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The Rhetoric of Slobodan Milosevic and War on the Territory of Yugoslavia

Agneza Bozic
Western Michigan University

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THE RHETORIC OF SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC AND WAR ON THE TERRITORY OF YUGOSLAVIA

by

Agneza Bozic

A Thesis
Submitted to the
Faculty of The Graduate College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the
Degree of Master of Arts
Department of Communication

Western Michigan University
Kalamazoo, Michigan
June 1992

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THE RHETORIC OF SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC AND WAR ON THE TERRITORY OF YUGOSLAVIA

Agneza Bozic, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1992

The hypothesis of this work is that the political rhetoric of the Serbian leader, Milosevic, was among the major factors contributing to the political and social changes in Serbia and Yugoslavia, which ultimately led to the war.

Three of Milosevic's speeches were studied in detail: the speeches of April 24, 1987, October 17, 1988, and November 19, 1988. The method of rhetorical analysis was adopted from Andrews (1990) because this method stresses the importance of context and effects of the speech. The theories of political language (Graber, 1981) and of political rhetoric (Bitzer, 1981) together with Johannesen's (1989) theory of ethics in political persuasion were utilized in the analyses.

The analyses of the speeches in regard to their level of complexity suggests that a shift occurred in Milosevic's rhetoric, from rhetoric high in the level of complexity to simplistic and value-laden statements, and thus low in the level of complexity.
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it possible for me to finish my studies at Western Michigan University as the recipient of a graduate assistantship.

The greatest debts are to my parents and brothers for their unselfish love and support.

The errors which remain in this work are my responsibility.

Agneza Bozic
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Bozic, Agneza, M.A.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Introduction

The purpose of this work is to examine the rhetoric of Slobodan Milosevic, the Serbian leader, and its influence on the political changes and the on-going war that is occurring in the former Yugoslav state. The hypothesis to be examined is that the political rhetoric of Slobodan Milosevic was among the major factors contributing to the political and social changes in Serbia and Yugoslavia which ultimately led to the war.

The research focuses on the literature of four major theoretical groups. The first chapter reviews the study of political communication, which assesses how political processes are seen from a communication perspective. Selected theories from this group will be utilized in the analysis of the speeches. The second chapter deals with the methods to be utilized in this project; specifically, material on rhetorical criticism as a subfield of the historical-critical method is reviewed. The third chapter provides the historical context for the speeches of Milosevic. The fourth chapter describes and analyzes
three of Milosevic’s speeches. This chapter also uses various publications on the political processes in Yugoslavia, mainly utilized in the analysis of the speeches selected for study. This group of literature is used to assess how much the rhetoric of Slobodan Milosevic corresponded with the major social and political processes and how much it served as a means in accomplishing a political goal.

The major motive for writing the thesis on this topic originates from the author’s desire to shed some light on the complex Yugoslav situation. With no pretense to advance clear-cut answers to the problems that pervade this troubled area, the author hopes this work will provide some insights into the dynamics of the political processes which propelled the destruction of Yugoslavia.

Review of Literature

As a type of historical-critical research (Tucker, Weaver, & Berryman-Fink, 1981), rhetorical criticism is dedicated to the spirit of critical inquiry—a desire to find the "whole truth" about the public speeches with which it deals (Thonssen, Baird, & Braden, 1970).

In historical-critical research, Tucker et al. (1981) insist that the researcher must examine the social
milieu into which an event is fitted. The same authors insist that every speech-communication scholar should know how to study the past, because history is a reflection of the people, their aspirations, values, and beliefs. That rhetorical criticism requires an historical-critical approach is understandable because a given event, in our case, a speech, is the product of a complex of social events in which human beings are identified with their environment (Thonssen et al., 1970). Rhetorical criticism reveals the nature of the process by which a communicative intent finally implements, or fails to implement, social action (Thonssen et al., 1970, p.24).

Andrews (1990) sees the critic of rhetoric as focusing his or her attention on human efforts to be persuasive. Although the students of the art of rhetoric have not achieved universal agreement on what the critic of rhetoric should be studying, to Andrews (1990) both common sense and evidence presented by what critics actually study suggest that "persuasive public discourse is an obvious and sensible object of critical examination" (p. 3).

To Aristotle, the classical theorist most concerned with political values, rhetoric was the art or faculty of discovering the available means of persuasion in any given case (Larsen, 1989, p. 9). Brock and Scott (1980)
define rhetoric as the human effort to induce cooperation through the use of symbols. Prelman (1969) defines rhetoric as the theory and practice of all arguments which aim to persuade and convince the audience in political and other human fields. Modern and contemporary theorists regard rhetoric broadly as a method of inquiry and communication applicable to spoken and written discourse (Bitzer, 1981).

These few definitions serve as an example of the character of rhetoric. They demonstrate that with rhetoric comes an effort to persuade. Both ancient and modern authorities agree that the fundamental purpose of public speeches is to induce some sort of social control, that is, desirable political outcomes (Thonssen et al., 1970).

This striving for social control is vividly expressed in political discourse. In its most elemental sense, political discourse deals with the major issues of public life (Dunner, 1964). It is this which makes politics and political rhetoric a serious matter of interest.

The recognized significance of the relationship between communication and political processes has led to the emergence of an independent field of study—political communication (Nimmo & Sanders, 1981). Political communication is devoted to studying the strategic uses of
communication to influence public knowledge, beliefs, and action on political matters (Nimmo & Swanson, 1990). In its political dimension, communication is a force for both conflict and consensus; it causes both empowerment and marginalization. Political communication scholars are thus interested in finding the meaning of political messages, and how this meaning leads to political consequences (Nimmo & Swanson, 1990, p.17). These consequences may be as large as the preservation of the state and the well being of each and every citizen, or as small as a single individual's wealth.

A discussion of political rhetoric and political language reveals how communication and politics are interrelated areas.

Political rhetoric deals with matters that constitute political business, that is, all transactions and their consequences which significantly affect the public or its parts. Political rhetoric serves the art of politics at every turn, both as a mode of thought and as an instrument of expression and action (Bitzer, 1981, p. 225). Political actors in their communication engage interests, values, emotions and aspirations. Consequently, messages designed for political persuasion use arguments that are linked to valued premises, facts that are linked to interests, descriptions and visions that evoke

It is in this context—the use of arguments, that the ethos of the communicator becomes an important part of the rhetorical situation. Johannesen (1989), who is concerned with ethics in persuasion, describes a demagogue as an unethical communicator who enjoys popular support, and who exerts his influence primarily through the medium of spoken word, that is public speaking (p. 37). According to Johannesen (1989), a demagogue relies heavily on propaganda "defined in the negative sense of intentional use of suggestion, irrelevant emotional appeals, and pseudoproof to circumvent human rational decision-making processes" (p. 37). A demagogue also uses the available social problems to advance his or her personal position (Johannesen, 1989, p. 37). Bitzer (1981) touches on an ethical aspect of political rhetoric in that part where he distinguishes between rhetoric, which insists on rational justification, and persuasion, which implies the lack of critical consideration. Bitzer (1981) maintains that "[t]he craft of persuasion reduces truth and value to the role of tactic for the sake of making people believe or do what the communicator desires, while rhetoric is committed to truth and value as regulative principles (p. 229).

In his study of politics and language, Corcoran
(1990) attempts to defy the widespread notion that "poli­
tics is all talk." His differentiation of "talk" and political action is well argued: "while language shapes and empowers its users, the unhappy consequence is that language reproduces and reinforces exploitation, inequality and other traditions of power" (p. 53). The same author argues that language is a paradigm of political action which offers a perspective for theoretical inquiry into social and political life (p. 51).

Graber (1981) sees political language as the tool of politicians who rose to power because they could talk persuasively to voters and political elites. This is somewhat contrary to Corcoran (1990) who finds it difficult to distinguish between language and politics, and sees all language as political "[b]ecause every speech setting, however private and intimate, involves power relations, social roles, privileges and centered meaning" (p. 53).

Graber (1981) differs from Corcoran also in her view on the impact of setting on political language, stating that different settings influence the character of the political rhetoric. For the purpose of this research, the discussion of the oratory setting is of primary import. Graber (1981) defines the oratory setting as a public event where the orator is fully in control of the
speech situation. Public oratory, which Graber says is reserved only for chief authority figures to address large audiences about predominantly political issues, is highly influential (Graber, 1981, p. 210).

Depending on the appeals political orators use to convey their message to their audiences, Graber (1981) classifies the styles of the oratory as statesman's, charismatic, and demagogic oratory. Statesman's oratory appeals to reasoned argument and intellectual explanation of the issues at hand. The salient issues are presented clearly and in moderate language without emotionally charged distractions (Graber, 1981, p. 210).

The underlying characteristic of charismatic rhetoric, Graber (1981) claims, is a speaker who possesses the ability to vocalize the emotions and ideals deeply held by a large number of people. The audience of a charismatic leader in turn feels that it has a spokesperson who is expressing its deeply felt needs; hence it is more likely to follow the orders of charismatic rhetors (p. 211).

Demagogic rhetoric appeals to emotions on a baser level, like prejudice, hatred, and bigotry. The appeals used by demagogues are opportunistic, thus leaving little room for truth and fairness (Graber, 1981, p. 212).

The basic function of political language is to
convey a message. It is the medium through which the communicative function of the speech is fulfilled (Thonssen et al. 1970). Graber (1976) describes political language as a separate entity, a language that political discourse endows with special potency. To her, what makes verbal and nonverbal language political is not a distinctive vocabulary or form, but the "substance" of the information it conveys, the context in which this information is disseminated and the functions that political languages perform (Graber, 1981).

One of these functions of language is to interpret the political scene in the process of calling attention to situations, people, and events (Graber, 1981, p.203). This function of language enables political elites to create reality through linking their own actions to acceptable motives, goals and developments. The linkages rhetors chose to make, explicitly or implicitly, to causes, concepts or analogies, shape the meaning and impact of their messages (Bormann, 1973). The symbolist approach to rhetoric has been particularly interested in the interpretative function of political discourse. In his fantasy theme analysis Bormann (1973) discovered how the use of the dramatic creation of social reality provides a powerful instrument in political persuasion.

Politicians use language to create messages that
will persuade or induce people to act, that will produce policy relevant moods such as hope or fear, pride in country, or a sense of community and nationhood (Graber, 1981, p. 207). Political messages may be especially dangerous when they turn into action itself. As Graber (1981) perceives, the threat or promise, or fear or blame, may have an impact akin to that of the potential action provided it is believed by a significant audience.

The political rhetoric of Slobodan Milosevic, the current leader of Serbia, appeared to have had such a strength--to turn the promises given to his fellow Serbs into actions that caused blood and ruins. For this reason, this research applies the theories of Bitzer (1981), Graber (1981), and Johannesen (1989) to the study of three of Milosevic's speeches. The method of study is described in the following chapter.
CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY

Speeches to Be Analyzed

The objective of this study is to describe and analyze the rhetorical strategies used by the Serbian leader, Slobodan Milosevic, prior to the start of the war in Yugoslavia.

Among many speeches, three will be studied. The first is the speech of April 24, 1987, delivered to the Serbs in Kosovo, the Albanian-populated province attached to Republic of Serbia. This event marked the public beginning of Milosevic’s populist leadership strategy, or as Engelberg (1991) says, "it will transform his image from faceless bureaucrat to charismatic Serb leader" (p. 32).

The second is the speech of October 17, 1988, given at the 17th League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) Central Committee Session in Belgrade. As President of the Central Committee of the Serbian League of Communists (LC) Presidium, Milosevic attacked the opponents of constitutional reforms in Serbia and demanded their removal. This speech is important also because it
declared the "meetings of solidarity" as legal tools to protest the supposed anti-Serbian "terror" in Kosovo. These meetings of solidarity, encouraged by Milosevic's policies became a political means used to remove the legal governments of Kosovo and Vojvodina. Later, the themes of these meetings formed the rationale for Serbia's abolition of the juridic autonomy of the two provinces (McCrea, 1992).

The third is the speech of November 19, 1988, delivered at the Meeting of Brotherhood and Unity in Belgrade. In this speech Milosevic openly invited the Serbs to fight for the establishment of the Serbian state. The Serbian people apparently decided to follow their charismatic leader because he touched something that had been a taboo-topic for many years: Serbian national pride (Tijanic, 1989), and the sense of Serbian grievances in the post-1945 Yugoslav state. The eventual result of this can be seen in the war which raged over Yugoslavia as Serbs outside of Serbia, first in Croatia, then in Bosnia attempted to grab as much territory as possible by force of arms.

All these speeches are published in Milosevic's book (1989) Godine raspleta [The years of solutions]. This book is written in Serbian using the Serbian Cyrillic Alphabet. These speeches are also translated in the
Method of Rhetorical Analysis

Rhetorical analysis, like any form of interpretation is in many ways a risky enterprise. Analysis, judgment, and interpretation of the rhetorical act must take into consideration the complex ways in which rhetoric interacts with the values and cultural standards of a society (Andrews, 1990, p. 5).

By means of analysis the critic hopes to determine the effect of the speech, immediate or postponed, upon the particular audience and society. The word "effect" is important because it expresses a central reason for rhetorical criticism (Thonssen et al., 1970).

While the field of rhetoric is rich in rules and procedures designed to guide rhetorical analysis (Stuckey, 1989), this study was guided by the theory and model of rhetorical criticism which J. R. Andrews (1990) offered in his work, *The Practice of Rhetorical Criticism*. It seemed the most applicable to the topic of
research because it represented a theory that would give the researcher enough freedom to assess cultures other than American, and because it was concerned with the impact of such a context on the speaker, his message and the intended audience. The second reason for selecting Andrews' model was the importance he ascribed to the historical background of the speech. This was applicable to this topic of research because "[p]olitical messages... are linked so closely to historical situations that we must understand the details of the situation as a condition of understanding the meaning of the message" (Bitzer, 1981, p. 239).

While any rhetorical act is a complex, interrelated whole, Andrews (1990) maintains, four parts can be separated as analytically distinct: context, speaker, message/speech, and consequences. Each of these in turn can be divided into subcategories, all of which merit individual emphasis (Andrews, 1990).

The first element of a rhetorical act is the context encompassing that act. The context consists of the prevailing political and ethical climates and the major issues of the time. Context also involves the audience of the rhetorical discourse. This audience is both immediate--those who actually witness the speech, and potential--those who may hear or read the speech.
The second element of a rhetorical act is the rhetor or the speaker, the individual who delivers the speech, hoping to accomplish a specific goal. There are three analytic approaches to the rhetor. The first is to examine his/her motives, which involves careful analyses of the orator’s strategy, or plan, by which he/she hopes to keep the speech achieving its goal (Thonssen et al., 1970). Second, any given rhetor has an ethos. The ethos is a combination of the image a rhetor wishes to project and the one that the audience perceives. It combines the past actions of the speaker with factors influencing audience perceptions of those actions (Andrews, 1990). Persuasive style is the final analytic element of the rhetor. The critical analysis of the style is guided by the careful examination of the functions of language in discourse. The critic’s goal is to describe the ways in which language is used to promote the speech and the hoped for influences of this use of language on listeners (Andrews, 1990; Bitzer, 1981).

The third element of a rhetorical act is the speech itself—the collection of and connection between words (Stacey, 1989). Any speech can be broken into four units that also serve as analytical categories. These are style, appeals, arguments, and grammar (Andrews, 1990).
In the analysis and criticism of Milosevic's speeches the study primarily concentrated on appeals and arguments. In the assessment of these categories the following theories were used: Johannesen's (1989) definition of a demagogue, Bitzer's (1981) distinction between rhetoric and persuasion, and Graber's (1981) typology of public oratory, as previously explained in the first chapter.

The final element of a rhetorical act is its consequences. This element is best expressed in the question: "What potential did the message have to influence what audience in what ways?" (Andrews, 1990, p. 6). This element is a summary of the other three in that it combines rhetor, context, and the speech itself, and looks at the rhetorical act as a whole. Answering this question involves looking at both purpose and possibility of the message. These two dimensions are essential for understanding rhetorical effect.

The major concern of this study was the effects of Milosevic's political rhetoric. Great emphasis was put on the historical and immediate context of the speeches, because, as Bitzer (1981) earlier observed, in order to understand the meaning of the political message, we must understand the situation in which the speeches took place. The following chapter depicts the historical context. This should help understanding of the power of
Milosevic's rhetoric to influence the events that led to the beginning of the War on the Yugoslav territory.
CHAPTER III

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Introduction

Every problem has its roots in the past. However simple or obvious this statement, it seems to fit perfectly the complex Yugoslav situation. Singleton (1985) noted that it was "impossible to understand contemporary Yugoslavia without some knowledge of the historical experiences which are so deeply imbedded in the consciousness of the people" (p. ix). In 1991, when Yugoslavia was facing the most serious crisis in its 70 years old statehood, Singleton's thesis is more salient than ever before. The complicated task of presenting Yugoslav history becomes even more difficult today, because lately so many participants in that history are demanding that the "new" history be written.

Pavlowitz (1988) thinks that a real understanding of Yugoslav history since 1918, when the state was established under the name of the Unified Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, "calls for a completely free inquiry by professional scholars, echoed by a public debate" (p. xii). The Communist regime that ruled Yugoslavia from 18
1945 to 1990, like its monarchical predecessor, intensely insisted on the heroic presentation of events. In post-war Yugoslavia, the history of the interwar Communist movement, the Second World War, and the civil war which occurred during the World War II, was written under the supervision of the Communist Party. A. Djilas (1991) states that in spite of the party's "historiographic orthodoxy," many Yugoslav historians have not been ready to misrepresent historical events. They, however, kept quiet about events that were, from the party's point of view, particularly "sensitive," that is, events that called attention to the problems of nationalism. This troubled relationship between the Communist party and history resulted in a large amount of "dissident literature" published abroad that dealt mainly with the issues about which Yugoslavs had to remain silent, for example, I. Supek's book *Krunski svjedok protiv Hebranga* (1983) which was literally smuggled across the Yugoslav-Italian border, and much of M. Djilas's later work. Since the death of President Tito in May 1980, the consequent liberalization of intellectual life has brought many serious challenges to the official "Titoist" interpretation of modern Yugoslav history.

Thus, one cannot present an "objective" history of Yugoslavia. All one can do is to take into account
different views on problematic issues in describing Yugoslavia's turbulent and often painful past.

Yugoslavia as a State

On December 1, 1918, the Unified Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was proclaimed. Even then, this first common South Slavic State was unofficially referred to as Yugoslavia, the name it officially assumed in 1929.

Yugoslavia emerged as the result of the changing international situation of the early 20th century, but the idea of South Slavic integration, Yugoslavenstvo, evolved in the 1860s under the leadership of the Bishop of Zagreb, Josip Juraj Strossmayer, who was known as a great philanthropist and the founder of the Yugoslav Academy, established in 1866 (Banac, 1984). This movement was primarily cultural and academic in character. Its predominant goal was to resist the denationalization imposed by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The proponents of Yugoslavism, mainly of Croatian nationality, recognized the Serb and Slovene nationhood. However, the belief that Yugoslavism meant respect for the nationhood and independence of each South Slav nation was not as prevalent among the Serbs as among the Croats. Banac (1984) explained that it could not have been otherwise.
because the national ideologies were extremely different. The Serbs had an independent national state with a history of expansion and assimilation, while the Croats and Slovenes had few state traditions.

The official Serbian version of a South Slavic state, as advocated by the Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pasic at the time of World War I, was burdened by visions of Serbian expansionism. So the first South Slav state was proclaimed amid tensions and a fundamental mutual misunderstanding between the Serbian representatives and the Yugoslav Committee (Jugoslavenski odbor) which represented the Croats, Slovenes and Serbs who had been the citizens of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy.

The unification did not establish any guarantees against the dominance of the Serbian monarchy, whose troops were already occupying former Habsburg South Slavic possessions and Montenegro, thus realizing the age-old dream of Serb unification. Banac (1984) explained,

Given the role of the Serbian state in the construction of Yugoslavia and the actual if not formal continuation of Serbian state institutions after the unification, the Serbs could adjust to the new circumstances without a feeling of loss, without feeling deprived of their sense of national individuality (p.138).

