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Life and Local Administration on Fifteenth Century Genoese Chios

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LIFE AND LOCAL ADMINISTRATION ON FIFTEENTH CENTURY
GENOESE CHIOS

by
Brian Nathaniel Becker

A Dissertation
Submitted to the
Faculty of The Graduate College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Department of History
Advisor: Larry J. Simon, Ph.D.

Western Michigan University
Kalamazoo, Michigan
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LIFE AND LOCAL ADMINISTRATION ON FIFTEENTH CENTURY GENOese CHIOS

Brian Nathaniel Becker, Ph.D.
Western Michigan University, 2010

This dissertation combines a comparative analysis of the colonial administrations of Genoese Chios (1346-1566) and Venetian Crete (1211-1669) with an examination of the internal dynamics of Chian society under Genoese rule. It asks how society functioned on Chios and what role the ruling Genoese Mahona, or association of ship owners involved in the conquest, played in its construction. This study demonstrates, on the one hand, how often a colonial administration lacking strong direction from its home state, as was the case with the Mahona, crossed various constructed boundaries to establish mixed relationships with other states and also the island’s indigenous Greek and Jewish inhabitants. These relationships were then used to sustain Genoese rule and to govern the island more effectively, which is in sharp contrast to the colonial government of Venetian Crete, whose institutions were established in emulation of Venice itself. This
different approach to colonial administration, in which Venice frequently intervened and also closely supervised, resulted in a much less flexible, integrative and adaptive regime on Crete. The dissertation also demonstrates, however, that in the private sphere of life on Chios the only way to maintain authority was to avoid the transgression of certain boundaries. The preservation of strong bonds, both within and between core Genoese family units on the island, not only facilitated the Mahona’s governance of Chios, but was also symptomatic of Genoa’s almost complete absence from the processes of administration there. Considering that the elite Genoese families were responsible for the governance of the island, it was important to keep these household units as strong and distinct as possible.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The act of writing a dissertation is, by necessity, the task of individual students, but fortunately the process allows those students to benefit from the insight, experience, and direction of many people along the way. I owe my deepest gratitude to my committee chair, Larry J. Simon, whose enthusiasm for and support of my work I have enjoyed for the entirety of my graduate career at Western Michigan University. His knowledge of medieval Mediterranean history, as well as his assistance and instruction at multiple Florentine archives, were invaluable resources for me while I worked on my master’s thesis. He has furthermore been an ideal doctoral mentor, helping me to find sources of funding for both my dissertation research and writing, as well as encouraging me throughout a degree program which at times seemed interminable. He has also been forever vigilant in pushing me towards both more precise and well-thought-out arguments, as well as clearer written expression. Yet, I can honestly say that I have probably learned as much from Dr. Simon outside of the university setting as inside, whether the day’s lesson came in the form of a Tuesday night Rock-Ola session at The Corner Bar or a watching of
the day’s Tour de France recap at my house with the aid of my wife’s famous enchiladas. I thus have the honor of counting him as not only my advisor, but also my friend.

I am greatly indebted to the members of my dissertation committee, Dimiter Angelov, Steven A. Epstein, and James Palmitessa, who have generously given their time and expertise to better my work. They have all been a constant source of support, advice, and intellectual challenge.

I have also benefited from the support of a number of institutions and individuals during the course of this project. The Institute of International Education, in conjunction with the Commissione per gli Scambi Culturali fra l'Italia e gli Stati Uniti, provided financial support in the form of a 2005-2006 Fulbright Fellowship for one year of research in the Genoese State Archives, while Western Michigan University's Graduate College facilitated the dissertation writing process with a dissertation completion fellowship. I was fortunate to have a network of friends and colleagues in Genoa, whose support and encouragement made my time there both productive and amusing. I would especially like to acknowledge a fellow Fulbrighter, Dryden Hull, with whom I shared a rather unconventional apartment on Genoa’s Salita San Leonardo.
Acknowledgments—continued

It was his good cheer that made the apartment's infestation of scorpions and many a lengthy dinner with our unhinged landlady much more bearable.

I would finally like to express my heartfelt appreciation to my family and friends, who have been unfailing sources of support throughout my degree programs. The antics of my brothers, Mike and Phil Becker, were welcome distractions from the rigors of graduate school. I cannot adequately thank my parents, Ron and Jana Becker, for their constant and unconditional support in countless ways over the years, and even though our family lost my father twelve years ago, he is still very much with us in spirit. Final thanks go to my wife, Rachel, whose unending patience and encouragement were invaluable to me as I shut myself away to write what, as it grew ever-larger, we began to refer to lovingly as "the doorstop." Her good humor, moral support, and belief in me made a lengthy and, at times, tedious writing process seem just a little less onerous.

Brian Nathaniel Becker
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLE</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOREWARD</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. CHIOS IN THE CONTEXT OF GENOESE EXPLORATION AND EXPANSION IN THE MEDIEVAL MEDITERRANEAN</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Explosion: Genoese Establishments in the Levant during and after the First Crusade (c. 1050-1150)</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New and Old Opportunities: Early Commercial Expansion into Byzantium and the Contraction of Commercial Opportunities in the Holy Land (c. 1150-1291)</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reversal of Fortune in the East: The Treaty of Nymphaeum and Reestablishment of the Byzantine Empire (c. 1204-1261)</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastward Expansion and the Establishment of Permanent Settlements in the East (1261- c. 1300)</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expansion in the Aegean Sea, Privatization of Colonial Administration, and the Decline of Activity in the Eastern Mediterranean (c. 1304-1566)</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. A TALE OF TWO CITIES: THE STABILITY OF THE VENETIAN AND GENOESE STATES IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES (c. 1100-1500)</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venice</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genoa</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. MONOPOLIZATION VS. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY: Differing Approaches</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to the Administration of Venetian Crete and Genoese Chios</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures of Authority</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Role of the Governed in Governing</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Island, Three Rites: The Coexistence of Latins, Greeks, and Jews</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. PRESERVING THE PATRIMONY WHILE INTER VIVOS ON CHIOS</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Constitution of the Household</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Age of Majority and the Emancipation of Minors</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Marriage of Daughters</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. PRESERVING THE PATRIMONY POST MORTEM ON CHIOS</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inheritance and Genoese Law</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Dowry</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal Heirs</td>
<td>393</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER

Conclusions ........................................... 435

VI. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ............................. 441

APPENDICES

A. Concession of Age (Venia Aetatis) Granted on
   Genoese Chios, 1381-1461 ........................... 450

B. Boys Emancipated on Genoese Chios, 1403-1486 .... 453

C. A List of Dowries from Genoese Chios, 1394-1495
   ......................................................... 456

D. A List of Testaments from Genoese Chios, 1394-1499
   ......................................................... 466

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................. 486
LIST OF TABLES

1. Latins and Greeks in Defense-related occupations on Fourteenth-century Venetian Crete .............. 208

2. Latins, Greeks, and Jews in Defense-related occupations on Late Fourteenth- and Fifteenth-century Genoese Chios ........................................ 225
A Note on the Sources and Methodology

There are several goals that I wish to realize in the pages that follow. I would be gratified if this dissertation helps to draw an increased amount of scholarly attention to Genoese colonial efforts on the island of Chios. I do not mean to suggest that the study of Chios has been underrepresented in the long bibliography of studies focusing on Genoese expansion in the medieval Mediterranean world; this has most certainly not been the case. What I am suggesting, however, is that the pool of scholars with an interest in, as well as producing works about, Genoese Chios has traditionally been very small and specialized. This assertion may, in fact, even be considered by some to be an understatement, because, beyond a few isolated examples from North America, Italian scholars at the University of Genoa alone have carried out the vast majority of work done on the island. I am confident that, if those other scholars interested in the broad context of colonization were to explore the corpus of scholarship dedicated to Chios in more detail, they would be impressed both with what has been done and what there is left to do. The history of the Genoese on Chios holds the proverbial “something for
everyone." Those scholars interested in methods of colonial administration would be impressed with the novelty of the Mahona organized by the Commune of Genoa in conjunction with a set of 29 ship owners, who were involved in the re-conquest of the island in 1346. In addition to this, those scholars who study encounters between distinct cultural groups, wherever their place of occurrence, would be equally impressed with the opportunity Genoese Chios provides in this regard.

One of the objectives of this dissertation, as stated above, is to attract more scholarly attention to Genoese Chios. The execution of a lengthy research trip to the Genoese State Archives can be made quite difficult, considering the time constraints of a graduate student’s study schedule or that of a university professor saddled with a full teaching load. It is therefore necessary for the scholarly community to make as much of the documentary evidence surviving from the two Genoese tenures on Chios available to as many researchers as possible, wherever they happen to be. The logistics of providing a transcription of every new child emancipation document, will, or dowry contract that I use in the following pages proved to be too large of a project at the present time, but I have provided the reader with summaries of the contents of these documents
in the four Appendices at the end of this dissertation. In addition to this, I have tried as much as possible to reproduce faithfully the descriptors used by the people of fifteenth century Genoese Chios when they refer to both themselves and others. For example, when I discuss the will of Domina Petra I will supply, in addition to her name, the descriptors she uses to identify herself and those close to her, in this case, "filia quondam Petri Iustiniani et uxor Domini Pantaleonis Argenti quondam Iohannis," or "daughter of the late Pietro Giustiniani and wife of Lord Pantaleone Argenti of the late Giovanni." The inclusion of these terms is meant to aid the reader, and me, in keeping straight the myriad of names that will be introduced in the following pages. It is also meant to help clarify and specify the relationships between these parties; for example, if Petra's husband, Pantaleone, had been deceased at the time of this testament's redaction, notary Antonio Foglietta would have preceded his name with quondam, or used the term relicta to describe Petra, not uxor. In like manner, the notary used the term quondam to signify that Pantaleone was the son of the now deceased Giovanni. I have also, in order to avoid any uncertainty, left the descriptive terms in the original Latin; the point being to present the reader with the evidence in its original
In the event that the readers of this dissertation wish to examine the evidence for themselves, I have provided the most detailed references possible to any and all documents cited. It is my hope that scholars can use my references to trace with facility the cited documents back all the way back to their home in the Archivio di Stato di Genova. For easy reference, I have also provided in Appendices I, II, III, and IV, respectively, lists of every concession of age, child emancipation, dowry contract, and testament that I have been able to locate and analyze in my research. It is to these appendices that I refer in the footnotes when I cite the child’s name and the date of the concession of age or emancipation, dowered wife’s name and the date of the dowry contract, or the testator’s name and date of the testament, respectively.

There is one final thing to note regarding the dating of the documents. The Genoese reckoned the year as beginning with the nativity of Jesus, or the 25th of December, and ending on the 24th December of the following year. The week in between Christmas and New Year’s Day, therefore, was always considered part of the following year by the Genoese. That is to say that while we would render a document or act redacted on the 27th of December
as part of the current year, say 1453, the Genoese notary dated this act as the 27th of December 1454. In order to reconcile these two renderings of the same date, please note that in the pages that follow I have listed the affected dates as 1454/3, where the 1454 refers to the year as written in the original document, and 1453 refers to my reconciliation of that date with our own calendar.
INTRODUCTION

European expansion into the wider world of the Mediterranean was certainly not a new phenomenon in the Middle Ages. If, in fact, one looks to the Ancient World, he or she can see numerous small urban settlements surrounded by agricultural hinterlands, which were the product of Greek expansion into, among other places, Italy, southern France, Iberia, Asia Minor, and Egypt. The Romans who followed the Greeks were able to expand their possessions so successfully, stretching at their height from England to North Africa and from Iberia to the Levant, that they were completely justified in referring to the Mediterranean Sea as “mare nostrum,” or “Our Sea.” It was not until the end of the First Crusade (1095-99) and the subsequent foundation of European colonies in the Holy Land, however, that the term “colonization” began to acquire the meaning which it carries to the present day, that is, “conquest followed by exploitation.”¹ The economic exploitation of a conquered area by the conquerors will be the ultimate goal of colonization efforts well past the voyages of Christopher Columbus and into the so-called “Age of

Whatever the time and place, one of the questions with which conquerors were constantly concerned was: how do you maintain, or even increase, your hold on a territory once it has been conquered? The most famous political theorist of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Niccolò Machiavelli, proposed that “one of the best and most effective solutions would be for the conqueror(s) to go and reside there. This would make the possession more secure and enduring.”\(^2\) The wholesale relocation to a conquered region is, however, rarely feasible for a prince or governing body, so other solutions to this problem must be sought. In the end, no matter what a conqueror does to impose order upon, and create an enduring governmental administration for, a conquered territory, Machiavelli asserts that “Difficulties present themselves when one acquires regions in a province where the language, customs and institutions are different; in order to keep them, one must possess both great fortune and ability.”\(^3\) This is the situation faced by the Commune of Genoa upon their


\(^3\) Niccolò Machiavelli, *Il Principe*, ed. Piero Melograni (Milan: Bur, 1998), 54: “Ma, quando si acquista stati in una provincial disforme di lingua, di costume e di ordini, qui sono le difficoltà; e qui bisogna avere gran fortuna e grande industria a tenerli.”
acquisition of Chios, an island in the eastern Aegean Sea and a Genoese possession first from 1304-29 and then more securely from 1346-1566. Upon their acquisition of the island, the Genoese were confronted with a scenario much like the one Machiavelli described in *The Prince*; that is to say that Chios was not only physically distant, but also culturally distinct, from the home city of Genoa. The inhabitants of Chios spoke Greek, worshipped in the Greek Orthodox Church, and were governed by Byzantine laws, while the Genoese spoke both standard Italian and the local Genoese dialect, worshipped in the Latin Church, and were governed by Genoese laws.

The Genoese colony of Chios was located in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, which has traditionally been a place where religious, political and social fragmentation has put even the strongest structural and environmental units to the test. Fernand Braudel's Mediterranean was essentially a unified sea in the broadest of senses, and more recent scholars such as Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell have enthusiastically agreed with this vision.⁴ Those scholars who have examined specific locales within this Mediterranean environment, however, make it clear that any semblance of unity dissolves away

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in the face of multiple dividing lines between geographical regions, territories, and people. The definition, and also the self-definition, of one's identity was not a facile task in this environment, and this point has been made increasingly clear by the work of recent scholars such as Sally McKee, Cemal Kefadar and Steven A. Epstein. The reality of the medieval Mediterranean world was much more complex than Braudel had once supposed. Labels of identity and blocs of influence were not static and monolithic, but constantly being renegotiated. Answers to the questions of whom someone was, to which ethnic group, race, or nation he or she belonged were products of that person's situation and were always complex. The numerous constructed boundaries prevalent in the Middle Ages, such as color, religion, language, ethnicity, etc., were not insurmountable obstacles; the frequency with which these boundaries were created or defined was only surpassed by the rate at which people crossed them.

The political borders of the medieval eastern Mediterranean world were one of these many sets of

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boundaries permanently under construction. During the fifteenth century, the struggle for political authority was a contest in which a wide variety of social groups differing in ethnicity and religion participated.\(^6\) Beginning in the late eleventh century, the fervor of the First Crusade had brought untold thousands of western Europeans to the Holy Land, eventually leading to the foundation of the four Crusader States of Edessa, Antioch, Tripoli, and Jerusalem. Even though all remnants of these States would disappear by 1291, the Franks remained in the region long after this, both retaining various and sundry lordships in Greece, Cyprus, and Syria, as well as making an important contribution to the social makeup of the eastern Mediterranean.\(^7\) The Hospitallers military order, itself a product of the

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First Crusade, established a headquarters on the island of Rhodes beginning in the fourteenth century.\textsuperscript{8} The Catalan Grand Company, who at various times were raiders and merchants but were always adventurers, held parts of the Peloponnesus and also the city of Athens in the same century.\textsuperscript{9} On the Greek mainland and in the Balkans there were contestations over land between Hungarian and Angevin claimants. The Fourth Crusade and the later encroachments of the Ottoman Turks had greatly reduced the Byzantine sphere of influence in the eastern Mediterranean, but they would continue to constitute an important presence in the region until Constantinople finally falls to the Ottomans on May 29, 1453. The Ottomans may have seemed alarmingly dominant to some fifteenth century contemporaries, but they were at this time only one of several Muslim powers vying for control and influence in the eastern Mediterranean; in Anatolia, the Ottomans encountered the Safavids, and they competed with the Mamluks in Egypt.\textsuperscript{10} The contest for power and

\textsuperscript{8} The undisputed authority on the Hospitallers’ tenure of Rhodes is Anthony Luttrell. The following are just a sampling of his vast contribution to the field: The Hospitallers in Cyprus, Rhodes, Greece, and the West 1291-1440 (London: Variorum, 1978); The Hospitallers of Rhodes and their Mediterranean World (Brookfield: Ashgate Press, 1992); and The Hospitaller State on Rhodes and its Western Provinces, 1306-1462 (Brookfield: Ashgate Press, 1999).


\textsuperscript{10} For good syntheses of Ottoman expansion and the growth of their influence, see Kefadar, Between Two Worlds; Palmira Brummett, Ottoman
influence in the fifteenth century eastern Mediterranean was constantly being negotiated and renegotiated among numerous groups.

It was in this competitive Mediterranean environment that Genoa had been establishing merchant outposts for several centuries before the fifteenth. By the Late Middle Ages, in fact, Genoa had acquired a reputation for maritime power, having established these outposts stretching from one end of the Mediterranean to the other. Felipe Fernández-Armesto has commented on how appropriate it was that Genoa should come to be popularly represented in the Late Middle Ages as Janus, the double-faced Roman god of doors and beginnings. In Fernández-Armesto's estimation Genoa was a medieval Janus "facing east and west, towards the trade of the Levant, the Black Sea and the Orient, as well as towards the western Mediterranean, the Maghrib and the Iberian peninsula."\(^{11}\)

These centers of production and exchange, which constituted Genoese colonial efforts across the Mediterranean, do not make a strong case for the existence of a medieval "Genoese empire," especially when compared with the Republic of Venice, Genoa's Italian

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rival *par excellence*. Genoa's colonial outposts, in fact, lacked several of the most basic, characteristic features defining the "Venetian empire."\(^{12}\) First, there was very little centralized direction from the home administration in Genoa. Second, the vast majority of Genoa's holdings were not sovereign, meaning that they were not self-governing, independent entities conducting their affairs without undue external influence, i.e. local rulers. Indeed, only three Genoese establishments in the Middle Ages could even partially fit this description: Pera, which faced Constantinople across the Golden Horn, Caffa on the Crimean Peninsula, and the Aegean Sea island of Chios. Furthermore, even among these three establishments the governing institutions differed significantly; Pera was administered by a podestà, Caffa by a consul, and Chios by a podestà working in cooperation with a transferable-share company of private citizens who came to be called the Mahona of Chios. The Commune of Genoa directly appointed all of these officials annually, but on Chios it was the Mahona who became the *de facto* power; its members were responsible for the defense and local governance of the

\(^{12}\) The following discussion of empire draws on Fernández-Armesto, *Before Columbus*, 96-120, and is echoed in McKee, *Uncommon Dominion*, 1-18; Monique O'Connell, "Venice outside the Lagoon: Politics and Local Administration in Fifteenth Century Venetian Crete," (Ph.D. diss., Northwestern University, 2002), 4-8.
colony, with little direction from the home city of Genoa.

The history of the Genoese on the island of Chios is rooted in the reestablishment of Byzantine control in Constantinople after 1261. Michael VIII Palaiologos, newly restored to the dignity of Byzantine emperor and appreciative of Genoese support offered to achieve this end, encouraged Genoese commercial activity in his own realm and the Black Sea. In 1267, Michael granted the western Anatolian alum mines of Phokaia to the Genoese Zaccaria family as their personal fief, which Emperor Andronikos II extended to include the nearby island of Chios in 1304. Although expelled by a combination of Byzantine forces and the indigenous noble families of the island in 1329, the Genoese had become aware of the Chios' potential for lucrative trade stemming from its rare, indigenous natural resource known as mastic. Chios and its possibilities for profit did not easily

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14 Mastic is a sweet-smelling, gum-like resin still found on Chios today. In the Middle Ages it was highly prized as a base for ointments and a chewing gum, among other things. See Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, I:477-8.
drift from the Genoese imagination, but La Superba and its citizens would not have to wait long before its citizens were again enjoying the island’s fruits.

In 1346, a fleet of twenty-nine ships, originally assembled to subdue the Grimaldi family stronghold of Monaco to the west of Genoa, was foiled in its mission when it discovered its targets had gone north to fight for the king of France. Upon returning to Genoa, the Commune reassigned Admiral Simone Vignoso and his fleet to protect Genoese interests in the Black Sea region, for which they quickly departed. In an interesting series of events that follow, the fleet encountered another predominantly Venetian and Hospitaller fleet at Negroponte intent on attacking their former possession of Chios. The Genoese, whatever their motivations may have been, sailed on ahead of the Venetians and Hospitallers,

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15 There were at least two aborted attempts to send fleets to Chios before 1346, see Fernández-Armesto, Before Columbus, 102; and McKee, Uncommon Dominion, 11.
17 Felipe Fernandez-Armesto asserts that Vignoso and his fleet took Chios chiefly to keep it from falling into Venetian hands, while Robert Lopez believes the chronically insolvent commune of Genoa, being unable to reimburse the ship owners for their efforts against Monaco, authorized the fleet to sail to the east and “reimburse” themselves however they saw fit, even if this meant using corsair-like tactics (Fernández-Armesto, Before Columbus, 103; Robert Sabatino Lopez, Storia delle colonie genovesi nel Mediterraneo [Bologna: Casa Editrice Marietti, 2004], 261-2).
reached Chios on 15 June, and had forced the besieged Byzantine forces to surrender the island's fortress, albeit on generous terms, by 13 September. The final conquest of the fleet would be both the settlements of Old and New Phokaia, so heavily prized for their alum mines. Simone Vignoso and his fleet had returned to Genoa by 9 November with great fanfare, but the situation presented a pressing problem: how were Chios and the two Phokaias to be administered?

It was not until 26 February 1347 that the association of ship owners, now calling themselves the Mahona of Chios, and the Commune of Genoa reached an agreement. The two groups effectively divided the power to rule Chios and the two Phokaias between themselves. The Commune of Genoa retained for itself the merum et mixtum imperium et omnimoda jurisdictio, or the right to rule there under Genoese law. The Mahona of Chios, however, was granted proprietas et dominium utile et directum, or the ownership and right to collect taxes and exploit the land as it saw fit. In reality, this meant

18 As specified in the treaty between Vignoso and the Greek nobility of the island, the Greeks were allowed to retain possession of all their property, save whatever was formerly Genoese (they would compensate the Greeks for this) and also two hundred houses located within the castro, which were to be sold or rented to the Genoese. An edition of both the capitulation treaty of 12 September and also the treaty between Vignoso and the Greek nobility of the island are printed in Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, II: 26-8 and 28-32.
19 A more detailed analysis of the Mahona of Chios, as well as other associations of this kind, will be provided in Chapter Three, but for
that the Mahonesi had received the right to control the two most financially important natural resources of the lands: the alum of the Phokaias and the mastic of Chios. In regard to the relationship between the governanti e governati, the Genoese did not remove the Greek nobility from their position of privilege on Chios, but actually confirmed it. In fact, none of these nobles were deprived of property, nor was the Greek Orthodox hierarchy replaced with a Latin religious infrastructure. This was in marked contrast to the system of governance instituted by the Venetian State on Crete after they had acquired the island in the early thirteenth century.

Crete came into Venetian possession in the aftermath of the Fourth Crusade. La Serenissima had accumulated, up to that time, little experience with colonial enterprises other than sponsoring numerous merchant
quarters in foreign cities around the Mediterranean. A minimal level of occupation centered on the island’s northern port cities may very well have been all Venice initially desired on Crete, but what the maritime power ultimately discovered was that the sustained possession of these ports required the sustained possession of much of the inland areas as well. Whether it was in consideration of the island’s size, strategic location in the Mediterranean, or both, upon taking control of Crete in 1211 Venice established a system of direct, centralized rule modeled on its home government. The Venetian State appointed a governor and salaried officials who served two-year terms in office and reported directly to Venice. It replaced the Greek Orthodox religious structure with Latin clergy, and also imported its own settlers to populate the island.

Venice maintained this highly centralized, direct system of rule for the entire 458 years in which they held Crete. Monique O’Connell has recently argued, however, that during the fifteenth century the Venetian

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22 Thiriet, La Romanie vénitienne, 105-6.
23 Before Venice firmly established itself on the Crete, they had to contend with a band of Genoese pirates led by Enrico Pescatore, who actually held Candia for a short time. The tenacity with which this Genoese lot fought for a claim on Crete could have played a part in Venice’s decision to take as much of the island as possible and do it as quickly as possible (McKee, Uncommon Dominion, 22).
24 Thiriet, La Romanie vénitienne, 180-215; and McKee, Uncommon Dominion, 20-1.
25 Mckee, Uncommon Dominion, 21; and O’Connell, "Venice outside the Lagoon," 5.
State enhanced this system of direct rule on Crete by adding many "informal and extra-institutional layers" to its governmental structure. These "layers of indirect, informal and client relationships" were the glue that held together Cretan society. The network of connections between Venetian officials, resident Venetian nobility, and indigenous Greek elite, which developed as a result of these relationships, provided the colonial government with a level of strength and flexibility that it was not capable of alone. This strong, flexible character of the Venetian government on Crete during the fifteenth century thus, in O'Connell's words, "closely resembled patterns of rule used both in the terraferma and in other places in the Venetian maritime state."

O'Connell's work builds on that of Sally McKee, who has recently analyzed fourteenth century Cretan society in detail. McKee argues that Venetian Crete deserves to be placed at the center of medieval colonial studies, because it represents "the premiere example of pre-modern colonization." The description above is merited, in her estimation, due to the high level of intervention by the Venetian State in the direct governance of the island. This becomes a key feature in later European colonial

26 O'Connell, "Venice outside the Lagoon," 6.
27 O'Connell, "Venice outside the Lagoon," 7.
29 McKee, Uncommon Dominion, 5.
enterprises in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. McKee furthermore expresses, and O'Connell echoes the sentiment as well, that it was the stability of their home city's bureaucratic state that rendered the Venetians capable of holding Crete for as long as they did. It is undeniable that the strength and stability of La Serenissima were key factors in the establishment and maintenance of direct rule on Crete. It raises a question, however, that is central to this dissertation: how was a colonial enterprise to succeed and be sustained when carried out by a home government characterized by weakness and instability? This study suggests that the Commune of Genoa, which ostensibly lacked the strength, structure and stability of the Venetian State in the Later Middle Ages, was able to establish and sustain effective control of Chios for over two centuries through a combination of administrative creativity, practicality and adaptability. The role of the state in the governance of a colony is a useful indicator by which to judge its importance, but just as useful an indicator, in my opinion, is the role that these three attributes play in colonial governance when the home state is almost completely an absentee landlord. A study of the

\[30\] McKee, Uncommon Dominion, 5.  
\[31\] McKee, Uncommon Dominion, 5; O'Connell, "Venice outside the Lagoon," 6-8.
institutional framework of Genoese Chios and the Mahonesi who governed it makes, for these reasons, a much-needed contribution to the history of Old World colonization.

The principal purpose of this dissertation, however, is to go beyond simply an institutional history of Genoese Chios and examine the internal dynamics of Chian society under Genoese rule and what role the Mahona played in its construction. Chios has been relatively well represented in the long bibliography of studies on the medieval eastern Mediterranean world. Yet, the small and specialized group of scholars who studies the island has traditionally analyzed Chios within the wider context of Genoese territorial expansion and economic activity. A very limited number of studies have focused on the relationship between differing ethnic and social groups on the island. Philip Pandely Argenti’s *The Occupation of Chios by the Genoese and their Administration of the Island 1346-1566*, while vitally important for an understanding of the history of Genoese Chios, is limited in its analysis. In Argenti’s view, monolithic, fundamentally static ethnic groups inhabited the island (i.e. the Genoese, the indigenous Greeks, and the Jews), a conclusion he draws from the examination of a selective

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32 Some of the scholars whose work most often discusses Chios within these contexts are Geo Pistarino, Enrico Basso, Laura Balletto, Gian Giacomo Musso and Sandra Origone, but there are others, as well.
array of sources including notarial records, governmental records, and literature.

More recent scholarship has added to Argenti’s body of work and refined his conclusions. No one has made more of a scholarly contribution to Genoese history in the eastern Mediterranean than the late Geo Pistarino. He published numerous articles and books on many different aspects of Genoa’s overseas holdings, including a significant number focusing on Genoese Chios. The picture emerging from the work of Pistarino and others is that relations between and within the island’s predominant social and ethnic groups were much more complex than Argenti had once supposed. They have all, however, underutilized the abundant number of extant notarial sources to tell the history of Genoese Chios.

33 The following is merely a selection of Pistarino’s most important works: Geo Pistarino: La Capitale del Mediterraneo: Genova nel medioevo (Bordighera: Istituto internazionale di studi liguri, 1993); “Chio dei Genovesi,” in A Giuseppe Ermini, Studi Medievali, serie 3, X, 3-68 (Spoleto: Centro italiano di studi sull’alto Medioevo, 1970); Chio dei genovese nel tempo di Cristoforo Colombo (Roma: Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 1995); Geo Pistarino, ed., Dibattito su Famiglie Nobili del Mondo Coloniale Genovese nel Levante. Atti del Convegno Montoggio, 23 ottobre 1993 (Genova: Accademia Ligure di Scienze e Lettere, 1994); “Genova medievale tra oriente e occidente,” Rivista storica italiana 81 (1969): 44-73; Genovesi d’Oriente, Civico Istituto Colombiano Studi e Testi, no. 14 (Genova: Civico Istituto Colombiano, 1990); I Gin dell’Oltremare, Studi e Testi, Serie Storica, 11 (Genova: Civico Istituto Colombiano, 1988); I Signori del Mare (Genova: Civico Istituto Colombiano, 1992); “Nella <<Romania>> genovese tra greci e turchi; l’isola di Chio,” Rivista storica italiana 73 (1961): 69-84.

34 The following is a sampling of these works: Carlo Brizzolari, Gli ebrei nella storia di Genova (Genova: Sabatelli Editore, 1971), 57-69; Michel Balard, “Les Grecs de Chio sous la domination génoise au XVe siècle,” Bizantinische Forschungen V (1977): 5-15; Sandra Origone, “Famiglie greche nel Levante genovese
This fact has consequently led scholars both to construct an incomplete vision of social relations on the island, and also to address inadequately the issues of ethnic identity and interaction between the ruling Genoese and subject Greek and Jewish populations. Sandra Origone, for example, has examined the conditions of the Greek families of Chios in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, citing as evidence a handful of notarial deeds from a few Genoese notaries all of whom were cited in earlier works by other scholars. In like manner, Carlo Brizzolari drew his conclusions concerning the status of the Jews on Genoese Chios from the acts of two notaries previously published by Paola Villa and Gian Giacomo Musso, respectively, as well as several more taken from


Origone cites the work of notaries used previously by, among others, Gian Giacomo Musso in his “Fonti documentarie per la storia di Chio dei genovesi,” in La Berio VIII, 3 (1968): 5-30, and Philip Pandely Argenti in his The Occupation of Chios by the Genoese (Origone, "Famiglie greche," 207-22).
David Jacoby's study.36

Recent scholarship focusing on the Venetian Romania has much more effectively examined relationships between differing social and ethnic groups in a late medieval Mediterranean colony. Scholars have moved beyond the traditional modes of analysis, which viewed Venetian Crete as a bridge between the defunct Byzantine Empire and the modern Greek state. The interaction between the governing Venetian and governed Greek populations did not result, as was postulated by earlier scholars, in the absorption or assimilation of the latter group’s culture by the former; the reality was much more complicated than this. Many members of these two distinct ethnic groups on Crete, who co-existed in the same physical space, shared cultural customs, intermarried, learned each other’s language, and even joined the ranks of the other’s church within the first century of Venetian rule.37 Benjamin Arbel, although referring to Venetian Cyprus, makes the same point: “The relations between the republic and its Greek ‘fideles’ have been too often perceived through the double prism of the fourth crusade


37 The wording here paraphrases McKee, Uncommon Dominion, 6.
and the national movement of the nineteenth century. In the sixteenth century, realities were more complex."⁵⁸ In other words, whatever the qualifications were for being considered "Latin" or "Greek" quickly became unclear in these colonies, and they were constantly being renegotiated.

Recent scholars have, in fact, acknowledged with increasing frequency the usefulness of "boundaries" as a conceptual framework within which to examine issues of identity. The pioneer in this field was Fredrik Barth, who in 1969 published a collection of articles entitled Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference. Barth and his fellow contributors initiated nothing less than a new scholarly discussion about ethnicity. The debate had, in their estimation, focused too heavily on particular attributes defining ethnic groups and had not sufficiently explored the various boundaries separating one of these groups from another. The purpose and nature of these boundaries can, indeed, tell us a great deal about the ways in which ethnic groups interact with each other and also how they

view themselves.\textsuperscript{39}

Since the appearance of Barth's seminal publication, scholars from many academic disciplines have applied the concept of "boundary crossing" to their work with fruitful results,\textsuperscript{40} including the fields of history and literature. In 1999, Sally McKee edited a collection of essays entitled \textit{Crossing Boundaries: Issues of Cultural and Individual Identity in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance}, which demonstrate "the breadth and depth of 'boundaries' as a concept."\textsuperscript{41} These twelve essays cover a broad range of historical and literary topics, including, for example, Jonathan Harris' study of Byzantine émigrés in Renaissance Italy. After the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans in 1453, it is well known that many Byzantine intellectuals fled to Italy. It has been argued by scholars for decades that these refugees


\textsuperscript{40} Scholars from disciplines as different as biblical exegesis to gender studies have employed "boundary crossing" as a mode of analysis. The following are a merely a few examples of recent works: Hans Vermeulen and Cora Govers, eds., \textit{The Anthropology of Ethnicity: Beyond "Ethnic Groups and Boundaries"} (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 1994); Stanley E. Porter, Paul Joyce, and David E. Orton, eds., \textit{Crossing the Boundaries: Essays in Biblical Interpretation in Honour of Michael D. Goulder} (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994); Konrad Eisenbichler, ed., \textit{Crossing the Boundaries: Christian Piety and the Arts in Italian Medieval and Renaissance Confraternities} (Kalamazoo, Michigan: Medieval Institute Publications, 1991); Jocelyne A. Scutt, ed., \textit{City Women, Country Women: Crossing the Boundaries} (Melbourne: Artemis, 1995); Carole Boyce Davies, \textit{Black Women's Writing: Crossing the Boundaries} (Frankfurt: Holger Ehling, 1989).

\textsuperscript{41} Sally McKee, ed., \textit{Crossing Boundaries: Issues of Cultural and Individual Identity in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance} (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 1999), vii.
abandoned their traditional identities as Byzantines and adopted new, local definitions of themselves in return for a new life and safety in Italy. Harris demonstrates, however, that this was not the case; these Byzantine elites were able to maintain their traditional Hellenic identity, founded as it was on devotion to the Greek Ruler, Religion, and Culture, by making common cause with Italians against a perceived external threat, the Ottoman Turks.\textsuperscript{42} The boundary crossed by these refugees was predominantly the physical one from East to West rather than a cultural or political boundary.

Steven A. Epstein’s recent work on the medieval eastern Mediterranean, based on a wide variety of source material, has done much to further our understanding of the ways in which the crossing of boundaries could affect the identity of an individual or a collective group.\textsuperscript{43} Epstein argues that those people living in the pre-national, fragmented world of the medieval eastern Mediterranean, frequently transgressed the predominant, constructed boundaries between groups, such as color, religion, language, and ethnicity, to establish relationships with those different from them. By doing


\textsuperscript{43} Epstein, Purity Lost, passim.
so, these people created “mixed” relationships, or relationships in which the parties had different creeds, languages, skin colors, or other markers of difference, which, in turn, “changed their members by blurring divisive distinctions and creating ties in place of obstacles.”

This study investigates the internal dynamics of Chian society under Genoese rule within the conceptual frameworks of “boundary crossing” and “mixed relationships.” Focusing on the relationship between social and ethnic groups, it asks how society functioned on the island, and what role the Mahona played in this society’s construction. It demonstrates, on the one hand, how often a colonial administration that lacked strong direction from its home state, such as the Mahona of Chios, crossed various constructed boundaries to establish mixed relationships with other states. These relationships were then used to sustain Genoese rule and to govern the island more effectively. It also demonstrates, however, that in the private sphere of life on Chios the only way to maintain authority was to avoid the transgression of certain boundaries. The preservation of strong bonds, both within and between core Genoese family units on the island, not only...

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44 Epstein, *Purity Lost*, xii.
facilitated the Mahona's governance of Chios, but was also symptomatic of Genoa's almost complete absence from the processes of administration there; considering that the elite Genoese families were responsible for the governance of the island, it was important to keep these household units as strong and distinct as possible. This study relies on a wide variety of sources housed in the Genoese State Archives, which contains a large amount of documentation for the history of Genoese Chios. Notarial registers, administrative correspondence, and letters between private individuals all evince the administrative creativity and preservation of private relationships used by the Genoese to sustain their rule on the island for over two hundred years.

The following chapters examine the public and the private spheres in turn. Chapter One traces the development of Genoese overseas expansion in the medieval eastern Mediterranean and describes the place of Chios within this context. The emphasis here is the creative solution to the problem of administration envisioned by the ever-insolvent Commune of Genoa and the group of 29 ship owners who originally conquered the island. The solution was a private transferable-share company, or Mahona, which would come to characterize European colonial enterprises in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and
eighteenth centuries. Chapter Two then turns to a comparative examination of the relative stability of the Genoese and Venetian States\(^4^5\) in the Later Middle Ages. A discussion of this stability is a necessary starting point for any analysis of the effects that a home government had on its colonies. It is my opinion that the stability or instability of a home state's political apparatus directly affected the means by which it attempted to govern its colonies, although the effect was, of course, not always uniform. Each colonial enterprise must be examined individually, thus this chapter will serve as the basis for chapter three, which examines Genoa's possession of the island of Chios specifically. Chapter three considers the actual governance of Chios by the Genoese State and the Mahona, both in terms of foreign relations and internal administration of the island. It demonstrates how the Mahona, benefiting as it did from little to no intervention from a weak, insolvent home government, was able to survive and sustain its rule through a complex network of political, religious and ethnic affiliations. In many cases, these affiliations crossed boundaries of religion, language, or ethnicity, which was nothing new.

\(^4^5\) I do not use the word state here in reference to the idea of the early modern "state" and its development, over which much ink has been spilled, but simply as an easy and quick way to reference the broad political structures of the two cities.
for the Genoese and also necessary for a continued Genoese administration on Chios.

The next two chapters then turn to an examination of Chian society during the fifteenth century, which is the only full century of Genoese occupation on the island. Chapter four examines acts of property division such as dowry contracts, child emancipations, and concessions of age in order to illuminate the elements of lineage that concerned the families of Chian households. Chapter five, predominantly through the use of wills, analyzes patterns of inheritance between generations. While the first substantive two chapters of this dissertation focus on the governmental structure of Genoese Chios, the discussions contained within both of the subsequent chapters are carried out within the framework of the household, or domus. It is the overarching objective of this dissertation to demonstrate that these two spheres, the public and the private, were not mutually exclusive. There was a relationship between the institutional structure of the colony, on the one hand, and the households in which people lived, on the other. The following chapters seek to illuminate the nature of that relationship.
CHAPTER ONE

CHIOS IN THE CONTEXT OF GENOESE EXPLORATION AND EXPANSION
IN THE MEDIEVAL EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

Introduction

It is no surprise that the Genoese very early turned their attention to the sea; the geography of Liguria, in fact, seemed to demand it. The site on which the city would eventually be established had a good natural harbor, but possessed little in the way of natural resources. The mountains come all the way up to the sea, leaving little to no room for agriculture, but even if there were room, the soil of both the mountains and the coast are inadequate for large-scale production. Genoa’s future location provided numerous obstacles to its early inhabitants, but it also provided them with some benefits. Positioned at the extreme northern end of the Gulf of Genoa, it is directly south of the Giovi Pass and the Scrivia Valley, one of the shortest routes to the interior of the continent. The Romans thus constructed a good road system there, but only because it “was on the way to provinces worth having.”

46 For the following discussion of Liguria’s geography and environment, I have used Steven A. Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 958-1528 (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 10-6.
47 Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 12.
The decline of Roman authority in the western Mediterranean left the small provincial trading center to be tossed about from one power to another for several centuries. The Ostrogoths briefly, and uneventfully, ruled the town in the early sixth century, followed by the Byzantines (537-642), the Lombards (642-774) and the Carolingians. Nothing much is known about Genoa in these early years until 934-5, when the city experienced a thorough sacking by North African Muslims. The effects of this sack on the population are not clear, but the community had certainly regained its footing by 958, when it was granted a charter by the kings Berengar and Adalbert.\footnote{The two kings, who at the time controlled parts of northern Italy, confirmed the possessions, rights and customs of all their “fideles et habitatores” in Genoa, see Epstein, Genoa, 15-6.}

The next century of Genoese history is also obscure, but by the 1050s the Genoese were practicing self-governance and had extricated themselves from “both imperial power and the top ranks of the warrior aristocracy in northern Italy.”\footnote{Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 21.} Genoa had reached a crossroads. The nobility could continue to extract what produce and profits they were able from the limited agricultural lands of Liguria, or they could strike out onto the sea in search of greater fortune; they clearly chose the latter.

The first official chronicler of Genoa was Caffaro
di Caschifellone, whose extant work covers the years 1099-1163. We can learn much from this "grande artista e grande storico" on Genoese involvement in the First Crusade, as well as the development of the Italian language.\textsuperscript{50} We must, however, look to non-Genoese sources for evidence of Genoa's earliest documented excursions into the greater Mediterranean world. The first mention of Genoa at sea is in the year 1016, when the Pisan chronicler Bernardo Maragone describes a joint Pisan-Genoese raid against Muslims on the island of Sardinia.\textsuperscript{51} Maragone makes it very clear in the report that his city was the leader of the operation, while Genoa played only a supporting role. Even at this early date, one can discern from Maragone's text a twinge of regional pride, or even rivalry, which will come to characterize the Italian peninsula for centuries to come; the text also, perhaps, foretells the future animosity between these two maturing maritime cities.

The Pisans and the Genoese were at loggerheads by the 1060s, when they fought the first of several wars against each other. In the same year that Duke William and the Normans were carrying out their famous invasion

\textsuperscript{50} The phrase is from Robert Sabatino Lopez, \textit{Storia delle colonie genovesi nel Mediterraneo}, 67.

to the north, Maragone claims that the Genoese were blockading the River Arno and doing their best to restrict the movements of Pisan vessels. In 1087, we once again have evidence of Pisan-Genoese cooperation in an attack on the North African Muslim stronghold of al-Mahdiyya. The information for this incident is preserved in a fascinating 73 stanza poem composed in celebration of the Pisan and Genoese allies' victory, the Carmen in victoriam Pisanorum. Although only preceding the event by eight years, H.E.J. Cowdrey and Steven A. Epstein have both cautioned against reading this attack on al-Mahdiyya as a precursor to Pope Urban II's call for an armed offensive by Christians against Muslims. They instead emphasize the desire of the Pisans and the Genoese to disrupt Muslim trade routes and, as a result, acquire a more prominent place in trans-Mediterranean trade. It is clear that by the time of the First Crusade the old proverb Januensis ergo mercator, or "a Genoese therefore a merchant," was a fitting way to describe the external perception of the Genoese and also the perception of themselves. Yet, it was their participation in the

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52 Gentile, Gli annali pisani, 6.
53 Al-Mahdiyya is the present day city of Mahdia, Tunisia. For a good account of this famous attack and also an edition of the Carmen, see H.E.J. Cowdrey, "The Mahdia Campaign of 1087," English Historical View 92, 362 (Jan., 1977): 1-29.
54 Even if the Pisans and Genoese did carry and wear "the pilgrim badge of a purse," see Cowdrey, "The Mahdia Campaign of 1087," 22.
crusading movement to the Near East that led to the great explosion of Genoese commercial success across the Mediterranean as a community of long-range traders and shippers.

The Explosion: Genoese Establishments in the Levant during and after the First Crusade (c. 1050-1150)

"Per l'onore di Dio e della città di Genova"\textsuperscript{56}

The Genoese presence in the Near East did not begin with the calling of the First Crusade; there were Genoese settlers in Syria as early as the middle of the eleventh century.\textsuperscript{57} The establishment of the Crusaders States in the aftermath of the First Crusade, however, provided the foundation for Genoese colonial development. Genoa received the same concessions from the Latin lords of these states as those given to Pisa and Venice, mostly in return for their military assistance against the Muslims. It was under these circumstances that one of the earliest Genoese colonies was established at Antioch in 1098. A contingent of Genoese aided both in the siege of the city and its defense against a subsequent retaliatory strike

\textsuperscript{56} Annales Ianuenses, Vol. I, edited by Luigi T. Belgrano (Genoa, 1890).

undertaken by the Sultan of Iconium (1097-8). In recognition of the Genoese efforts, the man who would be ruler of Antioch, Bohemond de Hauteville, granted to the Genoese government a section of the city, on which stood the church of San Giovanni, a fondaco, a well, thirty houses and the perpetual exemption from all taxes. The fact that these early Genoese colonists did not simply acquire individual concessions, but instead secured privileges for all Genoese is important. Their acquisition of trade privileges with a foreign ruler, so to speak, was a first for Genoa, and would inspire enterprising Genoese to establish similar trade relations in the Near East and elsewhere. Genoese success at Antioch was so significant to the economic takeoff of Genoese overseas commerce and colonization that Robert S. Lopez considered the date of Bohemond's concessions to Genoa there, on July 14, 1098, the "nascita del dominio coloniale Genovese."

Genoese activity in the Levant increased exponentially after the success at Antioch. In 1099, two members of the Embriaco family, the brothers Guglielmo

58 For a detailed account of the siege and following defense of Antioch, see Lopez, Storia delle colonie genovesi, 70-2; and for a more cursory treatment, see Argenti, The Occupation of Chios by the Genoese, 3.
59 Argenti, The Occupation of Chios by the Genoese, 3; Lopez, Storia delle colonie genovesi, 71; Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 29.
60 Steven A. Epstein expresses similar sentiments in his book (Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 29-30).
61 Lopez, Storia delle colonie genovesi, 72.
and Primo, appeared in the port of Jaffa as the crusading army prepared for an attack on Jerusalem. They made themselves, their crews and even the wood from their ships available to the campaign, and thus took part in the successful siege of the sacred city. After capturing a large booty of precious stones, gold and silver from the camp of the fleeing Muslims, the brothers returned to Genoa carrying letters from the Latin King and also the Patriarch of Jerusalem, Godfrey of Bullion and Daimbert, respectively. They make it known to the Genoese that more aid would be necessary to sustain and strengthen the Latin Kingdom and the other Crusader States. Whether it was the impassioned plea for succor from the king and patriarch or the tales of rich spoils available in the Holy Land, the Genoese were enthusiastic enough about the situation to outfit a large fleet of twenty six galleys and four ships, which carried around 3,000 men from both Genoa and the surrounding towns. The fleet, under the command of the same Guglielmo Embriaco, reached the port of Laodicea by the winter of 1100, where they found Baldwin I now on the throne of

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62 Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 30; Lopez, Storia delle colonie genovesi, 73.
63 Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 30; Lopez, Storia delle colonie genovesi, 73. Lopez places the number of men at 8,000, which is the number found in the Genoese chronicler Caffaro’s account, but this number was calculated according to the maximum carrying capacity of each ship. Epstein’s estimate of 3,000 men seems much more reasonable.
Jerusalem and Bohemond in captivity. The combined armies proceeded to besiege and conquer both Arsuf and Caesarea, but not before the Genoese had smartly requested that Bohemond’s nephew, Tancred, confirm and increase the initial privileges granted to them by his uncle in 1098. Tancred responded to the request by giving the Genoese the churches of San Lorenzo and San Giovanni, one-third of the income of the ports of Solino, Laodicea and any additional ports conquered with Genoese aid, and finally he exempted the Genoese from paying customs tax.

In October of 1101, Guglielmo Embriaco made a triumphant return to his home city. He had aided the King of Jerusalem and earned the nickname “Hammerhead” along the way. It seems clear that news of his deeds and honors made their way back to Liguria before he finally did. Several other fleets arrived from Genoa before his departure, undoubtedly hoping to share in the wealth and honor which the Holy Land had bestowed on Embriaco; they had little trouble finding work. One of these fleets aided Raymond of Toulouse, Count of Provence, in the 1102 conquest of Tortosa. Other Genoese fleets took part in the captures of Acre (1103), Gibellet (1104), Tripoli.

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64 Godfrey of Bullion had died in March, 1100 (Argenti, The Occupation of Chios by the Genoese, 4); Lopez, Storia delle colonie genovesi, 73.
65 Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 30.
By 1110, in fact, the crusading forces had been so successful that it prompted Robert Lopez to write: "almost every year was marked by a conquest performed with the common efforts of the Genoese and the princes of the Holy Land, until almost all of the Syrian and Palestinian coast was brought back under the banner of Christ." The Genoese were rewarded well for their efforts in the Levant. They were granted a section of Jerusalem, a street in Jaffa, one-third of the cities of Arsuf, Caesarea and Acre, and also one-third of any cities captured in the future to which they had contributed at least fifty soldiers. In addition to these concessions, Baldwin I exempted the Genoese from commercial tributes throughout his realm and granted them full autonomy in judicial and administrative matters. After the First Crusade, Genoa would add Gibellet and one third of the port of Laodicea to their possessions.

These commercial settlements in the Levant were the foundation for subsequent Genoese, and more generally Italian, colonial expansion in the eastern Mediterranean.

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66 Lopez, *Storia delle colonie genovesi*, 76.
67 "Da allora al 1110 quasi ogni anno fu segnato da una conquista operata coi comuni sforzi dei Genovesi e dei principi di Terrasanta...fintché quasi tutta la costa della Siria e della Palestina non fu ricondotta sotto la bandiera di Cristo..." (Lopez, *Storia delle colonie genovesi*, 76).
68 Lopez, *Storia delle colonie genovesi*, 76.
Upon their arrival in Syria and Palestine, Italian traders found great opportunities to increase the volume and variety of their commercial enterprises. A vibrant trade already existed in the region, as the products of the eastern interior made their way to the port cities of Syria and Palestine; it was a situation from which Italian traders knew how to derive great benefit. The trade settlements of Genoa, Pisa, Venice, and Amalfi, among others, were quickly transformed from insignificant and regional colonies into international clearing houses through which eastern goods were transferred to Europe and European goods were distributed in the East.\(^6\) These settlements were, however, more than mere trading hubs. The concessions granted by the Latin nobility to the Italian cities usually included a section of town large enough to construct the necessary buildings for trade, as well as houses, shops, warehouses, public buildings and a church. In addition to this, they also allowed for the introduction of the city’s own laws and customs into the colony.\(^7\) These provisions were intended to provide the city’s merchants with everything necessary to carry on the business of trade, but the importation of the city’s


laws and customs makes it clear that these were also permanent settlements; the Italian maritime powers intended to be in the East for some time to come.

Old rivalries, Iberian conquests, preparation for war against Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa, and the ever-present problem of internal political strife at home hampered Genoese activities in the Levant during the middle decades of the twelfth century. Beyond the battle for economic supremacy of the Tyrrhenian and Ligurian Seas, Genoa and Pisa fiercely competed for control of Corsica and Sardinia. In 1121, Genoa was successful in wresting away from the archbishop of Pisa the right to consecrate the bishop of Corsica, evidently by bribing Pope Calixtus II.\(^{71}\) The Pisans suffered another setback in 1133, when Pope Innocent II gave Corsica in fief to the Commune for the payment of one pound of gold per year to Rome.\(^{72}\) The Genoese chronicler Caffaro di Caschifellone informs us that in 1132 his home city had stationed sixteen galleys off the coast of Corsica to fight the Pisans.\(^{73}\) While these events were taking place, furthermore, Genoa was making war up and down the Ligurian Coast to solidify its own dominion, and thus have more resources with which to fight the Pisans in the

\(^{71}\) Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 40-1.  
\(^{72}\) Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 46.  
\(^{73}\) Caffaro, 26; Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 43.
Tyrrhenian Sea.  

In the late 1140s and 1150s, events transpiring on the Iberian Peninsula proved to be an early test of Genoese resiliency and also to foreshadow future methods of Genoese colonial administration. In 1146, the Commune agreed to aid the rulers of Catalonia and Aragon, Ramon Berenguer IV and Alfonso VII respectively, in capturing two important Muslim cities on the Spanish coast, Almeria and Tortosa. The Commune would receive for their efforts one-third of each city and be free from any customs and tariffs in the lands of the two rulers.  

Both of the conquests were completed by December, 1148, but not without great expense to the Commune. The expense of maintaining a large fleet at sea for so long may indeed have been too much for Genoa to bear, leading them to privatize their new possessions. On November 5, 1147, the leaders of the force entrusted the city’s share of Almeria to Ottone Bonvillano for thirty years, who, in return, promised to keep his 300 troops there and to not charge his fellow Ligurians any tolls. Two years after the successful siege of Tortosa, the Commune had made the

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74 Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 41-4.
75 Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 49-50.
76 Caffaro claims that the fleet was made up of 63 galleys and 164 other ships and that 12,000 men were in the field at Almeria, but Epstein suspects that this estimate may be too high (Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 50 and also 334 fn. 170).
77 Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 51.
same arrangement as above with Balduino di Castro, Guglielmo Tornello and their associates in 1150. Three years later, however, we find Genoa selling its portion of the city to Ramon Berenguer for 16,000 marabotini.

Genoa's victories on the Iberian Peninsula may have been inspiring to the Genoese people, but, in the final analysis, they appear to have been Pyrrhic to the Commune. Steven A. Epstein has examined the communal records for the years 1149 to 1154, and concludes that: "All the activities of the consuls indicate a desperate search for money." In April, 1149, Genoa made peace with Pisa, and then concluded a twenty-nine year alliance with her rival. Later in the same year, Genoa made a ten-year truce with the Muslim king of Valencia, increased the tariffs on ships and created a new grain tax. In 1150, the Commune began to sell openly various rights and taxes in order to pay for its debts from the Tortosa enterprise, and also made it known that the city was fielding offers for Tortosa's purchase. We must see the privatization of Almeria and Tortosa by the city of Genoa in this context. It was indeed a novel means of administering a territorial acquisition, and one that

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78 Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 51.
79 Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 51.
80 Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 52.
81 For all of the above references to the Genoese communal records, see Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 52.
will come to characterize Genoese colonial efforts in the coming centuries. These earliest examples of colonial privatization by the Commune, however, were the result of Genoese insolvency rather than the Commune's desire to innovate.

The Commune's desperate search for money, in fact, forced the government to borrow from, and farm out various taxes to, private individuals and even privatize entire colonies in Syria and Palestine. These dealings may have been an immediate solution to Genoa's financial shortcomings, but it would cost the city many of its Levantine holdings by the end of the twelfth century. The Embriaco family is a case in point. The family had been established in the Holy Land since the First Crusade. By the 1150s, they had solidified their position in the region well; they held all of Gibellet, as well as the Genoese quarters of Laodicea, Solino, and Antioch. They renewed their contract with Genoa in 1154 for a period of twenty-nine years and, in the process, acquired the rights to the Genoese quarter of Acre for an immediate payment of 100 lire and small annual rent. In the years that followed, the power and influence of the Embriaco family in the Levant continued to grow. They married into Latin royalty, when the daughter of Ugo

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82 For the following discussion of the Embriaco family, I have used Lopez, *Storia delle colonie genovesi*, 108-10.
Embriaco, Piacenza, married the ruler of Antioch, Bohemond IV. By 1179, the family was strong enough to renounce their loyalty to Genoa, suspend payments to the Commune, and take it upon themselves to exempt their compatriots from all tribute.

Incidents such as this and others\(^{83}\) thus quickly eroded to nothing any semblance of Genoa’s direct dominion over its Levantine possessions. It was a process that the home city was powerless to stop, beset as it was with internal discord and external wars. Genoa’s strained relations with Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa, as well as internal political strife within the Commune, did little to alleviate the city’s financial woes.\(^{84}\) These developments in no way, however, diminished the capacity of individual Genoese to pursue their own commercial interests in the East; perhaps they preferred it that way. Robert Lopez assesses the situation well when he writes: “Thus from the start we (can) trace what would become the most singular characteristic of Genoese expansion: a constant impoverishment of the Republic, while private individuals prosper and enrich

\(^{83}\) In 1186, for example, Pope Urban III ordered the Count and Bishop of Tripoli to hand over to the Genoese one-third of their possessions in that city (Lopez, Storia delle colonie genovesi, 109).

\(^{84}\) For Genoa’s relationship with Frederick I Barbarossa after his arrival in Lombardy in 1154, as well as the civil unrest of the city in the 1160s and subsequent decades, see Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, 70-87.
themselves." With the loss of many of its holdings in the Levant, Genoese commerce needed a direction in which to expand; her merchants found the logical choice in Byzantium.

New and Old Opportunities: Early Commercial Expansion into Byzantium and the Contraction of Commercial Opportunities in the Holy Land (c. 1150-1291)

"The Genoese are masters of the sea and build vessels called galleys by means of which they carry on war in many places, against Christian and Moslem alike, and bring home a great deal of plunder and booty, to Genoa. They are at war with the Pisans." These words of Benjamin of Tudela, the author of a famous medieval travelogue who visited Genoa in 1160, provide us with a reliable outsider’s impression of the city and its mobile population in the middle of the twelfth century. Genoa had indeed by this time firmly established itself in the far reaches of the Mediterranean world. Robert Lopez has in fact commented that, by the middle of the twelfth century, we find only two states along the eastern Mediterranean coast with whom the Genoese did not have commercial conventions of

85 "Si delineava così fin dai primi tempi quella che sarebbe stata la caratteristica più singolare dell’espansione genovese: un costante impoverimento della Repubblica, mentre i privati prosperano e s’arricchiscono" (Lopez, Storia delle colonie genovesi, 110).
some kind established: the Byzantine Empire and Egypt; this would not be the case for long. 87 Then there were for the Genoese, as always, the Pisans with whom to contend. We have already traced the development of the seaborne rivalry between these two Italian cities. Their relationship becomes even more strained, however, as the Genoese become increasingly involved in the commerce and politics of the Byzantine Empire.

The Genoese were latecomers to the lands of the Byzantine emperors. The Venetians, Amalfitans, and Pisans had all established commercial relationships with Constantinople, usually in the form of a merchant quarter there, well before Genoa's first attempt to obtain similar privileges in 1142. 88 This Genoese embassy would be unsuccessful, but the Commune had to wait only thirteen years to achieve its goal of establishing a footing on Byzantine soil. In 1155, Emperor Manuel Komnenos, having set his sights on reconquest in southern Italy, sent an envoy to Genoa with the goal of concluding

87 Lopez however suspects that, even though we do not possess documentation of it, the Genoese must have had a merchant quarter at Alexandria by mid-century just like the Pisans did. This is the only possible explanation for the high volume of commercial traffic between Genoa and Alexandria at this time, so high, in fact, that it surpassed by three and a half times Genoa's commercial traffic with Constantinople and almost equaled that of the Levant (Lopez, Storia delle colonie genovesi, 96-7).
88 The Pisan merchants had established a quarter for themselves in the imperial capital in 1111 (Lopez, Storia delle colonie genovesi, 96).
an agreement between the two states. The details of this treaty do not concern us here as much as its historical implications, but the basic terms were: the Genoese would keep peace with the empire, not aid its enemies, and provide manpower for its galleys when attacked. In exchange for all of this, Manuel promised that, among other things, the Commune would never pay higher customs duties than the Pisans and granted to them a merchant quarter on the Golden Horn located in Koparion. This set of agreements thus officially established a Byzantine-Genoese relationship which would endure, in various forms, until the fall of Constantinople in 1453. In addition to this, however, it created yet another arena in which the long-time enemies Genoa and Pisa would continue their commercial and territorial rivalry.

It indeed did not take long for conflict to arise between the Genoese and the Pisans in Constantinople. In the summer of 1162, a combined force of Pisans, Venetians, Greeks, and others attacked the nascent

Genoese quarter there, inflicting serious losses and destruction upon the population. Philip Argenti attributes this anti-Genoese uprising to the resentment harbored for them by the other Italian nations already established in Constantinople, namely the Venetians, Pisans, and Amalfitans. While there is no doubt that resentment between rival Italian states played some role in the attack, it does not alone explain this reappearance of hostilities between Genoa and Pisa. The two states had recently renewed their age-old struggle for control of Sardinia, as the Genoese chronicler Caffaro tells us. This must have also played a part in the uprising, which cost the Genoese in Constantinople an estimated 30,000 hyperpers. Whatever elements made up the cause of the conflict, Argenti’s assessment of Genoese-Pisan relations in the second half of the twelfth century is adept: “Relations between the two governments became so strained that any provocative incident, however unimportant, might have led to a conflagration entailing the complete destruction of all that had been attained in the colonies during many years of effort and

90 Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 78-9.
91 Argenti, The Occupation of Chios by the Genoese, 6-7.
93 Caffaro’s estimate is 30,000 hyperpers, but Epstein cites a document from 1174 which puts the damages at 29,443 hyperpers (Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 78).
The point here is that, by 1162, the Genoese colony at Constantinople was well established and would henceforth play a role in Byzantine history until the empire's demise in 1453.

As the Genoese established themselves in the Byzantine Empire, they, and all of the Italian states, were experiencing serious difficulties in the Holy Land. On 4 July 1187, the Sultan of Egypt, Saladin, defeated Guy of Lusignan at the Horns of Hattin, thus gaining for himself almost all of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Antioch, Tripoli, and Tyre were the only exceptions to this, which forces from Genoa and Pisa defended in alliance with Conrad of Montferrat. In appreciation for their aid, Conrad rewarded the Genoese with a section of Tyre and the usual tax exemption. The fall of Jerusalem to Saladin's forces was, as is well know, the major motivation for the Third Crusade. It was a remarkable event, led as it was by the most powerful princes of Europe: Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa, Philip IV Augustus of France, and Richard I of England. The crusade's importance for our purposes, however, is not who led it, but rather the effect that it had on Genoese

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94 Argenti, The Occupation of Chios by the Genoese, 5-6.
95 For the following discussion event in the Levant and the Third Crusade, see Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 87-91; Heyd, Histoire du commerce, vol. 1, 310-ff.; Lopez, Storia delle colonie genovesi, 115-27.
possessions in the Levant. Following Barbarossa’s drowning in a Cilician river on 10 June 1190, Richard and Philip had some successes with the fall of Acre on 12 July 1191, but then things started to disintegrate. Philip immediately returned to France. Richard stayed in the Levant and eventually made a truce with Saladin by which the Christians were to retain Jaffa, Tyre, Acre, and land along the coast as far as Ascalon. In addition to this, the Genoese and the Pisans reoccupied their respective quarters and regained their respective privileges. In Acre, which had been designated as the Latin capital, the Genoese attempted to impose some order on their holdings by establishing two consules et vicecomites Januensium in Syria, who had jurisdiction over all the Commune’s possessions in the region.96 Regardless of these efforts, Saladin’s successes had cost the Latins in the Holy Land a great deal; the Genoese were no exception to this. Gebel and Laodicea were permanently lost, leaving the Commune with only Acre, Arsuf, Caesarea, Jaffa, Tyre, and Tripoli, while, finally, Gibellet remained in the hands of the Embriaco family, who held it independently of Genoa.

The Genoese in Constantinople had fallen on hard times, as well. Manuel Komnenos had died in 1180 and

96 Lopez, Storia delle colonie genovesi, 118.
been succeeded by Andronikos Komnenos; although he reigned for only two years, it would not prove to be a good period for Italian residents of Constantinople. Andronikos did little to protect the Geneose and Venetian quarters from the animosity of the city’s Byzantine inhabitants, which spilled over into a terrible anti-Italian revolt and massacre during his reign. Robert Lopez describes the event in these terms: “It was a terrible slaughter: women, children, the sick people of the Knights’ Hospital, no one was spared.”97 The downfall of the Italian residents in the city was so abrupt, in fact, that by 1192 the Genoese had lost all of their rights in Koparion.98 This was a momentary low point, however, because the Commune would find successive Byzantine emperors more amenable to their presence in Constantinople. In the same year, the new emperor, Isaac II Angelos concluded a treaty with Genoese ambassadors, which reestablished the Commune’s concessions in Koparion and added to them a small compound and part of a quay.99 Building on this renewed amity with Constantinople, Genoa sent an ambassador, Ottobono della Croce, to the court of Alexios III Angelos in 1201. His instructions were very

97 “Fu un macello terribile: donne, bambini, malati dell’ospedale dei Cavalieri, nessuno fu risparmiato” (Lopez, Storia delle colonie genovesi, 114).
98 Argenti, The Occupation of Chios by the Genoese, 8.
specific: discuss compensation for the goods of Genoese residents that had been damaged by Greeks and also for a public building damaged by German soldiers, demand the release of imprisoned Genoese citizens, seek a reduction in customs duties and, finally, obtain certain overdue payments.\textsuperscript{100} The emperor's reply to this embassy does not exist, but an extant protocol records that the request at least resulted in obtaining an extension of the Genoese concession.\textsuperscript{101} Whether Genoa obtained everything for which they had hoped from this negotiation is, in some ways, irrelevant, because the Genoese were on the verge of suffering an even larger setback in Constantinople than that occurring in Andronikos Komnenos' reign.

Historians have long acknowledged, and rightly so, that The Fourth Crusade (1201-4) was a major turning point in the history of both the Byzantine Empire and also of the rivalry between those Italian states wishing to take advantage of the commercial opportunities Byzantium had to offer. The events of the Crusade are well known and do not concern us here. What is important for our purposes is the devastating effect that the Crusade had on Genoese holdings in Constantinople and the Levant. The Genoese did not participate in the Crusade and paid dearly for it; they lost all of their

\textsuperscript{100} Heyd, Histoire du commerce, vol. I, 240-1.
possessions in Constantinople and were almost completely excluded from activity in the Romania for more than fifty years, while the Venetians rose to ascendancy in the region. Genoa was not willing and/or able at the time to challenge Venetian dominance, most probably due to internal problems at home and its ongoing conflict with rival Pisa over Corsica and Sardinia.\textsuperscript{102} The Commune therefore endorsed the anti-Venetian efforts of two private Genoese citizens: Leone Vetrano, who was encouraged to see what rabblerousing he could do on Venetian Corfu,\textsuperscript{103} and Enrico Pescatore, who was urged to occupy the island of Crete.\textsuperscript{104} By 1218, the Venetians and Genoese were so openly hostile to each other that Pope Honorius III had to intervene; he was sincere in his desire for peace between the rivals, but he also needed the manpower for a new crusading effort against Egypt. It was slow in coming, but Genoa and Venice finally concluded a peace treaty on 11 May 1218, which reestablished the Genoese in Constantinople with the same rights that they had enjoyed under Emperor Alexios III, in other words, before the constitution of the Latin Empire of Constantinople.\textsuperscript{105}

\textsuperscript{102} Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 91.
\textsuperscript{103} Argenti, The Occupation of Chios by the Genoese, 8.
\textsuperscript{104} Pescatore was initially successful in taking the capital city of Candia in 1206, but Venice was in firm control of the island by 1211 (McKee, Uncommon Dominion, 22).
\textsuperscript{105} Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 110.
The Venetians had become, thanks to their role in the Fourth Crusade, the dominant Italian presence in the nascent Latin Empire of Constantinople. The situation in the Holy Land, combined with the inherent weakness of the Empire itself, ensured, however, that La Serenissima would not enjoy this position for long. The aftermath of Saladin's campaigns and the subsequent debacle that was the Third Crusade left the Italian possessions in Syria and Palestine on very precarious footing.\textsuperscript{106} By the 1220s, in fact, the maneuverings of the Pisans, Venetians, and Genoese had created an extremely volatile atmosphere in which even a minor dispute could touch off a major conflagration. This was the case in 1222, when, following an unsuccessfully mediated dispute, the Pisans took matters to the streets of Acre and burned down the Genoese fondaco of the city.\textsuperscript{107} The two old Tyrrhenian rivals were at loggerheads again in 1249, eventually concluding a three-year truce with mediation from an official of the King of Cyprus.\textsuperscript{108}

One final example will serve to illustrate just how contentious the atmosphere had become. In the 1250s, the Genoese and Venetians of Acre began to quarrel over the rights to a monastery in the area; what followed was

\textsuperscript{106} For my discussion of these events, see pages 50-2 of this chapter.  
\textsuperscript{107} Lopez, Storia delle colonie genovesi, 139-40.  
nothing less than a small-scale Italian war. In 1256, the Genoese seized the monastery by force, with the aid of the Pisans, and then demolished a good deal of the Venetian quarter in the city. While the Lord of Tyre, Philip de Montfort, encouraged the Genoese to expand their attack to Venetian holdings in other ports, all the Latins of the region chose sides. The Genoese became allies with the Catalans, Anconans, and Hospitallers, while the patriarch of Jerusalem, Bohemond of Antioch, the Templars, the Teutonic Knights, and the Provençals all supported the Venetians. The Pisans joined the Venetian cause as well, which motivated the Genoese to punish the duplicity of their former ally by destroying their settlement in Acre. Genoese success, however, would be short-lived. Venetian reinforcements arrived in the form of a flotilla, which defeated Genoese resistance in both Acre and Tyre. Finally, on 24 June 1258, a fleet of twenty Genoese ships under the command of Rosso della Turca was defeated by a Venetian-led flotilla four times its size; the Genoese sued for peace. They were allowed to leave Acre with their lives, on the condition that they not return to the city for three years. The Venetians, as if to make sure that this promise was kept,

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109 For the following Genoese-Venetian confrontation, see Heyd, Histoire du commerce, vol. I, 344-50; Lopez, Storia delle colonie genovesi, 155-60.
destroyed all Genoese houses and fortifications in the city and took the stones back to Venice as spoils of war.

The jockeying for position of these age-old Italian rivals did much to threaten the peace and prosperity of their respective colonies in the Near East, but the final demise of the Italian colonial establishments in the region would predominantly be the work of the early Mamluk Sultans of Egypt. By the time that the Mamluks had seized Egypt from the Ayyûbids in 1250, western Europe was very aware of the threat this slave-based dynasty posed to Latin holdings in Syria and Palestine. In that year, in fact, King Louis IX of France completed a disastrous expedition against Egypt, during which both he and his retinue were captured and held for ransom, and only released after paying a hefty ransom and returning the city of Damietta to the Sultan. The next forty years proved to be a sustained erosion of Latin power in the Near East. Antioch fell to the Sultan Baybars in 1268, which only left Tripoli and Acre in Latin hands. The year 1270 saw another failed crusade to North Africa by King Louis IX; it was greatly hindered by stiff Muslim resistance and the plague, to which Louis himself would succumb on August 25 of that year. In 1289, Tripoli fell to Sultan Qalâ'ûn, which left Acre as the only remaining

Italian possession in the region. Finally, after a siege lasting a little more than a month, and a little less than two hundred years after their initial establishment, this last remnant of the Crusader States fell to Sultan al-Ashrat on May 18, 1291.\footnote{For more complete information on the last years of the Crusader States, see Lopez, *Storia delle colonie genovesi*, 184-8; Heyd, *Histoire du commerce*, vol. I, 355-9.} The loss of the Crusader States was a terrible shock to Christian Europe, and one over which contemporaries would spill much ink.\footnote{The *Epistolae* of Riccoldo da Monte Croce provide a very personal account of the distress some people felt upon learning of the fall of Acre. There is only one complete edition of the letters, that being Reinhold Röhrich, "Lettres de Ricoldo de Monte-Croce sur la prise d'Acre (1291)," in *Archives de l'Orient latin* 2 (1884), 258-96.} Yet, as the Genoese were slowly losing hold of their possessions in the Holy Land, contemporary developments in Constantinople and the Black Sea were greatly alleviating any lost commercial opportunities that the Near East had provided them.

Reversal of Fortune in the East: The Treaty of Nymphaeum and Reestablishment of the Byzantine Empire (c. 1204-1261)

The foundation of the Latin Empire of Constantinople in 1204 fundamentally altered the geography of what had been the Byzantine east.\footnote{The aftermath of the Fourth Crusade and the conquest of Constantinople is summarized very well in Deno John Geanakoplos, *Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, 1258-1282: A Study in Byzantine-Latin Relations* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1959), 13-5, and also in Angeliki Laiou, ed., *The
Roman and then Byzantine capital, was now ruled by a Latin Emperor, Baldwin of Flanders. Venice, consummate opportunist and beneficiary of many turns of good fortune during the conquest, was thus the recipient of large portions of former Byzantine possessions; not only did they receive three-eighths of the city of Constantinople, but also the important commercial centers of Negropont (Euboea), Gallipoli, Crete, and other islands of the Aegean Sea. The remainder of the Byzantine east was divided among other crusade participants, such as Boniface of Montferrat, who created a kingdom for himself in the area surrounding Thessaloniki, and the Villehardouin family, who set up a principality for themselves on the ancient Peloponnese, i.e. Achaia or the Morea.

The establishment of these new Frankish kingdoms and principalities did not mean, however, that the tradition of Byzantine rule was completely eliminated. Within a very short period of time, in fact, three main centers of Byzantine exiles were established not far from their


114 Crete was actually first granted to the crusade leader Boniface of Montferrat, but was transferred to the Venetians by a secret agreement: Boniface received four-fifths of northern mainland Greece and the city of Thessaloniki, Venice received Crete and the Peloponnesian cities of Modon and Coron (G. B. Cervellini, "Come i veneziani acquistarono Creta" Nuovo Archivio Veneto n.s. 16 (1908): 269-71; Thomas F. Madden, Enrico Dandolo & The Rise of Venice [Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press], 183-8).

115 Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, 13-4.
former area of control. On the southeastern shore of the Black Sea was soon established the Empire of Trebizond, which was ruled by descendents of the old Byzantine Komnenos dynasty. Although this empire would survive well into the fifteenth century, it would never achieve the power of, or play as large a part in later Byzantine history as, the following two political entities.¹¹⁶ Nicaea, a town in northwest Asia Minor, soon after the fall of Constantinople became the home to a powerful empire founded by Theodore I Lascaris, who was son-in-law of the last Byzantine emperor, Alexios III Angelos.¹¹⁷ While in western mainland Greece Michael I, an illegitimate son of the Anglelos line, founded the Despotate of Epirus.¹¹⁸ Both of these governments were strongholds of Byzantine exile and each considered themselves the rightful heir to former Byzantine lands, especially Constantinople. They thus fervently devoted themselves to the recovery of this city, a task that

¹¹⁶ For more information on the Empire of Trebizond, see William Miller, Trebizond: The Last Greek Empire (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1926; reprint, Amsterdam: A.M. Hakkert, 1968), and Anthony Bryer, The Empire of Trebizond and the Pontos (London: Variorum Reprints, 1980).
¹¹⁷ The fundamental studies of the Empire of Nicaea are the following: Alice Gardner, The Lascarids of Nicaea: The Story of an Empire in Exile (London: Methuen, 1912); and Michael Angold, A Byzantine Government in Exile: Government and Society under the Laskarids of Nicaea, 1204-1261 (London: Oxford University Press, 1975).
would take around fifty years to complete, and one that would also reconfigure the relative power of the Italian states in the region.

The years following the Latin conquest of Constantinople in 1204 saw an intense rivalry develop between the Empire of Nicaea and the Despotate of Epirus, with their ultimate goal being the recovery of the former Byzantine capital. After an initial show of power by the Epirots, during which they seized many towns including Latin-held Thessaloniki in 1224, the Despotate was soon sent reeling by the equally ambitious Bulgars.\footnote{Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, 14.} The Greek exiles in Nicaea took advantage of the opportunity with which they had been presented. Under the leadership of Theodore I Lascaris' successor and son-in-law, John III Vatatzes, the Empire of Nicaea set about harrying the inherently weak and impoverished Latin Empire of Constantinople. Orchestrating their attacks from a solid base in western Asia Minor, the Nicaean Greeks reconquered Latin holdings in the Aegean Sea, which included the islands of Lesbos, Samos, Rhodes, and Chios, and even allied themselves with the Bulgars for an attack on Constantinople itself in 1236.\footnote{Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, 15, 81-2.} The two groups did not work well together as allies and failed to take the city, but this set back did not stunt the growth of the
Nicaean Empire; Vatatzes wrested Thessaloniki away from the Epirots in 1246, took most of Macedonia from the Bulgars and the Epirots shortly thereafter, and allied Nicaea with the Seljuk Turks of Iconium.\textsuperscript{121} It was clear that the Empire of Nicaea had become the most powerful of the exiled Greek states, a fact that was confirmed when the Despot of Epirus, Michael II Anglelos, found it necessary to give up important fortifications in Macedonia and Albania and also acknowledge Vatatzes' suzerainty over Epirus.\textsuperscript{122} The Nicaeans primary goal of recovering Constantinople, however, yet remained to be achieved. The city was still under Venetian control, and unlikely to be taken from the Italian power unless the Nicaean Greeks could match their forces ship for ship and man for man. The Empire of Nicaea needed aid against the Venetians, and who better to form an alliance with than their traditional rival from Liguria?

The circumstances were right for a Nicaean-Genoese alliance. When John III Vatatzes unexpectedly died on 3 November, 1254, the Empire of Nicaea had succeeded in reclaiming all the area around Constantinople, thus making it an island of Latin control.\textsuperscript{123} It would

\textsuperscript{121} Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, 15.
\textsuperscript{122} Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, 15.
\textsuperscript{123} A good summary of these events is found in George Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1969), 434-44.
ultimately rest in the hands of the new Nicaean emperor, Michael Palaiologos, who came to the throne after the short reign of Theodore II Lascaris and under suspicious circumstances, to affect an alliance with a Latin naval power. Genoa was the most obvious choice for several reasons. The conquest of Constantinople in 1204 had made the Venetians the undisputed commercial power in Constantinople, leaving the Genoese with precious little trading opportunities in the city. In addition to this, Genoa was still feeling the effects of the Veneto-Genoese struggles for Syrian trade, which resulted in the loss of her merchant compound at Acre in 1258. Given these considerations, in the words of Deno Geanakoplos:

It was only natural, therefore, that the humiliated Genoese should look for support to Palaiologos, now coveting Constantinople, the heart of Venetian commercial interests in the East. And if Genoa could be of use to the Emperor, would it not be reasonable to assume that she would acquire the Venetian monopoly of Constantinopolitan trade? What revenge could be sweeter and more profitable?

