The Greater Horn or Africa: Priming a Strategy and Mechanism for Greater Horn of Africa Peace, Security and Development

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The Greater Horn or Africa

Priming a Strategy and Mechanism for Greater Horn of Africa Peace, Security and Development

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Draft

Western Michigan University’s
Center for African Development Policy Research &
the Ethiopian Development Studies Program In collaboration with the Lewis
Walker Institute for the Study of Race and Ethnic Relations

The 4th International Conference on
Ethiopian Development Studies

A Multidisciplinary Conference on the Challenges of
Peace and Development in Ethiopia & Northeast Africa

August 2-4, 2007
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Abbreviations and acronyms

AU  African Union
CEWARN Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
COMESA Common Market for East and Southern Africa
CPMR Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution
CSSDCA Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
EU European Union
GFACM Gender Focussed Alternative Conflict Management
GoS Government of Sudan
JEM Justice for Equality Movement
HIPC Highly indebted poor countries initiative
HIV/AIDS Human Immunodeficiency Virus/ Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
IDP Internally Displaced Persons
IGAD Inter Governmental Authority of Development
JEM Justice for Equality Movement
NEPAD New Partnership Agenda for African Development
RECs Regional Economic Communities
SHD Sustainable Human Development
SPM Sudan People’s Movement
SSA Sub Saharan Africa
The Horn Greater Horn of Africa
WWII World War II

Abstract

Issues: The 21st Century has ushered in a time of unprecedented global wealth and extraordinary opportunities; but Africa has yet to benefit from this. From Darfur to the jungles of the River Zaire, from the Eritrean plateau to South Sudan, from trouble Somalia to the genocidal communities of Rwanda and Burundi, from the violent cities of Kenya to Northern Uganda, new faces and forces of vulnerability haunt the Greater Horn of Africa. Under militarised governance and with mostly short-term thinking, these are often not seen as ‘national security’ issues at all and are considered a lower priority than military and security affairs. Or if they are considered national security issues, the response is to prepare for any military threats that may transpire, rather than addressing the underlying causes.

Objectives: The paper will address threats to national security, real and potential, that include, among others: lack of constitutional order; incapacity to manage disputes; threats of invasion and destabilisation; terrorism; contested borders and natural resource jurisdiction – blood diamonds; small arms; poverty related unrest; ethnic conflicts; feeble governance institutions; human displacement and pandemics.

Conclusion: Because the security debate has changed dramatically since the inception of state security advocated in the 17th century international community urgently needs a new paradigm of security. The state remains the fundamental purveyor of security. Yet it often fails to fulfill its security obligations -- and at times has even become a source of threat to its own people. The peace and security strategy developed here shifts the debate from the state security to human security; that brings together the human elements of security, of rights, and of development.

The author presents the Darfur humanitarian operation is one of the largest operations in a single location so far in the continent. Our recommendations here are designed to reinforce such worthy actions and highlight the urgency of halting gender-based violence and provide relief and post-conflict reconstruction to the Darfuri IDPs and refugees.

BT Costantinos, CHE May 2007
I. Introduction

Because the security debate has changed dramatically since the inception of state security advocated in the 17th century international community urgently needs a new paradigm of security. In the 21st century, both the challenges to security and its protectors have become more complex. The state remains the fundamental purveyor of security. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms - freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people form critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people's strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military, and cultural system that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity. The vital core of life is a set of elementary rights and freedoms people enjoy. What people consider to be "vital" - what they consider to be "of the essence of life" and "crucially important" -- varies across individuals and societies. That is why any concept of human security must be dynamic.

Human security complements "state security" in four respects: Its concern is the individual and the community rather than the state. Menaces to people's security include threats and conditions that have not always been classified as threats to state security. The range of actors is expanded beyond the state alone. Achieving human security includes not just protecting people but also empowering people to fend for themselves. States security focuses on other states with aggressive or adversarial designs. States built powerful security structures to defend themselves and their boundaries, their institutions, their values, and their numbers. State security has meant protecting territorial boundaries with - and from uniformed troops Human security shifts from focusing on external aggression to protecting people from a range of menaces.

Hence the Greater Horn of Africa needs to draw elaborate plans to develop regional mechanism for peace and security for the Region. Meta-assumptions to be tested and indicators used are the rule of law, budgetary policies and priorities administrative and bureaucratic consistency, political openness and tolerance participation and communication favourable environment for private enterprise detailed assumptions and indicators civil service, with appointments based on merit civil service compensation is comparable to other sectors - independent of the political party in power there is an elected legislature which is responsible to the electorate and has oversight over governmental policy there are robust civic organisations.

Applied data collection focused on participatory, affordable, easy to understand and useful techniques. Stakeholders at district and regional levels will be consulted for their views, experience, and inputs to the assessment process fully participated in identification of lessons learned and formulation of recommendations. In addition to the primary data, secondary data were collected from different organisations to feed into the peace and security strategy and mechanism development process. Key Informants- telephone interviews with certain knowledgeable personalities from various walks of life were interviewed. Electronic focus groups discussions were held among working groups of relevant government officials, community leaders, public sector employees, service users.

The paper has also benefitted from the consultations on a Strategy for Peace and Security in the The Greater Horn of Africa Region Opening Conference, Khartoum, Sudan 1-3 October, 2005 underpinned the concern to promote peace and stability in the region.

Section I of the paper presents the methodology and protocols. The next sections dwell on state security and human Security, State security - underlying causes of conflicts and security architecture, Human security and alternative intra-party management, meta-assumptions to be tested and indicators to be used in the peace and security strategy and mechanism development process and conclusion.
II. Methodology and research protocols

In the following is outlined the kind and types of information gathered, data collection techniques used and the analysis system that were utilised to organise, interpret and present findings. For clarity purposes, we have organised the information to be collected in line along the major components of the assignment. Applied data collection will focus on participatory, affordable, easy to understand and useful techniques. Stakeholders at district, region, and community levels were consulted for their views, experience, and inputs to the assessment process and would fully participate in identification of lessons learned and formulation of recommendations. Information gathering/ data collection and analysis were conducted in close co-ordination and consultation with all stakeholders and authorities. In order to obtain the information needed to answer the above questions, the following data collection techniques were used.

- **Literature Review** - used in its broadest sense, meaning a survey of sources available in the contemporary research knowledge systems on peace and conflicts. The key object is to inform the review of the current and up-to-date knowledge about the peace and security strategy and mechanism development process that has in its background documents state of the art think tank pieces to consult on.

- **Survey Instruments** – a series of interview instruments that reflect the range of issues and questions contained in the peace and security strategy and mechanism development process assignment were developed and administered. The questions were designed to collect a wide range of factual and attitudinal data on the peace and security strategy and mechanism development process.

- **Official Records** - in addition to the primary data, secondary data were collected from different organisations to feed in into the peace and security strategy and mechanism development process. These data mainly will come from existing records of government bureaux and other organisations associated with them.

- **Key Informants** – interviews were held with certain knowledgeable personalities from various walks of life. These include officials, community leaders, members of disadvantaged and marginalised groups and others considered having particular insight to the issues. Lengthy and detailed discussions were held as to their conceptualisation of the peace and security strategy and mechanism development process objectives, activities, effects, impacts and underlying assumptions of the peace and security strategy and mechanism development process. Information obtained from key informants was invaluable in understanding the context within which the programme operates.