For Croats and Slovenes, however, the unification was not so simple. Barely a month after the end of their long
subordination to the Habsburg Monarchy, they were now bound into a unitary state with Serbia and Montenegro. Moreover, the decision to unite with Serbia was made for them in such circumstances by a group of men who, according to Banac (1984), did not know how to establish and use political power.

The sense of Yugoslav unity may have had some meaning to middle-class professional politicians, lawyers, and intellectuals who promoted the idea of a South Slav state, but it did not penetrate deeply into the consciousness of the mass of the peasantry who constituted more than 80% of the population (Singleton, 1985). None of the South Slavic nationalities, including the Serbs, had an opportunity to express their preferences by means of popular referendum. Among the Croats a democratic test of popular sentiment would probably have demonstrated substantial opposition, if not dislike, to the unification with the Serbs (Banac, 1984; Supek, 1983). Among the Slovenes the opposition to unification was stifled by the external danger of partition between Italy and Austria.

Once the monocratic characteristics of the new state were firmly established, various forms of domestic opposition arose in all non-Serbian areas, even among the educated and wealthy classes which were considered stron-
gly unitarist in 1918. The leaders of the Kingdom of the Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs attempted to impose from above, on a heterogeneous mixture of different social and cultural groups, a common set of rules and a common political and economic order, under Serbian dominance. The "founding fathers" of Yugoslavia pretended that a Yugoslav nation already existed. They ignored the existence of Slovene as a language separate from Serb and Croatian. They disregarded the differences in worldviews which had evolved during centuries of life under different regimes. No consideration was given to the great numbers of the non-Slavic population (17% of the total) who did not have any reason to identify themselves with the Kingdom. Singleton (1984) expressed the result: "By ignoring the realities of life at the grass roots, the constitution makers sowed dragon's teeth which continue to yield bitter harvest" (p.134).

In 1918 in Yugoslavia there were two governments, six custom areas, five currencies, four railway networks using three different gauges, three banking systems, and the remnants of four legal systems which had to be assimilated into a common code of law. The first general elections for the Constituent assembly (Ustavotvornu Skupstini) were held on the whole territory of the new state in 1919. They resulted in the following: Radicals,
27%; Democrats, 17% (both Serbian parties); Croatian Peasant Party, 14%; and Communists 12% (Pavlowitz, 1988).

A Serbian Radical-Democrat coalition decided that the constitutional document would be passed by a simple majority. This led to a Croatian Peasant Party boycott on the grounds that the electoral arrangements were rigged to favor the Serbs. This weakened the Croatian cause from the beginning. Pavlowitz (1988) describes the Constitution of 28 June 1921 as, in effect, the Serbian constitution adapted to the needs of a larger Yugoslav unit. It merely updated the old Serbian structure of a parliamentary government under the Serbian monarchy, keeping the triple name of the state as a concession to non-Serbian feelings. The fact that the constitution was declared on June 28 served as another reminder that The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was in reality Greater Serbia (Singleton, 1985). That day is Serbia's national day, Vidovdan (St. Vitus day), the day on which the fate of medieval Kingdom of Serbia had been decided at Kosovo Polje in 1389 and on which in 1914 in Sarajevo the Habsburg Archduke Ferdinand was assassinated which marked the beginning of World War II. This Serbian victory did nothing to heal the gap between the Serbs and their Slavic cousins in Croatia and Slovenia. To them, this constitution marked the conquest of the centralist
Serbian experience over the Austro-Hungarian tradition of constitutional complexity (Pavlowitz, 1988).

During the first decade of the life of the Kingdom an attempt was made to operate a parliamentary democracy based on the model which had evolved in Western Europe during the 19th century. The experiment in parliamentary democracy failed because the dominant political culture did not support it and because the social conditions for its survival did not exist (Dyker, 1977). The Serbs' centralist conception of the state and their numerical domination caused a radical increase in Croatian nationalism. Between the two world wars, the Serbian political, bureaucratic, and military elites, together with the monarchy, dominated Yugoslav political life (Shoup, 1968). The majority of Croatian political parties charged that Yugoslavia was under "Serbian hegemony."

The support for a united South Slav state which had been considerable among Croatian politicians since the beginning of the 20th century, and which had become prevalent among young and educated strata of Croats at the end of World War I, almost completely disappeared. Instead, during the interwar period, Croats called for independence of some kind, ranging from limited autonomy to complete separation (A. Djilas, 1991).
King Alexandar's Declaration and Death

The first confused decade of Yugoslav history culminated in King Alexandar Karadjordjevic's autocratic proclamation of January 6, 1929 which dissolved the Parliament (Skupstina), suspended the constitution, appointed a new government which relied heavily on a Serb dominated army, and renamed the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. While most Serbian politicians were willing to accept, at least temporarily, the establishment of King Alexandar's dictatorship because it preserved the unity of Yugoslavia, to the Croats it appeared as a more efficient way of getting them to accept Serbian-style centralism. The dictatorship increased Croatian emotional separation from the government in Belgrade and then was spurred by the assassination of Stjepan Radic. Radic, the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party (Hrvatska seljacka stranka--HSS), enjoyed the wide support of the Croatian population. Radic had fought in parliament for a federalist constitution of Yugoslavia, seeing this as the best way to ensure the autonomy and protection of national entities. His murder on the floor of the Parliament in 1928, by a member of an extreme Serbian Chetnik organization, changed the political atmosphere. It led to the institution of royal dictatorship in which the normal interplay
of party politics was suspended (Bilandzic, 1985). This was the time when the radical secessionist Croatian Ustasha movement grew strong out of Croatian dissatisfaction with the regime. The Ustashas were inspired in their ideology by Nazism and Fascism, and they operated from abroad with the generous help of Italy and Germany (Pavlowitz, 1988).

One of the Ustasha's agents assassinated King Alexandar at the beginning of his visit to France in October, 1934. The King was hoping to get the support of the French in Yugoslavia's resistance to the mounting threats from Italy, Hungary and Bulgaria. There was genuine grief in Yugoslavia when the news of the King's death was received. Although many of his opponents detested his methods, they all feared that his removal might cause an uncontrolled disintegration of the state, which could only be to the advantage of Yugoslavia's enemies.

The Regency

After the King's murder his cousin, Prince Paul, took his place as Regent until Alexandar's son came of age in September 1941. Prince Paul worked on two main objectives while holding office: defending Yugoslavia's independence against pressures of Italy, Germany, Bulgar-
ia, and Hungary; and liberalizing the regime to bring about a reconciliation between Serbs and Croats. The regent prince was careful to choose cabinets that would comply with his goals. After two changes in the government, in June, 1935, Milan Stojadinovic became Premier. He convinced the prince regent that he genuinely believed in a parliamentary system on Western lines and that he could effect a reconciliation with the Croats. In that direction he signed a Concordat with the Vatican. Although Stojadinovic signed the Concordat on the behalf of the Yugoslav government and although the Concordat was based on the one which existed between the prewar Serbian Kingdom and the Vatican, its ratification was refused in 1937 by the Parliament after the Serbian Orthodox Church threatened to excommunicate any Serb who voted for it. The plan proved abortive, but the fact that Stojadinovic was ready to make it was seen by Croats as a conciliatory move. An equally encouraging sign was the amnesty which was granted to the thousands of political prisoners, many of them Croats (Singleton, 1985).

The opposition, led by Vlatko Macek, Radic's successor as the head of the Croatian Peasant Party, was pulling its strength together. The opposition called for a national government to work out transitional arrangements leading to a new constitution which would satisfy a
majority of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Its activity caused a wave of enthusiasm. Pavlowitz (1988) concluded that Serbo-Croat relations at popular levels had never been so close. In leading the opposition block, Macek had the support of the Serbian Agrarians, the Democrats, and the Muslims of Bosnia, in addition to his Croat Peasants. The opposition coalition made much progress in general elections—more than 37% of the votes in 1935 and almost 45% in 1938, in spite of an electoral system designed to favor the government. In Croatia, the now-illegal Communist Party of Yugoslavia supported Macek's United Opposition in many districts (Bilandzic, 1985).

In the late 1930s, both the government and the opposition agreed on the need to solve the Croatian problem before a European crisis placed Yugoslavia in danger. Eventually, in August of 1939, the Croat Peasant Party came to an agreement with the regency-appointed Minister, Dragisa Cvetkovic. The Croat Peasant Party thus broke its alliance with the Serbian opposition parties (Pavlowitz, 1988). While the Premier, Stojadinovic, who had employed some of the "street politics" of fascism, was enjoying the hospitality of Hitler and Mussolini and assuring them of his devotion to fascism, his regent, Macek, and Cvetkovic were working hard to create the conditions necessary for national unity.
(Bilandzic, 1985, p. 25). They feared that the country would fall apart under the growing pressure of the Axis unless the Serbs and Croats found a basis for living and working together. Hence the Croatian compromise was reached under the pressure of European events.

The legislature was dissolved August 20, 1939. Stojadinovic was removed, and a new government was formed under Cvetkovic. Prince Paul chose him because he felt that Cvetkovic was the person most likely to win the confidence of the Croats and to bring the negotiations with Macek to a successful conclusion. Macek became vice premier in the new government, popularly known as the Cvetkovic-Macek government. As a result of the Cvetkovic-Macek talks, a self-governing province of Croatia (Banovina Hrvatska) was established on the basis of the Crown's emergency powers. Banovina Hrvatska was the only autonomous political-territorial unit in the Kingdom (Bilandzic, 1985). Thus, this was not a true federalism. Macek's close ally, Ivan Subasic, became governor (Ban) of the Province which covered most of the historic units of Croatia-Slavonia and Dalmatia, plus some of the Croatian-speaking areas of the Vojvodina, Srem, and Bosnia.
In 1936, the regency government decided on a policy of neutrality in international affairs. Such a decision was the result of a feeling that regional alliances could not protect Yugoslavia against the Axis powers without adequate support from Britain and France, whose attitude toward Yugoslavia was at best ambivalent (Pavlowitz, 1988). But the situation in which Yugoslavia found itself at that time was not favorable to Paul's plans, which were ultimately based on a Western orientation.

The Yugoslav economy was heavily dependent on Germany; during the 1930s Germany had become the predominant trading partner. The growing strength of Germany and Italy, added to the benefits of the German economic connection, made real neutrality impossible. The beginning of World War II increased Yugoslavia's dependence on the Reich. It made it plain to everyone how perilously isolated and weak was its position. As German pressure grew, on 25 March 1941, Yugoslavia signed the Tripartite Pact in Vienna (Singleton, 1985). Huge protest demonstrations occurred in Belgrade and in other cities as a response to the Pact. Although this may be seriously questioned, the Communists later claimed responsibility for organizing the demonstrations. In his report to the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY)
in 1948, Tito claimed that the party had controlled the situation and was responsible for the demonstrations which brought about the overthrow of the government and the installation of the still under-age King (Bilandzic, 1985). As far as Hitler was concerned, Yugoslavia had proved unreliable and hostile, and was therefore to be destroyed. He had promised pieces of its territory to his allies, and had also settled on the creation of the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska--NDH), although the final details were to be worked out after the military occupation was complete.

Yugoslavia was attacked by the Fascists without a declaration of war on April 6, 1941. The country was stunned, already in a state of confusion, and quickly put out of action. By the time of the capitulation of its armed forces on April 18, King Peter and his government had already gone into exile, soon to join other allied leaders in London, leaving Yugoslavia’s people to struggle with unsolved problems (Bilandzic 1985). Royal Yugoslavia ceased to exist, although its shadow lived on in exile in London. Pavlowitz (1988) describes the end of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia:

It had taken a world war for it to come prematurely into the world at the end of 1918 and, however shaky its state of health in the spring of 1941, it took another world war to destroy the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, which to all intents and purposes came to an end between 6 and 18 April of that year (p.
Yugoslavia was soon divided into a German and Italian zone. The Ustashas had set up a nominally independent state, the Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska (NDH), the Independent State of Croatia, which ended up being under the Italian protectorate, but after the Italian collapse of 1943, the German control over the Independent State of Croatia was absolute (Tudjman, 1963). But the fiction was maintained that the Independent State of Croatia was an independent state with its own army, police and administration. In reality it was not independent; almost half of its population were not Croats, and its economy was subordinated to the needs of German war machine (Supek, 1983). Its international status was not even recognized de jure by the Vatican, which has frequently been accused of supporting the Independent State of Croatia, and its government could act only with the approval of the occupying powers (Singleton, 1984). In any case, Ante Pavelic, the leader (Poglavnik) of the Croatian state, succeeded in dishonoring the name of Croatia by the appalling atrocities for which his regime became notorious. His regime declared that one of its chief objectives was to "purify" Croatia of alien elements, especially the Serbs. The number of Serbs who were killed during the regime is not known. Such re-
search was not allowed during the Communist regime; the figure of 750,000 as given by the Serbians was accepted as official. The German estimate is 350,000 (A. Djilas, 1991). The political talk in Serbia still turns to this powerful myth of extermination of their countrymen. Today's Croatian government is compared to that of World War II as being fascist and genocidal.

The NDH's savage policy toward Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies served to obscure the contribution of Croat Communist-led partisans in freeing the biggest chunk of the territory in the western part of Yugoslavia with the wide support of the Croatian population, who fought for the freedom of the country and "for a better tomorrow" only to realize that all turned against the people (Supek, 1983). These events in the history of Yugoslavia, which were disguised and removed from public eyes, are of mounting importance today.

The Ustasha's ferocious racism in the Independent State of Croatia encouraged in Serbia pro-Allied enthusiasm at the time of Hitler's invasion of Russia, and resulted in rebellions against the Germans, who retaliated ruthlessly. On the other hand, as both A. Djilas (1991) and Pavlowitz (1988) observe, the Ustasha policies strengthened the Partisan movement. In the fratricidal civil war that followed the Ustasha massacres, in which
Serbs killed Croats and Moslems, and Moslems killed Serbs, Communist national policies increasingly attracted people from the different nations of Yugoslavia.

There were two major "rebellious" groups that fought against the occupation. Both of them had far broader goals than "just defending" the country (Martin, 1990). One group, a faction of a larger Chetnik movement, was under Colonel Draza Mihailovic. His aim was to build an underground movement that would take power and restore the monarchy when the fortunes of war turned against the Axis. He was a standard-bearer for Greater Serbia and for the House of Karadjordjevic. He eventually made contact with the government-in-exile and in September, 1941, a joint Yugoslav-British mission was sent out to talk with him. In October, the British government, on advice from Yugoslavs in London, decided to recognize Mihailovic as the leader of the Yugoslav resistance movement. His Chetniks were credited with many acts of sabotage which were, in fact, carried out by Tito’s Communist-led Partisans (Tomasevic, 1975). The British and the London government-in-exile built up Mihailovic’s reputation and underestimated the role of the Partisans.

The Partisans were the other major insurgent group. Under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito and Communist
party cadres, they saw the Axis destruction of Yugoslavia as the opportunity to advance the cause of the socialist revolution and to establish a new Yugoslavia on the basis of national freedom and equality.

The Yugoslav Communist Party (CPY) was established in 1919 as a Bolshevik party. Its communist orientation had forced it to operate illegally during most of the interwar period, because the regime outlawed it in August 1921. At the time of occupation the CPY emerged as the only political force which called the peoples of Yugoslavia to arms, stressing in its Proclamation of July 4, 1941 the anti-fascist and liberating character of the fight against the enemy rather than its former anti-imperialistic and anti-capitalist emphasis (Bilandzic, 1985). In the short period of time from Yugoslav occupation till Germany launched an attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the CPY was prepared politically and militarily to resist the enemy (Bilandzic, 1985).

The name of Josip Broz Tito is irrevocably connected with the life of CPY. In 1937 he was appointed secretary-general of the party. During the four years that remained before the Axis invasion Tito built up the illegal Communist Party into a highly effective revolutionary avant garde. Its membership increased and it included people from all walks of life and from all national
groups within Yugoslavia. M. Djilas (1980) sees Tito's personality, his drive and energy, and his unswerving loyalty to the policies of Comintern as those that gave a sense of purpose and direction to the Party which, prior to Tito's accession to leadership, was torn by internal dissensions and factional fighting. When the old regime disintegrated under the pressure of war, under his leadership the CPY was able to rise to the occasion and create a national movement, and in turn to weld the resistance movement into an instrument of social revolution (Tudjman, 1963).

As Martin (1990) observes, it is misleading to explain what happened in Yugoslavia during World War II as the product of a two-sided struggle between the Partisan resistance movement on the one hand and the occupying powers and their collaborators on the other hand. He sees four major conflicts taking place: first, there was the religious-political war launched by the quisling Ante Pavelic and his so called "Independent State of Croatia" against the Serbian people living in its borders. As previously explained, this conflict was marked by massacres and countermassacres. Second, there was the conflict between the occupying powers and the two major resistance forces--the Mihailovic movement, which was essentially nationalist and dynastic, and the Partisan
movement that was committed to a communist Yugoslavia. Third, there was the conflict in Serbia between the forces of General Mihailovíc and the collaborationist "Chetnik" forces of Kosta Pecanac, and intermittently, the forces of General Milan Ljotic, the fascist appointed governor of occupied Serbia. Finally, there was the civil war that the Tito and Mihailovíc forces waged against each other, alongside or within the framework of the resistance movement.

Bilandzic (1985) explained the social and political background that caused such cruel fighting. The conflict that started in 1941 occurred in a period of historical development of the nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia when the relationships among them were already poisoned. The conflicts were used by the occupiers of Yugoslavia. They set the Yugoslav peoples against each other in an unprecedented way. Pavlowitz (1988) states that never before had there been physical conflict among the Yugoslav peoples as during World War II. Few nations in history have suffered such terrible consequences. Jukic (1974) blames the political leaders of both the Yugoslav government in exile and the Allies, and their procrastination, for creating all the horrors and hardships for the innocent people. The ultimate blame Jukic (1974), and Martin (1990), put on the Allies and their
war leadership. Both authors take Mihailovic's side and see the switch in the Allied policy toward Yugoslavia as the most dramatic change that occurred during World War II.

The Allied policy toward Yugoslavia was of great import for the future of this small Balkan country. During 1941 and 1942 and the first part of 1943, the Allies gave all-out support to General Draza Mihailovic as the only leader of the Yugoslav resistance. By the end of 1943, for all practical purposes, Mihailovic was abandoned because his forces were inactive against the enemy and he had collaborated with them. At this point Britain and the United States, which had conceded British primacy in determining Balkan policy, began to give their support to the Communist resistance movement.

At the Teheran Conference which took place between November 28 and December 1, 1943, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin agreed to support the Partisans as being the only effective Yugoslav movement (Singleton, 1985). The "switch" had occurred. There were still formidable obstacles for Tito's forces to overcome, but at the beginning of 1944 it was becoming increasingly obvious to all concerned that Germany was losing the war and that the future government of Yugoslavia would be dominated by the Communists (Bilandzic, 1985). The official surrender

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of Germany (May, 1945) did not stop the killing in Yugoslavia. Thousand of Croats and Slovenes who were retreating with the Germans were rounded up by the British forces in Austria and brought back to Yugoslavia, where many of them were murdered by victorious Partisans (Singleton, 1985). This part of Yugoslav history was kept in secret until the late 1980s. Then, the stories about the Partisans' cruelties began to get out. Among the most painful experiences of that time was the exodus of Croatian soldiers and people, many of whom were guilty of only being in the path of the war. These people were following Pavelic and the government of the Independent State of Croatia to hoped-for safety in the British zone of Austria after German capitulation. They were driven back to Yugoslavia from Italian and Austrian camps along what is now known as the "Bloody Path to Bleiburg." In the town of Bleiburg, Austria, they were slaughtered by Partisans and buried in huge pits (Bereza, 1988).

The Communist Rise to Power

When World War II ended in May, 1945, the Yugoslav Communist Party, at the head of the victorious Partisan army, proceeded to consolidate its power. The Partisans presented themselves as the sole unifying force in Yugoslavia because they led simultaneous campaigns
against occupiers, collaborators, and Croatian, Serbian and other national extremists (A. Djilas, 1991). This campaign appealed to a large number of non-communists, especially those who had been radicalized by the upheavals of the war. While the government in exile was contemplating the dangers of Communism in Yugoslavia, it was not able to fight for a return to the status quo before the war. The old elites, or "bourgeoisie" in Communist vocabulary, were eventually destroyed in the course of the civil war. As Germans withdrew, the Communists ascended to power.

