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Hegel and the Rebellion and Counter-Rebellion of Youth

By Rudolf J. Siebert

1. Hegel and Youth

The philosopher and educator Georg W. Hegel (1770-1831) and the academic youth of the last five generations in West and East—youthful rebels and counter-rebels, revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries—are separate from each other as well as inseparable. During the last one and a half centuries, since Hegel reached the culmination of his career in Berlin, even wider distances of time and space separated one generation of students after the other from the great philosopher and educator. But that separation was merely external. In spirit the academic youth remained inseparable from Hegel, from his last years at the University of Berlin, throughout the further development of the philosophical university of the 19th century and the evolution of the positive university of the 20th century up to the present. Hegel cannot be understood without his many contacts and relationships with students in Berlin, throughout Germany and Europe during his lifetime, and his enormous philosophical, pedagogical and political influence upon the academic youth of the world beyond his grave. This same academic youth of the philosophical and positive universities, on the other hand, remains unintelligible in its philosophical theories and political practice, its hopes, aspirations and sufferings without Hegel's genius and his philosophical, educational and political work. This academic youth has not only negated Hegel by its criticism as well as by its ignorance, it has also preserved and elevated him in its philosophies and educational as well as political projects.
Hegel's philosophical life-work, his Phenomenology of the Spirit, Logic, Philosophy of Nature, Philosophy of Right, Philosophy of History, Philosophy of Art, Philosophy of Religion, History of Philosophy—\(\text{is\ general\ education,\ general\ studies\ at\ its\ peak\ in\ Western\ civilization.}\) The one universal goal of Hegel's philosophical and educational life-work was the liberation of youth toward an existence of reason and freedom—a non-fragmented, non-compartmentalized, real and authentic life. For Hegel, a truly human existence in reason and freedom meant man's achievement of the identity of his identity and non-identity, the wholly "other"—nature, history and the ultimate reality of the Logos as the divine totality of Being. This universal motif of Hegel's philosophical and educational life-work—liberation toward an existence in reason and freedom—stimulated and gave direction directly to the rebellion and indirectly to the counter-rebellion of academic youth in "civil society" during the last 150 years up to the present student-protest-movement and the countervailing forces it elicited.

Throughout his career as philosopher and educator Hegel thought to achieve his goal of liberating youth toward a free and rational existence by preventing young men in and outside of the philosophical university from running away from history and by preparing and hardening them for facing up to it. Hegel knew himself as a man who lives in a late phase of the modern world, in the womb of which a postmodern epoch of human evolution is stirring. He finds himself in the midst of the senescence process of the extremely particularized European civilization. Europe is finished in principle, no matter how long it may prevail in a niche of the social evolution of mankind. According to Hegel's historical perspective either America or Russia will become the next world historical nation. Hegel feels like an autumn man. Winter was coming for Europe. Before winter sets in, Hegel wants to bring home the harvest of the gigantic process of world history up to his time in order to prepare a postmodern world historical stage of more universal reason and freedom (both theoretical and practical). In world history the spirit, hard and prosaic, comes to himself—the divine Logos as well as man. World history is a huge Golgotha for Hegel. It is tragic but not absurd. It is not a mass-neurosis but a hard educational process toward the ultimate goal, not of the Prussian or the Napoleonic state, but of a divine-human realm of freedom. Hegel did not betray the future. If he had done so, he could not possibly have fascinated the rebellious and revolutionary youth of the following one and a half centuries.

For Hegel, learning to think history means learning to die. It means to take upon oneself solitude and loneliness. It means to give oneself unconditionally into the sacrificial process which is world history in which, according to Hegel's extremely theistic view, the real God sacrifices himself. It means to participate in the death of God.
In the preface of his *Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel writes: “But not the life that shys away from death and which keeps itself clean from devastation, but which endures it and in it preserves itself, is the life of the spirit.” Man gains his truth, his freedom, only by finding himself, through being absolutely rendered asunder. Hegel was the great anti-romantic. He resisted every trace of romantic primitivism in his students. In Hegel’s view, youth had to learn to face the fury of disappearance at work in history. Youth will find its identity only in being rendered apart, only if it looks the terrible power of negation, active in history, straight in its face and abides with it. Hegel did not want to harmonize for his students what could not be harmonized. He was not an ideologist justifying to his students the contradictions of the societal process in which they lived. History is certainly continual rejuvenation and elevation, but it is also negation. Only a youth who can face the negative in history will be able to liberate itself and others toward the ultimate realm of freedom. That is the philosopher and educator Hegel’s testament to his students and the youth of the world: Freedom through liberation and liberation through facing the negativity of the world historical process. One must understand that testament in order to grasp the relation between Hegel and the rebellion and counter-rebellion of youth in the last 150 years.

2. *Berlin: the Culmination*

On December 26, 1817 Baron von Altenstein, the first “Minister of Religion and Education” in the state of Prussia, respectfully offered to the already famous philosopher Hegel a professorship at the University of Berlin. At the time of the offer Hegel taught aesthetics, anthropology, psychology and history of philosophy at the University of Heidelberg. Hegel accepted his new teaching assignment at the University of Berlin with enthusiasm and the highest expectations. Minister Altenstein’s offer was the most extraordinary one Hegel had ever received so far in his otherwise rather uneventful life. In Berlin the theological university had died. The positive university had not yet been born. Here in Berlin the philosophical university would reach its highest peak and Hegel would become one of its outstanding representatives.

At the time of his call to Berlin, Hegel was 47 years old. He had been a teacher of youth throughout his life. After his seminary years in Tübingen he had been a private tutor in Bern and Frankfurt, *privatdocent* and professor of philosophy at the University of Jena, headmaster of the humanistic Gymnasium in Nürnberg and during the last two years professor at Heidelberg. He had come to know the German and European Youth of the period of the Great Revolution in France and the Napoleonic era like few other men of his time.

Now in the summer of 1818, he taught his fourth and last semester
in Heidelberg and then left the romantic town on the banks of the Neckar for the much more sober and prosaic Berlin. Arriving in the Prussian capital, Professor Hegel moved with his family—his wife Marie (21 years younger than he) and his three still small sons—Ludwig, Karl and Emmanuel—into a house on the corner of the busy Leipziger and Friedrich Strasse, which Minister Altenstein’s sister had found for him. Later, Hegel’s family settled permanently in the house where Hegel was to live and work as philosopher and educator until his death from a stomach ailment on November 4, 1831. The address of the house was “Am Kupfergraben, Nummer 4.” It was from this house that Hegel’s strongest philosophical and political impulses radiated throughout Berlin, Germany and Europe. Here he reached the culmination of his career as the Heraclitus, Plato or Aristotle of the 19th century—as philosopher, teacher, author, politician.