- **Case Studies** - in addition to the survey-generated data, in-depth case studies were done on randomly selected cases in Darfur, to feed in into the strategy and mechanism development process. The purpose of these in-depth case studies is to gain a better understanding of local conditions by allowing the stakeholders to illustrate and expand on some of the points raised by the survey. Respondents were probed in detail and were encouraged to discuss their assessments in a non-structured manner.

- **Electronic Focus Group** discussions were held among working groups of relevant government officials, community leaders and other pertinent stakeholders to develop the peace and security strategy and mechanism. The objective is to get the broadest possible opinion and crosscheck and verify the findings with those directly involved through open e-forums.
II. Assessment of regional security crises (Darfur Case Study)

1. Rape as a savage instrument of humiliation: The story of every IDP interviewed is repeatedly the same as if the prescriptions for rape have been commandeered and organised by a central organ carefully synergised for maximum impact. A number of women IDPs told the Technical Mission of having been repeatedly and cruelly raped. Some resort to the general complaint of abduction as rape in the local cultures has consequences that women must pay, to get away with it. Raped women in cultural and Sharia contexts are excommunicated from the community and very often stoned and flogged publicly if they are found pregnant. Some women and girls have been publicly raped in front of their families and communities have only been to tell their stories to NGOs and human rights groups as well as AMIS and CIVPOL women police. All point to the fact that it is not of any help to the GoS police who have been ‘cited’ as perpetrators of rape in their own uniforms. This fact points to attempts both to subjugate the women and humiliate the whole community. Arab militias called Janjeweed kill, rape and rob Sudanese Africans in the process of quelling a rebellion against the GoS that began in February 2003.

2. The rise of vigilante gangs in the IDP camps: Perhaps a disturbing new phenomenon is the rise of local vigilantes in the IDP camps that now administer the camps forcibly and have replaced the Government of Sudan police in one Kalma Camp, Nyala Sector in Southern Darfur, visited by the Technical Mission. The vigilantes have taken over policing of the camp and deliver justice as they see it fit. They exact obedience from the IDPs and cart away large sums of money from the IDPs including officials of NGOs. They have been reported to engage in rape and violence against women. This development may be a harbinger of a grand design to destroy the life of the Darfuris.

3. Death of non-combatants: It is indeed difficult to zero in a figure of the number dead under the hands of the perpetrators. While the accurate figure may never be unknown in the foreseeable future, estimates have stated that 200,000 to 300,000 have died since the start of the Darfur conflict. In attacks on villages there has often been an emphasis on the killing of the male population. Instances have been reported of males being rounded up and taken away from villages to be shot. Some reporters and relief agency staff expressed surprise at the small number of wounded refugees entering the camps. In fact, the wounded were entering the camp. The brutal response to the Darfur uprising has resulted in a British parliamentary report claiming the death toll so far in Darfur at up to 300,000. US Congress decided to tem it as “genocide”, and to demand that the perpetrator face justice. 51 persons are accused of war crimes. The above threat of action notwithstanding, it is evident that not much has been done by the Government of Sudan to stop the carnage in Darfur.

4. Sudanese cultural configurations and anthropological considerations: Within the Darfur conflict context, race and ethnicity has indeed become a force to be reckoned with and social scientists have increasingly been forced to address it. Sheik Ali in Kalma told the Technical Mission that the attackers called them ‘Toro Bora’ and they had to be destroyed. Within the Darfur configuration, the cultural and anthropological rationale for the mayhem are grounded on the ‘Arab ness’ of the Janjeweed and the ‘African ness’ of the Darfuris, some time crudely assaulting them as ‘Abid’ or slaves.

5. Systematic destruction of Darfuris’ Villages: Information obtained from secondary sources mainly and in each case confirmed by group and individual interviews held with officials on the ground and the IDPs in the camps, points to a pattern of indiscriminate attacks on civilians in villages and communities in all three Darfur states beginning in early 2003. Most sources are in agreement that the escalation coincides with the
intensification of the internal armed conflict between the Government and the two rebel movements, SLM/A and JEM.\textsuperscript{vi}

6. **IDP camps turned into IDP Prisons:** Even though military offensives and large-scale displacement of civilians in all the three states of Darfur have remained low for about a year, violence has not ceased. Attacks have moved from villages to IDP camps. In all the six camps visited by the Technical Mission three had experienced recent attacks.\textsuperscript{vii}

7. **Armed robbery and abductions:** bandits scour the Darfur landscape and have spread fear and apprehension to business, civilians and humanitarian activities. The mandate and current equipment of Africa Union Military observers prohibits them from firing back or doing more than observing, hearing, and reporting IDP camps being raided by combatants on either side of the conflict. Cease-fire observer forces are not immune to the violence.\textsuperscript{viii}

8. **Relief aid to IDPs becomes a dangerous task:** channelling humanitarian assistance to the IDPs is a difficult task. The survival condition under which close to two million IDPs is unspeakably degrading and by any measure of human security, unacceptable. The once thriving communities of the 'Black African' populations have been relegated to sub-human conditions of life imposed by the nature of the camps and the inability of the IDPs to travel outside the camps for fear of rape, torture and murder. When even getting around to collect fire wood to cook food is as risky as a mission that would make one vulnerable to death, rape and torture signifies the inability of the GoS to even guarantee under camp conditions a minimal condition for life. Hence the IDPs will not survive without humanitarian assistance, including the possibilities of providing cooking facilities in camps.

9. **Blasphemy of spiritual and cultural idols:** There have been reports of “widespread destruction of mosques and desecration of Muslim religious symbols, despite the Islamic Government of Sudan being Islamic itself”.\textsuperscript{ix} Indeed, for many, it has become inconceivable that such violence against faith, culture and their own women can happen in such an organic Muslim community. A report of desecration of a Mosque and women was reported to the UN International Commission of Inquiry.

10. **Small arms and light weapons:** The problem of proliferation and misuse of SALW is acute throughout the Horn. Wide availability and flow of SALW is partly a consequence of past and present wars in the Horn and in the neighbouring regions (and related third states providing arms to opposition / rebel groups) and is a contributing factor to the warlordism, militias, criminal networks, and armed crime and violence in the region. It also serves as an enabler of terrorism. Efforts to prevent, combat and reduce SALW proliferation and misuse have become a major focus for the development of national strategies and regional co-operation in the Horn and have for example led to agreement on the Nairobi Protocol amongst ten states in the Horn and East Africa.