There were risks to be weighed, such as papal censure and the reaction of parties hostile to Genoa, such as Frederick II Hohenstaufen of Sicily. Frederick had died in 1250, however, and the commercial and political interests of Genoa made an alliance with Nicaea against

124 For the events surrounding Michael’s succession to the throne, see Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, 33-46, and also Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State, 444-65.
126 Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, 82-3.
Venice too attractive to refuse. Michael and Genoa thus opened their negotiations, and the resultant treaty would both change the political geography of the eastern Mediterranean and also present Genoa with new opportunities for commercial exploitation.

It is not known for certain which party initiated the negotiations that would eventually produce the famed Treaty of Nymphaeum, but, once inaugurated, they progressed rapidly. The envoys had, in fact, signed a convention by 13 March 1261, which was ratified by Emperor Michael Palaiologos on 28 April 1261 and, on 10 July of the same year, the treaty had been ratified by all necessary Genoese authorities with only minor amendments to the convention’s original version. The provisions of the treaty are well known, and have been analyzed in detail elsewhere, but a brief listing of the most important of them here will suffice to demonstrate just how much they favored the Genoese. First, the two parties agree to a permanent peace and

127 Deno Geanakoplos presents convincing evidence that it was most probably the Genoese who initiated the negotiations, but he stops short of giving this view his full endorsement, see Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, 83-5.
128 The negotiations for, and the subsequent ratification of, the Treaty of Nymphaeum have been studied in detail by Camillo Manfroni, “Le relazioni fra Genova, l’impero bizantino e i Turchi,” ASLSP 28 (1898): 577-858.
129 Manfroni, in addition to constructing a detailed analysis of the treaty’s articles, provides a complete edition of the treaty on pages 791-809. For the following listing of the treaty’s articles, this is the edition that I have used.
alliance between them, so that they could join together in war against their mutual enemy, Venice. Second, the Genoese in the emperor’s lands would be safe in their persons and possessions. Third, Genoese merchants were granted the right to travel freely and trade duty-free in all parts of the emperor’s domain. Fourth, in the cities of Constantinople, Thessaloniki, Anea, Cassandria, Smyrna, Landrimiti, and the islands of Crete, Negroponte, Chios, and Lesbos Emperor Michael promised the Genoese a merchant compound consisting of a loggia, a building for Genoese officials, a church, a bath, an oven, a garden and merchant housing. Fifth, Michael promised that the Genoese would be subject to their own laws and to be handed over to their own officials for punishment. Sixth, the ships of war and commerce of Genoa’s enemies were forbidden to resupply or provision themselves in Byzantine waters and markets, including the Black Sea.130 Seventh, after the reconquest of Constantinople, Emperor Michael promised to return to the Genoese all rights and possessions that they had once enjoyed in the city, in addition to certain possessions currently in Venetian hands, such as the church of Santa Maria, their loggia.

130 The article mentions one exception to this prohibition, the old Genoese enemy of Pisa, who are here referred to as “fideles nostri imperii” and had an even longer relationship with Byzantium than Genoa (Manfroni, “Le relazioni,” 794-5, see also Epstein, Purity Lost, 103).
cemetery, and fortified palace. Eighth, in a display of unusual concession on the part of a Greek emperor, Michael agreed to hand over his city of Smyrna and all his rights there to the Genoese, on the condition that the rights of its clergy and loyal subjects were respected. Ninth, Michael performs an act of "cultural memory"\textsuperscript{131} by promising to present the Genoese Commune with 500 perperi and two golden pallia\textsuperscript{132} annually, while the archbishop of Genoa was promised 60 perperi and a golden pallium. Tenth, the Genoese were promised the freedom to buy and sell grain with no duty levied against them. Eleventh, Genoese ships were never to be detained. Twelfth, Genoese businessmen could expect no new taxes as they plied their trade(s). Thirteenth, all foreigners except the Genoese and the Pisans were prohibited from entering the Black Sea, unless they had been granted permission by the Genoese and had paid the necessary fees. Fourteenth, Michael promised to open the doors to his prisons and release any Genoese being held therein, provided they leave his lands.

\textsuperscript{131} The term is Steven A. Epstein's, and refers to the fact that the promise of the above monetary amounts and pallia to the Genoese had been made previously by Emperor Manuel Komnenos in 1155, and were the first commercial privileges ever granted to the Genoese in Byzantium. In reality, therefore, this provision is a renewal of privileges, not a bestowal (Epstein, Purity Lost, 104).

\textsuperscript{132} A pallium was, in its ancient meaning, was the Latin word for a rectangular cloak worn by ancient Greek philosophers, but by this time had come to represent an outer vestment worn by Latin archbishops as a sign of their office.
The above provisions of the Treaty of Nymphaeum only represent, astoundingly enough, the promises and concessions granted by the Emperor to the Genoese. What promises did the Empire receive in return? The Genoese reciprocated Byzantine promises to maintain perpetual peace, not conclude a truce with Venice and offer security to Greeks in Genoese territory, but did not offer the Byzantines any territorial concessions, merchant compounds, or judgment according to their own legal mechanisms. The Genoese were more forthcoming when it came to military aid, which was clearly the heart of the issue for the Byzantines. They agreed to offer the Emperor the possibility of hiring their nearby merchant ships, should any naval conflicts arise between the Byzantines and the Venetians or Pisans. This was not as generous of a concession as it might initially seem, considering that Genoese vessels almost certainly sailed at a permanent state of readiness for hostile engagement; there was cargo to be protected on these ships, and Genoa had many enemies. It would, therefore, be an easy task to convert a merchant ship to a ship of war, but this brings us to crux of the matter: with his ultimate goal being the reconquest of Constantinople, military aid is what Michael wanted and needed more than all else. This would explain why Michael would agree to the provisions
above, but also to the exact terms of Genoese military aid to Byzantium, all of which are heavily weighted in Genoa’s favor. The Genoese promised to provide Michael with a maximum of fifty warships, which the emperor was to provision at his own expense and could only be used against the emperor’s enemies or those nations having no treaty with Genoa.\textsuperscript{133} It is also plausible, however, that Michael agreed to such terms because he never intended to honor them in any way, shape, or form. He could always alter or nullify the agreement after he was securely on the throne of Constantinople, which is exactly what happened in 1264 when, after accusing the Genoese of treasonous behavior at court, Michael abolished Byzantium’s friendship with Genoa and sought the friendship an alliance with Venice.\textsuperscript{134}

Whatever Michael’s motivations for concluding the Treaty of Nymphaeum might have been, our concern here is the agreements effect on Genoese fortunes in the East. Steven A. Epstein has characterized the Treaty of Nymphaeum in the following terms:

\textsuperscript{133} For the long list, by his own reckoning, of those “Genoese friends” with whom the commune had agreements, see Epstein, \textit{Purity Lost}, 106-7.
\textsuperscript{134} This view is expressed in Geanakoplos, \textit{Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West}, 90-1. For the events leading up to the eventual expulsion of the Genoese and the rest of the Latins from Constantinople, see Geanakoplos, \textit{Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West}, 161-70.
The Genoese-Greek relationship was based on a mutual calculus of self-interest. Michael gave up taxes and pieces of his own empire to find the resources to fight the Venetians, and the Genoese were willing to endure being pariahs in Latin Christendom for a chance for vengeance against Venice.\textsuperscript{135}

It is true that, by concluding this treaty, the Genoese did run afoul of the Papacy. In the same year of 1261, Urban IV excommunicated the Genoese for acting contrary to the well-being of Latin Christendom. It was clearly a price they were willing to pay, because, beyond this, the pope threatened the city of Genoa with ecclesiastical interdict and their response was to make it clear to Urban that they intended to honor their agreement with the Greek emperor.\textsuperscript{136} It is also true, however, that Genoa looked to its own self-interest no less than Michael Palaiologos did to his. Their promise of aid to restore Greek control in Constantinople, even if at the expense of their Latin brethren, made good sense to the Genoese if there was profit to be found in it, and indeed there proved to be even more profit in the East than this enterprising merchant state from Liguria could have dreamed.

There was a supreme irony of the celebrated Treaty of Nymphaeum, for, although the events immediately following its conclusion would render it null and void,

\textsuperscript{135} Epstein, Purity Lost, 107.
\textsuperscript{136} The excommunication and threatened interdict are discussed by an anonymous Genoese chronicler, see AI, 4, 41-44.
the treaty still proved to be the foundation on which Genoese power in the East would be built. In accordance with the treaty’s provisions, the Genoese government quickly sent sixteen armed vessels to aid Michael’s efforts to retake Constantinople from its Latin rulers. Before the Genoese commander, Marino Boccanegra, could reach the city with his fleet, however, Michael Palaiologos was the beneficiary of good timing. His troops arrived there to find little Latin resistance and proceeded to breech its walls, enter the city and secure it with surprising speed and efficiency on 25 July 1261. The deal breaker thus became the clause in the Treaty of Nymphaeum, which Michael was careful to add, that made the Emperor’s promises to the Genoese valid only if they had aided him in Constantinople’s recovery. Whether or not Michael would have reneged on the deal in light of this clause is debatable, but he was too smart to yield to temptation, given the present circumstances. He might have now been in control of Constantinople, but he had no strong naval force of his own, which would be necessary to repel inevitable

Venetian reprisals. He therefore chose to observe strictly the terms of the treaty in order to insure Genoese naval support; indeed, one of Michael's first acts was to hand over the Venetian palace in Constantinople to the Genoese.\textsuperscript{140}

The Genoese relationship with the reestablished Byzantine Empire would not remain amicable for long. In fact, the three years following Constantinople's recovery, would see the city government of Genoa suffer a coup,\textsuperscript{141} a Venetian fleet inflict a humiliating defeat on Genoese forces at Settepozzi,\textsuperscript{142} Genoese officials accused of treason in Constantinople and, as a result, Michael expel all Genoese from the Byzantine capital.\textsuperscript{143} Yet, the ebb and flow of thirteenth century Mediterranean politics insured that the Genoese would soon be back in favor with the Byzantine rulers of the city, and, very shortly, they were. Beyond the repopulation of their merchant settlement across the Golden Horn from Constantinople, Pera, the Genoese had been promised exclusive access to the Black Sea by the Treaty of Nymphaeum, and their movement into this region initiated a second phase of Genoese expansion in the East.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[141] For the events surrounding the fall of the Capitano del Popolo, Guglielmo Boccanegra, see Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 146-52.
\item[142] Settepozzi is a small island near Negroponte.
\end{footnotes}
Eastward Expansion and the Establishment of Permanent Settlements in the East (1261-c. 1300)

"E Tanti sun li Zenoexi
e per lo mondo si distexi,
che und'eli van o stan
un'atra Zenoa ge fan."  \(^{144}\)

"And there are so many Genoese and so dispersed are they throughout the world, that wherever they go or live they create there another Genoa."

Genoese penetration of eastern areas occurred at a remarkable rate indeed, once they had achieved the status of "most favored nation" in Constantinople. Within thirty years of the Treaty of Nymphaeum, the Genoese had expanded widely across Asia Minor, the Black Sea, the Sea of Azov, the Caucasus, and the lands ruled by the Kipchak Turks, and then the Tatars of the Golden Horde.  \(^{145}\) This second phase of Genoese expansion into the East differed in an important way from the initial surge of Genoese following the First Crusade. Genoese outposts had formerly been commercial settlements founded in the middle of hostile, indigenous populations; although in


the western Mediterranean, the Genoese establishments on
Corsica and Sardinia represent well this pattern of early
Genoese expansion.\textsuperscript{146} There were no attempts to rule
these settlements from the home city of Genoa or to
integrate the Genoese settlers with the local
populations, only the desire of her merchants to exploit
their hinterlands for economic gain. What develops after
1261, however, are settlements governed according to
statutes modeled on the laws of Genoa itself, governed by
Genoese officials, and of a permanent nature. They were
well fortified, capable of self-defense, and even
occasionally became involved in the political struggles
of Genoa itself.\textsuperscript{147} The character of the Genoese

\textsuperscript{146} From as early as the tenth century, Genoa had been trading
on Corsica; by the early twelfth century, the Genoese were making
deals with the papacy to secure investment rights for the bishops of
the island (Luigi Belgrano, ed., "Registrum Curiae Archiepiscopalis
Januae," Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria 2, part 2 (1872):
9; Luigi Belgrano, ed., Annales Iauenses, vol. 1, Fonti per la
storia d'Italia, N. 11, 1099-1173 (Genoa, 1890), 18-20; Imperiale di
Sant'Angelo, Cesare, ed., Codice diplomatico della repubblica di
In 1016, the Genoese and Pisans conducted a naval assault against
Muslims on Corsica, and had certainly established trading colonies
there by the end of the eleventh century (Epstein, Genoa and the
Genoese, 15 and 26-7).

\textsuperscript{147} In 1357, Genoese Doge Simone Boccanegra sent a consul to
Caffa, an important colony on the Crimean Peninsula, for the purpose
of overseeing the strengthening of its walls (Giorgio Stella, Annales
Genuenses, 156). In 1378, the Venetians, always a thorn in the side
of Genoa, succeeded in coercing contingents of Greeks and Turks to
attack Pera; the city defended itself using its own resources
(Giorgio Stella, Annales Genuenses, 175-7). Struggles between Guelf
and Ghibelline factions in 1318 further tore Genoa apart, which had
already been reeling from civil wars. Many powers weighed in on one
side or another, including the colony at Pera, which sided with the
Ghibellines probably due to the fact that the Byzantine Emperor
Andronikos II also supported this faction's exiles (Angeliki Laiou,
inhabitants in the East also changed. No longer did they intend to return to Genoa upon the completion of the commercial venture with which they were associated, but to settle abroad with their families, hoping to achieve a better future for themselves and their descendants.\textsuperscript{148} This permanent character was especially prevalent in regards to Genoese establishments in the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea areas; indeed, it would define Genoese settlements in these regions for the remainder of her presence in the East, which came to an end with the loss of Chios to the Ottomans in 1566.\textsuperscript{149} In order to demonstrate this change, both in Genoa’s attitude towards her eastern communities and also the comportment of her citizens there, let us briefly examine two representative examples.

Genoa’s Constantinopolitan merchant community, which was reestablished with the return of Byzantine rule to the city, is an excellent example of this evolution.\textsuperscript{150} The Genoese had a merchant settlement in Constantinople as early as 1155, but age-old Italian rivalries, the hostility of the Constantinopolitan population to Latin 

\textsuperscript{148} Argenti, \textit{The Occupation of Chios}, 31.
\textsuperscript{149} Epstein, \textit{Genoa and the Genoese}, 319.
\textsuperscript{150} The secondary literature on the reestablishment and flourishing of the Genoese merchant quarter at Constantinople after the Treaty of Nymphaeum is very large. For the following discussion, I have predominantly used Balard, \textit{La Romanie génoise}, 1:105-14, and Pistarino, \textit{Genovesi d’Oriente}, 122-41.
presence and the debacle that was the Fourth Crusade had combined, by 1204, to render their community insignificant in size or influence. In the years following the reestablishment of Byzantine control in Constantinople, Genoese presence and influence in the city would be restored and even augmented. In 1267, Michael Palaiologos allowed his Italian allies to settle across the Golden Horn from the city at Galata, which became the basis for their community of Pera; growth came very rapidly. The establishment of the Genoese at Galata marked the beginning of a nearly 200 year period in which the Genoese would dominate Byzantine commerce; in fact, their run would only end when Constantinople fell to the Ottoman Turks in 1453.

151 In his standard work on the history of commerce in the medieval Levant, Heyd argues that a 1251 treaty between Venice and the Latin emperor proves that the Genoese had already reestablished their old community in Constantinople. In my opinion, however, this is hard to justify, given that, in the treaty, Venice merely allows Genoa to return to the city and name its community’s leaders; this does not necessarily mean that a community already existed at that time. The treaty’s key phrase is: “Nos quoque idem Dux pro nobis et communi Venet., quantum pro parte nostra, concedimus, quod commune Jan. et homines districtus Jan. esse debeat in Imperio Romanie, secundum quod errant tempore Alexii Imperatoris, et quod licenter uti et negotiari debeat in ipso Imperio; cum his dationibus tamen, quas dare consueverunt tempore ipsius Imperatoris, et quod permittemus, commune perfrui et gaudere possessionibus et iuribus illis, quas et que habebant in Constantinopolim tempore dicti Imperatoris, solemnibus exceptatis usque ad tempus huius pacis” (Heyd, Histoire du commerce, vol. I, 292-3; the treaty has been published in Tafel and Thomas, II, 457).

152 The official return of the Genoese to the city, and their establishment at Galata, by late 1267 is confirmed by a treaty between Michael Palaiologos and the Genoese ambassador, Franceschino de Camilla, which grants to the Genoese the right to reside there (Balard, La Romanie génoise, I:113; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, 206-7; Heyd, Histoire du commerce, vol. I, 436; Manfroni, “Le relazioni,” 672).
Pera was not only the basis for Genoese commercial predominance in Byzantium, however. Its establishment also marked a new direction in how Genoese colonies were governed in the East. From 1155 until 1204, Genoese fortunes in the city had been at the mercy of Byzantine political developments; now that they had a second chance in the Byzantine capital, they made certain to guard against this happening again in the future. Rapid economic growth in the region, therefore, was matched by the rapid strengthening of Genoese government in Pera, which would soon place the colony in a position of relative extra-territoriality with respect to Byzantium. Beyond the fact that the ruling administrator in Pera, the podestà, was sent from Genoa and merely approved by the emperor, by the early fourteenth century, it was governed according to a set of statutes drawing heavily from Genoese law, was well fortified with walls and a great tower, as well as levying its own customs. Pera had even become, by this time, the overseer of certain lesser Genoese settlements in the Black Sea. The colony had, in fact, developed such authority in Constantinople that Michel Balard has commented: "...[Pera] rapidly became

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a state within a state, taking advantage of imperial weakness, civil wars and even Byzantine enemies to obtain a prosperity commented on by all the travelers who visited it in the fourteenth and beginning of the fifteenth centuries.\textsuperscript{154} Pera’s growth into a “state within a state” would finally be complete when, on 6 May 1352, Byzantine Emperor John VI Kantakouzenos granted, by treaty, full ownership of Galata to the Genoese inhabitants of Pera.\textsuperscript{155}

A similar development was taking place in the northern Black Sea around the same time. The exact origins of the Genoese settlement of Caffa, which was located at the site of ancient Theodosia on the Crimean Peninsula, are obscure.\textsuperscript{156} In fact, even the early sixteenth century Genoese chronicler, Agostino Giustiniani, had to admit that he had no knowledge of Caffa’s origins.\textsuperscript{157} Yet, the evidence does make it clear

\textsuperscript{154} "...[Pera] rapidement devenue un Etat dans l’Etat, jouant de la faiblesse impérial, des guerres civiles et même des ennemis de Byzance pour acquérir une prospérité remarquée de tous les voyageurs qui la visitèrent au XIV\textsuperscript{e} et au début du XV\textsuperscript{e} siècle" (Balard, \textit{La Romanie génoise}, I:113-4).

\textsuperscript{155} Balard, \textit{La Romanie génoise}, I:105; Pistarino, \textit{Genovesi d’Oriente}, 131.

\textsuperscript{156} For a detailed discussion of the scholarly debate surrounding the exact date of Caffa’s establishment, see Balard, \textit{La Romanie génoise}, I:114-8, and also Pistarino, \textit{Genovesi d’Oriente}, 134-6.

\textsuperscript{157} The text is as follows: “Ecco che la Republica ha posseduto, ampliato, e forsi di nuovo edificato la città di Caffa nobilissima, e non dimeno non abbiamo certezza alcuna se il sito della città sia pervenuto in la Republica, o per via di donatione, o per via di compra, o per via di guerra...” (Agostino Giustiniani, \textit{Annali della Repubblica di Genova}, Historiae urbium et regionum Italiæ rariores, 161, n.s., 77 [Bologna: Arnaudo Forni, 1537; reprint, 1981]), 136.
that at some point between 1267 and 1275 the Genoese obtained permission from the Khan of the Tatars to establish a permanent settlement at ancient Theodosia.\textsuperscript{158}

In the following years, Caffa's population grew quickly, as did its importance as a Latin trading hub, which controlled maritime activity in the Black Sea and the trade routes running to and from the Sea of Azov. The rapidity of Caffa's growth is illustrated well by a series of notarial deeds drawn up in 1281 at Pera, which detail agreements for trading at the many Black Sea ports under the control of Caffa.\textsuperscript{159}

Also important for the discussion here is Caffa's administrative organization. The earliest evidence we have for the structure of administration at Pera is a notarial deed of 1281 in which the bankers Angelino and Daniele Guecio bring a complaint against Raffaele Embriaco before the consul\textsuperscript{160} of Caffa.\textsuperscript{161} Caffa was therefore administered by a consul, who, just like the podestà of Pera, was annually appointed by the Genoese Commune to rule and oversee the colony and its Black Sea dependencies.\textsuperscript{162} Not until the early fourteenth century,

\textsuperscript{158} Balard, La Romanie génoise, I:117-8.
\textsuperscript{159} George Ioan Brătianu, Actes des notaires génois de Péra et de Caffa de la fin du treizième siècle (1281-1290) (Bucarest: Cultura Natională, 1927), docs. 181-455.
\textsuperscript{160} The emphasis here is mine.
\textsuperscript{161} Brătianu, Actes des notaires génois de Péra et de Caffa, doc. XII, 79.
\textsuperscript{162} Fernández-Armesto, Before Columbus, 103.
however, does it appear that the consuls of Caffa had much direction from the home government, as is illustrated by a set of instructions issued to the Genoese consul in 1316. We learn from these instructions that the consul was elected annually in Genoa, had a deputy, two secretaries and two counselors under his direction, was responsible thrice weekly for the administration and execution of justice according to laws based on those of Genoa herself and, at the end of his term, was required to submit a detailed account of his administration. Consular administration of Caffa would thus persevere for the entire lifespan of the colony, which would not end until the Genoese were forced out by the Ottomans in 1475. It was a good system, and one that may have been endured as much for its necessity as for its effectiveness. Geo Pistarino writes:

The administrative organization of Caffa was complex and articulated, as had been made necessary by its function of extreme eastern cornerstone of a vast economic empire. This included [the handling of] civil and military magistracies, officers in charge of finances and officials responsible for the relations with the Tatars.

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163 The fortunes of the Genoese at Caffa were ultimately dependant on their relationship with the Mongols of the Golden Horde. In 1307, Khan Toktai attacked Caffa and forced its capitulation after an eight month siege. Only after a new Khan, Usbech, had come to power, were the Genoese allowed to return and reestablish themselves at Caffa. The near loss of their most important and lucrative Black Sea trading hub thus prompted Genoa to take a more active role in the administration of Caffa (Heyd, Histoire du commerce, vol. II, 170-2). For more information on the Khanate of the Golden Horde in general, see David Morgan, The Mongols, 2nd edition (Malden, Massachusetts; Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 125-8).

The majority of Genoese Black Sea colonies depended on it...

The settlement at Caffa was more than merely a commercial hub for the region; it was the capital of an empire in miniature, even if its dependencies were held together tenuously.

In the final analysis, therefore, the image of Caffa we are able to draw from the sources is one that closely resembles that of Pera. Both colonies were governed by an official appointed in Genoa and charged with the control of dependencies, thus creating a hierarchy of Genoese settlements on the Black Sea, some under the control of Pera, some under the control of Caffa. This style of administration was certainly more complex and structured than that of earlier Genoese settlements in the Levant; they were little more than trading compounds set up in foreign ports for the expressed purpose of commercial gain, at the mercy of local politics, and its residents had little to no recourse to Genoese legal protection. In the half century or so following the reestablishment of Byzantine power in Constantinople, these trading settlements had given way to permanent

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165 "L'organizzazione amministrativa di Caffa...era complessa ed articolata, com'era reso necessario dalla sua funzione di estremo caposaldo orientale di un vasto impero economico. Comprendeva magistrature civili e militari, funzionari preposti alle finanze ed ufficiali addetti ai rapporti coi Tartari. Da essa dipendevano gran parte delle colonie genovesi del Mar Nero..." (Pistarino, Genovesi d'Oriente, 137).
Genoese establishments that functioned nearly as Mediterranean city-states in their own right. They were loosely federated with their home city of Genoa, and deferential to local political authorities, in this case the Byzantine Empire and the Mongols for Pera and Caffa respectively, but made conscious efforts to remain distinct from both. It is going too far, in my opinion, to label these colonies “fully sovereign...on the Venetian model,” but the way in which they were organized does represent an evolution of Genoese colonial practice.

Expansion in the Aegean Sea, Privatization of Colonial Administration, and the Decline of Activity in the Eastern Mediterranean (c. 1304-1566)

"Proprietas et dominium utile et directum”

"Ownership and Direct and Profitable Dominion"

Genoa’s permanent establishment at Constantinople and in the Black Sea certainly made the acquisition of a secure settlement in the Aegean desirable. Any analysis of the conquest, and reconquest, of Chios must therefore take this motivation into account. Chios, located just a few miles due west of the Anatolian coast, was perfectly placed to function as a base for the profitable trade of

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166 This sentiment is expressed in Fernández-Armesto, Before Columbus, 101.
167 Taken from chapter fifteen of the first convention between the Commune of Genoa and the Mahona of Chios, 26 February 1347, which is published in Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, II: 38-55.
Asia Minor, as well as to guard the approaches to the Black Sea, where the Genoese were heavily invested. What is of greater concern for us here, however, is the place of Genoese Chios within the context of Genoese colonial administration in the late medieval eastern Mediterranean. The significance of Genoese Chios, within this context, is the manner in which the island was initially obtained, and subsequently administered, by means of private enterprise. The private acquisition of territory by Genoese individuals was, of course, nothing new at the dawn of the fourteenth century; it had been common practice by industrious Genoese for centuries. But, rarely was there any attempt to rule these acquisitions from Genoa itself. Chios would prove to be an exception to this general rule, and the way in which Genoa structured her government there became an original Genoese contribution to Old World colonization.

The Treaty of Nymphaeum had, as was noted earlier, granted to Genoa a loggia, government building, church, and other accommodations on Chios, but these concessions only gave the Genoese sovereignty over a small section of the island. It would take the efforts of the Zaccaria, one of the most storied of all twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

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168 Just two examples would be the Grimaldi in Monaco and the Doria in Sardinia, for more see Fernández-Armesto, *Before Columbus*, 100.
169 See above, page 67.
century Genoese families, to bring Chios truly into the orbit of Genoa. After serving as Genoese ambassador to the court of Michael VIII Palaiologos, Benedetto Zaccaria, together with his brother Manuele, were given in fief Phokaia and its valuable alum mines sometime after 1267. The probability of profit was extremely high, but the precarious position of the fief, perched as it was on the extreme western tip of Asia Minor, combined with the serious threat posed to it by numerous and aggressive enemies of Genoa, made Phokaia’s defense the immediate priority for the Zaccaria. Key to that defense was possession of the nearby island of Chios, which Benedetto had requested from the Byzantine Emperor Andronikos II Palaiologos sometime in 1304. When Andronikos proved to be slow in responding to Benedetto, the enterprising admiral wasted no time in using Chios’ key defensive position as justification for his seizure

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171 Lopez, Genova marinara, 167.

172 The area in the vicinity of Phokaia had especially been teeming with activity in the wake of the 1282 Sicilian Vespers, but the most recent episodes were the Venetian sacking of Phokaia in 1296, the expedition to Chios of the Catalans in 1292 under the command of Roger de Lauria, then that of the Almogavars in 1302-3, and also, of course, the advance of the Turks across Asia Minor (Pistarino, Genovesi d’Oriente, 129).
of the island in either late 1304 or early 1305. Andronikos' enfeoffment of Chios to Benedetto shortly thereafter may seem surprising at first glance, but, seen within the context of events taking place in Anatolia and surrounding waters, it was perhaps an offer made more out of necessity than generosity. Facing a continual surge of Turkish forces in Asia Minor and ongoing conflicts with the Catalans at sea, Andronikos lacked sufficient sea and land forces with which to confront his enemies. It is therefore reasonable to interpret Andronikos' cession of Chios to Zaccaria as an attempt to set up a Latin buffer zone against Byzantine enemies, just as Michael VIII Palaiologos had attempted to do by granting the rights of Phokaia to the Zaccaria brothers some thirty years earlier.

Whatever the reasons may have been for Andronikos' grant to Benedetto, it not only made Chios part of his ever-increasing commercial empire, but it would also establish a relationship between the island, its indigenous population and the Genoese which would endure for more than two hundred and fifty years. The initial

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173 Manuele Zaccaria had died by this time (Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, I:54) For the problem of precisely dating the grant of Chios to Benedetto, see Laiou, Constantinople and the Latins, 153.
174 This view is shared by Deno Geanakoplos, Angeliki Laiou and Robert Lopez (Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, 210-11; Laiou, Constantinople and the Latins, 153; Lopez, Genova marinara, 12-3).
agreement between Benedetto and Andronikos was that Zaccaria would receive Chios for a period of ten years and would be free from the obligation of tribute payment, but, after this period of time, control of the island would revert to Byzantium. This did not mean, however, that Andronikos was in any way relinquishing sovereignty over Chios while Benedetto held it. The Genoese were obliged, as a symbol of Byzantine sovereignty, to fly the imperial standard over all ramparts and forts on the island, and also to mention the emperor's name during official functions.

The terms of Andronikos' cession of Chios to Benedetto thus it makes clear that Genoese possession of the island was intended to be temporary and for purposes of Phokaia's defense; in other words, for the economic, not territorial, profit of the conquerors. There was indeed much profit to be made from the possession of Chios, because not only did it provide protection for Benedetto's alum mines at Phokaia, the island was also commercially valuable in and of itself as one of the few sites in the world where mastic is found. This sweet-smelling, gum-like resin, which is still found on Chios today, was highly prized in the Middle Ages as a base for

175 Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, I:55.
ointments and a chewing gum, among other things.\textsuperscript{177} Benedetto did make early efforts to honor Byzantine sovereignty on the island,\textsuperscript{178} but, given the possibilities for profit which the retention of Chios offered him, his long-term intentions for Chios soon became clear. He quickly began restoring old buildings, adding to the existing infrastructure by constructing public buildings, widening the town’s moat, and strengthening its defensive walls.\textsuperscript{179} In addition to this, a notarial act from the year 1310 demonstrates that the Zaccaria established a sort of mastic profit-sharing program for its members with remarkable speed. This act, which gives the historian rare insight into the mastic trade during the first Genoese tenure of Chios, was drawn up by the widow of Manuele Zaccaria to confirm the amount of mastic that was owed to him by law and, not being able to appear and defend the rights of her late husband and two sons on the island, appoints two merchants to go in her place.\textsuperscript{180} It is clear from this act that the harvesting of Chios’ mastic crop, as well as a mechanism for its distribution, began very soon after the Zaccaria family’s arrival on

\textsuperscript{177} Argenti, \textit{The Occupation of Chios}, I:477-8.
\textsuperscript{178} The early coinage minted by Benedetto and Martino Zaccaria on Chios, for example, bore the words \textit{Martinus et Benedictus Zacharie Sii Vicarii Imperatoris} (Domenico Promis, “La Zecca di Scio durante il Dominio dei Genovesi,” in \textit{Atti dell’Accademia Reale delle Scienze in Torino} (Turin: Stamperia Reale, 1865), 36.
\textsuperscript{179} Argenti, \textit{The Occupation of Chios}, I:55.
\textsuperscript{180} ASG, Notai Ignoti, B, IV, no. 15 (10 September, 1310); also cited in Balard, \textit{La Romanie génoise}, I:121.
the island.

The Zaccaria family's fortunes were not tied to Benedetto alone, as events following his death in 1307 show. In that year, the leadership of Chios was assumed by Benedetto's very capable son, Palaiologo Zaccaria, who was named after the dynasty to which his maternal uncle belonged.\textsuperscript{181} Palaiologo had previously served as his father's representative in Phokaia, a post to which he now appointed his cousin, Tedesio, although this appointment would be viciously contested by some members of the Zaccaria family.\textsuperscript{182} Once established on Chios, Palaiologo had the same knack for sound administration that his father had shown and brought a fair amount of prosperity to the island. In 1309, he was on good enough terms with Andronikos II that he was able to procure an extension to the imperial concession of Chios good through 1314, which was also the year of his death.\textsuperscript{183} He named his sons, Benedetto and Martino, as joint successors on Chios, and, like their family predecessors,

\textsuperscript{181} There is some dispute as to the actual relation, but it is known that Benedetto Zaccaria had, sometime after 1275, married a relative of Emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos (Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, I:54).

\textsuperscript{182} Benedetto had promised Phokaia to his half-brother, Nicolino, who demanded that Tedesio give him his rightful inheritance. An argument over financial matters led to the removal of Tedesio from office; he was replaced with Andreolo Cattaneo della Volta, who was made Nicolino's heir to Phokaia should he die without children (Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, I:56).

\textsuperscript{183} Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, I:57; Balard, La Romanie génoise, I:120-1.
ruled the island "despotically but efficiently."  

The Zaccaria family had, in fact, within fifteen years of taking control of the island, become more than merely the titular rulers of Chios; they had begun to act like a legitimate ruling dynasty that was free, for all intents and purposes, from the sovereignty of the Byzantine Empire. Philip Argenti indeed describes the defense forces employed by the family as: "holding galleys and a garrison of 1000 infantry and 600 cavalry in readiness for any emergency." This is a sizeable force, and one that the Zaccaria would use not only to secure their position on the island, but also to establish Chios, in the years to come, as a bulwark of Latin Christendom against the advance of the Turks. Martino in particular won much fame and admiration following his participation, alongside the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, in a defeat of a Turkish fleet near Chios in 1319. In that same year, Andronikos II granted the Zaccaria brothers another five year extension on Chios, and Pope John XXII established a Latin bishopric on the island in gratitude for their aid against the Turks. In 1320, Pope John granted the Zaccaria's request

184 The words are Argenti's, see Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, I:57.
185 Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, I:57.
186 For the following, see Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, I:57-9; Balard, La Romanie génoise, I:121; Pistarino, Genovesi d'Oriente, 129.
to sell mastic in the markets of Alexandria and the rest of Egypt for a two year period, because Genoa's wars at home, they claimed, had made it impossible to find Christian buyers. In 1323, John even granted an indulgence to those Christians who might die fighting the Turks in defense of Chios. Finally, in 1325, the Latin pretender to the throne of Constantinople, Philip of Aragon, Prince of Taranto, gave Martino the title "King and Despot of Asia Minor."

The success of the Zaccaria family as rulers of Chios would ironically, in the end, be their downfall. The combination of the aforementioned events and the honors that were bestowed upon the family as a result was too much for Constantinople to take. The Byzantine imperial house was humiliated by, and deeply resented the independent actions of, the Zaccaria, who had, in the estimation of Andronikos II and his court, forgotten their place as Byzantine subjects. It is not surprising, therefore, that the negotiations over another extension of Zaccarian rule on Chios proved to be the catalyst for

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187 The grant was extended in 1322 and again in 1325 (Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, I:59). This deal proved to be quite lucrative for the Zaccaria brothers, increasing their annual income from mastic to 120,000 gold pieces (Pistarino, Genovesi d'Oriente, 130).
188 The indulgence was reissued in 1325 (Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, I:59).
189 Philip had obtained the title to the throne of Constantinople when he married Catherine of Valois (Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, I:59).
190 Balard, La Romanie génoise, I:121.
hostilities between Martino and Byzantium. In 1328, Andronikos II was ousted as the result of a civil war and succeeded by the young Andronikos III Palaiologos, who used the unauthorized construction of a new fortress on Chios as a means to declare Martino in violation of the terms of the imperial cession.\textsuperscript{191} The new emperor had, in the meantime and with the help of his \textit{Megas Domestikos} (Commander-in-chief of the army) John Kantakouzenos, been using the Greek population’s animosity toward fiscal burdens placed upon them by the Zaccaria to incite a local uprising on the island itself.\textsuperscript{192} Martino, on all accounts being a man of toughness and courage, defended Chios nobly, but faced with the arrival of a sizeable Byzantine fleet off the Chian coast and aid provided to them by Greek Chian nobles, he was forced to surrender to Emperor Andronikos III. He was imprisoned and taken in chains to Constantinople, while the eight hundred men in his service were given the choice of staying on the island, provided they take an oath of allegiance to the emperor, or leaving the island with all their possessions in hand; most of them left.\textsuperscript{193} Chios had seen twenty-five years of rule by a Genoese noble family, and they had

\textsuperscript{191} Balard, \textit{La Romanie génoise}, I:121.
\textsuperscript{192} For a detailed account of the Greek population’s resistance to the Zaccaria in the last years of their rule, see Argenti, \textit{The Occupation of Chios}, I:60-5).
\textsuperscript{193} Argenti, \textit{The Occupation of Chios}, I:64-5.
done so with a certain amount of success. The Zaccaria had prospered on the island, strengthened its defenses and augmented its existing infrastructure. On a larger scale, their time on Chios had made the Genoese aware of how strategically important the island was not only as defense for vulnerable Phokaia, but also as an eastern Mediterranean trading hub and way station between their possessions in the Mediterranean and Black Seas. Chios was now firmly in the Genoese imagination and would not fade from their memory quickly.

The removal of the Zaccaria from rule on Chios left, in many ways, a political void in the eastern Aegean Sea, which would facilitate its eventual reconquest by the Genoese. The Genoese government, on the one hand, was unable to react against the loss of the island, because they had been rendered impotent by recent bouts of factional fighting in the city between Guelf and Ghibelline forces. On the other hand, Emperor Andronikos III’s choice for imperial viceroy of Chios, Leon Kalothetos, a Greek nobleman who had been one of the leaders of the anti-Genoese uprising against Martino Zaccaria, proved to be incapable of defending the island against numerous local threats.

It would be the events of the early 1340s in the

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eastern Mediterranean, however, that would directly provide the Genoese with the opportunity to recover Chios from the Byzantines. The death of Andronikos III in 1344 created a bloody civil war, between John VI Kantakouzenos, who had usurped the Byzantine throne from Andronikos III in 1341, and the regents of John V Palaiologos, Andronikos' nine year old son. The complexities of this conflict do not concern us here, but the involvement of numerous factions, which even included Umur Pasha, the Emir of Aydin, soon motivated Pope Clement VI to make ready a fleet, consisting of ships from Venice, Cyprus and Rhodes, for the purpose of ending Turkish expansion. Command of the fleet was given to none other than Martino Zaccaria, who had earlier been released from prison by Emperor Andronikos III. This, of course, drew the ire of Venice, who feared that Genoese control of the fleet would thwart their desire to control Chios; it would prove to be a well-founded concern. Martino was murdered in January of 1345 at

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195 For a detailed account of this political crisis, from which, as George Ostrogorsky claims, "the Empire was never to recover," see Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State, 499-533. The quotation is from page 509 of this work.
197 Balard, La Romanie génoise, I:122.
198 There was, in fact, a group of senators who proposed that the Republic purchase Chios from the Byzantines (Balard, La Romanie génoise, I:122).
Smyrna, after having taken it from Emir Umur, but the decisive actions of another admiral would shortly return Chios to Genoese control.

It would once again be events much closer to home that affected Genoa’s holdings abroad. Genoa had done much to quell its instability which had resulted from the previous decades’ civil war by 1346. There were, in fact, only two areas along the city’s western coastline that had not submitted to Genoa at this time, Roccabruna and Monaco, the latter of which belonged to the Genoese Grimaldi family. A fleet of twenty-nine ships, originally assembled to subdue this family’s stronghold at Monaco, was foiled in its mission when it discovered its targets had gone north to fight for the king of France. Upon returning to Genoa, the Commune reassigned Admiral Simone Vignoso and his fleet to protect Genoese interests in the Black Sea region, for which they quickly departed. The fleet, as it made its way eastward,

199 On 17 January 1345, Martino unadvisedly decided to hold a thanksgiving mass in a cathedral located in between the Latin and Turkish strongholds. A group of Turks attacked the cathedral and many worshippers were killed, including Martino (Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, I:70).
200 Simone Vignoso’s reconquest of Chios in 1346 is recounted in numerous works, which include Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, I:86-105; Balard, La Romanie génoise, I:119-26; for the account of a fourteenth century Genoese chronicler, see Giorgio Stella, Annales genuenses, 145-9.
201 An account of the long civil war which eventually led to the election of Genoa’s first doge in 1339 is found in Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 194-211.
202 The Kipchak Turks had, by now, been giving the Genoese difficulties in the Black Sea for several years, including the
encountered Pope Clement VI's predominantly Venetian and Hospitaller fleet at Negroponte, which was commanded by Dauphin Humbert of Viennois and intent on attacking their former possession of Chios in order to set up a base there for further operations. The Genoese, whatever their immediate motivations may have been,\textsuperscript{203} sailed on ahead of the Venetians and Hospitallers, reached Chios on 15 June, and had forced the besieged Byzantine forces to surrender the island's fortress, albeit on generous terms, by 13 September.\textsuperscript{204} The final conquest, or more accurately the reconquest, of the fleet shortly thereafter would be both the settlements of Old and New Phokaia, which were so heavily prized for their alum mines. Simone Vignoso and his fleet had returned to Genoa by 9 November with great fanfare. It had been a very successful expedition in many ways. The

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\textsuperscript{203} Felipe Fernandez-Armesto asserts that Vignoso and his fleet took Chios chiefly to keep it from falling into Venetian hands, while Robert Lopez believes the chronically insolvent commune of Genoa, being unable to reimburse the ship owners for their efforts against Monaco, authorized the fleet to sail to the east and "reimburse" themselves however they saw fit, even if this meant using corsair-like tactics (Fernández-Armesto, Before Columbus, 103; Robert Sabatino Lopez, Storia delle colonie genovesi nel Mediterraneo [Bologna: Casa Editrice Marietti, 2004], 261-2).

\textsuperscript{204} As specified in the treaty between Vignoso and the Greek nobility of the island, the Greeks were allowed to retain possession of all their property, save whatever was formerly Genoese (they would compensate the Greeks for this) and also two hundred houses located within the castro, which were to be sold or rented to the Genoese. An edition of both the capitulation treaty of 12 September and also the treaty between Vignoso and the Greek nobility of the island are printed in Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, II: 26-8 and 28-32.
The reacquisition of Chios in 1346 running through the ultimate fall of the island to the Ottomans in 1566 represents the last period of significant Genoese influence in the eastern Mediterranean. This is not to say that the Genoese ceased making excursions into this region, far from it; wherever there was profit to be made, Genoese merchants could be counted on, as the saying goes, to "create there another Genoa."205 The Genoese State, however, for reasons such as political turmoil at home, the advance of the Ottoman Turks and then the turning of its attention to the Atlantic Ocean, slowly extricated itself from the affairs of its eastern colonies, leaving any new territorial acquisitions

205 See above page 73, footnote 144 of this dissertation.
essentially to govern themselves. The distribution of authority among the Genoese State and the Mahona of Chios certainly embodies this assertion, but it is also clearly demonstrated by the network of Genoese acquisitions made in the East shortly after the taking of the island. Pera, the Genoese colony across the Golden Horn at Constantinople, had been in existence since 1267, but it was not until its treaty with Emperor John VI Kantakouzenos on 6 May 1352 that the colony was granted enough authority and independence to become a state within a state.\(^{206}\) The initiative of private citizens of Genoa was responsible for, in the years that followed, the acquisition of a series of islands in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean Seas, beginning with 1355 the establishment of the Despotate of the Gattilusio family on Lesbos. The same Gattilusio family then quickly acquired the islands of Lemnos and Thasos, while a cadet branch of the family took Ios, Imbros, and Samothrace, all of which were privately run by this family.\(^{207}\) Finally, in 1373 the Genoese Commune did overthrow Peter II and establish direct dominion over the city of

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\(^{206}\) This treaty granted full ownership of Galata to the Genoese inhabitants of Pera (Balard, *La Romanie génoise*, I:105; Pistarino, *Genovesi d’Oriente*, 131).

Famagusta on Cyprus, but it soon thereafter relinquished much of its authority to a consortium of Genoese noble families which governed Famagusta much as the Mahona administered the island of Chios.

There were many advantages which the Genoese could and did derive from the possession of these territories. Pera gave the Genoese the ability to monitor the maritime traffic entering and exiting the Black Sea, both their own and that of archrival Venice. Lesbos gave the Genoese a firm base from which to intervene, when their interests required it, in the affairs of Byzantium, such as when Lord Francesco Gattilusio provided aid to John V Palaiologos in his attempts to recover the Byzantine throne. The occupation of Famagusta was valuable in two ways for the Genoese: they had secured a foothold on Cyprus, thus checking the Venetian colonial presence on the island, but it also made the lucrative trade of Syria, Armenia, and even Crete, which were dominated by Venetian merchants at the time, more accessible to Genoese merchants. Finally, the possession of Chios not only provided Genoa with a convenient way-station for

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209 Pistorino, Genovesi d'Oriente, 132. Francesco had obtained the island of Lesbos as a dowry after marrying the daughter of John V Palaiologos, thus the aid (Balard, “The Genoese in the Aegean,” 161).
navigation to and from the Black Sea and provided an access point for tapping rich Anatolian trading, it also ensured the Genoese a virtual monopoly on the exportation of mastic.

The vast majority of the benefits listed above, however, are of an economic nature and well known to scholars of Genoese expansion. What has been studied far less by these scholars are the ways in which the Genoese who inhabited these establishments, which were well beyond the boundaries of the home city, actually governed them. What administrative mechanisms were put in place to assure productive and efficient governance? How did the colony communicate with its home city, as well as with foreign political entities? What are the similarities and difference between contemporary colonial governments when they are compared? The second Genoese occupation of Chios (1346-1566) and its contemporary colony of Venetian Crete provide an excellent opportunity to explore some of these questions, both because they each have a large amount of extant primary documentation, and also because they were governed in very different ways. Geo Pistarino, one of the foremost authorities on Genoese activity in the East, once wrote: "In the vast system of the Genoese Romania Chios is thus, allowing for some due difference, what Crete represents in the
Venetian *Romania*: a linchpin of the system, an economic, political, spiritual driving force.”\(^{210}\) The purpose of the following two chapters is to explore some of these “due difference,” not only between the colonies of Chios and Crete, but also between their respective home cities.

\(^{210}\) “Nel vasto sistema della *Romania* genovese Chio è dunque, fatte alcune debite differenze, ciò che Creta rappresenta nella *Romania* veneziana: un perno del sistema, un centro propulsore economico, politico, spirituale” (Pistarino, *Genovesi d’Oriente*, 132).
CHAPTER TWO

A TALE OF TWO CITIES: THE STABILITY OF THE VENETIAN AND GENOESE STATES IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES (c. 1100-1500)

Introduction

The reacquisition of Chios in 1346 presented a pressing problem. Benedetto Zaccaria had previously obtained Chios through private enterprise and private agreement with the Byzantine emperor. Now that Chios had been recovered by a fleet in the service of the Genoese State, even if it was composed of the ships of private owners, how were Chios and the two Phokaias to be administered? It was not until 26 February 1347 that the association of ship owners, calling themselves the Mahona of Chios, 211 and the Commune of Genoa reached an agreement. The two groups effectively divided the power to rule Chios and the two Phokaias between themselves. The Commune of Genoa retained for itself the merum et mixtum imperium et omnimoda jurisdictio, or the right to

211 The etymology of the word Mahona is not entirely clear. Hieronimo Giustiniani suggests that it derives from the Greek word Monos, which describes the concept of one and only, or Monas, meaning unit in Greek. Some experts of modern times argue that the Genoese word Mahona was a lexical product of the Arabic word ma'ūnah meaning company or financial institution (Hieronimo Giustiniani, History of Chios, ed. Philip Pandely Argenti [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1943], 253-4; and Philip Pandely Argenti, Chius Vincta, or The Occupation of Chios by the Turks (1566) & their Administration of the Island (1566-1912): Described in Contemporary Diplomatic Reports and Official Dispatches [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1941], xlii, fn. 2).
rule there under Genoese law. The Mahona of Chios, however, was granted proprietas et dominium utile et directum, or the ownership and right to collect taxes and exploit the land as it saw fit.\textsuperscript{212} In reality, this meant that the Mahonesi had received the right to control the two most financially important natural resources of the lands: the alum of the Phokaias and the mastic of Chios. In regard to the relationship between the governanti e governati,\textsuperscript{213} the Genoese did not remove the Greek nobility from their position of privilege on Chios, but actually confirmed it. In fact, none of these nobles were deprived of property, nor were the Greek Orthodox clergy replaced with a Latin religious hierarchy.

This was in marked contrast to the system of governance instituted by the Venetian State on Crete after they had acquired the island in the early thirteenth century. Whether it was in consideration of the island’s size, strategic location in the Mediterranean, or both, upon taking control of Crete in 1211 Venice established a system of direct, centralized rule modeled on its home government.\textsuperscript{214} The Venetian

\textsuperscript{212} See Argenti, \textit{The Occupation of Chios}, I:106-25 and 370-415; and Balard, \textit{La Romaine génoise}, I:376-86.

\textsuperscript{213} The phrase is from Alfredo Viggiano, \textit{Governanti e governati. Legittimita del potere ed esercizio dell’autorità sovrana nello stato territoriale Veneto della prima età moderna} (Treviso: Fondazione Benetton, 1993).

\textsuperscript{214} Thiriet, \textit{La Romanie vénitienne}, 180-215; and McKee, \textit{Uncommon Dominion}, 20-1.
State appointed a governor and salaried officials who served two-year terms in office and reported directly to Venice. It replaced the Greek Orthodox religious hierarchy with Latin clergy, and also imported its own settlers to populate the island. Venice maintained this highly centralized, direct system of rule for the entire 458 years in which the republic held Crete.

It has been argued that the stability of the Venetian State was the key factor in rendering the Venetians capable of holding Crete for as long as they did. It is undeniable that the strength and stability of La Serenissima were key factors in the establishment and maintenance of direct rule on Crete, but it raises an important question which will be explored in the next two chapters: how was a colonial enterprise to succeed and be sustained when carried out by a home government characterized by weakness and instability? This chapter lays the groundwork for the answering of this question by comparing the political stability of Venice and Genoa during the Later Middle Ages, the findings of which outline the stability of the former and the relative instability of the latter. There were naturally many factors, both internal and external, that could affect

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215 Mckee, *Uncommon Dominion*, 21; and O'Connell, "Venice outside the Lagoon," 5.
the stability of these governments, but, for the purpose of this examination, the causes of change are less important than the changes themselves. This comparison, therefore, will evaluate the evolution of the two cities' political institutions and the changing demographics of those who held the cities' administrative posts in terms of their effect on political order, leaving the significance of these developments in other contexts to be interpreted elsewhere. Chapter three will then proceed to examine how this variance in the political stability of the home governments could influence the administrative structure of its territorial possessions. This examination will begin with the general development of the Mahona, or a collaborative administration between the Genoese Commune and an association of private Genoese citizens, which was employed on several occasions by Genoa in the Late Middle Ages. The discussion will then focus specifically on a comparison of the direct, centralized rule of Crete by Venice with the indirect system of rule instituted on Chios by the Genoese State, known as the Mahona of Chios, which is by far the best documented of all Genoese attempts at such an institution. This comparison suggests that the Commune of Genoa, which ostensibly lacked the strength, structure, and stability of the Venetian State in the
Later Middle Ages, was able to establish and sustain effective control of Chios for over two centuries through a combination of administrative creativity, practicality, and adaptability.

Venice

The direction of political development for both Genoa and Venice was, during the High Middle Ages, generally the same as other northern Italian cities; they had each established, by 1100, a communal form of government, or a sworn association of citizens, to rule their respective city. The development of these communes differed from city to city in northern Italy, but the end result was the same: authority was concentrated in the hands of a common power, usually a small group of nobles or magnates. The communal structure in Genoa and Venice indeed developed in very different ways, and an examination of this difference in development is important for understanding the respective political stability of both cities for centuries to come.

The development of the Venetian Commune did, like

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other northern Italian cities, result in a reorganized system of rule, but, unlike Genoa and the other communes, it did not dismantle its old system of government, i.e. its ducal system; it simply incorporated new communal features into the old system.\textsuperscript{218} This is not to say that the doge retained all the powers he had enjoyed early on; the development of the Venetian Commune, in fact, represents a steady diminution of those powers. Yet, the retention of the ducal tradition of the old system helped the city to transition more easily to a new form of government by preserving a link to the past. The first indigenous doge of Venice was elected around 725, while the city was still subject to Byzantine authority.\textsuperscript{219} The early centuries of the dogeship were dominated by the Arengo, or General Assembly, which elected the doge and approved new laws, but it should be pointed out that these early doges held unlimited power.\textsuperscript{220} The Arengo was made up of noble families who increasingly tried to make the office hereditary,\textsuperscript{221} and, as Venice grew in wealth


\textsuperscript{219} Crouzet-Pavan, Venice Triumphant, 196.

\textsuperscript{220} Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, 91.

\textsuperscript{221} Among these families were the Badoer, Giustiniani, Michiel, Morosini, Contarini, as well as others (Crouzet-Pavan, Venice Triumphant, 197).
and importance in the eleventh century, more and more counselors from established noble families surrounded the doge. This culminated, in 1143, with the institution of the Council of the *Sapienti* (the Wise men), the members of which were noble, elected at regular intervals and were consulted by the doge. The creation of this council marks the official beginning of the Venetian Commune, the first reference to which comes in an act dated 1144.

The establishment of the Venetian Commune marked a steady decline in the powers of the doge and an increase in communal power, and thus also the power of the dominant families making up the Commune, which resulted in the permanent interconnection of the three entities. The Council of the *Sapienti* soon assumed the power to legislate, which opened the door for the Commune to absorb the powers of the *Arengo*. The 1172 assassination of Doge Vitale II Michiel, who had been blamed for a loss to Byzantine forces, provided an early means for the commune to augment its powers. An electoral commission was established to choose Michiel’s successor to the ducal office, which, although still nominally under the control of the *Arengo*, was in reality dominated by the Venetian aristocracy. The Doge would henceforth be

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222 Crouzet-Pavan, *Venice Triumphant*, 197.
223 Crouzet-Pavan, *Venice Triumphant*, 196.
elected by powerful members of Venetian councils, in other words, by the aristocracy.²²⁴

The Commune also steadily limited the prerogatives of the doge during this period, which can be seen in the promissio, or the oath taken by the doge setting out his rights and privileges.²²⁵ A detailed examination of these oaths, the first known of which was sworn to by Enrico Dandolo in 1192, is not necessary here, but only to trace the rapid decline in ducal political authority over the course of the Later Middle Ages and also the increasingly intense contestation for the office between the Venetian noble families.²²⁶ In fact, the doge’s powers of governance had been almost completely stripped away by the middle of the thirteenth century, and a commission was formed at the death of each doge to propose changes to the next promissio and impose further limits on the

²²⁴ Crouzet-Pavan, Venice Triumphant, 198; Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, 91-2.
²²⁵ For more information on these promissiones, and for the following discussion, see Gisella Graziato, ed., Le promissioni del doge di Venezia: dalle origini alla fine del Duecento. Fonti per la storia di Venezia (Venezia: Comitato editore, 1986); and also Thiriet, Histoire de Venise, 35-6 and 69.
²²⁶ The election of Riniero Zeno as doge in 1268 provides an illustrative example of the lengths to which the commune would go to ensure an honest and forthright ducal election. The Great Council drew lots to select thirty of its members, who chose nine of that group to nominate forty electors. Twelve of the forty were then selected by lot to choose twenty-five members, who reduced their number, by lot, to nine. These nine then selected forty-five members to choose eleven of their number, by lot, who then chose forty-one electors to vote for the next doge from among those nominated. This complicated process would usually take several days to complete, but one would think that this complexity would make it very difficult to rig an election in the favor of any one faction of the Council (Crouzet-Pavan, Venice Triumphant, 199).
next doge's rights and privileges. The process was complete by the year 1501, when, at the death of Doge Agostino Barbarigo, a commission of *inquisitori* was established to bring proceedings or levy fines against, as well as to evaluate the performance of, the late doge; the forming of similar commissions for the same purpose would become a regular occurrence after the death of future doges.

The importance of the doge's role in the actual governance of Venice thus grew smaller and smaller as the Middle Ages progressed, but there is more than one way to exercise authority. Elisabeth Crouzet-Pavan touches upon this point when she writes:

Magistrates were usually appointed for a one-year term in the Republic; the doge alone remained and knew the city's secrets. He presided over the councils and possessed the right to propose laws and defend suggested legislation. His ability to influence events was strong in spite of all, and he held considerable potential power, many examples of which are reported in the chronicles.

This "potential power" could take many forms, such as when Marino Sanudo laments the absence of Doge Agostino Barbarigo from council meetings due to illness, without whose decisiveness the meetings did not accomplish much of anything. The point is that the doge's real power

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227 Crouzet-Pavan, *Venice Triumphant*, 198.
229 Crouzet-Pavan, *Venice Triumphant*, 200.
during the Late Middle Ages lay in what he represented: both a symbol of continuity between the old Venetian ducal system of governance and the new system of communal governance, and also of God’s special relationship with Venice. Edward Muir has indeed demonstrated that, by the thirteenth century, the figure of the doge had been elevated to a place of privilege in the imagination of the Venetian State. Venetian historical memory imagined him, correctly or incorrectly, as the ancient font of the city’s claims to political power and independence, and had placed him at the center of a series of rituals designed to alleviate the inherent tensions in its political system.  

Debra Pincus, building upon the work of scholars such as Muir, has recently studied the development of the ducal office in the fourteenth century. Her examination of four fourteenth-century doges’ tombs led her to conclude that the office was reformulated in the years following the famous Venetian Serrata of 1297 to portray the doge as a revealer of God’s divine plan and a symbol of His special relationship with the city. In fact, the image of a ducal connection to the divine became so strong over the

232 The Serrata will be discussed in more detail later in this section.
course of the next two centuries that, by the sixteenth
century, its exclusion from a doge's representation was
unimaginable.\textsuperscript{233} Crouzet-Pavan writes:

Politics operated on two levels. On one level the doge
was the agent of a symbolic system, and by his presence
he maintained the pertinence of that system in the
sociopolitical sphere. On a second level, however,
Venetian equilibrium depended on the complexity that he
added to action and decision making. The strength of the
system probably lay in this active dialectic between the
symbolic and the real.\textsuperscript{234}

The doge's powers of actual governance may have been
eroded over the course of the Later Middle Ages, but he
still held an important symbolic place in the mechanisms
of Venetian government and was a visual representation of
its continuity, both of which served to stabilize and
strengthen the system.

A discussion of the rising power of the Venetian
Commune in the Later Middle Ages is really a discussion
of the rise to power of the various councils emerging out
of the original Venetian council, the Council of the
Sapienti. The Arengo, or Venetian General Assembly, had
been rendered almost completely impotent over the course
of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries as the authority
of the commune steadily increased, with the institution

\textsuperscript{233} Debra Pincus, "Hard Times and Ducal Radiance: Andrea Dandolo and
the Construction of the Ruler in Fourteenth-Century Venice," in
Venice Reconsidered: The History and Civilization of an Italian City-
State, 1297-1797, ed. John Jeffries Martin and Dennis Romano
(Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 89-
136.

\textsuperscript{234} Crouzet-Pavan, Venice Triumphant, 201.
of the Council of the Sapienti in 1143 and the ducal election reform discussed above playing a large part in this dispossession of authority.\textsuperscript{235} The assembly that had formerly held full responsibility for the election of the doge had, by the middle of the thirteenth century, been reduced merely to acting as a rubberstamp. Emerging in its place were a group of councils including what came to be known as the Great Council, which really meant the great families of Venice, who would dominate the city's politics and political institutions by means of these councils for the remainder of the Middle Ages.

The development of this system of councils can be traced back to the twelfth century, specifically to 1178, when the Minor Council was created to serve the large assembly which would later be known as the Great Council.\textsuperscript{236} The addition of numerous magistracies soon followed, which further diversified and complicated the administrative functions of the government. The finances of the commune were managed by a group of camerarii, who were in turn supervised by the Procurators of San Marco. Civil and commercial justice was administered by a group of judges called the \textit{curie iudicum}; the administration of

\textsuperscript{235} The reference is to Elisabeth Crouzet-Pavan's description of the diminution of the Arengo's authority as a "dispossession" (Crouzet-Pavan, \textit{Venice Triumphant}, 201).
\textsuperscript{236} For what follows, see Lane, \textit{Venice, A Maritime Republic}, 92-3 and 103-17; and Thiriet, \textit{Histoire de Venise}, 35-6 and 70-8.
criminal justice was reserved for the doge and his counselors. An *advocator communis* was appointed to safeguard the laws of the commune, no matter the nature of the case, and a group of *visdomini* became responsible for police matters. There were, in addition to the above communal offices, neighborhood offices, such as the Procurators of the Commune, who each represented one of the six *sestiere*, or city districts, and served on the Minor Council. In all cases the filling of these posts was the prerogative of the Commune alone, and service in these positions was for a fixed length of time and mandatory, with refusal earning the nominee a hefty fine.

The basic structure of this system of councils and magistracies was in place by the middle of the thirteenth century. The Great Council had, by this time, become the primary organ of legislation for the Venetian commune, and would grow larger and larger as the years passed. The Great Council grew so large, in fact, that it had to delegate some of its functions to other councils, such as the Council of Forty, or *Quarantia*, and the Council of the *Rogati*, or the Senate. Governmental offices also

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237 This council was established between 1207 and 1220, and comprised of three *capi*, or heads, who were automatically members of the Minor Council (Crouzet-Pavan, *Venice Triumphant*, 204).

238 The Senate was set up after the *Quarantia*, and had sixty members, who were all on the Great Council. It was originally established to deal with commercial and maritime affairs exclusively, but was given additional responsibilities in the early fourteenth century, such as matters of international affairs, defense and diplomacy (Crouzet-Pavan, *Venice Triumphant*, 203).
grew in number, as the numerous magistracies and courts mentioned above each created new subordinate offices when circumstances necessitated it. The increasing number of these institutions may have become, as Andrea Padovani describes it, a frequently remodeled and complex organization of courts and offices that had overlaps in responsibilities and jurisdictions, but it was a relatively strong, stable, and responsive system, as events in successive centuries would prove.

Venice's late thirteenth-century response to the trials and tribulations it had experienced in the preceding decades provides an excellent example of the system's ability to withstand and adjust effectively to unsettling political conditions. The establishment of the Latin Empire of Constantinople in the early thirteenth century had exponentially increased Venetian wealth and prestige, but the city's fortunes changed as the century progressed. The reestablishment of Byzantine control in Constantinople combined with a Genoese victory over Pisa in 1284 rendered Venice's archrival a serious threat to its continued dominance of, and even its participation in, eastern trade. Rivalries with Ancona

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and Bologna, as well as a conflict with Hungary over the port city of Zara, were also challenging Venetian superiority in the Adriatic. These troubles abroad naturally affected the well-being of Venice itself, which increasingly experienced monetary instability, economic contraction, food shortages and general unrest.\textsuperscript{240} The middle of the thirteenth century also experienced uprisings of the popolo, or "people," in many Italian towns, and Venice was no exception; riots broke out in the city in 1266 and 1275.\textsuperscript{241} These riots were rapidly brought under control, and little more than lip service was paid to the guilds’ grievances, but they demonstrate well the high level of political tension in the city during the later decades of the thirteenth century.\textsuperscript{242}

\textsuperscript{240} Pincus, "Hard Times and Ducal Radiance," 90.

\textsuperscript{241} The literature on the rise of the popolo is vast, but the following works are a good starting place for more information on the subject: Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 135-87; Hyde, Society and Politics in Medieval Italy, 104-18; Lauro Martines, Power and Imagination: City-States in Renaissance Italy (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), 45-58; Giovanni Tabacco, The Struggle for Power in Medieval Italy: Structures of Political Rule, trans. Rosalind Brown Jensen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 222-36; and Waley, The Italian City-Republics, 131-43.

\textsuperscript{242} The rise of the popolo is an important event in the history of many northern and central Italian cities, but the people were never able to exert as much influence on Venetian politics as they did in other cities. The guilds in Venice, which were the popolo expressed in institutional form, were given certain rights to govern themselves, but were overseen by a magistracy that was comprised exclusively of nobles. The popolo threat to the nobility was then extinguished in 1275, when the promissio of the new doge, Jacopo Contarini, was amended to include a statement prohibiting guild members from carrying weapons (Gerhard Rösch, "The Serrata of the Great Council and Venetian Society, 1286-1323," in Venice Reconsidered: The History and Civilization of an Italian City-State, 1297-1797, ed. John Jeffries Martin and Dennis Romano [Baltimore,
Venice's response to this political tension has long been known as the Serrata, or the Closing, of the Great Council.\textsuperscript{243} Recent scholarship on this pivotal time in Venetian history has rejected the long-held belief of earlier historians that the 1297 reorganization of the Council's membership was the decisive constitutional change that gave birth to the Venetian Republic, in favor of a more nuanced view which sees the establishment of the Republic as part of a longer series of reforms.\textsuperscript{244} These scholars have furthermore redefined the Serrata in the context of Venetian history by placing it at the beginning of a period during which Venice adapted, reevaluated, and modified its political institutions in light of recent troubles, thus deviating from the older historiography which viewed it as the endpoint of the city's political turmoil.\textsuperscript{245} The growing role of the

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\textsuperscript{243} Caveat lector: the secondary literature on this famous period in Venetian history is too vast to attempt a listing of even the most significant works here. I will therefore only list appropriate citations as the following discussion progresses. Frederic C. Lane has traced the first use of the word serar or serata in this context back to fourteenth century Venetian chroniclers (Frederic Chapin Lane, "The Enlargement of the Great Council of Venice," in \textit{Florilegium Historiale: Essays Presented to Wallace K. Ferguson}, ed. J.G. Rowe and W.H. Stockdale [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971], 237-42 and 255).


\textsuperscript{245} This is the contention of numerous Venetian historians, among whom are included Stanley Chojnacki, Victor Crescenzi, Debra Pincus and Gerhard Rösch, see Stanley Chojnacki, "Social Identity in Renaissance Venice: The Second Serrata," \textit{Renaissance Studies} 8 (1994): 341-58; Victor Crescenzi, "Esse de maiori consilio": Legittimità civile e
popolo in Venetian government during the first half of
the thirteenth century had increased not only the
percentage of "new men" holding seats in the Great
Council at the expense of the established noble families,
but also the Council's total number of seats. The
increasing diversity of its members' social class had, by
the second half of the century, created a tense political
atmosphere among Council members in which factional
alliances and conflicts were commonplace. This political
situation elicited a response from the well-established
Venetian noble families by which they would limit and
eventually "close off" the admission of "new" families to
the Council. There were reforms proposed to this end
which aimed to modify and control how the Council was
constituted in 1286 and 1296, but both proposals were
rejected.

The adopted reform program of 1297, which would
later become known as the Serrata of the Great Council,

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Gerhard Rösch has studied the elections of Great Council members in the thirteenth century and found that fifty-five percent of those men elected in the second half of the century had non-noble names, while the total number of seats had increased at least ten times by mid-century (Gerhard Rösch, Der venezianische Adel bis zur Schließung des Großen Rats: zur Genese einer Führungsschicht, Kieler historische Studien, Vol. 33 (Sigmaringen: J. Thorbecke, 1989), 112-67.

Crouzet-Pavan, Venice Triumphant, 212; Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, 212; and Rösch, "The Serrata of the Great Council and Venetian Society," 72-3.
was therefore not even the first proposed reform but only the first plan to be accepted, thus corroborating the above scholarly reinterpretation. The reform henceforth restricted membership only to those families that had held a seat on the Council during the past four years and then only to legitimate heirs within these families.\textsuperscript{248} There is still intense scholarly debate over the short- and long-term effects of this legislation, but it does represent, within the context of this chapter, one of many steps in a nearly forty year long process by which the ruling class of Venice worked within its governmental system to resolve political conflicts and factionalism that may have otherwise led to civil war.\textsuperscript{249} The very fact that the Council made attempts to reform its own electoral procedure numerous times prior to 1297, even if

\textsuperscript{248} There were two additional categories of membership: first, those who had formerly been council members, but, due to absence from the city, had been forced to give up their seats could ask for reinstatement from the Quarantia; twelve votes from its members could return the applicant to the Great Council. Second, a small number of "new men" could henceforth be granted membership in the Council, but it was a complicated process involving nomination by a commission and approval by the Quarantia. The intention of such a process was clearly to make a "new man's" access to the Council more difficult, but the fact that he still had a point of access leads me to believe that calling the 1297 reform a closing of the Great Council is going too far (Crouzet-Pavan, Venice Triumphant, 213; Rösch, "The Serrata of the Great Council and Venetian Society," 73).

\textsuperscript{249} The initial effect of an increase in the total number of Council members combined with the concentration of access to the Council in the hands of only the most distinguished families in the long term has divided scholarly opinion as to the intentions behind the Serrata: was it intended to limit access to only the most distinguished families, or was it an effort to extend membership to a larger number of distinguished families? For a discussion of the scholarly debate, see Rösch, "The Serrata of the Great Council and Venetian Society," especially 68.
they were unsuccessful, demonstrates this well enough.\textsuperscript{250} Yet, the assertion is strengthened when we observe that it would take many more reforms spread over the next twenty-six years before the nobles achieved their goal of closing off the political elite in 1323.\textsuperscript{251} Political tension in Venice certainly did not disappear in the wake of these reforms, as we will see below, but the city’s government had managed to maintain its functionality in the face of a serious challenge from the popolo and its “new” families; indeed, similar challenges had significantly altered or even collapsed the governments of other Italian cities in the thirteenth century.

A closer examination of the proposed changes to the Great Council’s electoral procedure in the last years of this century also demonstrates how, in this instance, the Venetian government attempted both to respond to external threats and also to resolve its own internal structural problems. Procedures for election to the Great Council, prior to 1297, had two parts: a group of electors nominated candidates, which was followed by a vote in the Great Council.\textsuperscript{252} The electors were chosen by those

\textsuperscript{250} In fact, one is able to distinguish no less than sixty-five different resolutions relating to electoral procedures prior to the Serrata (Roberto Cessi, Deliberazioni del Maggior consiglio di Venezia [Bologna: N. Zanichelli, 1931], II:88-101).

\textsuperscript{251} For a listing and discussion of these reforms, see Rösch, “The Serrata of the Great Council and Venetian Society,” 74-7.

council members who were leaving office, which gave the sitting session of the Council great influence over the composition of the incoming session. There were, moreover, two categories of council members: those who were elected to the Council according to regular election procedures, and those who were council members by virtue of their office (thus called *ex-officio* members) among whom were included the doge, members of the Quarantia and the Senate, as well as other high-ranking state officials. It was a common occurrence, given the nature of its members' social statuses, that a regularly elected member was *post factum* named to a high state office, thus transferring his membership classification in the Council to *ex-officio* and necessitating a by-election to fill his old regularly elected seat. The composition of the Great Council was therefore in a constant state of change, due to not only the normal turnover caused by regular elections, but also the inter-institutional movement of members within a given session of the Council.

A significant number of people within the circles of Venetian government held the opinion that the Council's election procedures needed modification, as is made clear by the numerous proposals to that end which were introduced in the last decades of the thirteenth century. The Deliberations of the Great Council, which were
published by Roberto Cessi, record a failed proposal on 3 October 1286 that all regularly elected members of the Senate and the Great Council should be confirmed by a majority of the Quarantia prior to their taking office.\textsuperscript{253}

Another failed proposal on 5 October 1286 suggested that membership in these councils should be henceforth limited only to those men whose fathers and grandfathers had previously served on them.\textsuperscript{254} Yet another failed proposal on 17 October 1286 suggested that approval by a joint meeting of the Quarantia, Senate, and Doge’s Council be required for all nominations to the Council.\textsuperscript{255} It was only after the rejection of these proposals and others that the famous electoral reforms discussed above were adopted on 28 February 1297.\textsuperscript{256} An interesting feature of these proposals, including even that of 28 February 1297, is that none of them attempt to exclude “new” men from council membership, but only to make their election more difficult and make them more dependent on well-established noble families. It is therefore incorrect, in my opinion, to assert that these proposed reforms of election procedures constitute a “closing” of the Great Council for the simple reason that they do not prohibit

\textsuperscript{253} Cessi, Deliberazioni, III:156, no. 119.
\textsuperscript{254} Cessi, Deliberazioni, III:156-7, no. 120.
\textsuperscript{255} Cessi, Deliberazioni, III:157, no. 123.
\textsuperscript{256} See pages 119-20 in this chapter.
the election of "new" men to its ranks.\textsuperscript{257} This interpretation was, in fact, the result of fifteenth century historians projecting the political events of their own day backwards onto the late thirteenth century.\textsuperscript{258} If this explanation is rejected, however, then to what are we to attribute these electoral reforms of the Great Council?

There are two more convincing, and simpler, explanations for the restructuring of the Great Council's election procedures at this time. The first involves the external pressures being exerted on Venice that came with two wars waged simultaneously against Genoa and Padua. Genoa, which had reached the pinnacle of its Mediterranean-wide prosperity in the late thirteenth century, had been in a fierce war with Venice since 1294 and proven to be a worthy adversary. Lasting Venetian dominance of Padua would not come for another century, but Venice's deployment of troops to protect its commercial interests had, by this time, instigated a war

\textsuperscript{257} This has become the accepted interpretation by the vast majority of scholars, but here I cite Rösch, "The Serrata of the Great Council and Venetian Society," 73.

with this ardently independent commune which was consuming large amounts of Venetian resources.\textsuperscript{259} It seems only logical under these circumstances that Venice would desire to have politically experienced men sitting on the Great Council, in other words, men who were familiar with recent political events and were thus in a good position to make informed decisions concerning the welfare of the commune. The proposed electoral reforms above, if viewed within this context, can be interpreted as a prudent attempt to preserve some level of political continuity within the Council and thus facilitate the government's ability to maintain order at home and preserve Venetian interests beyond the Lagoon.\textsuperscript{260}

Secondly, Roberto Cessi has suggested that the reforms may have been proposed as a way of resolving a structural flaw in the Great Council itself.\textsuperscript{261} The problem stemmed from the large number of \textit{ex-officio} council members, which made it possible for them to outvote the one hundred regularly elected members and

\textsuperscript{259} James Grubb, \textit{Firstborn of Venice: Vicenza in the Early Renaissance State} (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press), 6-8.

\textsuperscript{260} This argument is also found in Rösch, "The Serrata of the Great Council and Venetian Society," 73. Its clearest articulation, however, may be found in Frederic Lane's article, where he asserts: "Rather than translate it (Serrata) as the 'Closing' which implies exclusion or locking out, it would be better to translate it as the 'Locking in' of the great council, reassuring, in a moment of national emergency, all members already in the ruling class that they would not be left out in the future" (Lane, "The Enlargement of the Great Council," 255).

\textsuperscript{261} For what follows, see Cessi, \textit{Deliberazioni}, I:xiv-xx.
thus dominate the leadership of Venetian government. The enacted reform corrected this flaw by allowing the Council to be expanded indefinitely as a safeguard against the complete dominance of government by the ex-officio members. This procedural change was not, however, at the expense of the office holding council members' power, because it was the doge and his councilors who set the number of council members, while the electors compiled a list of candidates which was then approved by the Quarantia. It is easy to see how the Council's membership structure in this form would have had serious political implications. It is therefore perfectly reasonable to explain the numerous electoral reforms proposed in the last decades of the thirteenth century as attempts to emend this serious procedural problem. There is no doubt that the increasing number of "new" men on the Great Council in the second half of the thirteenth century was a growing concern for the established noble families, but the exclusion of these "new" families from the Council is not the only possible explanation for the interest in reforming its electoral procedures at that time. The Council would eventually be closed to "new" families, but only following a long reform process that culminated in 1323, when it was declared that henceforth only men whose ancestors had
served on the Council were eligible for admission. This discussion of late thirteenth-century Venetian government and politics was intended to highlight Venice’s ability to work within its governmental system to confront internal and external threats to its stability and resolve them successfully.

The establishment of the commune on a solid base of councils, magistrates and offices gave the Venetian administrative apparatus the flexibility necessary to adapt and respond to changing circumstances, whether internal or external to the commune. This flexibility would come to characterize the Venetian State during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, when age-old rivalries and new territorial conquests would make the establishment of new, more specialized offices necessary. The Senate was the main focus of this growth in government, and, as a result, during these centuries it became the primary legislator and governor of Venice. Its duties had in fact increased to the point, by the early 1360s, that it was necessary to create a commission, or zonta, of sixty nobles to aid the Senate in their responsibilities.²⁶² In addition to this, three commissions were added to the Senate over the course of these two centuries to aid the Senators in matters of war

and expansion: the Savi del Consiglio,\textsuperscript{263} or Savi Grandi; the Savi di Terra Ferma,\textsuperscript{264} or Savi della Guerra; and the Savi agli Ordini.\textsuperscript{265} The members of these commissions, or the savi, were all prominent nobleman, whose seats quickly became some of the most prized and honored in the entire government.\textsuperscript{266} The creation of these commissions marks an important innovation in Venetian administration, not only because these "sages" helped to relieve the Senate's ever-increasing work load, but also because it demonstrates the ability of this administration to adapt to pressing needs and shift power to where it was needed.

The distribution of communal power was altered again

\textsuperscript{263} The Savi del Consiglio, by far the most prestigious of the three commissions, was comprised of six members and established sometime after 1380 to aid the Senate in the extra work generated by the last of the late medieval Venetian-Genoese conflict, or the War of Chioggia. It was created specifically to prepare the Senate's agendas and resolutions, as well as to handle matters of defense (Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, 254).

\textsuperscript{264} The Savi di Terra Ferma was made up of five members and created between 1420 and 1430 to handle matters of war and the mainland, in which Venice was increasingly taking an interest at this time (Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, 254). For a detailed discussion of the establishment of a Venetian territorial state on the Italian mainland, see Grubb, Firstborn of Venice, especially 3-13.

\textsuperscript{265} The Savi agli Ordini were the least prestigious of the three consigli, and to it were delegated responsibilities of a maritime nature, which included commerce and overseas colonies (Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, 254-5).

