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Technological Fix: Altering the Consciousness of the Social Work Profession

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Social work, like other professions, seeks a jolt of technology and technical sophistication into its theoretical and practical repertoires. Such efforts have, thus far, ignored the considerable ethical and axiological freight that "Techne" brings with it. Ironically, many of the implicit values of techniques subvert the unique and defining values of the social work profession. This paper offers a cautionary note and a prescription for avoiding the "technological fix."

Social work, like most professions, seeks a rush of science and technology into its bloodstream. Since the late sixties there have been persistent, increasingly strident, and thoroughly argued pleas for the fashioning of an empirical (read: wrought of scientific methodology) basis to both understanding and helping (Briar, 1980; Fischer, 1981; Hudson, 1982). Such complaints are not unusual in a society that, though it may misunderstand it, fawns over "Science"—with a big S. Some years ago, C.P. Snow (1964) wrote of the two cultures of the Western world, Art and Science, and the paradigmatic clash between them. More recently, Jacques Barzun (1964) has suggested that our cultural world has but a single guiding paradigm—Science. As a culture, and within most of our social institutions, we have become slavishly devoted to the ideologies and myths, the boons and bounties of Science and offspring, technology. We worship abjectly and daily at the altar of Science. Whether designing a nuclear holocaust or unraveling the psychic skeins of love, we turn to Science as the way to know and to technology as the way to do. The professions most visibly bound to Science are the most revered. Professions that in the public mind are not covered under the canopy of Science scurry to seek its shade.

What does an allegiance of this sort to what we understand as science mean? There is a single science, and it is both method

and methodology (that is, it is both a way to understand and discover, and a philosophy of discovery). In the social sciences, and in the social work profession in particular, the advocates of a more empirically funded body of knowledge and technique, the version of science that is usually proposed is positivist. The positivist position has two apparently implacable dicta: all propositions regarding the nature of the universe must be reducible to statements describing hard data (data that are observable, first, and second, capable of being reduced to numbers); and general propositions about the nature of the universe must be developed through the process of inductive inference and that means, in essence, inference from observable data (Overton, 1984). While many apparently are shying away from this hard position, in one form or another it still separates the advocates of empirically-derived, technologically sound practice, from those who are more circumspect about that possibility. Walter Hudson (1982) puts it bluntly: "Constructs that cannot be defined, operationalized, and then measured are mentalisms that are useless to an understanding of the world in which we live" (p. 256).

Technique, it is assumed, rather than ideology, philosophy, intuition, artistry, empathic grasp, dialectical exposition, or dialogical exploration will become the hallmark of practice. While widely considered to be a creation ultimately traceable back to theory, techniques have many parents and, in the end, are merely means to be judged by their effectiveness. The scientific approach to practice is nearly willing to abandon theory in the service of developing these means of intervention:

Thus, practitioners can have available to them a body of specific techniques to apply with their clients, based on a careful assessment of the client, situation, and problem. That the techniques of intervention will have been selected, if possible, because of their demonstrated effectiveness also suggests that their use will lead to the increased probability of successful outcome. (Fischer, 1981, p. 203)

Conceivably, a practitioner might author an eclectic hodgepodge of techniques that bore little ethical, theoretical, or conceptual relationship to one another or to any coherent body

of knowledge solely because they were "validated" empirically and known to "work."

This view of science presumes that the world operates lawfully, and that, though elegant, the world is essentially simple and straightforward in its operation. The firmest barrier to a more complete understanding of the world, human and nonhuman, is the failure of craft: that is, the correctable lack of better instruments and methods of discovery. Beneath these assumptions lies a more durable one—Science will save us. However, there are developments in the "harder" sciences that suggest these assumptions are embarrassed by a number of factors, from the inevitable influence of the observer to puzzling gaps and changes in the appearances of the material world. Even for a human brain to know, say the structuralists of neuroscience, there must be the systematic destruction of a certain amount of data and input in order for the brain to categorize and to hierarchically arrange information so that it can be at all useful. The fact that the brain is able to do this is nothing short of a miracle, but it speaks to the fact that even at the level of the sense organs, "interpretation" is going on (Stent, 1976; Gazzaniga, 1988).