As seen from Table 1, the EU asserts that crucial issue in reducing instability in the Horn of Africa is to address the mutually reinforcing connections between insecurity, under-development and governance. At the heart of this relationship are communities, which feel marginalised in the national distribution of power, wealth and access to social services, security and justice. The marginalisation of vulnerable groups may over time develop grievances that can lead to violent rebellion. Conflicts in the Horn can be exacerbated by powerful networks of state and non-state actors, such as warlords and the business community, who benefit from war economies, which they to some extent control and who thus have an interest in maintaining the status quo. These interests exacerbate the marginalisation of communities and the manipulation of ethnic solidarities. In addition the absence of political space for the peaceful resolution of conflicts, the authoritarianism and
militarism and interference by external powers have perpetuated instability and conflict in the Horn of Africa.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
<th>Eritrea</th>
<th>Sudan</th>
<th>Somalia</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Djibouti</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inter state war 1998-2000. Support for Eth opposition and rebel groups – including OLF and ONLF. Internal conflicts suppressed.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Has sought to improve relations with Sudan since war with Eth. Eastern Front/Darfur indicates this is circumstanti al.</td>
<td>No common border. Issues in relations. Eritrea has provided military support for some factions in Somalia and is a supplier of arms.</td>
<td>No common border</td>
<td>No common border</td>
<td>Relations strained by Et Er war. Support for FRUD; ethnic Afar problem spills over into Djibouti.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for OLF, ONLF and other opposition groups in 90s. Now seeking normalisation and demarcation of border.</td>
<td>Support for Islamist groups. Hosts many Eritrean refugees. Relationship now improving</td>
<td>Comprehens ive Peace Agreement has concluded N-S civil war. Major conflict in Darfur that could spread to Kordofan.</td>
<td>No common border but Sudan has increasingly been close to the TFG in the context of the Sana alliance with Ethiopia and Yemen. Facilitating dialogue between the TFG and the Islamic courts.</td>
<td>Poor relations. Past support for LRA. But now permits Ugandan military operations against LRA</td>
<td>Ilemi triangle border dispute. Resource conflicts among pastoralists from Sudan, Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia.</td>
<td>No common border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of demarcated border, rise of Islamic courts and &quot;Greater Somalia&quot; Ogaden related threat lead to continued tension; relations with TFG are robust</td>
<td>No common border. Some Somali factions receive support from Eritrea</td>
<td>No common border.</td>
<td>Peace and reconciliation process ongoing under the auspices of TFIs: governance, security and Islamic courts issues provide formidable challenges.</td>
<td>No common border.</td>
<td>Somali instability spill over into Kenya. Armed Somali groups operating in NE Kenya</td>
<td>Issaq (Somalilands ) involveme nt in Djibouti politics.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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### Uganda
- No common border. Close relationship between leaders.
- No common border.
- Poor relations. Support for SPLA. Hot pursuit of LRA into S Sudan.
- No common border. Uganda has offered to send peacekeepers.
- Conflict ongoing in North. Gov. Amnesty Offered; ICC Arrest warrants issued.
- Tribal cross border clashes over cattle and pastures.
- No common border.

### Kenya
- Tense and insecure border. Cattle rustling and arms smuggling. Resource conflicts between pastoralists. Ethiopian incursions in pursuit of OLF.
- No common border.
- Tribal cross border clashes over cattle and pastures. Arms trafficking, smuggling.
- Relatively stable internally. Low-level conflicts in NE border areas and political agitation in coastal areas.
- No common border.

### Djibouti
- Complex relations. 60% of Djibouti population ethnic Somali. Increasingly supports TFG and not supportive to desegregation of the country.
- No common border
- No common border
- Peace concluded.

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Table 1: Conflicts and peace process: Regional perspectives Source EU Concept paper: An EU regional political strategy for in the Horn of Africa

### III. State security and human Security

Because the security debate has changed dramatically since the inception of state security advocated in the 17th century international community urgently needs a new paradigm of security. According to that traditional idea, the state would monopolize the rights and means to protect its citizens. State power and state security would be established and expanded to sustain order and peace. But in the 21st century, both the challenges to security and its protectors have become more complex. The state remains the fundamental purveyor of security. Yet it often fails to fulfill its security obligations -- and at times has even become a source of threat to its own people. That is why attention must now shift from the security of the state to the security of the people to human security. Human security complements state security, enhances human rights, and strengthens human development. It seeks to protect people against a broad range of threats to individuals and communities and, further, to empower them to act on their own behalf. And it seeks to forge a global alliance to strengthen the institutional policies that link individuals and the state - and the state with a global world. Human security thus brings together the human elements of security, of rights, of development.
The Commission on Human Security's definition of human security: to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhances human freedoms and human fulfilment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms - freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people form critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people's strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military, and cultural system that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity. The vital core of life is a set of elementary rights and freedoms people enjoy. What people consider to be "vital" - what they consider to be "of the essence of life" and "crucially important" -- varies across individuals and societies. That is why any concept of human security must be dynamic. And that is why we refrain from proposing an itemized list of what makes up human security.

As the UN Secretary-General pointed out, human security joins the main agenda items of peace, security, and development. Human security is comprehensive in the sense that it integrates these agendas: Human security in its broadest sense embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her own potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing poverty, achieving economic growth, and preventing conflict. Freedom from want, freedom from fear and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment - these are the interrelated building blocks of human and therefore national security. Human security also reinforces human dignity. People's horizons extend far beyond survival, to matters of love, culture, and faith. Protecting a core of activities and abilities is essential for human security must also aim at developing the capabilities of individuals and communities to causes and interests in many spheres of life. That is why human security starts from the recognition that people are the most active participants in determining their well-being. It builds on people's efforts, strengthening what they do for themselves.

Human security complements "state security" in four respects: Its concern is the individual and the community rather than the state. Menaces to people's security include threats and conditions that have not always been classified as threats to state security. The
range of actors is expanded beyond the state alone. Achieving human security includes not just protecting people but also empowering people to fend for themselves. States security focuses on other states with aggressive or adversarial designs. States built powerful security structures to defend themselves— their boundaries, their institutions, their values, and their numbers. Human security shifts from focusing on external aggression to protecting people from a range of menaces. State security has meant protecting territorial boundaries with—and from—uniformed troops. Human security also includes protection of citizens, massive population movements, such infectious diseases as HIV/AIDS and long-term conditions of oppression and deprivation.

The range of actors is also greater. No longer are states the sole actors. Regional and international organisations, nongovernmental organisation (NGOs) and civil society are involved in managing security issues—as in the fight against HIV/AIDS, the ban against landmines and the massive mobilisations in support of human rights. Securing people also entails empowering people and societies. In many situations, people can contribute directly to identifying and implementing solutions to the quagmire of insecurity. In post-conflict situations, for example, bringing diverse constituents together to rebuild their communities can solve security problems. Human security and state security are mutually reinforcing and dependent on each other. Without human security, state security cannot be attained and vice versa. Human security requires strong and stable institutions. Whereas state security is focused, human security is broad.

In summary, human security is to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhances human freedoms and human fulfilment. It means protecting fundamental freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military, and cultural system that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.

The Consultations on a Strategy for Peace and Security in the The Greater Horn of Africa Region Opening Conference, Khartoum, Sudan 1-3 October, 2005 underpinned the concern to promote peace and stability in the region has been a core concern of IGAD since the early 1990’s, and was reflected in active and continuous engagement with the peace processes in Sudan and Somalia from that period.

A carefully selected group of specialists, officials and activists were invited to the conference representing stakeholders and representatives of civil society, governments and activists. A number of background papers covering the key issues touching on peace and security in the region have been circulated and discussed in the conference, which represented a pivotal part of the consultation process as well as offering concrete proposals for the strategy. In particular, the conference identified thematic topics for the series of workshops planned as part of the consultation strategy, work to create a constituency that advocates for the strategy and help in formulating the strategy.

The Conference issues to be discussed included inter alia reflecting on the “identity” and orientation of IGAD as a regional body, and the extent to which members identify with and commit to it, and how this commitment is affected by overlapping membership in other organisations; reviewing IGAD’s role in the area of conflict management and resolution and the consensus among members about approaches to peace and security issues; focusing on a human security approach which ensures that the security of states should not conflict with the security of its citizens, and examining ways of continuing and public citizenship involvement in and monitoring of the regional security agenda both within states and on the interstate level; looking at the issues of poverty, HIV/AIDS and their impact on regional security and governance; discussing the question of terrorism and the proliferation of
militias, militarised societies, flow of arms and organized crime and impact on security; lessons on existing peace and development initiative that worked; undertaking a comprehensive assessment of the present situation in the region, including an analysis of the causes or potential causes of conflict, and ways of dealing with them; reflecting on the lessons of regional successes and how to learn from them and to build on them; exploring ways for engaging the power and security elites in the region in open discussion with relevant stakeholders on the security agenda.

