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What Role for Ethnicity? Political Behavior and Mobilization in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone and Liberia

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WHAT ROLE FOR ETHNICITY? POLITICAL BEHAVIOR
AND MOBILIZATION IN POST-CONFLICT
SIERRA LEONE AND LIBERIA

by

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WHAT ROLE FOR ETHNICITY? POLITICAL BEHAVIOR
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This dissertation examines political behavior in Sierra Leone and Liberia

following the end of their civil wars. Dominant theories on politics in African societies

suggest that ethnic interests underpin political behavior and elections are mere censuses

of ethnic support for co-ethnic party elites. Yet, while using a proportional

representation electoral system that is expected to result in splintered vote shares for

multiple political parties, Sierra Leone's elections in 2002 concentrated votes around

one presidential candidate and political party. Conversely Liberia's elections in 2005,

held using a first-past-the-post electoral system that expectedly discourages multiple

vote shares, diffused votes among several political parties and candidates. Given this

variation the study examines the general question of what role ethnicity plays in the two

elections by investigating why and how voters in Sierra Leone concentrate their votes

around one political party whereas voters in Liberia diffuse their votes around several.

The research has two focal points: 1) understanding the ways political elites recruit

party membership in the post-conflict environment and 2) understanding how

electorates respond to parties' and candidates' messages in addition to other cues and

ultimately decide which to support. Data for the study was collected and analyzed using

a triangulated range of qualitative and quantitative methods including survey research,

elite interviews, content analysis, logistic regressions with logged odds and King et al.'s CLARIFY. The study finds that there is an important distinction between ethnic identity and ethnic interests; the latter reveals motivation but it is not a deterministic explanatory variable of vote choice. There is consistent evidence that ethnic identity shows how Sierra Leoneans and Liberians voted given geographic settlements but not why they voted. The study contributes to the scholarship on post-conflict political behavior and elections; ethnicity and politics; and democratization.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER

CHAPTER

CHAPTER

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Most of the political science literature devoted to the continent is full of predominant paradigms and reductionist stereotypes, not only of African politicians but also of African people's behavior in politics – or more precisely, their lack of political behavior. And these paradigms and stereotypes are used to explain the economic misery and democratic ineptitude that characterize the continent in the eyes of the average Western citizen. (Monga 1996, viii)[1]

Exploring Political Behavior and Political Mobilization in Post-Conflict Liberia and Sierra Leone

This dissertation examines political behavior and mobilization in Sierra Leone and Liberia following the end of their civil wars. The research for this study focused particularly on exploring how elites of political parties mobilized the mass electorates and how the latter, in turn, decided whom to support as they participated in the respective electoral processes during the time of the first post-conflict elections in each country, Sierra Leone in 2002 and Liberia in 2005.

The body of scholarly work on political behavior in Africa accords much credence to the salience of ethnicity as a rallying point during electoral processes. Yet at the country level, we still understand very little about the interactions between ethnicity and voting behavior and what demographic groups are more likely or less likely to be susceptible to the effects of ethnic cues, if at all, when voting or expressing support in

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[1] See Celestin Monga, *The Anthropology of Anger: Civil Society and Democracy in Africa* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), viii.

other ways for political parties. Several aspects of the voting patterns that emerged in Sierra Leone and Liberia following the elections in question do not conform to what the dominant theories on political behavior in African societies would lead us to expect from multiparty elections. The ultimate goal of this study is to contribute to the scholarly literature on ethnicity and political behavior in Africa, especially in the unique context of countries emerging from conflict.

Throughout the nineties, Liberia and Sierra Leone made news headlines across the world for the brutality of their civil wars. Insurgent groups in both countries fought heavy battles with government or international intervention forces on a daily basis and, in the case of Liberia, sometimes against each other. Wanton murder, rape, amputation, looting and arson were constant descriptors of the violence in both conflicts.[2] For a while, it seemed as if there would be no end to the hostilities as peace negotiation after peace negotiation aimed at bringing the conflicts to an end failed.[3] Rather miraculously, starting with Sierra Leone in 2002, both countries emerged from what are arguably the bleakest periods in their histories, signed peace agreements and held multiparty elections that all international elections observers ruled free and fair. These were dramatic developments

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[2] See Robert Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation, Tribalism, and Disease are Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of Our Planet," *Atlantic Monthly* 273, (February 1994): 44-81. In his analysis, Kaplan discounted all hopes of redeeming countries such as Sierra Leone and Liberia from the violence that engulfed them at the time. He may yet be proven right by future events but both countries did not succumb to the picture painted of a pending doomsday future for the West African region that Kaplan predicted.

[3] Agreements such as the Abidjan Peace Accord of 1996 and the Lome Peace Accord of 1999 all failed to end the violence in Sierra Leone. In the case of Liberia, the Akosombo Agreement of 1994 and the Abuja Agreement of 1995 are just two examples of the over 10 peace agreements that failed to bring the civil war to an end.

given the record of prolonged violence and the difficulty of resolving conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa.[4]

While Sierra Leone had a brief experience with open and free multiparty elections before one-party rule and the subsequent chaos of civil war set in, Liberia arguably had no such historical experience before the elections of 2005 because its politics were dominated by various forms of one-party dictatorships for most of its history as an independent nation.[5] So, even as they made the transition from war to peace, the citizens of both countries also made a transition, this one from virtual disenfranchisement to participating in multiparty elections with no restrictions on their choices. Truly, the processes of multiple transitions in both countries were dizzying times for the citizenry who had to learn anew the art of peaceful mobilization as they participated freely in their political systems, most for the very first time.[6] One of the aims of this study was to use

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[4] Rarely had countries in Africa emerged directly from civil war to hold elections that are acceptable to all parties. To put the dramatic nature of these transitions from war to holding multiparty elections into perspective, consider the prolonged civil wars in the Sudan, Somalia, Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example. Similar elections following what was supposed to be the end of civil in Angola in 1992 plunged that country straight back into war when the former guerilla leader Jonas Savimbi reneged on accepting the validity of those elections.

[5] Liberia became a republic in 1847 under the True Whig Party but remained a virtual one-party state under that party until Samuel Doe overthrew the government of William Tolbert in 1980 and instituted his own brand of dictatorship, first as the head of a military junta and then as a civilian dictator. Doe was ousted and killed in 1990 following the commencement of the civil war and the country essentially descended into chaos following his death. Doe organized multiparty elections in 1985 that he won but that façade was nowhere near the free elections of 2005 that was overseen by credible external observers and judged free and fair by all.

[6] In the case of Sierra Leone it is more appropriate to say that citizens rediscovered the art of free and fair multiparty competition following years of one-party rule under the All People's Congress party. From independence in 1961 to 1977, Sierra Leoneans had the opportunity to take part in multiparty elections. The

social science research methodology to discover the most important influences that guided the decision-making of mass electorates as well as the political elites during these processes.

A great deal of the scholarly analyses of sub-Saharan Africa concerned with political behavior suggests that ethnicity is the major influence guiding African elites and mass electorates during such periods in question. The pervasive argument in this literature is that because African societies are characterized by what that scholarship claims are constraining factors such as low levels of education, minimal inter-ethnic group mobility and undeveloped infrastructures, the most employable heuristic for collective actions like voting are the ethnic groups to which citizens belong. These constraints, the arguments continue, are compounded by low levels of access to the media further strengthening ethnic cues and also making narrow ties of kinship, family or region the major influences on citizens as they mobilize to participate in politics (Melson and Wolpe 1970; Horowitz 1985; Palmberg 1999; Bekker, Dodds and Khosa 2001; Daddieh and Fair 2002; Van de Walle 2003; Forrest 2004; Posner 2004, 2005; and others).

According to some of this scholarship, the hindrances caused by subsistence livelihoods that are largely based on farming around the home community restrict social and geographic mobility so that citizens never really move far from the "pack" of the communities into which they are born. Thus, the groupthink of communal existence remains resistant to external influences, and this groupthink is often partly articulated in terms of expectations of disproportionate shares of state resources such as roads and other

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last freely contested elections were in 1996. For younger generations in both countries, it is clear that these were the first opportunities to freely take part in multiparty elections.

development projects in the locality. Other factors such as the shortage of formal education resulting in low levels of literacy strongly root cues of political mobilization in local communities through the primary ties of kinship, ethnicity and long-standing cultural bonds, it is further argued.

Often, the preceding description of political behavior on the continent is contrasted with that in Western societies such as the United States where higher levels of literacy, geographic mobility, access to the media and other factors associated with human development and societal modernization lay the foundations for greater ethnic, regional and even partisan dealignment leading to issue voting by a sophisticated electorate (Mattes and Norris 2003; Norris 2004).

One conclusion from such analyses suggests that the interactions and disagreements between ethnic groups as they participate in politics on the continent eventually results in violence as similarly mobilized groups clash in competition for scarce resources, which they perceive are only obtainable through access to the holders of public offices under what are best known as patronage systems of distribution (Bayart 1993; Berman, Eyoh and Kymlicka 2004; Horowitz 1985; Nnoli 1998; Joseph 1999; Berkeley 2001; Udogu 2001). Jimmy Kandeh, a Sierra Leonean scholar, paints a picture of politics in Sierra Leone that is a characteristic example of how numerous other scholars and analysts have perceived and described politics on the continent.

> The individual [or politician] is seen as an embodiment of the tribe, consequently his [or her] fortunes are strongly identified with the fortune of the tribe. If he or she succeeds it is the tribe that has progressed, and if he or she fails it is the tribe that has suffered a setback...[thus], each time a high office or post goes to someone in the community his or her tribesmen jubilate openly, culminating finally in a delegation to the Head of state [with special *kola nuts* and other forms of gifts] to thank him for the appointment of their son or daughter to the high office...such jubilation could be taunting to the neighboring ethnic groups, who watch from the sideline because they are not so blessed with a similar fortune.

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Indeed, what this does is encourage ethnic competition as it whets the political appetite and sharpen the desire for ethnic solidarity in the next democratic competition. This is so because the newly appointed minister or high government appointee is likely to bring political goodies to his or her ethnic group at the seeming expense of the contiguous ethnic groups. This scenario brings into limelight the quest for political solidarity and active participation along ethnic lines in future political contestation to elect the 'big man' or 'big madam' who would bring home the bacon. Such political behavior pattern, in effect nourishes the theory of ethnic boundaries, which if not handled adequately, could result in ethnic political clashes. (Udogu 2001, 26-27)

Besides such suggestions for the mobilizing potential of ethnicity leading to dangerous conflict, we still understand little else about how the ethnic influences on political behavior and mobilization into politics in Africa unfolds and what potential impacts this may have on interethnic existence, especially in the unique context of countries emerging from war.

Developments in Sierra Leone such as the results of its first post-conflict elections visibly challenge Kandeh's analysis and similar explanations regarding the effects of ethnicity on politics in African countries. The way the Sierra Leone civil war was fought and, more important for the current analysis, the results of the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2002 do not reflect mobilization and participation of the people along ethnic lines.

Following the conclusion of its civil war in 2001, Sierra Leone successfully held free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections in May 2002. The results of these post-conflict elections do not conform to what we should come to expect given the various accounts of ethnic mobilization in Africa. While political parties of diverse dispensations formed to take advantage of the political space, the electorates largely *ignored* those parties to concentrate their voting preference around one party, the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP).

In 2002, Sierra Leone had roughly five million people distributed among 17 ethnic groups. Eleven political parties registered to take part in the elections. The electoral system that was employed for those elections was a variant of the proportional representation voting system called the "district block voting system" which required political parties to only submit general constituency-based lists of candidates for approval by the electorate in the respective constituencies (International Foundation of Election Systems 2004; Kandeh 2003). All these factors provided an ideal recipe for mobilization along ethnic lines or what Donald Horowitz refers to as "census-type" or polarizing elections in which the various ethnic groups cast their ballots overwhelmingly for parties led by elites from their ethnic groups.[7] But the final results of the parliamentary elections registered a convincing victory for one party, the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), which gained nearly 70 percent for a total of 83 seats in a 112 chamber legislature (International Foundation for Election Systems, 2005).[8]

Ostensibly, the SLPP draws most of its support from the Mende ethnic group that populates the south and east of Sierra Leone. In fact, some claim that the SLPP is a "Mende-based" party because in elections past, the party gained a majority of its votes

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[7] According to Horowitz, in "census-type" or polarizing elections, voting is largely indicative of a census of the different groups in the electorate providing little or no change in the vote patterns thus giving the largest group a lock on power. For this conceptualization, see Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985).

[8] In the presidential elections, the SLPP candidate and incumbent, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah also won over seventy percent of the total votes against the main challenger and runner-up from the All People's Congress Party, Ernest Koroma, who won about twenty-three percent of the votes.

from those two regions (Kandeh 1992, 93; Hayward 1987; Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999).[9]

Yet in the elections of 2002, it won significant portions of votes from all regions of the country, even in regions dominated by other ethnic groups and considered political strongholds of parties with ties to those other ethnic groups. The puzzle that the SLPP win presents is that, as an ethnic group the Mendes comprise less than thirty-four percent of the population (Levinson 1998). Thus, to win by the margin it did, the SLPP had to have secured the votes of other ethnic groups across the country. Why did the members of other ethnic groups cast their vote for the SLPP given that there were other political parties on the ballot that could be considered more considerate of the interests of their ethnic group?

Turning to Liberia, hostilities in its civil war eventually came to an end in 2003, one year after the elections in Sierra Leone, allowing that country to hold its first completely free and fair multiparty elections in October 2005. The results of the first round of elections showed, unlike Sierra Leone, that support for the twenty-two political parties that contested the elections was diffused throughout the country with the Congress for Democratic Change (CDC), led by George Weah, holding a slim lead over other political parties. In the legislative elections, the CDC carried seven counties out of 15 gaining over 29 percent of the total votes casts in the first round. Since no clear winner emerged in the first round of the presidential elections held on October 11, a run-off

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[9] See Jimmy D. Kandeh, "The Politicization of Ethnic Identities in Sierra Leone," *African Studies Review* 35 (2 February 1992): 81-99. Kandeh lays out an elaborate argument for the ethnic thesis in Sierra Leone referring to political competition in the country as a battle between the Mendes and the Temnes in which "Mendes (under the banner of the Sierra Leone People's Party –SLPP) had to lock horns with the Temnes (under the aegis of the All People's Congress –APC) for control of the apparatus of government.

election was held on November 8, 2005 between the two frontrunners from the first round, Weah of the CDC and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf of the Unity Party. Johnson-Sirleaf won the run-off election with close to 60 percent of the votes defeating Weah who was the frontrunner in the presidential elections during the first round of the elections.[10]

Thus, the study seeks to examine the general question of what role ethnicity plays in the political behavior and mobilization of Liberians and Sierra Leoneans in the post-conflict environment with the question about why voters in Sierra Leone concentrated their votes around one political party whereas voters in Liberia diffused their votes around several.[11]

In the case of Liberia, a corollary development that demanded explanation was to understand why support shifted from Weah to Johnson-Sirleaf during the runoff election. Ethnicity, after all, is a static identity. If ethnic groups have fixed preferences for those they elect to represent them, why did Weah fail to win the second round of the elections given that he was the frontrunner in the first round?

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[10] An important caveat here is to point out that initial post-conflict elections took place at different times in Liberia and Sierra Leone. All parties to the conflict in Sierra Leone laid down their arms in late 2001 and the country held its elections in May 2002 whereas the war in Liberia only drew to a close during the fall of 2003 allowing that country to hold its initial elections in 2005.

[11] The contrast between the two vote outcomes is even more striking when considering the electoral systems used by each country. Liberia used the single-member district system whereas Sierra Leone used the proportional representation system. The tendency of PR systems to increase the number of parties represented in legislatures is well noted (Duverger 1954, 1986). Out of the 11 parties that went to the polls, only three received enough votes to gain seats in the parliament of Sierra Leone. On the other hand, the tendency of single-member districts to discourage third party representation in democracies is also well documented. In the case of Liberia, several parties gained seats on the Liberian legislature following their initial election.

Sierra Leone and Liberia: Comparing the Two Cases

One of the most important considerations in undertaking a meaningful comparative exercise in comparative politics is to ensure that the objects, cases, or policies being compared are alike in significant ways so that the basic logic of comparison is not violated and the results of the exercise are not rendered meaningless (Sartori 1970, Dogan and Kazancigil 1994). In what ways does Sierra Leone provide a meaningful comparison to Liberia for a comparative exercise aimed at unearthing the essential elements of political behavior following civil war?

I will argue that several factors make Sierra Leone a meaningful comparison to Liberia. First, both are neighboring countries located in the Mano-River sub-region of the West African region of Africa. Both are signatories to the same regional and sub-regional accords: the Mano-River Union with Guinea; and the Economic Community of West African States with fourteen other states in West Africa. Also, both countries divide ethnic groups such as the Kru, Vai, Kissi, and the Mende across their common borders and both countries share similar socio-cultural traditions and historical linkages dating back to the pre-colonial era.[12] More importantly, scholars and analysts are unanimous in agreement that the war that rived Sierra Leone for over ten years was an offshoot of the civil war that erupted in Liberia in 1989 (Richards 1996; Abdullah 2004; Gberie 2005).

Thus, from a most similar systems design perspective, the two countries provide interesting contrasts that form useful foundations for comparative analysis since they are similar in most regards but the concentration of votes around the SLPP in Sierra Leone's

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[12] For a detailed explanation of this colonial linkage see Christopher Clapham, *Liberia and Sierra Leone: An Essay in Comparative Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

election contrasts with the diffusion of votes in Liberia's election. By highlighting the most important variables that affected political behavior and mobilization in the two countries, this dissertation will help explain the differing electoral outcomes and how and why both electorates made the decisions that they did.

Rationale of this Study: Why Liberia and Sierra Leone?

According to Sisk and Reynolds (1998), elections can either help reduce tensions following major conflicts by reconstituting legitimate government and political order or they can exacerbate such tensions as exist by further polarizing highly conflictual societies.[13] Perhaps, no two countries fit their description of "conflictual societies" better than Sierra Leone and Liberia during their civil wars. Given a predominant argument about ethnicity and political behavior and mobilization in Africa, scholars and analysts interested in seeing both countries emerge permanently from conflict must have held their collective breaths in anticipation of the voting outcomes in each since those outcomes were, arguably, proxy indicators of an acceptable peace or of residual animosities following the wars. The precariousness of the two situations was underlined further since the two countries were making a transition from visibly polarized situations of civil war to, almost directly, holding multiparty elections where there was a need for consensus of some kind in electing representatives that will oversee the processes of post-conflict democratization and institutionalization of the peace.

Indeed, the outcome of Liberia's legislative elections and the first round of its presidential election might have been a cause for alarm. But the puzzling contradiction

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[13] Several other contributors to the same volume make the same point.

described earlier with regard to the elections in Sierra Leone was also apparent in the second round of the presidential election in Liberia. So instead of a mere "census" at the polling booths by the various ethnic groups as it appeared during the legislative elections, there were crossovers in voting during the second round of presidential elections in Liberia.

Certainly, the explanations of political behavior and mobilization in sub-Sahara Africa are wide-ranging. But I argue that the evidence offered in support of such explanations is sometimes narrow and efforts to describe politics in African societies lean heavily towards support for conflictual relations between ethnic groups engaged in zero-sum competitions for the scarce resources available at the center of the state (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Enloe 1973, 1980; Bates 1983; Bienen and Herbst 1996; Horowitz 1985; Lake and Rothchild 1998; Berman and Lonsdale 1992; Glickman 1995). Rarely do such studies focus on explaining cooperative interactions between different ethnic groups, and rarely have studies offered explanations for the conditions under which ethnic cues of voting are adopted or discarded for comparatively more pragmatic decisions.[14]

Given the diversity of their ethnic populations, and given the potentially ethnic-sensitive post-conflict environment, the probabilities of governing majorities to emerge

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[14]Fearon and Laitin's work focusing on interethnic cooperation is a notable exception to this trend. In their analysis, they suggest that most interethnic interactions in Africa are characterized by cooperation rather than by conflict. See James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation." American Political Science Review 90, no. 4 (1990): 715-735. Daniel Posner's (2005) analysis is another exception to this trend. Using an institutional approach, Posner explores the conditions under which different aspects of ethnic identity are adopted or discarded using evidence from Zambia. He shows that changes from one electoral system to another shaped the ways Zambians mobilized into politics.

were severely precluded according to the predictions of the ethnic mobilization theses. But we can assume, from the fact that winners and majorities emerged in such challenging circumstances, different ethnic and other demographic groups, whether collectively or individually, identified some candidates or parties that may not necessarily belong to their own ethnic groups as the most reliable depositories of their different aspirations and elected those candidates or parties into national offices. What remains is for scholars to shift analytic focus and devote attention to understanding and accounting for such differences in voting behavior.   This study sheds new light in this direction.

Literature Review: Towards Conceptual, Theoretical and Methodological Frameworks for This Study

The research concerns of this study situate it in a broad literature on elections and voting behavior in Africa, which have their foundation in research into voting behavior of the American and European electorates. It also draws from the budding literature on post-conflict elections. Studies of voting behavior have their foundations in seminal studies and advancements in survey research methodology that were pioneered in the 20th century by the Columbia University and University of Michigan studies beginning around the early 1940s.

For the longest time in their histories, the majority of African countries were colonies of European countries and indigenous peoples were denied the right to vote and to participate in other aspects of political decision-making (Cowen and Laakso 2004).

Ultimately, these countries were granted independence resulting in enfranchisement and political participation beginning around the late1950s.[15]

As scholars began to pay attention to the political behavior of the newly independent countries, they argued that existing explanations of political behavior borrowed from Western societies did not adequately explain the evolving political behavior in these societies. Thus, even though the emergent explanations of political behavior in the new societies in Africa borrowed heavily from the theoretical and conceptual frameworks of the existing works, they adapted such frameworks to the context of politics in African societies.[16]

In doing so they argued, for the most part, that the political behavior emerging in the newly independent colonies was driven by the desire of competing elites to occupy the political and administrative spaces left by departing Europeans using the support of their ethnic communities. Here, I trace the emergence of this literature starting with a discussion of the major trends along which the study of voting behavior emerged in the United States followed by a discussion of the most influential works that have resonated within the analyses of political behavior in Africa.

The study of voting behavior in Africa has seminal roots in the studies and analyses of voting behavior that were conducted in the United States (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1948; Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954; Downs 1957; Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes 1960; Schattschneider 1960; Key 1966; Lipset

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[15] See Michael Cowen and Liisa Laakso, eds. *Multi-Party Elections in Africa*, (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 3.
[16] Cowen and Laakso, 6.

and Rokkan 1967).[17] Beginning around the 1940s, these studies flowed through three

dominant paradigms, so to speak. First, there was the Colombia University study which

emphasized socioeconomic factors like income and education as important influences on

the vote choice; next, followed the socio-psychological model advanced by the

University of Michigan which emphasized parties, issues and the candidates and

introduced the "funnel of causality" model to explain the voting decision; and a third

paradigm, the rational voter model based on the rational choice theories and models of

voter decision-making introduced by Anthony Downs. Both the Michigan School and the

rational models of decision-making that came later emphasized the "issues" as important

influences on voter decision-making; a caveat being that the latter emphasized it more

than the former.

A comparable replication of the extensive efforts to understand political behavior

of the American electorate is yet to be undertaken at the country level in African

societies. The Afrobarometer Studies launched in 1999 could potentially fill this void in

the years to come. In the meantime the scholarship has explained very little of the

preferences shown for different political parties by electorates in Africa.

<u>The Study of Voting Behavior in Africa</u>

Arguably, Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) work on party systems and voter

alignments in Western Europe had one of the most influential impacts on the structural

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[17] For a very neat chronology and analyses of these studies of voting behavior, see Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg, eds, *Classics in Voting Behavior* (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1993). And Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg. Eds, *Controversies in Voting Behavior,* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2001).

theories of voting behavior that emerged on Africa. Their theories provided the baseline for comparison of the structural foundations that resulted in issue-based voting in the established Western democracies and what the earliest scholars of voting behavior in Africa found wanting in the societies of Africa. Regarding states in Western Europe, Lipset and Rokkan observed that social identities formed the basic building blocks of party support in these societies. These social identities included "regional cleavages of center-periphery," "the class inequalities between workers and owners," and "sectarian cleavages over church and state." The class inequalities between workers and owners locked the preferences of political parties and voters into left-right dimensions based on views on a strong role for the state through egalitarian welfare policies preferred by the left versus the free market, limited government preferences of the right.

Lipset and Rokkan's work established another framework on which scholars built the earliest analyses of electoral politics and voting behavior in African societies during and following the independence era of the late-fifties to early seventies. However, scholars did not fail to observe the remarkable differences between the structural conditions underlying political behavior in Western Europe that were observed by Lipset and Rokkan and those characterizing the societies of Africa (Melson and Wolpe 1970). For example, African societies emerging from years of colonial domination lacked the class inequalities between workers and owners of the means of production which structured voters into left/right preferences for the appropriate role of government in society (Sklar 1979). Instead, the societies were relatively underdeveloped with low levels of education and without the income levels that reinforced the cleavages between parties and voters in the West. The search for the unique structural conditions underlying voting behavior in Africa was fully underway by the early seventies as scholars sought to

16

provide answers to the question of what guided Africans in their political decision-making (Cowen and Laakso 2002).[18]

Initial explanations, with varying degrees, focused on cues of ethnicity, cultural bonds, regional loyalties and family ties following observations of the initial post-colonial mobilizations, as Africans moved to occupy the political spaces left by departing Europeans (Mackenzie and Robinson 1960; Hodgkin 1960; Coleman 1958; Coleman and Rosberg 1964; Fisher 1969; Carter 1966; Melson and Wolpe 1970; Lemarchand 1972; Oluronsola 1972; Hayward 1987). According to most of these theories, sociological variables served as the major influences that guided voter mobilizations following independence. Fred Hayward (1987) concluded from a study of elections in Africa that

> political parties were basically ethnic or regional parties…political mobilization in these circumstances goes beyond seeking support for a particular position, becoming a matter of ethnic loyalty and solidarity…competition often leads to ethnic violence. (Hayward 1987, 279)

Humphrey Fisher (1969, 40) writing on the cycle of coups that gripped Sierra Leone following the elections of 1967 opined, as somebody who was present during the events, that "Sierra Leone had deeply rooted tribal divisions and religious differences of great antiquity" which formed the basis of political parties and voting cues. Interestingly, Fisher's analysis also conceded that some elements of issue-based voting did take place in Sierra Leone in the immediate post-independence era as voters showed their preferences for what political party was best able to articulate an acceptable vision of foreign relations for the young country.

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[18] See Michael Cowen and Liisa Laakso, Eds, *Multiparty Elections in Africa* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 1-26 for a neat chronology of the development of this literature.

17

According to some of these scholars, ethno-regional factionalism of sub-Saharan Africa was much in evidence early on in spite of the desires by some immediate post-colonial leaders to mesh various ethnicities within their inherited boundaries and forge a sense of nationhood (Lawson 1999). The new developments of ethnic mobilization for political participation and the inter-ethnic conflicts that sometimes ensued from such efforts also flew in the face of optimistic modernization theories that had predicted the decreasing relevance of ethnic ties as these societies evolved and set aside ethnic identities in favor of Western-style industrial and cultural practices. Melson and Wolpe (1970) pointed this out to the scholarship in a quite influential analysis. Drawing evidence from the Nigerian experience, they argued "technological and economic developments" had not done much to "undercut the organizational bases upon which communal politics rested. By "communal politics" they meant racial, ethnic, religious, or tribal politics (1973, 1112). Among several other propositions, Nelson and Wolpe advanced that competition engendered by social mobilization in culturally plural societies will tend to be defined in communal terms.

> What is more important is that personal fortunes of individuals are generally believed to depend on their communal origins and connections. This being the case, individuals plan and organize accordingly. Thus, the aspirant Nigerian politician seeks to mobilize his "tribal union" behind his candidacy; at the same time, his towns-people –those resident in the home community as well as those residents in the alien city –view his candidacy as an expression of their group aspirations and his elections as an indicator of group recognition and power. Conversely, the members of other communal groups view his candidacy as a threat to their own group aspirations and vested interests. (Melson and Wolpe, 1973 1114-1115)

Borrowing from William Riker, Robert Bates (1983, 164) contributed to the analysis of political behavior in Africa by arguing that the interactions between ethnicity and politics on the continent revolved around the formation of "minimum winning

18

coalitions" wherein the mobilized ethnic group was large enough to secure the benefits of political competition for the resources of the state but small enough to maximize the value of those benefits for each individual.

In another contribution, Donald Rothchild (1985) described an aspect of political behavior in African societies as "hegemonial exchanges" in which members of an ethnic group in control of the state apparatus, aware of their incapability to impose their hegemony over other ethno-regional groups, resort to exchanges of state resources in return for legitimacy from those groups. The insights provided by Bates and Rothschild into the nature of political behavior and mobilization within African societies firmly place ethnic identity at the center of political behavior in Africa. Bates' analysis raises interesting questions about the extent to which groups in Liberia and Sierra Leone were forms of minimum winning coalitions, regulating inclusion in order to maximize benefits. The application of Rothchild's conceptual framework is more useful for understanding political mobilization within stable societies that are yet to disintegrate into conflict than it is for understanding the post-conflict environment in the two cases.

Donald Horowitz's (1985) analysis that followed almost a decade and a half after the earliest studies of political behavior in the post-colonial societies of Africa reinforced the claims made by the earlier group of scholars and has remained the most influential among published works on ethnicity and political behavior anywhere. Using evidence accumulated from various multiethnic societies across the world and that from Africa in support of his arguments, Horowitz argued that a direct relationship existed between ethnicity, party systems and voting behavior in developing societies. Elections, according to him, where like an ethnic census in African societies and other societies across the world divided by race, language and religion. Horowitz pointed out what he saw as an

19

observed tendency of the "segments" of such societies to give large proportions of their votes to "ethnic parties" associated with those segments. He defined "ethnic parties" as political parties that draw support largely from an identifiable ethnic group and serve the interests of that group.[19] Ethnic parties and the party systems in which they operated exacerbate ethnic divisions in African countries leading to a zero-sum competition for state resources.

An application of Horowitz's propositions to the cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone exposes several shortcomings. For example, there is a gap between his explanations and the events that transpired in Liberia and Sierra Leone where the voting outcomes suggested evidence of pragmatic voting calculi by members of different ethnic groups instead of mere ethnic censuses. Thus, one of the key concerns of this study is to bridge such gaps in evidence by determining the salient variables that affected vote choice and support for the various political parties during the initial post-conflict elections as well as to determine the most preferable cues employed by elites of political parties in both countries to attract voters to their parties.

Other scholars have raised a number of conceptual and methodological issues with Horowitz's analysis. Mattes and Gouws (1998, 122) raised doubts about his findings and questioned the clarity of Horowitz's definition of an "ethnic party."[20] For example, what percentage of votes does a group have to give to a party for that party to be referred

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[19] According to Horowitz, "to be an ethnic party, a party does not have to command an exclusive hold on the allegiance of group members. It is how that party's support is distributed, that is decisive. See Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 293.

[20] See Robert B. Mattes and Amanda Gouws, "Race, Ethnicity, and Voting Behavior: Lessons from South Africa," in Timothy D. Sisk and Andrew Reynolds, eds *Elections and Conflict Management in Africa*, (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998).

to as an ethnic party, they asked? But the biggest concern they raised with Horowitz's analysis is his use of district level aggregate data to make inferences about individual behavior, which, they argued, resulted in ecological fallacy.[21] Using data from the South African elections of 1994, Mattes and Gouws found little evidence of "ethnic parties" among the political parties in South Africa or voting approaching an ethnic census. Parties such as the Inkatha Freedom Party, the Freedom Front and the Pan-Africanist Congress that had elements of ethnicity as a criteria for joining them, were the few exceptions. Rather, they argued that the great majority of voting behavior in South Africa could be explained by "utilizing the usual theories of voter behavior developed in apparently 'more normal' democracies" (1998, 140).

However, they neglected to acknowledge the relative modernization of South African society when compared to most African societies. But the methodological concerns they expressed with Horowitz's analysis regarding his employment of aggregate data significantly influenced the approach in this study in opting to employ survey data for an analysis of voting behavior in the two countries instead of looking merely at aggregated elections returns from polling stations.

But for a few exceptions such as Fred Hayward's (1987) edited volume, there is a noticeable lull in the analysis of elections and voting behavior during the late seventies to eighties. Not the least of reasons for this lull was the absence of competitive, free and fair elections in much of the continent during the decades of "suspended constitutions,"

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[21] In his defense, Horowitz did employ survey data in looking at some of his cases such as Guyana and Trinidad, for example. See Donald L. Horowitz. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict.* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 321.

military rules and dictatorships.[22] As Hayward points out "the interest in and enthusiasm for elections became less frequent, the one-party state or military regime became the norm, and the utility of the electoral process itself was called into question" (Hayward 1987, 1). Other scholars similarly acknowledge the façade of elections that one-man dictatorships and personal rulers set up during the period in question (Chazan 1979, 1982; Barkan and Okumu 1978; Cowen and Laakso 2002).

Following the end of the Cold War and the trend towards democratization on the continent that commenced with elections in Benin and Zambia where the incumbents lost, a flurry of studies examining elections and voting behavior on the continent reemerged trying to offer explanations for the new developments (Glickman 1995; Bratton and Van de Walle 1997; Huntington 1996; Conteh-Morgan 1997; Salih and Markakis 1998; Sisk and Reynolds 1998; Joseph 1999; Palmberg 1999; Udogu 2001; Bekker, Dodds and Khosa 2001; Daddieh and Fair 2002 and others).

Much of this second wave of analyses reached the same conclusions as the early scholars that the major influences on political behavior and mobilization were structural ties of ethnicity, kinship, or region, instead of the socioeconomic factors influencing voters and "issue voting" that was largely argued, influenced political behavior in more established Western democracies.[23] One might have hoped for a finding of the waning of ethnicity as an influence on voting behavior given the years that had elapsed since independence in most African countries and given their relative technological and

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[22] See Fred M. Hayward, Ed, *Elections in Independent Africa.* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987).

[23] It is important to point out here scholars have pointed out that as a variable, ethnicity does impact political behavior in the United States and Western Europe too. For an example of such analyses, see Jan E. Leighley, *Strength in Numbers? The Political Mobilization of Racial and Ethnic Minorities* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

infrastructural advancement. It seemed that modernization had not, after all, resulted in greater ethnic dealignment in political behavior and mobilization.

Building on the earlier studies, the new studies pointed out that the absence of authoritarian governments, which they argued kept such narrow loyalties in check for much of the decades following independence, now gave free reign for such divisions to rise to the fore during the democratization processes. For example, Marina Ottaway pointed out the failure of previous systems of co-opting ethnic leaders because in the new political dispensations of democracy, "people became free to choose their own representative and they did so using ethnicity." As a consequence, ethnic conflict became much more visible and, in some cases, much more acute and destructive" (1999, 311).[24]

In his analysis of the democratization processes that were taking place around this time, Samuel Huntington struck a sobering note of caution about potential problems of democratization in order to tamper the euphoria of the times with the reality of what he thought were challenges that lay ahead.

> The initiation of elections forces political leaders to compete for votes. In many situations, the easiest way to win votes is to appeal to tribal, ethnic, and religious constituencies. Democratization does promote communalism and ethnic conflict, and relatively few new democracies have structured their institutions to minimize the incentives to make such appeals. (Huntington 1996, 6)

His argument summarizes the emphasis that the scholarship has placed on the potential for elites to employ narrow cues of ethnicity and other structural cues as a mobilization tool and reinforces the need to study the situation in Liberia and Sierra

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[24] See Marina Ottaway "Ethnic Politics in Africa: Change and Continuity," in Richard Joseph, Ed, *State Conflict and Democracy in Africa* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 299-316.

Leone in order to determine the veracity of such theories given the fragility of the post-war environment and the need for democratization.

Indeed, not all observations of voting behavior in Africa have stressed mobilizations based on ethnicity. For example, Richard Joseph (1991) observed that groups mobilized against authoritarian regimes to pursue democratization following the end of the Cold War were broadly based and transethnic. Bratton (1992), Gerkie (1993), and Oyediran and Agbaje (1991) also observed instances of nonethnic voting and transethnic coalitions to face authoritarian regimes in Zambia, Kenya and Nigeria, respectively.

Patrimonialism and Patron-Client Networks: The Nexus of Political Behavior in Africa?

Yet another vein of analyses explaining political behavior in Africa has focused on factors such as patron-client networks and the realities of patrimonial rule on the continent (Zolberg 1969; Hyden and Leys 1972; Lemarchand 1972; Clapham 1982; Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Bayart 1993; Reno 1998; 1995; Orvis 2001 and others). This strand argues that patrimonial rule, found where all decision-making power within the state is concentrated in the hands of one leader, explains much of the voting behavior of electorates in Africa as loyal subjects reward a patron at the ballot box for roads and other benefits to the locality either directly or by voting for representatives from those localities anointed by the patron in the central state structure. Closely related to this phenomenon is clientelism, which Thomson (2004) described as a

> mutually beneficial association between the powerful and the weak...a patron extends public office (a salary and access to the state), security (something akin to freedom from arbitrary violence), and resources (such as wells, roads and medical

centers) to his or her clients. In return, the client offers support and deference that helps legitimize the patron's elevated position. (Thomson 2004, 119)

In a similar vein, Orvis (2001) pointed out that patron-client networks were pervasive in Africa "because they provided crucial resources to all involved." According to him,

> the ethnic and clan-based voting in many parts of Africa attests to patron-client networks' ability to act collectively; patrons can mobilize clients for political purposes. The networks, however, also serve as means of political participation for clients. (Orvis 2001, 27)[25]

To what extent did voters in each country cast their votes for the representatives of their respective clientele networks? Lemarchand (1972) and Bayart (1993) similarly argue that there are interconnections between ethnicity, clientele networks and political behavior in African societies. Bayart described politics and corruption in Cameroon as "one of the belly," suggesting that political support and ethnicity went hand in hand as politicians looked out for the interests of their respective constituencies/clients while those constituencies looked to those public officials from their clan, village, town, church or mosque as the legitimate depositories of their hopes and aspirations even as sources of livelihood, in reciprocal relationships that were determinative of political support.

While agreeing with some of the analyses that have focused on patron-client networks and patrimonial relationships in describing political behavior in African societies, I suggest that we can refine their arguments in important ways to describe some of the benefits of the exchange described earlier by Thomson (2004) - roads, medical centers, security - as legitimate concerns that are similar to the issues with which voters

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[25] See Stephen Orvis, "Civil-Society in Africa or African Civil Society?" In Stephen N. Ndegwa, Ed, *A Decade of Democracy in Africa* (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 17-38.

in advanced western democracies are concerned, for example ideological and policy positions on taxation, welfare, immigration, death penalty, abortion and so forth. Possibly, a difference between the way the electorate in America, for example, and those in Africa process their preferences for benefits could be that voters in America do not explicitly evaluate candidates based solely on their ability to bring what are referred to as "pork barrel" projects to the congressional district. But bringing such benefits, in fact, enhances the candidate's potential for reelection.[26] Whereas, for voters in the electorates in Africa, we can suggest that such benefits are the main *issues* and they go to the polls with the intention of voting for individuals who they think will bring those benefits directly to their communities. Certainly this notion is as worthy of empirical verification as is the task of determining the important influences on political behavior from among the multitude of explanations advanced by the scholarship over the years.

Typically, as Mattes and Gouws (1998) point out, the older established theories of political behavior and mobilization in Africa, for example Horowitz's "ethnic-census" theory, drew their evidence from experiences with aggregation of polling data from district or regional voting returns. However, these studies suffered from several important methodological problems. For example, to the extent that political behavior and the mobilization of electorates into the political process in the decades immediately following the end of colonialism was largely along communal lines, these studies failed to adequately account for both the heterogeneity of group identity and the effects of the electoral system on the strategies employed by political elites. More importantly, as they

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[26] In fact, some voters in urban communities in America, especially tough inner city neighborhoods, sometimes evaluate candidates based on their ability to deliver a form of security to their communities in the form of fighting and reducing crime.

point out "the census theory committed a significant ecological fallacy by using group-level voting patterns to infer individual-level motivations." (1998, 122-123)

In addition to this point, most of the recent scholarship neglected to discuss the evolution of African electorates over the years through several identifiable phases of electoral decision-making beginning with the introduction and demise of one-party systems through the reintroduction of multiparty elections (for example Ottaway 1999). Even after accounting for and acknowledging how institutional changes in the post-authoritarian state have led to shifts in electoral patterns and strategies employed by communal groups, most analyses have invariably reduced their explanations to ethnic identity as the most important denominator of electoral choice (for example Posner 2005).

What emerges from this survey of the literature is the recognition that in addition to sociological and socio-psychological factors such as ethnicity, religion, income, place of residence and class, identified by the Colombia and Michigan Schools, issue-based voting does take place but is usually associated with sophisticated, rational individuals in advanced democracies. In contrast, the dominant picture painted of political behavior in Africa is that the programs of political parties lack any meaningful ideological content.[27] The electorates in Africa are also incapable of sophisticated voting based on ideological issues and party programs and while they might share similar voting cues as those of electorates in the long-established democracies, the pervasive cues remain those narrow ties of ethnicity, kinship and region that root candidates and electorates to communities.

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[27] See Celestin Monga, "Eight Problems with African Politics," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds. *Democratization in Africa*, (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), p.49.

Studies of Post-Conflict Elections in Africa

Studies of post-conflict elections in Africa and other societies that have tried to democratize following civil conflict such as East Timor provide an additional but different framework for the research concerns of this study. Such analyses focus on the legitimating and healing potential of elections that follow periods of strife balanced with concerns for their divisive potential especially in multiethnic societies. Abbink and Hesseling (2000), Sisk and Reynolds (1998), Jarstad and Sisk (2008), Reilly (2001, 2008), Kumar (1998), and Lyons (1999) are influential examples of such studies.[28] Beyond empirically investigating voting cues and political behavior following initial elections in both countries, it is also important to apply insights provided by the post-conflict literature to exploring the potential for the outcomes to hold among all the stakeholders in the conflicts in Sierra Leone and Liberia.

Post-conflict studies have variously examined issues such as whether the votes cast following the end of civil wars are indicative of "votes for peace" or mere continuations of war by other means among the various factions; whether the elections are free and fair and the outcomes are acceptable to all parties (Abbink and Hesselling 2000); whether the electoral system agreed upon is the most appropriate for such divided societies (Reilly 2002, 2001), or whether international assistance has provided a strong anchor in the form of monetary and moral support, for the elections to be conducted smoothly and the results considered binding on all parties (Kumar 1998).

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[28] A useful summary of some of the most critical concerns in holding post-war elections is found in Benjamin Reilly's work. See Benjamin Reilly, "Uncertain Turning Points of Transition," in Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk, eds. *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 157.

Terry Lyons contributed to this body of scholarship with his examination of the mid-conflict elections of 1997 in Liberia. Following the elections in which Liberians voted overwhelmingly for Charles Taylor with over 70 percent of the votes, he concluded that "the July 19, 1997, elections in Liberia represented an impressive demonstration of the Liberian People's desire for peace." Liberians had turned out in large numbers and voted for peace "in the belief that Taylor would return to war if not elected." (Lyon 1999, 61)

Lyons' conclusion contradicts the ethnic census thesis. By proposing that the vote of Liberians was a vote for peace rather than of ethnicity, he pointed out a significant instance where other cues are more influential than the narrow cues of ethnicity, even if it was under unique circumstances. If, in fact, Lyons' claim is true, then to what extent was the concentration of votes around the SLPP in Sierra Leone during the 2002 elections also indicative of a vote for peace? Following the same logic, can we inversely infer that the diffused pattern of voting in Liberia after the 2005 elections indicated that the electorate in Liberia was not ready for peace? Such questions give rise to testable hypotheses and the need to investigate the probability that mass electorates cut across ethnic boundaries in search of the same goal that they may have perceived in the candidacy of one candidate who was not necessarily from their ethnic group.[29]

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[29] It is important to further clarify that testing whether Sierra Leoneans ignored ethnicity to "vote for peace" is a testable proposition that is unique to the context of African countries emerging from war. This variable has no relevance in examinations of political behavior of countries that have not been afflicted by war. Even in the cases of countries emerging from war, such as Liberia and Sierra Leone, it could well be the case that ten years removed from the war, the electorate in such countries will not make "voting for peace" an issue since the traumatic memories of the war that prompted such concerns could have receded with

A direct application of Lyons' thesis is undermined by the case of Sierra Leone because the SLPP won the post-conflict elections. The Revolutionary United Front Party (RUFP), the political party of the rebel group that had carried out much of the violence and intimidation during the civil war, with the support of Charles Taylor, did not win a single seat in the legislative elections and its presidential candidate did not receive even five percent of the total votes cast. If there was to be a vote for peace in Sierra Leone, according to Lyon's suggestion (Lyons 1999), it should have been for the political party that the rebel movement formed to take part in the elections, not the SLPP.

A vast number of testable assumptions that concern a study of this kind could be identified from the arguments and findings in the literature that have been summarized here. Thus, a useful conclusion to this section is to reiterate some of the most important of these assumptions and findings as identified from the literature on the nexus between ethnicity and political behavior in Africa that potentially applies to an understanding of the outcomes of the post-conflict elections of 2002 in Sierra Leone and 2005 in Liberia. These will be consequently examined in detail in the empirical chapters that follow on each case country. Some of the assumptions and findings identified in the pertinent literature are:

1. African societies are infrastructurally underdeveloped and elites of political parties lack the means of effective dissemination of their campaign messages as obtains in Western democracies creating an atmosphere of low information about

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time. Events following the 1997 elections showed that peace did not exactly follow Charles Taylor's electoral victory as Liberia disintegrated into one of the worst stages of the violence of its civil war.

their platforms and policy initiatives (Basedau et al 2007, Cowen and Laakso 2002, Horowitz 1985, Olukoshi 1998, Salih 2003 and others).

2. To complement the above, most voters are illiterate and lack the means to turn themselves into informed decision makers. In the prevailing atmosphere of low information with little or no access to the media, voters resort to group identity as a useful heuristic in making the voting decision.

3. Africans are inherently communal people and relations are characterized by groupthink, individualism is eschewed. Important decision making such as the voting decision is carried out in the collective (Vail 1989, Young 1994).

4. Politics in Africa is different from politics in Western democracies. Electorates in Western societies are more informed about various political parties, candidates and their stances on policy issues, and thus make sophisticated decisions than the simplistic decision of ethnic voting in Africa.

5. Voters have fixed preferences. Electoral choice will rarely change from one election to the next.

6. As the bases of most political organizations, ethnic groups in Africa are homogenous and group membership is restricted by communal identity; political parties formed thus become forms of 'minimum winning coalitions, large enough to secure benefits in the competition for spoils but also small enough to maximize the per-capita value of these benefits.' Bates (1983).

7. Ethnic groups lack hegemony over one another so various 'ethnic brokers' are necessary in order to facilitate 'hegemonial exchanges' between the state and ethnic groups (Rothschild 1985, Fatton 1988).

8. Elections in Africa represent an ethnic census because various ethnic groups come out in full support of only the political parties, elites and candidates from their ethnic groups (sons and daughters of the soil) who represent their ethnic interests Horowitz (1985).

9. Patron-client relationships in Africa are underpinned by ethnic identity with elites from various ethnic groups acting as patrons on behalf of their communal groups in return for electoral support for the regime. A probable extension of hegemonial exchanges above (Chazan, Lewis Mortimer, Rothchild and Stedman 1999).

10. Violence and confrontations during elections in Africa are extensions of ethnic group rivalry from yet unresolved historical differences (Basedau et al 2007, Berman et al 2004, Rothchild 1985).

For analytical convenience, I divide these assumptions and findings in two broad categories.[30] The first category (consists of one through four) represents a focus by some scholars on attributing what they consider to be the unsophisticated nature of political behavior and mobilization in African societies to the technological backwardness of such societies when compared to advanced societies in the West. Inherent in such explanations is the view that the modernizing effects of technological advancement, increased number of educational facilities leading to higher levels of literacy and other such developments will have a withering effect on communal attachments as electorates become more exposed to competing cues from the campaign messages of political parties and elites other than the ones hailing directly from their communities.

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[30] Both categories are not mutually exclusive as items belonging to both sets can be found in the works of some scholars.

The rest collectively constitute a second category of explanations that have focused on ethnic identity as a profound but intangible influence on political behavior and mobilization in African societies. Inherent in such explanations is the view that as the bases of political competition, ethnic identity is not amenable to the modernizing influences of technological advancements and elections will continue to provide an arena for zero-sum competitions between ethnic groups for the resources of the state.

Theoretical Argument and Hypotheses

What is the role for ethnicity in the political behavior and mobilization of elites and mass electorates in post-conflict Sierra Leone and Liberia? From the preceding survey of the literature, much of the scholarship suggests that ethnicity is the most profound influence on political behavior and the major rallying point around which elites and the mass electorates mobilized going into both elections. But as already pointed out, the *prima facie* evidence suggests that ethnicity could not have been *the most* important influence on voters in Sierra Leone given the pattern of the distribution of the votes among political parties and presidential candidates that took part in the elections.

This gap between the theories and the evidence is a motivating factor in undertaking this study of the political behavior of Sierra Leoneans and Liberians following their respective post-conflict elections. The task is to comparatively evaluate such existing explanations of political behavior using the evidence from the two cases in order to fully understand the lines along which the electorates mobilized to support political parties. I will argue that the gap in evidence stems in part from interrelated theoretical, methodological and conceptual shortcomings in the existing empirical research. Theoretically, the emphases on the intangible influence of ethnic identity on

33

voting behavior in African societies have required that diverse scholars first agree on an acceptable conceptual definition of ethnic identity. In the absence of such a standardized and acceptable concept, the explanations have been copious and ranging but most have lacked precision about the exact elements of ethnic identity. Some have stressed regional co-habitation, others a common language or religion and some all three together. Closely related to this is the methodological challenge of what type of data to use in the analyses of these issues.

Furthermore, following the popular trend to cast African societies as undeveloped and the voters as relatively unsophisticated, scholars have put too much emphasis on intangible cues of social identity, particularly ethnicity, as the most important variable affecting vote choice. I question and test such conclusions in my research for this dissertation and argue that if they ever followed ethnic cues into the polling booth or if they were ever mobilized primarily by elites of political parties from their ethnic groups, then in the instances of their post-conflict elections, voters in Sierra Leone and Liberia paid little attention to such cues because their votes did not reflect an abiding adherence to ethnic loyalties.

Beyond ethnicity, I suggest that a factor that has received less attention in the scholarship but could, potentially, better explain the unexpected patterns of vote diffusion and concentration in the two countries are the other identified issues unrelated to identity cues. For presidential candidates, such issues included the perception of each candidate's capability to unite the country and solidify the peace, and also their perceived ability to bring tangible economic development in the forms of roads, hospitals, schools, jobs and

other issues of human security.[31] For candidates running for legislative seats, it was more so the case of the second set of issues than the first one. Most analyses that focused on casting African societies as undeveloped and voters as unsophisticated (Ottaway 1999) arrived at such conclusions using the standards of technological advancement in television advertisements, radio and newspaper pitches and how campaigns are typically conducted in Western societies for their assessments. This approach reduces the possibility of appreciating the "unconventional" means through which voters have evaluated candidates in African societies and arrived at their voting decisions such as their own versions of "bush radio" which, albeit unconventional, are quite effective in evaluating candidates before voting for them.

To support the arguments, the alternative analytic models I propose and employ in this study take into account ethnicity as well as other non-identity and non-communal variables as potential influences on vote choice and support for political parties. They also differentiate between ethnicity as an "issue" variable and an "identity" variable. I discuss this implication for political behavior in both countries. In the simplest version of the alternative analytic model I suggest, ethnic groups might consider their communal and ethnic interests in their voting decision but seeking to secure such interests is not the major reason why they vote for the candidates for which they vote. Rather, ethnic groups may actually make Sociotropic calculations by prioritizing those issues that are beneficial to the country as a whole rather than their communities alone. Under this model, it is

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[31] I refer to "issues" as a latent variable that could possibly explain political behavior of the African electorate, because scholars have not explored the utility of this variable to explain political behavior in Africa in recent years. In the immediate post-independence period, Humphrey Fisher (1969) suggested that some issue-based voting did take place in Sierra Leone when voters chose political parties based on their preferences for the foreign policy positions that the parties proposed.

easier to see why voters from different ethnic groups will produce a voting outcome representative of a consensus than the splintered voting one would expect given the extant theories in the literature in which communal and identity interests alone are argued to influence the vote choice.

The argument suggests that ethnicity plays a role during political mobilization and the interactions between different groups in the two countries, but this role is at best ambiguous instead of manifest as suggested in much of the existing scholarship. If, as I claim, political behavior and mobilization in post-conflict Liberia and Sierra Leone was not entirely about ethnicity as conventional wisdom would lead us to expect, then analyses of the survey data should establish the relative insignificance of the ethnic identity variable when introduced into the same analytic model with other non-identity and non-communal variables.

To reiterate, the need in this study is to determine the salient variables that affected vote choice and support for the various political parties during the initial post-conflict elections; the corollary need is to identify the most preferable cues employed by elites of political parties in both countries to attract voters to their parties. The goal is to understand why voters in Sierra Leone concentrated around one political party during their initial elections while voters in Liberia diffused their votes among several parties.

Hypotheses

Theories about political outcomes in African societies argue that self-seeking calculations such as considerations for the exclusive interests of the ethnic group, a local community, a religious identity, region or loyalty to local patrons factor heavily in the decision-making of African electorates more than other variables such as loyalty to the

greater political community of the state. Ethnic census theories, for example, argue that elections are like an ethnic census because ethnic identities help voters to distinguish promises that are credible from others that are not (Posner 2005, 1305). The inherent assumption is that *only* elites of specific ethnic communities can convince electorates from their communities to vote for them. Such claims give ground to a number of hypotheses about the nature of the relationships between the explanatory variables I examine in this study and vote choice for political parties as the dependent variable during the respective elections in Sierra Leone and Liberia. I list and describe each hypothesis below before proceeding to examine them in the empirical chapters.

1. Ethnicity and Vote Choice: Following Horowitz (1985), Ottaway (1999), Van de Walle (2003) and other scholars who argue that ethnic groups in Africa tend to vote only for political parties which are led or supported by elites from their ethnic groups and local communities, it is expected that ethnic identity is a major predictor of the political parties or candidates for which electorates in African societies vote, thus I will test the hypothesis that:

Ethnic groups are less likely to vote for political parties that are founded or led by elites from other ethnic groups.

Specifically, given ethnic census theories, we should expect to find that members of different ethnic groups in Sierra Leone and Liberia came out in support of or to vote only for candidates and political parties who purported to represent the interests of the various ethnic groups and local communities to which they belonged or who are explicitly identified with such interests.

2. Regionalism and Vote Choice: Next, following scholarship (for example Posner 2004, 2005, Van de Walle 2003) that argues that voters in African societies seek

to vote for candidates and political parties from the same regions or parts of the country because they believe only these candidates or political parties will secure the interests of their regions by bringing development projects and other benefits to the region, I test the hypothesis that:

Regions or counties will not vote for political parties of presidential candidates that are not from their regions or counties.

Here, the expectation is that voters from various regions will cast their ballots only for candidates or political parties that purported to represent their regional interests or with which they can identify as a party representing the interests of their home region or county.

3. Religion and Vote Choice: Another hypothesis concerns the influence of religion on politics in Africa. Some scholars argue that religious influences have been a factor determining support for various political parties especially with regards to politics in Nigeria and the Sudan. In Nigeria, violent clashes between differing factions in various parts of the country have been often attributed to religious differences between Muslims from the north of the country and Christians from other parts of the country. Based on such arguments, I will test that the hypothesis:

Respondents identifying with a religious identity are less likely to vote for the political party of a presidential candidate that does not share their religious interest.

Here, the expectation is that if theories regarding the influence of religion on politics in African societies have any traction, then we can expect that the evidence provided by the two countries will show that Sierra Leoneans and Liberians voted in their respective post-

conflict elections with the intent to cast their ballots for political parties or candidates who shared their religious beliefs and interests.

4. The "big man"[32] and Vote Choice: Yet another strand of the literature examined earlier argued that political behavior in Africa is influenced by attachments or memberships to various clientele networks of patronage (Young 1994, Chazan et al 1999; for example). Under such systems voters, it is argued, cast their ballots for the big man or big woman from their communities in the belief that only these sons or daughters of the soil could deliver the resources they expect from the state. One consequence of such outcomes it is further argued is inefficiencies in resource-distribution as benefits are distributed to various regions not on the basis of need, but upon the influences of the big person or patron from different localities. Given such arguments, I will test the hypothesis that:

> *Ethnic groups are less likely to vote for the political party of a big*
>
> *person/political elite who is not from their ethnic group or region of the country.*
>
> *The alternative hypothesis here is that ethnic groups are more likely to vote for*
>
> *the political parties of presidential candidates from their ethnic locale.*

The expectation is that if in fact theories about the influence of big men on the politics of African societies have any traction, then the evidence from the two cases will show that Sierra Leoneans and Liberians voted during the post-conflict elections of 2002 and 2005 respectively, with the intent to cast their ballots only for those political parties to which the big men from their communities belonged.

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[32]From here on, I will use the gender-neutral term of "big person" to refer to this variable.

5. Finally, I tested two more hypotheses concerning the expected relationships between the votes for peace and development and the vote choices of Sierra Leoneans and Liberians during their respective post-conflict elections. These last two variables represent a more pragmatic calculation by the voters of Liberia and Sierra Leone, as scholars such as Kandeh (2003) and Lyons (1999) have argued in the case of the peace vote. Here, I tested the hypothesis that:

> *If peace was the paramount concern superseding other concerns on the minds of voters in the two postwar countries, then positive values of the peace vote variable will produce the largest coefficients in models predicting vote choices for political parties.*

Here, it is expected that a positive relationship exists between the peace vote and the vote choice for political parties.

A sixth hypothesis also explored a more pragmatic calculation by voters desiring the rebuilding of their war-torn countries as an overarching concern above the more narrow pursuits of exclusive benefits to the local community. Thus, a testable hypothesis based on this consideration is that if considerations for the rebuilding of the war town countries superseded other concerns on the minds of voters going into the respective elections, then:

> *Positive values of the vote for development and reconstruction will produce relatively greater coefficients in models predicting vote choice for political parties than other explanatory variables employed in the same model.*

Where, the expectation is that Sierra Leoneans and Liberians voted during their respective post-conflict elections with the intent to cast their ballot only for those political parties and presidential candidates that they deemed most capable of maintaining the

40

new-found peace as well as undertaking development projects to rebuild the country

following their civil wars. As evident, the last two variables are at odds with the

preceding four which represent the narrower considerations for exclusive communal

benefits that are popular in most explanations of politics in Africa.

Conceptualization

Up to this point, the discussion floats a number of terms such as ethnicity,

political mobilization, political participation, and political or politicized ethnicity. What

do I mean by these terms and how do I intend to use them within the context of this

study? Précising the meanings of terms and concepts is a problematic subject in political

science, especially in the sub-discipline of comparative politics (Sartori 1970).[33] The

problem is even more pressing in African studies where it is often the case that one needs

to employ concepts that have been framed in other contexts. Such concepts can

sometimes travel well from those external contexts into the African situation without

losing any of their meaning; however, it is sometimes the case that concepts have to be

adjusted and explained in order to more meaningfully extend their use. This tends to load

such concepts with further meanings making painstaking clarification an absolute

necessity in order to be confident about measurement as well as communicating to the

reader exactly what is meant by a particular term. I have selected some of the most

controversial concepts here for clarification; others will be clarified in subsequent

sections of the dissertation.

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[33] For a discussion on the rigors of concept formation in political science, see Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misinformation in Political Science," *American Political Science Review* 64 (1970): 1033-1053.

Ethnicity. Horowitz (1985, 53) defined the concept as "a real or imagined shared ancestry, the centrality of kinship metaphors, a minimum size, and sense of distinctiveness, whether or not this distinctiveness rests on unique cultural attributes." The "real or imagined shared ancestry" component of this definition has become one of the more accepted descriptors of ethnicity in the literature sin Horowitz's seminal analysis.[34]

In one of the most comprehensive treatments of defining ethnicity, Chandra and Wilkerson (2008) advanced the concept as an umbrella term under which scholars included

> identity categories associated with one or more of the following types: religion, sect, language, dialect, tribe, clan, race, physical differences, nationalities and caste. (Chandra and Wilkerson 2008, 519)[35]

Indeed, much of the debate in the literature regarding what exactly consists of an ethnic group has revolved around the terms thrown under this "ethnic umbrella" by Chandra and Wilkerson. In addition to "shared ancestry," some scholars have identified ethnic groups as groups using the distinctive features of language, religion, physical features or even habitation of a distinct geographical boundary (Hutchinson and Smith, 1996). There are particular challenges in applying these terms to the cases of Sierra Leone and Liberia. Distinctions such as religion are not "givens" of an ethnic group in both countries since it is possible to find members of the same ethnic group, indeed even

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[34] Even this descriptor is also violated by cases where two or more groups consider the same community or village as the source of their ancestral lineage. This is the case with some Mandingos and Limbas in Sierra Leone who hail from the chiefdom of Tonko in the Bombali District, the Yalunka and Korankos from the deep north of Sierra Leone or the Mendes and Kissi from the town of Kailahun in Eastern Sierra Leone.

[35] See Kanchan Chandra and Steven Wilkerson, "Measuring the Effect of 'Ethnicity," *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (April/May 2008): 515-563.

members of the same family, that belong to different religions. So, for example, in Sierra Leone there are members of the Creole, Mende, Temne and other ethnic groups who are Muslims and others who are Christians and the same goes for various ethnic groups in Liberia.

Drawing from the scholarship, one of the more useful determinants of ethnic identity consists of the ability of one claiming membership in an ethnic group to trace their ancestral lineages to a specific locality that is considered a common ancestral home with others who identify with that locality. Language is an important factor of this identification with the group but even language is less of a distinguishing factor of ethnicity when one considers that most Sierra Leoneans and Liberians speak several local languages. Young (1993, 5) struck a note of caution that "ethnic identity does not always require a distinct language." He pointed to examples from Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia where, respectively, Hutus and Tutsi speak the same language and Serbs and Croats do likewise, even though both sets of groups are distinctly polarized ethnic groupings. Arguably, more important is the ability to trace lineage to an ancestral locality. Some individuals who claimed to be Temne, Mende or another ethnic group could not speak the language associated with that ethnic group yet self-identified as such because they could trace their lineage to the ancestral home.

Intermarriages between members from different ethnic groups also complicate further the task of conceptualizing ethnic identity in a study of Sierra Leone and Liberia because both countries experience a high rate of intermarriages such that lineage is not an effective determinant of ethnic identity.

Given these issues with using language, religion and lineage as descriptors of ethnic identity, what then makes a useful conceptual descriptor of ethnic identity for this

study? Rather than applying identity labels to subjects during the study, I accept self-reported identifications as the most suitable approach for each individual respondent to the surveys. In any case, the important logic behind the emphasis on ethnic identity in explanations of politics in Africa is its patterning effect on group politics. Thus, it is more important to accept what group an individual self-identifies with in expressing their vote choice than thrusting an identity upon them from externalities drawn from the literature.

Political Mobilization. Following Rosenstone and Hansen (1993, 26), I define political mobilization as "doing something to increase the likelihood of…someone's participation." However, their examples of *indirect* and *direct mobilization* by a candidate, a political party, or some other political activist or group describe efforts in the Western contexts that cannot be directly applied to the African context. Their examples of direct mobilization include efforts by a candidate, a political party, or some other political activist or group to include "door-to-door canvasses…direct mail solicitations, televised appeals… grass-roots letter drives" and indirect mobilization by politically active organizations or individuals when "contact is made through mutual associates, for example when a candidate talks to an employer to contribute to the candidate's campaign or volunteer in other ways." Leighley (2001) also offers useful insight into the nature of political mobilization in the American context, dealing with what factors influence blacks, whites and Latinos, for example to mobilize. Distinguishing between mass and elite mobilization, she argues that race, class and ethnicity provide individual and contextual influences on elite mobilization and mass participation.[36]

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[36] See Jan E. Leighley, *Strength in Numbers? The Political Mobilization of Racial and Ethnic Minorities,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) for an extensive discussion of how participation and mobilization patterns differ among whites, blacks and Latinos in America.

Since some of these activities, such as direct mail solicitations and televised appeals, are unlikely to (as yet) occur in the African context, I refine the definition of political mobilization to include efforts made by heads of political parties and other elites to recruit voters and memberships of political parties through door-to-door canvasses, direct appeals through scheduled speeches, meetings with traditional elders, offering money to voters for votes, and advertisements on radio and in newspapers.[37]

Political Participation. I settle upon Conway's (2000) definition of political participation as "those activities of citizens that attempt to influence the structures of government, the selection of government officials, or the policies of government." In Africa, the mass electorate specifically carries out such activities when they are mobilized to demonstrate, rally, make financial contributions to a political party and most importantly, come out to vote in support of one party or the other.

Political or Politicized Ethnicity. I define political ethnicity, politicized ethnicity or ethnopolitics as the manipulation of an ethnic identity for political purposes and gains. Such purposes range from the mobilization of the membership of an ethnic group in a manner that intimidates the membership of another ethnic group or reorganization of identity structures for administrative convenience, like the Belgians did in Rwanda during colonial rule when they created, virtually, ethnic groups out of Rwanda society to make it easier to administer the territory (Prunier 1995). Gains are benefits of having the ethnic group as a support base for use as bargaining chips during competition with other ethnic

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[37] Sierra Leone and Liberia both have one television station each. The TV stations are government property in each case and in order to avoid the suggestion of bias on the side of the party in government, like the SLPP in the case of Sierra Leone, the TV stations are usually neutral and do not carry any campaign advertisement for any particular candidate or party.

groups. Indigenous elites, following colonial rule, were the main culprits of this form of exploitation of ethnic identity (Ottaway 1999, Joseph 1999, Edie 2003).

Research Design

Data Collection

Undertaking a study of political behavior in two societies that are still recovering from the traumas of war is quite challenging. Several important concerns needed to be addressed regarding the evidence to be collected. For example, how could it be trusted to yield valid measures? Neither one source of data, nor one method of analysis is likely to produce sufficient data to address the research concerns dealing with a sensitive concept such as ethnicity. Therefore, I settled upon multiple methods for both data collection and analysis as important precautions in order to produce the most reliable findings. Thus, the research process employs both qualitative and quantitative methods for data collection and the analysis that follows. The data were gathered through a triangulated method of surveys and focus group interviews, elite interviews, document analysis and a long period of "soaking and poking" from over 20 months in the field.[38] The units of analysis for both

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[38] As a research method, the American political scientist and congressional scholar Richard Fenno who utilized the methodology for his many works on the United States Congress popularized "soaking and poking". Fenno described the method "as just hanging around and observing." He followed members of Congress to their districts observing and recording their daily activities such as meetings with constituents, campaign staff and even friends and family. I employed this methodology during my time in the field and similarly followed a number of political parties on campaign trips to the countryside of Sierra Leone during the campaigns for the 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections in order to get a first hand grasp of how they conducted their campaigns. I was also fortunate to obtain employment as a policy analyst in the Office of the President of Sierra Leone during my time in the field. The appointment gave me access to a

cases were elites of political parties who occupied executive memberships within the political parties during or following the respective elections. The inclusion of individual Liberians and Sierra Leoneans as representative samples of the electorates justified the use of surveys for collecting data nationwide (Johnson and Joslyn 1995, 63-66; Mattes and Gouws 1998).

I developed questionnaires in the summer of 2006 and pretested both of them using small samples of Sierra Leonean and Liberian immigrants living in the Indianapolis, Indiana area in late July before departing for Sierra Leone in the fall of 2006 to commence fieldwork. Some of the questions on the questionnaires were employed by the Afro Barometer Studies to study political behavior in other African countries.[39]

Data collection during the research project progressed in two phases. The first phase consisted of conducting national surveys of randomly sampled respondents among the populations in both countries. The surveys targeted 1,200 randomly sampled respondents drawn from the mass electorates in each country.[40] The surveys generated data about the motivations of the electorate as they participated in the processes leading up to and immediately following the respective post-conflict elections.

I contracted the services of two reputable organizations, the Campaign for Good Governance (CGG) in Sierra Leone and Center for Transparency and Accountability (CENTAL) in Liberia, to undertake the surveys nationwide in each country using their

number of state documents pertinent to my research as well as access to key political figures including President Kabbah, whom I would not have otherwise had easy access to.

[39] See www.afrobarometer.org for samples of the questionnaires employed by the organization.

