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U.S. Policy toward Iraq within the Context of Complexity Theories

Alexander Rayssan Dawoody

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U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF COMPLEXITY THEORIES

by

Alexander Rayssan Dawoody

A Dissertation
Submitted to the
Faculty of The Graduate College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Complexity is a new paradigm in social science inquiries. Dimensions derived from complexity theories can explain interactions within a dynamic system that often escape the traditional linear analysis or been dismissed as errors.

Observing a dynamic system such as the U.S. policy toward Iraq, a phenomenon that dominated issues of governance in the United States for the past decade, and conducting this observation according to complexity theories is intended to reveal dynamics within the policy that can explain its internal changes as impacted by environmental factors. And by contrasting such a complex observation with that of a traditional linear analysis, a new insight may be added to the body of knowledge gathered on researches of political phenomena.

The focus of this research is to introduce a qualitative inquiry in the new sciences of complexity which to date have been applied solely to quantitative models. An analytical model is applied within a qualitative research framework that employs a traditional method of inquiry, including interviews, focus group, and content analysis, in order to observe changes in the U.S. policy toward Iraq according to the traditional linear method of inquiry. The analytical model then moves to investigate the internal and external changes in the U.S. policy toward Iraq according to complexity theories, and compares the resulting complex analysis with that of the linear one.
This research is grounded in the existing body of literature. Since there are a great number of existing studies that examine the impact of changing trends in dynamic systems both according to the Newtonian and the complex sciences, this research benefits from such observations in order to explain the trajectory of the U.S. policy toward Iraq and its phase shifts from 1990-2004. However, most of the complex studies of changes in dynamic systems are quantitative in nature. Therefore, by adopting a complex qualitative approach to observe change in a dynamic system, in this case the U.S. policy toward Iraq, this research can bring a different perspective and approach toward inquiries in the social sciences.

Research Questions

The questions that this research attempts to answer are geared toward establishing a contrast in discovery between observing the U.S. policy toward Iraq according to the traditional linear model and also according to the new sciences of complexity. These research questions are the following:

1. How does a linear observation interpret the U.S. policy toward Iraq?
2. How do the new sciences of complexity interpret the U.S. policy toward Iraq?
3. How does a linear observation of the U.S. policy toward Iraq contrast and compare with that of a complex analysis?

In order to answer these questions, this research observes the history of the U.S. policy toward Iraq from 1990 to 2004. The research also examines the new sciences of complexity and their application in various disciplines within the social sciences, designs a theoretical base for the study, constructs a methodology and analytical model in order
to interpret the data, collects data on the U.S. policy toward Iraq, analyzes the data according to this study’s analytical model, and then presents the answers to the research questions as it presents the study’s findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

Why Does Complexity Matter?

The reason why complexity matters in a social science inquiry is because we are no longer constrained by a single ontological model. Truth can now be seen not as an attribute inherent in an entity or event but as the meaning we attribute to that entity or event. This kind of ontological liberation is evident in a paradigm shift from a Newtonian world to a complex world.

Several shifts may occur in a complex inquiry. Evans (1999) observes that the types of these shifts include moving from part to whole in our investigation of a phenomenon, from structure to process, and from objective to epistemic science. Other types include shifts from building block to network as a metaphor of knowledge, and from truth to approximate descriptions (pp. 202-203).

In inquiries related to issues of governance and public administration, there is no "one right way" to see reality. Overman and Loraine (1996) explain that complexity science “frees us from the constraint of the one right way mentality that influences many studies. It also frees us from the burden that comes from needing to control rather than to evoke process and relationship” (p. 490).

Events and phenomena are interconnected to generate unpredicted potentials. The collapse of these potentials into a defined formative outcome is the result of our observation and interaction with reality. The world, according to Wheatley (1999), is a participatory process that engenders energy, becoming, and intensionality (p. 33).
There are many levels on which a dynamic system, such as the U.S. policy toward Iraq, can be analyzed. Systems, such as the policy toward Iraq, are best understood if observed as wholes contained within wholes that are impacted by various changing elements in the environment of geopolitical dynamics. Every aspect in this dynamic, no matter how small, can impact the policy and its trajectory as a whole. Lorenz (1993) has explained how this works in describing the impact of small events, such as the flapping of a butterfly wings on the atmospheric weather of an entire continent. He traces how a butterfly that is flapping its wings in Brazil, for example, can set off a tornado in Texas (p. 14).

On the other hand, the world according to classical Newtonian sciences is described clock-wise. Time and motion are reversible, and phenomena are reducible to parts, functions, and building blocks. By applying the classical Newtonian analysis of machinery into the understanding of a phenomenon, researchers are collapsing possible interpretations within the dynamics of non-linear systems by following rationality and one-dimensional interpretation, instead of pluralistic and multi-dimensional view of the world.

The new sciences of complexity defy rational tools and enhance the prospect of serving the purposes of scientific research by observing a dynamic system as a composite of interconnected relationships. These new sciences include the theories of deterministic chaos, bifurcation, and autopoiesis. They also encompass quantum theories, such as the Copenhagen Interpretation, the Multiple-World Interpretation, Bohn’s Deterministic Interpretation, Capra’s Taoist Interpretation, and the Standard Model Interpretation.
Complexity theories are an umbrella for emerging perspectives. The fundamental positions of these perspectives, according to Morcol (1999), are that simple systems demonstrate complex behavior. Complex systems as such are self-organizing and impacted by chaos (pp. 6-8).

Little (1999) suggests that in the world of policies and governments, where goals are multiple, unclear, and often conflicting, top-down systems of accountability are easily transformed into systems of constraints. These systems then result in policies and governments that are inherently less responsive, less effective, and less efficient (p 166).

From the perspective of many citizens of democratic societies, policies and governments seem incapable of control by the people, who supposedly are sovereign. Citizens often speak of policies and governments, as entities that are separate from them and that are closed and inaccessible to them. This perception tends to de-legitimize, in the public's view, the actions and actors of governments and policymakers (Little, 1999, pp. 166-167).

By applying the perspectives of complexity to the inquiry of observing the U.S. policy toward Iraq, this research examines issues of governance and democratic accountability in the United States. In doing so, this research presents a complex perspective of the U.S. policy toward Iraq that can better explain changes in governance and the decision-making process in the United States and their impact on issues of citizenry and democratic accountability.

Importance of This Research

This research is interested in undertaking a contemporary issue in governance, namely the U.S. policy toward Iraq and observing it according to the new sciences of
complexity. The importance of the research consists in its observation of this policy with a qualitative inquiry that is guided by the new sciences of complexity. Up to now, such methods of inquires have been applied solely to quantitative models.

The study's model employs traditional methods of qualitative inquiry, interviews, focus group, and content analysis, but it also extends them to investigate the changing trends within the U.S. policy toward Iraq by observing them according to dimensions derived from the complexity theories.

The new sciences of complexity are the cutting-edge theories in public administration. Observing the U.S. policy toward Iraq according to a traditional linear interpretation and then according to complexity theories enables us to compare and contrast elements within these two methods of interpretations and thereby uncover the components that went into the construction of the policy.

The Purpose of This Study

The purpose of this study is not to depart from the linear methodology of Newtonian science but juxtapose it with a new methodology that is based on complexity theories. The contrast between the two methodologies provides the research with an in-depth analysis of a dynamic system that differs from an observation based only on a singular perspective and ontology.

As such, this research is not interested in replacing linear observation with a complex one, or to assigned normative values to either one as being right or wrong. Instead, it intends to bridge the gap between the Newtonian and complex scientific contributions in order to advance our body of knowledge.
Since complexity analysis relies on quantitative analysis in observing phenomena in the social sciences, using complexity theories in qualitative inquiries is something new. And since these qualitative inquiries rely on the power of words, not quantifiable measures, an analytical model that uses complexity in a qualitative inquiry ought to construct its analytical model through enhancing these qualitative characteristics by employing words and images and their power of analytical description.

As such, this research is constructing a Phi Model that is unique to the complex analysis of a qualitative inquiry. The model uses metaphors to build on the tradition of verbal analogy and analysis. It guides these metaphorical expressions in order to present a constructive interpretation of the U.S. policy toward Iraq that contrasts linear and complex interpretations of data by moving through three specific analytical steps.

Step one of the analogy consists of observing data gathered on the U.S. policy toward Iraq according to the traditional linear method. Step two of the analysis derives dimensions from the complexity theories in order to trace the behavior of emerging indicators in the data. Finally, step three of the analysis uses the same complex dimensions in order to trace the behavior of the same emerging indicators in the data and observe changes in the policy as affected by factors that constitute its environment. By doing so, the research observes the U.S. policy toward Iraq according to complexity theories, compares these complex observations with those of the traditional linear observation, and then answers the study's research questions by comparing and contrasting between the two types of analysis.

The perceived weakness of this model is that it implies linearity from the start by dividing its analytical procedure into three steps. However, such a division does not
necessarily constrain the analytical model within a Newtonian methodology. With the analytical model devoting two steps of the analysis to complexity, the model is able to remain faithful to complex analysis and compare the complex observations with those derived through the linear analysis. In so doing, the model is shifting its emphases from parts to whole, from structure to process, from objective to epistemic knowledge, from building blocks to networks, and from truth to approximate descriptions.

Organizational of the Study

Chapter One of this dissertation consists of an introduction to this study that outlines its purpose and significance. Chapter Two consists of a review of the history of U.S. policy toward Iraq. Chapter Three presents review of the literature dealing with complexity sciences and their application. Chapter Four provides a theoretical model for the study. Chapter Five consists of methodology. Chapter Six presents a linear analysis of the collected data. Chapter Seven includes a complex analysis of internal changes within the U.S. policy toward Iraq. Chapter Eight presents a complex analysis of external changes in the environment that impacted this policy. And, Chapter Nine presents the summary, conclusions, and recommendations of the research.
CHAPTER II

THE HISTORY OF THE U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ

Introduction

The United States is relatively a young country in comparison to Iraq. Although the current state of Iraq was formed in 1920 by the amalgamating of three former Ottoman provinces, the area and societies that comprise modern Iraq have historical roots that extend beyond the history of the United States and well into 6000 years BC.

The area presently known as Iraq was known to the ancient Greeks as Mesopotamia, or the “land between the rivers,” and is in fact the cradle of civilization, wherein mankind’s first cities were born approximately five thousand years ago. The area also witnessed the establishment and decay of many political entities that conquered or were conquered by other nations in the region.

The United States, on the other hand, was formed in 1776 after its Declaration of Independence from England. The thirteen British colonies established earlier in North America with the arrival of Pilgrims from England rebelled against the British Crown, citing “taxation without representation” among other grievances, and forming an independent republic. The American Revolution, however, was more than a tax rebellion. It brought forth a system of government that gradually became one of the most powerful political structures in the world, with influence on other nations, including the historically ancient Iraq.
America’s influence and presence in the region of the Middle East, however, was absent for many years, began small, and then it gradually grew. European powers, however, had a longer and larger influence on the region, especially during the turn of the Twentieth Century when the exploration and production of Middle Eastern oil became of interest to the Western oil companies, especially when the reconstruction and expansion of the industrialized capitalist countries required a rapid increase in the production and export of Middle Eastern crude oil.

For decades, Iraq and the United States had little to do with one another. The days of Iraq’s greatest glory occurred long before there was a United States. In recent centuries, while America was still a young and relatively isolated nation, the Ottoman Turks ruled the Iraqis, whose relationship with the United States barely existed. Even after the fall of the Ottoman Empire in World War I and the formation of the modern state of Iraq, it was Britain, not America, that dominated Iraqi politics.

In the decades after World War I, the United States took an interest in the Gulf region while focusing its primary attention on Saudi Arabia and Iran. Iraq was a weak Arab state that posed no threat to U.S. security and interest. It was not until the discovery of oil in Iraq during the late 1920s that Iraq and the United States came into contact with one another.

The Development of U.S./Iraqi Relationships

On October 15, 1927 the British exploration team in Iraq hit a gusher, proving oil reserves in large quantities near Kirkuk in northern Iraq. Paul (2002) reveals that American oil companies secured 23.7 percent of concession areas in Iraq for the
exploration of oil. As of then, the U.S./Iraqi relationships began to take form. It is ironic that it was oil that started this relationship, and it was oil that would bring the two nations into major conflicts and two devastating wars in the later years (p. 25).

The United States did not interfere in local Iraqi politics from the creation of the Iraqi state in 1920 until the establishment of the Republic of Iraq in 1958. The U.S. virtually adopted a hands-off approach toward Iraq and accepted the Britain's dominant role in Iraqi affairs.

However, once the monarchic regime in Iraq was toppled in 1958 by the Iraqi Army, and the new Republic reduced the concession areas of all foreign companies to five percent of the oil, the United States became more proactive in its policy toward Iraq, experimenting with regime change efforts in order to secure the return of previous privileges to the American oil companies in Iraq.

The Republic of Iraq and U.S. Regime Change Efforts

U.S. regime change efforts were successful in toppling the new military regime in the 1963 coup and helped bringing into power the thuggish Baath Party. The political turmoil resulted in a series of military coups between 1963-1968, until the Baath returned once more to power on July 17, 1968.

Evidence of U.S. plots to overthrow the military regime that emerged after the 1958 coup are abundant, supported by testimonies that in later years were published by various CIA field officers. Morris (2003) observes that the CIA, under President John F. Kennedy, decided to conduct its own regime change in Baghdad, carried out in collaboration with the Baath Party (p. 65).
Britain and Egypt backed the American intervention for a coup against the Republican regime in Iraq, while other United States allies, chiefly France and Germany resisted. Without significant opposition within the US government, Kennedy pressed on. In Cairo, Damascus, Tehran and Baghdad, American agents marshaled opponents of the Iraqi regime. Washington set up a base of operations in Kuwait, intercepting Iraqi communications and radioing orders to rebels. The United States also armed the Kurdish insurgents in their fight against the government (Morris, 2003, p. 63).

In his explanation of the CIA backing of the Baath coup, Sale (2003) notes that the CIA provided the Baathist National Guardsmen with lists of suspected communists who were then jailed, interrogated, and summarily gunned down. Zaher (1986) offers that a top Baath Part official and one of the coup’s leaders, named Ali Saleh al-Sadie, confirmed the CIA/ Baath relationship by stating:

The Baath came to power in Iraq in 1963 while riding an American train.” An American espionage service which had been in touch with the Iraqi Baath Party also conveyed to the Baath, on a secrete broadcasting service, the names and addresses of the Iraqi Communists. Armed with the names and whereabouts of individual Communists, the Baath Party and its National Guard carried out summary executions. Members and supporters of the ICP were dragged out on the streets and shot without a hearing (p. 32).

King Hussein of Jordan also confirmed the CIA’s involvement in the 1963 coup during an interview with Haikal, the chief editor of the Egyptian al-Ahram newspaper in September 1963. According to Batatu (1978), the king stated the following:
Permit me to tell you that I know for a certainty that what happened in Iraq on February 8 had the support of American Intelligence. Some of those who now rule in Baghdad do not know of this thing but I am aware of the truth. Numerous meetings were held between the Baath party and American Intelligence, the more important in Kuwait. Do you know that . . . on February 8 a secret radio beamed to Iraq was supplying the men who pulled the coup with the names and addresses of the Communists there so that they could be arrested and executed (p. 986).

The scale on which the killings and arrests took place during the coup indicated a closely coordinated campaign. Sluglett & Sluglett (1990) suggest that those who carried out the raid on suspects' homes were working from lists supplied to them by the CIA who had a strong vested interest in breaking what was probably the strongest and most popular Communist Party in the region (p. 86).

By supporting the 1963 coup, the CIA helped bring the thuggish Baath Party to power and fatally weakened the prospects for Iraqi democracy (Batatu, 1978, p. 985). As a reward for America's support, Zaher (1986) observes that the 1963 coup leaders declared that the rights of the oil companies in Iraq would be respected and that they would be permitted to continue their operations (p. 34).

The Baath regime of 1968, however, shifted its alliance toward the Soviet Union in opposition to increased U.S. support for Israel, and in 1970 it nationalized Iraqi oil. These developments dampened the U.S./Iraqi relationships, creating an atmosphere of hostility and mistrust. However, after the 1979 Iranian revolution in Iran and the presidency of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the U.S. relationship with Iraq moved toward a
warmer association of mutual interest. Both countries saw in Iran a threat and as such, began to cooperate with one another.

This relationship further blossomed during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1989. The U.S. provided Iraq with financial, agricultural, technological, and military aid in order to win the war with Iran. In 1989, after years of Iraq's extensive use of weapons of mass destruction against Iranian troops, Iran finally accepted a ceasefire.

From 1989 until the Gulf War of 1991, the United States made no mention of Iraq's stockpile of weapons of mass destruction, nor it attempted to destroy them. Instead, it continued extending loans and credits to the regime of Saddam Hussein.

**Iraq's Financial Problems After the Iran-Iraq War**

Iraq emerged victorious from its war with Iran, but the cost of the war had devastated its economy. Iraq was desperately short of money. Henderson (1991) points out that every two weeks a meeting was held at Iraq's central bank to decide which bills had to be paid and which creditors would be told they had to wait. The country either had to boost oil production by 40 percent, and hope that the price remained constant, or it had to seek a 40 percent increase in oil prices (p. 219).

But oil exports were not providing the revenues that Saddam thought Iraq deserved. The price, he said, should be $25 a barrel, certainly not bouncing around below $20. Moreover, the Turks were building dams on the headwaters of the Euphrates, which threatened the river's free flow through Iraq. In any direction Saddam looked, he saw conspiracies against him (Henderson, 1991, p. 235).

Hiro (2002) explains that overproduction continued, with Kuwait exceeding its OPEC quota by 40 percent, and the UAE by 30 percent. By May 1990, petroleum prices
fell to $11 a barrel, a level at which Iraq's oil income was just enough to meet current expenses, leaving nothing to service foreign debts or fund urgently needed reconstruction (p. 34).

In mid-July, 1990, Saddam gave a serious warning to Kuwait. The memorandum sent to Kuwait, explains Henderson (1991), demanded compensation of $2.4 billion for oil that Saddam alleged had been stolen from the Rumaila oilfield, part of which straddles the common border. The Kuwaitis admitted that they had been taking oil from the Rumaila field but only 30,000 barrels a day (pp. 225-226).

When the Republican Guard began massing on the Kuwaiti border in mid-July, 1990, it created a dilemma for the Bush administration. Washington continued to believe that the United States' interest would be served by finding a way to work with Saddam.

Meanwhile, Egyptian President Hossni Mubarak managed to persuade the Iraqis to sit down with the Kuwaitis and discuss the issue at a meeting on July 28, 1990 in the Saudi port of Jeddah. But the session did not actually begin until August 1, 1990 because Kuwait objected to Iraq's threatening negotiating stance.

Izzat Ibrahim, the Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, accompanied by Saddam's cousin and Iraq's Local Government Minister, Ali Hassan al-Majid, represented Iraq in the meeting. The presence of Majid made two serious points: first, that Iraq considered relations with Kuwait a local government matter; second, that Kuwait should take into account the minister's fearsome reputation in using chemical weapons to punish rebellious Kurdish citizens in northern Iraq in 1988 (Henderson, 1991, p. 227).
The August 1, 1990 meeting in Jeddah went according to Saddam’s script. According to the Research Unit for Political Economy (RUPE) (2003), the Iraqis demanded that Kuwait wipe clean Iraq’s debt and pay Baghdad what amounted to $27 billion to offset the financial burden suffered by Iraq due to the Iran-Iraq War. This was a demand clearly intended to elicit an angry Kuwaiti rejection, which it did, and so justify an Iraqi attack. The meeting broke up after less than two hours. On that same day, the Bush administration approved $695,000 worth of advanced data transmission devices for Iraq (p. 33).

Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait

On August 2, 1990, at 1:00 A.M., 120,000 Republican Guards poured across the border. Within thirty-six hours, Kuwait was conquered, its military was swept, and its leadership had fled to Saudi Arabia (Pollack, 2002, p. 36). By doing so, Saddam altered the balance of petroleum power in the region (Pitt & Ritter, 2002, pp. 22-23).

There are several theories and speculations on the real motive beyond Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait. A key argument was “financial.” Kuwait was to be used as a cash cow by Saddam in order to offset Iraq’s financial problems that were caused by Iraq’s eight years war with Iran.

The idea of using military force began to take shape among Saddam’s inner circle in the early 1990. Tripp (2000) asserts that Kuwait was to be the immediate target, but the longer-term aim was to extract resources from all the Arab Gulf states and particularly from Saudi Arabia. Kuwait was to be a commodity that could either retained through a puppet government or through annexation, or it could be exchanged for concessions.
These would solve Iraq’s financial position, strengthening Saddam’s authority and establish Iraq as a leader in the oil market (p. 252).

Another speculation on Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait is bordered on a conspiracy theory and believed by many on the Arab street. The theory is based on the notion that the United States was aiming to “shrink” Iraq’s military capacity to the period prior to the Iran-Iraq War by creating a scenario whereby Iraq will be driven into a war and its military power thus will be reduced to the 1970s level. Accordingly, Kuwait began to instigate a problem with Iraq in early 1990 by demanding Iraq to pay back its loans and by siphoning Iraqi oil from the Iraq’s oil field of Rumaila.

This theory justifies its claim by pointing to the notion that the United States did not warn Iraq not to invade Kuwait prior to August 2, 1990. Instead, on July 25, 1990, U.S. Ambassador to Baghdad assured Saddam that the United States would not interfere in matters between two Arab nations.

In the midst of the debates in Washington over Saddam’s intentions, U.S. Ambassador to Baghdad April Glaspie met with Saddam on July 25, 1990. Glaspie endorsed Saddam’s view that oil prices should be higher than $25 per barrel and sympathized with his anxiety about low oil prices forcing a huge drop in Iraqi spending (Henderson, 1991, p. 227). The Ambassador also assured Saddam that the United States did not intend to intercede in Iraq’s dispute with Kuwait (Pollack, 2002, p. 35).

The conversation took place even as Iraq had massed troops at the Kuwaiti border and declared that it considered Kuwait’s acts to be aggression. RUPE (2003) notes that it was plain to the world that Iraq was about to invade. Given the eventual American response, one would have expected that the United States would have send a clear
message condemning the invasion. Instead, the United States ambassador responded in the mildest possible terms (p. 39).

Reinforced by Ambassador Glaspie’s meeting with Saddam, Pollack (2002) explains that the Bush administration continued to take a hands-off approach, and both the State Department spokesman and the Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East emphasized publicly that the United States did not have any treaty obligations to defend Kuwait (p. 35).

Another conspiracy theory is based on the notion that Saddam was provoked to invade Kuwait in order for the U.S. military to have permanent base in the oil-rich Middle East. Pollack (2002) suggests that Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait made possible the establishment of permanent U.S. military base in Saudi Arabia and the Bush administration resolved to destroy Iraq’s conventional forces and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (p. 39).

Sciolino (1991) advises that Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait was not a surgical strike against key Kuwaiti installation, but a relentless onslaught of military power. The forces sent into Kuwait were far larger than what would have been needed to occupy the country (p. 206). Dickey & Thomas (2002) offer that Saddam might have gotten away with invading Kuwait if he had pulled back to the Mutla Ridge, which overlooks Kuwait (p. 38).

On August 2, 1990, the day that Iraq invaded Kuwait, the White House (1990) issued Executive Order 12722, stating that the United States found the actions of the Iraqi government constituting an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security of the United States.
On August 3, 1990, the United Nations (1990a) passed resolution 660, condemning Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. On August 6, 1990 the UN (1990b) passed resolution 661, levying economic sanctions against Iraq in order to compel it to leave Kuwait. Resolution 661 was also issued to ban all trade with Iraq, including an oil and arms embargo, and curtailment of international flights and financial transactions. It also froze Iraqi government assets abroad (Hurd, 2001). This was a devastating blow. Iraq imported 70 percent of its food. By September 1990 Iraq was forced to begin food rationing (Pitt & Ritter, 2002, p. 23).

In order to comply with the UN sanction requirements, President Bush (1991) ordered all economic transactions with Iraq by U.S. citizens and organizations to be prohibited. By 1991, U.S. authorities promptly ended all trade between Iraq and U.S. corporations or citizens.

By August 8, 1990 Saddam announced that he was annexing Kuwait as Iraq's nineteenth province. At the same time, Pollack (2002) explains that American ground and air forces were arriving in the Persian Gulf as part of Operation Desert Shield (p. 39).

Tripp (2000) observes that Saudi Arabia was alarmed by the Iraqi forces on its border. The United States began a military airlift that was to lead to the stationing of over half a million American troops in Saudi Arabia within six months (p. 253).

The arrival of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia infuriated a wealthy Saudi named Osama bin Laden, who had made a name for himself while fighting against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. As America steeled itself to attack one threat, it gave birth to another, as it would learn later (Pitt & Ritter, 2002, p. 23).
The United Nations (1990c) passed Resolution 678, providing for the use of all necessary means to end the occupation of Kuwait. The United States scotched all diplomatic efforts by the USSR, Europe, and Arab countries by continuing to insist that Iraq withdraw unconditionally (RUPE, 2003, p. 39).

Pollack (2002) observes that Saddam launched a public relation offensive to undermine the coalition’s political will. He threatened that a war with Iraq would be the “Mother of All Battles” in which thousands of troops would be killed. Pollack adds that Saddam chose not to attack the coalition forces building up in Saudi Arabia because he felt that in doing so, it would simply ensure the war that he preferred to deter (pp. 40-41).


The Gulf War

On January 16, 1991 the international coalition began a dizzying and deadly aerial assault upon Iraqi forces in Kuwait and their command center in Baghdad (Pitt & Ritter, 2002, p. 23). With this, the Gulf War, code-named Operation Desert Storm, had begun. Tripp (2000) comments that Iraq had no effective defense against such an attack and responded instead politically, firing a number of missiles against Israel, in symbolic defiance and possibly hoping that an Israeli retaliation would disrupt the coalition by causing its Arab members, Syria and Egypt in particular, to withdraw. However, this failed to have the desired effect (p. 254).
The U.S.-led coalition’s bombing campaign systematically destroyed Iraq’s civilian infrastructure, including electricity generation, communication, water and sanitation facilities. For more than a month the bombing of Iraq continued without any attempt to send in troops for the purported purpose of the Gulf War, namely, to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait (RUPE, 2003, p. 42).

Pitt & Ritter (2002) assert that for forty-two days the allies bombed and strafed, sending 2,000 sorties a day against the Iraqi armies and air force. After a month of this punishing assault, President Bush urged the Iraqi people to rise up against Saddam, who Bush had publicly compared to Hitler. But, no such popular uprising took place at the time (p. 24). According Research Unit for Political Economy (RUPR) (2003), as many as 15,000 civilians died as a direct result of allied bombing (pp. 40-41).

By February 22, 1991 and prior to the allied ground assault, Iraq agreed to begin withdrawing from Kuwait in twenty-four hours if the coalition would agree to suspend its military operations immediately and lift the U.N. sanctions. To the coalition, this Iraqi offer was just another hoax (Pollack, 2002, pp. 43-44).

Having rejected Saddam’s final offer, the coalition launched its long-awaited ground campaign. By the time the coalition ground offensive began on February 24, 1991, Iraqi forces in the Kuwaiti Theatre had fallen from their high of around 550,000 to about 350,000 because of low morale and logistical problems (Pollack, 2002, p. 44). Exactly 100 hours after the ground assault had begun, Iraq announced its withdrawal from Kuwait. On February 28, 1991 Iraq and the United States agreed to a cease-fire (Pitt & Ritter, 2002, p. 24).
Meanwhile, between 100,000 and 200,000 Iraqi soldiers lost their lives in a massive overkill. According to RUPE (2003), the heaviest toll was inflicted by U.S. carpet-bombing of Iraqi positions near the Kuwait-Iraq border, where tens of thousands of ill-fed, ill-equipped conscripts were helplessly pinned down in trenches. Thousands were buried alive as tanks equipped with plows and bulldozers smashed through defenses. Others were cut down as they tried to surrender or flee (p. 41).

Pollack (2002) offers that the fog of war had descended over the American political and military leadership, prompting the most controversial decision of the war. President Bush was feeling domestic pressure to end the war and the slaughter of Iraqi forces. Consequently, with the advice of the Pentagon and CETCOM, the president ordered a halt to the ground offensive and agreed to leave Saddam in power (p. 45). According to RUPE (2003), the cost of the war to the U.S. was $61 billion, of which $48 billion was paid by US allies (p. 102).

President Bush and his National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft explained the reason for stopping the war after the liberation of Kuwait and not continuing to Baghdad in order to remove Saddam from power. According to their book, *A World Transformed*, Bush and Scowcroft (1998) wrote the following:

"Trying to eliminate Saddam, extending the ground war into an occupation of Iraq, would have violated our guideline about not changing objectives in midstream... and would have incurred incalculable human and political costs... Had we gone the invasion route, the United States could conceivably still be an occupying power in a bitterly hostile land (p. 489)."
On April 3, 1991, the United Nations (1991a) issued Resolution 687, declaring a cease-fire and demanded that Iraq accept the provisions that it destroy its weapons of mass destruction and allow U.N. inspection to monitor that provision. Commenting on this resolution, Chomsky (2000) asserts that the resolution did not mention any enforcement mechanism (p. 16). Instead, Ritter (1999) explains that the resolution required the certified destruction of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction as a condition for ending economic sanctions. Saddam was in no position to challenge the will of the United Nations, especially with the American-led coalition still overseeing southern Iraq (p. 104).

The resolution also created the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) for the purpose of inspecting Iraq’s compliance with UN resolutions to destroy its WMD (Pitt & Ritter, 2002, p. 25). This action, explains Hiro (2002), represented steps toward achieving the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction (pp. 46-47).

The Aftermath of the Gulf War

Of the eight Republican Guard divisions deployed to the Kuwaiti Theater, only three had been destroyed, and a fourth had lost about half of its strength. At least two Republican Guard divisions had already escaped across the Euphrates River and were moving to defend Baghdad. The Hammurabi Armored division and al-Faw Infantry Division remained largely intact and, along with the remnants of the Medina, were taking up positions to defend Basra (Pollack, 2002, p. 45).

At the end of the conflict, Saddam announced to the Iraqi people that they had emerged victorious from the Mother of All Battles. But that was a whistle in the dark.

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The Iraqi intifadah (uprising) against Saddam’s regime began in Basra on March 1, 1991 with tired, hungry, and angry Iraqi soldiers who turned on the regime and convinced many of the Shiites who lived there to join them.

Pollack (2002) reveals that the first act of the intifadah came from a nameless Iraqi soldier who fired a long burst from his AK-47 at a mural of Saddam in Saad Square in Basra, sparking the huge number of demoralized soldiers collected in the square to rebel against the dictator. Within twenty-four hours the city was in chaos as small units of rebels battled street to street with units loyal to the regime (p. 47).

Pollack (2002) adds that within just a few days, similar revolts erupted in two-dozen other towns in southern Iraq, including the cities of Nasiriya, Samawa, Karbala, Najaf, Omara, Hilla, and Diwaniya. Iran tried to fuel the rebellion by dispatching members of its at-Tawabeen Division (Iraqi prisoners of war who had remained in Iran) and Badr Corps (Iraqi Shiites who had fled to Iran). The revolt in the south was also a signal to the Iraqi Kurds, who had been looking for an opportunity to rise up again and reassert their autonomy since the Anfal campaign (p. 47).

The uprisings in southern Iraq were spontaneous. Tripp (2000) notes that in each town local leaderships emerged, some associated with underground Islamic organizations. In the towns seized by the rebels, a terrible revenge was wrought on those whom they regarded as agents of or collaborators with the regime (pp. 255-256).

Although the Shiites revolt was almost entirely spontaneous and uncoordinated, the Kurds had been planning their offensive since the invasion of Kuwait, sensing that they might have an opportunity if Saddam’s army were defeated in battle. By March 19,
the Iraqi Kurds were in control of virtually their entire ancient homeland, including the

The regime’s counterattack began on March 6, 1991 where the intifadah had been
born in Basra. Pollack (2002) suggests that the Republican Guard’s Hammurabi Armored
and al-Faw Infantry Divisions, and the army’s Fifty-first Mechanized Division led the
regime’s forces in a bloody two-day offensive that crushed the rebels in tough street
battles. Altogether, 60,000 Shiites were killed in the suppression of the intifadah (pp. 50-
51).

Hiro (2002) alludes that most of the deaths resulted from the artillery
bombardment of residential areas by government troops. They also forced 70,000 Shiites,
including many clerics and most of the 8,000 theological students of Najaf, to flee into
Iran (p. 43).

Having dealt a deathblow to the Shiite rebellion in the middle and the south, Tripp
(2000) advises that the Iraqi regime turned its forces on the rebellions that had broken out
simultaneously among the Kurds of the north (p. 256). Using heavy artillery, Hiro (2002)
offers that multiple rocket launchers, and helicopter gunships, the Iraqi armored and
infantry divisions drove out the lightly armed rebels by nightfall. This led to a massive
Kurdish exodus to the mountainous Iranian and Turkish borders (p. 45).

Tripp (2000) warns his audience that nearly two million Kurds were on the move
within the space of a few days, leading to the disintegration of the rebel forces (p. 257).
The regime’s forces, according to Pollack (2002) acted with great brutality, slaughtering
roughly 20,000 Kurds, many of them civilians. The scale of the diaspora threatened a
humanitarian disaster (p. 51).
In April 1991 the Security Council adopted Resolution 688 (United Nations, 1991b). It expressed concern about Iraq’s repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including in Kurdish populated areas. This led to a massive flow of refugees across international frontiers and to cross-border incursions, which threatened international peace and security in the region. The resolution demanded that Iraq, as a contribution to remove the threat to international peace and security in the region, immediately end the repression and open a dialogue to ensure that the human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens were respected.

Although the resolution was not adopted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and therefore did not imply that member states could enforce its terms militarily, on April 16 the United States, Britain, and France created a safe haven in northern Iraq to protect Kurdish refugees from the regime’s forces. Pollack (2002) notes that as part of Operation Provide Comfort, the three countries undertook to feed and care for more than 500,000 Kurdish refugees in an area of northern Iraq and announced the establishment of a no-fly zone (NFZ) north of the Thirty-sixth Parallel, in which Iraqi aircraft would be forbidden to fly (p. 51).

After the insulation, Hiro (2002) explains that the Iraqi government signed a truce with the Kurdish leaders as a prelude to negotiations. A draft agreement reached in June 1991 gave the Kurds predominant military and political authority over the Kurdish area, with joint control of the army and police by the Kurdish authority (p. 75).

Once the Iraqi military was reformed after the trauma of Desert Storm, several divisions were sent south to conduct counterinsurgency operations in the Hawizeh and Nasiriya marshes. Pollack (2002) offers that the regime’s forces began a massive
program to drain the southern marshes altogether to simply eliminate the sanctuary of the insurgents. The regime’s counterinsurgency operations were so brutal that in August 1992, the United States, Britain, and France declared a second no-fly zone under Operation Southern Watch, below the Thirty-second Parallel in southern Iraq in order to provide some protection for the Shiites from attacks by Iraqi aircraft and helicopter gunships (p. 59).

The Bush administration was terrified that Iraq would fall into chaos or fragment along ethnic and religious lines, leaving a power vacuum in the region and no state to balance Iran. Pollack (2002) suggests that the United States did not assist the rebels primarily out of fear of hastening the fragmentation of Iraq and plunging the region into a new cycle of instability (p.49).

Hiro (2002) explains that the scenario of an independent Kurdistan also worried Turkey, with a large Kurdish population concentrated in its southeastern sector. During his meeting with President Bush at Camp David on March 24, 1991 Turkish president Turgut Ozal explained how an independent Iraqi Kurdistan would become the nucleus for a Greater Kurdistan for the Kurdish populations of Turkey, Iran, and Syria, thus destabilizing the entire region (p. 44).

**Containing the Iraqi Regime**

Dickey & Thomas (2002) explain that Saddam was supposed to get rid of his stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, and to allow inspectors to make sure none were hidden or being secretly manufactured (p. 40). However, Whitelaw & Mazzetti (2002) observe that it took the UN weapons inspectors more years to uncover the extent
of Saddam's weapons program, all the while maintaining the sanctions that had hurt the
Iraqi people more than Saddam and his regime (p. 18).

There was a qualitative difference, however. According to Ritter (1999), the Gulf
Wars cease-fire was not an arms control treaty brokered between two equal partners, but
rather a disarmament in which one side, Iraq, defeated on the battlefields of Kuwait in the
1991 Gulf War was compelled to carry out the dictates of the other side, the United
Nations. UNSCOM was an outcome of the cease-fire, and disarmament was a
precondition for ending the war (p. 32).

UNSCOM engaged Saddam in a frustrating game of cat and mouse, trying to hunt
down the evidence of Iraq’s wrongdoing. Saddam had covered his tracks well, yet
UNSCOM continued to isolate inconsistencies in the stories told by Iraqi officials,
pressing hard on their inherent contradictions. Gradually at least part of the truth
emerged.

From the outset Saddam decided to outwit the disarmament provisions of the
Security Council resolution. Immediately after the adoption of 687, an emergency
committee, chaired by Tariq Aziz and loosely based on the Special Security Organization
(SSO)-run Weapons Control and Maintenance Committee, met in Baghdad to craft Iraq’s
response. Broad guidelines were established (Ritter, 1999, pp. 105-106).

Whitelaw & Mazzetti (2002) observe that the United States was forced to track
Saddam's weapons program with images taken from spy satellites and from aircraft
flying over Iraqi territory. Those were the same techniques used in the years before the
Gulf War, and they missed the mark by a mile when it came to judging the progress of
Saddam's quest for WMD (p. 20).
In June 1991 inspection teams led by David Kay succeeded in unmasking Iraq’s undeclared program to enrich uranium using gigantic magnets called calutrons. In July 1991 the IAEA discovered several kilograms of highly enriched uranium and large stocks of natural, un-enriched uranium.

The Iraqis then turned over to the inspectors huge amounts of WMD-filled bombs and artillery shells, many of their Scud missiles, and major chunks of their nuclear program. They held back considerable documentation, key equipment that would be difficult to replace, and a residual force of Scuds and WMD munitions as a final deterrent (Pollack, 2002, p. 62).

Aided by national intelligence agencies, the inspectors kept turning up new Iraqi WMD caches. Pollack (2002) reveals that in August 1991, the inspectors found Gérald Bull’s super-gun, which Iraq had not declared. Shortly thereafter, they discovered a huge quantity of heavy water for use in nuclear reactors. In September 1991 another team led by David Key uncovered a treasure trove of sixty thousand documents detailing Iraq’s nuclear weapons development program hidden away as part of the harmless-sounding Petro-Chemical 3 project outside of Baghdad (pp. 62-63).

Timmerman (2002) advises that as of May 15, 1992, the Iraqi Government provided a full disclosure of its programs for weapons of mass destruction. From May 26 to June 4, the 12th nuclear inspection team oversaw the destruction of three buildings at the al-Atheer nuclear weapons fabrication facility. It also inspected uranium enrichment sites at Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat, and destroyed and rendered harmless utilities and ventilation systems.

29
Sanctions

The UN sanctions were originally designed to force Iraqi troops withdrawal from Kuwait. However, these sanctions were maintained after the end of the Gulf War to assure Iraqi disarmament and compliance with all relevant UN resolutions.

Unfortunately, the economic sanctions hurt the average Iraqi citizens more than it hurt the Iraqi regime. So great were Iraq’s humanitarian problems that the United States and the United Nations quickly recognized that allowance had to be made so that the Iraqi people would not starve and to exempt food from the embargo, ease restrictions on essential civilian needs, and unfreeze many of Iraq’s foreign assets for the purchase of food and medicine.

On August 16 and September 19, 1991, the Security Council adopted Resolutions 706 and 712 (United Nations, 1991c and 1991d). It approved the oil-for-food program, and permitted Iraq to sell up to 1.6 billion dollars worth of crude and oil products over six months. Iraq's resulting revenues to be paid into escrow accounts. Ritter (1999) states that 66 percent for imports, 30 percent to a compensation fund, and four percent for UNSCOM and other UN costs. Imports of food and medicine were to be vetted by the Security Council's sanctions committee (p. 149).

Saddam, however, refused to implement the oil-for-food program until 1996. He rejected the amount of oil allowed by the United Nation for Iraq to sell oil in order to buy food. He also feared that the administration of the program would threaten his authority and weakens his control over the political situation in Iraq and his regime’s overall security.
Pollack (2002) explains that on April 14, 1995, the Security Council passed Resolution 986. It adopted new formula for oil-for-food that allowed Iraq to export two billion dollars worth of crude every 180 days under UN supervision. The resolution gave Baghdad primary responsibility for distribution of humanitarian supplies (p. 74). Hiro (2002) adds that a year later, Iraq declared that it was now ready to implement the oil-for-food deal and therefore would be increasing the monthly food ration by 35 percent (p. 141).

The human toll imposed by the U.N. economic sanctions was real. Real suffering, real hunger, and real death were taking place, reaching gigantic proportions. The only recourse available to Iraq was to accept the Security Council resolution, which authorized Iraq to sell oil to finance the purchase of food, medicine, and other humanitarian goods as well as pay off war reparations and fund the work of UNSCOM.

Regime Change Efforts During the Containment Era

The Bush administration began planning for a regime change in Iraq through a CIA-supported plot. President Bush in late 1991 ordered the CIA to develop a plan to overthrow Saddam. The agency put together a $30 million package to destabilize the regime. It combined anti-Saddam propaganda with active support for Iraqi opposition group (Ritter, 1999, p. 132):

The most promising avenue the CIA found was with a group of exiles calling themselves the Iraqi National Accord (INA), or al-Wifaq. This group, according to Pollack (2002), consisted of former Iraqi military officers. The CIA also reached out to an Iraqi exile named Ahmed Chalabi, a former banker who was convicted by a Jordanian
court of embezzling more than $70 million from Jordan’s Petra Bank, to serve as the coordinator of an effort to create the Iraqi National Congress (INC) to serve as a cohesive opposition under a single umbrella organization (p. 63).

Chalabi was chosen because he was wealthy and had good organizational skills, and because he had no base of support inside Iraq or any standing with any of the exile groups. In short, Chalabi was acceptable as an office manager, which was all he was supposed to be.

Dreyfuss (2002) notes that the INC has been trying to drag the United States into war with Iraq. By its very nature, the INC’s strategy of building a paramilitary presence inside Iraq, and creating a provisional government, launching attacks on Iraqi cities was intended to create inexorable momentum for a war in which in the United States would be compelled to support the INC. But American policy in the 1990s was focused primarily on containing Saddam and disarming him of WMD.

The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) then became part of Washington’s strategy to use Kurdistan as a staging area to oust Saddam, using the INC as the main instrument. However, the Bush administration pursued an anti-Saddam coup not as its sole option, but as part of a bigger game plan with diverse roles assigned to U.N. sanctions, the maintenance of no fly zone in Iraqi Kurdistan, and the upkeep of a U.S. armada in the Gulf (Hiro, 2002, p. 75).

Hiro (2002) explains that a dispute, however, between a pro-KDP landlord and his pro-PUK peasants in May 1992 mushroomed into wide-scale fighting between the two major Kurdish parties. Before a temporary cease-fire came into effect a week later, more
than a thousand people were dead, and the PUK had stormed the parliament building in Irbil and ransacked the government treasury (p. 79).

Meanwhile here in the United States, Bush lost to Democrat Bill Clinton in the November 1992 presidential election. This pleased Saddam, who reckoned that there was now a chance of a fresh start with the new occupant in the White House, since Clinton had no personal animus against him (Hiro, 2002, p. 48).

The Clinton Presidency

The new Clinton administration took office without the baggage of President Bush’s failed efforts to oust Saddam and with little desire to focus on Iraq. From the start, the administration was dominated by the dovish position on Iraq. Pollack (2002) alludes that the Clinton White House was not about to engage in a battle of wills with Saddam. To the administration’s doves, containment of Iraq offered the opportunity to prevent Saddam from making trouble at a relatively low cost, with the hope of pursuing the rest of their policy agenda (p. 65). Ritter (1999) observes that when Clinton and his national security team took over in January 1993, America’s Iraq policy had grown from no policy at all to one of open embrace, containment, confrontation and back to containment (pp. 132-134).

There was a window of opportunity for the new Clinton administration to negotiate a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. If the negotiators were successful, that outcome would have a profound effect on the region. The administration therefore focused its energies on peacemaking, while containing the radical opponents of peace, such as Iraq, Iran, and Libya.
There was still a debate regarding Iraq within the administration. At lower levels, there were a number of hawkish officials who believed that the United States should be trying to topple Saddam. Others within the administration recognized that Saddam was weak enough to be overthrown by internal forces. According to Pollack (2002), both groups agreed that force would be necessary to check Saddam, and keeping containment in place and intact would require the willingness of the United States to employ military operations from time to time in response to Iraq (p. 66).

**Attempt to Assassinate Former President Bush**

Dickey & Thomas (2002) explain that in 1993, Kuwait accused Saddam of hiring some Kuwaiti liquor smugglers to try to assassinate former president Bush during his visit to Kuwait (p. 38). Chomsky (2000) reports that administration officials, speaking anonymously, informed the *New York Times* that the judgment of Iraq’s guilt was based on circumstantial evidence rather than ironclad intelligence (pp. 18-19).

On June 26, 1993, American warships fired twenty-three TLAMs at the Iraqi intelligence service headquarters in Baghdad and flattened it (Dickey & Thomas, 2002, p. 38). Ironically, former President Bush whose life and honor Clinton was defending seemed most reluctant about attacking Iraq. President Clinton, however, declared that the plot against former President Bush was an attack against America (Stephanopoulos, 1999, p. 162).

Pollack (2002) reveals that after the June 1993 cruise missile strike, Saddam decided that discretion was the better part of valor by lowering his level of confrontation with the United States and the United Nations. Saddam continued to look for ways to
hamstring the inspectors while the Clinton administration was distracted by other projects, such as in Somalia and Haiti (p. 67).

**UN to Verify Iraq's Completion of its Disarmament**

In early 1995, having destroyed all known research, development, and manufacturing facilities for nuclear weapons, the IAEA channeled its resources into strengthening its monitoring and verification regime in Iraq. Hiro (2002) reveals that UN weapons inspection team chief Ekeus declared that the UNSCOM-IAEA verification and monitoring system was fully operational (pp. 103-104).

Before UNSCOM was able to certify Iraq’s completion of its disarmament requirements, the debate within the Clinton administration between the hawks and the doves resurfaced on how long the U.S. should hold containment of Iraq in place? According to Pollack (2002), the hawks and the doves argued that containment could not last and that the best thing the United States could do was to bow out gracefully before the containment collapsed (p. 71).

In the Middle East, the anti-Iraqi front broke down in the spring of 1995, with Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates calling for an easing of sanctions against the Iraq. Sympathy for the Iraqi people was high in Jordan, which, with U.N. permission, continued to receive its oil needs of 75,000 barrels per day from Iraq (Hiro, 2002, p. 140).

**The Hussein Kamel Fiasco and the Continuation of UN Inspections**

Fearing a retaliation by Saddam’s eldest son, Uday, Hussein Kamel, Saddam’s son-in-law and Minister of Military Industry, took the cautious step of packing up his brother, Saddam Kamel, their wives (both of them Saddam’s daughters), and their
children, and defected to Jordan in 1995. Kamel was afraid of Uday because of the tension and rivalry between the two caused by the increasing rise of Kamel’s influence within Saddam’s inner circle.

Hiro (2002) explains that while in Jordan, Kamel met with Ekeus and the CIA. He told them that Iraq had withheld information on its WMD program. Saddam responded by accusing Kamel himself of secretly hiding vast amounts of information about Iraq’s WMD programs on his chicken farm near Habbaniya (pp. 65-66).

Barry (2003) notes that after six months in exile in Jordan, Kamel realized that the United States would not support his dream of becoming Iraq’s ruler after Saddam’s demise. Kamel was hoping that the U.S. would use him as a replacement for Saddam because he was a ranking official in the Baath Party and Iraqi government and member of Saddam’s own clan. Unfortunately, Kamel was misguided in his hope.

Pollack (2002) alludes that the United States did not trust Kamel and regarded him as an opportunist thug that lacked any real support inside Iraq or within Saddam’s clan. In February 1996, Kamel packed up his family and returned to Iraq, where he and his brother were immediately divorced from their wives and killed by their tribe members in a bloody shoot-out at their home (p. 79).

Pollack (2002) adds that during the spring of 1996, UNSCOM began inspecting sites more closely connected with Saddam himself to try to get at Iraq’s hidden WMD. Iraq was well aware of the CIA covert action campaign and assumed that American inspectors were feeding information regarding the Iraqi security services to the CIA (p. 79).
In 1997, Ekues reported to the Security Council that 93 percent of Iraq’s major weapons capability had been destroyed by UNSCOM. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also certified that Iraq’s nuclear stocks were gone and most of its long-range systems had been destroyed (RUPE, 2003, p. 48).

Continued CIA Plots for Regime Change in Iraq

The Clinton administration continued its attempt to use UN inspections for espionage purposes and to support a secret CIA plot to overthrow Saddam. The CIA funded the Iraqi Kurdish parties, the INC and the INA for mastering plans for regime change in Baghdad. However, despite the CIA’s funding and support, the Iraqi opposition groups remained fragmented, weak and ineffective.

In December 1994, Wafiq al-Samarraie, the head of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (the Mukhabarat) fled to Kurdistan, where he made contact with U.S. intelligence. Samarraie told UNSCOM that despite what it had been led to believe, Iraq continued to possess and produce WMD (Pollack, 2002, p. 71).

Encouraged by Samarraie’s defection to Kurdistan, the White House decided to accelerate its plan to overthrow Saddam and replace him with a small group of generals, including al-Samarraie. According to Hiro (2002), Chalabi and the INC were allied with Samarraie. Their joint plan envisaged suborning the commanders of the Iraqi forces in nearby Mosul and Kirkuk, and then infiltrating these cities with INC partisans to incite a popular insurrection (p. 80).

Samarraie’s plan had several problems. First, there were few indications that the rest of the Iraqi Army was ready to defect to the rebels. Pollack (2002) explains that a Kurdish-led revolution would rally the most royal formation to the regime. However, no
one in the administration was aware of the operation. National Security Adviser Anthony Lake and Secretary of State Warren Christopher were furious when they found out about it (p. 72).

On March 6, 1995 a force of roughly 10,000 PUK militia and a few hundred INC personnel launched a surprise attack on the 130th and 847th Infantry Brigades of the Thirty-eight Infantry Division. The disaffected battalion surrendered virtually en masse, and the two brigades were routed. Saddam’s agents, however, rounded up Samarraie’s accomplices in Baghdad and deployed armed Republican Guard and army units and crushed the small Kurdish penetration. The disappointed and discredited Samarraie left Kurdistan for Damascus, from where he went to London (Pollack, 2002, p. 73).

The CIA then turned to the INA to plot against Saddam, instead of the INC and the Kurds. Hiro (2001) suggests that the anti-Saddam coup was coordinated earlier by the CIA and originated with Muhammad Abdullah al-Shahwani, a retired Iraqi general running an import-export business in Amman. The coup was designed to take place in June 1996 (p. 102).

In the fall of 1994, Shahwani contacted Ayad Allawie of the INA who had homes in Amman and London, with a plan to stage a coup against Saddam. Shahwani had three sons who were serving in the Republican Guard. Allawie alerted the Saudis and the British Secret Intelligence Services, MI6.

Hiro (2001) advises that in mid-January 1996, at a high-level gathering of intelligence officials from the U.S., Britain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait took place in Riyadh under Prince Turki bin Faisal. The Americans committed $6 million to the plan
of toppling Saddam, the Saudis $6 million and the Kuwaitis $3 million. At about the same time CIA Director Deutch got the go-ahead with the plot (p. 103).

Hiro (2001) adds that on June 26, 1996 the date of the putative anti-Saddam coup, the CIA station at the U.S. Embassy in Amman, Jordan received a message from the Iraqi General Intelligence Directorate: “We have arrested all your people, and so pack up and go home” (p. 106). Within a few days, hundreds of the conspirators were arrested, and the CIA teams supporting the operation had to flee the region (Pollack, 2002, p. 80).

KDP-PUK relations continued to deteriorate, with Kurdistan virtually divided into two zones among them, both raising revenue through customs duties on goods moving across either the intra-Kurdish borders or the Kurdistani frontiers with Turkey or Iran (Hiro, 2002, pp. 84-85). The main reason for the conflict was money.

With six hundred oil trucks using the Iraqi-Turkish crossing daily in each direction, Hiro (2002) offers that the KDPs customs duties amounted to an estimated half a million dollars. Violating its 1994 pact with the PUK, the KDP refused to share this revenue with its rival. The PUK responded by refusing to meet its obligation of sharing the control of Irbil, a city of more than 700,000, with the KDP. Barzani found this unbearable (p. 85).

Pollack (2002) asserts that by September 1995, the intra-Kurdish violence claimed three thousand lives, with the PUK gaining the upper hand (p. 81). Hiro (2002) reveals that on August 22, 1996 Barzani, head of the KDP addressed a letter to “His Excellency President Saddam Hussein” via the commander of the northern-based First Corps, requesting military assistance to “ease the foreign threat” from Iran. Saddam complied (p. 86).
Early on the morning of August 31, 1996 acting in cahoots with Barzani, Saddam sent three Republican Guard armored divisions, armed with four hundred tanks, toward Irbil while heavy Iraqi artillery targeted the city's suburbs. The PUK commander in Irbil ordered an evacuation. On their way to Irbil, the Iraqi forces executed two-hundred-plus agents of the INC (Hiro, 2002, p. 86).

Clinton’s Second Term

Clinton’s second administration continued to debate fiercely how best to handle Iraq. It was determined to react strongly to Iraq’s provocation but it hoped to not have to react so strongly that it would become a distraction for the president’s other priorities.

Hiro (2002) explains that the covert cooperation between the United States and UNSCOM deepened to the extent that the head of the inspection team, Scott Ritter, gave regular briefings to the U.S. National Security Council in Washington before and after his inspection tours of Iraq. On July 1, 1997, the Australian and pro-American Butler took over as UNSCOM’s new chief weapons inspector (p. 108).

In October 1997, Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz told the UN Security Council that Iraq would no longer accept U.S. personnel in UNSCOM teams, since they had shown more loyalty to the United States than to the United Nations. He charged that under the U.N. umbrella the U.S. government was spying with the aim of changing the Iraqi regime (Hiro, 2002, pp. 108-110).

Pollack (2002) states that the Security Council reacted by threatened additional actions if Iraq did not shape up. In response, Iraq declared that it would no longer participate in the oil-for-food program unless the United Nations agreed to set a firm date for the lifting of sanctions (p. 88).
Hiro (2002) notes that on November 12, 1997 Iraq expelled six U.S. inspectors after accusing them of spying. Of the remaining 83 UNSCOM staff in Baghdad, Butler pulled out all except seven technicians to safeguard the UNSCOM headquarters (pp. 111-112).

Pollack (2002) explains that Arab and European governments began to distance themselves from Washington. The Saudis and other U.S. allies made it clear that they would not support any attack on Iraq because their people were increasingly unhappy about the plight of the Iraqi populace, and they felt that the United States had not given negotiations enough of a chance (p. 88).

The Events of 1998

Hiro (2002) emphasizes that on January 17, Saddam said that Iraq had met all its obligations under Resolution 687 and demanded that the sanctions be lifted. To bolster the morale of the Iraqis, Saddam decreed the training of one million volunteers to prepare for jihad if the U.N. embargo was not lifted by May 29, 1988 (p. 69).

A few hours later, a story broke on U.S. television that President Clinton allegedly had an affair with Monica Lewinsky, a young White House intern. The scandal dogged Clinton for a year. The Monica scandal also impinged directly on his decisions on Iraq (Hiro, 2002, p. 114).

Clinton did not want to appear weak on Iraq while the Republicans in Congress were gathering their forces to investigate whether he lied under oath regarding his involvement with Monica Lewinsky. Clinton tried also to use Iraq as a diversion in order to push attention from the Monica scandal.

Hiro (2002) asserts that on January 27, 1998 Butler complemented the neoconservatives' letter to Clinton by claiming that Iraq had enough biological weapons and missiles to blow away Tel Aviv. His statement startled and angered the Security Council, to which he had not presented any such evidence (p. 114).

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan then went to Baghdad and met with Tariq Aziz. According to Pollack (2002), Aziz promised "immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access," while Annan promised that U.N. personnel would "respect the legitimate concerns of Iraq relating to national security, sovereignty and dignity" (p. 89).

Hiro (2002) observes that in a closed session of the Security Council Annan alluded to some UNSCOM inspectors acting as "cowboys," throwing their weight around and offending Iraqis (p. 117). This turn of events left the Russian, French, and Chinese delegations quietly impressed by Saddam's survival skills.

Aruri (2002) notes that the Clinton administration greeted the agreement initially with skepticism and reservations (p. 41). Soon afterward, however, Washington converted the Security Council and secured the adoption of Resolution 1154 on March 2, 1998, which was designed to establish the kind of legal façade needed to subvert the Annan-Aziz agreement (see United Nations, 1998).
Brown (2000) explains that Clinton also came under increasing pressure to amend the sanctions against Iraq. Efforts to lift or change the sanctions were gaining momentum both abroad and in the U.S. Congress, where 70 lawmakers signed a letter of protest asking President Clinton to allow more nonmilitary goods to enter Iraq. The lawmakers, mostly Democrats, argued that the measures against Iraq were doing little to erode Saddam Hussein's power, while at the same time they were hurting the country's 22 million citizens.

In May 1998, a Syrian delegation visited Baghdad. Three months later Syria and Iraq signed agreements to reopen the Kirkuk-Banias pipeline with 1.4 million bpd capacity, once the U.N. sanctions had been lifted (Hiro, 2002, p. 145).

At the Security Council there was a growing consensus among the Russians, French, and Chinese diplomats that Iraq's disarmament was practically finished, and that the comprehensive review should be completed by Christmas 1998. Meanwhile, President Clinton decreed that there would be no more attempts at military action to force the Iraqis to allow access to presidential sites or anywhere else to the UNSCOM inspectors (Cockburn & Cockburn, 1999, p. 281).

On April 13, 1998, the IAEA's six monthly report concluded that Iraq had compiled a full, final and complete account of its previous nuclear arms projects, and that the IAEA's monitoring and verification regime did not reveal indications of the existence in Iraq of prohibited equipment or materials or of the conduct of prohibited activity (Hiro, 2002, p. 120).

In June 1988, several Republican members of Congress sent a letter to President Clinton concerning U.S. policy toward Iraq. The letter expressed the members' concern
about the apparent failure of the Clinton administration to fully support the work of UNSCOM (U.S. Congress, 1998a).

On August 4, 1998 Saddam decreed that cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA be suspended since its work was completed regarding Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. But he exempted UNSCOM’s monitoring activities, and so the cameras and sensors installed at suspected weapons sites remained intact (Hiro, 2002, p. 123).

On August 26, 1998 Ritter resigned his post because of the direct impingement of U.S. domestic politics on UNSCOM. Hiro (2002) states that Ritter did so in protest of the cancellation of his UNSCOM team by Butler under pressure from Washington (p. 124).

Having achieved fame as the UNSCOM martyr, Ritter inflicted another wound on the organization. In an interview with the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, he spoke of his relationship with Israeli intelligence. At the same time, the Washington Post reported that Ritter, with his supervisor’s approval, had been in the habit of bringing film taken by UNSCOM’s U-2 spy plane to Israel for processing and analysis (Cockburn & Cockburn, 1999, p. 282).

Cockburn & Cockburn (1999) add that given this admission of collusion with Israel, the prospect of any Arab support for UNSCOM was fading away. On November 1, 1998 Saddam suspended all cooperation with UNSCOM’s long-term monitoring program, meaning that the inspectors could no longer inspect previously visited sites (p. 283).

Amid the furor over Scott Ritter’s resignation, another resignation passed with little attention. Denis Halliday, the Irish Quaker who had been sent to Baghdad to supervise the UN’s oil-for-food, resigned his post in disgust. According to Cockburn &
Cockburn (1999), Halliday directed a bitter blast at the policy that caused “four thousand to five thousand children to die unnecessarily every month due to the impact of sanctions because of the breakdown of water and sanitation, inadequate diet, and the bad internal health situation” (p. 285).

RUPE (2003) then adds that Halliday was replaced by Hans von Sponeck, who also resigned in 2000 on the same grounds as Halliday. Jutta Burghardt, Director of the UN World Food Program operation in Iraq, also resigned, saying, “I fully support what Mr. Von Sponeck was saying” (p. 46).

Ritter (1999) explains that many of the countries that had supported Desert Storm no longer viewed Iraq in the same threatening light as they had in 1991. The Iraqi military was a mere shadow of its former self, unable to sustain any meaningful military action beyond internal suppression of the Kurds and Shiites. The U.S. was criticized for advocating the continuation of sanctions (pp. 191-192).

On August 7, 1998 al-Qaeda detonated car bombs outside the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. According to Pollack (2002), this was also the day after Monica Lewinsky testified before a grand jury. The Clinton administration found itself caught up in these other issues and was wary of threatening to use force against Iraq, given its previous experiences (pp. 90-91).

In September 1998 Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act that called for the overthrow of the Iraqi regime and authorized $97 million worth of Pentagon goods and services for the effort through supporting the Iraqi opposition groups. In October 1998, the Clinton administration announced plans to bring about “regime change” in Baghdad (Hiro, 2002, p. 145).
On December 11, 1998 Butler met with Clinton National Security Advisor Sandy Berger at the American Mission to the United Nations. Their common aim was to manipulate the fast-moving situation in a way that would provide the United States with a credible basis for bombing Iraq against the background of imminent impeachment proceedings against President Clinton.

Masud (1998) offers that Butler conferred with Berger on how to write his report of noncompliance before submitting it to the U.N. Security Council. The White House wanted to ensure the report contained sufficiently tough language on which to justify its decision to bomb Iraq.

Four days later on December 15, 1998 the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations advised Butler to withdraw all U.N. inspectors, monitors, and support staff from Iraq immediately. Butler did so, without informing the Security Council. At 6 P.M. of the same day, Butler delivered his report to Annan that was prepared in close consultation with U.S. officials, concluding that Iraq was not cooperating with UNSCOM. Three hours later, and before the council members saw the report, news agencies published a summary of the report (Hiro, 2002, p. 129). On December 16, 1998, the United States and Great Britain launched Operation Desert Fox, a limited punitive operation uncoupled from any coercive demands on Saddam (Pollack, 2002, p. 92).

