Philosophy and the Liberal Arts

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The focus of these remarks is a simple, general question: How should philosophy be taught to college students? Notice that the possibility is simply taken for granted. We do not ask if we can teach but how we can teach. Is this to treat philosophy like any other field within the humanities or sciences? We give instruction in mathematics, physics, history, English literature; can we not also teach philosophy? An etymological rephrasing would suggest this assumption is open to serious reservations. How can college students be taught "to love wisdom?" Can so radical a personality-commitment be taught, be the product of three unit courses? Is there any other subject-matter within the contemporary liberal curriculum which speaks of love as its finality with wisdom as its object? At least three serious difficulties confront this presupposition of our initial question. They should be raised and may serve, perhaps, as coordinates within which we may chart a response, if not an answer, to the inquiry we have set ourselves.

The question belongs to an educational institution, not only because it touches some form of instruction—however ambiguous this activity—but because "wisdom" is historically associated with the whole purpose of education: with the Academy, the Lyceum, the Stoa, the Garden, the University, and the College. Yet any professor who attempts this profession must recognize paradoxically that he is a man uniquely censored within its history. From the Platonic condemnation of the sophists who exacted tuition and claimed to teach wisdom through the medieval meaning of philosophus and Schopenhauer's acid question: "How can philosophy degraded to become a means of earning one's bread generally fail to degenerate into sop-
histry?"1 And now even to the most influential thinkers of our period Heidegger has claimed: "The misinterpretations with which philosophy is perpetually beset are promoted most of all by people of our kind, that is, by professors of philosophy."2 Wittgenstein attempted to dissuade his pupil Norman Malcolm, currently at Cornell University, from a career as a philosophy professor, because he judged that a normal human being could not be a university instructor and an honest and serious thinker. The teacher had to pretend to an omnipotence he did not possess, one which could not afford to stay with questions for years because of the demands of the weekly lectures and the quarter-syllabus. The teacher was expected both by students and administration to rhetorize serious, painstaking philosophic inquiry to dazzle students and gain the reputation and tenure of an "interesting teacher." To Malcolm, Wittgenstein wrote: "The temptation for you to cheat yourself will be overwhelming (though I don't mean for you more than anyone else in your position). Only by a miracle will you be able to do decent work in teaching philosophy. Please remember these words if you forget everything I've ever said to you."3 The antinomy here is between the possession of wisdom and its profession, and the history of philosophy indicates the depth of the estrangement.

The difficulty of our assumption lies not only in an antithetical relationship between teaching and wisdom but also within the sources and nature of wisdom. "Wisdom" runs like a theme through Western thought and educational institutions, but in various locations its meanings differ profoundly. It can denote "knowing all things, though not in detail" or the reflexive realization that one knows nothing while others think they do. "Wisdom" has embraced either conclusions reached or the methods by which they are reached or the principles from which these methods proceed and by which these conclusions are justified. "Wisdom" can be either a habit of thought or a manner of choice or a conditioned sensitivity to values or a life which issues from reflection, decision, and perception. It can be a particular human achievement or a comprehensive divine gift which subsumed them all. Whatever its definition and location, however, "wisdom" always touches upon something ultimate, something absolute enough to have other things related to it or evaluated by it. Whatever its pluralisms, I suggest that in Anglo-Saxon countries serious students have turned from philosophy courses elsewhere in the aca-

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ademic search for ultimates or absolutes. As in Socrates' time, wisdom is derivative for most students: The conclusions of poets, dramatists, scientists, and artists—even of enthusiasts and seers—are taken for wisdom, though they be unable to ground or explain their own propositions. Logistic methods of mathematics in their exactitude or operational methods of science in their productivity are taken for wisdom, and used paradigmatically to judge the seriousness of other methods and other forms of discourse. Transcendent principles of religion or of revolution or human principles of sensitive interrelations are taken for wisdom, as if what is most profound may be beyond reason but not beyond emotion, action, or experience. But wisdom as a unique, a philosophic enterprise—one with its own principles, methodologies and resolutions—is neither very much the subject of courses in "philosophy" nor the object of policy or programmed instruction, indicating anything like "love." This curricular stance of the American university also forms part of our problem: How can the college student be taught to love wisdom?