\textsuperscript{266} The late medieval Venetian historian Marino Sanudo provides evidence for the rapid rise in prestige of the Savi del Consiglio, whom he describes as: "sono sie di primi, et principali della Terra," and that they "vanno ogni mattina...in Collegio dal Principe et Signoria, dove hanno loco deputato appresso i Cai di 40." It must be remembered that this was only written a little more than one hundred years after the establishment of the first of these three consigli (Marino Sanudo, De origine, situ et magistratibus urbis Venetae, ovvero, La Città di Venetia (1493-1530), ed. Angela Caracciolo Aricò, Collana di testi inediti e rari, 1 [Milan: Cisalpino-La Goliardica, 1980], 93-4).
in the first half of the fourteenth century with the establishment of yet another council, the Council of Ten. This council was originally created as an ad hoc, temporary institution meant to restore public order following the Tiepolo-Querini conspiracy of 1310. Indeed, it most probably would have remained only a temporary council had a later doge, Marino Falier (r. 1355), not led a conspiracy of his own, in which he tried to recover power for the dogeship, and himself, at the expense of the councils of noblemen. These episodes of

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267 The following description and discussion of the Council of Ten’s development has used: Crouzet-Pavan, Venice Triumphant, 208-9; Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, 115-7; Rösch, “The Serrata of the Great Council and Venetian Society, 1286-1323,” 67-88; and Thiriet, Histoire de Venise, 74-6.
268 The events of the Tiepolo-Querini conspiracy follow the death of Doge Giovanni Dandolo in this year. The Venetian popolo, or commoners, demanded that Giacomo Tiepolo, be elected as the next doge, but, fearing the election of a Tiepolo as doge for the third straight generation, the old noble families of the city forced Giacomo to flee the city until the new doge was chosen. Giacomo’s son, Baiamonte, quickly sought to avenge the slight to his father by joining in a plot to murder the newly elected Doge Pietro Gradenigo with Marco Querini, who felt unjustly blamed by the Gradenigo and Dandolo families for a military defeat he had suffered while in command at Ferrara. The plot was soon discovered, however, and Marco Querini was killed in the fighting which followed. The palazzi of the Querini and Tiepolo were then razed to the ground, while their former residents were all exiled (Rösch, “The Serrata of the Great Council and Venetian Society,” 81; and Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, 115-6).
269 In fact, Falier had even greater ambitions than this, desiring to overthrow the city’s prominent nobles and make himself the Lord and Master of Venice. He put his plot into action only several months after becoming doge in early 1355, when he enlisted the help of two commoners, Bertuccio Isarello and Filippo Calendario, to assemble a force of 800 men to meet at the ducal palace on the night of April 15. It did not take long for things to go wrong, however, because few of the potential participants agreed to take part in the plot, while others informed their noble friends of the two men’s intentions. Subsequent inquiries into the matter traced the plot all the way up to Falier, who was arrested along with Isarello and
social unrest motivated the Great Council to make the Council of Ten permanent, which was done by official decree on 20 July 1355. The Council was actually made up of sixteen members, but the doge and his counselors were members by right of office; it was from the ten members chosen from among the most prominent senators, all required to be from different families, that the council derived its name. The primary function of the Ten was to ensure state security, which was clearly a high priority for Venice in light of the city’s political problems in the early fourteenth century. The Ten chose to interpret their raison d’être very broadly, however, and thus began to involve itself in a wide range of affairs on all levels of Venetian government and society, many of which were hardly relevant to their initial charge.\textsuperscript{270}

The Ten came into ever-increasing conflict with the Great Council in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries over questions of jurisdiction. Its secretive and broadly based dealings had, by this time, earned the Council a reputation as a sort of pre-Orwellian police

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\textsuperscript{270} Just a small sample of these include the Ten’s involvement in the control of the city’s corporations and confraternities, supervision of the Venetian Zecca, or Mint, and regulation of strategic resources, such as forests and mines (Crouzet-Pavan, Venice Triumphant, 208).
organization which was everywhere and knew all things.\textsuperscript{271} The Ten's creation of a special zonta to deal with especially serious matters, as well as its establishment of offices such as the Executors against Blasphemy and Inquisitors against the Propagation of Secrets,\textsuperscript{272} only strengthened this reputation during these centuries. The Great Council, to be sure, did not stand idly by and watch the Council of Ten expand its powers, but all the statutes and decrees it issued against the Ten did little to curb the growing role it played in political decision-making. In fact, the trend towards concentration of political power in ever-smaller, more exclusive councils was completed by the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, when the affairs of state were handled mostly by the Signoria,\textsuperscript{273} the Council of Ten, the Savi del Cosiglio, and the Savi di Terra Ferma.\textsuperscript{274}

\textsuperscript{271} The depiction of the Council of Ten as a terror organization is discussed in Thiriet, 
\textit{Histoire de Venise}, 75-6.


\textsuperscript{273} The Signoria was a term used to refer to the most powerful and prestigious of all small councils, and was comprised of the doge, the Minor Council and the three capi of the Quarantia (Thiriet, 
\textit{Histoire de Venise}, 68).

\textsuperscript{274} Finlay, \textit{Politics in Renaissance Venice}, 59-81.
The locus of power had thus shifted once again in Venetian government. This is not to say, however, that the Great Council had lost any importance in the larger context of the Venetian State. It was still, at the end of the fifteenth century, the foundation on which all other organs of government had been built. Crouzet-Pavan rightly states that:

Sovereignty emanated from the Council, even the sovereignty invested in the narrow, exclusive, and restricted highest governing circle. Laws, including those that had been deliberated by other bodies such as the Senate, were voted by the Great Council. It was from within the Great Council that the consuls who represented Venice on the Terraferma and the officials of many of the principal magistracies were elected.²⁷⁵

These points are all well taken, and ones that help to shed light on the workings of the Venetian administrative structure. The Venetian Commune was, on the one hand, grounded in traditional institutions such as the office of the doge and the Great Council, which provided a certain level of strength and stability to the entire governmental infrastructure. The locus of power within that infrastructure, on the other hand, was far from immutable, and steadily became concentrated in smaller, more exclusive institutions as the years passed. It would be incorrect to assume that this trend represented a shift of power from a larger to a smaller proportion of

²⁷⁵ Crouzet-Pavan, Venice Triumphant, 209.
the Venetian population, because power had, in reality, been concentrated in the hands of a small number of the city’s families since time immemorial. What is important here is the flexibility of the system, which allowed Venice to adapt to changing political and societal conditions. The late medieval Venetian State was, therefore, simultaneously static and dynamic; thus, Venice’s political stability may have given rise to the city’s famous “myth,” but her institutional flexibility made the perpetuation of that “myth” possible. But how does the development of Venetian government compare to that of Genoa during the same period?

Genoa

The Genoese Commune was formed in the aftermath of the Investiture Controversy, between 1087 and 1099, during which time the city’s people had supported the ecclesiastical reform efforts of Popes Gregory VII and then Victor III, while Bishop Conrad of Genoa had sided with the imperial cause. The formation of the Commune was most probably a voluntary oath between Genoa’s original seven compagne, or neighborhoods, its bishop,
and nobility.\textsuperscript{277} Political authority in Genoa, like most other northern Italian cities in the Early Middle Ages, had been concentrated in the hands of local magnates and the bishop, who was usually a member of one of these noble families.\textsuperscript{278} As the bishop’s power waned in the course of the eleventh century, the oath was, therefore, probably meant to impose some structure of power on a city suffering from a lack of strong authority.\textsuperscript{279} This is similar to other northern Italian cities, such as Florence, Padua, and Milan, which formed their communes as new organizations for the purpose of wresting authority away from local lords or bishops.\textsuperscript{280} It does not, however, necessarily signify the wholesale collapse of the bishop’s power in the city; there is no evidence for this. The initial Commune was more likely a superstructure imposed upon the previously independent governments of the seven local compagni, which each sent representatives to the larger organization.\textsuperscript{281}

The Commune was originally designed to be a

\textsuperscript{278} Epstein, \textit{Genoa and the Genoese}, 22.
\textsuperscript{279} Epstein, \textit{Genoa and the Genoese}, 22.
\textsuperscript{280} Lane, \textit{Venice, A Maritime Republic}, 91.
temporary institution of three years led by six consuls, but was soon reorganized with varying numbers of consuls who served varying terms of service, until the consular term was finally fixed at one year in 1122.\textsuperscript{282} We learn much about how the early Genoese commune functioned, as well as the responsibilities of its consuls, thanks to the survival of a document from 1143, a brief of the consuls.\textsuperscript{283} It was the consuls’ charge to preserve the honor of the city and that of the Church, as well as to administer equal justice to citizens of the Commune. They were to dispense this justice, as well as perform all their consular functions, at three major churches in the city: Santa Maria di Castello, San Siro, and San Lorenzo, which is significant, because it gave a religious sanction to the emerging Commune. In addition to this, two of these churches, San Siro and San Lorenzo, were the old and new seats of the archbishop, respectively, thus also providing a clear link between the emerging communal and old episcopal systems of rule;

\textsuperscript{282} Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 33-4. The temporary nature of the early Genoese commune has led Gerald Day to conclude that it was established by a consortium of the city’s businessmen for the purpose of providing aid to the forces of the First Crusade (Day, Genoa’s Response to Byzantium, 72).

\textsuperscript{283} This brief has been edited and published by Cesare Imperiale di Sant’Angelo in the CD, I:153-66. For a good summary of the briefs contents, and the one on which the follow discussion of the brief relies, see Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 34-7; and also Avner Greif, “On the Political Foundations of the Late Medieval Commercial Revolution: Genoa during the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries,” The Journal of Economic History 54, no. 2 (Jun., 1994): 271-87.
it seems that the physical locus of power did not wane as quickly as the institutional had. One of the most important and difficult responsibilities with which the consuls were charged was the preservation of public peace. They were thus given the authority to handle cases relating to homicide, assault, disputes involving trade, and others. The consuls performed their responsibilities in pairs, whatever the charge, because an oath contracted by only one of them was not valid under Genoese law, and in all matters the majority opinion of the consuls won the day, whether it concerned war, taxes, or something else. They were, beyond this, not to make any decision regarding war or taxation without the approval of a majority of “the council.” This is incredibly vague, but the “council” was most probably some kind of advisory committee, that is to say an early version of what would become the Council of the Anziani, or elders.\(^\text{284}\)

The 1143 brief of the consuls is also important because it furnishes us with information on who the members of the Commune were and what rights came with membership. Admittance to the Commune was by invitation only, and the penalty for taking longer than forty days to accept an invitation was denial of entrance for three

years. This would have been a serious inconvenience for one aspiring to rise through the ranks of Genoese government, because only members of the Commune were eligible to serve as its officers. A lack of membership in the Commune also prevented one from enjoying the counsel or aid of any kind of a commune member, should he have a dispute with a commune member. Membership in the Commune also probably secured its members the right to vote for the Genoese consuls and also the right to practice maritime commerce, which was so crucial for Genoa’s continued wealth and prosperity.\(^{285}\) The Commune was thus made up of prominent and affluent Genoese men, that is to say, those who were considered socially, politically, or economically important enough to warrant an invitation for membership. It was to the advantage of these elite citizens, however, to keep the second rank of Genoese society close for both their own protection and the protection of their allies. The inclusion of these lesser members in the Commune meant that, should one of their patrons come to need their aid for whatever reason, they would not be hindered by the legal, commercial, and suffrage-related restrictions stemming from lack of membership. It is therefore probable that the early Commune comprised a larger number of members than one

\(^{285}\) Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 35.
would expect, because it was to the benefit of everyone involved; the elite protected their interests by admitting members of the second rank, and these second rank members were able to better their situation by participating in overseas trade.\textsuperscript{286}

The basic institution of the Genoese Commune was, at the middle of the twelfth century, well established and represented the creation of a new system of government. Steven A. Epstein has made the following observation in regard to this development: "...it must be remembered that medieval Genoa was an independent state whose leaders were solving the problems of self-government largely through trial and error."\textsuperscript{287} The communal system of government, as it developed in Genoa and Venice, took on different forms, not only in terms of origin, but also in terms of structure and membership. The office of the Venetian doge was a product of Byzantine tradition, which the Commune was able to integrate into its own infrastructure as it developed, thus providing Venice with a tangible link to the past. The ducal office exercised less and less real political power as the centuries went on, but it still played an important role in the Commune as a sacred symbol of Venetian strength.

\textsuperscript{286} For an elaboration of this argument, see Greif, "On the Political Foundations," 274-80.
\textsuperscript{287} Epstein, \textit{Genoa and the Genoese}, 37.
and stability. The Genoese consuls had none of the tradition and prestige of the Venetian doge;\textsuperscript{288} they were a creation of the newly established Commune, which rose out of the power vacuum left by the lessening power of the Genoese bishop. In addition to this, the very fact that they were serving only one year terms by the middle of the twelfth century denied them any possibility of comparison with the doges in regard to longevity, who served life terms.

The very nature of the Genoese Commune did, on the other hand, allow a larger number of its citizens to participate in the city's government than did the Venetian Commune. The short duration of the consuls' term in office, in this sense, becomes a means through which power at the highest level could be shared among families vying for a consular post, while powerful Venetian families had to wait for the death of their doge, unless they chose to quicken the process through some act of knavery. It was also advantageous in every way for these powerful Genoese families to allow some of those outside of their ranks to participate in communal government. Membership in the Commune meant the right to

\textsuperscript{288} Gerald Day has alluded to this comparison by stating that: "The city of Genoa offers a rather unusual conception of government because the communal organization had no revered or mystical rationale that could justify its existence or sustain its continuance” (Day, Genoa’s Response to Byzantium, 71).
vote for consuls, give and receive legal aid from other members of the Commune and practice maritime trade, so by thus extending communal membership to those outside their ranks, the powerful families were each providing themselves with a voting constituency and loyal group of supporters, should the need arise. But did the inclusion of a larger number of citizens in the Genoese Commune translate into a distribution of power among a larger percentage of the city’s residents?

The evidence does not support this interpretation. The trend that is discernible for the twelfth century, in fact, seems to have been the exact opposite.\(^{289}\) The data for the first half of the twelfth century does demonstrate that the consular posts experienced a high familial turnover rate. There were forty-three noble families that had members who served as consuls between the years 1122 and 1153, with the average number of posts per family being almost three. This number drastically changes in the second half of the century, however, as the consular posts become increasingly concentrated in the hands of several of the more powerful noble families,

\(^{289}\) The following discussion of families and consular posts is taken from Greif, "On the Political Foundations," 274-5. Greif obtained his data for the holding of posts from two sources: Agostino Olivieri, Serie dei consoli del comune di Genova (Bologna: Forni, 1971); and Annali genovesi di Caffaro e dei suoi continuatori, 1099-1240, translated by Ceccardo Roccatagliata Ceccardi and Giovanni Monleone (Genoa: Municipio di Genova, 1923), vols. I-IV.
especially the della Volta.\textsuperscript{290} The numbers are telling: the average number of posts per family increased to almost four, and a member of the della Volta family held a consular post on nineteen different occasions, more times than any other family.\textsuperscript{291} Intermarriage with other noble families also increased the della Volta’s power and furthered this trend towards autocracy in Genoese government. The della Volta and its allied families, some of the most important of whom were the Embriaco, Castro, Guertio, Pevere, Spinola, and Vento, held an astounding percentage of the available consular posts in the second half of the twelfth century, increasing from 54.9 percent between 1154 and 1164 to 65.5 percent between 1172 and 1193.\textsuperscript{292} The reason for this faction’s increasing dominance of the consulship becomes clear from a reading of the Genoese historian Caffaro’s entry for the year 1154, where he remarks that the della Volta and its allies had rewritten the election procedure so that “only the best citizens would be elected.”\textsuperscript{293}

The internal harmony of Genoese society was not positively affected by the development of autocracy.

\textsuperscript{290} The inner workings of this process are extremely complicated, but are well explained in Day, Genoa’s Response to Byzantium, 70-99; Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 75.
\textsuperscript{291} Caffaro reports that, by 1163, the della Volta family had also come to dominate the archbishopric (Caffaro, Annali genovesi, 1:100-1).
\textsuperscript{293} Caffaro, Annali genovesi, 1:48.
within its government, whatever the reasons for this shift might have been.\textsuperscript{294} The second half of the twelfth century indeed saw Genoa become a victim of almost constant infighting between neighborhood factions. The fact that the city was becoming an increasingly dangerous place for its residents is clearly shown in the 1161 communal set of rules, which revoked the city's old prohibition against the carrying of weapons and made it now legal to carry swords and knives, although it was still illegal to carry a crossbow, bow, or lance.\textsuperscript{295} This set of rules also informs us of an important addition to the Genoese communal structure; it mentions the existence of a formal advisory committee, called the Anziani, or Elders.\textsuperscript{296} The rules, unfortunately, give us no information as to the committee's composition and responsibilities, but its establishment was undoubtedly an attempt to address the growing need for order in the city. There were, furthermore, at least two distinct periods of fierce civil war in Genoa, from 1154 to 1164 and from 1189 to 1194, both of which were based on

\textsuperscript{294} Daniel Waley, among others, has blamed the shift towards autocracy on increasing conflicts between Genoese families or the fallout of the souring of relations between the Empire and Papacy. Avner Greif disagrees with these interpretations, however, and instead sees this shift as a result of the interplay between the economic and political histories of Genoa (Daniel Waley, \textit{The Italian City-Republics}, 3rd Ed. [London; New York: Longman, 1988], 90-1); and Greif, "On the Political Foundations," especially 275-80)

\textsuperscript{295} Epstein, \textit{Genoa and the Genoese}, 68.

\textsuperscript{296} Epstein, \textit{Genoa and the Genoese}, 68.
contests for consular offices.\textsuperscript{297} In fact, the fighting between these various factions had disrupted Genoese society to such a degree that, in 1190, it prompted the city’s historian, Ottobono Scriba, to lament that: “civil discords and hateful conspiracies and divisions had arisen in the city due to the mutual envy of the many men who greatly desired to hold office as consuls of the commune.”\textsuperscript{298}

A clear attempt to end this incessant factional fighting is described by a different Genoese historian, Oberto Cancellare. He informs us that, in the midst of a rather serious conflict with archrival Pisa in 1170, some Genoese citizens who were tired of the city’s internal strife resolved to allocate an equal number of consular seats between the warring factions.\textsuperscript{299} It was a noble effort, but one doomed to failure unless those factions had some motivation to cooperate with one another. The old Genoese noble families were too well entrenched in the city’s political landscape, and the networks of alliances between them were too strong, to make a cession of hostilities plausible within the existing political

\textsuperscript{297} Oberto Cancellare and Ottobono Scriba, \textit{Annali genovesi}, II: 132. For further discussion of these two periods of Genoese civil war, and also of the chaotic years for her residents in between them, see Epstein, \textit{Genoa and the Genoese}, 71-91.
\textsuperscript{298} Ottobono Scriba, \textit{Annali genovesi}, II: 219-20. This statement is also quoted in Greif, “On the Political Foundations,” 275.
\textsuperscript{299} Oberto Cancellare, \textit{Annali genovesi}, II:132.
structure. The reform-minded members of the anziani and political opponents of the della Volta were presented with the opportunity to create, what Ottobono Scriba calls, “a new, modern thing” in Genoa,\textsuperscript{300} when, in 1189, the calling of the Third Crusade took all of the leaders of the della Volta out of the city.\textsuperscript{301} The factional fighting continued through the next year, when the anziani and counselors of the Commune finally decided to abolish the consular positions and call in a podesta to restore order to the city, an act that would take effect in 1191.\textsuperscript{302} The establishment of a foreign noble as temporary ruler of Genoa was undoubtedly a maneuver by the political enemies of the della Volta, especially the della Corte faction, to erode the family’s power base in the city,\textsuperscript{303} but it does represent an important constitutional development in the efforts of the Genoese

\textsuperscript{300} Ottobono Scriba, Annali genovesi, II:36.
\textsuperscript{301} For the following discussion of the constitutional changes to the Genoese government, see Day, Genoa’s Response to Byzantium, 145-54; Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 88-91; Greif, “On the Political Foundations,” 280-4; Ottobono Scriba, Annali genovesi, II:36-37; and Waley, The Italian City-Republics, 40-3.
\textsuperscript{302} A podestà, in general terms, was a noble from a foreign commune trained in the law and brought in to administer a city, hopefully impartially, for a six month or one year term. See especially Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 88; and Waley, The Italian City-Republics, 40-2.
\textsuperscript{303} Vito Vitale sees its establishment as a more general attempt by elites to bring peace to the city, but I share the opinion of Gerald Day, who argues that it was indeed the della Corte who aided in the establishment of the podesteria both to decrease the power of the della Volta and to court the favor of Emperor Henry VI (Vitale, Breviaro della storia di Genova, 51-2; and Day, Genoa’s Response to Byzantium, 150).
to govern themselves.

The institution of the podesteria was not a Genoese invention, nor was it conceived solely for the purpose of introducing an impartial outsider into a factional conflict between locals. The practice makes its first appearance around 1160, when Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa began installing podestà in Lombard and Emilian towns, with the purpose most likely being both to ensure a city’s ruler was an imperial supporter and also, vice versa, to facilitate the city’s negotiations with the Emperor. In addition to this, it was not uncommon for a city to turn to a temporary substitute for its consuls during times of crisis, and there were clearly a fair number of Genoese officials who reckoned that a crisis had struck the city. The Genoese, therefore, called in the Brescian Manegoldo Tetoccio to serve as the city’s first podestà for the year 1191. It was a steep learning curve, for almost immediately violence erupted when a family allied to the della Volta, the de Castello, murdered the consul Lanfranco Pevere, who was assumed to be involved in the move to obtain a podestà. Tetoccio acted quickly by razing one of the most opulent of the de Castello’s palazzi to the ground and exiling the guilty

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members of the family, but factional fighting was a difficult thing to eliminate. In the very next year, in fact, the della Volta leaders returned from crusade, quickly reestablished control, dispensed with the podesteria, and engineered the election of a consulate entirely comprised of their adherents. The most important event of Tetoccio’s reign, in the end, would be his finalizing of a treaty with Emperor Henry VI, who was heir to the Norman Kingdom of Sicily through his wife, Constance, daughter of Roger II, and wanted Genoese aid in conquering it. This conquest would come to nothing, but the treaty would involve the Empire in Genoese politics for years to come.

The podesteria in Genoa, despite a rocky start, would become a fixture in the city for most of the thirteenth century, while the consular form of government would lose favor as the Emperors’ involvement in Genoese politics grew. The true death knell of the consulate would prove to be a combination of the city’s internal strife and the Emperors’ hostility to the consular form of government. An early sign of this came in 1196, when

305 The de Castello who were responsible for the murder had already fled to Piacenza, so it was a symbolic exile more than anything (Ottobono Scriba, Annali genovesi, II:36-37).
306 Ottobono Scriba, Annali genovesi, II:36-37.
307 Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 88. For a detailed account of both the Genoese commune and its relationship with Henry VI’s successor, Frederick II, see Vito Vitale, Il comune del podestà a Genova (Milan: R. Ricciardi, 1951).
the commune added an institutional layer to the government by establishing an office of eight rectors to aid the podestà in his duties, and, with the exception of a few breaks, these rectors became permanent.\textsuperscript{308} Henry VI had, in the same year, seen to the installation of another podestà in Genoa, who would not only aid the emperor in his successful conquest of Sicily, but also increase his influence on Genoese politics.\textsuperscript{309} It had been the intention of Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa to rule northern Italian cities with podestà, and the plan was adopted enthusiastically by Henry VI and Frederick II after him.\textsuperscript{310} The hostility towards a consular form of government indeed makes perfect sense from the perspective of the emperors; they were both hard to control and, in the case of Genoa, represented a tradition of independence from imperial authority.\textsuperscript{311} It was a slow death for the consulate from this point forward, and a process that would finally be complete by 1216, when Genoa had firmly come under the rule of an imperially approved podestà.\textsuperscript{312}

\textsuperscript{308} Olivieri, \textit{Serie dei consoli}, 244-ff.
\textsuperscript{309} The podestà in question was Oberto de Olevano, who would die in the emperor’s service at Messina (Epstein, \textit{Genoa and the Genoese}, 89).
\textsuperscript{310} Hyde, \textit{Society and Politics in Medieval Italy}, 101-2.
\textsuperscript{311} Day, \textit{Genoa’s Response to Byzantium}, 150.
\textsuperscript{312} The clear animosity Henry VI felt for Genoa, and the consulate in particular, can be seen in his response to the Genoese representatives who approached him in Palermo after his successful Sicilian campaign. He revokes all former privileges given to Genoa.
An ironic result of this replacement of the consulate with the podesteria in Genoa was that it restrained the power of the della Volta in city politics. This was not to the benefit of the della Volta’s rivals such as the della Corte and its allies, however, as is demonstrated in the lists of podesterial officials and rectors serving between the 1190s and 1216. There is no usable data for the years in which there was only a podestà, but when rectors served the podestà, in the years 1196, 1199, 1202, 1203, 1205, and 1206, the data provides no discernable numeric advantage in favor of the della Corte and its supporters. Yet, there does seem to have been a conscious effort to bar the della Volta and its allies from government posts. This is in marked contrast to the years in which there were consuls, when this family held thirty-nine of a possible sixty consular posts.

The power of the della Volta faction may have waned with the demise of the consulate, but the arrival of the

by earlier Sicilian kings, prohibits any Genoese from calling himself consul, and adds: "Your podestà is dead; I see no one who represents the commune of Genoa, and I know of no commune. But if I should ever see a man or men who represent the community, I shall well fulfill what I have promised" (Ottobono Scriba, Annali genovesi, II:52).

There were a total of thirty-six podestà and rectors for these years, and only four posts were filled by supporters of the della Volta: Ugo Embriaco served as rector in 1196; Guido Spinola served as rector in 1203; Pulco di Castro served as podestà in 1205; and Oberto Usodimare served as rector in 1206 (Olivieri, Serie dei consoli, 244-5 [1196], 250 [1199], 255 [1202], 257 [1203], 260 [1205], 261-2 [1206]). For a more detailed discussion of this data, see Day, Genoa’s Response to Byzantium, 150-1.
thirteenth century brought with it new divisive issues that would move Genoese factional fighting into the wider realm of Mediterranean politics. The century began very well for Genoa: the city concluded peace treaties with their archrivals Pisa and Venice in 1212; it was on good terms with many noble families of the surrounding Riviera; and it even hosted future-emperor Frederick II for nearly three months during the spring of the same year without incident.\[^{314}\]

The following years, however, would see not only the resumption of factional fighting among local clans, but also the fierce struggles between Empire and Papacy spill over into Genoa’s streets. An early sign of troubles to come appeared in 1227, when a group of Genoese from all levels of society, who felt that they had not been given their just due in terms of government offices and honors, revolted while the podestà was away in Lucca.\[^{315}\]

The leader of the revolt, Guglielmo de Mari, and his followers managed to occupy the city center, but drew the ire of a large number of noble families after seizing the city’s two main gates, an act which motivated them to side with the podestà.\[^{316}\]

The revolt was then put down and the participants


\[^{315}\] A discussion of the revolt is found in Ogerio Pane, *Annali genovesi*, III:28-35.

\[^{316}\] Among these families were the Embriaco, Mallon, Doria, Camilla, Usodimare and Spinola (Ogerio Pane, *Annali genovesi*, III:31.
threatened with the seizure of their belongings and perpetual banishment, but the event reveals the ease with which factional conflict could erupt in the city. It also demonstrates the relative instability of the podesteria in the early thirteenth century; indeed, no sooner than the podestà had left town, an uprising occurred. In addition to this, a closer look at the revolt allows us to interpret the event in the wider context of imperial-papal relations, when we learn that Guglielmo de Mari’s brother, Ansaldo, later served as admiral under Frederick II and attacked Genoa as head of an imperial fleet.\footnote{Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 116.} It is thus possible to view the 1227 de Mari revolt as an early uprising of imperial supporters, or Ghibellines, against the ruling class of Genoa, who were predominantly papal supporters, or Guelfs.\footnote{The difficult question of just what it meant to be a Guelf or a Ghibelline is discussed in Waley, The Italian City-Republics, 145-56.} It is probably incorrect to adopt this interpretation wholeheartedly, but, considering the rapid division of the city into Guelf and Ghibelline camps in the decades to come, there is some validity to viewing the revolt as a premature expression of future hostilities.

Early expressions of Guelfism in Genoa did not reflect support for the Church, but for Lombardy, and
especially Milan.\textsuperscript{319} This was a practical stance, because hostilities with their neighbor to the north would mean both more immediate military conflict and also the loss of one of the city's most profitable economic markets. The Church soon became an important ally of the ruling noble families of Genoa in the following years, however, as the relations between Emperor Frederick II and Genoa soured due to his Lombard wars and his instigation of several serious revolts in the city's Ligurian possessions. It certainly did not hurt papal support in the city when Sinibaldo Fieschi, a member of the family who ruled nearby Lavagna, was elected pope in 1243, but the increasing and incessant hostilities between Frederick and Genoa in the 1230s and 40s polarized the city's residents, and led to the development of two factions: the pro-papal Rampini and the pro-imperial Mascherati. Membership in the two factions did not follow class lines; there were noble families on both sides of the fence, while the vast majority, but not all, of the people supported the Church. Genoese society would remain thus divided until mid-century, when Frederick's death in 1250 rendered the Mascherati faction powerless, and soon after the Rampini faction was able to conclude a series of peace agreements with opposing noble

\textsuperscript{319} For what follows, see Epstein, \textit{Genoa and the Genoese}, 121-4 and 127-8.
families, whom they treated leniently. The first half of the 1250s was generally a peaceful time for Genoa; the commune minted its first gold coinage in 1252 and was at peace with Pisa by 1256. The Genoese were never long content when faced with the prospect of peace, however, as they would demonstrate in 1257 by overhauling the constitutional structure of their government once again.

The rise of the popolo, or "people," was a common occurrence in many Italian towns during middle decades of the thirteenth century, but the rapidity, peacefulness, and tardiness with which they rose in Genoa made the city unique. The popolo were, generally speaking, a product of the economic success which Italian towns had been enjoying for many years. They were made up of the increasing number of wealthy, non-noble merchants and tradesmen, who commanded much less political representation than they warranted. A very brief discussion of the events surrounding the rise of the

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320 For the details of these treaties, see Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 127.
321 Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 129.
322 This is discussed in more detail in Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 135-8.
323 The literature on the rise of the popolo is vast, but the following works are a good starting place for more information on the subject: Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 135-87; Hyde, Society and Politics in Medieval Italy, 104-18; Lauro Martines, Power and Imagination: City-States in Renaissance Italy (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), 45-58; Giovanni Tabacco, The Struggle for Power in Medieval Italy: Structures of Political Rule, trans. Rosalind Brown Jensen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 222-36; and Waley, The Italian City-Republics, 131-43.
popolo will help to clarify its effects on the Genoese political infrastructure. The withdrawal of the podestà Filippo della Torre from the city in January of 1257 set off a riot as he worked his way out of town through the neighborhood of the bakers. The rioters quickly gathered at San Siro Church to elect a leader, as cries of “fiat populus,” or power to the people, resounded throughout the city’s streets. Their choice to be the captain of the people was Guglielmo Boccanegra, who came from a wealthy, non-noble family and had previously served the Commune in various capacities such as ambassador and consul of Genoese possessions abroad. A council of thirty-two anziani was established a few days later, who soon prescribed the particulars of Boccanegra’s new position: he was to serve for ten years, have an annual salary of 1,000 lire and two notaries and a judge at his disposal, while a podestà was to be responsible for the running of the day-to-day government.

The explanation for exactly why the Genoese popolo were motivated to rise up is beyond the scope of this chapter and, in any event, has been discussed in many other places; what is of greater concern for us here is

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324 For the events surrounding the rise of the popolo, see Annali genovesi, IV:25-8.
the place of this uprising in the context of Genoese political history.\textsuperscript{326} The attention that Boccanegra’s election as captain of the people has received from historians is certainly warranted, because the period during which it occurred marks an important milestone in several facets of Genoese history. The second half of the thirteenth century is generally depicted by historians as the beginning of a period in which the Genoese achieved their greatest Mediterranean-wide prosperity. This assertion is justifiable, considering not only the defeats Genoa inflicted on its traditional rivals Venice and Pisa during these years, but also the large volume of trade and general economic success that was generated by the numerous and far-flung territorial possessions of the Genoese in both the Mediterranean and Black Seas.\textsuperscript{327} This period represents a changed political landscape in Genoa, as well. The election of Boccanegra began a stretch of fifty-four years during which Genoa was ruled by a series of captains of the people, with the

\textsuperscript{326} Robert Lopez pinned the blame on a severe economic depression in the years following the peaceful early 1250s. Steven A. Epstein agrees with this interpretation, but also sees the uprising as a reaction to both the popolo’s growing awareness of the nobles’ inability to self-regulate their factional violence and also the popolo’s resentment of the nobles’ control of the city’s wealth (Robert Sabatino Lopez, \textit{La prima crisi della banca di Genova, 1250-1259} [Milan: Leo S. Olschki, 1956], 68-86; Epstein, \textit{Genoa and the Genoese}, 135-6).

\textsuperscript{327} Epstein provides a detailed discussion of Genoese trading and economic structure between 1252 and 1313 (Epstein, \textit{Genoa and the Genoese}, 141-6).
occasional reversion to a podesterial form of government. These captains guarded the city, with varying degrees of success, against numerous external threats, including conflicts with Venice, Pisa, the Catalans, and Charles of Anjou, but internally factional fighting continued to tear Genoa apart. The post of captain, in fact, soon became an object of contestation between the numerous factions making up Genoese society, whether noble vs. popolo, Guelf vs. Ghibelline, or some combination of the two, thus in no way reducing internecine conflict in the city. Steven A. Epstein provides a good illustration of just how intense factional violence was in Genoa during this period by charting the city’s revolts and changes in government between 1257 and 1311. There were no less than twelve revolts or changes in government during this fifty-four year span, which averages out to one every four and a half years!\(^{328}\) The rate of turnover was, needless to say, astoundingly high for Genoese governments, and the city was operating at a level of political instability that soon drew a radical response from its own ruling class.

The beginning of the fourteenth century was especially trying time for the city. The combination of violence between the Guelfs and the Ghibellines at home

\(^{328}\) Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, 325.
and the dramatic decrease in eastern trade following the 1308 destruction of Caffa by the Kipchak Turks had left Genoa on the brink of anarchy. Genoa had experienced plenty of hard times before, but it was their reaction to these particular events that was unique. In 1311, Genoa voluntarily surrendered itself to Henry VII, who, at this time, was making his way to Rome to be crowned emperor.

He agreed to rule Genoa for twenty years, during which time he promised to restore peace and end factionalism in the city; this was a tall order for any ruler, no doubt, but the act was significant. The history of Genoese government up to the dawn of the fourteenth century is the story of a city plagued, almost from the start, by internecine strife, and the successive attempts by its ruling class to manage that strife. Venice also had its share of political upheavals, but, unlike Genoa, was able to adapt, conform, or expand its existing government to confront the crisis at hand. Genoa, on the other hand, was not able to work within its existing system of government, and often had to restructure its political institutions in the face of crises, but it had always been an internal matter. The cession of the city to

330 For the events leading up to the surrender and the surrender itself, see Petti Balbi, Annales genuenses, 77-9; William M. Bowsky, Henry VII in Italy; The Conflict of Empire and City-State, 1310-1313 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1974), especially 132-58; and Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 184.
Henry VII was the first time that medieval Genoa had come under foreign rule, and the Genoese had made the deal voluntarily. The arrangement did not prove to be lasting, in fact Henry died two years later, nor did it end Genoa’s internal difficulties for long, but the act is telling. It was not a decision that a city’s ruling class arrived at lightly or frequently, which indeed illustrates just how hopelessly divided Genoa must have been in the early fourteenth century.

Henry brought a moment of peace to Genoa, but, when he died on 24 August 1313, factional fighting soon made its triumphant return and would plunge the city into another period of civil war, significantly altering the Genoese political landscape yet again. The Spinola and the Doria, who were the two most powerful families in the city and thus intense rivals, had entered the fourteenth century on good terms. They concluded a peace agreement and also established, with the support of the popolo, a twenty-four member council, whose officials were to be

331 Thomas Allison Kirk is incorrect in stating that Genoa’s first voluntary submission to a foreign power came in 1396, when the city was handed over to King Charles VI of France; this was actually the third foreign occupation, as the following pages will demonstrate (Thomas Allison Kirk, Genoa and the Sea: Policy and Power in an Early Modern Maritime Republic, 1559-1684 [Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005], 16-7).

332 The last months of Henry’s life are covered in William M. Bowsky, Henry VII in Italy, 178-211. The following discussion of the Genoese civil war that followed Henry’s death is based on Giorgio Stella, Annales genuenses, 77-ff.; and Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 194-202.
chosen in equal numbers from among the nobility and the popolo. The complicated divisions within Genoese society were too deeply ingrained to allow for a lasting peace, however, as conflicts between the Guelfs and Ghibellines and/or the people and the nobility soon flared up anew. Vicious fighting in Genoa had, by early 1318, resulted in a Guelf victory, whose supporters elected Carlo Fieschi and Gaspare Grimaldi captains of the people. The Ghibelline rebels sought and received aid from Milan and had Genoa under siege by March, which prompted the besieged Guelf leaders to resign their offices and surrender the city to Pope John XXII and the Guelf leader in Italy, Robert of Naples, for a ten year period; the deal was finalized on 27 July 1318. Thus, for the second time in less than a decade Genoa was voluntarily ceded to a foreign power by its own residents, who saw no other solution to the city's factionalism. The irony is that foreign rule again did not resolve internecine conflict in Genoa, but merely began to change the lines along which the conflicts were drawn.

Civil war raged in Genoa from 1317 to 1331, as

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334 Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 195.
335 Giorgio Stella, Annales genuenses, 84-7.
336 The arrangement specified that the real authority over the city would be held by Robert and his heris, while the pope would only be a titular ruler (Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 196).
factional violence consumed both the city and also the whole of the surrounding Riviera. The cession of the city to Robert of Naples had placed Genoa at the center of Guelf-Ghibelline conflict in Italy, and spelled even more serious troubles for a town already racked by internal division. Only an external threat from the Catalans would eventually motivate the two parties to bury the hatchet on 2 September 1331, but much damage had been done to the city and its surroundings during these fourteen years. Externally, the coastal towns of Liguria had experienced much destruction and the fighting had rendered Genoa powerless to contest the Aragonese and Byzantines, who stripped Sardinia and Chios from Genoese control, respectively.337 Internally, beyond the flourishing of deep factional divisions, the city had accumulated some monstrous debts by improving its defensive works,338 while an increase in piratical activity had given it a reputation as a den of avarice.339

337 For more on the relationship between Aragon and Sardinia, see John Day, Bruno Anatra and Lucetta Scaraffia, La Sardegna medioevale e moderna (Torino: UTET, 1984); and John Day, La Sardegna sotto la dominazione pisano-genovese: dal secolo XI al secolo XIV (Torino: UTET, 1987). For the events leading up to the Zaccaria’s loss of Chios to the Byzantines, see Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, I:60-8.
338 The Genoese chronicler Giorgio Stella reports that, during the 1320s, Genoa extended the city walls to double the size of the area protected (Giorgio Stella, Annales genuenses, 96 and 112).
339 Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 196. Benjamin Z. Kedar has studied the Genoese organ that was responsible for compensating foreign victims of Genoese piracy, the Office of Robbery (Piracy), and seriously doubts that the Office functioned at all during the years
Clearly foreign rule had not hitherto been a remedy for the internal strife of Genoese society, but the period of civil war did see the rise of a group of new families who soon came to play an important part in the city's government. Certain families of the popolo had been able to take advantage of the Guelf-Ghibelline conflict, which was predominantly a fight among noble families, by increasing their wealth and establishing their presence in city government at the expense of these same noble families.340 This group proved to be difficult for the nobility to dislodge from the government, and from the middle decades of the fourteenth century to the early decades of the sixteenth these popolo families would become the biggest challenge to continued noble dominance of Genoa.

It was, in fact, a popolo revolt in 1339 that would yet again change the face of Genoese politics.341 The

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340 Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 201.
341 The only extant contemporary account of the establishment of a doge in Genoa is Giorgio Stella's history, which is found in Giorgio Stella, Annales genuenses, 128-32. There are, of course, numerous discussions of the events surrounding the ducal election, here I have used the following: Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 202-5; and Giovanna Petti Balbi, Simon Boccanegra e la Genova del'300 (Genoa: Marietti, 1991), 24-8.
violent events of the late 1330s would set the stage for this shift; a Ghibelline uprising ousted Robert of Naples from Genoa in 1335, the leaders of which were in turn ousted by the popolo of Genoa, who had been inspired by a recent popolo revolt in nearby Savona. In the days that followed, twenty men were chosen to select a leader of the new government, one who was to be chosen by the people, and not by the two most powerful noble families of the city, the Doria and Spinola, as they made clear. Their choice was Simone Boccanegra, who hailed from one of the most prestigious popolo families and also the same family that had produced Guglielmo Boccanegra, the first captain of the Genoese people in 1257.\textsuperscript{342} He was confirmed as the first Genoese doge in late September 1339, and was given the assistance of a podestà and various other officials, while all Guelfs were barred from serving in the new government; many old noble families, including the Doria and Spinola, took refuge outside of the city’s walls as a result.

The election of a Genoese doge was a significant event in the political history of the city. It marks the beginnings of an institution that would survive for almost two hundred years, ending only when political reforms of the early sixteenth century resulted in the

\textsuperscript{342} See pages 150-3 of this chapter for a discussion of Guglielmo Boccanegra and the rise of the Genoese popolo.
establishment of a Genoese aristocratic republic.\textsuperscript{343} It also represents a shift in power from the old noble families, such as the Doria and Spinola, to the popolo, or at least to its most prominent families; indeed, the rise of the Boccanegra also meant the rise of other popolo families such as the Maruffo, Magnerri, Ermirio, and Sant’Olcese.\textsuperscript{344} In addition to this, the old factional division of Guelf-Ghibelline, which was mainly a division among nobility, became virtually meaningless in the face of the new popular threat; whether one was a Guelf or Ghibelline became less important, from a noble’s perspective, than whether one was noble or non-noble. Finally, it is significant that, in a time of political turmoil in the city, the Genoese chose to establish a dogeship, which was an institution that their long-time rival Venice had possessed for centuries. Steven A. Epstein has suggested that the high-ranking popoli who engineered this revolt may have considered the Venetian example as the surest way to ensure executive continuity.\textsuperscript{345} This was, in a sense, borne out by the almost two hundred year existence of the dogeship, but

\textsuperscript{343} These political reforms, and also the role that Andrea Doria played in their development, are discussed in Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 314-8; Edoardo Grendi, La repubblica aristocratica dei genovesi: politica, carità e commercio fra Cinque e Seicento (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1987), 105-72; Kirk, Genoa and the Sea, 20-8; and Vitale, Breviario della storia di Genova, 1:205-8.

\textsuperscript{344} Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 205.

\textsuperscript{345} Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 205.
the ducal experiment did not provide Genoa with long-term political stability in the end. Internecine conflict was too embedded in Genoese society for any one institution, even a strong executive, to bring lasting peace to the city.

The political history of Genoa for the remainder of the Commune, which ended with the establishment of a Genoese aristocratic republic in 1528, indeed records numerous additional internal uprisings of all kinds, attacks on the city by rival states, as well as several instances in which the Genoese again voluntarily surrendered their city to foreign rulers. There were fifteen revolts in the first sixty-two years of the dogeship’s existence alone, almost all of which were along noble/popolo lines. The Genoese voluntarily ceded their city to Lord Giovanni Visconti of Milan in October 1353 and then to King Charles VII of France in November 1396; the threats of both external and internal enemies, not to mention Genoa’s chronic insolvency, were the motivating factors on both occasions.  

346 Genoa’s government was no more stable in the fifteenth century.

346 See Epstein’s appendix, which charts out the Genoese revolts and changes in government from 1257-1528 (Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, especially 325-6). For a detailed account of the events leading up to Genoa’s cession to Visconti, see Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, especially 211-21. For more information on the surrender of Genoa to King Charles VII and the ensuing relationship between the two, see Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, especially 346-62; and Eugène Jarry, Documents diplomatiques et politiques. Les origines de la domination française à Gênes (1392-1402) (Paris: A. Picard et fils, 1896).
The creation of the Casa San Giorgio, or Genoese State bank, in 1407 to manage the government's large debts and interest payments was an example of Genoese innovation at its best, but the very fact that its creation was necessary speaks volumes about the city's perpetual lack of money. The number of internal uprisings and changes in government did not decrease at all between the years 1401 to 1499. Genoa experienced no less than twenty-five internal revolts and one civil war in 1414-5, while the city was surrendered voluntarily, but under duress, to Filippo Maria Visconti in 1421, to King Charles VIII of France in 1458, to the duke of Milan in 1464 and again in 1487. The situation did not improve during the final years of the Genoese Commune, as the city became a prize over which the French and the Spanish crowns fought. The two powers passed Genoa back and forth six times between 1499 and 1528, and Spanish forces even sacked the city in.

347 In fact, by 1407 an astounding ninety percent of Genoa's income was eaten up by interest payments, which, combined with the city's other necessary expenses such as maintaining trade, defense, etc., left the city deeply in debt. The situation became so desperate that a group of creditors established the Casa San Giorgio to regulate Genoa's debts and interest payments. This creative solution was, at first, a success and steadily took on more responsibilities such as control of the state mint and collector of the state's revenues, but eventually faltered. It was a truly innovative answer to Genoa's financial problems, and inspired Steven A. Epstein to write: "Venice and Florence had their own consolidated debts, but they did not yet take the next step to turn their funded debt into banks. Genoa thus led the way in creating something similar to the Bank of England, but almost three centuries earlier" (Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 230). For a more detailed discussion of the Casa San Giorgio, see Jacques Heers, Gênes au XVIe siècle, activité économique et problèmes sociaux (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1961), 97-190. 

348 Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 326-7.
May 1522.\textsuperscript{349}

The listing of these uprisings, coups, and changes in government admittedly makes for tedious reading, but it serves to illustrate just how politically unstable the Genoese Commune was for the last two centuries of its existence. The establishment of the office of doge in 1339 had put in place the last major component of the Genoese communal structure. Boccanegra was able, for a short time, to pacify Genoa's internal violence and restore many of its Ligurian possessions, while simultaneously reinvigorating trade possibilities for Genoese merchants abroad.\textsuperscript{350} It would in no way, however, improve Genoa's internal political stability in the future. It indeed took only a few years for a coalition of ousted nobles, both Guelf and Ghibelline together, to mount an offensive against the new popular regime, which forced the impotent Boccanegra to resign his office on 23 December, 1344.\textsuperscript{351} The resulting compromise between the warring parties was to allow the popular government to remain in place, but end the exclusion of nobles from it, thus institutionalizing the dichotomy on which almost all of Genoa's future internal conflicts would be based. The

\textsuperscript{349} Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 327.
\textsuperscript{350} For a detailed account of Boccanegra's reign, see Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 204-8 and 221-5; and Petti Balbi, Simon Boccanegra, especially 66-92.
\textsuperscript{351} Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 208-9.
basic institutional structure of the commune in late medieval Genoa and Venice was relatively similar; both cities possessed an executive officer called a doge, who was assisted in his task by various groups of counselors and assistants, while legislative functions were carried out by a number of councils.\textsuperscript{352} This begs the question: why was Genoa racked by so much more political instability than Venice in the Middle Ages, given the above observation? The examination of the two governments contained in the preceding pages clearly reveals that the Venetian government was able to respond to, and resolve effectively, threats and crises while working within its existing political structure, whereas Genoa was not.

Conclusions

The pages above have had two goals. First, to compare the political stability of late medieval Venice and Genoa by outlining the institutional frameworks of government that developed in these cities over the course of the Middle Ages. Second, to observe to what degree these governments were able to maintain public order and control violence, two things which John Najemy has called

\textsuperscript{352} I here refer to the late medieval Genoese political structure as laid out in Heers, \textit{Gênes au XVe siècle}, 601-7.
“the indispensable and primary responsibilities of all governments." \textsuperscript{353} It is relatively clear that Venice was more successful in providing its citizens with these securities than was Genoa; indeed, it is difficult, given the preceding evidence, to reach any other conclusion. But why should this have been the case? Genoa was not alone in its struggles against civic conflict, to be sure. The Venetian government too had serious internal challenges through the years, such as the political upheavals of the late thirteenth century, the Tiepolo-Querini conspiracy of 1310, the conspiracy of Marino Falier in 1355 and others, although some scholars still choose to endorse the myth that Venice was utterly free of political turmoil and conflict. \textsuperscript{354} Furthermore, the general direction of political development for both Genoa and Venice during the High Middle Ages was similar to that of other northern Italian cities. They had each established, by 1100, a communal form of government, or a sworn association of citizens, to rule their respective city, the end result of which in both cases was the concentration of authority in the hands of a common


power, or a small group of nobles or magnates. There were, despite the above similarities, some significant differences in the development of the two cities' political institutions that aid our understanding of this question.

In the first place, the distinctly different origins of the two cities' communal structures should not be underappreciated. The Genoese Commune, on the one hand, was originally a superstructure erected on top of the governments of the seven local neighborhoods for the purpose of wresting authority away from local lords or bishops. This was similar to the development of other northern Italian cities, which formed their communes in an attempt to impose some structure of power on governmental systems suffering from a lack of strong authority as the bishop's power waned in the course of the eleventh century. The Venetian Commune, on the other hand, was an outgrowth of the city's old ducal system of government, which had been established centuries earlier when Venice was still under Byzantine authority. This development did, like Genoa, result in a reorganized system of rule for Venice, but, unlike Genoa, did not dismantle the city's old Byzantine tradition of administration and governance; instead, it incorporated some of the features of the old ducal system into the new
communal government, most important of which was the ducal office itself. Retention of the ducal tradition of the old system thus helped the city to transition more easily to a new form of government by preserving a link to the past.

The office of the doge, furthermore, played an important role in maintaining Venetian confidence and bolstering the city's self-image for centuries to come, even as his function in the actual governance of Venice diminished as the Middle Ages progressed. The work of Edward Muir, Debra Pincus and others have indeed shown that over the course of the Middle Ages the doge was elevated to a place of privilege in the imagination of the Venetian State. He was given a place at the center of a series of rituals designed to alleviate the inherent tensions in Venice's political system and came to be portrayed as both a revealer of God's divine plan and also a symbol of His special relationship with the city. The doge clearly had an important symbolic place in the mechanisms of Venetian government and was a visual representation of its continuity, both of which served to stabilize and strengthen the system. The Genoese consuls, however, had none of the tradition and prestige of the Venetian doge; they were created contemporaneously with the newly established commune, and thus possessed no
link to the city's past. The fact that they were serving only one year terms by the middle of the twelfth century also denied them any possibility of comparison with the doges in regard to longevity, who served a lifetime term in office.

Venice's intense devotion to St. Mark, who is still its patron saint to this day, must be mentioned alongside reverence for the doge as a stabilizing factor for the city, and a figure around whom its citizens could rally as a symbol of continuity and civic patriotism. Edward Muir has traced the evolution of civic patriotism in northern and central Italian cities and indeed concluded that "an intimate artistic and ritual relationship between the cults of patron saints and the citizenry was the crucial test of civic harmony." Strong patronal devotion to St. Ambrose in Milan, St. Zenobius in Verona, St. Nicholas in Bari, St. John the Baptist in Florence and, of course, St. Mark in Venice led to the development of saints' cults in these cities and provided their citizens with a charismatic core from which they derived a sense of civic unity and purpose. In fact, Venice developed one of the strongest cults of patron saints in Italy. The worship of St. Mark was deeply integrated

into state functions, thus providing the Venetians with a symbol of strength and stability and their government with divine approval.\textsuperscript{356} St. George, although intimately associated with Genoa, never saw the development there of a unified cult in his honor, or even attracted the devotion of all Genoese. This may have been due to the city's lack of George's relics or any miracles having been attributed to him, but the fact is that St. George was not a figure to whom Genoese leaders could turn for protection in times of trouble. The fragmented distribution of power in Genoa was most probably both a symptom and a cause of this development.

The symbols of continuity and strength that the ducal office and the cult of St. Mark represented gave the Venetian Commune a solid base on which to develop in the twelfth and following centuries. The powers of the doge steadily declined as communal power and the power of the dominant families making up the Commune increased, which resulted in the permanent interconnection of the three entities. In addition to this, the Commune's establishment on a solid base of councils, magistrates, and offices made it even more stable, and gave the

Venetian administrative apparatus the flexibility necessary to adapt and respond to changing circumstances, whether internal or external to the commune. These institutions became larger, better articulated and more complex through the centuries, but the most significant feature of the Venetian structure of government, for the purposes of this chapter, is that it was always unitary in nature. It was not the source of power that changed for Venice, but rather the locus from which it emanated within the existing governmental structure. The pages above illustrate how time and again the Venetian Commune redistributed the responsibilities of government when faced with a political crisis, whether it was the restructuring of the Great Council or the passing of power to the Senate and then to the Council of Ten. This ability of the Venetian government has not gone entirely unnoticed by scholars such as Elisabeth Crouzet-Pavan, who suggests that: “Perhaps this frequent reshuffling of the institutional cards was what enabled Venice to live in an apparent stable political order.”357 Yet, this attribute continues, in my opinion, to be underappreciated as a stabilizing characteristic in Venetian government.

The political landscape of Genoa had, in many ways,
a much more common path of development during the Middle Ages than that of Venice. The establishment of a communal form of government was certainly a common occurrence in many other northern Italian cities, as was the podesteria, the rise of the popolo, Guelf-Ghibelline conflicts and even bouts of civil war. What made Genoa unusual was the intensity and consistency with which internal strife racked the city through all of these developments. The lack of an institutional link to the past and a patron saint’s cult deprived Genoa of a solid base on which to erect a stable government from the very beginning, as we have already seen. In addition to this, the Genoese Commune did allow, for the reasons outlined earlier in this chapter, a larger number of its citizens to participate in the city’s government than did the Venetian Commune, but more families meant more chance of internecine conflict. The intense fighting amongst these families as they scrambled for positions of power was, in a sense, institutionalized in the second half of the twelfth century, as the consular posts become increasingly concentrated in the hands of several of the more powerful noble families. The della Volta and their allies inextricably integrated themselves into Genoese government by rewriting the election procedure so that their adherents would dominate the Commune, thus drawing
clear factional lines within the ruling class and dissolving any sense of political stability in the city. The fact that political, and civic, instability was on the rise becomes very clear when we observe that during this half century the Genoese abolished an earlier ban on the carrying of weapons, created the Anziani in an attempt to restore order to the city, failed to implement effective consular reform and had two nasty bouts of civil war.

Factionalism was thus deeply ingrained in Genoa’s political culture at an early date and would remain so throughout the Middle Ages. The establishment of the podesteria eroded the della Volta’s power in the early thirteenth century, but it also meant an increased imperial presence in the city; Genoa’s internal conflicts were thus increasingly drawn along Guelf-Ghibelline party lines in the following decades. The rise of the popolo to power in the middle of the thirteenth century was unusually peaceful, but this development in no way reduced internecine conflict in the city. The post of captain of the people soon became an object of contestation between the numerous factions making up Genoese society, whether noble vs. popolo, Guelf vs. Ghibelline, or some combination of the two. The establishment of a ducal office in 1339 did somewhat
stabilized the city's political situation, but did not curb internecine strife. The exclusion of nobles from the dogeship was enough to redraw the lines along which the city's internal conflicts were drawn; under these circumstances, Guelf vs. Ghibelline became less important than noble vs. non-noble. In fact, no political development was ever enough to end factional fighting in medieval Genoa. We have seen in the pages above that Venice's ability to redistribute power within its governmental institutions provided it with stability, longevity, and the capability to control internal political conflict. Genoa's governmental structure lacked this ability, however, and it was the locus of conflict, not of power, that shifted in the city as a consequence. It is also important to mention that Venice's relationship with the Empire was never as intimate as was Genoa's, nor was the popolo ever as threatening of a political force in Venice as it was in Genoa, both of which may have saved La Serenissima from a good deal of the conflict that these developments instigated in other Italian cities.

Genoa's political stability was greatly affected by this factionalism, which was a large factor in the city's inability to work within its governmental structure to resolve political conflict. The clearest indication of
just how violently and consistently factional fighting affected the city is the astonishing fact that the Genoese willingly ceded their city to a foreign power on numerous occasions in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. It is certainly a rare occurrence in history for a city or nation to give up its authority voluntarily to a foreign power, but the historian of late medieval Genoa Jacques Heers described how desperate the Genoese were for political stability and order when he wrote: "Tranquility, Genoa only truly knew it under the governance of a foreign ruler; also, this domination was always well accepted, if not desired, specifically by the Genoese merchants and nobles." This same sentiment is found in the works of the official Genoese historians, as well. Agostino Giustiniani, who wrote the history of Genoa down to 1528 with the government's backing, recorded that the ruling class threw their support behind Duke Galeazzo Sforza of Milan and took it as a certainty that if the city were to regain totally its liberty, the usual factions and partisanship would return. He also

358 “La tranquillité, Gênes ne la connaît vraiment que sous le gouvernement d’un maître étranger; aussi cette domination est-elle toujours bien acceptée, sinon souhaitée, par les marchands et les nobles proprement gênois” (Heers, Gênes au XVe siècle, 608).
359 “I cittadini più richi per cagione del riposo, e perché si parevano sicuri dei movimenti della città, li pareva ben fatto di supportar queste cose, anchor che si paressero liberi della giurata fedeltà, perché il principe non servava le convenzioni, e non li pareva ben fatto venire alle armi, non sapendo che fine dovessi haver la cosa, e li pareva haver certezza che se la città ritornava
describes, in an earlier passage, the upturn in civic order that the city’s cession to Duke Francesco Sforza of Milan in 1464 had produced when he remarks histrionically that:

...the city, then experiencing so many calamities from war and civil discord, as was its custom, began to breathe and position itself as much at sea as on land; wars, seditions, exiles, deaths, robbery were gone all at once, and peace, harmony and justice returned in their place.360

There is some evidence, especially economic, that suggests a correspondence between Genoa’s bouts with foreign rule and increased prosperity, and there are indications that these periods temporarily improved civic relations, but the point here is that they in no way put an end to the city’s internal conflicts.361 Genoa’s tendency towards internecine strife was too deeply integrated into Genoese political life for such a quick and tidy solution.

There were naturally many factors, both internal and external, that affected the political stability of Venice...
and Genoa during the Later Middle Ages, and this chapter has not presumed that an analysis of them all is possible. The comparison between the two cities here has only included the evolution of the two cities’ political institutions and the changing social profile of those who held the cities’ administrative posts in terms of their effect on political order. The myriad of other considerations, such as economic, etc., have been treated very well elsewhere by many other historians, and intentionally left out here to emphasize the political stability of Venice in relation to Genoa. This conclusion will serve as the basis for the next chapter, which will examine the involvement of these governments in the affairs of their colonies, specifically Venetian Crete and Genoese Chios. It has been argued that the stability of the Venetian State was the key factor in rendering the Venetians capable of holding Crete for as long as they did. It is undeniable that Venice’s strength and stability were key factors in the establishment and maintenance of direct rule on Crete, but it raises an important question: how was a colonial enterprise to succeed and be sustained when carried out by a home government characterized by weakness and instability, such as Genoa? The next chapter explores how this variance in the political stability of a home
government could influence the administrative structure of its territorial possessions.
CHAPTER THREE

MONOPOLIZATION VS. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY: DIFFERING APPROACHES TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF VENETIAN CRETE AND GENOESE CHIOS

Introduction

Genoa’s chronic insolvency during the Late Middle Ages has long been acknowledged by scholars. Indeed, Vito Vitale has written that one constant of Genoese economic life throughout the entire history of the Commune was “the contrast between the wealth of individuals and the poverty of the State.”\(^{362}\) It has also long been acknowledged that this chronic insolvency affected, by extension, the manner in which it administered its colonial possessions. Michel Balard has commented that, in the specific case of Chios, Genoa’s “chronic impecuniousness” left the city no choice but to share its rule of the island with the private ship owners who had carried out the conquest in 1346.\(^ {363}\) These observations are certainly correct and are not disputed here in the least, but scholars of Genoese colonization have not to date sufficiently examined the ways in which the

\(^{362}\) “il contrasto tra la ricchezza dei singoli e la penuria dei mezzi dello Stato” (Vitale, Il comune del podestà, 58).

\(^{363}\) “Il n’avait en fait pas le choix: son impécuniosité chronique l’obligeait à composer avec les armateurs” (Balard, La Romanie génoise, 1:377).

178
political stability of the city's home government influenced the administration of its territorial possessions.

Historians of Venetian colonization have treated this topic to a greater degree than those of Genoa's colonies, but still only the surface has been scratched. Sally McKee, for example, briefly comments upon this subject while discussing the powerful thirteenth-century Venetian community in Constantinople. Venice's worry that the community's independent mindedness would motivate it to break away from the home government had, in turn, prompted Venice to rule its new possession of Crete with a rod of iron. She thus writes:

Consequently, the administrators and magistrates of Crete would never experience anything other than close supervision, thanks to the political stability that Venice, unlike Genoa, enjoyed.

Urban's [Urban V, that is] inclusion of Latins as first among those whom Venice ruled in Crete underscores another important feature of the colony that set it apart from almost every other in that period. When the island came under its nominal dominion in 1211, the Venetian state chose not to delegate rule of the island to noble colonists who would govern in its name, as it did elsewhere in Latin Greece.364

The purpose of this chapter is to further this discussion. The analysis of political stability in the preceding chapter will serve, in the following pages, as a basis on which to compare the administrative structure of both Venetian Crete and Genoese Chios. Especially of

364 McKee, Uncommon Dominion, 20-1.
interest is how these structures were influenced by the relative political stability of their home governments which we observed, and also to what degree these home governments were involved in the affairs of their territorial possessions.

Structures of Authority

Venice's claim to the island of Crete, which it had obtained during the partitioning of Byzantine territories following the Fourth Crusade, did not go unchallenged. Overly ambitious Genoese adventurers, among whom the principal character was Enrico Pescatore, had seized the city of Candia before Venetians arrived to make good on their claim. It was not until 1211 that Venice forced the Genoese off the island for good, but with the resolution of one problem came another: how to establish an enduring colonial government on this large island when they had little previous experience in such an enterprise. Venice's solution to this problem makes clear that the Venetian home government intended not merely to supervise closely, but rather to control and dominate, the administration of Crete. Sally McKee has

365 Georges Jehel notes that the Genoese never again attempted to establish a foothold on Crete (Georges Jehel, "The Struggle for Hegemony in the Eastern Mediterranean: An Episode in the Relations Between Venice and Genoa According to the Chronicles of Ogerio Pane (1197-1219)," Mediterranean Historical Review 11, 2 [1996]: 196-207).
attested to this by stating that:

The system of governance installed by Tiepolo\textsuperscript{366} at the behest of the Signoria was designed to regulate and modulate the participation of the military settlers, who came to be known as feudatories...The Venetian state charged those colonists with the defense of the island, but did not trust them to rule themselves. Therefore the colonists dispatched to Crete did not devise a system of rule for themselves, nor did they rule the land they had conquered. The feudatories of Crete themselves, along with everyone else in the colony, had to conform to the laws and regulations that Venice imposed on them.\textsuperscript{367}

The government on Crete was thus established to represent Venetian authority and protect its interests on the island, so it should therefore be no surprise that the basic structure of the colonial government closely resembled that of the home government.\textsuperscript{368} The highest ranking Venetian official on Crete was the duke of Candia, who was assisted by two counselors, three state treasurers, nine judges, and four "officers of the night."\textsuperscript{369} He was chosen, as were his two counselors, from among the most prominent noble families in the Venetian government and was confirmed by the Great

\textsuperscript{366} Giacomo Tiepolo was a Venetian from one of the oldest and most prestigious families. He served Venice abroad as podestà in Constantinople and as Doge of Venice back home, but, most importantly for the purposes of this chapter, he served as the first duke of Candia on Crete (McKee, Uncommon Dominion, 26).

\textsuperscript{367} McKee, Uncommon Dominion, 30.

\textsuperscript{368} For the following discussion of the Venetian colonial government on Crete, see Silvano Borsari, Il dominio veneziano a Creta nel XIII secolo (Naples: F. Fiorentino, 1963), 127-31; McKee, Uncommon Dominion, 26-8 and 30-1; and Thiriet, La Romanie vénitienne, 182-97.

\textsuperscript{369} These figures are described as "domini de nocte." George Thomas provides a list of offices on Crete in his Diplomatarium Veneto-Levantinum sive Acta et Diplomata Res Venetas Graecas atque Levantis (New York: Burt Franklin, 1966), I, 253-4, no. 130.
Council itself. His responsibilities included the administration of both the island and also Venetian justice and the preservation of public order. The duke and his two advisors made up the "high court" of the colony and, taken together with his many other advisors, is reminiscent of the doge and his court back in Venice.370

The similarity between the home government in Venice and the colonial regime on Crete becomes even stronger when we take into account the duke's advisory councils.371 There were three major councils established by the beginning of the fourteenth-century: the Great Council of Candia, the Council of Feudatories, and the Council of the *Rogati*, or the Candiote Senate. The exact responsibilities of these councils are not known, but Sally McKee's examination of the only surviving register of the Senate's deliberations allows for some generalizations. Their functions included, in some way, shape or form, the carrying out of governmental and ducal pronouncements, the election of local officials, the organization of military ventures, and the coordination of tax collection.372 The involvement of the councils in such a wide variety of administrative activities should

370 I am here borrowing the words of Sally McKee (McKee, *Uncommon Dominion*, 27).
371 The councils are specifically addressed in McKee, *Uncommon Dominion*, 31-56; and Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne*, 203-8.
not be interpreted, however, as a means through which the feudatories on the councils participated in the real governance of Crete. It is probably more accurate, even if a bit Orwellian, to say that their involvement illustrated Venice’s desire to control Crete from afar. This is the opinion of McKee, who writes that:

The functions of these councils were not legislative or executive, in the sense that they constituted the agencies through which the feudatories exercised any rights of governance. On the contrary, mandatory attendance at the council and its evil twin absenteeism say as much about the obligatory nature of the feudatories’ involvement in the councils as they do about the reluctance of feudatories to fulfill their obligations to the regime. The councils were the regime’s way of keeping an eye on the feudatories and of securing their assistance in the management of the colony.\textsuperscript{373}

The councils were thus a key point of interaction between officials from Venice and local officeholders, which included both the feudatories and also the resident Venetian patricians, through which the home government could more closely and effectively rule the island.

The duke of Candia, his advisors and the three councils discussed above closely resemble the core structure of the Venetian government discussed in the last chapter, which include the doge, the Signoria, and the major advisory councils. The colonial administration on Crete is furthermore evidence of the Venetian home government’s ability to adapt and expand its institutions

\textsuperscript{373} McKee, \textit{Uncommon Dominion}, 31.
to changing administrative needs. Indeed, flexibility was needed to ensure the strength of Venetian government as its colonial presence on Crete expanded in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Venice soon found it necessary to appoint rectors to govern the western Cretan cities of Chania, Rethimno, and Sitia, all of whom were appointed by the Venetian Senate. The most important adaptation of the system came in 1365, when Venice, which was still reeling from the 1363 Revolt of St. Tito and becoming increasingly concerned about the frequency of Ottoman raids along the eastern coast of Crete, appointed a captain general for the island. The significance of this development was that it shifted the responsibility of military organization and overseeing the island’s defense from the duke and his advisors to this new, Venice-appointed official. The post of captain general would in fact become as much of a representation of Venetian power as the duke by the end of the fifteenth-century. Finally, Venice responded to the ever-increasing Ottoman threat in the sixteenth-century by transferring additional military responsibilities from the duke to a provveditore generale.

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374 McKee, Uncommon Dominion, 27; and O’Connell, “Venice outside the Lagoon,” 59.
375 For a detailed examination of the evolution, see O’Connell, “Venice outside the Lagoon,” 61-4.
376 Chryssa A. Maltezou, “The Historical and Social Context,” in Literature and Society in Renaissance Crete, edited by David Holton
government thus came to rule Crete effectively by redistributing power within this core group of officials, i.e. the duke, captain, advisors, and rectors, when it was deemed necessary. This adaptability is also seen in the addition of a new council in the sixteenth-century, the Council of Eighteen, which was created to combat the increasing social exclusivity of Venetian and Cretan nobles.\(^{377}\)

The ruling class of Genoese Chios also became increasingly exclusive and entitled as time went on, but the source of their authority was far different from that of Venetian nobles on Crete. In 1346, a fleet of twenty-nine privately-owned ships, originally assembled by the Genoese commune to subdue the Grimaldi family stronghold of Monaco to the west of Genoa, was foiled in its mission when it discovered the Grimaldi and their adherents had gone north to fight for the king of France.\(^{378}\) Upon returning to Genoa, the Commune reassigned Admiral Simone Vignoso and his fleet to protect Genoese interests in the Black Sea region, for which they quickly departed. In an interesting series of events that followed, the fleet...
encountered a predominantly Venetian and Hospitaller fleet at Negroponte intent on attacking their former possession of Chios. The Genoese, whatever their motivations may have been,\textsuperscript{379} sailed on ahead of the Venetians and Hospitallers, reached Chios on 15 June, and had forced the besieged Byzantine forces to surrender the island's fortress by 13 September. The terms of the treaty between Vignoso and the Greek nobility of the island were surprisingly fair.\textsuperscript{380} The Greeks were allowed to retain possession of all their property, save whatever was formerly Genoese, but for which they would be compensated, and also two hundred houses located within the castro, or fortress, which were to be sold or rented to the Genoese. The Genoese, in other words, did not remove the Greek nobility from their position of privilege on Chios, but actually confirmed it. In fact, none of these nobles were deprived of property, nor was the Greek Orthodox hierarchy replaced with a Latin one. This was in marked contrast to the system of governance

\textsuperscript{379} Felipe Fernandez-Armesto asserts that Vignoso and his fleet took Chios chiefly to keep it from falling into Venetian hands, while Robert Lopez believes the chronically insolvent commune of Genoa, being unable to reimburse the ship owners for their efforts against Monaco, authorized the fleet to sail to the east and “reimburse” themselves however they saw fit, even if this meant using corsair-like tactics (Fernández-Armesto, Before Columbus, 103; Lopez, Storia delle colonie genovesi, 261-2).

\textsuperscript{380} An edition of both the capitulation treaty of 12 September and also the treaty between Vignoso and the Greek nobility of the island are printed in Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, II: 26-8 and 28-32. For a discussion of Vignoso's treaty with the Greek nobility, see Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, I: 97-100.
instituted by Venice on Crete, whose authorities both confiscated all lands held by the Byzantine imperial fisc and Greek nobility, and also replaced the Greek Orthodox episcopate with either Latin bishops or Greek bishops who recognized the authority of Rome.\textsuperscript{381} The final conquest of the fleet would be the settlements of Old and New Phokaia, which were so heavily prized for their alum mines and had both fallen to the Genoese by 20 September.\textsuperscript{382} Simone Vignoso and his fleet had returned to Genoa by 9 November with great fanfare,\textsuperscript{383} but the situation presented a pressing problem: how were Chios and the two Phokaias to be administered?

It was not until 26 February 1347 that the association of ship owners, now calling themselves the Mahona of Chios, and the Commune of Genoa reached an agreement. The two groups effectively divided the power to rule Chios and the two Phokaias between themselves. The Commune of Genoa retained for itself the merum et mixtum imperium et omnimoda jurisdictio, or the right to rule there under Genoese law. The Mahona of Chios, however, was granted proprietas et dominium utile et directum, or the ownership and right to collect taxes and

\textsuperscript{381} McKee, Uncommon Dominion, 69-71 and 104-5.
\textsuperscript{382} For the text of the treaty between Vignoso and the defenders of New Phocaea, see Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, II:33-8. For a brief discussion of the treaty, see Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, I:100-3.
\textsuperscript{383} The triumphant return of Vignoso to Genoa is described in Agostino Giustiniani, Annali, 134.
exploit the land as it saw fit. In reality, this meant that the Mahonesi had received the right to control the two most financially important natural resources of the lands: the alum of the Phokaias and the mastic of Chios. The two parties also established an administrative structure for Chios. The communal contribution was headed by a podestà who was chosen by the Genoese doge, but from a list of candidates put forward by the Mahonesi. He was sworn to render justice in accordance with Genoese law, but also according to the agreements concluded between Genoa and the Mahona. A group of six to ten counselors, who were chosen by and from among the Mahonesi, assisted him. The defense of Chios was entrusted to a doge-appointed guardian, who was elected in the same manner as the podestà and paid by the Mahona.

All of this clearly demonstrates the Mahonesi’s powerful position of authority relative to Genoa’s chief representatives on Chios, yet the Mahona was made even

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384 For the text of this agreement, see Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, II:38-55. For a discussion of the treaty, see Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, I:106-17; and Balard, La Romaine génoise, I:376-8.
385 Balard, La Romaine génoise, I:378.
387 Balard, La Romaine génoise, I:380.
388 Philip Argenti has indeed commented that the podestà appears to have had hardly any executive authority during the entire 220 year Genoese domination of Chios and “in the event of any kind of clash between the Mahona and the Genoese Government his position became extremely ambiguous” (Argenti, Chius Vincta, xlix).
more powerful by the appointment of its own functionaries who were responsible for the local governance and defense of the island. It is not surprising that the internal administration of the Mahona was constructed around the function of collecting compensation for the private ship owners taking part in the conquest of Chios, which the Commune had been unable to pay. Indeed, the Mahona’s very existence was due to the fact that Genoa was unable to pay the 203,000 lire debt agreed upon by the ship owners and the Commune; a creative solution to this problem had to be found. The original Mahonesi, most of whom lived in Genoa, constituted the Old Mahona and, by 1373, had ceded their right to collect all direct and indirect revenues of Chios and Phocaea to a group of no more than thirteen appaltatori, or shareholders, who came to be called the New Mahona. It was this second Mahona that would provide local governance and defense of Chios for the next two centuries, functions that had been delegated to it by an unstable and insolvent Genoese home government.

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389 The following discussion of the Mahona’s administrative structure predominantly uses Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, I:106-46; and Balard, La Romaine génoise, I:381-6.

390 For the series of conventions concluded between Genoa and the Mahona that culminates in the creation of the New Mahona, see Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, II:56-122.

391 Conspicuously absent from the negotiations between the Mahona and the Genoese commune for the governance of Chios is Byzantium. Simone Vignoso had, after all, taken the island from the Byzantines in 1346, and it was certain that the new emperor, John VI Cantacuzenus, would not give up control of the island without a fight. Indeed,
island’s twelve administrative districts soon came to be dominated by the Mahona, with the Genoese podestà left merely to confirm the choices. The same was true for the posts associated with mastic production, Chios’ peculiar indigenous crop, and also high-ranking military posts. The authority of the Mahona even spilled over into the podestà’s administration, for two of the six members of his council were chosen from among the highest ranking Mahonesi and called the “governors of Chios.”

The Mahona thus possessed a position of great authority in the administration of Chios, if not a dominant one, when compared with the Genoese Commune’s representatives on the island. Michel Balard, who has studied the Genoese occupation of Chios in detail, indeed concedes as much, if not with some qualification:

So thus, although the Mahona had a preponderant part in the administration of Chios, the principal organisms of government set up on the island strongly resemble the administrations established in the merchant colonies placed under the direct authority of the Commune, particularly at Pera and Caffa.

Cantacuzenus soon demanded the return of Chios, but, in the end, was unable to retake the island. The matter was finally resolved on 7 June 1355, when Emperor John V Palaeologus ceded Chios to the Mahonesi in return for an annual tribute of 500 perperi (Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, I:117-35 for discussion; Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, II: 173-6 for the treaty of cession).

Balard, La Romaine génoise, I:381-4.

“Ainsi donc, quoique la Mahone ait une part prépondérante dans l’administration de Chio, les principaux organismes de gouvernement mis en place dans l’île ressemblent fort aux services administratifs établis dans les comptoirs placés sous l’autorité directe de la Commune, particulièrement à Péra et à Caffa” (Balard, La Romaine génoise, I:384).
The fact that the basic administrative infrastructure installed on Chios resembles that of the two other chief Genoese colonies in the East, however, does not lessen the significance of Genoa’s establishment of a Mahona on the island; in fact, it brings us readily to the crux of the issue at hand. The collaboration of an autonomous political body with a private organization to rule its colonial possession is indicative of the Genoese Commune’s inability to maintain effectively a territory abroad at that time. In other words, the unusual arrangement concluded with, and also the unusually large amount of authority invested in, the Mahona were concessions made out of necessity by Genoa, which was plagued by both regular bouts of political instability and also chronic insolvency throughout the Later Middle Ages. Venice was able to establish a regime on Crete that was directly answerable to, and closely supervised by, its home government, because it was relatively strong and stable; the lack of political stability in Genoa ruled out this course of action as an option on Chios.

It should be noted, however, that Genoa’s solution to the problem of colonial administration on Chios, while certainly creative, was not without precedents. Genoese merchants had in fact established a mahona in the North African coastal city of Ceuta as early as 1235, and
although it was the result of a punitive raid carried out on the merchants’ own initiative, the Commune nevertheless recognized their association.\textsuperscript{394} In addition to this, the establishment of a mahona on Chios also reflected a fiscal innovation that had become, by 1346, a time-honored practice in Genoa. Two years after Guglielmo Boccanegra, the first Genoese captain of the people, had been installed in 1257, he set out to stabilize the Commune’s shaky finances.\textsuperscript{395} He accused the previous government of fleecing the city of much of its income, and worked with his new government to restore this revenue to the Commune’s treasury. His solution was not to expropriate its creditors, but to promise to all of those people who had bought some of this income eight lire per year for each one hundred lire they had of their shares that had been recorded in the cartulary of the public debt, or \textit{compera}. What this meant, in reality, was that Genoa had created a funded public debt out of its mortgaged revenues that promised to pay its shareholders eight percent interest every two months, and also freed the Commune’s creditors to sell their part of the income; the money began to return to the public


\textsuperscript{395} The economic reforms of Guglielmo Boccanegra, as well as his captaincy as a whole, are discussed in detail in Epstein, \textit{Genoa and the Genoese}, 146-52.
The Genoese had thus demonstrated the ability to craft creative solutions to economic dilemmas both at home and abroad well before the time Chios entered their orbit. The establishment of a mahona on Chios, when viewed in this context, stands as only the most recent in a long line of attempts of an astute people to apply their economic expertise to a difficult fiscal situation. Yet, The Mahona of Chios does represent the beginning of a concerted effort by the Genoese to develop more completely this institution, as can be seen by the subsequent establishment of a mahona on both Cyprus and Corsica. This is not surprising, because the efficiency of this institution was perfectly suited to the interests of both parties. The Mahonesi were to collect all profits from the exploitation of Chios, whether the revenue came from taxes, duties, or mastic production, while the Genoese Commune gained a

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396 Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 147.
397 This sentence is an altered version of Steven A. Epstein’s phrase regarding Guglielmo Boccanegra’s fiscal reforms: “These remarkable fiscal innovations underscore Boccanegra’s attempt to apply the economic expertise of an astute people to their commune’s finances” (Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 147-8).
strategically located port and way station that was of minimal financial burden, given its sovereignty over the island was only nominal. It was an arrangement that hardly resembled the Venetian experience on Crete.