On Saturday, December 19 at 1:30 P.M. EST, the House of Representatives impeached Clinton on the first article of perjury before a Grand Jury and on the third article of obstructing justice. Half an hour later, the case went to the U.S. Senate, which had the final authority to dismiss him. At 4:30 P.M. Clinton stopped the bombing of Iraq.
after one hundred hours. By then, the Pentagon had fired 415 cruise missiles, 90 more than in the Gulf War, and dropped 600 laser-guided bombs (Hiro, 2002, p. 130).

Desert Fox consisted of four days of air and cruise missile strikes. According to Pollack (2002, p. 93), the ostensible goal of the attack was to degrade Iraq’s WMD programs and its ability to threaten its neighbors. Ritter (1999) suggests that precision bombardment with cruise missiles made many walls crumble. They fell precisely as targeted, but there was nothing of substance within those walls. UNSCOM crumbled with the buildings in Baghdad (p. 29).

Desert Fox, however, gave new heart to opposition inside Iraq. Grand Ayatollah Sadiq al-Sadr began preaching subtle acts of defiance against the regime, and his sermons attracted tens of thousands of disaffected Shiites. Polack (2002) states that in February 1998 Saddam had al-Sadr and his two sons killed as they were leaving a mosque in Najaf (p. 93).

Cockburn & Cockburn (1999) warn their audience that for the first time since the debate that preceded the Gulf War, Iraq had become a partisan issue in U.S. politics. The CIA was hard at work on a whole new covert scheme of “sabotage and subversion” to undermine Saddam. And, Kurdish and Shiite agents were enlisted to destroy “key Iraqi pillars of economic and political power, like utility plants or broadcast stations” (p. 279).

Cockburn & Cockburn (1999) add that in early September 1998, Masood Barzani and Jalal Talabanie were invited to Washington for a peace meeting at the Key Bridge Marriott Hotel. The two Kurdish leaders agreed to swallow their enmity and unite in a reformed Kurdish government, with elections to follow (p. 280).
1999 and the Erosion of Containment

In the region of the Middle East, however, the Iraqi regime was getting out of its isolation and was once again invited to return to the rank of Arab nations. On January 24, 1999, for example, Iraq was invited to attend the Arab League foreign ministers’ meeting in Cairo for the first time since 1990. The ministers expressed profound disquiet and concern at the use of the military option against Iraq and appealed for a diplomatic means to be used in the future (Hiro, 2001, pp. 165-167).

In March 1999, NATO began an air campaign to force the Serbians to cease their ethnic cleansing of the Kosovar Albanians. This was a war the Clinton administration had never wanted to fight. Its expectation had been that if NATO demonstrated its willingness to use force, Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic would back down as he had in Bosnia four years earlier. When Milosevic did not, Washington found itself in an air campaign that lasted for nearly three months.

Pollack (2002) notes that this was critical for U.S. policy toward Iraq because no one in the National Security team wanted to live through another Kosovo. The final element determining the fate of the regime change bid was the long-standing position of the doves that Iraq simply was not worth the efforts (pp. 98-99).

The Clinton administration decided to pursue a different track, crafting a new, comprehensive U.N. resolution on Iraq to try to restore the consensus within the Security Council. Throughout the summer and fall of 1999, Washington negotiated a new resolution that the Security Council eventually passed on December 17, 1999 as Resolution 1284 (see united Nations, 1999).
The resolution set up a new UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). It removed the ceiling on Iraqi oil exports and provided for fast-track approval of agricultural and educational imports as well as food and medicine. It also lifted the cap on the amount of oil Baghdad could sell to pay for humanitarian goods and greatly expanded the types of goods it could import.

In August 2000 President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela became the first foreign-elected leader to visit Baghdad since 1990. He arrived in Baghdad in the course of a tour of OPEC member-states. Chavez’s trip set the scene for air flight-busting, a process that started with a Russian plane arriving in mid-August 2000 from Moscow at the newly reopened Saddam International Airport near Baghdad (Hiro, 2002, pp. 149-150).

Hiro (2001) explains that by late November 2000 Saudi Arabia reopened its border with Iraq and allowed vehicular traffic, and Egypt had upgraded its consulate in Baghdad to the ambassadorial level. “Iraq will soon be integrated into the Arab fold,” said President Mubarak of Egypt (p. 301).

Iraq then was invited to the Arab Summit of 2000. Saddam dispatched his deputy, Izzat Ibrahim to attend the meeting. While the Arab summit gathered in Cairo, Saddam sent a convoy of forty trucks of food and medicine to the Palestinian Territories via Amman. The next week a Palestinian plane brought many wounded Palestinians to Baghdad for medical treatment. These gestures boosted Saddam’s already high standing among young Palestinians (Hiro, 2002, p. 152).

Meanwhile, the American corporations and their foreign subsidiaries were purchasing Iraqi oil on a large scale and selling petroleum-related equipment and spare parts to Iraq. While the U.S. and Britain were carrying out almost daily air strikes against
military installations in northern and southern Iraq, executives and some former architects of American policy toward Iraq were doing business with Saddam’s government and helping to rebuild its oil industry (Hiro, 2002, pp. 165-166).

Hiro (2002) suggests that Halliburton, of which Dick Cheney was then the chief executive officer, were in the forefront. Placing bids through their foreign subsidiaries and affiliates, more than a dozen U.S. companies signed tens of millions of dollars worth of contracts with Iraq for oil-related equipment between mid-1998 and the end of 1999 (p. 166).

The Presidency of George W. Bush

In January 2001, George W. Bush became the 43rd President of the United States. According to Pollack (2002), the one topic on which the Bush team had already decided was Iraq. It made regime change in Iraq one of its first and highest priorities. This notion was confirmed when the new Bush administration announced that the first comprehensive foreign policy review would be conducted on Iraq (p. 104).

Abunimah & Masri (2002) further explain that the American media’s demonization of Saddam helped the hawks in the Bush administration to target Iraq and build a case against Saddam. The tendency of the United States government and media to demonize foreign leaders has been widely noted. With Iraq, this was particularly insidious, because the habit of many in the media to use “Saddam” and “Iraq” as synonyms obscured the suffering and even the existence of more than 22 million Iraqis (pp. 107-108).
The administration’s comprehensive Iraq policy review drove home to the administration just how complicated the Iraq issue had become since Republicans had last been in office. Initially, the Bush team wanted to have its Iraq policy review completed in a matter of weeks, but it quickly became clear that it needed a much better understanding of the multiplicity of issues involved and much more staff working to develop new options (Pollack, 2002, pp. 105-106).

With February 2001 came the Bush administration’s first military strike against Iraq when the Pentagon concluded that Iraq was about to link parts of its air defense system with its freshly installed fiber-optic network. According to Hiro (2001), on February 16, 2001, the Pentagon struck at 12:30 P.M. Two-dozen U.S. and UK warplanes fired on five Iraqi air defense targets above the 33rd Parallel, around Baghdad, containing seven command and control nodes and twenty radar installations (p. 303).

The first deadline of the Bush administration’s comprehensive review of U.S. policy toward Iraq came and went, as did a later one, and another and another. By May 2001 it was clear that the administration was not going to seek a radically new approach to Iraq. It was simply too difficult to reconcile the costs and risks of regime change with the administration’s other foreign and domestic policy priorities (Pollack, 2002, p. 106).

The INC took advantage of the hawk’s agenda toward Iraq and pushed the WMD envelope and the claim that Saddam had ties with al-Qaeda to the maximum. The INC perpetuated in the American media that Saddam had an advanced program and substantial experience in the production, storage and use of chemical weapons, including mustard agent and nerve agents such as Sarin, Tabun, and VX, and retained the expertise...
to continue production and step up production within weeks of the departure of inspectors.

**September 11 and the Political Impact**

On September 11, 2001, a group of terrorists hijacked four American passenger airplanes. Two of the planes slammed into the World Trade Center towers in New York City, causing the collapse of both towers and the death of more than 3,000 people. The third airplane slammed into the Pentagon building in Washington, and the fourth crashed in an open field in Pennsylvania. The Bush administration accused Saudi businessman Usama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda group of carrying out the attacks, and identified 19 passengers on the four hijacked flights, most were Saudi nationals, as members of al-Qaeda.

On September 12, 2001, the Security Council passed Resolution 1368, calling on all States to work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of the terrorist attacks (See United Nations, 2001). Iraq was one of the three countries that refused to fly its flags at half-mast at its U.N. Mission in New York, the others being Libya and China. Baghdad went beyond this gesture.

Iraq Watch (2001) reveals that in an open letter to the American people on September 19, 2001, Saddam stated that the United States needed to try wisdom after it has tried force over the last fifty years. Saddam added that the danger that may threaten any people or nation does not call upon the people in charge to lead the way against this danger only, but also to analyze its reasons in view of abating them.

The Bush administration vowed to retaliate for the September 11 attacks, and the president announced that he wanted Bin Laden dead or alive. Since Bin Laden and al-
Qaeda had training camps in Afghanistan, the administration demanded that the Taliban regime in Afghanistan arrest and surrender Bin Laden to U.S. authorities.

The hawks within the administration, headed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, went a step further by calling for strikes against all terrorist groups and terrorist-sponsoring states, regardless if they had anything to do with September 11 or not. The list of terrorist groups, in addition to al-Qaeda included Hezbollah in Lebanon, the PKK in Turkey, Hamas in Palestine, Ansar al-Islam in Iraq, and various other organizations. The list of states sponsoring terrorism included Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, North Korea, Cuba, and Sudan.

However, Iraq was put on the back burner while the doves agreed with cobbling together a coalition to attack Afghanistan. The bombing of Afghanistan started on October 7, 2001.

The U.S. military operation in Afghanistan, codename "Operation Enduring Freedom," managed to topple the Taliban regime. Bin Laden, however, was able to escape. Hiro (2002) explains that during this time, Americans were nervous, with anthrax-related deaths in Florida triggering a nationwide alarm. The hawks then claimed immediately and without evidence that Iraq was the instigator behind the anthrax attack. The FBI, however, dismissed this claim (p. 176).

Once the Taliban were expelled from power, the hawks began discussing the second phase of the war on terror. As expected, they advanced their case for attacking Iraq. The doves remained skeptical of the wisdom of an anti-Iraq military campaign.

The hawks eventually succeeded in turning the administration, media, and public attention toward Iraq. Instead of hunting for Bin Laden and continuing the war on al-
Qaeda, the focus shifted toward Iraq as the primary state sponsoring terrorism that was connected with September 11 and al-Qaeda. This terrorism was seen as posing an imminent threat to the United States.

Hiro (2002) adds that the Iraq mania reached fever pitch in November 2001 when, during his visit to Washington, Czech prime minister Milos Zeman told Powell that Muhammad Atta, one of the ringleaders of the September 11 hijackers, had visited Prague in April 2001 to confer with Iraqi intelligence officer Ahmad Ani. The U.S. intelligence community, however, was unable to verify Iraq's connection with September 11 (p. 177).

Preemption as a Policy

According to Hamad (2003), the terrorist attacks on America on September 11, 2001 provided the hawks within the Bush team with an opportunity to push their views forward, especially regarding the notion of a preemption strike as the United States’ official policy. September 11 gave the hawks the excuse they needed not to hold off with respect to Iraq. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld even began pushing for attacking Iraq within hours after the terror attacks had occurred.

Within hours of the attacks of September 11, 2001 with no evidence pointing at Iraq’s involvement in the attacks, Rumsfeld ordered the military to begin working on a strike plan against Iraq. RUPE (2003) reveals that notes of the meeting quote Rumsfeld as saying he wanted “best information fast, go massive, sweep it all up, things related and not” (p. 53).

In an interview with ABC News (2003) with Bob Woodward, Rumsfeld insisted that Saddam's Iraq should be a principal target of the first round of terrorism a day after
the terrorist attacks on September 11 and before it was even clear who was behind the attacks. A hint of a deliberate campaign to connect Iraq with the September 11 attacks and al-Qaeda surfaced in a June 2002 televised interview with General Wesley Clark on a public-affairs program, Meet the Press. Lobe (2003) explains that Clark asserted that:

There was a concerted effort during the fall of 2001, starting immediately after September 11, to pin 9/11 and the terrorism problem on Saddam Hussein. It came from the White House. It came from other people around the White House. It came from all over. I got a call on September 11, 2001. I was on CNN, and I got a call at my home saying: 'You got to say this is connected and this is state sponsored terrorism that this has to be connected to Saddam Hussein.'

Wolfowitz shared these views as well. According to Bob Woodward and Dan Balz of the Washington Post, Wolfowitz argued during meetings on September 15-16, 2001 of the administration's war council at Camp David that, the real source of all the trouble and terrorism was Hussein (see Lobe, 2003).

Lobe (2003) notes that upon their return to Washington, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz convened a secret, two-day meeting of the Defense Policy Board (DPB), chaired by Richard Perle. Instead of focusing on the first steps in carrying out a war on terrorism, the discussions centered on how to use September 11 to strike at Iraq.

Paul O'Neill, former Secretary of Treasury under President George W. Bush, stated in an interview with CBS (2003) that, “from the very beginning, there was a conviction, that Saddam Hussein was a bad person and that he needed to go.” Going after Saddam was topic A, ten days after the inauguration, eight months before September 11.
O’Neill argued that it was all about finding a way to invade Iraq, with the president saying, go find me a way to do this.

The hawks’ overreaching case was rooted in the doctrine of a preemptive strike, early unilateral action against a foe suspected of posing a future threat to the United States, a radical departure from the traditional policy of a defensive war sanctified by international law as set out in the United Nations Charter.

In 1992, Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy under Bush Sr., supervised the drafting of a new Defense Policy Guidance document, objecting to what he considered the premature ending of the Gulf War. In the document, Wolfowitz outlined plans for military intervention in Iraq as an action necessary to assure access to vital raw material, primarily Persian Gulf oil and to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and threats from terrorism.

Wolfowitz’s plan did not materialize at the time and was further ignored by President Clinton. In 1998, however, it became part of the thinking for a new conservative think tank in Washington, called Project for the New American Century (see PANC, 2003).

RUPE (2003) offers that in 1998, when the PANC was formed by Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, Dick Cheney, Lewis Libby, and Zalmay Khalidzad, it outlined its plan for a new America and published its strategy for America’s domination of the world. The strategy was named “Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategies, Forces And Resources For A New Century.” In 2002, it became the blueprint for the Bush administration’s National Security doctrine. PANC developed its plans for an era of U.S. world domination, sideling the UN and attacking Iraq (p. 77).
Usborne (2003) suggests that Paul Wolfowitz was the architect in persuading the Bush team then focused on Iraq’s WMD and used it as the primary justification for toppling Saddam Hussein because it was politically convenient. According to Leopold (2003), a Pentagon committee led by Wolfowitz advised Bush to include a reference in his 2002 January State of the Union address to the nation that about Iraq was trying to purchase 500 tons of uranium from Niger in order to bolster the case for war in Iraq, despite the fact that the CIA warned Wolfowitz's committee that the information was unreliable.

The Bush administration became more vocal on its doctrine of preemptive strike, defending a policy of striking terrorists and countries that harbored or supported terrorists before they attacked the United States. Calabresi, Dickerson, Thompson & Waller (2002) explain that Iraq was singled out from the other two countries that Bush identified as the axis of evil and became the first target in Bush’s preemptive strike policy. Administration officials, from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to Secretary of State Collin Powell and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, began articulating and defending the administration’s position to the public, the media, and Congress.

Hilton (2004) notes that on September 12, 2002 claims by Iraqi military officers supplied by the INC that Iraq was training Arabs in hijacking planes and trains, planting explosives in cities, sabotage and assassinations were given uncritical prominence in a White House report. Later this information proved to be a fabrication. The INC also claimed that Iraq had mobile biological warfare research facilities and the information was included in Powell’s presentation to the UN Security Council in February 2003. Again, this information proved to be a fabrication by Chalabi and the INC.
The Iraqi opposition role in the U.S. policy toward Iraq, however, was primarily an exercise in public diplomacy aimed at showing American and international critics of the Bush team's push for regime change that Iraqis wanted to be liberated from Saddam’s grip. But the Bush team was also spinning its intentions for the sake of Iraqi public opinion.

The Bush administration made it clear that it could not accept what had become the status quo with respect to Iraq, a country ruled by Saddam Hussein and free to attempt to reconstitute its assorted weapons of mass destruction programs. Richelson (2003) states that as part of its campaign against the status quo, the Bush team published documents and provided briefings detailing Iraq’s WMD programs and attempts to deceive other nations about its WMD activities.

The justification for a preemptive strike against Iraq increased as the propaganda war to enlarge Iraq’s imminent threat to the U.S. increased. Statement by statement, the administration officials elevated the hypothesis of Iraqi threat posed by its WMD and ties with al-Qaeda to an urgent national security matter.

Risen & Johnston (2003) allude that in order to gain support and legitimacy for its policy, the Bush team sought to secure a new resolution in the United Nations to disarm Iraq by force. At the same time, Bush sought Congressional authorization for his policy of a preemptive strike and war against Iraq.

On September 20, 2002, Bush sent a proposal to Congress, asking for the authorization of war if diplomacy did not result in disarming Saddam. On October 10, 2002, Congress passed Joint Resolution HJ Res. 114, Public Law 105-235, also known as


The Bush administration was hopeful that the member states would realize that Washington was not bound by their consensus and might pressure them into adopting a satisfactory disarmament resolution. Resolution 1441 recognized the threat that Iraq’s noncompliance with previous UN Security Council resolutions and Iraq’s proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles posed to international peace and security, and it demanded the disarming of Iraq’s WMD programs.

According to the Iraqi Foreign Ministry (2003), Saddam expressed his government’s willingness to comply with the resolution and welcomed the inspectors’ return to Iraq. He characterized the Bush administration’s accusation about Iraq’s ties with al-Qaeda and possession of WMD as a ploy to use fear, especially after September 11, in order to justify a politically motivated war against Iraq.

In an interview with Saddam on February 4, 2003, he states that Iraq was committed to dealing and implementing Resolution 1441 as demanded by the United Nations. Saddam added that the U.S. and the world should know by now that Iraq does not possess any of the weapons claimed by top-ranking officials in the U.S. and the UK (Iraqi Foreign Ministry, 2003).

Iraq Watch (2002a) observes that on September 19, 2002, Saddam sent a message to the United Nations, responding to President Bush’s accusations regarding the Iraqi
threat. According to Saddam, the U.S. president left nothing to the imagination of those who cannot pinpoint his purposes and intentions.

Hiro (2002) advises that on October 1, 2002 the Iraqi foreign ministry published a 29 page dossier rebutting the charges made in the American and British documents on Iraq’s WMD. Even British public opinion, historically and culturally close to America’s, turned against U.S. policy to the extent that an opinion poll revealed that 37 percent considered Bush the greatest danger to world peace, only six points behind Saddam (pp. 215-218).

On December 7, 2002, Iraq submitted an 11,800-page declaration, which claimed that it had no WMD (CNN, 2002). RUPE (2003) states that the United States insisted on examining the report before anyone else, even before the weapons inspectors, and promptly insisted on removing 8,000 pages from it before allowing the non-permanent members of the Security Council to look at it. Iraq then leaked the list of American companies whose names appeared in a report to the German daily, Die Tageszeitung (pp. 33-34).

Neuffer (2002) explains that the White House was not satisfied with the Iraqi move and insisted that the U.N. Security Council pass another resolution that would authorize force against Iraq in order to disarm Saddam. According to White House spokesperson Scott McClellan, the Iraqi move was a tactic set up in hopes of avoiding strong UN Security Council action.

Neuffer (2002) adds that U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan considered the Iraqi move as a possible breakthrough in the nearly four-year standoff concerning Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. Iraq’s announcement meant that UNMOVIC, led by Dr.
Hans Blix, was able to enter Iraq for the first time since UNMOVIC was created in 1999. The UN International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was also entrusted with the task of checking for nuclear weapons.

On December 26, 2002, the UN inspectors returned to Iraq and began the inspection process (CNN, 2002). The *Washington Post* (2003) reveals that Blix stated in a report to the UN Security Council on January 27, 2003 that Iraq was cooperating, but emphasized that proactive cooperation by Iraq was more useful for the inspection process. He also asked the Security Council to allow the inspections to go on for several months to be completed thoroughly.

The Bush team, however, did not want to give the inspection more time, even if it was merely a matter of months. As such, it asked the Security Council to authorize the use of force against Iraq instead. One of the reasons for rushing to war was because the administration did not want American public opinion that was supportive of war in Iraq to change before the administration had the opportunity to accomplish its goal. The other reason was to avoid combat in bulky chemical suits during hot weather and to prepare for the anticipated oil price shock with the arrival of the hot season in Iraq.

Since Bush invested so much in building a case for war, and deployed nearly 200,000 troops to Kuwait, he in essence had boxed himself in one direction: to go to war with Iraq. Pitt & Ritter (2002) explain that on August 2002, Perle said, “the failure to take on Saddam after what the president said would produce such a collapse of confidence in the president that it would set back the war on terrorism” (p. 8).

In a four-hour council meeting, only the U.S., Britain, Spain and Bulgaria supported the Bush proposal for a new resolution. Other council members refused to
endorse it. Britain then suggested a compromise proposal. However, 11 out of 15 members of the Security Council rejected the British initiative as well. According to Farley & Wright (2003), this was a diplomatic setback both for Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair.

The Bush team was facing worldwide opposition to its policy of preemption. Countless demonstrations both in the United States and abroad, at times reaching to millions of participants, took to the streets to express opposition to the administration’s unilateral policy toward Iraq. Steinberg (2002) offers that many countries, including some of America’s allies, expressed their frustration with the Bush team. These countries included Canada, France, Germany, Pakistan, China, Russia, South Africa and India. Within the U.S. itself, more than thirty major cities issued resolutions in opposition of the Bush policy.

Iraq Watch (2003a) asserts that in a joint statement on February 10, 2003 the Foreign Ministers of Russia, Germany and France stressed that their common aim was to disarm Iraq according to UN resolution 687. However, the means to achieve it were to be inspired by the principles of the United Nations Charter. The three ministers agreed that inspection had yielded results and that Russia, Germany and France favored the continuation of the inspections and the substantial strengthening of their human and technical capabilities by all possible means as an alternative to war.

Iraq Watch (2002b) notes that on February 9, 2002, Saddam sent a letter to Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit stating, "Iraq has no weapons of mass destruction and has no intention of making them. On July 16, 2002, Iraq Watch (2002c) explains that the Jordanian Prime Minister and the Arab League Secretary General reiterated their
rejection to any military action against Iraq. Jordan also denied its territories were to be used as a launching pad by U.S. forces against Iraq.

Hiro (2002) emphasizes that on September 4-5, 2002 the Arab League’s Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Cairo declared “total rejection of the threat of aggression on Arab nations, in particular Iraq, reaffirming that these threats to the security and safety of any Arab country were considered a threat to Arab national security.” This view was echoed once again during the Arab League’ summit held in Beirut in March 2002. The summit resolved to reject “exploitation of war on terrorism to threatening any Arab country and using force against Iraq” (pp. 183-208).

Iraq Watch (2003b) suggests that on January 23, 2003, the Foreign Ministers for Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey met in Turkey to express their common resolve for attaining a peaceful solution to the Iraqi problem. The ministers agreed that the countries of the region did not wish to live through yet another war and all its devastating consequences, and war was not to be an option to resolve the Iraqi crisis.

Hiro (2002) explains that at home, Congressional leaders who were entitled to classified intelligence briefings were unable to see or hear any fresh evidence that Baghdad posed an immediate threat to U.S. security. Among the early critics of the Bush Iraq strategy was Senator John Kerry, a veteran of the Vietnam War, who accused Bush of allowing his rhetoric to get ahead of his thinking.

**Operation Iraqi Freedom**

Department’s spokesperson, unless there was something that gels in the Security Council by then, there was no reason to push beyond that. Farley & Wright (2003) offer that there were no votes in the Security Council to issue a new resolution on Iraq.

On March 18, 2003, Bush gave Saddam and his two sons 48 hours to leave Iraq or face invasion. Bush outlined the premise and rationale for his policy of preemption as a just means in defending America’s security against Iraq’s threat (White House, 2003a). Saddam, however, refused to resign or leave Iraq.

On March 20, 2003, Bush announced the beginning of the war on Iraq, code-named “Operation Iraqi Freedom.” Sanger & Burns (2003) explain that the American forces poised on the Kuwaiti borders and at the Persian Gulf began the invasion of Iraq. The air campaign against Baghdad, codenamed “Shock and Awe,” was launched from the U.S. military base and command center in Qatar. They were, however, unsuccessful in killing Saddam.

Secretary of State Collin Powell explained the United States’ official justification for the war in a statement on March 31, 2003. According to Powell, Coalition forces in Iraq were fighting to protect the world from "the potentially catastrophic combination of an outlaw state, weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism," and in the process were "liberating the Iraqi people from a ruthless tyranny that has showed utter contempt for human life" (International Information Program, 2003).

The Bush administration refused to continue with the containment policy toward Iraq because it reached the realization that such a policy was eroding. The continuation of the sanctions were also hurting average Iraqi citizens and increasing worldwide resentments against the United States and in support of Iraq.
After September 11, 2001 and the failure in capturing Bin Laden, Bush wanted to use force against Iraq in order to show the American people that he was taking a tough measures against fighting terrorism by linking the war in Iraq with the war on terrorism. He was also sending a message to countries, such as Iran and Syria, not to support terrorism or they will also face a U.S. military response.

The war continued despite national and international opposition. On April 9, 2003, the U.S. forces captured Baghdad, and the regime of Saddam Hussein crumbled. According to the New York Times (2003), Iraqi citizens streamed into the streets of Baghdad, celebrating the sudden disintegration of Saddam’s three decades of dictatorship. The scene in central Baghdad, where jubilant Iraqis and American marines collaborated in toppling a huge statue of Saddam, signaled victory for America’s war.


Hunt (2004) alludes that the White House retreated from its once-confident claims that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. The administration's switch came after retired chief U.S. weapons inspector David Kay said that he had concluded, after nine months of searching, that Saddam did not have stockpiles of forbidden weapons.

The Bush administration was wrong in its assessment both of Iraq’s capabilities and intentions. Iraq had nothing to do with September 11 or al-Qaeda, and had reputedly
admitted that it no longer possessed weapons of mass destruction. The UN inspecting teams were ready to verify that in 1995 if it was not for Hussein Kamel’s defection to Jordan and his allegations regarding Iraq’s continuous concealment policy. The lack of human intelligence inside Iraq and the heavy reliance on exiled Iraqi groups who fabricated reports on Iraq’s ties with al-Qaeda and possession of contributed to the intelligence failure regarding Iraq.

According to former UN weapons inspector Hans Blix, the invasion of Iraq was not justified, especially when Iraq was fully cooperating with UN weapons inspectors and relevant UN resolutions. Blix (2004) states that the Bush administration chose war with Iraq not because of the claim that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and it refused to disarm (which was untrue to begin with) but because the administration did not want to continue with the previous policy of containment, especially after the events of September 11.

Hutton (2003) advises that the cost of invading Iraq was $280 billion. The estimated cost of occupation until September 2004 was $87 billion. Most countries refused to help the Bush administration’s adventure in Iraq either financially or militarily.

The immediate task for the Bush team that followed its quick military victory in Iraq was the occupation of the country. It appointing J. Garner as a Military Governor for Iraq, and appointing former CIA operatives such as Chalabi and Allawie as members of advisory board under Garner, and contracted out Iraq’s oil industry to American firms. The council members then chose their relatives to head Iraq’s new cabinet. Instead of opening up to Iraqis, the council members were hiding inside one of Saddam’s palaces,
unable even to walk in the streets, refusing to leaving the palace except to fly to other countries in order to promote themselves future appointments.

To empower Chalabi for future political manipulation, Hilton (2004) suggests that the Pentagon handed him 25 tons of captured Saddam’s intelligence documents after the fall of Baghdad on April 9, 2003. The Pentagon then planed to spend $4 million over the next year to buy back this intelligence from Chalabi. The Pentagon also awarded a company that had extensive family and business ties to Chalabi $400 million in contracts.

Phillips (2003) notes that before the war, hundreds of Iraqis were involved in discussions with Washington about securing and stabilizing their country after the end of military combats. The Bush team, however, especially the neoconservatives in the Pentagon, ignored all such advice. Instead, it relied solely on advice by Ahmad Chalabi in disbanding the Iraqi Army, police and administrative cadre.

The Bush team failed to bring order and security to Iraq after a period of chaos that followed the power vacuum created by the downfall of Saddam. It also failed in returning normalcy to the Iraqi people who continued to suffer because of massive unemployment, severe economic problems, increased violence, and a shortage of electricity and clean water.

At night, most of downtown Baghdad lived in darkness, with only the blue and red police sirens lighting the streets along with the sound of intermittent gunfire puncturing the silence. This was not a picture of a festive newly liberated capital. With most of Iraq suffering from power interruptions that lasted an average of 16 hours daily, it was a little hard to party in the dark.
During the day, some of Iraq’s 12 million unemployed hang out in front of the heavily fortified headquarters of the Military Governor of Iraq, named Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). With many unemployed former university professors, engineers, and civil servants choosing to become cab drivers instead, Docena (2003) asserts that many of those Iraqis summed up their opinion of the U.S. administration of Iraq by stating that not even Saddam could have screwed up this badly.

Garner’s failure to restore order led the Bush team to replace him with a Civil Administrator, and appointed former Ambassador L. Paul Bremer as Iraq’s new head of the CPA. Bremer then created the Iraqi Governing Council, composed of 25 members who were chosen based on Iraq’s ethnic and religious composition for the purpose of advising Bremer on the matter of administering Iraq. As Garner before him, Bremer packed the council with former CIA operatives such as Chalabi and Allawie.

Docena (2003) adds that Iraqis were in broad agreement that life was deteriorating rather than improving. The prevailing sentiment was a complex mix of resentment and resignation, frustration and incredulity. The Iraqis felt bitter about being occupied and yet many were resigned to entrusting their day-to-day survival to the Americans. Many Iraqis also questioned how the United States despite all the time and money was unable to make the reconstruction process work.

The occupation turned Iraqis’ temporary sense of jubilation after the downfall of Saddam into a sense of resentment. This was exacerbated when the Pentagon privatized Iraq’s economy in violation of standing international trade regulation. Many Iraqis concluded from such an action that American came to Iraq not as a liberator but to
occupy Iraq for its resources. When America reaps the profits of another nation's most valuable resources, it is called a colonial power, not a liberator.

The U.S. military presence in a schoolyard in Faluja, a small city west of Baghdad caused a small demonstration in May 2003 demanding that school be opened. The American troops stationed in the school yard responded by opening fire on the crowd, killing a few demonstrators. This incident ignited a long and fierce insurgency against the occupying force that continued to claim the lives of U.S. soldiers in Iraq.

On December 13, 2003 while hiding in an underground hole, U.S. forces near Tikreet captured Saddam. On capturing his foe, Bush stated that the United States came to this moment through its resolve and focused action (White House, 2003b).

The insurgence in Iraq, nevertheless, continued despite Saddam’s capture. While the White House was accusing Saddam of financing and leading the insurgence, the mere fact that the insurgence continued after Saddam’s capture proved that the White House’s accusation was designed to discredit the insurgence as remnant of the old regime rather than to acknowledge it as a resistance to occupation.

Klein (2004) explains that the condition in post-Saddam Iraq turned America’s quick military victory into a losing political battle. To minimize criticism of his handling of post-war Iraq, Bush decided to hand authority to the Iraqis in June 2004 with U.S. forces to remain in Iraq for many years to come. The Bush team rejected many Iraqi’s suggestions on how to handle the transition, including opinion expressed by the revered Shiite clerk, Grand Ayatollah Sistani, who called for direct elections.

Instead, Bremer chose the new interim Iraqi government from his appointed members in the Iraqi Governing Council. Klein (2004) adds that UN envoy Brahimi went
along with Bremer's plan to stamp a form of credibility on the process. This, according to the Bush administration, constitutes a transition to full Iraqi sovereignty. However, for Iraqi sovereignty to be established by appointees appointing appointees to select appointees to select appointees is neither a democracy nor sovereignty. Iraqis have thus now ushered in a new democratic tradition of appointocracy.
CHAPTER III

LITERATURE REVIEW

The History of Complexity Sciences

Complexity studies were nonexistent until the work of Poincare. In a series of papers written during the period 1881-1886, Poincare analyzed and named many of the qualitative features displayed by dynamical systems. Ding & York (1997) note that Poincare showed that problems in non-integratible and phase space trajectories are complicated. Poincare’s observation is regarded as the very first indication of chaotic behavior in dynamical systems (pp. 1-2).

Brown (1996b) explains that Birkhoff then provided a more detailed depiction of this dynamic, followed by Cartwright, Littlewood, Van der Pol, Levinson, Smale, Peixoto and Kolmogorov. These studies arrived at the conclusion that trajectories are unstable. Chaos exists when the long-term prediction of a system is impossible because uncertainty in a system's initial state grows exponentially fast over time (p. 119).

Bishop (1997) offers that as a technical expression, chaos describes a specific type of irregular motion produced by a deterministic system that exhibits exponential divergence from an equilibrium start leading to unpredictability (p. 256). As a structural function in a system, chaos describes changes in the system triggered by environmental conditions. These conditions will then lead the system to further dissipation and entropy...
production. This entropy, according to De Greene (1996), leads to further instabilities, which leads to change in the threshold and the emergence of a new order and equilibrium (p. 276).

Ding & York (1997) observe that a typical dynamic system can exhibit a variety of temporal behavior (p. 2). According to Brown (1996a), when the behavioral history of a system is examined, the nature of change becomes the core of its inquiry (p. 54). Wheatley (1999) explains that if a system becomes unstable, it will move first into a period of oscillation, swinging back and forth between two different states. After this oscillation stage, the next state is chaos, and it is then the wild gyrations begin (p. 117).

Dennard (1996) alludes that a chaotic system is both self-referential and transformational. It adheres to a set of organizing principles to which the change process always reconnects to create a stable structure. The structure itself is not deterministic as much as it is accommodating to the environment of which it is also a part (p. 499).

Campbell & Mayer-Kress (1991) note that in the early 1960s Edward Lorenz, a meteorologist at MIT, began a series of investigations aimed at establishing that unpredictability in weather forecasting was compatible with a completely deterministic description (p. 38).

Ding & York (1997) suggest that at the same time, a group of mathematicians developed a wide variety of examples of chaotic systems, known as the Anosov systems, which had chaotic attractors. One important character of such systems is that they are structurally stable, meaning that small perturbations would leave the system unchanged (p. 9).
Ding & York (1997) add that the state of awareness of chaotic behavior changed dramatically in the 1970s. Computer technology had evolved to the point where many scientists had available interactive computers with improved graphics. The examples of chaos mushroomed in practically every field of science (p. 10).

An important concept in chaos is the dynamics of collapse. This dynamic is also referred to as *bifurcation* or phase shift in the order of a system. As the self-organizing order emerges out of the interaction of elements within the system, the system's parameters become unstable and the order starts to collapse (Brem, 1999, p. 133). Such collapse allows for the emergence of a new, systemically self-organized order more appropriate to the new context.

Brem (1999) adds that there are two types of collapse, natural and human-made. The first is the inevitable bifurcation that follows upon the increasing complexity of a systemic order wherein the order of the system collapses and then reforms into a new order. The second type of collapse is the result of cognitive and behavioral dysfunction (pp. 134-135).

With the focus of complexity theories on nonlinearity, instability, and uncertainty, Elliott & Kiel (1996) offer that the application of these theories to public administration is a predictable eventuality. We live in a highly nonlinear world. The social realm is clearly nonlinear, where instability and unpredictability are inherent, and where cause and effect are often puzzling (p. 2).

Another important theory in complexity is that of autopoiesis by Maturana and Varela (1980). The central idea of autopoiesis is that a living system is organized in a way that all its components and processes jointly produce those same components and
processes, thus establishing an autonomous, self-producing entity. Little (1999) explains that autopoietic systems are self-organizing in that they produce and change their own structures as well as their own components (p. 155).

A key notion of autopoiesis theory is self-reference. According to Little (1999), the idea of self-reference designates the unity that a system is for itself. Self-reference is independent of observations by others and implies that unity can be produced through relational operations (p. 160).

Prigogine & Stengers (1984) explain that structures may disappear, but also they may appear. Some processes are well described by deterministic equations, such as in measuring a chaotic behavior. Others involve probabilistic processes, such as in the observation of a quantum phenomenon (p. 9).

Evans (1999) notes that with the appearance of quantum theory, the nature of reality has come into question. No longer can we assume that our experiments tell us anything concrete about pre-existing states of reality. Whatever reality is out there, it has fuzzy and quantum indeterminacy (pp. 198-201). Overman & Loraine (1996) explain that the quantum world is a world of participatory collusion among particles in which two entities separated by many meters and possessing no mechanism for communicating with each other can exhibit correlations in their behavior (p. 488).

The history of quantum theories is a history of conflicting interpretations of observed quantum phenomena. The most important theoretical positions in quantum theories are the Copenhagen Interpretation, the Multiple Worlds’ Interpretation, Bohm’s Deterministic Interpretation, Capra’s Taoist Interpretation, and the Standard Model Interpretation.
The Copenhagen Interpretation

Overman & Loraine (1996) explain that Max Planck hypothesized and later Einstein demonstrated that electromagnetic radiation comes in discrete bundles of energy called quanta. From this beginning the Copenhagen Interpretation, championed by physicist, Niels Bohr, began the process of reformulating Newtonian physics into quantum mechanics (p. 489).

Bohr (1983) theorized that the wave and particle theories of light were not mutually exclusive, but complementarity in their association. Bohr's complementarity principle suggests that reality is irreducibly plural and complex and no single theoretical description can exhaust it.

The notion of a holistic universe led to another important concept: nonlocality. Albert (1994) explains that nonlocality is the idea that something that occurs in region A can have an effect in region B instantaneously regardless of how far apart these two regions happen to be. Morcol (1999) notes that nonlocality violates Einstein's special theory of relativity that states nothing can travel faster than light. “Nonlocality (or, nonlocal causation) runs against the classical physical notion of local causation by traveling the space between them” (p. 14).

The Many Worlds Interpretation

Hugh Everett developed and Bryce DeWitt revived this theory. Morcol (1999) explains that this theory is based on the notion that many worlds exist side ways across time from reality, parallel to our universe but forever cut off from it. The overlapping wave functions of the universe do not collapse. Rather, all of them are equally real and...
exist in their parts of "superspace" and "supertime." All possible things, thus, do happen, in some branch of reality (p. 17).

**Bohm's Deterministic Interpretation**

David Bohm (1952) describes the dynamics and interconnected nature of reality with a new term, holo-movement. Holomovement is a dynamic phenomenon out of which all forms of the material universe flow. Space and time emerge as forms flowering out of holomovement.

**Capra's Taoist Interpretation**

Taoist philosophy, which originated in ancient China, has emphasized how the way of nature (the word *Tao* means "way") is characterized by a continuous flux shaped by the dynamic interplay of *yin* and *yang* (dark and sunny sides of a hill). The Tao is determined by a flow of opposite energies through which all trends eventually reverse themselves.

Capra (1991) finds Bohm's notion of implicate order compatible with Taoist philosophy and thinks that science and mysticism are two "complementary manifestation of the human mind" (p. 306). Subatomic particles do not have any meaning as isolated entities. They must be understood as "interconnections, not only between themselves but also between them and the measurement" (p. 68).

To explain the quantum phenomena, the S-Matrix (Scattering Matrix) theory is used. Capra (1991) explains that the theory shifts the emphasis from objects to events. It also shifts the emphasis from building blocks (elementary particles) to a web of
interconnectedness. Elementary particles are regarded as intermediate states in a network of reactions.

The Standard Model Interpretation

The Standard Model Interpretation depicts a physical reality that is made up of thirteen stable particles and four fundamental forces of nature. Capra (1991) notes that these thirteen particles have their anti-particles, which constitute the building blocks of anti-matter. He offers that the thirteen particles are then divided into two categories: leptons (such as the electron) and hadrons (p. 227). Morcol (1991) states that leptons are "elementary" particles because they are not made up of smaller particles. Hadrons, on the other hand, are complex structures of more elementary particles called quarks (p. 22).

Morcol (1999) adds that there are commonalities between complexity and quantum mechanics, as well as differences. Both Capra and Prigogine and Stengers, for example, declare that the age of deterministic science, as defined by Newton, Laplace, and their followers is over. Both agree that the Cartesian dualism between "I" and "the world" is irrelevant and invalid (p. 25).

According to Capra (1991), quantum mechanics' indeterminism does not exist with certainty but shows "tendencies to exist" (p. 68). Prigogine & Stengers (1984), on the other hand, accept quantum theory's position that matter is not given, and that it has to be constructed out of a more fundamental concept in terms of quantum field.
The Application of Complex Studies

Complexity had spread to all areas of the natural and social sciences. Morcol (1999) notes that the first application was in interpreting Darwin’s theory of evolution, which not only established that humans were a part of a larger organic process but also led to the notion that evolutionary time was irreversible. Darwin's theory became the basis of the biological sciences of evolution, genetics, and ecology. Later, the application of Darwin's theory of evolution to computer simulations led to the development of artificial life simulations and the neural networks research (p. 7).

In other application, such as in topology, Poincare discovered that a group of simple equations lead to multiple solutions. Poincare’s work evolved into a new mathematics of fractal geometry (Morcol, 1991, p. 7). Gleick (1987) then popularized this geometry as the science of chaos. Other applications of complexity can be observed in the following disciplines.

Complexity and Computer Technology

Closely connected with the development of chaos theory is the breathtaking progress in the performance of computer hardware and software. Campbell & Mayer-Kress (1991) suggest that many results would have been practically impossible without the availability of fast, interactive computer graphics and scientific visualization tools. Similar progress has been made in business areas where decisions are made with increasing reference to computerized databases and electronic spreadsheets. Modern spreadsheets incorporate many features from simulation and visualization requirements (p. 54).
Complexity and Engineering

Deterministic chaos has many possible applications in engineering. Aihara (1997) explains that examples of these applications include deterministic nonlinear prediction, identification and modeling of nonlinear systems, nonlinear filtering, dynamical memory and search and information compression and coding. Other examples include pattern recognition, production of spontaneous fluctuation, system design avoiding chaotic oscillations, homodynamic control, and electronic and optical implementation of chaotic dynamics (p. 124).

Complexity and Neural Networks

The existence of chaotic dynamics is confirmed in the microscopic level of the nerve membranes. Aihara (1997) offers that brains are nonlinear networks composed of chaotic subsystems, or neurons, that in turn are formed of nonlinear devices of nerve membranes with chaotic dynamics. Chaos can be observed not only in oscillatory nerve membranes stimulated by sinusoidal force but also in resting nerve membranes stimulated by pulse-train force (pp. 111-119).

Aihara (1997) adds that chaotic phenomena in the macroscopic level of EEG (electro-encephalogram) and MEG (magneto-encephalogram) have also been studied by calculating indices of deterministic chaos. The results imply the existence of deterministic chaos at the macroscopic level also. Oscillatory phenomena have also been found in the cat visual cortex. This kind of oscillation seems important for clarification of the missing link between the microscopic and macroscopic chaos in the brain (p. 119).
Complexity and Biology

Little (1999) suggests that biologists have struggled for some time with the question of what distinguishes systems that call living from those that we are as complex, but are not living? This led to vitalism, or the idea that there is some substance or force that accounts for life. Vitalism then led to systems theories with mechanistic explanations of organisms as homeostatic goal seeking. System theory then led to open systems (p. 155).

Little (1999) adds that Maturana and Varela focused on a basic example, a living cell and asked what it is that makes a cell an autonomous living whole (p. 155). A living cell, according to Maturana and Varela (1980), produces itself in a process described as autopoiesis, which means self-producing. Mingers (1995) asserts that the central idea of autopoiesis is that a living system is one organized in such a way that all its components and processes jointly produce those self-same components and processes, thus establishing an autonomous, self-producing entity.

Little (1999) explains that autopoietic systems not only produce themselves but also continually renew themselves in ways that maintain the integrity of their structure. Although the system is open to and depends upon the environment for energy and raw materials, it can use only that energy and material that is already present within the system's boundaries (pp. 155-156).

While autopoiesis is maintained, the system's changes are determined by its structure, not by the environment. Luhmann (1990) extended Maturana and Varela's definition of autopoiesis to propose a theory in which he reconceptualized social systems
as autopoietic systems based on communication. According to Luhmann, it is communications that are autopoietically produced.

A key notion of autopoiesis theory and of Luhmann's theory is self-reference. Self-reference, according to Luhmann (1995) is independent of observations by others and ultimately leads to a paradox in which the overall system reconstructs itself into subsystems and subsystems' environments. In this way the system “multiplies its own reality” (p. 33).

Complexity and Evolution

From a Darwinian perspective, we might see life in the jungle. Creatures devour each other; not everything survives. Dennard (1996) explains that a closer look by complexity reveals that these events are aspects of a more general order of things, not simply individualized, brutal acts. The species living within an ecosystem have co-evolved and worked out interactions that sustain the environment and the relationships within it in a way that permits all species to survive. They do not compete as much as they cooperate” (p. 497).

Natural selection, however, plays only a partial role in evolution. Morcol (1999) notes that the laws of complexity generate much of the order in the natural world, then natural selection comes into play, further molding and refining. Patterns in life are caused by internal processes, “endogenous and natural, not exogenous impacts.” These patterns are somehow self-organized and emerge as collective phenomena (p. 8).
Dennard (1996) offers that organisms are being and becoming by means of a single evolutionary process. These manifestations exist as part of a continual chaotic process of change and accommodation (p. 499).

Kendall, Schaffer, Tidd & Olsen (1997) suggests that in most simple population models, chaotic dynamics are characterized by fluctuations. With the presence of the inevitable environmental and demographic stochasticity, chaos increases the probability of population extinction. Thus any species that evolved will be selected against (p. 193).

Kiel (1999) explains that rather than evolution being driven by some combination of mutation and fitness to an environment, evolutionary processes are the results of inherent forces seeking enhanced order and increasing complexity. This suggests that in the social realm evolutionary fitness actually requires increasing complexification (p. 68).

Population, when unchecked, increases in a geometric ratio. This is known as the *Malthus equation*. Campbell & Mayer-Kress (1991) notes that the conclusions of the Malthus equation can control perceptions not merely of what is likely but also of what is possible. The idea that population growth was inexorable and eventually had an influence on the evolutionary theories of Darwin and the economic theories of Ricardo (p. 28).

The concept of evolutionary feedback regards energy dissipation as the driving force of evolution. De Greene (1996) recognizes that evolutionary feedback is characterized by nonequilibrium conditions leading to the system's crossing a critical threshold. Beyond this threshold the system becomes structurally unstable, which leads to increased dissipation for further evolution (p. 276).
Complexity and the Environment

Nonlinear systems exhibit bifurcations. Small changes in parameters lead to qualitative transitions to new types of solutions. Campbell & Mayer-Kress (1991) explain that the global greenhouse effect is an example of such a phenomenon. A small increase in the carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere leads to qualitative change in the global ecology (p. 56).

Campbell & Mayer-Kress (1991) add that in studying the global climatic problems such as the greenhouse effect and ozone depletion a workable chaotic control theory would clearly be valuable. For example, it is already too late to reverse the negative effects of man-made perturbations by reducing these perturbations. Perhaps we will are obligated to create hurricanes on the ocean to enhance carbon dioxide exchange, prevent the hurricanes from touching land, or steer rain clouds to areas where desertification is threatened in order to reverse these trends (p. 52).

Complexity and Economics

Historically, four Kondratiev cycles have been identified in economics, with the first beginning with the Industrial Production Revolution about 1785. Kondratiev cycles are divided into phases of recovery, prosperity, recession, and depression. De Greene (1996) suggests that the Kondratiev phenomenon has properties of nonequilibrium, nonlinearity, instability, and structural change (p. 282).

The overall Kondratiev system evolves in the following manner: from chaotic attractor to limit cycle attractor to point attractor to limit-cycle attractor to chaotic attractor, with successive growth of exhaustion of information and innovation, and so on. De Greene (1996) adds that evolution show movement from nonequilibrium to

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equilibrium to nonequilibrium, and so on. Because of the irreversibility of structural change, the specific structures would not be the same. Each Kondratiev cycle is characterized by a primary energy source. However, any of these features can spill over to the next Kondratiev cycle (pp. 288-291).

With or without the application of Kondratiev in explaining chaotic behavior in the economy, attention has been paid in the last decade to the presence of nonlinearities in economic data. Boldrin (1997) notes that the issue has been approached uses the theory of nonlinear dynamic systems to build statistical tests that are meant to discriminate between a random and a deterministic explanation for a given time series (pp. 284-285).

Boldrin (1997) adds that the discovery of nonlinear dynamics brought excitement into economics and gave economists the analytical instruments to think of economic oscillations as endogenous phenomena, driven by market behavior and not by supernatural and stochastic forces (p. 293).

**Complexity and Sociology**

Brown (1996b) notes that social dynamics result from sets of local interactions between group members and their interactions with the environment. This signaling fits within a variety of classical social psychological perspectives that suggest individuals adapt to their social environment or from impressions about others based on behavioral experiences (p. 123).

Kiel (1999) observes that a closer look at the complexity of social systems behavior shows that the history of a successful society within a region is largely a tale of increasing cooperation and complementarity, not competition. This means that competition is simply one element of evolving complex systems (p. 69).
Human societies display all the characteristic features of nonlinear non-equilibrium systems, such as unpredictability generated by complex processes, phase transitions, and critical mass phenomena. Mayntz (1991) offers that radical losses of a state of order are found at every level of social reality (p. 300).

Mayntz (1991) adds that disorder and the emergence of social order has become the concern of most social theories due to the existence of human volition. This was true of social philosophy even before Hobbes explained how the state of nature was created as a means to curb the chaotic war of all against the natural state. Later, Emile Durkheim found the basis of social order in the conscience collective, while Max Weber pointed to traditions, values, and interests as the social factors producing social norms (p. 300).

Marx (1906) used the dialectic as a metaphor to explain social contradictions that result in movement through negation. His method was to search for the primary tensions shaping a given society, and to trace their repercussions on the detailed pattern of social life. In so doing, he identified the laws of movement of a society, documenting how one stage of social organization passes into another.

**Complexity and Politics**

The purpose of theory, according to Einstein, is to make nature stand still when our backs are turned. Brown (1996b) suggests that nature often dances around us. In politics, decision makers modify their own behavior and the influence of social environments through migration or a generalized contagion process (pp. 123-136).

Structure collapses because of consistently small reasons, as they grow larger and more complex. Brem (1999) offers that causal distortion may not be the distortion that collapses the system. The best we can do is to learn from each collapse in the subsequent
design that emerges from it. Efforts to stabilize the system beyond its useful life may be the roots of catastrophic collapse as the system tries to address problems it is simply not capable of addressing (pp. 129-132).

Brem (1999) adds small distortions in nonlinear dynamic systems may have consequences in the long term that will be unpredictable. Because of this inherent unpredictability of events, policymakers can address this ambiguous state of affairs. A more complexity based social scientific inquiry focuses more upon the error than the certainty, recognizing the certainty as being potentially more an illusion than a reality (p. 131).

Campbell & Mayer-Kress (1991) stress that behavior over long times can be essentially unpredictable and that a system governed by deterministic laws can exhibit effectively random behavior runs directly counter to our normal intuition. Perhaps it is because this intuition is inherently linear, deterministic chaos cannot occur for linear systems (p. 22).

The potential harm comes when the system does not collapse when it ought to but instead, collapses at a time far beyond this optimal time. Therefore, the adjustment is that much more difficult and potentially catastrophic for the human beings involved. Brem (1999) explains that the harm can take many forms including catastrophic downsizing, pension plan collapse, corporate bankruptcy, and social safety systems structural collapse. It is through embracing chaos rather than avoiding it that these problems are best addressed. In policymaking, embracing chaos means assuming that human errors in perception, mistakes in process, and flaws in outcome are natural (pp. 134-135).
Brown (1996b) explains that while politics is a complicated process, its complexity may even be understandable and manageable once political behavior can be precisely described. Yet despite the wealth of contemporary data and information, political scientists do not know precisely how to describe political behavior or which political phenomena are linear and can be transformed (p. 137).

Brown (1996b) adds that gaps in understanding of political dynamics have become particularly obvious during recent political events in Europe, Russia, Japan, and the Middle East. These events came unexpectedly to political scientist as unpredicted events (p. 120).

Politics, whether at the communal, state, national, or international level, results from the interactions of individuals. Political leaders base their decisions on interactions with their advisors. Brown (1996b) notes that legislators chat in the halls before key votes and discuss issues with staff, advisors, and adversaries or check with constituents back home. The process is reflected down to the level of the voter based on interactions with friends and family (pp. 121-122).

Brem (1999) offers that complexity presents a real alternative to current practices. Governance in utilizing complexity can frame society as a system that experiences flux and transformations in behavior patterns that defy effective prediction. The higher the level of governance, the more it is involved in the enterprise of guaranteeing and empowering the democratic vision. The lower the level of government is, the more the focus would be on the “partnership between public, private, and social sectors in manifesting democratic community” (p. 145).
Brem (1999) states that democratic vision acts as a strange attractor around which a self-organizing order of participatory democratic community forms and emerges. Policy that empowers people to participate in their own governance would be appropriate (pp. 145-146). Leland (1998) asserts that American democratic government is more than self-interest, and we need to move toward a more complex model of political behavior (p. 274).

Complexity and Public Administration

Overman & Loraine (1996) allude that there is not one sentence, one paragraph, or even one book that can tell us what the new sciences of complexity are. Taken together, however, the theories and ideas of the new sciences of complexity portend a new administrative science (p. 487).

Mingus (1999) offers that the application of quantum theory to public administration is a movement toward a profound change in shifting scientific paradigm from Newtonian physics to quantum physics. He warns his audience that the ontological foundations of this new paradigm must be examined (p. 245).

Overman & Loraine (1996) note that the new sciences of complexity lead us to rethink and reformulate a new science of public administration for the 21st century instead of just reinventing the old one. This new administrative science is not going to be based on a crude form of physics envy but on a careful reconsideration and reformulation of the administrative phenomena that surround us in our everyday lives (p. 487).

Dennard (1996) offers that complexity does not necessarily provide methodological relief for the administrative problems of efficiency and service delivery.
It does not tell us how to overcome disorder and chaotic behavior, for example. Rather, it views disorder and chaos not as problems to be solved but as meaningful aspects of a process by which living systems “adapt, renew, maintain, and transcend through self-organization” (p. 495).

Quantum mechanics, on the other hand, describe interconnection and interdependence as an exchange between all matters at the subatomic level. Interdependence is not merely a mental connection but a physical one. Chaos is understood as the turbulence implicit in these interconnections of living things as they accommodate each other. But quantum mechanics explains the nature of interconnectedness in forming networks.

Overman & Loraine (1996) suggest that if the language and application of complexity resonates with the understanding of the administrative world, then the next important decision is how to use them. One way to apply the new sciences is metaphor (p. 491).

Chaos administration brings new order out of chaos, invest greater confidence in self-organization, and relax the constraints of prediction and control. Quantum administration focuses not only on the tangible organization but also on energy, becoming, intensionality, and constructing reality (Overman & Loraine, 1996, p. 491).

Dennard (1996) explores that for Newton, a state of entropy or chaos signaled a system's decline. It would therefore seem natural that too much conflict might signal the impending death of a social order or organization. New complexity physics reframes the nature of social responsibility for public administrators. Instead of taking responsibility
for the strict maintenance of social equilibrium, administrators might more appropriately assist this creative evolutionary chaos (p. 498).

Newell & Meek (1999) examine that a complex system follows multiple logics. This complex system contains a number of interacting simple systems, but, their interactions are unpredictable (p. 82).

Newell & Meek (1999) add that there are three main issues in the applications of complex systems theory to public administration: the nature of the relationship between systems and human thoughts, the extent of chaos people tolerate, and the differences between human and non-human complex systems (p. 86).

There are dangers as well as potential advantages in the application of complex systems theory to public administration. Newell & Meek (1999) warn their audience that one danger is not known when to stop. On the other hand, human traits of cognition and anticipation can facilitate systematic self-organization, by speeding up the process when participants understand the objectives of the change (pp. 102-103).

Little (1999) explains that the American administrative system reduces complexity by coding in terms of the accountable versus unaccountable or compliant versus noncompliant. Decisions are structurally coupled to the administrative systems. The political system, however, cannot exert direct control over the administrative system, but can only perturb or irritate it (p. 168).

Little (1999) adds that the administrative system reacts to the perturbation by increasing the complexity of its structure of bureaucratic control in an attempt to increase internal accountability. Thus a cycle is created in which the complexity of citizen desires
is simplified into public opinion, which triggers the political system to irritate the administrative system, reducing responsiveness and alienating the citizenry (p. 169).

Kiel (1999) suggests that a review of the evolution of American public administration reveals the challenges of managing public institutions in a complex society. Public administration contends with a complex environment. This drive towards complexity places demands on public administration to develop new perspectives for dealing with new challenges (p. 63).

Newell & Meek (1999) offer that complexity calls for analogy over analysis, and pattern recognition over cause-and-effect predictions. It draws on the strategies of the learning organization, because no one individual possesses wide perspectives to handle such a complex situation. Such perspectives can be developed only through group interaction (p. 90).

Evans (1999) contends that quantum theory frees us from the constraint of the "one right" way mentality that influences administrative life and from the burden that comes from needing to control rather than to evoke process and relationship. As co-creators of the world, our sense of ourselves as fully human will be enhanced and we will see ourselves simultaneously as authors and readers of an unfolding text (pp. 213-214).

Overman & Loraine (1996) allude that the new administrative sciences must learn to focus not only on the tangible but also on energy, becoming, intensionality, and on constructing our reality. The implications of quantum theory lead to reconsidering our contemporary state of consciousness (p. 491).

Wheatley (1999) explains that a quantum event in a new administrative science is the place where energies meet to make something happen. No one event is the basic
element or causation agent. Each event has the capacity to intersect with another and produce different outcomes (pp. 71-72).

Evans (1999) notes that the mechanical model of the world adapted from Descartes and Newton has informed social practice for three centuries, and has done harm through its insistence on control and order. Through quantum theory, science reveals a model for social organization to those who are willing to listen by freeing us from the necessity of following a determined and constraining path in our relationships (pp. 210-211).

Dennard (1996) observes that groups evolve to accommodate diversity and create new forms, ideas, and understandings that will support these changes. Complexity explains this process by recognizing that change does not occur along a planned, incremental line of history. Instead it is the ability of living systems to adapt to the turbulence caused by interrelationship (p. 499).

Dennard (1996) adds that the problems of management are not methodological but rather ontological. Complexity does not offer more information about how to manage better but questions the basic logic of most management philosophy (p. 495).

Kiel (1999) suggests that the work of the early 20th century leaders in public administration reveals efforts to emulate the epistemology of the natural sciences. These efforts were also intended to develop an enterprise dominated by Newtonian sciences overlaid on the simple elements of urban administration (p. 63).

Kiel (1999) observes that as we enter the 21st century, scholars in the field of public administration are struggling to find an intellectual framework that attempts to bring to life a public administration that is dominated by the stale elements of
instrumentalism (p. 64). Evans (1999) explains that views of public administration, arising out of a greater understanding of complexity, argue that traditional control gets in the way of organizational learning. Public administrators ought to change from intending control over work processes to empowering of the bottom-up self-organizing processes (p. 206).

Evans (1996) offers that complexity invites us to visualize a plural society, rich with diversity, whose citizens are bound more by covenant than by contract. This is possible because of the quantum properties of human consciousness. If we wish to actualize this vision, we ought to discard some of our most treasured notions about our reality and ourselves (p. 494).

Overman & Loraine (1996) advise that quantum administration is a world with different foci on energy, becoming, coincidence, constructivism, and new states of awareness. Quantum administration shifts the focus from structural and functional aspects of organization to the spiritual characteristics of organizational life (p. 489). This model, according to Kiel (1999), may serve as a new foundation for public administration that resolves both the problem of instrumentalism and the need for expanding the democratic project (pp. 63-64).

Newell & Meek (1999) state that we are shifting attention from individual components and relationships to the overall pattern or motif created by the system. Public administrators are best served by focusing their attention on complex systems, treating chaos as one possible characteristic and self-organization as one possible property of a complex system (pp. 83-84).
Evans (1996) observes that managing chaos and complexity in government presents a picture of the public agency with which practitioners can readily identify. While its theoretical base derives from some of the more puzzling aspects of the new physics, one can make this material accessible and relevant. The positive aspect of this puzzling uncertainty is that change brings opportunities to learn and improve in highly energized organizations (p. 492).

Kiel (1999) notes that at least two clear challenges arise in the effort to apply the sciences of complexity to public administration. First, the novelty of the sciences has not yet served to produce a universal definition of complexity. Secondly, the scope of the concepts and perspectives that are incorporated in these sciences covers a vast area of research activity (p. 67).

Nevertheless, complexity has a role to play in guiding public administration. According to Newell & Meek (1999), this is because agencies are charged with responsibility for interacting with a complex environment and need to find ways to be more responsive to that environment (p. 98).

Evans (1996) observes that the management of public organizations is a process of liberating the creative energies of individuals and work groups rather than of direction and control (p. 491). Kiel (1999) explains that the role of the public administrator involves more than developing systems that expedite democratic participation. The public administrator has a pedagogical role aimed at transforming citizens from passive economically rational individuals to "cognizant citizens" (p. 70).

Little (1999) suggests that public administration needs the theoretical notions of autonomy, self-organization, and self-governance. The ability of a network of
autonomous systems to maintain itself when confronted with disturbances in a complex environment is vital qualities in an administrative situation (p. 159).

Dennard (1996) notes that for the public administrator, self-organization means that one can justify a faith, with empirical science, in the citizens' ability to co-create goals, plans, and outcomes that can be sustained by them and their communities. Self-organization also means that administrators cannot rely on their expertise alone to address social conditions but ought to participate with citizens in their own governance. Public administrators ought to support democracy as it occurs rather than planning for it (p. 496).

Dennard (1996) adds public administrators are constrained by bureaucratic structure. However, in an interconnected and turbulent environment, small actions are as powerful as cumulative ones (p. 496). According to Evans (1996), the best strategy for the public manager is one that does not set bounds but instead expects instability that does not monitor productivity but tolerates variation (p. 491).

Newell & Meek (1999) suggest that self-organizing control occurs when political interactions and dialogues between members of a group produce coherent behavior, despite the absence of formal hierarchy imposed from outside it. Managers can affect the context within which networks operate (p. 89).

Little (1999) observes that in the American system of governance, the relative fragmentation of the political system has allowed the administrative system to further splinter into a number of relatively autonomous administrative systems that are structurally coupled to the political system, but are not subsystems of the political system. This relative autonomy is suggested by the “binary coding of politics versus
administration.” This led to a governance system which includes both the political and relatively autonomous administrative subsystems (p. 168).

