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ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY: AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINIATION OF MUSLIMS'
POLITICAL CULTURE

by

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ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY: AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF MUSLIMS'
POLITICAL CULTURE

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Western Michigan University, 2004

This dissertation focuses on the following empirical puzzle: Do the attitudes of ordinary educated Muslims stand as an obstacle toward the adoption of democracy?

This research question calls for empirical/behavioral methodological tools that bring into focus contemporary Muslims' attitudes rather than ancient jurists' contributions. In other words, the dissertation shifts attention from ancient Islamic texts to contemporary Muslims' mindsets through written and web-based surveys in 32 Muslim societies.

At the aggregate level, Muslim societies perplex with two types of sub-cultures: the culture of "dictator, but…" and the culture of "democracy-as-a-must." The former is the sub-culture of two groups of Muslims: 1) Traditionalist Islamists who argue that a just autocratic ruler who abides by sharia/Islamic legislation and defends its tenets is the most legitimate ruler ever. 2) Autocratic secularists who argue in favor of a Hobbesenian ruler who maintains the state's sovereignty and defends it against its foreign enemies. In both cases, Muslims behave as rational actors who find that the advantages of having an autocratic ruler outweigh having a democratically elected one.

The "democracy-as-a-must" sub-culture is the one that is adopted by modernist Islamists and liberal secularists. Modernist Islamists find democracy consummating Islamic teachings that fight dictatorship and ensure pluralism in society. Liberal secularists find democracy as the core component of modernity that should be adopted on secular grounds.

At the individual level, the dissertation finds that Muslims are too heterogeneous to be studied in a lump-sum way of thinking. Not all secular Muslims are liberal and not all Islamists are anti-democracy. Some Muslim countries' political cultures are compatible with democracy while others are clear obstacles to democratization. Seemingly unrelated regression models suggest that socio-economic, demographic and cultural factors have different types of impact on Muslims' attitudes toward democratic hardware and software across societies.

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CHAPTER I
THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOIGCAL CONSIDERATIONS

> Today we [Muslims] are the poorest, the most illiterate, the most backward, the most unhealthy, the most un-enlightened, the most deprived, and the weakest of all the human race. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf (*BBC*, Feb. 16, 2002).

> Democratization or the march of freedom in the Muslim world is in the interest of the U.S. … Bahrain, Qatar and - to a certain extent – Jordan [have] several reformist elements. We want to be supportive of them. Condoleezza Rice, US national security adviser, (*Financial Times*, September 23 2002).

> We in the Arab and Muslim world know our way. We have our own will and we hold firm to our rights. Besides, we do not need anybody to give us lessons in how to run our countries. Ahmad Maher, Egyptian Foreign Minister in response to Rice's comments. (*Al-Hayat*, September 25, 2002).

The previous quotes illustrate the debate over Islam and modernity in general and democracy in particular. Mostly after the September 11th tragedy, but even earlier, it is not uncommon in the West to relate Islam as a religion and Muslims as individuals to antagonism to Western values and norms including democracy. Montesquieu, for one, argues that "The Christian religion is remote from pure despotism…The Mohammedan religion, which speaks only with a sword, continues to act on men with the destructive spirit that founded it" (Cohler et al. 1995).

It is argued as well that Arab and Muslim societies are the most likely to produce violence in a systematic way and the least respectful of the values of rule of law, individual dignity and human rights. Besides they are the least in terms of economic achievement (see Said 2002).

These assertions have been advanced to explain the deficit of democracy in the Muslim world. In 1975, predominantly Muslim countries were responsible for around 25 percent of the world's non-democratic regimes (Potter 1997), while in 2003 they have become responsible for around 55 percent of the world non- democratic regimes. Besides, no one single Muslim country qualifies as a consolidated democracy as defined by Linz and Stepan (1996). A recent study shows that predominantly Muslim countries "are markedly more authoritarian than non-Muslim societies, even when one controls for other potentially influential factors" (Fish 2002: 37).

> In other words, while the countries of Latin America, Africa, East Central Europe, and South and East Asia experienced significant gains for democracy and freedom over the last 20 years, the Islamic world experienced an equally significant increase in the number of repressive regimes (Karatnycky 2002: 103).

A working definition of democracy focuses on what democracy does. It is as a system of government that provides: 1) a system of norms that emphasizes tolerance, trust and sense of moral and political equality among citizens irrespective of gender, sect, race or religion. This side of democracy will be labeled democratic software or the software of democracy. 2) It provides as well the political institutions and procedures that increase people's access to and influence on government (ex. free fair and periodic elections, political parties and elected parliaments). This procedural and institutional aspect of democracy will be labeled democratic hardware or the hardware of democracy.

The literature on democratization has used several criteria for judging countries on both of these aspects. On the procedural aspect, Huntington proposed a criterion for democratic countries based on two consecutive peaceful alterations of power through free fair elections. Huntington's criterion anticipates the problematic phenomenon of "one man, one vote, one time." Taken with Przeworski's intriguing criterion: "no country in which a party wins 60 percent of the vote twice is a democracy" (Przeworski 1992:126), almost no one Muslim country is a full-fledged democracy. However, some are less democratic than others according to these two criteria. When it comes to the normative aspect of democracy, violations of human rights based on gender, belief and thought along with political exclusion of minorities and women from the political process have been widely studied and reported in Muslim countries with almost no exception (an-Naim 1990; Ibrahim 2003; Mayer 1999; Moussalli 2001; Price 1999).

However, not all Muslim countries are alike. Some Muslim countries have witnessed some incomplete elite-guided (reluctant and long) transitions that have been examined by other scholars such as Senegal (Villaon 1995), Nigeria (Aborisade 2002), Tunisia (Hamdi 1998), Turkey (Ozbudun 2000), Indonesia (Singh 2000) and (Hefner 2000) , Syria (Wedeen 1999), Egypt (Kienle 2001) among others. Those transitions defy one of the assumptions that : "any country moving away from dictatorial rule can be considered a country in transition toward democracy" (Carothers 2002) mainly because that the transition did not eventually lead to democracy, rather to prolong non-democratic regimes.

In the previous fifteen years, for instance, with the possible exception of the troubled democracies of Senegal, Mali and Turkey, most Muslim countries' trajectories away from authoritarianism have been abrupt and irregular. Some countries have been fluctuating around variant forms of non-democracy (Libya, Chad, Guinea, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Oman and Saudi Arabia to name some). The ruling elites in those countries find democracy to be luxury that should be postponed to meet other more immediate tasks such as economic development or achieving national unity. Thus, democratization is not on their agenda any time soon. Another group can be described as "hybrid regimes," (see Karl 1995). or "semi-authoritarianism" (see Ottaway et al. 1998; WMD) (e.g. Albania, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Morocco and Egypt.) This group of liberalized autocratic regimes relate themselves to democracy and acknowledge its importance but for them democratization is too risky to be pursued. Thus, they find risk-free liberalization through increasing the doses of freedoms (e.g. controlled freedoms of speech and association) a more compelling strategy than risking their own positions. A third category can be grouped into the class of "soft authoritarianism," (see Means 1996) "pseudodemocracy" (see Case 2001) or "semidemocracy" (see Case 1996). (such as Tunisia, Lebanon and Malaysia). This group is best described as systems with democratic procedures and severe exclusion of main social and political opposition forces. A

fourth group can be labeled "illiberal democracy," (see Zakaria 1997) or "virtual democracy" (see Joseph 1998). (such as in Nigeria, Iran, Bangladesh and Sierra Leone). This group of Muslim countries have some democratic procedures but still suffer from socio-economic, socio-political and religious complications that work against full transition toward democracy .The last group can be characterized as "electoral authoritarianism" (see Fish 2001) or "electoral democracy," (Freedom House 2001; Schedler 2000) (such as the Sudan, Algeria, Yemen, Niger and Mauritania) in the sense that they hide their authoritarian nature behind a veil of democratic rhetoric and procedures yet they do not seem to be convincing either their own people or the outside world of their democratic façade.

All previous categories refer to political regimes that either did not start or started and later departed from the process of democratic transition and, not surprisingly, are not considered free by Freedom House (2002).

The prevailing interpretation of this phenomenon in the West originates in the writings of the orientalists and neo-orientalists. The main proposition of (neo-) orientalists is that Muslims, by virtue of being Muslims, hardly have the potential for democratic political culture unless they give up their understanding of mainstream Islam (Sadowski 1993). In an implicit use of Mill's method of agreement, orientalists and neo-orientalists find that Muslim countries have two common characteristics and several historical, political and economic differences which lead them to uniquely and uniformly link Islam and lack of democracy in a cause-effect manner. This logic of inference reminds us of Weber's attempt to explain the capitalist success by the proportion of Protestants in West European countries (Weber 1996) following Mill's famous method of agreement that has been highly criticized as misleading (King et al. 1994; Skocpol 1979).

Given this characterization of Muslim countries and proposed interpretation of the (neo-orientalists), it is reasonable to ponder:

Do the values and attitudes of Muslims obstruct or decelerate the democratization process in Muslim countries? In other words, following Sherlock Holmes, why do not Muslims bark for democracy when the evidence suggests that they should? Or do they?

This study seeks to throw new light on this question by examining the cultural values of educated Muslims in thirty-two societies around the globe, including Muslim minorities in four countries, utilizing first-hand survey data collected from a probabilistic written survey (followed by focus-group discussions in eight of these countries) and non-probabilistic (controlled quota) web-based survey followed by intensive interviews of Muslim scholars, activists and intellectuals in ten countries of the world.

1. Literature Review

a. Islam and Autocracy: Causation or Correlation?

The relationship between Islam and autocracy has generated considerable controversy between the (neo-)orientalists and their critics. (Neo-)orientalists tend to think of Islamic creed as the *cause* of an anti-democratic culture that accounts for the dearth of democracy in most Muslim countries. Their critics point to the confusion between causation and correlation that

(neo-)orientalists create.

According to (neo-)orientalists, as a religion that "does not differentiate the realm of Caesar from the realm of God" (Huntington 1984), Islam is fundamentally anti-democratic. It is argued that (Ben Achour 1999):

> Islam is a religion of the two cities. It determines a constitutionality in which there is no rift between the political and the religious. It unifies norms and institutions. The law is the embodiment of the faith. The state directs prayers and protects religion, as well as administrating secular society.

This causal relationship needs an intervening variable which is Muslims' parochial/passive/violent culture that lacks an appreciation for modern democratic values and institutions. Pipes illustrates this genuine and uniform anti-democratic nature of Islam as follows:

> Islam calls forth intense reactions. It inspires a powerful loyalty among Muslims which no other faith can rival…nearly all Muslim subjects kept away from politics and became actively engaged only when they had a chance to apply the law or battle non-Muslims. This Islamic pattern - customary withdrawal punctuated bursts of activities - survived into modern period (Pipes 1983: 144).

Fukuyama contemplates that Islam, especially its radical version, works as a counter-player against modernism and democracy (Fukuyama 2001).

Others (Gellner 1991; Huntington 1984; Karatnycky 2002; Kedourie 1992; Lewis 1993a, 1997, 2002; Miller 1997; Naipaul 1981, 1998; Pipes 1988) argue that for Muslims to catch up with modern world, they have to give up the mainstream understanding of Islam as a source of beliefs regarding politics and society and instead adopt a reformed version of Islam that can be more compatible with modernism. In other words, as Christians now adopt Christianity version 3.0 which is more secular and modern instead of Christianity version 2.0 that was adopted during the Middle Ages, Muslims have the same task ahead of them. They need to give up Islam version 1.0 and adopt the new version 2.0 which is more secular and modern. Under this recommendation is the premise of religions as social organisms that evolve and mature.

According to this reading, Catholicism is approaching its modernist maturity. Huntington argues that the third wave of democratization was for the most part a Catholic one. Yet he thinks that the wave reached its cultural and civilizational ceiling since other civilizations, particularly the Islamic one, hold values that are not conducive to civil society, respect for minorities and democracy in general. That said, the civilizational achievements of the 'Judeo-Christian' West are not easily transferable to the Islamic civilization, which will eventually create clashes (Huntington 1996a).

Thanks to neo-orientalists, the cultural paradigm has dominated the fields of Middle Eastern and Islam politics. Thus unlike other regions of the world, Islam and Muslims are taken for granted as either ademocratic or anti-democratic due to their belief system (Laroui 1997; Said 1979).

In Latin American, East European and Southeast Asian polities, the nuances of (lack of) democratic transition are usually examined as a game among actors (incumbent and opposition)

or a function of socio-economic pre-requisites rather than a normative attitude adopted by individuals regarding politics.

To explain why democracy flourished in India and not in Pakistan, it is argued that: "Ideologically, Hinduism is quite compatible with secularism, democracy and democratic values. Islam is hostile toward all three´ (Ali 2000).

Lack of democracy in Muslim countries is a phenomenon that cries out for an explanation that tries to go beyond the simple answer of Islam is the cause of everything goes wrong in the Muslim world. Even if this is the case, how so? The neo-orientalist reading that deftly places the vicissitudes of the present in the context of the enduring influence of the past needs more empirical examination.

Muslim scholars in general find most of these allegations offensive and reflecting of a prejudice against Islam.

Most orientalists proceed according to a macro-historical approach where they cast their gaze "across large spans of history, constitutive elements of Islamic faith, and some features of Middle Eastern languages in order to construct a grand schema" that is usually used to reach law-like generalizations about the religion and the people (Ansary 1996).

Several scholars, Muslims and non-Muslims, defy the proposed causality between Islam and autocracy in Muslim countries. Recent writings have adopted three strategies to dispute the (neo-) orientalist arguments:

1- Showing that Muslims are no exception compared to other non-developed countries (Abootalebi 2000). That is to say, Muslims' culture is not unique in its inhospitality to democracy. But this inhospitality is not because of the religion but other conditions (i.e. tribalism or illiteracy) that are not conducive to democracy, at least from the perspective of modernization theory (Fandy 1994).

2- Focusing on the multitude and diversity of Muslims' cultures (Price 1999). That is to say: Muslims are not monolithic in their understanding of Islam or democracy (Esposito 1996; Haddad 1995; Hunter 1988). Rather Muslims would end up adopting their own version of (adapted) democracy (Kabuli 1994).

3- Studying Islam's basic tenets and isolating them from the practices of Muslims through history (al-Ghannouchi 1993; Moussalli 2001) or by the re-interpretation of those practices (Sachedina 2001). That is to say: Islam is not equal to the beliefs of nominal Muslims since those beliefs are function of several non-Islamic factors such as colonialism and nationalism (Gilsenan 1982; Kurzman 1998).

A possible explanation for the competing readings of the relationship between Islam and democracy is the over/misuse of Qur'anic verses and hadiths/sayings of the prophet by intellectuals, politicians and ulama/scholars to justify whatever they do or think. Islam itself has become the battlefield among different sects and trends of thinking in which each claims to be the true and genuine representation of authentic Islam. This battle is tagged as a cultural or intellectual civil war among Muslim intellectuals, ulama/scholars and activists by the Egyptian highly respectable jurist Tareq El-Bishri. This inexorable mélange between Islam and politics has led Western area specialists to infer that Islamic exceptionalism makes Muslims' system of beliefs the least compatible with modernity due to its immunity to the general forces of secularization, otherwise operative elsewhere (Casanova 2001; Gellner 1992).

Survey research from different sources has given us somewhat divergent accounts of the relationship between Muslims' political culture and democracy. Tessler's work (depending upon different surveys from Egypt, Algeria, Morocco and Palestine at different points of time) emphasizes the diversity among Arabs in their attitudes toward politics and more importantly that "Islam appears to have less influence on political attitudes than is frequently suggested by students of Arab and Islamic society" (Tessler 2002). Given the limitations of the data "in both space and time," Tessler calls for further scrutiny of the effect of Islam on Muslims' political attitudes. This study will examine this effect using fresh data. Inglehart (2003) and Norris and Inglehart (2002) contend that Huntington's thesis of clash between Islam and the West is partly right and partly wrong. Huntington, they argue, is right that culture does matter, and indeed matters a lot, so that religious legacies leave a distinct imprint on contemporary values. Yet he is mistaken in assuming that the core clash between the West and Islamic worlds concerns democracy. The evidence suggests striking similarities in the political values held in these societies.

Norris and Inglehart's effort is highly recommended since it takes the scholarship on this subject into the individual level of empirical analysis. Yet by examining the Muslim sub-cultures, two caveats should be kept in mind. First, several pieces of anecdotal evidence along with systematic data from my survey show that Sartori's dilemma of coming up with reliable and consistent definition of democracy across cultures is almost impossible. As Sartori (1962:12) put it: "the *thing* democracy is not described properly by the *word* democracy". If this statement is correct theoretically, it is empirically vivid in the Muslim world too. Many Muslims are ready to accept the *thing* democracy but without calling it democracy mainly because of the non-Islamic (Western) praxis and connotations associated to it.[1] Some researchers found that most of Western concepts do not travel well to the Muslim world. "A plethora of meanings and incompatible usages have dissuaded many social scientists from using these concepts [e.g. secularism, liberalism, democracy], as heuristic devices" when they study Muslim countries (Boroujerdi 1994:56).

Besides, "in many countries, democracy got a bad name because it was associated with bad regimes that the United States supported, despots like the Shahs in Iran" (Armstrong 2002).

The issue of labels is not peculiar to Muslims; Hochschild finds that political labels such as liberal, conservative and capitalist society mean different things to different citizens even inside the same country such as the US (Hochschild 1981).

For some Muslims democracy means excessive freedoms which infringe upon the sharia/Islamic legislation of Allah (this tendency was found most notable in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Oman and UAE). That is why in some Muslim countries, Saudi Arabia for one, the word has not been widely used, or has been misused or abused officially or publicly. For most ordinary Saudis, when the word democracy is used, it refers to an alien system of government.

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[1] When asked if "democracy" would lead to homosexuality and replace the will of God with the will of people, 19% of the Muslim respondents to the web-based survey agreed or strongly agreed. Yet around 38% of the 19% accepted having public elections, parliaments and one person and one vote principle. Many devout Muslims prefer using the word "Shura" (Arabic word for consultation which is an Islamic imperative too,) instead of the non- (or even anti-) Islamic word "democracy."

To others, such as Libyans, the elite's misuse of the word democracy made it equal to a very conservative pro-status quo system of government that associates democracy with the current praxis of their rulers. A Libyan professor once corrected me when I asked him about "democracy" by saying: "I see you mean real democracy not ours." However, this is not the case in Jordan, Malaysia, Turkey, Egypt, and Morocco among others in which people use the word democracy to refer to an elected accountable government without necessarily meaning that it is anti-Islamic. On the other extreme, in Iran, Tunisia and the Sudan, the term Islamic democracy is often used by progressive/modernist Islamists (e.g. president Mohamed Khatami of Iran ((1998), Rashid al-Ghannouchi of Tunisia (1993) and Hassan al-Torabi of the Sudan (2003) to refer to democracy as a necessity to establish Islamic rule. Thus it is necessary when we measure the attitudes of Muslims toward elected accountable government to triangulate the questions with and without using the term "democracy."[2] This is one of the lessons I learned during the pilot study.

Second, because of the lack of empirical and systematic data from most Muslim countries some observers overlook the differences among Muslim sub-cultures. For instance, the conclusion that average Muslims like average non-Muslims have an inclination to support democratic ideals and performance is limited to the nine Muslim nations that Norris and Inglehart tackle in their study (which have already experienced semi-free elections at some point or another in the last 10 years) and does not apply to other Muslim countries that still are more critical of Western values and ideals (e.g. Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Libya, the Sudan and others).[3] Norris and Inglehart's exploratory work needs to be supported by a survey that is mainly tailored to understand the Muslim mind. This Muslim-tailored survey does reduce comparability with other non-Muslim cultures but increases the accuracy and validity of our capacity to gauge Muslims' attitudes toward democracy.

Third, while examining Muslims' attitudes toward democracy, it is important to note that the real challenge in most Muslim countries is not the mere existence of democratic institutions or procedures (Abukhalil 2001; al-Ashmawi 1992). Most Muslim countries have what a journalist from Turkey, described to be beautiful constitutions and democratic names with no democratic spirit or pluralistic praxis. In other words, the challenge of democratic software (that is to consider women, non-Muslim minorities, communists, Muslims of other sects such as Ahmadis, Baha'ais and Shiite as morally and politically equal and thus to accept them in the political process as voters, candidates and elected officials) is more challenging and exigent than having "beautiful constitutions." This project attempts to tap both dimensions.

In sum, neo-orientalists paint a portrait of Muslims (one could think of their claims as a list of hypotheses) as largely indifferent to or negative toward democracy, attracted mainly by fanatical anti-Western religious discourse, ambivalent or unaware of democracy's advantages and unlikely to accept them.

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[2] World Value Survey and the Pew Project for instance ask the following question: "Having a *democratic* political system is a good way of governing this country." I am asking a similar question along with other questions that describe the democratic process with and without actually using the word democracy itself.
[3] In one of the rare surveys done in countries like Kuwait, Egypt, UAE and Saudi Arabia, Arab responses were extremely heterogeneous in patterns of life, values, interest in political issues and the nature of these issues as suggested by Zoby's analysis of the views of 3,800 Arab adults polled by *Zogby International* from eight countries (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait, Morocco, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Israel).

Partly the purpose of this project is to compare this portrait with empirical evidence from 2001-2002 surveys representative of educated Muslims. In general, the evidence contradicts the image of democratic deficit described above and suggests that orientalists may have detected only one group, admittedly the most radical, of Muslims.

The neo-orientalists adopted a definition of culture that circularly will lead to the causality of Islam and autocracy. The neo-orientalists tend to define culture as "shared values legitimating social practices" (Wildavsky 1987:6). The main criticism raised to this definition is the fact that "there is rarely consensus within a culture" (Laitin and Wildavsky 1988: 589).

Conversely, Laitin develops Thomas Metzger's definition of culture in his examination of neo-Confucian society as " 'points of concern' that are debated (Laitin and Wildavsky 1988: 589). According to Metzger as quoted in Laitin:

> We can understand the Neo-Confucians by understanding what they worried about… what their shared points of uncertainty and concern …There I suggest looking at Neo-Confucianism as a widely shared 'grammar' defining the problems of intellectual struggle by positioning discrepancy between the goal of life and life and the given world. Sharing this grammar, Neo-Confucians differed in terms of their solutions for these problems.

Laitin continues "[T]o be sure, cultures support some common values. But a general focus on points of concern rather than shared values provides a richer appreciation of why political action differs across cultures" (Laitin and Wildavsky 1988:590).

These two views of culture are not mutually exclusive. Rather they point to two dimensions of (political) culture analysis: unity and diversity. Each culture has elements of unity that make a group of people share the same culture. Each culture as well has elements of diversity that take the format of sub-cultures or sub-groups within the same culture. The elements of unity are manifest in the same aggregate grammar and macro-concerns that can be best embodied in *macro-questions* within the culture. However, these common questions do not mean that all individuals will respond to them in the same way. Rather one expects individuals to differ in their responses to these questions.

It is reasonable to expect those who belong to the same culture have contesting "practices, texts and images" (Wedeen 1999) to back up their responses to the questions. With this contestation, each sub-group will share similar values in responding to the same macro-questions or points of concern. The larger the gap among these sub-groups, the more they will appeal to other sources of texts, images and practices to prove that their responses are the closest if not equal to "truth."

By stipulating culture in this way, it is reasonable to assume that Muslims share one culture since they respond to common points of concern. The following question can be proposed as the main point of concern or macro-quest that most Muslims face:
What is the form of government that best corresponds to Allah's will?

There are three broad schools of thought that compete over the answer to this previous question. These three schools will be used to analyze the attitudes of ordinary Muslims toward democracy.

<u>b. The Relevance of Political Culture</u>

Why should one attend to Muslims' political culture when discussing democratization?

The examination of Muslims' political culture is important for any serious discussion about democracy and democratization for three related reasons.

1- Most elites in Muslim societies have proven to be very far away from adopting elite-guided democratization following the examples of Juan Carlos and Mikhail Gorbachev (Midlarsky 1998) or elite negotiated transitions such as Greece in 1973, Brazil in 1974, , Portugal in 1974, and Peru in 1979 and Chile in 1983 (Linz and Stepan 1996; Przeworski 1992). Being ruled mostly by non-democratic regimes that have no history of support for real democratization, this leaves us with two other options for where the breakdown of authoritarian regimes might start: foreign invasion (George W. Bush's Operation Iraqi Freedom is the most recent example in this regard) or mass pressure for democracy such as in Romania of 1989 and Georgia of 2003. This last alternative requires a high level of resentment toward autocracy and an inelastic demand for democracy.

2- Most neo-institutionalist researchers on democratic transition and consolidation argue that authoritarian breakdown and democratic transition may not require a specific type of cultural values. Yet democratic consolidation and sustainability cannot hold up without common agreement among the great majority of individuals on certain values and norms (Diamond 1993; Karl 1990; Linz and Stepan 1996) That is why some countries may be more ready for democratization than others based upon their capacity to assimilate the democratic values.

3- Regarding Islamic countries in particular, most of the literature suggests that lack of resentment toward authoritarianism and the absence of appreciation for democracy are two inherent traits of the Islamic political culture (Huntington 1984; Lewis 1993b; Pipes 1983). This study proposes to test this claim empirically, taking into consideration that Islam is not the only factor that may be shaping Muslims' perception of democracy. That is to say, Islam as a religion is not equal to Muslims' political culture; yet it is an important component of it. Consequently, a comparative cross-cultural study of ordinary Muslims' attitudes toward democracy will help us go beyond the hasty conclusion of "one religion, one culture, one phenomenon."

2. Data, Operationalization, Hypotheses and Measures

To garner first-hand data through surveys about serious issues such as democracy in closed societies is an endeavor that is both risky and rare. Drawing a representative sample of illiterate and suspicious Muslims made the task more difficult. As Mohamed Majidi, an Iranian criminologist who administered three cross-cultural surveys in five Muslim countries has said during the pilot examination of the survey used in this project: "The illiterate people in closed societies do not have the culture of survey especially if you ask them about issues that, they believe, will put them in trouble."

a. The Sample and its Limitations

The technical aspects of obtaining the first-hand data are fully discussed in appendix III. Educated Muslims have been approached through two survey techniques followed by focus group discussions.

It is crucial to explicitly limit the findings of this project to the population of non-poor educated adult Muslims who form roughly 96% of the respondents to the surveys and represent around 300 million Muslims (out of 1.2 billion) who have this set of characteristics. It is important to note that 55% of Muslims of the world are illiterate and over 42% of them are under the age of 18 (*World Development Report* 2001).