The Tito-Subasic government, which came into existence in March, 1945, as a result of political maneuvering among Tito, the Yugoslav government in exile and the British government, was intended by the same subjects to be a caretaker administration, set up to govern the country during the difficult period of war reconstruction.

The elections to a Constituent Assembly on November, 1945, were held under a new electoral law which gave equal rights to men and women over the age of eighteen and to ex-Partisans under that age. The right to vote was withdrawn from 250,000 people who were alleged to have been collaborators. By the time of elections, any political party which was unwilling to run on the CPY
National Front Slate had been eliminated. Although some prewar, non-communist groups were permitted to run on the National Front slate, there were no contested seats. Such a discriminatory electoral law resulted in the victory of the People's Front (a newly formed organization that represented Communists) with 90% of the votes cast. On November 29, 1945, the Constituent Assembly approved the abolition of the monarchy and the establishment of the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia (Federativna Narodna Republika Jugoslavija--FNRJ) (Bilandzic, 1985, pp. 71-80).

The outcome of the war led to a unified Yugoslavia, even though, once again, there was no national consultation (Pavlowitz, 1988, p.15). A new constitution was promulgated on 21 January 1946. The Constitution sanctioned the country's new structure as a multinational federation of eight units (six republics and two autonomous provinces) based on both ethnic and historic criteria. The intention was to establish balance between the units and to avoid the division of territory with ethnically mixed populations. The largest republic, Serbia, contained three elements--Serbia proper, the autonomous province of Vojvodina and the autonomous province of Kosovo-Metohija. The justification of this division of Serbia, besides the ethnic reasons, was that it would
dispel fears of revival of Serbian hegemonism which dominated in pre-war Yugoslavia (Singleton, 1984).

Since the Communist regime downplayed the historic memories of the nations, the eruption of Serbian nationalism in the mid-1980s began with the Serbs' demand that Serbia be a unified state, with full control of Vojvodina and Kosovo. The division of Serbia into three units did not correspond with the Serbian national tradition. This was the card to be used once the power of Communism started to fade.

Enthusiastic Communists, enchanted by the Marxist ideology, were proud of their achievements during and after the war. Dyker (1977) summed up the image with which the Communists emerged from World War II in terms of Yugoslav internationalism, heroism and personality. They never questioned that intended postwar federalism and Yugoslavism would solve the national question for good. That image was maintained in post-war works of the intellectuals. Tudjman's work (1963) may serve best to illustrate the official picture and ideology concerning the role of the Communists during World War II: The People's Liberation Movement was described as the principal factor of all developments in Yugoslavia during the Fascist occupation of 1941-1945, so that its growth within the general framework of the Second World War
resulted not only in the overthrow of the occupation system, but also in liquidation of the bourgeois monarchy and the establishment of a new federated socialist commonwealth of Yugoslav peoples (p. 309).

After the War

The results of the first elections well illustrated that the CPY was committed to the abolition of all other political parties. There were two ideological motives for the CPY's rejection of political pluralism. First of all, Marxism regards political parties as a part of a "superstructure" of the capitalist social and economic order whose purpose is the perpetuation of that order. In the building of a socialist society, the CPY saw a multi-party system as unnecessary and regressive. Secondly, Leninism maintains that a monopoly of power by a communist party is a prerequisite for the revolutionary transformation of society. The CPY leadership was united in their belief in the need for the "dictatorship of the proletariat," that is, their party's monopoly of power (Kostunica & Cavoski, 1985).

The CPY believed that federalism would solve the national question. The Constitution of 1946 provided each nation with a separate national unit and representative assemblies, government, courts, anthems, flags and
other signs and symbols. But, as Stanovcic (1988) warns, one should not overestimate the importance of these signs and symbols because the system in general was centralized. The economy was under the control of the central government and the monolithic Communist Party enjoyed a monopoly of political and ideological power. This system of "administrative socialism," marked by the total control of the CPY, distanced people from power and weakened the cooperation that had developed during the liberation war (Dyker, 1977).

In 1948, the break with the Soviet Union and Eastern European Communist parties occurred as a consequence of the Yugoslav habits of autonomous decision making and lack of submission to Stalin, who wanted overall control over the new Communist party states of Eastern Europe. In order to mobilize support against the Soviet Union and to win the confidence of the population, the policy of "four Ds" (democratization, decentralization, deetatization and debureaucratization) was launched (Bilandzic, 1985). The well-known features of the Yugoslav system, self-management and local government, reflected this orientation and grew out of it. Remington (1991) characterized this form of participatory socialism a "utopian agenda."
1960s: The Decade of Reforms

Remington (1991) described this period of Yugoslav history as "Perestrojka the Yugoslav way" because it was marked by Yugoslav economists struggling with the question of how to reform the country's still largely command economy. The economic boom of the early 1960s convinced economists from the successful sectors of the economy that the time to push ahead had come. For them, the real problem with self management was the ratio of principle to practice. Their choice was real market socialism (capital intensive selective development) instead of token market socialism (Remington, 1991). Naturally, the chief opponents of the reform were those who would be left out in the shift to selective development. This is when the division of developed and underdeveloped republics was introduced, and when the more developed republics complained that the payments which they were forced to make (to the federation) to sustain the less developed areas were being wasted. The reformers, who were joined by advocates of party democratization and liberalization in the cultural sector, got the support and blessing of Tito and federal party leaders.

The Yugoslav economy was not strong enough for its big leap forward and the reform failed. Severe economic conditions, the rise of unemployment and the decrease in
the standard of living induced rising discontent in the population (Pavlowitz, 1988). The student demonstrations of 1968 pointed at the salience of the crisis. The students demanded jobs for Yugoslavs at home. They objected to the party privileges and wanted knowledge and technical training to count for more than political connections or military record. They requested a more meaningful democratization of party life, less corruption, and a return to socialist morality. The demonstrations clearly pointed at the LCY as being incapable of dealing with the growing problems in the Yugoslav society (Bilandzic, 1985, pp. 305-320).

As the loosening of central control and the separation of the LCY from the state machine gave an opportunity for more republican assertiveness, another grave conflict was about to erupt. The nationalism was the product of several factors: of the growing regional inequalities and differences which did not correspond with the notion of Socialism as the society of equals, of the growing power of the republican/provincial party elites and consequently of the increasing emancipation of the society from the party and from the state. The growing chorus of discontent from the republics came at the end of the 1960s, the culmination of it being the "Deklaracija," a statement signed by leading Croatian
intellectuals asking for the separate existence of a Croatian linguistic and literary tradition and denying the validity of Serbo-Croatian as an historic language. In an attempt to diffuse these threatening revolts, a series of constitutional amendments that gave wider powers to the republics were hastily prepared and rushed through the Federal Assembly in April 1967 (Singleton, 1985). But the constitutional changes did not achieve the desired effect of dampening the fervor of the nationalism. Yugoslavism was once again forced to retreat under the growing pressure from local, although Party, leadership. It became obvious that the feelings of sectarianism had not gone away. Pavlowitz (1988) related this growing sense of sectarianism with the impossibility of fostering anything common to all Yugoslavs other than Communism. Tomc (1988) saw the national movements in Yugoslavia as the new social actors that filled the social space vacated by the party in the 1960s. At the beginning of the 1970s, the most vocal and articulate demands for further decentralization, meaning greater congruence between republic and nation; and democratization, meaning greater space for independent expression of social movements, came from Croatia (p. 69). What the political elite in Croatia wanted above all was reform of the banking, foreign trade and foreign
currency system so as to implement their own policies within their republic, going beyond the power to veto decisions of the federal government. The request on the part of the Croatian League of Communists that the money should be at the disposal of those who earn it, rather than go to the center in Belgrade and then be distributed as the federation decides, was interpreted by the Belgrade Press as a growing wave of nationalism in Croatia (Bilandzic, 1985). The mass demonstration of students on the streets of Zagreb in December 1971 ended with the army and police moving into Zagreb and the arrest of student leaders and the prohibition of Matica Hrvatska. There followed the purge of republic and provincial leaders who were "nationalistically minded."

The Croatian crisis along with the upheavals in Slovenia, Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo raised the fear with the LCY leaders that any radical change in the federal framework would threaten the unity of Yugoslavia.

Tomc (1988) observed the reaction of the core party leadership to the crisis that ended the 1960s period of liberation as twofold: It severely reduced the degree of political democracy while at the same time it delegated greater power to republican and provincial party elites. Thus, the counter-reform had aspects that were antidemocratic and aspects that were confederalist, although
the confederate character of Yugoslavia was not admitted. One inevitably wonders what was the reason behind this process of confederation. Tomc (1988) thought that the reason for it was that the party elite thought it had armed itself with the strong ideology of self-management by allowing greater powers to federal units. This ideology of self-management was intended to hold the country together with the sheer strength of belief. Ideology became the main integrating factor which was supposed to be capable of withstanding both political decentralization and national unity.

Developments in the 1970s proved that this hope was in vain. Regional party elites, paying lip service to "brotherhood and unity," used the ideology of self-management to promote their own particular political interests and thus to create political legitimacy in their home republics. The party failed to apply any mechanism that would enable it to exert an integrating influence at a nation-wide level. The party did not want to give up its monopoly of power because that was an essential part of its definition of socialism, but the monopolies were now defined by republican or provincial boundaries. As a result, party functionaries gave their allegiance first to their respective republican and provincial organizations and behaved accordingly. In
their drive to become the people’s party, the leadership of LCY turned it into eight national parties. The only institution that could hold the country together, the party, was fragmented into eight independent parties. The fragmentation of Yugoslavia into eight national states assumed a variety of forms; besides a decrease in economic exchange among republics, it was also apparent in culture, communications, science and other fields (Bilandzic, 1984; Tomc, 1988).

The 1980s: An Eye Opener

The system appeared to function reasonably effectively as long as Tito was alive. Through his ability to transcend conflicts and to enforce compromises in which all the parties assented whether they liked them or not, Tito acted as the ultimate agregator (Schopflin, 1985). After his death in May 1980, there was neither the instrumentality nor agreement on the criteria for the resolution of conflicts. Cross-national conflicts became everyday phenomena. Tomc (1988) regarded them as an outlet used in the absence of other means to express national aspirations.

In general, the development since Tito’s death had strengthened the assertiveness of regional structures, as the policy of the central leadership had continued to
balance ethnic groups against each other (Pavlowitz, 1988). Political tensions realized themselves in Croat bitterness against Belgrade; they stimulated emotional reactions among the Serbs and brought into the open the issue of Serbia as an unequal state; they surfaced in an Islamic assertion in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Tijanic, 1989). The eighties were characterized by the overwhelming decline of confidence of the Yugoslav society (Ramet, 1985) which was the result of the growing popular disenchantment with the party, socialism and self-management (Pavlowitz, 1988) which did not live up to their promises. The major cause that contributed to a sense of general crisis was the economic deterioration, whose roots lie in the strategy of overborrowing, popularly known as "buy now, pay later." Besides economic factors, Ramet (1985) listed several other factors that encouraged the growing popular discontent with the system, such as political paralysis, demographic changes that affected the ethnic balance, and the breakdown of traditional society and the displacement of the old norms by a widespread relativism. These factors have also exhilarated nationalist passions. As Schopflin (1985) attests, the party's initial analysis that nationalism would fade away once the economic inequality was eliminated, was faulty. The roots of nationalism were deeper. Uneven economic
development was, at most, one factor among many accounting for the survival and revitalization of nationalism.

In the mid eighties, after numerous attempts to hide from the public the size of the foreign debt, the party finally admitted that Yugoslavia was in crisis. The party, still in charge of economics, launched several emergency programs for the purpose of stabilizing the economy, but the failure to tackle the problems in time resulted in serious difficulties.

The historical background should aid in understanding of the political messages of Slobodan Milosevic, the Serbian leader. In the following chapter three of his speeches are analyzed.
CHAPTER IV

THE ANALYSES OF THE SPEECHES

The analyses of the speeches are based on the researcher's translation from Milosevic's Serbian text, *Godine raspleta*, (1989) [The Years of Solution], pp. 140-147; 264-271 and 274-277. The translation has been checked with that of FBIS. Thus, the three sections of this chapter, each of which is entitled Speech Summary and Speech Analysis, do not have individual citations for each direct quotation.

The Speech of April 24, 1987

**Immediate Context**

As noted in the preceding chapter, at the beginning of the 1980s Yugoslavia was experiencing a complex political, social and economic crisis. These included problems of Yugoslav federalism, the so called Kosovo Counterrevolution, stagnation of self-management, high unemployment rates, and the decrease in the standard of living. All this resulted in frustration, anger, and apathy among people (Ramet, 1985). Distrustful attitudes and national hatred developed. In large parts of the
public, especially in Serbia and Montenegro, there arose a belief that disintegration processes destroyed "former political, economic, cultural and spiritual unity and cooperation and brought Yugoslavia to the brink of decay" (Bilandzic, 1985, p. 506). In Serbia, the conviction that only the Serbian people in Yugoslavia did not have their own state reawakened and became widespread (Pavlowitz, 1988). This time there was no Tito to quiet down heretical thoughts of what was historically seen as Serbian striving for hegemony and a centralist state. The impulse to reform the political system toward some sort of recentralization came most of all from the Serbian League of Communists (Hopken, 1985).

This "disintegration" process pervaded all of Yugoslavia; it was the result of a political (LCY--League of Communists) decision on decentralization and strengthening of self-managerial and communal units, especially after the 1968 amendments to the Constitution. The League of Communists was still ruling the country; it was just that republican and provincial leadership had achieved so much independence that they could not influence each other's affairs. This was a general tendency and all the republics were gaining independence in relationship to the center. In Serbia, however, the constitutionally affirmed independence of the two provinces of
Kosovo and Vojvodina, and the lost power of the Serbian leadership to appoint the provincial officials, was an emotional issue—perceived as a deliberate policy of destroying the Serbian national state (Bilandzic, 1985).

After the upheaval of the Albanians, who demanded a separate republic of Kosovo in 1981, (which was, in party language, termed the "Kosovo counterrevolution"), the Serbian politicians became even bolder in criticizing federal balance, especially decision-making practices (Hopken, 1985). Any decision at the federal level could be made only through consensus, which meant that any one republican party could veto proposed decisions or changes. In order to arrive at the desired political changes, the Serbian Party leadership started with the process of "clearing up" its organization. Everyone opposing the offered changes was declared as an enemy or counter-revolutionary. The political struggle for "building and strengthening of unity and co-operation in the Socialist Republic of Serbia" had began to take place in public forums (Bilandzic, 1985).

By the mid-eighties Kosovo was a hotbed of crisis and a factor of instability in Yugoslavia (Danas, June 30, 1987). Djindjic (1988) claimed that the seriousness of the Kosovo crisis involved questioning of the relationship between Serbia and the federation, and the
destiny of Yugoslavia as a unified state. Kosovo was a serious problem. To the Serbs, the issue of Kosovo meant the pressures of Albanian nationalism. According to Pavlowitz (1988), ethnic harassment and Serbian emigration had been a persistent phenomenon since 1966, but the authorities had not wanted to acknowledge them until 1981. Then the Serbian media took on itself the task of revealing the alleged violence, the desecration of graves and churches, and the resulting exodus of Serbs. The picture was always one-sided, all the blame was on the Albanians, and the economic reasons for leaving the poorest region in Yugoslavia were seldom stressed enough (Bozic, 1990). The media depicted Albanians as irredentists, separatists, and terrorists. Such stereotyping only deepened the dissention between Albanians and Serbs, and served as a good political tool. In April, 1987, the Kosovo Serbs signed a petition denouncing their situation as an oppressed minority, demanding action and warning the authorities that they would no longer tolerate the "genocide" being carried out against their community.

Milosevic came as the representative of the top party officials to address and calm down the demonstrators.
Milosevic as Rhetor

Prior to his speech of April 24, 1987 when, Thurow (1991) asserts, Milosevic found his "populist voice," Milosevic's career was not different from any other careerist who joined the Communist party. His political position could be described as that of a hard-line communist, a "true believer" in the cause of Communism. On the other side, people who worked close to him said that this "true believer" behavior was a pose, and that he used Communism, as did everybody else in Yugoslavia, primarily to gain power (Engelberg, 1991). Ever since 1960, he was a staunch party activist, but he entered the professional political arena only in 1983 (Thurow, 1991).

In the assessment of the political processes from the beginning of the 1980s, Bilandzic (1985) saw the 18th Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, held on November 1984, as the best example of the nature of political processes described above. The most sensitive proposal the Serbian party leadership offered at the session dealt with the relations between Serbia and its provinces. Serbians openly insisted on greater jurisdiction over the provinces, and called for more decision-making powers for federal organs, but refused to call their stand on the issue as a plea for centralism or unitarism. Another factor con-
tributes to the importance of this session for analysis:
The name of Slobodan Milosevic, who just recently entered
the political arena, became associated with the Serbian
cause. Both Hopken (1985) and Bilandzic (1985) cited the
excerpts from Milosevic's speech at the session to justi-
fy the unappreciative response of the delegates from the
provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. Milosevic, a member
of the Central Committee asserted,

We must free ourselves of the complex of unitarism.
Serbian Communists have never been champions of
unitarism. On the contrary, we have throttled every
attempt at such a policy. The Serbian communists
have long been saddled with a complex about unitari-
sm, and unjustly so, and made guilty for a relation-
ship with the Serbian bourgeoisie (Hopken, 1985,
p.41).

Milosevic talked as a representative of all Serbs
who were tired of being labeled "unitarists" whenever
they actually strove for "unity." Another important
aspect of this speech revealed Milosevic's pledge for a
market economy and prosperity, that are possible only in
an "undivided Yugoslav market"; that is, where the
federation is stronger than the republics. After stating
that "[e]very citizen can see that the Yugoslav market is
less and less united" (Milosevic, 1989, p. 30), Milosevic
attacked the existing autarchic (republican and provin-
cial) economies of Yugoslavia by saying that "national
economies" can realize "economic interests of nations
only ostensibly" (Milosevic, 1989, p.30). After this
session, Milosevic’s name was associated with free-market economic principles. His characterization as an "ideologue of reforms" reflected his desire toward radical changes in the political and economic systems of Yugoslavia (Rodic, 1987).

This talk, in which he revealed his position on the issues at hand, served to establish his credibility with the Serbian audience, and affected the receptivity of his speech delivered in Kosovo Polje in April 27, 1987.

As President of the Serbian League of Communists Presidium, Milosevic traveled to Kosovo Polje to explore Serbian grievances about mistreatment by Communist-Albanian authorities, and to prevent the masses from marching to the capitol. The crowd of 15,000 Serbs and Montenegrins protested against their alleged harassment by members of the ethnic Albanian majority, who they claimed had forced them to resettle in other parts of Yugoslavia, mainly in neighboring Serbia (Jajcinovic, 1988a). In Kosovo Polje, Milosevic spoke the words that changed his political career (Thurow, 1991), and transformed his image "from faceless bureaucrat to charismatic Serb leader" (Engelberg, 1991, p. 32).

**Speech Summary**

Milosevic began his speech by referring to the
events of the previous day and saying that, "When we speak of this unpleasant event here today, intervention of the police, responsibility for this intervention will be established."

He then turned to the character of the meetings of the Serbs and Montenegrins and stated that "such gatherings are not gatherings of nationalists.... [and] are not gatherings of enemies." Thus, Milosevic said, precisely because these are not gatherings of enemies but of citizens, we must not allow the misfortunes of people to be exploited by nationalists, who must be opposed by every honest man. We must preserve brotherhood and unity as the apple of an eye. It is only on this basis, now when brotherhood and unity are threatened, that we must win.

Asserting that "we cannot, nor do we want to divide people into Serbs and Albanians," Milosevic went on to distinguish "the honest and progressive people, who struggle for brotherhood and unity and national equality from the counterrevolution and nationalists, on the other side."

Another topic change led to his providing assurance to the audience that not one of the problems that you have talked about, literally no single word about the problems, will be omitted in reporting to the members of the Serbian LC Central Committee; not in order to inform about them, but in order to solve them within our society's institutions.

