets of symbols and meanings, or whose "creativity" produces meanings and values not understood by others will exhibit behavior considered deviant by the conventional society.

Let us consider the "operational reality" by which behavior is judged. The operational reality must enable individuals to predict what others will do, and to foresee the results of their own actions. It must contain a logical unity and be simple enough to be useful. It must have a self-correcting capacity. It must be fairly stable and upheld over time.

To understand behavior, we must also consider anxiety. Anxiety, as defined by Kelley, is the encountering of a situation for which there is no previous socialization. Anxiety is manifested in stress and discomfort. As socialization (that which the individual knows and accepts) interacts with anxiety, a struggle ensues between the two processes. Deviant behavior occurs when anxiety, rather than socialization, predominates in the individual's dynamics. When an individual commits behavior which the operational reality classifies as illegal, immoral, non-conformist or unanticipated, the behavior is considered deviant.

Interactionist societal theory holds that the nature of the transaction or confrontation is not as important as the meanings which people attach to their own actions and to the actions of others. A person does not act in a predeterminable way; his actions are purposeful and voluntary.

Thus, actions are not as much the result of exchange or of coercion, as they are the result of the individual's differing situation definitions.

It should be noted that a residual effect occurs when a person does not have an adequate repertoire of symbols, meanings, values and roles necessary to deal with a situation. In such instances he reverts to animal-like behavior and this is often evident in times of violence, aggression, or escape.

Among the various societal theories, interactionism is probably singular in its emphasis upon the mutual causality of communication difficulty and deviance. It takes two or more persons to create communication ineffectiveness. Functional deviance is a product of ineffective communication. According to this theory, such problems as non-somatic mental illness, mental retardation, neurosis, character

disorders, and difficult interpersonal relations can be traced to misperception, misinterpretation, mis-orientation, and inadequately provided and perceived socialization. (See Blumer 1967, Blumer 1969, Scheff, Glisinian, Hurwitz, Rose, Mannis, Melther, Dreitzel, Gordon and Gergen, Kuhn, Thomas, Berger and Luckman, Shibutani 1961, and Shibutani 1970.)

In the study of social work it is important to understand that the societal model one uses not only indicates choices of alternative interventions, but also sets up a series of definitions which are critically decisive for social work and its clients.

The model of society utilized by the social worker (and his teachers) strongly shapes the following:

1. Definition of the client and populations to be served

2. Definition of the most effective social work service and interventions

3. Definition of the social work task and its parameters

4. Definition of the nature of social problems

5. Definition of the most effective agency structure

6. Definition of the roles of the client, worker, client "others," agency, profession, etc.

7. Definition of the sanctioning authority and its degree of legitimization

8. The nature of "prognosis" for social work

9. The location of responsibility for the social work task in the society

10. Priorities for clienteles to be served, problems to be addressed, services to be rendered

11. Choice of the theoretical frameworks to be utilized in social work

12. The degree of objectivity sustained by the profession in the utilization of design and use of research measures of effectiveness

Because the model of society used largely defines the social work goal, it is easy to understand why social work professionals have difficulty determining what is effective service. Until the profession (and its teachers) agree on a societal definition, professionals will continue to be confused about what are the tasks at hand and whether those tasks are being accomplished.

Under the interactionist model, the deviant is one who is out of

-471-

communication with society and its subsystems. The client of social
work, therefore, attaches meanings and value ladings to his own actions
and the actions of others which are out of congruence with accepted
meanings and value ladings. He is unable to, or does not desire to
value interaction with the mainstream of society, so social conflict
or social dysfunctionality occurs. Where the client presents a problem
in his own functioning this can be viewed as inadequate interactional
socialization and understanding. This can explain malfunctions. Where
this occurs in groups, it can be related to incongruous understandings
of role functions. Where it occurs between marginal groups and society,
it can be laid to "deviant cultures," and to the gap in communication
between them and the mainstream. Under this model of society, the
social worker's role is one of clarifying meanings for those involved.

Social work's role under interactionist theory is focused on
effecting or re-effecting communication between participants in social
conflict, between the deviant cultures and the "mainstream," and
among individuals and groups who create or perpetuate social problems
by their differential understandings of symbols at issue. Thus, to
help those who are alienated we should attempt to increase understanding
of the definitions of realities held by the mainstream, in efforts to
achieve some congruency of comprehension.

Other theories define social problems differently. Distorted,
inappropriate behavior (and explanations of such behavior) might be
labeled as mental illness of the individual by the "consensualist"
social worker. Such behavior might be viewed as inadequate preparation
for meaningful exchanges by the exchange theorist social worker. The
same behavior might be viewed by the conflict theory social worker as
coping mechanisms resorted to by a "loser" in what Laing designated
as "family politics." Under interactionist theory such behavior (and
the counterpart behavior of other members of the family) would be
viewed as mutually aberrant distortions of reality involving a complex
of interacting persons. In this sense, the interactionist view of such
behavior is parallel to the views of Szasz, Rycroft and others.
Social work's task, under interactionist theory, is to reduce incongru-
ity of meanings to a minimum so that a commonly acceptable civilization,
and a minimization of societal strain are gained. Since social struc-
ture is founded upon the commonality of meanings, community and human
welfare is unattainable in a semantic and emotional "tower of babel."
When almost everyone has distortions or bluntings of meanings, due to
inexact communication, strains and problems proliferate.

Social work under interactionist theory cannot seek official
authorization from the society. Unlike psychotherapeutic services
and probation programs, it cannot serve as an officially chosen
instrument of social control. The rationale for this is related to
the fact that interactionist service is a "bridge" service. If the

social work service takes its authority from the society, it commits itself to accept only those definitions of meaning, valuation, etc. which are established by the mainstream. Under publicly sponsored circumstances such services would amount to nothing more than a public relations service or a one-sided interpretive office rather than a communication effectuator. Social work under interactionist theory must accept responsibility for the broader conceptualization of society, which includes not only the mainstream but also all of those "out of phase" with the mainstream. This makes of the social worker a post-conventional man - someone who owes allegiance to authority beyond the offical state, the consensus and the contemporary social structure. The worker may serve the contemporary society but his responsibility goes beyond it.

From the symbolic interactionist view, "social pathology" and social deviance may be considered to be results of dysfunctional or skewed early social learning. Society defines mental disturbances as anything so labeled by psychiatrists. Psychiatrists and related professionals, according to Szasz and others, base their determination of mental disorder on the degree to which the acts of a person do not coincide with societal norms. Symbolic interaction does not presume that mental disorder is anything more than the product of the social experiences of a person. It does not establish diagnostic positions but instead views all human patterns of acting as part of a spectrum of behavior. It provides opportunity for research-oriented study of "mental disorder," without requiring acceptance of preconceived, untestable paradigms such as unconscious or libidinal forces. Finally, it provides for a _social_ explanation of such disorders.

The adoption of a _social_ (non-disease) explanation of mental disorder would deny society opportunities to transfer responsibility from itself to the medical establishment. It would deny the medical establishment the opportunity to perpetuate "treatment" programs for which no evidence of effectiveness exists. It would provide opportunity to view unqualified parenthood as a potentially iatrogenic process from which mental disturbances are predictable. It would provide opportunities for study of professionalisms and institutions which are potential spawning grounds for such disturbances. Finally, it shifts the emphasis of treatment from clinical focus on the patient to the developmental environmental and social context of the disturbance.

Symbolic interaction is not a new postulation in sociology. Its application to the field of mental and emotional disorders is, however, yet to be tested.

A Symbolic Interaction Typology of Deviance

Case #1 - The Non-Deviant Mainstream Member

The actor behaves in a manner which conforms with the expecta-
tions for him held by "others" in the social mainstream. The actor
has been reared to perceive events with a minimum of emotional skewing.
He receives, decodes, and records events with a general clarity of
meaning and with minimal emotional disturbances of rational processes.
Other actors perceive events in a similar manner, and in their inter-
action with the actor, mutually held meanings with neutral value ladings
and feelings are shared. Where perceptions are not completely congruent
they are resolved by mutual discussion.

Case #2 - The Member of a Deviant Culture

The actor and his peers value themselves highly. They have a
strong sense of group cohesion because they share a point of view and
a sense of worth. They screen out perceptions which will lower mutual
esteem. Thus, people who associate only with each other, and who pro-
tect themselves from contact with the incongruity of outside "inputs"
develop an increased uniformity of perception. The closed communica-
tion network insures that the groups' meanings for symbols and their
likes and dislikes develop an almost perfect "match." Their defini-
tions of reality increasingly deviate from that of the "mainstream."
Their definitions of "self" and their "worth" (value lading) also
deviates from the "mainstream's" definition of them and their "worth."
Their norms and symbols become highly idiosyncratic and ultimately
unrelated to "larger realities."

When individuals in such a closed clique or peer culture experi-
ence "social pathology" it is likely to be related to a conflict of
cultures between "the establishment" (the agent of the mainstream)
and the deviant culture. This conflict can occur on individual and
on group levels.

Case #3 - "Paranoid"

The actor has developed his elementary meanings and values in an
atmosphere where they have been distorted by this significant others or
have been distortedly perceived by him.

The actor perceives events with a different value lading than
other people use. Events which might "threaten" other people do not
make him feel threatened. Events which might please or reassure other
people may be threatening to him. It does not matter whether the
threat or support "really" exists. His perception, his situation
definition is so different from those of the "others" that others
cannot understand his behavior and they label him paranoid.

Case #4 - "Mental Illness" general

The actor perceives events with meanings or conceptual content much different than the "mainstream's," so his "situation definitions" are different. This becomes evident in interpersonal conflicts when other people's situation definitions prevail, the actor is viewed as mentally deviant.

The actor becomes isolated from the others because he experiences less group-validated communication, he depends more upon his own subjective validation of all events, until his definition of reality is completely different from other people's. At some point along the path of communication deterioration, mental illness is diagnosed.

Case #5 - An Iatrogenic "Disease" of Communication

The actor (as described in Case #4) is unable to have his definitions of events and their meanings accepted. When the resulting interpersonal difficulties arise he is committed to some institution as "mentally ill." A definition of his condition is forced upon him by others around him. In the institution, he is pressed to reaffirm a definition of his condition as "illness." In the process the actor looses some of his accumulated validations that had made him consider himself a valuable person in touch with reality. This makes the actor more malleable and he becomes "institutionalized." He enters into behavior more related to institutional needs than to the realities of the world beyond the institution. Thus the actor focuses upon symbols and norms which have meanings particular to the institution and which have no relevance to the actor's world outside the institution. Because persons with lower levels of external value validation act as expected by others who have higher self-value validation, we observe a "self-fulfilling prophecy" condition. The actor's definition of reality becomes dichotomized. He has one set of behaviors and beliefs related to the others about him and another set of behaviors and beliefs which he reserves to himself. He does not present his personal beliefs and behaviors to others for evaluation or "testing." When this occurs, it can be viewed as autism.

Case #6 - Neurosis

The actor's perceptions are not sufficiently congruent to those of the others about him. This lack of congruence may be caused by emotional "skewing" by cultural differences, or by experiences which yield non-standard meanings and contents. The actor's security of self is limited because he receives little validation from others. The disparity between the actor's perceptions and those of the others is not great enough to cause a complete breakdown of relationships or ejection from the circle of others, but it does cause interpersonal

strains which lead others to class him as psychoneurotic. Usually
the neurotic is a victim of cognitive dissonance. He is drawn almost
equally to two opposing positions.

The therapist may advise the client to reshape his definitions
to match those of the others, or may suggest to the client that he sub-
due his differences of definitions with the others. His perceptions are
being remade. On the other hand, the therapist may support the client's
perceptions, based on the therapist's own congruent perceptions, thus
validating the client's definitions of reality. Then the client is able
to devalue the reports of others and retain his autonomy.

The therapist thus becomes an interpreter of meanings. Such inter-
pretation is a continuing process, until the actor learns to arrive at
his own redefinitions. If the actor continues to rely upon the therapist
for definitions indefinitely the psychotherapeutic process serves as a
prosthetic device.

Case #7 – The "Character Disorder"

The actor's "significant others" have a definition of reality
which differs widely from that of the mainstream of society. Or, he
may misunderstand what his significant others do, and think that they
differ from the mainstream when they do not. In either case, when he
encounters the mainstream society, he confronts a set of symbols,
meanings, norms, etc., to which he cannot conform. Character disor-
dered persons have been called "moral idiots" because they do not
understand the mainstream's definitions of what is right.

The actor will develop an entire complex of situational defini-
tions which agree with neither his associate's nor the mainstream's,
and his behavior will show this discrepancy. He will think that his
actions are justified regardless of their "cost" to others. Because
he has an entirely different set of "oughts" he seeks to reaffirm
his view about himself rather than accepting other people's judgements.

This actor develops little feeling of mutual trust. (Trust is
confidence that one's "significant others" will agree that what he does
is right, and that he can count on them for backing.) His definition
of a trust relationship never develops beyond one in which he simply
receives materials, services, and special dispensations.

The character disordered person, especially the sociopath, has
experienced little of an externally imposed value system, or he has
not succeeded in internalizing such values. He depends primarily on
values he learned as an infant, when his only role was to be "pleasured,"
satisfied, and relieved of tensions. Therefore the sociopaty seeks
tension-reductive activities with few "rules of the game" to control
how he secured gratification.

Case #8 - The Non-Somatically Damaged "Mental Retardate"

The actor is permitted to enter into activity with others beyond
his own circle without an adequate preparation. His supply of symbols,
valences and meanings and symbol sets (including roles, counter-roles
and norms) is too small for him to be accepted as a societal actor,
and he is also unable to build on what he has learned so far. He has
already outgrown the chronological age when basic concepts are usually
absorbed. This incapacity makes communication with others difficult
because they think he is unable to exchange highly-developed concepts.
Thus, non-somatic mental retardation is a communication dysfunction
involving the individual and the others around him.

On clients in general

The social work view of the client, particularly of the undevelop-
ed or neurotic client can be very destructive if mainstream meanings
are imposed, and creative and autonomous meanings are devalued, in
the relationship. Similarly, the post-conventional client whose
value systems go beyond mainstream interpretations can be supported or
repressed by the values and meanings interpreted by the social worker
as appropriate and acceptable. Social workers must remember that the
mainstream seeks to discipline, often without reason, not only those
who fall below the established norms but also those who excel beyond
them. Deviance is not necessarily a matter of <u>client</u> change; it may
instead indicate a requirement for change in the client environment
or in mainstream meanings. A mainstream which is over-dominant can
be uncomfortably oppressive. Conversely, a mainstream which is too
diffuse provides an inadequate basis for communication and civilization.
The cases described above represent most of the types of "social
pathology." Note that each of the clusters of deviant populations is
marginal to the mainstream's operational culture. The deviants are
socially distant from the mainstream, and interaction between them and
the mainstream is minimal. Deviant cultures are usually dependent for
material support on the mainstream despite their lack of mutual commun-
ication.
Thus, individuals who are excluded, either by themselves, or by
the mainstream, are relegated to a "trade-off" relationship with the
mainstream. They receive limited benefits, but they relinquish contact
and participation with the mainstream. Because marginal people have
fewer chances to interact with mainstream people, they and their chil-
dren have even less chance to rejoin the mainstream. Thus excluded,
many people develop separationist coping mechanisms to deal with fears,
stress and feelings of inadequacy. Often the coping mechanisms make
communication even less likely, so the problem grows worse.
Thus, they and their children build a life pattern which constantly

minimizes their opportunities to rejoin the mainstream and the problem is aggravated by reproduction.

Over and beyond its explanation of the deviance of the non-mainstream, symbolic interaction theory is highly heuristic in the understanding and analysis of problems and social conflicts frequently encountered in social work. Symbolic interaction theory explains status inconsistency, cognitive dissonance and role confusion. Eventually, this theory may provide models of differential dysfunctional interaction scripts and resolution mechanisms for such problems.

Thus, symbolic interaction theory provides a model for explaining social and individual dynamics, so that a rational plan, rather than a mythology, can become the basis for appropriate treatment planning. This theory also provides an understanding of the total communication process which can become a basis for analysis of the problems of social work. By giving common definitions of the nature of social problems and of treatment goals and methods, this theory provides increased meaning for the profession as an integration of knowledge and practice.

In the process, symbolic interaction provides social work education with a more effective approaching to the teaching of social work.

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Structural Functional Theory,
Social Work Practice
and Education

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INTRODUCTION - THE PARSONIAN SYSTEMS FRAMEWORK

The theoretical framework of structural functionalism in sociol-
ogical theory does not consist of a single, unified, and consistent
exposition. Different writers make different emphases, use somewhat
different terminology, and include different phenomena under a variety
of similar terms. Rather than attempt to deal superficially with a
wide variety of theorists writing out of this perspective, we will
focus primarily on the central concepts in the work of perhaps the most
eminent proponent of this approach in current sociological work - Tal-
cott Parsons - and, in turn, discuss the relevance of this framework
for social work education and practice.

Viewing the Parsonian systems approach from a general perspective,
the close links with the older sociological tradition of organicism
can be noted.[1] That is, the idea of an organic system is generalized
to social pheonmena and made the central theoretical focus without,
in the process, being related to a particular historical situation.
In short, an abstract "system" is postulated in which social and cul-
tural phenomena are conceptually handled and this "system" is regarded
as analogous to biological organisms. Furthermore, the system is con-
ceived as being "boundary maintaining" and "structure maintaining."
That is, it is viewed as resisting external forces and retaining some
considerable degree of stability and structure in order to remain a
system. As Parsons has put this:

> "The concept of an open system interchanging with environ-
> ing systems also implies boundaries and their maintenance.
> When a set of interdependent phenomena shows sufficiently
> definite patterning and stability over time, then we can
> say that it has a "structure" and that it is fruitful to
> treat it as a "system"...In so far as boundaries in this
> sense do not exist it is not possible to identify a set of
> interdependent phenomena as a system." [2]

Through the use of organismic analogy, Parsons tends to apply the
basic principles of systems to all phenomena from the level of the
biological organisms up to, and inclusive of, the larger social order.

A variety of concepts have been introduced by the structural-
functionalists for the purpose of explicating the systems scheme. A
central concept is that of "function" or, in more refined terms, the
concepts of "eufunction" and "dysfunction," referring to system main-
taining and system disrupting activities.[3] Clearly, however, the
concept of 'function' is distinguished from 'purpose.' While a 'pur-
pose' is viewed as something subjective, something in the mind of the
participants in a social system, the concept of 'function' is regarded
as an objective consequence of action.[4]

Parsons has also emphasized the concept of the "functional pre-
requisites" of the system to refer to the essential functional problems
which every social system must solve in order to continue existing as
an independent and distinctive entity. In addition, there are the
concepts of "functional alternatives, "functional substitutes," all
of which are largely synonomous and point to the idea that certain
elements of the system are not functionally indispensable but may be
substituted with other elements.

A key characteristic of the system theorists in general and Par-
sons in particular is the focus on "dynamic equilibrium" within the
social system. Essentially, this feature relates to the analogous
feature of homeostasis within biological organisms. Thus for Parsons,
the idea of static equilibrium is no more a characteristic of the
biological organisms than it is of the social system. This, for at
least two reasons: first, there is always a certain amount of continu-
ing process within the system which provides an impulse for change of
state and, secondly, there is supposedly always an element of flux in
the external situation which tends to throw the system continually off
balance. In short, the "dynamic equilibrium" of a social system is
not so much a matter of a system remaining always in a stable state
as it is of the system having the capacity to achieve some stability
after each minor disturbance.[5] The dominant tendency is towards sta-
bility within the system as maintained through mechanisms of social
control which serve the equilibrating function in Parsons' theoretical
scheme. The central focus is on tension reduction and functionalism
rather than tension production and disorder.[6] The unit of analysis
in the structural-functionalist social system is the status-role.[7]
Status refers to the location of the individual and role is essentially
what the individual does in that position. Inasmuch as each person
occupies a number of different statuses, the organized system of stat-
uses and roles which can be attributed to the particular individual con-
stitute his identity as a social actor. In turn, systems of statuses
are combined into "collectivities" which are "partial social systems,"
each of which is composed of particular interactive roles. A network
of such collectivities is seen as constituting a complex social system.
It is what Parsons refers to as the concept of "institutionalization"

which ties a complex system together -- meaning that actions of the individuals involved in the social system (the "social actors") are guided by shared and internalized values.[8] These shared values held by the social actors within the system are the "glue" that holds the system together and although perfect integration within the system is never found empirically, it is the mode of normative integration which has been sketched above that Parsons regards as fundamental in all actual social systems.

While dysfunctions are viewed as existing within the system and are seen as potentially persisting for long periods of time, they are treated by Parsons as tending to resolve themselves or to be institutionalized in the long run. Change is regarded as occurring in a generally gradual, adjustive manner within the system -- the "dynamic state of equilibrium" of the system.

Parsons perceives four functional problems faced by every social system, two of which have to do with relations of the system to the external environment, the others with conditions internal to the system itself. These "social needs" or "functional prerequisites" of the system arise out of social interaction and not out of the peculiar nature of the social actors constituting the system. Parsons argues that every social system must solve four functional problems in order for the system to exist as an independent entity.[9]

The first "functional prerequisite" relates to the instrumental problems of goal attainment. Essentially, this refers to the coordination of activities in such a way that a system moves toward whatever goals it has set itself. Second, there are the problems of adaptation to the external situation of the system. Included in these are not only the problems of coming to terms with the environment but also the active manipulation of either the environment or the system itself. Third, there are the internal problems of integration referring to the relations of individual social actors in the system to one another and the problem of establishing and maintaining a level of solidarity or cohesion among them. Finally, there are the related problems of pattern maintenance and tension management. Both are concerned with conditions internal to the system itself which have consequences for system functioning. The problem of pattern maintenance and tension management is essentially that faced by the social actor in reconciling the various norms and demands imposed by his participation in any particular subsystem with those of other sub-systems in which he also participates.

Parsons has applied this type of scheme to role differentiation within social systems. For example, in the systems of the family, a husband-father is viewed as the specialist in the instrumental function relative to the interactions of the family with the external environment while the wife-mother is the specialist in the expressive or social-emotional areas concerned with relations internal to the family. Also,

this scheme has been applied in terms of analyzing structural differen-
tiation among social sub-systems in the same larger system or society.
That is, Parsons argues that for each of the four functional problems
of the social system of society, there will be a corresponding "func-
tional sub-system" of the society.

    Parsons argues that the economy is the adaptive sub-system of the
society. That is, economic institutions are primarily developed to
deal with adaptive problems faced by the social system. With respect
to problems of pattern maintenance and tension management, the family
is regarded as primary although other sub-systems are also seen as play-
ing a part. Because it is the major socializing agency of society and
as a result of the extent to which it plays a part in the day to day
management of tension, Parsons sees the family as having primacy in
dealing with the pattern maintenance and tension management system needs
while educational institutions, religious groupings, and hospitals are
secondarily included. Goal attainment problems fall within the primacy
of the state, polity, or, more specifically, the government. In short,
the task of defining system goals and moving toward them is primarily
the delegated responsibility of government. The integrative sub-sys-
tem is the most diffuse of all and is divided among the state, the
church, and many other structures about which important cultural values
are focused.

    According to Parsons, each of the functional sub-systems of a so-
ciety can itself be analyzed as a social system with its own system prob-
lems. This point has been previously alluded to relative to the dis-
cussion of the role differentiation within the family. Thus for each
of the sub-systems, the other sub-systems are viewed as the most signi-
ficant part of the environment and all of the sub-systems are regarded
as having interchanges with one another. This is what Parsons has re-
ferred to as the "inherent relativity" in this frame of reference. Any
element is seen as relative to the system within which it is viewed,
while the system itself is relative to the system or systems within
which it acts as an element.

    Diagrammed in crux form, Parsons' scheme resembles the following:

Intra-Societal Functions	Sub-System
Pattern Maintenance and Tension Management	Family
Integration	State, Church
Goal Attainment	Polity
Adaptation	Economy

CRITICAL COMMENTS
    It would be an enormous tasks to systematically deal with all of
the criticisms which have been directed toward the structural function-

alists. Instead, the aim here will be to briefly identify some of the major types of criticisms which have been made.

A general point made against the structural functionalist orientation is that it reflects a conservative ideological bias in favor of the dominant institutions of the particular social system or society under consideration.[10]

Related to the charge of a conservative ideological bias is the criticism pointing to the inability of the structural functionalist approach to handle the problem of social conflict and change. It is argued that while mature organisms, by the very nature of their organization, cannot change their given structure beyond very narrow limits, this capacity is precisely what distinguishes social systems.[11] Dahrendorf, for example, has noted that there is a primary emphasis placed upon value consensus within the social system and consequently there is an inability of this viewpoint to allow for structurally generated conflicts.[12] The concept of dysfunction, from this criticism, is seen as a residual one which has been thrown in after the fact and is unable to explain serious conflicts in the structure of particular social systems.

Related to the issue of change and conflict is the charge of the "over-socialized" conception of the individual found in structural functionalist theory. The individual is viewed as essentially a social creature depending entirely upon training provided by, and experienced in, the social system. The almost total malleability of the individual is stressed, so that, in principal, conflicts between the individual and the group are totally eliminated.

Parsons has also been charged with failing to delineate specifically what constitutes a "dynamic" or "moving" equilibrium.[13] In this connection, Sprott[14] has noted that the emphasis of the systems theorists upon equilibrium is implicitly illogical and infers disequilibrium rather than the converse, as a consequence of the fact that a constant tendency towards equilibrium presupposes original imbalances away from which the system moves. To operationally define the equilibrium of the system under consideration raises a whole host of problems. Unless one can state with some precision what the defining conditions of the systemic equilibrium are, there would not seem to be any way to pin the abstraction down to empirical reality. Furthermore, to argue as Parsons does that there is a strain toward equilibrium within the social system is to posit a hypothesis that can only be examined on empirical evidence applicable to the particular case. Social phenomena may or may not illustrate homeostatic tendencies at any given time or place — the issue is ultimately an empirical one.[15]

Hemple has questioned the very nature of the "functional indispensability" of any particular social or cultural phenomena and he notes that, "in all concrete cases of application, there do seem to exist alternatives."[16] Along this line Bendix and Berger argue that

every social phenomena has consequences for both the continued adaptation and impairment of the social structure.[17] As opposed to this view, the Parsonian framework argues for an either/or function or dysfunction for the particular social fact of the system. In addition, Bendix and Berger have noted that the concept of system boundaries is open to serious questions on the grounds that because we are not able to specify the limits of what is possible in society, we are unable to define the boundaries of a system.

STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONALISM IN SOCIAL WORK

Howard W. Polsky has written extensively from a structural functionalist perspective on problems related to the residential treatment of children and adolescents. Polsky's first published work,[18] while not making direct use of a systems approach, can be seen as setting the theoretical stage for the use of systems theory in all of his later publications. The central finding of the "Cottage Six" study was a demonstration of the negative effects of the peer sub-culture upon the formal goals of the residential treatment unit and the consequent extent to which the institution unwittingly supported the deviant values of this peer group. Essentially, then, Polsky's study focused upon the relationship between the informal peer group culture and the formal goals and values of the larger and official institutional culture. The extent to which he found that the dominant reference group for the youth was the informal, as opposed to formal and official goals and values of the institution, led him into the use of the Parsonian framework from which to theoretically understand the social relationships of the residential unit and the manner in which these relationships effect and are effected by the treatment goals.

