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STRATEGIES FOR CRIME REDUCTION IN PUBLIC HOUSING

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ABSTRACT

Many recent studies have revealed that not only are residents of public housing the most vulnerable segment of the American population in terms of criminal victimization, but that even in projects where the actual incidence of crime is not high, a great fear of crime prevails, especially among the elderly tenants. There is general consensus among crime prevention experts that crime reduction programs in public housing must utilize an integrated set of measures, including: (1) physical design, security hardware, and maintenance improvements by management; (2) increased organization of tenants around crime prevention issues; (3) employment of unemployed tenants--both youths and adults--on the rehabilitation of their projects; (4) establishment of on-site crisis intervention and other social service programs; (5) better cooperation between public housing security personnel and the local police; and (6) more public-private agency investment in the upgrading of public housing projects and their surrounding neighborhoods. The Department of Housing and Urban Development's two-year, $40 million Anti-Crime Demonstration in Public Housing launched in 1979 is the first attempt by the Federal government to wage such a comprehensive attack on crime and its attendant problems in our nation's most neglected residential areas.

Crime and Fear of Crime in Public Housing

Crime statistics, citizens' reported fear of crime, and the altered behavior that this fear engenders all point to crime as a social issue of great magnitude in the United States today. Since the early 1960's, the rate of all serious crimes (murder, rape, burglary, robbery, aggravated assault, grand larceny, and auto theft) has doubled, and that of violent crimes (murder, rape, aggravated assault, and robbery) has risen even faster. The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in the Department of Justice, however, maintains that official police statistics reflect less than half the total number of crimes committed (McVeigh, 1978). Moreover, not all segments of the American population are equally vulnerable to criminal victimization; numerous studies sponsored by the Department of Housing and Urban Development have made the point that residents of low- and medium-income public housing developments are the hardest hit. A 1977 Law Enforcement Assistance Administration study, for example, revealed that while the incidence of robbery nationally was approximately 6.5 cases per 1,000 population, the number of robberies in selected public housing projects ranged from 21.8 cases per 1,000 population at Cincinnati's Millvale project to 114.1 cases per 1,000 population at Baltimore's Murphy Homes project. Similarly, while the incidence of assaults nationally was approximately
25.3 cases per 1,000 population in 1977, the assault rate at the Nickerson Gardens project in Los Angeles was 49.8 per 1,000 population (Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 1977).

In several public housing projects studied by Brill, Rosenthal, Perlmuter, and others, there is evidence that even where the actual incidence of crime is not high, a great fear of crime often disturbs the residents. Brill's 1975 study of four public housing complexes in Boston found that "very dangerous" was the way 75 percent of the residents described waiting for a bus alone at night; 71 percent, going to shopping areas at night; 60 percent, riding the elevators in their public housing complexes at night; and 59 percent walking down the hallways in their public housing complexes at night. In addition, 40 percent of the residents considered it "very dangerous" to be alone in their own apartments at night (Brill, 1975a). As a result of such fears, Brill discovered that 87 percent of the residents kept their front doors locked at all times; 64 percent did not go out alone at night; 62 percent tried to keep their children inside their apartments at night; 50 percent restricted nighttime visitors; and 47 percent did not shop at night (Brill, 1975a). Thus, the area in and around public housing often becomes the territory of those who do not have to be afraid—the criminals, whose safety is guaranteed by a high level of fear in the potential victims around them. Fear of crime is an especially severe problem among the elderly. Lawton, Nahemov, Yaffe, and Feldman (1976) contend that not only does anxiety about possible victimization make the elderly actually become more vulnerable, but it detracts from their feeling of well-being and results in their not carrying out a wide variety of activities that are common, everyday occurrences for most Americans. In this sense, both crime and fear of crime are major factors reducing the quality of life for all public housing residents.