This drive coincided with, and contributed to, the new dynamic in pan-African peace building and promotion, which culminated in the establishment of the African Union. The AU is currently actively engaged in dealing with the continent’s challenges and developing new African institutions, including the creation of the AU Peace and Security Council, the formation of the African Standby Forces and the development of a new pan-African peace strategy. Procedures and an agreed division of labour with AU, UN agencies and NEPAD need to be worked out on the basis of past experiences in the sub-region and elsewhere. To cope with all these developments and challenges, and to fully realise peace building and promotion potential, there is a consensus on the need for a new comprehensive and viable strategy for peace and security in the region, a realisation already made clear by the 2001 a study on "Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution: Capacity Assessment Study for the IGAD Sub-region", carried out by Leeds University for IGAD with assistance from the EU. A key recommendation of the study was the elaboration of a strategy and a mechanism for conflict early warning and to enhance the regional CEWARN, set up in 2000, with the current focus on pastoral boarder conflicts.

III. State security - underlying causes of conflicts and security architecture

Longer term underlying reasons for insecurity include poverty, and thus conflict over scarce resources, vulnerability to external economic shocks, weak institutions (further weakened by HIV/AIDS), and poor governance. However, under militarised governance and with mostly short-term thinking, these are often not seen as ‘national security’ issues at all and are considered a lower priority than military and security affairs. Or if they are considered national security issues, the response is to prepare for any military threats that may transpire, rather than addressing the underlying causes themselves. Some national security issues, such as the level of HIV/AIDS in the officer corps of the army, may simply remain secret. Underpinning these weaknesses is the absence of a clear strategy for promoting long-term national security in most countries. Countries that have identified their national security threats, and developed clear and transparent mechanisms for responding to them, are more stable and predictable. In addition, as countries move towards a correct identification of their national security challenges, they identify a wider range of threats, many of them longer-term ones that need to be dealt with by non-military means. Threats to national security, real and potential, include, among others:

1. Actual and potential external threats of force projection (invasion);
2. External threats of destabilisation and terrorism;
3. Potential sources of conflict with neighbours such as un-demarcated borders,
4. Contested natural resource control;
5. Violent crime and banditry associated with proliferation of light weapons;
6. Potential social unrest associated with economic recession;
7. Ethnic, religious and regional cleavages and the incapacity of governance structures to manage disputes peacefully;
8. Insufficiently institutionalised constitutional order;
9. Weak governance institutions and corruption;
10. Mass distress migration due to natural and man-made calamities; and
11. HIV/AIDS and its impact on institutions including security services.
As we move down this list we shift from immediate military threats to structural problems confronting African governments. In the longer term, it is these structural problems that are most likely to cause major problems. Addressing these requires an agenda that overlaps with establishing the AU and promoting good governance and economic development as envisioned by NEPAD. In the long term, security is best guaranteed by democratic, accountable and stable governments presiding over sustainable development. A far-reaching agenda of security sector reform, ensuring civilian control of the military and similar measures, will help to deliver these gains. A highly significant start has been made with a succession of resolutions by the OAU and AU to refuse to recognise forcible and unconstitutional transfers of power. The fact that the Constitutive Act of the AU precludes as a member any government that take's power by unconstitutional means is a powerful signal. The next stage in this process is deepening constitutionalism in member states, adopting common and ever-higher standards for democracy and the rule of law for African countries.

At present, the main question is, can Africa’s existing intergovernmental institutions play a leading role in promoting a security community (or communities) in the continent? The obstacles they face are formidable. For a start, not only are the problems severe and complex, but also the institutions are weak. While ASEAN benefited from strong, stable states, and Europe had both capable states and strong inter-governmental institutions, Africa has neither. Moreover, while Europe and southeast Asia benefited from states with strong political interests in making regional institutions work, the same does not necessarily hold in Africa. Across the continent, states retain vested interests in international organisations not developing sufficient autonomy to exercise real influence. Many governments, both African and non-African, prefer to bypass regional and sub regional organisations, and even sometimes undermine their efforts. Most African governments are also possessive of their sovereign privileges, and are thus averse both to surrendering any powers and to the implications of ‘variable geometry' approaches to inter-state activities.

There is no single strategy that can provide peace and security to GHA. Strategies should focus on the different stages of conflict, namely conflict prevention and peace building, conflict resolution and containment, and post-conflict reconstruction. Strategies also need to be undertaken simultaneously at local, civil society, national and regional levels, in the social, political, military and economic spheres. Strategies need to be simultaneously ‘objective', dealing with the substantive issues and the institutional mechanisms for responding, and ‘subjective', in developing the awareness, understanding and expectations of leaders at all levels. They need to move beyond purely military definitions of security to more comprehensive and strategic visions.

IV. Human security and alternative intra-party conflict management (ACM):

Conflict theories, be it Marxian or Freudian, see conflict as a necessary force to reduce tension between individuals and groups who are naturally seen as having different needs and interests. Hence conflict often serves as an important impetus for positive change. Nonetheless, conflicts can and do cause major societal destabilization and hence the need a multidisciplinary ACM approach and a variety of collaborative strategies that seek to bring Ethiopia’s political groups to agree to process, strategies, structures and systems for ACM is timely. The first strategic move is choosing the correct strategy through which to address a particular conflict, where contending parties to a dispute first decide whether to seek resolution to a conflict through a non-consensual process or through a more collaborative means. The CM process employed so far consist of attempts by neutral third parties to communicate separately with disputing parties for the purpose of reducing tensions and agreeing on a process for addressing a process in which parties meet face to face to reach a mutually acceptable resolution of the issues.
In the following, we present the protocols necessary to arrive at meaningful resolution. Many factors have been found to be helpful in analysing a conflict, to decide whether it could be addressed through the ACM approach. If careful analysis suggests that a dispute could be negotiated or mediated, these same factors are important in determining the structure and conduct of the dispute resolution process. The following table establishes the issues that the political groups can bring to the table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Query</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>‘REBELS’/OPPOSITION</th>
<th>GOVERNMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)  What is the party’s best alternatives to a negotiated agreement?</td>
<td>What would the party do if it does not negotiate?</td>
<td>Demand civil disobedience and launch the nation into unprecedented crisis</td>
<td>Stay in power but invite civil disobedience that wreck havoc in the nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Could it successfully bring a lawsuit or lobby politically to get what it wants?</td>
<td>It believes it can hardly get any ruling from the courts as its dominated by ruling party appointees</td>
<td>It can be expected to have fair hearing as the justice is appointed by the same and the Supreme Court Justice was also the head of election board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Does it have any reasonable position at all?</td>
<td>It says it does, but there are lingering question on the sincerity of the membership</td>
<td>It has claimed that it has won the elections and will form the government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What are the costs and benefits of each?</td>
<td>Settlement will enhance its capacity to stay in politics &amp; win more seats</td>
<td>Disagreeing with the opposition may cost it as it can turn into a crisis nation-wide</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Bottom line**

A party should not enter into a conflict management process if it believes that it can do better, overall, through other means. Conversely, protagonists entering into negotiations with strong positions enter with an important source of negotiating power.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(b) How should the process of reaching an agreement be structured?</th>
<th>What are the &quot;rules of the game&quot;?</th>
<th>As determined by the election board and observers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Who will participate? Will one party underwrite less well-financed individual candidates?</td>
<td>As coalition of many parties they have their hands full already</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>It should be able to sponsor finance smaller parties and individual candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order of issues to be addressed?</td>
<td>Elections, election, elections, elections</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do they want to reach a decision?</td>
<td>It is expected they should in their own interest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Strategic concerns**