Only societies with number of respondents equal to 480 and above are included in this project. This number is an acceptable cut-off to maintain enough observations to run the regressions and not to lose many observations. Iraq, though it has only 91 respondents, was included in the society level comparison for its policy implication relevance. Muslims from six European countries are coded as EU. All other countries are recorded as "other" and are not used in the regression models.

Consequently, 4 percent of the respondents have been tossed away. Those respondents indicate that their religions are not Islam; their ages are below 18 or above 50; belong to societies with the total number of respondents below 480; or do not explicitly state their nationalities and/or countries of origin.

The two techniques of data collections used in this study are the written and web-based surveys. The respondents to the written survey were drawn from a cluster probabilistic sample of college and university students and graduates. After tossing away the ineligible respondents, around 6,784 responses from 22 societies were kept. These respondents to the written survey were present in their respective countries or in Egypt or the U.S. The responses were collected during the period of May to August 2002.

The web-based survey rendered a higher number and more diverse group of respondents, yet from a non-probabilistic sample.[4] Yet whether a non-probabilistic sample is representative of the target population is an empirical question as Zettenberg (1965) and Charalambides stated (2000).[5]

After tossing away the ineligible respondents, the respondents to the web-based survey number 23,816 responses mainly from 32 countries. These respondents were chosen via 55 thousand emails (collected with a multi-stage and multi-phase sampling technique to represent

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[4] Non-probabilistic sampling does not ensure the elements are selected in random manner. It is difficult then to guarantee that certain portions of the population were not excluded from the sample since elements do not have an equal chance of being selected. Note that it is entirely possible that the elements that were not selected did not differ from the selected elements, but this could only be determined by examining both sets of elements. This examination was conducted as shown in appendix III by comparing data from different surveys.

[5] According Zettenberg (1965): "The relationships expressed in theoretical propositions are presumed to be universally present… both in representative and non-representative samples. To disprove or demonstrate their existence is hence, possible in any kind of sample –biased or unbiased. … When using a biased sampling for a verification, we must have assurance that the relationship we want to prove is not introduced into our data by selective sampling. … Also, when using a biased sample for verification, we should realize that we have no knowledge of the population to which the result can be safely generalized."

Muslims from all sects, countries and different levels of religiosity) to respond to 48 questions during the period from May until August 2002.

As shown in Appendices 5 and 6, the two surveys capture Muslims' attitudes from all over the world and with different democratic experiences. For instance, Turkey, Mali, Senegal and Bangladesh are countries with an Islamic majority and have experienced a troubled but still peaceful alteration of power through voting ballots in this past decade. Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Libya are countries that either never experienced elections or at least are only starting gradually to change this habit. Semi-constitutional monarchies such as Malaysia, Jordan and Morocco are also represented. Add to the previous list a wide array of countries that have taken some steps toward democracy but never finished the transition stage such as Egypt, Iran, Nigeria, the Gambia, Pakistan, and Indonesia among others. Additionally three countries that have just come out of the Communist fist (i.e. Albania, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan) are examined. Muslim minorities are represented in the sample by four cases. In Lebanon, Shiite, Sunni, Druze, Isma'ilite, Alawite and Nusayri Muslims compose roughly 70% of the population, yet it is difficult to think of them as one Muslim population due to the intra creed and political divisions (World Bank 2001). India (12%), USA (2.5%) and Europe (3.5%) are other three cases where Muslims are minorities and their attitudes toward an accountable system of government are examined.

b. Why is this Group of Sampled Muslims Relevant?

Following the experiences of the mass-initiated democratization processes in all the continents of the world, this slice of the educated adults is crucially important in posing demands for democratization. Consequently, the educated adult Muslims (above 18 and below 50) captured in this survey are important. Individuals under 18 and illiterate individuals are assumed to be the least expected to care about democracy and democratization or to pose real demand for their political rights and/or to participate in politics if they are given the opportunity (Beckett and Alli 1998; Burkett and Hart-Landsberg 2000; Calhoun 1995; Dolbeare and Hubbell 1996; Farnen and Meloen 2000; Glassman 1995, 1997; Leighly and Nagler 1992; Milner 2002; Ogden 1992; Semali 1995). Besides, the number of respondents above 50 is too small to be included in the analysis.

Some non-empirical assertions suggest that the least educated and poor are the most radical and thus will not be represented in pooled data. However, no empirical study has shown that this is the case. Many empirical studies noted "how rare it is to find examples of religious fanaticism among either the higher or the very lowest social strata of the Egyptian population" (Quoted in Pipes 2002). Pipes comments: "What is true of Egypt holds equally true elsewhere." Similar observation was suggested by (Cerutti and Ragionieri 2000; Ciment 1997; Dekmejian 1995; Hunter 1988; Mahmood 1995; Perlmutter 1992; Zeidan 2003). These argumentative assertions will be the subject of testing in this project.

This data will help in addressing and testing some of the competing readings about Islam and democracy on two grounds:

1) One needs to revisit the arguments that put Muslims in general in the basket of anti-democracy (neo-orientalists) or those that argue in favor of "striking similarities" between Muslims and non-Muslims support for democracy (Norris and Inglehart 2002).

2) One needs to search for a guiding preponderance of evidence, if any, to discern if there is a causal relationship between Muslims' culture and democracy which eventually assesses the *democratizability* of Muslim societies.

Contrary to initial expectations, the one way analysis of variance (ANOVA) suggests that there are no statistically significant differences between the two sets of respondents comparing the differences within groups once we control for the effect of age in the web-based sample (Appendix III). That is to say, one did not find statistically significant attitudinal differences between college students who have access to the internet and college students who do not have access to the internet. This result was more solidified by Zogby's study of 3,800 Arab adults from eight countries (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia) which found that: "[i]n the aggregate, Internet access appears to make little difference in the personal concerns of Arabs. Even where rankings and ratings do differ, the differences are slight" (Zogby 2002). Whether or not a study of, say, the professional lawyers or physicians would turn up similar findings regarding the influence of internet usage on their attitudes toward democracy is an empirical problem that deserves attentions, but one that cannot be addressed here.

Though admittedly imperfect, combining the data from the web-based survey and the written surveys serves three purposes. 1) It provides a larger N with wider representation of a greater number of Muslim countries and thus more diversity in Muslims' sects, ages, gender and political ideologies. 2) It strikes a balance between the advantages of a written survey followed by deeper focus-group discussion and the web-based survey where the researchers distanced themselves from any influence on the respondents (Smith 2002; Solomon 2001). 3) It controls for the effect of fear from responding to what can be seen as politically very sensitive questions given the fact that web-based survey do not meet the same level of censorship that written surveys may encounter.

To sum up: there is a clear and accounted for bias in the sample toward the educated Muslims who usually live in urban areas and are above the poverty line. A further limitation of our study arises from the problem of over-sampling of men compared to women. This over-sampling of men can be attributed to the fact that illiteracy rate among women is much higher than it is among men (Farjani et al. 2002). As one does not use random sample from all Muslims regardless of their gender, level of education or income, one cannot confidently extend our inferences from our sample to all Muslims.[6]

c. Operationalization

This study will contribute to the debate by surveying educated Muslims' attitudes toward democracy in 32 societies including four countries where Muslims are minorities (USA, Europe, India and Lebanon) (Appendices 5 and 6 have lists of the societies). To measure the attitudes of Muslims toward the thing democracy stipulated as a system of accountable government publicly elected according to the principle of one person, one vote the democracy is operationalized into two dimensions: democratic software and democratic hardware.

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[6] A possible solution that is not pursued in this project, to overcome the problem of over-sampling of men is to run separate regression models for men and women to control for the effect of gender.

Democratic software is a scale to measure the socio-political sense of tolerance, trust and equality in the attitudes of Muslims toward (1) their fellow Muslims from other sects (Sunna, Shiite, and Ahmadi), (2) non-Muslims (Christians, Jews, Hindus…etc.) and (3) women. This scale has its theoretical justification in the writings that view tolerance, trust and a sense of moral equality among citizens as a pre-requisite for any stable democracy that deserves its name (Almond and Verba 1963; Dahl 1982; Rawls 1993).

In other words, if the majority of Sunni Muslims in a given country think that their fellow citizens who are Ahmadi or Shiite should be expelled or deprived of their political rights because of their religious beliefs, the spirit of tolerance and trust is not likely to lead to anything but tyranny of the majority if the procedural aspects of democracy are satisfied. This form of intolerant democracy has been labeled illiberal (Zakaria 1997) or electoral democracy (Schedler 2000). The same can be said about non-Muslim minorities and women who are seen by some (male) Muslims as politically unequal to them and deserving to be deprived of certain political rights. For example, Kuwaiti women are disenfranchised from participating in what otherwise can be labeled fair and free elections (Tetreault 2000).

The attitude toward women has been suggested to be a real obstacle toward democratization in the Muslim countries based upon the analysis of micro-level survey data (Norris and Inglehart 2002), macro-level structural data (Fish 2002) and careful examination of historical evidence (Esposito 1996; Lewis 2002).

Factor analysis (as reproduced in Appendix 8) shows that the responses to the four questions (among the nine questions that were developed to measure the democratic software) were found to fall into one dimension and form a reliable and internally consistent measure of support for socio-political and religious tolerance (Cronbach's estimate of reliability and internal consistency a = .763). As shown in Appendix 8, the four questions examine the attitude of Muslims toward the political rights of Christians, Jews minorities, Muslim minorities and women. These questions were meant to measure political tolerance. The democratic software dimension was standardized and scaled to 100 points, for ease of interpretation, where higher scores represent the highest level of tolerance, trust and sense of equality.

Democratic hardware is a measurement of the attitudes of Muslims toward the procedures and institutions of political participation and competition that reflect the popular will into public office. Some highly homogenous societies may have a fairly reasonable sense of equality and tolerance toward others yet may not support democratic institutions, thereby supporting stable (sometimes corrupt) non-democracies due to the lack of peaceful alteration of power and government accountability (Elkin and Sotan 1999; Hadenius 2001; Lederman et al. 2001; Shapiro and Macedo 2000).

Three questions were found to score the highest factor loadings in gauging the democratic hardware with a decent level of reliability and internal consistency (Cronbach's estimate of reliability and internal consistency a = .875). After recoding, the scale was standardized to 100 points, for ease of interpretation, where higher scores represent the strongest support for the democratic hardware. Taken together, the hardware and software measurements would help to produce a cultural map of Muslims' aggregate relative attitudes toward democracy as produced in Figure 3.1.

The hardware and software of democracies, unlike the conventional wisdom in the West, are not identical. Suffice it to say that the history of the U.S. was a struggle to couple the

elected accountable government with full inclusive liberal political rights for women (until 1920) and blacks (until 1965). Thus, it is reasonable to expect some Muslim sub-cultures to be in favor of the hardware of democracy without its software. This type of combination can result in exclusionary democracy (if there is democracy), a system of elected accountable government elected only by those who meet certain qualifications enforced by the majority (e.g. Kuwaiti male-elected parliament).

One of the independent variables gauges the observance of Muslims of their Islamic rituals or what can be labeled religiosity. Three questions aimed at indicating the same variable of religiosity. However, the factor analysis (Appendix 8) revealed that only two of them (prayer and abstaining from drinking alcoholic beverages) fall into the same dimension (Cronbach's estimate of reliability and internal consistency a = .926).

Muslims differ in their tendency to sacrifice for their political rights. A measurement of the elasticity of demands for political rights (democracy) has been developed from two questions (2.14 and 2.20) as shown in appendix 8 and will be discussed in detail in chapter three (Cronbach's estimate of reliability and internal consistency a = .91).

d. Hypotheses and Measures

As indicated earlier, the democratic hardware and software are the two dependent variables that this project tries to examine. The hardware and software of democracies, unlike the conventional wisdom in the West, are not identical.

Explaining these two dimensions of democracy will occur at two levels: aggregate/society level in chapter three and at the individual level in chapter four.

At the aggregate level, it is reasonable to expect some Muslim sub-cultures to be in favor of the hardware of democracy without its software. This type of combination can result in some type of exclusionary democracy if there is democratization at all. That is a system of elected accountable government but only elected by those who meet certain qualifications enforced by the majority (i.e. Kuwaiti male-elected parliament).

Theoretically, one may expect some sub-cultures to favor the software (tolerance), more than they are interested in democratic procedures and institutions. If this is the case, the tolerance may maintain the social fabric of society but no real public demands for accountable and elected government may be made. This group of sub-cultures usually head toward stable non-democracy. These sub-cultures, however, are not necessarily anti-democratic; rather they do not see democracy as a solution to any problem. That is why they do not necessarily support it or oppose it.

Theoretically as well one may anticipate a third group of sub-cultures that lacks support for democratic institutions and procedures and meanwhile shows no respect for minorities. If (neo-)orientalists are right, most Muslims would fall into this category because they uphold mainstream Islam. In other words, these sub-cultures are the least likely to have mass-initiated democratization and even if there is a chance for an elite-led democratization, the non-tolerant culture will remain an obstacle toward democratic consolidation (Diamond 1993; Linz and Stepan 1996). (Neo-)orientalists would add: this is because of Islam (Pipes 1988) (for more info. Sadowski 1993).

A fourth group of Muslim sub-cultures is the one that has high level of support to democratic hardware and software. These are the sub-cultures that are ready to democratize.

One anticipates that the great most people in this sub-culture think of democratically elected and accountable government to be good and necessary and thus would see it as anti-Islam.

Chapter three will throw some light on the prevailing values in Muslim societies.

At the individual level, certain hypotheses will be tested to understand the dynamics that propel some Muslims inside the same society to accept or refuse democracy.

To test these hypotheses and understand these dynamics, multivariate seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) will be used as shown in Appendix 9. To verify the results, multivariate logistic regression models will be reiterated. Chapter four will be totally devoted to testing twelve hypotheses divided into four categories:

1- Demographic characteristics (relative income, education, age and gender).
2- Experience of democracy (previous political participation and residence in a democracy for year or longer).
3- The effect of Islam (religiosity, support for political Islam and compatibility between shura and democracy).
4- Perception of different political actors as credible agents of democratization or autocracy (incumbents, the West and ulama).

A. Demographics

1. Relative Income

Some accounts (Jackman 1973; Lipset 1959) try to explain the dearth of democracy as a function of *economic factors*. All (with the possible exception of India) stable democracies are prosperous. Besides, economic failure is even one of the reasons of the breakdown of democratic regimes (Linz and Stepan 1978). However, this relationship is subject to some debate. Dahl's conclusion regarding the pre-World War II polyarchies in Italy, Germany and Spain suggests that the failure in providing economic needs and to maintain public order spurred the shift toward dictatorship (Dahl 1971). That is to say, if dictatorships provide necessary needs to individuals, the individuals would become less supportive of change, even if it leads to democracy.[7] This hypothesis is crucial especially in some countries that are accused of buying legitimacy (Luciani 1995) under the slogan of "no taxation, no representation." Sherman proposes the following as a support for the role of prosperous economy in establishing consolidated non-democracies: "the correlation between income and democracy holds within all but one region/culture… The one exception is Islam for which there is no significant correlation. . . Among Arab nations there is a negative correlation between wealth and freedom" (Sherman 1998).

There is a theoretical puzzle that needs to be addressed regarding measuring and estimating the relationship between economic status and democratization. Most of the studies

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[7] "Throughout history, the overwhelmingly most common type of regime in the Islamic world has been autocracy--which is not to be confused with despotism. The dominant political tradition has long been that of command and obedience, and far from weakening it, modern times have actually witnessed its intensification. With traditional restraints on autocracy attenuated, and with new means of surveillance, repression, and wealth-extraction made available to rulers by modern technologies and methods, governments have become less dependent than ever on popular goodwill. This is particularly true of those governments that are enriched by revenues from oil. With no need for taxation, there is no pressure for representation" (Lewis, 1993b:54-55).

that have been conducted in this regard approached the puzzle from a macro-level, i.e. to measure the relationship between macro-economic indicators (i.e. real income per capita, inflation rate or economic growth rate) and strength of (demands for) democracy (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Gasiorowski 1995).

In this study, the prosperity-democracy puzzle will be approached from a micro-level route through testing the impact of individuals' relative economic status on his/her attitude toward elected accountable government in the thirty two cases at hand. The descriptive analysis of respondents' incomes report skewness toward more affluent than poor which corresponds to the target population of this article. A 9-point scale variable reflects one's economic status.

2. Education

Education is another factor that can be seen as a highly crucial factor that may shape the attitudes of Muslims toward elected accountable government. For highly educated people, the cost associated with acquiring information, comparing and contrasting conditions in different political systems is low and as a result they should exhibit more support for democracy since it gives them the rights to be active in deciding the affairs of their societies. On the other hand, the least educated as suggested by Lipset for instance pose a threat to democracy in the face of any socio-economic dislocation (1983). Thus, education is hypothesized to instill and reinforce liberal values such as equality, support for socio-political tolerance, respect for individual liberty and democratic institutions as suggested by evidence from other cultures (Flangan 1982; Gibson and Duch 1993). A 5-point scale will be used to measure the comparative level of education.

3- Age

The young are hypothesized to be more enthusiastic about change (Bahry and Silver 1990; Inglehart 1997), but not necessarily about democracy; thus we will pay close attention to the impact of *age* on the attitudes toward democracy especially given the fact that several anecdotal evidence (i.e. terrorist attackers of September 11th 2001 and the ratio of young men joining Islamist radical groups) indicate the opposite.

It is argued that:

> "rapidly increasing birth rates have given rise to a high proportion of young people in the population and a concentration of them in cities (the under fifteens in the Arab world are 44 per cent of the population in Algeria, 40 per cent in Egypt and Morocco, 41 per cent in Jordan, 60 per cent in Gaza, etc.) This burgeoning generation, born after independence, does not share the nationalist ideals of its leaders. The failure of nationalism and communism, as well as the liberal experience which preceded them, all of Western making, leads these young people to seek a new model taken from their own Islamic cultural legacy" (Munoz 1999:9).

A 5-point scale captures the age of respondents.

4- Gender

Two competing readings of Muslim *women's* attitudes toward democratization can be spotted. In some non-Muslim cultures, women have been traditionally more conservative than

men about political change; that is why they are hypothesized to be less supportive of democratic changes (Carnaghan and Bahr 1990). Yet feminists in the Muslim context suggest the opposite (Afshar 1993; Kandiyoti 1996). Females are coded as 1 in a dummy-coded variable.

B. The Experience of Democracy

Two indicators are used to gauge the respondents' experience and familiarity with democracy.

1- Political participation (voting)

Some Muslim countries have public elections or referenda. Though not necessarily free and fair in all countries, they give Muslims the opportunity to experience an important mechanism of the democratic process.

> A generation ago, with two or three exceptions, virtually no elections were held in the Muslim world. Now, however, 50 of the 53 predominantly Muslim nations hold regular elections. In the vast majority of cases the elections, held by often autocratic and corrupt regimes, are far from free and fair. But they represent the compliment that vice pays virtue (Taheri 2003c).

One may hypothesize that people who vote in public elections will be more supportive of democracy. It is reasonable that this hypothesis will hold in relatively democratic countries where elections really matter but not necessarily in autocratic polities.

A three-point variable is used to measure the voting experience of Muslims whose countries have public elections (question 1.17). This variable was dropped in the countries that do not have public elections.

2- The residence of Muslims in a democratic country for a year or longer or being a minority living in a democracy are presumed to approximate the effect of *global diffusion* of the democratic message which lowers the costs of understanding the democratic process. Thus these types of individuals will be more supportive of democracy (Duch 1995; Mueller 1992; Starr 1991). To ensure that the individuals have obtained enough knowledge about how democracy really works, only persons who have had the chance to stay in one or more democracies for a total of a year have been considered to understand the advantages and disadvantages of a democratic polity. A dummy coded variable is used to capture this experience with Muslims who had the chance to live in a democracy for a year or longer coded as 1.

C. Effect of Islam

Though this dissertation is about Muslims rather than Islam, it is important to know that Islam, either as equivalent to Christianity or Christendom, is an active factor in shaping Muslims' attitudes toward the world around them (Ansary 2003). Islam provides most Muslims with a theoretical framework to judge what is Islamic, non-Islamic (compatible with Islam even it is not originally developed by Muslims) and Un-Islamic (perceived by Muslims to be against Islam).

The effect of Islam on Muslims' attitudes toward democracy may be studied at the individual level from three perspectives: religiosity, Islam as a political ideology, and the compatibility between shura/mutual consultation and democracy.

1- Religiosity

Another hypothesis pertains to the relationship between observance of Islamic rituals (religiosity) and support for democracy. Fukuyama contends that the more a person is committed to Islam as a creed, the more one is involved in a culture that uniformly rejects modernity.

According to Fukuyama (2001):

> Islam is the only cultural system that seems regularly to produce people such as Osama bin Laden or the Taliban who reject modernity lock, stock and barrel. This raises the question of how representative such people are of the larger Muslim community, and whether this rejection is somehow inherent in Islam.

A previous US ambassador to Saudi Arabia concurs.

> [M]ore fundamentally, though, all Arab Muslims—and not just young, educated males—are challenged cosmologically by the modern world. From the start, Muslims saw Islamic society as a 'City of God' upon earth. Islamic society was built upon the perfect teachings of God's own revealed word, dictated and unalterable: the Qur'an (Horan 2003).

Thus, it is argued that the more a Muslim clings to Islam's imperatives, the more he/she will be puzzled by non-Qur'anic bed'a/man made innovations such as democratic procedures and values. This relationship will be scrutinized in this project using a continuous standardized variable that combined two questions as described in the factor analysis appendix (Appendix 8).

2- Support for Political Islam

This hypothesis is important since some commentators made democracy conditional upon secularism in the Middle East (Binder 1988; Gellner "Islam and Marxism" 1991, 1992; Sharabi 1988; Tibi 1998). Others argued that some Islamists are more democratic than secular rulers (Armstrong 2002; Rahman 1982:15). A 5-point scale captured Muslims' attitudes toward Islam as deen wa dawla/religion and state which is a slogan endorsed by all Islamists and opposed by all secularists.

3- Support for the compatibility between shura and democracy.

Muslims do not agree on the relationship between the Islamic concept of shura/mutual consultation and democracy. Some Islamists perceive shura/mutual consultation as superior to the inherently un-Islamic concept of democracy. Other Islamists perceive democracy as a modern implementation of shura/mutual consultation. Some secularists perceive them to be absolutely two different principles and praxes as it will be demonstrated in the second chapter. With these three different accounts, one will try to examine the effect of Muslims' perception of shura/mutual consultation and democracy as complementary to their support for democratic hardware and software. A 5-point scale question gauges the attitudes of Muslims toward the relationship between shura/mutual consultation and democracy.

D. Political Actors

It is hypothesized that among the variables that affect Muslims' attitudes toward democracy are the attitudes toward certain political actors including the legitimacy of the incumbents, the credibility of the West as an agent of democratization, and trust in ulama/scholars role as cultural entrepreneurs.

1- Legitimacy of the incumbents

Another important factor that may impact Muslims' attitudes toward democracy is the support they show to their *current rulers*. This factor is crucial from two perspectives. First, legitimacy is usually confused with silence in third world countries, a phenomenon best described by Wedeen's conceptualization of "acting as-if legitimacy" (1999). Muslims are asked to evaluate their current rulers and compare them to others who are more democratic (whatever this means in their minds).[8]

Second, citizens in stable democracies make clear distinctions between rating their rulers and the legitimacy of (democratic) institutions (Dahl 1989; Huntington 1991; Linz and Stepan 1989; Przeworski 1986). In Muslim countries, where the persona of rulers is more influential than institutions, myopic individuals are more likely to exist (Inkeles and Smith 1974; Kohli 1997). Being 'myopic' means that individuals would accept autocracy as far as it is associated with a popular ruler or the "benevolent dictator" (Mansour 1992). Support for (undemocratic) incumbents is hypothesized to be associated with less support for democratic transition. A 3-point scale expresses the support of Muslims to their rulers.

2- The West as a credible agent of democratization

Western countries supported democratization throughout the world except in the Muslim countries where there is the fear that democracy will lead anti-Western Islamists into power. In Muslim societies, "advocates for liberal values constitute at best a small minority" (Bacevich 2003:32).

This attitude, along with the support of autocratic pro-Western rulers, created a negative image of the West in the Muslim world. The Western discourse, led by the Bush administration, changed dramatically in favor of democratic Islam. Given the negative image of the US in the Muslim world, it can be hypothesized that the more Muslims distrust the US, the less they trust its capacity to pressure the incumbents to democratize.

A 5-point scale is used to measure Muslims' attitude toward the responsibility of the West for lack of democracy in the Muslim world.

3- Ulama/scholars role as cultural entrepreneurs

It is argued that "Muslims are addicted to religion. Thus any attempt to reform Muslims' affairs will fail unless it starts from Islam" (Omara 2002b). The problem resides with the fact that most ulama/scholars are very conservative and traditionalist which may lead Muslims who trust

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[8] It should be noted that the question about the support for the incumbents was the only attitudinal question that revealed some discrepancy between the web-based survey and the written survey responses. Respondents to the web-based survey were comparatively less supportive of their rules than the respondents to the written-survey. A possible explanation is related to the efficiency of the web-based survey to capture the attitudes of the respondents regarding sensitive issues (Lipschultz 2000).

them to adopt undemocratic attitudes. Thus, it is hypothesized that Muslims who trust ulama/scholars are less supportive of democracy than Muslims who are less influenced by them.

A 5-point scale question measures the level of trust that Muslims have toward the ulama/scholars.

3. The Structure of the Study

The second chapter will lay out the intellectual map of how intellectuals, activists and ulama/scholars in Muslim societies relate Islam to democracy. The discussion of the intellectual map of Muslim public opinion leaders is based upon the assumption that ordinary educated Muslims do not randomly choose their positions regarding political issues. Rather they resort to men of ideas to make sense of the world they live in and to respond to the challenges they face. This chapter will be devoted to the political intellectual debates.

The third chapter focuses on the cultural map of educated Muslims at the aggregate level. Thus, it responds to the following questions: First, to what extent are ordinary Muslims mere reflections of the cultural entrepreneurs as discussed in the previous chapter? Second, is it true that Muslims even if they believe in democracy, they limit it to illiberal version that forbids all competing un-Islamic ideologies? Third, are Muslims satisfied with their generally non-democratic governments because they think of them as Islamic governments and that is why they do not want democracy? Fourth, are Muslims ready to sacrifice for their political rights or will they wait until they are given to them as gifts from their rulers? Fifth, is it true that Muslims' minds are chained in the golden past of the early Islamic state?

