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Table of Contents

SPECIAL THEMATIC ISSUE

TIMOTHY W. LAUSE - Editor

# STATE AND REGIONAL POLITICS *

## INTRODUCTION

The policy decisions of the states have become increasingly important to social welfare in recent years. In that sense, it is an opportune time to introduce an interdisciplinary collection of articles which has as its principal focus the circumstances and the processes of policy at the state level. With one exception, the articles which address regional concepts do so in the context of comparative or case studies of one or more state policy decisions.

Much of the states' new prominence in social welfare is due to a conspicuously diminished scope and level of federal activity since 1980. Four of these articles establish significant connections between their research and one or more of these recent reversals in national policy. Mueller and Comer examine the fate of state health system agencies, following federal deregulation in 1981. They explore several potential explanations for state decisions, grounded in the framework of an interesting varient of general innovation theory as developed within political science. The results of their analysis suggest that "dissinnovation" or termination of the agency is negatively related to general factors normally associated with decisions to adopt reforms initially but in interaction with several variables which are more specific to the problem, such as the costs of hospitalization in the states. The aftermath of federal deregulation and reduced block grants is also explored in Sink and Wilson's case study of initial allocations in Alabama. In that article they develop a model of interaction between the initiation of that mechanism of fiscal transfers and regionally placed systems of political culture and balances of power among the branches of state government. Demone and Gibelman contribute an examination of factors effecting state decisions in the design of social service delivery strategies within the rubic of expanded state discretion. They devote special attention to purchase of service arrangements and relate the examined advantages and disadvantages to a discussion of future trends.

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The results of Heffernan's study of welfare spending are illustrative of a number of common objections to increasing reliance upon the states. They are also indicative of the challenges facing social welfare scholarship and advocacy even if future elections restore a period of incremental growth in federal funding roles. Controlling for differences between state wealth and several other measures similar to those used in Mueller and Comer's study, Heffernan concludes that in their allocation of their own revenues there are rather stable patterns in which some states exceed predicted spending, while others regularly make less than predicted efforts. Since the states appear to be "resilient in their desire to carry out programs consistent with their own traditions," reduced federal funding would compound benefit inequalities between states on the basis of those varied traditions. On the one hand, these inequalities may substantiate need for national standards requiring a larger federal funding role than that of the seventies. On the other hand, to defer actions to promote benefit allocations in the states in favor of creation of an adequate federalized program appears to be a remote prospect in the immediate future unless accompanied by a "swap" which yields a net loss of federal social program transfers to the states. One of his principal points is that as yet social research lacks a reasonable understanding of what exact circumstances account for the differences in spending efforts.

Three of these articles explore regional constructions as partial explanations of differing state policy decisions. The two case studies in that group fall within traditional boundaries of the south. Sink and Wilson's article on block grants in Alabama, already mentioned, was the only one of the two which focused upon spending. McNeece and Ezell discuss the interaction of political culture and symbolism in describing the backlash to reform in Florida's juvenile detention criteria. Along with Block's overview of a sunset review of social work licensing, the study of juvenile detention reform illustrates one of the reasons the framework of this collection was not equated with the scope or duration of the Reagan agenda for social welfare. Both issues fall within domains of state policy which are largely removed from federal politics.

Savage's article is the most ambitious of the studies concerned with regional traditions in state policy in that it is national in scope and historical in perspective. It should be noted that his inferences about regional traditions in the states' adoptions of policy innovations are drawn from statistical factors which underlie relations between the states over a broad range of policies including innovations outside common definitions of social welfare. Stated differently, his analysis is oriented towards the discovery of underlying patterns which apply to policy innovation in its most general sense. Regional traditions which might be operating only for one or several related fields of state policy would not be suggested. In terms of generally applicable regional traditions, he concludes that such patterns appear to be declining especially since 1930. The two exceptions, he notes, are southern and northeastern clusters.

While suggesting some continuation of societal development along multilinear regional lines, he concludes that the forces of national integration appear increasingly dominant in such evolution. Parenthetically, all but one of the six regional case studies of state politics received for review were concerned with the dynamics operating in the south. The two included in this collection have already been introduced. (Sink and Wilson) (McNeece and Ezell).

The receptivity of state governments and their legislatures in particular to the perspectives of and information provided by social welfare advocates and representatives of social agencies is often presumed to be low. Freeman and Lyons' comparative study of sunset reviews in Kentucky indicates that social welfare programs emerge from legislative evaluations with a lower probability of termination or major change than non-welfare systems. The pattern was reversed in terms of the liklihood and number of "minor" administrative changes which the agencies typically made in consultation with the review prior to completion of the formal sunset report. Along with Block's paper, the collection includes two articles on the performance of sunset mechanisms now found in over half of the states.

The activities of legislative staff are analyzed in the case study by Prindle and Burshtyn. In one of the less "professionalized" legislatures, at least, differences appear in the allocation of time to such activities as policy research for the staff of "liberal" and "conservative" members of the Texas assembly. Interestingly, McNeece and Ezell found the "tradition" oriented Florida legislature to be conspicuously inattentive to the research findings which supported retention of the reformed detention criteria for juveniles. Baney's study suggests that women legislatures may be especially receptive to the initiation of social legislation. Variables which have appeared to make gender differences in the introduction of bills spurious in other studies did not seem to do so in this case study.

Cox's paper on Black families in Appalachia is the only regional study in this issue which does not have state policy processes as a principal focus. Following a brief historical account of settlement patterns, it focuses upon the problems associated with the population's marginality within the region particularly in terms of economics as well as with the region's own typical marginality to the centers of state economics and politics. Substantial attention is given to the group's unique historical experience and to adaptative responses found within the group. His article includes recommendations for more responsive social service designs. Readers may wish to relate the state purchase of service options described by Demone and Gibelman to Cox's assessment of the role of the Appalacian church and informal family supports. The following two articles concern models of state policy planning and implementation which seem responsive to intra-state regional differences found in most states.

Ahn, Horan, and Taylor's paper focuses primarily on the development of an advocacy design in public administration. It and Korr's article describe regional models of state coordination. Korr outlines how a regional office in the field of mental health functioned as a catayst for community supports in underserved and inappropriately served minority neighborhoods.

Finally, Mathews describes a set of factors which influence the ability of social work political action committees to organize on behalf of the priorities of professional associations in the states. It is one of several papers which provide case histories of advocacy in the policy arenas of the states. They include Block's report on sunset review of licensing and McNeec and Ezell's analysis of juvenile detention reform.

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Welfare Spending in the American States:
A Comparative Perspective

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ABSTRACT

     The federal-state system of welfare is the result of a compromise between
the desire for national standards and the opportunity for each state to have its
own adaptation.  As a compromise, there is a constant tension in the system.
During the 1970's, there was a pressure toward federalization, but the states have
preserved their diversity.  The Reagan Administration has clearly indicated a
desire to "return" greater freedom to the states to chart their own course.  The
purpose of this paper is to identify variations among the states in such a way as
to identify those states with consistently "high" or consistently "low" expendi-
tures for welfare after allowance is made for differences in need, capacity, and
chance variations.  Individual states deviations from expected expenditures are
noted over the past decade.  The resilience of the states in pursuit of their own
welfare paths is noted and the implication of this for tension in federal-state
relationship is shown.

     The changing relationships between the national government and the state
governments have been a significant element in shaping the debate about welfare
in this nation for the last twenty years.  The perception that one set of govern-
ments or another would be likely fiscal losers in any reshaping of welfare has
stood as an impediment to reform.  At the same time, the absence of a clear cut
consensus of where power, capacity and responsibility lay in the coordinate system
has fueled a significant portion of the welfare debate.  The debate about welfare
responsibility between those concerned with national standards and those concerned
with the opportunity for state adaptations would, no doubt, have taken place even
in the absence of legalistic and fiscal problems.  The federal systems demand for
dual responsibility along side very uneven fiscal capacities for state programs
has magnified the already difficult problem of selecting and implementing welfare
policy.  (1)

     In recent years voices from virtually all points on the political spectrum
have called for a reassessment of the federal-state responsibilities in AFDC, Food
Stamps, and Medicaid programs.  The goals of these reassessments are clearly not
the same for all of the interested parties.  The goals of the various reform
proposals involved modification of welfare itself as well as changes in federal/
state responsibilities for welfare policy.  The goals most frequently articulated
are these:

     (1)  a desire to eliminate (or at least reduce) inter-state differences in
          benefit schedules

     (2)  to increase the benefits of lower paying states

-177-

(3)　to　achieve a better balance between fiscal demands of welfare programs
with fiscal capacity to meet the need

(4)　to reduce the aggregate spending on these transfer programs (or at least
to reduce the rate at which these programs grow)

(5)　to more effectively target benefits to those in the greatest need

(6)　to shift fiscal responsibility from one level of government to another

(7)　to sort out the federal/state responsibilities to achieve a higher
level of policical accountability and fiscal responsibility

Particular plans for reform reflect different priorities among these goals.  It
is also clear that some of these goals are incompatible with one another.  Each
president since John Kennedy has provided some measure of leadership in a welfare
reform effort, but each presidential initiative has been defeated because of
internal beauracratic and legislative inability to forge a compromise among these
goals.  The most recent initiative has been President Reagan's proposal for a
swap of welfare responsibilities.

Behind each new proposal for welfare reform there lies a complex tangle of
political desires and deeply held convictions about both welfare itself and the
federal/state responsibilities involved in the delivery of welfare services.  Any
welfare proposal must address simultaniously a theory of povery and a theory of
inter-governmental relations.  The first issue is reasonably well addressed in the
literature.  If one believes that the low income condition is a function of in-
sufficient employment opportunities of low skilled workers, then a jobs and skills
enhancement strategy needs to be given priority.  If one beleives that the problem
lies with specific character and motivational problems of low income persons,
then social work services need to be emphasized.  If one believes that inequality
is a systemic consequence of capitalism, then a negative income tax and direct
re-distributional schemes need to be emphasized. (Sommers, 1982) At the pragmatic
political level the proposals usually contain a complex misture of such goals.
Two decades of poverty research reflect the diversity of poverty theories and the
resulting differences  of grand strategies of welfare reform.  Relatively less
attention has been paid to the question of inter-governmental relations.

Questions of the appropriate relationship between the central and state
governments are of obvious fiscal and political importance.  The fact that one or
another set of governments perceive of themselves as fiscal losers in a re-
shuffled set or responsibilities clearly affects the course of reform within Con-
gress and the state capitols.  A complete history of the welfare reform effort
needs to include the details of the various cost-estimating techniques used by the
administration, the Congressional Budget Office and the various state welfare
establishments.  During the Carter welfare reform effort the administration
originally estimated that  the new program would cost an additional 2.6 billion
dollars, but the CBO estimated the federal cost at 25 billion dollars.  Haskins,
1981  During the Reagan administration's effort the Office of Management and
Budget estimated a net savings to the state of 2.6 billion dollars, but the
Congressional Budget Office estimated a 4.4 billion dollar state loss.( U.S.G.A.O.,
1982 ) The lack of confidence in cost estimations is only one of the problems
associated with disentangling federal/state responsibilities.

A second, equally difficult problem is the impact of dual federalism on interstate diversity in benefits, which appear intractable in the face of incremental reform. The present set of programs, of AFDC, Food Stamps and Medicare interact with one another in curious and unintended ways. The net effect of increasing AFDC benefit is to reduce food stamp benefit to the household by 30 cents for each dollar of benefit increase. Increase in AFDC benefits also expand Medicaid eligibility. The resulting consequences impacts on the state budgets in ways that are difficult to predict. During the 1970's there was a considerable political effort to decrease diverisity in benefits. One of the intents of the food stamp program was to reduce the inter-state diversity in total benefits to households elegible for both programs. Despite some progress, the states have acted in such ways as to retain considerable diversity. This is shown in Table I.

TABLE I

Diversity in AFDC Benefits
And AFDC/Food Stamp
Benefits, 1970-1980.
(State Maximum Payment To A Family Of Four With No Other Income)

|  | 1970<br>AFDC Schedules | 1980<br>AFDC Schedules | 1980<br>AFDC with Food Stamps |
|---|---|---|---|
| Range | 3756-828 | 6828-1680 | 7549-3990 |
| Mean | 2413 | 4218 | 5829 |
| Standard Deviation | 800 | 1532 | 1010 |
| Co-efficient of Variation | .311 | .363 | .173 |

The Reagan Administration has made it abundantly clear that it will seek to place emphasis on state responsibility and control. Thomas, 1981 Along the federal political fault line, the pressure will now come from the opposite direction. In light of this new emphasis of an old conflict in the federal/state contest, it is instructive to examine the differential performance among the states.

During the last eight years, despite significant political pressures for federalization of AFDC, the proportion of federal dollars spent on AFDC has been remarkably stable as is shown in Table II. The change in federal participation is a function of the changes in the Food Stamp Program.

TABLE II

Inter-Governmental Expenditures
For AFDC & Food Stamps
1970 - 80

|  | A F D C | | AFDC<br>Federal<br>Proportion | Federal<br>Food Stamp | Total<br>Federal<br>Proportion |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|  | STATE<br>(millions $) | FEDERAL<br>(millions $) |  | (millions $) |  |
| 1970 | 2,234 | 2,623 | 54.0 | 551 | 58.7 |
| 1973 | 3,426 | 4,153 | 54.8 | 2,136 | 64.7 |
| 1978 | 5,507 | 6,332 | 53.5 | 5,165 | 67.6 |
| 1980 | 5,914 | 6,838 | 53.6 | 9,210 | 73.1 |

Table II shows that while federal expenditures have exploded, so too have state expenditures in the aggregate. What has not been equally noted is that the expansion in the states has been decidely uneven. Some states have significantly increased their benefit schedules, coverage and hence expenditures on AFDC programs, while other have declined in real dollar terms. In light of the lack of progress toward comparible programs after a period of federalization and now the apparent desire of some actors "to return" these programs to the states, it is instructive to provide a closer examination of the states different roles in funding their parts of welfare programs. These funding patterns as measured by per capita expenditures from their own funds have remained diverse. After a decade of federal pressures, AFDC remains a collection of varied state plans in part funded by federal dollars. See Table III.

The differences noted above reflect real differences in the socio-economic conditions and political pressures in the various states. Because the states have different traditions and resources in their spending on welfare programs the result is variations in benefits paid from one state to the next.

One of the questions extensively discussed in the political science literature has been the extent to which political structures, political processes, socio-economic needs, and/or economic resources are influential in "explaining" state welfare performances. (2)

In the field of public finance, there has been voluminous empirical literature dealing with the budetary impacts of inter-governmental grants. These studies have typically found strong and significant coefficients for the grants. One of the best of these studies, that of Larry Orr, finds that the grants to the state are varied inversly to per capita income and range from 50% to 78% of state dollars. Orr's research indicates that there is slippage in the grants, and that about one-third of the grant is used to increase benefits and the rest is released for other budgetary purposes and/or tax relief. (Orr, 1976)

The question posed in this paper is different. We are interested in identification of the states with unusually high and unusually low expenditures after allowance is made for differences in need and capacity, and for chance variations made. In light of current circumstances, there is every evidence that states will need to assume a much greater responsibility for the funding of social programs. A careful examination of expenditure dollars in the past provides the best clue to state spending in the immediate future.

Methodology
        Like the previous studies, which attempted to identify the determinants of public spending, our basic statistical tool is regression analysis. Unlike past studies, however, we are not developing a causal model. Rather we are building on the causal models currently available in the literature. We have developed this investigation based on a procedure developed by Robert Klitgaard and George R. Hall. We are using the information learned from causal models to judge unique state performance. (Mosteller, 1977)

    1.  Instead of concentrating on property of the regression line, the per-
        centage of variation explained (R²) and the coefficients of the regressor
        variables, attention is devoted to the residuals from the regression
        line.

TABLE III

State Expenditures Per/Capita
From Their Own Sources On
1972-1980 (In Constant 1980 Dollars)[5]

|               | 1972 | 1974 | 1976 | 1978 | 1980 | 1980÷1970 |
|---------------|------|------|------|------|------|-----------|
| Alabama       | 146  | 118  | 128  | 129  | 141  | .965      |
| Alaska        | 207  | 201  | 184  | 228  | 288  | 1.391     |
| Arizona       | 81   | 67   | 66   | 66   | 68   | .839      |
| Arkansas      | 142  | 132  | 148  | 159  | 141  | .993      |
| California    | 371  | 316  | 308  | 337  | 286  | .771      |
| Colorado      | 189  | 172  | 169  | 174  | 139  | .735      |
| Conneticut    | 177  | 164  | 189  | 209  | 212  | 1.197     |
| Delaware      | 163  | 139  | 84   | 178  | 165  | 1.012     |
| Florida       | 95   | 84   | 84   | 78   | 78   | .821      |
| Georgia       | 168  | 149  | 142  | 142  | 142  | .768      |
| Hawaii        | 221  | 226  | 266  | 297  | 240  | 1.086     |
| Idaho         | 112  | 122  | 130  | 127  | 123  | 1.098     |
| Illinois      | 164  | 232  | 238  | 246  | 223  | 1.360     |
| Indianna      | 99   | 102  | 117  | 121  | 121  | 1.222     |
| Iowa          | 122  | 105  | 173  | 178  | 189  | 1.549     |
| Kansas        | 99   | 127  | 158  | 162  | 158  | 1.596     |
| Kentucky      | 136  | 127  | 173  | 170  | 177  | 1.301     |
| Louisianna    | 163  | 142  | 153  | 154  | 154  | .945      |
| Maine         | 181  | 202  | 206  | 237  | 235  | 1.298     |
| Maryland      | 168  | 175  | 179  | 183  | 179  | 1.065     |
| Massachusets  | 325  | 331  | 300  | 314  | 314  | .966      |
| Michigan      | 235  | 264  | 300  | 285  | 292  | 1.242     |
| Minnesota     | 191  | 224  | 263  | 280  | 254  | 1.329     |
| Mississippi   | 164  | 140  | 128  | 156  | 156  | .951      |
| Missouri      | 138  | 118  | 127  | 130  | 134  | .971      |
| Montana       | 122  | 123  | 125  | 144  | 137  | 1.123     |
| Nebraska      | 118  | 119  | 121  | 136  | 122  | 1.103     |
| Nevada        | 118  | 117  | 122  | 121  | 96   | .814      |
| New Hampshire | 140  | 151  | 179  | 173  | 182  | 1.300     |
| New Jersey    | 193  | 201  | 217  | 228  | 208  | 1.078     |
| New Mexico    | 148  | 132  | 119  | 118  | 128  | .865      |
| New York      | 357  | 356  | 404  | 374  | 358  | 1.003     |
| North Carolina| 110  | 100  | 109  | 108  | 131  | 1.191     |
| North Dakato  | 118  | 95   | 112  | 130  | 140  | 1.186     |
| Ohio          | 130  | 149  | 174  | 187  | 169  | 1.300     |
| Oklahoma      | 229  | 177  | 176  | 178  | 181  | .790      |
| Oregon        | 134  | 145  | 129  | 224  | 181  | 1.351     |
| Pennsylvania  | 189  | 217  | 248  | 307  | 236  | 1.249     |
| Rhode Island  | 258  | 271  | 301  | 314  | 145  | 1.221     |
| S. Carolina   | 73   | 85   | 105  | 123  | 116  | 1.590     |
| South Dakota  | 118  | 118  | 145  | 148  | 152  | 1.288     |
| Tennessee     | 118  | 110  | 131  | 140  | 130  | 1.102     |
| Texas         | 126  | 112  | 125  | 116  | 105  | .833      |
| Utah          | 124  | 110  | 131  | 152  | 129  | 1.040     |
| Vermont       | 230  | 215  | 248  | 217  | 187  | .813      |
| Virginia      | 110  | 122  | 131  | 143  | 144  | 1.310     |
| Washington    | 179  | 182  | 125  | 188  | 191  | 1.067     |
| W. Virginia   | 118  | 105  | 135  | 139  | 130  | 1.101     |
| Wisconsin     | 164  | 209  | 248  | 269  | 261  | 1.591     |
| Wyoming       | 85   | 84   | 85   | 89   | 91   | 1.071     |
| Mean          | 161  | 159  | 174  | 168  | 176  | 1.170     |
| Standard Deviation | 64 | 66 | 69 | 66 | 67 | .228    |

2. Instead of including an abundance of regressor variables to explain as much variation as possible, we are diliberately attempting to avoid over-controlling.

3. The critical intent is to "understand" the residuals.

Residual variation can arise from many causes: imperfections in measurement, misspecification of variables, omitted variables, incomplete and/or inaccurate data, as well as poor choice of fitting techniques. Our goal is to separate non-random outlyers from random variations.

The basic null hypothesis of this investigation is that there are no unusually effective (or ineffective) states. The assumption is then, when one has a well specified model with properly measured variables, deviations from the regression line are essentially random.

In order to gain a perspective of the randomness of the error terms we observe the standardized residuals. This formula is:

$$\text{Standardised} = \frac{\text{observed spending} - \text{estimated spending}^1}{\text{Standard error fo the the estimate}}$$

$^1$from regression model

The basic model estimates state welfare spending by controlling for variations in per capita income, percent high school graduates, percent non-white, and percent urban. Typically, these variables explain about one quarter of the interstate variations. The addition of politcal variables to this model does not significantly alter the estimates of welfare performance. This result is consistent with previous studies using step-wise regression models to estimate spending on welfare. (Stonecash, 1981) See Table IV. The basic intent here involves looking at a series of distributions of residuals over time. States which consistently score some distance above or below their expected performance provides fairly strong evidence that that state has an unusual pattern of determining its committment to welfare. See Table V.

The null hypothesis is that all states have their welfare spending similarly determined and that all of the variations in a particular distribution are the results of chance. Then, by using the nominal theorem and assuming independence, we compute the theoretical frequency of distribution of the number of times a state would have a spending deviation greater than one standard residual or less than one standard residual. This is contrasted with the observed occurences in Table VI.

A remarkedly consistend patter of deviation occurs which is decidely non-random. No state, for example, deviates both above and below its expected levels. While 25 states deviated at least once, 8 of these deviated all 5 times. This is consistent with the notion that circumstances which impel a state to unusual performance levels are stable. Clearly, if one knew what that cirsumstance was, the search would conclude. One could suggest that welfare performance is highly determined and the residuals would disappear. The point is, we do not know what they are. The states identified by this procedure are each different in some unknown ways. There is thus a strong persumptive evidence that welfare spending is vital, not deterministic. Close inquiry -- perhaps by case studies -- is likely to give

TABLE IV

Regression Estimates of AFDC: 1972-80

Dependent Variable: Per Capita Spending From

Own Sources on AFDC

| | | 1980 | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Independent Variables | | Beta | t | |
| Per Capita Income | 80 | .2430 | 1.55 | |
| Percent Metro | 80 | .3120 | 2.09 | $r^2$= .2444 |
| Percent Non-White | 80 | -.0297 | .74 | |
| Percent H.S. Grads. | 80 | -.1167 | .21 | |
| | | 1978 | | |
| Independent Variables | | Beta | t | |
| Per Capita Income | 78 | .2613 | 1.46 | |
| Percent Metro | 77 | .3434 | 2.32 | $r^2$= .2277 |
| Percent Non-White | 70 | -.0945 | .63 | |
| Percent H.S. Grads. | 76 | -.0947 | .52 | |
| | | 1976 | | |
| Independent Variables | | Beta | t | |
| Per Capita Income | 76 | .3146 | 1.83 | |
| Percent Metro | 76 | .2965 | 1.98 | $r^2$= .2304 |
| Percent Non-Whtie | 70 | -.1260 | .83 | |
| Percent H. S. Grads. | 76 | -.1168 | .68 | |
| | | 1974 | | |
| Independent Variables | | Beta | t | |
| Per Capita Income | 74 | .4108 | 2.35 | |
| Percent Metro | 76 | .2262 | 1.45 | $r^2$= .2841 |
| Percent Non-White | 70 | -.0478 | .33 | |
| Percent H.S. Grads. | 74 | -.0901 | .55 | |
| | | 1972 | | |
| Independent Variables | | Beta | t | |
| Per Capita Income | 72 | .3910 | 1.90 | |
| Percent Metro | 70 | .1779 | 1.04 | $r^2$= .2462 |
| Percent Non-White | 70 | -.0584 | .31 | |
| Percent H. S. Grads. | 70 | -.0408 | .27 | |

TABLE V

Direction & Duration

Significant Residuals

1972-1980[1]

| State | Sign of Deviation of Residual in | | | | | N |
| | 1972 | 1974 | 1976 | 1978 | 1980 | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Maine | + | + | + | + | + | |
| Massachusets | + | + | + | + | + | 4 |
| New York | + | + | + | + | + | |
| Rhode Island | + | + | + | + | + | |
| | | | | | | |
| California | + | + | + | + | 0 | 2 |
| Vermont | + | + | + | + | 0 | |
| | | | | | | |
| Michigan | 0 | 0 | + | + | + | 3 |
| Minnesota | 0 | 0 | + | + | + | |
| Wisconsin | 0 | 0 | + | + | + | |
| | | | | | | |
| Hawaii | 0 | 0 | + | + | 0 | 1 |
| | | | | | | |
| Mississippi | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | + | 2 |
| Oklahoma | + | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| | | | | | | |
| Remaining States | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 25 |
| | | | | | | |
| Colarado | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | − | |
| Kansas | − | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| South Carolina | − | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 |
| | | | | | | |
| Virginai | − | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Connecticut | 0 | − | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Delaware | 0 | − | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| North Dakota | 0 | − | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| | | | | | | |
| Wyoming | − | 0 | 0 | − | 0 | 1 |
| | | | | | | |
| Texas | 0 | 0 | − | − | − | 1 |
| | | | | | | |
| Arizona | − | − | − | − | − | |
| Florida | − | − | − | − | − | 4 |
| Indiana | − | − | − | − | − | |
| Nevada | − | − | − | − | − | |

[1] A (+) indicates performance (spending) greater than one standard deviation above what is predicted by the regression, while a (−) indicates a deviaion greater than one standard deviation below the regression line.  A zero indicates performance within the predicted range.

TABLE VI

A Comparison of Theoretical* and Actual Distributions of Residuals With A Consistent
Sign in Four Time Periods

| Deviation from Projection Sign | Frequency | Probability | Expected Frequency | Observed Frequency |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| + | 5 | .0000524 | .00262 | 4 |
| + | 4 | .0013763 | .06881 | 2 |
| + | 3 | .0144507 | .72253 | 3 |
| + | 2 | .0758661 | 3.79331 | 1 |
| + | 1 | .1991485 | 9.95743 | 2 |
| n.a. | 0 | .4182119 | 20.91060 | 25 |
| − | 1 | .1991485 | 9.95743 | 7 |
| − | 2 | .0758661 | 3.79331 | 1 |
| − | 3 | .0144507 | .72253 | 1 |
| − | 4 | .0013763 | .06881 | 0 |
| − | 5 | .0000524 | .00262 | 4 |
| | | .9999999 | 49.9999 | 50 |

*Theoretical frequency is calculated by using the biomial theorem and assuming
independence.  For the details of this procedure contact the author.

important lessons from inquiry into the welfare politics of these "good" and "bad" states. Each reader can decide for himself whether consistently high or consistently low spending is good or bad.

Conclusion:
The exercise provides strong presumptive evidence that state variations are decidely non-random. The empirical portion of this paper clearly suggest a resilient desire among the states to carry out their welfare programs consistent with their own tradition. These differences persisted throughout a decade of federalization of welfare programs. If, in the immediate future, the states are "freed" from nationally imposed constraints, it is reasonable to assume that these differences will intensify. For those concerned with national standards, this will be an undersirable result. For those who focus on the opportunity for each satate to chart it's own path, this result may be cheered. These attitudes reflect the tension of a federal state welfare system. What is, however, clear is that a retreat from federally imposed standards will most assuredly reintroduce drastic interstate diversity in benefits, coverage and costs.

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NOTES

[1] For a review of the complex political history of recent welfare reform efforts
it is instructive to read in serial form accounts of various efforts to change the
system.  A careful summary of literature follows:

    President's Johnson's Presidential Commission on Income Maintenance, (Heffernan,
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    Policy.  Santa Monica, Goodyear Publishing Co. 1980, Ch. 5.)

    President Carter's Program For Better Jobs and Income (Lynn, Saurence & David
    DeF. Whitman.  The President As Policy Worker. Philadelphia, Temple V. Press
    1981.

[2] The seminar paper in this field is Richard E. Dawson's and James E. Robinson's
"Inter-Party Competition, Economic Variables and Welfare Policy in the American
States," Journal of Politics, Vol. 25 (May, 1963), pp. 265-289.  This literature

has been significantly expanded and modified in the years since that publication and has spawned an entire subfield of political science.

An incomplete yet incisive restatement of the development of the literature is found in Thomas R. Dye's "Politics versus Economics: The Development of the Literature on Policy Determination", Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 7 (Summer, 1979), pp. 652-663. A more critical review along with very complete, but date, bibliographical statement is found in Robert L. Savage's "The Literature of Systematic Quantitative Comparison in American Stae Politics: An Assessment, Center for the Study of Federalism, Center Report #11, Temple University, Philadelphia, 1976.

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DISINNOVATION IN THE AMERICAN STATES:
POLICY TOWARD HEALTH SYSTEMS AGENCIES

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ABSTRACT

Requiring the states to involve consumers in health
planning through local health planning boards (HSAs) was an
attempt by the federal government to control health care costs.
Elimination of this requirement more recently has meant some
states have discontinued the program. The elimination of HSAs
can be considered a case of policy disinnovation. Drawing on
the innovation literature, the following variables were expected
to correlate, although negatively, with elimination of HSAs:
value added to manufacturing, average acre value of farms, per
capita income, population living in metropolitan areas, and
party competition. All were found to correlate negatively.
Predisposition to spend reflected in per capita state
expenditures was also correlated negatively with elimination of
HSAs, as was the average daily hospital room charge and average
hospital cost per stay.

Innovation is a term that has been applied to the adoption
of new programs and policies by state governments. The process
by which policies diffuse among the American states has been
described and explained, the latter chiefly in terms of state
characteristics found to correlate with the adoption of a
particular policy. While it has been recognized that there is a
reverse process, disinnovation, there has been little, if any,
effort to describe and understand it. This can be attributed to
an ever widening public sector over the years, spurred on by the
demands and resources of the federal government. Withdrawal of
federal initiatives and funds more recently may, however, make
disinnovation a more frequent phenomenon and perhaps a more
frequently studied one. This paper examines one such
disinnovation, the elimination of health systems agencies (HSAs)
in the American states. More specifically, it explores the

correlation between characteristics of the states and
elimination of HSAs.

     Health systems agencies are local health planning boards
provided for in the 1974 National Health Planning and Resource
Development Act in combination with Title 19 of the Social
Security Act (Medicare and Medicaid).  Under the provisions of
the law (P.L. 93-641) and subsequent amendments in 1979, state
governments were to divide their states into local and/or area
wide health planning and development agencies which were to be
responsible for synthesizing HSA plans into a single statewide
plan.  State governments would also be responsible for reviewing
HSA activities including HSA decisions on certificate of need
applications, i.e., applications from hospitals, nursing homes,
etc., for proposed construction and expansion of health care
facilities.  Funds for HSA staff were to be provided from
federal monies.  Failure of states to comply would mean a loss
of federal funds for hospital construction and medicare and
medicaid payments.  A change in the law in 1981, however,
permitted states the option of meeting the health planning
requirements of the 1974 act without continuing HSAs.

     One of the objectives of the 1974 act was to involve
consumers of health care services in health planning.  Federal
regulations thus required that at least one half of the
membership of HSA boards be consumers.  The remaining members
were to be health care professionals, e.g., physicians and
others involved in the provision of health care services.
Involving consumers in certificate of need review it was hoped,
would provide a check on unnecessary expansion of health care
facilities, limiting capital expenditures, and thus reducing the
cost of health care.  While HSAs have increased the number of
consumers involved in health planning (Burlage, 1979; Sigelman,
1982), it is less clear what the impact of HSAs has been on
health care costs (Downs, 1982; Duhl and Blum, 1981).  The
concern here, however, is with the response of state governments
to the change in federal policy toward HSAs.  Withdrawing the
requirement that states have HSA planning boards meant that
states were free to retain or eliminate local planning boards.
The elimination of HSAs by a state can be considered a case of
disinnovation, and it is variation among the states in this
regard that the study will try to explain.

## INNOVATION LITERATURE

Jack Walker has defined innovation as "simply a program or policy that is new to the states adopting it, no matter how old the program may be or how many other states have adopted it" (Walker, 1971: 335). Disinnovation can be considered a program or policy that is terminated or discontinued by a state (Rogers, 1962; Eyestone, 1977). While the focus of this study is disinnovation, the literature on innovation provides a useful framework.

Two principle questions are asked in research in policy innovation in state government. 1. What are the patterns of diffusion of policy innovations among the states? 2. Which states are likely to be "early adopters" of policy innovations?

With respect to the first, Walker (1971), borrowing from theories of human choice and organizational decision making, suggests that decision makers in the states may look to other states for cues regarding new programs and appropriate levels of services. While a few states fancy themselves as leaders in the adoption of new ideas and can be expected to move on their own, most delay waiting for other states to act, particularly those states which, for one reason or another, serve as a reference point. Walker refers to regional reference groups. States often compare themselves with others in their region and look to these states for new ideas and programs. Certain states may become regional pacesetters with new ideas failing to spread to the region until adopted by the pacesetter. Thus, we might expect patterns of diffusion to reflect a clustering pattern through time, with little variation in time of adoption within regions, but some variation between regions. We would also expect those states that use the self starting states as references to be the first to adopt innovations.

While regional ties work to slow the diffusion process and lead to an evenness in the diffusion pattern, specialized communication and increasing professionalism among state decision makers may have the opposite effect. Walker (1971) notes that the total time of diffusion has decreased over time. For the period 1930-1966, the total time for innovations to diffuse was 25.6 years, for 1870-1899, 52.3 years. The increase in associations that monitor developments in state government, such as the Council of State Governments, which disseminate information on new ideas to the states and the development of professional orientations among state decision makers, which

leads to a commitment to improved ways of doing things, is
having an homogenizing effect on state government. The result
is a faster diffusion process, with typically laggard states
adopting much sooner than in the past.

There is also the impact of federal incentives stimulating
innovation diffusion. Welch and Thompson (1980) find, for
example, that programs with federal incentives diffuse more
rapidly than those without, and that positive incentives are
more effective in diffusing programs than negative incentives.
Light (1978) too, based on a survey of state administrators,
finds that the federal government is an important stimulus to
innovation, but observes that this varies with policy area. He
notes that the federal government is perceived by state
administrators as an important stimulus in the areas of human
resources and criminal justice, but less important in natural
resources and transportation. He concludes that the study of
innovation by policy area is a promising approach to
understanding the diffusion process. Downs and Mohr (1976)
reach similar conclusions. With respect to which states lead in
developing innovations, Grupp and Richards (1975) find variation
across policy areas.

Virginia Gray (1975) has also examined patterns of
diffusion of policy innovations in the states. Gray examines
twelve policies in the areas of education, welfare, and civil
rights. Employing a model based on the assumption that
interaction among adopters and non adopters, similar to Walker,
accounts for the spread of adoptions, she is able to generate a
regression reflecting the pattern of diffusion over time. The
predicted pattern for the twelve policies is a close fit to the
observed. The cumulative percentage of adopters is "S" shaped,
the frequency distribution normal. Gray also observes variation
in the diffusion process by policy area. The diffusion of
education policies follows a regular and consistent pattern.
Policies in the civil rights and welfare areas vary in diffusion
patterns. Moreover, states that are innovative, early adopters,
in one area are not necessarily innovative in another. Nor are
the same states necessarily innovative within policy areas,
i.e., a state may be quick to adopt one education innovation but
slow to adopt another. She concludes that "innovativeness" is
both issue and time specific.

In spite of Gray's findings, differences among the states
in certain characteristics may be related to early adoption.
Gray herself finds that per capita personal income in the states

distinguishes the first ten adopters with respect to the twelve
policies she examined. The governor's electoral margin was also
correlated with the first ten states to adopt. In an effort to
uncover general correlates of innovation, Walker (1971) ranked
the states by innovation scores based on 88 programs and
policies. Reasoning that available resources in terms of wealth
and expertise might lead to a willingness to experiment as well
as risk failure, he hypothesized that the larger and wealthier
states, those with the most developed industrial economies and
the largest cities, would have the highest innovation scores.
It is plausible, Walker suggests, to assume that the great
cosmopolitan centers of the country would likely be the most
adaptive and sympathetic to change, and thus, the first to adopt
new programs.

        Consistent with this line of argument, Walker finds that
innovation scores do correlate with the value added to goods by
manufacturing, the average per acre value of farms, the size of
the urban population, and per capita income. He also examined
the correlation between degree of party competition,
malapportionment of the state legislature and innovation score.
Both were positively related to innovation. Correlations with
several other political variables lead Walker to conclude that
the states that adopt new programs more rapidly are bigger,
richer, more urban, more industrial, have more fluidity and
turnover among elected office holders, and have legislatures
that more adequately represent cities.

        The Walker and Gray studies are particularly relevant to
this study. It is plausible to assume that some of the factors
found by them to correlate with inovation also correlate,
although negatively, with disinnovation. That is, it is
expected that those characteristics which are positively
correlated with early adoption are negatively correlated with
elimination. Based on this line of reasoning the following
propositions can be derived: The value added to goods by
manufacturing, average per acre value of farms, per capita
income, size of urban population, and degree of party
competition are inversely related to elimination of HSAs. It is
also logical to assume that Walker's innovation scores for the
states relate inversely to elimination.

        Extending Walker's argument, expenditure levels among the
states might be another variable significant in accounting for
variation among the states in.elimination of HSAs. Per capita
state expenditures are not only another indicator of a state's

wealth, but in some way may reflect a predisposition to spend.
If so, it is plausible to assume that states with higher levels
of expenditures are more likely to add to those levels with the
addition of programs than states with lower levels. In other
words, states currently spending at a high level are more likely
to retain HSAs than those spending at a lower level. Thus,
another proposition is that expenditures per capita are
inversely related to elimination of HSAs.

Other variables relevant to the particular policy lead to
another set of propositions. HSAs were set up to cut hospital
costs. Where hospital costs are high, it is plausible to assume
a greater need for HSAs. In other words, the higher hospital
costs are, the greater need to control them, and thus, the
greater the need to maintain cost cutting mechanisms such as
HSAs. Therefore, there are the following propositions: Average
daily hospital room charge and average hospital cost per stay
are inversely related to elimination of HSAs.

METHOD

The Omnibus Reconciliation Bill of 1981 gave the states the
option of retaining or eliminating HSAs. While some states
continue to deliberate the fate of HSAs and this makes the
study's conclusions somewhat tentative, many have decided
whether or not HSAs will continue operation. In the Spring of
1982, questionnaires were sent to the governors in the 50
states. Followup questionnaires were sent in the Summer to
those failing to respond to the first wave. Thirty-eight
questionnaires were returned, with 33 (66%) indicating that the
issue of HSAs had been resolved.[1]

Responses from the 33 are the basis for the analysis.
States were categorized on the dependent variable, elimination
of HSAs based on their response to the following question: As
you know the federal requirements and support for the
continuation of Health Systems Agencies have been dropped.
Whether or not a state will continue with HSAs will be for each
state to decide. Some states may continue with HSAs and allow
them to operate as they did previously; other states may
eliminate them altogether. Still others may transfer the
functions of HSAs to other agencies of state government. Please
check the statement below which comes closest to what your state
is planning to do or may already have done. 1. No change. HSAs
will continue to operate as they have in the past. 2. HSAs will

-194-

be eliminated, but their review functions will be transferred to other state agencies. 3. HSAs will be eliminated.

Many responses did not fit neatly into the above three categories. For example, some states indicated that HSAs would continue but without the state providing funds. In most cases, local government and/or private funding sources were mentioned. Such responses were considered no change only if review functions of HSAs with respect to certificate of need review would continue. The transfer of HSA review functions to other agencies also presents some problems of classification. The nature of the review with respect to local input was not always clear; nor was it obvious in the case of some states whether certificate of need review would continue. In many such cases, however, it was clear that certificate of need review would not continue and consumer participation would be limited and/or not expected, at least not in a way comparable to HSAs. One might argue that such arrangements amount to elimination. Because of the problems of classification, we have created two variables based on these responses. One is a dichotomy with elimination and transfer coded one, all other responses zero. A second maintains all three categories. These two variables are correlated with the independent variables outlined earlier.

ANALYSIS

Of the 33 useable responses, 24 (73%) states indicated that HSAs were or would be eliminated; nine states (27%) indicated the continued existence of HSAs with the same or basically the same functions as before. Of the 24 indicating that HSAs would be eliminated, 15 (45%) responded that the function of HSAs would be transferred to other agencies of state government. Thus, we have nine no change, 15 elimination but transfer of function, and nine elimination with no transfer, or elimination of structure and function.

Previous studies suggest a number of variables are correlated with innovation, as defined by Walker, in the American states. Table 1 shows the correlation, measured by Pearson's correlation coefficient, between the two dependent measures and the independent variables reviewed earlier.[1] As a check on the appropriateness of Pearson's correlation with a trichotomous dependent variable, plots against each independent variable were examined and showed patterns of relationship to be reasonably linear. A check on the use of Pearson's with what amounts to an ordinal classification was also made by

Table 1.  Correlates of discontinuation of HSAs

| | Elimination/ Transfer/ No Change¹ | Elimination/ Transfer/ No Change² |
|---|---|---|
| Value added by manu- facturing (1977) | -.13 | -.17 |
| Average per acre value of farms (1980) | -.33** | -.23* |
| Per capita income (1979) | -.12 | -.33** |
| Percent population living in urban areas (1978) | -.20 | -.30** |
| Degree of party competition (1974-1980) | -.11 | -.25* |
| Per capita state expenditures (1978) | -.13 | -.29** |
| Average daily room charge (1979) | -.22* | -.37** |
| Average cost of a hospital stay (1978) | -.33** | -.41** |
| Walker's innovation score | -.23* | -.28** |

** Probability less than .05
 * Probability .05 to .10


Coding:   1.  Dependent variable coded 0 equal to no change; .5
transfer and 1 elimination.   2.  Dependent variable coded 0
equal to no change and 1 equal to transfer and elimination.
Degree of party competition is coded 1,2,3, with 1 equal to one
party, 2 equal to modified one party, and 3 equal to two party.
Taken from John F. Bibby, et. al., "Parties in State
Politics" in Politics in the American States, ed. by Virginia
Gray, Herbert Jacob, and Kenneth N. Vines (4th ed.; Boston:
Little, Brown, 1983)  Walker's innovation scores are taken from
Jack L. Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovation Among the American
States," American Political Science Review 63: 880-889, 1969.
All other measures taken from U.S. Bureau of the Census,
Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1980 (101st edition.)
Washington, D.C., 1980.

calculating Spearman's rho.  While somewhat lower in magnitude,
the results using rho were equivalent to Pearson's correlation.
We have selected to report our findings in terms of Pearson's
correlation because it is, we believe, more typically employed
and likely to be familiar to a wider audience, and because it
has multivariate extensions which permit more powerful
analytical techniques.