To the Hegel house “Am Kupfergarben” came students from Berlin, from all over Germany, and finally from all corners of Europe. The house was always open for students. Hegel always had time for his students despite his hard ground-breaking work in philosophy and his many engagements in the administration of the university, particularly as its president. The wine from the Rhine, the Mosel and Bordeaux flowed plentifully during serious encounters as well as during many happy bull-sessions. But with his new Prussian professor’s salary of 2000 thalers a year he could now afford some luxuries in life, after he had lived close to the poverty line for thirty intellectually highly productive years. Finally the truth-value of Hegel’s philosophy turned into exchange-value for him in German civil society. Hegel enjoyed the newly gained luxuries and let his students participate in them. A real Hegel-cult developed around the house “Am Kupfergraben” in Berlin, and finally throughout Germany and Europe.

Hegel was certainly the most serious of all the serious philosophers Europe has ever produced. His extremely theistic system of world history, including the history of social ethics, art, religion and philosophy, was gigantic and full of compelling genial insights and there was nothing to laugh at or about. For Hegel, history was a slaughter-house. The historical present was for him always a “cross” and only in this “cross” could man enjoy the “rose” of reason and freedom. With super-human energy, Hegel forced together the cultural and social opposites of his time into a grandiose synthesis; and if he ever suffered from schizophrenia, he certainly made the best of it. But this synthesis did not come easy to him. It was painful and his rather slow, heavy and flagging lecturing gave witness to that. Hegel had his own share of personal sufferings: his earlier poverty, his mentally sick sister, the deviations of his natural son Ludwig. Hegel carried his suffering deep inside as a sturdy Lutheran, which he again and again confessed to be. Hegel as an older man spoke a lot of “discipline” to
his students, particularly in his lectures on the philosophy of right, the very substance of which was freedom. Hegel aged early.

But Hegel also knew that life and history were, at least on the surface, not all that serious, but rather a bacchantian ecstasy in which all are drunk. The world was to him a dionysian madhouse. Hegel loved the old Greeks and he was grateful to them for giving not only Apollo, but also Dionysos to later Western civilization. Hegel enjoyed life as much as it was possible under the rather repressive conditions of the Restoration-Germany after the French Revolution. He had joy from his family, his teaching, his students, his travels, his snuff and drinking, the lottery and last but not least from the young actresses of the Berlin opera. Hegel often relaxed his students by his rustic humor. At one time he proved the presence of dialectical logic in nature by the fact that it ironically locates extremes closely together: for instance in all higher organisms the highest function of procreation with the lowest function of defecation. Hegel could laugh himself to death reading Aristophanes. During a lecture on aesthetics he told his students that nobody could really know how “piggish well” a man could feel without having read the plays of Aristophanes.

More than about “discipline” Hegel spoke to his students about “enjoyment.” For the great dialectician, discipline and enjoyment were not only opposites. They belong together. They reproduce each other. Hegel spent not only hundreds of class hours on his very serious and highly disciplined philosophy of right, religion and history, but also on his aesthetics, which contains a strong tendency toward what we would call today “non-repressive de-sublimation.” “Am Kupfergraben” in Berlin was a serious but at the same time, happy home for the Hegel family as well as for many of Hegel’s students. Hegel was one of the first European philosophers who got married at all and established a rather happy and harmonious home.

3. Philosophical Theory and Political Practice

On October 22, 1818 Hegel gave his inaugural speech at the University of Berlin. In this speech, Hegel described the correlation between philosophical theory and political practice against the dramatic background of his time. When Hegel began his teaching activity in the Berlin University, the beheaded body of Marie Antoinette, the former radiant Archduchess of Austria, wife of the dull Louis XVI and queen of France, lay in a common grave in Paris. Both the great French Revolution and Napoleon had run their course. Hegel commented that people believe something only after it is repeated. The citoyen revolution was settled once and for all by the arch conservative Austrian foreign minister and later chancellor Metternich. The furious national liberation wars against Napoleon had ended and Metternich’s restoration began to flourish fully. In the French Parliament
the political party-names "The Right" and "The Left" came up for the first time, never to be forgotten again. The American Republic had established itself well among the powers of the earth by an anticolonialistic citoyen-revolution. Hegel gave the American Revolution his full "world historical" endorsement.

Hegel's students had lived through these world historical events and had experienced some of them immediately and personally. "At this point in time," Hegel lectured, "those circumstances seem to obtain which augur the return of attention to and love of philosophy, so that this discipline, which almost completely lost its voice, may begin to speak again. For, a short time ago, it was in part the then current exigencies which gave the minor interests of everyday life such a great power over us, and it was in part the lofty interests of reality, the interests in the struggle to consolidate and preserve the political unity of national life and the state, a struggle, which so absorbed all the energy of the intellect and the strength of all ranks of society as well as all outer sources, that the inner life of the mind could not find any respite. The world spirit so occupied with reality, so engrossed by external things, was prevented from turning inward and concentrating on himself, and from indulging and enjoying himself in its own home territory. Well, after this torrent of reality had stopped and the German nation had rescued its nationality—the foundation of all living life, the time began, in which, with the state, next to the governing of the real world, the free realm of thought blossomed independently.... And particularly this state, which welcomed me, elevated itself by means of intellectual advantage to its authority in the real world and in politics, reaching the same level of power and independence as those states whose external resources were superior. Here education in and the flourishing of science and scholarship are cardinal forces in politics."

Hegel's whole heart was with education, science, scholarship, philosophy. But he was only too aware of the dialectics of philosophical theory and political practice. "However," Hegel continued, "intellectual life is not the only fundamental force in the existence of this state: now more particularly, we are witnessing the sublime beginning of the great struggle of the people and its rulers for independence, for the overthrow of unfeeling foreign tyrants, and for freedom of mind, heart and soul. The ethical power of the intellect felt its own energy, raised its banner and asserted this feeling as the might and power of reality. We must regard as inestimable the fact that our generation has lived, acted and produced in the grip of this feeling, in which all law, morals and religion are connected. In such deep and universal endeavor, the intellect inwardly raises itself to its dignity, while the shallowness of life and the insipidity of interests perish, and the superficiality of judgment and opinion is exposed and vanishes. The pro-
founder earnestness which has entered the mind, heart and soul is the real basis for philosophy.” For Berlin’s new philosopher, inner philosophical theory and external political practice were separate. But there existed no stiff dualism between them. They were fundamentally inseparable. They flowed into each other. They are fully alive only in each other. Philosophical theory and political practice condition and reproduce each other mutually and weave and work in each other toward the realm of concrete social freedom—the “telos” of all world history.

It was particularly during his Berlin years, after his inaugural address on philosophical theory and political practice, that Hegel became the one philosopher who, through his rebellious as well as counter-rebellious, revolutionary and counter-revolutionary students and more distant disciples, would effectively change the political face of the earth by philosophical theory. One does not overcome Hegel by underestimating theory in a condescending way. The old Chinese knew it already: in his head the fish stinks first! When man begins to think, his world changes. Hegel not only interpreted the world, but also changed it. Ernst Cassirer is correct in his remark, that no other philosophical system has ever exerted such strong and enduring influence on the political life of the next generations as the metaphysics of Hegel. The more or less angry young men of the generations following the climax of Hegel’s career in Berlin have not yet produced a single political system or movement that would have resisted successfully the great philosopher’s impact. Where would H. Marcuse, philosopher of the New Left, or Norman O. Brown, visionary of the New Right be without Hegel’s still powerful philosophical and political influence?