The fourth chapter is devoted to the analysis of possible causal relationships between Muslims' attitudinal positions at the individual level and the most important factors and actors that are hypothesized to militate both for and against Muslims' support for democratic software and hardware. In this chapter, the focus shifts from society-level analysis to individual level analysis.

The conclusion summarizes the results, reflects on their implications, clarifies their limitations and leaves some questions open for accumulation and further research.

CHAPTER II
MUSLIMS' INTELLECTUAL MAP

This chapter provides a road map for examining the schools of thought that shape the intellectual agenda in Muslim societies regarding the issue of Islam and democracy.

This chapter will discuss four main themes. The first section will discuss the nature of the men of ideas who are responsible for shaping Muslims' intellectual map. These men of ideas can be broadly categorized into intellectuals and ulama/scholars who function as both public opinion leaders and cultural entrepreneurs.

The second section will discuss how these men of ideas constitute three uncompromising schools of thought regarding what they consider Islamic, non-Islamic and un-Islamic ideals and praxis. These schools of thoughts are given the labels: traditionalist, modernist and secularist. The traditionalists in turn are divided into violent and pacifists. The secularists may be liberals or autocrats.

In a third section, the focus will be on how each school of thought tackles the issue of democracy given their understandings of Islamic teachings. In a fourth section, one will argue that these adamant schools of thought that shape the Muslim intellectual map engage in an intellectual civil war that may have a negative impact on the prospect of democracy in the Muslim world.

1. Shaping Muslims' Intellectual Map

a. Public Opinion Leaders and Cultural Entrepreneurs

Throughout this chapter, two terms will be used synonymously to refer to the men of ideas who function as agents of political socialization in Muslim societies. These two terms are public opinion leaders and cultural entrepreneurs. Each one of these terms reveals one of the mechanisms by which these men of ideas shape the Muslim mind regarding the challenge of democracy. These men of ideas through their public debates on the relationship between Islam and politics shape the cultural repertoire that identifies a limited set of intellectual repertoires among which ordinary educated Muslims locate themselves. That is to say, these intellectual debates portray the finite set of visions that ordinary Muslims can hold regarding an issue such as democracy. These repertoires are "learned, shared and acted out through a relatively deliberate process of choice" (Tilly 1995:42). Thus, Muslims' attitudes toward democracy are part of a learning process and deliberate choices that individuals make among the possible options available to them by the contemporary public opinion leaders.

This characterization of men of ideas makes this chapter more concerned with what contemporary ordinary Muslims read and listen to rather than the old philosophic or highly technical books that were written hundreds of years ago. The goal is not to discuss at any length all possible schools of thoughts that emerged in the history of Islam (Mohamed Omara numerated 198 schools and trends in the history of Muslim thought (see Oman 1991)) or their non-Islamic rivalries mainly because ordinary educated Muslims rarely consult these sources.

These sources are internalized in the contemporary debates and presented by public opinion leaders to Muslims as ready-made intellectual meals for consumption.

Public opinion leaders in this project play another related function which is to be cultural entrepreneurs by traveling through time and/or space to revive the norms of the past or import norms from others. These norms, "like genes" function as "instructional units [that are] in competition with other norms… that carry incompatible instructions – and some are reproduced at much higher rates than their competitors" (Florini 1996:364). Each group of cultural entrepreneurs competes with others over the legitimacy of the norms (as standards of behavior) that they present to the public. "Norms are obeyed not because they are enforced, but because they are seen legitimate" (Florini 1996: 365). Thus one may expect that in a given Muslim society some norms (e.g. tolerance) dominate other norms which make it more suitable for democracy than others. A possible explanation for why some Muslim societies may be more tolerant than others can be the nature of the norms that the cultural entrepreneurs revive from the past or import from others (e.g. the West).

Muslim intellectuals and scholars usually end up with a set of arguments or schema of thoughts that portray the past as translated into texts, history and legacy in a fashion that help them understand the present with all its modern problems, and to project solutions for future challenges including the challenge of democracy.

By the end of this chapter one will conclude that Muslims' political attitudes are not conceived as "a numerous cloud hovering over social life, shifting in its own winds, and producing social action as rain or snow" (Tilly 1995: 40). Rather Muslims' political attitudes are part a number of attempts to answer the question of where and how to draw the lines between what is Islamic, non-Islamic and un-Islamic political values and praxis.

b. Educational Schema: Intellectuals and Ulama

Men of ideas who function as public opinion leaders and cultural entrepreneurs come from different educational backgrounds and have different ways to spread their words and hence to influence the public. There are two types of men of ideas in terms of their educational backgrounds. Intellectuals usually had mainly non-religious education. Most of their influence on the public comes from publishing books, writing magazine and newspaper articles and appearances in television and radio shows. Coming from non-religious education background does not necessarily mean that they are ideologically secularists. Of course some of them are secularists who think that Muslims caught the Christian disease of ecclesiastic thinking. Most of these intellectuals publish their books and articles in state-owned or independent institutions as far as the government tolerates this way of thinking. The real threat that they face comes from ulama/scholars who would call their contributions apostasy or heresy. Some governments try to appease the publics by banning their publications but surprisingly these publications became the best sellers in the uncontrolled market of ideas. There is no real problem for any researchers to find the secularist writings either in their original languages or translated versions in the Middle East as in the West.

Some intellectuals have a favorable attitude toward Islam as a source of political ideology and use their intellectual capacities to draw lessons from the ulama/scholars. Usually Islamic intellectuals are referred to as Islamic thinkers/mufakereen Islameen to differentiate them from ulama/scholars who can issue fatwas/religious verdicts. Islamic thinkers are less bounded

by the Islamic authenticity or reliance on holy texts. They are freer to learn from non-Muslims and use their concepts (e.g. democracy). They are not seen by governments as dangerous as ulama/scholars who can issue fatwas/religious verdicts delegitimizing political regimes and rulers. They are men of opinions and not intellectual authority. Thus, their intellectual contributions may be found in books, magazines and newspapers and less in official television and radio stations that usually think of them as problematic if their ideas are publicly endorsed. Beside lack of trust on the part of the governments, they are hardly seen by the masses as religious authorities either. One rarely finds an audio tape in a mosque for any of these Islamic thinkers. They are perceived by most Muslims as good people with good intentions and testable opinions. If they walk down in streets, they are barely known by the public because people have not seen them yet they may recognize their names. One other contributing factor for their intellectual absence in mosques is that many of these Islamic thinkers or intellectuals may challenge popular ideas without providing daleel/textual support for their opinions. These Islamic intellectuals do not feel compelled to use daleel/textual support mainly since they lack the sophisticated Islamic education to allow them to issue fatwas/religious verdicts.

Fatwas/religious verdicts are issued mainly by ulama/scholars of Islam who are different from intellectuals in at least one significant aspect. Ulama/scholars got part of or all their education in Islamic institutions devoted to teach Islamic sciences of Qur'an, sunna/sayings and praxis of the Prophet Mohamed, fiqh/jurisprudence and turath/legacy of ancient Muslims. These ulama/scholars are divided into two groups depending upon their dependence on government institutions. There are ulama/scholars that constitute al-Islam al-rasmi/official Islam and others who constitute al-Islam al-sha'bi/popular Islam (Bill and Springborg 2000).

This distinction is significant in terms of the sources that one can rely upon to learn about their political attitudes. Since ulama of al-Islam al-rasmi/scholars of official Islam are considered moderate by Muslim governments, one can easily read or listen to their attitudes in the official publications and media outlets. The ulama of al-Islam/al-sha'bi are usually prohibited from giving public speeches or appearing in public television and radio stations. However, they managed to make their ways to the public through audio tapes, books and small booklets that are available in almost all mosques that are out of the grip of governments. With the revolution of the internet, hundreds of Islamic websites were devoted to the tapes and books of these unofficial scholars in all the languages on earth. The majority of them are in Arabic, Urdu, Farsi, English and French.
Some ulama/scholars heeded to preserve and record their contributions more than others.

In general, ulama/scholars who passed away before the revolution of the Internet or did not care much about audio recording of their fatwas/religious verdicts and sermons are less influential than others who kept audio and written materials. One way of understanding the influence of these ulama/scholars is by tracking their contributions in the minds of other ulama/scholars who learned from them personally or by keeping their outlawed books and booklets. These books are usually not in print anywhere and when they are in print they appear with no city of publication or publisher. Most of these publications are waqf/endowment for Allah's sake with a phrase that may be translated as follows: "If you want to re-print it, go ahead. May Allah accept our good deeds." In most Muslim countries freedom of expression is limited. Thus, it is a felony to disseminate such ideas. Thanks to some scholars who were interviewed along with area specialists and personal effort on the part of the researcher, this

chapter could secure around 60 publications on Islam and politics in general that are officially banned in many Muslim countries. These publications, nevertheless, are available under the table or on very high shelves of small mosque in Muslim countries.

One other important aspect of the role of intellectuals and scholars pertains to their level of political activism. Some intellectuals and ulama/scholars are more politically active than others. Some intellectuals and rasmi/official ulama/scholars are spokesmen of their governments. Some others are party ideologues and members in countries that allow political parties. A third group appears to be more independent.

Many unofficial ulama/scholars are as well leaders of Islamic movements that are usually banned in Muslim countries. Yet when legally allowed, these ulama/scholars may have more access to influence the publics.

2. Ideological Schema: Traditionalists, Modernists and Secularists

Ideologically, Muslim intellectuals and scholars adopt three different readings of Islam's response to modern challenges including democracy. These three ideological readings can be given the following labels: traditionalist, modernist and secularist.

They shape the Muslim intellectual repertoire through their responses to the common challenge of democracy that faces Muslims in the 21st century. These three schools of thought disagree upon which aspects of democracy are Islamic (ordained or accepted by Islamic teachings), non-Islamic (did not originate in Islam but still acceptable in Islam) and un-Islamic (against Islam and thus unacceptable).

Traditionalists search for what they perceive as an *Islamic* government which is necessarily contradictory with what most contemporary academicians and democracy students label democracy. Modernists, conversely, search for a modern (democratic) government *compatible with Islam*. They usually call it Islamic democracy. This state is different from the ancient state established by the Prophet and his companions in its format and procedure yet identical to it in its goals and framework. Secularists do not worry about how compatible their ideal system is with Islamic labels since Islam, any religion for that matter, can be used to justify all forms of government, if necessary.

Traditionalists are subject to another division based upon their attitude toward violence into pacifists and violent. Secularists are divided into autocrats and liberals based on their position on political plurality.

a. Conceptualization of Labels

There is no claim of novelty in any of the labels used or the idea of classifying Muslim intellectuals and ulama/scholars. Some caveats, however, should be kept in mind. First, it is better to think of these labels as depicting schools of thoughts rather than individual thinkers. Of course, this does not mean that readers cannot easily locate Usama bin Laden and Sayyid Qutb as violent traditionalists, Mohamed Khatami and Yusuf al-Qaradawi as Islamist democrats, and Saddam Hussein and Suharto as secular autocrats. Rather, these categories are proposed as extensions of Weberian ideal types that function as analytical constructs which may or may not correspond in detail to actual cases but which help us analyze and compare large number of cases.

Second, the following analysis will not be about a pre-determined set of scholars or intellectuals in particular; rather it is an analysis of intellectual positions regardless of who adopts them. This observation is important since some of these individuals who actually adopt these ideas shifted positions and thus may be under different labels given different times. For example, the Saudi thinker Abdu-Allah al-Qasimi in the early 1950s was considered one of the orthodox or typical traditionalists; however, in the 1970s he shifted directions to become one of the typical secularists.

Khaled Mohamed Khaled's 1950 famous book *From Here We Start* represented a core attack on the idea of Islam as a religion and state. Yet his book 1981 *The State in Islam* is considered repentance from his support for secularism where he clearly states that he was very much influenced by the history of theology and clergy in Europe (Kepel 1984). From 1950 to 1980s, Khaled shifted from a secularist position to a modernist Islamist one.

Once again, the labels epitomize schools of thoughts regardless of their adherents rather than portraying specific individual thinkers, clerics and activists because of what they believe in. Related to the previous point, it is important to note that some activists, intellectuals and scholars belong to the same school whereas they spoke different languages, resided in different parts of the world, lived at different points in time and/or possibly never heard of each other. Yet they share the same definition of what is Islamic, non-Islamic and un-Islamic and follow similar paths of reasoning.

Third, the more Muslim intellectuals or scholars move from traditionalism into secularism the more they set themselves free from the authority of the text and the appeal to traditions. The traditionalists' self-ascribed image is that they are the most adherent to the verbatim and literalist interpretations of Islamic texts such as the Qur'an, Sunna, teachings of the prophet's companions and their following 'ulama / scholars. Conversely, modernists contend that the interpretations of previous scholars are indicative and suggestive but not obligatory or binding, leaving more room for inductive learning from other civilizations. Thus they portray themselves as responsible for introducing the contemporary and modern reading of holy texts. On the contrary, secularists argue for more rationalist, relativistic and inductionist reading without assuming any supremacy of the past over the present understanding of socio-political, ethical and economic matters. Traditionalists and modernists blame secularists for being deductionists as well yet from Western sources. To Hanafi, the false deduction through time (in case of traditionalism) and space (in case of secularism) is one of the most important reasons behind the tension among Muslim intellectuals and scholars (Hanafi 2001).

Illustrating this tension by an example would be helpful. A traditionalist criticized Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (1881-1938), the founder of the Turkish Republic and its first president, for ignoring the teachings of Islam by quoting Imam al-Shaf'i's[9] advice to Muslims: "If you see a man walking on the water or flying in the sky, do not be swayed by him until you find a verdict for what he is doing from the Qur'an and Sunna" (al-'Amro 2002).

Fourth, the labels themselves help understand the core differences among the three schools. Traditionalists think of themselves as the keepers of the Islamic traditions. The verbatim obedience, assimilation and deduction from the Qur'an and sunna/sayings and praxis of the Prophet Mohamed as understood and interpreted by al-salaf al-saleh/ the pious predecessors

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[9] The founder of the Shaf'i school of Islamic jurisprudence (767-820 AD).

are what distinguish a Muslim from a non-Muslim according to traditionalists. Modernists, however, claim to combine deduction from holy texts with inductive ijtihad/independent reasoning. According to al-Qaradawi, a notable name in this school, Muslims currently need two types of ijtihad/independent reasoning: selective (which is to choose the most fitting and useful religious verdict if there is a plurality of opinions) and reconstructive (to come up with new fatwas/religious verdicts that match current and contemporary circumstances as far as they do not contradict well-established authentic holy text) (al-Qaradawi 1984). Both types of ijtihad/independent reasoning take into consideration the changing circumstances of modern world and would create plural interpretations of the same texts. Modernists, as a result, tend to show a higher level of tolerance toward those who do not adhere to their interpretations of the texts. For instance, many modernist Islamists (e.g. Fahmy Howaidi, Tareq al-Bishri and Salem al-'Awa) expressed their dismay because of a decision by an Egyptian court that deemed Nasr Hamed Abu Zeid's writings to be blasphemous and his marriage to be dissolved on the grounds of apostasy. Fahmy Howaidi's refusal of the decision was best expressed in the following quote: "Nobody debates anymore! Consequently only two channels are left: judges and guns" (Howaidi 1994).

Fifth, choosing terms and labels to describe and differentiate among people who think very differently but while claiming to be the true representatives of a religion that they hold dear makes the problem of labels more acute. An Iranian cleric, Mohamed Salem Takani, unequivocally refused using the label "modernist" to describe his way of reasoning yet other modernists like him find the distinction necessary and vivid (ex. Tareq al-Bishri and Salem al-Awa). For some of these scholars and activists, using words such as modernist or liberal is a great euphemism or even sensationalism depending on which side of the debate one takes. In contrast, the Turkish Imam Mohamet Soa'at used the label secular sheikh to introduce himself to me. He clearly refuses the use of Islamic rhetoric to justify or criticize political decisions or individuals. A Nigerian scholar who studies and lives in Saudi Arabia warns me against using the word "traditionalist" to describe a given group of Muslims since all Muslims should be, by his definition of a Muslim, traditionalists or salafis (again from al-salaf al-saleh/ the pious predecessors) as he said. Counselor al-Said al-'Ashmawi of Egypt preferred using the word civil instead of secular to describe his writings since the word 'Alamanya/secularism has become very notorious in the Muslims' public culture. Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi would prefer calling his school of thought moderate rather than modernist since Islam explicitly calls for moderation not modernization.[10] Though I understand that any consensus on the use of the terms is hardly viable, I need to take the risk of using the previous labels even if the individuals under each label may not agree to them. Consensus on the use of terms and labels is impossible as noted by other researchers and Islam specialists. On his attempt to stipulate what liberal Islam means, Ansary commented:

> The very expression 'liberal Islam' would, within Muslim societies, greatly handicap the acceptance of the very trends and approaches to which the phrase is meant to refer. 'Liberal Islam' seems to set up a new strain of 'Islam' along side the existing ones – introducing new divisions or creating new partisan attitudes- and links it to what are

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[10] Al-Qaradawi has a web site that contains almost all his writings and sermons: http://www.qaradawi.net

perceived- accurately enough, as largely secular attitudes, Western in origin (Ansary 2003).

The selection or stipulation of labels in the Muslim context is not an easy endeavor. Different Muslims, depending upon the amount of Islamic and Western education they get, use different labels to describe the same thing or person or use the same label to describe different things or persons. For instance, mostly Muslim secularists would use the word liberty as it is used in the West. Yet Rifa'a al-Tahtawi (the Egyptian cleric who visited France in the first half of the 19th century) made a perceptive observation that liberty in the West is equal to what Muslims throughout history used to call adl/justice with some modifications. For a while, liberal secularists in early 20th centuries found themselves the cultural entrepreneurs who implanted a new norm into a soil that limited the original meaning of liberty independence from colonialism rather than the antithesis of dictatorship. Based on the focus group discussions with a wide variety of Muslims in Muslim countries and the U.S., one finds that large sects of Muslims may make the argument that: "So and so is dictator but… ." That is to say being dictator is bad *but* one is a dictator who has other good qualities that may offset the negatives of being dictator such as being the leader of a national movement of independence, anti-Western policies, or sensitive to the issue of poverty and so forth. On traveling in space and time, concepts and labels acquire new meanings and connotations; that is why stipulation is a necessity in a project that aims at a comparative examination of a wide range of Muslims in different parts of the globe.

Last but not least, inherent in the idea of ideal types is to search for typical manifestations of each school of thought rather than semi- and quasi positions. For instance, al-Mawdudi, the founder of Jama'a Islameyya/Islamic group in Pakistan has inconsistent positions that make him both traditionalist and modernist in the same time. If one quotes him in his book *Concepts of Islam Regarding Religion and state* (Mawdudi 1977) he can be easily classified as a modernist who respects rights of minorities, democratic procedures such as elections, voting and representation. Yet upon reading some of his other books that were written during the same period such as *Islam and Modern Civilization* (Mawdudi 1977) or *Islam Facing Modern Challenges* (Mawdudi 1980), one notices a clear tendency to attack democratic principles, values and the same mechanism that he praised elsewhere such as elections and majority rule. Roh Allah Khomeini, as another example, can be used to illustrate a very traditionalist theological pattern of thinking or a very modernist who argues for democratic procedures and respect for basic human rights depending on which quotes one will use. For instance in 1977 he was reported stating that: "The real threat to Islam does not come from the Shah…The real threat comes from the idea of imposing on Muslim lands the Western system of democracy, which is a form of prostitution" (Taheri 2003c). However, he was quoted urging Iranians to participate in the "heavy responsibility" of electing the presidents, members of the shura council and the experts (Esposito 1996:24) as part of their Islamic obligations. Kuwaiti Islamists present a quasi-traditionalist and quasi-modernist position too. They participate in elections and form the majority of the Kuwaiti parliament yet they objected to women's enfranchisement (al-Tabetba'i and al-Basseri 2002) based on verbatim interpretations of Islamic teachings and local tribal considerations. Since this is the case, I prefer to focus on the typical positions of these cultural entrepreneurs rather than tracking all possible combinations and permutations of intellectual attitudes.

The attitudes of different schools of thought toward democracy are a function of their attitudes of the relationship between Islam and human intellect in general. One can imagine three Muslims who represent the typical attitudes of the three schools as mentioned earlier giving uncompromising answers to the following six questions that fully explicate the core differences among them.

1- How would Muslims differentiate between what is Islamic, non-Islamic and un-Islamic when it comes to alien ideas and mechanisms?

2- What if Islamic Sharia/law (coming from the Qur'an and sunna/sayings and praxis of the Prophet Mohamed) is silent about certain issues? Is it automatically halal/acceptable or haram/taboo?

3- Are there certain areas or zones in Islam that are not subject to human scrutiny and skeptical investigation?

4- Is it possible for contemporary Muslims to violate the ijma'/consensus when they deem appropriate?

5- Is it possible for Muslims to import ideas, mechanisms and inventions from non-Muslims?

Before responding to the first question it is important to note that traditionalists and modernists are Islamists who share similar assumptions and doctrines regarding the role of Islam in politics. For both schools of thought Islam is both religion and state. When encountered with the secular slogan of 'political Islam,' Islamists would respond by stating that "Islam cannot but be political" (cf. al-Khalidi 1984; al-Qaradawi 2001a; al-Ghazali ND; No'amani 2002; al-'Aawa 1989; al-'Aawa 2001; Qutb 1970; al-'Oda 2000; Howaidi 1985; Khatami 1998; Mawdudi 1980).

Secularists, who are not necessarily atheists or disbelievers, perceive Islam as a relationship between God and His servants. That is why they utterly disagree with Islamists. (Khalaf Allah 1984; Mernissi 1992; al-Ashmawi 1998; Heggazi 2002a); al-Sa'eed 2001; Baghdadi 1999). Sociologically, they are highly influenced by non-religious education, that they often get outside the Muslim world or from translated materials, and act as intellectual competitors to the semi-closed religious stratum of ulama/ scholars who "for generations had monopolized learning and intellectual activity" (Sharabi 1970). Not surprisingly, typical traditionalists think that secularists are not even Muslims any more.

A. Contesting Readings of the Islamic, Non-Islamic and Un-Islamic:

Traditionalist Islamists (whether violent or nonviolent) believe that what is Islamic is what has been accepted explicitly and overtly condoned by the Qur'an, sunna and ijma'/consensus of the greatest companions of the prophet and the authentic ulama/scholars, especially those who lived in the first two centuries after the death of the prophet (early 7th century). Moreover, they collapse the differences between what is non-Islamic and un-Islamic to make most if not all non-Islamic ideals and mechanism a priori un-Islamic unless they have been proven benign by careful scrutiny and passing through the tests of the holy and highly respectable texts. Modernists, unlike traditionalists, consider all man-made innovations that do not contradict the Qur'an and Sunna acceptable by Islam even if they do not come from Islamic

sources. They usually do not make the novelty of the innovation a sufficient reason to be rejected on Islamic ground. By adopting this position, they tend to weaken the role of the ijma'/consensus of ancient scholars. Modernists would say that "the ancient scholars were men and we [modernists] are men [like them]" (al-Qaradawi 2000a; Ibrahim 1991; Khatami 2001; al-Ghazali 1997; Howaidi 1999b). Hassan al-Banna', the founder of Muslim Brotherhood movement in 1928, wore the hat of a modernist in his debate with a group of Saudi traditionalist clerics in 1942 on the issue of using a microphone in the Ka'ba (the holy shrine of Islam in Mecca.) Traditionalist clerics refuted to allow him to use the microphone since it was considered *bed'a*/man-made innovation. The prophet never used one and the Qur'an has no clear verdict on it. As narrated by Yusuf al-Qaradawi (al-Qaradawi 2000a), al-Banna' found one of the clerics wearing a pair of glasses. Al-Banna' used the analogy between the glasses in magnifying the written words and the microphone in magnifying the vocal words.

To modernists, forbidden *bed'a/man-made innovation* is limited to the religious affairs not worldly affairs. Traditionalists see no big difference between religion and world affairs since Islam is religion and life/Deen and Dunya. The prophet left Muslims, traditionalists argue, with all the answers they need to all the questions that they may encounter (al-Qadderi 2000). Some commentators have records of the debates in the early years of the 1930s and 1940s on the verdicts of Islam on issues such as using cars, trains, radios and the like. A Malaysian scholar took a trip from Malaysia to Egypt to report back to his people the attitude of the Egypt-based famous Sunni school of Islamic fiqh/jurisprudence, al-Azhar, on the use of radios in early 1940s (Zaman "Interview" 2002).

Secularists in turn would not find the debate over what is Islamic, non-Islamic and un-Islamic relevant. They simply collapse the differences among them and neutralize Islam when it comes to what they perceive to be civilizational requirements such as technology, political institutions and ideologies. They share the same concerns and questions with the other two Islamist schools not because of the relevance of the issues they raise but because they cannot constitute their own vision without proving that the other two visions lead Muslims nowhere. In other words to build their own arguments they need to convincingly refute the Islamists' arguments. Secularists, answering the question of what is Islamic, non-Islamic or un-Islamic, refute the deductionist reading of Islamists with a possible exception of ethics and moralities. Yet in other worldly affairs, secularists argue that if one can interpret the same verse in two or more different, sometime contradictory ways, then the verse does not help us much. That is to say, most of the controversial texts in the Holy Scriptures actually have no one concrete meaning until the human mind imposes its understanding on them. Furthermore, fighting over the meanings of verses and sayings does not help solve the socio-political problems that currently face Muslims. In other words, secularists' logic goes as follows: if we agree inductively on what is good for society behind a veil of religious ignorance, we will definitely find good justification for it in the Qur'an and sunna/sayings and praxis of the Prophet Mohamed. This cell of secularist discourse has established itself among the great majority of individuals in the West (Hudson and Réno 2000). However, because of the lack of empirical examination of Muslims belief system, we do not know exactly the weight of this vision among Muslims.

Modernists and traditionalists, as a result of their differences in reasoning and sources, have perennial debates on issues such as celebrating mother's day and Christmas, congratulating non-Muslims on their feasts, insurance companies, the charging of interest in banks, the right of

women to work and participate in politics, the rights and commitments of non-Muslims under Islamic sharia/Islamic legislation, traveling to non-Muslim countries, studying Western philosophy, whether growing beards is fardh/obligation, sunna (to be rewarded if you do it and not being punished for not doing it) or just a matter of looking good (as secularists would argue), let alone democratic institutions and procedures. For traditionalists differences among Muslims on these issues are matters of aqeeda/creed that should not be subject to subjectivity (al-Zawahri ND) yet to modernists these differences are a matter of natural intellectual disagreements (al-Ghazali 1991).