The Role of the Governed in Governing

The preceding section highlights the different approaches to colonial administration which Venice and Genoa established on Crete and Chios, respectively. When demographic data from these two colonies is compared, however scant in may be, we find that the Venetians and Genoese also shared a similar condition on their respective islands: both groups were vastly outnumbered by the indigenous populations. Sally McKee has attempted to estimate the late fourteenth-century population of Candia, Crete’s capital city, and indeed concludes that the Greek city dwellers and burgers greatly outnumber Venetian feudatories and wage-earners.399 One draws the same conclusion after studying the evidence from Genoese Chios. The most telling piece of demographic evidence, and one of the very few that is extant, is a tax report of 15 October 1395 drawn up by the Podestà of Chios, Niccolò Fatinanti, for the Genoese Commune and Doge

399 McKee, Uncommon Dominion, 91-4.
Antonioto Adorno, in which he conducts a census of the island’s population.\textsuperscript{400} He established that there were 1,930 Greek heads of household on Chios at that time, excluding from consideration those who worked in mastic production, served on the Mahona’s galleys (numbering 150), or worked with wood or pitch (numbering 62). He then subtracted from this number 130 Greek men who were over seventy years of age, infirm, blind, or crippled with no male heir, leaving 1800 Greek heads of household to pay the new hearth tax.\textsuperscript{401} It is reasonable to assume that there were at least 2000 Greek households on the island, when the inevitable overlooked few are taken into account. If we furthermore estimate the number of family members in a given household to be four or five, as Sally McKee has done for Venetian Crete, than we arrive at a conservative estimate of 8,000 to 10,000 Greeks living on

\textsuperscript{400} The full text of Fatinanti’s report to Genoa can be found in Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, II: 141-57.

\textsuperscript{401} “...feci fiery sequella [sic] omnium hominum grecorum tocius Insule chii et non computatis masticariis et illis qui mastica laborant nec marinariis galee mahee mahone qui sunt numero marinarii CL nec facientibus tabulas et picem qui sunt numero sexaginta duo reperi eos esse homines M.D.CCCCXXX computatis in his septuagenariis et infirmis habentibus Instrumenta franchisie angarie predicte et computatis allquibus hominibus de folia nova duudum in chio habitantibus qui dicunt se et heredes suos francos esse debere ab omni angaria et qui hucusque franchi fuerunt et computatis allquibus extraneis et mancipiis factis liberis habentibus apodiasis a dominatione chii franchisi ab angaria de quibus hominibus MDCCCXXXX diminuuntur homines centum triginta septuagenarii infirmi ceci et magagnati qui nullum filium masculum habent et sic restant homines MDCCC ad solutionem predictorum perperorum duorum...” (Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, II: 148).
Chios at the close of the fourteenth-century.\textsuperscript{402} This estimate becomes more significant if we assume that the ratio of Greek heads of households to Latin heads of households examined in Fatinanti’s report, five to one, can be taken to reflect accurately the total number of households on the island.\textsuperscript{403} In this case, there were around 400 Latin households or between 1,600 and 2,000 Latins on Chios at the end of the fourteenth-century.

We must remember, however, that the above estimates only represent the Latin and Greek inhabitants of Crete and Chios. Conspicuously absent from almost all population estimates are the Jewish populations of Crete and Chios. This is unfortunate, because both islands had a significant number of Jews, who appear over and over again in the notarial record.\textsuperscript{404} It must furthermore be

\textsuperscript{402} McKee actually uses 4.5 members per household to estimate the number of Latin feudatories on Crete, and later uses 4 members per family to estimate the total population of Candia. She apparently arrived at 4.5 members per family group by following the lead of “ethnographers of late medieval Italy,” but does not cite a single one of them by name (McKee, \textit{Uncommon Dominion}, 39-41 and 91-2).

\textsuperscript{403} Fatinanti, after completing his census, called a meeting of around 150 of the most prominent Greeks of the island in the church of St. Michael of the Greeks in the suburbs of Chios (\textit{ecclesia beati Michaelis grecorum in burgis chii}) on 28 November 1395. He informed them of his proposed tax reform, which was to abolish the current poll tax of 6 \textit{perperi} a year and institute a new hearth tax of 2 \textit{perperi} a year, to which all the Greeks gave their assent. He then called a proportional number of prominent Latins of the island to inform them of the reform, which he gives as “over 32 of the most prominent Latin burgers of Chios (“...triginta duobus et pluribus ex melioribus burgensibus latinis chii...”), hence my arrival at a ratio of 5 to 1 (Argenti, \textit{The Occupation of Chios}, II: 149-57).

\textsuperscript{404} Joshua Starr, in his still standard study of Jewish Life on Crete, agrees with those scholars who estimate the Jewish community in Crete’s capital of Candia alone to have been 500 to 800 people, seeing no reason to believe that this number was smaller in previous centuries. The significance of the Jewish population on Crete is
taken into account that, although there were most certainly Greek and Jewish notaries on Crete and Chios, only registers drawn up by Latin notaries have come down to historians. The extant evidence is therefore a much more reliable source of information on Latin inhabitants of Chios than for the island's Greek and Jewish inhabitants, who presumably only had reason to employ a Latin notary when they had business with a Latin and thus needed to record the transaction to make it legal under Genoese law.

It is no surprise that, given this sizeable disequilibrium in numbers between the colonists and indigenous populations on the two islands, members of the

confirmed by Sally McKee who notes that the fourteenth century notarial registers from the island record Jews in almost all occupations, and even making up about 13 percent of the 175 cobbler recorded. The Jews of Chios likewise had a sizeable community throughout the entire 220 years of Genoese rule. The work of Philip Argenti, who has studied this community in depth, shows that the Jews of Chios were well integrated into Latin life on the island, and also that they appear in many different types of transaction with their Latin co-inhabitants (Joshua Starr, "Jewish Life in Crete under the Rule of Venice," Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research 12 [1942]: 59-114; McKee, Uncommon Dominion, 6 and 94-8; Argenti, "The Jewish Community in Chios during the XIV Century," in Polychordia. Festschrift F. Dolger [Amsterdam: A.M. Hakkert, 1966], 39-68; and ibid., The Religious Minorities of Chios, Jews and Roman Catholics [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970], 100-46]).

Scholars of Venetian Crete, such as McKee and Starr, all agree that Jews on Crete had their own notaries, even if none are extant, while scholars of Genoese Chios remain divided on the question. David Jacoby has suggested that "it is almost certain" that the Jews of Chios used their own notaries, while Philip Argenti, although not denying the possibility, has urged caution in making this assertion, because "no such documents have so far come to light" (Starr, "Jewish Life in Crete"; McKee, Uncommon Dominion, x-xi; David Jacoby, "The Jews in Chios under Genoese Rule (1346-1566)," in Zion. A Quarterly for Research in Jewish History [Jerusalem: Historical Society of Israel, 1960], 188 fn. 55; and Argenti, The Religious Minorities of Chios, 138).
latter occasionally found their way inside the Venetian and Genoese administrations. The fact that their participation in these governments was generally tolerated shows an understanding, on the part of Venice and Genoa, of just how much of a minority they represented on their respective island colonies; indeed, necessity sometimes bred cooperation. This is not to say, however, that their participation was always appreciated or tolerated; it seems to have depended on the nature of the participation.

This becomes clear from the events surrounding a set of two delegations of Candiote feudatories to Venice in the fourteenth century. A group of feudatories travelled to Venice, in 1302, to complain to the doge that "bastards" were coming into possession of feuda and also obtaining seats on the Great Council of Candia. The doge, in response to the complaints of these


407 A feudum was an allotment of property that was originally given by the Venetian state to the early Venetian settlers of Crete, whose mission it was to occupy the island, subdue resistance to the occupation and ensure their continued presence. The feudum was to be used to support and equip them, thus making their task easier (McKee, Uncommon Dominion, 32-3; and Elisabeth Santschi, La notion du "feudum" en Crète vénitienne (XIIIe-XVe siècles) [Montreux: Impr. Ganguin et Laubscher S.A., 1976]).
feudatories, issued a decree which equated bastards with Greeks and forbade them from possessing either a *feudum* or a seat on the Great Council.\(^4^{08}\) The decree, although perhaps effective initially, was ineffective enough in the long term to prompt another delegation of feudatories to make the same complaint to the Venetian Senate in 1356. The delegation charged that the Great Council was on the short road to ruin thanks to that portion of its members who were *personae indigenae*, or "indigenous persons," which presumably means those who were Greek.\(^4^{09}\) The Senate’s response was slightly different than that of the doge in 1302, but no less decisive: the duke of Candia and his councilors were henceforth not to hand out seats on the Great Council without having them approved by the Venetian home government first.\(^4^{10}\) In addition to

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\(^4^{08}\) The key passage in this decree is: "Item narrabitis, quod, cum in concessione Candide et Chanee contineatur, quod aliquis bastardus non possit habere feudum, nec esse de consilio, nec habere castellaniam, nec iudicatum, quod de cetero hoc non sit, quia iam tota Chanea est corupta, quia cotidie fiunt bastardi castellani et iudices; et quia plura feuda in eorum minibus sunt peruenta: unde omni modo tractetis, quod hoc non fiat, et etiam dicere quod aliquis Grecus non possit habere feudum, nec esse de consilio" (Diplomatarium Veneto-Levantinum sive Acta et Diplomata Res Venetas Graecas atque Levantis, ed. George Martin Thomas (New York: Burt Franklin, 1966), I:3-4, no. 3, 8 May 1302).

\(^4^{09}\) "Primo super puncto loquente, quod consilium maius Candide audit in desolationem occasione personarum indigenarum, quae fiunt de ipso consilio..." (Ernst Gerland, *Das Archiv des Herzogs von Kandia im K. Staatsarchiv zu Venedig* [Strassburg: Karl J. Trübner, 1899], 58).

\(^4^{10}\) "captum est, quod duca et consiliarii non possint de cetero per seuel alium facere alium de ipso maiori consilio per modum gratie. Sed si eis uidebitur aliquis meruisse dictum beneficium scribant"
this, the feudatories received a response to their second petition, which concerned the regularization of the Great Council's membership. The Venetian administration on Crete was henceforth to elect a thirty-man committee to conduct, in collaboration with the duke and his councilors, a review of the Great Council by administering a qualifying examination, or proba, to its members in the days leading up to Christmas.411

It is true that historians possess little evidence detailing how someone qualified for a council seat, or what criteria were used to elect him, but the intent was clearly to limit the access of Candiot Greek to the Great Council. Indeed, the implemented measures seem to have been effective, even if the evidence is limited. Sally McKee has studied the lists of both the committees of examiners and also the council members and found that the vast majority of both groups come from the most domination nostre, non intromittendo se in faciendo aliquid in predictis, donec per dominationem nostrum determinatum fuerit” (Gerland, Das Archiv des Herzogs von Kandia, 58).

411 “Super secundo puncto loquente, quod illi de maiori consilio Candide debeant combrobari omni anno, captum est, quod de cetero duca et consiliarii teneantur eligere inter eos de illis de dicto maiori consilio triginta omni anno, uidelicet unum pro domo et non ultra, in quorum numero sint camerarii; qui duca et consiliarii cum dictis triginta teneantur facere probam omnium de dicto maiori consilio singulisannis per quindecim dies ante nativitatem; non intelligendo consilium congregatum, nisi fuerint uiginti quinque congregate uel inde supra ultra ducam et consiliarios. Et qui habuerit decem ballotas ex dicto numero, intelligatur cecidisse ad illam probam secundum mores nostros de hinc, non excluding propertrea heredes eiusdem a dicto beneficio, si ad tale beneficiium forent admittendi” (Gerland, Das Archiv des Herzogs von Kandia, 58).
prominent feudatory families. The decrees and election reforms above also clearly demonstrate a concerted effort by the Venetian home government to control access to the Great Council of Candia. This is not surprising, considering the discussion earlier in this chapter, which described the Venetian desire to supervise and control closely the administration of Crete.

The Venetian home government may have taken pains to limit non-Venetian access to the high offices and councils of Crete, but there is evidence that they participated both directly and indirectly in other facets of the colonial government. A clear example of this comes from the judicial system established by the Venetians on Crete. It was a system remarkably similar to that of Venice, employing as it did three iudices di proprio, who dealt with matters of inheritance, and three iudices di petizion, who dealt with matters involving debt and commerce, all of whom ruled on disputes between Latins or between Latins and Greeks or Jews. In addition to these judges, and more important for our purposes here, there were also a group of iudices di prosopo who dealt with those cases involving only Greeks and Jews. There is evidence that, in the later years of the colony, some of them had Greek ancestry, which was

412 McKee, Uncommon Dominion, 39-50.
413 McKee, Uncommon Dominion, 27-9; and O'Connell, "Venice outside the Lagoon," 151-5.
possibly due to the nature of the di prosopo judges' responsibilities, or perhaps to the blurring of the line between what was considered Latin or Greek by this time. Whatever the case may have been, it is worth noting that these non-Venetian residents of Crete were judged by the Statutes of Venice and not by local law or custom, as would be the case when Venice expanded westward onto the Italian mainland in the fifteenth-century. This once again betrays the dominant role played by the Venetian home government in the administration of, and dispensation of justice on, Crete.

The Jews of Crete also participated in the Venetian system of justice on the island, although the evidence points to their participation being involuntary. The morbid practice of requiring a Jew to carry out sentences of capital punishment had been spreading throughout areas

415 The one exception to this rule was in matters concerning dowries, where the judge was bound to judge according to Greek custom. The oath of office, or capitularium, of the iudices di prosopo is similar to those of the other groups of judges, but add: "Excepto de ratione repromissearum, de quibus procedure et iudicare debo iuxta usum Grecorum" (published in Gerland, Das Archiv des Herzogs von Kandia, 98; cited by McKee, Uncommon Dominion, 197 fn. 36; and by O'Connell, "Venice outside the Lagoon," 153 fn. 15).
416 James Grubb has pointed out that Venice instead adopted the law of the conquered territories to rule its possessions on the Terraferma, opting not to impose in full the Statutes of Venice upon the territories. This development was not, however, wholly voluntary on the part of the conquerors. The new Venetian subjects' inability to comprehend the intricate and complex set of Venetian laws, combined with Venice's lack of adequate resources and inclination to substitute local custom with these laws, led to the establishment of a "dual jurisdiction" combining both sets (Grubb, Firstborn of Venice, 29).
of Byzantine influence since the late eleventh-century.\footnote{The first known reference to this practice is found in the account describing the blinding of Romanos IV Diogenes in 1073, which followed his famous defeat by the Seljuk Turks at Manzikert (Joshua Starr, The Jews in the Byzantine Empire, 641-1204 [Athens: Verlag der "Byzantinisch-Neugriechischen Jahrbücher," 1939; reprint, New York: Burt Franklin, 1970], 202, doc. 149).} It was in fact well established in Venice's colonies by the middle of the fourteenth century, and Crete was no exception.\footnote{Starr, "Jewish Life in Crete," 75. For a more detailed account of this episode, see Simha Assaf, "Jewish Executioners: A Contribution to the History of the Jews in Candia" (Hebrew) Tarbiz 5 (1933-34): 224-26. For more information on Jews as executioners in general, see Lucien Wolf, Jews in the Canary Islands: Being a Calendar of Jewish Cases Extracted from the Records of the Canariote Inquisition in the Collection of the Marquess of Bute (London: Printed for the Society by Spottiswoode, Ballantyne, 1926; reprint, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 42 and 62.} An early fifteenth-century account records that a criminal was sentenced to be executed by the Venetian authorities, but no Jew living in Candia would perform the task, having fled and hid in caves outside of the city. The Venetian authorities then took the drastic step of arresting the leader of the Jewish community of Candia, Elijah ben Moses Capsali, upon whom they inflicted torture until a Jewish youth was persuaded by his fellow Jews to perform the duty; for his efforts the authorities paid him fifty florins.\footnote{Starr, "Jewish Life in Crete," 75.} This practice, although customary by this time, did not go unchallenged by the Jewish population of Crete and other Venetian colonies. The fact is illustrated by the efforts of a wealthy Jewish merchant, David Maurogonato, who lobbied the Venetian government to abolish the practice, as had
been done in Corfu and Negroponte.\textsuperscript{420} He failed in his task, but the high regard in which the Venetian State held him was probably what prompted Venice at least to forbid the colonial government from forcing Jewish executioners from performing their duty on the Sabbath or other Jewish days of rest.\textsuperscript{421}

The colonial government’s constant search for physicians provides indirect evidence that Greeks and Jews were employed by the administration in this capacity. Sally McKee’s examination of the extant deliberations of the Council of Feudatories has indeed shown that attracting physicians to Crete was one of the council’s most pressing concerns.\textsuperscript{422} Ambassadors were often sent to Venice in order to secure the services of either a \textit{physicus medicus} or a \textit{physicus cirurgicus}, which is understandable considering that the plague visited the island several times in the years following 1347.\textsuperscript{423}

\textsuperscript{420} Starr, “Jewish Life in Crete,” 75. The official document was edited and published in Konstantinos N. Sathas, Ελληνικά Ανέχοστα (Athens: Τύποις του Φωτός, 1867), II:xxxii, 13 June 1465.

\textsuperscript{421} The city of Venice had ordered the colonial government to pay Maurogonato with 3,000 hyperpera and an additional 500 hyperpera annually as a reward for his part in informing the Venetians of a planned conspiracy against the colonial government that was to have taken place either in late 1462 or early 1463 (Starr, “Jewish Life in Crete,” 67-8 and 75). The official document was again edited and published in Sathas, Ελληνικά Ανέχοστα, II:xxix-xxx, 20 February 1463.

\textsuperscript{422} There are only eighteen years of deliberations that survive for the Council of Feudatories, but in that time there were no less than sixty-three occasions in which the council addressed the question of how to entice physicians to come to Crete (McKee, Uncommon Dominion, 51-2, 98 and 218 fn. 185).

\textsuperscript{423} The plague first arrived in Crete sometime in the fall of 1347, and then frequently reappeared on the island in the following fifteen
There was also the problem of retaining physicians once they had arrived, for it was evidently a common occurrence for these doctors to request leave in order to return to Italy. Yet, there is evidence that a significant number of non-Latin physicians were present and plying their trade on Crete at this time. Sally McKee has found the names of forty-three physicians in fourteenth-century notarial and governmental records, ten of whom were Jewish and at least four of whom were Greek. Joshua Starr's work on Crete has furthermore shown that Jewish physicians appear with increasing frequency in the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century records, and even enjoyed customs exemptions until 1441. It is therefore reasonable to assume, given both

years (Thiriet, La Romanie vénitienne, 261; also cited in McKee, Uncommon Dominion, 202 fn. 108).

424 The Quaternus consiliorum of the Archivio di Duca di Candia, Busta 12, in Venice record eleven petitions in which Italian physicians on Crete applied for permission to return to Italy on leave: fol. 26r, 31 May 1347; fol. 29v, 26 February 1347/48; fol. 79v, 23 April 1356; fol. 124r, 15 April 1359; fol. 138v, 12 July 1360; fol. 143v, 21 September 1360; fol. 146v, 22 November 1360; fol. 152r, 23 April 1361; fol. 159r, 9 January 1361/62; fol. 163r, 18 June 1362; fol. 165r, 27 September 1362 (McKee, Uncommon Dominion, 52 and 202 fn. 109).

425 The names of the Jewish physicians are: Açargias, 1323; Bonus, 1301; Master Elyas, 1374; Master Iacob, theotonicus, 1370-8; Master Ioste, 1389; Moyses, 1355; Rebi Michael, 1319; Samuel, sacerdos, 1368; Solomon, son of the late Bonus, 1355-63; and Laçarús de Serre, 1353 (McKee, Uncommon Dominion, 98 and 217-8, fn. 181).

426 The names of the Greek physicians are: Theodorus Gemisto of Constantinople, 1350; Master Marcus Granella, 1333; Master Cosmas Rosso, 1389; and Yacintho, monacus, 1353 (McKee, Uncommon Dominion, 98 and 218 fn. 182).

427 Hippolyte Noiret, Documents inédits pour servir à l'histoire de la domination vénitienne en Crête de 1380 à 1485; tirés des archives de Venise (Paris: Thorin & fils, 1892), 399; also cited in Starr, "Jewish Life in Crete," 91).
their significant presence on Crete and also the difficulty the colonial government had in securing and retaining Italian physicians, that the services of Jewish and Greek physicians were put to good use by Venetian officials on the island. It may not have been the case that they were always officially on staff with the government, but odds are that some of them were. In addition to this, even if these non-Latin physicians treated Latin feudatories and council members as part of their private practice, it can, I believe, still be construed as their indirect participation in the colonial administration; they were after all providing to Venetian officials a service on which they could not always count on their government to provide for them.

The relatively small percentage of Venetians on Crete, combined with its precarious location in the middle of a sea filled with potential enemies, made the defense of the island an utmost priority for Venice. The production of weapons and other instruments of war was thus very important to Venetian survival on Crete. It is therefore not surprising that non-Latinos appear in defense related occupations. These occupations, which include blacksmiths (fabri), knife makers (cultellarii), bow makers (arcerii), swordsmiths (spatarii), arrow makers (sagittarii or fusarii), and armorers
(clibanarii), required great amounts of skill and specialization, but were also essential to an ongoing Venetian presence on Crete. It was indeed the fruits of these artisanal workshops that kept government defense forces and feudatories supplied with weapons. These professions were in fact considered so vital to Venetian interests on Crete that the home government prohibited artisans engaged in these occupations not only from plying their trade outside of Candia proper, but also from working at their homes.\footnote{428}

What is surprising, however, is the high percentage of non-Latin workers in these defense related occupations. Once again we rely on the evidence provided by Sally McKee, who has, using primarily notarial records as her source, charted the ethnic representations in these occupations during the fourteenth century. McKee's findings are reproduced in the table below.\footnote{429}

\footnote{428 "Clamatum fuit publice per Petrum Vido, gastaldionem, quod amodo in antea nullus spatarius, faber, arcerius et sagitarius qui habitat in burgo Candide audeant laborare aliquid de arte sua nisi inter in civitatem et laborare quod ipsi fecissent usque modo debeant ponere in civitatem cras per diem. Et si fabri habitantes in burgo haberent ferrum laboratum debeant illud scribe lucta ordinem factum per dominium sub pena medietatis valoris rei. Et haec committatur advocatoribus comunis qui inquirant et exigant penas a contrafacientibus de quibus accusatores habeant terciam partem et terciam partem ipsi advocatori et reliquam terciam partem comuni" (Archivio di Duca di Candia, Proclami e Banni, Busta 14, fol. 9iv, 12 September 1333; cited by McKee, Uncommon Dominion, 97 and 217 fn. 175).}

\footnote{429 This information is found in McKee, Uncommon Dominion, 97.}
Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trade</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Latins</th>
<th>Greeks</th>
<th>% Greek</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blacksmiths</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knifemakers</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bowmakers</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>64.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swordmakers</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harnessmakers</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrowmakers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armorer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Total</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>50.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data is striking. In six of the seven defense-related occupations listed above, Greeks represent more than one quarter of the total known practitioners of that profession. The figures become even more striking when it is taken into account that this data comes exclusively from Latin notarial records, in which non-Latinos were most likely only to appear when they had some business with a Latin or needed to ensure the recognition of a transaction in a Venetian court. Thus, the number of non-Latinos in these professions was probably higher still, although only the discovery of Greek and Jewish notaries' casebooks would prove this for certain. In any case, the importance of this data for the purposes of
this chapter is that it evinces a significant level of non-Venetian participation in an industry vital to the survival of Venetian colonial government. It is, of course, impossible to know exactly how many of these Greek workers were directly or indirectly employed by the Venetian administration, but a fair number of them must have been. Indeed, they represent a slim majority of the total number of workers listed.

The evidence from Chios records a more conspicuous participation of the island’s Jewish and Greek inhabitants in the Genoese Mahona’s government compared to that found in the Venetian government on Crete. There is strong evidence that Jewish physicians were in the direct employ of the Mahona of Chios. This is in contrast to the earlier discussion of the Venetian colonial government’s use of non-Latin physicians on Crete, the evidence for which, even if suggestive, is still merely circumstantial and indirect. The practice of the Genoese ruling class in the East to enlist and maintain a physician on staff was common well before Genoa’s first occupation of Chios began in 1304. A notarial act of 1281 indeed records that the brothers Benedetto and Manuele Zaccaria, while in Pera, contracted a “Master Tulius medicus cirorgie” to take care of the ill in their fief of Phocaea; he was promised a forty
hyperpera salary for his services.\textsuperscript{430}

This practice was continued by the Mahona of Chios almost immediately after their establishment on the island, which is evidenced by the notary Pellegrino de Bracellis. On 14 July 1348, the first governor of Genoese Chios, Simone Vignoso, appointed Master Michele Mirasolis, \textit{syrurgicus [et] civis Janue}, to the post of physician of the Mahona with a house and annual salary of twenty-five gold florins and six pounds of grain for however long he remained in the city of Chios.\textsuperscript{431} Furthermore, the presence of physicians on Chios in the following years is easily traceable in the notarial records. There are a relatively large number of physicians who appear in these registers between the years 1394 and 1520, including at least eight Jews, all of whom were employed to treat sick Mahonesi in their homes.\textsuperscript{432}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{430} George Ioan Brătianu, \textit{Actes des notaires génois de Péra et de Caffa de la fin du treizième siècle (1281-1290)} (Bucarest: Cultura Națională, 1927), 91-2, doc. 31, 8 July 1281.
\item \textsuperscript{431} “Item promisit et convenit dictus Symon dicto nomine dare et solver dicto magistro annuativ in vita dicti magistri Micaelis pro provisione et salario persone sue florenos viginti quingue auri et minas sex grani quandiu in civitate Sii habitaverit et continuam residentiam fecerit ipse magister Micael” (published in Argenti, \textit{The Occupation of Chios}, III:520-2, doc. 36, 14 July 1348).
\item \textsuperscript{432} The names of the Jewish physicians, and their appropriate places of reference, are: Calo (Published in Giuliano de Canella, \textit{Notai genovese in Oltremare}. Atti rogati a Chio da Giuliano de Canella (2 novembre 1380 - 31 marzo 1381), edited by Enrico Basso [Athens: Società di Studi dell’Egeo Orientale, 1993], 101-3, doc. 45, 20 February 1381); Elia Gripioti (published in Villa, “Documenti sugli Ebrei a Chio,” 130-3, doc. 5, 29 May 1394); Eliseo Calaihi (published in Villa, “Documenti sugli Ebrei a Chio,” 133-47 and 149-51, docs. 6, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 13; Domenico Gioffrè, “Atti rogati in Chio nella
inhabitants were occasionally entrusted to meet the health care needs of the Genoese colonial administration and its officials, obviously an important charge. Any documentation showing that Greek physicians were employed in the same capacity is admittedly lacking at the present time. It is however reasonable to assume, considering the difficulty with which the services of Italian doctors were procured in the faraway East, that they too were utilized by the Mahona.

It is true that most Greeks would have taken their business to one of their own notaries on the island, especially when both transacting parties were Greek, but unfortunately none of these notaries’ casebooks survive. Furthermore, there are no known extant seconda metà del XIV secolo,” in Bulletin de l’Institut Historique Beige de Rome XXXIV [1962]: 379-81, carta 68v, 26 February 1398; and Donato de Clavaro, Notai genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Chio da Donato di Chiavari (17 Febbraio-12 Novembre 1394), edited by Michel Balard [Genoa: Università di Genova, 1988], docs. 39 [29 May 1394], 40 [29 May 1394], 41 [29 May 1394], 48 [17 June 1394], 49 [17 June 1394] and 50 [17 June 1394]; Magister Ismael (published in Gioffré, “Atti rogati in Chio,” 379-81, carta 68v, 26 February 1398); Benedetto de Ologar (published in Gregorio Panissaro, Notai genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Chio da Gregorio Panissaro (1403-1405), edited by Paola Piana Toniolo [Genoa: Accademia Ligur di Scienze e Lettere, 1995], 157-8, docs. 109 and 110, 7 July 1404 and 7 July 1404); Isac de Meire (also Mere) (published in Panissaro, Notai genovesi, 162-4, doc. 114, 14 August 1404); Astrucho (ASG, Notai Antichi, Giovanni Balbi, Filza 603, no. 297, 29 March 1414); Elia Benno (ASG, Notai Antichi, Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, no. 239, 7 January 1460); and Leone Benno (ASG, Notai Antichi, Tommaso de Recco, Filza 847, no. 154, 4 September 1449). Argenti cites some of these Jewish doctors, but does not discuss them (Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, I:628).

433 The existence of Greek notaries on Genoese Chios must be proven using the casebooks of Latin notaries, who occasionally make mention of them. The following list gives the names of known Greek notaries and the citation as to where these notaries are recorded: Stefani Catoari; Giorgio Magnendi; Iohannes Coressi; Nicòla Plasini Cavanucii.
casebooks of a Jewish notary, whose existence on Chios, although probable, is less of a certainty than that of his Greek colleagues. Nevertheless, the direct participation of Chios’ Greek and Jewish populations in the legal processes of the Genoese colonial administration is well documented in the surviving Latin notarial records. Greeks frequently appeared as witnesses to legal proceedings, whether the contracting parties were Latin or Greek. On 5 June 1394, a Greek priest, Nicola Triandafilo de Crionia, sold his house to a Genoese notary, Franciscus Gardinus, for eighteen ducats and had two fellow Greeks, Sergi Vestarchi and Iane Magenendi, stand as witnesses. The same Sergi Vestarchi, along with fellow Greeks Theodorus Calocetus and Nicola Vlasto and two other Latins, witnessed the donation of a house owned by Nicola Prasimo to

(Balard, Notai genovesi, 150-1, doc. 53, 24 June 1394); Michali maestro (Antonio Fellone III, fol. 108v); Cripti Corelli (ASG, Notai Antichi, Gregorio Panissaro, Filza 523, no. 21 and 134, 28 September 1403 and 16 November 1404); George of Phocaea (ASG, Notai Antichi, Giovanni Balbi, filza 603, nos. 336, 363, 422, 446).

There is no direct evidence proving the existence of a Jewish notary on Chios, but David Jacoby has nevertheless taken their existence to be a fact, while Philip Argenti has taken a more cautious approach by stating that we have no definitive proof of this. Argenti furthermore argues that notaries would have been less necessary for the Jews of Chios because certain disputes between Jews were resolved by appealing to the Jewish rabbinical hierarchy, whose rulings were sufficiently authoritative (Argenti, The Religious Minorities of Chios,” 138).

There were also two other Latin witnesses, Iohannes de Grimaldis and Lazarinus de Rapalo (Balard, Notai genovesi, 123-6, doc. 42, 5 June 1394).
Christoforus de Costa one month later.\textsuperscript{436} Iohannes Coressi, a Greek notary, appears as a witness in Latin-Latin transactions many times over the course of the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries; his knowledge of both the Latin and Greek languages must have made him a valuable resource to Chios' Genoese inhabitants.\textsuperscript{437} Finally, on 18 November 1464, the notary Antonio Foglietta recorded the inheritance of two houses and a garden located in the small village of Neochori by two brothers, Dominicus and Bernardus Asseretus, from their grandfather, Antonius de Tasti. The division of the inheritance was completed without dispute between the brothers, and was witnessed by the physician Barnabus de Trainato, Andrea de Corrado, Iacobus Catacalus, Teodorus Schilizzi, and Georgius Rodocanachi.\textsuperscript{438}

The Jews of Chios appear as witnesses with less regularity than Greeks, and, when they do appear, it is to witness the transactions of their coreligionists alone. One example will suffice to illustrate the pattern found time and again in the notarial record. The notary Donato de Clavaro recorded on 29 May 1394 that

\textsuperscript{436} Published in Balard, \textit{Notai genovesi}, 154-8, doc. 57, 4 July 1394.

\textsuperscript{437} Coressi appears in numerous witness lists, of which the following only represent a sampling: Balard, \textit{Notai genovesi}, 150-1, doc. 53, 24 June 1394; ASG, \textit{Notai Antichi}, Antonio Fellone III, fols. 140v-141r; ASG, \textit{Notai Antichi}, Gregorio Panissaro, Filza 523, no. 21 and 134, 28 September 1403 and 16 November 1404; ASG, \textit{Notai Antichi}, Giovanni Balbi, filza 603, no. 336.

\textsuperscript{438} ASG, \textit{Notai Antichi}, Antonio Foglietta, Filza 843, no. 183, 18 November 1464.
Elias and his mother Etsati, both Jews, sold a house with a courtyard located in the Jewish Quarter to a Jewish physician, Elixeus Calaihi, for 225 ducats. Four men participated in the sale as witnesses: the Latins Antonius de Oppicis and Antonius Restanus, and Samaria sacerdotus and Lazarus de Zagora, both Jews. The absence in the notarial casebooks of a Jew standing as witness for a non-Jew does not stem from any known legal restriction against the Jews, as Philip Argenti and David Jacoby have demonstrated. There were thus, in theory, no legal obstacles to prevent a Jew from appearing in court or in legal documents when the case involved Christians. Argenti instead argues that the lack of even a single extant Jewish witness to a transaction involving non-Jews is the result of “the particular social prejudice of both Latins and Greeks at that time,” making it “unlikely that they were ever called upon to do so.” This may well have been the case, but even if their service as witnesses did not extend beyond the Jewish community, the fact that they appear at all in Latin legal proceedings proves that they were participants in the Genoese legal system on Chios.

441 Argenti, The Religious Minorities of Chios,” 140.
One of the most common acts recorded in the extant notarial records is the appointment of arbitrators to settle disputes out of court. The practice was, in fact, so common on Genoese Chios that it must be considered the preferred method of dispute resolution in the colony.\footnote{This is most likely in emulation of the home city of Genoa, where Steven A. Epstein has commented on the curious lack of lawyers in city and its preference for arbitration over litigation (Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 64-5).} It is well documented that Greeks had an unrestricted right both to appoint arbitrators and also to be appointed arbitrators regardless of the disputants' ancestries or social class. The proof of this appears time and time again in the registers of Tommaso de Recco, who worked on Chios during the mid-fifteenth century. Two deeds from 1457 record three Greeks, Georgius Gordato, Luca and Teodorus Frangopoli, naming as their respective arbitrators Costa Nomico and Mariolo Agropoli, both Greeks.\footnote{ASG, Notai Antichi, Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, fols. 199 and 200, 14 May and 28 May 1457.} Latins also appointed Greeks as their arbitrators, as the Genoese citizen Benedictus Bottus quondam Jeronimi and Jacobus Portus filius Christofori...
did on 31 October 1471, when they named Bartholomeus de Garibaldo, Nicolaus de Trani, and Nicolaus Argenti quondam Johannis as arbitrators. Furthermore, there is evidence that Mahonesi both appointed, and also were appointed by, Greeks to be arbitrators. On 13 December 1456, Egregius Dominus Thomas Adurnus and the Greek Nicola Mendoni agreed to accept Egregius Dominus Christoforus Justinianus and Angelus Justinianus quondam domini Andrioli as arbitrators in the dispute between them. Finally, on 12 August 1460, the Greeks Giano Arfani and Giano Marriani named the Egregii vires Johannes Paterius and Edoardus Justiniani to arbitrate in their dispute.

An interesting edict, issued by the podesta of Chios and two of his commissioners in 1496, provides evidence that there were Greeks who did not merely take part in the Mahona’s legal proceedings as arbitrators, but actually manipulated the system to their own benefit. The edict begins by describing the current state of the arbitration system on Chios, in which the burgers and Greeks commonly appointed Mahonesi to argue their cases

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444 Published in Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, III:806, no. 319.
445 ASG, Notai Antichi, Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, fol. 132, 13 December 1456.
446 ASG, Notai Antichi, Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, fol. 429, 12 August 1460.
447 Argenti discusses this edict, but does not reproduce it in his appended collection of sources (Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, I:441.
before the podestà, his representative, or arbitrators. The podestà and his officials found this practice to be deplorable, because the just cases of the island’s poorer inhabitants were being thrown out in favor of the party supported by the full weight of the Mahonese’s wealth and influence. The situation therefore moved the podestà to decree that henceforth no Mahonese was to represent burgers or Greeks in court, and the parties involved in the case must appear in person. In addition to this, the podestà or his representative was prohibited from participating in a case in which a Mahonese was named an arbitrator, a transgression for which he would have to answer by appearing before a panel of “censors” at the end of his post’s term.

This informative document provides fascinating insight into the operation of the Mahona’s legal system on Chios and the local inhabitants’ participation in it. It is insight even more welcome when we consider that almost no judicial records of any kind survive from the city of Genoa and its colonies before the Early Modern period. Yet, perhaps the most striking feature of the

448 The municipal laws of Genoa are completely missing for the medieval period, and, other than an early thirteenth century cartulary of a mysterious Savonese notary named Martino, the city’s criminal court records are nearly non-existent. The situation is similar for the Genoese colonies, which have little extant judicial documentation other than the briefs of the consuls and the mid-fourteenth century statutes of Pera (Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 64-5 and 108). For Martino’s cartulary, see Dino Puncuh, Il
edict is the manner in which it describes how the indigenous Greek population "consumed" Genoese justice.\textsuperscript{449} It is dangerous to make an argument on the basis of one document, but it is nevertheless certainly possible to interpret the above edict as evidence that some Greeks were able to use the Mahona's own legal system to secure a favorable outcome to their disputes. It is furthermore plausible that the more astute and legally savvy of these disputants may have inflicted the burden of arbitration on an unsuspecting acquaintance or neighbor on whose property, goods or good name they had designs. This is, of course, merely speculation and must be supported by more evidence before being declared a valid assertion, but the fact that the practice warranted an official decree of prohibition from the Genoese podestà illustrates how common it had become by the end of the fifteenth-century.

Philip Argenti, in his monumental work on Genoese Chios, firmly asserted that "Jews never appear as arbitrators in disputes" on Genoese Chios.\textsuperscript{450} This claim

\textsuperscript{449} The use of this term references Daniel Lord Smail's book, The Consumption of Justice: Emotions, Publicity, and Legal Culture in Marseille, 1264-1423, in which he examines not the jurist's view of the law, but the people who actually brought cases to court, or the "consumers" (Daniel Lord Smail, The Consumption of Justice: Emotions, Publicity, and Legal Culture in Marseille, 1264-1423 [Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2003]).

\textsuperscript{450} Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, I:443.
was then corrected two years later by David Jacoby, who provided evidence to prove his assertion that "the position of the Jews was no different from that of the other inhabitants of the island" in regard to arbitration.\textsuperscript{451} Jacoby found his proof in the notarial register of Bernardo de Ferrari, who records a dispute between Lazarus Catalanus and the Jew Micaeli de Nichosis on 4 November 1450. The dispute arose following Lazarus' payment of 2,040 aspers to Micaeli for the purchase of grain, the shipment of which had never arrived. The two parties decided to resolve their dispute out of court through arbitration, indeed following Genoese preference. Lazarus and Micaeli then each appointed a bonus vir as their arbitrator, Angelus de Rimini and the Jew Tobia Mosera, respectively, who found in favor of Lazarus, ordering Micaeli both to refund him the price of the grain and also to pay an additional fine.\textsuperscript{452}

This notarial act provides historians with indisputable evidence that Jews, just like Greeks, participated in Genoese legal proceedings as arbitrators. But, is it correct to assert that the Jews of Chios had the same unrestricted right as the island's Greeks both to appoint arbitrators and also to be appointed

\textsuperscript{451} Jacoby, "The Jews in Chios," 190.
\textsuperscript{452} ASG, Notai Antichi, Bernardo de Ferrari, Filza 765, fol. 215, 4 November 1450 (also published in Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, III:629, no. 170).
arbitrators? The evidence does not support this assertion. I have been able to uncover, in the course of my research, two additional instances of Jews serving as arbitrators, both of which are found in a casebook of Tommaso de Recco. First, a sententia drawn up on 3 September 1460 records a Jew, Beniaminus quondam Hemin, appointing as his arbitrator a fellow Jew, who is simply referred to as Mordichai, to resolve his dispute with two Christians, Johannes de Bozollo and Petrus Cigala. The act is similar in composition and content to Jacoby’s abovementioned evidence from 1450, and deserves no further comment. The second deed is much more interesting, however, because it records that, on 1 June 1456, the Jew Elias Valargo named Nicolaus Paterius and Thomas Vacha, both Christians, to arbitrate his dispute with Johannes de Via quondam Petri. This is the only documentation of which I am aware that records a Jew naming a non-Jew as his arbitrator, thus supplementing Jacoby’s discovery. There is, to my knowledge, no extant examples converse to this; in other words, there is no evidence of a Latin naming a Jew as his arbitrator. We are therefore only able to conclude the following, given the extant documentation: Jews named Jews arbitrators and

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453 ASG, Notai Antichi, Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, fols. 428r-428v, 3 September 1460.
454 ASG, Notai Antichi, Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, fols. 44r-44v, 1 June 1456.
Jews named non-Jews arbitrators, but it does not appear that non-Jews named Jews as arbitrators.

The Greek and Jewish elite of Chios are additionally found, in contrast to their counterparts on Venetian Crete, holding positions of significant administrative responsibility within the Genoese Mahona. Certainly one of the most immediate and constant concerns for the Mahonesi was the collection of tax revenue from the island's inhabitants; the exploitation of Chios' resources was, after all, guaranteed to them by their initial charter with Genoa. One would thus expect the Mahona to restrict rigorously such an important function as tax collection solely to its own members, or at least to fellow Latins, but this was not the case. A 1405 dispatch issued by the Deputy Royal Governor of Genoa to the podestà of Chios, Quirico Tadei, ordered the Greek Stephan Triandafilo, along with Giovanni de Castiliono, to officiate the annual auctions of oil and wine.\textsuperscript{455} A few years later in 1413, the notary Giovanni Balbi drew up an act in which a Greek was charged with aiding a Latin official in the collection of a \textit{comerchium angariae}, or a duty on the transportation of goods.\textsuperscript{456}

Greeks and Jews also held positions within the

\textsuperscript{455} Published in Argenti, \textit{The Occupation of Chios}, II:172-3.

\textsuperscript{456} Philip Argenti claims that the Mahona prohibited the participation by a non-Latin in the collection of any \textit{angaria}, or direct tax, in 1410, but the above notarial act would suggest otherwise (ASG, Notai Antichi, Giovanni Balbi, Filza 603, 12 June 1413).
Mahona’s *Officium provisionis civitatis et insule Chii*, or the Office of Provisions for the City and Island of Chios. Two notarial deeds drawn up by Donato de Clavaro in 1394 clearly demonstrate the participation of Greeks in the Mahona’s distribution of grain to the island’s inhabitants. Dominus Giovanni Giustiniani de Garibaldo and Cristofororo de Costa, along with two Greeks, Costa Meistro Mismilangi and Micali Meistro Spano, all officials *provisionis grani civitatis Syi*, twice borrowed money from a Chiote burger, Nicola de Sancto Stephano, to fund the distribution of grain in that year.457 The notary Gregorio Panissaro provides further evidence of Greek, and also Jewish, participation in the Mahona’s efforts to provision grain. On 20 September 1404, Nicola de Sancto Stephano, now a grain provisioning official himself, along with Nani de Pace, the Greeks Sergi Anafisto and Criti Sepsi and the Jew Beniamino, made Demelode Campiono of Savona responsible for the delivery of 800 *modia* of grain,458 which the officials then proceeded to divide up for distribution.459 Panissaro

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457 Nicola de Sancto Stephano lent these grain officials 1160 gold ducats on 20 July and then another 580 gold ducats on 5 October (Published in Balard, *Notai genovesi*, 164-6 and 245-7, docs. 61 and 96, 20 July 1394 and 5 October 1394).

458 A *modium* is an old Roman unit of dry measure equivalent to 9.28 liters, although this is an approximate number because it varied from place to place (Ronald Edward Zupko, *British Weights and Measures: A History from Antiquity to the Seventeenth Century* [Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1977], 8).

459 Published in Gregorio Panissaro, *Notai genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Chio da Gregorio Panissaro* (1403-1405), edited by Paola
drew up an equally interesting act one month later, in which the same five officials contracted a Jew named Natam to handle personally the distribution of 200 modia of grain. These documents thus provide proof that non-Latins were not only granted the authority to oversee the distribution of grain, but were also involved in its physical distribution on the ground.

The Genoese Mahona's delegation of these positions to Greek and Jewish elites placed significant administrative responsibility in the hands of Chios' non-Latin inhabitants. It is extraordinary that the Mahona entrusted, on occasion, the collection of taxes to Greek inhabitants of the island, considering how important this revenue was to the Mahona's very survival. Equally as interesting is the participation of non-Latins in the Officium provisionis, whose officers had the authority to stand as the Mahona's guarantors for contracts with ship owners importing grain to the island. What might explain the presence of non-Latins in the administrative posts of the Mahona? The administrative posts of the Venetian colonial government on Crete were replenished by

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Piana Toniolo (Genoa: Accademia Ligure di Scienze e Lettere, 1995), 176-7, doc. 126, 20 September 1404.

460 Published in Panissaro, Notai genovesi in Oltremare, 180-1, doc. 131, 21 October 1404.

461 See the series of notarial acts discussed directly above, which illustrate the close relationship between the office of the podestà of Chios and the Officium provisionis (Panissaro, Notai genovesi in Oltremare, docs. 124-8 and 131).
a steady stream of officials imported from Venice, which was not the case for the Mahona on Chios. The Mahonesi did thus not have the luxury of excluding non-Latins from these positions. In addition to this, the prompt supply of grain to Chios’ inhabitants, taken together with the timely and efficient collection of taxes, represent two of the Mahonesi’s most pressing concerns in their continuing efforts to maintain public order on the island. It is therefore also plausible that the presence of non-Latins in these positions represents an attempt by Genoese officials to minimize the possible hostility of the local Greek and Jewish populations to the performance of necessary administrative duties.

The high percentage of non-Latin participants in defense related occupations on Venetian Crete was discussed earlier in this chapter. The presence of Chios’ Greeks and Jews in defense related occupations, such as blacksmiths (fabri), knife makers (cultellarii), bow makers (arcerii), swordsmiths (spatarii), arrow makers (sagittarii or fusarii), armorers (clibanarii), shipwrights (fabri navalis, naupegii or marangoni), caulkers (calcatores) and ballista makers (balistarii), is likewise found in the extant records. But, the evidence from Genoese Chios, interestingly enough, differs significantly from that of Venetian Crete. This
becomes clear when one examines the table below, in which I have charted the ethnic representations in these occupations using notarial records from the late-fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.462

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trade</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Latins</th>
<th>Greeks</th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>%Greeks</th>
<th>%Jews</th>
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<tr>
<td>Blacksmiths</td>
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<td>57</td>
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<td>Shipwrights</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
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<td>Caulkers</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Armorers</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballistamakers</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knifemakers</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
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<td>Swordmakers</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Total</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The evidence, in terms of overall numbers, closely

462 I compiled the above evidence by examining both published and unpublished notarial casebooks. Previously edited and published notaries' registers in full (with editor's name): Gregorio Panissaro (Paola Piana Toniolo); Giuliano de Canella (Enrico Basso); Lorenzo Calvi (Ausilia Roccatagliata); Donato di Chiavari (Michel Balard). Unpublished notaries (and each register's archival classification): Antonio Fazio, Seniore (filzas 587, 590, 591, 594, 595 bis); Bernardo de Ferrari (filzas 764 and 765); Antonio Foglietta (filza 843); Tommaso de Recco (filzas 847 and 848); Francesco Camogli (filza 934); Giovanni Battista de Ferrari/Christofforo Sisto (filza 886); Domenico de Algario/Niccolo Torriglia (filza 944); Lorenzo Costa (filza 1005); Ambrogio Galumbero/Antonio Gallo (filza 1205); Girolamo Loggia (filzas 1122, 1123, 1125); Agostino Foglietta/Agostino de Via (filza 1205); Antonio Pastorino (filzas 1290 and 1307); Luca Torre (filzas 1393, 1394, 1395, 1396).
compares to McKee's findings for fourteenth-century Venetian Crete. The number of workers for which there is evidence on Genoese Chios is only five less than the 107 McKee uncovered for Venetian Crete. In addition to this, blacksmiths by far make up the largest group of workers in both samples. The samples diverge, however, when we examine the findings as a whole. The number of non-Latin workers in defense related fields is drastically smaller than McKee's sample from Crete, representing only 5.9 percent of the 102 total workers, compared with Crete's 50.4 percent of 107 total workers. It cannot be determined with any certainty how many of these workers, both Latin and non-Latin, plied their trades in the service of the Genoese Mahona, but it is a fair assumption that a significant number of them did. The Mahona had to procure ships, weapons, and other instruments used to defend Chios from somewhere, and the city of Genoa was rarely in a position to help supply them. A total of six non-Latin workers is also not a large pool from which to draw, especially over a period of almost 150 years. It is thus not too unreasonable to conclude that, given the available evidence, far fewer non-Latin(s) worked in the Mahona's defense industry during the second half of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, even if all six had the Mahona as their
employer.

The reason that there is such a discrepancy in these numbers from Venetian Crete and Genoese Chios is not clear. In fact, the high percentage of non-Latin workers in defense related occupations on Crete is just as striking as how low that percentage is on Chios. Yet, there are several observations that may help us to understand better these curious findings. One of the themes thus far of this dissertation has been to stress the stability of Venice relative to the instability of Genoa and how deeply these conditions affected their respective colonial administrations on Venice and Chios. There is no reason to doubt, therefore, that the closely supervised manner in which Venice administered its stato da mar would play a part in matters of defense. Venice regularly sent defensive implements to Crete, so it stands to reason that it also possibly sent artisans who were to ply their trade in the service of their home city. Beyond this, perhaps the strong and authoritative presence of the home city in all aspects of Cretan life may have provided a sense of security to the colonial administration, thus facilitating the employment of non-Latin artisans in occupations of great import to it. Genoa, on the other hand, provided little military support to the Mahona on Chios, which would perhaps
motivate the administration to maintain tight control over occupations directly connected to a continuing Genoese presence on the island.

There is also the possibility that these findings simply reflect geography. Crete is over nine times larger than Chios, so there was much more colony and coastline for the Venetians to defend than there was for their Genoese counterparts on Chios.\textsuperscript{463} The Venetians, with this task in mind, established an extensive network of castles and fortified outposts to protect not only the capital city and district of Candia,\textsuperscript{464} but also the other relatively large cities of Rethimno, Chania, and Sitia.\textsuperscript{465} This network required a large commitment of manpower and weapons, which would have made the Venetian administration recognize very quickly the value of all available artisans who practiced a defense related trade, whether Latin or Greek. Genoese Chios, in contrast to Venetian Crete, had only one real city, Chios Town, and all indications are that the vast majority of Genoese activity of all kinds, including those of defense, took

\textsuperscript{463} The area of Chios is around 350 square miles, whereas the area of Crete is around 3,235 square miles.

\textsuperscript{464} The district of Candia had eight castles alone, the following lists their names and the years in which their construction began: Temene (961), Belvedere (1212), Bonifacio (1212), Castelnuovo (1212), Malvesin (1303), Pediade (1340) and Priotissa/Pirgiotisa (1340) (Spiridone Alessandro Curuni, "Candia: l’edilizia civile all’interno dei luoghi fortificati veneziani," in Venezia e Creta: atti del convegno internazionale di studi Iraklion-Chania, 30 settembre-5 ottobre 1997, edited by Gherardo Ortalli [Venice: Istituto veneto di scienze, lettere ed arti, 1998], 303-36).

\textsuperscript{465} O’Connell, "Venice outside the Lagoon," 37-8.
place in this city and the surrounding district. This fact, combined with the expectation of little aid from their home city, might explain the reluctance of the Mahonesi to put trust for their own defense in anyone’s hands other than their own.

One Island, Three Rites: The Coexistence of Latins, Greeks, and Jews

The definition of the word “coexistence,” on the most basic level, is to live in the same space, although sometimes modern scholars have assumed that it also implies doing so peacefully. The latter definition is a difficult one to accept fully after a close examination of religious life on Venetian Crete, at least at the outset of Venetian rule. Indeed, religious life and practice perhaps best illustrate the level to which Venice closely supervised and dominated the administration of Crete. The tone was set from the very beginning of Venetian occupation of the island shortly after the Fourth Crusade, when they set about establishing a Latin church on the former Byzantine island. Venice restructured the ecclesiastical

466 See Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, I:531-49.
467 Detailed analyses of this process are found in the following: Giorgio Fedalto, La chiesa latina in Oriente (1204-1261), 3 vols. (Verona: Mazziana, 1973); Lock, The Franks in the Aegean, 193-221; McKee, Uncommon Dominion, 104-15; R.L. Wolff, "The Organization of the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople, 1204-1261: Social and
hierarchy to reflect the religious practice of the Lagoon. It replaced the Orthodox archbishop with a Latin archbishop, while creating an Orthodox protopapas, or first priest, as a state-approved and salaried official, who acted as a visible point of reference for the Greek population within the Venetian institutional apparatus. Latin bishops replaced those Greek bishops who refused to recognize the authority of Rome, with the remaining group all under the jurisdiction of the Latin archbishop of Crete. Venice seized all the property of the Orthodox Church, which was extensive, and reallocated it among Venetian colonists and the new Latin clergy. The Venetians also collaborated with the papacy to revise the Cretan liturgy. This new ecclesiastical structure on Crete closely resembled religious practice in the Venetian home city, where the Roman Church was, as Sally McKee has commented, “firmly subordinated to the

Administrative Consequences of the Latin Conquest,” Traditio 6 (1948): 44-60.


Borsari, Il dominio veneziano, 107; McKee, Uncommon Dominion, 104.


McKee, Uncommon Dominion, 104.
exigencies of the Venetian regime."⁴⁷²

The imposition of the Latin rite on a traditionally Orthodox population was bound to generate resistance to and animosity for both the Venetian authorities and also the new Latin Church on Crete. Most of this resentment came from the upper Greek hierarchy, because in reality little changed in the lives of the humble Greek clergy and their flocks. The Venetian administration in fact placed very few restrictions on the greater Orthodox population of the island. Sally McKee’s work on fourteenth-century Venetian Crete has demonstrated that the influx of the Latin Church on Crete did not prevent Greek priests from administering a complete liturgy of Orthodox rites to their congregations.⁴⁷³ Maria Georgopoulou has furthermore shown that the Greek Church even grew under the domination of the Latin rite, citing the appearance of over twenty newly established Greek churches in and around Candia during the early fourteenth century.⁴⁷⁴

There was, to my knowledge, only one issue over

⁴⁷² McKee, Uncommon Dominion, 104.
⁴⁷³ McKee, Uncommon Dominion, 105-6. There is even evidence that at least one Greek church had a confraternity associated with it. Michael Chanioti drew up a will on 24 March 1348 in which he left five hyperpera to the fratulia Sancte Marie grecorum (Sally McKee, Wills from Late Medieval Venetian Crete 1312-1420, 3 vols. [Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks, 1998], II:655-6, no. 516).
which the Venetians imposed a restriction on the Orthodox faithful, but it was a very important one: candidates for the Greek priesthood were prohibited from seeking ordination anywhere except on Crete. This prohibition came at the insistent urging of the papacy, and was facilitated by John XXII’s creation of a bishop, who was to be Orthodox, but faithful to the Latin Church, to handle the ordination of Greek priests. What would motivate Venice to impose this on Greek priests? The restriction was clearly designed to weaken, if not sever, the Cretan Orthodox Church’s connection to the Byzantine emperor, and thus facilitate the domination of the island by Venice and the Latin Church. Its subsequent development also provides us with another good example of how intimately Venice concerned itself with matters of religion on Crete. In 1360, the Candiot Senate introduced a series of discussions on possibly reforming the ordination procedures for Greek priests. There had evidently been too many special exceptions granted to Greeks for ordination off of the island. There was no agreement on how to proceed, other than continuing to observe the restriction already in effect, so it was renewed by a vote of forty-five to two, with four abstentions. But, what is most striking is that it is

475 McKee, Uncommon Dominion, 106.
the Venetian officials who come across as strongly committed to this restriction, and that the discussions were prompted by the apparent laxity of the Latin clergy in following it.\footnote{McKee, \textit{Uncommon Dominion}, 106-7.}

The Venetian colonial government's efforts to control the Cretan Orthodox Church were matched by its close supervision and regulation of the Latin Church on Crete. Future conflict between the two entities was almost inevitable from the very beginning of the Venetian occupation of the island. The original \textit{Concessio}, which established the nature of Venetian rule on Crete, scarcely mentions ecclesiastical matters at all, the only inclusion being a brief statement concerning the Greek Church: "You must maintain the freedom of the churches of the island and their ministers, but their possessions will be at the disposition of the duke, who will be there with his council."\footnote{Quoted in McKee, \textit{Uncommon Dominion}, 105.} One can assume that, given the tight leash on which the Roman Church was kept back in Venice, the colonial administration would act no differently towards the Latin Church on Crete. There were in fact many occasions on which disputes over authority and jurisdiction arose between the two. Some of the most heated disputes in this regard arose over the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical versus secular courts. On
13 April 1394, for example, the Latin archbishop of Crete, Marco Giustinian, complained to the Venetian Senate that his rights had been violated when Venice had appointed a new protopapas, Andronic Cortazi, without his approval. The Senate’s answer to Giustinian’s complaint is not surprising, and also a good indicator of the policy adopted by the home city concerning the administration of Crete. The Senate responded that they support the Duke of Crete Pietro Mocenigo’s explanation that he was not required to confirm the nominee for protopapas with the archbishop of Crete, and furthermore suggested that Giustinian make a better study of the rights of civil power which the archbishop is bound to respect. Venice’s message was clear and rendered in no uncertain terms: the Latin Church on Crete was subordinate to the Venetian regime on the island, but both institutions were subordinate to the Venetian home government, and there should be no confusion as to from where authority emanated.

Venice’s vigorously asserted claims to authority over the Latin Church on Crete did receive some resistance from the archbishop of Crete. The most fervent resistance came on those occasions when the archbishop felt the Venetian colonial administration, and

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479 For a summary of this appeal, see Freddy Thiriet, Régestes des Délisations du Sénat de Venise concernant la Romanie (Paris: Mouton, 1958), I:201, no. 848.
by extension the Venetian home government, were infringing on the jurisdiction of his ecclesiastical courts. Several examples illustrate well this clash between the civil and ecclesiastical authorities on the island. On 3 July 1366, for example, a case came before the duke of Candia’s civil court, in which two Greek priests had supposedly granted a dowry to Leo Dandolo, the husband of a certain Greek woman named Maria, on behalf of her father. The payment or non-payment of the dowry had since become disputed following the death of Maria’s father, and the two Greek priests, Dimitrius and G., were now called by the duke and his court to testify. What is interesting is that the priests excused themselves from testifying in the case on the grounds that they were among the 130 Greek clergymen under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the archbishop of Crete, thus a conflict of jurisdictions existed. Four years later, on 1 August 1370, a case in the curia archiepiscopatus Candide, and also coram dominis vicariis, brought the cobbler Nicolaus Trivixano to court. He was there to represent his heir, the Greek

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480 The document is found in Elisabeth Santschi, Régestes des arrêts civils et des mémoriaux (1363-1399) des archives du duc de Crète, Bibliothèque de l'Institut hellénique d'études byzantines et post-byzantines de Venise, no. 9 (Venice: Institut hellénique d'études byzantines et post-byzantines de Venise, 1976), 108, no. 71, 3 July 1366).
481 Thus it is written in the document (Santschi, Régestes des arrêts, 108, no. 71, 3 July 1366).
482 Santschi, Régestes des arrêts, 108, no. 71, 3 July 1366.
Calica Nasimbene dicte Cortacopulena, who had to defend her assertion that she was the legitimate wife of the Latin Nicoletus Foscolo according to the standards of Holy Mother Church. It was surely not an accident that a case involving the validity of a marriage of mixed ethnicity appeared in the court of the archbishop of Candia.

The lack of modern scholarship on the Jews of Crete is regrettable, especially considering the fact that they were an ancient and important portion of the island’s population. Their absence from this scholarship, however, is not on account of their absence from the historical record. Jews appear time and again in the records of the Venetian Senate and various other

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483 "Manifestum facio ego Nicolaus Trivixano, cerdo, habitator Candide, cum meis heredibus tibi Calice Nasimbene dicte Cortacopulena, habitatrici Candide, et tuis successoribus quoniam promitto tibi et sum contentus debere comparere tuo nomine in curia archiepiscopatus Candide, coram dominis vicariis in...dicte archiepiscopate, vacante sede tociens quociens opus fuerit, pro procurando et exercendo quod Nicoletus Foscolo quem dicis esse virum tuum cogatur per dictos dominos vicarious sentenciam diffinitam debet te accipere in suam uxorem legittimam secundum normam Sancte Matris ecclesie..." (the document is quoted, but not analyzed in McKee, Uncommon Dominion, 105, fn. 23).

484 The lack of work done on the Jews of Crete has not been remedied by recent scholarship. Joshua Starr’s study, “Jewish Life in Crete under the Rule of Venice,” is still the standard study on the subject, even though it was published in 1942. David Jacoby and Steven Bowman have made important contributions to the field in more recent years, but there is still much more to be done. See David Jacoby, "Venice and Venetian Jews in the Eastern Mediterranean," in Gli Ebrei e Venezia: secoli XIV-XVIII: atti del convegno internazionale organizzato dall’Istituto di storia della società e dello Stato veneziano della Fondazione Giorgio Cini, Venezia, Isola di San Giorgio Maggiore, 5-10 giugno 1983 (Milan: Edizioni Comunità, 1987), 29-58; and Steven Bowman, The Jews of Byzantium (1204-1453) (Tuscaloosa, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1985).
councils, as well as in notarial casebooks of Venetian notaries, although they most often made use of their own notaries. This documentation leaves one with the image of a Jewish population that, although enjoying a legal status comparable to that of their Greek counterparts, was caught in between Latin domination and Greek hostility.

The comparable legal status of the Greeks and Jews under Venetian rule, at least in theory, is implied by the reference of cases involving members of both groups to the same Venetian court, the Curia di prosopo, despite repeated declarations by community leaders that Jews should be tried in Jewish courts. It appears that, at least in the early years of the occupation, Jews may even have enjoyed slightly more favorable treatment by the Venetian authorities than Greeks. The evidence for this assertion is found in a little-known document of 1224, in which leaders of the Greek community of Candia complained that the Venetian authorities on Crete were just to the Jews, who retained their homes and synagogues, but not to the Greeks. Yet, the Jews'
relationship with the Greek population of Crete was not wholly negative during the thirteenth century, despite the animosity evinced in this complaint. This becomes clear in the aftermath of a rebellion led by Alexios Calergi, which wreaked havoc on the island during the late thirteenth century. The rebellion was finally brought to a close by a treaty signed on 3 April 1299, which states that all rebels and Jews may live anywhere they wish, except the villain militum.\footnote{The treaty reads: "Item volumes, quod omnes rebelles et Iudei et fabri possint habitare, ubicunque voluerint, salvo villain militum" (Gerland, Das Archiv des Herzogs von Kandia, 125).} The fact that there are no restrictions on where the Greeks and Jews could reside in this treaty implies a relatively peaceful relationship between the two communities. If there had been the possibility of serious conflict arising from the close habitation of Greeks and Jews, one assumes that some attempt would have been made to separate their living spaces, if possible, by the Venetian authorities.

Sources from subsequent years show that the Jews of Crete did not achieve a peaceful long-term relationship with the Venetian colonial government, although outbreaks of physical violence against them rarely occurred.\footnote{In fact, the only large-scale act of physical violence known to have broken out against the Jews of Venetian Crete was during the Revolt of St. Tito, and then by a group of Greek rebels in the summer of 1364 (Laurentius De Monacis, Chronicon de Rebus Venetis [Venice: Remondi, 1758], 179 and 186).} There is evidence that, by 1334, the Venetian officials
in the cities of Chania, Candia, and perhaps others had begun to restrict the residence of Jews to their own respective quarters. 490 This may have been due to some level of prejudicial treatment against them, but probably more important to Venetian officials was the opportunity it presented for the collection of taxes and fees. In the year 1403, the Venetian Senate sent a set of instructions to the colonial government concerning a section of the city walls that had collapsed and fallen into the sea. 491 The fact that this wall also bordered the Jewish quarter prompted the Senate to authorize the Cretan administration to extract half of the repair costs from the Jews, because of the benefit they would derive of said repair. 492

Instructions sent from Venice to the administration on Crete are, in fact, one of the best places in which to find evidence of the regime’s economic exploitation of the Jews. As early as 1255 Venice instructed the Duke of Candia and his officials to accept no gifts from Jews or

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490 The evidence from Chania can actually be dated back to 1325, when that city's officials were given the authority to “ponendi Iudeos in aliquot loco burgi.” Candia then followed suit in 1334 (Starr, "Jewish Life in Crete," 63).
491 “passus viginti vel circa de muro circum Candidam a parte ponentis ubi est Judaicha ceciderunt et ruerunt in mare” The document is published in Noiret, Documents inédits, 143-4, 28 March 1403.
492 “...volumes respect quod Camera de inde est stricta pecunia et si mandetur dicto regimini quod faciat solvi expensam dicti muri per hunc modum, videlicet, considerato quantum utilitatem percipient Judel in dicta terra, et quam habitations sue sunt site ab illa parte muri minati, quod omnes Judei civitatis nostre Candide solvent medietatem expensarum predictarum...” (Noiret, Documents inédits, 144).
Greek monasteries "for their enjoyment." Special and excessive levies above and beyond those required by the Venetian home government were frequently imposed upon Christians and Jews alike. Venice reissued prohibitions against such practices to the rector of Rethimno and the Duke of Candia himself in 1316 and 1350, respectively. Another incident involved the Jewish community in Rethimno, which the Venetian rector there had ordered to close their synagogue for an unknown reason. The rector offered the Jews an alternate meeting place, but the insistent Jewish protests eventually forced him to reopen the synagogue, but not before charging the community an 800 hyperpera fee for harbor maintenance. Rethimno is yet again mentioned in a case for which a sentence was rendered on 27 October 1448. The Venetian Council of Forty found that a Jew from that city, Yoste, had been wrongfully imprisoned eight months before by a local sindicus, Antonio Gradenico (Gradenigo). Gradenico was summoned to appear before the Quarantia and explain his actions within one month’s time, and Yoste’s release was immediately ordered, but not until he had paid a 1,000

hyperpera bond. The Duke of Candia was, on other occasions, the defender of the Jews on the island. In 1455, for example, he issued a decree prohibiting a Latin chaplain from collecting more than the traditional one ducat from each Jew at the time of Epiphany, which was used to purchase wax.

The Venetian administration’s efforts to control the Orthodox Church on Crete, as discussed above, are not surprising, given the intimate role Venice played in the governing of the island. Neither should it be surprising, therefore, that Venice made attempts to infiltrate the synagogue on Crete. The cantor is a functionary of the synagogue who conducts the liturgy, often sings or chants prayers and was most probably, in the case of Crete, chosen by the heads of the Jewish community. The great social prestige that the cantorship awarded to an individual within the community was often enough motivation for some to conspire with the Venetian colonial government to obtain it. It was thus

496 "Vadit pars quod dictus Ser Antonius teneatur infra unum mensem venisse ad hoc consilium, et expedivisse casum predicti Yoste. Et ex nunc captum sit, quod nisi ad dictum terminum eum expediverit, ipso elapse, idem Juste e carceribus liberetur, remanente tamen firma fideiussione per, ipsum Yoste data, de yperperis mille" (Noiret, Documents inédits, 420-1).
498 For instance, in 1362, five men agreed in writing to the appointment of Jacob, "the rabbi’s son," as both cantor and butcher. It was not unusual for these two occupations to be filled simultaneously by the same person, and is attested to many times in the extant documentation for the Jewish community on Crete (Starr, “Jewish Life in Crete,” 100).
necessary, in 1363, for the Jewish community to prohibit from the cantorship anyone installed in the post by the Venetian administration.\textsuperscript{499} The issue arose again almost a century later in 1458, when the community once again took umbrage at the newly appointed cantor. The situation received so much attention that none other than Moses Capsali of Constantinople, one of the most respected rabbis of the East, denounce the unwanted cantor and gave him three days to resign or be censured, which he readily did.\textsuperscript{500}

It appears that the most serious threat to the security and peaceful existence of Cretan Jews was the hostility directed towards them by the Christian inhabitants of the island, both Latin and Orthodox. A good example of the overly-zealous hostility that Latins could occasionally direct towards the island’s Jewish community, involves a curious resurgence of blood libel accusations during 1449-50. The evidence for this comes from a legal opinion written by an Avignonese canonist, Oldrado da Ponte, to whom is submitted a case concerning the crucifixion of a lamb at Passover by certain Jews.\textsuperscript{501}

\textsuperscript{499} Starr, “Jewish Life in Crete,” 100.
\textsuperscript{500} Starr, “Jewish Life in Crete,” 100.
\textsuperscript{501} The following case is found in Oldrado da Ponte and Rinaldo Corso, Consilia, seu responsa, et quaestiones avreæ (Venice: Ex officina Damiana Zenari, 1585); and Flaminio Cornaro, Creta sacra [sive De episcopis utriusque ritus Graeci et Latini in insula Cretae] (Modena: Editrice Memor, 1971), 382-9. The consilia is also partially reprinted in Noiret, Documents inédits, 425-6.
Oldrado informs his readers that, beyond the lamb’s crucifixion, the Jews additionally spit and stomped on the cross as an insult to Christ. The specific incident that set off this religious frenzy against the Jews was the discovery of a crucified lamb one morning near the Jewish quarter in 1449, which was considered by all to be a symbolic assault on the Christian religion. The uproar caused by the event prompted the abovementioned sindicus Antonio Gradenico (Gradenigo) to inform the Venetian Senate of the incident immediately. He reported that the Jews crucified lambs as a way of denigrating Christianity, also adding that this may be due to their inability to capture and use Christian children instead. The Senate launched an investigation in response to this affair, and ordered any offending party to be fined 2,000 ducats or, if not specific offenders were discovered, the Jewish community as a whole should pay this amount.

502 Cornaro, Creta sacra, II:382-3.
503 "Non satis quidem habuit perfida Judaeorum natio Cretae degens Christianos iniquis adeo molestiis divexare, sed ut Religioni etiam illuderent, teneros agnos (fortasse quia fideles pueros captare nequiverant) in Jesu Christi contumeliam cruci affixerunt, cujus facinoris nuntium cum Venetias delatum esset, Consilium XL virorum ad Criminalia Cretensi Regimini mandavit, ut omni studio in impios, qui adhuc ignoti erant, inquireret, publico etiam praemio iis proposito, quorum opera scelesti homines detegerentur" (Cornaro, Creta sacra, II:382; and Noiret, Documents inédits, 425).
504 "Significamus vobis qualiter in nostro Consilio de Quadraginta ad Criminalia propter intromissionem et placitum Viri Nobilis Antonii Gradonico Auditoris Nostril novi sententiarum, et in hac parte Sindici a parte Levantis capta fuit pars tenoris infrascripti videlicet:
This case is made even more interesting by a dispatch of a local official, Ludovico Foscarini, to Gradenico, in which he relates his response to this affair.\textsuperscript{505} Foscarini begins by citing several examples of Jewish perfidy in Italy, Candia, and Pontus all of which were designed to harm Christians, and his subsequent participation in punishing several of these offending parties.\textsuperscript{506} He then proceeds to offer proof for the widespread Jewish practice of lamb crucifixion, which he claims is known to everyone. His proof is a miracle story given by an unnamed pauper that tells the tale of a husbandman named Sauscus. Sauscus, as the story goes, sold a lamb to a Jew who intended to crucify it that Easter. Retribution for this act came to Sauscus in the form of a wolf, which ate up all of his remaining sheep. The wolf revisited the husbandman’s farm exactly a year later, and, despite the posting of guards and guard dogs

\textsuperscript{1}‘Che per autorità di questo Conseglio sia scritto al Regimento di Candia, che per haver al tutto la verità degl’agnelli crocifissi in qualunque si fosse, sia proclamato in la Piazza, et in la Giudaica di Candia, che se alcuno accuserà, o denonzierà, darà indizio overo segno, per il quale si habbia la verità, non essendosi avanti del ricever queste lettere ricavata la verità, debba aver in qualunque modo facesse venir in luce il detto caso ducati domille d’oro delli beni delli colpevoli, e se quelli non havessero da pagar sia dati delli beni della Giudaica in Candia...’'' (Cornaro, Creta sacra, II:382-3; and Noiret, Documents inédits, 425).

\textsuperscript{505} This letter directly follows Gradenico’s letter to the Venetian Senate in Cornaro, Creta sacra, 384-9.

\textsuperscript{506} Foscarini cites instances in which a group of Jews had purchased a Christian slave from pirates and proceeded to crucify him, in which he had taken an Orthodox church newly acquired by a Jew and converted it to a church of the Latin rite, and also in which he had expelled the Jews from their synagogue in the Italian town of Marostica (Cornaro, Creta sacra, 385, 385-6 and 388, respectively).
around his flock, once again devoured his sheep. The final act of Sauscus’ story then comes the next year, when he and several of his family members die in a plague. Foscarini’s tale ends here, but the clear implication is that Sauscus had finally received his just punishment for selling the Jew that sacrificial lamb.

This case is interesting for several reasons. It is significant as an example of Venetian readiness to intervene in matters of religion if public order was threatened. It also demonstrates how, given the right circumstances, religious fervor can transform an isolated event into an accusation of perpetual disrespect. The discovery of, what was purported to be, a single crucified lamb near the Jewish quarter became, in Gradenico’s letter, a habitual Jewish practice. The offence was even further aggrandized by the addition of a topos commonly found in blood libel accusations: the Jews would have preferred to slaughter Christian children instead of sheep, but they had been unable to capture any. It is furthermore important to point out that Foscarini’s letter provides no evidence that he or anyone else had ever witnessed a Jew performing a lamb crucifixion. His only evidence given to that effect is a dubious story related to him by an unnamed pauper, who, even if he had actually witnessed anything at all, most
probably mistook traditional Jewish food preparation methods for a perverse act of religious disrespect.  

The hostility of the Latin population of Crete to the Jews was often matched, if not exceeded, by that of the island’s Orthodox Greek population. Contemporaneous to the outbreak of blood libel discussed above was a case in which Ursa, the wife of an Orthodox priest, accused the entire Candite Jewish community of Host desecration.  

The same sindicus mentioned above, Antonio Gradenico, thought the matter serious enough to sail to Venice and personally enter the case before the Venetian supreme court, the Avogaria de Comun. The Venetian response was to order the Duke of Candia, Bernardo Balbo, to arrest the community’s leaders on 26 January 1452 and transport them to Venice for trial. Two of the leaders died upon arrival at Venice, but the remaining seven men were brought before the Great Council on 15 July, and were acquitted despite strenuous objection from Gradenico and the Avogaria de Comun. They were on trial again in the following year, when Gradenico trumped up charges of bribery against the leaders, but they were again acquitted by the Great Council by an

507 For more on the strict rules of meat and wine preparation followed by the Jews of Italy, see Ariel Toaff, Il vino e la carne: Una comunità ebraica nel Medioevo (Bologna: Società editrice il Mulino, 1989), 81-92.

overwhelming majority. It is unclear exactly how or under what circumstances the Jews of Candia had supposedly desecrated the Host. What this case does illustrate is the distrust with which the Greek population regarded the Jews of Candia. It also illustrates just how quickly accusations of impropriety could be constructed against the Jewish community, and how ready certain members of the Venetian administration were to believe them.

The events of the 1460s involving a wealthy Jewish merchant of Candia, David Maurogonato, illustrate well the tense relationship between the Greeks and Jews of Crete. Greek nationalism had been revived on the island with the influx of Greek refugees after the fall of Constantinople in 1453. A Greek-led revolt against the Venetian administration was soon clandestinely organized and was scheduled to take place either in late 1462 or early 1463. Maurogonato and an Orthodox priest, Father Limas, uncovered the conspiracy and soon reported it to the Council of Ten in Venice. The Council instructed Maurogonato to work with the colonial government to root out and arrest the conspiracy's leaders, which was quickly done. Venice then ordered the administration to award Maurogonato 3,000 hyperpera and an additional 500

hyperpera annually as a reward for his help. The colonial government’s dealings with Maurogonato, however, were not yet over. The merchant registered a complaint with Venice, in November of 1463, that the colonial administration had not yet paid him the abovementioned reward. Furthermore, his aid to the Venetian state had won him widespread hatred (publicum odium) among Greeks as much as among Jews. Maurogonato’s claim must have been well-grounded in fact, because the regime granted him permission to carry arms for his own security on 7 June 1464. Venice’s final gesture of appreciation for Maurogonato’s service to the state was rendered posthumously, when the Duke of Candia extended his annual

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510 This episode is discussed in Xanthoudidés, Η Εντοκοκτία εν Κρήτη, 113-6. The official document was again edited and published in Sathas, Ἐλληνικά Ανέκδοτα, II:xxix-xxxi, 20 February 1463. The pertinent section of the document reads: “Et per istud Consilium Decem confirmata fuit talea danda iperpyra III statim et V singulo anno et participation officiorum et beneficior, cum descentibus, et tres bannitos, sicut constat pluras Regiminis Cretae.”

511 “Ipse David die XII mensis Octobres dedit notitiam Regimini Cretae de hac re, cumque Regimen not ita cito ad inquirendum, et procedendum attendisset die XVIII mensis Novembris Regimen Rethimni inquisivit, et processit, et captum Gavala mori fecit, nullo dato praemio denunciator, nec ibi, nec hic quam de mense Octobre conscientia et accusation prius facta fuerat Regimini Cretae: cumque predictus David reverses ad capita exposuerit incommode sua, quae eundo stando et redeundo de mandato capit. X passus fuit, et publicum odium, quod ipse in tota insula, tam per Christianos, quasi per Judeos, acquisivit, cum jam digitmo mostraretur ad omnibus tam pro prima causa, quam pro ista secunda, nec petat propter hoc praemium taleae sed solum gratiam Nostri Dominii et infrascriptas petitiones” (Sathas, Ἐλληνικά Ανέκδοτα, II:xxx-xxxi, 20 February 1463).