A negative correlation in the Table means that a variable
is inversely related to elimination of HSAs.  Expectations
fashioned from the innovation literature suggest all
relationships should be negative and examination of the Table
shows that they are.  The variables Walker found to correlate
with innovation are inversely correlated with disinnovation, as
is Walker's own innovation scale for the states.  The pattern
holds with both the trichotomous and dichotomous measures,
although the correlations are somewhat higher for the dichotomy.
The finding holds out the prospect that disinnovation can be
explained by the same theoretical structure that underlies
innovation.  Spending patterns too, relate negatively to
elimination of HSAs, which is consistent with the thesis that
predisposition to spend among the states is likely to lead to
the retnetion of innovations, at least those that cost money.
The Table also reveals that elements relevant to the particular
policy make a difference.  Both average daily room charge and
average cost of hospital stay are negatively correlated with
elimination of HSAs.  It may be that innovation and
disinnovation are correlated with variables that reflect wealth
and expertise, as Walker hypothesized, but it is also quite
plausible to assume that variables specific to a particular
policy can also be important.  In some situations one can
anticipate that policy relevant factors can enhance prospects
for innovation or disinnovation, while in others, retard
prospects.  In some cases, one can imagine that the influence of
policy factors may have effects opposite and perhaps stronger
than wealth and/or expertise.  These possibilities may help to
explain what appears to be a contradiction in the literature on
innovation diffusion among the states.

While all the variables Walker examined in his study
correlated in the expected way with elimination of HSAs, the
correlations were quite modest.  This may reflect the crude and
imprecise manner in which disinnovation is measured.  But it
also raises the question of the utility of these variables for
understanding disinnovation.  Why did the variables not
correlate higher?  One can argue that slack resources, available

expertise, and a willingness to take risks may push states with these characteristics to innovate, however, once an innovation is in place, neither expertise nor potential risk should play a role in retaining it. Once a program is underway, the obstacle of risk has been overcome and expertise, if by this we mean the skill necessary to implement and administer a policy or program, while still important, at least through the years immediately following adoption, would presumably be less of a factor as a state begins to acquire knowledge of the program or policy in operation. Furthermore, we can anticipate that a tight fiscal situation would not necessarily lead to withdrawal of an innovation, particularly if interests have developed with a stake in preserving it, which is often the case.

While no one would suggest giving up on the development of what might be called a non policy specific explanation for innovation or disinnovation at this point, with respect to disinnovation, a more fruitful approach may be one that focuses on factors and elements unique to the particular policy or group of policies. This is especially likely to be the case where policies remain controversial. Health planning or at least the issue of who should be involved in it are quite controversial. Therefore, we expect that policy specific and other idiosyncratic factors will be important in explaining health planning policy. In addition to patterns of health care costs, one might expect variables such as the strength of the medical lobby and the personal preferences of significant public officials, e.g., governors, to be important.

Bivariate relationships do not allow one to sort out the relative importance of variables in explaining a dependent variable, however, a multiple regression procedure can. While we must be cautious in our conclusions owing to the small number of cases and intercorrelations among the independent variables, regression provides additional evidence that bears on our hypotheses. Table 2 contains the results of regressing the dependent variable on the independent variables. The numbers in the Table are standardized regression coefficients (betas). We have included only one of the health care cost variables in the regression because they are correlated (.68) with each other and reflect basically the same thing.

The regression analysis shows Walker's variables, or some of them, to be more important in explaining variation in policy toward HSAs than either per capita state expenditures or average cost of a hospital stay. While the latter are not unimportant,

Table 2.  A Regression Analysis of Correlates of
Discontinuation of HSAs

|  | Elimination/ Transfer/ No Change | Elimination/ Transfer/ No Change |
|---|---|---|
| Value added by manu- facturing | .06[1] | .09 |
| Average per acre value of farms | -.15 | -.05 |
| Per capita income | .10 | -.04 |
| Percent population living in urban areas | -.20 | -.25 |
| Degree of party competition | -.16 | -.22 |
| Per capita state expenditures | -.18 | -.28 |
| Average cost of a hospital stay | -.11 | -.18 |

1.  Numbers are standardized regressions coefficients (betas).

the variables Walker used as measures of wealth, expertise,
etc., rank higher at least in terms of their ability to explain
variation in the dependent variable.  Although conclusions must
be considered tentative, analysis here would not allow us to
reject the thesis that conditions giving rise to adoption of
innovations are also important in the retention of innovations.
To be sure, further research is required not only with respect
to health policy but other areas of policy as well.  If
disinnovation becomes more widespread, as it may well, this
issue can be examined more fully.

CONCLUSION

    Mandating consumer involvement in health planning through
HSAs in the states was an attempt by the federal government to
control health care costs.  More recent elimination of this
requirement has meant some states have abandoned the program.
The discontinuation of HSAs can be considered a case of policy
disinnovation.  While there have been several studies of
innovation in the states, little work has focused on
disinnovation.  Drawing on the innovation literature, the
following variables were expected to correlate, although

negatively, with elimination of HSAs: value added to manufacturing, average per acre value of farms, per capita income, population living in metropolitan areas, and party competition. All were found to correlate negatively with elimination of HSAs. However, correlations were not particularly high. One explanation for this is that disinnovation is something different than the reverse of innovation, and therefore, variables that correlate highly with one will not correlate highly with the other.

Predisposition to spend reflected in per capita state expenditures was also inversely related to elimination of HSAs. This too was expected. States willing to pay for one program or policy, it is suspected are likely to pay for another. Two policy specific variables also correlated with elimination of HSAs. These were the average daily hospital room charge and average cost per hospital stay. It is reasonable to expect that where health care costs are high, the felt need to control costs will be strong. The negative correlations for both confirm this.

Much of the literature on innovation stresses the need for policy specific research on factors related to adoption patterns. While the data presented here would lead us to concur, the data also direct us to consider the more general influences suggested by Walker which reflect the fiscal and intellectual capacity of the states. In seeking to understand state responses to HSAs and perhaps other programs designed to cut costs, patterns of health care costs within the states seem to be an important variable. It appears, however, that they work with other variables that also bear on such programs and policies.

NOTES

1.  Differences between respondent and non respondent states do not appear to be severe, at least on the independent variables included in the analysis. Statistically significant differences, measured by a difference of means t test (p equal to .05), exist only on the variables average cost of a hospital stay and state expenditures per capita. Non respondent states are more likely to have higher hospital costs per stay and higher expenditures per capita.

2. While cases in the analysis do not constitute a random
   sample, statistical tests can be considered as a check
   against an undefined random process or some other source of
   variation producing a result.


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# POLICY TRADITIONS IN AMERICAN STATE POLITICS*

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## ABSTRACT

An examination of the states across a wide range of policy innovations dur-
ing three historical periods reveals policy traditions having distinctive geo-
graphic limits roughly conforming to major regions commonly recognized in Amer-
ican politics. Only two of these traditions, the "Southern Parochial" and the
"Northeastern Bureaucratic," persist across time and even these have been weak-
ened. This provides some evidence that while multilinear evolution along regional
lines will continue to contribute to differences in policy values among the Amer-
ican states in the foreseeable future, sociocultural integration is the stronger
dynamic in American political development, especially since about 1930.

Social scientists have long recognized the unique research opportunity af-
forded by the American states, constituting as they do, many separate laboratories
for political investigation. As these semi-autonomous political systems seek to
regulate the conflicts arising among citizens within their respective boundaries,
each is confronted by problems of varying degrees of uniqueness and with different
historical records of managing these conflicts. Each American state, then, is
more than simply a location for happenings or a holder of attributes. Each state
is a complex, semi-autonomous system with patterned modes of behavior, structural
regularities in social relationships, and characteristic societal attributes. And
each state, in the process of acquiring its own milieu, has considerable autonomy
to choose among alternative lines of development. The states are in this sense
producers of values as their choices help to shape the culture, social structure,
and population within their respective boundaries. As the states are also polit-
ical systems acting to regulate social conflict, they continually readjust the
bases of conflict in response to both internal and external changes of their
milieu. Choice, then, is a key ingredient in the differences that occur among the
states, and differences in choices among them arise from variations in informa-
tion, values, and actions that are available to decision makers in the several
states.[1]

Certainly, previous studies of American state political behavior have ad-
dressed the element of choice even if in many cases only to stress its con-
straints. But the focus in most comparative studies has been on information and
action with relative exclusion of value as a consideration. This emphasis flows
rather naturally from subscriptions to the input-output model of systems analy-
sis in which one looks to the conversion of demands and supports (information) to
policy outcomes (actions). This view of the political process tends to ignore the
fact that each step toward a policy is subject to the decisions of many agents,
each deciding in the fact of a multi-valued choice. This view further tends to
disregard the realm of values imposed upon the actors by previous choices not

only at the individual level but at the systemic level as well.

The elements of choice assuredly are not easily untangled in the real world. Information and action are always value-laden, and values must confront the realities of information and action. Still, values provide a continuity, a patterning, that injects a note of stability into the processes of choice. At the same time, values are typically inferred from series of actions. Actions in turn reflect the interplay of configurations of information and values that are themselves interdependent. Given this essential circularity and autocorrelation, then, the "facts" that are the building blocks of empirical research must always be accepted as tentative and multi-faceted.

This emphasis upon choice, as a derivative of the interplay of information values, and actions, clearly suggests a cybernetic conception of the states as political entities (Deutsch, 1966). Cybernetic models focus especially upon goal-seeking activities. In the face of dissatisfaction, behaving entities make choices so as to move closer to a desirable condition. For any complex system, however, many satisfactions and dissatisfactions may exist at any given time. Thus, complex systems are rather continously faced with the multivalued choice, but to the extent that certain desirable conditions are preferred more or less with regard to others, such entities can be viewed as seeking goals in a develop-ment fashion. Development in this sense refers to the successive institutional-izations of such goals or values. For the American states, development is indi-cated by continuing approximations to values sought through policy choices.

This linking of goal-seeking and development in human behavioral systems im-plies sociocultural evolution wherein values serve as genetic structures that are transmitted from one point in time to a later point in time (Deutsch, 1966; Thor-son, 1970). And like their genetic counterparts in the biological realm, values impel behavior but do not necessarily compel it, i.e., values determine ranges of possibilities for social systems. For example, the American South has developed along lines diverging from other areas of the nation with respect to the bonds of democratic political association. Southern states did not, however, eschew demo-cratic association as the fundamental political bond. Culture, then, understood as a "socio-genetic system of information transmission," suggests constraints and possibilities, not mechanisms and causes (Thorson, 1970: p. 130; cf. also Paige, 1966; Riggs, 1968).

These considerations--the ubiquity of conflict, and thus of choice, in and among behaving systems, a multifaceted rather than a hierarchical image of real-ity, and a developmental, as opposed to a causal, perspective--propel the realm of values to the forefront in behavioral analysis. What are needed, then, are ap-propriate data manipulated by a technique that slices through to present the Amer-ican states in full array as entities confronting challenges and making decisions as to what is, what ought to be, and what can and will be done. Certainly, no research procedures exist that will parsimoniously compare the full ranges of po-litical behavior within and among the states. Still, the study of state politics is enhanced to the extent that certain dominant patterns within particular seg-ments of behavior are found (see, e.g., Luttbeg, 1970; Savage, 1973, 1975; Walker, 1969). The analysis of dominant patterns of policy values should particularly provide an opening wedge into the study of the symbolic realm of political behav-ior, a research concern that has tended to be lost in the quantitative analysis of state politics.

POLITICAL CULTURE, POLICY TRADITIONS, AND REGIONALISM

Culture has been construed variously but one useful definition argues that it
consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior
acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive
achievement of human groups, including their embodiments in arti-
facts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e.
historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their at-
tached values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered
as products of action, on the other as conditioning elements of
further actions (Kroeber and Kluckhohn, n.d.: p. 357; see also
Kluckhohn, 1951; Kluckhohn and Kelly, 1945).

This construction of culture focuses upon patterned behavior, symbolic transmis-
sion, group action, traditional ideas, and values. Thus, culture as a word-con-
struct refers first of all to structured regularities in behavior that are embed-
ded in the symbolic interplay within and between generations. Moreover, this sym-
bolic activity embraces with varying degrees of penetration an entire group or
society. As ideas are formulated and validated by symbolic activity valuations
come to be attached to them such that the ideas become embedded deeper and deeper
as traditional axioms of subsequent behavior. In this way values become struc-
tured and represent one mode of human experience, the "oughtness" that pervades
the cultural field.

The prevailing value system emerges over time with many of its components the
by-products of unintended consequences. Yet, much of that value system is con-
sciously produced and often through the actions of government. It is this aspect
of culture that ought to be of most particular interest to students of politics.
Yet, as Karl Deutsch (1969) points out, political science especially has tended
more readily to accept "mechanistic" models of the political process and focused
more and more on the allocative function of public policies to the relative exclu-
sion of their function in producing values.[2] Assuredly, value allocation and
value production are not unrelated. Both are reflected in governmental policies.
Such policies may be, for example, the initiation of new programs, funding of
established programs, or perhaps simply resolutions, symbolic expressions giving
or denying rhetorical support to some goal that may or may not require subsequent
action by government. Every instance of policy making is, thus, an allocative
effort--"who gets what, when, how" in the celebrated Lasswellian formulation. The
production of values appears in the patterning of such allocative efforts over
time. Thus, for example, the commitment in the United States to democracy was
initially both ill-defined and severely restricted. One line of development in
the growth of this value of democratic association has been the gradual widening
of the franchise to include ever larger portions of the population. Allocation
and production, then, are inextricably linked in a cyclical process.

To the extent that a governmental system pursues a more or less coherent set
of policy directions across time, then, we can speak of a policy tradition. This
tradition directs the general production and growth of values within the society
as well as the more specific allocations granted at any given points in time. In
examining the American states there is the two-headed problem of their uniformity
within a national system and their autonomy as components of a federal system.

For comparative analysis, their shared, invariant characteristics must be sorted out and their utterly unique characteristics most often glossed over. In other words, for the sake of utility on the one hand and parsimony on the other, a small number of basic types or traditions is desirable.

Indeed, the literature of American state politics richly suggests that a small number of such types is highly probably, given the tendencies toward shared regional configurations of attributes.[3] Regional groupings in patterns of policy responsiveness are likely due to the variant physical geographies across the states combined with the concommitant economies attached to those geographies. These regional regularities are sometimes complimented, and at other times crosscut, by historical settlement patterns as Elazar (1970, 1972) has shown. Thus, two problems emerge in the analysis of policy traditions as an aspect of regional political cultures: the physical contiguity of states adhering to a common tradition and the likelihood of changes over time in socio-economic structure and settlement patterns.

Social scientists, unwittingly or not, usually apply the term "region" in a functional sense that generally requires territorial contiguity.[4] Unfortunately, the requirement is imposed a priori and not empirically. However, in some disciplines a region is defined in a formal sense that requires some specific level of homogeneity in a given set of attributes.[5] Region may be construed in this sense, then, as a set of states which share locally and relativistically distinctive uniformities in cultural content and form--regardless of their geographical locations relative to one another. Thus, Delaware and Vermont may form a more meaningful region for some purposes (or more strongly share a tradition) than Delaware and Maryland or Vermont and New York. Of course, if geographical contiguity is present as well, then regional analysis is enhanced. Still, the formal definition of region with its requirement for prior, rather than post hoc, analysis and its focus upon the dynamics of man-environment relationships is preferable for most examinations of culture.[6]

Linked with this problematic decision is the problem of regional instability over time. Particularly in the modern era, as technology allows greater independence from the physical environment and as settlement patterns move in ways other than the classical spillover into "virgin" lands, human culture witnesses an expansion of available options, including policy choices. To the extent that diffusion processes are involved, technological advances in communication and transportation further enhance the likelihood of breakdown of functional regions, but not necessarily formal ones. And at the same time, formal regions must always be put to the empirical test of essential homogeneity.

Beyond these considerations, a formal definition more clearly pushes toward theoretical questions as to the dynamics of cultural change. Certainly, if policy traditions are the substantive concern, then these dynamics are of central importance. Those dynamics offer two possibilities with regard to regional distribution: multilinear evolution or sociocultural integration. If the states sharing a regional similarity continue to be distinctive in that same fashion from other states over time, then a pattern of multilinear evolution is evident. Students of comparative state policy making more often, however, argue that the states are becoming more and more alike; indeed, these assertions usually suggest that sociocultural integration is moving so as to bring all the other states up to the "stan-

dard" of the states in the industrial Northeast.[7]  Such arguments ignore the multi-
dimensionality of development, or "modernization."[8]  The more thoroughgoing empiri-
cal examinations that actually focus on political change in the states are more
equivocal, however.  Generally, these studies suggest that regionalism may have
been more stable in the past with an accelerated movement toward greater sociocul-
tural integration in the twentieth century, especially in the past three or four
decades (Sharkansky, 1970; Savage, 1975, 1978).  The research reported here focuses
upon policy traditions as indicated by proneness to adopt policies reflecting par-
ticular values across time and is thus likely to be the strongest test of sociocul-
tural integration.

### AN EMPRIRICAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF POLICY TRADITIONS

    While public expenditure data reflect values in state policy, the various cat-
egories into which such data are aggregated are relatively limited.  Moreover,
these decisions reflect environmental constraints to a greater degree than do the
decisions that actually come prior to these appropriations.  Thus, a measure of
policy authorization is preferable for the analysis of policy traditions.  Such a
measure is the speed of adoption of a given policy, the length of time in years re-
quired by a state to adopt a policy after its first adoption.  These lapsed-time
scores are computed for each of 207 policies for all 48 contiguous states.[9]  The
last state to adopt a given policy is assigned a zero for that adoption item.  The
lapsed-time scores for a given policy are then derived for the first and subsequent
units of adoption from the date for the last state to adopt that policy (or 1971
where one or more states had failed to adopt the policy as of that date).  Allow-
ance has been made for states that had not achieved territorial status at the time
of the first adoption of a policy by adding to their scores the number of years be-
tween the initial adoption date and the date of acquisition of territorial status.
These adoption scores provide flexible statistics with a common unit of measurement
and are susceptible to a variety of statistical treatments.
    The adoption measures have been compiled so as to obtain data for the widest
possible variety of policies.  These measures include the creation of sundry state
agencies; the extension of state activity into various areas of public concern
such as education, health, housing, and welfare; the expansion of economic develop-
ment, including the support of transportation facilities and the regulation of
business and professions; the regulation of political participation; intergovern-
mental relations; and taxation.
    The 207 measures of adoption speed are segmented into three broad temporal
categories that permit developmental analysis.  These three periods were selected
so as to give roughly equal numbers of measures for each period and, as much as
possible, to mark watershed points in the political development of the states,
namely the beginning (about 1900) and ending (about 1930) of the Progressivist era.
Thus the nineteenth century offers 72 adoption measures, the early twentieth cen-
tury has 60 measures, and there are 75 measures for the later twentieth century.
    As the concern here is with the extent to which states share common patterns
of variation across an array of policies, the Q-data slice is appropriate and fac-
tor analysis determines these underlying dimensionalities, i.e., the common types
of variation.[10]  Thus, a policy tradition is operationally defined by a Q-factor

(depicting the degree of similarity among the states) and its typal array of factor scores across the policy adoption items. The typal array promotes analysis of policy values by presenting the modal configuration of policy adoptions for each type of state.

For each time period the data are correlated, factored by principal components, and rotated with a Varimax solution. Originally the number of factors was determined by the eigenvalue-one criterion, but for each of the three time periods, idiosyncratic factors emerged that made comparisions difficult. Examination of the three matrices by the scree method suggested that a four-factor solution for each matrix is appropriate.[11] Accordingly, the analysis here uses the four-factor solutions.

EMERGENT TRADITIONS IN AMERICAN STATE POLICY MAKING

A four-factor solution explains more than sixty percent of the variation in each instance with a low of 62.2% for the early 20th century and a high of 77.1% for the later 20th. Communalities ($h^2$) for individual states rarely fall below 0.50 (three instances in the 19th century and three in the early 20th). The empirical results, then, support the decision to use four-factor solutions. Still, the substantive utility of the factor results for each period is the ultimate test of the validity of the decision. Accordingly, each of the time periods is examined in depth below.

POLICY TRADITIONS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

The factor matrix presented in Table 1 presents four "regions" defined operationally in the formal sense but even a cursory examination suggests that these regions tend strongly to be functional regions as well. Factor I, best represented by the states of Arizona, Montana, Utah, and Washington, groups fifteen contiguous states from west of the Mississippi River along with the more easterly states of Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, and Maine. Assuredly, this points to a "Western" policy tradition in the 19th century. Factor II, best represented by Alabama, Tennessee, and Texas, is hardly a surprise; it is a "Southern" tradition including all the Old Confederate states and the five adjoining states of Missouri, Kentucky, West Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware. Factor III, best represented by Connecticut and New Hampshire, is "New England," excluding Maine. Factor IV, best represented by New Jersey, exhibits the least contiguity, combining three Mid-Atlantic states in the east with four Midwestern states and Wyoming. For reasons that will become more apparent later, this factor can be called "Mid-American."

Note should also be made of significant secondary saturations as well. Thus, several Factor I states of the Great Plains (Montana, South Dakota, Colorado, Nebraska) load on Factor IV, as well as scattered others. This subsidary regional tendency is less apparent with Factor I states having secondary saturations on Factor II, just as Factor II states having secondary saturations on Factor I are not necessarily the more westerly of the Southern states. On the other hand, four of the five more westerly Factor IV states and only one of the more easterly ones have secondary saturations on Factor I.

All in all, similarities in the responsiveness to new policies in the 19th century strongly reflected sectional divisions in the young nation. An examination

Table 1

CONFORMANCE TO POLICY TRADITIONS IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY:  A Q-FACTOR MATRIX*

| State | Factor | | | | $h^2$ |
|-------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| | I | II | III | IV | |
| Arizona | 89 | 16 | 14 | 12 | 0.86 |
| Washington | 83 | 16 | 18 | 17 | 0.77 |
| Utah | 82 | 10 | 22 | 15 | 0.76 |
| Montana | 80 | 17 | 12 | 36 | 0.81 |
| South Dakota | 79 | 15 | -02 | 37 | 0.79 |
| Colorado | 79 | 10 | 16 | 29 | 0.75 |
| Nebraska | 76 | 18 | -04 | 35 | 0.74 |
| Idaho | 74 | 16 | -01 | 46 | 0.79 |
| New Mexico | 74 | 33 | 13 | -12 | 0.69 |
| Kansas | 73 | 24 | -12 | 23 | 0.65 |
| Nevada | 71 | 33 | -06 | 35 | 0.74 |
| Oklahoma | 70 | 35 | 11 | 22 | 0.67 |
| Michigan | 69 | 15 | 01 | 14 | 0.52 |
| Maine | 67 | 09 | 29 | 04 | 0.54 |
| California | 65 | 29 | -05 | 38 | 0.65 |
| Iowa | 64 | 36 | -26 | 16 | 0.63 |
| Indiana | 63 | 48 | -14 | 06 | 0.65 |
| Oregon | 57 | 46 | -17 | 27 | 0.64 |
| Ohio | 51 | 44 | -13 | 37 | 0.60 |
| Alabama | 14 | 86 | 12 | 04 | 0.77 |
| Tennessee | 09 | 82 | 09 | -05 | 0.69 |
| Texas | 25 | 82 | 13 | 12 | 0.77 |
| Florida | 03 | 80 | 27 | 01 | 0.72 |
| Virginia | 16 | 79 | -03 | 05 | 0.66 |
| South Carolina | 05 | 78 | 20 | -01 | 0.65 |
| Georgia | 08 | 75 | 10 | 16 | 0.60 |
| Kentucky | 30 | 73 | 09 | 15 | 0.66 |
| West Virginia | 31 | 71 | 18 | 05 | 0.64 |
| Louisiana | 29 | 70 | -02 | 26 | 0.64 |
| Arkansas | 30 | 69 | -11 | 01 | 0.58 |
| Missouri | 25 | 68 | 04 | 24 | 0.59 |
| North Carolina | 22 | 66 | 27 | 06 | 0.55 |
| Mississippi | 33 | 65 | -16 | -04 | 0.56 |
| Maryland | 42 | 60 | -08 | 20 | 0.58 |
| Delaware | 33 | 41 | 19 | -06 | 0.32 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Connecticut | -07 | 17 | 82 | 23 | 0.76 |
| New Hampshire | -05 | 14 | 82 | 26 | 0.76 |
| Vermont | 08 | 06 | 79 | 02 | 0.63 |
| Massachusetts | 30 | 25 | 76 | -26 | 0.79 |
| Rhode Island | 24 | 14 | 48 | -01 | 0.30 |
| | | | | | |
| New Jersey | 24 | -07 | 08 | 73 | 0.61 |
| Minnesota | 42 | 09 | -03 | 70 | 0.67 |
| North Dakota | 45 | 06 | 04 | 69 | 0.69 |
| New York | 33 | -08 | 21 | 65 | 0.58 |
| Pennsylvania | -01 | 32 | 10 | 64 | 0.52 |
| Illinois | 15 | 27 | -21 | 57 | 0.46 |
| Wyoming | 48 | 02 | 16 | 57 | 0.58 |
| Wisconsin | 46 | -09 | 02 | 56 | 0.54 |
| Cumulative percentages of total variance are: | 25.3 | 46.5 | 54.1 | 64.8 | |

*Decimals are omitted from factor loadings.  FL  0.29 are significant
with p  0.01; significant secondary saturations are underlined.

of typal arrays in Table 2 for the four factors fleshes out the bases for these
distinctive policy traditions.

Factor I states are distinctive for their quicker response to policies sug-
gestive of what Elazar (1972) calls a Moralistic political subculture.  Thus, poli-
cies supportive of popular participation either directly (female suffrage) or in-
directly through expanding educational opportunities (establishment of a state
college) received quicker response from these states.  Localism, another aspect of
the Moralistic orientation, is reflected both in the quicker adoption of a consti-
tutional provision for municipal home rule and a greater reluctance to accept Mor-
rill Act provisions or to establish regulatory agencies (Board of Health) at the
state level or to constitutionally limit the powers of municipal governments.  On
the other hand, where local efforts seem contraindicated, e.g., state hospital for
the insane, a state-wide governing board for higher education, and efficient judi-
cial administration (code of civil procedure and rule-making power for the supreme
court), this type of state could be more responsive.  Curiously, despite the modern
image of the old wild West, these states were also quicker to abolish capital pun-
ishment and, on the surface seemingly just as curious, they were even more quick,
relatively speaking, than Southern states to adopt anti-miscegenation laws.  But
the latter instance simply reflects the demographic reality of greater potential
for racial mixture with the larger number of Amerindians and Asian immigrants.
Similarly, in the reverse direction, a state college for Negroes was an unneces-
sary luxury.  And their comparative youth and capability for profiting from other
states' experiences meant that a constitutional revision commission was less nec-

essary and the pre-modern income tax was a dead issue before most of these states
had even achieved territorial status. In sum, the states of Factor I in the 19th
century were laying the foundations for a Western Populist tradition of public
policy that largely fits Elazar's Moralistic political subculture in its overall
tone.

Factor II, the "Southern" type, not surprisingly, is positively distinctive
for innovativeness with regard to race relations. To a lesser degree, such states
are notable for their concern with establishing constitutional minimums for the
initial organization of counties and some limitations on state indebtedness. More
important for an understanding of Southern political values, however, are the many
policies for which states of this type lagged behind other American states. Con-
trary to the Western states, Southern states were slow to respond to measures pro-
moting mass participation and education. They also lagged with regard to early
social welfare legislation, bureaucratic development, business regulation, and con-
servation. To a lesser degree, the Type II state was also slow in regulating the
electoral process, a policy area touching directly upon the maintenance of the po-
litical elite. Thus, Factor II conforms to Elazar's Traditionalistic political
orientation. More than that, the policy array suggests a stagnant political order
seeking to avoid trends prevalent elsewhere in the nation and to cope with inter-
nal pressures in a repressive fashion. Hence, in the nineteenth century, a South-
ern Parochial tradition of public policy emerged quite distinctively.

The New England states of Factor III were just as busily racing toward a mod-
ern, secularized system of government with the establishment of a wide array of
state government agencies for the better regulation of many public purposes, in-
cluding health, welfare, and highways. Moreover, these states early began to re-
gulate political parties and to establish merit systems for public employment
pointing toward a professionalized governmental system. While the New England
states were less supportive of direct measures promoting popular participation than
the Western states, they were more quick to expand mass education. On the negative
side, Type III states were not so likely to adopt constitutional limitations upon
the powers of the legislature in fiscal matters. Thus, while public policy in New
England reflected the Moralistic orientation described by Elazar, the more evident
thrust of that tradition was governmental expansionism, a Northeastern Bureaucratic
tradition.

Factor IV in many ways seems to be a residual type rather than a distinctive
policy tradition. The type is positively distinctive for its ardor in constitu-
tionally limiting fiscal powers of the legislature and negatively for its rejec-
tion of measures directed against Negroes. To a very large extent, on the other
hand, these tendencies reflect prevailing conditions in these states in the post-
Civil War period, a rising popular concern for the more extreme excesses of the
new industrial order and a relatively lily-white population. Tentatively, then,
the type may be called the Mid-American Industrial policy tradition.[12]

State policy making in the first century and a quarter of American political
experience reflected the sectional patterns of settlement that have become tradi-
tional elements in American folklore. Beyond that, these emerging policy tradi-
tions are imbued with the basic subcultural variations predicted by Elazar.

Table 2

TYPAL ARRAYS FOR NINETEENTH CENTURY POLICY
TRADITIONS:  Q-FACTOR SCORE MATRIX

| Policy | Types | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | I | II | III | IV |
| Acceptance of Hatch Act provisions | -0.1 | -1.1 | -0.8 | -1.3 |
| Game protection law | 2.4 | 2.1 | 2.3 | 2.6 |
| State park | -0.2 | -0.2 | 0.5 | -0.0 |
| Constitutional Revision Commission | -0.7 | -0.7 | -0.4 | 0.1 |
| Abolition of capital punishment | -0.1 | -1.2 | -0.7 | -0.2 |
| State Superintendent of Public Instruction | 2.3 | 1.5 | 2.5 | 2.6 |
| Compulsory school attendance | -0.3 | -1.0 | 0.4 | -0.3 |
| State College | 0.7 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.2 |
| State normal school | -0.0 | -0.7 | 0.5 | 0.1 |
| Acceptance of Morrill Act provisions | -0.5 | -0.2 | 0.3 | -0.3 |
| Statewide governing board for higher education | -0.6 | -0.9 | -0.8 | -1.2 |
| Agency for public library extension | -0.3 | -0.4 | 0.5 | -0.1 |
| Australian ballot | 0.2 | -0.0 | 0.5 | 0.1 |
| Regulation of party nominations | -0.8 | -0.9 | -0.6 | -0.7 |
| Complete female suffrage | 0.2 | -0.9 | -0.6 | -0.9 |
| Female suffrage:  school elections | 1.2 | -0.6 | 1.4 | 1.1 |
| Female suffrage:  municipal elections | 0.4 | -0.7 | 0.0 | -0.2 |
| Female suffrage:  non-constitutional elections | 0.4 | -0.5 | -0.4 | -0.2 |
| White suffrage | -0.2 | 2.0 | -0.5 | 0.4 |
| Poll tax as suffrage requirement | -1.1 | 0.2 | -0.2 | -1.4 |
| Literacy test as suffrage-requirement | -0.3 | -0.3 | 0.9 | -0.6 |
| State debt limitation | 1.4 | 0.8 | -0.7 | 1.9 |
| Constitutional allowance for casual state deficits | 1.1 | -0.0 | -0.7 | 1.9 |
| Duration of state loans constitutionally limited | 0.6 | -0.2 | -0.9 | 0.9 |
| State constitutionally prohibited from assuming local or corporate indebtedness | -0.3 | -0.3 | -0.7 | -0.8 |
| State constitutionally prohibited from lending credit to private corporations | 1.1 | 1.4 | -0.7 | 1.9 |
| State constitutionally prohibited from contracting debts for internal improvements | -0.5 | -0.4 | -0.9 | 0.2 |
| State tax to pay loan is constitutionally irrepealable | 0.1 | -0.9 | -0.9 | 0.8 |
| State constitutionally prohibited from becoming stockholder in private corporations | 0.7 | 1.0 | -0.9 | 0.3 |
| Aggregate state debt constitutionally limited | 0.7 | -0.5 | -0.7 | 1.7 |
| Internal improvements by state government constitutionally encouraged | -0.1 | -0.3 | -0.9 | -1.1 |
| Legislative post-audit | -0.9 | -0.6 | -0.2 | -0.8 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Restriction upon special and local laws | 1.8 | 1.2 | -0.6 | 2.1 |
| State merit system | -0.8 | -1.0 | -0.3 | -0.6 |
| Court interpreter | 0.9 | -0.2 | -0.2 | 1.1 |
| Code of civil procedure | 2.3 | 0.2 | -0.3 | 1.6 |
| Rule-making power for State Supreme Court | -0.2 | -0.6 | -0.8 | -0.5 |
| State Board of Health | -0.6 | -0.4 | 0.1 | -0.4 |
| State Hospital for the Insane | 1.1 | 0.6 | -0.2 | 0.7 |
| Maximum hours legislation | 0.0 | -0.4 | 0.7 | 0.5 |
| Child Labor Law | -0.4 | -0.9 | 0.5 | -0.3 |
| Minicipal home rule (constitutional) | -0.2 | -0.8 | -0.5 | -0.5 |
| Municipal home rule (statutory) | -0.4 | -0.3 | -0.2 | -0.4 |
| Local government aid to private corporations consti- tutionally prohibited | -0.8 | -0.1 | 0.4 | 0.1 |
| Ratio limit on municipal indebtedness | -1.0 | -1.0 | -0.4 | -0.1 |
| Municipalities may not lend credit | 0.2 | 0.7 | 0.4 | 1.1 |
| Municipalities may not become stockholders | 0.2 | 0.7 | 0.4 | 1.1 |
| Minimum size for counties | 0.3 | 1.6 | -0.9 | 0.6 |
| Minimum population for counties | -0.6 | 1.0 | -0.9 | 0.3 |
| Professional licensing: pharmacists | -0.2 | -0.4 | 0.4 | 0.0 |
| Professional licensing: dentists | -0.2 | -0.3 | 0.2 | 0.0 |
| Professional licensing: midwives | -0.5 | -0.7 | -0.4 | 0.2 |
| Personal liberty law | -0.8 | -1.3 | 1.3 | -1.1 |
| Antimiscegenation law | 4.5 | 3.6 | 0.7 | -1.4 |
| Jim Crow law: railways | -1.0 | 0.6 | -0.9 | -1.4 |
| Segregated schools | 0.2 | 1.3 | -0.4 | -0.2 |
| Black Law (fixing status of free Negro) | -0.6 | 0.7 | -0.9 | -1.0 |
| Reconstruction of Negro marital relations | -1.1 | 1.2 | -0.9 | -1.2 |
| Limitations on Negro witnesses | -0.6 | -0.2 | -0.9 | -1.0 |
| Prohibition of alcoholic beverages | 0.7 | 0.1 | 2.2 | 0.8 |
| State Tax Commission | -0.6 | -0.9 | 0.0 | -0.9 |
| Bank deposits tax | -0.8 | -1.0 | 0.9 | -0.7 |
| Death tax | 0.9 | 0.6 | 1.2 | 1.4 |
| Pre-modern income tax | -1.1 | 3.2 | 5.1 | -1.1 |
| State liquor monopoly | -0.7 | -0.9 | -0.5 | -1.2 |
| State Highway Department | -0.9 | -1.1 | -0.3 | -1.0 |
| State aid for roads and highways | -0.9 | -1.1 | -0.4 | -1.0 |
| State Board of Charities | -0.4 | -0.6 | 0.3 | 0.1 |
| Blind education | -0.2 | -0.4 | 0.5 | 0.0 |
| Deaf education | -0.1 | -0.3 | 0.7 | 0.1 |

## POLICY TRADITIONS IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY

In the first three decades of the present century, the most important forces affecting public policy in the American states were the one-two punches of the Populist movement followed by the Progressivists. We continue to see the impact of these colorful movements even today with the "Taxpayer Revolt" on the one hand and

institutional streamlining measures such as the Sunset Law on the other. Still, as Table 3 shows, these movements did not drastically reshape the topography of policy traditions. Factor I is still basically a western aggregation, sixteen contiguous states west of the Mississippi River and four other states in the Northeast. Factor II is just assuredly the South with ten contiguous states of the Old Confederacy and Delaware. Factor III seems to have spread outward but is still essentially northeastern with Indiana the only non-contiguous state. Factor IV consequently becomes a more midwestern aggregation with only New Jersey as a non-contiguous eastern state adhering to the tradition.

Factor I states continue to reflect the concern for mass participation in politics, being most distinctive for the four measures of direct legislation (see Table 4). At the same time, fiscal conservatism is indicated by the slower response to a variety of new taxes, although this may be only the contemporary mode of rejecting government at higher levels in favor of more localized government. The relative reluctance to accept the provisions of the national government's Sheppard-Towner Act supports this interpretation. In any event, the Western Populist tradition is carried on to the 1930's.

Just as clearly, the Southern Parochial tradition continued through this period. Factor II states continue to innovate in the area of repressive measures for fixing the lower status of blacks and to restrict popular participation, wherever possible. A further development of the image of a Southern Parochial tradition includes the anti-corporatism reflected in the quick adoption of the chain-store tax and the lack of enthusiasm for an anti-injunction law to protect the organizational efforts of the labor movement. Less clearly related are the positive responses to a wide array of new taxes and the simultaneously slow move to adopt programs of public welfare.

Factor III seems to emphasize even more strongly the concern of states of this type to build a modern governmental apparatus. Indeed, this emphasis falls in line especially with Progressivist concerns for more efficient governmental operation, hence acceptance of a legislative research agency, a centralized administrative agency, and various court reforms. These states are also continuing to expand public regulation of the economy and society generally. The Type III states seem to be least concerned with the development of local autonomy, or grass-roots politics. In general, then, the Northeastern Bureaucratic tradition remained live and well and even expanded its geographical spread considerably in the early twentieth century.

Factor IV, again, seems almost a residual type even though its territorial basis is more definite. The stress in states of this type is, in opposition to Factor III states, on expanding grass roots control in local communities although perhaps not at the county level and certainly does not include direct legislation at the state level. A Mid-American Industrial policy tradition remains, then, even more problematic in the early decades of this century.

POLICY TRADITIONS IN THE LATER TWENTIETH CENTURY

Geographical contiguity of policy traditions in the period 1930-1970 is less apparent as shown in Table 5. The western states no longer constitute a major bloc but are dispersed across three factors. Still, three factors exhibit contiguity for a majority of the states constituting them. Factor I is a Northeastern aggrega-

Table 3

CONFORMANCE TO POLICY TRADITIONS IN THE
EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY:  A Q-FACTOR MATRIX*

| State | Factor | | | | $h^2$ |
| | I | II | III | IV | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Arizona | 87 | 04 | 08 | 26 | 0.83 |
| Colorado | 83 | 05 | 08 | 25 | 0.76 |
| Nevada | 82 | -05 | -06 | 19 | 0.71 |
| Nebraska | 81 | 14 | 20 | 17 | 0.75 |
| Oregon | 81 | -05 | 02 | 18 | 0.69 |
| North Dakota | 81 | 14 | 15 | 20 | 0.74 |
| South Dakota | 76 | 34 | 02 | 18 | 0.73 |
| Washington | 75 | 03 | 19 | 34 | 0.72 |
| California | 75 | 10 | 12 | 20 | 0.63 |
| Missouri | 75 | 30 | 13 | -06 | 0.67 |
| Idaho | 74 | 24 | 04 | 32 | 0.71 |
| Ohio | 74 | 08 | 26 | 05 | 0.62 |
| Michigan | 70 | 08 | 07 | 22 | 0.56 |
| Arkansas | 70 | 28 | 07 | -05 | 0.58 |
| Montana | 70 | 20 | 14 | 30 | 0.64 |
| Oklahoma | 67 | 50 | -02 | -04 | 0.70 |
| Massachusetts | 64 | 13 | 39 | 03 | 0.58 |
| Utah | 60 | -01 | 36 | 11 | 0.50 |
| New Mexico | 58 | 34 | 13 | 37 | 0.61 |
| Maine | 55 | 06 | 31 | 15 | 0.42 |
| South Carolina | 15 | 90 | -06 | 12 | 0.84 |
| Mississippi | 24 | 81 | -07 | 22 | 0.77 |
| North Carolina | 17 | 80 | 02 | 16 | 0.70 |
| Georgia | -04 | 77 | 33 | -20 | 0.75 |
| Alabama | 16 | 73 | 12 | 22 | 0.62 |
| Virginia | -19 | 70 | 35 | -20 | 0.69 |
| Tennessee | 20 | 67 | 44 | 04 | 0.68 |
| Florida | -02 | 64 | 32 | 02 | 0.52 |
| Louisiana | 11 | 63 | -06 | 33 | 0.52 |
| Texas | 39 | 57 | 21 | 32 | 0.62 |
| Delaware | 22 | 49 | 34 | 23 | 0.46 |
| Rhode Island | 07 | 02 | 83 | 06 | 0.70 |
| Connecticut | 14 | 06 | 80 | 13 | 0.68 |
| Vermont | 20 | 26 | 79 | 03 | 0.73 |
| New York | 18 | 32 | 72 | 14 | 0.68 |
| New Hampshire | 25 | 13 | 69 | 19 | 0.60 |

| | I | II | III | IV | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pennsylvania | 15 | 18 | 59 | 42 | 0.58 |
| Indiana | 18 | 15 | 59 | 35 | 0.52 |
| Maryland | 31 | 47 | 54 | -16 | 0.64 |
| | | | | | |
| Wyoming | 39 | 03 | 06 | 65 | 0.58 |
| Minnesota | 42 | 31 | 34 | 60 | 0.74 |
| Illinois | 36 | 16 | 46 | 58 | 0.71 |
| Iowa | 47 | 45 | 22 | 57 | 0.80 |
| New Jersey | 34 | 15 | 53 | 57 | 0.74 |
| Kansas | 46 | 24 | 33 | 56 | 0.70 |
| West Virginia | 46 | 42 | 14 | 56 | 0.72 |
| Wisconsin | 32 | 24 | 42 | 54 | 0.62 |
| Kentucky | 28 | 38 | 20 | 40 | 0.42 |

Cumulative percentages
of total variance are:    26.9    42.8    55.9    62.2

*Decimals are omitted from factor loadings. FL 0.32 are significant with p 0.01; significant secondary saturations are underlined.

tion primarily, including all of the New England and Middle Atlantic states confounded with three smaller blocs of states from the Northwest, Upper Middle West, and Border States. Factor II is once again the Southern type including Oklahoma with all of the Old Confederacy states except Tennessee. Factor IV aggregates a continuous belt of thirteen Mid-American state from West Virginia to Wyoming with a bloc of four Desert Southwest states. The altogether non-contiguous Factor III nonetheless is constituted of three western states; yet, examination of secondary saturations suggests that the factor is not really "western."