The methods of science, it is thought, and the techniques derived from them carry no implicit or important meaning, have no substantial or measurable ethical freight (Hudson, 1978). Whether one proceeds through a controlled experiment or an in-depth interview to discover some aspect of the world, the only question is how powerful is the method in eliciting answers, solving problems, and accumulating data?

Some argue that the distinction between knowing and doing, between assessment and intervention, will disappear as our science becomes more effective and our practice becomes more empirically accountable. In a sense, every encounter with a client, every planned change in agency will be an experimental space in which the demeanor and method of scientist resemble, if not being epistemologically the same as that of the practitioner (Seigel, 1984).

These, then, are some elements of our current faith in science and technique. To put the central issue—should technique (or technology) be the centerpiece of social work practice?—in

larger compass, Jeffrey Record (1980), a senior fellow at the Institute for Policy Analysis in Washington, DC, despairs of the trend he sees in the service academies. The current focus of the academies, he observes, is on the strategies and logistics of developing and deploying various destructive and defensive technologies. Thus, warfare is an endeavor solely informed by science and is regarded as only technically (not morally, philosophically, or geopolitically) problematic. Our ability to conduct war and to defend ourselves improves, it is believed, only as our technology improves.

This rationalization or 'scientification' of warfare breeds a disconcerting hubris in its practitioners because it de-emphasizes, if it does not altogether deny what is called 'His sacred majesty, Chance'—whimsy, the irrational or unpredictable event or circumstances, *Fortuna*—in shaping victory or defeat on the battlefield. It is an hubris that disregards the elder Moltke's (A Prussian field marshal and brilliant tactician in the 19th century - D.S.) wise caution that 'no plan of operations can look with any certainty beyond the first meeting with the . . . enemy because it cannot govern the independent will of the opposing commander.' The study of history, by contrast, is a humbling experience; the historical record bulges with one aborted attempt after another by the best and the brightest to identify, assemble, and manipulate the ingredients of military triumph. (Record, 1980, p. 19)

The current situation in the Persian Gulf certainly exemplifies the clash of technical hubris and persistent contingency. I do not mean to draw too strained an analogy between the fortunes of war and the vagaries of social work practice. The point is merely this: fascination with technique frequently has the effect of driving out other facets of an activity or endeavor whether they are the considerations of history, the complexities of human nature, the ebb and surge of passion; the chastening and executive powers of intuition and philosophy, or the energies of the sensual.

The Risks of the Technological Fix

The social work profession wants a fix: a sanctifying jolt of technology into the marrow of the profession; a fix that, like all fixes, can enhance the sense of power and control, inflate

the self-image, and obliterate the nagging confusions and tensions of reality. As with every fix, the threat of addiction always looms, inviting both the subversion of judgment and the corrosion of values. What, specifically, are the risks of the technological fix?

Jacques Ellul (1965) argues that "... a principal characteristic of technique is its refusal to tolerate moral judgments" (p. 97). Ellul here is exposing the implication that technique is value-free. Enthusiasts of technique claim that other than the pursuit of effectiveness and efficiency of application, technique is an ethical neuter. Likewise, questions of good and evil, right and wrong, truth and falsity—any moral desiderata—lie well beyond the interest of technique. Thus, given the validation of a technique, that is to say, insurance that the technique works, its application then becomes a foregone conclusion. But techniques *do have* considerable ethical and political heft, and each technique insinuates something about human nature and the human condition. The leucotomy works, electro-convulsive therapy works, the phenothiazines work, but each demands a particular posture and attitude in the minister, supposes something about the state and worth of the recipient, and its effects can never be fully accounted for (Cohen, 1988). The fact that a technique works seems to absolve the user of moral choice and suggests that, after a time, the technique takes on its own life, invoking what Ellul (1965) has called the "automatism of technical choice" (p. 79). Because it exists, because it works, it must and will be used, value questions and dilemmas preempted.

