Robert Grosseteste's De Ubero Arbitrio

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ROBERT GROSSETESTE'S DE LIBERO ARBITRIO

by

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ROBERT GROSSETESTE'S *DE LIBERO ARBITRIO*

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*De Libero Arbitrio* of Robert Grosseteste (ca. 1170-1253) represents his primary exploration of that aspect of man's relationship to nature, to other human beings, and to God, known as free choice. This thesis explores the relationship of his treatise *De Libero Arbitrio* to his treatises *De Veritate*, *De Veritate Propositionis*, and *De Scientia Dei*. It also offers an outline and summary of *De Libero Arbitrio* and presents an English translation of Ludwig Baur's edition of the first recension of this treatise with updated notes.
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Andrew L. Pearson
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Robert Grosseteste's "De Libero Arbitrio"

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................. ii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ......................................................... iv

CHAPTER

I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................. 1
   Robert Grosseteste: His Life ............................................... 1
   De Libero Arbitrio ............................................................ 3
   Summary of De Libero Arbitrio ............................................ 13

II. TRANSLATION OF DE LIBERO ARBITRIO ......................... 26

III. NOTES .................................................................................. 127

BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................... 142
**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Anselm, <em>Opera Omnia</em>.</td>
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<tr>
<td>BGPM</td>
<td><em>Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie [und Theologie] des Mittelalters</em> (Münster i. W.).</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCL</td>
<td><em>Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina</em>.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSEL</td>
<td><em>Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum</em> (Vienna-Leipzig).</td>
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<tr>
<td>P. S.</td>
<td>Peter Lombard, <em>Sententiae</em>.</td>
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Robert Grosseteste: His Life

The writings of Robert Grosseteste (ca. 1170-1253), dealing as they do with subjects as diverse as calendars, Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, and the nature of light, attest to the wide range of his interests as well as to the power of his intellect. It is not surprising, therefore, that he should also turn his attention to the existence and nature of free choice, a subject that almost inevitably appears in any philosophical or theological analysis of human nature. *De Libero Arbitrio* represents Grosseteste's primary exploration of this aspect of man's relationship to nature, to other human beings, and to God.

Grosseteste wrote this treatise before he received his appointment as the Bishop of Lincoln in 1235. Although he attained high stature as bishop, relatively little is known about his life until the twenty years preceding this appointment, when he received his first benefice. In the absence of biographical sources, much if not all of Grosseteste's early life is subject to scholarly speculation. Scholars are not in agreement over his birthdate and actual birthplace. As to his birthdate, a comparison of modern scholarship yields an approximate date of 1170. Tradition supposes his birthplace to be in the County of Suffolk, but the actual birthplace is unknown. In regard to his family and their status in society, scholars agree with the chronicler Matthew Paris, as well as Richard Earl of Clare and Robert Grosseteste himself, that he was of humble birth. Little is known about his immediate family except that his later correspondence shows that he had a sister, Juetta (or Ivetta), "a nun, probably at
Godstow, to whom one of his letters is addressed.6 His parents are thought to have died while he was still a child. After their deaths he may have gone to Lincoln where a wealthy citizen, Adam of Wigford, received him. Helped by this act of benevolence, Grosseteste began his early education at Lincoln Cathedral.7

There is no evidence of where he continued his education or whether he attended Cambridge or Oxford.8 That he had acquired the title Magister is attested by his signature on a charter of Hugh, Bishop of Lincoln, written sometime between 1189 and 1192.9 He can also be located at Lincoln a few years later by means of a testimonial written for him by Gerald of Wales sometime during the years of 1194-1195.10 He then was employed as an administrator in William de Vere's household until William's death in December 1198.11 Southern suggests that he then may have worked as a papal judge-delegate in the diocese of Hereford at Shropshire with Hugh Foliot, archdeacon of Shropshire.12

The course of his life for the next fifteen years remains obscure. Most scholars, with the exception of Southern, agree that he went to Paris and studied theology during the period of the Interdict of 1209-1214 with the suspendium clericorum.13 With the resumption of lectures at Oxford in 1214 or shortly thereafter, he became the Chancellor or Master of the Schools at Oxford,14 perhaps the first ever appointed.

At this point his activities begin to emerge more clearly. From 1220-1230, he lectured on theology at Oxford. In 1225 he received his first benefice of the rectory of Abbotsley.15 Southern argues that it is also at this time that he became a priest.16 In 1229-30, he became the first lecturer at the newly established Franciscan school outside Oxford. During that time, he resigned his archdeaconry of Leicester and "gave up all his other revenues except his prebend in Lincoln cathedral."17 He
focused on his teaching at this school until 1235, when he became Bishop of Lincoln. 18

During his eighteen years as Bishop of Lincoln, Grosseteste distinguished himself through his enforcement of discipline among the clergy and laity and by his episcopal visitations. 19 In his attempts at reform, he often struggled with authorities in his own church as well as the papacy itself. He remained an active bishop until his death in 1253.

_De Libero Arbitrio_

_De Libero Arbitrio_ falls into the transitional phase of Grosseteste's writing and thought, and probably was written during his years of lecturing at Oxford between 1220 and 1230. It is in this transitional phase that his intellectual curiosity is extended to the fields of theology and philosophy. Works before this, such as _De Cometis_ 20 and _Computus_, 21 are primarily scientific in nature. _De Libero Arbitrio_ approximately coincides with his commentaries on Aristotle's _Posterior Analytics_ 22 and the first part of Aristotle's _Physics_, both of which influence his treatment of free choice. From this transitional period, his work matures so that his later works show a blending of his scientific interests with his theological and philosophical interests, most notably in his _Hexaemeron_, 23 his treatise on creation in Genesis, and _De Luce_, 24 his treatise on light.

The treatise, _De Libero Arbitrio_, is most closely associated with three other treatises of Grosseteste's Oxford period, _De Veritate_, 25 _De Veritate Propositionis_, 26 and _De Scientia Dei_. 27 It is entirely possible that these four treatises may have originated in part from Grosseteste's lectures at Oxford, or even from his own reading. According to Southern, the authorities cited in _De Veritate_ and _De Libero
Arbitrio are similar to those listed under the subjects "Truth" and "Free Will" in Grosseteste's own subject index to his readings.28

However, these three treatises and De Libero Arbitrio may be even more closely related. The treatises, De Veritate Propositionis and De Scientia Dei, appear to represent development in his thought from De Libero Arbitrio. Their use of terminology and clarity of expression in respect to truth and the necessity of God's knowledge suggest a clarification of his position in Chapter 6 of De Libero Arbitrio. De Libero Arbitrio, then, represents a preliminary study of God's knowledge and truth.

De Veritate is, on the other hand, a specific study on the subject of truth. Sections of De Veritate reflect similar discussions on truth that occur in the latter part of Chapter 8 of De Libero Arbitrio, and, as Baur notes in his edition of De Libero Arbitrio, there are over two full paragraphs in De Veritate, which correspond word for word with a section of De Libero Arbitrio.29 The direction of borrowing is not clear. Since, however, De Veritate displays clarity in its discussion about the relationship between truth and a proposition, which is not the case in De Libero Arbitrio, and cites from sources such as Anselm's De Veritate, which are absent in De Libero Arbitrio, the cursory evidence would suggest that De Veritate borrowed from De Libero Arbitrio.

As to existing manuscripts of this treatise, the text has been received in two recensions. For the first recension, there are two complete editions, and one incomplete edition. The two complete editions are found in the Florence Laurentian manuscript, Pl. XVIII, dext. VII, ff. 249\textsuperscript{rb}-260\textsuperscript{ra}, dated 13th C., and the Worcester Cathedral manuscript, F. 152, dated 14th C. There is an incomplete edition in the Florence Marucelliana, C. 163 ff.22\textsuperscript{D}-31\textsuperscript{C}, dated ca. 1400.30
Callus describes the Laurentian manuscript's edition of *De Libero Arbitrio* as the earliest, of English provenance and copied in the middle of thirteenth century. Details about the Worcester Cathedral manuscript are limited to its appearance in the *Catalogue of Manuscripts Preserved in the Chapter Library of Worcester Cathedral*. In this catalogue, its entry appears as follows:

F.152 - 1-11 - *Lincolniensis de libero arbitrio* [Robert Grosseteste].
Inc. f.1 - 'Quia circa rei esse';
Expl. f.11 - 'que circa liberum arbitrium essent dicenda.'

No dates are given. Thomson in his *Writings of Robert Grosseteste* assigns this manuscript to the late 14th century. It shares a common heritage with the Florentine manuscript as shown in the close similarities of the text, but with several of its own variations as seen in Baur's *Vario Lectio* for Grosseteste's *De Libero Arbitrio*.

The Florence Marucelliana manuscript is not used in Baur's edition of Grosseteste's *De Libero Arbitrio*. Thomson comments on this manuscript as a codex primarily known to be the most complete collection of Grosseteste's *opera physica*. The codex is written on paper by an Italian scribe, c. 1400. *De Libero Arbitrio* appears as the last treatise in this collection and is incomplete. Thomson does not note, however, to what extent this treatise is incomplete.

In regard to the second recension, there is chiefly the Exeter College manuscript [Ex. 28 fol. 296r-305r] at Oxford, which is incomplete in comparison to the first recension. Callus notes that *De Libero Arbitrio* appears between Grosseteste's *De Veritate* and a set of anonymous *quaestiones*, which are attributed to Grosseteste. All of these are written by the same scribe. Thomson assigns the date of the manuscript as c. 1325. Callus comments that the scribe carelessly copied an imperfect copy.
Thomson adds two other manuscripts to the second recension, the Jones 15, pp. 1-85, at Oxford and Marsh's Lib., 3. 6. 20, pp. 1-70 in Dublin. He notes that the Jones manuscript is a copy of the Exeter manuscript. The Dublin manuscript has a note on page 1 that reads: "E Msst Bibliothece Coll. Exon. apud Oxon.," suggesting that this codex belonged to Archbishop Marsh and has a connection with the Exeter manuscript. Thomson dates both as belonging to the 17th Century.

The primary difference between the recensions is that the second recension appears to be an edited version of the first, that is to say, the second recension omits material that is in the first recension and adds material that is not. It often summarizes sections of the first recension and elaborates or extends others. For example, in Chapter 6 of the first recension, the lines 17-19, which present a logical contradiction, have been edited out in the same passage of the second recension. The second recension, however, does not vary from the main current of thought that is in the first recension.

This translation of the first recension of *De Libero Arbitrio* makes use of Ludwig Baur's edition of the treatise, published in *Die philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste*. His edition of *De Libero Arbitrio* attempts to reconstruct the primary text by making a composite from the two complete copies of the first recension, i.e., the Florence Laurentian manuscript and the Worcester Cathedral manuscript. He publishes the second recension below the first recension, displaying their common material. For the second recension, he exclusively uses the Exeter College manuscript. The *Vario Lectio* for this treatise appears on pages 710-724.

In Baur's edition of *De Libero Arbitrio*, the chapter divisions that are used are less than helpful for following the early development of Grosseteste's disputation. In general, the chapter divisions do break the disputation at points where particular topics of discussion can be isolated, but Baur does not explain whether these
divisions are of his own devising or suggested by the actual manuscripts. These divisions, however, may lead the reader to believe that each new chapter begins a new topic. In particular, the divisions for Chapters 1-8 are the most misleading because all eight chapters belong to a single disputation on God's foreknowledge. On the other hand, Chapters 9-21 effectively divide the different topics of the disputation.

Using Baur's chapter divisions, the following chapter headings have been added and may be used as a guide to Grosseteste's treatise:

Chapter 1: The existence of free choice is uncertain
Chapter 2: God knows singulars and universals
Chapter 3: God's immutable omniscience proved by authorities
Chapter 4: God's immutable omniscience proved by reason
Chapter 5: Contingents follow from necessaries
Chapter 6: Necessity and contingency
Chapter 7: God does not seem to have the ability toward opposites
Chapter 8: God seems to have the ability toward opposites; the relations between God and that which is known
Chapter 9: Predestination and free choice
Chapter 10: Grace and free choice
Chapter 11: Fate and free choice
Chapter 12: The best possible creation
Chapter 13: Sin ruling free choice
Chapter 14: Forced free choice
Chapter 15: The existence of free choice
Chapter 16: The predication of free choice with God, angel, and man
Chapter 17: The essence of free choice
Chapter 18: The divisions of freedom
Chapter 19: The first-formed man and these freedoms
Chapter 20: The efficient cause of free choice
Chapter 21: The efficient cause of free choice is God; Epilogue.

In this treatise, Grosseteste writes in an unrefined style of disputation, "unrefined" in the sense that his treatise appears to lack polish, as seen, for example, in Chapter Six and Chapter Eight. His use of this disputational style in *De Libero Arbitrio* is not as clearly structured as in his *De Veritate*. In *De Libero Arbitrio*, Grosseteste tends to move between proving and disproving contrary views and then to move through related tangents, clarifications and distinctions without clearly
indicating what he is doing. This interrupts the flow of the treatise, and sometimes creates uncertainty over what he is proving or disproving and in relation to which argument he is doing this.

Despite the style, Grosseteste lays out a clear structure for his discussion of free choice. His treatment of free choice falls into two parts. He devotes the first part to the discussion of its existence and the second part to the discussion of its nature. He arranges the treatise around four particular questions. He first asks whether free choice exists. He then explores the essence of free choice, i.e., what exactly is it, and what does free choice come from. He concludes by asking whether free choice acts from within itself or is an action moved by God.

Of these four questions, Grosseteste dwells predominantly on the first question, whether free choice exists. His treatment of this is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on powers that eliminate free choice. He subdivides these powers into four particular topics of power that traditionally conflict with the existence of free choice, namely, God’s omniscience, predestination, grace, and fate.

He then follows this discussion with three tangential issues. First, if God created the universe to be as good as the universe was able to be and to become, why do human beings have the ability to sin? Secondly, if choice has the ability to sin, is it free? Thirdly, if someone is forced to make a choice from the fear of death, is that choice free?

Having resolved the power conflicts involved in free choice, he devotes the second part of the first question, whether free choice exists, to the actual proof for its existence. He does this by using several arguments and by citing scriptural passages that suggest its existence. In this way, he delineates the existence of free choice first, in face of conflicting powers and then by offering proof of its actual existence.
Before attending to the next question—what is it?—Grosseteste first inquires whether free choice is predicated univocally or equivocally of God, angel, and man. He first presents Anselm's position that free choice is predicated univocally because Anselm assigns a single and common definition to free choice. Grosseteste then advocates an equivocal predication of free choice. He resolves the conflicting views by explaining that Anselm was pursuing an earlier method of investigation whereby he found a definition common to creator and creature. Grosseteste concludes that free choice is equivocal in God, angel, and man, i.e., freedom of choice is freer even in God than in man, and freer even in confirmed angels than in man.

Grosseteste proceeds next to a discussion of what is free choice? This part of the treatise is essentially a disputation to resolve the difference between Anselm who says that the ability to sin does not concern the essence of free choice and Lombard, Augustine, and Bernard who say that it does. Anselm argues that the ability to sin does not concern the essence of free choice and that the definition of free choice is "the power of preserving the rectitude of the will for the very purpose of uprightness itself." On the other hand, Lombard, Augustine, and Bernard believe that the ability to sin does concern the essence of free choice and that free choice is "the rational power of the soul whereby it, discerning either one, can will good and evil." Grosseteste resolves these conflicting views by distinction. Anselm speaks of free choice per se or of its essence, while the "others" speak per accidens or that which is extraneous to the nature of free choice.

Yet, why is free choice called "free choice"? To answer this, Grosseteste arranges arguments devised from his interpretation of St. Bernard. He argues that choice is designated an act of the will from the naturally preceding judgment of reason. Therefore, in the term "free choice," "choice" pertains to reason, and "free"
pertains to the will. In this, there is one root of will and of reason, which is the substance and essence of free choice, because judging is free in reason and in will.

But from what does this freedom of choice come or what is its material cause? Grosseteste does not explicitly identify any particular discussion as the material cause of free choice, although later in the treatise he writes that he has discussed its material cause. He does, however, distinctly locate freedom with being and willing. True freedom is *being well* according to what one wills and to have complete autonomy over having one's *being well* commensurate with one's own ordered will. Only God is free in the highest degree. His whole being is commensurate with His own will. He has in His power both *being well* absolutely as He wills ordinately, and willing as He wills absolutely. Man, on the other hand, will come closest to this only in Heaven; yet, being and willing, and being well, will not be the same in man as it is in God.\(^4^5\)

At this point, the discussion takes a subtle turn to discuss different divisions of freedom, according to one's perspective of free choice. From the perspective of changeability, there is freedom from necessity, also called freedom of condition, and there is freedom of nature, because the will wills always voluntarily and without constraint. On the other hand, viewing free choice as the actual ability to choose opposites, "the will has freedom of prudence and of counsel, since it has in [its] responsive power both to apprehend choosing and to avoid that which must be avoided."\(^4^6\) Grosseteste concludes that "the aggregation of all these freedoms which have been discussed above constitutes true and consummate freedom."\(^4^7\)

In regard to the fourth question—*what causes free choice to exist?*—he presents a relatively brief discussion, in which he argues for the efficient cause of free choice to be God. This is followed with a related discussion about whether the motion and action of free choice are also from God. He then concludes the treatise.
with several unresolved questions about free choice, such as whether it is simple or composite, and what is the relationship between free choice and time.

If we try to inquire as to what are some possible sources for this particular arrangement, three possibilities commend themselves: Aristotle, Anselm, and Lombard. The influence of Aristotle is immediately recognizable in the four questions around which Grosseteste structures his treatise. Grosseteste draws the first question—whether it is—from Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*, Bk. II, Cap. 2. The other three questions that he uses to order the treatise are recognizably the formal, material, and efficient causes, taken from Aristotle's *Physics*, Bk. II, Cap. 3.

A secondary arrangement exists within the first question, whether it is, that is reminiscent of St. Anselm's *De Concordia*. In this treatise, Anselm discusses the relation of free choice to God's foreknowledge, predestination, and grace. Grosseteste uses the same order, but adds a section on fate. Grosseteste also differs from Anselm in that Grosseteste extends his concern to prove the actual existence of free choice, which Anselm does not do.

The second part of Grosseteste's *De Libero Arbitrio*, which deals with the essence of free choice, is similar in structure and in content to Anselm's *De Libertate Arbitrii* and Lombard's *Sententiae*, Bk. II, Dist. 25, Cap. 8. Anselm sets forth three specific objectives for his treatise *De Libertate Arbitrii*, "that it asks what freedom of choice is, whether man always has it, and how many distinctions of freedom there are with respect to having or not having uprightness-of-will." By comparison, Grosseteste arranges the second part of his treatise around the question of what is free choice just as Anselm, but rather than asking whether man always has it, Grosseteste asks what divisions there are for freedom and which of these did the first man have.

When Grosseteste discusses the divisions of freedom, it is the influence of Lombard, rather than Anselm, that appears. Anselm's divisions of freedom in his *De
Libertate Arbitrii are in relation to its own being, that is, unoriginated freedom of choice in God, and freedom of choice created and received from God. Lombard, on the other hand, uses divisions of freedom in relation to the nature of free choice, rather than its existence. Lombard takes these divisions, such as freedom of counsel, freedom from necessity, and freedom of condition from St. Bernard's treatise De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio (On Grace and Free Choice). These are also the divisions used by Grosseteste.

Other antecedent influences appear in his citations of various authorities. Grosseteste quotes from 14 different authorities in the course of this treatise, authorities such as: Augustine, Anselm, Boethius, Chrysostom, Cicero, Jerome, Hilary, Lombard, Ps.-Augustine, Seneca, and Virgil, as well as Biblical scriptures. A statistical examination indicates that Augustine is the preferred source for quotations with a total of thirty-nine quotes. The scriptures are second with thirty-one; Anselm and Bernard tie at third with nine apiece, and Boethius with eight. The rest are limited to one to five citations.

Although Grosseteste quotes Augustine most often, his quotations from Anselm and Bernard relate more directly to the subject of free choice. The two works of Augustine from which Grosseteste quotes most often are Augustine's De Libero Arbitrio with nine citations and his De Genesi ad Litteram with eight. Upon closer examination of the nine quotations from Augustine's De Libero Arbitrio, Grosseteste uses only one in relation to free choice, and that is to show its existence. The others show that mathematical principles are eternal, that there is eternal law, and that God is sufficient unto Himself and is not helped by man's free choice. Of the eight quotations from Augustine's De Genesi ad Litteram, most relate to God's omniscience.
On the other hand, the two works of Anselm, which Grosseteste uses for nine quotations, are more directly related to the subject of free choice. Grosseteste quotes passages from Anselm's *De Concordia* to show that there are views from scripture that both embrace the existence of free choice and deny it. The passages from Anselm's *De Libertate Arbitrii* show that there is a common and single definition of free choice and that free choice exists equally in all.

When writing about the nature of free choice, however, he quotes mostly from Bernard's *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* (On Grace and Free Choice). These quotations from Bernard convey the ideas that God gave the ability to sin and this ability is good, and that "free choice" is called such because "free" pertains to will, and "choice" pertains to reason." Although the absence of quotations from a particular source does not exclude its influence, the sources quoted show which ones were important to Grosseteste in a particular context or argument at the time he wrote this treatise.

**Summary of *De Libero Arbitrio***

The following is a summary of each chapter for the purpose of following the path of Grosseteste's thought throughout the treatise. The summary is ordered around an outline for Grosseteste's *De Libero Arbitrio*. Within each summary, where it has been appropriate, a distillation of the basic arguments and conclusions has been provided. This does not attempt to interpret or judge the quality, validity, or veracity of his conclusions. It does, however, call attention to particular arguments that are noteworthy and contribute to understanding the disputation.
Outline of *De Libero Arbitrio*

I. The existence of free choice
   A. The existence of free choice is uncertain [Chap. 1]
   B. God's knowledge
      1. God knows singulars and universals [Chap. 2]
      2. God's immutable omniscience proved by authorities [Chap. 3]
      3. God's immutable omniscience proved by reason [Chap. 4]
         a. Transition to the problem of future contingents [Chap. 4]
         b. Contingents follow from necessaries [Chap. 5]
         c. Necessity and contingency [Chap. 6]
      4. God does not seem to have the ability toward opposites [Chap. 7]
      5. God seems to have the ability toward opposites; the relations between God and that which is known [Chap. 8]
   C. Predestination and free choice [Chap. 9]
   D. Grace and free choice [Chap. 10]
   E. Fate and free choice [Chap. 11]
   F. The best possible creation [Chap. 12]
   G. Sin ruling free choice [Chap. 13]
   H. Forced free choice [Chap. 14]
   I. The existence of free choice [Chap. 15]

II. The nature of free choice
   A. The predication of free choice with God, angel, and man [Chap. 16]
   B. The essence of free choice and the essence of freedom [Chap. 17]
      a. The divisions of freedom [Chap. 18]
      b. The first-formed man and these freedoms [Chap. 19]
III. The efficient cause of free choice
   A. The efficient cause of free choice [Chap. 20]
   B. The efficient cause of free choice is God. [Chap. 21]

Summary of Each Chapter

I. The existence of free choice
   A. The existence of free choice is uncertain

Chapter One: Grosseteste begins the treatise by immediately questioning the existence of free choice and proceeds to lay the foundation for its discussion over the next eight chapters. By the use of authorities such as Augustine and Anselm, he shows that some people believe in the existence of free choice and some deny its existence. Even Scripture appears to be divided in this debate. In addition, there are powers that conflict with the existence of free choice; there are the foreknowledge and predestination of God, the truth of a statement about the future, divination, prophecy, the necessity of fate, grace, and the coercion by temptation or any impulse to sin.