As the major forces shaping the broader contours of public policy in the states during this latter period have tended to obscure traditional sectional differences, the breakdown of geographical contiguity along the lines evident in the earlier periods is not surprising. Those forces include important nationalizing thrusts such as the Great Depression of the 1930's accompanied by the great expansion of national grant-in-aid programs and the parallel enhancement of interstate communications through the creation of many associations of state officials. At the same time, this later period has witnessed the emergence and spread of a metropolitan-technological frontier that deviates from earlier settlement patterns with respect to the maintenance of sectionalism (Elazar, 1972).

What may be really surprising is the degree of geographical contiguity that persists. Still, nationalizing influences have had a major impact. One bit of evidence showing that impact is the dramatic decrease in the number of "pure" states, i.e., states with no secondary saturations. There are 21 "pure" states for each of the earlier periods but only four for the last period, all on Factor I. This nationalization is further indicated in the greatly increased number of "consensus" policies, i.e., items having a difference of less than one standard devia-

Table 4

TYPAL ARRAYS FOR EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY POLICY
TRADITIONS: Q-FACTOR SCORE MATRIX

| Policy | Types | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | I | II | III | IV |
| Blue-sky law | 1.2 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 1.7 |
| Air pollution law | -0.9 | -0.4 | -0.4 | -0.4 |
| Gas and oil conservation law | 0.3 | -0.2 | -0.6 | 0.2 |
| Amendment XVI:  Income tax | 1.7 | 1.7 | 0.1 | 1.1 |
| Amendment XVII:  Direct election of senators | 1.5 | -0.2 | 1.5 | 1.7 |
| Amendment XVIII:  Prohibition | 1.3 | 1.8 | 1.0 | 0.9 |
| Amendment XIX:  Female suffrage | 1.3 | -0.7 | 1.8 | 1.5 |
| Unratified amendment on child labor | 0.1 | -1.2 | -0.6 | 0.7 |
| Juvenile probation | 0.4 | 0.6 | 1.2 | 0.4 |
| Adult probation | 0.6 | 0.1 | 1.9 | 0.7 |
| Juvenile court | 1.9 | 2.3 | 2.9 | 1.8 |
| Junior college enabling act | 0.0 | 0.3 | -0.6 | 0.3 |
| Coordination commission for higher education | -1.1 | -0.8 | -0.9 | -1.0 |
| Government research bureau at state university | -0.7 | -0.0 | -0.9 | -0.7 |
| Constitutional initiative | 0.9 | -1.2 | -1.2 | -1.4 |
| Statutory initiative | 1.8 | -1.2 | -1.2 | -1.4 |
| Recall | 0.3 | -1.0 | -1.2 | -0.8 |
| Statewide direct primary | 0.9 | 1.3 | 0.5 | 1.2 |
| Grandfather clause | -1.5 | 1.5 | -1.2 | -1.4 |
| Optional referendum | 1.9 | -1.2 | -1.0 | -1.4 |
| Enabling act:  local initiative | 1.9 | 1.2 | -1.0 | 2.1 |
| Enabling act:  local recall | 1.5 | 1.0 | -1.2 | 1.8 |
| Enabling act:  local referendum | 1.8 | 1.5 | 0.2 | 2.1 |
| Central administrative agency | -0.8 | -0.9 | -0.0 | -0.3 |
| Female eligibility for jury service | 0.4 | -0.5 | 0.8 | 0.7 |
| Legislative research agency | 0.1 | 0.3 | 2.2 | 0.4 |
| Original budgeting law | -1.1 | -0.8 | -0.8 | -0.9 |
| Statute revision agency | -0.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| Retirement system for state employees | -0.7 | -0.3 | 0.3 | -0.5 |
| Judicial council | 0.1 | -0.1 | 0.7 | 0.5 |
| First recognition of ABA judicial Canons | -0.6 | -0.4 | -0.3 | -0.3 |
| Minimum wage provision | 0.7 | -0.9 | 0.5 | 0.4 |
| Equal pay for females | -0.8 | -1.2 | -0.1 | -0.6 |
| Anti-injunction law | -0.1 | -1.1 | 0.3 | 0.5 |
| Criminal syndicalism law | 0.7 | -1.2 | -1.0 | 0.5 |
| County home rule | -1.0 | -1.0 | -0.9 | -1.3 |
| State municipal league | 0.7 | 0.9 | 0.0 | 1.3 |
| Enabling act: municipal zoning | -0.9 | -0.6 | -0.6 | -0.6 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enabling act: rural zoning | -0.5 | 0.1 | 1.3 | 0.0 |
| Optional forms of county government | -1.2 | -0.3 | -0.9 | -1.4 |
| Professional licensing: engineers | -0.6 | 0.1 | -0.4 | -0.2 |
| Professional licensing: accountants | 0.9 | 1.2 | 1.9 | 1.4 |
| Professional licesning: nurses | -0.5 | -0.1 | 0.3 | -0.1 |
| Jim Crow law: streetcars | -1.3 | 2.3 | -1.0 | -1.4 |
| Personal income tax | 0.2 | 1.1 | -0.3 | 0.1 |
| Corporate income tax | 0.4 | 1.3 | 1.0 | -0.1 |
| Gasoline tax | -1.2 | -0.8 | -0.9 | -1.2 |
| Motor vehicle tax | -1.0 | -0.8 | -0.3 | -0.8 |
| Chain-store tax | -0.8 | 1.1 | -0.7 | -0.4 |
| Cigarette tax | -0.1 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.2 |
| Mortgage registry tax: state | -0.6 | 0.4 | -0.3 | -0.3 |
| Forest yield tax | -0.9 | -0.5 | -0.1 | -0.9 |
| Forest serverance tax | -1.3 | -0.8 | -0.9 | -1.3 |
| Automobile registration | -1.2 | -0.8 | -0.5 | -1.0 |
| Highway patrol | -1.1 | -0.9 | -0.1 | -0.9 |
| Workmen's compensation | 0.2 | -0.0 | 1.0 | 0.6 |
| Old age pension | -1.1 | -1.1 | -0.9 | -1.0 |
| Mother's aid | -0.3 | -0.6 | -0.0 | -0.1 |
| Blind pension | -0.5 | -0.7 | -0.2 | 0.0 |
| Acceptance of Sheppard-Towner Act provisions | -1.2 | -0.8 | -1.0 | -1.2 |

tion across the factors. Just over 47% of the policies were "consensual" in the nineteenth century, 50% in the early twentieth, and nearly 83% in the later twentieth. Still, distinctive policy traditions remain.

Type I states are most distinctive for their quick ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment, repealing Prohibition, and their rejection of the sales tax, segregated buses, and the Oil and Gas Compact (see Table 6). More generally, these states have been more responsive than others to measures that enhance governmental operations including interstate agreements in the criminal justice field, collective bargaining for public employees, and the establishment of a planning and development agency. Beyond this, these states are leaders in supporting equity of opportunity beyond governmental circles to the private economic sector. In general, then, while new concerns are evident, the Northeastern Bureaucratic policy tradition has continued in to the later twentieth century.

The Southern states are most distinctive for their rapid adoption of Jim Crow laws on buses and, somewhat less so, a right-to-work law. On the negative side these states dragged their feet with regard to the ratification of Repeal, the establishment of a State Human Relations Commission, and outlawing age discrimination in employment. In general, the Southern states remain unsupportive of popular participation, e.g., the lack of response to the 23rd and 24th Amendments; anti-organized labor if not anti-corporate; and relatively unconcerned about modernizing government.

Type III states are different not only in their geographical dispersion but in the peculiar array of preferences indicated by policy adoption scores. There is some evidence to suggest support for the redistribution of wealth, most notably the

| State | Factor | | | | $h^2$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | I | II | III | IV | |
| Vermont | 83 | 23 | 01 | 24 | 0.80 |
| Delaware | 81 | 24 | 05 | 17 | 0.75 |
| New Hampshire | 80 | 20 | 04 | 34 | 0.80 |
| Minnesota | 75 | 24 | 45 | 17 | 0.85 |
| Massachusetts | 74 | -01 | 26 | 22 | 0.66 |
| Idaho | 74 | 25 | 14 | 47 | 0.86 |
| New Jersey | 72 | 06 | 11 | 01 | 0.54 |
| New York | 71 | 12 | 04 | 33 | 0.62 |
| .Oregon | 70 | 20 | 45 | 15 | 0.76 |
| Montana | 69 | 26 | 04 | 50 | 0.80 |
| Maine | 68 | 22 | 16 | 51 | 0.79 |
| Connecticut | 66 | 11 | 37 | 42 | 0.76 |
| Wisconsin | 65 | 16 | 56 | 15 | 0.78 |
| Kentucky | 60 | 25 | 17 | 51 | 0.72 |
| Pennsylvania | 60 | 18 | 08 | 49 | 0.64 |
| Maryland | 60 | 26 | 14 | 33 | 0.56 |
| Rhode Island | 58 | 13 | 58 | 25 | 0.76 |
| Tennessee | 48 | 45 | 36 | 44 | 0.77 |
| Georgia | 06 | 88 | 01 | 38 | 0.88 |
| South Carolina | 19 | 80 | 16 | 28 | 0.78 |
| Mississippi | 01 | 79 | 13 | 46 | 0.84 |
| North Carolina | 05 | 74 | 43 | 05 | 0.73 |
| Florida | 36 | 73 | 00 | 42 | 0.83 |
| Arkansas | 37 | 71 | 02 | 45 | 0.84 |
| Oklahoma | 04 | 70 | 43 | 34 | 0.79 |
| Alabama | 30 | 68 | -06 | 44 | 0.74 |
| Texas | 31 | 67 | -22 | 34 | 0.71 |
| Virginia | 45 | 64 | 28 | -08 | 0.70 |
| Louisiana | 08 | 61 | 53 | 25 | 0.72 |
| Washington | 47 | 19 | 58 | 39 | 0.75 |
| California | 51 | 22 | 57 | 43 | 0.82 |
| Colorado | 42 | 19 | 52 | 40 | 0.63 |
| Kansas | 13 | 38 | 23 | 79 | 0.84 |
| North Dakota | 01 | 43 | 23 | 76 | 0.83 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Illinois | 45 | 28 | 20 | 75 | 0.89 |
| New Mexico | 46 | 26 | 20 | 73 | 0.89 |
| South Dakota | 11 | 44 | 27 | 71 | 0.78 |
| Indiana | 51 | 34 | 18 | 69 | 0.89 |
| Michigan | 50 | 25 | 27 | 69 | 0.86 |
| Ohio | 55 | 29 | 28 | 67 | 0.92 |
| Wyoming | 49 | 33 | 18 | 66 | 0.82 |
| Utah | 52 | 40 | 18 | 65 | 0.89 |
| Arizona | 42 | 34 | 20 | 64 | 0.75 |
| Nevada | 49 | 24 | 07 | 64 | 0.71 |
| Iowa | 50 | 30 | 25 | 61 | 0.76 |
| Missouri | 58 | 25 | 29 | 58 | 0.84 |
| Nebraska | 28 | 39 | 11 | 58 | 0.58 |
| West Virginia | 48 | 30 | 20 | 56 | 0.67 |

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| Cumulative percentages of total variance are: | 27.2 | 45.0 | 53.7 | 77.1 | |

*Decimals are omitted from factor loadings.  FL  0.28 are significant with
p  0.01; significant secondary saturations are underlined.

early adoption of the gift tax but these same states tended to be slow in accept-
ing the various welfare programs funded by federal grants.  These states also ex-
hibit a strong interest in reforming the judiciary.

Type IV, combining both Mid-American and Western states, is even less clear as
a tradition of public policy.  The type positively emphasizes the adoption of a
sales tax, the establishment of a Legislative Council, and membership in the Oil
and Gas Compact.  There are no policies that states of this type have clearly re-
sisted.

The analysis of typal arrays further supports the contention of a breakdown
in longstanding traditions of policy preferences among the American states.  It re-
mains to show in a straightforward fashion the extent to which policy traditions
have persisted or merged over time.

EVOLUTIONARY PATTERNS IN POLICY TRADITIONS

Where a given policy tradition for an earlier temporal period is correlated
positively with policy traditions of later periods, it seems reasonable to assert
that the tradition is a persistent one in American state policy making.  On the
other hand, since the content of policy arrays changes necessarily, this assertion
means simply that some states continue to share a similar pattern of adoption
proneness over time.  Such persistence can be determined by correlating the load-
ings of the states for a given factor against those for every other factor.  Table
7 presents these correlations.[13]  Clearly, the Southern Parochial tradition is per-
sistent in this regard with the weakest correlation at 0.68 for the nineteenth and
later twentieth centuries.  Likewise, the Northeastern states, with New England

Table 6

TYPAL ARRAYS FOR LATER TWENTIETH CENTURY POLICY
TRADITIONS:  Q-FACTOR SCORE MATRIX

| Policy | Types | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | I | II | III | IV |
| Soil conservation districts | -0.2 | 0.3 | -0.1 | 0.1 |
| Fair trade law | 3.8 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.6 |
| Cooling off for door-to door sales | -0.7 | -0.6 | -0.7 | -0.6 |
| Oil and gas compact | 0.2 | 1.9 | 0.8 | 2.1 |
| Pest control compact | -0.7 | -0.7 | -0.5 | -0.6 |
| State grant for municipal waste treatment facilities | 0.1 | -0.4 | -0.4 | -0.5 |
| Radiation control act | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 |
| Amendment XXI:  Repeal of Prohibition | 4.5 | 1.1 | 3.2 | 2.6 |
| Amendment XXII:  Two-term limit for President | 1.9 | 1.7 | 0.8 | 1.8 |
| Amendment XXIII:  Electoral vote for D.C. | 0.5 | -0.4 | 0.2 | 0.5 |
| Amendment XXIV:  Elimination of poll tax | 0.2 | -0.6 | 0.0 | 0.2 |
| Amendment XXV:  Presidential succession | -0.2 | -0.3 | -0.3 | -0.2 |
| Victim compensation | -0.8 | -0.7 | -0.7 | -0.7 |
| Interstate parolee compact | 1.0 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.7 |
| Interstate juveniles compact | 0.7 | 0.2 | 0.8 | 0.4 |
| Agreement on detainers | -0.1 | -0.5 | -0.3 | -0.5 |
| Police standards law | -0.3 | -0.5 | -0.2 | -0.4 |
| State medical examiner | -0.1 | -0.2 | -0.8 | -0.5 |
| State commission of post-mortem examiners | -0.5 | -0.0 | -0.8 | -0.6 |
| State planning board | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.2 |
| Planning and development agency | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 0.7 |
| Science and technology advisory council | -0.6 | -0.3 | -0.8 | -0.6 |
| Compact for education | -0.4 | -0.3 | -0.4 | -0.4 |
| Personnel qualification agreement for education | -0.6 | -0.6 | -0.7 | -0.7 |
| State board for junior colleges | -0.4 | -0.6 | -0.5 | -0.4 |
| Interstate library compact | -0.3 | -0.5 | -0.5 | -0.6 |
| Court administrator | 0.4 | -0.1 | 0.7 | 0.1 |
| Judicial code of ethics | 0.5 | 0.5 | 1.3 | 0.5 |
| Judicial qualifications commission | -0.8 | -0.6 | -0.3 | -0.6 |
| Legislative Council | 1.8 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 2.6 |
| Collective bargaining:  state employees | -0.6 | -0.7 | -0.7 | -0.7 |
| Collective bargaining:  municipal employees | -0.5 | -0.7 | -0.6 | -0.6 |
| Collective bargaining:  policemen | -0.6 | -0.7 | -0.6 | -0.6 |
| Collective bargaining:  firemen | -0.5 | -0.7 | -0.7 | -0.6 |
| Collective bargaining:  teachers | -0.5 | -0.7 | -0.4 | -0.6 |
| Interstate compact on mental health | 0.7 | -0.0 | -0.4 | 0.1 |
| Mentally disordered offender compact | -0.8 | -0.7 | -0.8 | -0.6 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abortion law liberalized | -0.8 | -0.5 | -0.5 | -0.7 |
| Screening for PKU in infants required | -0.2 | -0.2 | -0.3 | -0.3 |
| Uniform Anatomical Gift Act | -0.7 | -0.5 | -0.6 | -0.5 |
| State Housing Finance Authority | -0.6 | -0.7 | -0.8 | -0.6 |
| Anti-age discrimination in employment | 0.3 | -0.4 | 2.0 | -0.4 |
| Right-to-work law | -0.8 | 1.8 | -0.8 | 0.8 |
| Department of Community Affairs | -0.2 | -0.1 | -0.0 | -0.6 |
| State commission on local government | -0.9 | -0.6 | -0.8 | -0.5 |
| Civil defense compact | 1.9 | 1.7 | 1.4 | 1.8 |
| Military aid compact | -0.2 | -0.5 | -0.8 | -0.7 |
| National Guard compact | -0.9 | -0.7 | -0.8 | -0.7 |
| Human Relations Commission | 1.2 | -0.6 | 1.1 | 0.5 |
| Fair housing law: private housing | -0.0 | -0.7 | -0.1 | -0.5 |
| Jim Crow law: motor carriers | -0.9 | 4.2 | -0.8 | -0.7 |
| Liquor tax | -0.4 | -0.3 | -0.4 | -0.4 |
| Multistate tax compact | -0.8 | -0.6 | -0.7 | -0.5 |
| Sales tax | 0.2 | 2.7 | 3.1 | 3.6 |
| Mortgage registry: local | -0.5 | -0.3 | 0.7 | -0.7 |
| State lottery | -0.7 | -0.7 | -0.8 | -0.7 |
| Gift tax | 0.2 | 0.5 | 2.5 | -0.7 |
| State income tax withholding | 0.7 | 0.4 | -0.3 | -0.1 |
| State Department of Transportation | -0.7 | -0.7 | -0.5 | -0.7 |
| Vehicle registration agreement | -0.5 | -0.7 | 0.9 | 0.3 |
| Bus taxation proration | -0.4 | -0.7 | -0.8 | -0.7 |
| Taxation of motor fuels compact | -0.6 | -0.7 | -0.8 | -0.7 |
| Equipment safety compact | 0.1 | -0.1 | 0.0 | 0.2 |
| Driver license compact | -0.5 | -0.4 | -0.0 | -0.2 |
| Medical advisory board for driver licensing | -0.9 | -0.7 | -0.8 | -0.7 |
| Passenger restraint device required in automobiles | -0.2 | -0.2 | -0.2 | -0.2 |
| Old age assistance | -0.6 | -0.5 | -0.6 | -0.5 |
| Aid to dependent children | 1.7 | 1.5 | 1.2 | 1.4 |
| Aid to the blind | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| APTD | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.1 | 1.5 |
| AABD | -0.5 | -0.3 | -0.8 | -0.3 |
| Unemployment insurance | -0.7 | -0.6 | -0.7 | -0.7 |
| Child placement compact | -0.5 | -0.7 | -0.8 | -0.6 |
| Extension of unemployment payments to 39 weeks | -0.9 | -0.7 | -0.8 | -0.7 |
| Highway relocation assistance | -0.8 | -0.6 | -0.8 | -0.7 |

constituting the core area, show this persistence, albeit much weaker. The weakest correlation ($r=0.35$) is again between the nineteenth and later twentieth. The Western Populist tradition is clearly sustained in the early twentieth century but appears to move toward a more midwestern locus in the later twentieth. The Mid-American policy tradition weakens in the early twentieth century and then seems to disappear altogether in the last period. Unfortunately, the correlation matrix gives no further information.

An alternative approach to analysis of the data is available that provides fur-

Table 7

CORRELATION OF POLICY TRADITIONS

| | Nineteenth Century | | | | Early Twentieth Century | | | | Later Twentieth Century | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | I | II | III | IV | I | II | III | IV | I | II | III | IV |
| **Nineteenth Century** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| I | 1.00 | -0.43 | -0.41 | 0.11 | 0.76 | -0.47 | -0.45 | 0.21 | -0.07 | -0.22 | 0.25 | 0.45 |
| II | | 1.00 | -0.22 | -0.54 | -0.39 | 0.74 | -0.30 | -0.36 | -0.40 | 0.68 | -0.22 | -0.15 |
| III | | | 1.00 | -0.29 | -0.25 | -0.12 | 0.50 | -0.24 | 0.35 | -0.25 | -0.07 | -0.28 |
| IV | | | | 1.00 | 0.20 | -0.37 | 0.08 | 0.44 | 0.11 | -0.32 | 0.10 | 0.08 |
| **Early Twentieth Century** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| I | | | | | 1.00 | -0.60 | -0.49 | 0.11 | 0.02 | -0.32 | 0.18 | 0.44 |
| II | | | | | | 1.00 | -0.22 | -0.25 | -0.50 | 0.77 | -0.23 | -0.34 |
| III | | | | | | | 1.00 | -0.08 | 0.54 | -0.45 | -0.10 | -0.20 |
| IV | | | | | | | | 1.00 | 0.13 | -0.34 | 0.09 | 0.26 |
| **Later Twentieth Century** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| I | | | | | | | | | 1.00 | -0.78 | -0.05 | -0.24 |
| II | | | | | | | | | | 1.00 | -0.24 | -0.04 |
| III | | | | | | | | | | | 1.00 | -0.19 |
| IV | | | | | | | | | | | | 1.00 |

ther insights: higher-order Q-factor analysis. Just as with the factor analyses of the raw data matrices, the states are clustered in terms of their similarity in loadings across the twelve policy traditions. Table 8 presents that matrix, showing that the geographical basis of the policy traditions found originally in the nineteenth century generally persists across the entire time frame.[14] The "Mid-American" tradition very definitely weakens, however, as only Illinois and Pennsylvania have statistically significant saturations on Factor IV. The typal arrays of the twelve policy traditions across the "higher" policy traditions, presented in Table 9, more clearly and graphically show what is evident in the three period factor analyses and the correlations of the factor loadings. The Southern Parochial tradition declines over time but remains strong. The Northeastern tradition persists and grows geographically by expanding into the Mid-American and Western states. The Western Populist tradition splits asunder in the later twentieth century with some of these states moving toward the Northeastern tradition and others toward a new Mid-Western tradition that also encompasses some of the older Mid-American tradition. The original Mid-American Industrial tradition had already split in the early twentieth century with a number of its former adherents beginning to model themselves after the Northeastern states. The fourth type emerging in the later twentieth century seems, then, to be something altogether new.

## POLICY TRADITIONS AND THE FUTURE

The adoption of new policies in the American states has largely reflected a pattern of multilinear evolution revolving about well-recognized geographical sections, then, rather than a pattern of sociocultural integration.[15] The American South has been especially persistent in this regard but New England, as a core area of the greater Northeast, has also been very persistent. Still, the analysis of the larger values indicated by specific policies raises considerable doubt about the continued viability of this multilinear tendency.

These doubts are amplified by Deutsch's concerns regarding value production and value growth. Value production and the resulting allocations of those values have tended along very narrow lines where regional distinctions are notable. For varying reasons many of these regional value patterns have reached very nearly their ultimate and do not point, in themselves, to new values. Thus, it seems that the states are ripe for a stronger thrust of sociocultural integration than ever before.

This "erosion" of the multilinear dynamic comes at a time when the mechanisms of diffusion and population settlement patterns are also more conducive to integration than ever before. The diffusion mechanisms in American state policy making are primarily national starting with the mass media generally and organizational channels such as the various associations of state officials and related agencies. And, of course, the influence of the national government is highly pervasive. Population settlement patterns have changed to reflect Elazar's "metropolitan-technological frontier" which, while not necessarily counterproductive of a multilinear dynamic, is very amenable to increased sociocultural integration.

Moreover, policy responses of the states in the 1970's suggest that an integrative trend is very much dominant at the present time. While it is still too early for any rigorous analysis, the tendency toward universal adoption of such policies

Table 8

CONFORMANCE TO POLICY TRADITIONS ACROSS THE THREE PERIODS:
A HIGHER-ORDER Q-FACTOR MATRIX*

| State | Factor | | | | $h^2$ |
| | I | II | III | IV | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Michigan | 95 | -03 | -21 | 23 | 1.00 |
| Utah | 94 | -17 | 18 | 03 | 0.95 |
| Montana | 91 | -12 | 03 | 30 | 0.93 |
| Nebraska | 90 | -09 | -26 | 09 | 0.89 |
| Nevada | 90 | 02 | -19 | 22 | 0.89 |
| California | 87 | -14 | -16 | -07 | 0.81 |
| Arizona | 85 | -11 | -10 | -02 | 0.75 |
| Colorado | 85 | -36 | -14 | -01 | 0.87 |
| Ohio | 85 | 20 | -03 | 23 | 0.82 |
| South Dakota | 83 | -03 | -56 | -02 | 1.00 |
| Idaho | 81 | -11 | -03 | 31 | 0.77 |
| Washington | 81 | -38 | -05 | -03 | 0.80 |
| Maine | 79 | -02 | 49 | 12 | 0.88 |
| Oregon | 78 | 01 | 01 | 11 | 0.62 |
| New Mexico | 77 | 23 | -11 | 12 | 0.67 |
| Alabama | -05 | 91 | -10 | -12 | 0.86 |
| Florida | -29 | 88 | 07 | -05 | 0.87 |
| Tennessee | -04 | 87 | 12 | -11 | 0.79 |
| Mississippi | 06 | 81 | -46 | -09 | 0.88 |
| Georgia | -31 | 80 | -16 | -10 | 0.77 |
| Arkansas | 55 | 77 | -16 | -16 | 0.95 |
| South Carolina | -21 | 76 | -30 | -17 | 0.74 |
| Kentucky | 26 | 73 | 05 | 32 | 0.71 |
| Texas | 11 | 73 | -20 | -08 | 0.59 |
| Connecticut | -27 | -23 | 82 | -04 | 0.80 |
| Vermont | -15 | -01 | 82 | 02 | 0.70 |
| New Hampshire | -21 | -16 | 77 | 04 | 0.66 |
| Massachusetts | 33 | -03 | 74 | -30 | 0.75 |
| Rhode Island | -18 | -12 | 72 | 02 | 0.57 |
| Illinois | 14 | 04 | -23 | 78 | 0.68 |
| Pennsylvania | -16 | 02 | 32 | 75 | 0.69 |
| Missouri | 61 | 46 | 11 | -09 | 0.60 |
| Iowa | 57 | 31 | -34 | 46 | 0.75 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| North Dakota | 54 | -24 | -50 | 11 | 0.61 |
| Oklahoma | 54 | 27 | -53 | 37 | 0.78 |
| Virginia | -25 | 69 | 04 | -14 | 0.52 |
| Maryland | 29 | 65 | 37 | 07 | 0.65 |
| West Virginia | 36 | 65 | -07 | 20 | 0.60 |
| North Carolina | -31 | 62 | -34 | -38 | 0.74 |
| Delaware | 17 | 59 | 51 | 17 | 0.66 |
| Wisconsin | 14 | -53 | 08 | 48 | 0.54 |
| Kansas | 49 | 08 | -56 | 45 | 0.76 |
| Louisiana | -17 | 55 | -63 | -11 | 0.74 |
| Minnesota | 17 | -37 | -02 | 66 | 0.60 |
| New York | 04 | -29 | 53 | 56 | 0.68 |
| New Jersey | 00 | -48 | 31 | 55 | 0.63 |
| Indiana | 43 | 47 | 03 | 54 | 0.70 |
| Wyoming | 42 | -41 | -30 | 51 | 0.71 |

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| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cumulative percentages of total variance are: | 29.8 | 52.1 | 66.1 | 75.7 |

*Decimals are omitted from factor loadings; FL  0.71 are significant with
p  0.01.

Table 9

TYPAL ARRAY OF POLICY TRADITIONS

| | Type | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Policy Tradition | I | II | III | IV |
| Nineteenth Century | | | | |
| I.   Western Populist | 1.7 | -0.5 | -0.9 | -0.3 |
| II.   Southern Parochial | -0.6 | 1.9 | -0.6 | -0.9 |
| III.   Northeastern Bureaucratic | -1.3 | -0.9 | 1.8 | -1.9 |
| IV.   Mid-American Industrial | -0.4 | -1.1 | -0.9 | 1.4 |
| Early Twentieth Century | | | | |
| I.   Western Populist | 1.7 | -0.5 | -0.2 | -0.2 |
| II.   Southern Parochial | -1.0 | 1.5 | -0.7 | -0.8 |
| III.   Northeastern Bureaucratic | -0.9 | -0.4 | 1.6 | 0.8 |
| IV.   Mid-American | -0.6 | -0.8 | -0.8 | 0.9 |
| Later Twentieth Century | | | | |
| I.   Northeastern | 0.7 | 0.1 | 1.7 | 1.5 |
| II.   Southern Parochial | -0.2 | 1.4 | -0.6 | -0.6 |
| III.   Western (truncated) | -0.4 | -0.8 | -0.3 | -0.7 |
| IV.   Mid-Western | 1.1 | 0.3 | -0.0 | 0.7 |

-226-

as sunset laws, energy agencies, generic drug substitution laws, and the legalization of laetrile suggest integrative tendencies. Sectional deviations still exist, for example, in such matters as equal rights for women and collective bargaining for employees, but these are continuing issues from an earlier time. Thus, sectionalism will likely continue to color patterns of state policy making for the remainder of this century. For better or worse, then, a more universal pattern seems to be more likely in the foreseeable future barring any significant changes in present American socioeconomic trends.

<div align="center">ENDNOTES</div>

*This essay is a revised version of a paper originally presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Political Science Association, Fort Worth, Texas, March, 1979.

[1] Cf. Vickers (1967). The more general view of politics leading to this emphasis on choice as a key element in the understanding of political behavior flows especially from Deutsch (1966) and Nimmo and Ungs (1967); and more generally from the works of Friedrich Nietzsche and Albert Camus.

[2] Cf. also the Preface to Deutsch (1966: pp.vii-viii).

[3] Notable works on regionalism in American politics include Elazar (1970, 1972); Elazar and Zikmund (1975); Jensen (1951); Luttbeg (1970); Patterson (1968); Savage (1973, 1975); Sharkansky (1970).

[4] V.O. Key and his students in their various works on specific American regions follow this mode, as does Sharkansky (1970).

[5] Cf. the usage of the eminent anthropologist, Julian Steward (1955). Luttbeg (1970) and Savage (1973, 1975) follow his construction.

[6] For a succinct examination of the alternative modes of regional analysis, see the introduction to Berry and Hankins (1963).

[7] Cf., e.g., Hofferbert (1966). However, he seems to retreat from this position later (1968).

[8] Unfortunately, the heuristic essay by Crittenden (1967) is generally overlooked.

[9] Alaska and Hawaii are dropped from consideration as the requisite information is not available for most of the policies.

[10] The analyses reported here are not simply expansions of the Q-factor derived structures of regional policy diffusion reported in Walker's (1969) seminal study of innovation diffusion among the American states. His method of computing the adoption scores has the effect of producing a doubly-standardized matrix for factoring. This reduces the variance primarily to within-state variance, and the resulting factors more closely correspond to what I have labeled as "policy profiles" elsewhere (1971). The factors reported here retain the full temporal variation and are rightly called "policy traditions."

[11] The eigenvalue-one criterion produced 8-factor solutions for both of the two earlier periods and a 10-factor solution for the last period. The eigenvalues for the 19th century are 20.2, 5.6, 3.7, 2.0, 1.6, 1.3, 1.2, and 1.2 respectively. For the early twentieth century they are 19.1, 6.0, 3.4, 2.5, 1.9, 1.6, 1.4, and 1.1. In the last period, the ten eigenvalues are 5.5, 3.5, 2.6, 2.5, 2.3, 2.0, 1.9, 1.9, 1.7, and 1.6. Strictly interpreted, the scree test strongly points to a three-fac-

tor solution as more correct statistically but for comparative and substantive pur-
poses I have used a four-factor solution.  Rummel (1970) is a readable source for
reviewing this and other technical aspects of factor analysis for the reader un-
familiar with these decision criteria.
   [12]This appellation seems further supported as the concern for limiting what
appeared to many as the unfair access of corporations to government conforms to the
marketplace conception of government as Elazar (1972) posits for the Individuali-
stic political subculture.  And it is especially in the more easterly states of
Factor IV that he locates the origins of this subculture.
   [13]The measure of correlation is the Pearsonian $r$.
   [14]Initially, an eigenvalue-one criterion was used to determine the number of
factors, resulting in a six-factor solution.  However, only the first four factors
had states with significant saturations.  A five-factor solution had the same re-
sult; thus, the four-factor solution is presented here.  The four factors very
acceptably explain almost 75% of the variance, and only four states have communali-
ties ($h^2$) under 0.60.
   [15]See Steward (1955) for a comprehensive analysis of these alternative cultural
dynamics.  Also, see Savage (1973) for their application in a broader socioeconomic
and political context to the American states than that presented here.

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THE INTERSECTION OF POLITICAL CULTURE AND
FISCAL FEDERALISM: STATE BLOCK GRANTS IN ALABAMA

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ABSTRACT

Political culture and intergovernmental relations together shape specific
policy actions of a state government within the constraints of its economic condi-
tion. Although financial resources provided a state government strongly influence
the level of its policy outputs, the political and administrative dynamics appear
to affect the exact nature of that policy. A case study of state block grant
implementation in the state of Alabama provides an opportunity to observe these
variables in action. In particular, the prominent role played by the executive
branch appears to have influenced strongly the decisions made concerning social
services, health policy, and community development.

A state's political system of inputs, decisions, and outputs operates within
a political culture and a complex intergovernmental partnership, which together
shape the formation and execution of public policy. To consider one without the
other is incomplete, as if the distribution of resources were determined solely
by regional peculiarities or federal mandate. Both are dynamic, though regional
political cultures appear to have changed more slowly than federal-state relation-
ships. In order to understand state policy, we need to understand how their inter-
action impacts the ways a state government, its leaders, and institutions do
business.

One recent opportunity to study the shaping of state policy outputs involves
nine state block grants which were enacted by Congress as part of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (P.L. 97-35). Starting October 1, 1981 (FY1982),
the state of Alabama assumed responsibility for seven of those block grants.[1]
Although modest by comparison with President Reagan's intentions, these health,
social welfare, and community development programs return considerable, though
not complete, decision-making control to the states. The importance of that
control has been diminished somewhat with severe federal budget reductions.
Organizational structures, budgetary response, eligibility standards, and program
oversight are left largely to state devices. It is the adoption and implementa-
tion of these block grants which serve as substance for this discussion of cultural
and intergovernmental dynamics in the politics of social welfare in Alabama.

## Southern Political Culture and Alabama Government

Political culture is a useful concept for linking social and economical factors
with political performance. Its theory and application to public policy combines

psychological interpretations of individual political behavior with macroanalytic group and societal variables common to political sociology (Pye, 1965: 8-10). According to Elazar (1972), political culture is a particular pattern of orientation to political action, a value framework shared by residents of a state which establishes common goals and actions to achieve them. It is the product of history and geography within the United States, of migrations, religions, and attitudes toward power and the role of government.

Elazar identified three major political subcultures that jointly inhabit the U.S. Although each has national proportions, individualistic, moralistic, and traditionalistic subcultures are tied to specific sections of the country (Elazar, 1972: 93).

To understand government in Alabama is to realize the enduring strength of the traditionalistic political subculture. The people of Alabama, and the South in general, are characterized by a traditional culture which "reflects an older, precommercial attitude that accepts a substantially hierarchical society as part of the ordered nature of things, authorizing and expecting those at the top of the social structure to take a special and dominant role in government" (Elazar, 1972: 99). Political competition is limited in scope, both in political party structure and participation (Hanson, 1983: 31). An appropriate mission for state government in a traditionalistic subculture includes maintaining and encouraging the status quo or existing order. Change comes slowly, usually at the behest of an elite.

This traditionalistic approach to government manifests itself in specific fiscal indicators and is underscored by the relatively poor economic conditions of the state. There exists a strong tendency to distrust government and corresponding refusal to support it. It appears that Alabama state government suffers from both a relative inability and unwillingness of the populace to sustain it. The former may be seen in Alabama's rank of 48th among all states in fiscal capacity (ACIR, 1981), and median family income of $13,674, almost $9000 below the U.S. median. The latter is indicated in numerous statistics. For example, Alabama ranks in the bottom five states in the nation in Aid For Families of Dependent Children (AFDC) payments, the adequacy of AFDC grants, in state contributions to welfare payments (Albritton, 1983), and in elementary-secondary education spending (Wirt, 1983: 306-20).

Political and bureaucratic indicators consistent with the traditionalistic subculture are apparent as well. They may be summarized as follows:

General Centralization of State Government

1. Because of the general poverty and low taxation in Alabama local jurisdictions, the state government must provide or fund services normally provided by local governments elsewhere. This centralization tends to strengthen the influence of the state government (Sharkansky, 1978: 25, 26).
2. Since Alabama is one of eight states which allow no home rule for their local governments, the state government plays a powerful legislative role over its county and municipal government.
3. In a rural, homogeneous, one-party state such as Alabama, a strong pressure system dominated by an alliance of interest groups, education,

timber and coal, focuses attention on the state capital as the primary
decision-making locus for the state (Ziegler and van Dalen, 1976).

Strength of the Governor

    4.  Partly because of an absence of a well-organized Republican party,
the Alabama governor (always a Democrat in this century) has gained con-
siderable political strength (Sharkansky, 1978: 25).
    5.  Because party labels are less important in Alabama than in most
non-South states, voters tend to identify with personalities, rather than
with parties and issues.  This provides the governor an opportunity to
attract considerable attention.
    6.  Both the former "multifunctional" one-party system in Alabama
(pre-George Wallace) and the "dominant" faction headed by Wallace tend
to reinforce the politics of personality (Palmer, 1977: 68, 69).
    7.  The Alabama governorship enjoys relatively strong formal strength
based on budget and appointive powers, tenure potential and veto powers
(Schlesinger, 1976).
    8.  The state's Budget Management Act of 1976 establishes the governor
and finance officer (whom the governor appoints) as central and influential
figures in the state budget process (Cowles and Berry, 1982).
    9.  The Alabama governor traditionally names the Speaker of the House
and the President Pro Tem of the Senate.  These allies are expected to
serve as floor leaders for the governor's legislative program (Jewell, 1972).
    10.  The Alabama governor has become (as have other governors) an
important conduit of federal aid to the point where s/he may be called
the "federal-systems-officer" at the state level.  This role has enabled
the governor "to dispense a new style of patronage--of services and
programs" (Williams, 1972: 3,4).

Weakness of the Legislature

    11.  Partly because of the relative poorness of the state, Alabama state
legislators are poorly paid, well under the national average.  This poor
support tends to discourage a more permanent body of legislators who need
seniority and time to establish policy leadership and strength (Palmer,
1977: 96).
    12.  Alabama's traditionalistic political culture has been linked
with a general lack of support for state assemblies (Patterson, Wahlke,
and Boynton, 1973).
    13.  Similarly, the traditionalistic culture has been shown to hold
a less favorable view toward government spending and regulation (Kelleher,
Goodman, and Cornwell, 1973).  Hence, the legislature has less influence
over fewer resources.
    14.  At the bottom of the Legis 50 ranking based on five legislative
performance criteria is found Alabama.  (Citizens Conference, 1971).
    15.  Another study ranked the performance of Alabama legislative
committees among the least effective (Rosenthal, 1974).  Research and
staff capacity are lacking.

Both the economic problems and political characteristics of Alabama state government are apparent. The use of these data as determinants of policy is well-grounded in the literature. Economic variables, especially in states with under-developed economies, predict fairly well both political variables and level of policy outputs (Dawson and Robinson, 1963; Dye, 1966; Press and VerBurg, 1979: 42). But, as Lineberry (1977: 46) has cautioned: "If economic factors produce a bigger or smaller pie, then it is reasonable to suppose that political factors determine who gets the shares." Further research seems to confirm this point (Fry and Winters, 1970).

Given the apparent imbalance of power between the governor's office and the legislature, we would expect the chief executive to dominate decision-making that allocates funds to various programs. Secondly, given the traditionally poor support for welfare programs in Alabama, we would anticipate that those state block grants most directly targeted to poor people would suffer. Third, the nature of the block grants, themselves, should affect the economic and political balance of power within state government.

## Changes in Fiscal Federalism

The second intersecting influence on state block grants is fiscal federalism. The term refers to the extensive grants-in-aid program among governments that began in the New Deal, was greatly expanded in Johnson's Great Society, modified by Nixon in the early 1970s, and now modified again by Reagan with his state block grants. What effect do these forms of federalism have on state and local government discretion and flexibility over various social welfare programs? To the point, are the state block grants an extension of the decentralization of power begun by earlier federal block grants and general revenue sharing? The answer is yes and no.

Categorical grants developed under Johnson's administration provide consider-able control to the grantor--the federal government (Reagan and Sanzone, 1980: 57-60). Block grants loosen that control (Hanson, 1983: 40-52; Reagan and Sanzone, 1980: 124, 125). The recipient jurisdiction enjoys considerably more freedom. General revenue sharing monies are virtually unrestricted. The tendency of all three, however, is to establish a "vertical" relationship between federal and local governments (or local extragovernmental agencies), effectively bypassing, in most though not all cases, state government. Reagan's stated intention is to strengthen the role of state governments in the process so that the federal monies, however much reduced, become "pass-through" funds that provide states, not local governments, with primary discretion. Hence, the answer is yes, the state block grants appear to continue the decentralization or devolution of power from Washington, but no, local governments do not enjoy that discretion--states do.

The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act directs the governor of each state to take charge of block grant implementation, though the legislature is not excluded from the process. In Alabama, those federal funds became part of the General Fund to be appropriated by the legislature. Not surprisingly, Reagan's own governor-ship appears to have shaped his philosophy about not only the most appropriate part of government to have discretion over block grants, but the appropriate policy actor as well. Although the number of federal mandates attached to each state block grant varies, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the

Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) have imposed a minimum of regulations on the states' use of the block grants (Beyle and Dusenbury, 1981). Hence, the potential discretion and flexibility afforded governors is considerable.

The inherent difficulty in predicting uniform impact from sweeping change in intergovernmental relations is that states react with great diversity. To expect all states to assume responsibility for state block grants in an equally competent fashion is to ignore the influence of political subcultures, fiscal resources, and resulting state government policy actions. As Radin (1982: 62) indicates: "Arguments for all-encompassing devolution of power to the states do not take into account the state variations and the needs in many states for active federal presence."

In the case of Alabama, the block grants appear to complement government resulting from a traditionalistic political subculture. When two nearly paralleling roads intersect, the natural inclination of the resultant route is to continue in the same direction.



Given this orientation, we would expect the incumbent governor to play a central role in the implementation of the state block grants. The lack of support for legislative oversight and active citizen involvement only reinforces such executive domination. We may check this assumption by briefly reviewing a case study of Alabama's first year of block grant implementation.