[40]Copies of the questionnaires employed in each country are available in the appendix.

respective databases of randomly sampled Liberians and Sierra Leoneans.[41] Both

organizations maintain well-established systems for conducting national surveys. Table

B.1 and Table B.2, provided in the Appendix, present descriptive profiles of the samples

from both countries.[42]

During the first phase of the field research, I also collected data on all the political

parties in Sierra Leone and Liberia using interviews with selected party executives and by

examining historical and current records such as party programs and campaign

manifestoes. My travels took me to the offices of 11 of the 16 political parties that

functioned in Sierra Leone around the time of the 2002 elections and 14 of the political

parties that functioned in Liberia during the time of the 2005 elections. In all, I conducted

83 elite interviews in Sierra Leone and 64 elite interviews in Liberia between October

2006 and December 2007. These numbers also include elites who did not occupy

administrative or senior positions within political parties such as heads of civil society

movements, senior civil servants, members of the security forces, journalists, Liberian

and Sierra Leonean scholars and expatriate workers stationed in both countries who had

observed the events surrounding the elections. The data that was gathered from the latter

provided evidence of how elites of political parties mobilized electorates for the

elections, the processes of recruitment for party membership, and also what factors were

most responsible for the electoral outcomes from the perspective of the unaffiliated elites.

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[41]Records of previous works by both organizations could be found on their respective websites. The website for Campaign for Good Governance Sierra Leone can be accessed using the following link: http://www.slcgg.org/home.htm. That for the Center for Accountability and Transparency in Liberia can be accessed through the following link: http://www.liberiantransparency.org/index.htm.

[42] Both tables are available in Appendix A.

Working with questionnaires consisting of close-ended and open-ended questions, I interviewed executives or party elites at the level of the national executive committees. This list included founders, presidents, chairpersons, secretaries-general of the parties and regional or local equivalents of the executive levels of each party. I compared some aspects of the information I gathered from the interviews with the party executives against the information gathered from others within their party and elites who did not hold senior membership positions in any political party for neutrality, validation and consistency.

The interviews with elites of political parties were geared towards generating discussion around the preferable cues that were sent out to the electorates and the historical origins of each political party. I asked party elites the following: their reasons for forming or joining their parties; what their functions were within their parties; the rewards derived from party membership, their views of multiparty competition; post-conflict rebuilding; relations between ethnic groups; their visions of the political futures of their countries; and most importantly their favorite messages or other tools of choice for attracting voters in the period leading up to the elections.

The third data gathering exercise during the first phase of the field research consisted of analysis of secondary documents from the archives of the University of Sierra Leone library and perusal of the personal collections of some influential citizens in both countries. I was not successful in finding a useful library or similar archive of public records in Liberia and had to rely on the personal libraries of some Liberian scholars and elites. During this phase, I also examined the transcripts of political speeches at rallies, party documents, newspapers and radio transcripts of campaign activities by the

candidates and political parties in each country around the time of the elections in question.

The second phase of the research consisted of conducting focus group discussions in the two countries. The group discussion sessions were geared primarily at comparing and testing some of the preliminary findings of the national surveys. In all, I conducted four focus group sessions in different locations across Sierra Leone and four focus group sessions in different locations across Liberia. For each session, I selected a dozen persons—six females and six males. The groups varied in age, income and level of education in the selected areas in each country. All group discussions were held following a preliminary analysis of the data and were directed towards discussions and examination of the patterns of voting behavior that were captured by the survey data. The results of these sessions are reported in Chapter V.

Operationalization and Measurement

The Dependent Variables

The dependent variables for this study are *vote choice* and *support for the political parties in the two countries*. Vote choice is conceptualized as a vote for one of the eleven political parties that took part in the first post-conflict elections in Sierra Leone, and in the case of Liberia, for the twenty-two political parties that took part in the post-conflict elections of 2005. *Support for political parties* is much more varied, ranging from supporting a political party to the emotional and psychological attachment for a political party without doing anything such as making financial donations or engaging in a street demonstration in support of the party. Respondents were asked if they had

engaged in any of these activities in support of the cause of a party after they have confirmed that they support one political party or the other.[43]

Support for political parties included all of the admitted psychological affections and physical demonstrations of support for one political party or another even if the individual did not vote in the elections in question. The assumption here is that vote choice itself is a show of support for a party but one can support a political party without being able to vote for it because of unforeseen encumbrances.

The Independent Variables

The independent variables represent the potential influences of ethnicity, region, religion, big person, the peace vote and the vote for development. Each independent variable is described below. Some of the variables, such as ethnicity and ethnic interest, region and regional interest and others were measured both as variables describing identity and also as variables capturing the reason why a respondent voted for the political party for which they voted.

Ethnicity and Ethnic Interest. This study benefits from the fact that it did not impose an ethnic identity on respondents. Rather, respondents self-reported their ethnic identity during interviews. The ethnicity variable was measured on a nominal scale reflective of all ethnic groups in both countries whereas the variable for ethnic interest was measured as a response to the statement "you voted for this particular party because…they are the party representing the interests of my ethnic group."

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[43] See appendix for questions capturing these variables.

The important distinction between the two is that one captures intent whereas the other one is mostly descriptive. As an identity variable, ethnicity is mostly descriptive. It points to a structural variable that identifies how members of the electorate voted for a particular political party from a given area given geographical cohabitation of the members of that ethnic group within a specified area. As an issue variable, ethnic interest captures intent and represents the choice voters made in voting for a particular political party because they believed that only coethnics within that party could fulfill electoral promises to bring benefits to their locality. The latter captured those who made a conscious decision intending their vote to pursue a benefit that was restricted to the interests of their ethnic group whereas the former is more descriptive.

Religion and Religious Interest. The research incorporated religious influence on vote choice and support for the political parties in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The variable for religious interest was measured as a response to the statement "you voted for this particular party because...they are the party representing the interests of my religion."

Region and Regional Interest. It is particularly important to understand how district or county of residence affected vote choice and support for political parties because there is a high correlation between administrative districts, counties and the settlement patterns of ethnic groups in both countries. In Sierra Leone, the two largest groups, the Mende and Temne, who constitute slightly over 30 percent each of the population, dominate demarcated geographical regions of the country. Members of all ethnic groups are found in the capital, Freetown where the Creoles form a slight majority. Similar geographic and demographic demarcations characterize the spread of ethnic groups in Liberia where some counties are almost exclusively populated by one ethnic group or another. This county-ethnic group correlation is especially high in Liberia. This

52

variable was measured on a scale indicative of all administrative regions in both countries. The variable for regional interest was measured as a response to the statement "you voted for this particular party because...they are the party representing the interests of my region."

The Big Person. This variable captured the influences of elites from local communities on vote choice. It was measured as a response to why respondents chose to vote or not vote for particular parties associated with elites from their local communities.

The Issue of Peace. This variable captured evidence of a more pragmatic decision-making by the electorates such as their perception of the candidate or the party's capacity to reinforce the peace and unite the country following the conclusion of the civil wars. Respondents were asked during the surveys the reason why they voted for the political party for which they voted and the response options included the two issues of peace and development.

The Vote for Reconstruction and Development. This variable captured the perception of the candidate's capacity to economically manage the country in order to bring about tangible developments such as new roads and hospitals following conflict. It was measured as a response to the statement "you voted for this particular party because...they are the party that are most likely to develop the country by building roads, clinics and bringing electricity to the whole country."

In the case of the peace vote, the variable was measured as a response to the statement "you voted for this particular party because...they are the party that will best unite the country and bring peace."

Data Analysis – Methods

After gathering data, the next goal was to use appropriate methodology that has been applied to the understanding of voting behavior in advanced democracies such as the United States to explore the voting behavior in the two post-conflict countries. The reality is, in spite of the desire of scholarship to understand emergent patterns of political behavior in budding democracies such as Sierra Leone and Liberia, and in spite of advances in social science methodology for such undertakings, we still know little about this particular characteristic of research interest in African societies. Until the relatively recent studies of voting behavior undertaken by the Afro Barometer Studies at Michigan State University, much scholarship on voting behavior in Africa had been conjectural and speculative, underpinned by personal opinions gathered from sources such as exaggerated media reports of ethnic conflicts.[44]

Where effort was made to undertake such an effort that approached scientific rigor, as pointed out earlier, the evidence assessed was gathered from an aggregation of data from various polling returns, which masked individual preferences and the nuances in patterns of political behavior and mobilization between and among diverse communities (Mattes and Gouws 1998).

I employed both qualitative and quantitative methods for analyses of the data. Using the quantitative method allowed me the advantage of working with a large-N sample of respondents to statistically explore multiple relationships between the variables in my survey data. It also aided my quest to evaluate the existing theoretical explanations

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[44] For this criticism see Kenneth Ingham, *Politics in Africa: the Uneven Tribal Dimension* (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), 1.

using only two cases. The qualitative method, on the other hand, allowed me the opportunity to examine the contextual differences that helped to explain the strategies employed by political elites in seeking to mobilize the electorates in the two countries. The smaller sample of elites of political parties and non-political party elites that I interviewed precluded the use of the quantitative method employed in my analysis of the survey data. Settling on the use of both kinds of methods complemented my analytic efforts and has resulted in a more comprehensive picture of political behavior than is typically available from studies of political behavior in African societies.

To analyze the survey data, I coded and entered the responses to all the questions on the questionnaires administered in both countries into the statistical programs STATA 9.0 and SPSS 16.0. I created two separate data sets, one for the Liberia case and another one for the Sierra Leone case.[45] I then used Chi-square tests of association as the initial tests of the hypothesized relationships between the dependent and independent variables described earlier. To facilitate the analysis, I recoded several variables including the responses to the independent variables measuring agreement or disagreement with the reasons why a respondent would vote for a particular political party.

There was hardly any variation in the original response options especially with regard to the votes for peace as voters appeared to have, at least verbally, prioritized peace in the two societies above all other issues. I collapsed the response options into two categories of "strongly agree," and "not strongly agree" and ran a model to test for differences across categories of the peace variable. The tests revealed that respondents who "strongly agreed" with the statement were different from all the other categories of

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[45] The datasets are available on request; please send all requests to fjbatty@yahoo.com

respondents in relation to the dependent variable of vote choice whereas those who "agreed" were no different from those who fell into the opposite categories of "disagree" and "strongly disagree" in relation to the dependent variable. Thus, the recode into the two categories helped to maximize variability in preparation for additional tests without negatively impacting the explanatory direction and intent of the original coding scheme.

The wording process may seem counterintuitive, but the logic is not. As an example, consider the variable for reconstruction and development. For this item, 82 percent indicated strong agreement, 15 percent agreed, one percent disagreed and about another one percent strongly disagreed. Empirically, the first category is distinct from the last three. Conceptually, those who do not answer "strongly agree" are willing to put some other value ahead of reconstruction and development.[46]

Following tests of association, I developed several explanatory models of vote choice in each country and employed hierarchical logistic regression methods to test the effects and the likelihood of voting for a political party if the respondent agreed or a disagreed with the reasons that were suggested to them for why they would vote for one political party or another. I settled upon using logistic regression with logged odds for this portion of my analysis because of the nonlinear categories that captured the response options of the respondents following the recode. The dependent variable for vote choice was recoded into a binary option such that a respondent either voted for a particular

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[46] In the American politics literature, similar results occur with a commonly used survey item on an equal role for women in society. An overwhelming majority of respondents strongly support women's equality. Among those who do not, there is little difference between those with a weak commitment to equality and those who are clearly opposed.

political party or did not vote for that political party. Additional models included controls for each variable and these are explained further in the empirical chapters to follow.

Several caveats are in order. For analytical convenience, I included only the votes for the two major political parties in Sierra Leone, the SLPP and the APC, as dependent variables in the models. These are the two most antagonistic forces in Sierra Leonean politics and no other political party has been able break their stranglehold on political power or to exercise the kind of influence that these two parties have had since independence. Following the initial test of the models, I next used CLARIFY to identify within-group differences in the voting behavior of members of the two largest ethnic groups in Sierra Leone, the Mendes and the Temnes. Together these ethnic groups comprise over 60 percent of the population and most observers have identified them as the two most antagonistic forces in Sierra Leone. While the rest of the ethnic groups combined total roughly 38 percent of the population, they have never attempted to articulate a collective voting interest and most have voted along similar lines as Mendes or Temnes over the years.

Another caveat that is in order is my focus on administrative counties in Liberia but regionalism in Sierra Leone. The rationale is that there is no identifiable regional consciousness in Liberia as is the case in Sierra Leone where northerners, it has been argued, are distinctly opposed to regional interests expressed by south-easterners. Rather, the politics akin to the regional politics in Sierra Leone transpires at the county level in Liberia with several identifiable competitive episodes between members hailing from different counties. For example, according to folklore in Liberia, the Gios and the Manos of Nimba County are traditional enemies of the Krahn in neighboring Grand Gedeh County and the antagonism between the two counties came to a head when former

Liberian President Samuel Doe had one of his associates and former close friends

Thomas Quiwonkpa, a descendant from Nimba County, executed for an attempted coup

attempt. When Charles Taylor started his rebellion in 1989 against the Doe regime, Gios

and Manos from Nimba County were at the forefront of this rebellion, probably in

retaliation for Quiwonkpa's death, the folklores point out (Berkeley 2001).

I employed qualitative methods for analysis of the rest of the data I collected

during my research. I content-analyzed the party programs and materials, campaign

manifestoes and other documents obtained from political parties for references that

potentially tie a political party to (an) expression(s) of securing an ethnic or communal

interest as the extant scholarship claims. In the same vein, I analyzed the contents of the

interviews with elites of political parties and other non-political party elites for references

that a particular political party had sought, in its campaign messages or other efforts, to

mobilize the membership of an ethnic group or groups using cues of a distinctly exclusive

nature –such as the "us" versus "them" terms that were said to be behind the messages

that drove Hutus to committing genocide against Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994 (Straus 2004).

As well, the transcripts of the interviews with political party elites were analyzed in order

to trace the historical development of the political party and whether this had any

identifiable links with motivating a particular ethnic voting bloc into politics. In a similar

vein, the transcripts were analyzed in order to identify the most preferable cues employed

by political parties for mobilizing the mass electorates into politics.

Finally, I analyzed the contents of some local newspapers in each country (five in

Sierra Leone and three in Liberia) for references to historical events describing situations

where communities, ethnic groups, or elites of political parties have attempted to

mobilize or mobilized others in the past to take action intended to benefit such narrow interests only.

The Limitations of this Study

This is a cross-sectional study that offers a snapshot into a period in the political histories of two countries that were characterized by extraordinary events. It is possible that the actions and behavior of Liberians and Sierra Leoneans during the periods in question were conditioned by the tense post-war environment and not likely to be replicated. Like other cross-sectional studies, this limits the explanatory or predictive power of the findings especially in terms of establishing bases of comparison with political behavior in more stable societies from which the study draws its overall theoretical and conceptual frameworks.

Given the preceding, it is also important to point out the limitations on the generalizibility of this study. While some lessons we learn about political behavior in the two multiethnic, post-conflict societies may be invaluable for understanding democratization elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, the unique circumstances of the two cases places limits on the generalizibility of the findings for other societies. Even though most civil conflicts are characterized by a singular destructive will by all parties to such conflicts, the background conditions may be inimitable. Thus what lessons we may learn from political behavior in Liberia and Sierra Leone may not be applicable to all other societies in or emerging from conflict given such unique conditions.

There is also the problem of human memory. First, the surveys were administered in both countries some years after the elections, in the case of Sierra Leone four years following its post-conflict elections in 2002, and in the case of Liberia two years

following its post-conflict elections in 2005; this caused important constraints on the study. It may well have been the case that some respondents had forgotten what issues factored most in their decision to cast their vote for one party or candidate or the other or even for whom they cast their ballots. The study attempted to control for this potential problem through several means. First, some questions on the questionnaire were repeated with slight modifications in order to gauge if a respondent varied their answers to the question. The interviewers were instructed to check for these "response traps" as they conducted the interviews. During the coding phase, questionnaires were disqualified if they contained contradictory responses to these special questions. Also, during the training sessions before commencing the national surveys, the interviewers were trained and instructed to take all diligent care to ensure that respondents who claimed to competently recall the events surrounding the respective post-conflict elections were prioritized when targeting the samples.

However, in order not to cause a selection bias by including in the sample only those who may have uncharacteristic memory of the events due to, perhaps, a role in the proceedings that were atypical of the rest of the population, interviewers were instructed to try to establish the potential respondent's standing with respect to these considerations and those who were judged to be such were not interviewed.

Interestingly, perhaps given the sensitivity of events surrounding those elections, most among the populations still recalled with a great amount of detail the events as they unfolded. In both countries, there was some kind of perception that one was not a responsible citizen if they forgot the details of the events as they had transpired a few years earlier. This aided my research greatly, especially in my informal conversations

with people, as it enabled me to gather information with greater ease than would have been the case if people claimed that they had forgotten the details of what transpired.

Despite its limitations, the study is useful for several purposes. In one sense it establishes a comparative historical basis, from a path-dependent perspective, against which future trajectories in Liberian and Sierra Leonean politics could be measured. Secondly, the primary goal of the study is to explain political behavior, for which it is entirely appropriate. Understanding what happened around the post-conflict elections in both countries, and more importantly why, is equally important from a comparative sense with similar situations that could possibly emerge in post-conflict countries elsewhere. In one way, this already happened with the two cases. The peace agreement in Liberia and other developments leading to the elections of 2005 drew heavily from the blueprint established by institutional designers and conflict mediators from experience with Sierra Leone. As a matter of fact, some United Nations staff and troops stationed in Sierra Leone were moved across the border to assist with the task of replicating the successful peace program in Liberia.

Organization of the Dissertation

The introduction to this dissertation has developed the foundation that orients the rest of the analysis to follow in this study. Chapter II will present a historical overview of political competition in Sierra Leone and Liberia; the purpose of this chapter is to trace political competition that preceded the civil wars to the present in order to establish a background and throw light on the post-conflict political behavior that was the focus of the study. Further, the chapter helps to determine if the emergent patterns following the

two elections were really anomalies in political behavior and mobilization or largely continuous of the way both societies had mobilized in the past prior to the civil conflicts.

Chapter III reports the results of the analysis of the data from the mass survey in Sierra Leone and reports the results of the elite interviews. The focus is on unraveling the puzzle that was a prime motivator for the study - in an eleven-political party race, why did more than 70 percent of the electorate cast their votes for the SLPP, which is believed to be the party of "the Mendes" who constitute only 30 percent of the population? Since the majority of the electorate did not appear to cast their ballots along ethnic lines, in this chapter I concentrate on identifying the most salient determinants of vote choice and support for the various political parties that took part in the elections in Sierra Leone.

Chapter IV analyzes the data on Liberia and reports the results of the elite interviews. Here, the foci are also to demonstrate the most salient variables that explain the diffusion of votes and to identify factors that explain the vote shift from Weah, who was the front-runner in the first round of elections to Johnson-Sirleaf who emerged as the winner of the run-off elections. The strategic shifts in alliances and support for both candidates going into the run-off elections suggests that there are some ethnic groups that saw the need to cooperate and agree on one candidate, which, again raises questions about the ethnic thesis regarding political behavior and mobilization and demands analysis to explain the most important determinants of vote choice in that second round of elections.

Chapter V reports the results of the focus group discussions that were conducted in both countries and also establishes the first direct comparison of the two cases. The goal is to compare the aggregated results of the focus group sessions to the individual results obtained from each country. This strengthens the comparative foundation of the

study and provides what additional evidence there are in support of the main theoretical arguments.

The concluding chapter discusses the implications of my findings, describes the emergent pattern of political behavior and mobilization in the two countries, speculates on the sustainability of the peace in both countries and again spells out the limitations of the study offering suggestions for incremental analysis in the future.

CHAPTER II

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO POLITICS IN SIERRA LEONE
AND LIBERIA

Introduction

This section provides a historical background to politics in Liberia and Sierra

Leone with two goals in mind. First, the discussion serves to trace the major events in the

evolution of political competition in the two countries. Second, the discussion highlights

historical events and major decisions taken by political leaders in the past that provide

useful insight to help understand and explain the emergent patterns of political

mobilization and political behavior in both countries following the conclusion of their

civil wars.

Liberia is sub-Saharan Africa's first republic and its political history as an

independent state, which commenced with the election of Joseph Jenkins Roberts as its

first president in 1848, far outdates that of its neighbor, Sierra Leone, to the southeast.

Both countries share the similar historical fact that they were founded as settlements for

freed slaves in West Africa during the 19th century. But quite early, we can point out a

major contrast in the history of the two countries. Prior to the military coup of 1980, the

politics of Liberia were characterized by a major concentration and monopolization of

power by the coastal elite from the Americo-Liberian population. Through a series of

elite-sanctioned discriminatory practices, indigenous ethnic groups were excluded,

virtually, from participating in important political decision-making (Liebenow 1987;

Clapham 1976; Berkeley 2001). During the military coup of 1980, indigenous non-commissioned soldiers succeeded in seizing power from the elite Americo-Liberians after assassinating President Tolbert and replacing his administration with a military junta of young officers.[47] The situation was reversed with the indigenous population, from thereon, exercising a monopoly of political power.

On the other hand, since independence from Britain in 1961, Sierra Leonean politics was not characterized by elite-sanctioned exclusion of the deliberate kind seen in Liberia where identifiable portions of its citizenry were kept out of political decision-making. This and other similarities and contrasts in the political histories of the two countries will be documented at the end of this chapter. Liberia is discussed first since its political development as an independent state predates that of Sierra Leone.

Liberia

Liberia is located on the West Coast of Africa, bordering the North Atlantic Ocean, nestled between the Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone and taking up a land area slightly larger than Tennessee (CIA World Factbook 2006).[48] The country occupies a unique status in sub-Saharan Africa because it was the only state that did not experience colonialism and because of this, did not have to endure a protracted struggle for liberation, like most states in Africa, before achieving independence. In fact, until the

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[47] To make a cautionary note; president William V.S. Tubman, began to liberalize the political system beginning around 1944 through the Open Door Policy and the Unification Policy which broke down some of the barriers for the participation of indigenous people in Liberian politics and the attempted "unification" of the coastal and hinterlands of the country.

[48] CIA World Factbook 2006 www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html. Accessed on 03/14/2006 at 9pm.

civil war broke out in December 1989, Liberia was widely acknowledged as a bastion of relative peace, progress and prosperity in an otherwise troubled part of the world (Clapham 1976; Dunn and Tarr 1988; Pham 2004; Liebenow 1987).

The history of Liberia as a state in that area off the coast of West Africa began with the arrival in 1821 of the first boatload of American Negro settlers followed by the establishment of what would become the first permanent settlement on Cape Mesurado. The initial settlement was named after the American President James Monroe (Fraenkel 1964). Various accounts explain the motivation behind the arrival of the new settlers from North America with most of these accounts centering on the explanation that the founding of what later became Liberia owed its origin to the American Colonization Society that was founded in 1816 with the intention of "solving the awkward social problems involved in the presence of numbers of free Negroes among the slave-owning communities of the Southern States of the U.S.A. by sponsoring a scheme of emigration to Africa." (Fage 1969, 120).

Following the Emancipation Proclamation by President Abraham Lincoln in 1863 that set free all black people in slavery in the slave-owning states of America, a large number of ex-slaves were found roaming the streets of southern cities with nothing to do leading to friction and frequent altercations with the white population. The American Colonization Society stepped-in with the proposal to repatriate the newly-freed slaves to Africa with the dual purpose of solving the problem of what to about the newly-freed slaves at home in America, and providing an instrument for promoting

> Protestant Christianity and Western civilization, not only spreading the Gospel to the "dark continent" but also implementing some of the fuzzy nineteenth-century ideas regarding pacificism, alcoholic prohibition and other novel experiments in morality and social relationships. (Liebenow 1987, 13)

From their arrival in the colony in 1821, the American Colonization Society, through its appointed agents, ran the affairs of the new territory until 1847 when Liberians proclaimed their new country a republic and elected its first president, Joseph Jenkins Roberts. The focus of this background to the political history of Liberia covers three historical periods: the "First Republic," which ran from the election of Roberts, in 1848, through the first part of the rule of Samuel K. Doe –from 1980-1986 after he seized power in a military coup; the "Second Republic," which covers the second period of Doe's rule after winning the heavily rigged elections of 1986 and transforming himself into a civilian president; and what is currently a "Third Republic" commencing with the inauguration of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf as the first post-civil war president in January 2006.[49]

Political Competition in Liberia During the First Republic (1848-1980)

The significant characteristic of political competition during the First Republic in Liberia was the exclusionary nature of political decision-making carried out at the detriment of the local indigenous population. Through the True Whig Party that was founded in 1878, the settler population of Americo-Liberians rallied behind a single-party state and systematically organized to deny voting rights to the larger indigenous populations.[50] Furthermore, The True Whig Party endorsed forced labor upon the local population and often cooperated with Masonic orders to throw a veil of secrecy and

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[49] In 1997, Charles Taylor, the leader of the former rebel group the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) won elections and was in office until his removal from power in 2003 under heavy pressure from the United States. This period can be argued as a "third republic" in the history of Liberia but the civil war in the country and threats to its sovereignty and cohesion continued throughout the administration of Taylor, making the claim of a "republic" a tenuous one.

repression over the state (Clapham 1978). It is important to point this out because this development had an enduring impact on the political developments of Liberia and consequently contributed to the civil war that occurred about a century later.

So, from 1848 to 1980, the descendants of Americo-Liberians alternated the transfer of political power within their group largely keeping the indigenous population out. The limited political competition was restricted within the membership of the True Whig Party and the settler community. Christopher Clapham explained the exclusionary nature of Liberian politics during the First Republic thus

> all the usual mechanisms for advancements within a well-institutionalized, political community –reasonable diligence, a decent respect for social norms prudent attachment to leading men already well-placed in the system –apply also in Liberia. So, President Tubman's son Shad Tubman Jr. becomes senator of Maryland County. President Tolbert's brother Stephen becomes Minister of Finance. Stephen Tolbert's legal adviser Cecil Dennis becomes Minister of Foreign Affairs. Cecil Dennis' cousin William Dennis becomes Minister of Commerce. When Stephen Tolbert is killed in an air crash, his place is taken by Deputy Minister of Finance Edwin Williams, son of the Defence Minister, Allen Williams. It is quite an intimate affair. (Dunn 1978, 120-121)

The picture, painted above by Christopher Clapham, of the exclusionary nature of politics in Liberia during the years of the First Republic can be buttressed by looking at the list of executive presidents of Liberia during the same time.

From its inception as a Republic in 1847 until 1980, Liberia had twenty presidents and all of them were descendants of the Americo-Liberian settlers. The only alternation of power was within the same group. For example, Joseph J. Roberts, the first president was voted out of office in 1856 but made a comeback in1872. James S. Payne, another

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[50] The True Whig Party was Liberia's only legal political party for over 100 years. It's dominance over national affairs weakened, somewhat, during the Tolbert administration as gradual economic decline encouraged various dissident groups to challenge the monopoly of the party. This gradual decline culminated in the military coup of 1980 that resulted in the banning of the party.

president also lost office and regained it on two separate occasions during the same period. Strikingly, William V.S. Tubman became president in 1944 and ruled Liberia for twenty-seven years until his death in 1971 (Liebenow 1987; Lyon 1999).

The fact of political exclusion of the indigenous population of Liberia by the settler elites during the First Republic is even more remarkable against the background that since its inception as a state, the population of Americo-Liberians in Liberia had never exceeded five percent of the total population. Thus, the incredible feat of holding on to power that Americo-Liberians achieved during the years of the First Republic could only have been pulled-off by the most exclusionary of measures that kept the greater percentage of the indigenous population from supplying at least one president. In the absence of universal participation, the ability of the Americo-Liberian population to monopolize power was left largely unchecked.

But the caveat should be made here that during the First Republic, presidents William V.S. Tubman and his successor, William Tolbert, tried to liberalize the political system and grant some level of access to the indigenous population even if only on a token basis. Beginning around 1944, President William V.S. Tubman made several commitments, under a Unification Policy, towards opening up the political system to allow the inclusion of indigenous peoples into the political system. This offered the opportunity to selected "hinterlanders" to participate in "politics on terms approaching – though not entirely equaling –those available to the immigrant core." (Clapham 1976, 12)

In further pursuit of his Unification Policy, which he saw as a way to broaden the political base of his regime, Tubman held Executive Councils for the redress of grievances throughout the hinterland, thus for the first time acting like "a president of all Liberia" rather than just a leader of the coastal communities (Clapham 1976). More

69

barriers to inclusion of indigenous into the political system were taken in 1963-64 when the provincial system of hinterland administration was abolished and replaced by four new Counties with administrative structures similar to those of the five long-established Counties on the coast. The changes were a little more than mere symbolism because they afforded the hinterlanders representation in the Liberian legislature even though they were outnumbered there by the representation from the comparatively much smaller coastal regions. Furthermore, the changes resulted in the increase of jobs available for the hinterlanders in their home areas (Clapham 1976).

Notwithstanding the liberalization program undertaken by Tubman during his administration, the opportunities that became available to indigenous Liberians under his Unification Policy, and for that matter to all Liberians, did not include or tolerate political opposition to the True Whig Party and entrenched system of political patronage that emanated from him. Christopher Clapham notes that in 1951 a Kru, Didwo Twe, challenged Tubman's re-election bid but was intimidated into exile to keep him from taking part in the polls. Other splinter groups that attempted to break away from the True Whig Party hegemony where outlawed and their activities were deemed treasonable and suppressed. Until his death in 1971, this was the political situation in Liberia under Tubman. He opened up the political system by faintly cracking the door open and leaving it tight enough to discourage or do away with any challenges to his and the authority of the True Whig Party.

Tubman's successor, William Tolbert, assumed office in 1972 and continued with the implementation of some of the policies of his predecessor. Disdainful of pomp and ceremony, unlike earlier presidents of Liberia before him, Tolbert continued Tubman's unification policy and invited many indigenous Liberians to join him in his

administration. He allowed for more liberalization of the political system including giving more rights for freedom of speech and political expression. The latter could have, ironically, hurt his chances of ruling Liberia beyond 1980. For during that year, he was overthrown by soldiers who were partly motivated by rice riots and demonstrations that had occurred a year before during which people took the streets to denounce his administration's handling of the shortage of rice supplies in stores on the local markets. The First Republic of Liberia came to a sad end with the assassination of William Tolbert in 1980. Throughout the First Republic, the remarkable feature of political competition in Liberia was the exclusionary nature of politics that kept the natives out of power and resulted into the restriction, and alternations, of power within the settler population and the True Whig Party they had founded.

The Second Republic of Liberia – 1986-1990

On the night of April 12, 1980, Samuel K. Doe stormed the executive mansion of the president of Liberia with other junior officers and assassinated President William Tolbert. In the days following their storming of the executive mansion, the coup plotters, comprised of young, uneducated and, most importantly, indigenous junior officers of the Liberian military brutally executed all former senior members of the Tolbert administration, including cabinet ministers. Most of the executions were carried out in public in broad daylight on the beaches of Monrovia. The young officers formed the People's Redemption Council with Doe as their chairman, which effectively made him the head of state.

Doe was from the minority Krahn ethnic group from Grand Gedeh County. Slightly over a year after assuming office, he started turning on his co-conspirators,

whom he increasingly distrusted in moves that many people saw as efforts to consolidate his hold on power. In August 1981 Doe arrested his former friend Thomas Weh Syen and four other members of the ruling military junta, the PRC, on accusations of plotting to overthrow his regime and assassinate him. Four days later, all five former members of the council were executed. In the years following the first putsch of his regime, Doe proceeded to systematically eliminate other members of his group that stormed the executive mansion with him on that night of April 12, 1980 (Berkeley 2001; Liebenow 1987).

During the early years of his administration Doe developed ties with the United States that were closer, and more financially rewarding to his rule, than any head of state of Liberia that preceded him. He developed a special affinity with President Ronald Reagan and was a fervent supporter of United States foreign policy during the Cold War. In 1984, Doe supported a referendum that changed the constitution of Liberia paving the way for him to run in presidential elections that were scheduled for October 1985. He won the elections amidst widespread allegations of vote rigging and intimidation of other presidential candidates emerging with fifty-one percent of the votes cast at the head of his political party and effectively civilianizing his military regime.

Thus began the Second Republic in the political history of Liberia. From 1986 to 1990, Doe consolidated his rule around his ethnic group the Krahn (Berkeley 2001). Through measures that were very similar to what the True Whig hegemony had used to consolidate their hold on power several decades earlier, Doe appointed members of his Krahn ethnic group to key positions around the country and continued to eliminate members of other ethnic groups that were in senior positions of government. In November 1985, he fell out with the widely popular Thomas Quiwonkpa, one of the last

remaining original co-conspirators of the 1980 coup. Quiwonkpa was executed in fighting around Monrovia and his disfigured body was displayed in public. Most analysts point to Quiwonkpa's death as a key incident that precipitated the country's slide into civil war four years later because members of Quiwonkpa's ethnic group perceived his death as a personal blow to their ethnic interests in the government.

In 1989 Charles Taylor, a former civil servant during the Doe government, who had been accused of embezzling public funds and had escaped to the United States to avoid trial, where he also sprang a Massachusetts jail while in federal detention, led an invasion into Liberia aimed at toppling the administration of Samuel Doe. Exploiting the death of Thomas Quiwonkpa as a persecution of his ethnic group by Doe, Taylor managed to draw a lot of followers to his rebellion and thus gained enough recruits to start a full-scale civil war. This was the beginning of the end of the Doe regime and the end of the Second Republic of Liberia.

Less than a year into Taylor's rebellion, his National Patriotic Front of Liberia had succeeded in capturing over eighty percent of the territory of Liberia including some portions of the capital, Monrovia. Doe was virtually isolated in the executive mansion in Monrovia together with the last remaining, mostly Krahn, members of the Armed Forces of Liberia that were still loyal to him. On September 9, 1990, Doe was tricked out of the executive mansion, captured and killed by Prince Johnson who had earlier broken away from Charles Taylor's NPFL and formed his own Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL). Thus, the Second Republic came to an end and the civil war escalated and gained international attention for the brutality and factional dimension to the conflict.

The Second Republic was characterized by the brutality of the Doe administration with frequent summary executions of real or imagined enemies. Furthermore, just like the

settler population and the True Whig Party had done before him, Doe consolidated his hold on power by concentrating authority within his Krahn ethnic group while isolating members of other ethnic groups from key positions in his government.

The Third Republic of Liberia – 2005

After Doe was captured, at the headquarters of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) regional intervention force that had been hastily assembled to intervene in the conflict, and subsequently killed, the regional body strengthened its efforts to find peace for Liberia. The intervention force was strengthened with support from the international community outside Africa and regional negotiators put pressure on the different factions to the fighting that had emerged in the civil war to agree on a cease-fire agreement and to form a government of national unity. That goal was achieved in late 1990 when the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) was formed with a renowned Liberian intellectual, Amos Sawyer, as president. The largely ineffectual Sawyer-led Interim Government of National Unity of Liberia lasted for about four years until March 7, 1994. The IGNU period witnessed increased tensions in the civil war in Liberia and the administration is largely remembered today for its ineffectiveness. Lacking any enforcement mechanism and largely crippled by an absence of operational funds, the government could not carry out the most basic functions expected of a central government. It could not penetrate territories under rebel control and its authority was virtually limited to those small portions of Monrovia under the control of the ECOWAS forces.

Amos Sawyer's presidency of Liberia came to an end on March 7, 1994 and was replaced by a looser governing arrangement headed by David D. Kpormakpor, as the

chairman of a Council of State that had been agreed upon by all the major factions to the fighting in Liberia. Wilton G.S. Sankawulo succeeded Kpormakpor as chairman of the Council of State in September 1995 and one year later, in September 1996, he turned over power to Ruth Perry. Ruth Perry, as chairwoman of the Council of State, oversaw the general elections of 1997 that had been negotiated by the international community in order to bring peace to Liberia. Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Party of Liberia won the general elections of 1997.

Unfortunately, the civil war did not end with Charles Taylor's election as head of state in 1997. If anything, it led to an escalation in factional fighting and just a few short months after he assumed office, Liberia was embroiled in renewed fighting with a viciousness that was unparalleled. The other factional leaders of the conflict accused Charles Taylor of murder and intimidation and the international community frequently censored him for his alleged role in the civil war that was raging in neighboring Sierra Leone. Fighting in Liberia escalated and the capital, Monrovia, came under furious attack in the summer of 2003 with the all other factions to the civil war united under one goal to force Charles Taylor to resign his office. Finally, under pressure from the United States, Charles Taylor resigned his position as head of state of Liberia in August 2003 and went into exile in Nigeria. His vice president Moses Blah succeeded Charles Taylor for a period of about two months before a United Nations appointed transitional government was sworn in headed by Gyude Bryant.

The transitional government headed by Bryant oversaw the general elections of 2005 in which twenty candidates ran for president and eleven political parties participated. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf emerged victorious, 59.4 percent of the total votes cast, after the conclusion of run-off elections with her closest challenger, George Weah.

She was sworn in as the first female president of Liberia, and a first as a democratically elected female president of Africa, giving birth to the Third Republic of Liberia. The international community certified the 2005 elections as free and fair and Johnson-Sirleaf was inaugurated in January 2006 to head the Third Republic of Liberia.

Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone lies to the Southeast of Liberia bordering the North Atlantic Ocean with a land area slightly smaller than the state of South Carolina (CIA World Factbook 2005). Like Liberia, it was founded as a settlement for freed slaves with one important difference being that the freed slaves that were resettled in Sierra Leone came from England instead of America. Slavery was abolished in England in 1772 by Lord Mansfield's judgment leaving about 15,000 former slaves with nowhere to go and aimlessly roaming the streets of London (Fage 1969).[51] Faced with problems that were similar to what Southern society in America will face almost a century later after the Emancipation Proclamation, a group of anti-slavery activists led by the abolitionist Granville Sharp proposed the resettlement of the newly freed slaves in Africa and agreed upon the coastal area of present-day Sierra Leone as a suitable choice. The first group of freed slaves was shipped from England to Sierra Leone in 1787 under ill-advised circumstances to a small piece of land along the coast bought from a local king called King Tom (Fage 1969). The freed slaves arrived in their new settlement during the harsh

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[51] Lord Mansfield's judgment established the "free soil" policy so that any slave who set foot on the soils of England was considered a free man. This resulted in an influx of blacks to England causing a new problem of overpopulation in the streets of London that the Abolitionists like Granville Sharpe sought to solve

rainy season to which they were no longer accustomed. Most of them perished and the first settlement was almost abandoned in its initial stages.

Sharpe and his colleagues persevered in their intentions to relocate the freed slaves back to the continent of Africa. Eventually, they convinced the British government to assume some responsibility for the new territory, first by an Act of Parliament passed in 1791 incorporating the Sierra Leone Company to organize trade in the territory and, finally, as crown colony in 1808, which brought the new territory under direct control of the British government as a colonial possession. The British ruled Sierra Leone for 153 years until they granted the territory its independence in 1961.

As an independent state, Sierra Leone has a comparatively shorter, but rather eventful, political history than Liberia because even though the country only achieved its independence from Britain in 1961, political participation in the country has never been restricted to one group in the country making political competition a fiercely competitive one from the very beginning. In contrast to Liberia, the settler population of Freetown, the Creoles, soon became a marginalized group with no influential political base when compared to the indigenous elites (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999).

We can also identify several distinct periods in the political chronology of Sierra Leone: from 1961 to 1967, when two brothers from the SLPP Party held power in quick succession following independence; 1967 to1992 when the All People's Congress Party (APC) held office with several punctuations by military coups. The last coup that dropped the curtain on APC rule in the country came in 1992 when the National Provisional Ruling Council seized power and ruled until they organized elections in 1996. And finally, from 1996-1997 when a short-lived civilian administration was rudely punctuated by another military coup organized by the Armed Forces Ruling Council. The

AFRC lasted a year before they were kicked out by regional military forces of the

ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) led by Nigeria. The current phase began with

the conclusion of the civil war and the holding of the first post-civil war presidential and

general elections that the SLPP won in 2002.

This historical background to political competition in Sierra Leone begins at the

period immediately following the conclusion of the World War II when the British, in

preparing the country for eventual independence, began to open up the political system to

the indigenous African population through various local and other elections to the

legislative council of the colony.

The 1951 Constitution of Sierra Leone paved the way for the beginning of the

eventual transfer of power from the British to the African population. The constitution

"provided a majority of seats in the legislature for Africans, and –more importantly in

local terms –gave the hinterland enough seats to outvote the Freetown peninsula"

(Clapham 1978, 13). This was the genesis of indigenous political competition in Sierra

Leone. Initially, it was one between the Creoles of the peninsular who were the

descendants of freed slaves and the educated elites and traditional chiefs of the hinterland

who gained most of the seats in this election. The first political parties in Sierra Leone

were formed along these divisional lines of interest. The National Council of the Colony

of Sierra Leone (NCCSL) representing the Creoles, and the Sierra Leone People's Party

(SLPP) representing the hinterland. According to Christopher Clapham, the NCCSL was

doomed from the start by the smallness of its electoral base thus paving the way for the

emergence of the SLPP as the dominant political party in the country.

The SLPP, led by Sir Milton Margai, a medical doctor, drew largely on the

support of traditional leaders, chiefs and educated elites from the hinterland to form the

political base of the new party throughout the country. This fact provoked grounds for later claims that the party was elitist in orientation. In the elections of 1957 which here held under universal suffrage, for the first time in the country, the SLPP retained its dominant position in the country and emerged victorious from those elections as well but it came under increasing criticisms for the conduct of the traditional chiefs within the ranks of the party. The chiefs were accused of corruption and heavy handedness resulting in widespread riots in the country, in 1955-6, against their rule by the more youthful population (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999).

On the eve of independence in April 1961, the initial rivalry between the Creoles and the elites of the protectorate had faded away with the realization on the part of the Creoles that their small numbers confined them to perpetual minority status and any meaningful political contribution on their part would remain elusive unless they joined ranks with other political parties that had broader political bases in the interior (Clapham 1978). Thus, the political influence of the Creole during the rivalry that had played out in the 1950s between them and Sir Milton Margai faded away to be replaced by a new political rivalry that was fiercer in its intensity and, which arguably played a major role in the future political rivalries that were to eventually lead the country to civil war. This rivalry was between the SLPP, still led by Sir Milton Margai, and a new political party, the All People's Congress formed by Siaka Stevens, a fiery trade union organizer who had broken away from the ranks of the SLPP with Sir Albert Margai, the younger brother of Sir Milton.

The SLPP/APC rivalry has remained the enduring political rivalry in Sierra Leone. The APC drew most of its initial support from the north and western areas of the country whereas; the SLPP retained its political support from the south and central

regions of the country. The iconoclastic figures in each party were Sir Milton Margai and later followed by Sir Albert Margai for the SLPP and in the case of the APC; Siaka Stevens was the principal identifying figure of that party. Furthermore, while the SLPP had a conservative, elitist tinge to its membership, the APC's appeal was to mostly to the masses in labor unions, blue-collar workers and the vast numbers of unemployed in the capital Freetown.

After the SLPP victory in the independence elections of 1961, Sir Milton Margai assumed office as the first prime minister of independent Sierra Leone but he died in office in 1964 and was succeeded by his brother Albert Margai whose period in office coincided with a series of upheavals, some of which were caused by him, that precipitated a cycle of military interventions towards the end of the decade. The events that led to the first cycle of military coups in Sierra Leone towards the end of the decade started with Albert Margai's handling of the general elections of 1967. Here is how Christopher Clapham described the tumultuous years of political rivalry under Albert Margai.

> Firstly, Albert's defeat of the leading northern contender for the premiership, Dr. John Karefa-Smart, intensified ethnic and regional conflict and led most northerners to look to the APC. Secondly, Albert's attempt to increase his power at the expense both of the opposition, and of other politicians in the loosely-knit SLPP, alienated a great deal of support and led eventually to his defeat in the election of March 1967. His proposals for a single-party state, for the declaration of a republic, and for strengthening the SLPP's central machinery were all seen as attempts to improve his own position, and were widely opposed and eventually dropped. Likewise he tampered with the electoral machinery, but lacked the nerve to do so enough to ensure his return. (Clapham1976, 14-15).

Albert Margai's political ineptitude in handling the rivalry that he faced from the northern challenge resulted in his ill-advised move to tamper with the elections of 1967. When the final results of the elections were announced, his SLPP manage to win only 28

seats compared to the 32 won by the APC, with about six seats going to independents that were strategically opposed to Albert Margai. The SLPP victories came mostly in the Southern and Eastern Provinces of the country while the APC won important victories in the Northern Province and Western Area registering two victories in Kono district. The country was witnessing its first major political fault line. Because the APC had emerged with the most votes, Siaka Stevens, as leader of the part, was duly invited by the Governor-General to form the next government. He was sworn into office but two days later was prevented from exercising any authority by a military coup led by the Army Commander Brigadier Lansana who was, incidentally, Mende acting on the alleged encouragement of Albert Margai. Siaka Stevens went into exile in Guinea.

Brigadier Lansana's coup was the precipitating event to a series of coups and counter coups that finally ended with the reinstallation of Siaka Stevens in 1968 following another military coup. First, Lansana was ousted by a counter coup led by middle-ranking officers who invited a popular officer in the military, Lt Col Andrew Juxon-Smith to head a new government of national reformation. This was short-lived. Less than a year after Juxon-Smith was invited to head the national reformation government, he was ousted in yet another coup, this one led by non-commissioned officers hailing mostly from the north. The young officers invited Siaka Stevens back from exile to reassume office.

Siaka Stevens was never ousted in another military coup despite several real or imagined attempts that were made against his administration during his 18 years in office. He moved to consolidate his hold on power by quickly reintroducing the measures of one-party rule and the declaration of a republic that Albert Margai, who by this time had gone into exile in London, had so unsuccessfully tried to introduce. He declared a

81

republic in 1971 and executed several army or civilian officers who were associated with past coup attempts against him (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999).

As Siaka Stevens and the APC consolidated their hold on power, the SLPP started to decline as a national party. The next elections in 1973 intensified the political competition between the SLPP and the APC. The SLPP was hopeful of making a comeback following its poor showing in the 1967 elections and it was hoping to win seats especially in the Southern regions of the country where it had maintained a traditional dominance. But the APC was ready for the SLPP challenge. The party resorted to intimidation to prevent all non-APC candidates from registering their nominations leading to the elections. Such measures and threats of violence against opposition candidates cowed all but the most foolhardy from taking part in the elections. The APC won the elections of 1973 but the tone of future political rivalries between it and the SLPP had been magnified. The instability surrounding the elections of 1973 was followed in 1975 by the executions of another group of politicians in the country accused of taking part in a plot to kill Siaka Stevens's vice-president C.A. Kamara-Taylor and taking over the government.

The next elections came in 1977 and they were marred by violence on a scale that was unprecedented in the country. SLPP candidates and other non-APC candidates were harassed and beaten up during campaign trips across the country or even jailed without trial in some cases (Kandeh 2003). All across the country, thugs acting on behalf of the APC sought political rivals and beat them up, or in some cases even killed them. There were clashes between SLPP and APC supporters in towns across the country and the provincial town of Bo experienced the most violence with reports of over 100 people killed. When the results were turned in, the APC had secured yet another election victory

through violence and intimidation. But it did not stop at that. Siaka Stevens referred to the violence of the last elections and proposed that the time was now ripe to eliminate such violence by introducing a one-party state. The bill to make Sierra Leone a one-party state was introduced into the APC-dominated parliament and quickly passed. Sierra Leone, officially, became a one-party state in 1979 with the APC as the sole political party.

Thus, Siaka Stevens consolidated his and the APC's hold on power sending the SLPP into a political wilderness from which it will not come back until the democratization wind of change that blew across the continent of Africa in the early 1990s caused the ban on political activity to be lifted and the one-party amendment dropped from the constitution. In 1985, an ailing Siaka Stevens turned power over to another northerner, Force Commander of the military, Joseph Saidu Momoh, who hailed from his Limba tribe. Momoh remained in office until the civil war started in 1991. He was ousted in a military coup a year later when disgruntled junior officers from the warfront, in the capital to complain about poor conditions at the front, changed their minds and decided to overthrow the government once and for all. Thus, ended twenty-fours of APC rule to be replaced by a military junta that the young soldiers christened the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC).

The NPRC stayed in power for slightly over four years and eventually, under pressure from the West, organized general elections for the transfer of power to a civilian administration in 1996. Fifteen political parties participated in those elections including a resurgent SLPP and the APC. But a three-way competition soon opened up with the reemergence on the political scene of John Karefa-Smart of the United National Patriotic Party (UNPP). The UNPP drew most of its support from the areas that the APC had

originally drawn their support from –the Northern and Western areas of the country. After the votes count in the presidential elections, no one party emerged with a clear lead and according to the provisions of the constitution, a run-off election was called for in order to elect a clear winner. The two frontrunners from the first round of the elections were Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of the SLPP and John Karefa-Smart of the UNPP. The other political parties maneuvered behind the two contenders in the runoff elections. Kabbah and his SLPP won the runoff and formed the next government but their rule was not to last long. On the evening of May 25, 1997, the city of Freetown awoke to the sign of rapid gunfire and to the dreary announcement that there had been a coup d'état that has toppled the government and that Kabbah had fled into exile (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999).

The new military junta christened itself the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, headed by Major Johnny Paul Koroma. It remained in power for about nine months before action by Western African regional forces, Ecowas Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), ousted them from power in February 1998. The AFRC and their RUF partners retreated into the bush and continued their attacks against innocent civilians and government forces. The short, brief period of AFRC rule is notable for two things: first, for the level of brutality that the junta and their supporters indiscriminately perpetrated against the civilian population; and secondly, for inviting the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) Rebels, who up to that point had been unsuccessfully fighting three successive governments of Sierra Leone in the six-year civil war, into the capital to form a ruling coalition. The chaos and mayhem that followed was unparallel. When Freetown fell to ECOMOG forces in February 1998, thousands of civilians had already been murdered across the country and the city lay in ruins.

The government of Kabbah was reinstated in March 1998 with full support from the United Nations and other regional leaders in West Africa. But the last was not yet heard from the AFRC/RUF coalition. On January 6, 1999, forces loyal to the coalition, who had been threatening to breach the capital for weeks finally entered the city and stormed the maximum security prison freeing dangerous criminal and other prisoners to join the violence they were about to unleash anew on the city. In the two weeks following their invasion of the city, the AFRC/RUF forces burnt down major government buildings and other infrastructure and killed over five thousand civilians. Eventually, they were again pushed out of the city by ECOMOG. They beat a retreat to their bases in the bush but they had succeeded in creating a realization among international and regional leaders that the civil war in the country was a militarily stalemate with civilians as the major losers of the conflict who bore the brunt of all attacks.

First, the Togolese leader Gyannisingbe Eyadema offered to mediate the conflict and invited the government and officials of the AFRC/RUF coalition over to the Togolese capital, Lome to negotiate in 1999. The negotiations lasted over two sessions, Lome I and Lome II, and ultimately resulted in a power-sharing arrangement for a government of national unity and an agreement by the SLPP government of Kabbah to hold general elections as soon as they could raise the funds to do so. By this time, the conflict had finally captured the attention of the world. The United Nations also approved a resolution authorizing the deployment of UN troops to the country in what will, ultimately, become the largest UN peacekeeping mission ever organized.

With the ECOMOG and UN presence in the country, the security situation improved a little for talks about holding elections to start and political maneuverings between the different groups intensified.

The leader of the RUF, Foday Sankoh, who had gained the status of a vice-president as an outcome of the negotiations in Lome, was accused of trying to overthrow the government and destabilize the country afresh. Demonstrators marched on to his official residence on the morning of February 20, 2000 allegedly hoping to register their grievances at the accusations regarding his intentions. Sankoh's bodyguards opened fire on the demonstrators as they approached his residence killing some of them. Chaos broke out and in the confusion Sankoh left his residence and allegedly fled into the hills surrounding Freetown. His house was ransacked by the mob and some of his bodyguards were killed. Sankoh became a wanted man on the run and the incidence effectively signaled the end to any role he had in the politics of Sierra Leone.

Sankoh was captured a couple of weeks after the incident at his residence and turned over to government and United Nations forces by soldiers loyal to no other person than his former AFRC ally, Johnny Paul Koroma. Koroma gained the status of a hero from the incident and also acquired the appearance of a possible contender in the elections that were planned for 2002. The war had effectively come to an end with the capture and detention of Sankoh. With Sankoh in detention facing trial, plans were set afoot for general elections to be held in May 2002. Sixteen political parties took part in what were Sierra Leone's first post-conflict elections of 2002. The SLPP won those elections with over eighty percent of the votes cast. The competition this time was between the SLPP and a resurgent APC but the APC comeback, ultimately, did not appear to be strong enough. In what is a serious test of ethnic theories of politics in Africa, the SLPP garnered votes from all regions of the country, even in those regions that were considered to be strongholds of the APC or other political parties. It remains to

be determined what the near-unanimity of votes for the SLPP means for Sierra Leone or the future of peace in the country.

Contrasts and Similarities

From the preceding discussion of the major political developments in the history of Liberia and Sierra Leone, we can point out several similarities and striking contrasts that set the groundwork for the comparison that will follow. Earlier on, we had pointed out that the politics of Liberia, since its inception as an independent republic, was one of exclusion of the much larger indigenous population in the non-coastal regions of the country by the settler population that had arrived from America as resettled slaves. Through formal and informal networks regulated by the Americo-Liberians and the political party that they formed, the True Whig Party, the indigenous populations were prevented from full participation in the political system. Large segments could not vote and only the most token of appointments in senior government positions went to the indigenous population.

From 1847 until the military coup of 1980, elite Americo-Liberian families monopolized power through the linkages they had created, sometimes letting a few indigenous elites who had demonstrated loyalty and commitment to the group through association with the freemasonry system established by the Americo-Liberians and the True Whig Party, or through intermarriage or friendship (Clapham 1976). The military coup of 1980 revolutionized the political system of Liberia by turning the tables around from an elite monopoly of power to an indigenous monopoly of power led by Samuel Doe.

Politics in Sierra Leone was not characterized by such deliberate exclusion. The settler population of Sierra Leone, also living in the coastal areas of Freetown was highly favored for senior administrative positions by the British colonial authorities because of their comparatively higher levels of education. But this favor shown by the British towards them was never transformed into a political capital that could be used to monopolize the reigns of government and control of the country when once the British left. From the moment the British opened up the political system to all of the African population in the early 1950s, all segments of the indigenous population were allowed to participate and they did so by forming and joining several political parties of their choice unlike the one political party that had been in operation for most of the history of Liberia. The Creoles formed the NCCSL with their much smaller political base in the coastal areas and the indigenous elites allied with local chiefs to form the SLPP.

Another important contrast between the two countries is the length of time that their various systems have been open to universal political participation and open electoral competition. Liberia became the first republic in sub-Saharan Africa in 1847 but restrictions in access to the political system prevented any open electoral competition. In contrast, Siaka Stevens and the APC party eventually declared one-party rule in Sierra Leone in 1979 but for the first eighteen years following independence, Sierra Leone had a multiparty political system in operation. Furthermore, the nature of one-party rule in Sierra Leone was such that all other ethnic groups in the country were allowed to participate within the one-party system unlike the case in Liberia.

Besides these contrasts, Liberia and Sierra Leone also have much in common beginning with the historical fact that both began as settlements for freed slaves. This development alone accounts for a different kind of class system than what is typically

found among other West African countries. Regarding electoral competition, the two groups –indigenous groups and settler groups –soon found out that their interests diverged. In Liberia, the settler group had the upper hand much earlier and thus moved to consolidate their hold on power by marginalizing the indigenous population. This could have set the example for political competition and for what the indigenous groups tried to do in the 1980s during the regime of Samuel Doe.

According to scholars (Clapham 1973; Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999), the settler population in Sierra Leone never had the upper hand in electoral competition partly because of their small numbers and smaller political base given the non-ideological basis of party competition. After losing the first two elections organized in the country by the British, they were forced to develop a pragmatic political strategy wherein they sought representation within one or more of the more favorable indigenous political parties. Following the war, did other Sierra Leoneans make similar pragmatic decisions? The next chapter examines post-conflict political behavior in Sierra Leone.

CHAPTER III

POLITICAL BEHAVIOR AND MOBILIZATION IN
POST-CONFLICT SIERRA LEONE

*The People of Yardaji Have No Regard For Any Political Party Whatsoever.
We are Tired of Hearing Idle Talk. Whoever Ignores This Advice Will Regret It.
Listen Well: Don't Come Here. This is Not a Matter of One Person Alone. We
Don't Want It. This Concerns Everyone. Forewarned is Forearmed.* (Miles
1988).[52]

*The stronger link between political elites and the citizenry is through the less
tangible bonds of ethnic identity. Even in the absence of tangible benefits, citizens
will choose to vote for individuals of their own ethnic group, particularly in
ethnically divided societies. Less than the expectation that they will benefit
directly from the vote, citizens may feel that only a member of their own ethnic
group may end up defending the interests of the ethnic group as a whole, and that
voting for a member of another ethnic group will certainly not do so.* (Van de
Walle 2003)[53]

Introduction

The 2002 post-conflict parliamentary and presidential elections in Sierra Leone

provide an invaluable opportunity to apply insights provided by existing scholarship to

the understanding of a critical real world event. The scholarship in question is the body of

work, surveyed earlier, on political behavior and mobilization that emerged on African

societies following the end of the colonial period (Cowen and Laakso 2002).[54]

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[52] Reproduced verbatim from a sign outside Yardaji Village, Hausaland, Northern Nigeria. William F.S.
Miles, *Elections in Nigeria: A Grassroots Perspective,* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
1988), 65.

[53] Nicholas Van de Walle, "Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa's Emerging Party Systems," *Journal
of Modern African Studies* 41 (February 2003): 313.

[54] European colonial powers permitted the first elections for seats in the legislatures of West African
countries in the late 1940s. However, it is the pattern of political behavior and mobilization into politics

Specifically, an empirical examination of the results of the 2002 elections allow us to test the relative strength of explanations which suggested that ethnic and communal identities were, and remain, the dominant and efficient bases of political mobilization within the post-colonial state structure in Africa (Bates 1983, Horowitz 1985, Rothchild 1985, Young 1994, Glickman 1995, Welsh 1996, Ottaway 1999 and others) versus comparatively more recent explanations that have suggested evolving individualistic orientations predicated on such appeals as a preference for party programs or the issue positions of competing candidates in a given election (for example, Harris 1999, Lyons 1998, Daniel, Southall and Szeftel 1999 and Kandeh 2003).[55] Most importantly, such an undertaking potentially reveals the emerging patterns of political behavior in the post-conflict environment that, in the long run, hold important implications for the durability of the hard won peace in the country following its civil war and the efforts at post-conflict democratization.

Thus, in this chapter I explored the various factors that the scholarship has suggested influence the outcomes of elections in Africa, factors such as ethnic identity

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during multiparty elections leading up to independence and immediately following it that first formed the characteristics of interest for the scholarship. For a neat chronology of this scholarship, see Michael Cowen and Liisa Laakso, eds. Multi-Party Elections in Africa (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 3-4.

[55] Throughout the discussions I use "ethnicity," "ethnic identity," "identity politics," "communal identity" or "ethnic politics" interchangeably to refer to what scholars have implied is the mobilization of voting groups into the political process in multiethnic societies along lines of the cultural identity that defines those groups as people. However, more clarification is in order. Communal identity, understood further, may involve more than one identity and may, more appropriately, refer to a locality that mobilizes into politics using the attributes of that locality as the locus of such mobilization. Thus, some ethnic groups may not even be found in the same locality even though most scholarship on the politics of Africa has implied this homogeneity of local existence. For a useful discussion of these distinctions see John Cartwright, *Political Leadership in Sierra Leone* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978), 159. See also Daniel Posner, *The Institutional Origins of Ethnic Politics: Regime Change and Ethnic Cleavages in Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

and regional interests. I found that the various factors are far more intricate than has been previously suggested leading me to argue that political behavior in the country during the post-conflict period was more complex than previously assumed under identity-based voting theses. I conclude that the results of the post-conflict elections of 2002 are suggestive of a critical break from the theoretical expectations of elections in Africa. This argument will be developed and elaborated as I proceed with the analysis of the empirical evidence at hand.

To the extent that ethnicity still plays a role in the electoral politics of Sierra Leone, its most important utility, I will suggest, is its communication function not its identity function. Ethnicity, understood in this context as speaking the same language as targeted constituents, facilitates direct communication of party programs, messages from candidates, and other campaign content and materials to uneducated citizens in rural communities who are mostly mono-lingual. To cite an example, one advantage Kabbah was said to have over other presidential candidates was the fact that he was multilingual in several indigenous Sierra Leonean languages, which allowed him to directly convey his message and relate to members of the electorate in various parts of the country. However, I will caution that listening to campaign material should not be construed to automatically predict candidate or party preference for targeted constituents. Following an analysis of the data, I place less emphasis on the cues of ethnic identity as predictive of political behavior and mobilization during the post-conflict electoral dynamics in Sierra Leone.

Primarily, the evidence provides less support for an electoral ethnic census of the kind posited by Horowitz (1985) and points more to an earnest desire by the Sierra Leonean electorate, in the post-war environment, to elect the political parties and

individuals whose candidatures were more likely than others to provide a warranty for the peace, as argued by Kandeh (2003) and others. The evidence shows further that even Sierra Leoneans from the same ethnic groups were divided on a broad range of preferences in vote choice for the various political parties that contested the 2002 post-conflict elections. In the ensuing analysis, I demonstrate that beyond a concern for ecological fallacy, the extant scholarship has largely neglected to account for incomplete correlations between ethnic settlement patterns or localities and electoral constituencies or district boundary lines that had precluded electoral choice for legislative seats in most areas of Sierra Leone from being one of a race between members of different ethnic groups. This factor alone, may account for a large percentage of the apparent homogeneity in voting preferences for the two main political parties, the SLPP and the APC, in elections preceding the 2002 post-conflict elections.

Regarding the elections of 2002, Kandeh (2003, 189) submitted that the outcomes were due to a "perception among a plurality of voters that President Kabbah and the ruling Sierra Leone People's Party delivered on their promise to end the war and therefore deserved re-election" but he neglected to show how the process of perception among the electorate occurred that resulted in their resolve to cast a majority of their ballots for one candidate, Kabbah, who did not belong to their ethnic group in the true sense of 'ethnic belongingness' in the hopes of attaining peace. Neither does he explain the related process of identification of one candidate by multifarious groups of ethnic communities. Invariably, he concurrently credits ethnic identity as having played a role in producing the outcomes in the 2002 elections in Sierra Leone.

Even though the arguments for the strong influence of ethnic identities on the voting decision in African elections tend to be persuasive, they still do not explain why

Sierra Leoneans of various ethnic and other socio-political backgrounds crossed barriers to vote for the SLPP, which is perceived as a predominantly "Mende-party" with roots in the south-east region of the country.

The observations and explanations that follow are based on evidence derived from the following sources: a) a national survey of a randomly sampled segment of the population of Sierra Leone, N=905, b) interviews with political party elites at the national, regional and local levels; c) interviews with senior government officials especially those dealing with elections administration at the national, regional and local levels; d) interviews with chiefs and other traditional elders that are widely acknowledged in Sierra Leone as repositories of knowledge on the history and collective identity of local communities; e) analyses of published materials including archival records of the Sierra Leone Archives at Fourah Bay College, University of Sierra Leone, university theses and newspaper reports; f) interviews with members of civil society movements and staff of international and local non-governmental organizations across the country; g) and finally, insight gained both from a long period of 'soaking and poking' around the country during my stay in the field.

The 2002 Post-Conflict Elections

The 2002 elections in Sierra Leone were the first attempt to directly incorporate multiparty contested elections into a comprehensive peace program in the West Africa sub-region as a mechanism to definitively resolve a conflict. Scholars, analysts, observers and those generally interested in the politics of Africa were curious to see how the

process played out.[56] The outcome of the elections had clear implications for not only subsequent post-conflict elections elsewhere, but also the unique experiment of a new strategy of robust peace enforcement that the United Nations had undertaken by assembling the largest peace force ever of over 17,000 troops in a single country.

Sierra Leoneans went to the polls on a clear Tuesday morning on the 14th of May 2002, less than one year after the cessation of hostilities and less than six months following the ceremonial disarmament of the last armed combatant in the country's civil war by the UN force. The day itself was unlike any other that most Sierra Leoneans had experienced –some report that the day had a strange and surreal feel to it. Many did not believe that what they were witnessing on that day could actually happen given the extremities of the violence that had occurred in the country for over a decade. The voting process was very peaceful and orderly with minor logistical problems in conveying sufficient ballot boxes to some polling centers, which the National Election Commission (NEC) largely attributed to insufficient funds to secure transportation of polling materials across the country. Voting was officially scheduled to commence at 7 AM but voters enthusiastically began lining up to vote as early as 1 AM in some parts of the country (Kandeh 2003, Commonwealth Observer Group 2006).[57]

The polling process was observed by a contingent of over 2,000 elections monitors and observers from domestic and international organizations including delegations from the Carter Center, the European Union, the Commonwealth Observer

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[56] Earlier attempts at using a similar model in Southern Africa had yielded mixed results with successful elections in Mozambique and unsuccessful elections in Angola.

[57] See Jimmy Kandeh, "Sierra Leone's Post-Conflict Elections of 2002," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 41 (February 2003): 189-216, for a comprehensive discussion of events on and around the elections of 2002 in Sierra Leone. Also see The Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group, "Sierra Leone Presidential and Parliamentary Elections: 14 May 2002." (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2006).

Group, ECOWAS, and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone. In the end it was the

most peaceful and freest elections Sierra Leoneans had experienced since the elections of

1967, over thirty years previously. With few reservations regarding the logistical

inadequacies and relatively minor concerns about incumbency advantage enjoyed in

media representation by the ruling Sierra Leone Peoples Party, all the observer missions

gave the election a clean bill of health and considered it a legitimate opportunity for a

genuine expression of the electoral preferences of Sierra Leoneans.[58]

The elections were conducted using a system designed by international

institutional designers and mediators of the conflict with a view to guaranteeing

representation of any shade of opinion present in the supposedly fractious country while

minimizing the likelihood of a repetition of violence at the local constituency level that

had characterized elections past. Therefore, the preferred electoral rule was called the

District Block System, a variant of the Proportional Representation electoral system

under which political parties nominated and presented lists of preferred candidates for

parliamentary seats at the constituency level in the 14 districts that were demarcated in

the country for the purpose of the elections. To win a seat, a political party needed to win

at least 12.5 percent of the votes cast in an electoral district. In the case of the presidential

elections, the electoral rule stemming from the Electoral Laws Act 2002 of Sierra Leone

stipulated that for a candidate to be declared the winner in the presidential elections, he or

she had to win, outright, 55 percent of the total electoral votes cast in the first round or

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[58] For an independent assessment of the legitimacy and genuineness of the 2002 elections, see the Carter Center Report, "Observing the 2002 Sierra Leone Elections: Waging Peace. Fighting Disease. Building Hope, (Atlanta, Georgia: The Carter Center, 2002).

face a run-off in a second round of elections with the runner-up candidate polling the second highest number of votes in the first round of the elections.[59]

In all, eleven political parties managed to navigate a lengthy process of electoral rules to be placed on the ballot. Among the various stipulations, political parties were required to sign a Code of Conduct under Section 19 of the Electoral Laws Act 2002 of Sierra Leone, which among other things bound all parties to a pledge to renounce violence and intimidation and to conduct their campaign in a manner that posed no threat to the interests of other political parties in the campaign. Table 3.1 below provides information on the political parties that were on the ballot for the elections including their flag bearers for the presidential elections and the ethnic group or groups to which the flag bearer belonged.

Among other things, Table 3.1 shows the uneven representation of ethnic identity in the leadership of political parties that contested the parliamentary and presidential elections. Of the 17 ethnic groups in Sierra Leone, only six are represented in the leadership of the political parties. An important question here is why other ethnic groups did not seek the means to represent themselves in the leadership of the political parties that sprang up to contest the elections given an electoral system that was specifically designed to facilitate the representation of a diversity of interests around the country. We also note from the table that Temnes alone accounted for the leadership of five different political parties.

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[59] The country has since reverted to single-member electoral districts and first-past-the-post system for parliamentary elections in the 2007 elections.

