The Socialist Evolvement of The Cuban Revolution 1948-1960

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Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba after a surprisingly powerless Batista fled the country during the early morning hours of January 1, 1959. Joyous celebration swept the country as Castro made his triumphant journey across the island, leaving his hideout of two years in the Sierra Maestra for Havana. The revolution had succeeded in overthrowing the hated Batista, for whom almost all elements of Cuban society felt disdain. The people were rejoicing at his overthrow. Yet most had little conception of what was to come. Fidel Castro, outside of being a popular hero, was a little known commodity to the peasants who he claimed to be leading. Few others, including outside observers, offered light on what the direction of the revolutionary government would be; indeed, many simply resorted to an analysis composed of their own predisposed biases.

That direction of the revolutionary government over the first three years of Fidel Castro's rule has led some to conclude that the revolution has been betrayed. After a careful discussion of the appropriate evidence during the years 1959-1961, Theodore Draper, for instance, concludes that "The revolution that Castro promised was unquestionably betrayed." Draper sights the series of broken promises regarding the nationalization of lands and the failure of the government to comply with their promise of elections as evidence in his support. Others

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have examined the question of betrayal on somewhat different grounds, the result of a perceptual difference regarding what exactly would be the fulfillment of the revolution. Mesa-Lago, as an example, looks at the revolution in terms of a Communist model, and his conclusion is also that the revolution has been betrayed. Such conflicting analyses which arrive at the same conclusion point to the fact that if one is going to talk about "betrayal" of a revolution, he had better be clear in indicating first what the most important goals of the revolution are, and second, to show whether or not those goals are on the way to being fulfilled, or if they have been betrayed.

The difficulties inherent in an analysis of any revolution regarding its goals and the consequent fulfillment of them is important to note. Additionally, one finds even greater obstacles facing him in an examination of the Cuban revolution. First, there was a pronounced ideological void in this revolution compared with the explicit doctrines apparent in others. The revolution, says Draper, "was not made by a revolutionary party which had struggled for years to formulate an ideology and create an organization."\(^2\) Suárez has indicated that the only true ideological doctrine to come out of Castro's 26th of July Movement during its later development prior to taking power was produced while in Mexico in 1956. And this, he adds, had little ideological thrust.\(^3\) Castro himself, in fact,


\(^3\)Andrés Suárez, *Cuban Castroism and Communism*. 
has admitted on occasions that his movement had weak ideological origins. 4

The Cuban revolution is a difficult subject to analyze in another sense. Much of the writing about the revolution is often of questionable objectivity. This is particularly true of the writings of the day, generally between 1959 and 1965. The "Communist menace" was seen above all else in most American publications, and it was implied that any turn toward Communism was an ipso facto betrayal of the revolution. Such analyses mistakenly placed traditional democratic values in a position of tantamount importance, and they methodically showed evidence regarding the betrayal of the revolution on the basis of these high American ideals. Former Ambassador to Cuba Earl E. T. Smith's book, The Fourth Floor, is an example of such an approach which immediately comes to mind. Edward Boorstein summarized succinctly the problem of a dissimilar frame of reference from the subject which is under study: "you cannot understand revolutions... if you look at them through the eyes of a bank teller." 5

The immediate concern of this paper is similar in many ways to the topics of those types of books just described - namely, the socialist evolution of the Cuban revolution, through December 1960. Hopefully we

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4Draper, Castro's Revolution, p. 85.

will be able to transcend the "bank teller" syndrome and be able consequently to examine and to judge that which took place within as objective a value schema as is possible. We will strive to remember that our subject must be approached in terms of social, economic, and political realities of twentieth century Cuba, and not in terms of the best interests of the United States or any other foreign power or ideological bias.

The socialist evolution of the Cuban revolution can be viewed accurately only after a survey of the background events which preceded Castro's ascension to power during the first week of January 1959. The first chapter of this paper deals with this important and illuminating background. First, a socio-economic picture of pre-revolutionary Cuba is constructed. Then we will focus more specifically on the Cuban situation immediately prior to the revolutionary takeover. In the second chapter we will approach the political evolution of Fidel Castro and his organization, the 26th of July Movement. What we will discover here are the beginnings of some of the ideas that would later be translated into policy by the revolutionary government, and we will view as well notions that would eventually be rejected by the Castro government. It is by way of this second chapter that we can gain valuable perspective of what would take place once Castro did achieve power.

The third chapter of the paper will address the immediate subject matter, namely the political thrust
of the Castro regime from January 1959 to December 1960. The effect of the changing Cuban environment will be examined initially in terms of policy formulations. The revolutionary regime indeed was responsible for numerous changes in Cuban society, but a large effect was also exerted by the outside forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. The inputs all found expression in two ways: in later policy formulations, and in rhetoric. We will see a definitive socialist evolution, both ideologically and in policy. We will also note the roots of this socialist evolution in the pre-1959 development of Castro and the 26th of July Movement.

Finally, the paper will approach the question of whether or not the Cuban revolution had been betrayed in its early years. At this point we will feel obliged to explicate what the goals of the revolution were, as near as can be found, and to reanalyze our evidence in support of our resultant conclusion. We will find that on a basis of measurement other than a liberal-democratic one, the Castro government was on the whole consistent with earlier prescribed goals, and consequently, the revolution had not been betrayed in any absolute sense during those early days of Castro's regime.

I

It can be said that there did exist a kind of economic boom in the 1950's, but this was possibly more illusory than real. Because of the growth in the population which took place during the same time period, Cuba's per capita income in 1958 was the same as it had
been in 1947.6 The unemployment rate immediately prior to
the revolution remained at an unfortunate 16 per cent,
a level some three times higher than the level of unem-
ployment in the United States.7 An additional 10 per-
cent of the country's working force worked less than
forty hours per week on the average.8 The essential
reasons for such a state of affairs can be adequately
summarized in three words: sugar, monopoly, and
imperialism.

Pre-revolutionary Cuba was the world's leading
producer of sugar, but it achieved such a status at a
high price. Cuba had evolved into being very nearly a
one product economy. 80 per cent of all her exports
consisted of sugar, and if one merely adds to that the
tobacco, mineral, and coffee industries, 94 to 98 per
cent of the country's total exports were accounted for.9
The sugar industry on the island also constituted between
1/4 and 1/3 of the country's Gross National Product,
owned 2/3 of the railroad tracks, and employed 25 per
cent of the island's labor force. Additionally, many of
those employed by the industry were able to work only
four months per year, as that comprises the harvesting

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6 Dudley Sears, "Economic and Social Problems of
Twentieth Century Cuba", (1964), appearing in Background
to Revolution, The Development of Modern Cuba, Robert
Freeman Smith, Ed. (New York: 1966), p. 211
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Edward Boorstein, p. 2.
season for the cane. During the course of the rest of the year, these workers were either unemployed or they got along with whatever odd jobs that they could pick up until the next cutting season began.

Given the problem of unemployment that the sugar industry largely initiated and certainly reinforced, there was a definite need to either industrialize in an attempt to ease the island’s problems of unemployment, or to expand the sugar industry in order to include more workers. It is regarding these possible resolutions to the impeding Cuban problem of unemployment that the second and third elements of Cuban economy, monopolization of the land, and imperialism, must be considered.

There was some reason to believe that expanding the sugar industry as a solution was viable. Although sugar cane was the country’s most important product by far, the fact that much land supposedly under cane production was not being used testified to the industry’s inefficiency. Boorstein implies that it was in the interests of the cane companies that such a situation existed. Their interests, he says, lied with unemployment so that they could get cutters during the short harvesting season. This point of view gains substance when one can fully appreciate the magnitude of the monopoly of land in Cuba. As early as 1946, 8 per cent of Cuban landowners held  

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10 Boorstein, p. 3.  
almost 3/4 of the land on the island.\textsuperscript{12}

The monopolization of the land by a few large landowners gave to the sugar industry the ability to manipulate the island’s employment picture to their own advantage. Also, with regard to the sugar industry, we view for the first time U.S. dominance of the island by way of economic imperialism. Three quarters of all Cuban exports went to the United States in the pre-revolutionary period, while 80 per cent of her imports came from America.\textsuperscript{13} By far the largest proportion of the former figure was sugar. The United States, given this trading status, was not what one might call simply a trading partner. In 1958, 40 per cent of Cuban sugar production for that year was in the hands of the United States;\textsuperscript{14} 1/3\textsuperscript{15} was controlled by eleven U.S. companies.\textsuperscript{15} This gave to the U.S. a large part in the idle land situation described above. American participation in the Cuban economy did not end here; the same pattern existed in other areas. 90 per cent of Cuba’s mineral industry was under American control, as was 4/5 of Cuba’s public utilities. Almost the whole Cuban oil industry was controlled by the U.S.\textsuperscript{16}


\textsuperscript{15}"Castro Cleans the Cuban Slate," \textit{Business Week} (January 10, 1959), p. 31.

\textsuperscript{16}Taber, "Castro’s Cuba," p. 666. British interests also had some involvement in this industry, and this taken
Ever since the United States helped Cuba win her "independence" in 1898, it had acted toward the island as if it was a benevolent big brother. The Platt Amendment, enacted shortly after Cuba's independence, granted to the U.S. the right to intervene in the affairs of Cuba if something were deemed a threat to Cuban security. And of course, with such favorable investment opportunities awaiting American businessmen, the pattern of deep U.S. financial involvement on the island followed by governmental policies aimed at protecting and encouraging that involvement began. Cubans soon became at best limited participants and at worst agents and instruments of the American empire. 17 "Instead of opening possibilities, American policy limited opportunities and moved toward stagnation at what can be termed a high level of under-development." 18

The magnitude of the American influence on the island in addition to sheer economic power was also overwhelming, as former Ambassador Smith has indicated: "The American Ambassador was the second most important man in Cuba, sometimes even more important than the president." 19 Political power failed to be rooted in

17 William Appleman Williams, "The Influence of the United States on the Development of Modern Cuba" (January, 1964), found in Background to Revolution, The Development of Modern Cuba, Robert Freeman Smith, Ed., p. 192.

18 Ibid., p. 193

19 Boorstein, p. 12.
local economic power, and this resulted in a situation tantamount to one of colonialism.

The United States involvement also was a primary factor in the development of the Cuban social class structure. Traditionally, Cuban society demonstrated the type of class dichotomy typical of many underdeveloped countries: a large, subservient lower class with a very small but dominant upper class, and only a thin layer in the middle. During the course of this century, the middle class rose in importance, and included intellectuals, teachers, small businessmen, industrialists, entrepreneurs, and government officials. But significantly in terms of the Cuban revolution as will be explicated later, it never was to become a cohesive class force. Between 1945 and 1959, a few industrial workers were also added to the ranks of the middle class, largely the result of the success of the unions in gaining concessions from the Batista regime.

The largest effect of the American involvement in terms of social impact was on the lower and upper classes. As was indicated earlier, the United States participated directly in blunting the development of Cuba. The consequences were most easily seen in looking at the lower class, people who were largely illiterate

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(23.6 per cent of the total Cuban population was illiterate in the mid-1950's), often unemployed, and a negligible political force. The oppressed state of the peasant in the countryside gave to Fidel Castro a viable group to lead in revolution. He said in 1959: "... it is the rural areas which are the most radical and liberal parts of the country." 

The upper echelons of Cuban society were also affected adversely by the U.S. presence. Even this class was touched, says Williams, because they lacked the power usually associated with their class. In short, the upper class could not escape the preponderance of the foreign power because of American economic dominance.

Bonachea and Valdez argue that in a quantitative sense, the U.S. presence in Cuba greatly influenced the class structure by polarizing it far more rapidly and definitively than might have been the case had Cuba been allowed to develop on its own. This was probably the most profound impact. But in relation to the middle and upper classes alone, they argue, the impact was severe in another sense. The Cuban bourgeoisie lacked "a sense of themselves as agents of progress." Additionally,

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24 Bonachea and Valdez, Cuba in Revolution, p. 59.
25 Ibid.
Cuban capital was not invested in competition with U.S. capital, but in cooperation with it. "The result," say Bonachea and Valdez, "was the structural integration of the Cuban bourgeoisie within the economy of the alien capitalism."  

If such a disoriented economic and social system needed a counterpart in the political realm, it had one in Cuba. Daniel M. Friedenberg characterizes the Cuban political system historically as a reflection of the economic chaos promulgated by the imperialism of the United States. Undoubtedly there is a link between the two. Corrupt and inefficient government has been the rule of the Cuban political setting since the winning of independence.

General Batista once observed that Cuba "would be a paradise if it were properly governed." With the possible exception of the administration of Tomas Estrado Palma, Cuba's first president, it never had been properly governed.

Most of the governments since the turn of the century have been democracies in form, in that the president and members of the legislature were elected officials. Yet given the economic dependency and corrupt rule that has existed parallel to these governments that sought to gain legitimacy through elections, one wonders if there

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26 Ibid., p. 60.


was a direct link between the introduction of the ballot 
fee in Cuba and the economic and social ills of the 
island, as some have argued.\textsuperscript{29} If this was indeed true,
then a major piece of evidence put forward by those who
argue that there was a betrayal of the Cuban revolution
would be rendered useless - for they argue that one of
Castro's betrayals was in not holding the elections that
he had promised. It is difficult to think of this
action as a betrayal if elections have historically
given rise to such undesirable situations in the Cuban
setting. But let us not get ahead of ourselves. Let it
simply be said for now that Cuba's historic encounter
with democracy has been unfortunate at best and tragic
at worst.

We have now developed an adequate sketch of the
Cuban economic, social, and political situation for our
purposes. The most important fact to remember about
twentieth century Cuba is the American involvement and
dominance, and its effect both politically and socially.
The revolution must be viewed in the light of a struggle
for reform. In fact, the American presence was so great
that the latter struggle would have had only a marginal
chance of succeeding without the success of the former
struggle. Fidel spoke for many Cubans in demonstrating
a revulsion toward traditional attempted solutions to
Cuban misfortunes in 1957:

\textsuperscript{29}For instance, Robert Taber, "Castro's Cuba,"
The Nation, p. 70.
Cuba's problems... will only be solved if we Cubans dedicate ourselves to fight for their solution with the same energy, integrity, and patriotism our liberators invested in the country's foundation. They will not be solved by politicians who jabber unceasingly of "absolute freedom of enterprise", the "sacred law of supply and demand", and "guarantees of investment capital." 

With this review behind us, we must construct a picture of Cuba immediately prior to the revolutionary takeover of January 1, 1959. Some of this might seem to be recapitulation, but to gain a totally accurate view of pre-revolutionary Cuba for the purpose of gaining a valuable perspective is worth the repetition. We will then be prepared to examine the political and ideological development of Fidel Castro and his movement up to his ascension to power.

Some discrepancies exist pertaining to the economic state of affairs on the island in the two or three years prior to the takeover. Descriptions of the island during this period range from those that characterize masses in ignorance and poverty and riddled with disease to contentions that the revolution was taking place amidst relative prosperity. In part, both viewpoints are correct. A review of the situation for the period with scrutiny eases the dilemma. There does appear evidence which would indicate that there was a rapidly growing middle class in the 1950's in Cuba. Draper informs us that there was a general economic upswing in 1956, and by that year, 22 per cent of the island's population fell

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into the middle or upper strata of society, a situation
only exceeded in Latin America by Argentina at that time. 31
The best economic year in Cuban history was 1957. Some
of the rewards of this relative prosperity went to the
urban workers, whose unions were treated very kindly
by President Batista. 32 A share of the prosperity
virtually eliminated for much of the pre-1959 period
the workers from the revolutionary movement. "The
bulk of Cuban workers, as well as businessmen," said
Newsweek in May 1957, "just don't want to upset the
applecart." 33

While the relative prosperity on the island was
being enjoyed in urban areas, however, out in the country-
side life was not improved. There existed no prosperity,
therefore, for almost half of the Cuban population.
Bonachea and Valdèz say the "social development lagged
far behind that of the organized urban workers," and the
non-urban portion of the population lived under circum-
stances of poor housing and deficient diets. 34 The
average income in the city in the mid-1950's was $1600
as opposed to the average income of a laborer in the
country of $130; the literacy rate compared similarly -

31 Theodore Draper, Casteism: Theory and Practice
32 N. P. McDonald, "The Cuban Complex," Contemporary
33 "Sugar and Strife," Newsweek, v. 49 (May 6,
34 Bonachea and Valdèz, pp. 57-8
41.7 per cent in the city compared with 11.6 per cent in the country.\textsuperscript{35}

So in terms of economic analysis, the revolution did take place in relative prosperity, yet there certainly existed a large portion of the total population that did not witness any improvement in way of life as a result. What might be called the well developed roots of revolution may not have been as clear as Castro and his revolutionary intellectuals were claiming at the time, but there was widespread disenchantment regarding the socio-economic situation that did not take on a revolutionary tone. As one observer put it, the people were profoundly discontented; they wanted change, but weren't clear in expressing what change they wanted.\textsuperscript{36}

Despite discontent, particularly in the countryside, few suspected in 1957 that the Batista regime in two years would be overthrown by revolution. Fulgencio Batista had gained power by way of a military coup on March 10, 1952. His ascension to power was made possible by his support in the army. This, taken together with the relative prosperity on the island in the mid-1950's, was the basis of his rule in 1957. Batista was able to dilute the power base of potential antagonists by outlawing opposition parties. He also maintained a cozy relationship with the leadership of labor, a move which brought benefits

\textsuperscript{35}Draper, \textit{Castroism: Theory and Practice}, p. 105.

\textsuperscript{36}Boorstein, p. 19.
to the members of organized labor and which consequently dropped them for the most part from the ranks of the disenchanted.

But by 1958, disenchantment was reaching higher levels. Small bands of Cuban insurrectionists were bombing, obstructing, burning, and generally attempting to inflict chaos into the Cuban quagmire. Terrorist activities were stepped up particularly in January 1958. This pushed Batista into two decisions that seriously affected his relationship, already spurious, with the Cuban people. First, the internationally sponsored elections that were scheduled for March 3 were postponed until November 1958. Second, on March 12 Batista suspended constitutional guarantees, a move in answer to the increased terrorist activity of the preceding months. Although the former move subverted confidence in Batista, the latter move was perhaps the real turning point toward Batista's downfall. The suspension resulted in such abuses and government sanctioned violence that those who had been committed to Batista before were not so positive with their support now.

Late in 1958, the economy was staggering because of rebel subversion, and the government was appearing less likely to last much longer. Batista finally agreed to not participate in the elections on November 3, 1958, but nevertheless, it was clear that those election results would not be acceptable to the people. Batista's candidate won, and many accused the government of fixing the election (this was an election not atypical for Cuba in this regard, one might add). By December, Batista's last
bastion of support, the army, was losing its will to resist the rebels, a fact not in a small part due to the bribing of army officers by Castroists.