## Taking the Block Grants in Stride

Alabama government officials prided themselves in the quickness with which the state took on seven block grants. Whereas the executive branch assumed a leadership role, legislative involvement in the first year of block grant implementation was minimal, providing little in the way of a balance of power to executive branch decision-making or a conduit for public participation and input. After co-sponsoring two sets of public hearings with the Office of State Planning and Federal Programs (OSPFP), the legislature did little with the block grants. Interviews with state legislators revealed much uncertainty and confusion on their appropriate role in the block grant process. Compared to other states, the Alabama legislature has played an extremely minimal role (Beyle and Dusenbury, 1981).

This near-abdication of responsibility to date leads to fundamental questions about the legislative oversight function. Though the Alabama legislature has an

established procedure for reviewing federal fund transfers and their utilization within the state, it has served to "rubber-stamp" executive decisions concerning these block grants. If the federal government is no longer charged with holding the state to its responsibilities, who within the state guarantees fiscal, procedural, and substantive accountability? Thus far, the implementing agencies have been slow to replace federal rules and regulations with their own nor have they established a management audit function.

Because of the brief period between acceptance of the block grants and the beginning of FY1982, the four executive departments responsible for the block grants had little time to institute meaningful organizational change. In the following year (through 1982), however, during which a thorough review and planning process could have been conducted, little was accomplished. Hence, the state entered into FY1983 with essentially the same organizational structure that was in place upon initial acceptance. Interviews with state officials consistently indicated that the executive branch, following cues from the governor, saw block grant implementation as routine business which, at its best, required considerably fewer application and reporting functions. Few perceived the block grant process as an opportunity to innovate or create new means of service delivery. Innovation and creativity had been basic assumptions of devolution of responsibility to the states.

By necessity, the Small Cities-Community Development Block Grant and the Community Services Block Grant required significant organizational adjustments since the state had not been involved directly with either program. Otherwise, in-place agencies and offices were able to include the block grant in established sections. This low level of adaptation may be explainable since several of the block grants are logical extentions of established programs. For example, the Social Services Block Grant is essentially the former Title XX federal block grant (in fact, most state and local bureaucrats continue to refer to the Social Services Block Grant as "Title 20"). Also, the priorities established in the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Systems Block Grant were consistent with priorities of care previously adopted by the state mental health department. Further, since severe budget cuts accompanied most of the block grants (see next section), administrators contend that their current strategy is more "survival" than expansive. That view is consistent with the unfortunate irony experienced in many governments that when creative management techniques are most needed (in times of fiscal stress), there are no slack resources with which to innovate.


Governor James' Approach

To accept this explanation as the main reason behind the former state administration's low-key approach may be misleading. Governor Fob James, who succeeded George Wallace in 1979 and handed back the job to Wallace in 1983, sought to reduce the size and influence of state government. Working on that premise, he chose not to establish a separate agency to oversee block grant implementation nor did he concentrate that effort in his own office. Instead, he depended heavily on the line departments for block grant implementation. Formation of an Inter-Agency Council and block grant Task Forces, which met an average of just two times, represented

-235-

the extent of any extraordinary effort regarding block grants.

There are positive and negative aspects of this type arrangement.  The governor retained some control over the block grants through the power of appointment; however, Governor James opted for a decentralized model in which the departments are primarily responsible for planning and implementation.  The Inter-Agency Council, unlike similar bodies in other states, did not include citizens and representatives from outside concerns.  Instead, that input was channeled (quite unevenly) through the agencies themselves.  In short, the implementation process was extremely bureaucratic in nature.

## The Government's Fiscal Response*

Legislative and executive response in Alabama to federal goverment budget cuts which accompanied the decentralization of power varies by block grant as Table 2 indicates.  The totals are interesting.  Overall, the seven block grants were reduced 5.7 percent, as the state's 5.1 percent increase could not offset federal budget reductions of an average of 9.7 percent.  An attempt was made by the legislature to improve Social Services funding, but Governor James was forced by the

Table 1

State and Federal Funding Levels for FY1981 to FY1983

| Block Grant | Percent Change State | Percent Change Federal | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| Small Cities-Community Development | +100% | +15.2% | +17.4% |
| Maternal and Child Health Services | +83.5 | -27.7 | + 9.8 |
| Preventive Health and Health Services | + 9.4 | +23.2 | + 9.4 |
| Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health | - 2.9 | - 5.1 | - 4.0 |
| Low Income Home Energy Assistance | N.A. | -11.8 | -11.8 |
| Social Services | -10.4 | -14.7 | -13.2 |
| Community Services | N.A. | -39.7 | -39.7 |
| TOTAL | + 5.1 | - 9.7 | - 5.7 |

Sources:  Patrick J. Cowles with Sandra E. Berry and Odessa Woolfolk, "Budget Cuts and Block Grants:  The New 'New Federalism' Comes to Alabama," Paper presented at the 1983 meeting of the American Society for Public Administration, New York. Data drawn primarily from the State of Alabama Executive Budget for FY1981-1982 and FY1982-1983, plus miscellaneous state documents.

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*Data in this section are drawn primarily from a report by Cowles (1983).

exigencies of the recession to transfer monies appropriated for Social Services to the state's welfare program. As Cowles (1983) suggests, whether or not the cut was prompted by an unwillingness to maintain those social servies or an inherent incapacity to support them and emergency welfare assistance is unclear. He concludes that "the nature of the economic and fiscal problems faced by the state were (and are) such that its fiscal capacity was, at the least, so severely constrained that the decision to cut must be viewed largely as a function of this constraint" (Cowles, 1983: 31).

Otherwise, state appropriations increased in the Small Cities-Community Development, Maternal and Child Health, and Preventive Health block grants. The losers were Mental Health, Low Income Home Energy Assistance, and Community Services. The state's smaller decrease (2.9 percent) offset slightly a larger federal cut in Mental Health. The latter two received absolutely no appropriations to offset considerable federal reductions. Though not all the evidence is consistent (i.e. the legislative attempt to increase Social Services funding), it appears that those block grants targeted directly to the state's needy suffered the most. Although it is too soon to draw conclusions, a continuation of this trend could reflect an anti-poor bias on the part of the state.

Governor Wallace's Non-Response

Given the pressures of combatting pernicious unemployment and the lingering recession, a Justice Department requirement for new legislative elections, and his own serious health problems, Gov. George Wallace has done little to impact directly the state block grant implementation process. However, his style differs from James' in that he has moved to concentrate more policy influence and power in his office rather than disperse it to the administrative agencies. As a new budget cycle evolves, his office's role will become clear. Long-time observers predict that Wallace will continue to consolidate discretionary power in his office, though he personally adopts a style of detachment. His continuing health problems may prevent any greater degree of involvement.

Conclusions

Programs targeted directly for low-income residents suffered relative to other block grants. Of particular note is a major reduction in the Community Services block grant which funds the Community Action agencies and Head Start project. Additionally, Low Income Home Energy Assistance was cut. Conversely, health and community development programs were strengthened by the state government.

Gubernatorial and state bureaucratic dominance of the block grant implementation process is evident. Legislative acquiescence likewise stands out. Given the political subculture and governmental arrangements in Alabama, these findings are not surprising. However, their impact on accountability, on oversight, and on citizen input are of continuing importance.

A significant difference between Fob James' approach to administrative leadership and that of George Wallace is that James sought to remove block grant implementation from the political arena. A review of the case study indicates that James and his department heads "largely saw block grant implementation as routine

business which, at its best, required considerably fewer application and reporting functions." James did not establish a "blue-ribbon" advisory group of state citizens to advise him; he did not establish a separate agency to oversee the block grants, nor did he control that function in his office. Instead, he integrated the process into existing administrative functions, away from the oversight of the legislature and generally removed from regular citizens observation and input. By insulating the planning and decision-making process within the state bureaucracy, he managed a "politics of expertise," to use Benveniste's (1972) term.

James, who entered state government from the corporate world without previous government service nor political experience, said frequently during his term that government should and could be run like a business. Many of his legislative and administrative efforts were in tune with this belief. He valued rationality in planning that could be enhanced by removing administration from politics. In essence, he avowed the concept of neutral competence, to use Kaufman's (1963) term. He eschewed the concept of executive leadership which, according to Kaufman (1963) reflects the belief that state government decisions should be centrally coordinated. In this sense, James may have been bucking the dominant political subculture.

If past performance is useful as an indicator, Wallace will "politicize" the block grant process in Alabama by taking a firmer hold of its administration and by using certain discretionary options permitted by the legislation to influence implementation. This may be opposed by bureaucrats who have enjoyed a relatively free hand under James and who traditionally value professionalism over politics. It also may be opposed by the legislature, not because it necessarily favors a politics of bureaucratic expertise, but because its members may resist added gubernatorial power over them.

Regardless of executive style, the locus of power and discretion lies within the governor's domain. Together, political culture and the nature of the block grants predict this.

<div align="center">NOTES</div>

[1]The seven block grants assumed by Alabama were: 1) Small Cities-CDBG for which non-entitlement cities apply directly to a state office which reviews applications and makes awards; 2) Community Services, designed to consolidate community action/local initiative, senior services, and community food and nutrition programs, and operated by Community Action Agencies; 3) Preventive Health and Health Services which consolidated programs in rodent control, flouridation, hypertension, home health and health incentive, plus risk education/health education; 4) Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Services for which community mental health centers are required to provide outpatient services, 24-hour emergency care, day treatment, mental hospital screening, consultation and education; 5) Maternal and Child Health Services, designed to bring together maternal and child health programs, crippled children's services, hemophilia, lead-based poisoning, genetic diseases, sudden infant death syndrome, and SSI disabled children; 6) Social Services which covers services provided under the Social Security Act including child care/protective services, adult day care and home maintenance, transportation, family services, health support services, and special services for the disabled; and 7) Low-Income Home Energy Assistance to assist eligible households to meet the cost of home energy.

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POLITICAL SYMBOLISM IN JUVENILE JUSTICE:
REFORMING FLORIDA'S JUVENILE DETENTION CRITERIA

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ABSTRACT

A recent reform in Florida's juvenile detention criteria was
over-turned during the subsequent legislative session.  This
paper describes both the initial reform and its reversal and
suggests that symbolic political rewards may often be more
important   than   the   actual   consequences   of   a   policy.
Recommendations are made for accomplishing policy reform in a
traditional political culture.

INTRODUCTION

In the late 1970's, a child entering the juvenile justice system
in Florida was more likely to be placed in secure detention than
a child in any other state (Florida Center for Children & Youth,
1980).   By 1980, "reform" legislation had been passed which
reduced the number of admissions by twenty-one per cent and
decreased the average daily population by twenty-six per cent.
Only a year later, however, new "tougher" legislation had been
passed which led to an ultimate increase in secure detentions of
forty-seven per cent and to a growth of thirty-nine per cent in
the detention population (Department of Health and Rehabilita-
tive Services, 1982).   This article provides a case history
of these two important changes in Florida's juvenile justice
legislation which were accomplished within the short space of a
year.  This case illustrates some of the problems which confront
liberal, reform-minded coalitions when they oppose the power of

local politicians and political organizations within the context of a state legislature.

## Juvenile Detention

Detention is roughly analagous to jail in the adult criminal justice system, inasmuch as it provides custody for juveniles accused of committing delinquent acts. It is different from jail in that detention in most jurisdictions cannot legally be used for the punishment of children who already have been adjudicated as delinquent by the court, while adults with short sentences are frequently incarcerated in jail (Sarri,1974).

Detention is not intended as a punishment for children since, like adults, they are presumed innocent at the pre-trial stage. Until the turn of the century, children who were deemed criminally responsible for illegal acts were also tried and punished much the same as adults. With the creation of juvenile courts and the further specialization of legal codes regarding juvenile behavior, a separate system for trying and treating juvenile offenders gradually developed (Platt,1977). Not until the Kent decision in 1966 did our legal system recognize some responsibility for the protection of the rights of children under the juvenile justice system (Kent vs United States 383 U.S. 541 [1966]). Over the next few years, further court decisions, state and federal laws, and administrative practice further defined the function of juvenile detention so that ideally juvenile offenders: 1) could expect much the same protection of their legal rights during detention as adults, 2) were subject to pre-trial detention only in very limited conditions (Anbry, 1971), and 3) were separated from adult offenders. Those children accused of status offenses, i.e., behaviors not defined as criminal activity for adults, are also entitled to separate facilities from those children accused of criminal offenses (42 U.S.C. 5633).

## Detention in Florida

These legal and humanitarian ideals regarding detention were rarely met anywhere in the nation, and they were certainly not reached in Florida. An LEAA-funded study of children in adult jails in Florida by a private research/advocacy organization, the Florida Center for Children and Youth, disclosed that one of the state's major problems was that half of the jails violated minimum federal standards for juvenile detention, and 95% of the adult jails used violated minimum state standards for use as juvenile facilities (1979). Among the problems encountered in these substandard facilities were overcrowding, sexual abuse, lack of supervision, and suicide ("Faulty Jails", 1980).

-243-

Florida also operated twenty regional, maximum-security juvenile detention facilities with a combined capacity of more than 1,000 youths.

## Previous Research on Juvenile Detention

In one of the most comprehensive studies of juvenile detention in the United States, Sarri documented widespread problems in the administration of laws regarding detention, as well as the importance of situational or structural factors in the detention decision (1974). For example, the time and location of the apprehension and the location of the detention facility were at least as important as the severity of the offense. A later study by Kramer and Steffensmier supported the importance of these factors, in addition to discovering that juvenile status offenders were more likely to be detained than were juveniles accused of criminal behavior (1978). (Status offenders are also just as likely to be incarcerated as juvenile delinquents (McNeece, 1980)).

Other research at the National Assessment of Juvenile Corrections concluded that juvenile offenders who were detained were less likely to have their legal rights protected by the court or by the public defenders than were juveniles who were not detained (McNeece, 1976). Kihm found in a later study of detention criteria that the re-arrest rates and failure-to-appear rates for juveniles who were released pending adjudication were not significantly different from the rates for detainees (1980). This finding erodes one of the major reasons for the use of detention --insuring that the offender is present for an adjudication hearing and that he or she is not involved in subsequent delinquent activity prior to adjudication. Unfortunately, as we shall see in the following pages, most Florida lawmakers did not choose to utilize this information in the development of new juvenile justice policies.

REFORM, 1980

## The Background for Reform

Prior to the 1980 changes in the juvenile detention law, Florida statutes had provided five criteria for detention placement. They were:

(a) To protect the person or property of others or of the child;

(b) Because the child has no parent, guardian, responsible

relative, or other adult approved by the court, able
to provide supervision and care for him. If a child
is to be detained pursuant to this paragraph alone,
a crisis home only may be used;

(c) To secure his presence at the next hearing;

(d) Because the child has been twice previously adjud-
icated to have committed a delinquent act and has been
charged with a third subsequent delinquent act which
would constitute a felony if the child were an adult;
or

(e) To hold for another jurisdiction a delinquent, child
escapee or an absconder from probation, community
control program or parole supervision or for a child
who is wanted by another jurisdiction for an offense
which, if committed by an adult, would be a violation
of law (Chapter 39.032, Florida Statutes).


These criteria were originally intended to limit the use of
detention to children who might pose a threat to the community or
to themselves, or who were not likely to appear for an adju-
dication hearing if released. The criteria, vaguely worded and
subject to broad interpretation by intake workers and courts
alike, led to the inappropriate use of detention. A report from
the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services
(DHRS) in 1978 showed that 371 abused or neglected children and
754 status offenders had been housed in secure detention during
the first half of that year, contrary to both Florida law and
federal standards (1979a). During this same time, several of the
regional detention facilities were under court orders to reduce
their populations because of overcrowded and unsafe conditions.
This situation lent an air or urgency to the need for reform.

The next year another HRS study reviewed the decisions of
intake workers to place children in detention. In one of the ten
HRS regions studied, the monitors disagreed with 61% of the
decisions to detain. Another study reported that 38% of the
detained children in Daytona Beach were questionably, inappro-
priately, or illegally placed (DHRS, 1979b). The latter report
resulted in a class action suit against local detention officials
(H.C. vs. Jarrad, et. al., N.D. FL. TCA-79-0830).

Building a Reform Coalition

During 1978-79, the Florida Center for Children and Youth
assisted citizens groups in five communities in monitoring the
processing of children in their regional detention centers. In
all of the five sites, a large proportion of the children
processed were accused of minor offenses such as curfew vio-

lations, truancy, liquor possession, etc. A substantial number of the children detained were status offenders, children who had committed no criminal acts. In Broward County (Ft. Lauderdale) the Human Rights Advocacy Committee found that 30% of the cases they reviewed represented children who were placed in detention contrary to HRS policy or state law. This overuse of detention was costly in both human and economic terms. In addition to the restrictions on individual liberties, detention was estimated to cost $35.00 per day per youth (FCCY, 1980).

At the same time, the Florida Chapter of the National Association of Social Workers (NASW), the Florida Association for Human Services (FAHS), and the League of Women Voters were also active in generating support to revise the detention criteria during the 1980 legislative session. NASW was particularly active in contacting legislators and soliciting their support for adopting the detention standards developed in 1976 by the Committee on Standards for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, a committee of the National Advisory Committee on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (U.S. Department of Justice).

All three of the major participating organizations in the drive to reform the state's detention criteria - - the Florida Center for Children and Youth, the Florida Association for Human Services, and the National Association of Social Workers - - had a long history of involvement in policy development in Florida, and they were generally well-regarded by members of the legislature.

Meanwhile, the FCCY report on the status of children in adult jails in Florida (page above) was timed for release at the opening of the 1980 legislative session. FCCY recommended that the best way to solve the various problems associated with the placement of children in jails was to make room for them in the juvenile detention centers. This could be easily accomplished, according to FCCY, by implementing specific, offense-based criteria for the use of secure detention. There was broad legislative interest in these issues and some support for the specific proposals. Senator Dunn, a long-time advocate for improved juvenile justice, agreed to add language to a bill he had already filed that would severely restrict the conditions under which a juvenile could be placed in any detention facility. (The bill which finally passed and was signed by the governor also contained several provisions which did not relate to detention, but the main thrust of that bill was detention.)

Unfortunately for the advocates of the new detention criteria, Senator Dunn was having difficulty getting any of his

legislation to the floor of the Senate because of some changes in
the Senate power structure. Senator Beard, however, had proposed
a non-controversial bill at the request of the Florida Sheriff's
Association, SB409, that would clear up vague and confusing
language relating to juvenile placements in adult jails. When
SB409 reached the floor of the Senate, Senator Beard, a former
sheriff himself, agreed to let Senator Dunn amend his bill onto
SB409. The new detention standards allowed detention in cases in
which:

(a) The child is from another jurisdiction and is an
escapee, (sic) from a commitment program or absconder
from probation, a community control program or parole
supervision, for an offense which, if committed by an
adult, would be a violation of law, or the child is
wanted by another jurisdiction for an offense which, if
committed by an adult, would be a violation of law;

(b) The child requests protection in circumstances that
appear to present an immediate threat to his per-
sonal safety.

(c) The child is charged with a capital felony, life
felony, or felony of the first degree; or a crime of
violence, i.e., murder in the third degree, man-
slaughter, sexual battery, robbery, aggravated
assault; or with two or more serious property
crimes arising out of separate transactions;

(d) The child is charged with a serious property
crime; i.e., arson or burglary as defined in
s. 810.02(2) and (3); or with the sale or
manufacture of or trafficking in a controlled
substance; which if committed by an adult
would be a felony, and:
1. He is already detained or has been released
and is awaiting final dispositions of his
case; or
2. He has a record of failure to appear at court
hearings; or
3. He has a record of violent conduct resulting
in physical injury to others; or
4. He has a record of adjudications for serious
property offenses (Chapter 39.032, Florida
Statutes).

With little opposition from organized law enforcement, the
courts, or the press, the new standards were passed during the
1980 legislative session and went into effect July 1, 1980.

OUTCOME OF THE REFORM

## Public Reaction

Soon after the implementation of the new standards, strong objections were being raised across the state by almost every part of the juvenile justice system - - judges, law enforcement officers, state prosecuting attorneys, and intake workers. The state's newspapers were almost universally critical of the new standards. The reason for this outcry had nothing to do with the performance of the criteria, for the changes passed by the 1980 legislature had accomplished just what was intended - a reduction in the general use of detention. More important, the average detention population and detention admissions had been greatly reduced (page 1, above) without any increase in the re-arrest rate or the failure-to-appear rate (DHRS, 1981).

Obviously, detention had been used in the past not just as a way of protecting the community or guaranteeing the appearance of the accused juvenile at adjudication hearings, even though those were the only legitimate ends recognized in the statutes. The old standards had allowed for a type of symbolic punishment which seemed to be lacking in the new standards. Under the new criteria, many critics felt that a number of offenses were not included among those violations which warranted detention. Among those were drug possession, grand theft, and possession of stolen property. Under the new legislation children accused of those crimes would now have their day in court before being punished -- much the same as in the adult justice system. Sanctions could then be meted out only after a proper adjudication.

All adults accused of crimes in Florida have a right to bail except when charged with crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment. In fact, most sheriffs in the state operate "release on recognizance" programs which allow the release of an adult without bail pending his or her trial. We know that a small percentage of those adults released on bail or on their own recognizance will either commit subsequent crimes or will fail to appear for trial. The public may not be happy with this situation but it is at least tolerated. When the new juvenile detention standards were implemented and similar rights of pre-trial release were granted to children, there was an immediate widespread protest. One newspaper after another printed stories with headlines such as these:

"Juvenile Justice System Aids Young Killers"
            Florida Flambeau, April 16, 1981

-248-

"Juveniles' Antics Frustrate Police"
                    Tampa Tribune, March 28, 1981

"New Law Helps Teenage Thugs as Victims Lose"
                    Miami Herald, October 24, 1980

    The criticism of the new standards in each of these stories
focused on the inability of local officials to detain most ju-
veniles accused of a crime between apprehension and adjudica-
tion.   In most of the stories, there were implicit assumptions
that such juveniles were guilty, would commit subsequent crimes
and would have a low rate of appearance for adjudication hear-
ings.   In the relatively few instances where these behaviors did
occur, newspapers published graphic illustrations of the crimes
committed, thus lending support to the public's opinion of the
unsoundness of the new law.

## Judges, State Attorneys and Law Enforcement Reactions

    Law  enforcement  officials  responded  by  "discovering"  a
rising crime rate and blaming it on the inability to detain most
juvenile offenders.   They publicly lamented the fact that under
the new detention criteria, "the juvenile offender is back on the
street before the victim is out of the hospital." In some cases,
police hinted that they were not pursuing juvenile arrests as
vigorously as before because of the futility of prosecuting
juveniles under the new code.   The Police Chief's Association
issued a statement calling for an amendment to the criteria which
would   allow   more   discretion   in   decision-making   regarding
detention.   Their statement also indicated a desire for strong
input from police officials in detention decisions, a factor
which they felt was lacking in the new standards (DHRS, 1981).

    The Prosecuting Attorneys Association viewed the new de-
tention criteria as too restrictive, and they believed that too
many accused juveniles were being released after apprehension
when they actually should have been held in detention.   They
recommended an expansion of the detention criteria, and they even
went so far as to recommend that adult jails once again be used
for juvenile detention (DHRS, 1981).

    Judges were perhaps the most vocal of all local officials in
their opposition to the new criteria.   Although it was seldom
expressed, one obvious reason for their dissatisfaction was that
the new criteria virtually eliminated the exercise of judicial
discretion regarding detention.   Six of the twenty judicial
circuits went so far as to issue court orders broadening the
detention criteria and allowing a broader category of juvenile
offenders to be detained.   As a result, almost a third of the

juveniles detained during the last nine months of 1980 were
detained by court order (DHRS, 1981). One local judge issued an
advisory opinion (involving no litigants) stating that:

> "The legislature did not intend that children
> (some of which are thugs) when caught in the
> act of a serious crime such as burglary.....
> threatening children, scaring old people.....
> BE TURNED LOOSE ON THE SPOT AND NOT BE DETAINED
> IN THE JUVENILE DETENTION CENTER ...........
> It is further ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that any
> language in the new Act....conflicting with
> the language authorizing the jailing of a
> juvenile thug....is hereby declared uncon-
> stitutional..." (Nineteenth Judicial Circuit,
> 80-10 CCJ, 1980).

Although this opinion was quickly invalidated by a state ap-
pellate court, it represented a strong and widely held attitude
among Florida judges.

## Impact of the New Criteria

It should be restated at this point that the actual impact
of the new detention criteria on the major problems of over-
crowding and inappropriate use of detention was quite positive.
As described earlier, the detention population was reduced and
the number of admissions was substantially decreased. This
allowed the State time and resources to comply with various court
orders regarding overcrowding. Abuse and suicide rates also
dropped among the detained juveniles. At the same time, there
were noted no significant differences in the rates of re-arrest
or failure-to-appear for hearings among those juveniles who were
now being released compared to those previously detained (DHRS,
1981). Opponents of the new criteria did not want to be bothered
with these facts, however. The important change which had
aroused their ire was that the punitive value of detention -- at
the discretion of local officials -- had been diminished.


BACKLASH, 1981

## The Law and Order Coalition

The stage had been set for a nullification of the 1980 re-
form bill by the opening of the next legislative session. All of
those groups which had expressed stong criticism of the 1980

changes had sought out support in both houses of the legisla-
ture, and potential sponsors for a new "tough" bill which broad-
ened detention criteria were in plentiful supply.  Senator Beard,
perhaps   hoping   to   make   amends   to   his   constituents   for
inadvertently sponsoring the 1980 legislation, quickly filed such
a bill.   (The bill was written by Beard with considerable input
from Judge Spicola from his district.   Spicola had served as a
Senator until his appointment to the bench.   Beard was then
appointed to fill Spicola's vacant Senate seat.)

## The Reform Coalition

    The same liberal forces which supported the 1980 changes
once again coalesced and planned to fight any subsequent change
to broaden the detention criteria (or any other change which
would make the state's juvenile justice system more punitive.)
NASW and FCCY were especially active in coordinating lobbying
efforts and organizing expert witnesses to speak against pro-
posed changes in committee hearings.

## The New Juvenile Code Proposal

    The new bill, HB1095, not only sought to broaden detention
criteria, but it also included several other "punitive" features
which NASW and FCCY viewed as a backlash from the forces of
law-and-order conservatism.   It also included changes regarding:
1) the processing of juvenile traffic offenders, 2) the placement
of   juveniles   in   jail   as a sentencing alternative,   3)   the
judicial determination of post-disposition treatment plans, 4)
parental restitution requirements, 5) the publication of names
of alleged juvenile offenders, and 6) provisions for processing
16-or-17-year-old juveniles in adult courts at the discretion of
the state attorney.   This was one of fifteen   "get tough"
juvenile bills filed in the 1981 legislature ("Juvenile Justice",
1981).

## The 1981 Legislative Process

    HB1095 was developed by the House Select Committee on Ju-
venile Justice, a newly created committee, which was heavily
weighted with law-and-order advocates.   (Normally such a bill
would have been referred to the Committee on Health and Reha-
bilitative Services a relatively friendly committee.)   The senate
counterpart was referred to the Senate Judiciary-Criminal Justice
Committee, a committee not ordinarily given jurisdiction over
juvenile justice legislation.

    During the hearings most of the committee members spoke of
the "many concerns" expressed by their constituents regarding the

lax treatment of juvenile offenders.  The Chair of the Senate
committee stated that:

> "I've gotten more letters on this subject than
> anything since I've been here.  People are afraid
> of children.  There's a certain rationality with
> an adult (criminal), but not with a child" ("Juvenile
> Justice", 1981)

Senator Beard and other members of the Senate Committee
arranged for a carefully selected group of "victims" to testify
at committee hearings regarding the harm which had personally
befallen them because of the 1980 revisions in the detention
criteria ("Who Protects Us", 1981).  Opponents of HB1095 attended
these hearings, but most of those persons wishing to speak
against the bill were never called.  Most of the time for taking
testimony was devoted to advocates of the bill.  (Note:  Both
authors were in attendance at the Senate committee meeting,
wishing to speak against the bill.)

Opponents of the bill planned to make one last attempt to
modify some of its more punitive aspects at an expected House-
Senate Conference Committee meeting, but several prior "secret"
meetings took place between the major participants and their
staff in order to avoid bargaining and decision-making in ano-
ther highly-charged public meeting.  A secret compromise was
reached and no joint conference committee was named.  Only one
punitive feature of the final bill was totally eliminated before
passage, the section which specifically allowed courts to use
detention as a sentencing alternative.  The Senate had passed the
bill by a 30 to 1 vote, and the House version passed by a 113 to
10 margin ("Get-Tough Juvenile Bill", 1981).  It was obviously a
very popular piece of legislation.

Opponents also attempted to influence the governor to veto
HB1095, some pointing only to the state's regression to an
earlier, more punitive use of detention, others citing the cer-
tainty of additional expenses accruing from an anticipated growth
of detention.  Nevertheless, the governor had already publicly
voiced his support for "tougher" juvenile laws, and he signed the
bill without hesitation.


CONCLUSIONS

## Impact of the 1981 Changes

Just as the opponents of HB1095 had expected, the broader
detention criteria implemented in July, 1981 resulted in in-

creased use of detention. During the first six months, the new criteria resulted in: 1) a 47% increase in admissions to secure detention, 2) a 62% increase in the average daily population in non-secure detention, and 3) a dramatic increase in the proportion of youth screened and detained. Once again there was no significant change in the non-appearance or re-arrest rate (DHRS, 1982). Those rates did not increase with the 1980 reform, nor did they improve with the 1981 broadened detention criteria. Those behaviors are apparently not related to the matter of detention.

## Politics and Symbolism in Juvenile Justice

Perhaps more important to the law-and-order groups lobbying for the 1981 changes, and perhaps even to the public at large, was the restoration of the symbolic function of punishment through pre-trial detention. It has been pointed out quite clearly in the context of other political issues that the symbolic rewards which emanate from political action are frequently more important than any tangible results (Edelman, 1964).

The 1980 reform was pushed through the legislature by a liberal-minded coalition of social workers and youth advocates at a time when the "law-and-order" forces were paying little attention. In fact, some of the more conservative members of the legislature had supported the 1980 changes because they incorrectly perceived SB409 only as a way of separating adult and juvenile offenders, reducing overcrowding, thus removing the threat of various lawsuits and the threat of a loss of federal funding for juvenile programs.

When they learned of the limitations in the power of local officials to use the symbolic function of pre-trial detention, there was a groundswell of opposition. Organizations of judges, law enforcement officials, state prosecuting attorneys, and others coordinated grass-roots lobbying efforts to negate the reform only one year later. The use of detention as a symbol of the local court and police ability to protect the community from the threat of juvenile crime was a function overlooked by the liberal reform groups. It made no difference that juvenile crime had not increased with the 1980 reform (Florida Department of Law Enforcement, 1981), or that re-arrests and non-appearance did not significantly change. What mattered was the missing symbol of the power of state and local authorities to immediately punish accused juveniles, thus ritualistically reinforcing community norms against delinquent behavior and giving the impression of protecting the community against subsequent delinquent behavior.

Regional Differences in Political Symbolism

Most scholars of public social policy agree that it is much
easier to achieve agreement on programs than on objectives, and
that when agreement on values underlying programs is necessary,
policy compromise is more difficult to reach (Banfield, 1961;
Gil, 1976; Wildavsky, 1979; Dluhy, 1981). The basic prob-
lem is that agreement on a particular policy is more difficult
to achieve whenever there are value conflicts among the parti-
cipants in the policy process. "Liberal" reform efforts are
likely to lead to such value conflicts under certain fairly
predictable conditions. For example, issues that touch on such
matters as the treatment of criminals (or delinquents), gay
rights, and abortion, provide more potential for conflict on
the basis of values than do highway construction or teacher
education requirements.

Another important factor is the geographic context of the
policy development process. Elazar has thoroughly described the
geographic distribution of political cultures in the settlement
of America, and the subsequent migration patterns of those
cultures throughout the continent (Elazar, 1966). Within the
southern states the dominant political culture is identified as
"traditional"; it grew out of a conservative, plantation-centered
agricultural system. This culture tends to perpetuate the
dominance of an elite-oriented political order, and political
leaders play conservative and custodial rather than initiatory
roles (Elazar, 1966, pp. 79-116). In contrast the upper Midwest
is dominated by a "moralistic" political culture in which "both
the general public and the politicians conceive of politics as a
public activity...properly devoted to the advancement of the
public interests" (Elazar, 1966, p. 90).

Although the mobility of our citizens has undoubtedly led to
the erosion and displacement of dominant political cultures in
every state in recent years, there is no doubt that generally
Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota have a different approach to
politics than do Virginia, Arkansas, and Florida. Despite the
steady flow of Northeasterners into South Florida and the move-
ment of "hillbillies" into Southern Michigan, these two states
are vastly different in their politics. Although one might find
it impossible to precisely calculate the effects of differences
in political cultures on policy outcomes, one could get a rough
idea of those differences by examining a limited number of common
policies in each state and/or region.

The political culture in Florida is still predominantly
"traditional", and was not conducive to a liberal reform effort
in the late 1970's. As evidence of the conservative political

climate, one could cite the failure of the legislature to pass
the Equal Rights Amendment, the overwhelming rejection by voters
of a referendum to allow casino gambling, the rejection of a gay
rights ordinance in Miami (one of the state's most liberal
communities), and the continued use of capital punishment.

## Advocacy Strategies for Unpopular Causes in a Traditional
## Political Culture

Reformers interested in liberalizing social policies in a
state should consider how other relevant social issues have been
resolved before developing a strategy for reform.  Such issues
might include state legislative action concerning the Equal
Rights Amendment, the legal rights of homosexuals, the
incarceration of juvenile and adult offenders, and the provision
of services to disadvantaged, handicapped, and minority groups.
Public opinion polls are also very useful in determining whether
the right climate for policy reform is present.

If the policy in question is one which is likely to en-
counter opposition from a dominant political elite because of a
clash in values, then it is obviously in the reformers' best
interests to avoid raising a question of values (or program/
policy objectives) if at all possible.  A reform of a state's
juvenile detention criteria could be pressed on the basis of its
practicality (allowing intake workers to be shifted to
supervising probationers) or cost-efficiency (cutting perhaps by
one-half the number of youths detained in a regional facility at
$35.00 each per day).

Avoiding publicity and media coverage is also a wise stra-
tegy if the policy change raises questions which could push
policy-makers into a position of opposing the change.  The new
detention criteria would probably have encountered less criti-
cism if it had not been for the widespread coverage in the press.
As indicated earlier, most of this coverage was biased and
one-sided, giving the citizens an impression that "juvenile
killers" were being whimsically turned loose on the community.
Members of the reform coalition even held meetings with edi-
torial boards throughout the state in an attempt to obtain fair
and accurate reporting of the consequences of the revised code.
Unfortunately, it is easier to sell newspapers with headlines
such as "Who Protects Us? Asks Mother of Raped Son" than with
editorials noting the success of the new policy in reducing
costs, increasing individual liberties, maintaining a low "no-
show" rate for court appearances, etc.

Where a great potential for value conflict exists, re-
formers should consider the possibility of a policy change

through bureaucratic rather than legislative means.  This tech-
nique is particularly appealing if there is an enlightened
professional bureaucracy which exercises discretion in the
administration of the policy.  Unfortunately, such a bureaucracy
seems less likely to be found in states with a traditional
political culture.  Even in the deep South, however, one
occasionally finds small enclaves of professional social workers
within a large unprofessional bureaucracy.  If the values of
these small groups of professionals are congruent with the reform
efforts, than perhaps a bureaucratic manipulation of the policy
is possible.

A closely related strategy is possible whenever policy
decisions are highly decentralized.  For example if each county
is responsible for developing and enforcing criteria for juvenile
detention, one might attempt to locate a progressive county in
which officials could be persuaded to consider a policy change.
By working closely with local officials and making every attempt
to insure the success of the reform effort at that level (along
with fair and accurate reporting in the local press), an appeal
could be made later to other counties, using the first county as
a model for policy change.

If all attempts to reform policy fail using concilliatory
methods such as these, reformers can fall back on the possi-
bility of accomplishing change through adversarial means such as
litigation. Such efforts have been more-or-less successful in
states like Texas (Morales vs. Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166 (1973))
and Alabama (Pugh vs. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (1976)), especially
in the area of correctional policy.


Strategies involving cooperation and public education are
still in order, of course, in those situations in which a strong
conflict of values between reformers and decision-makers is not
likely to occur.  The methods outlined above may be of more use
in a traditional political culture such as Florida has, especial-
ly when the reform involves value-laden policies such as correc-
tions.

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LEGISLATIVE EVALUATION OF SOCIAL WELFARE PROGRAMS:
THE PROCESS AND CONSEQUENCES

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ABSTRACT

   Program review has increased substantially in recent years.  There has been
concern that the upsurge in policy evaluation would be detrimental to social welfare
programs, where data is often unavailable, little agreement exists concerning
specific goals and documenting success is often virtually impossible.
   In this analysis we compared the program evaluation of social welfare programs
with non-social welfare programs.  The review process differed substantially as did
the recommendation made as a result of the review.  Social welfare programs faced
more criticisms than non-social welfare programs.  However, the criticisms were less
serious.  Changes prior to the publication of the evaluation report were more common
for social welfare programs.  They were also considerably more likely to make
significant administrative changes—action that helps then avoid legislative
involvement.  Non-social welfare programs were more than twice as likely to face
changes mandated by the legislature.  Those findings indicate that social welfare
programs are not experiencing adverse consequences as a result of mandatory reviews.

   The evaluation of public policies has increased substantially in the past
decade.  In the early 1970s, about two hundred new evaluation studies were begun each
year with average budgets of about $100,000 each.  By now the number of policy and
program evaluation studies started each year has probably doubled, and costs risen
substantially.  (Freeman, 1977: 19)  Another indication of the growing interest in
program evaluation is the fact that federal and state legislation involving public
programs increasingly includes formal evaluation of the policy's impact as part of
the bill.  (Nachmias, 1979: 2)  Finally, and having the greatest impact, is the dra-
matic increase taking place in the states in the exercise of legislative oversight
and the expertise with which it is conducted.  Program review and policy evaluation
have become a part of the legislature's workload.  (Keefe and Ogul, 1981: 385-408)
   The greater involvement with program evaluation among legislators can be attrib-
uted to several factors.  There have been considerable improvements in staff, facil-
ities and technical hardware in most state legislatures in the past two decades which
have facilitated the conduct of policy evaluation.  (Hamm and Robertson, 1981) Also
important is the increased emphasis on legislative independence and legislative ac-
tivity that accompanied the move toward professionalization of state legislatures.
The national mood, which had been resentful and distrustful of government in general,
and bureaucracy in particular, during the 1960s and 1970s, has encouraged the devel-
opment of program review and other forms of evaluation.  Finally, committees have
been developed in a majority of states whose primary mission is oversight.

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Thus the mechanisms have been established for policy evaluation and program review and legislators are committed to increased activity in this area; from all indications legislatures will become increasingly involved in policy evaluation.

Significant questions that have received little or no attention are one, how these evaluations are to be conducted and secondly, the types of changes that are recommended and enacted into law as a result of these program evaluations.

These questions are of particular relevance for those interested in the future of social welfare programs. For several reasons, the problems inherent in the evaluation of any program are magnified when the policy is in this area. First, most programs are adopted without a clear statement of purpose. Indeed, ambiguity was necessary to build a coalition large enough to win policy adoption. Ambiguity is particularly a characteristic of social welfare policies, which involve a redistribution of income and are therefore highly controversial. (Ripley and Franklin, 1982: 158) Second, the art of program evaluation is not well developed. It is difficult enough to determine the effectiveness of a new weapon, much more problematic is determining whether the goals of a social welfare program are being met. How does one determine the extent to which a juvenile correction program has reduced recidivism, or whether a program for teenagers has raised self esteem? So many factors are influential in these areas it is extremely difficult to establish cause and effect relationships. (Dubnick and Bardes, 1983: 227)

This paper examines the program evaluation process through an analysis of the reviews conducted under sunset, a law mandating periodic review of agencies by the legislature. We will focus on one state, Tennessee, to determine the impact of comprehensive legislative review on social welfare programs.

<center>SUNSET LEGISLATION</center>

Sunset legislation, which is directed towards improving fiscal control and accountability through a periodic review of agencies by the legislature has received considerable attention since 1976, when Colorado became the first state to adopt a sunset law; thirty-four other states have also enacted sunset legislation. Sunset has three goals: to force accountability to the legislature, to curtail unnecessary bureaucratic activity and to formalize long neglected oversight activity. These goals have garnered support from a wide variety of sources, with different expectations. However, the distinguishing feature of sunset, and the factor which has received the most attention, is the termination of agencies on established dates unless recreated by law.

Sunset statutes grant no additional authority to legislatures for performing their oversight task. Many of the checks on bureaucratic growth can be accomplished by existing review mechanisms. However, the wide-spread adoption of sunset reflected a recognition among lawmakers that traditional oversight procedures were not working. In most states legislative review is largely discretionary. Since little personal pay-off is perceived for stringent oversight activities, the process, at best, is characterized as hit or miss supervision. Many hoped that sunset would provide the tools and create the incentive for periodic and comprehensive evaluation.

Despite the popularity of the sunset concept, not everyone was an enthusiastic supporter. Several reasons for this skepticism of this highly publicized "reform" have been cited. First, many questioned whether states would be willing to invest

<center>-260-</center>

the time and staff necessary to perform an adequate evaluation. Critics were con-
vinced that there would be very little review. (Behn, 1977) Some voiced concern
that the difficulties in establishing uniform evaluation criteria would create sub-
stantial problems for agencies which have difficulty documenting output. There were
fears that the threat of termination would lead to an increased bureaucracy as agen-
cies fought to prove themselves productive. Finally, there was apprehension, which
has proven well founded in at least some states (e.g., Texas), that sunset review
would serve as a "marvelous generator of legislative campaign funds" as interest
groups sought a favorable evaluation. (Azama, 1977) Those fears were particularly
prevalent with regard to social welfare issues, where improvements are very difficult
to document. Because of the problems in documenting output, there was concern that
more time would be spent justifying the agency, taking away from service to clients.
Social welfare programs usually lack the number of lobbyists that regulated agencies
depend on. In short, many felt that social welfare programs would be highly vulner-
able to substantial criticisms and some of the smaller programs would face termina-
tion under the sunset law.

   Because this study involves only one state, as with any case study caution must
be exercised in generalizing from this study to the experiences that other states
have had with sunset review. Tennessee has a comprehensive rather than selective
sunset law. Under a comprehensive law, all agencies are evaluated while under selec-
tive review only certain agencies (primarily regulatory bodies and occupational
licensing boards) come under review. However, because it has more adequately co-
ordinated sunset activities (review is performed in stages rather than simulta-
neously), Tennessee has not been in the position in which so many entities were to be
reviewed there was little more than routine re-authorization.[1] As in most states,
Tennessee was confronted with a significant, but not overwhelming number of entities
to evaluate. Thus, its experience is compatible with that of most other states. A
discussion of the data used in this study follows a brief description of the law.