He ends Chapter One by setting up the foundation for a disputation about the foreknowledge of God. He forms a syllogism that shows the arguments of Boethius and Anselm, as follows:

   Everything known by God is or was or will be.
   A is known by God. Let A be a future contingent.
   A is or was or will be.
   A neither is nor was.
   Therefore, A will be.

He points out that some will oppose the second premise by saying God knows only universals, and not singulars.
B. God's knowledge

1. God knows singulars and universals

Chapter Two: Grosseteste responds to the objection that God knows only universals, and not singulars. He proves the omniscience of God both by authorities and by reason.

2. God's immutable omniscience proved by authorities

Chapter Three: Having proved God's omniscience, Grosseteste now turns to prove the immutability of God's knowledge. He introduces two new objections to God's knowledge of contingents. First, it is not necessary that God know A because A will be able not to be. Secondly, God's knowledge extends only to that which has been and therefore not to future contingents.

He again uses authority and reason to defend God's immutability. Here, his only authority is Augustine, whereby he concludes at the beginning of Chapter Four, "What God knows, he cannot not know in the future, although that which has been known may not be. So, since He knows A, He will always know A, whether A will have been or will not have been."50 [As seen here in Chapter Three, while Grosseteste likes to play on paradoxes, he does not often answer them. Grosseteste does not explain how God may have knowledge of things that do not exist. Aquinas clarifies this issue in Question 14, Art. 9 in his Summa Theologica.51 Aquinas notes the relationship between God's will and things that exist, and makes the distinction between those things that are and those things that are possible: "[I]t is not necessary that whatever God knows should be, or have been or is to be; but this is necessary only as regards what He wills to be, or permits to be. Further, it is not in the knowledge of God that these things be, but that they be possible."52]
3. God's immutable omniscience proved by reason
   a. Transition to the problem of future contingents

Chapter Four: Next, Grosseteste proves the immutability of God's knowledge by reason. He ends with the illogical conclusion that contingents follow from necessaries.

b. Contingents follow from necessaries

Chapter Five: In this chapter, he supports the previous conclusion that contingents follow from necessaries, primarily on the authority of Boethius, Augustine, and Seneca. From them he concludes that "exemplars are necessary, from which it follows that the being of the copy is contingent."53 He supports this apparent contradiction together by quoting Anselm: "Since from the existence of a thing in eternity, its existence in time follows, the mutable follows from the immutable and a contingent follows from a necessary."54

c. Necessity and contingency

Chapter Six: Grosseteste now turns to resolve the conflict between the necessity of God's knowledge and the contingency of creation.

To do this, he begins by making a distinction of the term "necessary." There is the simply necessary, as that which does not have the ability or capacity to be otherwise, such as 2+3=5. And there is the immutable, i.e., that which cannot be one way after being another.55 According to Grosseteste, the truth of a future statement, e.g., "that the Antichrist will be," is immutable. The truth of such a statement cannot cease. While the truth of a future statement is necessary, however, the existence of that future contingent is not from necessity. Therefore, these statements are a mixture of contingency and necessity. The necessity is to be placed with the truth of the statement and the contingency is to be placed with the existence. This foreshadows his explanation in his De Veritate Propositionis that truth in a future statement is
twofold. "The truth of speech or opinion concerning a future thing is the present assertion of the existence of the thing in the future with the existence of the thing in the future."\textsuperscript{56} So, there is the truth of assertion which is immutable and the truth of the existence which is contingent. [\textit{Grosseteste assumes that the evaluation of truth in an assertion about the future is only at the time of that assertion or utterance. Therefore, the truth of that assertion cannot cease, because the truth of that assertion is evaluated only at the time of its utterance; so, its truth is immutable, regardless of the later actualization of that assertion about the future. Here lies the most important contribution of this treatise, for Grosseteste is introducing a time dependent necessity.}]

As truth in a statement about the future is immutable, God's knowledge is immutable. "\textit{S}ince God has known something, it is not possible for Him not to know this afterwards. It is nevertheless possible that from eternity He has known this and has not known this, so that He may know what He does not know and may not know what He knows."\textsuperscript{57} So, if God knows some contingent, he has always known this from eternity. And if He does not know some contingent, He has always not known this from eternity. For God knows what will be and what will not be in the same way. In his treatise \textit{De Scientia Dei}, he explains further that God's knowledge has consequent necessity, a necessity that follows the being of a thing and does not force it to being.\textsuperscript{58}

Grosseteste concludes that God can not know A, because God's knowledge of this is immutable and God knows and not knows in the same way. Furthermore, although there is immutable truth in a statement such as "that the Antichrist will be," with respect to its assertion, the truth concerning the existence of the Antichrist is contingent. So, that the Antichrist was to be can be false, and that the Antichrist will be can be false, and can in the future be false. Therefore, God, knowing that the
Antichrist is going to be, can not know in the future that he is going to be and vice versa. [Aquinas’s comments in his discussion about why effects do not follow from causes necessarily supplement Grosseteste’s discussion here. See Question 19, Art. 3 of Aquinas’s Summa Theologica.59]

4. God does not seem to have the ability toward opposites

Chapter Seven: Grosseteste counterattacks the conclusions of Chapter Six by proposing five proofs to show that God does not have the ability toward opposites and two proofs to show that truth does not have the ability toward falsity. Proofs 1, 2, 5, 6, and 7 use eternity as the prohibitor of the ability toward opposites. Proofs 3 and 4, use characteristics of God’s perfection and of His being to prove that He does not have the ability of opposites.

Grosseteste’s closes Chapter Seven declaring that although the above arguments disprove the conclusions of Chapter Six, the conclusions of Chapter Six are still true, i.e., for God, it is possible for Him to know and not to know.

5. God seems to have the ability toward opposites; the relations between God and that which is known

Chapter Eight: Although Chapter Eight begins as a continuation of Chapter Seven, most of the chapter wanders through arguments and issues that digress from the main course of the treatise. He begins this chapter by taking the last proof of Chapter Seven, which shows that in God it is possible to know and not to know, and applying it to God’s willing, i.e., He can will what He does not will and can not will what He wills. He then follows this with three proofs for the existence of the ability for opposites in eternity.

In the fourth proof, he sets out to show how it is possible that God is able to know many things that He does not know and vice versa, and how it is not possible. His efforts center on the relations that exist between knowing and that which is
known. The relation that exists between God and that which is known is variable; however, since the relation is in God, it is eternal. In the course of his inquiry, he becomes preoccupied with the status of the relationship between those relations and God. His primary concern throughout this section is both to show that the relations are eternal and not the same as God, and also to adhere to the idea that nothing other than God is eternal.

C. Predestination and free choice

Chapter Nine: Grosseteste turns to the next topic that may eliminate free choice, predestination. He argues that the effect of every necessary cause is necessary. Therefore: A is a necessary cause. Let A be an effect predestined to be made by a rational creature. Since the effect is from a necessary cause, it too is necessary and therefore there is not free choice in rational creatures. He resolves this by clarifying the necessary cause as existing conditionally. The necessity is subsequent as in the example "it is predestined that Socrates be saved contingently, not necessarily." Therefore, he concludes that A's contingent existence is necessary.

D. Grace and free choice

Chapter Ten: He next discusses the effect of grace on free choice. The working of grace limits the power of free choice in that grace makes all work meritorious. Therefore: if A makes all B, then nothing else shares in the work with respect to B. He then supports this view with several arguments.

He draws his resolution for this from Bernard's De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio (On Grace and Free Choice). The above view is incorrect because it separates the action into two parts, grace and free choice. They cannot be separated into different actions, since they perform together.
E. Fate and free choice

Chapter Eleven: In this chapter, he inquires into the nature of fate and its relation to free choice. He distinguishes two perceptions of fate. From Boethius he takes the perception that fate works within the simplicity of providence. Fate is the temporal manifestation of providence. The second perception is from Cicero's De Divinatione. Fate "is the necessity of all lower things by the order and the movement of the stars." He directs his reply to Cicero's definition of fate. According to Augustine, "the soul is loftier than the stars and therefore it directs inferior reason and voluntary motions of the body. This may not occur by stars." 

F. The best possible creation

Chapter Twelve: Grosseteste asks, if God created the universe to be as good as the universe was able to be and to become, why is there the ability to sin? Would not the universe be better with the non-ability to sin that is in God and the angels as well as in man when he reaches heaven? He answers that the universe was created in the best way. He supports this by quoting Jerome: "The best creator wanted us to have the ability for both, but to do one, namely, the good that He has commanded...so that we would do His will from our will."

G. Sin ruling free choice

Chapter Thirteen: In this chapter, he posits that since choice is able to sin, it is not free. He first refutes this by saying that free choice is subject to its own law; it is subject to sin voluntarily. He opposes this refutation thus: "Since the will has subjected itself to sin, it has lost its freedom." He suspends any solution for this until he has explained what free choice is and how many kinds of that freedom exist.

H. Forced free choice

Chapter Fourteen: Grosseteste asks whether forced choice is free. He argues that a man, coerced by fear, does what he does not want. Therefore he does not act
from the will and so not from free choice. He responds to this by saying, "No will can be forced so that it does not will what it wills, but it can be forced so that it does not do what it wills,...[forced] by a greater contrary will or other emotions that do not obey the commanding will." 67

I. The existence of free choice

Chapter Fifteen: He returns now to the main question of this part of the treatise, whether free choice exists. This chapter provides several reasons or arguments that demonstrate that free choice exists. This is then followed by the use of authorities to prove this, namely, the Scriptures, Jerome, Augustine, Chrysostom, and Bernard.

II. The nature of free choice

A. The predication of free choice with God, angel, and man

Chapter Sixteen: Before attending to the next question—what is it?—Grosseteste first inquires whether free choice is predicated univocally or equivocally of God, angel, and man. He first presents Anselm's position from his De Libertate Arbitrii that free choice is predicated univocally because Anselm assigns a single and common definition to free choice. Grosseteste then advocates the equivocal predication of free choice. He resolves the conflicting views by explaining that Anselm was pursuing an earlier method of investigation whereby he found a definition common in creator and creature. Grosseteste concludes that free choice is equivocal in God, angel, and man, i.e., freedom of choice is freer even in God than in man, and freer even in confirmed angels than in man.

B. The essence of free choice and the essence of freedom

Chapter Seventeen: Grosseteste begins Chapter Seventeen by arguing that the ability to sin does not concern the essence of free choice, which is Anselm's position
from his *De Libertate Arbitrii*, and concludes this section with Anselm's definition of free choice cited in Anselm's *De Libertate Arbitrii*: "Free choice is the power of preserving the uprightness of the will for the very purpose of uprightness itself."68

He then argues for those who believe that the ability of opposites does concern the essence of free choice. Free choice is "the rational power of the soul whereby it, discerning either one, can will good and evil."69 He clarifies this position by showing that the power of doing good does not equal the power of sinning.

He resolves these conflicting views by distinction. Anselm speaks of free choice *per se* or of its essence. The "others," namely, Lombard, Bernard and Jerome, speak *per accidens* or that which is extraneous to the nature of free choice.

Grosseteste then shifts his discussion from those who believe that the power of sinning and not sinning concerns the essence of free choice to their conception of what free choice is. Since their position asserts the changeability of the will, freedom is the inclination of the will. Influenced by Bernard's *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, Grosseteste explains that choice is derived from the judgment of reason which naturally precedes the act of the will. "Reason itself does not bring any necessity to the will for choosing or avoiding, because reason itself has so judged, but it is left free for the will to follow or to decline the sentence of the judgment of reason."70 According to Bernard in his *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio (On Grace and Free Choice)*, "'choice' pertains properly to reason, and 'free' pertains properly to the will."71

Although there seem to be two actions, free choice is one, i.e., one in the one essence of the root. "The one root of will and of reason is the substance of free choice."72

Grosseteste then explains that free choice is called "free choice," rather than judgment, because judgment conveys judicial necessity. Choice is judgment, but
there is not the necessity of fulfilling choice as there is for judgment. "For the will, for which reason judges, has the freedom to follow or to reject its judgment." 73

He concludes this section by clarifying the views of those who say that the power of sinning and not sinning concern the essence of free choice. He adds that this in fact is not quite correct, rather it is the changeability, which is not the same as the power to sin or not to sin.

a. The divisions of freedom

Chapter Eighteen: From the perspective of changeability, which is essential to free choice, Grosseteste explains that there is freedom from necessity, also called freedom of condition, and there is a freedom of nature, because the will wills always voluntarily and without constraint. On the other hand, viewing free choice as the actual ability to choose opposites, "the will has freedom of prudence and counsel, since it has in [its] responsive power both to apprehend choosing and to avoid that which must be avoided without any obstacle." 74 Grosseteste concludes that "the aggregation of all these freedoms which have been discussed above constitutes true and consummate freedom." 75

b. The first-formed man and these freedoms

Chapter Nineteen: Grosseteste then asks which of these freedoms — of nature, of counsel, or of pleasure — did the first-formed man have. He answers that the first-formed man had these three freedoms, but did not have freedom from wretchedness. Since these three freedoms follow from freedom of choice, from his abuse of this freedom, "he deprived himself of the others." 76
III. The efficient cause of free choice

A. The efficient cause of free choice

Chapter Twenty: Grosseteste’s discussion about the efficient cause of free choice concentrates on showing that God is its efficient cause. The beginning of the discussion posits that free choice is not from God because the evil of error is from free choice. If free choice is from God, evil is from God. He counters this with Augustine’s proof, drawn from Augustine’s De Libero Arbitrio: Every man is made by God; whatever concerns the essence of man is made by God; free choice concerns the essence of man; therefore, free choice is from God. He accompanies this with three more arguments to show that free choice is good and from God.

B. The efficient cause of free choice is God

Chapter Twenty-One: In this final chapter, Grosseteste presents three inconclusive discussions about the source for the motion of free choice. He first discusses whether the motion of free choice toward indifferent good is from God or from within free choice itself. Although he argues for God being the source for its motion causally, he does not determine that this is the case, but leaves this discussion for others to debate.

He next asks whether the motion of free choice, whereby it is moved toward evil, is also from God. Again, while Grosseteste defends the idea of separating God from any act of evil, he avoids committing himself to a particular point-of-view.

Grosseteste then turns to the question whether free choice from itself alone can will meritorious good? Through several arguments, he essentially proposes that free choice descends from the good of its own accord, but that free choice can only ascend to the good with the help of grace. However, he does not determine that this is the case.
CHAPTER II

TRANSLATION OF
DE LIBERO ARBITRIO

Chapter One

Since there can be uncertainty about the existence of things, the first of the questions is "whether it is?" Therefore, since we find reasons inclining us to the existence and non-existence of free choice, and the opinions of wise men differ, we first turn to the debate about its existence.

Moreover, that philosophers hold conflicting views is evident. As Augustine says in his Homily 53 on John: "For some deny free choice so that they may dare to dismiss sin. Some, however, defend it so that they may dispel prayer." And Anselm says: "For many people lament because they believe that free choice is of no avail for salvation or damnation, but that as a result of God's foreknowledge there is only necessity." And again the same Anselm says: "Therefore, since we find in Sacred Scriptures certain passages which seem to favor grace alone and certain passages which are believed to establish free choice alone, apart from grace, there have been certain arrogant individuals who have thought that the whole efficacy of the virtues depends only upon freedom of choice; and in our day there are many who have completely given up on the idea that there is any freedom of choice." Yet, Cicero attributes the whole good of virtue to free choice and nothing to the gods in Book III of his De Natura Deorum.
Since the existence of it [free choice] is uncertain, let [those issues] which seem to remove completely its existence be proposed. [These issues] are God's foreknowledge and predestination, the truth of a statement about the future, divination, prophecy, the necessity of fate, grace, the coercion by temptation or any impulse to sin. That we also sin by free choice seems to destroy it and perhaps [there are] others which presently do not come to my memory.

Free choice seems to be destroyed by foreknowledge, as the blessed Anselm and Boethius sufficiently demonstrate. Since those arguments and the solutions of those arguments presented by them are clear, we pass beyond them and demonstrate as follows: everything known by God is or was or will be. A is known by God. Let A be some future contingent. Therefore, A is or was or will be. But it neither is nor was; therefore it will be.

It is self-evident that each one of the premises is necessary. It is also clear that the consequence [consecutio] is necessary, therefore the consequent [consecutio]$^8$ is not only true, but also necessary: for only that which is necessary follows from necessaries. In this way therefore, either one of the premises is false or the consequence is not necessary or a contingent follows from necessaries or all things follow from necessity.

But there is no doubt that the consequence is necessary. Moreover, it is clear that the major is true. Someone will say, however, that the minor is false, namely, "A is known by God," either because He only knows universals and not singulars, as some pagans say, or because it is not necessary "that God knows A," since He is able not to know what He knows.
But, that God also knows singulars can be doubly proved by authorities and by reason.

By authorities as follows: in Ecclesiasticus it is indeed written in this way: "All their works are as the sun in the sight of God, and His eyes watching without intermission on their ways. And their testaments have not been concealed by their iniquity and all their iniquities are in the sight of God." By singulars and not universals: therefore He has known singulars.

In a like manner, Ecclesiasticus: "The eyes of the Lord are much brighter than the sun, looking upon all the ways of men, both the depths of the abyss and the hearts of men, gazing into the concealed parts. For before all things were created they were known to the Lord God; so, after it was finished, He looks upon all things." Similarly in Ezekiel: "The Lord says this: So you have spoken, house of Israel, and I know the thoughts of your heart." Again, in I Samuel: "Man looks on the outward appearance, but the Lord looks on the heart." Again in Proverbs: "All the ways of man are clear in His own eyes." Again in Jeremiah: "For my eyes are upon all their ways; they are not hid from me, nor is their iniquity concealed from my eyes." Similarly in Jeremiah: "If a man will be hid in secret places and will I not see him says the Lord? Do I not fill heaven and earth?" Also in II Corinthians: "Moreover we are known to God." Again in Hebrews: "All things are bare and open to His eyes."

Therefore from these authorities of the New and Old Testaments it is clear that nothing, either universal or singular, eludes God. But because the aforementioned view about the knowledge of God is of the pagans, who believe the authorities of the Holy Scripture not at all, because they do not accept them, something should be brought forth against those [pagans] from the particular authorities which they accept.
Seneca says: "So we must live as though we live in the sight of God; so we must think as though someone should be able and can look upon our inmost heart. For what good is it that something be hidden by a man? Nothing is shut off from God: He lies between our souls and intervenes in the midst of our thoughts." Cicero says the same in his book about divination: "If the gods exist and the world is administered by their providence, and for the same world they direct human affairs not only regarded as universals, but also as singulars." Similarly [these words of] Boethius in his book *The Consolation of Philosophy* thus fell from his mellifluous lips:

He sees all things and hears all things.  
Sweet-voiced Homer sings of the clear light of bright Phoebus; but the sun's weak rays cannot pierce the bowels of the earth nor the depths of the sea.  
It is not so with the Creator of this great sphere.  
No mass of earth, no dark and clouded nights can resist his vision which looks down on all things.  
He sees at once, in a single glance, all things that are, or were, or are to come.  
Since He is sole observer of all things, you may call Him the true Sun.

In the same way he says in the same place: "With a single intuition of his mind He knows all things that are to come, whether necessarily or not." Likewise, he says in the same book: "But God sees as present those future things which result from free will." From these [passages], it is clear that God knows eternally not only universals, but also contingent singular things. And those passages that have been cited are the authorities of the pagans.

Furthermore, Augustine says in Book V of his *De Genesi ad Litteram*: "But when the Psalmist added the phrase, *fulfilling His command*, he made it quite clear that the plan in these phenomena subject to God's command is hidden from us rather than that it is absent from universal nature. Our Savior with His own lips tells us that not a single sparrow falls to earth without God willing it, and that God Himself
clothes the grass of the field, which is soon to be thrown into the oven. In saying
this, does not our Lord assure us that not only this whole region of the world which
has been assigned to mortal and corruptible beings but also the least and lowliest parts
of it are ruled by Divine Providence?"99 In the same way, Augustine says in Book
III of his De Trinitate: "For nothing happens in a visible and sensible manner, that is
not commanded or permitted by that inner, invisible and intelligible court of the
supreme ruler, in accordance with the ineffable justice of His rewards and
punishments, and His graces and retributions, in this very vast and immense republic
of all creation."100 In the same way, Augustine speaks about purgative punishments:
"If you never turn away from a good life, then your tongue is silent, your life cries
out and the ears of God incline toward your heart. For in the manner that our ears
incline toward our voices, thus the ears of God [incline] toward our thoughts."101

The same [that God knows singulars] is also shown by reason as follows:

Since God is a just retributer, He knows to balance rewards and penalties with
merits and sins. But if He knows to balance them, He knows as many rewards as
faults. But the merits and the actions of sin are singulars. Therefore, He knows
singualrs.

Furthermore: since He is the creator of singulars, of necessity He knows
them. In fact, it is His to create, His to speak, and His to know.

Furthermore: no one will make an instrument well for some purpose, unless
he knows either by himself or by another that purpose for which there is the
instrument. Therefore, since sense perception and imagination are instruments for the
comprehension of singulars, the maker of the sense perception and imagination
knows either by himself or by another the nature of singulars. But God does not
know these singulars by another. For Isaiah says: "Who has directed the Spirit of
the Lord, or who has been a counselor and has shown [anything] to that One?"102 In
a like manner, the Apostle in his letter to the Romans [writes]: "For who has known the mind of the Lord..." 103 Similarly, the Psalmist says: He who set the ear in place, does he not hear? He who formed the eye, does he not see? 104 Therefore in Himself God knows singulars. Moreover, it is evident that the major proposition is true. Indeed, an ironworker would not make a plane well, unless he had been instructed by a woodworker in the nature of things that are planed. And if perhaps he, without instruction, should make it well, this would be by chance. God, however, renders or does nothing by chance.

Furthermore: if God did not know singulars, you would know many things which God would not know. But to say this is absurd.

Furthermore: if singular contingent things are not ruled by chance, but by divine providence, God knows them. For how could He rule without error things which He does not know?

Furthermore, a thing is not loved unless it is known. And God, since He is responsive, loves those who love Him. Therefore, He also knows them.