Batista fled the country on January 1, 1959, leaving the country supposedly in the hands of his designated successor. Due to popular disdain for Batista, however, this transfer of power was never possible, and the rebel government soon took command.

It was pointed out numerously at the time that few thought that Batista would fall so easily. With the advantage of hindsight, though, we can see what a precarious power base Batista did possess. He was at a great distance from the people, and was never in contact with them; his decisions were certainly not made in their interests, nor were they made after careful analysis of what the effects of those decisions on the people would be. Ultimately, his base of power within the army followed the same kind of progression. And if he derived power from the economy, he lost most of that base as the economy slumped badly during the course of 1958. It doesn't take much of a social upheaval to place off-balance an economy with a single crop orientation as Cuba had.

Earl E.T. Smith suggests that U.S. non-support of Batista is another reason for the Batista downfall, possibly the most important one. When Batista suspended constitutional guarantees in March, the United States

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37 For instance, see "Revolution in Cuba," *Commonweal*, v. 69 (January 16, 1959), p. 400.
suddenly turned a cold shoulder toward the regime. This was translated into a suspension of arms shipments to the government. "The proclaimed policy of the United States," says Smith, "was nonintervention - although for a power as the United States, it is really impossible not to intervene in a country as closely associated with us as Cuba had been." The withholding of support from Batista probably played a role in how quickly the regime eventually fell, but it probably would have fallen even if the U.S. had maintained its support throughout. Smith overrates the effective influence of the U.S. when he implies that America was responsible for Castro's coming to power. We can view Smith's frame of reference in such statements as the following, which sheds some light on his analysis of the situation:

I was convinced that it had become a fixed American policy to oppose all Rightist dictators, even those favorable to the United States. This policy opened the door to Leftist dictators and to the Communist Party. It was clear that this was a dangerous gamble, as each Communist Party, in whatever country, is a political arm of Soviet Russia.

Smith was not able to comprehend the levels of dissent that were surfacing within the Cuban population.

It is important to point out, however, that the feeling of the majority of the people even as the Castro rebels took power was not revolutionary.

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38 Smith, The Fourth Floor, p. 56.
39 Ibid., p. 100. His testimony before a Senate Subcommittee, August 30, 1960.
40 Ibid., p. 160.
If revolution is to mean a violent, long drawn out, and fundamental transformation of the prevailing social and economic system, brought about through the demands of the "oppressed and exploited masses", who are "aware of the impossibility of going on living as they are living and so demand changes", [Lenin], then in January 1959 there was no revolutionary situation in Cuba.41

Fidel Castro gained power by way of the disdain that the Cuban people felt for the Batista regime. There was little support for a revolution; only revulsion at the old regime. "In Cuba, mass support for a socialist revolution came after the seizure of power."42

Such was the backdrop that preceded Castro's takeover. By having a sense of that which took place both historically on the island and immediately prior to January 1959, we can more suitably sense the influences of the Cuban environment on Castro before taking power and on his revolutionary government in its first few years of rule. As we will see later, many of the early economic policies of the Castro regime were attempts to diversify the economy, and thus to make the economy steadier. The experience of the election of 1958 left a bad taste in the mouths of many Cubans, leaving some, including Castro, wondering as to the value of elections at all. Batista's aloofness with regard to the people must have had an effect on Castro, as he gave overriding importance to his individual contacts with the Cuban

41. Andrés Suárez, p. 34.

people after taking power. Although the U.S. refused
to actively support Batista, it also refused to support
Castro. In fact, it seemed that U.S. sympathies still
lied with the Batista regime, if Ambassador Smith could
be seen as a mouthpiece of American policy, as indeed
he was so viewed by the rebels.

After I had been in Cuba for approximately
two months, and had made a study of Fidel Castro
and the revolutionaries, it was perfectly obvious
to me, as it would be to any other reasonable man,
that Castro was not the answer, that if Castro
came to power it would not be in the best interests
of Cuba or in the best interests of the United
States.\footnote{3}

Smith's viewpoint was abundantly clear to the Castroists,
and even if it was true that the State Department's
actual policy was far less belligerent toward Castro
initially than was the Ambassador's view, it was the
latter that was familiar to the rebels; it set the tone
for revolutionary Cuba's policy with regard to the U.S.

II

We should now have at our disposal a sense of
the pre-revolutionary situation on the island. It was
in this environment that Fidel Castro and his revolutionary
movement developed. We will now begin our analysis of
that time period which laid the groundwork for the
socialist evolvement of the Cuban revolution. We will
examine the early political development of Fidel Castro
and his revolutionary movement.

The one American who has a right to say that he

\footnote{Smith, p. 30.}
knows Fidel Castro, Herbert Matthews, has written of Castro: "...no one know the Cuban Revolution who does not know Fidel Castro."\(^4\) Then, continuing, Matthews writes: "Yet his is a character of such complexity, such contradictions, such emotionalism, such irrationality, such unpredictability that no one can really know him."\(^5\) Few would argue with this analysis. In a very real sense the Cuban revolution is Fidel Castro - his ideals put forward at a particular time, his energy, his "machismo", his "irrationality", as Matthews puts it, all seem to be characteristics also of the Cuban revolution. Matthews also refers to Castro's "conviction of the righteousness of everything he does" which is "basic to his character."\(^6\) He adds his impression that Castro's idealism is genuine, as is his nationalistic pride in Cuba.\(^7\)

Others have viewed Castro in a far less positive light. It was clear to Freeman Lincoln of *Fortune* magazine that Castro possessed a disjointed personality as demonstrated by his having "no administrative sense."\(^8\) Others have thought Castro to be a popularizer and a demagogue, and an "unstable terrorist," in Ambassador Smith's words. According to Javier Felipe Pazos Vea,

\(^4\)Herbert Matthews, *The Cuban Story*, p. 149.
\(^5\)Ibid., p. 149.
\(^6\)Ibid., p. 152.
\(^7\)Ibid., p. 153.
\(^8\)Freeman Lincoln, "What Has Happened to Cuban Business?", *Fortune*, v. 60 (September 1959), p. 274.
a Cuban exile, Castro is above all a political opportunist.\textsuperscript{49}

In her enlightening study of the revolution's evolvement toward Marxism-Leninism, Loree Wilkerson concludes that "behind the seeming inconsistency of his political actions lies a highly consistent will to exercise virtually unchecked personal power."\textsuperscript{50} As we will see, there is some validity for this conclusion as the evidence shows. Matthews concurs with this conclusion to an extent, but places the blame on the corruptive impact of power itself; he finds it appropriate to quote William Blake:

\begin{quote}
The strongest poison ever known
Comes from Caesar's Laurel Crown.\textsuperscript{51}
\end{quote}

It is interesting to note Castro's own agreement with the argument that power generally corrupts men. "Fortunately," he quickly adds, "this has never happened to me."\textsuperscript{52}

Agreement on some of Fidel Castro's personal traits have been reached despite disparities such as those just described. The most important of these is the belief that Castro is not an original political thinker. This appears to be the case in view of the evidence. In his writings and speeches, Castro is continuously quoting and sighting past leaders of thought, be he Chibás, Martí, Jefferson, or Lincoln in the early


\textsuperscript{50}Loree Wilkerson, \textit{Fidel Castro's Political Programs from Reformism to Marxism-Leninism}, p. 95.

\textsuperscript{51}Matthews, p. 153.

years, or Marx, Lenin, or Mao in the later ones. The only exception to this came in the first months of 1959 when he and his government proclaimed a kind of humanism. But this was short-lived. An interesting study would be a comparison between the writings of Castro and those of a revolutionary leader with original political thoughts in another developing country, like Nyerere of Tanzania or Cabral of Guinea. Unfortunately, this will have to be left for another study.

Fidel Castro was the son of a landowner, and was educated in Jesuit secondary school. Throughout his school days he was an outstanding student, scholar, and athlete. Our interest in Fidel's distant past is with his political thinking, of course, so a detailed description of his early life is not necessary. We shall begin our look into Fidel's political development with his college days, more particularly his period in law school in the late 1940's.

Castro's law school career is an important place to start, because there are those who claim that even this early in his life he was a Communist, and well read in the political ideology of Communism. Murkland, for instance, calls Castro an ardent student of Marxism since his student days. Most Cuban observers, however, think that it is absurd to argue along this line. Vea goes so far as to say that not only was he not a Communist

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in the late 1940's, "nor was he particularly interested in social revolution." The evidence suggests that this argument also has little basis.

Castro led an active political life while studying law at the University of Havana. And it is apparent that his political thinking was leftist to a considerable degree. In 1948, Castro was a delegate to a Latin American student convention that was being held in Bogota. While the convention was taking place, a leftist uprising occurred protesting the policies of the conservative Colombian government. Castro is said to have been among a group of students who participated in the uprising. The disturbance was quelled rapidly, and Fidel returned to Havana and his study of law.

Castro was also active in student government while in law school. One event is particularly enlightening regarding those who think that Castro was a Communist at this time. Wilderson tells us that

When he ran for the vice-presidency of the student governing body of the Law School, he drew heavily on the support of the Communist group on campus. Once elected, however, he began a militant campaign of denunciation against his Communist supporters, who retaliated by denouncing him as a traitor.

Castro himself contributes to a picture of his political frame of mind during his student days in a

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56 Ibid., p. 19.
1967 interview. He tells us in retrospect that he began to see on his own the conflict between man's technical possibilities and his needs for happiness. He started to think of alternatives.

You might say that I had begun to transform myself into a kind of utopian Socialist. At that time I had not yet read the Communist Manifesto. I had read hardly anything by Karl Marx. According to Castro after assuming power felt the need for ideological justification for the programs that he eventually pursued once gaining power, a need which he did not apparently sense in the pre-1959 period. Therefore, this statement by Castro might provide us with a distorted and possibly inaccurate view of him in the late 1940's. Yet in light of those ideas regarding policy initiatives that would begin to emanate from him five years later after Batista became President, it is possible that he was becoming a kind of "utopian Socialist" as he says, during his student years. But note that even assuming the grounds for distortion that might have existed for Castro at the time of this interview, he still admits to have not read much Communist writing while a student. Castro was not a Communist while in law school. In fact, Wilkerson indicates that while Fidel was attending school, he became a strong supporter of Eduardo Chibas, leader of the P.P.C. (Ortodoxo Party). 58

The Autentico Party had been the dominant political

58 Wilkerson, p. 20.
party in Cuba since the 1920's, but in 1946, after a siege of inner-party squabbling, a splinter party broke away from the Autenticos. This party, which was called the Ortodoxo Party, became the leftist opposition in the latter portion of the decade. Its leader Chibas spoke in liberal-democratic terms and argued for a real democracy for his countrymen, not a form which hides corrupt 7overnment and self-interested bureaucrats. Castro became quite active in the party. In 1952, Chibas died as a result of an accidentally self-inflicted wound, and shortly after this, Fidel became chairman of the Ortodoxos organization in Havana. It is clear that Castro, apparently of leftist inclinations, chose a conventional party for his political expression.

The Ortodoxos role as the loyal opposition ended in the spring of 1952 when Batista assumed power by way of his coup. Castro, fresh out of law school, chose the route of legal challenges through the courts in order to question the validity of Batista's presidency. Once again as with his political party affiliation, we find the political expression of Castro in the form of conventional avenues. This, however, would be the last time such would be the case. Fidel's legal challenges proved unsuccessful, and as a result he turned to clandestine opposition. 59

Castro viewed Batista's ascension to the presidency

59 Ibid., p. 22.
as not a revolution, but "a brutal snatching of power." In the same statement, he then again demonstrates the liberal-democratic foundation in his political thought. "We were growing accustomed to living within the Constitution," he said, "...the thirst for power is too great, and the restraints too few when there is not a constitution or law other than the will of the tyrant and his accomplices."  

Castro was proclaiming the doctrines of the Ortodoxo Party. Let's take a closer look at the political programs of the Ortodoxo's so that we might gain insight into the thoughts of Castro at the time.  

The Ortodoxo program, primarily formulated by Chibás, was liberal and anti-Communist. Above all else, nationalism was its cornerstone. It proclaimed the need for an independent judiciary, honest government, free labor unions, and a considerable amount of economic planning. Chibás' successor, Agramonte, called for much the same in programs, but included an emphasis upon the need for agrarian reform. The Ortodoxo proposal for agrarian reform didn't propose the abolishment of private ownership, but did support expropriation of

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61 Ibid., p. 148.
62 Wilkerson, p. 29.
63 Ibid.
idle lands. The Constitution of 1940, the party pointed out, had already made provisions for such an endeavor. "In essence," states Wilkerson, "the Orthodoxos were social-democrats whose program... was an expression of the everlasting yearning by the masses for a better life."65

There's no doubt that Fidel agreed with this program, which we can see was quite leftist oriented for what one might expect from one of the conventional political parties on the island. The material well-being of the citizenry was emphasized vis-à-vis any long term goals. There seems to be a lack of emphasis upon the collective good, as its programs were oriented toward the individual, and its goals would have pushed for his material betterment.

Yet despite Castro's reaffirmations of the philosophy of the party of which he was still a member, there was now a tendency on his part to pursue the reinstatement of liberal democracy in Cuba by way of extra-legal means. On August 16, 1952, he said:

"The moment is revolutionary and not political. ... A revolutionary party requires a revolutionary leadership, a young leadership originating from the people, that will save Cuba."66

Fidel apparently could still agree with the policies of the Orthodoxos, but was beginning to disagree with

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64 Ibid., p. 31.

65 Ibid.

regard to tactics. He no longer held hope of anything coming from negotiations on the part of the party with Batista. The time was revolutionary, not political. He and a group of like-thinking middle class intellectuals were beginning to plan an attack and a takeover of the Moncada army post, the second most important military establishment in Cuba. From this bastion, they reasoned, they could overthrow the Batista government.

Draper informs us that Castroism did not exist before July 26, 1953, the date of the resultant unsuccessful attack on the Moncada post. This was the first definitive action taken by the newly constituted revolutionary group, so in that sense it was the beginning of Castroism. But if Castroism has more to do with the theoretical and ideological spectrum, then Castroism had begun to develop during Fidel's initial political activities during his student days. In the sense that Fidel had been an Ortodoxo, it can be said that the roots of the movement can be found with the Ortodoxo's Party.

It is important for our purposes to take note of Castro's thoughts just prior to the attack. Castro the liberal again showed through. "The Cuban people's unshakable faith," he said, "rises with their unanimous decision to regain their constitution, their essential freedoms and inalienable rights, trampled ceaselessly

67Draper, Castroism: Theory and Practice, p. 4.
by treacherous usurpers." He also demonstrated his nationalist sentiments, a theme which would be emphasized throughout Castro's struggle for power: "The Revolution identifies with the roots of Cuba's nationalistic sentiment..." Then Castro spoke of the roots of the revolution, and its "vanguard."

Motivated by the most genuine "criollo" values, the "Revolution" comes from the soul of the Cuban people. Its vanguard is a youth that wants a new Cuba, a youth that has freed itself from the faults, the mean ambitions, and the sins of the past. The Revolution comes from new men with new methods, prepared with the patience, courage, and decision of those who dedicate their lives to an ideal.

Significantly, the only groups mentioned by name in this, the years of foundation for the "peasant revolution," were the workers and students, for whom the revolution declares its respect, in Castro's words. Both groups were supporters of the Ortodoxo Party to a significant degree. Fidel informs us that the revolution bases itself on the ideals of José Martí, a nineteenth century Cuban liberator, and on the ideals of the Ortodoxos. And finally, in order to leave no doubt as to the liberal-democratic intent of the revolution, Castro concludes by saying: "The 'Revolution' declares its absolute and reverent respect for the Constitution of 1940 and would reestablish it as its official code."
Although the occasion for the article just described in depth called for an enumeration of emotion-related rhetoric, it probably is also true that few definitive programs had been thought about by the revolutionaries to any degree of depth. The only thing mentioned close to an actual policy formulation in this article of July 23 other than the reinstatement of the Constitution of 1949 was Castro's indication that the revolution is dedicated to economic prosperity for the nation.\(^\text{72}\)

This is a statement of questionable substance, indeed, but perhaps we shouldn't allow ourselves to be too critical of this apparent absence of program suggestions in the article. Castro, after all, was not an intellectual, but "a man of revolutionary action."\(^\text{73}\)

The Moncada attack ended in failure, and Castro was tried and convicted as the head of the revolutionary organization which had initiated the assault. At the trial, Castro defended himself. He was allowed to speak at length after his conviction, and this occasion gave rise to Fidel's famous "History Will Absolve Me" speech, performed on October 16, 1953. The speech would later be made into a pamphlet and considered to be the doctrine of Castro's revolutionary organization.\(^\text{74}\) It is important that we examine this speech in some detail, as it

\(^{72}\text{Ibid., p. 157.}\)

\(^{73}\text{Andrés Suárez, }\text{Cuban Castroism and Communism, 1959-1966, p. 16.}\)

\(^{74}\text{The complete text of the speech is found in Fidel Castro, Revolutionary Struggle, pp. 165-220.}\)
is undoubtedly the best example of Fidel's political thinking in those formative years of his revolutionary outlook. In the words of Castro himself, "My Moncada speech was the seed of all the things that were done later on."

The speech can be conveniently divided into four distinct portions for our analytical purposes. In the opening section, Castro relates to the jury the events surrounding his prosecution and the attack itself on the Moncada post, all of which is not of immediate interest to us presently. What is of interest is that here we find statements such as "I bring in my heart the doctrines of Martí and in my mind the noble ideas of all men who have defended the freedom of the people." The word "freedom" is a word with which we will come into contact from time to time in Castro's speeches and writings. He uses the word with varying frequency as time goes on, and later we will see where it is notable in its absence. Here the word is utilized apparently in its most abstract and general form, and conclusions at this point concerning his utilization of the word would be premature.

From this liberal frame of reference, Castro accuses Batista's presidency once again of being unconstitutional, because it has corrupted the legitimate

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75 "Playboy Interview: Fidel Castro," p. 64.
76 Castro, "History Will Absolve Me," Revolutionary Struggle, p. 171.
constitution of the Republic. He adds, "A legitimate constitution is that which emanates directly from a sovereign people." Again, the liberalism which he continues to emphasize is significant. Despite an increasingly militant revolutionary stance which we first discovered in his July 23 article and which will also be profoundly apparent later in this speech, Fidel leaves little doubt as to the liberal tendencies of at least his macroscopic political thinking.

The second portion of the speech delineates Fidel's conception of the revolution's relationship to the people, and also he describes his thinking toward the role of the revolutionary. He claims that the people support his movement, and then he goes on to indicate who he means when he says "the people": the 600,000 who are out of work, the 500,000 farm workers that live in miserable huts, the 400,000 industrial workers whose retirement funds have been stolen, the 100,000 small farmers who work land that isn't theirs. He indicates that the success of the revolution is contingent upon the support of these people, and points out that he doesn't need nor want the support of the comfortable and conservative sectors.