## The Tennessee Experience

   The Tennessee sunset statute, known as the 1977 Government Entity Review Law, is
a comprehensive law mandating review of all agencies, departments and compacts to
which the state is a party. The responsibility for conducting reviews of each entity
was assigned to the Division of State Audit under the office of the Comptroller of
the Treasury. The division was already involved in program reviews and key officials
were consulted in regard to provisions of the Tennessee law. Termination dates for
every agency of state government were established over a six-year cycle with over 220
agencies being cited. A sunset review staff in the Division of State Audit was es-
tablished who reports to the joint committee on Government Operations. After a
public hearing, the committee forwards legislation to the entire general assembly.
This legislation can mandate the continued existence of an entity, its alteration or
its cancellation. Without any action, the entity will automatically terminate after
a year.

   Because the amount of time and money that can be spent on sunset review is
limited, more resources are allocated to major agencies, or programs where the

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[1]This was the situation in Alabama, Arkansas, and Louisiana.

potential savings are greater, and the services provided are of greater significance. For example, less than 350 hours were charged to the Board of Cosmetology, while almost 4,000 hours were spent on the evaluation of the Department of Insurance. For each review, the Joint Government Operations Committee is presented with a written report of the evaluation. This is followed by a public hearing after which the committee makes a decision regarding the action that will be recommended to the legislature. The sunset staff is to be present throughout the deliberations to explain the options available with regard to the entity under review.

## DATA AND METHODS

The sunset evaluation process was examined through an analysis of the written reports conducted between 1978-1980. For the content analysis, information was collected regarding the number and the type of evaluation methods used, the objectives of the evaluation, the number and type of criticisms made in the evaluation reports, and managements' response to the criticisms. An analysis of legislative records and interviews with staff provided information regarding the action taken by the legislature and the agency staff in response to the report. The responses were categorized as follows: (a) no action, (b) administrative change, (c) legislative change, and (d) termination. An administrative response consisted of a significant change in the program's administration, either a change in structure or in its operation. Any change mandated by the legislature constituted a legislative response. Forty-seven reports were analyzed, seventeen of these involved social welfare issues, thirty were non-social welfare programs. Social welfare policies were defined as those which transfer benefits or social resources to individuals or groups. The definition was not restricted to programs assisting the financially needy (seventeen percent); criminal justice (thirty-seven percent), mental health (seventeen percent), alcohol and drug abuse programs (twelve percent), and policies providing assistance for select groups in the state (e.g., the elderly--seventeen percent) were also included.[2]

To insure that any differences between the reviews of social welfare programs and non-social welfare programs were not due to factors such as size or revenue, a matching procedure was used. The two groups of programs were compared on the basis of expenditures, size (number of staff), and type of entity. Non-social welfare programs were selected that matched the characteristics of the social welfare programs. The percentage of each group falling into each category was as follows:

| | SIZE | |
| | Non Social Welfare | Social Welfare |
| | (n = 30) | (n = 17) |
| Number of staff | Percentages* | |
| over 100 | 26 | 24 |
| 51-100 | 31 | 29 |
| under 50 | 43 | 47 |

*figures are rounded to nearest tenth

[2]A list of the programs evaluated is available from the authors upon request.

| EXPENDITURES | | |
|---|---|---|
| | Non Social Welfare (n = 30) | Social Welfare (n = 17) |
| | Percentages* | |
| over $3,000,000 | 07 | 06 |
| $2,000,001 to $3,000,000 | 10 | 12 |
| $1,000,001 to $2,000,000 | 07 | 06 |
| $500,001 to $1,000,000 | 10 | 12 |
| $100,001 to $500,000 | 10 | 06 |
| $75,001 to $100,000 | 17 | 17 |
| $50,000 to $75,000 | 22 | 24 |
| under $50,000 | 17 | 17 |

| TYPE OF ENTITY | | |
|---|---|---|
| | Non Social Welfare (n = 30) | Social Welfare (n = 17) |
| | Percentages* | |
| Advisory commission | 13 | 12 |
| Hearing board, commission, corporation, authority, association | 13 | 24 |
| Institute, advisory board | 22 | 17 |
| Department, division, agency | 26 | 24 |
| Compact, regulatory board, commission | 26 | 24 |

*figures are rounded to the nearest tenth

The fact that the two groups of programs are highly similar to each other on these characteristics increases our confidence that any difference found between the social welfare and non-social welfare programs can be attributed to the different kinds of services provided.

There were fifteen review methods used in the sunset evaluations. To simplify comparisons of the methods a varimax rotated factor analysis was used. Three factors emerged. One encompassed methods involving staff and other "advocates" of the entity under evaluation. Advocates were defined as those benefiting from the entity's existence—staff, interest groups and those regulated. We expect staff to present as favorable a view as possible to evaluators. Among the most intense criticisms of

government agencies, regulatory agencies in particular, is that they are unduly in-
fluenced by the industries they are supposed to regulate or moniter. Thus, we also
expect interest groups and those regulated to be positive towards the entity. Of
course, not all individuals falling into these categories will be highly supportive.
It is likely that some will raise significant issues to the reviewers with a few
being highly critical. Nevertheless, the literature on interest groups and bureau-
cracy indicate that the staff, the clientele, and the interest groups involved with a
program generally serve as advocates for that program (McCurdy, 1977: 118-121). The
second factor consisted of more "objective" evaluation methods--contact with non-
advocates of the entity. The third factor was comprised of review methods involving
the examination of records. The following items fell into each factor.

Evaluation Methods Using Advocates: (1) interviews with entity staff, (2) surveys of
entity staff, (3) interviews with clientele, (4) surveys of clientele, (5) surveys of
interest groups.

Evaluation Methods Using Non-Advocates: the legislative staff conducting the review
(1) corresponded with other states, (2) corresponded with professional organizations,
(3) observed administration and operation, (4) analyzed existing data.

Examination of Records: the examination of (1) minutes, records, documents, (2)
material related to the entitys' operation--publications, articles, reports, (3)
minutes, files, employee qualifications.

All items had loadings of at least .40 on the factor on which it was listed.
There was no significant overlap across factors as no item had a loading greater than
.15 on any of the other factors.
The first question examined was whether the evaluation methods used in the
review of social welfare agencies differed from the methods used with non-social wel-
fare entities. This issue was addressed by comparing the variety and type of evalua-
tion methods used with each. The first step was to identify the sunset reports in
which there was a high use of one of the three types of evaluation methods--use of
advocates, non-advocates, and record examination. A score was assigned to each re-
port for the number of research components used within each of the three dimensions
produced by the factor analysis. A report was designed as having an "extensive"
number of evaluation methods used in its compilation if the score was at least one
standard deviation above the mean of all reports on that research dimension.
Approximately one-third of the total reports fell into the high category for each
dimension (use of advocates--28 percent; use of non-advocates--34 percent; examina-
tion of records--38 percent).

FINDINGS

The Review Process

Table 1 shows the percentage of reports in which there was "extensive" use of
each type of evaluation method, comparing social welfare programs with non-social
welfare programs. There are marked differences between the two types of programs in

the kind of evaluation process that predominates, sixty-five percent of the social welfare programs involved advocates compared to fifty-seven percent of the non-welfare programs. Although a majority of social welfare evaluations also relied heavily on methods involving non-advocates of the entity (fifty-two percent), some-what more extensive use of non-advocates was made in the review of non-social welfare programs (seventy-three percent). Non-social welfare program reviews also made more extensive use of records.

The types of review methods were broken down through time to determine if the evaluation techniques have changed since sunset reviews first began. Table 1 also presents the figures for the three years (1978 to 1980) in the percentage of sunset reports containing "extensive" use of each of the evaluation methods. As the number of cases is not large when viewing each year separately, particularly for the social-welfare programs, any difference appearing from year to year should not be overemphasized. Nevertheless, the data provide information regarding trends. An examination of Table 1 indicates that similar types of changes are occurring in the review of social welfare and non-social welfare programs. Both types of programs show greater use of all three types of evaluation methods. However, the use of advo-cates show a particularly sharp increase. It appears that reviews of social welfare programs will continue to rely more heavily on "subjective" data—interviews with "advocates"—than more objective data. However, evaluations of non-social welfare programs are also increasingly involving agency staff and others who primarily serve as advocates of the program.

The second question examined was the objectives of the report, that is, what factor(s) did the evaluation center on? As Table 2 shows, the non-social welfare evaluations focused primarily on the effectiveness and efficiency of the operation. In contrast, most reviews of social welfare agencies centered (1) on the type of per-sonnel used, the extent to which they were qualified and whether affirmative action requirements were met, (2) public disclosure questions, and (3) whether there were alternative ways of providing the service. Over seventy-five percent of the sunset evaluations of non-social welfare agencies made extensive use of review factors re-lated to efficiency and effectiveness while less than thirty percent of the welfare

Table 1
"EXTENSIVE USE" OF EVALUATION METHODS IN SUNSET REPORTS
SOCIAL WELFARE AND NON-WELFARE PROGRAMS
(figures are %s)

| Methods | Average during 3-year period (1978 – 80) | | Change from 1978 to 1980 (1978 – 80) | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Social Welfare | Other | Social Welfare | | | Other | | |
| | | | 1978 | 1979 | 1980 | 1978 | 1979 | 1980 |
| | (n = 17) | (n = 30) | (n=4) | (n=6) | (n=7) | (n=9) | (n=12) | (n=9) |
| Advocates | 65 | 57 | 50 | 66 | 71 | 44 | 58 | 66 |
| Non-advocates | 52 | 73 | 50 | 50 | 57 | 66 | 75 | 77 |
| Examination of records | 24 | 37 | 25 | 17 | 29 | 33 | 33 | 44 |

TABLE 2
OBJECTIVES OF SUNSET EVALUATION
CITED IN REPORT
(figures are %s)

| Objectives | Average during 3-year period (1978 – 80) | | Change from 1978 to 1980 (1978 – 80) | | | | | |
| | Social Welfare | Other | Social Welfare | | | Other | | |
| | | | 1978 | 1979 | 1980 | 1978 | 1979 | 1980 |
| | (n = 17) | (n = 30) | (n=4) | (n=6) | (n=7) | (n=9) | (n=12) | (n=9) |
| Efficiency/ effectiveness | 29 | 76 | 25 | 33 | 29 | 77 | 75 | 77 |
| Personnel qualifications | 53 | 30 | 50 | 50 | 57 | 33 | 25 | 33 |
| Public disclosure | 58 | 23 | 50 | 66 | 57 | 22 | 25 | 22 |
| Alternative ways of providing the service | 53 | 40 | 50 | 50 | 57 | 33 | 41 | 44 |

programs were reviewed using that criteria. By contrast, in less than one-third of
the non-welfare programs was it reported that extensive use was made of review
methods involving personnel or public disclosure issues. The general pattern is that
social welfare programs were reviewed with a focus on the extent to which procedures
were followed correctly while the output of the program and the efficiency with which
the program operated was the focus of the reviews of non-social welfare agencies.
The pattern has changed little through time. Thus, in terms of the review process, a
different type of review was made of social welfare programs. Probably because of
the difficulties discussed above in evaluating program success, the reviews centered
on procedural questions.

Another interesting difference that appeared when comparing the sunset reviews
of social welfare programs with other types of programs is that evaluations of wel-
fare programs were more apt to involve advocates of the agency--those benefitting
from the program and staff while the evaluations of non-welfare programs relied more
heavily on information gained from more "objective" sources--observation, interviews
with those not directly benefiting and the evaluation of records. The obvious ques-
tion is whether the recommendations made from the evaluation staff and the subsequent
action taken in response to the review differ for social welfare and other types of
programs.

THE SUNSET REPORT:

Criticisms and Recommendations

Table 3 shows the frequency with which social welfare and non-social welfare
programs received various types of criticisms from the sunset review team. Social
welfare agencies were most likely to be criticized for their administration and for

the type of personnel employed.  The types of criticisms leveled against non-social
welfare programs relate to their purpose—whether the function they serve is still
necessary, the extent to which the legislature's mandate is met, and the entity's
financial management.  This finding is what we would expect, given the fact that the
evaluation of social welfare agencies centered on procedural questions rather than an
analysis of output.  With regard to the changes occurring through time, social wel-
fare agencies received more criticisms in later years questioning whether various
programs were necessary.  Non-social welfare programs have received slightly more
criticisms for not following the legislative mandate.  Criticisms regarding admin-
istration and financial management increased for both social welfare and non-social
welfare programs.
    The average number of criticisms per report and the severity of the criticisms
are shown in Table 4 along with the response, by the management of the entity, to the
review.  We distinguished between major and non-major criticisms.  A major criticism
was defined as any criticism involving a significant change in administration, staff,
hiring procedures (the change recommended requires hiring different types of people
or involving different actors in the decision making) or any challenge made to the
program's purpose or effectiveness.  On the average, social welfare agencies received
twice as many criticisms per report (eight) as other types of programs (four).
However, while seventy-seven percent of the criticisms made of non-social welfare

TABLE 3
TYPE OF CRITICISM IN SUNSET REPORT
(figures are %s)

| Criticisms | Average during 3-year period (1978 – 80) | | Change from 1978 to 1980 (1978 – 80) | | | | | |
| | Social Welfare | Other | Social Welfare | | | Other | | |
| | | | 1978 | 1979 | 1980 | 1978 | 1979 | 1980 |
| | (n = 17) | (n = 30) | (n=4) | (n=6) | (n=7) | (n=9) | (n=12) | (n=9) |
| Administrative treat- ment of clients, dis- tribution criteria | 58 | 27 | 50 | 50 | 71 | 22 | 25 | 33 |
| Program purpose—not following mandate | 12 | 40 | 0 | 17 | 13 | 33 | 42 | 44 |
| Program not necessary | 35 | 53 | 25 | 33 | 42 | 55 | 50 | 55 |
| Financial management | 6 | 40 | 0 | 0 | 13 | 33 | 42 | 44 |
| Personnel qualifications | 52 | 33 | 50 | 50 | 57 | 33 | 33 | 33 |

programs were  major, this was true of only fifty-two percent of the criticisms made
of social welfare programs.  Finally, the management of social welfare programs was
at least twice as apt to accept the criticisms made in the report (sixty-five percent

to twenty-seven percent).  There were no great differences between the two types of programs in the changes occurring through time.  The management of both social welfare and non-social welfare programs were increasingly more apt to accept the recommendations of the sunset report.

The final and most important issue addressed is the final action taken in response to the sunset reports.  Is the fact that different evaluation methods and objectives were used in the evaluation of social welfare and non-social welfare programs reflected in the changes made in the entities?

The action taken as a result of the sunset evaluations is shown in Table 5.  A comparison of the two types of programs shows considerable differences in the response made to the sunset evaluation of social welfare and non-social welfare

TABLE 4

CRITICISMS AND RESPONSES TO REPORT

| | Average during 3-year period (1978 - 80) | | Change from 1978 to 1980 (1978 - 80) | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Social Welfare (n = 17) | Other (n = 30) | Social Welfare | | | Other | | |
| | | | 1978 (n=4) | 1979 (n=6) | 1980 (n=7) | 1978 (n=9) | 1979 (n=12) | 1980 (n=9) |
| Average number of criticisms | 8 | 4 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 3 | 4 | 4 |
| Percent of criticisms that are major | 52 | 77 | 50 | 50 | 57 | 77 | 75 | 77 |
| Average number of changes made prior to report | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Management's response to report-percent agree | 65 | 27 | 50 | 66 | 71 | 22 | 25 | 33 |

programs.  The evaluation of non-social welfare programs was more apt to invoke no response (twenty-three percent compared to twelve percent for social welfare programs).  However, non-social welfare programs were more apt to be the focus of legislative action, and non-social welfare programs were more than twice as likely to be terminated (thirty percent of non-social welfare programs were terminated compared to twelve percent of welfare programs).

The changes made as a result of sunset evaluations of social welfare agencies were made by the entity's management.  The fact that fewer social welfare programs were terminated within this time period should not be construed as evidence that these programs are more "safe" than are other types of programs of comparable size.  The higher termination rate of non-social welfare programs occurred because there were several programs falling into this category which no longer served any purpose

-268-

and had little or no funding. We can offer a couple of explanations for the dif-
ferences between the programs in the amount of changes made in administration. One,
since administration is the focus of review for social welfare programs, the criti-
cisms they receive are mostly in this area. It might also be the case that because
social welfare administrators face more serious criticisms, they make the changes
because of a fear of what the legislature will do. If this is what is happening,
administrative action is taken with the purpose of pre-empting legislative involve-
ment, it appears to be successful.
    The changes through time vary little for social welfare and non-social welfare
programs. Among non-social welfare programs there is a slight increase in the number
of agencies making administrative changes, it is, of course, too early to determine

Table 5

ACTION TAKEN TO SUNSET REPORT
(figures are in percentages)

| | Average during 3-year period (1978 - 80) | | Change from 1978 to 1980 (1978 - 80) | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Social Welfare | Other | Social Welfare | | | Other | | |
| | | | 1978 | 1979 | 1980 | 1978 | 1979 | 1980 |
| | (n = 17) | (n = 30) | (n=4) | (n=6) | (n=7) | (n=9) | (n=12) | (n=9) |
| None | 12 | 23 | 0 | 17 | 14 | 22 | 25 | 22 |
| Administrative | 65 | 17 | 50 | 66 | 71 | 11 | 17 | 22 |
| Legislative | 18 | 33 | 25 | 17 | 14 | 33 | 33 | 33 |
| Termination | 12 | 30 | 0 | 17 | 14 | 33 | 25 | 33 |

whether the increase will be significant. The management of social welfare programs
are increasingly.making administrative changes and there has been somewhat of a drop
in significant legislative action with regard to these programs. Given the small
number of cases, however, the amount of change is not large and thus, its signifi-
cance is questionable. Finally, the termination of social-welfare programs increased
in the last two years of the years examined. This may indicate higher termination
rates as sunset evaluations continue.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

    The evaluation of any public policy is very complex. The problems are magnified
when the programs under review are social welfare programs, where data is often un-
available, there is little agreement regarding the programs' goals and establishing
cause and effect relationships is exceedingly difficult. For this reason, there has
been concern that the recent upsurge in program evaluation would lead to significant
reductions in social welfare programs since the policies' benefits could not be

easily documented. At the very least, many felt it would be necessary for staff to spend time trying to prove the significance of the policy taking time away from their service to clients.

We note that the significance of these findings is limited by the fact that the evaluations examined all occurred in one state and were all part of sunset review. This analysis does, however, offer some evidence regarding a question that has yet to receive much attention. Our findings show differences between the evaluation process of social welfare and non-social welfare programs. Although all evaluation methods were used for social welfare and non-welfare entities, staff and advocates of the agency were more likely to provide information for the evaluation of social welfare entities where more objective sources of information—observation, analysis of records—were the primary methods used for non-welfare programs. The goals of the evaluation also differed for the two types of programs. The extent to which administrative procedures were followed and the type of personnel employed constituted the focus of social welfare evaluations. Non-welfare programs, on the other hand, were primarily evaluated in terms of efficiency and effectiveness criteria. In other words, the focus of the review of non-social welfare programs was whether the program was accomplishing what it was supposed to and whether it was doing it as well as possible where the less challenging procedural questions dominated in the review of social welfare entities.

Social welfare programs faced more criticisms than non-welfare programs. However, the criticisms were less serious. There was also a difference in the response to the evaluation. Social welfare personnel were more apt to make changes prior to publication of the report of the sunset evaluation team, perhaps because they were fearful of action that the legislature would take if the report was highly critical. Additional evidence for the fact that social welfare personnel try to avoid legislative action comes from the fact that sixty-five percent of the sunset reports covering social welfare programs resulted in an administrative response by the entity's staff, only seventeen percent of the non-welfare programs experienced administrative change. Non-social welfare programs were almost twice as likely to face change mandated by the legislature.

Thus, the evaluation of social welfare programs has differed from the review that occurs of non-welfare programs. A number of changes have been made in social welfare programs as a result of the review. However, it does not seem to be the case the social welfare programs are faring badly in the review. Indeed, their adminstration appears better able to make changes in response to the evaluation that satisfy the legislature and thus, it would appear, probably exert slightly more control over the changes invoked as a result of sunset review.

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STAFF ACTIVITIES IN THE TEXAS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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ABSTRACT

In this study multivariate analysis is applied to the allocation of staff time among members of the Texas House of Representatives. Ideology of the representative is found to be an important factor in explaining differences in staff behavior. Chief staffers serving liberal Democrats and Republicans report spending less time on constituency service, and more time on policy research, than do staffers serving conservative Democrats. There are differences between the parties, but not between the ideologies, on time spent with lobbyists. Other variables, such as urban population of the district, and the years a legislator has served in the House, show slight relationships with staff activities.

The study of the attitudes and behavior of legislators has long been one of the staples of political science. In recent years, attention has also begun to focus on the staffs of representatives and committees. In the 1970s, some investigators went so far as to suggest that the activities of the personal staffs of members of Congress are fully as important politically as the behavior of representatives themselves (Fox and Hammond, 1977, pp. 1-2; Malbin, 1980, pp. 4, 27). If this is true, the awakening interest in legislative staffs is justified, and should be expanded.

The research which has so far been conducted on legislative staffs, however, tends to have four weaknesses. First, earlier explorations of legislative staffs, usually showed little concern for the use of quantitative evidence. Until recently, the typical discussion of staff activities included statements about their functions without much effort to measure them (Kofmehl, 1962, pp. 171-179; Price, 1972, pp. 197, 329-331; Redman, 1973, passim).

Second, where discussion of staff activity has been quantitative, it has tended to assume the form of what might be termed a "one-variable equation." That is, the amount of time that staffs spend on various tasks has been listed, but not related to outside, independent variables which may account for differences in the observed

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behavior.  John Saloma, for example, found that more time was given by Congressional
representatives' personal staffs to correspondence than to constituency service,
and more time to constituency service than to legislative support, but he did not
investigate the background variables that might explain these variations (Saloma,
1969, p.  185).  Do the staffs of conserva-tive Republicans pay more attention to
constituency service than those of liberal Democrats?  Do Northern staffs engage in
more policy research than their Southern counterparts?  Such variations would
provide a clue to patterns of political behavior as important as roll-call voting,
but their compilation was not attempted by Saloma.  Other studies of staff activity
also suffer from this problem (Fox and Hammond, 1977, pp. 186-187; Fenno, 1978, pp.
40-49; Johannes, 1979, pp. 327-344).

One exception to this generalization appears to be an unpublished manuscript by
Norman Ornstein, as quoted in a textbook by Lawrence Dodd.  Ornstein correlated the
amount of time that Congressional staff members spent on legislative activities with
background variable of their representatives.  He discovered that the more junior,
ideologically liberal, and urban-based members used more of their staff resources
for legislative purposes (Orstein, 1974, p. 3; Dodd, 1975, p. 25).  Another excep-
tion is a study in which Bennett and Johnson concluded that liberal United States
Senators tend to spend higher percentages of their staff allotment than do conser-
rvative Senators (Benett and Johnson, 1981, p. 56).  Unfortunately, the authors did
not pursue their investigation to determine what sorts of activities the greater
allowances are used to fund.

Third, almost all research into legislative staffs has so far been conducted on
the United States Congress.  If staffs are important in the federal government, they
are also important in the states.  Such attention that has been focussed on state
legislative staffs, however, has been even less systematic than that directed at
Congress.  That is, scholars have been concerned only with, say, total staffing
available to legislators (Robinson, 1970, p. 386), or the activities of staff in a
highly general way (Jewell and Patterson, 1977, p. 229), without providing specific
information on their behavior.

The fourth difficulty of staff research presents not so much a problem as an
opportunity.  Clearly, one of the major incentives for studying legislative staffs
is to provide us with a method of indirectly observing legislative behavior.

Over the last generation, many scholars hae investigated the self-concept
(often called "role") of American legislators (Wahlke, et al, 1962, pp. 8-32;
Davidson, 1969, pp. 72-142; Jewell and Patterson, 1977; pp. 369-373).  In these
studies, investigators have attempted to discover whether representatives see them-
selves as "tribunes," "inventors," or "brokers," as "trustees" or "delegates," in
other words, whether they define their functions and purposes in different, identi-
fiable ways.  These studies have been rich with data about the attitudes of legis-
lators, and about background variables, but they have, with few exceptions (Jones,
1973), paid little attention to what representatives actually do.  If the role
assumed by a legislator is important, however, it is because different subjective
roles simply different activity within the political system, and hence, different
outcomes from the legisltive process.

Perhaps one of the reasons that little research has been done on the actual behavior of legislators is that, except for the acquisition of roll-call records, keeping track of so large and active a group of people would require a huge, expensive and obtrusive research project. Much of this difficulty could be avoided, however, by recording the activity of staff members, rather than the representatives themselves. The staff exists to further the aims of the representative. It therefore seems plausible to suppose that a compilation of the amount of time that staff members devote to various categories of activity is a good indication of the quantity of resources the representative wishes to expend on different tasks. We do not argue that the staff is a perfect substitute for the legislator in terms of activity. Individuals representatives may wish to divide labor with their staffs, delegating some tasks and reserving others for themselves. Still, the staff is the chief instrument of the representative, and as such presents us with a good proxy for his or her own behavior. Such, at any rate, is the assumption here.

With the acquisition of records of staff time and background variables on the representative, the opportunity arises to explore the links between the social forces impinging on the legislator, and his or her response in terms of staff activity.

The present investigation is an attempt to advance the study of legislative staffs by applying multivariate analysis to the behavior of personal staff members of the Texas House of Representatives. Estimates by chief staff members of the amount of time they spend daily on legislative support activities are related to background variables pertaining to legislators' personal characteristics and constituencies. Although the variations uncovered are not large, some independent variables do have an effect on reported staff activities, and to an extent large enough to suggest the desirability of further researach. Notably, the ideology of representatives seems to play a significant part in determining the bahavior of the chief staffer.

## Methodology

During the course of the regular session of the 66th Texas legislature in 1979, all of the chief personal staffers to House members were contacted. One hundred eleven of the one hundred fifty agreed to be interviewed, and to fill out a "diary" of the average amount of time they spent each day on legislative support activities. Printed on the diary form were instructions designed to clarify the categories into which each activity fell. During the interview, care was given to making each respondent aware of the requirements of the questionnaire. Categories of activity were the following.
1. Helping people in the district (constituency service). We made clear to them that this category included casework and correspondence, but not contact with representatives from interest groups, even if those were from the legislator's district.
2. Policy research. The activities that fell under this category were listed as "checking on the status of bills, researching and drafting legislation." It was defined so as not to include time spent in committee hearings.
3. Time spent with members of other staffs. We specified that this could be either by phone or through personal contact.

4. Time with lobbyists. So as to avoid the pejorative connotations of the word "lobbyist," on the diaries these were called "representatives from interest groups." Respondents were instructed to include both office visits from lobbyists, and attendance at evening functions sponsored by the various groups.
5. Time with the legislator.
6. The average length of the staff member's day.

This information is of course not completely reliable, because it consists of estimations. We attempted to impress upon our respondents the need for accuracy in filling out the questionnaires, but we could not supply an independent check on the results. Self-report is of course a common and accepted form of social research, but the reader would be aware of the "recall" nature of our data anyway.

Additionally, we obtained information on the legislator for whom each chief staffer worked.

Each representative was assigned an "ideology" rating, based on data supplied by the Texas Conservative Union. Like the ratings of more nationally-oriented groups such as the Americans for Democratic Action and the Americans for Constitutional Action, these were based on the conformity of a representative's vote on twenty-two selected bills to TCU recommendations. Three examples of such bills are those to establish pilot service centers for displaced homemakers (TCU: no), reduce state welfare appropriations for A. F. D. C. (TCU: yes), and create a state agency to implement affirmative action (TCU: no).

Moreover, information was gathered as to the representative's party, length of service in the House, the rural, urban, or metropolitan character of his or her district, and the region of the state in which it was found. Coding information on all these variable can be found in the appendix.

The analysis to follow consists of a discussion of the relationship between variations in reported chief staff behavior, as measured by our diaries, and variations in characteristics of the representatives who employed them.

The one hundred eleven chief staffers who supplied usable data serve seventy-four percent of the representatives in the Texas House. Republicans, conservatives, and representatives from metropolitan districts are slightly over-represented in our sample, legislators from districts in the western half of the state somewhat under-represented. None of the differences are great enough to skew our results seriously.

## A Note On Politics In Texas

Although we believe that the political process in Texas is sufficiently similar to that in other states to make comparison useful, it does have its unrepresentative aspects. Two facts are particularly relevant to the present study: Texas' "Southern" tradition of domination by the Democratic party, and its relative lack of a professional, well-equipped state legislature.

Although Texas has in recent years emerged from one-party domination at the level of national offices, it is still overwhelmingly Democratic at the local level. It is not uncommon for the state's voters to elect Republican members of Congress, or to vote for the Republican candidate in Presidential contests. But Bill Clements, elected in 1978 (and defeated in 1982) was the first Republican governor since Reconstruction, and during the course of our study the state legislature was a Democratic domain. In the 1979 House, only fifteen percent of the members represented the minority party.

The traditional pattern of local democratic dominance has meant a balance of political forces within the state that is common in the South but somewhat anomalous elsewhere. The small Republican party is based predominantly in the suburbs of the larger cities. Virtually all Republicans are very conservative. The majority Democratic party is split into two clearly recognizable factions. Democrats from the central portions of the cities tend to be liberal, while their fellow partisans who represent rural, suburban, and small-city districts are conservative (Kraemer and Newell, 1979, pp. 25-41).

The relative position of the parties has consequences for the present analysis. It should be borne in mind that, as members of a marginal party Repubicans might not be integrated with Texas' economic/political power the way they would be in a state where they were a viable opposition vehicle. Much of the battling between say, consumer and producer interests, that in another state occurs between the parties, in Texas probably takes place between liberal and conservative wings of the Democrats. The Republican party seems to function more as an ideological gadfly than as a spokesman for a strong and stable coalition of interests.

This interpretation of the position of the Republican party in the legislature is of course a testable proposition, and one purpose of a large-scale study might be to measure differences between the parties. Such a project, however, is made extremely difficult in the present instance by the very fact that makes the Repubican party marginal: its small size. Of the one hundred eleven chief staff members who completed our diaries, only twenty served Republicans. This total is too small to permit much meaningful statistical manipulation. We will look for differences between the parties, and, in particular, for differences between the Republicans and conservative Democrats, but the reader should not expect much in the way of statistically significant relationships.

Besides its party composition, the Texas legislature as an institution has aspects worth noting. It is limited Constitutionally to meeting for 140-day sessions, during odd-numbered years only. A legislator's annual salary of $7200 in 1979 was the least renumerative of any in the ten most populous states, and insured that representatives had to spend such of their time when the House was not in session making a living instead of thinking abut public policy (Crain, et al, 1980, pp. 186-187).

An inadequate salary was complemented by inadequate staff allowances. House members received $3750 per month between sessions and $4800 per month during sessions for staff salaries and expenses (Crain, p. 190). As a result, there were few educated, experienced staffers in the Texas House. They tended to be young, and many representatives relied on undergraduate volunteers from the nearby University of Texas campus for part-time help. We avoided these part-time workers when conducting our research.

## Constituency Service

Furnishing help to constituents has for decades been recognized as one of the principal activities of American legislators and their staff (Matthews, 1960, pp. 224-228; Olson, 1980, pp. 135-139). Recently there has been speculation in both the political science literature and in the press that the more recently-elected members of Congress tend to concentrate on constituency service to an even greater extent than their predecessors, with balefull results for the political system (Fiorina, 1977, 1977; Alpern and Hubbard, 1977, pp. 26-27). It would be interesting to see if background variables account for any of the differences in the amount of time invested in constituency service by the staffs of the Texas House. If so, it would suggest hypotheses for research about Congressional behavior.

Table One
Constituency Service By Ideology

|  | Less |  | More |  |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Liberal | 17 | 20 | 10 | 47 |
|  | 36.2 | 42.6 | 21.3 | 42.3 |
| Conser-vative | 15 | 25 | 24 | 64 |
|  | 23.4 | 39.1 | 37.5 | 57.7 |
|  | 32 | 45 | 34 | 111 |
|  | 28.8 | 40.5 | 30.6 |  |

gamma = .30        Chi square p = .14
r = .19

As Table One illustrates, there is indeed a relationship between some background variables and reported constituency service. Conservatives tend to give more time to "Helping people in your district" than do liberals. The conservative advantage is even more marked when only Democratic representatives are evaluated, as in Table Two.

This relationship is somewhat diminished, but not eliminated, when length of service and urban/rural variations are controlled. More liberal legislators tend to have served in the House fewer years than their conservative colleagues; they also tend to represent center-city districts. It is therefore possible that the greater tendency of conservatives to assign their chief staff members to work on constituency service is a result not of their ideology but of other factors.

Table Two
Constituency Service By Ideology
Democrats Only

|  | Less |  | More |  |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Liberal | 17 | 20 | 10 | 47 |
|  | 36.2 | 42.6 | 21.3 | 51.6 |
| Conser-vative | 8 | 16 | 20 | 44 |
|  | 18.2 | 36.4 | 45.5 | 48.4 |
|  | 25 | 36 | 36 | 91 |
|  | 27.5 | 39.6 | 33.0 |  |

gamma = .43        Chi square p < .05
  r = .27

The data, however, do not support such an interpretation. Among all levels of experience, conservative staffers report spending more time working on constituency service than do liberal staffers. Conservatives from three of the four categories of urban constituency (those representing rural, urban, and metropolitan/center city districts) tend to have their staffs spend more time on constituency service. Those from the fourth category (metropolitan/suburban) show no clear pattern.

The ideology interpretation is reinforced by the data in the stepwise multiple regression of Table Three. Using Democrats only, and eliminating one outlier, ideology alone explains fifteen percent of the variance in constituency service, with a steep Beta slope of 1.4. Length of service and urbanity of district add an additional three percent of explanatory power. When Republicans are retained in the equation, the pattern continues, but is weakened.

These relationships are by no means spectacular, but they are steady and consistent. Districts in the more traditional, conservative areas of Texas are represented by more experienced legislators, whose chief staff aides concentrate to a somewhat greater extent than those of other members on servicing the constituents. Regardless of the length of service or type of constituency, however, conserative Democrats tend to concentrate more of their resources on personally serving the people in their districts than do Republicans or liberal Democrats.

Table Three
Stepwise Multiple Regression:  Constituency Service With
Ideology, Length of Service and Urbanity; Democrats Only
(One Outlier Eliminated)

Dependent Variable:  Constituency Service

Independent Variable:  Ideology

Multiple $r^2$ = .15    B = 1.4

Independent Variable:  Length of Service

Multiple $r^2$ = .1774    B = 2.75

Independent Variable:  Percent urban of district

Multiple $r^2$ = .1776    B = -.60

Significance of equation: $p < .001$

It is clear from this analysis that Republicans and liberal Democrats share important characteristics.  Both expend fewer staff resources on constituency service.  This is partly, but by no means wholly, attributable to the fact that they both tend to represent metropolitan districts, and have a shorter tenure in the House.  It poses a question as to whether it is their more explicitly ideologcal orientation, or perhaps their position as "outsiders" in Texas politics, that leads them to a lesser concentration on "Helping people in your district."  Such a question is beyond the scope of this study, but its answer does not seem impossible with the right research design.

Policy Research

If the staffs of liberal representatives tend to do less constituency service, of what do they do more?  A partial answer is that they spend slightly more time researching policy issues.  Our findings on this subject complement Ornstein's conclusions about Congressional staffs.

There is no distinction between the parties per se in the amount of time that chief staffers report they spend conducting policy research.  Once again, the difference is attributable to ideology, as illustrated in Table Four.  And again, the difference is most striking within the Democrats, as illustrated by Table Five.

## Table Four
### Policy Research By Ideology

| | Less | | More | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Liberal | 5<br>10.6 | 16<br>34.0 | 26<br>55.3 | 47<br>42.3 |
| Conser-<br>vative | 24<br>37.5 | 17<br>26.6 | 23<br>35.9 | 64<br>57.7 |
| | 29<br>26.1 | 33<br>29.7 | 49<br>44.1 | 111 |

gamma = -.44      Chi square p < .01
r = -.28

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## Table Five
### Policy Research By Ideology
### Democrats Only

| | Less | | More | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Liberal | 5<br>10.6 | 16<br>34.0 | 26<br>55.3 | 47<br>51.6 |
| Conser-<br>vative | 19<br>43.2 | 12<br>27.3 | 13<br>29.5 | 44<br>48.4 |
| | 24<br>26.4 | 28<br>30.8 | 39<br>42.9 | 91 |

gamma = -.54      Chi square p < .01
r = -.36

Some of this relationship washes out when length of service is controlled; conservatives tend to have served longer and do less research. There remains a considerable difference between the ideologies, however, especially among those with fewer years experience. As Table Six illustrates, liberals of four years or fewer years experience are more likely to devote staff time to policy research, a relationship that is heightened dramatically if Democrats are examined separately, as in Table Seven. Once again, it appears that Republicans, all of whom are conservative, allocate staff resources in a manner more similar to liberal than to conservative Democrats.

Table Six
Policy Research By Ideology Among
Representatives With Four or Fewer
Years of Service

|  | Less |  | More |  |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Liberal | 1 | 9 | 19 | 29 |
|  | 3.4 | 31.0 | 65.5 | 51.6 |
| Conser-<br>vative | 10 | 7 | 10 | 27 |
|  | 37.0 | 25.9 | 31.0 | 48.2 |
|  | 11 | 16 | 29 | 56 |
|  | 19.6 | 28.6 | 51.8 |  |

gamma = -.59     Chi square p < .01
    r = -.40

Table Seven
Policy Research By Ideology Among
Representatives With Four or Fewer
Years of Service; Democrats Only

|  | Less |  | More |  |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Liberal | 1 | 9 | 19 | 29 |
|  | 3.4 | 31.0 | 65.5 | 64.4 |
| Conser-<br>vative | 7 | 5 | 4 | 16 |
|  | 43.8 | 31.3 | 25.0 | 35.6 |
|  | 8 | 14 | 23 | 45 |
|  | 17.8 | 31.1 | 51.1 |  |

gamma = -.73     Chi square p < .01
    r = -.51

## Time With Lobbyists

The hypothesis about the general irrelevance of the Republicans in the Texas legislature is underscored by our findings on the amount of time spent with representatives from interest groups. As shown in Table Eight, Democrats tend to devote slightly more time to such activities than do Republicans, which is what we would expect if the minority party is peripheral to the structure of power within the state.

Table Eight
Time With Lobbyists By Party

|  | Less | | More | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Demo | 46 | 16 | 29 | 91 |
|  | 50.5 | 17.6 | 31.9 | 82.0 |
| Repub | 14 | 4 | 2 | 20 |
|  | 70.0 | 20.0 | 10.0 | 18.0 |
|  | 60 | 20 | 31 | 111 |
|  | 54.1 | 18.0 | 27.9 | |

gamma = -.42     Chi square p < .13
$r$ = -.18

Perhaps surprisingly, however, there is no difference between liberal and conservative representatives on the subject of time with lobbyists when party is controlled. Democratic staffers serving liberals and conservative report spending virtually identical amounts of time meeting with representatives from interest groups. It is possible and even probable, that members of the two ideological camps spend time with lobbyists from different kinds of interests, but our data are not sufficiently subtle to detect such variations.

## Residual Variables

There are no important differences in the relationships between background variables and the time that chief staffers report they spend with members of other staffs and with their own legislator, or in the length of their day. Staffers from rural districts spend slightly more time with other staffs than do staffers from urban or metropolitan districts. Democrats spend slightly more time with their bosses than do Republicans, and report a somewhat longer day. These relationships, however, are not strong enough to justify an extension of the analysis.

## Some Possible Objections

As with all research, the present study may be vulnerable to methodological criticisms, but we wish to forestall some of them by pointing out some potential objections that do not apply.

There is first the possibility that the existence of district offices skews the results. Some Texas legislators keep offices in their districts, as well as in Austin. If requests from constituents for aid are handled in the districts, it could free the Austin staff from such activity, thereby distorting our data.

This fear appears to be groundless, however. During the interviews with staff members, we paid special attention to those whose representatives maintained district offices. They unanimously agreed that constituency service was handled entirely from Austin. Most requests for aid came directly to the capitol anyway, because, while citizens often do not know the location of a local office, most know that the representative works in the state capital. In addition, the standard practice is that even those constituency requests which are made at the local level are immediately channeled to Austin, where they are processed. The local offices are used as campaign information centers. We are therefore confident that the existence of district offices does not weaken our findings.

Second, it is possible that the quantity of resources under the control of a representative may affect the total amount of effort available to his or her staff, and hence the percentage of time devoted to specific activities. Suppose, for example, that liberal legislators had more money, with which they hired more staff. The staff underlings might then be assigned to, say, constituency service, leaving the chief staffer free to concentrate on policy research. Under these conditions the chief staff member of a conservative legislator, with a smaller staff, would have less time to spend on research. Given these circumstances, our findings would be an artifact of having forgotten to include an intervening variable in our analysis.

Such does not appear to be the case, however. We included staff payroll figures from the Texas House's Annual Financial Report in our analysis. The correlation (Pearson r) between constituency service and staff payroll i -.06. The correlation between policy research and staff payroll is .10. The correlations between the two staff activity variables and the total staff budget (payroll plus phone bills, mailing costs, etc.) are no more impressive. We think these correlations are so low as to allow us to dismiss the possibility that the relationships we found are spurious.

A third potential objection is that our analysis extends only to staff time expended during the 140-day biennial session, and that we ignore staff activities between sessions. We acknowledge this to be true, but we are not claiming to study all possible staff activities at all times. We maintain that an accounting of the way a representative employs his or her staff during the session is of considerable interest. No doubt a much larger investigation of the Texas legislature would include an exhaustive discussion of staffing, but our own goals are modest.

## Conclusion

As with much research, this investigation has raised more questions than it has answered. It is clear that in one session of the Texas legislature, chief staff members for representatives from the House varied their activities systematically in conjuction with the political situation of the legislator. Ideology was the most important variable associated with these differences. Republicans and liberal democrats were relatively more likely to spend time on policy research, and less likely to spend time on constituency service, than were conservative Democrats.

None of these associations were particularly robust, but the fact that they existed at all suggests other avenues of investigation. It would, for example, be interesting to see if similar patterns prevail the United States Congress. In a recent study of marginal districts, Richard Born found that incumbents elected to that body since 1966 have fortified their electoral margins more efficiently than those elected prior to that year; he avoided investigating whether that fact might be due to their greater emphasis on constituency service (Born, 1979, p. 816). Such would be an interesting topic of investigation. It would also be interesting to see if variations within patterns of constituency service on the part of new members could be attributed to their ideologies.

Secondly, it might prove illuminating to replicate this study in other state legislatures. Other states have different party systems and constitutional settings and different blends of constituency and ideology, but that does not mean that the patterns evident here could not occur elsewhere, perhaps even in sharpened form.