Secularists find the "fever over hijacking texts" a sign that both schools are wrong (Zakaria 1986). They clearly draw the analogy between the roles of ulama in the Muslim context with the Catholic Church in Europe of the middle ages. Traditionalists and modernists exhaust the Muslim mind with interpretations and counter-interpretations that aim only at solidifying their positions as super Muslims at the expense of the 'ignorant non-knowledgeable Muslims" who do not memorize old texts with no applicability in the modern era (al-'Azm 1969). Thus in the secularist program of change, the main source of truth and virtue should come from the human mind as the best and most trustworthy judge between the good and evil, the true and false, the valuable and useless (Fouda 1993),. Surush's battle against velayat al-faqih / the rule of the supreme jurist aims at hermeneutic readings of holy texts and putting an end to the professionalized and personified representation of Islam (Surush et al. 2000).

An Algerian novelist who studied Islamic law was very specific in this regard: "do not we have books about democracy in Islam, socialism in Islam and private ownership in Islam?" He has a point to make: Some Muslims twist verses, sayings and interpretations of the Qur'an and Sunna to justify pre-determined mental positions (al-Azmeh 1992). The novelist argues that "the speakers in the name of Islam," meaning Islamists, are just "human beings who support their own personal arguments by appealing to holy texts." What is more dangerous, he contends, is that yet they claim that they are mere mirrors of Allah's will while Allah did not give them any right to speak in his name. To a typical secularist, unbounded reason is the redeemer of Muslims. When secularists make this claim they do not ask Muslims to give up their religion and follow their human intellect as if it is one or the other. They make the case that it is Islam that asks Muslims to free themselves from the setup of old texts (Baghdadi 1999).

Typical secularists find contesting meanings, images, and interpretations of holy texts a convincing sign that the discourse on religion has been very much conflated with religion itself. Mohamed died and nobody, including his companions, ancient or contemporary 'ulama, can speak for Allah. If one verse can mean one thing to a scholar and its opposite to another scholar, then it means nothing until human beings impose their understanding on it. If this is the case, the words of the holy text are actually holy but humans' understandings are not. Muslims should know that and they should act accordingly. Secularists ponder that the Qur'an and the teachings of the prophet were more examples of how Muslims should seek public interest given their circumstance yet the details of these verses and teachings are not binding to Muslims today (Fouda 1988).

Typical traditionalists gain their credibility by portraying themselves as primarily deductionists. Typical secularists propagate inductive reasoning as the redeemer of Muslims from their plights. Modernists, in turn, introduce themselves to the Muslim mind as seeking the balanced reading of both the imperatives of Islam with modern challenges.

<u>B. Silence of sharia/Islamic legislation</u>

The issue of democracy calls upon Muslims to discuss topics that are not specifically addressed in the two main sources of Sharia (the Qur'an and sunna). The silence of sharia/Islamic legislation is another controversial issue among the three ideological schools of thoughts. What if Muslims do not find a clear well-established verdict in either the Qur'an or sunna/sayings and praxis of the Prophet Mohamed regarding an issue such as democracy?

To typical traditionalists sharia cannot be totally silent or mute regarding any given issue. That is to say, there should be a hint regarding what a sincere Muslim should follow regarding every single issue. Besides, if it seems that there is a legislative vacuity in one topic, this is some type of test for Muslims and thus they should cling to the original path as described in the holy texts. Muslims should stay away from accepting bed'a/man-made innovation since it is in hellfire as the Prophet mentioned (Al-Ahadal 2001). By doing that, traditionalists think of themselves as the sincerest in their interpretation; since they add nothing of their own mindset to the holy texts. They are Mutabe'een wa lassna Mubtade'een/followers and not innovators (al-Saqqaf 1993). Their refusal of silence of sharia on some issues makes them the least likely to compromise their views even if they do not really have specific texts to clarify where Islam stands regarding certain issues. Unless it is based upon a familiar reading of authentic holy texts, they usually deem any addition or different interpretation to holy texts as bed'a/man-made innovation. One of the often quoted hadith/saying of the Prophet is the following :

> I advise you to fear Allah, to listen and obey even if a slave [is in charge]. Since whoever will live after me will witness so many changes, follow my sunna, and the sunna of the rightly guided caliphs after me firmly cling to it. Stay away from heresies, since each heresy is an innovation and each innovation is mischief (Hadith number in Albany's encyclopedia 2735).

Modernists consider the silence of sharia/Islamic legislation a deliberate space made by Allah for the human mind to contemplate and flourish (Iqbal and Vahid 1964). There is no place for bed'a/man-made innovation in worldly affairs according to modernists. Rather modernists often quote the following saying of the prophet:

> Whatever forbidden in the book is forbidden. Whatever is acceptable in the book is acceptable. Whatever is left undecided, it is toleration from Allah. You should accept His toleration. Allah never forgets (al-Qaradawi 2000a).

The silence of Sharia has a different connotation from the secularists' perspective. It means that Allah does not answer all the questions but He leaves them to Muslims' discretion (Arkoun 1994). "The prophet did not die before telling us that we need to brush our teeth. Yet he never told us how to choose his successor. Does not this tell you something?" Rifa'at al-Sa'eed wondered in an interview with him. "Allah teaches us how to ask questions not to follow pre-given answers. The Qur'an is not a book in politics, economics or social work. It is a moral reference with no final answers to any social, political or economic problems."

Secularists make the case that Islamists, like their peers in ancient Europe, manipulate Muslims' minds by telling them that Allah has sent down all the answers to all the questions and they (the Islamists) know them and thus they should be followed and given power ('Abd al-

Karim 1987). Secularists draw the analogy with the ecclesiastic clergy of catholic Christianity and thus emphasize the indeterminacy and relativity of sharia/Islamic legislation. They argue that Islamists introduce themselves as super-Muslims. As Zakaria stated it:

> The thesis that Islam does not and did not know a religious institution at all is greatly exaggerated. Sometimes this religious institution used its position and influence for the defense of the true principles of religion, and that led to intense clashes with rulers… At other times, they put themselves at the disposal of the ruler and issued fatwas for him…The conditions of medieval Christianity were not fundamentally different from the conditions prevailing in Islam… The Middle Ages are not only a period of time but they are also a state of mind…Many characteristics of this state of mind are present in contemporary Islamic societies (Quoted in: Flores 1993:34).

The attitude of each school toward democracy is highly influenced by their position toward the silence of sharia/Islamic legislation. Democracy is not part of complete and perfect sharia/Islamic legislation according to traditionalists. It is simply un-Islamic or anti-Islam if you will. To modernists, conversely, democratic procedures and mechanisms are good innovations that are highly compatible with Islamic teachings that fight dictatorship and shore up justice. Modernists would argue that some democratic procedures and mechanisms may be non-Islamic by origin but definitely can be Islamized. Secularists perceive democracy as absolutely political matter that should not be judged by holy texts. The silence of sharia/Islamic legislation in this regard, secularists argue, is an area for the human mind to flourish developing the necessary political institutions and values compatible with Muslims' needs.

C. Zones Immune to Skeptical Scrutiny

Are there areas in the Muslim legacy that are not subject to skeptical questioning and inductive examination? Typical traditionalist Islamists would put sharia-related writings including the fiqh/jurisprudence and fatwas/religious verdicts of al-salaf al-saleh/ the pious predecessors in a position beyond skeptical scrutiny for the reasons mentioned earlier. Related to skeptical examination of Islamic sources is the issue of philosophic thinking in general. Philosophy, especially if influenced by Western logic of thinking, is blasphemy and an attempt to override Allah's wisdom as expressed in the great text with man's fallible self-serving thinking according to typical traditionalists (al-Amiri 1983).

To them, humanistic sciences are the sciences of the devil that put the fallible human mind above Allah's legislation. The so-called Muslim philosophers throughout the Islamic history created more division and sectarianism in the Muslim umma because of the influence of the Greek philosophy on them. That is why Allah sent "Godly ulama" to show Muslims "the way of their God" rather than being led astray by those who "follow the path of the devil by attributing to Allah what He has not attributed to himself" (al-Buraiq 1994). Another traditionalist attributed all the failures of the umma to those who betrayed the "trust that Allah has put on their necks" by associating with Him their "own Gods of Marx, Lenin, capitalists and democracy" (al-Sawaf 1979). Simply philosophic thinking that is unbounded by Sharia' is the antithesis of Islam.

A typical modernist would be more careful not to confuse sharia/Islamic legislation as Allah's revelation to prophet Mohamed with the interpretations, arguments and ijtihad/independent reasoning of the companions, their followers and more recent ulama. Modernists would even argue that the immunity of the acts and sayings of the prophet is limited to what he conveyed about and from his God excluding things that he did or said based on his own human intellect (Iqbal 1930; Omara 1989). Islam is a religion of thinking. *Thinking is an Islamic Obligation* is a phrase that al-'Aqqad chose as a title one of his famous books (al-'Aqqad 1962). Modernists would argue that some philosophical thinking is wrong and should be refuted whether it is coming from Islamic source or non-Islamic sources (al-'Aqqad 1962, 1963; al-Ghazali 1981; Iqbal 1930; Sayyid 1986). Typical modernists accepted dialogues with intellectuals and philosophers and attempted to 'enlighten' them about their religion (Omara 1998). Though they have many reservations on the result of philosophical thinking, modernists seem more pluralistic and more ready to listen and discuss than traditionalists (al-Sawi 1990; 'Awad 2001; Fasi 1972).

Typical secularists would not agree with either school. There is no one Islam. There as many Islams as Muslims make of it (Zakaria 1989). Allah sent His messenger with the Qur'an and sunna/sayings and praxis of the Prophet Mohamed not to blindly follow them but to contemplate and emancipate our minds from the authority of fiction, superstition and irrational thinking. Habib Bourguiba (Brand 1998), the ex-president of Tunisia, outlawed polygamy based on the fact that when the Qur'an limited it to four women (with the stringent condition of justice among them), this was not a static one-time revealed teaching. Rather, Allah teaches Muslims to extend the line of thinking by limiting the number of women available to men from almost countless number before Islam to four during the prophet's time and now it is Muslims' decision to follow the same line of thinking and make it one (Salem 1984). The same thing was said about equating men and women in inheritance. Thus, the texts of the Qur'an are examples of how Muslims should think rather than actual factual commands ('Abd al-Karim 1987).

That is why the existence of Allah is the only possible non-debatable issue according to secularists (Abu Zayd 1994). Establishing such rational understanding of sharia/Islamic legislation requires the liberation of Islam from hide-bound theology as represented by the schools of traditional fiqh/jurisprudence and their contemporary followers (Chandra 2002; Fasi 1972).

Of course Islamists, modernists and traditionalists, do not agree to this line of thinking since it equates the holy texts with philosophical texts that are subject to the process of picking and choosing (al-Sawi 1993; Idris 1999; Qutb 1978).

Secularists attribute the Muslim's plight of the mind to the lack of critical and philosophical thinking. Muslims, according to secularists, still live with and in the mentality of middle ages. Islamic discourse chose to follow Abu Hamed al-Ghazali's (1058-1111 AD) methodology of appeal to texts and traditions rather than the critical and skeptical mind of Ibn Rushd (Averos).They took the path of imitating their ancestors rather than the path of fresh independent examination of the world affairs. This wrong choice created at least a 400-year gap between Muslims and the West according to Wahba (Wahba 1998).

Enlarging the area immune to skeptical examination on the part of traditionalists is seen as an obstacle toward democracy by the other two trends. Modernists and liberal secularists are skeptical about the compatibility of the inherited fiqh with modern democracy and its

requirements. However, secularists' skepticism on political issues is part of a larger and deeper rejection of most traditional interpretations of the Holy Scriptures.

D. Violation of consensus among ancient ulama and the legacy of the past

To both schools of Islamists "ulama are the heirs of prophets" according to the saying of prophet Mohamed (al-Okkda 2001; Khatami 2001). Their commitment is huge in terms of showing Muslims the right path, defending the sharia, achieving the unity of umma and advising its rulers. However, traditionalists divide regarding how ulama/scholars should perform this task between violent and non-violent traditionalists. Modernists find no place for violence in their doctrine unless it is defense of Islamic lands or people. However, it is crucial to note that modernists have a tendency to think more critically into the inherited legacy of ancient ulama (al-Ghazali 1981) than the traditionalists who tend to avoid weakening what they perceive to be the "pure sources of Islam and their interpreters" (al-Khodhair 1998).

To secularists, ulama should be like chemists, physicians or scientists of all sorts. They should be subject to scientific standards, debates and questioning (Fandy 2003; Mohamed 1989). Otherwise, Islam is in danger since it is being hijacked by those ulama and their Islamist supporters. Secularists argue that ulama and Islamists claim for themselves the true knowledge and monopolize speaking in the name of Allah (Surush et al. 2000). Additionally, most contemporary ulama/scholars, secularists argue, show very weak understanding of the history of the world and sometimes even with the history of Islam itself which makes them incapable of rising up to the intellectual debates and complications of the modern world (Arkoun and Maïla 2003).

Traditionalists perceive themselves as having a moral commitment to keep the Islamic identity of Muslims through reducing or even eliminating *ikhtlaf*/differences and divisions (al-'Ali 2000). Some traditionalists reckon that their opponents deliberately seek the differences among ulama to show how relativistic and unauthentic the teachings of Islam are (al-'Alwan 2003; Gabreen 2003).

Very close to the previous position, modernists are concerned with making Islam a matter of opinion. That is why they firmly stand against non-ulama who introduce themselves as thinkers or intellectuals and come up with ungrounded opinions that create confusion and eliminate the common ground among Muslims (Abo al-Magd 1988; al-'Aawa 2001). Additionally, modernists reject the tendency among traditionalists to eliminate pluralism by emphasizing an ahistorical reading of Islam that makes one opinion the right one. This attitude on the part of traditionalists renders any modern type of ijtihad/independent reasoning bed'a/man-made innovation (al-Bouti 1990; al-Ghannouchi 1993; Omara 1989).

According to secularists, since the consensus on the wrong reading of Islam is an obstacle toward modernization and democratization, violating the so-called consensus among ulama is a necessary step toward a better future (interview with al-'Ashmawi). According to secularists, Muslims are in backwardness because of these ulamas' control over Muslims' minds. Secularists think that they have a moral commitment toward their Muslim societies to break up the vicious control of the retarded understanding of Islam by Islamists. Farag Fouda, in a daring call to the grand Imam of al-Azhar, the most notable sunni Islamic school in Cairo once wrote:

Oh Shaikh al-Azhar, thank God profusely for the backward of Muslims, for it

alone preserves your job for you! But don't imagine for a moment that anybody will allow you to preside over inquisition courts, to accuse and to oppress, to threaten and to forbid (Quoted in Flores 1993:32)

Actually no progress or modernization is possible without giving the Muslim human mind its capacity to disagree with the established Islamic clergy that claims representation of Allah and His teachings, secularists argue (an-Naim 1990). In other words, Muslim secularists echo Lewis's argument that Muslims have contracted a Christian illness and now they should consider the Christian remedy of separation of religion and state (Lewis 1997).

The traditionalists' respect for ancient ulama/scholars is part of their respect for the past in general. Traditionalist Islamists think that the early years of Islam are perfect and the more we move from the early seventh century Islam, the less perfect the world becomes and less pious Muslim are (Othaimeen 2001). They usually quote a saying by prophet Mohamed that:

The best among you (are) the people (who belong to) my century (or generation). Then those next to them, then those next to them, then those next to them….Then after them would come a people who would give evidence before they are asked for it, and would be dishonest and not trustworthy and who would make vows but would not fulfill them."(Hadith number in Sahih Muslim 4599).

Inspired by this hadith among others and literalist interpretations, traditionalist Islamists have a tendency to see "classical authors in rather romantic terms: as perfect individuals, incapable of making a wrong judgment. Classical scholars themselves are also guilty of perpetuating this. They have venerated taqlid/the following of predecessors to such an extent that it has now become a sacred principle" (Sardar 2002). Some traditionalists make prayer to Allah to remain followers and imitators to the early companions of the prophet (Muqaleddeen) and not innovators/Mubtade'een in both worldly affairs and religious beliefs (al-'Ali 2002; al-'Amro 2002).

Modernists note the dangerous aspect of glorifying the past and equating it with rightly glorified original teachings of Islam (Shariati and Rajaee 1986). A typical modernist would warn against this tendency: "Because of the sanctity of the Islamic texts (Qur'an and Sunna), salafis (traditionalists by my terms) sanctified the era during which the texts had been revealed" (Omara 1980: 213). This sanctity of the era increases the closer we get to the age of the prophet.

Secularists tend to attribute the problems of today to the praxis of the past. The three main causes that led to the current crisis in almost all aspects of the Islamic world are: the ulama's monopoly of education and knowledge, males' monopoly of the public sphere, and the caliphs' monopoly of public interest (Manna 2001). A famous argument made by almost all secularists is that the Muslim application of Islamic sharia/Islamic legislation failed except for around some thirty years during the first century of Islam. Yet after that Islamic history is a "long series of failures" (Zakaria 1986:174). That is why it is a completely false analogy to promise Muslims the exceptional ideal thirty years of their history and to completely ignore the lessons of the other thirteen centuries of dictatorship and corruption in the name of religion (al-Sa'eed 2001; Engineer 1985). Turk al-Hamad, a Saudi political researcher, is critical of the traditionalist reading that takes the following saying of Imam Malek for granted: "The affairs of

this umma will not be better without following what its predecessors did." Al-Hamd deems this attitude to be wrong because it romanticizes an old golden age. Besides it creates in the Muslim non-consciousness a myth of the possibility of replicating the past in the future with paying no attention to the historical differences (Al-Hamad 1993).

Modernists would not confuse Islamic sharia/Islamic legislation (mainly Qur'an and Sunna) with Islamic fiqh/jurisprudence or fatwas/religious verdicts that were issued in a given point of time in the past. They would even be more aggressive in their refusal of confusing any of the previous two with Muslims' history and literature (such as the behavior or sayings of certain rulers, poets or others) (Iqbal 1930). Modernists argue that the Islamic sharia/Islamic legislation has provided Muslims the "noblest principles that any nation may aspire for" yet Muslims may or may not live up to these principles. Muslims achieved excellent scores ethically and politically during the first thirty years and relatively lower scores later on but they never were in the complete failure that they currently face under contemporary secular regimes (al-Rayess 1998; Howaidi 1999a; Sayyid 1986).

In conclusion, for traditionalists the past is the golden era that Muslims need to replicate; for secularists it is the past that Muslims need to recover from. For modernists, the past is a combination of what needs to be learned and should be avoided.

E. Cultural exchange with non-Muslims

Since democratic processes and institutions did not emerge in the Muslim world per se, this last dimension about cultural exchange can summarize for us from one perspective all previous points and introduce us to the next section on the attitudes of Muslim intellectuals and ulama/scholars toward democracy. Cultural exchange and the possibility of civilizational cross-fertilization with non-Muslims is an issue that widens the gap between the three schools.

As stated earlier, typical traditionalists gain their credibility in the Muslim mind through strict deduction from holy texts and their ancient interpretations:

> [A]nything not established in Islam should not be followed, as this will lead to castigation… Islam is complete and perfect, and we derive our total lifestyle from Islam that Allah has completed for us, we cannot add nor eliminate any teachings from this completed religion as the Prophet said: 'nothing of what would bring you closer to *jannah* (paradise) and further away from hellfire but I have clarified for you (Jibril 2003).

This quote recapitulates some of the epistemological underpinnings of the typical traditionalist attitude that were discussed earlier. To traditionalists, Islam is complete regarding the issues of religion, spirituality and world affairs. Moreover the more Muslims accurately deduce from the holy texts, the closer they are to the right path of Islam. Besides, the fear of innovation is clear. If something is not clearly stated in the Qur'an, sunna and ijma'/consensus of the early companions and ulama, contemporary ulama alone can deduce its verdict through qiyas/analogical reasoning.

To traditionalists, there is no need for cultural exchange or cross-civilizational discourses, given their gloomy view of un-Islamic civilizations. Consequently, traditionalists are inherently anti-modern in many aspects. Importing solutions from non-Muslims defies Allah's assertion in the Qur'an that He has perfected Muslims' religion (Chapter 5, verse 3). However,

this verse in itself has been interpreted by traditionalists and modernists differently. Typical traditionalists believe that Allah through the text of the Qur'an and the life of prophet Mohamed left Muslims with no need for further investigation regarding the most important issues including governance which is by itself part of 'aqeeda/creed. When Muslims diverge from their 'aqeeda/creed and follow the paths of wrongdoers, they move into a state of jahilliyya/the state of ignorance before Islam (Qutb 1989). Thus, according to Enaya (1999), when one says "Islamic democracy," one belittles Islam by making it in need of corrections and modifications from others. This attempt in itself goes against the teachings of Islam. According to a traditionalist Sudanese imam, "Islam has no prefixes or suffixes. Islam is beautiful and complete. Attaching words such as democracy, socialism or the like to it, takes away from its beauty and makes it in need of human beings to beatify it. There is not such a thing in Islam."

Thus, democracy, liberalism, capitalism, socialism, communism, fascism, nationalism and so forth cannot be justified in Islam either as a means or as a system of values since it is forbidden for Muslims to imitate the disbelievers (al-Gazza'eri 1984).
Traditionalists often quote two hadiths/sayings of prophet Mohamed in which he clearly warns Muslims against imitating the non-believers.

In the first one the prophet said:

> You will surely follow the ways, steps, or traditions of those who came before
> you, span by span and yard by yard (very closely) even if they entered a lizard's
> hole you will enter it." The companions asked, "Oh prophet, you mean the Jews
> and Christians? So he answered, who else! [Reported by Imam Bukhari]

Another hadith reads "He is not one of us, he who imitates others. Do not imitate either the Jews or the Christians." [Reported by Imams Termithy & Abu-Dawd]
These two hadiths/sayings among others have been taken by traditionalists to be part of al-wala' wa al-bara'a creed / alliance to Muslims and disloyalty to non-Muslims meaning Muslims should be allies of Muslims and vindicate themselves of non-Muslims' wrongdoings (Al-Howaini; al-Zawahri 2002).

According to typical traditionalists, imitating non-Muslims (and adopting democracy is one way of doing that) has been always part of a conspiracy to "destroy Islam and annihilate its people," through making Muslims "roll in Western civilization away from Mohamed and his book," following the path of Turkey that adopted a "civil constitution instead of its sharia-based system of government" (al-'Alem 1975:48-49). By enticing ordinary Muslims to legislate for themselves they challenge Islam's essence: "No God but Allah" that means no legislator but Allah (al-Badry 1983: 150; Qutb 1989). As Allah said to his prophet:

> judge thou between them by what Allah hath revealed, and follow not their vain
> desires, but beware of them lest they beguile thee from any of that (teaching)
> which Allah hath sent down to thee. (Chapter 4, verse 49)

That is why "it is not appropriate to use the term 'democratic Islam' or 'democracy in Islam'; Islam is self-sufficient and does not need the masks of others… No democracy, communism, socialism or nationalism in Islam. If there is something good in any of these principles, Islam preceded them and does not have the distortions that they have" (al-Sawaf 1979:38).

Thus adopting un-Islamic political or socio-economic systems is not good or right since it makes individuals compete for worldly benefits; yet Islamic bai'a (allegiance) is based on belief for the sake of piety. As a result, "Islam ordains upon the al-ra'eeya/subjects not to give the oath of allegiance except for a pious man" (al-Sharawi 1980:18).

To traditionalists, democracy is un-Islamic by association as well. It comes from the Judeo-Christian west with all its covetousness, lack of respect for religion and affection for personal liberties. Muslims are highly encouraged not even to visit the West, let alone import its systems and values (al-Nadwi 1985). Al-Zawahri perceives a label such as a "Muslim democrat" to be self-contradictory. "Whoever labels himself as a Muslim democrat or a Muslim who calls for democracy is like saying he is a Jewish Muslim or a Christian Muslim" (al-Zawahri NA:22). Al-Zawahri's position is not limited to the label-democracy but to the thing-democracy as well. He wrote a piece of advice in response to a fatwa that would allow Muslims to join parliaments. The title of Al-Zawhari's piece is very telling: "Advice to the Umma to avoid Ibn Baaz's Fatwa of Permissibility to Join Majlis al-Umma/Parliament."

Modernists and secularists are very critical of traditionalists mainly because they exhibit noticeable hostility to intellectualism, pluralism and any sectarian divisions within Islam. Indeterminacy of rational thinking and ijtihad/independent reasoning is not tolerated by traditionalists ('Arabeyat 1998). Wahabism is considered, from the perspective of their critics, as the worst example of traditionalism. Whabists refuse to "interpret the divine law from a historical, contextual perspective and treat the vast majority of Islamic history as a corruption of the true and authentic Islam" (Abou El Fadl 2001). Rather, typical Wahabists do not consider themselves as one "school of thought within Islam, but [as] Islam." (Abou El Fadl 2001)

Typical modernist Islamists, by definition, do not *a priori* extend their definition of the "un-Islamic" to non-Islamic sources and civilizations. Rather, a Muslim can learn whatever is good for him/herself and society regardless of its origins (Fasi 1972). Typical modernists do not perceive al-wala" wa al-bara'a creed/alliance to Muslims and disloyalty to non-Muslims as part of sharia/Islamic legislation; rather it is part of fiqh/jurisprudence that may not be valid for Muslims right now. Even if Muslims abide by this creed, it should not be an obstacle toward learning from other civilizations (al-Qaradawi 2003). Modernists believe that whatever achieves justice and fairness among humans, even if it is not explicitly mentioned in sharia, is part of it and vice versa. That is because sharia/Islamic legislation in its origin and purpose is based upon the interest of people in this life and hereafter. Modernists usually quote a famous saying by a medieval scholar that goes as follows:

> Everything that may divert people from justice to injustice, from mercy to its
> opposite, from what is good to what is evil, from wisdom to foolishness is not
> part of sharia even if [somebody has] associated it with sharia through [false]
> interpretation (al-Jawziyah 1969: part 3, page 1).

Following the same logic, modernists often quote the early praxis of the prophet and his companions who learned a lot of worldly inventions from the Persians, Romans and Egyptians as far as they do not contradict clear-cut "do" and "do not do" of the holy texts. This group of Islamist scholars, intellectuals and activists usually quotes an unauthentic hadith that reads: "Wisdom is the wandering goal of the believer. Wherever he finds it, he will be the first to follow

it." Thus, if Muslims refute Darwinism, Marxism or the contributions of Freud and Kant, this is not because everything they said was wrong. Some of what they said may be useful and thus deserves to be studied al-Qaradawi 2000). The following quote best reflects modernists' position on cultural exchange. "I am Muslim. I may like to eat an Arab grilled fat sheep or a European simple boiled dish. No problem as far as I mention the name of Allah and eat from what is in front of me according to Islamic teachings" (al-Ghazali 1985). Mohamed Al-Ghazali best exemplified the modernist thinking in his refusal of a nominal Islamic constitution prepared by al-Nabhani since it does not have enough legal guarantees to ensure shura/mutual consultation, political freedoms and public interests. Al-Ghazali praised the 1923 Egyptian constitution that was mainly imported from the West as practically more Islamic than most of the so-called Islamic constitutions (al-Ghazali 1997:156).