In a later publication,[19] Polsky explicitly formulated his systems perspective and pointed to the utility of this framework for understanding the cottage system as well as for guiding practice skills in the direction of "neutralizing" the deviant values of the peer group and replacing them with more positive ones. The language and concepts of Parsonian systems theory are made explicit in this paper by Polsky. Thus, he defines a "social system" as, "a distinctive entity of interdependent parts (statuses)...[20] and further, he notes;

By social system is meant a boundary-maintaining interdependence of parts that make up a whole in moving equilibrium. A system must be distinguished from an entity: a system consists of parts that are in some way different from one another in nature or function; these parts must be coordinated if the system is to maintain itself as a system rather than a collection or congeries. Social systems are supported by mutual orientations of their interacting actors and by the internalization of relevant values. 21

In both of these "definitions" the Parsonian concept of "system" can be noted. For as was noted earlier, in Parsons' treatment the unit of analysis in the social system is the status-role and a system of statuses constitute a collectivity or sub-system out of which is formed the social system. Polsky directly adopts this conceptualization in the above quotations. These quotations also reflect the emphasis on the _interdependence_ of the status relationships constituting the system, the emphasis on "_boundaries_," the phenomenon of "_moving equilibrium_," along with the stress placed upon the _common value orientations_ which have been _internalized_ by the social factors and which function to _support_ the system. All of these concepts stem directly from Parsons' scheme. While Polsky uses the concept of "moving equilibrium" and Parsons that of "dynamic equilibrium," the difference is more semantic than substantive.

By using the notion of the "functional prerequisites" of the system as formulated by the functionalists, Polsky develops a systems paradigm for analyzing the interactions which occur in a residential treatment unit. The paradigm is a four-fold scheme based on a two way axis of internal, external, and instrumental, expressive. The system is conceived as having both _external_ dimensions — "in order for a system to maintain equilibrium it has to be able to adapt facilities in the environment to achieve goals and gain satisfaction[22]— and _internal_ dimensions —"...it must be able to resolve frictions and tensions satisfactorily."[23] Combined with these dimensions are those relating to the functions of the system — the task oriented or _instrumental function_ of the system which relates to the achievement of system goals and the _expressive function_ relating to the resolution of problems arising within the system.

Summarizing the scheme, Polsky identifies four functional "needs" of any social system: the _external expressive_, resolving environmental problems; _external instrumental_, the achievement of environmental goals; _internal instrumental_, achieving internal equilibrium of the system; and _internal expressive_, reolution of internal tensions.

Diagrammed:

	External System	Internal System
Instrumental	Ext. - Instr.	Int. - Instr.
Expressive	Ext. - Exp.	Int. - Exp.

The paradigm proposed by Polsky can be seen as essentially amounting to the Parsonian paradigm of the functional prerequisites of the social system. In turn, the scheme is applied to the basic problems associated with the negative influence of the peer sub-culture upon the formal treatment goals of the residential unit. In his later work Polsky has brought this scheme to full Parsonian bloom.

-487-

In two later publications, Polsky and Claster have filled in the outline of the four-fold scheme as follows:[24]

	Instrumental	Expressive
External	Adaptation	Goal Attainment
Internal	Pattern Mainten- ance and Tension Management	Integration

This scheme is then used to assess the nature of the adult-youth interactions in the residential treatment cottage social system. Polsky argues that each of the four cross-classifications can be regarded as a key function arising out of the role assumed by the adult staff member in his interaction with the youth. Thus the system "need" or function of adaptation corresponds to the adult role of monitor, custodian, or supervisor; goal attainment is regarded as corresponding to the adult role of counselor, guide, or teacher; pattern maintenance and tension management corresponds to the role of nurturer, comforter, and supporter; the integration function corresponds to the friend, mediator, judge role.[25] The scheme is presented as follows:

	Instrumental	Expressive
External	System Need-Adapta- tion Functional Role- Monitor	System Need - Goal Attain- ment Functional Role- Guide
Internal	System Need-Patt. Maint. Functional Role- Supporter	System Need- Integration Functional Role- Friend

More analytically, the scheme is presented by Polsky and Claster as follows:[26]

INSTITUTION

	Instrumental	Expressive
External	Adaptation "Monitor Role"	Goal Attainment "Guide" Role

COTTAGE

	Instrumental	Expressive
Internal	Pattern Maintenance "Supporter" Role	Integration "Friend" Role

Essentially, the "monitor" role relates to an orientation by the adult toward the youth relating to complying with the regulations of the larger institution. From the diagram it can be noted that the adult staff role of "monitor" corresponds with the external-instrumental functional system "need" of adaptation. Similarly, the role of "guide" relates to helping the child formulate and work towards particular goals which are compatible both with his perceived needs and the values of the institution. Both of these role relationships— "Monitor" and "Guide" — relate to the relationship of the social system of the cottage unit with the external social system of the larger institution in which it is situated. The two functional needs of pattern maintenance and tension management and integration are correspondingly related to the functional roles of "supporter" and "friend." Both are seen as contributing to the maintenance of the internal system — i.e. the social system of the cottage unit. The role of "supporter" characterizes the nurturing role of the adult insofar as he enables the youth to function within the system of the cottage unit. Finally, the integrative function is fulfilled by the adult assuming the role of a "friend" in the form of an informal relationship — i.e. in such forms as informal conversations directed toward no specific goal.

By analytically breaking down the various role functions performed by the adult directly involved in working with youth in institutional settings, Polsky argues that one is able to more effectively analyze the total function of the institutional setting as manifested in the role of the cottage worker. As he puts it:

Uncovering the complex interplay of functions underlying an apparent unitary role enables us to develop a more comprehensive picture of the dynamics, conflicts, and potentialities of the cottage worker's role.

Polsky also argues that the particular roles which are emphasized will largely determine the nature of the ongoing interaction between the adults and the youth, largely determine the nature of the interplay between the informal and formal cultures, and consequently affect the treatment atmosphere of the cottage.

While the scheme is presented in a structural manner and does seem to imply relative stability, Polsky's orientation is toward perceiving the dynamic nature of the theoretical scheme. That is, while any particular child care worker may, at any one point in time, be interacting with a youth on the basis of one of the functional roles, superordinately that child care worker should be flexibly shifting from one role to another vis-a-vis the particular situation of the specific children with whom he is interacting. In turn, the actual extent to which each particular role is manifested by different child care workers within any one institutional setting will, it is argued, affect the nature of the cottage sub-culture.

Looking more critically at the systems paradigm and the uses to which it is put by Polsky and Claster, a number of concerns present themselves. First, it should be noted that in the original formulation of the paradigm of system "needs" or functional prerequisites, Parsons and his colleagues held that maximizing efforts to resolve one of the problems, intensified one of the other problems.[28] That is, it is postulated that resolving adaptation problems will increase problems of integration, the resolution of goal attainment will intensify the problem of general pattern maintenance, and the converse is also seen as true. For example, in a decision making group when the members cooperate in assessing information (adaptation) prior to making a decision (goal attainment), they will strain their personal relationships (integration), and temporarily prevent each other from fulfilling other needs and goals (pattern maintenance and tension management). In short, the interrelations of the system is stressed through the dynamic interplay between the four functional problems. However, in Polsky and Claster's use of the paradigm this interplay between the system needs appears to have been lost. Nowhere is the reader presented with an indication of the "connectedness" of the system needs to each other. The closest the authors come to this point is in their discussion of a cottage system's overemphasis on a particular orientation and the effects this is likely to have on the general quality of the cottage atmosphere or culture. For example, overemphasis on the adaptation function and the "monitor" role is likely to result in a custodially oriented cottage system. However, the question then arises; what of overemphasizing the "guide" role of the goal attainment need; will this result in effects upon the pattern maintenance function and the "supporter" role? According to Parsons' work this would seem to be the result. Polsky and Claster do not relate to this at all. We must assume, however, that such an event would be forthcoming.

In later sections of their book,[29] Polsky and Claster briefly allude to a scheme for differentiating the major types of child care worker role orientations. And in a more recent work,[30] Polsky has more extensively dealt with this scheme and has related his analysis much more in the direction of focusing on the problematics of values and of change in the cottage system. The scheme is presented as follows:[31]

	High (1,9)		(9,9)	
concern for youth autonomy, maximizing peer group initiative and involvement		(1,1)		(1,9)
	Low			High

concern for production, goal consumption

Although Polsky does not refer to any theoretical connections between this scheme and his earlier systems model, it would appear that he has, for all intent and purposes, retained the earlier scheme in modified form. Essentially, what he seems to have done is to reduce the four functional needs of the system to two axis of a graph, each of which contain two role orientations or functional needs. One axis contains the adaptation and pattern maintenance functions — now reformulated as the "concern for production and goal consumption." The vertical axis can now be seen as combining the goal attainment and integration spheres which are now called "concern for youth autonomy, maximizing peer group initiative and involvement." While Polsky has changed the labels and modified the scheme to emphasize role orientations of workers, the essential thrust of the scheme remains the same.

Several further features of this paper by Polsky should be noted, all would seem to be themes that run through his earlier work as well. First, after Parsons, Polsky makes the basic assumption that as social systems, society or social groups are held together or made possible through the existence of common norms which, in effect, regulate the "war of all against all." Durkheim's question, "How is society possible?," is answered through an emphasis on common normative patterns. These patterns, in turn, are seen as deriving from the processes of socialization. As was previously indicated, Parsons has made this point quite explicit in his work. Polsky adopts this perspective throughout all of his published work dealing with a systems framework. As he puts it:

> The selective reception of input is governed foremost by the
> underlying values of the members composing the social system
> which insures a stability of their interaction in interde-
> pendent events, the basic stuff of human systems. 32

and further, we are informed:

> The ultimate hold, however, upon the members are the system
> norms, the justification and idealization of its functions
> and a common acceptance of the rules to get the job done.
> These norms emerge out of the social experience and culture
> of the larger society into which members are born and so-
> cialized, principally by parents and their surrogates. 33

Thus the reader is told that the orderly processes which occur in the social system are not to be attributed primarily to the contemporary social structure of the system but, instead, to the fact that individuals in the system have at some time in the past — in childhood — internalized the roles and norms of the system. While this type of explanation certainly has a degree of plausibility for the institutionalized aspects of society, it seems doubtful whether it can serve as more than a partial explanation for the problematic and changing aspects of the system. From this perspective, change in the system is treated and defined

largely as a by-product of the malfunctioning of social control mechanisms. Conflict and change come to be regarded as "pathological" consequences arising out of certain dysfunctional aspects of the system and the focus is then on the means by which control is to be restored. The functional consequences of social conflict[34] are largely ignored as is the fact that dissensus and conflict are simultaneously generated out of the structural conditions of the social system.[35]

It should also be noted that while Polsky has been relatively consistent in his use of the Parsonian framework, some modifications can be detected over the course of his various publications. Thus, while in his original work he emphasized a "closed system,"[36] Polsky has more recently noted that, "it is dangerous to assume explicitly or implicitly a closed system."[37] Moreover, in contrast to his earlier work in which he used the concepts of "function" and "dysfunction" in a loose evaluative sense, in his more recent work Polsky makes quite explicit the normative problem of who is to say what individual or organizational needs are functional or dysfunctional for the particular system under consideration. Thus while he notes that:

Evaluating social arrangements as functional or dysfunctional is equivalent to classifying them as normal or pathological.[38]

he also notes:

Making judgments about the functioning of the system and the human needs that are being served by it, I well realize, presupposes a whole catalog of assumptions...[39]

Polsky is thus well aware of the nature of the evaluative problem. Being aware, the way is then open for him to specify objective criteria of what is to be considered as "functional" or "dysfunctional" for the particular system under consideration. He seems to fail in this by presenting the rather vague and abstract concept of "maximizing individual autonomy" as the crucial differentiating factor. The subjective nature of this concept and the consequent lack of specific empirical referents makes it appear as rather worthless. It can, quite literally, mean anything to anybody.

The fact that Polsky has directly adopted the Parsonian framework from which to view the "needs" and structure of the residential cottage system leaves him open to a number of the criticisms levied against Parsons. It is evident from his increased sophistication in the use of this model that he is aware of the criticisms and has attempted to modify his scheme in the direction of taking them more fully into account. However, there still remains the fact that Polsky's scheme is rife with anthropomorphisms in the form of the system "seeking" equilibrium, and having "needs." Furthermore, Polsky's work tends to emphasize stability and structure over the processual nature of social reality. While Parsons has ingeniously attempted to answer this criticism by arguing that all theory construction inherently entails a

process of "mythologization" in which the investigator must abstract from the empirical world,[40] he seems to lose sight of the fact that while theory construction may indeed be viewed as a process of "mythologization" this does not necessarily mean that the "connectedness" of phenomena or the rendering of them as essentially static need necessarily follow. In short, the processual nature of social reality can be treated on a theoretical level without being made static.

CONCLUSION

The most general feature of the structural functionalist systems approach is the emphasis placed upon the unitary or holistic nature of particular phenomena under investigation. The emphasis is on a synthetic orientation as opposed to one which is more analytic in nature. Viewing the profession of social work from this orientation one would not perceive discrete, largely air-tight compartments of casework, group work, community organization, administration, research, education, and so on, but instead would look to a more holistic conception of social work. Thus the logic of the systems approach leads away from increasing differentiation within the profession and in the direction of a unified, social work process which can be traced throughout the various sub-fields. Hearn has explicitly related to this point:

> ...if individuals, groups, and communities can all be regarded as systems, and if there are certain properties common to them all, it seems likely that there may also be certain common principles that define their operation and that the latter may form a part, at least, of a unified conception of social work. [41]

As Hearn brings out in the above statement, the systems principle of perceiving commonalities in terms of principles of organization from the level of the individual through the levels of the group, the community, and the larger social order, leaves the way open for a unified conception of the social work process which, in turn, has relevance for the methods of casework, family treatment, group work, community organization, and administration. This holistic type of orentation, however, directly entails the basic assumption that elements of social phenomena cannot be regarded as isolated from one another but must be seen as ultimately linked through a network of relationships. The social work analyst or practitioner must assume the relatedness of all phenomena — tinkering in one place has reverberations across space and time. The focus is on the systemic relations of elements rather than on the nature of an element, in and of itself, in a relationship. Thus the use of the systems perspective should sensitize the worker to the possibility that a change in one part of the system may have effects in another part due to the interdependence of the system ele-

ments. Moreover, the consequences of the changes effected may be nei-
ther linear or desirable in nature. That is, a change strategy injec-
ted into the system may have cumulative or amplified undesirable ef-
fects in certain parts of the system while having minimal effects in
other parts. As a glaring example of this process in the form of a
national change strategy -- the "war on poverty" -- we can note the
host of unanticipated consequences arising out of the implementattion
of the "maximum feasible participation" clause in the Economic Oppor-
tunity Act of 1964.[42] It should be noted, however, that the desired
changes may be brought about in one part of the system, not only by
focusing directly upon it but also by the alteration of more distantly
removed elements. Thus, in effect, systems analysis directs attention
to the multiple possibilities of intervention into the system with
respect to solving a particular constellation of problems.

In itself, as has been noted, the structural-functionalist scheme
tends to overstress the stable properties of social life. On the other
hand, the conflict view of social life espoused by such theorists as
Marx and Dahrendorf tends to over-stress the instability and disinte-
grative aspects of social systems. Rather than being necessarily anti-
thetical views, these can, as Dahrendorf has noted,[43] be seen as com-
plementary views of social reality. Thus, for example, in Polsky's
use of the Parsonian framework, by incorporating the disjuntive ele-
ments of the system into the analysis the reader could be provided
with a more coherent and "realistic" assessment of the total configura-
tion of elements which go to make up the system of the residential
treatment unit. The consensual and dissensual, the stability and in-
stability, the integrative and disintegrative elements of the unit
would then be more fully elaborated. Also the extent to which conflict
contributes to the integration of the system and the extent to which
consensus can prevent integration would be more amenable to empirical
analysis. As it is, Polsky completely omits such considerations from
his work. Thus, while his analysis of the social system of the resi-
dential cottage until is insightful, it is also one-sided. A goal for
social work theory is to combine into a balanced theoretical perspec-
tive both aspects of the empirical world with relevant intervention
strategies based upon such a synthesis.

Most generally, then, the structural functionalist variant of sys-
tems theory would seem to have great relevance for the development of
a social work model in the form of focusing upon the contextual "system"
in which the social phenomena under consideration occur. This attempt
to focus on the contemporaneous interrelatedness of phenomena bears
quite obvious connection to Kurt Lewin's "field theory." In his terms,
field theory analysis proceeds not by picking out one or another iso-
lated element within a situation, the importance of which cannot be
judged without consideration of the situation as a whole, but rather by

starting with a characterization of the situation as a whole. Watz-
lawick, and his co-authors have put this well:

> ...a phenomenon remains unexplainable as long as the range
> of observation is not wide enough to include the context
> in which the phenomenon occurs. Failure to realize the
> intricacies of the relationships between an event and the
> matrix in which it takes place, between an organism and its
> environment, either confronts the observer with something
> "mysterious" or induces him to attribute to his object of
> study certain properties the object may not possess. 44

And in a very different context, Roszak has related to this necessity
for "global vision:"

> Our habit is to destroy this receptive peripheral vision
> in favor of particularistic scrutiny. We are convinced
> that we learn more in this way about the world. And, af-
> ter a fashion we do...We learn what one learns by scru-
> tinizing the trees and ignoring the forest, by scrutini-
> zing the cells and ignoring the organism, by scrutinizing
> the detailed minutiae of experience and ignoring the
> whole that gives the constituent parts their greater
> meaning. In this way we become ever more learnedly stu-
> pid. Our experience dissolves into a congeries of iso-
> lated puzzles, losing its overall grandeur. 45

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CONFLICT THEORIES AND SOCIAL WORK EDUCATION

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How one defines the world has consequences for one's actions in
the world. Sociology has attempted to utilize the scientific method
to help human beings understand their social world. However, in the
process of its development, sociology has reflected the ideological bi-
as of its practitioners. (Mills, 1943). Irving Zeitlin (1968, pp. vii)
claims "Much of classical sociology arose within the context of a debate
- first with eighteenth-century thought of the Enlightenment, and later
with its true heir of the nineteenth century, Karl Marx."
     The central theme of this paper is that social work education makes
extensive use of conflict theory in selecting the social science con-
cepts we teach. The concepts are selected to fit the practice technol-
ogy, which developed prior to the formalization of social work educa-
tion. The conflict theories most prevalent in social work education
are direct descendents of the "conflict ideology developed in the name
of business groups in modern society...which lies close to the main-
stream of sociological development - Social Darwinism" (Martindale,
1960). Social Darwinism is a polemic with the conflict ideology devel-
oped in the name of the proletariat-Marxism."
     We further maintain that the derivatives of Social Darwinism are
an integral part of the prevailing ideas of society and reflect the
continuing debate with Marxism.
     We will explore briefly the contrasting positions of Marxism and
the mainstream sociology in the areas of stratification theories, aliena-
tion, and power and politics. Throughout we contend that we select from
the body of social science theory and ideology those concepts which
provide an intellectual rationale for our existing practice skills and
technology.
     A critical aspect in understanding the contrasting views of the
world between Marxism and the mainstream of sociological theories is
how the human being is defined in each of these frameworks.
     Mainstream sociology is the heir of the Newtonian world view: "the
image of the great machine itself, and the expulsion of man from the
center of the stage - from an active part in the drama - to a seat in
the audience and the passive role of spectator. The full meaning of

this tableau was that man disappeared from the world as subject in order
to reappear as object." He became as Floyd Matson (1966) notes "The
Broken Image." Inherent in this view was "the belief that the behavior
of the individual human being is the product of circumstances beyond
his control and is therefore at bottom involuntary, irresponsible and
mechanical." (Matson, 1966 pp. 21) The English sociologist, Herbert
Spencer, represents the Social Darwinist school based on faith in evolu-
tion and in the survival of the fittest.

"The ultimate development of the ideal man is logically certain as
any conclusion in which we place the most implicit faith: for instance
that all men will die. Progress, therefore, is not an accident but a
necessity. Instead of civilization being artificial, it is a part of
nature; all of a piece with the development of the embryo or the un-
folding of a flower." (Matson, 1966 pp. 23) The faith in the evolu-
tionary process as providing progress in society is part of the mythol-
ogy of American Thought.

Simultaneously with his belief in the inevitability of progress
of civilization, Spencer saw the "natural process of conflict and sur-
vival operate as a kind of biologically purifying process resulting
in the survival of the fittest." (Martindale, 1960)

Building upon the inevitability of progress coupled with a deep
faith in the rightness of things as they were, William Graham Sumner,
the American sociologist, regarded as absurd attempts to make the world
over. "There can be no rights against Nature except to get out of her
whatever we can, which is only the fact of the struggle for existence
stated over again." Natural rights and moral values were only the
"rules of the game of Social competition which are current now and
here." (Matson, 1966, pp. 24) Both Spencer and Sumner defined the
human being as self-seeking, competitive and concerned with his/her own
survival. Self-interest was the motivating force for the individual.

Two quotations from Sumner will illustrate how these ideas are
currently in vogue in sociological theories.

"Capital is only formed by self-denial, and if the possession of
it did not secure advantages and superiorities of a high order men would
never submit to what is necessary to get it." (Hofstadter, 1959)

"The millionaires are a product of natural selection, acting on
the whole body of men to pick out those who can meet the requirement
of certain work to be done...It is because they are thus selected that
wealth — both their own and that entrusted to them — aggregate under
their hands...They may fairly be regarded as the naturally selected
agents of society for certain work. They get high wages and live in
luxury, but the bargain is a good one for society. There is the in-
terest competition for their place and occupation. This assures us
that all who are competent for this function will be employed in it,
so that the cost of it will be reduced to the lowest terms." (Hofstad-
ter, 1959)

The modern heir of the first quotation is to be found in the Davis-Moore theory of Social Stratification.

"One may ask what kind of rewards a society has at its disposal in distributing its personnel and securing essential services...It must concern itself with motivation at two different levels: to instill in the proper individuals the desire to fill certain positions and, once in these positions, the desire to perform the duties attached to them...Inevitably, a society must have, first, some kind of rewards that it can use as inducements and second some way of distributing these rewards differentially according to positions." (Davis and Moore, 1945).

The heir to the second quotation is to be found in the concept of meritocracy. (Mankoff, 1974)

Kristol currently argues that there is a relationship between ability, on the one hand, and economic inequality on the other. "Human talents and abilities, as measured, do distribute themselves along a bell-shaped curve. Moreover, it is a demonstrable fact that in all modern bourgeois societies, the distribution of income is also along a bell-shaped curve, indicating that in such an "open" society the inequalities that do emerge are not inconsistent with the bourgeois notion of equality." (1972)

It is possible to continue at great length to demonstrate that much of mainstream sociology is related to the conservative individualistic conflict-competitive theories of Spencer-Sumner Social Darwinism.

Contrast Marx position to that of the Social Darwinistic conflict theories.

Marx defined the human being as self-creative and as creator of the social world through his labors. He noted that the individual could not in his/her struggle with nature, conquer it alone. Individuals must labor together in order to satisfy their needs. Work is therefore a social activity based on cooperation. (Marx and Engels, 1947)

The Marxist conception of the class structure is based on the relationships of the people to the means of production. It is a structural concept which focuses attention on how society is organized rather than on individual achievements. In addition the Marxist concept of social class is social in that Marx viewed work and work relationships as social relations. Marx developed both a dichotomous and trichotomous scheme. The dichotomous scheme has variously been described as "the oppressing classes and the oppressed classes," "the small excessively rich class and a large propertyless class of wage workers," "the propertied and the propertyless classes." In the trichotomous scheme he referred to the capitalist class which owns large scale means of production so as sufficient to make possible the employment of hired labor; the proletariat...which owns no means of production whatsoever and the polit boureoisie who dispose of the means of produc-

tion on a modest scale. At another time he saw the middle class as consisting of those who "possess their own means of production and themselves make use of them." (Ossowski, 1970)

The current debate with Marx on social class, i.e. stratification theory in America, has been summarized as follows: "The ideology of students of American stratification has remained optimistic, individualistic and evolutionary. Belief that the stratification system selects for mobility those who are biologically and socially most fit has generally prevailed since the inception of the discipline. Sociologists have also believed that rates of occupational mobility have tended to verify the dominant ideology because the relatively high rates have reduced extremes of economic, social and political inequality and have created a middle-class society." (Pease, Form, Ryteria, 1970)

The individualistic ideology that emphasizes the selection of the most fit for mobility is a direct lineal descendant of Social Darwinism. The emphasis on biopsychic approaches to understanding the roots of economic inequalities, which suggests that economic inequality is largely dependent upon the psychological disposition or genetic endowment of the lower classes is a direct polemic with Marx. (Banfield, 1970; Jensen, 1969; Herrnstein, 1971)

Another area where considerable debate continues concerns the concept of alienation. We consider alienation a part of the conflict theory because Marx originally developed the concept to deal with the personal and social consequences of the capitalist mode of production. There are several important characteristics which differentiate the Marxist and mainstream sociological meaning of alienation. The Marxist theory of alienation is structurally related. The main dimensions of Marx theory of alienation involve the fact that the worker lacks control over the disposal of his products, that he is treated as a commodity to be bought and sold on the market, work becomes a means to an end rather than an end itself, —the end being the opportunity to develop freely his mental and physical energies, social relationships tend to be reduced to the operations of the market, they are built on the basis of money and finally men are estranged from the ties to society. (Giddens, 1971)

Marx view of human nature focused upon the self-creating aspects of labor. It is by means of work that humanity comes to create its essential, self-defining characteristics. The products of labor, as well as labor activities, are extensions of his own nature. Alienation is the condition in which man's productive activities and the products of these activities exercise control over him, rather than providing him a means for the development of human potential through the simultaneous processes of self-creation and world creation. This condition, Marx contends, is endemic to the capitalist mode of production. (Plasek, 1974)

Marx concept of alienation is also a criticism of the reification of the self-interest ethic and the essentially psychological and atomistic interpretation of man and society. (Horton, 1964)

American mainstream sociology, which is positivisitic and empirical oriented is "microsociology dealing with definite, well-delineated problems but not with society at large." (Israel, 1971) Israel notes that in the psychologically oriented definitions of alienation, the social structure of society is often accepted in its current shape. The focus is on individual social adjustments and that alienation is frequently implicitly perceived as a lack of social adjustment. Whereas Marx focused on the social structure as the source of alienation, mainstream sociology focuses on individual adjustment or lack of adjustment as the source of alienation.

The major theoretical work in alienation in American sociology is that of Melvin Seeman (1959). Although claiming to adhere to the Marxian view, Seeman transfers his analysis to a social-psychological level rather than the sociological social process, social structural level of Marx's analysis. This shift moves the analysis to individual expectations, perceptions and values concerning certain elements of the individual's life situation. Thus, the approach becomes a subjective experiential one. The five dimensions of Seeman's concept of alienation and their definition will suffice to illustrate this point.