Additionally, this study has implications for thinking about the place of legislators in the American political system. If some of these findings should be generalized, they would present students of the legislative process with problems of interpretation. The reason why a representative's ideological position on policy issues should be associated with his or her allocation of staff time is not immediately clear. We cannot answer the questions raised by the data, only suggest further research to help the thinking about them.

## Appendix: Coding the Data

I. Staff time

Most members of the Texas House have several full-time and part-time personal staff employees. Some members employed only one staff person; such a situation presented no problems about whose workload to record. When there were several staff employees, an effort was made to identify the "chief of staff," and that person was asked to fill out the diaries. No part-time employees were used in this study.

The diaries consisted of a short, clear set of directions followed by spaces for the staffers to estimate the number of hours and minutes that they spent on various activities per day. Of the 150 members of the House, staff employees of 111 supplied usable data.

Compilation of the diaries yielded the following summary statistics:

| Category of activity | Mean minutes/day | Standard Deviation |
|---|---|---|
| Helping people in district | 158.3 | 98.2 |
| Policy research | 137.2 | 76.5 |
| Time with other staffs | 59.1 | 49.7 |
| Time with lobbyists | 82.8 | 53.4 |
| Time with representative | 113.4 | 79 |
| Length of Day | 630.4 | 156.7 |

The total number of minutes in the average day, as determined by summing the categories of activity (550.8), does not equal the category "length of day" because one category—miscellaneous activity—has been ommitted. Categories of time were recoded into approximate thirds. For "time with lobbyists," for example, 0 through 60 minutes was coded "low," 61 through 119 coded "moderate," and 120 through 240 coded "high."

II.  Background variables

A.  Ideology

The Texas Conservative Union publishes ratings of House and Senate members based on its compilation of "key" roll-call votes. During the 66th legislature, there were twenty-two of these key votes. The mean rating for representatives, on a scale in which zero equals perfect liberalism and one-hundred equals perfect conservatism, was 52.7, with a standard deviation of 28. We recoded so that a TCU score of 0 to 49 made a representative a "liberal," and a score of 50 to 100 made him or her a "conservative."

B.  Years of service

Unlike the U.S. Congress, the Texas House of Representatives is not a place where people typically stay a long time. Mean years of service was 5, with a standard deviation of 4.2. We recoded the data so that 0 to 4 equalled "lowest," 5 to 8 "moderate," and 9 to 27 "highest."

C.  Rural/urban/metropolitan

Most districts were heavily urban. The mean urban percent of population was 82.3, with a standard deviation of 25.6. Recoding was accomplished in the following manner:  0 to 49 percent urban was classified as "rural," and 50 to 99 percent "urban." The numerous districts that were 100 percent urban were located on maps and classified as either "metropolitan/center-city" or "metropolitan/suburban." Since not all the districts fell neatly into an obvious geographic category, this coding is inexact.

D.  Region

Districts were placed into one of four regions of the state based on geography and the historical/cultural background of the area. No regional variations are discussed in the analysis because such differences were too small to warrant serious attention.

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THE IMPACT OF WOMEN LEGISLATORS ON INTRODUCTION OF SOCIAL LEGISLATION INTO A
SOUTHERN STATE HOUSE

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ABSTRACT

The study investigated the interest of male and female legislators in social
legislation as measured by the number of bills each group introduced.  Legislators
included in the study were the entire female population of the North Carolina
General Assembly House of Representatives serving between January and July 1981,
and an equal number of their male colleagues randomly selected.  Comparisons of the
female and male legislators in the study criteria such as number of legislative
terms served, relative power of committees on which they served, number of
committee chairpersonships and independent rankings and effectiveness by
colleagues, lobbyists and the media revealed that the male legislators lead by
significant margins on all criteria.  Results of the study were that the women
introduced more bills and more social legislation.  Of the 159 bills introduced by
the women, 64 percent were identified as social legislation, while of the 111 bills
introduced by the men, only 37 percent were identified as social legislation.  The
designations of social legislation or non-social legislation were submitted to a
jury of experts for validation.  Recommendations were made for further study of the
interests of male and female legislators in more specific content areas.

Introduction

Women have been increasingly active in many decision making areas of society
and are more visible in state legislatures across the nation.  The number of women
elected to state legislatures has tripled just in the last ten years until there is
at least one woman serving in each state house and only four states failing to have
a woman serving in the state senate.[1] When the first Conference of Women State
Legislators was held in 1972, there were 344 women legislators in the country
representing only 5.5 percent of state legislators.  By the second Conference of
Women Legislators in 1982, their numbers had increased to 908 or 12.1 percent of
all state legislators.[2] Yet it has been reported that the political participation
of women has had little impact on the formulation of policy.[3]

Background and Significance

Increasing numbers of middle-aged women are becoming involved in politics
resulting from earlier trends toward marrying and bearing children at a
comparatively younger age than present which enables significant numbers of women
now reaching middle age to pursue activities outside the home with increasing

frequency. Newer trends toward later marriages and fewer children, combined with the increasing numbers of women with advanced education, are creating greater numbers of bright, creative and energetic younger women committed to political careers. This overall growth in the political activity of women is enhanced by changing attitudes about families and relationships and about the acceptability of political activity by women.[4]

Little serious political analysis of women's attitudes and behaviors had been published prior to the mid 1970's.[5] A 1977 study involving local representatives in Connecticut did reveal some significant differences in self-expressed expertise between male and female participants on "Social Problems" with 53.3 of the women expressing the belief that they had expertise in that area as compared to only 18.2 percent of the men.[6] This finding of increased self-expressed expertise on social problems by local women representatives as compared with their male colleagues would seem to indicate that increasing numbers of women in political office would have an impact in that area. To investigate this potential impact, a study was conducted comparing the number of pieces of social legislation (bills) introduced by a group of female legislators and an equal number of their male counterparts.

## Research Setting

North Carolina is one of the seven states governed by a legislature which meets only in odd-numbered years, except for a brief session each even-numbered year to make minor budget adjustments to maintain the state's constitutionally required balanced budget. The North Carolina General Assembly is composed of a fifty member Senate and a hundred and twenty member House of Representatives. Due to a limited number of female senators during the 1981 General Assembly (only three) when the study was conducted, the study was limited to the House where there were 19 female representatives. This is in line with studies that show women are twice as likely to serve in a state House of Representatives than in a State Senate.[7] Since House districts are smaller in size and greater in number, it is fairly common for state legislators to begin their legislative careers in the House. It seems common for state legislators to begin their legislative careers in the House. It seems logical that women, who are new as a force in the political arena, are presently represented here in greater numbers.

## Procedures

The entire population of nineteen female House members (16%) were included in the study with an equal number of their male colleagues selected in a random drawing from the 101 male legislators (84%) using a non-replacement sampling technique. The Daily Bulletin, a digest of actions by the N. C. General Assembly published by the Institute of Government of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, was used to make the initial determination of bills relevant to the study.

Any bill introduced by a legislator included in the study was labeled social legislation if it was initially assigned to one of the following committees: Aging, Appropriations - Human Resources, Commissions and Institutions for the Deaf and Blind, Corrections, Education, Health, Higher Education, Human Resources or

Mental Health.

Additional bills were identified as social legislation by a three person panel of experts, consisting of two registered lobbyists and one volunteer (citizen) lobbyist representing human service professional and employee associations. Panelists received all the bills introduced by legislators in the study which were not assigned to a designated committee. All bills included in the study were unanimously labeled "social legislation" by this expert jury. All bills included in the study were Public Bills which have statewide impact.

## Results

There were 270 public bills included in the study of these 111 or 41% were introduced by the female legislators. The total number of public bills introduced by a single legislator ranged from one to 31 for the male legislators and from one to 19 for the female legislators. The males introduced an average of just under five bills (4.7), while the females introduced an average of just over eight bills (8.3).

With regard to social legislation, there were 102 public bills introduced by female legislators which were identified as social legislation and 41 public bills introduced by male legislators identified as social legislation. For female legislators, 64 percent of the public bills they introduced were identified as social legislation. The male legislators in the study introduced public bills of which 37 percent were identified as being social legislation. (See Table 1).

TABLE 1

NUMBER AND PERCENTAGES OF BILLS INTRODUCED BY LEGISLATORS
IN THE STUDY BY SEX

| Group | Public Bills | Percent of Public Bills Social Legislation |
|-------|--------------|---------------------------------------------|
| Female | 159 | 64% |
| Male | 111 | 37% |
| Total | 270 | 101% |

## Discussion, Implications and Recommendations

The results clearly suggest that the women in the N. C. House were significantly more active in introducing social legislation (bills) than their male colleagues.

Further comparison of the female and male legislators studied as to their tenure, committee assignments, committee chairpersonships and vice-

chairpersonships and overall effectiveness revealed nothing to contraindicate the significance of gender as a key factor in their introduction of bills labeled "social legislation."[8]  (See Table 2)

TABLE 2

| | Average Overall Effectiveness Rating | Average Number Terms Served In N.C. House | Number of Times Represented on Committees | Number of Chair and Vice-Chairpersonships |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Female Legislators | 54 | 2.9 | 17 | 23 |
| Male Legislators | 56 | 3.4 | 22 | 24 |

   While the male legislators lead in every category, the gaps are relatively narrow and in no case approach the disparity in the number of social legislative bills introduced by the two groups.  This contradicts some reported evidence that women are not distinct from men in their policy preferences, simply on the basis of sex.[9]  The results of the study are in line with other research suggesting that women are more responsive to policy issues with "moral overtones."[10]
   More research is needed in regard to the contributions of women legislators, but it must be designed to investigate areas other than those conventionally considered women's issues.  Do female and male legislators differ in specific policy issues in areas such as health, consumer protection, banking or agriculture?  The study of expertise among male and female local representatives in Connecticut implies that perhaps they might.[11] Does the interest of female legislators in social legislation, as indicated by the present study, remain constant or alter with increased experience and tenure?  Finally, a most compelling need is for investigation of the success rates between female and male legislators as determined, not by the introduction of bills as was investigated in this study, but by the frequency with which the bills they introduce become law.

Notes and References

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AN ADVOCACY APPROACH FOR
MORE EFFECTIVE PROGRAM DELIVERY AND COORDINATION:
A CASE STUDY OF MAINE'S HOUSING REHAB TECHS

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A detailed case analysis of the Maine Housing Rehabilitation Project
provides an exploratory observation of the innovative use of human resources at the
federal, state and regional levels through an evolutionary development process of
housing rehabilitation technicians.  Functioning largely as advocate planners and
human service delivery administrators through self-expanded roles, these individuals
were able to promote change in the context of this intergovernmental environment.
The analysis presented here reveals findings of intrastate regional differences
between the urban and rural areas.  Low income citizens appear to be the main bene-
ficiaries of a proactive style of leadership that was performed by the most productive
rehab techs.  The autonomy of their roles afforded all technicians a degree of free-
dom to produce different results through experimentation.

Current proposals of the Reagan Administration's "New Federalism" are
illustrative of the need for state and local governments to reassess their own
public service delivery capabilities.  Viable alternatives for program delivery at
the state and local levels often involve, in part, innovative approaches for more
efficient and effective coordination of several different agencies and institutions.
Charles H. Levine, in his text devoted to this problem entitled, Managing Fiscal
Stress, elaborates on the implications of the drastic change in domestic spending
policy:

> Indeed, almost all our public management strategies are pre-
> dicated on assumptions of the continuing enlargements of
> public revenues and expenditures.  Recent events and gloomy
> forecasts, however, have called into question the validity
> and generality of these assumptions, and have created a need
> to reopen inquiry into the effects of resources scarcity on

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public organizations and their management systems (Levine, 1980, p. 13)..

This study will examine the Maine Housing Rehabilitation Project (MHRP) and its utilization of the innovative human resources of the housing rehabilitation technicians. The "rehab techs" were essential to the success of the MHRP by serving as the instruments through which a variety of federal, state and private resources were effectively linked to facilitate a high degree of cooperation in achieving MHRP goals. There have been select arenas where administrators have identified service delivery problems and taken corrective action that traditional human services' administrators and planners would consider rather drastic. This study analyzes such an experience with the Maine Housing Rehabilitation Project within the contextual framework of an advocacy planning and service delivery approach. By stressing the advocacy planning and service delivery approach utilized in the project, this study will consider intrastate regional differences and their impact on project performance and professional roles involved in the project implementation.

## An Advocacy Approach to Planning and Service Delivery

It seems clear from the Maine case that the key actors, rehabilitation technicians, did not play what would be considered typical roles for social planners and human services' administrators. Their desire to bring the maximum amount of assistance to their clients put them in a position of (1) promoting organizational changes, (2) advocating their client's positions before other bureaucracies, (3) participating in a regional approach to service delivery and (4) breaking down traditional barriers to intergovernmental and interagency cooperation.

In a selective literature review we will consider the contributions of the early proponents of political action and neighborhood organization; the related concepts for those who examined organizational change, and especially the change agent role; and the advocacy approach. All three of the above stems of the literature prove to be useful in analyzing the evolutionary process of the role of Maine's rehab techs.

There has been a long tradition in the reform spirit that conceived solutions to social problems in largely political action terms. Many of these nineteenth century traditions can be found in the work of the late Saul Alinsky and his disciples (Alinsky, 1946 and 1972 and Specht, 1975). Social problems for these political activists represented a clear conflict between the haves and have nots, and social action was largely a struggle for power and resources. Little in the way of structured analysis was undertaken, since adherents to this approach believed that ideology "explained" the origin of social problems (Etizoni, 1976). However, Alinsky believed that the power that community organizations possess is the power to disrupt normal activity through social protest. Specific protest tactics (i.e., pickets, boycotts, marches, rent strikes, harassment of local officials) are carefully matched to the type of issue (Bailey, 1972).

During the 1960's some of these activists were to become converted participants through newly created bureaucratic roles, sponsored largely by federal investments. Moreover, the achievements and many failures of the federal government

to broker competing delivery systems with traditional local government and foster new power structures at the community level through such initiatives as the community action and Model Cities programs have been well documented (Marris and Rein, 1973).

Another stem of the literature that relates to the development of a more proactive bureaucratic style for social problem solving is that of organizational change. One common technique has been derived from Lewin's field theory, where the change agent, together with the client group, analyzes the forces available which may support and resist change (Lippit, Watson, and Westley, 1958). These approaches have stressed such topics as the need for change and the levels of change, methods for developing the goals of change and the overcoming of resistance to change (French and Bell, 1973 and Zaltman and Duncan, 1977). These techniques have tended to utilize trained professional change agents, but some administrators have found the application of these methods to the planning and implementation of human services to be essential. Since the delivery system for human services has become so complex, greater control has been needed, which requires skills in social change; its implementation will significantly affect the existing patterns of rewards, statuses, and roles (Mayer, 1972 and Bolan, 1979).

Finally, the call for theoretical importation and further development of the concept of advocacy, which has been utilized by social welfare and legal professions, to the planning profession provides another salient stem in the direction of the literature. As Paul Davidoff explains in his classic article "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning":

> Where plural planning is practiced, advocacy becomes the means
> of professional support for competing claims about how the
> community should develop. In addition to carrying out these
> necessary parts of planning, he would be a proponent of specific
> substantive solutions (Davidoff, 1965, p. 333).

Thus, the advocate would be responsible to his or her client and seek to express that person's viewpoint; but this would occur within the confines of pluralism.

Davidoff contends that planners should no longer approach their work strictly as a value-free exercise. Traditionally, an accepted decision-making rule for bureaucrats was to find the most efficient way to achieve the ends prescribed by the controlling legislative body. However, the new decision-making rule for social planners, working as advocates, would be to promote policy alternatives that would bring about a more equitable distribution or redistribution of society's economic production. Thus, advocacy planning becomes a form of community decision-making that would enhance a wider breadth of social benefit in a pluralistic setting (Blecher, 1972).

Others have cautioned about the limitations of the advocacy approach. As Catanese warns:

> . . .advocacy planning has had a mixed success and incredibly
> strong reaction against it. . . Much of the movement was decide-
> dly radical and perhaps naive, which resulted in an almost
> direct relationship between the advocate role and the assistance

offered to those special interest groups which had the least
ability to formulate their demands and supports in a clear
manner (Catanese, 1978, p. 41).

The concept of a public employee acting as an advocate for low income, disadvantaged
clients was easier said than done.

Advocate planners had insisted on working within the political system like
lawyers for their clients of the judicial system. Moreover, advocacy concept coin-
cided with the 1960's period of general rejection of many traditional values and a
growing demand for such innovations as citizen participation in government programs.
Davidoff had been relatively neutral as to whose interests planners should represent;
yet advocacy planning was generally equated with advocacy for the poor. Further
study and debate of the concept of advocacy planning did not end with the decade of
the 1960's. According to A. D. Heskin: ". . .advocacy planning still exists. There
are those who have not lost the faith, and others who employ advocacy as a tactic
particularly when a community is under attack. . ." (Heskin, 1980, p. 61). Likewise,
within the field of public administration, the need for administrators to realign
their thinking around achieving the goal of social equity was called for:

Pluralistic government systematically discriminates in favor
of established stable 'bureaucracies and their specialized
minority clientele (the Department of Agriculture and large
farmers as an example) and against those minorities (farm
laborers, both migrant and permanent as an example) who lack
political and economic resources. . .Social equity, then,
includes activities designed to enhance the political power
and economic well-being of these minorities (Frederickson,
1971, p. 311).

Although it is apparent that the Maine rehabilitation technicians did not
view themselves as social visionaries, it is important to note that their actions
were of major social significance whether they realized it or not. Given the recent
emphasis by the national government on the philosophic view that individuals can take
care of themselves without public intervention, the moral imperative to assist the
politically and economically deprived may be even more crucial as a driving force
for program managers at the state and local levels.

Maine Housing Rehabilitation Project: An Application
within the Framework of the Advocacy Planning and Service Delivery

An Innovative Projects Program (IPP) grant from the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development funded the MHRP on a demonstration basis. State and
local governments were awarded grants on a competitive basis to develop innovative
approaches to the solution of long-standing urban area problems. The Urban Insti-
tute selected the Maine Housing Rehabilitation Project as one of six demonstration
projects to be evaluated for any insights the project might offer to similar ven-
tures in other states and localities (Goedert and Blake, 1980).

The data for this study was collected primarily in two stages. The initial
stage consisted of written, self-administered questionnaires transmitted to all

-296-

major project participants, including the current and former project directors, rehab techs, the Community Action Program directors, FmHA Rural Housing Specialists and FmHA county supervisors. The second stage of data collection involved site visitations, following a preliminary analysis of the responses received through the questionnaires. On-site interviews were conducted with most of the key project part- icipants. The interviews proved to be extremely valuable in providing clarifications and refinements with respect to the information received through the questionnaires and also in providing insights into the implementation of the project at the grass roots level.

The impetus behind the MHRP was the Community Action Agency's (CAA) weather- ization program in Maine, which could not address the needs of approximately forty percent of applicants whose housing units were in substandard condition and thus were not suited for minimum standards of weatherization. As has been argued (Morris and Binstock, 1966), the socially responsive planner needs to provide specific definitions of his or her goals with explicit statements of what will replace unsatisfactory con- ditions. The State of Maine applied for the IPP grant, through its Division of Community Services (DCS), to develop a program which would take advantage of the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) 504 rehabilitation program, a suitable funding source which initially had been underutilized. The result was the MHRP, which util- ized the rehabilitation technicians as links between the CAAs and the county offices of the FmHA.

Thirteen rehabilitation technicians were housed in the state's CAAs, which provided basic administrative support for the project. FmHA county supervisors familiarized the rehabilitation technicians with required procedures, referred clients to rehabilitation technicians and eventually became more involved with the grantsman- ship paperwork. The function of direct client contact was assumed by the rehabili- tation technicians. The role of the rehabilitation technicians was intended to be one of identifying low-income homeowners who needed housing rehabilitation assistance and might qualify for funding through the 504 grant and loan program. In seeking potentially eligible households, rehabilitation technicians relied upon such refer- ral sources as CAA outreach programs, winterization programs, public officials, local newspapers and radio announcements. Through these sources, significant numbers of low-income residents of substandard homes were identified.

The rehabilitation technician's first visit to potential clients' homes was very informal in order to develop the trust of many individuals who traditionally had tended to be distrustful of a government contract (fearing, for example, that they might be signing away the rights to their homes). When the loan or grant pro- cess was initiated, the rehabilitation technician (1) carefully explained the process to the client who was required to sign the application, explaining the various conditions such as not selling the home for a minimum of three years if grant monies were received, under penalty of returning the money; (2) drafted a Development Plan which described the work to be done, after completing a required inspection of the home; (3) secured credit references from the client; (4) conducted credit checks; (5) reviewed the application (but did not determine eligibility); (6) obtained a copy of the deed and a sketch of the property; (7) verified employment status and income of all of the client's family members; and (8) assisted in the preparation of

a "family budget", thereby aiding the client in the management of income toward the eventual repayment of the loan.

The role of the rehabilitation technicians expanded as the project evolved. Their initial concern with only one federal program (the FmHA 504) soon was broadened to general involvement in several federal programs such as the FmHA 502 program, the HUD Community Development Block Grant program and the HEW Title XX program. The rehabilitation technicians also became instrumental in enhancing the accessibility of clients to other social service programs such as food stamps, fuel assistance and meals for the elderly. The rehabilitation technicians clearly had come to see them-selves as advocates for the needs of low-income persons, and viewed the county FmHA supervisors as persons before whom they needed to plead their case on behalf of their clients. Thus, the concept of social equity, which represents a major pillar within the intellectual reform of the theory of public administration, took on special meaning to the rehabilitation technicians. Acting as advocates for their low-income clients, they performed a role envisioned by both the planning and public adminis-tration theorists, while serving at the same time as agents of social change.

Although the rehabilitation technicians were officially responsible to the CAA housing directors or the CAA directors, in reality they had a great deal of auto-nomy and operated with considerable independence on a day-to-day basis. In fact, most rehabilitation technicians established their own priorities for the best use of their time and resources. The program subsequently took on a slightly different form under each rehabilitation technician. It appears that differences in personal characteristics among rehab techs and intrastate regional differences could have major impacts on project performance and professional roles involved in the imple-mentation of the program. Interview data suggest that while most of the rehab techs could be classified as "proactive" in their behavior patterns, some were more or less "reactive" types. For example, in responding to the depletion of 504 funds, some reacted with "anger" or "pandemonium"; some became "more resourceful," "looking for other sources," or "corresponding with Maine's congressional delegation"; others were simply "disappointed" or indifferent. The personality differences also could have a significant impact on their relationship with clients and other key parti-cipants of the program such as FmHA county supervisors and CAA directors. It is interesting to note that the rehab techs spent from less than one month to about nine months to establish a good working relationship with local FmHA officials. Establishing such relationships was a crucial factor in successfully seeking 504 loans and grants from FmHA county offices. The rehab tech who spent less than a month to establish a good working relationship proved to be most successful in that the rehab tech had fourteen 504 loans and nineteen 504 grants approved and funded during the first year of operation whereas other rehab techs averaged only five loans and six grants each.

The flexibility of the experimental program also made possible for rehab techs to mold the implementation of rehabilitation programs according to differences in regional needs and resources. As one rehab tech stated, "the biggest strength is that the program is flexible. Each CAA serves a different public. . .Each rehab tech can develop the program to fit community needs." A tendency toward regional responsiveness in rehab tech strategies and project performance is clearly illust-

trated in Table 1. The Southern Region, which is characterized by the highest population density, the highest percentage of urban population and the highest per capita income in Maine, showed the lowest project performance. Each of the four rehab techs operating in this region processed less than six 504 loans and grants and served only eighteen clients on average during the first year of program implement-ation. Other rehab techs worked in the Midcoast Region and particularly those in the North-central Region performed far much better than the ones in the Southern Region. The four rehab techs in the Midcoast Region successfully generated an average of almost seventeen 504 grants and loans and served more than thirty-two clients each. The five rehab techs who worked in the North-central Region fared even better in terms of the total number of clients served and the number of grants and loans processed other than 504, e.g., Title XX and HUD Community Development grants. However, their performance in processing 504 grants and loans was less successful as compared to those in the Midcoast Region. Perhaps this was due to the fact that these rehab techs who worked in the North-central Region had to cover vast geographic areas and each technician had to deal with several FmHA county offices dispersed around the region. For example, the rehab tech in the Aroostook County Action Program had to negotiate with seven FmHA county offices located throughout the county encompassing 6,453 square miles.

A clear inverse relationship between socio-economic conditions of the region and project performance of the rehab techs indicate that the FmHA programs were not as popular with economically better-off urban areas as with more impoverish-ed rural regions. Many people who resided in economically better-off urban areas were found to be either uninterested or ineligible to receive the 504 programs. A statement by the rehab tech who worked in the county with the highest per capita income attests to this:

> . . .I had trouble with publicity and outreach. I mailed ap-
> proximately 200 letters to previous recipients of Project FUEL,
> and received only 4 responses. Of these 4 responses 2 were
> ineligible, one was potentially eligible but changed her mind,
> and was processed but found ineligible.

This situation led the rehab techs to believe that their roles should be expanded to include the administration of other or all housing programs in the region and that this would improve the individual rehab tech's overall effectiveness in pro-viding a more diverse housing service. The CAA directors in the Southern Region had a similar attitude that the rehab tech's responsibilities should include the administration of other housing programs and they believed that an expansion would not necessarily conflict with the current responsibilities of the CAAs. On the other hand, the rehab techs and CAA directors in the other two regions were generally opposed to the idea of expanding the rehab tech's responsibilities because this certainly would reduce the rehab tech's flexibility.

However, according to project data, rehabilitation technicians were unani-mous in their belief that someone employed within FmHA could not have accomplished as much as they had been able to accomplish, even if provided the same amount of time to concentrate solely on housing rehabilitation. The rehab techs believed that they could lobby FmHA for funds more effectively from outside rather than from inside the

Table 1

Regional Differences and Project Performance

| | Socio-Economic Indicators | | | Performance Indicators | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Persons per Square Mile (1980) | Percent of Urban Pop. (1980) | Per Cap. Personal Income as % of State (1982) | No. of R.Ts. | Average No. of 504 G.& L. by Each RT | Average No. of Other G. & L. by Each RT* | Average No. of Clients Served by Each RT |
| Southern Region | | | | | | | |
| (York, Oxford, Cumberland, Androscoggin) | 114.2 | 56.4% | 108% | 4 | 5.75 | 15.75 | 18.75 |
| Midcoast Region | | | | | | | |
| (Sagadahoc, Lincoln, Kennebec, Knox, Waldo) | 89.6 | 47.0 | 100 | 4 | 16.75 | 28.50 | 32.25 |
| North-central Region | | | | | | | |
| (Franklin, Somerset, Piscataquis, Penobscot, Hancock, Washington, Aroostook) | 17.3 | 37.0 | 89 | 5 | 13.00 | 46.20 | 44.40 |
| Total | 36.3 | 47.5% | 100% ($7,868) | 13 | 11.92 (156) | 31.87 (408) | 32.77 (433) |

* Those loans and grants which were less than $100.00 in the amount were deleted.
Sources:  U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census of Population, Volume 1. Characteristics of the Population, Chapter A. Number of Inhabitants, Part 21. Maine;  Maine Department of Labor, Division of Economic Analysis and Research, Annual Planning Information:  Maine Statewide, Fiscal 1983;  Mary Ellen Twombly, "A Report on and a Request for Extension of the Maine Housing Rehabilitation Project to the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, Washington, D.C.", 1978.

organization due to the close relationship that developed between them and their clients. Thus, the rehab techs served as the buffers between their clients and the FmHA administrators, contributing to the avoidance for the former of many of the problems that they frequently associated with the bureaucracy, such as perceived remoteness (Downs, 1967). Viewing themselves in many cases as social activists, they sought not only to carry out legislative mandates as efficiently and economically as possible, but also to both influence and execute policies which more generally improve the "quality of life" for all.

The rehab techs proved to be quite effective in gaining the cooperation of key project participants. Initially, the FmHA county supervisors had been given almost no role in the design of the MHRP and, according to interview data, they actually tended to be rather skeptical of the project. Although some rehab techs, particularly those in the Southern Region, believed their relationship with the FmHA supervisors was not as desirable as it should be, most rehab techs reported that after demonstrating their sincere interest in grant application procedures, the relationship between themselves and the supervisors improved considerably. Here the promotion of organizational change and the role of the rehab techs as change agents were clearly manifested. The rehab techs sought to modify certain bureaucratic service delivery patterns or develop new ones to achieve solutions. Instead of merely serving as a link between the CAAs and the FmHA, the rehab techs also were concerned with the comprehensive needs of their low-income clients, to the extent of attempting to influence the outcome of service delivery in their clients' favor. The determination and resourcefulness of the the rehab techs, according to the Urban Institute evaluation, overcame a variety of problems that could have negatively altered the project (Goedert and Blake, 1980).

Not only were the relationships between the rehab techs, the clients and other project participants positively affected by the advocacy role assumed by the rehab techs, but the achievement of specific project objectives also was enhanced. Each rehab tech had been expected to process an average of two loans per month over the fourteen month demonstration period, which collectively represented a target of upgrading approximately 365 homes. The target was exceeded by an impressive margin. During the fourteen month demonstration period, 433 homes were substantially upgraded. In addition, there was remarkable improvement in FmHA 504 grant and loan activity and in the coordination of other means of housing rehabilitation. Moreover, other assistance to the low-income clients, not necessarily in the form of housing rehabilitation, was significantly increased. Through all these various efforts, a higher standard of living was promoted for many of the clients.

Some significant secondary benefits also were realized. An improvement in intergovernmental cooperation exemplified by a memorandum of understanding, the Rural Development Cooperation Agreement, signed by FmHA and the State of Maine, targeted funds for housing and economic and industrial development to rural areas throughout the state.

Thus, the success of the MHRP is significant in that program goals were achieved with high productivity and low administrative costs. These successes were often the result of the rehab techs' ability to process multiple request packages and to utilize the same labor force to do repair work funded under different aid

programs. For example, seventy-five 504 loans were approved and funded and eighty-one 504 grants were approved and funded. Four out of every ten clients received assistance in upgrading their dwellings. Nearly 300 of the 497 Maine municipalities were represented by these clients. The end result was a very cost effective, yet viable and comprehensive, approach to the basic needs of low-income homeowners.

Although the strong commitment of the rehab techs played a major role in the delivery of the MHRP, the project also required strong support from state FmHA administrators, the Maine Housing Rehabilitation Project Director and the Director of the Division of Community Services. The role of individual leaders can not be underestimated here. The proactive style of a dynamic woman administrator serving as the MHR Project Director initiated many of the changes in the CAAs' relationship with FmHA. Secondly, the important political support in the state capital and the Governor's Office was gained from a respected black activist, who served as the Director of the Division of Community Services. In addition, MHRP success may have been enhanced by factors somewhat unique to Maine such as the high visibility of FmHA and the lack of specialization in and the relatively autonomous nature of the CAAs. These factors may well have encouraged the rehabilitation technicians to seek several sources of funding beyond the 504 program.

## Conclusions

During the process of obtaining resources for the successful implementation of their program, the Maine rehabilitation technicians were able to evoke a new spirit of cooperation among some very unlikely partners in the Farmer's Home Administration, the local Community Action Agencies and the state's Division of Community Services. This type of bureaucratic response could be more pervasive should the present trend of devolution of responsibility to state and local governments continue. President Reagan is offering less in total dollars to the states and municipalities and is parceling it out in the form of increased usage of block grants, rather than categorical grants. Under President Nixon, the original brand of "New Federalism" articulated one of the goals of the block grants as being the return of program design and delivery of services to sub-national governments. The alleged intention was to involve a greater degree of intergovernmental cooperation so that state, regional and local agencies could best determine the priorities for the federal dollars flowing down to them. During the Nixon administration, this concept was termed "Creative Federalism", and it was to be largely achieved with an influx of no-strings attached funds to general purpose state, county and local governments. In light of the fact that the Reagan version of the "New Federalism" involves funding cuts, and not increases, to state and local governments, there may be an added impetus to better coordinate the limited federal grants at the state and local levels. This type of coordination has been described as orchestration by jurisdictional leaders, self-linking among functional specialists and meshing by community-based organizations (Lovell, 1979). Efforts at the integration of services and the use of such techniques as case management and client advocacy function have also attempted to address the issue of fragmentation (Kaplan, Gans, and Kahn, 1972).

The rehabilitation technicians in Maine operationalized Lovell's concept of coordinating federal grants from below in their efforts to help their low-income

clientele. In essence, the rehab techs were able to combine the spirit and normative
flavor of the advocacy planning with an innovative approach to regional service deli-
very which involved a patchwork of different funding sources and delivery agencies.
Significant intra-state regional differences were found that suggested an inverse
relationship between the socio-economic conditions of the regions and the performance
levels of the rehab techs, which in turn seemed related to different needs and resources
of the thirteen CAA geographic areas. While the Community Action Agencies served as
the home base for the rehab techs in their efforts at increasing the utilization of
the Home Weatherization program, the latter did not limit themselves merely to the
resources provided through those agencies. One could even assume that they acted on
some perceived moral imperative when they went to such great lengths to obtain fund-
ing and services for their clientele. It may be that in this next decade, which
probably will be characterized by shrinking, or, at best, stable federal resources,
conventional means of service delivery and funding will no longer suffice for admini-
strators seeking to achieve the goal of social equity in public resource allocation.
If this should prove to be the case, then state and local program administrators may
want to look carefully at the Maine experience--an experience which combined the role
of the local grants coordinator with that of the public servant as an advocate. A
catalytic resource such as the rehab tech could be applied to other functional areas
at the state and local levels where there exists a need for initiating change in the
direction of more effective program delivery in the public sector. This case analysis
does suggest that the role of the advocate is a legitimate role for administrators
in planning, in housing rehabilitation or in other social service areas.

The pattern of the rehab tech's performance could have been illustrated by
many of the same negative features epitomized by Rainwater's (1967) "dirty workers"
and Lipsky's (1980) "street level bureaucrats", if it were not for the experimental
nature of the program, their somewhat autonomous roles (which allowed for regional
differences) and the possibility of a regional, rather than a purely local frame of
reference. This Maine prototype reduced the inequities and fragmentation implicit
in a delivery system that otherwise would have tended to rely on its 497 minicipalities,
most of whom are very small towns, for essentially a local response. The desired
bureaucratic concepts of responsiveness, effectiveness and the pursuit of social
equity were enhanced by the state's involvement in the experimental program through
an inter-regional network, held together by the rehabilitation technicians.

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# REGIONAL PLANNING OF MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES:
## AN ILLINOIS CASE EXAMPLE

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## ABSTRACT

Now that Reagan has ended a twenty-year pattern of federal involvement in setting mental health policy priorities, states must develop models for implementing and maintaining services to the mentally ill. The Illinois model of regional offices which plan and monitor programs is described. A case example showing how one such office developed services in a minority community is given. Examples of the work of other offices illustrate the flexibility of this model in meeting special community needs.

With the Reagan administration's shift of the federal mental health funding to a block grant to each state, we need to look more closely at models for state roles in the mental health delivery system. Illinois provides a timely example because of its history of funding mental health services in the community and because of its relative lack of reliance on federal dollars. By 1980 half of the mental health catchment areas in the United States received federal funds (Neigher, et al., 1982). Only a third of the catchment areas in Illinois received federal funding, but all had some state-funded mental health services.

This paper will briefly review the structure of services in Illinois from the 1960s to 1983. Illinois used a model of regional state offices to promote continuity of care between state-operated hospitals and voluntary community services and to facilitate monitoring and accountability of state funds. The work of one such regional office in developing the delivery system in a minority community will be considered as a case study. To highlight how regional offices can tailor their work to the specific needs of the community, examples will be given of the work of two other offices. The changes instituted in early 1983 will be described and their potential limitations discussed.

Finally, the applicability of the Illinois regional model for the current national situation will be discussed. Under Reagan's new federalism, the states have assumed responsibility for federal mental health, health and social service block grants, all at reduced funding. States should be considering models that can take into account the differing needs of various regions and communities and confront competition among various service providers for decreasing resources.

## Federal vs. State Roles

Recent analyses of mental health policy (e.g. Mechanic, 1980; Levine, 1981) have focused on the role of the federal government while largely ignoring the role of state government and

state agencies. During the 1960's and 1970's states were characterized as the owners and operators of over-crowded, under-staffed hospitals. States were sued for abrogating clients' rights, (e.g. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975)) and for lack of adequate treatment facilities (e.g. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F.Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972)). By contrast the federal government was seen as fostering de-institutionalization, promoting prevention and early intervention, and funding community mental health centers as the major alternative to hospitals.

These examples should not lead one to the conclusion that the federal government encouraged reform in mental health policy while the states did not. Dorothea Dix and other reformers went to state legislatures for help and received it. In response to their pleas the first state hospital in Illinois was opened in Jacksonville in 1851. In contrast, President Pierce vetoed legislation in 1854 which sought federal land grants for the construction of asylums for the mentally ill, because he believed care of the needy was the responsibility of the states, not the national government.

As hospitals became over-crowded at the turn of the century, suggestions for reform came from within. Adolf Meyer, who came to the United States in 1903 to head the asylum in Kankakee, Illinois, was one of the leading mental health reformers of the Progressive Era. His innovations included the psychopathic hospital and its outpatient clinic, outreach, aftercare, and the promotion of "civic medicine" (Rothman, 1980).

States have affirmed their response to citizens in need by enacting statutes that establish agencies under the executive branch of government to serve the needy. The statutory base for such services has been established, amended, and expanded throughout the twentieth century. In Illinois a large public welfare department was created in 1920 which had responsibility for mental health, corrections, vocational services, public assistance, and child welfare. In the 1920s and 1930s most state legislatures were concerned with the existing hospitals, but a few states also began to develop outpatient programs (Rothman, 1980). Today all states have statutes that specify their responsibility for mental health functions.

## Illinois' Role

While the federal government was developing its response to the report of the Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health (1961), Illinois was devising its own innovative plans for responding to the needs of the mentally ill. In 1960 voters approved a bond issue to provide $150 million for capital improvements for state hospitals. Under the leadership of Dr. Francis J. Gerty these funds were used for the construction of "zone centers" -- modern hospital and outpatient facilities located in each of eight regions of the state to make mental health services accessible to all citizens (Reidy, 1964). In 1961 a new state Department was established with responsibility for mental health, developmental disabilities, and alcoholism services. Legislation passed in 1963 authorized the state agency to make grants-in-aid to community groups to provide services. Subsequent legislation enabled counties and townships to raise money for mental health services by adding additional taxes. However, many areas, most notably Chicago, did not utilize this legislation.

By the time the first federal community mental health legislation (PL 88-164) was announced in 1963, Illinois was well on the way to modernizing its mental health system. The major push for deinstitutionalization in many states including Illinois came in the late 1960's when changes in Medicaid regulations enabled the states to save money by discharging patients to nursing homes (Levine, 1981). By the early 70's, fostered by a grant-in-aid system, community mental health programs were available in all of Illinois' eighty-two catchment areas. About a third of these centers ever received federal monies appropriated for

comprehensive mental health centers. In most areas local funding covered outpatient and early intervention services and state funds covered after-care for patients discharged from the hospitals. These programs were operated by voluntary agencies or units of local government, e.g. city or county health departments.

## The Role of the Regional Offices

Regional offices of the Department of Mental Health were developed concommitantly with the zone centers and the community programs. Each region was to have a zone center. The larger regions were further divided into sub-regions to facilitate planning and increase accessibility. For example, the region serving the greater Chicago area was originally divided into fifteen sub-regions, each of which was a group of catchment areas that generated about 1,000 admissions per year to the state hospitals. The region and sub-region offices were responsible for the development of community programs, continuity of care between hospital and community, and the monitoring of expenditure of grant-in-aid monies.

## Case Example: An Urban Minority Sub-Region

Not all areas had been able to develop adequate community programs. One area on the south side of Chicago in which a zone center had not been developed had special difficulties. In the late 60's and early 70's while most areas developed and consolidated their community mental health programs, this area was experiencing extreme population changes. The movement of blacks and the resulting white flight led to a near-total racial change making it difficult to find community groups to provide mental health services. The sectarian agencies that had served the white religious and ethnic communities had moved out. The total amount of state mental health funds going into this community of 700,000 was the same as the budget of an area in another part of the city with 1/10 the population which was receiving federal CMHC funds.

In 1975 a leadership change in the sub-region office serving this area led to a variety of new efforts to develop services. In order to carry out the mission of developing programs in this under-served area, the new director hired four new staff for a total of 12. All had experience in mental health services or administration, and the majority had graduate training in social work, nursing, psychology, or sociology. This author's role was program evaluation, including conducting needs assessments, identifying gaps and duplications in services, and evaluating specific programs (Korr and Beech, 1983). In keeping with the demography of the community, the majority of the staff and the director were black. The new director of the sub-region retained the goals of community development, continuity of care, and accountability and monitoring.

One of the first tasks was to collect and analyze data about the six catchment areas, the sub-region and the existing community services. The major findings were: increasing public assistance caseloads (in some areas, 100% increases in a year), large numbers of young black men between 18 and 35 going in and out of the state hospital, outpatient caseloads composed primarily of older women.

The sub-region office began to work toward change. In the area of community development staff worked closely with community groups to explain mental health needs and to train the boards of the few existing voluntary mental health agencies. The board of a small day treatment center worked with sub-region staff and obtained a planning grant for a federally-funded CMHC for their catchment area. Cooperation with a group of black businessmen and professionals led to their incorporating as a not-for-profit agency and receiving a grant for the first transitional living facility and another day treatment center.

In one catchment area of the sub-region a staff member started a network of providers including mental health programs, the area hospital, a family service agency, the public assistance and social security offices, and area churches. These groups worked together to meet the needs of mental health clients and their families.

Staff also focused on continuity of care. An intake-aftercare coordinator reviewed state hospital admissions and facilitated discharge planning. Sub-region staff coordinated weekly discharge planning meetings in which community agency representatives came to the hospital more than twenty miles away. Staff previously limited to planning for patients being discharged to nursing homes were able to develop other alternatives including family homes and boarding homes. A contract with the police department led to screening of clients in the emergency room of a community hospital and more deflection from hospitalization. State funds for purchase of care helped support this program.

Because newer agencies have more difficulty in meeting accountability standards than established agencies, sub-region staff provided ongoing training in management by objectives, accounting techniques, filling out fiscal and programmatic monitoring forms, and program evaluation.

In order to continue to develop innovative programs, other funding sources were exploited. Federal monies given to the states under section 314d of the 1966 Partnership for Health Act went to a community agency to open an emergency living facility as an alternate to hospitalization. Title XX funds from the state's donated funds initiative went to a clinic in an isolated public housing project to provide outpatient services to high risk young women.