Table 3.1

Political Parties on the Presidential and Parliamentary Ballot in 2002

Political Party	Presidential Flag Bearer	Ethnic Group Of Presidential F/Bearer
1. All People Congress Party	Ernest Bai Koroma	Temne mother and Limba father
2. Citizens United for Peace and Progress	Raymond Kamara	Temne
3. Grand Alliance Party	Raymond Bamidele Thompson	Krio
4. Movement for Progress	Zainab Bangura	Temne
5. Peace and Liberation Party	Johnny Paul Koroma	Limba
6. Revolutionary United Front Party	Alimamy Pallo Bangura	Temne
7. United National Peoples Party	John Karefa Smart	Temne or Loko*
8. Sierra Leone People's Party	Ahmad Tejan Kabbah	Mandingo father and Mende mother
9. Young People's Party	Andrew Turay	Limba
10. Peoples Democratic Party	Osman Kamara	Temne**
11. National Democratic Alliance	Alhaji Amadu Jalloh	Fullah**

* Karefa Smart's ethnicity has always been the subject of much speculation in Sierra Leone despite his long presence in the politics of the country. There is no public record of him clarifying the issue of his ethnic identity.
** Did not contest the presidential elections but political party was on the ballot in the parliamentary elections.

Interestingly, the largest and arguably one of the most influential ethnic groups in the country, the Mendes, were only half represented, so to speak, in the leadership of the SLPP by the candidacy of the incumbent Kabbah whose mother is a Mende. Kabbah's claims to being a Mende were tenuous given that his paternal ancestry was unequivocally Mandingo hailing from Kambia in the north of the country. Some press reports in the country even claimed later that Kabbah's direct lineage could be traced to neighboring

Guinea.[60] Karefa-Smart of the UNPP, the sole octogenarian on the ballot, and Ernest Koroma of the APC also have questionable ties to the ethnic groups to which they claim to belong. While Koroma claims to hail from the Temne ethnic group because his mother is Temne, most observers claim that he is actually of Limba heritage, the third largest ethnic group who constitute about ten percent of the population of Sierra Leone but comparatively much smaller in size to Mendes and Temnes.

The major issues of the campaigns included sustaining the still fragile peace; the rule of law and law and order; economic development and reconstruction of the heavily damaged infrastructure; jobs and corruption.

The incumbent SLPP campaigned as the architects of the peace and also as the party most competent, in terms of capacity, to staff the administrative needs of the country. Tejan Kabbah projected himself as a centripetal figure in the politics of Sierra Leone from his experience as a former international civil servant in the UN system with roots in two of the most politically polarized regions of the country –the north and the east. His major opponents, Koroma of the APC and Karefa-Smart of the UNPP, accused the incumbent government of rampant corruption, mismanagement of state resources and a failure to create jobs for the thousands of the country's unemployed youth especially following the civil war. Karefa-Smart cited his over 50 years of experience in government and international jobs as qualifications to better manage the affairs of the country. At 52, Koroma claimed relative youth and a deeper understanding of the problems of the majority of the youthful population of Sierra Leone; an understanding he accused the 70 year old Kabbah and the 87 year Karefa-Smart of lacking. Moreover, he

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[60] Under most customary practices in Sierra Leone including that of the Mendes, paternal lineage identifies an individual rather than maternal ancestry.

claimed that he would bring accountability to governance and reform the structures of the state to be more responsive to the needs of the people. In reality, all the political parties contesting the elections presented similar proposals for programs to the people with no major ideological or philosophical differences separating one party from the others.

When the ballots cast in the elections were tallied and officially reported by the Chairman of the National Elections Commission five days later on May 19, 2002, the results showed an overwhelming victory for the SLPP. The party polled over 67 percent of the votes to guarantee it 83 seats in the 112-seat national parliament. Kabbah, its incumbent presidential candidate, polled over 70 percent of the votes cast. More importantly, Kabbah polled over 50 percent of the votes in three of the four provinces in the country. In the Northern Province, which is considered an opposition stronghold, he still managed to poll over 30 percent of the votes besting several candidates on the ballot with more direct lineages to that region of the country.

All of the other political parties on the ballot had poor showings in districts that where supposed to be their political strongholds given their ethnic linkages to those districts. Neither the Revolutionary Front Party, the main instigator of the civil war who had terrorized the people for over a decade, and whom some feared could revert to war if they lost the elections, nor the People's Liberation Party of Johnny Paul Koroma, a more recent source of terror during the 1997 interregnum, managed to garner any votes significant enough to affect the political landscape. The PLP managed to win enough votes to gain two seats in the national parliament while the RUFP did not win a single seat.

The real competition, as it were, emerged between the SLPP and the APC party, both of which had alternated governance of the country in the past. The APC was in

power for over 24 years and their excesses while in office where blamed for the country's

descent into civil war. Koroma of the APC, campaigning under the theme of a repentant

political party, managed to win 22 percent of the votes cast nationwide. His party

managed improved showings in the parliamentary elections than their previous outing in

1996 winning about 22 percent of the votes for a total of 27 seats in the national

parliament. Perhaps a sign of the once unpopular party's future resurgence, Koroma won

over 33 percent of the votes for the Western Area, which includes the national capital

Freetown, once a hotbed of opposition to APC rule. Table 3.2 provides the results of the

parliamentary and presidential elections.

Table 3.2

Results of the 2002 Elections in Sierra Leone

Political Party	Total Votes	% of Popular Vote	% of Popular vote for President	Parliamentary Seats
SLPP	1,293,401	67.6	70.06	83
APC	409,313	21.4	22.35	27
PLP	69,765	3.6	3.00	2
RUFP	41,997	2.1	1.73	-
GAP	25,436	1.3	0.59	-
UNPP	24,907	1.3	1.04	-
PDP	19,941	1.0	-	-
MOP	15,036	0.7	0.55	-
NDA	6,467	0.3	-	-
YPP	5,083	0.2	0.20	-
Totals	1,911,346			112

Source: Adapted from Jimmy Kandeh. 2003. "Sierra Leone's Post-Conflict Elections of 2002." *Journal of Modern African Studies*. 41(2), pp. 189-216.

The results show the extent of the SLPP victory in the elections of 2002. Even

when some opposition candidates claimed that the results could have been flawed by

some voting irregularities around the country, international observer groups were

convinced that the margin of victory was so decisive as to leave no doubts about the

intentions of voters in the elections (Carter Report 2002). Given the pervasiveness of explanations of communal voting during elections in Africa, why did voters from all across this multiethnic country of over five million people cross those various barriers of ethnic and regional cues to cast their votes for the SLPP and Kabbah?

Tables 3.3 and 3.4 present the results of the presidential and parliamentary elections by region, respectively.

Table 3.3

The 2002 Presidential Election by Region

Candidate	Western Area N (%)	Northern Province N (%)	Southern Province N (%)	Eastern Province N (%)
A.T. Kabbah	166,194 (54.8)	179, 634 (32.7)	532,220 (95.4)	458,375 (91.8)
E.B. Koroma	101,613 (33.5)	289, 086 (52.7)	17,244 (3.0)	18,462 (3.6)
J.P. Koroma	24,651 (8.1)	25,813 (4.7)	1,622 (0.2)	5,147 (1.0)
A.P. Bangura	2,429 (0.8)	17,305 (3.1)	1,506 (0.2)	11,834 (2.3)
J.K-Smart	2,357 (0.7)	13,125 (2.3)	2,329 (0.4)	2,036 (0.4)
R. Kamara	1,432 (0.4)	8,046 (1.4)	916 (0.1)	787 (0.1)
Z. Bangura	2,371 (0.7)	5,490 (1.0)	948 (0.1)	1597 (0.3)
R.B. Thompson	1,085 (0.3)	7,014 (1.2)	363 (0.06)	566 (0.1)
A. Turay	815 (0.2)	2,409 (0.4)	205 (0.03)	430 (0.08)
Totals	302,947	547,922	557,353	499,234

Source: Source: Jimmy Kandeh. 2003. "Sierra Leone's Post-Conflict Elections of 2002." *Journal of Modern African Studies*. 41(2), pp. 189-216. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.

Table 3.4

The 2002 Parliamentary Election Results by Region

Political Party	Western Area N (%)	Northern Province N (%)	Southern Province N (%)	Eastern Province N (%)
SLPP	136,469 (45.8)	171,159 (30.8)	527,009 (93.2)	458,506 (91.)
APC	89,360 (30.0)	282,064 (50.8)	17,789 (3.1)	20,100 (3.9)
PLP	33,778 (11.3)	28,314 (5.1)	2,031 (0.3)	5, 641 (1.1)
UNPP	3,972 (1.3)	16,012 (2.8)	2,550 (0.4)	2,373 (0.4)
RUFP	4,994 (1.6)	22,423 (4.0)	10,899 (1.9)	12,728 (2.5)
GAP	4,628 (1.5)	17,785 (3.2)	1,564 (0.2)	1,459 (0.2)
MOP	9,421 (3.1)	3,257 (0.5)	1,754 (0.3)	604 (0.1)
PDP	9,046 (3.0)	8,286 (1.4)	1,471 (0.2)	1,138 (0.2)
NDA	4,218 (1.4)	2,249 (0.4)	- -	- -
YPP	1,792 (0.6)	2,620 (0.4)	213 (0.03)	458 (0.09)
Totals	297,678	554,169	565,280	503,007

Source: Jimmy Kandeh. 2003. "Sierra Leone's Post-Conflict Elections of 2002." *Journal of Modern African Studies.* 41(2), pp. 189-216. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.

Tables 3.3 and 3.4 illustrate the regional disparities in voting from the elections of

2002. The SLPP, as it appears drew the greater portion of its votes from the south and the

east of the country where the Mende ethnic group, who are said to be the most loyal

supporters of the SLPP, are the predominant ethnic group. The APC also appears to draw

most of its support, in their case, about 50 percent of their votes from the Northern

Province from where the presidential candidate of that party, Koroma, hails. However,

when compared to Table 3.2 earlier, the regional pattern to the vote pales into

insignificance against the broader national support for the SLPP. The Mendes, the most

loyal supporters of the SLPP party and other ethnic groups allied to them constitute less

than the percentage of the electoral votes the Party garnered in the elections. For such a

decisive win to emerge, it was necessary that other ethnic groups not allied to the Mende

cross lines to cast votes in support of the SLPP. This includes the Temnes who, most

observers on Sierra Leone argue are the most loyal followers of the opposition APC

Party. This voting pattern from an election conducted using the proportional

representation system, which is argued to favor the emergence of small groups, is one of

the gaps between the evidence and explanations of political behavior in African societies

such as Van de Walle's (2003), quoted in the opening to this chapter.

Mass Political Behavior in Sierra Leone: Support for Political Parties and Vote Choice During the 2002 Elections

In contradiction to the theoretical expectations drawn from observations of

electoral behavior in America, voter turnouts in multiparty elections in Africa have been

encouragingly high with turnouts regularly extending over 60 percent of the voting

eligible population since the Third Wave of democratization commenced on the continent

in the early 1990s (Bratton 1999: 24; Harris 2006: 381; Pintor, Gratschew et al. 2002).[61]

Sierra Leone has not been an exception to this trend. Beginning with the elections in

1996, over 72 percent of the registered electorates have turned out in each election to cast

their ballot. The turnout for the 2002 post conflict elections in question was also over 70

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[61] An important caveat here is the distinction drawn by Cowen and Laakso (2002, 14-15) between several types of elections namely, relatively competitive elections, landslide elections, elections with marked voter apathy. Voter turnout varies in all three types with voters turning out to vote less in countries where there is no reasonable chance of changing a government.

percent. This makes Sierra Leone a deviant case of voting behavior given expectations about voting behavior in low-information societies such as Africa.

The country consistently occupies the basement of all human development indices as one of the poorest countries in the world. It has one of the highest rates of illiteracy with barely 36 percent of the population able to read and write. To compound these two characteristics, the population of Sierra Leone is an extremely youthful one where young people between the ages of 18-35 make up over 40 percent of the voting eligible population (World Bank 2008). Since theorists have maintained that the young, the poor and the uneducated tend to participate less in elections with regard to the American electorate, one question this fact raises is why Sierra Leoneans, among the most illiterate and poorest populations in the world, have shown such keen interests in elections and voted in such high numbers over several elections.

In the main, studies of political behavior on African societies, which borrowed heavily from the theoretical conceptualizations in studies of political behavior in America, failed to account for several discrepancies in their evidence. In exception, Fred Hayward (1987) discussed at length the high level of political knowledge and sophistication in voter decision-making he found among rural voters in a study of Ghana.

> I was struck by the level of political knowledge and sophistication of the rural people I was interviewing, often in contrast to the students I had been teaching the day before. Conventional wisdom at that time maintained that rural masses in Africa were ignorant; that they did not know much about government, the political process, who represented them, or how the political system operated. That was patently not the case in Ghana. In fact, my own research indicated that their level of political knowledge was slightly higher than that in the United States. (Hayward 1987, p xv)

Hayward also pointed out, in the same vein, that his experiences in Ghana reminded him of an earlier experience in Sierra Leone during the 1967 elections when he recalled

being struck by the commitment of rural and urban voters to democratic norms, their opposition to the idea of a one-party state, and their expression of disenchantment with the regime in power –disenchantment they soon expressed by voting them out of office. (Hayward 1987, p. xv)

The descriptions provided by Hayward contrast with the dominant characterization of rural African societies as low-information environments where various forms of communal identity serve as the engines of political mobilization both for opportunistic elites and for gullible masses. Why would the electorates turn out to vote in large numbers during elections if the outcome is never in doubt given inflexible communal preferences? I need not speculate further on these issues as they relate to larger research questions of this dissertation; I proceeded to examine the data at hand using different kinds of analytical methods.

I began with an examination of the relationship between ethnic identity and the vote choice; seeking to verify whether any statistically significance relationships existed between variables measuring ethnic identity and vote choice in my survey sample that could lead me to make the same inferences about the general population.

As pointed out before, Horowitz's seminal study of political behavior in multiethnic societies such as Sierra Leone is faulted for making inferences about individual voter preferences from data that was collected at the aggregate level. In the design and collection of the data for this study, there was a keen sensitivity to avoiding this critical limitation of Horowitz's otherwise influential work. As designed, key items on the survey such as the respondent's ethnic identity, preferences for political parties or presidential candidates were gathered only from the self-reported answers respondents gave to the interviewers during the surveys.

The most important variable, ethnic identity was measured by asking the respondents "What tribe or ethnic group do you consider yourself to be a part of?" While

this may seem like a question that required a straightforward answer, the reality is much different because in most African societies, identifying with one ethnic identity or group is not a given from mere birth in the geographical area inhabited by that group. Thus, for example, among ethnic groups like the Mende, lineage identification is primarily along patriarchal lines.[62] To illustrate this point, a child born to a Temne father and a Mende mother growing up in Mendeland is not simply a Mende because he or she is growing up in Mendeland and has a Mende mother. Rather, for all intents and purposes of societal reckoning, that child is a Temne even if he or she speaks the Mende language better than Mendes who are resident outside the geographical proximities of Mendeland. Such nuances in the determination of ethnic identification have been largely lost in most studies.

The political parties and the presidential candidates for whom they voted measured the dependent variable, the vote choices of Sierra Leoneans. These variables were less complex to measure and involved only a listing of the 11 political parties that took part in the elections as well as the nine candidates that were on the ballot for the presidential election. Since both items resulted in variables measured at the nominal level, the appropriate test of association for both the relationships between the ethnic identities of the individuals and their preference for political parties as well as that between them and their preferences for presidential candidates is the Pearson Chi-Square measure of association with accompanying P-values for statistical significance and the Cramer's V measure of the strength of the association between the variables. If the ethnic

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[62] Joe A.D. Alie, *A New History of Sierra Leone* (Oxford: Macmillan, 1990). Provides a useful account of these rights of inheritance of cultural identity among different ethnic groups across Sierra Leone.

thesis is valid, the expectation here is that the variable for ethnicity will maintain a statistically significant relationship with the vote choices of the respondents.

Table 3.5 reports the relationship observed between ethnic identity and vote choice. Table 3.5 reports the results of the test of the Chi-Square measure of association between respondents belonging to different ethnic groups and the political parties for which they voted. The table reveals that the modal vote choice for respondents of the Temne and the Mende groups are with the APC and the SLPP, the political parties with which both groups have, respectively, been identified over time. The table also shows that about 30 percent of Temnes broke ranks with their ethnic group to vote for the SLPP whereas only three percent of Mendes voted for the APC. A somewhat surprising revelation is the fact that of the ten Fullahs in the sample, none of them cast a ballot for the NDA, which was founded and led by a member of the Fullah elite from their ethnic group, Amadu Jalloh. Another interesting revelation is the fact that no Lokos cast their ballot for the UNPP in the 2002 elections, a party they had supported heavily six years earlier during the 1996 elections. Members of other ethnic groups such as the Krios, Limbas and the Sosos diffused their votes among several political parties with no clearly discernable modal category revealing the preference of members of each of those groups. In the case of the Krios, this point is underscored with the case of the Grand Alliance Party (GAP), which was led by a Krio in the person of Raymond Bamidele Thompson. In spite of this fact, the party received only ten percent of the Krio vote.

Moving over to the statistical implications of the results above, the large Chi-square value and the accompanying p-value shows that the relationship identified here between ethnic identity and vote choice in the parliamentary elections is statistically significant and not likely to have occurred by chance. Thus, we find evidence that there is

Table 3.5

Survey Result: Ethnic Identity and the Vote Choice in the 2002 Parliamentary Elections

Ethnic Group	APC	GAP	MOP	NDA	PDP	PLP	RUFP	SLPP	UNPP	YPP	Total
			Raw Vote Counts Reported by Respondents from Each Ethnic Group								
Fullah	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	-	-	10
Galns	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
Gola	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	3
Kissi	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	2	-	9
Kono	7	1	1	-	-	5	1	57	13	-	85
Krnko	3	-	-	-	-	2	-	9	-	-	14
Krio	8	1	5	-	-	1	-	11	6	-	32
Limba	24	-	3	-	-	7	-	13	2	-	49
Loko	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	3	-	-	5
Mndgo	4	-	1	-	-	-	-	10	-	1	16
Mende	10	3	4	2	1	1	3	260	8	1	293
Shrbro	2	-	1	-	-	-	1	53	1	-	58
Soso	4	-	1	-	-	-	-	4	1	-	10
Temne	137	1	12	-	3	2	-	68	6	-	229
Vai	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	3
Ylunka	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	3
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
Just/SL	26	-	2	1	-	7	-	41	3	-	80
Total	227	6	31	3	4	27	7	553	42	2	902

Pearson Chi-Square (153) = 515.194***

Cramer's V = .252   Lambda =.230
N=902

Note: ***Significant at P < 0.001
Galns= Gallinas; Krnko = Koranko; Mndgo=Mandingo; Shrbro=Sherbro; Ylunka=Yalunka

a statistically significant relationship between ethnic groups in Sierra Leone and the political parties for which they voted. But what is the nature of this support? The finding provides support for those who argue that communal identities influence voting preferences in African societies. Even though there are visible variations in the voting patterns among some of the smaller ethnic groups such as the Krios, the Sosos and the Limbas and even among the Temnes; the respective modal categories for the Mendes and the Temnes, the two groups that together make up more than 60 percent of the population of Sierra Leone lie visibly with the APC and the SLPP. The SLPP gained most of the votes in the Southeastern portion of the country where the Mendes have their homelands while the APC gained most of its votes from the Northern portions of the country where Temnes have their homeland.

Next I turn to the relationship between ethnic groups and the presidential candidates for whom they voted during the elections of 2002. Table 3.6 below reports the preferences of the respondents from different ethnic groups for the presidential candidates, including Kabbah, running in the 2002 elections. Again, the Chi-Square test of association is utilized to test for the relationship between the choice of presidential candidate as a dependent variable and the ethnic groups that the respondents belonged to as the independent variable.

Table 3.6 shows that respondents from other ethnic groups crossed such lines to cast their ballot for Kabbah. He received almost 32 percent of the vote cast by Temnes; an ethnic group many observers of Sierra Leone would argue is not likely to vote for a presidential candidate from the SLPP Party. Perhaps even more striking is the fact that with a Krio running for president in the candidacy of Raymond Bamidele Thompson, Krios cast more votes not only for Kabbah but also for Ernest Koroma, Zainab Bangura

Table 3.6

Survey Result: Ethnic Groups and the Presidential Candidates They Voted for in the 2002 Election

Ethnic Group	Name and Ethnic Group of Presidential Candidate									
	E. Koroma Temne/Limba	Thompson Krio	Kamara Temne	Z. Bangura Temne	J. Koroma Limba	A. Bangura Limba	Kabbah Mandgo/Mende	Smart Temne/Loko	Turay Limba	Total
					Raw Vote Count of Respondents					
Fullah	1	-	-	-	-	1	8	-	-	10
Gallinas	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
Gola	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	3
Kissi	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	2	-	8
Kono	-	1	-	1	5	1	58	12	-	78
Koranko	4	-	-	-	1	-	9	-	-	14
Krio	8	1	-	5	2	-	10	5	1	32
Limba	26	-	-	2	7	-	13	2	-	50
Loko	-	-	-	-	2	-	3	-	-	5
Mndgo	2	-	-	1	-	-	12	-	-	15
Mende	9	2	1	3	2	9	259	5	3	293
Sherbro	2	-	-	1	-	1	52	2	-	58
Soso	3	-	-	1	-	-	5	1	-	10
Temne	137	-	2	11	2	1	73	3	-	229
Vai	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	3
Yalunka	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	3
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
Just/SL	21	-	1	5	8	-	42	3	-	80
Total	221	4	4	30	30	14	558	35	4	

N = 900

Pearson Chi-Square (136) = 518.214***   Cramer's V= .268***   Lambda = .225**

Note: ***Significant at p <0.001; **Significant at p<0.05. Mndgo=Mandingo

and Karefa-Smart, than their so-called "Krio brother" on the ballot. In the 1996 elections, Karefa-Smart received over 80 percent of the votes cast by Lokos who came out in large numbers to demonstrate support for his candidacy. However, in the 2002 elections, more Lokos cast their ballot not for Karefa-Smart but for Kabbah, a Mandingo-Mende. Other groups who diffused their votes among several presidential candidates include the Golas, the Konos, the Yalunkas and the Sosos, although in the case of the two latter groups, less so than with other groups.

The value of Chi-Square and the accompanying p-value (0.001) suggest that the association between respondents from different ethnic groups and their choices of presidential candidates are statistically significant and not likely to have occurred by chance in this sample. Given that the modal category of respondents from the two major ethnic groups, the Mendes and the Temnes, lies with the presidential candidates of the two political parties that are respectively associated with their ethnic groups, the SLPP and the APC, the challenge still remains to explain what resulted in this voting outcome given the theoretical position that I have maintained thus far. I next turn to the examination of the reasons why Sierra Leoneans voted for the parties that they voted for during the elections.

As described earlier in the methodology section, in order to examine these questions, the survey instrument asked respondents a series of questions why they voted for their respective political parties. The major question was phrased thus: "why did you vote for this particular political party in the parliamentary elections of 2002?" Respondents were then given eight response options and asked to indicate a level of

agreement with each response option.[63] The answer choices included variables that are indicative or representative of a theoretical explanation or assumption that has been employed to explain political behavior in the literature on African politics:

1. Ethnic identity: This has been explored fully in Chapter I.

2. Regionalism: Most scholars argue that regionalism is another important variable that explains electoral outcomes in African societies. For example, Monga (1999, 49) points out "African parties also often fall short of the mark on the second count. Not many of the continent's countries have political organizations with broad national bases. Very often, parties are tied to the home regions of their leaders."[64] Thus, regionalism is said to closely correlate with communal identity and ethnic preferences since most ethnic groups have home regions that, most scholars argue, are the electoral bases of most political parties. In one of the definitive discussions of this regional influence on the politics of Africa, Donald Rothchild introduced the concept of "hegemonial exchanges" in reference to attempts by central governments to co-opt regional interests into state coalitions using facilitators or ethnic intermediaries. As he puts it

> an ideal type, hegemonial exchange is a form of state-facilitated co-ordination in which a somewhat autonomous central state and a number of considerably less autonomous ethnoregional (and other) interests engage in a process of mutual accommodation on the basis of commonly accepted procedural norms, rules or understandings. (1985, 15)

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[63] I excluded two variables from the discussions, youths and no reason at all, in order to make the analysis manageable.

[64] The "second count" in reference here is the point made by Celestin Monga that political parties in Africa lack national organization. See Celestin Monga, "Eight Problems with African Politics," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds. *Democratization in Africa* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 48-62.

Part of these "rules and understandings" it is further argued, is the expectation that regional leaders, as part of these coalitions, will deliver their people enmasse during electoral contests. In a more disconcerting reference, regional interests, irredentist conflicts and secessionist actions like the enduring one in the Cassamance region of Senegal, or the bloody one that took place in Biafra Nigeria from the late-sixties to the early seventies are, it is often claimed, the outcome of regional politics at its worst when a party or political faction fails to secure or know they cannot secure meaningful dialogue at the ballot box, on issues they hold sacred to the interests of their region and thus resort to the extreme measure of civil war as means of seeking such interests.

To the extent that the argument for regionalism provides a useful explanation of the voting patterns that emerged in Sierra Leone following the 2002 elections, then it is expected that this variable will maintain a statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable of vote choice. The polarity in vested regional interests in Sierra Leone has been that between the northern part of the country, dominated by the Temne ethnic group and the southeast portion of the country that is the geographical area of the country inhabited by the Mendes. Various scholars of Sierra Leone (Kandeh 1998, 2003, Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999, Hayward and Kandeh 1987, Hayward and Dumbuya 1983 and others) argue that the Southeast is the stronghold of the SLPP, which draws the majority of its support from the Mende ethnic group while the APC maintains its regional stronghold in the north and on some occasions the western region of the country which includes the capital. It is often less-clearly explained how and why these regional patterns in electoral outcomes have emerged following independence in 1961. According to Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle, the earliest trends towards the maximization of ethnoregional identities in the politics of Sierra Leone was the attempt

114

made by Albert Margai, the second Prime Minister of Sierra Leone, to consolidate his rule in 1966 with the purging of the national military of officers of non-Mende descent and "the increase in authoritarian rule, often along ethnoregional lines" (1999, 77).

3. Religion: In recent years, scholars of African politics have argued that religious differences have also emerged as important influences on political behavior and mobilization into politics on the continent (Haynes 1996). The pro-democracy movements of the early 1990s were a particularly remarkable period in the expression of religious influence on the political behavior of Africans because during that time, some churches and mosques served as hotbeds of political opposition to regimes, condemning outright from the pulpit and in some cases in point, emboldening civil society groups to take steps to counter authoritarian regimes.

However, in a disconcerting development, religion also became another fault line along which some people on the continent came to be divided. This point is particularly highlighted with reference to Nigeria where efforts to impose Sharia law in some states met with violent opposition from Christians resident in those states. Sudan has also seen its share of the negative influence of religion on politics as that country is still divided along the lines of a predominantly Muslim north and a Christian and mostly animist south. Sierra Leone has not been as deeply divided along religious lines as other countries. While there are some reports that Tejan Kabbah was preferred among all the candidates running for President in Sierra Leone in 2002 because of his Muslim faith, it should be pointed out that most Sierra Leoneans I met in the field where quick to point out their reservation about such a view. The tests to follow will show whether indeed there were any statistically significant relationships between religious interests and the way the electorates voted during the elections in Sierra Leone.

115

4. The "big person" from the respondent's area of the country: Much is made of the clienteslistic nature of African politics where according to the situation described by scholars, voters cast their vote as a sign of loyalty to the most influential patron from their part of the country who brings home the "pork" in the forms of roads, rural clinics, market centers and so forth in return for votes and political support during elections (Clapham 1982, Coleman and Rosberg 1964, Fatton 1992, Sandbrook and Barker 1985, Reno 1995, and others). This argument is also closely related to that of the influence of communal and regional identities on the conduct of politics in Africa. The "big person" in question are the ethnic entrepreneurs referred to in Rothchild's explanation of hegemonial exchanges. According to Christopher Clapham, the relationship is a mutually beneficial association between the powerful and the weak, a form of political contract where in exchange for protections from arbitrary violence, for example, a client offers the patron their political loyalty and allegiance; the weak, in this instance, include rural dwellers and the vast majority of the urban poor.

One of the enduring contradictions in the scholarship on African politics remains the relative underdevelopment of rural areas and vast areas of the urban ghettoes that are argued to be the major recipients of clientelistic benefits in exchange for political support. If the gifts of politicians in return for support at the ballot box have continued to flow over time, why do vast areas of the countryside where "big persons" come from still remain so poor and undeveloped? The variable for "big person" assessed the extent to which respondents reported that they cast their ballot for a political party because that party represented the "big person" from their area of the country.

5. Peace: I added two variables to the preceding in the forms of a variable representing the "peace vote" and another representing economic development. The

peace vote argument is a relatively recent phenomenon that emerged following the end of civil conflicts in countries such as Sierra Leone and Liberia. Scholars have discerned a tendency among voters to identify a candidate or political party that they perceive could best handle the management of the post-conflict environment in terms of either keeping other volatile groups in check or being able to negotiate and maintain a sustainable strategy for peace for the whole country (Harris 1999, Kandeh 2003). The peace vote is argued to transcend all forms of narrow communal interests and its empirical verification should be welcome news, indeed, for institutional designers, peace negotiators and others interested in conflict resolution around the world because one of the challenges of designing institutions suitable for the post conflict environment is the perceived diversity of interests among various ethnic groups that have a stake in the process. The peace vote indicates a shared interest and a willingness to cooperate.

If indeed a "peace vote" exists during post-conflict elections as argued, then we should expect to see a statistically significant relationship between this variable as a reason why the respondents cast their ballots for the political party that they voted for as opposed to other narrower communal interests such as seeking the interests of their ethnic group, or seeking benefits for their region.

6. Economic Development and Reconstruction: This variable assessed the extent to which voters cast their ballot for a particular political party with the expectation that this party was the one most likely and most competent to bring about the change, progress and development for which they yearned following years of debilitating civil war.

The peace and economic development/reconstruction variables test the thesis that Sierra Leonean and Liberian voters are more pragmatic and less ascriptive than the literature usually suggests.

The answer options to the questions about the variables ranged on a 4-scale continuum from "agree strongly" with each response option to "disagree strongly." Each variable was then recoded into a two-scale continuum of "strongly agree" or "not strongly agree" in order to facilitate interpretation. The recoded variable collapsed categories of "agree," "disagree," and "strongly disagree" into the "not strongly agree" category.[65] The main goal of the analyses is to determine whether statistical tests of these variables show statistically significant relationships with the dependent variable of choice of political party for which respondents voted.

Ethnic Identity and the Vote Choice

Table 3.7 reports the results of Chi-Square tests of association between the political parties for which respondents voted, as the dependent variable; the independent variable is the respondent's submission that they voted for a political party because it represented the interests of their ethnic group.

Table 3.7 shows that 89 percent of the respondents did not strongly agree with the statement that they voted for a political party because it represented the interests of their ethnic group. Only 11 percent of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement. The

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[65] I ran several models to test for differences across categories of the continuum ("strongly agree," "agree," "disagree," and "strongly disagree") measuring the variables. The "disagree/strongly disagree" category was no different from the "agree" category with regard to the dependent variable, but the "strongly agree" was different.

118

modal response category lies with those who did not strongly agree with the suggestion that they voted for a political party because they believed it was the party most likely to secure the interests of their ethnic group. The value of the Pearson Chi-Square and the accompanying p-value shows that the relationship between the two variables as revealed here is statistically significant and therefore not likely to have occurred by chance.

Table 3.7

Parliamentary Elections: Ethnic Identity and Vote Choice

What political party did you vote for in the parliamentary elections?	"I voted for them because they represent the interests of my Ethnic group" (%)	
	Not Strongly Agree	Strongly Agree
All People's Congress	94	6
Grand Alliance Party	100	0
Movement for Progress	97	3
National Democratic Alliance	100	0
People's Democratic Party	50	50
Peace and Liberation Party	89	11
Revolutionary United Front Party	86	14
Sierra Leone People's Party	86	14
United National People's Party	98	2
Young People's Party	100	0
Total	89	11
Pearson Chi-Square (9) =24.179***		
N =903		
Cramer's V =.164***		

Note: ***Significant at p <0.001

Regional Interests and the Vote Choice

Next, I examined the relationship between region and the vote choice. As I mentioned earlier, Sierra Leone is broadly divided into 14 districts for administrative

purposes. These fourteen administrative districts are rather unevenly spread out among the four geographic regions of the country. The map of Sierra Leone in Figure 3.1 illustrates the administrative division of Sierra Leone into the 14 districts.

Figure 3.1

Map of Sierra Leone Showing Administrative Districts

1 - Western Area Urban
2 - Western Area Rural

Source: http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/s/sierraleone/sierraleonemap.shtml
(Accessed 12/04/2008)

Koinadugu, Bombali, Kambia, Port Loko and Tonkolili Districts are in the Northern Province of the country. Moyamba, Bo, Bonthe and Pujehun Districts are in the Southern Province and Kenema, Kailahun and Kono Districts are in the Eastern Province. The Western Urban Area consists of the capital Freetown and the Western Area Rural is the suburbs surrounding Freetown.

Going back to the voting patterns that emerged following the results of the General Elections of 1967, scholars had come to assume that the country was neatly divided into two zones of control under the two major political parties, the SLPP and the APC due to the interconnectivities which existed, they argued, between ethnic groups inhabiting those regions and support for the political parties following those elections (Cartwright 1978, Hayward and Dumbuya 1983, Kandeh 1992, 2003; Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999). The APC, it was argued, was a northern-based party because Siaka Stevens, a Limba from the north and the electoral coalition that he formed were comprised mostly of his northern kindred and a small number of Krios resident in the western area of the country. Such explanations are often propounded ignoring the fact that Stevens was born in the southern town of Moyamba and did not display much affinity with the north throughout his presence on the political scene of Sierra Leone. Also, Stevens was a founding member of the SLPP and first ran for elections in 1957 on the SLPP ticket for Port Loko East Constituency.[66]

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[66] Some scholars often explain how Siaka Stevens managed to forge an electoral coalition including northerners as a product of the efforts of one of his able-lieutenants and vice-presidents Sorie Ibrahim Koroma who was considered an ethnic Temne. An interesting irony is that SI Koroma confessed towards the twilight of his political career that he did not actually belong to the Temne ethnic group but was in fact a Mandingo. How he managed to fool members of the Temne ethnic group who he identified with for obvious political gain throughout his political career is yet to be comprehensively explained by scholars.

On the other hand, according to most of this scholarship, the southeast regions of the country are the ethnic strongholds of the SLPP because most of the support for the party in previous elections, it is argued, has come from the Mende ethnic group who hail from those two regions. In subsequent elections since the 1967 elections, each electoral outcome has come to be explained, erroneously or not, in terms of an adherence to this regional pattern of ethnic support for the two major political parties.

There are several problems inherent in such explanations. The founding histories of both the SLPP and the APC show that the SLPP was founded as political party during meetings that were held in the northern town of Kambia that was attended by a cross section of elites from all ethnic groups in the Protectorate (Kilson 1970, Collier 1970, Hayward and Kandeh 1987, Kandeh 1992, Allie 1990). The initial guiding motivation at the founding the SLPP was to counter Krio domination of the political space following the phased withdrawal of colonial Britain that led to independence in 1961.

I shall return to a more comprehensive discussion of the founding histories of these two political parties later on in the chapter. For now, let me proceed to examine the influence of region on voters as an independent variable affecting their choices of political parties. The results are reported in Table 3.8.

Table 3.8 shows that 93 percent of respondents did not strongly agree with the suggestion that seeking regional interests was the reason why they cast their ballots the way they did. Of all the votes for the different political parties, the only noticeable variations from are those who cast their ballot for the National Democratic Alliance and

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The fact speaks however, to the tenuous claim of communal identity as an important factor of political behavior in African societies when groups are not homogenous in most senses of the word.

Table 3.8

Parliamentary Elections: Regionalism and Vote Choice

What political party did you vote for in the parliamentary elections?	"I voted for them because they represent the interests of my region" (%)	
	Not Strongly Agree	Strongly Agree
All People's Congress	89	11
Grand Alliance Party	100	0
Movement for Progress	96	4
National Democratic Alliance	67	33
People's Democratic Party	75	25
Peace and Liberation Party	100	0
Revolutionary United Front Party	100	0
Sierra Leone People's Party	93	7
United National People's Party	93	7
Young People's Party	100	0
Total	92	8

N =887
Pearson Chi-Square (9) =13.948
Cramer's V = .125

the People's Democratic Party as 33 percent and 25 percent, respectively, seem to have

cast such ballots intending to vote for the political party deemed most likely to secure the

interests of their region. In the case of the PDP, this fact itself could be attributed more to

response error than much else because by the time of the 2002 elections, the PDP was a

spent force as a political party. The once influential leader of the party, Thaimu Bangura

had passed away in London from a heart condition and the interim leader of the party,

Osman Kamara was not quite the force that Bangura was. Also, the PDP is supposedly

one of the northern-based political parties but since its founding, the PDP's influence in

the north had never reached the level of influence the APC exerts in that part of the

country. Thus, a voter intending to cast a ballot for a political party that will secure the

interests of the Northern Region is arguably better served by casting that ballot for the APC during the elections than for the PDP.

While 11 percent of respondents who cast their ballots for the APC and only seven percent of those who did for the SLPP strongly agreeing with the statement, these numbers are not close to those who did not strongly agree with the statement. The modal category is clearly with those who disagreed with the statement. Statistically, the Pearson Chi-Square values and the accompanying P-values tell us that the observed relationship between the two variables is not statistically significant and is likely to have occurred by chance. Thus, we cannot reject the null that there is no difference across voting for parties in terms of regional interests.

Religion and Vote Choice

Next, I examined the relationship between the political parties for which respondents voted in the 2002 elections and their desire for their vote to go to a political party that represented the interests of their religion. In Sierra Leone, around the time of the 2002 elections, there was much speculation about how Muslim voters, who make up over half the population of the country, would vote. According to some sources, Muslim voters were yearning for a Muslim candidate following years of Christian domination of the major positions of political leadership in the country. According to the opinion of a top party executive of the PDP whom I interviewed, voters mostly voted for Kabbah and his SLPP Party because he was a Muslim. I investigated religion as an influence on the voting behavior of Sierra Leoneans with the response option on the survey instrument that asked respondents why they voted for a particular political party, and if they did so

because the deemed the party to represent the interests of their religion. The results are

reported below in Table 3.9.

Table 3.9

Parliamentary Elections: Religion and Vote Choice

What political party did you vote for in the parliamentary elections?	"I voted for them because they represented the interests of my religion" (%)	
	Not Strongly Agree	Strongly Agree
All People's Congress	97	3
Grand Alliance Party	100	0
Movement for Progress	96	4
National Democratic Alliance	100	0
People's Democratic Party	100	0
Peace and Liberation Party	89	11
Revolutionary United Front Party	86	14
Sierra Leone People's Party	97	3
United National People's Party	98	2
Young People's Party	100	0
Total	97	3

N= 878

Pearson Chi-Square (9) = 9.070

Cramer's V = .102

Table 3.9 shows that over 97 percent of the respondents did not strongly agree

with the suggestion that religion was a factor in their decision to vote for one political

party or the other. Potentially, we can explore this relationship further by controlling for

religious denomination and trying to determine which religious faith, say among

Christians and Muslims for example, in Sierra Leone is more likely than others to vote

for a candidate or political party based on their preference for the candidate or political party's position on their religious faith. There are no political parties in Sierra Leone with clearly identified religious agendas and none is expected to thrive given the demography of the country.[67] The rate of intermarriages between Christians and Muslims in the country is high and most Sierra Leoneans join faiths other than their own in celebrating special religious occasions such as Christmas or the end of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. The value of Chi Square and the accompanying p-value suggest that the relationship between the two variables is likely to have occurred by chance alone rather than a representative pattern within the population.

The "Big Person" and Vote Choice

Next, I examined the relationship between vote choice of political party and the "big person" variable. If indeed big men and big women are the influential figures in politics that most scholarship has argued they are, then we should expect to see a statistically significant relationship between the variable measuring this response option and the political parties for which respondents voted. Table 3.10 below reports the results of the Chi-Square test of association assessing this relationship.

Table 3.10 shows that only two percent of voters strongly agreed with the suggestion that they voted for a political party because it was the party to which the big person from their region or area of the country belonged. Ninety-eight percent disagreed with the suggestion that they had cast their ballot for the big man from their area. Statistically, the Pearson Chi-Square values and the accompanying P-values tell us that

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[67] I will explore this point further in a subsequent section of this chapter.

the observed relationship between the two variables is not statistically significant and is likely to have occurred by chance. Thus, we cannot reject the null that there is no difference between the two variables.

Table 3.10

Parliamentary Election: The "Big Person" and Vote Choice

What political party did you vote for in the parliamentary elections?	"I voted for them because they are the party that represents the "big man" from our area of the county" (%)	
	Not Strongly Agree	Strongly Agree
All People's Congress Party	99	1
Grand Alliance Party	100	0
Movement for Progress	100	0
National Democratic Alliance	100	0
People's Democratic Party	75	25
Peace and Liberation Party	100	0
Revolutionary United Front Party	100	0
Sierra Leone People's Party	97	3
United National People's Party	100	0
Young People's Party	100	0
Total	98	2

N=877

Pearson Chi-Square (9) =13.705

Cramer's V =.125

The Peace Vote and Vote Choice

The next variable I examined is the peace vote. Table 3.11 reports the results of a Chi-Square test of association between the peace vote and vote choice.

Table 3.11

Parliamentary Election: Peace and Vote Choice

What political party did you vote for in the parliamentary elections?	"I voted for them because they are the party most likely to bring peace and unite the country" (%)	
	Not Strongly Agree	Strongly Agree
All People's Congress Party	23	77
Grand Alliance Party	33	67
Movement for Progress	10	90
National Democratic Alliance	67	33
People's Democratic Party	25	75
Peace and Liberation Party	15	85
Revolutionary United Front Party	14	86
Sierra Leone People's Party	13	87
United National People's Party	17	83
Young People's Party	0	100
Total	16	84

N=903

Pearson Chi-Square (9) =21.255**

Cramer's V= .153

Note: **Statistically significant at p <0.010

Table 3.11 shows that 84 percent of respondents voted for the political party of their choice believing that it was the party most likely to bring peace to the country and unite it following the civil war. This finding suggests support for Kandeh's contention of a "peace vote" among Sierra Leoneans during the 2002 elections. The value of Chi-Square and the accompanying p-value suggests that the relationship observed here is statistically significant and not likely to have occurred purely by chance.

Economic Development/Reconstruction and Vote Choice

Next, I report the result of one more test of association, that between economic

development/reconstruction and vote choice. Table 3.12 reports the results.

Table 3.12

Parliamentary Elections: Economic Development/Reconstruction and Vote Choice

What political party did you vote For in the parliamentary elections?	"I voted for them because they are the party most likely to develop the country by building roads, clinics and bringing electricity to the whole country" (%)	
	Not Strongly Agree	Strongly Agree
All People's Congress Party	16	84
Grand Alliance Party	17	83
Movement for Progress	13	87
National Democratic Alliance	33	67
People's Democratic Party	50	50
Peace and Liberation Party	22	78
Revolutionary United Front Party	14	86
Sierra Leone People's Party	18	82
United National People's Party	14	86
Young People's Party	0	100
Total	17	83

N=896
Pearson Chi-Square (9) = 5.121
Cramer's V =.076

The table shows that most respondents, 83 percent, strongly agreed with the

statement that they voted for a political party because they believe it was the party most

likely to develop the country by building roads, clinics, schools and bringing electricity to

the whole country. Among votes cast for all political parties, the modal category lies with

those who strongly agreed with the statement to those who did not strongly agree with the

statement. However, the Pearson Chi-Square statistic and its accompanying p-level shows

that the relationship observed here is not statistically significant and is likely to have

occurred by chance within the population. This finding does not support the hypothesis for a statistically significant relationship between the vote for development and the political parties for which respondents voted during the post-conflict elections of 2002.

In summary, the tests reported here show the nature of the relationships between the dependent variable vote choice for political parties and six independent variables indicative of reasons that were suggested to voters for why they would have cast their vote for the political party for which they voted. Four of the six reasons (ethnic identity, regionalism, religion, and the "big person") were derived from the established literature on politics in African societies that had argued that these factors exerted the strongest influences on voting behavior in African societies. The remaining two variables, the peace vote and economic development/reconstruction tested the extent to which voters in Sierra Leone preferred a political party because they believed that it was the one most likely to bring real gains not only for their welfare but also to the entire country.

However, I realize that this analysis alone may not put to rest the notion that voters in Sierra Leoneans, like voters in most African societies have been portrayed, are prone to vote along ethnic lines than any other way. So, to explore these relationships further, I developed and tested several models of the voting patterns using ordinary logistic regression to evaluate the influences of the independent variables examined here on the dependent variable of vote choice for a political party. Below, I describe the models and report the results from these tests.

Explaining the Vote Choice of Sierra Leoneans in the 2002 Elections

I developed several logistic regression models to estimate the odds, using a calculation of the percentage change in the odds ratio,[68] that a respondent, therefore a randomly selected voter in the general population, voted for a political party given their responses to the suggestions, examined above, that were offered to them on the survey instruments as reasons why they voted for that political party instead of others. I recoded two variables into a binary dummy variable for this purpose.

The variable "Party Vote" was recoded out of the variable that originally reported the political parties for which respondents voted. The original variable was coded into 11 nominal categories for all the political parties that were on the ballot during the 2002 elections in Sierra Leone. The new variable was recoded out of this variable to represent: 0=Voted for the APC and 1=Voted for the SLPP.

The justification for creating a dependent variable consisting of only the two political parties is the fact that both have been the most antagonistic forces in Sierra Leone politics since independence. In fact, most observers are quick to blame the problems of Sierra Leone on the debris emanating from the fallout between these two political parties in their struggle for control of the political landscape of the country since the 1960s. Thus, a respondent representing a random voter who cast a ballot for the SLPP or the APC during the elections is also more likely to have made the decision to vote for a political party because it represented their communal interests or not, since both parties are argued to be affiliated with the two major ethnic groups that make up over 60 percent

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[68] The percentage change in the odds ratio is calculated using the formula (b-1) *100. Where b is the coefficient of the odds ratio. See Pollock III (2006).

of the population and arguably the architects of any patronage networks that may exist within the political system.

The independent variables in the model include the six variables that have been described and tested previously. For this purpose, as I have explained previously, each independent variable was recoded from the four-scale categories of "agree strongly," "agree" "disagree" and "disagree strongly" into the two categories described previously where: 1= Strongly Agree with the statement and consisted of the "agree strongly" category and 0=Not Strongly Agree with the statement, consisting of the "agree," "disagree," and "strongly disagree" categories.[69] Lastly, out of the variable for ethnic groups, I created five separate dummy variables to represent the five largest ethnic groups in the country (Mende, Temne, Krio, Kono, and Limba) to serve as variables denoting ethnic identity. In the case of each of the variables, "1" represented the ethnic group of the respondent and "0" represented all other ethnic groups.

If the ethnic thesis is valid, such that considerations for the protection of the interests of their ethnic group influenced voters during the elections of 2002 more than any other factors, then we can expect that the independent variable for ethnic identity which I label "ethnchc" will show itself to be statistically significant both by itself and when controlling for other factors such as those for development and peace in the various tests. Furthermore, we can expect that this variable will have a positive effect on the dependent variables for both the likelihood that the voter voted for the SLPP or APC or just the SLPP alone, as the party that won the elections.

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[69] Similar tests across the recoded independent variables showed that the "disagree/strongly disagree" category was no different from the "agree" category with regard to the dependent variable, but the "strongly agree" category was different

132

Conversely, if considerations for securing the interests of their ethnic group mattered less for voters than choosing the political party they deemed most likely to maintain the peace and undertake much needed development and reconstruction, then we can expect to see that those variables for the peace vote and development are statistically significant and maintain positive relationships with the dependent variable by themselves in any model or when controlling for the ethnic interest variable, suggesting that when a voter cast their ballot either for one of the political parties or the SLPP by itself, considerations of voting into office the political party that will secure the best interests of their ethnic group mattered less to them.

Ethnic Identities/Group Interests and the Vote Choice – Results of Logistic Regression with Logged Odds

I begin by reporting the test of the model demonstrating the likelihood that a respondent voted for the SLPP or APC if the respondent indicated agreement with the statement that they voted for a political party because it represented the interests of their ethnic group while controlling for being a Mende or Temne – in other words, when a respondent belonged to one of the two largest ethnic groups.

Table 3.13 reports the results of the models predicting vote choice for a political party if the respondent was Mende or Temne and when controlling for the respondent's agreement with the statement that the political party for which they cast their ballot was the party most likely to secure the interests of their ethnic group. The table shows that being Mende is a statistically significant predictor of the vote for the SLPP whereas ethnic interests and being Temne are not. The odds of voting for the SLPP drops to -83 if the respondent were a Temne. The result shows that the likelihood that a respondent

voted for the SLPP dropped to –58 percent if they agreed with the statement that the

political party for which they cast their ballot was the party most likely to secure the

interests of their ethnic group suggesting that even though it was highly likely that

Mendes voted for the SLPP, they did so not because they felt it was the party most likely

to secure the interests of their ethnic group alone. Overall, the value of R^2 at .27 suggests

the moderate strength of the model in explaining the variances in vote choice.

Table 3.13

Predicted Votes for the SLPP or APC: Ethnic Identities and Ethnic Interests

Variable	Party Vote	% Change in Odds
Ethnic Interest	-.87***	-58
	(.28)	
Mende	2.5***	1,068
	(.37)	
Temne	-1.8***	-83
	(.20)	
Constant	1.19***	
	(.14)	
N =	765	
LR chi2 (3)	250***	
Log Likelihood	-334.09	
Pseudo R2	.27	

Note: ***Significant at p <0.001; Standard errors in parentheses.

Next, I included the peace vote as an additional control variable in order to test if

its inclusion makes a difference to the likelihood that a respondent voted for the APC or

SLPP if they were Temne or Mende when controlling for their response to the ethnic

identity/voting question (Table 3.14).

Table 3.14

Predicted Votes for the SLPP or APC: Including the Vote for Peace

Variable	Party Vote	% Change in Odds
Peace Vote	.60*	81
	(.26)	
Ethnic Interest	-.75***	-53
	(.29)	
Mende	2.3***	948
	(.37)	
Temne	-1.86***	-84
	(.21)	
Constant	.72***	
	(.24)	
N =	765	
LR chi2 (4)	255***	
Log Likelihood	-331.47	
Pseudo R2	.28	

Note: ***Significant at p <0.001; * Significant at p <. 05. Standard errors in parentheses.

The result shows that the peace vote variable has a positive relationship with the

dependent variable of vote choice when controlling for ethnic interests and the identity

variables for being Temne or Mende. When compared to the previous model, the odds

that a respondent voted for the SLPP dropped from 1,068 percent in the previous model

to 948 percent in this model, a change of 120 percent if the respondent is Mende. The

resulting effect is still a relatively strong one even when controlling for ethnic interests,

which shows that Mendes were still more likely to vote for the SLPP, an all-too

predictable observation given that Mendes are traditionally associated with voting for the

SLPP (Hayward and Dumbuya 1983, Hayward and Kandeh 1987, Kandeh 2003 and

others). The other explanatory variables retain the direction of their relationships with the dependent variable suggested that the observed values are not spurious effects on the dependent variable.

The result suggest that voters were still more likely to vote for the SLPP when they agreed with the statement that it was the political party most likely to secure the peace and when controlling for the ethnic group to which they belonged. The negligible difference in R^2 between the two models suggests that the second model, with controls for the peace vote, was not an improvement on the first model.

I developed one more model to test the dependent variable of voting for the SLPP or APC to which I added the explanatory variables for development/reconstruction, regionalism, the "big man," and regional controls for three regions of the country (East, South, and North),[70] in addition to the variables for peace and ethnic identity that I tested earlier. The model tested the likelihood that a respondent voted for one of the two major political parties when controlling for the structural and identity variables that scholars have frequently argued predict voting behavior in African societies. I report the results of these tests in Table 3.15.

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[70] I established the Western area as the category of exclusion because it contains the capital city of Freetown, the most cosmopolitan area of the country. No political party has been able to lay claim to Freetown as a political stronghold over several elections. The pattern, which is not unusual over the course of several elections in African countries, is that the opposition always wins the greater share of the votes in the capital cities. See Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) for a discussion of electoral trends in African societies following the end of the Cold War and the accompanying liberalization of political regimes that resulted in several multiparty elections across the sub-continent.

Table 3.15

Vote Choice in the 2002 Post-Conflict Elections in Sierra Leone with Logged Odds

Variables	Party Vote	% Change in Odds
Ethnic Interest	-.86*	.58
	(.38)	
Peace Vote	.46	58
	(.32)	
Region	-.62*	-46
	(.32)	
Development	-.66*	-48
	(.31)	
Big Man	1.33*	278
	(.58)	
Mendes	1.55***	372
	(.42)	
Temnes	-.94***	-61
	(.28)	
Eastern S/Leone	2.16***	771
	(.44)	
Southern S/Leone	1.78***	495
	(.41)	
Northern S/Leone	-.46	-37
	(.33)	
Constant	.83*	
	(.42)	
N =	753	
LR chi2 (10)	337	
Log Likelihood	-280.08	
Pseudo R²	.38	

Note: ***Significant at p < .001; * Significant at p <. 05. Standard errors in parentheses.

The table shows that the coefficients for the explanatory variables of the big person, being Mende and coming from the East or South of the country maintained positive relationships with the dependent variable of vote choice. The likelihood of voting for the SLPP by respondents who identified themselves as Mende drops in comparison to the preceding model but the variable is still statistically significant. One of

the strongest effects on the dependent variable is that of the coefficients of the variable for those who inhabit the Eastern regions of Sierra Leone. There are other differences in the model that need to be reported together with their implications for the understanding of voting behavior. For instance, agreeing with the statement that they were voting for the political party more likely to secure the interests of their ethnic group made a respondent less likely to vote for the SLPP. We notice a similar tendency for the regional interest variable and development.

An important implication of the results of the models on the course of this thesis, however, are the comparatively strong influences that identity and structural variables such as being Mende, or coming from the Eastern provinces of Sierra Leone retained on the dependent variable. This outcome appears to provide support for claims that communal identity and regional ties exert the strongest influence on voting behavior in multiethnic African societies such as Sierra Leone. On the surface, it also appears to provide support for the claims made in various observations in the country that the APC is a Northern political party while the SLPP is a Southeastern political party. However, we note also from the table that the issue variable of ethnic interest showed a negative relationship with the dependent variable and tended to influence why people voted for one or the other party such that we are not in error if we claim that while identity and structural variables appear to nominally show *how* people voted, they do not adequately explain *why* people voted the way they did.

When respondents were asked to indicate reasons *why* they voted for the political party for which they voted, as reported earlier from Table 3.7, nearly 83 percent of them disagreed with the ethnic identity thesis. The effect of this explanatory variable on the outcome variable in the test reported above suggest that ethnic groups do not hold

138

singular views of the political parties for which they voted. Hence, those who voted for the SLPP were less likely to think of it as the party most likely to secure the interests of their region whereas others saw it as the party of the big person from their part of the country and, thus, deserving of their votes.

Since no definitive conclusions could be drawn from several tests of the model of vote choice reported above, I resorted to additional tests in order to enable a more definitive conclusion as to whether the voting patterns that emerged were indicative of an ethnic census or the outcome of a much different calculation by voters.

Exploring the Vote Choices of Sierra Leoneans: Results of Logistic Regression with CLARIFY

To explore these angles further, I specified several smaller models that included only the two largest ethnic groups in Sierra Leone, the Mendes and the Temnes, and the two political parties, the APC and the SLPP. I then ran several tests of these models using CLARIFY, a program developed by Gary King and others that amplify tests of discrete binary variables and maximizes the reporting of the results to highlight within and between group differences in the models (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000).[71] One objective of this additional exercise was to highlight within group differences between voters from the same ethnic groups. However, this time, for succinctness and efficiency I only include four explanatory variables of interest (ethnic interest, peace vote, development and region) to test the likelihood of vote choice if the respondent was a Mende or Temne and strongly agreed or did not strongly agree with the statement

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[71] I would like to express my gratitude here to Dr. Kevin Corder for introducing me to CLARIFY and encouraging me to use it.

suggesting a reason why they would have voted for the political party for which they voted.[72] CLARIFY reports the outcome variable as the quantity of interest with mean values of the effects of the independent variable on the dependent variable while controlling for interaction terms between the independent variables.

Each model tested the within-group probabilities of vote choice given the individual's preference on the issue variables that were suggested to them. The first model tested the probability of voting for the SLPP or APC if the respondent was Mende or Temne and given their response to the question about the ethnic identity thesis. The second model tested the probability of voting for the SLPP or APC if the respondent was Temne or Mende and given their response to the question about the peace vote. The third model tested the probability of voting for the SLPP or APC if the respondent was Mende or Temne and given their response to the economic development/reconstruction question. The fourth model tested the probability of voting for the SLPP or APC if the respondent was Mende or Temne and given their response to the question about seeking regional interests.

In addition, I included several interactions into each model in order to more effectively control for the interaction between the identity of different ethnic groups and their particular preferences on these variables. So for example, one interaction term controlled for the relationship between Mendes alone and their preferences on the peace vote when the variables for Mende, Temne and that for the peace vote are included in the model at the same time.

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[72] Of the four variables two, ethnic interest and regional interest, represent the traditional explanations of the vote in African societies while the other two, the peace vote and development, represent the more pragmatic considerations of voters in recent times, for which I have argued.

In all of the tests, the expectation is that *there would be no difference between*

all Mendes and all Temnes in their respective votes given suggestions in the literature

that ethnic groups tend to display homogenous preferences in vote choice (Horowitz,

1985). Each table of the results of these tests is followed by another table summarizing

the computed effects of the probability of vote choice given the reported preference of the

respondent. Table 3.16 below reports the results of the first model.

Table 3.16

Ethnic Interests and Vote Choice

Explanatory Variables	Vote Choice
Ethnic Interest	-.82*
	(.38)
Mendes	2.2***
	(.44)
Temnes	-1.74***
	(.21)
EthnMen	.59
	(.08)
EthnTem	-.87
	(.84
Constant	1.2***
	(.15)
N	765
LR chi2 (5)	252.18***
Pseudo R2	.27

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***Significant at p< .001.* Significant at
p<.05. Models are results of binary logit regressions using CLARIFY in STATA.
EthnMen and EthnTem are interaction terms.

With the inclusion of interaction terms in the model, the table above shows that

when controlling for the respondent's ethnic group, the coefficients retain their

relationships with the outcome variable as in previous tests. For example, "ethnic

interest" retains its negative relationship with vote choice as in previous models just as

being Temne does for the SLPP vote. Next, I report the calculated effects of the

probability of vote choice (Table 3.17) given the results from the model above.

Table 3.17

Effects on the Probability of Vote Choice: Ethnic Interest by Ethnic Group

	Probability of Vote Choice		
	Strongly Agree	Not Strongly Agree	
Mende	.95	.96	
	(.02)	(.02)	
Temne	.12	.36	
	(.08)	(.03)	

Standard errors are in parentheses; P< .001

The result shows differences in vote choice between Temnes and Mendes and

among Temnes given their answers to the statement that the party for which they voted

was the party most likely to secure the interests of their ethnic group. However, there was

no difference among Mendes who strongly agreed with the statement or who did not

strongly agree with the statement and their vote choice. As expected, the result

demonstrates that Mendes were more likely to vote for the SLPP. The noticeable gap is

that evident in the voting preferences of Temnes. Among this ethnic group, there was 24

percent difference in the probability of voting between those strongly agreed with the

statement and those who did not agree strongly with the statement. This portion of the

result is contrary to previous assumptions about ethnic group homogeneity in voting

preferences. Next, I report the results of the second model (Table 3.18).

Table 3.18

Peace and Vote Choice

Explanatory Variables	Vote Choice
Peace Vote	.60*
	(.30)
Mendes	1.12
	(.60)
Temnes	-2.10***
	(.56)
PcvtMen	1.38
	(.74)
PcvtTem	.33
	(.60)
Constant	.58*
	(.25)
N	780
LR chi2 (5)	258.28***
Pseudo R2	.27

Notes: Standard error in parentheses. ***Significant at P< .001, *Significant at p <. 05. PcvtMen and PcvtTem are interaction terms. Models are results of binary logit regressions using CLARIFY in STATA.

The result shows that the peace vote is statistically significant in predicting vote choice. However, the variable for Mende is no longer statistically significant when controlling for the peace vote and the interaction terms that have been added to the model. The variable for Temne retains the negative relationship with the dependent variable suggesting that Temnes are no more likely to have voted for the SLPP when controlling for the peace vote. Next I report the calculated effects of the probability of vote choice given the respondent's preference on the peace vote.

Table 3.19 shows the differences within the ethnic groups, as they voted given their preference for which political party they believed was most likely to secure the peace. Unlike the results in the model that preceded this one, a significant gap is found

143

between the vote choices of Mendes who strongly agreed with the statement that the political party for which they voted was the party that was most likely to unite the country and secure the peace and those who did not strongly agree with the same statement. A similar gap exists between the calculated probabilities of vote choice for Temnes who strongly agreed with the statement and those that did not strongly agree with the statement.

Table 3.19

Effects on the Probability of Vote Choice: Peace Vote by Ethnic Group

	Probability of Vote Choice	
	Strongly Agree	Not Strongly Agree
Mende	.97	˙83
	(.01)	(.07)
Temne	.36	.19
	(.04)	(.07)

Standard errors are in parentheses; P< 0.001

One suggestion from the current result, when compared to the preceding, is that the peace vote was a more important factor in the deciding vote choice among the two groups whereas it mattered less where they stood on the other explanatory variable as it did not make a great difference in their vote choice. Next, I report the results of the test of Mendes and Temnes who voted for the SLPP or APC and who agreed or disagreed with the statement that the political party for which they voted was more likely to undertake development projects in the country following the civil war (Table 3.20).

Table 3.20

Development/Reconstruction and Vote Choice

Explanatory Variables	Vote Choice
Develop	-.27
	(.32)
Mendes	1.0
	(.67)
Temnes	-1.86***
	(.50)
DevMen	1.5
	(.79)
DevTem	.12
	(.55)
Constant	1.29***
	(.28)
N	774
LR Chi2 (5)	247.10***
Pseudo R2	.27

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***Significant at P< .001, DevMen and DevTem are interaction terms. Models are results of binary logit regressions using CLARIFY in STATA.

The results indicate that belonging to the Mende ethnic group is not a significant predictor of vote choice when controlling for those who agreed with the statement that the political party for which they voted was the party most likely to develop the country by rebuilding the infrastructure including roads, bridges and schools (or the vote for development and reconstruction). The negative sign of the coefficient for "develop" in the model suggests that when agreeing with the statement, the respondent is less likely to vote for the SLPP. This finding conforms to the common belief in Sierra Leone that even though the SLPP was largely perceived as corrupt; people chose to vote for the party because there was the perception that no other political party possessed the capacity to rebuild the country.

I moved on next to explore the differences within groups by looking at the calculated probabilities of vote choice for respondents who strongly agreed with the statement and those who did not strongly agree with the same statement that the political party for which they voted was the party most likely to develop the country by rebuilding its infrastructure. Table 3.21 reports the results of these calculated probabilities of voting.

Table 3.21

Effects on the Probability of Vote Choice: Develop by Ethnic Group

| | Probability of Vote Choice | |
	Strongly Agree	Not Strongly Agree
Mende	.97	.90
	(.01)	(.06)
Temne	.33	.37
	(.04)	(.09)

Standard errors are in parentheses; P <. 001

Although it is not as large as the difference in the preceding table, the result here shows within group differences for Mendes and vote choice. Mendes who strongly agreed with the statement that the political party for which they voted was the party most likely to develop the country by rebuilding its infrastructure were more likely to vote for the SLPP. The result shows that Temnes, on the other hand, were more likely to vote similarly if they did not strongly agree with the same statement. One suggestion here is that Temnes that voted for the party did so for other reasons not because they expected it to develop the country and rebuild its infrastructure following the devastating civil war. Next, I present the results of the fourth model.

Table 3.22

Regional Interests and Vote Choice

Explanatory Variables	Vote Choice
Regional Interests	-1.1***
	(.30)
Mendes	2.07***
	(.42)
Temnes	-1.85***
	(.22)
RegMen	.54
	(.77)
RegTem	.04
	(.60)
Constant	1.3***
	(.16)
N	767
LR chi2 (5)	254.19***
Pseudo R2	.28

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***Significant at P< .001, RegMen and RegTem are interaction terms. Models are results of binary logit regressions using CLARIFY in STATA.

The table shows that regional interests has a negative effect on vote choice and is statistically significant. The suggestion here is that if respondents strongly agreed with the statement, it was not likely that they voted for the SLPP. Thus, region was not a part of the voting calculus when controlling for the ethnic identity of the respondent and the interaction terms inserted into the model. Below are the results of the calculated probabilities of vote choice given a respondent's preference on the regional interest variable.

Table 3.23 shows within group differences between Temnes, Mendes and vote choice given responses to the statement that the political party for which they voted was the party most likely to secure the interests of their region. In the case of Temnes, there is

a 19-percentage point difference between those who strongly agreed and did not strongly

agree with the statement and their vote choice. There is less difference between Mendes

who strongly agreed and those who did not strongly with the same statement and their

vote choice. The result here supports the earlier of a negative relationship between the

variable for regional interests and vote choice. Among both groups, the probability of

vote choice was higher for those did not strongly agree with the statement.

Table 3.23

Effects on the Probability of Vote Choice: Region by Ethnic Group

| | Probability of SLPP Vote | |
	Strongly Agree	Not Strongly Agree
Mende	.93	97
	(.04)	(01)
Temne	.18	.37
	(.07)	(.04)

Standard errors are in parentheses; P <. 001

In summary, the results from the tests of all four models suggest that there are

differences within groups following the election. The differences are visible both between

and among the two groups examined here and the vote choices that they made. The

results do not provide support for the claims that voting in African societies is largely a

predetermined outcome contingent on group identity rather than a conscious

consideration of party programs and the options that come with those programs.

So why do explanations abound that voting behavior in African societies is,

primarily, an outcome of ethnic identity? One answer could lie in the suggestion by

Mattes and Gouws (1998) that existing studies relied on aggregate data to make inferences about individual motivations and, thus, failed to guard against ecological fallacy.[73] Overreliance on aggregate data is one limitation on the methodology employed in previous works. In the next section, I discuss how even when guarding against ecological fallacy, existing explanations may still fail to account for the voting pattern in cases such as Sierra Leone. In order to gain a fuller understanding of why communities in Sierra Leone show similar preferences in vote choice and thus, why they have come to be identified with support mainly for one political party or the other, we need to look beyond explanations that focus on individuals as our units of analyses and towards the examination of structural variables such as electoral districts within which individuals exercise their choices.

Beyond Ecological Inference: Ethnicity as an "Identity Variable" and an "Issue Variable" in Sierra Leone

An interesting point about the literature on political behavior in African countries is that this scholarship built largely upon the bases, concepts and accompanying theoretical constructs of work carried out by the pioneers of survey research methodology in the United States such as the Columbia University and Michigan Studies without employing much of the methodological rigor that characterized those studies of voting behavior in America. Some scholars have advanced reasons for this shortcoming. Cowen and Laakso (2002, 9) point out that part of the problem in the early days of the scholarship on electoral behavior in African societies were cost concerns and the assumed

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[73] Timothy D. Sisk and Andrew Reynolds, *Elections and Conflict Management in Africa* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 119-142.

complexity of organizing the sample survey in such societies. Other scholars, Nohlen, Krennerich and Thibaut (1999) cite the inaccessibility of the geographical areas of interest as a limitation in studying elections in Africa, while some scholars were often in disagreement over the right approach to be adopted in studying the emergent countries. These problems were only partially overcome by enlisting the use of the data that was easily available for analysis, which came in the forms of aggregated returns over several elections. With little to work with, it is no surprise that the analyses and insight provided by such scholarship was severely constricted by a limitation to group level inference.

For example, emanating from these analyses, Yorubas of Southwestern Nigeria it was argued, voted overwhelmingly for the Action Group party of immediate post-independence Nigeria because Obafemi Awolowo a prominent Yoruba politician formed that party. Ibos, on the other hand, during that same time overwhelmingly supported the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) because Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Ibo politician from Eastern Nigeria and a major rival of Obafemi Awolowo, founded that political party (Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1988, 61-62).

In the current case of Sierra Leone, the SLPP was, historically, a "Mende man's party" because the party drew heavy support from the Mendes and Sir Milton Margai, one of the founders of the party was a Mende man while the APC was founded to counteract the Mende hegemony of the SLPP and the majority of Northerners voted for the APC in the 1967 elections (Hayward and Kandeh 1987; Cartwright 1978 and others). These are all examples of ecological inferences about individual behavior (Yorubas, Ibos) in the Nigerian example and (Mendes, Temnes) in the Sierra Leone example.