1) Powerlessness - the expectancy or probability held by the individual that his own behavior cannot determine the occurrence of the outcomes or reinforcements he seeks.

2) Meaninglessness - the individual is unclear as to what he ought to believe - when the individual's minimal standards for clarity in decision-making are not met.

3) Normlessness - high expectancy that socially unapproved behaviors are required to achieve given goals.

4) Isolation - assign low reward value to goals or beliefs that are typically highly valued in the given society.

5) Self-estrangement - a loss of intrinsic meaning or pride in work - the degree of dependence of the given behavior upon anticipated future rewards. (Seeman, 1959)

In the area of alienation we see again the critical difference between a social structured view and an individualistic view. The individualistic view, it is our contention, is a derivative of the conservative individual competition-conflict ideology of Social Darwinism.

Social work education in selecting Seeman's definition of alienation shifts its focus from the structurally induced sources of alienation to the individual's psychological reaction to the social structure. Within this orientation, we are able to differentiate those who have adjusted to society and those who are maladjusted. We feel better prepared to deal with individual's psychological reactions than with the

social structure. Thus our helping technology dictates the theoretical
orientation we use in the area of alienation.

The last area we will briefly discuss relates to power and con-
flict. Marx theory places emphasis on the economic structure of so-
ciety as the basis for political power. He postulates the existence
of ruling elite based on the ownership of the means of production.
The issue of the existence of a ruling elite has become one of the
main points of debate between Marxist and liberal-conservative sociol-
ogists. One need only recall the Floyd Hunter (1953)-Robert Dahl (1961)
exchanges or the work of C. Wright Mills (1956), William G. Domhoff
(1967, 1974), David Turman (1951), Charles Lindblom (1968), Arnold
Rose (1967) to recall that both on the local level and a national
level there is a continuous debate as to whether there exists a ruling
elite or a pluralist system. The Marxist view is that a ruling elite
does in fact exist and that it is capable of utilizing the machinery
of the state to maintain and expand their own benefits. The pluralist
view is that interest groups compete with each other in the decision-
making process, that no one group is strong enough to gain complete
power or control; that the result is an incremental allocative strategy
in which some needs are met, but not all.

Although conflict is inherent in the pluralist theory, the con-
flict is routinized and more peaceful because the groups abide by a
unifying theme or "value system." The theory posits the existence of
changing coalitions which may come together on a particular issue and
disband on other issues. There are no permanent coalitions capable of
exerting undue control over the decision-making process.

The consequences of the pluralist theory are:

1) It denies the existence of a ruling class capable of exerting
undue power.

2) The concept of multi-interest groups denies the existences of
a class structure in the Marxist sense.

3) The element of coercion is minimized to the degree that no
one group has control of the decision-making process.

4) Interest groups which may coalesce around one issue may oppose
each other on other issues.

Marxist conflict theory requires social workers to recognize the
existence of an exploited propertyless class whose members are experi-
encing social and economic inequities not because of some weakness in
their character, personality, culture, genetic endowment, or moral
standards, but because of the nature of the institutionalized social
structure.

Pluralistic conflict theory permits the social worker not to iden-
tify with any particular class since none exist, only multiple interest
groups. The theory allows for "issues" to become paramount and thus
permits social workers to appear neutral insofar as social class is

concerned, but to champion worthy causes.

One of the major consequences of the conflict theories based on the individualistic Social Darwinist ideologies of Spencer and Sumner is the development of a group of theories which attempt to explain the difficulties people have as being rooted in some aspect of personal deficiency, i.e. psychological, genetic, cultural or biological. The implications of these theories are that the institutional arrangements of society are sound. The technology required of the "individual deficiency model" is individual remedial work.

A few illustrations that emanate from these ideologies may suffice to demonstrate this assertion.

1) The Culture of Poverty Theory:

This theory does not take into account the relative stability of the inequitable distribution of economic resources over the years, but stresses the fact that people are poor because their "culture" maintains them in poverty. (Kolko, Gabriel, 1962; Miller, 1971) Studies of the characteristics of lower class people have highlighted such aspects as inability to forego immediate gratification, inability to plan ahead, poor motivation, etc. (Lewis, 1966) Cne can hear discussions of whether these characteristics are adaptations to their social situations or the causes of their social situation. Conspicuous by its absence is any real reference to the economic structure and the inequitable distribution of resources.

2) War on Poverty Programs:

Based in part on the "culture of poverty" construct, programs such as Headstart were designed to break this cycle. People were poor because they had no marketable skill. We established job training programs for people, frequently for non-existing jobs or obsolete jobs. People were poor because they lacked sufficient education. We developed a series of compensatory educational programs. We tried to induce people to remain in school. We developed programs to encourage people to seek higher education. While all these efforts were underway, the United States Census Bureau released figures demonstrating that the median income for white families was between $2,015 to $3,179 higher than other families with identical educational achievement (New York Times, January 10, 1972).

Warren (1971) points out that our belief - value system - "which emphasizes the essential soundness of the institutional order, democratic pluralism, science, organizational reform and the principle of inducements" was so prevalent that even where assessments of the cause of the problem of people was within the institutional arrangement, our technology resulted in the development of programs designed to deliver services to the people not changing institutional arrangements. This was the conclusion of a research project involving eight Model Cities Programs.

A leading scholar in social casework notes "Concepts from the social sciences, although they permit us to describe and define the situation more richly, offer only limited prescriptions for intervention...a socially based counterpoint to the present helping technology has not yet developed (Germain, 1970). It is not very accurate to say that we have not yet developed a socially based helping technology. It is our contention that our current helping technology is in great measure based on the conservative-individualistic, competitive-conflict ideology. Whether this is due to the possibility that we are captives of our own helping technology, or that we have accepted the conception of the world which belongs to the dominant group (Marx and Engels, 1947) or that we lack viable alternative helping techologies and theoretical supports is a question that requires further exploration.

What would the helping technology be based on the Marxist conflict theories awaits further development. However, before we can develop this technology, we need considerably more understanding of Marxist sociology. There are hopeful signs that social work education is beginning to address itself to this question. Last year in Atlanta there was a panel discussion on teaching a "Marxist approach to social work." At the University of Connecticut School of Social Work, there are two seminars, one on "The Radical Perspective in Social Work," the other a seminar on Marx sociology. We are aware of at least two other schools that have introduced courses dealing with Marx and modern day Marxist. In order for us to make more headway, we need to be aware, that knowingly or otherwise we are currently committed to the modern day derivatives of Social Darwinism – a conservative individualistic Conflict ideology.

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TWO PERSPECTIVES
ON ORGANIZATIONALLY-INSPIRED BARRIERS
TO INNOVATION IN SCHOOLS OF SOCIAL WORK:
SHORT AND LONG TERM STRATEGIES TO
PROMOTE NATIONAL MINORITY GROUP
REPRESENTATION*

by

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ABSTRACT

This paper focuses on conditions conceived to militate against innovation and change in organizations adhering to administrative principles found often in many workplaces. While these principles are not peculiar to schools of social work, these schools are singled out along with two related problems identified often by persons employed in these schools as ones for which few effective innovations have been implemented. These problems center upon how these schools may best achieve an adequate representation among faculty members, of minority group staff, and an adequate representation of substantive course offerings focusing upon the experiences of national minority group members. The authors suggest that several administrative principles basic to the organization of most schools of social work preclude the development of an organizational milieu capable of satisfying key work related needs of staff. Elimination of these basic organizing principles results in a more satisfying work setting that promotes quality staff relationships for all staff as well as a setting viewed to enhance the willingness of non-minority faculty to respond positively to the introduction of minority staff and content. Second, the authors propose further that

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immediate steps requiring little change in the organizing principles of schools may be taken to promote appropriate representation of both minority-related content and minority group staff. This latter strategy amounts to a short-range solution to solve problems associated with minority group representation through the manipulation of rewards viewed as associated with but not fundamentally related to the work satisfaction of social work faculty and staff. In contrast to the former strategy, this second strategy treats the basic organizing principles of these schools as a constant and, while requiring less time for implementation, does not move schools of social work toward humanistic organizational patterns.

Introduction

In recent years, many articles in the literature contained within social welfare journals and other professionally relevant published works have pointed to a fairly widespread and recalcitrant problem that has continued to defy ameliorative intervention attempts. Essentially, this problem involves adequately representing national minorities in staff roles and curricular offerings in schools of social work (Norton, 1970; Robinson, 1970; Turner, 1972; Gary, 1973). Points advanced in this paper suggest that this and other problems will remain largely unabated unless profound changes are made in what are depicted as inegalitarian and alienating principles of administrative organization. However, a short-range approach to resolving these problems that requires no fundamental attack on basic administrative principles is included in this paper. We feel that it is likely to be the best alternative in meeting employment and curricular goals if no movement away from inegalitarian organizational modes is achieved.

We decided that the best point of departure in examining this recurrent problem should focus on areas identified by working individuals as most germane to their employment satisfaction. These factors that workers themselves list as the important facilitators of individual satisfaction at work are viewed as the bases by which school organizations may dispense rewards serving as incentives for faculty members to: (1) foster their increased receptivity to the introduction and development of new minority-relevant curricular offerings; (2) facilitate their efforts to incorporate minority-relevant materials into existing curricular offerings and; (3) bolster their support of what, for most schools, are sorely needed proportionate increases in the employment of national-minority staff.

To aid our deliberations, we employed Frederick W. Herzberg's

"dual-dimensional hypothesis" of work satisfaction (Herzberg, 1959, 1966). Herzberg has suggested that the needs of workers may be dichotomized in terms of "extrinsic" and "intrinsic" factors. Extrinsic factors refer to attributes of the job such as salary, job security, quality of supervision, and other marginal properties including side payments such as fringe benefits, entitlements, etc. By contrast, the provision of intrinsic factors refers to the fundamental capacity of the work setting to provide the worker with personal esteem through challenging, meaningful, and non-static work.[1] The regulation and dispensation of rewards consistent both with one's extrinsic and intrinsic needs we view as powerful incentives when used to encourage efforts along formerly specified lines.

On first glance, it should be clear that many factors relevant to one's extrinsic needs are those that easily may be regulated by organizational decision-makers. Thus, their provision can be treated as straightforward incentives that serve as rewards to faculty members whose efforts complement that aspect of the school's mission to include minority content and to attract and retain minority faculty. On the other hand, the regulation and dispensation of rewards by organizational decision-makers compatible with meeting the intrinsic needs of individual faculty members obviously is a far more difficult quest since these latter needs cannot be met in the absence of some rather dramatic changes in the way most schools of social work--or any schools within university settings for that matter--are organized.

Our proposition--that changes in the organizing principles of most schools can themselves constitute incentives--is based on the contention that such changes would result in a milieu more favorable to the inclusion of minority content and staff. Actually implementing these might

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[1]Herzberg's thesis, as employed in this discussion, serves only as a conceptual guide and an organizing framework utilized for the presentation of our ideas. Use of this framework by no means should infer that we subscribe to all of Herzberg's ideas, nor to all implications logically derived from his framework. For example, Herzberg proposes that satisfaction with work is a function of meeting intrinsic needs while dissatisfaction results from the failure to meet the extrinsic needs of workers. In other words, failure to meet one's intrinsic needs does not result in dissatisfaction but merely an absence of satisfaction. This proposition seems to us to constitute a conceptual trap. For example, taking Herzberg's thesis to its logical conclusion could allow a worker to be described as both satisfied and dissatisfied with his work, if his intrinsic needs were met while his extrinsic needs were not. The value of Herzberg's thesis, with respect to our discussion is

be more difficult than implementation of straightforward and pragmatic extrinsic rewards, such as reasonable class schedules, class and advising loads, etc. That is because the dispensation of these rewards may be provided relatively easily by so-inclined administrative personnel and/or faculty committees empowered to grant them, while the former rewards inevitably amount to challenges against existing privilege patterns. Specifically, implementation of the former rewards requires the abolition of extant organizing principles on which existing privilege patterns are based. These points will become more self-evident as the text of the paper unfolds.

As a final introductory remark, we would like briefly to point out that in our consideration of means to promote the equitable representation of both minority faculty and minority content we endeavored to develop bases for action which fell outside the realm of arguments resting strictly or essentially on moral or ethical grounds. Second, our attention has been directed solely to how incentives may be used to promote these objectives, and not to whether or not relevant actors will or should adopt these procedures. Thus, there is no discussion here of how to persuade or lobby effectively for the implementation of these procedures. We feel such discussion best takes place within the context of the particular political realities of individual schools.

Perspective One

Meeting Intrinsic Work Needs as an Incentive

The basic concern to which this first portion of our discussion is directed is the consideration of organizational milieus that, at least theoretically, are likely to promote responsiveness among school personnel to the employment and curricular objectives previously noted. Our conjecture is based on the conviction that in order to provide incentives that meet intrinsic needs of staff employed in schools of social

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[1](Continued) that it allows the identification of two discrete conceptual domains that have a bearing on a worker's satisfaction with his job, or lack thereof. For a good summary of studies that both support and reject Herzberg's thesis, see: Valerie Bockman, "The Herzberg Controversy," Personnel Psychology, 24, No. 2 (1971). For a more detailed critique of Herzberg's thesis see: Roger McNeely, "An Examination of the Relationship of Work Satisfaction Correlates to the Worker's Conception of the Organizational Style of the Work Setting," unpublished doctoral dissertation, Brandeis University, Univ. M-Films, No. 76-16, 255.

work, dramatic changes must occur with respect to the basic organizing principles to which most of these schools adhere,

The essential tenets underlying this conviction we can specify succinctly. We believe, and some social science literature undergirds this speculation, that persons employed in settings emphasizing collaboration and mutual support rather than competition and hierarchial decision-making are more likely to respond favorably to innovations that constitute departures from status-quo operating modes. That is with specific reference to the concerns addressed in this paper, they are less likely to be intimidated by the introduction of minority faculty who arrive on a basis of equal footing and less likely to be threatened when called upon to include content in their classes alien to their own experience as members of the national-majority population. The point that schools of social work tend to be organized, as are other institutions, in accord with principles stressing competition and inegalitarian decision-making modes is a truism we do not feel it necessary to belabor. Further, and without belaboring the point, we should state that we are not implying that every majority group faculty member employed under these conditions is cosmologically narrow and intolerant. What we are suggesting is simply that such structures tend to be in themselves both hostile to innovation and reinforcing of intolerant attitudes among staff. Thus, producing appropriate changes in the administrative styles of those schools that may be characterized as competitive and inegalitarian conceivably might militate against intolerance, barriers to innovation and, in fact, enhance the potential receptiveness of faculty members to changes along employment and curricular lines.

As we continue our preliminary discussion of theoretical perspectives, we hasten to point out that we do not share the view that university settings are profoundly less alienating than other U.S. work-places in which one might be employed. That is because the organizational structure of social work schools tends to conform to administrative principles we view to be inherently alienating and thus deficient in their capacity to grant rewards compatible with needs one may characterize as "human work-needs". These needs are the "intrinsic" needs specified by Herzberg's classification schemata. Fulfillment of intrinsic needs purportedly provides individuals with strong feelings of self-worth that are requisite to good health and social functioning while failure to meet these needs often results in less than satisfying and possibly alienating outcomes. Individuals dissatisfied or alienated from their work have reduced chances for good social and health functioning and we propose correspondingly that their responsiveness to new forms of experience and different points of view is lessened.

We have developed the conviction that most schools of social work

are socially repressive organizations because they tend to conform, never absolutely but in varying degrees, to salient organizing principles associated with the "weberian" or "rationalistic" organizational model.[2] These terms are used synonymously and salient administrative dimensions associated with this model include: hierarchical decision-making; impersonal relations between staff members; and a division of labor one well may argue is in conflict with one's desire to achieve excellence at work. In schools of social work, this division of labor may be characterized best as "overgeneralization". We will define and discuss this term later.

Hierarchical decision-making in schools of social work refers mainly to the fact that great power tends to be held by a relatively small and select group of faculty members who comprise the major power bloc (s). This bloc generally consists of strong tenured faculty who sit in judgment over incoming or non-tenured staff as well as the weaker tenured staff. While faculty meetings that presumably allow input from all staff are held during which decisions made at committee level are sanctioned or rejected, it is at great potential risk that faculty members not belonging to this bloc express their disapproval or opposition to the former's stated views. This is particularly so for non-tenured faculty. Thus, policy and decision-making may be described best in social work schools as oligarchical rather than collegial in character. In short, "collegial" input into decision-making boils down to one's having the right to offer one's input at the risk of losing one's source of livelihood--depending on the extent to which one's views clash with the stated preferences of the more powerful faculty actors. Genuine collaboration to meet school objectives occurs rarely with respect to the really important decisions in such a context, and the collaboration that does occur is generally superficial, at best.

Arguments made by those with contrasting views to the points above generally include:

(1) that the quality of decisions made by a select few is likely to be superior to those made by the entire staff, and;

(2) that it is unreasonable to assume within the context of formal organizations that everyone can be made to be satisfied with their working conditions and that given this reality, at least

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[2]For reference purposes see: Eugene Litwak, and Henry Meyer, "The Administrative Style of the School and Organizational Tasks," Strategies of Community Organization, edited by Fred Cox, et al., Itasca, Ill.: Peacock Publishers, 1974.

the power-wielding few do not suffer what negative effects
result from the absence of power.

It is probable that those making the first point base these remarks
on the assumption that decision-making is likely to be more consistent
if made by a single or select few decision-makers. Since consistency in
decision-making is an objective to be valued, then perhaps existing
power patterns are justified as they result in superior policy choices,
or so the argument goes. This is simply not so, particularly when one
takes into account the nature of tasks confronting schools of social
work. As with all schools, and especially with those dealing with pro-
ducing expertise related to the amelioration of complex human problems,
the tasks that must be addressed are myriad and ambiguous. Even the
provision of educational experiences for students--the task to which
faculty members presumably are principally devoted--is an ambiguous
event. Is anyone really certain as how to proceed best with this task?
In an ambiguous context, single or select few decision-makers are like-
ly to break down. This is due simply to the complexity, ambiguity, and
unpredictability of events for which decisions must be made. Only when
one works in a setting where tasks are routine and predictable are a
select few likely to make the best decisions consistently. In other
words, they do not buckle under the overload of a melange of diverse,
complicated, and constantly occurring new problems. In ambiguous con-
texts decisions are made best by all actors since such decisions are
more likely to promote staff conformance to agreed-upon policies while
the process serves to reduce through collaboration, the stress associa-
ted with making decisions in such contexts. Thus, in schools of social
work, the best decisions are likely to be those based on the broadest
participation.

With respect to the point that everyone cannot be made to be satis-
fied, we simply retort that while this may be so, at least we can pro-
mote structures that enhance the potential for everyone to be satisfied.
Clearly, structures emphasizing collegial rather than oligarchical de-
cision-making modes are likely to accomplish this. Finally, we flatly
reject the point that those occupying top rungs in the organizational
hierarchy suffer no debilitating effects because they hold power. We
believe that holding power in this context is alienating because it sets
one apart from many other potential colleagues and, further, requires
constant vigilance for its maintenance. Indeed, the so-called "power-
ful" faculty are practically powerless to do anything else within the
context of the existing politics most often played out within the corri-
dors and committee-rooms of the university.

It is not surprising that superficially amicable and thinly veiled
competition among "contestants" takes place in such settings. A "social

isolation" of sorts results. The real potential for faculty members to work together on a genuinely collaborative basis is sharply circumscribed, though all appears well on the surface. This reality results in staff often tackling tough and ambiguous problems alone, if such work falls outside the context of relationships established by contract. Staff who are often confronted with ambiguous work assignments, that often require collaboration to achieve the most productive outcome, are thus forced to work in settings that may be described aptly as socially fragmenting.

Another factor that places sharp constraints on one's productivity --and here we speak mainly to the level of scholarship of work undertaken in contemporary graduate school settings--has to do with what we refer to as "overgeneralization" in the division of labor. This term we use to describe the diverse and demanding work load which most must assume when employed in these settings. Admittedly, these demands vary by school and rank. However, diverse committee responsibilities at both school or department as well as at the broader university level, teaching preparation for the unremitting evolution of new courses, community service, consulting, publication demands and solicitation of funds to carry out research, etc., constitute a veritable barrage of tasks to which all, in some degree, are subjected. Exacerbating the obvious demands of a work load including these myriad tasks is the fact that all of these tasks are ambiguous rather than routine in character.

At first glance, such a workload might be viewed as far superior to the routine nature of most work in contemporary industrial society. Specifically, many theorists have proposed that employment in work settings stressing specialization is far less desirable than those stressing generalization in the division of labor. Theodore Lowi captures this position with the following remarks:

> "Specialization reduces a man's chances of developing
> a whole personality - men become alienated from them-
> selves as well as their families, friends and community
> . . . work can become so divided and subdivided that one
> loses the human meaning of living." (Lowi, 1969:25)

Victor Thompson, another critic of specialization, introduces greater conceptual clarity through his use of a term he refers to as the "specialization of task". Specialization of task refers to making work activities more specific. This term allows distinction between (1) the kind of specialization of function--an inevitable concomitant of industrialization--to which Lowi's remarks are directed, (2) the conventional meaning ascribed to the term referring to specialized work roles such as neuro-surgeon, clinical psychologist, aircraft engineer,

etc., and (3) task specialization which ". . . moves in the direction of the micro-division of labor, as for example, tightening bolts on an assembly line". (Thompson, 1961:26) It is this last form of specialization that is relevant here.

Task specialization may be viewed as alienating because it results in a proliferation of tasks that are too simple for the worker's abilities. It is personally limiting because such work does not advance the worker's human need to engage in a process of systematic and substantive development of an expanding repertory of skills. The development of such a repertory fosters the sense of having exerted mastery over one's environment. Inevitably, task specialization results in the narrowing of work to the point where it provides little or no meaning to the worker.

We believe that overgeneralization in the division of labor similarly tends to produce feelings of meaninglessness among workers. First, the myriad tasks which must be addressed by graduate level instructors often preclude the development of a skill repertory that is truly substantive, i.e., embodying a profound conceptual grip on the essence of matters under "scholarly" consideration. Instead, time demands imposed by too many varied activities often relegate one's efforts to a cursory and superficial status. From such work can be derived few personal rewards with which to satisfy one's intrinsic needs.

Two factors worsen this problem. First, these tasks often tend to be ambiguous yet occur within contexts that are unlikely to provide meaningful collegial support. Such support reduces stress associated with ambiguous work tasks. Second, the strong emphasis placed on generating publications and securing funds for research purposes often results in work assignments that are viewed by staff as strictly instrumental in character. In essence, what you have are faculty-based entrepreneurs competing for funds around projects that often are tangential to their true research interests. We suggest that this sort of entrepreneurship heightens the potential for staff to view the work to which their energies are directed as relatively meaningless.[3]

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[3]An article, "Fraud in Research is a Rising Problem in Science," which appeared in a recent issue of the New York Times, draws attention to the scope of one outcome we believe results in part from the conditions outlined above. This article implicitly details the personal destruction of some academicians who have yielded to institutionally inspired pressures, impelling the production, in the shortest time, of rapid processions of publications fit for scholarly journals, etc. The author points out:

The above points and arguments, taken in sum, provide the bases on which we suggest that work milieus in graduate university settings may often produce work alienation among staff. Specifically, inegalitarian decision-making modes are seen to produce feelings of powerlessness; superficially personalized relations-more accurately described as competitive relations-are seen to produce a sense of social isolation, particularly at work; and overgeneralization in the division of labor is seen to result in perceived meaninglessness. The fact that the great bulk of work in university settings is ambiguous enhances the potential outcome of dissatisfaction and/or alienation since such settings fail to encourage non-contract based mutual support. These three dimensions--powerlessness, isolation, and meaninglessness--are the principal dimensions of work alienation as defined by Robert Blauner, one of our leading social theorists (Blauner, 1964).

As stated previously, the objective to which this portion of our discussion is directed is to speculate on ways that the employment setting itself may be made to become an incentive. We have identified three problem areas which we feel are most pertinent with respect to this quest. Attention to these areas we theorize will increase the capacity of the institution to meet the intrinsic needs of staff. We now focus our deliberations to why we believe meeting intrinsic needs is one way to enhance the possibility of achieving the employment and curricular objectives to which this overall discussion is directed.

Studies have repeatedly shown that failure to meet the needs of workers is associated with serious social and health functioning pathologies. Such problems include impaired social interaction, reduced civic participation, work-related suicide (Kornhauser, 1965), substance abuse (Roman and Trice, 1969), peptic ulcers (Susser, 1967) heart disease (Theorell and Rahe, 1972), myriad psychosomatic disorders (Gardell, 1972), and reduced life spans (Palmore, 1969). Some writers have advanced the notion that parents who are dissatisfied with their work roles are more likely to produce children who are juvenile delinquents (Tolmach, 1972). Further, some research data supports the contentions

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[3](Continued) "Scientists who cheat by faking their results or by selecting only those data that support their theories represent a phenomenon that often goes unrecognized . . . Some scientific leaders suspect the number of dishonest scientists is growing as a result of the increasingly fierce competition for grant money, which tends to go to researchers who can produce, or assert they can produce, the most impressive new findings in the shortest time." (Rensberger, 1977:44)

of writers that familial violence is associated with job-related frustra-
tions (O'Brien, 1971; Steinmetz, 1974; Bednarik, 1970), and some theo-
rists have even proposed that the burgeoning violence so prevalent in
contemporary American society is often work-related (Fromm, 1972).
Clearly, the sentiments of workers with respect to their work is related
to a plethora of potential problem areas.

While the above cited studies provide an empirical basis on which
to demonstrate the debilitating effects of socially repressive and un-
fulfilling work organizations, what, one might ask with reference to
this discussion, are the positive outcomes associated with work struc-
tures more capable of meeting intrinsic needs? William Torbert and
Malcolm Rogers have developed a framework that purports to answer this
question. The ideas of these two theorists, upon which much of this
portion of the discussion is based, evolve around a central concept they
refer to as "play". Essentially, though the authors emphasize the sali-
ence of work activities, "play" is any activity that is self-developing
in nature and serves to develop a mature understanding of one's self in
relation to one's world (Torbert and Rogers, 1973). Embodied in this
definition of play is a somewhat elaborate theoretical framework--
Torbert and Rogers require several chapters to develop it. We employ
the Torbert and Rogers framework to provide the basis for our conclu-
sions as they relate to promoting responsiveness on the part of existing
majority-group faculty members to the introduction both of minority-
group staff and curricular offerings focused positively upon the ex-
perience of national minorities. For this purpose, it will be suffi-
cient to outline the framework though the reader is cautioned that some
aspects of the theory are omitted.