A glimpse at Fidel's own conception of the role of the revolutionary also surfaces. Above all else,

77 Ibid., p. 173.
78 Ibid., p. 184.
79 Ibid., p. 183.
he says, he wants to be just.\textsuperscript{80} He speaks of sincerity and good faith, and the need "to speak clearly and without fear."\textsuperscript{81}

In the third part, Castro does something that he had not done before - he announces five revolutionary laws that would have taken effect had they been able to overthrow the Batista government.\textsuperscript{82} This is the first time that Fidel in such explicit language put forth policies that would be pushed by a revolutionary government with himself at its head. This portion deserves our close scrutiny, as it is here that we find what Castro years after referred to as "the seed of all things that were done later on."

The first law was to return sovereignty to the people by proclaiming the Constitution of 1940 as the supreme law of the state. Castro, however, provides a convenient afterward: it would be the supreme law of the state, he says, "until such time as the people would decide to modify or change it." This can be viewed as the first time Castro publically hedged on the supreme applicability of the Constitution of 1940, and is the first suggestion that Fidel might have been beginning to question in his own mind the traditional liberal remedies of his Ortodoxo Party. But then on a second look, we see that we might be being over-critical. In light of the rest of the speech, it seems doubtful

\textsuperscript{80}Ibid., p. 180.
\textsuperscript{81}Ibid., p. 183.
\textsuperscript{82}Ibid., pp. 184-185.
that Fidel was hedging much on any of the programs of the Ortodoxos.

In the second law, he returns to the line of the uncompromising sanctity of the constitution. He says that upon assuming power, the government would encompass the power of the state "except that of modifying the Constitution itself." And so, Fidel leaves us with some doubt as to his thinking regarding the constitution. Apparently he is saying that the people, not the government, can modify the constitution. Only the people would have the authority to change the ultimate law of the land.

The third law encompasses another first: the revolutionary government would grant property to all tenant farmers, sharecroppers, renters, and squatters. This is a hint at expropriation by the government, a suggestion not apparent before explicitly in Castro's writing, but was as we have seen a program of the Ortodoxo Party. As described here, there is no violation of the Ortodoxo line. Expropriation might occur, but private ownership, it seems to be saying, would remain. His mentioning it here is also significant in its pointing the revolution toward the plight of the laborer in the countryside.

The fourth law is the granting to workers the right to 30 per cent of the profits. This law taken together with the previous one was aimed apparently at helping out "the people," given Castro's definition.

The fifth law brings the philosophy hinted at
in the previous two laws to a head. It calls for the
confiscation of all wealth attributable to misappropriated
funds, an act that would carry full legal weight.
"Misappropriated" is Castro's word, and what it was he
meant by its use is open to speculation. He could have
meant it in a rather limited sense, for instance in
possibly referring to the corruption within the govern-
ment. In light of the laws that immediately preceded
this one, however, it is more likely that Castro had a
broader meaning in mind. He appears to be suggesting
a large scale expropriation of lands by the government,
centrally administered, and distributed to those who
live and work there as opposed to the situation of ab-
sentee ownership which then existed. Castro gives
increasing substance to this interpretation later in the
speech, stating that the law would define the maximum
amount of land that any person or entity may own for
each kind of undertaking. 83

It is with regard to this statement concerning
confiscation of wealth attributable to misappropriated
funds that Castro might be going further than the Orto-
doxo program. The extent of Ortodoxo redistribution
would be more limited, confined to the acquisition of
idle lands primarily. Castro here is at least talking
about a redelegation of resources that is currently
"misappropriated," which implies a broader meaning then

83 Ibid., p. 186
what might be included within the framework of the Ortodoxo's policies.

The implication of a more powerful central government to be utilized in the capacity of redistribution and development can also be found later in the speech.

A revolutionary government with the support of the people and the respect of the nation, once it cleared out all venal and corrupt office-holders, would proceed immediately to industrialize the country, mobilizing all inactive capital...84

The plan, he adds, would be submitted for organization and planning, an activity we would gather as being centrally administered. The revolutionary government would also solve the rent problem on the island by lowering rates 50 per cent, and it would completely reform the educational system.85 Here for the first time in the speech Castro refers to long term goals - industrialization and education specifically. This is a slightly different emphasis than could be found earlier in the speech. Earlier it seemed as though the problems of Cuba could be solved by simply giving "the people" the reigns of power, for that would be the "just" thing to do. And as a result of this action, things would then be fine on the island. Now he demonstrates his associating some long term goals with the development of a better way of life. It must be indicated, however, that he intends for industrialization and education to

84 Ibid., p. 190.
85 Ibid., p. 191.
aid in providing greater comfort for Cuba's citizens in the short term. No conception of a more socialist attitude, the common good, is implied here.

Then, after these suggested policy alterations from those that existed in the Cuba of 1953, Castro, in the final portion of his speech, returned to his initial topic, namely the constitution, and his tracing back to liberals of the past, particularly Martí.

Speaking of the constitution, he says:

A constitution, as we understand it, is the fundamental and supreme law of a nation; it defines the political structure and regulates the functioning of the organs of the state, placing a limit on its powers.

The constitution, says Fidel, is not inconsistent with the revolution, because Article 40 grants the right to revolt, and second, because the constitution itself has been betrayed by the Batista government. With regard to the unjust rule of Batista, Castro then quotes Martí: "'The man who conforms to obeying unjust laws and permits the man who mistreats him to trample the country in which he was born is not an honest man...""

Toward the end of the speech, Fidel again speaks of Martí:

It looked as though his memory would be extinguished forever; so great was the affront. But he lives. He has not died. His people are rebellious, his people are worthy, his people thankful to his memory.

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86 Ibid., p. 213.
87 Ibid., p. 215.
88 Ibid., p. 219.
89 Ibid., p. 220.
We can view accurately in this speech a picture of Fidel Castro in the latter portion of 1953. Castro the liberal continued to shine through to a pronounced degree, so much so in fact as to cause embarrassment for Fidel later. In retrospect, he felt a need to defend what was to appear to be his "moderateness" in light of his political inclinations years later.

If we had not written this document with care, if it had been a more radical program — though here it is certain that many people were a little skeptical of programs and often did not give them much attention — the revolutionary movement against Batista would not, of course have gained the breadth that it obtained and made possible the victory.90

This type of retrospective comment by Castro has given rise to accusations of opportunism by his critics. It is possible, however, that the speech was at the time a truthful summary of Fidel's political thought, and that such statements as the one above can be seen as attempts by Castro to establish greater ideological consistency with the past than the evidence suggests he deserves.

It is clear in examining the speech that there was plenty in its substance to make uneasy "the comfortable and conservative sectors." The threat of expropriation was apparently not limited to just idle lands, as the Ortodoxo program suggested, and so would not place the mind of large landowners at ease; nor would the specter of the lowering of rents by 50 per

90Draper, Castroism: Theory and Practice, p. 7.
Just as the speech gives us a view of Castro the liberal, so does it give us for the first time a peak at Castro the evolving socialist. No doubt Castro shows us not socialist inclinations ideologically in the speech. Yet he suggests programs that emphasize a central government with the authority to restrict rent and to expropriate land, all for the benefit of the great majority of Cubans who are oppressed. The policy suggestions are not socialist ones and go little further than the program of the social-democratic Ortodoxos; but they do demonstrate a definite break with liberalism and its concomitant conservative economics.

Wilkerson indicates that the ideas which built the 26th of July Movement, Castro's revolutionary organization, and which we find in Fidel's "History" speech, had its roots in liberal Latin American action groups of the 1920's, particularly those in Peru.

...the subsequent popular parties which they have inspired have tended to adapt the practical aspects of [their programs] without bothering much about the theoretical concepts from which they were derived.91

The political thinking of Castro as exemplified by the "History" speech and which would soon be the thinking of the 26th of July Movement can be viewed in light of past Latin American leftist parties. To paraphrase Wilkerson, programs are proposed without regard for those political ideals that gave rise to the formulations in the first place. Consequently, in the case

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91 Wilkerson, p. 6.
at hand, Castro was able to suggest such radical approaches to Cuba's problems without feeling a need to modify his otherwise liberal-oriented rhetoric. Such would be characteristic of Fidel through his first days of rule in 1959.

As Fidel entered prison in late 1953 for what was to be up to a twenty year sentence, he was a well known revolutionary throughout the country, and was already close to becoming a folk hero of sorts among lower classes and the youth. But while he was well known, it is doubtful that he had a great deal of support politically.

Castro began to conceive of the 26th of July Movement apparently while he was in prison. With a great deal of time at hand to simply think of his political career, his ideas, and the fate of his country, his conception of the Cuban revolution developed and matured during this period.

Fidel's stay in prison was not very long. After Batista had been reelected early in 1955, Castro and other "political" prisoners were freed by executive clemency in May 1955. This brought to a close one and a half years in prison for Castro, a period of time spent in preparation for just such an event. He would now embark on the journey that would take him through revolution to the leadership of his country.

Six weeks after he was let out of prison, Fidel left the island for Mexico in order to formulate programs and plan strategy for the revolution. The 26th
of July Movement, Castro's revolutionary organization named after the date of the ill-fated attack on Moncada, was formally launched in the summer of 1955 while in Mexico. Draper indicates that at this point Castro still considered himself to be an Ortodoxo, and he continued to do so until the spring months of 1956. But his thoughts also were very revolutionary. Shortly after leaving prison, he said:

The Cuban people want something more than a mere change in command. Cuba earnestly desires a radical change in even the field of its public and social life. The people must be given more than liberty and democracy in abstract terms...  

On August 8, 1955, Fidel's movement issued its first significant political statement from Mexico, "Manifesto No. 1 to the People of Cuba." The statement echoed Fidel's Moncada speech in terms of policy suggestions - redistribution of land among peasants, broad participation by the workers in profits, immediate industrialization by means of a vast plan promoted by the state, a drastic decrease in rents, and extention of the educational system. A new suggestion consistent with the implications of the Moncada speech was the nationalization of public services. It is significant, however, that such a move was suggested explicitly here, as we can recall that the great majority of public utilities

93 Wilkerson, p. 35.
were controlled by the United States. This initiative was in fact directed toward the expropriation of a foreign-dominated enterprise. A new theme also began to appear with Manifesto No. 1 - the theme of corrupt government and what to do about it. "Reorganization of public administration and establishment of administrative training" is suggested here, as is a reorganization of the judicial branch.

Possibly of some significance in the Manifesto is the fact that the concepts of freedom and democracy are here at least not emphasized. Instead, the revolutionary movement is prepared for the great task of redemption and justice. The latter has a certain moralistic tone about it that is not present in the political terms of freedom and democracy. Justice could be intended to include freedom here, and democracy also, for that matter. Nevertheless, the broader meaning represented by his use of the words "justice" and "redemption" might imply a slight movement away from an implicit liberal orientation.

Of equal importance for our purposes is in noting Castro's statement regarding elections.

To those who impudently advise participation in partial elections as a national solution, we answer: Who is concerned with those elections? The discontent is found, not on the part of the politicians who seek posts, but in the people who seek justice. Those who believe that serious political, social, and economic problems can be solved by satisfying the appetites of a hundred or so miserable candidates for a few

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95Ibid., p. 269
posts as mayors and representatives think very badly of Cuban citizens. What have petty politicians given the country in the last fifty years? Speeches, sinecures, congas, lies, compromises, deceit, betrayals, improper enrichment of a clique of rogues, empty talk, corruption, infamy. We do not view politics as the traditional politicians do.

It is true that immediately following this passage was a portion stating that the only just solution was elections without Batista. Yet what surfaced in the paragraph above indicates a distrust of elections and traditional politicians that goes much deeper than a criticism of only the Batista government. The traditional Cuban political system itself seems to be coming under criticism. Although still speaking in basically liberal terms, Castro was saying that more was needed than simply a return to the political techniques of the past. Such a return to more "petty politicians" and their "deceit" and "betrayals". This was the Cuban experience. And again, we see that the people seek "justice", according to Fidel. In its context here, it is clear that justice definitely might not mean traditional liberal remedies. Justice, implies Castro, would not be the important point for our purposes; this: Much of what is considered to be liberal values could be (and ultimately would be by this revolution) rejected on the grounds that justice is not served by their presence.

The following week, Castro sent a message to the Congress of Ortodoxo Militants, in which he concen-
trated on declaring Batista. But here again the subject of elections appears. As before he acknowledges the opposition's request for immediate elections, and Castro hesitates. "How many months," Fidel asks, "would we have to wait to see repeated the unpunished treason of March 10?" 97 Instead, he indicates that the Chibás legacy points to revolution as the solution. 98 It is significant to point out that most other opposition groups at the time were in favor elections immediately.

The Ortodoxo Party had been bargaining with the Batista government during this time, and this probably contributed to Fidel's feeling a new independence from his formerly trusted party. Castro had concluded, we remember, that the moment for negotiation was not present. In this same message, Castro indicated that it was sad to see some of the best men in the party accepting positions in Batista's government. Then, in a statement that can be considered to be one of independence from the Ortodoxos, Fidel said that his movement, the 26th of July, didn't constitute a tendency within the party, but was the revolutionary apparatus of "Chibasismo." 99

By the end of 1955, Castro can be viewed as a pronounced revolutionary still maintaining an essentially liberal-democratic outlook in the most generalized form,

97 Castro, "Message to the Congress of Ortodoxo Militants" (August 15, 1955), Revolutionary Struggle, p. 274.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid., p. 276.
although a pervasive emphasis upon the highly moralistic stance of justice was beginning to surface. Also for the first time Castro is seen doubting the value of immediate elections in the attainment of those goals of his revolutionary thinking. It is clear that such a stance was the result of Castro's perception of the political dominance of President Batista, and a reassessment on his part of the value of elections in the Cuban setting. The result, his opposition to elections, was a compromise with his liberal political philosophy for perhaps a greater goal as he saw it.

Two portions from the 26th of July Movement's "Manifesto No. 2 to the People of Cuba," dated December 10, 1955, deserve mentioning. First, the moral superiority of the leaders of the revolution is argued.

Those of us who lead an austere and poor life, devoted without rest or respite to the struggle, giving the country our youth and our life, working for six million Cubans without asking anything of anyone, we feel that we have the moral authority and courage to speak to the nation in these terms.100

This condescending attitude which surfaces from time to time in the writings of Castro and his revolutionaries gives substance to the argument that this revolution was made by a revolutionary vanguard for the people of Cuba. "Here were a few middle-class students and intellectuals," says C. Wright Mills, "in contact with the tragedy of Cuban poverty and corruption, responding to it in a revolutionary way."101 Matthews characterizes

100 Revolutionary Struggle, p. 290.
the middle class orientation of the revolution's leaders, and Draper argues that their being appalled by the peasants in their condescension was partly the reason for their wanting to revolutionize Cuba. 102

The other significant portion of this second manifesto regarded how the revolution was to be financed. Castro wondered openly here about this topic, and then spoke of the dilemma facing the movement.

If the revolution robs a bank to get funds, the enemy will call us gangsters. If the revolution accepts aid from emissaries who have plundered the Republic, the revolution will be betraying its principles. If the revolution solicits aid from vested interests, it will be compromised before it attains power. 103

Fidel returned to this theme on December 25 when he indicated what he thought the reason was behind the government's hunting him. "It is due to my keeping a firm line of conduct since March 10, when so many have changed their attitude just as one changes shirts." 104

The revolution's integrity, he said, cannot be bought.

It can be added that the revolution eventually found financial support mostly from former political strongmen who had left the island either by force or by their own will when Batista took power. The great majority of them lived in Florida, and were of a relatively conservative frame of mind. Almost all, like

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102 Draper, Castro's Revolution, p. 11.
103 Revolutionary Struggle, p. 288.
104 Castro, "Against Everything!" (December 25, 1955), Revolutionary Struggle, p. 293.
Prio Socarras, the president of Cuba at the time of Batista's coup, were ardent supporters of democracy in the Cuban sense and the Constitution of 1940. Their support financially for Castro was for a liberal democrat, and undoubtedly the pressure to "compromise" the revolution, as Fidel puts it, was great. We will soon see the beginning of a kind of political moderation on Castro's part that is not explainably by anything else other than this consideration.

The compromises of which we are speaking were not apparent in 1956, however. Fidel's strongest statement to date was issued on March 19, 1956, the date that Draper attributes to the 26th of July Movement's formal break with the Ortodoxo Party. In the statement, Fidel argues that those who are silent about the revolution share the dishonor with those who oppress. The movement is also fighting those opposed to the regime but are not interested in radical change, he said. There is little doubt that his attack is directed particularly at certain leaders of the Ortodoxo Party who were negotiating with Batista. He is careful to indicate that the vast majority of rank and file Ortodoxos support his movement in his judgement. Then he constructs a picture of the 26th of July Movement as developing from warring factions within the Ortodoxo Party, and

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105 Castro, "The 26th of July Movement" (March 19, 1956), Revolutionary Struggle, p. 310.
106 Ibid., p. 313.
says that "It was a movement, which, without violating the line of independence by Chibas, resolutely accepted revolutionary action against the regime."\(^{107}\) The best Ortodoxo, he adds, are beside him waging the revolutionary struggle.\(^{108}\)

Draper is careful to emphasize the extent of Castro's break with the Ortodoxo Party in March of 1956 as being organizational and not political. After all, as he point out, Castro was still saying that "...the 26th of July Movement is not something distinct from the Orthodoxia."\(^{109}\) It appears that the March 19 statement gives Castro's concurrence with this conclusion. But it is true that the organizational break, if you will, was a direct result of Fidel's perception of the Ortodoxos betraying their heritage. No longer could Castro tolerate the prospect of traditional solutions, that is, through negotiations and compromise with the regime, as real prospects for solving the problems of Cuban society. Fidel had stated that the Cuban revolution doesn't compromise with groups of any sort.\(^{110}\) His political expression no longer fit into conventional channels, like those represented by the Ortodoxo Party. He was even having increasing difficulty in supporting

\(^{107}\)Ibid., p. 315. 
\(^{108}\)Ibid., p. 318. 
\(^{110}\)Castro, "Manifesto No. 1 to the People of Cuba", *Revolutionary Struggle*, p. 271.
the elections that other opposition groups were suggesting. Despite claims by Fidel that his movement still reflected the political thoughts of Edwardo Chibá, he and his organization no longer fit well within the established Orthodoxo framework.

Castro remained in Mexico into the latter portion of 1956. From April until November, Castro is seen as a contradictory figure indeed. We can hear again Castro's distractors shouting "opportunism," which seems to be the only thing that could make sense of the disparities. The disparities do indeed exist. For instance, in an interview in August, Castro says that a government elected by the people is an "inalienable right," and something which the nation demands. But later in the same interview, he begins talking about unity with all revolutionary forces, then adds that it is better to unite to demand freedom than to unite and participate in useless elections. How can we balance this second statement with regard to Castro's original proclamations about the value of elections? In clarification of this statement, Fidel says:

Some might think that this declaration implies a change of tactics on our part. I accept it. A tactical change is necessary within the revolutionary line. It is foolish to disregard the lessons of reality. Later we can argue; now the only honest thing we can do is to fight.