The pursuit of technique also obscures the importance of practice. Christopher Lasch (1984), in discussing what he believes is our cultural confusion between practice (in the Aristotelian sense of the development of character, the quest for a higher moral standard of action, and the elaboration and teaching of the virtues specific to various forms of practical activity) and technique (which concerns itself exclusively with the means to given ends), puts it this way:

As work and politics lose their educative content and degenerate into pure technique, the very distinction between technique and practice becomes incomprehensible. Industrial societies have almost completely lost sight of the possibility that work and politics

can serve as character-forming disciplines. These activities are now understood as means of satisfying material needs. Moral ideas, meanwhile, lose their connection with practical life and with the virtues specific to particular practices and become confused instead with the exercise of personal prejudices and tastes, which can neither be justified nor explained and which should therefore not be regarded as binding on anyone else. (p. 255)

How does this apply to social work practice? The problems that people bring to social workers are often problems of belief, conscience, will, and knowledge and they occur in a particular, though often unclear or confusing, sociopolitical context. To make people "feel" better, or more assertive, or less tense, or more happy, and to have the techniques for doing that, without addressing the demands of "praxis" (What knowledge is critical to my understanding, the articulation of my beliefs and intentions? What do I need to do in order to further my involvement in resolving the moral, political, and personal issues and questions of my life?) is to merely dabble in the possibilities of character and action. It may even encourage mindless adjustment to a larger, more profound context for being. To teach, say, social service workers techniques of stress management is not an immoral thing to do. But to do it without addressing the ethical, political, and social issues which in a public bureaucracy breed "burn-out," turnover, and discouragement is to thwart the possibility of collective action, and the development of the virtues needed to confront the burdensome realities of bureaucratic employment (Galper, 1980).

The employment of technology and technique in human affairs also may be based upon a distortion of the nature of human experience in the world. They assume degrees of standardization and predictability that may apply only to the most surface conditions of human behavior. The practitioner, too, may have to assume simplicity and ignore the more subtle and contentious elements of human activity. Our hunger for new techniques may, in part, be based on the very fact that they can be counted on to "banalize" human life. Problems of sexuality, child discipline, eating, working, maintaining a family, for example, become merely mechanical difficulties to be tuned up through some esoteric fiddling. Purely technical intervention literalizes

the metaphor of the machine just as the narrow and “enclosing framework” of technical application preempts the consummate human attributes—consciousness, conscience, desire, and intention. Reducing the marital relationship—its snags, tangles, and ineffabilities, its moments of divinity and despair—to a contract in which each partner plies the other with contingent positive reinforcement seems to assume that marriage, when it falters, suffers from a thoroughly correctable technical defect and that one marriage is pretty much like another. Marriage then is not a problem of being, of inadequate poetry (enhancing visions, symbols, and words), of failed virtue (not to know what to believe or do) but rather a mechanical one: somehow the engine of the marriage has developed a disconcerting ping. Perhaps it requires a clinical “Mr. Goodwrench.”

Ivan Illich (1977) in his bitter critique of the professions and the medical establishment in particular, describes the ultimate effects of professional “intervention” or technique as “disabling,” leaving us unprepared to understand and cope with the pains and tribulations that life brings; even unable to recognize or express organismic Joy. Through appropriation by the professions expectable human experiences of challenge, passage, and transformation have been removed from our aegis and can no longer inform, heal, or strengthen us. They have been converted to problems to be solved by an expert.

As the professions have burrowed their way into our economy, philosophy, and our psyches, we have, as a society, become devoted to what Illich (1977) labels staple-values as opposed to use-values. Staple-values circumscribe the consumer role and encourage us to suspend our own knowledge, interest, and motivation so that we may purchase what we need, for example, to chase the blues away, bring the centrifugal family back together, mourn and grieve for a deceased loved one. To a significant degree, such purchases are intended to rid us of the pain and confusion, the anguish and ambiguity of such mundane crises. Use-values, on the other hand, flow from active doing and seeking. They yield a system of meaning and technique that grows out of individual and collective intention, resolve, and action in meeting and solving problems. For use-values to flourish there has to be teaching, an intergenerational

context in which to learn about the tools of life and the lessons and virtues extracted from those tools. A couple's desire for a natural childbirth experience may not just be a reaction against the risks of a hospitalized, benumbed, less involved birth, but also an implicitly correct sense that to involve oneself in this most common and remarkable human event, to return some degree of control and responsibility to the self, bodes well for the development of this child and the evolution of this family (Illich, 1976).