Torbert and Rogers posit that the lack of play ultimately leads to
limited self-development, particularly as such development relates to
one's individuality and behavioral maturity, and a lack of understand-
ing, obviously, of one's environment. Thus, the lack of play imposes
sharp constraints on the parameters of one's potential to achieve pro-
found personal fulfillment through what some writers describe as self-
actualization. What exactly is it that causes this to occur? In adult
life, repressive work organizations that block one's playful impulses
and coerce, shape, and encourage conformance to shallow social roles
are one answer. Such organizations are seen to reinforce the dual tech-
niques of accommodation and assimilation as modes of dealing with one's
environment. Accommodation requires the person to change himself to
fit the environment rather than to engage in a self-developing inter-
play with that environment. Assimilation requires, as Lazarus points
out, that a person ". . . assimilate the world to his own requirements,
using people and social situations about him for attaining his own ends"

(Lazarus, 1963:10-11). Play, as a self-developing mode stands in stark contrast to accommodation and assimilation.[4]

The relevance of Torbert and Rogers' thesis with respect to this discussion has to do with the social impairment likely to result when one's existence becomes dominated by repressive work organizations characterized by hierarchical decision-making, social isolation, and overgeneralization in the division of labor. Persons working under such conditions are those for whom the drive for "playful" exploration is stifled or otherwise impeded. Torbert and Rogers suggest that such persons are much more likely to be constrained to narrow and rigid views of their world, their community, and themselves, and that they are much more likely to maintain cosmological frameworks that are contrary to the common good. They are less likely to be active in developing relationships with persons of diverse backgrounds who have differing views, philosophies, and orientations to life. These ideas, as advanced by Torbert and Rogers, often find both direct and indirect support in the writings of many theorists including notables such as Herbert Gans, William Kornhauser, Seymour Lipset, Harold Lasswell, and Alex Inkeles.[5]

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[4]According to Torbert and Rogers: "When people do not understand themselves in relation to the world, they are pushed here and there by internal whims and external pressures. They are led to strive for goals which do not express their exploratory impulse--goals to which they are related, not by their selves, but by their pseudo-selves, their personalities (accommodation and assimilation are manifested through one's personality) . . . Play is the phenomena of fully conscious self-world exchange, in which the full interdependence--mutual feeling--of self and world is recognized . . . (it is self-accepting and self-developing, not self-rejecting . . . if either self or world appear dominant, as in assimilation or accommodation, or if conflict occurs, it is a sign of incomplete play . . . When people do not understand themselves in relation to the world, they experience themselves as separated from the world. They and the world appear without common cause. The world becomes something 'out there' to manipulate if possible, or from which to endure manipulation." W. R. Torbert, M. P. Rogers, Being for the Most Part Puppets, Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1973. pp. 63,64,54.

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[5]See for example:
Herbert Gans, "Barriers to Equality," Psychology Today, Vol. 7, no. 7, December, 1973 (esp. pg. 67).
William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society, (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959) (esp. pg. 32).

Direct statements made by these writers or inferences drawn from their work suggest that non-democratic impulses characterize "non-playful" persons who, trapped as they are in their own narrow and rigid views of the world, are also alienated from their fellowmen. Specifically, work organizations that foster competitive, superficial, and shallow social relations while emphasizing instrumental labor rather than self-developing playful work limits diverse involvements and thus impedes personal growth. The consequences of these conditions can only be the rigidification of narrow and factional cosmologies that militate against quality interaction and meaningful dialogue between staff stratified along racial lines.

By contrast, according to Torbert and Rogers, the characteristics of those employed under less alienating work conditions more likely include the following:

(1) self-acceptance
(2) acceptance of others
(3) self-direction
(4) openness; seeking to understand differences
(5) search for the values in others rather than the subordination of others
                                    (Torbert & Rogers, 1973:55)

In short, such persons presumably are more likely to maintain a belief in the dignity and worth of one's self and others, stress personal autonomy, be open to change and diversity, and pursue many values rather than to subordinate diverse interests to a single goal. In sum, the person who plays is more likely to express concern for the common good rather than the factional good, is less likely to be involved in strictly instrumental or non-self-developing recreational activities, and is more likely to prefer active pursuits to those that are passive or expressive of accommodation and assimilation as the principal modes that govern one's interaction with other actors within his social universe.

Based on this theoretical discussion, our recommendations and

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[5](Continued)
Seymour Lipset, Political Man, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1963). (esp. pg. 74).
Harold Lasswell, "Democratic Character," The Political Writings of Harold D. Lasswell, (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951).
Alex Inkeles, "National Character and Modern Political Systems," Psychological Anthropology, ed. by Francis Hsu (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1961).

conclusions may be stated forthrightly. If the intrinsic needs of staff in schools of social work are to be met, the structure of these work settings must themselves be changed to reflect a commitment towards organizational egalitarianism. Simultaneously, such settings must allow and encourage scholarly activity directed along lines that are dictated by social welfare interests individually determined rather than the flow and ebb of federal and other grant monies. To respond willy-nilly to this flow and ebb is to reduce the work of professors and therefore the professors, themselves, to the status of social work entrepreneurs. The shallow social interaction that results from the competitive relations necessary within a hierarchical context, along with the inevitable meaninglessness associated with this kind of entrepreneurship, necessarily results in conditions that tend to exacerbate rather than mitigate existing differences between staff of diverse backgrounds. Settings that allow relatively equal participation, foster genuinely cooperative rather than competitive or superficially collaborative relations, and encourage personally meaningful scholarly activity, can both meet intrinsic needs and serve as a reinforcing incentive.

In conclusion, we propose that such conditions promote not only the fluid introduction of minority staff and content, but result in self-developing places of work for all.

Perspective Two

Meeting Extrinsic Work Needs as an Incentive

Factors identified in the preceding section that militate against the inclusion of minority faculty and content obviously will require more than simple short-range strategies aimed at bringing about their elimination. By contrast, straightforward and pragmatic incentives focusing upon the extrinsic work needs of staff, comparatively speaking, easily may be manipulated to encourage the responsiveness of majority-group faculty to include relevant content into their class offerings and to allocate some portion of their time to recruiting minority-group members for faculty and staff positions. There are a number of rewards that could be dispensed based on priorities in line with the introduction of minority staff and content. However, the implementation of such an incentive structure will require some changes in conventional notions of what generally is considered by faculty members of schools of social work to constitute sound curricular and manpower practices.

A point requiring little elaboration is that the manner in which schools allocate human and monetary resources attests directly to the importance assigned to a particular objective. The notion that a relationship exists between an organization's view of what is important and

its budgetary allocations is captured by the oft-quoted saying among disenfranchised people: "Put your money where your mouth is." The manipulation of salary increases through variable merit raises clearly is salient here; aside from the obvious benefits, income helps satisfy one's need for security. This is particularly so when discussed within the context of tenure since future income flow is guaranteed beyond short-term employment contracts. The manner in which merit increases and base salaries are set and distributed could constitute strong incentives in encouraging the efforts of faculty members to develop, teach, and conduct research on topics relevant to the experience of the national minority population.

A second category of manipulatable pragmatic rewards involves various naunces of faculty assignments. A delineation of specifics that fall under the category of "faculty assignments" includes responsibilities such as the number of courses taught per semester; the number of such courses requiring entirely new preparation or that represent very large student-classroom loads; advising loads; and committee responsibilities that, given their scope and the time they require, are directly related to career or personal development. The point we raise is that heavy assignments in these areas tend to minimize the chances of those overburdened with these assignments to achieve tenured status in most universities. If priorities are strongly set to underscore the importance of such things as the development of minority content in curricular offerings, etc., junior faculty unwilling to conform to these priorities may be unevenly burdened with these tasks to make it extraordinarily difficult for them to achieve tenured rank. Unwilling faculty in the tenured ranks may simply be made to suffer the uneven burden.

Career development supports encompass extrinsic rewards that permit faculty members to spend more time engaged in tasks related to personal as well as career development. Teaching and research support opportunities to expand technical skills, and professional exposure, are examples of rewards that could provide powerful incentives for faculty to invest time in performing minority-relevant tasks. Career development supports such as student help (teaching, research and project assistants), and efficient easily accessible secretarial help can free faculty members from many routine activities that sap creativity, and steal time from participation in scholarly endeavors. Administrative willingness to selectively dispense these rewards to faculty for performing needed organizational tasks related to minority concerns is a must, given concurrence with objectives as previously noted.

Research support guaranteed by the administration for faculty members who help the school to accomplish its objectives is another way of encouraging faculty responsiveness. Computer time and programming

assistance are examples of rewards that are valued by faculty members. The persuasive potential of these rewards, given their relatedness to scholarly productivity, is considerable. By selectively dispensing rewards that facilitate faculty research efforts, school administrations and faculties will have greater assurance that minority-related objectives will be accomplished.

Another group of important extrinsic rewards is related to expanding technical skills and opportunities for professional exposure. Release time can be given to select faculty desirous of attending specialized institutes, training sessions, or to enroll in technical courses. Release time also can be granted to faculty to facilitate the preparation of scholarly papers on minority-related topics for presentation at professional conferences. In that both skill acquisition and professional exposure are directly related to personal and career development, the general appeal of these rewards to faculty members is self-evident.

Movement by schools of social work in the direction of achieving minority faculty and curricular goals are supported by the organized profession's Code of Ethics; The Council on Social Work Education's accrediting standards; and various federal and state laws. For example, an excerpt from the Council on Social Work Education's Manual of Accrediting Standards states that "A school is expected to demonstrate the special effort it is making to enrich its program by providing racial and cultural diversity in its student body, faculty and staff". (Council on Social Work Education, 1971:6). In the same vein, it is significant to note that a Federal Executive Order (11246) issued in 1966 prohibits federal contractors from discriminating on the basis of race, creed or color in their employment practices. Schools contract with the federal government through grants awarded these schools by various governmental departments. These factors (Code of Ethics, Accreditation Manual Standards, Federal and State Fair Employment Laws) represent an adequate degree of support for schools desirous of establishing and attaining minority related objectives. Thus, given the existence of these policy statements, it is reasonable to both assume and maintain that the lack of success must be directly attributed to poor, perhaps racist, faculty attitudes that spawn limited or no commitment to the employment and retention of minority staff. The manipulation of various "benefits" to satisfy work needs can be used to this aim of fostering staff conformance to policies related to the introduction, promotion, and retention of minority staff, and to a fair representation of minority content in curricular offerings. We firmly believe that deploying benefits in ways previously specified will result in substantive progress along these lines.

We have identified manipulatable extrinsic organizational rewards

that we believe could provide the means for facilitating efforts to increase minority faculty and minority-relevant curricular content. As they are the primary actors that determine the scope of change within schools we strongly believe that chief administrators and policy setting bodies must be intimately involved in the process of developing mechanisms to increase proportions of minority faculty and minority relevant course offerings. Their leadership and commitment to substantive minority-related improvements serve a particular and especially important function. The image painted by school units, or individuals in control of organizational perogatives to make policy decisions, provides the screen through which determinations are made as they relate to the encouragement of individual responsiveness. Faculty members can be expected to wonder what the relationship is between their participation in the curricular change effort and their capability to pursue, augmented by the provision of organizational resources, some of their own individually determined interests. They can be expected to wonder what the relationship is between their responsiveness to minority-relevant concerns and their receipt of promotions and administratively orchestrated prestige, esteem, etc. These are important personal considerations. Affirmative answers to these questions are, in large measure, the prerequisites for individual commitment and long-term involvement, if the organizing principles to which schools of social work adhere remain unchanged.

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THE PERPETUATION OF INSTITUTIONAL RACISM THROUGH ETHNIC AND RACIAL MINORITY CONTENT IN THE CURRICULUM OF SCHOOLS OF SOCIAL WORK

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ABSTRACT

The author asserts that the effect of assimulation of ethnic and racial minority content into the curriculum of schools of social work may perpetuate institutional racism.

Social work education as well as the purpose of the profession itself are viewed as basically one of helping people adjust and accommodate to the dominant and racist institutions of our society. Consequently, the author argues, incorporation of ethnic and racial minority content into curriculum that serves such a function is likely to serve ends to which it was not intended.

Five suggested areas of change in the mission of social work education are briefly noted.

The relevance of the curriculum in schools of social work for ethnic and racial minority groups has been a concern of social work educators for some time. Serious and sustained charges of racism have been leveled at individual faculty members as well as to the organization of schools of social work in most areas of this country over the past fifteen years. While considerable "heat" and discussion has been generated, little light has been shed on the subject and significant change has not taken place, largely due to acceptance without question and serious examination of the context within which "heat" and discussion about racism takes place. In this article the nature of that context will be examined.

Thesis

My thesis is that incorporation of ethnic and racial minority content within the prevailing curriculum and organization of social work may only serve to perpetuate institutional racism.[1]

Whether we like it or not, professional education for social work practice is designed to prepare people for practice in accordance with prevailing institutional values in our society. Students learn ways of helping people adjust and accommodate to the dominant framework. Basic curriculum content is selected and used in the interests of this objective. Courses in a school of social work curriculum that are not consistent with this objective, while sometimes viewed by faculty and students as an interesting diversion from the primary educational task, are little more than an often temporary accommodation to the interests of a few faculty and students. Despite the desires and efforts of some faculty, students and practitioners to the contrary, the primary function of social work as it currently exists in practice is to help people maintain and develop themselves within the basic institutional framework of our society rather than to change the framework itself.[2]

Thus, curriculum content consistent with the objectives of schools of social work is incorporated, and content inconsistent with the objectives of schools of social work is not incorporated in any kind of comprehensive and meaningful way into the curriculum.

Curriculum content that is selected and used to enhance curriculum objectives obviously has the consequence, when implemented, of reinforcing and perpetuating the primary mission of the school - enabling students to learn how to help people maintain and develop themselves within the dominant institutions of our society. The existing institutions and the values they espouse are taken as "givens" and are not viewed as subject to basic change. With the exception of unequal opportunities to achieve the "benefits" of what prevails, no evidence exists that ethnic and racial minority groups seriously question the legitimacy of the dominant institutions and their values. To view the primary concerns of racial and ethnic minority groups in this country as representing basic institutional change is to misrepresent the primary interests of these groups in

obtaining on a basis of equality the political, economic, educational and social-cultural benefits that currently exist in our society.[3] As takes place within other groups striving to get their share of what prevails, "radical" members of ethnic-racial minority groups who disagree with dominant views tend to be perceived by the majority as deviant and attempts are made to assimilate and co-opt them into "mainstream" activity. Consequently, institutional racism, along with most other aspects of our major institutions, are generally accepted as part of an unchangeable reality.

The essential point here is not that institutional racism should be accepted or that it cannot be changed. Instead, the purpose of this discussion is to point out that as long as the primary mission of social work education and practice is to help people live within the existing institutions of our society, institutional racism is enhanced along with the other features of dominant institutions.

Thus the incorporation of ethnic and racial minority content into the existing curriculum of schools of social work in a comprehensive and integrated way means the use of that content to teach students how to help people live within a context of institutional racism. Through such use of ethnic and racial minority content, attention paid to elimination of institutional racism would be dysfunctional, counter-productive and inconsistent with the primary mission of the school and the profession. Instead, concern that may be expressed about institutional racism is diverted into "appropriate" and "feasible" areas, such as symptomatic relief of personal difficulties created by this form of racism.

Symptomatic relief often takes the form of alleviation of the personal stress and guilt felt by students and faculty about the nature of ethnic and racial minority relations in our society through various forms of consciousness and awareness-raising activities and by providing avenues for symbolic and culturally sanctioned responses to the problem of institutional racism. For example, in awareness workshops, in conferences and in courses emphasizing ethnic and racial minority content, feelings of personal guilt may be expressed, dramatic soul-wrenching presentations may be made about the plight of ethnic and racial minority groups in our society and concerns about

what to do about the situation may be raised. However, the institutional context of racism in our society is not normally considered as part of the agenda for serious examination and change. Consequently, the identification, examination and resolution of personal difficulties takes place within the cultural context of what prevails in our society and represents an attempt to reduce the stress that is felt by maintaining such a cultural context. The reduction of stress among participants in such ventures facilitates the working out of ways to more comfortably live within existing institutional realities.[4]

The Meaning of Institutional Racism

Vagueness and ambiguity about the meaning of institutional racism contributes to a redefinition of the problem as one of personal difficulties. Clearly any serious examination of the meaning of institutional racism would suggest the development of the problem along different lines.

Using a dictionary definition, racism is "a program or practice of racial discrimination, segregation, persecution and domination, based on doctrines or feelings of supposed racial differences of superiority and inferiority."[5]

Pervasive racist values of superiority and inferiority held by individuals, such as those related to intelligence levels, motivational differences and achievement potentials, are well known and do not have to be documented here. However, in institutional racism these values become an integral part of the fabric of our dominant cultural values and are transmitted as part of the way of life in our society. Our basic cultural values of competition, individualism, inequality of circumstances of living and of human rights, materialism and hierarchy include values of superiority and inferiority based upon race and ethnic status and over time these values are taken as a given and not subject to question.

These dominant values are organized as cultural institutions. Cultural institutions; economic, political, religious, educational, legal and welfare; represent various networks of interrelated dominant values that are relatively stable, that prevail throughout the society and that tend to maintain themselves through time. Cultural

institutions represent preferred belief systems about what is a
desired way of life in a society. Such a desired way of life,
reflected through cultural institutions, establish preferences for
resolving basic social problems of a society, such as problems of
social control, socialization and mastery of the environment.

Institutional (cultural) solutions to basic social problems of a
society are carried out by formal organizations. Formal organizations
represent the "agency" or means of institutional problem solving.
Examples are economic organizations such as business and labor organi-
zations and educational organizations such as schools. One component
of the complex of formal organizations are schools of social work and
they are clearly part of the apparatus of institutional problem
solving.

Thus, institutional racism is the ideological (value) orienta-
tion of superiority-inferiority of racial and ethnic minority groups
that (1) are an integral part of the dominant cultural values of our
society, (2) are part of desired institutional forms of resolution
to basic social problems of social control, socialization and mastery
of the environment, and (3) are implemented through a vast complex of
formal organizations.

Ethnic and Racial Minority Content

Ethnic and racial minority content in the curriculum of schools
of social work has become a vague and ambiguous catch-all category
for anything which is supposed to pertain to the past and present
circumstances of ethnic and racial minority groups in our society;
economic, political, social, cultural, educational, religious,
psychological and biological. Generally, the ethnic minority
content is supposed to identify and explain "the facts" about (1) the
particular experiences of various ethnic and racial minority groups
in our society, and (2) the relevance of particular course materials for
ethnic and racial minority groups. Pressure from minority communities,
students and faculty as well as tenure of the times has led to incor-
poration of ethnic minority content in some form in most courses in the
curriculum. The form of incorporation varies from nothing, a few books
on a course reading list, to one or more class periods on the subject.
It is likely that most faculty provide a few bibliographical items and
try to gear content to minorities where appropriate.

However, it is not so much _what_ is incorporated, but the way
it is incorporated that may raise some serious problems. In fact,
when fitted into existing courses with prevailing philosophies
minority content may actually reinforce the primary purposes,
objectives and organization of the school.

Further, in the process of incorporation the assumption is made
that ethnic and racial minority content serves to raise the level of
awareness of all students about the experience of particular ethnic
and racial minority groups and the relevance of the content of the
academic curriculum for specific minority groups. But does it do
this? If so, how does this attitudinal change occur? Such an
assumption is subject to serious question.

First, as previously indicated, it is not clear what is meant
by "minority" content and a "minority" group and why certain content
and groups are included for consideration over others. _Minority_
content is usually perceived in a global way as if any minority
content is equal to all other minority content. For instance, we
speak of addition of minority content as if any addition will suffice.
Actually, however, different minority content have different
relevance depending upon where the school is located, composition of
student population, faculty composition, etc. In addition, we tend
to lump together various groups into ethnic categories acting as if
they are all the same. For example, Filipinos, Koreans, Chinese,
Japanese and Vietnamese are often combined together under the
category "Asian" and Mexican and Puerto-Rican under the category
"Chicano."[6]

Second, the inclusion of ethnic and racial minority content is
largely in response to pressure from concerned minority students,
faculty, and community members and is primarily an attempt to appease
those who create such pressure and to reduce it. Faculty activities
in this area are in direct proportion to the pressure experienced
from others and often reflects desire to avoid criticism. Such
appeasement to ethnic and racial minority concerns does not
necessarily represent serious attempts to achieve awareness and
relevance or attention paid to the problem of institutional
racism as defined here.

Implications for Change

In order for ethnic and racial minority content to avoid per-
petuation of institutional racism and other features of the dominant
institutions of our society a change of the mission of schools of
social work and of the profession of social work would be necessary.
The profession and schools of social work must be a force for change
if the content (ethnic minority content) of the curriculum can
contribute to change. Adding, eliminating or changing elements in the
curriculum in a piecemeal fashion will have limited impact as the
essential difficulty is located in the very nature of what pro-
fessional education and practice is basically designed to accomplish
in our society.

Assuming that the primary mission of schools of social work and
of the profession can be changed through collective work of social
workers and others, several suggestions for change are considered
next.

First, the prevailing institutions of our society must be
systematically and critically examined. Examination of the dominant
values that make up these institutions would require critical consider-
ation of the interrelationship between the values of competition,
inequality, individualism, materialism, and of hierarchy of social
class, as well as values of superiority-inferiority of racial and
ethnic minority groups. While some social work educators and social
scientists have, and are conducting some examinations as indicated
here, such work does not represent a primary mission of the profession
and of schools of social work.

A second area for examination is (1) how social problems are
defined in the content of existing institutional value constellations,
and (2) how resolution to social problems such as social control,
socialization and mastery of the environment can perpetuate institut-
ional racism by promoting inequality, injustice and denial of oppor-
tunity for self-realization of most people in our society.

The third area for consideration is to examine how formal organi-
zations as mechanisms for institutional problem-solving carry out
dominant institutional solutions to social problems of our society.
Formal organizations implement racist practices consistent with the
institutional nature of racism that is an integral part of the way of
life in our society. As previously noted, formal organizations are a

means for carrying out institutional solutions and do not (for long) have a life of their own apart from this function.

Fourth, critical analysis of "what is", as mentioned above, needs to be carried out in the context of a conception of "what should be" - a non-racist "good" society. Such consideration would involve identifying and examining the nature of desired values and their arrangements as cultural institutions; economic, political, legal, religious, educational and welfare. New institutional solutions to problems of socialization, social control and mastery of the environment need to be formulated as well as new organizational arrangements for carrying out desired institutional solutions.

Finally, given an adequate conception of "what is" and "what should be", attention needs to be given to approaches for changing to a desired society. Such approaches mean consideration of basic institutional change - a fundamental alteration of the cultural institutions of our society. Strategies of basic institutional change are based on an adequate critique of existing institutions and a conception of what is desired as the outcome of change.

Summary

The argument has been made that the incorporation of ethnic and racial minority content into existing curriculum of most schools of social work in this country has the consequence of perpetuating institutional racism. This position is based on the widely acknowledged and generally accepted primary mission of the profession of social work and of schools of social work in educating students to become members of the profession; to help people maintain and develop themselves within the established institutions of our society.

Clearly, curriculum content that has any sense of importance to the school and that achieves a permanent position in the curriculum, is shaped and modified to be consistent with curriculum objectives that enhance the primary use of the school and the profession. Consequently, curriculum content, such as ethnic-minority relations, that is viewed as a crucial and major part of the curriculum must support the mission of the school. Thus, from a logical and rational perspective, institutional racism as part of fabric of the dominant institutions of our society is reinforced and perpetuated by ethnic minority content.

For ethnic and racial minority content to serve interests other than the status-quo and further development of what prevails, the primary mission of the profession of social work, and consequently education for the profession, would have to be significantly altered.

Changes or additions in curriculum, such as ethnic and racial minority content, will not in itself have any significant impact on change of the current direction of social work education. If a non-racist society as well as other changes of our dominant cultural system, is perceived as part of a desired mission for social work, then the purposes, organization and curriculum of schools of social work should be designed to reflect this mission. The current situation reflects a different mission - support for existing institutional arrangements and consequently the perpetuation of institutional racism.

Notes

1. Colleagues at the University of Washington School of Social Work, William Berleman, Ronald Dear and Henry Maier, were very helpful to me in developing this position.

2. For a sample of the literature that amplifies this position, see: Roland, Warren, "Overview of the Intercultural Seminar" in An Intercultural Exploration: Universals and Differences in Social Work Values, Functions and Practice, (New York: Council of Social Work Education, 1967), p. 67. Herman D. Stein, "Social Works Developmental and Change Function: Their Roots in Practice". Social Service Review, 50, (March, 1976), p.1. Walter Fisher, Joseph Mehr, and Philip Truckenbrod, Human Services: The Third Revolution in Mental Health (New York: Alfred, 1974), p. 268. Yeheskel Hasenfeld and Richard English, Human Service Organization (Ann Arbor, Michigan, University of Michigan Press, 1974), p.1. Jeffrey Galper, The Politics of Social Services (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1975). David Gil, Unravelling Social Policy (Cambridge, Mass: Schenkman, 1973). Peter Marris and Martin Rein, The Dilemmas of Social Reform (New York: Atherton, 1967). Frances Piven and Richard Cloward, Regulating the Poor (New York: Vintage, 1971). Bertha Reynolds, An Uncharted Journey (New York: Citidel, 1963).

3. Observation made by Ronald Dear in a critique of an earlier draft of this article.

4. A similar process frequently takes place in professional practice working with clients disturbed about racism.

5. Webster's New World Dictionary (New York: World Publishing Co., 1964), p. 1198.

6. Ideas developed here are those of Henry Maier.

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SOME CRITICAL QUESTIONS IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOCIAL WELFARE - THE CARTER "WELFARE REFORM" PROPOSALS

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The purpose of this paper is to discuss President Carter's welfare reform proposals, appropriately titled, "The Program for Better Jobs and Income." If these proposals are adopted by Congress, they will guide the Administration in its stance toward and its work with the lowest income sectors of the nation: the welfare poor--those who cannot work and must be supported by the government, and the working poor--those who are able to support themselves, but whose yearly income is less than the poverty level.

Consequently, the paper starts with an analysis of what the government documents have to tell us about the scope and nature of poverty in the United States. Then we proceed with a discussion of the current welfare reform proposals--what the Administration intends to do about the persistent entrenched poverty that plagues the nation. Finally, we ask: will the Carter welfare reforms work? We return to the key question posed at the beginning of the paper: Is it possible for the federal government to institute reforms that will result in better jobs and better distribution of income so that the welfare poor and the working poor can maintain a standard of living above abject poverty?

The content of the Carter proposals is constantly being modified: the August 6th version is different from the May 2nd. HEW Secretary Joseph Califano, Jr., has invited "in-depth consultation, . . . to see how our plan should be further developed and refined." He acknowledges "that Washington, D.C. is not the final repository of wisdom and we do not have all the answers, nor even all the questions."

In short, now is the time for social policy analysts and social critics to prepare for the national debate that is bound to ensue during the coming months.

The General Approach of the Carter Administration to Welfare Reform

In June of this year, the Bureau of the Census issued two comprehensive reports: "Money Income in 1975 of Families and Persons in the United States," and "Characteristics of the Population Below the Poverty Level: 1975." At approximately the same time, President Carter announced his proposals for "welfare reform," more

appropriately subtitled "The Program for Better Jobs and Income" in the text of his report.