Furthermore, Cicero says: "If God does not know human affairs, nor pay attention to what we do, how can there be piety, sanctity, religion, and why are worship of, honor for, and prayers to God offered? For God will not punish or reward sins or merits. If this is so, piety, sanctity, and religion perish. Without these, disorder of life and great confusion follow. And without piety toward God, faith and the society of the human kind and justice, the most distinguished virtue, are removed." 105

Furthermore, Anselm says: "God is something greater than anything that can be conceived." 106 But in each genus, knowing is better and greater than not knowing, as Augustine 107 says in his Enchiridion. Therefore, if we posit that God only knows universals and not singulars and we pose that there is another condition,
namely, that he knows both universals and singulars, it would be greater that He
knows both than only one of the two. Therefore, it follows that in accordance with
the intellect, something greater than God can be comprehended. Anselm says the
opposite of this, as has been mentioned above.

Therefore, as it is now clear, the stated reasoning cannot be resolved by
saying that God does not know singulars, because this is clearly false.

If, therefore, this proposition "God knows A" is not necessary, this will not
be because God does not know singulars, but because He knows A and will be able
not to know [A]. But it follows from this that His knowledge of A is alterable, which
is clearly false and against all holy fathers. And let no conviction arise concerning
fallacies of this sort: God knows that I am about to sit, and after I have sat, will not
know that I am about to sit but that I have sat. Therefore He knows something, that
He will not know. But this does not follow because change of time does not apply to
Him, but with all conditional, temporal things withdrawn He knows. For His
knowledge applies to the essences of things without reference to changes of time.
(But if things be not considered with reference to changes of time, He knows many
things which He will not know. And yet, there is no change in His knowledge, but
in things. Therefore, by withdrawing and throwing out all conditions of time,
it follows: He knows A and will not know A. Therefore His knowledge changes.
This, however, is impossible.)
Chapter Three

But perhaps someone will still say that it is not necessary that God know A, because A, since it is contingent, will be able not to be. Therefore, He is able not to know that.

Furthermore: someone will say that it is not necessary that God know A, because His knowledge applies to being and is of being. Consequently, God does not know a thing, except when those things have been. Hence, since A, whether it be the Antichrist or any other future contingent, does not yet exist, it is not yet in the knowledge of God. But to say this is irreverent, because to say this is to say that God is mutable in knowledge. Therefore, this impiety must first be opposed by authorities, then by reason.

By authorities as follows: for Augustine says in Book V of his *De Genesi ad Litteram*: "As for God Himself, I dare not say that they were known to Him, once He had made them, in any other way than that in which He knew that He would make them; for with *Him there is no change or shadow of turning*." He also says: "In a simple and wonderful way He knows all things steadfastly and immutably." The same Augustine says in Book XIII of his *Confessions*: "But You, O Lord, always work and are always at rest and neither do you see in time, nor move in time, nor rest in time." The same Augustine in Book IV of his *De Trinitate* says: "The Word of God, through which all things were made, that is immutable truth, therein principally and immutably are all things at the same time not only that are now, but also those that have been and that are going to be. And there they neither have been, nor shall be, but only are, and all things are life, and all things are one and what is more marvelous: life is one."

The same Augustine says in Book XV of his *De Trinitate*: "His Word knows," he says, "what is necessary for us before you seek it from Him. And He

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has not known it in this way from a certain time, as if He came to know them, but He
has foreknown, without any beginning, all things to come in time, and even in these
things He knows what and when we were going to ask Him, to whom and
concerning what matters He was to listen. For He was not ignorant of that which He
was about to create; and He knew in the same way those things that had been created
and those things that were to be created. For no part of His wisdom is removed from
them, but as it was necessary His wisdom remained as it was when they came into
being [as it was before]. Therefore as it has been written: Before they were created,
all things were known to Him, so also after they were perfected; so, I say, they,
both before they were created and after they were perfected, were known to Him in
the same way." The same Augustine says in Book V of his De Genesi ad
Litteram: "All these things before they were made were in the knowledge of God
their Creator." The same Augustine says on John: "We will answer that the Lord
foreknowing the future foretold the infidelity of the Jews, foretold, but did not cause.
For this reason, God did not compel anyone to sin because He already knows the
future sins of man." Shortly thereafter he says: "Therefore the Jews committed
sin which God who does not like sin did not compel them to do, but He foretold that
they were to commit it, He whom nothing eludes. And therefore, if they had desired
to do good, not evil, they would not have been prevented. They who were about to
do this were foreseen by Him who knows what each person is about to do and what
each person is about to restore to Him from his work." Again, he says: "But,
that had to be predestined which not yet was, so that it was done in its own time, just
as before all time it had been predestined that it be done." The same Augustine
says in Book XII of his Confessions: "Neither the substance of the Creator nor His
will changes at all through time. Hence, it appears that He does not will now this,
now that, but it appears that He wills once and at the same time and always what He
wills; not again and again, nor now this, nor now that, nor that He wills what He does not will, or that He wills not what He wills, rather, because such a will is mutable and everything mutable is not eternal. But God is eternal."119 The same Augustine [says] in the same place: "The expectation of matters becomes a seeing when they occur; and this same seeing becomes memory when they have passed; furthermore, every intention that changes is mutable; everything mutable is not eternal. But God is eternal."120
Chapter Four

From these authorities it is evidently clear that God knows all things eternally in one indivisible and simple gaze, always in the same and immutable manner. Wherefore, what He knows, He cannot not know in the future, although that which has been known may not be. Therefore since He knows A, He will always know it, whether A will have been or will not have been.

The same is also able to be proved by reason as follows:

That I sit, while I am sitting, is necessary; and if presently you have sat down with me watching [you], you cannot not have sat down with me watching. Therefore, in a much stronger degree, you cannot not have sat down with God watching. But, future things are more certain to Him than present things are to us. Therefore, since future things are under His visage, they cannot not be under His view. It is therefore necessary that those things are entirely under His view.

Furthermore: if in the same way I saw your future course just as the present, it could not exist [as present], even though I saw it [as present]. But God sees future things more sharsightedly and more truly than I [see] the present, because He sees these unchangeably. Therefore etc.

Furthermore: if He knows A, He either can not know A or cannot not know A. If He cannot [not know A], I have a proposition, namely, that "A known by God is necessary." If He can not know [A], not knowing can be made from knowing. Therefore, He [His knowledge] can be altered, which is impossible. Therefore the first [alternative] is impossible, namely, that He can not know A. And I speak now not about knowledge pertaining to things as they are subjected to changes of time, but concerning His knowledge that pertains to things completely detached from these conditions.
But perhaps it will be said that even if not knowing is made from knowing, it, nevertheless, does not follow that it [knowledge] is altered, because that the Antichrist will be is true, namely, that enuntiable [is true] and can be false, but yet not alterable from truth into falsity, because if a falsity is brought into being, namely, what makes [an enuntiable] false, it was false from eternity, and if true, it was true from eternity. Therefore, one of the contraries will not be after the other. It is therefore not altered. When there is an alteration, the movement is from a contrary into a contrary. Therefore in the same manner, as it appears [to those who argue this way], it does not follow: "not knowing can be made from knowing: therefore it is alterable," since if He knows, He has known from eternity, and if He does not know, He has not known from eternity.

But before we answer that, let us explain our proposition more thoroughly. Let us say therefore: if something [e.g., some characteristic] were on some subject, to which it cannot not belong nor can it belong to another, then it belongs to its own subject necessarily; and this is true for whatever kind of mode of being it has in its own subject. But that the Antichrist will be is true and has been true from eternity and always will be true because, if it is not always true, it will begin to be false. Therefore it was false from eternity. Therefore it was never true; that is clearly false. Therefore it will always be true and was true from eternity: therefore necessary. And in the same way, it seems that it can be argued about anything that is going to be.

Furthermore: if it were that the whiteness of Socrates could not be lacking [to him] except through his own corruption, I would be able to infer necessarily: Socrates is; therefore Socrates is white. But futurity is something that belongs to the Antichrist, and futurity will not be corrupted except by the presence of the Antichrist himself. Therefore futurity itself is necessary, if the Antichrist will be.
Furthermore: the opinion of Aristotle does the same, namely, if this will be, in a thousand years before this it was true to say that this is going to be. But all truth about the past is necessary; that it will be is a truth about the past, as has been said: therefore necessary. And that which used to be said does not refute that argument, namely, that when it is said in the millenial year before this was able to be called true, namely, that the Antichrist would be, I say: it does not apply to this truth, but applies to this thing only. For it does not refute this, because if I saw Socrates white, he never has the ability to be [nonwhite], since Socrates would have been white at that time when I saw him; in the same way, if it were true when I said that the Antichrist would be, never will it be able to be, as though this then had not been true: therefore also necessary, since the truth is about the past.

In the same way, Isaiah foresaw the captivity of the Jews, and the future to a prophet is so certain, as the present [is] to us, just as Augustine said. Therefore etc.

We do not judge [that they] are able to be answered to the aforementioned arguments and especially to the first argument except by saying that a contingent follows from necessaries. Since the consequent [consecutio] is false, namely, all things are done out of necessity, it is also clear that the consequence [consecutio] is necessary or that both of the premises are necessary, as has been shown above, there does not seem [to be] a way of escaping except by saying that a contingent follows from necessaries. That, however, is contrary to the art [of logic], which shows that neither a falsehood follows from truths, nor a contingent follows from necessaries.
But it seems that not only is it possible that a contingent follows from necessaries, but also that it is even necessary, and this by necessary reasons.

So let us speak about some future contingent that nevertheless will be. From this I argue: If it will be, the cause of it is in the divine mind, [and] this [future] will be or is or was from necessity. Therefore, this, i.e., future contingent, will be from necessity because it neither is nor was. But it is self-evident that this is false. For it exists contingently. Therefore, it is clear that a contingent follows from a necessary even syllogistically.

But the causes of all these that are have been in the divine mind eternally as Augustine says in Book I of his *Confessions* : "Before You, God, the causes of all unstable things stand, and the immutable origins of all mutable things remain, and the eternal causes of all non-rational and temporal things live." Therefore, since the causes are eternal, fixed, immutable, and do not live by a mortal life, but by an immortal life, the causes themselves are necessary; from which necessarily follow things which are temporal, mutable, corruptible, and contingent. Moreover, Boethius says: "This as it relates to divine knowledge is necessary, but in itself [is] contingent. But from this in divine knowledge follows this in itself"; therefore, a contingent follows from a necessary. In a like manner, Augustine says in his *De Genesi ad Litteram*: "These absolutely were previously; they were in the knowledge of the Creator, and certainly there [they are] better, where [they are] truer, eternal, immutable." Furthermore, Seneca says: "Plato calls those things ideas, from which all things, whatever it is we see, are made and according to which all things are formed. These ideas are immortal, immutable, and invariable. Hear what an idea is! The idea of those things that are made by nature, is an eternal exemplar. Infinite nature of the universe has such exemplars of man, of fish, of trees, according to
which, whatever must be made from that nature is produced. God has these exemplars of all things within Himself and the measure of all things that must be done and He has grasped their limits in His mind. This exemplar is fuller than the forms which Plato calls immortal, immutable, indefatigable ideas. Therefore men indeed perish, but humanity itself, after which man is fashioned, remains and suffers nothing though men toil and die.¹²⁷

From these it is clearly held that the exemplars are necessary, from which, nevertheless, it follows that the being of the copy is contingent.

Furthermore, Anselm says: "Similarly, then, by no argument it appears to be possible to deny that something mutable in time is immutable in eternity. Indeed, being mutable in time and being immutable in eternity are no more opposed than are not being at some time and always being in eternity—or than are being in the past or future according to the temporal order and not being in the past or future in eternity."¹²⁸ Therefore, since from the existence of a thing in eternity, its existence in time follows, [therefore] the mutable follows from the immutable and a contingent follows from a necessary.
Chapter Six

What therefore shall we say? In what way shall we escape from these propositions? Perplexities are truly everywhere, because it seems that all things are done from necessity. It seems again that a contingent follows from a necessary which the syllogistic art certainly does not permit.

The aforementioned propositions can be answered as follows: first, however, let us divide necessary, so that what follows is clearer. I say, therefore, that the necessary is twofold: in one way, it does not have the ability in some way toward its opposite with either a beginning or an end. An example of this kind is: "2 and 3 are 5." For this kind has not had the ability either before time, or in time for not being true. And such is a necessary simply.

There is also another necessary that neither in regard to the past, nor the present, nor the future has the ability toward its opposite, yet without beginning, there was the ability toward this and the ability towards its opposite, and such is "that the Antichrist will be" and of all those [propositions] that concern the future, because the truth of these things, since the truth does exist, cannot have non-existence after existence, as has been shown above. Nevertheless, there is the ability toward this, that they have been false from eternity and without beginning. And it follows for such a possibility toward existence and non-existence from eternity that a thing is contingent in itself, and not because it can have non-existence after existence. There are many contingents that will not have non-existence after existence, just as the soul of the Antichrist.

There is [a necessary] in this second way about the knowledge of God, namely, that since God has known something, it is not possible for Him not to know this afterwards. It is nevertheless possible that from eternity He has known this and [possible that from eternity] He has not known this, so that He may have known
what He does not know and may not have known what He knows. Whereupon the Teacher in his *Sentences* [says]: God could have created nothing and so could have foreknown or have known nothing that has been created. Therefore, He has the power never to have created and never to have known many things that He knows.130

From this power (*potentia*) that is toward either one of the opposites, namely, true and false without beginning and to have known and not to have known without beginning, the contingency of things follows, as has been said. On the other hand, this ability follows from the contingency of things in this way toward either one without beginning.

Accordingly therefore, these statements that are true about the future have necessity in some way, and in like manner such things as "God knows A" and "Isaiah knew this truth," because the truth of such things cannot cease, nor are they able to be changed from true to false. They also have contingency in some way, because there is the ability toward true and false without beginning, from which ability, as it has been said above, the contingency of things follows. They are not as entirely contingent as this is contingent: that Socrates is white, because he is able in the future to cease to be white. For this is complete contingency. But in this "2 and 3 are 5," it is a complete necessity.

But in these statements about the future and such that have been said about the present, such as "God knows A," and about the past, such as "Isaiah foreknew and foretold this truth," there is some contingency mixed with some necessity. A contingency follows from the extent of such contingency of things that are about to be toward this state, and such necessity of conclusion follows from the extent of necessity by the syllogistic way, just as it is in the antecedent. For just as the truth of this "God knows A" or "the Antichrist was going to be" or "Isaiah has foretold this
truth" is not able to cease, so truth or the futurity of this "the Antichrist is going to be
or will be" cannot cease except by giving up the existence of the Antichrist.

It must be therefore conceded that this is necessary: "the Antichrist is going to
be" from this understanding, that its truth and its futurity cannot cease. And yet the
Antichrist is not necessarily going to be or will not necessarily be, that is, will have
existence from necessity in the future. However, this is twofold: "the Antichrist
necessarily is going to be," because the necessity, that is non-finiteness, can be
posited over the futurity attributed to the Antichrist; and in this way it is true and
follows syllogistically from similar necessaries. Or necessity can be placed with the
existence of the Antichrist that is going to be, so that the sense is: "the Antichrist
will have existence in the future in a state of necessity": and so it is false. This does not
follow from any premises, whether true or necessary; for, in the future it will have a
contingent existence.

Similarly for contingency, this is twofold: "the Antichrist contingently is
going to be, or contingently will be," because contingency is able to be posited over
that futurity and in this way it is false, or over the existence of the Antichrist, that he
is going to be, and in this way it is true.

Therefore through the syllogistic way, a necessary follows from necessaries
in this mode of necessity. Antecedents have this mode of necessity because the
conclusion, just as an antecedent, has a truth that cannot cease in the future, and from
which it cannot be altered. Nevertheless, the object itself of the conclusion does not
have necessity toward being on account of this. Rather on account of the ability of
antecedents toward either one, namely, toward [being] true and [being] false without
beginning, the object itself of the conclusion has necessarily a contingency toward
either one, namely, toward being and not being, and it is true that a contingent thing
follows from a necessary [proposition]. Never, however, does a conclusion that may
not have a necessity corresponding with the premises follow from necessary propositions, as has been mentioned above; from "that God knows that the Antichrist is going to be," or from this "that the Antichrist was going to be," or [from] "that Isaiah foretold this or foreknew this" it follows that "that the Antichrist will be" has similar necessity with the premises, because it has the truth that cannot cease. Nevertheless, the Antichrist has the ability toward being and not-being in the future, not because these premises could cease to be, but because, as it has been said, there is the ability toward this: that always without beginning they had not been true.

Therefore, the whole of what produces fog in these arguments is that the contingency of things in themselves seems to be incompatible with the their necessity in the divine mind and divine knowledge, [and] likewise for that necessity that is the presential immutability of truth in these statements about the past and about the future, and that no distinction is made how in the same proposition there is necessity in one way on account of the fact that its truth is not finite, and in another way there is contingency because that which is true could have been not true without beginning, from which power follows the contingency of things, and because there is no distinction made about the multiplicity of such statements such as "the Antichrist necessarily is going to be" and "it is contingently going to be."

It should also be indicated that this must be conceded: "God can not know A" and similarly such "that the Antichrist was to be can be false" and "that the Antichrist will be can be false and can in the future be false" and similarly: "God can not know A in the future because, if He has not known A without beginning and from eternity, He will not know A in the future." But there is the ability toward this: that without beginning and from eternity He does not know A, as has been said. Therefore, there is the ability toward this: that in the future He may not know A. And it is likewise concerning this: "that the Antichrist was to be" and so for like propositions.
But yet, this is twofold: "that the Antichrist was to be can be false in the future." For it can be false either because it can be stated that there is the ability toward falsity which has a beginning after truth, which it has, and so the statement is impossible just as when it is said "Socrates is white and is able to be black," it is understood that there is the ability toward blackness which has a beginning in the future after whiteness which now exists in Socrates—or because it can be signified that there is the ability toward falsity simply in the future which does not have a beginning after truth, but, the falsity, having continued with falsity that is without beginning, was able to have been. And similarly this is twofold: "God can not know A," because it can be understood that He has the ability for not knowing after knowing, and in this way it is false; or, that He has the ability for not knowing simply in the future,—the not-knowing I say having continued with eternal not-knowing—and then it follows that "the Antichrist is able not to be going to be." Therefore God, knowing that the Antichrist is going to be, can not know in the future that it is going to be, and vice versa.

Hence, it is clear that standing together are "that God's not-knowing is necessary," that is, a true by truth that cannot cease to be, and nevertheless, "that this same ability is false" and yet it cannot occur that He not know A nor can He be changed from one who knows to one who not knows. And although we just spoke about the knowledge of God through the manner of extent of time, it is most noted nevertheless that nothing in eternity exists in accordance with such a manner of extent of time. But it is not an easy matter to speak in other terms concerning the simple state of eternity to an intellect that is weak and thus far dwelling in temporal images.
Chapter Seven

Now that these aforementioned statements have been well examined, all things have been resolved that previously appeared difficult to resolve; and truly they are most difficult.

As it is now clear to one who examines these things, we have now posited that in God there is the ability not to have known many things that He knows, because there is the ability for some things not to be about to be that will be; and if they will not be, He has never known those things. Similarly, we posited that "that the Antichrist is going to be" and similar things have the ability for never having been true and always having been false.

But these suppositions seem incompatible; and therefore, speaking about these things we see that they are false because that something is, while it is, is necessary, and especially if we speak about momentary being, such as: "if Socrates is white in this moment, there is not the ability for this, that he not be white in this moment; because if that ability can be, it can either be reduced to an act or not. If it is able, let it be reduced! Then it follows that he is white and is not white at the same time and in the same indivisible moment, which is impossible. If he cannot be reduced to an act, then the ability is vain. But no possibility is vain.

There is not a moment of the possibility of infinitely dividing magnitude, because that moment cannot be deduced to an act, because that possibility can always exist in a deduction toward its own act and never, however, is it completely deduced, because it is toward infinity in deduction.

Since, therefore, in the same instance there is not the ability with respect to opposites in that instance, and for every indivisible instance, eternity is more simple and more indivisible, there will not be the ability in eternity with respect to opposites. Therefore, if God in eternity knows something, He does not have the ability toward
its opposite. For in Him, there is not "was able" or "will be able," but only is able," not "knew" or "will know," but only "knows." But yet, it is said "that God knew," meaning: His knowledge was not lacking from any past thing, or "that God will know" meaning: for, His knowledge will not be lacking from any future event. The Master explains in this way in the Sentences. Therefore, it is clear that in Him, as it seems, there is not the ability for opposites.

Furthermore: every ability that exists unexercised exists with respect to its own act yet to be for some purpose. But in God nothing is future. Therefore, nor is there any possibility with respect to a future act.

Furthermore: in God ability and act are the same. But nothing acts except one of a pair of opposites. Therefore nothing is able except one of a pair of opposites.

Furthermore: whatever is ability without act is still perfectible in that act. Therefore, if the ability is in God without act, the ability is perfectible in the act itself. But this is impossible, since God is the most perfect.

Furthermore: in eternity, nothing precedes another by time or space naturally. But the ability of opposites naturally precedes either of those. Therefore, there is not the ability with respect to opposites in eternity.

Furthermore: if it is certainly true that the Antichrist was or will be, in it falsity is not able to begin in the future, as is clear before; not even in the present is falsity able to belong to it, when only truth resides in it, nor in the past; for, potency does not exist with respect to the past. Therefore, no possibility with respect to falsity will be able to abide in it. Therefore, what was stated above is not true, namely, that though it be true, it had the ability to be false from eternity.

Furthermore: if it could have been false without beginning, it was therefore reducible to falsity without beginning, or some possibility was vain. But the act of this possibility is falsity without beginning. Therefore, that act could begin to be,
i.e., falsity without beginning. But this [is] most clearly impossible: for that which
is without beginning is not mutable; therefore it is a first thing, namely, that which
exists is such ability toward falsity without beginning.

Therefore from these arguments it is clear, so it would seem, that the aforesaid
suppositions are false.

But that they are true can be shown from necessity, because if something
follows another and the antecedent were possible, then also the consequent will be
possible. But that "the Antichrist will not be" implies: God has eternally not known
that the Antichrist would be. Therefore, since the antecedent is contingent, disposed
toward being and not being, then also the consequent [is also contingent], i.e., to
know that it is possible to know and possible not to know.
Chapter Eight

In the same manner it follows with respect to the willing of God, namely, that He can will what He does not will and can not will what He wills, because if the Antichrist will be, God has willed him from eternity to be; therefore, since the antecedent is possible, then the consequent is also possible.

Furthermore: freedom of choice exists in God in the highest degree. Therefore, all His acts are also voluntary in the highest degree; therefore, they are not necessary. For that which is voluntary is not necessary. Therefore, although His act is necessary, He has ability for an opposite act. And Anselm clearly says this in his book *De Concordia Praedestinationis, Liberi Arbitrii et Gratiae*.132

Furthermore, the rational powers differ from the irrational in that the rational powers have the ability for opposites. But God is rational in the highest degree, more precisely "all reason," as Seneca says.133 Therefore He has the ability for opposites.