Following the 1967 elections in the Sierra Leone case, one fallacy of such arguments consisted in concluding that heavy polling for the APC in electoral precincts

150

located in Northern Sierra Leone or for the SLPP in Southeastern Sierra Leone constituted a pattern of ethnic voting (Salih 2001). If Northern Sierra Leone was the traditional homeland of Temnes and the region voted overwhelmingly for the APC, or vice versa for the case of the SLPP and Mendes in Southeastern Sierra Leone, then Temnes and Mendes, respectively, rejected the SLPP and the APC and were culpable of ethnic voting because the polling returns showed that the opposition party did not do as well in each of the opposing regions.

Subsequently, the inevitable conclusion reached was that ethnic identity was the major predictor of political behavior and vote choice in Sierra Leone and similar societies emerging from colonialism. Such claims were based on assumptions similar to that inherent in the opening quote attributed to Van de Walle (2003).

In view of such assumptions, the requisite empirical confirmation require observation of the outcomes of head-to-head electoral contests between Temnes and Mendes in Sierra Leone in order to ascertain this fact such that if in a given election a Temne candidate ran against a Mende candidate and the Mendes came out in uniform support for the Mende candidate while the Temnes came out in similar fashion for the Temne candidate then we have an actual ethnic census and a mere headcount of the ethnic identity of voters in the given electoral constituency should be sufficient in revealing the winner of the contest, and for that matter the winner of similar contests for the foreseeable future as long as the demographics of such locality held constant. However, the demarcation of electoral constituencies along lines of ethnic settlement, since colonial times, as a means of diffusing ethnic tensions preclude such electoral scenario for legislative elections in most of Sierra Leone. Additionally, former President Momoh, on assuming power in 1986, ensured that district lines were redrawn to reflect

151

the ethnic composition of the country (Hayward and Kandeh 1987, 36). As they point out, the action that Momoh took to redraw district lines was done primarily to forestall tensions in the more ethnically heterogeneous North.[74]

Thus, in any given election in Sierra Leone since the first multiparty elections for the legislative council in 1957, a typical electoral constituency in most of the 12 administrative districts of Sierra Leone ran several candidates from the same ethnic group but who represented different political parties; the choice for voters during most of the elections lie not between different ethnic groups but different political parties. Some examples of electoral constituencies from the 2007 elections underscore this point.[75]

Table 3.24 shows candidates for each of the two major political parties in the electoral constituencies were drawn from the same ethnic group. This pattern could be found across the country where the two parties fielded candidates. It is also consistent with the pattern in previous elections starting with the first competitive multiparty legislative elections of 1962 in which the APC and the SLPP first fielded candidates for seats in the legislature. Sometimes, the SLPP and the APC ran candidates from the same family in an electoral constituency as was the case during the 2002 elections in Port Loko

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[74] The electoral constituency of Koinadugu North is an exceptional case in point. During the general elections of 1982, electoral violence in this constituency, said to emanate from the competition between Fullahs and Yalunkas reached such brutish depths as to warrant cancellation of the elections in this district and their rescheduling. For a useful description of events within this district see Hassan G. Kamara. "Tribalism as an Obstacle to Nation Building. The 1982 General Elections in Koinadugu North Constituency and the Fullah/Yalunka Tribal Conflict" (Undergraduate thesis, Department of History, Fourah Bay College, University of Sierra Leone, 1991).

[75] I have employed information from the elections of 2007 here because it was available in national gazettes in the country during my field research. Complete constituency data for previous elections is much harder to access.

District when Ousman Kanu was on the SLPP ticket while his cousin Alpha B.S. Kanu was on the APC ticket.[76] Both emerged victorious and were elected to parliament since the elections were held using the proportional representation system. A similar case occurred during the 2007 elections in the Western Area Urban District of Constituency 112 when Hariatu Turay and her cousin Salamatu Turay, both Temnes were on separate tickets for the APC and the SLPP in a head-to-head contest for that electoral seat. It is difficult, thus, to justify claims of ethnic voting given the composition of most electoral districts and the candidate slates offered by the two major political parties.

Table 3.24

Select Electoral Constituencies and Candidates During the
Parliamentary Elections of 2007

Electoral Constituency	Candidates	Political Party	Ethnic Group
Kailahun 1	Alice M. Foyah	SLPP	Mende
	Joseph B.S. Jusu	APC	Mende
Kenema 13	Jeremiah Gendemeh	APC	Mende
	Bernadette Lahai	SLPP	Mende
Bombali 28	Abu-Abu A. Koroma	SLPP	Temne
	Abdul F. Serry Kamal	APC	Temne
Port Loko 54	Ahmed Kalokoh	SLPP	Temne
	Mohamed K. Kanu	APC	Temne
Pujehun 87	Ansumana J. KaiKai	SLPP	Mende
	Mustapha A. Swaray	APC	Mende
Bo 77	Mohamed E. Jalloh	SLPP	Fulla/Mende
	Victor Mbawah	APC	Mende

Source: Adapted from the Sierra Leone Gazette Extraordinary. 2007. Vol. CXXXVIII, No. 37.

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[76] In my interview with Alpha Kanu, he cited this as an example of political tolerance in Sierra Leone.

Political parties everywhere are about winning elections. In the famous words of Downs (1957, 28) "parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies," the emphasis being on 'winning elections.' Before seeking to formulate policies that will benefit members of their ethnic groups, parties must first win elections and to do so partly involves adopting the right strategies that will maximize its vote share among the electorate. Rationally, the APC and the SLPP will not seek to run candidates in electoral constituencies where their chances of winning are minimized by the perception that they are not true sons or daughters of the soil that will protect the welfare of those constituencies. Thus, in the case of Sierra Leone, assuming it is an open, free and fair election; no political party will transplant a candidate from a foreign locality and allow them to run on their party ticket in a new location. All politics is local and every political party heeds this axiom by recruiting locally in order to be competitive. Thus, given the correlations between regions, electoral constituencies and ethnic groups, the basic support underlying previous assumptions of ethnic voting is violated by the very nature of electoral constituencies in Sierra Leone. To put this into visual perspective, let us take a look at the ethnic map of Sierra Leone in Figure 3.2.

Indeed, notwithstanding advances in technology and refined methodology to undertake the empirical understanding of voting trends, the tendency to characterize political behavior in African societies along conventional conceptions of ethnically and regionally divided entities, with much disregard for the complexities inherent within such societies, has persisted. The analysis demonstrate some of the inadequacies inherent in such tendency by revealing the marked within group differences among the Mendes and Temnes, where, largely, none was assumed to exist, and their voting preferences for the APC or the SLPP during the 2002 elections.

154

Figure 3.2

Map Showing Ethnic Distribution in Sierra Leone

ETHNIC GROUPS

Source: Perry Castaneda Library Map Collection, University of Texas at Austin.
Available online at <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/sierra_leone_ethnic_1969.jpg

However, even when the appropriate approach is employed with the use of survey

data to draw conclusions about individual behavior in African societies such as Sierra

Leone, there could still remain the unanticipated probability of erroneously attributing

individual preferences to group choice. As an "identity variable" ethnicity could largely

be interpreted as an "issue variable" when describing political behavior in African

societies.

In the Sierra Leone case, ethnicity becomes an identity variable when it is what

defines the patterns by which the people of a particular district, region, town, or other

locality voted given correlations between such district, region, town or locality and their

ethnic identity and pattern of settlement. On the other hand, ethnicity is an issue variable if considerations for the preservation of the interests of any given ethnic group are the admitted and compelling reasons as to why electorates voted the way they did. If we go back to the examples of electoral constituencies I have referred to earlier, an analysis of survey data out of those areas asking the electorate how they voted is likely to reveal a largely skewed pattern of voting regardless of how the people voted. The results, if they turn out to be polling returns from Southern Sierra Leone would most likely reveal an SLPP victory showing Mende support for that political party as is likely to be the case for the APC in the North.

As an identity variable, ethnicity shows how people vote given their geographical distribution over an electoral constituency and their support for political parties within that geographical spread. Whereas as an issue variable, ethnicity shows *why* as a collective, electorates may have voted the way they did. The former could be determined by an assessment of aggregate data, which accordingly has resulted in charges of ecological fallacy leveled by scholars such as Mattes and Gouws against the works of Horowitz and others who largely saw ethnic groups in conflict following such assessments. A determination of the latter entails going beyond that outward appearance of mass support for political parties within the geographical areas and exploring more deeply, the linkages between the elected representatives and those whom they represent.

Thus, we must look beyond concerns for ecological inference by making necessary distinctions between how electorates may have voted and why they voted for the political party or candidate for which they voted. Next, I turn to an analysis of the role of elites in the electoral outcomes of 2002.

Elite Political Behavior: Getting out the Vote – Who Does What, Where and Why?

In 2007 I interviewed an executive committee member of the APC Party in the capital Freetown who was running for a parliamentary seat. He was very gracious with his time and paid a great deal of attention to my questions taking time to give his opinions and in the process shedding light on the political dynamics of the country around the time of the 2002 elections. But he was also evidently looking forward to leaving at the end of the one-hour interview time he had agreed to grant me. Towards the close of the interview, he intimated to me that he had a campaign engagement for his parliamentary bid that he could not afford to miss and given the long drive out of town, he needed to leave in good time so as to make the meeting. Since we were almost done and I did not have much more to ask him, I turned to the reason for his trip and asked why he was campaigning for a parliamentary seat; shouldn't his people automatically support his parliamentary bid as a prominent son from the area?" He paused for a couple of seconds as if the question I had asked did not make sense but being the politician, he calmly replied, "my son, this is politics, if you do not campaign for votes by reminding the people what you have done for them or telling them what you are going to do for them, you will lose elections. It's that simple."[77]

I considered his response to my question telling for several reasons. Firstly, here was a representative who was aware that the constituents he represents hold him accountable. In the framework of liberal democratic theory, what more could one wish for in a fragile democracy such as Sierra Leone than a governor who is answerable to the governed? But much more important for the focus of my research, the encounter

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[77] 2-3pm, February 7th 2007.

increased my curiosity to explore the boundaries that previous scholarship had placed around our understanding of the connections that have been argued exist between elites and the communities that support them in multiethnic African societies. Given the emphasis on explaining the communal and ethnic bases of party support in African politics (Van de Walle 2003, Berman Eyoh and Kymlicka 2004, Horowitz 1985, Salih 2001, 2003, Cartwright 1978 and others), I wondered why the elite I was interviewing could prioritize a campaign trip to his local community when their support for his candidacy should be a foregone conclusion as theoretically assumed. Following that interview, I included the question "why campaign?" as one of my key questions to elites of political parties during interviews and sought, on each occasion to understand why they mounted such vigorous political campaigns for elected office in communities where they are expected to receive unequivocal support.

Quite frequently, the answers I received from officials revealed their sensitivity to the fact that the expectations of the masses they represented were different and much higher than commonly assumed by the scholarship. One official told me that a year earlier, a delegation from one of the towns in his constituency had come to ask him to provide a generator to electrify their town because another member of parliament from another constituency bordering his had done the same for a town in his constituency. Another politician told me, rather boastfully, that he had constructed more wells for his constituency than any other member of parliament in the country but yet still his constituents were not satisfied and had been recently favoring one of his opponents. He referred to most of his constituents as ungrateful but then wistfully reminded me about the fluid nature of politics. A female aspirant for a parliamentary seat confided in me that a paramount chief in one of the chiefdoms in her constituency was against her candidacy

158

simply because she was a woman. The chief, she said, was holding meetings around his chiefdom on behalf of one of her opponents. She reassured me, however, that she was going to win the elections hands down because she was running the better campaign and the people of the constituency appreciate what her husband and her had done for them over the years by providing scholarships for numerous school children, paying hospital fees for those who could not afford to seek medical attention and a long list of other good deeds and benefits she had brought to the district. Also, she told me another reason why she will win the elections was because her main opponent in the elections was perceived as one of the most corrupt people in the country and everyone in the constituency knew of his dishonest dealings and record while in government. The aspirant in question was Mende and her husband that she was referring to was from another ethnic group. Other aspirants from urban areas cited unemployment and the demands from constituents to help them find jobs as the major pressure for constituency service.

These brief responses constitute a concise summary of the kinds of issues that typically engaged the attention of electorates and aspirants running up to the elections of 2007. More importantly, they reveal a political system predicated on elites that are accountable to their people and issue-demands that are similar to those typically pursued by the governed in advanced democracies. If concerns for the maximization of benefits to various communities were couched in ethnic terms as parts of the national discourse during this time, such concerns were never overtly stated in the way these other issues were set on the national plate.[78] In most ways, these issues and concerns were similar to

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[78] "Ethnicity, what ethnicity?" was the rhetorical response one political party elite gave me when I suggested to him what the scholarship has posited that ethnic identity was the primary bases of communal support for candidates. He told me that food and survival were much more important to the people than

what Hayward and Dumbuya claim occupied the minds of voters around the time of the elections in1982, twenty-five years earlier.

> In most constituencies, the major issue was what the various candidates could do for the people of the area. The answer to that question depended on many things including experience, past record, expectations that they might be appointed to a ministerial position (with increased resources to help the constituency), ties to the top leadership, education, and the candidate's reputation and respect in the area. (1985, 75)

This portrayal conflicts with traditional explanations, which, in addition, reflected an elite bias in the relationships, described between elites and their local communities (Miles 1988, Post and Vickers 1973, Chazan et al 1999). Previous scholarship maintained, for the most part, that the political processes in African societies are elite-led. Peil (1976) lamented this tendency pointing out that this elite bias resulted in an incomplete understanding of the politics of the area and potentially masked the ingenuity of ordinary citizens to "pick and choose their way through the alternatives" given to them by different political parties.

In this section of the chapter, I illustrate the political behavior of the political elites of Sierra Leone by describing the processes through which they mobilized the masses into following them around the time of the 2002 elections, the issues that they campaigned on and how these contributed to produce the outcomes of those elections. Political elites are the executive officers and officials who help organize support for the party at all levels including the local communities, villages and towns. Inclusion into the category of political elite is a factor of the individual's rank of membership within the political party, which is usually determined by the amount of contribution made to the

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ethnic identity and they will give their ballot to anyone who could guarantee that he or she will provide food security regardless of ethnicity.

party. Those who donate the highest amount of money to the party, in the case of the SLPP are the grand chief patrons followed and these are followed in party hierarchy by chief patrons, patrons. Simply buying a party card and paying monthly dues determine party membership.

To use the APC as an example, the executive of the party is organized into a national executive, regional board and a national advisory council. The highest level of party hierarchy within the APC is the national executive. The presidential candidate, national secretary general of the party and national chairman of the party, who is usually the presidential candidate all belong to the national executive. The next level down from the national executive is the regional board. Each board member on the regional board represents a region of the country such that there are four individuals on the board representing the North, South, East and West of the country. The national advisory council is next, below the regional board. All offices are filled through open election. The national executive wields the strongest influence within the APC party and serves as the party's executive secretariat. In the case of the SLPP, there is an executive committee membership that is responsible for the day-to-day running of the party. Most, if not all, political parties in Sierra Leone similarly follows this hierarchically organized system such that administrative authority within the party flows downwards from the party secretariat to the lowest level of local organization found at the chiefdom level. All political parties are headquartered in the capital Freetown, which is regionally considered a neutral ground. A Constitutional requirement in 1991 mandating all registered political

parties to maintain a presence in all 13 administrative districts of the country ensures that political parties have offices in all districts of the country.[79]

Political parties make a conscious effort to diversify not only their support bases within the general membership, but also their executive memberships. The executive membership rolls of all the political parties reflect some diversity. For example, even though the APC is considered a party of the Temnes, a Mende man, Victor Foh occupied one of the most influential positions within that Party as its secretary general leading up to the 2007 elections. Beyond tokenism, you can identify a deliberate effort by parties to broaden the bases of their support through the diversification of both their executive board and their mass membership. This statement implies, erroneously, that the parties had never maintained such broad bases of support in the past and had instead restricted both executive and general membership mainly to their ethnic constituencies. Nevertheless, an analysis of the historical roots of the political parties in Sierra Leone will reveal that Siaka Stevens, the founder and longtime leader of the APC that is alleged to be a party of Temnes was a founding member of the SLPP, which is alleged to be a party of Mendes. Further, Stevens' initial desertion of the SLPP in 1958 was to form the People's National Party in collaboration with Albert Margai, who was not only Mende, but was also the brother of the Prime Minister and leader of the SLPP at the time, Sir Milton Margai. Following the resolution of differences between the Margai brothers,

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[79] As further proof of evolving trends, most political parties now maintain a virtual presence on the World Wide Web. It is little more challenging for parties to try to reach out to a global audiences while at the same time maintaining potentially exclusive messages of securing ethnic interests among a diverse electorate. Some party websites include: SLPP http://www.slpp.ws/; APC http://www.apcpartysl.org/; and the PMDC http://www.pmdcsl.net/

Albert Margai returned to the SLPP fold while Stevens continued on to found the first

post-independence opposition political party of significance, the APC.

One of the interesting ironies in the picture of party formation in the 1960s was

that Stevens was a Limba who was born and raised in Mendeland. He had never lived in

Temne country before, yet the political party that he founded came to be permanently

identified with the protection of Temne interests. With the exception of Dixon-Fyle and

Conteh-Morgan (1999) most commentators fail to point out the major falling out between

Stevens and some Temne elite in 1973 that led to the execution of Ibrahim Taqi and

others, most of who were emerging young elites from the Temne ethnic group (Conteh-

Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999,81).

It is important to point out that there are distinctions between how campaigns are

conducted for the presidency and for seats in the country's parliament, although the

differences in both kinds of campaigns did not appear to have a major effect on the

behavior of voters during the elections of 2002.[80] In addition, there are also differences

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[80]The differences in campaign strategy and message between presidential and parliamentary campaigns

appeared to have varying effect on the behavior of the electorate as well as the electoral fates of political

parties taking part in the elections. Voters, it appeared, made a distinction between the heads of the smaller

political parties and the parties they led whereas it appears that no similar evaluation was made of the larger

parties. To cite a few examples, it appears that voters who voted for Ernest Koroma and his APC party did

not make a distinction between his presidential candidacy and the party that he led in the elections as the

APC won 20 percent of the national votes and Koroma won 22 percent of the votes. Tejan Kabbah won 70

percent of the national votes and his SLPP party also won about 70 percent of the votes. In the case of the

smaller parties, Raymond Kamara of the Grand Alliance Party came in sixth among the presidential

candidates while his political party polled the fourth highest number of votes from the electorate.

between how campaigns are conducted for primary elections for parliamentary seats and general elections for those same seats. Typically, the broader national constituency in presidential elections necessitates the tailoring of strategy and a campaign message that is different both in substance and focus from the more localized messages of parliamentary elections. The strategy adopted by former President Kabbah during the 2002 elections that I will describe subsequently for illustration is a good example. In parliamentary elections, quite similar messages from all political parties are localized to fit the aspirations of the people within the district. The discussion will also examine assumptions about the bases of political party support and the relationships between elites of political parties and the masses they are said to mobilize into politics, sometimes dangerously.

In Sierra Leone the process through which political elites are elected for legislative office typically begins with campaigns for primary elections that generally take place within a localized context of electoral constituencies modally consisting of no more than five paramount chiefdoms spread out over a radius of about 50 miles or less. Political parties recruit candidates locally to run on party tickets within each constituency.[81] Often, an important consideration of such recruitment is the popularity and affinity of the candidate with each electoral constituency, which could, in turn, be

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[81] This statement should not be taken to imply that all candidates are recruited primarily within the communities that they represent. Quite often, candidates return home from studies overseas to become representatives of their people. During the one-party era of Siaka Stevens, it was not uncommon for him to court the support of young, well-educated politicians by encouraging them to run in their districts of origin. The former Minister of Agriculture, Aloysius Joe-Jackson and others like Dr. Shekou Sesay all got their start through such mentorship from President Stevens.

dependent on factors such as the candidate's ties to ruling houses, successful

entrepreneurship within their community or sometimes, their record of academic

excellence.

All political parties conduct a process of primary elections where candidates make

their first pitch to the party members within their electoral constituency. Just like in the

United States, the successful candidate at the primary stage is one the party members

from within the electoral constituency believe has the best chance of winning in the

general election against other candidates, usually from the same ethnic group,

representing other political parties.[82] Nominated thus, it is expected that candidates have

legitimate chances to win elections within their electoral constituency because they hail

from within their constituencies; they know how and where to transmit important

messages within the constituency for maximum effect.

Campaigns generally take the forms of "conscientization tours," campaign rallies,

meetings with party faithful, door-to-door campaigns and posting of campaign flyers and

billboards with electoral promises from candidates.[83] Loud music, singing, merriment and

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[82] The process is often vulnerable to manipulation at this primary stage. Sometimes, it is the case that the preferred candidate of the party executive at the national level is not the preferred candidate of the constituents at the local level. National executives who try to circumvent the process by arbitrarily imposing their choice of candidate on the members of the constituents risk losing the vote of those constituents as it happened in Constituency 87 in Pujehun District where an otherwise 'safe' constituency for the SLPP was carried by the opposition PMDC because the SLPP candidate, Ansu KaiKai was not the preferred choice of constituents at the primary stage. Following the election, it was revealed that most constituents who had planned to vote for the SLPP switched their votes to the PMDC and the APC in protest.

[83] I have described the norm of political campaigns within constituencies. There are a few exceptions of electoral constituencies inhabited by more than one ethnic group where the competition takes place between candidates from different ethnic groups.

dancing often accompany most campaign rallies. Recently, moderated debates have been added to the repertoire of campaign events. During the months leading up to the parliamentary and presidential elections of 2007, the British Broadcasting Corporation, Westminster Foundation for Democracy and civil society groups and non-governmental organizations conducted three presidential debates and no less than one radio debate each per constituency in all electoral constituencies across the country.

Conscientization tours, in a sense, are illegal. Usually, they take place before the National Electoral Commission declares the commencement of the legal campaign period. Conscientization tours consist of clandestine meetings with constituents around the electoral constituency, offering gifts and canvassing support all in very hushed tones. Under the conditions of the 1991 Constitution, no political party or candidate can engage in such activities before the National Electoral Commission declares the campaign season open but most political parties violate this law in order to get any advantage they can on their opponents. Campaign rallies take place following the official declaration of the start to the campaign period. In order to avoid clashes that have occurred in the past between opposing parties and candidates, parties are each assigned special days during which they can organize and come out in open campaign. On such days, no official rallies or campaign activities of a similar nature should be undertaken by parties that are not designated to come out that day although they are allowed to continue campaigning in other ways. While conscientization tours usually take place in an atmosphere of mutual interest in the coming campaign, campaign rallies are huge public affairs where people come out to large open venues, preferably soccer fields to listen to the speeches and party programs of the party campaigning.

Crowd sizes at campaign rallies are never an accurate indicator of support for candidates or political parties. Some market women along a popular street in the capital Freetown, Kroo Town Road, reported to me that they received several different T-shirts from all the political parties. They confessed that they would attend any political rally more out of curiosity than a show of support for the party. I interviewed some street boys during the campaigns leading up to the 2007 elections who told me that the two major parties, the SLPP, the APC and several other parties have all approached them to recruit their services to go dancing at rallies and help swell numbers. In return, they were given money to buy food and promised jobs if the party won. According to the boys, election season meant good business for them because they felt important once more with all the politicians trying to win their support. Free food was also available everyday at rallies organized by different political parties and at the different headquarters of the parties. They boys were conscious that the politicians might not keep their promises after elections so they thought the best they could do was make good use of the present by getting as much as they could from the parties. Such developments are cautionary tales for those who tend to emphasize the intensity of political campaigns in societies such as Sierra Leone as an indicator of the intense rivalries that exist between communities in Africa. Other kinds of campaign events such as door-to-door meetings are personal in nature and are usually undertaken by foot soldiers hired by the political party or the candidates. On occasion, the foot soldiers of the party will invite the presidential candidate for the party or other important figures within the party structure to join them in a campaign event in their neighborhood.

There is rarely an overt ethnic tone to most campaigns for political office in Sierra Leone. As Cartwright (1978) points out, given the ethnic composition of Sierra Leone, no

one group predominates in terms of population size and campaigning using appeals to the ethnic group is an immediate recipe for inviting other ethnic groups to gang up against your party. One interesting development that takes place during presidential campaigns is the amount of turf protection that goes on. For example, during the campaigns for the 2007 presidential elections, there were several reports of the SLPP barring entry of other political parties, especially the APC, into areas of the country they considered part of their electoral base. The APC lodged several complaints to the National Electoral Commission about these "no-go campaign areas" in the South and East of the country. A point of note in such actions was that the SLPP really did not trust that their alleged support base would stay in their corner of the ring if other parties approached and campaigned to them. This distrust gives away the fact that the alleged ethnic bases of party support are not foregone conclusions.

Conducted thus, recent political campaigns afford constituents the opportunity to learn about the different choices and to make a decision between those choices. Contrary to the existing suggestions that voting decisions are a consequence of low information, the evidence from the case of Sierra Leone points to an atmosphere in which any messages put out by candidates were amplified both by the improvements in technology and the dexterity of candidates in knowing where to put those messages. A British Broadcasting Corporation poll conducted in the country between 2006 and 2007 found out that over 80 percent of the people had access to radio "and the majority of those with access reported listening to the radio every day or almost every other day." (BBC World Service Trust and Search for Common Ground 2007) This finding supports a similar finding from my survey, which showed that a similar percentage of the respondents cited radio as the major source of their information and that it was utilized more than family

and friends, word-of-mouth or "bush radio," alternative sources of information that are often considered a major source of erroneous information.

In presidential campaigns, the electoral constituency is the entire nation. The party primary process, just like in the United States, seeks to vet and nominate the candidate that the party faithful believes has the best chance of winning the presidency, even though this part of the process is open to much manipulation. In the recent era of open, contested, multiparty elections, a favorite strategy of political parties is to balance the ticket through the nomination of candidates from either the two heavily polarized regions of the country, or from what is believed to be the two most antagonistic political foes in the country –the Mendes and the Temnes. It is interesting that in the months leading up to the 1996 elections, after the military National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) lifted the ban on political parties and cleared the way for multiparty elections, party leaders within the SLPP, which is said to draw most of its political support from the Mende ethnic group, approached Dr. John Karefa-Smart, a Temne or Loko (depending on who is talking) as the first choice to head their party ticket as presidential candidate. Karefa-Smart declined the offer citing that he was once passed over for the position in 1964 following the death of Sir Milton Margai, the country's first leader. Tejan Kabbah, a Mandingo/Mende, emerged eventually as a replacement for Karefa-Smart. Karefa-Smart went on to form his own political party, the United National People's Party (UNPP). Both candidates met in the runoff elections of 1996 at the helm of their political parties, which Tejan Kabbah won with the SLPP.[84]

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[84] Interview with Dr. Mohamed Dabo

Another gap between the evidence and previous explanations is the assumption that group benefits accruing from the center were equally distributed among all groups within the community. In order to gain a fuller picture of the distribution of group benefits and how the support system works for candidates within their local communities I will borrow from Richard Fenno's work (1977) on how members of the American Congress function within their congressional district.[85]

In his seminal work on members of the United States Congress, Fenno argued that representatives saw their congressional districts in four different circles. The broadest circle consisted of the geographic district followed by the circle of electoral supporters, primary supporters and finally, the closest inner circle consisted of the Representative's family members, close friends and family advisors. Parliamentarians in the Parliament of Sierra Leone do not necessarily view their constituencies in similar concentric circles as Fenno conceptualized, but they do have similar circles within which group benefits are distributed and a support system established along similar lines. In Sierra Leone, the broadest view of the Member of Parliament's constituency is the entire geographic constituency. These are the people who elect him or her and who form the legitimate bases of any claims or demands the MP makes on the central government. The MP asks for a well project, new school or road in the name of the constituency whether he or she delivers it to the constituency or not. In the absence of any ideological content to

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[85] Richard F. Fenno, *Homestyle: House Members in their Districts* (Boston: Little Brown, 1978). The analogy is not a faulty one because the goal is to describe how elected representatives, in a very broad sense, represent the represented. Even though much scholarship has portrayed politics in African societies as different, the essence of representation remains the same. Whether under one party rule or not, electorates in constituencies in Sierra Leone retained the opportunity to remove their elected representatives from parliament during elections. See Hayward and Dumbuya again for an elaboration of this point.

campaigns in Sierra Leone, the MP's constituency is also viewed as his or her electorate, those who will choose between them and another candidate. The support the electorate extends to him or her is not given but earned through similar sets of benefits and rewards system known as "constituency service" in American politics. He or she is expected to provide benefits to the constituency and the constituency reciprocates or rewards the MP with their votes.

Some discussions in previous works will have us believe that benefits to the district are not the significant factor in gaining reelection in the politics of societies such as Sierra Leone. During my time in the field, I followed activities within the parliamentary districts of some MPs for several months. I found constituents who reported to me when the MP from their area visited the constituency from Freetown, how long he or she stayed and what kinds of activities they undertook while in the constituency. I drove through the constituency of one MP where I was told he had not visited the constituency for over three months. During the 2007 elections, the MP in question lost his seat.[86]

It could be argued that the next view MPs have of their district is that similarly conceptualized by Fenno as the smallest circle of the MPs intimates consisting of his or her close friends and family members. These are his or closest supporters who, most times, are also his or her primary supporters. It is within this latter circle that most of the contentiousness of politics in Sierra Leone takes place. Often, one family member or "ruling house" as they call them will engage in almost fratricidal struggle for one position

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[86]In his defense, the MP in question was ailing and could barely walk when I paid a visit to his house in Freetown. According to him, he had just lost interest in politics and was now concentrating on getting well.

171

or another either in parliament or for a chieftaincy position. Often, struggles from one sphere of the politics within the constituency spills out into another sphere. A prominent local family that has lost the chieftaincy often tries to win the parliamentary seat for the constituency so that they are not left out. This is the case, for example, between the Mansaray family and the Marah family in Kabala Town in the North of the country. According to Chief Allie Marah, the Marahs are the senior family in the two-chiefdom headquarter town of Kabala but the Mansarays have recently tried to make claims to that position by supporting opposing candidates against the Marahs in every election both local and national.

The group benefits due to communal groups are never evenly distributed, if distributed at all. The rural districts I visited around the country are the poorest sections of Sierra Leone. I found a similar pattern in most districts. Often, the finest house in the major town in the constituency belonged to the MP from the area or to someone within his family or close friend. Most other people lived in the squalor of the post-war environment. One of my greatest surprises came when I visited the town of Binkolo, the hometown of former president Joseph Saidu Momoh, in the north. During Momoh's administration (1985-1992) rumors abounded about the numerous projects diverted to his hometown and much of the rest of the country envied the people of Binkolo for producing such a great son that was bringing so many benefits to their area. To my chagrin, when I visited Binkolo, I found no evidence of the lavishness that has been rumored to exist from Momoh's association with the town. He built a guesthouse in the outskirts of the town with tennis courts and a swimming pool; all were in ruins from disrepair by the time I visited, but besides the house there was nothing else to show for all the millions of dollars that Momoh had allegedly stolen from the coffers of Sierra Leone,

172

some of which should have gone to benefit his Limba people. Most of the inhabitants of the town detested the association with President Momoh saying that it was just a bad name for the town which did not see anything extraordinarily above what most other areas of the country received during Momoh's administration.

Most scholarship suggests that largesse accrued from the state flows down neatly to the ethnic community of the elite, but I did not find this to be true in the case of Sierra Leone. Benefits that tend to filter down to the constituency are the occasional road, sometimes a school or a local clinic, and similar such amenities. Other benefits like academic scholarships to study abroad most often end up in the hands of the family or extended family members of an MP.

Another gap in the scholarship is the assumption of group homogeneity among ethnic groups where the empirical evidence may suggest otherwise. In Sierra Leone, Mendes who inhabit the Southeast region and who, it is said, overwhelmingly support the SLPP do not in reality share the same interests both politically and culturally (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999,79).[87] Culturally, Mendes in the Eastern region are initiates of the secret Poro society that often serve as the major socializing influence of male Mendes in that part of the country while the South maintains the Wonde society. There is much disagreement among Mendes as to which group has the better secret society; relations are sometimes strained between the two groups of Mendes. In terms of voting during elections, the assumption that the two groups support the SLPP unequivocally has not been subjected to empirical verification. It is not unrealistic, therefore, to expect that

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[87] A common lamentation in Mendeland that "Mendeman nor lek e kompin." Tanslated, it means a Mende man does not like his fellow Mende man, or Mendes are not united.

their interests may lie with different candidates during elections. A history of the founding of the SLPP does not provide any evidence to indicate that the founding of the party was partly due to a consensus between these two groups, which it is expected to be if the SLPP were the "ethnic vehicle" of the Mendes it has been argued to be by Kandeh (1992) and others.

Yet another shortcoming in previous discussions is that scholars largely portrayed ethnic communities in societies such as Sierra Leone as societies in which there were no free riders to collective actions for communal interests. One reality is that there was much free riding among various communal groups in Sierra Leone during the election period of 2002. What is often assumed to be communal action is really that of the action of a selected few from among the communities who are personally related to the candidates, or hired by them to provide "muscle" during elections campaigns as Hayward and Dumbuya (1983), pointed out.

To probe the previous point further, my survey instrument included a set of questions which asked respondents what kinds of activities they participated in during the period leading up to the elections when all the campaigns of the various political parties were under way. The six activities that were suggested included both conventional and unconventional forms of political participation namely: 1) whether they merely supported the party emotionally hoping it won the elections; 2) whether they attended a campaign rally or some other political event organized by the leaders of the political party they supported; 3) whether they made a financial contribution to the political party of their choice; 4) whether they actually voted for the political party; 5) whether they demonstrated for the party of their choice and 6) whether they got out the vote by trying to convince others to go out and vote for the political party that they supported.

I constructed an additive index to measure the levels of mobilization of ethnic groups across the country out of these measures of support. I categorized taking part in one or two actions as "low mobilization." Taking part in three to four actions as "medium" and taking part in five to six actions was categorized as "high mobilization." The index served to test the expectation that there were no free riders to communal mobilization and that all ethnic groups are highly mobilized in support of the political parties they support given assumptions in the extant scholarship. If this expectation has any veracity, then we will expect that a modal level of mobilization among ethnic groups will fall into the "high" category and this will occur across and within all ethnic groups. Table 3.25 below reports the results of this test for the five largest ethnic groups, those who consider themselves to be just Sierra Leoneans and not part of any ethnic group, and all other ethnic groups bunched into one category.

Table 3.25 shows differences in the levels of mobilization within and between the groups shown here. As is evident, the modal category for all groups is in the middle of the index where respondents reported participating in three to four actions in support of their political party of choice. The modal category within groups, as well, is in the Middle category of mobilization. Very respondents fall into the extreme category of high mobilization. One point that the results in the table above demonstrate is that there were free riders to various kinds of collective actions in support of political parties and their representative communal interests and that groups were not similarly mobilized going into the elections of 2002.

Table 3.25

Level of Mobilization of Respondents

| Ethnic Group of Respondent | Level of Mobilization (%) | | |
	Low	Medium	High
Mende	73	64	10
Temne	22	61	17
Limba	31	51	18
Krio	23	63	13
Kono	24	48	28
All other ethnic groups	33	49	18
I consider myself just a S/Leonean	18	58	24
Total	25	58	17

N =838

Pearson Chi2 (12) =27.8***   Likelihood Ratio chi2 (12) =27.5***

Gamma = .1323   Cramer's V = .1288

Note: ***P<. 001

Next, I examine the role of President Kabbah in mobilizing the masses into the

political process leading up to the elections.

President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah and the 2002 Elections

The final results of the 2002 elections symbolized a watershed development not

only for post-conflict environments, but also how scholarship may come to generally

understand elections in multiethnic societies and their implications for efforts at

democratizing in recent times. As the results show, one candidate, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah

and his party, the SLPP emerged victorious by garnering support across all ethnic lines and thus potentially reducing any lingering tensions following the civil war in the country. It is remarkable that several years on, not a single shot has been fired in the name of that conflict which engulfed entire communities in the country for over ten years. It is even more remarkable that in a multiethnic society conducting elections using the proportional representation electoral system, Kabbah and the SLPP were able to forge an electoral majority despite the expectation that the PR system typically induces the emergence of small parties representative of diverse shades of opinion.[88] Thus, an important question that this electoral outcome raises is why voters of diverse ethnic groups and local communities cast their votes overwhelmingly for Kabbah and his SLPP when candidates and political parties considered more representative of their ethnic groups and communities, given existing theories, were on the same ballot.

To answer this question, it is important to start by taking another look at Kabbah, his style of leadership and his worldview during his stewardship of the SLPP and Sierra Leone. Kabbah's role in steering Sierra Leone towards the peaceful outcome of the 2002 elections was not lost on even his political adversaries. An executive member of the opposition People's Democratic Party told me that Kabbah's calm demeanor, his policy of inclusiveness and his Muslim faith were all blessings to the nation of Sierra Leone during the turbulent times of the events leading to the ceasefire and the conduction of elections. Kabbah, he said, stayed very calm throughout the months of negotiations with the rebel Revolutionary United Front and because of this many people came to perceive him as a steady leader, a good captain of the boat of state during stormy weather and so

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[88] See Maurice Duverger

most concluded that he could be trusted at the helm of Sierra Leone for another term. The opposition figure told me that unlike other political leaders in the country and in Africa, Kabbah did not have any known enemies that he was sworn to destroy or vice versa. This made him a likeable national figure and preferable to the others that Kandeh (2003) refer to as "legion of certified scoundrels."

Regarding his policy of inclusiveness, the opposition figure also told me that since Kabbah assumed office in 1996, his cabinets were the most inclusive Sierra Leoneans had ever seen. His appointments for key positions in government included members of ethnic groups from all across the country. Even the leader of the PDP, the late Thaimu Bangura, was once a minister in Kabbah's government, the opposition leader told me. It was hard for voters not to like this kind of man, he added. Thirdly, the opposition figure concluded that Kabbah's Muslim faith also played a factor in his electoral victory because many Muslims identified with his religious faith and his title of "Alhaji," which in the Muslim faith represents a title of respect. Since the religious majority of Sierra Leoneans are Muslims, they also identified with Kabbah for this reason. (This latter claim, as we can see from above, is not supported by the analysis of the data earlier).

Kabbah, a lawyer by profession who was trained in the United Kingdom, returned to Sierra Leone in 1992 following almost 20 years as an international administrator in the service of the United Nations. Following his return to Sierra Leone, his first national appointment was chairman of the National Advisory Council set up by the military junta, the National Provisional Ruling Council, to advise on constitutional matters in the country with a view to revisit the 1991 Constitution of Sierra Leone. When the NPRC lifted the ban on political activities in 1995, Kabbah was elected president of Sierra

Leone in 1996 through an unlikely coalition with Thaimu Bangura, a Temne, who threw

his electoral weight and that of his support base behind Kabbah and the SLPP party that

drew the majority of its support from the supposedly rival Southeastern based ethnic

group of the Mendes.[89] With this coalition, Kabbah and the SLPP won the 1996 elections

with almost 60 percent of the votes. Given theories of ethnic voting, it was expected that

Bangura should have thrown his lot with Karefa-Smart the second-runner up that was on

the runoff ballot with Kabbah because, as Van de Walle argues, "less than the expectation

that they will benefit directly from the vote, citizens, [in this case Temnes] may feel that

only a member of their own ethnic group may end up defending the interests of the ethnic

group. If such theories have veracity, why did Temnes crossover to the SLPP and not the

UNPP given the supposed correlation of their interests with the latter?

Following his electoral victory in 1996, Kabbah was ousted in a military coup a

year later on May 25th 1997 and subsequently reinstated in 1998 only to see his

administration threatened with violent overthrow again in 1999 when the RUF invaded

Freetown. Agreeing to negotiate an end to the conflict, Kabbah signed an accord with

rebel forces in Lome Togo in July 1999. The Accord granted amnesty to all rebels and

gave both Foday Sankoh, the head of the RUF and Major Johnny Paul Koroma

unconditional pardons to return to Sierra Leone. Sankoh was offered a position in

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[89] A similar occurrence repeated in the 2007 elections albeit with different beneficiaries. Going into the
runoff between the APC and the SLPP party; Ernest Koroma and his APC party which, supposedly draws
most of its support from the Temne people of the Northern region, negotiated an unlikely coalition with
Charles Margai of the PMDC party, a rival party to the SLPP which draws most of its support from Mendes
in the Southeastern region of the country. The APC emerged victorious at the helm of this coalition, which
pitted Mendes against Mendes.

Kabbah's government as a government minister in charge of the mineral wealth of the country with a rank of vice president, which he accepted.

This was one of the instances that demonstrated Kabbah's policy of inclusiveness. He was willing to set aside all political differences, make concessions to opposing interests in the country and do anything necessary to bring to peace to people of Sierra Leone just like he had promised them in his swearing-in statement in 1996.

Jimmy Kandeh and some observers have attributed the overwhelming victory of Kabbah and the SLPP in the elections of 2002 to a referendum on Kabbah's presidency. One weakness in such claims is that there were other political parties on the ballot representing different shades of opinion. The other parties and presidential candidates campaigned across the country making promises about what they will do if elected, just like Kabbah and the SLPP did. Given the supposed ethnic bases of political parties and given the electoral promises of each political party, the theoretical expectation is that other ethnic groups would have failed to realize that their best interest lay in a common interest of voting for the SLPP because the pull of ethnic commitment to voting for candidates from one's ethnic group would have been much stronger.

Kabbah launched his bid for a second presidential term in April 2002 campaigning on a message that emphasized food security and the well being of all Sierra Leoneans. With the war officially declared over four months earlier, Kabbah also reminded voters of the need to consolidate the peace that the nation had recently achieved. For this task, he touted his past experience as an international civil servant with the United Nations. Two years later, his friend in neighboring Liberia, Madam Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, cited similar experience to capture the imagination of voters. Wherever Kabbah campaigned leading to the 2002 elections, he drummed home the message of his

international experience and the need to consolidate the peace, which he argued he was the most qualified to do. There were huge crowds welcoming the president at every campaign stop all across the country. In his appearances, Kabbah preached a message of national unity and inclusiveness and encouraged Sierra Leoneans to love each other.[90]

While Kabbah concentrated on these messages and sought to bring everyone on board towards the center of the state, most of his opponents chose to remind voters of the economic hardship in the country pinning the blame for such hardship on the incumbent government. The opposition also highlighted corruption and nepotism in state politics and tried to remind some voters of how deprived they were relative to other Sierra Leoneans. This inability to create an inclusive vision for all Sierra Leoneans is more indicative of the real reason why so many voters from all walks of life and ethnicity crossed those lines to cast their lot and their future for the next five years with the SLPP and Kabbah. The facts suggest that in a multiethnic electoral environment, the presidential candidate that preached a message of inclusiveness triumphed over others who preached messages of difference.

The role of former President Kabbah in steering Sierra Leone towards the peaceful events leading up to the elections of 2002 will be the focus of much more scholarly attention in the years to come as others are likely to engage it as an illustrative case study of consensus building in a multiethnic West African state.

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[90] Some of his exhortations in the lingua franca Krio for Sierra Leoneans to love each other become the stuff of jokes across the country because he could not correctly pronounce the Krio word "bad at," which translated literally means "bad heart" or to envy or hate somebody because of their achievements.

An Ethnic Census or a Vote for Peace, Development and Reconstruction?

The analyses of the data have provided insight into the political behavior of the mass electorates and elites of political parties in Sierra Leone leading up to the decisive post-conflict elections of 2002. From the onset of this analysis, the task was determining if the vote choices of Sierra Leoneans were indicative of a vote for peace, development and reconstruction or a vote for the respective interests of their ethnic groups? A verdict supporting any of the positions bears important implications both for scholarship and for policy. For scholarship, the findings matter in terms of understanding the boundaries that have been previously set around the understanding of ethnicity and politics in African societies. For policy, it mattered in view of the fact that the elections were an experiment by institutional designers to address what they believe were some of the root causes of the conflict, expressed partly by the reported marginalization of segments of the population of Sierra Leone. As they stood, the collective results of the 2002 presidential and parliamentary elections were a proxy variable that served to show whether the peace achieved through negotiations was acceptable to all, and whether the country was moving towards greater national consensus and cohesion or whether, as much of the established scholarship on political behavior in Africa had proposed, it was business as usual during elections.

As the analyses show, the findings confirm what was evident in the results and readily address the first concern. Wearied from the war, Sierra Leoneans from all communities across the country voted for peace in large numbers because they identified Kabbah and the SLPP as the candidate and the political party that were most likely to serve their concerns for security following the war and to undertake the imperative task

182

of national development and reconstruction. It is less certain if the vote was an ethnic census. Clearly, the variables for ethnic identity retained statistically significant relationships with the vote choice than was the case for the peace vote even when controlling for other factors such as development needs or the political party in question. This finding suggests that voting for peace, while a particularly strong predictor of who voted for the SLPP during the elections, was a finding that was not likely to be replicated. Unsurprisingly, five years later, in the elections of 2007, the major issue on the minds of voters changed to concerns about corruption in government. The SLPP was found guilty of fostering corruption and was duly voted out of office.

Further, the analyses suggest that what has previously been perceived as voting for the APC and the SLPP based on ethnic loyalties to those parties could actually be outcomes of the coincidences between ethnic identity and patterns of regional communal settlements across the country dating back to pre-colonial times. As it turns out, in all national elections up to 2002, no Mende has ever run against a Temne in direct head-to-head contests in parliamentary elections in any constituency across the country or even in presidential elections. As it turns out, the ideal conditions and the material evidence necessary to verify claims of communal adherence to patterns of ethnic voting in Sierra Leone have been nonexistent.

Regional correlations with ethnic identity have necessitated all political parties to throw up candidates for national elections who have been recruited from within each electoral constituency, which customarily turn out to be Mende or Temne as the case may be for most electoral constituencies in the Southeastern and Northern parts of the country. As the findings suggest, ethnicity has been much more indicative of an identity variable showing how Sierra Leoneans have cast their ballot but it has not been the reason why

they have cast their ballots the way they have, given that their ethnic interests alone could

reasonably be served by voting for any of the candidates running for either the APC or

the SLPP within their electoral constituencies. I next turn to an analysis of the Liberia

case.

CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL BEHAVIOR AND MOBILIZATION IN POST-CONFLICT LIBERIA

In June 1992 an all-party Task Force, established by the National Council of Churches of Kenya (the Wanjau Report) to investigate the causes of the clashes, submitted a report which noted that in many of the affected areas 'tribes, namely Kalenjin, Kikuyu, Luo, Luhyia, Kisii and Masai had co-existed peacefully and intermarried since pre-independence days. (Ajulu 1999, 110-135)[91]

Traditionally, democratization in sub-Saharan Africa has been linked to fears of spiraling ethnic conflict. Colonial powers used tribal organization of traditional societies as an excuse to delay the granting of independence, authoritarian African leaders after independence equated multi-party politics with ethnic conflict in a defence of military regimes and one-party states, and when the third wave of democratization reached Africa in the early 1990s, many expressed concern that democratization on the continent would politicize ethnic divisions and result in ethnic violence. (Bogaards 2007, 168-193)[92]

Introduction

Following numerous failed attempts at negotiating and sustaining peace

agreements among the various factions that sprouted during the civil war,[93] Charles

Taylor's departure from power in 2003 under pressure from the international community

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[91] Rok Ajulu, "Kenya: The Survival of the Old Order," in *Voting for Democracy: Watershed Elections in Contemporary Anglophone Africa*, ed. John Daniel et al. (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1999), 110-135.

[92] Matthijs Bogaards, "Electoral Systems, Party Systems and Ethnicity in Africa," in *Votes, Money and Violence: Political Parties and Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Matthias Basedau et al. (Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2007), 168-193.

[93] Dorina Bekoe lists sixteen failed ceasefire and peace agreements between 1989 and 1996 alone. See Dorina A. Bekoe, "Toward a Theory of Peace Agreement Implementation: The Case of Liberia," in Rose Kadende-Kaiser and Paul J. Kaiser, eds, *Phases of Conflict in Africa*, (Ontario, Canada: de Sitter Publications, 2005), 114-115.

and an unlikely coalition of rival Liberian warring factions finally paved the way to peace allowing that country to also hold its first truly post-conflict elections in 2005, two years after Sierra Leone held its elections. The results of those elections contrasted markedly with those from Sierra Leone and allow us to test the relative strength of dominant explanations in the literature which have largely maintained that voting in African societies is an expression of group identity instead of individualistic preferences for the positions of competing candidates.

Additionally, an empirical examination of the results of the election in Liberia allows systematic comparison with the Sierra Leone case enabling the first comparative determination of the salient variables that help explain why voters in Sierra Leone appeared to reach a consensus by voting overwhelmingly for the SLPP and Ahmed Tejan Kabbah while voters in Liberia appeared to fail to reach a similar consensus on any political party or presidential candidate during the first round of their post-conflict elections. More importantly, the comparison helps to identify the conditions under which political parties and candidates emerge during post-conflict elections that engender consensus given identified lines of cleavages in such societies that some scholars have argued preclude such outcomes (Daniel et al. 2007).

Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to undertake a post-hoc evaluation of the data from Liberia, as was done with Sierra Leone. As mentioned in the opening chapter to this dissertation, the contrasting voting outcomes from Liberia and the Sierra Leone are even more striking given the electoral systems that were employed by institutional designers for the two elections. We need not revisit the overall theoretical underpinnings of the dissertation in the opening to this chapter. Nevertheless, it is important to point out,

however briefly, some of the additional evidentiary gaps between the voting outcomes in Liberia and some expectations given theories in the existing scholarship.

As with the previous chapter, the analyses, observations and explanations that follow are based on evidence derived from the following sources: a) a national survey of a randomly sampled segment of the population of Liberia, N=910; b) interviews with elites of political parties at the national, regional and local levels; c) interviews with senior government officials especially those dealing with elections administration at the national, regional and local levels; d) interviews with local community elders; e) analyses of published materials including university theses and newspaper reports; f) interviews with members of civil society movements and staff of international and local non-governmental organizations across the country; g) and also, insight gained from long periods of 'soaking and poking' around the country.

In the main, the empirical evidence provides less support for an ethnic census. Instead, much of the evidence demonstrates that, in the post-war environment, more Liberians voted for political parties and inspirational individuals such as George Weah and Madam Johnson-Sirleaf whose candidatures held promise for real changes in their livelihoods. The evidence suggests further that the fact that so many candidates sprouted up to contest the elections points more to an electoral field of competent Liberians or, at least, those who thought they were competent to undertake the imperative tasks of national development and reconciling Liberia rather than an ethnically splintered country, as conventional wisdom would suggest.

Prior to the elections of 2005, Liberians experienced what ultimately turned out to be premature aspirations for lasting peace when they elected Charles Taylor president in a landslide in 1997, similar to what Sierra Leoneans bestowed on Tejan Kabbah and his

SLPP party in the post-conflict elections of 2002. Scholars such as Lyons (1999) and Harris (1999) offered what seemed at the time plausible explanations of the voting outcome as a desire for peace by the totality of Liberians who reasoned that if Charles Taylor did not win those elections, he would resort to war and destabilize the entire country all over again.[94] The seeming inevitability and scale of the violence that ensued in 1999 two years following the election of Taylor belies the logic of such explanations. One irony is that whereas it was claimed that Liberians voted for Charles Taylor hoping that as the most belligerent of all the parties to the conflict his victory would grant them a modicum of relief from war, Sierra Leoneans resisted all such inclinations when faced with similar choices in the elections of 2002. With the Revolutionary United Front on the ballot, Sierra Leoneans risked life and limb but the voting pattern that resulted ensured that the RUF did not win a single seat in parliament.

A remarkable point about the 1997 vote for Taylor is that given the socio-cultural milieu of various ethnic group identities in Liberia, which much of the scholarship has emphasized shape the political choices of voters, their congregation towards a locus of addressing their security needs in electing Taylor as Harris and Lyon posit, suggests a much more complex and much more calculated decision-making process than what such voters have been credited with. The fact that the votes for the first truly post-conflict elections of 2005 took a very divergent turn buttresses this latter point. If we interpose the logic of the explanations of the voting decisions of the Liberian electorate during the elections of 1997 on the elections of 2005, are we then to assume that Liberians desired

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[94] The phrase in the local Liberian lingua franca "you killed ma ma, you killed ma pa I vote for you" is said to be derived from those elections. Literally translated it means "you killed my mother, you killed my father, I will still vote for you."

peace in 1997 but did not in 2005 since they could not identify a single candidate to whom they could award a landslide vote?

One analytical challenge is that despite our desire for post-conflict elections to become turning points for the democratization of societies that have endured conflict, and in spite of advances in methodology for studying voting behavior, we are yet to systematically study and understand the political behavior of the electorate during such elections and, consequently, we just do not yet know what the electorates mean to say and whether the electoral outcomes are most indicative of a desire for peace or of persistent cleavages.

Another gap between theoretical explanations and the evidence offered by the final electoral outcome in Liberia is the fate of Weah who went from the frontrunner following the first round of voting to losing the second round of elections held on November 8.[95] Within less than a one-month time frame, from October 11 to November 8, the electoral fortunes of Weah changed rather dramatically in a society where voting preferences are assumed to be fixed. The remarkable note here is that given the predominant ethnic thesis, why did Weah ultimately lose the second round of the elections to Johnson-Sirleaf? The switch was dramatic enough such that in counties such as Nimba and Montserrado that Weah carried during the first round, Johnson-Sirleaf overturned those leads winning those counties by 77 percent and 55 percent, respectively (National Elections Commission of Liberia 2005). Harris (2006, 388-389) attributed the

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[95] Following the conclusion of voting for the first round of the presidential elections in Liberia, the Journal of Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy declared that "Mr. Weah had won 30 percent of votes against Johnson-Sirleaf's 20 percent with almost 90 percent of the votes counted. This meant that George Weah was favored to win the run-off vote on November 8, 2005." See "Key Transitions," in *Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy*, October 2005; 33, 10; Research Library pg. 21

vote switches to elite bargaining as some elites from those states placed their collective loyalties behind Johnson-Sirleaf during the intense maneuverings that took place between the two elections. An interesting point here is that some of the elites from those states who were credited for delivering the votes to Johnson-Sirleaf were also on the presidential ballot during the first round but failed to carry their states. Weah also bested Johnson-Sirleaf in five other states during the first round: Maryland, River Cess, Bong, Grand Bassa and Grand Cape Mount. He lost all but River Cess and Grand Cape Mount to Johnson-Sirleaf during the second round of elections. If indeed, it were a question of communal loyalty to supposed natives of those counties, why did individuals from those counties who were on the presidential ballot not carry their home counties during the first round of voting when their people had the chance to vote for them?

Consequently, instead of accepting indiscriminate explanations of group preference as important influences on the political behavior and mobilization of voters in Liberia, it is important to undertake an empirical examination of those patterns in order to understand more fully what voters really intended to say when they cast their ballots for the different candidates and parties. This chapter of the dissertation undertakes that task by presenting the results of the analyses of the survey data.

The 2005 Post-Conflict Elections in Liberia

After Charles Taylor was forced out of both the presidency and the political scene of Liberia, the various parties to the Second Liberian war (1999-2003) which included the Government of Liberia (GOL), Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), and various political parties signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Accra, Ghana on August 18

190

2003 under the auspices of President John Kuffuor of Ghana in his other role as head of the African Union at that time (Bekoe 2008; Levitt 2005).[96] The signing of the agreement was witnessed by a cross section of members of civil society in Liberia.

Following difficult negotiations lasting over three months, the stakeholders to the CPA agreed on a two-year transitional government leading to elections in 2005. Article 20, Sections 1a and 1b of the agreement provided that Moses Blah, the vice president to the deposed Taylor, precede the transitional government but step down on 14th October 2003 and allow the transitional government to assume office. Blah stepped down on the stipulated date making way for Gyude Bryant, a prominent Liberian businessman, to assume the executive duties of head of the transitional government. Bryant and other members of the transitional government would later be accused of gross misappropriation of public funds (Sawyer 2008, 180). The CPA stipulated that the term of the transitional government end on the third Monday of January 2006 with the inauguration of the next elected government of Liberia.

In addition to the establishment of an executive, other institutional arrangements under the CPA provided for the formation of a legislative assembly, a judiciary, an electoral commission and several other commissions consisting of members appointed by the various armed factions, political parties, and Liberian civil society using a pre-agreed formula (United States Institute of Peace 2003; Sawyer 2008, 179). An interesting condition imposed by Article 25 (4) of the CPA on the members of the executive membership of the transitional government including the Chairman Gyude Bryant, his

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[96]For a copy of this agreement and its details, see the United States Institute of Peace at http://www.usip.org/library/pa/liberia/liberia_08182003_cpa.html (Accessed December 29, 2008).

vice chairman, and all the principal cabinet ministers was that they would not run for any elective office in the elections that were to come in 2005. David Harris argues that this stipulation proved very strategic later in establishing a political space that was relatively devoid of any direct undue influence by the membership of the transitional government (Harris 1999, 376). Amos Sawyer (2008) made a similar observation that the absence of an overbearing incumbent during the elections in 2005 made for a confident electorate relishing the opportunity to exercise their free will, for the first time, in electing who shall rule them.

Except for as yet unsubstantiated allegations and rumors of corruption (Sawyer 2008, 180), the stewardship of Gyude Bryant and the National Transitional Government of Liberia from 2003 up to their handing over of the reins of government in 2006 was largely uneventful. Working with a United Nations Force of over 15,000 that was similar both in mandate and composition to the United Nations Force that had successfully supervised the peace operations earlier in Sierra Leone, Bryant and the transitional government oversaw preparations for legislative and presidential elections as agreed upon in the CPA of 2003. It can be said that Liberia benefited greatly from the roadmap established by the experience the international community gained in Sierra Leone two and a half years earlier. This experience included tried and proven steps towards demobilization and reintegration of former combatants leading to elections. For one, organizing post-conflict elections of that magnitude in that part of the world was no longer unfamiliar territory for institutional designers and stakeholders to the peace in Liberia. But for the number of armed antagonists to the conflict and the absence of an incumbent on the political scene, the conditions were quite similar and conducive to replicating what had worked in Sierra Leone.

Overall, the broader campaign themes that subsumed all tendencies and messages from the political parties and candidates were the rebuilding, reconciliation and post-war development of Liberia. All candidates tried to position themselves as the most competent to carry out these tasks in the eyes of the electorate. In doing so, the campaign platforms of the various political parties blurred. Harris (2006, 378) comments, "little separated the parties in terms of their political platforms. Poorly articulated desires for good governance, development and reconciliation were standard fare."

Most Liberians I interviewed about their recollections of Election Day on October 11 2005 told me it was a joyous occasion for them. Their recollections of the day were devoid of the fear and intimidation that had overshadowed previous elections in the country such as those of 1997 in which Taylor got elected, or for those who were old enough to vote, the questionable elections of 1985 that Samuel Doe supposedly won. Interestingly, whereas most Sierra Leoneans I interviewed expressed joy at the cessation of the war that allowed them to pick those who will represent them, Liberians expressed a sense of apathy with the candidate pool of presidential candidates that I did not detect in Sierra Leone. Most were glad at the opportunity to vote again but they did not express optimism that the crop of leadership will be any less corrupt than previous leaderships whose actions had led them down the road to civil war.

Like Sierra Leone two years earlier, many of the activities leading up to the elections on October 11 and immediately after went as planned. Again, the process seemed to have benefited from the previous experience the international community gained in Sierra Leone. There were few problems. Some raised concerns regarding the large number of potential voters among Liberian refugees who could not register to vote. The ballots cast by about 25,000 internally displaced Liberians for members of the

legislature were also invalidated when they were prevented from casting votes in the counties in which they had registered. The eligibility of some presidential candidates was challenged in several court cases. Resolutions were handed down late by the Supreme Court in favor of some of the candidates whose names were left off the ballot. A potentially crippling logistical crisis in reprinting ballots to include their names was averted when they decided not to run in the elections (Harris 2006, 380).

Some stakeholders criticized the timing of the elections around the rainy season when a huge proportion of roads in Liberia are impassable (Harris 2006, 379). Others such as the former head of state, Amos Sawyer questioned the pace of the transition from the signing of the peace agreements to holding elections as too fast and not giving enough time for the country's electoral body to adequately prepare for the election. It turned out that these fears were largely unfounded given that the elections went mostly as planned.

Finally, there was the problem of voter awareness. For an electorate that had not voted in about eight years, or arguably never voted in completely transparent and violence-free elections, this problem was manifested by the considerable numbers of voters who could not comprehend the ballot papers they were given to cast (Harris 2006, 381). Some of the younger population had never voted. Regardless of these problems, for a country recovering from civil war, the elections went quite well as no major incidents occurred that threatened to derail the overall process.

Frances Johnson-Morris, the chairperson of the National Elections Commission announced the results of the vote on October 26, 2005. No presidential candidate gained enough votes, the required 50 percent plus one votes stipulated in the electoral laws, to claim outright victory. Table 4.1 below reports the details of the results for the election

for the Liberian National Assembly. As the table shows, no party won enough seats close

to the minimum required in forming a majority in any of the houses in the legislature.

Table 4.1

Results of the 2005 Legislative Elections in Liberia

Political Party/ Coalition	Senate Number of Seats	House of Representatives Number of Seats
Coalition Transformation Liberia (COTOL)	07	08
National Patriotic Party (NPP)	04	04
Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)	03	05
Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)	03	15
Liberty Party (LP)	03	09
Unity Party (UP)	03	08
National Democratic Party Liberia (NDPL)	02	01
All Liberia Coalition Party (ALCOP)	01	02
National Reformation Party (NRP)	01	01
New Deal Movement (NDP)	-	03
United Democratic Alliance (UDA)	-	01
Independents	03	07

Source: Africa Elections. http://africanelections.tripod.com/lr.html. (Accessed December 29, 2008)

Weah's Congress for Democratic Change won 15 seats, the highest number of

seats in the House of Representatives but could not manage a similar result in the

elections for the Senate where the Party placed third with three seats behind Varney

Sherman's Coalition for the Transformation of Liberia (COTOL) with seven seats and

Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Party with four seats. The Unity Party whose

presidential candidate would eventually win the elections was equally disadvantaged and

rather handicapped by the outcome. With only eight seats in the House of Representatives

and a paltry three seats in the Senate, the UP would need a lot of bargaining and

cooperation from other political parties in the legislature to get its proposals passed. The results of the elections for president were equally splintered as those for the legislature.

The elections results in Table 4.2 show the splintered nature of the votes Liberians cast in their choices for president in the elections of 2005. Ten candidates on the presidential ballot gained less than one percent each of the national votes cast. Most could not best Weah, the frontrunner in the first round of elections even in counties from which they hailed. Weah won 28.3 percent of the votes in the first round leading Johnson-Sirleaf, who placed second with 20 percent of the votes.

Table 4.2

Results of the 2005 Presidential Elections in Liberia

Presidential Candidate	Political Party	First Round		Second Round	
		Votes	%	Votes	%
George Opong Weah	CDC	275,265	28.3	327,046	40.6
Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf	UP	192,326	19.8	478,526	59.4
Charles Brumskine	LP	135,093	13.9		
Winston Tubman	NDPL	89,623	9.2		
Varney Sherman	COTOL	76,403	7.8		
Roland Massaquoi	NPP	40,361	4.1		
Joseph Korto	LERP	31,814	3.3		
Alhaji G.V. Kromah	ALCOP	27,141	2.8		
Togba-Nah Tipoteh	APD	22,766	2.3		
William S. Tubman	RULP	15,115	1.6		
John Morlu	UDA	12,068	1.2		
Nathaniel Barnes	LDP	9,325	1.0		
Margaret Thompson	FAPL	8,418	0.9		
Joseph Woah-Tee	LPL	5,948	0.6		
Sekou Conneh	PRODEM	5,499	0.6		

Table 4.2 – Continued

Presidential Candidate	Political Party	First Round Votes	%	Second Round Votes	%
David Farhat	FDP	4,497	0.5		
George Kieh, Jr.	NDM	4,476	0.5		
Armah Jallah	NPL	3,837	0.4		
Robert Kpoto	ULD	3,825	0.4		
George Kiadii	NATVIPOL	3,646	0.4		
Samuel R. Divine Sr.	Independent	3,188	0.3		
Alfred Reeves	NRP	3,156	0.3		

Source: African Elections. http://africanelections.tripod.com/lr.html (accessed December 29, 2008).

Five presidential candidates from Lofa, running on the tickets of five different political parties, all fared poorly. Roland Massaquoi, one of the presidential candidates from Lofa and the flag bearer of Charles Taylor's former party, the National Patriotic Party, performed better than the other candidates from Lofa. But even he could not manage to poll five percent of the national votes. This fact is even more remarkable given that the National Patriotic Party had controlled the greater heartland of Liberia during the war period with thousands of young fighters under its command and in spite of some residual concerns for Taylor's interference by remote control from outside the country.

Was the diffusion of their votes among so many candidates and political parties an ethnic census or something else? The Carter Report would later describe the entire conduct of the elections as an outcome of the "demonstration of strong desire for peace by Liberians" (Carter Center Report on Liberia 2005). If we accept this conclusion and compare it to that referenced in the previous chapter by Jimmy Kandeh (2003) on Sierra Leone, could the voting patterns in two similar societies desiring peace be so divergent

and yet mean the same thing? Table 4.3 shows political parties that won in each county in the elections for president, Senate and the House of Representatives.

Table 4.3

Political Party Victories by Counties – Elections of 2005

County	President	Senate	House of Representatives
Bomi	UP* UP**	NDPL; COTOL	3 Seats: COTOL; NDPL; CDC
Bong	NDPL* UP**	NPP; Independent	6 Seats: UP; NPP; LP; NPP; CDC; NDM
Gbarpolu	UP* UP**	NRP; UP	3 Seats: NRP; LP; UP
Grand Bassa	LP* UP**	Independent; LP	5 Seats: LP; LP; LP; LP; LP
Grand Cape Mount	COTOL* UP**	NPP; NPP	3 Seats: COTOL; COTOL; COTOL
Grand Gedeh	CDC* CDC**	NDPL; COTOL	3 Seats: NDM; Independent; CDC
Grand Kru	CDC* CDC**	COTOL; APD	2 Seats: APD; COTOL
Lofa	UP* UP**	COTOL; ALCOP	4 Seats: LP; ALCOP; ALCOP COTOL
Margibi	UP* UP**	LP; CDC	6 Seats: Independent; UP; CDC NPP; Independent; UP
Maryland	NDPL* UP**	UP; UP	3 Seats: APD; UP; NPP
Montserrado	CDC* UP**	CDC; CDC	14 Seats: 9 Seats to CDC; UP Independent; LP; Independent

198

Table 4.3 – Continued

County	President	Senate	House of Representatives
Nimba	CDC* UP**	Independent; COTOL	6 Seats: UP; COTOL; COTOL NDM; CDC; UP
River Cess	LP* CDC**	UP; LP	2 Seats: Independent; UP
River Gee	CDC* CDC**	COTOL; COTOL	3 Seats: CDC; APD; LP
Sinoe	CDC* CDC**	APD; APD	3 Seats: UDA; APD; APD

Source: Compiled from National Election Commission of Liberia. 2005 Election Results.
www.necliberia.org .
*Won the first round of the election for president
**Won the second round of the election for president
Please refer to the list of abbreviations for political parties listed here.

Table 4.3 illustrates further the diffusion of votes among political parties in

Liberia following the elections of 2005. No political party won across the board in any

county in elections for president, Senate or House of Representatives. The closest parties

came to a sweep of the votes in counties were the CDC in Montserrado where the party

won the votes for president, the two senate seats and nine of the fourteen seats in the

House of Representatives. The Liberty Party of Charles Brumskine also swept the House

seats in his native Grand Bassa and Sherman's coalition, COTOL, did the same in his

native county of Grand Cape Mount, winning all three House seats.

Some political parties that were founded by native sons from several counties had

poor showings where, under ethnic census theories, they would be expected to derive

their greatest support. Several examples are evident. Running on the ticket of the New

Deal Movement, George Klay Kieh Jr. a professor of Political Science and the sole

199

presidential candidate in the race who hailed from Margibi County lost that county to Johnson-Sirleaf. The New Deal Movement did not even win a Senate seat or seat in the House of Representatives for Margibi County, nor did Kieh even place third when the presidential results for his home county where tabulated. Margaret Tor-Thompson, the only other female presidential candidate in the race hailed from River Cess County and ran on the ticket of the Freedom Alliance Party. One would have expected that the publicity from her being one of the two female aspirants in the race would have translated into votes in her home county with support from her community but that support did not materialize. Instead, Brumskine won River Cess in the first round of the elections and Tor-Thompson did not even place among the first three. Johnson-Sirleaf placed third in that county. The Freedom Alliance Party also did not win a single seat in the legislature from River Cess County.