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111 "Interview in Mexico" (August 7, 1956), Revolutionary Struggle, p. 327.
112 Ibid., p. 328.
113 Ibid., p. 331.
Let's try to sort the contradictions apparent in this interview. In a moment of candor Castro seems to be telling us that elections are at least not useful under the circumstances present in August 1956. This is the case, he says, because the consideration of other ideals of the movement, such as the freedom of the people spoken of here in the most abstract sense, are more important than other ideals that are ascribed to by the movement, such as the principle of elections. Castro indicates the value and the rightness of elections, yet they could be counterproductive under the present circumstances. The goals of the movement, still primarily of a motivation for bettering materially the people, were becoming more uncompromising as time passed. Principles like expropriation and redistribution of land, expropriation from the utility empires and broader participation of laborers in profits, among others, would be nonnegotiable with the regime, Castro foresaw. At this time the rebels thought that they could settle for nothing less. Consenting to elections within the situation present in 1956 would have been a compromise with the possible achievement of those goals, and as Castro clearly saw, a compromise with the principles inherent in their conceptualization of the Cuban revolution.

The only difficulty that we have remaining with the interview given this analysis is Castro's use of the word "freedom". It is a word which he doesn't
utilize often, and its meaning here is not clear. If he meant the word in a sense familiar to Americans, then clearly the whole interview remains full of contradictions. Freedom, like democracy however, can have other meanings and it is possible that Castro the evolving socialist had a different meaning entirely intended for it.

For instance, we have already seen that democracy in the Cuban setting has not meant freedom, constitutional guarantees, an impartial judiciary, and equality, but instead it has been paralleled by corruption, inequalities, unemployment, foreign domination, and a lack of sanctity for human rights. We can conclude that the concept "freedom" to Castro doesn't invoke in him an immediate picture of the secret ballot and honest election.

Instead, freedom means to him something much different than our frame of reference permits us to see easily. Part of his conceptualization of the term probably pertains to a freedom of the people to pursue their lives without fears of exploitation, unemployment, and poverty. Regarding Castro's programs that we have thus far discussed, freedom means a sort of neo-Medonistic right of the people to enjoy a happier and more meaningful life.

We have also viewed Castro's lip service to the western conceptualizations of freedom, like constitutional guarantees and the like, but especially since leaving prison, these views have not been in the fore-
front. As we have seen, Castro has used the word "justice" often in the context of what the people and the movement want, an exceedingly moralistic term that invokes the antithesis of what is right and wrong rather than the more neutral western interpretation of freedom being a state of being.

And finally, although we have seen Castro's formulations in terms of bettering the plight of the individual materially, his conception of freedom must also include its usage in a more collective sense. We have certainly gained perspective regarding the American impact on the island in economic, social, and political senses. Certainly "justice" would not be served, in Castro's mind, until Cuba could gain its "freedom" from its northern neighbor. The revolution was for Castro an act of nationalistic independence as well as an act of social change.

If Castro's probably conception of freedom can be seen in these lights, it becomes clear that the goal of freedom of the people might not be perceived to be parallel with that activity which we immediately associate with the term, namely elections. On the contrary, Castro viewed immediate elections as an activity diametrically opposed to the attainment of freedom in the senses described. In terms of his perception of freedom, he was probably right.

In September 1956 the movement took its first step toward a unified revolutionary opposition by being
joined by the Federación Estudiantal Universitaria (FEU). In the announcement of the "Mexico Pact," Fidel advises other opposition groups to cease their useless function.\footnote{\textit{Mexico Pact}} (September 1956), \textit{Revolutionary Struggle}, p. 338.

The next document that can give us a glimpse into the political thinking of Fidel Castro is the "Program Manifesto of the 26th of July Movement," issued in November 1956, or just prior to the time when Castro left Mexico.\footnote{The complete text of the document found in \textit{Cuba in Revolution}, Banachea and Valdés eds., pp. 113-139.} This document provides us with the opportunity to view for really the first time Castro's attitude toward the Cuban economic system, particularly with regard to the U.S. impact. It also demonstrates again the remaining liberal tendencies in Castro's thought; Fidel would still place ultimate blame for the plight of Cuba on the Batista regime, and not on the United States, and second, he was unable to conceive of U.S. non-support of the revolution considering its "justness." Let us examine it with meticulous care.

The Manifesto begins, as so much of Castro's political writing, by drawing upon the past in an attempt to demonstrate the deep roots of the revolution: The movement declares itself a continuation of the revolutionary tradition of the past, and the struggle taking place is for "the worthy destiny of Cuba."\footnote{Ibid., p. 113.} But then the new twist is added.

The destiny has been crushed by an immoral
and anti-Cuban power... The colonial mentality, the foreign economic domination, political corruption, and unlimited military control have united into one, like apocalyptic riders, to impose a regime of oppression and exploitation, grotesquely disguised as a republican government, upon the country.

The tone of the Manifesto is thus set early in the opening paragraphs. U.S. domination has had a large part in contributing to the plight of Cuba, but the ultimate blame must rest with the Batista regime, which is the predominant "anti-Cuban power" that has adversely affected Cuba's destiny.

A new anti-imperialist theme is hinted, but at least the liberal-thinking Castro blames most of all Batista and not the U.S.

The March 10 coup radically suppressed the law of the land. Arbitrary brute force (which is not even capable of inventing an ideological pretext) prevails... All human rights are disregarded, and the most elemental guarantees are (home, property, moral integrity, and life) assured by any civilized society are crushed by the brutal weight of the repressive hordes. 118

Castro criticizes the American role on the island elsewhere in the document. It is not true, he says, "that the best method of creating more jobs and the material well-being of the people is the surrender of the economy to foreign domination." 119 But then he again backs off from placing ultimate blame here.

Basically, this is not a dispute between

117 Ibid.
118 Ibid., p. 114.
119 Ibid., p. 125.
economic theories. The root of the matter lies in the government's banditry, anxious to obtain foreign backing at any price. The government does not hesitate to gain that support in a criminal and irresponsible manner by surrendering the economic sovereignty and material wealth of the country.120

Much later in the document Fidel goes well out of his way to clear the United States of any direct blame. He states that the ideals and interests of the revolution should be common to all states of America, and that Cuba's attitude should be one of friendship for other governments, including the U.S.121 Although foreign economic penetration still persists, says Castro, the term "imperialism" is improper in this context.

Fortunately, such a situation can be overcome without damage to any legitimate interest. Through constructive friendship, Cuba can truly become, as is indicated by a multitude of geographical, economic, and even political factors, a loyal ally of the great country to the north, yet at the same time preserve its ability to control its own destiny.122

Undoubtedly the specter of American support in a substantive way for the Batista regime was a very real consideration for the revolutionaries, and thus for them to show open hostilities toward the United States would have been a questionable tactic. Yet it also seems unlikely that even Castro in 1956 fully realized the incompatibility of his program suggestions and the "interests" of the U.S. Castro the liberal

120 Ibid.
121 Ibid., p. 137.
122 Ibid., p. 139.
must have been wondering why it would not be possible for the U.S. to realize that Cuba would require economic sovereignty in order that democracy would really work there, a realization that would result in U.S. cooperation with the revolution.

But was it democracy that Fidel was fighting to establish in late-1956? First he says in this document, "Let it be clear, the, that we are thinking about a true revolution." Soon later he says, "We want a just and functional democracy." Are these conflicting statements? Perhaps not. Castro provides for us a partial answer later in the document. "The paths of democratic recuperation are closed; only the dignified road of unsurrection remains..." The struggle has in Castro's mind two phases: destructive, in that the former government and system surrounding that government must be torn down; and constructive, the building of a new order. This new order, implies Castro, is to be guided by the ideals of democracy, nationalism, and social justice. What is meant by democracy? Simply "the Jeffersonian philosophy" and the Lincoln formula of government of, by, and for the people.

In short, Castro creates for us little ideological

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123 Ibid., p. 115.
124 Ibid., p. 125.
125 Ibid., p. 126.
126 Ibid., p. 128.
127 Wilkerson, p. 38. Taken from the document under study.
depth with which to work. The microscopic democratic jargon remains, but underneath it all was there substantive belief or did the words simply constitute a hollow shell of meaningless ideological rhetoric? In view of what took place after Batista stepped down and the revolutionary government gained power, we might be led to believe that Castro's opportunism was again apparent.

The question is certainly a difficult one to answer. There does, however, appear reason to believe that Castro's belief in the principles of democracy enunciated at this time did go deeper than a superficial dedication - that is, his devotion to democratic principles were deep enough; he just couldn't perceive the events that were to follow that would make an immediate passing to actual democracy truly counterproductive for the attainment of other more practical goals of the revolution; like the large scale social changes he was suggesting. These two streams of thought - first, the belief in the principles of liberal democracy, and second, his supreme dedication to a real social revolution on the island were incompatible given the circumstances, which included the economic involvement of a democratic neighbor and domestic problems which inhibited development. Their incompatibility did not become wholly apparent to Fidel until 1959. When it became apparent to him, he altered his position.

Not long after the issuance of the "Program Manifesto," Castro and his followers who had been in Mexico with him boarded a boat headed for Cuba. The
purpose: to begin an immediate insurgency upon landing, which would result in the successful takeover of the Cuban government. By combining with organized opposition forces already on the island, it was reasoned by Castro and the others that those aboard the "Granma" could accomplish the feat. The "Granma" expedition of November 1956 ended in failure, however. The timing that was of the utmost importance between those on the boat and the forces on the island was way off, and the invasion was crushed easily. Of the almost one hundred rebels on board the "Granma", only twelve got away; three of them were Fidel, his brother Raul, and a revolutionary with Argentine citizenship named Ernesto "Che" Guevara. The twelve escaped to the Sierra Maestra, a mountain range in the far eastern portion of Cuba, which would become the revolutionaries' base of operations for the next two years.

Our next glimpse of the revolutionaries comes with Herbert Matthews notable visit to the Sierra in February 1957. Matthews' visit came at a time when rumors were circulating both on the island and elsewhere that Castro was now dead, and the interview which he had with Fidel dispelled those rumors. For our purposes here, it is most important to note Matthews' impression regarding the number of revolutionaries in the Sierra with Castro. He estimated that the 26th of July's total number there was about eighteen men.\textsuperscript{128} It seems incredible that this could have been an accurate figure.

but it is believable. Months later, Suárez estimates that the size of the revolutionary force in the Sierra was not larger than three hundred; other observers appraised the total size of all of those actively fighting Batista in May 1957 as not being more than a thousand spread over the whole island, but then adds that there probably were many more sympathizers.

The reason for the importance of our establishing a realization of the minuteness of the revolutionary force is so that we can more accurately view the apparent moderation which occurs in Castro's political thought and the principles of the revolution during 1957. After the "Granma" catastrophe, and the sense of their being little better than a negligible revolutionary force because of their numbers certainly contributed to the increasing feeling of the need for unity among opposition forces. Castro was still the most well known revolutionary leader, and he still commanded at least the greatest following in terms of quiescent dissidents on the island. But this was not enough.

It became increasingly clear that the peasants alone would not be able to pull off a revolution - despite their oppressed state that was real enough, Castro found that they could not be mobilized for radical change. Likewise the workers were not easily organized for

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revolutionary expression, a result of their becoming a part of the system itself by attaining a degree of prosperity for themselves. The failure of two general strikes called by the Sierra rebels, one in 1957 and the other in the spring of 1958, pointed to this conclusion. The only strategy left to the movement that would give them a chance for a revolutionary take-over became increasingly clear.

The necessary condition for Batista's overthrow was the mass desertion of the middle class, and Castro's entire political strategy in 1957 and 1958 was designed to encourage and hasten this process. And so in order to promote the broadest possible unity which was a prerequisite for the overthrow of Batista, the great moderation of 1957-58 began. We must remind ourselves that this is in light of our finding Castro to be evolving into representing a radical social-democratic stance over the course of the preceding five years.

The initial definitive expression on record which exemplified this much more moderate stance for the purposes of the unity of the opposition is found in the Sierra Maestra Manifesto of July 12, 1957. The purposes of this document were twofold: to promote a unity of the desperate opposition forces which we have come to realize was necessary for the success of the

132 Complete text found in Castro, *Revolutionary Struggle*, pp. 343-347.
movement; second, to provide a platform that would be likely to be supportable by numerous groups of the opposition. The former of course hinged on the latter, and it was understood that the unity which they sought would be best developed by a resumption of emphasis on liberal-democratic emphasis. Given these purposes, the Manifesto consequently addresses itself openly to the necessity of unity, and provides a liberal-democratic platform on which to base that unity.

Early in the document it is indicated that personal group rivalries have been the greatest weakness of the opposition movement. The opposition should be able to unite on one point, implies the Manifesto: a common desire to overthrow the Batista regime.

With this as its basis, the document then begins to rejoice in certain political ideals that were calculated to make it easier for other factions of the opposition to unite with the 26th of July. "Do the Sierra Maestra rebels not want free elections, a democratic regime, and constitutional government?" we are asked. This is why they have fought, we are told. One of the Manifesto's guarantees was

To declare under formal promise that the provisional government will hold the Constitution of 1940 and the Electoral Code of 1943 and will deliver the power immediately to the candidates elected.

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133 Ibid., p. 344.
134 Ibid., p. 345.
135 Ibid., p. 345.
136 Wilkerson, p. 39.
"We want elections," repeated the Manifesto, "but with one condition: truly free, democratic, and impartial elections."\textsuperscript{137}

Other proposals and policies of the revolutionary government were also enumerated. Among them were a guarantee of separation between the military and politics, immediate initiation of a campaign against illiteracy, acceleration of industrialization, the appointment of a provisional president immediately, and an absolute guarantee of freedom of the press specifically, and more generally, a guarantee of political rights. Immediate appointment of a provisional president before taking power was given a special emphasis, as was, of course, the subject of elections.

The emphasis placed upon elections here causes Draper to react in this fashion: "If Castro could not be trusted to carry out this 'formal promise,'...it was hard to know what to trust in the first months of the regime."\textsuperscript{138} This conclusion is particularly accurate for those with a predisposed unqualified bias for the sanctity of elections and the democratic process. One can't argue with Draper that the main goal of this document seems to be elections and democracy in the American liberal sense. But it is difficult to take the step, as Draper does, to move to a statement implying that

\textsuperscript{137} Revolutionary Struggle, p. 345.

\textsuperscript{138} Draper, Castroism: Theory and Practice, p. 15.
elections were a goal of primary of the revolution. Without viewing any of the earlier material with which we have come into contact, and thus judging this revolution solely on the basis of the Sierra Maestra Manifesto, we might come to a similar conclusion. Yet in view of our study of the progression in Castro's political thought, i.e., his increasing emphasis on social programs which would alter the fabric of Cuban life, it is difficult to call this document typical of Castro's writings, and does not therefore deserve the status of showing us an absolute and uncompromising goal of the revolution. The point is this: the Manifesto's expressed purpose was in its attempt to promote the unity which was required for the revolution to even have a chance at gaining power. It was not either a totally accurate reflection of the supreme goals of the revolution; and nor was it a perfect reflection of the political thoughts of Castro at the time.

Theodore Draper goes on in his analysis of the Manifesto to arrive at perhaps an unwitting partial concurrence with the above. Castro indeed signed the document, he thinks, but did not believe in it.\(^{139}\) Che Guevara gives us some light on this situation, Draper explains. Guevara has indicated that the democratic provision of the Manifesto were virtually forced on Castro by other co-signers. "Castro signed the document, Guevara says, because it was 'progressive at that moment

\(^{139}\text{Ibid., p. 18.}\)
to get support, though it could not last beyond the moment."

We can thus agree that the political inclinations of Castro are not represented for whatever the consideration in the Manifesto. The evidence indicates that the reason why this document came into being in spite of this fact lies implicitly within the Manifesto itself – the goal of unity. It just happened to be the case that for any revolution to succeed in Cuba unity was necessary. It also happened that those other opposition groups who could contribute to the cause of overthrowing Batista, both financially and through insurrectionist activity, were democrats, liberal and conservative, who could not support a movement which appeared otherwise inclined. This does not necessarily mean that the people of Cuba on the whole could be said to be represented by these political outlooks. It does mean, however, that monetary and otherwise organized groups were largely inclined in that direction.

The dilemma for Castro was clear: compromise with his ideological inclinations, either truly or making it appear as such, or maintain the revolutionary theme that seemed to be progressing toward the left, and thus losing all hope of accomplishing the larger goals of his revolution. The quandry is a familiar one for political leaders to be sure, and Castro apparently concluded that it was best for him to adopt a variant on the former

\[140\] Thid., p. 19.
stance. Edward Boorstein sees perfectly what Fidel was beginning to see in late 1956.

The problem for the leaders of the Revolution was to promote the broadest possible unity in the struggle against Batista without giving up essentials, or losing the leadership of the movement. Some weight had to be given to non-revolutionary groups; sometimes compromises had to be made.\(^{141}\)

Our perception of the Sierra Maestra Manifesto is extremely important for our purposes in that it demonstrates a decision made by the revolution's leaders in order to come to terms with very practically-oriented political realities, i.e. the necessity of organizational support and monetary backing. Our preoccupation with the document might, however, mislead us in regards to the actual effect that it had at the time of its distribution. Wilkerson indicates that other than receiving support from Agramonte, Chibás' successor as head of the Ortodoxo Party, the Manifesto received little support.\(^{142}\) She attributes this at least partially to a fear on the part of other opposition groups that their unhesitating support for the document might lessen their position within the revolutionary movement, and do little but enhance the prestige of Castro as the leader of the revolution.\(^{143}\)

The only other event which took place in the year 1957 that should be pointed out of importance to us


\(^{142}\)Wilkerson, p. 41.

\(^{143}\)Ibid.
was an uprising at the naval base at Cienfuegos, a disturbance coordinated between elements within the navy and the civilian population.\textsuperscript{144} As with the cases of most of its revolutionary predecessors, however, the uprising failed, with three hundred being killed. The event had some significance for the long-term revolutionary struggle because it demonstrated that Batista could no longer count on the blind support of the military.\textsuperscript{145}

Political themes initiated in the Sierra Maestra Manifesto were continued and expanded upon in Castro's article of November 1957 entitled "Why We Fight", and appearing in Coronet magazine. Wilkerson finds it important to note a possible relationship between the themes found in the article and the audience who would be reading it, namely, Americans. It is easy to see Castro's astute perception of America in terms of his emphasis in the article, she says.\textsuperscript{146} The emphases would obviously be palatable to an American audience. Castro again promises elections, and adds that they would be held six months after the taking of power. He states that the movement is fighting for liberty and freedom above all else, and is fighting against military rule and police oppression. Then Castro outdoes himself in a statement concerning "misconceptions" that were arising with

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\begin{footnote} \textsuperscript{144} Smith, \textit{The Fourth Floor}, p. 31. \end{footnote}
\begin{footnote} \textsuperscript{145} Ibid. \end{footnote}
\begin{footnote} \textsuperscript{146} Wilkerson, p. 46. \end{footnote}
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regard to the 26th of July Movement's economic progress.