Furthermore, according to the proposition and opinion of Augustine,134 all works that are called the works of six days had been created in the same indivisible moment and the distinction of six days is only in regard to the early and later sequence of angelic cognitions. And he says this in his *De Genesi ad Litteram*. He also says how the creation and renewal of angelic nature existed at the same time in the presence of the Word itself in the same indivisible [moment], and there was not an angel first and then he willed, but at the same time the angel existed and he willed good or evil. And Augustine says this about that phrase: "He stood not in the truth" [John 8:44].135 Although he had the ability to stand [in the truth], he stood not in the truth, not that at some time he would stand in the truth, rather an evil angel immediately upon his own creation willed evil and a good [angel willed] good. If therefore it is so, should the good angel be praised on account of willing good, if even then it were not in his own power to will evil, if he had wanted? It is clear that this is not the case.
And the bad angel also should not be blamed on account of willing evil, if it were not in his power to will good. Therefore, it is evident that there is the ability for opposites in angels.

Furthermore: the word "knowing" adds above substance a relation toward that which is known, and that relation is variable. But, the substance of God, to which this relation pertains, is simply invariable. And these relations have been in God from eternity and yet [they are] variable. For whatever thing is considered in itself beyond the first [praeter primum] has the ability toward existence or non-existence. And it is evident that such relation in God with respect to that which is known is not God, because it is variable. Therefore, if this word "to know" applies to divine substance not absolutely, but just as it is with relations to things which are known, it is clear that He is able to know several things that He does not know and is able not to know several things that He knows. But if it applies to substance itself without comparisons of this kind, because the substance of all things is invariable, so indeed it is not possible that He knows what He does not know and He does not know what He knows. And it is not incompatible to say that relations are eternal and are not the same with God, but it is necessary [to say this]. And the Blessed Augustine clearly means this. For he says and it is true without beginning, namely, "that two and three are five"; if it were not true from eternity, by necessity its opposite was true. And then the same thing follows which was before, namely, that the expressible truth of this and of many other infinites has existed from eternity, yet it does not follow that there are several beings from eternity. For these truths at first, if they should be well considered, are nothing else but the relations of the creator toward creatures. But the relation has not an essence different from the essence of its own limits. And this is clear to one who understands the nature of relative things. Although it would be so that there had never been any creature,
nevertheless, the relations were just as much in God as they were also infinite. Therefore it is clear in this way that although several such things existed from eternity, nevertheless it does not follow that several things are eternal. Now from these statements it is therefore clear that our suppositions, which we have supposed, are true, but truly the reasons which contradict these stated suppositions are very difficult and a clear sign of this is that all those who philosophize, the faithful as well as the others, were uncertain about these matters and some believed one way and others believed another.

But concerning this matter that God has given, let us speak, first putting forth those which are useful for our purpose.

Let us say, therefore, that in eternity there are precedence and subsequence; this is not temporal, but rather causal and natural in this way, just as by which consequence is not reversed. And an example of this is the following: if it were so that there had been light from eternity, then from necessity, there would also have been brightness from eternity. Light, nevertheless, is the cause of brightness and is prior [to brightness] not by time, but by causality. In the same way, if there had been a foot in the dust from eternity, there would have been its print from eternity, but yet the cause of the latter was from necessity.

And Chrysostom says that the Father and the Son exist as light and brightness do, between whom there is no precedence in time and also no precedence in nature, because the Father and the Son are also completely the same indivisible nature as light and brightness. There is nevertheless between them a certain precedence. Chrysostom comments about this on that verse "In the beginning was the Word": "the Father precedes the Word not by nature, but by cause; the Son precedes all others by nature. Therefore, since individual essence that is more simple than any simple
thing and more indivisible than any indivisible thing, is before and after, we have stated beforehand that there is a before and an after in eternity." 138

Furthermore: although the divine substance itself is one and the most simple, nevertheless in it there are infinite relations, namely, of Himself with His creation and of Himself with Himself. Therefore it is that the divine nature, considered in itself absolutely, receives several predications which it does not receive when it has been extended to the relations that have been discussed; and on the other hand just as it is here, that several things are predicated about man that are not predicated about a white man and vice versa. And it is clear that this is true. For Augustine says that God could have freed the human race in another manner than He has freed it. Anselm says the opposite of this. This contradiction cannot be resolved unless it is said that if the divine substance had been absolutely considered in itself, it would indeed be able to be resolved; but if it is considered according to that condition toward the creation, that He makes all things very well and with great order, it would not be able to be resolved.

And it is similar concerning that question by which it is asked whether God could have created the world before He did. God, considered absolutely in Himself, was indeed able to do so; but He was not able to do so, if He be regarded as distributing what is most fitting to everything; for, that which was fitting did not exist before in order that it should be created.

Furthermore: as Anselm says, before man wills, he is able not to will. But when at some time he wills together with an act, he cannot any longer not have willed, but he becomes willing necessarily. And in the same way, if he should will this, he cannot not have willed this; yet, he could previously have both willed and not have willed this. And this ability by which he is able both to will and not to will precedes willing itself and not willing both by nature and by time. In God, however,
the ability to will or the ability to know does not precede willing itself or knowing by
time, but only by causality. As the Father precedes the Son by causality and yet they
are entirely the same in substance, so ability precedes willing and ability precedes
knowing. For although the ability and the willing are the same in Him, nevertheless
the ability causally precedes the willing. Therefore, if the divine substance were
considered in itself absolutely, it can certainly both will and know opposites. But if it
be considered not absolutely, but in cause, whereby it wills or knows some individual
thing, it cannot both will and know its opposite.

On account of this, we should distinguish the following: "God can know
what He does not know, or He can not know what He knows," namely, that this
ability, which exists, is able to apply to Him not absolutely, but in relation to some
thing, with respect to which there is knowledge and then it is false. For it is
impossible that God, knowing this thing, knows the opposite of it or does not know
this. For if not knowing this thing were made from knowing this thing, He would be
changeable.

It is the same concerning this proposition: "God can will what He does not
will." For if He be considered absolutely, He can; but if He be considered in so far
as He wills to determine one certain thing, He cannot. But always someone will say:
"If He can know what He does not know, that ability will be vain, this ability which
cannot be reduced in act." It should be said that it is not vain: for here rational ability
differs from the irrational, in that rational ability is one and the same with respect to
opposites, and whatever one of those opposites should occur, there is ability itself in
its own act. Therefore, it is with God because His ability is supremely rational.

But it is not so in irrational powers. The abilities are different with respect to
different opposite acts. Now, on account of these remarks, it appears that there is not
this ability unexercised in God, but always exercised, because the exercise of that
ability is indifferently either the exercise of it or the opposite to this; and, it is always one of these because it is always one of the opposites.

So, it is therefore clear how it should be answered to the first argument and to all others as well, by which it seems to be demonstrated that God did not have the ability for opposites.

But in relation to that which was opposed to us, i.e., "that the Antichrist is going to be can be false, but yet it is certainly true," it should be replied that that God is able to know and not to know something, namely, from eternal ability, is true by the same ability by which it is true. And may you know that truth of such statements is not a temporal truth, but an eternal truth. The sense of this is: "that the Antichrist is" could have been true or false from eternity; this is that it has the ability, whereby it could be true before all past truth and false before all past falsehood. In the same way, it should be explained if I should say "will be able."

So therefore now by discourse, if anyone has understood, all are able to be resolved that seemed to hinder our aforesaid suppositions.

And you may note that when it is said, "An angel had the ability to will good and to will evil in the same indivisible moment," although the ability is one, to will good is still something other in itself from that which is to will evil, that is that the wills are different. However, it is not the same with God, but knowledge whereby He knows that the Antichrist is if he will be, and the knowledge whereby He knows that he is not if he will not be are entirely the same in God, if He is considered absolutely. And in the same way, willing and not willing are the same in Him, although the difference between them began in His creations. For if these should be different in God Himself, His substance would not be simple in the highest degree, but composite and mutable. And here is an example of this, such as we are able to find for now: accordingly, let us propose that a ray according to its substance
illuminates something which has been placed within the ray itself and illuminates the space of that thing when it has been removed from the ray. Therefore the same ray illuminates the presence of the hand and the absence of the same. The knowledge of God is like that. His single and undivided knowledge knows that the Antichrist is, if it will be, and knowledge by which He knows that he is not before he will be, and knowledge by which He knows that he is not after he will not be. I do not say that He knows in the same way that the Antichrist is if he will be and will not be, because this is impossible. But if he will be, He knows in the same way that he is before he is and when he is and after he has been. Therefore, the same ray in this way illuminates the presence of the hand and the absence of it. And if the ray were a faculty of sight, by the same sight it would see the presence and the absence of it: so it is in God. And if the ray should have ability in itself, so that it should be able to draw the hand under its illumination and to remove it at will, we would truly say that that whole capacity of the illuminating and the not illuminating is in the ray. Therefore it is completely in God.

So, now through discourse, it is clear that there is no diversity in God Himself and there is the beginning of diversity in things themselves. So therefore the relations which He has with His creatures can be differentiated by no transmutation made in Himself, and He is able to become lord and not lord, and as Augustine says, creator and not creator existing exactly in the same way. But in this way, can He, knowing, become not knowing without change of Himself as He, lord, can become not lord?

It must be said that it cannot be done, because the word "knowing" exists within God in the same way, when a thing is and when it is not. But, the words of ruling, creating, and governing and words of this kind do not exist in the same way in Him, but in different ways.
Therefore, as it has been said, this has been one of those words that have been understood less clearly, i.e., the same thing, being and not-being, is not indifferent toward the relation which is a creation. But the same thing, when it is and when it is not, is indifferent toward the relation connoted in the word "knowing"; it is not indifferent when it is and when it is not [in the words] to rule and to create, but it is indifferent when it is and when it is not toward the knowing of God. Therefore, it does not follow that if He becomes one-who-creates from one-who-does-not-create or vice versa and that He becomes lord from one who is not lord, God changes; nevertheless, it follows that if He should become one who does not know from one who knows or vice versa that God would change.

Therefore this word must not be understood in this way, that if a thing should never be future, it exists in one and the same manner in the knowledge of God, as the same thing exists in the knowledge of God, if it should be future, or on the other hand, if the same thing were future, it would exist in the same manner as it exists in the knowledge of God, even if it never should have been future. But it must be understood in the following way, that a thing which at some time was about to have being, when it has being and before it shall have being and if it has ceased to have being after it ceased to be, then it exists exactly in one way in the knowledge of God.

It is irrefutably known that this has been understood as most true from writers of the Holy Fathers, listed elsewhere for you. You can also add this from what has been said before, that a thing which at some time was to have being, when it is and when it is not, always exists in the same way for words of providence, for example, knowing, understanding, and discerning, but, a thing does not exist in the same way, when it does not exist in respect to words of attitude that belong to movable things, by which attitude providence "binds everything by its own order," and if the name of fate were not suspect and superstitious, it could competently be said that a thing,
when it is and when it is not, exists in the same way, as it has been said, with respect to words of providence, but not to words of fate, because, as Boethius says, "providence embraces all things equally, though they be diverse; fate sets particular things in motion once they have been assigned their own forms, places and times so that this unfolding of temporal events brought together in view of the divine mind is providence; but this same unfolding of events, separated and worked out in time is called fate." 139

Therefore, the obscurity of this word seems to me to have been clarified to those who understand the difference in perceptions of fate and providence.

Furthermore: Chrysostom 140 in his definition has employed this expression concerning "in the beginning was the Word": "the Father precedes the Word not by nature, but by cause," "the Father precedes the Word causally," "the Son precedes all things, which through Himself were made naturally."

This statement again appears to be obscure because, as it seems, there is no procession in the Trinity and no causality except with regard to creatures. And certainly, that holy catholic man, eminently commended and favored among the catholic writers, imbued most excellently in earthly and divine philosophy, knows much more perceptively and clearly than we that in the Trinity there is no rank, nothing before or later, nothing greater or less, but that for him all three persons are coeternal and coequal, 141 nothing there was created or made as by some causality, but only proceeding and begotten. For if we understand in his own words or from them we apply to them anything false and contrary to the truth, this is our presumption and our fault. It is not that he in his own words understood anything unfaithful. Therefore we must not understand anything incorrectly in the words of so faithful, so knowledgeable, so holy a man, but that we may receive what he intends.
us to seek devoutly, and that we may find what he intends us to seek anxiously and that that for which we must knock persistently may be opened to us.\textsuperscript{142}

Therefore we believe that this is the faithful understanding of his spoken words: he knows well that this is the definition of cause: "cause is that by which something has being, which is called effect." Since the Father certainly is the one by whom the Son has being, for the reason that "whatever the Son has, He has from the Father," —and the Son Himself is a different person from the Father although not a different substance from Him, clearly there is reason of cause between the Father and the Son, because the Father is the one by whom anything else is, namely, the Son has being and whatever He has He has from the Father. Therefore, the causality and procession are precisely what Chrysostom suggests for the true life of the Father to the Son, which the Father has within Himself, a gift to the Son, so that the Son has the same life in Himself, i.e., the Father causally precedes the Son. The truth itself says: "just as the Father has life within Himself, so He has given it also to the Son to have life in Himself," i.e., what Hilary\textsuperscript{143} says, that the Father is greater than the Son not only in accordance with the fact that the Son is man, but according to the fact that the Son is the Word; and yet, the Son as Word is not less than the Father, but equal. This precedence is causality, which Augustine signifies by the noun "beginning [principii]" when he says in Book V of his \textit{De Trinitate}: "The Father is the beginning for the Son," since He begot Him. He also says in Book IV of his \textit{De Trinitate}:\textsuperscript{144} "When the Lord says, 'Whom I will send unto you from the Father,' He shows the spirit both of the Father and of the Son. Because, though He said, 'Whom the Father will send,' He added, 'in my name'; nevertheless he did not say, 'whom the Father will send from Me,' just as he said: 'whom I will send to you from the Father,' i.e., showing that the Father is the beginning of the entire Trinity, or to put it more correctly, of the Godhead."\textsuperscript{145} This is the causality and the procession
which Augustine intends by "primacy" ["principatio"] and which Hilary intends as "superiority" ["maioritas"] and what Chrysostom precisely intends by "the gift of true life from the Father." Certainly, if now this statement of Augustine previously had been heard and had not been worn with use, i.e., that the Father is the beginning of the Son, it would be similarly close so that from this statement of Augustine, it would be understood unfaithfully, i.e., that the Son was created or made by the Father, as is similarly close as is understood in this statement of Chrysostom: "The Father causally precedes the Word;" rather to be sure it is much closer, because nothing added to the same expression removed this unfaithful idea from the statement of Augustine. But this added expression removes this understanding from the statement of Chrysostom, namely, that the Father precedes the Son by cause, but not by nature. For every effect that has been made or created is preceded by its own cause not only causally, but naturally.

But if the statement of Hilary had now been heard before, how much more it would seem to add rank in the Trinity! But then, just as Chrysostom removes the impiety of every erroneous understanding through qualification, after Hilary said "greater than the Son," nevertheless he adds: that the Son is not less than the Father.

The third statement also seems to be obscure, namely, from which it was said that eternal relations of the creator toward creatures are countless and vice versa, because from this it seems that to some, many things are eternal, and something other than God is eternal - although we frequently have added and have asserted one thing alone, namely, the Trinitarian God, is eternal, and no such relations completely make a multitude of eternal essences. Therefore we strongly and faithfully claim that there is only one who is eternal, namely, God, and that no essence other than or divided from Him is eternal.
Therefore, in regard to the declaration of this obscurity of the third word, we oppose in the first place as follows: being follows the true, because truth is under being or because truth and entity are the same, as Augustine says: "Truth is that which is."\(^{146}\) But if God is, that God is is true. Therefore that God is is, because being follows the true. And if God is is, that God is is is true. Therefore that God is is is. Likewise, in "that God is is true," "that is true" is true and being and infinite in this way. Therefore, if God is, such statements are infinite. But God eternally is. Therefore such infinite matters eternally are. Therefore, is God any part of these statements, so that it may truly be said "God is: that God is, and: that God is is, and: that God is true, and: that God is is is true" and so without end? For if God is not this truth, it has been said: "Infinite matters eternally are, none of which is otherwise."

Furthermore: should it be granted that that that God is is is is is true and that that God is is is and so successively and so concerning other statements, when to be anything is the same with another? It follows that many things eternally are, of which nothing is the same that [is] otherwise.

Furthermore: if God is, the Trinity is and the Father is and the Father begets the Son and the Holy Spirit proceeds from both and these statements are true: is God therefore these statements, so that it may truly be said: "God is that the Father begets the Son" and "God is namely the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son" or which one of these statements is left? Who will allow this that that the Father begets the Son is namely that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son? But if these are the same, then many things eternally are; of which nothing is otherwise. This seems incompatible.

Furthermore: if there is precedence, then subsequence corresponds to it. But the precedence of God with respect to the creature exists from eternity. Therefore, the
subsequence of the creature with respect to the creator exists from eternity. Therefore, is the subsequence of the creature with respect to Him or the precedence of God with respect to the creature, the subsequence of the creature with respect to Him? Or the subsequence of a single creature with respect to Him is the subsequence of another creature with respect to Him? Likewise, future creatures have been without beginning. Therefore, the futurity of things without beginning existed before God was the futurity of things.

Moreover, such statements as "that Peter was to be" and "that Paul was to be," and in this way concerning every creature "that that creature was to be" were eternally true. Therefore, they eternally existed. And so, is God "that Paul was to be" and anything of such statements, or are these statements mutually the same? For if they are not the same, then many things exists eternally.

Furthermore: is God this truth: "that the diameter is asymmetrical to a side and again that the diameter drawn through the middle of the circle is the greatest of all lines not drawn through the middle of the circle," since according to Augustine this truth and such truths are eternal? For in Augustine's book about the immortality of the soul he says: "For what is as eternal as the principle [ratio] of a circle, or any other thing of this kind in the disciplines which ever was and is understood to exist at some time, or understood to be?" 147

Augustine says in his book De Libero Arbitrio: "Seven and three are ten, not only now, but forever; and there has never been a time when seven and three were not ten, nor will there ever be a time." 148

Augustine says in Unde Malum: 149 "Let me explain briefly the notion of eternal law that is impressed upon our nature: it is the law in virtue of which it is just that all things exist in perfect orders." 150
He says in the same book: "There is an eternal law that a good life is bestowed on a good will and an unhappy life on a bad will." So, is God these laws and these statements? Or is one of those laws different, although nevertheless those laws are eternal? But if someone should say that technical propositions are not true before things were created, at least he would concede that such things had truth without beginning: "the diameter drawn through the middle of a circle will be the greatest line of all"; likewise if it is said that the diameter having been drawn etc. began to be true: is therefore its opposite previously true and is that truth God?

Furthermore: what is true is true by truth and by the truth which exists, and which is different [from what is truth]. But, what is clearly nothing cannot be shaped by truth that exists. Therefore, if it is shaped by truth, it is clearly not nothing, but before every creature it was true that there was no creature. Since it was shaped by truth, it was clearly not nothing and it was not a creature, because there was not yet a creature and there was not God. For there was not this truth "God is there is no creature." Therefore, it was the case, as it appears, that there was neither creator nor creature.

Furthermore: the eternal truth of all conditionals is also an eternal statement.

In terms of answering this objection, moreover, I pose the following example: let it be posed that there was someone praising Caesar from eternity and likewise praising Socrates. According to this position, it is true from eternity that Caesar was praised and Socrates was praised, because if there is someone praising Caesar, Caesar was praised. Therefore let there be a noun A, the definition of which is "Caesar having been praised," and let there be a noun B, definition of which is "Socrates having been praised." It will therefore be true that A is eternal and B is eternal, so that there is a predicate per se and not per accidens, just as it is true per se "that white is not able to be black." And yet, it does not follow that Caesar or
Socrates is eternal, or that anything is eternal except the one praising, because eternity is not given when it is said that A is eternal except on account of the praising that is eternal in the one who is praising. The praise corresponding to him obtained the predicate of eternity because of the eternity of the one who is praising. Such correlations, moreover, as praise, suffering, do not require an eternal subject or a being or the existence of anything apart from the one who is praising except the position stated previously.

A good example for this is that God knows all things from eternity. Wherefore, if He knows A, the definition of which is "Socrates has been known by God," and B, the definition of which is "Plato has been known by God," speaking per se it will be true that A eternally is and B eternally is, and A is not B, nor vice versa, and God is neither of those. And yet only God eternally is; because, when it is said "A is not B and B is not A and neither of these is God," the predicate is given to the corruptible subjects. But when it is said "A or B eternally are," the predicate is given per se for the sake of form, by which these nouns are applied, namely, which are called eternal on account of the eternal knowledge of God; and truth of some such statement does not claim existence or coeternity apart from God. Similarly therefore, when it is said that "this truth is eternal or expression is eternal," this predicate is taken on account of the form correlated to the language in the eternal Word, but yet, on account of this relation nothing is required beyond that God is.

So, it will be replied to the aforementioned oppositions in this way, or we shall be forced to confess that expressions are nothing other than eternal reasons of things in the divine mind. So, I pose that A is God and that B and C are two technical statements of God or two things supposed [to be] subsumed under eternal relations. So, I say that A is eternal and B is eternal and C is eternal. None of these are otherwise, and yet only one, namely, A, is eternal, and there is not any essence nor
any eternal thing except the one and only A. These three are said to be different from
one another because the supposition of different things. But supposed things by B
and C do not exist by having been posed, which our statement is in regard to the state
before creation; but on account of these relations themselves, existence is attributed to
both B and C, which relations have no essence or existence beyond their own limits
and whose multiplicity makes no multiplicity or numerosity of essence. Therefore,
because of such alteration, it does not follow that there are many things, because they
are called different on account of different things that are nothing. But, on account of
the numerosity of relations, it does not follow that there are many things, because the
numerosity of these does not demand any numerosity of existences or essences. But,
if B and C were called another or the other with regard to A or in regard to one
another because of the difference of existences which are mutually subject or because
of the difference of forms, which are essences in themselves and multiply essences,
so that they make qualities and quantities, it would follow that there are several things
eternal. But now, the plurality of essences follows from neither part, neither from the
part of those things that are subject since they do not exist, nor from a part of forms,
since they are relations which do not multiply essence.

But, such relations clearly do not multiply essence. For let us now pose only
one thing suddenly created while all others remain: it is clear that many relations will
be born of that suddenly created object with respect to singulars of the other things
and many relations will be born of singulars with respect to it. Therefore if these
relations had essences beyond the essences of the extremities, the number of things
will be doubled and will be tripled or perhaps will be multiplied even more by that one
thing which has been born and has been added to the number of things; rather, the
number of those things will be increased even to an infinite degree, because the
essence of any relation which has been born together with another will have many
relations with regard to singular things, and conversely and likewise it will have
relations with those relations and so on ad infinitum. But this is unsuitable, namely,
that essences are infinite, if one thing alone is produced, or if a fly is born.