The census documents, in part, provide the factual and historical data required for an assessment of the relevance of the Carter proposals. Basically what the census documents contain is good sound information pertaining to two sensitive indicators of the effectiveness of economic and social organization in the United States: whether it sustains a large impoverished social class, and whether it distributes income and other resources with equity and equality.

The central question to be answered is: Is it possible for the federal government to institute reforms that will result in better jobs and better distribution of income so that the welfare poor and the working poor can maintain a standard of living above abject poverty?

The facts of poverty. The fact of the matter is that in 1975 there were 25.9 million persons living below the poverty level of $5,500 for a nonfarm family of four. This comprised about 12 percent of the entire population.

The poverty level is a statistical concept developed by the Social Security Administration in 1964 that has come to have profound implications for administrative decision-making. For example, it is used to determine who will receive certain welfare benefits. The poverty index is based on the economy food plan, the least costly of four nutritionally sound food plans, designed by the Department of Agriculture. It provides a range of income cutoffs adjusted by such factors as family size, sex of the family head, number of children under 18 years old, and farm-nonfarm residence. Those who are living below the poverty threshold are experiencing "absolute poverty."

The report highlights the current situation in 1975 for those living in absolute poverty, and presents the trends since 1959 in the following words and numbers:

> There were 25.9 million persons below the poverty level in 1975, comprising 12 percent of all persons. Between 1974 and 1975, the number of persons below the low-income level increased by 2.5 million or 10.7 percent, reflecting the continued inflation and sluggishness in the economy. For example, during this period the poverty thresholds increased 9.1 percent, reflecting the changes in consumer prices, whereas personal income per capita increased only 7.5 percent. In addition, the average annual unemployment rate rose from 5.6 percent to 8.5 percent, and the number of persons

who exhausted their unemployment benefits increased from 2.0 million in 1974 to 4.3 million in 1975. The increase of 2.5 million low-income persons during the 1974-1975 period was the largest single year increase observed since 1959, the first year for which poverty data were available . . .

Between 1974 and 1975, the increase in the number of persons below the poverty level was quite pervasive, occurring for both Black and White persons, for persons of Spanish origin, and for the young as well as the elderly. Particularly large percentage increases were observed for Whites, persons under 65 years, and husband-wife families.[2]

There have been substantial changes over time in the size of the population living below the poverty level. During the early 1960s, from 1959 to 1966, the number and percent of persons living in absolute poverty declined from a high of 39.5 million, or 22.2 percent, to a low of 25.3 million or 12.4 percent. This led many at that time to believe that the War on Poverty had been won. Unfortunately, however, since 1968 there has been little change in the numbers or the proportions: about 25 million persons, 12 percent of the total population, remain in absolute poverty.

Furthermore, it has now become evident that while changes may be effected in "absolute poverty" as measured by the number and percent of persons below the poverty threshold, very little has really been accomplished to further income equality in the nation; that is, very little has been done to effect the "relative poverty." This is perhaps the single most striking finding of the Bureau of the Census report on "Money Income in 1975 of Families and Persons in the United States." Despite the War on Poverty and other governmental efforts of the past decades, there has been no general reduction in income inequality from 1947 to 1975.

Using the simplest measure of income distribution--the share of annual income received by portions of the population ranked by income--the lowest 20 percent of the population has never varied from a 3 to 4 percent share, while the highest 20 percent has always received about 44 percent. In 1975, the income for the highest fifth was $31,466 per year, about seven times the annual income of the lowest fifth, $4,514. These figures are not aver- ages--they represent the upper limits of income for the fifth.

The historical trends presented in these two census monographs add up to a single hard fact about the nature of the American economy. It is an economy that sustains income inequality and absolute poverty for millions of persons. The low-income fifth contains

about 5.6 million families and 9.4 million unrelated persons with
annual incomes of less than $4,514 in 1975 and mean incomes of
less than $3,000 per year. About half of this income derives from
earnings, the balance from government transfer payments and proper-
ty. Those in absolute poverty experience even a less-favored
status.[3]

The economic conditions which produced this situation in 1975 have
persisted essentially since the termination of World War II. The
economy of the United States apparently is unable to reduce income
inequality or absolute poverty to an acceptable level without
substantial restructuring of the economy. This should have pro-
found implications for the Carter Program for Better Jobs and
Income.

The Theory of the Fluidity of Poverty

Instead, the Carter administration apparently is pursuing another
line of reasoning based on another set of facts about the nature
of poverty. This can be called the theory of the fluidity of
poverty. The theory, and Carter's policy, is based on the premise
that there is a "hard core" of poor people, perhaps 6 or 7 million,
who should, and must, be supported by the government, but that the
majority of the nation's poor, perhaps 7.5 to 10 million people,
are able to move out of absolute poverty if they are provided with
appropriate government assistance to do so.

This theory is stated clearly by Joseph Califano, Jr., Secretary
of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the leading
spokesman for the Carter administration on the issue of welfare
reform, as follows:

> We have to face the fact in this country, unless we want to
> defy the laws of all recorded history, that there will be
> some poor people always.
>
> There are going to be people that are utterly incapable of
> taking care of themselves, You know, blind people that are
> seriously disabled will need some kind of help. There are
> going to be small children who have the misfortune of being
> put in families, being born into families or non-families,
> where there is no one to take care of them. Either we can
> write them off and say we are not going to take care of them,
> or we can, as we have as a civilized society since the New
> Deal, take care of those children. If we looked at the
> numbers . . . (at the) . . . irreducible three percent . . .
> (there are) . . . still . . . six or seven million people
> that will need help from somebody.

(However), this country is not full of people that have been
sitting on welfare for three generations. That is a really
pernicious--I use the word advisedly--myth. Let me take the
opportunity of pointing out how fluid this population is.

Each year, 7.5 to 10 million people move above the poverty
line in this country, and a like number unfortunately become
poor. The one study we have done, which is from 1967 to
1972, (shows that) only three percent of the American popula-
tion was poor in every one of those six years. It is still a
large number of people. And I realize that. But the other
side of it is (that) more than 20 percent--actually 21 per-
cent of the people who were poor--of the American population
was poor at least in every one of these years.

So while the poverty percentage in this country hovered at
11 percent, about a quarter of the population at risk in any
given year during that 6-year period, people moved in and out
of poverty. In every one of those years, 30 to 40 percent of
the poor in one year were not poor in the next succeeding
year. So people can move, and they can move out of poverty.

The Carter administration theory of the fluidity of poverty fol-
lows clsoely the Brookings Institution analysis of income security
policy by John L. Palmer and Joseph J. Minarik. Palmer and Minarik
hold that the major reductions in absolute poverty in the period
of 1959 to 1975 were caused by a combination of "strong economic
growth during the 1960s and the increased antipoverty effective-
ness of public transfers in the last decade."[4] By public trans-
fers they refer to government cash programs such as Aid to Fami-
lies with Dependent Children (AFDC), Supplemental Security Income
(SSI), Social Security, Unemployment Compensation, and other
programs, as well as the "in kind" transfers such as Food Stamps
(FS), Medicaid/Medicare, Child Nutrition, and Housing Assistance.
For example, Palmer and Minarik cite government studies indicating
that in 1972, 85 percent of the total food stamp bonuses, 74 per-
cent of public housing benefits, and 75 percent of Medicaid expen-
diture were received by those whose pretransfer incomes were below
the poverty level.[5]

The transfer programs are less effective with certain groups than
with others. For example, cash transfers were far less effective
in helping the poor in male-headed families with children than
they were for the aged. Moreover, according to Palmer and Minarik,
the effectiveness of transfer payments in removing female-headed
families from poverty has not increased since 1959, in contrast to
their increasing effectiveness for other demographic groups.

The importance of government transfer payments to low-income families is clearly shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1

Percent Distribution of Aggregate "Money Income"

For Families and Unrelated Individuals by Poverty Status in 1975

(Numbers in Thousands)

Type of Income	Above Poverty Level		Below Poverty Level	
	Families	Unrelated Individuals	Families	Unrelated Individuals
Mean Income (Dollars)	$16,882	$8,319	$3,100	$1,573
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
EARNINGS	85.5	72.3	41.5	22.3
OTHER THAN EARNINGS	14.5	27.7	58.4	77.7
Government Transfer Payments	7.1	13.5	52.7	70.3
Dividends, Interest, Rent	4.2	8.2	1.8	3.9
Pensions, Annuities, Alimony	3.2	6.0	3.9	3.5

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 106, "Characteristics of the Population Below the Poverty Level: 1975," U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1977, pp. 154, 156, 159, 161.

Table 1 indicates that over 70 percent of the aggregate "money income" of unrelated individuals and almost 53 percent of the aggregate money income of families living below the poverty level derived from government transfer payments in 1975. In contrast, small proportions--7.1 percent and 13.5 percent--comes from this source for families and individuals above poverty.[6]

Several low-income categories rely more on welfare checks for their aggregate income than others, as for example:

	Percent of income received from transfer payments
2,430,000 families with a female head	65.9
1,513,000 black families	60.5
728,000 families with head 65 and over	89.0
2,125,000 individuals 65 and over	93.3

A more detailed analysis of the source and types of income appears in the Census Report on "Money Income in 1975 of Families and Persons in the U.S." It shows that most families depend on income from both earnings and property, 63.4 percent, whereas smaller proportions rely on either their earnings only (24.6 percent) or nonearned income (11.8 percent).

As the family becomes more affluent, the importance of earnings and property combined predominates. About 1 percent of the income of persons in the upper-income fifth is not earned; 18.8 percent comes from earnings alone, and 80 percent from earnings and pro-perty investment. In fact, it is evident that wealth is more unequally distributed than annual income in the United States. In 1972, 32.5 million or slightly under one-fifth of the population of the United States owned corporate stock. The wealthiest 1 per-cent owned 61 percent of all corporate stock, real estate, cash, bonds, insurance, equity, pension-fund reserves, and personal trusts.[8]

In contrast, the poor owe more than they own. Families in the lowest-income fifth are much like the families below the poverty level. About half (46.1 percent) of the families in this category are dependent on government transfer payments and pensions for their livelihood.

Table 2 is a 100-percent chart showing the amount of income by its source for all families with less than the median family income of $13,719 in 1975. The horizontal axis identifies the amount of the family income at each thousand-dollar level. The vertical axis divides the chart into decile units indicating the proportion of income allocated to each source. For example, of all the families with less than an income of $2,000 in 1975, 28 percent was derived from earnings only, 34 percent from earnings and other income than earnings only, 17 percent from other income from nonearned sources, and 21 percent from Social Security and/or public assistance only, or both.

From an inspection of the chart, it is apparent that families having incomes of more than $8,000 get very little of this from transfer payments. It is unlikely that this situation will change in the future, even if the Carter "welfare reform" proposals are enacted into law. As will be seen, an $8,400 ceiling is placed on cash transfer payments under the Carter proposals. It should be noted, however, that the income figures in the chart do not include nonmoney transfers such as food stamps, health benefits, and subsidized housing, as well as other forms of nonmoney income such as rent-free housing, goods produced and consumed on farms, the use of business transportation and facilities, capital gains, and other benefits.

The importance of transfer income in alleviating absolute poverty is also indicated by an analysis of trends in federal government expenditures. For example, payments to individuals (in cash and kind) and grants to state and local governments to administer some of these programs rose from $12.1 billion in 1955 to $167.4 billion in 1967. This comprised 3.2 percent of the nonrecession gross national product in 1955 and 8.4 percent in 1977. According to Charles L. Schultze:

> Developments in three major types of program explain almost nine-tenths of the growth in the ratio of domestic federal expenditures to GNP between 1955 and 1977. (1) The rapid expansion of retirement, disability, and unemployment compensation was responsible for slightly more than half the growth. (2) The introduction of new low-income assistance programs providing food, medical, and housing benefits to the poor, and subsequent increase in both these benefits and the older cash welfare payments, accounted for 14 percent of the

TABLE 2

What Was the Source of Money Income of Families
Below the Median Family Income of $13,719 in 1975?

FAMILY INCOME LEVEL (in dollars)

Source of Income by Deciles		

100%
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0%

Under $2,000 | 3,000 | 4,000 | 5,000 | 6,000 | 7,000 | 8,000 | 9,000 | 10,000 | 11,000 | 12,000 | 13,000 | 14,0

EARNINGS ONLY

EARNINGS AND OTHER

INCOME OTHER THAN EARNINGS ONLY

OTHER INCOME FROM NONEARNED SOURCES

(interest, dividends, rent

unemployment comp., etc.)

SOCIAL SECURITY AND/OR PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ONLY OR BOTH

Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 106, "Characteristics of
          the Population Below the Poverty Level: 1975," U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
          1977, Table 31, pp. 130-131.

growth. (3) The introduction and the rapid expansion, espe-
cially between 1965 and 1970, of new social growth and social
investment programs contributed about 18 percent of the
growth.[10]

As will be seen later in the paper, the Carter "welfare reform"
proposals are designed at least in part to put a tight lid on
these zooming federal expenditures.

Conclusion

There can be no denying that government transfer payments contri-
bute much to the livelihood of the poor. They constitute probably
a good half of the annual income of most low-income families and
individuals. However, given the recorded experience of the last
two decades, there is no sound body of evidence as yet in support
of the theory of the fluidity of poverty, given the present level
and distribution of transfer payments, and given the present
uncertain economic conditions: high unemployment, high under-
employment, relatively low wages for selected occupations and
geographic areas, widespread and uncontrolled inflation, and a
regressive tax system.

Furthermore, there are many obstacles, dilemmas, and contradic-
tions which must be solved to make the transfer strategy work.
The Carter "welfare reform" is an attempt to solve these problems,
to transform government transfer payments into an escalator out of
absolute poverty for the welfare poor and the working poor. In
the sections that follow, we will deal with each of the major
proposals and show its relevance to the preceding analysis.

The Carter Welfare Reform Proposals

President Carter's Program for Better Jobs and Income has emerged
gradually during the first 8 months of his administration.

If some reluctance and tentativeness has been shown by the Admini-
stration in addressing the task, that is understandable because
welfare reform has been the submerged reef on which many presiden-
tial administrations have floundered. HEW Secretary Joseph Califano
calls welfare reform "the Middle East of domestic politics" with
just cause.

The first version of the program was introduced in a televised
message to the nation by President Carter on May 2nd. Subse-
quently, on May 24, HEW Secretary Califano issued a "tentative
working draft" of two "major program initiatives--a jobs program
to reach low-income Americans and a consolidated cash assistance

structure that, at a minimum, replaces the Aid to Families of Dependent Children, Supplementary Security Income, and Food Stamp programs." Finally on August 6, as Congress adjourned for its summer recess, the finished product was submitted for Congressional consideration.

The President emphasized the need for welfare reform in the following words:

> In May after 4 months of study, I said that the welfare system was worse than I expected. Each program has a high purpose and serves many needy people, but taken as a whole the system is neither rational nor fair. The welfare system is anti-work, anti-family, inequitable in its treatment of the poor, and wasteful of taxpayers' dollars.[11]

He underscored his earlier conclusion of May 2nd that:

> The most important unanimous conslusion is that the present welfare programs should be scrapped and a totally new system implemented.[12]

What is the "present welfare system" that President Carter intends to scrap? The components are clearly identified in the Administration's proposals.

First of all, it should be noted that these proposals cover only a small portion of the welfare system as it is presently constituted. Social welfare expenditures in fiscal 1976 consumed $331.4 billion in national budget outlays.[13] This figure includes all the cash benefits, services, and administrative costs for all programs operating under public law that are of direct benefit to individuals and families. The programs included are those for income maintenance through social insurance programs and public aid, and the public provision of health, education, housing, and other welfare programs, i.e., what are usually considered as public social welfare expenditures.

In contrast, the scheduled reform under the Carter proposals will replace $26.3 billion in current programs that provide income assistance to low-income people. The programs and their cost to the federal government in 1978 dollars are listed below:[14]

AFDC $6.4 billion

SSI $5.7 billion

Food Stamps $5.0 billion

Earned Income Tax Credit	$1.3 billion
Stimulus Portion of CETA Public Jobs	$5.5 billion
WIN Program	$0.4 billion
Extended Unemployment Insurance Benefits (27-39 weeks)	$0.7 billion
Rebates of per capita share of Wellhead Tax[15] Revenue to Low-Income People if Passed by Congress	$1.3 billion
Total	$26.3 billion

In addition to these expenditures, the program will produce savings in other related programs amounting to $1.6 billion. This includes savings in: decreased unemployment insurance expenditures, $0.4 billion; HEW program to reduce fraud and abuse, $0.4 billion; decrease in required housing subsidies due to increased income, $0.5 billion; increases in Social Security contributions, $0.3 billion.

It is evident that the part of the welfare system scheduled for reform is that which provides income assistance to low-income people, namely those affected most directly by government transfer payments. Also, it is these income security transfer programs which have had such a phenomenal growth since 1960.

According to Palmer and Minarik, the income security transfers have risen from 24 percent of the federal budget in 1960 to an estimated 42 percent in 1977.[16] The total federal expenditure in 1977 is estimated to be $183.0 billion.

Furthermore, income security expenditures have the potential for dramatic expansion. While the present enrollment of families eligible for AFDC is estimated at 90 percent and little growth is expected in this program, the same cannot be said about the food, housing, and health programs. Only about 50 percent of those eligible to receive food stamps actually participate in the program. Less than 15 percent of the low-income poor entitled under the law since 1968 to home ownership and rental assistance have received it because of limited appropriations. Medical costs continue to spiral upward. Continuing high rates of unemployment

and inflation contribute to the problem. In short, the cost of income transfer programs is an ever-increasing part of the feceral budget.

It is about this fact of life that President Carter refers when he says:

> In my May 2 statement I established as a goal that the new reformed system involve no higher initial cost than the present system. It was my belief that fundamental reform was possible within the confines of current expenditures if the system were made more rational and efficient. That belief has been borne out in our planning. Thereafter, Secretary Califano outlined a tentative no-cost plan which embodies the major reform we have been seeking.[17]

The President wants to keep the lid on welfare spending--a difficult task. For he frankly acknowledges that the new programs will have a total cost of $30.7 billion, which is $2.8 billion in spending above the costs of existing programs.[18] In addition, he reports that an additional $3.3 billion in tax relief may be given to working low- and moderate-income taxpayers through an expanded income tax credit.

Thus the total costs of Carter's welfare reform proposals may well be close to $35 billion rather than the lesser estimates. Even so, this does not constitute all the welfare reform anticipated by the Administration. Later in the year there will be presidential proposals for tax reform legislation and restructuring of the Social Security system.[19]

What the President is saying is that there will be little additional cost now, initially, for my welfare reform package, but it is designed to prevent any great expansion in welfare spending for the poor in the immediate future.

Controlling the growth of federal spending and reassessing the feceral government's role in society were two of the major themes in the 1976 election campaign. These are the central concerns of the Carter welfare reform proposals.

How does he plan to do this? How will welfare reform "transform the manner in which the federal government deals with the income needs of the poor, and begin to break the welfare cycle?" In this paragraph and the ones that follow, the words in quotes are the direct statements of the President.

A four-point strategy is proposed:

1. <u>Reduce the number on welfare by introducing "tougher" standard rules for eligibility.</u>

First of all, work is a mandatory precondition for many groups if they are to receive government income support. "All two-parent families, single people, childless couples, and single parents with no child under 14, are expected to work full-time and re-quired to accept available work. Single parents with children aged 7 to 14 will be required to accept part-time work which does not interfere with caring for children, and will be expected to accept full-time work where appropriate day care is available."[20]

Only those who cannot work--the aged, sick, blind, disabled, and single-parent family heads with children under 7--are exempted.

Thus the proposed program initiative would clearly establish a two-tier system of welfare recipients: (1) the upper earned-income supplement tier, and (2) the lower income-support tier.[21]

"The upper tier benefit level for a family of four will be $4,200 in 1978, approximately 65 percent of the poverty threshold and exceeding the bonus value of food stamps plus the federal share of AFDC in all but two states. The national basic benefit for aged, blind, or disabled couples and individuals exceeds the current federal SSI benefits plus the bonus value of food stamps. The Administration's proposal extends federal cash assistance for the first time to single individuals and childless couples, and estab-lishes national basic benefit levels that would be nearly 50 per-cent higher than the bonus value of food stamps.

Benefits on the lower tier are designed to preserve an incentive to work. The benefit will augment the earnings of the working poor, provide cash assistance while families and individuals search for jobs, and provide a level of income protection for children if a parent refuses to work. The proposal calls for an 8-week period of job search with a cash assistance of $2,300 for a family of four, followed by an increased benefit of $4,200 if no job is available. Benefits will be reduced after the first $3,800 of earnings by 50 cents for each dollar. A four-person family ceases to be eligible for benefits at an income of $8,400.

A wage earner in all families with children on the lower tier will be required to work. In two-parent families, the wage earner with the longest experience will be required to work. The latter provision will obviously discriminate against the woman in two-parent families where both parents desire to work, if govern-ment services are provided only for the male head.

The institution of a mandatory work requirement drastically modifies the principle that "all citizens are entitled and should regard themselves as entitled to receive an adequate income."[22] In particular, it would alter the primary goal of the Aid to Families of Dependent Children program: that of strengthening family life. It would deny that all mothers have a right to income support to enable them to take care of their children themselves and should not have to go to work. Although self-support has also been an acknowledged goal of the program since revisions in 1962, little has been done hitherto to implement this requirement administratively.[23] To be sure, there are mitigating aspects to the Administration's proposal for AFDC mothers, as indicated above. However, the proposal does away with income as a right and makes it contingent upon willingness to work.

The imposition of a work requirement is not the only change in the rules of eligibility proposed in the reform package. Changes are also required: (1) in who may apply for benefits (filing unit); (2) in the "countable income" or income that counts in determining eligibility; (3) in assessing standard assets "to assure that people with substantial assets, such as a bank account," do not receive a benefit; (4) in the nature of the accounting period; and (5) in the system for filing regular income reports. The Administration views these changes as essential because at present procedures vary greatly among the states and between the programs to be incorporated in welfare reform. The adoption of uniform rules will allow for decentralized administration of the vast program among the states while maintaining federal standards. It will also significantly reduce the number of beneficiaries of the program.

For example, the proposed change in filing unit would discourage two nuclear families on welfare from living in the same household by denying benefits to one of the families. Single persons who are not aged, blind, or disabled may apply separately for benefits only if they are living alone or with nonrelatives. The benefits of aged, blind, and disabled persons will be substantially reduced if they live in the household of another and do not bear a pro rata share of the household's expenses. Students who live away from home may not apply separately for benefits if they are claimed as dependents for federal income tax purposes.

The Administration proposes a change to "retrospective accountable periods." Present programs use prospective periods of varying lengths (3 months in SSI, 1 month in AFDC and food stamps) for determining need. An applicant's entitlement is determined by anticipating income.

The Administration's proposal will measure income retrospectively, using an applicant's actual income over the preceding 6 months. The Administration offers several weighty reasons for the change: that it would prevent families with relatively high but irregular incomes from receiving benefits; that it would help avoid the problem of overpayments; that it would prevent manipulating income and welfare through sporadic work efforts.

On the other hand, a shorter accounting period is more responsive to emergency and sporadic needs. Furthermore, shorter accounting periods have the effect of redistributing assistance to a larger population. The assumption of savings implied by longer accounting periods has not been proven in real family situations.

There is abundant evidence in the census reports and other government sources that employment for many low-income workers is sporadic, and that they are likely to work on jobs which are unprotected by unemployment insurance. Lengthening the waiting period for government assistance would be just one more hardship.[24]

It is difficult to assess the number of persons that would be affected by a change in the rules for eligibility. A variety of studies document how welfare authorities can constrain the choice of potential users of welfare by imposing a work requirement and can lower the value of assistance by making its receipt distasteful. All of these show that a change in rules and regulations can be effective for limiting the population served.[25] What they do not show very well is that they can motivate people to go to work. That is the second of the Carter strategies for welfare reform!

2.   Transform the welfare poor into the working poor whenever possible.

Not a single person is guaranteed a steady job at decent pay under the provisions of the President's Program for Better Jobs and Income, with the exception of those who administer the program. However, it promises that "a new effort" will be made by "state and local officials . . . to match low-income persons with available work in the private and public sector, . . . to assure an unbroken sequence of employment and training services, including job search, training, and placement."[26]

In essence, job opportunities are to be provided to welfare recipients, primarily to AFDC mothers and other low-income persons. This is the way that President Carter proposes "restoration of the work ethic in our country":

Dramatically reduce reliance on welfare payments by doubling the number of single-parent family heads who support their families primarily through earnings from work. Combine effective work requirements and strong work incentives with improved private sector placement services, and create up to 1.4 million public service jobs. Forty-two percent of those jobs may be taken by current AFDC recipients. Those who can work will work, and every family with a full-time worker will have an income substantially above the poverty line.

The proposed program stresses private sector employment. President Carter emphasized the principle that "incentives will always encourage full-time and part-time private sector employment." A fiscal reason is given for this by President Carter:

It is obvious that the more jobs that are made available by private industry and public regular employment and in public service jobs and training jobs, the less cash supplement will be needed.

When private sector employment is unavailable, "public training and employment should be provided." The public service jobs will be full-time and will pay the minimum wage. Training stipends will equal about 85 percent of wages from a full-time minimum wage job.

In general, state and local agencies will be responsible for the employment placement process and the public job and training programs under the supervision of the Department of Labor. Local administration of public jobs programs is one of the Carter principles for welfare reform.

The incentives for work include the following: "(a) Those whose family sitautions are such that they are deemed 'expected to work' are given a lower level of cash benefits if they do not work or if they refuse an appropriate job that has been offered. (b) Cash benefit payments are reduced for those who are earning income, but not by so much that work fails to be worthwhile. (c) The Earned Income Tax Credit will increase the financial rewards of work in regular employment compared with public service employment, by being made inapplicable to earnings from public service employment. (d) To help all single-parent families with children under 14 with the special work expense of child care, a deduction from income for child care expenses will be allowed in calculating the family's cash benefits."[27]

By providing these inducements President Carter hopes to transform the welfare poor into the working poor. The proposal is somewhat

fuzzy about the exact number of jobs that will be required, and the census data on poverty are not organized in a way that accurate estimates can be made. However, the data do indicate that almost 60 percent of the families below the poverty level had one or more persons working during 1975. Almost half of the male-headed families and a quarter of the female-headed families worked full time for below poverty-level incomes, and a large proportion worked part time. Families with male heads averaged 37 weeks of work during the year, while for female heads and unrelated individuals the average was 29 weeks during 1975.[28] If the work experience of people living below the poverty level is similar to those receiving welfare payments, it would seem that there is no lack of work motivation on their part.

While the census data are such that hard conclusions cannot be drawn, there are a number of excellent research studies on the subject. In particular, the work and welfare patterns of AFDC families can be pinpointed rather accurately. One review summarizes the research findings as follows:[29]

> The turnover in the welfare population is high. Estimates of the average number of months spent continuously (spells) on AFDC vary from under 2 years to over 3 years, reflecting regional variation. The length of spells on AFDC are associated with differences in family structure and labor-market experience. Male-headed families and families with a head who has a good chance of becoming employed are more likely than female-headed families and families of limited employability to leave welfare. Whites, those with higher nonwage income, and those with better labor-market opportunities, all have better prospects of leaving welfare. Once off welfare, nonwhites and those whose expected wage is below the legal minimum are more likely to return to welfare. Over the long term, changes in annual family income are rather small for most units in the low-income population, including AFDC families. Therefore, most low-income families remain at risk for long periods. Unemployment or other small changes frequently result in their return to welfare.