Let me say for the record that we have no plans for the expropriation or nationalization of foreign investments here. True, the extension of government ownership to certain public utilities - some of them, such as the power companies, U.S. owned - was a point of our earliest programs; but we have currently suspended all planning on this matter. I personally have come to feel that nationalization is a cumbersome instrument. It does not seem to make the state any stronger, yet it enfeebles private enterprises.  

Nationalization, Castro continued, would be counter to the goal of industrialization at the fastest possible rate.

With this article, Castro continues to pursue the absolute goal of overthrowing Batista in the manner begun in the Cuban Manifesto: harp on themes calculated as not offensive to either the other groups of the opposition or the United States. The latter consideration was obviously more important here. "He was, of course, writing to Americans at a time when their support of his cause was a matter of importance to him," points out Wilkerson.  

On the other hand, we view a Fidel slightly more in line with the progression in political thinking than we previously observed in "The Cuban Manifesto" of September 21, 1957. Here Castro can be seen as being considerably more willing to include certain program suggestions from the past than in the Manifesto. For

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147 Ibid.
148 Ibid., p. 48.
instance, the concept of national sovereignty in relation to economic independence is indicated, and so is the promotion of cooperatives. However, stimulation for foreign investment will be maintained, and a sacred respect for the constitution and the law is declared.

Castro again stressed an economic theme in another article appearing in *The Nation* in November 30, 1957. Cuba's problems, Fidel says here, are related to industrialization, living standards, unemployment, education, and public health. He refers to the land ownership situation, pointing out that more than half of the best arable land is in foreign hands. Then finally, in dramatic conclusion, Fidel says that only death frees the Cuban people from poverty.

It must have been exceedingly difficult for Fidel for the time being to tone down what were previously his radical inclinations for the purposes of overthrowing Batista. Certainly some of his ardent supporters must have questioned the apparent political moderation in their leader.

Perhaps of some significance in this regard is the publication of the "Program of the 26th of July Movement" as viewed by a "Committee of Exiles and Sympathizers of the 26th of July Movement" in Costa Rica.

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151 Ibid., p. 400.
As can be seen in the reprint below, this group's perception of the program of Castro's movement in late 1957 was little different from what we would have concluded to be a fair representation of its program in 1956.

### Program of the 26th of July Movement

*Reprinted by Caba Libro, bulletin published in Costa Rica by the Costa Rican Committee of Exiles and Sympathizers of the 26th of July Movement.*

1. Ownership of their land to be granted to all tenant farmers occupying parcels of less than 170 acres. The state will indemnify the former owner on the basis of the rents which the lands would draw in ten years.

2. Laborers and employees will be granted 30 per cent of the profits of all industrial, mercantile, and mining enterprises, including sugar refineries. Enterprises which are exclusively agricultural would be exempted in consideration of the laws to be enacted dealing specifically with agriculture.

3. Sugar farmers to be granted the right to 55 per cent of the price of their cane, ground in sugar mills, and a minimum quota of 500 tons will be awarded to all sugar farmers established more than three years. (This means that 500 tons of the sugar quota assigned Cuba by the International Sugar Council would have to come from the crops of small farmers, who usually depend on being able to help fill a quota only after the large plantations have sold their crops. Sugar mills normally prefer to deal with large-scale operators only. Typical recent crops have been of the order of five million tons—Translator.)

4. Confiscation of the fortunes of the grafters and embezzlers in all previous governments, and from their assigns and heirs by means of special tribunals with full access to all sources of investigation; and the audit, for these purposes, of the books of all stock companies registered in the country or operating in it, and the soliciting from foreign governments the extradition of persons and the impounding of funds. Half of all funds recovered would be applied to social security, the other half to hospitals, asylums and settlement houses.

5. In international affairs, the establishment of close solidarity with the democratic nations of the American continents. Persons persecuted for political reasons by the tyrannies which oppress sister nations will find in Cuba generous asylum, brotherhood and bread.

6. The enactment of fundamental laws and measures necessary for agricultural and educational reform; the nationalization of the electric and telephone trusts, coupled with a return to the public treasury of all taxes owed by the companies now operating these services, as well as of all illegally excessive income they have garnered through their rates.

The document of course signifies that there were still many of Castro's followers who still believed in the 26th of July's program as conceived prior to 1957. What's more, these Castro sympathizers believed that these were still the political and social aims of the revolution. This discovery gives us tremendous confidence to conclude with Wilkerson and others that Castro's
supposed moderation was fallacious, and the appearance of the same was entirely due to the political consideration which we have enumerated.

The results of these diverse political initiatives by Castro and members of his organization in 1957, which we have discussed were visible in the differing perceptions apparent of the revolutionary movement. Although prior to 1957 the movement had not developed a completely coherent political ideology within which it could operate, the effects of the movements' development in 1957 were confusion with regard to what the 26th of July really stood for. It practically could stand for anything that one's subjective mind wished it to stand for. Observers years later would characterize the movement as lacking a unifying ideology and political theory, a reflection, they would say, of the movements' varied class content. More correctly, it happened just in reverse of this. A unifying political theory may have been evolving, however slowly prior to 1957. That process was interrupted by the need for diverse popular support for the movement, a need which precluded the final cohesive development of such a theory.

The unity that was achieved as a result of Castro's "compromise of the revolution" was tenuous, and its elements less than confident concerning the unity.

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Some thought typically like one Jules Dubois when he said, "The 26th of July Movement has never stated that it will socialize or nationalize industries. This has been stated only by those that stupidly fear our revolution..." Others, like the money men who were now contributing in their way to the revolution, thought perhaps differently: "They have to worry whether Castro has really discarded the socialist beliefs that he held earlier, including drastic land reforms and nationalization of U.S.-owned power companies." Still others were even more suspicious, as this observer indicates: "You think you may see, out of the corner of your eye, a red flag waving. But when you look directly at the spot, it's disappeared."

As 1957 past, the movement thus found itself espousing on the whole more moderate politics than it had a year earlier, although we have seen instances where not even this generalization has seemed safe. It is accurate to still view Fidel Castro as the most important actor in our look at the year 1958, the final one of the revolutionary struggle for power. "It was within his power," says Matthews referring to Castro, "to give the revolution, to a considerable extent, the

154 "The First Year of Rebellion," Time, v. 70, December 9, 1957, p. 44.
direction, the pace, the time and the intensity that it has taken."156

The year can best be summarized as being one where an increasing amount of repression on the part of Batista brought an augmentation in revolutionary, which, of course, again caused even greater repressive activities by the government. Such was the plan of Fidel's organization:

Castro's guerilla tactics, then aimed not so much at 'defeating' the enemy as at inducing him to lose his head, fight terror with counter-terror on the largest possible scale, and make life intolerable for the ordinary citizen.157

Batista fell headlong into this reasoned progression, which resulted in his fall. Ultimately, Batista's overthrow was largely due to the desertion of his middle class backing. Batista defeated himself.158

The situation on the Island had gotten much worse by March 1958. The relative prosperity which had been present over the course of the previous two or three years was beginning to be eroded, and Batista's increasingly harsh tactics in dealing with insurrectionists were not popular. Whatever support that Batista had had with the people had definitely suffered, one observer wrote in March 1958 that "The central fact facing Batista this week was that a majority of the Cuban people now

156 Matthews, The Cuban Story, p. 135.
157 Draper, Castro's Revolution, p. 15.
appeared to sympathize with rebel Castro."159

The increasing savage of the Batista regime prompted a declaration of "total war" against tyranny by Castro was announced over radio on March 12, 1958. Also on this occasion, Castro called for a general strike to occur the following month in order to demonstrate the popular support for the revolution.

The month of April is important to us in two regards. First was the failure of the general strike on April 9, and second was the suspension of armament shipments from the United States to the Cuban government.

Draper indicates that the strike was promoted by the rebels because "Victory was foreseen through the vastly larger resistance movement in the cities, overwhelmingly middle class in composition."160 The plan may have been sound, but apparently the organization of the strike wasn't, and the events of April 9 turned into nothing less than a "total fiasco".161 The strike failed simply because the middle class couldn't carry it off.162 Economic conditions were still just too good in urban areas for such a show of revolutionary support to succeed.

The failure of the general strike again indicated

160Draper, Castro's Revolution, p. 12.
161Suárez, p. 25.
162Draper, Castro's Revolution, p. 12.
the reluctance on the part of urban workers to support revolutionary activity. Their middle class orientation as yet would not permit them to support the movement. Had Castro’s movement seemed even more radical than it appeared to be in early 1958, their reluctance would have presumably been greater.

Increased government terrorism was the mark of the period immediately following the ill-fated general strike. Perhaps the Batista regime was buoyed by the prospect of eliminating Castro and his rebels once and for all, now that the failure of the general strike made it appear that the oppositions’ strength was apparently illusory. The government’s activities, however, were so appalling that the U.S. government cut off all shipments of military equipment to the regime, a blow to the regime, if not fatal, it was at least enough to blow new life into the opposition. No longer would the might of the United States be at the disposal of Batista.

By early July the erosive elements within the regime’s power base began to appear, and a couple of weeks later Castro was able to predict that in half a year the government’s army would completely disintegrate,163 a forecast which turned out to be quite accurate indeed. We have already seen the immediate circumstances of the downfall of Batista: his hand-picked successor

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163 Castro, Revolutionary Struggle, p. 413.
winning the election on November 3, Batista's fleeing the country due to unrest in the first hours of 1959, and finally a week of jubilation capped by the ascension to power of Fidel Castro.

Before proceeding to the next portion of the paper, let us examine two or three instances which indicate the theoretical and ideological progression of Fidel in 1958. It is interesting to note that Fidel seemed to feel less a need for espousing traditional democratic values to the extent that he had the previous year. In fact, we can distinguish a slight return to an emphasis upon the revolutionary goals more characteristic of Castro in 1956. One of the significant reasons for this stance might have resulted from the tremendous decrease in friction between rival opposition groups, a lessening in tensions which resulted in the "Unity Manifesto of the Sierra Maestra," signed in July 20, 1958. The document united the opposition forces on only three points: adoption of the common strategy of insurrection; that after taking power a brief provisional government would be established in order to establish full constitutional and democratic rights; and the provisional governmental program would include the punishment of guilty parties related to the Batista regime.164

Perhaps with the unity of the movement within

his grasp, Castro felt less tied to the rhetorical compromises apparent in 1957, and more able to develop his own "left-of-liberal" thinking without fearing he'd lose control of the movement, and the revolution. For whatever the reason, Castro emphasized democratic principles to a less degree during the fall of 1958. A particular indication of this trend can be found in a proclamation issued from the Sierra on October 10, 1958, entitled "Concerning the Peasants' Rights to Land." The premise of this document, as one might expect, is that the land should be owned by those tilling it. The program suggested then is explicitly described: two cabs (i.e. caballerias, 13.4 hectares) of land would be granted by the government to all farmers not owning property, with the government paying indemnification to previous owners. The state would furnish seeds and implements to new owners. And finally, expropriations did necessarily require a priori cash indemnification. After almost a year's absence, which included a number of denials concerning the "threat" of expropriation, Castro once again was proclaiming an active government role for the purposes of allowing people the chance of pursuing a fruitful life. Perhaps this was the justice that he had emphasized vis à vis democratic values in 1956.

And so, in the first week of January 1959, this

revolution without a doctrine, as Matthews calls it, achieved power. Those backing the new revolutionary government, and they included virtually all of the Cuban citizenry who weren't directly connected with the Batista regime, varied from being socialists to old-style liberals like Socírres. All could sight instances where they agreed with Castro, while at the same time most ignored those statements of Castro's with which they would have disagreed. It didn't matter to Castro. The only accounting that he valued, he said, was in public opinion.  

Certainly he was getting the high marks here. Besides, he says, the revolution "is in the hands of a new generation and not in the hands of those who would like to chain its destiny to a dishonorable past."  

It is in conclusion pertaining to that which we have covered so far that the course travelled of Castro's political thought from 1948-1958 begin with a frame of mind typical of a Latin American social democrat. He began to view the problems of Cuba in somewhat more radical terms, in that certain social structures within the Cuban system were to blame for the situation. As this change in thought transpired, paralleled and reinforced by the reign of a dictatorial, corrupt bureaucrat, Castro's political thoughts could no longer fit

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into conventional modes of expression, and he turned to clandestine activities. The evolving revolutionary tendencies corresponded to a retention of some traditional democratic values, showing that Castro did not conceptualize the difficulty of attaining revolutionary change by way of democratic means, given the pre-revolutionary situation in Cuba. Fidel did not see that the United States' influence on the island, together with the improprieties resulting from the country's economic situation, would not be receptive to the radical changes that he had in mind.

As Castro's movement progressed in its development, Fidel came to realize that success of the goals of the revolution, to which he subscribed, would necessitate a superficial compromise with these very principles in order to gain a needed unity with the revolutionary groups less inclined toward the left than they. The move was largely successful. After there existed a substantive unity, Castro was inclined to move away from his compromise stance slightly, and a deemphasis of liberal jargon was demonstrated. Far left programs were now being explicitly stated again. And then Castro came to power. Finally, it is important to note that throughout the struggle for power, Castro felt little need for ideological justification.

As an afterward to our discussion of the years prior to the revolutionary takeover, we must point out two groups which were somewhat notable in their absence
from active participation in the revolution up to this
time. The first of these, the working class, has been
alluded to previously. Their inaction, we remember,
was most easily observed regarding the proposed general
strike of 1957 and 1958. It has also been indicated
why workers played such a minor role. They had become
a privileged class of sorts during the reign of Batista,
and so long as the economy was on the upswing, which
i was through 1957, they comprised something far less
than a revolutionary class. One observer viewing the
revolution in November 1958 thought that Castro had
no chance of achieving power unless he could gain the
support of the trade unions. This simply was not
a requirement, as Castro's takeover less than two months
later indicates. Once it was realized that the working
class couldn't be relied upon as participants in the
revolution, they were viewed as a portion of the middle
class; and the goal of the revolution regarding these
groups was just one of neutralization.

The other group that participated in less than
an active way in the revolution to this point was the
P.S.P., also known as the Communist Party of Cuba.
Some digression is necessary at this point regarding
their participation in Cuban politics historically.

The Cuban Communist Party had been in existence
since 1934, and its primary founder, Blas Roca, was

168 "Bullets at the Ballot," The Economist, v. 189,
November 8, 1958, p. 499.
still the party's leader when Castro fought for and gained power in the late 1950's. The Communists had had remarkable success in working from within the corrupt "democracies" of the 1940's and 50's. They had control of the island's largest labor union until a purge of the union in 1946 by the government blocked open participation there by party officials. After that time, the party continued to work successfully in a less conspicuous way, and was able to maintain a very active working relationship with Batista and his government in the 1950's. The fruits of this friendliness were seen in the better wages and working conditions of the working class, a significant proportion of whom were either card-carrying members of the party or Communist sympathizers.169

With a record of such success in working within the established system, we might surmise a difficulty for the party to support a revolution on the island. This, combined with the Stalinist orientation of the party, combined for such an effect. In Matthews' words, the Communists simply jumped on the bandwagon of revolution very late.170 And once on the "bandwagon", perhaps by late-1957, they can best be viewed as a moderating influence on the revolution. This is a par-

169 Some Communists had claimed membership to approach 20,000 in the mid-1950's, while the CIA estimated there to be 10,000 members and about 20,000 sympathizers. Sighted in Smith, The Fourth Floor, p. 33.

170 Matthews, p. 80.
particularly important point to remember, this was the role that the party was to follow over the entire course of time approached by this study. As an example in this pre-1959 period, it has been indicated that as late as July 1957 the P.S.P. was in opposition to any insurrectionary-tactics carried on in the name of the revolution. In another instance, Draper relates a letter of the party's dated February 28, 1957, which expressed "radical disagreement with the tactics and plans" put forward by Castro. The Communist tactical approach was more appropriately represented by strikes, demonstrations, and protests.

At least two Communist leaders were more in a Castroist vein—Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and Cesar Escalante. Rodriguez was the leader of a younger, second generation group within the party that was more leftist, and less Stalinist in orientation than were Boca and the controllers of the party. Rodriguez and those that he represented were far more receptive to Castro than was the party generally. In fact, he eventually grew a beard, and fought in the Sierra for Castro in the last months of the insurrection.

The turning point in Castro-Communist relations

173 Ibid.
174 Ibid., p. 86.
came in the summer of 1958 when the unity packs among the opposition movement were being signed. The pact demonstrated the support of the party for Castro's revolutionary struggle, and his methods. The only apparent reason that Castro sought the P.S.P.'s support, which he did, seems to be that he only wanted to unite the opposition forces of the left, of which the Communist Party had recently become a member.175

In short, to describe the Communist Party's involvement in the revolution as insignificant prior to 1959 is probably if anything an overstatement. More importantly with regard to our understanding the socialist evolution of the Cuban revolution, we must the view the Communists' "impact" on the revolution, if it can be called that, as being of a moderating influence. Fantastic as it might seem, the Communist party continued in this role well after January 1, 1959, as we will soon see. Any analysis regarding the revolution's movement toward socialism must keep this fact in mind, because as a result of this realization, the Cuban Communist Party, like the workers, are unlikely choices in our attempt to find the forces behind Castro's evolution, and revolutionary Cuba's evolution, toward socialism.

We can now see clearly that the roots for this socialist progression can be found early in Castro's political career, and then developed in terms of their expression from there. But these roots of which we speak

175Matthews, p. 120. Wilkerson, p. 51.
were not of a socialist nature themselves. The primary point of Castro's political development up to this time is his consistent dedication to a time social revolution for Cuba that found its expression not in ideological developments, but in predominantly specific proposals concerning the development of a better life for the people of Cuba. It was this then which was emphasized more than any other during this pre-1959 period, with the only exception being the period of moderation which occurred in 1957. All other values, be they the glorification of elections or the exaltation of constitutional government, were subservient to this goal. Changes must take place, he seemed to be saying, but we need not consider with what ideology those changes conformed. Ideological justification was sought, as we will see, only after the program of the revolution began to fit into a consistent ideological pattern.