The seepage of technology and technique into the wellspring of our culture also contaminates the poetic appreciation of life. As Barrett (1979) has suggested, in a society dominated by technicians and obsessed with technique, the technician runs the poet out of town on a rail:

If the poetry does not touch the daily round of existence somewhere or other, then we ourselves have become homeless on this earth. The figure of the poet thus represents a dimension of our human being, the loss of which would leave civilized man a cripple. What is the difference between a poet and a technician? The poet walking in the woods loses himself in the rapture of its presence; the technician calculates the bulldozers that will be needed to level it.

Barrett does not, nor do I, advocate somehow ridding ourselves of the technician so that we can unembarrassedly enjoy the fruits of Erato. But there is a sense in which the idea of technology and the reality of technique crowd out other experiences of the situation, other possible meaning to be found in or placed upon it.

In the field of practice, what technology stanches is artistry, that kind of knowing and doing based upon sensual involvement, tacit appreciations, spontaneous re-visions and "presence." As Donald Schon (1987) puts it:

In the terrain of professional practice, applied science and research-based technique occupy a critically important though limited territory, bounded on several sides by artistry. There are an art of problem framing, an art of implementation, and an art of improvisation—all necessary to mediate the use in practice of applied science and technique. (p. 13)

Finally, technology and technique are inherently conservative. Almost always controlled, shaped, and implemented by those with superior economic, social, and political power, technology is also conservative in that it can subvert human freedom—the exercise of choice, moral intention, the urge to autonomous action. It does this in two ways. First, the guiding assumption of much technological development is that the exigencies of life eventually can and should be tamed by technique. We shall overcome psychic malaise, not through personal or collective craft or action, but through the passive reception of regimen, tool, or intervention. This orientation undermines the basis for social and political change: individual and group awareness of the context from which problems arise; understanding or seeking out the precise relationship of private troubles to public issues; and translating this critical consciousness into some sort of personal or collective project. As Guba and Lincoln (1989) say of positivist science “. . . facts are heavy-laden, . . . exist within some value system and . . . are embodiments of a value system” (p. 123). The values embodied by empirically-based technical artifacts are inherently institution preserving and non-subversive (Jacoby, 1987).

Secondly, technological development and the reliance on technique erode the possibility of commitment and choice by touting bogus individualism above all over values—an individualism of desperation, detachment, and illusion beset by a siege mentality.

Confronted with an apparently implacable and unmanageable environment, people have turned to self-management. With the help of an elaborate network of therapeutic professions, which themselves have largely abandoned approaches stressing introspective insight in favor of ‘coping’ and behavior modification, men and women today are trying to piece together a technology of the self, the only apparent alternative to personal collapse. (Lasch, 1984, p. 58)

Technology preserves the status quo by playing to and boosting this ersatz individualism at the expense of community, interdependence, cooperation, collective will, political knowledge and action, not to mention self awareness (as opposed to self-manipulation), all of which are necessary conditions of change.

After all, if the common conditions of one's life are such to have elevated the blood pressure menacingly, why bother to ask questions or to engage others in the possibility of reform or action? A pill, a run at the biofeedback machine, building a stress management regime are easier, not to mention more immediately gratifying. The pernicious or malignant social conditions will remain to nettle us, others, and succeeding generations, but our pressure is down to a swell 120/70. We won't, I think, ask the questions we should about an environment or lifestyle that can kill.

Altering the Social Work Profession's Consciousness

The desire of the profession of social work for the fix, and the jolts it has already received, have moved it some distance away from its central missions and beliefs. Veins throbbing with the need for a hit, the intensifying of the craving for scientific respectability and technological facility, will send social work careening away from the core of its concerns so that fifteen years hence we may not even recognize it, transformed so radically by clinical-technical debauchery (Lloyd, 1984). The profession may become partners to what Hampden-Turner (1970) calls the "cryptoconservatism" of technology (pp. 303-347). The symptoms of our addiction are prodromal, perhaps, but highly visible:

- The waning of concern for the poor, the disreputable, the oppressed, the disenfranchised.
- A continuing thirst, hard to slake, for professional respectability, that is to say, more Ph.D.s, more "science," more technique, more clamoring for "accountability," more alliances with the established professions, and a continuing dalliance with the medical-technical model of practice.
- Amnesia for the progressive roots of the profession and the implicit radical agenda suggested by social work values (e.g., social justice).
- A knowledge base, that by implication or actual statement, encourages the antic "psychologizing" of human problems and predicaments.
- The expansion of private sector practice.