512 “Che possa portar arme con uno appresso di se, per sicurtà della sua persona non gli possa esser fatto violentia over vergogna et mal per quello l' hà fatto per voi” (Sathas, Ἐλληνικά Ανέκδοτα, II:xxviii, 7 June 1464).
payment of 500 hyperpera to his children.\(^{513}\)

Maurogonato’s dealings with Venice and its administration on Crete are illustrative of many significant things. Once again the Venetian home government was proven to be intimately involved with local administration on the island. It is telling that when Maurogonato and Father Limas decided to inform the Venetians of the planned conspiracy they first informed Venice, not the colonial government, who then instructed the Duke of Candia how to proceed every step of the way. This included the distribution of Maurogonato’s reward. The incident indeed also demonstrates clearly the inherent tension existing between the Greek and Jewish populations of Crete. What is not clear, however, is why Maurogonato became the object of such hatred by both groups, equally subjected to Venetian colonization as they were. It is indeed hard to imagine that either group would have been motivated to shun Maurogonato by its loyalty to Venetian colonial rule. The most likely explanation for this animosity from the Greek perspective is that the merchant had intervened in a matter of Greek nationalism. He had foiled a plot to return authority

\(^{513}\) “David Maurogonato qui denique endo in servitiis nostril status admisit vitam, dum vixit fidelis et obediens Domino Nostro et in multis secretis opperandis Nostri status propter suam prudentiam quoniam sagaciter sciebat sibi commissa efficere illum pronuntio exercimus...et illius Tudei filli et alii nostril fideles inderunt ea quae fidelibus nostris promitus firma manent” (Sathas, ΕΛΑΗΝΙΚΑ Ανέκδοτα, II:xxviii, 18 December 1470).
over Crete to its indigenous Greek population, and with the help of one of their own, no less!

The negative response of Maurogonato's own people to his actions is more difficult to explain, but the answer may have to do with the precarious position of the Cretan Jewish community vis-à-vis the ruling Latin and subject Orthodox Christian communities with whom they shared the island. Ariel Toaff, in his book *Il vino e la carne*, commented that:

The power of attraction of a Christian society was present at every level. A direct and open clash against it would have clearly been counterproductive, in regard above all to the geographic dispersion of the Italian Jews... Jewish society [therefore] had to develop a large capacity for accommodation in order to resist and survive...the images and models [of Christian society], which threatened it from the outside, were partially integrated into the [Jewish] system, subdued, utilized and transformed to blunt their friction and tame their disruptive force. The search for compromise...thus coincided with a pragmatic ideology of survival...and this ideology proved to be extraordinarily effective. If there was, therefore, an intrusion of many typical aspects of Christian society into Jewish life in this period, it was rarely a brutal intrusion and more often appeared as a constant and insidious influence, which was born out of unequal power relations between the opposing societies.\footnote{Due to the length of the above citation, much of the extraneous phrases and qualifiers were removed from the above translation, but I include them here in full for the sake of transparency: "Di fronte ad una società Cristiana, la cui forza d’attrazione è presente ad ogni livello e contro la quale uno scontro diretto è palese è chiaramente controproducente, tenendo conto soprattutto della dispersione geografica degli ebrei italiani, che dà vita ad una miriade di insediamenti per lo più demograficamente insignificante, la società ebraica deve sviluppare una grande capacità di adattamento per resistere e sopravvivere. Le sue peculiarità ideologiche e religiose quindi, nell'impatto con la società circostante diversa, prepotente e affascinante, si allentano, si dissimulano, si mascherano sotto il velo di nuove apparenze, ambigue per necessità. Le immagini e i}
Toaff’s comments concern the Jewish communities of late medieval Italy, but much of what he asserts is valid for the Jews of Crete, as well. They were, in respect to the Latin and Greek populations of the island, the vast minority, for whom the Greeks harbored a significant amount of animosity, as we have seen. Any involvement in activities that would bring unnecessary attention to, and possible resentment of, their community would therefore naturally have been something to avoid. There is in fact evidence that Greek enmity of Jews intensified in the last years of the fifteenth-century, perhaps partially in response to Maurogonato’s whistle blowing.\textsuperscript{515} Acts such as Maurogonato’s worked to break down Toaff’s suggested “pragmatic ideology of survival,” and could make life much more difficult for the island’s Jewish community.

modelli, che vengono a minacciare la dall’esterno, sono parzialmente integrati al sistema, sottomessi, utilizzati, trasformati per ammorbidirne l’attrito e addomesticarne la forza dirompente. La ricerca del compromesso, che possa salvare capra e cavoli almeno all’apparenza, viene così a coincidere con una pragmatic ideologia della sopravvivenza. Un’ideologia che, è bene essere chiari su questo punto, si è dimostrata straordinariamente efficace. Se c’è quindi intrusion di molti elementi tipici della società Cristiana all’interno del sistema di vita ebraico in questo periodo, essa raramente costituisce un’irruzione brutale e più spesso si manifesta come un’influenza costante e insidiosa, che nasce dal diseguale rapport di forze tra le società a confronto” (Toaff, Il vino e la carne, 10.

\textsuperscript{515} In 1490, Bishop Girolamo Lando was forced to threaten the “inhabitants and soldiers” of Candia with excommunication if they did not cease their hostilities against the Jews. Only two years later, in June of 1492, the Duke of Candia, Luca Zeno, confirmed the ancient Jewish practice of placing guards at the grave of a recently deceased Jew of wealth or prestige, lest the grave be vandalized. Finally, in 1515, Venetian authorities once again renewed the prohibition of locals disrespectfully allowing their animals to graze in Jewish cemeteries (Schiavi, “Gli Ebrei in Venezia, 490 and 499).
It was asserted at the outset of this section that religious life and practice perhaps best illustrate the level to which Venice closely supervised and dominated the administration of Crete. The opposite may be said for the Genoese colonial administration on Chios. Religious life and practice on Chios, in other words, perhaps best illustrate to what a small degree the home city of Genoa was involved in the governance of the island. The Genoese commune, being in a state of frequent factional strife and chronic insolvency, was in no position to aid the Mahona in any effective way. The Commune delegated all real authority in governing Chios to the Mahona, which was thus largely left to its own devices in this regard. The result was that the Mahona cultivated a relationship with the island’s Greek and Jewish communities which was distinct from that of the Venetian administration with Crete’s Greeks and Jews.

The Genoese, unlike the Venetians on Crete, had a previous relationship with Chios and its inhabitants when they conquered the island in 1346, as has been discussed in an earlier chapter. The first Genoese occupation of Chios from 1304-29 is best characterized as an imperial enfeoffment to the Zaccaria family, who never fully escaped the authority of the Byzantine basileus and the Orthodox Church. The Zaccaria never gained the loyalty
of the Greek population of the island during their tenure. This is made clear by the contemporary emperor and historian John VI Kantakouzenos, who commented on the facility with which Emperor Andronikos II reconquered Chios in 1329: he sent a letter of submission to Martino II Zaccaria, in response to which the island’s population rose up to support Andronikos, who quickly expelled the Genoese.  

The new emperor, Andronikos III, then firmly established the archontes, or elite Greek landowners, as the ruling class on Chios later in the same year, exempting them from all personal taxes, or the kapnikon. These archontes were fiercely loyal to the Byzantine emperor and would remain the authority on Chios until the Genoese again took possession of the island in 1346. Their hostility to Genoa’s reappearance on the island is illustrated well by the late fourteenth-century historian Giorgio Stella, who described the Chiote response to Simone Vignoso’s offer of protection in June 1346. Vignoso’s offer was greeted with cries of “Let the Genoese perish and be killed!”, although this display left the Genoese admiral undeterred; the archontes, led by Calojanni Cibo, defended Chios with honor, but were finally forced to capitulate on 12 September of that same year.

517 See Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, I:65.
The Genoese clearly did not arrive on Chios with a blank slate. Local memory of a harsh Genoese occupation, which had only ended seventeen years earlier, combined with a strong, well-entrenched ruling class loyal to Byzantium thus explains the hostile reception of the Genoese by Chios' inhabitants in 1346. This is in stark contrast to the Venetian experience on Crete, for they had no prior relationship with the island when they arrived there in the early thirteenth century.

The fact that Simone Vignoso and the Genoese were faced with this strong, well-entrenched class of archontes upon taking possession of Chios explains the lenient terms reached between the conquerors and the Greek nobility of the island. The treaty of capitulation of 12 September preserved Cibo's rights and possessions, 7,000 hyperpera payable in three years from the islands income and tax exemptions for his entire family. On the same day, Vignoso also concluded a treaty with the Greek nobility of the island, in which they were allowed to retain possession of all their property, save whatever was formerly Genoese. The Genoese required, beyond

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518 Stella wrote that the Genoese were met with cries of "Moriantur et occidantur Ianuenses!" (Giorgio Stella, Annales Genuenses, 148). For a detailed account of Vignoso's conquest of Chios, see Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, 1:86-105; Balard, La Romanie génoise, 1:119-26.
519 The treaty is published in its entirety in Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, II:26-8.
520 The affected archontes would be compensated for their losses, however.
this, two hundred houses located within the castro, which were to be sold or rented to the Genoese, but by a commission made up of Greeks and Genoese that would fix the price. These were the extent of the terms imposed upon the Chiotes by the Genoese, and all that was required in return was the switching of their allegiance from the Byzantine emperor to the Genoese commune.521

What is important for our purposes here is that there was no attempt by the Genoese to restrict or replace the Orthodox belief structure on Chios. The terms of the treaty clearly stated that the Greeks were to remain in control of "their churches, monasteries and all of their clergy, living by their own customs and faith."522 This included the Greek metropolitan, who was the highest ranking member of the Orthodox hierarchy on Chios. It was granted to the Greeks that: "if by chance their [the Greeks] metropolitan should die, they may elect another according to their custom."523 Furthermore, nowhere in this treaty do the Genoese restrict the freedom of movement of the island's Orthodox clergy in any way. Once again, this differs considerably with Venetian actions on Crete, where the new conquerors

521 This treaty is also published in its entirety in Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios*, II:28-32.
522 "habendo ipsi ecclesias suas et monasteria sua et totum clerum suum viduendo [sic] secundum consuetudines suas uxitas et secundum eorum fidel" (Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios*, II:29).
523 "et si forsitan eorum metropolitanus moreretur alium more consueto possint eligere" (Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios*, II:30).
replaced the Orthodox hierarchy with a new Latin one and restricted foreign ordination for the lower Orthodox clergy. The moderation demonstrated by the Genoese should not be interpreted as representing anything other than practicality on their part. Vignoso and his men were in no position to impose severe restrictions and limitations on the archontes of Chios as the Venetians had done on Crete, and no help was coming from Genoa. The Genoese recognized that winning over the allegiance of the ruling class was the only means by which sustained control of Chios would be possible. The undermining of the Orthodox infrastructure, seen in this light, would have been detrimental to Genoa's survival on the island.

The appeasement of the Greek nobility translated, at least initially, to a relatively smooth political transition from Byzantine to Genoese control. The island's Orthodox religious community was much less inclined to cooperate with the new rulers. Three incidents illustrate well how deeply the Genoese occupation of Chios, or more generally Chios' occupation by a foreign, Latin power, affected the Orthodox Church on the island. The first involves the famed Byzantine monastery of Nea Moni on Chios, the events of which

524 For more information on the history and fame of this monastery, see Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, 1:287 and 656; and Carl Hopf, "Storia del Giustiniani di Genova," Giornale Ligustico VII-VIII (1880-81): 95.
were collected and recorded in a later work by a didaskalos named Nikephorus and another man named Gregorios Proteinos.\textsuperscript{525} The monastery had a long and distinguished history and had been given gifts by the emperors through the years. The monks, who were very apprehensive of the recent Genoese arrival, fled the monastery and absconded with many of these symbolic tokens of prestige. One of the most famous was an icon of the Virgin Mary as Theotokos, or Mother of God, which was taken away by a monk and hidden in his home village of Pyrgi, in south-central Chios. The icon was returned to Nea Moni after the monk died, but the story is illustrative of the apprehension with which the Orthodox monastic culture of Chios regarded the arrival of a Latin authority on the island. The initial reaction was to safeguard the most valuable items and keep them out of the hands of the Latins.

The second incident involves a plot, supposedly planned by the Greek metropolitan of Chios himself, to destroy Genoese authority and return imperial control to the island. It is difficult to date precisely the conspiracy and the events that followed, but modern scholars have placed it somewhere in between April and

\textsuperscript{525} The following anonymous account is found in Nikephoros and Gregorios Proteinos, \textit{Ta Neamónesía dyo vivilia} (Chios: typ. K.M. Prodikou, 1865), 102-3.
November of 1347. The best source for this conspiracy is an anonymous sixteenth-century manuscript, which tells us that a group of conspirators intended to assassinate all of the Mahonesi when they gathered to celebrate Easter. The conspirators gathered in the Church of St. George of Varvassi, which was located in the Campos, to prepare for the assassinations. An anonymous informer betrayed the intentions of the conspirators to the Mahona, who immediately had the church surrounded and the conspirators arrested. Those involved in the plot were soon hanged from the battlements of the castro, with the exception of the metropolitan. The Mahona sent him into exile and replaced the office of metropolitan with a dikaios, who would henceforth be confirmed by the Mahona, instead of the patriarch of Constantinople, as the metropolitan had been. The property of the conspirators was then collected and redistributed among

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526 The dating of the conspiracy only datable through later notarial acts that document the transference of land seized from the conspirators after the fact; this land was called xelímata in Greek, or confiscated possessions, and shows up in the notaries' registers in its Latinized form, chisilm. The first known land transference of this type is dated 20 February 1348 (ASG, Sezione Notarile, busta 359, fol. 171r-v), and we know from an anonymous later source that the conspiracy supposedly happened on Easter (Biblioteca Civica Berio, ms.). It is highly probable, therefore, that the conspiracy took place on 1 April 1347, which was that year's Easter day. See Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, I:652-3; and Balard, "The Genoese in the Aegean," 164-5).

527 For more information on this manuscript, see Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, I:652-3; and Balard, "The Genoese in the Aegean," 164.

528 A dikaios is a monastic dignity that survives to this day on Mount Athos, but here it seems to signify something similar to a metropolitan.
the informers, Mahonesi and other colonists who had recently moved to Chios. The identity of at least some of the conspirators is in fact known to historians through extant notarial deeds recording the transfer of their property to others. The list is long and, as might be expected, heavily laden with the names of archontes, including at least one who was also present for Vignoso’s treaty with the Greek nobility, Michali Coressi.\footnote{The names of the known conspirators are: Michali Coressi, Ianis of Carestino, Nicheta Corsolora Ogeros, Mavrogano Vassili Argenti, Savasto Gallatulla, Cristostomi, Chisomeniti, George Agabito, Mavrogordato, Stefano Petrici, Sidero, Dimitri Ducas, Achastani, George de Boto, Tucalaresti, Nicola Carlonuco, Nichetas Anichesaros, Evigenos Coperiati, Theodore Filadelfino scolaros, Marglaviti (ASG, Sezione Notarile, busta 359, fol. 171r-v; Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, III:493-4, 512-3, 528-31 and 886-94, docs. 17, 28, 48 and 411, 24 March 1348, 12 June 1348, 10 September 1349, 19 May 1381, respectively).}

The Mahona’s decision to replace the Greek metropolitan with a dikaios appointed by the Mahonesi deserves some comment. This move put the Mahonesi in control of the highest ranking Orthodox cleric on Chios, which, on the surface, resembles actions taken by Venice to bring the religious life of Crete within its sphere of influence. The circumstances under which the Mahona made this decision, however, differed significantly from those Venice experienced after taking control of Crete. The initial agreement between Vignoso and the Greek nobility, as we have seen above, imposed no restrictions or limitations on the Chiote Orthodox Church. It was only
when the plot involving the metropolitan of Chios was uncovered that the Genoese thus acted. The difference, in other words, was that the Mahona was reacting to the local situation, whereas Venice behaved proactively when they replaced the Orthodox hierarchy with a Latin one as soon as they occupied Crete. Furthermore, the Mahona did not replace the Orthodox hierarchy by any means; they simply reserved the right to confirm the dikaios proposed by the Greek clergy.

The final episode concerns an obscure series of events occurring in the early sixteenth century, which again involved the church and monastery of Nea Moni. In 1509, the Mahona seized this church and monastery and reassigned it, along with its riches, to the Latin bishop of Chios. It is unclear why this action was taken, but perhaps the lure of Nea Moni's wealth was too much to resist for the Mahonesi. Nea Moni's abbot soon came into conflict with the Latin bishop, as might be expected, and the dispute became an international affair. The matter was referred to Rome, and delegates were appointed by both sides in turn. The dispute was still raging in

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530 There is a brief recounting of these events in Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, I:656.
531 We know from extant documentation that the Mahonesi appointed Francesco Paterio to represent them in Rome, while Pope Leo X appointed Don Macario: "Martino de Spinosa cappellano di papa Leone X, uditore del Palazzo apostolic, comunica al vescovo di Scio e al priore del convent di S. Domenico della città di Scio che nella lite fra la Maona rappresentata dall'oratore Francesco Paterio e l'Abate e il Convento di Santa Maria de Neamoni è stato nominato procuratore..."
October of 1515, but the extant sources provide no closure to the matter. We do not know how long the dispute persisted or who emerged victorious, but the event does offer some evidence that perhaps the Mahona increasingly intruded into the Orthodox Church's affairs as the years passed. The seizure of a church and monastery as wealthy, important and prestigious as Nea Moni must have been, if nothing else, a serious blow to the Orthodox faithful of Chios. It represented an actual co-opting of Nea Moni's wealth and resources for the Mahona, but it must have represented a symbolic co-opting of the island's Orthodox belief system to the Greeks.

The events described above constitute the important clashes known to have occurred between the Latin and Orthodox Churches during the Genoese occupation of Chios. Conflict was conspicuously absent from most of the two hundred and twenty year occupation of Chios by the Genoese. Greeks and Latins thus managed to achieve and then maintain, after the early revolt, a relatively stable relationship with each other, at least this is the picture provided by the extant sources. Why might this have been the case? Michel Balard has asserted that this peaceful coexistence between the Latins and Greeks of Chios can be explained by several factors: the Greeks had

'magistrum don Macharium'..." See Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, III:839, no. 361, 15 December 1514.
no recourse to Byzantine power; \(^{532}\) "an obvious community of interests" arose between the Mahonesi and the archontes, which led to a culture of mutual collaboration; \(^{533}\) finally, the Mahonesi were all too aware that they operated at a "substantial demographic disequilibrium," when compared to the island’s Greek population. \(^{534}\)

Balard’s assertions are all reasonable and logical, but, in my opinion, they also highlight a basic difference in colonial strategy between the Mahona and the Venetians in regard to local religious institutions. Venice intended to sever as completely as it could Crete’s long-standing relationship with the Byzantine Orthodox Church and replace it with a Latin Church that it could control. This can be seen in all of Venice’s actions, which had the goal of restructuring the ecclesiastical hierarchy on Crete to reflect the religious practice of the Lagoon. Venice replaced the

\(^{532}\) Byzantium was in no position to aid the archontes of Chios in 1346-7, because it was then embroiled in a nasty succession dispute involving John VI Cantacuzenus and Anne of Savoy, regent for her son John V (Balard, "The Genoese in the Aegean," 164). Another factor was the lack of available Byzantine naval support. Cantacuzenus himself related that several ships, under the command of Admiral Phakeolatos, were dispatched to Chios in 1346, but turned back immediately upon hearing of the Greek surrender to Vignoso (Cantacuzenus, Historiarum libri IV, II:583-4; and Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, I:95).

\(^{533}\) "Confirmed in their property and their rights, contingent only on their recognizing the domination of the [Genoese] Commune, the archontes gradually came around to collaborating with the new masters" (Balard, "The Genoese in the Aegean," 166).

\(^{534}\) Balard, "The Genoese in the Aegean," 166-7. See also the discussion earlier in this chapter on pages 195-8.
Orthodox archbishop with a Latin archbishop and created an Orthodox protopapas as a state-approved and salaried official. It replaced those Greek bishops who refused to recognize the authority of Rome with Latin bishops, all of whom were placed under the jurisdiction of the Latin archbishop of Crete. Venice seized all the property of the Orthodox Church and then reallocated it among Venetian colonists and the new Latin clergy. The Venetians also collaborated with the papacy to revise the Cretan liturgy.

The Genoese Mahona, on the other hand, recognized the usefulness of preserving Chios’ Byzantine Orthodox connection as a means of preserving public order. The deconstruction or replacement of the Orthodox hierarchy would have surely served to increase the abovementioned hostility of the Greeks for the new Genoese conquerors. This understanding is clearly reflected in Vignoso’s treaty with the Greek nobility, which preserved Greek control over “their churches, monasteries, and all of their clergy, living by their own customs and faith.” The Greek metropolitan was left in place, as was the right of the Greeks to replace him should he die. Also, the Genoese in no way restricted the freedom of movement of the island’s Orthodox clergy, which differed considerably with Venice’s prohibition against foreign
ordination for the lower Orthodox clergy. At the heart of these actions was a basic difference in approaches to ruling these colonies: Venice’s monopolization of colonial government vs. Genoa’s delegation of it to a private company.

The extant sources from Genoese Chios offer a welcome opportunity to examine the interaction between Jewish and Genoese communities, especially considering the lack of a significant Jewish population in medieval Genoa. Indeed, it would appear that the medieval city of Genoa had, at worst, a hostile attitude towards Jews and, at best, not much of a relationship with them at all. There is some scant evidence of a Jewish presence in the city. We know that during a brief period of Ostrogothic rule there was a Jewish community and synagogue there.\(^5\) In 1134, the consuls of Genoa decreed that every Jew in the city should be obliged to pay a special tax of three soldi per year in order to provide the altar of San Lorenzo Cathedral with lighting oil.\(^6\) When the Spanish traveler Benjamin of Tudela passed through the city twenty six years later in 1160 on his way to the Levant, he informs us that he found only two Moroccan Jews.\(^7\)

\(^6\) Cesare Imperiale di Sant’Angelo, *Codice diplomatico della repubblica di Genova*, vol. 1 (Rome: Tipografia del Senato, 1936), 84.
\(^7\) "Two Jews, from Ceuta on the North African coast, reside here. They are said to be refugees from Almohad persecutions" (Benjamin of Tudela, *Benjamin of Tudela: A Medieval Mediterranean Travelogue*, 77).
There is no evidence, however, that a Jewish community was ever established in the city during the Middle Ages. It could not have been long after Benjamin’s visit that Genoa summarily expelled its Jewish population and thereafter allowed Jews to reside in the city for no more than three days. The Genoese historian Bartolomeo Senarega informs us that after their expulsion from Spain in 1492, Spanish Jews fleeing to Genoa were turned away because of this “ancient custom.” Some of them were allowed to winter on the harbor mole, but were sent on their way the following year. In fact, from the mid-twelfth-century to the end of the fifteenth we have mostly passing references to Jews in the city of Genoa, and, with increasing frequency after 1493, many of these make reference to Jews as slaves.

The Genoese conquerors did not expel the Jewish population upon seizing Chios in 1346, but tolerated their presence, as the extant documentation clearly

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538 Again, see Benjamin of Tudela, who wrote: "There is no real Jewish community here. According to Genoese law, the visit of a Jew or a Moslem is limited to just three days. Another law subjects any Jew sojourning here to a tax of three solidi annually to pay for the lighting of some church. In fact, a few Jewish traders do drift in and out of the city without much hindrance. They cannot take up official residence, yet the people of Genoa treat them well enough so that they continue their precarious sojourns, the attraction being the great amount of trade along this coast (Benjamin of Tudela, Benjamin of Tudela: A Medieval Mediterranean Travelogue, 77).

539 Bartolomeo Senarega, De rebus Genuensibus commentaria ab anno MCDLXXXVIII usque ad annum MDXLV, ed. Emilio Pandiani (Bologna: N. Zanichelli, 1932), 24-5.

shows. Genoese Chios thus presents us with an even rarer opportunity still, because it represents one of the few places under Genoese dominion where we have the regular interaction between Genoese and Jews documented. It was common procedure for Latin conquerors in the eastern Mediterranean to entrench themselves securely in the most fortified structures of their new possession, often expelling the indigenous residents of the place to do so. The Genoese behaved no differently, as has been discussed earlier in this dissertation, establishing themselves in the castro, or citadel, of Chios, and taking possession of 200 houses within the structure.\textsuperscript{541} It is also clear from the start that the Genoese had a special relationship with the island’s Jewish population, for whom they allotted a living space within the citadel which became the Jewish Quarter, and by the fifteenth-century was known as the \textit{Judaica}. The first known reference to the Jewish Quarter comes in a notarial casebook of Donato de Clavaro on 29 May 1394, in which the Elia and his mother Etsati sell to Magister Elixeus Calaihi their house with a courtyard located \textit{in castro Syi in contracta Iudeorum}. Donato furthermore draws up

\textsuperscript{541} There is no evidence, however, that in so doing the Genoese exelled all Greeks from the castro. In fact, the extant sources are full of examples of Greeks living and working inside the castro well into the fifteenth century. For Michel Balard’s refutation of Philip Argenti’s assertion that all Greeks were expelled from the citadel of Chios upon the Genoese arrival, see Balard, “The Genoese in the Aegean,” 167.
Numerous references to this section of Chios' citadel are found in the following years, although occasionally referred to by differing terminology such as *Judaica* and *Carrubeus Judayche*, or the "Street of the Jews."\(^{543}\)

Several sixteenth-century sources allow for a relatively accurate placement of the Jewish Quarter within the citadel of Chios. André Thévet, a visitor to the island in 1549, described the *Judaica* as being within the *castro* and next to the square on which the Chancery is located.\(^{544}\) Hieronimo Giustiniani, a resident of Chios during his youth, confirmed the assertion of Thévet in his *Historie di Scio* that the *Judaica* was indeed located within the citadel. In addition to this, he describes the houses of the Jews as being in a favorable position, next to Chancery Square and stretching all the way to the small city gate.\(^{545}\) Martinus Crusius, who visited Chios very late in the Genoese occupation, both described a

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\(^{542}\) Published in Villa, "Documenti sugli Ebrei a Chio," 130-3, doc. 5, 29 May 1394.

\(^{543}\) There appears to be no discernable difference in meaning among these designations. In my examination of more than 150 occasions on which a notary drew up his deed in the Jewish Quarter, the terms are interchangeable.

\(^{544}\) Cited in Argenti, *The Religious Minorities of Chios*, 118.

\(^{545}\) "Il palazzo della signora è fatto all'anticha, ha inanzi a se una bella piazza quadra, intorniata di magnifici palazzi, ma sono a particolarij ove si reducono i gentil'huomini et altri mercanti per loro negocij. In dietro d'esso è un'altra piazza più pichola, dove era la cancelaria et la guardia del governatore. Appreso essa di longo fino alla piccola porta della città era l'habitazzione di giudei" (Hieronimo Giustiniani, *History of Chios*, 65).
good relationship among the island’s inhabitants, and also corroborated the existence of a separate quarter for Jewish residents. He described the residents of Chios as “refined and hospitable, devoted to music and [other] praiseworthy endeavors: some are Genoese, some are Greek, some are Jewish; the Jews, however, live on their own street.”

The Genoese conquerors’ motivation for taking possession of the castro upon their arrival in 1346 is easy to discern. They needed to establish a position of strength in case there were additional violent outbreaks of anti-Genoese sentiment among Chios’ inhabitants. It was also not unusual for the Jewish quarters of Latin-controlled cities in the Mediterranean to be located within the city’s walls, as the above evidence proves was the case for Chios. But, why might this have been the case on Genoese Chios specifically? The abovementioned Hieronimo Giustiniani claimed that the Genoese granted the Jews this position as a means of protecting them from a hostile Greek population. He wrote that: “This

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neighborhood was given to them [the Jews] by the lords for their safety, so that they were not harmed by the common people, who are by nature hostile to their [the Jews] perfidy." Giustiniani also went on to offer a specific time during which the Jews needed protection from both the island’s Greeks and Latins: Holy Week. It is a well documented fact that in medieval Italian towns a religiously motivated tension often upset the public peace in the days leading up to Easter Sunday. Jews were accused of deicide in remembrance of their role as accomplices of Pontius Pilate, who had left the fate of Jesus of Nazareth up to the people of Jerusalem. Their business practices were deemed reprehensible. Their very presence in town was an insult, and conjured up the Jewish crime against Christ which the town’s Christians had to avenge. As a result, varying forms of ritual violence against Jews developed during Holy Week, the most popular of which was the sassaiola, or throwing of stones. Giustiniani reported that Chios was not immune from such violence. He explained that the intense passion aroused by Holy Week often led to violence against the Jews on Chios. It was both for this reason

547 "Questa contrada li fu datta dagli signori per loro sicurezza, acciò non fussero molestati dal popolo, che di natura è nìmico a' que' perfidi" (Hieronimo Giustiniani, History of Chios, 65).
548 The following discussion of violence against Jews during Holy Week makes use of Toaff, Il vino e la carne, 219-25.
549 In particular, see Toaff, Il vino e la carne, 220-1.
and also out of reverence for the Resurrection that the Mahona prohibited the Jews from appearing in town from Thursday through Easter Sunday.\textsuperscript{550}

This attempt to protect the Jews from possible violence was not unprecedented; in fact, the action was well in line with developments in Italy that had been initiated centuries earlier.\textsuperscript{551} Ariel Toaff has discussed in detail ritual violence against Jews during Holy Week, and asserted that authorities had no intention of prohibiting such outbursts, but only to regulate them.\textsuperscript{552} It was thus their objective to make sure that such a “ritual spectacle did not turn into seditious bedlam, but that it would rather be a guarantee of stability and social control.”\textsuperscript{553} This is an astute observation, and one that fits well the demographic constitution of late

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\textsuperscript{550} Giustiniani explained that Greek hostility to the Jews was especially intense during “li giorni della Settemana Santa, ove pensano i christiani simplici vendicare la morte di Christo crucifisso, Salvatore Nostro, facendo a essi ingiuria, s’inguana però il fidele popolo, et s’abusa: per la qual cosa il concilio primo Matisconense [the Mahona], volendo provedere et scancellar tal errore, ha prohibito che li giudei dalla Cena del Signore, cioe da giovedì fino il primo giorno doppo Pascha, non potessero andar atorno per la città, per evitar lo scandalo et per la reverenza della ressurezione di Jesù Christo, ma non per vendicare la sua morte” (Hieronimo Giustiniani, History of Chios, 65).

\textsuperscript{551} For a detailed discussion of early ecclesiastical efforts, and also the later efforts of Italian communes, to curb violence against Jews during Holy Week, see Toaff, \textit{Il vino e la carne}, 221-3.

\textsuperscript{552} These sentiments have been echoed more recently by David Nirenberg in his \textit{Communities of Violence: Persecution of Minorities in the Middle Ages} (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), especially 200-30.

\textsuperscript{553} “Questa sono le regole del gioco, la cui violenza deve essere rigidamente incanalata nelle forme prescritte, perché lo spettacolo rituale non si trasformi in sediziosa baraonda ed anzi sia garanzia di stabilità e controllo sociale” (Toaff, \textit{Il vino e la carne}, 224).
medieval Italy, where a unified Latin Christian majority interacted with a Jewish minority. It does not explain as well, however, Italian colonies such as Genoese Chios, where the religious tension between Christians and Jews was exacerbated by ethnic tension between competing Christian rites. The Mahona's restriction on Chiote Jews' freedom of movement during Holy Week, in my opinion, was motivated less by the concern to regulate ritual violence than by the intention to avoid violence completely. The Mahonesi were only too aware that their position as rulers of Chios was precarious at best. The demographic disequilibrium existing between the Genoese rulers and the island's Greek population, combined with the lack of aid that they could expect from their ever-insolvent and factionally divided home city, was motivation enough to be cautious. The Greeks of Chios had risen up against the Genoese in the past, as has been discussed above, and it would make little sense for the Mahona to invite the possibility of another uprising by condoning violence of any kind; ritual violence often had a habit of transforming into real violence all too quickly.

It was not, as stated above, an unusual act for the Genoese to establish Chios' Jewish Quarter within the city's walls. What is of more significance is that the
Jews were apparently given a favorable place therein by the Genoese. What might explain the Mahona’s fair treatment of Chiote Jews? The most obvious reason is the financial relationship that the Mahona developed with the Jews of Chios. The Genoese encountered a prosperous Jewish community on Chios which traded in a wide variety of commodities throughout the eastern Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{554} Their success at trading had made many members of the community rich, and thus an excellent source from which the frequently impecunious Mahona could borrow money. Most of this borrowing was facilitated by the desire of Jewish merchants to gain a foothold in the mastic trade, over which the Mahonesi had established a monopoly in the original 1347 convention with the commune of Genoa.\textsuperscript{555} What developed out of this was, in essence, a futures market in which the Mahona’s need for liquid capital forced them to mortgage quantities of future mastic crops to these Jewish merchants in exchange for an immediate loan.

\textsuperscript{554} Argenti, The Religious Minorities of Chios, 127-8.
\textsuperscript{555} The terms of the Mahona’s convention with Genoa read as follows: "Item quod officiales dictorum participum constituendi et deputandi super laboreriis et recoleriis seu recolectis masticis in insula Syi possint, licite et sine metu alicuius pene at absque contradicione potestatis Syi vel alterius officialis, facere masticum laborari et colligi seruari et consignari officialibus ipsorum participum secundum modos et consuetudines uxitatos in dicta insula. Ac possint dictos laboratores et operarios masticis compellere ad dicta laboreria exercenda et adimplenda secundum consuetudinem ipsius insule et contradicione ipsorum potestatum et rectorum non obstante" (published in Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, II:38-55, but specifically 52, clause 33).
Notarial deeds provide many examples of this type of loan transaction between the Mahonesi and Jewish money lenders. One early example will suffice to illustrate how the process worked. The notary Donato de Clavaro recorded on 17 June 1394 that Elixeus Calaihi phsicus, acting in the name of Melicha quondam Ellie Salomonis et uxoris quondam magistri Ismail et tutricis testamentarie Godidie sold seven and one-quarter cantari of mastic to the Mahonesi Dominus Daniel Iustinianus olim Longo and Bartholomeus Iustinianus olim de Campis for 1377 and one half gold ducats. This mastic was to be counted as part of the fifty cantari of mastic that the Mahona had promised to Ismail back in 1386 for the money it had borrowed.\textsuperscript{556} The result of loans such as this was that Jewish merchants became middlemen in the mastic trade, and also wielded significant financial power over the Mahona as debtors. It would therefore be to the Mahona’s benefit to protect this valuable source of revenue from Greek hostility, as Philip Argenti so aptly stated when he wrote: “In consequence, the Jews were necessary to the Genoese and from them received the quid pro quo of a certain physical protection from the Greek population.”\textsuperscript{557} The close proximity of the Jews also facilitated the Mahona’s collection of taxes from the community, thus

\textsuperscript{556} Published in Villa, “Documenti sugli Ebrei a Chio,” 138-40, doc. 9, 17 June 1394.
\textsuperscript{557} Argenti, The Religious Minorities of Chios, 115.
augmenting yet further their value as a source of income for the colonial administration.\footnote{It seems certain from the writings of Nicolas de Nicolay that the Jews had been paying a special tribute of protection to the Mahona for some time. He reported that the Jews were “en grand nombre sous le tribut de la Seigneurie” (Nicolas de Nicolay, \textit{Dans l’empire de Soliman le Magnifique}, 112). Beyond this, it appears that the Mahona imposed no taxes on individual Jews, but rather taxed the community as a whole. This was the case at least until the late fourteenth-century, when the Mahona began to pay a tribute, or \textit{kharaj}, to the Ottoman Sultan. The burden of raising the \textit{kharaj}, as might be expected, was soon passed on equally to the Greeks and Jews of Chios. Latin documents refer to this exaction as a \textit{caragium}, which consisted of an annual tax on their houses and lands. The Mahona’s collection of a \textit{caragium} steadily increased throughout the fifteenth-century, but especially after the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453, after which the sultan was in a position to demand even more tribute from the Mahonesi. For more on this, see Argenti, \textit{The Religious Minorities of Chios}, 144-5; and Elizabeth Zachariadou, “Ertogrul Bey Il Sovrano di Teologo,” in \textit{Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria}, n.s. V, LXXIX (1965): 153-61.} The evidence documenting the Mahonesi’s protection of the Jews of Chios does not imply that they possessed an unusually kind attitude towards this group. This behavior was first and foremost motivated by necessity. The Mahona’s goal was twofold: to avoid unnecessary conflict, in the face of which they could rely on no external support from Genoa, and to preserve its sources of income on Chios, without which it could not function. The Mahona’s physical protection of the Chiote Jewish community greatly facilitated the achievement of both.

The impecuniousness of the Mahona, and the ever-increasing financial dependency on Jewish loans which resulted, was one of the defining factors of Genoese-Jewish relations on Chios from the late fourteenth-
the sixteenth-centuries. Indeed, many of the actions taken by both individual Mahonesi, and also the Mahona as an institution, evinced a need to protect what they considered to be an important source of revenue. It is therefore not surprising that Mahonesi appeared in court on behalf of Jews when the case revolved around the recovery of a debt. On 17 June 1394, for example, the same Jewish physician mentioned above, Elixeus Calaihi, again acting in the name of Melicha, appointed as his representative the Mahonese Dominus Franciscus Iustinianus de Campis to recover a debt of 90 gold ducats owed to Melicha’s late husband, Magister Ismail, by another Mahonese Dominus Nicolaus Iustinianus quondam Pauli.559 This deed is illustrative of several things. It highlights, on the one hand, a possible hazard in becoming a debtor to a frequently insolvent colonial administration. We know from the earlier deed in which Elixeus sold a quantity of mastic to two Mahonesi that in 1386 Ismail had been promised fifty cantari of mastic by the Mahona for a loan. It is clear from the above deed that, while the issue of the missing mastic is left unresolved, Melicha was still fighting on behalf her late husband to bring his business dealings with the Mahona to a close. Yet, it is also illustrative, on the other hand,

559 Published in Villa, “Documenti sugli Ebrei a Chio,” 145-7, doc. 11, 17 June 1394.
of how dependent the Mahona was on Jewish loans as a source of income and the financial tangle to which it could lead.

Financial dependence also explains the lengths to which the Mahona protected the Jewish community when the Inquisition reached Chios in the mid-sixteenth-century. The appointment of Friar Antonio Giustiniani as Inquisitor of Chios in the mid-1550s did not go over well from the start. A dispatch from the commune of Genoa’s ambassadors to Istanbul, who had stopped in Chios on their return trip to investigate some conflict among the Mahonesi, makes this clear. Ambassadors Niccolò Grillo and Francesco de Franchi reported that the podestà of Chios, Franco Sauli Giustiniani, had performed his duties with discretion, but real trouble had arisen only after Antonio Giustiniani had been named inquisitor. They claimed that he had incited unnecessary fear on the island by denouncing heretics where there were none. The ambassadors thus recommended that he be removed, and he soon was.\(^{560}\) Friar Antonio was soon reinstated, however, and returned to Chios with a more zealous desire to root out heresy on the island than ever.\(^{561}\) He made it known to all that his goal was to purify Chiote society, which,

\(^{560}\) ASG, Archivio Segreto, Lettere Ministri Constantinopoli, Busta no. 2169, fasc. no. 2, 29 August 1558.

\(^{561}\) For more detail on his reinstatement, see Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios*, I:360-2.
in his mind, had been corrupted by Latins conspiring with Orthodox and Jews colluding with Muslims.\textsuperscript{562} In this endeavor he received no help at all from the Mahona of Chios, a fact which he documented in a complaint to Doge Gerolamo Vivaldi of Genoa. Friar Antonio complained that he had not been successful in his task because, as an inquisitor, he was held to be odious, and furthermore had no support at all from the secular government.\textsuperscript{563} What possible motivation did the Mahona have for rendering no aid to the Holy Inquisition? It is possible that Antonio's bad personal reputation was responsible for his lack of assistance on Chios; his previous interaction with the Mahonesi had indeed proven him to not be a good co-worker. Yet, the Mahona's reign as ruler of Chios would be over in less than a decade, and it was common by this time for their tribute payments to the Ottoman sultan to be in arrears multiple years.\textsuperscript{564} The Mahonesi were destitute and preserving any and all sources of revenue, such as the island's Jewish community,\textsuperscript{565} would

\textsuperscript{562} Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, I:361.
\textsuperscript{563} "Già quella sano che conoscono come savie et prudente, l'uffito nel quale mi trovo esser odioso...Non dimeno, io non ho fato esegutione ne demonstratione alcuna, non havendo il braccio dil magistrato e dil governo e de alcuni altri moneisi [Mahonesi] come bisognerrebbe" (ASG, Archivio Segreto, Oriente, Scio, Busta no. 2774B, 30 November 1559.
\textsuperscript{564} For the ever-increasing financial woes of the Mahona, especially after the fall of Constantinople in 1453, see Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, I:329-69.
\textsuperscript{565} See footnote 558 of this chapter for more information about the Jewish obligation to help pay the Mahona's annual tribute to the Ottoman sultan, which was collected through a tax known as the caragium.
have been paramount for them, even if it meant turning a blind eye to the Holy Inquisition.

The tardiness with which the Mahona began to enforce Papal pronouncements on Jewish clothing is also illustrative of the government’s efforts to protect the community. The imposition of badges and other clothing requirements on Jews had a long history beginning with the articles of the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215, but were enforced only very sporadically in Italy before the late fourteenth century. The fifteenth century then saw an explosion in the amount of legislation related to Jewish dress issued by numerous Italian cities and the Papacy, but it does not appear that the Genoese on Chios heeded these measures. In 1423, Pope Martin V in fact wrote a letter to Bishop Leonardo of Chios in which he expressed his concern that local authorities’ were not adequately enforcing certain papal injunctions, namely those regarding Jewish dress. Martin’s letter states that:

Although, as you have lately taken the trouble to notify us, the Jews living in the island of Chios and your diocese, and those arriving there from other parts, are bound, both by law and by the accepted custom, to wear clothing distinct from the dress of Christians; nevertheless, they do not care to wear such, but go about in outer apparel similar to that of Christians, from whom they cannot be distinguished by any indication in their clothing, and because of this it happens that almost always these people [the Jews] intermingle with similar-looking Christians in grave scandal and danger to faithful souls. Wishing to provide for this, so that we may obtain full assurance in God, we commit and ordain that all Jews of either sex, both the permanent inhabitants of the said island, and those coming from outside, should be distinguished from Christians by some sign on their clothing.

The pope then ends the letter by ordering the above to be implemented no matter the local customs or privileges conceded by the "temporal authority." It is possible that this "temporal authority" to which Martin is referring is only a formulaic construction, but it is probable, in my opinion, that he specifically referencing
the Mahona and, more specifically, the Genoese podestà of Chios. The Mahonesi had a clear history of protecting the Jews by this time, as the above evidence demonstrates, and this letter is evidence that the Mahona had also been granting various religious exemptions to the community, as well. It is easy, in this case, to discern the Mahona’s reasons for not enforcing papal injunctions on Jewish dress. A common papal justification for such impositions was that a distinctive style of dress for Jews was only fitting, since the rules of their own religion required that they distinguish themselves from gentiles in dietary matters and other customs.  

Making the Jews distinct from Chios’ other inhabitants, however, presented the Mahona with a problem: a possible increase in violence against them by the island’s Greeks. Considering the degree to which the Mahonesi were dependent on Jewish financial support, the enforcement of such a papal injunction was, viewed in this context, in direct opposition to the Mahonesi’s best financial interest and well-being. The effort to

570 "L'imposizione del cosiddetto segno agli ebrei (ad ai saraceni) é già presente nei paragrafi del IV Concilio Lateranense del 1215, dove è giustificata con il timore che, in caso contrario, la possibilità di rapporti sessuali tra infedeli e cristiani ne sarebbe agevolata. La successiva normative della Chiesa, che richiama frequentemente tale disposizione, alla prima motivazione ne aggiunge una seconda. Dato che le particolari norme religiose degli ebrei, prescrivono loro di distingueresi dai gentili nei costumi e nell'alimentazione, è opportuno che la distinzione venga estesa anche agli abiti e al modo di vestire" (Toaff, Il vino e la carne, 214).
maintain a crucial source of revenue once again was the motivation for the cash-strapped Mahona.\footnote{571}

The apparent laxity with which the Mahona adhered to ecclesiastical pronouncements on distinctive Jewish dress, combined with the other evidence discussed above, warrants the conclusion that the Mahonesi treated the Chiote Jewish community with relative benevolence. The Mahona's protection and apparent fair treatment of the Jews of Chios should not however be interpreted as a sign of enlightened rulership or an unusually kind attitude towards this community. The evidence instead reveals that a more reasonable explanation for the Mahona's protection of Chiote Jews: the Mahonesi were motivated by practical concerns about their financial destitution and desire to preserve public order. Indeed, the evidence supporting this latter assertion comes from none other than a former resident of the island, Hieronimo Giustiniani, who claimed that the Genoese had established the Judaica within the walls of Chios' citadel to protect the Jewish community from a hostile Greek population.\footnote{572}

\footnote{571} Martin's letter, in the end, did not appear to spur the Mahonesi to action, for it is not until Nicolas de Nicolay's visit to the island in 1551 that we have any reference to distinctive clothing being worn by the Jews of Chios: "Et, afin qu'ils [the Jews] soient connus entre les autres, sont contraints de porter pour enseigne un grand bonnet à arbalète de couleur jaune" (Nicolay, Dans l'empire de Soliman le Magnifique, 112). This assertion is probably accurate, because both Martinus Crusius and Hieronimo Giustiniani report the Jews wearing the same yellow hat (Martinus Crusius, Turcograeciae libri octo, 246; and Hieronimo Giustiniani, History of Chios, 65.}

\footnote{572} See pages 268-9 of this chapter.
The Genoese thus established a relationship with the Jews of Chios that had as its primary objective the preservation of the Mahona’s income and authority. The problem was that such behavior could, and did, have the effect of inflaming Greek hostility to Jews. It is easy to see, from the Greek perspective, how this might have been the case: the Genoese occupied the island; they then displace a large number of Greeks from the citadel and soon establish a Jewish Quarter within, which the Greeks could have perceived as leaving them on the short end of a reordering of the island’s social hierarchy. The Mahona, for this reason, did not rely on the abovementioned measures alone to preserve public order, but also organized acts of ritual shaming against the Jewish community of Chios. The best documented example of this is a series of ceremonies that the Mahona annually organized during the Christmas season.\footnote{The descriptions of the following ceremonial rituals are found in Hieronimo Giustiniani, \textit{History of Chios}, 400-4; they are also briefly discussed in Argenti, \textit{The Religious Minorities of Chios}, 124-6.}

The first of these ceremonies took place on Christmas Eve, during which the leaders of the Jewish community presented the Mahonesi with a newly-crafted Genoese state flag, or a red cross of St. George over a white background. The flag was then hoisted up a pole on a section of the citadel known as the Cullà Tower for all
Philip Argenti has interpreted this ceremony as a means by which the Mahona visibly and symbolically acknowledged the Jewish community’s payment of their annual fiscal obligations, namely the caragium and other communal taxes. This is undoubtedly true, but why did the Mahona require a public airing of this obligation and placement of that obligation’s symbol on a citadel tower in everyone’s view? First, the act served to reinforce the Mahona’s role as protector of the Jewish community on the island, and, conversely, the community’s status as the protected. The frequent reassertion of established roles of dominance and subservience may have been necessary, given the financial dependence of the Mahonesi on the Jewish community. Second, the Genoese were conveying a visible reminder to Chios’ Greek population of Jewish subservience to the Mahona, and thereby assuaging some of their hostility to the Jews and avoiding any budding outbursts of violence against them.

Additional and more elaborate ceremonies continued on Christmas Day. The festivities began with the noonday Christmas feast, in which the Mahonesi held private

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574 "Di sopra nel luogo ove lo araldo proferiva la sopra detta oratione, vi è eminente ancora un’altra torre, nella quale sopra uno grasso trave era attacata la bandiera traversata per mezzo una croce rosa di Santo Georgi. Quella i giudei vi eravano ogni anno tenuti di nuovo reffarla et metterla in quel luogo sempre la vigilia di natale, et al vecchia si transportava in un’altra torre, chiamato il cullà, appresso il vecchio palazzo, dove era l’armamento, essa torre havea nome stentà" (Hieronimo Giustiniani, History of Chios, 400).

575 Argenti, The Religious Minorities of Chios, 125.
family feasts at their own houses. The purpose of these feasts was apparently to provide the island’s lower social classes with the opportunity to pay their respects and make offerings to Chios’ rulers. Hieronimo Giustiniani reported that these groups indeed appeared at the Mahonesi’s houses for this purpose in turn, according to their social status, the last of whom were the Jews. The Mahonesi’s usual response was not to stop and acknowledge the gestures respectfully, but simply to continue to eat and drink. The intention of this ceremony is clear, and it is rife with symbolism. The Mahona is once again using a public performance to reaffirm the place of the Jews in Chios’ social hierarchy. Yet, there was no reason that the Mahonesi had to involve the entire city in this ceremony; it would have been just as easy to see the Jews inside the palace of the podestà and out of public view. The significance of forcing the Jews to approach their houses was that it made the act public, and would thus be witnessed by Chios’ Greek population. The Mahonesi’s family Christmas

576 "Jndi ritornati [the Mahonesi from Mass] ciascuno ci andava ha casa sua a pranso. Et nessuno il giorno de questa festa ardiva mangiare fuori della casa sua, stimando altramente per cosa pressagiosa et di cattivo augurio. J clientuli et amici domestici all’hora ciascuno secondo le sue forze, etiamdò i giudei, si sforzavano con molta riverenza a hora del desinare andar per le case del loro patroni et mecenati appresentarle, mentre si sedea nella tavola mangiando; quel disinare si tirava più in longo se ne potesse, acciò tutti, che nevianno a quello ufficio, havessero tempo di venirci. Chi portava presenti, insegnò di carità, oblatione, et obbedienza, torze di cera et hippocrato" (Hieronimo Giustiniani, History of Chios, 402-3).
feasts, viewed in this way, were an opportunity to shun ritualistically the Jewish community before the eyes of Greeks with the intention of diffusing social tension between the two groups.

Christmas Day then continued with a parade, in which the Mahona allowed all of Chios’ non-Latin inhabitants to take part.\textsuperscript{577} The ceremony consisted of a procession in which the Greeks and Jews of the island lined up and marched before the Genoese podestà and the members of the Mahona. The exercise provided these groups with the opportunity to swear their loyalty to the Genoese commune, which the podestà and the other Genoese expected them to do. The customary marching order of the groups in the procession had been predetermined by the Genoese, and was highly symbolic. The Greek clergy held the position at the head of the parade, then came the Greek nobility, then any other groups who might be present and participating, and then, finally, the Jews.\textsuperscript{578} What followed next can only be described as a performance of state-approved ritual violence. Giustiniani related that, instead of filing by the podestà in an orderly fashion:

\textsuperscript{577} The details of this ceremony are provided by Giustiniani, see Hieronimo Giustiniani, \textit{History of Chios}, 403-4).
\textsuperscript{578} “All’hora s’incomminciava sonar le trombe, a cui sonno compariva a passo a passo il clero greco accompagnato dalla guardia del palazzo a dua a dua per fila...Appresso essi seguivano I nobili greci, i quali eravano seguiti da molta altra gente...et passata la magior parte di quei i giudei” (Hieronimo Giustiniani, \textit{History of Chios}, 403-4).
The majority of the Jews did not wait for everyone else to have passed by [the podestà], due to their mistrust of the young [Greek] men, but instead ran confusedly among the other groups. They paid their respects to the podestà and saved themselves as quickly as possible. Those among them who were caught by the people were pelted with a hail of oranges, and were physically attacked with great cheer. The podestà was then compelled to leave the piazza for some time, until his guard had suppressed the scuffle.\textsuperscript{579}

The procession of the varying groups before the Genoese podestà was yet another public display designed to impart a clear message to its audience, who were all the non-Latin inhabitants of the island. It was a visual representation of Chios' social hierarchy in microcosm, or at least as the Genoese reckoned it: Greeks, followed by other groups, and, lastly, Jews bringing up the rear. The display was thus another means by which the Mahona conveyed to the Greeks their social status, which was superior to that of the Jews; hopefully the repeated expression of this fact would ease any social tension between the two groups.

On this occasion the Genoese also allowed the Greeks to engage the Jewish community in a form of ritual violence practiced in many late medieval Italian cities,

\textsuperscript{579} "et passata la magior parte di quei i giudei, dubitando i giovanni, non aspettavano che tutti fussero passati, anzi confusamente correndo per mezzo loro, rendeanno riverenza al magistrato, quanto potevano si salvavano. I quali scoperti dal popolo s'è li tirava gransissima copia de aranzi, onde con molto applauso s'attaccava una gran scaramuccia de aranzate, che il magistrato vi era costretto quitare la piazza per qualche tempo, fino che la guardia dimellasse la baruffa" (Hieronimo Giustiniani, History of Chios, 404).
the abovementioned sassaiola. This is in contrast to the earlier discussion of Holy Week, when the Mahona protected the Jews from possible violence by prohibiting them from appearing in town from Thursday through the end of Easter Sunday. The opposite action was taken on Christmas, and the Mahonesi were not only participants, but also organizers of this ritual violence. The actions taken by the Mahona during Holy Week and on Christmas Day provide a glimpse of the varying levels of passion that could be aroused by two of the most important holy days on the Christian calendar. Holy Week evidently aroused such animosity for the Jews that the Mahona truly feared that the Jewish community might suffer serious, possibly irreversible harm, so they were prohibited from town for their own protection. It was in the best interest of the Mahonesi to act in this way, considering the value of the Jews as an important source of the Mahona’s income. On Christmas Day, however, the Mahona demonstrates that it is willing to allow and participate in violence against the Jews when there is little threat of serious danger to the community. Indeed, the Mahonesi made sure of this by substituting oranges for stones. The violence was a performance through which the Mahona allowed the Greeks of Chios to expel safely a certain amount of pent up hostility which they harbored for the Jews without
permanently harming them. This interpretation follows that of Ariel Toaff, who has described how common of a practice it was for medieval Italian communes to countenance violence against Jews, channel it into a small space and thus control it. Ritualized violence against Jews is, for Toaff, a violent and spectacular game which was played according to strict rules and served to satisfy the aggressors, but "without dangerous and irreversible results." It was indeed a performance from which everyone involved derived some benefit.

Conclusions

There exists a letter in the collected acts of Pope Urban V, in which the pontiff writes to the Latin archbishop of Crete about the state of the Latin Church on the island. The latest reports reaching him had not been comforting: the Greek Church was assuming an ever-increasing dominance over Crete’s indigenous inhabitants. Urban, in response to these reports, thus ordered the archbishop to work with the Venetian colonial administration to ensure that no Greek left the island to

580 “La violenza non è repressa dalle autorità, perché sarebbe controprodotto e pericoloso. È soltanto incanalata su binari morti e controllata” (Toaff, Il vino e la carne, 220).
581 “In genere il gioco si svolge secondo schemi scontati e collaudati ed il rito religioso si trasforma in uno spettacolo, che è si violento e clamoroso, ma senza esiti pericolosi e irreversibili” (Toaff, Il vino e la carne, 221).
be ordained, unless that ordination took place in the Latin rite. He then added that: "[for indeed] as we have been pleased to learn, our beloved sons, the doge and the commune of Venice, wield in the island of Crete uncommon dominion over Latins and Greeks." A few decades later the newly-installed Latin bishop of Chios, Leonardo Pallavicino, likewise had reason to be concerned for the state of the Latin Church on Chios. On 16 January 1425, he wrote to the archbishop of Genoa, Pileo de Marini, complaining that he had become an object of persecution from which he was desperately trying to escape. In this instance, however, the persecutors were not Orthodox loyalists, but the Genoese Mahona itself, whose preference it was, he claimed, to follow the Greek rite instead of the Latin. It was Leonardo’s purpose in writing to Pileo, therefore, to request the archbishop’s permission to employ the resources of his church office to assuage this dire situation. Leonardo assured Pileo that his help would be gratefully received, both by him and the Mahona, to whom he refers as his enemies, "inimicis meis."
These examples illustrate well the main point of this chapter, which is that the colonial administrations of Venetian Crete and Genoese Chios were very different in nature. The role of the home government was at the center of this difference. Venice maintained authority over Crete by participating intimately in the governance of the island and closely supervising its administration on the ground. Genoa, on the other hand, governed Chios by effectively delegating its authority over the island to a private association of ship owners, who were granted the right to exploit the island’s fruits as it saw fit. The utilization of such different approaches to colonial administration, the centralization versus the delegation of authority, that is, was the direct result of the relative political stability of the Venetian and Genoese
states. Venice’s flexible and adaptive system of governance provided a firm base from which to administer effectively and efficiently a large colony such as Crete, even from a great distance. The factionalism and insolvency which constantly plagued Genoa made any attempt to rule Chios in the same manner impossible.

These different structures of authority in turn affected the processes of administration on Chios and Crete and also the types of relationships which developed between the governing and the governed. In general, both governments crossed boundaries of religion and ancestry allowing the Greeks and Jews of the islands to participate in, and facilitate the functioning of, colonial government. The judicial system on Crete, for example, evinced a few judges who had Greek ancestry, although these iudices di prosopo dealt with those cases involving only Greeks and Jews. Greeks also participated prominently in defense related occupations to a surprising degree. Furthermore, the Venetian administration practiced the morbid custom of requiring a Jew to carry out sentences of capital punishment. The colonial government’s constant search for physicians means that Greeks and Jews were most likely employed by the administration in this capacity, as well. There is strong evidence that Jewish physicians were in the direct
employ of the Mahona of Chios. Both Greeks and Jews participated in Genoese legal proceedings as witnesses and arbiters. Yet, what is even more interesting is that the Mahona entrusted, on occasion, the collection of vital tax revenue to Greek inhabitants of the island, and also employed both Greeks and Jews in the important task of distributing grain to the island.

The above evidence demonstrates that Venice was less willing to allow indigenous populations access to positions of responsibility within its administration than were the Genoese. There are several observations to be made here. This finding matches up well with earlier discussions of the closely supervised manner in which Venice administered its stato da mar. The strong and authoritative presence of the home city on Crete emulated in many ways Venice itself, and it would not be in keeping with the city’s custom of restricting foreigners’ access to Venetian power if the colonial government allowed non-Latins to hold posts of responsibility. It also conversely illustrates the adaptability, flexibility, and practicality of the Genoese Mahona, who had little involvement from its home government with which to contend. The use of non-Latins thus served a

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584 Sally McKee has conjectured that the second Serrata of the Great Council was in fact an attempt by the Venetian government to keep noblemen of Greek ancestry from gaining access to the Council and thus reducing the prestige of the established Venetian elite families, see McKee, Uncommon Dominion, 170-1.
practical purpose for the Genoese by providing them with a larger pool from which to draw officials, seeing as Genoa did not regularly furnish them for Chios as Venice did for Crete. Yet, the placement of non-Latin officials in positions of responsibility could have also served to facilitate the Mahona’s task of preserving public order on the island. Necessary administrative duties performed by members of their own groups may have helped to minimize the possible hostility of the local Greek and Jewish populations to the Mahona.

Byzantium’s influence on Crete and Chios was well established by the time Venice and Genoa respectively arrived on the islands. This influence is perhaps most visible in the Christian Orthodox rite, which the overwhelming majority of both islands’ inhabitants practiced. It is also the treatment of the islands’ Orthodox Churches that perhaps best illustrates the differences in Venetian and Genoese colonial rule. Venice’s subordination of the Orthodox Church to the colonial administration, its imposition of the Latin rite, and its subsequent domination of the new Latin Church on Crete, were all attempts to emulate religious practice in the home city. The Genoese Mahona, on the other hand, cultivated a relationship with Chios’ Greek community that was different from that of Venice’s on
Crete. The Mahonesi allowed the Greeks to retain control over their churches, monasteries and clergy, the Greek metropolitan was also left in place, as was the right of the Greeks to replace him should he die. The Genoese in no way restricted the freedom of movement of the island's Orthodox clergy, which differed considerably from Venice's prohibition against foreign ordination for the lower Orthodox clergy.

What is at issue here, when viewed in a broader context, is the manipulation of the Orthodox Church, and thus Byzantine tradition, by these colonizers to carry out their respective colonial designs. All Venice's actions served to sever as completely as it could Crete's long-standing relationship with the Byzantine Orthodox Church and replace it with a Latin Church that it could control. The Mahona, on the other hand, recognized the usefulness of preserving Chios' Byzantine Orthodox connection as a means of preserving public order, especially after early resistance from the Greek population. The deconstruction or replacement of the Orthodox infrastructure would have surely served to increase the hostility of the Greeks to the new Genoese conquerors. The Genoese thus again exhibited the ability to adapt and integrate successfully existing institutions into their scheme of rule, which was a skill that was
necessary with very little aid coming from their home government.

It appears that the Jewish communities of both Crete and Chios did not suffer undue hardship, and were in fact treated relatively well. They enjoyed a comparable legal status to the islands' Greek populations and were, in many cases, protected from the hostility of others and rewarded for their merit. The Venetian regime also exploited the Jews economically, however, and it is not surprising that it found occasions to impose its will on the Jewish Synagogue of Crete by attempting to have a Venetian approved candidate elected to the cantorship. It is clear from the start that the Genoese had a special relationship with the island's Jewish population. The Mahona allotted a living space for them within the citadel, not an unusual occurrence for Italian colonies in the eastern Mediterranean, but the degree to which the Mahonesi protected the Jews from both the island's Greeks and Latins was distinctive. Papal injunctions to enforce regulations on Jewish dress were very slow in being obeyed by the Mahonesi. The Mahona forbade Jews from appearing in town at all during the most important days of Holy Week, which was a clear attempt to protect them from suffering violence at the hands of overly zealous Christians. But, the Mahona's financial dependence on
the Jewish community was the primary motivation for this protection; the Genoese were not kinder and gentler by nature. A relationship of mutual dependence thus existed between the Genoese and the Jews: the Jewish community depended on the Mahona for physical protection, and the Mahona depended on the Jewish community for a significant portion of its income.

The Mahona was willing to protect the Jewish community as long as that protection went towards the preservation of public order. It thus stands to reason that the Genoese administration would be prepared to endorse violence against Jews if it achieved those same ends. This was the case every Christmas, when Greek animosity towards the Jewish community reached a fevered pitch. On this occasion, the Mahonesi participated in acts of ritual shaming towards the Jews, in which they refused to acknowledge the leaders of the community and hoisted a flag on the citadel that reminded the entire town of Jewish subordinance to the Genoese. They additionally sponsored a procession which recreated the social hierarchy of the island in miniature: the Greeks behind the Genoese, the Jews bringing up the rear. The Greeks, having been reaffirmed of their social superiority to the Jews, were then allowed to relieve their built up hostility to the Jews physically by
pelting them with oranges while they scattered; the Genoese podestà and the Mahonesi had, by now, long since ceremonially withdrawn from the scene. The rapidity with which the Mahona’s guard restored order and dispersed the crowd, however, indicates that the Mahona did not intend to inflict lasting harm on the Jewish community. It was a performance for the benefit of the Greek community, a chance for them to relieve social tension, while the Mahona also preserved a valuable source of income at the same time.
CHAPTER FOUR

PRESERVING THE PATRIMONY WHILE INTER VIVOS ON CHIOS

The Constitution of the Household

The two preceding chapters have examined, in turn, the stability of late medieval Venetian and Genoese political institutions, and how that stability or instability influenced both the type of administrative structures employed to govern their most important territorial possessions in the eastern Mediterranean, and also to what degree these home governments were involved in the affairs of these territorial possessions. The foci of these chapters have thus, by their very nature, been on matters external to the colonies. It is true that the colonial governments' relations with the Greek and Jewish populations of their respective islands were discussed, but this discussion was only used to illustrate the varying degrees of autonomy granted by the home government to their colonial administration. The final two chapters of this dissertation shift the focus to the internal social dynamics of one colony in particular, Genoese Chios, asking the question: how did the high degree of autonomy granted by the Genoese home government to the Mahona of Chios affect the efforts of
Genoese families to protect and preserve their households on the island during the fifteenth century?

The obvious place to begin such an inquiry is to establish what constitutes the basic family unit, or household, which most historians have traditionally limited to family members alone. Indeed, the exclusion of those people not related by blood or marriage from most social historians' definitions of the household has appeared time and again in scholarly literature on the subject. The intense scholarly debate over the nuclear or extended nature of the fifteenth century Tuscan family is a good example of this. Richard Goldthwaite has argued that by the fourteenth century Tuscan families consisted of small groups of both blood relatives and also those related to the families by marriage. David Herlihy and Christine Klapisch-Zuber contested this conclusion in their extensive analysis of fifteenth century Florentine tax records. They challenge Goldthwaite's conclusions by asserting that their data instead suggests that fourteenth and fifteenth century Tuscan households were large and extended in nature.

586 David Herlihy and Christiane Klapisch-Zuber, Tuscans and Their Families: A Study of the Florentine Catasto of 1427. Yale series in economic history (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1985), especially 290-303. Herlihy also questions Goldthwaite’s assertion that the nuclear household was normative, see his “Family Solidarity in Medieval Italian History,” Explorations in Economic History 7 (1969): 173-84.
The household thus defined is partly a result of the sources used by these historians. The archives of Florence, and many other Italian towns for that matter, are indeed filled with census and tax records from this period that would lead the historian to construct definitions of the household in accordance with the manner in which they are presented in these sources, i.e. taxable units. As a result, it has become common practice for many historians to use the terms family, clan, and household interchangeably. Diane Owen Hughes, for example, calls for historians to re-conceptualize social relations of the past, but then goes on to reemphasize traditional ideas of what constitutes kin.587 Goldthwaite clearly means only for those people related by blood or marriage to be included in a household. The same can be said for Herlihy’s and Klapisch-Zuber’s discussion of the household. Francis William Kent, in his work *Households and Lineage in Renaissance Florence: The Family Life of the Capponi, Ginori, and Rucellai*, states that: “Here a household is understood to be a group of kinsmen living in the same house or in several houses which, in the manner of the time, were joined

together to form in effect one dwelling." 588 Finally, we sometimes even see this same assumption in the works of scholars who have based their studies on sources containing information on household members not related by blood or marriage. Steven A. Epstein, in his *Wills and Wealth in Medieval Genoa, 1150-1250*, discusses the household in these terms: "The familial desire to intercede for souls extended no further than this small circle - the nuclear family as it existed in time with members departed and yet to be born." 589

Other scholars, such as Sally McKee, have taken issue with this interpretation of what constitutes a household. McKee sees the predominant focus on family members as anachronistic, because it frames family relationships in terms of the standards of contemporary western society. She instead argues that information contained in notarial sources across the medieval Mediterranean force their readers to define the households as consisting of both family and non-family members. 590 She continues by tracing the inclusion of

non-family members in the definition of a household even further back in time. Aristotle, in fact, makes the same argument in his *Politics*, where he describes the makeup of the household, in its perfect form, as consisting of freemen and slaves, who are linked by three basic relationships: that between master and slave; husband and wife; and father and children.\(^{591}\) It is thus McKee’s contention that people have considered the household, for most of western history since the time of Aristotle, to include non-kin, and scholars should continue to do so.

An examination of life on Genoese Chios adds yet another dynamic to this debate, where politics and the family converged to create a new, broader understanding of what constituted a household on the island. As early as 1362 the Genoese doge was sufficiently concerned about the unfavorable economic situation of the Mahona’s administration, and its resultant danger to the security of Chios, to feel it necessary to renegotiate Genoa’s agreement with the shareholders of both the Old and New Mahonas.\(^{592}\) The intricacies of the new agreement are not important for the discussion here, but, by way of summation, the twelve members of the Old Mahona leased

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\(^{592}\) The Old Mahona refers to the ship owners who took part in the original conquest of Chios in 1346, while the New Mahona refers to their Genoese agents on the island who collected the island’s revenue.
their rights to Chios to a group of their agents already on the island. These twelve agents of the New Mahona, who each held an equal share, promised in turn to pay the Old Mahona in Genoa a seven percent return annually and to govern and defend Chios. What is of interest for the current discussion are the individuals making up this New Mahona, which is recorded in the deed of agreement between these twelve appaltatori and the Commune of Genoa on 14 November 1362. They were all from prominent Genoese Popolo families including the Cattaneo, de Campis, Arangio, San Teodoro, Adorno, Banca, Longo, de Furneto, de Negro, de Oliverio, and Garibaldo. The deed furthermore records that the majority of these members had adopted a common surname, Giustiniani (Iustinianus), to create a Genoese-style albergo, or group of allied families. This fact is later confirmed by a sixteenth-century historian named, appropriately enough, Agostino Giustiniani, who reports that the earliest families to adopt the new surname were the Longo, de Furneto, Banca, Cattaneo, de Campis, Arangio, San Teodoro, Adorno, Banca, Longo, de Furneto, de Negro, de Oliverio, and Garibaldo. The deed furthermore records that the majority of these members had adopted a common surname, Giustiniani (Iustinianus), to create a Genoese-style albergo, or group of allied families. This fact is later confirmed by a sixteenth-century historian named, appropriately enough, Agostino Giustiniani, who reports that the earliest families to adopt the new surname were the Longo, de Furneto, Banca, Cattaneo, de Campis, Arangio, San Teodoro, Adorno, Banca, Longo, de Furneto, de Negro, de Oliverio, and Garibaldo. The deed furthermore records that the majority of these members had adopted a common surname, Giustiniani (Iustinianus), to create a Genoese-style albergo, or group of allied families. This fact is later confirmed by a sixteenth-century historian named, appropriately enough, Agostino Giustiniani, who reports that the earliest families to adopt the new surname were the Longo, de Furneto, Banca,

593 For a detailed discussion of the 1362 agreement between the commune of Genoa and the Mahonas of Chios, see Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, I:125-35. The actual texts of the agreements are in Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, II:56-79.
595 The deed records that the following partners had adopted the new cognomen: Nicolaus Iustinianus olim de Sancto Theodoro, Tomas Iustinianus olim Longus, Paulus Iustinianus olim de Bancha, Andreolus Iustinianus olim de Campis, Luchinus Iustinianus olim Niger (de Negro), Franciscus Iustinianus olim Arangii, Iohannes Iustinianus olim de Campis, Raphael Iustinianus olim de Furneto, and Petrus Iustinianus olim de Oliverio (Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, II:78).
Arangio, de Campis, and Garibaldo, who were eventually joined by the Monelia, Ugheto, de Negro, Rocha, Recanello, de Oliverio, de Castello, de San Bindoro, and de Pagana.  

There were many conceivable reasons that these families would form such an association: to strengthen their stranglehold on the export of mastic, Chios' most profitable crop; to foster trust among the participating family groups, who were becoming ever more dependent on each other for their own economic prosperity on the island; and/or to make a public demonstration of their solidarity. The Giustiniani present an interesting example of consanguineous kin groups entering into a relationship for the purpose of protecting and pursuing common interests, thus creating a family-style bond among them. It is therefore my contention that, for the purposes of this study, when the families mentioned above took the common surname Giustiniani, they did nothing less than create a new, if somewhat extended, family group that was based not on blood, but instead on a common sense of purpose. I agree with Sally McKee's definition of a household as including both family and non-family members, but also contend that the household cannot always be envisioned as simply "a group people

596 Agostino Giustiniani, Annali, 137.
sharing a residence, whether in one dwelling or in an arrangement like a homestead, whose reason for co-residence is the care and support of the family group and its property.  

It is clear from an examination of Genoese Chios and the Giustiniani that co-residence was not always a requirement for achieving these ends. Those families taking the surname Giustiniani all had separate residences, nor were they related by blood, yet they clearly exhibited a concern for the well-being of their extended household and its property, just as individual, mostly consanguineous households did. We must therefore give consideration, at least in the case of Genoese Chios, to the fact that, in addition to the single family residence, a household could also be conceived of more broadly as including multiple, smaller family units, who through their name and actions represented an extended household.

The notarial evidence regarding marriage and inheritance patterns on Chios clearly records that the Giustiniani often acted, as did the majority of households on the island, to protect family property by largely distributing it internally, if possible. It is certainly not surprising that this would be the case, because property, or patrimony, was at the heart of a

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household, forming its very base. It is therefore reasonable to study households as a web of relationships between their members and property, which regularly changed. The key factor affecting changes in these relationships was the conveyance of property, either internally from one household member to another, or externally to a member of another household. This could be a conveyance of money, land, slaves, agricultural produce, or other valuables to any member whatsoever of a given household. Patrimony could also be passed either within the same generation or to the next generation by testament, depending on its recipient. The purpose of this chapter is to examine those moments of everyday life when a household’s property was transferred between its family members. The predominant focus here will be on those acts that made provisions for the immediate conveyance of a household’s property from one party to another, as opposed to those provisions made for inheritance, whatever the motivating factor may have been. First, we will examine the moments when fathers and sons transferred property between themselves. This chapter will then conclude with an examination of the transference of property between fathers and daughters when it came time for the latter to marry. In the next chapter, this discussion will continue with an
investigation of those acts making provisions for the eventual conveyance of a household’s patrimony from one generation to the next through inheritance upon the death of a parent.

The Age of Majority and the Emancipation of Minors

On 3 November 1461, Leonardus Bazurrus, the deputy-Podestà of Chios sought out the services of the notary Bernardo de Ferrari. Leonardus’ purpose was to confirm officially that he had granted to Georgius de Franchi Turturinus quondam Andrea, who is described as being between the age of 18 and 25 (esse maiorum annis decimocto minorem tamen annis viginti quinque), the “concession of age,” and thus bestowing upon him all the rights of majority. It is unfortunate for the historian that Leonardus chose to include neither a reason why he granted these rights to Georgius nor why Georgius requested them, but almost assuredly the request was motivated by the desire of Georgius and his family to protect or benefit their household in some way. The evidence from fifteenth-century Chios clearly illustrates that the “concession of age” and the full-fledged emancipation of a son from his or her father’s legal and

598 ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Bernardo de Ferrari, Filza 764, 557r, 3 November 1461.
economic potestas were two privileges hardly ever requested of, or granted by, the office of the Podestà.\textsuperscript{599} When one of these grants was actually bestowed on a minor, however, the reason is almost always in the interest of bettering the household in some way. Achieving the age of legal majority, whether reaching it naturally or early through the efforts of one’s family, could thus be considered an important time for a family and its property. It was a moment of change when suddenly a son had the authority to enter into legal contracts, appear in court, and be considered fit to conduct business, among other things, all rights that often proved to be useful tools for protecting or augmenting household property, and the framework governing practices of age was the law.

The Genoese ruled Chios from the beginning by a legal code shaped by Roman or Lombard law, just as Genoa and many other northern Italian states had done for centuries.\textsuperscript{600} The usual age of achieving majority under this law was twenty five, and it is clear that the law code of Genoa, and hence its colonies, was in accordance

\textsuperscript{599} I have found 13 occasions on which the office of the Podestà granted the “concession of age” to a minor and 3 occasions on which a minor is described as having obtained this concession, ranging in date from 1381-1461. I have also found 10 occasions when a child was emancipated from his father’s potestas, ranging in date from 1403-86. These documents will be itemized and discussed below in detail.

\textsuperscript{600} Epstein, Wills and Wealth in Medieval Genoa, 8.
with this. Bartolomeus Berrinus, filius Enrici, for example, acknowledged a debt to Iohannes Piccininus quondam Bonifacii of 10 Genoese lire on 25 February 1458, and it is noted in the act that Bartolomeus had attained the age of majority of twenty five years. Lanfranchus Paterius, filius Iohannis, likewise was reported to have been older than twenty five years (esse maiorum annis viginti quinque) when he granted power of attorney to the Genoese merchant Pasqual Pinellus so that he could engage in business with Demetrius Cattaneus quondam Iohannis.

Certain circumstances would occasionally arise, however, that made it necessary for a father or legal guardian to request a special dispensation to have his under aged son or charge recognized as an adult, and thus have all the legal rights of a major. This special dispensation appears in the notarial registers of Genoese Chios as a venia aetatis, or the “concession of age,” which was yet another borrowing from a Roman precedent. It is also found in the Codex Iustinianus, where the minimum age at which a man could receive relief from the burdens of minority was 20 years. There is some

601 Thomas Kuehn, Emancipation in Late Medieval Florence (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1982), 44.
602 ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, no. 31, 25 February 1458.
603 ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, no. 279, 18 February 1460.
604 The Codex also provides the possibility of this relief to women having a minimum age of 18 years (Paul Krueger, ed., Codex Iustinianus [Berolini: Apud Weidmannos, 1973]), II.XXXXIII.2.
divergence of practice, however, between the *veniae aetatis* of Justinian's era and those granted on Genoese Chios. The notarial registers record sixteen occasions between the years 1381 and 1461 on which the office of the Podesta granted the "concession of age" to a minor, as is shown in Appendix A. On the twelve of those occasions when any information is recorded regarding a young man's age, every one of the acts record that the mens' minimum possible age was eighteen years.\(^{605}\) It is not entirely clear why the evidence from Chios shows a lower minimum age, but perhaps it was an attempt to reconcile Roman and Genoese law, where it is stated that minor boys and girls could participate in a legal contract at the ages of seventeen and fifteen.

\(^{605}\) The twelve acts are as follows: Angelus de Rimini (not. Bernardo de Ferrari, Filza 765, no. 175r-v, 3 October 1450); Gregorius de Sibilia (not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 847, no. 217r, 1 December 1450); Iane Politi *quondam* Neamoniti (not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, fol. 66-r, 27 April 1458); Iacobinus de Franchis Luxardus *quondam* Marchixii (not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, fol. 142r-v, 3 September 1459); Constans Carnoni (not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, fol. 147-r, 20 September 1459); Ieronimus de Garbarino *quondam* Iohannis (not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, fol. 161r, 16 October 1459); Iohannes Iustinianus *quondam* Bartholomei (not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, fol. 181r-v, 20 November 1459); Barnabus Paterius *quondam* Petri (not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, fol. 223r-v, 7 December 1459); Baptista de Eliano de Ovado *quondam* Nicolai (not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, fol. 228r-v, 3 January 1460); Iohannes Antonius Iustinianus (not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, fol. 368r, 15 May 1460); Iohannes Iustinianus *quondam* Dominici (not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, fol. 425r-v, 4 August 1460); Georgius de Franchi Turturinus *quondam* Andrea (not. Bernardo de Ferrari, Filza 764, no. 557r, 3 November 1461).
respectively, if the minor had done so with the counsel of two relatives.  