III

The first years of the revolutionary government can be viewed as a year of definitive socialist development in the political thoughts of Fidel Castro. It is here that we view for the first time those policies which we have construed as being the goals of the revolution, gaining a socialist expression, both in the policy initiatives of the regime and in its rhetoric. The time period which we are approaching, namely the years 1959 and 1960, are not as difficult from an analytical standpoint regarding our subject than was the period of time which we have thus far covered. For one thing,
we now can view actual policy initiations, something which we could not of course do before because of the fact that the revolutionaries did not hold power. In the policies of the first two years of the Castro regime we will be able to clearly see an expression of definite socialist tendencies, and the tendencies will appear during the first months of 1959. The first portion of this chapter will deal with these policies.

The second section of the chapter will deal with two external influences that played a very important part with regard to our subject. We have seen how great the influence of the United States was during the pre-revolutionary years in the economic, social, and political realms. The declining economic involvement of the U.S., a situation forced by the arising reaction to policies of the revolutionary government, caused the American "presence" to be felt even more. Opposition to the Cuban government by the U.S. began with economic sanctions against the island and protests concerning the course of the revolution. It gained expression in increasingly volatile ways, and Cuban fears of American military intervention, ridiculous as that seemed at the time, were substantiated to a considerable degree by the Bay of Pigs fiasco of April 1961. We will view the impact of an antagonistic U.S. foreign policy on the island, and how this may have contributed to Castro's leftward movement.

The other external influence on the evolution of the revolution was contributed by the foreign Communists.
We will see a growing dependency of Cuba on the Soviet Union in economic and political ways during this period, at least partially the result of the pressure-enclosed foreign policy of the United States. The impact of this virtual dependency in the domestic political realm on the island is unclear, but nevertheless we will approach this subject also.

The only date with which we could really work up until this point has been related to theoretical formulations by Castro and the 26th of July Movement, and what ideological framework for the movement which we have been able to construct has been gingerly based upon this as evidence. In the final portion of this chapter, we will trace the rhetorical utterances over the course of the two years under study, and thereby contribute to our understanding the revolution's evolution toward socialism. So let's begin our look into the policies initiated by the regime for the years 1959 and 1960.

As the revolutionary government assumed power in January 1959, it must first be noted that Castro himself had no official position within the governmental structure. A man named Manuel Urrutia was made president. Urrutia was declared to be the president designate of the Cuban revolution almost a year earlier, and the revolutionary leadership followed through with the pledge. Urrutia's background is enlightening in terms of its pronounced liberal-democratic orientation. Morray characterizes him as being the conservative champion of the constitu-
tion and a firm believer in the independence of the judiciary. Urrutia was a judge who gained prominence in Castro's way of thinking in his defending the right to rebellion against Batista in the early days of the revolution. "It was because Urrutia was a conservative, not a revolutionary, that he had defended Castro's right of insurrection against Batista," Morray indicates. Then he continues:

Urrutia regarded it as his responsibility to the nation to moderate the radical insurrectionaries who had won the civil war. Like the bourgeois property minded Girondists of the French Revolution, who had turned against their Jacobin allies after helping them to overthrow the King, Urrutia was anxious to brake the Revolution before it went to extremes. As his Prime Minister, Urrutia appointed another true-formed Girondist, José Miro Cardona. Cardona was the president of the Havana Bar Association prior to the revolution and shared generally the same political outlook that Urrutia possessed.

It seems likely that these two unquestioned believers in the democratic system were appointed to these positions, ostensibly by Castro, because they were seen as true allies in the revolutionary struggle that was now to begin. If we can assume this, then there appears little indication that when the revolutionary government was formed, the rebels of the Sierra Maestra thought their views to be incompatible with democrats.

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176 Morray, p. 10.
177 Ibid.
178 Ibid.
like Urrutia and Cardona. In other words degree of the
differences between Castro and his democratic appointees
in terms of the direction that the revolution should take
was not perceived by Fidel, nor probably by most others
in Cuba at the time. Castro's liberal-democratic utter-
ences were real enough, they might say. But what was
not perceptible by Castro, that is the incompatibility
within his own political thinking regarding his democratic
ideals and radical goals, was certainly not seen by
democrats like Urrutia and Cardona.

Castro's official position at this time was leader
of the 26th of July Movement and commander-in-chief of
the rebel army. These positions entitled Castro, cer-
tainly by design, to maintain his control over the course
of the revolution. The reason he chose a no more
public position from the beginning, such as Prime Minister,
can probably be traced to his prior commitment indicated
numerously that he sought no rewards for his revolutionary
services. A "fundamental source of his power," as Suárez
puts it, was Castro's personal prestige with the people.179
This source was great indeed, but it is difficult to
really perceive the degree of power derived in such
a way. Nevertheless, Castro's relationship with the
people was one of a folk-hero, and he most certainly
was a legend of sorts with them.

And the people seemed ready for changes. Even

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179Suárez, p. 33.
the middle class, indicates Draper, was ready for deep reforms.\textsuperscript{180} The time for changes was ripe, and the revolutionary government was ready to interpret this will into policies. The only remaining ingredient for an apparently smooth alteration of the old order was the people's trust in their new government. This, also, was forthcoming. The Cuban peasant, for example, "does know that for the first time in Cuban history a government cares for him, wants to help him, and is helping him."\textsuperscript{181} The process showed evidence of contributing toward its continuation also. In the words of Boorstein, the revolution itself began to revolutionize the people.\textsuperscript{182}

With the moment right for changes of a significant nature, the new revolutionary government went to work in January. Initial steps of the regime included the dissolving of Congress, with the legislative function being transferred to a newly constituted Council of Ministers; civil courts were suspended, because it was thought that these contained Batista sympathizers; the role of the rebel army was expanded, and it eventually "maintained and strengthened the links with the people that had first been forged in the Sierra."\textsuperscript{183} An immediate initiation was taken in the field of education on January 11 when it was decreed by the govern-

\textsuperscript{180} Draper, \textit{Castro's Revolution}, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{181} Matthews, p. 112.
\textsuperscript{182} Boorstein, \textit{The Economic Transformation of Cuba}, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{183} Ibid., p. 39.
ment that all academic titles granted before 1956 by private universities were void. Perhaps more significantly, as soon as Castro came to power, electric companies were intervened by the government. This was the first of the "nationalization" decrees, although total nationalization of the industry did not take place until the summer of 1960. Also, Law #17, dated January 16, ordered the confiscation of all construction equipment which had worked on public projects. We can see that the government in January was certainly taking an active stance regarding confiscations. Also in January the government began what was to become a long series of monetary interventions on its part that would culminate in an economy almost entirely controlled by the government: on January 6, the National Bank prohibited withdrawals from private vaults and deposit books. This was aimed primarily at those who had been under the favor of Batista. Further, exchange of $500 and $1000 bills was prohibited, and confiscation of the contents of safety deposit boxes was authorized. And on January 26, 1959, it was ordered that all banks would abstain from giving interest on time deposits.

Perhaps the time was right for changes, but some of these initiatives, particularly the monetary ones, must have forced to the surface from some quarters a degree of skepticism regarding the constitutional intentions of the revolutionary regime. Even in the first month of rule, we

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185 Ibid., p. 634.
can see clearly policy initiations that seemed to run counter to the values of liberal democracy. We have by no means sighted all of the decrees promoted by the government in its first month of rule, but the intent of the revolution even from what we have briefly seen indicated that the rebels' intentions were toward the purpose of a radical transformation of society, not just the reestablishment of the old system with simply more rigidly obeyed constitution and a more honest leadership.

Reactions to these first series of reforms were quite favorable.186 Many within the population had much to gain from the implementation of these equalization decrees initiated early in 1959. Of course, there were those who could not support many of the actions because the revolutionary laws, some of them being indicated above, were obviously affecting their positions adversely. These types left the revolution early, states Mills, because the revolution started to affect their pocketbooks and their bourgeois hearts.187

The month of February saw Castro's ascension to the position of Prime Minister. The primary reason for this move, preceded by Cardona's step-down, is open to question. Suarez suggests that it might have been the result of pressure exerted by the far-leftists within the regime for the development of a greater degree of revolutionary leader-


187 Mills, Listen, Yankee, p. 48.
ship, but this guess is little more than idle speculation. At any rate, by the end of February, the new Cuban government not only now had Fidel Castro himself as its Prime Minister, it also had one less liberal—democrat within its ranks.

Also during this time, a fiscal system within which the government would operate was being prepared by the Ministry of Finance. The resultant system is enlightening to view. It generally designed methods that would obtain revenue from all kinds of income earners.

It established a higher scale of taxes in some cases, but at the same time, it established exemptions and reductions in those cases in which the tax might affect new investments or in which the enterprise had a low return on capital invested. Similarly, tax on profits were reduced from a previous 50 per cent to a new level of 20 per cent. And other stimuli to private investments were apparent, such as the allowance of accelerated depreciation in some instances, and deductions of profits put at 50 per cent if an endeavor was perceived to be in the national interest.

This fiscal system developed by the Ministry of Finance indicates at least two things of significance: first, that not all of the thinking within the regime was of a socialist inclination in early 1959; second, that such considerations apparent here indicate a degree

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188 Suarez, p. 43.
190 Ibid.
191 Ibid.
of toleration of that entity which could best supply the needed capital spoken of, that being the United States. This latter observation may indicate that the prospects for Cuba of a peaceful and friendly situation concerning the U.S. seemed impossible to attain to the Castro regime at this time.

At the other end of the spectrum there were early indications that pointed to the extent to which the government was willing to go in its role as initiators of change in Cuban society. The law of March 10 decreed a 50 per cent reduction in all rents that were presently exceeding on the island $100 per month. One could take the cynical view of this as being obviously politically discreet reductions for Castro, but we should also remember that Castro had suggested the proposal long before.

Government's tampering with the very liberal tradition of the institution of private property was also demonstrated a few weeks later with Law No. 218 of April 7, 1959. This decree forced owners of property in urban areas which was deemed as not being in use to sell their "vacant lots." Taken together with the rent reduction law, these decrees did not bring with it the end of the capitalist road in Cuba, but it did offer a tipoff of things to come. 193

The Agrarian Reform, issued on May 17, 1959,

192 See for instance, A Study on Cuba, p. 726: "Rent constitutes an important element of the family budget, and lends itself to measures of public interest."

193 Murray, p. 25.
brought a realization of the worst fears of the landlords, says Marray. \(^{194}\) Under the law, land would be expropriated from private owners if they owned in excess of 999 acres. The land that was expropriated would be paid for by the government in bonds, payable in twenty years. Part of this land would be given outright to sharecroppers, renters, and landless peasants which would constitute the private agricultural sector. Most importantly, for our purposes, the remainder of the newly acquired land would be placed into cooperatives. These were to be modelled after the Soviet "kolkhozi," with the program being organized by the state and controlled by an administration provided for that purpose. \(^{195}\)

The idea of cooperative never really took hold, though, and this portion of agricultural production became under the direct auspices of the government. \(^{196}\)

The law further created agricultural development zones, which was another administrative device. The IMRA, which was proclaimed to be the government's overseer of those things falling under the Agrarian Reform was: to organize, direct, and orient cultivation of land in the zones; to regulate agricultural production temporarily in private lands; to offer assistance whenever necessary; and to be in charge of rural life

\(^{194}\)Ibid., p. 53.


generally, including the areas of education, health, and housing.\textsuperscript{197} Needless to say, the powers granted to INRA were great even within the law, and INRA didn't necessarily always function within the guidelines. The Cuban Economic Research Project indicates that even these very broad powers were transgressed by INRA to the extent that the Project wonders "whether the Agrarian Reform Law was ever meant to be complied with.\textsuperscript{198}

The purposes of the law have come under study various times, and there exists a difference of opinion. This is an important question for our purposes also, as with its remedy might come an insight into the regime's socialist inclinations in mid-1959. Draper claims, for instance, that the revolutionary leaders put forth a proposal not predominately inconsistent with that which was suggested by them prior to taking power; they moved to more active direct government participation later. In other words, Draper is saying that again we can view deceptions regarding the actual aims of the Castro government. "Collectivization", he says, "would have given the game away...\textsuperscript{199} In agreement with Draper is The Cuban Economic Research Project. "The law seemed, in retrospect, only an expedient to permit the total Communization of land, property, and agricultural pro-

\textsuperscript{197}Ibid., p. 670.
\textsuperscript{198}Draper, \textit{Castroism: Theory and Practice}, p. 91.
\textsuperscript{199}Bunachea and Valdes, p. 243.
On the contrary, others have argued that direct government intervention in the form of collectivization was not a purpose of the law originally.

...it would be an error to suggest that the creation of cooperatives was a consciously taken political first step toward ulterior state control of agriculture. A careful reading of the texts shows well that the revolutionary leaders who wrote the law did not conceive of the cooperatives as a form of state-run enterprise. 201

And continuing, it is added that "In practice, and contrary to the explicit intentions of the law, the cooperatives sector became very quickly closely dependent upon the state." 202

It seems apparent that our advantage of knowing what was to take place soon after the law's initiation works to our disadvantage here. Surely the law seems, looking at it retrospectively, as a plan meant to be transgressed in view of the process of collectivization that was to take place. But it seems unlikely that such was the aim of the government while constructing the law. The document itself should not be viewed as an explicitly socialist one. The largest amount of the land expropriation under the terms of the law were to go to private owners created out of the disadvantaged classes who presently worked the land but did not own it. A reinforcement of capitalist enterprise is not the initiation of socialism.

200 A Study on Cuba, p. 670.
201 Bonachea and Valdés, p. 243.
202 Ibid., p. 244.
So in its initial form, the Agrarian Reform Law was not socialist oriented.

A possible reason for a fairly rapid switch to collectivization rather than fully deploying the idea of cooperatives which retained private ownership may have been a result of a consideration of production quotas. We've seen that during this same period a planning agency had suggested tax breaks for investors for the goal of development. Perhaps the goal of increased agricultural production on the part of the government can shed some light for us here. With the prospect of numerous relatively small farmers making up a substantial proportion of the agricultural sector, it seems likely that the government soon felt the need for utilizing the most productive means available, so as to counterbalance the slight loss in efficiency that would inevitably result from a policy promoting numerous small farms. As we remember, the private sector was to exist side by side with the cooperatives. It might have become clear over the course of 1959 that a more productive partner to the promotion of private farms would be the initiation of a government controlled farm sector even more involved than would have been the case under the cooperative format. The fact that State Farms did not replace the less government controlled cooperatives until 1960 is evidence pointing to this conclusion.

Although the Agrarian Reform Law was generally a non-socialist document, the importance of extensive governmental intervention in agricultural production established a precedent. Even larger governmental participation in the
economy would soon take place that would acquire socialist characteristics.

Opposition began to appear among some of the liberal supporters of the regime regarding the Agrarian Reform Law. They were arguing that the law had even gone beyond the proclamations of the rebels when they were in the Sierra Maestra, as indeed they had. Seven cabinet members resigned as a result of the dispute over the law.

The law, and the arousal of disapproval which it invoked in many, also had effects on Castro. There was no doubt in his mind that the great majority of Cubans were benefitted significantly by the Agrarian Reform, and that the law was most certainly consistent with those policy suggestions first mentioned in his Moncada speech. Moderation of the goals of the revolution, he thought, must not take place in response to controversy. Castro addressed himself to this question on another occasion.

At times one asks oneself if there are any Cubans...who do not understand that in a revolutionary process as deep as this one that there is no middle road. Who do not understand that a revolutionary process like this one reaches its goal of the country sinks in an abyss. Who do not understand that we advance a hundred years or we go back a hundred; that a relapse would be the worst fate, the most unworthy that could happen to a country like this one. I ask myself whether or not they realize that after the blood that has flowed and after the enormous damage done to the country by the criminals who have robbed it there can be no possible middle way between the triumph and the failure of the revolution.203

The evidence began to point to this attitude in Castro shortly after the initiation of the Agrarian Reform. "Cas-

203 Wilkerson, p. 53.
tro interpreted all criticism within his government as opposition to the agrarian law, which in turn became a disloyalty to the government or 'counterrevolutionary.' "204 By June 1959 the regime began defining as "counterrevolutionary acts" activities which it deemed as threatening to the revolution.205

The Land Reform Law of May 17 can be seen as a close continuation of the plans initiated in the Agrarian Reform. The decree included the expropriation of 2,300,000 acres. It set a maximum amount of land which could be owned by any one person or firm. It is important to note, though, that it also set a minimum of land which could be owned, an action that was hoped to prevent excessive fragmentation which would hinder production.206 In the same vein, certain exceptions were placed into the law regarding land expropriation. For instance, farms whose production was 50 per cent higher than the national average were exempted from the confiscations, as were cattle ranches whose production was just better than the average per ranch production.207 All of this of course was for the purpose of not compromising the goal of increased production with those goals of the social revolution. The Land Reform also treated foreign landholdings no different from those of domestic ownership. The goal of eliminating foreign inter-

204 Ibid., p. 60.
205 A Study on Cuba, p. 737.
206 Bonachea and Valdez, p. 239.
207 Ibid., p. 240.
ests from the island was left for other laws to deal with later in the year.

President Urrutia was ousted from his office in July, and he was replaced by Dr. Osvaldo Dorticos in full support of the Council of Ministers. The event signalled clearly that which the policies issued earlier in the year had begun to suggest - that an increasingly leftist tendency on the part of the government was now taking place. Although not well known, Dorticos was a Communist, and as such was the first member of the PSP to occupy a prominent position in Castro’s government.208

Two more significant appointments were made during the latter portion of 1959. In October Raul Castro, Fidel’s brother, was appointed to the position of Minister of the Armed Forces, and in November Che Guevara was named President of the National Bank of Cuba. Unfortunately space does not permit an in depth analysis of the ideological perspectives of these two revolutionaries. Suffice it to say, as one observer did, that Fidel himself was not as "leftist" as were Raul and Che,209 and in this light their appointments in late-1959 were significant, much in the same way as the appointment of Dorticos was a couple of months before.

One other event of the fall of 1959 deserves our attention - the circumstances surrounding the prosecution

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208 A Study on Cuba, p. 632.
of Herbert Matos. Matos had been in the revolutionary movement since March 1958, and had proved himself to be a competent military man, and was made military commander of Camaguey province before the seizure of power. We find him in that capacity in October 1959. Matos had become increasingly uneasy regarding what he viewed as a Communist infiltration of the government. Raul Castro's appointment to the post of Minister of the Armed Forces confirmed his apprehensions, and on October 19, he resigned from his position, stating that he could no longer support a regime that was Communist inspired. Matos was correctly perceived by Castro as being a threat to his regime, for Matos seemed to have some support in Camaguey province. 210

Shortly after the resignation, leaflets were dropped over Havana proclaiming that Castro was a Communist, and that the government was infiltrated by numerous Communists. In response to the Matos threat, Castro moved decisively. On October 21, Castro's forces successfully arrested him, and after a short trial Matos was imprisoned. The rapidity of Fidel's response in this circumstance demonstrates the degree of threat to which Castro attributed to the situation.