Evans (1996) offers that in a self-organizing system, change and adaptation arise out of fluctuations that can come from either internal or external sources. One source of creative disorder is work force diversity. One external source of fluctuation is enhancing citizen participation and bringing citizens into the process. Empowered and involved citizens not only fulfill the intention of democracy, but they also provide practical insights into the kinds of service an agency provides (p. 491).

In addition to internal patterns of adaptation, Newell & Meek (1999) explain that public administration scholars have identified external patterns of government adaptation. External relationships, such as "contracting out" governmental services to private agencies, have evolved to the extent where government management and citizen interface have been altered. The result is a "hollow state" which requires new legitimacy and control and accountability of governance. As these third party administrative relationships build, the notion of networks has been offered to assist administrative theory (p. 98).

Since public administrators are both citizens and participants in government's environment, they have the potential to function as either internal or external observers. This can lead to confusion if they do not make others aware of their perspective as observers (Little, 1999, p. 170). This new archetype for an effective public administrator in a chaotic world is not the one-dimensional rational administrator. Instead it is engaged and multidimensional administrator (Dennard, 1996, p. 499).
Overman & Loraine (1996) notes that the modern administrator knows chaos best from first-hand experience. Chaos is too much happening too quickly all at once, and seemingly out of control and incomprehensible. Chaos is when everything seems on the verge of collapse today, yet somehow emerges tomorrow or next month in a new form with new structures and new relationships (p. 487).

Overman & Loraine (1994) advise that chaos theory suggests that researchers and managers should seek to understand the apparently chaotic conditions of their organizations rather than requiring more information and means of controlling them. When managers recognize chaos as a source of change, then new information can contribute and speed the continuing evolution of organizational systems (p. 196).

Overman & Loraine (1996) add that understanding chaos theory means adopting a new perspective, and part of any new perspective is a new language. Part of understanding chaos theory is using the new language to explain everyday organizational and policy phenomena (p. 488).

Morcol (1999) advises that public administration need to use action research and experimental praxis and establish dialogical communities to achieve practical discourse and communal judgment. Public administrators ought to use methodologies that recognize participatory role, such as mediation, intuitive knowledge, and transformational leadership (p. 31).

Kiel (1999) observes that these emerging models include two distinct approaches. One approach involves applications of several elements of critique as it applies to public administration. A second approach represents efforts to reinvigorate the principles of direct and participatory democracy through the agencies of public administration (p. 66).
Kiel (1999) adds that what distinguishes applications of the sciences of complexity from the competing paradigms in public administration is that these sciences are founded on knowledge derived from the natural sciences. Rather than rejecting complexity, the complexity sciences bring forward emerging views of the world (p. 66).

**Organizational Myth and the Garbage Can Model**

Meyer & Rowan (1977) observe that traditional conceptualizations of an organizational environment focus on the organization's task or technical environment. Because Western culture places a high value on rationality, participants in ambiguous organizational environments find themselves in the position of having to make sense of a world that is not sensible (p. 346).

Meyer & Rowan (1977) note that myths about formal organizational structure have two key points. The first point is that formal organizational structure is rationalized and has impersonal prescriptions. The other point is that organizational structure is highly institutionalized and do not consider individual participation (pp. 349-354).

The Garbage Can Model (GCM) has been influential in dealing with organizational myth. The GCM implies that random outcomes should be expected, because the connections between decisions and outcomes are determined by temporal factors rather than by causal connections between decisions and outcomes.

Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972) propose the garbage can model to elucidate processes of decision-making that is defined by three characteristics: problematic preferences, uncertainty, and fluid participation. Problematic preferences refer to ambiguity regarding problems and goals. Uncertainty refers to organizational members
do not fully understand the workings of their organization. And, fluid participation means that different actors are involved in different decisions (pp. 345-348).

In contrast to rational choice theory, in which solutions are chosen for their efficient resolution of preexisting problems, garbage can theory sees problems as independent. Cohen, March & Olsen (1972) observe that solutions may exist prior to any problem, and advocates of particular solutions will seek to attach them to any problem and choice opportunity that promises to serve as a vehicle for the policy's adoption. The linking of problems and solutions is determined more by temporal sorting than by rational fitting of solutions to problems (pp. 18-22).

The GCM suggests that organizations tend to produce many solutions which are discarded due to a lack of appropriate problems. However problems may eventually arise for which a search of the garbage might yield fitting solutions. The mix of garbage depends on the mix of labeled cans available, on what garbage is currently produced and the speed with which garbage and garbage cans are removed (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972, p. 12).

Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972) explain that problems require attention. Problems are the result of performance gaps or the inability to predict the future. Thus, problems may originate inside or outside the organization. The organization man goes through the garbage and looks for a suitable fix called a solution (p. 11).

Two aspects of organizational structure are elaborated in the garbage can model. The first is the decision structure. The second is the access structure or the mapping of problems onto choices. According to this model, decision processes within organizations do not operate according to rational choice models. Problems, solutions, participants, and
choice opportunities flow into the organization at different rates and connect according to a temporal rather than a causal logic (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972, p. 16).

Solutions, however, have a life on their own. They are distinct from problems. Solutions are answers looking for a question. Participants may have ideas for solutions. Significant solutions have to be prepared without knowledge of the problems they might have to solve (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972, p. 11).

Choice opportunities are occasions when organizations are expected to produce behavior that can be called a decision. Just like politicians cherish ‘photo opportunities,’ the organization man needs occasional ‘decision opportunities’ for reasons unrelated to the decision itself. Participants come and go. Cohen, March & Olsen (1972) state that participation varies between problems and solutions. Participation may vary depending on the other time demands of participants. Participants may have favorite problems or favorite solutions which they carry around with them (p. 13).
CHAPTER IV

THEORETICAL BASE AND ANALYTICAL MODEL

Theoretical Base

There are four sections that compose the theoretical base of this research. These sections are the following:

1. The Section on Linear Perspectives explains the policy toward Iraq according to the Newtonian science. It emphasizes rationality, cause and effect, linear progression, and analyzing the whole by breaking it into parts and studying each part separately.

2. The Section on Complexity explains the policy according to the new sciences of complexity. It emphasizes interconnectedness, relationships, mutual causality, change through chaos and collapse dynamics, and understanding the whole as an inter-related loop matrix of interactions.

3. The Section on Metaphorical Perspective explains the use of language as a cognitive container expressed through metaphors to translate abstract concepts into meanings and lived experiences.

4. The Section on a Phi-Model for the Purpose of Data Analysis designs an analytical model based on the combination of the three previous sections.

The Section on Linear Perspectives

We speak in linear order. In a sentence, we say some words earlier and others later. Since speaking is correlated with time and time is metaphorically conceptualized in
terms of space, it is natural for us to conceptualize language metaphorically in terms of space. Lakoff & Johnson (20030 offer that our writing system reinforces this conceptualization. Writing a sentence down allows us to conceptualize it even more readily as a spatial object with words in a linear order.

The universe, according to this thinking is observed as a linear progression. Time and motion are reversible, and phenomena are reducible to parts. The whole is observed by breaking it into parts and then each part is examined separately in fixed time and space with focus on design, control, cause and effect and prediction. Jorgensen (1989) observes that the emphasis is on object and objectivity, breaking up, or disassembling of data into pieces, parts, elements, or objects. With data broken down into manageable pieces, then they are sorted in order to search for types, sequences, patterns or wholes within them. The aim of this process is to reconstruct the data in a meaningful way.

The understanding of a phenomenon within a linear, objective perspective is devoid of the human experience. Researchers are obligated to remove their own personal experiences from their inquiry and adapt a “one size fits all” method of analysis in their inquiry and observations.

Linear analysis and the understanding of the whole through its parts is a Newtonian concept. This concept emphasizes objective reality, rationalism, critical mass, force, gravity, inertia, forms, linear time and motion, order, closed-system, reason, and the mechanism of cause and effect in observing natural and social phenomenon. Linear, objective observation is a uniform and non-subjective procedure that if applied to various studies, different observers will reach the same results. Instrumentalism as such is the norm.
Objectivism has dominated Western culture, and in particular Western philosophy, from the Pre-Socratic to the present day. Lakoff & Johnson (2003) explain that objectivism has flourished in both the rationalist and empiricist traditions, which differ only in how they perceive absolute truths. For the rationalists, only the innate capacity to reason can lead to knowledge of things. For the empiricists, the knowledge of the world arises from the sense perceptions.

Lakoff & Johnson (2003) note that the rise of empirical science as a model for truth became dominant in Western thought. Hobbes, for example, found absurdity in the use of metaphors and other rhetorical figures, instead of words proper. Locke viewed metaphors and rhetoric as enemy of truth. In Western culture, objectivism is governs the realms of science, law, politics, journalism, morality, business, economics, and education (pp. 189-195).

Lakoff & Johnson (2003) explain that there is, however, no objective or absolute truth. Truth depends on categorization. A statement can be true only relative to some understanding of it. Understanding always involves human categorization, which is a function of interactional properties and of dimensions that emerge from experiences (pp. 165-185).

Lakoff & Johnson (2003) add that the meaning of a sentence is given in terms of a conceptual structure. Most of the conceptual structure of a natural language, however, is metaphorical in nature. Truth is absolute or objective but is based on understanding. Thus, sentences do not have inherent, objectively given meanings, and communication cannot be merely the transmission of such meanings (pp. 196-197).
Morcol (1999) explains that the ontological implications of the complementarity aspects of reality are too important to be confined to the subatomic world. In our everyday world the particle aspect of reality dominates its wave aspect, but the latter is still there, although it may be insignificant. This suggests that conceptual dichotomies are epistemological illusions and that multiple interpretations of reality can coexist (p. 11).

Nevertheless, in order to show a contrast between linearism and nonlinear perspectives, we need to present both perspectives in order for us to contrast and compare between the two varying perspectives. As such, this section on linear perspective is designed as a theoretical base to start the analysis as a linear interpretation.

**Instrumental Reliability**

An important notion in linear analysis is that of instrumental reliability. The importance of such notion is to assure objectivity and that every researcher can duplicate the process and come up with similar findings.

Reliability in a linear analysis is to be established by collecting data from various sources. O’Sullivan & Rassel (1999) suggest that these measures are designed to assure data collection, assigning definitions, and analyzing data linearly need to be systematic. The terms then ought to be defined precisely, ambiguous items or terms to be eliminated, information is made to be accessible to participants, and directions need to be clear and easy to follow (p. 37).

Weber (1990) explains that reliability problems in a linear analysis often grow out of the ambiguity of word meanings, category definitions, or other coding rules. Classification by computer, however, may lead to better code reliability. Once correctly defined for the computer, the coding rules then need to be applied in the same way. The
validity of concepts based on their classification is assured to the extent that it measures the construct it intended to measure (p. 15).

Weber (1990) adds that three specific types of reliability are assured during the process of linear analysis: stability, reproducibility, and accuracy. Stability refers to the extent to which concept classification is invariant over time. Inconsistencies in coding will constitute unreliability. Reproducibility refers to the extent to which concept classification produces the same results when the same data is coded by more than one coder. Accuracy refers to the extent to which the classification of data corresponds to a standard (p. 17).

Concepts and Conceptual Definitions

Lakoff & Johnson (2003) observe that another important notion in a linear analysis is that of concepts and conceptual definitions. Concepts are abstract representations of ideas. Concepts are identified before data is collected. Any adequate theory of the human conceptual system are given an account of how concepts are grounded, structured, related to each other, and defined (p. 106).

Lakoff & Johnson (2003) note that humans categorize objects, not in set-theoretical terms, but in terms of prototypes and family resemblance. They categorize things in terms of prototypes. A prototypical desk, for example, has a well-defined surface, four legs, and often one or a few storage compartments (p. 122).

A definition is not a matter of giving some fixed set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of a concept. Instead, concepts need to be defined by prototypes and by how they relate to these prototypes. Rather than being rigidly defined, concepts arising from our experiences are open-ended. These definitions are indications
of what are meant by the concepts. The appropriateness of each conceptual definition
depends on the purpose of the study.

Data Classification

Charmaz, (1983) explains that an important notion in a linear analysis is that of
data classification. Data may appear to be a mass of confusing and unrelated accounts.
Studying and sorting out the data help in composing a systematic order to be created (p.
114). Seidel (1998) observes that the goal is to make sense out of each collection, looking
for patterns and relationships both within a collection, and also across collections, and to
make general discoveries about the unit of analysis (p. E5).

Weber (1990) offers that the primary task during the process of data classification
is to look for concepts and themes within the data, and to identify these concepts and
themes. Each concept consists of one, several, or many words. The words and phrases
that are classified in the same concept will have similar meanings. This similarity needs
to be based on words sharing similar connotations. Data classification are based on
identifying the concepts’ names, the concepts’ definitions and the assignment of specific
words, sentences, and paragraphs to a concept (pp. 24-25).

Agar (1991) suggests that a computer-aided software, such as Ethnograph, can be
used in order to aid with the coding process. The emerging themes serve as the literal
metaphor of the data. Ethnograph is primarily oriented toward segmenting and sorting
data, breaking down wholes into parts, and focusing attention on the collections of parts,
at the expense of the wholes from which they came. Consequently, it may bias the
analysis toward segmenting and sorting, and away from intensive analysis of small bits of data, and away from viewing the parts in context (p. 193).

Wiseman (1979) advises that breaking down data into its constituent parts, however, is misleading. Therefore, a process of going back and forth between the parts and the whole of the data is utilized in order to observe the data in its entirety (p. 278). Seidel (1998) notes that by doing so, it is possible to compare and contrast between themes and discover similarities and differences, build typologies (landscape maps), or find patterns (p. E6).

Weber (1990) explains that certain problems arise when classifying data. These problems stem from the ambiguity of both the concept definitions and the words assigned to these concepts. The construction of valid and useful concept categories depends on the interaction between language and the classification scheme. Words, sentences, and phrases in the concepts are classified where they most clearly belong. Words and phrases with sufficient ambiguity are dropped from the concept (pp. 25-36).

The Section on Complexity

Wheatley (1999) offers that the world is the world of relationships, processes, intermediate states, and change. No event or a phenomenon can be drawn independent from the other or understood by breaking them into parts. What is important in any diagram is the overall process by which elements meet and change (p. 30).

Evans (1999) suggests that we are no longer constrained by a single ontological model dependent on correspondence as the meaning we attribute to an event. Without necessarily accepting linear reasoning and perspectives as the only model for ontology,
we may in essence introduce the Aristotelian notion of final causes—volitional acts of consciousness in meaning to change our ontological and epistemological thinking toward the complex (p. 202).

Evans (1999) adds that these kinds of perspectives help us shift our thinking toward the multiple and the complex. Five indicators may suggest such a shift is taking place. A Shift from the part to the whole, from structure to process, from objective to epistemic science, from building blocks to networks, and from truth to approximate descriptions (pp. 202-203).

This section provides the research with the theoretical base to build an analytical model that utilizes the new sciences of complexity and their dimensions to interpret the collected data on the U.S. policy toward Iraq. These sciences differ from the Newtonian science in the sense that they observe the world as irreversible, non-linear, interconnected, and evolving.

Morcol (1999) explains that the new sciences of complexity are the arena for emerging perspective. Although these perspectives take into account the observer’s experiences, the primary focus is on simple systems demonstrating complex behavior (pp. 6-8).

This research derives four distinct dimensions from the new sciences of complexity and designates them as guides in leading the analysis toward the multiple and the complex. These four dimensions are the following

**Autopoiesis**

This term means self-production. Little (1999) observes that the central idea of autopoiesis is that a dynamic (living) system is one that is organized in such a way that
all its components and processes jointly produce those self-same components and processes, thus establishing an autonomous, self-producing entity. Autopoietic systems are self-organizing in that they produce and change their own structures as well as their own components (p. 155).

Morgan (1986) suggests that the theory of autopoiesis encourages us to understand the evolution of living systems as the result of internally generated changes. Autopoiesis places emphasis on the way the entire system of interactions shapes its future. It is the pattern, or whole, that evolves (p. 240).

Morgan (1986) adds that one of the strengths of the theory of autopoiesis is that it shows us that while the preservation of an identity is fundamental for all living systems, there are different ways in which closure in relation to the environment can be achieved. When we recognize that the environment is not an independent domain, and that we don’t necessarily have to compete or struggle against the environment, a completely new relationship becomes possible (p. 245).

Although autopoiesis is an internal process of change within a system, it does, however, pay attention to the environment since living systems do not live independently and are impacted by changes in the environment. Observing a system from the standpoint of autopoiesis enables us to understand the internal dynamics of self-organization that are triggered by the environmental changes.

**Bifurcation**

This term means a phase shift in the order of a dynamic system. Brem (1999) explains that as the self-organizing order emergent out of the interaction of elements within a system becomes complex in response to changing context, the system becomes
unstable and the order starts to collapse. Such collapse allows for the emergence of new systemically self-organized order more appropriate to the current context and is a normal phenomenon (p. 133). In Table One, I illustrate the four main phases of a system behavior that exhibit transformation through bifurcation from equilibrium to chaos and later to the emergence of a new order and equilibrium.

When a system is at equilibrium, its structure is relatively stable and its property is interconnected while containing the seeds of change. Environmental changes then sets off a series of internal changes and reorganization that will lead to a period of oscillation and disorder. From the chaotic disorder, a new structure will emerge without precedence that will bring the system back to equilibrium. This is the essence of bifurcation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Phase State</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>Initial state</td>
<td>The System's internal structure (its point attractor) is stable and at equilibrium.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>Oscillation state</td>
<td>The system's internal structure will witness an internal destabilization. The structural components will revolve back and forth between boundaries, toward a cyclical path, rather than being fixed in one place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>Chaotic state</td>
<td>The system's internal structure will go through a restructuring and self-organization process (strange attractor).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four</td>
<td>Emergence</td>
<td>A new order will emerge out of chaos and without retracting previous mapping and without precedence, reaching a new equilibrium.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Dynamic System Behavior
Bifurcation intends to interpret the system’s geometry of behavior and the acceleration of irreversible evolution over time. It constructs metaphorically the growth of uncertainty as a translation of chaotic behavior. And it does so by describing the information about the system over time when compared with the initial state of equilibrium.

Brown (1996a) notes that in a system increasing in entropy, the number of possible states that evolve from some initial distribution over time increase. Movement of the system away from equilibrium, associated with some internal irreversible processes, increase the rate of dissipation. Instability, triggered by nonequilibrium environmental conditions, lead to further dissipation and entropy (pp. 56-57).

De Greene (1996) offers that the probability then increases that the system, with its internal processes, becomes unstable with respect to given fluctuations. This instability enables the system to cross a threshold of an unstable structure, and then it leads it to changes in the system in the threshold by creating interplay among its forces (p. 276).

All systems must collapse in order for their older structures to dissipate and for the new orders to emerge. If collapse, however, is delayed through artificial engineering, the system results in catastrophes.

The S-Matrix

To explain the quantum phenomena, the S-Matrix (Scattering Matrix) theory is used. Morcol (1999) observes that the theory shifts the emphasis from objects to events and from building blocks and elementary particles to a web of interconnectedness. The universe is a dynamic web of interrelated events. None of the properties of any part of
this web is fundamental. All phenomena in the universe are uniquely determined by mutual self-consistency (pp. 21-22).

Morgan (1986) suggests that matrix systems increase the adaptability of the systems in dealing with their environments. The matrix analysis of living systems provide means of breaking down the barriers between specifics and allowing elements from different specifics to fuse their abilities in an interconnected web of association (pp. 58-59).

**Mutual Causality**

According to Daneke (1999), this term represents the relationship between events that impact one another. Lakoff & Johnson (2003) advise that the concept of causation is based on the prototype of direct manipulation, which emerges directly from our experience. Causation is a basic human concept. It is best understood as an experiential gestalt (pp. 69-75).

Morgan (1986) suggests that mutual causality translates the changes in the system shaped by the processes of positive and negative feedback, rather than a single or collective of spatial and temporal causes. Feedback is when one element of experience in a system influences the next. Feedback can be positive or negative. Together, these feedback mechanisms can explain why systems gain or preserve a given form, and how this can be elaborated and transformed over time (p. 46).

Morgan (1986) adds that positive feedback is when accounting for a system’s change, we will observe that more changes in the system’s environment will lead to more changes in the system internally, and fewer changes in the system’s environment will
lead to fewer changes in the system internally, and visa versa. Negative feedback, on the other hand is when a change in a variable initiates changes in the opposite direction, with more changes in the environment leading to less changes inside the system and less changes in the environment leading to more changes inside the system, and visa versa (pp. 247-248).

There is, as such, a mutual causation in the relationship between the environment and the system. This relationship is best understood as being in a state of interaction and mutual dependence with one impacting the other.

Morgan (1986) offers that one of the features of complex systems of mutual causality is that any given set of starting conditions lead to different end points. Random kicks combine with the systemic relations transform the system in unpredictable ways. Systems frequently move from kick to kick, from one pattern of transformation being kicked into another. The transformation stemming from this kick settles into a new pattern of relations that is eventually kicked by another incident or pattern of chance connections (p. 254).

The Section on Metaphorical Perspective

People frequently use metaphors in daily life to ease communication. Lakoff & Johnson (2003) explain that researchers are increasingly employing metaphors to represent cultures. Metaphor is a natural phenomenon and a natural part of human thought and language. Which metaphor we use depends on our interactions and practices (pp. 244-247).
Goodman (1968) suggests that metaphor comes in many varieties, most of them listed in the prodigious if chaotic standard catalogue of figures of speech. Among metaphors some involve transfer of a schema between disjoint realms. But not for all metaphors are the two realms disjoint. Sometimes one realm intersects or is an expansion or a contraction of the other (p. 81).

Goodman (1968) adds that metaphorical force requires a combination of novelty with fitness, of the odd with the obvious. The good metaphor satisfies while it startles. Metaphor is most potent when the transferred schema effects a new and notable organization rather than a mere relabeling of an old one (pp. 79-80).

Metaphors are conceptual in nature. Although metaphors always involve transfer in the sense that some labels of the schema are given new extensions, the realm itself may remain constant under the transfer (Goodman, 1968, p. 83).

Lakoff & Johnson (2003) explain that metaphors play a central role in the construction of social and political reality. How we think metaphorically matters. “Because concepts are metaphorically structured in a systematic way, it is possible for us to use expressions from one domain to talk about corresponding concepts in the metaphorically defined domain” (p. 52).

Pearce (1996) offers that some people criticize the use of metaphor as too simple. However, the risk is not in simplification but rather in oversimplification to the point of distortion or inaccuracy. Metaphor can either be developed in conjunction with people within the culture who will be affected by the change, or evaluated as a result of input from the participants (p. 26).
Morgan (1986) observes that one of the strengths of metaphor rests in the fact that it refers to the symbolic significance of rational aspects of a system. A second strength of metaphor stems from providing a new focus for the creation of organized action (p. 135).

Matravers (1998) notes that an important role of metaphor in communication is to cause a belief the content of which is not captured by the metaphor itself, but rather by a statement of similarity. If metaphors do relate things through resemblance, it should be possible to specify the respect in which the things resemble each other simply by specifying the common property (pp. 108-109).

Davidson (1979) suggests that what metaphor adds to the ordinary is an achievement that uses no semantic resources beyond the resources on which the ordinary depends. A metaphor implies a kind and degree of artistic success (p. 29).

Morgan (1986) explains that a particular strength of metaphor is the contribution that it makes to the understanding of change (p. 137). Lakoff & Johnson (2003) offer that the heart of metaphor is inference. It allows inferences in sensory-motor domains, such as domains of space and objects, to be used to draw inferences about other domains. Because we reason in terms of metaphor, the metaphors we use determine about how we live (p. 244).

A statement is metaphorically true when others equally do not hold. Morcol (1999) explains that the changes in one's cognitive structure fall along from literal, to comparative-metaphorical, and to interactive-metaphorical. Literal language requires assimilation to existing frameworks of understanding. Comparative metaphor requires simple extensions of the framework. Interactive metaphor facilitates an extensive change in the rules of understanding (p. 48).
Morcol (1999) states that “the interactive-metaphorical learning, which is the most radical change in our cognitive framework, represents a major shift in the ontological metaphors and epistemological assumptions.” This shift is from the Newtonian deterministic knowledge to the indeterministic knowledge (p. 49). Elliott & Kiel (1996) note that the obvious metaphorical value of applying theories of chaos and complexity to the social realm serves as an impetus for the emergence of the application of these theories to social phenomena (pp. 2-3).

Lakoff & Johnson (2003) emphasize that metaphor is not just a matter of language and mere words. Metaphor is in our very concept of an argument. We act according to the way we conceive of things. The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another (pp. 5-6).

Garth Morgan (1986) developed several metaphors to describe organizations. His metaphors provide examples of organizational forms. Morgan’s metaphorical models are useful illustration of metaphorical interpretation of the organizational systems both linearly and in accordance with the new sciences of complexity. The following are two of Morgan’s metaphorical models, the machine metaphor and the flux metaphor, that are of interest to this research:

The Machine Metaphor

We live in a technological society dominated by the needs of machine and mechanical modes of thought. Aristotle used mechanistic principles to understand the movement of animals. Archimedes, Galileo, and others used machines to make important contributions to mathematics and physics. This mechanistic view influenced scientific though right into the twentieth century and received its fullest expression in the

Morgan (1986) states that by examining a system through the lens of the machine metaphor, we can observe if they were mildly or overly bureaucratized and if they had manifested increasingly bureaucratic behavior as a concern for control (p. 325). Under the influence of the machine metaphor, organization theory looks into a form of engineering that is preoccupied with relations between goals, structures, and efficiency (Morgan, 1986, p. 40).

The strengths of the machine as a metaphor rely in its explanation of straightforwardness of tasks, such as decision-making and progression of events. It also can explain the environment of the system when such an environment is stable. However, mechanistic explanation of the linear analysis will have limitations. These limitations occur when the interpretation becomes difficult because of its inability to capture the system’s web of associations and function other than in line.

The Flux Metaphor

Around the year 500 B.C., the Greek Philosopher Heraclitus noted that one could not step into the same river twice, for other waters are continually flowing on. He was one of the first western philosophers to address the idea that the universe is in constant state of flux embodying characteristics of both permanence and change (Morgan, 1986, p. 233).

Like Heraclitus, Bohm (1952) views process, flux, and change as fundamental, arguing that the state of the universe at any point in time reflects a more basic reality. He
calls this reality the implicit order, and distinguishes it from the explicit order manifested in the world around us.

Bohm (1952) uses the term holomovement or holoflux to express the undivided and flowing nature of this order, which provides the generative source of explicate forms. According to Morgan (1986), these forms, like Heraclitus river, have the appearance of stability while being underpinned by flux and change. He believes that the world unfolds and enfolds from moment to moment as a kind of pulsating wholeness. Each moment of existence has similarities with, yet differs from, its predecessors, creating the appearance of continuity in the midst of change (p. 234).

Morgan (1986) adds that from the perspective of the flux and transformation metaphor we can acquire interesting insights on the logic of change shaping a system and its environment. We are able to appreciate the autopoietic loop linking a system's self-image to its understanding and enactment of its environment, or to use ideas about mutual causality or the dialectical nature of change to understand the dynamics shaping the system and its industry (p. 327).

Morgan (1986) observes that the strength of the flux metaphor is that it forces us to understand the world in a constant state of flux. The limitations of the flux metaphor lie in the notion that the metaphor could be too far idealistic, and the understanding of logic of change may have to depend on our hindsight (pp. 267-272).

The Section on a Phi-Model

Harvey & Reed (1996) note that models, as opposed to theories, are well-formed metaphors and analogies. Models are used to study chaotic phenomena. They do not
express the truth of the world, but provide heuristic insights. While theories claim to explain reality, models are partial constructions that speak a language of "as if," not "what is" (p. 309).

The analytical model in this research is a structuralist model in order to grasp the theoretical basis of the research and conduct the analysis of data by using axiomatic methods. This structuralist model guides the analysis beyond assumptions in order to grasp the essence within the data, employing an ontology that will echo Plato's vision of the world as being structured by a concatenation of geometric forms. The goal of the model is to capture the reliable and theoretically articulated knowledge derived from analyzing the data.

The model has a main linguistic format for the purpose of analytical expression. Within this format, there are two functional units to guide the specific steps of analysis, one unit to guide the linear analysis and the other to guide the complex analysis.

The main linguistic format is known as the metaphorical form and it is based on the theoretical explanation presented in the section on metaphorical perspectives. The functional unit specific to linear analysis is known as the linear form and it is based on the theoretical explanation presented in the section on linear perspective. The functional unit specific to complex analysis is known as the complex form and it is based on the theoretical explanation presented in the section on complexity.

Together, these units and their host linguistic format compose and construct the research’s Phi-Model for the purpose of analyzing collected data on the U.S. policy toward Iraq. In Figure One (page 120), I illustrate the graphic presentation of this model.
After collecting the data, the Phi Model guides the three steps of data analysis within a metaphorical presentation. Step one is comprised of interpreting the data according to the linear tradition and by using a machine metaphorical presentation in breaking the whole into parts and then analyzing each part separately.

Step two is consisting of interpreting the data according to four specific dimensions derived from complexity theories (autopoiesis, bifurcation, the S-Matrix, and mutual causality) and by using a flux metaphorical presentation. Emphasis is on observing internal changes in the U.S. policy toward Iraq as impacted by environmental changes. And, step three is comprised of complex analysis and flux metaphorical presentation the same as the procedure in step two but emphasis will be on the policy's external changes. In Table Two (page 121), I illustrate these three steps.
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Step One</th>
<th>Step Two</th>
<th>Step Three</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Unit of Analysis</td>
<td>The U.S. policy toward Iraq.</td>
<td>The U.S. policy toward Iraq</td>
<td>The U.S. policy toward Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical Base</td>
<td>The Section on Linear perspective</td>
<td>The Section on Complexity</td>
<td>The Section on Complexity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metaphorical Format</td>
<td>The Machine Metaphor</td>
<td>The Flux Metaphor</td>
<td>The Flux Metaphor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristic</td>
<td>Linear</td>
<td>Comparative</td>
<td>Interactive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>Interpreting data according to concepts, themes and emerging super themes.</td>
<td>Analyzing internal changes in the policy toward Iraq.</td>
<td>Analyzing external changes in the policy toward Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patterns/ Indicators of Observation</td>
<td>Events along the linear progression</td>
<td>Patterns involving the internal mechanism of change and self-organization</td>
<td>Patterns with the environment that impact internal changes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analytic Guide</td>
<td>Computer software, such as Ethnograph to code the data.</td>
<td>Four dimensions derived from the complexity theories: 1. Autopoiesis. 2. Bifurcation. 3. S-Matrix. 4. Mutual Causation</td>
<td>Four dimensions derived from the complexity theories: 1. Autopoiesis. 2. Bifurcation. 3. S-Matrix. 4. Mutual Causation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graphic Representation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. The Three Analytical Steps of the Phi-Model

The Phi-Model’s Three Analytical Steps

**Step One**

The first step is to analyze the data according to the linear tradition. During this step, collected data on the policy toward Iraq are analyzed and a machine metaphorical model is used to present the analysis.

The linear analysis emphasizes breaking down data into its parts and then studying each part separately. Breaking down data into its constituent parts, however, can be distorted and misleading. Therefore, a process of going back and forth between the parts and the whole of the data is utilized in order to observe the data in its entirety. By doing so, it is possible to compare and contrast between themes and discover similarities, differences and find patterns.
The primary task during this step is to look for concepts and themes within the data, and to identify these concepts and themes. Each concept consists of one, several, or many words. The words and phrases that are classified in the same concept have similar meanings. This similarity is based on words sharing similar connotations. A computer-aided software, such as Ethnograph, is used in order to aid with the coding process.

By observing the U.S. policy toward Iraq through the lens of the machine metaphor, we are able to witness the line of progression within the policy and its linear movement from one phase to another. We can, for example, observe the policy moving from the state of reactive measure toward Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, to a state of proactive measure in 1998 when the policy adopted the doctrine of regime change in Iraq through the funding of Iraqi opposition. Then, when we can observe it moving toward a proactive preemptive measure when it actively sought to implement the regime change in Iraq through direct military involvement in 2003.

**Step Two**

The second step is to analyze the data based on the new sciences of complexity. Super themes (Interpretive Levels) that emerge during step one are used to observe the internal changes in the policy toward Iraq according to the complexity theories. The analysis is presented according to a flux metaphorical model.

Step two is designed to observe the policy toward Iraq as a dynamic system that experienced internal processes of phase change. These changes are occurring as the policy is evolving, self-organizing, experiencing chaotic behavior and emerging with new order that is better equipped to deal with its environment. This step traces the behavior of
the Interpretive Levels as measures of internal changes in the policy according to four specific dimensions derived from the complexity theories. These dimensions are autopoiesis, bifurcation, S-Matrix, and mutual causality.

**Autopoiesis**

The dimension of autopoiesis explains internal changes within the unit of analysis based on the concept of autopoiesis in complexity theories. The Interpretive Levels that emerge from step one of the analysis are observed according to autopoiesis in order to determine changes in their behavior as indicator of internal change in the policy toward Iraq.

**Bifurcation**

The dimension of bifurcation explains internal changes within the unit of analysis based on the concept of bifurcation in complexity theories. The Interpretive Levels that emerge in step one of the analysis are observed according to bifurcation in order to determine changes in their behavior as indicator of internal change in the policy. By observing the system according to the bifurcation dimension, we are able to witness whether the U.S. policy toward Iraq is experiencing any type of collapse dynamics, is the collapse delayed, and what are the catastrophic consequences.

**The S-Matrix**

The dimension of the S-Matrix explains internal changes within the U.S. policy toward Iraq based on the concept of the S-Matrix in complexity theories. The Interpretive Levels that emerge in step one of the analysis determine according to the S-Matrix how
changes in the behavior of these indicators reflect internal changes in the policy as a function of interconnectedness.

Mutual Causality

The dimension of mutual causality explains internal changes within the U.S. policy toward Iraq based on the concept of mutual causality in complexity theories. The Interpretive Levels that emerge in step one of the analysis are observed according to mutual causality and its concepts of positive and negative feedback to see how these indicators' behavior translate internal changes in the policy.

Step Three

This step follows the same procedure outlined in step two. The only exception is that instead of observing internal changes in the U.S. policy toward Iraq, emphasis is on external changes that trigger the internal changes in the policy.
CHAPTER V

METHODOLOGY

The Research Design

Research is a systematic investigation of a phenomenon (O’Sullivan and Rassel, 1999, p. 24). This study is designed to investigate systematically, within the context of complexity theories, the U.S. policy toward Iraq from the Gulf War of 1990 until the official end of the preemptive war of 2003.

The study uses the method of qualitative inquiry in conducting the research. The rationale for doing so is because qualitative research is descriptive, interpretive, disclosive and explanatory. Marshal & Rossman (1999) offer that qualitative study is used by academic as well as practitioners because it takes place in the natural world, is interactive and humanistic in its methods, and emergent, not pre-figured (p. 2).

Qualitative analysis, according to Seidel (1998), is progressive because it is a cycle that keeps repeating. It is recursive because one part can call the investigator to a previous part. And, it is holographic because each step in the process contains the entire process (p. E2). Such an explanatory study can identify the events, beliefs and attitudes that shape the characteristics of the policy toward Iraq and its progression. As Marshall and Rossman (1999) suggest, qualitative data analysis is an accepted data collection technique for an explanatory study and is useful for interpreting major events and social conflicts (p. 33).
Qualitative research is useful because it allows the investigator to use narratives, such as related events, or describe the process step by step. Qualitative design is flexible, continuous design, builds for themes, enabling the investigator to listen to ideas, concepts, and themes. This study follows Rubin and Rubin (1995) recommendations by conducting research that is:

a) *Transparent*, the reader is able to see the basic process of data collection, and is able to assess the strength, weaknesses, and biases in the research.

b) *Consistent*, the study checks out ideas, even inconsistent ones. The goal is not to eliminate inconsistent ideas but to understand why they occur.

c) *Coherent*, the study offers explanation for apparent contradictions.

d) *Communicable*, the research feels real to its participants and uses the participants’ first hand experience in answering questions (pp. 24-48).

This research is important because of the tradition of qualitative inquiry. It is also important because it is multi-methods in focus, collecting variety of empirical materials, consisting of complex time-consuming data analysis, using long passages, and has specific procedures (Creswell, 1998, pp. 16 & 122).

Qualitative design is useful for this research because it is an in-depth study, using detailed information on fewer cases, using detailed information about the context in which the policy toward Iraq occurred, and allowing flexibility in the types of data to be obtained. Qualitative study produces verbal data that is difficult to convert to numbers, and it is characterized by extensive use of verbal information on the unique feature and environment of the unit of analysis.
Attention is paid to recording information accurately, dividing trivial from important details, drawing appropriate connections, and looking concept and themes in the analysis of qualitative data. The strength of this method is that it is unobtrusive and non-reactive. O’Sullivan & Rassel (1999) explain that the data is analyzed without disturbing the setting in which it was created, the procedure for analysis is clearly delineated, and the information and actual analyses are checked (pp. 36-37). Another strength of the study is that it is using the new sciences of complexity in a qualitative inquiry, which has not been done prior to this research.

The Analytical Model

The specific model designed for this purpose is the Phi Model. The Phi Model is a structuralist model, composed of three specific forms, a metaphorical form, a linear form and a complex form. The metaphorical form is responsible to assign the specific metaphorical containers as an expressive format of analytical expression. These metaphorical containers are the machine metaphor and the flux metaphor.

The Phi model is designed to guide the analysis in three steps. Step one is designed to analyze the data linearly and according to the classical, Newtonian science. Step two is designed to analyze the data according to complexity theories and to explain the internal changes in the policy toward Iraq. And, step three is designed to analyze the data according to complexity theories by observing the impact of environmental changes.

The machine metaphorical model is assigned to express the analysis during step one. The flux metaphorical model is assigned to express the analysis during steps two and three. Super themes (Interpretive Levels) derived from step one are used as indicators to
determine internal changes in the policy toward Iraq during step two and to determine external changes that impacted the policy during step three. Four specific dimensions derived from complexity theories guide the complex analysis during steps two and three and trace the behavior of each indicator. These dimensions are autopoietic, bifurcation, the S-Matrix, and mutual causality.

The rationale for analyzing the data in this fashion is to provide the research with a linear analysis during step one that to be used in contrast with complex analysis of data during steps two and three. Without a linear analysis of data, a comparison of analyses between linear and complex observations is unable to take place.

Step One

Data for analysis during step one is collected through secondary data review, focus group, and one-on-one interview. The rationale for collecting data through document review, focus group and one-on-one interview is to obtain official and non-official data regarding the U.S. policy toward Iraq and construct a linear analysis of the policy that does not reflect only the official explanation.

The linear analysis constitutes the research's first analytical procedure and it follows the Phi Model by breaking the data into parts, such as concepts, themes and super themes, and then interpreting the whole by analyzing the parts. Computer software, such as Ethnograph, assists in the process of coding.

The linear analysis of secondary data, focus group and one-on-one interview is appropriate for this research because it provides the first step in the process of analytical comparison based on official and non-official data. Weber (1990) notes that in order to
make valid inferences from data, the classification procedure is reliable in the sense of being consistent (p. 12).

Once concepts are identified, those with common function compose the emerging themes. Collectively, these themes illustrate the changes in the U.S. policy toward Iraq. From grouping similar themes together, super themes emerge in order to constitute the interpretive levels for the complex analysis in steps two and three.

Four trajectory phases from 1990 to 2004 are specifically examined because of their impact on the policy's overall progression. The first phase is the period that precedes Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, which constitutes U.S. support of the regime of Saddam Hussein. The second phase is the period of the Gulf War of 1990 that symbolizes a shift in the policy from supporting to confronting Saddam. The third phase is the period from 1991 to 2003, which reflects the policy of containing Saddam. And the fourth phase is the period of toppling the regime of Saddam Hussein directly in 2003.

**Step Two**

Super themes that emerge from the linear analysis during step one are used as Interpretive Levels to observe changes in the policy toward Iraq. Four specific dimensions derived from the complexity theories, such as autopoiesis, bifurcation, the S-Matrix, and mutual causality, guide the analysis by tracing changes in the Interpretive Levels' behavior as indication of changes in the policy in a flux metaphorical language.
Step Three

The analysis in step three is the same as the one in step two. The same procedure used in step two is used in step three. The emphasis of the analysis, however, is on observing the environmental changes that impact the U.S. policy toward Iraq.

Data Collection Strategies

This study utilizes a triangulated method of data collection. It uses secondary data, focus group and one-on-one interviews in order to obtain data. As such, the study’s methodology in obtaining and collecting data consists of three main strategies. The first strategy is collecting secondary data from existing data on the policy toward Iraq, such as books, articles and official governmental documents. The second strategy is collecting data on the policy by conducting a focus group. And, the third strategy is collecting data on the policy through one-on-one interviews.

Human Subjects Institutional Review Board (HSIRB)

Since there is a target population made of human subjects to participate in a focus group and the one-on-one interviews, approval from Western Michigan University’s Human Subjects Institutional Review Board (HSIRB) prior to collecting data is obtained. Participants in the focus group and one-on-one interview are informed of the purpose of the study, the risk that might occurred, the voluntary nature of their participation and confidentiality, why they are selected, and what is to be done with the information. Informed consent is then obtained from each participant.
The research is designed to protect its human subjects from physical harms, pain, discomfort, embarrassment, loss of privacy, and abuse. The participants are able to weight benefits and risks and assess voluntary participation. An incentive for participating in the focus group and the one-on-one interviews is to discuss an important public policy issue such as the U.S. policy toward Iraq among professional academic scholars. Please see Appendix A to read this research’s approval by Western Michigan University’s Human Subjects Institutional Review Board.

Secondary Data

This study is collecting its data first from existing literature on the policy toward Iraq. The sources of data vary, such as the National Archive, the White House, the Library of Congress, the Internet, and the library of Western Michigan University.

The types of data are official governmental data on the policy toward Iraq, such as presidential speeches, Congressional Acts, Public Laws, and press releases by various governmental entities, and non-governmental data on the policy toward Iraq, such as articles and books. The limitation of this strategy is that it does not involve live data. Some of the secondary data is in poor shape, not easily accessible, and reflect the bias opinion of their authors. Therefore, supplemental data is needed, such as from focus group and one-on-one interview, in order to balance out the secondary data.

The Focus Group

The rationale for using focus group in data collection is to obtain live data that may differ with the official documents and explanation of the policy toward Iraq.
existence of these official governmental documents may have already influenced the focus group participants. However, there may also exist a possibility for these participants to reflect their own independent perspectives.

The focus group is to some degree low in cost, saves time, and generates speedy results. The focus group is also conducted as a semi-structured discussion by a small group of knowledgeable academic professionals living in Michigan to address the policy toward Iraq and generate synergy and rich discussion about the topic. The hallmark of this process is group interaction led by the investigator as a moderator of the discussion. In addition to guiding the discussion, the investigator records, collects and transcribes the data.

Open-ended questions are used, composed of introduction questions, transitional questions, key questions, and closing questions. Krueger (1994) notes that these questions are clear, based on significant background of information, presented in context, and focused. Please see Appendix B to read the focus group’s questions.

Krueger (1994) explains that the process includes listening for inconsistent comments and probing for understanding, listening for vague and cryptic comments and probing for understanding, taking notes carefully, seeking confirmation, considering words in context and with consistency, intensity and specificity, and looking for big ideas (pp. 145-156). O’Sullivan & Rassel (1999) observe that emphasis is on systematically looking for trends and patterns in participants’ answers (p. 193). Planning for the focus groups involves peer review in order to examine the feasibility of the data collection instruments (the questions). After the completion of the planning, a pilot test is conducted similar to the actual focus group.
The pilot test is designed to assist the researcher to examine forming the groups, moderating the session, testing the recording procedure, examining the adequacy of the time and place of the session and its coordination by examining the questions and their logical flow, preparing the discussion session, recording the session, and conducting the interviews. Attention is paid to the feasibility of the plan, how much time and efforts are needed to collect, compile, and transcribe the data, and the appropriateness of the plan.

Focus Group Sampling

Purposive sampling of professionals working in academic fields in Michigan is used to form the focus group. The participants are individuals who hold graduate degrees in various disciplines and have some knowledge of the policy toward Iraq.

O'Sullivan & Rassel (1999) advise that purposive sampling in qualitative studies is a form of non-probability sampling. Non-probability sampling is subjective and its usefulness depends on the purpose of the study and the criteria for selection. In non-probability sampling, it is not important to obtain accurate estimate of population characteristics. The adequacy of the non-probability sample is evaluated through subjective means, not by mathematical evaluation, especially when the study is not intended to apply statistical theory to estimate the accuracy of the sample (pp. 145-148).

The process of purposive sampling begins by examining the electronically published lists of professors teaching or who have taught in departments such as political science, public administration, history, sociology, and philosophy at ten institutions of higher-learning in Michigan. A search engine, such as Google or InfoTrac is utilized to access the electronically published websites of these institutions, and through these
websites to access the electronically published lists of the faculty within the various schools and departments.

The rationale for choosing professors from these disciplines is because of the diversity and depth in perspective that an academic scholar in such disciplines can offer the focus group discussion while observing the policy toward Iraq. Limiting the sample to professors within only one or two disciplines, such as in political science or public administration, renders their perspectives narrow and restrained. However, by enlarging the sampling list to include professors from various disciplines such as in philosophy, history, sociology, political science and public administration is able to create a larger pool of wider and more diverse opinions.

From the electronically published lists of various university departments, an approximately 100 prospective candidates are selected by purposively choosing professors or associate professors who are specialized in Middle Eastern history, religion, sociology, and politics, or in American government, policy, political theory, public administration, ethics or international political systems. Special attention is devoted to individuals with publications in these fields.

Once the names and addresses of these 100 individuals are gathered, invitation letters to participate in the focus group along with self-addressed/ stamped envelopes are mailed to each prospective candidate. A one-page survey questionnaire is included with each invitation letter to serve as a screening tool in the selection of the final candidates. The invitation letters explain the topic and the purpose of the focus group, and its duration and contact persons.
From those who respond favorably to participating in the focus group and answer yes to the question of whether they are familiar with the U.S. policy toward Iraq on the questionnaire list, 10-12 candidates are selected as finalists. Once selected, the participants are informed of the place suggested for the focus group session, such as in a private function room in a restaurant of choice that is located in a midpoint for all candidates.

A letter of acknowledgment is mailed to each candidate. Along with the letter, a one-page survey questionnaire is attached in a self-addressed/stamped envelope in order for the participant to respond with the best available time to participate in the focus group.

Once the candidates answer the survey questions and return them with their time of availability and preference for a place of gathering, a date and place is selected that is agreeable to all prospective participants. Then, a confirmation letter is mailed to each prospective participant in order to inform the participants of the exact time, data, and place of the focus group.

Each prospective participant learns the purpose of the study, the duration and time required to conduct the focus group, how data is gathered, for what reason the data is used, how confidentiality is addressed, the benefits of the study, and any possible risks associated with the study. The prospective participants are informed that they can withdraw from the focus group at any time and that their participation is voluntary and by consent.

Each participant is assigned a code name in order to maintain confidentiality. The participants' identity is remains confidential at all times and no personal information is
collected from them. A separate master list with the names of participants and the corresponding code numbers is kept. Once the data is collected and transcribed, the master list is destroyed. During the actual session, the participants are asked several key questions (no more than six), with a few additional probe questions to facilitate discussion regarding the U.S. policy toward Iraq and their reflections and opinion of this policy.

A total of ten to twelve candidates participate in the focus group. The rationale for selecting only ten to twelve participants in the focus group is to keep the participants’ number small enough to facilitate good discussion, yet large enough to promote diversity in opinion. The focus group session is audiotaped and transcribed. Once transcribed, the audiotapes are destroyed. Any references to personal information that may emerge during the focus group session are not transcribed and omitted.

All data retained for at least three years in a locked file. All participants sign a consent form approved by Western Michigan University HSIRB in order to participate in the focus group. All the signed consent forms are kept in a locked box in the principle investigator’s office. During the focus group discussion, the participants are presented with a list of concepts that emerge in the literature review of the U.S. policy toward Iraq in order to facilitate discussions and generate inputs.

One-on-One Interviews

The third strategy in collecting data is through one-on-one interviews. These interviews are structural, whereby all respondents are asked the same questions regarding the U.S. policy toward Iraq. The purpose in asking different respondents the same
questions is to compare and contrast the answers with a common framework. These questions follow the same order, and they are asked of one individual at a time.

Each participant in the interview learns of the purpose of the study. The questions on the policy toward Iraq are asked without changes in wording. Probe questions are used without directing answers. The investigator’s personal opinions remain excluded.

The investigator relies on good listening skills and focuses on general trends and patterns in the answers. The same procedure of purposive sampling designed in selecting the focus group participants is utilized to select the one-on-one interview participants.

Since each participant in the one-on-one interviews does not have to be concerned about the preference for time and place of other participants, there is no need, as is the case with the focus group, to coordinate availability schedule and preferences between all participants. For the purpose of the one-on-one interview, every participant chooses his/her own time, date and place for the interview. Once a participant has selected a time, date, and place for the interview, a confirmation letter is mailed to him/her in order to confirm the interview.

All one-on-one interviews are recorded and then transcribed. Each participant’s name remains confidential and not referenced in the data. Each participant signs a consent letter approved by Western Michigan University’s HSIRB, indicating his/her willingness to participate in the one-on-one interview.

The interview questions are open-ended and designed to facilitate in-depth discussion and information. Probe and follow up questions are used to supplement the key questions. Please see Appendix C to read these key questions.
Summary

The assumption in this study is that the concepts to form emerging themes during the processes of linear analysis are related, and that the instruments to collect data through secondary data review, focus group and one-on-one interview are reliable. The assumption is that the purposive sampling of secondary data, focus group and one-on-one interview participants are appropriate. And, the transfer of dimensions and images from the complexity theories to steps two and three of the analysis are also accurate and based on a correct understanding of the new sciences of complexity.

This study relies solely on the written word and its metaphorical construction. Marshall & Rossman (1999) explain that the written word, according to is subject to the investigator’s abilities and as such may contain errors and omissions (p. 117).

Developing a conceptual framework, designing a study that is systematic and manageable, and having a continuous concern for ethical issues, resources, and trustworthiness of the overall data are important (Marshal & Rossman, 1999, pp. 55 & 91). Also, the investigator’s background as an Iraqi native who lived in Iraq for nearly 20 years and had to escape to the United States due to the tyrannical nature of the former Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein may bias his overall approach to data collection and analyses. However, having a committee to challenge the investigator’s data collection procedure and analysis and his own alertness to such bias help in maintaining a level of objectivity throughout the research process.

Conducting focus group and one-on-one interview in the aftermath of a war and obtaining answers from participants without the possibility of the war polarizing their opinion also represent a challenge to the research’s objectivity. A careful screening
process is thus important. The aim is to obtain objective data from the focus group and one-on-one interview participants without having their answers polarized by the war in Iraq and its aftermath.

In order to have a balanced observation of the U.S. policy toward Iraq within the context of the new sciences of complexity, a comprehensive research strategy beyond the immediate scope of the policy is needed. A thorough knowledge of the new sciences of complexity and their application to comprehensive policy studies will enrich further investigation of the U.S. policy toward Iraq as a dynamic system.

A comprehensive qualitative analysis of a dynamic system according to the complexity theories requires an analysis not bounded by time and space. Since the world, according to complexity theories, is an interconnected web of associations, an analysis of a particular system within the world requires the encapsulation of empirical information concerning the world as a whole.

The same is true in regard to a comprehensive qualitative analysis of the U.S. policy toward Iraq. Such an analysis requires an understanding of the social, political, and economic dynamics both in Iraq and the United States from the early evolutionary stages of both political entities up to date. It also requires discussing the interconnectedness of these dynamics with their environment and events in the world as a whole beyond temporal and spatial limitation. Yet, such a wider scope is beyond the limitation of this research and it is open to future researches.

During this research, data analysis is guided by a Phi Model and constructed in three steps. In the first step of the analysis, the U.S. policy toward Iraq is observed as a linear progression, moving from one phase to another. The language of the analysis is
presented as a machine metaphor. Data collected from focus group, one-on-one interviews and secondary data is linearly analyzed by breaking it into parts (concepts, themes, and super themes) and then by analyzing each part separately. Computer software such as Ethnograph is utilized for the purpose of coding the data.

The second step of the analysis interprets the super themes that emerge in step one according to four specific dimensions derived from complexity theories. These dimensions are bifurcation, S-Matrix and mutual causality. The purpose of the analysis is to observe internal changes within the policy toward Iraq as impacted by trends in the policy’s environment. The changes in the behavior of the super themes as assessed by the four dimensions derived from the complexity theories are indication of internal changes in the policy. The language of the analysis is a flux metaphor.

The third and final step is the same as step two. The same procedure used in step two is used in step three. The emphasis of the analysis, however, is observing the environmental changes that impact the U.S. policy toward Iraq. Collectively, three steps provide the study with a contrasting analysis of the policy toward Iraq between two perspectives: linear and complex.
CHAPTER VI

THE LINEAR ANALYSIS

Introduction

The Linear Analysis constitutes the first step designed by the Phi Model in the
analysis of U.S. policy toward Iraq. The linear analysis relies on the traditional inquiry of
understanding the whole by breaking it into parts and then analyzing each part separately.
Such analysis is an important prerequisite for a qualitative inquiry that will utilize the
complexity theories in steps two and three of the Phi Model. Without the linear analysis,
the inquiry lacks the trends, themes and interpretive levels that enable steps two and three
of the model to take place.

Step one uses Morgan’s Machine Metaphorical Model (Morgan, 1986, pp. 325-
347) for the purpose of presenting the analysis. The material for this analysis is collected
from books, articles, official governmental documents, and lives data. The live data is
collected from a focus group and one-on-one interviews.

Ethnograph and Conceptual Analysis

The four collected data sets from books, articles, official governmental documents
and live data are broken into parts. Ethnograph is used in order to facilitate that process
while utilizing a codebook composed of 67 specific concepts. Appendix D lists these
concepts and their definitions.
The total occurrences of all 67 concepts in the four data sets are 1343. Some concepts have higher frequencies in the four data sets than others. There are certain concepts that Ethnograph validates as important because of their high frequencies in all four data sets. There are other concepts that Ethnograph fails to validate as important and considered insignificant because of their low occurrence in the four data sets. Table Three lists the 67 concepts and the number of their occurrences in the four data sets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>#</th>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>#</th>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>#</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrative state</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Dollar vs. Euro</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Kondratiev wave</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambiguity</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Enemy</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American psyche</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Falsehood</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Looking into a mirror</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointocracy</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Fear factor</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Machiavellian methods</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attila the Hun</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Folly politics</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Metaphor of war</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Force</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>ME status quo</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capitalism</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>UN/ US goals</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Militarism</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circular reasoning</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Geopolitics</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Misleading</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercion</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Hegemony</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Mistrust</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War politics</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Hobbes vs. Kant</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Misuse of intelligence</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonialism</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hypocrisy</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>Multilateral</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Containment</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Narrow state interests</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control issues</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Imperial pres.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current as epiphenomenon</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Imperialism</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Paranoia</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debate</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Intensionality</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Pattern of behavior</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic cave-in</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Iraqi opposition</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>Preemption</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourse</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Irony</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Presidential x</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. List of Ethnograph Concepts and Their Occurrence in the Four Data Sets
The highest occurring concepts are “The Role of Oil,” “Force,” “Rhetoric,” “Imperialism,” and “Enemy.” The lowest scoring concepts are “Debate,” “Priorities,” and “Colonialism.” Figure Two illustrates a random sampling of the highest and lowest occurring concepts in the data sets.

![Figure 2. Random Sampling of Highest and Lowest Occurring Concepts in Data](image)

Concept occurrences in each individual data set differed as well. For example, in the Books Data Set, the concept “Hypocrisy” occurs 33 times. In the Articles Data Set, the concept “The Role of Oil” occurs 35 times. In the Live Data Set, the concept “Narrow State Interests” occurs 21 times. And, in the Documents Data Set, the concept “Misleading” occurs 14 times. Figure Three illustrates these highest occurring concepts in the four individual data sets.

![Figure 3. The Highest Occurring Concepts in Each Data Sets](image)
As for the lowest occurring concepts in each individual data set, the concept "Cold War Politics" is the lowest occurring concept in Books Data Set. The concept "War as a Corrective Action" is the lowest occurring concept in Articles Data Set. The concept "Capitalism" is the lowest occurring concept in Live Data Set. And, "The Middle East and the Status Quo" is the lowest occurring concept in the Official Documents Data Set. Figure Four illustrates these concepts’ low occurrences in each individual data set.

![Figure 4. The Lowest Occurring Concepts in the Data Sets](chart)

Books, Articles and Live Data Sets have an average of 55 concepts occurring in each set out of the total of 67 concepts, while Documents Data Set includes only 42 concepts out of the total 67 concepts. This difference in the utility of concepts makes Document Data Set stand alone in a different category from the other three data sets. Figure Five illustrates this difference.

![Figure 5. Chart of the Total Numbers of Concepts Occurred in the Data Sets](chart)
In the Books Data Set, 433 are the total number of concepts occurrences. In Articles Data Set, the total are 447, and in the Live Data Set 326. In the Documents Data Set, however, the total is only 139 occurrences, making the Document Data Set once more stand alone in a different category than the other three data sets. Figure Six illustrates this difference:

![Figure 6. Chart of the Total Numbers of Concepts Occurrences the Four Data Sets](chart)

Since the total number of concepts that compose Ethnograph's codebook is 67 and some concepts do not occur in one or more data set, these non-occurring concepts are valued at zero. In the Book Data Set, for example, there are 16 zero-valued concepts. In the Articles Data Set, there are eight zero-valued concepts. In the Live Data Set, there are nine zero-valued concepts. And, in Documents Data Set, there are 25 zero-valued concepts. Figure Seven illustrates the total number of non-occurrences of concepts.

![Figure 7. The Total Number of Non-Occurrences of Concepts in the Four Data Sets](chart)
As Figure Seven illustrates, the largest number of zero-valued concepts is in the Document Data Set. This is another example of a difference between this data set and the other three data sets. These combined differences illustrate that there is more commonality between the Books, Article, and Live Data Sets and more differences between these three sets and the Documents Data Set. It also refers to the gap between the thinking and perspective of ordinary citizens who generate the three data sets of books, articles and live, and the thinking and perspectives of governmental officials who generate the Documents Data Set.

Ethnograph is useful in recognizing such gaps in the relationships between the four data sets as well as in identifying the level of importance of each concept based on its occurrences in the data sets. Several important trends emerge during this process.

1. The Articles Data Set shares a similarity with the general trend in the combined four data sets because its highest and lowest occurring concepts are similar in numbers to the highest and lowest occurring concepts in the four sets. As such, article depicting the U.S. policy toward Iraq are credible source in observing the policy and its trajectory.

2. Each data set is unique, and the four data sets are valid in their representations of the policy.

3. The Documents Data Set stands alone and in a different category than the other three data sets. The differences indicate a gap between the perspectives of ordinary citizens who generate Books, Articles and Live Data on the U.S. policy toward Iraq and those who author the official governmental documents. This
indicates that the myths and propaganda depicted by the official governmental
documents regarding the policy do not resonate with ordinary citizens.

4. Contrary to the conventional wisdom in observing U.S. policy toward Iraq and my
own anticipation, the former Iraqi regime’s behavior is not the most important
factor in any data set, including the governmental data set. What emerge as the
most important factors in U.S. policy toward Iraq are concepts such as “Oil,”
“Hypocrisy,” “Regionalism,” “Narrow State Interests,” and “Legitimacy.”

5. An extreme explanation of U.S. policy toward Iraq, according to concepts such as
“Colonialism” and “Trotskyism,” is marginal.

6. Attempts to represent the U.S. policy toward Iraq based on ethics and morality are
also marginal. This is demonstrated in the low occurrences of concepts such as
“Current as Epiphenomenon” and “Looking into a Mirror.”

Theme Analysis

Once the data are coded, several themes emerge from grouping concepts together
that share similar characteristics both in meaning and in the frequency of occurrences. A
total of 13 themes emerge in this process. Table Four demonstrates these 13 emerging
themes, definitions, and the concepts that construct each theme.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Concepts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Baseball</td>
<td>It is a type of functional and behavioral state of the American executive leadership in post Cold War era that often operates aside the constitutional separation of power and emphasizes the rule of the executive branch over Congress.</td>
<td>Administrative State, Imperial Presidency, Appointocracy, Unilateralism, and Paranoia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pitcher</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Judas</td>
<td>It represents the policies adopted by nations states for their own narrow interests, but is presented as though they are serving a common good. These policies also suffer, as a consequence of mistrust and abuse.</td>
<td>U.S. and Iraq Abuse of UN, Mistrust, Narrow State Interests, Presidential Extra, Gap Between UN &amp; U.S. Goals, UN Mistakes, and Folly Politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syndrome</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Table 4—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Concepts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Metamorphism</td>
<td>The phase shifts and changes in composition of U.S. policy toward Iraq</td>
<td>Containment, Trajectory and Status Quo, Kondratiev, Regime Change Trajectory, and Iraqi Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amebic Response</td>
<td>The Ameba changes its shape in response to light. This metaphor represents Saddam’s response to U.S. policy as a means for survival.</td>
<td>Control Issues, Survival Issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Issues</td>
<td>The metaphor of economy represents America’s power interests based on oil and the dollar as power instruments to dominant the world.</td>
<td>Capitalism, Dollar Vs. Euro, The role of Oil, and Power Interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pax-Americana</td>
<td>The metaphor of Pax-Americana represents America’s drive to dominate the world as a new imperial power, through the use of military.</td>
<td>Colonialism, Hegemony, Imperialism, and Militarism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Telephone Pole</td>
<td>The metaphor of the Telephone Pole represents the collapse of the opposition party in the United States as a viable voice for political discourse, resulting in the administration’s political agendas standing alone without challenge or examination.</td>
<td>Democratic Cave in, Discourse, Debate, Priorities and Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moby Dick</td>
<td>Moby Dick avenges the threat to his environment and the slaying of his mate by using force and violence to offset the very violence that causes the imbalance in his world. This metaphor emphasizes war as a corrective action, and the leaning toward the philosophy of Hobbes as a translation in doing good.</td>
<td>War as a Corrective Action, Force, Metaphor of War, Hobbes vs. Kant, American Psyche, Unipolar World, and Capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eskimo Community</td>
<td>The environment of the Eskimos is cold that requires balance in resources in order to preserve energy for survival. Such necessity requires cooperation, a sense of community and universal and regional collaboration in order to survive.</td>
<td>Geopolitics, Regionalism, Cold War Politics, ME Status Quo, Multilateralism, and Legitimacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactics</td>
<td>It is the means to achieve an end in the policy toward Iraq.</td>
<td>Circular Reasoning, Coercion, Irony, Machiavelli, Fear Factor, Falsehood, Misuse or Misinterpretation of Intelligence, Current as Epiphenomenon, Misleading, Pattern of Behavior, and Attila the Hun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rasputin</td>
<td>Rasputin was the palace-power behind most of Tsar’s policies. This metaphor represents the special powers (such as think tanks and special interests) behind the decision-making process in the policy toward Iraq.</td>
<td>Ideology, Intensionality, Preemption, Rhetoric, Special Interests, and Trotskyism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shadows</td>
<td>It represents policies based on vague definitions, symbolism, and simplistic explanation of the world in regard to the policy toward Iraq.</td>
<td>Simplicity, Symbolism, Ambiguity, Enemy, and the War on Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beyond Good and Evil</td>
<td>It represents the negation of looking inward and taking responsibility of U.S. role in creating the very evil in Iraq that it cried against while placing itself hypocritically on a high moral ground.</td>
<td>Hypocrisy and Looking into a Mirror</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Baseball Pitcher

Four concepts go into the construction of the baseball pitcher as an emerging theme. These concepts are “Administrative State,” “Imperial Presidency,” “Appointocracy,” “Unilateralism,” and “Paranoia.”