Milosevic then turned to a discussion of the problems of Kosovo, stating that "Kosovo is a great problem in our
society [and] that is slowly being solved." He said that "if Kosovo were the only, or the only great problem of Yugoslav society, the problems would be solved faster and better." This statement was followed by a listing of some of the economic and political problems facing the country at the same time. "Finally, this has been the time when anti-Yugoslav and anti-communist forces have been more present and more aggressive." He concluded this point by saying that,

In solving all these problems the League of Communists was not always united, and therefore could not be sufficiently effective. I do not say this as an apology, because I do not have right to say that; I simply state it.

Milosevic then turned to the subject of solving the problem and asserted that "unity of the LC is indispensable.... Indeed, with unity we can solve many problems, almost all of them. Without unity, we cannot solve a single problem."

Milosevic's next comments identified himself with the problems of the Kosovo Serbs:

Kosovo remains to be underdeveloped, unemployment is high, foreign loans are high, exports are unsatisfactory, there are a lot of incomplete projects. What is most difficult is the presence of a great misuse of work and of functions in the administration and even in the area of politics.

Milosevic mentioned that these matters were discussed at the session of the LC Provincial Committee Presidium. He further identified himself with the Kosovo Serbs by
claiming that the "emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins under economic, political, and simple physical pressures constitutes probably the last tragic exodus of an European population." He compared the emigration to that which occurred during the Middle Ages.

He then moved to assure the audience that the changes were underway:

I nevertheless want to assure you that many measures in the spheres of material life, political relations, and cadre policy change every day and that the pace of these changes will be faster in the coming months.... Cadre shifts are being increasingly carried out, legal, administrative, and ideological measures are being proclaimed.

After mentioning that the members of the Committees of the LC are not happy with the rate of progress, he reasserted, "the process is accelerating and I am sure that the pace of the process will increase even more. You should know this." He then repeated his dissatisfaction:

Let it be understood, I do not intend to suggest that we have reason to be content.... Kosovo is still the poorest region of our country. Albanian separatists and nationalists have quieted down a little.... They should know, there will be no tyranny on this soil any more. That will not be allowed by the progressive people of Kosovo, it will not be allowed by Serbia, and it will not be allowed by Yugoslavia.

Milosevic then challenged the position of the Albanian separatists and offered the argument that the "logical continuation" of their position is "that the province should be actually and legally transformed into a repub-
lic, by which, in fact, the first, but not insignificant steps, are taken toward a breakup of the territorial integrity of Socialist Republic of Serbia and of Yugoslavia. Milosevic claimed that "[w]e have grappled with this problem, and the progressive people in Kosovo, in Serbia, and in Yugoslavia have grappled with it." But, he said, "some misunderstandings must be cleared." Misunderstandings he addressed were dealing with the conception of minorities and majorities in Kosovo.

The Serbs and Montenegrins are not a minority in regard to the Albanians in Kosovo, just as the Albanians are not a minority in Yugoslavia, but a nationality that lives together in equality with other nations and nationalities in three of our socialist republics.

He then argued against the idea of "an ethnically pure and economically and politically autonomous and isolated Kosovo," saying that such "nationalism would exclude [the Albanians] from the encirclement and would not only slow down, but it would cease their development both in economic and a generally spiritual sense." He said that such policy would "deprive [the Albanians] of the possibility to participate in the dynamic life of the modern world." He argued generally that "[n]ationalism always means isolation from others and... lagging in development" and that "we, the Communists, must do everything to eliminate the consequences of nationalist and separatist behavior of the counterrevolutionary forces, both in
Kosovo and in other parts of the country." Milosevic emphasized a coming together of interests by saying: "Our aim is to get away from hatred; to have all the people of Kosovo living well."

This was followed by a lengthy argument that the Serbs in Kosovo should not emigrate, but should stay in Kosovo. He appealed to their memories and tradition and claimed that "[i]t has never been in the spirit of the Serbian and Montenegrin peoples to give up before the obstacles." He noted that the Serbs in Kosovo cannot change their circumstances alone and called for all Serbs and all Yugoslavia to help them. He argued that solving the problems of Kosovo was primarily a matter of applying law:

Now the Serbs and the Montenegrins suffer most from the nonimplementation of the law, but tomorrow it could be the Albanians that will suffer. For that reason, the introduction of the respect for law, order, and equality is really in the interest of all the inhabitants of Kosovo, in the profound social and historical sense.

Milosevic then returned to the issue of emigration, calling for changes that would encourage the return of professionals who have left Kosovo. He argued that "the progressive forces, the Communists and the youth, everything that is honest and progressive in all of Serbia may and must participate in [the] creation of the conditions" which will encourage the professionals to return. He
argued for a "campaign for the return of 50, then 100, then 200 teachers, physicians and other experts, skilled workers, and then the rest."

He described obstacles to returning:

Indeed, comrades, pay is low and prices are high in Yugoslavia. Shoes and books are expensive and it is difficult to go for a vacation.... [It is possible] to make our country richer and happier ... but only under one precondition: that the forces of socialism, brotherhood and unity, and progress be separated from the forces of separatism, nationalism and conservativism. In this separation of what is progressive from what is reactionary, the Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo will certainly get the support of many of Albanians, Communists, and Albanian people, among whom they have relatives and friends and their children have companions. Here in Kosovo, all of them have the common aim that the province should develop economically and culturally, and that all the people should have a better and happier life. All the working and honest people should rally around this goal. This should be the basis of brotherhood and unity in Kosovo.

Milosevic concluded his speech by referring to the power of the workers' class of Kosovo, which "must be the bearer of the spirit of brotherhood and unity, justice and progress.... Only this class can defeat the present injustice." He mentioned that "the LC must highly appreciate the fact that the people turn to it... for this is proof that people believe in the party. Precisely for this reason... the LC leadership will do everything to accomplish what we, as Communists and as leadership, have assumed as our tasks."

Milosevic concluded: "All of Yugoslavia is with
you. It is not a question of this being a problem of Yugoslavia, but rather of Yugoslavia and Kosovo.... Yugoslavia disintegrates without Kosovo! Yugoslavia and Serbia will not give Kosovo away!"

Speech Analysis

At the meeting before his address, Milosevic ordered police to stop beating the people, "No one has the right to beat the people!" After carefully listening to requests and complaints of indignant people who asked for "all that other citizens of this country have," "To live in our own and not in someone else's country," Milosevic delivered a speech that would later be characterized as legendary (Jajcinovic, 1988a). He was able to identify and express emotions his public was feeling at the time.

By saying, "Comrades, it is clear to all the people all over Yugoslavia that Kosovo is a great problem in our land and that it is being slowly solved," Milosevic uttered aloud the words that were until then only whispered. He criticized the leadership of the Federation and the League of Communists as being indifferent to the Serbian issue. "In solving all these problems the League of Communists unfortunately has not always been united and, therefore also could not be sufficiently effective." He implicitly concluded that Serbia was lamenting its own
inability to act: "You, above all and all of us are not satisfied." His party vocabulary was interwoven with emotionally charged statements which were aimed at assuring people that he, although it was verbalized as "we-the Party" (but under his leadership), was aware and understood the seriousness of the problems affecting people in Kosovo:

the spirit of separatism and often of counter-revolution is still present in the process of education and training, and in cadre policy. The emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins under economic and political and simple physical pressure constitutes probably the last tragic exodus of a European population. The last time such processions of desperate people moved was in the Middle Ages.

Feeling that Kosovo's political problems reflected the feeling of abandonment fostered by Serbs and Montenegrins and that these problems have become psychological problems, Milosevic touched something that was a taboo topic for many years: Serbian national pride (Tijanic, 1989). Milosevic said that "it has never been in the spirit of the Serbian and Montenegrin peoples to give up before obstacles, to demobilize when they should fight, to become demoralized when the going is difficult." These words provoked in his countrymen remembrance of their traditions of statehood and military prowess, particularly on the Allied side in both world wars. This entitled them, the majority of Serbs believe, to a position of at least "first among equals" in
Yugoslavia (Moore, 1988).

This is the moment in his speech when it could be claimed that the rhetoric of Communist ideology—disguised in the appeals for "brotherhood and unity," for united Yugoslavia, and for the equality of all the nations and nationalities in Yugoslavia, in the struggle against terrorism and separatism—was getting a new, populist and nationalist connotation. Milosevic called on the Serbs to remain on their land, where their fields, their gardens, and their memories were. By saying, "Surely you will not leave your land because it is difficult to live there and you are oppressed by injustice and humiliation," Milosevic reminded Serbs of their historical duties because with their departure they would "disgrace [their] ancestors and disappoint [their] descendants."

The address Milosevic delivered to the resentful Serbs and Montenegrins of Kosovo Polje could be best described in Graber's (1981) terms as a combination of statesman's, charismatic and demagogic styles. Statesman's oratory, characterized by an appeal to reason is evident in Milosevic's appeal to the Serbs and Montenegrins to "conduct themselves with dignity.... and not to let their misfortunes to be exploited by the nationalists." Milosevic presented an assessment of the
Kosovo crisis in moderate language compared to his later speeches, as will be illustrated. This statesman's style of Milosevic speech is also evident in the fact that his message about Kosovo was closer to reality than in his later speeches (Jajcinovic, 1988c). Milosevic thus said, "I must, however tell you that if Kosovo were the only problem or the only great problem of Yugoslav society, the problems would certainly be solved in faster and better way." This statement indicates a willingness to be patient, to allow standard political processes to solve the Kosovo crisis.

The charismatic style of Milosevic's rhetoric becomes apparent in the emotional appeal he made to the Serbian pride and to the Serbian glorious past. The charisma of orators originates from their ability to express the most deeply felt emotions of their audience (Graber, 1981). Milosevic expressed this ability to verbalize the emotions and grievances of his fellow Serbs at this time, and for that reason he was declared "the leader of all Serbs" (Jajcinovic, 1988c).

The demagogic character of his speech is difficult to assess because at the time Milosevic's primary goal was to calm the demonstrators. If one applies Johannesen's (1989) claim that demagogues capitalize on the available social issues to advance their personal...
positions, one can speculate that Milosevic's populist appeals served him in his effort to establish himself as the leader of the Serbian people.

The main virtue Milosevic displayed in this address was the honest approach toward the issues he discussed. Rodic (1987) commented that in the speech Milosevic said nothing deceitful regarding the whole political problem of Kosovo. For that reason, and according to the Bitzer's (1981) distinction between rhetoric, which is committed to truth, and persuasion, which is used as a tactic to make people believe or do what the rhetor wants them to do; I would classify this speech as rhetoric rather than as persuasion.

Speech Effects

One of the most important consequences of this rhetorical event was the meteoric rise of Milosevic as a proponent of "Serbian initiative" (Lovric, 1988b). The Serbs finally found their long-desired political leader. The power his audience granted to Milosevic was one of the necessary prerequisites for the changes in the political and social system he inaugurated. As Andrews (1990) observes, audiences can be gullible; their yearnings for solutions to their problems can lead them to believe what and whom they want to believe. Milosevic appeared to
sense that his reputation would be a function of the audience’s needs, expectations and priorities.

Burke (1950) maintains that among the marks of rhetoric is its use to gain advantage of some sort. In his wish to become the leader of the Serbs, Milosevic discovered his populist voice and spoke the sentences which the Serbian people wanted to hear, that Serbs must be equal to all other people (Thurow, 1991). The salience of the issue—the relationship between Serbia and the provinces—made the Serbian audience receptive to Milosevic’s speech, especially because he offered solutions. On the other side, among Albanians, his words and promised actions bred fear (Tijanic, 1988).

This speech empowered both the speaker and the audience. For the first time Milosevic felt his power over crowds (Engelberg, 1991), and the malaise-beset Serbs finally saw in front of themselves a leader who promised to grapple with their problems (Rodic, 1987).

As Rodic (1987) observed, Milosevic was not the first politician to go to Kosovo, but the reaction to his speech was tempestuous and immediate. His success was thorough; he became the most popular and celebrated Serbian politician (Jajcinovic, 1988a). He soon received the aura of a charismatic leader (Andrejevic, 1988b). Tijanic (1989) observed that he solved the problem of
legitimacy and credibility through appeals for a plebiscite type support from his people. He was the first party leader to be inaugurated as the people’s leader and not as head of the "worker’s class vanguard" as other communist leaders were characterized.

Tijanic (1989) ascribes Milosevic’s political success and his becoming the Serbian leader to the deep changes that were taking place in the minds of many Serbs who, for the first time in history, put Serbia ahead of Yugoslavia, to the discontent with the federal impotency over Kosovo, to frustration with the fact that every initiative from Serbia was labeled as a "unitarist fraud of Beograd," and resentment of the notion, carried by many in Yugoslavia, that it was sufficient to be Serb in order to be suspected (p. 42). The surge of mass support for Milosevic was also due to his programs of reforms, which advocated an energetic approach and unity, contrary to the existing school which advocated "dialogue and democratization" but which was never able to solve the persistent grievances of the Serbian nation (Rodic, 1987). Milosevic astutely realized that for the Serbs these were not the times that would tolerate sluggishness and delicate nuances, and that this was not the period in which every debate necessarily meant democracy. "Having felt that, with the energetic nature of a Montenegrin,
Milosevic raised the question of Serbia's self-confidence!" (Tijanic, 1989).

A second important effect of the speech was its impact on Serbian self-confidence. The Constitution of 1974 carved out of Serbia two provinces, Vojvodina in the north and Kosovo in the south because of their ethnic composition. These regions had been the cradle of Serbdom at the beginning of its medieval and modern development. The Serbs experienced this as being cut down to a size that was not too big in comparison with Croatia. The framers of the Constitution wanted to put an end to what many non-Serbian nations felt to be Serbia's domineering position, and give satisfaction to the minorities that lived in the regions now separated from Serbia proper (Pavlowitz, 1988, p. 70). When nationalism reappeared in the form of rivalries between richer and poorer republics, said Pavlowitz (1988), Serbia, whose economic level was pretty much on the Yugoslav average, had no particular ground of complaint.

Her dissatisfaction was psychological. All that expressed pride of the Serbian nation had been clipped back to satisfy the others. The local apparatus, too close to the center on which it modeled itself, did not provide any real leadership [italics added]. Serbian nationalism fed on nostalgia (p. 72).

Milosevic was able to identify such feelings and to remove from Serbs' consciousness the burden of historical
guilt. In his rhetoric he chose to exchange it with the thesis of "victimization" (Jajcinovic, 1988c) and the sense of grievance which were more appealing to Serbs and their perception of history: The Serbs were victims of the Independent Croatian State of 50 years ago.

The strongest grievances of the Serbs were directed against Tito's regime of post-World War II Yugoslavia (Moore, 1992). These feelings that Tito's system had systematically cheated and oppressed the Serbs were strongly stressed in the 1986 Memo of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (Memorandum SANU) (Pavlowitz, 1988). The content of the Memo, the criticism of the regime and the requests of the members of the Serbian Academic community, Thurow (1991) asserts, provided Milosevic with the guidelines for action--to correct the mistreatment of Serbia. Serbian dissatisfaction with Tito originated from the division of Serbia which granted Vojvodina and Kosovo the status of autonomous provinces, while no other republic had been split up in such a fashion. Serbian nationalists also accused Tito of having denied the Serbs the primacy within the federation that they considered theirs by right. This they felt not only because they are the most numerous single people in Yugoslavia, with 36% of the total population, but because of their sacrifices and victory in both world wars (Moore, 1992).
The whole rhetorical development that took place April 24, 1987 shows that identification (Burke, 1950) between the audience and the speaker occurred. Milosevic's language revealed the substance that enabled him to identify himself with his listeners, and his audience found in him a long-desired leader ("vozd") who would, together with them work toward the "united Serbia."

The Speech of October 17, 1988

Immediate Context

The period between April, 1987, and October, 1988, was a period of deepening crisis for the Yugoslav federation. The conditions in Kosovo worsened—the tension between the majority ethnic Albanians and the minority Serbs and Montenegrins did not improve under the strong one-sided propaganda of the Serbian media (Bozic, 1990). Kosovo and the serious conditions in that province became a paradigm for the unsolved problems and decadence of the Yugoslav legal, political, and economic system (Culic, 1988; Lovric, 1987b; Tijanic, 1987). In October, 1987, the collective nine-member State Presidency ordered 400 members of the federal police to Kosovo in an attempt to restore peace and prevent the situation from growing worse. However, the radical Serbs from the province, the
organizers of the meetings of solidarity in particular, saw the sending of the police as only a halfhearted attempt by the central authorities. They demanded more force to counter the alleged Albanian terrorists (Andrejevich, 1988a).

For the first time in modern Yugoslav history, the masses on the streets were ruling the country (Lovric, 1988b). Numerous strikes of workers were becoming commonplace in Yugoslavia (Lovric, 1987b). Another type of mass behavior, the so called "solidarity meetings," presented Yugoslav leadership with the most serious threat because they proved the leadership's inability to deal with the inflammatory political situation (Lovric, 1988b).

This period of 18 months was also marked by all-Yugoslav (meaning inside the leadership of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia) discussions over the reform of the League of Communists toward a more democratic organization and over the constitutional changes. The intention of these reforms was to introduce economic and political reform (Lovric, 1988a). This was a sign of Communist political culture--that endless discussions and verbose documents would bring about the solution of the problems (Letica, 1988).

Regarding constitutional changes in Serbia, the
leadership asked that state security, national defense, foreign policy, and the planning and development systems of Kosovo and Vojvodina be constitutionally incorporated into Serbia's direct sphere of control (Andrejevich, 1988a). These changes were perceived in Serbia as indispensable in order for Serbia to become "one unified state" (Djindjic, 1988) and as such "to establish elementary law and order [in Kosovo] ... in the struggle against separatism and anti-Yugoslavism" (Milosevic, 1989, p. 297). Milosevic's words expressed the prevailing attitude among the Serbs that the Constitution of 1974 prevented Serbia from taking any actions and thus improving the conditions in the province (Culic, 1987b,; Marinkovic, 1988a). Such an attitude toward the 1974 Constitution was not shared either by the leadership of the two provinces or of the two liberal republics of Croatia and Slovenia (Ribicic, 1987). These leaders opposed the dogmatic hard line in the Serbian League of Communists led by Milosevic and accused the League of using the instruments of political coercion in order to alter the constitutional order and form some kind of "forced artificial unity under the name of Yugoslavism" (Lovric, 1988a).

The myth of Kosovo and Serbian unity established and maintained by Milosevic (Tijanic, 1989) served him
well throughout this period. Among Serbs he was perceived as the initiator and carrier of the constitutional changes that would right "the absurd [fact] that Serbia after many centuries of a struggle for its national identity and independence ha[d] to fight for the basic right to function as a state" (Milosevic, 1989, p. 217). According to Milosevic "the most absurd [fact] is that in the heart of Serbia [Kosovo], the center of persecution and terror over Serbian people smoulder" (Milosevic, 1989, p. 218). Milosevic’s public discourse, of which the above is an example, provided him with reelection as Presidium President of Serbia’s League of Communists

Central Committee. To the Serbs his rhetoric provided justification for the actions he undertook in this period, actions whose dogmatic nature only added fuel to a country already burning with problems.

First, he took control over the Serbian media and reduced the once respected Politika publications into bellicose pieces of propaganda (Moore, 1988). The editors of the media who could not ethically accept "Stalinist dictatorship" (Jajcinovic, 1987) or who opposed the imposed view were forced either to resign or to accept lower positions (Lovric, 1987b).

A second action was "differentiation" (diferencijacija). This process was officially described as a
necessary measure against poor leaders who contributed to the creation of "absurd" policies and against those who opposed the implementation of the resolutions on Kosovo and thus impeded the solution of the crisis (Marinkovic, 1988a). It was also a strategy to ruthlessly remove Milosevic's political opponents and the key officials in Serbia so as to achieve the ideologically monolithic structure of his government (Andrejevich, 1989; Moore, 1992; Thurow, 1991). Milosevic also led an "anti-bureaucratic revolution" which was similar to the differentiation policy (Engelberg, 1991). This action was directed towards removing leaders in provinces and republics other than Serbia. The object was to remove those "incapable of obeying the people's will" (Milosevic, 1989). It was Milosevic's attempt to extend his sway over all of Yugoslavia (Andrejevich, 1989). In realization of his plan, the "meetings of solidarity" played a major role. The "meetings" were massive demonstrations, usually of 20,000 to 30,000 Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo, who protested the League of Communists' inability to formulate and carry out policies for calming the ethnic conflict in Kosovo. They were also an expression of support of Serbia's drive to change its constitution (Andrejevich, 1988b). Although there were different views on this "street movement" explaining its sociologi-
cal background (Lovric, 1988b), and its necessity as an expression of despair (Djindjic, 1988), it soon became obvious that in these meetings the rational social bases were used to develop the irrational pretensions that went well beyond the demands for the solution of the Kosovo problem and for the institution of Serbia as a "normal" state (Lovric, 1988b).