A sympathizer with the revolution, J.P. Morray, provides us clearly with the Castroist position regarding this incident: "Hubert Matos went to jail a martyr for the rich, the conservatives, the liberals, and the anti-Communist social democrats. But for the masses he went to

210 Morray, p. 64.
jail a traitor." Shortly after Matos' arrest, Castro staged a public rally in Havana to demonstrate the people's support for his actions. For our purposes, two related points are particularly significant here. First, this was the first time that there took place to any large degree a violation of basic personal guarantees in a western liberal sense; in this instance, the violation regarded the right to due process of the law. Second, in a more general sense, a conceptualization of the inherent illegality of actions which were deemed to be counterrevolutionary by the government was demonstrated. "We do not guarantee to anyone the right to conspire against the people, to make counter-revolution," Castro would say. Morray defends this premise: "It is progressive in the 20th century to protect the advocacy of abolition of the despotism of capital over labor, and then to suppress advocacy of a return to the despotism." An analogous situation, says Morray, would be "denying expropriated slave-owners the freedom to organize a recovery..." Considering the goals of the revolution and their increasingly leftist expression, and the threatening presence of the U.S. as we will later examine, it is possible that Morray was correct.

Early in 1960, the pace of expropriation under the Agrarian and Land Reforms accelerated tremendously. Ex-

211 Ibid., p. 65.
212 Ibid., p. 126.
213 Ibid.
214 Ibid., p. 128.
propagation came slowly for the first months of their authority - about 850,000 hectares had been confiscated, and only 40,000 of those had been redistributed to individuals through December 1959. Compare this six month total with a one week total of expropriations in January 1960, when 600,000 hectares were taken by the government. \(^{215}\) Part of the reason for this drastic increase in pursuing the fulfillment of the decrees was a government reaction to the opposition of large cattle men to the first phases of the new policies. After the first confiscations, this group refused to deal with small farmers whose positions they owed to the government. That is, they resulted a boycott of the newly constituted small farmers. "For the first time," say Bonachea and Valdez, "it was necessary to disregard the formal stipulation of the law."\(^{216}\) The government began buying beef from the small cattle men in order to keep the prices up, then began expropriating more lands on which the government's cattle could graze.\(^{217}\)

And a centralizing tendency inevitably paralleled the increase in confiscations and collectivizations.\(^{218}\) The initiation of a central planning board, "JUCEPLAN", was an example of collectivization promoting a growing bureaucracy.

Despite this increase in the expropriation pace,

\(^{215}\) Bonachea and Valdez, p. 242.

\(^{216}\) Ibid., p. 244.

\(^{217}\) Ibid.

\(^{218}\) A Study on Cuba, p. 676.
it has been indicated that most U.S. investors on the island were willing to hang on as long as they could.\footnote{Ibid., p. 642.} This was May. In July the government passed a law initiating the expropriation of all foreign owned enterprises. Starting around August the Castro regime began making things more difficult for the domestic owned firms. A law was pronounced which made it more difficult for an enterprise to continue at a profit. The tax situation was revised regarding corporate profits. It must have been presumed by the revolutionary regime that large firms would be unable to cope with the adverse tax situation, resulting in their being taken over by the government.\footnote{"U.S. Companies Hang On in Cuba," \textit{Business Week}, May 28, 1960, p. 143.} Then in September a massive string of nationalization decrees ensued. On September 15, the cigar and cigarette companies were taken over. On the 17\textsuperscript{th}, banks owned by the United States were seized. Nationalization of Cuban banks proceeded on October 13, and on the same day, 382 specific business enterprises were also taken over. Most of these expropriations were accompanied by no indemnification for the former owners. By October 13, almost the entire Cuban bourgeoisie had been wiped out by nationalization.\footnote{A \textit{Study on Cuba}, p. 657.} Finally, on October 24, the remainder of U.S. owned property on the island was confiscated.

By the end of the year, the evolution toward social-
ism of Castro's regime was complete, at least in terms of their policies. 80 per cent of industrial capacity was now socialized, while only smaller plants remained in private hands. The state also controlled the country's banking system, its railroads, posts, airlines, department stores, casinos, movie houses, cafeterias, and bars. In addition, 30 per cent of the country's farms had been nationalized, and these included most of the best lands. Although it had not been announced officially, and would not be until the following year, says Boorstein, Cuba had become a socialist country in 1960.

It can also be added that in policies other than those related to nationalization the Castro regime demonstrated beyond a doubt the depth of their socialist inclinations. Socialist emulation, "a method in the building of socialism based on the maximum activity of the labor masses," using Guevara's words, was also begun in 1960, for example. The system consists of rewarding small numbers of workers by presenting them as an example for the rest. It is, again in Guevara's words, "a weapon to increase production and an instrument to elevate the conscience of the masses." The emulation system attempts to eliminate, or at least deemphasize, the need for material incentives.

Certain resignations from the government during the

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222Boorstein, p. 32.
223Mesa-Lago, p. 129.
224Ibid., p. 129.
course of 1960 also indicated the now obvious trend toward socialism. David Salvador, who had been the prominent labor man within the 26th of July, resigned from his position as leader of Cuba's largest union in March. By the end of the year he was arrested for counterrevolutionary activity. Other similar occurrences also took place. Andrés Suárez tells us that

> It cannot be doubted that these resignations and replacements affected the discontent of the July 26 Movement with a policy that continued to insist on the autonomy of the revolution and at the same time steadily tightened Cuba's ties with the Communist world.225

Throughout the year, a radical change came over Cuba, as the government began to make good on its promise of providing "a real revolution" for the Cuban people. In 1959 the government seemed to give hints regarding their progression toward socialism, but the policy decisions during that year seemed to stop just short of initiating a true socialist revolution. This was probably due to a number of factors, which included the requirement of Castro's own ultimate rejection of liberal-democratic values for the purposes of pursuing in its stead a more profound and radical revolution. In 1960, the revolution gained steam, and a radical transformation of the Cuban societal order really started taking place.

Two topics now await our analysis. First, what was the impact of the ever present foreign pressure, exerted directly and primarily by the United States, and less dir-

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225 Suárez, p. 96.
ectly by the Soviet Union, have on this socialist evolution that we have just examined? That will be our immediate subject. And second, what was the theoretical thrust of Castro's rhetoric during 1959 and 1960?

We have mentioned time and again the involvement of the United States on the island of Cuba. Many have indicated their perception of the tremendous degree of that involvement by proclaiming that the United States was a contributing force, and for some the primary force, in pushing the new Cuban regime toward its friendship with the Soviet Union, and toward its socialist policies. "...if Cuba is dominated by Communism today," said Kingsley Martin in 1961, "that is in large part the direct result of American policy." Morray tells us that the revolution was accelerated by U.S. attempts to stop it. As the self-proclaimed voice of the Cuban revolutionary, C. Wright Mills said "Sometimes, these days, we feel that you are forcing us to say 'Cuba, sí! Yankee, no!" And Edward Boorstein: "If the United States had not acted so violently to land reform and the expansion of trade with the socialist countries, the Revolution would have developed somewhat less quickly." And finally, there is Castro himself, indicating that we may have arrived at a


227 J.P. Morray, p. 94.

228 Mills, Listen, Yankee, p. 97.

229 Boorstein, The Economic Transformation of Cuba, p. 33.
rare moment of consensus among observers and revolutionary participants alike. "It can be said that the policy of the United States is accelerating the radicalization process of revolutionary movements not only in Cuba but throughout the world."230

Virtually all can agree that the U.S. impact on the island after 1959 was one of quickening Cuba's so-called "radicalization," and its consequent move toward socialism and the Communist bloc. It is more difficult to determine the extent of the impact. Surely the U.S. trade boycott of 1960 pushed the island into finding viable trading partners, and the U.S. political policies regarding the Castro regime forced Fidel to find powerful allies in order to preserve security. The more difficult question remains: to what extent did the circumstances of 1959 and 1960 that were precipitated by U.S. foreign policy impel Castro's Cuba toward socialism?

In October 1958, Castro said that it was the desire of the movement to establish the best and friendly relations with the United States.231 He would have been the first to admit that this was going to be a difficult task. Castro, as we remember, was trying to deny in some instances that his movement still had plans for expropriating the island's public utilities, and enterprise like many controlled primarily by U.S. interests, but the


231Castro, "A Reply to the State Department" (October 26, 1958), Revolutionary Struggle, p. 432.
State Department was still skeptical. The Castroists could view easily the coziness of Ambassador Smith with Batista, and Smith's anti-Castro declamations were well known among the rebels. Above all, as Williams points out, "The United States sought the prompt and permanent pacification of the island under circumstances that would insure military control of the island and that would facilitate and safeguard United States economic predominance." Such circumstances would indeed not be contributory for the waging of a radical revolution. "Given the proximity of the U.S. to Cuba and its influence on Cuban affairs, the implementation of a social revolution in Cuba was an extraordinarily delicate task..."233

In January 1959 the United States was game to give Castro a chance to prove himself to be a sensible and pragmatic democrat and not an irresponsible radical. It was one of the first to recognize and establish diplomatic relations with the new Cuban regime. Even as late as the spring of 1959, the revolutionary regime's first year in power, Cuba was negotiating to buy $9 million in destroyers from the U.S. But it was not long before it was indicated in increasingly rigid language by American officials that the course of the revolution was unacceptable to the United States. After the initiation of the Agrarian Reform, in June the U.S. State Department issued a terse note of regret regarding the revolutionary actions, and regret-

232William Appleman Williams, "The Influence of the United States on the Development of Modern Cuba," p. 188.

233Suárez, p. 64.
tting that the new government had not consulted with American investors before promulgating the law.234

It is obvious that normal relations between Cuba and the United States were impossible given two factors: first, the fairly radical approach toward change by the revolution, and second, the negative attitude of the U.S. regarding those proposed changes. In the final analysis, those things perceived by the State Department as being in the interests of the U.S. were too integrally involved with Cuba for the former to be able to accept activities on the part of the Cuban government that were deployed in the name of social revolution and sovereignty.

In the summer of 1959, after Castro's order of American destroyers was cancelled by the U.S., Cuba felt the need to look elsewhere for armaments. While most in Cuba sensed little military threat from the United States, despite evidence of a developing hostility toward the Cuban government, one influential revolutionary at least, Che Guevara, indicated a fear of direct U.S. military intervention.235 Suárez informs us that Cuba felt great difficulty in finding armaments suppliers, as the American influence made impossible their acquisition from Europe. "So the Cuban leader Castro began to look toward the only source of arms not reached by American influence - the Soviet Union."236 And so began Cuba's relationship with the

235Suárez, p. 52.
236Ibid., p. 72.
Russians, a relationship which would indeed become integral in the months to come. It is important to note that before the summer of 1959, the revolutionary regime had received no help from the Soviets.237

Hostilities continued to grow during the massive government land expropriation that took place in January 1960. U.S. Ambassador Phillip Bonsal delivered a note to the Cuban regime protesting

the seizure and occupation of land and buildings of United States citizens without court orders and frequently without any written authorization whatever, the confiscation and removal of equipment, the seizure of cattle, the cutting and removal of timber, the plowing under of pastures, all without the consent of the American owners.238

Despite the protests, the expropriations continued, and the ambassador was finally called home on January 21.

The relations between the revolutionary regime and the U.S. took a drastic turn for the worse in the first months of 1960. After a year in power, it was certainly becoming clear that the Cuban regime was not measuring up to the standards for which the United States was hoping. Not only was expropriation now out of hand in the eyes of the State Department, but also Cuba was turning toward the Russians while demeaning its former trading "partner" as an imperialist aggressor. Up to the beginning of actual sanctions against the Castro regime, it is claimed, the U.S. had been "super-humanly long suffering;" but now American patience was "wearing razor thin."239

237Morray, p. 5.
238Hulsey, p. 161.
239"Closing In on Castro," America, v. 103, July 2,
The first actual point of direct confrontation between the U.S. and the Castro regime came with a dispute with the oil companies on the island in early 1960. We can remember that American and British companies controlled the entire petroleum industry in Cuba. The oil which they processed came, of course, exclusively from the United States. Revolutionary Cuba began to have other ideas of where they should be getting their oil. We will see the development of this conflict a little later, one which set off a process of reprisals on both sides culminating in a U.S. trade embargo on the island. But we must examine the events in the order that they happened.

A special emissary from the Soviet Union, Anastas Mikoyan, visited the island on February 4, 1960. The initial relationship between Cuba and Russia had been established the previous year in the way of Cuba's purchase of military aid. But now Mikoyan came on a different sort of mission.

Mikoyan saluted the Cubans in their desire for independence. He made independence a real possibility by offering Cubans an alternative market for their products and an alternative source of capital, the two indispensables of economic liberation. The proposal seemed attractive to the revolutionary regime. They knew that no true revolution could take place until economic independence was achieved. And also, considering the growing hostile atmosphere between Cuba and the United States, for its own protection it seemed that the establishment of alternative sources of imports was vital for

240 Murray, p. 93.
the island's well-being if their primary source of goods, acquired from the U.S., were to be cut off.

In a more specific realm, the Soviets presented Cuba with a second possible supplier of petroleum; it would be cheaper than that which was currently being bought from the United States, and also, the Soviets were willing to receive their payment in Cuban goods. Additionally, the Soviets offered to buy 425,000 tons of sugar in 1960 and a million tons in each of the following years.

Cuba agreed to both of these trading plans. It is important to emphasize that such moves did not result from the socialist shift in terms of Cuba now transferring itself to an orbit around the Soviet Union. It is much more correct to say that economic sovereignty being a primary goal of the revolution, they saw as being extremely important the discovery of alternative trading partners. Nevertheless, the U.S. interpreted the move as another piece of evidence that Castro and his government were Communist inspired, which of course meant that they were an enemy of the United States. Indeed, they were an enemy of American domination of the island.

After the trade agreement was signed with the Soviets, there were first indications that Cuba would cut down on its dependency with the U.S. On March 2, in a volatile speech by newly appointed president of the National Bank Guevara, the feeling was indicated that the U.S.

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241 Suárez, p. 84.

242 Ibid.
preferential sugar quota was a form of slavery. Then there was more provocative language in the island on March 4. A freighter from France carrying a shipment of goods to the island exploded in Havana Harbor.

Cuba accused the U.S. of engineering the demolition of the boat, a charge which seemed on the surface ridiculous. The charge, however, gained some substance by the observation that the U.S. at least covertly was participating in activities designed to overthrow the Castro regime. "Freedom" planes, flown by Cuban exiles, were being passing over Cuba after taking off from Florida, and dropping leaflets over the island proclaiming their dissidence toward the revolution. The U.S. seemed unwilling to stop these flights.

And it was becoming clear that U.S. was indeed running short on "patience." Also in March a U.S. Congressman, Larry Brock of Nebraska, said of Castro: "It's about time we took a big stick to him." One observer wondered how Cuba could possibly turn on the United States, considering that "For more than a century the United States has been sending money, men, ideas, and above all, confidence in the future to Latin America."

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243 Draper, Castroism: Theory and Practice, p. 143.
245 Halsey, p. 162.
246 Dickey Chapelle, "Cuba - One Year After," Reader's Digest, v. 76, January 1960, p. 68.
Then he adds typically, "Hope for the start of real stabilization awaits the day when the new rulers shave off their whiskers, psychologically if not literally, and buckle down to the prosaic chore of providing political and economic order."  

The moves toward establishing economic relations with other countries continued, and the trend was definitely primarily in the direction of the Soviet bloc. A reason for trade with the Communists to predominate Cuba's new trading patterns goes back again to U.S. policy and its sphere of influence. Few western nations were willing to break with the cool American policy toward the island so close to its home, so as with the acquiring of military good, Cuba could turn nowhere else. A substantiation for this argument can be seen in Cuba's immediate establishment of trade with at least one western nation that was willing, that country being Japan. U.S. reaction to Cuba's newly attempted economic independence, however, was already signalling things that would come a matter of months later. As soon as early 1960, it was becoming clear that the Soviets and East Europeans were becoming the keys to Cuba's economic development.

The first shipment of Soviet crude oil arrived on the island on April 19, 1960. A process of events

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247 Ibid., p. 74.
248 Boorstein, p. 72.
then followed which resulted in the first definitive action taken by the U.S. against revolutionary Cuba. The three primary crude oil companies on the island, two of them American owned and one of them British owned, refused to process the oil purchased from the Soviet Union. Not long after this refusal, the Cuban government began to "intervene" the refineries. On June 19, the Texaco refinery was seized, followed on July 1 by the seizures of the Esso refinery and the British owned Shell refinery. This was simply too much to take as far as the United States was concerned, and only two days later, Congress passed a bill granting to the President authority for cutting the Cuban sugar quota. On July 7, President Eisenhower suspended the sugar quota for the remainder of the year.

This period was no doubt a turning point for Cuba and the Castro regime. Morray tells us that the regime's dispute with the oil companies moved Cuba toward the Soviets and also toward socialism. This was probably the case. The Soviets were certainly now more integrally involved with the island than ever before. As soon as May 1960, only three months after Mikoyan's initial visit, 60 per cent of Cuba's imports came from Communist countries. On July 8, the day after the cancellation of the sugar quota, Khrushchev issued a statement saying:

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250 Morray, p. 100.

"I should like to call attention to the fact that the United States now obviously plans perfidious criminal steps against the Cuban people." 252 Some have characterized this period as a new servitude on the part of Cuba toward the Soviets, but this can be doubted. "Having just thrown off American control of their economy Cuba's leaders are not prepared to take orders from anybody else," said The New Republic. 253

It is also undoubttable that the events of the spring and summer of 1960 pushed the Castro regime toward socialism to an extent. Expropriation of private enterprises had not taken place before the problem with the oil companies. Previous to this event the only dominant socialist tendencies demonstrated by the regime were the expropriation of the island's public utilities immediately upon assuming power (a move even the U.S. didn't express much objection to), and the establishment of some government controlled state farms with regard to the Agrarian Reform Law. But by the fall, after the antagonisms between Cuba and the United States had reached great proportions and the U.S. initiated its economic sanctions, the Cuban government began its massive nationalization policy.

So the problems with the petroleum companies followed by the suspension of the Cuban sugar quota did

252 Boorstein, p. 30.

move Cuba toward socialism. In realizing the validity of this argument, we must be careful to find ourselves not saying that these events precipitated socialism in Cuba. Again, we can sight the trends toward socialism on the island apparent before the development of these events in 1960, such as the two unenumerated above.

The rest of the summer of 1960 saw an increase in Cuban trade relations with Communist countries, corresponded by more pronounced verbal attacks by Khrushchev and the Cuban regime on the United States. In mid-July, the Soviets agreed to purchase 700,000 tons of the suspended Cuban sugar quota. Open shipments arrived from the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia, while trade talks were being initiated with Communist China. Meanwhile, Khrushchev was threatening the U.S. with a retaliation of rockets if the U.S. would intervene militarily in Cuba.

Castro himself gives us evidence that the trade connections with the Soviets had effects upon the Cuban regime.