The baseball pitcher plays on a team. His performance, however, depends largely on his own skills. The metaphor as such reflects a type of governance that resembles the baseball pitcher in its reliance on governmental resources for support but it bases its decision-making process on its own agendas. Let us examine the role of some of the concepts that went into the construction of this theme in order to better understand the dynamics of the policy itself through the lens of these concepts that interplay in the composition of the theme.

Administrative State

The tendency in governance to move toward an administrative type encourages the evolution of a strong executive at the expense of the constitutional separation of powers. Review of secondary data (books, articles and documents) reveals that the move toward an administrative state in the United States gradually was increasing, especially after the Vietnam War and during the Nixon administration. The aim was to bring about a strong executive who was able to dictate certain political agendas outside the traditional checks and balances in governance.

Such a tendency was reduced in later events. After the Watergate scandal and the resignation of Richard Nixon, the drive toward an administrative state slowed considerably. However, it was revived during the presidency of George W. Bush. As a
consequence, the U.S. policy toward Iraq became increasingly guided by the Executive branch of government and was curtailed according to this branch’s political will. Congress, in the process, became a less partner and subservient to the Executive branch rather than its equal.

A political historian and expert on this matter states in a one-on-one interview that “Congress chose to surrender its right to declare war in 2002 to the president as a failure of courage and a failure of conscience. The stage had been set by not questioning a variety of policies and the decisions that Bush had made all the way along the road.”

**Imperial Presidency**

Within this metaphor, the concept of Imperial Presidency is the chief aim of the administrative state. When there is an imperial presidency handling America’s foreign policy, such policy will be immune from the scrutiny and examination of the two other branches of government. The concept of the imperial presidency and strong executive emerged during the Kennedy administration. The concept then further developed during the Nixon administration as contempt for Congress and the process of checks and balances were increased and favored by the administration.

However, with the manner in which Nixon resigned his position as president, the concept of Imperial Presidency was marginalized during the administrations of Ford, Carter, Reagan and Clinton. With George W. Bush in the White house, attempts once again were made to revive the concept by belittling the role of Congress and strengthening the executive branch to dictate its political agenda with little or no oversight by Congress,
Unilateralism

The Imperial Presidency and its administrative state rely on unilateralism as a necessary mechanism in order to carry out their function. Unilateralism, as a concept, is the willingness to take political actions by a government with little or no regard to established national and international norms. As such, unilateralism serves the imperial presidency because it is able to advance its political agenda without adherence to other concerns.

However, unilateralism is not something new or unique only to the imperial presidency and the administrative state. In a one-on-one interview, a political scientist states that “unilateralism is not some thing new in American politics, and although it was used to advance the concepts of administrative state and imperial presidency, it, nevertheless, was embedded in America’s political tradition.” This expert adds that “if we are to be political realists, we have to understand that every major war that occurred in our time was unilateral.”

Yet, unilateralism was not a normative practice in U.S. foreign policy despite its historical past and current occurrences. In a one-on-one interview with a political historian “the Bush administration has departed from the previous administrations by its unilateralism.” This expert cites a few examples for such unilateral action, such as “the refusal to accept revisions to the Hague tribunals, the refusal to honor the Kyoto accord, and the failure of the U.S. to attract viable allies in the war in Iraq, especially its traditional allies.”
Appointocracy

It is used as a vehicle by the baseball pitcher in order to shift governance toward an administrative state, headed by an imperial presidency. Appointocracy is not only a symptom of the administrative state but also one of its main products and requirements. If we to observe the American administration of post-Saddam Iraq, it will become clear to us that appointocracy was one of the main ingredients that went into the construction of both the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Iraqi Governing Council. Even the Bush administration’s attempt to build democracy in Iraq by transferring authority to Iraqis after June 30, 2004 became based on such a concept by appointing selected Iraqis by the Bush administration to form the new Iraqi government.

In a one-on-one interview with a former leader of an Iraqi opposition group in exile, the tendency to rely too much on appointocracy became a matter of concern. The former leader asks that the policy’s decision-makers to avoid “appointed Iraqis chosen by America rather than the Iraqi people,” and advises them to “build civil and democratic institutions from the bottom up, by creating local councils that are democratic, and to respect the right of the Iraqi people to take charge of their own affairs.”

The frequency in the content analysis of four for a concept related to issues of appointocracy, and a frequency of 16 for a concept related to issue of administrative state demonstrate that there is a tendency in U.S. policy toward Iraq, while building on past traditions in some aspects and violating other traditions in other aspects, to gradually move toward an administrative state and an imperial presidency while practicing a unilateral approach toward decision making in the political process whether abroad or at
home. This increased tendency is represented by the metaphor of the baseball pitcher and constitutes one of the features of the policy.

The Judas Syndrome

The second theme that emerges from grouping similar concepts together is the metaphor of The Judas Syndrome. This theme is constructed from concepts such as “U.S. and Iraqi Abuse of the United Nations,” “Mistrust,” “Narrow State Interests,” “Presidential Extras,” “Gap Between UN and UN Goals Relative to Iraq,” “UN Mistakes,” and “Folly Politics.”

The Judas Syndrome is a metaphor that represents policies intended to do good deeds but results instead in creating negative consequences. The metaphor borrows its meaning from the Biblical character of Judas, one of the twelve disciples of Jesus. Judas betrayed Jesus thinking he was doing something noble in having Jesus brought to the High Priest in Jerusalem to persuade him to his cause. However, Judas’ action led to the arrest and consequent crucifixion of Jesus, instead.

The Judas metaphor, as such, represents national and international policies adopted to do good deeds that subsequently cause more harm than good. Now, let us examine some of the concepts that went into the construction of this theme and observe the policy’s dynamics through their lenses.

Folly Politics

Perhaps the most obvious policy that intended to do good but resulted in causing harm was the UN economic sanctions imposed on Iraq after 1990. The sanctions were
intended to disarm Saddam and force his compliance with UN resolutions. Instead, they harmed the Iraqi people and caused the deaths of nearly one-quarter-million Iraqi children each year because of malnutrition and disease.

The UN attempted to modify the sanctions in order to ease the suffering of the Iraqi people, and allowed Iraq to sell limited amount of its oil in order to buy food. But this Oil for Food program came late, especially when Saddam refused to implement it for many years because he feared losing control over Iraq as a result. The United States’ insistence on enforcing the sanctions despite their negative impacts made the policy more punitive and less positive.

In a one-on-one interview with a political scientist, there is a testimony to the fallacy of designing a policy based on good intentions without carefully thinking through the consequences. According to the interview, “the sanctions meant to change the Iraqi regime’s attitude. The UN and the U.S. thought that it would be able to take the authority from Saddam by having direct connection with the Iraqi people through the distribution of food through the oil-for-food program. This, however, did not work because neither the UN nor the U.S. anticipated how the sanction was going to hurt average Iraqis.”

**Gap Between U.S. and UN Goals**

In addition to such folly politics, there is also the concept of a gap between the U.S. goals in Iraq and those of the UN. As the history chapter reveals, after the Gulf War of 1991, the goal of the United Nations was to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction. The United States goal, however, was to implement a regime change in Iraq.
by toppling the regime of Saddam Hussein either through supporting plots by the Iraqi opposition groups or by direct military involvement.

The differences in goals between the United Nations and the United States toward Iraq created a gap in the overall political approach toward Iraq between the UN and the U.S. The U.S. used such a gap in order to exploit the UN for its own political agenda, and the UN failed to recognize these illegal and unauthorized practices by the United States.

At times when there was a roadblock in front of UN inspectors in Iraq, the United Nations attempted to resolve the matter peacefully through negotiation. The United States, on the other hand, used the situation to escalate the tension and attack Iraq militarily.

The U.S. justified its action by stating that it continued to believe that Iraq was producing weapons of mass destruction. Although there was no clear evidence to support this claim, the United States government continued to portray Iraq as having the same weapon capacity in 2003 as it did in 1990.

**Mistrust**

An important component that comprises the Judas Syndrome is Mistrust. Based on this concept, neither Saddam nor the United States trusted one another, and they constructed their relationships based on such mistrust. This notion went back as early as the 1970s and it further heightened after the Gulf War of 1991. Such mistrust in the Middle East was caused by the United States support for Israel and the Baathists poor human rights record in Iraq and political alliances in the world.
After the fall of the Shah in Iran in 1979, the United States saw in Iraq a useful (yet temporary) ally to do its bidding in the region. Iraq also used U.S. support in order to build its military capability during its eight years war with Iran. Once the Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988, however, that temporary alliance came to an end. In its stead, mistrust returned in a full scale, leading to open hostilities and later to a military conflict during the Gulf War of 1991.

The ignorance and miscalculations on both the Iraqi and the American sides was created by the lack of any real relationship prior to the Iran-Iraq War. According to a participant in this research focus group, “the key event for mistrust between the United States and Iraq was the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990.”

Another participant agrees with the statement. He argues that "Saddam miscalculated. He assumed that he had a free hand to settle his dispute with Kuwait, but he overlooked the security of oil in the area, which brought him to U.S. attention as a dangerous man.”

The mistrust, however, was mutual both between Saddam and the United States. Another participant in the focus group states that “there was a mutual mistrust and misunderstanding between America and Saddam. The U.S. did not quite understand what Saddam was like, and Saddam did not understand America’s interests.”

Saddam also miscalculated U.S. resolve and thought that his war with Iran had earned him a favor with the United States that would prevent a confrontation if he attempted to attack Kuwait. This error in judgment by Saddam was, according to a focus group participant, “a vast miscalculation. Taking Kuwait militarily while the U.S. was the
only remaining superpower who had vested economic interests in the region and its stability simply was wrong.”

**Nation-state Interest**

Another concept that participates in the construction of the Judas Syndrome is “Nation-state Interests.” When a nation-state prefers its narrow interests to the collective interests of the world community, it is in effect creating a Judas Syndrome.

It was based on the narrow nation-state interests of the United States during the 1980s, for example, that the Reagan administration supported Iraq during its war with Iran. According to a one-on-one interview with a political historian, “what happened in the Iran-Iraq War came in the aftermath of the revolution in Iran and the hostage crisis with the United States, which rendered the United States much less disposed to come to Iran’s assistance in the context and to hope to offset Iran with Iraqi power.”

Once Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990, the U.S. national interest moved from the position of supporting Saddam to confronting him. All focus group participants agree on this point and expressed their consensus in a statement by one of their participants who stressed that “Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait threatened Saudi Arabia, and a threat to Saudi Arabia was a direct threat to the United States because of the U.S. reliance on Saudi oil.”

Another focus group participant argues: “if Saddam was going to stay in Kuwait he was going to become a potential threat to Saudi Arabia. He was a wild card that grew even wilder. As long as he was a wild card against Iran, America did not mind him, but when he grew wilder by taking Kuwait, then the situation changed.”
As of 1990, U.S. national interest continued to verge toward continuous confrontation with Saddam. In 1998, this confrontation was clearly pronounced with the U.S. government officially adopting the policy of regime change in Iraq. The Bush administration later built on this policy to justify its own doctrine of preemption and consequence invasion of Iraq.

According to a focus group participant, “the strategy of the current administration, as reflected in the national interest and self-interest of the U.S. as they saw it, had to do with a regime change in Iraq. Our policy now is based solely on national interest. Under the Bush administration, the U.S. is backing off from international interest for its own self-interest.”

The United States alone, however, is not the only nation in the world who is guilty of advocating its national interest and placing it above international norms and the collective interests of the world community. In a one-on-one interview with a political scientist, “France, Russia and Germany all had interests and contracts in Iraq. They did not support the American effort because of their national interest, not because of international law.”

The nation-state interest, especially the power interest of corporate America and the governmental policy that defends them, becomes more problematic when it is held as part of the national interest. A member of the focus group equates the national interests and national security. He states that “our national security, self-interests are the most important elements in our policy now. There is a problem in summing national interests and national security as the same.”
When U.S. national interest and national security are viewed as one, not all nation-states will support the United States in all aspects of its foreign policy, especially the policy toward Iraq. This does not mean that those nations are against American security. Rather, it means that they have their own national interest to follow. As one of the focus group members explains it, “we are falling into the argument that other countries either have to agree with us or we will do it anyway. The issue is not whether or not France and Germany support us. The U.S. has its own self-interest, so do France and other nation-states.”

In a one-on-one interview with the former leader of an Iraqi opposition group in exile, the subject agrees with the focus group’s assessment with regards to U.S. policy and interest in Iraq, stating that “the underlining reason for the U.S. involvement in Iraq was for its own interests in the Middle East, mostly economic. Politically, the U.S. policy toward Iraq is not going to influence the overall American foreign policy that much, although things changed after September 11, 2001.”

Content analysis with frequencies of 15 for a concept related to issues of containment, 13 for a concept related to issues of Middle East stability and status quo, and 47 for a concept related to issues of nation-state interest indicate that U.S. self-interest changed after September 11, 2001 toward removing U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia. The presence of these troops in the Muslim holy land in Saudi Arabia after the Gulf War of 1991 angered Islamic fundamentalists and led some of them (the al-Qaeda network) to retaliate by attacking the United States on September 11, 2001. And since the purpose of these troops was to contain Saddam, their removal meant the end of
containment itself and the subsequent removal of Saddam himself from power in Iraq in order to end the justification for the positioning of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia.

**Presidential Extras**

Another important concept that participates in the construction of the Judas Syndrome is Presidential Extras. Presidents are human beings, and like many other human beings in powerful positions, at times they allow their personal affairs, relationships, family ties, and political affiliations to play an important role in their political decision-making process.

As such, presidential extras emerge as a result of personal affairs or because of family ties related to U.S. policy abroad or at home. The policy toward Iraq is one of the arenas that witnessed such an impact.

Two presidents stand out in allowing their “extra” personal issues to affect their decisions regarding Iraq. One was President Clinton who used Iraq as a diversion from his impeachment trials in 1998. The other was President George W. Bush who used Saddam’s alleged attempt to assassinate his father, former President Bush, during his trip to Kuwait in 1993, as a motivation to further the cause toward war in Iraq in 2003.

In regards to President Clinton’s extra presidential issues, his decision to launch Operation Desert Fox against Iraq, for example, began just one day prior to his impeachment by the U.S. House of Representatives and ended once the House impeached him. The timing of Desert Fox, among other issues, led many political commentators to believe that the President’s decision to bomb Iraq was based on diverting attention from his impeachment trial. They labeled it with the phrase, “wagging the dog,” a reference to
a Hollywood movie that depicted a fictional president who started a war with a third world country in order to divert attention from a scandal in which he was involved.

In a one-on-one interview, an expert on U.S. policy toward Iraq echoed the “wagging the dog” analogy by stating that “the reason people said that Clinton’s action in Iraq at the time was akin to wagging the dog was because it took place while he was under the threat of impeachment and he wanted to generate popular support to overcome impeachment.”

Presidential extras reflect negatively on the president and undermine his decision, even if these extra issues are just a matter of perception. A member of the focus group views President Clinton as a weak president precisely because of such a perception, stating that “Clinton was a weak president, had a sex scandal and was impeached because of it, and as a consequence he did not carry on his Iraq policy, as he should.”

In reference to President George W. Bush and the impact of his personal issues on his decisions regarding Iraq, another focus group participant states that “Bush is not very smart to carrying out a complex confrontational policy such as this one. Cheney and others drove the policy and Bush went along with them because he did not like Saddam, especially when Saddam tried to assassinate his father in 1993.”

In another interview, a political scientist disagrees with the previous statement by the participant in the focus group. According to this expert, “the underlining motive for the war with Iraq in 2003 was to defend the United States. When America perceives threat, although not clear or easy to define, such a perceived threat becomes central to its ability to defend itself. As for the issue of Bush trying to defend his father’s honor by going after Saddam, no one can play that kind of psychological game.”
UN Mistakes

The other critical concept in the Judas Syndrome is the issue of UN mistakes in reference to its relation to U.S. policy toward Iraq. These mistakes, although lacking intensionality and evil intent, result in promoting the mentality and behavior of violence, whether by Iraq or by the United States, and in causing harm to the Iraqi people who suffered for many years the horror of brutality, economic sanctions and wars. The history chapter in this dissertation summarizes these United Nations mistakes as the following

- When Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the United Nations imposed economic sanctions on Iraq in order to force Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. When sanctions alone did not persuade Saddam to pull his armies out of Kuwait, the UN authorized the use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait in 1991 and maintained the sanctions until the fall of Saddam’s regime in 2003. The UN neither lifted nor eased these sanctions despite the suffering of the Iraqi people.

- The United States infiltrated the UN inspection teams in Iraq with its own spies, often with UN knowledge and authorization. Yet, the UN failed to take any action to restore its credibility as an impartial world body even when those spies where exposed.

- Despite three decades of the Iraqi regime’s violation of human rights in Iraq from the rise of the Baath Party to power in Iraq in 1968, the UN did not react against the Iraqi government’s behavior except in 1991 when it passed Resolution 668, demanding Iraq to treat its citizens fairly. The resolution, however, was ineffective because it was not adopted under Chapter VII that obligated all UN member states to enforce the resolution.
• Between 1991 and 2003, the United States took it upon itself to unilaterally interpret the UN resolutions and bomb Iraq without the United Nations’ authorization. Yet, the UN failed to issue any resolution against the United States for its violation of established international norms.

• In 2003, the United Nations refused to authorize the use of force against Iraq. Yet, the Bush administration went ahead with its military plan of a preemptive strike and invaded Iraq. The UN, however, failed to issue any resolution against the United States’ unauthorized use of force against Iraq. Instead, the UN issued Resolution 1511 (see United Nations, 2003c), legitimizing the U.S. occupation and administration of Iraq.

The United States and Iraq’s Abuse of the United Nations

The last component that participates in the construction of the Judas Syndrome is the concept of “The United States and Iraq’s Abuse of the United Nations.” Content analysis yields a frequency of 16 for a concept related to issues of U.S. and Iraq’s abuse of the UN mission in Iraq that Iraq did so in order to retaliate against U.S. spies in UN inspection teams, and also to give the false impression that it continued to possess WMD as a measure of deterrence. On the other hand, the United States used the UN and its inspection teams to gather information on the Iraqi regime’s security apparatus and defense mechanism in order to plan plots for regime change. As such, both Iraq and the U.S. were guilty of using the United Nations for their own political agendas, instead of actively working within the UN mandate to implement the 1991 ceasefire resolution.
Political Metamorphism

The theme of political metamorphism emphasizes the changes that take place in the policy as it moves from one phase to another. The theme is emerging from the grouping together of concepts such as “Containment,” “Iraqi Opposition,” “Kondratiev’s Wave,” “Regime Change Trajectory,” and the “Trajectory of U.S. Policy toward Iraq.”

Containment

The first concept that takes part in the construction of this theme is Containment. Containment was a phase in the U.S. policy toward Iraq that followed the Gulf War of 1991. It began during the administration of George H. Bush and continued during the administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. In 1998, however, the Clinton administration, while maintaining containment, shifted the policy toward officially adopting the concept of regime change by signing the Iraq Liberation Act into law. After September 11, 2001, containment was no longer a viable element in the policy, and the Bush administration replaced it with the concept of preemption and toppling the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein through direct military intervention.

The longest period of the containment era occurred during the presidency of Bill Clinton. During this period, Saddam was contained within a specific sphere of action designed by the Clinton administration. The Iraqi regime was managed so it would not pose a threat to its neighbors or to the United States. Several mechanisms were used to enforce this management. Among these mechanism were the enforcement of the UN economic sanctions, the no-fly-zones in northern and southern Iraq, supporting the Iraqi
opposition, and periodically attacking Saddam's military and security installations by cruise missiles.

The Clinton administration adopted containment not only toward Iraq but also toward terrorism as well. In a one-on-one interview, a political scientist and an expert on Clinton's foreign policy states that "the Clinton administration policy of containment was practiced not only in Iraq but also was tried to contain terrorism as the administration was reluctant to commit troops on ground. Its preferred policy was to use cruise missiles and high-flying bombers in order to contain the world. Such policy did not remove Saddam's threat or terrorism's ability to strike against us."

The former leader of the Iraqi opposition group agrees that containment was not working. In a one-on-one interview, the expert states that "in the mid-1990, the U.S. policy was designed to contain Saddam, not cause his removal. During the Clinton administration, containment was tried through the enforcement of the no-fly-zone and the UN economic sanctions. But the no-fly-zone was not effective because Saddam continued sending his tanks to southern Iraq and killing people. It was because of that Clinton adopted the policy of regime change in 1998."

In addition to the ineffectiveness of the no-fly-zone, there was also the issue of Saddam smuggling oil outside the UN imposed embargo that added to the erosion of the policy of containment. In the same interview stated above, the former leader argues that "Clinton figured out that Saddam was smuggling oil, and continued supporting Palestinian terrorist groups. So the United States had no choice but to replace Saddam, especially when he was unable to change, did not trust America, and America did not trust him."
Under George W. Bush, containment finally collapsed. Even if containment was allowed to continue, it was going to stand as an obstacle to forwarding U.S. interests. As one of the participants in the focus group had phrase it, “containment was beneath the new America, the world’s new empire and the sole superpower.”

The Iraqi Opposition

The other concept that takes part in the construction of the theme of political metamorphism is the concept of the Iraqi Opposition. The Iraqi opposition groups were part of U.S. policy toward Iraq and emerged from being an insignificant element in 1990 to becoming part of U.S. efforts in implementing a regime change in Iraq in 1995 to becoming an important part of the regime change policy in Iraq as of 1998.

The Iraqi opposition groups were used by the U.S. policy toward Iraq to advance the policy’s agendas, as they too used the policy to advance their own agendas. Often, these opposition groups fed the U.S. false information and flimsy intelligence in order to encourage a tougher U.S. policy toward Iraq and to engage the United States militarily in removing Saddam from power.

According to a one-on-one interview with the former leader of an Iraqi opposition group in exile, “some of the opposition had some information about what Saddam was doing. Others had outdated information. And at times, Saddam used to send false information indirectly to confuse the Americans.”

The former leader adds that, “the Iraqi opposition could not get rid of Saddam on its own. But in 1994 and 1995 the Iraqi opposition was in a good position to get rid of him. Unfortunately the CIA leaked the information and Saddam was able to get rid of the
plotters. The CIA did not trust the Iraqi opposition to do a good job partly because they failed to form a united front.”

According to another one-on-one interview with a political scientist, “relying on exiled groups has a long tradition in the American administration’s practices during the 20th century. The Iraqi opposition did what such people always do, telling the U.S. what it wanted to hear and how that would help its position.”

According to a third interview with a political historian, "the Iraqi opposition groups were active, starting in 1991. They were pushing for their own interest. They did not get the results, but they did not give up. They had some influence on the policy toward Iraq but they were as much used as using.”

According to a focus group participant, “the U.S. had to rely on human intelligence in an environment where it did not have very good tools to gather information. So the information that came through the exiled groups was often misleading.”

The Kondratiev’s Wave

The other concept within this theme is the Kondratiev’s Wave. Although it is often used in economics, we can use the concept of the Kondratiev’s Wave in this analysis as a reference to the cycle of appearance and reappearance of a phenomenon repeatedly once in every three or four successive blocks of time. In assessing the U.S. policy toward Iraq from 1990 to 2003, for example, we can trace such a wave by following the cycle of appearance and reappearance of a particular phenomenon but each time under different conditions.
In a one-on-one interview with a political scientist, emphasis is placed on the recycling of political influence between the two major political parties in the United States every five or six decades. This recycling of influence in successive time sequence is analogous to the Kondratiev’s Wave. The expert states that “the principal impact of the Iraq war of 2003 in the U.S. was to force the opposition party to develop a peace framework for its political platform and an anti-war agenda. This is something that occurs in America only once every several generations, when one party’s views are so dominant that they remain dominant for sixty some years.”

This recycling of political influence also involves the recycling of political agendas within the U.S. policy toward Iraq. It includes choosing ready-made solutions that were adopted in previous experiences, such as in Vietnam or Cuba, and applying them to Iraq with no regard to the specific conditions of Iraq and the changes in the circumstances. Relying on ready-made solutions from previous experience is analogous to pulling a response out of a hat, with the responses written prior to the actual event. This scenario is also known in management and organizational theories as the Garbage Can Model, with managers pulling ready-made solutions out of the garbage can to fit arising problems.

**Regime Change Trajectory**

The fourth concept that takes part in the construction of this theme is the trajectory of regime change in Iraq. This concept represents the evolution of regime change politics in the policy toward Iraq from a covert action in 1990 to an official policy of the United States in 1998, and then to the main principle of the war of preemption in
2003. Content analysis uncovers a frequency of 45 for a concept related to issues of regime change trajectory that the transition in the development of this concept from 1990 to 2003 had pointed to its impact on the overall direction of the U.S. policy toward Iraq.

The Trajectory of the Policy

The final concept that takes part in the construction of this theme is that of the trajectory of policy itself toward Iraq. The concept illustrates changes and progression in the U.S. policy toward Iraq from 1990 to 2003. These changes are indicators of metamorphism in the policy, making the concept itself one of the indicators of change in the political metamorphism of the policy. Other indicators of political metamorphism are the remaining concepts that participate in the construction of this theme.

The trajectory in the policy began during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. It was intended to maintain status quo in the Middle East without allowing any regional power to disrupt this political balance in the region. This trajectory continued during the Gulf War after Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990. It was then too that the policy was intended to restore the balance in the region that Saddam had disrupted momentarily by his invasion of Kuwait. Such a trajectory continued during the containment era of the 1990s, and also during the Iraq war of 2003. During each period, the policy’s intent was to maintain the status quo in the Middle East.

Why was maintaining political balance in the Middle East so important to the policy? One of the participants in the focus group answers this question by stating “if Saddam was sitting on empty sand without oil, his problems wouldn’t be a big deal for us. America’s corporate interest, where oil is a big part of it, played an important part in
our political calculations. This was an active trajectory to either interfere passively as did Clinton or aggressively as did Bush. This is not going to go away until the oil is gone.”

Another participant of the focus group presents a different picture by arguing that there is a difference in the trajectory between Bush Sr. and Bush Jr. and their approach toward Iraq. The participant states that “we miss out if we do not calculate the differences between the Bushes. The current Bush is very much a mediocrity, supported by ideologues who believe that there can be a Pax Americana. His father, Bush Sr., on the other hand, was much more moderate and pragmatic and had a better understanding of the reality of world politics.”

Both perspectives, despite their differences, emphasize that there is a trajectory in the policy toward Iraq, a sort of phase shift that evolves with changes in the administrations as well as world politics. This is important because it stresses the notion that the policy toward Iraq is dynamic, never static, and always changing.

The Amebic Response

The microorganism known as the Ameba changes its shape and behavior in response to light. Borrowing from this metaphor in order to describe the behavior of the former Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein, the theme represents the former Iraqi regime’s response to the U.S. policy toward Iraq based on its need for survival. The theme consists of two concepts: “Control Issue,” and “Survival Issue.”
Control Issue

Consists of the former Iraqi regime's continuous attempts to sabotage or disrupt international relief efforts, such as the UN Oil-for-Food-Program in order to maintain its control over the Iraqi people. Control issue as practiced by the regime of Saddam Hussein continued without disruption without regard by the regime to ease up the suffering of the Iraqi people who were hurt by the UN imposed economic sanctions.

Survival Issue

Refers to the tactics and maneuvers adopted by the former Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein in order to survive. These tactics ranged from playing a cat-and-mouse game with the UN inspection teams, manipulating divisions within the United Nations Security Council in order to serve its interest, manipulating divisions among the Iraqi ethnic and tribal groups in order to disable unified efforts against the regime, and infiltrating the Iraqi opposition groups in order to pass false information to the United States, all intended to serve as means for the regime to remain in power.

Perhaps the Iraqi regime's tactic in passing false information to the United States about Iraq's WMD was the most dangerous game played by the regime. On one hand, passing this false information to the United States through double agents in the Iraqi opposition groups may have served as deterrence and delayed any plan of military invasion of Iraq. But, it brought the world into a consensus that Iraq was not entirely free of WMD and as such it prolonged the inspection of Iraq's weapons programs. It also led in 2003 to the conclusion by the United States that these weapons were a threat and warranted a full-scale invasion in order to disarm Iraq. Thus, while Iraq intended to use
false information about its WMD to deter invasion, in the end it actually invited its own invasion.

In a one-on-one interview with the former leader of an Iraqi opposition group in exile, "Saddam wanted to show the international community that he had those kind of weapons so America would not attack him. Tariq Aziz, while in prison today, admitted to this. So it was a kind of deterrence tactic. But for America, it had to look at Saddam’s history. The issue was trust."

Economic Issues

The theme of economic issues represents America’s economic interests based on oil and the dollar as power instruments to dominate the Middle East. The theme emerges by grouping together concepts such as “Capitalism,” “Dollar versus the Euro,” and “Power Interests.”

Capitalism

This concept refers to the specific mode of production that is based on capital investment and surplus. Capitalism uses natural resources, technology, and labor to change these materials into goods (products). Upon their sale profit is generated for the owners of the production means as a result of differences between aggregate costs and revenues. Capitalism is also based on competition, marketing and the use of the nation-state mechanism in order to advance its interest.

In the United States, capitalism is the main engine of its economy. The frequency in content analysis of 11 for a concept related to issues of capitalism reveals that the
health of the United States is based on the progress and prosperity of its capitalist system. As such, the United States government employs its public policies in order to support the American capitalist system on a global scale.

Content analysis demonstrates a frequency of 25 for a concept related to issues of power interest, a low frequency of one for a concept related to issues of colonialism, and a frequency of 11 for a concept related to issues of capitalism that since American capitalism depends on raw materials, open markets, and cheap labor, the United States government utilizes its policies and military in order to assure the American capitalist system’s access to these necessities. And, it is precisely in quest of such resources to compete successfully with other economic systems in the world that the U.S. policy toward Iraq has born. This policy has become part of the American capitalist system’s strive for survival and continuation as a viable economic system.

The Dollar Versus the Euro

The other concept that takes part in the construction of this theme is the competition between U.S. Dollar and the new European currency, the Euro. For decades, the Dollar maintained its supremacy in the world, reflecting the supremacy of the U.S. capitalist system in the world. However, with the formation of the European Union and the creation of the Euro as its new currency that supremacy of the Dollar is challenged.

Nation states that want to carve a notch for themselves outside the economic hegemony of American capitalism are welcoming the Euro. This drive toward the Euro is empowering Europe as a new economic and political block to challenge U.S. leadership and influence in the world. Content analysis with a frequency count of 12 for a concept
related to the issues of the Dollar versus the Euro indicates that Iraq became part of this equation by adopting the Euro for its economic transactions, a matter that further shifted the U.S. policy toward Iraq in favor of toppling the Iraqi regime and by doing, thereby reducing the influence of the Euro in that oil-rich part of the world.

Oil

The third concept that participates in the construction of this theme is “Oil.” This concept represents the impact of oil as a political influence on the policy. Oil impacted both Iraqi and U.S. behavior toward one another, dictating and directing the course of their policies.

During the containment era in the 1990s, for example, Iraq was allowed to sell limited amount of its oil in order to buy food for its citizens. OPEC exempted Iraq from its quota in order to help Iraq recover from the devastation of the Gulf War. Saddam used this quota also to sell oil that was smuggled outside UN authorization. Saddam’s action encouraged U.S. policy to adopt a more aggressive approach toward Iraq in order to end the smuggling of Iraqi oil and impacting of the world oil market.

One of the participants in the focus group alludes to the role of oil in directing U.S. policy and leading to war in 2003, stating that “oil on its own was not a cause for war, especially when Iraq was willing to sell its oil and we were willing to buy it. The important issue was controlling this oil and using it politically to benefit U.S. interest in its competition with Europe.”

Another focus group participant agrees with this notion, adding that “Iraq was always a bit of a question mark, especially when it nationalized its oil in 1972. After
September 11, 2001, Iraqi oil became a weak spot in the link between oil and U.S. power, so we needed to secure that link and strengthen it by removing the source that made it weak for us: Saddam.”

In a one-on-one interview with a political historian, the importance of oil in directing the policy is echoed once more. According to this expert, “the underlining motive for the Bush administration to go to war in 2003 was oil. The administration had a domestic agenda to roll-back domestic relation in the United States to the 1890s, by securing the economic advantages for the key sectors in the society and by bringing us back to complete reliance on oil.”

The high frequency count in content analysis of 70 for a concept related to issues of oil and its impact on the U.S. policy toward Iraq, the frequency count of 30 for a concept related to issues of hegemony, and the frequency count of 15 for a concept related to issues of containment demonstrate that when demand for energy became the central issue in U.S. policy, the Bush administration’s policy toward Iraq was influenced by increased demand for foreign oil by the United States both as an energy source and as a political veto to maintain U.S. hegemony in the world. It was primarily because of this demand that the Bush administration was determined to end the policy of containment in Iraq and to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein by force.

**Power Interest**

The last concept that goes in the formation of this theme is that of Power Interest. This refers to the special interest of the United States as a nation-state obligated to protect
the interest of its corporations. Power interest plays a major role in shaping the policy toward Iraq as well as other nations in the world.

Content analysis provides a frequency of 25 for a concept related to issues of power interests that one of the major reasons for the Bush administration to go to war with Iraq in 2003, for example, was because American oil and military corporations foresaw in Iraq a fertile arena not only for profit but also for global economic hegemony. The war became a vehicle to advance the economic interest of corporate America.

The line between U.S. interest and corporate America’s interest became so murky that when we speak of U.S. interest, we are in effect speaking of America’s corporate interest. The American government on its own has no specific economic interests because it is not a producer. Rather, it relies on taxes it collects from the public and profit-generating organizations in order to pay for its programs.

The core function of government in the United States is to protect the economic interest of the private sector. Without the private sector, there would be no American nation-state. And the government does so through its policies, treaties, bureaucracy, and the use of its military.

One of the most vital industries in the American private sector is energy. Energy is either produced, such as electricity, or generated through the use of natural resources, such as the sun, oil, and coal. Oil is the largest of these energy sources and the corporations that produce this type of energy (also known as fossil fuel energy) are among the most politically influential segments in America’s economic sector. U.S. government devotes a considerable amount of its resources to protect and advance the interest of this group.
The lesson corporate America learned from the Cold War was not to allow other economic rivals in the world and nation-states once again to challenge the power interest of the United States. With the rise of regionalism in the world, such as the European Union and the Asian economic block, America’s power interest began to see an emerging challenge to its dominant role in the world. This challenge came in the form of the Euro, the Yin, the European Common Market, and the rise of the Asian capitalist industries.

A participant in the focus group captures the role of power interest in impacting U.S. policies. According to this participant, “in regard to our policy in Iraq, there was a sense that we needed to do more, especially in response to our power interest in the world. There was a coalition of political forces arising out of the opportunity of the United States deemed as the single super power.”

Another participant in the focus group agrees with this statement by saying that “if we talked about Iraq in terms of simple, short-term economic interest, this will not explain our involvement there. Unless we talk about a long-term power interest, and economics is an important part of it, then we can see the connection.” A third participant in the focus group wants to link the U.S. military function in Iraq with that of power interest by suggesting that “we cannot explain the U.S. military function in Iraq unless we talk about power interest and the ideology of groups such as Project for the New American Century and others who brought it to action in relation to America’s power of interest.”

Power interest, as such, is a major economic and political factor both in our capitalist system and in driving our governmental policies. Because of this impact, we see ourselves departing from the traditional capitalist systems in the world, such as the one in
Europe. This departure is reflected in Iraq, where the Europeans approached Iraq in a certain way while we approached it in another. Europe seemed to prefer a more peaceful approach toward solving the Iraqi problem while we preferred a more aggressive approach.

Pax Americana

This theme is a metaphor that represents America's drive to dominate the world as a new imperial power through the use of its military, political and economic hegemony. The concepts that go into the construction of this theme are "Colonialism," "Hegemony," "Imperialism," and "Militarism."

Colonialism

This concept represents the military and political occupation of one nation by another through acts of war and invasion. In dealing with Iraq, content analysis reveals that the United States constructed its policy toward Iraq as an imperial power, dictating to the smaller and weaker nation of Iraq to adhere to U.S. political will from a position of power and intimidation. This geared the U.S. policy toward Iraq more toward securing U.S. political and economic interests than implementing UN resolutions pertaining to Iraqi disarmament.

Hegemony

This concept represents the political or economic domination of one political entity over another. In dealing with Iraq, the U.S. thus operated from a position of
intended dominance rather than merely working within the United Nations regulations. The history of the United States' foreign policy also reflects such a hegemonial tendencies, such as in the U.S. occupations of the Philippines, Granada, and Haiti.

In a one-one-one interview, a political scientist and a leading consultant for the Republican Party argues that the United States was justified to practice such an approach toward Iraq because of its political, economic and military power as the only superpower in the world. This expert reflected a Hegelian justification for such a practice by stating that “the U.S. must be looked at as a great world power that it is in other people’s interests to try to interest into cooperating with them. Politics in the world have to change since no other nation is able to build strong military capability sufficient to counter the weight of U.S. military."

One of the focus group participants agrees with the expert in his analysis of U.S. power. However, the focus group participant also alludes to other powers that are on the rise in the world that they may constitute a challenge to U.S. hegemony in the future. The participant states that “the only foreseeable counter-weight to the United States is China. China is able to develop its muscles further in the future, and other nations in the world will rally behind it in order to play against the U.S. and bring about another bipolar world. People resent U.S. power even though it is a benign power."

Another participant in the focus group points to the danger of having U.S. power dominated by ideologues in government, as they will manipulate this power to serve particular political and economic interests with no regard to world peace and U.S. leadership position in the world. The focus group participant argues that “the ideologues in the Bush team are bound on world domination through the use of U.S. military. This is
very dangerous and will further make us isolated and hated in the world. It is aimed to serve the interest and greed of a few American corporations.”

**Imperialism**

The subjugating by force or coercion of the political and economic system of one nation to the power, political and economic will of a dominating nation-state is imperialism. In dealing with Iraq, the United States operated from the position of imperialism rather than working within the United Nations framework of regulations and laws.

One of the participants in the focus group suggests that the Iraq war of 2003 was a continuation of an imperialistic policy that the United States had adopted once it remained the only super power in the world after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This person states that “the clear cause for the recent war goes to as early as 1998 when we were truly feeling like an imperialist power with the Soviet Union gone.”

Content analysis with a frequency of 14 for a concept related to issues imperialism reveals that the Iraq war of 2003 was driven by the same mentality as that of an imperial power. The United States was able to assert its will with little or no regard to international norms. A participant in the focus group agrees with this analysis and identified two specific conditions that formed the U.S. imperialist policy toward Iraq. These conditions are “the reconstitution of an American hegemony in the Middle East is unrivaled and in need of no legitimation, and the assumption that the United States is responsible for the maintenance of a stable regional security conducive to its interest.”

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Militarism

This concept refers to the use of military as a political tool to advance the regional and global interests of a nation-state. In its relations with Iraq, the United States acted from the position of militarism to dictate its policy rather than acting within the United Nations regulations. A member of the focus group places the U.S. policy toward Iraq within the context of militarism by suggesting that “America needed a target since the Soviet Union no longer existed. We needed a target for our military. Having a military makes no sense if you have no enemy. Iraq provided that military enemy.”

The frequency count in content analysis of 34 for a concept related to issues of militarism indicates that “for the Pentagon to maintain its tremendous budget, arms industries, and feeding its contracts, for the oil companies to increase their profits, and for the Bush administration to establish a permanent military presence in the Middle East to control its oil resources, Iraq was presented as a challenge in order to justify U.S. military intervention.”

Accordingly, militarism is the language of colonialism and imperialism in order to maintain U.S. hegemony in the world. Iraq was the arena to test such a policy and provide a bridge to extend U.S. dominant power to other points of interests in the world and manipulate existing nation-states to submit to U.S. political, economic and military will.

The Telephone Pole

This theme is a metaphor that represents the collapse of the opposition party in the United States as a viable voice for political discourse, resulting in the lack of political
debates and the supremacy of artificial priorities to take hold under the guise of justifying U.S. political agendas. The policy toward Iraq is one of the arenas that is witnessing such a development. The emerging political agenda stands alone as a telephone pole, distant from other political agendas that are achieved through dialogue and the democratic process of political examinations and debates.

Several concepts go into the construction of this theme. These concepts are “Democratic Cave-in,” “Discourse,” “Debate,” and “Priorities and Resources.”

**Debate**

The first concept that goes in the construction of this theme is that of the absence of debate in the policy toward Iraq. Debate, as the name suggests, to the absence of political discourse on agendas presented by various administrations to Congressional committees on U.S. policy toward Iraq. As a consequence, these agendas are enacted as part of the policy without going through the required examinations required by democratic debates and due process. The lack or absence of debate aided in the emerging of political unipolarism in governance of the United States, which in turn aid in the development of the administrative state and the imperial presidency.

Content analysis yields a frequency of seven for a concept related to issues of debate that the most interesting feature of the debate over the Iraqi issue is that it never took place. Many words flowed, and there was dispute about how to proceed. But discussion was kept within rigid bounds that excluded the obvious answer that the U.S. had to act according to its national interest.
In a one-on-one interview with a political historian, reference is made to the notion that the issue of debate became problematic during the presidency of George W. Bush, and the lack of debate was a form of political tragedy that impacted governance in the United States. The expert states that “it is tragic that there was so little debate about the war in Iraq in 2003, and that the Democrats gave a blank check for the invasion of Iraq and caved in to the administration.”

**Democratic Cave-in**

This concept refers to the notion that the Democratic members of Congress did not oppose or seriously challenge the political agendas of two U.S. Republican administrations in 1991 and 2003 and oppose these wars in Iraq. As content analysis reveals through a frequency of 13 for a concept related to issues of Democratic cave in that many Democratic members of Congress became cheerleaders for the Republican administration’s agenda in Iraq. And, contrary to the Democratic members of Congress, their Republican counterparts challenged the political agenda of the Democratic administration of Bill Clinton and pushed it to adopt a more aggressive policy toward Iraq, including signing into law the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 and adopting regime change in Iraq as the official policy of the United States.

**Discourse**

The third concept that takes part in the construction of this theme is Discourse. Discourse is the essence of politics. When there is no discourse, politics is a mere dictation of narrow, unchallenged and unexamined viewpoints.
Commenting on the importance of political discourse in U.S. politics and the resulting process of decision making in governance, a political scientist states in a one-on-one interview, “people talk, that is how they find out about what is going on in the world, and that is how they deliberate and make decisions.” The expert, who is also a strategist for the Republican Party, does not see the Congressional act in 2003 to authorize President Bush with the decision to go to war as something that is outside the tradition of political discourse in America. The expert states that “Congress authorized Bush to go to war in Iraq because that is what Congress has done historically. After the Vietnam crisis, Congress passed the War Powers Act to restrain the power of the president, but even that Act delegated to the president the authority to declare war but he had 90 days to state the reason.”

The expert justifies Congress’ delegation of its authority to declare war to the executive branch because of the awesome responsibility of such decision. According to the expert, “Congress persistently placed that responsibility with the executive, because war is too daunting of a responsibility for a contemporary Congress to imagine.”

A participant of the focus group agrees with the expert’s analysis and refers to the American system of government as one designed in a manner that allows for such delegation of authority as part of political discourse itself. The focus group participant states that “the issue here is the synergy of interests. We talk about checks and balances, but checks and balances operate in an environment in which they are integrated. Congress is reluctant to accept the full weight of making a decision about going to war, and it prefer to put that accountability on the head of the executive branch. The executive, on the other hand, is happy to do it.”
Another participant in the focus group alludes to the danger of delegating the Congressional power of declaring war to the Executive by arguing that “Congress was interested in such Constitutional responsibility in order to arrive at the decision to go to war after lengthy discourse. Surrendering this responsibility to the Executive will deprive the decision of discourse.”

Another focus group participant agrees with the former participant’s statement, and to demonstrate this point in the argument, the participant refers to the error in judgment that the Bush administration has made by relying on faulty intelligence as evidence to go to war instead of allowing for the political discourse to take place. The focus group’s participant states that “Powell’s address to the UN was not convincing because the so-called evidence seemed to be trivial. If there were enough debates on Iraq’s WMD in Congress, Bush would not have had the authority to rely on such faulty intelligence and go to war.”

Why was the Bush administration so convinced in its belief about the Iraqi threat that it discouraged the traditional debating of issues to take place? Another participant in the focus group answers the question by stating that “during the 1980s, the CIA considered the Soviet Union as a serious threat. Later, it saw the situation quite differently. By pressuring the governmental apparatus, such as intelligence, U.S. politicians make situations appear closer to what they want those answers to be. This is our new political discourse.”

A political historian comments on the discourse within the government apparatus itself, such as between the State Department and the Pentagon. In a one-on-one interview, the expert states that “in 1991, there was a great deal of controversy between the State
Department and the Department of Defense, on what action should be taken regarding Saddam. In some ways like 2003 there were not consistent views of what should be done.”

A participant in the focus group connects the continuous political discourse in the United States to the Cold War politics. The focus group’s participant states that “politics in America is really connected to Cold War politics and the idea of George Kennan in the 1950s in stabilizing what have been put in place in the world. Those who had this vision were able to be more persuasive than other voices.”

Another focus group participant emphasizes more the impact of the emerging disconnect between governmental agencies on the policy’s direction than on Kennan’s notion of maintaining the status quo in the world. He argues that “one can be struck by the discourse in 2003 between the Pentagon’s plan for the invasion of Iraq and that of the State Department. It was the disconnect between these two groups that lent credence to the notion that our policy toward Iraq was designed to achieve the ultimate goals of people like Wolfowitz and others in the Pentagon.”

Priorities and Resources

This concept refers to political operatives acting on behalf of the Bush administration and its policy toward Iraq to negate political debates with the opposition party for the sake of artificial political priorities and agendas based on the perspectives of the controlling political party in the White House. The history chapter suggests that such tendencies are sought in order to minimize criticism by the opposition party to the
administration’s political agenda in removing Saddam by force and direct military intervention.

Moby Dick

This is a story of a whale that had to remove a threat to its environment, through the use of destructive force, that caused the slaying of its mate. This metaphor represents public policy that utilizes force in retaliation to offenses against the United States, instead of understanding the roots of these acts and treating their causes.

On September 11, 2001 terrorists attacked America. The Bush administration designed its national security policy to prevent future terrorist attacks by adopting preemptive force as a response in protecting the homeland. Little or no attention was paid to treating the causes of the terrorist attacks on America, and Iraq was chosen as one of the arena to witness America’s wrath.

As such, the U.S. policy toward Iraq became analogous to the rage of Moby Dick, and hence, this theme was selected to explain this particular aspect of the policy. The concepts that participate in the construction of this theme are “War as a Corrective Action,” “Force,” “Hobbes versus Kant,” the “American Psyche,” “Unipolar World,” and “Capacity.”

War as a Corrective Action

This concept represents the political mindset that war can be used as a corrective measure for failed policies or to remove a threat. In relation to Iraq and the United States,
both the Iraqi government and various U.S. administrations used military operations to correct what they perceived to be failed policies or to respond to outside threats.

Content analysis through a frequency of six for a concept related to issues of war as a corrective action demonstrates that Iraq used war against Iran in 1980 as a preemptive strike against what it perceived to be an Iranian threat to the security and stability of the regime. Iraq also used the military operation against Kuwait in 1990 as a response to what it perceived to be an economic threat posed by Kuwait to Iraq’s national interest.

Examination of such data also reveals that the U.S. used the Gulf War of 1991 to counter the Iraqi illegal invasion of Kuwait and remove the threat to U.S. national interest in the region. The U.S. used Operation Desert Fox in 1998 as a response to what it perceived to be an Iraqi defiance of UN resolutions and refusal to disarm. And, it used war in 2003 as a preemptive strike to correct the failed policy of containment and to neutralize what it believed to be an imminent threat posed by Iraq’s WMD and ties with al-Qaeda. In all these cases, excessive force was used to justify failed policies and to enforce new political agendas.

Force

The second concept that takes part in the construction of this theme is that of “Force” and the utility of the mentality of force when used either by Iraq against its citizens or neighbors or by the United States against Iraq. Content analysis yields a frequency of 44 for a concept related to issues of force that Saddam’s solution for his
problem with Kuwait, for example, was an example of the mentality of using force to serve a political agenda.

The history chapter in this dissertation shows how Saddam responded to the uprising inside Iraq that followed Iraq’s defeat in Kuwait with the use of massive force. Force was also used by the United States against Iraq in order to serve its political purposes. The excessive use of force, for example, during the Gulf War of 1991 was intended not only to end Iraqi occupation of Kuwait but also to send a message to Saddam and other nations in the world not to repeat such an adventure in the future.

The use of force in 2003 was not provoked by Iraq, and it was decided entirely as a political choice by the Bush administration that perceived Iraq (although without any credible evidence) as posing an imminent threat to the United States. Hence, force became a political tool to serve the purpose of a particular policy.

**War as a Metaphor**

This concept refers to the political use of war as a metaphor in order to explain a public policy designed to resolve a certain conflict. For example, poverty was identified by the Johnson administration as an obstacle for creating a Great Society. As such, the administration launched its metaphorical war on poverty by designing political measures to combat poverty. The Reagan administration used the same kind of metaphor to launch a war on drugs. Then, the Bush administration used it to fight terrorism.

War as a metaphor has become a normative phrase in American political jargon as well as a policy toward Iraq. However, when the line between what is fiction and what is real becomes murky, it leads to catastrophe. This was the case of using war as a metaphor
by the Bush administration in 2001 and 2002 that eventually led to the creation of an
actual war in Iraq in 2003.

**Hobbes Versus Kant**

This concept represents the philosophical differences between two political
perspectives. On the one hand, there is the Hobbesian philosophy that believes in force
and cruelty as the main attributes that characterize community. Man lives in a savage
state of nature. On the other hand, and the Kantian philosophy believes in reason and
enlightenment as the basis to build a human community. Content analysis yields a
frequency of nine for a concept related to issues of Hobbesian thinking versus that of
Kantian that the policy toward Iraq leaned toward the Hobbesian approach. The policy
has become hostage to a mentality of force, fear and violence.

The Iraqi regime used the same Hobbesian perspective as well and resorted to
violence when its authority was threatened. As such, for both Iraq and the United States,
violece became the language of their policies in order to justify positions of authority
and power.

In the United States, the Bush administration went a step further when violence
was curtailed by international mediation. It invented an enemy in order to institutionalize
fear and preemption. And with the political manipulation of fear, the Bush administration
collapsed governance in the United States inwards toward an imperial presidency by
turning fear and violence into forms of political legitimacy.

Western Europe, on the other hand, walked away from the Hobbesian notion of
fear and violence and embraced the Kantian notion of enlightenment and rational
thinking. The European approach toward Iraq (with the exception of England and the former Soviet client states in Eastern Europe) differed from that of the United States.

**The American Psyche**

This concept refers to the notion that America uses its policies and military forces in the world not to create wars or force its will on others but to act as a benevolent and benign power in order to protect the oppressed and promote peace and democracy. America is thus neither an imperialist nation nor a colonial power, and its policy toward Iraq is generated from America’s nobility and commitment to root out the evil Saddam Hussein from Iraq.

The concept neglects the historic role of America in supporting Saddam and other tyrants in the world so long as it was in the U.S. interest to do so, enforcing a crippling sanction on Iraq for 12 years that resulted in the senseless deaths of millions of innocent Iraqi children and subjecting Iraq to routine bombings that resulted in the killing of thousands of civilians. This concept is used by hawkish politicians in the United States to manipulate public sentiment in justifying violence in the policy toward Iraq.

This concept views the pay-off for America’s investments in Iraq as a matter of pride. In a one-on-one interview with a political scientist, “pride means a great deal to Americans. We defended Europe to protect our own freedom by keeping other people from slavery, and we were happy and proud to do so. This is part of the American psyche. This underlines the entire U.S. foreign policy.”

A participant in the focus group attributes the Bush administration’s plan to build democracy in Iraq to the American psyche and concern with doing good. The focus group
participant states that “democracy in Iraq is doable because the fact is what really is at stake here the argument that all human beings are capable of being free. The United States believes that all human beings are capable of living the life of freedom and benefit from democracy.”

Another participant in the focus group agrees with this assessment, and attributes the United States decision not to invade Iraq in 1991 to the American psyche as well. “Powell and Schwarzkopf were intimidated by the American culture. The American public did not allow any kind of deviation from the objective of the war and that was to liberate Kuwait only.”

A third participant in the focus group uses the concept of the American psyche to criticize President Bush’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003. The participant states that “with the current Bush administration the attitude that we had in 1991 toward invading another country had completely disappeared. The idea was that you couldn’t go to war unless you get it over with in a hurry, before any American got killed. And that argues against our theory of occupying a country now.”

But a fourth participant in the focus group disagrees and blames the United States itself for blocking the emergence of democracy in the Middle by supporting reactionary and totalitarian regimes. The participant argues that “it was the U.S. who continued to support the anti-democratic regimes in the region, instead of supporting democracy. We cannot impose democracy on Iraq. If we do, it will fail.”

A political historian explains the changes in U.S. policy in the region based on the concept of the American psyche. In another one-on-one interview, the expert states that “it is quite clear that the people of good will in the U.S. had deep concern about Saddam
Hussein and his inhumanity, as well as the corruption of his regime. The picture of Hussein as someone capable of using WMD was already there. There was also a genuine fear of post-Cold War regimes that seem to be out of control."

A participant in the focus group attempts to connect the current shift in the policy toward Iraq with its history while maintaining the influence of the American psyche on such policy. The focus group participant states that “the levels of American psyche and strategic planning are formative. If we connected that to the Iranian revolution in 1979, the 1970’s oil embargo, the Reagan’s presidency and the hostage crisis, then we would have a background picture for the current Republican administration.”

**Unipolar World**

This concept refers to the political reality after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the United States as the only remaining superpower in the world. With the world having only one superpower, it has become a world of unipolarism, with virtually no other country capable of challenging the policies and military might of the United States. And without such challenge, the U.S. policy toward Iraq becomes devoid of effective opposition by other nation-states. This allows the United States to dictate its will both on Iraq and the world.

A participant in the focus group comments on such reality, and what this means to the American people. The participant states that “when the United States became the single superpower, we no longer had the Soviet Union to challenge our political will. And after the terrible tragedy of September 11, the American people developed a unilateral sense to do something about Iraq with or without other nations supporting us.”
Capacity

The sum total of the United States’ military, political, intelligence, and information capacity to deal with internal and external threats comprises its capacity. One of these perceived external threats was Iraq.

Capacity has to do with America’s defensive capability to encounter, fight and eliminate the source of the threat. The U.S. defense apparatus and intelligence networks are primarily designed to respond to threats posed by nation-states. This design is the result of long decades of the Cold War. However, current threats are generated by clandestine, privately-funded networks of operatives. These threats constitute high intensity threshold (HIT), while traditional threats posed by nation-states constitute low intensity threshold (LIT).

The policy toward Iraq responds to an LIT. However, policymakers present the threat as a high intensity threshold. This misguided identification of threat is based on U.S. capacity to respond primarily to nation-state threats, rather than the administration’s political agenda to get rid of Saddam’s regime.

In order to be able to respond to all kinds of threats, especially those posed by non-nation states, the U.S. must redesign its defense and intelligence capacity beyond its current function as a Cold-War warrior. The United States must align its capacity with a clear definition of what constitute high or low threshold threats and respond with clear and objective strategy to each threat based on the appropriate capacity.

A participant in the focus group refers to the Bush administration’s use of faulty intelligence as a measure of such outdated capacity. The participant states that “the problem with the intelligence was that America lacked human sources on the ground in
Iraq and instead it relied on the Iraqi opposition groups. America did not want to create a political problem here at home of having American citizens being captured or killed as spies.”

Eskimo Community

The environment of the Eskimos is cold and bitter and that requires good management of scarce resources in order to preserve heat and energy for survival needs. Such necessity requires cooperation, a sense of community and universal association as well as regional collaboration, multilateralism, and acceptance of norms by the collective in order to maintain the collective will to survive.

This theme is composed of several concepts: “Cold War Politics,” “Geopolitics,” “Legitimacy,” “The Middle East and the Status Quo,” “Multilateralism” and “Regionalism.”

Cold War Politics

This concept refers to geopolitics as a whole and the United States policy toward Iraq in particular at the time when the Soviet Union still constituted the world’s second superpower. For America, Cold War politics means taking actions after considering possible responses by the Soviet Union.

The policy toward Iraq during the Cold War had to consider a challenge by the Soviet Union and, as such, it was balanced and reflective of geopolitical interest in the world. After the collapse of the Soviet Union it became unbalanced and representative of the narrow interest of the United States.
Content analysis reveals through a frequency of 12 for a concept related to issues of Cold War politics that when comparing the Gulf War of 1991 that was born during the Cold War, with the Iraq war of 2003 that took place after the end of Cold War, a difference in the policy’s approach toward Iraq could be seen clearly. The Gulf War was restrained with international norms and United Nations authorization. The 2003 war was conducted outside UN authority and in violation of international norms.

In a one-on-one interview, a political historian explains such differences, “there was strategic concern that included the Cold War and the influence of the Soviet Union, with Iraq on its way to becoming a client state of the Soviet Union. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. was no longer concerned about a counterweight to its foreign policy.”

A participant in the focus group agrees, arguing that “we attend to the views rather more of a kind of balance of powers, playing one against another, rather than responding to them directly. With the Soviet Union having veto power in the UN, we did not have much flexibility in dealing with others within the very troubled environment in the world, such as in Iraq. That changed once the Soviet Union disappeared.”

Another focus group participant expands further on this observation, suggesting that “Iraq was a pro-Soviet state. When the Soviet Union collapsed, a lot of things had to be reshuffled in the new world order. At this point, the U.S. had the upper hand in settling things with Iraq for its past associations and pay a price for being a former client-state of the Soviet Union.”

Another focus group participant alludes to the demise of even concepts such as Pan-Arabism, nationalism, and Baathism once the Soviet Union collapsed. “Some of
Saddam's action had also to do with the idealism of Pan-Arabism, of Baathism. Such idealism no longer held ground in the Arab world, especially in a world without the Soviet Union and the U.S. as the single superpower. It was the Soviet Union that enabled such regimes to promote their idealism.”

Geopolitics

This concept refers the collective international political relationships as nation-states attempt to deal and negotiate with one another for a peaceful coexistence. Geopolitics, however, often is complex since it represents the various political interests and agendas of different nation-states in the world.

At times, dialogues and negotiations between these nation-states are successful in reaching treaties and alliances. Other times, they fail, leading to conflicts and even wars. Within such a complex system, the U.S. policy toward Iraq has born. Because of such conditions, the forces of antagonism and alliances in the world are influencing the policy.

Analyzing the policy toward Iraq in the context of geopolitics, a political scientist and an expert on U.S. policy toward Iraq stated in a one-on-one interview that “the policy toward Iraq needs to be looked at in the context of broader world politics. It is a big mistake to try to turn relationships between the United States and any particular nation into an immediate relationship.”

Another participant in the focus group agrees with this assessment and identified the Gulf War as an example of an emerging political phenomenon that is impacted by world politics. This participant states that “the central factor in the 1991 war was the disappearance of the Soviet Union, which changed the calculus of power in the region
and gave an opportunity to the United States to think differently about how to react and relate to Iraq."

Another participant in the focus group further explains the Gulf War's international efforts as remaining within the confines of world politics by suggesting that "Bush Sr. realized there was a practical reason to have world support, especially from the Arab countries. We needed coalition support so the United States did not look as if was alone in the war with Iraq. Without a coalition we would have endangered and destabilized the region."

Another focus group participant expands on this statement: "the reason former President Bush did not go to Baghdad in 1991 is because he did not have a mandate from the United Nations to do so. If he was going to go alone, the coalition that he put together was going to collapse. Also, our Arab partners did not want to see us bombing an Arab country and seeing the Iraqis butchered outside the UN mandate."

The political scientist, however, stresses the importance of having nation-state interests continue to play a significant role in world politics. In a one-on-one interview with this expert, "we continue to look after our national interest. But the fundamental issue is: we want to promote our interest unilaterally or should we do it through collaboration and cooperation?"

A participant in the focus group answers this question in comparing the administrations of former President Bush and of President George W. Bush. The participant states that "the former president was versed in the dynamics of Middle Eastern politics. His administration did not want to take a unilateral action. His son, however, had alienated U.S. traditional allies."
Another focus group participant references the relationship between the United States and Europe or between the United States and the United Nations regarding Iraq as a product of such world politics. The participant argues that “the impact of the Iraq war on the world is a question of the relationship between the U.S. and Europe and between the U.S. and the UN. No one can hide from the reality of these guerillas living in the world.”

The political scientist offers a remedy to the seemingly complicated political dynamics in the world by suggesting that the world needed to agree with the United States on a viable strategy in finding solutions to world problems. The expert states that “the only viable strategy for the world is to find ways to interest the U.S. in cooperating with them, rather than antagonizing it.”

The expert justifies his proposal with the notion that the United States is a superpower that is reconstructing the political order in the world. This ability, as such, entitles the United States the privilege of guiding political directions in world politics. According to the expert, “the U.S. began approaching Eastern European countries to counter-balance France and Germany. This is done based on historical tension in Europe. Even the expansion of NATO is based on controlling such classical sources of discord and to displace the geopolitical center from Europe.”

A member of the focus group agrees with this analysis by suggesting that “in terms of geopolitics, it is one of the clever moves by the current administration to court the expansion of NATO and undercut the European unity that was forged economically.”
Legitimacy

The third concept that participates in the construction of this Eskimo Community theme is Legitimacy. Issues of legitimacy have to do with respecting international laws and established international norms. Iraq violated these norms, for example, in 1991 by invading a sovereign state, and the UN responded by authorizing force to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait.