In the process of employing ACM strategies, participants generally make a series of rapid decisions, more often than not with limited information. Understanding and applying these key ideas will assist a political party in deciding, first, whether to enter into a negotiation, mediation or conciliation, and second, how to engage more successfully.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(c) What are the basic interests of each of the parties?</th>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Winning the election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A careful and sophisticated analysis of each party's interests can, first of all, clarify the extent to which one party needs the others to achieve what it wants. If one party depends on the others to achieve its goals, then negotiation may be needed. In addition, an analysis of each party's interests can help point out which groups have common or competing agenda.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(d) What are options that could be presented at the negotiation table? How can competition be balanced with some degree of cooperation? Can implementation of an agreement be ensured?</th>
<th>Contested seats</th>
<th>Clarifying the impasse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political parties in Ethiopia enter into negotiations with only one solution in mind - they have identified the positions they wish to take rather than the interests that they wish to defend. This can quickly lead to an impasse. A political party will be in a stronger negotiating position if, after analyzing its interests, it develops a range of options for satisfying them. This implies being flexible about the way in which basic interests are satisfied -- not about whether they should be satisfied.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convergence of ideas</td>
<td>Winning the agenda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All too often, parties to a negotiation believe that the discussions must be entirely competitive, and fall into communication patterns characterized by mutually aggressive behaviour. In fact, competition can be balanced with cooperation over some aspect of virtually any negotiation -- without either party making unacceptable concessions.</td>
<td>Winning the agenda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convergence of agency</td>
<td>Winning the agency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The implementation of agreements needs to be discussed from the early stages of a dispute resolution process, rather than being left to the end. Important topics that need to be addressed include technical feasibility, political viability, financial requirements and mechanisms for ensuring compliance by all sides.

CEWARN has an important function in a region that greeted the new millennium with more conflicts; while still haunted by poor and rapidly increasing subsistence population, environmental crises, shattered infrastructure and a history of natural and man-made disasters. It is also a time of new claims on relief and development assistance. Moreover, states and civil societies in the region have insufficient capacity and inadequate networks to develop responses to the challenges to human security. The business plan will hence focus on systems approach for policy analysis, formulation and management, strategic reassessment, participatory processes thrusts, and structural/functional imperatives. Key concepts that influence these systems tools are

- **Human Security**, which is about protecting people's security and requires of CEWARN to identify and prepare for menaces that have severe consequences. What defines a menace to human security is its depth, its swift onset and pervasiveness. These menaces must be identified and prioritised in an empowering way using the rights-based approach.

- **Capacity building**, which does not only mean that those with skills will build the capacity of those without skills. Civil society-augured participatory EW/CM vastly augurs deep on local knowledge. Hence, the overall aim of capacity building is to get stakeholders more focused on taking charge of their own situations and working towards changing their own conditions.

- **CEWARN-system governance regimes, development of communities of practice, civil society engagement, engendering CEWARN, learning and knowledge management, internal research capability, internal and external resources mobilization and mainstreaming and integration**

V. **Recommendations**

Within democratic political governance, we must provide services of strengthening democratic governing institutions (parliaments, elections, judiciary), promoting human rights, supporting decentralization and local governance, building capacities of civil society, advising in public sector management (civil service reform, anti-corruption and aid harmonization) and facilitating governance in pre-crisis and post-conflict countries.

1. **Strengthening democratic and human rights institutions**: Democratic and governing institutions include legislatures, legal and judicial systems and electoral bodies. Legislatures (parliaments) mediate differing interests and debate and establish policies, laws and resource priorities that directly affect the political environment and encourage and support sustainable human development. Electoral bodies and processes ensure independent and transparent national and local elections, ultimately securing political legitimacy. Independent judiciaries uphold the rule of law, bringing security and predictability to social, political and economic relations and assuring the protection of human rights. The respect for the rights of people is the foundation of sustainable human development. Good governance requires respect for human rights - freedom from discrimination and violence, equal opportunity, due process, freedom of expression and organization, and transparent, accountable state. These rights include not only political and civil rights but also the right to development. Other include decentralization and building local governance, strengthening civil society, public sector management, civil service reform and anti-corruption and conflict management processes and preventive diplomacy, good governance and human rights

2. **Humility and Optimism**: State policy makers must express their humility, optimism, ethics and recognition of shared responsibility -- that justice is worth striving for and,
therefore, the understanding of participation must embody the right to citizenship; a recognition for people to participate in national and community development with passion. The State and legitimate structures of civil society must build on those ideals; deploy them to address the need for management of a more equitable system that would allow the continents vulnerable groups to take control their own future.

3. **Macroeconomic Prudence:** States must marshal their resources toward alleviating the effects of our vulnerabilities. They must ensure policy coherence that all initiatives are made to have a sense of direction. Structural adjustments, policies for poverty alleviation, trade agreements, the debt threat, international aid and financing, peace and security, destitution safety nets, human rights, production relations and the organization of the productive forces must all be designed as mutually supportive elements in their implementation.

4. **Trans-national relations and integration:** according to the EU, “attention shall be devoted to reforming border-controls and trade tariff-regimes in the region to facilitate and encourage cross-border trade and development and removing some existing incentives for illicit trafficking and corruption. This could include bilateral initiatives to enhance the monitoring of borders such as the Ethiopia and Eritrea military coordination commission, the border Commission between Djibouti and Eritrea or joint training programmes for customs services. IGAD’s counter terrorism programme could specifically focus on this area. Increasing the capacity and political commitment of the AU, IGAD and other sub-regional organisations to play a key role in regional stabilisation is a high priority in the regional framework”. Prioritising current strategic country level issues with a view of taking into account the regional dimension in political dialogue; tackling regional cross-cutting and cross-border issues; strengthening the capacity of the AU and sub-regional organisations to respond to and prevent crises and to promote economic cooperation and integration; several actions are already being undertaken and there are proposals to further review priorities and existing actions within the regional strategy.

5. **The right to humanness, survival and development:** It is a fundamental premise of people-centred development that people have certain basic and universal human rights as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations. Furthermore it is a fundamental responsibility of every state to respect and protect these rights.¹

6. **Voluntary action as a human right:** Voluntary action, the sine qua non for development and preventive diplomacy among communities, is an expression of both a basic human right and a civic responsibility to participate actively in the life of the community. Indeed, voluntary action is one of the highest forms of citizenship as it represents action in the service of the community without expectation or pursuit of personal economic or political gain. Voluntary action may be either individual or collective. Collective action may range from purely informal temporary forms of cooperation to large corporate organizations with professional staff and significant assets. People’s organizations as legal organizational entities are one vehicle for the expression of voluntary action. Our immediate concern is primarily with organized action, but the same basic principles relate to individual voluntary action as well. The exercise of a basic right that resides with the individual requires no permission from any state. Nor does the intention or act of require public notification.