Hegel came to Berlin and lived and worked there for 13 years not only with philosophical, but also with political ambitions. Already early in his career he had rewritten the constitution of his home-state of Württemberg. Still shortly before his death, he finished a critique of an English reform-bill, which the Prussian government repressed for some time in order not to let it disturb its good relations with Great Britain. There was the stuff of a great politician in the philosopher Hegel, which the rather oppressive reality of German civil society in a period of restoration denied its full actualization. Hegel came, nevertheless, close to the image of Plato’s philosopher-king, at least via the work of his students and disciples. With Hegel, school-philosophy began to climb down from its academic cathedra in the philosophical university into the political arena, causing enormous rebellions and counter-rebellions throughout the 19th century and gigantic revolutions and counter-revolutions in the 20th century.

Naturally we have no sufficient evidence and therefore no right to assume that every single rebellion or counter-rebellion, revolution or
counter-revolution in modern societies of the last 140 years in West or East can be traced back directly or indirectly to Hegel or Hegelians. Not every revolutionary betrays his Hegelian background so well as, for instance Mao Tse Tung, when he speaks of world history as a "long march from animality to freedom." Also, Hegel must not be blamed for every transformation his philosophy suffered under the hands of 5 generations of revolutionaries or counter-revolutionaries. A teacher should never be blamed for all the mistakes of his students. Also the effects of all original causes in the course of world history are the more mitigated in time by later causes, the more the time-distance grows between the original cause and its later effects. That is particularly true for the influence Hegel had upon the rebellious and counter-rebellious, revolutionary and counter-revolutionary youth of the 19th and 20th centuries.

But it also cannot be entirely denied—on the basis of evidence which actually exists—that most rebellions and counter-rebellions, revolutions of the past five generations are somewhat connected with Hegel's philosophy, be it with its radical dialectical form or its more conservative content. They were imitations of it or deviations from it or contradictions against it. Since, with few exceptions, by Hegel's time the kings had still not yet become philosophers, philosophy entered the dimension of political practice. This meant that in terms of Hegel's Philosophy of Right the existential social life-world would become rational and thereby real and that the rational would become existential in man's social life-world and thereby real. Youth became impatient during Hegel's lifetime and no longer wanted to endure the fact that their political life-world would remain irrational and unfree and that reason and freedom would remain non-existent in their political world. They found their intellectual leadership in Hegel and among the Hegelians.

In Berlin Hegel laid the theoretical foundation for the practical execution of reason and freedom in the political life-world by the youth of the following generations in West and East. The drama of the political actualization of reason and freedom is still going on in 1971 and will probably continue, even if the recent student protest movement should become a matter of the past. Wherever this drama unfolds, the counter-drama will soon arise. Where there is an "SDS" group on campus, there will soon come into existence a group of "The Young Americans for Freedom." That is the dialectic of freedom. Hegel is often blamed for this dialectic of freedom in modern societies. This is one reason Hegel's work is still difficult to discuss in "civil" as well as in socialistic society. Each of them has its own set of Hegel-legends. These, by the way, are the best witness to Hegel's enormous influence, which their content may at the same time deny. For "civil society," Hegel is the man who, allegedly, destroyed liberalism and
became the intellectual father of Feuerbach, Marx, Bakunin, Lenin, Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi Minh and even Stalin and of everything these “Hegelians on the Left” stand for. For the socialistic society, Hegel is, allegedly, the arch-ideologist of the Western bourgeoise, the great mystifier of the world historical process and even the father of European fascism and of everything that “Hegelians on the Right” stand for, and so the more dangerous and fearsome, the greater his philosophical genius.

Hegel is obviously deeply involved in the dialectics of freedom in the 19th and 20th centuries. Civil society and socialistic society must talk about Hegel. It does not help either of them to repress Hegel's memory. If they do so, the philosophical giant will continually attack their rear in unwatched moments. His philosophical influence will not be conquered by repression. Modern society owes it to itself and more still to its restless younger generation to discuss Hegel and his relation to modern rebellions and counter-rebellions, be it only for the simple purpose of self-clarification in the present crisis situation. The understanding of Hegel and his work and influence may be greatly helped by studying the way in which he handled the rebellion and counter-rebellion of youth at his time. It will become obvious in such study, that Hegel’s time is not completely different from ours and that at least some of his problems are still our problems and that there is a chance that some of his solutions could still become our solutions.

4. Hope and Desperation

When Hegel gave his inaugural speech in October 1818, he knew the youth around himself in Berlin, Giessen, Jena and all over Germany was struggling between political hope and desperation. Even on December 13, 1830, a year before his death, Hegel writes to his friend Goschel, that at present the gigantic political interest has swallowed up all other interests. Throughout Hegel's teaching activity in Berlin the political situation in Germany and Europe remained turbulent. Philosophical theory and political practice had entered into a dialectical correlation never to be discontinued again up to the present.

In the second and third decade of the 19th century, the restless German youth marched around on the streets of Berlin and other German cities, with new hopes, new aspirations, new banners and new songs. But the great hopes of those young men marching in the streets were again and again deeply disappointed. Their friends had been imprisoned and even shot by the police during and after the riot of 1816. Student rebellions and counter-rebellions would follow in 1819, 1820, 1822, up to the abortive German citoyen-revolution of 1848. This youth had to experience the hard way that the master-servant relationship, which Hegel had described in his Phenomenology of the Spirit, was brutal reality and that the masters did not take jokes. The
order of domination in which the students lived was real. Political practice showed that better than philosophical theory. The bloody heads of the students demonstrated it. This youth had great hopes and was at the same time desperate. It was torn between hope and desperation.

The youth whom Hegel could observe around himself suffered from a high degree of psychic instability. Students were extremely irritated. Some youth-groups became politically perverted. They searched for short circuit outlets for their frustration, desperation, and general inner misery in pogroms and political murder. Contemporary attentive foreign observers from the East see in German youth an explosive power which could possibly blow up the whole of Europe.

Hegel teaches a youth which has in itself the propensity and inclination to throw away, in its utter desperation, the highest divine gift, the gift of reason, which enables man to take freely and joyfully responsibility in and for society. This youth becomes aggressive toward the outside, against others, strangers—for instance against Frenchmen, Poles, Jews—since it is lacking in healthy self-confidence. The aggressions which had been ineffective in changing the obsolete unjust old social order of Germany would turn outside and produce international problems of the largest scope. Hegel is the philosopher and teacher of youth which, despite some residue of hope and trust, has fundamentally lost its faith and hope that the miserable social conditions of its country could ever be changed toward the establishment of a rational and free society. This youth Hegel wants to bring to reason. Passionately he puts his whole existence into that task. He is not willing to capitulate to desperation. He is a man of hope in the midst of historical disaster. He is not a rebel or counter-rebel, not a revolutionary or counter-revolutionary. He is a progressive evolutionist. He teaches at the same time an ethos of adaptation to and of resistance against the unjust power structures of semi-feudal German civil society.

The youth around Hegel in Berlin and all over Germany and Europe can be divided into four groups: the conformists, the rebels, the counter-rebels, and the evolutionists. Each of those four groups developed its own specific attitude toward the societal process in which they all participated. The philosopher and educator Hegel is related to all four of those groups, but in very different ways.