The ambiguous position of the professor and the derivative nature of wisdom compound the difficulties with the third term of our question: the college students. Here, I am speaking of the undergraduate student, especially of liberal arts students, but by no means exclusively so. Philosophers have habitually considered youth too callow or too enthusiastic to care about much besides pleasures, wars, ambitions and loves. Contemporary educationalists have judged him either too inexperienced or too financially oriented to entertain an education which was neither specialized in its departments nor geared to a career. And so the undergraduate college has lost its unique finality. Professional schools and graduate departments have reached down into the college to train students even earlier for the specialists they are to become or for the careers they are to enter. So much of the liberal arts have become pedantic or technical training in a specialty, while the genuinely liberal tradition—whose aim was, under one or another variant, to free a student—is little understood in its theory or operative in significant practice. Most undergraduate colleges are content to train the student technically, because this is what he wants or what he needs or where he is or where he is going.

The assumption of the possibility of philosophic instruction, then, conceals a threefold diremption: between the professorial career and wisdom, between curricular commitments and wisdom, between collegiate orientations and wisdom. The split involves in a complicated antinomy: the teacher, philosophy, the student, and wisdom.

The history of philosophic instruction within American higher education has done little to obviate or to heal these lesions. This instruction has passed over an enormously varied course as the orientation of its teaching reflects the manifold influences and in-
volvements predominant in each period. Perhaps three moments can be isolated which reflect three distinct structures within American higher education and which embody three divergent approaches to philosophic initiations: the religious colleges of the 17th and 18th centuries, the rising Germanified universities of the 19th and early 20th centuries, and the technologized multiversities of our own times. And corresponding to these patterns of education stand three different understandings of philosophy: forensic, historical, and technological.

Philosophy as taught in the early religious colleges conceived its subject-matter as the content of statements, a heritage of wisdom, an array of conclusions; “theses” they were called in the older Latin textbooks, in the English manuals and in the Harvard Broadsides. These buttressed the conclusions of a Renaissance version of Christian theology or of the rising political doctrines of the body politic. The function of instruction was the assimilation and defense of their truth. Philosophy was conceived, all unknowingly within the classically rhetorical tradition. A truth is laid down for defense, places (“topics” in rhetoric) are searched for its proof, debate is indicative of its mastery and persuasion is the finality of its engagement. When this enterprise was well conducted, it contained rigor in its definition of terms, clarity in its demonstrations, and exactitude in its argumentation. The debater was to repeat the counterargument of his opponent in the precisely ordered relationship of the terms, distinguish the term or the proposition which was critical, and indicate how this change bore upon the conclusion. It could be precise and elegant. As it appeared to its critics, however, it was over-simple in its propositions, unnuanced in its elaborations, and unconvincing in its “proofs.” When it began to disintegrate, its ignorance of history, its failure to consider the central works of genius of its tradition, and its isolation from the current discussion among original philosophers left it seriously unfair in its consideration of adversaries, significantly uninteresting in its presentation of a problematic, and often without the stimulus, honesty, and challenge of even responsible debate. I can speak with some experience of this kind of philosophic instruction, because under the influence of the pontifical universities and Roman seminaries it lasted in the education of the Jesuit almost a century after it had passed from American higher education.