The late 1970's and early 1980's were a period of consolidation and stabilization. The state grant-in-aid funds for community mental health programs in this area had grown from $1.7 million in FY75 to $3.1 million in FY82. In 1980-81, $1.7 million of federal funds was awarded to establish a comprehensive CMHC in one catchment area. Its funds now come through the mental health block grant to the state. The boards of two small voluntary community agencies merged to insure fiscal stability and programmatic strength. The Title XX program closed because it could not raise its matching funds. The community hospital felt it wasn't adequately reimbursed for its services and began to cut back its programs.

In 1982 as part of a regional reorganization two sub-region offices were combined. That office was responsible for a geographic area of over 1 million people and planned and monitored services to the developmentally disabled in addition to the alcoholic and the mentally ill. In May of 1983 a fiscal crisis in Illinois led to another re-organization. Two-thirds of the staff in the regional and sub-regional offices were laid off. The city of Chicago, served by twelve sub-regional offices in 1975, now has one office with a staff of eighteen to monitor over 400 programs. The goals and priorities for this staff have yet to be clarified. However, the scope of their work will certainly be narrower.

## Use of the Model in Other Communities

Other sub-regions and regions had different priorities, depending on the needs of the particular communities served. While all offices were responsible for the same major functions -- program development, continuity of care, and monitoring -- each could develop plans tailored to the needs of the service area.

For example, one sub-region identified high readmission rates as a major problem in a racially and economically heterogeneous urban catchment area "where nomadic, socially deprived individuals congregate" including a large number of former mental patients (Witheridge, Dincin, and Appleby, 1982, p.9).

The sub-region staff worked to obtain a Hospital Improvement Program grant from NIMH. The grant allowed the sub-region and voluntary agency staff to identify and study the chronic recidivists in this community. The study led to the development of a successful assertive outreach program (Witheridge, et al., p. 11).

One sub-region had to work with a white ethnic urban community which was one of the last catchment areas in the state to develop an outpatient mental health program. In the Illinois model the State mental health department has deliberately chosen not to operate outpatient programs in the community, but rather to give grants to voluntary agencies or local governments to provide services. One approach the State used to develop community services was the "spin-off." When a new service was needed, State staff operated the program in the community until a grantee could be found, then the grantee assumed control of the program. In this case the sub-region staff worked closely with citizens' groups in the community to find a group to take over the state-operated outpatient program (Smith and Beech, 1983). The sub-region staff worked unsuccessfully with mental health advocates in the community to form an independent, not-for-profit mental health agency. Eventually the staff, with input from community advocates, decided that the most qualified agency was a sectarian social service agency. They were given a grant, State staff operating the program either went to work for the new agency or returned to other state jobs, and the program was successfully spun-off.

Some region offices have the additional role of working with local planning authorities. These authorities are established in the counties and townships which passed referenda to raise taxes for mental health services. They set priorities and distribute the local funds. These communities, because of their stronger local funding base, are more able to plan for their own needs than are the urban communities described above.

State legislation in 1980 (PA81-919) provided funds for demonstration projects to develop a continuum of community-based supportive services for the chronic mentally ill. This state initiative paralleled the federally-sponsored Community Support Program (Turner and TenHoor, 1978) implemented in other states. Again, region and sub-region staff worked with community agencies to plan and develop the demonstration project. The fact that the projects begun are all different is an indication of the state's concern for individualized planning for its varied communities.

**Current Issues; Future Trends**

A sharp decrease in state revenue income has led to a fiscal crisis in Illinois. The legislature granted the Governor power to make 2% cuts in state agency operating budgets for fiscal 1983 and more cuts are expected. Community mental health programs have been cut up to 4%. The Governor has also stated that if the state's flat-rate income tax is not increased for FY84 the General Assistance benefit of $144 per month will be eliminated. Such a cut, combined with the recent increase in denials of SSI applications, will make it increasingly difficult for the mentally ill to find adequate places to live in the community. As the federal and state priority continues to be development of community support services for the chronic mentally ill, Illinois may have lost the staff most qualified to develop these services and see that they become effective parts of the mental health system.

The most pressing issue is providing adequate services in the face of decreasing revenues. All states face similar problems. The block grant led to a net loss in federal monies. State and local funds for outpatient and early intervention programs have decreased (e.g. Schelkun and Cooper, 1982). Increasing unemployment has created an at-risk population which is no longer eligible for third party reimbursement for services. Minority communities, hard-hit by unemployment, frequently have fewer services.

The model described here of region offices responsible for the development of community programs, continuity of care, and accountability is both effective and flexible. It can serve as a means of developing the continuity of care systems that match the needs of clients, families and communities as Bachrach (1981) recommends. In an era when funding is decreasing and private community mental health agencies may be competing with one another and with state hospitals for scarce resources, some group of people must be responsible for the development and monitoring of the the delivery system as a whole. The region office can serve that function.

Now, when the federal government has withdrawn from a leadership role in mental health services and adequate community support services for the mentally ill still need to be developed, the states must fill in the gap. Using the model described here, State staff can work to maximize the use of limited resources to provide services in all communities.

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BLACK APPALACHIAN FAMILIES    Arthur J. Cox, DSW

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ABSTRACT

The black family in America has been subjected to social change
more than the family of any other racial or ethnic group.  An
overview of its adjustment through successive crises of African
transplantation, slavery, sudden emancipation, migration to cities
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Introduction
      The black family in America has been subjected to social
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An overview of its adjustments through successive crises of
African transplantation, slavery, sudden emancipation, migration
to cities and the vicissitudes of second-class citizenship help in
understanding the Black Family's contemporary forms.
      The Black family of Appalachia faces yet another problem -
invisibility.  Appalachian Blacks are a neglected minority within
a neglected minority.  There are few studies on the existence and
plight of Blacks in the hills, mountains and valleys of
Appalachia.  The most basic kinds of socio-economic and
demographic data on this segment of Appalachia's population is
difficult to obtain or is non-existant.  Statistics and other
published materials are scarce and the media frequently ignores
the experiences of blacks in the Appalachian region.
      A major purpose of this paper is to bring into the literature
vital information and data about Appalachia and its Black family.
      A general historical perspective provides for understanding
the evolution of and the maintenance of the Black family in
Appalachia.

Evolution of the Black Family in America:

    While there is controversy over the patterns of social interaction between the African family systems and the Black family in America, nevertheless, some generalizations can be made. It is generally acknowledged that the kinship group formed the basis of African Family life and that all other societal functions were organized and controlled by it.[1] Radcliffe-Brown and Forde indicate that African families were guided by certain philosophical principles of humanitarianism, mutual and community participation.[2] Herskovit's anthropological study of the Dahomey Tribe located at the center of the slave trade area, found that polygamy was the favored form of marriage , yet the family system was highly organized and characterized by unity, stability and security. All evidence indicated that sexual behaviors before[3] and after marriage were under strict family and community control.[4] Staples collaborates Herskovit's study by noting,

> Marriage was not just a matter between individual's but was the concern of all family members...as a result of this, there was community control of marriages, the dissolution of a marriage was a severe action and only used as a last resort—the authority pattern in the family was patriarchial. This male control in the family was based not so much on being dominant, but on the reverence attached to his role as the protector and provider of the family. Only if he successfully carried out these roles would respect and admiration be accorded him.[5]

    Blacks brought to America as slaves found their way of family life destroyed. Blacks lost most ties and cultural bonds as a result of the institution of slavery. The slaveowner put himself in the position of sanctioning behavior on his plantation including matters of religion, moral order, mate selection, sex, marriage and family life. Under more favorable conditions (and there were some) slaves did in fact develop and maintain families resembling that of the slave owner (parents and their offspring). It should be noted, however, that this occurred in significant numbers only after 1835, when the gap between the number of male and female slaves closed.[6]

    The slave mother remained the most stable and dependable elements during the entire period of slavery. Due to pressures by slave owners, the economic value of Black children and the slave mothers' devotion to their children, the Black woman was generally recognized as the head of the family group. As Dr. Frazier pointed out, "she was the mistress of the cabin, to which the husband or father often made only weekly visits;" under such circumstances a maternal group took form and the tradition of the Negro woman's responsibility for her family took root.[7]

Even among free Blacks, many of whom were mulatto and had been given freedom with a sound economic base by their white fathers, the mother or grandmother was placed in a special position. Staples disagrees with the Frazier thesis regarding the role of the father. He (Staples) argues that although the slave father could not perform many of the functions traditional assigned to fathers, there were other ways he would acquire respect from his family...he could add to the family's meager rations of food by hunting and fishing, or by making furniture for the cabin.[8]

There is also much evidence to dispel the notion that marriage and family ties were loosely held by Black families. After the Emancipation Proclamation, many slave marriages were recorded in local county offices, and previously sold family members were sought by their relatives throughout the South. Many former slaves and those who became free through their own efforts, copied the majority view of marriage - i.e., mother/father and their offspring.

No greater rate of mobility occurred within any ethnic group than among Blacks in the early 1900s. The "great migration" of Blacks from the South to the North which occurred just prior to, during and immediately after World War I illustrates this point. During the decade of the 1900s, 450,000 Blacks migrated North and West for the 1930 decades.[9] These families left the South for many reasons, but most important were potential economic benefits, avoidance of overt racial injustices, segregation and discrimination. The three major paths of migration were: 1) Florida, Georgia, the Carolinas, and East Alabama to Washington, D.C., Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York City, Hartford and Boston; 2) West Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, and Tennessee to Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, Dayton, Columbus, and Buffalo; and 3) Louisiana, Texas, and Oklahoma to Los Angeles, San Diego, San Francisco, Portland, and Seattle. Appalachia was partially on the route of two major pathways North.

This mobility resulted in major problems for Black families. Probably the most noted was the absence of strong sense of community (kinship) and control exercised by rural community organizations, primarily the church, on family members in the more impersonal, urban settings of the North.

The Black family differs from other families because of its unique history of slavery, mass migration, and extreme discrimination. The history continues today in society's maintenance of a caste-like system which tends to relegate Blacks to inferior status and keeps them in the lower socio-economic classes in America.

## The Black Appalachian Family:  An Historical Perspective

The number of blacks living in the Appalachian region is approximately 7.1% of the total population.  One out of every fourteen Appalachians is Black; the majority of these live in urban areas.  As in other parts of the nation, Appalachian blacks have a special history and a special heritage.

From the time of slavery, the region was in some ways a place of relative refuge.  The mountainous terrain provided some safety to runaway slaves and many underground railroad stations were known in Appalachia.  Additionally, the terrain was unsuitable for a plantation-oriented economy and many small, independent farmers were opposed to planters who tried to control the economy and to the institution of slavery which gave those planters their wealth and power.[10]

Some general remarks regarding the development of the Appalachian region are in order.  The East Coast of the United States was primarily settled by Aristocrats from Western Europe. The western area was settled by the more rugged Europeans, i.e., Germans, Scotch, Irish, Hugenots, Quakers and poor Whites who had served their time as indentured servants.  The Shenandoah Valley became a familiar thoroughfare for a continuous movement of these immigrants across the mountains of the Carolinas, Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Alabama.  These immigrants were best described as poor and every man and woman believed heavily in the "work ethic."

Economically speaking, the natural endowment of the west was so different from that of the East Coast that the former did not attract the people who settled along the Eastern Seaboard.  The mountaineers were in the midst of natural meadows, steep hills, narrow valleys and inexhaustible forests.

In the East, tobacco and corn were the stable commodities. Cattle and hog raising became profitable west of the mountains, while various other occupations which did not require so much vacant land were more popular near the sea.  While the settlers near the East Coast sought the cheap labor which the slave furnished, the mountaineers encouraged the influx of free men.  It is not strange then that there is no record of an early flourishing slave plantation west of the mountains.[11]

Pockets of mountaineers along the Shenandoah and Appalachian Mountain ranges resisted slavery.  These Appalachians resisted in a number of ways including participation in the underground railroad and providing education to runaways.  Runaways were among the first blacks in Appalachia.  The major routes of the underground railroad by which more runaways secured their freedom ran though the mountains to Ohio, Illinois, Indiana and Michigan.[12]

Immediately after the emancipation of Blacks in 1863, many
moved to Appalachia to work on the railroad, in the coal mines and
later in industries. But the majority of the earlier runaways and
later freedmen did not find the terrain hospitable to the skills
learned on the plantation and continued on through Appalachia to
the Midwest.

Despite the opposition to slavery, institutional racism as we
currently know and understand it does exist in Appalachia. Many
of the attributes which characterized the early eastern seacoast
settlers, such as a privileged class and caste-like system factors
can be found in the region. This is especially true outside of
the urban areas of the region, such as Knoxville, Chattanooga,
Roanoke, and Pittsburgh. Yet these cities have had their racial
problems, too. Many counties in Appalachia have few or no Black
families primarily because at some time or another, Blacks met
with violence when they tried to move there.

Another key factor to the understanding of the condition of
Black Appalachian Families is migration and reverse migration. As
Brown/Hillery points out:

> ..., Appalachian people desiring higher levels of living
> have had few alternatives to migration. The prospects
> for commercial farming have not been bright, industry had
> in the past been reluctant to settle in the region and
> coal mining has proved to be an undependable and
> inadequate source of employment even in the areas richest
> in coal resources.[13]

In addition, Southern Appalachia has been surrounded by more
highly developed economic areas with major cities and metropolitan
areas offering many jobs suitable for relatively unskilled and
inadequately educated persons. Consequently, for the past several
decades Appalachia has been the major labor pool for industrial
metropoli.

And, of course, the majority of migrants have been individuals
in their productive years (20-44). Pickard notes that in the
1960s, 38% of all net out-migration was concentrated in a single
five year age group (20-24) twice as high for males as females with
1/3rd of all Appalachian males leaving the region by 1970.
Ninety-five percent (95%) of all net migration out of the region
consisted of people under 45 in 1970.[14]

As a result of the above, the average age of the population
left behind increased, there was a drop in birth rates and the
replacement of young people slowed. Therefore, we find extended

Black families, with many very young and old members and few
members in their most productive years.
    In an earlier study, [15] Black families in Appalachia were
described as facing triple jeopardy, i.e., poverty being Black and
being invisible. While the Black population is of significant
number, basic socio-economic and demographic data are difficult to
obtain or is non-existant. Statistical data and published
materials are scarce and the media frequently ignores the
experience of Black Appalachians. While this kind of data is more
readily available on Blacks in other parts of the country, what is
available on Black Appalachian tends to be clouded in too many
myths and too little reality. Blacks generally appear to be
virtually invisible in Appalachia. In most instances, when
Appalachia is compared with the rest of America, it lags behind,
and when Blacks are compared to White Appalachians, they lag
behind.
    The following demographic data describes black Southern
Appalachian families as recorded in 1980 census data.

Table I
Southern Appalachian Region Population by State & Race

| STATES | White % | Black % | Other % | Total |
|--------|---------|---------|---------|-------|
| Alabama | 1,831,790 79.90% | 449,033 19.59% | 11,687 .51% | 2,292,510 |
| Georgia | 871,652 92.78% | 63,906 6.80% | 3,885 .42% | 939,443 |
| Mississippi | 340,534 71.36% | 130,962 27.44% | 5,695 1.20% | 477,191 |
| North Carolina | 1,094,541 89.50% | 117,597 9.62% | 10,877 .88% | 1,223,015 |
| South Carolina | 654,335 82.63% | 133,281 16.83% | 4,279 .54% | 791,895 |
| Tennessee | 1,547,780 92.16% | 112,164 6.68% | 19,470 1.16% | 1,679,414 |
| Virginia | 533,902 97.09% | 14,302 2.60% | 1,705 .31% | 549,909 |
| TOTAL | 6,874,534 86.44% | 1,021,245 12.84% | 57,598 .72% | 7,953,377 |

The Southern Appalachian region consists of portions of seven
states: Virginia, Tennessee, The Carolinas, Georgia, Alabama, and
Mississippi: Fourteen southwest Virginia counties, thirty east
Tennessee counties, twenty-nine Western North Carolina Counties,
six Western South Carolina counties, thirty-six North Georgia
counties, thirty North Alabama counties and twenty Northeast
Mississippi counties. Major cities included are Roanoke, Virginia,
Knoxville, Tennessee, Asheville and Charlotte, North Carolina,
Greenville, South Carolina, Chattanooga, Tennessee and Birmingham,
Alabama.

There are substantial numbers of black middle class families
in and around South Appalachian Cities, i.e., Roanoke, Knoxville,
Asheville, Charlotte, Greenville, Chattanooga and Birmingham. In
many ways these cities do not identify with Appalachia except in
political and funding consideration - Appalachian Regional
Commission - (see Tables II and III), in fact, residents in
surrounding counties reject the lifestyles of the city.

Table II
Large Metropolitan Populations of Southern Appalachia by Race

| Metropolitan Counties or Metropolitan Cities | White | Black | Other Pop. | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Charlotte N.C. | 182,647 74.95% | 59,403 24.38% | 1,633 .67% | 243,683 |
| Greenville S.C. | 235,210 81.69% | 50,842 17.66% | 1,861 .65% | 287,913 |
| Spartanburg S.C. | 159,872 79.20% | 40,870 20.25% | 1,119 .55% | 201,861 |
| Hamilton County City of Chatt TN | 229,976 79.34% | 55,840 19.26% | 4,047 1.4% | 289,863 |
| Knox County City of Knoxville TN | 288,675 89.74% | 28,006 8.71% | 4,986 1.55% | 321,667 |
| TOTAL | 1,096,380 81.52% | 234,961 17.47% | 13,646 1.01% | 1,344,987 |

## Table III
### Southern Appalachian Region with Metropolitan Area Cities

| States | White | Black | Other | Total |
|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| North Carolina | 911,894<br>93.62% | 52,902<br>5.43% | 9,244<br>.95% | 974,040 |
| South Carolina | 259,253<br>85.81% | 41,569<br>13.76% | 1,299<br>.43% | 302,121 |
| Tennessee | 1,029,129<br>96.37% | 28,318<br>2.65% | 10,437<br>.98% | 1,067,884 |
| TOTAL | 2,200,276<br>93.87% | 122,789<br>5.23% | 20,980<br>.90% | 2,344,045 |

## Socio-Economic Characteristics of Black Families:

Nearly twice as many Blacks as Whites live on incomes below the poverty level. Of Appalachians with low educational level (defined as lack of high school diploma) there is little difference between Blacks and Whites with more Whites having high school diplomas. Black employment rates outnumber White unemployment rates by at least 50%; with Black teenagers rate having nearly 70% more unemployment than White teenagers. This is particularly interesting finding since there is little difference in the number of Whites and Blacks who have high school diplomas.

In terms of housing, the data is more revealing. Housing in Appalachian is generally smaller and more cheaply constructed than housing in other areas of the country. Additionally, the houses are more crowded in this area of the country than one would expect. However, in terms of basic amenities including such important elements as central heat and hot water, three times as many Black Appalachian families live without central heat and hot water as do White Appalachians. This data suggests that Black Appalachians are worse off than Whites in terms of these social indicators. Yet, this region continues to be one considered as a land of poor White hillbillies solely with White problems and without the color problems that plague the rest of America. For instance, in the southern Appalachian region which lies between Knoxville, Tennessee and Roanoke, Virginia, approximately 250 miles east along the Appalachian range, there is only one Black dentist, one medical doctor, one Black with a terminal college degree, five Black registered nurses, and sixty-six Black teachers. There are few Blacks who are considered middle income in this region.

-319-

## Family Stability:

Family stability is measured in American Society by the extent to which families are able to meet the needs of their members and the demands made on them by outside social systems.

Utilizing Otto's framework for determining family stability, the following five attributes can be identified:[16]

A.  A concern for family unity, loyalty, and inter-family cooperation.
B.  An ability for self-help and the ability to accept help when appropriate.
C.  An ability to perform family roles flexibly.
D.  An ability to establish and maintain growth-producing relationships - within and without the family.
E.  The ability to provide for the physical, emotional and spiritual needs of a family.

These attributes are not limited to Black Appalachian families. These can be found among Black families in other parts of America as well as in White families. What is different, however, is the way in which these attributes are manifested in an Appalachian setting - a minority within a minority.

## A Concern for Family Unity, Loyalty, and Inter-family Cooperation:

The literature strongly supports the idea that the Appalachian family (both Black and White) has stronger kinship ties than families in other parts of the country, including middle and upper-class families. In Gazaway's[17] study of East Kentucky families, her quote of an Appalachian mother illustrates this point dramatically. "My children will never live any farther from me than I can spit." While a large number of Black Appalachian young adults have left the area, many their children are being reared by family members left behind; they make frequent visits back to the area and are also joining in the reverse migration trend.

Further, as Hill[18] reports, when the census reports are reviewed we find more Black families with no children of their own under 18 at home. Black families are more likely to take in other young related members; Black families headed by females have an even greater tendency to absorb other related children; Black families tend to take in elderly family members, but not significantly more so than White families. More absorption of family units has occurred within Black families until very recently. High interest rates caused a slump in new housing which resulted in more competition for available rentals, causing rents to skyrocket. As a result, many families, both White and Black, in and outside Appalachia, are absorbing families more than ever before.

## Availability for Self-Help and the Ability to Accept Help When Appropriate:

Appalachians are known for their rugged individualism. Various sociological studies[19] reveal Appalachians have a strong work orientation and tend not to accept help except as a last resort. Gazaway's[20] study on Eastern Kentucky contradicts this data in one respect. She found that poor White Appalachians lived to get on "the draw" - i.e., any income maintenance program. My social services experiences in the region reveal many Appalachians refused social services as they view professional helpers as intruders. More importantly, they feel they can resolve their own problem. They go to their families for help.

Black Appalachian families possess a strong work orientation. Hill[21] notes that this strength is characteristic of most Black families. Contrary to popular belief, Black families place a strong emphasis on work and ambition. Note: Black poor families are more likely to work than White poor families - 3/5ths of the Black poor work compared to 1/2 of the White poor. Despite this statistic, the economic plight of the Appalachian Black family is dismal. They tend to work at the most menial jobs earning the lowest wage.

Appropriate use of social and welfare services is limited by Black/White Appalachian families alike. This appears to be culturally determined. There is a general rejection of outside intervention into the family by those other than close family members or local extended groups. Also, outside use of societal resource systems is considered a weakness and used only as a last resort.

## Ability to Perform Family Roles Flexibly:

Appalachian family members (both Black and White) have difficulty performing various family roles. Most Appalachian families are traditional in nature - sex roles and functions of members are clearly defined. However, due to economic constraints, Black Appalachian families lean in the direction of performing various roles. For example, the substantial number of Black working wives has caused older siblings to act as "parents" and many Black youngsters have entered the job market (though without much luck).

## Ability to Establish and Maintain Growth-producing Relationships Within and Without the Family:

Black Appalachian families have a strong achievement orientation although in some instances, it is unrealistic. In a longitudinal study of Southwork[22] - White Appalachian children tended to have lower achievement orientation compared with the rest of White America - for example, girls choose traditional female occupations with a very high number choosing marriage. Blacks,

-321-

however, tended to choose high occupations while avenues to these
contain may barriers. These aspirations generated in the family
then, not in the Appalachian culture.
     As a result of not being able to reach goals we note
frustration emerging in antisocial and other dysfunctional
behaviors, this being no different form the Black majority group.

## Ability to Provide for the Physical, Emotional and Spiritual Needs of a Family:

     Religion in Appalachia, no matter the faith, plays a
significant roles in the lives of Appalachians, both White and
Black. Blacks have been adept as using religion as a mechanism for
survival and advancement throughout their history in America.[23]
Yet the role of religion in Appalachia appears to be used less for
survival and advancement. In a recent study[24] native Appalachian
Black families placed heavy emphasis on the church as a community
organization that sought community change. A review of the Black
churches in Appalachia suggest the opposite.
     Frazier[25] noted - it was through the Negro Church, one of
the most independent institutions in the Black community, that
Blacks learned to use religion as a survival mechanism. Black
ministers frequently used their sermons to transmit coded messages
to the congregation. Negro spirituals were often used for similar
purposes, particularly in assisting runaway slaves.
     However, the Black church in Appalachia tends to be
conservative and most resistive to change. The church's primary
membership is composed by older and very young persons. Its
missionary role revolves around "lost souls" and refuses to see
justice, adequate housing, equal opportunity for jobs, health, and
social services as necessary prerequisites to finding lost souls.
This attitude is quite different from Blacks in other areas of the
country. The most ambitions - in the age range of 22-45 - tended
to migrate out of the region and those who remained obtain ambition
for their children, but not necessarily for themselves.[26] It
would appear from Black's involvement and control of its religious
institutions, efforts could be generated to further enhance their
abilities to provide for the physical, emotional and spiritual
needs of family members.

     The future of the Black family in Appalachia is integrally
tied to the economics of the region, the political sophistication
of Black Appalachians and a change in its fatalistic view of the
world.
     Economic viability is a major factor which enables a family to
meet the needs of its family members as well as societal
expectations. Economic growth of the region has and still is
occurring. A consequence, among others, has been the influx of
Blacks from other areas of the country who have brought the plight

of native Black Appalachia to the attention of community decision-makers. Better paying jobs and promotions are slowly becoming available to Native Black Appalachia. If the economics of the region continues to expand, Blacks will benefit if they continue to exert constant pressure for higher paying jobs.

Black political participation must emerge and take shape in the region. Blacks must identify appropriate Black/White potential officeholders and actively engage in the political process. Due to their small percentage of the population in semi-rural and rural areas, Blacks have tended not to participate in major political parties or even vote, thinking their participation will not make a difference. This lack of political sophistication appears to be tied to the fatalistic outlook held by most Appalachians. Black families tend to accept their plight as fate, resist assistance to change their environment leaving their lives in the hands of the Lord.

It is true some progress has been made re-thinking this fatalistic view of life. Nonetheless, only a few groups and organizations within the Black Community are attempting to reverse the trend. Perhaps this is why so many Appalachians feel they are entrapped.

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ALTERNATIVE SERVICE DELIVERY STRATEGIES:  FACTORS IN STATES' DECISION MAKING

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ABSTRACT

   This article focuses on the range of choices and factors affecting state
level decision making about how human services are to be delivered.  In
light of the dual thrusts of decentralization and privatization, the
viability of public-private partnerships through contracting for services
is explored.  Among the significant factors affecting decisions about alter-
native forms of service delivery are: political and fiscal preferences; the
strength of organized labor; the role and availability of the private ser-
vice sector and history with purchase of service.  The advantages and dis-
advantages attributed to a contracting model for delivering services are
unlikely to be argued from an empirical base.  Rather, the relative influence
of various actors, ideologies and practices will affect states' decisions
about the scope and range of contracting and the degree to which there will
be reliance on the private sector.

   With the passage of the Ominbus Reconciliation Act of 1981 (P.L. 95-35),
states and localities now have substantially increased authority and flexibility
to design their human service programs.  Among the choices facing states is the
determination of how and to whom services will be delivered, methods of financing
services in light of decreased federal dollars, and the extent to which public-
private partnerships in service delivery can and should be fostered.  Although
the option to select among alternative service delivery arrangements is not new,
such issues have, heretofore, most frequently been debated at the federal level.
This paper explores some of the relevant issues and factors affecting state
decision making about strategies for delivering services, with particular atten-
tion to the viability of a contracting model between public and private organ-
izations.

   For this discussion, public agencies are defined as governmental, tax
supported agencies whose powers and duties are determined by statute and
administrative regulation.  Such agencies include state and local welfare
departments, youth and family service agencies, departments of mental health
and retardation, health departments, and other units of government often now
administered through an "umbrella" state human services agency and staffed
largely by civil service employees.

Private organizations are either for-profit or not-for-profit. Those of concern in this paper provide  human services as a primary function under the direction of a board of directors and are financed through profits, endowments, fees, direct or United Way contributions, and, to varying degrees, third party payments, and government contracts and grants. Non-profit organizations include affiliates of the Family Service Association of America and sectarian agencies such as Catholic Charities. Private for-profit organizations follow the customary corporate or other proprietary provisions and are becoming increasingly invested in human services. Activity areas include the nursing home, general hospital, day care center,  and homemaker service provider.

There are several exchange routes between the public and private sectors. In this paper we will focus on purchase of services which is one sub-heading of a larger spectrum of arrangements pertaining to the transmission of public funds to private bodies. More precisely, purchase of service (POS) refers to a set of organized procedures to bring public and private entities into partnership for the acquisition of goods or services in the public interest. Typically, a contract mechanism is used to actuate this arrangement between two organizations.

### Changing Policy Directions

The issue of choice about the manner in which services are delivered and by whom (public or private) occurs within the context of evolving relationships between the federal and state and local governments. President Reagan's "New Federalism" has as its thrust the decentralization of decision making and the dimunition of the federal government's role in determining the allocation and use of funds at the state and local level. The proposition is that by permitting states to choose their methods of delivering services, services can be planned and implemented in a way that meets specific state circumstances and needs.

The Reagan initiatives are, however, evolutionary rather than revolutionary. Revenue sharing, for example,  was created during the Nixon Administration to give localities broader discretion in speding federal funds than had previously characterized federal social service programs.  In a 10 year period beginning in 1972, $64.8 billion has been channeled to help pay for goods and services (Pear, 1982).  What is different under the Reagan plan is the planned withdrawal of federal agencies from such fields as welfare, the reduction or elimination of regulations governing the nature of human service programs, and decreased federal responsibility for funding such programs,  These changes significantly affect the magnitude of decisions to be debated at the state and local level.

There is, however, only a limited menu from which states can select in deciding on a service delivery strategy. States may elect to directly deliver services under public auspices, purchase services from private sources, rely on private sector initiatives, or combine direct and private delivery. Ultimately, the selection of a service delivery plan will reflect the particular political context affecting a state's decision making process, and the perceived feasibility of one approach over the others in terms of the organizational and fiscal resources available. Although ideologies of the left and

right occasionally bear witness to some cause most public policy decisions are made on a more pragmatic basis. The search is less for the ultimate truth than for the decision which will help the elected official the most and cost the least.

Decisions regarding methods of service delivery are very much influenced by and interrelated with changing federal policy directions, including the priority placed upon the use of the private marketplace and the reduced level of government funding available for human services. This Administration would like to see philanthropic and voluntary organizations assume major responsibility for social welfare, an occurence most consider unlikely. For example, the Independent Sector, a coalition of national voluntary organizations, corporations and foundations, cautions that the Administration has "unrealistic expectations for what private philanthropy can do "(Schmidt, 1982). To the extent possible, state governments are compensating, at least in part, for some of the reduced federal dollars, but states are experiencing their own, often severe, financial problems. A likely scenario is a continued public role (federal, state and local) in financing services, with contracts and grants serving as the major mechanism for the transfer of government funds to private organizations. Private organizations, in turn, will be expected to meet, in cash or kind, a proportion of the administrative and operating social welfare costs.

The current emphasis on finding alternatives to purely public systems of human services is consistent with the philosophy expounded by Drucker and Savas who believe that virtually all governmental program functions should be "re-privatized" through delegating or contracting them out to autonomous private or quasi-private institutions (Drucker, 1968: Savas, 1982). Partnerships between the public and private sectors have also been stressed. President Reagan has appointed a President's Task Force on Private Sector Initiatives to help meet the social and economic needs of communities. According to Chairman C. William Verity, Jr., local public-private partnerships will be encouraged to identify important community needs, followed by a marshalling of human and financial resources from the public and private sectors to meet those needs (Schmidt, 1982). Fiscally, as well as philosophically, the use of purchase of service arrangements fits with recent alterations in government roles and priorities and provides an important option for states in patterning their service delivery systems.

## Service Delivery Options

The extent to which state and local governments or private bodies should be reponsible for human services delivery has varied within the larger philosophical and political shifts affecting American domestic policy. Traditionally, the private sector has been the provider of choice, if not always in practice, in large part due to the residual nature of government services and the laissez-faire philosophy which has dominated government's approach to human services policies and practice. Long-standing perceptions that the public agency is a "weak" service provider have encouraged the formation of a "partnership" with the "more competent" private sector. The use of purchase of service arrangements has also been affected by general social forces which vary over time, including decentralization, subsidiarity, the growth of government and associated costs, public employee unions, legthargy and tradition, conflict of interest, and increased concern about productivity and accountability.

Wedel suggests the evolving practice of purchase of service has not relied upon an organized body of theory, but has instead followed normative guidelines (Wedel, 1974). As such, the availability of alternatives from which units of government can select how services are to be delivered rests on a series of interrelated propositions about the inadequacies of public services and perceived improvements needed in human services policies and programs. The strength of these propositions will vary depending upon state experiences, inter-organizational dynamics, and political preference. The degree of influence and power wielded by the private sector will also affect state decision making about service delivery mechanisms.

A number of factors have, in combination, encouraged states to opt for purchase of service with for-profit and voluntary providers. Not all of these factors are based on rational, considered processes, but financial considerations are likely to be a powerful influence favoring POS (Tatara and Pettiford, 1984). Under the 1967 Amendment to the Social Security Act, public welfare agencies were authorized to receive 75 percent federal reimbursement for service purchased from private agencies, with the private sector often supplying the matching 25 percent. As a result, the scope of social service contracting at the State level grew enormously, with estimates that over 50 percent of all public services are now purchased (Pacific Consultants, 1979). With the elimination of many of the federal regulations governing purchase of service contracting, states may now require that private agencies provide even a higher percent of the match. This "contribution" on the part of private agencies can be a powerful inducement to states to encourage the use of purchase source of purchase of service arrangements. Likewise, relying on the private sector as a primary source of service meets public demands to limit the size of government bureaucracies and their expenditures. With the introduction of new treatment concepts, the private sector has also been seen as more capable of responding to problems of deinstitutionalization, normalization, and mainstreaming. And of course, as always, interest group politics continues to operate.

The delegation of responsibilities and functions to the private sector does, however, poses anew a series of political questions regarding the relationship between government and non-public systems. These issues are now being debated in state capitols and the resolutions achieved will determine the extent to which purchase of service maintains or increases its status as a primary method of service delivery. Such questions include:
  •In what proportion should    public and private agencies have responsibility for providing services?
  •What systems of accountability can be instituted to insure the proper use of public funds and the targeting of services to specific client populations?
  •What method of service delivery is most cost effective?
  •What sector can more effectively and efficiently deliver services?
  •What role do public employee unions play in influencing a continued public sector role?
  •Do the advantages of contracting outweigh the liabilities of these arrangements?

Factors Influencing State Decision Making

Despite its long standing history, purchase of service continues to stimulate debate. Theoretical, empirical and pragmatic themes and questions about the efficacy and efficiency of POS continued to be posed, frequently couched in contrasting beliefs about the general role of government and its specific responsibilities. To a lesser degree, concern also arises about the impact of contracting on the voluntary, not-for-profit sector; here, too, varying points of view are reflected. Fear of, and occasionally antagonism to the private, for-profit sector are also at issue. Contrariwise there is another view which views the total organized not-for-profit sector, public and private as equally incompetent. To varying degrees, these historical issues regarding the use of POS are stimulating discussion in state legislatures and administrative agencies as decisions are made about the best means to deliver services.

For the most part, both advocates and opponents of purchase of service tend to be speculative, seldom arguing from an empirical base. Theory is tenuous. An advantage to one observer may be a disadvantage to another. The debate about contracting centers on such themes as efficiency and effectiveness of alternative service delivery approaches, accountability, client impact, cost, appropriate auspices, standards and professionalism. Diagram I outlines some of the frequently identified arguments for and against contracting. It should be noted that, although the advantage seem to numerically outweigh the disadvantages, the cogency of each argument will vary. The numbers are not relevant.

Some of the advantages and disadvantages are empirical, others are ideological. Even some of the more pragmatic criteria can be debated on value based terms. For example, most studies come roughly to the same conclusion: it is generally more efficient and productive for government to purchase goods and services than to provide them on its own. Thus, from the perspective of state legislators and public administrators, the logical decision in a majority of cases would be to purchase. Realities, however, often dictate otherwise.

In some jurisdictions, status, size of office, and even the quality of furnishings for senior officials are tied directly to the number of employees supervised. Fewer employees could mean a smaller office, poorer furniture and vinyl tile rather than carpeting. For elected officials, a reduction in patronage is anticipated. Public employee unions fear loss of positions and members. Such unions may be major financial contributors to state legislative campaigns as well as some legislators' most loyal volunteers. Similarly, they or their family members may be politically active in local government. Or, vendors may be in short supply or may not desire a government contract.

Space does not permit an in-depth discussion of all of the arguments which may enter the equation as to whether states and localities will purchase services (Capoccia, 1978). Instead, this discussion is limited to some of the more significant factors currently, or likely, to affect state and local decisions about the manner in which human services will be delivered.

Cash/Vouchers. Conspicuously absent from most of the continuing arguments posed about alternative service delivery mechanisms is the use of vouchers as a responsible option to provide consumers the financial resources to buy needed

Diagram I

ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE USE OF PURCHASE OF SERVICE  (Demone and Gibelman, forthcoming)

## Advantages

Cost Effectiveness
Accurate cost determinations
Administrative efficiency
Better service coordination
More responsive to immediate needs
Avoids cumbersome and dysfunctional Civil
    Service regulations
Ease of altering or terminating programs
Enhanced quality of services
More effective use of talent and human resources
Improved utilization of voluntary expertise and
    volunteers
Desirable mix of public and private services
Avoids political patronage
Increased professionalism
Flexible use of personnel
Improved program and administrative control
Program flexibility
Promotion of innovation in policy and
    administration
Helps retain volunteerism
Allows for competition in level of wages
More legal rights for clients
Frees public resources to service other important
    needs

## Disadvantages

Difficult to insure standards and adequate
    coverage
Loss of public control and accountability
Abrogates legislative intent
Undermines role of public agency
Loss of protection for the poor and most
    needy ("creaming")
Loss of autonomy for private agencies
Private agencies subject to shifts in public
    policy
Reduces experimental voluntary spirit
Directs private agencies to provide only
    publicly funded services

services on the open market. (In recent decades each Federal administration has explored the voucher philosophy. Since these initiatives are seldom implemented voucher alternatives are seldom integrated into mainstream debates about purchase of services). Vouchers can take the form of a coupon, chip, or credit to be reimbursed for consumer expenditures. Tuition tax credits and deductions can also be applied. These devices are all instrumentalities to make government assistance individual centered rather than institutionally based, thus effectively by passing the major human service agencies as required "brokers." An appeal of this individually oriented form of purchase of service is that it vastly reduces administrative and operating expenditures, while optimizing "freedom of choice" for clients.

Experience with the use of vouchers is limited and observations are not always grounded in empirical investigations. An attributed advantage of vouchers is that they allow the application of private market remedies to serve public policy objectives. They may have a beneficial impact on cost, efficiency and economy, widen choice and diversity, and enhance accountability to the consumer. On the other hand, drawbacks to voucher schemes include the limitation on consumers' ability to make informed judgements, the reliance on marketplace mechanisms in an environment of incomplete information, and the abdication of reliance on professionalism and expert knowledge.

To date, most of the experience with vouchers has been in the field of education, although third party reimbursement in the health industry has many voucher characteristics. Their enlarged use could stimulate the certification of providers to maintain quality control, in which public and private agencies. could compete. Voucher systems could probably not be easily applied to service areas in which a regulatory/supervisory public justice function in involved, such as child protective services, corrections and police protection. In these areas, the services delivered claim public uniqueness and could not be easily left to consumer choice.

Decentralization. The Federalist spirit has abounded throughout our nation's history, taking many forms. More recently, President Johnson sometimes bypassed state governments, going directly to local governments with funding and service delivery responsibility. In addition, in 1966 block health grants to states were enacted. Under the "Great Society", federal funds were allocated to neighborhood groups which in turn organized themselves to influence governmental decision making. Smith claims that this strategy was partly a response to the societal conditions of the time, including a pervasive feeling of estrangement from the powerful institutions of society and deep historic tensions concerning race relations. In his view, "the participatory contracts are especially interesting because they illustrate in extreme form the tendencies implicit in the 'diffusion of sovereignty', the dispersion of power, the blurring of the lines of authority, the breakdown of the public-private distinctions" (Smith, 1971).

President Nixon explored decentralization by strengthening federal regional offices and giving state and local governments more authority. Revenue sharing was enacted. To President Reagan, the federal government was created by the states. Decision making, he believes, should occur at the local level where officials best know local needs (Pear, 1982). He also talks about reinvigorating the private sector. Volunteerism has returned in spirit, if not in fact.

Whatever the form for implementing a decentralized structure, the net result of the combined rhetoric and actions by many presidents and echoed by many governors is to reinforce pluralism and alternative structural models. Revenue sharing and block grant programs have generally been received with enthusiasm; governors and mayors welcome the reduced red tape and orders from Washington. Discontent at the state and local level with this structural mode is aimed at the diminished federal dollars, not the concept. Purchase of service is ideologically consistent with these preferences for decentralized local decision making and has the added advantage of utilizing the expertise of the local private sector.

Government Performance. Opinion polls, the source of much wisdom and political action, document the increasing disenchantment of Americans with their government. The Harris Poll "Index of Alienation" asked a sample population to respond to the statement: "The people running the country don't really care what happens to you." In 1966, 29 percent agreed with this statement, but by 1980 those in agreement reached 58 percent. The comparable item from the Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan, found trend figures of 19 percent in 1964 and 60 percent in 1980 (Time, Feb. 23, 1981). Another Harris poll (1973) found that the majority of respondents viewed public employees as the "least productive in the country " (Serrin, W., 1981). These negative opinions about the performance of governmental agencies has stimulated elected and administrative officials to search for alternatives. The options may be limited to finding ways to improve government performance or to circumvent the use of public agencies by enlarging the role of the private sector. Here, again, purchase of service enters the equation as a viable means of reducing government's role.

Government Size. Another matter of continuing presence at the federal, state and local level is the constant lament about the size and growth of government. Typically, it is more complicated than promulgated. In respect to absolute numbers of civilian employees, the federal government has remained remarkably stable for about twenty years. The growth has been in state and local government; consequently, attention to decreasing the size of public bureaucracies is now increasingly directed to state capitols. In regard to expenditures, government at all levels has grown, generally in excess of inflation and increases in the Gross National Product.

Whatever the facts or complications, the size of government is a serious target for many significant segments of our society. The sixty year boom in public employment may have finally stabilized (The Economist, November 22, 1975). Options are more legitimated. To the extent that public opinion continues to favor a decrease in the size of public bureaucracies, pressure will be exerted on elected and appointed officials to explore alternative ways of producing goods and services.

Organized Labor. The position of public employee unions is unequivocal. They oppose contracting public services and are mounting increasingly strident objections to such practices. Picketing of private contractors is not uncommon.

Despite the size and importance of public employee unions, it seems unlikely that the AFL-CIO, for one, will take an aggressive continuing organizational stance against public purchase of services. Many of their members belong to unions affiliated with private sector organizations receiving these same contracts.

-333-

Also, in many cases the public employees loosing their positions are hired by private organizations, often joining another union. In addition, most human service employees, in private or public organizations, are not members of organized labor. Thus the positions assumed by both advocates and opponents of contracting are sometimes contrary to their own self-interest. Last, but perhaps most important, many of the major critics of public services are themselves members of organized labor.