Thus a mature Muslim can read un- and non-Islamic philosophies, and pick and choose what is compatible with his/her ethics and creed (Shariati and Rajaee 1986). Muslims cannot refute the wisdom that may exist in the books of the "people of falsehood" (al-Qaradawi 2000a:45). Most of what Muslims learn from others was mainly what others previously had learned from Muslims (al-Ghazali 1997; Rahman 1982). However, this learning cannot violate or contradict what they perceive to be the fundamentals of Islam. That is why they may accept Western technologies and institutions but not some creeds such as separation of mosque and state ('Arabeyat 1998). This creed contradicts oneness of religion and state in Islam and assumes conflict between them. A conflict can be between two separate parties but cannot be between the one (al-Ghannouchi 2003). Some modernists even give the right of ijtihad/independent reasoning to all Muslims who have the right to choose among the ijtihad/independent reasoning of ulama (al-Turabi 2003; 'Arabeyat 1998). Unlike secularists, modernists aim at advocating "modernization without encouraging servility to the West and discouraging confidence in one's own cultural resources" (Keddie 1972).

Secularists, unlike both traditionalists and modernists, start from the assumption of Muslims' need to follow the paths of the most successful to outdo them. This is exactly what the West did by learning from ancient Muslims and others. The Islamists' slogans about the peculiar and idiosyncratic nature of Muslims are obstacles to rather than catalysts for development and modernization. The defeat of the Ottoman Empire and the fall of almost all Muslim territories under the European colonial powers were not a coincidence or isolated events. Rather, Muslims stopped developing new ideas in response to new challenges. They clung to the old answers in face of new questions until they found Napoleon occupying Egypt in 1798. Since then it has been clear that the gap is getting larger and larger between downward sloping curve of Muslims' power and flourishing Western democracies (al-'Azm 1969; Fouda 1993). Several attempts were made to catch up with the Western models but they remained scattered and superficial mainly because of the supremacy of the theological mentality in the Muslim land and lack of a worldview that would respect other civilizations and learn from them (Wahba 1998)

Secularists believe that it is very difficult to import Western materialist products and outcomes without understanding and later adopting the system of beliefs and ideologies behind them. In a clear criticism of modernists, secularists do not see how possible to "import from the west what is compatible with our values and leave the rest" (Al-Hamad 1993).

Interaction and learning from other civilizations is a human necessity yet will never succeed without emancipation from the power of the "holy" interpretations and traditions that

come as a package with the holy texts (Arkoun 1994). Actually, Muslims imprison themselves in the old books of the past / turath whether useful or unusual while the world around them advances in all fields. If learning other languages was discouraged by traditionalists, secularists deem translating from other civilizations a very important sign of the perseverance of Muslims and their capacity to make up what they missed. Yet, a secularist argues, all the books that Arabs translated into Arabic since caliph al-Ma'moun (1000 years ago) is around 10,000 books while Spain translated into Spanish the same number in one year (Bagabeer 2003).

To secularists, Marx, Kant, Locke, Machiavelli, Voltaire, Madison and Rousseau are more acceptable sources of knowledge and virtue than most of the ancient scholars of Islam because of the capacity of Western thinkers to set free the human mind from the chains of the church. They think that a similar reform is needed in the Muslim mind too (Barakah 2002). Arkoun's intellectual project collapses the artificial gaps that both Islamists and orientalists create between Islamic and western civilizations and intellectual heritages. Both civilizations are built upon religious beliefs and commitments. There will be no salvation for Muslims without acknowledging their influence on the West and internalizing the influence of the west on them (Arkoun 1994).

Modernists and traditionalists perceive secularism as an alien solution to a problem that never existed in the history of Islam since Islam never had a clergy similar to the Catholic Church. Secularism, modernists argue, is compatible with the Christian creed, yet it is at odds with Islam (al-Amiri 1983; al-Qaradawi 1980). Mohamed was both a prophet and a politician. He led the prayer and signed political treaties; conveyed the message of Islam and led armies; gave sermons and sent ambassadors. Neither Jesus nor Moses had clear political roles to play. Actually both of them left earth before establishing a coherent society. Mohamed, conversely, left the responsibility of defending Islam in the hands of the faithful who later on established the Islamic caliphate. However, when despotic rulers took over power in this Islamic caliphate, this did not happen because of Islam but despite Islam's teachings. Besides, the ulama/scholars were the main source of opposition in the Islamic society which is contrary to the situation in ancient Catholic Europe.

Secularists disagree with the above characterization. They reckon that Muslims' contemporary intellectual and political dilemma is similar to the Western Middle Ages with all its implications. There is no much difference between the pope and his priests trying to defend their status and Islamists' attempts to jump to power. That is why they attack any attempt to liberate women, build modern education systems, or to create modern civil society. Furthermore, they refuse to lift their custody over the public mind and call any criticism to their authority some type of "intellectual invasion" coming from the West (al-'Eraqi 2002). Islamists leave the Muslim mind with a golden past and refuse to accept the modern inventions and innovations that left Muslims the least developed among all the civilizations of the world ('Asfoor 2003).

F. Sub-sects:

It is important to note that traditionalists differ regarding the issue of violence. Some of them infer from the holy texts and their interpretations good reasons to wage violence against their fellow Muslims; others refrain from pursuing this path. Secularists as well are not identical when it comes to the issue of pluralism. Some are autocrats; others are liberals.

1. Traditionalists: Violent and Pacifists

All violent Islamists are traditionalists but not all traditionalists are violent. Some of them are pacifists. Thus, all modernist Islamists are not violent. However, it is crucial in this study to limit the definition of violence toward the governments and societies of the Muslim world. That is to say that Muslims in general regardless of their ideological preferences may support violent resistance against Israel's occupation of Arab/Muslim lands (al-'Abeykan 2003).

The difference between violent and pacifist traditionalist is lies on which verses they choose to articulate the concept of jihad. Violent traditionalists disagree with pacifist traditionalists (e.g. Sufis) and modernists on the applicability of the so-called the verse of the sword.

To understand the textual logic behind the use of violence on the parts of violent traditionalists such as those found in al-Jama'a al-Islameya, al-Jihad, al-Qae'da, al-Salfeya al-Jihadeya in Pakistan, Egypt, Algeria, Malaysia, Morocco, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and the U.S. among others, we need to refer to the fact that there are three types of verses in the holy Qur'an and hadiths/sayings of prophet Mohamed that pertain to the issue of violence: First there are verses that ask Muslims to treat non-Muslims justly and kindly, such as:

> Allah forbids you not, with regard to those who fight you not for (your) Faith nor drive you out of your homes, from dealing kindly and justly with them: for Allah loveth those who are just. (Chapter 60, verse 8).

Second, there are verses that ask Muslims to lean toward peace if others do the same such as: "But if the enemy inclines towards peace, do thou (also) incline towards peace" (Chapter 6, verse 61).

A third type of verses demands Muslims fight the infidels such as the verse that is labeled the 'verse of the sword.' The verse reads[11]:

> But when the forbidden months are past, then fight and slay the Pagans wherever ye find them, and seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war); but if they repent, and establish regular prayers and practice regular charity, then open the way for them: for Allah is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful. (Chapter 9, verse 5).

Violent traditionalists believe that this verse among others propels sincere believers to wage violent jihad against all infidels, by virtue of them being infidels, including their rulers who replaced the sharia of Allah with Western laws and falsify *Hakemeyat* Allah/ the sovereignty of Allah (Mawdudi *Concepts of Islam Regarding Religion and State* 1977; Qutb 1989). Pacifist traditionalists along with modernist Islamists think of this verse as an exception to general principles mentioned elsewhere in the Qur'an that equate jihad with defense and require justice and kindness as a path for co-existence (Chapter 49/13) (Ibn Baaz 1992). Besides,

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[11] There is disagreement about which verse is actually the verse of the sword. Yet most likely it is the quoted verse or the following one that is usually quoted with it from the same chapter of Surat al-Tawba: "Fight those who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, nor hold that forbidden which hath been forbidden by Allah and His Messenger, nor acknowledge the Religion of Truth, from among the People of the Book, until they pay the Jizya with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued." (Chapter 9, verse 29)

pacifist traditionalists use very tough criteria to permit the use of violence against their rulers such as prohibition of prayers, denying the authenticity of a verse or hadith and/or publicly renouncing Allah's verdicts and replacing them with others, believing that the latter are better or more just than the former (Othaimeen 1998).

Modernists in particular refuse the radical concept of jihad adopted by violent traditionalists. If this conceptualization of jihad advanced by violent traditionalists is true and authentic, then the Islamic state is a colonial state that aims at khiraj/properties of the nations Muslims occupy (al-Ghazali 1985). A modernist describes the violent traditionalist argument as "ignorance, stupidity, even madness" (al-Rikabi 2003). Another eminent Pakistani modernist referred to the success of Islamists in general in guiding a considerable percentage of new generations of young men and women into love and respect for their origins but this success was coupled with a magnificent failure in creating civilizational and intellectual depth and modern understanding of Islam's peaceful and tolerant message (Rahman 1982).

Violent traditionalists consider the verse(s) of the sword, that were revealed to be chronologically last, and therefore abrogating and amending former verses (al-Zawahri 2002; Azzam 1984; Qutb 1989). They make the analogy between two verses: "O ye who believe! Fasting is prescribed to you as it was prescribed to those before you" (Chapter 2, verse 183) that assigns fasting on each capable Muslim with another verse in the same chapter that reads "Fighting is prescribed upon you, and ye dislike it." (Chapter 2, verse 216). How come that Muslims comply with the prescription of fasting unquestionably yet question and philosophize the prescription of fighting?, a violent traditionalist argues (Halima 2001).

Non-violent traditionalists would be reluctant to accept the idea of abrogation without another clear text that says so (al-Buraiq 1993). Thus, they prioritize the verses that ask Muslims to seek peace at the expense of the verses that solicit Muslims to wage wars. Modernist Islamists, in contrast, would go into a complex process of deduction and induction that would take into consideration three aspects: 1- the linguistic meaning of the texts; 2- the historical setting (reasons for revealing these verses); 3- the consequences of taking one verse (and not the other) as the principal rule; while the other is a mere exception or boundary. By following this way of thinking, modernist Islamists end up rejecting the idea of abrogation and instead think of the verses as different directions that were given on different occasions (al-Ghazali 1985). Thus in this particular case of using violence, modernist Islamists would not think that the mentioned verses of chapter nine (sura al-Tawba) have actually abrogated 120 other verses that were revealed earlier to emphasize, peaceful co-existence of Muslims with non-Muslims let alone many verses and hadiths that prohibit Muslims from killing each others (Abo al-Magd 1988; al-Ghannouchi 1993; al-Qaradawi 2001a; Anwar 1995; Howaidi 1999b). According to modernists, the rules of jihad are not applicable to the governments that do not apply Islamic Sharia since "the rulers are not infidels even if they did not apply Sharia." (al-Din 2001: 85; al-Qaradawi 2001a)

Pacifist traditionalists' main field of jihad is in da'wa/inviting Muslims and non-Muslims to a better understanding of Islam; thus they devote themselves to respond to questions, teach the Qur'an, explain its verses, issue fatwas and revive dd ijtihad/independent reasoning to remind Muslims of the basics of their religion (Ma'moon 2003). They are the least politicized compared to all other Islamists and can be considered the religious "preservers" or "caretakers" of status quo (Lipset and Basu 1976). Violent traditionalists think of the pacifists in the same

way Marx thought of religion in bourgeois society (al-Zawahri NA; Qutb 1978). Modernists think of pacifist traditionalists in general as incompetent lawyers who claim to defend the just cause of Islam (al-Ghazali 1981). Secularists believe that this type of non-violent traditionalists represents the moderate and technical Islam and leave the affairs of politics, economics, engineering and so forth to the best who can handle them (al-Ashmawi 1987).

2. Secularist: Liberals and Autocrats

Some secularists are more pluralistic than others. Autocratic secularists may be benevolent or malevolent. In the history of Muslim world, almost all the rulers were autocrats (who possess personal political domination) but not necessarily unjust dictators. This distinction should be understood within Roy's notice that in the Muslim world the opposite of tyranny is not liberty but justice (Roy 1994). A just benevolent autocrat was the catchword of an ideal system of governance. Thus, judged by the history of the Muslim world, autocratic governance should not be necessarily equated with malicious dictatorship. Liberal secularists are the closest to the Western concept of liberal democracy. They think that all citizens, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, should enjoy all basic human and political rights including Islamists as far as they abide by the democratic principles (Abul Khair 2003).

Autocratic secularists in return oppose and fear Islamists (traditionalists and modernists) more than they respect democratic principles and procedures. Put differently, they know that if they allow real democracy in Muslim countries, the public will get mobilized by the other two groups which means the end of their reign and probably the end of democracy once allowed. Their best bet then is to make sure that guided risk-free liberalization, if any, is at its minimalist level. To justify their autocratic tendencies autocratic secularists poison the well of Islamists by equating all Islamists to one version of long-bearded fascist fanatics who want to establish totalitarian theocracies once in power. If there are differences among Islamists, secular autocrats would argue, then it is a difference in degree rather than in kind. This was the argument made by the Tunisian president Zein Abdin Ben Ali to decapitate the Islamic opposition (Renaissance or Nahda party) after winning the elections of 1993 with 99.91 percent of the vote (King 2003). "If you open the door for genuine democracy, you have the chance that fundamentalists sill come to power. What will the Americans do with them?" the head of the Foreign Relations Committee in Egypt's parliament contended (Faki 2003). The result is a patriarchal system (Abu Odeh 2003; Sharabi 1988).

Secular autocratic discourse is associated with most intellectuals who earn their living through glorifying and defending the rulers in most Muslim countries. Most of these regimes have learned how to play the game of autocratic tactical liberalization through the measures of "state-monitored political openness to promote reforms that appear pluralistic but function to preserve autocracy" (Ottaway et al. 2002). These regimes are highly skillful at controlling "elections, manipulating divide-and-rule tactics, state interference in civil society organizations, and the obstruction of meaningful political party systems, these regimes have created deeply entrenched systems that are surprisingly effective at resisting democratic change" (Ottaway et al. 2002).

Most autocrats face a dilemma of credibility as they use democratic rhetoric yet systematically exclude or marginalize their most important rivals, the Islamists whose discourse resonates with an important segment of the public. Autocratic activists argue that if free and fair elections are held, they will bring to power political parties and movements that will abrogate

democracy itself and rather create a more despotic theocracy. Thus the status quo, though not fully democratic, is better than theological dictatorship that would come hand in hand with the naïve trust in Islamists' respect for democracy (Fouda 1993). To skirt this dilemma many governments, such as those in Algeria, Kuwait, Indonesia, Niger, Pakistan, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Yemen, Malaysia, and Morocco allow Islamists to sneak into politics but not to the extent to pose a viable alternative source of legitimacy (Esposito 1996; Etienne 1987). An immediate democratization process may make democracy a more remote likelihood because it would "too quickly tip the balance in favor of the groups that are best organized and enjoy grassroots support, Islamist organizations in most cases" (Ottaway et al. 2002). Democracy requires time and it is not necessarily the most immediate task of the moment. A Jordanian former prime minister argues:

> Democracy is an evolving being, gets born and grows up. It is never created all at once. Whoever asks for something pre-maturely, one will be punished by not getting it. The baby that is born bigger than its natural size either will die; the mother will die or both will die (al-Rawabda 2001).

According to autocratic secularists, Muslims are not ready for democracy: illiteracy, tribalism, apathy, emotionalism, and nostalgia are not conducive to democracy. It is argued that most of these problems are not necessarily the outcomes of wrong policies adopted by the autocratic rulers themselves (Mahathir and Hashim 2000). They were inherited from the distorting experience of colonialism that led to (1) urbanization without industrialization, (2) verbal education without productive training, (3) secularization without scientification (decline of religion without the rise of science), and (4) capitalist greed without capitalist discipline (Mazrui 1990:35).

Unlike others, the autocratic discourse is unique in its defense of the status quo. To the question, "is the ruler autocratic because of the people or the people not democratic because of the ruler?," autocratic discourse would definitely refer to the masses who are not ready for liberty (Zartman 1982) as the cause of leisurely democratization. Some examples may support the autocratic argument: the Lebanese democratic experience ended up with a severe civil war (Fisk 2002). The democratic political opening in Egypt in the eighties opened up the can of massive violent fundamentalism (Mubarak 1992). The rebellion against Siyad Berri in Somalia ended up with chaotic state breakdown (Schofield 1996). Free elections in Algeria led the country into civil war with tens of thousands of deaths and casualities (Martnez 2000). Hafez al-Assad's autocratic policies managed to break the vicious cycle of coups d'etat by systematic removal of his opponents for "the interest of Syrians and all the Arab umma" (Assad and Talas 1990). Each democratic experience in Nigeria, Pakistan, Algeria, Cote d'Ivoire and the Sudan among others failed to be sustained and was shattered due to military intervention. Interestingly enough, autocratic discourses are similar and propagate the argument that each autocrat maintains the highest possible levels of freedoms given the potentials of instability (Berberoglu 1999; Musharraf 1999; Soekarno 1959). Autocratic discourse is clear as well in the importance of other tasks such as defending national integrity and security (Hussein 1988).

In democratic countries, the majority or at least the plurality forms the government; in Muslim countries the schism is severe and the majority is apathetic and irrational; that is why the

autocrat has to create and shape the majority around his persona. Muslim autocratic rulers attempt to accomplish this task of holding their countries together through mobilizing symbols, pictures, slogans and the annihilation of possible opponents (Diamond et al. 2003).

Liberal secularists disagree. Liberal secularists argue that no limits on anybody's right to be part of the political competition should be allowed. That is why their main target of criticism is not Islamists in opposition; rather their main battle is with autocratic rulers; Islamists or secularists.

> For decades after independence, most populist autocrats had suspended democracy until national liberation; until Palestine had been liberated; until we have economic development; until we have true social justice, and so on. As it turns out now, after fifty years of depriving ourselves of democracy, we find ourselves with none of these things! And we are no closer to democracy… We must not continue to allow ourselves to be manipulated by these false messiahs… Now we know better than to fall for the despots' delaying tactics (Ibrahim 2003).

Liberal secularists perceive the ruling non-democratic regimes as more dangerous and immediate challenge than Islamists (Abdelrazeq 2001). From their perspective, the appeal to Islamists comes from the fact that they do not have current failures in most societies (Hariq 2001). The more they reach power and fail to convert their demagogic slogans into practical solutions, the more Muslims will refrain from electing them.
Liberal secularists argue that failures of Islamists in the Sudan, Iran, and Indonesia among other places will prove that politics is not about slogans and symbols but about running trains, building bridges, delivering public services, fighting diseases and eliminating illiteracy (Ibrahim 1984). With those kinds of problems, how many times Islamists pray a day will not be the main factor in determining their re-election.   Liberals do not buy the autocrats' argument that fundamentalists would annihilate the available, though limited, freedoms once in power.

Autocrats do not show enough tolerance toward opposition parties even if they are secularist or Islamic with a genuine democratic and liberal agenda such as al-Wasat party (the middle way) in Egypt. This party "advocates political pluralism and human rights…has a woman and a Christian on its central committee, setting it apart from other Islamic groups" (Rouleau 2001). Yet the Egyptian government does not (or does not want to) see the difference between al-Wasat party and other Islamists. Whether out of conviction or opportunism, Islamists learned how to shape their political discourse and propaganda to reveal the autocratic tendencies of the rulers by repudiating "all forms of violence, whatever their sources" (al-Nahda 2001) asking for a real opportunity for them to prove their adherence to democratic principles. Autocrats know that this is a risky and irreversible path (Ibrahim 2002).

Liberal secularists have the weakest voice in the Muslim world and they seem to be the least in number too (Salamah 1994). They do not have the baksheesh (tips and free services) that autocratic rulers have (Korany 1994). They do not have the legacy of the past and claims of Islamic *assala*/authenticity that Islamists have. No wonder that their program of democratization failed so far. "How can you have democratic institutions if you have few democrats?" (Gerges 2001)

To sum up the discussion of the typology of the intellectual map, Table 2.1 has been developed. As the table shows, the three schools face common challenges and concerns. They respond to them differently, including the challenge of democracy itself that has not been addressed fully yet and will be discussed in the pages to come. The table as well shows that there are five major types of intellectuals and scholars: Islamist violent traditionalists, Islamist pacifist traditionalists, Modernist Islamist, liberal secularist and autocratic secularists. These schools of intellectuals and ulama/scholars contest scarce resources. Each school presents itself as the genuine representative of Islam and speaker of its name.

Table 2.1
Three Main Schools of Intellectuals and Scholars

	Traditionalist Islamists		Modernist Islamists	Secularist Muslims	
1) For something to be Islamic, it should	Be consensually accepted by sharia and ulama.		Not contradict the sharia	in the interest of society regardless of holy texts	
2) Silence of Sharia is	Impossible		opportunity for Ijtihad	a sign of the indeterminacy of sharia.	
3) Zones immune to skepticism are	sharia and fiqh		Sharia	No immune zones	
4) Violation of consensus among ulama is	destroying the unity and uniqueness of the umma		dangerous but possible.	Necessary to eliminate traditional consensus	
5) Cultural exchange with non-Muslims is	imitation and innovation		a search for wisdom	better than blind imitation of ancestors	
6) Sects:	Violent	Pacifist	Islamist Democrats	Liberals	Autocrats
7) Democracy is	Anti/un-Islamic		Islamic/Islamizable	Necessary	Impractical

Traditionalist Islamists limit what is acceptable by Islam to what has been anciently accepted by sharia/Islamic legislation and consensually condoned by al-salaf al-saleh/the pious predecessors. To them sharia/Islamic legislation can never be silent even if they need to resort to qiyas/analogical reasoning. Preserving the identity of this umma/nation requires traditionalists to keep both sharia/Islamic legislation and traditional fiqh/jurisprudence immune to skeptical minds who want to corrupt the ideal legacy of the past. That is why they would argue against any bed'a/man-made innovation or violation of the consensus among ulama/scholars. The greatest threat to this pure Islamic tradition of respecting the legacy of al-salaf al-saleh/the pious predecessors is coming from the external sources of values, norms and ideas most notably the West. However, traditionalists differ in their strategies to bring their ideals into power. Some are violent; others are pacifists. Whether violent or pacifist, they think ill of democracy as an alien un/anti-Islamic system of government that replaces the will of Allah with the will of the masses.

Modernists on the other hand respond to the previous questions differently. They accept new ideas, mechanisms and values as far as they do not contradict authentic and well-established sharia/Islamic legislation.   They would accept that Allah left Muslims deliberately with some legislative vacuum that should be filled by the human mind performing ijtihad/independent reasoning within the boundaries of Islamic sharia/Islamic legislation.

Well-established and clear-cut verses of the Qur'an and hadiths/sayings of the prophet are the only zones that are immune to skeptical scrutiny. Yet the interpretations of these verses and hadiths are subject to ijtihad/independent reasoning. The scholars of the past and al-salaf al-saleh/the pious predecessors performed ijtihad/independent reasoning to respond the new challenges that they faced. Now it is time for modern and contemporary Muslims to have their share in this ijtihad/independent reasoning. Modernists think that most of their modern ijtihad/independent reasoning rarely violates consensually agreed upon fatwas/religious verdicts of the past. Even if this violation happens, there should be a direct and clear reference to authentic sources of Islam to justify the violation of the previous ijma'/consensus. Modernists find nothing in the Islamic authentic sources that hinders them from communicating and learning from non-Muslims as far as they do not infringe upon authentic Islamic principles. To modernists, most aspects of democracy are compatible with Islam.

Secularists do not think that holy texts tell Muslims much about how to run their societies. Holy texts are excellent sources of aqeeda/creed and ethics but not politics and economics. Numerous and sometimes contradictory interpretations and inferences made based upon the very same verses or sayings of the prophet indicate that most of these texts have no one meaning until the human mind imposes its understanding on them. The silence of sharia/Islamic legislation regarding many issues is another sign that Allah wants the human intellect to function and flourish.

To them all texts and issues are subject to human scrutiny with no immune zones. By doing so, Muslims will replace their obsolete impractical perception of the world with more contemporary science-based ideologies. Cultural exchange with other civilizations is a must in this regard. Some secularists are liberals; others are autocrats. Liberals tend to think of democracy as good and possible. Autocrats think that democracy is not possible in their respective countries without giving Islamists their golden opportunity to establish theological states.

3. Four Readings of Democracy

No one single group can claim absolute triumph in this intellectual contest in the Muslim world since it is still escalating on different fronts and over different issues. The attitudes of the previous schools regarding democracy and its Islamic alternatives will follow. Yet it should be noted that violent Islamists do not differ from the rest of traditionalists except regarding the issue of the use of violence against rulers and their supporters. That is why in tables 2 and 3 all traditionalists will be treated as one group.

a. Shura and/versus Democracy

The most famous concept that comes to the Muslim mind when asked about Islamic governance is shura/mutual consultation or governance based upon decision by consultation and

deliberation. When traditionalists are asked if not the un-Islamic democracy, then what? The traditionalists' answer is *shura*. Shura/mutual consultation is an Islamic principle that requires Muslims to consult each other on important matters as it is ordained in the Qur'anic chapter of al-Shura.

> Those who hearken to their Lord, and establish regular prayer; who (conduct) their affairs by *mutual consultation*; who spend out of what We bestow on them for Sustenance. (Chapter 42, verse 32)

When it comes to the application of shura, traditionalists travel in history to al-salaf al-saleh/the pious predecessors of Islam to infer from their writings how shura was and should be applied. The first lesson that they learn from them is that all issues that are already determined by Qur'an, sunna/sayings and praxis of the Prophet Mohamed and ijma'/consensus are not subject of consultation. To traditionalists, shura is the antithesis of democracy. For the past fifty years, traditionalists used every possible argument, whether logical or fallacious, to prove the contradiction between shura and democracy. Ali Belhaj, the second person in the Islamic Front of Algeria said: "I disbelieve in dictatorship as much as I disbelieve in democracy. Democracy is *shirk* (polytheism)" (al-Gorshy 1997).