Furthermore, let us speak for the state, whereby God created heaven and
earth, and let us understand the works of six days that had not yet come into
existence: were there then more than three, namely, God, heaven and earth? And yet
there were not necessarily the creation, domination, and supposition of God toward
these two creations, and there were corresponding correlations of each of these two
creations. Those corresponding relations neither were God, nor were they these
creations, because the subjection of heaven and of earth to God is neither God nor
heaven nor earth. Therefore there is this supposition, and it is not nothing but
something; and yet it is neither heaven, nor earth, nor God. And yet there is nothing
but these three, namely, God, heaven, and earth, because this supposition has no
essence nor does it multiply beyond these limits. I say therefore, that when a non-
eternal thing is named from a relation related to an eternal relation in God toward a
non-eternal thing, since when understanding is mentioned, future knowledge suits
reason in an eternal word and is attributed by those things which have been named to
being both eternal being and eternal, that which has been predicated in this way
suggests no essence and some eternity or of some essence either being or existing
apart from essence and eternity, which is God, but it predicates this essence and this
eternity with regard to a non-eternal thing, or a non-eternal thing in regard to that, and
that the latter is not the former or always existed with the former; and on account of
this, it does not follow that although such things are called eternal, anything is eternal
except God alone.

But concerning these statements, however, which are only about God, in
whose terms nothing is indicated for creation, clearly they have entirely no essence
apart from divine essence. For either it should be conceded about whatever kind of those statements, which itself is God, i.e., that it should be said "that God is is God" and "that the Father begets the Son is God," or it should be said about any such statement that neither God exists nor is there anything different from God, just as we say about the Father and the Son that the Father is not the Son nor [is He] different from the Son; and so, it does not follow that the Father or the paternity is also the Son, and the Son or the sonship is also the Father; and the Father is not the Son, nor is the paternity the sonship: therefore there are many—just as it does not follow: "God is: and that the Father begets the Son is; and, that the Father begets the Son is not God: therefore there are many,"—because this argumentation is not valid except when there is a separation of essences and difference and multitude among these, one of which is denied by the other, which is not in these. For in relation to this, that such an argumentation would be necessary, one should add the following: A is not B and A is and B is and both are different from the other and both according to the same, which itself is, is different from the other in terms of the present. For then it would follow well that there are more. But in those statements, the terms of which are indicating nothing outside divinity or eternal persons; there is no essence separated from divine essence.

But in technical statements as "that the diameter is asymmetrical to a side" is different from divine essence according to that, according to which it is different from divine essence, and it is not coexisting with the divine essence before creation, nor is being attributed to it before the creation of things on account of something that is different, but on account of some relation, whereupon that is named that other before it is. This relation has no essence subsisting apart from divine essence prior to creation. Therefore neither for this reason, nor for that one does it follow that from
such plurality of eternals anything eternal is truly subsistently something eternal save one alone.

Likewise concerning the eternal relations of God to creatures it must be said that these relations are God or that they are not the same, nor different from God. For a relation can be called in one way that essence, upon which the relation itself is based precisely and from the existence of which essence the relation itself takes the name of being, whereby it may be said about the relation that it exists. Therefore, if the essence is made subject by the name of relation, the relation exists and is named what it is from the existence of that essence, but it is to speak truly that this relation is this essence. But if the order itself of one be subjected to another by the name of the relation, then the relation itself is not the essence itself nor different from itself. And therefore no multitude of essences follows from a multitude of such relations.

But concerning the relations of creatures to God, it does not seem to be grantable that they are God or that they are the creatures themselves, and yet they exist, just as it has been said above. And on the side of the term that is creature, upon whose essence that relation is based, that relation is different from God. But in accordance with that, the other is not eternally with God. And, the relation itself that is but from eternal existence is not named from the existence of the creature itself that is not yet before creation, as it has been said. And therefore, no plurality of eternal essences follow from these statements, while yet it is said about whatever such relation that it is eternal and concerning things, that they are named by such relations in accordance with that statement. But if someone quibbling should say that there is not difference except among those existing together, then let him grant that such relations are not the same with God nor different from Him. And it will always be true that the aforementioned argument that seems to suggest the plurality of existences of many eternals is not valid. Yet, it seems more allowable that God is different from
the creature that not yet is and that He is different from the Antichrist who not yet is
than that He is neither the same nor other. Because if God, who exists in eternity, is
different from a thing that appears to be in time, which is a different measure of
duration than eternity is, how will this not be rather different in one sphere of time
from that which will be in another sphere of time, when eternity and time are different
measures rather than one sphere of time and another?

Therefore relations do not have an essence different and separate from the
essences of related and compared terms, just as qualities and quantities have essences
which are other than essences of subject things, but from the essence of another term
the relation is always named being [ens] or existing [esse]. Therefore, the
multiplication of predications of being does not multiply the essence in such matters,
and even the relation itself then is named being [ens] from the extremity which the
relation itself names, but then from the essence of a term, not which it specifies, but
to which it refers, such as the future of the Antichrist with respect to me and similar
ideas. Furthermore, although it is said that plurality is eternal, just as Augustine
says153 that laws are eternal, things are eternal, teachings are eternal, or of things yet
to be begun, not coeternal with God, but compared to His eternity and of things
denominated by relations not begun, possessing no essence apart from divine
essence, and therefore let no plurality of being be suggested from the force of such a
statement, or there is plurality of eternal relations or reasons in God, where there is
only singular and undivided essence. And therefore this plurality in no way suggests
the plurality of essences existing eternally, as when it is said: "these three persons are
eternal," or "notions are eternal," "reasons of things in the divine mind are countless
and eternal." Yet in this plurality, simple and undivided essence alone is suggested,
and yet no person is different, no notion is different, perhaps likewise no reason is
different, and yet all these are not except one essence.
Let us return therefore to the proposition.
As it is clear from these premises, the foreknowledge of God does not eliminate free choice. Therefore it should now be seen whether the ordinatio of predestination can exist at the same time with free choice.

For this predestination adds to foreknowledge that which is completely the sufficient cause for the predestinator that cannot be hindered from its own effect, but its effect is necessary. Therefore, the effect of this cause will be necessary. Therefore, it can be syllogized as follows: the effect of every necessary cause is necessary. The cause of it, which is A, is a necessary cause. Therefore, A is necessary; therefore, not by free choice. And let A be some effect predestined to be made by a rational creature. Therefore, as it seems, the necessity of predestination eliminates freedom of choice.

But other arguments may be suggested in addition to this. But now when this problem has been solved easily, all the rest can be resolved. And therefore it must be said that indeed predestination is a necessary cause and its effect is necessary. Moreover, a necessary cause exists not simply, but conditionally, and has necessity not preceding [praecedentem] a subject, but following [sequentem], because it is not predestined that Socrates be saved necessarily, but that he be saved contingently. For since that which has been caused ought to be taken proportionally with a cause and the cause has not simple necessity, but conditional, it is necessary that that which has been caused be taken in this way, if it be taken rightly and completely and proportionally: "therefore that A exists contingently is necessary." Therefore when he infers, "therefore that A exists is necessary," he assumes the part of that which has been caused and not the whole; and so the inference is not valid. So therefore it is clear how one should answer arguments of this type.
After these considerations, it must now be seen how grace and freedom of choice are compatible with each other at the same time.

Grace, therefore, has something in common with foreknowledge and predestination. Since therefore it is clear from these statements that foreknowledge or predestination does not eliminate free choice, it is clear from the same arguments how grace also does not eliminate free choice according to that which it has in common with foreknowledge and predestination.

But in addition to that common element, grace has some special thing, by which freedom of choice seems in particular to be destroyed. That is, grace makes all work meritorious. So therefore it can be argued: if A makes all B, then nothing else shares in the work with respect to B. But grace makes all which is in us meritorious. Therefore, free choice makes nothing of that.

And let the major proposition be taken not where causes have been ordered in accordance with the early and later, because there it is well possible that different causes make something whole, as it is clear to one who has understanding; but that two proximate causes do this is impossible. But God, as Augustine says, is the cause of all things, not only the primary, but also the proximate. Therefore, it is impossible that another proximate cause functions with it.

But perhaps someone will say that grace does not produce anything as a near cause. But this cannot be said because it is impossible that anything touches something as closely as the eternal Word touches something, whose notice nothing escapes. Therefore, since His own saying is His own making and nothing exists that He does not say, therefore, there is nothing that He does not make.

Hence Augustine in his book "Unde Malum" says: If matter had been uncreated and lying before, as Aristotle says, it would follow that this is
incompatible, i.e., that God had an aid." But this is false, because He is sufficient to Himself. Therefore, in the same way I say this: if He is sufficient to Himself in doing good, He has no helper. How then does the Apostle say: "We are fellow helpers of God?" 

Furthermore, Anselm says: desiring itself is from free choice, but good desire is from grace and good desire is a setting up from grace and of this setting up there is nothing which is not from grace, because if anything is not from grace, that was not meritorious.

Furthermore: desire itself, considered per se, cannot cause this, because good desire is more honorable than to desire simply. Therefore, that one wills simply does not cause that, because that which was caused would be better in this way than the cause, which is impossible. Therefore, of this there is nothing which is not from grace. And Scripture seems to agree to this: "Without Me you can do nothing"; and the Apostle: "So then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy." Furthermore: "For it is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish, according to his good will." Furthermore: "What have you that you did not receive?"

For there is not essence and creation or anything else which has not been made through the Word: for all things were made by Him. But the essence of that which is not made through the Word does not exist, but only deficiency and nothing. Therefore, all the gracious good of man has been made through the Word, since nothing of Him stands in failure. Therefore, the Word does not have a co-producer or co-helper in causing that. Therefore, we are not co-helpers of God through free choice, which is contrary to the Apostle. So therefore, it appears that the existence of free choice perishes, or if we are co-helpers of God through free choice, all things are not made by the Word.
Furthermore: as it has been said, the most immediate cause of every established essence is the eternal Word of God. For nothing can be as proximate to some essence established according to some action, nor so closely and so nearly to contact that according to its own action, as closely and nearly as the eternal wisdom touches every essence according to His own knowledge, which same knowledge itself is the more immediate causing of the same essence. Therefore, eternal wisdom causes every established essence with some agent and producer. But how will the most immediate agent, altogether sufficient for itself and lacking nothing, have a co-helper? But Augustine in his book "Unde Malum" proves that God has made the world from nothing because He is sufficient to Himself, and therefore He was not assisted by any creature, saying as follows: "No one thinks most highly of God who does not believe He is omnipotent and the most just governor of all things which He created and that He was not helped in creating by any nature as if He were not sufficient unto Himself. From this it follows that God created all things from nothing." Therefore for the same reason He alone makes all things, assisted by no nature.

But the solution of these objections can be considered, as it appears, from the words of the blessed Bernard who says as follows: "Grace itself arouses free choice, when it sows the seed of thought. It heals it, since it changes its disposition; grace strengthens it, so as to lead it to action; which saves it, lest it senses a defect." But this grace works with free choice, so that only at first does grace come before and follows in the rest: in any case, prevenient with respect to this, so that now it works together for itself in others, so nevertheless, that which was begun by grace alone is equally completed by both so that they perform mixedly, not individually, at the same time, not by turns by individual stages, not partly by grace and partly by free choice,
but singulars achieve the whole by individual effort: indeed all this and all that, but as complete in that, so complete from that."

From these words of Bernard he says that the objections are resolved in this way, so that the same is said to be caused completely by free choice and completely by grace. And it does not follow: if A causes all of C, that B does not cause C or anything of itself, namely, because A and B work C by individual work. But two things working by an individual work necessarily do one and the same, since the action of those is undivided. But if they acted with divided actions, it would be necessary that that which has been worked be divided, just as on the other hand an undivided action cannot make divided works.

The objections from this argument are not valid above, because it follows that just as if the works of grace and of free choice were divisible works, neither one at a time would they make the same thing by individual work. But since the two produce any one thing by an individual work, the remaining one does not have a co-agent with itself for the reason that it is insufficient or in need of something for producing, because whatever the Father does, the Son also does the same things together with the Father. And yet the Father is not insufficient or needing something for producing, but when something requires with itself a co-agent with divisible work, it is insufficient for producing or needing something for acting.

Moreover, an example of an undivided action of grace and of free choice is light and color. For when a ray of sun passes through a colored glass, the colored light and lighted color is produced in the object, which the color of the glass completely causes and the light of the sun completely causes, not separately, but together by individual work, not in turn, but at the same time. For nothing is in the lighted color, which color does not cause or which light does not cause. Likewise, it is in the species of all colors coming to view and passing through the air. For a
species of color is completely caused in my eye or in midair by the color of the thing seen and by light poured out and returning to the eye through the air from the light of the sun. Another example in the book "Hypagnosticon" is about a rider and a horse; each of whom completely finishes the journey and every part of the journey.164

But if it is said about the activity of God and of free choice, namely, that they work together, not individually, at the same time, not in turn, by singulars and that the singulars produce a whole by individual work, can it similarly be said that in every effect of any creature, God and the proximate cause per se of the same creature work that creature together, not individually, at the same time, not in turn, not partly this, partly that, but singulars work this completely by individual work? Or can it be said likewise that because He is the primary cause penetrating every secondary and proximate cause, and not only the cause, but also its causation, and a proximate secondary cause causes nothing, which the first cause itself does not cause even more closely? If the secondary cause made anything by a work divisible from its own work, would it be necessary that the same cause make anything, which it did not make? And if a cause itself acted by a divisible work, it would not be something causing closely the operation of the same secondary cause.

Moreover, if likewise a thing in other causes also related to free choice pertains to the first cause, why does the argument not pertain likewise, so that, just as it is said "God our helper" and we "helpers, or co-helpers of God," even so it may be said that a helper of other causes and other causes are his co-helpers? Or perhaps, because it is not called "help" except when it is free choice, which is able spontaneously to show agreement to the one who is helping or compliance to the one who is acting, and freely and spontaneously leaving behind the offered help or not offering, so that this freedom of doing and not doing be introduced in the name of a helper?
But because Augustine says this, "If he has been helped, he is insufficient in himself." 165 This is true, if "helped" means with a helper working separately or that he did not do it, just as it would be if the matter had not been created by himself, but had existed from eternity, just as Aristotle states, 166 and it alone would be subject to him, in whom and by whom it was worked, just as iron is subject to a blacksmith and wood is subject to a carpenter.
Furthermore: if there is fate, it eliminates freedom of choice. But yet it should be known that fate is meant in two ways: in one way, [it is meant] in accordance with what Boethius says in book IV of his *Consolation of Philosophy*\textsuperscript{167}: that fate is identical with providence. Nevertheless, according to other considerations, fate is also called providence because providence is the divine reason that has been placed as the most high ruler of all things that governs all things. But fate is the arrangement inherent in mutable things, through which providence binds all things in its own order. For providence embraces all things equally, however infinite, however diverse. Fate sets particular things in motion once they have been given their own forms, places, and times, so that providence is the unfolding of temporal order brought together in view of the divine mind, but the same bringing together carried out and unfolded in time is called fate. Although these two meanings are different, nevertheless the one depends upon the other. For the order of fate derives from the simplicity of providence."

And shortly thereafter Boethius says: "It is clear that providence is the immutable and the simple form of all things which come into being, but fate is the simple and immutable form which the divine simplicity has appointed to be carried out with respect to their movable and temporal connection."\textsuperscript{168}

But Cicero says in Book I of his *De Divinatione*: "I call fate what the Greeks called *Imarmenen*,\textsuperscript{169} that is, an order and series of causes, when the cause produces cause from itself. This is an eternal truth flowing from the direction of God. From this it is understood that fate is not that which is called superstitiously, but that which is called scientifically the eternal cause of things."\textsuperscript{170}

Therefore, according to the just said understanding of fate, it is clear that there is fate, and that fate, just as divine providence, is not incompatible with free choice.
For words of fate tell the end of things in existence by the divine will. And just as
divine providence knows many things which will exist contingently and not
necessarily, but by freedom of the will, and therefore providence does not eliminate
freedom of choice or the contingency of futures: so divine will and order arranges
and wills many things which will exist contingently and not necessarily, but by
freedom of the will. And therefore fate, defined in this way, not only does not
eliminate free choice, but rather supposes the contingent existence of many things and
the existence of free choice.

But some perceive fate in a different way, namely, "that which is not able to
be turned," just as Cicero declares in Book II of his De Divinatione; and as he says on
the same subject: "Why, the very word Fate is full of superstition and old women's
credulity."171 Because the word of fate is commonly understood in this way, fate is
the necessity of all lower things by the order and the movement of the stars. The
necessity for these that happen apart from free choice is not only according to the
common understanding of fate, but also of all things which are carried out by our free
choice. Astrologers strive to predict from constellations all our works made or about
to be made by free choice. Therefore, if there were some fate according to this
perception, it is clear that all things happen from necessity and nothing by freedom of
choice. Augustine even suggests this concerning Psalm XXXI saying: "They
determine human character from the stars. With free choice God created me. If I
have sinned, I have sinned, so that I shall proclaim my iniquity to the Lord, but
against myself, not against Him."172 And that verse of the poet also suggests the
same: "Cease to hope that the fates of the gods are influenced by praying."173 When
Seneca had introduced this verse in a certain passage, he adds: "These decrees are
determined and fixed; they are carried out by a great and eternal necessity."174
Therefore, if fate is spoken of in this way, it eliminates free choice. Wherefore this would be the place to show that fate spoken of in this manner exists not at all. But because Augustine fully shows this in Book V of his *City of God*, we refrain from showing this here, adding briefly this comment, that rational soul is loftier than the stars, whose loftiness is being joined directly with God and learning rules for righteous living from His eternal reason and in accordance with those rules, which it has viewed in eternal truth, directing more inferior reason and the voluntary motions of the body, so that voluntary motions and rational works and voluntary works in the body may occur not by the middle of the courses and motions of the stars, but from the highest reason by the midst of reason of that man himself and by the strength of the soul proper to his own body.

Therefore the body of man is subject to two motives; for, although part is sensible of this world, part receives many changes and alterations from heavenly motions, and likewise it takes many from the soul. But if these two motives compel one to opposite acts, certainly the greater is the rational power and impulse especially toward all voluntary acts.

Consequently no mind can be forced especially if it is good, because it cannot be forced by an evil mind, since an evil mind is weaker; likewise, it cannot be forced by a body, since every body is weaker than every mind. There is no force by a good mind, because if it is just, it neither is able nor wants to force; if it is greater, it does not want to compel an inferior, because if it wanted to force an inferior to an evil act, it would be evil itself by that very fact; if it wanted to force it to a good act, it would be unjust in this respect, because no reward would follow from that which it would do by force. Therefore it is clear that the will is not able to be forced by anything.
Chapter Twelve

From reasons of a different sort, it also seems that it can be demonstrated that free choice is nothing. For let it be supposed that God created the universe very good, i.e., as good as the universe was able to be and to become. For this is consistent with God's power, wisdom, and goodness.

In addition, let it also be posed that there are three goods A, B, C; and let a fourth and fifth be D and E. But let D be better than E, and let the same D be not worsening, but let it be bettering the aforementioned three, namely, A, B, C, by the addition of itself to them, as much as or more than E betters these three, if E is added to the same three. Therefore, the set from these four, namely, A, B, C, D, will be better than the set from A, B, C, E. Therefore, let D be "the non-ability to sin" and let E be "the ability to sin." Since therefore the non-ability to sin either by nature, as in the case of God or by confirmation as in the case of angel, is better than the ability to sin, if the non-ability to sin in man and angel were added to the created universe from the beginning in place of the ability to sin, the universe would have been better. But it has been made as good as it was able to be made. Therefore, it was made with the non-ability to sin in man and angel: therefore, without choice inclining to one or the other. And it cannot be said that the non-ability to sin is not better than the ability to sin, because the ability to sin will be changed in heaven into the non-ability to sin, and there will not be change there except for the better. And it cannot be said that the non-ability to sin would remove the nature of man, because in heaven there will be man and at the same time he will not be able to sin.

Furthermore: in heaven we will not be able to sin because of confirmation. But the good that is more lasting is better. However, this good would have been more lasting, if it had been from the beginning. Therefore, the universe would have been better, if it had been founded in this way.
Furthermore: if it be said that the ability to sin is powerlessness, that which has been proposed follows better, because, when powerlessness has been removed by the addition of power, the matter itself becomes better. Therefore, when the power of sinning has been removed which is truly powerlessness and the potentia peccandi impotentia,\textsuperscript{177} which truly is power, there will be a better thing. Therefore, if it had been so in the universe from the beginning, the universe would have been better.

Furthermore: what wise father, if he builds a house for himself, does not build that house as beautiful and sound and free from a tendency to collapse as he knows and is able? But a house of God is a rational creation and He created this to be a home for Himself. Therefore, if He knew and was able, He made it free from a tendency to collapse, but sound and without a tendency to collapse by sin. But by free choice, man is flexible toward sin. Therefore, etc.

And it cannot be answered that if God had made creation such, and then the creation would not include man or angel, because now the angels are such and we will also be such men once in heaven.

In response to this, it can be said that it is true that the universe itself has been created in the best way. But that the universe itself not only is a creation which now is, or which was, or which will be, but everything that was, is, or will be from the beginning up to the end in duration. And according to this it does not prove the first argument, because it only shows that the universe is better in accordance with one state and not simply. And it follows well: if then there were some such state with the non-ability to sin, it would be better than a state with the ability to sin, and yet the whole universe would not be better. And it is not inconsistent that one state of the universe is better than another. For the state after the resurrection will be better than that state now. And yet it does not follow that on account of this, the whole universe

\textsuperscript{177}I.e., the power to commit sin.
would be better if it were such in the first state, because although the eye in man is a
certain part more worthy than the finger, yet the whole man would not be better, if the
whole man were an eye, but much worse and uglier. Likewise, it does not follow
that although the non-ability to sin is better than the ability to sin, the universe is
would be better with the non-ability to sin alone than both at the same time. But
something of the universe would be lost, if the ability to sin were removed: for this is
a kind of creation. And again: if there were a rational creation without the natural
power for the ability to sin, it would not be voluntary. And may you know that even
an angel naturally has this ability for this; but by confirmation, this power is impeded,
lest it can result in action.

But it can always be asked whether it would be better that man had been
confirmed in the non-ability to sin from the beginning. And may you know that it
would not be better; because, if he had been confirmed before he who was tempted
had resisted from one who was tempting, there would not be reward for persevering
in good.

Therefore, if there had not been the natural ability for sin, there would not
have been many good things that are, and there would be a shortage of integrity and
beauty of the universe, unless, as it has been said, there was the ability to sin which
has not been confirmed in the non-ability to sin before temptation or allurement. And
since allured ability is sin, nothing is lost from the integrity and beauty of the
universe. For that which is disfigured by fault is set in order by a just punishment.
For the beauty of the justice of retribution exists in this manner, to the extent that it
does exist, if only there were well doing, for whom there would be the retribution
alone of a reward.

But perhaps it will appear incompatible to someone that it is said that the
ability to sin is natural, since the ability to sin seems rather like powerlessness,
because Augustine says, "the power of sinning is the evening of rational creation"178; which therefore is not power because it comes from defect alone of rational creation.