5. The Conformists

The conformist group of German youth is concerned with adaptation for survival alone. Survival is its highest ethical and socioethical imperative. The members of this group prefer nothing more than to fit—under all circumstances—into the extant German and European social system with its specific power structure and order of domination—no matter how unjust or repressive it may be or how many con-
tractions it may contain. In the perspective of this conformist youth, the great revolution of the "others" across the Rhine had miserably failed. Now, after the long years of revolutionary disorganization through Europe and Germany, nothing is needed more than reorganization, stabilization, harmonization, return to the old equilibrium. The young foxes to whom the grapes of reason and freedom have become too sour adapt themselves cunningly to the old order to survive. They become traditionalists. Later they would find an ideological home in the "Hegelian Center."

Did Hegel have something to do with the traditionalistic conformists? On the 10th of June 1822, the very powerful, important and prudent Minister Altenstein wrote to the Prussian State Chancellor Hardenberg, that Hegel was the most profound and genuine philosopher Germany had. Altenstein himself became a Hegelian later on. He emphasized to Hardenberg that even greater than Hegel's value as a philosopher was his value as a man and a university teacher. He praised Hegel for having an infinitely beneficent effect upon the youth. In what did this beneficent effect consist? According to Minister Altenstein, Hegel had "broken the conceit and arrogance of the young people." This is, of course, a very questionable and doubtful kind of praise for any pedagogue by the representative of any establishment. Did Hegel's philosophical genius break the courage of the youth to analyze and to change by political action the oppressive social conditions around them in the still semi-feudal civil society of Germany and other European countries? Did Hegel produce conformists whose intellectual backbone had been broken? Did he preach resignation to an unbearable social and political situation?

Minister Altenstein's praise throws light on the most problematic aspect of Hegel's work as philosopher and pedagogue. Hegel wanted to promote the selfness of his students by breaking their selfishness. He wanted to help the birth of free subjectivity in his students by conquering bad egotistic subjectivity. For Hegel, bad subjectivity was one unmediated by historical reality. It was romantic subjectivity—the beautiful soul without contact with the real facts of social and political life. Such subjectivity was abstract and therefore untrue. Hegel wanted to educate his students to a concrete free subjectivity, one mediated with itself through facing and changing political and historical reality. Where "id" is, "ego" must be. The God Logos had to prevail. Spirit was all. The selfish, irrational, arbitrary subjective freedom has to be broken in the educational process, so that the real concrete freedom—the unity of the youthful subject and its objective political and historical world—can be actualized. In Freudian terms: Hegel without underestimating the importance of the pleasure principle, wants to educate a youth which would be able to face and endure the political and historical reality principle. To break selfishness in order to reach
true selfhood—that is the most crucial, the almost impossible task of an educator. Hegel failed many times in that task with himself, with his students, and last but not least in the upbringing of his illegitimate son Ludwig. But there is no evidence that Hegel in trying to fulfill that task produced conformists en masse. Ludwig became a rebel. In fact, Hegel showed little interest in the conformist youth around him. They had their reward.

In the worldwide struggle between the Hegelian Left—representing the interests of the proletariat in civil society—and the Hegelian Right—standing up for the interests of the petite-bourgeoisie and the high bourgeoisie throughout the 19th and 20th centuries—the Hegelian Center (conformists and traditionalists) often attempted to remain neutral. But because the biological law of inertia dominates the processes of civil society, the neutrality of the conformists and traditionalists turned mostly into support of the reactionary Right. It needs no particular effort to let a society regress down hill. It needs active political engagement to transform civil society into a rational and free society. Conformists and traditionalists were not willing to become engaged agents of change. Only too often they became the material, objects, gunfodder, victims for the far Right agents of regressive change. Left and Right want social change—the Right toward the good old times, an earlier period of social evolution of the human species and the Left toward an evolutionary period mankind has never gone through before. Only too often, the traditionalist and conformist Hegelian Center, by professing ideological neutrality and value-freedom, latently promoted not the progressive social dynamics of the Left but the regressive social kinetics of the Right.

6. The Rebels

Shortly before his death, Hegel sees a flash of lightning at the political-historical horizon: the rise of youthful rebels of the highest intellectual abilities, who would devote themselves to political radicalization on the far Left of the political-ideological spectrum of civil society. Soon those rebels would close themselves together to form and constitute the radical Hegelian Left in Berlin, Germany, Europe, in world society.

In Hegel’s class on philosophy of religion at the University of Berlin sits young Ludwig Feuerbach, who would soon find the secret of theology in anthropology and announce that it was not God who created man, but man God. On the 22nd of November 1829, young Dr. Feuerbach wrote to his old teacher Hegel: “Thousand year old forms, ways of viewing things must disappear, since the knowledge of their nullity, vanity, nothingness and finitude has come about—despite the fact that this has not yet become completely manifest. From now on all will become idea and reason. A new ground of things
must be established, a new history, a second genesis, in which reason will become the general view of things.” Against the master’s dialectical logic, Feuerbach argues: “The development of notions in the form of their generality, in their abstract purity and in their closed up being in themselves is not now important. Now it is rather necessary to annihilate and to stamp truly into the ground of truth the previous world historical views of time, this-worldliness, other-worldliness, ego, individual, person and particularly of God understood as being outside of the realm of finitude in the dimension of the absolute.” Continuing his letter against his Lutheran professor’s philosophy of religion which declared Christianity the absolute religion, Feuerbach says, “Christianity cannot, therefore, be considered to be the complete or absolute religion. The complete and absolute religion can only be the realm of the reality of the idea and the existing reason. Reason is therefore in Christianity not yet redeemed.” The letter was signed: “Your most obedient Ludwig Feuerbach, Ph.D.” Hegel, by putting into question and by criticising all epochs and periods of the social evolution of the human species, had mobilized his student Feuerbach and had given him the intellectual instrumentalities to supersede even his own philosophy. Thus, Feuerbach solved the religious problem for the radical Hegelian Left until the advent of the contemporary neo-Marxist Ernst Bloch’s philosophy of the future, of the new history, of the second genesis, of the “not yet,” of real potentiality, of concrete utopia, of hope, of the new.