Yet, the U.S. launched a preemptive and unprovoked war on Iraq in 2003 and occupied a sovereign nation without authorization from the United Nations. These actions placed the entire U.S. policy toward Iraq under the scrutiny of international law to examine its legitimacy.

The UN authority as a source of political legitimacy, however, is questioned in an interview with a political scientist and a strategist for the Republican Party. The expert argues that “we often take the UN Security Council as a source of law, which it never is. A prudent example was what happened in Haiti during the 1990s. The U.S. worked the Security Council to justify its intervention in Haiti by manipulating the refugees issue to turn the tide on and off almost at will as a consequence of our sanctions and the vigor of our enforcement of the policy at sea.”

A political historian comments on the U.S. manipulation of the United Nations in order to get resolutions passed in its favor. He states that “once the U.S. gets the declaration it wants from the UN, other states that are carrying out the Security Council policy will retain the right to judge the actions of the party in question. In 1991 the U.S. could easily have decided to get the UN to approve the invasion of Iraq under the guise of
removing the threat. But it chose not to do so at the time because Bush was not ready to replace Saddam.”

Content analysis provides a frequency of 47 for a concept related to issues of legitimacy that the U.N. Charter is a solemn treaty recognized by the United States as the foundation of international law. The U.S. Constitution provides a mechanism by declaring treaties as the law of the land. It further authorizes Congress to punish offenses against this law. With the Bush administration declaring war on Iraq in 2003 outside the specifics of the UN Charter, it had violated the U.S. Constitution that obligates the United States to honor all treaties that the United States is a signatory to.

The history chapter demonstrates that it is the Security Council that determines the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and shall make recommendation, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, which detail the preferred measures not involving the use of armed force. The only exception is Article 51, which permits the right of self-defense against armed attack until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

These arguably are legitimate ways to react to the many threats to world peace. If Iraq’s neighbors feeling threatened, for example, they can approach the Security Council to authorize appropriate measures to respond to the threat. If the U.S. feels threatened, it can do the same. But no state has the authority to make its own determination on these matters and to act as it chooses. Accordingly, the U.S. had no such authority in 2003 to interpret the UN resolution unilaterally and invade Iraq based on its own arbitrary interpretation.
Russian President Vladimir Putin summarizes both the negative and positive aspects of the 2003 war in Iraq within the context of international law by stating that “the toppling of the tyrannical regime of Saddam Hussein was a plus. But, the human losses, the humanitarian catastrophe, the destruction of Iraq were negative.” Putin calls the U.S.-led war in Iraq “illegitimate and a threat to international law.” He also criticized the United States for failing to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, which was the only justification for war and argued that “even in the most acute moment of the fight for its survival, the Iraqi regime did not use such weapons. If in the last moment of its existence it did not use them, it means they do not exist” (Kalamazoo Gazette, 2003, p. 2A).

**The Middle East and the Status Quo**

The other concept that takes part in the construction of the Eskimo Community theme is the concept of maintaining the political status quo in the Middle East. The concept refers to the notion that policies of Middle Eastern countries and that of the United States are primarily designed to prevent radical changes in the political dynamics in the region of the Middle East and to maintain its political status quo.

Content analysis reveals through a frequency of 13 for a concept related to issues of the Middle East and status quo that it was based on such a notion that many Arab nations cooperated with the United States in supporting Saddam during the 1980s. The purpose of that support was not to empower Iraq to emerge as the most powerful nation in the region but to box the Islamic revolution in Iran within its own boundaries and help sustain the political status quo in the region.
It was also this concept that led the United States and many Arab nations to reject Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 once more restore the status quo to the region. And it was this same rationale that drove the Bush administration to launch its war against Iraq in 2003 in order to maintain the status quo by returning a democratized Iraq to the community of nations after the U.S. was no longer able to maintain its troops in Saudi Arabia to contain Saddam after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.

**Multilateralism**

Decisions taken whether on national or international levels based on multiple inputs, perspectives and concerns comprise multilateralism. This involves debate, discourse, dialogue, and compromise through negotiations.

The transformation of policy from multilateralism to unilateralism is a failure of policy. While multilateralism often enjoys legitimacy because it involves multiple voices, unilateralism often rejects the legitimacy of multilateralism because such legitimacy politically threatens the political agenda of a single nation-state. The U.S. policy toward Iraq has experienced both unilateral and multilateral approaches.

Considering both policy options toward Iraq, a participant in the focus group emphasizes the importance of political experience in order to develop an appreciation for multilateralism. The participant states that “Former President Bush had a different approach than his son. A lot of wisdom came out of his experience. But his son came to politics as an ideologue with no experience in foreign policy. Bill Clinton was also an experienced politician and because of that, he saw the importance of multilateralism.”
Regionalism

Political, economic, and military decisions taken by nation-states are often influenced by the nations within this geographical sphere. Examples of such regions are Europe, the Middle East, and the Western Hemisphere. Even though the U.S. policy toward Iraq is primarily designed to serve its national interest, regionalism does influence the policy.

Analyzing European regionalism and its impact on the political approach toward Iraq, a political scientist states in a one-on-one interview that “Europe will never be a counterweight to the U.S. because of the problem with France and Germany. Eastern Europe is not going to settle for that. Europe does not have the political will to completely restructure itself or find itself creating a new regime in which France and Germany can disappear for the sake of a united Europe.”

In explaining Middle Eastern regionalism, a former leader of an Iraqi opposition group in exile states in a one-on-one interview that “the problem in not supporting the war of 2003 was created by a regional influence. Turkey, for example, did not want to see the Kurds independent in northern Iraq. The Saudis did not want to see a Shiite state in southern Iraq that would bolster and strengthen Iran.”

A participant in the focus group belittles regionalism and emphasizes the importance of nation-states and their narrow interests in explaining the policy toward Iraq. The participant, for example, sees no authentic regionalism in the Middle East. Most Arab nations supported the United States’ war in 2003 to get rid of Saddam even if they did not do so publicly. The participant argues that “the Arab governments secretly
supported the invasion of Iraq in 2003, but publicly they did not announce it because of internal concerns.”

Tactics

The means to achieve strategic ends are tactics. Here tactics refers to the means of achieving U.S. policy goals toward Iraq. Tactics are various procedures and utilities adopted by the United States for the purpose of implementing its political agenda.

When the agenda is not clear, tactical means vary, thereby reflecting the confusion in the strategy. But, when the agenda is clear, the tactics used to achieve the political strategy are rational. In the case of U.S. policy toward Iraq, there was no clear strategy toward Iraq as of 1990. As such, the tactics employed toward advancing this policy are numerous, illustrating the confusion and disarray in the political strategy itself.

This theme therefore requires using a total of eleven concepts. These concepts are “Attila the Hun,” “Circular Reasoning,” “Coercion,” “Current as Epiphenomenon,” “Misuse or Misinterpretation of Intelligence,” “Fear Factor,” “Irony,” “Machiavellian Methods,” “Falsehood,” “Misleading,” and “Patterns of Behavior.”

Attila the Hun

This concept refer to the tactic of transforming Saddam’s image in the world by U.S. government and U.S. media from that of the usual brutal dictator to an even larger and further exaggerated image more akin Attila the Hun. Content analysis with a frequency of ten for the concept of Attila the Hun indicates that this portrayal of Saddam as Attila the Hun made it easier for the United States to launch two wars on Iraq, reduce
Iraq to one person and punish the entire country for the crimes of one person, placing the country under crippling sanction for 12 years, and then occupying the country under unpopular and illegitimate military control.

Circular Reasoning

The notion of doing A as a prerequisite for accomplishing B, and doing B as a prerequisite for accomplishing C is termed here as circular reasoning. As such, the U.S. policy toward Iraq, for example, is adopting certain steps in order to reach a certain phase, and it thus uses its position in reaching that phase to follow up other steps in order to reach another phase, and so on. All these steps were taken to advance the interest of the United States.

In explaining these steps and their rationale within the overall tactics of circular reasoning, one of the participants in the focus group states that “the sanctions were in place in order to create a condition for the Baath Party itself or the Iraqi army to remove Saddam. But after 12 years of sanctions and the suffering of the Iraqi people Saddam continued to remain in power. So America had to do something about it.”

Another focus group participant explains the Bush administration’s reliance on circular reasoning in 2003 in order to justify its preemption policy toward Iraq. He argues that “when most of the UN resolutions were implemented by Iraq, Bush used the old issue of WMD as a reason to keep the issue of confronting Iraq circular and at the center. He started to use old stories about Iraq’s use of WMD, such as against Iran and the Kurds as though these stories were taking place recently.”
Coercion

Political maneuvers and actions designed to alter political situations toward the desired outcomes of an intended political agenda constitute coercion. Viewing the U.S. policy toward Iraq since 1958 illustrates repeated instances of this tactic.

Content analysis uncovers a frequency of 38 for a concept related to issues of coercion that coercion relied on intimidating the United Nations to take actions against Iraq to advance the political agenda of the United States. Bush's unilateral and preemptive strike in 2003, for example, forced the United Nations to legitimize an action that lacked authorization, and to issue resolutions legalizing the U.S. occupation of Iraq.

Current as an Epiphenomenon

The fourth concept that takes part in the creation of this theme of tactics is “Current as an Epiphenomenon.” It illustrates the continuous negation of considering past roles and associations undertaken by the policy, and the constant reliance on the present instead to justify a political agenda. By emphasizing the present, the Bush administration is able tactically to avoid admitting past errors and enables itself to claim a moralist position to enhance its myth as a liberator of the Iraqi people.

The frequency count in content analysis of two for a concept related to issues of current as an epiphenomenon reveals that the Bush administration described atrocities committed by the regime of Saddam Hussein against his neighbors and his own people as a justification for war. Bush, however, purposely neglected to state the U.S. role in the past in supporting Saddam while the Baath regime was committing such atrocities. By
doing so, the administration placed itself and its political agenda on high moral ground in order to justify its preemption policy toward Iraq.

**Misuse or Misinterpretation of Intelligence**

This concept refers the U.S. government’s misuse or misinterpretation of its own intelligence in order to serve its political agenda in Iraq. Content analysis yields a frequency of 22 for a concept related to issues of misuse or misinterpretation of intelligence that the Bush administration, for example, had used faulty intelligence in order to justify its war on Iraq in 2003.

**Fear Factor**

The U.S. government is using fear as a prime motivator to persuade public support and opinion to favor its political agenda in Iraq. A frequency count in the content analysis of 15 for a concept related to issues of fear factor reveals that September 11 provided the Bush administration with an atmosphere to manipulate fear in order to persuade public opinion to support a war in Iraq.

A participant in the focus group further explains the Bush administration’s attempt to connect between September 11 and Iraq by stating that “the Bush administration was successful in arguing that Saddam was somehow responsible for September 11. The sense of having been violated among the American people provided an opportunity for the administration to have a military solution to political problems.”

Another focus group participant agrees and stresses the impact of fear in persuading public opinion. The participant states that “it is a great mistake to
underestimate the power of fear. When the Bush administration influenced the unconscious imagination of the American people with a series of lies and fear tactics, it in essence had created an ultimate tragedy in American policy.”

The Irony of Paradox

The American Heritage Dictionary defines irony as “the use of words to convey the opposite of their literal meaning” (Morris, 1975, p. 692). Irony here means saying something but doing something else. For example, the U.S. insisted on enforcing the UN economic sanctions on Iraq in order to force Saddam to comply with the UN resolution. The irony, however, was that the sanctions benefited Saddam by keeping the Iraqi people weak and withered, and hurt average Iraqis more than it hurt the regime.

Another irony was having U.S. troops stationed in Saudi Arabia after the Gulf War in order to protect the Saudis and U.S. oil interests in the region. Ironically, the presence of these troops in a Muslim holy land angered some Muslim fundamentalists, such as the al-Qaeda network which attacked the United States on September 11, 2001. The network was voicing its opposition to the positioning of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia. Consequently an action intended to secure America’s security led to the biggest attack on America’s security in its modern history.

A participant in the focus group comments on this irony by stating that “there were 400,000 American troops in Saudi Arabia to shield that country. Unfortunately, that attracted Muslim fundamentalists not only in Saudi Arabia, but also all over the Arab world. We never understood that even the Saudi royal family remain in power so long as the fundamentalists allowed it.”
Machiavellian Methods

Political decisions and tactics based on the principle that the end justifies the means are Machiavellian in nature. The U.S. is employing this perspective in its policy toward Iraq in order to serve its interest.

One of the tactics that the United States used as a means to justify its war in Iraq in 2003 was the issue of Iraq’s WMD in Iraq. In a one-on-one interview with a former leader of an Iraqi opposition group in exile, “WMD become one of the main justifications for war in 2003 because it was easier to explain. Everyone was going to understand that.”

A participant in the focus group also comments on Iraq’s WMD and how it was used by the Bush administration to justify the war of 2003. He states that “the issue of WMD is a political foil is as much as any other political message. Given the complexity of the preemptive strike that confused many people, some thought that Saddam did have WMD and we were obligated to stopping him.”

Falsehoods

The exaggerations and misrepresentation of reality in favor of serving certain political agendas constitute falsehoods. Content analysis yields a frequency of 33 for a concept related to issues of falsehood that the Bush administration is relying on exaggerations and misrepresentation of reality in order to advance its political agenda.
Misleading

This concept refers to the use of false information, coercion, and fabrication in order to lead others toward desired political objectives that they do not otherwise want to support if they are left to make their own choices and decisions without being misled.

To mislead the American people toward supporting the war of choice in Iraq in 2003, the Bush administration used selective intelligence to justify such action. A participant in the focus group thus states that “not all the intelligence pointed to Iraq having WMD. Bush purposely selected faulty intelligence in order to go to war. He manipulated intelligence for political purpose and the interest of power.” Another focus group participant agrees: “Bush and his crowd were selectively receiving bad intelligence regarding Iraq’s WMD. Perhaps there was some bad intelligence. But Bush used only the bad intelligence needed to justify war.”

Pattern of Behavior

The last concept that participates in the construction of the theme of tactics is “Pattern of Behavior.” It refers to the special types of relationships between the United States’ government and the governments of other nations to advance U.S. interest, despite the tyrannical nature of these other nations’ governments.

Content analysis shows in a frequency count of six for a concept related to issues of pattern of behavior that U.S. relationships with China and Saudi Arabia, for example, were based on U.S. economic interest regardless of China and Saudi Arabia’s tyrannical political systems. Often, the policy toward Iraq used such artificial priorities in order to secure support for its agenda.
Rasputin

The palace power behind most of the Tsar’s policies in Russia prior to the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 was Rasputin. This metaphor represents the special power interests, such as think tanks, ideologues, and special interests, active cynically in influencing policy decisions. In regard to the policy toward Iraq, this theme is utilized by these various actors in order to direct the policy toward engaging the United States in a war with Iraq to remove the regime of Saddam Hussein by force. The concepts that are participating in the construction of this theme are “Ideology,” “Intensionality,” “Preemption,” “Rhetoric,” “Special Interests,” and “Trotskyism.”

Ideology

The American Heritage Dictionary defines ideology as “the body of ideas reflecting the social needs and aspirations of an individual, group, class, or culture” (Morris, 1975, p. 654). According to the Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion, the term refers to “a set of beliefs presented as objective whereas in fact they merely reflect the material condition of society” (Reese, 1985, p. 245). Here, ideology is a specific thinking process that played an important role in the policy toward Iraq.

In a frequency count in the content analysis of 54 for a concept related to issues of ideology demonstrates that the policy toward Iraq from 1990 until 2001 was designed by pragmatics, not ideologues. Although in 1998, the ideologues in Congress managed to persuade the Clinton administration to officially adopt the concept of regime change in Iraq, the policy remained without the influence of a particular political ideology until 2001 with the rise to power of the neoconservatives in the Bush administration.
The dominance of one politically driven ideology on the process of decision making is dangerous because it can manipulate resources toward achieving specific political objectives in the name of national interest. In the case of Iraq, the main reason for the Bush administration to go to war in 2003 was not because Saddam’s regime posed a high intensity threshold threat to the United States. On the contrary, and despite all the allegations made by the administration regarding Saddam’s WMD and ties with al-Qaeda, the Iraqi regime remained a low intensity threat. But, since the hawks within the administration were ideologically driven to replace Saddam, issues of national security and fighting terrorism were used to justify a war in Iraq as a first response to a fictional imminent threat.

**Intensionality**

The conscious and deliberate use of political means to achieve a desired end, intensionality, deserves the question, for example, whether the Bush administration was duped by faulty intelligence into launching a preemptive war on Iraq or the administration intended to go to war from day one.

Content analysis reveals in a frequency count of five for a concept related to issues of intensionality that even Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, who was one of the architects of the Iraq war in 2003, admitted that the Bush team focused on Iraq’s WMD and used it as the primary justification for toppling Saddam Hussein because it was politically convenient.
Preemption

The political doctrine of preemption justifies the use of U.S. military to strike at any target in the world without provocation. Such strikes are based only on perception of future threats.

Preemption is now part of our national security mode of operation, and the focal strategy of the Bush administration’s policy. In a one-on-one interview, however, a political scientist suggests that preemptive strike policy is not preemptive at all. According to this expert “the national security document in itself did not require going to Iraq. What it did was to identify the circumstances within which for us it was reasonable to perceive threats, and as threats emerged on the horizon they would then become eligible for response.”

Based on this argument, Iraq became eligible for a response because its threat on the horizon was sufficient under our doctrine of preemption. As for the document itself, to suggest going to war preemptively, the expert adds that “the doctrine does not say that we will go to war in the world preemptively. It says that when we perceive threats that we are unable to meet except by preemption, then preemption is warranted.”

A participant in the focus group echoes this statement but more positively, “preemption has always been an intrinsic part of our foreign and national security policy since the beginning of the republic. Even George Washington’s farewell address provided adequate justification for a doctrine of preemption. The document that we see in the national security strategy is part of our political tradition.”

Another focus group member agrees, and argues that “preemption in Iraq was premised on the notion that the Iraqi regime was no longer capable of being fixed and
returned to the international community. The U.S. policy toward Iraq was no longer viewed by the Bush administration as successful in managing the Iraqi regime and for a new regime to emerge.”

A third participant in the focus group, however, disagrees with all three statements. He states that “we put ourselves in a position of unjust war and that is similar to Germany’s attacking of France or Poland during WWII. This is where George W. Bush did such a good job in selling this war to the American people by presenting it as a just war.”

Another focus group member also rejects preemption despite its alleged historical tradition in the American policy and its adoption by the current Bush administration. He argues that “the U.S. is prepared to take a preemptive strike against anyone it thinks is likely to do something in the future. This is the fundamental principle of the U.S. It is basically saying that we don’t have to worry about international law and the United Nations, and we don’t have to worry about the world court. Our policy as such is motivated by power interest. This is the real danger.”

Another expert denounces preemption and stresses that it is not part of the American political tradition despite similar actions in the past that resembled preemption. “The current policy of preemption is a rather substantial furthering of U.S. foreign policy. There are ties to previous policies in that vein, such as in our intervention in Vietnam and Nicaragua. But on its own, preemption is neither a diversion nor a natural extension of our political tradition.”
Rhetoric

The Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion defines rhetoric as "the art of persuasive yielding belief but not knowledge" (Reese, 1985, p. 491). The American Heritage Dictionary defines rhetoric as "exaggeration in prose or verse, and the persuasive use of language to influence the thoughts and action of listeners" (Morris, 1975, p. 1114). Here, the use of jargons may be defined as rhetoric, used by the United States' government to justify its political agenda. It goes hand in hand with propaganda.

Political rhetoric can also be recycled and used in different situations. In a one-to-one interview a political historian alludes to the use of similar rhetoric during the Vietnam War and the Iraq war of 2003 in order to justify the use of force in both situations. "In a 1969 political poster that was issued by the U.S. government, the U.S. psychologically wanted to bolster homeland morale by claiming in the poster that the U.S. was in Vietnam to stop terrorism. Today, we are using the same rhetoric in Iraq."

Special Interest

Representatives of various political, economic, and social groups, special interests, lobby the executive and legislative branches of government to secure policies favors for their groups. Review of governmental documents reveals that various interest groups lobbied both Congress and the Executive branch since the 1980s to influence the policy toward Iraq.

During the 1980s, for example, oil companies, military technology and industrial lobbyists were successful in influencing the policy toward supporting Iraq in order to gain contracts in Iraq. As of 1990, military-related lobbyists influenced the
administration to maintain the use of force in Iraq and were thereby able to increase the sale of military equipment to the government. And in 2003 the oil companies, telecommunications and military industrial lobbyists were again successful in influencing the administration to invade Iraq in order to gain no-bid contracts by the Pentagon in Iraq.

**Trotskyism**

The current political ideology within the American neoconservative movement is based on Trotsky’s ideas of permanent revolution (war) and the destruction of older orders through violence in order to construct new orders that are more in line with U.S. interest. The founders of the neoconservative movement in the United States, such as Irvin Kristol, were Trotskyites who believed in permanent revolution on a global level with the United States playing a major role in promoting freedom and democracy.

Today, Kristol’s students and successors, such as Paul Wolfowitz, Donald Rumsfeld, Douglas Faith, Richard Perle, and Dick Cheney are using their prominent positions within the U.S. government in order to repackage Kristol’s Trotskyite ideas and bring about a permanent revolution in the world by destroying the older order (especially in the Middle East) through the violent intervention of U.S. militarism.

A member of the focus group, without mentioning Trotsky by name, explains this mantra in the policy toward Iraq that involves destroying the old order in order to build a new through war. This political scientist argues that “the war in Iraq removed the sovereign. This is extremely important. It also impacted the broader political situation by taking people who were marginalized in Iraq and then empowering them. The game is to
try keep them fighting one another with the hope of continuing to interact with them peacefully.”

Shadows

The metaphor of shadows represents policies based on vague definitions, symbolism, and simplistic explanation of reality in regard to the policy toward Iraq in order to avoid complicated analysis and examination of motives and intents. The theme emerges from the grouping together of several similar concepts. These concepts are “Ambiguity,” “Enemy,” “Simplicity,” “Symbolism,” and “War on Terrorism.”

Ambiguity

Uncertainty and confusion, ambiguity, regarding a particular political issue also pertains to owe policy toward Iraq. It refers to the uncertainty and confusion regarding a clear and consistent strategy in the policy as it moved from one phase to another.

One of the focus group experts captures this ambiguity in the U.S. decision-making process, particularly after the liberation of Kuwait in 1991. The ambiguity stemmed from the question whether to proceed to Baghdad in order to remove Saddam from power or remain confined within the UN mandate. The expert argues that “the decision not to go to Baghdad in 1991 was a failure of nerve, fearing to appear imperialistic in the goals and design.”

Another participant points to the ambiguity in U.S. policy toward the Middle East as a whole. The expert states that “ever since the U.S. helped to depose Mossadaq in Iran
in the mid 1950s, we have not really known where to go as of then. During the Iran-Iraq War, we sided with Iraq, and later in 1991 we went to war with Iraq.”

**Enemy**

This concept refers to the target of offensive or defensive measures taken by the U.S. government both politically and militarily. With reference to Iraq, the U.S. policy’s definition of enemy is not clear and continues to change.

At one point, the Iraqi regime was considered a friend of the United States during the Iran-Iraq War. After Iraq invaded Kuwait, the Iraqi regime became an enemy. During the containment era, the U.S. government did not identify the Iraq regime as “enemy” even when it officially adopted the concept of regime change in 1998. Then in 2002 the Bush administration identified Iraq as part of the axis of evil.

It is important to identify what is meant by “enemy” when designing foreign policy. This definition must be clear, precise, timely, and objective. As such, the definition requires a proactive perspective rather than a reactive measure to a specific phenomenon. The definition must also be guided by clear goals, and devoid of ideology. The focus must be on political and economic interests.

Once a definition is reached, the nation must map out a sound strategy, assess its strengths and weaknesses, and design its methodology based on a definition well-suited to achieving its objectives. This ought to be done without resorting to any extreme measures, reacting on impulse, or justifying inappropriate methods according to the misguided mantra that the end justifies the means.
Simplicity in Explaining Complex Issues

It is necessary to avoid complex political issues to simplistic explanation that lacks depth and substance. An example of such oversimplicity is used by the Bush administration in reducing global political dynamics to the simplistic slogan, “you are either with us or against us.”

With Bush describing the Iraqi regime during his 2002 State of the Union Address as part of the axis of evil (in addition to Iran and North Korea), he in essence had reduced politics to a sound bite, a simplistic representation of certain archetypes (in this case by using evil as a metaphor to represent the Iraqi regime). In doing so, he is portrayimg any action against Iraq by the United States as good, and designed to confront evil. When a nation is fighting evil, it is doing so on behalf of humanity and for world peace. Thus, Bush’s simplistic representation is a cleaver manipulation of imagery in order to justify the administration’s political agenda.

Symbolism

The use of symbols is a time-honored means to explain a complex political issue. In regard to the policy toward Iraq, the history chapter shows numerous uses of symbolism, such as portraying patriotism, liberty, human rights, peace, democracy, fighting terrorism, eliminating threats, and fighting aggression in order to dress up the policy with enough positive imagery to win public support.
War on Terror

The definition of a war on terror has evolved into a vague and unspecified political response by the U.S. government to international terrorism. This response lacks specificity, duration, boundaries, correct definition, accurate identification of the enemy, or a clear and defined exit strategy. It is an on-going political war intended as a substitute for the required police action necessary in fighting terror, and it is stretching across the globe, targeting any person or entity that the U.S. government in its interest may identify as a potential threat.

During this declared political war on terror, Iraq was identified as a target after September 11, 2001. Analyzing the connection between the war on terror and Iraq, a focus group member states that “our presence in Iraq will attract the essence of international terrorism into Iraq, whereby we can defeat them once and for all and that will be the end of the war on terror.”

To explain the rationale for choosing Iraq to become the battlefield in the war on terror, the expert states that “the terrorists did not respond to our presence in Afghanistan. However, they responded to our presence in Iraq and made it their battleground. We are now engaged with them there. It is classical warfare and we have the best advantage to destroy them.”

Based on this analysis, the U.S. is compensating for the lack of its capacity to fight clandestine private organizations of operatives by pulling the terrorists into Iraq. This would be a preferable alternative by in effect creating a nation state. Once they are there, the U.S. would fight them with the capacity that it has to fight a nation-state.
The expert adds that “terrorists do not have a state, and as such we have to hold the states accountable that give them haven accountable in order to control terrorism. This, in reality, will reinforce sovereignty because we are telling other nations that they have responsibilities to avoid these things from taking place.”

However, in a one-on-one interview with a political historian, reference is made to the notion that Saddam had no connection with international terrorism, especially those who were responsible for September 11. As such, choosing Iraq as a target or battleground in the war on terror, when Iraq itself had nothing to do with September 11, undermines the logic beyond the previous argument. “Saddam had nothing to do with September 11. He did support some Palestinian terrorists and the Iranian Mujahideen. His regime also terrorized the Iraqi people. But, that terror was directed inward, not toward the United States. This was the Bush administration’s main mistake in linking Saddam with the war on terror.”

Beyond Good and Evil

The metaphor of beyond good and evil represents the deliberate and conscious rejection of looking inward in order to avoid taking responsibility for the U.S. role in creating atrocities in Iraq by supporting the regime of Saddam Hussein in the past. Instead, the United States completely has negated its responsibility and blamed Saddam solely for these atrocities to which it was also a party. There are only two concepts that are participating in the construction of this theme. These concepts are “Hypocrisy,” and “Looking into the Mirror.”
Hypocrisy

This concept refers to the notion of criticizing others for doing something wrong while committing a similar wrong or failing to comment publicly about these wrongs when they occurred. Content analysis reveals through a frequency count of 67 for a concept related to issues of hypocrisy that America’s history with Iraq is one of the more hypocritical tales in American foreign policy.

Time and again, America turned a blind eye to Saddam’s crimes and flinched at the opportunity of replacing him while he was committing unthinkable atrocities on his people. At times it seemed that Saddam fixated the United States. Several administrations tolerated him because they were worried that if he fell, Iraq would disintegrate and ignite chaos in the Middle East.

One of the participants in the focus group comments on the resulting policy stance: “America supported Saddam during the Iran-Iraq War and stayed with him while he was gassing the Kurds. He was our good guy then, and we made that relationship possible by oversimplifying things.”

Another focus group participant explains the reason for U.S. support for Saddam during the Iran-Iraq War and why that support was gradually reduced and later changed into confrontation. He states that “our initial support of Iraq came after the hostage crisis. But once that situation was resolved, we had less interest in supporting Iraq. After the Gulf War was won, Bush called Saddam a bad guy, but did not want to topple him because he did not want to dismantle Iraq or disrupt the political status quo in the Middle East.”
Looking into a Mirror

It is a metaphorical expression of U.S. government behavior to reject reflecting inward and assessing its own role in supporting the former Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. Such rejection of looking into a mirror enables the U.S. to take the high moral ground, blaming Saddam alone for the wrong doings in Iraq while ignoring the U.S. role in contributing to Saddam’s actions and sustaining his power for nearly 35 years.

Content analysis demonstrates through a frequency of four for a concept related to issues of looking into a mirror that the United States supported Iraq during the 1980s and helped building its weapon programs. When Saddam used these weapons against the Kurds, the United States turned a blind eye to Saddam’s crimes and continued supporting him. Later in 2003, when the Bush administration wanted to build up its case against Saddam and justify its war, it used the very story of Saddam using WMD against his people as though the United States had just discovered the incident and had nothing to do with it.

Four Emerging Interpretive Levels (Super Themes)

From the 13 metaphorical themes, four super themes are emerging. The rationale chosen in composing these four super themes is to construct each super theme out of the combination of two or more themes that share a common trait. For example, one of the super themes that is emerging is Mythticism. This super theme is composed of grouping together three metaphorical themes, such as the Telephone Pole, Shadows, and Beyond Good and Evil.
The common thread between these three themes is that the U.S. policy toward Iraq relies on imagery and shadow reality than on factual evidence, reason, and substance. The policy also uses the power of myth to exercise expressive judgment, divide the world into a struggle between good and evil, and to stand alone in the world (as a telephone pole) in order to uphold good and defeat evil within the perceived tradition of the American regime values. The emerging super theme, as such is constructed to describe the specific trends relative to the U.S. political and administrative system within the context of U.S. policy toward Iraq. It describes this policy as relying on prediction, far-reaching goals, and myths.

The other three resulting and evolving Interpretive Levels are dichotomy, rational choice, and primordial interests. Together, these four super themes compose the data’s Interpretive Levels, explaining the policy toward Iraq in a condensed format that is used as an indicator for the complexity analysis that follows in the next two chapters. Table Five explains these emerging Interpretive Levels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interpretive Level</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mythicism</td>
<td>It describes the specific trends relative to the U.S. political and administrative system within the context of U.S. policy toward Iraq. It relied on prediction, far-reaching and attainable goals, and the myths that perpetuated U.S. foreign policy as one that promoted democracy, human rights, and freedom.</td>
<td>The Telephone Pole; Shadows; and Beyond Good and Evil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Dichotomy between Tyranny and Suffering</td>
<td>It describes within the context of U.S. policy toward Iraq the dichotomy between the suffering of the Iraq people on one hand and the tyrannical regime of Saddam Hussein on the other hand.</td>
<td>The Judas Syndrome; The amebic Response.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rational Choice</td>
<td>Making rational choice appropriate to temporal situations. It favors the reliance on tactics, maneuvers, short-term strategies and cautious trajectory. It is devoid of prediction and far-reaching goals and utilizes administrative knowledge and experience.</td>
<td>Political Metamorphism; Moby Dick; Tactics; and Rasputin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Primordial Interests</td>
<td>The fundamental law that governed the U.S. policy toward Iraq was based on advancing the primitive nation-state interests of the United States.</td>
<td>The Baseball Pitcher; Economy; and Eskimo Community.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Super Themes (Interpretive Levels), Definitions and Composing Themes
Mythticism

Myth is a powerful element both in policy and in organizational dynamics. As explained earlier in Chapter Two, because Western culture places a high value on rationality, which implies theories of cause and effect, policymakers and participants in ambiguous organizational environments find themselves in the position of having to make sense of a world that is not eminently sensible. The means to do so is by creating myths capable of enabling the policy and its organization to deal with the reality of its environment.

Meyer & Rowan (1977) explain that myths about formal organizational structure have several key points. The first point is that formal organizational structure is “rationalized and has impersonal prescriptions on how to pursue some purposes in a rule-like way and rationally.” The other point is that structure is “highly institutionalized and do not consider individual participation.” However, as rationalized institutional rules arise in given domains of work activity, formal organizations incorporate these rules as structural elements (pp. 349-354).

The Garbage Can Model (GCM) is influential in dealing with organizational myth and theory. It implies that random outcomes should be expected, because the connections between decisions and outcomes are determined by temporal factors rather than by causal connections between decisions and outcomes (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972).

According to this model, many decision processes within organizations do not operate according to rational choice models. Rather, confounding situational elements further limit the cognitive capacities of organizational participants. Problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities flow into the organization at different rates and
connect elements according to a temporal and mythical rather than a causal logic (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972). This is the case with the U.S. policy toward Iraq.

Mythticism is the specific trends relative to the U.S. political and administrative system within the context of U.S. policy toward Iraq may be termed as mythticism. Metaphorically, it represents the special characteristics of the “home base” and its trajectory. Home base refers to the impact of the policy domestically on the American people and how they perceived it.

This Interpretive Level is based on series of internal collapses in the policy as it responded through either legitimate or illegal means to emerging trends within the home base or in the environment. Mythticism relies on prediction, far-reaching and unattainable goals, and the myths that perpetuated U.S. foreign policy as one that promotes democracy, human rights, and freedom. The super theme is constructed by the grouping together of the following themes: The Telephone Pole, Shadows, and Beyond Good and Evil.

Mythticism is composed of themes that represent the collapse of the opposition party in the United States as a viable voice for political discourse, resulting in the lack of political debates and the supremacy of priorities and resources to justify specific agendas in U.S. policy toward Iraq. These agendas then stood alone as a telephone pole, dictating their messages to a wider mass without challenge or examination.

Mythticism also represents a policy that is based on vague definitions, symbolism, and simplistic explanation of the world. In addition, Mythticism rests on a theme that represents the negation of looking inward and taking responsibility for the U.S. own role
in creating the very evil in Iraq that it opposes while placing itself on a high moral
ground.

The Dichotomy between Tyranny and Suffering

This super theme describes the dichotomy between the suffering of the Iraq
people on one hand and the tyrannical regime of Saddam Hussein on the other hand. The
policy neglected to recognize this dichotomy by continually treating Iraq and the regime
of Saddam Hussein as one or defining the regime in the person of Saddam Hussein.

This super theme is constructed by grouping together the following themes: The
Judas Syndrome and the Amebic Response. It reveals the error in U.S. Policy toward
Iraq in neglecting to see the dichotomy between Saddam’s regime and the Iraqi people.
Instead, the policy reduced such a dichotomy to one person, and as such it emerged as a
folly policy, hurting the Iraqi people in the name of containing Saddam or toppling his
regime.

The negation also caused the policy toward Iraq to differ from the UN path and
international perspectives, thereby creating a paradox resulting in a gap between U.S.
ama and objectives in Iraq and those of the UN and the international community. The
gap was further widened when the UN itself committed errors in its approach toward Iraq
and in managing the U.S. policy toward Iraq within the international legal framework.

This dichotomy is composed of themes that represent the U.S. policy toward Iraq.
These themes are designed primarily to serve U.S. interest as a nation-state at any cost to
others. As a consequence, the policy suffers of mistrust and abuse. The dichotomy also
represents Iraq's response to the U.S. policy as a means for survival while entangling the Iraqi people in the process and causing them more suffering.

Rational Choice

The super theme of Rational Choice represents the tactical choices made by the policy in order to respond to internal and external changes. It is based on making appropriate rational choice in response to specific emerging conditions. As such, it favors the reliance on maneuvers, short-term planning and cautious procedures. Among the four super themes, this one proves most rational because it is devoid of prediction and far-reaching goals. It also utilizes administrative knowledge and prior experience. The super theme is constructed by the grouping together of the following themes: Political Metamorphism, Moby Dick, Tactics, and Rasputin.

Rational Choice illustrates the triumph of tactics in the policy toward Iraq over strategy. Because the policy lacks any long-term comprehensive strategy, and it is a trajectory in its nature, responding primarily to trends, it has as a consequence no clear objective or strategy. The policy evolves according to the specifics dictated by emerging trends during each segment of its progression.

The Primordial of Interests

This super theme represents the raw, primitive interests of the United States as a nation-state in generating, directing and guiding its policy toward Iraq. It is constructed by grouping together the following themes: The Baseball Pitcher, Economy, Eskimo Community, and Pax Americana.
The super theme of Primordial Interests is composed of themes that explain the type of functional and behavioral state of the American executive leadership in the post-Cold War era. This type of state often operates outside the constitutional separation of powers and emphasizes the rule of the executive branch over Congress. This behavior in its relationship with Iraq and the world is based on how the U.S. as a nation-state is perceiving signals from its environment and how its responds to such perceptions.

Primordial Interests also represent America’s power interest in oil and the dollar as political tools to dominate the world. And, in order to carry on its function within the context of the policy toward Iraq, the U.S. as a nation-state seeks to cooperate with other nation-states in the world in order to bring about a sense of an inter-related global community even while maneuvering between regional associations to maintain its niche in the environment. This drive toward a global sense of community while striving at the same time to dominate the world is an important reason for the dialectical relationships in geopolitics and U.S. relations with the world.

Conclusions

So what does the linear analysis reveal in relation to the policy toward Iraq? What do the four data sets, their Ethnograph coding, the emerging themes, and the evolving super themes tell us about this policy? Does the policy make sense? Does it follow a specific pattern, design, strategy, or ideology? Does it achieve its goals? And, what are the outcomes of this policy?

The linear analysis is an important first step in observing the U.S. policy toward Iraq. However, as an only step, this analysis is incomplete because it is not capable of
uncovering the hidden meanings that transcend logical progressions of reductionism (interpreting the whole by reducing it into parts). Therefore, complexity theories are needed to complete this analysis.

But, as a first step, the linear analysis is able to diagnose important dimensions of the policy. Mainly, the analysis reveals that the U.S. policy toward Iraq from 1990 until 2003 is a trajectory. This means that the policy neither evolves from a particular point nor leads to a desired aim. Rather, it is a system of complex relationships that is fixed within the particularities of its time and the political and administrative system of governance that generates it.

Such a system does react to its environment, but it is primarily driven by one force, the sole self-interest of the United States as a nation-state in competition for resources. This nation-state, though, is transformed from being one of the two superpowers in a bipolar world in 1990 to one that is the only superpower in a unipolar world in 2003.

Nevertheless, this lone superpower is unable to dictate its hegemony and political will on the world despite its military and economic might. The reason for such a challenge is because of the competing self-interests of other nation-states which are able to form regional alliances in order to preserve their primordial interests and compete with the United States for scarce world resource.

The U.S. policy toward Iraq operates on four distinct, yet inter-related levels. These levels are Mythticism, Dichotomy, Rational choice and the Primordial of Interests. Out of the four emerging inter-related levels, the Primordial Level is the driving engine beyond the policy and its associations. Everything else falls in between. The policy is
implemented from day to day as a tool to advance the primordial interests of the United States. Once this is understood, the overall picture, direction and aim of the policy starts to make sense.

Where to go from here? Since policies operate in an interacting and evolving world, it is difficult to predict where the U.S. policy toward Iraq will lead or what will be its next phase. By tracing the policy to 1990, however, and observing it since, the linear analysis is capable of observing its trajectory as it progresses from one phase to another.

This trajectory begins in 1990 as a response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and its disruption of the oil market (and as such the U.S. nation as a state interest in the region). It then gradually moves ahead ambiguously and without clear objective, responding only to evolving trends. Within this progression, the policy adopts several tactics in order to survive. The supremacy of tactics within the policy is at the expense of clear goals and strategy. It reveals a repeated process of internal collapse that the linear analysis is unable to explain (yet the complex analysis will in steps two and three of this dissertation).

As the responses to trends create more of a dead-end trajectory for the policy rather than opening windows of opportunity, policy-makers begin to adopt desperate measures, often outside the collective of internationalism, in order for the policy to survive. These measures result in efforts at regime change in Iraq either through political proxies composed of exiled Iraqi opposition groups, such as in 1998, or through a military invasion, such as in 2003. The policy, however, despite the efforts at regime change does not move forward toward a desired end. Instead, it further alienates the United States in the world and exposes its political tactics as Machiavellian in nature,
designed only to advance its nation-state interest at the expense of legitimacy and world peace.
CHAPTER VII

THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Introduction

Step one emerges with four Interpretive Levels: Mythicism, Dichotomy, Rational choice, and Primordial Interests. This chapter focuses on interpreting the internal changes within the U.S. policy toward Iraq according to complexity theories by observing the behavior of these four Interpretive Levels and presenting the observation in a flux metaphorical model.

The U.S. policy toward Iraq is a dynamic (living) rather than a static system. This dynamic system goes through internal processes of phase change while the policy is responding to changing trends in its environment. The characteristics of these internal processes and restructuring are comparative with changes in the policy's environment. Hence, this analysis is identified as the "Comparative Structure."

Internal Changes in the Policy Toward Iraq

Within the decision-making processes of the U.S. policy toward Iraq there are interpretive levels that explain the mechanism of the policy as a whole. This unfolding empirical reality is to be understood by observing the trajectory of its transformation from one phase to another. Such a trajectory invites us to search for the basic dynamics that generated and sustained the policy and its environments in comparative relationships.

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To understand the internal changes and the processes of self-organization within the U.S. policy toward Iraq and these processes' relationships and causality, four dimensions are derived from the complexity theories to interpret the policy's internal mechanism. These four dimensions are autopoiesis, bifurcation, the S-Matrix, and mutual causality. Morgan's flux metaphor is utilized to observe changing trends in the U.S. policy toward Iraq and according to each specific complexity dimension.

Each dimension explains the internal changes within the policy according to the specific characteristics of that particular dimension. They do so by tracing the behavior of each Interpretive Level as an indicator of change. Each Interpretive Level is illustrated as a flux metaphor. Together, the four Interpretive Levels, as observed by the four complexity dimensions, provide perspectives on the policy's internal changes and restructuring based on the new sciences of complexity. Table Six illustrates these four dimensions and how they function in observing the four Interpretive Levels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Functions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autopoietic</td>
<td>The analysis of self-organization within the policy by monitoring the behavior of the four Interpretive Levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bifurcation</td>
<td>The analysis of phase shift, collapse, entropy, and the emergence of a new order within the policy by monitoring the behavior of the four Interpretive Levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The S-Matrix</td>
<td>The analysis of the policy's web of associations and their impact on the internal dynamics by monitoring the behavior of the four Interpretive Levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual causality</td>
<td>The analysis of changes in the internal structure of the policy through the processes of positive and negative feedback by monitoring the behavior of the four Interpretive Levels.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. Complexity Dimensions and the Flux Metaphorical Interpretation

Autopoiesis

Autopoiesis is used as an analytical lens in observing internal changes in the U.S. policy toward Iraq. This enables the manifestation of self-production, reassembling of
components and changing of structure through top-down dynamics to take place. These dynamics occur because the policy responds to external changes in its environment.

Every pattern in the case of U.S. policy toward Iraq gives way to another pattern and do not stay fixed in time and place. For example, neither containment nor preemption stayed fixed. This flow in the process is flux, and the internal changes that occur are irreversible. Preemption, for example, is unable to return to containment, and containment is unable to return to cooperation and negotiation.

In order to understand the impact of autopoiesis on observing internal changes in the policy, behavioral changes in each indicator (each Interpretive Level) are observed in order to assess the level of internal changes in the policy. As such, autopoiesis serves as a complexity guide in the process of observing the internal changes in the policy through the observation of behavioral changes in the Interpretive Levels.

The dimension of autopoiesis explains internal changes within the unit of analysis based on the concept of autopoiesis in complexity theories. The emerging Interpretive Levels in step one of the analysis are observed according to autopoiesis in order to determine changes in their behavior as indicator of internal change in the policy toward Iraq. Although the U.S. policy toward Iraq does experience self-organization in some of its aspects, nevertheless and as a whole, it resists self-organization in order to maintain its original structure. By interpreting each super theme according to autopoiesis, we are able to see which aspect of the policy witness self-organization and why, and which other aspects resist such a notion.

The rationale for using the four super themes that emerge from the linear analysis in order to observe the U.S. policy toward Iraq according to dimensions derived from the
complexity theories is because these super themes provide consistency in the overall analysis of the data and follow the methodological steps outlined by the Phi Model and explained earlier in Chapter Five.

A qualitative inquiry based on complexity analysis is not capable of launching "pure" complex analysis and completely divorce itself from prior linear findings as it lacks the mechanism to do so. The linear findings and themes serve as new raw data to further explaining the data but in accordance to complexity theories. Even quantitative inquires use "linear" data in order to explain the same data but in the light of complexity dimensions. For example, data that is regarded as "error" in regression is used in complex analysis in order to understand the dynamic changes and characteristics of such error. As such, what is emerging during the linear analysis in this research, such as the four super themes, is playing the role of "errors" in a linear regression. The complex analysis explains the nature, dynamics, and characteristics of these errors as an observation of a dynamic system.

Autopoiesis and Mythticism

In order to respond to changing trends in its environment, the U.S. policy toward Iraq moves from one myth to another in order to answer the conditions provided by each trend. As such, the policy does witness self-organization in its myth structure, utilizing the temporal imagery during its trajectory from one phase to another.

There are several trends in the data that support such a notion. Examples of such trends are the policy’s promotion of regional stability in the region of the Middle East by supporting Saddam during the 1980s. This trend, as it is shown in the history chapter,
changes to the notion of legitimacy of international law during the Gulf War of 1991.

Later, the policymakers reorganize the political myth to reflect an image of containing
Saddam and disarming his regime during the 1990s.

Analyzing the policy’s myth in the context of geopolitics, a political scientist and
a strategist for the Republican Party states in a one-on-one interview that “the policy
toward Iraq needs to be looked at in the context of broader world politics. It is a big
mistake to try to turn relationships between the United States and any particular nation
into an immediate relationship.”

An economist in the focus group agrees with this assessment and identifies the
Gulf War as an example of an emerging political myth in the United States that is
impacted by world politics. This participant states that “the central factor in the 1991 war
is the disappearance of the Soviet Union, which changes the calculus of power in the
region and gives an opportunity to the United States to think differently about how to
react and relate to Iraq.”

The frequency count in the content analysis of 13 for a concept related to issues of
Middle East stability and status quo reveals that it was based on such a notion that many
Arab nations cooperated with the United States in supporting Saddam during the 1980s.
The purpose of that support is not to empower Iraq to emerge as the most powerful nation
in the region but to box the Islamic revolution in Iran within its own boundaries and help
sustain the political status quo in the region.

A political scientist in the focus group states that “the policy toward Iraq from
1990 until 2001 is designed by pragmatics, not ideologues. The pragmatic aspect in the
policy’s decision-making process makes its myth more acceptable within the political
normative processes on world level than when pragmatism changes to ideology-driven policymaking (as it is the case after September 11, 2001).” Another focus group participant, a historian, states that “although in 1998, the ideologues in Congress manage to persuade the Clinton administration to officially adopt the concept of regime change in Iraq, the policy remains without the influence of a particular political ideology until 2001 with the rise to power of the neoconservatives in the Bush administration.”

After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on America, the myth and policy of containment no longer was capable of responding to changing trends in the environment. A frequency in the content analysis of 16 for a concept related to issue of Machiavellian methods reveals that policymakers reorganized the policy’s myth once more and had it reassemble to represent the U.S. resolve in removing Saddam’s threat to the security of the United States that was posed, according to this myth, by Saddam’s possession of weapons of mass destruction and ties to al-Qaeda. However, when no such weapons were found or evidence of ties with al-Qaeda could be established, the policymakers reorganized the political myth as brining freedom and democracy to Iraq through the direct U.S. military removal of the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

These trends are exhibited in presidential speeches, Executive Orders, and legislative agendas. They are also illustrated in the media by various governmental spokespersons as they try to reflect the policy’s trajectory of myth from one phase to another.

The policy’s myth, although impacted by world politics and international normative processes, as exemplified by UN actions, is nevertheless a creature of its own making and uses UN relations to justify its existence. The UN authority as a source of
political legitimacy to justify an American political myth is questioned in an interview with a political scientist. The expert argues that “we often take the UN Security Council as a source of law, which it never is. A prudent example is what happened in Haiti during the 1990s. The U.S. worked the Security Council to justify its intervention in Haiti by manipulating the refugees issue to turn the tide on and off almost at will as a consequence of our sanctions and the vigor of our enforcement of the policy at sea.”

A political historian comments on the U.S. manipulation of the United Nations in order to get resolutions passed in its favor. He states that “once the U.S. gets the declaration it wants from the UN, other states that are carrying out the Security Council policy retain the right to judge the actions of the party in question. In 1991 the U.S. could easily have decided to get the UN to approve the invasion of Iraq under the guise of removing the threat. But it chose not to do so at the time because Bush was not ready to replace Saddam.”

Contrary to the world of make believe in the making of the policy’s myth and in its justification outside international political normative, content analysis in a frequency of 47 for a concept related to issues of legitimacy reveals that it is the Security Council that determines the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and shall make recommendation, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, which detail the preferred measures not involving the use of armed force. The only exception is Article 51, which permits the right of self-defense against armed attack until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. This provision puts the policy’s myth within the test of reality, and examines it outside the parameters of its fictional boundaries.
The frequency in the content analysis of 16 for a concept related to issues of administrative state, the frequency of nine for a concept related to issues of imperial presidency, and the frequency of 47 for a concept related to issues of legitimacy reveal that the U.N. Charter is a solemn treaty recognized by the United States as the foundation of international law. The U.S. Constitution provides a mechanism by declaring treaties as the law of the land. It further authorizes Congress to punish offenses against this law. With the Bush administration declaring war on Iraq in 2003 outside the specifics of the UN Charter, it had violated the U.S. Constitution that obligates the United States to honor all treaties to which the United States is a signatory.

A philosopher in the focus group argues against subjugating an American political process and its myth to international normative processes. Instead, the expert suggests that a political process in the United States and its myth “find their justification within the American political tradition and its history.” Commenting of the Bush administration’s doctrine of preemption, for example, the expert states, “preemption has always been an intrinsic part of our foreign and national security policy since the beginning of the republic. Even George Washington’s farewell address provided adequate justification for a doctrine of preemption. The document that we see in the national security strategy is part of our political tradition.”

Another focus group member, a public administrator, also rejects preemption despite its alleged historical tradition in the American policy and its adoption by the current Bush administration. He argues that “the U.S. is prepared to take a preemptive strike against anyone it thinks is likely to do something in the future. This is the fundamental principle of the U.S. It is basically saying that we don’t have to worry about
international law and the United Nations, and we don’t have to worry about the world court. Our policy as such is motivated by power interest. This is the real danger.”

Another focus group member, a sociologist, agrees, and argues that “preemption in Iraq was premised on the notion that the Iraqi regime was no longer capable of being fixed and returned to the international community. The U.S. policy toward Iraq was no longer viewed by the Bush administration as successful in managing the Iraqi regime and for a new regime to emerge.”

Another expert, an Iraqi-American chemist, rejects preemption and stresses that it is not part of the American political tradition despite similar actions in the past that resembled preemption. “The current policy of preemption is a rather substantial furthering of U.S. foreign policy. There are ties to previous policies in that vein, such as in our intervention in Vietnam and Nicaragua. But on its own, preemption is neither a diversion nor a natural extension of our political tradition.”

Political myth is also recycled and used in different situations. In a one-one-one interview a political historian alludes to the use of similar rhetoric during the Vietnam War and the Iraq war of 2003 in order to justify the use of force in both situations. “In a 1969 political poster that was issued by the U.S. government, the U.S. psychologically wanted to bolster homeland morale by claiming in the poster that the U.S. was in Vietnam to stop terrorism. Today, we are using the same rhetoric in Iraq.”
Autopoiesis and Dichotomy

The U.S. policymaker's lack of recognition of the dichotomy between the regime of Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi people does not experience any change throughout the shifts in the policy toward Iraq. This lack of recognition remains constant, contributing to the policy's failure to engage itself with the Iraqi people and truly reflect the policy's various assemblies of myth.

There are several trends in the history chapter that support such a notion and the welfare of the Iraqi people was never an issue to be considered by the U.S. policymakers from the start. For example, as the regime of Saddam Hussein fell out of favor because of its invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the plight of the Iraqi people for freedom was exploited by the policymakers in the United States for mere propaganda purposes, and they did not differentiate in their punitive actions toward Iraq between targeting Saddam's regime and targeting the Iraqi people who were suffering under the brutality of Saddam's regime.

This is the formula of the policy's basic internal mechanism. By ignoring this dichotomy, the policy creates a dichotomy of its own, between U.S. interests in Iraq and the aspirations of the Iraqi people. Because of this trend, the Iraqi people, with the exception of a few isolated exiled groups, are divorcing themselves from the United States and its plans, widening the gap of mistrust and suspicions with the United States and its appointed administrators in post-war Iraq.

The history chapter reveals that as the U.S. policy moved from supporting Saddam during the 1980s to confronting him in 1991, the dichotomous nature of the policy goes through a series of internal artificial changes in order to maintain the policy's main structure intact while reorganizing it artificially. During the Iran-Iraq War, for
example, the U.S. policy toward Iraq at the time was constructed to favor U.S. support of Saddam while ignoring the Iraqi people’s suffering at the hand of Saddam’s regime. When the environment changed after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the policymakers rearranged the policy’s dichotomy in order to allow it on the surface to separate between the Iraqi people and their government. This was the first time that the policymakers acknowledged, though without a reorganization of the policy, that there was a dichotomy between the Iraqi people and their government.

It was based on the narrow nation-state interests of the United States during the 1980s, for example, that the Reagan administration supported Iraq during its war with Iran. According to a one-on-one interview with a political historian, “what happened in the Iran-Iraq War came in the aftermath of the revolution in Iran and the hostage crisis with the United States, which rendered the United States much less disposed to come to Iran’s assistance in the context and to hope to offset Iran with Iraqi power.”

One of the participants in the focus group, a historian, comments on the resulting policy stance: “America supported Saddam during the Iran-Iraq War and stayed with him while he was gassing the Kurds. He was our good guy then, and we made that relationship possible by oversimplifying things.”

Another focus group participant, a public administrator, explains the reason for U.S. support for Saddam during the Iran-Iraq War and why that support was gradually reduced and later changed into confrontation. He states that “our initial support of Iraq came after the hostage crisis. But once that situation was resolved, we had less interest in supporting Iraq. After the Gulf War was won, Bush called Saddam a bad guy, but did not
want to topple him because he did not want to dismantle Iraq or disrupt the political status quo in the Middle East.”

Content analysis with a frequency count of 67 for a concept related to issues of hypocrisy reveals that the United States supported Iraq during the 1980s and helped building its weapon programs. When Saddam used these weapons against the Kurds, the United States turned a blind eye to Saddam’s crimes and continued supporting him. Later in 2003, when the Bush administration wanted to build up its case against Saddam and justify its war, it used the very story of Saddam using WMD against his people as though the United States had just discovered the incident and had nothing to do with it.

The main political structure that neglects the dichotomy, as such, is not allowed to experience a complete reorganization and reflect the dichotomy on a policy level. The policymakers continue to treat the dichotomy superficially, as something secondary to other objectives.

The policymakers, for example, continued to deal with the dichotomy during the Gulf War of 1991 in the same way as before. This situation continued during the containment era of the 1990s and throughout the administration of President George W. Bush.

The frequency in the content analysis of 15 for a concept related to issues of containment reveals that as containment was enforced on Iraq and Saddam’s regime reluctantly responded to UN resolutions, unintended consequences were taking their toll on the Iraqi people. These unintended consequences are best illustrated in the Judas Syndrome, with policymakers intending to do something, such as enforcing an economic
sanction on Iraq in order to assure Saddam’s compliance with UN resolutions, but the intended consequences of these sanctions resulted in hurting the Iraqi people.

Despite the severity of these sanctions on Iraq, their negative impact did not result in the policy toward Iraq shifting internally in recognition of a dichotomy between the Iraqi people and the Iraqi regime. Instead, the policymakers continued with their disregard of this dichotomy, allowing the UN sanctions to hurt the Iraqi people without concern.

Content analysis also reveals through a frequency of ten for the concept of Attila the Hun that facilitated U.S. foreign policy initiatives. The portrayal of Saddam as Attila the Hun made it easier for the United States to launch two wars on Iraq, reduce Iraq to one person and punish the entire country for the crimes of one person, placing the country under crippling sanction for 12 years, and then occupying the country under unpopular and illegitimate military control.

In a one-on-one interview with a political historian, there is a testimony to the fallacy of designing a policy based on good intentions without carefully thinking through the consequences. According to the interview, “the sanctions meant to change the Iraqi regime’s attitude. The UN and the U.S. thought that it would be able to take the authority from Saddam by having direct connection with the Iraqi people through the distribution of food through the oil-for-food program. This, however, did not work because neither the UN nor the U.S. anticipated how the sanction was going to hurt average Iraqis.”

Artificial engineering is also employed in order for the U.S. policymakers to continue abusing the United Nation’s mission in Iraq. An economist in the focus group states that “such an abuse resulted in the policymakers’ failure to recognize the negative
impacts of sanctions on the Iraqi people.” Another focus group participant, an Iraqi-American chemist, states that artificial engineering is further encouraged by “presidential extraordinary issues, the continuous mistrust in the U.S./Iraqi relationships, and the widening gap between U.S. and UN goals in Iraq.” Collectively, these trends weaken the effective recognition of the issue of dichotomy in the U.S. policy toward Iraq and maintain the mistreatment of the Iraqi people as an irrelevant issue in the overall political objectives in the United States.

In a one-on-one interview, a former leader of an exiled Iraqi opposition group states that “in the mid-1990, the U.S. policy was designed to contain Saddam, not cause his removal. During the Clinton administration, containment was tried through the enforcement of the no-fly-zone and the UN economic sanctions. But the no-fly-zone was not effective because Saddam continued sending his tanks to southern Iraq and killing people. It was because of that Clinton adopted the policy of regime change in 1998.”

In addition to the ineffectiveness of the no-fly-zone, there was also the issue of Saddam smuggling oil outside the UN imposed embargo that added to the erosion of the policy of containment. In the same interview mentioned above, the former leader argues that “Clinton figured out that Saddam was smuggling oil, and continued supporting Palestinian terrorist groups. So the United States had no choice but to replace Saddam, especially when he was unable to change, did not trust America, and America did not trust him. During all these events, however, the welfare of the Iraqi people themselves was not a factor either in Saddam’s calculations or in the U.S. policymakers’ calculations.”
In explaining these dichotomies and their rationale within the overall circular reasoning of the policy toward Iraq, one of the participants in the focus group, a philosopher, states that “the sanctions were in place in order to create a condition for the Baath Party itself or the Iraqi army to remove Saddam. But after 12 years of sanctions and the suffering of the Iraqi people Saddam continued to remain in power. So America had to do something about it.”

After September 11, 2001, the Bush administration focused on the Iraqi regime itself as the main threat to the United States. In a frequency in the content analysis of 45 for a concept related to issues of regime change trajectory reveals that as the administration developed its policy of preemption toward Iraq, the issue of dichotomy was used by the Bush administration to support its goal of regime change in Iraq. The dichotomy between the Iraqi people and the regime of Saddam Hussein, however, remained within the policy’s on-going organizational structure. After Saddam was toppled in 2003, the Bush administration continued to ignore the welfare of the Iraqi people, dealing with them instead with the mentality of an occupying force that came to dictate its political will rather than to liberate.

Content analysis reveals a frequency of six pertaining to a concept elated to issues of war as a corrective action that the Bush administration described as atrocities committed by the regime of Saddam Hussein against his neighbors and his own people as a justification for war. Bush, however, purposely neglected to state the U.S. role in the past in supporting Saddam while the Iraqi regime was committing such atrocities. By doing so, the administration placed itself and its political agenda on high moral ground in order to justify its preemption policy toward Iraq.
Autopoiesis and Rational Choice

The U.S. policy toward Iraq lacks a coherent, consistent, comprehensive and clear strategy from the start to the end. However, the policy’s tactics do experience autopoiesis, as the policy responds to various environmental needs and changes throughout its trajectory. These tactics are the policy’s only rational choice, representing its true objective: advancing the United States’ nation-state interest. It is during the changes of these tactical responses that autopoiesis takes place and self-organization occurs.

Can a tactic be rational when the policy’s decisionmaking process itself is irrational? The answer to this question is yes. In dealing with temporal trends in the environment, content analysis yields a frequency of 13 for a concept related to issues of political trajectory and a frequency of 47 for a concept related to issues of nation-state interest. It reveals that the tactics that were applied to bolster the policy were appropriate in dealing with particular trends. However, when these tactics were placed in the overall context, they made no sense and emerged as irrational because they lacked a strategy to follow.

If we describe this metaphorically, it is similar to having the correct tires on a car that was involved in an accident. The tires can be regarded as tactics employed to get the car moving from point A to point B. However, these tires were not the ones that drove and commanded the car. Therefore, regardless of their correct size and function, they were not responsible for the car’s accident since they had no control over the driver’s strategy. As such, their correct size and functions were irrelevant to the accident.

If we observe rational choice during each phase in the policy’s trajectory, we are able to witness continuous processes of autopoiesis within the series of choices that are
made by various administrations regarding Iraq. This observation can be determined through the tracing of rational choice behavior as an indicator of internal change in the policy. The tracing of this ingredient’s self-arrangement reveals that its characteristics, such as the policy’s metamorphism, Moby Dick (the theme of using revenge and force) and Rasputin (the theme of relying on think-tanks and ideologues in the decision-making process) are rational if viewed in relation to emerging trends in the environment during each phase in the policy’s progression but irrational if viewed in relation to the policy’s overall trajectory.

A philosopher in the focus group states that “during the 1980s, the U.S. policy toward Iraq was driven by pragmatists who considered the policy’s tactical support for Saddam as a rational choice in order to advance U.S. interest in the region. From a tactical point of view and without relying any ethical or moral evaluation, these pragmatists were correct in their assessments and choices.”

The history chapter in this dissertation shows that supporting Iraq during its war with Iran did stop the threat of the Iranian revolution from spreading to other countries and destabilizing the region, and as a consequence it served the U.S. oil interest and its stability in the region. But from a strategic point of view, aiding Saddam was a mistake because it strengthened his capabilities and allowed him to threaten the very U.S. interest that the rational choice was aiming to protect.

After Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990, a frequency count in the content analysis of 47 for a concept related to nation-state interest demonstrates that the tactical choice was to end the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and Saddam’s perceived threat in holding Western energy hostage in his hand by controlling the Kuwaiti oil. As such, the tactical
choice of removing Saddam from Kuwait and freeing Kuwaiti oil from Iraqi control was a correct tactic in serving U.S. oil interests. However, changing the direction of these tactics from supporting Saddam in the 1980s to opposing him in the 1990s had to experience an internal metamorphosis and an autopoietic change in order for the policy to transform from one that supported Saddam to one that opposed him.

In 1990, Saddam miscalculated U.S. resolve and thought that his previous war with Iran during the 1980s had earned him a favor with the United States that would prevent a confrontation if he attempted to attack Kuwait. This error in judgment by Saddam was, according to a political scientist in the focus group, “a vast miscalculation. Taking Kuwait militarily while the U.S. was the only remaining superpower who had vested economic interests in the region and its stability simply was wrong.”

The mistrust, however, was mutual both between Saddam and the United States. Another participant in the focus group, a sociologist, states that “there was a mutual mistrust and misunderstanding between America and Saddam. The U.S. did not quite understand what Saddam was like, and Saddam did not understand America’s interests.”

During the policy’s autopoietic change in 1991, elements that went into the composition of rational choice during the 1980s had to be reshuffled and reorganized in order to correspond with the environmental change triggered with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Some elements, such as the U.S. support for the Iraqi opposition groups, supporting regime change efforts in Iraq, the use of force against the Iraqi regime, and the metaphor of war as the language of the policy toward Iraq became the functional ingredients of the policy’s rational choice. Other elements, such as the policy’s
Machiavellian tactics and its hypocritical nature, were pushed to the back as less important ingredients.

As the environmental trends changed due to containment during the 1990s, these elements had to be reshuffled and rearranged once more in order to respond to the presiding trend in the environment. A political historian in the focus group thus states that “the abuse of the UN became a functional ingredient in the policy toward Iraq and it was placed on the top of the policymakers’ list of priorities.”

Not only the U.S. abused the UN mission in Iraq during the 1990s. So did Saddam. Content analysis uncovers a frequency of 16 for a concept related to issues of U.S. and Iraq’s abuse of the UN mission in Iraq. Iraq did so in order to retaliate against U.S. spies in UN inspection teams, and also to give the false impression that it continued to possess WMD as a measure of deterrence. For its part, the United States used the UN and its inspection teams to gather information on the Iraqi regime’s security apparatus and defense mechanism in order to plan plots for regime change. As such, both Iraq and the U.S. were guilty of using the United Nations for their own political agendas, instead of actively working within the UN mandate to implement the ceasefire agreement resolution at the end of the Gulf War of 1991.

This theme of mistrust between Iraq, the U.S., and the UN made containment an ineffective tactic after more than a decade of its trial. A former leader of an exiled Iraqi opposition group agrees that containment was not working. In a one-on-one interview, the expert states that “in the mid-1990, the U.S. policy was designed to contain Saddam, not cause his removal. During the Clinton administration, containment was tried through the enforcement of the No-Fly-Zone and the UN economic sanctions. But the no-fly-zone
was not effective because Saddam continued sending his tanks to southern Iraq and killing people. It was because of that Clinton adopted the policy of regime change in 1998.”

In addition to the ineffectiveness of the No-Fly-Zone, there was also the issue of Saddam smuggling oil outside the UN imposed embargo that added to the erosion of the policy of containment. In the same interview stated above, the expert argues that “Clinton figured out that Saddam was smuggling oil, and continued supporting Palestinian terrorist groups. So the United States had no choice but to replace Saddam, especially when he was unable to change, did not trust America, and America did not trust him.”

After September 11, 2001 the Bush administration adopted preemption as its new tactic. Because of that, specific elements, on one hand, were pushed to the front of the policy toward Iraq as functional ingredients of the policy, such as ideology, war as a corrective action, Hobbesian thinking, falsehood, misuse of intelligence, ideology, turning Saddam into Attila the Hun, the use of symbolism, ambiguity, current as epiphenomenon, fear factor, and Machiavellian methods, and refusing to look into the mirror. On the other hand, elements such as lack of discourse and debate, multilateralism, and legitimacy were pushed to the backburner. With such rearrangement, phenomena such as Moby Dick and Rasputinism emerged in the policy toward Iraq as evolving trends that continue up to date.

To illustrate the process of self-organization graphically as it arranged the policymakers’ rational choice, let us compare the organizational states of these choices during two phases in the progression of the U.S. policy toward Iraq. We designate the functional positions of certain ingredients within these choices in 1991 as Position A.
misuse of UN mission in Iraq are shifted in priorities according to their functional positions during each period. For example, during the Gulf War of 1991 (Position A), support for Iraqi opposition is not a priority tactic, but it becomes so during the 1990s (in Position B). Also, regime change is a priority tactic while in Position B, but it is not as such while in Position A. These changes in functional positioning are the result of the process of autopoiesis (self organization) in the internal dynamics of the policy’s rational choice. Figure Eight explains these dynamics.

Figure 8. Autopoiesis and Rational Choice

Under George W. Bush, containment finally collapsed. Even if containment was allowed to continue, it was going to stand as an obstacle to forwarding U.S. interests. As one of the participants in the focus group, a public administrator, phrases it, “containment was beneath the new America, the world’s new empire and the sole superpower.”

Although collapse dynamics occurs within the policy’s tactics, content analysis reveals that the most interesting feature of the debate over the Iraqi issue is that it never took place. Many words flowed, and there was dispute about how to proceed. But
discussion was kept within rigid bounds that excluded the obvious answer that the U.S. had to act according to its national interest.

In a one-on-one interview with a political historian, reference is made to the notion that the issue of debate became problematic during the presidency of George W. Bush, and the lack of debate was a form of political tragedy that impacted governance in the United States. The expert states that “it is tragic that there was so little debate about the war in Iraq in 2003, and that the Democrats gave a blank check for the invasion of Iraq and caved in to the administration.”

Content analysis yields a frequency of 13 for a concept related to issues of Democratic cave-in, the frequency of seven for a concept related to issues of debate, and the frequency of 34 for a concept related to issues of discourse. These frequency counts reveal that many Democratic members of Congress became cheerleaders for the Republican administration’s agenda in Iraq. And, contrary to the Democratic members of Congress, their Republican counterparts challenged the political agenda of the Democratic administration of Bill Clinton and pushed it to adopt a more aggressive policy toward Iraq, including signing into law the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 and adopting regime change in Iraq as the official policy of the United States.

Commenting on the importance of political discourse in U.S. politics and the resulting process of decisionmaking in choosing a tactic, a political scientist and strategist for the Republican Party states in a one-on-one interview, “people talk, that is how they find out about what is going on in the world, and that is how they deliberate and make decisions.” The expert does not see the Congressional act in 2003 to authorize President Bush with the decision to go to war as something that was outside the tradition of
political discourse in America. The expert states that “Congress authorized Bush to go to
war in Iraq because that is what Congress has done historically. After the Vietnam crisis,
Congress passed the War Powers Act to restrain the power of the president, but even
that Act delegated to the president the authority to declare war but he had 90 days to state
the reason.”

The Republican strategist justifies Congress’ delegation of its authority to declare
war to the executive branch because of the awesome responsibility of such decision:
“Congress persistently placed that responsibility with the executive, because war is too
daunting of a responsibility for a contemporary Congress to imagine.”

A political historian states in a one-on-one interview that “Congress chose to
surrender its right to declare war in 2002 to the president as a failure of courage and a
failure of conscience. The stage had been set by not questioning a variety of policies and
the decisions that Bush had made all the way along the road.”

With tactical choices collapsing outside the traditional political discourse in
American politics, there has to be another dynamic that is motivating these collapses in
order to secure its own interest. This dynamic is the U.S. primordial interest, the main
engine that drove the U.S. policy toward Iraq from start to date.

Another political scientist in the focus group agrees with this analysis and refers
to the American system of government as one designed in a manner that allows for such
dynamic as part of political discourse itself. The focus group participant states that “the
issue here is the synergy of interests. We talk about checks and balances, but checks and
balances operate in an environment in which they are integrated. Congress is reluctant to
accept the full weight of making a decision about going to war, and it prefer to put that
accountability on the head of the executive branch. The executive, on the other hand, is happy to do it.”

**Autopoiesis and Primordial Interests**

Primordial interests are the raw, primitive, and underlining core of the policy toward Iraq. They represent the basic, selfish, narrow nation-state interest that drives the policy in its many phases. This primitive notion is self-organized in order to respond to changing trends in the environment.

During the policy’s process of adaptation to environmental needs, the primordial interest itself goes through the internal process of self-organization. By doing so, the history chapter shows that the policy is moving from the traditional system of governance that characterized the American federal government since its inception in the 1770s toward the type of an administrative state that discourages discourse and debate and promotes a strong executive headed by an imperial presidency. This trend became apparent during the Kennedy and the Nixon’s administrations, though it was reduced during the Carter, Reagan and Clinton’s administrations, before it resurfaced during the administration of George W. Bush.

It was based on the narrow nation-state interests of the United States during the 1980s, for example, that the Reagan administration supported Iraq during its war with Iran. According to a one-on-one interview with a political historian, “what happened in the Iran-Iraq War came in the aftermath of the revolution in Iran and the hostage crisis with the United States, which rendered the United States much less disposed to come to Iran’s assistance in the context and to hope to offset Iran with Iraqi power.”
If we look at the U.S. policy toward Iraq prior to Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait on
August 2, 1990, the history chapter reveals that the primordial interests of the policy at
the time was structured around supporting Saddam through bank loans, agricultural
credits, technology, and military aid in order to assure an Iranian defeat. Such primordial
interests were to protect U.S. interests in the region of the Middle East and they were in a
state of equilibrium for nearly a decade, illustrating a trend and a policy that was
organized without a need for further self-organization or experiencing any internal
changes to produce new self-reassemblies.

Once the environment changed, triggered by Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait on
August 2, 1990, the policymakers’ decision-making process experienced internal
processes of self-organization. These internal changes were in response to the change in
the environment. Saddam’s invasion was the kick that triggered change, and as a
consequence, what followed was a phase shift in the policy, experienced as an autopoietic
manifestation in the policy’s primordial interests to shift the relationship with Saddam
from an alliance to open hostility. Presidential directive and Congressional Acts were
imitated to legalize the shift within the framework of multilateral association and under
the umbrella of the United Nations.

After Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990, the U.S. national interest moved from the
position of supporting Saddam to confronting him. All of the focus group participants
agree on this point and expressed their consensus in a statement by one of their
participants who stresses that “Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait threatened Saudi Arabia,
and a threat to Saudi Arabia was a direct threat to the United States because of the U.S.
reliance on Saudi oil.”
Metaphorically, the shift is represented in the concept of the Eskimo Community, employing the role of oil, Cold War politics, multilateralism and legitimacy as its functional vehicles. The policy's primordial interests are served by returning the management of Kuwaiti oil to the Sabah Royal family in Kuwait, as in 1991. Saddam's acceptance of the conditions for a ceasefire after the Gulf War on 1991 satisfied the mechanism of change required at the time and maintained the primordial organizational structure within the U.S. policy toward Iraq until future environmental conditions dictated further needs for restructuring.

The history chapter in this dissertation demonstrates that during the 1990s, when Saddam emerged as unwilling to actively cooperate with UN inspection teams to destroy his WMD, his police state capacity proved to be capable of maintaining him in power despite the UN economic sanctions imposed on Iraq. Content analysis through a frequency of 15 for a concept related to issues of containment and the frequency of 53 for a concept related to issues of regionalism reveal that the attitude in the region and the world was shifting gradually toward easing the sanctions on Iraq and to returning Iraq to the community of nations. As such, conditions in the environment had once again changed, requiring another autopoietic change in the organizational structure of the U.S. policy toward Iraq and its primordial interests.

The organizational state of the policy's primordial interests during the containment era experienced internal reshuffling. The mechanism of change and self-organization relied on specific ingredients such as coercion, unilateralism, paranoia and militarism in order to function as primary functional elements. These ingredients surfaced
to the front of the organizational restructuring of primordial interests by pushing aside as
less important other ingredients such as geopolitics and Middle East status quo.

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the organizational state of the
U.S. policy toward Iraq and its primordial interests self-assembled once again,
responding to the environmental triggers of the time. The metaphorical representation of
these changes is illustrated in the theme of the Baseball Pitcher. With the U.S. standing
alone and apart from the international team, eager only to secure home runs for its own
primordial interests, the policymakers reassembled the policy’s organizational structure
to satisfy the needs for responding to emerging trends in its environment and adjusting its
primordial interests to represent these changes.

A philosopher in the focus group states that “the quest for power continued to
present challenges to the United State nation-state interest.” As the Euro rose to challenge
the supremacy of the dollar, and as oil became a political veto power after September 11,
2001 in the hands of emerging ideologues in U.S. government, the organizational state of
the policy’s primordial interests self-organized itself in order to correspond with
changing trends in the environment.

The nation-state interest, especially the power interest of corporate America and
the governmental policy that defends them, becomes more problematic when it is held as
part of the national interest. A sociologist in the focus group is alert to equating the
national interests and national security. He states that “our national security, self-interests
are the most important elements in our policy now. There is a problem in summing
national interests and national security as the same.”
When U.S. national interest and national security are viewed as one, not all
nation-states will support the United States in all aspects of its foreign policy, especially
the policy toward Iraq. This does not mean that those nations are against American
security. Rather, it means that they have their own national interest to follow. As the
philosopher member of the focus group explains, “we are falling into the argument that
other countries either have to agree with us or we will do it anyway. The issue is not
whether or not France and Germany support us. The U.S. has its own self-interest, so do
France and other nation-states.”

In another one-on-one interview, the subject agrees with the philosopher’s
assessment with regards to U.S. policy and interest in Iraq, stating that “the underlining
reason for the U.S. involvement in Iraq was for its own interests in the Middle East,
mostly economic. Politically, the U.S. policy toward Iraq is not going to influence the
overall American foreign policy that much, although things changed after September 11,
2001.”

New ingredients in the decision making process are employed to function as
primary vehicles during the process of self-organization, pushing aside previous vehicles
that once were important for the policy to function in its environment. These new
ingredients are appointocracy, the administrative state, and the imperial presidency.
These ingredients are operating to bring about the organizational state of Pax
Americana as the policy’s new metaphorical mantra. On the other hand, ingredients such
multilateralism, legitimacy, discourse, and political debate are pushed to the side.

A political scientist in the focus group captures the role of power interest in
impacting U.S. policies. According to this participant, “in regard to our policy in Iraq,
there was a sense that we needed to do more, especially in response to our power interest in the world. There was a coalition of political forces arising out of the opportunity of the United States deemed as the single super power.”

Another participant in the focus group, an Iraqi-American chemist, agrees with this statement, saying that “if we talked about Iraq in terms of simple, short-term economic interest, this will not explain our involvement there. Unless we talk about a long-term power interest, and economics is an important part of it, then we can see the connection.”

A third participant in the focus group, an economist, links the U.S. military function in Iraq with that of power interest by suggesting that “we cannot explain the U.S. military function in Iraq unless we talk about power interest and the ideology of groups such as Project for the New American Century, Wolfowitz, Cheney, and others who brought it to action in relation to America’s power of interest.”

Content analysis yields a frequency of 14 for a concept related to issues of imperialism, thereby revealing that the Iraq war of 2003 was driven by the same mentality as that of an imperial power. The United States was able to assert its will with little or no regard to international norms. A historian in the focus group agrees with this analysis and identifies two specific conditions that formed the U.S. imperialist policy toward Iraq. These conditions are “the reconstitution of an American hegemony in the Middle East that would be unquestioned, unrivaled, and in need of no legitimation, and the assumption that the United States is responsible for the maintenance of a stable regional security environment conducive to its power interest.”
This analysis echoes the public administrator’s observation in the focus group that “for the Pentagon to maintain its tremendous budget, arms industries, and feeding its contracts, for the oil companies to increase their profits, and for the Bush administration to establish a permanent military presence in the Middle East to control its oil resources, Iraq was presented as a challenge in order to justify U.S. military intervention.”

A political historian and expert on U.S. policy toward Iraq, however, stresses the importance of having nation-state interests continue to play a significant role in world politics. “We continue to look after our national interest. But the fundamental issue is: we want to promote our interest unilaterally or should we do it through collaboration and cooperation?”

Bifurcation

If autopoiesis illustrates the processes of self-organization in the policy, bifurcation illustrates how these processes take place and the internal transformation of the policy from one organizational state to another. Bifurcation explains the internal changes within the policymakers’ decisionmaking process as the U.S. policy toward Iraq moves from a state of equilibrium during a particular organizational phase to a state of oscillation, chaos, and then the emerging of a new organizational order in a new state of equilibrium. We are able to observe these changes by tracing the behavior of the four Interpretive Levels as the policy moved from one phase to another.

As with autopoiesis, internal changes in the policy according to bifurcation are also observed and expressed in a flux metaphorical expression. The reason for choosing a flux metaphorical expression is to observe the dynamic nature of the policymakers’
decisionmaking process unfolding and enfolding as a kind of pulsating wholeness. Although the policy toward Iraq does experience bifurcation and collapse dynamics in some of its aspects, nevertheless and as a whole the policy resists bifurcation and collapse in order to maintain its original structure. By interpreting each super theme according to bifurcation, we are able to witness which aspect of the policy do indeed witness collapse and why, and which other aspects resist such a notion.

By observing the policy according to bifurcation, we are able to witness whether a policy decision experience any type of collapse dynamics. Is the collapse delayed or prevented through artificial engineering, and if so, what is the impact of catastrophic consequences on the policy?

As the older internal structure of the policy became unstable in responding to environmental changes after Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, for example, the older structure prepared to collapse in order for a new structure to emerge. Then, as the collapse dynamic of the decade-long containment phase of the 1990s allowed for the emergence of a new phase in the policy, preemptive emerged as a response to the environment of post-September 11.

Bifurcation means a phase shift in the order of a dynamic system. As the self-organizing order emerged out of the interaction of elements within the policy’s parameters, as it was the case with the emergence of preemption after the September 11 attacks, the policy became unstable and its older order of containment started to collapse. Such a collapse allowed for the emergence of preemption as a new systematically self-organized order that was more appropriate to the new context in the environment.
When the policy was at equilibrium, such as during the 1980s, its structure was relatively stable and its property was interconnected while containing the seeds of change. Environmental changes that was triggered by Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 then set off a series of internal changes and reorganization that led to a period of oscillation and disorder. From the chaotic disorder, a new structure emerged that brought the system back to equilibrium. This was the policy’s essence of bifurcation.

Bifurcation intends to interpret the policy’s geometry of behavior and the acceleration of irreversible evolution over time. It constructs metaphorically the growth of uncertainty as a translation of chaotic behavior. And it does so by describing the information about the system over time when compared with the initial state of equilibrium.

All systems must collapse in order for their older structures to dissipate and for the new orders to emerge. If collapse, however, is delayed through artificial engineering, the system results in catastrophes. Although aspects of the U.S. policy toward Iraq does collapse and emerge with new orders, not all aspects of the policy, however, collapse. By observing the U.S. policy toward Iraq according to bifurcation, we are able to witness whether the U.S. policy toward Iraq experience any type of collapse dynamics, whether the collapse is delayed, and what are the catastrophic consequences.

Mythticism and Bifurcation

Mythticism is one of the aspects in the U.S. policy toward Iraq that witness a collapse dynamics through the process of bifurcation. In 1990, for example, the policy’s myth was shifted from a state of equilibrium that represented U.S. support for Saddam
during the 1980s to one that confronted him as a symbol of evil and tyranny in the Middle East after he invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. This shift reflected the collapse of the myth's older structure and allowed for the emergence of a new myth and a new structure that was better capable of dealing with the changes in the policy's environment.

Such a shift occurred by reshuffling the older structure's ingredients, such as the balance of power in the region, stability, and defusing radical Islam, and it allowed for new organizational elements to form the emerging new myth. The history chapter reveals that these new myth and its organizational elements that emerged after Saddam's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 were the new world order, defeating aggression, and international legitimacy. The new myth brought the policy into a state of equilibrium, until other triggers in the environment (such as the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001) caused the policy to experience a disorder, collapsing its older mythical structure, and allowing for a new myth and a new state of equilibrium to emerge. This process continued throughout the policy's various phase shifts. Figure Nine illustrates this process.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 9. Internal Changes in a System According to Bifurcation**

Phase One: The system is stable and at equilibrium

Phase Two: The system is experiencing a chaotic behavior.

Phase Three: A new order is emerging in the system, returning the policy to equilibrium
Figure Nine shows that the myth that sustained its organizational order during the 1980s remained in a state of equilibrium until Saddam invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. However, once the environment changed due to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the policy’s internal processes changed. A new myth then emerged through the dissipation of the older myth.

The new myth that emerged after the Gulf War of 1991 became destabilized due to another kick in the policy’s environment during the period from 1991-2001. This new kick was caused by the negative impact of war and destruction of the infrastructure inside Iraq on the Iraqi people. This trend led the myth’s structural order that emerged in 1991 to collapse and another myth to emerge during the containment era in order to correspond with changes in the environment.

The newly emerged myth during the containment era brought the policy once more into equilibrium. This equilibrium continued until another kick in the environment, caused mainly by the terrorists’ attacks on America on September 11, 2001, provided another kick in the environment that destabilized the policy’s internal order, collapsing its older myth, and emerging with a newer myth and newer state of equilibrium that was a more fitting to respond to the environment. Figure Ten (page 267) illustrates these four different phase shifts in the policy’s Mythticism from the 1980s until 2003.

A participant in the focus group, a public administrator, explains the power of myth in the Bush administration’s attempt to connect September 11 and Iraq and to connect this myth to the American psyche and its new state after September 11, 2001. He states that “the Bush administration was successful in arguing that Saddam was somehow responsible for September 11, which was a complete lie. But the sense of having been
violated among the American people provided an opportunity for the administration to have a military solution to political problems.”

Figure 10. Phase Shifts in Mythticism

Another focus group participant, a sociologist, agrees and stresses the impact of fear in persuading public opinion as a trajectory development in the American psyche. The participant states that “it is a great mistake to underestimate the power of fear. When the Bush administration influenced the unconscious imagination of the American people with a series of lies and fear tactics, it in essence had created an ultimate tragedy in American policy.”

An historian in the focus group attempts to connect the current shift in the policy toward Iraq with its history while maintaining the influence of the American psyche on such policy. He states that “the levels of American psyche and strategic planning are formative. If we connected that to the Iranian revolution in 1979, the 1970’s oil embargo, the Reagan’s presidency and the hostage crisis, then we would have a background picture for the current Republican administration.”
Bifurcation and Dichotomy

The policy of dichotomy refuses to go through phase shifts when the environment is triggered by kicks. Changes in the policy’s environment do not result in a change within the policy’s dichotomous nature. Instead, artificial engineering, such as the enforcement of the economic sanctions against Iraq, U.S. support of a few isolated exiled Iraqi opportunists, and the practice of coercion in dealing with Iraq, are used to maintain the prolongation of the policy’s dichotomy.

A focus group participant, an Iraqi-American chemist, states that this type of artificial engineering “created a catastrophe both for the Iraqi people and the U.S. policy toward Iraq as policymakers continued to link Saddam’s regime and the Iraqi people, treating them in effect as one.” By doing so, the artificial engineering increased the trend toward more and more failures in the overall U.S. policy toward Iraq.

A political scientist in the focus group suggests that the policy of ignoring the welfare of the Iraqi people is a continuation of an imperialistic policy that the United States had adopted once it remained the only super power in the world after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This person states that “the clear cause for the recent war goes to as early as 1998 when we were truly feeling like an imperialist power with the Soviet Union gone.”

Bifurcation and Rational Choice

Rational choice does go through bifurcation and phase shifts. Unlike the policy of dichotomy, rational choice experience the collapse of its older tactics during each phase shift, allowing for new tactics to emerge and respond to the trends in the environment.
Rational choice during the 1980s, for example, was designed to support Saddam and neutralize the Iranian revolution. The history chapter reveals that after Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the policy’s older structure of supporting Saddam experienced a period of oscillation and reshuffling. This chaotic disorder eventually led to the collapse of the older tactic and emerged with a new tactic that enabled the United States to engage in a military combat with Iraq and changed the nature of its relationship with the Iraqi regime from supportive to hostile.

During the containment period of the 1990s, rational choice was the same as the structure that emerged after the Gulf War of 1991. However, as the Iraqi regime continued to play a cat-and-mouse game with UN weapon inspectors, there was no possibility for the Iraqi Army to topple the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein through a military coup. The high frequency count in the content analysis of 47 for a concept related to issues of geopolitics reveals that the political climate in the region was becoming hostile to the U.S. as the result of the continuous use of force against Iraq and the negative impact of the economic sanctions against the Iraqi people.

The policymakers then shifted the internal mechanism of the policy toward Iraq toward a new phase by officially adopting a new tactic as illustrated in the concept of regime change and the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998. As such, rational choice experienced a structural change and collapsed its older structural order (tactic) that emerged after the Gulf War of 1991.

The containment era’s rational choice that espoused regime change in Iraq through the support of the Iraqi opposition had to dissipate and give way in order for a new tactic to emerge. The new tactic was illustrated in the Bush administration’s concept
of preemption, and it led the United States toward implementing regime change in Iraq through direct military invasion of Iraq. This new tactic was also translated in the language of the Iraq Liberation Act of 2002 and various Presidential Executive Orders. Figure 11 illustrates these various transitions in rational choice from the 1980s to 2003.

After September 11, 2001, the history chapter reveals that the environment created another kick that triggered the policy of preemption. The terrorists’ attacks on America, combined with the new Bush administration’s ideological perspective on Iraq, combined with the elevation of the role and impact of oil and power interests on U.S. foreign policy, all provided a new atmosphere for a new political dynamic to emerge and for the older order of containment to dissipate. In a one-on-one interview, an expert on

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the U.S. policy toward Iraq states that these changes had “transformed the United States into a new imperial power in post-Cold War era as the time was right once again for a new dynamic to emerge in American politics.”

The history chapter in this dissertation also reveals that even the new political dynamic that emerged in 2003 is now once again experiencing instability and challenges (oscillation) due to changes in the environment. The policymakers, as a consequence, are designating certain ingredients, such as falsehood, misuse of intelligence, fear factor, and militarism in order to artificially prolong the age of this tactic and prevent it from collapsing.

To explain the rationale for choosing Iraq to become the battlefield in the war on terror, a philosopher in the focus group states that “the terrorists did not respond to our presence in Afghanistan. However, they responded to our presence in Iraq and made it their battleground. We are now engaged with them there. It is classical warfare and we have the best advantage to destroy them.”

Based on this analysis, the U.S. is compensating for the lack of its tactical capacity to fight clandestine private organizations of operatives by pulling the terrorists into Iraq. This would be a preferable alternative by in effect creating a nation state. Once they were there, the U.S. could fight them with the capacity that it had designed to fight a nation-state.

The expert adds that “terrorists do not have a state, and as such we have to hold the states accountable that give them haven accountable in order to control terrorism. This, in reality, will reinforce sovereignty because we are telling other nations that they have responsibilities to avoid these things from taking place.”

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Bifurcation and Primordial Interests

The primordial interests of the United States do not experience any structural change in their order. Instead, the U.S. policy toward Iraq remains consistent in its structural order in representing the same primordial interests, such as from the 1980s until 2004. Because of the consistency of the United States’ nation-state interest during all phases of its policy progression, no collapse occurs within the policy to change its primordial interests from one phase to another. Content analysis with a frequency of 47 for a concept related to issues of nation-state interest reveals that the primary interest of the United States during all these periods remained the same: securing and serving the narrow self-interest of the United States as a nation-state.

The frequency in the content analysis of 11 for a concept related to issues of capitalism reveals that since American capitalism, like any other capitalist system in the world, depends on raw materials, open markets, and cheap labor, the United States government utilizes its policies and military in order to assure the American capitalist system’s access to these necessities. And, it is precisely in quest of such resources to compete successfully with other economic systems in the world that the U.S. policy toward Iraq has born. This policy is becoming part of the American capitalist system’s strive for survival and continuation as a viable economic system.

The S-Matrix

The S-Matrix explains the policy’s internal changes by shifting the emphasis from objects to events. On their own, the ingredients that compose the four Interpretive Levels
themselves do not have meaning as isolated entities. They are understood best as interconnected, thereby reflecting the oneness of the policy. These four Interpretive Levels and their behavior determine the internal changes within the policy.

As with autopoiesis and bifurcation, the S-Matrix expresses internal changes in the policy in a flux metaphor. It focuses on the connections that simultaneously create internal patterns of unity and change within the policy. The S-Matrix also illustrates the interconnected and dynamic nature of the policy as a system that does not live independently and is not predictable and rational. Instead, the policy must be seen as a system that shares many worlds, many dimensions, many players, and many forces.

In order to understand the impact of the S-Matrix on the policy’s internal changes, the behavioral changes in each indicator is assessed as they relate to the level of change in the policy’s internal mechanism as a whole. As such, the S-Matrix serves as a complexity-guide in the process of observing the internal changes in the policy through the observing of behavioral changes in its Interpretive Levels.

The dimension of the S-Matrix explains internal changes within the U.S. policy toward Iraq based on the concept of the S-Matrix in complexity theories. The Interpretive Levels emerging in step one of the analysis determine according to the S-Matrix how changes in the behavior of these indicators reflect internal changes in the policy as a function of interconnectedness.

**The S-Matrix and Mythticism**

The policy’s internal mechanism that is producing its myth during each phase is composed of relationships that are interdependent and interconnected. These relationships
are based on process rather than units. As such, the ingredients (components) that compose mythticism during each phase of the policy’s progression share the same ingredients. In making the transition from one myth to another, for example, these ingredients share an interconnected web of interrelated relationships.

The S-Matrix, however, is not a causal relationship. Rather, the S-Matrix explains the complex interconnected relationships of temporal events during a specific trajectory period. In order to understand a particular myth of the U.S. policy toward Iraq during a specific period, this myth is best understood when observed as interconnected web.

Figure 12 depicts the components engaged in the interplay of the policy’s myth during a trajectory phase in 2003. These components are illustrated as interconnected throughout the policy’s dynamic relationships with its environment. These holistic relationships assist us in the understanding of the policy as an interactive dynamic.

In this dynamic, there is no starting or ending point since the web is a continuous process of relationships, bridged through time. If we observe any particular component within this web, we are able to determine that the policy and its internal relationships are manifested in continuous mythticism.

![Figure 12. Mythticism and the S-Matrix Analogy in 2003](image-url)
As Figure 12 shows, the myth of liberating the Iraqi people that is portraying the policy’s preemption in 2003 is interconnected with a number of other elements within governance in the United States. These elements are utilized by the Bush administration in order to justify not only its policy in Iraq but also its entire political agenda. Within this web of interconnectedness, there is antagonism caused by such a policy, as well as alliances. The result of this complex relationship is witnessed within the emerging political discourse in the United States. It is this relationship that makes the U.S. policy toward Iraq as part of an interconnected whole that is best understood if viewed within the context of the entire web of relationships that constitute the nature of the policy.

Figure 12 illustrates, for example, that the myth of liberating the Iraqi people in 2003 does not exist in a vacuum. Instead, it is interconnected with other factors in the policy, such as militarism, the rise of the administrative state, appointocracy, and granting sweetheart deals to companies such as Halliburton. The S-Matrix does not suggest that either one of these elements is causing the myth of liberating the Iraqi people in 2003. Rather, the S-Matrix suggests that in order to understand such a myth, it needs to be viewed within the context of relationships with the factors in the myth’s web of association.

A political scientist in the focus group comments on Iraq’s WMD and how it was used by the Bush administration to justify the war of 2003. He states that “the issue of WMD as a political foil is as much as any other political message. Given the complexity of the preemptive strike that confused many people, some thought that Saddam did have WMD and we were obligated to stopping him.” Underpinning the U.S. policy toward Iraq in 2003 to only the issue of WMD will not fully explain the myth of liberating the Iraqi
people. This myth, as such, has to be understood within the S-Matrix context that brings into the picture other elements that went into the making of this myth. Figure 12 demonstrates some of these elements.

Another focus group participant, a public administrator, explains the Bush administration’s reliance on circular reasoning in 2003 in order to justify its preemption policy toward Iraq. He argues that “when most of the UN resolutions were implemented by Iraq, Bush used the old issue of WMD as a reason to keep the issue of confronting Iraq circular and at the center. He started to use old stories about Iraq’s use of WMD, such as against Iran and the Kurds as though these stories were taking place recently.”

Content analysis provides a frequency count of 22 for issues related to unilateralism. The Bush administration thus relies on coercion to intimidate the United Nations into taking actions against Iraq to advance the political agenda of the United States. Bush’s unilateral and preemptive strike in 2003, for example, forced the United Nations to legitimize an action that lacked authorization, and to issue resolutions legalizing the U.S. occupation of Iraq. Put together, all these elements weave a detailed quilt that better explain changes in the policy’s myth.

The S-Matrix and Dichotomy

As with mythticism, the internal mechanism of the U.S. policy toward Iraq is manifested in its relationships with its failure to recognize the dichotomy between the Iraqi people and the government of Saddam Hussein. If we observe the dichotomous nature of the U.S. policy toward Iraq during one of its trajectory phases, we are able to see this dichotomous trend as it relates within an interconnected web of relationships with
other elements in governance in the United States. Figure 13 illustrates sanction as a specific notion within the policy’s dichotomous nature during the containment era of the 1990s with other components in the policy.

![Diagram](image)

Figure 13. Dichotomy and the S-Matrix Analogy During the Containment Era

Observing the sanction linearly, however, gives us only part of the picture. As such, the sanction needs to be observed within a broader and more complex context that encompasses many elements that are associated with it. The S-Matrix provides that observation by showing the sanction's interrelated connections with elements such as the U.S. continuous bombing of Iraq, the continuous mistrust between Iraq, the U.S. and the UN, the destruction of the Iraqi infrastructure, and the U.S. support of a few isolated Iraqi opposition groups in exile. Collectively, these elements contribute to the dichotomous nature of the U.S. policy toward Iraq and make its signature element, the sanction, more damaging and more devastating than if it is observed linearly.
The S-Matrix and Rational Choice

The S-Matrix illustrates the interconnected relationships between the ingredients that compose the policy’s rational choice. If we observe a policy’s tactic during a particular phase, we are able to witness this tactic’s relations with other components that constitute the interconnected nature of the U.S. policy toward Iraq and within the issue of governance in the United States.

In explaining the policy’s tactic after September 11, 2001 and adopting the preemption as a rational choice for the U.S. policy toward Iraq, an economist in the focus group states that “for the Pentagon to maintain its tremendous budget, arms industries, and feeding its contracts, for the oil companies to increase their profits, and for the Bush administration to establish a permanent military presence in the Middle East to control its oil resources, Iraq was presented as a challenge in order to justify U.S. military intervention.”

In placing preemption within such a complex matrix, understanding the policy toward Iraq becomes richer and more complex than if observed linearly. This type of analysis can be applied to other trends in the policy as well. A participant in the focus group connects the political discourse in the United States to the Cold War politics as an example of such analysis. This historian states that “politics in America is connected to Cold War politics and the idea of George Kennan in the 1950s in stabilizing what have been put in place in the world.”

Another focus group participant, a public administrator, emphasizes more the impact of the emerging disconnect between governmental agencies on the policy’s direction than on Kennan’s notion of maintaining the status quo in the world. He argues
that “one can be struck by the discourse in 2003 between the Pentagon’s plan for the invasion of Iraq and that of the State Department. It was the disconnect between these two groups that lent credence to the notion that our policy toward Iraq was designed to achieve the ultimate goals of people like Wolfowitz and others in the Pentagon.”

Developing such a complex perspective through the analysis of the S-Matrix that places related elements within a nexus of relationship is therefore important. It places political decisions and tactics in more suitable formats and enables policymakers to have multi-dimensional perspectives of phenomena.

In a one-on-one interview, a former leader of an exiled Iraqi opposition group explains the interconnectedness of the policy’s tactic in 1998 of supporting the Iraqi opposition groups in order to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and the association of this tactic with other elements that were engaged within a complex web of relationships. According to this expert, “the Iraqi opposition could not get rid of Saddam on its own. But in the 1990s it was in a good position to get rid of him. Unfortunately the CIA leaked the information and Saddam was able to get rid of the plotters. The CIA did not trust the Iraqi opposition to do a good job partly because they failed to form a united front.”

Figure 14 (page 281) depicts the policy’s tactic in 1998 in supporting the Iraqi opposition groups and its relationship with other components within the U.S. political system. As Figure 14 shows, supporting the Iraqi opposition, and thereby the concept of regime change in Iraq, is not an isolated event. Rather, it is connected with other temporal events that need to be investigated in order for the tactic of supporting the Iraqi opposition in 1998 to be understood fully. Together, these elements while engaged in
their web of association, they give us a better and richer understanding of the policy’s trajectory and tactics than if observed individually.

1998:
The Iraq Liberation Act of 1998
Supporting the Iraqi opposition groups
Plots by the CIA for regime change in Iraq
Funding the Iraqi opposition by $90 million

Operation Desert Fox

Figure 14. Rational Choice and the S-Matrix Analogy in 1998

The S-Matrix and Primordial Interests

The S-Matrix explains the primordial interests of the United States as viewed by the U.S. policy toward Iraq but in relation with the holistic interests of the United States as a nation-state. Figure 15 traces the primordial interests of the U.S. policy toward Iraq in 2003 within the context of these interests’ relation with the interests of the United States as a nation-state.

2003:
energy source (Iraqi oil)
Increase the value of the dollar
Enhance US military capacity
Strengthening the administrative state
Sweetheart deals (such as Halliburton)

Figure 15. Primordial Interests and the S-Matrix Analogy in 2003

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Figure 15 also illustrates that the U.S. primordial interest in 2003 of securing Iraqi oil for the benefit of U.S. energy is not operating in isolation. Instead, it is interrelated to other temporal events in the policy, such as the Pentagon' granting of sweetheart deals to American oil companies in no bid contracts, increasing the value of the dollar versus the Euro or the Yen via the power of oil in the world market, enhancing U.S. militarism in order to secure oil reserves in the Middle East for U.S. interests, and strengthening the administrative state in the United States in order for such tactics to pass without political or Congressional scrutiny. By understanding the complex dimension of all these elements and their interconnectedness, we gain a better understanding of the primordial interest in 2003 to secure the Iraqi oil for U.S. interest.

Figures 12, 13, 14, and 15 illustrate the interconnected relations between the policy’s ingredients within each Interpretive Level separately. However, the four Interpretive Levels are also interdependent. These dynamics enable the political decision making process to become a living organism, changing and interchanging as it moves from one phase to another in order to survive. Figure 16 illustrates the S-Matrix dynamics among the policy’s four Interpretive Levels.
Figure 16 demonstrates that the policy’s mythticism is related with the policy’s dichotomy, just as the dichotomy in turn is related with the policy’s primordial interests, the primordial interests are related with the policy’s rational choice, and the rational choice is related with the policy’s mythticism. The diagram also illustrates that mythticism is related with the policy’s primordial interests, primordial interests then are related with the dichotomy, the dichotomy is related with the policy’s rational choice, and rational choice is related with the primordial interests.

The primordial interests are thus related to the policy’s mythticism, mythticism is related to rational choice, rational choice is related to the dichotomy, and so on. As such, all the policy’s Interpretive Levels and their individual components are related with one another and interrelated and interdependent, rather than linear or fragmented. If we observe the policy as such, its trajectory through the progression of several phases is better understood as a function of the S-Matrix.

Mutual Causality

Mutual causality explains the internal changes in the policy. This is examined by observing the impact of positive and negative feedback on behavioral changes within the policy’s four Interpretive Levels. This observation enables us to see how mutual causality translates the systemic changes in the policy’s internal mechanism.

Feedback is manifested metaphorically as a flux metaphor, with positive feedback meaning that more changes in the Interpretive Level lead to more changes in the policy, and fewer changes in the Interpretive Level lead to fewer changes in the policy. Negative feedback, on the other hand, means that a change in the Interpretive Level initiates a
change in the opposite direction within the policy, with more changes in the Interpretive
Level leading to fewer changes in the policy and fewer changes in the Interpretive Level
leading to more changes in the policy. Changes in the Interpretive Level are always
triggered by changes in the environment.

The idea is that one element in the Interpretive Level influences the entire policy
and that there is a mutual causation in the relationship between the policy and its
Interpretive Levels. This relationship is best understood if observed within a state of
mutual interdependence.

Mutual causality represents the relationship between events that impact one
another (Daneke, 1999). The concept of causation is based on the prototype of direct
manipulation, which emerges directly from experiences. Causation is a basic human
concept. It is best understood as an experiential gestalt (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003, pp. 69-
75).

Morgan (1986) observes that mutual causality translates the changes in the system
shaped by the processes of positive and negative feedback, rather than a single or
collective of spatial and temporal causes. Feedback is when one element of experience in
a system influences the next. Feedback is either positive or negative (p. 46).

Morgan (1986) adds that positive feedback is when accounting for a system’s
change, we observe that more changes in the system’s environment lead to more changes
in the system internally, while fewer changes in the system’s environment lead to fewer
changes in the system internally. Negative feedback, on the other hand is when a change
in a variable initiates changes in the opposite direction, with more changes in the
environment leading to less changes inside the system and less changes in the environment leading to more changes inside the system (pp. 247-248).

The dimension of mutual causality explains internal changes within the U.S. policy toward Iraq based on the concept of mutual causality in complexity theories. The Interpretive Levels that is emerging in step one of the analysis is observed according to mutual causality along with its concepts of positive and negative feedback to see how these indicators’ behavior translate internal changes in the policy.

**Mutual Causality and Mythticism**

If we view mythticism according to positive feedback, we see that more changes in mythticism result in more changes in the policy, and fewer changes in mythticism lead to fewer changes in the policy. If we observe mythticism, however, according to negative feedback, we see that more changes in mythticism lead to fewer changes in the policy, and fewer changes in mythticism lead to more changes in the policy. Let us observe how these two types of feedback are manifested in mythticism.

**Positive Feedback**

The history chapter in this dissertation reveals that during the 1980s, there were not many changes occurring in the policy’s myth that supported Saddam under the guise of maintaining balance in the Middle East. The perpetuation of the balance meant that no structural changes occurred in the policy’s internal dynamics and mythticism. There were fewer activities in mythticism regarding human rights and democracy in Iraq, and therefore there were fewer activities by the policy regarding these issues. When Saddam
used chemical weapons against Iran and the Iraqi Kurds, for example, the U.S. turned a blind eye to these practices.

After Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the policy’s myth changed to reflect the internal changes in the policy that were triggered by the changes in the environment. Content analysis through a frequency of seven for a concept related to issues of symbolism and a frequency of 12 for a concept related to issues of Cold War politics reveal the presence of a new emerging myth. This myth spoke of a new world order, standing up to brutality and restoring freedom to the victims of aggression. The more internal changes that occurred in the policy’s myth to describe the policy’s new environment and the tactical responses for espousing internal changes, the more changes occurred in the policy’s mythticism and its relationships.

During this same period, there were fewer activities creating mythticism with regard to democracy in Iraq. Instead, mythticism was used to support only a cosmetic change in the regime in Iraq by removing Saddam and his inner circle through a CIA-sponsored coup designated to maintain the regime intact. As a consequence, there were fewer activities in support of a policy to support democracy and a popular movement in Iraq. For example, the history chapter reveals that when the Iraqi people rose against Saddam in March 1991, the United States decided not to support them and enabled Saddam’s forces to crush the uprising.

The 1990s and the containment era brought more changes to mythticism. The frequency in the content analysis of 38 for a concept related to issues of coercion and the frequency of 56 for a concept related to issues of Iraqi opposition reveal that during this period, the policy’s myth was designed to support sanctions and the use of force against
Iraq under the guise of maintaining containing Saddam. Policy activities intended to remove the person of Saddam and his inner circle increased, while the Iraqi people’s activities to promote true changes aimed toward toppling the Iraqi regime remained unsupported. Instead, the policy adopted a regime change concept that was based on the CIA’s support of a few isolated Iraqi opposition groups in exile rather than supporting a democratic popular movement in Iraq.

Content analysis with a frequency of 15 for a concept related to issues of containment reveals that during this same containment period, there was little attention paid by the policymakers to the suffering of the Iraqi people under the UN-imposed economic sanctions. As a consequence, there were fewer political decisions to ease those sufferings or lift the sanctions.

After September 11, 2001 activities related to mythicism increased dramatically. The new emerging myth began speaking of eliminating an alleged imminent threat posed by Saddam to the United States and of promoting a unilateral preemptive war against Iraq with or without UN authorization.

The policy’s myth after September 11, 2001 was reflected in the talk of liberating the Iraqi people from Saddam’s tyranny. It portrayed the U.S. invasion of Iraq as an act of liberation rather than an invasion and occupation. The history chapter reveals that the myth blamed Saddam alone for the sufferings of the Iraqi people and attributed the policy’s negative impact on the Iraqi people solely to Saddam, elevating him to the metaphorical status of Attila the Hun and the symbol of evil.

A sociologist in the focus group states that the policymakers, in effect, “refused to look into the mirror and admit their own responsibility in contributing to the sufferings of
the Iraqi people and in prolonging the regime of Saddam Hussein.” This trend of blaming outside enemies for the shortcomings of policies was not a new phenomenon in American politics. A political historian observes that “politicians always blamed others for things that they were responsible for. For example, politicians blamed Communism for the war in Vietnam during the 1960s that consumed U.S. energy for decades, and as of 1990 they blamed solely Saddam for the problems in Iraq.”

Negative Feedback

When fewer activities in mythticism lead to more activities in the policy and more activities in mythticism lead to fewer activities in the policy, this concept is termed as negative feedback. For example, the history chapter reveals that during the 1980s there were fewer activities by mythticism to justify U.S. support of Saddam in building his military arsenal. This diminished mythticism, however, lead to more activities by the policymakers in supporting Saddam and building his deadly arsenal.

During the containment period of the 1990s, there were more activities in mythticism in support of multilateralism, legitimacy, and working within the accepted international norms. Instead, content analysis in a frequency of 22 for a concept related to issues of unilateralism reveals that this increased mythticism led the policy toward less recognition of international norms, legitimacy or multilateralism. The daily bombing of Iraq, for example, the launching of operation Desert Fox, and the legalization of regime change efforts in Iraq through the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 all were in violation of international norms and were taken unilaterally and outside the United Nations’ regulations.
After September 11, 2001 there was more activities in mythicism toward world peace and legitimacy. This, however, was translated to a policy that took the opposite direction toward war and unilateralism.

**Mutual Causality and Dichotomy**

If we view the issue of dichotomy in light of positive feedback, we see that more changes in the policy’s recognition of the dichotomy between the Iraqi people and their government result in more changes in the policy itself toward acknowledging the separation between the Iraqi people and the regime of Saddam Hussein. Conversely, fewer changes in the policymakers’ recognition of the dichotomy between the Iraqi people and their government lead to fewer changes in the policy’s treatment of the Iraqi people as separate and distinct from the regime of Saddam Hussein.

If we observe this dichotomy, however, according to negative feedback, we see that more changes in the recognition of a dichotomy lead to fewer changes in the policy, and fewer changes in the dichotomy lead to more changes in the policy.

**Positive Feedback**

This term refers to the notion in effect that less leads to less and more leads to more. In regard to the issue of dichotomy, the history chapter reveals that when fewer attempts are made to recognize the dichotomy between the Iraqi people and their government, there is less emphasis by the policymakers on treating the Iraqi people separately from the regime of Saddam Hussein.
Such neglect leads to political and human catastrophe. Examples of these catastrophes are the U.S. daily bombing of Iraq since 1991 and the killing of civilians, the enforcement of economic sanctions that resulted in the deteriorating of living conditions and the death of many Iraqi children because of disease and malnutrition, the U.S. support of a few isolated and ineffective exiled Iraqi opposition groups instead of supporting a wider democratic movement in Iraq, and the creation of an unnecessary war to invade Iraq under false pretences while promoting it as a war of liberation.

After September 11, 2001, the frequency in the content analysis of 24 for a concept related to issues of rhetoric shows that there were fewer emphases on the dichotomy between Iraq and international terrorism. In terms of policy, this notion was translated into an increased attempt to link Iraq with international terrorism, but in terms of preemption, there were fewer emphases on the dichotomy between the Iraqi people and their government.

When translated into war, policymakers deliberately ignored the dichotomy between Saddam’s regime and the Iraqi people. As a consequence, Iraqi civilians were targeted by massive U.S. bombardments during the 2003 war, thereby destroying their civil infrastructure, increasing the deterioration of their economy and security, and focusing instead on protecting the oil industry and a few Iraqi exiles who were flown to Iraq on board U.S. military jets to be appointed as Iraq’s new leaders.

**Negative Feedback**

During the Gulf War of 1991 and only for a short time, there was more emphasis by the Bush administration on the dichotomy between Saddam’s regime and the Iraqi
After September 11, 2001, the history chapter reveals that there was again more emphasis on the dichotomy between the Iraqi regime and the Iraqi people. There was again, however, fewer emphases on such a policy of dichotomy. That disparity led to the treatment of Iraq after the 2003 war as an occupied country, delaying and often blocking the means for the emergence of a true democratic movement to create a new, independent Iraq.

A former leader of an exiled Iraqi opposition group states in an interview that “whenever Iraqis are able to organize themselves in a political movement, they express their organizational efforts either in the form of tribal loyalty or religious affiliations. These affiliations are not viewed as democratic because they devalue individual rights in favor of the collective rights of the tribe or the religious sect.”

So when an outside force, such as the U.S. military, was able to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein, Iraqis did not capitalize on their dichotomy with the fallen regime by expressing themselves democratically. Rather, they organized their efforts within tribal and religious affiliations. The U.S. policy toward Iraq reinforced this trend by creating an administrative regime in Iraq, such as the Iraqi Governing Council, that was based on tribal and religious affiliation instead of democratic accountability.

**Mutual Causality and Rational Choice**

If we view the policymakers’ rational choice according to positive feedback, we see that more changes in these choices lead to more changes in the policy, and fewer changes in these choices lead to fewer changes in the policy. If we observe the rational choice, however, according to negative feedback, we are able to see that more changes in
these choices lead to fewer changes in the policy, and fewer changes in these choices lead
to more changes in the policy. Let us now see how these two types of feedback manifest
their impact on the policy’s rational choice.

**Positive Feedback**

The more tactics are employed in response to environmental changes, the more
changes occur in the policy. For example, the frequency count of 13 through content
analysis for a concept related to issues of trajectory indicates that after Iraq’s invasion of
Kuwait in 1990, tactics such as force, economic sanctions, clandestine plots to topple the
Iraqi regime, and war were used as rational choice to expel the Iraqi Army from Kuwait
and restore the political balance in the region.

As a consequence, the U.S. policy was galvanizing the international community
and was supported by 32 nations in its efforts to liberate Kuwait from the Iraqi invasion.
Congress also legitimized the policy and united the country under its mantra. With the
increase of such tactics, the U.S. claimed a leadership position in the world despite the
geopolitical system at the time that experienced two prominent superpowers, the United
States and the Soviet Union.

The history chapter in this dissertation shows that during the same period in 1991,
fewer tactics were used by the policymakers to support the Iraqi people and their
aspiration for freedom. As a result, the policymakers demonstrate fewer tendencies
toward supporting the Iraqi people, such as during the uprising against Saddam in March
1991. Because of such lack of support by the U.S. for the Iraqi people, Saddam’s army
was able to crush the Iraqi uprising and maintain the regime in power.
During the containment era of the 1990s, the frequencies in the content analysis of 44 for a concept related to issues of force, 38 for a concept related to issues of coercion, 15 for a concept related to issues of containment, 56 for a concept related to issues of Iraqi opposition, and 13 for a concept related to issues of Middle East status quo indicate that more rational tactics were used to respond to emerging trends in the environment. For example, tactics such as coercion, force, supporting the Iraqi opposition groups, and supporting the political status quo in the Middle East were utilized to respond to the changes in the policy’s environment. The increased use of tactics resulted in increased activities in the policymakers in further moving the policy toward unilateralism, use of force outside UN authorization in the so-called No-Fly-Zones, and launching unauthorized military operations against Iraq such as Desert Thunder and Desert Fox.

A political historian states in a one-on-one interview that during the same era “fewer tactics were utilized to support the cause of democracy in Iraq. The policymakers were less interested in supporting the emergence of a true democratic movement in Iraq. Instead, the policymakers supported a few isolated Iraqi exiled groups and funded plans through the CIA to trim off the leadership of the Iraqi regime through military coup attempts but maintained the regime’s structure intact. These plots, however, were unsuccessful.”

A political scientist in the focus group states that “after September 11, 2001, the policymakers ushered in an increasing numbers of tactics. This was done in order to justify the Bush administration’s new preemptive doctrine against Iraq.” Examples of such tactics were the increased use of Machiavellian methods, elevating Saddam to the metaphorical position of Attila the Hun, the use of rhetoric, Trotskyism, force, metaphor
of war, fear, falsehood, and the misuse or misinterpretation of intelligence. The increase in tactics caused an increase in the policy’s internal activities to allow for ideology, power interest, the role of oil, militarism, special interests, and Hobbesian thinking to take hold in the decision-making process.

Fewer tactics were utilized after September 11, 2001 to support the cause of democracy in Iraq. The policymakers had minimum interest in supporting a true democratic movement in Iraq and relied on the U.S. invasion of Iraq in order to change the regime through direct military involvement.

**Negative Feedback**

The history chapter reveals that during the 1980s, tactics were employed to support Saddam as a means of balancing the political powers in the Middle East. As a consequence, the policy was less concerned about the increased military and political capacity of Iraq. U.S. aid to Saddam helped in the transformation of Iraq into the kind of force capable of disrupting the very political balance in the Middle East that the policy was aiming to protect.

After Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990, a political scientist and a strategist for the Republican Party states in a one-on-one interview that “the policy’s tactics increasingly opposed aggression and brutality, defended freedom, and restored legitimacy.” On the policy level, however, there were fewer activities to oppose aggression and brutality inside Iraq, fewer activities to support human rights in Iraq or push the United Nations to delegitimize the Iraqi regime and encourage its internal collapse.
The high frequency in the content analysis of 56 for a concept related to issues of Iraqi opposition suggests that during the containment era, support increased for the Iraqi opposition and regime change efforts as a measure of opposing Saddam’s regime. On the policy level, however, fewer activities were generated to support the Iraqi people and their aspiration for freedom. The policy substituted supporting the Iraqi people with support of a few isolated exiled groups that lacked any support or base inside Iraq.

Content analysis yields a frequency of ten for a concept related to issues concerning the enemy. After September 11, 2001, fewer tactics thus were utilized to identify the “enemy” and accordingly fewer tactics were utilized to make a correct use of U.S. capacity against such an enemy. However, more activities were generated to identify Iraq as the enemy and U.S. capacity was therefore utilized to defeat Iraq.

Mutual Causality and Primordial Interests

If we view the policy’s primordial interests according to positive feedback, we see that more changes in the policy’s primordial interests result in more changes in the policy, and fewer changes in these primordial interests lead to fewer changes in the policy. If we observe the policy’s primordial interests, however, according to negative feedback, we see that more changes in these interests lead to fewer changes in the policy, and fewer changes in the policy’s primordial interests lead to more changes in the policy.

Positive Feedback

The United States’ “nation-state” interest has always been the primary factor and the moving element in the U.S. policy toward Iraq. All other issues that the policy
advocates, such as upholding world peace and legitimacy, defending freedom, promoting democracy, and confronting aggression are secondary.

An economist in the focus group argues that "the U.S. interest, and the interest of its special interest groups in particular, is always in the center of the U.S. policy toward Iraq and constitutes its focal point." In dealing with Iraq, a historian in the focus group feels that this could "be seen during the 1960s when the United States supported a clandestine regime change effort to overthrow the government of General Qasim in 1963 in order for the American oil companies to regain their concession areas in Iraq. U.S. support for Saddam during the 1980s Iran-Iraq War could also be seen in the tactics adopted to serve the policy's primordial concern: oil."

After the fall of the Shah in 1979 by an Islamic revolution in Iran, the history chapter in this dissertation traces how the U.S. feared that the extension of revolutionary Islam to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region would destabilize the oil-rich region. As the Khomeini regime pulled the Iranian oil out of American control, the United States feared that the extension of Khomeinism to other Islamic countries would further increase the possibility of the U.S. losing control over Middle Eastern oil. The United States thus needed a proxy to offset Khomeinism, and it saw in Saddam such a proxy.

The history chapter also shows that in September 1980 Saddam launched his preemptive strike against Iran. The resulting war between Iran and Iraq lasted for eight years. During these years, the primordial interests of the United States were geared toward supporting Saddam. The prospect of an Iranian win threatened disastrous results for the United States. As such, the United States increased its support for Saddam and
designed its policy toward Iraq to translate this mantra without regard to Saddam’s brutality and possession of weapons of mass destruction.

Once the Iran-Iraq War ended in 1988, content analysis provides frequencies of 70 for a concept related to issues of oil, 25 for a concept related to issues of power interests, and 53 for a concept related to issues of regionalism. These frequencies thereby demonstrate that the primordial interest of the United States no longer was in supporting Saddam.

With Saddam’s armies growing both in size and capacity while Saddam was espousing Arab unity and control over Arab oil, the policy’s interest was to curtail Saddam’s capacity to deliver on such a threat to U.S. interests. The decision makers, however, saw no benefit in overthrowing Saddam at the time and still considered Saddam as a useful tool to maintain political balance in the region.

On August 2, 1990 Saddam invaded Kuwait. Whether he was duped into doing so or was misguided by the signals that he was receiving from the United States and its embassy in Baghdad, Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in either event served two objectives for the United States.

The frequency in the content analysis of 34 for a concept related to issues of militarism demonstrates that the first objective of the United States was to reduce Saddam’s military and political capacity to what it had been prior to the Iran-Iraq War. The second objective was to establish a permanent American military presence in the oil-rich Middle East in order to secure U.S. oil interests. The increase in the policy’s primordial interests toward enlarging the U.S. presence in the Middle East resulted in an
increase in policy activity in producing the Gulf War and a political leadership that became a major player both in the region and the world.

With the increased U.S. role in the Middle East and its control of Middle Eastern oil, other nation-states in the world began to challenge the newly emerging trend of American hegemony. A political scientist in the focus group states that “as a counter measure, these nation-states formed regional alliances to challenge America’s political and economic supremacy. Examples of these alliances could be seen in Europe and Asia. Iraq was used as a veto card to advance these alliances’ competition with the United States for scarce resources, particularly oil.”

The 1990s’ containment period was the era of friction between these alliances and the United States. It appeared clearly in dealing with issues related to Iraq. Consequently, the U.S. policy toward Iraq increased in its level of activity as decision makers pursued the policy’s primordial interests in order to secure America’s niche in the world. This was achieved even with the policy adopting unilateral and illegal tactics outside UN authority.

Another focus group participant, an economist, argues that “the drive to control oil in the world by the United States, especially in the oil-rich area in the Middle East, eventually drove the world to be divided into two camps. One camp was headed by the United States. The second camp was headed by regional alliances such as the European Union and the Asian economic partnerships. The developing nations of the Third World tilted toward the second camp to protect its own interests and to pressure the United States for more aid and political concessions.”

A political historian states in a one-on-one interview that the struggle between these camps replaced the Cold War and changed geopolitics to witness increased
tendencies, especially by U.S. camp, toward isolationism, militarism, and a new state of imperialism. As a consequence of such dynamics, the U.S. policy toward Iraq shifted toward adopting illegitimate tactics outside international norms. Examples of these illegitimate tactics were preemption, neocolonialism, Pax-America, and an administrative state headed by an imperial presidency.

Negative Feedback

To use Kafka's (2002) analogy of the "migration of consciousness," the policy's primordial interests became the political center for the migration of political ethics in the United States. This statement is not a normative judgment. Rather, it is a diagnostic analysis based on an understanding of the policy's primordial interests and their anatomy in leading political discourse in the United States to neglect the sufferings of the Iraqi people and in using Iraq as a political campaign issue in the United States.

A sociologist in the focus group contends that "the more the policy's primordial interests used to express the American psyche and American idealism, the further its policy toward Iraq moved away from such notions as political ethics, responsibility and accountability. The policy was expressed instead in terms of supporting political opportunism, local tyrants in the Middle East, and the increased adaptation of the methodology of destruction, wars, and starvation in Iraq."

Complexity teaches us that life is irreversible. This means that the policy's various trajectory phases are unique on their own. None is reversible or could be repeated. However, the policy's primordial interests are based on power interests rather than on human consciousness. The policymakers are thus able to weave parallel trends of
similar characteristics within the policy’s internal dynamics in order to move on the same wave function in a trajectory lasting from the 1960s until the fall of Saddam and the occupation of Iraq in 2003.

While moving along this historical pathway, the policymakers produced two signatory traits that became simultaneously parts of the policy’s continuous construction. These two traits are misery and absurdity. Such production brings Marx’s prophecy back to life. According to Marx (1990), if history is able to repeat itself, it can only do so twice, once to repeat itself as misery and the other time to repeat itself as an absurdity. The policy toward Iraq reproduced itself in both conditions. It reproduced itself as a misery during the Gulf War of 1991, and as absurdity during the war of 2003.

Conclusions

In observing the U.S. policy toward Iraq and its hidden dynamics, our attention moves from observing it while moving in one direction to viewing it as moving in many directions. These many directions are the function of the policy’s internal mechanism, organizational behavior, phase shift dynamics, interdependent and interrelated relationships, and the impact of change that result in impacting the policy as a whole.

These multiple dimensions differ from the linear analysis in that they do not rely on interpreting the data piece by piece. Instead, we look for emerging trends, hidden meanings, and the overall behavior and relationships of these trends in constructing the internal dynamics of the policy. These trends together constitute the complex analysis of the policy’s internal relationships and the qualitative expression of its internal trajectory in accordance with complexity theories.
Although complex analysis differs from linear analysis, it relies on the same themes and concepts that are drive linear analysis. Observing a dynamic system in a qualitative inquiry in accordance with complexity theories is not a rejection of linear analysis. Rather, it is complementary to the linear analysis. Without the empirical observations needed for linear analysis, we are unable to make sense of the data and devise the Interpretive Levels needed for complex analysis. Linear analysis, therefore, goes hand in hand with complex analysis when conducting a qualitative inquiry. Together, they enrich our understanding of the world and the dynamic interplay necessary in changing a living system.

The internal analysis of the U.S. policy toward Iraq according to complexity dimensions is not normative and does not evaluate the policy based on ethical or moral standards. Rather, the analysis is diagnostic in its nature, and it describes changes occurring within the internal trajectory of the policy by emphasizing the dynamics of organizational reassembly, phase shifts, interrelation dynamics, and non-local causation.

