For many with broadly Aristotelian intuitions the Humean usurpation of work in philosophy is a frustrating landscape. This is most obviously demonstrated in the arena of the metaphysics of modality, and talk of "possible worlds" specifically. Famously, the Humean denial of necessary connections in the world has led to the most strongly defended thesis on modality to date: the extreme modal realism (EMR) of David Lewis. Pace Lewis, actualism ought to be the preferred position, but whose version, which actuality? The thrust of this paper shall be to argue that the truth makers, or grounding, for modal claims are not to be found in possible worlds. The focus of this paper is on the truthmakers of modal facts and the neo-Aristotelian solution: essences and properties.
"Not to Be: Modality without Possible Worlds,"
The Hilltop Review:
2, Article 10.
Available at: http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/hilltopreview/vol5/iss2/10