Karl Marx, the future father of scientific authoritarian socialism, came to Berlin from Bonn five years after Hegel’s death and attended the lectures of one of Hegel's students, the rightwing Hegelian Eduard Gans. But he soon joined the “doctor club” of the leftwing Hegelians. One year later in 1837, the then 19-year-old Marx wrote to his father: “I had read fragments of Hegelian philosophy, but I did not much care for their grotesque, craggy melody. Now I wanted to dive into the sea again, but with the definite aim of finding intellectual nature as necessary, concrete and solidly rounded as physical nature; of no longer practicing skillful faints, but holding the pure pearl up to the sunlight instead.” Marx continues: “I wrote a dialogue of some 24 folios: ‘Kleanthe’ or ‘On the starting point and the necessary progress of philosophy.’ I united to a certain extent art and knowledge, which had moved apart; and I, a sturdy wanderer, went straight to work attempting a philosophical dialectical development of the Godhead, as it manifests itself as an idea, as religion, as nature, as history. My final sentence was the beginning of the Hegelian system and this paper, for which I did some delving into natural science, Schelling and history, and which required endless cerebral effort and is written so chaotically (since it actually meant to be a new logic) that even I can’t think my way back to it—this dearest child of mine, fostered in moonlight,
carries me like a treacherous siren into the enemy's arms." For a while, Marx turned to more positive studies. If he had become a positivist, the world would never have had a "Marx" and a Marxism. But during an illness Marx returned once more "into the enemy's arms." He re-read Hegel. His critical analysis of Hegel's philosophy began with the help of Hegel's *Logic*. It would end decades later with the application of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* and his *Logic* to economics, with *Das Kapital*—the new bible of one-third of mankind. Hegel had begun, in a peculiar disguise, his march into world history. Great intellectuals come most alive after they are dead.

Michael Bakunin, the future father of scientific anti-authoritarian socialism or anarchism, stemmed from a noble family in Russia. In 1835, he broke off his career as an officer in the Russian army, in order to study philosophy at the University of Moscow. Only twenty-five years of age, he was considered the most knowledgeable Hegel student of his country. In 1849 he came to Berlin. Like Kierkegaard, Bakunin was disappointed in Hegel's former friend and later opponent and successor to his chair of philosophy in Berlin—the nature philosopher Schelling. So, he joined the Left Wing Hegelians. As a result of his Berlin studies, he wrote the book: *The Reaction in Germany*. The book had to appear anonymously. In this book, Bakunin is much more radical in his critique of Hegel than his friend Marx. Bakunin admits that Hegel is without doubt the greatest philosopher of the present, the highest peak of modern, one-sided theoretical education. Exactly as this peak, Hegel is also the beginning of the self-dissolution of modern education. As this peak, Hegel has already transcended theory—of course still in the boundaries of theory—and has postulated a new practical world, a world which produces itself not through a formal application and diffusion of fixed theories but through an original act of practical autonomous spirit. Hegel had shown to Bakunin, as to Marx but not to Feuerbach, the way from the ethereal realm of theory to the hard and thorny political practice. The dialectics of philosophical theory and political practice toward a human realm of freedom will henceforth be the common demand of anti-authoritarian as well as authoritarian socialisms on the Hegelian Left.

In 1870, two years before Feuerbach's death and six years before Bakunin's, Lenin, another Leftwing disciple of Hegel, is born. He would not only become a rebel on the Hegelian Left, but even a successful revolutionary. The Russian exile Lenin read Hegel in Bern where the other Russian exile Bakunin, a mere rebel, had died lonely, estranged from Marx, excommunicated from the communist movement. Enthusiastically, Lenin found from reading Hegel that the truth is process. He wrote into his notebook in Bern that the dialectical way of the knowledge of truth leads from living perception to abstract thought and from there to political practice. This is the way to knowl-
edge of objective reality. E. Kant, according to Lenin's notebook, had reduced and degraded knowledge in order to make room for faith. Hegel had exalted knowledge by asserting that all knowledge was theology. Now the materialist, Lenin triumphantly states, exalts knowledge about the matter and nature and throws God and the whole rabble of philosophers, Kant and Hegel included, into the dungpit.

But like everybody else on the Hegelian Left, Lenin does not want to leave Hegel completely behind. Neither the Old nor the New Left can do without Hegel. Today neither Marcuse, Fromm, Horkheimer, Bloch nor even the late Adorno in his *Negative Dialectics* abandon Hegel. Under all circumstances, Lenin wants to hold on to what he considered to be the genial, cardinal idea of the whole Hegelian system: the universal, all-sided, living coherence and connection of everything with everything and the reflection of such connection—materialistically turned around once more—in the notions of man. These notions in the heads of men must, according to Lenin's notebook, become refined, smooth, dynamic, relative, mutually bound together, united in their opposition, so that the world can be comprehended through them. Lenin argues that the continuation of Hegel's and Marx's work must consist in the further dialectical cultivation, adaptation, arrangements of the history of human thought, of science and technology. For Lenin, Hegel's *Logic* became the "Algebra of Revolution," particularly the revolution he initiated in Moscow in 1917.

After a half century of rebellion in civil society, the Hegelian Left achieved the first successful socialistic revolution in the Russia of 1917. In reaction to the victory of the Hegelian Left in the Russian revolution, the counter-rebellion of the youth on the Hegelian Right increased and led to a chain reaction of successful reactionary fascist counter-revolutions in Italy, Spain, Portugal, Germany. Revolutions and counter-revolutions have rather lengthy incubation times. Hitler finally led the Rightwing youth of fascist Europe out to conquer communistic Russia. If he could have won the war, half of Russia would have become a German colony and the other half a crippled Russian civil society with fascist capitalism and fascist political dictatorship. The Hegelian Left would have been liquidated forever. But the two opposing factions—the Hegelian Left and the Hegelian Right (both illegitimate, but nevertheless intellectual sons of the philosopher and educator Hegel)—met finally in mortal embrace in the bloody streets of Stalingrad. In this city, the Hegelian Left, with the help of Hegel's dialectical logic, won a devastating military, moral and political victory over the Hegelian Right which abandoned this logic and held on to the more conservative content of Hegel's philosophy.

After World War II, Leftwing youth rebellions were numerous in civil societies around the globe. The New Left in European, American, and Asian universities were inspired by the beginnings of a critical
theory of societal process in Hegel's philosophy and by the further continuation of this theory in the not-yet-so-authoritarian, humanistic-socialism of the young Marx and in the anti-authoritarian socialism of Bakunin. Bakunin's later book, *God and the State*, was reprinted in France and Germany during the sixties and influenced the whole student protest movement of that decade, particularly the May Revolution in Paris in 1968. During the fifties and sixties one country after the other in Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia and South America became or tried to become socialistic and adopt one or the other form of Left-wing Hegelianism. Anarchism remained unsuccessful.

The critical theory of societal process began with Hegel, not with Marx or Bakunin. Hegel's ruthless criticism of civil society was topped only by Marx. Anyone comparing Hegel's description of civil society in his *Philosophy of Right* with the basic theses on this type of society by the later Marx will admit that all the fundamental elements of Marx's critical theory of the societal process of bourgeoisie society are already contained in Hegel's work. Hegel foresaw already, on the basis of his analysis of the structure of civil society, that this type of society would never be able to solve the poverty problem. According to Hegel, the civil society would by its very structure be forced to transcend its own boundaries and develop colonialistic and imperialistic tendencies. Hegel warned civil society that it must never allow a huge subproletariat or proletariat to come into existence in its cities. Since a civil society cannot preserve its equilibrium with a growing, unemployed proletariat in its cities and is structurally unable to solve the poverty problem inside itself, and, at the same time, in its search for cheaper labor, new markets and higher profits, always subsumes new masses of an external proletariat under its domination, sooner or later a qualitative jump will take place in world history and the modern epoch will end and a post-modern epoch will come about and the civil society will be transformed into a new type of society and organic state in which its contradictions can be dissolved. Despite his criticism of civil society, Hegel did not become a revolutionary. He knew that the "Logos" of world history has time and therefore takes his time. The dialectic of freedom needs time. Hegel became, in terms of the neo-Kantian, neo-Hegelian, neo-Marxian Frankfurt-School, a more or less radical reformer or progressive evolutionist. Neither the rebels and revolutionaries on the Hegelian Left nor the counter-rebels and counter-revolutionaries on the Hegelian Right ever forgave Hegel his radical reformism or progressive evolutionism.