- The rapid growth of industrial (read: corporate) social work practice and the increasing growth of medical social work practice.

- The spread of credentializing movements and legislation as the primary political interest of the profession.

- The enthusiastic brandishing of “symbolic science” (e.g., single subject design) as a mode of practice or the possibility of the wedding of researcher/practitioner roles.

The symptoms are becoming more pronounced, the addiction nearly established.

The Fusion of Eros and Techne

One should not stand, curmudgeon-like as a cantankerous foe of technology, deluded by a romantic memory of a past that never was, afraid of a future that is unformed. Technology and technique have always been a part of humanity’s creations, stemming from curiosity or challenge, empowered by vision, and articulated by toil and test. But they also have been more or less under the control of their creators, intended to serve the cultural and human values of the moment. In our time, technology has outstripped our efforts to make it serve us, its own prepossessing sway replacing more humane philosophies and practices.

It is within the power of technology and technique to suppress the sensual. Norman O. Brown (1959) argues that technology originates from only a part of the human experience—the anal. The oddity of the psychoanalytic lexicon aside, Brown’s thesis is important. The anal character (formed during unceasing struggles for control during early childhood—often over control of one’s very body) is fascinated with control, possession, power, the machine and the lifeless. Anality opposes eros, the urge to life, the energy of the sensual and organismic. Like all instinctual strivings, anality has become institutionalized, suffused into the infrastructure of social institution and ideology. It is technology, more than anything else, that breathes life into the anal possibility because it provides tools for ignoring the “mess” of life, for channeling and restraining unpredictable surges of human passion, for detaching ourselves from the frivolous play of chance as well as the idiosyncrasies of our

neighbors, and for accumulating goods and power in the interest of maintaining control. The tools may be inanimate but they are powerful enough to deliver eros to the subterranean realm of fantasies, wishes, and dreams, and eventually, to distort its very nature (Berman, 1989).

As Morris Berman (1989) suggests, unless technology is under the control of, or fused with, the sensual and resonant, its contribution to humanity will, at best, be merely accidental and, at worst, out of our hand and destructive. In the end, our individual and political wills begin to sag under the weight of technique and technological growth.

For social workers, the fusion of *Techne* and *Eros* means that we should not be beguiled by technique. Because it "works" is *always* a feeble reason for employment. Social workers must begin with the human condition, as it is and as it might be, and identify with the insistent and the inchoate urges and passions of those they serve. To invigorate the experience of life, to enhance intention and will, to assist in the politics of struggle, to align with the power of eros is social work's mission. If technique and technology further that agenda, so be it. But if any given technique rationalizes and extends oppression, denies the reality of individual or collective meaning, obscures reality, suppresses tacit knowledge and artistry, then the fact that it works is bane not boon.

The visible source of eros is *care*. "Care," says Rollo May (1969), "is a state in which something does matter; care is the opposite of apathy. Care is the necessary source of eros, the source of human tenderness" (p. 286). Further, "It is a feeling denoting a relationship of concern, when the other's existence matters to you; a relationship of dedication, taking the ultimate form of being willing to get delight in or, in ultimate terms, to suffer for, the other" (May, 1969, p. 300). without care, its giving and receipt, we wither and die, physically, maybe; ontologically, certainly. Without care, passionate energy cannot be harnessed in the service of will—of doing, effecting, creating with purpose and sensation. Technique is merely tool, a device of our caring. As social work moves to emulate other professions, it is in danger of spitting out its own sweet moral core for the bitter rind of technical facility and social approbation.

The desire for the technological fix comes primarily from the academy, not the agency. *But* rest assured that the urge will gradually spread to the profession as a whole. Whether practitioner or academe there are some guidelines for the fusion of Eros and Techne.