But on the other hand, Jerome suggests that this is the power created by God and given in this way saying in Epistle 47: "God, desiring to give rational creation the gift of voluntary good and the power of free choice or to enrich man by implanting in him the possibility of each part, made proper to him what He wanted, so that man, capable of good or evil, is naturally able to do either one and could incline his will toward either one. For creation could not have voluntary good in any other way unless it also had [voluntary] evil. The best creator wanted us to have the ability for both, but to do one, namely, the good that He has commanded; and He has given the faculty of evil for this end only, so that we would do His will from our will. Since it is so, it is also a good that we can do evil things: I say good, because it makes part of good better. For He makes this voluntary act, not bound by the necessity of His own law, but by free judgment."179

Furthermore, Bernard says: "Among all living beings, to man alone was given the ability to sin, on account of his prerogative of free choice. But he was given it, not that he might sin, but rather that he might appear the more glorious did he not sin, although he was capable of sinning."180 And shortly thereafter: "Free for no other reason than his freedom of choice, concerning which the possibility of sinning existed in him."181 And again he says: "For though he sinned from the ability that he received, yet he sinned, not because he was able, but because he wanted."182 The philosophers add the following to these statements: "The rational powers have power with respect to their opposites. " And again: "They sin who place power in the genus of evils."
But contrary to this, it seems to be that sinning is descending and failing. Therefore, the ability of sinning is failing and descending and is corruptability. These seem to be placed under the genus of evils, because their opposites are placed under the genus of goods.

These perhaps will be more evident later. Nevertheless, a twofold power is able to be stated and distinguished: namely, the more distant and the nearer. Therefore the created will itself is the power free with regard to one of the two; this will, we say, considered in itself without the inclination toward good and toward evil, considered to be this, because this will is from creation alone. And this will is first removed [prima remota]. And Jerome and Bernard speak about this. But the will itself of its own accord, now tending downward and toward evil by an act or habit, is called the nearer ability of sinning. And this ability exists from defect alone of a rational creature because it is a downward tendency, as Augustine says; and this is truly not power, but rather powerlessness, just as it has already been said, fashioned evilly and tending toward non-being. Yet the ability itself, which considered in itself naturally has the ability toward either one, is created and is good. And God made this ability.
Chapter Thirteen

Furthermore: it would appear to someone that perhaps choice is not free because sin can rule it. For free choice is able to sin, and if it sins, it is a servant of sin; and so sin rules it. Therefore choice is not free.

But this does not follow: rather if sin were able to rule reluctant choice and this ability were from the part of ruling sin, it indeed would not have true freedom. But now free choice is subject to its own law, and it is subject to sin only voluntarily; not to be subject to sin is in its own power, just as if there were a man powerful and free, over whom another man, powerless, had no power or rule. Yet, the powerful man would be able voluntarily and without compulsion to submit himself to the rule of the powerless man. And if the powerless man were only able to rule him from the power of the powerful man, nevertheless, the powerful man would be free on account of this.

But let it be posed that now the powerful man had voluntarily submitted himself to the rule of a more powerful man and were not able in any way to escape per se from the yoke of servitude now begun: he would still never be free, rather it is clear that he would be a slave. Likewise, it appears that since the will has now subjected itself to sin, it has lost its freedom. John 8 agrees with this: "He who commits sin is a slave to sin."183 And that passage of the Apostle to the Romans: "You yield yourselves to any one as obedient slaves, you are slaves of the one whom you obey, either of sin, which leads to death, or of obedience, which leads to righteousness."184

But the solution of this will be more clearly evident, when it has been explained what free choice is and how many kinds of that liberty exist.
Furthermore: is that which can be forced free? It is clear that it is not. Consequently, if anyone is compelled with the fear of death to lie lest he be killed, since the force of the one compelling and the fear of death forces him, does he, unwilling and coerced, not lie? In what manner therefore does he act voluntarily and freely? For he desires not to lie. And let us suppose that he does not want to lie. And so he does what he does not want. Therefore, he does this not from the will; therefore, he does this not from free choice.

Furthermore: he who lies out of fear of death has two wills, one of living and the other of not lying. But the will of living is greater than the other and conquers the other and, as it seems, forces him to lie; and, the will is always compelled in this way, and in this way is not free.\textsuperscript{185}

It should be said that the upright will of not lying remains, although the will of living is greater and stronger and produces an act contrary to the will of not lying. And he lies not from the will of lying, nor from the will of not lying which has been compelled, but lies from the will of living. And so in this case, the act of lying is produced from the will of living, and, i.e., that the will of not lying is forced by this, namely, hindered by its own act, because the stronger will brings the contrary act into being.

Therefore, no will can be forced so that it does not will what it wills, but it can be forced so that it does not do what it wills; and this is done either by a greater contrary will acting, as in the aforementioned case, or by other things putting emotional states in the way that they not obey the commanding will. And so he lies from the will of living or from the will of lying, in order to live, not nevertheless simply from the will of lying. And according to this, it is not true that every voluntary act comes forth from the will of the same act, because in this case the act of
lying does not come forth from the will of the same act, but from the will of the other act.
Since we have posited reasons that seemed to eliminate free choice and have posited their solutions, the consequent is to show that free choice exists. This is clear: otherwise every precept were vain. For that which is usefully commanded is able to be done and not to be done. For if it is necessary that it be done, it is commanded in vain, and similarly if it is necessary that it not be done, it is commanded in vain. Therefore, if it is not commanded in vain, it is not necessary that it be done or not be done. But if it is not necessary that it be done, it is able not to be done; if it is not necessary that it not be done, it is able to be done. Therefore, if it is not commanded in vain, it is able to be done and not to be done.

In the same way, if it is not forbidden in vain, and if it is not counseled in vain so that it is done or not done, [it can be done or not done].

Furthermore: if anything is done from necessity, the agent does not merit praise from that act unless perhaps necessity itself were also voluntarily taken and were able not to have been taken from the freedom of the will. But through this, that which was done in this way would not be necessary, but from the beginning it would be voluntary, free, and not necessary. If therefore the agent is praiseworthy because of the act, that act is not necessary, but the agent was able not to have done that. For what reason is the agent otherwise praiseworthy except because he has done good, since he could not have done that good, or consequently blameworthy except because he has done evil, since he could not have done that evil? For this reason Seneca says: "They will not be disgracefully overcome by those circumstances that are not in our power." 186

Furthermore: if anyone does this act necessarily and it was never in his power not to do it, he cannot justly be punished on account of it. Therefore, if he is
punished justly for some act, he was able not to have done it; similarly, if he is justly rewarded, [he was able not to have done it].

Furthermore: why do we blush about something, unless we were able to have avoided the same deed? For we could also have avoided the shameful emotions of the genitals in the first parent, as Augustine says.

Furthermore: why do we flee the knowing and witnessing of an evil act unless because we can then be disproved by law, since it is in our power not to have done the same evil act? If it were necessary that this happen, the disproof would be unjust and every reproach in vain. Therefore, if the reprimand and reproach are just, not to have done this was free.

Furthermore: from what source does the conscience torment and accuse someone concerning some act unless because he had in his power [the ability] to have not done the same act.

Furthermore, from what cause in good acts is the mind joyful, firm, and unshaken, unless because, although he had in his own power [the ability] not to have done the same good, yet he has done the same good without coercion.

So, prohibition, counsel, praise, blame, punishment and reward, reprimand, reproach, blushing from evil and confusion, flight of awareness [of evil], appetite for concealment, fear and hatred of disclosure, a conscience which torments and restrains in evil, a mind joyful, firm, and unshaken in good, desiring to be shown by some natural impulse show that free choice is a precept.187 And so, every authority of scripture that commands or prohibits, counsels, praises, blames, threatens punishment, promises reward, disproves, reproaches proves that free choice exists.

Furthermore, from Augustine's book "Unde Malum,"188 it follows that free choice exists because man does evil, to which he is not forced by God, because God, supremely good, cannot be forced by knowledge, or by another good mind, or by an
evil mind or body, since they are inferior. Therefore it follows that man does not do evil except from his own will.

And so although all scripture is filled with authorities proving that free choice exists, as it is clear from the aforementioned [passages], lest however this abundance should make poorer those desiring to prove that it exists, we here insert certain authorities by which for their part it is proved to exist.

Therefore it is written in Ecclesiasticus 15: "God from the beginning created man and left him in the power of his own counsel. He added commandments and rules; if you desire to keep the commandments, they will protect you and to make faith pleasing in perpetuity. He has placed before you water and fire: stretch out your hand for whichever you wish. Before a man are life and death, good and evil: and whichever he likes will be given to him."189

Furthermore, in Ecclesiasticus 17: "He granted him authority over the things upon the earth. He placed the fear of him in all flesh, and he ruled over the birds and the beasts. He created of him a helper like to himself: He gave them counsel and a tongue, and eyes, and ears and a heart to reason and filled them with the training of their understanding."190

Furthermore, in Deuteronomy 30: "I call heaven and earth to witness this day, that I have set before you life and death, good and evil, blessing and curse191; therefore choose life."192

Furthermore, Jerome, [in his Hebraicae Quaestiones in Libro Geneseos 49], cites, "The brothers Simeon and Levi satisfied their own iniquity from their own will."193

Furthermore, in Isaiah: "If you are willing and hear me, you shall eat the good of the land. But if you are not willing and do not hear me, the sword will devour you."194
Furthermore Isaiah 7: "You all will cut yourselves down to the slaughter, because I have called you and you did not listen; I spoke and you ignored me; you did evil in my sight and chose what I did not want."195

Also the Lord Himself in the Gospel: "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, you who kill the prophets and stone them who were sent to you, how often would I have gathered your children together as a hen gathers her brood under her wings, and you would not!"196

In a letter to the virgin Demetriades, Jerome adds to these authorities as follows: "When we see the willing and the not willing and the choosing and the refuting, it is not the force of nature, but the freedom of the will. The books of each testament are full, into which is always added every willful good as well as every willful evil."197 And shortly thereafter: "And we do not defend the good of nature so that we may say that nature cannot do evil, which in any case we still acknowledge as capable of good and evil. But let us only defend it from this injustice, lest we seem to be impelled toward evil by its shortcoming, we who do neither good nor evil without the will, and in whom [the will] is free always to do one of two, since we always have the ability to do one of two. For why do some judge and others must be judged unless because of the same nature the will is different and because we do different [things], although we are all capable of the same things?"198

Therefore in order to make this more clear, some examples should be produced: Adam is cast out from paradise; Enoch is taken up from the world. In both the Lord shows freedom of choice. For as the former who transgressed could have pleased [God], so the latter who pleased [God] could have sinned. For Adam would not have deserved to be punished or Enoch to be taken up unless either had been able [to do] both. The same should be understood about the brothers Cain and Abel, [and] also about the twins Jacob and Esau; it should be understood and known
that the only cause is the cause of the will because the merits are different in the same nature.

Furthermore, Augustine in his book about the definitions of the correct faith [i.e., the Enchiridion]: Man was immediately joined to freedom of his own choice in the first condition of the world. But afterwards he fell, [and] he truly lost the good as well as the vigor of choice, not however the faculty of choosing. Therefore freedom of choice continues toward seeking salvation, i.e., the rational will. 199

Furthermore, John Chrysostom [says]: "The possibility of believing in the Son of God and the possibility of God causing the Son are removed from no one; for, this was constituted by the choice of man and the co-working of grace." 200

Furthermore, Augustine says in Homily 3 on John: "In regard to one's own will, everybody either is antichrist or is in Christ." 201

Furthermore, Augustine says in Homily 4 on John: "And everyone who has hope in Him makes himself pure, just as He is pure. Consider how he has not removed free choice so that he said 'He makes himself pure.' Who makes us pure, if not God? But God does not make pure you who are unwilling. Therefore because you join your will to God, you make yourself pure not of yourself, but of Him who dwells in you." 202

Furthermore, Augustine says: "How in accordance with one's own works is anything returned to each person in the day of judgment, unless there were free choice?" 203

Bernard also says, "Since the will alone is not forced by any necessity either to rebel against itself or to agree in anything beyond itself because of its innate freedom, the will alone rightly determined the just or unjust creature worthy and able of blessedness without misery, just as the will agrees to justice or injustice." 204
Numerous witnesses of this sort from Holy writers support this. But we omit them lest the abundance of witnesses create offense.
Chapter Sixteen

Since therefore it is established, as well by sound arguments as by reliable authorities that free choice exists, there remains for us to ask consequently, "What is it?"

Yet, another question precedes this investigation, namely, whether free choice is predicated univocally of man and of angel, good and bad, and of God? For if equivocal, it is not possible to assign one reason for it.

But that it is predicated univocally is apparent in Anselm, who assigns a single and common definition of free choice, according to which it is predicated of all these. Therefore since it has one name and according to its name the basis of its substance is the same, it is predicated univocally.

Furthermore: only the univocal is capable of comparison; but concerning these, free choice allows comparison referring to greater and less, which will be evident from the authorities cited below: therefore it is univocal.

Furthermore: if reason and will in these are predicated univocally then similarly free choice [is predicated univocally], because free choice is nothing other than rational will.

But that free choice is not predicated univocally of creature and creator is clear in the following way: freedom of choice is substance and divinity in the creator; quality exists in creature and divinity does not. Therefore it is not predicated univocally of these.

Furthermore: creator and creature share in nothing. But univocal things share in something. Therefore, the creator and creature are in no respect univocal.

Furthermore: if God is univocal with something in something which has been stated without referring to relation, it would be necessary that God be composite and
not simple, or that He be part of another substance or quality or quantity of another substance.

Furthermore: free choice said about a creature is contained under a certain genus of predicates; but, free choice said about God is contained under no genus of predicates. Therefore it is not predicated univocally about those.

How therefore did Anselm assign one reason to it?\(^{206}\) We truly concede that nothing is predicated univocally of creature and creator; but yet, a rational creature is so near an imprint and likeness and image of its own creator, that in these, because that is a near and assimilated imprint, it is able to share the name, not indeed univocally, but with a near, imitative likeness. In this way it also has one definition of name, not univocal, but with a near, imitative likeness. And the likeness is also so closely imitative, the intellect by a single gaze is able to view the exemplar in that which has been copied and vice versa, just as an image of a seal in wax \(<\text{which}\>\) was impressed by that seal and vice versa. Therefore the intellect, which ponders in this manner and makes these two as one in this manner, must attribute one name and one definition of free choice in creator and creature because from a single and undivided gaze the intellect observes this in creature and creator on account of the similitude of the close likeness. Yet these in themselves are different according to the diversity of essences; when the intellect observes this diversity of essences, it will give different definitions.

Therefore, Anselm following an earlier method investigated and found a definition in the aforementioned way common in creator and creature. But others, following a second method, defined differently free choice in creature and creator, or they even appear to deny the creator free choice. For Jerome says: "Since there are other faculties of free choice, they have the ability to be turned in either direction."\(^{207}\) Moreover, those which are brought together in any designation through equality of
name are univocal. But it should surely not be the case that those things that are able to be brought together in any designation through the consequent or according to prior and posterior are univocal, as ten predicates are brought together with respect to that which is being \( \text{ens} \), because substance is a greater being than quantity is a being. Yet, these are not called univocal on account of such comparison mutually under this name "being," and they are not completely called equivocal. So, freedom of choice is called freer in God than in angel, and freer in an angel than in man, not because they are univocal, but because, since there is freedom here and freedom in an angel, the former is nearer to someone and the latter is more distant to someone. Therefore, it is clear in this way how one reason can be assigned to it and how it cannot. But before we proceed further and assign any common reason to free choice, namely, that which is in God and in creature, let us see whether there is freedom of choice in God?

This is clear in Boethius in Book V of his \textit{Consolation of Philosophy} where he says: "For there has not been any rational nature to which freedom has not been attributed."\textsuperscript{208} And he proves this in the same place, as it is clear for one who is examining, and the reasoning of it can briefly be composed as follows: when there is reason, there is the discernment of good and evil. But the discernment would be in vain unless there were the free power of choosing good and of avoiding evil. But this free power is free choice. Therefore, every rational nature has free choice. For the end of the discernment of good from evil could not be the necessary assumption of another, but could be understood to be the end of cognition alone of that which is taken, not of this discernment of an opposite from an opposite. For the necessary taking of this alone could be understood to be the end of the cognition of the same alone, but not of this discernment from its opposite. Therefore, every rational nature has free choice.
Freedom of choice is freer even in God than in man, and freer even in a confirmed angel than in man, because of having every good thing voluntarily good which it cannot lose—especially, since the non-ability to lose is itself voluntary—is freer than that which has that with the possibility of losing. And therefore that which is freer is more distant from servitude. Moreover, God, angel, [and] man have voluntary goods; but God and angel are not able to lose them; however, man is able to lose what he has and each voluntary, namely, the ability to lose and the non-ability to lose. Therefore, God and angel have freer choice than man.
Chapter Seventeen

Since these considerations have been made, before we ask what is free choice, let us see what it is not and that the ability to sin is not truly the essence of free choice, because the power of sinning does not exist either in confirmed angels, or in God, who have freedom of choice in the highest degree. Therefore, the power of sinning is not of the essence of freedom of choice: for although free choice is not truly predicated univocally concerning these, but by a near and imitative likeness, it follows nevertheless that whatever concerns the whatness of free choice in one [being], may also be predicated in another proportionally, because in these which have the nearest imitative likeness, it is necessary that whatever is in one with a near, imitative likeness be in the other, from which likeness it merits the same designation.

Furthermore: the approaching ability to sin lessens freedom of choice, its departing strengthens freedom of choice. Therefore, [the ability to sin] is not essential to free choice, because the absence of nothing essential increases that to which it is essential or presence lessens it. But freedom of choice is not free generally to obtain what it wills, but for willing what it ought to will. I say "generally" on account of God's freedom of the will, as is evident below. For if it was established that free choice is not able to will what it ought, it must not be attributed to God, if it does not will what it ought. But this may rightly be attributed to Him. Therefore, it has not been established that that which not able wills what it should. Therefore, it has been established that that which is able wills what it should.

Furthermore: if it had been established that that which is not able wills what it should, the same ought and ought not: for let it be supposed that there is the obligation to do A and the non-ability to do A. But whatever is not able ought not [do A] unless that one is unable by its own fault. But whatever is not able from its own first condition, it is not its own fault that that one is not able. Therefore, that which in
its own first condition is not able is not obligated [to do A]. Therefore, he is obligated to do A and not obligated to do A, which is impossible.

"But in its own first condition" I said on account of us, who, when we are born, are not able [to do] what we should. But that "non-ability" is not with us from our first condition, rather from the fact that all human nature has sinned and has been corrupted in Adam who sinned.

Furthermore: I have said "generally" on account of the freedom of the will of God that is free both for willing what it ought and for obtaining what it wills.

But to be each one just as it ought is to be rightly. Therefore, to will what it ought is to will rightly. Therefore, if it is free for and having the capacity for willing what it ought, it is free for and having the capacity for willing rightly and to the uprightness of the will. But something does not have the capacity for and is not free to obtain per se the rectitude of the will before it has that rectitude, nor even for receiving from an extrinsic giver before it has received it. Therefore, this freedom and power are only for preserving the rectitude of the will that has been received or exists.

What is not done by its due end is not ever right, nor just as it ought to be. Therefore, having the capacity for and free for willing in any case what it ought, it not only has the capacity to preserve that which is right in the will on account of something, but also on account of uprightness itself. Therefore "free choice is the power of preserving the uprightness of the will for the very purpose of uprightness itself."209

But this power of preserving the uprightness of the will exists both in a bad angel, who has never had uprightness of the will, and in man, who lost what he once had. For it should not be understood that this power is only for preserving that
uprightness, which he has by act, but for preserving the uprightness at the same time as he has it. And this is the common reason of free choice which Anselm gives.

Therefore, in accordance with this way of Anselm, it does not seem that the flexibility or the changeability of the will for both concerns the whatness of free choice, but only the power itself of standing in truth or uprightness, and not of dropping or leaving it, if it has been possessed. And his reasoning seems to compel this: for if changeability for either one is the power of doing good and of sinning, the power of sinning, however, is not in God and in confirmed angels, the changeability for either one is not in God and in angels, and yet freedom of choice is in them.

Furthermore: just as the ability to die or necessity to die does not concern the whatness of man, because sometimes he will have the necessity of not dying, the same necessity of not dying does not concern the whatness of him, because now he has the ability and the necessity to die, so the changeability or flexibility for good and evil in man will not concern the whatness of his free choice, because at some time he will be without this changeability.

On the other hand however, it seems by the definitions of free choice that have been given by other authorities, that such changeability concerns the essence of it. For by the same authorities it is defined as follows: "Free choice is the faculty of the will and reason, whereby good is chosen with the help of grace, or evil [is chosen] without its help"; and the Master adds in the Sentences: "and it is called "free" to the extent that it regards the will, which can be directed toward either, but "choice" to the extent that it regards reason." And shortly thereafter he says: "Therefore, that rational power of the soul, whereby it discerning either one can will good and evil, is called free choice."
Also, in regard to the same matter, the aforementioned authorities Jerome\textsuperscript{211} and Bernard\textsuperscript{212} cause it to be proven that the ability to sin is good and was created by God.

Furthermore: the changeability to either one does not at all concern the whatness of the rational will; for, discernment is in vain, when the power is not free of choosing toward either of the things discerned. But the rational will itself is free choice.

Furthermore: all reasons that have been stated above argue that free choice exists. What else do they argue other than the free changeability of the rational will?

Furthermore: if God could never have willed many things that He wills, because He was able not to have done many things that He did, and was able to have done what He did not do, the changeability of the will is in Him, not so that, when He wills something, His will can be changed into the opposite, since He is completely immutable, but so that there is in Him the power of willing either of two opposites, namely, the ability of willing without beginning and from eternity what He does not will, and of not willing without beginning and from eternity what He does will. Therefore, God has the power of willing either of opposites. And it is clear that this power was created in angel and man. Otherwise, since His nature, which has been established, was one and equal of angels, the will in them would not have been in them a different will, in one praisable, in another blameworthy. Therefore, there is the power of willing either opposites in God, as in angel, as in man. And if this power is called the changeability of the will, this is in them also. And since this is in God, this cannot be an imperfection in any way. Therefore, the same power is not an imperfection in a creature, but is a good created by God.

And from these it is clear that this power of opposites, which we call changeability of the will, is not the same simply. This power, whereby one can freely
will either of the opposites, which we have also called changeability of the will, is not the same in a simple manner, because it is the ability of sinning and of not sinning, since this changeability is in God, who cannot sin. For since the uprightness exists per se and therefore upright things exist, because He wills them, and He cannot will not right because, if He wills something, it is right by that very fact. Therefore, the aforesaid changeability exists, when the power of sinning does not exist. Therefore, this power of sinning is not that changeability.

Moreover, there are many pairs of opposites, either of which is indifferent and for either one to be done well, and man is able to will either one well and laudably. Therefore, this power in both cases is a power of doing good. But the power of doing good is not simply identical with the power of sinning.