The height of mass rallies was in the summer of 1988. They were organized throughout Serbia proper, Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Serbian-populated Montenegro. In the fall of 1988, at the meeting of solidarity, the government of Vojvodina was removed. The Slovene officials publicly blamed Milosevic for open encouragement of the nationalist-inspired rallies and pressure tactics which "reminded many people of central Europe in the 1930s" when Hitler was rising to power (Andrejevich, 1989). It appeared that the meetings were used by Milosevic as a tactic to turn the pressure from the streets into Yugoslav political life (Thurow, 1991) and increase his political power (Andrejevich, 1988b).

Amid the general crisis of Yugoslav society, and of the Communist party, Yugoslavia's only unifying force, and in the midst of the war of words that was taking place among the republican leaderships (Andrejevich, 1988c & McCrea, 1992), the 188 representatives of repub-
lican Central Committees gathered together at the Yugoslav level for the 17th session of the Central Committee of League of Communists of Yugoslavia. The session, which was held in Belgrade on October 1988, was aiming to unify the party and search for a solution to the crisis (McCrea, 1992).

The LCY Central Committee was the most authoritative body in Yugoslavia's communist-party system. The most significant resolutions and decisions were issued in the name of The Central Committee, and they served as a guideline for the future actions of its members (McCrea, 1992). The public interest in this plenum indicated that the expectations among people were high. People hoped that the Central Committee at its 17th Plenum would adopt decisions of crucial importance for the fate of the country (Lovric, 1988b).

Speech Summary

Milosevic (1989) began his speech by criticizing the existing leadership's failure to address the problems in Kosovo. He stated, "therefore, the question of responsibility for the crisis is imposing itself." He reprimanded the audience not to continue their "marathon and sclerotic sessions while the citizens continue to be poorer and poorer, the peoples more divided, and the
Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo exterminated." He then moved to the expectations of the Serbs, "Serbia expects changes that are necessary not to overcome the crisis, but to resolve it. This is why the Serbian LC Central Committee supported the proposed document which has the aim of achieving the unity without which changes cannot be implemented."

Then Milosevic addressed the need for change and noted that "[t]his dispute cannot be resolved in such a way that will please everybody." He then spoke a series of sentences which contrasted those who wanted change (those who wanted Serbia to have more control over Kosovo) and those who opposed change. These sentences served to broaden the description of those favoring and opposing change to a description of two groups differing in economic status, political freedom, and personal power:

Those who are against changes do not want anything to be changed, because at present they are living well, in both the material and the political sense. Those who do want changes are not satisfied with their economic and political life. And indeed, some people are in a position to change their job, some have not been able to find employment for years, some are changing apartments, others will retire as tenants, some have barely enough for food, others have two or three houses, some have been deciding about the fate of the country for 40 years, others cannot say what they think in an associated labor organization without being demoted. It is not right that some have been able to educate their children abroad, while others have to escort their children to the school around the corner so that they do
[not] get beaten up or raped on this short journey. Some people cannot make decisions about anything as long as they live, while others cannot criticize their boss or the system once a year without suffering consequences. It is clear that the first group is not in favor of changes, at least not essential changes, and that the others are in favor of essential changes. ... [E]stablishing greater economic and political justice among the peoples and people will not receive the support of those whose interests are threatened by this.

Milosevic then argued that the opposition position was "not attained through work and responsibility, but through benefits, aggressiveness, and ignorance."
Milosevic was referring here to the ones (both Albanians and inept leadership) who opposed the constitutional changes sought by Serbia. He said that their interests "do not have an equal position in this pluralism of interests." He described the opponents to the changes as having "interests that are based on the exploitation and humiliation of other people," and said that they "constitute injustice and shame. ... Their interests cannot be discussed."

Milosevic then turned to a description of the economic conditions in Kosovo, saying that the "majority of the working people live on the edge of poverty at present, and will very likely have poverty in the future." By implementing the concept of a market economy and "creating a unified Yugoslav market, socialism as a rich society, a society that is not in contradiction to just
relations among the people, will be possible."

Milosevic stated that Serbia "favors changes and has started to introduce them." He claimed that the changes "are connected with improvements in the standard of living and the overall economic situation." He called for changes "within the Constitution that would enable Serbia to establish territorial, administrative, and legal unity, which it has not had up to now." He mentioned that in order to carry out these changes, "it was also necessary to introduce certain cadre changes." This refers to the differentiation program which was described previously in this thesis (p. 79).

He claimed that the opposition to these changes, as one could expect and understand, has come from those whose current material, political, status, and personal interests are threatened by these changes. However, it is more difficult to understand and expect the fact that, after such a long time of living together in socialist Yugoslavia, the opponents to changes in Serbia seek and find allies outside Serbia [Croatia and Slovenia]. The basis of this alliance probably lies in the remnants of the old intolerance toward Serbia caused by its alleged hegemonism. Communists, workers, and citizens of Serbia have always been sensitive about this kind of intolerance. . . . [I]f everything that we have done so far is not a good enough argument that the Serbian people want to live in Serbia and Yugoslavia, on an equal footing with other peoples and nationalities, then I have no other arguments. I can only say that, at the least, it is hypocritical to accuse Serbia of wanting to be superior because it wants to be equal with others.

Milosevic claimed that the changes "are not to the detriment of other people, republics or the country as a
whole," that the changes are "in accordance with the achievements of our revolution and the fundamental tenets of the LC." He claimed that this was clear to all "well-intentioned people," and said that: "As far as ill-intentioned people are concerned, we do not intend to try to change them or polemicize with them, and certainly do not intend to justify our actions to them."

Milosevic then turned to an attempt to inform the comrades outside Serbia who have been misled by the media. He said, "I would like to use this occasion to state several facts about the situation in Serbia." His first "fact" concerned the meetings of solidarity. He claimed that these meetings were "held as protest against the inability of the existing institutions... to stop the terror in Kosovo." He defended the meetings as being "fully in the spirit of our socialist and self-managing system, whose essence lies in the fact that all working people should manage society." He said, "It is sad, of course, that the majority of the comrades present do not have the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the real face of the meetings that have been held" He said that the meetings were in favor of "equality among the peoples and nationalities and, to tell the truth, against some current leaders that people hold responsible for mistakes in society." He says that those opposing the
change falsely equate themselves with the system, "but it is not a reason for raising the temperature and activating all mechanisms of society to protect them."

His second "fact" was an attack on those who criticized the solidarity meetings: "the fact that some leaderships and individuals have issued warnings that these gatherings are a public disturbance is sad and shameful."

He claimed that the government has not been responsive to the problems in Kosovo and that having meetings that disturb the public is normal and honest. It would not be normal and honest if the citizens of Yugoslavia were not disturbed and if they were to sleep in peace while children in Kosovo are raped, houses are burned, people beaten up, graves desecrated, two nations exterminated, and a whole culture eliminated.

Milosevic's third "fact" constituted a defense of Serbia's role in seeking changes. He argued that "[o]nly the bureaucracy stands to lose by the implementation of these changes. . . . The autonomy of the provinces does not stand to lose anything at all. This is now evident."

He claimed that Serbia

as is known, has no ambitions regarding the territories of other republics, but does have ambitions regarding the territory of its republic. . . . Therefore, the threat to Yugoslavia does not stem from the fact that Serbia wants to constitute itself as a republic and to solve the Kosovo problem.

Milosevic then continued attacking the opposition
and the failure of governmental leadership to make the requested changes. He asserted that the Serbs have understood "this session as an end to a number of sessions that did not succeed" in solving a problem that has resulted in "the great, perhaps irretrievable migration of Serbs and Montenegrins from their land, and for the last genocide in the 20th century." He complained that he has been hearing about how complicated the problem is for six years. He scolded the leadership for wanting to address other problems first: "Maltreatment, rape, and the humiliation of people cannot wait until inflation is bridled, unemployment is reduced, exports are increased, the standard of living is raised, democratic centralism is applied, and the relations between the class and national elements are discussed." He argued that "in the political and generally in the spiritual sense, the people have outgrown their leadership."

Milosevic's conclusion was a direct attack on the political opposition:

It is better for the entire society that the will of the working people be implemented in a peaceful and democratic way. There is no reason that this should not be the case. The only obstacle to this way out of the crisis lies in individuals--indeed, not few in number--who have been passed over by time; not in a biological sense, but in a spiritual sense. In the absence of a program for a way out of the crisis and in the absence of the ability to carry the program out, they want to block everything: ideas and people. They almost want to introduce some sort of a moratorium; ready to use even emergency measures to
introduce the moratorium. However, Yugoslavia does not need emergency measures. It needs extraordinary efforts and results.

Speech Analysis

The seriousness of the political situation in Yugoslavia demanded that the members of the Central Committee display the highest level of logic and understanding in order to arrive to a desired solution to the country's problems (Letica, 1988).

According to Graber's (1981) definition of statesman's oratory, that particular style of political rhetoric appeared to be most appropriate to be utilized by a member of LCY Central Committee, because it appeals to reasoned argumentation and clear presentation of the issues at hand. However, demagogic rhetoric prevailed in Milosevic's address, thus implying that his intentions were not so much the preservation of Yugoslavia, as the advancement of Serbian initiative (Lovric, 1988b).

The speech Milosevic delivered to the members of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) Central Committee in Belgrade on October 17, 1988 is an example of his tough and uncompromising "forum rhetoric," as Letica (1988) defines the Communist Party's official discourse. Milosevic (1989) expressed the anticipations of the Serbs, "From this session Serbia expects changes that are
necessary not to overcome the crisis but to resolve it."

Through this speech Milosevic revealed a dogmatic attitude toward the changes that would supposedly pull Yugoslavia out of crisis and that he advocated so much. He displayed irrational and ethically highly questionable arguments, especially in that part where he justified the "solidarity meetings." The whole speech appears to justify the policies he inaugurated as the president of the Serbian League of Communists.

The beginning of the speech is devoted to the topic with which Milosevic became identified--the criticism of existing leadership: "[T]he leadership continue their marathon and sclerotic sessions while the citizens continue to be poorer and poorer, the peoples more divided, and the Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo exterminated." The Kosovo myth about poor mistreated Serbs is used here as a contrast to inefficient politicians; however it is an irrational argument in the pledge for the changes that would "establish greater economic and political justice" among the people.

Milosevic’s next statement reveals his populist nature, "It is not right that some have been able to educate their children abroad, while others have to escort their children to the school around the corner so that they do not get beaten up or raped on this short journey." The
Serbian media was full of stories describing beating, rape and other type of violence committed by Albanians in Kosovo. On the other side, there were Croatian and Slovenian media characterizing Serbian writing on Kosovo as gross exaggerations of Albanian violence (Bozic, 1990).

Milosevic's oversimplification of the complex Kosovo situation (explaining it only in terms of violence and crime committed by Albanians, and describing the Serbs only as victims of the crime) could not be characterized as what Johannesen (1989) would describe as a strategy of an ethical communicator who should be concerned with truth rather than with the promotion of personal or group interests (p. 38). Instead of easing the tensions in that troubled province, Milosevic's address intentionally reinforced the stereotypes of "bad Albanians." Although he did not use that term, one could not accuse him of being ambiguous because the political context of his speech made his message a clear innuendo. The speech was an appeal to hatred toward Albanians, or in Milosevic's emotionally charged talk, to "[t]hose who exiled the whole nation from its territory"

As much as Milosevic presented himself as the promoter of the changes toward a "socialist democratic country," the evidence he presented appeared rather as
pseudoproof. For instance, he refused any dialogue with the ones who are "against changes.... because at present they are living well, in both the material and the political sense." Milosevic's alleged pro-democratic attitude was inconsistent with his hard-line stand on the issue. He was already publicly criticized by Croatian (e.g., Danas, 1988, March 1; Danas, 1988, August 30) and Slovene media (Andrejevich, 1989) as an authoritarian and nationalist leader of the Serbs who used demagogic tactics such as protest marches and rallies to promote his views (Brkovic, 1988). One of the characteristics of a demagogue that Johannesen (1989) observes, is "intentional use of suggestion, irrelevant emotional appeals, and pseudoproof to circumvent human rational decision-making processes" (p. 37). The inclination of Milosevic to use pseudoproof is present throughout the speech, but it becomes especially apparent in the part of the speech where he wanted to "inform" his comrades about the nature of events and processes that were taking place in Serbia. Each "fact" about the meetings, about the constitutional and economic changes, was "supported" by a pseudoproof—emotionally charged attack on those who oppose his political position. The attack on the opposition was done through provocative language. They were described as those who enjoy a high standard of living, "who exiled
the whole nation from its territory," who tolerate rape and genocide, who "attained their positions through aggressiveness and irresponsibility."

The speech as a whole provides a good basis for an assessment of Milosevic's ethos as that of a demagogue, and for the claim that he was using demagogic as opposed to the statesmanlike rhetoric. In the dogmatic move toward monolithic ideological unity, Milosevic did not tolerate any dissent; he even rejected the "pluralism of interests" which was the only legal way to express different opinions in the Communist party, because, he argued, it served "to protect positions that were not attained through work and responsibility, but through benefits, aggressiveness and ignorance." Thus, Milosevic asserted that "their interests cannot be discussed. This is what democracy is." He explained that "[t]hose who exiled the whole nation from its territory do not have an equal position in this pluralism of interests with those who were exiled." The pluralism of interests, according to Milosevic's speech, cannot tolerate the aforementioned groups (both incapable politicians and "bad" Albanians) because "their interests are based on the exploitation and humiliation of other people and they do not represent a part of pluralism of self-managing interests, but constitute injustice and shame." Here he
described those who did not fit into his picture of a "socialist democratic country" (i.e., those who opposed his intent to impose more control over Kosovo) in "Devil" terms. Once again he used the Kosovo myth as "distorted and irrelevant evidence... to support [his]... claims" (Johannesen, 1989, p. 38).

The part of the speech that is most indicative of his opportunistic, and thus demagogic political attitudes is that where he undertook the task of informing "the comrades outside Serbia who, because of divisions in the media are not well or sufficiently informed...about the situation in Serbia." First he defended the meetings of solidarity with Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins,

Comrades, these are held against the inability of the existing institutions and some individuals in them to stop the terror in Kosovo....This kind of public reaction is not incompatible with our social system. On the contrary. It is fully in the spirit of our socialist and self-managing system, whose essence lies in the fact that all working people should manage society.

The strategic use of his rhetoric becomes apparent when one sees that each "fact" Milosevic earnestly presented was followed by an attack on those opposing the constitutional changes his leadership offered. So the "fact" about the meetings is followed by the following statement:

In this respect, the condemning or banning of citizens' gatherings in our society is not acceptable. Nobody has the right to do this if these meet-
ings are rallies for socialism and Yugoslavia and are held with the aim of stimulating institutions to take actions to protect and develop socialism, which is something they are not doing at present [italics added].

The change in Milosevic's attitude toward the meetings, can only be explained as an opportunistic tactic of a demagogue. Johannesen (1989) characterizes a demagogue as a persuader who "capitalizes on the availability of a major contemporary social issue or problem" (p. 37).

In April, 1987, when Milosevic stood in front of 15,000 demonstrating Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins, he appealed to them to behave peacefully and democratically and not to hold protest rallies, and that "[they] must not allow the misfortunes of the people to be exploited by the nationalists." Although Milosevic prevented demonstrators to go to the capital at that time, since the summer of 1988 he advocated mass rallies as an expression of a "uniform mood in favor of socialism, Yugoslavia, equality among the peoples and nationalities, and to tell the truth, against some current leaders that people hold responsible for mistakes in society." Milosevic's audience at this Session consisted of the representatives from all parts of Yugoslavia. His appeal to their understanding of "the real face of the meetings...[as] something sacred" did not find a responsive audience. It was difficult for the representatives to trust him because
the media in other parts of Yugoslavia were disclosing that "the real face" of the meetings was not what Milosevic wanted them to believe, but the pragmatic use of the discontented masses (e. g. Danas, 1988, March 1; Danas, 1988, October 11). One of the organizers of the meeting of solidarity in Novi Sad, Scepanovic (1988), reveals that the removal of the Vojvodina government was planned and "programmed....[i]t took only somebody to...direct the events" (p. 8). On their way from Backa Palanka to Novi Sad the organized workers from Majevica and Jugoalat factories chanted, "In Novi Sad we will overthrow the government" (Paripovic, 1988, p. 7). While standing in front of the capital building they cried, "Down with the bureaucrats," and "Down with the thieves" (Paripovic, 1988, p. 8). At the Novi Sad meeting the crowd turned their back when the provincial officials wanted to talk with them. They hurled yogurt and bread at the provincial capital building. They stood in front of the building for two days stipulating their leaving in exchange with the complete government resignation. The government of Vojvodina, which refused Milosevic's proposal for the constitutional changes, abdicated on October 7, 1988 (Paripovic, 1988). The new government of Vojvodina was formed of pro-Milosevic followers (Engelberg, 1991).
The slogans most often chanted at the meetings were, "Kosovo is Serbia," "Vojvodina is Serbia," "We love you Slobodan" (Andrejevich, 1988b, p. 8), "We will give our lives before we give up Kosovo," (Jajcinovic, 1988a, p. 10), "A Yugoslav flag for Kosovo," "A strong Serbia, a strong Yugoslavia," "Give us back our history," (Moore, 1988, pp. 17-18), "Hey Serbia in three parts, you will again be undivided" (Paripovic, 1988, p. 7). At the rallies the protesters carried posters with Milosevic's photograph and sang the songs about him (Moore, 1988; Tijanic, 1989).

Bitzer (1981) draws the distinction between political rhetoric and persuasion. According to Bitzer (1981), Milosevic's attempt to "inform" his audience would be seen as persuading others to adopt his viewpoints "that are weak in conception and shallow in value," rather than political rhetoric which is committed to truth and value and insists on rational justification (Bitzer, 1981, p. 228). Bitzer's distinction may well help us understand Milosevic's political strategies which were primarily done through persuasive discourse.

Another important section of Milosevic's speech at the 17th Session is that part where he talks about constitutional changes in Serbia. Once again he used shallow arguments, whose truth could have been questioned at
the moment (after the manner in which the Vojvodina government was forced to resign), "Only bureaucracy stands to lose by the implementation of these [constitutional] changes, above all provincial bureaucracy. The autonomy of the provinces does not stand to lose anything at all."

Speech Effects

Milosevic, knowing the power he enjoyed with his Serb followers, uttered the words that could be hardly understood in any way other than the threat to Yugoslavia’s existing political order. He stated that Serbia did not have ambitions regarding the territories of other republics, but that it did have ambitions regarding the territory of its republic. He then followed with a very ambiguous assertion, "Whether this territory is large or small, depends on the yardstick used to measure it. But whatever its size it must remain as such, and will remain as such" (Milosevic, 1989, p. 269). However, just after the 17th session the organizers of the meetings of solidarity staged another meeting in Titograd, Montenegro causing a coup d'etat in that republic (Lovric, 1989a). Milosevic’s actions thus showed that his talk did not have any real basis, that his arguments were dishonest, and served as a means to achieve an
ambitious end—Greater Serbia. The threat to the discordant and to the fate of Yugoslavia was best expressed by Milosevic in the following sentence, "Do they really not see that the working people and citizens in Serbia will not accept any bans or any permits, that they will not accept any tutors, especially not in matters concerning their legitimate rights" (Milosevic, 1989, p. 269). This statement proved to have prophetic significance. The path Serbia had chosen to follow did not allow any tutors, any discussion. As much as their mouths were full of preserving Yugoslavia, it became indubitable that the Serbian view on Yugoslavia was different than the more democratic view of Yugoslavia as offered by Croatian and Slovenian party leadership (Lovric, 1988c).