The picture that one gets of life opportunity below the poverty level is that it offers a choice between temporary low-paying jobs or welfare, and little else.

The research studies also indicate that variations in the welfare administrative structure also is of crucial importance in determining welfare experience over time. Families are more likely to remain on welfare the more generous the welfare program they face. Generosity may take the form of high guarantees, low tax rates, or lenient administration. While reemployment, the return of an

absent male head to the family, or toughened administration may result in short-term success, i.e., the removal of families from welfare dependency, such success will often be temporary.

3. The Carter reform plans to <u>standardize</u> <u>welfare</u> <u>benefits</u> <u>and</u> <u>"ensure"</u> <u>that</u> <u>work</u> <u>will</u> <u>always</u> <u>be</u> <u>more</u> <u>profitable</u> <u>than</u> <u>welfare</u>, and that a private or nonsubsidized public job will always be more profitable than a special federally funded service job." This is the third strategy for welfare reform.

Not only is there great variation currently in the welfare bene-fits among the states, but in some states it is possible to have more income on welfare than by working full time. President Carter cites several examples:[30]

*Current combined state and federal AFDC benefits for a family of four with no income vary from $720 per year in Mississippi to $5,954 in Hawaii.

*In Wisconsin, if a father quits his full-time job at an income of $5,691 (after taxes, tax credits, and food stamps) and took a half-time job at the same wage scale, his income would jump to $6,940 on welfare.

*In Michigan, a family of four with the father working full time at minimum wage has a total income of $5,678. The same-sized family, without the father in the home with still four people there, not working at all, has an income of $7,161. If the mother goes to work at minimum wage, the family has a total income of $9,530.

The solution proposed is to: (1) consolidate the three major welfare programs serving the poor (AFDC, SSI, Food Stamps) and replace them with a single system of cash assistance; (2) standar-dize the rules for eligibility among the 50 states; (3) establish a national basic benefit for all welfare recipients; (4) encourage states to add to or supplement the national basic benefit; (5) en-force the minimum wage provisions during the process of job place-ment.

Where unsubsidized jobs are found in the regular economy, they must pay at least the federal minimum wage or the state rate, if it is higher. Placement on jobs in the new Public Service Employ-ment Program is "carefully designed to avoid disruptive effects on the regular economy," and "the basic wage rate will be kept at, or where states supplement, slightly above the minimum wage."[31]

Thirteen major categories of public service jobs are identified including: aiding the elderly and the sick, providing childcare,

paraprofessionals in the schools, improving public safety, building and repairing recreational facilities, cleaning up neighborhoods and controlling insects and rodents, monitoring environmental quality, weatherizing homes to save energy, and others.

In one sense the Carter proposals represent a well-organized campaign under federal auspices to downgrade the standard of living of the welfare poor, for it is likely that the standard of living will be altered downward for those fortunate families of the welfare poor whose government checks now supply them with a higher annual income than the working poor. In order to enhance the work incentive, their income will have to be reduced below that of the working poor. Moreover, trade union members and professional groups may view the Carter proposals as a threat to their employment, for a large pool of low-paid government workers will be created if the Carter proposals are adopted--even if that is not their intent. The public service jobs are clearly identified as one-year placements, essentially for the purpose of training, and are open only to unemployed applicants who must have spent at least 5 weeks in prior search for an unsubsidized job in the regular economy. Moreover, the public jobs are restricted to work not currently being done by local and state governments.

However, there is so much work of the nature described as appropriate to subsidized employment that requires doing, and is not being done now, that a great pressure will be created on local governments to apply for the federal subsidy. Sponsorship of public job programs will not be limited to governmental auspice, but may include other nonprofit organizations as well. This will increase the demand.

Finally, the proposal states that "subsidized jobs will be used only as a last resort for those who cannot find regular nonsubsidized employment."[32] Many local communities have already passed the "last resort"; they are in fiscal crisis with high levels of persistent unemployment. This is apparent to the Carter administration, for one of the major goals of the welfare reform is "to give significant financial relief to hard-pressed state and local governments."[33]

4. Streamlining the administration of welfare programs is the fourth part of the Administration's strategy of welfare reform. To be successful, the willing and active cooperation of state and local governments is needed, for public assistance has been a shared responsibility for the past 40 years. In giving relief to "hard-pressed state and local governments," the federal government paves the way for compliance and cooperation. Administrative procedures and standards may

ultimately be established at the federal level, but they must be implemented at the local level. It is at that level that the consumer of welfare benefits becomes a part of the system.

Many of the proposals for strealining administration of welfare programs have already been discussed elsewhere in the article. However, President Carter has stated three additional objectives which seem relevant to administrative practice for their success. The are:

Reduce fraud and error, and accelerate efforts to assure that deserting fathers meet their obligations to their families.

Provide strong incentives to keep families together rather than tear them apart, by offering the dignity of useful work to family heads and by ending rules which prohibit assistance when the father of the family remains in the household.

Provide increased benefits and more sensitive treatment to those most in need.[34]

The extent of deliberate fraud on the part of the recipient has always been minimized by the Administration in its discussions of welfare reform. According to President Carter, it is "the complexity of current programs (that) leads to waste, fraud, red tape, and errors."[35] Secretary Califano amplifies the point:

"As I indicated when we went through the HEW reorganization, there is substantial error rate in these programs. We revealed that the error rate in Medicaid was running about 9 or 10 percent, meaning that 9 or 10 of every $100 we were spending was being spent on ineligible people, not necessarily because there were thieves out there, but because we were making a lot of mistakes--and the complications of the current administrative structure makes a lot of mistakes inevitable."

By consolidating the current programs into a single cash program, and by establishing uniform rules of eligibility among the states and local units, the Administration believes that it can reduce fraud and error. Its estimate of savings in the reduction of fraud and abuse, if the new system is implemented, is $0.4 billion, little more than 1 percent of the cost of the program.

While much is said in the proposals about the desirability of keeping families together, the context is largely that of fiscal economy rather than the provision of social services directed toward this end. To be sure, subsidies for childcare will be made available to mothers of young children who are required to work as

a precondition for government assistance. However, is this a program for keeping families together or keeping families apart?

Even less attention is devoted by the Administration to specific proposals to "provide increased benefits and more sensitive treatment to those in need." Sensitive treatment implies the provision of an adequate program of social services. But social services are mentioned only as a byproduct of the public services employment program. They would be performed largely by untrained personnel in programs in which the structure guarantees a complete turnover each year. It should be remembered that social services (job counseling, training, day care, rehabilitation, and personal services) are critical to an income maintenance system which deals with people on a basis of their availability for work.

To be sure, the Administration is now aware of the excessive amount of paperwork that flows through the welfare system and that is a barrier to sensitive treatment of the consumer. Secretary Califano cited an exhibit of the State of California where the welfare recipients have to fill out "7 feet of forms." "Incredible!" he exclaimed. "It is that kind of an unbelievable morass that we have leveled on the American taxpayer and the American people."[36]

The streamlining of the administration of social welfare will be a complicated and time-consuming process. If only for this reason, welfare reforms, if adopted by Congress, will not go into effect until 1981.

Will the Carter Welfare Reform Work?

There is an addiction to euphemism in the White House. Whereas President Johnson proclaimed to the nation over a decade ago that he (the Administration) would "win" the War On Poverty, now President Carter, in softer accent, makes a similar declaration for :welfare reform":

> In 1981, this program will provide for families with children and one parent able to work: (a) a total minimum income 20 percent above the 1981 poverty line if a job in the regular economy can be found; or (b) a total income 13 percent above the 1981 poverty line if a subsidized job must be provided.

To accomplish this pledge will require more in the way of a revolution than there appears to be in the welfare reform proposals of the Carter administration.

At the beginning of this article we posed the key question: Is it possible for the federal government to institute reforms that will result in better jobs and better distribution of income so that the welfare poor and the working poor can maintain a standard above abject poverty?

The Administration's answer to this question is partially in misleading and optimistic estimates such as those cited above, and partially in a realistic set of procedures aimed at establishing tight controls over runaway welfare expenditures. If these procedures are instituted and made to work, experience tells us that by 1981 conditions at least as bad and probably worse will prevail in the nation. They will be the conditions reported in the 1975 census reports: 25 to 40 million welfare and working poor with the lowest-income fifth receiving less than 4 percent of the aggregate income of the nation.

President Carter's pledge to solve the problems of poverty is based on the contingency: "if a job in the regular economy can be found." This contingency is not underlined in the quote above. Nor does it receive appropriate attention in his proposals for welfare reform. Instead it is stressed that public employment will be offered, but "as a last resort," that "incentives will always encourage . . . private sector employment," that the program is "carefully designed to avoid disruptive effects on the regular economy."

Thus the Administration is placing its faith in the theory of the fluidity of poverty. The nation will take care of the "hard core" welfare poor--the aged, sick, blind, disabled, and the mothers of preschoolers. But millions of others below the poverty level will have only "a new effort by state and local officials" to prepare and help them find "job opportunities." Not a single person is guaranteed a job except at minimum pay for a short period of time in the Public Service Employment Program.

There is not enough in the President's proposal either to achieve better jobs or a decent income for people in poverty. In fact, the phrase, "a decent income for those who cannot work" disappears from the final version of the proposal, although it was identified as one of the major goals in the original. The federal government promises only a national basic income benefit of up to 65 percent of the poverty threshold for its favored upper tier of subsidized worker-families, and the balance is up to the beneficence of state and local governments--which are already suffering a fiscal crunch. All the poor, favored and unfavored, are left with is an opportunity for better jobs if they can be found in the regular economy.

On the other hand, there are some good things and some bad things in the proposals for the reform of welfare administration, if arrangements can be worked out with Congress and the 50 states. Among the good things are the consolidation of allied welfare programs, the transformation of benefits into cash benefits, and some of the procedures to make management more efficient and effective. Among the bad things are the many restrictions that would reduce the eligibility of poor people for government aid: subsistence income would no longer be the right of all needy mothers of dependent children, but a privilege to be conferred upon the few who are not required to work.

One set of difficult-to-enforce eligibility criteria is substituted for another set of difficult-to-enforce criteria. A critical problem in this respect is the difficulty of determination of the willingness to work. Friedman and Hausman state the issue succinctly:

> As a practical matter, work tests are unlikely to operate so easily, since much unemployment is involuntary, resulting from labor-market conditions beyond the control of the worker. In addition, some workers have characteristics that employers do not want, making it especially difficult for them to get jobs. Thus work tests cannot require actual work effort of all; they can only demand some sort of evidence that the unemployed worker is seeking a job actively. The actual work requirement can be applied only once a job is available. Prior to that point, work tests usually are work registration requirements requiring only work search on the part of the registrant. However, a test of job search rather than a straightforward requirement of work opens opportunities for evasion. It is not necessarily a success for a work test to return a person to work; that would probably happen anyway. The critical test induces a person into a job more quickly than he would go on his own. Since voluntary unemployment is largely a matter of timing, it is not obvious that a work test will succeed . . . Thus although a work test seems like an obvious device to increase work effort, careful investigation is required to determine whether this is actually the case.[37]

Major social policies such as welfare reform should be based on the findings of empirical research whenever possible, rather than on strictly political considerations. There is little certain evidence that the extensive research on the work and welfare patterns of low-income families has been considered adequately. In contrast, the proposals seem to ignore even the obvious findings of the Bureau of the Census on the persistence and intransi-

gence of poverty, which occurs despite the evidence of widespread work experience among the poor.

Apparently Congress is not waiting for the Carter welfare reform proposals before taking action of its own. In fact, hearings are presently being conducted which would effect many of the changes that are included in the Carter proposals. However, not all of the proposals are beneficent in character. Commerce Secretary Juanita Kreps calls for the withholding of Social Security benefits until recipients reach 68, which runs counter to the present provision of benefits at the ages of 62 and 65. She believes this is necessary to restore Social Security to financial health: actuaries have predicted that the first of several Social Security funds will go dry in fiscal year 1979. This evoked a strong protest from HEW Secretary Califano:

> I absolutely don't agree with that. I think the Older Americans of this country have worked for years, 30, 40, and some of them 50 years, and we have promised them that at age 65 there'll be Social Security benefits to help then to have a comfortable and dignified life as senior citizens."[38]

According to the analysis presented above, the Administration has failed to provide a federal solution to the income and full employment needs of the poor. Does this mean that this is an impossible task for the government to achieve?

The position of the author is that it is not!

An economy capable of generating a gross national product in excess of $1.5 trillion is one that should be able to provide an estimated before-tax income for a family of four of $17,912, or almost $18,000. This is based on statistical calculations from the Department of Commerce by Pamela Roby. She concludes: "In other words, if income were distributed equally or even nearly equally in the United States, not one family or individual would be poor."[39]

Whether income is distributed according to a work requirement or free of it is another question. Certainly there is a backlog of unfulfilled material, cultural, and service needs that are required in the nation that would benefit all of its citizenry, not just the poor. The planning and accomplishment of this work would use millions of workers. And if it seemed that the work was about to run out, then the work week might be shortened, with the dollar savings from this given to the workers or the citizenry at large. Such a plan does not demand either public ownership of the means of production or that work be performed under public auspices,

provided that the owners of the means of production and the citizenry are willing to empower their government to institute the plan.

Such a proposal, of course, seems Utopian under present conditions in the United States. However, anything less than this is unlikely to accomplish the goal of better jobs and decent living standards advocated in the Carter proposals.

Some less radical solutions are also available if the will to implement them exists. For example, the federal government expenditures in fiscal 1977 will amount to about $452.0 billion, about a quarter of the gross national product. There should be ways to allocate government expenditures in the future other than about $1.5 trillion for social welfare and almost $1.0 trillion for defense in the next 5 years.[40] It is ironic that the interest on the national debt is estimated at $40.3 billion for fiscal 1977, as compared with the estimated $35.0 billion for the costs of the Carter welfare reforms.

One source of funds suggested by the Administration to pay for the costs of welfare reform was the rebate of per capita shares of the Wellhead Tax Revenue to low-income people under the National Energy Plan. It is estimated that this would produce an estimated $1.3 billion in fiscal 1978.

This transfer procedure suggests others which also should be supported. Congresswoman Holtzman in 1976 and Congressman Mitchell in 1977 proposed transfer amendments to the Congressional Budgeting Committee which, if passed by Congress, would have relocated about $10.0 billion from the development of new weapons systems and other military expenditures to a variety of social programs such as those suggested in the Carter proposals. They would also have provided relief to state and local governments to meet the work and training needs of the unemployed. Such transfer amendments should be supported.

A minimal plan to accomplish welfare reform would be the support of bills already in the legislative hopper, such as the Humphrey-Hawkins bill for full employment, the Harrington Youth Employment Act, and many bills that call for an upward revision of the minimum wage. Welfare reform probably will come in incremental steps rather than at one fell swoop. And there will be intense struggles every step of the way.

All that is required is the willingness of the citizenry, translated into pressure on Congress to do their part. Of course, given the present lack of imagination and inertia that character-

izes the administrative and legislative wings of the government, as well as the structural barriers that hinder reform, it will nevertheless take concentrated effort by an organized public to make government fly.

In the interests of the working poor and the welfare poor, we must ask for a better effort from the Carter administration. The pernicious consequences of widespread increasing poverty and unemployment demand a more imperative implementation of the timetable than 1981, which is that proposed for welfare reform.

FOOTNOTES

1. Statement of Secretary Joseph Califano, Jr., on Welfare Reform, HEW News, May 25, 1977, p. 2.

2. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 106, "Characteristics of the Population Below the Poverty Level: 1975," U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1977, pp. 1-2.

3. The estimates contained in this paragraph are derived from Table 7, p. 41, and Table 13, p. 57, of the Bureau of the Census report on money income, op. cit. The reader should be cautioned that families and unrelated individuals in the lowest-income fifth do not correspond to those below the poverty level. Because of different methods of reporting, an exact comparison cannot be made with the existing documents.

4. John L. Palmer and Joseph J. Minarik, "Income Security Policy,' in Henry Owen and Charles L. Schultze (eds.), Setting National Priorities, the Next Ten Years. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976), p. 520.

5. Ibid., p. 525.

6. Money income is the sum of the amounts received from earnings; Social Security and public assistance payments; dividends, interest, and rent; unemployment and workmen's compensation, government and private pensions; and other periodic income. Furthermore, money income is computed before payments for personal income taxes and deductions for Social Security, union dues, Medicare, etc. However, it should be noted that income from nonmoney transfers such as food stamps, health benefits, and subsidized housing--as well as capital gains-- are not included in computations.

7. The Bureau of the Census distinguishes three major sources of
    income in this report: (1) earnings only, (2) earnings and
    income other than earnings, and (3) income only. The first
    and third categories are relatively discrete as compared with
    the second category. The first category identifies workers
    whose income derives entirely from wages and salaries or
    self-employment. The third category identifies those persons
    who have no earned income; they live largely on government
    transfer payments and pensions, with only a small number also
    having incomes from property in combination with these other
    sources. The second category includes both earnings and
    income from property.

8. These statistical facts are borrowed from Pamela Roby (ed.),
    The Poverty Establishment. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
    Hall, 1974), p. 7.

9. The data on which the chart is based appear in Table 31,
    pp. 130-131, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population
    Reports, Series P-60, No. 105, "Money Income in 1975 of
    Families and Persons in the U.S.," U.S. Government Printing
    Office, Washington, D.C., 1977.

10. Op. cit., Henry Owen and Charles L. Schultze, p. 335. See
    also Table 8.5, p. 333.

11. Statement by President Carter on Welfare Reform, August 6,
    1977, p. 2.

12. Statement by President Carter on Welfare Reform, May 2, 1977,
    p. 1.

13. Alfred M. Skolnik and Sophie R. Dales, "Social Welfare Expen-
    ditures, Fiscal Year 1976," Social Security Bulletin, Vol. 40,
    No. 1 (January 1977), p. 1.

14. Statement by President Carter, August 6, 1977, op. cit.,
    pp. 4-5.

15. The item on Wellhead Tax Revenues refers to a provision in
    the National Energy Plan which calls for rebate of the
    wellhead tax revenues to taxpayers through the income tax
    system and to "the poor who do not pay taxes," in effect
    through income maintenance programs.

16. Palmer and Minarik, op. cit., pp. 507-509, 515-519.

17. Statement by President Carter, August 6, 1977, op. cit., p. 4.

18. Ibid., p. 6.

19. Press conference at the White House on welfare reform, May 2, 1977, involving President Carter, Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Joseph A. Califano, Jr., and Secretary of Labor F. Ray Marshall, p. 5.

20. Statement by President Carter, August 6, 1977, op. cit., p. 8.

21. The following paragraphs excerpt freely from the HEW News, "Proposal for Welfare Reform," August 6, 1977.

22. National Association of Social Workers, "Issues in Developing a NASW Position on Welfare Reform," mimeographed paper, June 1977.

23. Mildred Rein, "Social Services as a Work Strategy," Social Services Review, Vol. 49, No. 4 (December 1975), pp. 516-538.

24. Barry L. Freedman and Leonard J. Hausman, Work and Welfare Patterns in Low Income Families. (The Florence Heller School for Advanced Studies in Social Welfare, Brandeis University, Waltham, Massachusetts, June 1975), p. 19.

25. Bruno S. Albin and Bruno Steir, "The Constrained Demand for Public Assistance," Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Summer 1968), pp. 300-311. See also Frances Fox Pivin and Richard A. Cloward, Regulating the Poor, The Functions of Public Welfare. (New York: Random House, 1971), Chapter 5.

26. Statement by President Carter on Welfare Reform, August 6, 1977, p. 7.

27. Proposal for "Welfare Reform," HEW News, August 6, 1977, p. 26.

28. See Table 26 and Table 27, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Series P-60, No. 106, pp. 105, 106, 110, 112, 113.

29. Friedman and Hausman, op. cit., pp. 28-30. The following paragraphs paraphrase these findings.

30. Statement by President Carter, August 6, 1977, op. cit., p. 2; Press Conference, May 2, 1977, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

31. Statement by President Carter, August 6, 1977, op. cit., p. 7.

32. Proposal for "Welfare Reform," op. cit., p. 6.

33. Statement by President Carter, August 6, 1977, op. cit., p. 2.

34. Ibid., pp. 1-2.

35. Ibid., p. 2.

36. Press conference, May 2, 1977, op. cit., p. 7.

37. Friedman and Hausman, op. cit., pp. 233-234.

38. The Seattle Times, August 28, 1977.

39. Social and Economics Statistics Administration, Department of Commerce, Press Release BEA73-33, "Total and Per Capita Personal Income by States, 1972." In Pamela Roby, op. cit., p. 2.

40. These estimates are the government's own, listed in the Senate Budget Committee release titled "Committee Reports for FY 1977 Budget Adjustments," February 10, 1977, and the First Concurrent Resolution of the Budget--Fiscal Year 1977, Appendix D. They are included in the author's mimeographed paper, "The Implications of the New Congressional Budgeting Process for Legislative Action," presented at the Council for Social Work Education, Phoenix, Arizona, 1977.

CREATIVE RESTITUTION:
A STUDY OF DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE PATTERNS

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ABSTRACT

Creative restitution offers considerable potential to the field of criminal justice. The concept is of historical significance for it has been an important element in a variety of cultures. Yet, the notion of restitution or permitting an offender to make amends is not a significant element in our society. This paper explores the responses of a variety of populations to creative restitution. A number of findings were of significance including strong support for and acceptance of the concept by diverse groups.

For years a call has been made to criminal justice professionals and writers in the field, develop new alternatives and directions, for what we have been doing in the past does not work! Creative restitution is such an alternative.

Although restitution has been known for hundreds of years, its significance as an alternative and sanction in criminal justice is a rather recent development. Restitution has been a significant concept over the centuries and has had a vital place in a variety of cultures. Restitution has been a concept of prominent importance, historically, to our system of law and criminal justice. A primary foundational support for the concept of restitution is its concern for the motivations and psychological dynamics of the offender. Evidence for this concern in "primitive" criminal law can be found in Germanic law, Roman law, Babylonian and ancient Persian law, as

well as in contemporary primitive laws.

An indication of the extremely limited utilization of restitution is manifested by the number of programs in operation. A program which is related to creative restitution is that of Community Service Volunteers in England. Juveniles identified as delinquents function as volunteers and are placed in a variety of programs and projects in the community with their volunteer work comprising an important element of their own institutional or school program.[1]

One of the few programs which utilized restitution in the United States is described as follows:

> The Minnesota restitution program is the first systematic attempt to apply the idea of restitution to a community-based correctional center. The program has two distinct phases -- the negotiation of contracts for restitution, which takes place at the prison, and implementation of restitution, which occurs after the offender is released to the center.[2]

Thus, its use is limited although the potential appears well substantiated.

> Creative restitution,

> is a process in which an offender, under appropriate supervision, is helped to find some way to make amends to those he has hurt by his offense.[3]

It refers to "...payments in either goods, services, or money, made by offenders to the victims of their crimes."[4] Creative restitution, as it is conceptualized here also refers to services provided by the offender to the community and to the general "community good." Thus, it may take three forms: monetary payments to the victim, service to the victim, and service to the general community. While it is not mandatory that the offender make restitution directly to the victim, where this is possible it is considered. Creative restitution is concerned with the individual offender's responsibility and reform, the focus being on the offender as well as the victim.

The characteristics of the creative restitutional act have been described as follows:

1. It is an active effortful role on the part of the offender.
2. This activity has socially constructive consequences.
3. These constructive consequences are related to the offense.
4. The relationship between offense and restitution is reparative, restorative.
5. The reparation may leave the situation better than before the offense was committed.[5]

The contractual relationship between the offender and the victim is an important element in creative restitution. It is through this contract that the amount, as well as the form, of the restitutional act will be decided upon. This contractual relationship, in bringing together the two parties, serves as the vehicle for possible dynamic behavior change. The relationship which is developed between the offender and the victim offers a great deal of potential to both parties.

It is felt that two forms of creative restitution, service to the victim and service to the community, may offer the greatest potential to the offender, i.e., symbolic restitution. Monetary payments could possibly lack the level of social investment and involvement that might be present in the other two forms. An issue in the literature is that of full payment in a symbolic fashion. In the development of the restitutional contract there are a number of variables which contribute to the determination of the form as well as the amount of restitution. There should ideally be some parity between the damage of the offense and the subsequent restitution. It does not necessarily follow that monetary payment is the best way to fulfill this obligation. The service performed for the victim by the offender is limitless, although ideally it should be related to the offense. In many cases, such as victimless crimes, lack of victim participation in a restitutional contract, or in the case of groups of institutionalized offenders, it is not possible for the offender to provide a direct service to the victim. In this situation the offender would provide a service to the larger community which might ideally, but not necessarily, be related to the offense; yet the restitutive act would be of social value. Critical elements in creative restitution are that the restitution be related, when possible, to the offense and that the restitution not be imposed on the offender, but developed through a contractual relationship between the offender and the victim. The offender cannot be forced or made to become involved in the creative restitution process by criminal justice personnel. It should, in effect, be voluntary on the part of the offender, as far as this is possible in the criminal justice system.

Creative restitution offers significant potential because it relates to, and has implications for, a variety of personal dynamics and processes including self-respect, self-esteem, self-concept, individual basic needs, guilt, anxiety, responsibility, treatment interventions or therapy, and the victims themselves.

Methodology

Since a primary concern of the present study was the determination of differential attitudes toward the innovative approach of creative restitution, this factor helped to determine the research methodology. The overall study sample was comprised of six populations, which was an important dimension of the research. The populations included police, second year social work graduate students, members of a women's community service organization, probation officers, juvenile parole officers, and parole officers. The writers felt that by utilizing various subsamples, the variety of attitudinal patterns was of greater significance. Because of the very nature of criminal justice, a number of community groups were of importance in achieving an increased understanding of attitudes in relation to creative restitution.

One subsample which is not often included in such research studies is the police. It was felt that since the police represent such a significant population in the criminal justice system, their inclusion in the study was important. The rationale for studying second year social work graduate students was two-fold. The inclusion of some element of the professional community in the human services was needed. This population, in general, could be described as being "outside" of the criminal justice system, although of primary importance in the human services area. Since second year students, at the time of data collection, were very near graduation and entrance into the professional community, their inclusion in this study was felt to be justified. A third subsample included in the present study was that of members of a women's community service organization. The inclusion of a population which tended to reflect general community attitudes was quite important to incorporate into the study. Due to sampling problems which would be encountered if the general population was utilized, it was decided to use a population which was assumed to tend to represent the broad general community. The fourth subsample included in the present study was a State Probation Department. This subsample was significant to incorporate into the present study, in part, because of the wide

diversity which was present in the terms of the officers, as well as their duties and responsibilities. Also, since probation is a primary service delivery system in criminal justice, its incorporation into the present study was needed. An additional subsample consisted of juvenile parole officers. It was felt that juvenile parole officers were an important element in the criminal justice system and represented a distinct subsample which needed to be studied if a comprehensive approach was to have been undertaken. The sixth subsample was comprised of adult parole officers. The rationale for including this subsample was two-fold. First, parole represents an integral element in the criminal justice system and, in addition, this particular subsample represented a different geographical section of the country than the other subsamples.