Ayman al-Zawahri clearly adopts a similar position when he considers democracy to be "a new religion to allow God-like men to legislate for themselves… versus the religion of Allah that gave the right of legislation to Allah and Allah alone" (al-Zawahri NA: 19). Thus, democracy is inherently un-Islamic since it gives individuals the rights to legislate regarding everything including issues that Allah has already stated in His own words. "When Allah decides, there is no place for consultation" (al-Sharawi 1980:18; Mawdudi 1977). Even the issues that are not addressed in Holy Scriptures should not be subject to the debates by commoners. This deliberation should be limited to Ahl-alhal wa-a'lakd/men of decision making because they are pious and knowledgeable to make ijtihad/independent reasoning and draw verdicts by qiyas/analogical reasoning (Taskheeri 1999). Even if the ruler consults, he is not forced to act according to the decision of the majority. According to typical traditionalists, the ruler is responsible before Allah more than he is responsible before people, following the Qur'anic verse that says:

> and ask for (Allah's) forgiveness for them; and consult them in affairs (of moment). Then, when thou hast taken a decision, put thy trust in Allah. For Allah loves those who put their trust (in Him) (Chapter 3, verse 3).

Traditionalists argue that on this verse Allah addresses prophet Mohamed to consult and listen to his companions and then to make up his mind and trust God only. The most recent application of unbinding shura is the Taliban's system of government that had several shura councils, none of which could enforce their decisions on mulla Omar (Haqqani 1997). Traditionalists state that the prophet and his early companions consulted just to garner opinions and information to take enlightened decisions with no commitments toward their followers to abide by the decision of the majority since the commitment is before Allah and to serve his religion alone (Mushtaheri 1993).

King Fahd of Saudi Arabia wore the hat of a traditionalist when he commented on the compatibility of democracy with Islam:

> The democratic system prevalent in the world is not appropriate in this region…The election system has no place in the Islamic creed, which calls for a government of advice and consultation and for the shepherd's openness to his flock, and holds the ruler fully responsibly before his people (Fahd 1992).

Table 2.2
Break Down of Democratic Values and Institutions – Shura

Is shura	Islamist		Secularist	
	Traditionalist	**Modernists**	**Liberals**	**Autocrats**
1- Mandatory?	Imperative by Islam	Imperative by Islam and practical reasons	Imperative for practical reasons	Negligible
2- Binding?	No	Yes	Yes	No
3- Institutionalizable?	May be	Yes	Yes	No
4- Open to the commons?	No.	Yes	Yes	No.
5- Selection of consultants?	Ahl-Alhal wa-Al'akd	Elections with given restrictions	Elections	Appoint-ment

An Iranian conservative faqih/scholar argues that Islam cannot allow the unqualified to govern and rule either with the approval of the masses, as in Democracies, or against their wills as in aristocracies. This is simply un-Islamic. Islam's way is to keep Allah as the only legislator and to allow people to apply Allah's laws meaning sharia. Thus the ruler abides by Allah's imperatives; that is why there is no place for dictatorship in Islam. Rulers are good Muslims as far as they obey Allah more than they obey their own whims or even the people (Shirazi 2001).

Modernists disagree. They think that typical traditionalists draw a false analogy between Muslims' golden era and contemporary circumstances (al-Bouti 1990). Modernists believe that shura is not only obligatory but the result of the shura is binding (al-Gorshy 1997). They even extend the frame of candidate consultants to include all Muslims regardless of gender or knowledge, based on the fact that ulama/scholars, though knowledgeable about religion, are limited in their understanding non-religious worldly affairs (Abo al-Magd 1988; al-Ghazali ND). Modernists use the term *Ahl-alhal wa-a'lakd/men of decision making* (al-Gorshy 1997) too but these people are publicly elected representatives of the whole umma, including non-Muslims (al-Ghannouchi 1988; al-Qaradawi 2001a; Bishri 1996; Howaidi 1985). Unlike traditionalists who have many reservations on bed'a/man-made innovations, modernists believe that Western democratic institutions are the best mechanisms for implementing shura/mutual consultation in Muslim societies (Nehnah 1999).

Liberal secularists perceive shura/mutual consultation as a characteristic of good governance that existed before Islam in Arabia and was ordained by Islam later on; yet Muslim rulers since the Umayyad caliphs manipulated it (Heggi 2002). A Western democratic regime of government with separation of powers and checks and balances would be the ideal shura-based system of government (Surush et al. 2000). Autocratic secularists do not trust the masses and reduce shura to the deliberation among their aids since shura is not obligatory or binding. If there are people to be consulted, they are mostly appointed or at best elected among a pre-determined set of loyal politicians (Halliday 2000; Hariq 2001). Autocrats in this sense are very elitist who distrust the masses.

As a way of summing up the core differences among the four different schools of intellectuals and ulama/scholars, Table 2.2 was developed.

b. Democratic Institutions and Processes

A closer look at the inclusiveness of the political participation is another aspect of strife among the four mentioned schools of thought. Typical traditionalists would disfranchise non-Muslims, Muslims from other sects and women from any self-initiated or voluntary participation in running the affairs of society. Since a non-Muslim or a woman cannot lead Muslims in prayer, they are not allowed to have the right to decide for the whole umma. The often quoted statement is Ibn al-Qayyim' statement that "a woman for her husband is like a slave for his master" as quoted by traditionalists (al-Oda 1994; Ibn Baaz 1981). Women are intellectually and physically suited to be the queens of their homes with no political rights whatsoever (Abdelkarim 2002). What is said about women is said about non-Muslims too (al-Hawali 1994). Non-Muslims are safe in Muslim land but they do not have the same political rights of Muslims (Gabreen 1989). Equality before government means allowing the infidels and innovators to have *sultan* / authority over the believers (al-Oda 1997). The most ideal way for selecting the ruler is through Ahl-aAlhal Wa-a'Al'akd⁄men of decision making then the bay'a/oath of allegiance among the rest of the umma. Ahl-aAlhal Wa-a'Al'akd⁄men of decision making are the most pious and knowledgeable of who best fits into this major position (al-Khalidi 1984).

A quote from the Qur'an was used to refute majority rule while it is clear that it is not about the majority of Muslims but the majority of non-Muslims: "Wert thou to follow the common run of those on earth, they will lead thee away from the Way of Allah. They follow nothing but conjecture: they do nothing but lie" (Chapter 4, verse 116). This verse was used to characterize majority rule as un-Islamic (Saleh 1992). Another account considered the idea of majority rule and competing parties toward power as forbidden bed'a and imitation to the "lovers of this world" since the prophet clearly stated that whoever asks for power should not be given it (Soweyyan 1999). To traditionalists bed'a revolves around "everything whose essence was available during the prophet's era yet the prophet did not do" (alsalafyoon.com; Soweyyan 1999). Since the prophet could have used majority rule and counted the votes of his companions yet he did not, then it is un-Islamic bed'a/man-made innovation (Soweyyan 1999).

Asking two of the traditionalists (Sheikh al-Galali of Saudi Arabia and Tomawi of the Sudan) about any possibility of tajdid/rejuvenation in Islam, they did not consider adopting the mechanisms of voting, majority rule, and competition over votes Islamic praxis. Al-Galai was clear that the struggle between tajdid/rejuvenation and taqlid/the following of predecessors

dates back to the Abbasid period (extending from the 8th to the 13th century) when scholars without prior agreement or arranged coordination decided to close the gates of ijtihad/independent reasoning and tajdid/rejuvenation. They had three main reasons for that position. First there was a tendency among new comers to Islam to flavor their understanding of Islam with their own inherent cultures and traditions which made the pure and authentic teachings of Islam debatable. These scholars, in other words, wanted to stop the flows of wrong interpretations and un-Islamic ijtihad/independent reasoning from creating another nominal heretic Islam that would sway people from the true teachings of the 7th century Islam. A second reason for freezing up ijtihad/independent reasoning was to stop the misuse of religion by caliphs who showed greater tendencies toward usurping power and using religious arguments to legitimize their actions. A third reason is the wrong but still convincing assumption that the world would hardly need new types of fiqh/jurisprudence since all new problems could be easily solved by imitation or by analogical reasoning. Typical traditionalists argue that the three reasons are still valid today (Sardar 2002). There are Muslims, who call themselves 'Assraneen/ modernists or 'Aqqlanyeen/rationalists (al-Khodhair 1998) who have not studied Islam well and try to flavor it with their own fallible understanding. Additionally autocratic rulers intimidate or bribe scholars to issue fatwas that would serve their personal interests.

Modernists disagree. Nobody can close a door that the prophet left open. The traditionalists' assumption was reasonable given the circumstances of the Abbasid era; modernists argue that this in itself was some type of ijtihad/independent reasoning suitable for its time. The abode of Islam (dar al-Islam) was magnificently more advanced than the abode of war (dar al-harb) during the first ten centuries of Islam. Everything un-Islamic was bad and everything bad was simply un-Islamic. There was no real challenge politically, economically, socially, scientifically or culturally to the Muslim way of life. The only possible challenge was military in nature and this one needed only larger armies and more weapons. And it worked; the Mongols were defeated physically and spiritually and crusaders' vibrant attempts to invade the East failed too throughout the middle ages. To sum up, in the 13th century Muslim world, every non-Islamic thing was equal to un-Islamic and vice versa. In other words, every new idea, discovery or invention, if any, coming from outside the Islamic world was not worth discussing either because it was heretical (e.g. the Greek philosophy) or evil (e.g. the crusades). Starting from the 18th century, Muslims would be struck that some non-Islamic inventions are not necessarily un-Islamic (i.e. are not against Islam). Some 18th and 19th century reformists such as al-Tahtawi of Egypt, al-Tunisi of Tunisia, al-Kawakebi of Syria, al-Afghani of Iran, and Mohamed Abdu of Islam, in the name of Islam, called upon Muslims to learn about these non-Islamic discoveries and inventions from Europe (Afghani et al. 1957; Husry 1966; Omara 1980; Tahtawi and Luqa 1988; Tunisi and Shannufi 1991)). These scholars are the God fathers of the modernist intellectual discourse in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. They would argue that if there is anything not Islamic by origin but necessary to establish Islamic goals, such as justice, it can be imported and Islamized.

Modernists criticize the idea of freezing up or narrowing down the gates of ijtihad/independent reasoning that limit contemporary Muslims from making ijtihad/independent reasoning in favor of reviving the already agreed upon ijtihad/independent reasoning of the 13th century. That is to say, most of post-13th century ijtihad/independent reasoning aimed mainly at keeping the 13th century fiqh/jurisprudence alive which led to the death of certain topics in fiqh

and most notably the political ones as Ibn al-Qayyim in the 14th century referred to (al-Jawziyah 1969; al-Qaradawi 2001a).

Prior to the 19th century, there was no place in Islamic writings for revolutionary ideas such as voting, elected bodies, institutionalization of the very Islamic concepts such as conditional bay'a/ oath of allegiance, accountability or peaceful alteration of power. Though they did not lack the theoretical/philosophical or textual/religious support for these ideas, experts on Islam, Muslims and non-Muslims, barely find any traces of these ideas in medieval Islam (Abd al-Raziq 1925; Kurzman 1999; Lerner 1958; Lewis 2001). The ready explanation was the closed door of ijtihad/independent reasoning. Yet the problem seems to be as political as it is religious. Traditionalists prioritize the value of unity around one ruler, even if despotic, over other values including limiting the power of this ruler himself. Voting, factions and majority rule on worldly issues would have institutionalized differences and created fitnah/internal divisions while Muslims are asked to be united: "Be not like those who are divided amongst themselves and fall into disputations after receiving Clear Signs: for them is a dreadful Penalty." (Chapter 3, verse 105) The traditionalist understanding of shura is very close to Mansbridge's concept of unitary democracy (Mansbridge 1980) except that shura, to traditionalists, is not inclusive. It was a deliberation among brothers in religion that should end up with ijma'/consensus. That is why shura should be only among a small number of knowledgeable and pious people. Yet even with rightly guided caliphs and the greatest companions of the prophet, this consensus broke up within thirty years of the death of the prophet. Modernists attempt to go beyond what ought to be by reading the world as is. To them, the fitnahs/internal divisions are already there and Muslims are already divided over religious and non-religious issues alike. Thus, it is better to institutionalize these differences in the format of political associations and parties where the representatives of each madhab/sub-tradition can negotiate and compromise. According to modernists, these associations are not only acceptable but necessary to face the God-like rulers (al-Ghazali 1997; al-Qaradawi 2001a; Howaidi 1999b).

Modernists of the 19th century and onward go back to this closed door of ijtihad/independent reasoning and open it widely for the discussion of ideas such as voting, political parties, elected representatives, rights of non-Muslims and women, though not without resistance (Abo al-Magd 1992; al-'Aawa 1989; al-Din 2001; al-Ghannouchi 1993; al-Ghazali 1997; al-Qaradawi 2001a).

To typical modernists, political participation is open to every citizen regardless of religion or gender. Even the concept of ahl al-Dhima/people of the covenant that was used to refer to non-Muslims who are under the protection of Muslims is not applicable in the modern era since they are politically full citizens who join the army and defend their countries (Bishri 1982). However, devout Muslims, both men and women, in particular are required to be more participatory since it is part of their religion to enjoin the good and forbid evil and not to conceal the testimony if they can express it in voting (al-'Aawa 1989; al-Qaradawi 2001a; Khatami 2001).

Some traditionalists pointed out that referenda are the closest form in modern history to the early praxis of Islam regarding the way of selecting a ruler. The most knowledgeable among Muslims Ahl-aAlhal Wa-a'Al'akd/men of decision making would nominate one person to be the caliph and the rest of the umma would swear (conditional) allegiance to him (Abu Talib 1986). Modernists are open to import the idea of multi-candidate elections to put an end to the 99.9%

referenda that have been very popular in the Muslim world since independence (al-'Aawa 2001; al-Gabri 1987; al-Ghannouchi 1988; al-Ghazali 1997; al-Qaradawi 2000a). Al-Qaradawi was reported praising Israel for having free fair elections comparing to the famous %99.9 that Muslim rulers get. Al-Ghazali praised Indira Gandhi for being honest to the extent that she failed in the elections that her party ran. These two events are hardly heard of in Muslim societies. It is interesting to know that when sheikh al-Othaimeen (a well-known traditionalist scholar) was told that sheikh al-Qaradawi (a well-known modernist) had extolled the free elections of Israel, he said that al-Qaradawi should repent to Allah for praising the polytheists.[12]

Given the long history of Muslim rulers' capacity to manipulate Ahl-alhal wa-a'lakd/men of decision making, modernists decided to resort to public voting. Modernists do not perceive public voting as an un-Islamic Western idea; rather it is the culmination of the effort of millions of people through thousands of years to limit and check the rulers. There is nothing un-Islamic about that (al-Qaradawi 2001a; Omara 1998) and even if the idea and practice non-Islamic, it can be Islamized since it is a necessary mechanism against acts of dictatorship that are highly condemned by Islam. Majority rule is an Islamic principle according to modernists. Some of the sayings of the prophet support voting and majority rule. So they are not bed'a/man-made innovation. For instance, prophet Mohamed told his great companions Abu Bakr and Omar: "if you agree upon something, I will never disagree with you." "The devil is remoter from the two and he is closer to the one" and "the umma cannot agree upon wrongdoing" (al-Qaradawi, 2001a: 32). Even when the second caliph, Omar ibn al-Khatab, left six of the companions of the prophet to decide the next ruler, he told them to count among themselves and to follow the group that had the greatest number out of the six. So voting and majority rule along with political parties are all Islamic or Islamizable according to modernists.

However, modernists face a moral and religious dilemma when they are asked about the possibility of allowing communist, socialist and liberal parties in Muslim countries. They usually give very indecisive responses to this dilemma because these parties in general are un-Islamic. Unlike traditionalists, typical modernists cannot act as if these imported ideologies have no followers or supporters. Given their reading of the Muslim political systems modernists argue for general and respected principles of government that are applicable to everybody. Modernists in general do not want their commitment to democracy to be questionable by secularists. To them, Muslims should be given the right to choose among all these parties whether they have Islamic labels or not. Typical modernists perceive the existence of these parties and associations as negative signs since it means that Muslim societies search for imported solutions. Yet if Islamists fail as rulers, there is nothing in Islam that gives them the right to usurp power (Howaidi 1999b; Ibrahim 1991; Khatami 1998; Omara 1980).

Secularists in general do not trust Islamists in this regard. Modernists share with traditionalists their refusal of associations that clearly and offensively challenge the immune zone of Islamic teachings such as the existence of God or the prophethood of Mohamed or any of the other prophets. Thus, atheist associations are absolutely unacceptable. Issues of this sort draw the fine and thin line between their acceptance of democracy as a technical mechanism for limiting the despotic tendencies of Muslim dictators and liberalism as a framework for competing co-existent relativistic readings of truth. This discrepancy between liberalism and democracy in

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[12] The two audios are available with the researcher.

the mind of modernists instills a heavy dose of suspicion among secularists who see modernists as equivalent to traditionalists with modern rhetoric (Harb 2003; Hariq 2001; Heggazi 2002b).

Typical secularists do not waste their time digging into the texts to support what they perceive to be right and necessary. Liberals do not differentiate among citizens based on religion. They even argue for not using a cell for religion in personal identification cards in Muslim countries. To typical liberals, there should be no *a priori* conditions on formation of parties or associations (El-Naggar 1993; Ibrahim et al. 1997). Public elections of rulers in multi-candidate campaigns are a must for them (Abu al-Su'ud 1995).

Autocrats do not have one concrete vision regarding the inclusion of non- Muslims and women into the political process. For instance, Qaddafi of Libya appeared to be more open to women's equal rights than Kuwaiti Islamists. The Kuwaiti Islamists have no objection to the idea of elected and representative parliament yet they disqualify women. Qaddafi, who endorses women's rights in public office, stands against public elections and equates representation to travesty and deception. Theoretically direct public participation, though a sham, is guaranteed in Libya (World Center for Researches and Studies of "The Green Book". 1988). To limit the possibility of multiple sources of legitimacy, most typical autocrats rely on referenda instead of elections. However, this should not make us think that elections in themselves would indicate higher levels of tolerance toward competitors. Muslim autocrats do not accept bargaining and clearly refuse pressures from any group or sect of society. They simply see them as signs of weakness and danger (Hassan 1999; Sadat 1978; Sallam 1996). Thus, there should be no institution, public square or sport stadiums without their personal photos and statues and run by their own appointees. An official who does not perceive himself as an extension of the autocrat is perceived by the autocrats as a seed of Huntington's penetration crisis (Huntington 1968). That is why all major positions are appointed rather than filled by elections. According to Edward Said, "We live in a region with no one democratic country." This phenomenon is not easy to explain but "part of the problem is that most of Arab rulers did not live in the West or know what democracy means." Thus, no wonder that Arabs and Muslims live in the "only region in the world that still suffers of dictatorships in universities, civil societies, press…etc. There is democratization in Eastern Europe, Latin America and Africa, except for us who are still ruled by military rulers starting from 1948 war" (Sa'id 2000).

Political parties, if allowed, should be loyal to the regime and respect the green and red lights imposed by the autocrat either through coalition with the ruling party (ex. Syria) or posing no threat to the dominance of the autocrat (George 2003; Jafri 2002; Marsh et al. 1999; Ujo 2000).

c. Civil and Political Rights

Traditionalist Islamists have a clear argument against personal freedoms and basic rights that are not explicitly mentioned in hotly texts. For them rights are not fundamental or basic; they are given from Allah and thus limited by Allah's imperatives as stated in the Qur'an and practices by the prophet. To traditionalists, these un-Islamic rights and freedoms are themselves the core of illegitimacy of democracy. To typical traditionalists, democracy in its essence is the replacement of the will of Allah with the will of fallible people who legislate for themselves rights and freedoms Allah has not legislated for them (Tash 1980). No wonder that democracy is associated with the materialistic system of capitalism and atheism that entitle them un-Islamic

freedoms (ex. same sex marriage, gambling, cursing the prophets and distorting their messages) (Cahtelier et al. 1980). Allah has forbidden injustice and democracy is the highest form of injustice (Soweyyan 1999). Democracy is unjust since it allows humans to be their own Gods by legislating for themselves what is halal/acceptable and what is haram/taboo (Saleh 1992). In an extreme form of traditionalism, a person who praises democracy because it guarantees human freedoms and rights is considered fasiq / sinner since praising the disbelievers' wrongdoings is a sin in itself (Al-Ahadal 2001:24) .

Muslims are given the right to express their points of view as far as they do not create fitnahs/internal divisions. If there is a possibility of fitnahs/internal divisions, the freedoms of expression and association ought to be restricted. Public opposition is absolutely forbidden; however, an individual can raise one's mazelm/injustices to judges or scholars who can defend one's rights without creating fitnahs/internal divisions. Rulers can be advised by Ahl-aAlhal Wa-a'Al'akd/men of decision making but not challenged for the same reason. Traditionalists' reading of these basic freedoms seems inconsistent when it comes to the issue of the capacity of the commons to question their ruler as an authentic well-established Islamic right and the fear of fitnahs/internal divisions. Typical traditionalists believe that the leader of Muslims is not accountable before the ignorant commons as far as he (never 'she') "obeys Allah's book and His prophet's straight path" and should not govern according to their own perception of the best interest (Abdelkhaleq 1997; al-Maged 2002). Personal freedoms of democracies are excessively un-Islamic and immoral. Democracy allows adultery, drinking wine and drugs, homosexuality, atheism and the like. Thus "Islam created for Muslims rights to enjoy within Sharia but not unbounded freedoms" (al-Badry 1983: 155). Al-Zawahri among others often quotes the following verse to argue against democracy-based legislations: "What! have they partners (in godhead), who have established for them some religion without the permission of Allah?" (Chapter 42, verse 21) (al-Zawahri NA).

Violent and pacifist traditionalists differ on the issue of public opposition to rulers. Violent traditionalists acknowledge the imperative of obedience to the ruler. But they focus on limiting this obedience to those they perceive to be pious rulers (al-Albani et al. 1997). Prophet Mohamed was reported to say:

> It is obligatory upon a Muslim that he should listen (to the ruler appointed over him) and obey him whether he likes it or not, except that he is ordered to do a sinful thing. *If he is ordered to do a sinful act, a Muslim should neither listen to him nor should he obey his orders.* (Hadith number in Sahih Muslim: 3423)

Violent traditionalists put more emphasis on the italicized part of the previous hadith. While Pacifist traditionalists focus more on the former portion. The fear of fitnah/internal divisions is a clear concern among pacifist traditionalists (al-Albani et al. 1997). They usually quote other hadiths to refute the public opposition to rulers since it habituates people to dissent and disobedience (al-Buraiq 1993):

> The Messenger of Allah said: If one sees something which he dislikes from his Amiri (leader) he should be patient, for if he separates from the main body of the Muslims even for the length of a hand-span and then died, he would die the death of one belonging to the days of Jahilliyya (disbelief). (Hadith number in

Sahih Muslim: 3438)

Other traditionalists (al-Tareqi 1993; Galil 2003) quote another hadith that states:

That time will witness the rise of people who will adopt ways other than mine and seek guidance other than mine…They will be a people having the same complexion as ours and speaking our language…You should stick to the main body of the Muslims and their leader… [Otherwise] separate yourself from all these factions, even if you have to eat the roots of trees (in a jungle) until death comes to you and you are in this state. (Hadith number in Sahih Muslim: 3434)

These two hadiths reflect the fear of fitnahs/internal divisions and loss of Muslims' identity by imitating un-Islamic systems of governments with all their fallibilities (Ibn Baaz 1992). Bringing these hadiths up by traditionalists represents another sign of their attempt to portray themselves as mere deductionists who refuse the idea of pragmatic reading of the Holy Scriptures. Additionally, traditionalists have their own reading of freedom of religion. The Qur'an explicitly states that "Let there be no compulsion in religion" (Chapter 2, verse 256). To traditionalists, nobody can be forced into Islam; yet once a person voluntarily has become a Muslim, he/she should be forced to practice Islam (al-Sharawi 1980:24). They are forced to become perfect. For instance, all women should wear hijab and once the call of prayer is raised, all stores, restaurants and businesses should be closed down and whoever does not pray should be forced to pray. A typical example in this regard is the men of amr belma'roof and al-nahai 'an al-monkar/enjoining the good and forbidding the evil in Saudi Arabia.

Typical modernist Islamists have a different reading regarding basic human and political rights. There is more space for freedom of expression to scholars and non-scholars alike as long as they do not infringe upon the immune zone of sharia/Islamic legislation. Modernists base their support for freedoms of expression and association on a different reading of the famous argument made by traditionalists that Islam is a complete religion and rarely needs human mind to reason beyond the deductive active application of its teachings. No doubt that Islam is a complete religion as the Qur'an states. Yet when it comes to worldly affairs the Qur'an asks Muslims to go and ask the knowledgeable. "If you do not know, ask the knowledgeable [among you]" (Chapter 16, verse 43). Thus, according to typical modernists, Islam is complete since it provides Muslims with all the answers they need regarding their spiritual affairs and lets them search inductively for the appropriate answers regarding their worldly affairs within the boundaries of what is halal/ acceptable (Iqbal 1930). However, the real tension between traditionalists and modernists goes deeper to two other questions that stem from the previous verse: First where to locate political freedoms and politics in general? Are they worldly affairs or religious affairs? Second, who are the knowledgeable whom we can consult on worldly affairs if there is agreement on politics as worldly affairs?

Typical traditionalists consider politics as part of religious faith since Allah and his prophet explicitly discussed them due to their great relevance to the creed itself (al-Ansari 1988). A famous quote by al-Zawahri states that:

The issues of governance against Islamic sharia/Islamic legislation, democracy, and loyalty to non-Muslims are not matters of minutiae that are subject to

scholars' jurisprudential differences; rather they are germane to the principles of iman/faith and the core of Islamic aqeeda/creed which is al-Tawheed."

Al-Zawahari used this argument to wage a war of criticism against the somewhat modernist Muslim Brethren (mainly in Egypt) since they:

> support the rulers of Egypt, the constitution, democracy, beside their refusal of jihad against the disbelieving government, their acquiescence of secularist parties, their participation in elections and their acceptance of un-Islamic laws and legislations in Egypt and the Muslim world (al-Zawahri NA).