The second method of instruction was adopted from Germany to remedy the obvious decadence of the first. While philosophy had been rhetoric, now its guide was history. This second conceived wisdom was that which philosophers taught, and the study of philosophy became the study of philosophers: “Histories of philosophy” replaced the systematic textbooks. These histories of philosophy were not the medieval commentaries upon a single philosophic inquiry, a careful following of a philosopher in his questioning deeper and deeper into
his resolution. They were a more or less readable compilation of his conclusions contextualized by antecedent philosophers, systematized into an assimilable unity, and evaluated in importance by the impact these conclusions or methods were to attain with successors. Philosophic instruction—no matter how much this accusation was denied—became history; and history, a development incorporating the 19th Century's enthusiasm for progress, in which each successive continental philosopher found the past the preparation for his own definitive achievement. Philosophy as history was given its unity not by subject matter and argument but by chronology or by influence or by system. When the enterprise was well done, it contained care in its textual analysis and assignations, concern about systematically ambiguous terms and propositions, and vision in its elaboration of historical patterns. It could be engrossing and stimulating. As it appeared to its subsequent critics, however, it was superficial when it attempted to cover vast periods of philosophy, unphilosophic in its failure to deal carefully with argument and principle, and deadening both in its location of questions only within the past and in its pedantic muster of detail. While the first, in its manual elaborations failed to come to grips with original philosophers, the second failed to grasp or to occasion rigorous argument and proof. One presented the student with a series of conclusions to be defended. The other was a series of facts and philosophers to be interrelated. Both lent themselves to collegiate introductory courses in which the major problems or figures within the philosophy were resolved in a summary fashion. Both lent themselves to too much, too quickly. Both of them initiated the study of philosophy as the study of propositions already enunciated, either historically or defensively conceived.

Both left their impact on 20th Century Anglo-American philosophic inquiry, feeding into it either an enormously varied series of propositions whose discussion was philosophy or an overwhelming heterogeneity of historical opinions whose progression was philosophy. The dominant philosophy became linguistic and highly technical, attempting precision in meaning through semantics and accuracy in implication through logical syntax. Carnap asserted in 1934: "Philosophy is to be replaced by the logic of science—that is to say by the logical analysis of the concepts and sentences of science, for the logic of science is nothing other than the logical syntax of the language of science."4 Within the decade, he would move from syntactical to semantic emphasis, but the matrix of philosophy was consistently linguistic. So also the unities attempted were no longer those of

divergent subject matter as aspects of the real, nor those of methodologies and systems worked out of concepts, but those of a language common to all the sciences. Dubious of metaphysical speculations or of epistemological criticisms, philosophy could resolve the propositions of the past into nonsense or unintelligibilities. The history of philosophy became a tissue of errors. As Professor Vere Chappell defined it: “It follows that the way to achieve success in philosophy—and this again means understanding and the solving of problems—is to determine how our language is in fact used and thence show where and how philosophers have gone astray.”5 In its finest usages, linguistic philosophy has encouraged a careful honesty in terms and proposition, precision in methodology, and a modesty in assertions. In the eyes of its critics, however, it has become trivial in its interests and controversies, arrogantly over-simple in its dismissal of vagueness and ambiguity, ignorant in its unnuanced reading of the philosophic tradition, and outdistanced in logic and semantics by the coordinate disciplines of mathematics and linguistics. Within this tradition, the student is introduced to philosophic issues through perspectival discriminations of divergent philosophers and introduced to philosophic method through logical discipline.

I suggest that either enterprise is not adequate as an introduction into the philosophic task, most simply because the etymology of the question fails to tell in its solution how to bring the student to love wisdom—not to defend it, not to possess it even, but to love it. What philosophic instruction aims at is this attitude of reverence, dedication, based upon the deepest affection. Let me stress what I am saying: It is this love that is the terminus of our work. Our question is how to awaken such a love. I suggest that neither debate conclusions nor historical and textual facts nor linguistic techniques are happy solutions to our problem. Love is awakened neither by power nor by assignment. It is awakened by a revelation of the good—by the “standing before” of what has been hidden; and this revelation is of worth, of value, of what is humanly the object of desire and joy. If philosophy is to be “taught,” it must also be through some sort of vision, a revelation that the enterprise of wisdom entails the object of men’s deepest love: that whatever a man loves most radically, whatever he moves toward at the deepest part of his person—the reflexive grasp of these is the reality of wisdom. Wisdom—either as thought, choice or life itself—touches upon these ultimates which a man loves and by which his life is structured. One is taught to love wisdom through the revelation of this relationship. Merleau-Ponty has put this very simply: “To philosophize is to seek, and this is to imply that there are things to