Since it has also been supposed that all pairs of opposites are indifferent and none of the opposites is contrary to the will of God, the said changeability of the will could be understood to exist without the power of sinning. Therefore, the power of sinning is not the same simply as this changeability.

Furthermore: to sin is to will what is wicked. It is not, however, wicked unless it is contrary to true equity and true uprightness, i.e., contrary to the divine will. Therefore, this is to sin: to will that which is contrary to what God wills, to will that, I say, in accordance with what is contrary to Him. But the contrary of sinning, namely, to do good, consists in willing that which God wills in accordance with what has been pleasing to God.

But the changeability of the will consists in willing either of the opposites considered in themselves, unrelated toward the pleasure or displeasure of God. And this will is natural to Him, namely, that per se He wills that which in itself is indifferent and does not have a relation to the pleasure or displeasure of God. But this willing something, in accordance with what has been pleasing to God, is not
possible unless helped by grace. But this willing, in as much as it is contrary to the will of God, is this deficiency from natural good, which is this bare will, and which has lessened the natural freedom of the will. For to will something displeasing to God is less than to will something indifferent. Therefore the power of sinning is the power of deficiency, and it is not that natural good, which is the changeability of the will toward either of opposites, but certain deficiency or corruption or depravation of that good.

Moreover, it will be clear after this that man of himself has the power of natural goods, i.e., of indifferent things and of gratuitous things only from grace and of evils only from deficiency.

Therefore, freedom of choice itself is a natural and voluntary changeability of the will toward willing either of opposites considered in themselves. In God, moreover, it is the same to will something and to will something consonant to His own will and therefore consonant to uprightness and equity. Therefore it is the same for Him to will something and to will good.

In a creature, however, it is not so, since the will of a creature is not uprightness itself, and it is not essential for it to be similar to the divine will. But the aforementioned changeability for willing either of opposites considered in themselves promotes in a creature willing one of the opposites through grace, in as much as it is pleasing to God. And through it, a creature is insufficient in itself for willing the rest in accordance with what is displeasing to God.

Therefore, in a creature, free choice is the aforementioned changeability that is the faculty of the rational will to choose good with grace helping and evil with grace lacking.

But in the creator, choosing good is essential to this faculty, because from choice itself that which is chosen is good and equitable.
But the aforementioned changeability of the will toward either of the opposites considered in themselves can be said to be the power of sinning and of not sinning by speaking *per accidens*, because it is the power of choosing that opposite, for which it happens to be contrary to the divine will and that opposite, for which it happens to be pleasing to the divine will.

And so authorities who say that the power of sinning and of not sinning is the whatness and essence of free choice speak *per accidens*. But they who deny this speak *per se*.

They understand the aforementioned changeability of will, who define free choice in the following way, that freedom itself is the inclination of the will. I believe that Bernard intends this, when he says: "Such consent, on account of the imperishable freedom of the will and the inevitable judgment of the reason always and everywhere accompanying it, is, I think, well called free choice, having free disposal of itself because of the will and the power to judge of itself because of reason. It is only right that judgment should accompany freedom as whatever has the free disposal of itself to judge itself in the act of sinning, should it chance to sin. And it really is judgment, because if he sins, he suffers justly indeed, what he does not will, who does not sin unless he wills." 214

And so in accordance with that authority, choice is designated the act of the will by the following judgment of reason, whereby it is condemned, namely, by judgment, if freely it acted evilly, or is absolved if it acted justly.

Nevertheless, choice is designated just as much an act of the will from the naturally preceding judgment of reason. For it is first the function of the reason to apprehend and to judge between the apprehended and its opposite, whether it is true or false, whether good or evil, and whether better or worse, and to propose to the will that which it has found to be necessary to choose or to avoid. Yet, reason itself does
not bring any necessity to the will for choosing or avoiding, because reason itself has so judged, but it is left free for the will to follow or to decline the sentence of the judgment of reason. Therefore, it is choice by reason, and free by will.

It is still called free choice of reason not of the one who is subjected, but of the one who grants freedom to that will, namely, for which he judges. For he is a judge who judges from the things done or to be done of another, who voluntarily has subjected himself to the judgment of him who is judging, so that he may follow his sentence. But he who has subjected himself to the judgment of another, either is forced to submit to the sentence of the judge, or is free from the coercion of the arbiter [arbitrantis]. Therefore the choice, under which he who has subdued himself has the freedom of submitting or of not submitting to the sentence of the judge, is called free choice. It concerns the will and reason in the following manner. For the will must naturally subdue itself voluntarily to the judgment of reason, so that it may obey its judgment; however, it does not undergo the necessity of obeying, rather it is left in its own power to obey or not. That choice, therefore, is free because the will does not compel him, who submits himself to the choice of the judge to fulfill the sentence.

According to the aforementioned authority of Bernard, it seems to him to be called "free" because he considers freedom of the will of the agent, or the action that was in the free power of the will. So, "choice" pertains properly to reason, and "free" pertains properly to the will. For Augustine in the Hypagnosticon says: "Why it is called free choice must be discussed a little. I believe that it receives the name choice, namely, from judging or discerning by rational consideration what it chooses or what it rejects: therefore, that is called free which has been placed in its own power, having the possibility of doing what it wills, which is the motion of a vital and rational soul."
Therefore, since reason and will are different virtues, but choice exists in reason, and free in will, it cannot be irrationally doubted how free choice is one and not two. Or if it is some one thing, is the reason greater than the will?

Perhaps it can more accurately be said that the root itself of will and reason is one substance and whatness of free choice, because choosing [arbitrans] is free in reason and in will. This agrees with the word of Augustine: "For this root is the motion and motive of the vital and rational soul. For there is one root that moves itself from this point to an act of reason, from this point to an act of the will."217 This also sufficiently agrees with the aforementioned words of Bernard,218 by which he says that free choice is voluntary consent, which is "free of itself" on account of the will, and which is "judge of itself" on account of reason. For it is necessary that consent be apprehensible and searchable in the essence and in the root. For it is not sought, unless it is comprehended. But, never on account of the apprehension of something did something else seek that same apprehended thing, just as one man did not seek something because another apprehended it. Nor has taste ever sought for something because sight apprehended that unless taste and sight were the same common sense in root. And so just as the brightness of the sun's ray is not the warmth nor is the warmth the brightness, and yet the warmth and the brightness are not different from the single essence of the ray and both are one in the essence of one ray, so the appearance and the affect, namely, reason and will, although by simply speaking the latter is not the former, they are yet one in the one essence of the root. And this one essence of the root, looking upon and seeking, extending itself to the judging reason and to the changeable and free will, inasmuch as this root is thus extending itself "judge of itself" on account of reason and "free of itself" on account of the will, is free, and in accordance with this way this word "free" is not so joined to choice, as to this root, whose essence is both free and is of choice [arbitratus]; yet
nonetheless, in the aforementioned way this word "free" is able to denote choice. Perhaps from these examples it could be doubted why it is called choice rather than judgment. And perhaps therefore it is called choice, because judgment is inevitable, i.e., there is not the power for declining the sentence of judgment. For judgment conveys necessity. But choice is judgment, which is voluntarily subjected; and the necessity of fulfilling choice does not occur, but it is left to the freedom of that will, for which it has been judged. For choice, properly called, leaves freedom as much to that for which it chooses, as for the arbiter. For Seneca in his *De Beneficiis* says the following about the freedom of choice from the side of the arbiter: "It is clear, accordingly, that a just case is in a better position if it is brought before a judge than if it is brought before an "arbiter," because the judge is restricted by the formula of instructions, which sets definite bounds that he cannot exceed, whereas the other has entire liberty of conscience and is hampered by no bonds; he can lessen the value of some fact or augment it, and can regulate his opinion, not according to the dictates of law or justice, but according to the promptings of humanity or pity."219

Therefore, it is about the choice of reason, especially about the choice following the act of the will, which can freely add or detract something, [and] modify the sentence sometimes, in so far as compassion demands. And so there is this free choice from the side of the one who is choosing. It is also free from the side of that, for which he chooses. For the will, for which reason chooses, has the freedom to follow or to reject its judgment. And so because of this freedom from the side of the one who chooses and of that, for which he chooses freedom, it is more accurately called choice than judgment. Moreover, although judgment of reason, which precedes the act of the will, adds no necessity to the will, yet perhaps it has been limited in itself and judges always as justice advises. And although it has been said, it cannot be said that there is no difference between choice and judgment, namely,
because judgment introduces necessity. In fact it can be called from judgment. Therefore, it does not have necessity. But you should know that it is not called from judgment per se, but perhaps it is called by the judgment of someone, so that the sentence of a higher judge is obtained. Therefore somewhere in a judgment there is a state and a necessity.

Since these things have been considered, something should be said about true freedom so that freedom of choice and freedom of will are clearer.

It should be known, therefore, that the true and highest freedom is being well according to what one wills, and to have completely one's own being well commensurate with one's own ordered will in one's own power with the exclusion of all others. And so one's conformity, which is being well in regard to the power and the individual ordered will, is true freedom. Moreover, from this it follows that God is free in the highest degree. For He is absolutely as He wills, and His whole being is commensurate with His own will, and since for Him being and willing and being well and willing ordinately are the same and He necessarily wills absolutely as He wills, and He is necessarily, and He has in His own power both being well absolutely as He wills ordinately and willing as He wills absolutely. Therefore, since this is His own willing, He has absolutely His own being well in His own power and ordinate will.

Furthermore: since being and essence are the same in God, and He has His own being in His own freedom, and so all that He is consists in freedom.

In heaven, however, all our being will be being well and all that is commensurate with our ordinate will and all being well, which we will have there, we have in our power. For we can acquire something if we will and disregard something if we will. Therefore, in heaven our whole being, which will be being well, will be commensurate with our ordinate will, which is all in our power.
But yet our being, according to what will be there, is not completely in our power, with the exclusion of all others, nor will being and willing and being well be the same for us as it is for God. Wherefore, we will be more distant from the highest freedom than God in these two respects, namely, that although our being well is in our power, yet not with the exclusion of all others, and again in this, that being well is not our willing as it is God's. Therefore, since nothing is as close to willing as willing itself, our being well will not be for us as close to willing as it is for God.

Furthermore: perhaps on this point, because being and essence are not the same for us, for which reason though our whole being is going to be as we will will, yet not all that we are will be free and voluntary for us in this way as it is in God. For to will refers most closely to being.

Furthermore: since every will wills the perpetuity of its own good and beatitude and an infallible security of the same perpetuity, an infallible security of truth and of perpetual beatitude concerns the plenitude of freedom, because unless it has this, it does not have being commensurate with its own will. But to have this security is to be confirmed in good and in the non-ability to sin; because, while the ability for sinning exists, the infallible security of the highest good does not exist. Therefore, confirmation in good and the non-ability to sin is part of consummate freedom. Therefore, the ability to sin, which is removed through confirmation, does not concern truth and the whatness of true freedom.

But yet "the ability to sin," which is removed through confirmation, is not changeability itself of the will that has been created or part of the same essential changeability, about which we have spoken above. For natural changeability will remain, when nevertheless there will be a stability that will never be turned and security that will never be changed.
From this it is clear how the more blessed and the better something is, the freer it is, because it has its own being more commensurate with its own will and, as Boethius suggests,⁵²⁰ has a more steadfast judgment and a less corruptible will and a more ready and more effective power of desires.
Since these things have been considered, let us examine the division of freedom.

Since, therefore, freedom consists in the conformity of being with willing, freedom can also be divided by division of being. I designate "being" as whatever verbally is signified by an infinite word.

Moreover, the being of a rational nature is twofold, namely, to will and to apprehend. And that can be divided into acting and undergoing.

Therefore first, being is willing and being most of all. For blessedness properly consists in willing firstly and per se, but not in seeing. Moreover, this being, namely, willing, by no means is also commensurate with that which is willing, and indifferently in God and angel and man, good and evil. For everyone wills indifferently, as he or she wills, and cannot not will as he or she wills. Therefore, every rational nature has parity with another in this [willing], because it wills as it wills, and so in accordance with this being that is willing, it exists equally, as it wills. Therefore, to this extent, no [rational nature] is freer than another; for in fact, to will evil is commensurate with willing, just as to will good is commensurate with its own willing. And it is true in accordance with this, as Anselm says,\textsuperscript{221} that one does not receive free choice more and less, but it exists equally in all. And the whole essence of freedom consists in this equality, because it is fully in the power of the will so that it wills and moves itself. And the aforementioned changeability is contained in this freedom, which we have called essential to free choice.

Since several things have been posed in the definition of one thing, it is not incompatible that they share that certain element equally according to one condition that has been posed there, unequally according to another and according to more and less; rather it is often so. Therefore it is in free choice, namely, that according to that
being, which is willing, free choice is equally shared by all, but according to other beings, it is not the case. For since every will wills to know and not to err or to be deceived in judgment or counsel of its own reason, which will thrives more in actions, this will has being greater and more commensurate with its own will. For it is also freer in this being, but it is equally free in willing what it wills.

Furthermore: if we posited that these three things are better and those three things are worse, and that he wills in accordance with these and the other in accordance with those, and that he who wills being according to worse things is in accordance with that, but he who wills being according to the better is not yet in accordance with that, but in accordance with any one of those, which nevertheless is a greater and better being for all things or worse things, according to which this is the other. Therefore he who is according to the worse things will be as much as anything freer than the other, because he exists more as he wills, i.e., because he has being more commensurate with his own will, and so evil men who are more free rule the just. But the other is freer in another respect; because he exists more as he wills, he has greater deficiency commensurate with his own will. And so the good men are always freer than the bad men.

Therefore this freedom, whereby a rational creature is free in the fact that he wills as he wills, and so what pertains to this as he wills and has being commensurate with his own will, is freedom from necessity because not to will what it wills is compelled by no force and by no necessity. Indeed the will is able to change, but voluntarily and into another will; and, it wills what it wills always voluntarily and without compulsion, and is unable not to will what it wills. This is consequently freedom from necessity, freedom of condition and of nature, according to which we were put before other living beings in the first condition.
Freedom is able to be divided in another way according to its division created in another way, which is being. Therefore, I say that what willing comes before is good *per se*; and just as evil is twofold, namely, what we do—and this is evil of error—and what we undergo—and this is evil of punishment—, so good is twofold, namely, what we do,—and this is an expedient good *per se*, or what we undergo,— and this is delightful good. Therefore, since it is called good only in these two ways, every willing comes before an expedient good or a delightful good. And to say this perhaps does not differ much with regard to something we said earlier, that the aspect is divided into acting and undergoing. Since therefore the right reason judged rightly, what is expedient good, i.e., what should be chosen [and] what should be fled, it is of counsel and of prudence to approve and to follow and to apprehend what should be chosen and to flee what should be fled, and he who does so acts prudently as a man of counsel does; but he who does otherwise does so foolishly. Therefore, the will has freedom of prudence and counsel, since it has without any obstacle in its ready power both to apprehend what should be chosen and to flee what should be fled. And as much as it does not have this in the readiness of its own power, it lacks the freedom of counsel and of prudence.

Moreover, to have this freedom is to lack sin and to be saved with the assistance of grace. For this freedom is called freedom of counsel, as Bernard[^222] says and it is said in the *Sentences* ; it is also called freedom from sin and freedom of grace. For since man voluntarily stooped down to choose what was to be fled, now he does not have in his power *per se* to rise upwards toward approving and apprehending what should be chosen, as it will be clear below, but is held captive under the yoke of sin until through grace he is restored to the stated freedom.

In addition to this, if one had the ability to grasp the delightful and would delight not at all in that which was not permitted, he would have freedom of pleasure
and of blessedness and of glory. For that which is pleasing or in which someone glories is delightful per se. And this would be freedom from wretchedness and even so it is called. For that makes nothing wretched except that which is able to be sad.

Therefore the division of freedom is able to be reconciled in the following way, because the will first returns upon itself and has in itself changeability, and there freedom consists of necessity either of condition or of nature. But that which the will wills beyond itself is either a true good or an apparent good; therefore that which he wills is good simply. But just as evil is twofold, namely, of error and of punishment, i.e., the evil that we do and that we undergo, so the good is twofold, namely, the good that we do and the good that we undergo, i.e., the expedient and the delightful. For the good that we do and the evil that we do is properly called expedient and inexpedient. But the good that we undergo and the evil that we undergo is called delightful and sorrowful. Consequently, the will is free toward that which is expedient, having freedom of counsel, but free toward the delightful, having freedom of pleasure. And they are not several, according to which freedom is able to be considered concerning a different will. Therefore the aggregation of all these freedoms, which have been discussed above, constitutes true and consummate freedom.

Moreover, concerning the freedom of counsel, that is the freedom from sin, the Apostle says in II Cor. 3: "Where Christ is, there is freedom." Furthermore in Romans 6: "For when you were slaves of sin, you were free in regard to righteousness ... but now that you have been set free from sin, you have become slaves to God etc." Concerning freedom of pleasure or from wretchedness, the same Apostle says in Romans 8: "Creation itself will be set free from its bondage of decay to freedom of the glory of the sons of God."
Concerning both of these freedoms, it is written in John 8: "If the Son makes you free, you will be free indeed."227
Chapter Nineteen

Therefore, these things being so, since it is certain that we will fully have these three freedoms in heaven, namely, freedom of nature, of counsel, of pleasure, one can ask whether the first man fully had them in paradise upon his own creation.

And perhaps someone would rationally believe that this is so, because the first man was created in the best state. And it is clear that he had the first freedom. And it also appears that he had the second freedom because he was able to engage in good per se. But did he have freedom from wretchedness? It seems that he did not, because part of this freedom is the security of perpetuity of blessedness. But he did not have this freedom in paradise, as it seems, because either he believed that he was not going to fall and was deceived and so he was wretched; or he doubted and feared a fall and so again he is wretched; or he foreknew a fall and so he is wretched: or they did not direct him to reflect upon the perpetuity of his own blessedness, which seems unlikely.

Furthermore, since hope is the apprehension of future good with the belief that it will be, if he were hoping not to fall, he would have believed that this would be and was deceived and thus wretched.

It should be said that he believed neither of the opposites and yet perhaps he thought of both of the opposites and hoped that he would not fall, but not with the presumption that he would not fall, nor with the presumption that he would fall, and so fear did not afflict him, nor was he deceived. For the fact that he firmly asserts what he hopes is not always joined with hope; just as perhaps someone hopes that he will eat, yet he does not claim this nor does he claim the opposite of it.

And this solution can clearly and fully be obtained in Augustine's De Genesi ad Litteram.228
Yet it can be distinguished that man in paradise had lower grades of counsel and of pleasure, namely, the ability not to sin and the ability not to be disturbed. In heaven, however, he will have the non-ability to sin and the non-ability to be disturbed. And rightly so, since man sinned by the will which had the ability toward an opposite, he rightly lost both the ability not to sin and the ability not to be disturbed.

Whereupon Bernard says: "There only remained, for his punishment, the freedom of choice through which he had lost the others; yet, he was not able to lose this freedom. Enslaved by his own will to sin, he deservedly forfeited freedom of counsel. Through his sin he became a debtor of death, so how could he hold on to his freedom of pleasure? Therefore, concerning the three freedoms that he had received, by abusing the one called freedom of choice, he deprived himself of the others. He abused it, in that what he had received for his glory, he turned to his shame." 229

Furthermore, Augustine says in the Hypognosticon: "The first-formed man did not commit an offense except through the fact that that which he was able to do, lest he was lacking this ability. Therefore by willing evil, he, who could conquer willing evil by the ability for good, rightly lost the ability for good. God justly sent him away, who now had wrongly become captive to a base will, so that he had the punishment for not doing what he wanted; moreover, if he had been obedient to God, he would have been able to have satisfied all good which he would have desired." 230

Now from these statements it is therefore clear that freedom is threefold, namely, of nature, of counsel, and of pleasure, and that each one of these and that freedom of counsel and of pleasure naturally follow freedom of choice or of nature to its complement and well being. And the word of Anselm sufficiently agrees with these things now spoken, which says that man is free, who cannot be hindered in the
things that must be done, and he takes from those things that should be done both
those things that should be done and those thing that should be undergone.
Chapter Twenty

Since it has been concluded what free choice is and consequently has been concluded as well what is its material and formal cause, it remains to inquire about its efficient cause, namely, from what it is.

And someone will say immediately and well that it is from God. On the other hand, it could be opposed as follows: from whomsoever free choice is, from him it is also that which follows freedom of choice. But the evil of a fault is from free choice. Therefore, the fault would also be from God, if free choice were from Him. But this is false. Therefore the aforementioned is also false. And this line of reasoning forces the Manicheans to suggest two principles: one principle of good and another of evil. But this reason must be resolved by saying that it does not follow that although freedom of choice is from God, therefore this evil also follows from God; for, although some construct had been built well of the nature of its own material, namely, its mass, and it undergoes corruption of some sort, this must not be attributed to the builder himself who built the construct well. For he did not make the mass and the weight, upon which corruption follows. So it is in this case, that he has in himself a voluntary deficiency, because he was made from nothing, and God did not make that deficiency, but God alone created the structure and this being of man and created nothing which He would make for his ruin, nor did He create man so that man would fall, but so that man would stand, and also, what is more, God gave the power of not falling. So therefore this argument does not prevent free choice being from God.

Moreover, Augustine proves that free choice is from God as follows: Man is entirely made by God. Therefore, whatever concerns the essence of man is made by God. But freedom of choice concerns the essence of man. Therefore, free choice is from God.231
Furthermore: He rewards or punishes no one, unless he be of His kingdom, but God rewards and punishes freedom of choice. Therefore, free choice is of His kingdom and is His manner.

Furthermore: all good is of God, just as Augustine shows and shows this very copiously. But free choice is good. Therefore, it is from God.

He proves his assumption in this way: there is something better without which anyone cannot live rightly than that without which he can [live rightly]. But anyone can live rightly without a foot or a hand, but not without free choice. Therefore, free choice is better than a foot or hand. But those things are good. Therefore, free choice is good. Therefore, it is of God.
Chapter Twenty-One

With this arrived at, it can be asked: whether its own motion and its own action are also from God. And since its own motion is for willing the good of grace and willing the good of nature, namely, indifferent good, and willing evil, it can be asked whether all these are able to will from themselves, or none are able to will from themselves, or some yes and some no.

Therefore firstly let it be asked whether its own motion to indifferent good be from God, or is free choice capable of this per se. It seems that it is from God, because such motion in willing some indifferent good exists in essence and "all things were made by Him."234

Furthermore: if anything exists, God has eternally said it; and, His saying is His doing. Therefore, since it was spoken by God, it was done by God.

Yet, Augustine seems to say the opposite of this in his Hypognosticon.235 For he says there that meritorious good is possible from grace, but evil from its own deficiency, but the middle [course], namely, indifferent good, from itself. And Bernard seems to say this.

It seems that this is so by the definition of free choice: for, free choice is an instrument moving itself. For if it were moved by another, it would not be true to say that it moves itself.