The Speech of November 19, 1988

The meeting of the Brotherhood and Unity at the confluence of the Sava and the Danube rivers in Belgrade was conceived to be "the meeting of all meetings" (Klasinc, 1988, p. 3), the crown of all the protest rallies and the meetings of solidarity with the Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins that had taken place since the summer of 1988. The organizer, the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Serbia, prided itself on organizing the biggest meeting in the history of Yugoslavia.
Milosevic's address was the most important item on the agenda for the meeting (Marinkovic, 1988b).

Speech Summary

Milosevic (1989) began his speech by recognizing the importance of the event, stating that such a large meeting has not been held in Belgrade since its liberation... on October 20, 1944. At that time people in Belgrade streets celebrated the war victory, and started the great battle for the reconstruction of a country devastated by the war.

He then reminded the people of the accomplishments of "those days" because in the time of crisis "in which we have found ourselves, we are inclined to forget everything good and worthy which we have created by ourselves, and which we have created with joy."

He admitted that the Communists "have halted on the road to the society we had aspired to during the revolution" but then went on to assure his audience that they could create such a society, if they "renounce that road." He offered a way out of crisis: "What we have to do is to change many concepts and many people in politics to make our life better.... we will do this through a great social reform which we must carry out."

Milosevic then moved to the issue of Kosovo, asserting that establishing law and order in Kosovo was "the most important thing we must resolve," and that this
constituted the "most urgent task for Serbia" and should be seen as such in the rest of Yugoslavia. He described the solidarity of the Yugoslav peoples and of Yugoslav workers as their "greatest and strongest characteristic" which manifested itself on many different occasions. Because of that solidarity, Milosevic averred that it was "difficult to explain why that solidarity has been late in manifesting itself to a greater extent, faster and with greater love when citizens of our own country are concerned." Here his implication was the negative response of the non-Serbian parts of the country toward the meetings of solidarity. He charged that "the long absence of this solidarity with the boundless suffering of the Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo represents an incurable wound to their hearts and to the heart of all of Serbia."

He swiftly moved then to say: "But this is no time for sorrow; it is time for struggle." This statement was followed by describing how this "awareness captured Serbia last summer" (when the solidarity meetings began taking place), and how it turned into "a material force that will stop the terror in Kosovo and unite Serbia."

He claimed that

This is a process which no longer can be stopped by any force, a process in the face of which all fear is weak. People will consent to live in poverty but they will never consent to live without freedom; at
least not people gathered here and the people in
Serbia, to whom I myself belong and therefore I know
that they can only live in freedom and in no other
way.

He spoke of the battles for freedom and victories
over the Turkish and German invaders in "both world wars"
and asserted, "We shall win the battle for Kosovo regard­
less of the obstacles facing us inside and outside the
country." In the next several sentences he described
those "obstacles" as "perplexed conclusions, confused
announcements, negotiations carried out at restaurant
tables... a host of petty and dirty tricks aimed at
calming down people who are great in heart, for such
tricks cannot frighten them." After expressing once
again that "we shall win despite the fact that Serbia’s
enemies... are plotting against it," Milosevic went on to
warn Serbia’s "enemies" that "we do not frighten easily,
and that we enter every battle with the aim of winning
it."

He stated that the Serbs "have never waged unjust
and dishonest battles that would be to the detriment of
other people." He then spoke of the power of the people
who are "at the head of this battle for Kosovo, asserting
that "there is no battle in the world that the people
have lost." In regard to the country’s leadership,
Milosevic said that it had "little choice here: It shall
either head the people and listen to their voice, or time
will push it aside and its existence will be recorded in history only briefly and for the bad things alone."

Milosevic then turned to the lengthy description of the significance of Kosovo for the Serbs, and why entire Serbia "rose up last summer because of Kosovo." He argued that "Kosovo is the very center of [Serbia's] history, its culture, and its memory." He then spoke of Kosovo as "a love that is warming [Serbs'] heart forever." He engaged in a lengthy defense of the constitutional changes Serbia planned to introduce as not detrimental to Albanians. He distinguished between good and "bad people":

"That is why Kosovo must remain in Serbia. That will not be at the expense of Albanians. I can tell the Albanians in Kosovo that nobody has ever found it difficult to live in Serbia because he is not Serbian. Serbia has always been open to everybody: For those who have no houses, for the poor and the rich alike, for the happy and the desperate, for those who were only passing through and for those who wanted to stay. The only people Serbia did not want were evil and bad people even when they were Serbs.

He then appealed to "honest" Albanians to rally against the "evil" part of their ethnic group--"chauvinists"--because they do not cause evil only to Serbs and Montenegrins, but also to their own Albanian people. They embarrass their people in front of the entire world, shame it before its children and offend its dignity. For the sake of all this, I call on the Albanians throughout Kosovo and say to them that instead of the police and Army units, Albanian mothers and fathers should tend to the peaceful dreams,
calm schooling, and carefree games of Serb and Montenegrin girls and boys. This is not so because such division of care is more efficient, but because it is more humane, more honest, and because it is more appropriate to socialism and the ideals for which we in Yugoslavia all strive.

Milosevic then addressed the issue of "terror and hatred" which Yugoslav peoples always fought against, even if it was far away, "in Spain." In contrasting the fight against terror in Spain and in Kosovo, Milosevic said that "in the fight against Kosovo evil [it] is not necessary to sacrifice lives." He claimed that in the struggle against "Kosovo evil" one only needs to "take an oath," which the Yugoslavs had given in 1941, when the decision was made by the partisans to protect Yugoslavia against fascist occupiers. The "oath" was "that in brotherhood and unity we will share everything, both the good and the bad, as well as victory, injustice, poverty, that we will build a new and better world."

Milosevic mentioned that a Conference of the Serbian LC would be held in Belgrade two days after the meeting. He used this announcement to begin the discussion of the reform which was going to be the major item on the agenda of the LC Conference. The reform which "concerns great social changes which should take place as soon as possible," consisted of two parts: economic and political changes. He described the economic changes as "the most important" ones because these should "raise the standard
of living of the entire society and of every individual.

Concerning the political aspect of the reform, Milosevic contended that "[these] changes should establish the unity in Serbia as a republic and its equality with other republics in Yugoslavia." He then spoke several sentences about the achievements the reform should bring to the society: Improve "prices, medical care, education, and the information system,... contribute to responsible and open politics." Milosevic depicted the reform as "a great program" that could be realized only "if we remain resolute and united as we have been in the last few months [the period in which the meetings of solidarity took place and removed the governments of Vojvodina, Kosovo, and Montenegro] and here today." He completed his discussion of the reform by asserting that it "represents an expression of the needs of the working people and citizens of Serbia" and that the Serbian leadership understood it as "its obligation to those who have elected it." He said that the changes introduced by the reform "should be implemented throughout entire Yugoslavia." He expressed his conviction that

in the forthcoming months all Yugoslav peoples, all citizens of Yugoslavia will find the strength to overcome differences, intolerance, and clashes, that they will jointly and fraternally succeed in preserving, renewing, and developing their country. Tito’s Yugoslavia is the result of a struggle, work, and love of all of Yugoslav peoples and nationalities.
He concluded his speech with an optimistic declaration and threat to Serbia’s opposition [Croatia and Slovenia who proposed to discuss more democratic changes of Yugoslav federation]. He asserted that despite the "difficulties" Yugoslavia was experiencing, it would not die "at the conference table as its enemies hope."

This statement was followed by several slogans with which Milosevic terminated his address: "Yugoslavia was created through a big struggle and will defend itself through a big struggle"; "Long live socialist Yugoslavia, our country"; "Long live free and united SR of Serbia"; "Long live courage with which we always fought for freedom and justice"; and "Long live comrades who gathered here at the meeting for brotherhood and unity, for Yugoslavia, and for better days."

Speech Analysis

Milosevic (1989) opened his speech with the following words,

Comrades, such a large meeting has not been held in Belgrade since its liberation. The last time such a large number of people, united by a great idea, gathered in Belgrade streets was on 20 October 1944. At that time people in Belgrade streets celebrated the war victory...At that time, just as today, members of all Yugoslav peoples and nationalities assembled in togetherness.

The beginning, as well as the rest of the speech, was laden with appeals to emotions, in this case, Milosevic’s
appeals to a glorious past of the Serbs. The appeals were utilized by Milosevic to distract the audience from remembering his inability to keep up with his promises of resolving the Kosovo problem and of establishing a rich and just society for everyone (Lovric, 1989a). The speech as a whole is an example of demagogic and charismatic rhetoric, both of which are characterized as having little concern for truth or fairness on the part of the rhetor, according to Graber’s (1981, p. 211) definition of these two styles of political oratory.

Milosevic’s claim that the members of all Yugoslav peoples and nationalities gathered "in togetherness" was ethically questionable because the majority of the people at the meeting came from Serbia and Serbian-populated Montenegro. Their transportation was part of the arrangement by the organizer of "the meeting of all meetings" (Marinkovic, 1988b).

Milosevic also never mentioned the rallying of hundreds of thousands of Albanians in Pristina, the Kosovo capital, that was taking place just the day before the "meeting of all meetings" was staged (Lovric, 1988d). In the biggest eruption of disaffection since 1981, the Albanians protested the "resignation" of their provincial leaders, because those resignations were rather imposed by Milosevic’s policy of "leadership responsibility" and
"cadre changes" (Spanovic, 1988). He did not even mention that the date on which the meeting was held was the anniversary of the liberation of Pristina from fascist occupiers (Spanovic, 1988). Having ignored the facts of importance for one constituent nation of Yugoslavia, Milosevic's announced pro-Yugoslav policy became critically dubious. His refusal to deal with the grievances of the Albanians could only suggest to the Albanians that he did not find it as significant as when the Serbs rally in protests, consequently instilling in them a feeling of being unequal and second rate citizens.

In her discussion of rational and irrational appeals of political orators, Graber (1981) distinguishes charismatic and demagogic rhetoric from statesman's oratory. The former types of rhetoric appeal to emotions shared by large numbers of people, whereas statesman's oratory deals with the issues at hand in moderate language and with sound arguments. Milosevic's charisma was already established through his ability to articulate the needs and ideals of his fellow Serbs (Tijanic, 1989). To achieve the identification with the Serbian audience he only needed to play on the myth of Kosovo, which Milosevic did in this speech as well, "The most important thing that we must resolve at this time is to establish peace and order in Kosovo."
He reveals his demagogic nature through the same tactic—the use of myth. Johannesen (1989) claims that demagogues intentionally use irrelevant emotional appeals to evade analytic thinking and decision making. Knowing the impact of the myth on the masses, Milosevic openly pronounced that

[n]obody should be surprised that all Serbia rose up last summer because of Kosovo. Kosovo is the very center of its history, its culture, and its memory. All people have a love that is warming its heart up forever. For a Serb, that love is Kosovo. That is why Kosovo will remain in Serbia.

An audience whose emotions get aroused by such a talk may be easy to persuade to believe in Milosevic’s solution to the crisis, "What we have to do is to change many concepts and many people in politics to make our life better." Milosevic’s simplistic attitude about what needs to be done in order to resolve the crisis in Yugoslavia, Johannesen (1989) would describe as that of an unethical communicator. Johannesen (1989) maintains that ethical communicator does not oversimplify complex situations, such was in Yugoslavia at that time, into simplistic views or choices.

The talk about Kosovo at this meeting was much fiercer than in the previous rhetoric of Milosevic. After accusing the rest of the Yugoslav peoples for not extending their solidarity "with the boundless suffering of the Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo... [which] repre-
sents an incurable wound to their hearts and to the heart of all of Serbia," Milosevic quickly switched to another political tactic that Graber (1981) defines as "the use of language to spur or guide action" (p. 207). This is particularly evident in demagogic rhetoric whose primary concern is the effectiveness of the message (Graber, 1981). Milosevic asserted,

But this is not time for sorrow: it is time for struggle. This awareness captured Serbia last summer and this awareness has turned into a material force that will stop the terror in Kosovo and unite Serbia....We shall win the battle for Kosovo regardless of the obstacles facing us inside and outside the country.

These militant words uttered in front of 1.3 million people (Marinkovic, 1988b) were feeding the emotions and egos of the Serbs (Kruselj, 1988). The "awareness [that] has turned into a material force," that is, meetings of solidarity, were perceived by non-Serbian parts of the country as Milosevic's tactic to increase his political power (Andrejevich, 1988b), and as something whose method of action was not to bring forward a peaceful solution for Kosovo (Lovric, 1989a). Therefore Milosevic's rhetoric did not correspond with the actions he was initiating as Serbian party leader.

Moore (1988) charges that in this address Milosevic used "vague, illogical, intolerant and aggressive" formulations (p. 8) that to Moore (1988) seem reminiscent of
the rise of fascism in Central and Eastern Europe of the 1930s. The following excerpts from Milosevic’s speech should substantiate Moore’s (1988) assessment of Milosevic’s demagogic rhetoric,

This is a process ["the awareness"] which no longer can be stopped by any force, a process in the face of which all fear is weak. People will even consent to live in poverty but they will not consent to live without freedom, at least not people gathered here and the people in Serbia, to whom I myself belong and therefore I know that they can only live in freedom and in no other way.... [W]e shall win despite the fact that Serbia’s enemies... are plotting against it. We tell them that we do not frighten easily, and that we enter every battle with the aim of winning it.... [T]here is no battle in the world that people have lost.

The abundance of abstract words and words ambiguous in meaning such as freedom, victory, or enemies made Milosevic’s language obscure. Kruselj (1988) observed that in this address, Milosevic used the word "struggle" 13 times and the word "freedom" seven times (p. 10). His intention was to to make Serbs feel that they are victims and therefore should fight (Jajcinovic, 1988c). Against whom and why Milosevic explained in equally obscure language, "Serbia’s enemies outside the country are plotting against it, along with those in the country."

This tactic of awakening the baser emotions in the Serbs disguised in the cloak of Yugoslavism, together with the use of false and inadequate information, make this speech an example of persuasion, rather than rheto-
ric (Bitzer, 1981). To illuminate this conclusion, let us turn to the part of Milosevic's address which could be identified as "an appeal to Albanians." Milosevic said, "I can tell Albanians in Kosovo that nobody has ever found it difficult to live in Serbia because he is not Serbian." The words Milosevic uttered were very much contradictory to the reality for the Albanians in Kosovo.

Since the middle of 1987, the Slav population (Serbs) were given "Special status," in order to prevent their emigration, while the Albanians were denied basic human rights (Tijanic, 1987). The exaggeration of the Serbian media on violence in Kosovo (Bozic, 1990), the projected image of Albanians as chauvinists who wanted to take Kosovo from Serbia and attach it to Albania (Moore, 1988), that was the reality. Since Milosevic's ascent to power, Albanians were treated like second-rate citizens. By conveying, "I now ask [the Albanians] to rally against the evil and hatred of their own chauvinists because they do not cause evil only to Serbs and Montenegrins, but also to their own Albanian people," Milosevic supported the existing anti-Albanian feelings. His words made it look like the entire Albanian nation was suspect (Lovric, 1988d).

This speech was characterized as a "warrior's address" (Kruselj, 1988). At the time, the speech was also
criticized as lip service to Yugoslavism, and one that would promote Milosevic into a Yugoslav leader (Lovric, 1988d). The violent words uttered in Belgrade stirred emotions of the Yugoslav public. Milosevic’s rhetoric was perceived in Croatia and Slovenia as "an open threat to Yugoslavia" (Krsnik, 1989) that was going to produce a ferocious intra-national conflict in order create a country according to the desire of only one nation, Serbs (Lovric, 1989a, p. 8).

The Effects of the Speeches

In 1989, Yugoslavia experienced its most serious political crisis since World War II (Andrejevich, 1990a). The tension between the Slovenian and Serbian Leagues of Communists was the result of the growing opposition in Slovenia and elsewhere to the hard-line policies Milosevic was attempting to impose over all of Yugoslavia.

Slovenes, who argued for democratizing the Party and for a loose confederation of the states in Yugoslavia (Ribicic & Tomac, 1989), were constantly voted down by the Serbian block. Serbia, with its allies in Montenegro and Vojvodina, had the largest block of delegates in the party; the principle of majority vote, the decision making procedure in the party, was to its advantage.
In March, 1989, a new Serbian Constitution "that united Serbia" was proclaimed (Zagorac, 1989). The actual democratic nature of the document, although persistently stressed by Milosevic's government, was questionable because the new Constitution had not received the consent of the Albanian population of Serbia. The proclamation took place amid bloodshed after the Yugoslav federal Presidential body enacted a state of emergency in Kosovo (Lovric, 1989b). Milosevic's critics interpreted this repressive method of dealing with Albanian discontent as signalling Milosevic's success in making Kosovo a Yugoslav problem (Maliqi, 1989).

Milosevic's abuse of the party and of the federal institutions resulted in the secession of Slovenia's League of Communists from the federal umbrella party, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. The Serbs chose to interpret this as an attempt on the part of Slovenes to ruin Yugoslavia (Andrejevich, 1990b).

The end of the Yugoslav League of Communists was sealed in January, 1990, at the Fourteenth (Extraordinary) Congress of the League of Communists. The proceedings of the Congress showed how sharply divided the federal Party was over such important issues as the future form of political pluralism, the transformation of the party, and the definition and protection of human
rights (Andrejevich, 1990b). After being outvoted on crucial reform measures, the Slovenian Communist delegates walked out. Milosevic sought to continue the Congress without Slovenia, but Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, and the Yugoslav Federal Army delegations all refused Milosevic's call and asked for indefinite suspension of the Congress. The Congress, and indeed the full Party, has never met again.

The Extraordinary Fourteenth Congress buried the Yugoslav Communist party and showed the growing strength of the republican leaderships. The death of the only all-Yugoslav force meant the end of Yugoslavia. In Slovenia and Croatia this fact was recognized. In the spring of 1990, both republics organized their first multiparty elections and elected nationalist governments (Moore, 1992). Milosevic, since December 1989 reelected Serbia's State President, worked on his promise and announced a program to establish a state where all Serbs would live together. In the steadfast quest for Greater Serbia he has followed a single strategy. Each step began with a propaganda campaign stressing injustices—usually exaggerated—committed against Serbs, portraying the Serbs as victims (Engelberg, 1991). As a key component of his campaign to unite all Serbs in one country and create one Serbian state, he proclaimed himself the
savior of Yugoslavia, which to everybody else but Serbs meant a Greater Serbia and Serbian hegemony.

The surge of criticism against Milosevic left him intact because of the huge popular support that Milosevic enjoyed with the Serbs. This support was shown through the solidarity meetings discussed previously in this thesis. After the goal was accomplished in Serbia, and the provincial governments were stacked with Milosevic's followers, the rallies turned into "meetings of truth." The intention of the organizers was to spread the "truth" about Kosovo, as defined by Milosevic, to other parts of Yugoslavia. However, local authorities in the places the meetings were to take place frequently banned the meetings. The prevailing feeling was that these meetings were Milosevic's methods of intimidation, because they were similar to the meeting that brought about the Milosevic-engineered coup in Vojvodina in the fall of 1988 (Andrejevich, 1990a).

In the western parts of the country, Croatia and Slovenia, which had their democratically elected governments by the spring of 1990, proposals to the other parts of Yugoslavia to negotiate the future of the country were constantly rejected by the Serbian officials.

The threat of Milosevic's tyranny became serious at the end of 1991, when the Milosevic-dominated Serbian
government illegally took 1.8 billion dollars from the federal bank (Glynn, 1991). The apparent reason behind this act was that the Serbian economy was in crisis, with many enterprises unable to meet payrolls, and Milosevic had finally consented to hold elections in Serbia. Milosevic was successful in that he won the election, with the other republics unable to block him, but the piracy of the federal treasury destroyed all chances for the economic reform which had been mandated by the federal government, under Ante Markovic, at the behest of Western lending agencies (Andrejevich, 1991). It illustrated as well the impotence of any federal institutions in the face of Serbian determination.

The next ominous event was the constitutional crisis caused by the Serbs when they blocked a Croat from taking a position of President of the Yugoslav Collective Presidency as decreed by the constitutional rota. The stated reason behind their abuse of the federal institution was that the Croats were fascists and secessionists who aimed to destroy Yugoslavia.