Guidelines for Developing Crime Prevention Strategies

There is tremendous disagreement among the residents, managers, and security personnel in public housing, as well as among government officials and nationally recognized experts on crime and crime prevention, regarding the causes of, and the solutions to, crime and the fear of crime at public housing projects. There is agreement, however, that just as there are multiple causes for these problems, a variety of strategies must be employed to ameliorate them. More importantly, it is recognized that not only do types of crime and crime rates differ from one public housing complex to another, but so does the mix of physical, social, and other contributing factors. Therefore, a critically important aspect of any crime reduction effort in public housing is to determine the unique combination of causal factors at each project. Moreover, since several interrelated factors constitute the public housing environment in which crime and fear of crime occur, a comprehensive crime prevention approach is required— one composed of an integrated set of physical, social, and management strategies that will reinforce each other in deterring potential offenders and in reducing the vulnerability of potential victims.

Three Correlates of Crime in Public Housing
Physical Factors

There is general agreement in the literature that the structure of the physical environment can either reduce or enhance the probability of a crime being committed and can either limit or facilitate the detection of offenders. Physical characteristics that encourage "territoriality," that create "defensible space," and that promote "access control" have been the subject of much crime-environment research. The literature begins chronologically with Elizabeth Wood's *Housing Design: A Social Theory* (1961) in which the author contended that the physical characteristics of public housing complexes minimize communication and informal gathering among residents and thereby preclude the development of a sense of community. Later, in 1961, Jane Jacobs expanded on this theme in her book, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*. Her central hypothesis was that there are two essential conditions which must be present in order for streets, neighborhoods, and residential areas to be safe: (1) "natural surveillance" or "eyes on the street" and (2) continuous and multiple uses of neighborhood facilities which create overlapping patterns of pedestrian movement and thereby keep "eyes on the street" at all times of the day (Jacobs, 1961). Eight years after Jacobs' book, in 1969, Schlomo Angel wrote:

The physical environment exerts a direct influence on crime settings by delineating territories, by reducing or increasing accessibility through the creation or elimination of boundaries and circulation networks, and by facilitating surveillance by the citizenry and the police (Angel, 1969).

Since the early 1970's, the number of researchers and practitioners writing about the relationship between physical environment factors and the incidence of crime and the fear of crime has grown tremendously, but they all share certain basic assumptions: (1) the physical environment can be made relatively crime-proof by means of specific "target hardening" measures and by its overall design; (2) changes in the physical environment can alter the behavior of residents in ways which increase the likelihood that offenders will be impeded and/or apprehended; and (3) the combined effect of the above two factors can be made even stronger if consideration is given to the social correlates of crime and if residents are actively involved in planning and implementing crime prevention programs.

One of the physical factors repeatedly cited as a contributor to crime within and surrounding public housing complexes is the existence of areas where surveillance by residents, management, or security personnel is severely restricted--i.e., portions of the grounds which are not observable from windows, poorly lighted areas, unmonitored stairways, and obscure basement entrances. Many empirical studies have documented the inverse relationship between level of surveillance opportunities and crime rates (Angel, 1969; Brill, 1975a; Dietrich, 1977; Luedke, 1970; Molumby, 1976; Newman, 1972, 1975, 1978; Pope, 1977; and Repetto, 1974) and others have concluded that the lower the number of surveillance opportunities in a given neighborhood, the higher the residents' fear of crime (Malt, 1973). However, there are two limitations to the strategies employed to increase surveillance opportunities--physical design changes such as more strategic window placement, additional lighting, and relocating children's recreational areas and amenities such as laundry rooms in highly visible areas near paths and walkways: (1) the offender must
perceive that his risk of apprehension is increased by such alterations in the physical environment and (2) the residents, management staff, and security personnel must react to the crimes they observe.

A second category of physical factors commonly cited as contributing to crime at public housing sites includes inadequate door locks, windows that are too low or too close to adjacent dwelling units, and the absence of electronic surveillance equipment such as burglar alarms. The limitations of installing "target hardening" devices to correct such deficiencies, however, are that potential offenders may eventually figure out methods of circumventing them and that the barricade appearance they present may actually increase residents' fear of crime. Moreover, because they address only one type of criminal activity--forcible entry or burglary, "target hardening" measures which are not complemented by other crime prevention strategies may simply displace crime from inside dwelling units to the grounds surrounding them.