7. **Conflict management and trans-boundary resources management:** Peoples in the Horn share common and open access properties and resources in the borders that is fundamental to their survival. Nevertheless, within our lifetime we have witnessed major conflict between clans and tribes in the Greater Horn and outright wars between
countries – Ethiopia and Somalia, Eritrea and Ethiopia, DRC and Uganda, Rwanda and Uganda, Tanzania and Uganda, DRC and Rwanda.... These have curtailed development efforts in the region. More than that, development efforts in The Horn over recent decades have been frustrated by the complicated and multifaceted nature of the expected processes of change; and because of a number of inherent contradictions among the various issues and actors and their differing perspectives. In order to understand the specific constraints and opportunities of the natural resource management sector, analysis of the contradictions can be useful for understanding the context and issues, and for defining opportunities for constructive action. xi

8. The African renaissance- conceptualization of African unification and dividends to the Horn: We have underpinned that the 21st Century has ushered in a time of unprecedented global wealth and extraordinary opportunities; but Africa has yet to benefit from this. In this globalization of prosperity and plenty, an important dimension that features prominently in the Africa discourse is the relative contribution and weight of international trade and mechanisms for democratic development.xii The question is how does the continent go about to bring that change? Here we need to identify a political design and governance methodology using various strands of the literature on political change, and suggests that democratic development derives from three distinct sets of factors. xiii

VI. Conclusion and recommendations on Darfur

The need for the fundamental change on how the global community deals with the internecine crises must change. It must encourage appropriate action for promoting and managing an enabling environment for mainstreaming peace, security a developmental response in the drive for human development and popular participation – people acting as citizens of a political society, reinforcing ownership and ensuring continuity. We advocate for the development of think tanks that would set the stage for the paradigmatic development of internal models of growth and human welfare. To every human problem there is always a solution that is smart, simple and immoral. We tend to have a linear way of thinking that is inadequate to unravel the many complex inter-relationships underlying people’s peace and insecurity. It is neither popular nor scientific.

Women’s empowerment is important in human security, human rights and peace building because women develop their potential as individuals and as communities. Strengthening their abilities to act on their own behalf is also instrumental to human security. Women empowered can demand respect for their dignity when it is violated. They can create new opportunities for work and address many problems locally.xiv Supporting their ability to act on their own behalf means providing education and information so that they can scrutinise social arrangements and take collective action. It means building a public space encourages local leadership and cultivates public discussion. It is in this belief that the UN Security Council resolution 1325 “Calls upon all parties to armed conflict to respect fully international law applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls, especially as civilians”.

The achievements of AMIS and the humanitarian community in Darfur so far are impressive: While media and international human rights reports put the death toll of Darfuris at anywhere between 50,000 – 300,000; the fact remains that such mass murder has been controlled by the monitoring action of AMIS. The contribution of the hundreds of humanitarian organisations to providing direly needed relief and sustenance support have saved the lives of close to two million Darfuri; who would be without food, water, shelter and health assistance in this punishing desert environment. The Darfur humanitarian operation is one of the largest operations in a single location so far in the continent. Our
recommendations here are designed to reinforce such worthy actions and highlight the urgency of halting gender-based violence and provide relief and post-conflict reconstruction to the Darfuri IDPs and refugees.

1) **Recommendation for the GoS**: the GoS bears the primary responsibility to resolve the unprecedented human impasse in the most humane way. Towards this end the GoS must immediately and unconditionally put a **halt to the heinous crimes committed in Darfur** on all Darfuris and especially Darfuri women that are being atrociously abused by the armed militia; allegedly with the support of its police and military forces. The perpetrators of the murder, rape and violence must with out delay to the ICC. The GoS must **guarantee gender-based human security** in Darfur at all levels. The human security package must include relief aid to the needy including food, fuel, and shelter; emergency health support to the weak and meek; competent policing of the Darfuri villages with a heightened community-based security; and reinstatement of the spiritual and cultural symbols of the Darfuri. The GoS must **organise gender sensitive post-conflict recovery and rehabilitation packages** for the Darfuri IDPs to go back to their villages and start life again. Wherever the village have been taken over (settled) by the armed militia, these villages must be returned immediately to the lawful owners. The **GoS must rethink its justice systems in Darfur**: over and over again the IDPs refer to the collapse of the GoS police and justice system. To complicate the misery of women further the Sharia Law has unfettered power over the justice system. Women could barely get there, as they are systematically discouraged from appealing to the rule of the law. There is an urgent need for the GoS to revisit this and attend quickly to all cases that have been referred to the courts. The deployment a professional police force in Darfur will go a long way in providing peace dividends to the GoS and Darfuris.

2) **Recommendations for the AU**: the AU through the various organs it has established in Darfur has undertaken the task of monitoring the cease fire and peace, providing security and protection to humanitarian missions, and through the Abuja Peace Talks, finding lasting solutions for the problem. Towards this end it must **ensure human security, enhancing the size of its force, recruit more CIVPOL women officers, and develop capacity for** multi-track communications in terms of advocacy, social marketing, negotiation with communities and public relations. Given the wide spread abuses against women, the potential such communications systems have in curbing impunity is indeed feasible.

3) **Recommendations for the GoS and Humanitarian Organisations**: the task of humanitarian organisations (NNGOs, INGOs, UN, and Human Right Groups) is to provide relief, psychosocial trauma management and PCR. The **GoS, UN and NGOs** must deliver **gender-sensitive relief, protection and development services** at all levels so that the Darfuris can continue to lead their lives at several levels of human security packages that must per force include relief aid to the needy including food, fuel, and shelter could be delivered within the framework of emergency aid and long-term development programmes. Agencies must use the rights-based approach to supporting communities to ensure less dependence on their programmes. **Human rights groups** must continue to collect, collate, analyse and document information that can and must be communicated to the GoS, AU, UN and other stakeholders to ensure that all forms of violence reported and acted upon.

**Gender mainstreaming**: the GoS in cooperation with the AMIS, humanitarian organisations can engage government sectors, NGOs, private sector entities, faith organisations, etc., that can both meet the needs of their own environment, as well as apply their comparative advantage to support specific aspects of governance, gender, HIV/AIDS, and rights. Mainstreaming provides a mechanism through which multi-
sectoral strategies can be analysed and acted upon, within clear areas of responsibility, building up multi-level yet coherent interventions at all levels.

**Women’s participation in peace and conceptions of citizenship in the 21 Century:** Women’s participation in peace making and peace building as citizens of a political society is an important concept in the late twentieth century. Hence we recommend that the GoS, AU, UN, bilaterals and multilaterals, NNGOS, INGOs and foundations and trusts to undertake **women’s citizenship sensitisation, awareness and education:** It is the fundamental recommendation of this report that citizenship education - learning about and appreciating one’s rights, duties, obligations and responsibilities as a citizen and the immediate rules, laws and governance structures within which women exercise citizenship is the first and fundamental step in peace building. The civic education programme must underpin the fact that women’s **collective action is an expression of both a basic human right and a civic responsibility** to participate actively in the life of the community. Indeed, women’s citizen action is one of the **highest forms of citizenship** as it represents action in the service of the community without expectation or pursuit of personal economic or political gain.¹⁵

**Agency and rape and assault on women:** Participants in and around projects of GBV generally constitute a network or intersection of institutions and groups. The one important agency missing in all these is a Darfur women’s organisations in Darfur; thereby denying women IDPs with agency to represent their interest, aspirations and make known their fears and vulnerabilities.

**Gender Focussed Alternative Conflict Management (GFACM):** It is recommended that GFACM, a multi-disciplinary field of research and action that portends and seeks to address the question of how women and men can make better decisions together, particularly on difficult, contentious issues. GFACM refers to a variety of collaborative approached that seek to reach a mutually acceptable resolution of issues in a conflict through a voluntary pro. Such approached were developed as alternatives to adversarial or non-consensual strategies, such as judicial or legal recourse, unilaterally initiated public information campaigns, or partisan political action. A three-day workshop can be held with Darfuri IDP women, sheiks, GoS, CFC and the international community to enable the return of IDPs to their villages with all human security conditions fulfilled.