The opposition of public employee unions, tempered as it is by the needs of members to secure jobs in contracted programs, may not always be a critical variable in states' decision making about methods of service delivery. The cogency of their arguments will, of course, vary with the strength of unionism in a particular locale and the extent to which purchasing services is perceived as hurting or helping union members. The realistic concern with maintaining or securing employment for union members in a time of 10 plus percent national unemployment is likely to affect the position assumed by unions,

Conflict of Interest. Conflict of interest is an increasing concern. Such conflict may mean a loss in quality to the consumer, as well as increased costs. Conflict of interest may occur when the organizations responsible for providing services also monitor, evaluate and account for such services as is often the case for many large state agencies. The organizations responsible for the allocation of funds also may be in a conflict of interest position when the alternative is to continue funding their own operations or disperse funds to non-public service providers. Self-monitoring attributes are inherently limited by self-interest, and decisions may not be achieved on objective criteria. Americans distrust private monopolies, and public monopolies are no less sacred as they suffer the same structural faults. But even more than trust; monitoring of public organizations is ridden by conflict of interest.

The editor of the distinguished British journal, The Economist, suggests "... it has become increasingly clear the ownership of means of production is no longer a source of political and economic power and may indeed now be a source of political or economic powerlessness" (The Economist, Nov. 22, 1975). The editor concludes that governments' may have limited day-to-day control over themselves. Direct control over employees can only be secured by passing down instructions and this doesn't work when people resent being regarded as subordinates. The Economist notes, in contrast, that it is relatively easy to take action against subcontractors, taxpayers, or other outsiders by cutting off orders or raising charges (The Economist, 1975). Public organizations responsible for planning, budgeting, staffing, programming and evaluation, when viable competition is lacking, are highly vulnerable to conflict of interest charges, as in all vertical organizations. A logical means of addressing this issue is to create a service delivery structure more amenable to control and accountability.

Procurement and Assistance Programs. A continuing force at the federal level has been presidentially-promulgated policy since 1955, through the Office of Management and Budget, that the government rely on private sector contractors to provide goods and services needed to act on the public's behalf (Comptroller General, 1981). Basically, the position as later postulated in Circular A-76 has several components:
   ·Agencies may use military personnel, civilian employees, and contract services to perform Federal activities;

·Activities whereby 10 percent or more in personal savings can be identified should be contracted; and
·Exceptions are selected with discretion. Examples are core functions of government such as national defense, program priority selection and controlling monetary transactions.

It is noteworthy that Congress has not overruled the policy although it could do it by legislative or political action. In 1980 the Office of Management and Budget estimated that about 14 percent of all Federal employees were still providing services that could be contracted out under the terms of this policy. This pro-contracting stance serves as a model for states, and at least to some degree is followed. The message from Washington seems to be that purchasing services is a more desirable alternative, and when this option is present, it should be pursued.

Shepsley uses as a criterion for public operation those matters in which there is an "insufficient supply of public gooods and externalities." in such instances, there would be a "... prima facie case for the consideration of public provision or regulation " (Shepsley, K.W., 1980). As examples, he uses national highways, interstate highways and lighthouses. By inference, the use of private sources to provide goods and services is justified in all instances when such external alternatives are available.

Cost Data. Several findings seem to occur consistently in research on governmental functioning; among them, cost data are inadequate and understated and it is usually found to be less expensive to contract out than to operate services directly. A typical example of inadequate information is shown in a 1978 study by Savas and Associates of 315 municipal refuse collection systems. Savas found that accounting costs varied, many costs were never included in the refuse budget and, in conclusion, the actual costs could not be calculated (Savas, E.S., Stevens, B.J., Berenyi, E.B., 1978).

In respect to costs, the Department of Defense, which conducted over 300 comparison studies using the 10 percent personnel savings factor noted above, found in about 60 percent of the studies activities that it was more economical to convert in-house activities to contracts (Comptroller General, 1981).

Reprivatization. Given the many influences, theory building and language innovation is often stimulated, Peter Drucker a noted economist filled the gap in 1968 with his development of the theory of "reprivatization" now more often called privatization. He described the esteem attributed to government in the developed countries from the 1890s to 1960s. But international disenchantment set in, Drucker believes. Government is big, not strong; it is flabby and fat; costs a great deal but achieves little. He suggests that governments have lost control of their bureaucracies. "It can do only two things well. It can wage war, It can inflate the economy " (Drucker, 1968, p. 217).

Drucker traces the etiology of this change in perception of government. Too much was expected and disillusionment set in. It was believed that governmental redistribution of wealth would solve economic problems that are noted in inadequate productivity. Another illusion was that by giving a task to government "... conflict of decisions would be made to go away" (Drucker, p. 215). Government would be rational and unselfish and economic self interest would disappear.

To Drucker, government should be making the basic decisions. To govern effectively, political energies need to be focused and issues identified and dramatized. Fundamental choices must be clarified. But governing and doing may be incompatible. Drucker urges decentralized functions, separating doing from governing. Doing should be accomplished by non-governmental institutions who would perform the operations. Government would serve as society's resource for determining major objectives, and be a "conductor" of social diversity. This need not mean "return to private ownership" (Drucker, p. 234).

In Drucker's conception, government would be the logical body to make choices about what services are to be delivered, who can best provide them, and to whom they should be targeted. But government would not be the service delivery source. Such functions would be left to private, autonomous institutions either of a for-profit or on occasion, the not-for-profit nature. Drucker sees a society which allows institutions to do what they are best equipped to do, including governing by government.

## Future Directions

It is highly unlikely that state and local decisions about which needs are most important, how services can best be delivered, and under whose auspices, will be made as the result of a straight-forward need analysis and empirical analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of purchase of service as contrasted with direct public delivery. Forecasting in this political environment is replete with complexities. Many of the factors influencing decision making about service delivery options have already been listed and some of the forces at work described.

The major pressures to purchase include stimuli which will not easily subside. It is usually less expensive and allows for more effective quality control. Purchase is compatible with the desire to decentralize, which feeds on large scale and increasing public discontent with governmental functioning and performance and hostility to the bureaucracy. It reduces the public monopolistic vertical organizational structure and is reinforced by the periodic thrusts to "reprivatize" public functions. Changes in the 1981 Federal tax laws are also favorable to selected new relations between governments and the private sector. And each successful implementation facilitates additional exchanges.

Those forces opposing the use of the private market, through purchase of service, are also very powerful. Within the human services, recent dramatic reductions in available federal and state dollars mean curtailment of some services. It may be easier to reduce contracted programs than to decrease governmental operations. Public service employee unions fear loss of members and, depending on their strength, may engage in vigorous counter attack. Their opposition is reinforced by the way Federal and some state and local governments managed their reductions in force in 1981 and 1982. It was often inept, extraordinarily complex, created organizational choas and so disrupted morale that few senior bureaucrats want an early replay.

Also in opposition to purchase of service are concerned people in significant positions in and out of government who hold strongly held ideological positions about the proper role of government. The gradual transfer of selected governmental

operating programs to the private sector is not compatible with their long-standing beliefs. These matters reflect honest matters of judgement, not self interest.

Perhaps most important in determining how states' human services will be structured and delivered are factors of inertia, caution and self-interest. These factors have long restrained major change in government and there is no reason to believe that they are less powerful today. Our governments are not designed to accomodate to rapid social change or to deal effectively with entrenched opposition. Despite the increased decision making powers of the states within the human services realm, tradition and long standing practices may play a particularly powerful role in determining the degree to which patterns of service will be altered.

The net balance suggests selective growth in purchase of human service, but at a slower rate than in the 1970s due to both increased resistance and a decreased public investment in the human services. In the face of conflicting demands, choice will be difficult. Nevertheless, the decision to purchase services from private vendors is consistent with the thrust to redefine governmental functions and operations and form partnerships with the non-public sector. No one doubts the government will continue to play the important planning, development, financing and accountability roles, but increasingly as an overseer rather than a doer likely through the remainder of this century and into the next one.

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THE SUNSET REVIEW OF A SOCIAL WORK BOARD OF EXAMINERS:
A CASE EXAMPLE

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ABSTRACT

    The author reviews the events following the passage of Colorado's pioneer
Sunset Review Legislation in 1976.  The experiences of the 36 states which
passed Sunset Legislation have been varied.  Lobbying efforts in addition to
costs have played a significant role in the review process and outcome.  A case
analysis of the Sunset Review of the Colorado Social Work Board of Examiners
illustrates the tenacity of a group of professionals determined to maintain
legal regulation of the social work field.  The group's success was a result of
political organization and the technical expertise required to influence policy
makers.

    The scenario goes something like this:  In 1976, just one year after the
enactment of a Colorado Social Work Practice Act and the establishment of a Social
Work Board of Examiners, the Colorado Legislature initiated the first Sunset
Review Law in the country.
    The original concept of Sunset Review was conceived by the Colorado Chapter
of Common Cause.  They envisioned it as a tool which would enable state government
to be more accountable through a process of joint executive and legislative evalu-
ations of programs created by statute.  In Colorado, the passage of House Bill No.
1088 of 1976 provided for the termination of the 39 boards and commissions in
Colorado's Department of Regulatory Agencies. Starting July 1, 1977, one-third of
the boards and commissions were scheduled for termination every other year. In
addition, any newly created agency, as well as those which survived the review
cycle, would be given a terminable life of six years. After six years, the agency
would be scrutinized through the Sunset Review process.  In all cases, the boards
and commissions would be abolished unless they received a mandate from the
Colorado Legislature to continue existence.  Legislative consideration would be
based on both a performance audit conducted by the executive branch and by
legislative hearings where the public could respond and give testimony. According
to statute, the agency under review must demonstrate a 'public need' for its
continuance.[1]
    Under the new Sunset Law, the first round of agency reviews concluded with
an array of changes.  The Legislature continued nine boards.  Three of the nine
were re-established with modifications--the Collection Agency Board, the Racing
Commission, and the Passenger Tramway Safety Board (which regulates ski lifts).
In addition, two other boards--the Cosmetologists Board and the Board of Barber

Examiners--were consolidated.  Also, three boards were abolished--the Board of
Shorthand Reporters, the State Athletic Commission, and the Board of Professional
Sanitarians.

During this same review period, the Colorado Legislature was unable to
complete a thorough review of six sizeable agencies. The Legislature postponed
review of the Public Utilities Commission, the Division of Insurance, the Board
of Life Care Institutions, the Board of Nursing Home Administrators, the
Electrical Board, and the Board of Mortuary Science.  In the following legis-
lative session all six boards were continued and the Legislature created a new
oversight board for the Division of Insurance.[2]

Colorado's initial experience appeared to have accomplished the sunset aim
of streamlining government.  In turn, the popularity of sunset grew like topsy.
Twenty-three additional states adopted Sunset Laws by 1977, and every state
legislature has since given consideration to a mandatory agency evaluation
mechanism.[3]

Sunset Review appears to have an impressive track record.  From 1976-1981,
approximately 1500 agencies were reviewed in all the sunset states: nearly 300
agencies have been terminated; approximately 500 were modified; and the balance,
re-established with very little or no change (Common Cause, 1982).

Despite its successful record, Sunset Review is not without its problems.
In fact, many states report difficulty with the review system including  problems
of cost, limited public participation, limited program evaluation experience, and
the enormous amount of staff time that is required to complete an audit (Common
Cause, 1982). The costs of the reviews have been reported to run between $8,000
to $12,000 each, and the average 1982 state sunset budget was over $200,000
(Roederer and Palmer, 1981; Common Cause, 1982). In addition, eighty percent
of the sunset states have not been able to report any savings as a result of
the review process (Common Cause, 1982).  Another major problem is the unwilling-
ness of legislators to abolish boards in response to professional association
lobbying pressure (Mitzman, 1979).

Disenchantment with Sunset Review has grown significantly.  Seven of the
sunset states have introduced bills calling for the repeal of their statute.
One state--North Carolina--repealed its Sunset Law in 1981, and replaced it with
an evaluation mechanism without the automatic termination authority found in
Sunset.  Ironically, even the pioneer state--Colorado--considered proposed
legislation in 1981 to terminate the nation's first Sunset Law.  Although this
bill failed in the Senate by a two-to-one margin, its existence  marked the level
of frustration that legislators have experienced with sunset activity.

Since its beginning in 1976, legislators have gradually  decreased their
support of Sunset Review as a reaction to the criticism they have encountered.
For example, the Colorado Deputy State Auditor publicly reported disillusionment
over the Legislature's minimal efforts in the review process (Pierce and Hagstrom,
1977).  Criticism was also assailed at the Texas Legislature where legislator
voting patterns on sunset audits were clearly a reflection of the amount of
campaign contributions they received during the election races (Common Cause,
1982). In North Carolina, the Legislature was accused of buckling under

the pressure of lobbyists and interest groups leading to the repeal of the
North Carolina Sunset Law (Common Cause, 1982).

Back in Colorado, legislators came to their own defense.[4] Some spoke of
repealing the Sunset Law, while others thought it should be modified so that the
review cycle was every ten years.  Furthermore, some legislators held a more
extreme  view which consisted of killing some regulatory boards in order to
demonstrate to the public that they were indeed serious about curbing government.
The crusade to kill off regulatory agebcies came at an inopportune time for the
Colorado Social Work Board of Examiners.  They were scheduled for the next review!

## PREPARATION FOR SUNSET REVIEW

The potential for a problematic review of the Colorado Social Work Board of
Examiners was recognized earlier on.  Reports from the Kansas Chapter of the
National Association of Social Workers on the Sunset Review of the Kansas Board
of Social Work Examiners indicated legislator interest in the number of complaints
adjudicated by the Board.  There was also strong interest in the idea of merging
the Psychology Board with the Social Work Board.[5]  In Colorado, consumer complaints
against  social workers numbered only fifteen in a six year period. Seven of those
cases, however, were against unlicensed social workers for which the Board did not
have any jurisdiction. Of the remaining eight cases, four were closed based on
findings of no violations; two cases were still under investigation; and, two
cases were referred to a Board hearing.  By the beginning of the review period,
one of the two cases was still pending a decision. The other case resulted in a
licensee suspension.  Thus, the argument that  a Social Work Board of Examiners
was needed to protect the consumer was, like in Kansas, a weak position. In
addition, there was a desire among Colorado social workers to reject the amalgamated
board concept like the one that was developing in Kansas. In fact, the Kansas
experience prompted Colorado social workers to communicate their position on
the umbrella board issue in a letter to the Executive Director of the Colorado
Department of Regulatory Agencies.[6]

In response to the potentially problematic review, a Surviving Sunset Review
Committee was appointed by the Colorado Chapter, National Association of Social
Workers' President.  Ten Chapter members were selected to serve on the Committee
based on their substantial social work experience as well as their ability to
represent social workers from a variety of practice settings.  The Committee was
staffed by the Chapter Executive Director and assisted by a graduate social work
intern.  Committee activities were financed by Chapter funds and contributions
from several sources including individual social workers, the Colorado Society
for Clinical Social Work, the Colorado School Social Work Association, and from
a National Association of Social Workers' Program Advancement Fund (PAF) Grant.[7]

By September 1979, the Chapter Committee was meeting on a monthly basis.
Initial meetings weredevoted to formulating a direction for the year.  These early
planning sessions also provided the Committee with an important opportunity to
educate each Committee member on the fine points of the Colorado Social Work
Practice Act[8] in addition to reviewing the arguments for and against occupational

regulation (Hardcastle, 1977; Johnson, 1977; Shimberg, 1976; NASW, 1976).
Other concerns that were examined included several issues that were raised by
the State Auditor's Office and the Department of Regulatory Agencies. Among
these concerns were the limited number of consumer complaints; the five year
eligibility requirement for the LSW II type of license;and, the inability to
enforce the reciprocation clause with other states.[9] Another concern that was
raised by the auditing groups was the limitation the Act had on regulating the
practice of social work.  Both auditing agencies thought that the Act only served
to protect the title of "Licensed Social Worker."

## LEGISLATIVE EVENTS AND THE LOBBYING EFFORT

The Chapter Committee secured a Senate sponsor and a House sponsor to intro-
duce a bill calling for the continuation of the Social Work Practice Act of 1975.
The new bill contained some housecleaning measures to help clarify the boundaries
between the Registered Social Worker and the Licensed Social Worker I.  While
the Committee recognized the benefit that the Sunset Review could have on clean-
ing up some difficult sections in the law, they felt the best strategy would be
to suggest few changes and be obliging when amendments were introduced in the
legislative hearings (Block et al, 1983).

On January 8, 1981, the second day of the new General Assembly year, the
bill to continue the Social Work Practice Act came before the Senate Health
Committee for its first legislative hearing.  As in both their reports to the
Legislature, the State Auditor and the Executive Director of the Department of
Regulatory Agencies testified against the continuation of the Act. In addition,
the President of the Colorado Division of the American Association for Marriage
and Family Therapy spoke against the merits of the Act. He asked the Senators
to abolish the Social Work Board of Examiners and create in its place a
Behavioral Science Board which would include the counseling groups that were
not licensed, such as the guidance counselors, pastoral counselors, vocational
rehabilitation counselors, and the (non-M.S.W.) marriage counselors.

Although opposition arguments were strong, the biggest blow came from
the Colorado Social Work Board of Examiners--the group that the Chapter Committee
was attempting to sustain.  Testimony from members of the Board did not convey
much  knowledge of the Act, nor did they display any zeal in support of it.
In fact, the Board members that were present in addition to the Board Admin-
istrator were not able to  respond with exactness to legislator inquiries con-
cerning the number and status of cases that were investigated and reviewed.
Consequently, Chapter Committee members whose testimony followed the Board's
presentation  simply could not capture the interest of the Senators. A vote at
this juncture would have meant certain defeat for the bill.  Fortunately, the
bill's chief sponsor was also the Chairman of the Senate Committee.  As Chairman,
he exercised his authority to postpone a vote on the bill.

In an attempt to turn around the sentiment against the social work bill
that prevailed during the January 8th hearing, the Chapter Committee diligently
lobbied Senators who served on the Health Committee. In addition, over two
hundred letters were generated by activating the Chapter Education Legislative

Action Network's (ELAN Committee) telephone contact system. In February, the Chapter Committee returned to the Senate Health Committee's chamber to discover that the lobbying efforts paid off. That morning, the bill passed out of the Senate Committee, although in an amended form. The amended bill reduced the life of the bill from its six year cycle to onle one year. According to the author of the amendment, the social work profession should return in one year with a new bill which includes a provision for the regulatory control of the behavioral science practitioners not currently covered by statute. Also, a second amendment was adopted which would prohibit the Colorado Department of Personnel from including licensed social workers in the sample population used for the State's wage and salary survey. Apparently, the amendment's maker feared that a licensed social worker's salary would be high, thus pushing the cost of State salaries upward.

The next day, the full Senate approved the amended bill and sent it to the Colorado State House of Representatives for their consideration of the bill. With the assistance of the bill's House sponsor, it was appointed to the House Health Committee which gave the psychologists an unfriendly reception during an earlier Sunset Review.

The Chapter Committee spent a considerable amount of time preparing for the House Committee hearing. The result was an improved range of testimony. Furthermore, a handout was created for this occassion which identified that social workers saw more clients than both the combined caseloads of psychologists and psychiatrists (Thompson et al, 1980; Grosser and Block, 1983). The handout also reported that there are as many social workers that are engaged in private practice as there are psychiatrists. Moreover, the Chapter Committee questioned the logic of terminating the Social Work Board of Examiners while leaving the Psychology Board and the Medical Examiners Board intact. The House Committee agreed and they passed the bill on to the Rules Committee with an amendment to restore the bill back to an extended life of six years.

Next, the bill was sent to the House Rules Committee which has the responsibility for determining when a bill will be brought before the entire Assembly for a vote. It was here that the Chapter Committee was stonewalled by the Rules Committee Chairman who proclaimed that he was going to "kill" the bill by not placing it on the House Calendar.

In response to this new crisis, the Chapter Committee spent the next three days working earnestly to change the Chairman's staunch position. As before, the Committee was aided by the Chapter ELAN Committee. They were able to generate sixty mailgrams from constituents of the Rules Chairman. Meanwhile, the bill's two House sponsors pleaded its cause, and sympathetic lobbyists from outside the human service field agreed to help at the request of the Chapter's Lobbyist, President, and Executive Director. Within hours of the deadline, at which time the bill would face its automatic death, the Rules Chairman decided to schedule the bill on the House Calendar.[10]

The bill would now be examined by the full House. However, the bill's House sponsor used her charm and reputation to help move the bill successfully

through the House without any debate. The House also agreed to assign the bill
to a Conference Committee since House and Senate versions differed.  The
Conference Committee consisted of the bill's two major sponsors in addition to
two Senators and two Representatives.  At the time of the Conference Committee
meeting, the Senate sponsor was absent (due to a death in his family).  In his
absence, the House sponsor chaired the meeting and verbalized a strong pro-
bill position.  The Chapter Executive Director was the only witness that was
called to testify.  Afterwards, the Conference Committee reached a consensus
of opinion.  They agreed to restore the bill to its original six year version,
and to strike the amendment concerning the wage and salary survey sample.
      After Conference Committee, the bill was returned to the House for its
final consideration.  After its passage, the bill was sent to the Senate.  How-
ever, the Senate sponsor (from Colorado Springs) was still absent.  In need of a
Senate advocate, several Colorado Springs social workers along with the Chapter
Lobbyist convinced another Colorado Springs Senator--who early in the process was
against the bill--to agree to speak in support of the bill.  As it turned out,
the original Senate sponsor arrived back to the Senate Chambers just in time to
present the bill to a weary Assembly.  The bill passed unanimously.


                                    NOTES

1. State of Colorado House Bill 1088 of 1976 requires a performance audit to take
   into consideration: the extent in which the Board has permitted qualified
   applicants to serve the public; affirmative action requirements complied with;
   operated in the public interest; agency recommendations to serve the public
   better versus the profession; impact of the rules and regulations; public
   participation in the rules making; the efficiency  by which complaints have
   been handled.

2. In 1979, thirteen agencies were reviewed in Colorado, ten were continued
   and three were terminated.  In the 1980-81 legislative session, thirteen
   agencies were reviewed, four were modified, four were continued for one
   year, two were consolidated, and three were terminated.

3. The 36 sunset states and the year they adopted Sunset Legislation are as
   follows: In 1976, Colorado, Alabama, Florida, Louisiana; in 1977, Alaska,
   Arkansas, Conneticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Maine, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
   New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
   Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington; in 1978, Arizona, Indiana, Kansas,
   Maryland, South Carolina; in 1979, Illinois, Mississippi, Nevada, West
   Virginia, Wyoming; in 1980, Delaware; in 1981, Pennsylvania.

4. For examole, on Saturday February 7, 1981, two legislators held a press
   conference during which time Senator Hefley stated, "the Legislature lacks

   .

the backbone to do what needs to be done with agenceis up for review." One
week earlier, Senator Durham said he wanted to do away with the Sunset Law
because the Legislature lacked courage to take a stand against lobbyist
pressure.

5. Information regarding the Kansas sunset audit came from materials received from
   the Kansas Chapter of the National Association of Social Workers. Additional
   information was shared in conversation with the Kansas Chapter, NASW Executive
   Director, Carl Myers. See, The Kansas Sunset Audit, Kansas Division of Post
   Audit, released November, 1978.

6. A letter was sent to Gail Klapper, Executive Director of the Department of
   Regulatory Agencies, from the Chapter Sunset Review Committee, on July 30,
   1980.

7. The Program Advancement Fund Grant was awarded for two reasons: One, to help the
   Chapter in its efforts to maintain legal regulation of the profession. The second
   reason was to establish a set of guidelines that would be useful for other State
   Chapters that would become involved in Sunset Reviews.

8. There are three levels of Social Work Regulation in Colorado. Eligibilty
   requirements for the Registered Social worker include an M.S.W or B.S.W. plus
   two years of supervised experience, and a fee. The Licensed Social Worker I,
   requires two years of supervised experience, plus an M.S.W., an exam, and a fee.
   The Licensed Social Worker II requires five years of supervised experience, plus
   an M.S.W., an exam, and a fee. The Social Work Practice Act of 1975 also contains
   a provision for privileged communication, public employee and not-for-profit
   employee exemption, continuing education of 14 clock hours for renewal, and a
   clause on reciprocity. However, reciprocity has not been honored to date since
   applicants come from states with different eligibility requirements.

9. The official position of the State Auditor's Office was revealed in the
   Sunset Audit of thr Board of Social Work Examiners, released July, 1980.
   Information was also gleaned through conversation with Dan Hall, Program
   Evaluator, Colorado Department of Regulatory Agencies, on January 25, 1980.

10. Although the Rules Chairman decision to place the bill on the House Calendar
    may be attributed to the aggregate efforts of the Chapter Committee, the
    sponsors, the lobbyists, and the CHapter membership, the Chairman stated his
    reason for placing the bill on the Calendar was  in oder to not interrupt the
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# SOCIAL WORK PAC'S AND STATE SOCIAL WORK ASSOCIATIONS
## PURPOSE, HISTORY, AND ACTION STRATEGIES

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### ABSTRACT

Social work as a profession has only recently become politically active. One consequence of this interest in the political process has been the proliferation of political action committees as creatures of the National Association of Social Workers and its state chapters. Social work PAC's are a key ingredient necessary to enable the profession to influence public policy. Perhaps because political action committees are new to NASW, or perhaps because NASW is new to politics, very little has been written about the history, purpose or strategic implications of these committees.

This paper will trace the development and operation of PAC's and their relation to the state chapters of NASW. The Michigan Political Action for Candidate Election Committee (PACE)[1] will be utilized to illustrate key points.

## Purpose

What is a political action committee? It is a legal entity established for the purpose of supporting political candidates and issues. PAC's are regulated by the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA") and its 1976 amendments. The reasons for establishing a PAC quickly explain their sudden proliferation.

FECA prohibits associations like NASW from making campaign contributions but allows them to "establish, administer and solicit contributions to a 'separate segregated fund' whose sole purpose is to make political contributions and expenditures." (Webster, 1979) There are tax advantages. There is the selling point that all money contributed to candidates will go to candidates since the association can pay expenses. Another advantage is spending limitations. While individuals are limited to $1,000 per candidate, PAC's may spend up to $5,000 per candidate per election. Finally, according to the American Society of Association Executives, "...the association which establishes a PAC may control the PAC completely with respect to its income and expenditures. For example, the association may decide who will be solicited by the PAC and which candidates for public office will be supported." (Webster, 1979)

This is a persuasive list of advantages to an organization for operating a PAC. There are other advantages in addition to the legal, tax and control issues. The Michigan NASW PAC lists among its objectives, in addition to helping the election of candidates:

"-to promote the adoption of public policy that is in the interest of the social work profession and those they serve.
    -to promote political awareness and lawful political action among the members of the social work profession." (Mi-Pace brochure, 1980)

So it would seem that at least one state chapter of NASW is seizing the vehicle of the PAC to serve as a locus for political activity beyond providing contributions to campaign coffers. What is behind this increased political activity by state chapters of NASW, and how does it fit with the issue of social work and political activity in general?

## History

The debate over whether or not social workers have an obligation to be active

politically is as old as the profession itself. Jane Addams made her opinion
known thusly: "When the ideas and measures we have long been advocating become
part of a political campaign, would we not be the victims of a curious self-con-
sciousness if we failed to follow them there?" (Lasch, 1965) By the early 1960's
social workers had developed a reputation as political lightweights in stark con-
trast to the style of the social reformers like Jane Addams and her contemporaries.
     Abraham Ribicoff, then Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare admonished the profession, saying: "I am sure that I am not the first to
tell you that you have not wielded your influence to anywhere near the degree
your unique fund of knowledge and your skill at working with people might warrant.
This truth ought to be a challenge to your profession to take an active part in
shaping laws and policies." (Ribicoff, 1962) Research by Wolk indicated that,
in fact, "...social workers are political members of society..." (Wolk, 1981)
using well tested criteria.
     If a gap has existed between Wolk's findings and the contemporary image of
the social worker as nonpolitical, one answer that suggests itself is that social
workers have been active as autonomous citizens "...while individual social work-
ers are politically active, the profession as a whole does not have a record of
political efficacy. The problem then may be a lack of political influence rather
than a lack of political activity." (Mathews 1982) This hypothesis was supported
when a group of state and federal legislators were asked to rate six professional
organizations for political influence. Of the six, NASW was ranked last and was
virtually unknown to a quarter of the respondents. (Mathews 1982) Collective
action is powerful action and in the mid 1970's a national political action com-
mittee, dubbed PACE (Political Action for Candidate Election) was formed. The
first state chapter PACE was initiated in 1978 in Florida. This well-organized
effort was to serve as a model for virtually all of the state chapters to follow
suit. Their by-laws, for example, were used as a basis for the by-laws of other
PACE committees. In the five years since Florida led the way, between 30 and 35
state chapters of NASW have formed PACE committees.[2] Some see the development of
PACE committees as a positive sign. "The creation of political action committees
by NASW chapters across the country represents a new level of mature involvement
in the political system and a recognition that even good politicians realistical-
ly expect professions to put their money and their volunteer hours behind their
values." (Abrams and Goldstein in Mahaffey and Hanks, 1982)

Strategies for Action

How do state chapters organize a PACE and once it begins, what considerations are
involved in the implementation of its activity? Every challenge involves over-
coming obstacles. What are the obstacles and how can state chapters anticipate,
minimize or overcome them?[3] What are some of the most common myths that we as
social workers hold about the political process? A question of equal importance
is one of theory. What theoretical perspectives provide the basis for decision-
making? Which informed perspective directs the machinery once constructed?

Initiation of a PACE by a state chapter of NASW is necessary to the support of
local candidates and issues. For legal and organizational reasons, a state PACE
is required to be separate and distinct from the national NASW PACE. Moreover,
there are significant areas of social policy which are operationalized at the
state level. Some examples of these decision-making areas are welfare, mental
health and education. Other policy controversies occuring at the state level
are the ERA, capital punishment, and abortion. (Lause 1979)
     Several important ingredients are necessary to the successful initiation of
a state PACE. The first ingredient is a strong and genuine interest in a politi-

cal action committee by the state NASW chapter board of directors. The active support of the chief executive officer is also a key. Next, a small cadre of people willing to serve as active members of the PACE committee must be recruited. They will ideally have similar goals for the committee and not have diverse intentions.

Barbaro has noted that increased political activity by social workers is aided by "...a desire to maintain a consistent organizational self image (Barbaro) Another finding by the same author bears out the experience of the state PACE committees. He reports that "The amount of organizational resources had little impact on a groups decision to become involved in an issue." (Barbaro, 1978)

Once Board support is established and a small group is convened the next step is usually to solicit expert advice. The national office has been generous in supplying a staff person to the state chapters.[4] Along with advice copies of sample by-laws (a la Florida PACE) are customarily supplied. The next step is filing with the State Board of Elections or a similar state agency and the work of the committee may begin in earnest.

There are three tasks which most state chapter PACE committees must accomplish to be successful. One is to endorse candidates and issues at the state level. Another is contributing financially and otherwise to their campaigns. A third is spreading the word among the membership of the state NASW that politics is an activity worthy of their time, their attention, and their money.

All three tasks are important and all three are closely connected. They require communication with the grass roots of the organization membership. This communication is time consuming but is at the heart of the success of the whole process. If the committee does not garner the support, opinions, enthusiasm and money of the membership the committee fails to function effectively.

For these reasons the state PACE must use every available means of communication. The state chapter newsletter provides an immediate means of doing so. A highly visible presence at the annual state program meeting is helpful. Guest speaking at local unit meetings is another tactic. The organization of special forums to speak to special policy issues is a tactic which is often useful in election years.

One illustration of the application of the above tactics is the Michigan PACE response to a proposed tax issue in the 1980 election. Proposal D, also referred to as the Tisch Tax Cut was a proposed gigantic tax cut which would have reduced the state budget by 57%. PACE mobilized the chapter membership in a variety of ways.

The October, 1980 issue of the Chapter Newsletter was filled with articles directly or indirectly coming from PACE. The front page consisted of a letter by the President of the Board opposing the tax cut, an article about how the state chapter had joined a coalition called "Citizens to Save Our State" (from Tisch), and an article about the Chapter formally opposing the tax cut. Headlines from the remainder of that issue of the newsletter are self-explanatory:

-Highlights of the Property Tax Reform Proposals
-Suggestions for Follow-up in Your Community Regarding the Tax Proposals
-Overview of Budget Implications of Tax Proposals
-M-PACE Announces Endorsements
-Debbie Stabenow: Social Worker in the State Capitol[5]

In other words, of eight feature stories in that issue, six were about the tax cut and the other two were about PACE endorsements of candidates for state office.

Members of the state PACE committee also made presentations at almost every local unit meeting in the months preceeding the election. A special mailing went out two weeks before the election from the M-PACE chair, opposing the Tisch Tax Cut. A final touch was a statewide Tisch Tax-cut Workshop which was held in the state capitol. Speaking at this workshop were the Director of The Michigan Department of Social Services, sev-

eral state legislators, and other state officials.  This well-attended workshop had other significant pay-offs.  Without exception, the speakers commented on how pleased they were that social workers were getting politically involved.  Ironically, the Director of D.S.S., a non-social worker, stated that the only other contact he had experienced from NASW was a letter opposing his appointment from the Detroit Metropolitan Unit years ago.

As a post-script, the Tisch Tax-cut was soundly defeated.  Who is to say that the PACE committee's work did not contribute somewhat to that defeat?

Another subject of communication with the membership is the myths and fallacies many social workers hold about politics.  Few, if any, schools of social work offer courses on the role of social work in politics.  Most social workers still talk in conflict neutral terms like social planning, policy analysis, and program development as if these endeavors occurred external to a political process.  Nothing could be further from the truth.  Political social work takes stands on the issues, fights to have those positions win out over other positions and then defends and participates actively in the consequences of those positions.  Social workers have been operating under some prevailing myths.  Seven of these are presented below.[6]

Seven Political Myths Commonly Held By Social Workers

Myth 1.  Campaign work is the best way to influence politicians.
Campaign work is important but is often not the most effective pathway to influence.  Virginia W. Smith wrote an excellent article which explains the wide variety of ways to influence legislators.  (Virginia Smith, 1979)

Myth 2.  A letter-writing campaign is only effective if hundreds or thousands of letters can be generated.
Amazing as it may seem, at the state level, if a legislator receives as few as three letters on a topic, they consider it to be a "hot" issue!

Myth 3.  The only way to lobby effectively is to hire a professional lobbyist.
Professional lobbyists are a complement to a well-organized, politically active professional association, not a substitute for an involved constituency.  Lacking an involved membership, a professional lobbyist is a waste of money.

Myth 4.  Politicians already know what social work is about and how we stand on the issues, so there is no need to get involved.
Most politicians have a narrow and distorted opinion of what social work is and rarely associate our profession with legislative issues.

Myth 5.  Politicians already have their minds made up on legislative votes so why lobby?
The fact that politicians are open to tactics aimed at capturing their votes is corroborated by the immense organizational structure and resources established for that purpose.  Put another way, if lobbying did not work, there would not be so many people and organizations doing it.

Myth 6.  Liberal politicians enjoy social workers and are happy to talk to them. Conservatives do not like social workers and avoid them whenever possible.
The authors research discovered that some conservative politicians would like more contact from social workers and feel "snubbed" by the profession.  At the same time, some liberal politicians consider themselves well enough acquainted with social work issues that they prefer less frequent contacts.

Myth 7.  Rural legislators are less likely to want contact with social workers than are urban legislators.
Rural legislators are often interested in meeting social workers and, having fewer resources of all kinds within their districts, are often anxious to take advantage of possible contacts.

There are four important obstacles to the formation of statewide political action committees for social work professionals. These four obstacles, while not all inclusive, are a useful beginning list. They are: geography, leadership, finances, and a hostile public arena.

1. Geography--Most states are large enough to make regular travel even to a centrally located chapter office problematic. This distance barrier is exacerbated by skyrocketing gasoline prices. This concern is generic to the state organization of the chapters and as such, is one understood and acknowledged by most NASW members. In Michigan this problem is made more difficult by the fact that a constituency exists in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan, which is, at its furthest point a longer drive than from Detroit to New York City.

It is important to hold meetings in a centrally located place so that no one has to drive an inordinate distance. In Michigan, as in most other states, the largest metropolitan area is not centrally located geographically. This means that perhaps a third to a half of the persons attending any given meeting will be coming from the urban area of the state and can carpool. Another part to solving the dilemma of long distance travel is to be prepared for less than perfection. For instance, a representative from the Upper Peninsula of Michigan was invited to participate in our meetings and this did not occur. On the other hand everyone can fully appreciate the extreme hardship of travel to and from the UP and there were no hard feelings.

Communication is also important as a way of overcoming distances, and this issue has already been addressed.

2. Leadership--It was our experience that for the most part the established leadership of the social work political scene did not come to meetings and did not participate actively in developing the political action committee. They did become involved later in the process. Those who did participate early on were reliable, responsible, and willing to take risks. It did not matter whether they were extremely well-connected or not. It seemed that where one person was weak or poorly informed, another committee member would be knowledgeable. Fear of inadequacy is an initial concern that is quickly dispelled.

In retrospect, it is clear that the "big wheels" have neither the time nor the energy to do the grassroots work required to make a success of PACE. It also has become clear as the PACE Committee members gained experience they developed competence, contacts and confidence, to "play hard ball with the big boys."[7] While the original Michigan PACE Committee members were by no means the most well-connected and well-established social workers in the state, several of them have developed into political heavyweights. Since the Committee's initial successes, it has recently boasted two past national presidents of NASW as members.

3. Money, money, money--Money is important. But it is so much less important than we think. The Michigan PACE budget for 1980 was about $1,300. A laughable sum when compared with most other PAC's, and a sum that was so insignificant that it caused innumerable problems in dealing with the State campaign finance bureaucrats. They just couldn't accept that the budget was so small. Politicians are moved by more than money, though, just as social workers are motivated by more than money. As a matter of fact, there is almost a reverse snobism attached to receiving contributions from a political action committee as poor as the Michigan PACE. It could be argued that receiving a $50 donation from us is in some ways more a symbol of support than receiving $500 would be from a wealthy committee. A state legislator in Michigan mentions nine kinds of power that are available to organizations seeking to influence government. These include: money, use of media, relationships, positions, unity, coalitions, numbers, knowledge, voting.[8]

To read the media or to watch TV one could easily conclude that political action committees are only as effective as the size of the purses. It is widely

believed to be true that large budget equals large political influence while small budget equals small political influence. Social workers have never been known for their affluency, nor for their ability to contribute large sums of money to worthy causes. This could lead one to conclude that a social work political action committee is defeated before it begins, but it is just not true.

4. The Public Arena--In spite of the fact that social workers find many job opportunities in the public sector, we are reluctant to approach the bureaucracy as consumers. We have perhaps become too comfortable with making the rules and playing the game from a position of power in our narrow segment of government programs to adapt to the quite different role of the participant or customer. When dealing with the State Board of Election and the Secretary of State's office, it becomes clear all too quickly that we are just another person standing in line rather than the one giving out the numbers. Along with this difficulty in negotiating the maze of government regulations is a lack of familiarity in dealing with politicians. Many of us see politicians as intimidating, disparaging, and for the most part opponents in terms of philosophy. It is easy to develop a sense of being overwhelmed by the rules and regulations on one hand and the necessity of dealing directly with politicians and their staff members on the other. Perhaps the most important thing to remember in an ongoing relationship with the state campaign finance division is that a committee treasurer familiar with finances and reporting is essential. As far as politicians being intimidating and the political arena being overwhelming, experience is a good teacher. Experience and familiarity removes the mystery from political relationships.

Why participate in your state PAC? What could possibly come from participating on a political action committee? It is easy to develop a scenario in which one will receive criticism from many constituencies and appreciation by few. Perhaps nowhere else in the structure of the profession is visibility more a guarantee than in the political arena. Social workers are often trained to take a back seat, to stay out of the limelight, and to be in a supporting role. But when the issues are public and the other players in the game are public, then social workers must be prepared to go public as well.

There are no doubt many other obstacles to the implementation of state political action committees. In addition to the ones discussed above, there are the problems of minority representation, of open versus closed meetings, of selection criteria for the endorsement of candidates, of separation of finances between the political action committee and the rest of the chapter organization, of educating the membership, and the usual stresses and strains of committee decision-making.

This discussion of state chapter PAC's would be incomplete without mention of the mission of the enterprise. Are social work PAC's destined to be self-serving mechanisms for more exclusive licensing legislation? And if our newly acquired political clout is used to benefit our clients instead, will the aim be at "deficient individuals" or at the problems inherent in the social structure? There is a distinct choice to be made here and a knowledge of sociological theory is helpful in making it.

Goroff tells us that conflict theory applies directly to politics but that there are actually two kinds. "Marx postulates the existence of ruling elite based on ownership of the means of production....The pluralist view is that interest groups compete with each other...that no one group is strong enough to gain complete power or control...." He goes on to point out that social workers choose either to acknowledge the basic structural changes needed or to "champion worthy causes separate and apart from issues of social class. (Goroff, 1978) Regardless of what choices are made, it is encouraging to note that social workers are at least entering the "ball park" and familiarizing themselves with the basic rules of the game. Social workers are undeniably becoming more aware of political power and the steps necessary to obtain it. During the 1982 elections more than $7,000 was contributed to the Michigan PACE, up from $1,300 in 1980.

Also, for the first time in recent memory, hundreds of hours of volunteer time was donated, not by individuals who happened to be social workers but by social workers as social workers. Finally, social workers are learning the meaning of power. Once that happens eventually the knowledge could filter down to clients.

"Power has to do with whatever decisions men make about the arrangements under which they live, and about the events which make up the history of their times ...the problem of who is involved in making them is the basic problem of power. In so far as they could be made but are not, the problem becomes who fails to make them?" (Mills, 1963)

## NOTES

1. PACE is the name that the national office and all of the state chapters of NASW have taken for their political action committees.

2. This estimate was obtained during a telephone conversation to the national office of NASW in May, 1983.

3. Material for this section came in part from a presentation made by the author at the "Social Workers in Politics Conference", Washington, D.C., 1981.

4. Ms. Carol Sheffer-Hartman, PACE staff person of the national office of NASW has traveled extensively to encourage and cultivate the development and operation at PAC's at the state level.

5. State Representative Stabenow, M.S.W., was endorsed by the Michigan PACE and is now serving her third term in the state legislature. Rep. Stabenow sponsored the 1982 Michigan Children's Trust Fund Legislation which includes an innovative voluntary $2 checkoff on state income tax forms which goes to child abuse prevention programs.

6. These myths were first identified and addressed following the completion of a Field Studies in Research and Practice project entitled "Southwest Michigan Politicians: Influence and Interactions with Social Workers", 1981, Western Michigan University School of Social Work. This material was presented in slightly different form at the 5th Annual Social Workers in Politics Conference, sponsored by NASW and PACE, Washington, D.C., April, 1982.

7. While this is hardly an original statement, Michigan readers will recognize it as a favorite saying of Patricia Curran, current chairperson, Michigan PACE.

8. Hon. David Hollister, Michigan House of Representatives.

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