see and to say.”6 One can value this search only through some glimpse of its objects. The invitation to philosophize is an invitation to “radical reflection” (again Merleau-Ponty’s expression), and one accepts the invitation only if he discovers a love for the radicalities, the roots of that within which he moves and loves. The introduction to philosophy, instruction in philosophy, should be a revelation of the depth and the expansion in which a man lives.

Philosophic instruction as revelation would move quite differently from that of philosophy as rhetoric, as history, or as technique. It would begin with the man where he is—with what Aristotle calls the *procheira,* those things that are before his hand, the proximate and the immediate.7 And these are certainly not the possibility of movement or Thales on water or propositional calculus. The task of instruction would be to question these, to probe them, to ask what is involved in them or why they are of worth. Socrates would begin with generals and ask about their understanding of courage, an ultimate which was involved in their lives; or he would ask a good man about justice, or even a teacher about wisdom and instruction. The *data* with which one begins depends very much upon where a particular man is. The initiation of the philosophic enterprise is the *question*—the question which one asks about ultimates involved in his stance. And the *method* is to move—in a thousand different possible ways—from the *data* which is proximate and which has meaning and worth to those *ultimates* in terms of which it is understood and loved.

Now any educational institution confronts enormous problems with such an understanding of philosophic instruction. Each student is different. Each lives in a personal set of coordinates, a unique history, peculiar aspirations, idiosyncratic attitudes and choices. How can such diversity provide any commonality for philosophic questions? Does this not make rhetorical defense or historical studies a necessary, albeit a less ideal, program?

I think not, at least not totally—though there is much to recommend this objection as solid and serious. The personal choices of the students have already involved them within communities of learning within the college. The students have opted for those studies which placed them within the major division of undergraduate education. They are involved in humanistic studies, social sciences, or physical and biological sciences. One can begin here: with the studies seriously entertained and the knowledge deeply loved in any of these studies and move to the philosophical by question and inquiry. Secondly,

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my further contention would be that as one moves through one of these divisions in questioning towards its ultimates, he will find himself involved in certain constants which run through the considerations in all of the other divisions. The ultimates which underlie or structure any particular human enterprise in knowledge or love will be found to pervade every human enterprise in knowledge and love. Let me give an example of what I mean.

If the student were studying physics, one might well begin with either quantum mechanics or relativity theories. Let us say with quantum mechanics. The class might well read Niels Bohr’s great essay which recounts his discussions with Einstein over thirty years. The essay is interesting because it immediately introduces the question of ultimates in physical theory. Both Einstein and Bohr agree upon the findings of the sub-atomic physics of their period, but they are in radical disagreement about its implication. As Bohr stated the question of discussion: “Whether the renunciation of a causal mode of description of atomic processes involved in the endeavor to cope with the situation should be regarded as a temporary departure from ideals to be ultimately revived or whether we are faced with an irrevocable step towards obtaining the proper harmony between analysis and synthesis of physical phenomena.”

The problem of cause comes out of physical research itself, but it reaches into social and humanistic studies. You will recall that Thucydides poses the entire analysis of the Peloponnesian War upon the distinction between the alleged reasons for the conflict between Athens and Sparta and the actual underlying cause: the growth of power within the one and the inevitable fear that this occasioned in the other. The grasp of the power-factor within political movements will allow those who follow his inquiry to predict future events when such power blocs amass again. In Present at the Creation, one can find a similar determination of political and economic movements seen as an analysis of the American origin of World War I in the growing power of Germany and the fear and distrust this awakened in the United States.