Yet, another example is the case of Joseph Korto, the sole presidential candidate from Nimba County who ran on the ticket of the Liberia Equal Rights Party. Korto lost Nimba County in the first round of voting to Weah, albeit narrowly by less than one percent of the votes. But it was still a telling fact because he was the sole presidential candidate who hailed from Nimba and the ethnic thesis would have had the people of Nimba throwing their weight behind him. Also, LERP did not win a single seat in Nimba for the legislative elections of 2005. Joseph Woah-Tee of the Labor Party of Liberia and Samuel Divine, an independent presidential candidate, are also cases in point. Woah-Tee, who hails from Bong, was the sole presidential candidate from that county but during the first round of the election, he lost the county and did not even place among the first three. Instead, Winston Tubman of the National Democratic Party of Liberia, an Americo-Liberian who had spent most of his time out of the country, placed first in a county where

an African-Liberian was running as the sole candidate for president. Divine's case is a little understandable because he hails from the very populous urban and cosmopolitan county of Montserrado that includes the capital Monrovia. Any edge he might have had as a native son of Montserrado was swept aside by the super stardom of Weah and the appeal of Johnson-Sirleaf who placed first and second, respectively, in the county following the first round of elections. Given explanations of communal voting in African societies and the much hailed "big person" of patronage networks rooted in local communities (Randall 2007; 89-92), the evidence from these cases are contradictory and even confounding.

Mass Political Behavior in Liberia: Support for Political Parties and Vote Choice During the 2005 Elections

As in the previous chapter, my aim now is to use appropriate methodology that has been applied to the study of voting behavior to examine and explain the voting patterns that emerged following Liberia's post-conflict elections of 2005. In analyzing the 2005 elections, I will start with tests of association between the independent variables and the dependent variable of vote choice for political parties. Following this step, I utilize logistic regression with calculated probabilities to analyze the vote choices for political parties by respondents from various ethnic groups in order to identify any within-group differences that exist among members of the same ethnic groups.

As in the previous chapter, I will also start here with an examination of the relationship between ethnic identity and the vote choice, the vote choice being the political parties and presidential candidates that Liberians supported during the elections of 2005. Here too I sought to verify the nature of any potential relationships between

variables reflecting ethnic group identities and political parties and candidates for which respondents to the surveys voted. The dependent variable "vote choice" and the explanatory variable "ethnic identity" were similarly measured as in Sierra Leone by asking respondents to self identify with one of the sixteen ethnic groups in Liberia. Table 4.4 produces results of the test of the hypothesis that there is a statistically significant relationship between ethnic groups in Liberia and the candidates or political parties for which they voted during the post-conflict elections of 2005.

Table 4.4

Survey Result: Ethnic Identity and Vote Choice in the
Liberian Legislative Elections of 2005

					Political Party							
	ALCOP	CDC	FAPL	FDP	LAP/ COTOL	LDP	LERP	LINU	LP	LPL	LPP/	Totals
Ethnic Groups					Vote counts among respondents from each ethnic group							
Bassa	-	25	3	2	2	-	-	-	101	-	5	138
Bella	-	6	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	8
Dei	-	5	-	-	6	1	-	-	-	-	1	13
Gbandi	2	4	-	1	2	-	-	4	-	-	1	14
Gio	-	9	-	-	2	-	2	-	1	-	-	14
Gola	-	10	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	13
Grebo	-	24	1	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	1	28
Kissi	-	7	-	1	2	-	-	-	2	-	1	13
Kpelle	1	31	3	-	2	-	-	1	10	-	2	50
Krahn	-	24	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	3	31
Kru	-	52	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	5	62
Loma	-	21	2	-	1	-	-	-	6	-	1	31
Mndgo	16	3	-	-	2	-	-	-	1	-	2	24
Mano	-	12	2	-	3	-	4	-	5	1	3	30
Mende	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	2
Vai	2	8	1	-	13	-	-	-	-	-	-	24
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Just/Lib	-	13	-	2	-	1	-	-	9	-	-	25
Totals	21	255	14	7	36	3	6	5	146	2	25	520

Table 4.4 – Continued

Ethnic Groups	NVPL	NDM	NDPL	NPL	NPP	NRP	PDP	RULP	ULD	UP	Totals
					Political Party						
				Vote counts among respondents of each ethnic group							
Bassa	-	1	1	-	2	2	-	-	-	27	33
Bella	-	1	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	3	7
Dei	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	8	10
Gbandi	-	-	-	4	1	-	-	-	-	7	12
Gio	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	6	10
Gola	-	2	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	5	11
Grebo	-	-	5	-	1	-	-	1	1	15	23
Kissi	-	1	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	19	22
Kpelle	7	1	48	-	18	-	-	-	-	35	109
Krahn	-	-	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	12
Kru	-	1	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	16	21
Loma	-	2	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	26	31
Mndgo	-	-	-	-	1	-	4	-	-	7	12
Mano	-	-	2	-	1	-	4	-	-	7	14
Mende	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	5
Vai	-	1	1	-	-	-	2	1	-	6	12
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	3
Just/L	-	-	6	-	2	-	-	-	1	10	19
Totals	7	10	73	6	34	4	14	1	2	226	366

Pearson Chi-Square (357) = 1.637***

Cramer's V =.327***   Lambda =. 236***

N=900

Note: ***Significant at p<0.001

With the exception of members of the Bassa ethnic group who awarded three-fourths of their vote to the Liberty Party of Brumskine, a leading politician in Liberia who identifies with Grand Bassa County, the discernable pattern from the table above is that ethnic groups in Liberia did not display much allegiance to political parties whose leaders hailed from their counties. Of particular note are the Grebo vote, the Krahn vote, the Kpelle vote and the Mandingo vote. Data from the table shows that all these groups

did not ally themselves solely with political parties that identify with their administrative regions and counties of origin. Rather, their votes were spread almost evenly among the parties. In the case of the Krahn, one would expect that their votes would have gone in overwhelming numbers to the National Democratic Party of Liberia, the party founded by Samuel Doe, the former head of state who hailed from Grand Gedeh, the homeland of the Krahns. Doe is credited as the individual who single-handedly elevated Krahns from relative obscurity in the political landscape of Liberia to major administrative positions in the national government. Instead, the Krahn vote was seen spread across the board with a sizeable portion going to Weah's Congress for Democratic Change. One pattern from the figures above is that exceptionally popular personalities such as Weah and Madam Johnson-Sirleaf benefited the most from the dispersion of the votes as their political parties received votes across all ethnic groups. This revelation is consistent with the conclusions reached by Harris, Sawyer and the Carter Report that personalities, more than political parties, mattered in the elections (Harris 2006, 382; Sawyer 2008, 182; Carter Report 2005, 12). Statistically, the p-value suggests that the relationships we see here between the two variables of vote choice for political parties and the ethnic identities of respondents are statistically significant and the observed pattern is not likely to have occurred by chance.

Next, I examined the relationship between ethnic groups and the presidential candidates for whom they voted during the elections of 2005. Table 4.5 reports the result of the Chi-Square test of association testing the relationship between the choice of presidential candidate as a dependent variable and the ethnic groups of respondents as the explanatory variable.

Table 4.5

Survey Result: Ethnic Identity and Vote Choice in the
Liberian Presidential Elections of 2005

	Barnes	Brmskne	Conneh	Divine	Farhat	Jallah	Sirleaf	Kiadii	Kieh	Korto	Kpoto	Total
Ethnic Group						Vote Count						
Bassa	-	103	-	-	2	-	28	-	1	-	-	134
Bella	1	1	1	-	-	-	3	-	1	-	-	7
Dei	1	1	2	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	-	12
Gbandi	-	-	-	2	-	4	7	-	-	-	-	13
Gio	1	1	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	2	-	10
Gola	-	1	4	-	-	-	5	-	2	-	-	12
Grebo	-	1	1	-	-	-	14	-	-	-	-	16
Kissi	-	2	1	-	1	-	20	-	1	-	-	25
Kpelle	-	10	-	1	-	-	36	7	1	1	1	57
Krahn	-	4	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	10
Kru	-	5	-	-	-	-	16	-	1	-	-	22
Loma	-	7	-	-	-	1	27	-	1	-	1	37
Mndgo	-	1	6	-	-	-	7	-	-	1	-	15
Mano	-	4	-	-	-	-	24	1	1	8	-	38
Mende	1	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	5
Vai	-	-	2	-	-	-	6	-	1	-	-	9
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	3
Just/L	-	8	-	-	-	-	11	-	-	2	-	21
Totals	4	149	17	3	3	5	231	8	10	14	2	446

	Kromah	Msquoi	Morlu	Reeves	Sherman	Tipoteh	MT-Th	TmanW	TmanV	Weah	W-Tee	Total
Ethnic Group						Vote Count						Total
Bassa	-	2	-	2	2	1	3	1	-	26	-	37
Bella	-	1	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	6	-	9
Dei	-	-	-	-	6	-	1	-	-	5	-	12
Gbandi	-	1	4	-	2	-	-	-	-	4	-	11
Gio	-	4	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	8	-	14
Gola	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	10	1	12
Grebo	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	8	2	23	1	36
Kissi	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	7	-	9
Kpelle	-	17	1	1	1	1	3	49	-	30	-	103

Table 4.5 – Continued

Ethnic Group	Kromah	Msquoi	Morlu	Reeves	Sherman	Tipoteh	MT-Th	TmanW	TmanV	Weah	W-Tee	Total
					Presidential Candidate							
					Vote Count							
Krahn	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	8	-	24	-	35
Kru	-	2	-	-	-	5	-	2	-	52	-	61
Loma	-	1	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	21	-	25
Mndgo	16	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	3	-	21
Mano	-	1	-	-	2	1	-	4	-	12	-	20
Mende	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	2
Vai	2	-	-	-	13	-	1	1	-	8	1	26
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Just/L	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	7	-	13	1	23
Totals	18	32	5	5	35	9	11	81	3	253	4	456

Pearson Chi-Square (357) 1.708***

N=904

Cramer's V =. 333***   Lambda =241***

Note: ***Significant at P<0.001; "Mndgo" represents "Mandingo;"
MT-Th= Margaret Thor-Thompson; Msquoi=Roland Massaquoi; Brmskne=Brumskine; TmanW=Winston Tubman; TmanV= William Tubman; W-Tee=Woah-Tee.

Similar to their votes for political parties, there also did not appear to be any bloc preferences for presidential candidates reflective of an ethnic census. Just as is the case with their respective political parties, the CDC and the UP, Weah and Johnson-Sirleaf emerged as the favorite presidential candidates among all the ethnic groups, even with ethnic groups such as the Gbandi and Mano from which other presidential candidates on the ballot hailed. The exception is the Bassa who preferred Brumskine and his Liberty Party two-to-one against all other candidates including the very popular Weah and Johnson-Sirleaf.

Why did the electorate vote as they did? In exploring the voting pattern, the survey instrument employed the same questions as those employed in the surveys on

Sierra Leone asking respondents why they voted for the particular political party for which they voted in the elections of 2005. Again, the answer choices were the same as those for Sierra Leone including: voting for a political party that was most likely to secure the interests of one's ethnic group against other ethnic groups, voting for a political party that was most likely to secure the interests of one's region (in the case of Liberia, counties); voting for a political party that was most likely to secure one's religious interests; and voting for a political party because it was the party of the "big person" from one's community or region of the country.[97] Additional answer options reflected a desire to vote for the political party most likely to maintain the peace and a desire to vote for the political party most likely to effectively undertake postwar reconciliation and reconstruction and development projects such as building schools, roads, and clinics. With similar justification, the answer scales were recoded as with the analysis for Sierra Leone earlier by converting responses into the two categories of "strongly agree," and "not strongly agree."

Ethnic Identity and Vote Choice

I begin with an examination of the association between a respondent's preference for a political party and their belief that it was the political party most likely to secure the interests of their ethnic group. Table 4.6 reports the results of the Chi-Square test of association.

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[97] Please refer to Chapter I for a description of these variables and explanations. I dropped two other potential explanatory variables that were explored in the surveys, those for "young generation" and "no reason at all" because, theoretically, their inclusion added the least explanatory value to the study. Their exclusion was also based on the need to keep the analysis manageable.

Table 4.6

Liberian Legislative Elections: Ethnic Identity and Vote Choice

What political party did you vote for in the elections for House and Senate?	"I voted for them because they represent the interests of my Ethnic group" (%)	
	Not Strongly Agree	Strongly Agree
ALCOP	48	52
CDC	84	16
FAPL	79	21
FDP	100	0
LAP/COTOL	94	6
LDP	67	33
LERP	50	50
LINU/UDA	40	60
LP	50	50
LPL	100	0
LPP/APD	72	28
NATVIPOL	100	0
NDM	100	0
NDPL	82	18
NPL	17	83
NPP	80	20
NRP	50	50
PDP	93	7
RULP	100	0
ULD	50	50
UP	85	15
Total	77	33
Pearson Chi-Square (21) = 128.7***		
N =903		
Cramer's V = 377***		

Note: ***Significant at p<0.001

The table shows that at 77 percent, more respondents did not strongly agree with

the statement that they voted for a particular political party because it was the party most

likely to secure the interests of their ethnic group. A discernable pattern is that more

respondents indicated that they voted for comparatively smaller parties such as ALCOP,

LINU and NPL because they believed these parties were the parties most likely to secure the interests of their ethnic group than was the case for parties such as the CDC and UP that garnered the most votes. The comparatively large Liberty Party led by Brumskine is an exception. An equal number of respondents who voted for the LP strongly agreed with the statement that it was the party most likely to secure the interests of their ethnic group as those who did not strongly agree with the statement. The size of the Chi-Square tells us that the observed relationship did not occur by chance alone.

Regional Interests and Vote Choice

I turn next to an examination of the relationship between region and the vote choice. Liberia does not offer much in terms of regional cleavages akin to the divide in Sierra Leone. According to Clapham (1976), there existed something approaching a regional divide between tribal groups of the coastal counties such as the Dei in Montserrado, the Vai in Grand Cape Mount, the Bassa in Grand Bassa and the Kru in Sinoe, and those of the hinterland such as the Gbandi and Loma of Lofa, and the Krahn of Grand Gedeh during the 1960s and 1970s when the True Whig Party controlled the political structures and tended to discriminate in favor of indigenous Liberians from the coastal regions who were more likely to seek to assimilate into the Americo-Liberian culture than groups from the hinterland.[98]

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[98] For an example of this discrimination, one only needs to look at a distribution of cabinet seats in Liberia between 1964 and 1973. During that time period, coastal tribal groups received 16 cabinet seats to the two for groups from the hinterland. In fact, the hinterland only received the two seats in 1973 and had none in either 1964 or 1968. See Christopher Clapham, Liberia and Sierra Leone: An Essay in Comparative Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 48

In the absence of regional consciousness, competition between factions emanating from counties seemed to have taken over as the geographic loci of political competition. For example, Gios and Manos from Nimba County, it is argued, are locked in a struggle with Krahns from neighboring Grand Gedeh such that ethnic groups from a county that are in opposition to another county are not likely to support or associate with a political party hailing from the opposing county (Osaghae 1998; Berkeley 2001). Thus, with the case of Liberia, focus shifted to the mobilizing cues, structures and preferences at the county level. When the survey asked respondents if seeking regional interests underlay their preferences for political parties, they were prompted to think of the regional preferences as their county of origin. Here I sought to verify whether a statistically significant relationship exists between the political parties for which respondents voted and their desire to vote for a party because they felt it was the party most likely to present the exclusive interests of their region of the country, in this case counties. Table 4.7 reports the results of the test.

Table 4.7

Liberian Legislative Elections: Regionalism and Vote Choice

What political party did you vote For in the elections for House and Senate?	"I voted for them because they represent the interests of my region" (%)	
	Not Strongly Agree	Strongly Agree
ALCOP	86	14
CDC	82	18
FAPL	93	7
FDP	86	14
LAP/COTOL	89	11
LDP	67	33
LERP	50	50
LINU/UDA	60	40
LP	82	18

Table 4.7 – Continued

What political party did you vote For in the elections for House and Senate?	"I voted for them because they represent the interests of my region" (%)	
	Not Strongly Agree	Strongly Agree
LPL	100	0
LPP/APD	92	8
NATVIPOL	86	14
NDM	100	0
NDPL	77	23
NPL	33	67
NPP	89	11
NRP	100	0
PDP	93	7
RULP	67	33
ULD	50	50
UP	79	21
Total	82	18
N =903		
Pearson Chi-Square (21) =29.892		
Cramer's V= .182		

More respondents above did not strongly agree with the suggestion that they voted for their choice of political parties in the elections of 2005 because they believed the parties were most likely to secure the interests of their respective regions (in this case, counties). An exception to this trend is respondents who voted for the relatively small political party of the NPL. However, much cannot be made of the relationship observed here because the p-value for the related Chi-Square is not statistically significant suggesting that the observed pattern could have materialized by chance alone.

211

<u>Religion and Vote Choice</u>

Next, I turned to an examination of potential religious influences on political behavior at the time of the elections by looking at the relationship between the political parties for which respondents voted and their desire to vote for the political party most likely to represent the interests of their religion. Table 4.8 reports the test of association between the two variables.

Table 4.8 reveals that religion was not a major influence during the elections of 2005. Surprisingly, the majority of respondents who voted for the political parties of all the presidential candidates who claimed to be guided by a divine vision to run for president, George Kiadii and the National Vision Party of Liberia, Brumskine and his Liberty Party, and Alfred Reeves and his National Reformation Party, did not strongly agree with the statement that religious identity guided their vote choice. Rather, it is the majority of respondents who voted for Alhaji Kromah's Muslim and Mandingo dominated ALCOP who indicated that they were guided by religious identity. Perhaps this reflects the insecurity that Mandingoes felt as Muslims during the civil war when they were sometimes specifically targeted by NPFL fighters and other factions of the Liberian civil war who intentionally sought Mandingoes for retaliatory violence following long-suppressed feelings of animosity from the Doe era. Mandingoes were believed to be one of the major beneficiaries of Doe's ten-year rule. Kromah once served as Doe's information minister and Mandingoes were thought to be the recipients of major government contracts. The value of Chi-Square and the accompanying p-value tells us that the observed pattern is statistically significant and not likely to have occurred by chance alone.

Table 4.8

Liberian Legislative Elections: Religion and Vote Choice

What political party did you vote for in the elections for House and Senate?	"I voted for them because they represent the interests of my Religion" (%)	
	Not Strongly Agree	Strongly Agree
ALCOP	29	71
CDC	79	21
FAPL	93	7
FDP	100	0
LAP/COTOL	100	0
LDP	67	33
LERP	67	33
LINU/UDA	60	40
LP	88	12
LPL	100	0
LPP/APD	100	0
NATVIPOL	86	14
NDM	100	0
NDPL	90	10
NPL	100	0
NPP	94	6
NRP	100	0
PDP	93	7
RULP	100	0
ULD	50	50
UP	85	15
Total	84	16

N=903
Pearson Chi-Square (21) =93.054***
Cramer's V = .321***

Note: ***Significant at p<0.001.

The "Big Person" and Vote Choice

I examined next whether the post-conflict voting pattern in Liberia was influenced by cues of clientelistic politics. Table 4.9 reports the results of this test.

Table 4.9

Liberian Legislative Elections: The "Big Person" and Vote Choice

What political party did you vote for in the elections for House and Senate?	"I voted for them because they are the party of the "big person" from our area of the country" (%)	
	Not Strongly Agree	Strongly Agree
ALCOP	86	14
CDC	97	3
FAPL	93	7
FDP	86	14
LAP/COTOL	92	8
LDP	67	33
LERP	83	17
LINU/UDA	60	40
LP	93	7
LPL	100	0
LPP/APD	88	12
NATVIPOL	100	0
NDM	100	0
NDPL	96	4
NPL	67	33
NPP	94	6
NRP	75	25
PDP	93	7
RULP	100	0
ULD	100	0
UP	98	2
Total	95	5

N=903
Pearson Chi-Square (21) =48.725***
Cramer's V = .232***

Note: ***Significant at p<0.001

More people did not strongly agree with the statement that they voted for a party because it was the party of the big person from their part of the country. This trend is consistent among the votes for all the political parties. The value of Chi-Square and its

accompanying p-value shows that there is a statistically significant relationship between the two variables.

Peace and Vote Choice

I next tested for the relationship between the variable for the vote for peace and the vote choices for political parties. Table 4.10 reports the results.

Table 4.10

Liberian Legislative Elections: Peace and Vote Choice

What political party did you vote for in the elections for House and Senate?	"I voted for them because they are the party most likely to unite the country and sustain peace" (%)	
	Not Strongly Agree	Strongly Agree
ALCOP	19	81
CDC	12	88
FAPL	14	86
FDP	29	71
LAP/COTOL	6	94
LDP	0	100
LERP	0	100
LINU/UDA	20	80
LP	12	88
LPL	0	100
LPP/APD	4	96
NATVIPOL	14	86
NDM	20	80
NDPL	11	89
NPL	0	100
NRP	0	100
PDP	21	79
RULP	0	100
ULD	0	100
UP	16	84
Total	13	87

N=903
Pearson Chi-Square (21) = 21.262
Cramer's V =. 153

More respondents, 87 percent, strongly agreed with the statement that they voted for a political party because it was the party most likely to unite the country and sustain peace following the civil war. This finding is explainable given that peace appeared to be a valence issue on which the electorate of Liberia did not waver going into the elections. However, the test statistic is not significant suggesting that this finding was likely due to chance than anything else. While the issue of peace preoccupied the minds of all Liberians during this time, one suggestion is that peace will not indefinitely remain the paramount issue.

Economic Development/Reconstruction and Vote Choice

The final test of association tested the relationship between political parties for which respondents voted and their desire to vote for the party that was most likely to develop the country by undertaking infrastructural and other development projects. Table 4.11 reports the results of this test.

Table 4.11

Legislative Elections: Economic Development/Reconstruction and Vote Choice

What political party did you vote for in the elections for House and Senate?	"I voted for them because they are the party most likely to develop the country by building roads, clinics and bringing electricity to the whole country" (%)	
	Not Strongly Agree	Strongly Agree
ALCOP	43	57
CDC	23	77
FAPL	36	64
FDP	14	86
LAP/COTOL	14	86
LDP	0	100
LERP	33	67
LINU/UDA	60	40

Table 4.11 – Continued

What political party did you vote for in the elections for House and Senate?	"I voted for them because they are the party most likely to develop the country by building roads, clinics and bringing electricity to the whole country" (%)	
	Not Strongly Agree	Strongly Agree
LP	18	82
LPL	0	100
NATVIPOL	12	88
NDM	10	90
NDPL	16	84
NPL	33	67
NPP	14	86
NRP	0	100
PDP	0	100
RULP	33	67
ULD	0	100
UP	23	77
Total	21	79
N=903		
Pearson Chi-Square (21) = 31.827		
Cramer's V = .188		

Table 4.11 shows that 79 percent of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement that they voted for the political party they believed was most likely to undertake development projects in Liberia such as rebuilding roads, hospitals and schools following the civil. However, this finding is not statistically significant and it is likely that the expression we see here happened by chance alone.

Having explored these relationships using measures of association, I next turned attention to identifying the most salient variables that factored into the decision-making of Liberians during the 2005 elections and help explain why they cast their votes the way they did.

Explaining the Vote Choice of Liberians in the 2005 Elections

Approaching this task, I selected the three political parties that polled the highest number of votes during the first round of the elections of 2005 (CDC, UP, and the LP) for inclusion in order to keep the analysis manageable. I recoded the vote for each of these political parties into binary variables out of the variable that captured the choices of political parties for which respondents voted such that voting for a particular party or not was a binary outcome (voted for a party=1/did not vote for a party =0). I derived three variables out of this step to represent votes for the CDC, UP and the LP and these became the dependent variables that were included in the logistic regression models to estimate vote choice. I used similar tests to explore the vote choice for three other political parties that I do not report here because their inclusion does not add substantial explanatory value to the study beyond that derived from the analyses of the votes for the three parties. The parties are LAP/COTOL, the NDPL, and the NPP. The NDPL is the party created by Doe and they were in power at the onset of the civil war. Varney Sherman's party LAP/COTOL placed fifth in the polls and Taylor's party, the NPP placed sixth.

I estimated each model of vote choice for political parties separately initially including all variables described earlier in Chapter I which, it has been argued, affect voting behavior in African societies. In initial tests, variables that were shown to be either collinear with other variables or the observations for which showed no variance in predicting the outcome or not predicting it were dropped by STATA and the models were estimated over again. After obtaining the results I calculated the predicted probabilities of voting for political parties in each model and report the results as well the tables. The independent variables in each model include: 1) the variables, described previously in the

tests of association, which proffered reasons to the respondents why they voted for a political party (ethnic identity; peace; regional interests; development/reconstruction, religious interests and the "big person"); 2) nine of the sixteen ethnic groups in Liberia. The criteria for inclusion of ethnic groups were: the largest ethnic groups and groups from which presidential candidates or other heads of political parties hailed. Based on these criteria, the Kpelle were included as the largest ethnic group in the country and the rest (Bassa, Kru, Gola, Loma, Mano, Grebo, Krahn and Vai) as the ethnic groups that predominate in the counties from which the presidential candidates or the heads of the political parties hailed. 3) The third criterion included residency in the counties that are considered home to the presidential candidates or heads of political parties that were on the ballot.

Explaining the Vote for the Congress for Democratic Change

I begin by reporting, in Table 4.12, tests of a logistic regression model that was estimated to determine the likelihood that a randomly selected respondent; therefore, a voter in Liberia, voted for Weah's CDC political party as a result of their agreements with the explanatory variables described previously. Given assumptions in the literature, there are reasons to expect here that variables for ethnic interest, being Kru and residency in Sinoe County will have a significant impact on the CDC vote because Weah is a Kru whose county of birth is Sinoe and members of these groups will be more likely to vote for the party of their fellow Kru from Sinoe county in order to advance the interests of their ethnic group.

219

Table 4.12

Voting for the CDC: Results of Logistic Regression with Logged Odds

Variables	CDC Vote	% Change in Odds
Ethnic Interest	-.69***	-50
	(.26)	
Peace Vote	.30	36
	(.26)	
Regional Interest	.13	13
	(.25)	
Development Interest	-.06	-6
	(.22)	
Religious Interest	.68***	97
	(.24)	
Big Person	-.63	-46
	(.42)	
Sinoe County	1.47***	333
	(.47)	
Bomi County	1.47***	334
	(.47)	
Montserrado County	.37*	44
	(.18)	
Grand Gedeh County	.89	144
	(.66)	
Vai	-.24	-22
	(.43)	
Kpelle	-.22	-20
	(.24)	
Bassa	-.55*	-42
	(.26)	
Kru	1.63***	413
	(.27)	
Gola	.25	28
	(.49)	
Krahn	2.78	150
	(1.66)	
Constant	-1.48***	
	(.30)	
N=	900	
LR chi2 (16)	124.71***	
Log Likelihood	-474.111	
Pseudo R2	.12	

Note: *P<0.05. **P<0.01. ***P<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.

The result shows that the following explanatory variables increased the odds of voting for the CDC: religious interest; the vote for peace; regional interest; residence in Sinoe, Bomi, Grand Gedeh and Montserrado counties; and being Kru, Gola and Krahn. Variables for ethnic interest, big person, development and reconstruction, being Vai, Kpelle and Bassa reduced the odds of voting for the CDC. The result suggests that being Kru and residency in Sinoe county, the ethnic group to which Weah belongs and the county from which he hails, are significant predictors of the vote for the CDC. This provides some support for identity-based thesis of voting but this finding should be contrasted with the one that shows that the variable for ethnic interests lowered the odds of voting for the CDC suggesting that while certain identity groups may have voted for the CDC, voting with the desire to vote for a political party that would secure the exclusive interests of an ethnic group was not a major explanatory variable in this model. Further, we learn from the results that residency in Bomi, Grand Gedeh and Montserrado counties and being Krahn also increased the odds of voting for the CDC. The three counties and the Krahn ethnic group are not directly affiliated with the CDC but these variables also increased the odds of voting for the party suggesting that the CDC drew votes from other areas and demographic groups of Liberia other than those from which one could expect them to exclusively draw votes given Weah's ethnicity as the founder of the party.

I reran the model using fewer variables. The variables in the second test were those offering reasons to respondents why they voted for a particular party for which they did, a variable indicating whether a respondent voted for Weah or not as the presidential candidate of the CDC party, and identity variables such as identifying oneself as Kru, the ethnic group from which Weah hails, indicating residence in Sinoe County, the home of

Weah. The new result showed that only the variable for development interests and that for voting for George Weah were statistically significant but the variable for development did not increase the odds that a respondent voted for the CDC party, only the variable for voting for Weah in the presidential elections did.

Explaining the Vote for the Unity Party

Next, I report the results of the test of the model, in Table 4.13, that I employed to estimate the odds of voting for the Unity Party. The UP ultimately won the presidential but not the legislative elections. One expectation here is that belonging to a Kru or Gola ethnic group or identifying Bong county as their county of birth will significantly increase the odds that a respondent voted for the Unity Party because of Johnson-Sirleaf, the presidential flag bearer of that party. Even though many in the Liberian public associated her with the Americo-Liberian/Congo elite of the coastal regions of the country Johnson-Sirleaf took every opportunity to identify with the Gola and Kru ethnic groups and on every occasion she associated her lineage with Bong County (Sawyer 2008). We should also expect that respondents whose votes were guided by the desire for development would significantly increase the odds that they voted for the Unity Party because Madam Johnson-Sirleaf's candidacy was touted by her supporters as the most capable individual to undertake postwar reconstruction among the presidential candidate field. Whether that message was the one that most resonated with voters remains to be seen.

The variables that significantly increased the odds of vote choice for the Unity Party were residence in Lofa, Montserrado, Bong and Nimba Counties; being Gola, Kru, Loma, Kissi and Mano ethnicity and the regional, development and the religious interest

Table 4.13

Voting for the UP: Results of Logistic Regression with Logged Odds

Variables	UP Vote	% Change in Odds
Ethnic Interest	-.78***	-54
	(.26)	
Peace Vote	-.01	-1
	(.24)	
Regional Interest	.47	60
	(.24)	
Development Interest	.08	8
	(.21)	
Religious Interest	.01	1
	(.26)	
Big Man	-1.24*	-71
	(.56)	
Kpelle	-.01	-1
	(.31)	
Kru	.06	6
	(.32)	
Gola	.73	107
	(.58)	
Vai	-.08	-8
	(.48)	
Kissi	1.30***	270
	(.39)	
Loma	.68*	98
	(.30)	
Grebo	.81*	126
	(.36)	
Mano	.47	59
	(.33)	
Bong	.49	63
	(.39)	
Bomi	-1.87	-84
	(1.06)	
Montserrado	.78***	119
	(.22)	
Lofa	1.72***	457
	(.39)	
Nimba	1.21***	233
	(.31)	
Constant	-1.89***	
	(.35)	

223

Table 4.13 – Continued

N=900	
LR chi2 (19) =	99.40***
Log Likelihood =	-457.50
Pseudo R2 =	.10

Note: *P<0.05. **P<0.01. ***P<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.

variables. Strongly agreeing with the ethnic interest statement significantly decreased the odds that a respondent voted for the UP. As seen from the results, variables such as being Gola or being Kru and residency in Bong County had the expected effects in increasing the odds of voting for the UP. However, some of the largest increases in odds of voting for the UP are visible with the variables for residency in Lofa and Nimba counties and being Kissi, the ethnic group of Joseph Boakai, Johnson-Sirleaf's running mate in the elections. This suggests that members of the Kissi ethnic community, who hail mostly from Lofa County, supported their fellow Kissi elite. However, to put this finding into perspective, we also note that variables for counties such as Nimba and Montserrado and ethnic groups such as the Loma and Grebo registered increased odds of voting for the UP even though there are no direct affiliations between the party and those counties and ethnic groups. It should be noted that the capital city of Monrovia is in Montserrado County. As such, most of the political parties that did relatively well in the elections appear to have drawn some fair amount of support from the very urban Montserrado County.

I retested the model, this time using only the reasons suggested to respondents for why they voted for a particular party and five variables that indicated whether a respondent identified with the Kru and Gola ethnic groups, the ethnic groups to which Johnson-Sirleaf claims ancestry, and whether the respondent declared residency in Lofa

and Bong Counties, the counties of origin of Johnson-Sirleaf and her running mate and finally, whether a respondent voted for Johnson-Sirleaf or not in the presidential elections. The results of the new model showed that three variables were significant in predicting the likelihood that a respondent voted for the Unity Party. The variables were those for "big person," a vote cast for Johnson-Sirleaf and residency in Lofa County. Of the three, the variable for "big person" showed a negative relationship with the dependent variable of voting for the UP, reducing the likelihood that a respondent who strongly agreed with the statement that they voted for a political party because it was the party of the big person from their part of the country. The variables for voting for Johnson-Sirleaf and residency in Lofa County were also statistically significant.

Explaining the Vote for the Liberty Party

The Liberty Party polled the third highest votes in the elections of 2005. Here we expect that factors such as belonging to the Bassa ethnic group or residing in Grand Bassa County would significantly increase the odds that a respondent voted for the Liberty Party because Brumskine, the presidential flag bearer of that party is the most recognized elite in Liberian politics who claims ancestry from among the Bassa people of Grand Bassa County. Also, the Liberty Party ticket was the only ticket that ran a presidential candidate and vice-presidential candidate from the same county and ethnic group in Brumskine and his running mate Amelia Ward. Other expectations are that the variable for big person, religious interests and that for seeking regional interests would also have statistically significant effects on the vote for the Liberty Party, since Brumskine is also viewed by many as the chief patron of the Bassa People (Sawyer 2008). Table 4.14 reports the results of the test of the model.

Table 4.14

Voting for the LP: Results of Logistic Regression with Logged Odds

Variables	LP Vote	% Change in Odds
Ethnic Interest	1.26***	253
	(.29)	
Peace Vote	-.39	-32
	(.36)	
Regional Interest	-.82*	-56
	(.33)	
Development Interest	-.04	-4
	(.32)	
Religious Interest	-.44	-35
	(.37)	
Big Man	.03	3
	(.50)	
Kpelle	-.01	-1
	(.40)	
Bassa	3.13***	2,188
	(.29)	
Kru	.08	9
	(.51)	
Gola	-.42	-34
	(1.05)	
Krahn	.10	11
	(1.07)	
Sinoe	.40	50
	(.78)	
Montserrado	-.91***	-60
	(.26)	
Grand Gedeh County	.56	76
	(1.23)	
N=900		
LR chi2 (14) =	274.71***	
Log Likelihood =	-261.64	
Pseudo R2 =	.34	

Note: *P<0.05. ***P<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.

The variables that significantly increased the odds of a respondent voting for the

Liberty Party are ethnic interests, Bassa ethnicity and residency in Grand Gedeh and

Sinoe counties. As expected, the odds of voting for the LP increased significantly with

Bassa respondents. The odds of voting for the Liberty Party also increased for those respondents who strongly agreed with the statement that they voted for a political party because they desired to protect the interests of their ethnic group. More than the votes for the CDC and the UP, the results indicate that voting for the Liberty Party was motivated by a significant ethnic voting bloc among the Bassas displaying allegiance to one of their own in the candidacy of Brumskine. Even though the variables for the big person and regional interests did not significantly increase the odds of voting for the LP in this model, that for the Bassa ethnic group did and this finding is consistent with earlier findings from the measures of association and provides support ethnic voting theses.

As mentioned previously, I tested similar models of vote choice for the three political parties that placed fourth, fifth and sixth. While findings from those models do not add explanatory value to the thesis, it is useful to discuss briefly one pattern that was evident in the results. It emerged that the big person was a significant explanatory variable predicting vote choice LAP/COTOL and not the NPP or the NDPL. Winston Tubman of the NDPL was out of Liberia for over two decades prior to the elections and it is not inconceivable that the voters may have seen him as an outsider instead of a chief patron of his home county of Maryland. In the case of the NPP, it is plausible that instead of Massaquoi, the presidential candidate of the party going into the elections, those who voted for that party were still making a psychological association between the party and Charles Taylor, the larger-than-life warlord who founded the NPP. In the case of LAP/COTOL, it appears that voters where making the connections between Sherman's overwhelming presence as the chief patron of his political coalition and their votes for the party.

Exploring the Vote Choices of Liberians: Results of Logistic Regressions with CLARIFY

Examining within-group voting patterns is another way of exploring the theoretical role of any influences ethnic identities may have on the political behavior and mobilization patterns of Liberians in the post-conflict environment. The important question is whether there are any within-group differences of a statistically significant nature between members of the various ethnic groups in Liberia and their preferences for political parties.

In this portion of the dissertation I estimated logistic regression models of the votes for the CDC, UP and the LP. The independent variables in each of the models include the variables examined earlier in addition to interaction terms between ethnic identities and agreement with the variables of interest. Each test was followed by an additional test to determine within group differences using CLARIFY in order to highlight the probabilities of voting for a political party by respondents from the same ethnic group.

I estimated three separate models of the vote for each political party as dependent variables when predicted by the independent variables described earlier. For example, the first model estimated the probability that a respondent voted for the CDC if that respondent was Kpelle, Kru, Bassa or any one of the ethnic groups and if they agreed or disagreed with the statement that the political party for which they voted was the party most likely to secure the interests of their ethnic group. A second model of the vote for the same political party tested the probability that respondents belonging to the same ethnic groups voted for the party if they agreed or disagreed with another reason for their vote with which they are presented, and so forth.

As in the previous chapter, the models test a number of assumptions about the vote choice for political parties by members of the same ethnic groups. First, given theoretical arguments in the dominant literature regarding the homogeneity of ethnic preferences, it is expected that there are no differences in the probabilities of voting for a political party by members of the same ethnic group. Secondly, it is expected that the ethnic groups from which presidential candidates hailed will show higher probabilities of voting for the political party of their ethnic kin than other ethnic groups. Thirdly, if as suggested in the literature, that citizens are more likely to vote for individuals from their ethnic group than other ethnic groups, then we should expect that the variable for seeking ethnic interests will show the highest probabilities that a respondent voted for a political party than other issues included in the models as independent variables.

One caveat is in order. In the estimation of the models for each political party, it was prudent to include only the ethnic groups that theoretically made the most sense in predicting the vote for that political party given the pattern established in Table 4.5. Nevertheless, in order to establish some contrast I also included variables for one or in some cases two or more ethnic groups to see how they compared with the variables that were expected to predict vote choice for a specific party. For example, we note from Table 4.5 that Bassas were less likely to vote for the CDC and the UP and more likely to vote for the LP but I included the variable for that ethnic group in the specification of the models for vote choice for the CDC and the UP to see how they compared with other groups who were more likely to vote for those parties, and vice versa. However, STATA rejected the inclusion of variables for some ethnic groups because of collinearity or because those variables predicted failure or success perfectly in vote choice for a political

party. Therefore it is possible that the tables will not contain the same explanatory variables for all the political parties.

Ethnic Identity. Table 4.15 presents the results of three models testing vote choices for the political parties as the dependent variables if respondents did not strongly agree or strongly agreed with the statement that they voted for political party because they desired their vote to go to a political party was more likely to secure the interests of their ethnic group when controlling for ethnic identities and interaction terms between those identities and ethnic interests.

Table 4.15

2005 Legislative Elections: Ethnic Interests and Vote Choice

Explanatory Variables	CDC Vote	UP Vote	LP Vote
Ethnic Interest	-.64*	-64	-1.2
	(.31)	(.36)	(.74)
Kru	1.09***	-.20	_
	(.28)	(.33)	
Bassa	-.33	-.27	2.1***
	(.27)	(.29)	(.30)
Kpelle	-.46*	-.24	-.04
	(.24)	(.24)	
Krahn	1.07**	_	_
	(.35)		
Gola	_	-.59	_
		(.57)	
Loma	_	.31	.43
		(.32)	(.51)
Grebo	_	.09	_
		(.35)	
Kissi	_	.85*	_
		(.40)	
EthnKru	1.9**	-1.29	_
	(.68)	(1.1)	
EthnBas	-1.1	-.70	3.5***
	(.65)	(.61)	(.83)
EthnKpe	-.81	-.98	1.1
	(1.1)	(1.1)	(1.3)

Table 4.15 – Continued

Explanatory Variables	CDC Vote	UP Vote	LP Vote
EthnKra	.84 (1.0)	–	–
EthnGol	–	2.14 (1.6)	–
EthnLom	–	2.2*** (.82)	1.1 (1.4)
EthnGre	–	.08 (1.2)	–
EthnKis	–	2.3 (1.2)	–
Constant	-.86*** (.11)	-.92*** (.14)	–
N	900	900	900
LR chi2	(9)106.35***	(15) 63.97***	(7) 280.20***
Log Likelihood	-483.29	-475.21	-258.90
Pseudo R2	.10	.07	.35

Notes: *Significant at p< 0.05, **Significant at p<0.01, ***Significant at p<0.001. Standard errors are in parentheses. (9), (15) and (7) are degrees of freedom for the likelihood ratio of each Chi Square. Models are results of binary logit regressions in STATA using CLARIFY. EthnKpe, EthnBas, EthnKru, EthnGol, EthnLom, EthnGre, EthnKra and EthnKis are interaction terms.

The results show that variables for the Kru, Bassa and Kissi ethnic groups were statistically significant explanatory variables of the CDC, the LP and the UP respectively, the political parties for which members of these groups are expected to vote under ethnic census theses given their leadership. However, the result also shows that Krahn ethnicity is a statistically significant explanatory variable of the CDC even though there is no readily evident ethnic connection between the leadership of that political party and members of that group.

Next, I report the calculated probabilities of voting for the three political parties, in Table 4.16, given membership in the ethnic groups included in the analyses.

Table 4.16

Effects on the Probability of voting for the CDC, UP and LP:
Ethnic Interests and Ethnic Groups

Ethnic Group	CDC Vote		UP Vote		LP Vote	
	Strongly Agree/Not Strongly Agree					
Kpelle	.09	.21	.09	.24	.09	.07
	(.09)	(.03)	(.08)	(.04)	(.08)	(.02)
Bassa	.05	.24	.08	.24	.85	.36
	(.03)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)
Kru	.80	.56	.07	.25	_	_
	(.09)	(.06)	(.07)	(.05)		
Gola	_	_	.50	.20	_	_
			(.26)	(.09)		
Loma	_	_	.71	.35	.12	.11
			(.13)	(.07)	(.11)	(.04)
Grebo	_	_	.25	.31	_	_
			(.18)	(.07)		
Krahn	.58	.55	_	_	_	_
	(.19)	(.08)				
Kissi	_	_	.80	.48	_	_
			(.15)	(.09)		

Note : Standard errors in parentheses. $P < .001$

The table reveals differences and, in some cases, consensus among members of the same ethnic groups in their vote choices given their position on the vote for ethnic interests. One pattern from these results lends support to ethnic census theories that have argued that support for political parties exists along ethnic lines. To cite one example, the highest mean predicted probabilities of voting for the LP and the CDC lie with the Bassa and the Kru, the ethnic groups from which the respective leaderships of the two political

parties hail. It is also evident that the predicted probability of members of the Kissi ethnic group to vote for the UP is very high, lending additional support to ethnic census thesis given that the running mate to Johnson-Sirleaf, Joseph Boakai hails from the Kissi.

However, it is also evident from the results in the table that significant differences exist between members of the same ethnic who strongly agreed with the statement with which they were presented and those who did not strongly agree with the same statement and the probabilities of their vote choices for the political parties associated with their ethnic groups. In the case of the Bassa, there is .49 difference between members of that group and their vote choice for the LP. There is a .32 difference between Kissis who strongly agreed with the statement and those that did not strongly agree with the statement. All of these suggest that members of the same ethnic groups may not have homogenous preferences in their support for various political parties.

The Peace Vote. Next, I examined the peace vote. Here I tested the probability of voting for the three political parties if the respondent did not strongly agree or strongly agreed with the statement that the political party for which they voted was the party most likely to secure the peace in Liberia and undertake the imperative task of reconciliation following the brutal civil war. Table 4.17 reports the result of the test.

The results show that the peace vote is a statistically significant explanatory variable in the vote choice for the UP but not the other two political parties. When controlling for the peace vote, the results show that the variable for the Bassa ethnic group is still a statistically significant explanatory variable of vote choice for the LP but that for Kru is no longer a statistically significant explanatory variable for the CDC.

Table 4.17

2005 Legislative Elections: Peace and Vote Choice

Explanatory Variables	CDC Vote	UP Vote	LP Vote
Peace Vote	.24	.26*	.45
	(.34)	(.38)	(.76)
Kpelle	-1.7	-.82	.51
	(1.1)	(.83)	(1.3)
Bassa	-.90	-.26	3.9***
	(.82)	(.73)	(.91)
Kru	1.1	.36	.33
	(.56)	(.60)	(1.3)
Gola	–	1.1	–
		(1.5)	
Loma	-.64	1.5*	2.1*
	(.84)	(.68)	(.98)
Grebo	.97	1.1	–
	(1.4)	(1.5)	
Krahn	.28	.44	–
	(1.2)	(1.3)	
Kissi	–	2.2	2.1
		(1.3)	(1.4)
PcvtKpe	1.6	.48	-.45
	(1.1)	(.87)	(1.3)
PcvtBas	.36	-.58	-.81
	(.86)	(.78)	(.95)
PcvtKru	.79	-1.1	-.27
	(.63)	(.70)	(1.4)
PcvtGol	–	-1.8	–
		(1.6)	
PcvtKis	–	-1.3	-2.8
		(1.3)	(1.2)
PcvtKra	1.2	-1.8	–
	(1.2)	(1.4)	
PctvtLom	1.4	-1.08	-2.1 .
	(.90)	(.75)	(1.2)
PctvtGre	.12	-1.2	–
	(1.5)	(1.5)	
Constant	-.97**	-1.1***	-3.2***
	(.31)	(.35)	(.72)
N	900	900	900
LRChi2	(13) 100.54***	(11)111.87***	(11)236.19***
Log Likelihood	-486.20	-480.53	-280.90
Pseudo R2	.11	.11	.30

Table 4.17 – Continued

Notes: *Significant at p< 0.05, **Significant at p<0.01, ***Significant at p<0.001. Standard errors are in parentheses. (13), (17) and (11) are degrees of freedom for the likelihood ratio of each Chi Square. Models are results of binary logit regressions in STATA using CLARIFY. PcvtKpe, PcvtBas, PcvtKru, PcvtGol, PcvtLom, PcvtGre, PcvtKra, and PcvtKis are interaction terms.

Next, in Table 4.18, I report the calculated probabilities of voting for the three

political parties given ethnic identity and peace interests.

Table 4.18

Effects on the Probability of Voting for the CDC, the UP, and the LP:
Peace Vote and Ethnic Group

Ethnic Group	CDC Vote		UP Vote Strongly Agree/Not Strongly Agree		LP Vote	
Kpelle	.20	.09	.23	.14	.07	.09
	(.03)	(.09)	(.03)	(.09)	(.02)	(.09)
Bassa	.15	.16	.16	.22	.58	.65
	(.03)	(.10)	(.03)	(.11)	(.04)	(.11)
Kru	.66	.53	.16	.33	.07	.08
	(.06)	(.10)	(.05)	(.11)	(.04)	(.08)
Gola	–	–	.19	.51	–	–
			(.08)	(.26)		
Loma	.38	.19	.38	.57	.07	.27
	(.07)	(.11)	(.07)	(.14)	(.04)	(.13)
Grebo	.48	.49	.29	.51	–	–
	(.07)	(.26)	(.06)	(.26)		
Krahn	.57	.38	.11	36	–	–
	(.08)	(.23)	(.05)	(.22)		
Kissi	–	–	.51	.70	.04	.29
			(.09)	(.20)	(.05)	(.19)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. P <. 001

235

The table shows that when controlling for the peace vote, the votes for the three parties were much splintered. The predicted probabilities of voting are higher for parties if respondents strongly agreed with the statement that their desired vote was for the political party they felt was most likely to secure the peace. However, there are some noticeable exceptions to this tendency. It could be inferred from the above that in some instances, members of the Bassa, Grebo, Loma, Kru, Kissi and Gola ethnic groups cast ballots for a political party even when they did not believe that it was the party most likely to secure the peace in Liberia. Of particular note are the Kissi, Grebo and Loma votes for the UP, and the Bassa vote for the LP. The data suggests that more members of the Kru ethnic group voted for the party of one of their own even when they did not believe that it was the party most likely to secure the peace in Liberia. The results demonstrate further that there was greater heterogeneity in the votes for the UP and the CDC than was the case for the LP suggesting that the latter drew votes from a fairly fixed constituency than the loose coalition of voters that propelled the CDC and the UP to the first and second place, respectively, in the elections.

<u>Regionalism and Vote Choice</u>

Next I examined if, and how, attempting to seek regional interests factored into the decision-making of Liberians during the elections of 2005. Here I tested the probability of voting for a political party if the respondent intended to cast a ballot for a party because she or he believed it was the party most likely to secure the interests of their region of the country.

The expectation here is that, if concerns for seeking regional interests factored into the decision making of Liberians during the elections of 2005, then we should expect

236

that this variable maintains a statistically significant effect on the dependent variable of

vote choice for the political parties across all the models. Table 4.19 presents the results

of the test.

Table 4.19

2005 Elections: Regionalism and Vote Choice

Explanatory Variables	CDC Vote	UP Vote	LP Vote
Regional Interests	-.42	.47	-1.7*
	(.33)	(.28)	(.75)
Kpelle	-.11	-.28	.03
	(.26)	(.25)	(.42)
Bassa	-.65*	-.09**	3.0***
	(.30)	(.30)	(.32)
Kru	1.3***	-.20	.18
	(.31)	(.34)	(.53)
Gola	.81	-.58	-.45
	(.46)	(.57)	(1.0)
Kissi	-.10	.10**	.09
	(.45)	(.37)	(.78)
Krahn	1.5***	-1.3*	.42
	(.36)	(.55)	(.59)
Vai	-.08	-.70	—
	(.46)	(.47)	
Loma	.60	.47	-.04
	(.34)	(.33)	(.65)
Grebo	1.0**	-.09	-1.2
	(.37)	(.40)	(1.0)
RegnKpe	-1.3	-1.0	—
	(1.0)	(.71)	
RegnBas	.63	.05	1.8*
	(.59)	(.53)	(.83)
RegnKru	2.0**	-1.8*	—
	(.69)	(.84)	
RegnGol	.79	1.0	—
	(1.5)	(1.5)	
RegnKra	-1.1	.73	—
	(1.3)	(1.3)	
RegnVai	.69	—	—
	(1.3)		
RegnLom	-.17	.25	1.9*
	(.68)	(.62)	(.92)

Table 4.19 –Continued

Explanatory Variables	CDC Vote	UP Vote	LP Vote
RegnGre	.27	.28	–
	(.64)	(.68)	
Constant	-1.2***	-.92***	-2.6***
	(.16)	(.15)	(.26)
N	900	900	900
LRchi2	(18)114.99***	(17) 54.34***	(11) 244.17
Log Likelihood	-478.97	-480.03	-276.92
Pseudo R2	.10	.9	.31

Notes: *Significant at p< 0.05, **Significant at p<0.01, ***Significant at p<0.001. Standard errors are in parentheses. (18), (17) and (11) are degrees of freedom for the likelihood ratio of each Chi Square. Models are results of binary logit regressions in STATA using CLARIFY. RegnKpe, RegnBas, RegnKru, RegnGol, RegnLom, RegnGre, RegnKra, and RegnVai are interaction terms.

Seeking regional interests does not appear to have been a significant factor in predicting votes for the political parties included in the models above. The results in the table show that the only statistically significant coefficient for regional interests is the one for the LP vote but it carries the negative sign suggesting that seeking regional interests may not have factored into the vote for the LP when controlling for the variables for ethnic groups in the model. However, the coefficients for the Bassa ethnic group is statistically significant in the model for the LP suggesting that when controlling for the regional interests variable, Bassas are still a significant explanatory variable of votes for the LP, the party of an elite from their ethnic group.

The results further show that the variables for the Kru and Krahn ethnic groups are also statistically significant explanatory variables in the model exploring the vote for the CDC party, suggesting that members of these two ethnic groups were likely to desire their vote to go to a political party that is protective of their regional interests. This

finding raises a question about how much members of the Krahn ethnic group bought into one of the campaign messages of Weah after he allegedly expressed gratitude to the late Doe, a Krahn, at his graveside in Grand Gedeh and thanked him posthumously for sponsoring the early part of his career in football. It is unlikely that there is any other explanation for the Krahn support for the CDC evident above when controlling for the vote for a political party that will secure regional interests given that Weah is not from Grand Gedeh, the home county of the Krahn ethnic group. The results of the tests of CLARIFY will help to throw additional light on the voting patterns observed in the table above.

The output reveals that in the cases of the probability of vote choice for some political parties, the modal category for respondents from groups such as the Kru, Gola, Grebo and Loma lies with those who strongly agreed with the statement that they desired their vote to go to a political party that secured the interests of their regions. We see this tendency in the example of the probability of voting for the CDC if a respondent is Kru, However, the results also reveal that members of other groups such as the Krahn did not strongly agree with the statement but they still voted for the CDC in more numbers than those who strongly agreed with the statement (Table 4.20).

In the case of the Bassa vote for the LP, we see that there is no difference in the predicted probability of voting for the LP if the respondent strongly agreed with the statement or did not strongly agree with the statement. Given that some of these categories favor the respective parties that are headed by members of their ethnic groups, the pattern suggests that seeking the interests of their various regions factored somewhat into the decision-making of voters from these groups as they went to the polls. However, the output also reveals significant differences both within and between groups as they

voted in the elections and given their intent to vote for a party that would best represent

the interests of their region. For example, even though the modal category of the

predicted probabilities of vote choice for the UP by respondents from the Grebo and

Loma ethnic groups lie with those who did not strongly agree with the statement, it is

evident that nearly half of the members of the same ethnic groups did not strongly with

the statement.

Table 4.20

Effects on the Probability of Voting for the CDC, the UP and the LP:
Regional Interest by Ethnic Group

Ethnic Group	CDC Vote		UP Vote		LP Vote	
	Strongly Agree/Not Strongly Agree					
Kpelle	.07	.22	.16	.23	.02	.07
	(.07)	(.03)	(.08)	(.04)	(.01)	(.02)
Bassa	.17	.14	.22	.14	.60	.59
	(.06)	(.03)	(.06)	(.03)	(.07)	(.04)
Kru	.84	.52	.09	.25	.02	.09
	(.07)	(.06)	(.07)	(.06)	(.02)	(.04)
Gola	.49	.41	.52	.20	.01	.06
	(.26)	(.10)	(.27)	(.08)	(.03)	(.07)
Kissi	.16	.23	.62	.51	.02	.09
	(.07)	(.08)	(.09)	(.08)	(.02)	(.06)
Krahn	.28	.59	.32	.11	.03	.11
	(.20)	(.08)	(.20)	(.05)	(.03)	(.05)
Vai	.32	.23	.26	.18	_	_
	(.22)	(.08)	(.10)	(.06)		
Loma	.26	.36	.57	.39	.10	.08
	(.11)	(.07)	(.13)	(.07)	(.08)	(.04)
Grebo	.43	.46	.44	.27	.01	.03
	(.13)	(.08)	(.14)	(.07)	(.01)	(.03)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; $P < .001$

Development/Reconstruction and Vote Choice

Next, I examined how Liberians voted given consideration for reconstruction and development. Like the vote for peace, the vote for development is a pragmatic decision that required Sociotropic calculations and an assessment beyond considerations for the interests of the narrow confines of one's ethnic community since postwar reconstruction of Liberia entailed benefits to the country as a whole.

To what extent where Liberians thinking about national development as opposed to voting to merely seek the interests of their ethnic groups? If a concern for rebuilding Liberia was a significant factor in the decision making of the electorate then we can expect that this variable will show a statistically significant impact on the vote choices for political parties. Table 4.21 reports the results of the test.

Table 4.21

2005 Elections: Development/Reconstruction and Vote Choice

Explanatory Variables	CDC Vote	UP Vote	LP Vote
Development/Reconstruction	-.65*	.22	.90
	(.32)	(.33)	(.62)
Kpelle	-.86	-.10	.26
	(.56)	(.68)	(1.1)
Bassa	-1.9*	-.18	4.3***
	(.78)	(.55)	(.71)
Kru	1.3**	.06	—
	(.47)	(.51)	
Krahn	.67	-.49	—
	(.86)	(1.1)	
Vai	-.94	—	—
	(1.1)		
Loma	-.72	1.3*	1.4
	(.62)	(.54)	(.95)
Grebo	.67	1.1	—
	(.69)	(.70)	

241

Table 4.21 – Continued

Explanatory Variables	CDC Vote	UP Vote	LP Vote
Kissi	–	1.1	2.5
		(1.0)	(1.3)
DevKpe	.78	.77	-.21
	(.63)	(.72)	(1.2)
DevBas	1.6	-.68	-1.4
	(.83)	(.61)	(.76)
DevKru	.52	-.87	–
	(.57)	(.65)	
DevKra	.09	-.72	–
	(.94)	(1.3)	
DevVai	1.1	–	–
	(1.2)		
DevLom	1.7*	-1.0	-.10
	(.72)	(.64)	(1.1)
DevGre	.50	-1.4	–
	(.28)	(.80)	
DevKis	–	–	-3.2
			(1.7)
Constant	-.67*	-1.1***	-3.6***
	(.28)	(.30)	(.59)
N	900	900	900
LRchi2	(15)102.57***	(15) 49.73***	(9)236.29***
Log Likelihood	-485.18	-482.33	-280.86
Pseudo R2	.10	.9	.30

Notes: *Significant at p< 0.05, **Significant at p<0.01, ***Significant at p<0.001. Standard errors are in parentheses. (15), (15) and (9) are degrees of freedom for the likelihood ratio of each Chi Square. Models are results of binary logit regressions in STATA using CLARIFY. DevKpe, DevLom, DevGre, DevVai, DevKra, DevKru, DevKis, and DevBas are interaction terms.

The results show that the variable for development and reconstruction was not a statistically significant explanatory variable in the models of vote choice for the three political parties that polled the most votes following the elections. In the case of the CDC, the variable for development and reconstruction is statistically significant but has the negative sign suggesting that those who did not strongly agree with the statement were less likely to vote for the CDC. When controlling for ethnic group identity, the

data suggests that for members of some ethnic groups such as the Bassa, Kru, and Loma, the political party headed by someone from their groups were also the parties they deemed most likely to undertake the task of rebuilding postwar Liberia. Respectively, the coefficients for these ethnic groups show when controlling for the variable for development and reconstruction, the variables were a statistically significant factor in predicting the vote for all three parties. One suggestion here is that voting for other reasons seemed to have outweighed the consideration to vote for a party hoping it was more likely than other parties to implement development programs for reconstructing postwar Liberia. The results of the predicted probabilities of voting for the parties given the variables for ethnic identity, reported in Table 4.22, should help to shed more light on this voting pattern.

Table 4.22

Effects on the Probability of Voting for the CDC, the UP and the LP:
Development by Ethnic Group

Ethnic Group	CDC Vote		UP Vote		LP Vote	
			Strongly Agree/Not Strongly Agree			
Kpelle	.20	.19	.25	.12	.07	.05
	(.04)	(.08)	(.04)	(.07)	(.02)	(.01)
Bassa	16	.09	.15	.23	.57	.68
	(.03)	(.06)	(.03)	(.08)	(.04)	(.09)
Kru	.61	.64	.16	.27	_	_
	(.07)	(.08)	(.05)	(.08)		
Loma	.41	.22	.36	.55	.10	.12
	(.07)	(.09)	(.07)	(.11)	(.06)	(.08)
Kissi	_	_	.55	.50	.05	.28
			(.09)	(.21)	(.06)	(.20)
Grebo	.47	.50	.25	.50	_	_
	(.07)	(.14)	(.07)	(.15)		
Krahn	.57	.50	.12	.22	_	_
	(.08)	(.18)	(.05)	(.16)		
Vai	.25	.21	_	_	_	_
	(.08)	(.17)				

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; P <. 001

243

The results show that with their votes for the UP, more members of the Grebo, Loma, and Kru ethnic groups seemed to have voted for that party even when they did not strongly agree with the statement that the political party for which they voted was the one most likely to undertake the tasks of postwar reconstruction and development.

It is evident also from the results that much difference does not exist between the predicted probabilities of voting for the political parties given considerations for the variable for development and reconstruction. Unlike previous models, we note here that significant differences do not exist between Krus, for example, who did not strongly agree with the statement and those who strongly agreed with the statement and their respective votes for the CDC. This is also the case with the Bassa votes for the LP and it suggests that members of some ethnic groups were more united on some issues than others. We also note that when some members of ethnic groups voted for other political parties with which they are not otherwise affiliated such as the Loma and Grebo votes for the UP, more of them did not strongly agree with the same statement. This finding provides support for the suggestion from the previous table that for members of these groups, the development variable was not the most important factor in their decision to vote for one party over others.

Religion and Vote Choice

The next variable I looked at was the religion variable – the extent to which religious allegiances factored into the decision-making of voters during the 2005 elections.

Table 4.23 reports the results of the probability of voting for a political party given the preferences of respondents on the vote for religious interests. The results in the

table show that the variable for religion was not a factor in predicting the votes for all three political parties. This finding suggests that seeking religious interests was not significant among the series of considerations that may have factored into the decisions of Liberians going into the elections of 2005. A number of candidates including Brumskine and Harry Sherman of LAP/COTOL preached overtly religious message implying that their runs at the presidency were informed by divine inspiration. In predicting the vote for the LP, the coefficient for the religion variable has a negative sign suggesting that consideration for this variable had the opposite effect on those voters who may have cast ballots for the LP.[99] The results also show that when controlling for religious interests, the coefficients for ethnic groups such as the Kru and the Bassa were still statistically significant explanatory variables in predicting the respective votes for the CDC and the UP, the parties for which we would have expected those ethnic groups to vote given ethnic census theories of voting.

Table 4.23

2005 Legislative Elections: Religion and Vote Choice

Explanatory Variables	CDC Vote	UP Vote	LP Vote
Religious Interest	.46	-.82*	-2.0
	(.36)	(.40)	(1.03)
Kpelle	-.10	-.56*	-.18
	(.27)	(.25)	(.43)
Bassa	-.36	-1.2***	3.0***
	(.29)	(.29)	(.31)
Kru	1.5***	-.59	.20
	(.32)	(.36)	(53)

[99] A similar model of vote choice for LAP/COTOL that I do not report here shows that the religion variable was not a statistically significant explanatory variable predicting the vote for that political party.

Table 4.23 – Continued

Explanatory Variables	CDC Vote	UP Vote	LP Vote
Gola	.10*	-.81	-.47
	(.47)	(.57)	(1.1)
Kissi	-.04	.86*	-.22
	(.46)	(.37)	(.78)
Krahn	1.7***	-1.5**	.40
	(.37)	(.55)	(.59)
Vai	.07	-.83	—
	(.46)	(.47)	
Loma	.75*	.26	-.12
	(.35)	(.33)	(.65)
Grebo	1.1**	-.30	-1.0
	(.38)	(.40)	(1.0)
RlgnKpe	.07	.27	3.0
	(.94)	(1.2)	(1.5)
RlgnBas	-1.0	2.0**	1.9
	(.86)	(.66)	(1.1)
RlgnKru	.96	.30	—
	(.67)	(.75)	
RlgnGol	-.09	2.3	—
	(1.5)	(1.6)	
RlgnKra	-1.9	1.9	—
	(1.3)	(1.3)	
RlgnVai	.12	—	—
	(1.3)		
RlgnLom	-.78	1.2	3.40**
	(.76)	(.73)	(1.4)
RlgnGre	-.30	1.2	—
	(.73)	(.78)	
Constant	-1.3***	-.69***	-2.6***
	(.18)	(.15)	(26)
N	900	900	900
LRchi2	(18) 110.00***	(17) 55.99***	(12) 242.74***
Log Likelihood	-481.47	-479.20	-277.63
Pseudo R2	.10	.12	.30

Notes: *Significant at p< 0.05, **Significant at p<0.01, ***Significant at p<0.001. Standard errors are in parentheses. (18), (17) and (12) are degrees of freedom for the likelihood ratio of each Chi Square. Models are results of binary logit regressions in STATA using CLARIFY. RelgKpe, RelgBas, RelgKru, RelgGol, RelgLom, RelgGre, RelgKra, and RelgVai are interaction terms.

Next, in Table 4.24 I present the CLARIFY outputs for this voting pattern noting the predicted probabilities of vote choice for a political party by respondents given their religious interests.

Table 4.24

Effects on the Probability of Voting for the CDC, the UP and the LP:
Religious Interest on Ethnic Group

Ethnic Group	CDC Vote		UP Vote		LP Vote	
	Strongly Agree/Not Strongly Agree					
Kpelle	.31	.19	.18	.22	.20	.06
	(.16)	(.03)	(.15)	(.03)	(.16)	(.02)
Bassa	.11	.16	.34	.14	.57	.59
	(.08)	(.03)	(.10)	(.03)	(.10)	(.04)
Kru	.82	.52	.16	.22	.02	.09
	(.07)	(.06)	(.07)	(.06)	(.02)	(.04)
Gola	.49	.41	.49	.19	.02	.07
	(.26)	(.10)	(.26)	(.08)	(.03)	(.07)
Loma	.30	.36	.51	.40	.23	.07
	(.11)	(.07)	(.12)	(.07)	(.11)	(.05)
Kissi	.29	.21	.35	.54	.02	.07
	(.11)	(.07)	(.11)	(.08)	(.03)	(.05)
Grebo	.50	.46	.37	.28	.01	.04
	(.13)	(.08)	(.12)	(.07)	(.02)	(.04)
Krahn	.29	.59	.30	.11	.03	.11
	(.20)	(.08)	(.20)	(.05)	(.03)	(.05)
Vai	.37	.23	.10	.19	_	_
	(.23)	(.08)	(.05)	(.07)		

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; P <. 001

The table shows that the probability of vote choice for the CDC was significantly higher for Krus who strongly agreed with the statement agreed with the statement that they voted for a political party because they believed it was the party most likely to secure the interests of their religion. This is the highest mean value for all ethnic groups, as revealed by the results. There are no significant differences between most of the other ethnic groups such as the Bassa vote for the UP. A few more Gola who agreed with the

247

statement in question voted for the CDC, but they also voted for the Unity Party by a similar margin at .49. Other noteworthy trends from the result include the differences between Krahns and their vote for the CDC, and that between the Gola and their vote for the UP. The Loma vote for the UP is also worth mentioning. It is interesting that more Loma who strongly agreed with the statement voted for the UP even though that political party did not explicitly espouse a religious ideology going into the elections.

The "Big Person" and Vote Choice

The last explanatory variable I examined is that of the effects of the "big person" on vote choice. The variable represents political clientelism and explored the extent to which voting in the 2005 elections was influenced by resilient modes of political transaction structured by patronage links between the mass electorates and political elites. Table 4.25 reports the results of the tests.

Table 4.25

2005 Legislative Elections: "Big Person" and Vote Choice

Explanatory Variables	CDC Vote	UP Vote	LP Vote
Big Person	-1.9**	-1.8*	-.67
	(.75)	(.74)	(1.0)
Kpelle	-.22	-.52*	.05
	(.25)	(.24)	(42)
Bassa	-.53*	-.89***	3.1***
	(.27)	(.26)	(.31)
Kru	1.6***	-.58	-.14
	(.28)	(.31)	(.58)
Gola	.83	-.58	-.40
	(.44)	(.52)	(1.1)
Kissi	-.19	.97**	-.05
	(.45)	(.37)	(.78)
Krahn	1.6***	-1.2*	.51
	(.36)	(.50)	(.59)

Table 4.25 –Continued

Vai	.02	-.77	—
	(.43)	(.47)	
Loma	.52	.45	.51
	(.31)	(.30)	(.50)
Grebo	1.1***	-.12	-1.2
	(.32)	(.34)	(1.0)
BgmnKpe	—	1.9	—
		(1.3)	
BgmnBas	—	1.1	1.3
		(1.3)	(1.2)
BgmnKru	3.5**	—	1.6
	(1.3)		(1.6)
Constant	-1.1***	-.75***	-2.7***
	(.16)	(.14)	(.26)
N	900	900	900
LRchi2	(11) 111.87***	(18) 109.61***	(11) 234.89***
Log Likelihood	-480.53	-481.66	-281.55
Pseudo R2	.10	.10	.29

Notes: *Significant at $p < 0.05$, **Significant at $p < 0.01$, ***Significant at $p < 0.001$. Standard errors are in parentheses. Models are results of binary logit regressions in STATA using CLARIFY. BgmnKpe, BgmnBas, BgmnKru, BgmnLom, BgmnKra and BgmnVai are interaction terms.