A third physical factor which is a correlate of crime in public housing is lack of access control to the grounds and to the residential buildings, a condition which Brill calls "penetrability." His 1976 study of the Millvale public housing complex in Cincinnati, for example, showed that the two highest crime areas in the project were near the perimeter of the site where there was no access control to prevent nonresidents from easily moving on and off the grounds (Brill, 1976a). That same year (1976) Phelan's study of security for middle-income townhouse complexes also concluded that a barrier along the periphery would constitute an important security feature, and Molumby, finding that open access was a contributor to crime in a university housing complex, recommended that gates and fences be strategically placed around the complex (Phelan, 1976; Molumby, 1976). Thus, there is considerable agreement among experts in the field of residential security that physical boundaries at a residential site, whether they are symbolic, like low walls or landscaping, or real, like high fences, inform the nonresident potential offender that he is passing through a barrier from a space which is public and where one's presence is not questioned to a space which is private and where one's presence requires justification.

The above argument also applies to controlled access to the residential buildings on public housing sites. In addition to advocating technical equipment such as intercoms and buzzer systems for this purpose, Brill and Newman contend that only a limited number of residents should share the same entry or space outside an entry in order to increase the likelihood of personal recognition and association as a means of reducing crime (Brill, 1976b; Newman, 1973a, 1975). This technique, called "clustering," has not only been implemented by Brill at the Millvale public housing project in Cincinnati and by Newman at several public housing complexes, but has been suggested in some of the literature as a means of increasing a sense of territoriality and social cohesion among public housing residents and, hence, of increasing offenders' perceived risk of apprehension.

As in the case of "target hardening" measures, however, there are also several limitations to strategies designed to improve access control to public housing grounds and buildings: (1) peripheral barriers like high fences and shrubbery may improve access control at the expense of reducing surveillance opportunities, as they often serve as hiding places for offenders; (2) the efficacy of symbolic barriers like low walls and shrubbery in deterring offenders, especially at night,
is highly questionable; (3) electronic access control devices for buildings, like intercoms and buzzers, are frequently in need of repair and are susceptible to vandalism by youths living in and around public housing projects.

A fourth physical factor which the literature identifies as a potential contributor to crime at public housing projects is the lack of adequate circulation patterns —i.e., pathways and walkways for the movement of people within the sites. The problem of inadequate circulation patterns has been discussed primarily by Newman (1973b, 1975) and Brill (1975b), both contending that uncontrolled circulation at public housing projects allows potential offenders to walk near the doors and windows of first floor apartments and of other physically vulnerable places. The literature also suggests that inadequate circulation patterns at public housing projects limit surveillance opportunities, prevent effective access control; stifle attempts to define specific areas on the project grounds; and, in general, increase the vulnerability of the project to potential offenders. One way of addressing this problem has been to channel pedestrian movement through a public housing complex in a controlled, easily observable manner by a system of walkways surrounded on either side by shrubbery to limit disregard for the designated route. However, since there is no evidence in the literature that pedestrian circulation control alone will effectively address the problem of crime in public housing, most practitioners use this strategy only in combination with other modifications of the physical environment discussed in this section.

A fifth crime-provoking situation cited by many residents of public housing projects is the necessity of their waiting a long time for public transportation at isolated and poorly lighted bus stops. Brill's (1975a) surveys of residents at four public housing developments in the Boston area revealed that 75 percent of them considered waiting for the bus alone at night "very dangerous." The principal strategies offered by Public Housing Authorities (PHAs) for dealing with this problem include moving bus stops closer to places where people congregate, increasing the lighting around them, and other surveillance improvement measures. The major limitation surrounding such strategies, however, is that they cannot be carried out independently by a PHA, but must be initiated by the local public transportation department and be implemented by several other public agencies. A second limitation is the paucity of evidence in the literature as to what specific strategy has the greatest impact on reducing the very high fear of crime that public housing residents do feel with regard to waiting for buses alone at night.