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9 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War. i. 22-24, 88-90, 118; ii. 9, 65; iii. 86.

10 “In the hundred years from Waterloo to Mons, so gradually did the power of Germany grow—that combination of population, resources, technology, and will—that, like the growth of a child, those close to it were hardly aware of its extent. . . . A century later it was thought—erroneously, as it proved—that the combined power of Europe could stop the German bid. By 1917 it was clear that this could not be done; the United States intervened to prevent German domination of Europe.” Dean Acheson, Present at the
historical causes. And to grasp causes is, in some way, to predict and to control the political future. Again, the purpose of the *Biographia Literaria* is to locate the principle of greatness in poetic construction, the works of talent being located in the fancy of the artist while those of genius, within the great esemplastic imagination, which fuses the diversities of words, image, movement into a wholeness and unity.\textsuperscript{11} Frank Lloyd Wright defines the understanding of that to which he has given his entire life, organic architecture, in terms of a diversity of causes. Indeed, his description reads almost like a Schoolman: A building should be a living organism, proceeding by way of natural inspiration, from the nature of the materials, the nature of its purpose in order to gratify the nature of man.\textsuperscript{12} Within theology, commitments on causality occur and occur critically. Bultmann, for example, accepts as the principle for the differentiation of myth from history, a doctrine on causality: The course of nature and history cannot be interrupted by the intervention of supernatural powers: cause and effect are phenomenal and form an unbreakable nexus. Anything which would represent the transcendent as if it were within history, as if it were a cause of the normal, ordinary order of events is myth. "Der Mythos objektiert das Jenseitige zum Diesseitigen."\textsuperscript{13}

Notice that we have begun with sub-atomic physics, have localized a term of critical importance to its understanding, and have run this term through issues of history, political science, literary criticism, architecture, and biblical exegesis. The issue is what is causality and how does it function. To start with the *procheira*, with anything at hand, and to question it in depth is to move finally to the philosophic commitments and presuppositions which underpin and justify the obvious. While the issue can come out of any human enterprise, it is bound to none. Conversely, while proper to none of these individually, it unites them all in common assumptions and language. What would be further noted is that the doctrine implicit in one field will have a telling, even if unexamined, influence in another. Atomic doctrines of causality can jump over into pointellism painting. Evolutionary conceptions of biology causality can move into dogmatic development, historical progress, and educational or moral


instruction. The great ultimates, those terms and assumptions which
underlie any field of knowledge, are the province of philosophic inquiry.
Any science or art subsumes them, implies them, contains them.
Philosophic question isolates them, examines them, and relates them
within the most basic human relationship: that of man to reality.
The alternative to such an examination, to philosophic inquiry, is
not that men will have no philosophy, but that it will be culturally
conditioned and immaturely accepted. Philip Frank, the great Harvard
physicist, has put the matter very well, à la Whitehead:

Quite a few great thinkers who belonged to very divergent schools of thought have been unanimous on one point: If a scientist believes that he has no philosophy and keeps tightly to his special field, he will really become an adherent to some “chance philosophy” as A. N. Whitehead puts it. This great contemporary metaphysician with a solid scientific background assures us that for a scientist deliberately to neglect philosophy is “to assume the correctness of the chance philosophic prejudices imbibed from a nurse or a schoolmaster or current modes of expression.”¹⁴

Philosophic instruction belongs to the undergraduate, to the liberal studies of the college, then, (1) not only because it unifies them organically in a consideration of their common assumptions (however divergent their use and applications), (2) but also because it frees the student from the prejudices of his own context by a reflexive grasp of their structure and an expanded understanding of alternative possibilities. Thus it is that every philosophic tradition moves back to a grasp of principles, whether through a metaphysics of first causes or a critique of the initial possibilities of knowledge or a foundation study of science and mathematics to determine radical meanings and referents.