The results show that the variable for the big person carries the negative sign and is statistically significant in the models predicting votes for the CDC and the UP, the two parties that won the highest votes following the elections in 2005. This finding is understandable given that whereas the candidacies of other contenders in the race such as Brumskine and Sherman were primarily identified with their respective localities of Grand Bassa County and Grand Cape Mount County, those of Weah and Johnson-Sirleaf were seen as groundswell, populist movements with which Liberians from all works of life identified. The coefficients for respondents from the Bassa ethnic group is also significant in predicting the vote for the Liberty Party suggesting that when controlling for the big person variable, Brumskine's candidacy was perceived somewhat as a

249

patronage vehicle. However, we should note also the statistically significant coefficient for the Kru vote for the CDC, which suggests that among Krus, Weah's candidacy was also perceived somewhat as some form of protection of Kru interests.

Next, in Table 4.26, I report the results of the CLARIFY tests which show the predicted probabilities of voting among and between respondents of the various ethnic groups given their preference on the vote for the party of the big person.

Table 4.26

Effects on the Probability of Voting for the CDC, the UP and the LP:
"Big Person" on Ethnic Groups

Ethnic Group	CDC Vote		UP Vote		LP Vote	
	Strongly Agree/Not Strongly Agree					
Kpelle	.05	.20	.29	.22	.05	.07
	(.04)	(.03)	(.20)	(.03)	(.06)	(.02)
Bassa	.03	.16	.13	.17	.71	.58
	(.03)	(.03)	(.12)	(.03)	(.12)	(.04)
Kru	.83	.60	.05	.21	.17	.06
	(.14)	(.06)	(.04)	(.05)	(.14)	(.03)
Gola	.12	.42	.06	.22	.05	.07
	(.10)	(.10)	(.06)	(.09)	(.08)	(.07)
Loma	.09	.35	.13	.43	.08	.11
	(.07)	(.06)	(.09)	(.06)	(.08)	(.04)
Kissi	.5	.21	.20	.56	.05	.07
	(.05)	(.07)	(.12)	(.08)	(.07)	(.05)
Grebo	.14	.47	.08	.30	.02	.03
	(.10)	(.07)	(.06)	(.07)	(.04)	(.03)
Krahn	.20	.59	.03	.14	.08	.11
	(.12)	(.07)	(.03)	(.05)	(.08)	(.05)
Vai	.06	.24	.05	.19	—	—
	(.05)	(.08)	(.05)	(.07)		

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; $P < .001$

For members of the Kru and Bassa ethnic groups, the highest mean predicted probabilities of vote choice lies with the CDC and the LP, the respective political parties of the big person from their ethnic groups in Weah and Brumskine. Almost all of the

250

remaining highest predicted probabilities of vote choice for the respective parties lie with members of those ethnic groups who did not strongly agree with the statement that they desired their vote to go the political party of the big person from their part of the country. Of particular note; two examples of groups that did not seem to have been looking for a political patron are the Grebo and Loma votes for the CDC and the UP.

In summary, the analyses have, in the main, shown that various ethnic groups in Liberia did not express homogenous preferences in their vote choices for political parties and all groups did not seek a purely ethnic vote by supporting only the political parties of elites from their communities. Voters from groups such as the Kpelle, the largest ethnic group in Liberia, spread their electoral support among several political parties and more importantly, they provided various reasons for doing so as revealed by the data. Other findings from the data do not provide much support for previous assertions that African electorates will vote largely for elites from their ethnic groups even if such elites may be less competent for political office than elites from other ethnic groups. As shown by the data, the CDC and the UP drew broad support from the electorate across Liberia, even from among ethnic groups such as the Krahn to which other political parties such as the NDPL could stake a greater claim.

Elite Political Behavior: Getting out the Vote, Who Did What, Where and Why?

In this section I explore the role of the elites of political parties in producing the voting outcomes that we saw in Liberia by examining the various campaigns to mobilize the electorate during the time of the 2005 elections.

A major difference between the institutional arrangements for the elections in Sierra Leone and those that were held in Liberia was the adoption of a simple majority

electoral system for Liberia whereas institutional designers had opted for a proportional representation system in Sierra Leone.[100]

Some were skeptical about aspects of the arrangements for the elections questioning the neutrality of the members of the transitional government and accusing the executive Chairman Gyude Bryant and others of unfair support for some members of the presidential candidate field.[101] Others raised concerns about the scheduling of the elections on the date specified arguing the proximity to the rainy season would hinder voting and put some electorates in some constituencies at a disadvantage because of the potential difficulty in reaching and educating them about the voting process and the electoral choices available to them.[102] Another argument raised fears that the difficult conditions would also create logistical nightmares in organizing the elections by discouraging many from voting (Harris 2006). However, all such fears where later to prove unfounded as the difficult terrain did little to discourage presidential, senatorial and

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[100] Some observers point out that the PR system was employed in Sierra Leone because of the challenges of registering both internally displaced members of the population as well as refugees in neighboring Guinea. However, this point is questionable given that similar conditions entailed in Liberia at the time of registration for the elections of 2005.

[101] See the special edition of Africa Week October 2004, pg. 8 for the article "Tipoteh Criticises Bryant" in which veteran Liberian politician Dr. Togba Nah Tipoteh makes the allegation that National Transitional Government of Liberia Chairman Gyude Bryant had maintained support for Varney Sherman, his former legal adviser despite provisions in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that stipulated the neutrality of the membership of the transitional government in the elections proceedings.

[102] Dr. John Scott Goffa, a former presidential candidate who ran as an independent in the presidential elections of 1985 made one such observation in an interview to the Liberian Analyst Newspaper. See "Former Aspirant Against "Hasty Elections," Liberia Analyst, Wednesday, September 14, 2005.

house candidates from taking their campaigns to the farthest flung regions of the country, or voters from voting on Election Day.[103]

This section of the chapter analyzes the behavior of political elites in Liberia illustrating how the leaderships of the various political parties mobilized voters to the polls during the campaigns for the elections of 2005. In order not to make the analyses unwieldy, the discussion centers on the actions of the leaderships of only three of the myriad of political parties in Liberia that contested the presidential and legislative elections of 2005 – the Unity Party, the Congress for Democratic Change and the Liberty Party. The logic of focusing on only these parties is that as the three highest vote getters following the first round of the elections on October 11, a discussion of the campaign strategies they employed is more likely to offer a useful insight into what elites said or did to mobilize Liberians in 2005 than a discussion of most of the other parties among the 30 or so registered political parties in the country during the period in question. Also, besides emerging as the victorious party from the presidential elections, the UP is among the very few political parties in Liberia that have been in existence since the pre-civil war days and is more likely than other parties to have cultivated a dedicated support base among the Liberian electorate –it is important to know how it mobilizes that support base. The case of the CDC exemplifies an emergent political party that managed to capture the imagination of a vast proportion of the electorate in a rather short period following its founding. The LP represents a political party that is mostly identified with

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[103] According to the Carter Center Elections Report on Liberia, the total number of candidates approved by the National Election Commission of Liberia was 762. This number included 22 candidates for president, 22 for Vice President, 205 for Senate seats, and 513 candidates for the House of Representatives. See the Carter Center 2005. "Final Report on the 2005 Liberia Elections." (Atlanta, Georgia: Carter Center), p.13.

one ethnic group (the Bassa) and the cultivation of a sectional interest in the religious

vote that the leader of the party, Brumskine, so diligently courted. Together, the actions

of the leaderships and memberships of these parties provide variation and a useful

contrast that is critical to the analytical goal of this section in seeking to understand the

political behavior of political elites and how they mobilized voters to the polls especially

given their electoral fates following the elections of 2005.[104]

Twenty-two presidential candidates successfully navigated the registration

process and were placed on the ballot for the elections of October 11. As mentioned

earlier in this chapter, six presidential aspirants were rejected on various legal

technicalities but two of the six had their rejection overturned by the Supreme Court of

Liberia on appeal (Carter Center 2005, 13; Harris 2006; Sawyer 2008). However, the

decision came a little late for the two aspirants to be reasonably included on the already

printed ballots without creating substantial cost overruns to the NEC or disruptions to the

entire system. Both aspirants discontinued their bids for the presidency.[105] Table 4.27

below provides information on the presidential candidates who were on the ballot for the

October 11 election including their political parties and the administrative counties from

which they hail.

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[104] For this section, I am deeply indebted to the management, editorial boards and other members of staff of several newspapers in Liberia including The Liberian Analyst and The Daily Observer, for granting me access to their archives, which contained material on all the campaigns and documented neatly, all the daily goings-on in the months leading up to and following the elections of 2005. I am also grateful for their patience in enduring countless hours of probing and other impromptu requests I made to them.

[105] I met Marcus Jones, one of the two aspirants that were initially disqualified. A popular lawyer with an office in downtown Monrovia, I asked him why he discontinued his bid for the presidency. He told me that he did it for "the good of Liberia and that was simply it." When I pressed him further, he refused to provide me with any additional details of his unsuccessful bid for the presidency.

Table 4.27

County of Origin and Political Party of Presidential Candidates
in the 2005 Presidential Election

Presidential Candidate	County of Origin	Political Party
Barnes, Nathaniel	Maryland	Liberia Destiny Party
Brumskine, Charles	Grand Bassa	Liberty Party
Conneh, Sekou	Lofa	Progress Democratic Party
Divine, Samuel	Montserrado	Independent Candidate
Farhat, David	Grand Bassa	Free Democratic Party
Jallah, Armah	Gbarpolu	National Party of Liberia
Johnson-Sirleaf	Bomi	Unity Party
Kiadii, George	Grand Cape Mount	National Vision Party of Liberia
Kieh, George	Margibi	New Deal Movement
Korto, Joseph	Nimba	Liberia Equal Rights Party
Kpoto, Robert	Lofa	Union of Liberian Democrats
Kromah, Alhaji	Lofa	All Liberia Coalition Party
Massaquoi, Roland	Lofa	National Patriotic Party
Morlu, John	Lofa	United Democratic Alliance
Reeves, Alfred	Gbarpolu	National Reformation Party
Sherman, Varney	Grand Cape Mount	Coalition for Transformation Liberia
Tipoteh, Togba Nah	Sinoe	Alliance for Peace and Democracy
Tor-Thompson, Margaret	River Cess	Freedom Alliance Party of Liberia
Tubman, Winston	Maryland	National Democratic Party of Liberia
Tubman, William V.S.	Maryland	Reformed United Liberia Party
Weah, George	Sinoe	Congress for Democratic Change
Woah-Tee, Joseph	Bong	Labor Party of Liberia

Source: Amos Sawyer, "Emerging Patterns in Liberia's Post-Conflict Politics:
Observations from the 2005 Elections," *African Affairs*, 107 (2008): 182. Reproduced
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The presidential candidates hailed from 13 of Liberia's 15 administrative counties. Only River Gee and Grand Kru counties did not produce presidential candidates, as it appears. Lofa County produced the most number of presidential candidates with five candidates on the ballot including two, Sekou Conneh and Alhaji Kromah, who are both Mandingoes. An interesting question arising from this fact is that given the assumed homogeneity of ethnic preferences, why did two candidates from the same county who are expected, under existing theories, to draw from the same ethnic constituency run on different tickets? Given scholarship about the communal bases of party formation in sub-Saharan Africa (Bogaards 2007, 168-193; Salih 2003), an intriguing observation, also, is the five individuals who vied for the presidency from Lofa County alone. It is also interesting that the Tubman cousins from Maryland both vied for the presidency of Liberia on the tickets of different political parties instead of pooling their resources together as would be expected under traditional explanations of elite political behavior in African societies.

Another point of note is the significant mergers that appeared to take place between political parties taking part in the elections whereas a similar picture of mergers between political parties did not emerge in Sierra Leone. While there were twenty-two presidential candidates on the ballot including one independent candidate Samuel Raymond Divine, there was effectively half of that number in political parties on the ballot for seats in the Senate and the House of Representatives. Political parties such as the Coalition for the Transformation of Liberia (COTOL), the Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD) and the United Democratic Alliance (UDA) consisted of several other political parties. For the legislative elections, COTOL was the result of a merger between four parties: Liberian Action Party, Liberia Unification Party, People's Democratic Party

256

of Liberia, and the resurrect True Whig Party. APD consisted of a merger between two parties: the Liberian People's Party and the United People's Party. The UDA consisted of three other political parties: the Liberia National Union, Liberia Education and Development Party, and the Reformation Alliance Party.

Observing the elections of 2005, Amos Sawyer noted a number of tendencies that surrounded these mergers some of which became the major issues of the political campaigns for the executive office and legislative seats (Sawyer 2008, 186-191). According to Sawyer, one of the earliest tendencies of political elites working together around the time of the campaigns was the emergence of a "heritage movement" bent on preventing the ascendance of any candidate of Americo-Liberian or Congo heritage to the presidency. The group consisted of a loose collection of African-Liberians who, according to Sawyer, were also motivated by preventing the emergence of any presidential candidate to the political fore who could be revenge-seeking and uncommitted to the reconciliation the group believed was necessary for Liberians. However, the heritage movement was not cohesive enough to articulate a single position or even throw their weight behind a single presidential candidate. The group disintegrated even before the first votes were cast and its membership threw their splintered weights behind different candidates, notably Weah and Togba-Nah Tipoteh (Sawyer 2008, 187).

Another tendency around the time of the campaigns was the emergence of a women's empowerment movement known as the 50-50 Movement. With two female presidential candidates, Margaret Tor-Thompson and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf on the ballot, one of whom will eventually win the presidency, various women's groups mounted a serious campaign arguing that women had borne the brunt of the war and given the previous years of bad governance and mismanagement under men, it was time to give

women a chance (Sawyer 2008, 187). According to Sawyer, while the amalgamation of women's movements under this umbrella did not officially endorse the candidacy of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, from their actions it was implicit whom their support went to.[106]

One of the most transmittable messages of the campaigns was Weah's populist message of representing the common Liberian. On campaign stop after campaign stop, Weah cited his humble origins from the slums of Monrovia to an international soccer star. Defending his limited formal education, Weah argued that the educated people of Liberia were the culprits of all the troubles that had befallen Liberia over the years. His supporters cited his unwavering support for the Liberian national soccer team during the most trying times of the country and his relative inexperience in politics as a positive sign of someone who was untainted by all the allegations of corruption or association with the civil war, which tainted some of the other candidates in the race (Sawyer 2008).

On the other hand, supporters of Johnson-Sirleaf criticized Weah for his lack of a formal education. His newness to politics was also used against him and argued as a lack of the requisite experience to tackle the massive problems of post-war Liberia. Johnson-Sirleaf's supporters cited her international administrative experience with the World Bank and other international organizations, her graduate degree from Harvard University and her long years of opposition to various oppressive regimes as the requisite credentials of whom Liberia needed at that moment in time. Equally so, detractors of Johnson-

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[106]In a reaction to a story in the Liberian Analyst newspaper of October 26,2005 titled "Gender Ministry Turns UP's Campaign Ground," some women, including former Liberian head of state Ruth Perry, the education minister Dr. D. Evelyn Kandakai, female governors, female religious leaders and other elite women, who claimed to be the representative voice of the women of Liberia reaffirmed their collective endorsement of Mrs. Johnson-Sirleaf's candidacy as the women of Liberian and not as any sectional interest. See "Liberian Women React to Analyst Story," Friday, October 28th, 2005.

Sirleaf hinted her past involvement with Charles Taylor in triggering the civil war, her service with the corrupt administration of William Tolbert in the 1970s and her questionable heritage as potential setbacks to her candidacy. According to Sawyer, Johnson-Sirleaf took great pains to counter the latter allegation making sure to refer to her Gola and Kru heritages at every campaign opportunity including the inauguration following her election (Sawyer 2008, 187).

As the campaign for president heated up, this distinction between the educated and experienced candidacy of Johnson-Sirleaf and the uneducated but populist persona of Weah would become the major divisive theme of the entire elections especially as the two went into the runoff elections in November.

Quite a few presidential candidates invoked religion during the campaigns referring to a divine inspiration that compelled them to seek the presidency of Liberia. Among this group, the most pronounced was the campaign of Brumskine (Sawyer 2008, 189). At the head of his Liberty Party, Brumskine mounted a major campaign on this message of fundamental Christianity helped by a grassroots evangelical Baptist foundation, which operated throughout the Bassa heartland of central Liberia. Other candidates such as Sherman of COTOL and Kiadii of the National Vision Party of Liberia similarly invoked divine inspiration for their candidacies but according to Sawyer, none of these were more prominent than Brumskine's effort.

The last two tendencies surrounding the campaigns that Sawyer (2008, 189) observed were those who were motivated by finishing what he calls "unfinished struggles" from the past and those bent on a transformation of Liberia from what it was previously. The former group consisted of those who yearned for the deposed oligarchy of the pre-war years and those who were strongly opposed to that oligarchy and

everything that it stood for. Those who opposed the old oligarchy considered themselves progressive forces in Liberian society. According to Sawyer, one of the issues that the two groups disagreed over leading up to the 2005 elections was the proposed mandate of a truth and reconciliation commission following the elections and the proposed payment of reparations to those who had been victims of state violence against protesters in the 1970s.[107]

The second schism among those resuming unfinished struggles was that between former supporters of Doe and those who were former supporters of Taylor. According to Sawyer, this struggle was played out between members of the Gio and Mano ethnic groups on one hand who supported pro-Taylor forces, and his former National Patriotic Party now headed by Massaquoi going into the elections and Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups on the other hand who supported pro-Doe forces such as the National Democratic Party of Liberia now ironically headed by Tubman of America-Liberia heritage and a direct descendant of the oligarchy Doe had deposed about 25 years earlier (Sawyer 2008, 190; Harris 2006, 384). Weah tried to stride the margins of both groups and perhaps paid for it in the runoff elections when potential Gio and Mano voters in Nimba realigned with Johnson-Sirleaf following reports that Weah had promised jobs to Krahn elites in Grand Gedeh if he won the election (Harris 2006, 389).

Finally, there was the movement of new reformers who were the new progressives. This very informal group consisted of Liberian professionals, civil society

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[107]In 2007 I was in Monrovia when one of the leaders of the protest movements of the 1970s, Gabriel Bacchus Matthews passed away. His funeral on September 29, 2007 was well attended. The funeral procession brought traffic in most of central Monrovia to a dead halt for the better part of the day, perhaps a testament to his popularity. The late Matthews threw is his tremendous populist political weight behind George Weah and the CDC during the elections.

groups and intelligentsia who perceived Johnson-Sirleaf's candidacy as the best option

for Liberia given her education, professional background and receptivity to contrary

points of view. In other words, Johnson-Sirleaf did not outwardly exhibit any dictatorial

tendencies (Sawyer 2008, 190).

An estimated 35 percent of the almost 1.3 million Liberians who registered to

vote in the elections of 2005 lived in Montserrado County, which includes the capital

Monrovia and its immediate environs such as the bustling suburban community of

Paynesville to the south. According to Dr. Charles Clarke, chairman of the Unity Party,

going into the elections, one challenge for his party was to design and disseminate a

campaign message that sufficiently addressed the needs of urban voters while also

remaining cognizant of the scattered but substantial votes to be won in rural areas

countrywide, even in the remotest parts of the country.[108]

Another challenge was to tailor a message that sufficiently addressed the needs of

all Liberians while remaining particularly sensitive to the unique concerns of young

Liberians in the 18-35 years bracket who accounted for over 35 percent of the registered

voters for the 2005 elections and who had borne the brunt of the war either as exploited

fighters or victims of the violence perpetrated by others. As such, one major thrust of the

campaign message from the Unity Party focused on engaging marginalized youths in

postwar reconstruction of Liberia. Another thrust focused on the promised delivery of

important services and infrastructure such as electricity and pipe-borne water to all

Liberians in urban and rural areas. The UP further underlined the international credentials

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[108] "We are the Unity Party," he told me. "We strive to get everyone on board our party wagon."

of their presidential flag bearer, Johnson-Sirleaf, as the requisite experience to undertake the imperative task of reuniting and rebuilding Liberia in the postwar period.

Other parties were not outdone in promising postwar reconstruction of Liberia and reengaging marginalized youth. For example, as the major thrust of their campaign messages, the CDC touted the relative youth of Weah, their presidential flag bearer, and his dedication to address the problems of Liberia. The CDC pledged in their National Platform to

> strongly support and put in place a comprehensive reconciliation plan for former combatants and other war-affected youths, and people as a significant component of Liberia's post-war reconstruction agenda. The CDC proposes the establishment of a National Reconciliation and Healing Program (NRHP) as a means of mainstreaming war-affected youths and children into society by providing academic, vocational and other career-developing opportunities for them.[109]

The official campaign period for the elections commenced on August 15 though many observers pointed out that all political parties started clandestine campaigns to canvass votes several months prior to the official date.[110] Like Sierra Leone, the chief means of campaigning were the mass outdoor rallies usually attended by any number of people between a few hundred to several thousand depending on the popularity of the political party, the candidate or the location of the rally.[111] Other means of campaigning

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[109] Congress for Democratic Change, 2005. National Platform (Monrovia, Liberia), p2.

[110] Charles Brumskine is alleged to have declared his intention to run again for the presidency and started elements of his campaign as far back as 2003 when Charles Taylor was still the incumbent president.

[111] Most political rallies held in the capital of Monrovia can be expected to draw audiences in their thousands whereas only a handful of people might attend a rally in some counties given the political party or candidate. Mass rallies are often colorful events accompanied by loud singing and dancing to campaign jingles often punctuated by screams of party slogans. Those who are heavy partisans or who can afford to, wear t-shirts emblazoned with the pictures of the standard bearers of the party holding the rally or other party symbol. Those who cannot afford the party attire or who are not heavy partisans appear in their regular dress.

included the door-to-door canvassing of potential voters, recorded audio messages for dissemination through various radio channels across the country and posting flyers and handbills of party candidates across the country. Each political party over-utilized one form or the other campaign tool given their campaign war chest for the elections, the location or the source of the vote they may be trying to canvass. Some like, the CDC and Weah, who had his own radio station, were able to reach wider audiences across Liberia with their campaign messages.

The first opportunity for the presidential aspirants to pitch their messages to a broad-base audience came in the form of a presidential debate that was organized by the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute and the Press Union of Liberia on Thursday September 15, 2005 at the Centennial Pavilion in Monrovia. The eagerly anticipated occasion was attended by eleven of the twenty-two presidential candidates running in the elections. The event was said to be remarkable more for the conspicuous absence of Weah, one of the leading contenders for the presidency than for the elaboration of any party program or campaign platform that was outside the lines of promising to reunify Liberians and develop the country following the war. Notable contenders in the presidential candidate field such as Johnson-Sirleaf, Brumskine and Sherman of COTOL all followed this line in their contributions to the debate.[112]

Unlike Sierra Leone, there is no constitutional stipulation in Liberia that parties establish a presence in all administrative districts of the country. Given that there was no such requirement, it is not surprising that the elections observation team from the Carter

[112]A full coverage of this debate is in the archives of the Analyst newspaper. See Liberia Analyst, 2005. "Presidential Debate: Cunning Politicians, Ignorant Audience, Sentiments Overtake Maturity." Friday, September 16, 2005.

Center noted that "party organization is centralized within Monrovia" and most campaign activity was focused in the capital" (Carter Center Report 2005, 40). Where campaigns branched out into rural counties, the highlights of such efforts were the visit of the presidential candidate and other top brass of a particular political party to a county to address a mass rally or other party function or meeting. Besides, Montserrado, parties tended to concentrate their efforts in Lofa, Bong, Nimba and Grand Bassa Counties, other areas with high voting population density. The discussions of the campaigns of the selected political parties below provide illustrative pictures of how elites sought to mobilize voters to vote for them around the elections of 2005.

George Opong Weah, the CDC and the Campaign for Votes During the Elections of 2005

Weah and his running mate, the veteran politician Rudolph Johnson an ethnic Gbandi from Lofa County, launched their official campaign for the highest office in Liberia from the CDC headquarters in Congo Town, along Tubman Boulevard in Monrovia on August 15, 2005.

According to Samuel D. Tweah Jr., the former chairman of the CDC in the United States and one of the party's founding members, the CDC inspired a following that cut through the spectrum of Liberian citizenry. At the top of the layer, the party attracted members of the Liberian intelligentsia and professional class who were tired of the "usual politics" from so-called political leaders who had spent a lifetime in Liberian politics without any tangible benefits to show for it. These leaders had failed to deliver the economic and political progress for which Liberians yearned and their failures had allowed the excesses of past dictatorial regimes resulting in the fourteen-year civil war.

The candidacy of Weah was therefore a welcomed freshness to the Liberian political scene that inspired this class, Tweah explained.

At the other end of the spectrum, Tweah explained that the candidacy of Weah and the formation of the CDC also appealed greatly to the masses of downtrodden Liberian youth who had endured years of unimaginable hardship brought on by the civil war. Weah's humble beginnings from one of the lower class neighborhoods on the outskirts of Monrovia and ascendance to an international soccer star struck an admirable chord with this class who saw in Weah several shades of themselves and what they could become given good fortune. Since Weah had never directly participated in Liberian politics before but had undertaken various charitable ventures across the country and sponsored the Liberian soccer team to attend various international tournaments at a time when the country could not afford to pay salaries to even key government functionaries; he was also seen as the most philanthropic Liberian in recent times, someone who genuinely cared about the problems Liberians faced.[113]

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[113] Weah was not without detractors who, at various times in the campaign and more so during the runoff harped on his lack of formal education as serious limitations on his bid to assume the presidency of Liberia. Groups such as the Movement for Political Reform in Liberia (MOP) declared that they possessed evidence showing Weah was a 4th grade dropout instead of a high school dropout and challenged him to prove otherwise. Notable individuals in Liberia who were in opposition to Weah's candidacy, such as Jay Mike David, the Operational Manager of the Associated Companies of Liberia, also made their opposition to Weah's candidacy felt. In one pronouncement, David warned that Liberia risked becoming a future "Zimbabwe" if Weah is elected President in reference to the dictatorship of Robert Mugabe. See the Analyst, 2005. "Resist Weah for Presidency: To Avoid Future Disgrace." Perhaps one of the even more remarkable criticisms of Weah's presidential bid came from Jonathan Sogbie, a former teammate of Weah's in the national soccer team. Sogbie disagreed with all the praises that had been heaped on Weah as a patriot for sponsoring the national soccer team in a time of need during the war when funds were seemingly unavailable for participation in international soccer tournaments. Sogbie alleged that Weah always asked for refunds of his money from the state of Liberia and that even though it took time to process

These two sentiments were the thrust of the CDC campaign machinery and the messages it produced. Earlier, we saw that members of the Kru ethnic group were also drawn to the candidacy of Weah and the CDC party in larger numbers than other ethnic groups but I could not identify any overt efforts to court members of this group as an ethnic base for the party; neither was there any such efforts made according to other executive members of the party that I interviewed. The overwhelming identification of the Kru ethnic group with the CDC was more explainable by the reasons members of the intelligentsia and marginalized youth gave for their support of the party's cause than it was by any sense of an ethnic bloc preference for Weah simply because he was a son of the soil.

For most of the campaign, Weah and other party elites the CDC delivered messages to the Liberian public and electorate that were broad-based, portraying the party and the candidacy of Weah as an innovative presence in the politics of Liberia that would undertake the imperative task of postwar reconstruction. The key words of the campaign were "peace and stability." Weah promised crowds, everywhere he went, programs that concerned ordinary Liberians struggling to recover from the war such as access to education. He promised to stamp out illiteracy in Liberia if elected and to create a peaceful environment for Liberian refugees and others displaced by the war to return to contribute to the rebuilding efforts.

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those payments, Weah always received any money he had spent on the team. Sogbie alleged further that Weah had dictatorial tendencies as team captain of the Lone Stars and would make instant enemies of anyone who dared to oppose his suggestions at meetings. However, any credibility that Sogbie might have had in making his allegations were undermined by his open declaration of support for Madam Johnson-Sirleaf's candidacy. See the Liberian Analyst, 2005. "Boye Charles Reveals More on Weah: Pledges Support for Ellen," Thursday, September 15 2005, for more details of Sogbie's allegations against Weah.

According to Tweah, had they (the entire campaign machinery of the CDC) stuck entirely with such chords, Weah would have emerged victorious at the end of the runoff elections in November of 2005. Indeed, it was such messages and his populist appeal of bringing all Liberians onboard that got him the votes and put him in front of the presidential race following the first round of the elections. What factors derailed the CDC campaign train and caused Weah's defeat in the runoff? According to several executive members of the party who told me in confidence, it was partly Weah's ill-advised and hasty decision to draw on elements of ethnic sentiments around the time of the closing stages of the campaigns that may have occasioned the flight by many potential supporters and votes to Madam Sirleaf's camp during the runoff elections.

On the occasion in question, Weah is said to have visited the village of Tuzon in Grand Gedeh County, the birthplace of Doe where he declared his gratitude to Doe for supporting him early in his football career. According to Harris (2006, 389), Weah promised to repay the debt he owed to the son of Grand Gedeh by appointing people from the county, ostensibly members of the Krahn ethnic group and therefore Doe's people, to his cabinet if elected president. Up to that point, his campaign machinery was running efficiently and even though he was gradually being outpaced in campaign funding by the revitalized Johnson-Sirleaf and Unity Party campaign machinery, he still maintained the substantial and influential core of loyal following among the youth who needed little convincing to stay in his camp. It is important to note that Johnson-Sirleaf did not even place second in the votes in Nimba following the first round of the elections. However, come the second round, it is argued that Weah's declarations in Grand Gedeh cost him the votes in the more populous Nimba when the news of his actions in Grand Gedeh earlier, was relayed by his political opponents to the people of Nimba. The revelation is

said to have caused an about-face turn in Nimba votes catapulting Johnson-Sirleaf to the top of the votes in that county (Harris 2006, 389).

This development is another cautionary tale regarding the potential effects of ethnic sentiments on the political behavior of electorates in Africa. With a populist tone to his messages, Weah was successful in motivating thousands of supporters to support his political cause whereas his supposedly tactical switch to invoke ethnic sentiments in Grand Gedeh County achieved nothing else but alienate potential voters in neighboring Nimba County, a development that probably cost him the election.

Earlier on in Weah's campaign for the presidency, it became evident that he did not possess the oratorical skills to convey his messages successfully to large crowds at mass rallies but he was still able to pull in the largest crowds of the entire campaign period.[114] However, it is a difficult task to decipher if his mere presence at such rallies did more to pull in adoring crowds who wanted to see the international soccer star than being drawn to listen to his electoral promises of rebuilding Liberia. Given his limited education, Weah could not directly take control of the crafting and dissemination of his campaign messages, especially those that should be tailored to fit the aspirations and needs of electorates in counties across Liberia and in the deepest rural areas. He therefore needed strong local campaign machineries in counties across the country but if there were few areas in which the CDC campaign machinery was vulnerable, this was one of them. As was the case with the electoral support for nearly all of the other political parties, outside of Monrovia, hardly any avowed adherents of the CDC paid any campaign

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[114] In one show of support, thousands of partisans of the CDC are said to have intertwined arms standing along the length of Tubman Boulevard in central Monrovia, a distance of more than several miles.

contributions to the party. The loyalty of such members, it appears was limited to attending party functions such as rallies and meetings and professing verbal support for the party than by campaign contributions that are often a feature of support for political parties in advanced democracies. Most of the executive membership of the party that I interviewed admitted that the party was a new organization that could not be expected to have sunk its roots deep into the countryside, as yet, given its recent founding and the time the elections were held. As a consequence, the CDC lacked the kind of grassroots support that the Liberty Party and Brumskine, for example, cultivated across the Bassa heartland that was the LP's stronghold.

To compensate for this apparent weakness, the CDC relied on the star power of Weah to grace every major campaign occasion across the country as well as his money to fund every major party activity. Local party organizations were rather weak or non-existent. Most candidates for legislative seats adopted the party name more as a brand name and probably to ride the good fortune of Weah's celebrity than in any professed belief in the political ideology of the CDC. Without providing details in depth, the party issued a ten-point national platform promising what it will do for peace and unity, education, economic management and liberalization, accountability and transparency, social justice and equality, infrastructure and transport development, healthcare, social security and environmental responsibility, agriculture, forestry, mining and food security, national security and defense, and international cooperation or foreign policy if their presidential candidate won the presidency. It was never clear from this, what candidates

would do at the local level or how these promises would translate into concrete benefits for local communities.[115]

Executive members of the party admitted that these were all weaknesses that they will work to address going forward because they were aware that most one-man parties do not outlive the support of their most influential membership. In the end, Weah could not be everywhere at the same time to inspire crowds and towards the tail end of the campaign this fact became evident with several no-shows at several scheduled campaign events across the country.

The remarkable feature about the emergence of the CDC and Weah as major players in the political field of Liberia was the relatively short time in which the party was founded but rose to become the major opposition party in Liberia. The CDC is, arguably, an urban party with a political leadership that had never dabbled in politics before. Most of that political leadership had, in fact, spent the greater portion of the years leading up to the elections outside of Liberia. Given that traditional explanations of political behavior in African societies attach much credence to the mobilization of electorates through the heightening of communal sentiments, especially those tied to ethnic identities, it is a telling contradiction that the success of the CDC could best be explained in urban terms and to the appeal of a candidate, that except for one occasion, hardly ever drew on ethnic sentiments and instead relied on a populist and inclusive message of bringing all Liberians together regardless of ethnic identity. I shall move on next to examine the campaign of the Unity Party for the elections of 2005.

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[115]See the National Platform of the Congress for Democratic Change Party. CDC, 2005. National Platform (Monrovia, Liberia: Congress for Democratic Change)

Madam Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and Unity Party Campaign During the Elections of 2005

The veteran Liberian politician, the late Dr. Edward Kesselly, founded the Unity

Party in 1984 to challenge the former Liberian military dictator Doe in his efforts to

civilianize his regime through presidential and legislative elections in 1985. Thus, the UP

is one of the few political parties that have occupied the political space in Liberia for over

two decades and understandably undergone "process of institutionalization" given their

long presence.[116] As such, it was reasonable to expect that if any party had cultivated a

following that would stand it in good stead in any free and fair multiparty elections in

Liberia, the Unity Party would be that party given its enduring presence on the political

landscape. It should, therefore, not be too much of a surprise that the party eventually

emerged victorious from the elections of 2005. What needs to be addressed is how the UP

managed to turn it political fortune and that of its flag bearer around after initially losing

ground to the newly organized CDC.

The Unity Party settled upon Johnson-Sirleaf, a senior Liberian citizen of mixed

heritage who claimed Bomi County as her county of origin and Joseph Boakai Nyuma, an

ethnic Kissi who claimed Lofa County as his county of origin.[117] Weah's running mate,

Rudolph Johnson, also hailed from Lofa. Whereas it could be argued that Weah and the

CDC drew support from marginalized youths and a section of the Liberian intelligentsia

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[116]See Samuel P. Huntington, 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press). Amos Sawyer makes a similar point in his article on the emerging patterns of political competition in Liberia following the 2005 elections. Please refer to the footnote, which follows.

[117] Madam Johnson-Sirleaf's paternal ancestry included German heritage and her maternal ancestry were of Gola and Kru origins. See Amos Sawyer, "Emerging Patterns in Liberia's Post-Conflict Politics: Observations from the 2005 Elections," *African Affairs*, 107, 427 (2008), p.187.

who yearned to see political aspirants of a different mold; it could be argued that the UP drew its support primarily from women and the section of the Liberian intelligentsia and professional class who preferred an experienced hand to steer the affairs of state in the country following the war.

On Friday September 25, 2005, the Unity Party unveiled its party program and the official profiles of its two standard bearers, Johnson-Sirleaf and Nyuma at Monrovia City Hall to a mammoth audience of Liberians from all works of life, international and local press, members of the diplomatic corps, and government officials (Liberian Analyst 2005). The central message of the party to all Liberians was the realization of a vision of a "unified, prosperous and stable Liberia" under its administration. In the pursuit of this vision, the UP proposed a thirteen-point agenda including four priority areas. The party promised to do the following if elected: sustain peace and national security, heal the nation's wounds, restore Liberia's pride and dignity, secure a brighter future for Liberian youth, provide educational opportunities for all, revive and strengthen the economy, reform health delivery services, reduce poverty and sufferings of the people of Liberia, and secure a clean and healthy environment. The four priority areas included the following: ensure good governance and practice systems, revitalize basic economic infrastructure, revitalize transport and road networks, improve information and communication. In the words of Johnson-Sirleaf, the UP pledged to do all of this and "return to the rule of law and respect for all Liberians irrespective of *tribe, religion, gender, age, disability, and social standing.*"[118]

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[118] From the Unity Party Manifesto and statement delivered by Madam Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf on Friday September 25, 2005. Pp. 1-3.

The UP was one of the few parties that matched Weah and the CDC's campaign war chest and towards the runoff, even came to surpass the CDC in spending.[119] Also, the UP had an advantage over the CDC given its long history and was, as such better organized at mobilizing grassroots support across counties and rural Liberia. The party also seemed to have benefited from its old campaign machinery from its electoral run for the 1997 elections, when its standard bearer Johnson-Sirleaf placed second to Charles Taylor, and brought this experience to bear, as well, across the country.

In spite of her age, Johnson-Sirleaf proved to be as able and energetic a campaigner as any other presidential candidate in the field. Often mounted atop an open wagon, she brought her long political experience to bear when articulating the issues at campaign rallies. Her mastery of the economic and political issues facing Liberia made her a better orator than Weah when she outlined to campaign crowds the problems that Liberia faced and what she will do, if elected to tackle those problems.[120] Her running mate, Nyuma, was also an able campaigner adept at stirring crowds at rallies across the country – a quality which perhaps explains why the party settled upon him as their vice standard bearer.

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[119]According to David Harris, during the runoff, Madam Johnson-Sirleaf and the UP had enough funds to hire a helicopter to take them on campaign trips to the remotest parts of the country in order to canvass votes whereas Weah's campaign was restricted to the roads. See Harris (2006, 390), Liberia 2005: An Unusual Post-Conflict Election. The Liberian Analyst newspaper also reported that at some point, the CDC had cause to fire the entire CDC office in Bong County over proven accusations of pilfering from the CDC campaign fund intended for that county. See the Liberian Analyst (2005), "Weah Popularity Soars: Rural Liberians Swarm CDC Rallies, Teahjay and others Add More Impetus."

[120] I listened to a tape that a friend played for me in which George Weah unsuccessfully tried to pronounce a three-syllable word in an interview. I could not help laughing. The friend then rhetorically asked me how they could let someone like that become president of Liberia and potentially embarrass their country at an international meeting.

The Achilles heel in Johnson-Sirleaf's campaign efforts to mobilize the Liberian electorate was the almost successful attempt by her opponents to associate her with almost twenty years of dirty politics in Liberia. Some made the allegation that shadows of corruption had never been far from her when she served as government finance minister in the 1970s. Others tied her to Taylor's invasion of Liberia claiming that she was one of the initial sponsors of the rebellion.[121] Perhaps, even more potentially debilitating, others questioned her ancestry and identity accusing her of foreign ancestry and therefore unqualified for the office of President of Liberia. One aspect of this latter accusation questioning her identity was to tie her to the more than one century of repressive rule by the True Whig Party in Liberia by labeling her an Americo-Liberian or Congo. As mentioned earlier, Sawyer (2008, 187) points out that she took great pains to explain her ancestry at every campaign stop making sure to enlighten listeners about her Gola and Kru grandmothers who raised her. She even made a similar reference to this heritage when she was on safe ground in her inaugural speech following her electoral victory.

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[121] Tom Woewiyu, the former defense minister in Charles Taylor's defunct NPFL was particularly adamant in alleging ties between Madam Johnson-Sirleaf and the former rebel organization. Several supporters of Madam Johnson-Sirleaf sprang to her defense on the matter challenging Woewiyu to produce the evidence in support of his accusation. In one dramatic rejoinder, Austin Clarke, the former deputy defense minister in the same NPFL who succeeded Woewiyu as defense minister held a press conference in Sinkor, Monrovia to debunk the allegations by his former boss. Clarke conceded that Madam Johnson-Sirleaf was part of the formation of the NPFL because everyone was frustrated with the Doe regime at the time and wanted to get rid of it but that she backed away from the movement when she saw that the movement had metamorphosed into a brutal rebel movement under Charles Taylor. See the Liberian Analyst, 2005. "Former NPFL General Defends Ellen: Takes Issue with Woewiyu," for this story. Another group, the Liberians For Ellen (LIFE) also demonstrated their support for Madam Johnson-Sirleaf by damning Woewiyu for his allegations but the latter group refused to ask him to produce the evidence saying that Woewiyu had already demonstrated that he was not a credible individual.

Like the CDC, the UP also ran a centralizing campaign bringing everyone on board towards a theme of reconstructing Liberia for all Liberians. In an interview at the Party's headquarters in downtown Monrovia, the chairman of the party, Dr. Clarke told me that theirs was an inclusive campaign intended to put all hands on deck to undertake the task of postwar reconstruction. As such, the party did not identify with any sectional interests but firmly touted the requisite experience of its flag bearer at every campaign event. When asked to put his finger on the one thing that he thinks clinched victory for his party, Dr. Clarke responded that it was the perceived "competence" of their standard bearer, Madam Johnson-Sirleaf that emboldened the majority of the electorate to place their collective faith in the stewardship of the UP in Liberia for the next six years. In the next section, I will discuss the campaign of the Liberty Party to serve as a contrast to the centralizing campaigns that were ran by the first two contenders of the presidency during the 2005 elections. Unlike the first two campaigns, the LP made deliberate efforts to court a specific voting bloc among the Liberian electorate. The manner in which the LP mobilized voters to vote for the party serves to illustrate why and how some campaigns are sometimes perceived as ethnic vehicles.

Charles Walker Brumskine, the Liberty Party and the Campaign for Votes in the Elections of 2005

Even though several party functionaries that I interviewed claimed otherwise, the Liberty Party did not run a centralizing campaign for the presidential and legislative elections of 2005. All other evidence, party programs, endorsements of electoral support, some pronouncements of the leadership of the party, and even the geographical focus of the campaign machinery of the party arguably points to the fact that the LP overly or

deliberately courted electoral support from sectional interests of the electorate in the forms of the Christian evangelical vote and the Bassa vote.

Brumskine, a charismatic lawyer who once served in the Taylor-led NPFL government both as legal representative of the rebel movement and later as president pro tempore of the Senate following the elections of 1997 (Harris 2006, 382), claimed ethnic Bassa ancestry from Grand Bassa County, even though he was associated with the former Americo-Liberian hegemony. Amelia Angeline Ward, his running mate, was also ethnic Bassa who claimed Grand Bassa County as her county of origin. As such, the standard bearers of the LP were the only team of president and vice president who both came from the same county and belonged to the same ethnic group.

In a presidential candidate field were all the other parties made a calculated effort to balance their ticket by diversifying their leadership to include a presidential candidates and running mates who were either from different counties or belonged to different ethnic groups, it is striking that the elites of the Liberty Party settled upon this particular team of Brumskine and Ward.

On Thursday September 22, 2005, Brumskine formally launched the party platform of the Liberty Party at the Antoinette Tubman Stadium in Monrovia titled "Contract with the Liberian People." Brumskine argued that unlike other political parties, theirs was not a party manifesto but a contract with the electorate of Liberia, which they hoped to fulfill in order to gain reelection after six years. According to an editorial in the Analyst newspaper of September 23, 2005, the LP's programs for Liberia were one of the most thoughtful and well-articulated of the party programs on offer during the elections of 2005 and in the words of the writer, "if implemented to the fullest in the event of the

victory of the party in next month's legislative and presidential elections, Liberia would be well on the way to peace, stability, and economic growth" (The Analyst 2005).

The thrust of the LP's platform consisted of a three-pronged program of recovery, reformation and reconciliation. In delivering the party's programs, Brumskine promised the recovery and rebuilding of Liberia in order to promote the general welfare of the Liberian people. He also promised that the LP would reform the basic laws and traditional practices to ensure justice, security, and socio-economic growth of the society, if elected. The third prong consisted of the reconciliation of the population to ensure domestic peace and tranquility. Springing forth from these, Brumskine promised free education for all Liberians following three years of Liberty Party rule. In other to enhance interethnic cultural understanding among students, Brumskine proposed that students from Monrovia, for example, would be sent to Lofa county and vice versa and students with an "A" average or "B+" average would be granted scholarships to attend the University of Liberia.

Even more innovative, Brumskine promised a social security system in Liberia upon getting elected in which "no old woman or man would go to bed hungry," and in which the unemployed would be provided for until they could get their feet back on the ground. In a country emerging from a fourteen-year civil war with unemployment as high as 85 percent, Brumskine's message should have played out well to the ears of the thousands of unemployed Liberian youth; but why was this not the case?

Perhaps, it is the other aspects of Brumskine's campaign messages that cost him valuable votes and bought him a third-place finish in the electoral contest of 2005. In a country where about 60 percent of the population consider themselves non-Christian, Brumskine may have misguidedly placed too much emphasis on courting a religious vote

that may not have existed in sufficient numbers to guarantee him election to the Executive Mansion of Liberia. Underlying his campaign theme was a religious undertone of "remaking Liberia under the rule of law by God's command." Through such pronouncements, Brumskine sold himself to sections of the electorate as a deeply devout Christian on a mission to save Liberia. While this message may have played well to the section of the Liberian electorate that professed Christianity as their faith, the thrust of such pronouncements excluded numerous other potential Muslim or non-Christian voters. Indeed, Brumskine received endorsements from groups such as the "Prophetic Call to Ministers," and a congregation of religious leaders consisting of over 500 pastors who met to formally declare their support for his candidacy.[122] It is doubtful whether he received such similar endorsements from any Muslim groups in the country. I asked an executive member of the Liberty Party why their standard bearer insisted on courting an evangelical Christian vote during the campaigns and his response was that it was the sincere belief of their candidate that postwar Liberia needed salvation given the horrors of the war and Brumskine's efforts in that direction was in pursuit of that mission of instilling the love of God in the hearts of all Liberians, in spite of the political implications or consequences.

Another campaign message from the Liberty Party that may have appealed to a limited audience is the focus on land reforms in Liberia. While not potentially as alienating as the religious message, addressing the land issue appealed most to members of Brumskine's Bassa ethnic group who had been victims of the greatest land dispossessions in Liberia by rubber companies and other commercial firms. In several

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[122] See Liberian Analyst Newspaper, 2005. "Christian Churches Endorse Brumskine."

campaign stops, Brumskine cited, as an example, the case of the Liberian Agricultural

Company and accused them of evicting farmers from their lands without just

compensation in order to plant trees. In addition to the collective memory of the war, the

land dispossessions struck some of the most sensitive political nerves in Bassaland and

may have served to ossify support for Brumskine's candidacy even though such messages

may have been less appealing to the peoples of other counties who had no similar

experience of land dispossessions. It is little wonder that we saw such huge support for

the LP by ethnic Bassas in previous sections of this chapter of the dissertation.

In the end, while several other aspects the Liberty Party's election party platform

had crosscutting appeal for Liberians and was one of the most coherent of the proposed

party programs that were disseminated to the electorate during the elections of 2005,

Brumskine's candidacy and the populist element to some of the proposals of his party

could not match those of Johnson-Sirleaf and Weah's all-centralizing platforms and

candidacies. He received a comparatively decent thirteen percent of the total votes cast

but this figure was far below that gained by Weah and Johnson-Sirleaf that propelled the

latter two into the runoff elections of November 8. I next move on to discuss the

campaigns for the runoff elections with a particular focus on understanding how Johnson-

Sirleaf managed to upend Weah as the frontrunner following the first round of voting.

The CDC and the UP Campaigns for Votes in the Runoff Election of November 8, 2005

It was during the campaigns for the runoff elections of November 8, 2005 that the

differences between the professional and life experiences of Johnson-Sirleaf and Weah,

came to the fore as the major focus of both camps in an increasingly acrimonious

competition for votes heading to the polls. While the CDC camp tried to chip away at Johnson-Sirleaf's assumed credibility and experiences as a highly educated international banker and former international bureaucrat by accusing her of ignominious associations with the NPFL, the civil war and even the defunct True Whig Party hegemony that suppressed indigenous Liberians for so long, the UP camp hammered Weah for his low education and lack of administrative experience of any kind. Together, the two issues, Weah's education and Johnson-Sirleaf's past populated the national discourse on the future of Liberia during the time of the runoffs, more than any other issue(s).

Following the announcement of the final results of the October 11 elections by the chairperson of NEC, negotiations and maneuverings began in earnest as elites bargained for advantageous positions in the post-electoral picture that was emerging. In the arithmetic of most observers, Weah and his CDC party were well positioned to clinch the runoff given how well he had performed in the first round of the elections and given the sometimes-wild rumors that were emerging from the camps of various parties. In one such calculation, it was claimed that the leaderships of eight out of the 22 political parties that contested the first round of the elections had declared their support for George Weah and the CDC following the announcement of the results from October 11. In the calculation, the analyst listed Sherman and his multiparty coalition of COTOL as declaring for the CDC, potentially bringing with them the 8 percent of votes that COTOL won in the first round. Other leaderships that were said to have crossed over to the CDC included the ULD, the NRP, the UDA, PRODEM, the Labor Party, and the NPL; all polled less than one percent of the national votes each following the first round of voting (Analyst 2005).

In a counter move, Johnson-Sirleaf and the UP also sought and received endorsements from several parties heading to the runoff election. The Liberia Equal Rights Party of Dr. Joseph Korto pledged their support to the UP, as did the National Party of Liberia, the People's Democratic Party of Liberia, the Liberia Education Development Party, and the Labor Party of Dr. Joseph Woah Tee. Several executive members of Sherman's COTOL/LAP coalition, including the former chairman, Willard Russell, broke ranks with the leadership of the COTOL alliance to pitch tents with the Unity Party. In all, about twelve political parties sided with the UP although many still considered the scales tipped in the favor of Weah up to that point (Analyst 2005). Given the pledged support from these sources and in view of the almost 29 percent of votes he had already secured in the first round as the frontrunner, why did Weah ultimately lose the elections to Madam Johnson-Sirleaf? Several developments during the course of the campaigns may offer some answers to this question and may also provide a cautionary note for traditional explanations that have assumed mechanical ethnic linkages between elites of political parties and the mass electorates during elections in Africa. These developments at both the party and county levels may help explain why Weah ultimately lost the runoff elections.

In one of the most interesting and striking developments of the runoff period, the leaderships of some of the political parties declared for Weah's camp, while it was reported that the mass membership of those parties, in some cases, failed to follow those leaders into supporting the CDC and instead declared for Johnson-Sirleaf. Even among the elites of political parties, splits on whom to support were not infrequent. For example, while Sherman, the head of the COTOL coalition of parties, declared support for Weah's camp in a dramatic statement, on that same day, the youth wing of one of the influential

blocs of his multiparty coalition, the LUP/COTOL, declared for Johnson-Sirleaf. The women's wing of the same bloc of the alliance also pitched tents with the UP candidate. Bishop Alfred Reeves of the National Reformation Party of Liberia (NRPL) is also reported to have broken ranks with other executive members of his party including the main financial backer Martin Sheriff who had all declared support for Weah, by urging supporters of his party to "vote for a candidate of their choice." Brumskine, the candidate who placed third following the first round of voting also, rather conspicuously, failed to endorse any of the two candidates in the runoff elections and instead encouraged his supporters to vote their conscience leaving over 13 percent of potential Liberty Party votes up for grabs.

In another dramatic development reported in the Analyst newspaper of October 28, 2005, some senators and representatives, recently elected on the CDC ticket pledged their support for Johnson-Sirleaf and the UP (Analyst 2005). Supporters of the CDC cause mounted efforts to stem such defections to the UP camp and increase support for their party. Mysterious leaflets with potentially damaging ethnic implications for Johnson-Sirleaf appeared on the streets of Monrovia. Printed on the letterhead of a Masonic fraternity, the letter purportedly was written by Johnson-Sirleaf to Amos Sawyer with a list of potential cabinet nominees should the UP clinch the runoff election. All the potential cabinet nominees listed in the letter were of Americo-Liberian or Congo descent. A similar list of potential cabinet nominees by the CDC also appeared bearing the names of influential individuals in Liberian society –all of indigenous descent, who

will serve with Weah, should he get elected.[123] Both efforts were attempts to inject ethnic sentiments into a political contest that had been remarkable by the noticeable absence of such sentiments during the first round of voting in October.

At the county level, the cases of Grand Gedeh and Nimba County illustrate well the questionable bases of ethnic and regional support for political parties as assumed in most of the existing literature. Attempts by some eminent sons of the soils and elites of political parties hailing from those counties to mobilize their people in support of one party or the other failed woefully to materialize into votes and instead resulted in controversies that are well worth mentioning here. In Grand Gedeh, an eminent son of the soil from the county, Boi Bleaju Boi an assistant finance minister in the government chided his contemporaries for what he referred to as their erroneous assumption that Grand Gedeh held a "political contract" with the National Democratic Party of Liberia, or any other political party for that matter, because the late Doe, the founder of the NDPL hailed from the county. In remarks to the Liberian press regarding allegations by NDPL executive members that the people of Grand Gedeh had betrayed "their party," Boi had this to say:

> At no time did the people of Grand Gedeh enter into a political agreement that binds them to attach their interest to a particular political party that contested the October 11, 2005 presidential and legislative elections. (Analyst 2005)

Mr. Boi continued further to remark that it was unfortunate that many Liberians continue to hold the notion that the NDPL belongs to the people of Grand Gedeh County but that

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[123] See "UP Intercepts Damaging Leaflets: Call on Liberians Not to Waiver," The Analyst newspaper. Friday October 28, 2005.

the NDPL was not an ethnic Krahn party as "widely misconstrued by many people in several quarters of Liberia."

Nimba County experienced a similar division among the elites of political parties who hailed from the county. Prince Johnson, a former warlord who had recently won one of the two Senate seats from Nimba made a somewhat unilateral declaration of support for Weah's presidential bid in the runoff. Other elites from the county rebuffed Johnson's declaration labeling it "an absurd political misadventure." In a release to the Analyst newspaper titled "Don't Sell our County for Pennies," a United States based citizens' group from Nimba had this to say:

> to begin with, Nimba County, like the rest of Liberia, has never been a monolithic political setting where all the people blindly follow the whims of a leader and therefore, Prince Johnson's attempt to mislead the people of Nimba County is an absurd political misadventure .... (Analyst 2005)

The statement continued further to condemn Prince Johnson for not first consulting with the people of Nimba before declaring his support and the promise of the support of the rest of Nimba for Weah and the CDC. The citizens' group continued further in the statement to offer an endorsement of their own.

> Having scrupulously scrutinized the solid records of the two presidential candidates, we have no doubt that Mrs. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf has the requisite experience, qualifications, competence, capacity, orientation and above all else, the COMMITMENT to lead Liberia from the quagmire that we now find ourselves in and stabilize the country for posterity. We are therefore calling on the people of Nimba County in particular and the Liberian people in general to vote for Mrs. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf in the runoff election of November 8, 2005 in best interest of the nation. ... (Analyst 2005)

As far as the official pronouncements of the candidates went, both stayed on message underlining previous promises with additional details of what they will do if elected. On one campaign trip to Buchanan in Grand Bassa County, Johnson-Sirleaf roused crowds with her interpretation of what the Unity Party stood for. According to her,

UNITY was an acronym in which U stood for unity; N stood for national development; I for integrity; T for tolerance and transparency; and Y for youth development. She promised the cheering crowd that achieving these will be her guiding focus if they were to elect her and the Unity Party to form the next government. Johnson-Sirleaf and her supporters played up her international experience everywhere they campaigned and filled the airwaves with stories about her remarkable achievements in serving several international bodies such as the United Nations Development Program. Some of her supporters, such as Reginald Goodridge, a former information minister in Taylor's government decried potential detractors of Johnson-Sirleaf who, he said, were downplaying education for the purpose of justifying the alleged shortcomings of their presidential candidate, Weah. Goodridge said that he was

> disturbed by anti-education and ethnic messages coming from the camp of the Congress for Democratic Change when Liberians are calling for reconciliation and unification and stressing the importance of education for every youth as a means of rebuilding Liberia. (Analyst October 2005)

Cyril Allen, a former chairman of Charles Taylor's NPP joined Goodridge in supporting Johnson-Sirleaf as did Jewel Howard-Taylor, the ex-wife of the former warlord. Professional women of Liberia including the Minister of Gender Affairs at the time, Varbah Gayflor, held another meeting and reaffirmed their support for Johnson-Sirleaf and the Unity Party following that meeting. So did over 200 influential traditional women from all across rural Liberia. Johnson-Sirleaf invited Weah to a debate to discuss publicly the issues facing Liberians heading into the polls on November 8 2005 so that the electorate would obtain a clear idea of the position of each candidate. The National Democratic Institute and other international organizations also tried in vain to get the two candidates together for a debate.

Weah embarked upon a ten-day road trip across Liberia as part of his campaign for the runoff election. Shifting focus a little from other issues such as increasing the literacy rate, Weah promised rapid economic development for Liberia if elected. In one of his campaign stops in Buchanan, Grand Bassa County, he promised to create business opportunities for small business owners in Liberia as well as attract foreign investments and the proper management of revenue accruing to Liberia from its vast natural resource deposits (Analyst 2005). In addressing the issue of corruption that many pointed to as one of the root causes of the civil war, Weah pledged to have zero tolerance for corruption and to punish any civil servants found guilty of the act. He also urged Liberians to reconcile for the sake of peace arguing that genuine peace cannot be achieved without reconciliation.

The results of the voting on November 8 showed how successful the various campaigns, endorsements and other efforts of the elites of political parties were in mobilizing voters to the polls for the runoff election. There were quite a few dramatic turnarounds as referred to earlier such as the ones in Nimba and Montserrado counties where Johnson-Sirleaf overturned all the odds to wrest those counties and their substantial votes away from Weah, who had won them following the first round. Weah won six counties during the first round, far more than any other presidential candidate including Johnson-Sirleaf, who only managed to win four counties on October 11. Although Weah held on to five of the six counties he had won following the first round of voting on October 11, that feat paled in comparison to Johnson-Sirleaf's final tally of 10 counties for a total of 59.4 percent of the vote. Table 4.28 illustrates these shifts in electoral fortunes between the two rounds of voting.

Table 4.28

Electoral Wins by County October 11 and November 8: Presidential Candidate

County	October 11 Presidential Candidate	November 8 Presidential Candidate
Bomi	Johnson-Sirleaf	Johnson-Sirleaf
Bong	Tubman, W.	Johnson-Sirleaf
Gbarpolu	Johnson-Sirleaf	Johnson-Sirleaf
Grand Bassa	Brumskine	Johnson-Sirleaf
Grand Cape Mt.	Sherman, H.	Johnson-Sirleaf
Grand Gedeh	Weah	Weah
Grand Kru	Weah	Weah
Lofa	Johnson-Sirleaf	Johnson-Sirleaf
Margibi	Johnson-Sirleaf	Johnson-Sirleaf
Maryland	Tubman, W.	Johnson-Sirleaf
Montserrado	Weah	Johnson-Sirleaf
Nimba	Weah	Johnson-Sirleaf
River Cess	Brumskine	Weah
River Gee	Weah	Weah
Sinoe	Weah	Weah
Voter Turnout	74.9 %	61%

The survey instrument included a set of questions which asked voters who voted in the runoff election if the presidential candidate for whom they voted in the election of November 8 was the same candidate for whom they had voted during the first round of the elections. 32 percent of the respondents indicated that during the first round of the presidential elections, they did not vote for the presidential candidate for whom they voted in the runoff elections. 48 percent of the respondents indicated that they did not switch votes between presidential candidates while the rest of the responses fell into the

missing data category or those who could not recall if they had switched votes or not. The follow-up question asked those who had switched votes between the two elections why they chose to vote for a different candidate during the runoff election than the one for whom they had previously voted. The responses are reported in Table 4.29.

Table 4.29

Why Did Respondent Switch Votes?

Response	Percent
First Round Choice No Longer on Ballot	21%
Was told by elders how to vote	7%
Candidate is from same ethnic group	.3%
Candidate is most competent to rule Liberia	13%
Respondent did not switch vote	58%
Total	100%
N	910

The responses suggest that those who switched votes between presidential candidates were less influenced by pressure from the elders or elites of political parties to which they belonged than by the opinion they had formed of the requisite competence of the candidate to undertake postwar reconstruction and reconciliation in Liberia, the issues that dominated the national discourse in Liberia at the time. Even far less so were considerations of ethnic affiliation with the candidate with less than one percent of respondents suggesting that as a reason why they switched their votes.

Next, I broke this down further to highlight the ethnic spread of the responses

across the categories for respondents who switched their votes as well as those who did

not between both rounds of election. Table 4.30 reports the result.

Table 4.30

Ethnic Groups and Reasons for Vote Choice in the Runoff Election

Ethnic Group	Initial Choice Absent	Elders Prompt	Ethnic Interest (%)	Competent Candidate	Did Not Switch Vote
Bassa	17	8	0	23	53
Bella	21	0	0	29	50
Dei	50	0	0	5	45
Gbandi	3	24	0	24	38
Gio	22	17	0	0	61
Gola	29	0	0	8	63
Grebo	12	2	0	8	78
Kissi	7	7	0	3	83
Kpelle	38	9	1	16	37
Krahn	13	5	0	13	69
Kru	9	5	1	7	78
Loma	11	2	0	5	78
Mandingo	39	12	0	15	35
Mano	25	6	0	4	65
Mende	14	0	0	14	71
Vai	24	9	0	36	30
Others	21	7	0	14	59
Total	21	7	.3	13	58
N=713					

The table shows that among respondents who switched their votes, the influential reasons why they cast a ballot for another candidate in the runoff elections appear to be because their initial choice was no longer on the ballot or the felt that the candidate was most competent for the job. Comparatively far less number of respondents declared that their vote choice in the runoff was determined by a prompt from their elders or because the candidate was most likely to secure the interests of their ethnic group. However, we should note that the two candidates in the runoff are affiliated with only the Kru and Gola ethnic groups. For those two groups, we note that most members did not switch their votes from one candidate to the other between the two elections. There are some minor variations in the numbers. It seems as if members of the Gbandi and Gio ethnic groups were more likely to be influenced by prompts from the elders of their ethnic group than others.

The final results of the election on November 8 suggest that Johnson-Sirleaf's sustained message of possessing the requisite capacity and commitment to undertake the imperative task of rebuilding Liberia following the war played out better in the ears of the electorate than any other efforts or tactics that were employed by elites of political parties to mobilize voters to their various camps; in view of the fact that those messages constituted the thrust of her campaign machinery for the runoff election.

An Ethnic Census or a Vote for Peace, Development and Reconstruction?

The empirical evidence from this chapter has offered more support for the claim that most Liberians went to the polls on October 11 and November 8, 2005 intent on voting for a presidential candidate who would consolidate and sustain the peace by building upon the preceding two years of relative peace they had experienced under the

National Transitional Government. Even though there were twenty-two presidential candidates on the ballot and over twenty political parties who all received votes in varying numbers, the evidence further suggests that this fact points less to an ethnic census, as could be hypothesized from existing explanations of voting behavior in African societies, than to a qualified crop of elites who all felt they possessed the requisite skills to undertake the imperative tasks of postwar reconstruction.

The survey results contradict theories that have maintained that political behavior in African societies is, in the main, identity driven as well as elite centered. The evidence included several cases where elites, such as the former warlord Prince Johnson of Nimba County, made the call and attempted to mobilize segments of the Liberian population but failed to do so, with those segments adopting a completely different stance. An important distinction could therefore be made between elites on the basis of credibility. Credible elites are successful in mobilizing the electorate if they have, in the past, established their credibility by providing the material needs of the people. If on the other hand such provisions have not been made, the less tangible element of identity alone does not suffice in serving as a mobilizing factor. This is inconsistent with most identity theories that have assumed elite driven processes because of the strong attachments that electorates are said to have to the ethnic communities from which they hail.

Notably, the majority of respondents did not report voting for candidates or political parties on the bases of identity or regional interests alone. Rather, the results show that tangible development interests such as the postwar reconstruction of Liberia, the provision of electricity, the construction of roads, hospitals and clinics were paramount in the minds of voters and also constituted statistically significant relationships with the dependent variables of vote choice and support for political parties.

The findings are also less consistent with ethnic census theories given that several counties produced quite a few presidential candidates who were on the ticket of different political parties and who had running mates from different ethnic groups who also hailed from different counties. Some were even from the same ethnic group but ran different campaigns, effectively handicapping them from using any kind of ethnic insinuation to attract or mobilize voters given the inherent contradictions in such messages. Tubman from Maryland County and his cousin both ran on the tickets of different political parties that had supposed electoral bases in other counties. Interestingly, Tubman headed the NDPL party going into the elections. As the political party founded by the man who overthrew the Americo-Liberian oligarchy of which he was a direct beneficiary, it is least expected, given ethnic census theories, that he would have led the NDPL into elections. Furthermore, it is least expected that the NDPL should have failed to attract votes in Grand Gedeh County, the ancestral home of the late Doe who founded the party.

This and the other findings provide less support for an ethnic census in spite of the splintering of votes following the elections. Much of the evidence points to votes that were intended to place the most competent individuals into office out of the large pile of political elites who were clamoring for votes. The next chapter presents the results of several focus group discussions and explores this point further through the comparative examination of the role of ethnicity in the post conflict elections in Sierra Leone and Liberia.

CHAPTER V

WHAT ROLE FOR ETHNICITY? POLITICAL BEHAVIOR AND MOBILIZATION
IN POST-CONFLICT LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE

This is the second key claim about the nature of African politics: that voters seek access to state resources by allocating their electoral support to members of their own ethnic groups, who they assume will be more likely than noncoethnics to redistribute those resources to them. Meanwhile, candidates, recognizing this, couch their appeals in ethnic terms. Ethnicity thus assumes a position of prominence in election campaigns in Africa not because voters are atavistic or tradition-bound but because, in a context where the goal is to capture resources from the state, and where politicians woo supporters by promising to channel resources to them, ethnicity provides a cue that helps voters distinguish promises that are credible from promises that are not. (Posner 2005)[124]

In addition to class differences, the postindependence political behavior of African ethnic groups reveals a persistence of internal or subethnic schisms along the lines of clan, age-set, geographical, and sometimes gender differences. (Chazan et al 1999)[125]

Introduction

This chapter undertakes a direct comparison of the two cases of Liberia and Sierra

Leone through an analysis of the aggregated results from the focus group discussions that

were held to discuss the results of the surveys obtained in each country. In doing so, the

focus group sessions served to validate the findings of the surveys through open-ended

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[124] Daniel N. Posner, "Regime Change and Ethnic Cleavages in Africa," *Comparative Political Studies* 40 (September 2007): 1305.

[125] Naomi Chazan, Peter Lewis, Robert Mortimer, Donald Rothchild and Stephen John Stedman, *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa.* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 110.

discussions which gave participants the opportunity to express their opinions about the findings and, more importantly, the reasoning behind those opinions.

One of the most repeated observations in the literature on political behavior in Africa is that ethnic identity and considerations for securing communal interests at the expense of other regions or broader national interests underlie the voting calculus and are the prime indicators of how electorates vote. Yet we have seen how members of various ethnic groups in Sierra Leone broke ranks with their groups to vote for Kabbah who emerged president following the elections of 2002. We have also seen how elites in Liberia, such as Winston Tubman, mobilized electorates from counties other than the one from which they hailed. Thus, during the post-conflict elections in both Sierra Leone and Liberia, voting preferences were not visibly predicated upon considerations for ethnic identity and communal preferences alone.

Conversely, as shown in Chapters III and IV, electorates from some groups such as the Kru and Vai in Liberia and the Mende and Temne in Sierra Leone displayed marked preferences for political parties associated with elites from their respective ethnic groups or local communities. In the case of the Mende and Temne, the distinguishing characteristic is that they constitute the two largest ethnic groups in Sierra Leone whereas the Kru and Vai are quite small in numbers in comparison to other ethnic groups in Liberia. In Chapter IV, we saw how Vais voted in significant numbers for COTOL, the coalition headed by Harry Sherman, the prominent lawyer from Grand Cape Mount County, the traditional home of Vais. On the other hand, Chapter III on Sierra Leone revealed that Fullahs voted for the SLPP in obvious disregard for the National Democratic Alliance headed by Amadu Jalloh, a Fullah. In effect then, some ethnic

groups tended to display overwhelming support for one political party or preferred the candidacy of some individual who hailed from their ethnic group while others did not.