Social Factors

The three social factors most often cited in the literature as major contributors to crime in and around public housing sites are a low degree of social organization, minimal social cohesion, and weak informal social controls. Social organization in this context may be operationally defined as the amount of group activity in which tenants participate, the existence of recognized leaders and the extent of informal interaction among the tenants, and the degree to which alienation, distrust, and anomie are present. The indices of social cohesion are the number and intensity of friendships among public housing residents, the real and perceived levels of actual and potential helping behavior, and the extent of social isolation felt by the residents. Informal social controls are norms and enforcement mechanisms that are
developed and implemented on an ad hoc basis among public housing residents. Brill, after conducting studies at eleven public housing projects between 1974 and 1977, made the following general assessment of their "social climate":

Social relations . . . are marked by distrust; few people dare to rely on one another. The social posture of the residents is basically defensive and insular [and] this feeling often extends to the Housing Authority, the local public agency responsible for managing the project. [As a result], Housing Authorities have not been able to involve tenants sufficiently in the management process. Yet, resident discontent over this issue is prevalent, as well as over the general quality of management services delivered by the Authorities. Moreover, residents tend to perceive these deficiencies as signs of their social isolation and neglect (Brill, 1977).

Rainwater (1970), Rosenthal (1974a), Wilson (1975), and Montgomery (1977) have also written about the low levels of social organization, cohesion, and informal social controls at public housing projects. The literature is likewise consistent about the relationship between this situation and high crime rates at many public housing projects, as expressed succinctly by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals:

Indeed, with each citizen looking out for himself only, there is no community, no strength in numbers, but rather a fragmentation that can only serve to embolden criminal elements (National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, 1973).

To enhance the "social climate" of public housing projects, Brill suggests the development of tenant organizations and the holding of group meetings at which residents would elect representatives and hall captains, establish anti-crime councils, and make decisions about a wide range of issues relating to the social environment. Rosenthal suggests the use of "community service organizers" (CSOs) to function as non-uniformed security personnel, to organize resident group meetings, and to serve as a liaison between residents and management and between these two groups and the local police. Acting upon these suggestions, several Public Housing Authorities have instituted crime prevention education programs to reduce the fear of crime as well as the actual incidence of crime and to increase the residents' capacity to protect themselves and their neighbors. In addition, residents of several public housing projects have implemented a variety of protective services such as escorts for tenants who must leave their apartments at night, neighborhood crime watches, apartment checks for residents who are out of town, phone calls to residents who are afraid of being victimized, hot lines to improve communication between residents and security personnel, and victim-witness programs which guarantee protection to residents who are willing to testify against offenders. Some of these strategies necessitate interpersonal contact and group-oriented protective behavior, while others develop leadership and authority structures among residents and the "internal resolve" as well as the capacity to act collectively when dealing with the problems of crime and fear of crime. It should be recognized, however, that such anti-crime strategies not only require a considerable amount of implementation time, but are
often difficult to manage and can even generate conflicts among residents as well as between residents and management.

A fourth social factor which several experts (Newman, Rosenthal, Wilson, and Krop) believe contributes significantly to crime in and around public housing sites is a lack of proprietary interest and an accompanying feeling of "territoriality" among the tenants. Proprietary interest and a feeling of "territoriality" mean that the tenants of a housing complex identify with their residential environment, are willing to make a personal investment toward improving the quality of life there, and desire a sense of control over their "turf." As Rosenthal (1974b) points out, proprietary interest and "territoriality" are both essential ingredients for the development of a sense of community, the lack of which contributes to minimal or negligible interaction, discourse, and helping behavior among residents of public housing projects. The strategies proposed for promoting proprietary interest and "territoriality" at public housing projects include physical design mechanisms like the clustering of dwelling units to reduce the number of persons sharing a common entrance, thereby controlling access, and the social programs described above in the social organization-social cohesion-social control discussion, plus the provision of employment and organized recreational activities for youths. Rosenthal (1974b) even suggests a "community promenade" whereby the residents of the several areas comprising a public housing project would simply knock on doors and introduce themselves. While most of these approaches could be expected to significantly reduce the fear of crime at public housing sites, it is less certain that they would reduce the actual incidence of crime.