The social work profession should consider abandoning the Positivist paradigm of knowledge development and employment (Pieper, 1985; Haworth, 1984; Saleebey, 1979; Goldstein, 1987; Weick, 1987). The history of this world view is the history of attempts to control and alter nature, both conceptually (objectivity, operationalism) and actually (technological mastery, technique). Since Thomas Kuhn (1970) wrote *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, there has been a gradual widening of the way in which we regard scientific knowing and doing (Capra, 1982; Guba, 1990; Rosaldo, 1989). The activity of science is the conscious creation of visions and images of the forms of nature so that the world will have meaning for us. We debate over particular constructions, but the core issue is how much experience and energy any given image inspires in us (Barrett, 1979). Let us give vent to the proposition that the core human activity is to give meaning to the inner and outer world (Bruner, 1990). To do so in a way that invigorates, appreciates, and enhances, and does not oppress the object of our interest, is a signal mark of caring, of empathy (Rifkin, 1985). Since the methodological axis around which social work turns, is caring (Perlman, 1989) our singular methodological charge is to understand and be astute about what caring is or might be, how it may appear, what forms it takes, what to care about, and how care, in any individual case (of policy or practice), can be transformed into action (Morris, 1978).

Technology and technique must always be subordinated to caring, the moral and ethical energies of the profession, and to fuller sensual involvement in the helping. Any technological scheme that expels caring must be immediately reevaluated and, perhaps, surrendered. Certain versions of behavior modification make some social workers edgy. Why? It may be that these techniques appear to crowd out caring. Thompson (1978) says it incisively (though he is speaking of the quality of Skinnerian science and not derived practices): "...the science of

Skinner bears the same relation to the scientific tradition as the Inquisition does to morality" (p. 91). Thompson means to counterpose the antic power of technique and the requirements of moral caring. In characterizing the "true" nature of professional practice, Donald Schon (1983) observes:

In the varied topography of professional practice, there is the high, hard ground where practitioners can make effective use of research-based theory and technique, and there is the swampy lowland where situations are confusing 'messes' incapable of technical solution. The difficulty is that the problems of the high ground, however great their technical interest, are often relatively unimportant to clients or the larger society, while in the swamp are problems of greatest human concern. (p. 42)

Technique thrives, in part, on the power inequality between the user and the recipient. Caring, on the other hand, assumes equality and a degree of psychosocial intimacy. Caring is, thus, profoundly democratic, an act of faith in the face of ambiguity, bureaucratic iniquity, and human frailty. Here one trembles with the meek rather than consorting with the powerful.

It is also time to amend the metaphorical language of technology rampant in the social work profession. Propelled by aspirations to professionalism, the search for scientific authority, and the mushrooming therapeutic enterprise, these metaphors, upon examination, reveal an attitude that runs directly counter to caring. 'Client system,' 'target populations,' 'intervention strategies,' and the like are characterizations of aspects of assessment and helping that are neither particularly accurate nor especially humane in their implication. Of the same ilk as bureaucratese, they are laughable because of their semantic arrogance but dangerous because they tend to disguise pain and suffering, stifle sensuality, and thwart intellectual grasp. They move us a step away from the humanizing of our concern and effort. Szasz (1978) refers to a similar "debauchment of the language of healing in the service dehumanizing and controlling persons by technicizing and therapeutizing personal relations" (p. 208).

The fusion of Eros and Techne turns out to be, in the individual case or the collective consequence, the unleashing of "desire" (passion, sensuality, organismic energy) in the service

of project (doing toward imagined or unimagined ends; the transformation of the self in action or interaction). "Care," argues Joel Kovel (1981), "becomes transcendent because, by affirming the indestructible value of the individual, it also criticizes the world according to whose standards she/he is wanting and so points the way toward its transformation" (p. 249). But "... care is noninstrumental: it is posited as an end in itself, not as the adjunct to some organizational purpose. The harsh reality is contained in the paradox that care must remain humble and ... shortsighted if it is to be authentic" (p. 250).

To put it in the strongest possible way, the utter reliance on technique and method can only mute Eros, not unleash it toward intention, commitment, and transformation. Rollo May (1969) makes the point:

...there comes a point...when the cult of technique destroys feeling, undermines passion, and blots out individual identity. The technologically efficient lover, defeated in the contradiction which is copulation without eros, is ultimately the impotent one. He has lost the power to be carried away; he knows only too well what he is doing. At this point, technology diminishes consciousness and demolishes eros. Tools are no longer an enlargement of consciousness but a substitute for it and, indeed tend to repress and truncate it. (p. 96)

Techne must help clarify our experience, focus our passion, and assist in the provision of meaning to our efforts in the real world. If it cannot, then it may be time to redefine what it means to be a "professional" social worker.

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