In this sense then, all ethnic groups do not display homogenous preferences in voting behavior. But this should not confuse an important point about the role of ethnicity in the political behavior and mobilization of electorates in the two cases. For example, in one sense of ethnic belongingness, seen as the ability to speak the same language as the audience with which elites intended to communicate at rallies, party meetings and other gatherings, ethnicity provided a vital tool for imparting important campaign messages to thousands in specific communes. The ability to back up the communicative utility of the ethnic identity as language common to a particular area with tangible evidence of good deeds in the local community offered an additional tool for elites as they sought to recruit voters.

Given the variations in the tendency of different ethnic groups to show support for political parties ostensibly affiliated with their local communities and given also the ability of elites such as Tubman of Liberia and Kabbah of Sierra Leone to mobilize members of communities with whom they may not necessarily speak the same language, it is important to ask then what groups, in the case of each country, were more likely to display homogenous support for the leadership of some political parties and why? Why did members of the Fullah ethnic group fail to throw their collective weight behind the NDA party and the candidacy of their Fullah brother Amadu Jalloh? How did Winston Tubman mobilize the following of the NDPL party to which he could not otherwise make an undisputed claim of solidarity with any communal cause that membership may have, given his Americo-Liberian heritage?

This chapter seeks to answer these and related questions following the examination of the data gathered from each country. The primary means of data collection for the purpose of validating the preceding findings was through the focus group discussions held in both countries. The total number of participants in the sessions for each country was 48 broken down into 12 participants per each session held in each geographical area of each country. The participants in each session ranged in age from 18 to the mid-seventies and were respectively recruited in each country with regard to membership in the voting eligible population. Staffs of CENTAL and Campaign for Good Governance were instructed to recruit only those individuals who they could verify were not involved in heavily partisan activities in their various localities and who did not hold membership in interest groups affiliated with political parties. Other criteria for recruitment into the focus group sample were dictated by the need to reflect the regional spread of ethnic groups and the respective proportions of gender, religion and ethnic demographic in each region. The final groups that were assembled included men and women, individuals who had attained various levels of education, the employed and unemployed, and individuals who occupied various socio-economic strata in their respective societies. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 provide a summary of the characteristics of the participants in the focus group sessions in each country.

In all the sessions, I endeavored to steer the discussions around three important themes, namely: the nature and content of campaign messages, how groups manifested their interest in politics and the determination of regional support or preference for parties and candidates. Additionally, the discussions in Liberia touched on the nature of Charles Taylor's electoral victory in the 1997 elections.

Table 5.1

Characteristics of the Focus Group Participants in Sierra Leone (N=48)

Characteristic	Number
Religion:	
Christian	18
Muslim	25
Other Faith	5
Region:	
East	12
North	12
South	12
West	12
Age Groups:	
18-34	20
35-50	18
Over 50	10
Gender:	
Women	22
Men	26
Level of Education:	
Illiterate	18
Primary	16
Higher Education (Beyond High School/Some College/College Grad)	14
Ethnic Groups:	
Mende	12
Temne	12
Limba	5
Kono	5
Krio	7
Other	7
Employment Status:	
Unemployed	18
Employed/Self Employed	30
Residence:	
Urban	12
Rural	36

Table 5.2

Characteristics of the Focus Group Participants in Liberia (N=48)

Characteristic	Number
Religion:	
Christian	30
Muslim	12
Other Faith	6
Region:	
Central/West	12
East	12
North	12
South	12
Age Groups:	
18-34	10
35-50	26
Over 50	12
Gender:	
Women	23
Men	25
Level of Education:	
Illiterate	7
Primary	22
Higher Education (Beyond High School/Some College/College Grad)	19
Ethnic Groups:	
Kpelle	8
Bassa	8
Kru	5
Gola	5
Loma	5
Krahn	5
Vai	4
Mano	4
Other	4
Employment Status:	
Unemployed	15
Employed/Self Employed	33
Residence:	
Urban	27
Rural	21

Identities, Communities, and Post-Conflict Political Behavior in Liberia and Sierra Leone: Findings from the Focus Group Discussions

A plausible explanation that could be derived from literature regarding the role of ethnicity in the political behavior and mobilization of voters in Liberia and Sierra Leone is that following the devastation of whole communities that accompanied both civil wars, political parties were likely to draw on communal sentiments and since these were often closely knitted with other ties such as ethnic kinship, they would become the foundations for the reorganization of political life in both countries. Given such interpretations, it is reasonable to expect that elites of political parties would play the ethnic card at each available turn and all sections of the electorates would be equally inclined to pay heed to such calls given the homogeneity of ethnic preferences and the struggle over scarce resources to rebuild following the war.

The findings from the survey research on both countries presented in Chapters III and IV show that some notable schisms existed among several political parties, particularly in the case of Liberia. During the runoff, elites of several political parties such as COTOL not only went their separate ways in endorsing various candidates, but also asked their supporters to "vote their conscience." Charles Brumskine of the Liberty Party of Liberia famously refused to endorse any particular candidate and he similarly exhorted his supporters to vote their conscience.

Thus, I asked participants in the focus group sessions how they felt voters made decisions about what political parties or elites to support during elections. One of the answer options from the survey question in the general survey was repeated to participants in the focus group sessions. The response option prompted them to indicate

their agreement or disagreement with the statement that "They are the party representing the interests of my ethnic group." From the responses received to this question, 60 percent of the participants in the focus group sessions in Sierra Leone suggested that 90 percent of Sierra Leoneans would strongly disagree with this suggestion. 35 percent suggested that Sierra Leoneans would strongly agree with this suggestion and the rest were distributed among the midrange response options.

In the case of Liberia, 67 percent of the participants in the focus group sessions suggested that 40 percent of Liberians would strongly disagree with the suggestion that considerations for their ethnic group could be the prime motivating factor for supporting parties or candidates during elections. Thirty-three percent of the respondents suggested that 55 percent of Liberians would agree with the statement, while the rest of the respondents were unsure of how Liberians would respond.

In both cases, the responses from the focus group sessions do not offer conclusive evidence to show that the respondents believed that ethnicity was the major factor motivating political behavior or informing patterns of mobilization into the politics of Sierra Leone and Liberia. However, this is less true for the case of Liberia than it is for Sierra Leone given that over half the respondents in the focus groups sessions believed that only 40 percent of Liberians would have strongly disagreed with the statement suggested in the surveys.

Following each response in the focus group sessions, I then introduced the actual figures from the surveys and encouraged discussions on the outcomes revealed. In the case of Liberia, the responses to the question on the surveys showed that 23 percent of Liberians strongly agreed with the statement that they supported a candidate or followed a political party because it was the party that was more likely than others to champion the

interests of their ethnic group, while about 12 percent agreed with the same statement. 50 percent strongly disagreed with the statement and another 12 percent disagreed with the statement.

I then probed for explanations that would explain the differences in the response options given from what they, the respondents, had suggested. Some respondents told me that considerations for seeking ethnic interests have never been a major concern for most Liberians when seeking what political party to support because they are aware that all politicians are greedy and not likely to deliver on any promise of channeling material benefits to their counties. If anything, Liberians have been more inclined to follow politicians, such as Bacchus Matthews and others, who championed broad-based issues such as organizing the rice riots of 1979 that eventually toppled the Tolbert administration. In some sessions, respondents told me that since politics in Liberia had never been the open, democratic affair that is practiced in some Western countries, there had never really been an opportunity for Liberians to play out their ethnic differences in terms of allocating support to political parties on the bases of ethnic identity. If anything, "we will see from now onwards, how things play out," one respondent told me, in reference to the expectation that future elections will be held in a much freer environment following the conclusion of the war. In reference to why the votes in Liberia were diffused among so many political parties, another respondent offered this explanation:

> people were faced with diverse choices, and that prominent politicians had failed over the years to develop the country and had been obsessed with corruption and enriching themselves. Frustrated over the latter, experimenting with any less-important but seeming credible candidate was the best way forward.

Turning to Sierra Leone, I revealed to participants of the focus group sessions, following their responses, that 11 percent of Sierra Leoneans strongly agreed with the

statement that considerations for securing ethnic interests were a major factor in determining their support for political parties while 73 percent strongly disagreed with the statement and about seven percent agreed with the suggestion while another seven percent disagreed. Opening discussions around this point, some participants made an interesting point that ethnicity was only a factor in the mobilization of Sierra Leoneans if it was thought to bring an immediate benefit. I probed for what this benefit was or were, as the case may be, and the examples offered included support for military regimes in the past by groups who felt that such regimes offered the potential for their members to receive lucrative government contracts, scholarships for their children to study overseas or high administrative positions. References were made to two military coups of the past: the National Provisional Ruling Council regime of 1992 and the Armed Forces Ruling Council junta of 1997. The latter was cited for receiving substantial support from Limbas while the former was cited for being largely a Mende affair.

One interesting point about these examples is that they are all drawn from the context of nondemocratic political regimes and the limited contestation in the public arena that such regimes offered. It is necessary, perhaps, to point out some contradictions in the two military coups that were cited as examples of the cases of motivation for ethnic mobilization when a group expected direct benefits from undertaking such action. The NPRC coup of 1992 that many of the respondents deemed a Mende affair was headed by a Krio military officer, Captain Valentine Strasser who served as head of state for two years before being overthrown himself in a subsequent in-house coup that was supposedly led by a Mende officer, Captain Julius Maada Bio. Other influential officers in that military junta were also either Limba, such as Karefa Kargbo or Temne, such as Idriss Kamara who was sent to serve as regional head of a Mende province in the south.

The contradictions abound. In the case of the AFRC coup of 1997 that was largely deemed a Limba affair, it is noteworthy to point out that a Corporal Gborie who was from the Kono ethnic group first announced the coup on the radio. Other influential players in the AFRC coup such as Alex Tamba Brima were also of non-Limba extraction. Thus, even though the coup was largely credited to Johnny Paul Koroma, a Limba, as chief organizer, it consisted of members of other ethnic groups rendering the claim that it was an occasion for championing the interests of Limbas unsupportable.

Another way to determine the role of ethnicity or communal preferences in guiding political behavior and mobilization in the post-conflict political contests in Liberia and Sierra Leone is to examine discourses around the respective campaigns by key elites and how these resonated with various sections of the electorate. We saw in both Chapters III and IV that candidates such as Kabbah or Johnson-Sirleaf who concentrated their messages on centralizing national issues of peace and post-war development fared better and eventually won the respective elections. Others, who promised to address specific communal grievances as a large part of their message, such as Brumskine promised to do for the case of the Bassa in Liberia, fared less well. Thus, I asked participants of the focus group sessions in both countries to describe the major thrust of messages they have heard at any political gathering they attended around the time leading up to the respective elections and what message seemed to make the most profound impression on them and why.

Drawing from a content analysis of the responses gathered from the participants, words or combination of words such as "peace and reconciliation," "national development," "equal opportunity," "development and change," "good roads, electricity, water, schools, wells," "no corruption" seemed to have predominated the discourse

303

around this time and also seemed to have gained the most traction with the respondents. "Tribalism," "regionalism," "sectionalism," "nepotism," were less frequently mentioned as constituting parts of the discourse and where these where mentioned, they were mentioned in the context of eliminating them as candidates identified them as vices, vowing not to engage in them if elected to office.

The follow-up question probed to determine how the different messages resonated with them. Here several patterns emerged from the responses. Participants in rural communities in both countries were more likely to mention that promises of roads, wells and the provision of material benefits such as the supply of electricity made the most difference in determining what candidate they liked or supported going into the elections. On the other hand, residents of urban areas in both countries who took part in the sessions were more likely to indicate that promises of eliminating corruption, tribalism, or regionalism, for examples, were more important to them in determining what candidates they liked or supported.

These responses are telling. If ethnicity or tribalism is the major attribute of political behavior and political mobilization in less-developed societies because of competing communal preferences, it is paradoxical that it is participants from urban areas who revealed that they were more interested in messages that promised to eliminate regionalism and tribalism. One would otherwise expect that it should have been participants of rural areas who would have been more impressed by such messages given the competing communal interests between different regions whereas urban areas tend to be melting pots for diverse groups.

Why were urban participants of the focus group sessions more likely to indicate that they were impressed with campaign messages promising to do away with tribalism,

304

regionalism or corruption than rural respondents? What do these responses suggest about the role of ethnicity in the political behavior of Liberians and Sierra Leoneans in the post-conflict environment? A related point that I probed was to determine what type of candidate, opposition or incumbent, the participants felt was more likely to preach a particular brand of message. It appeared that, for the case of Sierra Leone, opposition candidates were more likely to campaign on promises of eliminating regionalism, tribalism or corruption than candidates from the incumbent SLPP party. In fact, it was these vices that the opposition accused the ruling party of following the conclusion of the war. Thus, the insistence on regionalism or tribalism was intended to create a "we" versus "them" milieu in which most voters would feel left out of the gains that accrued from one group being in power and subsequently support change. Bratton and Van de Walle's (1997) finding that the opposition tends to do well in urban areas during elections in Africa may be instructive here, as a similar pattern seemed to have played out during the elections of 2002. This pattern is less clear for Liberia where there was no incumbent party in office running in the elections of 2005.

I also introduced findings from the national surveys regarding respective Mende and Temne support for the SLPP and the APC in Sierra Leone and the Kru and Vai support in Liberia for the CDC and COTOL to stimulate discussions around variations among group mobilization for political parties or candidates during elections. In Sierra Leone, Mendes and Temnes constitute over 60 percent of the population and are the two largest ethnic groups in the country. On the other hand, as a percentage of the population of Liberia, Vais and Krus together constitute less than ten percent of the population. Thus, what size of ethnic group is more likely to display a homogenous preference for someone from their group? In other words, is mobilization into politics along ethnic lines

305

a characteristic of small groups or large groups? I threw this question to the participants and ask them to identify what groups in each country are more likely to support only someone from their ethnic group for political office.

A lively discussion opened up around this point during all the sessions in Sierra Leone and I was offered varying answers. In northern Sierra Leone, participants typically pointed out that it is the Mendes of southeastern Sierra Leone who were more likely to mobilize into politics along ethnic lines and prefer candidates drawn from their regions. When I posed the same question in southeastern Sierra Leone, participants told me northerners or members of ethnic groups from northern Sierra Leone were the more tribalistic and more likely to support only candidates from their region. Members of the two groups also revealed that their co-ethnics would eagerly vote for a candidate from another ethnic group and against someone of their own. Some pointed to the example of the elections of 1996 when Thaimu Bangura, a Temne and a northerner, of the People's Democratic Party threw his political weight behind Kabbah and the SLPP thus tipping victory to Mendes at a time when the scales were evenly balanced with a party that was led by one of their own Temne brothers, John Karefa Smart. The interesting point is that each group denied being tribalistic themselves and instead pointed to another group accusing them of the tendency to give political support only to members of their ethnic group.

Another interesting point that emerged from the discussions around the same point is that participants from the Mende and Temne ethnic groups felt that their members were not united and were therefore incapable of offering any cohesive political front at the national level. Some added that it was for this reason that the Limbas and Korankos, much smaller ethnic groups in size, have emerged as the dominant forces in

the politics of Sierra Leone. For their part, participants of the sessions who were Limbas lamented their small numbers pointing out this factor ruled out any possibility for them to become power players at the ballot box in Sierra Leone; an advantage that they said belonged to members of the two larger ethnic groups of Temnes and Mendes.

Two interesting patterns emerged from this aspect of the discussions. First, participants from each group felt their group did not have the advantage in political mobilization in the country. Such advantage, they pointed out, lay with other ethnic groups. Secondly, it emerged from the discussions that there were imagined or real schisms within each of the two largest ethnic groups, a factor that may not otherwise be accounted for if one were to consider only the aggregation of voting outcomes from the two regions inhabited by the two groups.

Turning over to the discussions around this point in Liberia, after I threw the question out to the participants, there were near-unanimous affirmations by participants of non-Mandingo and Americo-Liberian extraction that Mandingos and members of the Americo-Liberian community were more likely than other groups to "stick to their own" by supporting only candidates or political parties affiliated with their respective ethnic groups. Some drew upon the disproportionate influence of both groups in the commerce and politics of the country in the pre-war days as an example of the effects of the "clan mentality" of these groups. Unfortunately, the only Mandingo participant I was able to include in the sessions refused to comment on these points but he pointed out that because of their small numbers, their existence as a group, especially as Muslims within a predominantly Christian or non-Muslim society was constantly threatened and as such there was need for close collaboration and bonding among their membership as a survival strategy. The participant pointed out further that the war years brought Mandingos even

closer because Gio and Mano fighting groups targeted them for extermination following accusations of corruption and mismanagement under the Doe regime. Had they not bonded together, Mandingos would nearly have been exterminated or driven out of Liberia during the civil war, the participant concluded.

Mandingos, however, were not without their own collective action problems. According to the Mandingo participant, Alhaji Kromah and Shekou Conneh, two of the most prominent Mandingo elites in Liberia in recent years, fielded separate political parties going into the elections of 2005, and asked "is that the action of a united group?" Participants who were Americo-Liberians pointed out that their group has had its fair share of collective action dilemmas over the years and that the accusations that they were more likely to support candidates or parties from their groups were more untrue than not. Some pointed out that inter-group marriages had in fact, made it almost nearly impossible to determine who an Americo-Liberian was in recent times as many former indigenous Liberians have since integrated into their ranks.

With regard to mobilization into the politics of Liberia, they told me that I only had to look at the composition of the 50 or more political parties that sprang up around the campaigns for the elections of 2005 to get a glimpse of the political behavior of Americo-Liberians. Nearly all of the 22 political parties that made it to the ballot list for the elections were comprised of Americo-Liberians or those affiliated with their group. The higher levels of education that Americo-Liberians have reached, when compared to other groups in Liberia, put them in high demand for recruitment by political parties nationwide in Liberia. This latter point drew a number of disagreements from other participants who pointed out that elites from their groups were equally spread out among several political parties and that this was not because of any superior or inferior education

but only the greed of such elites. In an interesting comparison with Sierra Leone, members of the largest ethnic group in Liberia, the Kpelle who constitute about 21 percent of the total population, also lamented the disunity within their group that they say has rendered them irrelevant in the political dispensation of Liberia. Since the demise of Gabriel Kpolle and his Liberian Unification Party, no other elite has emerged to mobilize Kpelles into politics in a meaningful way that will yield benefits to the group, some of the participants from the Kpelle ethnic group lamented.

It is harder to interpret what these latter revelations from the sessions mean for understanding the role of ethnicity in the political behavior of Liberians and Sierra Leoneans in the post-conflict environment since most participants declined to acknowledge or even address the views that members of other ethnic groups held about their group. One thing is clear though in both countries, participants from ethnic groups that were larger in size than other ethnic groups were more likely to report disunity and disorganization among their groups than participants from smaller ethnic groups. In one sense, this finding is consistent with collective action theories about group behavior such as those advanced by Olson (1965) that it is more difficult for large groups to organize for public goods than is the case for smaller groups. Thus, more than an acceptance of the uniform homogeneity of group preferences, the sizes of ethnic groups may also hold another key to our understanding of how groups mobilize into politics in Africa.

Finally, I used the focus group discussions in each country to accumulate and evaluate opinions on three very important issues that were central to the research concerns of this study. For Sierra Leone, I wanted to gauge the opinion of the mass electorate regarding the election of President Kabbah in the elections of 2002 with over 70 percent of the votes. For Liberia, two questions constituted part of the core of the

sessions. The first concern was to find out why Madam Johnson-Sirleaf ultimately emerged as the winner of the runoff elections after she had trailed in the first round of the elections. The second concern was to gauge opinion on why Liberia voted Charles Taylor president in the elections of 1997.

For Sierra Leone, the question I asked was "why did President Kabbah, as the presidential candidate for the SLPP, gain over 70 percent of the votes cast nationwide in the 2002 elections? The responses I received to this question did not vary across regions. Participants typically told me of a perception among the electorate that Kabbah was most qualified to undertake the task of national development and consolidating the peace following the conclusion of the war under his watch. Only a few respondents referred to some form of identity, his faith as Muslim, as having played a role in gaining him the votes of the electorate. For illustrative purposes I will highlight, *verbatim*, four of these responses below:

Response 1: "President Kabbah won over 70 % of the total votes cast because of the belief that he helped end the war and that he should be given another chance to develop the country both economically and infrastructurally given the turbulence of his first tenure (1996-2002)."

Response 2: "It is because he is believed to have restored peace in the country from its decade long civil war. Also he introduced a system of free education for external examination classes i.e. N.P.S.E., BECE, WASSCE. The north which is believed to be the stronghold of the A.P.C. he introduced free primary and girl child education project, school feeding program."

Response 3: "Because he proved to be politically inclined and showed a kind of political tolerance by bringing experienced politicians from all regions of the country onboard, which eventually paved the way for the creation of peace."

Response 4: "(1) He was a Muslim, so majority Muslims especially the elders voted for him. (2) Since he was a former UN worker, people thought he will not embezzle the country's coffer. (3) As a northerner leading the S.L.P.P, he was seen as a kind of unifier thus breaking the north-south divide."

Turning over to Liberia, I asked participants during the sessions: "why do you think Madam Johnson-Sirleaf ultimately emerged as the winner of the presidential run-off elections in 2005? As a follow up to the preceding, why did George Weah ultimately lose the run-off elections even though he was the frontrunner after the first round of voting?" Below are four examples of the responses I received, also reproduced verbatim:

Response 1: "I think Madam Johnson Sirleaf ultimately emerged as winner of the presidential run-off elections in 2005 because of her educational competence and threat of Liberia being left in isolation by the international community if she wasn't elected."

Response 2: "Madam Sirleaf won because many people thought twice about her experience and maturity as being relevant to post-war reconstruction as oppose to George Weah's ignorance, inexperience and shallow education which could not match up to beating post-war challenges."

Response 3: "Madam Johnson Sirleaf won the election because she has the education and experience. Unlike George Weah who has no experience and the necessary education to have lead more or less than three million person after the state have collapsed."

Response 4: "After the first runner-up, people began to weigh the lesser of the two evils. Regardless of ethnic affiliations etc. The people were looking for the most capable to do the task and George Weah was not capable. Especially where he had not earned a high school diploma, he was beyond. Ellen had the political will and a long history of power struggle, the credential was there. The people want what they taught was best for Mama Liberia."

I also asked participants in Liberia this question, "to the best of your recollection, why did Liberia vote Charles Taylor President in 1997 instead of the other candidates? Some examples of the kind of responses I received are also reproduced verbatim below:

Response 1: "In my best recollection, Liberia voted Charles Taylor president in 1997 because he had controlled much of the country's resources and it was believed he could use the income to bring about development he had the largest fighting forces and he could guarantee peace & stability."

Response 2: "Liberians voted for former President Taylor in that they did not want war again. They felt that if Taylor lost the elections, he would come back and fight."

Response 3: "They voted Taylor because he –Taylor –was seen as the strongest candidate who could deal with the post-war problems more effectively than the rest of the candidates. Also, many people were carried by the perception that said "he who spoiled it can better fix it."

Response 4: "Many Liberians voted Taylor president because of fear that the conflict would renew if he did not win. Another reason but less prominent was that people believed in his capable leadership and because he destroyed he should rebuild."

Conspicuously absent from these responses from both countries are such references as so and so won the elections because one ethnic group or community of people from one area threw their collective votes behind that candidate or his or her political party. In two societies where voting preferences are assumed to be dictated by ethnic identities and where such preferences are largely homogenous, it is remarkable that some of the qualities that the participants suggested made a difference in the elections in question were the educational credentials of candidates, perceptions of their tolerance for other groups and standing in the international community. Rather than any homogenous support from one or more ethnic groups, both Kabbah and Johnson-Sirleaf were perceived as tolerant and displayed these qualities going into the elections.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that several explanations of political behavior and mobilization in the literature on politics in Africa do not capture what transpired in Liberia and Sierra Leone during the times of their respective post-conflict elections. Perhaps as an encouraging sign of things to come, and certainly a hopeful sign of post-conflict democratization, the focus group sessions helped to validate most of the findings from the surveys. Encapsulated in one sentence, the finding is that emerging from the most traumatic periods yet in their histories, ethnic affiliations or considerations for securing communal interests mattered little to the voters as they sought to vote into office someone they deemed as competent to improve the conditions in their lives.

Most participants indicated that ethnic affiliations and communal interests did not primarily dictate political behavior. Rather, their opinions helped to confirm what the findings from the surveys had suggested. The strategic calculations of voters were

313

underpinned more by perceptions of competence and for presidential candidates –among other things –international credibility than by a strategic logic of voting someone into office because of a sense of ethnic belongingness.

Finally, the findings also demonstrate an important point about winning elections in a multiethnic society. In a contest with multiple parties seeking to gain vote shares from a diverse electorate, one would expect that candidates or political parties that sought to strengthen their support base by preaching exclusive messages of ethnic belongingness stood the better chance of winning such elections, not those who try to appeal to several groups and, thus, risk alienating the support of even their own group members. It is interesting that on each occasion, it is one of the candidates who preached the most centralizing messages, especially for the presidential elections, that won the elections not the candidate or candidates that insist on pointing out how one group is different from others.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

What role did ethnicity play in the political mobilization of Liberians and Sierra Leoneans during their respective post-conflict elections? Existing explanations of politics in Africa have held that ethnic interests are the locus of political behavior in African societies because voters do not trust elites from other ethnic groups to deliver electoral promises and elites, cognizant of this point, couch their electoral appeals in ethnic terms. One expectation from such explanations is that ethnic groups sought the singular interests of their respective communities during the elections in question. Yet, in spite of such propositions, voters in both countries displayed noticeable preferences for political parties and candidates other than those typically associated with their ethnic groups. Also, elites of political parties from various ethnic groups in both countries joined others in diverse, crosscutting alliances and patterns that do not provide clear support for ethnic interests or other identity interest-based voting thesis.

Thus, in this dissertation, I have sought to empirically question the role of ethnic identity in the political behavior of Liberians and Sierra Leoneans by investigating how elites of various political parties contesting the immediate post-conflict elections mobilized voters to the polls and win votes and how, in turn, the various cues transmitted to them by candidates and political parties seeking to recruit their support in anticipation of the voting decisions influenced voters.

This chapter summarizes the general findings of the study for this dissertation and presents the overall implications of these findings for discussions on democratization, post-conflict and peace studies, and ethnicity and politics in Africa. The final section of the chapter concludes this dissertation by pointing out the limitations of the findings, offering some suggestions for future research and the implications of the findings for policy.

Exploring political behavior in multiethnic societies such as Sierra Leone and Liberia presents several challenges. One such challenge lies in interpreting the subtle cues that are employed by those who sometimes utilize indigenous customary practices that are peculiar to certain communities as political tools such that a mere handshake may have more symbolism attached to it than any overt declarations of rallying an ethnic vote.

Emerging from war, Sierra Leone and Liberia are particularly appropriate cases for understanding the role of ethnicity and other competing influences on the political behavior of both elites and electorates in African politics because the human security needs of an immediate postwar environment might have heightened ethnic sentiments which, it is argued, guarantee the provision of material benefits through ethnic elites.

Specifically, I investigated why following the two civil wars voters in Sierra Leone concentrated their votes around one political party, the Sierra Leone People's Party and its presidential candidate, Kabbah during the elections of 2002, whereas voters in Liberia diffused their votes among several political parties and presidential candidates following their elections of 2005. A related and equally important task was to understand why Weah lost the runoff elections to Johnson-Sirleaf after winning the most votes in the presidential elections of October 11. I then used these interrelated questions to address the major question of the dissertation.

To explore the differing outcomes, I developed several explanatory models of vote choice that established the vote for various political parties running in the respective elections as dependent variables. The independent variables in the models included the dominant factors in the literature on political behavior and voting in African countries, factors such as ethnicity, regional interests, religious interests, and influences of the "big person" from local communities. In addition to the preceding, I included two variables, the peace vote and the vote for development and reconstruction, which I intuitively felt, did more to explain vote choice.

The results of the tests of the various models and my other findings from the exploration of political behavior in the two countries are varied, but one consistent finding is that ethnic identity did not play the expected role in the calculations of both voters and elites of political parties in the events that transpired during the time of the respective post-conflict elections.

For electorates, variables for ethnic identities show *how* voters voted during the respective elections but such variables did not explain *why* voters voted for the parties and candidates for which they did during the respective elections. Here, I drew a distinction between ethnicity as an identity variable and an issue variable. As an identity variable, ethnicity points to a structural variable that identifies how members of the electorate voted for a particular political party from a given area, whereas as an issue variable ethnicity represents the choice voters made in voting for a particular political party. The latter captured those who made a conscious decision intending their vote to pursue a benefit that was restricted to the interests of their ethnic group. As an issue variable, ethnicity failed to reach statistical significance in several models that tested vote choice in both countries.

317

For elites, a better case could be made for the communicative utility of ethnicity as a campaign tool for the canvassing of voters during the respective elections than a primary foundation of political mobilization. With high levels of illiteracy in both countries, even the respective lingua franca of Liberian English for Liberia and Krio for Sierra Leone is sometimes inadequate when significant segments of the population intend to communicate with each other. Indigenous languages are often the only means through which political elites convey their campaign messages and electoral promises directly to potential voters at campaign rallies and other gatherings or through interpreters. The ability to speak a language indigenous to a geographical area is, thus, a huge advantage because of the feeling of affinity it creates with local people. Beyond that, it was less clear that ethnicity served the purpose of a mobilization mechanism given the need to create voting majorities that may sometimes consist of two or more ethnic groups. Evidence from content analysis of the proposed party programs of several political parties in both countries and newspaper and other accounts of party rallies did not yield any specific references to the mobilization of an ethnic group or groups as a means of gaining political power or the use of particular language as a campaign tool to woo voters during the respective elections. In one exception, Charles Brumskine's presidential candidacy in Liberia was heavily associated with the Bassa ethnic group although local discourse repeatedly cast him as being of non-indigenous extraction.

Thus, the hypothesized relationships between ethnic identity and vote choice was unsupported and the empirical evidence demonstrates that neither elites of political parties nor voters made concerted efforts to secure the exclusive interests of their ethnic groups at the expense of other ethnic groups by largely conducting identity-centered campaigns for votes or voting for ethnic interests. Table 6.1 and 6.2 summarize these

findings about the hypothesized relationships between the various explanatory variables and vote choice for Sierra Leone and Liberia, respectively.

Table 6.1

Summary of Findings for Sierra Leone

Hypotheses	Finding(s)	Data and Evidence
1.Ethnicity and Vote Choice	Supported in part. Political parties gained major vote shares among some ethnic groups. Most voters did not vote for ethnic interests. Elites did not run identity-centered campaigns Ethnic identity is a statistically significant explanatory variable of vote choice	Tests of models of vote choice employing survey data. Weak-to-non reference or emphases on ethnicity following content analysis of campaign literature, newspaper accounts from 2002, transcripts of interviews with elites and focus group findings.
2. Regionalism and Vote Choice	Supported in part. Support for some parties strong in regions traditionally identified as their electoral base. SLPP won its base and some more. APC did not dominate its electoral base like the SLPP Region shows weak significance in explaining vote choice	Tests of models of vote choice using survey data Raw results from the elections of 2002 Elite interviews
3. Religion and Vote Choice	No support. No statistically significant differences between religious groups and vote choice Religion not a statistically significant explanatory variable of vote choice	Tests of models of vote choice using survey data Elite interviews
4. The "big person" and Vote Choice	Supported in part. Statistically significant explanatory variable in some but not all tests of vote choice Significant in predicting votes for the SLPP but not the APC	Survey data Elite Interviews
5. Peace and Vote Choice	Supported. Statistically significant predictor of vote choice for political parties across all ethnic groups	Survey data Elite interviews Content analyses of newspaper reports and other documentary evidence from 2002
6. Development Reconstruction and Vote Choice	Supported in part. Mixed effect on vote choice across models. Not a statistically significant predictor of the votes for the SLPP. Has a negative relationship with vote choice for the SLPP	Survey data Elite interviews Content analysis of newspaper reports and other documentary evidence

Table 6.2

Summary of Findings for Liberia

Hypotheses	Finding(s)	Data and Evidence
1.Ethnicity and Vote Choice	Members of the Bassa and Kru ethnic group were more likely to vote for the UP and the CDC, the respective political parties associated with the elites from their respective ethnic groups. However, the ethnic interest variable suggests that voters did not make the voting decision on ethnic bases. Evidence of other ethnic groups such as the Loma, Grebo and several others voting for political parties that did not have their ethnic elites on board. Voter crossovers during runoff	Tests of models of vote choice employing survey data. Analyses of Liberian newspapers and focus group findings Focus group discussions
2. Regionalism and Vote Choice	Mixed results but largely unsupported. Evidence of a Grand Bassa vote for the LP and the Sinoe vote for the CDC but other counties such as Grand Gedeh voted for Weah's CDC in spite of other Krahn elites on the ballot with other political parties	Elite interviews and tests of models of vote choice using survey data
3. The "big person" and Vote Choice	Not significant in predicting votes for the CDC and the UP, the two frontrunners in following the elections. Produces a different effect in the LP model.	Survey data, Elite Interviews and Results from focus group sessions
4. Religion and Vote Choice	Rather weak support even for Brumskine who had preached a religious message of divine inspiration to run for the presidency. Appeared to play a role in the vote for the CDC. Absence of religious tension between the major parties	Tests of models of vote choice using survey data. Elite Interviews, content analysis of newspaper accounts
5. Peace and Vote Choice	Weak support. Appeared to play a role in the vote for the UP. Produced expected coefficients but not statistically significant across most models of vote choice	Survey data Elite interviews Content analysis of newspaper reports and other documentary evidence
6.Development/Reconstruction and Vote Choice	Supported in part but not a statistically significant variable in most models of vote choice. Like the peace vote, not likely to repeat indefinitely	Survey data Elite interviews Content Analysis of newspaper reports and other documentary evidence

In Sierra Leone, opposition political parties and candidates campaigned to the electorate using messages that accused the incumbent SLPP government of incompetence, corruption, tribalism, nepotism and failure to address the massive unemployment among urban youths following the civil war. It was a strategy that bore little fruit given the margin of votes between all opposition parties and the SLPP. For their part, the incumbent SLPP party campaigned on a theme of having earned the right to undertake the consolidation of the peace and the rebuilding of the national infrastructure following their successful negotiation of the peace deal with rebel forces. Tejan Kabbah, the incumbent presidential flag bearer of the SLPP, emerged from the campaigns as a centripetal figure in the emerging political landscape of postwar Sierra Leone because throughout his campaign for re-election he preached a message of unity, not division or the underscoring of ethnic differences, encouraging everyone to get onboard the proverbial national train. This proved to be a winning message in addition to perceptions of his experience and competence among the electorate given his long tenure with the United Nations.

For the case of Liberia, in the absence of an incumbent political party or presidential candidate under provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2003 that barred key members of the transitional council from seeking reelection, the electoral field was open for anyone with the resources and the inclination to mount a political campaign. This institutional arrangement had a significant effect on both the strategy adopted by all parties during the campaigns and the final results. Given the perceived opportunity in the absence of an incumbent, over 40 political parties displayed their ambition to run candidates in the elections of 2005, out of which 22 qualified to be placed on the ballot on October 11. In their campaigns, each political party staked a claim of

possessing the requisite capacity, motivation and, in some cases, divine inspiration to undertake the task of postwar reconstruction of Liberia. Madam Johnson-Sirleaf emerged the eventual winner of the elections mainly because she touted her experience as a former international civil servant with the World Bank and other organizations. By so doing, she ran a campaign similar to Tejan Kabbah's in Sierra Leone three years earlier. The profiles and strategies of both Johnson-Sirleaf and Kabbah suggest that, for the presidential elections, international managerial experience and the perception that a candidate has earned the respect of the international community did more to sway voters than expectations that the candidate for whom they would vote is one who was more likely to channel exclusive benefits to ethnic communities or cater to some other narrow interest such as regional development.

How do the findings address the central concern of this dissertation? Ethnic identity played little role in candidate recruitment and the campaigns by elites in Liberia given the diversity of the presidential field as political parties sought to recruit candidates that would "balance" their party tickets and showing before the electorate. Several examples illustrate this point. Members of the Kpelle ethnic group, numerically the largest ethnic group in Liberia with 21 percent of the population, were a particularly popular choice for running mate and accounted for the vice presidential candidate on four separate party tickets. Other combinations on party tickets illustrated the point further. A Gola with part German heritage, Johnson-Sirleaf chose Joseph Boakai, a Kissi from Lofa County as her running mate. David Farhat, a Bassa from Grand Bassa County also chose a Kissi from Lofa County in the person of Saah Gbollie on the ticket of the Free Democratic Party. George Weah, a Kru from Sinoe County chose Rudolph Johnson a Gbandi from Lofa County. Only Charles Brumskine of the Liberty Party ran with another

322

candidate for the vice presidency who hailed from the same ethnic group and county as he did. In view of the fact that no ethnic group in Liberia commands the numerical majority of 50 percent plus 1 needed to win at the ballot box, it would have been politically suicidal for most parties to adopt a strategy of ethnic mobilization. The evidence shows that they did not.

For the parliamentary elections in Sierra Leone, given important correlations between ethnic identity and region of residence, parties essentially recruited from the same pool of candidates within a constituency or district because doing otherwise by running a candidate who was not from an area was a sure recipe for failure.[126] Political parties in Liberia essentially followed the same rule, recruiting candidates to run for the legislative seats from their respective counties of origin. Given such diversity among the presidential party tickets and given the nature of the recruitment of candidates for parliamentary and legislative elections, it is hard to find evidence to support claims of ethnic mobilization of the mass electorates by elites of political parties during the time of the respective post conflict elections. With evidence of five different presidential candidates from the Temne ethnic group alone and none at all from most of the other ethnic groups including the Mendes (who were only half represented in the candidacy of the Kabbah) the ethnic mobilization thesis is unsupportable.

For voters, the results of the tests of the models show that several of the explanatory variables found little or no traction among this group. Further, where much of the scholarship had presented pictures of homogenous preferences for parties and

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[126] The difference between this form of candidate recruitment and ethnic cues is that candidates represent opposition parties in regions that are not typically associated with their political party. Most ethnic theses assume that this form of candidate recruitment is virtually nonexistent.

candidates by ethnic groups, such that all Mendes, for example, were assumed to prefer the SLPP for the same reasons or all Krus voted for Weah because he is a Kru son of the soil, the evidence from the two cases provided little support for such claims. Instead, the results of the tests of CLARIFY showed that there were statistically significant differences between the means of the preferences of voters who voted for the same parties given various cues for voting for those parties suggesting that all voters from the same ethnic group do not vote for parties for the same reasons.

For two societies emerging from civil conflict, concern for the conduct of politics *status quo ante* was a constant fear overshadowing the proceedings. This was the case especially because most analysts attributed the descent of both countries into conflict to the political culture that had been woven in the past by self-seeking elites (Abdullah 2004; Richards 1996). Part of that political culture was the sometimes violent events surrounding elections as unscrupulous elites mobilized thugs to disrupt entire communities in the names of ethnic groups engaged in mostly imagined competitions for the resources of the state. In order to strengthen confidence among all interested parties that the two countries will continue their march towards democratization, the elections needed to demonstrate critical breaks with such pasts and the evidence suggests that they did. For one, the electorate in both countries did not vote for former rebel forces that had morphed into political parties and by so doing ensured that the most belligerent forces of the past had no stake in future proceedings. Neither the RUF of Foday Sankoh nor the NPP of Charles Taylor gained any meaningful votes from the respective elections.

Equally so, in the respective victories of Kabbah and Johnson-Sirleaf, Sierra Leoneans and Liberians offered archetypes of the kinds of leaders for which countries emerging from conflict may yearn. As pointed out earlier, both presidential candidates

shared the distinct qualities of having served with reputable international organizations with credentials that included the trust of other leaders in the international community. Their election into office suggests that when post conflict elections are conducted in an atmosphere devoid of intimidation or violence, as the two elections were largely conducted, cross-cutting national issues such as the reconstruction of the national infrastructure or the sustainability of the peace may matter more to voters than narrow cues such as concerns for the preservation of ethnic interests or the residual effects of regional loyalties.

What factors explain the differing voting outcomes in which voters in Sierra Leone concentrated their votes around one political party, the SLPP and its presidential candidate whereas voters in Liberia diffused their votes among several political parties in contradiction to expectations under the respective electoral systems in place? In the main, this study found that a combination of two factors contributed to the respective outcomes. Respectively, it was the conscious choices made by voters and the institutional structures in place in the two countries. In the case of Sierra Leone voters made a conscious effort to avoid former belligerents and corrupt politicians so that political parties such as the RUFP, PLP or the APC that included candidates who fit either bill failed to attract the imagination of the largest cross section of the electorate. Voters in Liberia similarly avoided political parties that included individuals deemed as perpetrators of the conflict but the institutional landscape that barred key members of the transitional government also meant that there was no one on the ballot with proven record of recent governance such as was the case with the SLPP. As a result, they were more amenable to giving several political parties and candidates the chance to rebuild Liberia except those parties that included former warlords such as Alhaji Koroma's ALCOP or Shekou Conneh's

PRODEM. The results of the elections provide evidence of the inclinations of voters as such parties received less than one percent of the votes cast.

The concept of an ethnic census that first appeared in the arguments of Horowitz (1985) and related explanations in the existing scholarship on political behavior in Africa stressed the tendency of ethnic groups to concentrate their electoral support behind political parties associated with the respective elites from their ethnic communities. Such arguments are, to some extent, helpful in capturing the tendency of members of the Bassa ethnic group, for example, to reward the Liberty Party of Charles Brumskine with the majority of their votes. Nonetheless they are limited by the inherent assumption that support by ethnic communities for elites of political parties associated with their ethnic groups is a knee-jerk reaction to an identity stimulus that motivated voters to vote for parties and candidates so that their ethnic communities will not lose in a zero-sum competition with other groups. This study has shown that ethnic cohesion is the exception rather than the norm among various groups such that the feeling of ethnic belongingness required to produce a collective vote for ethnic parties was absent in the electoral dynamic of both countries. Further, elite unity, another assumed precondition of ethnic mobilization thesis was also lacking. Evidence showed that ethnic groups such as Temnes produced the leadership of five different political parties in Sierra Leone during the elections of 2002. In Liberia, the presidential tickets of the various political parties offered an assortment of combinations of various ethnic groups, as mentioned earlier. Thus, with such diversity among the political parties, the ingredients required for a concerted effort that will produce electoral results indicative of an ethnic census were lacking.

This study has also shown that a sufficient amount of individual choice remained among the respective electorates such that voting for political parties was not merely expressions of group preference. The results of the test of CLARIFY demonstrated that there were significant differences between members of the same ethnic groups among the range of voting cues with which they were presented. Group preference is crucial to theses of ethnic mobilization because such explanations are usually advanced with reference to traditional cultural practices in African societies in which decisions, it is argued, are made in the collective.

In the main, the research for this dissertation failed to find much role for ethnicity and the deleterious effects of such sentiments in the political behavior and mobilization of Liberians and Sierra Leoneans following their respective post conflict elections.

As discussed previously in several sections of the dissertation, one plausible explanation for the discrepancy between my findings and existing explanations is the methodological approach that is employed. Much of the existing scholarship drew evidence from aggregated data and used such data to infer individual preferences in vote choice. This is rather unfortunate because as compelling as the arguments derived from such studies are, they fail to capture the heterogeneity of group preferences among ethnic groups and their utility in explaining political behavior is further undermined by the ecological fallacy they commit in using aggregate data to make inferences about individual level motivation as Mattes and Gouws (1998) pointed out. The empirical strategy that I employed was sensitive to such limitations and made corrections by asking respondents why they voted for the candidates and parties for which they did. This approach guarded against correlations between regional voting patterns and ethnic settlements, particularly in the case of Sierra Leone, that would have led us to

erroneously believe that voters from specific ethnic groups voted merely to protect the interests of their respective ethnic groups.

Contributions of This Dissertation

This dissertation contributes to discussions on a number of subjects in the scholarship of comparative politics such as democratization in Africa, peace and conflict studies as well as ethnicity and political behavior in Africa. I discuss each of these, in turn, below.

Scholarship on Democratization

By explicating the processes through which Liberians and Sierra Leoneans organized and mobilized into politics around their respective post conflict elections, this study sheds light on the process of democratization in two countries that returned from the brink of virtual disintegration. As most countries in Africa experienced *abertura* beginning around the late eighties and early nineties with the demise of one-party regimes and the institution of multiparty constitutions, Liberia and Sierra Leone went the opposite direction descending into the worst form of strife known to states. Emerging years later from their respective crises, it was important that their experiences are documented and added to the collective experiences of democratization on the African continent. This study seeks to provide such a contribution and by so doing impart some of the experiences of the two countries for the benefit of other countries, such as the Congo, that are still seeking solutions to their conflicts.

One of the most influential viewpoints in the scholarship on democratization in sub-Saharan Africa cautions that the optimism which accompanied multiparty elections

328

on the continent was likely to be tempered by the somber reality of disastrous interethnic conflicts as multiparty elections could provide renewed grounds for mobilization into politics along ethnic lines and other cleavages of identity. Crawford Young captures such viewpoints well.

> Skeptics have advanced two main arguments challenging the therapeutic value of democratization for African states. First, they charge that competitive multiparytism and open elections necessarily bring regional, ethnic, religious, and racial identities into play intensifying disintegrative pressures on fragile states without contributing to either stability or legitimacy... (Young 1999, 73)[127]

Such viewpoints were underpinned by the fatalistic assumption that electorates in African societies as well as elites of political parties are always motivated by the need to secure their ethnic interests from national processes, at the expense of other ethnic groups. This study casts sufficient doubt on such assumptions as it shows that electorates and elites of political parties in both Liberia and Sierra Leone were not primarily motivated by the need to secure the exclusive interests of their ethnic communities during the respective elections but rather, by all-encompassing needs to sustain the peace and undertake postwar reconstruction and national development.

Further, the empirical evidence from the study demonstrates that the assumed homogeneity of ethnic preferences was largely erroneous as electorates were divided over a number of cues informing the vote choices in both countries. As well, elites of various ethnic groups did not display much unity with members of their own ethnic groups as some joined members of other ethnic groups to form competing political parties.

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[127] See Crawford Young, "Africa: An Interim Balance Sheet," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds, Democratization in Africa, (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 63-82. This article is reproduced under the title "The Third Wave of Democratization in Africa: Ambiguities and Contradictions," in Richard Joseph, ed, State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa, (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 3-14.

The evidence from this study also suggests that the apprehension over the threat of ethnic mobilization emanating from multiparty elections was derived from the existing scholarship's focus on older voting patterns when much of the continent was in the grip of authoritarian one-party regimes and elections appeared to show support for various elites by their ethnic communities and voting was frequently accompanied by violence. Elections under one-party authoritarian regimes masked much of what the actual voting preferences of voters were as elections were frequently rigged in favor of electing handpicked candidates from various communities as symbolic representation of ethnic diversity in the respective national debates. This study suggests that when elections are conducted in an atmosphere devoid of the intimidation under one-party regimes, politics in Africa need not primarily be about identity interests. Real opportunity exists for electorates to think of themselves as parts of the larger political community of the state rather than as mere ethnic communities.

As referenced earlier, one of the major limitations of existing studies on democratization in Africa was the methodological focus on aggregated polling returns following elections to make inferences about how members of various ethnic groups vote. This methodological shortcoming distorted the true preferences of voters. As pointed out in this dissertation, when approached in aggregate terms, data on post conflict elections will almost always fail to discover motivation and will in all likelihood illustrate patterns of existing cleavages of a regional nature especially if there are correlations between regional settlement patterns and ethnic communities. Potentially, the electoral system agreed upon by institutional designers and parties to the conflict will further throw existing differences into stark relief as the PR system did for the case of Sierra Leone even when electorates from all across the country prioritized peace, development

and reconstruction over all other interests. This dissertation has shown that to capture individual preferences for the vote choice, it is almost always necessary to survey the population and aggregate the findings.

The strategy I employed in the current study, which not only looked at individual voters but also asked them why they voted for the parties for which they voted during the elections is an important improvement over such limitations. Going forward, the adoption of a similar strategy by future scholarship should serve to enhance knowledge of democratization on the continent and the kinds of choices that electorates in Africa make.

<u>Scholarship on Post Conflict and Peace Studies</u>

This study contributes also to the related literature on post-conflict societies and peace studies. One of the budding debates in these related literatures is whether electoral outcomes following civil wars are indicative of a desire for peace by the citizens of such societies or largely reflective of residual animosities from the conflict that are sometimes along the cleavage of ethnic and other identities. Scholars have largely assumed that electoral landslides such as the one Taylor gained following the Liberian elections of 1997 are the voting patterns that are most indicative of a peace vote. The analyses have shown that an empirical determination of either an electoral census or a peace vote is not improbable from the same outcome. Citizens desirous of peace may identify one candidate or political party as they did in Sierra Leone or they may buy into the messages of peace transmitted by several candidates and consequently spread their votes in producing results that will make the final outcome appear like an electorate that lacked a consensus. Thus, one important determination is not the pattern of vote spread across the electorate but the intent of voters.

331

Another concern in peace studies and the related literature on post conflict societies is what Jarstad and Sisk (2008) and others refer to as the "democratization-peacebuilding dilemma."[128] For peacekeepers and institutional designers, following conflict, this dilemma is underscored by the inherent contradictions between the simultaneous need to introduce competitive multiparty elections as definitive conclusions to peace processes while at the same time emphasizing consensus, cooperation and moderation among the parties as warranted under peacebuilding. By implication, elections are competitive processes that involve competition between rival groups whereas peacebuilding may involve striking compromises and sometimes ignoring constitutional stipulations in order to accommodate all parties. How are mediators to deal with such challenges? The current study has shown that democratization and peacebuilding need not be at variance during peace processes. What needs to be firmly established are the rules of the game and how they apply to all parties. In both cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone, the presence of robust peacekeeping troops with clear mandates to enforce the rules of the game which were made clear to all parties ensured adherence even when there was ample opportunity for potential spoilers to complain about the process and derail the proceedings. The case of Liberia underscores this point, where some presidential candidates were initially disqualified but later reinstated by a ruling from the Supreme Court of Liberia when it was almost impossible to include them on the ballot without incurring substantial cost overruns. In the absence of a firm mandate from

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[128] See Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk, eds, From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). For an illustration of this dilemma, see especially Anna K. Jarstad's contribution "Dilemmas of war-to-democracy transitions: theories and concepts," pp: 17-36.

the UN Peacekeeping force to oversee the elections process, the disqualified aspirants could have raised enough trouble to threaten or even derail the peace process.

Lastly, mediators of most conflicts in Africa often struggle to design institutional instruments such as constitutions and electoral systems that are not only acceptable to all parties to the conflict but also to all ethnic groups in the area of conflict. The understandable sense of such decisions is the assumption that ethnic groups are in an antagonistic relationship with other groups with little or no room for consensus or cooperation. This dissertation shows that the capacity to coexist peacefully is sometimes present in areas of conflict and that institutional designers may need not waste valuable time on finding suitable instruments for managing the post conflict environment. Rather, what they may need to concentrate on is finding ways to enhance such local capacities for conflict management as exist on the ground by complementing those capacities or relationships with appropriate institutions.

Scholarship on Ethnicity and Politics in Africa

The prevalent conclusion in the literature on ethnicity and politics in Africa makes several assumptions about the nature of ethnic identity and the political behavior of ethnic groups. One assumption regards the resilience of ethnic interests in African politics as exemplified by Glickman's conclusion that

> African politics remains severely divided by ethnic conflict. Quite apart from the dramatic events of Rwanda or Sudan or Liberia, where mass murder is enmeshed in perceived differences in ethnic identity, the political space provided by openings toward democracy in less than a decade remains an arena where policy

333

debate competes unequally with ethnic appeals, ethnic parties, and ethnically based support for candidates (Glickman, 1998).[129]

Another assumption regards a consciousness of group identity among co-ethnics and cohesiveness in pursuing group benefits. The empirical evidence obtained from studying the behavior of the ethnic groups in Sierra Leone and Liberia contradicts such assumptions. In Sierra Leone, for example, members of the Temne ethnic group who dominate the northern portion of the country accounted for the presidential candidacy of five different political parties going into the elections of 2002. If group consciousness and cohesiveness was a given, the assumed rationality would have had Temnes uniting behind a single presidential candidate and presenting a united political front which could have maximized their chances of winning an electoral contest. Additional evidence springs from the survey data. Some respondents did not vote for the expected political parties for which they would have voted in an ethnic headcount.

The political behavior of ethnic groups in Liberia is even more convoluted. In a sensitive election following a traumatic national event such as the civil war, elites from various ethnic groups chose to run as presidential candidates or vice presidential candidates of diverse political parties in contradiction to mobilizing along assumed lines of ethnic cleavage. Where is the ethnic cohesiveness when most ethnic groups in Liberia voted for political parties other than the one headed by elites from their ethnic communities?

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[129] See Harvey Glickman, "Ethnicity, Elections, and Constitutional Democracy in Africa," in Timothy D. Sisk and Andrew Reynolds, eds, Elections and Conflict Management in Africa, (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 37-54.

Thus, one major implication of the findings of this study for the literature on ethnicity and politics in Africa is that mobilization into politics on the continent is not always along ethnic lines. Indeed, some discussions in the democratization literature in Africa acknowledge the "third wave" movements that consisted of a diverse array of elites from various ethnic groups in a concerted effort to remove authoritarian regimes.

Another contribution to studies of ethnicity and political behavior in African politics is the demonstrable distinction between ethnicity as an identity variable and an issue variable. Existing explanations do not make this distinction and what one finds on occasion in such analyses are mixing-up of the two when the true intent is to show why one group voted for a political party or candidate. This is rather unfortunate because in most of the literature on African politics, the resulting obfuscation reflects negatively on the portrayal of ethnic groups as self-seeking, unintelligent voters with less commitment to the state as a political community.

Limitations of the Findings

One of the most important considerations in any study of comparative politics is the generalizibility of our findings. How can we incorporate the lessons that are empirically obtained from a particular set of cases to aid our scholarly understanding of a more general set? In the current instance, what does studying how Liberians and Sierra Leoneans mobilized into politics following their respective civil wars contribute to our understanding of political behavior in other post-conflict societies in Africa?

As I pointed out in Chapter I, any comparative exercise on Africa has its shortcomings because the continent contains some of the most diverse groups in the world. Comparing post-conflict political behavior has additional limitations because the

dynamics of conflicts may be different. As an example, the conflict in Liberia started in 1989 because Charles Taylor and his fellow insurgents accused Doe of tyranny over the people of Liberia and sought to remove him by force. The ensuing conflict was fought along multifarious lines, which had subsequent effects on the post conflict electoral dynamics. Instead of residual animosities from the years of conflict, we saw a variety and number of electoral alliances along unexpected lines. Conversely, the conflict in the Ivory Coast started in 2002 as a civil war between the northern and southern regions of the country. Northern groups accused the south, which contains the capital Abidjan, of discrimination against northern groups after the candidacy of Alassane Ouattara was annulled by the Supreme Court on the grounds that he was not authentically Ivorian. Ouattara, a Muslim presidential candidate from the north, had already served the country as prime minister several years earlier. Thus, the evidence accrued from this study and the accompanying lesson may have limited applicability to post-conflict societies elsewhere. Nevertheless, the insight gained on political behavior in the two countries is meaningful and the empirical demonstration that ethnic groups in Liberia and Sierra Leone do not maintain homogenous preferences is valid and carries the potential to generate hypotheses for studies of the political behavior of other ethnic groups elsewhere in Africa.

Another limitation of the findings of this study stems from the cross-sectional nature of the research methodology. Liberians and Sierra Leoneans voted mostly for peace and development during their respective post conflict elections in question but it is unlikely that they will always vote in a similar manner for the same issues. In any case, as the conflict years recede in the collective memories of the citizenry in both countries, the issue of peace is likely to be muted. Thus, the findings of the current study are likely to

provide a snapshot into political behavior around the post conflict period only and may not be representative of political behavior at other times. Indeed, during the subsequent elections of 2007 in Sierra Leone, which I witnessed firsthand, the major issue for voters turned into corruption in government. The SLPP, which years previously was hailed by the electorate for securing the peace, was found guilty of corruption and other vices in government and duly voted out of office.

Yet another related consideration for the generalizibility of the findings of this study to other cases of political behavior is the factor of war and the fact that the two cases are post-conflict countries. Post-conflict societies tend to have a heightened sense of security needs such as maintaining the peace than one will typically find in societies that have not experienced recent conflict. This awareness tends to shape behavior and arguably helps to produce the kinds of pragmatic decision-making that was evident among both elites and masses in the two cases.

National discourses in Sierra Leone and Liberia during the time of my study where distinctly shaped by memories of the recent war. This factor was evident in everyday conversation where people talked about events in terms of two broad time periods - before the war and after the war. One could make the case that the memory of war in both cases was in itself an explanatory variable that could help one to understand the kinds of outcomes that this study sought to understand. Thus, it is plausible that the behaviors I observed and reported in the present study were distinctly shaped by a sense of urgency among the electorate in a bid to avoid decisions that could have a deleterious effect on the immediate post-conflict environment and the recent peace. Societies that are yet to experience the level of suffering that Sierra Leoneans and Liberians experienced may not easily identify consensus candidates on national issues in the pragmatic manner

337

in which most Sierra Leoneans and Liberians did. It is possible that electoral politics in such societies are still the ethnic affairs that have been described in other studies. Thus, the recent wars in both countries may have unduly influenced the current findings, thereby limiting generalizibility.

Directions for Future Research

Studies of post conflict political behavior in Africa are still at an early stage with regards to data collection, methodology, conceptual development and theory building. It is only recently that the international community and other stakeholders managed to find ways to resolve most of the conflicts that raged on the continent since the independence period of the sixties. There still remains much to be studied about the political behavior of Africans and more importantly, about their mobilization into politics following periods of conflict. Lessons learned from such ventures may serve to mitigate the chances of repeating the unfortunate mistakes of the past; this study makes a contribution to this imperative task.

Future studies could expand the methodological approach employed here by conducting more extensive surveys of all strata of the demography of post conflict societies. While ambitious, it is not infeasible because sufficient technological development has taken place on the continent that could facilitate such a venture. Cell phone usage is now common in both urban and rural communities across Africa and the reach of radio and roads extensive.

Much grey area still remains around our understanding of the interactions within ethnic groups and how such interactions are influenced by and affect the external environment with other ethnic groups. The current study makes a contribution by

empirically demonstrating that significant differences of opinion exist among members of the same ethnic groups using the examples from Liberia and Sierra Leone. These differences are important for understanding the mitigation of conflict because of the suggestion that all members of all ethnic groups may not always be in concert in instituting violent action against other groups. This finding challenges future studies that significant empirical verification is expected should they want to make inferences about the behavior of ethnic groups in conflict across the continent.

The scholarship needs additional and more localized data on ethnicity and political behavior in African politics. Future studies may also want to consider carefully the issue of measurement. We need to identify ways to measure ethnic identity on a consistent basis. Current approaches are unclear and the step I took in the study for this dissertation to allow self-identification with ethnic communities is a first step towards the rigidity necessary in identifying and measuring membership in ethnic groups.

Implications for Policy

The findings of this study offer several interrelated suggestions for policy regarding conflict prevention, institutional design for managing post conflict societies and overseeing democratic reform in African societies. First, there is often a vigorous debate over the suitability of proportional representation versus plurality electoral systems for African societies based on the assumption that such societies are divided along a range of identity cleavages that influence political behavior. The PR system is argued to have the advantage because it allows greater representativeness and inclusivity in national legislatures (Reynolds 1995, Sisk and Reynolds 1998, Southall 1999 and others). This study suggests that the type of electoral system employed during elections

may matter little for achieving the outcome of representation in African legislatures. The post conflict elections were conducted in Sierra Leone using the PR system but voters from diverse ethnic and other identity backgrounds voted in a manner that showed a concentration of votes around a preferred political party and presidential candidate in spite of the presence of other political parties and presidential candidates on the ballot who could be considered more representative of their various identity interests. In Liberia, the opposite effect was much evident.

Quite different electoral systems were employed in the two countries but one common factor between them was the presence of UN troops on the ground with respective mandates of robust enforcement of the peace among all parties. This suggests that the problem of violence in African politics assumed to emanate from identity cleavages may, in actuality, be a law and order problem. Where the intervention forces in both countries upheld law and order, the elections were conducted peacefully, elites abided by the law peacefully exhorting their followers to get out and vote, and electorates displayed quite remarkable choices given assumed differences among ethnic and other identity interests. The policy suggestion here is to provide and deploy strong elections monitoring teams across Africa during elections to enforce the rules of the game among parties. However, I am cognizant of the fact that the international community may not always have the resources or the collective will to oversee all elections using the kinds of forces deployed in Sierra Leone and Liberia in 2002 and 2005, respectively. This takes us to the next interrelated policy implication.

In the absence of the resources or the collective will to deploy elections monitoring forces across elections in Africa, the international system may instead work to strengthen both the institutional mandate and the operational reach of the International

340

Criminal Court system so that those who threaten collective violence during elections do so under the threat of prosecution by the Court wherever they are in the world. Charles Taylor's trial in the Hague, the trials of some members of the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone as well as Civil Defence Forces in that country and the trial and conviction of other perpetrators of violence across Africa in recent times, has demonstrated to all would-be leaders who carry out violence in the name of particular groups that they are not likely to do so with impunity any longer. This has sent a real message across the continent: the international court system works! To cite a few examples, the leadership in Sudan may continue to scoff at the current UN indictment against them or members of the notorious Lord's Resistance Army operating in Uganda from across the border in Sudan may continue to evade the law, but recent history shows that they may very well be reined in and this will most certainly strengthen the message that the people of Africa are no longer expendable in the name of political differences.

All too often in the past, the erroneous message that has been transmitted by political leaders is that they have the mandate of the people on whose behalf they pretend to act. Violence between rival party supporters during elections campaigns is all too often interpreted as conflict between various ethnic groups because such ethnic groups are assumed to be the bases of support for political parties. This study has unearthed sufficient empirical evidence to throw doubt on such portrayals. The dominant form of interaction among and between ethnic groups across Africa is peaceful. Violence carried out by predatory elites in the name of identity differences is mere banditry especially when the mode of recruitment for such collective violence is forced conscription or the use of money and drugs to influence and use susceptible young men as thugs. Real struggles for survival by rival groups do not require forced conscriptions. Thus, as an

early warning system, instigators of electoral violence in the name of ethnic differences during elections in Africa should be identified before the onset of conflict and warned about the potential consequences of their actions. According to Laakso (2007), organizations and institutions such as the civil society groups, human rights groups, the media and non-governmental organizations have commenced action in this direction during recent elections around Africa. They must be encouraged by all possible means to continue discourse around this area.

These are not frivolous recommendations. I lived a good portion of my young adult life during a time of civil war and great suffering in Sierra Leone. In the past three years, I returned to Sierra Leone and Liberia and spent a great deal of time as a researcher on the ground studying the aftermath of the conflict that nearly caused the disintegration of the two states. While collecting my data, I strove to emotionally distance myself from the study so that my personal experiences do not cloud my judgment but rather enhance it given my intimate knowledge of my surroundings. The conclusions I have reached from the study dispute much conventional wisdom in studies of African politics about the role of ethnic identity in political behavior but they are conclusions that I reached following detailed observations and careful, rigorous study. As the dialectical process of furthering knowledge continues, additional research by others may support, dispute or even do away with some or all of my findings. Whatever the case may be, I hope that my work would have contributed to the scholarship on African politics and caused us to rethink some accepted ideas in that scholarship.

Appendix A

Human Subjects Institutional Review Board
Letter of Approval

Date: June 16, 2006

To: James Butterfield, Principal Investigator
    Fodei Batty, Student Investigator for dissertation

From: Amy Naugle, Ph.D., Chair

Re: HSIRB Project Number: 06-06-04

This letter will serve as confirmation that your research project entitled "What Role for Ethnicity? Political Behavior and Mobilization in Post-conflict Liberia and Sierra Leone" has been approved under the expedited category of review by the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board. The conditions and duration of this approval are specified in the Policies of Western Michigan University. You may now begin to implement the research as described in the application.

Please note that you may only conduct this research exactly in the form it was approved. You must seek specific board approval for any changes in this project. You must also seek reapproval if the project extends beyond the termination date noted below. In addition if there are any unanticipated adverse reactions or unanticipated events associated with the conduct of this research, you should immediately suspend the project and contact the Chair of the HSIRB for consultation.

The Board wishes you success in the pursuit of your research goals.

Approval Termination: June 16, 2007

Appendix B

Descriptive Profiles of the Sample Populations

Table B.1

Descriptive Profile of the Liberia Sample***

Demographic Category	% of Sample	% of Population
(Ethnic Groups):		
Bassa	19	16
Bella	2	<2
Dei	2	<2
Gbandi	3	3
Gio	5	8
Gola	3	3
Grebo	6	8
Kissi	4	3
Kpelle	18	21
Krahn	5	4
Kru	9	7
Loma	7	6
Mandingo	4	2
Mano	6	7
Mende	.8	<1
Vai	4	3
Other (include Americo-Liberian)	5	4
(Gender):		
Female	51	51
Male	49	49
***(Literacy)**:		
Illiterate (cannot read or write)	22	42
Literate	78	58
* **(Age)**:		
18-34 yrs	57	
35-70	42	
71 and over	3	
(Residence by County):		
Bomi	3	2
Bong	12	10
Gbarpolu	2	2
Grand Bassa	7	6
Grand Cape Mount	3	4
Grand Gedeh	3	4
Grand Kru	2	2
Lofa	6	8
Margibi	8	6

Table B.1 – Continued

Demographic Category	% of Sample	% of Population
Maryland	2	4
Montserrado	36	32
Nimba	13	13
River Cess	1	2
River Gee	2	2
Sinoe	2	3
(Religion):		
Christian	79	40
Muslim	10	20
Other	10	40
N =910		
Actual Population:		

***Notes: Due to rounding some totals may go above 100. (Literacy) The World Bank, the United Nations Development Program and other development agencies calculate the literacy rate of a country by the number of people age 15 over who can read and write in a country. The figures obtained by the sample include only those over the age of 18 who are members of the voting eligible population. As such, a direct comparison with the actual population was impractical. (Age) For the age distribution, comparable figures could not be obtained for the actual population; the survey expert at CENTAL set the figures to be obtained in the sample based on previous studies the organization conducted for other development agencies. It is estimated that about 44 percent of the population of Liberia is under the age of 14.

Table B.2

Descriptive Profile of the Sierra Leone Sample

Demographic Category	% of Sample	% of Population
(Ethnic Groups):		
Fullah	1	3
Gallinas	.1	.3
Gola	.3	.1
Kissi	1	2
Kono	9	4
Koranko	2	4
Krio	4	8
Limba	6	6
Loko	.6	.2
Mandingo	2	2
Mende	32	31
Sherbro	6	3
Soso	1	2
Temne	25	30
Vai	.3	.3
Yalunka	.3	.4
Other	9	4
(Gender):		
Female	40	52
Male	60	48
***(Literacy):**		
Illiterate (cannot read or write)	21	65
Literate	79	35
***(Age):**		
18-34 yrs	47	
35-70	52	
71 and over	2	
(Residence by District):		
Bo	6	9
Bombali	7	8
Bonthe	8	3
Kailahun	8	7
Kambia	5	5
Kenema	8	10
Koinadugu	6	5
Kono	8	7
Moyamba	6	5
Port Loko	7	9
Pujehun	8	5
Tonkolili	8	7
Western Area	16	19

Table B.2 – Continued

Demographic Category	% of Sample	% of Population
(Residence by Region):		
East	23	24
South	28	22
North	33	35
West	16	19
(Religion):		
Christian	43	30
Muslim	55	65
Other	2	5

***Notes: Due to rounding some totals may go above 100. (Literacy) The World Bank, the United Nations Development Program and other development agencies calculate the literacy rate of a country by the number of people age 15 over who can read and write in a country. The figures obtained by the sample include only those over the age of 18 who are members of the voting eligible population. As such, a direct comparison with the actual population was impractical. (Age) For the age distribution, comparable figures could not be obtained for the actual population. Like Liberia, Sierra Leone also has a young population with about 45 percent of the population under the age of 14.

Appendix C

Survey Instruments

Copy of Sierra Leone Mass Electorate Questionnaire

Survey of Post-Conflict Political Behavior in Sierra Leone:
Questionnaire

Instructions to the interviewer: It is VERY IMPORTANT that you read out the following statement to the respondent before proceeding. If the respondent consents to the interview, proceed to administer the survey to them. If they refuse to be interviewed, ask them the reason for refusing to be interviewed and code accordingly. BUT PLEASE REMEMBER that respondents who refuse to be interviewed DO NOT have to give you a reason why they refuse to be interviewed.