A fifth social problem associated with crime prevention at many public housing sites is the lack of a sufficient number of trained security personnel to patrol the complexes on a 24-hour basis, so that Housing Authorities often resort to volunteers—both youth and adult patrols—to supplement their regular security forces. Ideally, as in Chicago, Pittsburgh, and New York City, all public housing security personnel, both commercial and volunteer, would be trained at police and sheriff academies so that they would not only possess the technical skills required by the job, but would be culturally sensitive to the needs of the populations they are serving and would be capable of establishing good working relationships with local law-enforcement personnel. Security personnel who are not willing to communicate with residents on a helpful social basis as well as in the traditional law-enforcement-officer role will not be trusted by residents and, hence, will not be successful in dealing with the problems of crime and the fear of crime among public housing residents. In the absence of formal "sensitivity training" for all security personnel at a public housing site, team policing, where at least one member of each pair of security personnel working together has a broad cultural awareness of the resident population, may be quite effective in controlling crime.

Brill's research at eleven public housing projects (1974-77) provides the bulk of the empirical evidence that public housing tenants perceive a sixth social factor as contributing to crime in their residential settings—namely a serious shortage of social service programs. This is understandable in view of the fact that 60 to 90 percent of the residents at three Boston sites considered alcoholism and drug abuse to be serious problems in their settings (Brill, 1975a), and respondents at other public housing sites revealed that problems such as depression and the lack of homemaker and day care services for children of working mothers were also burdensome
for many tenants, especially for single, female household heads. Brill hypothesizes that all these problems contribute directly to crime insofar as the residents with drug, alcohol, and employment-related problems may commit crimes in order to secure money, and that they contribute indirectly to crime by reducing the potential for social cohesion and self-protective behaviors to limit residents' vulnerability to offenders. Therefore, in conjunction with physical design changes, Brill (1973) recommends the expansion of social services, including crisis intervention programs, at public housing projects and the training of tenant leaders and management personnel to render such services in order to promote the following objectives: (1) to improve social organization among the residents, (2) to alleviate residents' social problems, (3) to reduce residents' vulnerability to crime, and (4) to reduce the incidence of crime itself over a period of time. Based on his research in public housing environments, Rosenthal (1974c) also suggests expanding social services in these settings in order to reduce crime.

A seventh commonly-cited contributor to the problems of crime and fear of crime at public housing projects is a lack of supervision and organized activities for youths, especially in view of the large number of children and the prevalence of poor, mother-headed households in these residential settings. The literature provides a long list of strategies to address youth problems in public housing environments, including the following:

1. Organize a "proxy parent" system whereby parents' friends would take over the supervision of their children on a regular basis.
2. Follow up chronic truancy cases residing in public housing projects through daily evening visits with their families.
3. Provide vocational training and job placement programs for youths.
4. Employ youths to deliver needed social services to older public housing residents who, in turn, might serve as role models.
5. Employ youths as youth security patrol personnel.
6. Refer youths in public housing to all available private and public volunteer youth programs.
7. Provide supervised cultural and recreational activities for youths.

The logic behind such strategies is compelling, for studies have shown that programs providing employment opportunities and organized activities for youths can significantly reduce crime rates (National Urban League, 1978; U.S. House of Representatives, 1978). However, designing activities in such a manner that youths will be interested in participating in them is not an easy task. Moreover, in public housing complexes where much distrust exists between youths and Housing Authority officials, securing youths' support for and cooperation with these strategies may be next to impossible.