The connections that we established with the U.S.S.R. in 1960 very much matured the minds of both the people and the leaders of the revolution. Undoubtedly, it taught us something we had not clearly understood at the beginning: that our true allies, the only ones that could help us make our own revolution, were none other than those countries that had recently had their own. 254

The Castro regime formerly nationalized the remainder of American owned property in Cuba, totalling $750 million, on August 6. 255 And the chain of retaliation


255 Hulsey, p. 164.
continued with the U.S. initiation of an embargo on all exports to the island in October. "Officially, the State Department insists that the embargo is imposed 'reluctantly' in order to 'defend the legitimate interests of this country' against the aggressive economic policies of the Cuban government."256 However, the embargo's long range purposes went beyond this - it was hoped that the economic pressure would force the Cuban people against Castro.257

Undeniably the loss in trade with the United States placed Cuba in a difficult situation indeed. The embargo's effects were apparent quickly. Before the end of the year, shortages in spare mechanical parts for the predominantly American machines and motors on the island were a problem; it has been reported that several sugar mills were even dismantled in order to provide the spare parts needed for operation of the others.258 Shortages in raw materials and chemical products also ensued, - the mining industry, it is said, was particularly affected.259 By the end of 1960, it was clear that the embargo had dealt a blow to the Cuban economy. And as the economic situation got worse on the island in 1961, U.S. imperialism was blamed for the state

258 A Study on Cuba, p. 723.
259 Ibid.
of affairs more and more frequently. 260

Although the effectiveness of the U.S. embargo is indisputable, it is also clear that its intended effect was not accomplished. Instead of raising the peoples' resentment toward Castro and the revolution, it instead contributed toward the development of a high degree of resentment on the part of Cubans toward the United States. This was a continuation of a process which had begun with the cool U.S. reception to the revolution in 1959, if not sooner with the pre-revolutionary economic dominance of the island by the U.S. Morray sees more than a coincidental relationship between Cuba's growing resentment toward the United States and its lessening affinity toward the Soviet Union and its Communist revolution:

The People saw that Cuba was all truth, Washington and Miami all lies about the revolution. Did not that mean the demonstrated liars had also been lying about another revolution of 1917? 261

So it is established that the U.S. policy regarding Cuba caused a resentment of the Cuban people toward the United States which tended to taint their opinions of the principles for which the United States represented. We have also seen in some detail how America through its economic policy, in attempts to head off ensuing socialist revolution, actually pushed Cuba toward that end by forcing it to establish close relations with

260 Draper, Castro's Revolution, p. 132.
261 Morray, p. 138.
Communist regimes in Russia and elsewhere. Morray and others including Castro himself as we viewed earlier, have indicated the growing good feeling between Cuba and these countries in terms of political relations.

Morray also reminds us of the other side of the coin – the developing "enemy" image regarding the United States. "Thanks to the United States, the defense of the proletarian revolution in birth could take the inspiring form of patriotism defending a newly won independence from a imperialist aggressor," Cuban exclamations of the "imperialist aggressor" as a real counterrevolutionary threat were taken lightly until an American trained, financed, and supported mercenary force attempted to overthrow the Castro regime in the incident we refer to as the Bay of Pigs in April 1961. The counterrevolutionary threat from the U.S. was real enough, and probably exacerbated the domestic counterrevolutionary paranoia evident on the island.

But what about U.S. impact on the trend toward socialism through 1960? Did this push the Cuban government toward its socialist policies? We have seen the Castro regime pushed in a very tangible way toward the Communist countries for economic reasons by American trading sanctions. Undoubtedly Cuba would have moved in this direction at any rate, as one of the goals of the revolution was certainly economic determinism. As

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262 Ibid., p. 94.
we have also seen clearly, the Cuban policies were already beginning in a socialist nature prior to the culmination of the major problems with the United States in 1960. And at least through 1960, little evidence exists which suggests a Soviet magnitude of influence over the island that would precipitate by itself movement toward socialism.

In short, all of these things taken together contributed to the socialist evolvement of the Cuban revolution; but the evolvement had already been set in motion by a regime which began to view that the best application of its policies would encompass a socialist form. The external forces merely hurried along a revolutionary development that was aimed in at least the same general direction.

We are now left to survey our one remaining factor of study, that being theoretical and ideological justifications for the revolution during Castro's first two years of rule. Let's become reacquainted with the very early days after the takeover in January 1959.

Castro, we have seen, gained power while standing on a platform of numerous individual proposals, many of which would soon be initiated by the new government; these proposals had little ideological justification. We can remember a separation in Castro's pre-1959 thinking regarding macroscopic democratic utterances and those specific policies which drew attention to the movement.
In January of 1959 it was still difficult to gain a realization of how Castro's democratic principles would be translated into specific policy formulations. Part of this apparent vacuum in an area where most revolutions thrive was the result of the self-perceptions of the revolutions leaders: they did not see themselves as ideologues, but instead thought of themselves as "practical men." As soon as the rebels gained power, however, it was clear that an ideological attempt would be made.

Castro's initial attempt at an ideological doctrine of sorts was the proclamation of a rather vague humanism, beginning in early 1959. It was an attempt at providing an alternative to capitalism and communism, and it marked a period for Castro of his portraying the unqualified uniqueness of the revolution and its leadership, the 26th of July. "Capitalism may kill men with hunger," Castro would say, but "Communism kills men by wiping out his freedom." There is little to grasp hold of here and Fidel's enumeration adds little:

Neither dictatorships without liberty, nor liberty without bread; neither dictatorship of hunger, nor dictatorship of classes; neither dictatorship of groups, nor dictatorship of castes; neither dictatorship of class nor oligarchy of class; government of the people without dicta-

264 Draper, Castroism: Theory and Practice, p. 58.
265 Ibid., p. 60
266 Ibid., p. 39.
torship or oligarchy; liberty with bread without terror; that is humanism. 267

We can clearly see why "humanism" in the Castro sense prompted Anibal Escalante, the Communist and high ranking P.S.P. official, to call the doctrine "ideological confusion." 268 Perhaps we are lucky that Fidel seldom attempted original political thought. It is important to note, however, Castro's motivation toward constructing an ideology. He said later that "Every people has the right to its own ideology. The Cuban revolution is as Cuban as our music." 269

A much more refined doctrinaire within the revolutionary leadership early in 1959 was Che Guevara, although we must be careful to realize that Che was also left of Castro in the political sense at this time. In a speech which Che gave on January 27, Suarez informs us of no Marxist inclinations, but regarding specific issues, Che demonstrated a political stance to the left of the P.S.P. 270

Generally, there were no socialist or Communist inclinations in the revolutions' rhetoric in the first months of 1959. Fidel in a later interview contributes to this conclusion. After taking power, says Fidel, he still wasn't a Communist. "I didn't understand it

267 Wilkerson, p. 55.
269 Ibid., p. 59.
270 Suarez, pp. 41-3.
very well," he says. He continues:

I didn't thoroughly appreciate the relation that existed between the phenomenon of imperialism and the situation in Cuba. It is possible that I was then still very much influenced by the habits and ideas of the petit bourgeois education I had received.

As early as February, there began to appear alterations in at least one stance of the Castroists, and that regarded the prospect of elections. We can recall the profoundly varying policy toward the question of elections exhibited by the rebels before assuming power. Nevertheless they had been fairly consistent regarding the promise of elections after Batista had been overthrown. The tones had changed, however, and so had their commitment to elections. The official organ of the 26th of July Movement, Revolución, printed this in February.

The old politicians were already preparing for elections, and it would be necessary to circumvent them by turning the July 26 Movement into a revolutionary party that could control and ensure the continuation of the work undertaken by the present government.

Elections were now declared to be two years off, rather than six months. It was becoming clear to the revolutionary regime that at least one democratic value, i.e. elections, could be counterproductive for the progression of the revolution. In May 1959, the regime

272 Ibid.
273 Suarez, p. 46.
postponed elections indefinitely.

The moderating influence of the Cuban Communists was apparent from the early portion §§ 1959. They issued a document on January 6 which called for, among other things, an enumeration of the agrarian reform initiative of the Sierra Maestra, a quest for new markets for Cuban products, the restoration of the 1940 constitution, and support for democratic elections was proclaimed. A more moderate document than this coming from the Cuban Communists is hardly conceivable. To top things off, the piece didn't even use any declamatory rhetoric regarding the United States.

Despite our finding the Cuban Communists in a stance not as leftist as at least some members of the 26th of July Movement, the fact remains that they were viewed on the island at the time as the most radical political organization in Cuba, and were generally suspect. In fact, revolutionaries like Guevara, who we have already seen as being left of the Communists, was often called a Communist when his line of thought was actually more radical than that of the P.S.P.

By the middle of 1959, the Castro regime had already abandoned its theme of humanism, whatever it was; we will now highlight those trends which predominated in the Castro ideological thrust through the year 1960 from the end of his "humanist" tendency through 1960.

274 Suarez, p. 38.
One of the goals of the revolution was clearly that of economic sovereignty, and it is equally certain that changes took place in Castro's mind during 1959 which moved the revolution in a socialist direction.

Matthews points out correctly that Fidel became convinced that he could not make a drastic social revolution take place in a democratic situation. Any opposition to the regime, Castro saw, was inhibiting or attempting to inhibit the fulfillment of the massive social changes to which he was dedicated. A democratic process would only furnish methods of expression for these groups, and in this manner, the revolution would be slowed; it would be compromised.

Not only was radical change a value by itself for Fidel, but it was also a fundamental prerequisite for Castro's other primary goal, the attainment of economic sovereignty. Huberman and Sweezy point to the conclusion at which Castro had arrived:

The experience of Cuba proves beyond a doubt that a social revolution is our indispensable precondition for the initiation of economic growth and social development. The adoption of a planned economy is enabling Cuba to lay the groundwork for a balanced, healthy, educated, and eventually rich society..."276

So a movement at least away from democratic institutions and liberalism, in an ideological sense, resulted from the perception of the revolution's leaders

276 Huberman and Sweezy, p. 21.
that western democracy would be counterproductive to the attainment of their goals of development. But how explicit had those goals become? Castro can be seen demonstrating the ideological vacuum which we have associated with him as late as November of 1959. On the 26th of that month, Suarez describes for us the scene of Guevara's appointment to the presidency of the National Bank. After the appointment, Suarez sardonically relates his impression of the Castro ideology:

"Castroism has assigned itself a revolutionary task, one of infinite and boundless dimensions: the only thing that Castro was able to say was that "our revolution is profound, it is a radical revolution," and "a revolution different from all other revolutions ever made in the world.""

The criticism here certainly has justification, both in regard to the pre-1959 period as well as to the years 1959 and 1960. If we look closely, however, we can identify one theme that is of major consequence for us. There is a fairly consistent theme running through the rhetoric of the revolution right through 1960, and that is the goal of the material well-being and happiness of the Cuban people. All other themes seem subservient to this one. Man is seen as an end; that is, "making man happier, making man better" is Castro's words. Some viewed this theme, and authorized its discovery for the purpose of showing that Fidel was not a Communist because of his dedication toward

277Suarez, p. 78.

the well-being of the Cuban people for the present. Kinsley Martin's point is a good one.

Nothing could be more conclusively show that Fidel is not an indoctrinated Communist than his remark that he will never deprive the present generation of pleasure for the theoretical benefit of future generations... His idea is the romantic one of making peasants and workers happy now in their own Socialist paradise.279

Even after proclaiming himself to be a Communist, Castro maintained this position, with the emphasis now being on wealth again, but this time in a more collective sense.

We must use political awareness to create wealth. To offer man more for doing more than his duty is to buy his conscience with money. To give a man more participation in collective wealth because he does his duty and produces more and creates more for society is to turn political awareness into wealth.

As we said before, communism certainly cannot be established if we do not create abundant wealth. But the way to do this, in our opinion, is not by creating political awareness with money or with wealth, but by creating wealth with political awareness.280

Above all else, there is one distinct characteristic of the Cuban revolution and its leaders that gives insight to all else that took place in the period under study. It is the pragmatic character of the revolution, and this is demonstrated perfectly in the words of a Cuban revolutionary as expressed by Mills.

We don't want to leave the impression that we knew all our aims and obstacles in so clear-cut a way from the very beginning. We didn't. We came upon one fact at a time, as we began to go to work building our economy and trying to do something about the unemployment. We've had to try to meet many problems indifferently, of which many of these ways didn't seem to work, but we've kept at it. We've had to, and in working at it, we've come to our overall aims and our plans of how to realize them.281


281 Mills, Listen, Yankee, p. 71.
Then continuing later, he adds that "Insofar as we are Marxist of Leftist (or communist, if you will) in our revolutionary development and thought, it is not due to any prior commitment to an ideology."282

We have viewed in this chapter the Castro regime's socialist development in terms of the policy initiatives and programs of the revolutionary regime during its first two years of rule. We noted a trend toward a socialist orientation that culminated in the presence of a socialist economy in Cuba by the end of 1960. Then we examined the impact of the U.S. presence on the revolution after January 1, 1959, and found a correlation between the American policy toward the island and its developing socialist tendencies. We discovered that the U.S.-Soviet impact moved the revolution more quickly in a direction in which it was already headed. And finally, we have surveyed the theoretical undertones of the regime during these first two years. A lack of ideological justification arose primarily out of the pragmatic characteristic of the revolution's leaders. Those goals which did find expression concerned policies that would bring about happiness and the good life for the people as soon as possible.

IV

We can recall that we promised in the introduction to this paper to explicate what the goals of the revolution were in order that we could make a judgement concerning the charges toward the revolution of betrayal. The goals of this revolution, we have found, are somewhat difficult to grasp, but nevertheless, in looking for them it is true that we discover important facets of the Castroist movement which have previously been hinted at but not coherently stated.

We remember that there are many who argue that the revolution was betrayed, a consequence of the leftward push which culminate eventually

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Ibid., p. 110.
in communism. No one fighting the revolution, it is argued, were fighting for communism. Few really knew who they were fighting for, or what. They only knew what it was they were fighting against. The primary fact about the 26th of July Movement before 1959 was its complete lack of any unifying and cohesive doctrine, one formulated meticulously before any active revolutionary insurgency would begin. What goals this revolution did have could only be demonstrated sporadically through its policy initiatives prior to taking power. We have examined those initiatives, and it is a position now to declare our perception of the goals of the Cuban revolution.

We have discovered that the overriding factor in thinking of the Cuban revolutionaries epitomised by Fidel is its pragmatic character; this finds its expression most importantly in the lack of development of a unifying ideology. What goals that were apparent to us included first of all, material betterment of the people. The revolution declared through its policies a goal of promoting a kind of liberation for those classes which had for at least the last century been oppressed at the hands of an adverse economic structure. This goal of material betterment for "the people" was not moralistic in the sense of proclaiming values concerning what was right or wrong about private ownership, collective ownership, and the like. The movement simply supported a radical change in the property ownership structure on the island because the present system was unfair, and that a change initiated by the government through expropriations would be "just".

A second goal was a nation-building one, of development. Although short term considerations were emphasized, it was indicated that long range development of the island economically would contribute toward the attainment of a materially more satisfying and emotionally more meaningful life for the people. It was clear to the movement that for
the purpose of accomplishing this goal, the close ties with the United
States would have to be slackened significantly.

This latter point was really a third goal by itself, although it
is integrally related to the second goal. For Robert Taber, "The Cuban
Revolution was and is, above all, a Cuban declaration of independence
from the United States." As we have seen, many of the problems within
the Cuban economic, political, and social systems were directly attribu-
table to the economic role of the U.S. in Cuba. It was clear that no
meaningful development or improvement in the way of life on the island
could be brought about until this adverse influence was virtually elimi-
nated from the island. That is in an objective sense. With a more sub-
jective consideration, it further became increasingly clear to the revolu-
tionaries that revolutionary change could not take place unless the
American influence was brought to a close.

And finally, we return again to the pragmatic nature of Fidel
Castro and his movement. Whatever approach that the revolution would
take in form of government and ideology, it would have to be consistent
with these down to earth goals of the revolution. The ultimate rejection
of liberal democracy in the western sense by Castro and his follow-
ers can be seen in this light. There was a belief in macroscopic liberal--
democratic political ideals which showed itself on numerous occasion prior
to 1959. It became apparent to the Castroists that a real revolution,
something which was necessary to accomplish the goal described, would not
be possible within a liberal framework. On the basis of the previous
Cuban experience alone, Castro came to believe less and less in the west-
tern conception of democracy and capitalism.

Once in power Castro turned against the system that seemed
responsible for the misery of the Cuban people. That the system he
is establishing in its place is more similar to that of Red China's

283 Taber, "Castro's Cuba," The Nation, p. 64.
or Soviet Russia's is testimony to the success the Communist nations have had in presenting themselves as examples of rapid industrialization and to the failure of capitalism to give the majority of Cubans anything more than a dirt floored outdoor privy, and a poor diet. That the great strides in economic development in the Communist world have been brought at a great cost in political liberty seems to be of minor concern to the triumvirate of the Revolutionary government.

Expediency in carrying out the real goals of the revolution were the cause of the apparent contradictions which we have viewed in relation to Castro's political thought. These included the retraction of the promise of elections, given such importance in some of the writings researched.

The ideological move toward communism can be seen to an extent as the filling of what up to that time had been an ideological vacuum in the revolution. This process occurred after the pattern of policies had been set, as demonstrated by the fact that the country was socialist by the end of 1960, as we have seen, while the situation wasn't called a socialist one until the following year. Thus, we might add, is in reverse of what is usually the case in revolutions.

Finally, a concluding word about the socialist evolution of the Cuban revolution through the year 1960...

Given the goals of the revolution and the social-democratic orientation of Castro and his movement attributed to his Orthodox background, the jump to socialism was not a long one. Castro's skepticism of the Cuban political system was obvious early, but so was his apparent dedication to liberal-democratic ideals. During the course of the struggle for power, we began to view his objection to elections on certain

grounds because of their being inexpedient at the time, while proclaiming the value of elections as a rule. This could be taken as an example of the situations which were to come: constant conflict between the real goals of the revolution and a liberal-democratic frame of reference. It is interesting to note also that it is this dichotomy which separates those who believe that the revolution was betrayed and those who don't.

The roots for the turn to socialism showed inconspicuously before Fidel's ascension to power, but they were nevertheless present. After January 1959, we began seeing traces of Castro's sacrificing principles of liberalism for the pursuance of his revolutionary goals, both in policy and in rhetoric; we also saw the ever-present U.S. influence pushing the regime into a more rapid evolvement away from those liberal values. By the end of 1960, the evolvement toward socialism was complete.

Much argument is indeed possible regarding the goals of the revolution, and the sacrifice of liberal values that ensued over the course of time studied. But for now it is appropriate to sight this observation made in 1960 - "But, for good or evil, Cubans, for the first time since the landing of Columbus, have their destinies in their own hands." At least one of their prescribed goals had been accomplished.

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