According to this analysis, the policy experiences several self-assembly processes, and its organizational order at various settings dissipates and collapses, emerging with newer orders, while in other settings it resists collapse due to artificial engineering, causing catastrophic results both for the United States and the Iraqi people.

The complex analysis also shows that the policy and its various components are engaged in an interconnected relationship. A change in one component of the policy impacts the policy as a whole.

Although the tactics employed by decision makers are rational choice for the specific time and trend that emerges in the environment, the policy as a whole lacks a
coherent strategy, characterized by planning, and clear objectives. The policy is a trajectory, moving from one phase to another while responding to outside stimuli but without having a clear objective and strategy from the start to finish.
CHAPTER VIII

THE INTERACTIVE DYNAMICS

Introduction

This chapter focuses on observing the impact of environmental changes on the U.S. policy toward Iraq according to complexity theories. The analysis is conducted by tracing the behavioral changes within the four Interpretive Levels and presented in a flux metaphorical model.

The analysis in this chapter is complex in its function, looking holistically into the data through its indicators (the four Interpretive Levels) and is not constrained by interpreting the data piece by piece. The characteristics of this analysis emphasize the interrelationships between the four Interpretive Levels and their environment. As such, this analysis is called "Interactive Structure."

The emphasis in this analysis is on the changes in the policy's environment that provide kicks, triggering changes in the policy itself. The relationship between changes in the environment and those in the policy is interrelated and interdependent. As changes in the environment trigger changes in the policy, changes in the policy impact the environment, causing more changes in the environment, then more changes in the environment cause more changes in the policy, and so forth. The relationship between changes in the environment and changes in the policy, as such, is analogous to the Chinese boxes in that it contains wholes within wholes. All the wholes are symbiotic in their relationships and interdependent on one another.
This way of thinking helps us recognize that every phase in the policy depends on others as well as on the environment. The notion of relating the policy’s survival mechanism to changes in its environment brings Darwin’s theory of evolution into the center of this analysis.

The policy toward Iraq, like organisms in nature, depends for survival on its ability to acquire an adequate supply of resources necessary to exist within the environment. And since there is, and continues to be a resource scarcity in such an environment, only the fittest trends, tactics, and phases within the policy survive. The nature, numbers, and distribution of these trends and phases or tactics at a given time are dependent on resource availability and on competition among various trends. The environment is thus the critical factor in determining which trend succeeds and which fails.

In addition to the policy itself is evolving, the policy’s ecosystem (geopolitics) also evolves. The process of the policy’s evolution is understood at the level of the total ecology of its ecosystem. This has important implications because it suggests that the policy’s evolution is always the evolution of the pattern of relations that embraces changes in the environment. It is the pattern, not just the separate units comprising any particular patterns, that evolves. The evolution of the policy as such involves the survival of these phases and patterns that least fit the policy.

To understand the policy’s ecology according to this perspective, it is necessary to understand that the policy is engages with its environment in a pattern of co-creation,
with each producing the other. By analyzing the policy as part of an ecology comprising collaboration, we see the different levels of policy development.

External Changes and Their Impacts on the Policy

By viewing the policy within the frame of reference provided by the flux metaphor, we are able to examine the nature of the policy's environment, the critical tasks that influence the policy's ability to survive, how it secures a niche in the environment, how it is able to defend this niche adequately, how it searches for a new niche, how it adopts appropriate means for dealing with the environment, how it develops appropriate tactics, and how it satisfies the needs of its components. This type of observation is able to guide us toward observing the policy's survival mechanism, adaptation, and relations with the environment as an integral part of such an environment.

In doing so, we need to witness the policy's ability to occupy a highly competitive environment. And, we need to look at the loose matrix structure of the policy and observe its trend toward phase change as it responds to specific changes in its environment.

This analysis places importance on understanding the policy as an open system that is best understood as processes of patterns rather than as collections of parts. As such, step three is designed to observe the policy toward Iraq as a dynamic system that experiences internal changes due to environmental change.

To understand the policy's environmental changes and their impact on internal changes, dimensions from the complexity theories, such as autopoiesis, bifurcation, the S-Matrix, and mutual causality are utilized to guide the analysis. Each dimension explains the external changes in the policy as a function of environmental changes, and it
does so by tracing changes in the behavior of the four Interpretive Levels. Table Seven illustrates these four dimensions and their functions in the analysis. Morgan’s flux metaphor is utilized to show changing trends in the U.S. policy toward Iraq as impacted by changing trends in the environment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Functions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autopoietic</td>
<td>It analyzes environmental changes that impact self-organization within the policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bifurcation</td>
<td>It analyzes environmental changes that impact phase shift, collapse dynamics, and the emergence of a new order in the policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The S-Matrix</td>
<td>It analyzes the environmental impact on the policy as a function of the policy’s web of associations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual causality</td>
<td>It analyzes environmental changes that impact positive and negative feedback in the policy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7. Complexity Dimensions and Changes in the Policy’s Environmental

Autopoiesis

Autopoiesis is used as an analytical lens in observing changes in the environment and its impacts on the process of self-organization in the policy. This observation enables us to see the manifestation of self-production, reassembling of components and changing of structure through top-down dynamics take place. These dynamics occur because the policy responds to external changes in its environment.

Every pattern within the policy gives way to another pattern and does not stay fixed in time and place. Neither containment stays fix, for example, nor preemption. This flow in the process is flux, and the internal changes that occur are irreversible.

In order to understand the impact of autopoiesis on observing the impact of environmental changes on the policy, behavioral changes in each indicator in the data’s four Interpretive Levels are observed. Autopoiesis thus serves as a complexity-guide in

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the process of observing the impact of environmental changes on the policy’s internal changes by tracing the behavioral changes in the four Interpretive Levels.

**Autopoiesis and Mythicism**

The history chapter reveals that the United States’ relation with Iraq began with the creation of the Iraqi state in 1920. The foundation of this relationship was built on oil exploration in northern Iraq. Since Iraq was under British mandate, U.S. relations with Iraq remained small and insignificant. The impact of this minuscule relationship on U.S. foreign policy and the myth surrounding it were small, and were enlarged only as changes in the environment dictated more U.S. involvement in Iraq. This involvement, however, did not take place until 1958.

The emerging myth during the period from 1920-1958 spoke of capitalism and its ingenuity as the driving force for democracy and progress, justifying colonialism as a necessary mechanism to bring progress to the colonized people in the world. Oil was the fuel to run this engine, and as such it was vital that it be discovered and pumped to reach the industrial factories in the colonialist states. This mantra continued even during the Cold War, as the myth was designed to reflect the contrast between two worlds and two views: the so-called free world as represented by capitalism, and the world behind the iron-curtain as represented by the Soviet bloc.

The history chapter in this dissertation adds that the relationship between the industrial West and colonized Iraq continued without many changes until 1958, when the new Republican government in Iraq expelled the British from Iraq, established the independent Republic of Iraq, and reduced the oil companies’ concession areas in Iraq to
five percent. This angered the oil companies and their nation-states, including the United States, and led them to conspire against the new Iraqi government.

The U.S. government decided through the CIA and in coordination with the governments of Egypt, Kuwait, Iran, and England to support plots to implement a regime change in Iraq. The myth surrounding the U.S. policy toward Iraq at this time was to reduce Soviet influence in the Middle East and help bring forth democratic regimes that allied themselves with the free world. The plots succeeded, and on February 8, 1963 the CIA was able to topple the Iraqi Republican regime and bring the Baath Party into power in Iraq.

The Baath government was not democratic but a brutal police regime that institutionalized terror and murder. The U.S. policy, however, condoned these practices because they were directed against the Iraqi Communists, the perceived enemies at the time of capitalism and the free market.

With Communism representing evil in American political myth, the U.S. policy toward Iraq allowed for the Baath’s brutal tactics to take hold in the name of fighting Communism. The policy’s self-assembly was organized around this myth, legitimizing America’s support for the Baath regime under the guise of protecting the free market.

The history chapter also describes how the Baath rewarded America’s support by granting U.S. oil companies’ huge concession areas in Iraq. The alliance between America’s power interest and its local Baathist managers flourished to further derail any populist aspiration for democracy in Iraq.

In 1979, the Shah of Iran was overthrown by a popular Islamic revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini’s new Islamic republic ended U.S. control of Iranian oil
and threatened to spread its ideology to other oil-rich Islamic countries in the region, especially Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the Gulf states. According to a political historian in a one-on-one interview, this trend in the environment “alarmed the political decision-makers in the United States and triggered a kick in their Iraq policy” toward self-organization in order to “enable Iraq stop the threat of the Islamic revolution of Iran.”

This expert adds that the policy’s mythicism during this era emerged with “the U.S. supporting Iraq to balance the other political powers in the Middle East and to contain the Iranian revolution.” This assembly of myth occurred during the Carter’s administration, with “National Security Advisor Zbignew Brzezinski encouraging Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to invade Iran in order to protect the stability of the region.” Another historian in the focus group states that the myth “continued during the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s in order to assure Iranian defeat and Iraqi victory.”

On August 2, 1990, Saddam invaded Kuwait to rescue his war-damaged economy from collapse. The frequency in the content analysis of 19 of a concept related to issues of mistrust and the frequency of nine of a concept related to issues of survival suggest that Saddam thought that his invasion of Kuwait would not cause an American retaliation, especially after he stopped the Iranian revolution from disrupting U.S. influence in the region. Saddam also misread signals delivered to him by the U.S. embassy in Iraq, confusing the ambassador’s message that the U.S. would not interfere in matters between two Arab nations as a green light to march ahead with his plan to invade Kuwait. This newly developing trend in the environment provided a kick for the U.S. policy toward Iraq and its myth to reassemble in order to respond to the changes on the ground.
In 1990, the policy's mythicism was restructured in order to represent the change in U.S. relations with Iraq from cooperative to confrontational. The new myth was designed in order to metaphorically represent a New World Order that was devised by the Bush administration's outlook toward the world. The assembly of this myth was arranged to turn Saddam into Attila the Hun, and the efforts to oust him from Kuwait were portrayed as matters of freedom, legitimacy, and liberation.

By using Saddam as the symbol of evil, content analysis in a frequency of seven of a concept related to issues of symbolism underscores that policymakers claimed the U.S. military, political and moral leadership of the world. And with 32 other nations joining U.S. military efforts to rescue Kuwaiti oil from Saddam's grip, the Bush administration was successful in writing the final chapter of the Cold War by enabling America to emerge as the world sole superpower.

The policy's myth continued during the Clinton presidency, reinforced by the ultimate demise of the Soviet Union. With the U.S. emerging as the world's only superpower, the frequency in the content analysis of eight of a concept related to issues of a unipolar world reveals that America had begun to regard international laws and legitimacy issues as secondary to U.S. interests. As such, during the 1990s, the policy's myth was reassembled autopoietically to reflect these developments, with the new myth reflecting emerging trends in American politics, such as unilateralism, disregard to legitimacy and international law, and the increase in coercive actions.

On September 11, 2001, terrorists used commercial airliners to attack the Pentagon building in Washington, D.C. and the World Trade Center towers in New York City. The incident created a tense political climate in the United States that shifted its
foreign policy from operating within the mindset of the Cold War to fighting privately funded clandestine networks of terrorists.

The frequency in the content analysis of 12 of a concept related to issues of capacity and the frequency of 12 of a concept related to issues of Cold War politics reveal that the mechanism in fighting terrorism was the same as the one for fighting a nation-state during the Cold War. The U.S. identified a designated nation-state in order to activate its Cold-War capacity in fighting terrorism. Afghanistan was chosen first for harboring al-Qaeda, and Iraq was chosen later for allegedly having ties with al-Qaeda.

As of 2001, the policy's myth went into rearrangement and self-organization as a consequence. In order to justify the Bush administration's preemptive policy against Iraq and present it as a defense mechanism against imminent threat, and in order to legitimate this effort as part of the U.S. war on terrorism, a philosopher in the focus group maintains that the policy's myth was "designed to justify the war and occupation of Iraq in 2003 as a matter of self-defense and to prevent another terrorist attack on America from taking hold." This myth was also institutionalized when Congress authorized the President to use force against Iraq and passed Iraq Liberation Act of 2002.

Saddam eventually was toppled by the invading U.S. army on April 9, 2003 and arrested on December 12, 2003. The history chapter reveals that the Bush administration's pre-war claim that Saddam's regime had weapons of mass destruction and the delivery mechanism to threaten the United States through Iraq's alleged ties with al-Qaeda proved to be bogus and was based on faulty intelligence.

As a consequence, the policy's myth of 2001 collapsed and reassembled in 2003 within a new organizational structure to justify the Iraq war as a matter of liberating the
Iraqi people from tyranny. However, the year-long occupation, killing Iraqi civilians, imposing discredited figures as Iraq's new leaders, looting Iraqi oil and destroying its infrastructure, and torturing Iraqi prisoners led to the collapse of this newly reassembled myth as well and exposed it as a mask to hide the policy's moral bankruptcy. With the collapse of the policy's myth of 2003, the U.S. policy toward Iraq lost one of its greatest strengths to survive amidst continuous environmental changes. Consequently, the collapse of the policy itself is awaiting the impact of competing forces within its environment.

**Autopoiesis and Dichotomy**

Despite continuous changes in the environment, the policy toward Iraq neglects in its calculation the dichotomy between the Iraqi people and the Iraqi regimes that oppress them. An Iraqi-American chemist in the focus group contends that "the prime motivator of the U.S. policy toward Iraq was the U.S. nation-state interest. The welfare of the Iraqi people and their suffering did not matter to the decision-makers." In order for environmental trends not to impact changes in the policy's dichotomous nature, the decision-makers adopted various measures in order to artificially prevent the collapse of the order that neglected such a dichotomy.

A political historian states in a one-on-one interview that "by ignoring this dichotomy, the policymakers influenced the environment and created a dichotomy of their own, between U.S. interest in Iraq and the aspirations of the Iraqi people. Because of this new dichotomy, the Iraqi people divorced themselves from the United States and
its plans in Iraq and widened the gap between their interests and those of the United States.”

The frequency in the content analysis of 24 for a concept related to issues of rhetoric and the frequency of eight of a concept related to issues of irony demonstrate that as the policymakers moved the United States to confront Saddam during the Gulf War of 1991, they shifted the U.S. policy toward Iraq to acknowledge the dichotomy between the Iraqi people and their government. This acknowledgment, however, was used for mere propaganda purposes in order to perpetuate the policy’s myth as one that supported the Iraqi people’s aspiration for freedom. This myth, however, was designed to manipulate the suffering of the Iraqi people for the policy’s own advantage and it did not intend to change the suffering of the Iraqi people at the hand of their government.

The main organizational structure of the policy remained impervious to the dichotomy and continued using the same structure that it used during the 1980s. This, in return, impacted the policy’s environment, creating a backlash against the United States by regional powers in the Middle East, Europe and Asia who viewed the U.S. policy toward Iraq as harsh, punitive, and hurting the Iraqi people more than the regime of Saddam Hussein.

A public administrator in the focus group states that the policy’s neglect of dichotomy contributed to “the creation of a gap of mistrust between the Iraqi people and the United States. This gap became wider as the policy continued to ignore the dichotomy between the Iraqi people and the regime of Saddam Hussein and misused it for its political advantages.”
Content analysis with a high frequency of 43 for a concept related to issues of misleading strongly suggests that the misuse of this dichotomy increased after September 11, 2001, with the Bush administration focusing on the Iraqi regime as the main threat to the United States and pretending to fight Saddam on behalf of the Iraqi people. Such a claim was quickly exposed in 2003 when the invading U.S. troops began to treat the Iraqi people as an extension of Saddam’s regime. Instead of handing governance in Iraq to the Iraqi people themselves and encouraging the promotion of civic and democratic institutions, the Bush administration decided to occupy Iraq and run it as a war spoil.

Autopoiesis and Rational Choice

The frequency in the content analysis of 25 for a concept related to issues of power interest and the high frequency of 47 for a concept related to nation-state interest suggest that the policy’s tactics were its only rational choice, representing the advancement of the United States’ nation-state interests. Autopoiesis took place as these tactics responded to changes in the policy’s environment.

If we observe the rational choice during each phase in the policy’s trajectory, we witness a continuous process of autopoiesis within the series of choices that are made. This observation is determined through the tracing of these choices and their behavior as they respond to changing trends in the environment.

During the 1980s, for example, the history chapter in this dissertation shows how the United States interest in the Middle East was threatened by the Islamic regime of Iran. As a consequence, the policy’s rational choice was to support Iraq in its war with Iran in order to neutralize the Iranian threat. Content analysis with a high frequency of 67 for a
concept related to issues of hypocrisy indicates that this choice was not based on ethics or moral precepts but purely on the United States' interest in the region. By doing so, U.S. support for Saddam had an impact on the policy's geopolitical environment as well. The relationships between regional nation-states and the United States also became based on nation-state interests and devoid of political ethics.

The history chapter also reveals that this trend allowed the West, headed by U.S. actions in supporting Saddam, to ignore the Iraqi regime's violation of human rights in Iraq and its use of weapons of mass destruction against civilian populations both in Iran and Iraq. Turning a blind eye to such violations prolonged the tyrannical regime of Saddam and strengthened its repressive apparatus against the Iraqi people, while allowing it to present itself to the world and the United Nations as the legitimate representative of the very people that it was oppressing. The separation between democracy and tyranny in Iraq disappeared as both concepts were ignored in the quest for scarce resources by the West and the United States.

The frequency within the content analysis of 16 for a concept related to issues of the administrative state and the frequency of nine of a concept related to issues of the imperial presidency suggest that while democracy in the United States remained intact within the system of governance and civil institutions, its disregard of the problems in Iraq made it susceptible to anti-democratic norms within the United States itself. Examples of such norms can be detected in the emerging of concepts and tendencies such as the administrative state and the imperial presidency.

An economist in the focus group feels that "after Saddam's invasion of Kuwait, the U.S. power interest became threatened by Saddam's control of Kuwaiti oil. If he were
to be left unchallenged in Kuwait, his next target would probably be Saudi Arabia. The prospect of Saddam holding the oil of Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia was alarming and antithetical to U.S. interests."

As such, the policymakers' tactical choice was to end the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, liberate the Kuwaiti oil, and restore the rule of Kuwaiti local managers of the Sabah family. However, in order to achieve this tactic, the U.S. policy toward Iraq had to experience an autopoietic self-organization and it had to shift from supporting Saddam to confronting him.

The impact of this self-reassembly on the environment resulted in new dynamics. A political historian observes in a one-on-one interview that "geopolitics in the world shifted from supporting a tyrant such as Saddam to confronting him. This shift created a temporary alliance between the nation-states in the world and the United States to benefit from the status of curtailing Iraq."

Content analysis yields a high frequency of 53 for a concept related to issues of regionalism. It thus shows that during the containment era of the 1990s, the U.S. policy toward Iraq responded to new changes in the environment, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, the emergence of the United States as the sole superpower in the world that no longer was constrained by international norms, and the rise of regionalism as a challenge to U.S. supremacy. As a result, the policy toward Iraq experienced another autopoietic realignment, responding to environmental changes with tactics such as abusing the UN mission in Iraq and using coercion, regime change, and isolated Iraqi opposition groups in exile in order to impact the political discourse in Iraq.
After September 11, 2001 and as a response to changes in the environment, preemption became the new tactic. The U.S. policy toward Iraq was reorganized once more in order to respond to the new reality on the ground. The new autopoietic processes emerged with more tactics in support of preemption, such as the use of war as a corrective action for containment, a shift in ideology toward a Hobbesian thinking, using faulty intelligence in order to build a case against Saddam, and turning the imagery of Saddam to one that resembled Attila the Hun.

The impact of this new set of autopoietic process impacted the policy’s environment as well. Content analysis reveals that these changes in the policy and its environment pushed governance in the United States toward a type of administrative state that had little or no regard for the Constitutional separation of powers and the traditions of checks and balances.

**Autopoiesis and Primordial Interests**

An economist in the focus group argues that the policy’s primordial interests “represent the narrow, selfish nation-state interest of the United States that drives the policy’s trajectory throughout its phases.” Autopoiesis guides the process of self-organization in the policy in order to respond to the needs of these primitive interests and to environmental conditions.

During the policy’s process of adaptation to environmental changes, the policy’s primordial interests self-organize in order to move the policy toward the most suitable form that is capable in translating its needs and operating for the sole purpose of serving U.S. nation-state interest. Content analysis records a frequency of 25 for a concept related
to issues of power interest. It shows that this type of governance took advantage of America’s emerging power in the world in order to advance U.S. interest at the expense of international norms.

The history chapter in this dissertation describes how the policy’s primordial interests during the 1980s were structured around the mantra of supporting Saddam through bank loans, agricultural credits, technology, and military aid in order to assure an Iranian defeat. Once the environment changed, triggered by Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the policy’s primordial interests shifted toward liberating Kuwait oil from Saddam’s grab.

The shift was represented in changing the policy’s relationships with Saddam’s regime from one that was supportive during the 1980s to one that became hostile in 1990-1991 by cutting U.S. aid to Iraq and engaging the United States’ armed forces and the forces of 32 other nations in a war with Iraq. The policy’s primordial interests were served by returning the management of Kuwaiti oil to the local Kuwaiti agents of U.S. interests and by reducing Saddam’s military capacity to the pre-Iran/Iraq War period.

Operating from America’s pure primordial interests lead regional nations-states to design their policies and relationships with the United States based on pure self-interest as well. The high frequency in the content analysis of 47 for a concept related to issues of geopolitics underscores that this trend furthers the division in world politics despite the rhetoric of a new world order that is perpetrated by the united States.

Instead, the new world order becomes the order and supremacy of the nation-states’ interests in the world. When these nation-states form alliances among themselves
(as that during the Gulf War), it is because of their self-interest rather than of an altruistic interest in promoting peace and democracy.

A participant in the focus group, an Iraqi-American chemist, adds that “during the containment era of the 1990s, nation-interest supremacy drove both U.S. and Iraqi politics, causing both nations to abuse the UN mission in Iraq, creating a gap between UN goals and these two nations’ political goals while ignoring the sufferings of those whom were caught in the middle: the Iraqi people.” The organizational structure of the U.S. policy toward Iraq and its primordial interests stood alone, caring only the needs of securing “scores” for the home team at the expense of legitimacy, political ethics, and human consciousness.

The quest for power continues to present a challenge to the policy’s primordial interests. The frequency in the content analysis of 12 of a concept related to issues of the Dollar versus the Euro, while comparatively low, still suggests that as the Euro rose to challenge the supremacy of the dollar, and as oil became a political veto power in the hands of emerging ideologues in U.S. government to transform American capitalism into a new imperial power through direct colonialism and military hegemony, the organizational structure of the policy’s primordial interests reassembled and self-organized itself, especially after September 11, 2001. This new self-organization promoted appointocracy, the administrative state, and the imperial presidency in order to advance Pax Americana as America’s global policy.

Nation states that wanted to carve a notch for themselves outside the primordial interests of American capitalism, for example, welcomed the Euro. This drive toward the Euro empowered Europe as a new economic and political block to challenge U.S.
leadership and influence in the world. A content analysis frequency of 14 for a concept related to issues of imperialism and the frequency of 53 for a concept related to issues of regionalism reveal that Iraq had become part of this equation by adopting the Euro for its economic transactions. This matter further shifted the U.S. policy toward Iraq in favor of toppling the Iraqi regime and by doing so, thereby reducing the influence of the Euro in that oil-rich part of the world.

An economist in the focus group alludes to the role of oil as a primordial interest in directing U.S. policy and leading to war in 2003, stating that “oil on its own was not a cause for war, especially when Iraq was willing to sell its oil and we were willing to buy it. The important issue was controlling this oil and using it politically to benefit U.S. interest in its competition with Europe.”

In a one-on-one interview with a political historian, the importance of oil as a primordial interest in directing the policy is echoed once more. According to this expert, “the underlining motive for the United States Bush administration to go to war with Iraq in 1991 and 2003 was oil. Policymakers had a domestic agenda to roll-back domestic relation in the United States to the 1890s, by securing the economic advantages for the key sectors in the society and by bringing us back to complete reliance on oil.”

The frequency in the content analysis of 30 for a concept related to issues of hegemony and the high frequency of 70 for a concept related to issues of oil and its impact on the policy demonstrate that when demand for energy became the central issue in U.S. policy, policymakers were influenced by increased demand for foreign oil by the United States both as an energy source and as a political veto to maintain U.S. hegemony in the world. It was primarily because of this demand that the Bush administration was
determined to end the policy of containment in 2003 and to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein by force.

**Bifurcation**

If autopoiesis illustrates how changes in the environment impact the processes of self-organization in the policy toward Iraq, bifurcation illustrates how these environmental changes impact the processes of transforming the policy from one organizational state to another through phase shifts. Bifurcation, as such, explains the impact of environmental changes on the policymakers by observing the policy's decision-making process from a state of equilibrium during a particular organizational phase to a state of oscillation, chaos, and then to the emerging of a new organizational order in another state of equilibrium. We observe these changes by tracing the behavior of the four Interpretive Levels as indicators of the policy movement from one phase to another.

As with observing the impact of environmental changes on the policy's internal changes according to autopoiesis through a flux metaphorical expression, the impact of environmental changes on the policy's internal changes according to bifurcation is also observed through Morgan's flux metaphorical expression. The reason for choosing a flux metaphorical expression is to observe the dynamic nature of the policy unfolding and enfolding as a kind of pulsating wholeness while impacted by changes in the environment.

By observing the U.S. policy toward Iraq according to bifurcation, we witness whether environmental changes cause the policy's decision-making structure to collapse, whether the collapse is delayed or prevented through artificial engineering, and if so,
what the impact is of the catastrophic consequences on the policy. As the older internal structure of the policy’s decision-making process becomes unstable in response to environmental changes, it prepares to collapse in order to allow for the new structure to emerge. Let us now observe how each specific Interpretive Level behaved according to bifurcation while impacted by environmental changes.

**Bifurcation and Mythicism**

The history chapter in this dissertation shows how during the 1980s, the United States supported Iraq in its war with Iran. The rationale for doing so was to neutralize the threat of the Iranian revolution to U.S. oil interests in the region. The myth used to justify this policy was to restore balance to the region and confront the anti-American Iranians and their support for radical Islamic political organizations in the region.

For nearly a decade, the U.S. policy toward Iraq and its myth were in a state of equilibrium, disturbed only by minor criticism in the media and Congress. By large, the policy was implemented without significant internal or environmental interruptions. The case of Americans held hostage in Iran further influenced official sentiment in the United States toward supporting Iraq.

In 1990, the history chapter traces how this equilibrium was destabilized by events in the environment. The Iran-Iraq War ended with both Iran and Iraq deeply wounded and economically crippled. This satisfied the United States since these two troubling countries in the region managed to severely damage each other. However, Saddam emerged with a massive military capacity, ambitious political goal to unite the
Arab world (and its oil) under his control, thereby threatening the energy security of the United States. This tendency alarmed the United States.

On August 2, 1990, Saddam invaded Kuwait to remedy his war-torn economy and keep his huge army employed and redirected from turning on him. The event created a chaotic disorder in the U.S. policy that supported Saddam for nearly a decade.

As a result of this chaotic disorder, the policy's older structure (myth and tactics) collapsed. A new order and structure emerged in order to respond to the changes in the environment. This new order was clearly visible in the policy's myth. According to this new myth, Saddam became the source of political destabilization in the region while embodying the spirit of anti-Americanism and taking on the symbol of evil. He was compared by President Bush to Hitler.

The low frequency in the content analysis of six for a concept related to issues of war as a corrective measure and the frequency of one for a concept related to the metaphor of war imply that at least to some extent, the new order impacted the very environment that created it. Iraq became isolated from the world, and an international coalition was put together under U.S. leadership to drive the invading Iraqi army from Kuwait and to reduce Saddam’s military threat. The myth that was constructed to describe these transformations, such as multilateralism and the translation of the will of the international community to restore legitimacy to the region, was designed to justify the use of force as a necessary measure to offset aggression.

High content analysis frequencies of 53 for a concept related to issues of regionalism, 47 for a concept related to issues of nation-state interest, and 47 for a concept related to issues of regionalism suggest that during the containment era of the
1990s, the U.S. and its policy toward Iraq were no longer operating in a global leadership position. The decade from 1991 to September 11, 2001 witnessed a global political competition for scarce resources that bumped the United States out of the leadership position that it temporarily enjoyed in the short period after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

A public administrator in the focus group states that “although the Soviet Union collapsed and the United States emerged as the world sole superpower, other nation-states became weary of the growing U.S. political, economic, and military power. Since no single nation-state in the world was able to match the United States’ awesome economic and military power, many nation-states formed regional alliance in order to challenge U.S. hegemony.”

A political scientist agrees with this statement and asserts in a one-on-one interview that “these emerging regional powers created a competition for scarce resources among the capitalist systems in the world. The relationships between the United States and the emerging regional powers, although they took place within the union of the capitalist system, nevertheless were based on fragmentation and friction.”

Content analysis with a frequency of eight for a concept related to issues of irony and a frequency of 15 for a concept related to issues of containment reveal that the U.S. policy toward Iraq during the containment era fell within this formula of antagonism within the political union of the industrialized nation-states. A sociologist in the focus group states that “the regional powers’ competition for scarce resources used the Iraqi ticket as a means to compete with the United States and challenge its leadership position in the world.”
In response, the history chapter demonstrates that the U.S. chose two approaches. First, it reverted to illegitimate actions in Iraq, such as unnecessary and excessive use of force, coercion, and mastering plots for regime change, or bowed to international pressure to work with the United Nations. Second, it attempted to remedy the Iraqi situation diplomatically. The rotation between these two approaches went back and forth according to U.S. interests and tactical alliances during each period of time.

These trends in the environment forced the policy’s myth to collapse its older structure and emerge with a new order better equipped to find a niche for itself in the containment environment. The newly constructed myth spoke of world peace, freedom, and saving the world from Saddam’s threat and weapons of mass destruction.

This myth continued until another kick in the environment represented by the terrorist attacks on America on September 11, 2001 provided a trigger to destabilized the containment period’s myth, collapsing its older structure and emerging with a new order in order to bring the policy once more into a state of equilibrium. The frequency count in the content analysis of 29 for a concept related to issues of preemption indicates that the newly emerged myth after September 11, 2001 spoke of the nation-state of America and its right to strike first even in response to perceived threats, and to take the fight to those who are threatening or have the potential to threaten America before they are able to strike at the homeland.

A political scientist states in a one-on-one interview that this myth was presented “as a matter of protecting freedom, the American way of life, and bringing Western style democracy to the nations that suffered under tyranny. Iraq was chosen as a test arena for this hypothesis, and the Iraqi soil became America’s battleground in its new war on
terrorism. America's actions in Iraq, however, were rejected by regional powers which questioned America's motives and unilateral actions in Iraq." With such a rejection, the policy's myth was also rejected and forced to continually collapse and emerge with newer myths.

**Bifurcation and Dichotomy**

Unlike Mythticism, the policy of dichotomy does not go through phase shifts when the policy's environment is triggered by kicks. Instead of allowing for the older structure to collapse, artificial engineering such as economic sanctions and supporting a few isolated Iraqi exiled groups are designed to maintain the prolongation of the older order and its dichotomy. This artificial engineering creates a catastrophe for the policymakers as they continued to link Saddam's regime and the Iraqi people and treat them both as the same. By doing so, the artificial engineering increases the trend toward failure in the policy's overall approach toward Iraq.

The policymakers' neglect to recognize the dichotomy between the Iraqi people and their government impacted their own political environment, creating a dichotomy between U.S. interests and the interests of other nation-states and regional alliances in the world. The dichotomy between the United States and other nation-states in the world also intensified when America emerged as the sole superpower after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The frequency in the content analysis of eight for a concept related to issues of a unipolar world suggests that the rise of U.S. power in a unipolar world created a sense of insecurity and uneasiness in other nation-states which viewed themselves as threatened.
by the dictates of U.S. power interests. This sensitivity was ignored by the United States. And, instead of embracing an international world effort for collective cooperation, the United States continued to act on its nation-state interests. A political scientist in the focus group adds that “the policy toward Iraq was used as a vehicle to advance these tendencies, and other nation-states reacted by using Iraq as an avenue to reject U.S. imperialism.”

This trend in the environment emerged during the 1990s and became apparent during America’s unilateral war on Iraq in 2003. The double dichotomy between the United States and other nation-states, and between the Iraqi people and the regime of Saddam Hussein further weakened the U.S. policy toward Iraq as it approached both dichotomies with arrogance, ignorance, and a focus on its own self-interest.

The U.S. actions during its wars on Iraq both in 1991 and 2003 reflected the policymakers’ neglect to account for these double dichotomies. Because of such neglect, the U.S. gradually became isolated in the world even as it was trying to isolate the regime of Saddam Hussein.

The content analysis frequency of 44 for a concept related to issues of force reflects the willingness of the U.S. to consider using force in Iraq. Evidence of the catastrophic results may be seen in the U.S. campaigns of overkill in Iraq during both wars of 1991 and 2003, its disregard for the welfare of the Iraqi people in enforcing crippling economic sanctions against Iraq for nearly twelve years, the mistreatment and killing of Iraqi civilians during the routine bombing of Iraq since 1991, and the torture of Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad in 2003. These catastrophic results not only were felt in Iraq but also on a global level. They demoralized supporters of
America’s leadership in the world and exposed the United States as a power that had lost control.

What is surprising about the abuses committed against the Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison during the American occupation of Iraq as of 2003 is the fact that they came as a surprise. Content analysis in a frequency of 30 for a concept related to issues of hegemony, when combined with willingness to use force described above, shows that the abuse of Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison confirmed what has historically long been a tactic within U.S. foreign policy: targeting and torturing civilians in order to maintain U.S. hegemony. Whether it is was a “war on communism” during the Cold War, Vietnam, or a “war on terrorism” in the post-September 11 era, the targets and tactics have remained the same. The abuses in Abu Ghraib were the logical outcome of neglecting the dichotomy between people and regimes, treating everyone as an enemy, and dehumanizing that enemy. This is the language of power.

Bifurcation and Rational Choice

Because of changes in the environment, the policy’s rational choice goes through bifurcation and phase shifts. The U.S. witnessed the collapse of its older orders during the policy’s phase shifts in order to allow new tactics to emerge as a response to new trends in the environment. The history chapter demonstrates that during the 1980s, the Iranian revolution provided a kick to the policy’s environment. The result was a shift in the policy toward supporting Saddam and his war against Iran. This kick resulted in a phase shift and the emergence of U.S. support for Saddam during the Iran-Iraq War.
The frequency in the content analysis of 25 for a concept related to issues of power interest and the high frequency of 67 of a concept related to issues of hypocrisy remind us that for many years prior to the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, the United States supported Iran and the government of the Shah. This support was carried on despite the Shah’s corruption and abuse of human rights in Iran. The notorious SAVAK, the Shah’s secret police, was condemned by various international human rights agencies for abuse, torture, and assassinations of political dissidents. Yet, the United States government turned a blind eye to these practices as long as the Shah was acting as a local policeman in the region and safeguarding U.S. interests.

The U.S. support for the Shah and its neglect of the dichotomy between the Iranian people and the Iranian government created a sense of rage and resentment among the Iranian people toward the United States. When the Shah was eventually overthrown in 1979 by an Islamic revolution, the newly emerging regime adopted a hostile policy toward the United States and its client states in the region as a means of expressing the Iranian people’s rejection of the U.S. policy in the region.

The U.S., in response, used Saddam as a proxy to punish and neutralize revolutionary Iran, and it did so while turning a blind eye to Saddam’s abuse of the Iraqi people as well. This neglect now created a sense of resentment among the Iraqi people toward the United States just as previously had happened with the Iranian people. An Iraqi-American chemist in the focus group states that “this resentment was reinforced year after year as the U.S. continued to neglect the suffering of the Iraqi people by continually punishing Iraq either through the use of force or by imposing crippling
economic sanctions. The resentment clearly manifested itself when the Iraqi people overwhelmingly rejected U.S. occupation of their country."

The shift in U.S. policy toward supporting Saddam began in the late 1970s, shortly after the Iranian revolution of 1979 (see the history chapter of this dissertation). The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991, however, caused the policy to enter into a period of oscillation when its state of equilibrium was disrupted by the resulting disorder caused by Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait. These dynamics led the policy to collapse. U.S. decision-makers then abandoned the old structure of supporting Saddam and emerged with a new tactic and a new order. The newly emerging tactic confronted Saddam and engaged him militarily. Once the policy settled on confronting Saddam with a new tactic, it returned to a state of equilibrium.

The state of equilibrium, however, was short lived. Once the Gulf War ended, the containment era dictated the need for new policy measures to respond to changes in its environment. Although the rational choice of containing Saddam as of 1991 continued for 12 years, content analysis with a frequency of nine for a concept related to survival issues suggests that the Iraqi regime’s cat-and-mouse game with UN weapon inspectors, selling oil outside UN monitoring, and the inspectors’ inability to verify that Iraq had completely rid itself of all weapons of mass destruction made containment a difficult phase to maintain.

Also, as public opinion in the world was turning against the United States because of the negative impact of sanctions on the Iraqi people, the U.S. policy toward Iraq began to experience another oscillation. This led once again to a state of chaos and disorder and to the collapsing of the older tactic and the emergence of new tactical choices to respond
to these changes in the environment. For example, as of 1998 the United States officially adopted the concept of regime change in Iraq and funded the Iraqi opposition groups in order to enable them to bring about regime change in Iraq.

These efforts, however, did not result in a regime change in Iraq due to the ruthlessness of Saddam’s security apparatus. After September 11, 2001, the environment created another kick that triggered the policy of preemption.

The content analysis frequency of 54 for a concept related to issues of ideology and of 29 for a concept related to issues of preemption show that the terrorists’ attacks on America, combined with the new Bush administration’s ideological drive toward shifting the U.S. to adopt force and preemption, triggered the environment to force another set of internal changes in the policy to occur. As such, the policy’s tactical choice and the containment of Saddam collapsed and a newer tactic emerged. This new tactic was to invade Iraq militarily and remove Saddam by force. Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act of 2002 in order to legalize this newly emerging tactic.

This new tactic is impacting the policy’s environment as well. With the U.S. handling Iraq unilaterally, content analysis reveals through a frequency of 22 for a concept related to issues of unilateralism that most other large nation-states in the world respond by rejecting U.S. unilateralism and leadership. As a consequence, the U.S. operation in Iraq is becoming one that lacks international support and is threatening to consume America’s energy and resources for years to come.
Bifurcation and Primordial Interests

The policy’s myths and tactics experience changes as the policy moves from one phase to another, such as when the policy moved from supporting Saddam during the 1980s to confronting him military in 1991, to containing him during the 1990s, and finally to overthrowing him during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. However, the policy’s primordial interests (as the policy’s dichotomy) fail to experience any change or collapse to its organizational order despite changes in the environment.

This is because the fact that the policy’s primordial interest remains at a state of equilibrium throughout the policy’s phase shifts. These primordial interests represent the primary interests of the United States as a nation-state. They remain the same throughout the policy’s trajectory.

The S-Matrix

The S-Matrix explains the impact of environmental changes on the political decision making by shifting the emphases from objects to events and from building blocks to a web of interconnectedness. On their own, the ingredients that comprise the four Interpretive Levels do not have a significant meaning as isolated entities. They are understood only while interconnected, reflecting the oneness of the policy toward Iraq. These four specific Interpretive Levels and the behavior of the themes and concepts that construct them determine the impact of environmental changes on the policy.

As with autopoiesis and bifurcation, the S-Matrix utilizes the flux metaphor in order to explain the impact of environmental changes on the dynamic nature of the policy’s relationships. The S-Matrix assists in the construction of the flux metaphor by
focusing on the connections that simultaneously create the relationships between changes in the environment and the U.S. policy toward Iraq. The S-Matrix also illustrates the interconnected and dynamic nature of the policy as a system that does not live independently and is not predictable or rational. Rather, it is a system that shares many worlds, many dimensions, many players, and many forces.

In order to understand the impact of the S-Matrix on observing the environmental changes and their impact on the policy’s internal changes, we observe the behavioral changes in each indicator and their impact on the U.S. policy toward Iraq and its environment. The S-Matrix thus serves as a complexity-guide in the process of observing the environmental changes and impact on the political decision-making process by tracing behavioral changes at the four Interpretive Levels.

**The S-Matrix and Mythicism**

Changes in the policy’s environment compelled the decision-makers to view a policy’s internal and external relationships as an interdependent and interconnected web of association. This web is manifested clearly in the policy’s mythicism.

The policy’s relationships, while manifested as myth, are based on processes rather than units. The ingredients that go into the making of mythicism during each phase of the policy’s trajectory share a relationship with the players in the policy’s environment and make the transition from one myth to another through an interconnected web of interrelated stories.

Examples of the forces that go into the construction of the policy’s trajectory are the relationship between mythicism’ metaphors, such as the telephone pole, shadows,
and beyond good and evil, and the changing trends in the environment. Since each metaphor is composed of concepts, the relationship between these concepts, their composing themes, and the emerging Interpretive Level of mythticism is based on the interconnectedness of these ingredients and their behavior. Each component affects the entire relationship through the S-Matrix association.

If we observe the myth of the New World Order that emerges during the Gulf War of 1991, for example, we see that the components engaged in the dynamics of this myth are interconnected with changing trends and events in the policy's environment. In such dynamics, there are no starting or ending points since the web of association is a continuous process of relationship between patterns of behavior. Figure 17 demonstrates these patterns.

![Figure 17. The Myth of the New World Order and its Environmental Relationship in 1991](image)

Many patterns in Figure 17 are engaged in an S-Matrix relationship, reflecting the policy's myth of a New World Order that emerged during the Gulf War. Each pattern is relating with the myth of the New World Order, its life, duration, strength, and behavior. This relationship, however, is not a causal relationship. Instead, it is a pattern of
relationships between temporal events that are understood as interconnected in a web of association rather than as isolated units.

The myth of the New World Order, for example, cannot be understood if observed in isolation and without its associated network. Instead, the New World Order must be observed in its relation with elements such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the demise of the Soviet Union, the weakening of Iran and its Islamic revolution, and the rise of American leadership in the world. Together, the myth of the New World Order and its environment then can give us a better picture of the interconnected and intertwined dynamics that characterized the U.S. policy toward Iraq in 1991 as it was gearing to form its web of interdependent association and continue to move to the next phase.

These dynamics continued during the containment era or in the post September 11 period. The S-Matrix during each period illustrated the emerging myth while interconnected with other events and associated elements in the environment. These emerging myths, as the myth of 1991, are best understood if placed within the context of their associations.

Although Figure 17 illustrates the environmental relations of a policy myth within a specific period of time, this same myth is also engaged in relationships with events within the policy toward Iraq. Together, internal and environmental relationships are what constitute the policy's complex relationships. In order to understand the policy's trajectory, it must be observed within such a holistic context. This notion applies to the policy's myth as well as to dichotomy, rational choice, and primordial interests.
The S-Matrix and Dichotomy

Although the policy's dichotomy does not change throughout the policy's trajectory, the dichotomy's associations and networks, however, change from one phase to another. These changes in the dichotomy's association are caused by changing trends in the policy's environment, making dichotomy an even greater complex phenomenon within the US policy toward Iraq.

If we observe the U.S. policy toward Iraq during the containment era, for example, we see that changes in the environment lead to the construction of a web of association between the policy's dichotomy and the temporal events in the policy's environment during the 1990s. Figure 18 shows these dynamics and the emerging of the S-Matrix relationship.

![Figure 18. Dichotomy During the Containment Era and Environmental Relationship](image)

As Figure 18 demonstrates, the policy's dichotomy during the containment era is engaged in an interrelated relationship with other elements in the environment, such as regionalism, unipolar world with the U.S. as the sole superpower after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the continuous UN economic sanctions against Iraq, and the rise of U.S.
militarism and military response to political conflicts. Together, these elements exacerbate the policy’s dichotomy and contribute to the suffering of the Iraqi people. Understanding dichotomy in such a context gives us better perspective of the policy toward Iraq and its multi-level dimensions.

In a one-on-one interview with a former leader of an exiled Iraqi opposition group who is examining the policy’s dichotomy in post-Saddam Iraq, he observes that such a dichotomy “can be better understood if it is observed within its relationships with other factors in the environment, such as the policymakers’ tendency to rely too much on appointocracy.” This expert urges the policy’s decision-makers to avoid “appointed Iraqis chosen by America rather than the Iraqi people,” and advises them to “build civil and democratic institutions from the bottom up, by creating local councils that are democratic, and to respect the right of the Iraqi people to take charge of their own affairs.” By understanding the location of dichotomy within a web of relationship with appointocracy and other important environmental factors, we are better able to understand this policy’s multi-layered dimensions.

As with mythticism, the policy’s dichotomy operates in a web of relationship that includes temporal elements both within the policy toward Iraq and in its environment. Together, internal and environmental relationships are what constitute the policy’s complex relationships. In order to understand the policy’s trajectory, we observe these elements within the context of the S-Matrix relationship. This notion applies to the policy’s all four Interpretive Levels.
The S-Matrix and Rational Choice

The dimension of the S-Matrix illustrates the interconnected dynamics and relationships between the policy’s environmental forces and their relationships with the policy’s rational choice. If we observe the relationship between the policy’s rational choice during each trajectory period and the events and forces in the policy’s environment, we see that there is a pattern of interdependent association between these elements.

In a one-on-one interview, a political historian explains the interconnectedness of the policy’s tactic, such as in 1991, to remove Saddam from Kuwait and the association of this tactic with other elements that are engaged within a complex web of relationships. “There was strategic concern that included the Cold War and the influence of the Soviet Union, with Iraq on its way to becoming a client state of the Soviet Union. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. was no longer concerned about a counterweight to its foreign policy.”

A political scientist in the focus group agrees, arguing that “we attend to the views rather more of a kind of balance of powers, playing one against another, rather than responding to them directly. With the Soviet Union having veto power in the UN, we did not have much flexibility in dealing with others within the very troubled environment in the world, such as in Iraq. That changed once the Soviet Union disappeared.”

An economist in the focus group expands further on this observation, suggesting that “Iraq was a pro-Soviet state. When the Soviet Union collapsed, a lot of things had to be reshuffled in the new world order. At this point, the U.S. had the upper hand in settling
things with Iraq for its past associations and pay a price for being a former client-state of
the Soviet Union.”

A sociologist in the focus group alludes to the demise of even concepts such as
Pan-Arabism, nationalism, and Baathism once the Soviet Union collapsed. “Some of
Saddam’s action had also to do with the idealism of Pan-Arabism, of Baathism. Such
idealism no longer held ground in the Arab world, especially in a world without the
Soviet Union and the U.S. as the single superpower. It was the Soviet Union that enabled
such regimes to promote their idealism.”

A political historian in the focus group references the relationship between the
United States and Europe or between the United States and the United Nations regarding
Iraq as a product of such world politics. The participant argues that “the impact of the
Iraq war on the world is a question of the relationship between the U.S. and Europe and
between the U.S. and the UN. No one can hide from the reality of these guerillas living in
the world.”

The frequency in the content analysis of 29 for a concept related to issues of
preemption demonstrates that the policy’s rational choice of preemption in 2003 strove to
survive by securing a niche for itself in the environment and acquiring the necessary
resources to remain alive. Without this niche, preemption as a rational choice was unable
to survive and eventually had to die. Preemption toward Iraq survived because it was able
to secure a niche for itself in the environment. Once preemption is no longer able to
secure such a niche in a future policy toward any other nation, it will eventually die.

A high content analysis frequency of 53 for a concept related to issues of
regionalism shows that after September 11, 2001, for example, there was an
interconnected relationship between preemption, the policy's new choice after September 11, 2001, and the factors in the policy's environment during that period of time. Figure 19 depicts preemption as a rational choice engaged in a web of association with factors in the policy's environment after September 11, 2001.

As with mythicism and dichotomy, the policy's rational choice operates in a web of relationships that include temporal elements both within the policy toward Iraq and in its environment. Together, internal and environmental relationships are what constitute the policy's complex relationships. In order to understand the policy's trajectory, we observe these elements within the context of the S-Matrix relationship. This notion applies to the policy's all four Interpretive Levels.

**The S-Matrix and Primordial Interests**

Changes in the environment impact the policy's primordial interests. The relationships between events and factors in the environment and the policy's primordial
interests are interconnected and interdependent, with one component relating to another. If we view the policy’s primordial interests at any trajectory stage and observe these interests’ relationship with the forces in the policy’s environment, we see that there is a web of interconnected relationship between the factors in the environment and the primordial interests’ of the United States.

The high frequency count in the content analysis of 47 for a concept pertaining to issues of nation-state interest suggests strongly that after September 11, 2001, for example, the changes, events, and factors in the policy’s environment were related to the policy’s primordial interests of Pax Americana. Figure 20 illustrates these relationships.

As with mythticism, dichotomy, and rational choice, the policy’s primordial interests operate in a web of relationship that include temporal elements both within the policy toward Iraq and in its environment. Together, internal and environmental relationships are what constituted the policy’s complex relationships.

Figure 20. Pax Americana and the S-Matrix Relationships with the Policy’s Environment after September 11, 2001
Mutual Causality

Mutual causality explains the impact of environmental changes on the U.S. policy toward Iraq by observing the impact of positive and negative feedback on the behavior of the four Interpretive Levels. This observation enables us to see how mutual causality translates the impact of environmental changes on systemic changes in the political decision-making process within the U.S. policy toward Iraq.

This feedback is manifested metaphorically as a flux metaphor, with positive feedback meaning more changes in the environment lead to more changes in the policy, and fewer changes in the environment lead to fewer changes in the policy. Negative feedback, on the other hand, means that a change in the environment initiates a change in the opposite direction within the policy, with more changes in the environment leading to fewer changes in the policy and fewer changes in the environment leading to more changes in the policy.

The idea is that one element in the environment influences the entire policy and that there is a mutual causation in the relationship between the policy and its environment. This relationship is best understood if we observe it in the state of mutual dependence.

Mutual Causality and Mythicism

If we view mythicism according to positive feedback, we see that more changes in the environment result in more changes in the policy's mythicism, and fewer changes in the environment lead to fewer changes in the policy's mythicism. If we observe mythicism according to negative feedback, however, we see that more changes in the
environment lead to fewer changes in the policy’s mythicism, and fewer changes in the environment lead to more changes in the policy’s mythicism. Let us observe how these two types of feedback are manifested in the interaction between the policy’s environment and its mythicism.

Positive Feedback

Evidence in the history chapter reveal that during the 1980s, the main change in the policy’s environment was the threat of the Islamic revolution in Iran to destabilize the oil-rich region of the Middle East. Because of that threat, the United States supported Saddam under the guise of maintaining the political balance in the Middle East. As such, the change in the environment led the United States to upgrade its support for Saddam. This upgrading was the only structural change that occurred in the policy’s internal dynamics in response to the trends in the environment.

After Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the policy’s environment changed. As a consequence, the policy itself changed and responded to emerging trends in the environment. The change in the policy was reflected in a change in its mythicism. The more changes occurred in the policy’s environment, the more changes occurred in the policy.

During this period there were fewer activities as a result of the policy regarding issues of democracy and freedom in Iraq. Consequently, there were fewer activities by the policy’s mythicism to support democracy and popular movements in Iraq.

During the containment era, the frequency in the content analysis of 44 for a concept related to issues of force indicates that the policy’s myth was constructed to
justify the use of force in order to contain Saddam. During this period, there were fewer activities as a result of the policy addressed toward the sufferings of the Iraqi people caused by the UN-imposed economic sanctions. As a consequence, there were fewer activities by the policy's mythticism addressed toward the suffering of the Iraqi people. And, after September 11, 2001 activities in the policy’s environment increased dramatically. These changes caused corresponding changes in the policy and its myth.

**Negative Feedback**

When fewer activities in the environment lead to more activities in the policy's mythticism and more activities in the environment lead to fewer activities in the policy’s mythticism, this is termed here as negative feedback. For example, the history chapter shows that during the 1980s, the main change in the policy’s environment was the increase in U.S. support for Saddam in order to neutralize the Iranian threat to the oil-rich region of the Middle East. These fewer changes in the policy’s environment, however, led to more activities in the policy’s mythticism to openly justify U.S. support for Saddam in building his military arsenal as a matter of preserving peace and stability in the region.

During the containment period of the 1990s, a content analysis frequency count of nine for a concept related to issues of multilateralism indicates to some extent that there were more activities in the environment toward multilateralism, legitimacy, and working within accepted international norms. Instead, this eventually led the policy and its manifested mythticism toward less recognition of international norms, legitimacy and multilateralism.
And, after September 11, 2001 there were more activities in the policy’s environment toward world peace and legitimacy. This, however, was translated in the policy’s mythicism toward taking the opposite direction in creating a war in Iraq unilaterally and outside international norms.

**Mutual Causality and Dichotomy**

If we view the policy’s failure to recognize the dichotomy between the Iraqi people and their government according to positive feedback, we see that more changes in the policy’s environment were able to pressure the policymakers to recognize the dichotomy between the Iraqi people and their government, and fewer changes in the policy’s environment were less able to influence this dichotomy. If we observe the policy’s treatment of the dichotomy, however, according to negative feedback, we see that more changes in the policy’s environment led to fewer attempts by policymakers to change the policy’s dichotomy, and fewer changes in the policy’s environment were able to lead to more attempts by policymakers to change the same dichotomy.

**Positive Feedback**

When less leads to less and more leads to more, it is called positive feedback. In regard to the dichotomy, positive feedback had no impact on the policymakers’ recognition of the dichotomy between the Iraqi people and their government despite changes in the policy’s environment.
Negative Feedback

The history chapter indicates that, the more changes that occurred in the policy’s environment, the less changes occurred in the acknowledgment by the policymakers of the dichotomy between Saddam’s regime and the Iraqi people. This trend continued until April 9, 2003 when the U.S. invading forces in Iraq toppled the regime of Saddam Hussein.

As of September 11, 2001 there were more changes in the policy’s environment created by the terrorists’ attacks on America and the Bush administration’s political agenda in targeting Iraq as part of the war on terror. The U.S. policy toward Iraq, however, witnessed fewer activities in term of its treatment of the dichotomy between the Iraqi people and the regime of Saddam Hussein.

Mutual Causality and Rational Choice

If we view the policy’s rational choice according to positive feedback, we see that more changes in the policy’s environment lead to more changes in the policy’s rational choice, and fewer changes in the policy’s environment lead to fewer changes in the policy’s rational choice. If we observe the policy’s rational choice, however, according to negative feedback, we see that more changes in the policy’s environment lead to fewer changes in the policy’s rational choice, and fewer changes in the policy’s environment lead to more changes in the policy’s rational choice.
Positive Feedback

The more changes that occur in the policy’s environment, the more tactics are employed by the policymakers in order to respond to these environmental changes. For example, after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the developments in the environment forced the policymakers to adopt new tactics in dealing with Iraq, such as the use of force, economic sanctions, and clandestine plots to topple the Iraqi regime.

During the containment era of the 1990s, the frequency in the content analysis of 16 for a concept related to issues of U.S. and Iraq’s abuse of the UN mission in Iraq demonstrates that the environment once again changed because of Iraq’s reluctance to cooperate proactively with United Nations inspection teams. As a consequence, the policymakers adopted more tactics in order to correspond with the increased changes in the environment.

After September 11, 2001, however, evidence in the history chapter suggests that the policy’s environment witnessed larger changes caused by the terrorist attacks on America. These environmental changes served as catalysts to change the policy itself by increasing its tactics in relation to Iraq.

Negative Feedback

The history chapter reveals that there were fewer changes in the policy’s environment, such as during the 1980s. However, the policy’s tactics increased in number in order to support Saddam as a means to balance the political powers in the Middle East.

A content analysis frequency count of 19 for a concept related to issues of mistrust reveals that in 1990 the policy’s environment changed once more when Saddam
invaded Kuwait. However, the U.S. response toward Saddam’s abuse of human rights in Iraq was minuscule, and the policy manifested fewer tactics to oppose Saddam’s aggression and brutality inside Iraq.

During the containment era, the policy’s environment changed once again due to Saddam’s misuse of the UN mission and activities in Iraq. The U.S. policy toward Iraq, however, reflected fewer tactics to support the Iraqi people’s aspiration for freedom.

After September 11, 2001, the policy’s environment changed, triggered by the terrorist attacks on America. However, there were fewer tactics employed by the policymakers in order to correctly identify and target the real “enemy” in the war on terror.

Mutual Causality and Primordial Interests

If we view the policy’s primordial interests according to either positive or negative feedback, we see that regardless of any change in the policy’s environment, the policy’s primordial interests do not change. The motivating factor of these primordial interests is the United States’ own interests as a nation-state. These interests are the primary motive beyond the policy, its mythticism, dichotomy and choices. As a result of these interests, issues of legitimacy in the world of diplomacy and politics and the welfare of other people are ignored. While the policy’s primordial interests do not change as a result of changes in the environment, what relates to the policy in the way of relationships do change.
Conclusions

The environment has a great impact on any policy. Changes in the environment impact policies and their webs of associations. In regard to the U.S. policy toward Iraq, the environment is an important factor in impacting the policy and its trajectory. As the environment impacts the policy and causes its internal changes, the policy itself impacts its environment and causes changes within the environment as well. As such, there is a symbiotic relationship between the policy and its environment, with one feeding and depending on the other for resources, renewal and survival mechanism.

As with any other species, policies compete for survival in order to secure a niche for themselves in the environment. This also is the case with the U.S. policy toward Iraq. The primary motive for this policy is to secure U.S. interests as a nation-state. These interests are competing with other nation-state interests, and as such, alliances and networks are assembled in the form of regional powers in order to gain access and control of scarce resources.

Iraq is used as an arena to secure these interests, and the U.S. policy toward Iraq responded to environmental demands in the form of political issues emerging in Iraq itself. As such, the policy often was out of touch with the political process in Iraq and more engulfed in responding to U.S. nation-state interests as they competed to secure a niche in the environment.

As shown in the history chapter, for centuries, the United States had little or no interest in Iraq. This interest gradually developed as oil was discovered in northern Iraq shortly after the creation of the modern Iraqi state in 1920. Once U.S. oil companies secured 25 percent of the concession areas in Iraq for oil exploration, the U.S. virtually
adopted a hand-off policy toward Iraq until the overthrow of the oligarchic monarchic regime in 1958.

The new Iraqi military regime that established the Republic of Iraq on July 14, 1958 brought the U.S. policy toward Iraq to an active stage. The reason for this development was because of the new Iraqi regime’s oil policy in reducing all foreign oil companies’ concession areas in Iraq to 5 percent of the drilling area.

By 1959, the United States (through the CIA) was active in supporting efforts for a regime change in Iraq. These activities by the United States enabled the Baath Party to seize political power in Iraq in 1963, which then rewarded the U.S. oil companies with huge contracts.

The honeymoon between the Baath Party and the United States, however, was shortlived. Driven by greed, the Baath Party nationalized Iraqi oil in 1972 in order to empower its own economic base. The nationalization of Iraqi oil created a drift between the U.S. and the Baath regime, causing the U.S. policy toward Iraq to support local unrest, such as the national movement of the ethnic Kurds, in order to pressure the Iraqi government to change its oil policy.

As a consequence, Iraq gradually shifted its oil policy and alliances from the Soviet Union toward the West. After the fall of the Shah in Iran in 1979, Iraq became one of the United States favorite allies in the region and a perfect proxy to stop the threat of the Iranian revolution.

After Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the U.S. policy toward Iraq shifted once more. As of 1990, the policy was no longer acting on a predetermined political
agenda but purely responding to outside changes caused by changing trends in the environment.

The policy's trajectory as of 1990 has been based on the primitive need to secure a niche in the environment. Because of this need, the policymakers do not hesitate to operate within or outside the accepted international norms and practices. And after the collapse of the Soviet Union, policymakers are encouraged to secure these needs through even greater disregard to issues of legitimacy and multilateralism.

Meanwhile, governance in the United States itself is shifting toward more of an administrative type of government headed by an imperial presidency. The policy toward Iraq is exposing this trajectory in the four Interpretive Levels of mythicism, dichotomy, rational choice, and primordial interests. The trajectory of these levels illustrates the impact of changes in the policy's environment on the policy itself.
CHAPTER IX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary

The main purpose of this research is to observe the U.S. policy toward Iraq from 1990-2003. The research is qualitative in nature and relies on the power of words and descriptive analysis in order to conduct the study. And since there is no prior research conducted in the social sciences that made use of a qualitative inquiry in analyzing a phenomenon according to complexity theories, the research’s methodology and analysis, as such, are exploratory in nature.

A qualitative methodology is used in this research to observe a dynamic system (the U.S. policy toward Iraq) according to dimensions derived from complexity theories. These dimensions are autopoiesis, bifurcation, the S-Matrix, and mutual causality. A Machine Metaphorical Model is utilized to present a traditional, linear analysis of the U.S. policy toward Iraq, and a flux Metaphorical model is utilized for the purpose of presenting a complex analysis.

Data is gathered through document review, content analysis, focus group and one-on-one interviews. Data is first analyzed linearly by breaking it into pieces (concepts) and by utilizing Ethnograph for the purpose of coding that data. Emerging themes are then formed metaphorically to interpret the data and, by grouping similar themes, emerging super themes are identified as the data’s Interpretive Levels.
The four Interpretive Levels serve as indicators in the complex analysis. By tracing these indicators’ behavior according to autopoiesis, bifurcation, the S-Matrix, and mutual causality, environmental trends and their impacts on the internal changes in the U.S. policy toward Iraq are analyzed according to complexity theories.

Complex qualitative inquires in the social sciences are important vehicles in observing the dynamics of living systems, whether these systems are social phenomena, policies, or administrative procedures. These inquires are complementary analyses to the linear analysis and not a substitute. The progress of scientific methodology in explaining the world and the supremacy of reason over intuition and metaphysics binds all scientific inquires together, whether linear or complex, with one complementing the other.

A linear analysis provides the complex analysis with interpretive levels necessary for a complex analysis. Without a linear analysis, there is no viable means in qualitative inquires and metaphorical expressions to provide the complex analysis with manageable data qualified for the conditions of the analysis.

A Phi Model is designed in order to guide the analytical procedure. The model is composed of three steps. Step one is to analyze the data according to the linear tradition. Step two is to analyze the emerging Interpretive Levels from the linear analysis to observe internal changes in the policy according to four complexity dimensions: autopoiesis, bifurcation, S-Matrix, and mutual causality. And, step three is to analyze the same Interpretive Levels but to observe the impact of environmental changes on the policy according to the same four complexity dimensions.

Data is collected from various sources, such as books, newspapers, magazines, electronic articles, official governmental documents, a focus group, and one-on-one
interviews. Four sets of data emerge as a consequence and are identified as data from Books, Articles, Documents, and Interviews. These four data sets are coded by using 67 concepts.