With one exception, i.e., the women's community service organization, the entire population of subsamples were utilized in the research sample. Random sampling was utilized in relation to the women's community service organization subsample. Seven hundred and five data collection instruments were distributed, of these, 427 were returned and utilized in the study. The percentage of return which was utilized ranged from 34.1 to 76.3 for the subsamples, while the percentage of return for the over-all study sample was 60.5.

The entire data collection instrument was developed by one of the writers. The research instrument which was used to operationally measure creative restitution was the Creative Restitution Questionnaire.[6] Pilot tests and a pretest were utilized in the development of the data collection instrument. The creative restitution questionnaire was developed as an operational measure of creative restitution. Factors such as the rudimentary knowledge level regarding creative restitution and the need for an over-view of attitudes and reactions to the concept indicated that a questionnaire was the most appropriate type of data collection instrument. In order to obtain "wide-ranging" data and information, a number of dimensions were incorporated. These dimensions concerning creative restitution included: its potential value; use as a rehabilitative approach; appropriateness with various offender types; familiarity with the concept; the concept as a substitute for imprisonment; the contractual relationship; its limited utilization; reactions to type of forms of creative restitution; use in phases of the criminal justice system; level of interest in the concept; and open-ended questions relating to comments regarding creative restitution.

Reliability and validity measures were conducted in the development of the instrument. The test-retest method of reliability was used which incorporated the Spearman rank-order correlation test. The coefficient in measuring the test-retest score was .71, significant at the .01 level. Validity measures which were used included logical validation and predictive validity of the concurrent type. Descriptive statistics were computed as was the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance and content analysis.

A primary purpose of the study was a determination of community attitudes toward the innovative approach of creative restitution. In addition, attitudes toward various dimensions of the concept were of interest. The research hypothesis was:

> Attitudes held toward creative restitution will vary according to the specific subsamples.

Findings

The demographic data revealed that the study sample was relatively young, that is, the majority were 35 years of age or younger. Most of the respondents were male and were predominantly married with religious preference being Protestant. The vast majority were Caucasian. The study sample ranked high in educational level, that is, the vast majority were at least college graduates with a large percentage having taken some graduate work, in the process of completing graduate work, or having completed graduate work. The high educational level was obviously associated with the nature of the subsamples or populations.

A related, although not primary, focus of the present paper was the inclusion of five punishment subscales related to dimensions of punishment. The dimensions include retribution, deterrence, social defense, rehabilitation, and the impact of imprisonment.[7]

Initially, a descriptive analysis of the attitudinal variable, creative restitution, was conducted. The median statistic was computed for the creative restitution variable in relation to each subsample and is presented in Table 1. The median score values which were obtained were evaluated in relation to a theoretical or hypothesized median.[8]

Each of the six subsamples scored considerably higher than the theoretical or hypothesized median. This reflected one of the most

TABLE I

The Median Statistic for the Attitudinal Study Variable,
Creative Restitution, for Each of the Subsamples and
the Over-All Study Sample

	Police	Second Year Social Work Graduate Students	Members of Women's Community Service Organization	Juvenile Parole Officers	Parole Officers	Probation Officers	Overall Study Sample
Creative Restitution	61.50	72.75	72.58	72.17	69.00	70.79	70.14

important findings of the present study, the acceptance of and strong support for, the concept of creative restitution. All six of the study populations reflected such support, including the police and the members of the women's community service organization. This reflects a strong base of support and general endorsement of the concept of creative restitution.

The Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance was utilized to test the hypothesis that the subsamples or community groups will respond differentially to creative restitution. The Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance was computed in relation to the attitudinal variables and the six subsamples with the results presented in Table 2. The average rank scores indicated significant difference at the .001 level among the six subsamples as to creative restitution. Therefore, the hypothesis was accepted.

TABLE 2

The Study Populations and the Attitudinal
Variable, Creative Restitution, by Average Rank Scores

	Creative Restitution[a]
Police	316.99
Second Year Social Work Graduate Students	180.19
Juvenile Parole Officers	177.95
Parole Officers	232.61
Probation Officers	204.97
Members of a Women's Community Service Organization	172.16

[a] $H = 57.20$; 5d.f.;
   p   .001, significant

An important finding of the study was that the six populations responded differentially to creative restitution. The women's service organization reflected the highest level of support for creative restitution, followed by juvenile parole officers, social

work students, probation officers, parole officers, and police. Of considerable importance was the finding that the women's service organization, representing some degree of general community attitude, demonstrated the highest level of support for creative restitution.

The previously discussed findings, when considered in relation to related findings, are indeed of importance. One finding of interest was that all of the punishment scales, with the exception of rehabilitation, were negatively correlated with creative restitution.[9] The rehabilitation scale was positively correlated with creative restitution. Although negative correlations existed between the punishment scales and creative restitution, positive support for creative restitution was present as was indicated by previous findings. A related additional primary finding was that people in favor of and supporting the traditional concepts of punishment respond positively, but less positively, toward creative restitution than people holding favorable attitudes toward rehabilitation.

Several individual items were of particular importance in the present discussion. The overwhelming majority of the study sample indicated that creative restitution is of potential value to the criminal justice system and would be quite useful as a rehabilitative approach. The respondents felt that restitution would be most appropriate with property offenses, such as auto theft, shoplifting, income tax evasion, and possibly drunk driving and burglary. Conversely, restitution was viewed as inappropriate for offenses against persons, such as rape, manslaughter, armed robbery, and assault. The study sample indicated that restitution could be a substitute for imprisonment with some types of offenders. In general, the respondents viewed as realistic the development of a contractual relationship between an offender and victim. Monetary payments and service to the community were considered to have somewhat greater potential than service to the victim. The vast majority of the respondents were interested in the concept of restitution.

Because of the utilization of several open-ended items in the study instrument, content analysis was incorporated. This type of analysis concerned four items, the responses being studied in relation to various study populations. The first question to be considered asked:

Why do you think that creative restitution has not been utilized or implemented to any greater extent than it has

in the criminal justice system?

Content analysis was applied to this item with the results in Table 3. The three probation and parole subsamples were combined into one population, while the second population utilized in this analysis consisted of the police.

TABLE 3

The Application of Content Analysis Regarding the
Utilization or Implementation of Creative
Restitution

	Police		Probation-Parole	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Administrative Difficulties (Individualization, Time, Money, Personnel)	12	20.7	48	20.7
Public Resistance	8	13.8	6	2.6
Criminal Justice System Punishment Oriented and Resistant to Change	14	24.1	65	28.0
Lack of Education and Awareness of the Concept	2	3.4	28	12.0
Victims and Criminals Resistant to Creative Restitution, Criminals Not Responsible--No Concern for the Victim	11	19.0	35	15.1
No Answer	11	19.0	50	21.6
Total	58	100.00	232	100.00

Both populations identified the criminal justice system's punishment orientation and resistance to change as the primary reason why creative restitution has not been utilized or implemented to any greater degree than it has, while administrative difficulties were cited by both populations. The third reason cited was that victims and criminals would be resistant to creative restitution. A higher percentage of probation-parole officers than police indicated that a lack of education and awareness of the concept was responsible for the lack of utilization and implementation.

Several quotes are presented which reflect response to this item:

Difficulty in contracting and supervising such programs. Each is, or should be, unique, and therefore require considerable effort to establish and supervise. Community is not generally aware of restitution, it would take community education.

A probation officer stated:

Because it is a very personalized approach and would take time and involvement by public and criminal justice system. The criminal justice system has been slow to adopt a treatment oriented philosophy rather than a punitive one.

A police officer indicated that:

For the same reasons many other innovations haven't been implemented; lack of concern, politics, lack of enforced "punishment," a general feeling of frustration, and economics.

Finally, a parole officer suggested that:

The criminal justice system has not been and is not aggressive in the establishment of new programs, and is resistant to change. Both criminals and victims might be resistant to the concept.

An important finding related to this item was that both police and probation-parole officers perceived the criminal justice system's punishment orientation and resistance to change as the reason for the lack of utilization or implementation. Apparently,

there was some agreement regarding the orientation and resistance of the system. Related to this finding was the relatively large percentage of both populations who cited administrative difficulties as reason for the lack of utilization or implementation.

The second item to be described and considered by content analysis was as follows:

Please make any comments you wish regarding the concept of creative restitution; such as its application to the criminal justice system, the appropriateness of the development of such a program, your reactions to the concept, etc.

Content analysis was applied to this item with the results presented in Table 4. The probation and parole officer subsamples were combined, while the second population utilized consisted of the women's community service organization.

The vast majority of both populations supported creative restitution without qualification, while a sizable percentage reflected support with qualifications, such as: it depends on the community; limited potential, that is, it is expensive, difficult to administer, control and implement; applicable for only some offenders, that is, first offenders, juveniles, and nonviolent; and need for research. With these qualifications in mind, the over-whelming majority supported and agreed with the concept. A higher percentage of members of the women's community service organization supported creative restitution without qualification than probation-parole officers, while a higher percentage of probation-parole officers felt creative restitution was applicable for only some offenders, i.e., first offenders, juveniles, and those classified as nonviolent.

Several representative responses to this item are presented below:

I feel and have felt for some time that restitution is the most meaningful part of probation, but that it has not been treated with sufficient respect. The more direct the connection there is between offense and court action, the more meaning it has for the offender and the less expensive it is for the state.

-579-

TABLE 4

The Application of Content Analysis Regarding the
Concept of Creative Restitution

	Women's Community Service Organization		Probation-Parole	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Support the Concept	59	74.7	135	58.0
Disagree with the Concept	1	1.3	5	2.2
Depends on the Community	3	3.8	11	4.6
Limited Potential; Expensive, Difficult to Administer, Control, and Implement	2	2.5	14	6.0
Applicable for only Some Offenders; 1st Offenders Juveniles, Nonviolent	10	12.7	47	20.2
Need for Pilot Program, Research	2	2.5	5	2.2
No Answer	2	2.5	15	6.8
Total	79	100.00	232	100.00

A member of the women's community service organization stated that:

> It would take a massive education process to convince
> the general public and all who deal hostilely with
> prisoners (prison employees) that creative restitution
> would work, but I feel it is well worth the effort.
> Our present way of dealing with offenders is hopelessly
> inadequate in view of modern life.

A primary finding of this study was reflected by response to
this item, that is, overwhelming support for the concept of creative
restitution. An important finding was that, not only was community
support as represented by the community service organization at a
high level, but in fact, it exceeded the support of criminal justice
personnel. This finding indicated that very strong support for the
concept was present, with minimal qualification.

The third item to be described and considered by content analysis
is as follows:

> In your opinion, what do you think is the best way to change
> offenders' criminal behavior?

Content analysis was applied to this item with the results presented
in Table 5. Probation and parole officer subsamples were again
combined, while the second population utilized consisted of the
police. Considerable difference was present with regard to the
responses of the two populations. Police officers, to a much
greater extent than probation-parole officers, indicated that
behavior change is best achieved by a standardization and uniformity
in court processes. A considerable percentage suggested that a
differential approach of punishment and rehabilitation was the best
way to change offender behavior. A large percentage of probation-
parole officers indicated that rehabilitative efforts changed
criminal behavior, followed by a differential approach of punishment
and rehabilitation, and then community based corrections programs.

Several quotes are presented which reflected response to this
item:

> First, the offender has to be made aware that he is
> responsible for his action. Creative restitution is
> right in line with this. Plea bargaining is at odds
> with this. The court process needs to be more swift

TABLE 5

The Application of Content Analysis Regarding
Offender Behavioral Change

	Police		Probation-Parole	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Rehabilitative-Therapeutic Efforts, Counseling, Education, Job Training, etc.	10	17.2	70	30.2
Standardization, Uniformity; Court Processes, Definite Sentences, Punishment Fit the Crime, etc.	20	34.5	20	8.6
Prevention; Alleviate Social Conditions Which Produce Crime	2	3.5	15	6.5
Rehabilitation and Punishment	12	20.7	35	15.1
Responsibility for Actions, Motivations	1	1.7	10	4.3
Community Based Programs	2	3.5	25	10.8
Change Prison Environment, Humanize the System, Reduce Caseloads	1	1.7	20	8.6
No Answer	10	17.2	37	15.9
Total	58	100.00	232	100.00

and definite.

A police officer commented:

> Standardization and uniformity in sentencing; fear of
> quick and meaningful punishment; elimination of plea
> bargaining, so offenders know what to expect.

Finally, another respondent stated:

> Remove the social evils that lead to criminal behavior
> (Preventative): Poor education, unemployment, slum
> housing, boring and uncreative work, etc. Keep first
> offenders removed from contact with repeaters. Provide
> services, such as counseling, education, supervision,
> job training, etc.

An important finding related to the felt need for standardization
and uniformity in court processes as a way to change criminal
behavior. Responses to this item suggested that standardization
and uniformity is not present, but that it was felt that it could
lead to offender behavior change. Rehabilitative and therapeutic
efforts were suggested as methods of behavior change by both
populations as was a differential approach consisting of both
rehabilitation and punishment. Thus, three orientations were
considered primary in criminal behavior change, which indicated a
lack of consensus regarding the changing of criminal behaviors.

The fourth and final item to be considered by content analysis
is as follows:

> In your opinion, what changes, if any, need to be made
> in the penal system in this country?

Content analysis was applied to this item with the results presented
in Table 6. Probation and parole officer subsamples were again
combined, while the second population utilized was the women's
community service organization. Only slight difference was found
concerning the responses of the two populations. Both populations
identified standardization and uniformity as primary changes that
should be made in the penal system. This was followed by a need
for community based corrections and increased rehabilitative and
therapeutic orientation.

TABLE 6

The Application of Content Analysis Regarding
Changes in the Penal System

	Women's Community Service Organization		Probation-Parole	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Standardization, Uniformity in Court System, Definite Sentences, Less Plea Bargaining, etc.	25	31.6	60	25.9
Increased Rehabilitative Therapeutic Orientation	16	20.3	40	17.2
Community Based Corrections; More Alternatives for Offenders	20	25.3	40	17.2
Modernize the System; Better Facilities, Better Trained Staff, More Money, etc.	3	3.8	24	10.4
Abolish Penal System and Start Over	0	0.0	12	5.2
Prevention	5	6.3	20	8.6
No Answer	10	12.7	36	15.5
Total	79	100.00	232	100.00

Several quotes are presented which indicate response to this item:

>Drastic changes need to be made. Perhaps we still need to shut up some serious offenders, but the majority should stay in the community with positive efforts to help them overcome their anti-social behaviors. Also, I would like to see community residences for 8 - 15 people, providing treatment services, but community based.

A probation-parole officer stated:

>There are too many inconsistencies in sentencing, there should be less plea bargaining, and more strict enforcement of the laws.

Finally, a member of the women's community service organization indicated:

>More therapeutic and rehabilitative services in the penal system and community based programs to aid in the reintegration and return of the offender back to the community.

An important finding related to this item was the similarity and commonality of response patterns of these two rather diverse populations. As previously discussed, both identified standardization and uniformity in the court system as the primary change needed, followed by community based corrections and increased rehabilitative orientation. An important finding was the felt need for rehabilitative services as well as the community based corrections programs.

Study Implications

The most significant finding of the present research study was the strong support for, and acceptance of, creative restitution. Often, initial reaction to such a criminal justice concept is that it will not be accepted within the criminal justice system or outside of the system because it is too idealistic and not focused to the reality of the situation. Support did vary somewhat in relation to the study populations, although strong support was present in each of the populations. The finding that creative restitution was supported by the police and members of the women's community service organization had considerable meaning. The very nature of police

work would appear to be conducive to skepticism and criticism of such offender rehabilitation programs, especially one concerned with offender-victim and offender-community contracts. Many times offender rehabilitation programs are viewed as too idealistic or not in keeping with reality, yet this attitude was not present. Not only did this suggest that police are supportive of creative restitution, but that police can continue to function in their role in the community, yet agree with such a concept.

A related finding of considerable importance concerned the support for, and acceptance of, creative restitution by the community group included in the study sample. Members of a women's community service organization demonstrated such support. As was previously discussed, this was only suggestive of some community attitudinal patterns as well as that of community leadership. Because of the criminal justice system's sensitivity to, and awareness of, community or societal attitudes, frequently a preconceived expectation limits program implementation or the testing of a potentially significant concept. However, the present study indicated that, at least, this community group supported the concept of creative restitution.

Thus, populations both within and outside of the criminal justice system which might be perceived to disagree with a concept such as creative restitution, in fact, according to the study sample, supported it and indicated it had considerable potential. Therefore, it is suggested that implementation of creative restitution programs may arouse less resistance and, in fact, be supported by significant groups both within and outside of the criminal justice system as reflected by the study population.

The significance of the previously discussed findings must be considered in relation to a finding concerning the support for creative restitution even though support was present for the traditional concepts of punishment, i.e., retribution, deterrence, social defense, rehabilitation, and impact of imprisonment.[10] Support for these concepts was found to be present even though creative restitution was also supported. The most revealing was the support for retribution. Police and other groups may tend to have a retributionist orientation, yet at the same time, support creative restitution. It must be assumed that creative restitution is perceived and conceptualized differentially by various groups. Thus, police and other groups viewed creative restitution as an element of punishment or containing aspects of punishment. It can be concluded that the

concept has great appeal to traditionally conservative elements in the population. Liberals support restitution since it entails more than merely imprisonment; conservatives are attracted to the concept because it forces offenders to be responsible for their actions and pay for their crimes.[11] It is further suggested that restitution also serves deterrence and rehabilitation.[12] It can be concluded that creative restitution programs would appear to not only be accepted but also supported by divergent elements of society.

In analyzing the findings, implications are inherent for further programming. Even though research appears to indicate strong support for creative restitution, implementing the concept may meet with some resistance. Implementing a restitution program might be aided by several findings which reflect differential responses to the concept. Restitution was viewed as more appropriate for property offenders than for offenses involving persons. Restitution as a substitute for imprisonment with some types of offenders was supported. Creative restitution is strongly supported as a supplementary rehabilitative tool. Although some hesitancy was present, support was evident for the contractual relationship element of creative restitution. Even though monetary restitution was perceived as most appropriate at the present time, strong support was found for community service as well as service to the victim. From these findings it can be concluded that support would be greatest for a restitution program if it was limited to property offenders, used in combination with other criminal justice programming, involved the contractual relationship which was closely supervised, and consisted of preferably monetary restitution to the victim or service to the general community.

Although not a focus of the present discussion, support has been found for reconceptualizing restitution as a dimension of punishment.[13] This further supports the finding that people appear to support creative restitution while also supporting different aspects of punishment. Attitudinal patterns appear to be inherent in such a finding.

The open ended items produced findings in agreement with the previous discussions. The criminal justice system's punishment orientation and resistance to change was perceived as the reason for the lack of utilization or implementation of restitution. Perceived lack of community support was not given as a primary reason, which is of interest to note. The implementors of creative restitution programming would be confronted with this perceived difficulty, i.e., resistance to change and punishment orientation.

A high level of support for creative restitution was found, although some qualifications were noted. Thus, successful implementation might rest upon consideration of preferred aspects of restitution, previously discussed. Findings also conducive to restitution implementation were the felt need for standardization and uniformity in court processes as well as rehabilitation.

An important area for future study concerns the need for further explicating the dimensions which may be present within the concept of creative restitution. As has been previously discussed, it would appear that creative restitution may be perceived differentially by various individuals. In other words, individuals may respond differentially to various elements that are contained within the concept. Greater understanding is needed regarding the variety of meanings which may be attributed to the concept of creative restitution.

It would be helpful if additional data on more populations could be secured. It is suggested that populations such as offenders, prison personnel, judges, legislators, as well as a cross-section of the general community, be included in future research. This would contribute to a greater understanding of attitudes which are held by significant populations within the community toward such a concept of possible importance to the administration of the criminal justice system. If broad based support was found in future research, this finding would have important implications for program implementation and the possible incorporation and utilization of creative restitution.

The present research lends support to the previously held notion that creative restitution is multi-dimensional. It appeals to a wide and varied audience. Liberals and conservatives, police and social work students perceive value in it. Although certainly not a panacea for the problems inherent in the criminal justice system, creative restitution is a viable alternative. The time has arrived for further integration of creative restitution programming in the criminal justice system!

Appendix A[14]

Creative Restitution Questionnaire

This questionnaire concerns your attitudes toward creative restitution. The first several pages provide an explanation of the concept of creative restitution; examples are also included. Following this are a number of items relating to creative restitution. Unless otherwise noted, creative restitution should be considered as a general term, encompassing its various forms. Also, unless specific types of offenders are noted, the term offender refers to the general category of individuals who have been convicted of violating the law.

Creative restitution is "a process in which an offender, under appropriate supervision, is helped to find some way to make amends to those he has hurt by his offense."[15] It refers to "payments in either goods, services, or money made by offenders to the victims of their crimes."[16] Creative restitution also refers to services provided by the offender to the community and to the general 'community good.' Thus, it may take three forms: monetary payments to the victim, service to the victim, and service to the general community. While it is not mandatory that the offender make restitution directly to the victim, where this is possible it is considered.

Creative restitution requires active participation by the offender in the restitutive act and has socially constructive outcomes. This is especially true of creative restitution acts consisting of service to the victim and service to the general community. The relationship between the offense and the restitutive act is restorative, especially in the form of monetary payments to the victim or service to the victim.

The service performed for the victim by the offender is limitless, although ideally it should be related to the offense. In many cases, such as victim-less crimes, lack of victim participation in a restitution contract, or in the case of groups of institutionalized offenders, it is not possible for the offender to provide a direct service to the victim. In this situation the offender would provide a service to the larger community, which would ideally, but not necessarily, be related to the offense; yet the restitutive act would be of social value. Critical elements in creative restitution are that the restitution be related, when possible, to the offense

and that the restitution not be imposed on the offender, but
developed through a contractual relationship between the offender
and the victim. The offender cannot be forced or 'made' to become
involved in the creative restitution process by criminal justice
personnel. It should, in effect, be "voluntary" on the part of the
offender, as far as this is possible in the criminal justice system.

The following are programmatic examples of creative restitution:

1. An offender convicted of burglary at a private residence
   subsequently formed a contractual relationship with the
   victim and began making monetary payments of $16.00 a
   week to the victim to cover the damage that was done.

2. In a rural area two boys killed a calf and in lieu of
   commitment to a juvenile institution repaid the owner
   of the calf by working on his ranch for several weekends.

3. An offender originally convicted of burglary worked with
   the police department in burglary prevention programs and
   community education programs; thus utilizing his experience
   for the 'public good.'

4. An individual convicted of drunk driving worked with and
   assisted an ambulance crew, responding to highway accidents.

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1. In your opinion, is there any potential value for the use of
   creative restitution programs with the criminal offender?
   Check one.

   _____ Yes   _____ No   _____ Not sure

If your previous answer was "No" please stop here and do not respond
to any other items in this section.

2. In general, how do you respond to the concept of creative
   restitution as a rehabilitative approach in corrections?
   Check one.

   _____Very favorably   _____Favorably   _____Unfavorably

   _____Very unfavorably   _____Not sure

3. In your opinion, for which group of offenders would it be most appropriate to use creative restitution? Check one.

_____Juveniles   _____Adults   _____Both

_____Inappropriate for both   _____Not sure

4. In your opinion, how appropriate would creative restitution be with the following offense categories? Check the response which most clearly reflects your opinions for each item.

Appropriate	Not Sure	Inappropriate	
_____	_____	_____	1. Property offenses
_____	_____	_____	2. Offenses Against Persons
_____	_____	_____	3. Victim-less crimes

5. In your opinion, how appropriate would creative restitution be with the following criminal offenses? Check the response which most clearly reflects your opinion for each item.

Appropriate	Not Sure	Inappropriate	
_____	_____	_____	1. Burglary
_____	_____	_____	2. Auto theft
_____	_____	_____	3. Shoplifting
_____	_____	_____	4. Drunk driving
_____	_____	_____	5. Income Tax Evasion
_____	_____	_____	6. Involuntary Manslaughter
_____	_____	_____	7. Rape

5. (Continued)

Appropriate	Not Sure	Inappropriate	
_____	_____	_____	8. Armed Robbery
_____	_____	_____	9. Assault

6. How familiar were you previous to this questionnaire with the concept of creative restitution? Check one.

_____Very familiar   _____Familiar   _____Somewhat familiar

_____Unfamiliar

7. In your opinion, do you think a creative restitution program might replace the need for imprisonment with some types of offenders? Check one.

_____Yes   _____No   _____Not sure

If "Yes" -- what "type" of offenders do you think?

8. In your opinion, could creative restitution be utilized as the sole rehabilitation approach taken with some offenders?

_____Yes   _____No   _____Not sure

If "Yes" -- what "types" of offenders do you think?

9. Generally, should creative restitution be combined with supplemental rehabilitation services such as counseling, job training, and education, in your opinion? Check one.

_____Yes   _____No   _____Not sure

Comments?

10. Do you think restitution should be limited to financial payments to victims? Check one.

_____Yes   _____No   _____Not sure

If "Yes", why?

11. In general, how do you view the development of a contractual relationship between an offender and the victim? Check one.

_____Very realistic   _____Realistic   _____Unrealistic

_____Very unrealistic   _____Not sure

Comments?

12. Why do you think that creative restitution has not been utilized or implemented to any greater extent than it has in the criminal justice system?

13. In your opinion, which one of the following forms of creative restitution presents the greatest potential for programmatic use in the criminal justice system? Check one.

_____Monetary Payments   _____Service to the victim

_____Service to the general community _____All three would be equally appropriate

_____Not sure

14. In your opinion, what would be the reaction of the following groups, in general, to the concept of creative restitution? Check the responses which most clearly reflects your opinion for each item.

Strongly in Favor of the Concept	In Favor of the Concept	Not Sure	Against the Concept	Strongly Against the Concept	
_____	_____	____	_____	_____	Judges
_____	_____	____	_____	_____	Police officers
_____	_____	____	_____	_____	General Public
_____	_____	____	_____	_____	Lawyers

14. (Continued)

Strongly in Favor of the Concept	In Favor of the Concept	Not Sure	Against the Concept	Strongly Against the Concept	
_____	_____	____	_____	_____	Prison Officials
_____	_____	____	_____	_____	Social Workers
_____	_____	____	_____	_____	Probation and Parole Officers

15. In your opinion, for which of the following situations would creative restitution be most appropriate? Check one or more than one.

_____ Prior to sentencing (deferred sentence)

_____ In conjunction with probation

_____ In conjunction with a prison sentence

_____ Equally appropriate for all three

_____ Not sure

16. How interested are you in the concept of creative restitution? Check one.

_____ Very interested   _____ Interested   _____ Disinterested

_____ Very disinterested   _____ Not sure

17. Please make any comments you wish regarding the concept of creative restitution; such as its application to the criminal justice system, the appropriateness of the development of such a program, your reactions to the concept, etc.