A final social factor frequently cited as a major contributor to crime in public housing projects is the high rate of unemployment among the adult tenants. Public Housing Authorities across the country report unemployment rates that are ten times the national average, and the weight of empirical evidence reveals a strong positive correlation between this employment situation and high crime rates. In 1970,
then—Attorney General Ramsey Clark (1970) stated that crime serves as one of the primary means of earning a livelihood for the urban poor in the absence of employment opportunities; using macro-economic data (i.e., national unemployment rates), Brenner (1976) found a positive correlation between property crime, delinquency, homicide, and the unemployment rate; and the House Subcommittee on Crime reported in 1978 that nearly 50 percent of the persons arrested the previous year in Washington, D.C., were unemployed at the time they committed a crime (U.S. House of Representatives, 1978). Public Housing Authorities may use several strategies to reduce unemployment among their residents, both as an end in itself and as a means of reducing crime. One strategy is to hire residents to work on projects directed toward the solution of various physical and social problems at public housing sites, employing them as auxiliary security personnel, as social service aides, as rehabilitators of project property, or as liaisons between the residents and the management. Another strategy which may be utilized to relieve unemployment among public housing tenants is to establish employment counseling and job development services in public housing projects. Given the close links which many Public Housing Authorities already have with the public employment and training programs under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA-1973), the start-up and implementation of such programs should not entail many difficulties.

Poor Public Housing Management Practices

The third and final category of factors which the literature suggests contributes to the problem of crime in and around public housing projects may be labeled poor management practices, the most negative of which is the lack of adequate and stable funding sources for public housing security programs. Local Public Housing Authorities rely on a variety of funding mechanisms to staff their security programs: (1) their own operating funds; (2) Security Program funds and Community Development Block Grants from the Department of Housing and Urban Development; (3) Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (Department of Justice) grants; (4) CETA (Department of Labor) grants; (5) General Revenue Sharing funds; (6) local, county, and state government matching grants; and (7) local training opportunities provided as a contribution by local law enforcement agencies. The use of such a variety of funding sources, many of which provide financial assistance for only one year, contributes to the fluctuating size of Public Housing Authority security forces, discourages intensive training of personnel, and militates against the long-range planning of security operations. A few Public Housing Authorities avoid this problem by using local law enforcement agency personnel to patrol their sites, either through a contract or a non-monetary arrangement with the local, county, or state government.

Another management-related problem is lack of effective communication between public housing security personnel and local law enforcement agencies. There appears to be consensus in both the literature and among those who live and work in public housing projects that this problem contributes to the incidence of crime and the fear of crime experienced by the tenants. One strategy for correcting this situation is to redirect all crime-reporting calls from public housing residents and security personnel to a 24-hour central police dispatcher by means of an emergency telephone dialing system. To promote better coordination of the crime prevention efforts of public housing security personnel and local law enforcement
officers, joint planning sessions as well as regular joint meetings might be arranged between the two groups.

Finally, Rosenthal and Newman have suggested that public housing managers frequently lack the capability to appropriately place tenants within their projects and to evict those who engage in anti-social behavior, including crime. In regard to tenant placement, the literature shows, for example, that elderly public housing residents are victimized more often in settings where youths are present than in complexes comprised entirely of the elderly. Therefore, Newman (1976) has suggested that the elderly either be housed in different public housing projects from families with children or in segregated areas within the same projects. He also makes the point that having persons of uniform life style and age reside together promotes resident recognition, social interaction, and social cohesion. On the other hand, if the elderly reside apart from families with children, important elements of surveillance and informal social control may be lost. Glaser contends, for example, that the interaction of the old and the young in public housing projects can have the effect of deterring anti-social behavior because of the potential for caring attitudes to develop between members of the two groups and because the elderly may serve as role models for the youths (Glaser, 1978). This argument seems to favor allowing the elderly, if they so desire and if they are made aware of the higher probability of victimization, to live in public housing shared by other groups. As regards more stringent eviction policies as a means of reducing crime and fear of crime in public housing projects, they may not only be difficult to implement and manage, but their legality may also be questioned. The Public Housing Authority of Columbus, Georgia, has stated the problem as follows:

Recent court cases, revisions to the landlord tenant laws, and the Legal Aid Society have virtually destroyed our traditional tool, eviction. Since we must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of undesirable tenants, we must have at our disposal a trained staff of investigative and enforcement personnel (National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials/Department of Housing and Urban Development Conference, 1978).

Political problems could also arise for a Public Housing Authority if it evicted a tenant who could not readily secure another place to live for financial, racial, or other reasons.