7. *The Counter-Rebels*

The third group which Hegel witnessed around him in Berlin and all over Germany consisted of counter-rebels who devoted themselves to reactionary political activities on the far Right of the political-
ideological spectrum of civil society. Later on, those counter-rebels would join the extreme Hegelian Right, opposing furiously the Hegelian Left as well as the Hegelian Center in the 19th as well as in the 20th century.

The first visible signs of the counter-rebellious spirit of sections of German youth were a few reactionary speeches made by Rightwing students during the otherwise highly liberal if not revolutionary Wartburg Festival of 1817. The aim of the festival was the celebration of the third centennial of the Reformation. Martin Luther had taken refuge in Wartburg when he had been persecuted by religious and political authorities. Another purpose of the festival was to remember the battle of Leipzig in 1813, in which an allied force of 255,000 men won a decisive victory over Napoleon and his 160,000 men and forced him to withdraw behind the Rhine River. Most students participating in the Wartburg Festival were Lutherans. Many had participated in the battle of Leipzig.

During the Wartburg Festival counter-rebellious student groups, motivated by religious and national grounds, not only gave reactionary speeches but also burned liberal and revolutionary books in public. The Wartburg Festival was followed in some German cities by pogroms against the Jews. The student Karl Ludwig Sand assassinated the writer Kotzebue. The writer had been declared by the Rightwing students to be a Russian spy. The counter-revolutionary youth, therefore, presumed a perfect right to annihilate Kotzebue as an enemy of the people. Almost everybody knew that Kotzebue, like many others in far higher social and political positions, had accepted subsidy-money from Russia. Such acceptance of subsidy-money from foreign powers was quite customary in the little-integrated old Europe. Now Kotzebue had to die for taking subsidy money from Russia, because the German Right-wing youth defined this act as high treason and decreed his death.

In 1820, the Jewish poet Heinrich Heine, a student of Hegel’s, who later had to leave Germany for exile in France because of his all too liberal ideas, writes, with his usual irony, of his “admiration” for the counter-rebellious Rightwing youth of Germany. He had observed reactionary Rightwing students in a beer cellar in Göttingen. He “admired” the thoroughness with which his “old German friends” prepared the proscription list of their enemies in the ideological Center and on the ideological Left, so that they could be liquidated when the counter-revolution succeeded and a new order of things came about. According to the Rightwing students, whoever descended in the seventh degree from a Frenchman, a Jew or a Slav was to be sentenced to exile. The most radical counter-rebellious young men had their headquarters in Heidelberg and particularly in Giessen. They called themselves the “Blacks.” The poet Heine says of the Blacks that they
could determine exactly the degree of descendence a man or woman had to have in order to be liquidated when the Rightwing counter-revolution took place. According to Heine, disagreement existed among the Blacks only concerning the method of execution. Some of them asserted the sword was the oldest German instrument of execution. But others were somewhat tolerant in their romantic primitivism and thought the guillotine also could be used as a means of liquidating people from the Left and Center, since it was after all a German invention.

Hegel, noticing the development of the reactionary Right among his students, warned in his lectures of those who wanted to revive the old German mythology in the fashion of romantic primitivism. He condemned that revival because of its crudeness, its low level of consciousness of freedom, and because the Persians, Greeks and Moslems had already progressed so much further in their consciousness of freedom than the old German tribesman lying on the banks of the Rhine and the Danube drinking beer. Hegel warned of cultural and social regression. Germany would not listen to his warnings. German national socialists would hate him for them. Germany would decide against Hegel's progressive evolutionism and for the regressive old German disaster line: from Hegel's competitor at the University of Berlin—Schopenhauer, through Wagner and Nietzsche to Rosenberg and Hitler. Seedlike, the reactionary counter-rebellious youth of the first decades of the 19th century already contained most of the characteristics which later made up the syndrome of 20th century European fascism: romanticism, nationalism, anti-intellectualism, racism, elitarianism, authoritarianism, sadism and masochism—and beer, plenty of beer.

The Hegelian Right developed throughout the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries. It finally flowed into European fascism. The Hitler Youth Groups repeated everything reactionary rightwing students had done a century before. The Right experienced its disaster in Stalingrad. But the catastrophe of the Hegelian Right at Stalingrad was not as complete as the Hegelian Left might have expected. It is rather symptomatic and symbolic that only a few months after the end of the Second World War relatively fresh contingents of the SS Division Hermann Goering, spared in the furious battles in the East, moved to Strassburg, were transformed into French Foreign Legionnaires and continued the battle against the Hegelian Left in Indochina with new tanks and airplanes from the USA. The victory of the Hegelian Left over the Hegelian Right in Stalingrad would not have been possible without American military assistance. Now, a few years after Stalingrad, the Hegelian Right fought against the Hegelian Left with American weapons. This is the contradiction, the irony and the tragedy of American foreign policy after the Second World War in
terms of the continued world-wide struggle between the Hegelian Left and the Hegelian Right. Only one genuine counter-rebellion of Right-wing youth broke out in the sixties, when rebellious Left-wing youth came to the climax of its political activity. This happened in the late sixties in Indonesia. It cost the lives of more than a hundred thousand so-called “communistic” farmers. It brought Dutch and American corporations back into Indonesia. President Johnson called this Indonesian event one of his greatest foreign policy successes. It is not entirely improbable that the seventies may see more Right-wing movements and rebellions than the sixties in Western and Eastern societies.

8. The Evolutionists

Hegel was as little a conformist or traditionalist as he was a rebel or a revolutionary, a counter-rebel or a counter-revolutionary. As Marx never wanted to be called a “Marxist,” so Hegel would not have identified himself with the Hegelian Left, Right, or Center. As a more or less radical reformist, or better still, a progressive evolutionist, Hegel stands somewhere between the radical Left and the more conservative Center. Because of his progressive-evolutionist orientation, Hegel showed the greatest interest and paid most personal attention to the fourth group of students marching around in Berlin and all over Germany and Europe in the second decade of the great 19th century: the progressive-evolutionistic student fraternities.

The fraternity brothers had gone through the storm and stress of the liberation wars against Napoleon. At the time of Hegel’s teaching activity in Berlin, the fraternities were busy in clarifying their still unclear and all too enthusiastic philosophical and political ideas. They began to mature into men of more or less radical reform, of progressive evolution, rather than violent revolution. Those progressive evolutionists stood left of the center, left of the silent majority of conformists and traditionalists who simply wanted to survive, but also kept away from the radical Left which was only too eager to tear down the whole system of growing civil society together with its feudal residues. The evolutionists in the fraternities wanted to devote themselves to patient, tenacious, hard work toward a slow improvement of the unjust social conditions in Berlin, Germany, and Europe. Of all the youth groups in Germany, the fraternities came closest in their ethos to the inner spirit of freedom in Hegel’s philosophy.