In the summer of 1991, Slovenia and Croatia decided to secede. These decisions were the outcome of the referendums each republic held in order to stay within Yugoslavia or assume independence. The Yugoslav Army, whose officer corps was constituted mainly (an estimated
80%) of Serbs and Montenegrins, moved to Slovenia to "protect Yugoslavia" at the time when Yugoslavia had long lost its legitimacy.

Encountering fierce resistance, the Army agreed to pull back, to Croatia, only to start another war. The issue of "maltreated Serbs" provided a cause to fight, actually to gain the exaggerated amount of Croatian territory supposedly inhabited by the Serbian majority. After a long and tragically unequal war, which resulted in the destruction of ancient cities and cultural monuments, the world finally recognized the Serbian forces disguised in the Yugoslav Army as the aggressor. On May 22, 1992, the Organization of the United Nations recognized Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina as independent members of the UN. That act was followed by the discussion in the European Community and the UN Security Council to impose economic sanctions on Serbia (The New York Times, 1992b).

The death toll of the Serbian "struggle" against its imagined enemies and for the Greater Serbia is increasing every day. From Croatia the Army moved to Bosnia and Herzegovina where it has effected the worst destruction and refugee crisis of Europe since World War II.

The Serbs, led by Milosevic, attempted to deceive the world by proclaiming that they were establishing the
"Third Yugoslavia." The issue of the borders of the so-called new Yugoslavia remains a mystery because the Serbian forces are still fighting to keep and expand the territories they have occupied in Croatia and in Bosnia. The leadership of the new Yugoslavia does not distinguish itself from those who are working to extend the borders and to realize the historical map of Greater Serbia.

Control over the Serbian inhabited border regions of Croatia would enable Serbia to realize the age-long dream of Great Serbia. It now includes over one third of Croatian territory, much of which formerly was not Serbian inhabited. Serbian reach has extended into Bosnia, seizing an estimated 60-70 percent of Bosnian territory. In both cases Serbian militia units and the Federal Army have expelled non-Serbs, creating ethnically-pure Serbian areas and enabling them to claim yet more territory (The New York Times, 1992a).

This war showed that Yugoslavia as a state had lost legitimacy in all of its constituent parts but in Serbia and Montenegro. In the 1991 referendums in Croatia and Slovenia 95% of the voters chose to declare independence.

This war can also be viewed as a political struggle to preserve the privileges of the Yugoslav Army officer corps and keep the present hard-line Serbian Communist leader, Slobodan Milosevic, in power (Glynn, 1991).
Under the Communists, the Serbs were the privileged class in almost all the republics. They held down a disproportionate number of jobs in the military, police, bureaucracy, and government, with their primary loyalties in many cases being more to Belgrade than the republics they inhabited (Cuvalo, 1990). In the republican and provincial communist party units Serbs were dramatically over-represented in terms of membership (Slobodni Tjednik, 1991). Accusations have been made, even by Serbian politicians and analysts, that the Army brass were primarily intent on preserving their financial base and lavish lifestyles which would disappear without Croatian and Slovene tax revenues because the remaining republics were in economic collapse (Glynn, 1991).

Although this is the bloodiest conflict in Europe since the Second World War, there is one thing it has resolved thus far: The state of Yugoslavia cannot exist as projected by the Serbian leadership under Slobodan Milosevic, as a state where human rights are granted only to one people.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Moore (1992) and Engelberg (1991), prominent analysts of the Yugoslav conflict, maintain that the civil war that started June 26, 1991, was in many ways the logical outcome of Milosevic's policies. When the author began writing on this topic the term civil war was applicable, because Slovenia and Croatia, although established nations, were still under Yugoslav sovereignty. The declaration of independence proclaimed by Slovenia and Croatia on June 25, 1991, served as an immediate cause for Milosevic and the Serbian-dominated Army to attack independence-seeking republics. In the process these republics earned international recognition as of January 1992. Hence, the term of a civil war became inaccurate; the conflict, which already developed into a full-scale war, became recognized as such.

In an attempt to present one of the ways in which Milosevic's policies influenced the outbreak of the war in the former Yugoslavia, this study turned to Milosevic's political rhetoric. The speeches analyzed
are conceived to give some sense of how the tactical use of appeals and arguments by a politician can stir people's emotions and guide them to desired actions (Graber, 1981).

In Tetlock and Suedfeld's (1988) study of integrative complexity coding of verbal behavior, the work of Suedfeld and Rank from 1976 is cited as an empirical example of how different revolutionary leaders changed the level of complexity of their rhetoric in response to changes in the environment. Suedfeld and Rank concluded that revolutionary leaders used low level of complexity while rallying for support. Once their movement was established in power, due to the changes in the social environment, their rhetoric reflected a higher level of complexity (Tetlock & Suedfeld, 1988).

The level of integrative complexity refers to the number of variables and dimensions that a rhetor takes into consideration in the assessment and interpretation of the issues at hand. The low level of integrative complexity means that the events are interpreted through a "simplifying filter" that places events into value-laden, good-bad categories. High level of complexity refers to the recognition of a multitude of factors that influence existing problems. A rhetor high in complexity level recognizes that there are alternatives to be taken
into account in problem-solving processes as well (Tetlock & Suedfeld, 1988).

The speeches analyzed in this study show that Milosevic's phenomenon of a rhetor is quite peculiar. In the speech of April 24, 1987, Milosevic spoke as a politician already established in power. The speech he delivered at the time revealed that he recognized Kosovo as a multi-faceted problem. His rhetoric contained a high level of complexity in assessing the problem. He recognized that political, economic, and social factors were a source of a difficulties in Kosovo, together with the Albanian nationalism.

The later speeches, however, showed the drastic switch in his rhetorical style in regard to the level of complexity. One can argue that once Milosevic assumed the role of a spokesman for the Serbs (McCrea, 1992), which transpired as a consequence of the speech in Kosovo Polje in April 24 1987, that he also assumed the role of a leader of a Serbian national movement. Such a conclusion may be drawn from the content of the speeches delivered in October 17, and November 19, 1988. These addresses revealed that Milosevic, even though a Communist official and thus part of the political establishment, used the most suspected forms of appeal, an appeal to Serbian nationalism. The decrease in the level of com-
plexity reflected the change in his rhetorical style. This change toward a simplistic attitude and interpretation of the issues (e.g., Kosovo problem seen solely as a result of Albanian nationalism and terrorism) does not correspond with the conclusion of Suedfeld and Rank from 1976 that, once established in power, political leaders usually change their rhetoric to a more complex integrative mode (Tetlock & Suedfeld, 1988, p. 51). On the other hand, the switch in Milosevic's rhetorical style may be viewed as result of the demands of his audience, which the mentioned study maintained was the major reason for the modification of the complexity level in the rhetoric of the leaders.

A regular use of historical myths and symbols reflected Milosevic's ability to harness the frustrations instilled in Serbs in post-World War II Yugoslavia (Moore, 1992). His phenomenon is even more interesting in the fact that his "rhetoric [did] serve the art of politics," as Aristotle originally defined rhetoric. However, rhetoric in politics can serve good and bad ends (Bitzer, 1981., p. 233).

Milosevic's use of political language served bad ends. He never realized the plan, always presented in his rhetoric, to establish a market economy that would create prosperity. But he did work on fulfilling the
promise of establishing a Serbian state. This he did in an undemocratic way and at the expense of the other nations. Always rich with hidden meanings and connotations, his speeches seemed to be delivered only to one particular group, even though he always claimed the pro-Yugoslav orientation.

In a quest to establish Greater Serbia, the rhetoric of Milosevic, Serbian long-wanted leader, played one of the most important roles. Thurow (1991) maintains that Serbian politics after the April 24, 1987 speech, when Milosevic established himself as a charismatic leader, was actually a realization of the plan designed by the Serbian academicians in a so called Memo of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, which asked that the political inferiority of Serbia be removed. That was the centerpiece theme in Milosevic's rhetoric which secured him the position of Serbian president in 1990. In that role Milosevic and his supporters constantly blocked the work of the Yugoslav presidential body by refusing to discuss the critical issues on the future of the Yugoslav federation with Slovenia and Croatia. Croatian and Slovene democratically elected governments (in spring of 1990) offered the project of a looser Confederate state, but did not find positive response on the Serbian part. The fear of Serbian tyranny hastened their moves to
secede from Yugoslavia, which at that point proved to exist only with the Serbs and in Milosevic’s rhetoric.
Appendix

Translation of the Speeches
Comrades: before I say a few words about the content of our discussion today, I wish to say that in order to request responsibility, there is no need for us to change places, as a comrade said a short while ago. When we speak about this unpleasant event here today, and the intervention of the police, responsibility for this intervention will be established, because there was no reason for it. When comrade Mitar, our chairman, informed us about what was happening in front of the building, you know quite well that within a minute we agreed that order should not be maintained by the militia, but that you should take over in the interest of the security of the citizens and children who were there. The evidence that we made a good agreement is amply provided by the fact that order has been maintained quite well and that it was a matter of people conducting themselves with dignity.

I now wish to say something about the content of our talks. First of all I want to say that we discussed how these gatherings are assessed and evaluated here. Quite briefly, such gatherings are not gatherings of nationalists. Such gatherings are not gatherings of enemies. Precisely for this reason, I know that the great majority in this hall and outside this hall think so, precisely
because these are not gatherings of enemies but of citizens, we must not allow the misfortunes of people to be exploited by nationalists, who must be opposed by every honest man. We must preserve brotherhood and unity as the apple of our eyes. It is only on this basis, now when brotherhood and unity are threatened, that we must win. We cannot, nor do we want to, divide people into Serbs and Albanians, but we must draw the line that divides the honest and progressive people, who struggle for brotherhood and unity and national equality, from the counterrevolution and nationalists, on the other side. If we fail to create and strengthen this front, comrades, there will be no Kosovo, there will be no Serbia, and there will be no Yugoslavia.

Another thing I want to say is: be assured that not one of the problems that you have talked about, literally, no single word about the problems, will be omitted in reporting to the members of the Serbian LC Central Committee; not in order to inform about them, but in order to solve them within our society’s institutions. I feel an obligation to say this at the beginning, for it is simply physically impossible to discuss all the problems that were brought up here today.

It is clear to all the people all over Yugoslavia that Kosovo is a great problem in our society and that is
slowly being solved. I must say, however, if Kosovo were the only, or the only great problem of Yugoslav society, the problems would be solved faster and better. But Kosovo hit us as the gravest problem at the same time as the severe economic crisis occurred, when the standard of living drastically declined, when prices rose, when the number of unemployed was increasing; and also as huge political problems arose. As you know, Yugoslavia as a country has been shaken by separatism and nationalism in many of its parts, although by far not to the extent as here in Kosovo. Finally, this has been the time when anti-Yugoslav and anti-communist forces have been more present and more aggressive. As you see, many serious problems occurred all at the same time, and therefore our society and the LC are experiencing difficulties and are displaying slowness in solving them. In solving all these problems the League of Communists was not always united, and therefore could not be sufficiently effective. I do not say this as an apology, because I do not have the right to say that; I simply state it.

In order to solve the problems we have in Kosovo, as well as all other problems we have, unity of the LC is indispensable. This unity is the most important task facing the party now. This demand for unity was made yesterday and the day before yesterday by almost every
speaker at the plenum of the Central Committee of the LC of Serbia that was just held. I am convinced that we have taken a big step toward the unity of both the LC of Serbia and the LC of Yugoslavia. Indeed, with unity we can solve many problems, almost all of them. Without unity, we cannot solve a single problem.

Despite the many measures--some of them were mentioned by you here--taken so far, and especially in the past year, the situation in Kosovo, both economic and political, continues to be unsatisfactory. Kosovo remains underdeveloped, unemployment is high, foreign loans are high, exports are unsatisfactory, there are a lot of incomplete projects. What is most difficult is the presence of a great misuse of work and of functions in the administration and even in the area of politics. We talked about this today, I should say yesterday, at the session of the LC Provincial Committee Presidium which was held yesterday afternoon. We also talked about the fact that the spirit of separatism and often of counterrevolution is still present in the process of education and training, and in cadre policy. The emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins under economic, political, and simple physical pressures constitutes probably the last tragic exodus of an European population. The last time such processions of desperate people moved was in
the Middle Ages. I know that you no longer need to hear about what was in the past, and plain analyses of the present situation are no longer interesting to you. That is logical. You and all of us are interested and should be interested only in those arrangements that change matters for the better, and that solve the situation by which, and with good reason, you above all, and all of us are not pleased.

I nevertheless want to assure you that many measures in the spheres of material life, political relations, and cadre policy are changing every day and that the pace of these changes will be faster in the coming months. Investments are being constantly made in the material development of Kosovo. Separatism and nationalism have been treated as counterrevolution. Cadre shifts are being increasingly carried out; legal, administrative, and ideo-political measures are being proclaimed. Nobody in the Provincial Committee, nor in the Serbian LC Central Committee or the LCY, is happy with the speed of this process. We noted this yesterday at the session of the Provincial Committee Presidium. However, the process is accelerating and I am sure that the pace of the process will increase even more. You should know this. Let it be understood, I do not intend to suggest that we have reason to be content. On the contrary, Kosovo continues
to be the poorest region of our country. Albanian separatists and nationalists have quieted down a little. They are counting on time, and the circumstances work for them, as well. They should know, however, there will be no tyranny on this soil any more. That will not be allowed by the progressive people of Kosovo, it will not be allowed by Serbia, and it will not be allowed by Yugoslavia.

In the political respect, the belief is still present that the demand for an ethnically pure Kosovo is justified and possible. This is the basis. From the premise, launched by the counterrevolutionaries, that the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo is a community of the Albanian nationality in Kosovo, a logical continuation follows in that the province should, in this sense, be actually and legally transformed into a republic, by which, in fact, the first, but not insignificant steps, are taken toward a breakup of the territorial integrity of Socialist Republic of Serbia and of Yugoslavia. Comrades, we have grappled with this problem, and the progressive people in Kosovo, in Serbia, and in Yugoslavia have grappled with it. When one bears in mind what has been achieved so far, as well as everything that remains to be done--and what remains to be done is incomparably more than what has been achieved--we do not face
tasks and obligations, but a great party offensive whose aim should be the material and cultural development of Kosovo and a free and dignified life for every inhabitant of Kosovo.

Some misunderstandings must be cleared up, nonetheless. Under "inhabitants" we understand all the people who live in the province and who are not checked for their nationality every day; just as they are not checked daily for their sex, upbringing, social origin, education, or profession. In this sense one cannot talk about either minority or majority peoples in Kosovo. The Serbs and Montenegrins are not a minority in regard to the Albanians in Kosovo, just as the Albanians are not a minority in Yugoslavia, but a nationality that lives together in equality with other nations and nationalities in three of our socialist republics.

The premise about an ethnically pure and economically and politically autonomous and isolated Kosovo is impossible on ideopolitical and ethnic grounds; ultimately, such a position is not in the interest of the Albanian people. Such nationalism would exclude them from the encirclement and would not only slow down, but it would cease their development both in economic and a generally spiritual sense, as Enver Hoxha did with his policy to the small Albanian people. He excluded the
Albanians, a very underdeveloped society, from Europe. He deprived them of the possibility to participate in the dynamic life of the modern world. The Albanian people have striven toward Europe, toward a modern society. They should not be stopped in doing this.

Nationalism always means isolation from others, a withdrawal within one's own limits. This also means a lagging in development for, without cooperation and links in the Yugoslav area and beyond, there is no progress. Every nation that closes and isolates itself behaves irresponsibly toward its own development. Therefore, we, the Communists, above all must do everything to eliminate the consequences of nationalist and separatist behavior of the counterrevolutionary forces, both in Kosovo and in other parts of the country. Our aim is to get away from hatred, to have all the people of Kosovo living well.

The first thing I want to tell you in connection with this goal, comrades, is that you should stay here. This is your country; your homes, your fields, your gardens are here. Surely you will not leave your land because it is difficult to live here and you are oppressed by injustice and humiliation. It has never been in the spirit of the Serbian and Montenegrin peoples to give up before obstacles, to demobilize when they should fight, to become demoralized when the going is difficult.
You also should stay here because of your ancestors and because of your descendants. Otherwise, you would disgrace your ancestors and disappoint your descendants. I do not propose, comrades, that in staying you should suffer, carry on and tolerate a situation with which you are not satisfied. On the contrary, you should change it, together with all progressive people here, in Serbia, and in Yugoslavia. Do not tell me that you cannot do it alone! Of course you cannot do it alone! We shall change the situation together, we in Serbia and all of us in Yugoslavia.

We cannot in the foreseeable future return the national composition of the Kosovo population to that of the past, but we can at least check emigration and ensure the conditions so that all the people who live in Kosovo should stay in their homes, that they should live under equal conditions, and that they should equally share the fate, first of all, of the Kosovo economic situation and afterward, of all other situations. This demand sounds absurd to the ears of an inhabitant of Europe. It is ridiculous in these modern times. These inhabitants would rightly ask whether the life and work of citizens, their security and equality, their rights and duties are not regulated by the Constitution and the law. They are regulated when these are applied. When they are not
applied, they are not regulated. In this case it is necessary for all political and social posts to warn the state organs and the organs of administration that they should do their duty. Their duty, the duty of consistently applying the Constitution and the law, is in interest of all the inhabitants of Kosovo. For if we legalize the state of lawlessness, all who are exposed to lawlessness are ultimately endangered.

Now the Serbs and the Montenegrins suffer most from the nonimplementation of the law, but tomorrow it could be the Albanians that will suffer. For that reason, the introduction of respect for law, order, and equality is really in the interest of all the inhabitants of Kosovo, in the most profound social and historical sense. This is the first and most urgent matter that we must jointly accomplish in Kosovo.

Another matter is the following: it concerns the return to Kosovo, particularly of professional people. I firmly believe that the process of emigration cannot be stopped until the process of returning to Kosovo is started. The return of Serbs and Montenegrins to Kosovo is a process. We cannot adopt a decree and return people by force to where they do not want to be. But we can set in motion a political campaign for creating the material, economic, labor, and cultural conditions so that those
who left because of dissatisfaction and injustice would come back. Here I include both apartments and jobs, and the conditions in which this will actually happen. All the progressive forces, the Communists and the youth, everything that is honest and progressive in all of Serbia, may and must participate in the creation of these conditions. No price should be too high to achieve this.

Usually, we say in our political language that we are not in favor of campaigns but in favor of lasting processes. In this case the situation is such, and it is so alarming, that we must launch a campaign for the return of 50, then 100, then 200 teachers, physicians and other experts, skilled workers, and then the rest. This campaign should then become a process. Only then will prospects exist for stopping the emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo.

Indeed, comrades, pay is low and prices are high in Yugoslavia. Shoes and books are expensive and it is difficult to go for a vacation. But surely we will not therefore leave Yugoslavia and migrate to some richer and happier country! Surely these are reasons for staying so that we may make our country richer and happier. It is possible to achieve this, but only under one precondition: that the forces of socialism, brotherhood and unity, and progress be separated from the forces of
separatism, nationalism and conservativism. In this separation of what is progressive from what is reactionary, the Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo will certainly get the support of many of Albanians, Communists, and Albanian people, among whom they have relatives and friends and their children have companions. Here in Kosovo, all of them have the common aim that the province should develop economically and culturally, and that all the people should have a better and happier life. All the working and honest people should rally around this goal. This should be the basis of brotherhood and unity in Kosovo.

I am therefore convinced that only the workers' class of Kosovo may and must be the bearer of the spirit of brotherhood and unity, justice and progress, because only the workers' class has identical interests and has the least reason to divide along national lines. This class knew how to struggle against even greater injustices. Only this class can defeat the present injustice. Certainly the LC must appreciate highly the fact that the people turn to it, as somebody said here, for this is proof that people believe in the party. Precisely for this reason I want to say, comrades, that in the LC as a whole and in the LC leadership we will do everything to accomplish what we, as Communists and as leadership, have
assumed as our tasks.