The authority to grant this concession seems to have been possessed exclusively by the office of the Podestà, and almost always dispensed by the Podestà’s deputy. Of the thirteen concessions in which a grantor is listed, eleven were granted by the Deputy Podestà,  

while the other two were dispensed by the Podestà himself.  

There is no indication as to why the Podestà took it upon himself to make the dispensation in these two particular cases, but it was certainly not due to the importance of the occasions. In the first of the two acts, Gregorius Iustinianus, Potestas et Gubernator Civitatis et Insule Chii, granted the “concession of age” to Iacobinus de

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606 The statue reads: “Si quis minor masculus sane mentis ex quo compleverit annos decem septem, vel femina ex quo compleverit annos quindecem fecerit aliquem contractum, finem, obligationem, vel remissionem cum aliqua persona cum iuramento prestito cum et de consilio duorum ex millioribus propinquis suis, qui iurent, si poterunt inveniri” (Leges Genuenses: Historiae Patriae Monumenta, vol. 18 [Turin, 1901], cols. 876-8, Quod contractus minorum et mulierum valeant). Steven A. Epstein has also noted that it was common practice in Genoa to emancipate sons at eighteen or nineteen (Epstein, Wills and Wealth in Medieval Genoa, 11).

607 Theodorus Tetragoniti (not. Giulianus de Canella, Filza 175 [attributed to Antonio Fellone], 9 February 1381), also published in Enrico Basso, ed., Notai genovese in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Chio da Giuliano de Canella (2 novembre 1380 – 31 marzo 1381) (Athens: Società di Studi dell’Egeo Orientale, 1993), no. 29, 79-80; Angelus de Rimini, 3 October 1450; Gregorius de Sibilia, 1 December 1450; Iane Politi quondam Neamonti, 27 April 1458; Ieronimus de Garbarino quondam Iohannis, 16 October 1459; Johannes Iustinianus quondam Bartholomei, 20 November 1459; Barnabus Paterius quondam Petri, 7 December 1459; Baptista de Eliano de Ovado, 3 January 1460; Simon Iustinianus quondam Ambrosii, 15 May 1460; Johannes Iustinianus quondam Dominici, 4 August 1460; Georgius de Franchi Turturinus quondam Andrea, 3 November 1461.

608 Iacobinus de Franchis Luxardus quondam Marchixii, 3 September 1459; and Constans Carnoni, 20 September 1459.
Franchis Luxardus quondam Marchixii for the expressed purpose of doing business as a merchant. The use of this concession to make a boy fit to do business is in no way unusual, for it was the most common reasons given for its issuance. Nor is there anything remarkable about the second act, which notes that the same Georgius Iustinianus, in his capacity as the Podestà of Chios, granted the "concession of age" to a Greek boy named Constans Carnoni, but fails to provide a reason for said grant.

The nature of the concessions varies from act to act, but the majority of them include no restrictions on a boy's ability to behave as a major. This general "concession of age" appears in ten of the sixteen acts, and, by their very nature, are the least interesting of the *veniae aetatis*. They provide only minimal amounts of information concerning both the circumstances necessitating the concession, as well as the principal

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609 *A venia aetatis* gives a reason for its issuance only about one-third of the time, as is shown in Appendix A. Three out of the six times when a reason is given, however, it is in order to make a boy fit to engage in business as a merchant. The three grants are as follows: Angelus de Rimini, 3 October 1450; Iacobinus de Franchis Luxardus quondam Marchixii, 3 September 1459; and Baptista de Eliano de Ovado, 3 January 1460.

610 The ten acts falling into this category are: Theodorus Tetragoniti, 9 February 1381; Gregorius de Sibilia, 1 December 1450; Iane Politi quondam Neamoniti, 27 April 1458; Constans Carnoni, 20 September 1459; Ieronimus de Garbarino quondam Iohannis, 16 October 1459; Iohannes Iustinianus quondam Bartholomei, 20 November 1459; Barnabus Paterius quondam Petri, 7 December 1459; Simon Iustinianus quondam Ambrosii, 15 May 1460; Iohannes Iustinianus quondam Dominici, 4 August 1460; Georgius de Franchi Turturinus quondam Andrea, 3 November 1461.
participants involved. The grant of majority recorded by Tommaso de Recco on 4 August 1460 offers a good example of the formulaic nature of this type of *venia aetatis*. In this act he noted that the Deputy Podestà of Chios, Iacobus de Griffis de Blana, grants the "concession of age" to Iohannes Iustinianus quondam Dominici, who is between 18 and 25 years old.\(^{611}\)

It is the *veniae aetatis* of a more limited nature that give the historian some real insight into the benefits of majority on Genoese Chios. Six of the sixteen "concessions of age" fall into this category, due to the fact that all of these acts specify a particular arena in which the grantee was being released from the legal restrictions of minority to assume the responsibilities of majority.\(^{612}\) It is no surprise that the most common reason given for granting legal majority to a minor was so that the boy could engage in business as a merchant, considering the importance of Chios to Genoese trade in the eastern Mediterranean. This in fact appears as the reason for the grant three of six times. The first occurred on 3 October 1450, when the Deputy Podestà Albertus Bullus granted the petition of Guidus de Rimini.

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\(^{611}\) ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, no. 425r-v, 4 August 1460.

\(^{612}\) The six acts recording a limited "concession of age" to a minor are: Ellias Gripioti, 29 May 1394; Iane Demerode, 30 July 1394; Angelus de Rimini, 3 October 1450; Iacobinus de Franchis Luxardus quondam Marchixii, 3 September 1459; Baptista de Eliano de Ovado, 3 January 1460; Iohannes Antonius Iustinianus, 7 February 1460.
and Antonius de Podio requesting that Guidus' son Angelus be made fit to do business as a merchant.\textsuperscript{613} The grant is then made on the same grounds two subsequent times: first, on 3 September 1459, when Podestà Gregorius Justinianus granted the "concession of age" to Iacobinus de Franchis Luxardus quondam Marchixii; and second, on 3 January 1460, when the Deputy Podestà Gabriel de Rapallo granted majority to Baptista de Eliano de Ovado quondam Nicolai, a burger of Chios.\textsuperscript{614} It is unfortunate that none of these acts offer the particulars of these boys' mercantile dealings, but there is little doubt that the motivation behind a father's petitioning of the Podestà's office to this end was for the economic benefit of his household in some way, shape, or form.

An examination of the other three limited "concessions of age" demonstrates more concretely how the venia aetatis could be employed effectively to transfer property within, or between, households. Two of these acts make it clear that a grant of majority was sometimes necessary in order for a male heir to dispose of his household's patrimony. The first of these acts was drawn up on 29 May 1394, in which the Jew Ellias Gripioti, who is described as "son of the late Moses Gripioti and sole

\textsuperscript{613} ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Bernardo de Ferrari, Filza 765, no. 175r-v, 3 October 1450.
\textsuperscript{614} ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, no. 142r-v, 3 September 1459 and ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, no. 228r-v, 3 January 1460, respectively.
heir of the said Moses, his father, by means of the late
Samaria, brother of Ellie and son of the late Moses, and
having obtained the 'concession of age,'"615 and his
mother Esati sell a house with a courtyard and a well to
the Jewish physician Elixeus Calaihi quondam Magistri
Moise for 225 ducats.616 The designation of Ellias as
Moses' sole heir, which seems to have come about due to
his brother Samaria's death, suggests that he was the
only surviving son of Moses. It may also have been the
case that the extended Gripioti family, if it existed,
suffered from a general lack of majority-aged males, thus
leaving the task of distributing Moses' estate in the
hands of his wife, Esati, and his son, Ellias, neither of
whom were legally allowed to conclude a contract on their
own. It therefore became necessary to obtain a
"concession of age" for Ellias to carry out his legal and
familial duties as heir, which the notary recorded that
he had done in the previous year.617

615 “filius quondam Moses Gripioti, iudeus, heredes in solidum dicti
quondam Moises, patris sui, mediante persona quondam Samarie, fratris
ipsius Ellie et filli dicti quondam Moises, ectatis veniam
consecutus” (The act is published in Paola Villa, “Documenti sugli
Ebrei a Chio nel 1394,” Atti della Società ligure di storia patria,
n.s. V, LXXIX (1965): no. 5, 130–3.).
616 There is no indication that the Moses who is given as Elixeus'late
father is the same person as Elias' father Moses. It is therefore
probably correct to consider them as being two different people,
especially since the notary refers to Elixeus' Moses as magister,
while he does not record the same title for Elias' father.
617 The notary, Donatus de Clavaro, notes that Ellias had obtained the
"concession of age" "publico instrumento scripto et composito manu
Dominici de Campis notarii, MCCCLXXXIII, die [illegible]" (Villa,
Documenti,” no. 5, 130).
The second occasion on which a "concession of age" facilitated the distribution of household patrimony is a much clearer example of this practice, and also involves members of the Iustiniani. On 7 February 1460, the notary Tommaso de Recco recorded that Franciscus Iustinianus quondam Bartholomei and his son Iohannes Antonius Iustinianus had acknowledged that Iohannes had been granted the "concession of age" so that he would be able to dispose of the inheritance left him by his father, when the time came for him to do so. The circumstances necessitating this extraordinary action on the part of Franciscus are unclear from the document. It was possible that Franciscus was in poor health at that time, was planning an overseas journey, or some other perilous pursuit. What is clear from the deed, however, is that there was an immediate need for Franciscus to ensure that his son Iohannes would be in good legal standing to inherit the household's patrimony. This urgency suggests that Iohannes was the only option available to Franciscus when it came to keeping his patrimony intact and to protecting it against possible unwanted division. It is hard to imagine that Franciscus would have found it necessary to exercise such extreme

618 The notary notes that Iohannes had in fact been granted this concession in a deed that he himself had recorded on 20 November 1459: "instrumento scripti manum meum anno proximo die XX novembris" (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, no. 182r-v, 7 February 1460).
measures if another, majority-aged heir had been available.

The *venia aetatis* was certainly a useful tool for imbuing a minor with the legal rights and privileges of majority, but it did have its limitations. Genoese law, based as it was on Roman law, made allowances for minors to draw up legally valid contracts, as long as they had the permission of their legal guardian, that being their father or grandfather. Once a minor had reached the age of legal majority, however, this did not *ipso facto* alter the legal authority that his father had over him. This is made clear in Genoese law, where even if a son had reached his twenty-fifth year he was still considered to be under the *potestas patris seu avi*, and thus not allowed to conclude any contract without his guardian’s consent. In fact, Roman law gave complete economic and legal control over all household members to the

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619 Minors were certainly not allowed to draw up legally valid contracts on their own, but the Genoese statue on the subject does allow for the practice if “dictus minor, masculus vel femina, haberet patrem vel avum patronum presentem et idoneum et esset in potestate alterius eorum; quo casu possit se obligare auctoritate patris vel avi paterni in cuius ipsorum fuerit potestate, et indistincte absque alia solemnitate vel restitutione ipsa obligatio habeatur firma et rata, nisi ad benefitium ipsius patris vel avi quia tunc requiratur cause cognitio et utilitas ipsius minoris et auctoritas ipsius magistratus; alter vero contractus factus ipso iure non valeat” (*Leges Genuenses*, cols. 876-8, *Quod contractus minorum et mulierum valeant*).

620 “Aliquis etiam masculus maior annis vigintiquinque, qui sit in potestate patris vel avi, non posit contrahere, se obligare remittere vel facere aliquid, nisi de consenso patris vel avi in cuius fuerit potestate” (*Leges Genuenses*, cols. 876-8, *Quod contractus minorum et mulierum valeant*).
*paterfamilias*, or male head of the household, and thus only the father could appear in court, conduct business, or conclude legal contracts. This included the sons of the household, despite the fact that they were in line to one day inherit the family's property from their father. The control a father had over his sons was very strong, to the point that even after marriage and establishing a residence separate from that of his father's home, he was still not considered the head of his own household. This required the action of the father, who had to acknowledge legally and publically that he was voluntarily relinquishing his potestas over his son. Roman law allowed sons very few options for achieving the status of head of the household, and thus a legal identity independent from that of his father. In fact, there were really only two occurrences that could remove a son from underneath his father's legal authority: the emancipation of the son by his father, or a father's death.

Emancipation bestowed on a son all the legal rights enjoyed by his father, which were many. It meant that he could now appear in court, conclude contracts of any kind, or accumulate his own debt. It also meant that, conversely, he had the privilege of not being held

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responsible for any debts accrued by his father. The most important right that emancipation granted to a son for the purposes of this discussion, however, was the right to own and possess property. The control of property, and also its transference from one generation of a household to the next, was indeed an important familial concern that could motivate a father to emancipate his son. This was certainly the case in late medieval Florence, where Thomas Kuehn has shown that it was common practice for fathers to transfer property to their sons by means of emancipation, and thus shield it from their fathers' creditors. In fact, this sort of shady dealing seems to have been common enough by the middle of the fourteenth century that the city government decreed that all emancipations had to be registered properly with the Commune in order to be considered valid and not fraudulent.624

The defrauding of the Commune or the father's creditors by transferring property to an emancipated son appears to have been a significant concern in Genoa, as well, for Genoese law also includes a statute prohibiting this very practice. The Leges Genuenses, under a rubric entitled De emancipationibus liberorum, forbids any public official from emancipating anyone who is either

624 Kuehn, Emancipation, 38-42.
using the practice to defraud the Commune, or is guilty of coercing their father into emancipating them. The statute then continues by requiring that anyone granted legal emancipation must produce collateral to ensure that they pay their taxes and also obtain permission from a public official before travelling.\textsuperscript{625} The addition of these safeguards to the above prohibition suggests that perhaps attempts to defraud the Commune in this way occurred more frequently in Genoa than in Florence. Genoese lawmakers were not satisfied to stop there, however, and added to these preventative measures a requirement that these oaths be sworn to at the time of the emancipation and recorded by the notary in the deed.

The evidence from Genoese Chios makes it clear that this piece of notarial protocol came to the island with the Genoese, for a clause to this effect appears time and again in the emancipation deeds. It in fact appears in

\textsuperscript{625} "Non interponat nec prestet magistratus suam auctoritatem alicui volenti emancipari, quem tradat et cognoscat id petere ad damnum communis vel allicuius persone, et quem violenter et constrictae pater emancipet. Nec emancipet aliquem magistratus, quin primo bonam et ydoneam cautionem fecerit vel dederit, quia de quanto pater eius dederit vel dabit ei collectas et obsequia civitatis Ianu faciat ipse emancipatus sicut ceteri Ianuenses de posse suo fecerint et expendiderint, et quod in cursum non ibit vel intrabit nisi de mandato magistratus. Et si quis, ob emancipationem, recusaverit dare collectam de bonis que habuerit a patre, aut a patrimonio matris, teneatur magistratus de bonis et rebus patris collectam accipere quemadmodum ab alis civibus Ianu aceperit vel habuerit, excepto quando pater iurare poterit quod de bonis filli emancipati non habeat nec in fraudem desiderit habere; tamen de quanto magistratus aceperit vel habuerit de bonis patris, de tanto laudem ei faciat contra filium" (\textit{Leges Genuenses}, cols. 595-6, \textit{De emancipationibus liberorum}).
all 10 deeds of emancipation that will be discussed in the following pages, albeit sometimes in abbreviated form. A good example of this clause in its entirety comes from an emancipation occurring on 22 July 1457, when a Genoese citizen, Bernardus de Malta, emancipated his son, Constantinus, for an undisclosed reason. The appropriate passage of the deed reads:

Furthermore, the said Bernardus and Constantinus have sworn, with their hands upon the Scriptures, to God’s Holy Gospel that the aforementioned emancipation is intended neither to harm nor to defraud the Commune of Genoa or the creditors of the said Bernardus, nor was it the result of any malice or ill-will. The said Constantinus has also promised to his Excellency the Lord Vicar, the Judge Regular, and to me, the below-written notary, just as if he had done so in public, promising and undertaking in the name of the commune of Genoa and of everyone and anyone whom it concerns, will concern, or may concern, not to travel whatsoever in the future during the period indicated in the chapter “De Emancipationibus” [of the Genoese Statues], and to satisfy and be held to all other obligations of the said commune that are contained in that chapter.

It is a formulaic clause that the Genoese Commune required notaries to insert into the deeds, but it

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626 For a list of these 10 emancipations, see Appendix B.
627 "Insuper dicti Bernardus et Constantinus iuraverunt ad sancta Dei Evangelia corporaliter tactis scripturis predictam emancipationem non fieri in lesionem sive fraudem communis Ianue et seu creditorum dicti Bernardi vel inducta alicuius malicie seu malignitatis causa. Nec non iuravit et promissit dictus Constantinus perfecto domino vicario et iudici ordinario et michi notario infrascripto tamquam personis publicis officio publico stipulantibus et recipientibus nomine et vice communis Ianue et omnium et singulorum quorum interest intererit seu interesse posset quolibet in futurum non ire in currsum hinc ad tempus denotatum in capitulo de emancipationibus et subire onera dicti communis omnia que alia facere ad que tenetur vigore capitulorum communis Ianue loquentium de emancipationibus" (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, no. 223r-v, 22 July 1457).
nevertheless offers some insight into the practice and usage of emancipation in Genoa and its colonies. For example, the fact that the clause forces both parties to swear that this emancipation was not motivated by a desire to defraud the Commune makes clear that those debts and obligations accumulated by the son before emancipation were not diminished or discharged in any way by the son’s new legal status.

There were a variety of reasons why a father would liberate his son from his authority, such as the ability to participate in a court case. From 25 through 27 October 1403, the notary Gregorio Panissaro recorded a series of acts involving a money dispute among Michael Lomelinus, Iohannes de Podio, and Andalo de Murta, which was arbitrated by Leonardus Iustinianus de Rocha, Augustinus Ususmaris, and Iohannes de Castelliono. The details of the dispute are unclear, but Panissaro did record its outcome, when, on 27 October, the arbiters ordered Iohannes de Podio and Andalo de Murta to pay Michael Lomelinus a sum no more than 1000 gold ducats.

629 "Dicti Iohannes et Andalo constitute etc. promiserunt, dictis nominibus, habere ratum et firmum quicquid et quantum per dictos tres vel duos ex eis cognitum et declaratum fuerit et attendere, compiere et observare et contra non facere vel venire, aliqua racione, occasione vel causa, et solvere, omni exceptione remota, dicto Michaeli omne id et totum quicquid et quantum per dictos tres vel duos ex eis cognitum fuerit eos dicto Michaeli dare debere, usque in
What is important for the discussion here, however, is the fact that Gregorio notes at the bottom of this act that Nicolaus de Via, who is described as a *filius emancipatus*, stood as guarantor for the two debtors.\(^{630}\)

On two occasions there is evidence that a father emancipated his son for the purpose of engaging in business. This is clearly the case on 4 September 1484, when Iohannes de Via acknowledged having emancipated his two sons, Petrus and Franciscus de Via, in an earlier, undated deed of the notary Domenico de Algario.\(^{631}\) It was Iohannes’ intention on this occasion to make known his purpose for the emancipation, which was to make it possible for the said Petrus and Franciscus to take part in a commercial transaction in which they were to buy an unnamed ship from Albertus de Castello for 224 florins.\(^{632}\) The interest in this act of emancipation clearly lies in Iohannes’ motivation for its creation. It is curious quantitatem ducatorum auri mille” (Toniolo, *Gregorio Panissaro*, no. 39, p. 92).

\(^{630}\) “Et pro eis, dictis nominibus, de predictis omnibus actendendis firmiter et observandis intercessit et fideiussit Nicolaus de Via, filius emancipatus (Toniolo, *Gregorio Panissaro*, no. 40, p. 93).

\(^{631}\) ASG, *Notai Antichi*, not. Domenico de Algario/Niccoolo Torriglia, Filza 944, no. 477r-v, 4 September 1484. The Archivio di Stato di Genova catalogs its notarial registers according to traditional attribution, meaning that it sometimes happens that a given register contains the deeds of multiple notaries. This is the case here, where the work of Niccolo Torriglia appears in large numbers right next to that of Domenico de Algario, hence the listing of both notaries in this register’s catalog entry. It is clear in this case, however, that the act in question was recorded by Domenico de Algario.

\(^{632}\) ASG, *Notai Antichi*, not. Domenico de Algario/Niccoolo Torriglia, Filza 944, no. 477r-v, 4 September 1484.
that he would have needed to emancipate his two sons to conclude such a purchase; why did he not simply buy the ship himself, seeing as he was an adult who enjoyed all the economic and legal privileges that majority conferred? It is unfortunate that Iohannes noted no reason as to why the transaction required the involvement of his two sons. But, it is within the realm of possibility to envision a situation similar to that described by Thomas Kuehn, in which late medieval Florentine fathers transferred property to their emancipated sons in order to shield it from their creditors. It is thus possible, within this context, to interpret the emancipation of Petrus and Franciscus as an attempt by their father, Iohannes, to involve his name in the purchase of the ship in question as little as possible, and thus keep it hidden from the ever-watchful eyes of his creditors. Iohannes' actual motivation for emancipating his sons will of course never be known; this is merely one possibility.

The second occasion on which a boy is emancipated for the purpose of engaging in business appears three decades earlier. On 1 December 1450, the Deputy Podesta of Chios, Albertus Bullus, granted the "concession of age" to, and also emancipated, Gregorius de Sibilia, who

633 See the discussion of Kuehn's work on pages 317-9 of this chapter.
is described as "the son of the late Aloisius de Sibilia" and "between the ages of 18 and 25," while both he and his father are described as "formerly inhabitants andburghers of Chios." The act itself makes no mention of why Albertus emancipated Gregorius, but the reason becomes clear in the register's very next deed. Gregorius, now described as "emancipatus et etas venia constitutus," sells a female slave (famula) named Maria, whom he had acquired as part of his inheritance from his late father. These two acts give the impression that Gregorius had returned to Chios in order to settle at least some of the affairs of his late father, who had died before his reaching the age of majority. It thus became necessary for the Deputy Podestà to take the extraordinary step of emancipating Gregorius himself, so that he could perform the tasks required of him by the situation. It is also interesting to note that the issue at hand here must be the release of Gregorius from the potestas not of his father, but his grandfather, since his father had died before his emancipation. If his grandfather were also deceased, it is hard to imagine why

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534 "filius quondam Aloisii de Sibilia olim habitatorum et burgensium Chii," and then the notary continues by describing Gregorius as "esse maiorum annis decimocto minorem tamen annis viginti quinque" (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 847, no. 217r, 1 December 1450.
535 ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 847, unnumbered, 1 December 1450.
a formal declaration of his emancipation would have been necessary.

The evidence for the youngest minor emancipated on Chios comes from a deed dated 17 December 1459, which was also drawn up by the notary Tommaso de Recco. On that date the Deputy Podestà ratified the emancipation of Iohannes de Moneglia by his father Teramus. The deed does not provide much insight into the situation necessitating Iohannes’ emancipation, but it must have been highly unusual, for he is noted as being a mere fourteen years old.\(^{636}\) This is by far the youngest age description appearing in any of the four deeds of emancipation that list this information.\(^{637}\) Whatever the exact circumstances surrounding the emancipation of Iohannes, however, the act was clearly motivated by family affairs overseas. Indeed, the only information at all given as reason for the emancipation is that Iohannes’ sister, Bianchinetta, had died in Mitylene.\(^{638}\)

This emancipation deed furthermore lacks a clause

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\(^{636}\) ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, no. 221bis, 17 December 1459; this emancipation is also briefly mentioned in Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, I:462-3.

\(^{637}\) The other three minors are described as: Gregorius de Sibilia, 18-25 years old (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 847, no. 217r, 1 December 1450); Thomas de Furneto, 22 years old (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 847, no. 353r-v-16, 16 June 1450); and Martinetus Draperius, 25 years old (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Agostino Foglietta/Agostino de Via, Filza 1205, no. 54r-v, 18 January 1486).

\(^{638}\) “propter mortem Bianchinette sororis dicti Iohannis habitate Mitylene” (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, no. 221bis, 17 December 1459).
requiring that Iohannes swear not to travel, interestingly enough, which suggests that perhaps his father intended for him to travel to Mitylene in order to conclude his sister's affairs.

The largest proportion of these acts record the transference of money and/or property from father to son as the reason for the son's emancipation. Seven of the ten emancipations found in the notarial registers give some indication of the motivation behind the act, as is listed in Appendix B. Three of these seven acts, or 43 percent, note that the son's emancipation was prompted by the movement of either money or property from one generation to the next. The small number of emancipations under scrutiny does not allow for any decisive conclusions regarding this data, but yet the evidence does demonstrate that the act of emancipating a minor was used to convey assets from father to son.

On 31 August 1450, for example, Iohannes Marinus Pesagius declared that his father, Baptista, while in Genoa, had emancipated him on 18 June 1450 and contemporaneously made over to him 2000 Genoese lire that Iohannes could use as he saw fit upon his arrival on Chios. Baptista furthermore declared that he gave Iohannes his blessing to keep in full whatever profits
may come from his use of this money. The reason for the bestowal of this generous gift was unfortunately not recorded, but the impression is that Baptista was sending the young Iohannes out into the world to make his own way. There certainly was money to be made at this time in the Genoese East, and 2000 Genoese lire could yield large returns if invested properly. There is also the possibility that Iohannes’ trip to Chios was to resolve matters of a more immediate concern to the family. The deed contains the usual clause in which both Baptista and Iohannes declared that this transaction in no way intended to defraud the Commune of Genoa or Baptista’s creditors. The two parties did not however continue by making the usual promise not to travel during the period set down by the clause de emancipationibus of the Genoese statues. The notary instead recorded that Iohannes had been given leave to travel, presumably by a communal official. There is no way of discerning why the Commune made this grant allowing Iohannes to travel, but in either case this particular instance of emancipation

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639 ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Bernardo de Ferrari, Filza 765, no. 119r, 31 August 1450.

640 The clause de emancipationibus liberorum does not precisely denote the length of time during which the contracting parties had to swear not to travel, and seems to have differed from case to case. The relevant clause only states that: “[ipse emancipatus] in cursum non ibit vel intrabit nisi de mandato magistratus” (Leges Genuenses, cols. 595-6, De emancipationibus liberorum).

641 ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Bernardo de Ferrari, Filza 765, no. 119r, 31 August 1450.
clearly demonstrates how tightly the Genoese Commune controlled the movements of emancipated sons within its territory. They were first required to obtain permission to travel from a representative of the Commune, and then to register their arrival officially at their final destination.

In a similar deed from 31 October 1461, Dominus Thomas Iustinianus quondam Andree emancipated his son Raffael, an act performed "in the presence of the Wise and Eminent Lord Leonardus Bazurus, Deputy and Judge Regular of the Respectable Lord Podestà of Chios."\(^{642}\) Thomas also made known at the same time that: "he is granting to the said Raffael, in pursuance of the said emancipation and with the said Raffael present and accepting, 200 Chian gold ducats, which the said Raffael has confessed to have had and received from the said Thomas."\(^{643}\) The lack of additional information recorded in this act makes it impossible to conclude with any certainty what Thomas’ intention may have been when he made over this money to Raffael. There is in fact only

\(^{642}\) "in presentia sapientis et egregii viri domini Leonardi Bazuri vicarii et judicis ordinarii spectabilis domini potestatis Chii” (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Bernardo de Ferrari, Filza 764, no. 565r-v, 31 October 1461; also published in Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, III: no. 260, 727-9).

\(^{643}\) "largiens dicto Raffaelli in premium dicte emancipationis dicto Raffaelli presenti et acceptanti ducatos ducentos de Chio quos dictus Raffael ab ipso domino Thoma habuisse et recepisse confessus est” (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Bernardo de Ferrari, Filza 764, no. 565r-v, 31 October 1461; and Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, III: no. 260, 728).
one other piece of information known about the later dealings of Thomas and Raffael. On 18 December of the same year, the notary Bernardo de Ferrari recorded that Thomas had granted the power of attorney to Raffael for unnamed reasons.\textsuperscript{644} The chronological proximity of this act to that of Raffael's emancipation suggests that the two provisions are part of some larger preparation or plan on the part of Thomas, but the evidence provides us with no answers.

The third act in which we see an emancipation undertaken in order to transfer money and/or property from father to son provides more detail than any of those previously examined. On 18 January 1486, a burgher of Chios named Petrus Antonius Draperius made it known that he was emancipating his 25 year old son, Martinetus. He joined his father in taking all the usual oaths in which they promised that this emancipation in no way intended to defraud the Commune of Genoa, and also that Martinetus would not travel during the interval prescribed by the statute \textit{de emancipationibus}.\textsuperscript{645} Petrus Antonius then went

\textsuperscript{644} ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Bernardo de Ferrari, Filza 764, no. 570r-v, 18 December 1461. Argenti also makes brief mention of this particular deed (Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, I:462).

\textsuperscript{645} In fact, the notary taking down this emancipation, Agostino Foglietta, provides us with perhaps the most complete renderings of these two oaths contained in any of the emancipations: "Iurantes dicti Petrus Antonius et Martinetus ad sancta Dei Evangelia tactis corporaliter scripturis ac pr"\textemdash it\textemdash itentes egregio digno doctori de Franchi, potestati Chii et mihi notario infrascripto tamquam publicis personis et officio publico stipulantibus et recipientibus nomine et vice communis Ianue et omnium et singulorum quorum interest intererit vel interesse posset quolibet in futurum quod predicta non fieri in
on to give his reason for emancipating his son. He intended to hand over a shop (apoteca) to Martinetus, which he described as being located in the town of Chios, in the district of Tripoli Campana. Petrus Antonius did not make it clear exactly what type of shop he was giving to his son, but there is some reason to believe that this district was home to the bakers' quarter of Chios town, so perhaps it was a bakery. Whatever type of shop it may have been, on this occasion a father transferred a portion of his immovable property from his possession to that of his son.

The purpose of this section has been to examine those occasions when it became necessary for fathers to bestow upon their sons a legal personality independent of their own, for whatever reason. The granting of “the concession of age” to minors, as well as the full-fledged

fraudem communis Ianue nec creditori suorum”; and then Martinetus swears “non ire in cursum hinc ad tempus denotatum in capitolo de emancipationibus et subire onera dicti communis omnia que alia facere ad que tenetur vigore capitulorum communis Ianue loguentium de emancipationibus” (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Agostino Foglietta/Agostino de Via, Filza 1205, no. 54r-v).

646 “dictus Petrus Antonius dedit cessit et tradidit dicto Martineto apotecam unam positam in burgis Chii in contracta Tripoli Campana” (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Agostino Foglietta/Agostino de Via, Filza 1205, no. 54r-v). The district of Tripoli Campana seems to have been a fairly important district of Chios town in the fifteenth century, because it appears relatively often in the notarial registers. Philip Argenti has commented that the district must have been centrally located, because he has found several notarial acts proving that at least part of forum, or bazaar, was situated “in the place called Tripoli Campana” (Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, I:541). 647 Philip Argenti also made an assertion to this effect. He based this assertion on the fact that he found an act from the 1460s, in which Nicolaus de Trani quondam Antonio leased to a baker, Giorgio de Confortio, a house with a balcony, together with a shop and oven, in Tripoli Campana. (Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, I:541).
emancipation of sons, were two ways that fathers accomplished this end on Genoese Chios. The above examples help to illustrate how fathers used these legal provisions to benefit their own households. This included, in the case of both grants, facilitating their sons’ ability to participate legally in court proceedings, to engage licitly in trade or business, and also to receive a cash payment, for whatever reason. Fathers also used these instruments, however, to provide for their households’ futures, by granting their sons the legal status required to manage and/or dispose of household money and property. This may have meant granting a minor the legal authority to receive a dowry from his future wife’s family, or emancipating a son in order to ensure the legality of a property transfer. There were, in either case, many circumstances that could necessitate the movement of wealth from a father to a son within the lifetime of the father, and the granting of the “concession of age” to a minor or the emancipation of a son facilitated the achievement of this end.

The Marriage of Daughters

The marriage of a daughter was another occasion that changed the social dynamic of a household. It obviously signified a withdrawal of one of the household’s members
from the family unit, just as we have seen was the case when a son was emancipated from the potestas of his father. But, in addition to this, it also meant a diminution of that household's patrimony in the amount of the dowry that the father gave to his daughter as she took up residence with her new husband. In the previous section the evidence demonstrated that, in certain cases, fathers used emancipation to ensure that their sons would leave the household with some form and amount of property with which to begin living independent lives. This section will demonstrate even more clearly that the fathers of Genoese Chios provided their daughters with a significant portion of money and/or property with which to begin their lives in the household of their new husbands.

The wife almost always went to live with her new husband. It was extremely rare for a husband to join the household of his new bride's family. It was so rare, in fact, that among the sixty-six marriage contracts contained in Appendix C, there is only one occasion when it happened. This highly unusual arrangement was recorded on 24 October 1460, when Adamate, filia quondam Ambroxii de Mediolano et uxor Pauli Dulcis, acknowledged the receipt from her relative, Petrus de Zoalio, of a
house in the town of Neochóri.\textsuperscript{648} She then continued by agreeing to honor the condition of the gift that she and Paulus would not move into said house for the period of one year, during which time they would live with Petrus, who agreed to provide for all of their needs.\textsuperscript{649} It is not clear from the marriage contract exactly why this condition was placed on Paulus and Adamate, perhaps the motivation involved the circumstances surrounding the death of Adamate’s father, Ambroxius, Adamate’s age, or even the time needed for Paulus to complete his apprenticeship in Petrus’ trade, whatever that may have been. All that is clear is that whatever the situation might have been, it was extraordinary enough for this family to deviate from the practice of traditional social relations.

The marriage contracts of Genoese Chios mention two overarching categories of property connected to marriage: the dowry \textit{(dos)} and the counterdower \textit{(antefactum)}. This does not in any way mean, however, that these two types of property receive an equal measure of treatment within the contracts. The dowry, in fact, receives the vast

\textsuperscript{648} Neochóri was a village located directly south of the city of Chios, and is not to be confused with a similarly named district of the city itself, Neocorio (Argenti, \textit{The Occupation of Chios}, 1:537).

majority of the attention and is clearly the focus of the documents. The husband’s reciprocal gift to his wife, on the other hand, receives very little space on average, and is sometimes merely tacked on to the end of the contract with little more recorded than the husband’s promise to provide his wife with an antefactum of an unspecified amount in accordance with Genoese law. This lack of information makes it fitting, therefore, to discuss the practice of counter-dowering on Chios before turning to dowing.

The Leges Genuenses not only made provisions for a wife to bring a marriage gift to her new husband in the form of a dowry, they also indicated that the husband should reciprocate the gesture to his new wife by presenting her with a counter-dowry, which the Genoese referred to as a donatio propter nuptias, or much more regularly as an antefactum. The practice was not unique to Genoa, but widespread around the Mediterranean, and had, in its origins, represented the purchase of a

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650 Such is the case on 24 March 1394, for example, when Nicolaus Francus quondam Georgii Carvegni Franci acknowledged receipt of his new bride Marieta’s dowry of 250 Chian perpers and then reciprocated by promising to provide her with a counterdower of an unspecified amount “according to the laws of Genoa.” The original Latin reads as follows: “Et fecit dictus Nicolaus antefactum sive donacionem propter nupcias dicte Mariete secundum morem et formam capitulorum civitatis Ianue” (Published in Michel Balard, ed., Notai genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Chio da Donato di Chiavari (17 Febbraio-12 Novembre 1394) [Genoa: Università di Genova, 1988], no. 17, 58-60).

651 For the following discussion of the Genoese antefactum, I have used Epstein, Wills and Wealth in Medieval Genoa, 104; and Diane Owen Hughes, “From Brideprice to Dowry in Mediterranean Europe” Journal of Family History 3, 3 (1978): 283-4.
wife by her groom.\textsuperscript{652} The influence of Lombard law on early medieval Genoa made it customary in the city for brides to command a marriage gift valued at a fixed fraction of their own dowry value, the most common amount being one-third, or tercia.\textsuperscript{653} A consular decree repealed the right of Genoese wives to a marriage gift equaling one-third of the dowry in 1143, however, despite the objections this seem to have raised among women.\textsuperscript{654} The Genoese had adopted, by the High Middle Ages, a system by which the amount of a husband’s counter-dowry was to be decided by the two families involved in the marriage. The city’s laws clearly defined the guidelines for grooms to follow when donating \textit{antefacta} to their wives. The husband had the opportunity to settle on a particular amount in conjunction with his wife, but, if he did not do this, the law assumed that the \textit{antefactum} would amount to half the dowry value, provided the dowry was less than 200 \textit{lire}. If his wife’s dowry exceeded 200 \textit{lire}, then the \textit{antefactum} should be no more than 100 \textit{lire}.\textsuperscript{655}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{652} Hughes, “From Brideprice to Dowry,” 266.
\item \textsuperscript{653} Hughes, “From Brideprice to Dowry,” 270.
\item \textsuperscript{654} The anguish that this decree seems to have inflicted upon the women of Genoa was captured in a famous illustration contained in the manuscript of the city’s chronicler, Caffaro, which depicts two women wailing with arms raised in dismay (Hughes, “From Brideprice to Dowry,” 277).
\item \textsuperscript{655} “Premortua uxore, lucretur maritus ipso facto de dotibus tantum quantum ipse constituisset pro antefacto uxoris; que pari modo, viro premortuo, tantum lucretur in bonis mariti; et si antefactum non fuerit constitutum expresse, lucretur maritus pro dotibus uxoris premortue et e contra [uxor] de bonis mariti premortui tantum quantum pro antefacto constitutum esse presumitur.”
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
It does not however appear that the Genoese followed these guidelines rigorously when assigning amounts to their antefacta in the High and Late Middle Ages. Steven A. Epstein has found that the antefactum usually equaled one-half of its corresponding dowry amount in late twelfth-/early thirteenth-century Genoa, although it could vary from much more to much less than this amount. Diane Owen Hughes, in a western Mediterranean-wide study of dowry and counter-dowry practices, has also noted this wide-ranging variation in the values of Genoese antefacta in the Late Middle Ages. It is furthermore interesting to note that, in terms of the relationship between the values of Genoese dowries and antefacta, a similar pattern emerged from both scholars’ research. Epstein stated his impression as follows: “The smaller the dowry, the more likely it was that the marriage gift was more than half; the reverse is true of the large (over L.200) dowry.” The values assigned to antefacta on Genoese Chios largely conform to this pattern.

Quod antefactum, quando non fuerit constitutum expresse, intelligatur et presumatur esse, si dotes fuerint de libris ducentis vel abinde infra, tantum quantum fuerit medietas dotium; si vero dos fuerit a libris ducentis supra usque in quantitatem quamtambient, sit et intelligatur antefactum esse libre centum ianuinorum et non ultra” (Leges Genuenses, col. 879, Quantum vir lucetur uxore defunct, et de presumione antefacti).

Epstein, Wills and Wealth in Medieval Genoa, 104.
Hughes, “From Brideprice to Dowry,” 283-4.
Epstein, Wills and Wealth in Medieval Genoa, 104.
It is evident that Genoese families brought with them the practice of counter-dowingering to Chios, and, by the dawn of the fifteenth century, the practice had become a well-established custom on the island among Genoese and Greek burghers alike.\textsuperscript{659} Among sixty-six marriage contracts drawn up between the years 1394 and 1495, forty mention gifts from the groom or the groom's family to either the father of the bride or the bride herself, but only thirty-three of these forty actually specify the exact gift.\textsuperscript{660} The amounts of these thirty-three antefacta vary widely, ranging from an amount as little as the 80 Chian florins that Iohanes de Luna

\textsuperscript{659} It is surprising, given the frequency with which they appear in the Genoese notarial records, that I have only been able to find two instances where a Jew concluded a dowry-related transaction. I have recorded these transactions in Appendix C. In the first, a Jewish burger of Chios, Benedictus de Ologar, added 100 gold ducats to the original amount of his wife Druda's dowry, an amount that he had already promised to return to her in his will. Benedictus offered no explanation as to why he had decided to augment Druda's inheritance in this way, except that he was doing so "in appreciation for services she had rendered to him." Perhaps it was the unusual nature of the act that had motivated him to make it public record with Genoese authorities, rather than only record it with a Jewish notary, as he presumably had already done. The second occurrence is much less complicated: on 1 September, 1484, Michael Cobedi (ebreus) promised to pay to Eliashim Ceffano (ebreus) the amount of 100 Chian perpers within two years as the dowry of his daughter, and Eliashim's wife, Angela (Paola Piana Toniolo, ed., Notai genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Chio da Gregorio Panissaro (1403-1405) [Genoa: Accademia Ligure di Scienze e Lettere, 1995], no. 109, 157-8; and ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Domenico de Algario/Niccolo Torriglia, Filza 944, no. 478r, respectively).

\textsuperscript{660} See Appendix C for a list of these sixty-six marriage contracts. In order to limit confusion and to avoid the cumbersome task of listing numerous archival references when citing numerous marriage contracts in Appendix C, I will henceforth identify each by only listing the bride's name and the date of the contract. I will continue to cite the full archival reference when addressing only a few contracts at a time.
promised to his wife, Nicolosia on 25 March 1394, to as much as the Egregius Bartholomeus Iustinianus de Franchis’ gift of 4500 Chian ducats to his wife, Evangelia. In almost all of these cases, the amount of the antefactum is one-half its corresponding dowry amount or less, regardless of the dowry’s size. It thus appears that Genoese husbands on Chios, just like their compatriots back home, frequently deviated from the letter of Genoese law when offering their brides an antefactum, perhaps even more so. This is not as surprising as one might think, however, because late medieval dowry inflation had, by the fourteenth century, made a 200 lire dowry not nearly as unusual as it must have been when the Genoese enacted this law.

The marriage contracts rarely offer any information about these antefacta beyond their value, thus leaving some question as to whether it was customary to make the gift in the form of moveable or immovable property. The city statutes of Genoa make no mention of which type of property constituted a legal antefactum, but it must have

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662 ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Agostino Foglietta/Agostino de Via, Filza 1205, no. 293, 23 October 1495
663 There are, in fact, only four instances in which the husband provides his wife with an antefactum larger than one-half of the dowry amount: Perpetua, 30 July 1394; Barbarina, 5 February 1398; Erini Pandeveni, 27 November 1408; Bartholomea, 8 July 1460; Argentina, 9 November 1464.
664 For a discussion of rising dowry values in the thirteenth through fifteenth centuries, see Hughes, "From Brideprice to Dowry," 284.
been the case that the husband's marriage gift to his
wife almost always consisted of moveable goods. The
Leges Genuenses state that if a wife died before her
husband, he was entitled to retain from her dowry the
amount he had given to her as a marriage gift, but, if a
husband died before his wife, she then retained this
amount.\textsuperscript{[665]} It does not seem probable, given this
situation, that a husband would risk permanently losing a
portion of his household's immoveable property to his
wife or wife's family in the event that he predeceased
her; the more appropriate arena in which to order and
distribute definitively this type of property was the
testament.

The information contained in the marriage contracts
seems to fit with this interpretation. On only two
occasions do the contracts record any information at all
about the contents of the antefacta, and in both
instances only immoveable property is specified. On 27
May 1394, Nicola de Guiso, an inhabitant of Chios acting
in the name of his son, Antonius, acknowledged the
receipt of 600 gold perpers as the dowry for his son's

\textsuperscript{[665]} "Premortua uxore, lucretur maritus ipso facto de dotibus tantum
quantum ipse constituisset pro antefacto uxoris; que pari modo, viro
premortuo, tantum lucretur in bonis mariti; et si antefactum non
fuerit constitutum expresse, lucretur maritus pro dotibus uxoris
premortue et e contra [uxor] de bonis mariti premortui tanium quantum
pro antefacto constitutum esse presumitur" (Leges Genuenses, col.
879, Quantum vir lucretur uxore defunct, et de presuntione
antefacti).
wife, Salvaiga, who was the daughter of the late Iohanes de Alpe, formerly an inhabitant Pera. Nicola then acknowledged that he promised to Salvaiga not only an antefactum “secundum formam capitullorum civitatis Ianue,” but also a vineyard located on Chios in the neighborhood of Sigero as security for said antefactum. This is the only occasion on which a husband or member of a husband’s family offered actual security for a promised antefactum, beyond the standard legal formulae appearing in notarial contracts of this type, and the distinction Nicola made between the antefactum proper and its security is telling. Nicola’s offer of security for a customary Genoese antefactum in the form of immoveable property is a good indication that these antefacta usually consisted of moveable goods. If common practice were to offer the bride an antefactum consisting of immoveable property, why did Nicola not simply gift the vineyard to Salvaiga? The probable explanation is that Nicola felt comfortable offering immoveable goods only because he knew that it was a

666 Hardly anything is known about the neighborhood of Sigero, including its location. The undisputed expert on the topography of Chios during its occupation by the Genoese, Philip Argenti, tried unsuccessfully to locate it, remarking that this district of Chios Town was “unidentified” (Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, I:539).
temporary measure to appease Salvaiga and her family until his son finalized the details of the arrangement himself.

The second occasion on which a marriage contract provides information on the contents of an antefactum also mentions immovable goods, and is a much more illuminating document than the first. On 23 October 1495, the Egregius Bartholomeus Justinianus de Franchis acknowledged receipt of 4500 Chian ducats from Baptista Justinianus as the dowry of his wife, Evangelia filia Baptiste. Bartholomeus continued by reciprocating with an antefactum valued at 2250 Chian ducats, larger by far than any other, which he had delivered in the form of a house with a garden located in the castro of Chios and also a share in the Mahona of Chios. The first case discussed above only included immovable property as security for a customary Genoese antefactum, but, for the first and only time in the marriage contracts, Bartholomeus clearly specified that a portion of his marriage gift had consisted of immovable goods. It was an action that must have been considered important, and probably rare, enough for the notary to record it for posterity, but it also makes sense that Bartholomeus

668 "Dictus Bartholomeus fecit sibi antefactum et donationem propter nuptias de domo cum orto locata in Chio in castro et loca quindecim comperarum Mahone Chii" (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Agostino Foglietta/Agostino de Via, Filza 1205, no. 293v, 23 October 1495).
would have thought it wise to make such a permanent and valuable gift a matter of public record. It is also important to note that the recipient of this immoveable property was not a member of just another elite Chian family, but was a Justinianus, just like Bartholomeus. If the Justiniani are construed as an extended family group or household, as I discussed earlier in this chapter, then Bartholomeus' gift of immoveable property becomes much less bold than it might have first appeared. He was, in one sense, merely redistributing this property within the same, albeit extended, household.

Marriage contracts provide some valuable information about grooms' marriage gifts to their wives, but they are most valuable for illuminating the practice of dowering. The bride never relinquished legal ownership of the dowry, even after transferring its possession to her new husband. It was the husband's legal right to control and use the dowry for profit while he lived, but the law also made it his responsibility to preserve in full the dowry's value so that it could be returned to his wife in the event he should predecease her.669 The Leges Genuenses made it very clear that this was standard practice for the Genoese, and not even the passage of

669 This amount, of course, excludes the portion of the dowry that had been established at the beginning of the couple's marriage as the antefactum, of which he was legally entitled to retain possession in the event of his wife's death.
time should interfere with its fulfillment. The practice of returning the dowry to one’s widow was so deeply ingrained in the fabric of Genoese custom, in fact, that the city’s law makers found it necessary to disabuse anyone of the expectation that a dowry would even be returned to a widow whose family had never provided one in the first place!

Genoese practice on Chios seems to have mirrored that of the home city. The acknowledgement that the bride never relinquished legal ownership of the dowry is well illustrated, interestingly enough, in a notarial deed acknowledging a debt for some purchased cloth. On 4 April 1449, a Greek resident of Chios, Manoli Stratigopolus of Constantinople, confessed his debt of 57 ducats and 7½ zigliati to Visconte Iustinianus for the purchase of some cloth. This seemingly mundane acknowledgement of debt becomes of much greater interest when Manoli continued by producing his wife, Comeneni, to outline how her husband had come by the money he intended

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670 "Si contingerit aliquam mulierem stare in domo mariti premortui cum filiis suis non exigendo dotes in bonis mariti, liceat ipsi mulieri aut eius heredibus petere dotes et raciones suas et exigere et habere debere in bonis mariti premortui vel heredum, non obstante alciuius temporis prescriptione vel taciturnitate" (Leges Genuenses, cols. 857, De petendis dotibus, non obstante mora facta in domo mariti premortui).

671 "Statuimus...quod aliqua mulier vel habens causam ab ea non possit petere dotes eius, quantuncumque de dotibus appareat publicum instrumentum, si dotes non fuerint solute, quod per instrumentum contracarte probetur. Ita quod ubi instrumentum contracarte non appareat, dotes possint exigi, et si pro parte restent ad solvendum, pro parte que restet petere nem posseit." (Leges Genuenses, cols. 857, Quod dotes non solute non possint peti).
to use to repay his debt:

Knowing that all the goods of her said husband Manoli are mortgaged and bound for the rights of her dowry and antefactum, and knowing that her said husband Manoli has promised to the said Lord Visconte that she would renounce the rights of her dowry and antefactum, because otherwise the said Lord Visconte would not have bought the said cloth, she has therefore renounced and does renounce, freely and with certainty of mind, for the above written the amount of money of the said debt from her said dowry and antefactum. 672

It is interesting to note that Comeneni explicitly stated that the debtor in this transaction, the Genoese Visconte Iustinianus, knowing that Manoli was planning to pay for the cloth with a portion of her dowry, would not have done business with him without Manoli’s promise to have his wife renounce legally the purchase price. Comeneni’s renunciation of this money was vital to the legality of the transaction, because the amount was by law her property, even if Manoli temporarily controlled it. There is also evidence that the husband’s legal responsibility to return his wife’s dowry to her family upon her death was known and, at least on occasion, fulfilled. In fact, this very event took place on 13 February 1460, when Ratonus Corsus made it public

672 “Sciens quod sua omnia bona dicti Manoli viri sui sunt sibi ipotechata et obligate pro iuribus dotis suarum et antefacti et sciens quod...dictus Manoli vir suus promissit dicto Domino Visconti...ipsa renunclarentur iuribus dotis suarum et antefacti quia alter dictus Dominus Visconte non vendidisset dictos pannos ideo sponte et mentis certa renuncavit et renunciat pro super scripta quante pecunie dicte debite dicte dote suarum et antefacto” (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 847, no. 57r, 4 April 1449).
knowledge that he had paid Paulus de Savignone 805 Chian ducats, which was the amount of his deceased wife Isabella’s dowry.\textsuperscript{673}

The father of the bride paid the vast majority of dowries on Genoese Chios from his own property. This was in fact the case in forty-four of the fifty-seven marriage contracts that specified the dowry’s provider, or seventy-seven percent of the time. This percentage is deceivingly low, however, because in all of the thirteen remaining cases when a dowry was paid by someone other than the bride’s father, the contracts make it clear that the father had died at an earlier date.\textsuperscript{674} It was common on occasions such as this for close relatives to make arrangements for the bride’s dowry, who were thus probably acting in the capacity of the deceased fathers’ executors, but this was not always the case.\textsuperscript{675} Four marriage contracts record the payment of dowries by men

\textsuperscript{673} ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, no. 268r-v, 13 February 1460. Husbands’ practice of returning their wives’ dowries to them in their wills will be discussed in much more detail in the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{674} Maria, 1405; Anna, 1457; Primeflore, 1458; Peretta, 1459; Bartholomea, 1460; Benedicta, 1460; Orientina, 1461; Blanchinetta, 1461; Clareta, 1474; Blancheneta, 1488; Theodorina, 1488; Maria, 1489; Michelina, 1489.

\textsuperscript{675} On eight of the thirteen occasions when a bride’s father had died by the time of her marriage, a close relative stepped in to provide the dowry. On four occasions the relative was her mother: Maria, 1405; Primeflore, 1458; Benedicta, 1460; Blancheneta, 1488. On two occasions the relative was her sister: Bartholomea, 1460; Theodorina, 1488. Once the relative was her uncle (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Bernardo de Ferrari, Filza 764, no. 483r, 1 April 1461). Once the relative was her grandfather (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, no. 167r-v, 13 February 1460; and also published in Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, III: no. 274, 765-6).
who did not appear to have any familial relationship to the bride. There is also an interesting case illustrating the close, even familial, bond that could develop between a household’s kin and non-kin members. On 10 December 1461, Marius Capaci us quondam Thome acknowledged having received from the recently deceased Iacobus de Capua the sum of 60 Genoese lire as the dowry of his daughter, Bianchinetta, who was formerly the servant of Thomas and now the wife of Marius. The most unique of all dowry payments was without question that of Franciscus Tonsus, burgensis Fiorentiniorum et ad presens habitator Chii, who, on 31 October 1475, made his arrangements a matter of public record. He recognized having received an amount of cash and other goods totaling 125 Chian ducats as the dowry of Maria, who he described as both his daughter and wife, and to whom he then returned an antefactum of 25 Chian ducats.

676 ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, no. 132r, 1 July 1459; ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Antonio Foglietta, Filza 843, no. 102r-v, 24 February 1474; ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Agostino Foglietta/Agostino de Via, Filza 1205, no. 235r, 8 April 1489; ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Domenico de Algario/Niccolo Torriglia, Filza 944, no. 212r-v, 24 September 1489.

677 “pro dotibus et matrimonio dicti Bianchinette filie quondam Iacobi de Capua olim serve Thome patris dicti Marii” (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Bernardo de Ferrari, Filza 764, no. 859r, 10 December 1461).

678 “Frachischus Tonsus burgensis Fiorentiniorum et ad presens habitator Chii qui confessus fuit...et recognovit michi notariio infrascripto tamquam persone publice stipulante et recipient nomine et vice Marie fille et uxoris dicti Francisci se habuisse et recepisse a dicta Maria computorum auro argento vestibus et aliis rebus et bonis ac pecunia numerate valorem ducatorum centum vigenti quinque monte Chii pro dotibus et patrimonio dicte Marie” (ASG, Notai
Franciscus did not specify with whom he had transacted these payments, but presumably it was with himself.679

The dowry was paid to the husband in all sixty-six cases, and in one of several different monies of account, by far the most common of which was the Chian ducat.680

The marriage contracts also regularly include some sort of information about both the dowry provider and the husband beyond merely their names, such as their titles of rank or occupations. This information, taken together with the dowry values, makes it possible to establish the range of dowry values typical for a given social level on Chios. The correlation between dowry value and social rank has been established elsewhere by historians of both medieval Genoa, such as Diane Owen Hughes,681 and other

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679 This is, of course, only one interpretation of the evidence. It is equally, perhaps even more, plausible that the notary has simply omitted the name of Maria’s father by mistake, which, were it present, would customarily appear directly after “filie” in the above quotation.
680 The dowries were also assigned in a variety of other currencies, both Chian and Genoese, but with much less frequency than the Chian ducat. Thirty-eight of the sixty dowries that specify an exact dowry value were assigned in ducats, while twenty dowries were assigned in some other currency, whether it is the Chian perper, the Peran perper, the Chian florin, the Barcelonan florin, or the Genoese lira. The remaining two dowries consisted of a combination of these currencies: Barcelonan florins and gold ducats; and Chian gold ducats and Genoese lira.
681 “The medieval Mediterranean dowry...almost from its beginnings, then, formed part of a status, rather than an inheritance system. Only where status concerns were minimal - as, for instance, among Genoa’s petty artisans - did dowry resemble natural inheritance; and there, since it was part of a balanced marriage settlement in which the husband’s contribution remained so important, it is probably misleading to speak of ‘dotal marriage’” (Hughes, “From Brideprice to Dowry,” 290).
regions of the Mediterranean, such as Noël Coulet, who found a similar correlation in fifteenth century Provence. The value of individual dowries naturally fluctuated according to factors such as the wealth of the bride’s family and the bargaining power of her father, but there is still enough evidence available to allow for some reasonable assertions about typical dowry values of elite and non-elite Genoese families on Chios. Sorting the dowry values according to social rank is also a useful aid in identifying the social level of those dowry providers and husbands who did not do so themselves in the marriage contracts.

It is easiest to gain some sense of the typical dowry value for the ruling elite residents on Chios, because, by the late fourteenth century, all of the prominent Genoese families who participated in ruling the island through the Mahona had adopted a common surname, Giustiniani (Iustinianus), to create a Genoese-style albergo, or group of allied families. Taking this action, however, did not mean that these individuals

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682 Coulet points out that the dowry amount for noble daughters was, on average, higher than the other social classes of Provence, but not significantly so, thus any correlation between dowry values and social classes must be made with caution (Noël Coulet, “Dot et société en Provence au XVe siècle: une approche quantitative” in Sources of Social History: Private Acts of the Late Middle Ages, Paolo Brezzi and Egmont Lee, eds. [Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1984], 105-29, esp. 117-24).

683 The wording here is based on a phrase found in Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, 1:457-8.

684 See pages 302-5 of this chapter for a discussion of this unusual action taken by these prominent Genoese families living on Chios.
forever jettisoned any and all association with their traditional family names in favor of Iustinianus; instead, they almost always chose to use both names, such as Franciscus Iustinianus de Campis or Ambrosius Iustinianus de Garibaldo. It is therefore possible, using these self-identifications, to determine a rough range of dowry values for the ruling elite. Fourteen of the sixty-six dowry providers identify themselves, or can be identified, as Iustiniani, and twelve of these fourteen specify an exact dowry value, all but one of which was assigned in Chian ducats. Many of these dowries were well in excess of 1000 Chian ducats, such as on 17 June 1460, when Zaccaria Iustinianus acknowledged the receipt of his wife Catochia’s dowry of 4500 Chian ducats from her late father, Iacobus Iustinianus de Forneto. But, the highest value of any elite dowry by far was that of Blancheneta, filia quondam Francisci Iustiniani, whose mother, Batestina, on 28 August 1488, gave a sum of 8000 Chian ducats to her daughter’s husband, Dominus Domenicus Iustinianus quondam

685 Angelina, 7 November 1408; Salvaiga, 1 October 1453; Benedicta, 1 February 1454; Primeflore, 13 May 1458; Bartolomea, 21 July 1458; Catochia, 17 June 1460; Isolta, 31 August 1463; Iohanneta, 31 August 1486; Blancheneta, 28 August 1488; Theodorina, 5 September 1488; Evangelia, 23 October 1495.
686 ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, no. 396r, 17 June 1460.
The lowest value assigned to a dowry in this group, on the other hand, was, interestingly enough, also the only dowry of the twelve not assigned in Chian ducats, but instead in Genoese lire, and the first chronologically. On 30 July 1394, Franciscus Iustinianus de Campis provided his daughter, Perpetua, with a dowry of 800 Genoese lire, equivalent to 400 Chian ducats, the receipt of which was acknowledged by her husband, Iane Demerode quondam Philipi, burgensis Peyre et etatis veniam consecutus.

None of these dowry contracts offer any information as to what a “customary” dowry value may have been for a daughter of an Iustinianus household, but there is evidence that a determining factor in that value was the household from which the groom hailed. Half of all Iustiniani daughters appearing in the marriage contracts, i.e. seven out of fourteen, indeed married fellow Iustiniani men, all of whose dowry values are specified. The average of these seven dowry values is

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687 ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Domenico de Algario/Niccolo Torriglia, Filza 944, no. 479r-v, 28 August 1488.
688 The value of one Chian ducat hovered somewhere around two Genoese lire for the majority of the fifteenth century (Peter Spufford, Handbook of Medieval Exchange [London: Offices of the Royal Historical Society, 1986], 293).
690 The seven Iustinian brides who married an Iustinianus are as follows: Angelina, 7 November 1408; Catochia, 17 June 1460; Isolta, 31 August 1463; Iohanneta, 31 August 1486; Blancheneta, 28 August 1488; Theodorina, 5 September 1488; Evangelia, 23 October 1495.
a remarkably high 3982 Chian ducats, with all but one dowry being over 2000 Chian ducats.\textsuperscript{691} This average dowry value becomes even more remarkable when compared with the values of the dowries of the remaining seven Iustiniani daughters who married outside of the greater Iustinianus household, five of whose dowry values are specified.\textsuperscript{692} These brides took for their husbands a variety of men from varying social classes, ranging from the Greek nobility of Chios to the island's humble residents. On 4 November 1450, for example, Christoforus Iustinianus de Garibaldo gave 700 gold Chian ducats to the Greek nobleman Lazarus Argenti\textsuperscript{693} de Chio in recognition of his daughter Benedicta's marriage to the said Lazarus.\textsuperscript{694} Furthermore, the Iustiniani allowed their daughters to marry humble city dwellers, as was the case on 30 July 1394, when Jane Demerode quondam Philipi, a burgher of Pera, recognized his receipt of 800 Genoese lire from the agent of his wife Perpetua, filia Francisci Iustiniani de

\textsuperscript{691} On 7 November 1408, Angelina acknowledged the return of her dowry of 800 Chian ducats from her children, who were acting in their capacity of heirs of their late father, Iohannes Iustinianus de Furneto (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Giovanni Balbi, Filza 603, no. 379r, 7 November 1408).

\textsuperscript{692} The seven Iustiniani brides who did not marry an Iustinianus are as follows: Perpetua, 30 July 1394; Benedicta, 4 November 1450; Benedicta, 1 February 1454; Primeflore, 13 May 1458; Bartolomea, 21 July 1458; Peretta, 1 July 1459; Pantasilva, 9 February 1495.

\textsuperscript{693} The Argenti were a well established Greek noble family on Chios by the time Genoa took control of the island. Over the course of Genoa's 220 year rule of Chios, the Argenti family became closely related to the Iustiniani and other Genoese noble families living on the island (Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, I:594).

\textsuperscript{694} Published in Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, III: no. 169, 628.
The average value of this set of dowries is much lower than that of the Iustinianus-Iustiniana couples discussed above, coming in at 920 Chian ducats, and with only one of these five registering over 1000 Chian ducats.696

It is true that the sample size of these dowries is small, but it is still possible to draw some tentative conclusions from the evidence at hand. The most striking of them being that those Iustiniani fathers who offered their daughters to a fellow Iustinianus in marriage were likely to provide them with a dowry value four times greater than that of those Iustiniani daughters who married outside of the ruling elite. Why might this have been the case? Did the bride not always retain the amount of her dowry according to the law, whether while living in her husband’s household, or after his death when she was entitled by law to have her dowry amount returned to her? This is the legal truth, but these dowry providers had to make decisions about their households’ marriage gifts in the real world where the cash and goods were available for use in whatever manner

696 The one exception occurred on 13 May 1458, when Primeflore, daughter of the late Ambroxius Iustinianus de Rocha, delivered to her husband, Franciscus Gambonus, a sum of 1500 Chian ducats as her dowry (Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, no. 79r, 13 May 1458).
husbands chose. The end result must have been that the families of many widows never received their dowries back from the households of deceased husbands, whether this was due to the resources being tied up in some long-term business arrangement or simply to the greed of the husband’s heirs and relatives. The key factor determining the dowry value of many brides must have therefore been an estimation on the part of the dowry providers of how husbands would use the marriage gift, which is closely tied to the issue of how well they knew the husbands themselves. The Iustiniani were the ruling families of Chios, so closely tied together that they shared a common surname. Thus, when two Iustiniani married, it must have been an easier decision for the father of the bride to provide his daughter with a large dowry, because he both knew the groom and his family well and also could be fairly certain that however his new son-in-law put the marriage gift to use it would be in the best interest of his own family.

The other fifty-two marriage contracts represent the non-ruling element residing on Chios, of which forty-eight specify the exact dowry value. A combination of traditional Genoese patrician, mercantile non-aristocratic, and poor households make up this group of dowries, so it is not surprising that the values vary
widely. Nor is it surprising that, of the ten dowry values of this group greater than 700 Chian ducats, in other words those falling within the range of the ruling elite's dowries discussed above, either the bride or groom on six of those occasions hailed from a Genoese patrician or mercantile non-aristocratic family, while on two occasions brides married Iustiniani. In fact, the highest dowry value of this group was recorded on 27 December 1485/4, when Evangelista Iustinianus quondam Dolnitii acknowledged receipt of 2500 Chian ducats as the dowry of his wife, Blanchintta, from her father Iacobus de Campis. The remaining thirty-eight dowries are those of the moderately wealthy and poor households, or

697 Here I am borrowing the phrase "mercantile non-aristocratic family" from Quentin Van Doosselaere, who, in his recent book, established a list of those Genoese merchant families he considers to have been the most financially successful during the last quarter of the fourteenth and first half of the fifteenth centuries. He based his findings on several sources, including the extant customs records of 1376-7, the lists of the grand consilio of 1382 and 1396, and the city's tax assessment of 1414. Many of the family names on Van Doosselaere's list, not surprisingly, frequently appear in the notarial registers of Genoese Chios, such as Adurnus, Ardimentus, Bargalius, Bozzolus, Bracelis, Calcinaris, Campus, Cassali, Castilions, Coronatus, Corsus, Costa, Franchi, Goanus, Iustinianus, Longus, Monellia, Paterius, Podio, Recho, Sauli, Tarigu, Vignosus (Quentin Van Doosselaere, Commercial Agreements and Social Dynamics in Medieval Genoa [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009], 225-6).

698 Theodorina Paterius (married Antonius Ardimentus), 19 February 1405; Carentia de Podio (married Petrus de Via), 15 July 1405; Salvaiga Gatellusia olim de Porta (married Raffael Vegerius), 1 October 1453; Diamans Iosep (married Anfreonus Cataneus), 11 October 1456; Isabella Mastrozzi (married Rattone Corsus), 13 February 1460; Isotta Cellandia (married Luchinus de Porta), 22 June 1461.

699 Francepheta Manserri (married Andrea Iustinianus de Campis), 5 November 1484; Blanchintta de Campis (married Evangelista Iustinianus), 27 December 1485/4.

700 ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Domenico de Algario/Niccolo Torriglia, Filza 944, no. 472r-v, 27 December 1485/4.
those falling below 700 Chian ducats. Thirty of these thirty-eight dowry values fall somewhere above 100 Chian ducats, often times far exceeding this number, but clearly it appears that the poorest households were those that could not dower their daughters for this amount. The lowest dowry of all was that of Bianchinetta, filia quondam Iacobi de Capua olim serva Thome patris dicti Marii, whose husband, Marius Capaci quondam Thome, on 10 December 1461, acknowledged receipt of 30 Chian ducats from Iacobus Grecus for that purpose. It would thus appear that a former servant could not expect to command much of a dowry at all.

The contracts make it clear that the vast majority of dowry providers preferred to deliver the marriage gift in moveable property, which, as was discussed above, was also the husbands’ preferred form for the antefacta. In fact, out of sixty-three contracts that specify the form of the dowry, forty-nine of them consist entirely of moveable property, or seventy-eight percent, while only thirteen consist of some combination of moveable and immovable goods, or twenty-one percent. It is also

701 Eight households in all dowered their daughters for less than 100 Chian ducats: Barbarina, 5 February 1398; Isabella, 9 April 1405; Bartholomea, 8 July 1460; Lucia, 21 January 1461; Bianchinetta, 10 December 1461; Argentina, 9 November 1464; Teodora, 30 May 1470; Angela, 1 September 1484.
702 ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Bernardo de Ferrari, Filza 764, no. 859r, 10 December 1461.
703 There is one dowry among these sixty-three that is assigned entirely in immovable goods, but that will be discussed later in this chapter.
possible, from the wording of these contracts, to learn what kinds of moveable property the brides’ representatives offered in dowry. In almost all cases the dowry value consisted of some combination of cash and household objects such as furniture, jewels, silverware, beds and bed linens, clothing, and precious metal objects. There were also more exceptional arrangements, however, in which slaves were offered as at least partial payment for a bride’s dowry; this unusual form of payment occurred on three occasions.  

It was far less common for dowries to consist of immovable property, and rarer still for them to consist entirely of immovable property. In only fourteen out of sixty-three contracts, or twenty-two percent of the time, did dowry providers opt to include this type of property in the brides’ wedding gift, and even in these cases the immovable goods only made up part of the total dowry value. There is in fact only one case in which a dowry consisted of entirely immovable goods, which is recorded on 2 May 1481, when Petrus de Sancto Stephano offered to his future son-in-law, Iacobus Orvaletari, a dowry for

705 Nicolosia, 25 March 1394; Salvaiga, 27 May 1394; Maria, 30 October 1453; Teodora, 3 December 1453; Caterina, 5 February 1454; Anna, 10 March 1457; Adamate, 24 October 1460; Isotta, 22 June 1461; Teodora, 30 May 1470; Clareta, 24 February 1474; Mariola, 5 October 1484; 5 November 1484; Blancheneta, 28 August 1488.
his daughter, Francheta, which consisted of a house located in the Varvasi neighborhood of Chios' Campos, or the outlying area surrounding the town of Chios. It was furthermore most common for the immovable property to come in the form of buildings or houses, which was the case, for example, on 28 August 1488, when Batestina, filia quondam Domini Francisci Iustiniani et uxor quondam Domini Francisci Iustiniani quondam Domini Gabriellis, gave to Domenicus Iustinianus quondam Domini Valarani cash and property valued at 8000 Chian ducats as the dowry of her daughter and his wife, Blancheneta, part of which consisted of a large house with a courtyard located within the castro of Chios. This is in contrast with the very rare dowries that included immovable property in the form of land, of which there are only two examples, and neither of them even mentioned land located on Chios.

706 ASG, Notai Ignoti, Busta 53, 116r-v, 2 May 1481.
707 "domum magna et cortile... sita est intus castellum" (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Domenico de Algario/Niccolo Torriglia, Filza 944, no. 479r-v, 28 August 1488).
708 The first of these was drawn up on 5 February 1454, when the pharmacist (speciarius) Cosmas de Uvada de Elianis recognized having received as his wife Caterina's dowry (filia condam Raffaellis Cassine) 1000 perpers of Pera, which was paid by Dominus Thomas Spinula condam Gasparis in two installments totaling 825 perpers in cash and 175 perpers paid to Cosmas' brother, Adurninus, for a piece of land (terraticus) in Caffa. The second occurred on 10 March 1457, when Iohannes Bonichus de Vulturo (habitantur Chii), knowing that his granddaughter Anna had married Raffaele de Costa de Cuchurno, promised to give to Raffaele two houses, various lands, and moveable property as the dowry of Anna; the dowry value was left unspecified (Caterina, 5 February 1454; Anna, 10 March 1457, respectively).
It is impossible to know with any certainty what percentage of these dowries' values consisted of moveable or immoveable goods; marriage contracts from Chios regularly describe what type of property the dowries contained, but rarely itemize their contents. It is however a reasonable assumption that, given the infrequency with which the island's residents were willing or able to dower their daughters with immoveable property, the largest proportion of these dowries' values was made up of cash and/or precious metals. That this would have been the case on Chios is not especially surprising, because the practice mirrors the findings of historians studying other parts of the medieval Mediterranean world.\textsuperscript{709} A much more interesting finding emerges from an examination of when dowry providers on the island included immoveable property in their daughters' marriage gifts. Thirteen of the fourteen dowry providers who opted to dower their daughters with immoveable property hailed from the non-ruling element of the Chian population, and the vast majority from the moderately wealthy and poor classes.\textsuperscript{710} There is only one

\textsuperscript{709} Hughes has found for the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries an increasing preference on the part of fathers to dower their daughters predominantly with cash as an attempt effectively to disinherit them (Hughes, "From Brideprice to Dowry," 281).

\textsuperscript{710} The only two exceptions were: Raffus de Casali, who came from a mercantile non-aristocratic family, and Iohannes Baptista Lomellinus, a Genoese patrician (Nicolosia, 25 March 1394; and Teodora, 30 May 1470, respectively).
occasion when an Iustinianus father provided his daughter's husband with immoveable property, who, significantly, was also an Iustinianus. This arrangement was recorded on 28 August 1488, when Batestina, the widow of Dominus Franciscus Iustinianus, gave to Domenicus Iustinianus quondam Domini Valarani cash and property valued at 8000 Chian ducats as the dowry of her daughter and his wife, Blancheneta, part of which consisted of a large house with a courtyard located within the castro of Chios.\footnote{ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Domenico de Algario/Niccolo Torriglia, Filza 944, no. 479r-v, 28 August 1488.}

The general pattern that emerges here again matches that of Diane Owen Hughes, who sees the late medieval aristocratic preference for dowering daughters with moveable property as an attempt to retain the more valuable immoveable property within the family.\footnote{Hughes, "From Brideprice to Dowry," 281.} Indeed, in the particular case of the Iustiniani, here is another occasion on which an Iustinianus household retained significant personal assets by redistributing them within the structure of its larger extended family, but it is the only such known occurrence. The evidence in fact makes clear that only very rarely did the Iustiniani provide their daughters with dowries containing immoveable property, while, as we have seen above, they were much more willing to send them to their
husbands' households with substantial amounts of moveable property. The Iustiniani, together with the vast majority of wealthy households on Chios, thus clearly made a distinction between moveable and immovable goods when it came time to assign dowries to their daughters.

Conclusions

The venia aetatis, or "concession of age," and the full-fledged emancipation of a son from his or her father's legal and economic potestas were two privileges hardly ever requested of, or granted by, the office of the Podesta on fifteenth century Chios. When one of these grants was actually bestowed on a minor, however, the reason is almost always in the interest of bettering the household in some way. Many of the "concessions of age" provide only minimal amounts of information concerning the circumstances necessitating the concession, but those that do describe the reasons for the petition show that they could be useful for the augmentation of a household's wealth, as well as an effective facilitator of property transference from one generation of a household to another. The venia aetatis was thus a useful tool for imbuing a minor with the legal rights and privileges of majority, but it did have its limitations, namely it did not remove a son from
underneath his father's legal authority. This required an act of formal emancipation by the father, which bestowed on a son all the legal rights he enjoyed, such as the right to appear in court, conclude contracts of any kind, accumulate his own debt, and, perhaps most importantly, own and possess property. The control of property, and also its transference from one generation of a household to the next, was indeed an important familial concern, and, as we have seen, appeared as the most common motivation for a father to emancipate his son on Chios.

Fathers also transferred household property to their daughters when it came time for them to marry and begin their lives in the households of their new husbands. It was not unusual for fathers to dower their daughters with a significant portion of household property. The vast majority of dowry providers preferred to pay the dowry in moveable property, and mostly in cash and/or precious metals, which accorded with husbands' preference to deliver their brides' counter-dowries, or antefacta, in the same form. It was far less common for dowries to consist of immovable property, and rarer still for them to consist entirely of immovable property. Houses and buildings were by far the most common type of immovable property included in the dowries, with land of any kind
appearing very rarely. Furthermore, nearly all of those dowry providers who opted to dower their daughters with immoveable property hailed from the non-ruling element of the Chian population, and the vast majority of them came from the moderately wealthy and poor classes. It is very significant that the only occasion when an Iustinianus father provided his daughter’s husband with immoveable property the groom was also an Iustinianus.

The dowry value for daughters of the ruling elite was, on average, higher than the other social classes consisting of traditional Genoese patrician, mercantile non-aristocratic households, but the variation between the two is not significant enough to allow for any firm conclusions as to what a “customary” dowry value may have been for a daughter of the ruling class. There is evidence, however, that a determining factor in that value was the household from which the groom hailed. Iustiniani fathers who offered their daughters to a fellow Iustinianus in marriage were in fact likely to provide them with a dowry value four times greater than that of those Iustiniani daughters who married outside of the ruling elite. This suggests that the Iustiniani often acted to protect family property by largely distributing it internally.
Inheritance and Genoese Law

Concessions of age, emancipations, dowries, or any other type of act that made provisions for the immediate conveyance of a household’s property from one party to another are informative, but only tell half the story. They represent only those occasions in the course of everyday life when a household’s property was transferred between family members. It is indeed equally as important, from the standpoint of the patrimony’s movement into and out of the household, to examine those acts in which provisions were made for the long-term conveyance of a household’s property from one party to another. The clearest, and most abundant, example of these provisions are, of course, those made for surviving wives and children at the death of their husbands and fathers, respectively. These provisions made by heads of household almost always appear in their wills, and represent a point of comparison with those meant for immediate implementation.

The Genoese laws concerning inheritance, like those of Roman law which they closely followed, established
clear procedures for the disposal of one’s property in a will. It was the right of a testator to disperse of his or her property however he or she saw fit, but with the condition that one-fourth of this property had to pass to the testator’s heirs. Genoese law also established a clear hierarchy of the legal right that respective claimants’ had to a testator’s property: top priority went to the testator’s sons, followed by the testator’s daughters and brothers.\textsuperscript{713} The distribution of all or a portion of a given household’s property, as specified in the will of one of its members, was thus a relatively straightforward procedure. The household member, usually the husband, made his final wishes for the allotment of his property a matter of public record and legally valid by having a notary draw up his will, and his executor(s) would then make the necessary arrangements for the fulfillment of said wishes. What if, however, the head of a household died without having drawn up a will? This possibility must have been an especial concern for the citizens of a city such as Genoa, filled as it was with merchants and mariners whose vocations required frequent voyages into and across perilous waters. Perhaps it was due to their centuries of experience and frequent encounters with facing just such situations that the

Genoese law of intestacy was indeed so elaborate and complex. The law stated that the proper line of succession for someone dying intestate began with males descended only through males, and only if there was a complete lack of male descendents were daughters and their descendents, together with female descendents of any deceased sons, to succeed. The intention of the law was clear: to ensure that a household’s property remained in the control of the testator’s male descendents as much as possible.

The above rules of inheritance were wide-ranging, but not sufficient in and of themselves to cover all classes of Genoese. There were indeed a significant number of Genoese citizens not mentioned at all in these laws, namely those living outside of Genoa proper in the city’s numerous colonies scattered across the Mediterranean. It was clearly that the Commune had these Genoese in mind when it promulgated the law entitled De salvandis rebus defunctorum extra Januam, which, as its name suggests, concerned the property of Genoese citizens

714 “Statuimus et ordinamus quod si quis intestatus decesserit, masculus vel femina, succedant ei soli masculi liberis per masculinum sexum descendentes. Et si sint femine ex dicto defuncto vel ex descendente masculo ex eo, de legitimo matrimonio, vel descendentes masculi vel feminem ex fillabus pro defunctis cum dictis liberis masculis, que vel qui de iure comuni admitti deberent ad successionem cum dictis liberis masculis vigore presentis capituli, excludantur feminine et descendentes ex eis. Et tota hereditas dicti intestati decedentis ad dictos liberos masculos superstites defferatur” (Leges Genuenses, cols. 889-92, De successionibus ab intestato).
dying outside Genoa. The law stated that, just as in Genoa, a Genoese colonist had the right to dispose of his or her property as he or she wished. In the event that this was not done before the colonist died, however, the responsibility to settle the affairs of the household then fell to the colony’s head of government and his council. It was their responsibility to appoint two well-respected Genoese citizens and property holders (duos de melioribus civibus Ianue immobilia possidentibus) to act as executors for the estate, making sure that it passed to the rightful heirs intact. The law furthermore added that if two suitable Genoese citizens proved impossible to find, then two suitable members of the indigenous population were to be appointed instead (duos ex melioribus loci ubi decesserit Ianuensis).715 The temptation for the authorities simply to assume ownership of this floating property, in any event, must have been well known by the home government.