Modernists ponder that the principle of Islamic state governed by sharia/Islamic legislation is beyond questioning, but the structural and institutional aspects of this state are subject to human scrutiny. A typical Iraqi modernist (Sheikh Ahmad al-Qubaissi) was under severe criticism from traditionalists in an open discussion of the issues of governance and creed in Islam on al-Jazeera network. Al-Qubaissi, building a counter argument against traditionalist vision, contends that Islam has two types of sources: constant and variable. "The constant aspects form the aqeeda/creed and rituals. The variables are man-innovated mechanisms to apply the aqeeda/creed." When it comes to politics, al-Qubassi contends that "Islam does not have a specific form of government." This means that any government that applies sharia is Islamic even if it is republican, monarchic, caliphatic or something else. Part of sharia/Islamic legislation is to guarantee people their freedoms and rights (al-Qubassi 2002).

Traditionalist callers accused him of admiring the West that "does not have creed" to follow. Al-Qubassi does not agree that the West does not have a creed (meaning an ethical and moral framework). He thinks that the West clings to its creed of freedom, justice, and independent thinking in a way that he wishes Muslims would imitate. According to him, "if you contrast the founders of the U.S. and the founders of the early Islamic state [the companions of the prophet], you will find a lot of resemblance in their emphasis on freedom, power, commitment, and adherence to moral principles." He thinks that the only way for Muslims to cope with modernity is by opening the gates of Ijtihad/independent reasoning (independent reasoning) in all aspects of human life and guaranteeing Muslims all possible freedoms and rights within Islamic sharia/Islamic legislation. In a clear challenge of traditionalism, al-Qubassi states that:

> Omar [one of the greatest and most charismatic of the companions of the prophet] will not come back. Had he come back, he would have failed… Muslims need a modern Muslim ruler who understands this modern world with its values and concepts. Muslims wasted their time waiting for the rightly guided Caliph and he will never come back (al-Qubassi 2002).

The second question regards who the knowledgeable are. Modernists have a less elitist vision compared to traditionalists. Hassan al-Turbi thinks that ijma'/consensus is not only the Ijma' of scholars but Ijma' of the umma/nation… thus a referendum can constitute an Ijma' (al-Turabi 2003). Thus, the public have their rights to gather, air their voices and publicly challenge and question authorities (Howaidi 1999b) within sharia, democratic laws and regulations.

Modernists' attitudes regarding basic freedoms are self-serving since they mostly have been subjects to prosecutions and jails. Besides, they maintain that a system that guarantees basic human and political freedoms will eventually lead them to power, since they know that they have the majority in the street (Omara 2002a).

Freedom of religion goes beyond refraining from forcing non-Muslims into Islam to abstaining from forcing Muslims to practice Islam. The role of Muslims is to remind and advise each other unless there is a crime that should be penalized according to Islam's penal code (hodod) (Abo al-Magd 1992; Howaidi 2003a; Khatami 2001; al-Ghannouchi 1993).

Liberal secularists are like their counterparts in the West when it comes to basic freedoms. A truly democratic state does not limit the freedoms of its citizens beyond democratic rules and laws. That is why they think that conservative understandings of Islam or religion in general can be an obstacle toward one's right to freely and equally express his/her point view, to publicly convene and openly oppose the policies of their governments (El-Naggar 1993; Surush et al. 2000).

Autocratic secularists are close to liberal secularists regarding freedom of religion but differ with them regarding the other two freedoms. However, some commentators single out Arab countries as the most autocratic compared to the rest of Muslim countries. Countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Senegal, and Nigeria, though far from democratic, are very much less autocratic comparing to almost all Arab countries (al-Mahdi 2002). A quick comparison of the percentages of votes that each Arab ruler claims to gain comparing to other non-Arab Muslim rulers may be a good indicator of how Arab rulers perceive their followers and how successful they are in oppressing and intimidating their opponents. Suffice it to remember the 100% that Saddam Hussein gained in the 2003 elections. Autocratic rulers warn Muslim intellectuals from admiring a Western model of democracy. Mahathir Mohamed was quoted saying "We are weak nations and need strong governments" (Taheri 2003b). Al-Qadhaffi of Libya was blunter when he likened the masses as "sheep with no opinion" controlled and directed by the rulers (Qaddafi 2002). Liberals disagree and argue that freedoms of expression and association and public opposition contradict the interests of the autocratic rulers on all fronts. Thus autocrats blame the lack of these freedoms on the masses that need to be educated before being allowed to practice these freedoms. Autocratic rulers, as an Arab liberal noted, speak about and on democracy but add practical qualifications and conditions that make ordinary people and opposition figures know that they are just meaningless words. "Democracy … is just a tool in the machine of political propaganda" (Shuryan 2003) to legitimize their grip on power.

Out of self-survival and/or fear of increasing and overwhelming political and socio-economic demands that cannot be met at reasonable costs, autocrats restrict the freedom of expression and association to certain levels and issues. Some autocratic regimes are more liberalized than others. Liberalized autocrats allow nominal opposition parties, some level of freedom of expression and association and some level of loyal public opposition and demonstrations. The use of the word "loyal" is purposeful in this regard. Some opposition groups and parties are considered loyal since they hardly generate a competitive or alternative source of legitimacy to the one established by the autocrat. They may be critical of a given policy or official but accept the autocratic ruler as the only master in town. This kind of opposition is highly tolerated by autocrats to give the democratic façade necessary for global

prestige. Disloyal opposition is met with violence or exile. Some autocratic regimes hold even if they lose their legitimacy "because there is no coherent organized source of competitive legitimacy" (Przeworski 1986). All Arab countries, with no known exceptions, and most Muslim countries have disloyal opposition figures and movements in jail or in exile due to the repressive policies of autocratic regimes (Marzouki 2002; Shames 2002). Most Muslim autocratic regimes try to leave no room for real opposition even if it nominally exists. The famous 99.9% vote in favor of the incumbent does not mean that the ruler has won the respective elections but all coming elections too. Autocratic ideologues blame the opposition for being fragmented and more concerned about reaching power rather than searching for credible and applicable solutions to the problems. "[Autocratic] rulers risked their lives to reach power. They have the power and plans to rule; that is why they rule" (Nour al-Din 2002).

Table 2.3
Break Down of Democratic Values and Institutions - Civil and Political Rights

| | Islamist | | Secularist | |
	Traditionalist	**Modernists**	**Liberals**	**Autocrats**
1) Freedom of expression and association	Highly restricted.	Limited	Extended	(Highly) restricted.
2) Public Opposition:	Fitnah = dissent	Legitimate as far as it is "loyal."	Acceptable	Highly Restricted
3) Religious Freedom: No compulsion in religion:	No force into Islam but force Muslims to practice	No force into Islam or to practice Islam except for Islamic penal codes.	No forced religion	No forced religion

Freedoms and rights are not to be given; they are to be earned through struggle and effort. Discussions of democratic values and ideals are like foreign movies and songs: they represent alien cultures and values and rarely resonate in the Muslim mind. Autocrats are not only creators of this situation but also the first beneficiaries of it. "In Europe, one does not need to organize a conference on civil society because it is there and understood. The same can be said about tolerance. These concepts emerged and evolved in the same soil" (al-Gabri 2000). Yet in the Muslim culture in general one needs to import these concepts, legitimize them by proving that they are not in contradiction with basic and fundamental values of the culture. This process occurs in a political environment that impedes it through governmental intervention and security concerns which makes independent intellectuals potential threats to the whole regime. Sa'ad El-Din Ibrahim, an important defendant of civil society in Egypt, narrated that he mentioned the concept of civil society in the presence of President Mubarak who exclaimed what Ibrahim had against military personnel. According to al-Gabri, this exclamation on the part of the president indicates how alien such concepts are to political elites in the Muslim world (al-Gabri 2000).

Autocrats argue that this is not the right time for opposition. It is the time of war against the enemy whether it is Israel or else.

> The great majority of our countries have no freedom, democracy, human rights, accountability, checks, transparency or rule of law thanks to Israel … [that] efficiently provided us with a good excuse for all our failures and wrongdoings (al-Khazen 2003b).

With slogans such as "no voice should rise over the voice of the battles" all liberals and modernists were deprived of their basic political rights in almost all Muslim countries and most specifically in the Arab world.

Table 2.3 functions as a summary of the different attitudes of the four main intellectual schools.

4. Muslims' Intellectual Civil War

The more one reads and interviews Muslim intellectuals and scholars, the more one finds severe tensions and vigorous attempts to annihilate, politically and even ethically, the other partners in the debates. The tension is so intense that the eminent Egyptian counselor Tareq el-Bishri called it intellectual civil war. I asked my interviewees to verify this description. Surprisingly, out of 83 scholars, intellectuals and scholars whom I had interviewed, I found 68 interviewees (around 81.93%) agree that there is a great deal of support for this depiction.

The content and logic of the debate among the main schools of thought in the Muslim world does not leave much space for compromises and alternative possibilities. If you will, each group of intellectuals and ulama/scholars handle the debate with an 'either/or' dominant strategy. Muslims' history reveals many intellectual and actual civil wars (Gittler 2000). The attempts of some groups to purify Islam through the stringent application of its imperatives with extraordinary fascination with its penal codes and harsh rejection of their intellectual opponents were always common causes behind most of these tense debates and wars. However, in the modern era another factor exacerbated the tension: it is the dual systems of education. Educated traditionalist Islamists travel in time to advocate pre-modern Islamic society over modern un-Islamic society. Educated secularists travel in space to embrace religion-neutral modern society over pre-modern one. Educated modernist Islamists try to emphasize the possible compatibility between the holy texts and modern developments and achievements of the West and others. Researchers attribute the cultural civil war to the accumulation of the dual educational system: Westernized civil and traditional religious (Omara 1989). A Yemeni diplomat calls upon Muslim governments to stop this duality (No'man 2003).

Gellner and Rodinson's readings are very pessimistic about the future of a compromising and liberal Islam (Gellner 1981; Rodinson and Khoury 2003). The eminent French orientalist Maxime Rodinson acknowledges the tension among different intellectual factions in the Muslim world, yet he finds it closer to a blame game rather than to the critical thinking that has been a characteristic of the Western thought. As a result, most Muslims still live intellectually in the middle ages. Rodinson sees that the most distinct difference between Muslims and the West is not religious but rather socio-economic. He believes that the relative autonomy of the bourgeois class reduced the potential power of the aristocracy and oligarchy in modern Europe. This was not the case in the Muslim world at least since the sixteenth century

where the oligarchic nature of the Ottoman rulers created a military system controlling the Muslim world from its grassroots to its top from the 16th century until the 19th century. Once again, this development was absolutely the opposite of what happened in Europe and the U.S. where the economic and political power moved downward towards the bourgeois class that established a technology-based society, voting system and accountable governments. Other countries attempted to catch up, such as Japan and some other Asian countries but no one single Muslim country managed to replicate the Western experience so far. He even predicts that Muslims will need several centuries to have the renaissance that the Europeans had starting from the 16th century in Holland, 17th century in Britain and 18th century in France and the U.S. (Rodinson and Khoury 2003).

A careful reading of the tense debates among the mentioned schools of thoughts reveals the following five characteristics that they share at different degrees. 1- They are uncompromising debates. 2- Each trend claims full monopoly of truth. 3- They tend to non-pragmatic and rhetorical discourses more than collaboration. 4- They aim at the non-existence of other groups rather than co-existence with them. 5- Defaming strategies are usually used with frequent tendencies to strawman each other.

An Arab intellectual once wrote that Muslims' culture

> … does not appreciate criticism; they do not even know it… It is a plot, and treason against authenticity… [Muslims] consider their worst enemies those who try to correct their ideas and beliefs and protect them from the thieves of reason and deceivers of beliefs… (al-Qasimi 1967).

Al-Qasimi's harsh criticism of Muslim culture, and the Arab one in the heart of it, confirmed his point. In response to al-Qasimi's criticism of the traditionalist and autocratic readings of Islam and culture, very unforgiving poems written by Sheikh Rashed Ibn Khaneen, Shikh Saleh al-'Iraqi, Shaikh Saleh Bin Sahman, and harsh critiques by Shaikh Ibn Baaz of Al-Qasimi publicly apostatize him especially after his book *These are the Chains*.[13]

Zaki Naguib Mahmoud's criticism of Arabic culture extends to reflect the deeper phenomenon of equating disagreement with dissidence to the extent that makes each opinion holder think of himself as "Truth" holder which from his point of view creates an environment of hostility in the intellectual life (Mahmoud 1971).

It is not uncommon in Muslim culture to spot traditionalists who attribute the characteristics of mobtadea'/innovator or zendeeq/heretic to anybody who advances a new interpretation that does not correspond to the famous readings of any verse or saying of the prophet without making enough distinction between Modernist Islamists and secularists.

a. Secularists Wage Their War

Autocratic secularists, mainly from positions of political power, have their part in this intellectual civil war. In a way to limit the public support for modernist Islamists, the regimes put them in the same basket with traditionalists (violent and non-violent) and pursue the same strategy: annihilate them ethically if not physically. This strategy sees all Islamists as criminals

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[13] Read some of these poems along with other uncompromising criticism at:
http://www.shahr2000.com/reads/gasemy_9.htm

and/or terrorists who use Islam as a cover for their worldly illegitimate aspirations, as noted by Howaidi (Howaidi 2003a). Limiting the modernists' capacity to advance an image of peaceful modern Islam is a tactic that different autocratic rulers have adopted through different mechanisms. A very telling decision was taken by the Moroccan government on the May 18, 2003 when they prevented moderate Islamists and women wearing hijab to participate in the huge demonstrations denouncing the terrorist attacks that occurred there a week earlier. The Moroccan government simply did not want to give the opportunity to modernist Islamists to prove that they are moderates even though they were among the first to refute and condemn the attacks (al-Hayat, May 19th, 2003).

Modernists contend that violent traditionalists and autocratic secularists with no prior collaboration conspire against modernist Islamists' model of Islam. Violent traditionalists sinfully wage violent jihad against innocent people on their war against 'infidel' governments. Autocratic secularist governments, even long before September 11th, seize the opportunity to strawman modernists' arguments by diminishing the core differences between modernists and traditionalists.

"It is a waste of time and effort to try to distinguish Islamist terror groups one from another according to their alleged differences along a series of traditional religious, ethnic, or political divides" (Boroumand and Boroumand 2002). Thus secularists advance the argument that all Islamists are alike except in their clothes, their appearance and their outspokenness (al-Sa'eed 2003).

In Egypt, it was reported that the violent al-Jihad movement seized the opportunity of a large police campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood who had declared and committed itself to non-violence to offer high level of coordination between al-Jihad and the Muslim Brotherhood since the government put both of them in the same cell. However, the Muslim Brotherhood refused the offer which expanded the gulf between the two factions of the Islamists. Yet the Egyptian authorities considered the mere correspondence between the two groups sufficient evidence to wage preemptive attacks on both, as one of the modernists reported (Howaidi 2003a).

That said, one can easily infer that the very three-cell classification of intellectuals and scholars as presented in this chapter comes from a modernist or a liberal secularist position. That is to say, a traditionalist or an autocratic secularist classification would have only two cells: one for true Muslims and the other for else.

Modernists and liberal secularists argue that autocratic secularists in power have developed clever skills to defuse public anger. For instance, during the operation Iraqi Freedom, hundreds of thousands of Muslims from Morocco to Indonesia demonstrated to express their anger against their failed regimes and their inability to stop the attacks on their brethren in Iraq. Interestingly, the autocratic regimes managed to march thousands of their supporters denouncing the attacks and declaring their solidarity with the Iraqi people at the same time they banned liberal secularists and Modernist Islamists from the right to protest against the war. Imposing a monopoly over agents of socialization (e.g. public education, public TV and radio stations and mosques) is a famous tactic by autocrats to guarantee self-survival. One intellectual attributes the intellectual civil war among intellectuals to the role of Muslim authoritarian states that leaves no (or very little) room for critical thinking and offering alternative visions. "The state

monopolizes history; thus all defeats go without accountability…All intellectuals' contributions remain nonsense without documents and claims without proofs" (al-Imam 2003).

Some secularists, including those not in power, denounce the mere existence of Islamists regardless of their level of extremism or moderation. According to Taheri there is no such a thing as Islamic democracy. It is an oxymoron. He agrees with what a student leader in Tehran told him "Democracy cannot be modified by prefixes and suffixes" (Taheri 2003a). He goes further to dismiss the capacity of Islamists to even introduce any viable contribution to Muslims' lives.

> Today, the Islamists cannot field a single serious thinker or creative artist. There are no Islamist novelists, poets, filmmakers, architects, and, more obviously, no Islamist composers, painters and sculptors. All the Islamists produce are suicide bombers and street thugs. They are fast losing the support they once had in sections of society that produce culture and sustain the economy. Political books with Islamist themes no longer sell in any significant numbers (Taheri 2003a).

Taheri is definitely exaggerating yet his message is clear. The non-existence of Islamists is the ultimate goal compared to the coexistence with them. Wahba agrees with Taheri. To Wahba, the main obstacle to democracy is fundamentalists who claim that they have the full truth; they do not believe in relativism which is the core of democracy as a struggle among different attitudes and opinions. That is why they tend to call their opponents infidels, disbelievers, sinners and the like (Dr. Murad Wahba, Al-Jazeera Interview, 17 December, 2000).

Secularists argue that the medieval fiqh/jurisprudence and its contemporary supporters are, after all, merely human, and to suppose that their understanding of Islam represents the word of God is, therefore, misleading. Contemporary Muslims do not have to be constrained by the formulations of the traditional ulama/scholars. "From an Islamic point of view, no body of persons or institution has a monopoly on valid and relevant understandings of Islam." On the contrary, he insists, "Islamic discourse is radically democratic" (an-Naim 1990).

Modernist Islamists along with liberal secularists agree that the autocratic Muslim regimes have lost their credibility. As one commentator characterized the situation: "Those secular regimes are ready to fight against Iraq, their own people but not against Israel. They are traitors." (Dr. Nader Al-Tamimi (Palestinian), Al-Jazeera Interview, 17 December, 2000).

Muslim autocratic secularists imported the words "democracy" and "elections" from the west but they localized them. Muslim regimes reduced democracy to fake elections. There is no democracy without elections; yet Muslims have pseudo elections without democracy (Taheri 2003c). With the popular Islamists who are ready to hijack democracy and shut off the windows of freedom, most liberals feel that they do not have a chance to defend their cause. In the Arab and most of the Muslim world, "liberals are widely viewed as political dissidents, advocating the wrong ideas and values in a region that is illiberal, if not antiliberal." They are considered, even worse, as "vestiges of colonial domination"(Saghie 2003).

The secularists in the Muslim world would use certain defaming mechanisms against Islamists. For instance they use the word "Islamawi" – best translated as Islamicized- to refer to

the Islamists. The use of "Islamicized" is a sensationalism of 'Islamist' and political Islam in general was meant to convince the public that Islamists manipulate Islam for their worldly purposes (al-Sa'eed 2001). A Saudi secular intellectual, Turki al-Hamd, describes the current situation in the Arab-Muslim intellectual arena as a battlefield for "raising slogans and exchanging accusations and nothing but that" (Al-Hamad 2003). Another Syrian intellectual summarizes the intellectual war in the following words: "Ruling dictators and coward intellectuals betraying their noble mission so as to please the dictators." He quotes his fellow Syrian thinker, al-Kawakebi, who wrote over 100 years ago that "a nation that does not feel the anguish of dictatorship will never strive for liberty" (al-Lazaqqani 2001).

Secularists think that their program, compared to the Islamist one, is the only way toward a more powerful and modern world (al-'Arfaj 2003). They reckon that they have achieved some progress.

> No Muslim society today is governed solely with reference to religious law…and newly emerging leadership classes are almost everywhere displacing or marginalizing the clerisy of theological-legal experts who used to control meaning and organization in these societies (Ansary 1996).

b. Islamists Wage Their War

The intellectual war between modernist Islamists and traditionalist Islamists is as tense as the one between Islamists and secularists. Traditionalists play the game of strawman too. They present themselves as the true al-salaf al-saleh/the pious predecessors who have pure understanding of Islam with no un-Islamic influences. Thus, typical traditionalists do not think of secularists and modernists as good Muslims but rather as Mubtade'een/innovators who present themselves as "enlightened" Muslims. Since they claim to be enlightened, they get this enlightenment from un-Islamic sources (Sultan 1993) which makes them innovators at best. Some traditionalists would even consider modernists and secularists polytheists since they worship their minds, whims and masters. Among them, there are those who "worship the Americans, … Europeans, … Russians, …the new world system, …the rulers…, philosophies, …, nationalism, …their thinkers and ideologues. Thus there is no difference among them in disbelief and apostasy" (Luqmani 1998).

Another traditionalist labeled modernists and secularists as "students in the colonial schools (of thought)… thus Muslims, young and old, governments and commons have to resist this new polytheism and new idolatry" (al-Khodhair 2000).

Traditionalists accuse modernists and secularists of being like monkeys and parrots in the way they repeat Western ideas such as religion being the opium of the people; the evolution of the human mind from theological reasoning into philosophical, then scientific reasoning (Ghorab 1981); the applicability and compatibility of positivist ideological undercurrents with Islam (Qutb 1970); the separation between church and state and emphasis on Islam as a spiritual religion rather than both (al-Sharawi 1980).

Traditionalists use some technical terms to label modernists in particular since they are Muraja'at who tend to postpone Allah's punishment when it comes to monotheism. They are

pacifists[14] when it comes to Jihad, though some traditionalists are pacifists too. They are Mu'tazila and rationalists when it comes to the sources of Islam since they put reason before text. They are relativists when it comes to fiqh since they search for the most modern and thus least authentic verdicts, especially regarding women, songs, arts, liberties, photographing, clothes and so forth. They do not acknowledge the role of al-salaf al-saleh/the pious predecessors. They are the most suspicious of consensus because modernists habituate people to different opinions and contradictory verdicts. They are neutral against innovators, heretics and deviant minorities (al-Khodhair 1998).

To traditionalists, modernists and secularists alike are harbingers of moral degeneracy who are transfixed by the admiration of the west. Among Islamists, the debates over violence, women and non-Muslims create a lot of tension. Traditionalists view non-Muslims (especially in the Muslim world) as temporary and non-authentic, let alone enemies (al-Oda 1997). Traditionalists make supplication to Allah to annihilate non-Muslims regardless of details. Modernists reject what they call the 'innovated supplication' that Allah would destroy all non-Muslims or all Christians or Jews. Modernists perceive this type of supplication as un-Islamic and based upon a distorted understanding of Islam (al-Rikabi 2003).

Modernists find themselves actually fighting two wars: one against people who claim to be more deductionist (authentic) than they are and another against people to claim to be more inductionist (rational) than they are (Rahman 1982). Modernist Islamists agree with traditionalists on two accounts. First, no Islamic solution that deserves its name can be attained without clear and direct reference to and inference from the Qur'an and the Sunna of Prophet Mohammed. Islamists, both modernists and traditionalists think that secularists betray Islam and Muslims when they dilute the differences between Islam and Christianity. Secularism is a solution to a problem that Muslims did not and do not have. Muslims achieved their civilizational achievements under the rule of Islam because of Islam's compatibility with science, not despite it (Qutb 1978).

Yet modernists keep in mind that Prophet Mohammed's personification of the teaching of the Qur'an was limited by the fact that he was an Arab living in the 7th century and dealing with much simpler problems than those one faces fourteen centuries later. Second, they emphasize, along with traditionalists, that what keeps the idiosyncratic character of a Muslim person, and thus his/her belief in the oneness of God, is his/her commitment to the teachings of Islam with no objection or arrogance. Yet, this submission to Allah is not equal to refusing to develop modern political, economic and social systems that would not contradict the teachings of Islam. Traditionalists, from the perspective of modernists, are antiques or dinosaurs who live in the past and cannot carry the responsibility of Islamic tajdid/rejuvenation. Modernists argue that traditionalists negate the possibility of a contemporary scholar to reach the level of knowledge of Malik, Ahamd, Abu Hanifa, or the other great scholars of the past. They are worried that religion-claimers would distort Islam. Modernists share with them the same concern with one difference, modernists consider only secularists to be religion-claimers. Shutting down the gates of ijtihad/independent reasoning is not a viable solution given the huge amount of qualitative and quantitative differences between the contemporary world comparing to it ten centuries ago. Modernists accuse traditionalists of being less competent to represent

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[14] Traditionalists criticize modernists since a typical modernist would think that there is no place for violent Jihad since the freedom of religion is guaranteed in the 21st century.

Islam. They are prisoners of haram-phobia meaning excessive fear of taboos. Thus, they tend to render most of modern inventions haram/taboos.

By moving away from this tradition, traditionalist Islamists reckon, modernist Islamists have no place to go except for imitating, or at least giving credit to, the West.
Modernist Islamists argue that what they have in mind is fully, at least implicitly, autonomous from any Western influence. But learning from others is an absolutely Islamic tradition practiced by the prophet Mohammed and some of the early founding fathers of the Islamic state. Modernist Islamists do not think that any resemblance or difference between an Islamic democratic form of government and Western democracy is even a criterion for judging the success or failure of their theory (Safi 1996).

The other battle that modernists fight is the one against secularists. Modernists follow two paths: they first try to prove that they are different from the traditionalists. Second, they show that they can present a modern understanding of Islam that would diminish the need for Westernization. In other words, they try to Islamize what they deem appropriate and necessary from other civilizations. Modernist Islamists agree with secular intellectuals that the misuse of religion can lead to a theocracy which is absolutely against Islam. Besides they agree with the secular trend that any political division based upon creed may lead to turmoil and even civil wars which are, again, absolutely against Islam. However, they absolutely reject the false dilemma of either theocracy or secularism. From their perspective there is a third, viable option: Islamic democracy.
While doing that, they show the danger of those who are psychologically defeated due to their admiration of the Western civilization.

The intellectual environment in the Muslim world is the antithesis of Mill's argument that:

> Not the violent conflict between parts of truth, but the quiet suppression of half of it, is the formidable evil; there is always hope when people are forced to listen to both sides; it is when they attend only to one that errors harden into prejudices, and truth itself ceases to have the effect of truth, by being exaggerated into falsehood (Mill and Shields 1996:1062).

What makes this type of intellectual civil war a real obstacle to democratization in the Muslim world is the fact that it is transferred into the political arena from different angles.

> In cases of sharp ideological and societal division, it is not likely to have peaceful alteration of power. Democracy presumes some level of democratic culture that respects pluralism of sources of truth as an acceptable value in society. There is no democracy in a culture that negates the other (Hilal 2002).

When political parties and competing elites catch the same disease, peaceful alteration of power becomes highly unlikely. These intellectual civil wars occur as well inside the political parties which create the phenomena of 1) personalization of the political parties (the person of the leader is more appealing to its members and supporters than the ideology or interests of the party); and 2) a lack of democracy inside the political parties themselves which leads to divisions inside the parties. Most disagreement inside political parties is solved through dissent

and splintering (Abdelmiggeed 2003). That is to say negation of the other is not only an intellectual but a political phenomenon in most Muslim countries as well (al-Gamal 2001).