Shortly after the Wartburg Festival of 1817, the progressive-evolutionist fraternity students got entangled in a reactionary political whirlpool. The “Karlsbad Resolutions” ordered and sanctioned persecution, witch-hunting, snooping into beliefs and reprisals against fraternity students and professors allied with them. Metternich had initiated and the Federal Parliament in Frankfurt had accepted the
“Karlsbad Resolutions” in reaction to the assassination of the writer Kotzebue and an assassination attempt against the Hessian Minister Ibell. The “Karlsbad Resolutions” ordered: the liquidation of all fraternities, censorship for newspapers and all publications under 20 pages, firing of liberal and revolutionary minded professors, police surveillance of the universities, and a central board of inquiry. Professors were suspended without salary and some were put into prison. The general effect of the “Karlsbad Resolutions” was the strengthening of the traditional “law and order” forces in German civil society.

Since the government persecution respected neither students nor professors, Professor Hegel also felt threatened. In 1821, the Prussian king banned the nature-philosophy of Oken or similar teachings which led to atheism. Hegel himself was sometimes charged with pantheism and even atheism, despite the fact that he continuously confessed to being a good Lutheran. Even today some theological faculties in German universities would not consider Hegel’s philosophy “Christian,” despite the fact that the neo-orthodox Karl Barth thought of Hegel as the protestant Thomas of Aquinas. Hegel communicated his worries about the repressive political situation in Prussia to his old friend Niethammer. “You know,” Hegel tells his friend, “I am on one hand a jittery, anxious man and on the other hand I like my rest, quiet and calm. It is not exactly comfortable to see thunderstorms moving up the horizon year after year, despite the fact that I am quite convinced that I will get at most just a few drops of the rain.”

Hegel suffered under the “Karlsbad Resolutions”—the press laws, the censorship, the measures for police surveillance of the university, the students and professors. The “Resolutions” were enforced by a German government which turned more and more to the ideological and political Right. The youth on the Left considered Hegel’s Philosophy of Right servile toward the power-structure and the present order of domination and therefore conservative if not reactionary. Its publication was delayed for one year by the Rightwing reaction because it was too liberal for their taste. In this case, the Right was for once more correct in its judgment than the Left.

In the University of Berlin a sharp conflict arose between the two great adversaries (the philosopher Hegel and the theologian Schleiermacher), because of the dismissal of Professor De Wette. (Hegel could never sympathize with Schleiermacher’s definition of religion: “feeling of dependence.” It was too one-sided, romantic, and servile for Hegel’s view of man and religion.) Now the two antagonists met in the political arena. Professors Fries, Oken, and De Wette had lost their chairs in the Berlin University—Fries and Oken for more philosophical, De Wette for more political reasons. After the murder of the writer Kotzebue, De Wette had written a letter of consolation to the mother
of the culprit Sand, a student of theology, saying the deed had been committed by a pure, pious youth who had acted to the best of his belief. De Wette was severely criticized in public for his letter and had to relinquish his professorship. Hegel and Schleiermacher participated in a secret relief action taken by the “Lawless Society” to which both the philosopher and theologian belonged. Hegel and Schleiermacher and other professors pledged to pay a yearly income to De Wette until he found a new job. Hegel gave 25 Thalers, Schleiermacher 50 Thalers. At an evening meeting of the “Lawless Society” Hegel, in conformity to his Philosophy of Right, defended the right of the government to dismiss a teacher, in this case De Wette, as long as it continued paying his salary. Schleiermacher expressed shock at Hegel’s statement and called his attitude toward the De Wette case simply mean, piteous, miserable, wretched. Hegel’s rejoinder was equally irate. It is very possible that Hegel was not only defending a right of the government, but also disagreeing with De Wette’s judgment concerning the Rightwing assassin Sand. That at least could be concluded from Hegel’s general philosophy and particularly from his Philosophy of Right and what it has to say about the difference between individual morality and social science.

Despite his anxieties and extreme carefulness in political matters, Hegel helped his progressive-evolutionistically minded fraternity students as much as he could. Hegel wrote and received letters from politically persecuted students. He fought for some of those students with great circumspection and prudence. For instance, he put up 500 Thalers, about a fourth of his yearly salary, as bail for a student’s release from prison. Hegel was able to persuade von Kampionz, one of the worst enemies of the contemporary student protest movement in Berlin to be the lawyer for the progressive-evolutionist student Gustave Asversus. Hegel interceded with the authorities particularly for those young fraternity students who were politically incriminated.

The most important case for which Hegel exerted himself concerned the fate of Friedrich Wilhelm Carove. Carove was a Catholic fraternity student from Koblenz. That was unusual, since most of the persecuted fraternity students were Protestants. The Catholicism of the student made no difference to the Lutheran professor Hegel, who was otherwise quite critical of aspects of spiritual freedom in Catholicism. During the Wartburg Festival of 1817 the fraternity student Carove had given a great speech. Carove rejected in his speech, very discreetly and prudently, the racist radicalism of the Rightwinger Follen and the nationalistic-poet Arndt’s somewhat unsound supernationalism. Carove pleaded in his Wartburg speech for the acceptance of foreigners and Jews into the student fraternities. Two years after the Wartburg Festival, Carove got in trouble with the authorities through the publication of his pamphlet “About the Murder of
Kotzebue.” Carove’s pamphlet was fundamentally concerned, like Hegel’s whole positive-dialectical philosophy, with reconciliation. Freedom and reason were the result of the reconciliation of opposites in philosophical theory as well as in political practice. But Carove’s publication was denounced before the authorities. The highly gifted Carove was excluded by the authorities from any kind of an academic career. He was condemned to spend his life in the subordinate position of a second-rate writer. Hegel remained in continual contact with Carove. Even ten years after his political persecution, Carove wrote Hegel, addressing his teacher as “My dearest Friend!”

During the 19th and 20th centuries, the progressive evolutionists again and again came between the firelines of the Hegelian Left and Right. Today they may be called “fascists” in Russia and “communists” in the USA. Whatever may happen to the radical reformists they can at least be assured that they are closest in their ethos to Hegel’s program: To liberate youth toward an existence of reason and freedom by facing the negativity of history and by changing the structure of society by hard detailed social and political work.

9. Hegel today: Beyond Left and Right

The philosopher and educator Hegel was usually silent concerning the future. He thought that concern with the future consisted only too often of mere opinions—an all too soft material into which everything desirable could arbitrarily be impressed. Hegel’s main concern was his present, not his future—our today. But Hegel sometimes broke his silence concerning the future. He did so shortly before his death in his last lectures on the philosophy of history. In those lectures Hegel spoke not only of the USA as the probable future of old Europe, but also of the future of the USA. What Hegel had to say in those lectures may still give at least a hint of guidance to American youth—in the Center, on the Left as well as on the Right. American youth has little historical consciousness and therefore is deeply confused and sometimes desperate concerning the direction our country has been taking since the sixties. Hegel may show this youth a way beyond the dualism of Left and Right—rebellion and counter-rebellion, revolution and counter-revolution. He may show them a third way—progressive dialectical evolutionism.

