High error rates in entitlements and slow responses to client complaints by Federal agencies are analyzed from a r.arket-power frame of reference focusing on the relative powerlessness of agency clients in relation to agencies which hold monopolies of life sustaining benefits. Data from a survey of Members of Congress are presented to provide an estimate of error rates. Three alternative structural solutions to the problem of unresponsiveness are assessed, including increased congressional casework service, ombudsmen services, and use of Federal Information Centers to aid clients. Necessary quality control procedures to facilitate each solution are described.
Abrams, Harvey A. and Bidney, Peter
"When Clients Complain: Bureaucratic Responsiveness in Large Federal Agencies,"
The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare: Vol. 6
, Article 11.
Available at: http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw/vol6/iss4/11