**Leadership training and mentoring/apprenticeship - leadership gives agency for women:** the capacity to effect change. But leadership is constrained by structures, including the wider economic and political environment in which the leader operates, and the nature of his or her constituency and Organisation. An understanding of both leader’s agency and structure is necessary: each determines the other.

**Organisation or movement for social progress or emancipation:** This concept encompasses Darfuri women grassroots organisations, CSOs, and other forms of social organisation that involve the voluntary association of individuals. This is, self-evidently, a movement to remedy the GBV and bring about social change for the better. It is the practical manifestation of the impulse for social change or emancipation, the popular counterpart man of leadership.

**HIV/AIDS and IDPs:** Sexual abuse and violence—much, but not all of it directed against females—are serious problems that transcend economic, social, ethnic and geographical lines in the Darfuri IDP and refugee camps. Women IDPs and refugees – and in particular young women – are especially vulnerable to HIV infection, being unable to avoid coercive sexual relations. Darfuri communities in particular are also vulnerable because of lower levels of literacy and less access to information and services. Hence we recommend that urgent social policy specifically tailored to Darfur and Darfuris is
essential to provide a conceptual framework for vulnerability reduction and to develop strategic responses and empowerment of women to negotiate safe sex, programmes for high risk and non-high risk youth population, women and workplace programmes, care and support for PLWHA and PABA and treatment

Annex One

META-ASSUMPTIONS TO BE TESTED AND INDICATORS TO BE USED IN THE PEACE AND SECURITY STRATEGY AND MECHANISM DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

1) **Rule of Law**: legal protection of constitutionally defined rights; independent judiciary, with a range of legal expertise; there is a functioning court system, staffed by trained professionals; a system of civil security and a professional police force exist; people are generally informed of their rights and have access to the legal system; enforcement of contracts by the courts immune to political interference; all budgets and public expenditures made public; all government expenditures are audited, and audit reports made public; there is an independent auditor general's office, staffed with trained professionals; there are legal and regulatory frameworks to control corruption and rent seeking; all revenues accruing to the government or the central bank entered into official accounts?

2) **Military and Security policies and strategies**: the military is independent of the political parties; the military and security forces are under civilian control; the military does not decide on national security issues; military budgets are not proportionally more than human development budgets; nations have a security strategy and policy and composition of the military vis-à-vis ethnicity, religion, political affiliation?

3) **Administrative and bureaucratic consistency**: Is there a civil service, with appointments based on merit? Are governmental officials subject to the rule of law? Is the compensation for civil servants comparable to that of other sectors? Is civil service career development independent of the executive branch or political party in power?

4) **Political openness and tolerance**: Are political parties allowed to exist legally and constitutionally? Is there constitutional and legal provision for freedom of speech, media, assembly and association? Is there an elected legislature, which is responsible to the electorate? Does the legislature have oversight over governmental policy? Do opposition groups have legitimacy, and do they play a role in the political process?

5) **Participation and communication**: there are ranges of countervailing intermediary civic organisations that function freely and openly, legislative decisions made public, processes for popular participation exist; Are non-governmental organisations financially and operationally independent of the government? Are non-governmental organisations and institutions legally allowed to exist and free from governmental control?

6) **Favourable environment for private enterprise**: Is there constitutional and legal provision for private ownership of property? Is there constitutional and legal provision for private investment? Are there political conditions on access to credit? Is the banking system's ability to support private investment curtailed by governmental regulations? Are regulations governing investment, and import and export
procedures clear and easy to understand? Is the implementation of government regulations and licensing procedures slow and complicated?

7) **There is a civil service, with appointments based on merit:** there is a civil service with minimum entry requirements, or are large sectors of the population guaranteed a job in the public sector; there is a clear system of promotion based on merit, with checks and balances to ensure that this is implemented, or is it assumed that promotion is based on other factors; specific functions are clearly described, and chains of command clearly delineated; there are widespread recorded or known instances of promotion or appointment because of patronage or corruption; There are regulations prohibiting acceptance of bribes or kickbacks. Such regulations are enforced or are they widely circumvented; There recorded instances or public officials being brought to trial for misconduct; There are widely known instances of officials being guilty of law breaking but not being prosecuted.

8) **There is an elected legislature which is responsible to the electorate and has oversight over governmental policy:** freedoms defined by laws are broadly permitted, special permissions required before such freedoms can be implemented; there is an independent press and media; there is no governmental censorship of the press, press freedom is not curtailed due to fear of governmental redress; Legislature elected by open ballot and understands its role, Systems in place whereby public opinion can be made known; Executive branch can implement decisions without legislative approval; Members of the legislature have sufficient access to information and technical resources to enable them to make informed decisions, for example, a research service or library available and do they have technical staff; Legislature responsible for drafting legislation, does it approve legislation drafted by the executive branch, or does it do both.

9) **There are robust civic organisations:** The non-governmental sector well developed, with organisations serving a variety of sectors of the population, rural as well as urban; There are organisations which function as political pressure groups or which lobby for specific interests; Labour unions and professional associations exist and do they promote the rights of their members; Independent institutions such as policy or political and economic think tanks exist; most CSOs have independent boards of directors, and operate according to a constitution or other set of binding principles; legislation permitting CSOs to earn revenue, collect membership contributions, or receive donations from the public or local or foreign institutions exist; most CSOs self-financing; CSOs legally allowed to exist, and are there any restrictions placed upon them; There are known or recorded instances of governmental interference with non-governmental organisations and CSOs act as intermediaries between the government and their members.

10) **CSOs are independent of the government:** There are established and recognised ways and means for the public to voice concern or express opinion to policy makers; Are such things as opinion polls or attitude surveys undertaken; There are means by which communities can express their development priorities at the local level; Are local government officials elected; NGOs receive subsidies from the government.

11) **There is constitutional and legal provision for private investment:** Is legislation conductive to the private ownership of property, or does it make it difficult and only possible in certain circumstances; Is private ownership of both property and land for any purposes allowed, and can such property and land be sold or otherwise passed on by the owners; There are property and land ownership records which can be publicly consulted; Do the regulations and administrative procedures which need to be followed facilitate or impede private ownership of property and land; Is
provision made in the constitution for private investment, and does legislation conducive to private investment exist; Is private investment permitted in all sectors, or is it controlled; Is the regulatory environment conducive to small scale business, the informal sector and women entrepreneurs, or does it in effect discriminate against them; Is information about investment options easily available and is the tax structure conducive to small scale private investment

12) **There are political conditions on access to credit:** Is the amount of money available for credit controlled by the government; Are the restrictions on credit eligibility such that only a small percentage of the population qualifies; Is credit generally available, to both men and women, in rural as well as urban areas through a variety of mechanisms, or is it restricted; There are governmental restrictions on what credit can be provided for; There is a functioning banking system; Is the banking system subject to arbitrary political manipulation; There are governmental restrictions on lending for private sector investment or purchase of property or land; Do government regulations on interest rates or tax on private deposits exist, and do they negatively affect private sector activity; Are the regulations uniformly enforced, or are there known or recorded instances of their being waived in certain instances;

13) **Implementation of regulations and licensing procedures:** There is a facility for "one stop" procurement of licenses or other required documents, or is it necessary to visit a variety of different departments or offices; Are officials generally familiar with regulations, and able to expedite the process, or are they uninformed and need to seek guidance on a case-by case basis; There are known or recorded instances of bribes or other payment being required to obtain licenses or other documents, even though regulatory procedures have all been followed; Is it possible to obtain licenses or other documents within a relatively short time frame, or does it take a long time and require repeat visits by the person applying for the license;