Statement of informed consent: Good day! My name is
_____. I am from the Campaign for Good Governance here in Sierra Leone [please offer the contact address of CGG here]. We, CGG, are conducting the following interview on behalf of Mr. Fodei Batty who is working on a study for his Ph.D. dissertation at Western Michigan University in the United States. Mr. Batty wants to study the views of Sierra Leoneans regarding the parties that they voted for during the elections of 2002 and what parties Sierra Leoneans support at present. We are not from the government authorities nor do we represent any political parties or political interests in Sierra Leone or elsewhere. The answers you provide us will be confidential. They will be put together with 1,000 other Sierra Leoneans we are interviewing to get an overall picture of vote choice and support for political parties in the country. It will be impossible to pick you out from what you say, so please feel free to tell us what you think. This interview will not take long. There is no penalty for refusing to participate. If, you consent to be interviewed but change your mind during the course of the interview, please say so immediately and we will immediately terminate the interview and all your answers up to that point will be discarded.

Do you fully understand your rights to freely speak your mind during the interview and to terminate the interview at any point if you so wish? Yes_____ No_____

Do you wish to proceed? Yes_____ No_____

Item A. If "No" to the previous question, why do you refuse to be interviewed? [*To the Interviewer, if respondent refused to be interviewed, ask them the reason they refused to be interviewed but do not press them for an answer. Code accordingly and move on to find another respondent.*]

1. I don't talk to strangers. 2. I don't believe that my responses will be kept secret; I fear intimidation or retaliation for my answers. 3. I don't trust myself to provide the right responses.

4. I don't have the time to sit for an interview.   5. I just don't want to be interviewed.

6. Refused to answer. 7. Other reason_____ 9. Missing Data

Part 1: Demographic Information (1)

Name of town or village interview is being conducted in: _____

Name of Administrative District: _____

Geographic Region of the Country [north, south, west, east]: _____

Gender of Respondent:

    1. Female

    2. Male

Item 1. Can you tell us your age? [***Interviewer:*** *If the respondent cannot tell his or her exact age, please use a recollection of key historical events to estimate their age cohort. For example, did they witness the independence celebrations? Code appropriately deferring to the age offered by the respondent.*]

    1=18-25 yrs

    2=25-29 yrs

    3=30-34 yrs

    4=35-39 yrs

    5=40-50 yrs

    6=51-60 yrs

    7=61-70 yrs

    8=71yrs and over

    9=missing data.

Part 2: Support for Political Parties and Vote Choice

To the Interviewer: In this section you will talk about some events that happened about four years ago. Some of the details may or may not have been lost on the respondents. Please let the respondent know that they should feel very comfortable to ask to skip questions that they cannot recall answers to or that they feel uncomfortable answering. Thank you.

Item 2. Did you vote in the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2002?

1. Yes, I voted in the elections of 2002
2. No, I did not vote in the elections of 2002
3. Cannot recall if I voted in the elections of 2002
4. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data

Item 3. If "yes" to the previous question, what candidate did you vote for, for president, in the elections of 2002?

1. Mr. Ernest Bai Koroma
2. Mr. Raymond Bamidele Thompson
3. Dr. Raymond S. Kamara
4. Mrs. Zainab Hawa Bangura
5. Lt. Col (Rtd) Johnny Paul Koroma
6. Dr. Alimamy Pallo Bangura
7. Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabba
8. Dr. John Karefa-Smart
9. Mr. Andrew Turay
10. Other
99. Missing Data

Item 4. If "yes" to Item 2, **what political party did you vote for in the parliamentary elections**? [*Interviewer, Do not read options out to the respondent. Please code from responses*]

1. All People's Congress Party (APC)
2. Grand Alliance Party (GAP)
3. Movement for Progress (MOP)
4. National Democratic Alliance (NDA)
5. People's Democratic Party (PDP-Sorbeh)
6. Peace and Liberation Party (PLP)
7. Revolutionary United Front Party (RUFP)
8. Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP)
9. United National People's Party (UNPP)
10. Young People's Party (YPP)

11. Other _____
99. Missing Data

Item 5. Did you support the political party in any other way, if so how? [*Interviewer:*

clarify the question as "how do you show that you support this party?" Have you done

any one of the following activities for this or any other political party? Ask this question

only if the response to the previous Item was "yes," if not, skip to the next Item. **More**

than one response is appropriate for this item].

      A. I did not support them in any other way.
      B. Demonstrated [1=Yes; 0=No]
      C. Attended a political rally hosted by this political party [1=Yes; 0=No]
      D. Made financial donations to this particular political party [1=Yes; 0=No]
      E. I voted for them [1=Yes; 0=No]
      F. I support them emotionally, hoping they win elections.
      G. Other form of support_____
      H. Refused to answer
      9. Missing Data

Item 6. Did this or any other political party contact you to vote for them or support them

by other means during the elections of 2002?

    1. Yes I was contacted by this political party to vote for them or support them during the elections of 2002
    2. No, another political party contacted me to vote for them or support them during the elections of 2002. Name different political party here_____
    3. No political party contacted me to vote for them or support them during the elections of 2002
    4. I cannot recall if any political party contacted me during the elections of 2002
    5. Refused to answer
    9. Missing Data

Item 7. Do you feel "very close," "somewhat close" or "not very close" to the political

party you voted for in the parliamentary elections of 2002?

    1. Very Close
    2. Somewhat Close
    3. Not very Close
    7. Refused to answer
    9. Missing Data

Item 8. Why did you vote for this particular political party in the parliamentary elections

of 2002? [*Interviewer, initially, do not prompt. Code from responses. However, if*

respondent is unsure, gently prod using the following choices. Ask them by reading out

355

the following response options to them, "You voted for this particular party

because...?"] **More than one response is appropriate.**

    A. They are the party representing the interests of my ethnic group [1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree.]

    B. They are the party that will best unite the country and sustain peace [1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree.]

    C. They are the party representing the interests of my region [1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree.]

    D. They are the party that are most likely to develop the country by building roads, clinics and bringing electricity to the whole country [1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree.]

    E. They are the party that represents the interests of my religion [1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree.]

    F. They are the party of the young generation [1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree.]

    G. I don't have any reason, I just voted for them [1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree.]

    H. They are the party of the "big person," national personality or most important politician from our area [1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree.]

    I. Other _____

    J. Refused to answer

    9. Missing Data

Item 9. [*Interviewer, if respondent selected option B for Item 8; then ask them this question. If not, move on to the next Item*]. If the elections of 2002 were not a post-conflict election and peace was not an issue that was important to you, would you have still voted for this party that you voted for?

    1. Yes

    2. No

    3. Refused to answer

    9. Missing Data

Item 10. When you vote, what matters to you most, the political party itself or the leader of the party?

    1. The political party matters to me more than the leader of the party

    2. The leader of the party matters to me more than political party itself

    3. Refused to answer

    9. Missing Data

Item 11. In your opinion, were the last presidential and parliamentary elections free and fair?

1. Yes, the last elections were free and fair
2. No, the last elections were not free and fair
3. I don't know/cannot tell
4. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data

Item 12. *[Interviewer: Ask this question only if answer to Item 11 was "No."]* Why do you say the last elections were not free and fair? This is an open-ended response. Don't Code.

_____

_____

_____

_____

Item 13. Did you accept the outcome of the last elections?

1. Yes, I accepted the outcome of the last elections
2. No, I did not accept the outcome of the last elections
3. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data

Item 14. *[Interviewer: ask this question only if response to Item 13 is "No." This is an open-ended response]* If you did not accept the outcome of the last election, is there anything you plan to do about it? What are you most likely to do to ensure a fair outcome next election?

_____

_____

_____

_____

Item 15. *[Interviewer: ask this question only if response to Item 11 is "No"]*. Do you think anything can and should be done to ensure a fair outcome next time?

1. Yes, something can be done to ensure the elections are free and fair next time
2. No, nothing can be done to ensure that the elections are free and fair next time
3. I don't know what can be done to ensure that the elections are free and fair next time
4. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data

Item 16. [*Interviewer: If answer is "yes" to Item 15 then probe respondent some more and ask the following, if not, skip to the next item*] what is that thing you feel should be done next time to ensure a fair outcome? This is an open-ended response.

_____

_____

_____

_____

Item 17. Besides the political party that you voted for in the parliamentary elections of 2002, is there any other political party that was like a second choice for you? [*Interviewer, prompt respondent along the lines "what could be a substitute political party if the political party you first selected were not around, or did not exist? Do not read options out to respondent, please code from response*].

1. All People's Congress Party (APC)
2. Citizens United for Peace and Progress (CUPP)
3. Democratic Centre Party (DCP)
4. Grand Alliance Party (GAP)
5. Movement for Progress (MOP)
6. National Alliance Democratic Party (NADP)
7. National Council of Sierra Leone (NCSL)
8. National Democratic Alliance (NDA)
9. National People's Party (NPP)
10. National Unity Movement (NUM)
11. National Unity Party (NUP)
12. People's Democratic Party (PDP-Sorbeh)
13. Peace and Liberation Party (PLP)
14. People's National Convention (PNC)
15. People's Progressive Party (PPP)
16. Revolutionary United Front Party (RUFP)
17. Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP)
18. Sierra Leone Independence Movement (SLPIM)
19. Social Democratic Party (SDP)
20. United National People's Party (UNPP)
21. United Progressive Party
22. Young People's Party (YPP)
23. No, I do not feel close to any other political party
99. Missing Data

Item 18. Why is this second party your party of choice following your first choice? [*Interviewer: If respondent selects a second choice of political party, ask them this*

358

question but do not prompt, code from responses. If they do not have a second choice of political party, skip to the next Item.]

A. They also represent the interests of my ethnic group [1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree.]
B. They also represent the interests of my region [1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree.]
C. They have the second best proposals for bringing economic development to Sierra Leone [1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree.]
D. They are the second party that is most likely to bring peace to Sierra Leone [1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree.]
E. Other reason: _____
F. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data

Transition [to the interviewer]: **Now we are going to move on and talk about your opinions on various issues today. I am going to ask you questions about how you feel about those issues today.**

Item 19. There are so many personalities/national figures, call them big names or "big persons," in Sierra Leone politics today. I am going to name several of them, some of whom were also candidates in the last elections. Please let me know how close you feel to any one of them. [*Interviewer: More than one response is appropriate for this Item.*]

A. Mr. Ernest Bai Koroma. 1=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close; 9=no response
B. Mr. Raymond Bamidele Thompson. 1=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close; 9=no response
C. Dr. Raymond S. Kamara. 1=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close; 9=no response
D. Mrs. Zainab Hawa Bangura. 1=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close; 9=no response
E. Lt. Col. (Rtd) Johnny Paul Koroma. 1=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close; 9=no response
F. Dr. Alimamy Pallo Bangura. 1=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close; 9=no response
G. Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabba. 1=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close; 9=no response
H. Dr. John Karefa-Smart. 1=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close; 9=no response
I. Mr. Andrew Turay. 1=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close; 9=no response
J. Other. Please name_____1=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close; 9=no response
99. Missing data

Item 20. Why do you feel close to this particular personality/national figure or "big person?" in Sierra Leonean politics today and not to the others listed? [*Interviewer: if the respondent indicates that they feel close to more than one "big person," please rephrase the question and ask them why do they feel close to the names they have listed and not others. Do not prompt for answers. This is an open-ended response question. Do not Code.*]

_____

_____

_____

_____

Item 21. How likely are you today to vote for someone from a different ethnic group if you think that individual is the right person for the job?

1. Highly likely
2. Likely
3. Unlikely
4. Very unlikely
9. Missing Data

Item 22. Have you heard of the word "**democracy**" before?

0=No

1=Yes

9=Missing Data.

Item 23. If "yes," what, if anything, does the word 'democracy" mean to you?
[*Interviewer: do not prompt. Accept up to three responses and ask respondents to list responses in order of importance. Rank order the responses below accordingly. From 1=most important; 2=very important; 3=important.*] **If "no," skip this Item and move on to Item 28.**

1.

2.

3.

9. Missing Data.

Item 24. Which of these statements is closest to your own opinion? [*Interviewer: Read out statements. Only one option to be chosen.*]

1. Statement A: For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have.
2. Statement B: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable.
3. A democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.
4. I don't have an answer
9. Missing Data

Item 25. In your opinion how democratic is Sierra Leone today? [*Read out options. Accept only one option*]

1. Not very democratic
2. Somewhat democratic
3. Highly democratic
4. Do not understand this question/do not understand what degree of "democracy" exists in Sierra Leone
9. Missing Data

Item 26. How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Sierra Leone? Are you: [*Interviewer: Read out options. Only one option to be chosen.*]

0. Sierra Leone is not a democracy
1. Not at all satisfied
2. Not very satisfied
3. Fairly satisfied
4. Very satisfied
9. Missing Data

Item 27. In your opinion, how likely is it that Sierra Leone will remain a democratic country?

0. Sierra Leone is not a democracy [*Do not read.*]
1. Not at all likely
2. Not very likely
3. Likely
4. Very likely
5. Don't know [Do not read.]
9. Missing Response

Item 28. What do you think are the most important problems or issues facing Sierra Leone today? [*Interviewer: rank order responses from "1=the most important problems or issues facing Sierra Leone today is ..." down through the least important issue. Allow up to five responses.*]

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6. Sierra Leone is just fine. There are no important problems or issues facing the country.

7. Refused to answer

9. Missing Data

Item 29. What are the most important problems or issues facing **YOU** today? [*Interviewer: again, rank order responses from "1=the most important problems or issues facing me today is ..." down through the least important problem or issue. Allow up to five responses.*]

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6. Refused to answer

9. Missing Data

Item 30. What political party or political parties do you think can best resolve the problems and issues facing you today that you have just mentioned? [*Interviewer: do not prompt, code from responses*].

1.

2.

3.

4. Refused to answer

9. Missing Data

Item 31. Can you recall if that is the reason why you voted for this party in the parliamentary elections of 2002? [*Interviewer: do not prompt for answers, code from responses*]

1. Yes, that is the reason
2. No, I did not vote for them to resolve the problems and issues facing me, I voted for them just because they are the party of my ethnic group
3. No, at the time I voted for another political party. Which one _____
4. I did not vote in the parliamentary elections of 2002
5. Cannot recall
6. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data

Item 32. In general, how do rate your living conditions compared to those of other Sierra Leoneans? [*Interviewer: Please read out response options.*]

1. Much worse
2. Worse
3. Same
4. Better
5. Much Better
6. Don't Know
9. Missing data.

Item 33. What tribe do you consider yourself to be a part of? *[Interviewer, prompt if necessary: You know, your ethnic or cultural group or the group that you most identify with. Do NOT read options. Code from response]* **In other words, what are you? Are you a:**

1. Fula=1	10. Limba=10
2. Gallinas=2	11. Loko=11
3. Gola=3	12. Mandingo=12
4. Kissi=4	13. Mende=13
5. Kono=5	14. Sherbro or Bullom=14
6. Koranko=6	15. Soso=15
7. Krim=7	16. Temne=16
8. Krio or Creole=8	17. Vai=17
9. Kru=9	18. Yalunka=18
	19. Other [specify]

20. I consider myself just a Sierra Leonean and not part of any particular tribe or ethnic group

99. Missing Data

Item 34. Why do you consider yourself a part of this PARTICULAR tribe or ethnic group and not any other tribe or ethnic group? [*Interviewer: this is an open-ended response*]

_____

_____

_____

_____

Item 35. Think about the condition of _____ [**Fill in the respondent's Ethnic group in the blank space**.] *If respondent did not identify any group on Item 33, or if they chose "20=I consider myself just a Sierra Leonean and not part of any particular tribe or ethnic group, then mark "7=Not Applicable," and move on to the next Item.*

    A. Are their economic conditions worse, the same as or better than other groups in this country? 5=Much worse; 4=Worse; 3=same; 2=better; 1=much better; 7=not applicable; 8=Don't know/can't tell; 9=Missing Data.

    B. Do they have less, the same, or more influence in politics than other groups in this country? 5=much less; 4=less; 3=same; 2=more; 1=much more; 7=not applicable; 8=don't know/can't tell; 9=Missing Data.

Item 36. Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a Sierra Leonean and being a_____[**Enter respondent's ethnic group in the blank space**]. *Which of the following statements best expresses your feelings? If respondent did not identify any group on Item 33, or if they chose "20=I consider myself just a Sierra Leonean and not part of any particular tribe or ethnic group," or "99=Missing Data," then mark "7=Not Applicable," and move on to the next Item.*

    1. I feel only_____[Insert Respondent's Ethnic group].
    2. I feel more _____[Insert Respondent's ethnic group] than Sierra Leonean.
    3. I feel equally Sierra Leonean and _____[Insert Respondent's ethnic group]

4. I feel more Sierra Leonean than_____[Insert Respondent's ethnic group]
5. I feel only Sierra Leonean.
7. Not Applicable

9. Missing Data

Item 37. Let's turn to your views on your fellow citizens. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you must be very careful in dealing with people?

0. You must be very careful
1. Most people can be trusted
9. Missing Data

Item 38. How much do you trust each of the following types of people? [*Interviewer: if question is unclear, prompt gently saying "during business transactions or interpersonal relationships, or living in the same neighborhood, street or apartment complex, for example."*]

A. Your relatives. 0=Not at all; 1=Just a little; 2=I trust them somewhat; 3=I trust them a lot; 9=Missing Data.
B. Your neighbors. 0=Not at all; 1=Just a little; 2=I trust them somewhat; 3=I trust them a lot; 9=Missing Data.
C. People from your own ethnic group [or tribe]. 0=Not at all; 1=Just a little; 2=I trust them somewhat; 3=I trust them a lot; 9=Missing Data
D. Sierra Leoneans from other ethnic groups. 0=Not at all; 1=Just a little; 2=I trust them somewhat; 3=I trust them a lot; 9=Missing Data
E. Foreign citizens that you know of living in this country 0=Not at all; 1=Just a little; 2=I trust them somewhat; 3=I trust them a lot; 9=Missing Data

Item 39. How often are _____s [**Enter Respondent's ethnic group in the blank space**] treated unfairly by the government? *If respondent did not identify any group on Item 33, or if they chose "20=I consider myself just a Sierra Leonean and not part of any particular tribe or ethnic group, then mark "7=Not Applicable," and move on to the next item.*

0. Never
1. Sometimes
2. Often
3. Always
7. Not Applicable
9. Missing Data

Item 40. Let's talk for a moment about the kind of society we would like to have in Sierra Leone. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose statement A or Statement B. [*Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion. Do you agree or agree very strongly?*]

Statement A. As citizens, we should be more active in questioning the actions of our leaders. 1=agree very strongly with A; 2=agree with A.

Statement B. In our country these days, we should show more respect for authority. 3=agree with B; 4=agree strongly with B; 5=agree with neither; 9=Missing Data

Item 41. Let's talk about some expectations of leadership in this country today. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose statement A or Statement B. [*Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion. Do you agree or agree very strongly?*]

Statement A. Since our leaders represent everyone, they should not favor their own family or group. 1=agree very strongly with A; 2=agree with A.

Statement B. Once in office, leaders are obliged to help their home community. 3=agree With B; 4=agree strongly with B; 5=agree with neither; 9=no response.

Item 42. Now I am going to read out a list of groups that people voluntarily join or attend. For each one, could you tell me how likely you are to join that particular group with individuals from other ethnic groups? [*Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion. Are you very likely, likely, unlikely or very unlikely?*]

A. A religious group (e.g. church, mosque). 1=very likely; 2=likely; 3=unlikely; 4=very unlikely; 9=Missing Data.
B. A trade union or farmers association. 1=very likely; 2=likely; 3=unlikely; 4=very unlikely; 9=Missing Data.
C. A professional or business association. 1=very likely; 2=likely; 3=unlikely; 4=very unlikely; 9=Missing Data.
D. A political party. 1=very likely; 2=likely; 3=unlikely; 4=very unlikely; 9=Missing Data.
E. A community development, neighborhood association or self-help association. 1=very likely; 2=likely; 3=unlikely; 4=very unlikely; 9=Missing Data.

Item 43. During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about some important problem or to give them your views? [*Read out options*].

A. A local government councilor. 0=Never; 1=only once; 2=a few times; 3=often; 9=no response.
B. A member of the national parliament. 0=Never; 1=only once; 2=a few times; 3=often; 9=no response.
C. An official of a government ministry. 0=Never; 1=only once; 2=a few times; 3=often; 9=no response.
D. A political party official. 0=Never; 1=only once; 2=a few times; 3=often; 9=no response.
E. A religious leader. 0=Never; 1=only once; 2=a few times; 3=often; 9=no response.
F. A traditional ruler. 0=Never; 1=only once; 2=a few times; 3=often; 9=no response.
G. Some other influential person (prompt if necessary: you know, someone with more money or power than you who can speak on your behalf.) 0=Never; 1=only once; 2=a few times; 3=often; 9=no response.
9. Missing Data

Item 44. Think of the last time you contacted any of the above leaders. Was the main reason to: [*Read out options. If respondent answered "0=Never" for all parts of Item 43, i.e. they NEVER contacted any leader, circle code "7=Not applicable" for this Item.*]

1. Tell them about your own personal problems?

2. Tell them about a community or public problem?

3. Give them your view on some political issue?

4. Something else? Do you mind telling us? _____

7. Not applicable, i.e., did not contact any leader

9. Missing Data.

Item 45. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B. [*Interviewer: probe for the strength of opinion. Do you agree or agree very strongly?*]

Statement A: We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open and honest   elections. 1=agree very strongly with A; 2=agree with A.

Statement B: Since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other methods for choosing this country's leaders.3=agree with B; 4=agree very strongly with B; 5=Agree with neither; 9=missing response.

Item 46. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B. [*Interviewer: probe for the strength of opinion. Do you agree or agree very strongly?*]

Statement A: Political Parties create division and confusion; it is therefore unnecessary to have many political parties in Sierra Leone. 1=agree very strongly with A; 2=agree with A.

Statement B: Many political parties are needed to make sure that Sierra Leoneans have real choices in who governs them. 3=agree with B; 4=agree very strongly with B; 5=Agree with neither; 9=Missing Data.

Item 47. What political party will you vote for in the next elections? [*Interviewer: do not prompt. Code from responses.*]. *What political party would you like to see win the next general elections?*

1. I will vote for the _____ in the next elections.

2. I have not made a decision yet about what political party to vote for in the next elections.

3. I do not intend to vote in the next elections.

9. Missing Data

Item 48. [*If response to Item 47 is "1," ask this question, if not skip to the next Item.*] Why will you vote for this particular political party in the next elections and not any other?

1. They are the party of my tribe or ethnic group [1=agree very strongly; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=disagree very strongly]
2. They are the party that are most competent to run the country [1=agree very strongly; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=disagree very strongly]
3. Other. (Please Indicate) _____ [1=agree very strongly; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=disagree very strongly]
4. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data

Item 49. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B. [Interviewer: probe for strength of opinion. Do you agree or agree very strongly?]

Statement A: It is important to obey the government in power no matter whom you voted for. 1=agree very strongly with A; 2=agree with A.

Statement B: It is not necessary to obey the laws of a government that I did not vote for. 3=agree with B; 4=agree very strongly with B; 5=Agree with neither; 9=missing response.

Item 50. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B.

Statement A: It is better to find lawful solutions to problems even if it takes longer. 1=agree very strongly with A; 2=agree with A

Statement B: It is sometimes better to ignore the law and solve problems immediately using other means. 3=agree with B; 4=agree very strongly with B; 5=Agree with neither; 9=missing data.

Item 51. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B.

Statement A: The use of violence is never justified in Sierra Leone politics today. 1=agree very strongly with A; 2=agree with A

Statement B: In Sierra Leone, it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause. 3=agree with B; 4=agree very strongly with B; 5=Agree with neither; 9=missing response

Item 52. In this country, how often: [Please *read out options*]

> A. Do people have to be careful about what they say about politics? 3=always; 2=often; 1=rarely; 0=never; 9=no response.
> B. Does competition between political parties lead to violent conflict? 3=always; 2=often; 1=rarely; 0=never; 9=no response.
> C. Are people treated equally under the law? 3=always; 2=often; 1=rarely; 0=never; 9=no response.

Item 53. Now let's speak about the performance of the present government of this country. How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say? [*Interviewer: Please probe for strength of opinion.*]

A. Managing the economy. 1=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well; 4=very well; 9=no response

B. Creating jobs. 1=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well; 4=very well; 9=no response

C. Keeping prices stable. 1=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well; 4=very well; 9=no response

D. Narrowing gaps between rich and poor. 1=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well; 4=very well; 9=no response

E. Reducing crime. 1=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well; 4=very well; 9=no response

F. Improving basic health services. 1=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well; 4=very well; 9=no response

G. Addressing educational needs. 1=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well; 4=very well; 9=no response

H. Delivering household water. 1=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well; 4=very well; 9=no response

I. Ensuring everyone has enough to eat. 1=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well; 4=very well; 9=no response

J. Fighting corruption in government. 1=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well; 4=very well; 9=no response

K. Uniting the country following the civil war. 1=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well; 4=very well; 9=no response

L. Combating HIV/AIDS. 1=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well; 4=very well; 9=no response

M. Solving other problems that you know of besides those listed here. 1=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well; 4=very well; 9=no response

9. Missing Data

Item 54. [*Interviewer: Depending on the region this particular interview in question is taking place; ask the interviewee this question with reference to the regions where the interview is evidently not taking place. For example, if you are in the eastern region of the country, as the respondent about travel to the western, southern, or northern region.*] Have you ever traveled to the _____ regions of this country?

1. Yes

2. No

3. Refused to answer

9. Missing Data

Item 55. [*If answer to Item 54 is "yes," ask this question; if not skip to the next Item.*]

How often do you travel to other regions of the country?

1. Very often (more than twice a year)

2. Often (at least twice a year)

3. Hardly ever (have visited once or twice but hardly ever leave my region)

4. Never

9. Missing Data

Item 56. Did you join any armed faction during the civil war?

0. No
1. Yes
2. Refused to answer this question.
9. Missing Data

Item 57. If "yes" to the previous Item, then ask this Item. If "no," then skip and move on

to the next Item. What armed faction did you join during the civil war? [*Interviewer:*

Please read out response options and code accordingly.]

1. The Sierra Leone Military Force
2. The Revolutionary United Front
3. The Civil Defense Forces in the East – Kamajor
4. The Civil Defense Forces in the North – Kapras and Tamaborohs
5. Other. Please name _____
9. Missing Data

Item 58. If respondent indicated an armed faction that they fought with during the civil war, ask them; why did you fight with this particular faction and not others during the civil war? [*This is an open-ended response. Will code later.*]

_____

_____

_____

_____

Part 3. Demographic Information (2)

Item 59. What is your main occupation? What is the major source of the income you depend upon to survive? (If currently unemployed, retired, or disabled, what was the respondent's last main occupation?) [*Do not read options out to the respondent. Please code from responses.*]

Agrarian
1. Subsistence farmer (produces only for home consumption).
2. Peasant Farmer (produces both for own consumption and some surplus produce for sale).
3. Commercial Farmer (produces mainly for sale).
4. Farm Worker

Worker
5. Fisherman
6. Trader/Hawker/Vendor
7. Miner (diamond, gold, rutile)
8. Domestic Worker/Maid/House help
9. Armed Services/Police/Security Personnel
10. Artisan/skilled manual worker in the formal sector
11. Artisan/skilled manual worker in the formal sector
12. Clerical Worker
13. Unskilled manual worker in the formal sector
14. Unskilled manual worker in the informal sector

Professional
15. Businessperson (works in company for others)
16. Businessperson (owns small business of less than 10 employees)
17. Businessperson (owns large business of 10 or more employees)
18. Professional worker (e.g., doctor, lawyer, accountant, nurse, engineer etc).

19. Supervisors/Foreman
20. Teacher
21. Government Worker
22. Retail worker
23. Works for a local nongovernmental organization
24. Works for an international nongovernmental organization

Other
25. Student
26. Housewife/Works in the Household
27. Other (specify): _____
28. Unemployed
99. Missing Data

Item 60. [Education I] what is your highest level of education?

1. Illiterate (cannot both read or write)
2. Primary school education only
3. Up to secondary school education but did not continue after secondary school
4. Technical College/Teachers College
5. University education [University of Sierra Leone; Njala University or other]
6. Received Higher Education in a Western Country. Please list country here

_____

7. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data

Item 61. What is the respondent's social class? [*Interviewer deduces the respondent's social class with reference to responses to Item 59 above*]

1. Peasant [*please include in this class*: small agricultural producers producing largely for their own consumption, subsistence farmers, peasant farmers]
2. Proletariat [*please include in this class*: wage earners, landless rural laborers, urban laborers in industry, mining, transport, farm worker, domestic worker/maid/house help, clerical worker].
3. Informal sector entrepreneurs or lumpenproletariat [*please include in this class*: both licensed and illegal street vendors, money changers/lenders and petty thieves, the homeless living in the cities].
4. Petty bourgeoisie [*please include in this class*: teachers, lower ranks of the military and police services, lower ranks of public service, small traders]
5. Traditional rulers [*please include in this class*: clan heads, chiefs, paramount chiefs, emirs, monarchs]
6. Commercial bourgeoisie [*please include in this class*: commercial farmers, businesspersons owning large businesses of 10 or more employees, and land owners]

374

7. Bureaucratic bourgeoisie [*please include in this class*: government ministers, higher rank bureaucrats and senior military and police officers, largely urban-based].
8. Other [specify]: _____
9. Don't know/ could not deduce: _____

Item 62. What is your religion, if any?

1. Christian [*Interviewer: Please Include in this category all Protestants (mainstream and Evangelical Pentecostals); Catholics; Jehovah's Witnesses; Seventh Day Adventists; and African Independent Churches.*]
2. Muslim [*Interviewer: Please include in this category all sects-Sunni, Shiite etc.*]
3. Traditional African religions
4. I do not have a religion
5. Other [specify]:
9. No response

Item 63. Which of these things do you personally own or have access to in your home?

1. Radio
2. Television
3. Book, you know, a reading book
4. Bicycle
5. Motorcycle
6. Motor vehicle/car
7. A Cell phone
8. Do not own any of these
9. Missing Data

Item 64. How often do you get news from the following sources? [*Interviewer: Please read out options and code appropriately.*]

A. Radio. 4=Everyday; 3=A few times a week; 2=A few times a month; 1=Less than once a month;

0=Never; 9=No response

B. Television. 4=Everyday; 3=A few times a week; 2=A few times a month; 1=Less than once a month; 0=Never; 9=No response

C. Newspapers. 4=Everyday; 3=A few times a week; 2=A few times a month; 1=Less than once a month; 0=Never; 9=No response

D. Other. Please state. 4=Everyday; 3=A few times a week; 2=A few times a month; 1=Less than once a month; 0=Never; 9=No response

Item 65. How interested are you in public affairs? [*Interviewer: Prompt if necessary: You Know, in politics and government?*]

1. Very Interested
2. Somewhat Interested
3. Not very interested
4. Not at all interested
9. No Response

Item 66. Which of the following statements about the U.N. Special Court for War Crimes in Sierra Leone is closest to your view. *Choose statement A or statement B.*

Statement A: The Special Court is doing a necessary and important job of prosecuting and bringing to justice those responsible for war crimes in Sierra Leone. 1=agree very strongly with A; 2=agree with A.

Statement B: The Special Court is unnecessary. Their work is not important in bringing justice to Sierra Leoneans responsible for war crimes. 3=agree with B; 4=agree very strongly with B; 5=Agree with neither; 9=missing Data

We want to thank you for taking the time to respond to these questions for us. Your answers have been very helpful. The results of this study will be available in a few months, are you interested in seeing the final results of the study? [Interviewer: if respondent is interested in seeing the result of this study, please give them my contact address.]

End Interview

To the Interviewer: Please do not forget to complete the following sections.

Item 67: What proportion of the questions do you feel the respondent had difficulty answering?

0. None

1. Few

2. Some

3. Most

4. All

Item 68. Which questions did the respondents have trouble answering? [Identify up to ten.]

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Item 69. What was the respondent's attitude towards you during the interview?

    A. Was she or he...1=friendly; 2=in between; 3=hostile?
    B. Was she or he...1=interested; 2=in between; 3=bored?
    C. Was she or he...1=cooperative; 2=in between; 3=uncooperative?
    D. Was she or he...1=patient; 2=in between; 3=impatient?
    E. Was he or she...1=at ease; 2=in between; 3=suspicious?
    F. Was he or she...1=honest; 2=in between; 3=misleading?

Item 70. Do you have any other comments on the interview? For example, did anything else significant happen during the interview?

    0. No
    1. Yes. Please
       Explain_____

Copy of Liberia Electorate Questionnaire

Survey of Post-Conflict Political Behavior in Liberia

Questionnaire

Instructions to the interviewer: It is VERY IMPORTANT that you read out the following statement to the respondent before proceeding. If the respondent consents to the interview, proceed to administer the survey to them. If they refuse to be interviewed, ask them the reason for refusing to be interviewed and code accordingly. BUT PLEASE REMEMBER that respondents who refuse to be interviewed DO NOT have to give you a reason why they refuse to be interviewed.

Statement of informed consent: Good day! My name is

_____. I am from the Center for Accountability and Transparency here in Liberia [please offer the contact address of CENTAL here]. We, CENTAL, are conducting the following interview on behalf of Mr. Fodei Batty who is working on a study for his Ph.D. dissertation at Western Michigan University in the United States. Mr. Batty wants to study the views of Liberians regarding the parties that they voted for during the elections of 2005 and what parties Liberians support at present. We are not from the government authorities nor do we represent any political parties or political interests in Liberia or elsewhere. The answers you provide us will be confidential. They will be put together with 1,000 other Liberians we are interviewing to get an overall picture of vote choice and support for political parties in the country. It will be impossible to pick you out from what you say, so please feel free to tell us what you think. This interview will not take long. There is no penalty for refusing to participate. If, you consent to be interviewed but change your mind during the course of the interview, please say so immediately and we will immediately terminate the interview and all your answers up to that point will be discarded.

Do you fully understand your rights to freely speak your mind during the interview and to terminate the interview at any point if you so wish? Yes_____ No_____

Do you wish to proceed? Yes_____ No_____

Item A. If "No" to the previous question, why do you refuse to be interviewed? [*To the Interviewer, if respondent refused to be interviewed, ask them the reason they refused to be interviewed but do not press them for an answer. Code accordingly and move on to find another respondent.*]

1. I don't talk to strangers. 2. I don't believe that my responses will be kept secret; I fear intimidation or retaliation for my answers. 3. I don't trust myself to provide the right responses.

4. I don't have the time to sit for an interview.   5. I just don't want to be interviewed.

6. Refused to answer. 7. Other reason_____ 9. No response

Part 1: Demographic Information (1)

Name of town or village interview is being conducted in: _____

Name of Administrative County: _____

Geographic Region of the Country [north, south, west, east]: _____

Gender of Respondent:

      1. Female
      2. Male

Item 1. Can you tell us your age? [*Interviewer: If the respondent cannot tell his or her exact age, please use a recollection of key historical events to estimate their age cohort. For example, did they witness the transition from Tubman to Tolbert? Code appropriately deferring to the age offered by the respondent.*]

      1=18-25 yrs

      2=25-29 yrs

      3=30-34 yrs

      4=35-39 yrs

      5=40-50 yrs

      6=51-60 yrs

      7=61-70 yrs

      8=71-80 yrs

      9=missing data.

Part 2: Support for Political Parties and Vote Choice

In this section we will talk about some events that happened last year, during the elections of 2005. Some of the details may or may not have been lost on the respondents. Please let the respondent know that they should feel very comfortable to ask to skip questions that they cannot recall answers to or that they feel uncomfortable answering. Thank you.

Item 2. Did you vote in the presidential and National Assembly elections of 2005?

1. Yes, I voted in the elections of 2005
2. No, did not vote in the elections of 2005
3. Cannot recall if I voted in the elections of 2005
4. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data

Item 3. If "yes" to the previous question, whom did you vote for, for president, in the elections of 2005?

1. Mr. Milton Nathaniel Barnes.
2. Charles Walker Brumskine.
3. Mr. Sekou Damate Conneh.
4. Mr. Samuel Raymond Divine Sr.
5. Mr. David M. Farhat.
6. Mr. Armah Zolu Jallah.
7. Madam Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf.
8. Mr. George Momodu Kiadii.
9. Mr. George Klay Kieh, Jr.
10. Mr. Joseph D.Z. Korto.
11. Mr. Robert Momo Kpoto.
12. Mr. Alhaji G.V. Kromah.
13. Mr. Roland Chris Yarkpah Massaquoi.
14. Mr. John Sembe Morlu.
15. Bishop Alfred Garpee Reeves.
16. Mr. Harry Varney Gboto-Nambi Sherman.

17. Mr. Togba-Nah Tipoteh.

18. Mrs. Margaret J. Tor-Thompson.

19. Mr. Winston A. Tubman.

20. Mr. William Vacanarat Shadrach Tubman.

21. Mr. George Manneh Weah.

22. Mr. Joseph Mamadee Woah-Tee.

99. Missing Data

Item 4. If "yes" to Item 2, what party did you vote for in the elections for the legislature (National Assembly) in 2005?

1. All Liberia Coalition Party (ALCOP)
2. Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
3. Freedom Alliance Party of Liberia (FAPL)
4. Freedom Democratic Party (FDP)
5. Liberian Action Party/ Coalition for the Transformation of Liberia (LAP/COTOL)
6. Liberian Destiny Party (LDP)
7. Liberia Equal Rights Party (LERP)
8. Liberia National Union/United Democratic Alliance (LINU/UDA)
9. Liberty Party (LP)
10. Labor Party of Liberia (LPL)
11. Liberian People's Party/Alliance for Peace and Democracy (LPP/APD)
12. National Vision Party of Liberia (NATVIPOL)
13. New Deal Movement (NDM)
14. National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
15. National Party of Liberia (NPL)
16. National Patriotic Party (NPP)
17. National Reformation Party (NRP)
18. Progressive Democratic Party (PRODEM)
19. Reformed United Liberian Party (RULP)
20. Samuel Raymond Divine, Sr. (Independent)
21. Union of Liberian Democrats (ULD)
22. Unity Party (UP)
99. Missing Data

Item 5. Did you support the political party in any other way, if so how? [*Interviewer: clarify the question as "how do you show that you support this party?" Have you done any one of the following activities for this or any other political party?* **More than one response is appropriate for this item**].

A. No, I did not support them in any other way
B. Demonstrated [1=Yes; 0=No]
C. Attended a political rally hosted by this political party [1=Yes; 0=No]
D. Made financial donations to this particular political party [1=Yes; 0=No]
E. I voted for them [1=Yes; 0=No]
F. I support them emotionally, hoping they win elections.
G. Other form of support_____
H. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data

Item 6. Did this or any other political party contact you to vote for them or support them by other means during the elections of 2005?

1. Yes I was contacted by this political party to vote for them or support them during the elections of 2005
2. No, another political party contacted me to vote or support them during the elections of 2005. Name different political party here_____
3. No political party contacted me to vote or support them during the elections of 2005
4. I cannot recall if any political party contacted me during the elections of 2005
5. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data

Item 7. Do you feel "very close," "somewhat close" or "not very close" to the political party you voted for in the legislative elections of 2005?

1. Very Close
2. Somewhat Close
3. Not very Close
4. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data

Item 8. Why did you vote for this particular political party in the legislative elections of 2005? [*Interviewer, initially, do not prompt. Code from responses. However, if respondent is unsure, gently prod using the following choices. Ask them by reading out the following response options to them, "You voted for this particular party because...?"*] **More than one response is appropriate.**

A. They are the party representing the interests of my ethnic group
   [1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree.]
B. They are the party that will best unite the country and sustain peace
   [1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree.]
C. The are the party representing the interests of my region [1=strongly
   agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree.]
D. The are the party that are most likely to develop the country by building
   roads, clinics and bringing electricity to the whole country [1=strongly
   agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree.]
E. They are the party that represents the interests of my religion [1=strongly
   agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree.]
F. They are the party of the young generation [1=strongly agree; 2=agree;
   3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree.]
G. I don't have any reason, I just voted for them [1=strongly agree; 2=agree;
   3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree.]
H. They are the party of the "big person," national personality or most
   important politician from our area or county [1=strongly agree; 2=agree;
   3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree.]
I. Other _____
J. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data

Item 9. [*Interviewer, if respondent selected option B for Item 8, then ask them this question. If not, move on to the next Item.*] If the elections of 2005 were not a post-conflict election and peace was not an issue, would you have still voted for this party that you voted for?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data

Item 10. When you vote, what matters to you most, the political party itself or the leader of the party?

1. The political party matters to me more than the leader of the party
2. The leader of the party matters to me more than the political party itself
3. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data

Item 11. In your opinion, where the last presidential and National Assembly elections free and fair?

1. Yes, the last elections were free and fair
2. No, the last elections were not free and fair
3. I don't know/cannot tell
4. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data

Item 12. [*Interviewer: Ask this question only if answer to Item 11 was "No."*] Why do you say the last elections were not free and fair? This is an open-ended response. Please do not code.

_____

_____

_____

_____

Item 13. Did you accept the outcome of the last elections for president and National Assembly?

1. Yes, I accepted the outcome of the last elections
2. No, I did not accept the outcome of the last elections
3. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data

Item 14. [*Interviewer: ask this question only if response to Item 13 is "No." This is an open-ended response*] If you did not accept the outcome of the last election, is there anything you plan to do about it? What are you most likely to do to ensure a fair outcome next election?

_____

_____

_____

_____

Item 15. Do you think anything can and should be done to ensure a fair outcome next time?

1. Yes, something can be done to ensure the elections are free and fair next time
2. No, nothing can be done to ensure that the elections are free and fair next time

3. I don't know what can be done to ensure that the elections are free and fair next time
4. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data

Item 16. [*Interviewer: If answer is "yes" to Item 15 then probe respondent some more and ask the following*] "What is that thing you feel should be done next time to ensure a fair outcome?" *This is an open-ended response question. If answer to Item 15 was "No" then please skip to the next item.*]

_____

_____

_____

_____

Item 17. Besides the political party that you voted for in the elections for National Assembly in 2005, is there any other political party that you feel close to? [*Interviewer, prompt respondent along the lines "what could be a substitute political party if the political party you first selected were not around, or did not exist? Do not read options out to respondent, please code from response*].

1. All Liberia Coalition Party (ALCOP)
2. Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
3. Freedom Alliance Party of Liberia (FAPL)
4. Freedom Democratic Party (FDP)
5. Liberian Action Party/ Coalition for the Transformation of Liberia (LAP/COTOL)
6. Liberian Destiny Party (LDP)
7. Liberia Equal Rights Party (LERP)
8. Liberia National Union/United Democratic Alliance (LINU/UDA)
9. Liberty Party (LP)
10. Labor Party of Liberia (LPL)
11. Liberian People's Party/Alliance for Peace and Democracy (LPP/APD)
12. National Vision Party of Liberia (NATVIPOL)
13. New Deal Movement (NDM)
14. National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
15. National Party of Liberia (NPL)
16. National Patriotic Party (NPP)
17. National Reformation Party (NRP)
18. Progressive Democratic Party (PRODEM)
19. Reformed United Liberian Party (RULP)
20. Samuel Raymond Divine, Sr. (Independent)
21. Union of Liberian Democrats (ULD)
22. Unity Party (UP)

386

23. No, I do not feel close to any other political party

99. Missing Data

Item 18. Why is this second party your party of choice following your first choice? [*Interviewer: If respondent selects a second choice of political party, ask them this question but do not prompt code from responses. If they do not have a second choice of political party, skip to the next Item.*]

    A. They also represent the interests of my ethnic group [1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree]
    B. They also represent the interests of my region [1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree]
    C. They have the second best proposals for bringing economic development to Liberia [1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree]
    D. They are the second party that is most likely to bring peace to Liberia [1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree]
    E. Other reason: _____
    F. Refused to answer
    9. Missing Data

Transition [To the interviewer]: **Now we are going to move on and talk about your opinions on various issues today. I am going to ask you questions about how you feel about these issues today.**

Item 19. There are so many personalities/national figures, call them big names or "big persons," in Liberian politics today. I am going to name several of them, some of whom were also candidates in the last elections. Please let me know how close you feel to any one of them. [*Interviewer: More than one response is appropriate for this Item.*]

    A. Mr. Milton Nathaniel Barnes. 1=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close; 9=no response
    B. Mr. Charles Walker Brumskine. 1=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close; 9=no response
    C. Mr. Sekou Damate Conneh. 1=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close; 9=no response
    D. Mr. Samuel Raymond Divine Sr. 1=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close; 9=no response
    E. Mr. David M. Farhat. 1=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close; 9=no response

F. Mr. Armah Zolu Jallah. 1=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close; 9=no response

G. Madam Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. 1=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close; 9=no response

H. Mr. George Momodu Kiadii. 1=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close; 9=no response

I. Mr. George Klay Kieh, Jr. 1=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close; 9=no response.

J. Mr. Joseph D.Z. Korto. 1=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close; 9=no response

K. Mr. Robert Momo Kpoto. 1=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close; 9=no response

L. Mr. Alhaji G.V. Kromah. 1=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close; 9=no response

M. Mr. Roland Chris Yarkpah Massaquoi. 1=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close; 9=no response.

N. Mr. John Sembe Morlu. 1=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close; 9=no response

O. Bishop Alfred Garpee Reeves. 1=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close; 9=no response.

P. Mr. Harry Varney Gboto-Nambi Sherman. 1=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close; 9=no response.

Q. Mr. Togba-Nah Tipoteh. 1=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close; 9=no response.

R. Mrs. Margaret J. Tor-Thompson. 1=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close; 9=no response.

S. Mr. Winston A. Tubman. 1=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close; 9=no response.

T. Mr. William Vacanarat Shadrach Tubman. 1=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close; 9=no response.

U. Mr. George Manneh Weah. 1=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close; 9=no response.

V. Mr. Joseph Mamadee Woah-Tee. 1=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close; 9=no response.

W. Other. Please name_____1=very close; 2=somewhat close; 3=not close; 9=no response

Item 20. Why do you feel close to this particular personality/national figure or "big person?" in Liberian politics and not to the others listed? [*Interviewer: if the respondent indicates that they feel close to more than one "big person," please rephrase the question and ask them why do they feel close to the names they have listed and not others. Do not prompt for answers. This is an open-ended response.* Will Code later.]

1.

2. Don't know/cannot say

9. Missing Data

Item 21. How likely is it today that you can cast a vote for someone from a different ethnic group if you feel that person is the right person for the job?

1. Highly likely
2. Likely
3. Unlikely
4. Very unlikely
9. No response

Item 22. Have you heard of the word "democracy" before?

0=No

1=Yes

9=No Response.

Item 23. If "yes" to Item 22, what, if anything, does the word 'democracy" mean to you? [*Interviewer: do not prompt. Accept up to three responses and ask respondents to list responses in order of importance. Rank order the responses below accordingly. From 1=most important; 2=very important; 3=important.*] **If answer to Item 23 was "no," skip the following Items and move on to Item 28.**

1.

2.

3.

9. Missing Data.

Item 24. Which of these statements is closest to your own opinion? [*Interviewer: Read out statements. Only one option to be chosen.*]

1. *Statement A*: For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have.
2. *Statement B*: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable.
3. A democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.
4. I don't have an answer
9. Missing Data

Item 25. In your opinion how democratic is Liberia today? [*Read out options. Accept only one option*]

1. Not very democratic
2. Somewhat democratic
3. Highly democratic
4. Do not understand this question/do not understand what degree of "democracy" exists in Liberia
9. Missing Data

Item 26. How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Liberia? Are you: [*Interviewer: Read out options. Only one option to be chosen.*]

1. Liberia is not a democracy
2. Not at all satisfied
3. Not very satisfied
4. Fairly satisfied
5. Very satisfied
9. Missing Data

Item 27. In your opinion, how likely is it that Liberia will remain a democratic country?

1. Liberia is not a democracy [Do not read.]
2. Not at all likely
3. Not very likely
4. Likely
5. Very likely
6. Don't know [Do not read.]
9. Missing data

Item 28. What do you think are the most important problems or issues facing Liberia today? [*Interviewer: rank order responses from "1=the most important problems or issues facing Liberia today are ..." down through the least important issue. Allow up to five responses.*]

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6. Liberia is just fine. There are no important problems or issues facing the country.

7. Refused to answer

9. Missing Data

Item 29. What are the most important problems or issues facing YOU today?

[*Interviewer: again, rank order responses from "1=the most important problems or issues facing me today are ..." down through the least important problem or issue. Allow up to five responses.*]

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6. Refused to answer

9. Missing data

Item 30. What political party or political parties do you think can best resolve the problems and issues facing you today that you have just mentioned? [*Interviewer: do not prompt, code from responses*].

1.

2.

3.

4. Refused to answer

9. Missing Data

Item 31. Can you recall if that is the reason why you voted for this party in the National Assembly elections of 2005? [*Interviewer: do not prompt for answers, code from responses*]

1. Yes, that is the reason
2. No, I did not vote for them to resolve the problems and issues facing me, I voted for them just because they are the party of my ethnic group
3. No, at the time I voted for another political party. Which one _____
4. I did not vote in the elections of 2005
5. Refused to answer
9. Missing data

Item 32. In general, how do rate your living conditions compared to those of other Liberians? [*Interviewer: Please read out response options.*]

1. Much worse
2. Worse
3. Same
4. Better
5. Much Better
6. Don't Know
9. Missing Data.

Item 33. What tribe do you consider yourself to be a part of? [*Interviewer; prompt if necessary: You know, your ethnic or cultural group or the group that you most identify with. Do NOT read options. Code from response*]

1. Bassa=1
2. Bella=2
3. Dei=3
4. Gbandi=4
5. Gio=5
6. Gola=6
7. Grebo=7
8. Kissi=8
9. Kpelle=9
10. Krim=10
11. Kru=11
12. Loma=12
13. Mandingo=13
14. Mano=14
15. Mende=15
16. Vai=16
17. Other=17 [Specify_____]
18. Refused to answer=18
19. I consider myself just a Liberian and not part of any particular tribe or ethnic group
99. Missing Data

Item 34. Why do you consider yourself a part of this PARTICULAR tribe or ethnic group and not any other tribe or ethnic group? [*Interviewer: this is an open-ended response*]

_____

_____

_____

Item 35. Think about the condition of _____ [**Fill in the respondent's ethnic group in the blank space.**] *If respondent did not identify any group on Item 33, or if they chose "20=I consider myself just a Liberian and not part of any particular tribe or ethnic group," or "99=missing data," then mark "7=Not Applicable," and move on to the next Item.*

    A. Are their economic conditions worse, the same as or better than other groups in this country? 5=Much worse; 4=Worse; 3=same; 2=better; 1=much better; 7=not applicable; 8=Don't know/can't tell; 9=No response.

    B. Do they have less, the same, or more influence in politics than other groups in this country? 5=much less; 4=less; 3=same; 2=more; 1=much more; 7=not applicable; 8=don't know/can't tell; 9=no response.

Item 36. Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a Liberian and being a_____[**Enter respondent's ethnic group in the blank space**]. *Which of the following statements best expresses your feelings? If respondent did not identify any group on Item 33, or if they chose "20=I consider myself just a Liberian and not part of any particular tribe or ethnic group," or "99=Missing Data," then mark "7=Not Applicable," and move on to the next Item.*

    1. I feel only_____[Insert Respondent's Ethnic group].
    2. I feel more _____[Insert Respondent's ethnic group] than Liberian.
    3. I feel equally Liberian and _____[Insert Respondent's ethnic group]
    4. I feel more Liberian than_____[Insert Respondent's ethnic group]
    5. I feel only Liberian.
    7. Not Applicable

    9. Missing Data

Item 37. Let's turn to your views on your fellow citizens. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you must be very careful in dealing with people?

1. You must be very careful
2. Most people can be trusted
9. Missing Data

Item 38. How much do you trust each of the following types of people?

    A. Your relatives. 0=Not at all; 1=Just a little; 2=I trust them somewhat; 3=I trust them a lot; 9=Missing response.

    B. Your neighbors. 0=Not at all; 1=Just a little; 2=I trust them somewhat; 3=I trust them a lot; 9=Missing response.

    C. People from your own ethnic group [or tribe]. 0=Not at all; 1=Just a little; 2=I trust them somewhat; 3=I trust them a lot; 9=Missing response

    D. Liberians from other ethnic groups. 0=Not at all; 1=Just a little; 2=I trust them somewhat; 3=I trust them a lot; 9=Missing response

    E. Foreign citizens that you know of living in this country 0=Not at all; 1=Just a little; 2=I trust them somewhat; 3=I trust them a lot; 9=Missing response

    9. Missing Data

Item 39. How often are _____s [**Enter Respondent's ethnic group in the blank space**] treated unfairly by the government? *If respondent did not identify any group on Item 33, or if they chose "20=I consider myself just a Liberians and not part of any particular tribe or ethnic group," or "99=No response," then mark "7=Not Applicable," and move on to the next Item.*

1. Never
2. Sometimes
3. Often
4. Always
5. Not Applicable
9. Missing Data

Item 40. Let's talk for a moment about the kind of society we would like to have in this country. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose statement A or Statement B. [*Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion. Do you agree or agree very strongly?*]

Statement A. As citizens, we should be more active in questioning the actions of our leaders. 1=agree very strongly with A; 2=agree with A.

Statement B. In our country these days, we should show more respect for authority.

> 3=agree with B; 4=agree strongly with B; 5=agree with neither;
> 9=no response.

Item 41. Let's talk about some expectations of leadership in this country today. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose statement A or Statement B. [*Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion. Do you agree or agree very strongly?*]

Statement A. Since our leaders represent everyone, they should not favor their own family or group. 1=agree very strongly with A; 2=agree with A.

Statement B. Once in office, leaders are obliged to help their home community.

3=agree with B; 4=agree strongly with B; 5=agree with neither; 9=no response.

Item 42. Now I am going to read out a list of groups that people voluntarily join or attend. For each one, could you tell me how likely you are to join that particular group with individuals from other ethnic groups? [*Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion. Are you very likely, likely, unlikely or very unlikely?*]

- A. A religious group (e.g. church, mosque). 1=very likely; 2=likely; 3=unlikely; 4=very unlikely; 9=no response.
- B. A trade union or farmers association. 1=very likely; 2=likely; 3=unlikely; 4=very unlikely; 9=no response.
- C. A professional or business association. 1=very likely; 2=likely; 3=unlikely; 4=very unlikely; 9=no response.
- D. A political party. 1=very likely; 2=likely; 3=unlikely; 4=very unlikely; 9=no response.
- E. A community development, neighborhood association or self-help association. 1=very likely; 2=likely; 3=unlikely; 4=very unlikely; 9=no response.
- 9. Missing Data

Item 43. During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about some important problem or to give them your views? [*Read out options*].

A. A local government councilor. 0=Never; 1=only once; 2=a few times; 3=often; 9=no response.
B. A member of the national Senate or House. 0=Never; 1=only once; 2=a few times; 3=often; 9=no response.
C. An official of a government ministry. 0=Never; 1=only once; 2=a few times; 3=often; 9=no response.
D. A political party official. 0=Never; 1=only once; 2=a few times; 3=often; 9=no response.
E. A religious leader. 0=Never; 1=only once; 2=a few times; 3=often; 9=no response.
F. A traditional ruler. 0=Never; 1=only once; 2=a few times; 3=often; 9=no response.
G. Some other influential person (prompt if necessary: you know, someone with more money or power than you who can speak on your behalf.) 0=Never; 1=only once; 2=a few times; 3=often; 9=no response.

Item 44. Think of the last time you contacted any of the above leaders. Was the main reason to: [*Read out options. If respondent answered "0=Never" for all parts of Item 55, i.e. they NEVER contacted any leader, circle code "7=Not applicable" for this Item.*]

1. Tell them about your own personal problems?

2. Tell them about a community or public problem?

3. Give them your view on some political issue?

4. Something else? Do you mind telling us? _____

7. Not applicable, i.e., did not contact any leader

9. Missing Data.

Item 45. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B. [Interviewer: probe for the strength of opinion. Do you agree or agree very strongly?]

Statement A: We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open and honest elections. 1=agree very strongly with A; 2=agree with A.

Statement B: Since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other methods for choosing this country's leaders.3=agree with B; 4=agree very strongly with B; 5=Agree with neither; 9=missing response.

Item 46. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B. [*Interviewer: probe for the strength of opinion. Do you agree or agree very strongly?*]

Statement A: Political Parties create division and confusion; it is therefore unnecessary to have many political parties in Liberia. 1=agree very strongly with A; 2=agree with A.

Statement B: Many political parties are needed to make sure that Liberians have real choices in who governs them. 3=agree with B; 4=agree very strongly with B; 5=Agree with neither; 9=missing response.

Item 47. What political party will you vote for in the next elections? [*Interviewer: do not prompt. Code from responses.*]

1. I will vote for the _____ in the next elections.

2. I have not made a decision yet about what political party to vote for in the next elections.

3. I do not intend to vote in the next elections.

9. No response

Item 48. [*If response to Item 47 is "1," ask this question, if not skip to the next Item.*] Why will you vote for this particular political party in the next elections and not any other?

1. They are the party of my tribe or ethnic group [1=agree very strongly; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=disagree very strongly]
2. They are the party that are most competent to run the country [1=agree very strongly; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=disagree very strongly]
3. Other. (Please Indicate) _____ [1=agree very strongly; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=disagree very strongly]
4. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data

Item 49. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B. [*Interviewer: probe for strength of opinion. Do you agree or agree very strongly?*]

Statement A: It is important to obey the government in power no matter whom you voted for. 1=agree very strongly with A; 2=agree with A.

Statement B: It is not necessary to obey the laws of a government that I did not vote for. 3=agree with B; 4=agree very strongly with B; 5=Agree with neither; 9=missing response.

Item 50. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B.

Statement A: It is better to find lawful solutions to problems even if it takes longer. 1=agree very strongly with A; 2=agree with A

Statement B: It is sometimes better to ignore the law and solve problems immediately using other means. 3=agree with B; 4=agree very strongly with B; 5=Agree with neither; 9=missing response.

Item 51. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B.

Statement A: The use of violence is never justified in Liberian politics today. 1=agree very strongly with A; 2=agree with A

Statement B: In this country, it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause. 3=agree with B; 4=agree very strongly with B; 5=Agree with neither; 9=missing response

Item 52. In this country, how often: [Please *read out options*]

    A. Do people have to be careful about what they say about politics?
3=always; 2=often; 1=rarely; 0=never; 9=no response.

    B. Does competition between political parties lead to violent conflict?
3=always; 2=often; 1=rarely; 0=never; 9=no response.

    C. Are people treated equally under the law? 3=always; 2=often; 1=rarely;
0=never; 9=no response.

Item 53. Now let's speak about the performance of the present government of this country. How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say? [*Interviewer: Please probe for strength of opinion.*]

    a. Managing the economy. 1=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well; 4=very well; 9=no response

    b. Creating jobs. 1=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well; 4=very well; 9=no response

    c. Keeping prices stable. 1=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well; 4=very well; 9=no response

    d. Narrowing gaps between rich and poor. 1=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well; 4=very well; 9=no response

    e. Reducing crime. 1=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well; 4=very well; 9=no response

    f. Improving basic health services. 1=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well; 4=very well; 9=no response

    g. Addressing educational needs. 1=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well; 4=very well; 9=no response

    h. Delivering household water. 1=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well; 4=very well; 9=no response

    i. Ensuring everyone has enough to eat. 1=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well; 4=very well; 9=no response

    j. Fighting corruption in government. 1=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well; 4=very well; 9=no response

    k. Uniting the country following the civil war. 1=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well; 4=very well; 9=no response

    l. Combating HIV/AIDS. 1=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well; 4=very well; 9=no response

    m. Solving other problems that you know of besides those listed here. 1=very badly; 2=fairly badly; 3=fairly well; 4=very well; 9=no response

Item 54. [*Interviewer: Depending on the region this particular interview in question is taking place; ask the interviewee this question with reference to the regions where the interview is evidently not taking place. For example, if you are in the eastern region of*

the country, ask the respondent about travel to the western, southern, or northern region.] Have you ever traveled to the _____ _____ _____ regions of this country?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Refused to answer
9. No answer

Item 55. [*If answer to Item 54 is "yes," ask this question; if not skip to the next Item.*] How often do you travel to other regions of the country?

1. Very often (more than twice a year)
2. Often (at least twice a year)
3. Hardly ever (have visited once or twice but hardly ever leave my region)
4. Never
9. Missing Data

Item 56. Did you join any armed faction during the civil war?

1. No
2. Yes
3. Refused to answer this question.
9. No response

Item 57. If "yes" to the previous Item, then ask this Item. If "no," then skip and move on to the next Item. What armed faction did you join during the civil war? [*Interviewer: Please read out response options and code accordingly.*]

1. Armed Forces of Liberia –AFL
2. Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia –INPFL of Prince Johnson
3. Liberia Peace Council
4. National Patriotic Front of Liberia -NPFL
5. United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia-J: ULIMO J
6. United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia-K: ULIMO K
7. I did not join any armed faction during the civil war
9. Missing Data.

Item 58. If respondent indicated an armed faction that they fought for during the civil war, ask them; why did you join this particular faction and not others during the civil war? [*This is an open-ended response. Will code later.*]

_____

_____

_____

Part 3. Demographic Information (2)

Item 59. What is your main occupation? What is the major source of the income you depend upon to survive? (If currently unemployed, retired, or disabled, what was the respondent's last main occupation?) [*Do not read options out to the respondent. Please code from responses.*]

Agrarian
1. Subsistence farmer (produces only for home consumption).
2. Peasant Farmer (produces both for own consumption and some surplus produce for sale).
3. Commercial Farmer (produces mainly for sale).
4. Farm Worker

Worker
5. Fisherman
6. Trader/Hawker/Vendor
7. Miner (diamond, gold, rutile)
8. Domestic Worker/Maid/House help
9. Armed Services/Police/Security Personnel
10. Artisan/skilled manual worker in the formal sector
11. Artisan/skilled manual worker in the formal sector
12. Clerical Worker
13. Unskilled manual worker in the formal sector
14. Unskilled manual worker in the informal sector

Professional
15. Businessperson (works in company for others)
16. Businessperson (owns small business of less than 10 employees)
17. Businessperson (owns large business of 10 or more employees)
18. Professional worker (e.g., doctor, lawyer, accountant, nurse, engineer etc).
19. Supervisors/Foreman
20. Teacher

21. Government Worker
22. Retail worker
23. Works for a local nongovernmental organization
24. Works for an international nongovernmental organization

Other
25. Student
26. Housewife/Works in the Household
27. Other (specify): _____
28. Unemployed
99. Don't know (Did not respond)

Item 60. [Education] what is your highest level of education?

1.   Illiterate (cannot both read or write)
2.   High School education only
3.   Up to secondary school education but did not continue after
4.   Technical College/Teachers College
5.   University education [University of Liberia; Cuttington University]
6.   Received higher education in a Western country. Please list country
     here_____.
7.   Refused to answer
9.   Missing Data

Item 61. What is the respondent's social class? [*Interviewer deduces the respondent's*

social class with reference to responses to Item 6 above]

1.   1.Peasant [*please include in this class*: small agricultural producers producing
     largely for their own consumption, subsistence farmers, peasant farmers].
2.   Proletariat [*please include in this class*: wage earners, landless rural laborers,
     urban laborers in industry, mining, transport, farm worker, domestic
     worker/maid/house help, clerical worker].
3.   Informal sector entrepreneurs or lumpenproletariat [*please include in this class*:
     both licensed and illegal street vendors, money changers/lenders and petty
     thieves, the homeless living in the cities].
4.   Petty bourgeoisie [*please include in this class*: teachers, lower ranks of the
     military and police services, lower ranks of public service, small traders]
5.   Traditional rulers [*please include in this class*: clan heads, chiefs, paramount
     chiefs, emirs, monarchs]
6.   Commercial bourgeoisie [*please include in this class*: commercial farmers,
     businesspersons owning large businesses of 10 or more employees, and land
     owners]
7.   Bureaucratic bourgeoisie [*please include in this class*: government ministers,
     higher rank bureaucrats and senior military and police officers, largely urban-
     based].
8.   Other [specify]: _____
9.   Don't know/ could not deduce: _____

Item 62. What is your religion, if any?

1. Christian [*Interviewer: Please Include in this category all Protestants (mainstream and Evangelical Pentecostals); Catholics; Jehovah's Witnesses; Seventh Day Adventists; and African Independent Churches.*]
2. Muslim [*Interviewer: Please include in this category all sects-Sunni, Shiite etc.*]
3. Traditional African religions
4. I do not have a religion
5. Other [specify_____]
9. Missing Data

Item 63. Which of these things do you personally own or have access to in your home?

1. Radio
2. Television
3. Book, you know, a reading book
4. Bicycle
5. Motorcycle
6. Motor vehicle/car
7. Cell phone
8. Do not own any of these
9. Missing Data

Item 64. How often do you get news from the following sources? [*Interviewer: Please read out options and code appropriately.*]

A. Radio. 4=Everyday; 3=A few times a week; 2=A few times a month; 1=Less than once a month;

0=Never; 9=No response

B. Television. 4=Everyday; 3=A few times a week; 2=A few times a month; 1=Less than once a month; 0=Never; 9=No response

C. Newspapers. 4=Everyday; 3=A few times a week; 2=A few times a month; 1=Less than once a month; 0=Never; 9=No response

D. Other. Please state. _____ 4=Everyday; 3=A few times a week; 2=A few times a month; 1=Less than once a month; 0=Never; 9=No response

Item 65. How interested are you in public affairs? [*Interviewer: Prompt if necessary: You Know, in politics and government?*]

1. Very Interested
2. Somewhat Interested
3. Not very interested
4. Not at all interested
5. Missing Data

Here, we are going to move on talk about the second round of presidential elections in December of 2005. Some of the details may or may not have been lost on the respondents. Please let the respondent know that they should feel very comfortable to ask to skip questions that they cannot recall answers to. Thank you!

Item 66. Did you vote in the runoff elections for President between George Weah and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf?

1. Yes, I voted in the runoff elections
2. No, I did not vote in the runoff elections
3. I cannot remember whether I voted in the runoff elections
4. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data

Item 67. [*Interviewer: If the answer is "yes," then ask this next question.*] Who did you vote for in the runoff elections for president?

1. Voted for George Weah
2. Voted for Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf
3. Cannot recall who I voted for
4. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data

Item 68. Was this the same individual that you voted for president during the first round of presidential elections?

1. Yes, this was who I voted for in the first round of elections
2. No, I did not vote for this individual during the first round of elections
3. I cannot recall
4. Refused to answer
9. Missing Data

Item 69. If answer to Item 68 is "No," why did you switch your vote to this individual?

1. My initial choice on the first round was no longer on the ballot
2. I was told by the elders of my political Party to vote for this choice of candidate in the runoff
3. This candidate is from my ethnic group
4. This is candidate is most competent to bring Liberia out of the current crises
5. Refused to answer
6. No Response

Item 70. What do you think of the indictment of Charles Taylor by the U.N. Special Court for Sierra Leone? [*This is an open-ended question. Please allow the respondent to tell you what they think*].

_____

_____

_____

We want to thank you for taking the time to respond to these questions for us. The results of this study will be available in a few months time, are you interested in seeing the final results of the study? [Interviewer: if respondent is interested in seeing the result of this study, please give them my contact address.]

End Interview

To the Interviewer: Please do not forget to complete the following sections.

Item 71: What proportion of the questions do you feel the respondent had difficulty answering?

0. None

1. Few

2. Some

3. Most

4. All

Item 72. Which questions did the respondents have trouble answering? [Identify up to three.]

1.

2.

3.

Item 73. What was the respondent's attitude towards you during the interview?

    A. Was she or he…1=friendly; 2=in between; 3=hostile?
    B. Was she or he…1=interested; 2=in between; 3=bored?
    C. Was she or he…1=cooperative; 2=in between; 3=uncooperative?
    D. Was she or he…1=patient; 2=in between; 3=impatient?
    E. Was he or she…1=at ease; 2=in between; 3=suspicious?
    F. Was he or she…1=honest; 2=in between; 3=misleading?

Item 74. Do you have any other comments on the interview? For example, did anything else significant happen during the interview?

    2. No
    3. Yes. Please
        Explain_____

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426

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Interview with Mr. Alpha Kanu. Thursday, October 19, 2006 at 11 a.m. Freetown, Sierra Leone.

Interview with Dr. Mohamed Dabo. Thursday, November 9, 2006 at 5:30 p.m. Freetown, Sierra Leone.

Interview with Dr. Charles Clarke. Tuesday, December 19, 2006 at 1:45 p.m. Monrovia, Liberia.