Ethnograph is utilized to identify the frequency with which these concepts occurred in the four sets and aid in the process of identifying the emerging themes and super themes (Interpretive Levels). This process constitutes step one of the analysis. The highest occurring concepts in all four data sets are the roles of oil, force, and rhetoric in influencing the policy’s directions, as well as concepts such as imperialism, hegemony and targeting an enemy. The least frequently occurring concepts, on the other hand, are the lack of debates within the political discourse that guide the policy, the political status quo in the Middle East, and colonialism as a phase in U.S. foreign policy.

Once the data is coded and conceptualized, 13 themes surface from grouping together concepts with similar meanings. These themes provide the analysis with 13 metaphors in order to interpret trends within the unit of analysis. Some of these metaphors are political metamorphosis, the Judas Syndrome, the Baseball Pitcher, the Eskimo Community, Moby Dick, Rasputin, and Pax Americana.

Political metamorphosis refers to the phase shifts and changes in composition of U.S. policy toward Iraq. The Judas Syndrome refers to the policy representing the narrow nation-state interest of the United States that purports to do good but results in a series of unintended consequences that cause sufferings for the Iraqi people and damage the political discourse in the United States.

The Baseball Pitcher categorizes the type of functional and behavioral state of the American executive leadership in the post Cold War era that often operates outside the
constitutional separation of powers and emphasizes the rule of the executive branch over Congress. The Eskimo Community refers to the sense of community, universal association, regional collaboration, multilateralism, and acceptance of norms by several political systems in the world in order to secure the survival of regional and global interests.

Moby Dick refers to the use of war as a corrective action in restoring justice to the savage state of nature rather than utilizing reason in order to resolve conflicts in the world. In using the metaphor of Moby Dick as an analogous theme in interpreting the U.S. policy toward Iraq, it appears that war and violence are utilized by the policymakers in regard to Iraq rather than using reason, negotiation or diplomacy in solving the crisis with Iraq.

Rasputin, on the other hand, is a metaphor that refers to the special powers, such as think tanks, ideologues, and special interests, behind the decision-making process in the policy toward Iraq. And, Pax Americana as a metaphor refers to America’s drive to dominate the world as a new imperial power through its use of the military.

From these 13 themes, four super themes surface as a result of grouping together themes that share common perspectives. The four super themes that compose the data’s Interpretive Levels are: mythticism, dichotomy, rational choice, and primordial interests. With the emerging of these super themes, the linear analysis is complete, and the analysis moves to steps two and three.

Step two analyzes the internal changes in the policy by observing the behavior of the four Interpretive Levels according to autopoiesis, bifurcation, S-Matrix and mutual causality. And, step three analyzes changes in the policy’s environment and their impact.
on the policy by observing the behavior of the same four Interpretive Levels, also according to autopoiesis, bifurcation, S-Matrix and mutual causality.

Does the Phi-Model work? The Phi-Model is able to prove itself through its findings and by following a rigorous and systematic methodology. Findings that emerge both from the linear analysis and the complex observation appear to support the soundness of the model and its ability to carry on its intended function.

The policy displays its trajectory within its four Interpretive Levels. These levels are mythticism, dichotomy, rational choice, and primordial interests. All four of these levels are impacted by changing trends in the policy’s environment as the policy moves from one phase to another.

Out of these four Interpretive Levels, primordial interests emerge as the driving engine beyond the policy and its associations. The super theme of the primordial interests is composed of themes that project the type of functional and behavioral state of U.S. foreign policy that often operates after the end of the Cold War.

The super theme of Primordial Interests shows the constitutional separation of powers and emphasizes the dominant role of the executive branch over Congress. This behavior in relation to Iraq reflects U.S. needs as a nation-state. The most important need is to secure America’s power through the control of Middle Eastern oil and maintain the supremacy of the dollar in the world.

In order to achieve its primordial interests, content analysis and the interviews reveal that policymakers in the United States often seek other nation-states’ cooperation and strive for universal association while maneuvering at the same time among regional powers, using militarism and hegemonial tactics to secure U.S. primordial interests.
Both content analysis and the interviews reveal that one of the major elements in impacting the policy’s progression is oil. Oil constitutes a U.S. primordial interest that drives the U.S. policy toward Iraq. Such an interest began with the discovery of oil in Iraq in the early 1920s and continues to this day.

For decades, the United States had little or no interest in Iraq. Content analysis reveals that this interest gradually developed as the British discovered oil in northern Iraq shortly after the creation of the modern state of Iraq in 1920. Once U.S. oil companies secured 25 percent of the concession areas in Iraq for oil exploration, the U.S. virtually adopted a hand-off policy toward Iraq until the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958.

The new Iraqi military regime that established the Republic of Iraq on July 14, 1958 angered the United States and caused it to move its Iraq policy toward a more active stage. Content analysis attributes the reason for this development to the new Iraqi regime’s oil policy in reducing all foreign oil companies’ concession areas in Iraq to five percent. This led the CIA to support plots for regime change in Iraq. As a result, the Baath Party seized political power in 1963 and later in 1968, rewarding the American oil companies with huge contracts in Iraq.

The honeymoon between the Baath Party and the United States, however, was short-lived and soon changed to hostility. Driven by greed, the Baath nationalized Iraqi oil to empower its own economic base. This led the United States to support local unrest in Iraq, such as the national movement of the ethnic Kurds, in order to exert pressure on the Iraqi government and shift its alliance toward the West and away from the Soviet Union. As a consequence of the U.S.-supported Kurdish insulation, Iraq moved toward the West in 1975.
After the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979, Iraq became an important ally of the United States in the region to stop the spread of the Iranian revolution. The policy toward Iraq was proactive in nature, responding to environmental changes to secure its niche by altering the political situation in the region to one that would secure and protect U.S. interests.

After Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the policy shifted from a proactive to a reactive response mechanism. Although during both proactive and reactive states the policy was responding to environmental changes, as of 1990 it no longer was acting on a predetermined agenda to manipulate its environment. Rather, it was responding to external changes. As of 1990, content analysis and the interviews revealed that the policy’s trajectory was based on primitive survival needs. Because of these needs, the policy was applied both inside and outside accepted international practices in order to implement its agenda.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. policymakers in formulating their policy toward Iraq felt compelled to secure the nation’s survival needs through all means, including illegitimate ones such as the employment of U.S. military power to advance its political and economic interests. With such a shift, governance in the United States moved toward the posture of an administrative state and an imperial presidency.

As the policy’s response to external and internal trends created more of a dead-end trajectory, rather than opening windows of opportunity for multiple alternatives, policy-makers began to adopt desperate measures, often outside the collective of multilateral internationalism, in order for the policy to survive as an organism. These measures resulted in efforts for regime change in Iraq either through supporting political
proxies (such as Iraqi opposition groups) in 1998 or through direct military intervention in 2003.

Despite the regime change in Iraq, however, content analysis and the interviews reveal that the policy did not move toward a positive and desired end. Instead, it further alienated the United States from the rest of the world and exposed its political tactics as Machiavellian in nature, designed only to advance its nation-state interest at the expense of legitimacy and world peace.

The remaining three Interpretive Levels (mythticism, rational choice, and dichotomy) explain the specific conditions of the policy. Mythticism explains the policy's internal mechanism, in the form of its tactics, short-lived strategies, and perceived goals. The dichotomy explains the policy as it relates to the political process in Iraq, and Rational choice explains the nexus between the political process in the U.S., Iraq and the World within the context of the policy itself.

Mythticism reveals the fallacy in the policy that is presented in its façade. An example of this fallacy is the promotion of the policy as a system that reflects American idealism, democracy, freedom and human rights. Content analysis and the interviews reveal that the policy, although presented under such a façade, is none of that. On the contrary, the policy is based on hypocrisy, mistrust, misrepresentation, and circular reasoning.

Mythticism is composed of themes that identify the collapse of the opposition party in the United States as a viable voice for political discourse, resulting in the lack of political debates and the supremacy of narrow political perspectives to justify specific
political agendas. These agendas stand alone as a telephone pole, dictating their messages and transforming them into a wider orientation without being seriously challenged.

Content analysis and the interviews reveal that mythicism is reflected in vague definition of concepts such as the “enemy,” “terrorism,” and “evil.” Mythicism is also based on symbolism and a simplistic interpretation of the world and rests on the element of refusing to look inward and take responsibility for the U.S. own role in creating atrocities.

The super theme of Dichotomy, on the other hand, illustrates the errors in the policy and its failure to reflect the on-going dichotomy between Saddam’s regime and the Iraqi people. Content analysis and the interviews reveal that the policy reduced such a dichotomy to the person of Saddam Hussein, emerging as a folly policy that continues to hurt the Iraqi people.

This neglect is causing the U.S. policy toward Iraq to distance itself from the path of the United Nations in Iraq and creating a paradox that is based on a widening gap between U.S. political objectives in Iraq and the objectives of the UN or the international community. Content analysis and the interviews reveal that this gap is deepened when the UN itself committed errors in its approach toward Iraq by failing to take decisive actions against illegal and unauthorized U.S. actions in Iraq and later legitimizing these illegal actions, such as the U.S. occupation of Iraq after the unauthorized war of 2003.

The super theme of Dichotomy is composed of themes such as mistrust and abuse that represent the policy’s translation of the United States’ interests as a nation-state. These interests and the neglect of the dichotomy led to catastrophic results as witnessed in the sufferings of the Iraqi people since 1990 due to crippling economic sanctions.
intended to contain or topple Saddam. These sanctions instead ended up hurting the Iraqi people.

The super theme of Rational Choice illustrates the triumph of tactics over strategy. Because the policy lacks any long-term comprehensive strategy and it is a trajectory in its nature, it responds primarily to trends in its environment. Therefore, it lacks a clear strategy. It evolves accordingly by responding to the specifics of emerging trends in the environment.

Rational Choice as an Interpretive Level is composed of themes that represent phase shifts and changes in the policy. Content analysis and the interviews reveal that Rational Choice emphasizes war as a corrective action and a tactical maneuver, as well as the constant use of force. Furthermore, it leans toward a Hobbesian perspective of the world that stands in opposition to the American Psyche and to American regime values.

Rational Choice also represents the impact of special interests, such as think tanks, ideologues, and lobbyists on the decision-making process in the policy toward Iraq. The most important ingredient in Rational Choice is that of serving U.S. nation-state interests in Iraq and the world.

These observations are diagnostic in their nature, and they interpret the anatomy of change occurring within the internal trajectory of the policy as a dynamic system. The anatomy of change records the policy’s organizational reassembly, phase shifts, interrelation matrix, and non-local causation rather than assessing its normative values. Figure 21 views these diagnostic observations of the policy’s anatomy according to the Phi-Model.
Figure 21 illustrates the concepts, metaphorical themes, four super themes (Interpretive Levels) and the four complexity dimensions of autopoiesis, bifurcation, the S-Matrix, and mutual causality that compose the Phi Model. The model is composed of 67 concepts, 13 metaphorical themes, four super themes, and four complexity dimensions. These concepts, themes, super themes, and their complexity dimensions are interconnected in holistic and interdependent relationships. We cannot understand any particular part of this model without understanding the whole.

Conclusions

The Phi-Model proves that the combination of linear and complex observation of the U.S. policy toward Iraq can explain the policy’s trajectory and provide a sound
analysis through a qualitative study. The model's methodology, its choice of concepts, metaphors and data sources and emerging metaphorical themes and super themes, are sufficient to support both a linear and a complex analysis. By doing so, the model answers the following research questions.

1. How does a linear observation interpret the U.S. policy toward Iraq?
2. How do the new sciences of complexity interpret the U.S. policy toward Iraq?
3. How does a linear observation of the U.S. policy toward Iraq contrast and compare with that of a complex analysis?

Figure 22 (page 364) illustrates the specifics of this model by identifying the 67 concepts that compose the model's 13 metaphorical themes. It also illustrates the 13 metaphorical themes that comprise the model's four Interpretive Levels. In order to explain the model's trajectory from the 1980s to 2004, Table Eight (pages 364-368) illustrates the policy's trajectory and the resulting linear and complex findings that emerged during each phase of the progression. Table Eight, as such, illustrates the Phi Model's three analytical steps in action, demonstrating through the linear and complex finding what the Phi Model is able to accomplish in its utility to observe a dynamic phenomenon, such as the U.S. policy toward Iraq.

The linear findings refer to findings that emerge from breaking the data into concepts, themes and super themes. The complex findings refer to findings that emerge from observing the data by tracing changes in each super theme according to autopoiesis, bifurcation, the S-Matrix, and mutual causality. Each super theme plays as an indicator of self-organization, phase shift, interconnectedness, and positive and negative feedback in
the trajectory of the U.S. policy toward Iraq. Together, the linear and complex findings provide the research with a comprehensive observation of the U.S. policy toward Iraq.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concepts</th>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Interpretive Levels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Cave-in; Discourse; Debate; Priorities and Resources; Simplicity; Symbolism; Ambiguity; Enemy; War on Terrorism; Hypocrisy; and Looking into a Mirror.</td>
<td>Mythicism</td>
<td>Mythicism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq Abuse of UN; Mistrust; Narrow State Interests; Presidential Extra; Gap Between UN and US Goals; UN Mistakes; Folly Politics.</td>
<td>Dichotomy</td>
<td>Dichotomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Containment; Trajectory and Status Quo; Kondratiev; Regime Change Trajectory; Iraqi Opposition; War as a Corrective Action; Force; Metaphor of War; Hobbes vs. Kant; American Psyche; Unipolar World; Capacity; Circular Reasoning; Coercion; Irony; Machiavelli; Fear Factor; Falsehood; Misuse or Misinterpretation of Intelligence; Current as Epiphenomenon; Misleading; Pattern of Behavior; Attila the Hun; Ideology; Intensionality; Preemption; Rhetoric; Special Interests; and Trotskyism.</td>
<td>Rational Choice</td>
<td>Rational Choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative State; Imperial Presidency; Appointocracy; Unilateralism; Paranoia; Capitalism; Dollar Vs. Euro; The role of Oil; Power Interests; Geopolitics; Regionalism; Cold War Politics; ME Status Quo; Multilateralism; Legitimacy; Colonialism; Hegemony; Imperialism; and Militarism.</td>
<td>Primordial Interests</td>
<td>Primordial Interests</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 22. Interpretive Levels, Themes, and Concepts

Table 8. The Trajectory of U.S. Policy Toward Iraq According to the Phi Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Wave</th>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Interpretive Levels</th>
<th>Linear Findings</th>
<th>Complex Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979-1990</td>
<td>Equilibrium</td>
<td>Primordial Interests</td>
<td>Serving the nation-state interest of the United States</td>
<td>Competition for scarce resources; no phase shift.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dichotomy</td>
<td>Ignoring human rights violations in Iraq</td>
<td>Maintaining the same structural order.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Wave</th>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Interpretive Levels</th>
<th>Linear Findings</th>
<th>Complex Findings</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979-1990 (cont.)</td>
<td>Equilibrium</td>
<td>Rational Choice</td>
<td>Supporting Iraq to neutralize Iran</td>
<td>Positive feedback, with increased trends in the policy’s environment, triggered by the Iranian revolution lead to increased tactical support of Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mythticism</td>
<td>Maintaining political balance and stability in the Middle East</td>
<td>Within an interconnected web of associations in geopolitics, the policy’s myth was designed to maintain alliances within a bi-polar world with the U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Oscillation</td>
<td>Primordial Interests</td>
<td>Protecting U.S. interests in the region, mainly oil.</td>
<td>No phase shift. Maintaining the same organizational order in serving the interest of the United States as a nation-state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dichotomy</td>
<td>Misuse of the dichotomy for propaganda purposes.</td>
<td>Folly politics and artificial engineering (such as propagandizing dichotomy and shifting the attention to another dichotomy that was emerging between Saddam and the United Nations in order to delay any collapse dynamics and prevent phase shift).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rational Choice</td>
<td>Forming multilateral alliances to liberate Kuwaiti oil.</td>
<td>The dissipation of the former order that supported Saddam, leading to the collapse of its tactic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mythticism</td>
<td>Refuting aggression, protecting world peace, protecting U.S. interest in the region, and protecting stability in the Middle East.</td>
<td>The dissipation of the former myth that was based on supporting Saddam, and a phase shift toward the birth of a new myth that resulted from changes in the environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dichotomy</td>
<td>Misuse of dichotomy for propaganda purposes and to destabilize the Iraqi regime.</td>
<td>No phase shift. Maintaining the same organizational order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Wave</td>
<td>Phase</td>
<td>Interpretive Levels</td>
<td>Linear Findings</td>
<td>Complex Findings</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Gulf War of 1991 (cont.)</td>
<td>Chaos</td>
<td>Rational Choice</td>
<td>War as a corrective measure, imposing sanctions on Iraq to enforce compliance with UN resolutions and the destruction of the Iraqi infrastructure.</td>
<td>The emergence of new tactics that shifted from supporting Saddam to confronting him.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mythticism</td>
<td>Restoring legitimacy, fighting aggression, liberating a victim, and defending peace.</td>
<td>The emergence of a new myth that portrayed Saddam as a new Hitler and the U.S. as the champion of freedom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dichotomy</td>
<td>Ignoring the dichotomy between the Iraqi people and Saddam's regime; reducing Iraq to the person of Saddam.</td>
<td>Continuing with its previous order by ignoring the dichotomy between the Iraqi people and their government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rational Choice</td>
<td>Supporting Iraqi opposition, sanctions, misuse of UN inspectors, continuous use of force against Iraq, and Operation Desert Fox.</td>
<td>Negative feedback, with fewer changes in the policy's environment leading to more tactics by the policy to serve the policy's objective in containing Saddam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mythticism</td>
<td>World peace, maintaining the political balance in the ME, promoting multilateralism &amp; legitimacy, and containing threat.</td>
<td>Bifurcation during the Gulf War results in a new mythical order: containing Saddam internationally under US leadership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2002</td>
<td>Oscillation</td>
<td>Primordial Interests</td>
<td>Maintaining the power interest of the United States.</td>
<td>Continue with the previous structural order in serving the nation-state interest of the United States. No phase shifts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Wave</td>
<td>Phase</td>
<td>Interpretive Levels</td>
<td>Linear Findings</td>
<td>Complex Findings</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001-2002 (cont.)</td>
<td>Oscillation</td>
<td>Dichotomy</td>
<td>Reducing the Iraqi people and Iraq to the person of Saddam Hussein.</td>
<td>Resisting collapse and phase shifts through folly politics and artificial engineering.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rational Choice</td>
<td></td>
<td>Misuse of intelligence, fear, misleading the public, preemption as a national policy, and unilateralism.</td>
<td>Dissipation triggered by changes in the environment, such as September 11.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mythticism</td>
<td></td>
<td>Metaphor of war, securing America, lack of debate and political discourse, and exonerating U.S. role in contributing to the problems in Iraq.</td>
<td>Dissipation triggered by changes in the environment, such as September 11.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Iraq War of 2003</td>
<td>Chaos</td>
<td>Primordial Interests</td>
<td>Maintaining the power interest of the United States.</td>
<td>Continue with the previous structural order in serving the nation-state interest of the United States. No phase shifts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dichotomy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Misuse of dichotomy for policy objectives in toppling Saddam through direct military intervention.</td>
<td>Resisting collapse and phase shifts through artificial engineering, resulting in catastrophe, such as the continuous suffering of the Iraqi people.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rational Choice</td>
<td></td>
<td>Invasion, preemption, occupation, administrative state, and imperial presidency.</td>
<td>Collapse of the previous structural order. The emergence of new tactics.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mythticism</td>
<td></td>
<td>Good versus evil, liberating the Iraqi people, war as a corrective measure, ending tyranny and threat preemptively.</td>
<td>Collapse of the previous structural order. The emergence of a new myth.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Table 8—Continued

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Emergence</td>
<td>Primordial Interests</td>
<td>Securing the U.S. power interest.</td>
<td>Continue with the previous structural order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dichotomy</td>
<td>Treating the Iraqi people with the same tactics that were used to treat the Saddam’s regime. The absence of the Iraqi people from the political process.</td>
<td>Continue to resist collapse and phase shift through artificial engineering, such as the imposition of the Iraqi Governing Council and the occupation of Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rational Choice</td>
<td>Installing a non-elected interim Iraqi government, the use of force against Iraqi civilians, privatizing Iraqi economy, and torturing Iraqi prisoners.</td>
<td>The emergence of a new order (tactics) to support U.S. occupation of Iraq, maintain U.S. hegemony and militarism, and to secure the U.S. power interest.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mythticism</td>
<td>The myth of making Iraq a model of freedom and democracy in the region, and rebuilding Iraq.</td>
<td>The emergence of a new myth to portray U.S. involvement in Iraq as part of the American psyche.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table Eight illustrates, the U.S. policy toward Iraq collapses its myth and tactical orders during its trajectory from the 1980s to 2004 in order to respond to changing trends in the environment. The policy resists collapsing its primordial interest and dealing with the dichotomy in Iraq, and in its trajectory it responds to emerging trends rather than following a coherent and rational strategy. This trajectory suggests that the U.S. policy toward Iraq is irrational in its trajectory but rational in its tactics, and it is motivated first and foremost by U.S. power and nation-state interests.

As Table Eight also demonstrates, the policy toward Iraq experiences phase shifts in the trajectory of its tactics and myths while responding to changing trends in the environment.
environment. The policy, however, resists phase shifts in the structure of its primordial interest as well as in its neglect of the dichotomy between the Iraqi people and their government. The policy maintains these orders because it is driven from the start by the national interest of the United States and is not based on the idealism of promoting democracy, freedom or human rights in Iraq.

Data also reveals that policymakers are making decisions regarding Iraq based on the Garbage Can Model. They are chosen ready-made solutions that are accumulated throughout the time within an institutional memory from prior experiences in dealing with "hot" spots in the world (such as Iran, Vietnam, and Cuba) and then applying these ready-made solutions to Iraq. At best, these solutions are inadequate because they lack specification the in their application to the U.S. policy toward Iraq and are foreign to the historical, social, economic, and political conditions in Iraq.

The U.S. policy toward Iraq from 1990 until 2003 is a trajectory. This means that the policy neither evolves from a particular point nor leads to a desired aim. Rather, it is a system of complex relationships that is fixed within the particularities of its time and the political and administrative system of governance that generates it.

This trajectory begins in 1990 as a response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and its disruption of the oil market (and as such the U.S. nation as a state interest in the region). It then gradually moves ahead ambiguously and without clear objective, responding only to evolving trends. Within this progression, the policy adopts several tactics in order to survive. The supremacy of tactics within the policy is at the expense of clear goals and strategy.
The policy’s trajectory is based on the primitive need of securing a niche in the environment. Because of this need, the policymakers do not hesitate to operate within or outside the accepted international norms and practices. And after the collapse of the Soviet Union, policymakers in the United State are encouraged to secure the nation-state needs of the United States through even greater disregard to issues of legitimacy and multilateralism.

After the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the foreign policies of both Iraq and the United States went through a process of phase shift, changing from the state of equilibrium that described the period of temporary cooperation between the two countries, into a period of oscillation and disturbance once Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990. What followed was a state of chaos and direct confrontation manifested in the Gulf War of 1991 and the United States’ readiness to lead an international coalition and go to war with Iraq in order to rescue Kuwait oil (and U.S. energy dependence on Middle Eastern oil) from any threat that might repeat the catastrophic example of the Arab oil embargo of 1972.

The resulting relationship between the two countries reflects a new dynamic that emphasizes the re-ordering and re-organization of the political and administrative systems of both countries and their foreign policies. The new system is better equipped to deal with conditions and requirements of containing the Iraqi regime without another military involvement.

Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 on its own does not create chaos within the Iraqi political system or the U.S. policy toward Iraq. Rather, it serves as a catalyst in
triggering a process of change within both systems that managed to sustain both systems operating within their outdated moods and avoiding collapse for almost a decade.

The collapse of the political and administrative system in Iraq and within the U.S. policy toward Iraq after the Gulf War of 1991 do not take place as it ought to have. Such a collapse is needed by the dissipative requirements of a decaying system and an outmoded policy that is designed for a Cold War era. The system’s natural collapse in Iraq, for example, is delayed through artificial engineering, such as the excessive use of the state’s police power. In the United States, the policy toward Iraq does not collapse and is modified through artificial engineering by legislations and executive orders in order to sustain the policy operating despite its inability to live in the new and changing environment.

The U.S. policy toward Iraq experiences several self-assembly process, and its organizational order at various settings emerges with newer orders, such as in employing new tactics. However, the policy’s main structural order resists collapse due to artificial engineering, causing catastrophic results both for the United States and the Iraqi people.

Although the tactics employed by decision makers are rational choice for the specific time and trend that emerges in the environment, the policy as a whole lacks a coherent strategy, characterized by planning, and clear objectives. The policy is a trajectory, moving from one phase to another while responding to outside stimuli but without having a clear strategy and objective from the start to finish.

The older system, whether in Iraq or within the U.S. policy toward Iraq continues with its previous structure, resisting natural collapse and for a newer system to be born. The conditions for such birth and emergence are ready. Yet, artificial engineering delays
the system’s natural collapse, and the results are what we are experiencing today: continuous catastrophes caused by this system’s inability and failure to respond accurately to emerging trends in the environment.

An example of such a catastrophe is the system’s intelligence failure to anticipate the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The same intelligence failure results in misinterpreting intelligence regarding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, which ultimately lead to the war of 2003 and the preemptive strike against Iraq.

Other examples are the super-sizing of the function and role of the U.S. military industrial machine as a twin organ of U.S. foreign policy and the strengthening of the executive branch of the federal government at the expense of the judiciary and the legislative branches. The current Bush doctrine of preemptive strike and the surrendering of power to declare war by Congress to the President, a power that is entrusted by the Constitution in 1789 to Congress, is an example of such artificial engineering.

The same delay in the collapse of political and administrative systems takes place in Iraq as well. However, the Iraqi political and administrative systems eventually collapses under their own weight in 2003 (assisted by a catalyst in the environment that is triggered by the U.S. invasion of Iraq) in spite of artificial engineering employed by the Iraqi government in order to prevent the system’s collapse.

The delay in time for the collapse to occur, especially once it is triggered by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the resulting Gulf War, results in catastrophes measured by human misery and suffering under the Baath regime and the UN-imposed embargo against Iraq. Yet, the Iraqi political system eventually collapses despite the delay once
conditions in the environment (the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003) provide the catalyst for its demise.

The world and living systems are constantly changing, never static, and moving from equilibrium to oscillation to chaos and then to the emergence of new worlds and new systems. The new emerging systems go through the same process, experiencing oscillation and chaos and give birth to other new systems, and the cycle of birth and rebirth continues resulting in a world that is dynamic, alive, and continually changing. This transformation is complex, irreversible, holistic, irrational, uncertain and takes place within an interconnected web of relationships.

The reorganization of the political and administrative systems in the United States and Iraq, either through artificial engineering and the sustaining of the old system, as in the United States, or through collapse dynamics and the emergence of a new system, as in post-Saddam Iraq, is triggered by a kick in the environment. Reorganization is influenced by the systems’ environments, and these systems’ internal mechanisms evolve in order to deal with changes through patterns of interaction.

Such systems, although reacting to their environments, they are primarily driven by one force, the sole self-interest of the nation-state in competition for resources. The American nation-state is transformed from being one of the two superpowers in a bipolar world in 1990 to one that was the only superpower in a unipolar world in 2003. The Iraqi nation-state, on the other hand, is transformed from a totalitarian, highly bureaucratic, and highly centralized state prior to the Gulf War of 1991 to a fragmented state after the Gulf War and during the containment era, and later to a no-state in post 2003 war era.
The environment is an important factor in impacting the administrative and political system in Iraq as well as the U.S. policy and its trajectory. As the environment impacts Iraq and the U.S. policy toward Iraq, Iraq itself and the U.S. policy toward Iraq also impact their environments and cause changes within these environments as well. As such, there is a symbiotic relationship between these systems and their environments, with one feeding and depending on the other for resources, renewal and survival mechanism.

The need for re-organization and dealing with the environment of the containment era, for example, drives the Iraqi political system after the chaotic trigger of the invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War of 1991 to resist the militarization of Iraq’s foreign policy, especially after Iraq’s failure during the Gulf War. The system no longer is able to continue within its former structure.

However, events during the containment era do not tilt the center of gravitation (the military) toward a full-scale war. Instead, it takes a different course and forces the political/administrative systems in both countries to transform through chaos and the dissipation of their previous structures toward adapting to the conditions and requirements of containment. This transformation enables the force of entropy within the political and administrative systems of both countries to evolve and witnessed the emergence of new dynamics within new systems whether administratively or politically.

The interactions of the political and administrative systems in the United States and the former Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein with their environments are internally determined. While there are countless chains of interactions within and between these systems, there is no independent pattern of causation. Changes in one element do not
cause changes in other elements since the whole chain of relations is part of the same self-determining pattern. The systems evolve as complete fields of relations. One element of experience in each system thus is influencing the next.

The systems' evolution enables them to rearrange their components and emerge through phase transitions. For example, we witness aspects of these evolutions in areas such as communication, organizational decentralization and horizontal networking in organizational structure. These manifestations not only impact the dynamics of the systems themselves, but also all other systems that are associated with them.

These systems do not live independently in the world. Their movements and the events created by them are not predictable, rational, or precipitated by local causes that are fixed within their own local time and space. Rather, these systems have many dimensions, players, and forces, and the events that they produce are non-linear and interconnected. Therefore, these systems frequently move from one trigger to another. One pattern of transformation begins by triggering the other. The transformation stems from one trigger settling into a new pattern of relations that is triggered by another pattern of connections and so forth.

There is no starting or ending point in the web of these systems' functions and dynamics, especially when they are in continuous processes of relationships bridged with other dynamic systems in the world. If we look, for example, at any particular element within these systems, we will observe that their relationships with other systems in the world have transcended fixed time and space.

Governance in the United States itself is shifting toward more of an administrative type of government headed by an imperial presidency. The U.S. policy toward Iraq is
exposing this trajectory in the four Interpretive Levels of mythticism, dichotomy, rational choice, and primordial interests. The trajectory of these levels illustrates the impact of changes in the policy's environment on the policy itself.

As the responses to trends create more of a dead-end trajectory for the policy rather than opening windows of opportunity, policymakers begin to adopt desperate measures, often outside the collective of internationalism, in order for the policy to survive. These measures result in efforts at regime change in Iraq either through political proxies composed of exiled Iraqi opposition groups in 1998 or through military wars in 2003. The policy, however, despite the efforts at regime change does not move forward toward a desired end. Instead, it further alienates the United States in the world and exposes its political tactics as Machiavellian in nature, designed only to advance its nation-state interest at the expense of legitimacy and world peace.

Both political systems in Iraq and the United States engage in circular patterns of interaction whereby change in one element in either one of the systems is coupled with changes in the other and elsewhere, setting up continuous patterns of interactions that are self-referential. These patterns are self-referential because the systems are unable to enter into interactions with one another or with their environments unless they are specified in the pattern of relations that defined their own organization.

In observing the U.S. policy toward Iraq and its hidden dynamics, our attention moves from observing it while moving in one direction to viewing it as moving in many directions. These many directions are the function of the policy's internal mechanism, organizational behavior, phase shift dynamics, interdependent and interrelated relationships, and the impact of change that results in impacting the policy as a whole.
Understanding a phenomenon, such as the U.S. policy toward Iraq, does not rest on any simple cause, but on deviation from the process of linear evolution itself. This deviation explains the political evolution in the United States, for example, as a process of change that is triggered by a kick in the environment. The kicks initiate an open-ended process of self-organization within the political system in the United States, while interacting with other systems within its network of association to produce changing patterns in order to assume a relatively stable form.

If we observe an element of this system independently within its chain of interdependent and inter-related dynamics, such as the political ramifications of the U.S. policy toward Iraq, but without observing the entire relationship of this element with all the components in the network of geopolitics, we are unable to understand its dynamic even within its own fixed time and space. However, if we observe the elements of the U.S. policy toward Iraq in relation to other elements and events in the world beyond a fixed time and a fixed space, then we will be able to understand the precise function of these elements within the collective function of relationships on the S-Matrix that shapes the association of any system's dynamics.

Iraq is used as an arena to secure the nation-state interests of the United States, and the U.S. policy toward Iraq responds to environmental demands in the form of political issues emerging in Iraq itself. As such, the U.S. policy toward Iraq often is out of touch with the political process in Iraq and more engulf in responding to U.S. nation-state interests as they are competing to secure a niche in the environment.

The United States is also unable to use Iraq in order to dictate its hegemony and political will on the world despite its military and economic might. The reason for such a
challenge is because of the competing self-interests of other nation-states which are able to form regional alliances in order to preserve their primordial interests and compete with the United States for scarce world resource.

Within such a competition, the U.S. policy toward Iraq operates on four distinct, yet inter-related levels. These levels are Mythicism, Dichotomy, Rational choice and the Primordial of Interests. Out of the four emerging inter-related levels, the Primordial Level is the driving engine beyond the policy and its associations. Everything else falls in between. The policy is implemented from day to day as a tool to advance the primordial interests of the United States. Once this is understood, the overall picture, direction and aim of the policy starts to make sense.

The U.S. policy toward Iraq, thus contain wholes within wholes. Each event produced by these systems provides a trigger that becomes part of another event and requiring a broader focus. This broadening of analysis adds to the complexity of political perspective and brings us to identify new means of understanding problems of multiple dimensions. When these problems are then re-framed, new opportunities then come to the forefront.

Reaching to such an understanding and conclusion is possible because of this research’s ability to combine both linear and complex analysis in order to observe the U.S. policy toward Iraq. What I do not expect the Phi Model to prove is that the linear analysis is an integral part of a complex analysis in a qualitative inquiry. My assumption is that the complex analysis could stand on its on and bring an end to the application of traditional Newtonian science in public policy analysis. Instead, the model proves that all sciences are integrated and complement one another.
Recommendations

As public administrators, we ought to treat each situation as unique and relevant to all factors engaged in the holistic relationships that motivate internal and external changes. As such, this research makes the following recommendations concerning the U.S. policy toward Iraq based on short-term assessments.

The U.S. policy toward Iraq needs to avoid artificial engineering and folly politics to delay its collapse. The policy ought not to oppose an internal collapse of its structure and should allow a new order to emerge. Without a collapse, the policy will continue to create one catastrophic event after another.

U.S. policy toward Iraq cannot be viewed through the prism of a single-issue. Such policy reflects the complex dynamics of the interconnected relationships between various interacting players in geopolitics. The better the understanding of such complexity and its multiple layers, the more likely that decision-makers will be able to choose the more viable solutions for emerging policy challenges.

To secure such a shift in U.S. foreign policy, the American consciousness must be awakened in order to guide governance without fear, gimmicks or manipulation. The United States is in need both as a nation and government of a genuine self-evaluation and self-assessment of its policies and actions both at home and abroad. This tendency calls for the adoption of morality and ethics in our policy, not the moral codes and ethics of a particular group or religion but the universal doctrine of “doing unto others as you would have them do unto you.”

There are lessons for us to learn from the policy toward Iraq. We need to promote pluralism of ideas in governance and depart from the simplistic mentality of “you are
either with us or against us.” And, we need to encompass in our policies the complexity of the world in which we live and reject the narrow ideology of the few who would decide our political direction.

We need to change our attitude toward power from one that is based on the Hobbesian philosophy of mistrust and force in a savage state of nature to one that is based on the Kantian philosophy of reason and enlightenment. For an end to be just, the means to reach that end must be just as well. There must be no room for hypocrisy and Machiavellian tactics in our policies, and we must remain committed to our democratic ideals and values.

We need to devote our energies and policies toward building a cooperative human society that promotes peace, transparency, openness, social justice, and prosperity, instead of war, militarism, power, and greed. And, we need to understand and recognize the dichotomy between regimes and people in our foreign policy and stop dehumanizing other people if their regimes stand against our interest.

Ending wars and conflicts in the world cannot be realized until we reconcile the struggle between our power interest and the oppressed in the world. Our humanity matters more than our differences. This ought to be the single most important concept in our political mantra in dealing with Iraq or any other nation.

Life is shaped by a cycle of coming and going and growth and decay. Everything that begins in a process becomes something else. Living systems, including political and administrative systems in the United States, are not static but dynamic, moving from equilibrium to oscillation to chaos and once again to equilibrium. This transformation takes place within an interconnected world of uncertainty, resulting in continuous
changes within an irreversible world. The U.S. policy toward Iraq is an illustrative example of such dynamics.

In understanding this, we can create a new way of thinking about dealing with change. Rather than attempting to deal with the discrete events that contribute to the limited manifestation of understanding and knowledge, we can attempt to deal with life itself as a whole and as a collective of non-discrete events in order to understand the epistemology of our experiences.

In doing so, we begin to shape and guide the forces that we experience as belonging to an objective reality that appears independent of our own making. This kind of thinking encourages us to understand that life fluxes in different ways: as a manifestation of our experiences, as a network of mutual causality shaped by processes of interconnected dynamics, and as dialectical processes of contradiction.

Suggestions for Future Research

Although the Phi-Model contributes to the body of knowledge in the social sciences, more needs to be done in employing complexity theories in the observation of social phenomena. In observing the policy toward Iraq within a qualitative inquiry guided by complexity dimensions, it is useful to explore complexity dimensions other than autopoiesis, bifurcation, S-Matrix and mutual causality to guide a complex analysis. Examples of other complexity dimensions are syn-referentiality, ecology, entropy, and cybernetics.

Syn-referentiality refers to the shared reality constructs, the behavioral programs connected with those constructs, and the norms and values shared by the members of a
social system that a basis for communication and interaction. The idea of syn-referentiality is compatible with a view of social systems as self-referential, self-organizing, and self-regulating. Yet, syn-referentiality avoids the conception of social systems as autopoietic (Little, 1999, pp. 164-166).

Ecology, on the other hand, is the scientific study of relationships between entities and their environments. It involves assessing the effects of complex interactions of internal and external stimuli and how entities evolve and survive over time. Entropy is a measurement of the level of disorder, energy loss, or noise in a given system, and also a measurement of the system’s capacity for change (Daneke, 1999). In a system increasing in entropy, the number of possible system states that evolve from some initial distribution over time also increases.

As for cybernetics, it is derived from the Greek word kybernatas, which means steerman, and is also the root that produced the word governance. Cybernetics is the art of steering. It deals with ways of behaving, rather than with things, and it helps in developing theories of adaptation, evolution, and growth as processes of regulation. It also deals with a system’s effort to maintain equilibrium or to reach a goal (Little, 1999, p. 151-171).

We should also explore the use of other linguistic media instead of metaphors in order to present a qualitative, complex analysis, and try excluding linear analysis from the Phi-Model and explaining collapse dynamics in a system caused by external interventions. The Phi-Model is successful in explaining internal collapse caused by changes in environmental trends. It needs, however, to be expanded to include the explanation of internal collapses caused solely by outside interference as well.
Other suggestions for future researches include several other methodologies, such as conducting a loop analysis of the U.S. policy toward Iraq, undertaking an ethical observation of the policy, and using Iraqis living in Iraq itself as a sample for the focus group and one-on-one interviews. Such a suggested study needs to investigate the Iraqi policy toward the United States as well, go beyond the time line limitation of 1990-2004 in observing the U.S. policy toward Iraq itself, and investigate the possible shift in the policy toward the emergence of another Iran-Iraq war in the future with the U.S. using Iraq as a base to extend its preemptive war to other nations in the region. It is useful to hear what indigenous Iraqis think about these issues before the advent of another preemptive strike takes place.
Appendix A

Protocol Clearance From the Human Subjects

Institutional Review Board
Date: June 6, 2003

To: Peter Kobrak, Principal Investigator
    Alexander Dawody, Student Investigator for dissertation

From: Mary Lagerwey, Chair

Re: HSIRB Project Number: 03-05-32

This letter will serve as confirmation that your research project entitled "The Policy of Preemption Toward Iraq within the Context of Complexity Theories" has been approved under the expedited category of review by the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board. The conditions and duration of this approval are specified in the Policies of Western Michigan University. You may now begin to implement the research as described in the application.

Please note that you may only conduct this research exactly in the form it was approved. You must seek specific board approval for any changes in this project. You must also seek reapproval if the project extends beyond the termination date noted below. In addition, if there are any unanticipated adverse reactions or unanticipated events associated with the conduct of this research, you should immediately suspend the project and contact the Chair of the HSIRB for consultation.

The Board wishes you success in the pursuit of your research goals.

Approval Termination: June 6, 2004
Date: December 16, 2003

To: Peter Kubrak, Principal Investigator
Alexander Dawsosv, Student Investigator for dissertation

From: Mary Lagerwey, Chair

Re: HSIRB Project Number: 03-05-32

This letter will serve as confirmation that the changes to your research project "U.S. Policy Toward Iraq within the Context of Complexity Theories" requested in your memo dated November 19, 2003, and clarified in your memo dated December 9, 2003, have been approved by the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board.

The conditions and the duration of this approval are specified in the Policies of Western Michigan University.

Please note that you may only conduct this research exactly in the form it was approved. You must seek specific board approval for any changes in this project. You must also seek reapproval if the project extends beyond the termination date noted below. In addition, if there are any unanticipated adverse reactions or unanticipated events associated with the conduct of this research, you should immediately suspend the project and contact the Chair of the HSIRB for consultation.

The Board wishes you success in the pursuit of your research goals.

Approval Termination: June 6, 2004
Appendix B

Focus Group Questions
Introductory Question

In 1990, Iraq became an important part of U.S. foreign policy. From your perspective why do believe Iraq played this role?

Transitional Questions

What were the elements that impacted the U.S. policy toward in Iraq in 1990?

Key Questions

1. In 1998, the U.S. policy toward Iraq shifted toward the concept of regime change in Iraq. In your opinion, what caused this shift in U.S. policy?
2. What were the elements that impacted the shift in U.S. policy toward the concept of regime change in Iraq in 1998?
3. In 2002, the U.S. policy toward Iraq shifted toward the concept of preemption. In your opinion, what caused this shift in U.S. policy?
4. What were the elements that impacted the shift in U.S. policy toward Iraq toward the concept of preemption in 2002?

Closing Question

Is there anything we have left out that in your opinion is particularly important when thinking about these issues?
Appendix C

One-on-One Interview Questions
1. The Baath Party rose to power in Iraq in 1968. In your opinion, why was there no reaction either by the United States or the United Nations regarding the Iraqi regime’s behavior from 1968 until 1990?

2. In 1980, Iraq invaded the western part of Iran and caused the Iran-Iraq War that lasted for eight years. During this war, Iraq used WMD against Iranian troops and bombed Iranian cities. In your opinion, why did the United States or the United Nations choose not to pressure Iraq to stop the war and pay restitution for the damages caused to Iran as it was the case with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990?

3. Prior to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the Kuwaiti government asked for U.S. intervention as Iraqi troops massed on its borders. The U.S. ambassador to Iraq at the time told Saddam that the U.S. was not going to interfere in a conflict between two Arab nations. In your opinion, why did the U.S. refuse to warn Saddam not to invade Kuwait prior to August 2, 1990?

4. In 1991 and after the Gulf War, the U.S. had the opportunity to remove Saddam from power. In your opinion, why did it choose not to do so?

5. The Bush administration’s justification for the Iraq war in 2003 was that it was the front-line in the war on terrorism. In your opinion, how does the Iraq war of 2003 tie to the war on terrorism?

6. In your opinion, how did the Iraq War of 2003 strengthen or weakened terrorism?

7. In your opinion, how did the Iraq War of 2003 impact the political situation in Iraq?

8. In your opinion, how did the Iraq War of 2003 impact the political situation in the region?

9. In your opinion, how did the Iraq War of 2003 impact the political situation in the United States?

10. In your opinion, how did the Iraq War of 2003 impact the political situation in the world?

11. In your opinion, what is the impact of the Bush administration’s unilateral decision to go to war in Iraq on international law and legitimacy?

12. In your opinion, what role did the former Iraqi opposition groups in exile play in pushing for the Iraq war of 2003?
13. In your opinion, why did the issue of WMD become the main justification for war in 2003?

14. In your opinion, what were other options available to the Bush administration regarding Iraq in addition to war?

15. In your opinion, what were the Bush administration’s underlying motives in pushing for war in 2003?

16. In your opinion, how the Bush administration’s policy of preemption toward Iraq became an evolutionary phase within the U.S. policy toward Iraq?

17. Some of the Bush administration’s critics suggest that the Iraq war was planned in 1998 by a think tank known as Project for the New American Century. In your opinion, what was the impact of ideology and think tanks on the U.S. policy toward Iraq in 2002/2003?

18. What are the differences and similarities between the Kennedy administration’s preemptive policy toward Cuba and Bush administration’s preemptive policy toward Iraq?

19. In your opinion, why did Congress choose to surrender its right to declare war in 2002 to the President?

20. In your opinion, what are the challenges posed by the post-Saddam era in Iraq for the United States?
Appendix D

Concepts and Conceptual Definitions
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrative State</td>
<td>The Shifting in governance toward increasing power of the executive branch of government at the expense of the legislative and judicial branches.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperial Presidency</td>
<td>An archetypal type of presidential leadership in the administrative state that is based on characteristics driven from the symbolic representation of imperial power, such as authority, dictation, unilateral decision-making, secrecy, arrogance, one best way mentality, unipolar (you are either with us or against us), and the monopoly of power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointocracy</td>
<td>The process of governance by appointment of selected individuals to public offices rather than being elected democratically.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unilateralism</td>
<td>A type of decision-making in politics that negates multidimensional inputs and considerations and relies solely on a particular aspect, direction, idea, or perspective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paranoia</td>
<td>A psychological state of individuals within the political decision-making realm that reflects suspicion of plots, conspiracy, ill-intentions and counter measures that are based on exaggeration and mistrust rather than facts and evidence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. and Iraq Abuse of UN</td>
<td>The process of misusing the United Nations’ efforts to enforce the 1991 Gulf War’s cease-fire agreement both by the United States’ government and the former Iraqi government from 1991 until 2003, such as planting spies in the UN inspection teams, directing UN inspection teams to resolute outside the established UN guidelines and in favor of a particular nation-state political agenda, arm-twisting the Security Council to pass resolutions that were more reflective of a particular nation-state interest than the cease-fire goal, not cooperating with the UN inspection teams, and blocking free access of the UN inspection teams to complete their tasks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrow State Interests</td>
<td>The political and economic interests of a particular nation-state irrespectful of the global interests of other nations in the world.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Extra</td>
<td>Personal or family issues that affect the decision-making process of the President of the United States in relation to U.S. foreign policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gap Between UN and U.S. Goals</td>
<td>Differences between the stated goals of the United Nations regarding disarming Iraq as a condition for the 1991 cease-fire and U.S. political agenda regarding changing the Iraqi regime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Mistakes</td>
<td>Errors caused by UN’s attempt to disarming Iraq, which resulted in unintended consequences, such as enforcing the economic sanctions on Iraq and causing the death of more than three million Iraqi children, not incorporating the oil-for-food program from day one of the sanctions, having different ceiling for the oil-for-food program that were not comparable with Iraqi people’s needs, and failure to recognize Iraq’s long abuse of human rights and not taking actions to prevent or stop it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concept</td>
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<tr>
<td>Folly Politics</td>
<td>Wrong political measures by the U.S. in relation to its policy toward Iraq that resulted in catastrophic consequences, such as the persistence on enforcing the economic sanctions despite their severe negative impact on the Iraqi people or aiding CIA-supported Iraqi opposition groups who had no connections with the Iraqi people nor did they represent their interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Containment</td>
<td>The policy of maintaining the former Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein within his own boundaries and within the standards set by the UN resolutions, with the Iraqi regime not posing a threat to other nations, not causing a material breach to UN resolutions, and not warranting war as an enforcement mechanism for these resolutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trajectory and Status Quo</td>
<td>The progression of U.S. policy toward Iraq in order to maintain political stability in the Middle East that corresponds with U.S. interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kondratiev Wave</td>
<td>A cycle or trend composed of several phases that keeps recycling itself within U.S. policy toward Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Change Trajectory</td>
<td>The progression of the regime change concept in U.S. policy toward Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Opposition</td>
<td>Various Iraqi opposition groups that were supported by the United States in order to topple the former regime of Saddam Hussein.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Issues</td>
<td>Political measures taken by the former Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein in order to exert its political authority on the Iraqi people, such as the insistence on administering the UN’s oil-for-food program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survival Issues</td>
<td>Political measures by the former Iraqi regime to remain in power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capitalism</td>
<td>The economic system of the United States. It is based on free market principles of capital investments and the use of natural resources and wage labor in order to create profit through the manufacturing and sales of goods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dollar Vs. Euro</td>
<td>The political strive by the United States’ government to maintain the supremacy of the U.S. currency against other foreign currencies, such as the Euro and the Yen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Role of Oil</td>
<td>The impact of oil as a political power on U.S. policy and status in the world’s economic and geopolitical systems, as well as in the U.S. policy toward Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Interests</td>
<td>The special interests of the United States as a nation-states based on the principle of power and dominance in shaping U.S. foreign policy as a whole and its policy toward Iraq in particular.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonialism</td>
<td>The military and political occupation of one nation by another through the acts of war and invasion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hegemony</td>
<td>The political or economic dominance of a nation-state or a political or economic entity over others, whereby enforcing a particular perspective that only serves the interests of the dominating entity.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imperialism</td>
<td>Subjugating by force or coercion the political and economic systems of more than one nation to the power, political and economic will of a dominating nation-state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarism</td>
<td>The use of military as a political tool to advance the regional or global power interests of a nation-state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Cave-in</td>
<td>Representatives of the Democratic Party in U.S. government that base their decisions according to the stated agenda of the Republican administration and Congressional representatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourse</td>
<td>Political debates and differences within the American political system and governmental structure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debate</td>
<td>The absence of political debate within the American political system and governmental decision-making process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priorities and Resources</td>
<td>The negation or sacrificing of political discourse and debates for the sake of political priorities and agendas based on the perspectives of the controlling political party in the White House.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War as a Corrective Action</td>
<td>The use of war as a surgical measure to correct a perceived political failure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force</td>
<td>The mentality of using force as a mechanism for a political agenda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metaphor of War</td>
<td>The use of war as a metaphor in solving social, economic, and political problems instead of finding solutions based on dialogue and treating the cause, not the symptoms. Examples of such metaphors are the war on terror, the war on poverty, the war on drugs, and the war on illiteracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hobbes vs. Kant</td>
<td>The philosophy of coercion versus the philosophy of enlightenment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Psyche</td>
<td>The uninhibited characteristics of the American people reflected in the Bill of Rights and U.S. Constitution that desire goodness for all people in the world and believe in the fundamental principles of human rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unipolar World</td>
<td>The world’s geopolitical system after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union that left the united States as the only superpower in the world, thereby changing the system from a bipolar to a unipolar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>The American military, intelligence and political response system to threats based on Cold-War nation-states conflicts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geopolitics</td>
<td>The collective political relationships between nation-states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regionalism</td>
<td>Political, economic, and military decisions taken by nation-states based on regional interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War Politics</td>
<td>Geopolitical relationships based on bipolar superpowers as primary motivators to define alliances and networking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Middle East and the Status Quo</td>
<td>Decisions taking by nation-states in the Middle East that are motivated to preserve the political status quo in the region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateralism</td>
<td>Political decisions taken whether on national or international levels based on multiple inputs, perspectives and concerns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concept</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>Political decisions made in accordance with established national and international laws.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circular Reasoning</td>
<td>Doing A as a pre-requisite for accomplishing B, and accomplishing B as a pre-requisite in accomplishing C, and so for.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercion</td>
<td>Political maneuvers and actions designed to alter other political situations and actions toward the desired outcomes of a certain political agenda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irony</td>
<td>Saying or intending something but doing something in opposite. Adamas and accomplished B as a pre-requisite for accomplishing C, and so forth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machiavellian Methods</td>
<td>Political decisions and tactics based on the principle of the outcome justifying the means.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear Factor</td>
<td>The use of fear as a prime motivator to persuade public support and opinion in favor of certain political agenda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falsehood</td>
<td>Exaggerations and misrepresentation of reality in favor of certain political agenda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misuse or Misinterpretation of Intelligence</td>
<td>The U.S. government’s misuse or misinterpretation of its own or other nations’ intelligence in order to serve its own political agenda in reference to the policy toward Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current as Epiphenomenon</td>
<td>The continuous negation of considering past roles and associations, and the constant reliance on the present as a standing phenomenon. By emphasizing the present, the political system can avoid the guilt of past mistakes, and enable itself to claim moralistic positions that it cannot claim otherwise if it considered past experiences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misleading</td>
<td>The use of false information, coercion, or fabrication in order to lead others toward desired political objectives that they did not otherwise want on their own if they were left to make their own choices and decisions without being mislead.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pattern of Behavior</td>
<td>The various types of relationships between the United States’ government and the governments of other nations that are more often based on U.S. interests than those nations’ political orientations and practices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attila the Hun</td>
<td>The transformation of Saddam’s images by U.S. government and media from a brutal dictator to an even larger and further exaggerated image that often resembled Attila the Hun.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>The role of specific political thinking or ideology on decision-making in the political process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensionality</td>
<td>Conscious and deliberate use of political means to achieve a desired outcome.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preemption</td>
<td>A political doctrine based on the use of U.S. military to strike any entity without provocation based on perception of future threats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhetoric</td>
<td>Jargons used by US government to justify specific political agendas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Interests</td>
<td>Representatives of various political, economic, and social groups that lobby the executive and legislative branches of government to secure policies favoring these groups’ interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concept</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trotskyism</td>
<td>A political ideology within the American neoconservative movement that is based on Trotsky’s ideas regarding a permanent revolution (war) and the destruction of existing orders through violence in order to construct new orders that are more in line with U.S. interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simplicity</td>
<td>Reducing complex political issues to simplistic presentation that lacks the richness and depth of the substance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolism</td>
<td>The use of symbol to explain a political agenda, often through the use of simplistic presentation of complex political issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambiguity</td>
<td>Uncertainty and confusion regarding a particular political issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy</td>
<td>The target of offensive or defensive response measures taken by U.S. government both politically and militarily.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War on Terrorism</td>
<td>A vague and unspecified response by U.S. government to international terrorism emerged after September 11, 2001 that lacks specificity, duration, boundaries, target or enemy definition or identification, or having a clear and defined exit strategy. It is an on-going war, stretching across the globe, involving anyone whom the U.S. government may preserve as a potential threat to U.S. political and economic interests. It is, as the wars on drugs and poverty, more of a metaphorical expression than an actual war in classical terms that involves military conflicts, execution of military strategies, and ending the conflicts after specific periods of engagement with either wins or loses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypocrisy</td>
<td>Criticizing others for doing something that you were or are already doing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looking into the</td>
<td>A metaphorical expression of U.S. government’s behavior to negate reflecting inward and assessing its own role in supporting the former Iraqi regime in the past, while placing itself on a high moral ground and accusing that regime of the very thing that the U.S. was supporting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirror</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mistrust</td>
<td>A situation when both the United States government and the former Iraqi regime were suspicious of one another and neither government trusted the other.</td>
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*New sciences for public administration and policy, connections and reflections* 
(pp. 151-176). Burke, VA: Chatelaine Press.


Bibliography—Continued


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Bibliography—Continued


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADAPTATION</td>
<td>An entity’s ability to reproduce and survive, despite changes in the environment, by changing its structure and/or function (Daneke, 1999).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTRACTOR</td>
<td>An indicator that describes the particular state of systematic behavior (Daneke, 1999).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTOPOIESIS</td>
<td>It means self-producing. Autopoietic systems are self-organizing in that they produce and change their own structures as well as their own components (Little, 1999).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIFURCATION</td>
<td>A vital element of self-organization, it involves the appearance of an additional pattern of behavior or sequence of states for a system when it passes a critical level of turbulence (Daneke, 1999).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUREAUCRACY</td>
<td>Rule exercised through use of the written word, which provides the basis for a rational-legal type of authority, or “rule of law” (Morgan, 1986).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAUSALITY</td>
<td>A relationship between events or activities by which they are assumed to impact one another (Daneke, 1999).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAOS</td>
<td>Chaos is uncertain order that is neither random nor totally disordered. Chaos in the technical sense of the term is the ordered but unpredictable pattern (Newell, 1999).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLOSED SYSTEM</td>
<td>A system that does not interact or exchange energy with its environment (Daneke, 1999).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPLEXITY</td>
<td>The study of the simple behavior of systems exhibiting complex patterns of interactions (Daneke, 1999).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPLEX SYSTEM</td>
<td>It follows multiple logics. Complex system have several characteristics: nonlinear and often not well-behaved (producing effects disproportionate to their causes and exhibiting sudden large changes in behavior), dynamical (thus not in equilibrium), not deterministic or formally predictable (but not completely random or disordered either), often open, in that the boundaries with its environment are permeable, and containing paradoxes (Newell, 1999).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCEPT</td>
<td>DECISION</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refers to groups of works with similar meanings and/or connotations (Weber, 1990).</td>
<td>It presupposes a choice among alternatives with reference to some goal (Allison, 1999). The passing of judgment on an issue under consideration. The act of reaching a conclusion or making up one's mind (Morris, 1975).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Glossary—Continued</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>FEEDBACK</strong></td>
<td>One element of experience in a system influences the next. Feedback can be positive or negative. Together, these feedback mechanisms can explain why systems gain or preserve a given form, and how this can be elaborated and transformed over time (Morgan, 1986).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GOVERNANCE</strong></td>
<td>It has more to do with the emergent order arising out of the dynamic activities of empowered social movements of people governing themselves (Brem, 1999).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HOLISM</strong></td>
<td>The doctrine of holism is “the whole is often greater than the sum of its parts.” It is based upon the assumptions that the whole is irreducible (its parts cannot be understood alone) and the whole is understandable within its complex, contextual elements (Daneke, 1999).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LINEAR SYSTEM</strong></td>
<td>A system in which alterations is an initial state will result in proportional alterations in any subsequent state (Lorenz, 1993).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>METAPHOR</strong></td>
<td>It is the figure of speech in which a name or descriptive term is transferred to some object to which it is not properly applicable” (Trumble &amp; Stevenson, 2002). The relation between the central use of a word and its metaphorical use is similar to the relation between the central use of emotion term and its use in an expressive judgment as both relations are asymmetrical (Matravers, 1998).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>METHODOLOGY</strong></td>
<td>The tools and concepts used to guide a given scientific inquiry (Daneke, 1999).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MODELING</strong></td>
<td>A means of representing real world phenomena to facilitate understanding processes (Daneke, 1999).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MUTUAL CAUSALITY</strong></td>
<td>It gives particular attention to the nature of relations and interconnections (Morgan, 1986).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NEGATIVE FEEDBACK</strong></td>
<td>A change in a variable initiates changes in the opposite direction (Morgan, 1986).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NONLINEAR</strong></td>
<td>The mathematical property of complex relationships among two or more elements interacting. Generally speaking, it means getting more than one bargained for (Daneke, 1999).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Glossary—Continued

**NONLINEAR SYSTEM**  
A system in which alterations in an initial state need not produce proportional alterations in subsequent states; one that is not linear (Lorenz, 1993).

**IDEOLOGY**  
The body of ideas reflecting the social needs and aspirations of an individual, group, class, or culture (Morris, 1975).

**INTERPRETATION**  
It consists of translating one set of linguistic or linguistically expressed elements into another (Weber, 1990).

**ONTOMOLOGY**  
A branch of philosophy that deals with beings (Morcol, 1999).

**ONTOMICAL METAPHORS**  
Metaphors that are cognitive-domain references and define our experiences as if experiences were discrete entities. (Morcol, 1999).

**OPEN SYSTEM**  
A system that exchanges energy and information with its environment; it changes its behavior in response to conditions outside its boundaries (Daneke, 1999).

**ORGANIZATION**  
It is collections of human beings arranged systematically for harmonious or united action (Allison, 1999).

**PARADOX**  
It is the logical equivalent of self-reference (Little, 1999).

**PARADIGM**  
A set of theories, models, practices, findings, explanation, values, beliefs, and feelings that characterize a given culture at a given time (De Greene, 1996). It is a systematic statement of the basic assumptions, concepts, and propositions employed by a school of analysis (Allison, 1999).

**POLICY**  
It means the realization in a number of particular instances of some agent's objectives (Allison, 1999).

**POSITIVE FEEDBACK**  
When accounting for system change, more leads to more, and less lead to less (Morgan, 1986).

**POWER**  
It involves an ability to get another person to do something that he would not otherwise have done (Dahl, 1957).

**RANDOM**  
Attribute of a process that is entirely or largely governed by chance (Daneke, 1999).
Glossary—Continued

RANDOM SYSTEM A system in which the progression from earlier to later states is not completely determined by any laws; a system that is not deterministic (Lorenz, 1993).

RATIONALITY It referees to consistent, value-maximizing choice within specified constraints. It denotes behavior that is appropriate to specified goals in the context of a given situation (Allison, 1999).

REDUCTIONISM A doctrine stating that complex phenomena, knowledge, and experiences can be reduced to indivisible parts to facilitate explanation and understanding (Daneke, 1999).

SELF-ORGANIZATION The spontaneous emergence of structural organization (Daneke, 1999).

SELF-REFERENCE Is independent of observations by others and implies that unity, or self, can only be produced through relational operations designates the unity that an element or a system is for itself (Little, 1999).

SIMPLE SYSTEM A state map, for example, presents a simple system. It is a simple system because it follows a single logic and its terminology and method remain unchanged (Newell, 1999).

THE S-MATRIX THEORY It shifts the emphasis from objects to events, and from building blocks (elementary particles) to a web of interconnectedness. The basic structures of the physical world are determined ultimately by the way we look at this world; the structures and phenomenon we observe in nature are nothing but creations of our measuring and categorizing mind (Morcol, 1999).

SOCIAL ENTROPY The deterioration of structures that govern a social system (Daneke, 1999).

SYNERGETIC A nonlinear system in which the summing of previously individual inputs produces an output which is greater than, or different from, the sum of the inputs (Daneke, 1999).

SYSTEM Any entity that can undergo variations of some sort as time progresses (Lorenz, 1993).

STRUCTURE It refers to the actual components and relations between components that make up a particular example of a type of system (Little, 1999).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THEME</th>
<th>It refers to clusters of concepts with similar meanings or connotations that taken together refer to some theme or issue (Weber, 1990).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WHOLE</td>
<td>An irreducible pattern of interaction such that without recognition of its parts, a whole is essentially structure and cannot be analyzed. (Daneke, 1999).</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZEITGEIST</td>
<td>A way of thinking that characterizes a generation or time period. The new sciences zeitgeist is a new (and ancient) awareness that we participate in a world of interconnectedness (Wheatley, 1999).</td>
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