14) **All government expenditures are on budget ensuring public accountability:** There is a central, comprehensive budget, which includes all governmental expenditure, or are some sectors "off- budget"; government budgets and expenditure reports publicly available; expenditure reports consistent with budgets in terms of budget line-items; expenditure reports disaggregated by sector and geographic region; the government has access to sufficient funds for which it does not require legislative oversight to undermine public accountability; there are recorded or known instances of such funds being used to buy support for the government, or finance the party in power; There are known or recorded instances of government officials using such funds for personal profit

15) **There is decentralisation of resource generation and allocation:** all government departments and ministries develop their own budgets based on analysis of need, or are they allocated a fixed amount to programme; government ministries and departments have a chance to argue for additional resources, or influence the way funds are allocated; There are opportunities for government ministries or departments to generate their own resources, for example through user fees; There are incentives for government ministries and departments to develop more cost efficient ways of doing business, or if they save money is it taken away from them for re-distribution to other sectors; are provincial and local authorities able to collect revenue and program if for their own use, or are all revenues passed to the central government; local authorities develop their own budgets, or are local budgets centrally planned and funds allocated; can local authorities develop their own budgetary priorities and program funds; local government budgets, revenues and expenditures are subject to audit;
Notes and references

5 In the fortnight the Technical Mission spent in Sudan and the fortnight before; fatal attacks resulting in killings and maiming of the civilian population in the camps, AMIS personnel and staff of humanitarian agencies were carried out with deadly precision. The perpetrators in all these cases were reportedly a wide spectrum ranging from the Government of Sudan army and the Janjaweed (Tawilla camp), SLA rebels (Nyala) and JEM rebels (Tine). The killing of 4 Nigerian peace keepers and two civilian staff on the day the Technical Mission visited Nyala at the hands of a reported renegade SLA commander was particularly shocking only to be followed by the abduction of 18 AMIS military observers and their vehicles in Tine Western Darfur. On 18 September 2005, simultaneous attacks at Khartoum Djaadeed, Sandego, Khasantongur, Tary, Martial and Djabain resulted in the death of 12 civilians, 5 seriously wounded, and the displacement of about 4,000 civilians. Heavy and small weapons mounted on vehicles were reportedly used by GOS, in close coordination with about 300 Janjaweed. Most of the displaced people moved to Zam Zam and Tawilla IDP camps. The press statement of the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission reveals there are violation of the ceasefire by all parties concerned and wanton killing of civilians in attacks reportedly by the Government of Sudan forces and the armed militia.
6 The Technical Mission witnessed a burnt village and a slide show was presented to it by the AMIS on the killings of several men in Tawilla Camp. The village has been burnt down completely and the IDPs have taken to the mountains for protection. Such attacks are evidently well planned and executed with ‘military discipline’. Reports and interviews carried out with IDPs all pointed to the fact that in some of the attacks there were both aerial bombardments by the Sudanese Air Force and ground attacks by Janjaweed militia and government of Sudan soldiers. In all cases the Janjaweed militia were reportedly riding horses and camels while the government of Sudan ground troops sometimes used vehicles.
7 Tawilla camp had been burnt and its entire population had fled leaving behind piles of food from humanitarian agencies. Zam Zam had received new displaced people suffering a second order displacement after fleeing their earlier places of refuge. Tine near the Chadian border had been deserted and all refugees fled to Chad. Two days before the Technical Mission visited Tine, 18 AMIS military observers had been abducted by a faction of JEM and later released after an attack on this faction by another JEM group that claimed to be the mainstream organization. At the time of visiting Tine four of the vehicles ceased during the abduction of the AMIS personnel had not yet been recovered. In the remaining camps AMIS personnel and IDPs reported the populations were unable to go about their normal duties or even carry out such basic duties as collection of firewood without AU-CIVPOL escorts on account of threats of the Janjaweed mainly. The men in these camps are virtual prisoners who cannot move because of fear of execution by the militias. The women have little choice but to go out and search for supplementary food and firewood and risk being violently raped, robbed and beaten. Attack on IDP result in people moving to the safety of AMIS camps, the wilderness, or larger villages or towns, which become IDP camps. The IDPs are virtually prisoners within these camps; unable to leave them even to carry out vital life-support activities for fear of attacks by armed militia. By keeping their victims inside Darfur, the perpetrators are concealing the scale of their crimes. Even inside the camps, women remain vulnerable and humanitarian conditions are appalling.  

8 On 25 August, an AMIS soldier was shot and wounded in South Darfur. On October 9, 2005 two AMIS soldiers and two other civilian technicians were killed in an ambush in Korabeche by SLA combatants. A day later 18 Military Observers were abducted in North-West Darfur by a reportedly breakaway JEM group and were only rescued by counter-attacks from another group in the same organization. Daily reports of abductions, high jacking and robbery are all too rampant as has been in Tine.
10 First generation human rights: those that people must have to protect their right to security and well-being against the misuse of state’s coercive powers, such as: the right to freedom of expression and association, the right of redress of grievances, and due process. Both sets of rights are fundamental to people-centred development. It is the second set of rights that is of most fundamental concern when dealing with the rights and responsibilities of people and people’s organizations. Second generation human rights as they relate to basic human well-being, such as the rights to: food, shelter, livelihood and security of family and person, and freedom of movement, religion, and thought. States must accept as a universal right that the rights and obligations of citizenship are not gifts from the state or party. These rights are clearly spelt out in The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations. It is the assertion of this paper that these articles form the legal basis for relations between state and people’s organizations. Based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations, adopted and proclaimed by the General Assembly by resolution 217 A (III) of 10 Dec. 1948 individual human rights shall be respected fully and without any limitation whatsoever. Particularly every individual shall have the freedom of conscience, expression, association and peaceful assembly; and the right to engage in unrestricted political activity and to organize political parties, provided the exercise of such right does not infringe upon the rights of others. The right of nations, nationalities and peoples to self-determination is affirmed.

11 There is now an increasing awareness of the necessity to reconcile the contradictions above in order to ensure sustainable natural resource management. This awareness lies behind the current encouraging trend in which institutions at all levels are becoming willing to acknowledge the management potential of endogenous institutions, and that it is necessary to base development efforts on local aspirations, and to use the local potential as a bridge between endogenous and formal institutions.  
12 International market marginalisation of the Horn has also meant, among other things (1) low incorporation of added value to raw materials. (2) Slow and constant decrease in prices paid for primary products in international markets and (3) while there was a sustained increase
in prices of goods and services that the industrialized countries send, economic instability and the sustained deterioration of natural resources and increase in the international gap and of dependency.

The structural factor most commonly cited, as favouring African political unification is an advanced industrial economy, which can provide a high average of per capita national income. On the other hand, from a contingent perspective, African unification is installed as a result of the conscious reform initiatives of individual leaders, elite factions and social movements -- the trajectory of transitions is driven by the short-term calculations and immediate reactions of strategic actors. Finally, political unification finally depends upon the emergence of supportive set of political institutions. Institutions are recurrent and valued patterns of political behaviour that give shape and regularity to politics. They may be manifest as political rules or as political organizations. The central hypothesis is that the relative strength of national political organizations determines the rules of the political game that are installed. In taking an institutional perspective, we assume that national actors express preferences through organizations and that these organizations vary in strength according to their resource base. The relevant organizations are found both in society, where they represent and aggregate individual interests, and in the State, where they check and balance national executive authority that may hamper African unification.


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