Programmatically, philosophic inquiry should not begin with conclusions of a particular culture to be defended nor with the conclusions of many philosophers to be assimilated nor perspectives to be chosen or refuted. It should take its data from the students, from fields other than those classically called philosophic. It should lay against these data questions which will take the student into their underlying presuppositions or into those ideals which give the here and now its justification and its worth. The processes by which one moves through the initial data to the ultimates it contains (and which contain it) are many, and their steps are many: One can begin with the apprecia-

tion of a film, to a consideration of critical principles which structured this appreciation, to a consideration of principles of art and beauty which in turn structured both the criticism and the appreciation. In other words, one can move from "why do I like it or why did I not like it," to "why is it good or bad" to "what kind of thing is it and what kind of integrity should it have." This is to move by question from appreciation through criticism to aesthetics and metaphysics. And notice, one is not introducing new data. He is working, questioning what is already present and assumed. The philosophic goes beyond appreciation and criticism precisely by entering into it, by inquiry into meanings and methods which either of these take for granted. Indeed philosophic inquiry begins when one questions what is taken for granted—not to deny it (this would be as dogmatic as its gratuitous assumption) but to call it before radical reflection.

Granted that this is valid philosophic procedure, is it a possible educational arrangement? Again, I think so, but only within a liberal arts college in which (1) the faculty took their mutual collaboration seriously enough to be willing to discuss with and to learn from one another, and (2) the administration encouraged the cohesion of the college as an academic unity, a unity whose formal structure was intellectual and among whose liberating skills were the abilities to move from field to field with an understanding and a recognition of basic assumptions, if not a technical grasp of elaborations and applications. In such a college, the initial "courses in philosophy" would not be either doctrinal nor historical nor perspectival; they would not be set alongside the other courses in English literature or second year calculus. They would be transition courses, courses in which the major works in a particular field were read for their common assumptions—be those assumptions of principles, methods, concepts or reality-stances.

Each major division of the college could offer such courses: The physical scientist could begin with the works of Galileo, Newton, Maxwell, Einstein and Heisenberg. Basic terms would operate through the discussion of each of these works, but their meaning and their applications would vary: motion, space/place, necessity, probability and chance, time, force, cause, etc. Methods would vary as one shifted from the mathematic models of Galileo, brought to bear upon physical phenomena to yield fruitful results, to the strictly logistic composition of forces in Newtonian mechanics as one eventually constructed the *Systema Mundi* from the initial corollaries of the parallelogram of forces. This serious, careful reading would give the students neither a single doctrine on "causality" and motion, nor an entire history of the question nor perspectives to be refuted. It would open up the term itself for inquiry and the projects of great men would suggest some of the radical variations possible in its
pluralistic resolution. The social sciences could offer similar courses in the concepts and methods common to critical work in their own field: institution, freedom, man, power, and law—for a selective example. Art and literature could open their inquiry with works of appreciation and criticism which presuppose such concepts as imitation, creativity, beauty, art-object, etc. And notice that the divisional separations ultimately yield before this kind of examination as the terms and presuppositions are seen to be common to the humanities, the social, biological, and physical sciences. Time, for example, and its relationship to place is as critical a question in the structure of the Magic Mountain and in the theology of Augustine as it is in the physics of Einstein. The infinite figures in the universe of Newton, in the mathematics of Galileo, but also in the Opus Oxioniense of Duns Scotus and in the critical theories of Ruskin. Notice further that this is not an investigation of physics or history or criticism for answers to the philosophic question. Physicists are not asked to decide about ethics, and dramatists are not queried about God. One is interested in what is necessary to do physics or drama, what it is necessary to assume by way of meanings and methods. This is rather to probe them to show that the philosophic question emerges from the heart of their own assumptions, that it both defines the nature of the peculiar enterprise of each and provides a principle of selection and relevance even for data.