715 “Ut bona defuntorum civium et districtualium Ianue extra Ianuam et districtum morientium saniori via et meliori custodia valeant conservari heredibus et creditoribus ipsorum, statuimus et ordinamus quod, quotienscumque mori contigerit aliquem Ianuensem vel districtualem vel qui pro Ianuensi et districtuali vel habeatur, et non ordinaverit et disposuerit per quem vel quos ipsorum bona ibidem existentia salvari et custodiri debeant heredibus et creditoribus eorumdem, teneatur et debeat quilibet magistratus, Consul, Rector, Potestas, prout in dicto loco nominatus fuerit, una cum consilio suorum consiliariorum, statim post habitam de illius morte noticiam elligere duos de melioribus civibus Ianue immobilia possidentibus, si reperiri possint, si non, saltem mobilia; et, si cives Ianue non reperiantur, duos ex melioribus loci ubi decesserit Ianuensis” (Leges Genuenses, cols. 887-9, De salvandis rebus defunctorum extra Ianuam).
in Genoa, because it also promulgated a law that forbid just such a practice by colonial officials.\textsuperscript{716}

The fact that the island of Chios was a Genoese colony naturally made Genoa’s laws of inheritance applicable on the island, as well. But, the surviving documentation from Chios concerning inheritance is especially important, because it offers a unique opportunity to observe in detail how Genoa’s laws of inheritance were installed, upheld, and amended in a colonial setting. The laws of inheritance on Genoese Chios were in fact very similar to those promulgated in the law code of Genoa, thus illustrating that Genoese law prevailed on the island over local custom. An early piece of evidence for this is found in an anonymous letter written sometime around 1375 in Genoese dialect and addressed to Raffaele Paterius, in which the author outlines the established path of succession for property distribution on Chios.\textsuperscript{717} The letter’s author informed Raffaele that if someone was survived by sons, all of his

\textsuperscript{716} "Non possit nec debeat consul aliquis, vel potestas seu scriba, placerius seu nuncius, in diversis mundi partibus constituti, emere seu aquirere per se vel alium de aliquibus rebus quas incantari vel incalegari faciat; nec possit aliquis scriba vel placerius accipere, pro aliqua caliga quam faciat, ultra denarium unum per libram. Et si contrafactum fuerit in aliquo predictorum, debeat contrafaciens sindicari et condemnari in libris viginti quinque ianuinorum" (Leges Genuenses, cols. 596, Quod aliquis officialis in diversis mundi partibus non incantet res defuncti).

\textsuperscript{717} Philip Argenti gives the estimated date for the letter’s composition as 1375, but does not justify his selection of this year (Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, 1:451). For the text of the letter, see Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, 11:248-9.
or her property passed to them.\textsuperscript{718} If someone died
testate but without sons, however, his property was to be
disposed of as he saw fit among his father, mother,
brothers, grandfathers, or cousins, as long as a bequest
was made to the Signoria, or Genoese commune, otherwise
the testament was invalid.\textsuperscript{719} One-third of the deceased’s
estate, whether dying testate or intestate, was taken by
the Signoria, and the remaining two-thirds divided among
his or her surviving relatives, but if no relatives were
named, then among anyone named in the will.\textsuperscript{720}
Furthermore, the property of those people dying
intestate, but having neither parents nor relatives
surviving them, should pass to their husbands or wives,
respectively, after the Signoria had of course claimed
its third of the deceased’s estate.\textsuperscript{721} Finally, the
Signoria took total control of the property of any single

\textsuperscript{718} "...quella persona chi morisse e habia figi tuti li lor ben sum le
lor figi" (Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, II:248).
\textsuperscript{719} "Ma quello chi morisse e non hauesse figi e elo testasse e hauesse
paere e maire frai neui o coxin quello tal testamento se debe
autenticar in che modo ello testasse. Inter essi pocho o asai che
ello lassase ala Segnoria e se elo non lassase quello tal testamento
e anullao" (Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, II:248).
\textsuperscript{720} "E imperso de prender la Segnoria lo terso de tuto soche elo
hauesse E a quelo chi morisse sense testar semegieuementi la segnoria
dehauel lo terso de li soi beni e li doi tersi se partissam inter li
parenti de quello morto per la soa anima. E digo frai figi de frai e
coxim e claschum fin in quello grao che aperten parentao" (Argenti,
The Occupation of Chios, II:248).
\textsuperscript{721} "Se alcuna persona morisse sense testar e non hauesse antecessesoi
paire avo o bexavo succesoi figi neuj ne fraj coxin zermani o segondi
nj altri parenti proximi chi in quello caxo lo Mario de heredita la
moie, e semevegieuementi la moie de heredita lo mario. E la
segnoria prende lo terso" (Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, II:248-9).
person dying intestate with no relatives, but with the obligation of making some offering for the deceased’s soul.\textsuperscript{722}

There is also evidence that, by the mid-fifteenth century, the Genoese government felt it necessary to reevaluate and update Chios’ inheritance laws, although the reason(s) for this action remains unclear. On 12 June 1461, Quilicus and Paris Iustiniani submitted a lengthy report to the Signoria in which, after examining the laws of Chios concerning the disposal of the deceased’s property, they suggested seven amendments. First, the children of any man dying in a time of plague (\textit{tempore pestis}) should inherit all of his property, even if he had died intestate.\textsuperscript{723} Second, anyone recently deceased should have his inheritance distributed as established in his will, if he had bequeathed part of his property to the island’s authorities (\textit{dominationes}), and was also survived by a father, mother, brothers, sisters, nephews, nieces, or other relative up to the third degree. If this person had not made such a bequest, or had died intestate, then his relatives could inherit

\textsuperscript{722} "Se o scheisse che alcun non hauesse moie ni femena Mario che in quello caxo la segnoria de heredita tuto. E la segnoria debia dar per anima de quello morto" (Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, II:249).

\textsuperscript{723} "Et primo si continget tempore pestis aut ab inde citra et de cetero continget aliquem mori dimittentem post se filios uel filias quod ipsi filii uel fille hereditent omnia bona ipsius mortui licet decederet uel decessisset abintestato" (Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, II:249).
after paying 10 perpers to the authorities.\(^{724}\) Third, the will of anyone recently deceased and not having a relative up to the third degree would be considered valid if he had bequeathed a third of his property to the island’s authorities. If the deceased’s will did not contain this provision, or if he had died intestate, then the authorities inherited the entirety of his property.\(^{725}\)

Four, anyone who died before reaching the age of legal majority was to have his relatives up to the third degree as his heirs, as long as they paid 10 perpers to the island’s authorities. If the youth had no relatives falling into the above category, then the same authorities inherited all of his possessions.\(^{726}\)

\(^{724}\) “Si uero contingerit aliquem mori utsupra non dimittentem post se filios uel filias sed habeat patrem matrem fratres sorores nepotes neptes aut consanguineos usque in tercio gradu possint ipsi tales patres matres fratres sorores nepotes neptes neptes aut consanguinei usque in tercio gradu utsupra hereditare ipsum talem mortuum hac tamen conditione quod testando dimitterat dominationi aliquam partem bonorum suorum. Si uero testando non dimitteret aliquid dominationi uel decederet abintestato tunc ipsi tales heredes uel heres teneantur dare dominationi de omnibus bonis dicti mortui perperos decem reliquum uero dictorum bonorum sit et spectet dicto heredi uel heredibus superius nominatis” (Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, II:249-50).

\(^{725}\) “Et quia continget uel contingit aliquem mori absque ullo herede ipsi parentela et affinitate coniuncto usque in tercio gradu utsupra quod fecerit testamentum intelligatur tale testamentum ualidum et autenticum hac tamen conditione quod testando dimitterat dominationi tertiam partem omnium bonorum suorum quod si non fecerit uel non fecisset aut decederet uel decesisset ab intestate tunc et eo casu omnia bona ipsius mortui perueniant et peruenisse intelligentur in dominationem” (Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, II:250).

\(^{726}\) “Item si contingerit aliquem mori et non esset etatis possendi testare eo casu intelligatur quod heres uel heredes sui usque in tercio gradu ut supra sint obligati solummodo soluere dominationi perperos decem habendo heredes utsupra et non habendo heredes omnia perueniant in dominationem” (Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, II:250).
any husband or wife who died without heirs could have his or her spouse as heir, as long as the island’s authorities received one-third of the deceased’s possessions.  

Six, the island’s authorities became the sole heir of anyone dying without a wife, husband, or other heir(s), with the condition that they make some sort of monetary contribution for the good of the deceased’s soul (pro anima sua), which commonly manifested itself in the form of funeral costs, buying prayers or masses, or some combination of these things.

Finally, the island’s authorities ensured that any family would only have to pay the fee of 10 perpers once by adding that if any heir, brother, or sister, died while still a minor, and thus were incapable of making a will, the other heirs, brothers, or sisters were allowed to inherit from the deceased without having to pay the authorities anything at all.

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727 "Item si contingerit aliquem virum uel mulierem mori sine heredibus ut supra, si vir haberet uxorem uel mulier haberet maritum possit maritus hereditare uxorem et uxor maritum et quod dominatio habeat terciam partem omnium bonorum suorum" (Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, II:250).

728 "si uero mortuus non haberet uxorem uel mulier non haberet maritum nec heredes ut supra omnia bona ipsius mortui perueniant in dominationem et dominatio teneatur dare pro anima sua in discretione sua" (Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, II:250).

729 "Insuper dicimus et exclaramus ac volumus non obstante supradicta quod si aliquid heres sive heredes aut fratres sive sorores in pluri numero qui tunc fuissent sive sint in futurum et tunc mortuus fuisse aut in futuro moreretur aliquid ex ipsis qui non fuissent etatis possendi testare quod non sint obligati nec in aliquo teneantur soluere dominatione. Imo unus debeat hereditare alterum et alter alium successivae ita quod contingendo omnes heredes mori quod non teneantur nec obligati sint nisi pro unica siue sola solutione unius
Genoa's laws concerning inheritance, whether promulgated in the city proper or on Chios, established clear procedures for the disposal of both testate and intestate Genoese citizens' property after their deaths. These laws provided the Genoese with a wide array of possible natural heirs, but one particular family member is conspicuously absent from nearly all lines of succession established in said laws: widows. It would indeed appear that widows did not have the support to inherit much of anything, at least by law. The law did stipulate that it was the right of widows to repossess in full their dowries' values in the event of their husbands' deaths, but this was minimal legal protection for them if their husbands had not made additional provisions for them in their wills. The wills from Genoese Chios, however, demonstrate that it was common practice for husbands to provide for their wives beyond the legal minimum in widowhood, especially if it did not diminish their households' patrimonies by doing so.

persone tantum siue heredis unius cum quanto sint plures heredes in numero habendo tamen ipsi tales heredes usque in tercio gradu ut superius dictum et exclaratum est qui teneantur et obligati sunt ipsi tales heredes solvere dominationi perperos decem prodico siue dictis talibus qui non fuissent etatis possendi testare” (Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, II:250).

730 "Si contingerit aliquam mulierem stare in domo mariti premortui cum fillis suis non exigendo dotes in bonis mariti, liceat ipsi mulieri aut eius heredibus petere dotes et raciones suas et exigere et habere debere in bonis mariti premortui vel heredium, non obstante alicuius temporis prescriptione vel taciturnitate” (Leges Genuenses, cols. 857, De petendis dotibus, non obstante mora facta in domo mariti premortui).
The Dowry

Widows had the legal right to expect the full return of their dowries' in the event of their husbands' deaths, as was discussed in the previous section.\textsuperscript{731} It might therefore seem unnecessary for husbands to specify such an arrangement in their wills; indeed, perhaps this explains why some married men's wills make no mention of their wives' dowries whatsoever. The wills from fifteenth century Genoese Chios, however, makes it clear that on many occasions husbands deemed it necessary to make specific provisions for the return of their wives' dowries. Many men, in fact, even went beyond this, providing more for their wives in widowhood beyond just their dowries; the reality of the situation was that the provisions a man made for his wife in the event of his death varied widely on Chios.\textsuperscript{732} There were those husbands who simply returned their wives' dowries to them as a matter of course and with no provisos. There were other husbands who made additional gifts to their wives beyond merely their dowries, mostly in the form of cash. There were still other husbands who promised to return

\textsuperscript{731} See page 373 of this chapter.
\textsuperscript{732} The wills of forty-five men are extant from Chios between the years 1394 and 1499, twenty-one of whom were married men and three of whom were widowers. Nine of the twenty married men came from the ruling and wealthy elite, while twelve were of more humble means.
their wives' dowries to them, as well as to provide them with additional cash, if they adhered to certain conditions meant to keep these dowries in the household of the husbands' heirs. There were even a few husbands who appointed their wives principal heirs, thus negating the legal necessity of returning their dowries. It is the purpose of this section to suggest some reasons why husbands chose the course of action they did regarding their wives' dowries.

The wills from Chios demonstrate that a husband's desire to return his wife's dowry to her upon his death was a relatively straightforward and quite common business. Twenty-one of the forty-five men from fifteenth-century Genoese Chios were married at the time of their wills' redactions, thus making these testators the most likely to record some dowry related provision. Fifteen of these twenty-one married men, or seventy-one percent, did no less than arrange for the return of the entire values of their wives' dowries to them upon their deaths. These testators almost always ensured this

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733 For the following discussions of the dowry and principal heirs, see Appendix D, which contains the important information about the sixty-five total wills examined for his study. In order to limit confusion and to avoid the cumbersome task of listing numerous archival references when citing numerous wills at a time from Appendix D, I will henceforth identify each by only listing the testator's name and the date of the contract. I will continue to cite the full archival reference when addressing only a few contracts at a time.

734 Georgius Paterius, 11 March 1449; Paulus Justinianus, 20 July 1449; Iohannes Brexanus, 12 February 1454; Nicolaus de Olianis, 19 April 1456; Nicolaus de Calcinara, 17 October 1456; Antonius Fisis, 8
desire with a simple assertion to that end. The provision in the will of Nicolaus de Olianis de Nuada, which was drawn up in his house on 19 April 1456, is exemplary of such an assertion: "[Nicolaus] has bequeathed to his wife Luchineta her dowry, or forty Chian ducats, as is contained in the dowry contract redacted by the late notary Laxarus de Rapalo."\textsuperscript{735}

It is furthermore the case that a number of these fifteen men deemed the mere return of the dowry to be an insufficient inheritance for their wives. In fact, six of these married men, or twenty-nine percent of the total group, made clear in their wills that they wished to leave their wives a portion of their own patrimonies in addition to the dowry. This is not however to say that all of these men provided their wives with additional inheritances of substantial size. Three of the six men merely added to their wives' dowries their own antefacta, which was nearly always only a small portion of the dowry amount.\textsuperscript{736} The other three men did provide their wives with much more than their antefacta, but also imposed on

November 1459; Baptista Spinacius, 25 September 1456; Bricius Iustinianus, 20 May 1458; Adurninus de illariis, 23 March 1460; Petrus de Bozollo, 12 October 1460; Georgius Iustinianus, 4 December 1460; Augustinus Bervelepa, 9 December 1488; Valentinus Iustinianus, 21 October 1489; Dominicus Iustinianus, 10 April 1495; Petrus de Georgiis, 21 October 1496.

\textsuperscript{735} "Legavit Luchinete uxori sue doctes suas videlicet ducatos quadrigenta de Chio prout continetur in instrumento doctium scripto manu quondam Laxari de Rapalo notarii" (ASG, Notal Antichi, not. Domenico de Algario, Filza 944, unnumbered, 19 April 1456).

\textsuperscript{736} Nicolaus de Calcinara, 17 October 1456; Petrus de Bozollo, 12 October 1460; Valentinus Iustinianus, libertus, 21 October 1489.
them the restriction that they would receive the
described gift(s) only for as long as they remained
widows (*stare et habitare in habitu viduali*). On 8
November 1459, for example, Antonius Pisis, *civis Chii*,
made his will, in which he wished to return to his wife
Theodorina her dowry of 500 Chian ducats upon his death,
as "he was legally obligated to do" (*pro quibus his ipse
testator obligatur domui dicti quondam Nicolai
[Theodorina's father] *quas dotes legavit dicte Theodorine
uxor sue*). He continued by bequeathing her an additional
200 Chian ducats, and, if she did not remarry (*resteterit
in habitu viduali*), she should receive yet another 1000
Chian ducats.\(^737\) Bricius Iustinianus *quondam Domini
Francisci* imposed on his wife Mariola a similar condition
in his will of 20 May 1458, in which he left to her upon
his death her dowry of 2500 Chian ducats, his *antefactum*
of 100 Chian ducats, as well as permission to continue
living in his house and enjoying its fruits for as long
as she remained a widow.\(^738\) A total of four of these six
men include this restriction in their wills.\(^739\)

\(^{737}\) ASG, *Notai Antichi*, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, 354r-v, 8
November 1459.
\(^{738}\) "Voluit legavit et ordinavit quod dicta Mariola stante et stare
volente in habitu viduali in domo ipsius testatoris et de bonis
ipsius testatoris quamdiu restetterit in habitu viduali" (ASG, *Notai
Antichi*, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, 87r-v, 20 May 1458).
\(^{739}\) Baptista Spinacius, 25 September 1456; Nicolaus de Calcinara, 17
October 1456; Antonius Pisis, 8 November 1459; Petrus de Bozollo, 12
October 1460.
The portion of a married male testator’s inheritance that he designated for his wife seems to have played some role in his decision of whether or not to return her dowry. The wills clearly demonstrate that it was not common practice for married men on Genoese Chios to provide their wives with much in the way of property. There is not, in fact, a single instance of a married man bequeathing all of his worldly goods to his wife. The closest any testator came to doing this was in 1471, when Antonius Rubeus de Sexte, named his only son Stefanus as his principal heir, but then granted permission to his wife Francischina to use, enjoy, and possess the entirety of Antonius’ estate during her lifetime; Stefanus was then to assume total control of said estate upon the death of his mother. Beyond this, only eight of the twenty-one married men, or thirty-eight percent, named their wives heir to any degree. Five of the twenty-one married men, or twenty-four percent, divided their estates between their wives and their lone legitimate

740 Antonius named as his heir Stefanus, filius dicti Antonii testatoris, but “cum condicione quod dictius Stefanus non possit habere nec valeat stringere vel gaudere de rebus bonis vel patrimonii dicti testatoris nisi cum consilio consensu Antonii et voluntate dicti Francischine fille quondam Percivalis de Scharelis et uxoris dicti testatoris quia dictam Francischinam instituit et esse voluit usfuuctricem et possetricem omnium bonorum ipsius testatoris mobillium et immobillium in vita ipsius dicte Francischine et quandiu vixerit et post vero eius vita reverentur ad heredem suum Stefanum” (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Antonio Foglietta, Filza 843, 24r-v, 11 November 1471).
children, although two of these five make it clear in their wills that they were doing so because their only child was a minor. The other three men spilt up their property equally (in equis porcionibus) among their wives and multiple children, with none of their wives receiving more than one quarter of the total patrimony. The above evidence shows that those testators bequeathing one half of their estates to their wives returned their dowries, on average, less often than those testators leaving their wives with one quarter or less of their estates; the figures are three out of five, or sixty percent, and three out of three, or one hundred percent, respectively. The small sample size does not warrant

741 Georgius Paterius, 11 March 1449; Baptista Spinacius, 25 September 1456; Nicolaus de Calcinara, 17 October 1456; Antonius de Gastardus, 30 March 1461; Guirardus de Plebetheti, 19 March 1472.
742 On 11 March 1449, Georgius Paterius named as his principal heirs his son Matheus and his wife Katerina, but stated that he had only included Katerina as an heir "quia Matheus est ad presentem etatis annorum quinque vel circa." On 19 March 1472, Guirardus de Plebetheti quondam Laurentii used identical language to explain why he had named his wife Elena as co-heir with his daughter Peregrina. He stated that he had done so "quia Peregrina est ad presentem etatis annorum quinque vel circa" (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 847, 41r, 11 March 1449 and ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Antonio Foglietta, Filza 843, 35r, 19 March 1472, respectively).
743 On 20 July 1449, Paulus Iustinianus named as his heirs his six sons (Simonetinus; Andrieta; Antonathinus; Augustinus; Baptistenetus; Buabus; Laurentius) and his wife Marieta (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 947, 119r-v, 20 July 1449). On 19 April 1456, Nicolaus de Olianis named as his heirs his three sons (Baptista; Franchus; Berengarius) and his wife Luchineta (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Domenico de Algario, Filza 944, unnumbered, 19 April 1456). Finally, on 12 October 1460, Petrus de Bozollo names as his heirs his three sons (Augustinus; Ieronimus; Christofforus), his daughter Salvagina, and his wife Mariella (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Domenico de Algario, Filza 944, unnumbered, 12 October 1460).
744 Those testators who bequeathed one half of their estates to their wives and returned their dowries were: Georgius Paterius, 11 March
any definitive assertions on the subject, but the numbers do suggest some interesting patterns. The two groups of testators returned their wives' dowries very frequently, in both cases at least sixty percent of the time, but it seems that the higher the percentage of the estate a husband bequeathed to his wife, the less likely he was to return her dowry.

It does not appear that the production of children with their wives, whether legitimate or illegitimate, played an especially important role in the decision of married male testators to return or not to return their wives' dowries. Twelve of the fifteen men who returned dowries in their wills had at least one legitimate child with their wives, and, in many cases, had many more than just one. The most children listed by any testator in this group was in fact the ten of Paulus Iustinianus, alias de Campis quondam Domini Baptiste, who named his seven legitimate and natural-born sons (legitimes et naturales) as heirs to his estate. The lone testator

1449; Baptista Spinaci, 25 September 1456; and Nicolaus de Calcinara, 17 October 1456. Those testators who left their wives with one quarter or less of their estates and returned their dowries were: Paulus Iustinianus, 20 July 1449; Nicolaus de Olianis, 19 April 1456; and Petrus de Bozollo, 12 October 1460.

45 Georgius Paterius, 11 March 1449; Paulus Iustinianus, 20 July 1449; Iohannes Brexanus, 12 February 1454; Nicolaus de Olianis, 19 April 1456; Baptista Spinaci, 25 September 1456; Nicolaus de Calcinara, 17 October 1456; Bricius Iustinianus, 20 May 1458; Adurninus de Illariis, 23 March 1460; Petrus de Bozollo, 12 October 1460; Gregorius Iustinianus, 4 December 1460; Dominicus Iustinianus, 10 April 1495; Petrus de Georgiis, 21 October 1496.

46 The ten children of Paulus Iustinianus are as follows: Thobia; Orietina; Caterineta; Simonetinus; Andrieta; Antonathinus;
in this group who listed all of his children as being illegitimate (*filii sui naturales sed non legitesimes*) was Antonius Pisis, civis Chii, who had two sons, Iohannes and Benedictus.\textsuperscript{747} Finally, the remaining two married men, Augustinius Bervelepa, *filius quondam Valenteni Iustiniani*, and the freedman (*libertus*) Valerius Iustinianus quondam Valarani had no children at all.\textsuperscript{748} The fifteen married testators who returned their wives' dowries in their wills thus range from childless to having multiple children, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Nearly the same level of variety appears in the group of six remaining married male testators who did not make any arrangement to return their wives' dowries.\textsuperscript{749} Two of these six married men, Baptista Gataluxius and Petrus Iohannes, had multiple legitimate children.

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{747} ASG, *Notai Antichi*, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 847, 119r-v, 20 July 1449. \\
\textsuperscript{748} ASG, *Notai Antichi*, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, 354r-v, 8 November 1459. \\
\textsuperscript{749} It does not appear that, despite having identical names, this Valentenus Iustinianus was in fact Augustinus' father. First, Augustinus' will of 9 December 1488 referred to his father, Valentenus Iustinianus, as already deceased, thus making it impossible for this particular Valentenus to draw up a will almost a year later, as presumably another Valentenus did on 21 October 1489. Second, the fact that the latter Valentenus Iustinianus, referred to himself in his will as a libertus, or freedman, combined with the fact that it was not uncommon for a freedman to adopt the name of his former owner, makes it more probable that the Valentenus who made his will on 21 October 1489 was not the same man who fathered the above Augustinus (ASG, *Notai Antichi*, not. Domenico de Algaro, Filza 944, 556r, 9 December 1488 and ASG, *Notai Antichi*, not. Domenico de Algaro, Filza 944, 227r-v, 21 October 1489, respectively). \\
\textsuperscript{749} These six testators are as follows: Baptista Gataluxius, 11 May 1457; Antonius de Gastardis, 30 March 1461; Antonius Rubeus, 11 November 1471; Guirardus de Plebetheti, 19 March 1472; Lodisius de Primanelis Stobiari, 3 January 1486; Petrus Iohannes, 1 October 1499.
\end{footnotesize}
children, while one man, Lodisius de Primanelis Stobiari, listed as his only offspring two illegitimate children (*filii naturales*), Francisceta and Anthonius. The three remaining men in this group recorded having only one legitimate child each in their wills.

The evidence suggests that differing social ranks, whether the testator hailed from a wealthy family or one of more humble means, had a similar effect on a married man’s decision to return or not return his wife’s dowry. Seven of the eleven humble married male testators, or sixty-four percent, bequeathed their wives’ dowries to them upon their deaths. This is indeed a high percentage, but there is reason to believe that this number might have been even higher if not for the personal circumstances of two specific humble married men. One of the remaining four testators not returning their wives dowries, Antonius Rubeus de Sexte, still provided well for his wife Francischina after his death by granting her permission to use, enjoy, and possess the entirety of her late husband’s estate during her

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750 ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, 195r-v, 11 May 1457 and ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Agostino Foglietta, Filza 1205, 399r-v, 1 October 1499.
751 ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Agostino Foglietta, Filza 1205, 47r, 3 January 1486.
752 Antonius de Gastardis, 30 March 1461; Antonius Rubeus, 11 November 1471; Gulardus de Plebetheti, 19 March 1472.
753 Iohannes Brexanus, 12 February 1454; Nicolaus de Olianis, 19 April 1456; Antonius Pisis, 8 November 1459; Adurninus de Illariis, 23 March 1460; Petrus de Bozollo, 12 October 1460; Augustinius Bervelea, 9 December 1488; Valentinus Justinianus, libertus, 21 October 1489.
lifetime. He makes no mention of returning her dowry in his will, but perhaps he deemed it unnecessary, considering the favorable conditions he had already arranged for her in widowhood. There is also the possibility that Antonius was unable to return Francischina's dowry, because the money was tied up in a business arrangement or other enterprise at that time which made it difficult for him to convert to cash. This situation would have made it necessary for Antonius to ensure that his wife's dowry remain in his household, which he did by including the above provision for Francischina. Furthermore, the decision of the master shoemaker (magister calegarius) Antonius de Gastardis quondam Andree to not return the dowry of his wife Magdalena may have been influenced by either or both of the facts that she was his second wife and Antonius had made her heir to one-half of his estate. Only two of these four humble married men's wills, in fact, provide no possible explanation for why they did not return their dowries.

754 ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Antonio Foglietta, Filza 843, 24r-v, 11 November 1471.
755 It is clear that Magdalena is Antonius' second wife because, one of his first charitable bequests is to leave five ducats to the Franciscans of the Church of San Francesco to celebrate masses for his soul and the soul of his late wife Maria: "legavit et mandavit pro anima ipsius testatoris et pro anima quondam Marie olim uxor dicti testatoris" (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Antonio Foglietta, Filza 843, 219r, 30 March 1461).
wives' dowries; it seems unlikely that we will ever know their motivations for taking this action.\textsuperscript{756}

The wealthy testators of Chios also returned their wives' dowries very frequently. Eight of the ten wealthy married male testators, or eighty percent, made arrangements for the return of their wives' dowries upon their deaths, which is even sixteen percent higher than the above group of humble married men.\textsuperscript{757} The only two men from this group who made the decision not to return their wives dowries, Baptista Gataluxius \textit{quondam Domini Iuliani} and the \textit{Spectabilis Vir} Petrus Iohannes, \textit{medicus doctor}, offered no explanation for their actions whatsoever; it appears that, for whatever reason, they simply did not wish to do so.\textsuperscript{758} Petrus Iohannes barely mentioned his wife Caterneta at all in his will; her name in fact only appears when in relation to her position as his children’s mother (\textit{filii legitemes et naturals ipsius testatoris et uxoris sue Caternete}), and thus only for Petrus’ need to prove the legitimacy of his children, not

\textsuperscript{756} The two testators in question are Guirardus de Plebetheti \textit{quondam Laurentii} and Lodisius de Primanelis Stobiari (ASG, \textit{Notai Antichi}, not. Antonio Foglietta, Filza 843, 35r, 19 March 1472 and ASG, \textit{Notai Antichi}, not. Agostino Foglietta, Filza 1205, 47r, 3 January 1486, respectively).

\textsuperscript{757} Georgius Paterius, 11 March 1449; Paulus Iustinianus, 20 July 1449; Baptista Spinacius, 25 September 1456; Nicolaus de Calcinara, 17 October 1456; Bricius Iustinianus, 20 May 1458; Gregorius Iustinianus, 4 December 1460; Dominicus Iustinianus, 10 April 1495; Petrus de Georgii, 21 October 1496.

\textsuperscript{758} ASG, \textit{Notai Antichi}, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, 195r-v, 11 May 1457 and ASG, \textit{Notai Antichi}, not. Agostino Foglietta, Filza 1205, 399r-v, 1 October 1499, respectively.
out of any desire Petrus might have had to provide for his wife in widowhood.\textsuperscript{759} It is true that, in the case of Baptista Gataluxius, he appointed his wife Blanchina as one of the many executors of his estate, but this duty carried with it no expectation of compensation under normal circumstances.\textsuperscript{760}

The above testamentary evidence makes it clear that both humble and wealthy married male testators returned their wives' dowries at a very high rate, but this is not where the similarities between the two groups ends. In fact, they also exhibited a remarkably similar pattern in how they returned their respective wives' dowries, meaning that, more often than not, the wives of both groups received their dowries with no additional provisions at all. Five of the eight wealthy husbands who returned their wives' dowries, or sixty-three percent, did exactly that and nothing more, while the remaining three husbands arranged for their wives to receive an inheritance in excess of what the law required.\textsuperscript{761} The pattern is nearly identical when we

\textsuperscript{759} ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Agostino Foglietta, Filza 1205, 399r-v, 1 October 1499.
\textsuperscript{760} Baptista named no less than six people to be the executors of his sizeable estate: Blanchina (Wife); Nobilis Galeacius Falavicinicus; Nobilis Bartholomeus de Auria quondam Domini Iacobi; Nobilis Nicolaus de Auria quondam Domini Acelini; Nobilis Lazarus de Auria quondam Domini Opicini; Nobilis Thomas de Grimaldis (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, 195r-v, 11 May 1457).
\textsuperscript{761} The five wealthy husbands only returning their wives' dowries were: Georgius Paterius, 11 March 1449; Paulus Iustinianus, 20 July 1449; Gregorius Iustinianus, 4 December 1460; Dominicus Iustinianus, 10 April 1495; Petrus de Georgiis, 21 October 1496. The three
examine the actions of the seven married testators of more humble means who made arrangements to return their wives' dowries. Four of these men, or fifty-seven percent, simply fulfilled their legal obligation to provide their wives with the dowry and nothing more, while the other three husbands, or forty-three percent, went beyond this legal obligation and provided their wives with additional resources.\textsuperscript{762}

It is indeed these six cases above in which married male testators made provisions for their wives beyond just their dowries that are the most illustrative and interesting. The inheritance beyond the dowry ranged widely from a mere pittance to a substantial portion of the testator's estate in these wills. Two of the six men, one wealthy and one humble, merely added their own antefacta to their wives' dowries, which was nearly always only a small portion of the dowry amount.\textsuperscript{763} The wealthy husbands augmenting the inheritance of their wives beyond just the dowry were: Baptista Spinacius, 25 September 1456; Nicolaus de Calcinara, 17 October 1456; Bricius Iustinianus, 20 May 1458.\textsuperscript{762} The four humble husbands who only returned their wives' dowries were: Iohannes Brexanus, 12 February 1454; Nicolaus de Olianis, 19 April 1456; Adurninus de Illariis, 23 March 1460; Augustinus Bervelepa, 9 December 1488. The other three husbands of this group who provided their wives with an inheritance beyond just their dowries were: Antonius Pisis, 8 November 1459; Petrus de Bozollo, 12 October 1460; Valentinus Iustinianus, libertus, 21 October 1459.\textsuperscript{763} In his will of 20 May 1458, Bricius Iustinianus leaves to his wife Mariola her dowry of 2500 Chian ducats and his antefactum of 100 Chian ducats. In his will of 21 October 1489, Valentinus Iustinianus, libertus, does the same, but this time the dowry returned was 100 Chian ducats and the antefactum of 50 Chian ducats (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, 87r-v, 20 May 1458 and ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Domenico de Algario, Filza 944, 227r-v, 21 October 1489, respectively).
remaining four cases in question are also split evenly between wealthy and humble husbands, but they differ from the above cases because these testators provided for their wives well in excess of their dowries. Three of the four, in fact, even go so far as to name their wives as one of the principal heirs to their estates. This is the case with both of this group’s wealthy testators, Baptista Spinacius and Nicolaus de Calcinara, who each returned to his respective wife her dowry, his antefactum, and then additionally named her heir to one-half of his estate. In his will of 12 October 1460, Petrus de Bozollo, a man of humble means, promised to return to his wife Mariella her dowry of an unspecified amount, but added to this his antefactum of 200 ducats and also names her as heir to one-fifth of his estate. Another humble married testator, Antonius Pisis, civis Chii, did not name his wife Theodorina heir to any part of his estate, but did return her dowry of 500 Chian ducats upon his death plus an additional 200 Chian

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764 Baptista Spinacius returned his wife Mariola’s dowry of 1000 Genoese lire, his antefactum of 100 Genoese lire, and named her heir to his estate along with their son Iacobetus, while Nicolaus de Calcinara returned his wife Marieta’s dowry of 400 ducats, his antefactum of an unspecified amount, and named her heir to his estate along with their daughter Theodorina (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, 78r-v, 25 September 1456 and ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Bernardo de Ferrari, Filza 764, 259r-v, 17 October 1456, respectively).

765 Petrus named Mariella heir along with his four children Augustinus, Ieronimus, Salvagina, and Christofforus (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Domenico de Algario, Filza 944, unnumbered, 12 October 1460).
ducats, and, if she did not remarry (*resteterit in habitu viduali*), he wished her to have yet another 1000 Chian ducats.\(^{766}\) It is thus clear that, more often than not, when a married male testator of whatever social rank wished to provide for his wife beyond the legal minimum of her dowry, the addition he made to her inheritance was not by any means paltry.

The evidence from the wills indeed shows that, when it came time to decide whether or not to return their wives' dowries, both humble and wealthy married male testators often made similar choices. It is also illustrative to explore how a household’s authoritative status relative to others on Chios could affect these choices. The largest number of married testators hailed, not surprisingly, from the group with the least authority on Chios: non-ruling, non-elite men of humble means. Seven of the eleven humble married male testators, or sixty-four percent, bequeathed their wives’ dowries to them upon their deaths, as was discussed earlier in this section.\(^{767}\) Dowry-returning testators whose households were wealthy, but not members of the ruling elite of Genoese Chios, and thus a combination of traditional

\(^{766}\) ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, 354r-v, 8 November 1459.

\(^{767}\) Iohannes Brexanus, 12 February 1454; Nicolaus de Olianis, 19 April 1456; Antonius Pisis, 8 November 1459; Adurninus de Illariis, 23 March 1460; Petrus de Bozollo, 12 October 1460; Augustinius Bervelepa, 9 December 1488; Valentenus Iustinianus, libertinus, 21 October 1489.
Genoese patrician and mercantile non-aristocratic families, make up the next largest group. Three of the five husbands from this category, or sixty percent, returned their wives dowries. The only two men from this group who made the decision not to return the dowry, Baptista Gataluxius quondam Domini Iuliani and the Spectabilis Vir Petrus Iohannes, medicus doctor, offered no explanation for this course of action; it appears that, for whatever reason, they simply did not desire to do so. The husbands from both of these groups evinced a strong propensity to return their wives' dowries in their wills. In fact, when the statistics of the two groups are combined together, the result is that eleven out of sixteen, or sixty-three percent, of the non-ruling element residing on Chios returned their wives' dowries.

The fewest number of married testators hailed from the ruling elite residents of Genoese Chios, although this group might perhaps be the most informative. This group is certainly the easiest to identify in the sources, because, by the late fourteenth century, all of the prominent Genoese families who participated in ruling the island through the Mahona had adopted a common surname, Giustinian (Iustinianus), to create a Genoese-

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768 Georgius Paterius, 11 March 1449; Baptista Spinacius, 25 September; Petrus de Georgiis, 21 October 1496.
769 ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, 195r-v, 11 May 1457 and ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Agostino Foglietta, Filza 1205, 399r-v, 1 October 1499, respectively.
style *albergo*, or group of allied families.\textsuperscript{770} There are a grand total of four married male Iustiniani testators in the sample of wills: Paulus Iustinianus, *alias de Campis quondam Domini Baptiste*; Bricius Iustinianus *quondam Domini Francisci*; Gregorius Iustinianus *quondam Domini Oberti*; Egregius Dominicus Iustinianus *quondam Bernardi*. What is interesting about these four men is that every single one of them returned their wives' dowry, thus obviously making this group's members the most likely of any to do so.\textsuperscript{771} This finding, at first glance, might suggest nothing more than a coincidence or the possible result of such a small sample size. This is certainly a possibility, but the significance of this evidence becomes even more suggestive when we examine the wives of these four Iustiniani husbands. On 20 July 1449, Paulus Iustinianus, *alias de Campis quondam Domini Baptiste* made his will, in which he left to wife Marieta, *filia quondam Iohannis Iustiniani*, her dowry of an unspecified amount, as well as named her heir to one-eighth of his estate.\textsuperscript{772} Bricius Iustinianus *quondam*

\textsuperscript{770} See pages 302-5 of chapter 4 for a discussion of this unusual action taken by these prominent Genoese families living on Chios.


\textsuperscript{772} Marieta inherited equally with the seven sons she had produced with Paulus (ASG, *Notai Antichi*, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 847, 119r-v, 20 July 1449).
Domini Francisci took the same action on 20 May 1458, when he returned to his wife Mariola, filia quondam Andrioli Iustiniani, her sizeable dowry of 2500 Chian ducats, which Bricius then augmented by also bequeathing her his antefactum of 100 Chian ducats.\textsuperscript{773} On 4 December 1460, Gregorius Iustinianus quondam Domini Oberti followed suit by bequeathing to his wife Curreneta, filia Domini Petri Iustiniani de Campis, her dowry of 3000 Genoese lire.\textsuperscript{774} Finally, thirty-five years later on 10 April 1495, Egregius Dominicus Iustinianus quondam Bernardi made provisions in his will to return to his wife Mariola, filia quondam Gasparis Iustiniani, her dowry of 1000 Chian ducats.\textsuperscript{775} The wives of all four of these Iustiniani men thus, significantly, hailed from the Iustinianus family group themselves.

It is true that the sample size of these dowry-returning testators is very small, but the evidence at hand is nevertheless suggestive regarding the effect(s) of a household’s authoritative status on a testator’s decision to return or not return his wife’s dowry. The evidence shows that the traditional Genoese patrician, mercantile non-aristocratic, and poor families on Chios,

\textsuperscript{773} ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, 87r-v, 20 May 1458.
\textsuperscript{774} ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, 507r-v, 4 December 1460.
\textsuperscript{775} ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Agostino Foglietta, Filza 1205, 294r, 10 April 1495.
which represented the non-ruling element residing on island, returned their wives' dowries about two-thirds of the time. This is indeed a high percentage, but finishes a distant second to the ruling elite of Chios, or the Iustiniani, whose married men returned their wives' dowries to them in all cases. Why might the Iustiniani husbands have been so forthcoming in this regard? There is no evidence to suggest that they were acting out of a desire to honor their wives' legal right to their dowries, although there is evidence that notaries on the island must have made their clients aware of this right on occasion.\textsuperscript{776} It is possible that the legal obligation was partly the motivation of these husbands, but it is clearly also significant that all four of these Iustiniani men were married to women also members of Chios' ruling elite, i.e. fellow Iustiniani. In the last chapter, I suggested that a key factor used by families to determine the dowry value of many brides was how well they knew the groom and his family, which would explain why a Iustinianus daughter who married a fellow Iustinianus was likely to receive a dowry value four times greater than that of those Iustiniani daughters who married outside of the ruling elite. The issue of family familiarity undoubtedly also played a role in the

\textsuperscript{776} See page 377 of this chapter.
decision of Iustiniani husbands to return their wives’ dowries to them. The Iustiniani were the ruling families of Chios, so closely tied together that they shared a common surname. Thus, when a Iustinianus husband deemed it necessary to draw up a will, it must have been an easier decision to provide his wife with her dowry, because, unlike most married testators on Chios, his concern was not preventing his household’s complete loss of this property. He was instead redistributing some of his “nuclear” household’s assets within the structure of its larger extended family.

Principal Heirs

The primary purpose for making a will, wherever and whenever its redaction, has always been to provide for the future of one’s family members through the use of his or her household’s property. Decisions concerning just how to provide for the future of one’s family were often difficult to make, but it is clear that the existence of children made a testator’s task of distributing the majority of his or her patrimony much easier. It is indeed not surprising, considering the purpose of a will was to convey property from one generation to the next, that the vast majority of testators on Genoese Chios
named either all, or some combination, of their children as principal heirs. This option was, of course, unavailable to those testators who were clerics, had no children, or had suffered the misfortune of their children predeceasing them. It was thus this group of testators, unconstrained as they were by the necessity of providing for the future of their children, that had to settle on alternative guardians of household property; spouses and siblings were popular choices, but there were also other options from which to choose, as we will see. It seems that, however they chose to allot their property in death, testators' most important concern was to prevent their households' property from changing bloodlines. The wills clearly show that this necessity of preserving the patrimony within one's family was an all-pervasive concern for testators, cutting across boundaries of gender, marital and familial status, and social rank, although to varying degrees of intensity. It is the purpose of this final section of the chapter to suggest some reasons why this might have been the case, but it is appropriate to begin by discussing the

Nor is it surprising that, considering this primary purpose of the will, testators on Genoese Chios preferred to name specifically their legitimate children as principal heirs. I have in fact found not a single instance of a testator naming an illegitimate child as even a partial heir to his or her estate. It should thus be assumed in the following discussion that all children mentioned are the legitimate offspring of the testators, unless otherwise stated.
prevalence of children on fifteenth-century Genoese Chios.

Forty-three of the sixty-four testators, three men and thirteen women, made it known in their wills that they had children; the remaining twenty-one testators fell into four distinct groups: unmarried and childless; married, but childless; clergymen; and foreign men of affairs who were only on Chios for business or some other reason. The age of these children, although difficult to gauge with any degree of exactitude, range widely from unborn to grown men and women with their own families. It is equally difficult to determine from the wills exactly how many children each family had.

Wills are indeed one of the best sources for studying family size in the Middle Ages, but it must be remembered

The sample for this study includes sixty-five wills, but two of these were redacted by the same man, Antonius de Thodi (Todi), and nearly two years apart (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Antonio Foglietta, Filza 843, 221r-v, 11 April 1461 and ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Giovanni Battista de Ferrari, Filza 886, 282r-v, 12 February 1463). See Appendix D for a list of these testators and their children.

Steven A. Epstein has discussed the difficulty of estimating children's ages in wills: "There is no reliable way to estimate children’s ages, although the use of diminutive names is one of the best, but still imperfect, guides" (Epstein, Wills and Wealth in Medieval Genoa, 70-1).

On two occasions testators revealed the existence of an unborn child. On 4 December 1460, Gregorius Iustinianus named as one of his principal heirs his future child with whom his wife Curreneta was currently "gravida." Then, on 13 March 1461, Marietina Iustiniana named her unborn child as sole heir to her property. It may seem, at first glance, to be an unusual choice to include the unborn in the total count of children, but I have done so on account of the integral role their parents gave them in the inheritance of household property, as we will see below (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, 507r-v, 4 December 1460 and ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Bernardo de Ferrari, Filza 764, 475r-v, 13 March 1461, respectively).
that the purpose of a will was both to make arrangements for the passing of a household’s property from one generation to the next and also to prepare one’s soul for its passing to the afterlife. There was thus a low probability that a testator would include in his or her will any child who did not readily serve these purposes. A testator, for example, was under no legal obligation to provide his or her married daughter with any property beyond her dowry, thus making it less likely that daughters who were married at the time of the redaction of her parent’s will would appear in it. Nor was it likely that testators would mention those children who had predeceased them, except perhaps to make a bequest for their souls or for some other reason of sentimentality; these children were obviously unable to serve as heirs. The point here is that the number of children found in the wills of Genoese Chios paints an inaccurate picture of youngsters’ presence on the island.

There were almost certainly many more children on Chios during the fifteenth century than the wills record, but, in all honesty, this group of unknown children is not the concern of the current discussion. The focus here is the group of ninety-eight children, fifty-seven sons and forty-one daughters, who testators saw fit to mention in their wills. Included in this group is one
adopted daughter, Lucia, who Guirardus de Carreto quondam Manfredi had freed from servitude and adopted by the time he made his will.\textsuperscript{782} The legitimate children are almost exactly divided in half in terms of household status, with forty-one children hailing from humble households and forty coming from wealthier homes. There is an interesting difference in the frequency with which the testators of each social class included their daughters in the wills. Nineteen of the forty-one children from humble households, or forty-six percent, were female, while wealthy daughters only represent fourteen of the forty children, or thirty-five percent, included in their parents' wills. The discrepancy between the two percentages is not incredibly large, but the evidence does suggest that wealthy testators were less inclined to include their daughters in their wills than those testators of more modest means. This finding should not be considered anything more than a suggestion, however, because there are just too many variables, i.e. the unknown number of the testators' children, the daughters' marital status, etc., to warrant any firm conclusions on this account.

Testators also included illegitimate children in their wills. In fact, fourteen of the ninety-eight

\textsuperscript{782} ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, 162r-v, 7 March 1457.
children in the wills fit this description. Six testators, all men, referred to eight sons and six daughters as being "filii naturales," as opposed to the common designation for their legitimate children, "filii naturales et legitimi." These testators hailed from every social rank; four of the six were married while the other two men were unmarried. Four of the six men mentioned only illegitimate children in their wills, with three of this group having only one or two children. The lone exception was an unmarried man of modest means, Iacobus de Semino quondam Mathei, who named a total of six illegitimate children (five sons and one daughter), by far more than any other testator. Two other men, Baptista Spinaci quondam Bartholomei and Bricius Justinianus quondam Domini Francisci, both of whom were wealthy and married, included a combination of legitimate and illegitimate children.

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783 Petrus Justinianus, 31 August 1394; Baptista Spinacius, 25 September 1456; Bricius Justinianus, 20 May 1458; Antonius Pisis, 8 November 1459; Iacobus de Semino, 21 October 1460; Lodisius de Primanelis Stobiari, 3 January 1486.
784 The four married testators were: Baptista Spinacius, 25 September 1456; Bricius Justinianus, 20 May 1458; Antonius Pisis, 8 November 1459; and Lodisius de Primanelis Stobiari, 3 January 1486. The two unmarried testators were: Petrus Justinianus, 31 August 1394; and Iacobus de Semino, 21 October 1460.
785 Petrus Justinianus, 31 August 1394; Antonius Pisis, 8 November 1459; and Lodisius de Primanelis Stobiari, 3 January 1486.
786 Iacobus recorded all six of his illegitimate children's names: Franciscus; Antonius; Ieronimus; Pasqualinus; Luchetus; and Andriola (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Bernardo de Ferrari, Filza 764, 410r, 21 October 1460).
787 Baptista Spinaci named a total of five children (one legitimate son, two legitimate daughters, and two illegitimate daughters), as did Bricius Justinianus (two legitimate sons, two legitimate
In every case, the testators made clear that the reason for including these illegitimate children in their wills was simply to acknowledge their existence and make some provision for their future, not to inherit the bulk of the estate. Petrus Iustinianus olim de Rocha quondam Simonis, who made his will in 1394 before travelling to Egypt, wished for his natural daughter Catalina to have a dowry of 300 Genoese lire from his property (quando maritabitur). The dowering of their illegitimate daughters was also the concern of Bricius Iustinianus quondam Domini Francisci and Iacobus de Semino quondam Mathei, who both charged their respective relatives with providing them with an adequate dowry. Another testator, Lodisius de Primanelis Stobiari, simply bequeathed money to his illegitimate children and also made arrangements for their upbringing (alimonie filiorum suorum), giving his son Anthonius twenty-five Genoese
lire and his daughter Francisceta forty Genoese lire.\textsuperscript{790}

Finally, Antonius Pisis, \textit{civis Chii}, was arguably the most generous of any testator to his illegitimate child, when he bequeathed to his son Benedictus his pharmacist’s shop (\textit{apoteca speciarie}) and all of its possessions valued at seventy Chian ducats.\textsuperscript{791}

The number of children varied greatly from household to household. The largest household for which there is evidence is that of Paulus Iustinianus alias de Campis quondam Domini Baptiste, who named no less than ten children (seven sons and three daughters), all legitimate, in his will.\textsuperscript{792} Paulus’ household appears to have been exceptionally large, however, because the vast majority of testators who had children acknowledged having three or fewer. Twenty-nine of the forty-one testators\textsuperscript{793} who named their own children in their wills,

\textsuperscript{790} ASG, \textit{Notai Antichi}, not. Agostino Foglietta, Filza 1205, 47r, 3 January 1486.
\textsuperscript{791} ASG, \textit{Notai Antichi}, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, 354r-v, 8 November 1459.
\textsuperscript{792} Paulus’ children were: Thobia; Orietina; Caterineta; Simonetinus; Andrieta; Antonathinus; Augustinus; Baptistenetus; Buabus; and Laurentius (ASG, \textit{Notai Antichi}, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 847, 119r-v, 20 July 1449).
\textsuperscript{793} It is impossible to categorize two of the testators who mentioned children in their wills, Sorleonus Salvaygus quondam Domini Casani and Baptista Gataluxius quondam Domini Iuliani, because they do not give the names of any of their children. In these cases, the notaries instead merely recorded that the principal heirs would be the cryptic “filii” of the two testators. I have thus chosen to not include them in the sample (ASG, \textit{Manoscritti, Collectanea Testamentorum (quorundam januensium civium)}, not. Lazarinus quondam Nicolai de Rappallo, 88-9, 17 October 1411 and ASG, \textit{Notai Antichi}, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, 195r-v, 11 May 1457, respectively).
or seventy percent, indeed fell into this category, while only nine of these testators, or twenty-two percent, mentioned anywhere from four to ten children.

There is also a clear pattern within the group of twenty-nine testators having three or fewer children, for seventeen of these testators, or fifty-nine percent, acknowledged having only one child. The options of testators in this position were thus significantly

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794 Petrus Iustinianus (Unmarried), 31 August 1394; Obertus (Widower), 5 November 1408; Georgius Paterius (Married), 11 March 1449; Iohannes Granellus (Unknown), 23 November 1449; Argenta (Married), 6 February 1450; Iohannes Brexanus (Married), 12 February 1454; Blanchina de Furneto (Widow), 31 May 1456; Maria (Widow), 27 June 1456; Nicolaus de Calcinara (Married), 17 October 1456; Guirardus de Carreto (Unknown), 7 March 1457; Marieta (Married), 4 July 1458; Antonius Elisi (Married), 8 November 1459; Franciscus de Portufino (Unknown), 30 January 1460; Adurninus de Illariis (Married), 23 March 1460; Gregorius Iustinianus (Married), 4 December 1460; Marietina Iustiniana (Married), 13 March 1461; Antonius de Gastardis (Remarried), 30 March 1461; Mariolla (Widow), 22 August 1461; Florentia (Widow), 22 December 1461; Marieta (Married), 18 February 1462; Guillemus Crania (Unknown), 5 August 1463; Antonius Rubeus (Married), 11 November 1471; Guirardus de Plebetheti (Married), 19 March 1472; Anna Ungari (Married), 15 September 1484; Lodisius de Primanelis Stobiari (Married), 3 January 1486; Laurentia (Married), 7 March 1487; Iacobus de Marolo (Unmarried), 26 June 1492; Mariola (Married), 10 April 1495; Sebrana Iustiniana (Widow), 28 January 1499.

795 Testators with four children: Mecosa Iordanus (Widow), 24 May 1456; Petrus de Bozollo (Married), 12 October 1460. Testators with five children: Baptista Spinacius (Married), 25 September 1456; Petrus de Georgiis (Married), 21 October 1496. Testators with six children: Nicolaus de Olianis (Married), 19 April 1456; Bricius Iustinianus (Married), 20 May 1458; Iacobus de Semino (Unmarried), 21 October 1460; Petrus Iohannes (Married), 1 October 1499. Testators with ten children: Paulus Iustinianus (Married), 20 July 1449.

796 Petrus Iustinianus (Unmarried), 31 August 1394; Obertus (Widower), 5 November 1408; Georgius Paterius (Married), 11 March 1449; Argenta (Married), 6 February 1450; Iohannes Brexanus (Married), 12 February 1454; Nicolaus de Calcinara (Married), 17 October 1456; Franciscus de Portufino (Unknown), 30 January 1460; Adurninus de Illariis (Married), 23 March 1460; Antonius de Gastardis (Remarried), 30 March 1461; Marieta (Married), 18 February 1462; Antonius Rubeus (Married), 11 November 1471; Guirardus de Plebetheti (Married), 19 March 1472; Anna Ungari (Married), 15 September 1484; Laurentia (Married), 7 March 1487; Iacobus de Marolo (Unmarried), 26 June 1492; Mariola (Married), 10 April 1495; Sebrana Iustiniana (Widow), 28 January 1499.
limited when it came time to name principal heirs. It is not surprising to discover that the vast majority of testators with only one child chose their son or daughter for this role. Only four of the seventeen testators in this group, or twenty-four percent, opted for someone other than their lone child for principal heir, and the familial circumstances surrounding three of these testators make it easier to understand why they made the choices they did. The unmarried Petrus Iustinianus olim de Rocha quondam Simonis, chose his mother and sister-in-law over his daughter Catalina.\textsuperscript{797} Adurninus de Illariis de Ovada, speciarius in Chio et filius emancipatus Antonii, also chose not to name his daughter principal heir, instead appointing his three brothers.\textsuperscript{798} Marieta passed over her daughter, as well, when she chose her husband Georgius Ronelicandelus to inherit her worldly goods.\textsuperscript{799} In all three of these cases, the testators thus had close family members who were better suited to be heirs than their daughter. The most curious case of the four testators is that of Argenta, filia quondam Frediani Imperialis, who was married to Petrus de Sancto Steffano, civis et habitator Chii, and had a son named Antonachius.

\textsuperscript{797} This will is published in Michel Balard, ed., Notai genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Chio da Donato di Chiavari (17 Febbraio-12 Novembre 1394) (Genoa: Università di Genova, 1988), no. 76, 209-11).
\textsuperscript{798} ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, 331r-v, 23 March 1460.
\textsuperscript{799} ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Bernardo de Ferrari, Filza 764, 594r-v, 18 February 1462.
One might expect that Argenta’s choice for her principal heir would have been one of these two male family members, or both, but she inexplicably chose her mother Marieta instead.\textsuperscript{800} There is no conceivable reason why Argenta acted thus, and any attempt to explain her motives would be mere speculation.

Having multiple children all of the same gender also limited a testator’s options when it came time to choose a principal heir. This was the familial situation of ten testators, six men and four women, on Chios, and from their wills some clear patterns emerge.\textsuperscript{801} Seven of these ten testators had all sons, ranging in number from two to five, which appears to have made the decision of whom to appoint as principal heir a very easy one for them. Six of the seven testators opted to divide their estates equally among their sons (\textit{equis porcionibus}), which is not at all surprising.\textsuperscript{802} It is furthermore important to note that the lone testator in this group who did not chose his sons as principal heirs, Antonius Pisis, \textit{civis}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[800]\textit{ASG, Manoscritti, Collectanea Testamentorum (guorundam januensium civium)}, not. Baldasare de Signore, 57-9, 6 February 1450.
\item[801] Iohannes Granellus (Unknown), 23 November 1449; Mecosa Iordanus (Widow), 24 May 1456; Blanchina de Furneto (Widow), 31 May 1456; Maria (Widow), 27 June 1456; Guirardus de Carreto (Unknown), 7 March 1457; Antonius Pisis (Married), 8 November 1459; Gregorius Iustinianus (Married), 4 December 1460; Florentia (Widow), 22 December 1461; Guliermus Cranla (Unknown), 5 August 1463; Petrus de Georgiis (Married), 21 October 1496.
\item[802] Iohannes Granellus (Unknown), 23 November 1449; Mecosa Iordanus (Widow), 24 May 1456; Blanchina de Furneto (Widow), 31 May 1456; Maria (Widow), 27 June 1456; Guliermus Cranla (Unknown), 5 August 1463; Petrus de Georgiis (Married), 21 October 1496.
\end{footnotes}
Chii, had a good reason for not doing so, because his sons Iohannes and Benedictus were naturales, or illegitimate. This is most likely his motive for passing over them and instead appointing his mother Caterina as his heir.\(^{803}\)

The other three testators in this group each had two daughters and no sons, and, interestingly enough, an examination of their wills only evinces more clearly the testators' general preference for sons to inherit over daughters. Only one of the three testators, Guirardus de Carreto quondam Manfredi, named his two daughters Limbania (his natural daughter) and Lucia (his former slave and adopted daughter) as equal heirs to his estate condition free.\(^{804}\) It is true that the other two testators also chose their respective daughters to be heirs, but they did not do so unconditionally. The widow of Benedictus de Bozollo, Florentia, filia quondam Marini Vigne, named her two daughters Pareta and Orientina as her only heirs, with the understanding that if Pareta should die childless or her brother and their uncle

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\(^{803}\) It is also probable that Antonius did not choose his wife Theodorina as heir, because he had already made extraordinary arrangements for her earlier in his will. Antonius wished for Theodorina to receive 200 Chian ducats on top of the return of her dowry of 500 Chian ducats in full. He was not yet finished providing for Theodorina in widowhood, however, for he then allotted another 1000 Chian ducats for her if she did not remarry (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, 354r-v, 8 November 1459).

\(^{804}\) ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, 162r-v, 7 March 1457.
Bartholomeus should secure a legitimate marriage, then he should inherit along with Orientina. It appears that Florentia did not want Orientina to be the sole heir to her property. Perhaps an explanation for this lies in the diminutive name Orientina, which suggests that she was a minor at the time her mother drew up this will.

The will of Gregorius Iustinianus quondam Domini Oberti contains the most conspicuous attempt of a testator to secure the inheritance of a son over a daughter. Gregorius and his wife Curreneta had two legitimate daughters, Mariola and Baptestina, who he named as equal heirs to “the rest of his moveable and immoveable goods,” or the bulk of his estate (Reliquorum bonorum suorum mobilium et immobilium). This arrangement was subject to change, however, because Curreneta was heavy with child (gravida). Gregorius then expressed his wish that if the child were a girl, she should inherit with her older sisters an equal portion of the estate, but, if the child were a boy, then he should become sole heir and his daughters should receive whatever portion of the estate Florentia wished for her principal heirs to be: “Paretam et Orientinam filias ipsius testatricis et dicti condam Benedicti in equis porcionibus...tamen intelecto quod dicta testatrix mandavit et voluit quod si dicta Pereta decedet absque filis de se et dictus Bartholomeus filius suus de legitimo matrimonio nactus quam dictus Bartholomeus suscedat etali porcione in bonis dicte testatricis” (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Domenico de Algario, Filza 944, unnumbered, 22 December 1461).

For a discussion of diminutive names as a tool for estimating the age of children, see Epstein, Wills and Wealth in Medieval Genoa, 70-1.
is deemed appropriate by his wife, in conjunction with the executors, tutors, and curators of the estate.\textsuperscript{807}

Few testators recorded having children of both genders on Chios, and only a small percentage of them wished for their sons and daughters to inherit equally. Eight total testators, six men and two women, acknowledged having legitimate children of both sexes in their wills.\textsuperscript{808} Two of the testators, both men, admitted to having additional illegitimate children, but, not surprisingly, neither of these men chose them to inherit.\textsuperscript{809} Instead, legitimate sons were this group of testators’ main preference for principal heirs.\textsuperscript{810} All

\begin{footnote}
\textsuperscript{807} Gregorius named as his heirs: “Mariolam et Bapcestinam filias suas et dicte Currenot equis porcionibus et quia dicta Curreneta uxor sua est gravida voluit et legavit et mandavit quod si pariet filiam quam ipsa filia sit heres una cum predictis Mariola et Bapcestina equis porcionibus et si ipsa Curreneta pariet filium masculum quam tunc et eum causo ipsae filius masculus sit universalis heres ipsius testatoris et quod dicte Mariola et Bapcestina datentur et dotari de bonis ipsius testatoris quantum prout videbitur et placuerit dicte Curreneta et maiori infrascriptorum fideicommissario et tutorium et curatorium” (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, 507r-v, 4 December 1460).

\textsuperscript{808} The six men were: Paulus Iustinianus (Married), 20 July 1449; Nicolaus de Oliinis (Married), 19 April 1456; Baptista Spinacius (Married), 25 September 1456; Bricius Iustinianus (Married), 20 May 1458; Petrus de Bozollo (Married), 12 October 1460; Petrus Iohannes (Married), 1 October 1499. The two women were: Marieta (Married), 4 July 1458; Mariolla (Widow), 22 August 1461.

\textsuperscript{809} Baptista Spinacius recorded having a total of five children: a legitimate son named Iacobetus; two unnamed legitimate daughters; and two unnamed illegitimate daughters. Bricius Iustinianus also acknowledged having five children: Raffaele (Legitimate); Carlinus (Legitimate); Despineta (Legitimate); Ieromina (Legitimate); and Marietina (Illegitimate) (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, 78r-v, 25 September 1456 and ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, 87r-v, 20 May 1458, respectively).

\textsuperscript{810} Four of these seven testators who were married at the time of their wills’ redactions also name their spouses as heirs, but there is no discernable pattern that would explain why they chose to do so; an individual’s personal preference is the most likely explanation
eight of these testators named their legitimate sons to inherit equal portions of their estates, while only two of them also saw fit to appoint their legitimate daughters to the same position.\textsuperscript{811} This clear favoritism for sons over daughters is not however as straightforward a matter as it first appears. There is indeed a clear direct correlation, in these particular wills, between a daughter receiving a dowry and her name appearing among her parent’s principal heirs. All six of the testators who chose not to name their daughters principal heirs did in fact make arrangements in their wills for their future dowering.\textsuperscript{812} Conversely, Marieta, burgensis Chii et uxor Pelegrini de Sancto Iohannes and Petrus de Bozollo quondam Antonii, both of whom included their sons and daughters as equal heirs to their property made no mention of dowing their respective daughters.\textsuperscript{813}

Not a single testator in this group failed to provide their daughters with something after their deaths, but what form that something took seems to have depended upon their marital status. It would not have been the inclination of testators with an unmarried

\textsuperscript{811} Petrus de Bozollo and Marieta (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Domenico de Algario, Filza 944, unnumbered, 12 October 1460 and ASG, Manoscritti, Collectanea Testamentorum (quorundam januensium civium), not. Baldasare de Signore, 64-6, 4 July 1458, respectively).

\textsuperscript{812} See Appendix D for the details of these provisions.

\textsuperscript{813} Marieta had two daughters, Catarineta and Nicoloxina, while Petrus had one, Salvagina.
daughter to include her among the list of principal heirs, because that portion of the household’s property would become part of her new husband’s household upon their marriage. Testators in this position had an effective way to avoid such a loss of household property, however, and that was to provide their daughters with a set dowry amount, but not name them as a principal heir. Six of the eight testators in this above group opted to make just this arrangement in their wills. The motives of the other two testators who did name their daughters as principal heirs are more difficult to discern, but it is unlikely that Marieta and Petrus would have made this choice if their daughters were already married. The parents of Chios rarely mentioned married daughters in their wills; they were now members of their husbands’ households, and thus there was no need to bequeath them much of anything. It is furthermore significant to note that both Marieta and Petrus also named their respective spouses, Pelegrinus de Sancto Iohannes and Mariella, as heirs. This was possibly nothing more than a gesture of affection towards these spouses, but the move could have also served to safeguard household property. It put a trusted family member in a position to redistribute appropriately the households’ goods as the circumstances of its members’ lives changed, meaning that daughters who
later married could be dowered and removed from their household’s list of heirs.

The remaining twenty-two testators in the sample differed from the above forty-three in that, at the time they made their wills, they had not yet produced a legitimate heir to their households. This is however not to say that these childless testators had given up all hope of doing so. Genevra, filia quondam Iohannis Justiniani olim de Furneto, for example, chose as her heir husband Iohannes, filius Georgii delo Granuati, but then added that if he were to predecease her, her heir should then be any future children they may produce. Yet, the lack of a legitimate heir did influence who these testators chose to inherit the bulk of their estates, it was inevitable. This circumstance made it necessary for these men and women to conceptualize a larger pool of potential heirs, which oftentimes resulted in the selection of spouses, siblings, in-laws, charitable causes, and even friends for this honor. It was also inevitable that the marital status of a childless testator was a factor in his or her decision, and apparently quite an influential one.

814 The notary recorded that, as her heir, Genevra: “instituit et esse voluit dictum Iohannem eius virem si vixerit et si non vixerit heredum futurum vel heredes futuros ipsius dicte Genevre” (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Giovanni Balbi, Filza 603, 430r-v, 10 November 1408).
Only five of the twenty-two childless testators were married at the time they made their wills, two men and three women. The miniscule size of the sample allows for no firm conclusions, but there is a significant observation to make. Both childless husbands, Augustinius Bervelepa and the freedman Valentenus Iustinianus, named a brother as heir, Antonius and Georgius, respectively. It is not surprising that these two men opted for brothers over their wives as heirs, because by choosing their wives they would have voluntarily transferred the bulk of their property to their spouses' families. Childless wives had fewer options, because they were, by law, members of their husbands' households and not heads of their own. This was significant, because it meant that almost all the property to which these women had access, with the possible exceptions of their dowries and antefacta, was in reality part of their husbands' households, and thus not theirs to bequeath. Two of the three childless wives in fact named their husbands as sole heirs to their property, while the third inexplicably chose an

815 Genevra, 10 November 1408; Margarita, 21 May 1458; Petra, 27 October 1472; Augustinius Bervelepa, 9 December 1488; Valentinus Iustinianus, 21 October 1489.
816 ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Domenico de Algario, Filza 944, 556r, 9 December 1488 and ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Domenico de Algario, Filza 944, 227r-v, 21 October 1489, respectively
817 Genevra, filia quondam Iohannis Iustiniani olim de Furneto, and Domina Petra, filia quondam Petri Iustiniani, both named their
unrelated woman and her future children to inherit. Childless wives may also have opted for their husbands as heirs in the hope that they may one day have children. In this scenario, the odds would be good that any future children would eventually inherit most household property anyway through the father.

The remaining seventeen childless men and women were unmarried, which perhaps put this group of testators in the best position of any to select their heirs based on personal preference rather than societal and familial expectations. All but three of these seventeen unmarried, childless testators were men, including one cleric, one emancipated son, one who made two wills, and

husbands as heirs, Iohannes, filius Georgii delo Granuati and Qualicus de Franchis, respectively (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Giovanni Balbi, Filza 603, 430r-v, 10 November 1408 and ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Antonio Foglietta, Filza 843, 51r, 27 October 1472).

Margarita, wife of Petrosinus de Blasia, did not choose her husband, but Pasqualina, uxor Georgii de Puteo, and her future children. Should Pasqualina have no children, however, then the Church of Sanctus Franciscus de Chio should inherit Margarita's property; perhaps this Pasqualina was Margarita's sister, or, for whatever reason, Margarita did not want her husband to inherit at all (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, 92r, 21 May 1458).

Steven A. Epstein makes a similar argument in his Wills and Wealth in Medieval Genoa, 100-1.

Veri Francisci Gori, 9 November 1394; Bartholomeus de Stoprins, 19 April 1413; Presbyter Antoninus de Santurino, 8 October 1449; Nicolaus de Dieno, 27 July 1450; Petrus Antonius Paterius, 23 October 1459; Thomas Raybaldus, 10 January 1460; Ansaicdes Salamonus, 10 March 1460; Conradus de Porta (Widower), 14 June 1460; Iohannes de Semino, 27 January 1461; Antonius de Thodi, 11 April 1461 (and 12 February 1463); Benedictus Senaschus, 6 August 1461; Marieta (Widow), 13 December 1461; Antonius, 24 January 1467; Iohannes Casenus, 28 September 1473; Marisa (Widow), 12 March 1487; Isabella de Valencia, 3 October 1488; and Franciscus de Recho quondam Antonii, emancipatus, 19 October 1488.
one widower, while two of the three women were widows.  

The heirs chosen by this group varied in type almost as much as its membership. Three distinct groups of heirs emerge from this group of testators: close relatives, friends, and charitable causes. Eight of these seventeen testators, or forty-seven percent, named one or more close relatives as their principal heirs. Five of these eight selected only brothers over all other close relatives, while one testator, Iohannes Casenus de Relis quondam Michaelis, chose to leave equal portions of three-fourths of his estate to his three brothers, Antonius, Percivale, and Laurencius, while he bequeathed

821 Presbyter Antoninus de Santurino, 8 October 1449; Franciscus de Recho quondam Antonii, emancipatus, 19 October 1488; Antonius de Thodi had wills drawn up on 11 April 1461 and 12 February 1463; Conradus de Porta (Widower), 14 June 1460; Marieta (Widow), 13 December 1461; and Marisa (Widow), 12 March 1487, respectively.

822 I am here defining close relatives as a small group of consanguines and affines, such as parents, siblings, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, sons-in-law, and sisters-in-law.

823 There is one testator in this group, Ansaldus Salamonus quondam Simonis, de Saona, who demonstrated that people in his position were not necessarily bound to choose only one of these three categories of heirs. Ansaldus divided his estate into three parts, leaving one-fourth of his property to his brother Raymundus de le Forunte, de Soana, one-fourth to another relative, Denero de Salamonus, and the remaining one-half of his property to the Hospital of Santa Maria of Savona (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, 307r-v, 10 March 1460).

824 Veri Francisci Gori (Unmarried), 9 November 1394; Bartholomeus de Stoprius (Unmarried), 19 April 1413; Nicolaus de Diano (Unmarried), 27 July 1450; Petrus Antonius Paterius (Unmarried), 23 October 1459; Conradus de Porta (Widower), 14 June 1460; Iohannes de Semino (Unmarried), 27 January 1461; Iohannes Casenus (Unmarried), 28 September 1473; and Franciscus de Recho quondam Antonii, emancipatus, 19 October 1488.

825 Veri Francisci Gori (Unmarried), 9 November 1394; Petrus Antonius Paterius (Unmarried), 23 October 1459; Conradus de Porta (Widower), 14 June 1460; Iohannes de Semino (Unmarried), 27 January 1461; and Franciscus de Recho quondam Antonii, emancipatus, 19 October 1488.
the remaining one-fourth to unnamed nieces and nephews, specifically the children of his brother Antonius.\textsuperscript{826} The two remaining testators, Bartholomeus de Stoprius quondam Iacobi de Galvesio and Nicolaus de Diano filius quondam Domini Magistri Nicolai phisici, chose their mothers to inherit the entirety of their respective estates.\textsuperscript{827}

Another five of these seventeen testators selected principal heirs who had no discernable blood tie to them whatsoever.\textsuperscript{828} There were, of course, friendship ties on Chios just as strong as anywhere else in the world, and it only stands to reason that the familial situations or personal motivations of particular testators would sometimes make it necessary to choose as heir a trusted friend or friends. This appears to have been the case in three of the five cases above, in which Thomas Raybaldus quondam Georgii, Benedictus Senaschus, oritus Pere et ad presentem habitator Chii, and Antonius quondam Turchii de Sergi, named as their heirs Raphael de Ingraberte quondam

\textsuperscript{826} ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Antonio Foglietta, Filza 843, 77r-v, 28 September 1473.

\textsuperscript{827} Curiously, the notary, Giovanni Balbi, did not give the name of Bartholomeus de Stoprius' mother, instead he simply recorded that: "heredem ipsius [Bartholomei] instituit et esse voluit et mandavit matrem ipsius testatoris." The notary Tommaso de Recco was more forthcoming when he redacted the will of Nicolaus de Diano, so we know that Nicolaus wanted his mother Bigeta to inherit his estate (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Giovanni Balbi, Filza 603, 26r-v, 19 April 1408 and ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 847, 372r-v, 27 July 1450, respectively).

\textsuperscript{828} Presbyter Antoninus de Santurino, 8 October 1449; Thomas Raybaldus (Unmarried), 10 January 1460; Benedictus Senaschus (Unmarried), 6 August 1461; Antonius (Unmarried), 24 January 1467; and Marisa (Widow), 12 March 1487.
Antonii, civis Ianue, Bartholomeus de Pulio quondam Iohannis, ad presentem burgensis Chii, and Andrea de Monaco quondam Bernardi, civis Ianue and Baptista de Vignana quondam Bernardi, habitator Chii, respectively.\textsuperscript{829} The only testator in this group to list a friend of the opposite sex as heir was the widow Marisa, filia Lodisii Serlis et uxor quondam Augusti de Famagusta, who selected Angelus de Ansermo to inherit the entirety of her property; however, the nature of their relationship is entirely unclear.\textsuperscript{830} Perhaps the most interesting testator of this group is the Presbyter Antoninus de Santurino, the only clerical representative in the entire sample of sixty-five wills. Antoninus’ chosen profession provides a reliable explanation for his status as unmarried and childless, and most likely informed many of the choices he made in his will concerning his worldly goods, as well. The presbyter’s close friendship with the Bishop of Chios, Leonardus Palavicinus, is also implied in his will. Antoninus placed much trust in the bishop, charging him with burying Antoninus in the Cathedral of Chios “wherever is pleasing to him therein,” as well as selecting Leonardus as his sole heir.\textsuperscript{831}

\textsuperscript{829} Thomas Raybaldus (Unmarried), 10 January 1460; Benedictus Senaschus (Unmarried), 6 August 1461; and Antonius (Unmarried), 24 January 1467.
\textsuperscript{830} ASG, Notai Ignoti, Busta 63, 129r, 12 March 1487.
\textsuperscript{831} Antoninus specified that: “[corpus suum] sepeliri voluit in Ecclesiam Episcopali in loco illo in quo placuerit Religiosissimo
The many pro anima bequests made by the testators of Chios make it clear that they were certainly just as concerned about the welfare of their souls as any other group of people. The island’s inhabitants, however, did not often leave the bulk of their goods to charity. The two unmarried and childless testators below are in fact the only ones in the entire sample to have done so. First, an examination of Isabella de Valencia’s will, which she made on 3 October 1488, makes it clear that she was either extremely concerned for her soul, had few friends and family to whom she could leave her property, or possibly both. She made numerous charitable bequests to the various churches and monasteries of Chios, including bequeathing twenty Turkish perpers to the Church of Santa Maria de Coronato for the celebration of masses for her soul. Isabella indeed gave much of her property to charitable institutions, but she reserved the majority of her goods for one in particular, the Hospital of San Antonio, which she named as her lone heir. The will of the other testator in this group, Marieta, filia

Domino Episcopo Chii” (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 847, 173r-v, 8 October 1449).

832 In reality, a third testator, Antonius de Thodi, also bequeathed the bulk of his property to “the poor people of the Lord Jesus Christ,” his is a special case that will be discussed later in this section.

833 ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Domenico de Algario, Filza 944, 521r-v, 3 October 1488.

834 “heredem [Isabella] instituit et esse voluit Hospitalem Sancti Anthonii qui est intus castellum Chii” (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Domenico de Algario, Filza 944, 521r-v, 3 October 1488).
quondam Iohannis de Luna, suggests that she had few close relatives of any kind to which to leave her property. She was a widow (uxor quondam Fredrici Imperialis), had no children, named no family members at all in her list of bequests, which might explain why she selected her stepson, Andrea de Spigno quondam Iohannis, as lone heir, but she made plain that he was not to enjoy the use of her property. Marieta charged Andrea, as her heir, with distributing the bulk of her estate to whichever charitable institutions that pleased him, for her soul “had gone astray” (anima ipsius testatricis est in errando). 835

The principal heirs chosen by the unmarried and childless testators of Chios make it clear that personal preference played a larger role in their decisions than in almost any other group of testators. This is not surprising, because their lack of spouses and offspring, ipso facto, significantly decreased any familial obligations that these household members may have imposed on a testator. People in this position were thus at greater liberty to select an heir from a much larger pool of candidates; this freedom also facilitated the process of changing heirs, if they found it necessary for some reason. The actions of one particular testator from

835 ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Domenico de Algario, Filza 944, unnumbered, 13 December 1461.
Genoese Chios provide clear evidence of how this very thing could occur as the circumstances of one's family changed. Antonius de Thodi quondam Laurentius, burgensis Chii, is the only testator on Chios for whom we have two wills, which he made on 11 April 1461 and 12 February 1463, respectively. In his first will, Antonius was very charitable, making many pro anima bequests to several churches on Chios, but far and away his favorite donee was the Dominican Church of Santa Maria. He was also unusually open about his personal life, acknowledging that he was expecting a child with his Russian servant (famula sua de progenie Rubeorum) Caterina, and that this was a well-known fact ([Caterina] gravida de ipso testatore et patetur ipsius testatoris). Antonius furthermore showed himself to be willing to provide for his future child, bequeathing to him or her a house in the city of Chios and sixty Chian ducats, but if the said child died before the age of fourteen, then the house and sixty ducats should pass to the Dominicans.