Furthermore: let it be supposed per impossibile that God had said from eternity: "Just as I make all things that I will without anyone's assistance by that word alone, even so let there be free choice making its own motion unto the good of nature by its own word with nothing, neither Me, nor another, helping." If He had spoken in this way, it would be the case that it would move itself by itself; and although He had spoken so, nevertheless its own moving would be from God causally, although He would not assist its motion in any particular movement; and
consequently, although this were so, it would still follow well that all things are from God. Moreover, it seems that He has spoken in this way. For free choice is the likeness and image of God. Therefore, since God makes all things by His own Word, it will be possible to find this likeness in free choice, namely, that He creates some universe by His own word. And it seems that He makes free choice.

For the soul is in some way all things, both in apprehension and in appetite. It is obvious apprehension. It is even obvious in appetite, because there is not appetite in any creature, whose proportional appetite does not happen to be found in man. And these two, namely, appetite and apprehension, are one in root, as it was said in the aforementioned statements.

Furthermore: since therefore God is good in the highest degree, it is clear that there is nothing in Him, of which some imprint may not be found in any creature. Therefore, it is possible to find in any creature this imprint, which is to make all things by His own word. But it is agreed that it is in no creature, unless this creature be in free choice. Therefore, it is possible to find free choice there.

Whether however it be so, namely, that its own motion be from itself, or not, I do not determine, but clearly I leave it to be investigated to those who see.

Therefore, let us ask whether the motion of free choice, whereby it moves to evil, is also from God. And this does not seem to be the case, because the compulsion of God is the willing of God. Therefore, since He does not will anyone to do evil, He does not compel anything to perform evil.

But perhaps someone should say that the motion itself, whereby freedom of choice is moved to evil, namely, willing itself, is from God. Nevertheless, God does not will the joining of the will with evil.
But, on the other hand, this can be opposed as follows: but before there is the joining of willing with evil, there is a deformation of will, from which deformation this willing follows. Therefore, it is not from God.

Furthermore: the beginning of malice exists in the very will seeking this uniting itself with an evil act. Therefore, the will itself is not from God. Again, I do not determine this. If, nevertheless, you wish to say that the motion itself of free choice, by which it is moved to an indifferent good, is from God, so you can also say here that whatever exists in the will willing evil, which means being, is from God. For all willing in itself is from God; but, that deformation of the will, whereby that by which the will first wills evil, and those things which are consequent to its conjunction with evil, are from the will itself alone and in no way from God.

After asking these two questions, it is asked about the third, namely, whether free choice from itself alone can will meritorious good.

Our faith compels us to say that it cannot, because it can still be evident as follows: every cause is better than its own effect, and let us say per se. Therefore, the cause creating good from not good is greater than that which is created. Therefore, if anyone evil should make himself good, the evil one would be better than the good. But this is impossible. Therefore, it is impossible that anyone should make himself good. But someone becomes good by willing meritorious good, namely, for the sake of good. Therefore, no will can will this from itself.

Furthermore: being good is a better being than being simply. Therefore, it is better to make good to be than being only. Therefore, he who makes good to be in that person is greater than that person who causes being. Therefore, he who makes good to be in that person is greater than he who causes that person to be. For the causes are proportional to the effects. Therefore, if you should cause yourself to be good and God caused you to be, it would follow that you would be greater than God.
This, however, is impossible. And these are the arguments of Augustine and Bernard.

Furthermore: finite virtue does not move anything through infinity. But since you will gratuitous good, you become one spirit with God. Therefore, since God surpasses every creature unto infinity, you cannot be transferred from yourself to Him, except by infinite virtue, namely, uncreated power.

But from the same argument, perhaps it might appear to someone that since someone was good, he could not become bad from himself, because in this way he would cross over infinite space from himself, namely, from God or conformity with God to himself, between which the distance is infinite. But that someone becomes bad from good is nothing other than being abandoned by grace, which is infinite power. For since sinning is in him, to which dereliction comes from infinite power, it is in him because the ability to become bad is in him. It is, however, not in this way with respect to God. But, that some good is made from evil is also the best example about the atom, which, although made from nothing, is necessary to be made from infinite power: for, between nothing and something the distance is infinite. Yet, the atom by itself returns by dereliction from infinite power into nothing.

Since this has been observed and since it is the case that no one can will gratuitous good except by grace, and grace is nothing other than the willing of God, namely, that you will right, when you have not previously willed, therefore it could be asked whether God wills this simply or with condition. If God wills simply, then it is necessary that it be done: because "all things, whatever He willed, He made and they were made." Therefore, if God imposes necessity, that is not meritorious willing. But it is clear that this is false. Therefore, He does not will this simply, but under condition. What is that condition? Let it be this: God wills you to will A, if you should will it: either, therefore, He wills that you will A, which is evil, and it is
clear that He does not will this; or He wills that you will A, which is indifferent, and it is clear that He does not will this; or He wills that you will A, which is a gratuitous good, if you will. If He wills this (namely, that you will a gratuitous good), and if you will a gratuitous good, this willing is not able to exist except by His will. Or He therefore wills this simply or under condition. If simply, then as before, it would not be meritorious; if under condition, as before, it will be a process unto infinity.

How this should be answered, I cannot determine fully. Yet, in order that this be understood in whatever manner, let us imagine a particular infinite straight line and a particular point moved above it, which nevertheless could either stay or descend of itself, never, however, to ascend. If, nevertheless, someone placed a finger on it or some such thing, it can immediately ascend with the finger if one should will, or even withdraws the finger and to descend just as before, if one should will. And I say this: In the first applying of the finger, let the point have that power either of ascending with the finger or of descending per se. Thus it can be said about free choice, that it can descend of itself, but not ascend to gratuitous good except by the application of grace, which application does not impose the necessity of ascending on it; just as the finger does not either when the point has been moved on the line. If nevertheless free choice wills to ascend to the first application of grace, it can do this. Therefore, perhaps there is a condition, whereby He wills that someone wills a gratuitous good, namely, if one's very freedom of choice does not refuse the first application of grace. Yet, whether it is so or not, I do not say.

* 

Now that we have considered these things and we do not wish that lengthiness become weariness, by imposing an end to this treatise about free choice, yet, we leave these questions about it to be resolved later, namely, for what end has
freedom of choice been created? And in this question, if anyone should carefully
investigate, he will find that the use of free choice is a virtue.

Now having considered this, it could be asked whether it is in or outside the
genus of predicables? If it is in the genus, in which is it? That is, in substance or in
another? If it is in substance, is it in the first or the second substance? If it is in the
second substance, the second of what kind?

Furthermore: is it simple or composite? Is it one or many?

Furthermore: is it outside time or within time? Or is it in the bounds of
eternity or of time?

Furthermore: is it a natural power, or in accordance with this should it be
placed in another species of quality?

Furthermore: is it begetter or begotten or proceeding?

Furthermore: how does it exist moving itself, and whether it exists according
to the same moving and motion and moving according to what and moved according
to what?

And many other questions could still be asked about free choice, and for
which few or none would be able to answer.

We have nevertheless specified these questions, lest someone believe that we
have mentioned all which should be said about free choice and this therefore, because
we have disputed this matter for a long time.

Here end the questions of Master Robert Grosseteste.
NOTES

1 There are few valuable secondary sources for this treatise. The most valuable and most comprehensive discussion is Ludwig Baur's Die Philosophie des Robert Grosseteste, Bischofs von Lincoln (+1253), [BGPM, Bd. XVIII, 4-6 (Münster: Baumker, 1917), 298pp.]. In the second half of this work, he discusses the subject of metaphysics in Grosseteste's writing. Within this section, he devotes the latter chapters to a commentary on Grosseteste's De Libero Arbitrio. Following the sequence of topics in Grosseteste's treatise, Baur comments on each section about the ideas portrayed, possible antecedent influences on their conception, and later development in the reformers.

Another valuable secondary source is Calvin Normore's article "Future Contingents" [Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, eds., Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 358-81], in which he discusses the chronological development of arguments about future contingents in the late Middle Ages. In this article, he writes a brief interpretation of Grosseteste's De Libero Arbitrio, Chapter 6. In his discussion of Grosseteste's conception of God's knowledge and truth, he limits his interpretation to Grosseteste's De Libero Arbitrio and does not include Grosseteste's De Veritate, De Veritate Propositionis, and De Scientia Dei.

A third secondary source is Friedrich Vogelsang's Der Begriff der Freiheit bei Robert Grosseteste (Gütersloh, 1915). Its value is debatable. Baur severely criticizes this work as one which applies modern problems to a medieval author [Baur, Die Philosophie des Robert Grosseteste, BGPM, Bd. XVIII, 4-6 (Münster i. W., 1917), 208]. He faults the writer for not having a full grasp of Grosseteste and Scholastic thought.


4 Stevenson suggests Stadbroke (Stevenson, 5). Callus holds the view that it is uncertain. He discounts the evidence for Stadbroke and does not trust the 16th Century poem by Richard of Bardney who writes that the birthplace is Stow (Callus, 3, n.1.). McEvoy also discounts Stadbroke and does not suggest a particular place (McEvoy, 5-6). Southern, along with J.C. Russell, believes that Richard of
Bardney's Stow (Langtoft) is probably correct (Southern, 77); (J. C. Russell, "Richard of Bardney's Account of Robert Grosseteste's Early and Middle Life," *Medievalia et Humanistica* ii [1943]: 45-55).

5Southern, 63.

6Callus, 2 n.3; Stevenson, 2.

7Southern, 77.

8McEvoy, 6; Southern, 78.

9Southern, 63-4.

10Ibid., 65.

11Ibid., 66.

12Ibid., 66-7.

13McEvoy, 6-8; Southern, 23-4.

14McEvoy, 8.

15Southern, 69.

16Ibid., 79-80.

17Ibid., 75.

18McEvoy, 11.

19Southern, 249.


28 Southern, 192.


33 In Baur's *Vario Lectio of De Libero Arbitrio*, he gives the explicit as *Explicit de libero. Amen* with regard to the Worcester Cathedral manuscript. Ludwig Baur, *Die philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste*, 724.

34 Thomson, 91.

Thomson, 17.

Callus argues that the *quaestiones* belong to Grosseteste both by historical attribution and by its place among three of Grosseteste's treatises. He also adds that all four treatises are written by the same scribe and that there is nothing fundamentally inconsistent in the content of the *quaestiones* that would suggest someone other than Grosseteste to be the author. Callus, "The *Summa Theologiae* of Robert Grosseteste," 180-191.

Thomson, 91.


Thomson, 91.


Ibid., 150-241.

Grosseteste, *De Libero Arbitrio* (trans. Andrew L. Pearson), 99; Anselm, *De Libertate Arbitrii* 3 (AC 1, 212). Unless it has been noted otherwise, all entries entered as "Grosseteste, *De Libero Arbitrio*" refer to the translation of this treatise, appearing in the second half of this thesis.

Grosseteste, *De Libero Arbitrio*, 100.

Ibid., 108-10.

Ibid., 113.

Ibid., 114.


Ibid., 124-25.

Grosseteste, *De Libero Arbitrio*, 36.

52Ibid., 144.

53Grosseteste, *De Libero Arbitrio*, 40.

54Ibid., 40.


60Grosseteste, *De Libero Arbitrio*, 70.


63Grosseteste, *De Libero Arbitrio*, 78.

64Ibid., 79; See also, Augustine *De Civitate Dei* V, 1-9 (P. L. 41, 139ff.; CCL 47, 128-40; CSEL 40, pt. 1, 209-28).

65Ibid., 83.

66Ibid., 85.

67Ibid., 86.
68 Grosseteste, *De Libero Arbitrio*, 99; Anselm *De Libertate Arbitrii* 3 (AC 1, 212).

69 Grosseteste, *De Libero Arbitrio*, 100.


71 Ibid., 105.

72 Ibid., 106.

73 Ibid., 107.

74 Ibid., 113.

75 Ibid., 114.

76 Ibid., 117.

77 Cf. Augustine *De Lib. Arb. III*, 1,1ff. (P.L. 32, 1269ff; CCL 29, 274ff.).

78 Where it has been possible, Baur's notes have been verified and updated to the modern editions. The author has also added several new citations and notes for identifying both sources and ideas and for clarifying the text.

79 Augustine *In Johannis Evangelium, tract. 53*, 8 (P.L. 35, 1778; CCL 36, 455). Unless otherwise noted, all translations from the Latin sources have been made by the author.

80 Anselm *De Concord. Praesc. Dei I*, 6 (P.L. 158, 515; AC 2, 256).


82 Grosseteste may mean both consequence and consequent in the one word *consecutio*, the meaning of which is distinguishable only by context, or he is being redundant. This problem also occurs in Chapter Four, p. 39.

83 Ecclus. 17:16f.

84 Ecclus. 23:28f. in the Vulgate; 23:19 in modern editions.

85 Ezek. 11:5.
92 "View" seems to refer to Grosseteste's earlier citing of Cicero as the spokesman for the pagan view that all good originates from free choice and not at all from the gods, which appears in Chapter One, p. 27, in order to introduce his discussion on the knowledge of God.


94 Cicero *De Divinatione* I 51 (117).


97 Boethius *De Consol. Philos.* V, 2 (CCL 94, 103; CSEL 67, 124).

98 Boethius *De Consol. Philos.* V, 6 (CCL 94, 103; CSEL 67, 125).

99 Augustine *De Gen. ad litt.* V, 21 n. 42 (P.L. 34, 336; CSEL 28, 165).

100 Augustine *De Trinit.* III, 4 n. 9 (P.L. 42, 873; CCL 50, 136).

101 Augustine, *loco incerto*.


103 Rom. 11:34.
104Ps. 93 (94):9.


107Augustine Ench. 17 n. 5 (P.L. 40, 239).


109James 1:17.

110Augustine De Gen. ad litt. V, 19 (P.L. 34, 334; CSEL 28, 161).

111Augustine Confess. XIII, 37 n. 52 (P.L. 32, 868; CCL 27, 272; CSEL 33, 387).

112Augustine De Trinit. IV, 1 n. 3 (P.L. 42, 888; CCL 50, 162).

113Ecclus. 23:20.

114Augustine De Trinit. XV, 13 n. 22 (P.L. 42, 1076; CCL 50a, 494-95).


116Augustine In Johannis Evangelium, tract. 53, 12 n. 4 (P.L. 35, 1776).

117Ibid.

118Augustine In Johannis Evangelium, tract. 105, 17 n. 8 (P.L. 35, 1907).

119Augustine Confess. XII, 15 n. 18 (32, 832; CCL 27, 224-25; CSEL 33, 321).

120Augustine Confess. XII, 15 n. 18 (P.L. 32, 832; CCL 27, 224-25 CSEL 33, 321).

121 Cf. Aristotle De Interpretatione 19a 23.
Cf. Aristotle *De Interpretatione* 18b 26. Grosseteste changes Aristotle's 10,000 years to 1,000 years for theological reasons.

Cf. Aristotle *De Interpretatione* 18a34 and 18b9.

Augustine *Confess.* I, 6 n. 9 (P. L. 32, 664; CCL 27, 5; CSEL 33, 7).

Boethius *Consol. Philos.* V, 6 (CCL 94, 103; CSEL 67, 125).

Augustine *De Gen. ad litt.* V, 15 n. 33 (P. L. 34 332; CSEL 28, 158).

Seneca *Epist.* 58 (cf. cp. 65 *ad Lucillium*).


Since it is illogical to know something and not to know something at the same time, Grosseteste may have intended to extend the word "possible" so that it would read, "It is possible that from eternity He has known this and possible that He has not known this," although the Latin does not support this: "Est tamen possibile, quod ab aeterno scierit hoc et nescierit..." Baur, *Die philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste*, p. 169.

Peter Lombard I *Sententiae*, Dist. 39 et 41 (P.S., 280-84; 288-92).


Anselm *De Conc. Praesc.* I, 3 (P. L. 158, 511; AC 2, 250-53).


Augustine *De Gen. ad litt.* IV, 24-33 (imprimis cp. 33); (CSEL 28, 123-33).


Augustine *De Lib. Arb.* II, 8 n. 21 (P. L. 32, 1252; CCL 29, 251).

Augustine does not use the example of "two and three are five," but the example "seven and three are ten." Later, Grosseteste quotes this same passage, but uses "seven and three are ten."

Chrysostom *In Joh. Homil.* IV (P. Gr. 59, 47-49).

Chrysostom *In Joh. Hom.* IV (P. Gr. 59, 47-49).


Grosseteste's use of Latin verbs such as *accipiamus, petendum, inveniamus, quaerendum, aperiatur* and *pulsandum* suggests a parallel with Matthew 7:7-8: "Ask and it will be given you; seek, and you will find; knock, and it will be opened to you. For every one who asks receives, and he who seeks finds, and to him who knocks it will opened." RSV

Hilary *De Trinitate* IX, 54, 55 (P.L. 10, 324ff.); cf. *Tract. in Ps.* 148 n. 17 (P.L. 9, 801).

Augustine *De Trinitate* V, 13-14 (P. L. 42, 920f.; CCL 50, 220-22).

Augustine *De Trinitate* IV, 20 n. 29 (P. L. 42, 908; CCL 50, 195).

Augustine *Soliloq.* II, 5 n. 8 (P. L. 32, 889).

Augustine *De Immort. An.* 4 n. 6 (P. L. 32, 1024).


*Unde Malum* is an alternate title for Augustine's *De Libero Arbitrio* (CCL 29, 211).

Augustine *De Lib. Arb.* I, 6 n. 15 Russell (P. L. 32, 1229; CCL 29, 220).

Augustine *De Lib. Arb.* I, 15 n. 31 (P. L. 32, 1237; CCL 29, 232).

The following example appears in Grosseteste's *De Veritate* in Baur's *Die philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste*, p. 140, 13ff.

Augustine *De Lib. Arb.* II, 6-7 (P. L. 32, 1228s.; CCL 29, 245-50).

[154]

Grosseteste's text deviates from that of Augustine's. Grosseteste: "Si materia esset increata et praeciens, sicut dicit Aristoteles, sequeretur hoc inconveniens, quod Deus haberet adiutorem." Augustine: "...[N]ec ulla adiutum esse natura in creando, quasi qui non sibi sufficeret."

155I Cor. 3:9.

156Anselm *De Lib. Arb.* 3 (AC 1, 210-11); *De Concord. Praesc.* Q. III, 2 (AC 2, 264-65); cf. Bernard *De Gratia et Lib. Arb.*, VI.

157John 15:5.

158Rom. 9:16; Douai-Rheims.

159Phil. 2:13; Douai-Rheims.

1601 Cor. 4:7.

161John 1:3.

162Augustine *De Lib. Arb.* I, 2 n. 5 (P. L. 32, 1224; CCL 29, 213).


164Pseudo-Augustine *Hypognosticon* III, 11 n. 20 (P. L. 45, 1613f.).

165Augustine *De Lib. Arb.* I, 2 n. 5 (P. L. 32, 1224; CCL 29, 213). Augustine: "...[N]ec ulla adiutum esse natura in creando, quasi qui non sibi sufficeret." Grosseteste: "Si est adiutus, sibi insufficiens est..."

166Aristotle *Physic.* I, 9. 192a 25.

167Boethius *Consol. Philos.* IV, 6 (CCL 94, 79; CSEL 67, 96-97).

168Boethius *Consol. Philos.* IV, 6 (CCL 94, 80; CSEL 67, 97).

169εἰμη αἱρετικὴν ἐν τοῖς συμμετοχικοῖς.

170Cicero *De Divinatione* I, 55 (125).

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171 Cicero *De Divinatione* II, 7 (19).

172 Augustine *Enarrat. in Ps.* XXXI n. 16 (P. L. 36, 268; CCL 38, 237).

173 Vergil *Aeneid* VI, 376.

174 Seneca *Epist.* 77, 12.

175 Augustine *De Civitate Dei* V, 1-9 (P. L. 41, 139ff.; CCL 47, 128-40; CSEL 40, pt. 1, 209-28).

176 Cf. Augustine *De Immort. An.* 13ff. (P. L. 32, 1031ff.).

177 Questionable reading; amend *posito* to *potentia*.

178 Augustine *De Gen. ad litt.* I, 17 n. 33 (P. L. 34, 259; CSEL 28, 23ff.).


183 John 8:34.

184 Rom. 6:16; RSV.


186 Seneca, *incerto loco*.


188 Augustine *De Lib. Arb.* I, 13 (P. L. 32, 1235; CCL 29, 228-31).

189 Ecclus. 15:14-18.

191Grosseteste adds to the Vulgate "bonum et malum."

192Deut. 30:19.

193Jerome Hebraicae Quaestiones in Libro Geneseos 49 (P.L. XXIII, 1056; CCL 72, 49.5); cf. Gen. 34:1-34.

194Isa. 1:19f. There is a variation on verse 20. Vulgate: "Quod si nolueritis, et me ad iracundiam provocaveritis, gladius devorabit vos..." Grosseteste: "Si autem non volueritis neque audieritis me, gladius devorabit vos."

195Isa. 65:12. There is a variation between texts. Vulgate: "...[E]t omnes in caede corruptis. Pro eo quod vocavi, et non respondistis; locutus sum, et non audistis; et faciebatis malum in oculis meis, et quae nolui elegistis." Grosseteste: "Omnes vos occisione decidetis, quia vocavi vos et non exaudistis; locutus sum et neglexistis; fecistis malum ante conspectum meum et quae nolebam elegistis."

196Matt. 23:37.

197Jerome Epist. ad Demetr. cp. 7 (P. L. 30, 22).

198Jerome Epist. ad Demetr. cp. 8 (P. L. 30, 22-23).

199Augustine Enchirid. 27 n. 103, unde probaliter sumpt (CCL 46, 104-06).

200Chrysostom Commentarius in sanctum Joannem Apostolum et Evangelistam, Hom. 45 (P. L. 59, 254).


202Augustine In Epistolam Joannis ad Parthos, cp. 2, tract. IV n. 7 (P. L. 35, 2009).

203Pseudo-Augustine Hypognosticon, III, 3 (P.L. 45, 1621ff.)


Jerome Epist. 21 ad Damasum n. 40.

Boethius De Lib. Arb. 3 (AC, I, 212).

Peter Lombard Sententiae II, Dist. 24, cp. 3 (P.S., 452-3).

Jerome Ep. ad Demetriad. n. 3 (P. L. 30, 17 f.); Ep. 21 ad Damasum n. 40.


Baur mistakenly uses condiderari for considerari.


Rom. 6:20, 22.

Rom. 8:21.

John 8:36.

Augustine De Gen. ad litt. XI, 7ff. (P. L. 34, 433ff.; CSEL 28, 340ff.).


Cf. Augustine De Lib. Arb. II, 18, 47 (P. L. 32, 1266; CCL 29, 268ff.).


John 1:3.

Pseudo-Augustine Hypognosticon III, 1-3 (P. L. 45, 1621 ff.).


Aristotle De Anima III 8, 431b 21.

There appears to be a typographical error. For Baur's pradictis, read praedictis.


———. *De Civitate Dei*. P.L. 41, 13-804.


De Immortalitate Anima. P. L. 32, 1021-34.


Secondary Works