Such transition courses would be liberal in the medieval sense of grammar: an ability to interpret, to read or listen so carefully that the ultimate assumptions are forthcoming. It would be philosophic grammar in that its thrust is towards these ultimate, pervasive conceptions. Once they are isolated, once one is found irrevocably involved in a commitment to prerequisites, one can move from philosophic grammar to the history of philosophy or even to philosophic inquiry itself, to courses whose explicit focus is the nature of motion, the structure of art, the reality of institutions, the possibilities of freedom. This “grammar” will make inquiry not only enriched beyond possibility of a single dogmatism, but relevant to the life and the career of the student. It will show him that just as life or need has led him to art or biology, so art and biology inevitably involve him in philosophic commitments and questions. Most students are not capable of sustained and serious work within philosophic inquiry as such—at least on the undergraduate level. But they are capable of philosophy—of seeing the need for wisdom in their lives and longing for it, of loving it. Once this commitment to wisdom energizes and unites the student, technical training in philosophy is not only subsequential, but imperative. History, semantics, logic, argumentation and even defense can contribute as one moves from the love of wisdom
to its possession. But without this initial love, the technical training is without purpose or focus.

When I spoke of data offered by a liberal arts college as the subject of a philosophic question, I detailed a number of fields in which concepts and methods could be isolated: literature, physics, history, etc. I did so, because, since the Renaissance, our conception of liberal arts is that of various fields, various subject-matters, the command over which supplies a new freedom to the students. But there is an older conception of liberal education, one dating from the Middle Ages and which conceives the liberal arts as disciplines, as skills which can be brought to bear upon any subject-matter or any field. Rhetoric, poetic grammar, and dialectic (sometimes) could be brought to bear upon any discourse—either in literature or in science—to discover the structure of its argument, to criticize the work as a single unity, to understand the meaning of its terms and assertives or to resolve the work to its presuppositions and interconvictions with other such works. The fault of contemporary liberal arts is that the emphasis upon subject-matter has so particularized each field as to make communication difficult between them; the fault with those of the Middle Ages was that the techniques for formal analysis became abstracted from subject-matter and fact. R. S. Crane and Richard McKeon could contend, however, that there are those universal disciplines, operative, even if unarticulated, within contemporary liberal arts, pervasively present in almost all undergraduate courses but studied as such by very few: Criticism, History (from history of philosophy and theology to natural history and experimental histories), Linguistics perhaps should rank among them. Philosophic education within the liberal arts should function here as it functions with the more obviously recognized fields: isolate their assumptions and question them. Such a course at Chicago, for example, seriously questions the meaning of rhetoric as it moves from a pseudo-art in the Gorgias, to one of the universal arts in Aristotle, to the universal method of all philosophy in the De Inventione, to furnish the scientific method for the Novum Organum in Bacon. Philosophic grammar, brought to bear upon rhetoric, would again reveal a pluralism of


possibilities and the subsequent matter for an innovation and an organization of sciences and arts for our time—a task of proper philosophic inquiry.

The initial pages of this paper pointed out the three-fold ambiguity within which philosophic instruction moved: the dichotomy between teacher and wisdom, between philosophy and wisdom, and between education and wisdom. The introduction of philosophic grammar as the initiation of philosophic inquiry would go a long way to chart a path through them:

1. For *pace* Wittgenstein, the teacher, does not pretend to a competence in wisdom, but to a love and probing movement which moves him continually to ask questions and to isolate the assumptions which underlie all human knowledge.

2. Philosophy does not surrender its subject-matter, its methods and its conclusions to the other knowledges of men, but indicates that each of these knowledges presupposes those things which form the subject-matter of philosophy.

3. And the educational projection of inability or distinterest among the students falls against a program that moves through the student's own interests and life-long commitments to those concepts, as yet unexamined, by which these interests are evoked and by which these commitments are justified.