18. In your opinion, what do you think is the best way to change offenders' criminal behavior?

19. In your opinion, what changes, if any, need to be made in the penal system in this country?

NOTES

[1] Clementine L. Kaufman, "Community Service Volunteers: A British Approach to Delinquency Prevention," Federal Probation, XXXVIII, no. 4 (December 1973) pp. 35-41.

[2] Joe Hudson and Burt Galaway, "Undoing the Wrong," Social Work, XIX, no. 3 (May 1974) p. 314.

[3] Albert Eglash, "Creative Restitution: Some Suggestions for the Prison Rehabilitation Programs," American Journal of Correction, XX (November - December 1958) p. 20.

[4] Hudson and Galaway, op. cit., pp. 313-314.

[5] Eglash, op. cit., p. 20.

[6] John T. Gandy, "Community Attitudes Toward Creative Restitution and Punishment," (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of Denver, 1975) See Appendix A for the Creative Restitution Question- naire.

[7] Ibid.

[8] The theoretical or hypothesized median is an "idealized" mid-point dividing relative high and low scores on an attitudinal scale. The theoretical or hypothesized median for the creative restitution instrument was 42.5.

[9] Gandy, op. cit., pp. 147-148. John T. Gandy, "Attitudes Toward the Use of Restitution," paper to be presented at the Second International Symposium on Restitution, St. Paul, Minnesota, November 1977.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Philip Brickman, "Let the Punishment Fit the Crime," Psychology Today, May 1977, p. 29.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Gandy, "Attitudes Toward the Use of Restitution," pp. 18-19.

[14] Copyrighted

[15] Eglash, op. cit., p. 20.

[16] Hudson and Galaway, op. cit., pp. 313-314.

The "Science" of Social Policy: Max Weber Revisited[1]

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I

Introduction

Science documents two sources of knowledge--sense and
reason. Further, according to Kant, "The nature of the outer
empirical world is not known, what becomes known is that which is
perceived." Human constructs represent outer reality. They do
not express reality directly as it is in original nature. The aim
of the social scientist can never be to eliminate the relative per-
spective of social reality. It is to understand and explain it
within a larger cultural framework. The nature of this task brings
the social scientist "close" to defining the social reality within
a broader cultural praxis. Any policy--essentially, a set of judg-
ments and hence, conclusions, must always be tempered with this
thought in mind.

Scientific values imply causation. Here, the comment on
Heisenberg phenomenon--namely that the process of study and obser-
vation in the physical science modifies the data, equally applies
to the science of social policy formulations. Study and observa-
tion which utilize a set of definitions which assume certain value-
positions, clearly have an effect (dependent variable) on the nature
of conclusions to be reported. Here we are arguing that the values
that do define social "problems" have been seldom discussed.
Hunger, for example, can either be an evidence of functional motiva-
tion extant on the economic market place which encourages a populace
to participate in the societal mainstream or it could be an evidence
of a social malaise relating to an economic injustice in the social
structure. Deeply anchored in such prognostications is the view of
causation. Further, social scientists attempt to explain causal
statements, insofar as the conceptual phenomena are interrelated.
Concepts form a link between the observer, the observed, and the
object (purpose) of the observation.

Any policy organizes our empirical observations (data) which
in turn, explains our cultural reality. Causal conceptual clarifi-
cations, as formal explanations, are the primal task of the science
of social policy. These concepts tell us just what it is that we

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-597-

seek to formulate. As implied earlier, any politia--the science of government, involves perceptions of cultural reality as the policy planner perceives. What we are actually dealing with then, are abstractions from our perceptions of reality. On the surface this would appear to be a very shaky foundation upon which to base concrete conclusions. However, this must be so. We must establish some finite restrictions--call them boundaries, parameters, etc., to get a grip on the conceptual underpinnings of the observed events, and the policy outcomes. These finite boundaries are artificial for the simple reason that they have been created by us and are not found in nature.

The implications of the above statement for the science of policy formulations are chiefly two-fold. First, social policy by definition involves value judgments. As a general rule, the sooner the investigator articulates his or her position, the sooner the second stage could be instigated--viz., once the perception of the social scientists' abstracted (from observed events) social reality has been put forth, one can underline (and thus examine) formal causal propositions. A failure to articulate this task results in the fundamental scientific inconsistency of means and ends. Here the extended remark by Max Weber is quite à propos:

> It (consistency) can, in so far as it sets itself this goal, aid the acting willing person in attaining self-clarification concerning the final axioms from which his desired ends are derived. It can assist him in becoming aware of the ultimate standards of value which he does not make explicit to himself or which he must presuppose in order to be logical. The elevation of these ultimate standards, which are manifested in concrete value-judgments, to the level of explicitness is the utmost that the scientific treatment of value judgments can do without entering into the realm of speculation. As to whether the person expressing these value-judgments should adhere to these ultimate standards is his personal affair; it involves will and conscience, not empirical knowledge.

> An empirical science cannot tell anyone what he should do-- but rather what he can do--and under certain circumstances-- what he wishes to do. (Weber, 1949:54; italics in the original).

In the formulation of the science of social policy, the design is the slave and not the master. The fundamental confusion, or the interlocation of means and ends, rests with this view. Designs which allow the policy-planners to test his or her assumptions, cannot be efficiently and effectively developed without the conceptual clarity. All too often experimental designs have

prescribed the explanation of cultural events. More importantly,
the need for a particular "scientific" design has been arbitrated
by the planner's desire not to underline his or her value
dispositions. Resultantly, since individuals are involved in
events which one defines as "problems", the tendency by this group
has been to seek "answers" within the individuals involved. This
is a fruitless exercise. As we know, if the individual is elimin-
ated, social life would still continue. Therefore, the explanation
must be sought in the nature of society itself. It follows then
that the determination of the cause of "social" events must be
sought in the interactions preceding it, not within the conscious
state of the individual. Any scientific design which fails to
underline such a basic premise postulates a diagnostic dilemma.

Let us begin with an example from medicine. Under this
dilemma, the physician is faced with the problem of arriving at a
conclusion as to the cause of a condition based on too little data,
too soon, versus arriving at a more certain conclusion with enough
data, but too late to be of any use for the patient. Thus, we
propose conceptual positions ultimately decide the design, and
concomitantly, the nature of information (datum) to be obtained.
This failure establishes the distinction between the scientist and
therapist. To be a therapist is to seek solutions to specific
values as conditions and further, these conditions justify the end
to be desired. The scientist,. to the contrary, views conditions as
means to entertain further assumptions of an outcome. Both are
applied. The critical difference in the view of the science of
social policy making is that the scientist-planner views the social
conditions as dynamic; whereas, therapist-solvers' weltanschauung
is static. The dynamic view articulates the sources of knowledge
which contribute to a systematic examination of a cause. It is
heuristic; while the other is reformistic.

The scientific view of social policy formulation cannot hope
to provide "locked" norms and ideals from which directives for
immediate day to day activities can be distilled. At best, this
formalistic view purports to examine in detail the value-assumptions
involved in the development of policy propositions. For ultimately,
the critical difference centers in the scientific conduct of means
and ends. Furthermore, this conduct is no different from the vast
majority of human conduct. Such an existential proximity has indeed
been differentiated in the aftermath of the "sputnik age". An
ethical-product (to speak in operational terms) of the scientific
process should act as an aid to the policy analyst in a type of
self-clarification concerning the "truth" about his or her desired
ends. Such an approach or declaration of policy assumptions is not
a semantic hyperbole. To be explicit is to be scientific. It is
only when the assumptions of intent (a formalistic approach) become

particularistic, end-in-itself, that the diagnostic dilemma begins. It becomes reformistic. The critical characteristic in such a formulation assumes that one has already settled on the end. It is exactly these values (ends) which must be the objects of our research. For a proof to be scientifically and systematically valid (both internal and/or external) and reliable, it must be so regarded (not necessarily approved) by all. Only then it is a fruitful effort.

Further, such formulations cannot be "true" only contextually in one specific time-frame. The area of social policy contains the possibilities for the greatest difficulty in this area. It is slowly becoming historically-bound. There seems to be a growing trend of "solving" isolated "problems" dealing with this particular historical space-time only. The proponents of such "one-shot" studies must be called into question not only with regard to the discipline as a whole, but also to the problems that they purport to solve.

The diachronic view is completely lost and with it any historical-comparative analysis is forgotten. Unfortunately, in America such an "isolationist impulse" has become as widespread and damaging as it is unique. All too often, in the United States, the public sector in the name of party partisanship has excerbated such a diagnostic dilemma. For example, compare Graham Wallis' "great society" with that of President Lyndon B. Johnson's reformistic ideals. Empirical-cultural-reality is a political value, only because we place a partisan opinion on it. We only perceive what is significant (valuable); all other historical premises are forgotten.

II

The Pedagogy of Policy Science - Max Weber[2]

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[2] Key English translations of Max Weber's works are: Max Weber (1947), The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, translated by A. R. Henderson and T. Parsons, The Free Press; Max Weber (1947), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, translated, edited and with an introduction by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, Kegan Paul; Max Weber (1948), The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, translated by T. Parsons, Allen and Unwin; Max Weber (1949), The Methodology of Social Sciences, translated and edited by E. A. Shils and H. N. Finch, The Free Press; Max Weber (1968), Economy and Society, edited by Gunther Roth and Claus Wittich, Bedminister Press. Writings on Max Weber are: Reinhard Bendix (1962), Max Weber an Intellectual Portrait, Anchor Books; Raymond Aron (1964), German Sociology, The Free Press; Julien Freund (1968), The Sociology of Max Weber, Pantheon Books; Arun Sahay (1971), Max Weber and Modern Sociology, Routledge and Kegan Paul; and J. E. T. Eldridge (1971), Max Weber: The Interpretation of Social Reality, Charles Scribner's Sons.

With this prolegomenon on the cultural-historical content of the Science of Social Policy, I have set my next task to closely examine the pedagogy of Max Weber. What follows then is almost a textbook derivation on the implication of the science of social policy as articulated by Max Weber in his various writings.

In the study of policy sciences, man is both the subject and object of social inquiry. Policy science is ultimately "social" knowledge, so it cannot be developed in the same vein as "stars and molecules". For Weber, the framework of policy science is a value concept. Culture forms the primae facie evidence. Our social reality provides the empirical context of culture in terms of its relevance or significance for us. Cultural sciences select certain aspects of the world that present relevance for the observer (Weber, 1949:72).

Weber does not accept the idea of constructing a closed system of concepts in which social policy is synthesized in an universal classification. He surmises that we must abandon the illusion of thinking that knowledge can provide the essence of the 'things', the laws of God and nature. Such a metaphysical conception must be rejected. Social reality is not reducible to a system of laws. Concepts are simply instruments for apprehending the world. Understanding remained for Weber, the unique approach of the policy sciences. Ideal type is an instrument to apprehend the cultural reality. This concept signifies, in methodological terms, the freedom from metaphysical prejudices. Thus multiplicity of ideal-types could be generated, according to the directions of our interest and the needs of policy formulations.

The sense of imposition of ideal type involves the view of "social" man as the creator of society which generates a sociology of policy action (clearly in contrast to the sociology of social system derived from the problem of order). This method is analytical-historical. It must provide the analytic task of history to find a causal explanation. Policy science is then an empirical science. It must attempt to understand as much as possible how man evaluates, appraises, creates, and destroys his various social relationships.

Policy Action as Social Action

Policy actions are social in nature. Weber suggests "action is social insofar as by virtue of the subjective meaning attached to it by the acting individual (or individuals). It takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course" (Weber, 1947:88). He categorizes social action in four parts:

(a) <u>zueckrational</u>, (b) <u>wertrational</u>, (c) affectually-oriented
action, (d) traditionally-oriented action.

  <u>Zueckrational</u> is the most goal-oriented. It is an orienta-
tion which seeks rationally defined ends. <u>Wertrational</u> is the
value-oriented action. Its orientation is <u>rational</u> but the end is
absolute. Affectually oriented action underscores emotions and
feelings of the actor. Its orientation is affective. Finally,
traditionally oriented action rests its end on "long practice"
borne out by customary practices.

  Yet the question remains--how does policy action as social
action seek legitimacy? Weber defines legitimate order as "social
action which is oriented to certain determinate maxims or rules
and their orientation includes the recognition that they are
binding on the actor or the corresponding action constitutes a
desirable model for him to initiate (Weber, 1947:124). In the
final analysis, Weber viewed that major types of authority rela-
tionships (traditional, charismatic, and legal-rational) rested on
the basis of domination. Hence, stability, he stated, inversely
is an outcome of domination. Legitimacy of a system of domination
is the important raison d'etre to the stability of an authority
relationship. "State", he surmised, was a "compulsory political
association" to the extent that it claimed "monopoly" to the legi-
timate use of force in the fulfillment of order. Legitimate
domination exercises power. Power provides a successful claim to
the exercise of authority. It provides maintenance of order,
despite resistance.

  No commentary of Weber's view of policy sciences would be
complete without discussion of his conception of comparative policy
sciences. The cornerstone of Weberian analysis is historical. He
viewed history as a process of rationalization. The vast forces of
his extensive comparative scholarship employed causal tour de force
of necessary antecedent social conditions in the examination of
policy questions. Unlike Marx, he viewed the development (evolution)
of cultural production of policy throughout history increasingly
becoming <u>rational</u>. This evolution of historical rationality
suggests the development of an "universal ethic" (Smelser, 1976:115).
It provides the examination of social reality as an outcome of open
ethical considerations. For example, bureaucracy, he surmised, is
an outcome of historical-cultural forces from ascriptive to achieved
society. Social conditions have transformed the forces of traditional
authority to legal-rational authority. This transition is embedded
in the transformation of social conditions.

  His chief methodological strategy in the examination of

social change as mentioned earlier, was "ideal type". He offers a definition.

> An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytic construct (Gedankenbild). In its conceptual purity, this mental construct cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a utopia. Historical research faces the task of determining in each individual case, the extent to which this ideal-construct approximates to or diverges from reality. (Weber, 1949:90, underlining in the original).

This ideal-type is related to an historical idea. What is then the significance of such ideal-type constructs to policy science? In an important way, Weber viewed the explanation of policy sciences in the historical-analytic reality of cultural configurations. The "logic" of cultural sciences, helps us to employ this (ideal-type) methodological strategy in order to interpret historical-causal "viewpoints". In the final analysis, the proper relevance of any policy-science provides a judgment of our cultural reality. It is interpretative (Weber, 1949:150).

III

Summary

To summarize--the science of social policy, according to Weber, implies the following conclusion:

(a)   The aim of the social scientist can never be to eliminate the relative perspective of social reality. The task is to explain this reality within a cultural framework.
(b)   Any policy is a set of formal judgments--abstractions from perceptions of reality.
(c)   Values do define social "problems".
(d)   The science of social policy views social conditions as "means" and not "ends". Hence, the underlining of assumptions is an imperative task.

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MEDICAL SOCIAL WORK FACULTY:
CLINICIANS OR EDUCATORS?

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Within the health care field, medical social work has ex-
panded rapidly over the past few years.[1] In the United States,
medical social workers comprise approximately 1.5 percent of the
total medical schools' faculty.[2] And, there is empirical evi-
dence that medical social work faculty will increase substan-
tially over the years to come.[3]

However, we as social work educators know very little about
medical social work facultys' opinions on how they perceive their
overall function within medical schools.[4] More specifically, if
medical social work faculty are to function effectively in medi-
cal settings, we as a profession must know: if they perceive
themselves as clinicians or educators; what their involvement
is in curriculum development; if they perceive themselves as
specialists or generalists; what their professional contacts
are outside their departments; and, how they perceive their
present respect and credibility within their medical settings.
Thus, the purpose of this article is to present the results of
an empirically based research project that will shed new data
on the above concerns.

METHOD

Advisory Board

In August 1976, the authors formed an advisory board which
included members from the Association of American Medical Col-
leges (AAMC), medical social work practitioners, and/or educa-
tors, and/or researchers. The board's main function was to
increase the validity of the project by formulating relevant
questions most closely related to the study's research area.
The board also aided in refining the opinion questionnaire
utilized in this project through the various five drafts.

Instrument

The sixth draft of the questionnaire was pretested by in-
terviews in October 1976, with nineteen non-randomly selected
medical social work faculty employed by five different medical
schools located in three states. The pretest subjects' reac-
tions and comments were utilized to formulate a six-page final
questionnaire which contained 49 close-ended and 4 open-ended
questions.

On the final questionnaire, no attempts were made to test
the reliability for any of the open-ended questions as they
were worded in an extremely straight forward manner. To test
the reliability of the 49 close-ended questions, eleven non-
randomly selected medical social work faculty employed by two
different medical schools located in two states answered each
question twice with a 10-day waiting period. A Pearson Product
Moment Correlation was generated for each close-ended question
from time 1 with time 2. High correlation coefficients were
obtained with the lowest $r = .65$, $p = .032$. The 49 close-ended
questions mean $r = .74$, and mean $p = .021$, which indicates that
the questions were relatively reliable.

Medical Social Work Population

On January 1, 1977, the AAMC's current data bank indicated
that a little over 40,000 individuals were employed as faculty
in the 116 accredited medical schools in the United States.[5] Of
these, 561 were medical social work faculty. For the purposes
of this study, medical social work faculty were operationally
defined as individuals who held a master's degree in social work
from an accredited graduate school of social work and was cur-
rently employed by a medical school on January 1, 1977.[6] As
reflected in the following data analysis, these medical social
work faculty represent the total population of all graduate-
level social work faculty employed by medical schools in the
United States.

Medical Social Work Sample

A 33% random sample was drawn from the 561 medical social
work faculty. With AAMC providing the mailing labels, on
January 15, 1977, each member of the random sample was mailed
the above questionnaire with an accompanying self-addressed
return envelope. Exactly two months later a follow-up question-
naire was sent to those medical social work faculty who had de-
layed forwarding the requested information. From the original
random sample, 39 (20.9 percent) questionnaires were returned
because of incorrect address, transfers, retirements, or termina-
tions of employment which resulted in a workable sample of 148.
Of these, 125 (84.5 percent) medical social work faculty re-
sponded by June 1, 1977, which represents the sample of this
study.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Clinicians or Educators

The social work faculty were asked their opinions on how they would ideally view their overall role within their medical schools. A second question asked their opinions on how they presently viewed their overall role within their medical schools. A third question asked their opinions on how non-social work faculty viewed the social work facultys' overall role within their medical schools. All three questions were scored on a 5 point Likert-type scale where 1 represented "strictly clinician" and 5 represented "strictly educator." No operational definitions of these two terms were provided. One hundred-eleven (88.8 percent) social work faculty responded to all three questions where the results of their opinions are presented in table 1.

TABLE 1

MEANS OF SOCIAL WORK FACULTYS' OPINIONS
OF THEIR PERCEIVED ROLE BY CATEGORY (N=111)

| | Descriptive Statistics | | | |
Category	Mean	Median	Mode	Standard Deviation
Ideally	3.2	3.2	3.0	.77
Presently	2.9	2.9	3.0	.93
Non-Social Workers	2.2	2.1	2.0	.85
Total Average	2.8			

Analysis of variance revealed a significant difference (.001 level) between the mean scores of the three categories. Three independent correlated t-tests revealed significant differences (.001 level) for the three possible combinations of the three categories. This finding indicates that there were vast differences on the opinions of how social work faculty perceived their main overall role by category. This finding reveals that non-social work faculty view social work faculty much more as clinicians than as educators. There is also conflictual evidence that clinical practice has had a relatively low standing within the broader field of social work.[7] However, social work faculty would ideally like to have their overall role lean more toward the educator role than the clinician role. This finding may indicate that there is a tremendous amount of ambiguity between the overall role of social work faculty. We as social work educators may wish to clarify this role and teach potential medical social work faculty the appropriate knowledge and skills for the newly defined role. After all, schools of social work should adequately prepare students for medical placements when necessary. If social work faculty wish to lean more toward the educator role, they must be prepared to demonstrate the appropriate knowledge and skill areas necessary to adequately function as educators.[8] Where do they gain such knowledge and skills? In schools of social work? Or, do they gain the necessary knowledge and skills after graduation?

Involvement in Curriculum Development

The social work faculty were asked their opinions on the extent they were involved in the curriculum development of social work and non-social work courses. Both questions were scored on a 5 point Likert-type scale where 1 represented "very low" and 5 represented "very high." Seventy-five (60.0 percent) social work faculty responded to both of these questions. The mean of

their involvement in the curriculum development of social work courses was 2.0, where the mean of their involvement in the curriculum development of non-social work courses was 1.8 which resulted in a difference score of .2 (t-value = 1.2, p = .25). Thus, the social work faculty did not perceive a significant difference in social work faculty's involvement in the curriculum development of social work and non-social work courses.

One must note that both means were relatively low when viewed on a 5 point scale. One might expect a much higher mean score on the involvement of social work faculty in relation to the curriculum development of social work courses. Since the previous finding of this study indicated that non-social work faculty view social work faculty more as clinicians than educators, they may be trying to keep their involvement in curriculum development to a minimum. Non-social work faculty may perceive social work faculty as not having an expertise in curriculum development, thus keeping their involvement in such issues to a minimum. If this is true, where do social work faculty gain such expertise or experience? In a school of social work? There was a relatively large amount of variance among social work facultys' responses toward their curriculum involvement with social work courses (variance = 2.1). This indicates that social work faculty varried widely to the extent that they were involved in the curriculum development of social work courses. To find out what variables (factors) were correlated with social work facultys' involvement in the curriculum development of social work courses, a correlation coefficient was generated for each variable in the study with the curriculum involvement variable for social work courses. No meaningful correlations (r> .60) were found.

Specialists or Generalists

The social work faculty were asked their opinions on how they viewed themselves in relation to their functioning in either

as a specialist or as a generalist capacity within their medical
schools. This question was scored on a 5 point Likert-type scale
where 1 represented "strictly specialist" and 5 represented
"strictly generalist." No operational definitions of these two
terms were provided. One hundred-eighteen (94.4 percent) social
work faculty responded to this question where their mean score
was 2.5.

This finding indicates that social work faculty view them-
selves functioning exactly halfway between strictly a "specialist"
and strictly a "generalist." However, it should be noted that
there was a relatively large variance among their responses
(variance = 1.2). This finding indicates that not all social
work faculty view themselves in the middle of the scale. But,
they view themselves quite differently when viewed in either
a specialist or a generalist capacity.[9] To find out what vari-
ables (factors) were correlated with social work facultys' re-
sponses of being a specialist or a generalist, a correlation
coefficient was generated for each variable in the study with
the generalist/specialist variable. No meaningful correlations
($r > .60$) were found.

Professional Contacts

The social work faculty were asked to check what professional
contacts they had with a social service department within their
medical schools. All of the social work faculty responded to this
question. Only 30 (24.0 percent) responded "none" while the re-
maining 95 (76.0 percent) indicated: provide consultation, 49.5%;
have a staff appointment in a social service department, 43.2%;
and, offer courses or seminars to social work staff, 20.0%. A
correlation matrix was generated among the three possible contact
areas to check for interrelatedness. No meaningful correlations
($r > .60$) were found which indicates that the three choices were

unrelated. The above findings indicate that a majority of the social work faculty had contact(s) with a social service department within their medical settings.

The social work faculty were also asked to check what professional contacts they had with a school of social work. All social work faculty responded to this question. Only 25 (20.0 percent) responded "none" while the remaining 100 (80.0 percent) indicated: supervise social work students in field placements/internships, 75.0%; offer occasional seminars, 40.0%; serving on school of social work committees, 26.0%; and, teach occasional courses, 26.0%. A correlation matrix was generated among the four possible contact areas to check for interrelatedness. No meaningful correlations ($r > .60$) were found except between offering occasional seminars and serving on school of social work committees ($r = .64$, $p = .001$). The above findings indicate that a majority (75.0%) of social work faculty supervised social work students in their field placements/internships. This may indicate that future social work faculty should possess the appropriate knowledge and skill areas necessary to effectively function as a field supervisor of social work students. It would be interesting to know where they would gain such knowledge and skills. In a school of social work?

Respect and Credibility

The social work faculty were asked their opinions of the extent non-social work faculty and medical students accorded respect and credibility to social work faculty. Both questions were scored on a 5 point Likert-type scale where 1 represented "very low" and 5 represented "very high." One hundred-four (83.2 percent) social work faculty responded to both of these questions. The mean credibility score of non-social work faculty was 3.4, while the mean credibility score of the medical students was 3.3

which resulted in a difference score of .1 (t-value = .61, p = .54). Thus, the social work faculty did not perceive a significant difference between the credibility of non-social work faculty and medical students. However, it should be noted that both scores were relatively high when viewed on a 5 point scale.

CONCLUSIONS

This project was one of the first empirical studies that focused on the opinions of medical social work faculty toward the concept clinical teaching in medical schools. Their views in regard to this area have never been empirically explored before. Future research could focus on the effectiveness of medical social workers as viewed by themselves, non-social work faculty, and medical students. Research could also be executed on their exact job responsibilities and on their perceptions of the major contributions of social work to medical settings. It is hoped that this exploratory study will encourage further research into medical social work. It is also hoped that the opinions and concerns of the medical social work faculty as indicated in this project will be given serious attention to by social work practitioners, educators, and researchers.

NOTES

*The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance of Cheryl Chambers who served as a research assistant to this project.
    1. See, for example, Neil F. Bracht, "Health Care: The Largest Human Service System" Social Work, Vol. 19 (September 1974), pp. 532-545; and Robert Morris, "The Place of Social Work in the Human Services," Social Work, Vol. 19 (September 1974), pp. 519-531.
    2. Richard M. Grinnell, Jr., Nancy S. Kyte and Ski Hunter, "Social Workers Teaching in Medical Schools," Health & Social Work, Vol. 1 (May 1976), pp. 152-165.

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4. Richard M. Grinnell, Jr., and Nancy S. Kyte, "An Analysis of the Function of the Social Work Faculty in Medical Schools," Journal of Medical Education. In press.

5. Association of American Medical Colleges, Medical School Admission Requirements, 1976-1977 (Washington, D. C.: AAMC, 1976).

6. Council on Social Work Education, Schools of Social Work with Accredited Master's Degree Programs (New York: CSWE, 1976).

7. See, for example, Theresa W. Barkan, "Private Casework Practice in a Medical Clinic," Social Work, Vol. 18 (July 1973), pp. 5-9; Ruth Drucker and Diana King, "Private Practice for Low-Income People," Social Work, Vol. 18 (March 1973), pp. 115-118; and Richard M. Grinnell, Jr., and Nancy S. Kyte, "The Future of Clinical Practice: A Study," Clinical Social Work Journal, Vol. 5 (Summer 1977), pp. 132-138.

8. Richard M. Grinnell, Jr., and Nancy S. Kyte, "Measuring Faculty Competence: A Model," Journal of Education for Social Work, Vol. 12 (Fall 1976), pp. 44-50.

9. Scott Briar, "Generalists, Specialists, and Territory," Social Work, Vol. 21 (July 1976), pp. 262, 341.

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