Already in his lectures on the philosophy of art and even more so in his last lectures on philosophy of history Hegel is highly optimistic about the future of the US. In national or international crisis situations it is good to know about this optimism of the greatest Western philosopher of history. Today Arnold Toynbee conditionally affirms Hegel’s optimistic prognoses and does so with much more historical evidence than was available to Hegel. In a recent Life interview even Mao Tse-tung affirmed Hegel’s optimistic projection for the USA,
slightly modifying it, when he said: if Russia will not take the leadership of mankind, the USA will.

As optimistic as Hegel is concerning the future of the USA, he does not shy away from the grave problems which are obstacles to the full realization of that future and may even prevent us from ever reaching it. In Hegel's view world history will reach its freedom-telos. For Hegel that is a matter of inner necessity. No Pavlov or Skinner can ever hinder, for long, the course of history toward an era of freedom and dignity. But whether America or Russia will be the next world historical power, stimulating the highest aspirations of mankind concerning freedom and dignity, is a matter of insight and free decision and therefore of achievement as well as of possible failure and guilt. Whether America will lead mankind to man's home of identity or will all too soon move into a niche of world history (like the African tribes, Egypt, Greece or Turkey), leaving unactualized her full evolutionary potential and thereby burying so many great hopes and aspirations is to a large extent up to the historical and political initiative of American youth. That is Hegel's message to this century and to the youth of this country. Marcuse, who wants to lead American youth into the arena of political action toward a non-repressive, rational society, is much closer to Hegel than Norman O. Brown, who wants to lead American youth out of the rough and tough political arena into the bloomy fields of symbolism and promises them social change toward a good and just society without social change.

Hegel had told his students in Heidelberg that Homer once celebrated the triumph of the West over the East: of European measure, individual beauty, and self-limiting reason over Asiatic splendour (that is, the magnificence of a patriarchal unity, which either did not achieve complete differentiation and formation or which disintegrated into innumerable abstract social units). In Hegel's perspective, a future American Homer will tell in a new American epic the victory of a living, more universal American reason and freedom over the highly particularized, imprisoned, not so alive, positive rationality and freedom of the European nation states. If one wants to think beyond Europe, Hegel teaches his students, one must think of America. Africa and Asia have moved into the niche of world history. They may have a comfortable life, but they will never again come up to the front of the evolution of the human species toward the ultimate realm of freedom.

At a time when masses of immigrants were still moving into the plains of the Mississippi valley, Hegel projected, on the basis of rich historical data and his dialectical logic, the "not yet," the real potentiality of the USA, which would lead some day to the cultural triumph of America over Europe. Hegel, carrying in his stomach the sickness which would finally kill him, told his 60 to 70 students at the Uni-
versity of Berlin about the "not yet"—the future of the USA: "As to the political condition of North America the general object of the existence of this state is not yet fixed and determined, and the necessity for the firm combination does not yet exist; for a real state and a real government arises only after a distinction of classes has arisen, when wealth and poverty become extreme, and when such a condition of things presents itself, that a large portion of the people cannot any longer satisfy its necessities in a way in which it has been accustomed so to do." "But America," Hegel lectures his students, "is hitherto exempt from this pressure, for it has the outlet of colonization constantly and widely open... by this means the chief source of discontent is removed, and the continuation of the existing civil conditions is guaranteed. Had the woods of Germany still been in existence," Hegel asserts, "the French Revolution would not have occurred. North America will be comparable with Europe only after the immeasurable space, which that country presents to its inhabitants, shall have been occupied, and the members of the political body shall have begun to be pressed back upon each other. Only when the direct increase of agriculturists is checked," Hegel predicts, "will the inhabitants, instead of pressing outward to occupy the fields, press inward upon each other, pursuing city occupations, and trading with their fellow citizens; and so form a compact system of civil society, and require an organized state." Hegel prophesizes: "America is therefore the land of the future, where in ages that lie before us, the burden of the world history shall reveal itself—perhaps in a contest between North and South America."

Hegel's prognosis and program for the future social evolution of America is quite clear: First evolutionary stage: the development of farms and villages and small towns; Second evolutionary stage: development of civil society with big cities, based on production and exchange; Third evolutionary stage: development of an organized organic state—which for Hegel is nothing more or less than society organized rationally, freely and justly in terms of internal and external public law; Fourth evolutionary stage: possible development of a rational and free continental state, embracing North and South America. American youth stands before the task of developing the real government, the real rational and free organic supernational or continental state. Hegel has by far not already happened.

The philosopher Hegel's greatest pedagogical achievement was giving the youth of the following generations a model of the course of world history by which it could orient itself in time, and encouraging this youth to face the harshness of historical reality and endure the always wholly "other" in the strangeness of social objectivity as well as in the hard, always resisting political conditions. Hegel knew that the highest and most delicate task of the true educator was not to
draw young people to himself and bind them to himself, but to lead them away from himself. The good teacher is the one who makes himself superfluous precisely by his teaching. Young people become capable of freedom, happy to be free and willing to educate themselves toward a rational and free existence under the experience of the wholly "other," which never bends to all desires, to wishful thinking of the ego, entangled in narcissism. To students, who tried to find heaven for themselves alone, Hegel presented the gigantic process of world history in a huge cosmos, which has no regard whatsoever for individual human beings. Hegel continually warns of and fights against the romantic disease which pollutes the minds of youth. The romantic disease drove European youth into the facist movement. Romantic primitivism is the most dangerous virus in the minds of many contemporary young men and women in our positive universities. Hegel promoted general education toward social and historical objectivity; toward the development of an intellectual energy, able to break narrow willfullness, to oppose bad romantic subjectivity unmediated by objective reality of cosmos or history, to liberate toward reason and freedom. Such general education (conceived of as liberation toward reason and freedom) is the most difficult business on earth.

Can the philosopher and educator Hegel help American youth overcome romantic subjectivity and liberate itself toward a rational and free existence? Can he help them in the dramatic social development from civil society to the real non-repressive supra-national or even continental state? To lead Hegel and American youth into a new and honest encounter would be very worthwhile and necessary, but difficult. This new encounter would presuppose the sucess of an even more difficult task. This would be to let American youth take root in that healthy confidence, which Hegel characterized as threefold: 1) confidence is science, 2) faith in reason, 3) confidence and faith in one's self. Only such rational, reason-related and society-related self confidence can provide a powerful impulse and motive—to give Hegel the word a last time—to that intellectual "rejuvenation, which shows its next effect and expression in the political reality." Such intellectual rejuvenation may lead to a social and political movement of youth, which is able to go beyond the rebellious and revolutionary Left and the counter-rebellious and counter-revolutionary Right in terms of a progressive social evolution toward a rational society and state powerful enough to be able to afford freedom, not only for one or a few, but for all in practice as well as in theory. Such intellectual rejuvenation may very well begin and be promoted in the dimension of general education in our positive universities.