All the questions are on the agenda: the rights, freedom, culture, the language and the script; all the questions from land boundaries to constitutional changes, from day nurseries to courts of justice. In this forest of grave problems that cause both concern and anger among all honest people of Kosovo, Serbia, and Yugoslavia, concern and indignation are not sufficient in themselves, but the readiness of the people of Kosovo and of Serbia and of Yugoslavia to solve the problems, and readiness of each to make the contributions and to roll up their sleeves all together, as somebody here said, to solve the problems, constitute the guarantee that the economic, the systemic, and the political problems of Kosovo will be resolved. In this sense we can trust nobody else, comrades, but ourselves, and we shall solve this. I wanted to assure you that every member of the leadership of the SR of Serbia and of the SFR Yugoslavia will always be ready both for such talks and for a constant presence in joint actions that we have discussed. Be assured that this is the feeling that is present all over Yugoslavia. All of Yugoslavia is with you. It is not a question of this being a problem of Yugoslavia, but rather of Yugoslavia and Kosovo. Yugoslavia does not exist without Kosovo! Yugoslavia disintegrates without Kosovo! Yugo-
slavia and Serbia will not give Kosovo away!

The Speech of October 17, 1988

In the last several years the highest party and state bodies have been continuously holding sessions. They came to the conclusion that Yugoslav society is undergoing a crisis. At the same time, the amount of paper used to present the views on the crisis and the measures undertaken to overcome it is rising. The words: "views," "measures," and "overcoming" are words that I have taken from the usual terminology on crisis. I personally do not regard any of these terms as appropriate to the situation in society, because the crisis is deepening, thus causing dissatisfaction among the citizens. Therefore, the question of responsibility for the crisis is imposing itself. At a recent session of the Serbian LC Central Committee, we expressed the belief that the content of this session should be the responsibility of leaderships and individuals for the obligations undertaken in connection with the crisis, especially in connection with Kosovo, which at present represents the very heart of the crisis.

The Communists in Serbia, as well as the Serbian public, could not accept yet another session which would establish views in connection with the crisis and adopt
measures to overcome it if the leaderships continue their marathon and sclerotic sessions while the citizens continue to be poorer and poorer, the peoples more divided, and the Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo exterminated. From this session Serbia expects changes that are necessary not to overcome the crisis, but to resolve it. This is why the Serbian LC Central Committee supported the proposed document which has the aim of achieving the unity without which changes cannot be implemented.

The very essence of the dispute that has been shaking this country in the last few years is whether we should introduce changes or not, and what changes we should introduce. This dispute cannot be resolved in such a way that will please everybody. Those who are against changes do not want anything to be changed, because at present they are living well, in both the material and the political sense. Those who do want changes are not satisfied with their economic and political life. And indeed, some people are in a position to change their job, some have not been able to find employment for years, some are changing apartments, others will retire as tenants, some have barely enough for food, others have two or three houses, some have been deciding about the fate of the country for 40 years, others cannot say what they think in an associated labor organization.
without being demoted. It is not right that some have been able to educate their children abroad, while others have to escort their children to the school around the corner so that they do not get beaten up or raped on this short journey. Some people can make decisions about anything as long as they live, while others cannot criticize their boss or the system once a year without suffering consequences.

It is clear that the first group is not in favor of changes, at least not essential changes, and that the others are in favor of essential changes. There are fewer people against changes than for them, but even if the situation were to be the other way around, improving the material and political position of some parts of society, especially if it concerns the majority, cannot be achieved without bringing into question or at least limiting some other people's material and political interests. However, those people whose interests should be questioned or limited will not agree with this. This is natural. However their consent is not needed. Socialism did not come into being because everybody was in favor of it. Now, too, establishing greater economic and political justice among the peoples and people will not receive the support of those whose interests are threatened by this.
This is why LC must not allow anybody to throw dust into people's eyes and abuse the well-known formulation on the pluralism of interests in order to protect the positions that were not attained through work and responsibility, but through benefits, aggressiveness, and ignorance. Those who exiled the whole nation from its territory do not have an equal position in this pluralism of interests. Those who have put the state and their work organization into an unfavorable position through bad and dishonest work do not have an equal position in the pluralism of interests with those who are paying for this work. To equate these interests is not democracy. On the contrary, we are talking about interests that are based on the exploitation and humiliation of other people, and they do not represent a part of the pluralism of self-managing interests, but constitute injustice and shame. There is no theory or history that could justify them. Their interests cannot be discussed. Carrying out the changes which, as we can remember, the LC conference delegates demanded on behalf of their communities for three days here is also democracy. They did not do so that the leaderships could again start a series of meetings to explain what was said at the conference. What was said was heard in homes, offices, factory halls, surgeries, in buses, on the street. The country that
respects this is a democratic country. A country that successfully carries this out is a socialist democratic country.

We as individuals or as a society cannot continue to poor and to remain poor in the future. Divided at work, nationally divided, and economically blocked, the majority of the working people live on the edge of poverty at present, and will very likely have poverty in the future. The greatest changes should take place in the sphere of economic and social life, so that life under socialism stops being necessarily difficult and poor. By implementing the concept of a market economy and creating a unified Yugoslav market, socialism as a rich society, a society that is not in contradiction to just relations among the people, will be possible.

As far as Serbia is concerned, as is known, it favors changes and has started to introduce them. These changes are connected with improvements in the standard of living and the overall economic situation; changes in political system within the Constitution that would enable Serbia to establish territorial, administrative, and legal unity, which it has not had up to now. It would also enable Serbia to do what is the most important thing--to stop the terror in Kosovo. These are the three most important and mutually related tasks which roughly
represent the essence of our current policy in Serbia. To a great extent, this policy coincides with the policy which we are conducting at the level of our entire society. In addition, this policy is an expression of the political demands of the working people in Serbia, and is agreed upon by the leadership and the broadest public. In order to carry out these changes, it was also necessary to introduce certain cadre changes. Some of these cadre changes have already been completed, some will be made in the next period.

It is understandable that this policy of the Serbian LC and Serbia has been opposed. The opposition to this policy, as one could expect and understand, has come from those whose current material, political, status, and personal interests are threatened by these changes. However, it is more difficult to understand and anticipate the fact that, after such a long time of living together in socialist Yugoslavia, the opponents to changes in Serbia seek and find allies outside Serbia. The basis of this alliance probably lies in the remnants of the old intolerance toward Serbia caused by its alleged hegemonism. Communists, workers, and citizens of Serbia have always been sensitive about this kind of intolerance, because they are not obliged to bear forever the responsibility and burden of the Serbian bourgeoisie’s
behavior before the war, especially because the Serbian bourgeoisie’s behavior was identical to that of the Croatian and Slovene bourgeoisie, which all together exploited the workers class of Yugoslavia. Today I must say, the degree of this sensitivity is decreasing, because if everything that we have done so far is not a good enough argument that the Serbian people want to live in Serbia and Yugoslavia, on an equal footing with other peoples and nationalities, then I have no other arguments. I can only say that, at the least, it is hypocritical to accuse Serbia of wanting to be superior because it wants to be equal with others.

The currently implemented changes in the economic and political life of Serbia should contribute to the development of Serbia and are not to the detriment of other people, republics or the country as a whole. On the contrary. They are in accordance with the achievements of our revolution and the fundamental tenets of the LC. This is clear to all well-intentioned people in Yugoslavia. For those who are not familiar with the essence and details, this is an opportunity to familiarize themselves with this. As far as ill-intentioned people are concerned, we do not intend to try to change them or polemicize with them, and certainly do not intend to justify our actions to them. Concerning our comrades
outside Serbia who, because of divisions in the media which were mentioned today, are not well or sufficiently informed, I would like to use this occasion to state several facts about the situation in Serbia.

The first concerns the meetings of solidarity with Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins. Comrades, these are held as protest against the inability of the existing institutions and some individuals to stop the terror in Kosovo. This kind of public reaction is not incompatible with our social system. On the contrary. It is fully in the spirit of our socialist and self-managing system, whose essence lies in the fact that all working people should manage society. This reaction is in the spirit of the achievements of our civilization and the fact that our citizens have been able to freely and publicly welcome or condemn events in their own and other communes.

In this respect, the condemning or banning of citizens’ gatherings in our society is not acceptable. Nobody has the right to do this if these meetings are for socialism and Yugoslavia and are held with the aim of stimulating institutions to take actions to protect and develop socialism, which is something they are not doing at present. It is sad, of course, that the majority of the comrades present do not have the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the real face of the meetings
that have been held throughout Serbia this summer. This is a mass, vigorous, and uniform mood in favor of socialism, Yugoslavia, equality among the peoples and nationalities and, to tell the truth, against some current leaders that people hold responsible for mistakes in society. This is why I do not see why there is so much fuss about demands for some specific changes in the leadership, if they are justified. People have not been demanding change in the system, nor they demand change in our tenets. The fact that some officials who were criticized equate themselves with the system and our tenets can be their own illusion, but it is not a reason for raising the temperature and activating all the mechanisms of society to protect them.

Second, the fact that some leaderships and individuals have issued warnings that these gatherings are a public disturbance is sad and shameful in the country in which brotherhood and unity are, at least in words, something sacred. Comrades, do not tell me that the Yugoslav public was disturbed about Kosovo for the first time at noon on July 9, 1988, when the first meeting was held in Novi Sad. The public must have been disturbed by the situation in Kosovo back in 1981 when it was officially stated in the SFR Yugoslavia that counterrevolution was occurring place there. The Yugoslav public
should not have had a single peaceful day or night since the Ninth LCY Central Committee, because of the suffering of their fellow citizens in Kosovo. At that session they heard a great many details about suffering. Yugoslav Communists promised at that session that they would jointly eliminate the counterrevolution. Therefore, disturbing the public is normal and honest. It would not be normal and honest if the citizens of Yugoslavia were not disturbed and if they were to sleep in peace while children in Kosovo are raped, houses are burned, people beaten up, graves desecrated, two nations exterminated, and a whole culture eliminated.

Third, the essence of the resistance of some leaderships and individuals to political changes in Serbia, above all, is connected with constitutional changes. Only the bureaucracy stands to lose by the implementation of these changes, above all provincial bureaucracy. The autonomy of the provinces does not stand to lose anything at all. This is now evident. However, in an attempt to protect their positions, they tried to block these changes in the constitution. They have even resorted to taking from its intellectual moth-balls the warning that there is the danger of an alleged Great Serbia.

Comrades, I must state right now that Serbia, as is known, has no ambitions regarding the territories of
other republics, but does have ambitions regarding the territory of its republic. Whether this territory is large or small depends on the yardstick used to measure it. But whatever its size, it must remain as such, and will remain as such. In this, Serbia expects support from every republic, just as it is itself ready to provide this kind of support to others, which it has always done, after all, in similar situations, when other republics were concerned. In that respect, the support given by the LCY Central Committee Presidium represents a great step forward. Therefore, the threat to Yugoslavia does not stem from the fact that Serbia wants to constitute itself as a republic and to solve the Kosovo problem. Nonetheless, I propose that all those who want to oppose this ask themselves whether they have a picture of who should or should not allow Serbia to constitute itself as a republic. Do they really not see that the working people and citizens in Serbia will not accept any bans or any permits, that they will not accept any tutors, especially not in matters concerning their legitimate rights? In Serbia we have all understood this session as an end to a number of sessions that did not succeed in putting on their agenda the responsibility for the endangering of human rights in Kosovo and for the great, perhaps irretrievable migration of Serbs and Montenegrins from their
land, and for the last genocide in the 20th century.

Many, virtually all, who speak about Kosovo accept that the situation is difficult, but they are swift to warn that such a situation cannot be done away with overnight. I have been hearing these words for six years, and I ask myself: Should we call for assistance from world and Yugoslav geographers, meteorologists, and astronomers to investigate a night that has lasted six years? The longest night known to science lasts six months in the polar regions. Blocking or slowing down the constitutional changes in Serbia and delays in stopping the terrorism in Kosovo has held our mobilization in a deadlock, and at the same time it demobilizes our joint forces for solving the crisis and implementing the direly necessary economic reform.

Kosovo is not a cause but a consequence of the crisis of Yugoslav society. But the fact that it is a consequence does not mean that it should be solved at the very end. Maltreatment, rape, and the humiliation of people cannot wait until inflation is bridled, unemployment is reduced, exports are increased, the standard of living is raised, democratic centralism is applied, and the relations between the class and national elements are discussed. The crisis is such that one can get out of it by means of a great cadre renewal in key party, state,
economic, and cultural positions; that is indispensable for the purpose of implementing the socioeconomic reform of Yugoslav society as a whole.

The greatest number of Communists and citizens of our country are aware of this sequence of moves. Their awareness has obviously developed more quickly and more progressively than the awareness of a part of the leadership. At this moment, I think that, in the political and generally in the spiritual sense, the people have outgrown their leadership.

Considering that in our country, socialist and self-managing as it is, there is no interest and no will that is senior to the interest and the will of the working people, and especially the workers' class. I think that all aspects of these interests and this will must be respected, even in making changes in leaderships when the working people and the workers' class consider that their interests are inadequately expressed. It is better for the entire society that the will of the working people be implemented in a peaceful and democratic way. There is no reason that this should not be the case. The only obstacle to this way out of the crisis lies in individuals—indeed, not few in number—who have been passed over by time; not in a biological sense, but in a spiritual sense. In the absence of a program for a way out of the
crisis and in the absence of the ability to carry the program out, they want to block everything: ideas and people. They almost want to introduce some sort of a moratorium; ready to use even emergency measures to introduce the moratorium. However, Yugoslavia does not need emergency measures. It needs extraordinary efforts and results.

The Speech of November 19, 1988

Comrades, such a large meeting has not been held in Belgrade since its liberation. The last time such a large number of people, united by a great idea gathered in Belgrade streets was on October 20, 1944. At that time people in Belgrade streets celebrated the war victory, and started the great battle for the reconstruction of a country devastated by the war. At that time, just as today, members of all Yugoslav peoples and nationalities assembled here in togetherness. Many of you here remember how in those days nothing was difficult and how people felt that everything was easy and possible in the freedom. It is in this freedom that the citizens of Belgrade and of our entire country have succeeded in accomplishing much. Today, feeling angry because of the crisis in which we have found ourselves, we are inclined to forget everything good and worthy which we have creat-
ed by ourselves, and which we have created with joy.

It is true that we have halted on the road to the society we had aspired to during the revolution, but it is not true that we cannot create such a society, that we must renounce that road. What we have to do is to change many concepts and many people in politics to make our life better. We will do this through a great social reform which we must carry out. The most important thing we must resolve at this time is to establish peace and order in Kosovo. There is no other more urgent task for Serbia nor should there be more important task for all of Yugoslavia, because the solidarity of the Yugoslav peoples and especially of Yugoslav workers has always been their greatest and strongest characteristic. It has been manifested in the assistance which we have extended to the oppressed people, the workers' class, and even individuals throughout the world. For this reason, it is difficult to explain why that solidarity has been late in manifesting itself to a greater extent, faster and with greater love when citizens of our own country are concerned. The long absence of this solidarity with the boundless suffering of the Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo represents an incurable wound to their hearts and to the heart of all of Serbia.

But this is no time for sorrow; it is time for
struggle. This awareness captured Serbia last summer and this awareness has turned into a material force that will stop the terror in Kosovo and unite Serbia. This is a process which no longer can be stopped by any force, a process in the face of which all fear is weak. People will consent to live in poverty but they will never consent to live without freedom; at least not people gathered here and the people in Serbia, to whom I myself belong and therefore I know that they can only live in freedom and in no other way. Both the Turkish and the German invaders know that these people win their battles for freedom. We entered both world wars with nothing but the conviction that we would fight for freedom, and we won both wars. Now we have the unified LC stances on Kosovo and we shall implement them energetically to the very end.

We shall win the battle for Kosovo regardless of the obstacles facing us inside and outside the country. What I mean here are perplexed conclusions, secret meetings, confused announcements, negotiations carried out at restaurant tables, unscrupulous interpretations of Yugoslav reality in the world, allege ambiguous but in fact, hostile statements to the press, a host of petty and dirty tricks aimed at calming down people who are great in heart, for such tricks cannot frighten them.
Thus we shall win despite the fact that Serbia’s enemies outside the country are plotting against it, along with those in the country. We tell them that we do not frighten easily, and that we enter every battle with the aim of winning it.

We have never waged unjust and dishonest battles that would be to the detriment of other people. The people, all citizens regardless of their nationality and profession, are at the head of this battle for Kosovo. And there is no battle in the world that the people have lost. The leadership has little choice here: It shall either head the people and listen to their voice, or time will push it aside and its existence will be recorded in history only briefly and for the bad things alone.

Nobody should be surprised that entire Serbia rose up last summer because of Kosovo. Kosovo is the very center of Serbia’s history, its culture, and its memory. All people have a love that is warming their heart forever. For a Serb that love is Kosovo. That is why Kosovo must remain in Serbia. That will not be at the expense of Albanians. I can tell the Albanians in Kosovo that nobody has ever found it difficult to live in Serbia because he is not Serbian. Serbia has always been open to everybody: For those who have no houses, for the poor and the rich alike, for the happy and the desperate, for
those who were only passing through and for those who
wanted to stay. The only people Serbia did not want were
evil and bad people even when they were Serbs.

All the Albanians in Kosovo who trust other people
and who respect the other people living in Kosovo and
Serbia are in their own country. I now ask them to rally
against the evil and hatred of their own chauvinists
because they do not cause evil only to Serbs and
Montenegrins, but also to their own Albanian people.
They embarrass their people in front of the entire world,
shame it before its children and offend its dignity. For
the sake of all this, I call on the Albanians throughout
Kosovo and say to them that instead of the police and
Army units, Albanian mothers and fathers should tend to
the peaceful dreams, calm schooling, and carefree games
of Serb and Montenegrin girls and boys. This is not so
because such division of care is more efficient, but
because it is more humane, more honest, and because it is
more appropriate to socialism and the ideals for which we
in Yugoslavia all strive.

Now, let us remind the Yugoslav peoples, the work­
ers' class, the youth, and the Communists that half a
century ago even Spain was not far away. Many people
then went to fight in its barricades against terror and
hatred. Terror and hatred run riot in Kosovo today, and
Kosovo is in our country of Yugoslavia. In the fight against Kosovo evil it is not necessary to sacrifice lives as was done in Spain. One only needs to take an oath, which we Yugoslavs had already given to each other in 1941, that in brotherhood and unity we will share everything, both the good and the bad, as well as victory, injustice, poverty, that we will build a new and better world.

Comrades, the day after tomorrow, a conference of the Serbian LC will open here. This conference is devoted to the reform. The reform which we need to carry out concerns great social changes which should take place as soon as possible. The most important changes should take place in the field of economy. These changes should raise the standard of living of the entire society and of every individual. As far as the political system is concerned, the changes should establish the unity in Serbia as a republic and its equality with other republics in Yugoslavia. The reform should improve and remedy everything that is of importance to people's lives: prices, medical care, education, and the information system. They should facilitate a more successful and freer development of sciences and arts so that our culture can reach other countries and peoples and contribute to the progressive changes in the world. They
should contribute toward everything in society, if it is done openly, so that people compulsorily and regularly bear responsibility for the results of their work. This is a great program which we can realize only if we remain resolute and united as we have been in the last few months and here today.

This kind of reform represents an expression of the needs of the working people and citizens of Serbia. The leadership of the republic understands this reform as its obligation to those who have elected it. This reform will lead to changes which should be implemented throughout entire Yugoslavia. I am convinced that in the forthcoming months all Yugoslav peoples, all citizens of Yugoslavia, will find the strength to overcome differences, intolerance, and clashes, that they will jointly and fraternally succeed in preserving, renewing, and developing their country. Tito's Yugoslavia is the result of a struggle, work, and love of all of Yugoslav peoples and nationalities.

Today, when Yugoslavia is experiencing difficulties, we should all together raise our voices and wake up our hearts, use our brains and unite our forces in order to preserve our country. Yugoslavia was created in a magnificent revolution by Yugoslav Communists, the Yugoslav worker's class, and Yugoslav peoples. Yugoslavia
will not die at the conference table as its enemies hope. Yugoslavia was created by a huge struggle and will defend itself through a huge struggle. Long live socialist Yugoslavia, our country! Long live free and united SR of Serbia! Long live Belgrade, capital city of our country which is always open to all good and to all progressive ideas! Long live the courage with which we always fought for freedom and justice! Long live the comrades who gathered here at the meeting for brotherhood and unity, for Yugoslavia, and for better days!
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