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636 Antonius, interestingly enough, used two different notaries for wills: first, Antonio Foglietta, and then Giovanni Battista de Ferrari (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Antonio Foglietta, Filza 843, 221r-v, 11 April 1461 and ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Giovanni Battista de Ferrari, Filza 886, 282r-v, 12 February 1463, respectively).

637 Antonius not only wished to be buried within this church, but also left 4 Chian ducats to the church for the singing of requiem masses, and 6 Chian ducats to a group he called the "Domini Disciplinatorum Sancte Marie civitate Chii" (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Antonio Foglietta, Filza 843, 221r-v, 11 April 1461).
living at the Church of Santa Maria. He was thus clearly concerned for his unborn child’s future, but, perhaps due to the illegitimacy of the child, he did not name him or her as principal heir. Antonius instead reserved this title for “the poor people of the Lord Jesus Christ,” which was a common, generic designation used by the testators of Chios to mean charity.

Antonius then made a second will nearly two years later, on 12 February 1463, in which he reiterated all of his last wishes and pro anima bequests he established in his first will, with one suggestive emendation. He no longer wished for the bulk of his estate to pass to “the poor people of the Lord Jesus Christ,” but instead named as his heirs, in equal portions, “the children of his nephew, Bartholomeus de Axerete” (filius et filia Bartholomei de Axerete nepotis sui). What might have

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838 I have included here the entire bequest for the sake of clarity: “Item: [Antonius] legavit postumo suo filio maschulo vel femine nastituro vel nascitur ex ipso testitore et Caterina ad presentem famula sua de progenie Rubeeorum et olim quondam Petri de Ferno gravida de ipso testatore et patetur ipsius testatoris domum unam ipsius testatoris posita in civitate Chii cui coheret a tribus partibus via publica et ab uno latere ortus Georgii Critopoli greci ac etiam ducatos sexaginta de bonis ipsius testatoris cum hac lege et conditione quod si dictus postumus vel postuma moriretur infra etatis annorum quatuordecim ex nunc prout ex tunc dictam domum legavit Ecclesie Sancte Marie de civitatis Chii in qua habitant Fratres Predicatores Ordinis Sancti Dominici dictos vero ducatos sexaginta” (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Antonio Foglietta, Filza 843, 221r-v, 11 April 1461).

839 The phrase “pauperes Domini mei Jesu Christi” is most frequently seen in the testators’ pro anima bequests, but also occasionally was used to denote principal heirs, as in this case (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Antonio Foglietta, Filza 843, 221r-v, 11 April 1461).

840 ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Giovanni Battista de Ferrari, Filza 886, 282r-v, 12 February 1463.
prompted Antonius to revise his will? Unfortunately, he did not offer any explanation for this revision, but it is probable that the answer at least partially lies in the enlargement of his nephew's household. Antonius initially mentioned his nephews Dominicus and Bartholomeus de Axereto in his first will, when he bequeathed to them a large vineyard containing a small house, as well as an orchard, both located on Chios. It is interesting to note that he made no reference to either of his nephews having children at that time, yet two years later Antonius' second will makes it clear that, by February of 1463, Bartholomeus had produced both a son and a daughter; the details of Dominicus' life during this period are entirely unclear. The most probably, although far from the only, explanation is that the unmarried and childless Antonius originally desired to leave the bulk of his property to charity, and indeed made his will in 1461 to express this very desire. The two years following 1461 saw his nephew Bartholomeus produce two children, however, which caused Antonius to reassess his earlier wishes and revise subsequently his will to reflect his new choice of heirs, i.e. his young

841 “Item: legavit Dominico et Bartholomeo de Axereto fratribus et fillis quondam Rafaelis et nepotibus dicti testatoris et habitatoribus Chii vineaam unam magnam cum domucula positam in insula Chii contracta vocata Psorni sub suis confirmibus ac etiam viridarium unum ipsius testatoris positum in insula Chii in loco vocata Vauasi sub confirmibus” (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Antonio Foglietta, Filza 843, 221r-v, 11 April 1461).
grand nephews. It is also a realistic possibility in this equation is that Bartholomeus’ had recently died, leaving two very young children for whom Antonius wished to provide. Antonius’ revised will thus provides us with rare insight into the family dynamics of at least one testator on Genoese Chios, and how changes in a family’s constitution could affect the decisions of its members.

Testators of different social ranks evinced very similar preferences for the types of heirs they chose. Thirty-two of the forty-one humble testators, or seventy-eight percent, selected one or more close relatives as their heirs. The remaining nine testators chose friends, charitable institutions, or some combination

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842 Veri Francisci Gori, 9 November 1394; Obertus (Widower), 5 November 1408; Sorleonus Salvayagus (Unknown), 17 October 1411; Bartholomeus de Stoprius (Unmarried), 19 April 1413; Iohannes Granellus (Unknown), 23 November 1449; Argenta (Married), 6 February 1450; Nicolaus de Diano (Unmarried), 27 July 1450; Iohannes Brexanus (Married), 12 February 1454; Nicolaus de Olianis (Married), 19 April 1456; Mecosa Iordanus (Widow), 24 May 1456; Guirardus de Carreto (Unknown), 7 March 1457; Marieta (Married), 4 July 1458; Francescudos de Portufino (Unknown), 30 January 1460; Adurninus de Illariis (Married), 23 March 1460; Conradus de Porta (Widower), 14 June 1460; Petrus de Bozollo (Married), 12 October 1460; Iacobus de Semino (Unmarried), 21 October 1460; Iohannes de Semino (Unmarried), 27 January 1461; Antonius de Gastardis (Remarried), 30 March 1461; Antonius de Thodi (Unknown), 11 April 1461 (and 12 February 1463); Benedictus Senaschus (Unmarried), 6 August 1461; Florentia (Widow) 22 December 1461; Marieta (Married), 18 February 1462; Guillemus Crania (Unknown), 5 August 1463; Maria Angelina (Widow), 28 October 1463; Antonius (Unmarried), 24 January 1467; Antonius Rubeus (Married), 11 November 1471; Guirardus de Plebetheti (Married), 19 March 1472; Iohannes Casenus (Unmarried), 20 September 1473; Lodisius de Primanelis Stochiali (Married), 3 January 1486; Laurentia, (Married), 7 March 1487; Iacobus de Marolo (Unmarried), 26 June 1492.

843 Presbyter Antoninus de Santurino, 8 October 1449; Thomas Raybaldus (Unmarried), 10 January 1460; Marisa (Widow), 12 March 1487; Isabella de Valencia, 3 October 1488; and Franciscus de Recho quondam Antonii, emancipatus, 19 October 1488.

844 Marieta (Widow), 13 December 1461; and Isabella de Valencia (Unmarried), 3 October 1488.
of close relatives and charitable institutions to inherit the bulk of their estates,\(^{845}\) thus making the percentage of close relatives’ total inheritance as a group even higher than the number above indicates. An even greater percentage of Chios’ wealthy testators preferred to have a close relative as heir. In fact, twenty of the twenty-one wills made by members of either a wealthy mercantile family or the island’s ruling elite chose a close relative to inherit.\(^{846}\) Many of these testators were married, had children, or both, thus limiting their options when it came time to appoint someone as principal heir. Other testators were unmarried, widowed, childless, or fell into some combination of these categories, which allowed them to exercise more personal preference when selecting an inheritor. It is very clear from the above numbers that, whoever the testator may

\(^{845}\) Antonius Pisis (Married), 8 November 1459; Ansaldus Salamonus (Unmarried), 10 March 1460; Margarita (Married); 21 May 1458; and Anna Ungari (Married), 15 September 1484.

\(^{846}\) The one dissenting testator in this group was Mariola, uxor Dominici Iustiniani quondam Bernardi, and there was a very good reason why she opted not to choose a relative as heir. I will discuss Mariola’s situation later in this section. The eighteen testators in question above were: Petrus Iustinianus (Unmarried), 31 August 1394; Genevra (Married), 10 November 1408; Georgius Paterius (Married), 11 March 1449; Paulus Iustinianus (Married) 20 July 1449; Blanchina de Furneto (Widow), 31 May 1456; Maria (Widow), 27 June 1456; Baptista Spinacius (Married), 25 September 1456; Nicolaus de Calcinara (Married), 17 October 1456; Baptista Gataluxius (Married), 11 May 1457; Bricius Iustinianus (Married), 20 May 1458; Petrus Antonius Paterius (Unmarried), 23 October 1459; Gregorius Iustinianus (Married), 4 December 1460; Marietina Iustiniana (Married), 13 March 1461; Mariolla (Widow), 22 August 1461; Petra (Married), 27 October 1472; Franciscus de Recho (Unmarried), 19 October 1488; Dominicus Iustinianus (Married), 10 April 1495; Petrus de Georgiis (Married), 21 October 1496; Sebrana Iustiniana (Widow), 28 January 1499; Petrus Iohannes (Married), 1 October 1499.
have been, the most important concern for most was to prevent their households' property from changing bloodlines. The wills clearly show that this necessity of preserving the patrimony within one's family was an all-pervasive concern for testators, cutting across boundaries of gender, marital and familial status, and social rank.

The testators of Chios, whether humble or wealthy, furthermore shared strongly the desire to pass their patrimonies to one type of close relative in particular: their sons. In fact, nearly all of the testators in the entire sample who had both legitimate sons and daughters excluded the latter from their list of heirs altogether.\textsuperscript{847} This finding is not in the least

\textsuperscript{847} There were three exceptions, but only one of the three testators left no possibility of a daughter’s subsequent removal from her list of heirs. This was the case of Marieta, \textit{burgesis Chii et uxor Pelegrini de Sancto Iohannes}, who recorded one son, Antonius, and two daughters, Catarineta and Nicoloxina, in her will. Every other testator in a similar situation showed that they would have named only Antonius, or possibly Antonius and her husband, as heir, but Marieta instead split her property equally among her three children and her husband. There is no indication of why Marieta did this, but this case demonstrates that even if testators on Chios had legitimate children of both sexes and were willing to name their daughter(s) as heirs, they did not shun their sons to do so. There were two other occasions on which testators included their daughters as heirs. Baptista Gataluxius \textit{quondam Domini Iuliani} chose his unnamed sons and daughters as his heirs (\textit{filii et filias ipsius testatoris}), but the fact that he did not include them by name suggests that he was possibly referring to children he may have in the future. The final testator in this group was Gregorius Justinianus \textit{quondam Domini Oberti}, who selected as his heirs in equal parts his daughters Mariola and Baptestina, as well as the child with whom his wife Curreneta was currently pregnant. He added the following condition to this arrangement, however: if the child was born a girl, she should inherit in equal share with her sisters, but, if the child was born a boy, he should become the sole heir to the estate (Marieta \textit{(Married)}, 4 July 1458; Baptista Gataluxius \textit{(Married)}, 12 February
surprising, because the inheritance of a testator’s estate by his or her sons ensured that this property would pass to the family’s younger generation intact and, what is more to the point, be in the possession of a male kin of that family. Nor is it surprising that Chios’ wealthiest testators made the most fervent efforts to achieve this end, for the constraints of status and lineage made the preservation of household property a more crucial issue for them than for those testators hailing from families of more humble means. Five of the nine testators who came from traditional Genoese patrician or mercantile non-aristocratic families (eight men and one women) had few options for their heirs. Two were unmarried without children and chose their brothers as heir, thus still making sure that their patrimoines remained in their respective nuclear families. Three others were all married with children of only one sex, and every one of them named their respective children as heirs. The Spectabilis Vir Petrus de Georgiis had five sons, who he wished to inherit equal portions of his estate. Georgius Paterius split his estate between his wife Katerina and only child Matheus, but made it clear

1463; and Gregorius Justinianus (Married), 4 December 1460, respectively).

848 ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, 169r-v, 23 October 1459 and ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Domenico de Algario, Filza 944, 533r-v, 19 October 1488.

849 ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Agostino Foglietta, Filza 1205, 359r-v, 21 October 1496.
that he only included Katerina as an heir because Matheus was five years old.\textsuperscript{850} Finally, Nicolaus de Calcinara also split his estate between his daughter Thedorina, uxor Antonii Pisis, and wife Marieta, but it is probable that he here included his wife in the hope that she could redistribute his property for him should they produce any future children, especially a son.\textsuperscript{851} Another testator in this group, Baptista Gataluxius quondam Domini Iuliani, is an unusual case, because he chose his unnamed sons and daughters as his heirs (filii et filias ipsius testatoris), but the fact that he did not include them by name suggests that he was possibly referring to children he and his wife Blanchina may have in the future.\textsuperscript{852}

The final three wealthy testators had multiple children of both sexes, and thus had a real choice to make when naming an heir. They chose, in every case, to exclude their daughters from inheritance. This is not to say, however, that they left their daughters entirely empty-handed. The Spectabilis Vir and medicus doctor Petrus Iohannes had six children, all of whom were legitimate: Iohannes; Andrea; Lodixius; Mara; Mariola; and Ypolita. He named his four sons as equal heirs in

\textsuperscript{850} ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 847, 41r, 11 March 1449.\textsuperscript{851} ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Bernardo de Ferrari, Filza 764, 259r-v, 17 October 1456.\textsuperscript{852} ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, 195r-v, 11 May 1457.
his will, but also charged his wife Caterneta and his executors with dowering his two daughters appropriately from his property when it came time for them to marry; he thus avoided leaving them with nothing. The second and third testators, Baptista Spinacius quondam Bartholomei and his widow Mariolla, filia quondam Iacobi Rubei, are, for the purposes of the current discussion, the most interesting of the group. Baptista was first to make his will, on 25 September 1456, in which he acknowledged having a total of five children: a legitimate son named Iacobetus; two unnamed legitimate daughters; and two unnamed illegitimate daughters. He named as equal heirs his only son Iacobetus and his wife Mariola, but also bequeathed 200 ducats to each of his legitimate daughters and 25 ducats to each of his illegitimate daughters, thus providing us with interesting insight into how he valued them. Baptista also made it clear that this money was simply a gift and not meant to constitute their dowries, which might explain why he did not find it necessary to include these daughters by name.\footnote{ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, 78r-v, 25 September 1456.}

The familial dynamics of this household became even clearer when Mariola, now Baptista’s widow, made her own will almost five years later. Mariola still named Iacobetus as her heir, but also added his siblings
Francischeta and Bernardinus, neither of whom Baptista named in his earlier will. It is unclear why she only mentions one of her two daughters, but the wording of Mariola's will makes certain that Francischeta is in fact one of the unnamed legitimate daughters mentioned by Baptista. The diminutive name Bernardinus, combined with the fact that Baptista failed to mention him, also suggest that he was born in between his parents' two wills. Earlier in this chapter I discussed the possibility that a childless wife opted for her husband as heir in the hope that any future children they may have would one day inherit the estate through him. The wills of Baptista and Mariola above illustrate clearly that husbands could also benefit from this strategy and quite effectively preserve a household's property for its future generations. Mariola's status as her husband's heir put her in a position to provide for any children born to Baptista's household after his death, such as Bernardinus. Her control of the household's property also benefitted her legitimate daughter Francischeta, who Baptista had failed to dower five years earlier. Mariola remedied this in her will by dowering her daughter an

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854 The notary recorded several times in this will that Francischeta was "filia sua [Mariola] et dicti quondam Baptiste" (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Domenico de Algario, Filza 944, unnumbered, 22 August 1461).
855 See pages 410-1 of this chapter.
unspecified amount from the profits of the family’s ten shares it held in the Bank of St. George in Genoa.\footnote{Mariola provided Francisceta’s dowry from “loca decem comperarum Sancti Georgii in Ianua” (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Domenico de Algario, Filza 944, unnumbered, 22 August 1461).}

The ruling elite of Chios were certainly no less desirous than the non-ruling elite to ensure that their patrimony remained both intact and in the possession of their sons. All but one of the Iustiniani testators\footnote{There are a total of twelve Iustiniani testators in the sample (five men and seven women), whose marital statuses and family situations were as follows: Petrus Iustinianus (Unmarried with one illegitimate daughter), 31 August 1394; Genevra (Married with no children), 10 November 1408; Paulus Iustinianus (Married with seven sons and three daughters), 20 July 1449; Blanchina de Furneto (Widow with three sons), 31 May 1456; Maria (Widow with two sons), 27 June 1456; Bricius Iustinianus (Married with two legitimate sons, two legitimate daughters, and one illegitimate daughter), 20 May 1458; Gregorius Iustinianus (Married with two daughters and one child on the way), 4 December 1460; Marietina Iustiniana (Married eith one daughter and one child on the way), 13 March 1461; Petra (Married with no children), 27 October 1472; Mariola (Married with one son), 10 April 1495; Dominicus Iustinianus (Married with one son), 10 April 1495; Sebrana Iustiniana (Widow with one daughter), 28 January 1499.} who had at least one son when they made their will, or four out of five, selected all of their sons as equal heirs and none of their daughters.\footnote{Paulus Iustinianus (Married), 20 July 1449; Blanchina de Furneto (Widow), 31 May 1456; Maria (Widow), 27 June 1456; Bricius Iustinianus (Married), 20 May 1458.} The above statistic is deceiving, however, because there was a clear motivation for Mariola Iustiniana, filia quondam Gasparis Iustiniani, not to name her son Leonardinus as heir: her husband Dominicus Iustinianus quondam Bernardi had already done so. The wills of Mariola and Dominicus represent the only set in the entire sample made by a husband and wife while both were still alive, but they
are also important for the insight they provide into how a married couple could work together both to pass household property to a male heir and also simultaneously to care for the spiritual well-being of its members. Mariola was the first to make her will on 10 April 1495, in which she expressed the unusual desire to leave her entire dowry of 1000 Chian ducats to her husband, Dominicus Iustinianus quondam Bernardi, and then named as her only heir “the poor people of Christ” (pauperes Christi), both for her and her husband’s souls (pro anima dicti Dominici Iustiniani supradicti viri eius et sua). \(859\)

If only her will existed, we would have no knowledge that she in fact had a son named Leonardinus, for she did not even once mention him in it. This must however have been intentional, because only two folios later in the register of the same notary, her husband, the Egregius Dominicus Iustinianus quondam Bernardi made his will. He reciprocated Mariola’s earlier gesture by bequeathing her dowry of 1000 Chian ducats to her, and then selecting a total of six heirs: his five brothers and his son Leonardinus. \(860\) These two wills, when examined together, are suggestive of several things. It is initially

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\(859\) The notary recorded that: “Item: [Mariola] Legavit et reliquit Dominico Iustiniano supradicto viro eius ducatos mille Chii de dote ipsius testatricis” (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Agostino Foglietta, Filza 1205, 292r-v, 10 April 1495).

\(860\) The names of his five brothers are: Ottobonus; Jeronimus; Jacobus; Gregorius; and Blanesius (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Agostino Foglietta, Filza 1205, 294r, 10 April 1495).
interesting to note that Mariola’s will is much longer than Dominicus’ and also contains several very large pro anima bequests, while her husband’s contains none. In fact, Dominicus’ will is one of the shortest in the sample, containing only the obligatory provisions for his burial location and funeral expenses, as well as the abovementioned return of Mariola’s dowry and his choice of heirs. The evidence would thus suggest that this married couple planned for the future well-being of their household by making their wills in concert, especially since they drew them up with the same notary, and on the same day. Mariola’s pro anima bequests made the necessary spiritual arrangements for her soul, yet she also made her husband a spiritual beneficiary of her will when she chose to leave the bulk of her property to pious causes. These decisions did not in any way affect the transfer of the estate to her lone son, however, because she knew that her husband Dominicus, who was presumably present, planned to select Leonardinus as heir in his will. Dominicus indeed did just that directly after Mariola made her will, but their son’s name suggests that he was a minor, which possibly explains his decision also to include his brothers as heirs.

Mariola appears to have been very fond of the Franciscan Church of San Francesco de Chio, because all of her pro anima bequests focused on it, including an enormous bequest for the celebration of 1000 requiem masses (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Agostino Foglietta, Filza 1205, 292r-v, 10 April 1495).
Two of the four Iustiniani testators having only daughters, one man and one woman, furthermore evinced at least a preference for a male heir, whether this would in the end be possible or not. Marietina Iustiniana, filia quondam Domini Georgii Paterii et uxor Egregii Salvatii Iustiniani quondam Domini Boniferii, had one daughter with her husband, but did not choose her as heir, instead selecting the child she was then carrying.\textsuperscript{862} There are two possible explanations for Marietina's decision, the most likely being that her daughter Blanchineta was married.\textsuperscript{863} Blanchineta had become a member of her husband's family when she married him, so there was little motivation to name her as a principal heir; this course of action by Marietina would, in effect, be a voluntary diminishment of her own household. Yet, also influential in Marietina's decision must have been, on some level, the chance that her unborn child would be a boy. It may not have been the decisive factor, but, given that sons were the heir of preference for a large majority of Chios' testators, it is a reasonable possibility.

Gregorius Iustinianus quondam Domini Oberti expressed a much stronger desire to ensure that his son

\textsuperscript{862} ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Bernardo de Ferrari, Filza 764, 475r-v, 13 March 1461.
\textsuperscript{863} Marietina recorded that her daughter was married to Baptista Gioardi (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Bernardo de Ferrari, Filza 764, 475r-v, 13 March 1461).
would inherit his estate. This would not have been even the slightest of issues for Gregorius, except for the fact that he did not have a son! He and his wife Curreneta only had two daughters, Mariola and Baptestina, who he nevertheless named as equal heirs to the bulk of his estate in his will. Gregorius does not fail to declare that this arrangement could change in the future, however, because his wife Curreneta was heavy with child (gravida). He then expressed his wish that if the child were a girl, she should inherit with her older sisters an equal portion of the estate, but, if the child were a boy, then he should become lone heir and his daughters should receive whatever portion of the estate is deemed appropriate by his wife, in conjunction with the executors, tutors, and curators of the estate.864

The remaining two Iustiniani testators who had only daughters evinced no discernable desire for a male inheritor at all. Sebrana Iustiniana, uxor quondam Gasparis Iustiniani quondam Paridis, was the only one with a legitimate child, who happened to be the same

864 Gregorius named as his heirs: "Mariolam et Baptestinam filias suas et dicte Currenete equis porcionibus et quia dicta Curreneta uxor sua est gravida voluit et legavit et mandavit quod si pariet filiam quam ipsa filia sit heres una cum predictis Mariola et Baptestina equis porcionibus...et si ipsa Curreneta pariet filium masculum quam tunc et eo causo ipse filius masculus sit universalis heres ipsius testatoris et quod dicte Mariola et Baptestina datentur et dotari debeant de bonis ipsius testatoris quantum prout videbitur et placuerit dicte Currenete et maiori infrascriptorum fideicommissariorum et tutorium et curatorium" (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Tommaso de Recco, Filza 848, 507r-v, 4 December 1460).
Mariola, uxor Dominici Iustiniani quondam Bernardi, from the earlier discussion.\textsuperscript{865} Sebrana made her will nearly four years after her daughter, in which she named her daughter as the sole principal heir to her property. Her status as a widow, combined with the fact that Mariola was her only child, must have made this an easy decision for Sebrana.\textsuperscript{866} The question of who to pick as his heir must also have been an easy one to answer for Petrus Iustinianus olim de Rocha quondam Simonis. Catalina, Petrus' filia naturalis and only child, was not a serious consideration for heir, and his unmarried status denied him even the possibility of naming his spouse as heir. His mother Luchina Iustiniana was his closest living relative, and this must have been the reason that Petrus chose her as one of his two heirs. Petrus' motivation for also naming as heir his former sister-in-law Petrina (uxor quondam Simonis fratris sui) is even more apparent. The clause in which he declared his heir contains the following condition: "[Petrus] established and wished his universal heirs to be Luchina Iustiniana, the mother of the testator, and Petrina, wife of his late brother Simone, who live as widows with their children. If the said Petrina wishes neither to remain with her children nor to lead a life of widowhood, however, he then

\textsuperscript{865} See pages 427-30 of this chapter.
\textsuperscript{866} ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Agostino Foglietta, Filza 1205, 356r-v, 28 January 1499.
established the said Luchina as his heir for the rest of her life. After her death, he wished the same children of his said late brother Simone inherit." It is clear from this clause that Petrus was providing his sister-in-law Petrina with an incentive to remain a widow in the form of one-half of his patrimony. If Petrina wished to remarry, she would consequently lose her claim to that portion of Petrus’ patrimony, and his mother Luchina would become sole heir to her son’s estate until her death. It would thus appear that Petrus used his will to protect not only his own household, but also that of his late brother, Simone.

The two Iustinianae women who complete this examination of the ruling elite’s testators were both married with no children. Genevra, filia quondam Iohannis Iustiniani olim de Furneto, named as heir her husband Iohannes, filius Georgii delo Granuati, although with the understanding that if Iohannes should predecease

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I have given the entire clause here for the sake of clarity, with the relevant sections italicized: “Reliquorum vero bonorum tam mobilium quam immobilem, iurium, actionum undecumque et promodocumque et qualitercumque eidem testatori spectancium et pertinencium vel quolibet descendencium sibi universales heredes instituit et esse voluit Luchinam Justinianam matris ipsius testatoris et Petrinam uxorem quondam Simonis fratris sui, ipsas stantes in habitu viduali cum eorum filliis. [Si] vero dicta Petrina non velet stare cum filliis suis nec vitam vidualem ducere, [tu]nc et eo casu dictam Luchinam in [...] instituit sibi heredem in vita sua [quam]diu vixerit; post vero mortem [eius] voluit quod eisdem sucedant et sucedere [debea]nt fillie dicti quondam Simonis fratris sui [...] porcione” (This will is published in Michel Balard, ed., Notai genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Chio da Donato di Chiavari (17 Febbraio-12 Novembre 1394) (Genoa: Università di Genova, 1988), no. 76, 209-11).
her, then any child produced by their marriage in the future should inherit; Genevra presumably hoped that Iohannes would make the same arrangement if she predeceased him.\textsuperscript{868} Domina Petra, filia quondam Petri Justiniani, likewise named her husband, Dominus Magister Qualicus de Franchis, as her heir, but without any provision for an heir in the second degree if something should happen to Petrus.\textsuperscript{869} The fact that both of these women selected their husbands as their sole heirs is not in the least surprising, considering their familial circumstances, but it is interesting to note that neither of their husbands were Iustiniani. In other words, they chose to leave the bulk of their household property to a close relative of their nuclear families over all others. The choices of these two Iustinianae women are thus illustrative of those made by the ruling elite as a group. The Iustiniani testators evinced, in general, a clear desire for their sons to be principal heirs, but, if this was not a possibility, then a close relative, preferably from their nuclear family. This observation is significant, because it establishes that the Iustiniani's devotion to their extended family was not

\textsuperscript{868} The notary recorded that, as her heir, Genevra: "instituit et esse voluit dictum Iohannem eius virem si vixerit et si non vixerit heredum futurum vel heredes futuros ipsius dicte Genevre" (ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Giovanni Balbi, Filza 603, 430r-v, 10 November 1408).

\textsuperscript{869} ASG, Notai Antichi, not. Antonio Foglietta, Filza 843, 51r, 27 October 1472.
absolute. Its members' desire to preserve the patrimonies of their individual nuclear families trumped any allegiance they may have had to the extended Iustinianus family as a whole.

Conclusions

The testamentary evidence from fifteenth century Genoese Chios shows that it was very common for husbands to return dowries to their wives, thus fulfilling the letter of Genoese law, but offer them no additional gift. It is true that some husbands bequeathed more to their wives than Genoese law required, but the additional gift was always in the form of moveable property, not immovable property. The evidence also shows that those husbands who were more likely to return dowries were also those who bequeathed a smaller portion of their estate to their wives. Furthermore, an examination of women as principal heirs demonstrates that few married male testators wished for a women to inherit the majority of their estates, and only a few gave them as much as half of it. Married men were therefore generally forthcoming in regard to the return of their wives' dowries, but not nearly as inclined to leave them a large share of their estates.
The social rank of a married male testator did not significantly affect the likelihood that he would return his wife's dowry. Men of both wealthy and humble households returned their wives' dowries very frequently, in fact, around three-fourths and two-thirds of the time, respectively. Both wealthy and humble men also made provisions for their wives in widowhood beyond just the dowry at about the same rate, and the gifts were sometimes of rather substantial proportions. Two wealthy testators, for example, each bequeathed to their wives one-half of their estates on top of their dowries, while a pair of humble testators left their wives one-fifth of the estate and a large amount of cash, respectively. It is furthermore important to note that the Iustiniani married men are the only group of testators who returned their wives' dowries one hundred percent of the time, as opposed to the non-ruling elite's sixty percent and the humble men's sixty-four percent. The identities of these Iustiniani men's wives could account for the disparity among the social ranks, for every single one of them was also an Iustiniana, and thus hailed from the same extended family group. This familiarity and commonality with their respective wives' households undoubtedly made these husbands more apt to return their dowries, because, unlike most married testators on Chios, their concern was
not preventing the transference this property to an unassociated household. They were instead redistributing some of their "nuclear" households' assets within the structure of a larger extended family.

The wills, by their very nature and purpose, almost certainly underestimate the number of children on Chios, but nevertheless still record many who figured into their relatives' inheritance plans. Testators with legitimate children overwhelmingly chose them as their principal heirs, and this was a choice that transcended boundaries of gender, marital status, and social rank. The options of those testators with an only child or children of the same gender were relatively limited in this regard, so it is not surprising or particularly revealing that they chose their children as heirs. Those testators with multiple children of both sexes had more to consider, however, thus making their selection of heirs more indicative. This group of testators clearly preferred their legitimate sons as heirs, but not necessarily to the exclusion of their daughters. Parents often bequeathed significant moveable property to their daughters, and some made arrangements for their daughter's future dowries. There was furthermore a direct correlation between a daughter receiving a dowry and her name appearing among her parent's principal
heirs. In fact, every testator who chose not to name their daughters principal heirs made arrangements in their wills for their future dowering, while, conversely, every testator who included their sons and daughters as equal heirs to their property made no mention of dowering their respective daughters. It is thus evident that that marital status was at least one determinant of how daughters factored into their parents’ inheritance plans.

A lack of children gave married testators fewer household obligations to meet, as well as more freedom when choosing an heir, but they still generally preferred a close relative for the position. Childless married men opted for brothers over their wives as heirs in order to avoid the transference of the bulk of their property to their spouses’ families. The majority of childless wives instead chose their husbands as heirs, more than likely because they had little control over any household property other than their dowry and antefacta. But, it was also possible that they did so in the hope that any children they may have in the future would eventually inherit most household property through their husbands. The principal heirs chosen by unmarried and childless testators make it clear that personal preference played a larger role in their decisions than in almost any other group of testators. Indeed, the lack of spouses and
offspring, ipso facto, significantly decreased any familial obligations that these household members may have imposed on a testator. They were thus at greater liberty to select an heir from a much larger pool of candidates, which is reflected in the wide variety of heirs they chose. This freedom also facilitated the process of changing heirs, if they for some reason found it necessary to do so, as the case of Antonius de Thodi demonstrated.

This sample of wills from Genoese Chios, as a whole, illustrates the fact that, from whatever social rank a testator might have hailed, the most important concern for most was to preserve his or her household property within the family bloodline, and especially that of the nuclear family. This was an all-pervasive concern for testators, cutting across boundaries of gender, marital and familial status, and social rank. Related to this was the strong desire of the testators to pass their patrimonies, if at all possible, to a close relative, and, in particular, their legitimate sons. Nearly all of those men and women whose family circumstances allowed for this possibility did just that. It was the wealthy testators of Chios in particular, however, who made the most fervent efforts to achieve this end. The constraints of status and lineage made the preservation
of household property a more crucial issue for wealthy testators than for those hailing from families of more humble means. The Iustiniani testators likewise evinced a clear desire for their sons to be principal heirs, but, if this was not a possibility, then a close relative, preferably from their nuclear family. This observation shows that the Iustiniani's devotion to their extended family was not absolute. Its members' desire to preserve the patrimonies of their individual nuclear families trumped any allegiance they may have had to the extended Iustinianus family as a whole. The first family of government and authority on Genoese Chios, did after all originate as a group of allied families whose members adopted the common surname of Iustinianus. The Iustiniani may indeed have adopted a common surname, but the members of this family tree identified themselves more closely with their particular branch than with the trunk.
CHAPTER VI

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

If the stability of a government can be gauged by the degree to which it is able to maintain public order and control violence, then a comparison of the political landscapes of Venice and Genoa in the Later Middle Ages finds that the former city's government was the more stable of the two. It is relatively clear that Venice was more effective in providing its citizens with these securities than was Genoa. A possible explanation for this lay in several significant differences in the development of the two cities' political infrastructures. The outgrowth of the Venetian Commune from the city's old ducal system of government reorganized, but did not dismantle, the city's system of rule, thus helping the city to transition more easily to a new form of government by preserving a link to the past. The elevation of the doge to a place of privilege in the imagination of the Venetian state, also played an important role in maintaining confidence and bolstering the city's self-image, while his person served as a

870 John Najemy has called these two abilities "the indispensable and primary responsibilities of all governments" (John M. Najemy, "Governments and Governance," in Italy in the Age of the Renaissance, 1300-1550, edited by John M. Najemy [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004], 195-6).
visual representation of its continuity, which served to stabilize and strengthen the system. Venice’s patronage of St. Mark was also a stabilizing factor for the city, and a figure around whom its citizens could rally as a symbol of continuity, divine approval, civic patriotism and unity, and common purpose. Furthermore, the Venetian Commune’s establishment on a solid base of councils, magistrates, and offices provided it even more stability, and gave its administrative apparatus the flexibility necessary to adapt and respond to changing circumstances, whether internal or external to the Commune. The unitary nature of the Venetian structure of government was especially significant, because it ensured that it was never the source of power that changed, but rather the locus from which power emanated within the existing governmental structure.

The development of Genoa’s political infrastructure followed a significantly different path than that of Venice. The Genoese erected their Commune on top of the existing governments of local neighborhoods, thus establishing an entirely new system of government to which they had difficulty transitioning; the new government did not imbue its citizens with a sense of continuity. The Genoese consuls furthermore had none of the tradition and prestige of the Venetian doge. Their
offices were established contemporaneously with the new Commune, thus possessing no link to the city’s past, and their one year terms also denied them any possibility of comparison with the Venetian doges in terms of longevity, who served a lifetime term in office. The devotion of the Genoese to St. George never led to the development of a unified cult in his honor in Genoa, as the devotion to St. Mark did in Venice. The existence of such a cult, if Venice’s experience is taken as a model, could have given the Genoese a charismatic core from which to derive a sense of civic unity and purpose. Nor was the worship of St. George ever integrated as deeply into Genoese state functions as St. Mark was in those of Venice, thus depriving the government of a potentially important symbol of strength, stability, and divine approval. The Genoese Commune, as at least a partial result of the above observations, suffered greatly from a fundamental lack of flexibility, which allowed internal strife to rack the city intensely and consistently. The intense fighting amongst the city’s powerful families was institutionalized, in a sense, as they scrambled for positions of power. The top positions of the Commune became increasingly concentrated over time in the hands of the most powerful noble families, who drew clear factional lines within the ruling class and dissolved any
sense of political stability in the city. Factionalism was thus deeply ingrained in Genoa’s political culture at an early date and was a large factor in the city’s inability to work within its governmental structure to resolve political conflict. The clearest indication of just how violently and consistently factional fighting affected the city is the astonishing fact that the Genoese willingly ceded their city to a foreign power on numerous occasions in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. It is certainly a rare occurrence in history for a city or nation to give up its authority voluntarily to a foreign power, but the fact that the Genoese found it necessary to take this drastic step speaks to how desperate they were for political stability and order.

There were thus many factors, both internal and external, that had contributed to the varying levels of effectiveness and adaptability evinced by the Venetian and Genoese states during the Later Middle Ages. It is also clear that the political landscapes of these cities affected how their colonies were administered. The colonial administrations of Venetian Crete and Genoese Chios differed significantly in structure, and the role of these cities’ governments in the affairs of their respective colonies was at the center of this difference. Venice maintained authority over Crete by participating
intimately in the governance of the island and closely supervising its administration on the ground. Genoa, on the other hand, governed Chios by effectively delegating its authority over the island to a private association of ship owners, the future Mahona of Chios, which was granted the right to exploit the island's fruits as it saw fit. The utilization of such different approaches to colonial administration, i.e. Venice's centralization versus Genoa's delegation of authority, was the direct result of the relative political stability of the Venetian and Genoese states. Venice's flexible and adaptive system of governance provided a firm base from which to administer effectively and efficiently a large colony such as Crete, even from a great distance. The factionalism and insolvency which constantly plagued Genoa made any attempt to rule Chios in the same manner impossible.

These different structures of authority in turn affected the processes of administration on Chios and Crete and also the nature of the relationships which developed between the governing and the governed on the respective islands. In general, both governments crossed boundaries of religion and ancestry in order to allow the Greeks and Jews of the islands to participate in, and facilitate the functioning of, colonial government.
Venice was however less willing to allow the indigenous populations of Crete access to positions of responsibility within its administration than were the Genoese on Chios. This finding corresponds well with earlier discussions of the closely supervised manner in which Venice administered its *stato da mar*. The strong and authoritative presence of the home city on Crete emulated in many ways Venice itself, and it would not be in keeping with the city's custom of restricting foreigners' access to Venetian power if the colonial government allowed non-Latins to hold posts of responsibility. It also conversely illustrates the adaptability, flexibility, and practicality of the Genoese Mahona, who had little involvement from its home government with which to contend. The use of non-Latins thus served a practical purpose for the Genoese by providing them with a larger pool from which to draw officials, seeing as Genoa did not regularly furnish them for Chios as Venice did for Crete. Yet, the placement of non-Latins in positions of responsibility could have also served to facilitate the Mahona's task of preserving public order on the island. Necessary administrative duties performed by members of their own groups may have helped to minimize the hostility of the local Greek and Jewish populations to the Mahona.
The political landscapes of Genoa and Venice affected the form that their colonial administrations took on Chios and Crete, respectively, which in turn affected the nature of the relationships these administrations forged with the colonies' indigenous populations. A more detailed examination of life on Genoese Chios in particular also demonstrates that the colony's rulers played a role in shaping social relations among the Latin households on the island. It is of course very significant, in this regard, that the families of the New Mahona of Chios took the common surname Iustiniani sometime after 1362. Yet, the notarial evidence regarding marriage and inheritance patterns on Chios also shows that, after having done so, the Iustiniani families often acted to protect their property by largely distributing it internally. Iustiniani fathers, for example, who offered their daughters to a fellow Iustinianus in marriage, were in fact likely to provide them with a dowry value four times greater than that of those Iustiniani daughters who married outside of the ruling elite. This suggests that a determining factor in the dowry values of the ruling elites' daughters was the household from which the groom hailed. Men of both wealthy and humble households returned their wives' dowries very frequently in their
wills, but the Iustiniani men are the only group of testators who returned their wives’ dowries one hundred percent of the time.

The above evidence suggests that, to some degree, the Iustiniani combined elements of politics and the family to create a new, broader understanding of what constituted a household on Genoese Chios. Whatever the reason may have been for these families to form such an association, the Iustiniani present an example of consanguineous kin groups entering into a relationship for the purpose of protecting and pursuing common interests, thus creating a family-style bond among them. When these families took a common surname they did nothing less than create a new, if somewhat extended, family group that was based not on blood, but instead on a common sense of purpose. The Iustiniani’s devotion to this extended family was not absolute, however. The testators of the ruling elite, just like those of all other social ranks, evinced a clear desire for their sons to be principal heirs, but, if this was not a possibility, then a close relative, preferably from their nuclear family. This suggests that the Iustiniani’s desire to preserve the patrimonies of their individual nuclear families trumped any allegiance they may have had to the extended Iustinianus family as a whole; it would
also explain why its members continued to record their original surnames in documents along with Iustinianus. The evidence shows that, to whatever degree the Iustiniani allied themselves to their extended family group, the public and private spheres of life were not mutually exclusive on Genoese Chios. There was a relationship between the institutional structure of the colony, on the one hand, and the households in which people of the ruling elite lived, on the other. The preceding pages have sought to clarify, at least somewhat, the nature of that relationship.
Appendix A

Concessions of Age (Venia Aetatis) Granted on
Genoese Chios, 1381-1461
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notary</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Grantor</th>
<th>Grantee</th>
<th>Age Description</th>
<th>Nature of the Concession</th>
<th>Reason for the Concession</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antonio Fellone¹</td>
<td>2/9/1381</td>
<td>Deputy Podesta</td>
<td>Theodorus Tetragoniti</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>Not Given</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donato de Clavaro²</td>
<td>5/29/1394</td>
<td>Not Given</td>
<td>Ellias Gripioti (Iudeus)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>To dispose of inheritance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donato de Clavaro</td>
<td>7/30/1394</td>
<td>Not Given</td>
<td>Iane Demerode (Burgensis Peyre)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>To receive a dowry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernardo de Ferrari</td>
<td>10/3/1450</td>
<td>Deputy Podesta</td>
<td>Angelus de Rimini</td>
<td>18-25 years old</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>To engage in business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tommaso de Recco</td>
<td>12/1/1450</td>
<td>Deputy Podesta</td>
<td>Gregorius de Sibilia (olim habitatorum et burgensium Chii)</td>
<td>18-25 years old</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>Not Given</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tommaso de Recco</td>
<td>4/27/1458</td>
<td>Deputy Podesta</td>
<td>Iane Politi quondam Neamoniti</td>
<td>18-25 years old</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>Not Given</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tommaso de Recco</td>
<td>9/3/1459</td>
<td>Podestà</td>
<td>Iacobinus de Franchis Luxardus quondam Marchixii</td>
<td>18-25 years old</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>To engage in business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tommaso de Recco</td>
<td>9/20/1459</td>
<td>Podestà</td>
<td>Constans Carnoni (Grecus)</td>
<td>18-25 years old</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>Not Given</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Tommaso de Recco | 10/16/1459 | Deputy Podesta | Ieronimus de Garbarino quondam Iohannis | 18-25 years old | General | Not Given |
| Tommaso de Recco | 11/20/1459 | Deputy Podesta | Iohannes Iustinianus quondam Bartholomei | 18-25 years old | General | Not Given |
| Tommaso de Recco | 12/7/1459 | Deputy Podesta | Barnabus Paterius quondam Petri | 18-25 years old | General | Not Given |
| Tommaso de Recco | 1/3/1460 | Deputy Podesta | Baptista de Eliano de Ovado (Burgenses Chii) | 18-25 years old | Limited | To engage in business |
| Tommaso de Recco | 2/7/1460 | Not Given | Iohannes Antonius Iustinianus (filius Francisci) | None | Limited | To dispose of inheritance |
| Tommaso de Recco | 5/15/1460 | Deputy Podesta | Simon Iustinianus quondam Ambrosii | 18-25 years old | General | Not Given |
| Tommaso de Recco | 8/4/1460 | Deputy Podesta | Iohannes Iustinianus quondam Dominici | 18-25 years old | General | Not Given |
| Bernardo de Ferrari | 11/3/1461 | Deputy Podesta | Georgius de Franchi Turturinus quondam Andrea | 18-25 years old | General | Not Given |
Appendix B

Boys Emancipated on Genoese Chios, 1403-1486
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notary</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Emancipator (Ratified in every case by the deputy Podesta)</th>
<th>Emancipated</th>
<th>Age Description</th>
<th>Reason for Emancipation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Giorgio Panissaro</td>
<td>10/27/1403</td>
<td>Not Given</td>
<td>Nicolaus de Via</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>To stand as a witness to an arbitrated dispute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tommaso de Recco</td>
<td>12/1/1450</td>
<td>Aloisius de Sibilia</td>
<td>Gregorius de Sibilia (filius quondam Aloisii de Sibilia) (both olim habitatorum et burgensium Chii)</td>
<td>18-25 years old</td>
<td>To engage in business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tommaso de Recco</td>
<td>6/16/1450</td>
<td>Batista de Furneto</td>
<td>Thomas de Furneto (civis Ianue et filius domini Batiste)</td>
<td>22 years old</td>
<td>Not Given</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernardo de Ferrari</td>
<td>8/31/1450</td>
<td>Baptista Matinus Pesagius</td>
<td>Iohannes Marinus Pesagius (filius de Baptiste)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>To hand over 2000 Genoese lire to Iohannes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tommaso de Recco</td>
<td>7/22/1457</td>
<td>Bernardus de Malta (civis Ianue)</td>
<td>Constantinus de Malta (filius ipsius Bernardi)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Not Given</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tommaso de Recco</td>
<td>12/17/1459</td>
<td>Teramus de Moneglia</td>
<td>Iohannes de Moneglia (filius ipsius Terami)</td>
<td>14 years old</td>
<td>His sister, Bianchinetta, had died in Mitylene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tommaso de Recco</td>
<td>6/25/1460</td>
<td>Bartholomeus de Garibaldo (burgensis Chii)</td>
<td>Antonius de Garibaldo (filius ipsius Bartholomei)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Not Given</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Recipient Details</td>
<td>Recipient</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernardo de Ferrari</td>
<td>10/31/1461</td>
<td>Dominus Thomas Justinianus quondam Andrea (civis Ianue)</td>
<td>Raffael Justinianus (filius suus)</td>
<td>To hand over 200 Chian ducats to Raffael</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico de Algaro/Niccolo Torriglia</td>
<td>9/4/1484</td>
<td>Iohannes de Via</td>
<td>Petrus et Franciscus de Via (fratres et filii Iohannis)</td>
<td>To undertake the purchase of a ship on behalf of Albertus de Castello for 224 florens</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agostino Foglietta</td>
<td>1/18/1486</td>
<td>Petrus Antonius Draperius (burgensis Chii et pater Martineti)</td>
<td>Martinetus Draperius (filius Petri)</td>
<td>25 years old</td>
<td>To transfer to Martinetus a shop owned by his father</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C

A List of Dowries from Genoese Chios, 1394-1495
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notary</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Father/Dowry Provider</th>
<th>Wife</th>
<th>Husband</th>
<th>Dowry Content (M = Movable Goods; I = Immovable Goods)</th>
<th>Counterdower (Antefactu m)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donatus de Clavaro</td>
<td>3/24/1394</td>
<td>Iohanes de Costa</td>
<td>Marieta (filia quondam Iohanis)</td>
<td>Nicolaus Francus quondam</td>
<td>250 Chian perpers</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Georgii Carvegni Franci</td>
<td></td>
<td>unspecificed*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(habitatour Syi)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donatus de Clavaro</td>
<td>3/25/1394</td>
<td>Raffus de Casali</td>
<td>Nicolosia (filia quondam Raffi)</td>
<td>Iohanes de Luna</td>
<td>700 Chian florins</td>
<td>M &amp; I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>80 Chian florins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donatus de Clavaro</td>
<td>5/27/1394</td>
<td>Iohanes de Alpe (burgensis Peire)</td>
<td>Salvaiga (filia quondam Iohanis)</td>
<td>Antonius de Guiso</td>
<td>600 gold perpers</td>
<td>M &amp; I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>unspecificed* (plus a vineyard on Chios)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donatus de Clavaro</td>
<td>7/30/1394</td>
<td>Franciscus Justinianus de Campis</td>
<td>Perpetua (filia Francisci)</td>
<td>Iane Demerode quondam Philipi (burgensis Peyre)</td>
<td>800 Genoese lire</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Those antefacta marked with an asterisk refer to those that are mentioned in the marriage contracts, but whose exact value is left unspecified. The only indication of the actual amount of the husband's intended wedding gift comes from the notaries' descriptions of the antefacta as being "in accordance with the laws of Genoa." The Leges Genuenses note that if the husband does not specify the amount of his wife's antefactum, it was to be assumed by law that the marriage gift should equal half of the dowry amount if less than 200 Genoese lire, or 100 Genoese lire if the dowry exceeded 200 Genoese lire. Genoese law, however, does not bring us any closer to understanding the exact values of these particular antefacta, because it was certainly the case by the fifteenth century that grooms rarely gave consideration to this fact when deciding upon a value for their marriage gifts. I have therefore simply marked their amounts as "unspecified" (Leges Genuenses, cols. 879, Quantum vir lucretur uxore defuncta et de presuntione antefacti).
The original amount of Druda’s dowry was 100 Barcelonan florins and 25 gold ducats, as we learn from a later act drawn up by Benedictus, in which he adds 100 gold ducats to this amount in appreciation for services Druda had rendered to him.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Giovanni Balbi</th>
<th>11/27/1408</th>
<th>Nicola Duchio Strugiu</th>
<th>Erini Pandeveni (filia Nicole Duchio Strugiu)</th>
<th>Johannes Coresi (notarius)</th>
<th>600 perpers</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>600 hyperpers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Giovanni Balbi</td>
<td>12/27/1408 /7</td>
<td>Not Specified</td>
<td>Isabella (filia quondam Martini Brachelii)</td>
<td>Iulianus de Apostolis</td>
<td>541 Chian gold florins</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>59 gold ducats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giovanni Balbi</td>
<td>n.d./1413</td>
<td>Johannes Vairolli (burgensis Chii)</td>
<td>Marieta (filia Iohannis)</td>
<td>Petrus (unspecified)</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lazarinus de quondam Nicolai de Rappallo</td>
<td>10/7/1444</td>
<td>Not Specified</td>
<td>Marieta</td>
<td>Franciscus Iustinianus de Campis quondam de Bartholomei</td>
<td>600 Chian ducats</td>
<td>M &amp; I</td>
<td>None Offered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tommaso de Recco</td>
<td>11/10/1449</td>
<td>Iosep Melchior quondam Gabriele</td>
<td>Peiretta (filia iosep)</td>
<td>Ottovianus de Pallenzona</td>
<td>900 Chian ducats</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>None offered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernardo de Ferrari</td>
<td>11/4/1450</td>
<td>Christoforus Iustinianus de Garibaldo</td>
<td>Benedicta (filia ipsius Christofori)</td>
<td>Lazarus Argenti de Chio quondam Stephani</td>
<td>700 Chian gold ducats</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>None offered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lorenzo Calvi</td>
<td>10/1/1453</td>
<td>Laurentius Gatellusius olim de Porta</td>
<td>Salvaiga (filia Laurentii)</td>
<td>Raffael Vegerius</td>
<td>2500 perpers</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>290 hyperpers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lorenzo Calvi</td>
<td>10/30/1453</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>Maria</td>
<td>Dominicus Simbati (burgensis Pera)</td>
<td>700 Peran perpers</td>
<td>M &amp; I</td>
<td>150 hyperpers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lorenzo Calvi</td>
<td>12/3/1453</td>
<td>Nicola Botarius</td>
<td>Teodora (filia condam Nicole)</td>
<td>Baptista de Rubeis de Castronovo prope Terdonam</td>
<td>500 perpers</td>
<td>M &amp; I</td>
<td>100 hyperpers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lorenzo Calvi</td>
<td>2/1/1454</td>
<td>Cristoforus Iustinianus de Garibaldo</td>
<td>Benedicta (filia domini Cristofori)</td>
<td>Lazarus de Vultabio</td>
<td>1000 Chian gold ducats</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>150 Chian hyperpers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Father/Spouse/Relationship</td>
<td>Mother/Spouse/Relationship</td>
<td>Birthright</td>
<td>Offered</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lorenzo Calvi</td>
<td>2/5/1454</td>
<td>Raffael Cassina (filia condam Raffaellis)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lorenzo Calvi</td>
<td>2/12/1454</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>Magdaleneta</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tommaso de Recco</td>
<td>9/25/1456</td>
<td>Iacobus Rubeus (filia quondam Iacobi)</td>
<td>Mariola (filia quondam Iacobii)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tommaso de Recco</td>
<td>10/11/1456</td>
<td>Melchione Iosep (burgensis Chii)</td>
<td>Diamans (filia quondam Melchionis)</td>
<td>Baptista Spinaciou quondam Bartholomei</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tommaso de Recco</td>
<td>11/29/1456</td>
<td>Battista de Narixano (filia Battiste)</td>
<td>Argentina (filia Dominici)</td>
<td>Dominicanus Coronatus quondam Antonio</td>
<td>225 Chian gold ducats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernardo de Ferrari</td>
<td>2/15/1457</td>
<td>Dominicus de Clavario quondam Petri</td>
<td>Peruchia (filia Dominici)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tommaso de Recco</td>
<td>3/10/1457</td>
<td>Iohannes Bonichus de Vulturo (habitator Chii et avus Anne)</td>
<td>Anna (filia Dimitrus Bonchi et nepis Iohannis)</td>
<td>Raffael de Costa de Cuchurno</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tommaso de Recco</td>
<td>5/13/1458</td>
<td>Marietina (uxor quondam Ambroxii Iustiniani de Rocha)</td>
<td>Primeflore (filia ipsius Marietina et future sponse dicti Francisci)</td>
<td>Franciscus Gambonus</td>
<td>1500 ducats</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Birthright</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1000 Peran perpers</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>400 Genoese gold ducats</td>
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<tr>
<td>1000 Genoese lire</td>
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<tr>
<td>100 Genoese lire</td>
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<td>None offered</td>
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<td>Tommaso de Recco</td>
<td>5/13/1458</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tommaso de Recco</td>
<td>7/21/1458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>7/1/1459</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tommaso de Recco</td>
<td>2/13/1460</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tommaso de Recco</td>
<td>3/31/1460</td>
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<td>Tommaso de Recco</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bernardo de Ferrari</td>
<td>6/17/1460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernardo de Ferrari</td>
<td>7/8/1460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico de Algario/Niccolo Torriglia</td>
<td>8/19/1460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico de Algario</td>
<td>8/26/1460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niccolo Torriglia</td>
<td>10/24/1460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernardo de Ferrari</td>
<td>1/21/1461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giovanni Foglietta</td>
<td>4/1/1461</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bernardo de Ferrari</td>
<td>4/9/1461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernardino de Ferrari</td>
<td>6/22/1461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antun De Ferrari</td>
<td>12/10/1461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johannes de Via guondam Domini Peleii</td>
<td>Dominus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio Foglietta</td>
<td>Dominus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giovanni Barbola</td>
<td>Dominus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iohannes de Monaci guondam Leonis</td>
<td>Dominus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio Foglietta</td>
<td>Dominus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iohannes de Monaci guondam Leonis</td>
<td>Dominus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lorenzo Calvi</td>
<td>5/30/1470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio Foglietta</td>
<td>2/24/1474</td>
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<tr>
<td>Antonio Foglietta</td>
<td>10/31/1475</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unidentified Notary</td>
<td>5/2/1481</td>
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<tr>
<td>Domenico de Algario/Niccolo Torriglia</td>
<td>9/1/1484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico de Algario/Niccolo Torriglia</td>
<td>10/5/1484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>11/5/1484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico de Algario/Niccolo Torriglia</td>
<td>12/27/1485/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agostino Foglietta/Agosti no de Vía</td>
<td>8/31/1486</td>
</tr>
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<td>8/28/1488</td>
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<td>9/5/1488</td>
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<td>4/8/1489</td>
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<td>9/24/1489</td>
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<td>2/9/1495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10/23/1495</td>
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Appendix D

A List of Testaments from Genoese Chios, 1394-1499
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notary</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Testator (Marital Status)</th>
<th>Reason(s) for Making Testament</th>
<th>Executor (Relation to Testator)</th>
<th>Testator's Children (age, if known)</th>
<th>Principal Heir(s) (Relation to Testator)</th>
<th>Dowry/Antefactum Related Action Taken</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donato de Clavaro</td>
<td>8/31/1394</td>
<td>Petrus Iustinianus olim de Rocha quondam Simonis (Unmarried)</td>
<td>Traveling to Egypt</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Catalina, filia ipsius naturalis</td>
<td>Luchina Iustiniana (Mother); Petrina (Sister-in-law)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donato de Clavaro</td>
<td>11/9/1394</td>
<td>Veri Francisci Gori de Florencia quondam Simonis (Unmarried)</td>
<td>Infirmity</td>
<td>Iustinianus</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Iacobus (Brother); Bertinus (Brother)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giovanni Balbi</td>
<td>11/5/1408</td>
<td>Obertus quondam Bartholomei de Cavalcantibus de Florentia (Widower of Maria Bianzardi de Florentia)</td>
<td>Infirmity</td>
<td>Jubeus; Mandus</td>
<td>Constantia</td>
<td>Unnamed Sons; Constantia (Daughter)</td>
<td>Bequeathed a maximum dowry of 1350 Florentine florins for his daughter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giovanni Balbi</td>
<td>11/10/1408</td>
<td>Genevra, filia quondam Iohannis Iustinian olim de Furneto (Married to Iohannes, filius Georgii delo Granuati)</td>
<td>Not Specified</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Iohannes delo Granuati (Husband), but if he should predecease his wife, then any future child produced by their marriage should inherit</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Father or Guardian</td>
<td>Mother or Guardian</td>
<td>Illegitimate Issue</td>
<td>Infirmitas</td>
<td>Children</td>
<td>Mother</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Lazarinus de quondam Nicolai de Rappallo</td>
<td>10/17/1411</td>
<td>Sorleonus Salveygus quondam Domini Casani, civis Iauue (Unknown)</td>
<td>Infirmitas</td>
<td>Augustinus Ususmaris, civis Iauue; Thomas Spinula, civis Iauue; Johannes de Franchi de Pagana, civis Iauue</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Unnamed Children</td>
<td>Unnamed Children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giovanni Balbi</td>
<td>4/19/1413</td>
<td>Bartholomeus de Stoprius quondam Iacobi de Galvesio (Unmarried)</td>
<td>Not Specified</td>
<td>Benedictus Iustinianus; Nicollus de Bartholomeo</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Unnamed Mother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tommaso de Recco</td>
<td>3/11/1449</td>
<td>Georgius Paterius (Married to Katerina)</td>
<td>Not Specified</td>
<td>Katerina (Wife)</td>
<td>Matheus (5)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Matheus (Son); Katerina (Wife), but only because Matheus is 5 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tommaso de Recco</td>
<td>7/20/1449</td>
<td>Paulus Iustinianus alias de Campis quondam Domini Baptiste (Married to Marieta, filia quondam Johannis Iustiniani)</td>
<td>Infirmitas</td>
<td>Marieta Iustiniana (Wife)</td>
<td>Thobias; Orietina; Caterineta; Simonetinus; Andrieta; Antonathinus; Augustinus; Baptistenetus; Buabus; Laurentius</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Simonetinus (Son); Andrieta (Son); Antonathinus (Son); Augustinus (Son); Baptistenetus (Son); Buabus (Son); Laurentius (Son)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tommaso de Recco</td>
<td>10/8/1449</td>
<td>Presbyter Antoninus de Santurino (Unmarried)</td>
<td>Infirmitas</td>
<td>None Specified</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Bishop Leonardus Palavicinus of Chios</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tommaso de Recco</td>
<td>11/23/1449</td>
<td>Johannes Granellus quondam Georgii (Unknown)</td>
<td>Infirmita</td>
<td>Vinciguerra (Son)</td>
<td>Nicolaus Venciguerra; Georgius</td>
<td>Nicolaus (Son); Venciguerra (Son); Georgius (Son)</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>Baldasar de Signore</td>
<td>2/6/1450</td>
<td>Argenta, filia quondam Frediani Imperialis (Married to Petrus de Sancto Steffano, civis et habitator Chii)</td>
<td>Infirmita</td>
<td>Marieta (Mother); Petrus de Sancto Steffano (Husband)</td>
<td>Antonachius</td>
<td>Marieta (Mother) if she should live long enough, if not then all her goods should be sold and the proceeds should be used to buy shares in Genoa's public debt for the benefit of her husband</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tommaso de Recco</td>
<td>7/27/1450</td>
<td>Nicolaus de Diano filius quondam Domini Magistri Nicolai phisici (Unmarried)</td>
<td>To avoid dying intestate</td>
<td>Petrus, Maduli, and Cabella de Funero</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Bigeta (Mother)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lorenzo Calvi</td>
<td>2/12/1454</td>
<td>Johannes Brexanus (Married to Magdaleneta)</td>
<td>Traveling “ad partes occidental s”</td>
<td>Anthonius Brexanus; Iohannes Fodratus; Magdaleneta (Wife)</td>
<td>Margaritina</td>
<td>Margaritina (Daughter)</td>
<td>Returned in full his wife's dowry of 400 gold Chian ducats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Dowry</td>
<td>Infirmity</td>
<td>Children</td>
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<tr>
<td>Domenico de Algario</td>
<td>4/19/1456</td>
<td>Returned in full his wife's Dowry of 40 Chian ducats</td>
<td>Infirmit</td>
<td>Petrus de Castilione; Rafael de Astes; Antonio; Brigida; Pelegrina; Baptista; Franchus; Berengarius</td>
<td>Bequeathed 40 Chian ducats to each of his daughters for their dowries</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernardo de Ferrari</td>
<td>5/24/1456</td>
<td>Mecosa Iordanus (Widow of Iohannes Iordanus)</td>
<td>Infirmit</td>
<td>Bartholomeus de Garibaldo; Andrea de Neapoli</td>
<td>Baldasale; Bartholomeus; Dominicus; Anthonius</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bernardo de Ferrari</td>
<td>5/31/1456</td>
<td>Blanchina de Furneto (Widow of Dominus Raffael Iustinianus de Furneto)</td>
<td>Not Specified</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Paulus; Octavianus; Pasquale</td>
<td>Paulus (Son); Octavianus (Son); Pasquale (Son)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tommaso de Recco</td>
<td>6/27/1456</td>
<td>Domina Maria (Widow of Dominus Neapolione Iustinianus)</td>
<td>Infirmit</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Johannes; Octobonus</td>
<td>Johannes (Son); Octobonus (Son)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Father</td>
<td>Mother</td>
<td>Wife</td>
<td>Daughters</td>
<td>Bequeathments and Notes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tommaso de Recco</td>
<td>9/25/1456</td>
<td>Baptista Spinacius quondam Bartholomei</td>
<td>Mariola (Wife); Ieronimus Rubius quondam Seretii; Iohannes Iustinianus quondam Domini Neapolionis</td>
<td>Iacobetus; 2 Unnamed Legitimate Daughters; 2 Unnamed Illegitimate Daughters</td>
<td>Iacobetus (Son); Mariola (Wife)</td>
<td>Returned in full his wife’s dowry of 1000 Chian lire, with the addition of his 100 Genoese lire. Antefactum. Bequeathed 200 ducats to each of his legitimate daughters and 25 ducats to each of his illegitimate daughters.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernardo de Ferrari</td>
<td>10/17/1456</td>
<td>Nicolaus de Calcinara (Married to Domina Marieta)</td>
<td>Macieta (Wife); Antonius Pisis; Laurentius Gatus</td>
<td>Thedorina, uxor Antonii Pisis</td>
<td>Marieta (Wife); Thedorina (Daughter)</td>
<td>Returned in full his wife’s dowry of 400 ducats, with the addition of an unspecified Antefactum.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tommaso de Recco</td>
<td>3/7/1457</td>
<td>Guirardus de Carreto quondam Manfredi (Unknown)</td>
<td>Cristoforus Iustinianus; Iohannes Patarius; Thomas Vacha (Son-in-law)</td>
<td>Limbania</td>
<td>Limbania (Daughter); Lucia (Adopted Daughter and Former Slave)</td>
<td>Bequeath a dowry of 1300 Genoese gold lire to his daughter, but should she die without natural and legitimate children, her husband, Thomas Vacha, should still receive 500 lire.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Infirmity</td>
<td>Son(s)</td>
<td>Daughter(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tommaso de Recco</td>
<td>5/11/1457</td>
<td>Not Specified</td>
<td>Unnamed Sons and Daughters</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Baptista Gataluxius quondam Domini Juliani (Married to Blanchina)</td>
<td>Unnamed Sons and Daughters</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Blanchina (Wife); Nobilis Galeacius Palavicinus; Nobilis Bartholomeus de Auria quondam Domini Jacobi; Nobilis Nicolaus de Auria quondam Domini Acelini; Nobilis Lazarus de Auria quondam Domini Opicini; Nobilis Thomas de Grimaldis</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5/20/1458</td>
<td>Not Specified</td>
<td>Raffaele (Son); Carlinus (Son); and any sons he and his wife may have in the future</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>
|                       |            | Bricius Justinianus quondam Domini Francisci (Married to Mariola, filia quondam Andrioli Justiniani) | Magdalina (Mother); Edoardus (Brother); Mariola (Wife) | Returned his wife's dowry of 2500 Chian ducats, with the addition of his 100 Chian ducat Antefactum / Left it to his brother Edoardus to dower their sister Brigida as he saw fit from the testator's property / Left it to his
<p>| Tommaso de Recco | 5/21/1458 | Margarita (Wife of Petrosinus de Blasia) | To avoid dying intestate | None Specified | None | Pasqualina, uxor Georgii de Puteo, and her future children, but should she have no children, then the Church of San Francesco of Chios should inherit | None |
| Baldasar de Signore | 7/4/1458 | Marieta, burgensis Chii (Married to Pelegrinus de Sancto Iohannes) | Infirmity | Ieronimus de Obertis Mersarus (Son-in-law); Baldasare de Signore, notarius | Antonius; Catarineta; Nicoloxina | Antonius (Son); Catarineta (Daughter); Nicoloxina (Daughter); Pelegrinus de Sancto Iohannes (Husband) | None |
| Tommaso de Recco | 10/23/1459 | Petrus Antonius Paterius quondam Georgii (Unmarried) | Infirmity | Johannes Paterius (Relative); Nicolaus Paterius (Relative); Iulius Paterius (Brother) | None | Iulius Paterius (Brother) | N/A |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Relationship to Deponent</th>
<th>Reason for Avoiding Intestate</th>
<th>Beneficiary(s)</th>
<th>Comments</th>
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<tr>
<td>11/8/1459</td>
<td>Antonius Pisis, civis Chii</td>
<td>Married to Theodorina, filia</td>
<td>To avoid dying intestate</td>
<td>Caterina (Mother); Theodorina (Wife); Iacobus de Campis quondam Lodisii</td>
<td>Returned his wife's dowry of 500 Chian ducats, with the addition of 200 Chian ducats and an additional 1000 Chian ducats if she does not remarry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/10/1460</td>
<td>Thomas Raybaldus quondam</td>
<td>Georgii (Unmarried)</td>
<td>To avoid dying intestate</td>
<td>None Specified</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/30/1460</td>
<td>Francescus de Portufino,</td>
<td>civis Chii (Unknown)</td>
<td>To avoid dying intestate</td>
<td>None Specified</td>
<td>Orieta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Orieta (Daughter)</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/10/1460</td>
<td>Ansaldus Salamonus quondam</td>
<td>Simonis, de Saona (Unmarried)</td>
<td>To avoid dying intestate</td>
<td>None Specified</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Infirmity Details</td>
<td>Beneficiaries</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/23/1460</td>
<td>Tommaso de Recco</td>
<td>Infirmitas</td>
<td>Iohannes de Nesto; Aleonus Palavicinus; Baptista de Illariis de Ovada, eius consanguinus</td>
<td>Returned in full his wife's dowry of 1800 perpers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/14/1460</td>
<td>Tommaso de Recco</td>
<td>To avoid dying intestate</td>
<td>Raffaelus Pazus; Antonius Palavicinus, episcopus Chii; Antonius Caronella, compater suus</td>
<td>Gives his late wife's dowry (amount unspecified) to his sister, Marieta, and additionally gives her husband, Paulus de Anspino, usufruct of said dowry until the testator's death</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/12/1460</td>
<td>Domenico de Algario</td>
<td>Infirmitas</td>
<td>Paulus de Bozollo (Brother); Iohannes de Bozollo (Brother); Mariella (Wife); Augustinus Lercarius (Relative)</td>
<td>Returned in full his wife's dowry of an unspecified amount, with the addition of 200 ducats, but, if his wife remarries, the 200 ducats should pass on to the testator's children</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernardo de Ferrari</td>
<td>10/21/1460</td>
<td>Iacobus de Semino quondam Mathei (Unmarried)</td>
<td>Not Specified</td>
<td>None Specified</td>
<td>Filii sui naturales: Franciscus; Antonius; Ieronimus; Pasqualinus; Luchetus / Andriola, filia sua naturalis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tommaso de Recco</td>
<td>12/4/1460</td>
<td>Gregorius Iustinianus quondam Domini Oberti (Married to Curreneta, filia Domini Petri Iustiniani de Campis)</td>
<td>To avoid dying intestate</td>
<td>Curreneta (Wife); Baptista de Goano; Petrus Iustinianus de Campis (Father-in-law); Raffaele de Franchis quondam Lingari; Edoardus Iustinianus quondam Francisci</td>
<td>Mariola; Baptestina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernardo de Ferrari</td>
<td>1/27/1461</td>
<td>Johannes de Semino (Unmarried)</td>
<td>To avoid dying intestate</td>
<td>None Specified</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Heirs/Inheritors</td>
<td>Infirmity</td>
<td>Sundry/Miscellaneous</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernardo de Ferrari</td>
<td>3/13/1461</td>
<td>Marietina Iustiniana, filia quondam Domini Georgii Paterii (Married to Egregius Salvatius Iustinianus quondam Domini Boniferii)</td>
<td>Not Specified</td>
<td>Blanchineta de Via, uxor Baptiste Gioardi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio Foglietta</td>
<td>3/30/1461</td>
<td>Magister Antonius de Gastardis quondam Andree, calegarius, burgensis Chii (Widower of Maria; Married to Magdalena)</td>
<td>Infirmity</td>
<td>Johannes, filius legitimus et naturalis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio Foglietta</td>
<td>4/11/1461</td>
<td>Antonius de Thodi quondam Laurentius, burgensis Chii (Unknown)</td>
<td>To avoid dying intestate</td>
<td>Bernardus Iustinianus de Garibaldo Domini Nicolai, civis Ianue</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio Foglietta</td>
<td>8/6/1461</td>
<td>Benedictus Senaschus, oritus Pere et ad presentem habitator Chii (Unmarried)</td>
<td>To avoid dying intestate</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Stipulation of Her unborn child, but if the child predeceases her, then her brother Iulianus Paterius should inherit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico De Algario</td>
<td>8/22/1461</td>
<td>Mariola, filia quondam Iacobi Rubei (Widow of Baptista Spinaci)</td>
<td>Infirmita</td>
<td>Danianus Spinacus (Relative); Edoardus Iustinianus quondam Domini Francisci; Lucas Iustinianus quondam Domini Lanzaroti</td>
<td>Francischet a; Iacobetus; Bernardinus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico De Algario</td>
<td>12/13/1461</td>
<td>Marieta, filia quondam Iohannis de Luna (Widow of Fredricus Imperiale)</td>
<td>To avoid dying intestate</td>
<td>None Specified</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico De Algario</td>
<td>12/22/1461</td>
<td>Florentia, filia quondam Marini Vigne (Widow of Benedictus de Bozollo)</td>
<td>To avoid dying intestate</td>
<td>None Specified</td>
<td>Paret a; Orientina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernardo de Ferrari</td>
<td>2/18/1462</td>
<td>Marieta (Married to Gregorius Ronelicandelu s )</td>
<td>Infirmita</td>
<td>None Specified</td>
<td>Caterineta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giovanni Battista de Ferrari</td>
<td>2/12/1463</td>
<td>Antonius de Todi (Unknown)</td>
<td>Infirmity</td>
<td>Valentinus Iustinianus</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Antonio Foglietta</td>
<td>8/5/1463</td>
<td>Gulielmus Crania quondam Figemi de Petralata quondam Ivadi, ad presens habitator Chii (Unknown)</td>
<td>Infirmity</td>
<td>None Specified</td>
<td>Petrus; Iulianus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio Foglietta</td>
<td>10/28/1463</td>
<td>Maria Angelina, Greca, filia guondam Marini Pilosi de Nesia (Widow of Thomas Bizagninus, olim habitator Chii)</td>
<td>Infirmity</td>
<td>None Specified</td>
<td>Not Specified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio Foglietta</td>
<td>1/24/1467</td>
<td>Antonius quondam Turchii de Sergi (Unmarried)</td>
<td>Infirmity</td>
<td>None Specified</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio Foglietta</td>
<td>11/11/147</td>
<td>Antonius Rubeus de Sexte ( Married to Franciscina filia quondam Percivalis de Scharulis)</td>
<td>To avoid dying intestate</td>
<td>None Specified</td>
<td>Stefanus (Son), with the right to possess and use the inheritance reserved for Franciscina (Wife) while she lives; If Stefanus dies intestate or without a legitimate heir, Rolandus Rubeus (Brother) should inherit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio Foglietta</td>
<td>3/19/1472</td>
<td>Guirardus de Plebethetii quondam Laurentii (Married to Elena)</td>
<td>Not Specified</td>
<td>None Specified</td>
<td>Peregrina (Daughter); Elena (Wife), but only because Peregrina is 5 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio Foglietta</td>
<td>10/27/1472</td>
<td>Domina Petra, filia quondam Petri Iustiniani (Married to Dominus Magister Qualicus de Franchis)</td>
<td>Not Specified</td>
<td>None Specified</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Details</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Antonio Fogliett a</td>
<td>9/20/1473</td>
<td>Inheritance is divided into 2 parts: The children of Antonius Casenus (Brother) should receive 1/4; and the remaining 3/4 is to be divided equally between: Antonius (Brother), Percivale (Brother), and Laurencius (Brother)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iohannes Casenus de Relis quondam Michaelis (Unmarried)</td>
<td>Infirmity</td>
<td>Magister Franchus Maricenus; Petrus Lancia</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico de Algario</td>
<td>9/15/1484</td>
<td>Inheritance is divided into 3 equal parts: Paulus (Husband), Anthonius (Son-in-law), and Caterina (Daughter) should receive 1/3; Paulus and Anthonius (Son-in-law) should receive 1/3; and the Cathedral of</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anna Ungari (Married to Paulus de Stema Lazaroti de Chio)</td>
<td>To avoid dying intestate</td>
<td>Paulus (Husband)</td>
<td>Caterina</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Notary</td>
<td>Beneficiary</td>
<td>Relationship</td>
<td>Lasting Bequest</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/3/1486</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Agostino Foglietta</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/7/1487</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/12/1487</td>
<td>LODISIUS DE PRIMANELIS</td>
<td>ANTHONIO DE PRIMANELIS</td>
<td>Brother</td>
<td>1/3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pereta, filia Legitima</td>
<td>ANTHONIO DE PRIMANELIS</td>
<td>Daughter</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANTHONIO DE PRIMANELIS</td>
<td>ANTONIO DE PRIMANELIS</td>
<td>Brother</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANTONIO DE PRIMANELIS</td>
<td>ANTONIO DE PRIMANELIS</td>
<td>Brother</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANTONIO DE PRIMANELIS</td>
<td>ANTONIO DE PRIMANELIS</td>
<td>Brother</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANTONIO DE PRIMANELIS</td>
<td>ANTONIO DE PRIMANELIS</td>
<td>Brother</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANTONIO DE PRIMANELIS</td>
<td>ANTONIO DE PRIMANELIS</td>
<td>Brother</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANTONIO DE PRIMANELIS</td>
<td>ANTONIO DE PRIMANELIS</td>
<td>Brother</td>
<td>None</td>
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</table>

*The wills with an "unknown" notary are found in a section of the Genoese State Archives called "Notai Ignoti," which, as the name suggests, houses notarial documents for which archivists have been unable to identify positively their authors.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Relationship</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Bequest</th>
<th>Return dowry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domenico de Algario</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>10/19/1488</td>
<td>Returned in full his wife's dowry of 150 Chian ducats, along with his 50 Chian ducat.</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isabella de Valencia</td>
<td>(Unmarried)</td>
<td>10/19/1488</td>
<td>Returned in full his wife's dowry of 100 Chian ducats, along with his 50 Chian ducat.</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francesco Spinola</td>
<td>(Unmarried)</td>
<td>6/26/1492</td>
<td>Bequeaths her dowry of 1000 Chian ducats to her husband</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agostino Foglietta</td>
<td>(Married to Maria)</td>
<td>4/10/1495</td>
<td>Returned in full his wife's dowry of 150 Chian ducats, along with his 50 Chian ducat.</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Infirmity</td>
<td>Beneficiaries</td>
<td>Epoch</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/10/1495</td>
<td>Agostino Foglietta a</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not Specified</td>
<td>Leonardinus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/21/1496</td>
<td>Agostino Foglietta a</td>
<td>Infirmit</td>
<td>Iohannes (Son); Baptista (Son); Bernardus (Son); Dominicus Iustinianus quondam Bernardi; Iohannes Iustinianus quondam Galvarii</td>
<td>Filii legitemes: Iohannes; Baptista; Bernardus; Constantinus; Sebastianus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/28/1499</td>
<td>Agostino Foglietta a</td>
<td>To avoid dying intestate</td>
<td>Caterina (Sister)</td>
<td>Mariola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agostino Foglietta</td>
<td>10/1/1499</td>
<td>Spectabilis Vir Petrus Iohannes, medicus doctor (Married to Domina Caterneta)</td>
<td>Infirmity</td>
<td>Mariola (Daughter); Ypolita (Daughter)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Agostino Foglietta
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Filza 587     Antonio Fazio, Seniore  
Filza 590     Antonio Fazio, Seniore  
Filza 591     Antonio Fazio, Seniore  
Filza 594     Antonio Fazio, Seniore  
Filza 595 bis Antonio Fazio, Seniore 
Filza 764     Bernardo de Ferrari  
Filza 765     Bernardo de Ferrari  
Filza 843     Antonio Foglietta  
Filza 847     Tommaso de Recco  
Filza 848     Tommaso de Recco  
Filza 934     Francesco Camogli  
Filza 886     Giovanni Battista de Ferrari and  
              Christofforo Sisto  
Filza 944     Domenico de Algario and Niccolo Torriglia 
Filza 1005    Lorenzo Costa  
Filza 1090    Ambrogio Galumbero and Antonio Gallo  
Filza 1122    Girolamo Loggia  
Filza 1123    Girolamo Loggia  
Filza 1125    Girolamo Loggia  
Filza 1205    Agostino Foglietta and Agostino de Via  
Filza 1290    Antonio Pastorino  
Filza 1307    Antonio Pastorino  
Filza 1393    Luca Torre  
Filza 1394    Luca Torre  
Filza 1395    Luca Torre  
Filza 1396    Luca Torre

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            Busta E bis 
            Busta 53
            Busta 63 
            Busta 0 bis

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            (quorundam jauensium civium)
Manoscritto 216 bis, Scritture di Scio / originale mutilo del precedente

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