Summary and Conclusions

This article has shown that not only have rates for all serious crimes doubled in the United States since the early 1960's, but that rates at public housing sites are often two to twenty times higher than the national rates for the same crimes. Moreover, even at public housing projects where crime rates are not remarkably high, a great fear of crime prevails among the tenants, especially the elderly ones. As a result, many residents of public housing restrict their activities to such a degree that their quality of life is drastically reduced.

Five physical factors frequently cited in the literature as potential contributors to crime at public housing projects were discussed: (1) restricted surveillance of certain areas within the projects; (2) insufficient "target hardening" measures to
prevent burglaries; (3) lack of controlled access to project grounds and buildings; (4) the absence of controlled pedestrian circulation routes; and (5) insecure public transportation waiting facilities. Various strategies were proposed for correcting these physical deficiencies, but their limitations were pointed out as well.

A low degree of social organization, minimal social cohesion, weak informal social controls, lack of proprietary interest and a feeling of "territoriality," an insufficient number of properly trained security officers, a shortage of social service programs, lack of supervision and organized activities for youths, and high unemployment rates were the eight social factors discussed as major contributors to crime at public housing sites, and, as in the case of the physical factors, appropriate strategies suggested by experts in the field of crime prevention were cited and assessed.

Finally, the impact of three negative management practices on crime in public housing was discussed: (1) unreliable funding sources for public housing security programs; (2) ineffective communication between public housing security personnel and local law enforcement agencies and failure to coordinate their crime prevention efforts; and (3) lack of tenant placement and eviction policies and procedures. The literature contains many fewer strategies to correct these crime-inducing factors, however, than to correct the physical and social crime-contributing factors. This is not surprising, perhaps, in view of the tremendous disagreement among residents, managers, and security personnel in public housing, as well as among government officials and nationally recognized experts on crime and crime prevention, regarding the causes of, and the solutions to, crime and fear of crime in public housing. In the final analysis, the most valid statement that can be made about crime reduction programs in public housing is that a comprehensive approach is essential--one consisting of an integrated set of physical, social, and management strategies that will reinforce each other in deterring potential offenders and in reducing the vulnerability of potential victims.

The Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program in Public Housing announced by the Department of Housing and Urban Development on May 10, 1979, represents such a comprehensive approach. Funding for the two-year program, which was legislatively mandated by the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act of 1978, is now more than $40 million. Of the total funding, approximately $33 million has been obligated to fund anti-crime demonstrations by twenty-seven (27) Public Housing Authorities with 1,250 or more dwelling units, and approximately $7 million to fund such demonstrations by twelve (12) Public Housing Authorities with fewer than 1,250 units. The thirty-nine (39) Public Housing Authorities were selected from approximately 170 applicants in an open competition among PHAs which required them to propose anti-crime strategies addressing seven program areas: (1) improved PHA crime prevention management and maintenance; (2) physical design and security hardware improvements; (3) increased tenant participation, leadership, and organization relative to crime prevention issues; (4) increased employment of tenants, especially youths; (5) crime-related social service improvements; (6) improved support from the local criminal justice system, especially the police; and (7) more local public/private funding partnerships which target not only on the immediate public housing projects, but on the surrounding neighborhoods. These strategies are to be developed and implemented by means of the broadest possible cooperation among PHA management personnel, tenants, local government agencies, and Federal government agencies.
Thus, $20 million of the total $40 million program funding is in HUD modernization loan authority funds and $2.25 million in HUD Community Development Block Grant program funds; $8 million is being contributed by the Department of Labor (DOL) under its Youth Community Conservation Improvement Projects (YCCIP) Program (authorized by Title IV of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973) to provide jobs and training for the unemployed youths in public housing projects; the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) is contributing at least $1 million from its Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention and $340,000 from its Victim/Witness Program; and the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration (ADAMHA) is adding $500,000. Local matches, all of which are for non-hardware anti-crime strategies, total slightly over $8 million (Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1980). This innovative program is the first attempt by the Federal government to launch a comprehensive attack on crime, urban blight, and many personal, social, and economic problems in the most needy residential areas of the United States—our nation's public housing projects.

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