5. Concluding Remarks

The previous analysis shows that Muslims are more heterogeneous than some academic and media circles in the West portray them. Muslim intellectuals and scholars advance different and even contradictory readings of Islam and reality. Consequently, it is reasonable to judge that most orientalists and neo-orientalists fall into the trap of hasty generalization when they assume all Muslims are traditionalists.

The debate among Muslims on issues such as modernization and democracy dates back at least to the early 20th century when Muslims discovered the huge gap between how their holy texts describe them being the best nation came out in humanity and the reality that defies this assertion. In the heart of this gap is how Muslims would respond to the challenge of good governance. In response to this common challenge, this project demonstrated three broad ideal typical schools of thought: traditionalists, modernists and secularists. Traditionalists search for an Islamic government that is not similar or even close to any other un-Islamic government. It is closer to the moral state that was established by the prophet and his great companions in the 7th century. This system of government is the antithesis of what has been known as representative democracy. Modernists search for a government system that is compatible with Islam rather than being idiosyncratically Islamic. To them most aspects of democracy are compatible with their reading of Islam or at least Islamizable. Secularists do not worry about how Islamic or moral the government system they prefer. Religious texts can be read in different and contradictory ways. They do not help much and better be ignored when they come to face political challenges.

Muslim intellectuals and scholars are engaged in an uncompromising debate that has been characterized as analogous to an intellectual civil war. In the following chapter, the focus will shift to ordinary educated Muslims and to what extent they reflect the same tension.

CHAPTER III
MUSLIMS' CULTURAL MAP OF DEMOCRACY

Students of Islam and the Middle East had mixed success in pinning down the causal relationship between Islam as an explanatory variable and lack of democracy as the variable of concern. Any serious examination of this relationship cannot ignore the intervening variables of Muslims themselves. How Muslims understand Islam and how they understand democracy is far from monolithic. This chapter explores this question of causality, if Islam does have anti-democratic effects on Muslims, what are the causal mechanisms? Five hypothetical mechanisms will be explored. First, to what extent are ordinary Muslims mere reflections of the cultural entrepreneurs as discussed in the previous chapter? Second, is it true that Muslims even if they believe in democracy, they limit it to illiberal version that forbids all competing un-Islamic ideologies? Third, are Muslims satisfied with their generally non-democratic governments because they think of them as Islamic governments and that is why they do not want democracy? Fourth, are Muslims ready to sacrifice for their political rights or will they wait until they are given to them as gifts from their rulers? Fifth, is it true that Muslims' minds are chained in the golden past of the early Islamic state?

Some accounts propose generalizations on the assumption that Muslims are all influenced by the same creed and thus have similar culture. Their assumption is a testable hypothesis for this chapter. One way of testing this hypothesis is by drawing an aggregate cultural map that demonstrates variation among Muslims on their perception of democracy. The cultural map will depict Muslim societies' comparative positions through two 100-point scales of democratic hardware and software. Upon developing these two scales, the focus will shift in the following five sections to the validity of the five hypothetical mechanisms to explain the various positions of each Muslim society on the democratic hardware and software scales.

1. Democratic Hardware and Software

Unlike the previous chapter that was devoted to depict the intellectual debates among Muslim intellectuals and ulama/scholars, this chapter is limited to capturing an aggregate representation of educated Muslims toward democracy stipulated as a system of periodic and publicly elected accountable government under conditions of equality and freedom of choice according to the one-person, one vote principle regardless of religion, gender or belief.

a. Muslim Societies' Cultural Map

Most literature on democratization suggests that the image of democracy has never been more favorable as shown by public opinion polls. Inglehart, along with others (Lingemann 1999; Norris 1999), concludes that "democracy has become virtually the only model with global appeal" (Inglehart 2000).

Figure 3.1
Cultural Map of Muslims Societies toward
Democratic Hardware and Software (Web and Written Survey Data)

Source: web and written survey 2002

Data collected in the course of this research help qualify this proposition in the Muslim world. Though Muslims belong to the same religion, they are heterogeneous enough (in their interpretation of Islam among other factors) to make a grand theory of Islam and democracy overly simplistic. This result is depicted in Figure 3.1, a map of the attitudes of mostly urban, educated and non-poor Muslims in thirty three societies of the world.

On the horizontal axis, attitudes of Muslims toward democratic institutions and procedures (democratic hardware) are depicted in a 100 point scale. On the vertical axis, a 100 point scale of socio-political tolerance (democratic software) is presented. The pooled sample indicates a significant diversity of opinions.

From Muslims of Turkey, Morocco and Egypt on the up right corner to those in Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Libya, the idea that Muslims have one unique vision regarding democracy is not supported. The first observation regarding the map is that if one judges by the crude number of sampled societies that have 50 points or more in terms of support for democratic hardware and software (countries above the horizontal line and to the right of the vertical dotted line), one can infer that most Muslim societies do not prefer autocracy over democracy. This finding, in general, is consistent with Norris and Inglehart's findings (Norris and Inglehart 2002).

<u>b. Reliability of the Data</u>

Before drawing any conclusions from the previous data, one needs to ask about the reliability of the data. In other words, is the previous map a mere artifact of the survey's biases or is it a reliable snapshot of the Muslims' political culture?

To answer this question, I decided first to account for the effect of the internet by re-drawing the map of the cultures based only on the written surveys that mainly and randomly capture the attitudes of students in fourteen countries (Egyptians, Libyans, Nigerian students in Egypt, Malaysians, Syrians, Pakistanis, Algerians, Bangladeshis, Yemenis, Saudis in the U.S., American Muslims, Sudanese, Iranians, and Turkish) and students of other eight Muslim countries who reside in the previous countries. This cultural map that is based only on written survey is presented in Figure 3.2.

When the t-test is used to compare the means of the support for hardware and software in both the written and web-based surveys, the tests show no statistical difference between the means in any of the cases at confidence level .01 (Table 3.1). Although this test supports the claim that the alleged bias in the Internet did not produce observable biases that would propel us to treat the web-based survey and the written surveys as two different surveys, they do not give us enough indication on the reliability of the cultural map itself. Fortunately, during the same period some other survey data became available.

Though different in structure and questions, these other surveys can give us a good frame of comparison. Among a group of Muslims who were surveyed by the Pew Center's Global Attitudes Project, it was clear that the results on certain issues such as women's social rights (including work outside the home and their rights to decide on wearing veils) indicate almost identical results with this survey in Bangladesh, Lebanon, Pakistan, Turkey, Senegal, Nigeria, Mali, Indonesia, and Jordan. Unfortunately, the attitudes toward women were the only set of questions parallel to this project's measurement of democratic software. Regarding the hardware, with the exception of the cases of Mali and Turkey that are reported in this survey as two of the most supportive of democratic procedures and mechanisms, the Pew survey suggests almost identical results.

Table 3.1

T Test Results for the Comparison between the Web-based and Written Surveys

	Hardware				Software			
	Mean	Std. Dev.	T	Probability	Mean	Std. Dev.	T	Probability
Written Survey	62.77	10.18	0	1	55.77	6.52	1.14	0.27
Web survey	62.77	11.42			55.38	6.90		

2-tailed probability is shown.

Note: A T-ratio below 1.96 indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the means at confidence level of .95.

Though the scale used in this project does not address the question of the "most reliable kind of leadership" – democratic governments or strong leaders – the scale adopted in this project leads to very close results in the cases of Senegalese and Bangladeshis who highly support "democratic government;" Indonesians and Lebanese who moderately support "democratic government" and Pakistanis and Nigerians who clearly score the lowest in terms of their support for "democratic government" in favor of "strong leaders." There is a legitimate concern to be raised about the mutual exclusivity between "democratic government" and "strong leadership" options as used by the Pew surveys. Yet the real discrepancy between the findings of this survey and the Pew project rests with Mali and Turkey that both are reported to be among the most democratic cultures in this survey while, according to the Pew project, they moderately support democracy.

The preponderance of evidence suggests that this survey seems to capture the culture of these two countries better. With Mali as the only Muslim country that is considered to be "Free" according to the Freedom House (Karatnycky 2002) for the past 10 years with presidential elections and one of the relatively most peaceful processes of alteration of power in African in 2002, it seems that the wording of the question or other unknown factors made only 50 percent of Malians prefer "democratic government" over a "strong leader" in the Pew project.
Around 57 percent of Muslims in Turkey as well are reported in the Pew project to be in support of "democratic government" (Pew 2003a). Once again, based upon this survey (around 77 points of support for democratic hardware) and based upon the voting turnout which was around 77 percent in the 2002 parliamentary elections, one may suggest that the Turkish respondents did not necessarily prefer a strong politician leading a non-democratic government.

However, there can be another explanation, since these two countries already have democratic elections, while economic problems still exist, then a good number of the respondents took for granted that a strong leader would not violate the democratic nature of the government. Except for these two cases, the rest of the cases seem to be highly in congruence with this project's survey.

Another survey that used the question about strong leadership versus democratic government among other questions to measure the attitudes toward democratic institutions and practices confirmed the results of this survey. The World Value Survey (WVS) shows that all the countries that appear in top right corner of the cultural map (Figure 3.1) actually support democracy. "In Albania, Egypt, Bangladesh, Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Morocco and Turkey, 92 to 99 percent of the public endorse democratic institutions- a higher portion than in the United states (89 percent)" (Inglehart and Norris 2003). The country with Muslim majority that Norris and Inglehart found least supportive of democracy in their surveyed countries, Pakistan, is found among the relatively least democratizable cultures in this survey as well (Figures 3.1 & 3.2).

Figure 3.2
Cultural Map of Muslim Societies toward
Democratic Hardware and Software (Written Survey Data only)

Source: written survey 2002

In a different article that used the same pooled data (WVS 1995-2001), the two authors suggest similar results in terms almost all the cases except for Iran (Norris and Inglehart 2002). In their results, Iranians seem to be more supportive of 'democratic ideals' (equivalent to the democratic software of this study) than this project's survey suggest. It is very difficult to tell the exact reason for this difference but one possible factor is the period of time covered in their survey (95-2001) and this survey (2001-2002) or the wording of the questions. However, Iranians' "approval of democratic performance" (equivalent to the democratic hardware of this study) is almost identical.

Unfortunately the few other surveys that were conducted in the Muslim world were done without actually addressing democratic issues per se to any great extent. Yet their concerns with issues such as Muslims' perception of the West (Gallup 2002); Arabs' evaluation of their personal, socio-economic lives and again perception of the West (Zogby 2002); the impact of September 11th terrorist attacks on Muslims attitudes toward religion, and the west (Moaddel 2003); and societal issues (Hassan 2002) impede one's ability to compare results especially with somewhat remotely different wording of questions. However, as one will see in the pages to follow, these surveys generally confirm the results of this survey regarding certain

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issues such as the impact of Islamic teachings on Muslims' political attitudes and the negative attitude toward the West in general.

c. Categorization of Muslim Societies' Cultures

Most Muslim societies fall into one of four broad categories:
1- Societies that score high on software and low on hardware.
2- Societies that score low on both scales.
3- Societies that scores moderately on both scales.
4- Societies that score high on both scales.
Each one of these categories will be discussed in more details.

A. High Software and Low Hardware Category

The first category of Muslim societies' cultures is best exemplified by UAE, Oman and Libya. In terms of socio-political tolerance Libya, Oman and UAE score 51, 54, and 59 points respectively but with relatively low support for democratic institutions around 41- 43 points. Based on the focus group discussions with Libyans, the real discriminatory attitudes of Libyans is not toward their fellow Libyans but toward non-Libyans such as the half million Africans (around 10% of the population) who live and work there. A similar observation can be made about the relatively low political status of women in the minds of Libyan men. However, educated Libyan females are reported to be less parochial. Thus they enjoy higher level of self-esteem and sense of political efficacy now comparing to a decade ago (Obeidi 2001). Around 64 percent of Libyan educated women think that women should be equally enfranchised and they have the capacity to resume top executive positions. This result is almost identical to another survey conducted in Libya in which 63 percent of Libyan women thought that they can hold positions that may involve authority over men (Obeidi 2001). However, tribal traditions as a source of low status of women in the mind of men, even if educated, are a factor that cannot be missed in explaining the Libyan political culture (Bianci 2003). This relatively low image of Libyan women in the mind of Libyan men is best depicted with only 48 percent of Libyan men believing that women should participate in politics. Another survey showed that only 29 percent of men would accept women holding jobs involving authority over men (Obeidi 2001). Educated Emirati women are even more self-confident with around 73 percent of them defending their rights as political actors including 25 percent accepting that women should hold top executive positions. Unlike Libyan men, the majority of UAE educated men (around 60) accept that women should participate in politics as legislative representatives, although only 7 percent give them the right to hold top executive positions.

Women in Oman are both self-perceived and perceived by men in general to be in a relatively higher status comparing to their peers in Libya and UAE. In the pooled sample, around 33 percent of Omanis (men and women) would agree to give women top legislative and executive positions; however, this percentage goes down to 26 percent in the case of Libya and 10 percent in the case of UAE.

Though the Muslims' cultures are not necessarily a good determinants or predictors of Muslim regimes' official policies, it is worth noting that Sultan Qabus of Oman, for the first time

in all Arab gulf states, granted women the right to vote and participate in the election in 1994 and appointed the first female minister in the history of the region in March 2003.[15]

Having a culture that is comparatively pro-women's rights begs the question why Oman is located in a lower position comparing to UAE in terms of democratic software. This comparatively lower status can be attributed mainly to the negative impact of overlapping cleavages between religious sects and tribal affiliations that some researchers have found (Beasant 2002). However, the increase in government-administered sector is positively correlated with the level of trust and sense of equality comparing to the late sixties under the Dhofar Rebellion that ended in 1975s (Economist 1998).

The three countries' poor support for democratic institutions deserves some scrutiny too. The three countries together can be illustrated as an exemplars of semi-rentier state where "no taxation, no representation" seems to work fine (Beblawi and Luciani 1987; Kechichian and Grunebaum 2001). Libyans, for one, despite their relatively moderate level of socio-political tolerance, enjoy a very low level of support for democratic institutions. This discrepancy can be understood by the bizarre system of government that al-Qaddhaffi of Libya has established (Tahir and Qaddafi 1996; Zartman 1982). It is a system that claims full participation by all Libyans but with no political competition or clear contending platforms or political parties. Actually, according to an anonymous Libyan intellectual: "most [of the Libyan] people do not even know on what basis they are asked their opinions and what difference it makes to air them." No transparency, no opposition, and no partisanship but still it is a government by the people according to the Green Book that constitutes al-Qaddaffi's theory of politics.

In the survey conducted in the course of this research, When Libyans were asked about how satisfied they are with the performance of the system, only 20 percent showed a notable level of satisfaction. The rest were either unsatisfied or not sure. Muslims of UAE and Oman are stronger advocates of their incumbents in both the written survey (in the case of UAE) and the web-based surveys albeit at the expense of their support for democratic institutions. Around 80 percent of Emiratis show satisfaction of their political system while around 52 percent of Omanis have the same attitudes. These two scores are among the highest in the whole sample. Among all the ten participants in the focus group discussions in UAE, there was no one single supporter of copying Western democratic institutions to the country. According to Sa'eed, one of the interviewees in UAE who lived in Britain for two years, "democracy is a good system of government that we do not need in UAE." Analogously, it is a solution to problem or a medicine to a disease that they do not suffer. Even with noticeable resentment among almost half of the 26 Libyan focus group participants, the solution from their perspective was not so radical as to have a totally new system of government but for the officials to be "fair and conscious as Allah orders them to be." To sum up, the three countries represent comparatively high level of socio-political and religious tolerance (democratic software) with relatively low level of support for the procedures and institutions of political participation and competition (democratic hardware).

The classification of the rest of the 30 cases into three categories reveals less discrepancies and more symmetry between support for democratic hardware and software.

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[15] http://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2003/3/3-4-7.htm

B. Low Hardware and Low Software Category

Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Tajikistan, the Sudan (and possibly Pakistan and Nigeria) form what can be labeled the relatively least democratizable cultures, given the attitudes of their citizens toward democratic institutions of participation and competition and socio-political tolerance and trust. These countries occupy the lower left corner of Figure 3.1 which makes them belong to the same category albeit for different reasons. Saudis' feeble support of democratic institutions can be understood by the legacy of the kingdom that never experienced publicly elected government of any sort since its modern inception in 1930s (or even possibly since the early years of Islam 1400 years ago). Besides, Saudi officials rarely if ever use, abuse or misuse the word democracy or any of its connotations in any of their public speeches or to allow it to sneak into public schools curricula. Additionally, opposition in Saudi Arabia has always been seen to be equal to dissent; having political parties leads to fitnah/internal divisions (Fandy 1999). Around 74% of the Saudi respondents to the survey strongly disagreed to the compatibility of democratic institutions and procedures such as political parties, parliament and elections with Islamic sharia/Islamic legislation as they understand it. Even though Saudi Arabia has a fully appointed powerless Shura Council, Saudis do not even think that it is of any use because of its powerlessness. Ordinary Saudis, according to a Saudi engineer, call this council "manshaffa" meaning towel. That is when the royal family wants to make unpopular decisions, it sends them to the Council just to give them a flavor of legitimacy. In other words if the council is fully appointed by the King, then he is its constituency. Though I failed to have well-organized focus groups discussions in Saudi Arabia, anecdotes and casual talks with Saudis who never visited the West along with others who lived in the West for some time showed that the traditional institutions of the family along with the tribe play the political roles of interest articulation and representation that interest groups and lobbies perform in the West. Political parties, as collective actors competing for power and forming either the government or opposition, do not have counterparts in the public mind of the Saudi culture.

A Saudi journalist said:

It is highly destabilizing to allow political parties in the Kingdom. Tribal and familial cleavages will spontaneously convert into party competition and political campaigns with a lot of agony and prejudice. In a country that is named after one family, other unsatisfied families are not going to be controllable.

As for socio-political tolerance and sense of equality, women's position and the negative image that Shiites have in the minds of Sunnis and vice versa do not facilitate treating all Saudis regardless of belief, gender and religion as morally and politically equals. Around 40 percent of the Saudi respondents consider that women should not be franchised and 34 percent prefer to limit their participation to voting in case Saudi Arabia adopts some type of elections. A Saudi businesswoman blames ordinary Saudis for not being open-minded not because the government prevents them from interacting (learning) from non-Saudis but because "this is the nature of the Saudi people who are not ready for learning or interacting with others. Saudis are peculiar people [in this regard]" (al-'Alyan 2003).

Women in Saudi Arabia are not considered full citizens in the legal, social and financial senses because of their "inferiority to men rationally and psychologically. That is why a woman is always in need of man's custody" (al-Fassi 2003). This can be attributed to legal restrictions

on the one hand and to the social and cultural traditions on the other hand (al-Fassi 2003). The pooled data shows that around 35 percent of educated Saudi women would not think of themselves as political actors at any level and 33 percent limit this participation to voting without being able to represent themselves in elected councils or resuming executive positions. Considering that the data depicts only the attitudes of educated Muslims, this past result raises questions about the quality of education. The answer comes from a Saudi intellectual and political scientist who states that most of the Islamic values that students get in Saudi Arabia come from salafi/traditionalist teachers who do not train their students on critical thinking, rather on memorizing and blindly believing in unquestioned sayings that would not serve pluralism, tolerance or relative thinking (Al-Hamad "Beyond Brain-Washing (Arabic)" 2003). What is worse is that they are educated to believe that the authentic and (only) true Islam is the salafi/traditionalist Islam of Saudi Arabia. This notion makes other Muslim (let alone non-Muslim) societies pervert and thus should be avoided rather than studied and examined. With around 50 percent of Saudis are under 18 right now and thus still get affected by schools as agents of socialization, the forces of reform in Saudi Arabia should speed up the process of reviewing this educational material.

Given the peculiarity of Saudi Arabia where the country that has no non-Muslim citizens, it is meaningless to expect tolerant positions toward non-Muslims. However, the attitude toward the remaining non-Muslims in Arabia (not necessarily in the boundaries of Saudi Arabia) and Shiite is clear from the Islamic rhetoric adopted by some sheikhs who fully reject Shiites since they are people of bed'a/ man made innovation who curse the first great caliphs of Islam and attack the mother of the believers 'Aisha, as a Saudi scholar put it. In a sermon given by Sheikh Abdulrahman al-Hozzeffi under the title, "Wipe out the Jews, Christians and Shiite from Arabia" (al-Hozzeffi 1998), one finds complete support for this type of intolerance.

Though Yemenis, Sudanese and Tajiks show remarkable religious tolerance toward non-Muslims (especially Christians and Jews) in terms of their rights to build their houses of worship (over 75% agree or strongly agree), this tolerance fades away when it comes to the issue of political rights. Only 4 to 7 percent of the Yemenis, 2 to 12 percent of Sudanese, and 7 to 11 percent of Tajiks agree to give non-Muslims or Muslims from other sects the right to fully participate in elections, assuming top legislative and executive responsibilities.

The misuse of democratic techniques and procedures to create phony images of legitimate rule has caused a lot of harm to the perception of democracy in the minds of the Muslims of Yemen, the Sudan and Tajikistan. Four Sudanese students in two different group discussions differentiated between a 'democracy', referring to their own country's system of government, and real democracies. The pooled data show that Yemen's excessive tribalism, despite the claims that it is weakening (al-Iryani 1998; Othman 1998), and highly conservative attitudes toward women and Muslims from other sects are responsible for the weak support for democratic software. Sudanese and Tajikistani civil wars may help explain the relatively low level of socio-political tolerance. The Sudanese long civil war (from 1955 until present) has severely shackled the trust and tolerance among northern and southern Sudanese alike especially with lines of overlapping cleavages that separate Arab, predominantly Muslim political elites in the north from the rest of the population in the south. Tajikistan's civil war was shorter (1992-1995) but with over 100,000 causalities that revealed and exacerbated the gap of trust among many local groups and factions such as Kulob, Khujand, and Hisar who fought on one

side and later formed the government and their opponent Tajiks from Qarategin and Badakhshan. "Growing localism and the lack of a national consolidation have brought the [Tajik] society and the state to the verge of collapse" (Abdoullaev 1998).

However, the puzzle remains in the feeble level of support to democratic institutions. Unfortunately, the confusion between real and phony meanings of public elections in most of these countries account for the lack of respect for democratic procedures and institutions. Only 10 percent of the Sudanese and 12 percent of the Tajiks think that the elections and referenda, respectively, are free and fair. Sudanese interviewees were very critical of the phenomenon of putting all major opposition Figures in jail or in exile and to have free elections afterwards; a phenomenon that is very common in most Muslim countries. The civil war along with the four abrupt military coups, and the tension among the political and intellectual elites drove down the hope of real democratization in the Sudan. The Sudanese people chose to punish the government by boycotting both legislative and presidential elections which ended up with the empty ballot boxes in most of the counties; yet still the "elected" president Omar al-Bashir claimed landslide victory in the 2000 elections which encouraged the ruling party to propose to change the constitution to allow the president to be re-elected for unlimited number of times to guarantee the stability of the country.[16]

Pakistanis and Nigerians have a problematic position in the cultural map of Muslims attitudes toward democracy. Given their support for democratic institutions and procedures (democratic hardware), they do not belong to the same category as Saudi Arabia, Yemen and UAE. Yet given their relatively weak level of tolerance, it is easily to put them with the previous cases. For further explication, as Figure 3.1 shows, they have a relatively moderate support for democratic institutions and procedures (around 55 points) which is relatively higher than all previous cultures and as good as Indonesia and the Gambia. Conversely, the two cultures do not show equivalent level of socio-political tolerance. By examining the individual responses of the two cultures, it is clear that there is a lack of trust among Nigerian and Pakistani Muslims and non-Muslims of their respective countries. Furthermore, Pakistani Sunni, Shiite and Ahmadi do not hide their negative attitude toward each other with 73 percent of them refusing inter-sectarian marriages among themselves. Yet, as expected with most minorities, the Shiite and Ahmadi minorities tend to have more tolerant attitudes toward Sunni majority. The data suggests that the tension among different Pakistani ethnic groups such as the Punjabi, the Sindhi, and the Pashtun among others seems to be of secondary importance or has no significance unless concurrent with religious cleavages among different sects of Muslims and non-Muslims (Sunni 77%, Shiite and Ahmadi 20%, Christian, Hindu and others 3%). This result actually confirms other readings of the unstable social fabric of Pakistan (Chaudhri et al. 1989). Similarly in Nigeria, the overlapping religious and ethnic cleavages can explain the lack of socio-political tolerance (Suberu 1996). Though around 75% of Nigerians agree or strongly agree to the right of Christians and Jews to build their own houses of worship (a right that was actually given to the people of the book by Islam), 34 percent of the respondents believe that Christians and Jews should be disfranchised and 32 percent think that their participation should be limited to voting and nothing more. Commenting on this finding a Nigerian student studying Islamic fiqh in Al-Azhar, Egypt said:

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[16] http://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2000/12/12-25-1.htm

[Nigerian] Christians impede Muslims from living according to Islam. Muslims of Nigeria are going to fight for Sharia no matter what it costs even if they have to have their own Islamic state in northern Nigeria.

This finding suggests that Nigeria's public culture among Muslims (50% of the population) poses a problem not only to the country's prospectus of a sustainable democracy but more fundamentally to the unity of the country in general. Though the survey did not capture the specifics of the possible ethnic hostilities in Nigeria, a quick look at Nigeria's electoral disputes that were coupled with ethnic violence and military coup from 1960s thus far reveals the problems of nation building that the country has to face (Aborisade 2002).

Women are not seen in Pakistan as necessarily politically incompetent or unequal to men comparing to the previous cases. In Pakistan, almost 68% of the respondents have no problem that women would participate in politics as ministers (33%) and members of parliament (35%) let alone voting. However, according to the Pew survey, only 52 percent of Pakistanis think that women should decide for themselves on the issue of veiling (Pew 2003a). This result does not contradict with the previous finding about women's participation in politics since hijab/head scarf for both traditionalist and modernist Islamists is considered part of sharia rather than a personal preference. Actually to have this large percentage of Pakistanis to give women the right to decide on this issue is quite surprising. In sum, the deficit in Pakistan's democratic software can be attributed mainly to non-gender religious issues.

Unlike Pakistan, gender gap is a real problem in Nigeria with around 17% of the respondents refuse that they would participate in politics in general and 57 percent limit their participation to voting with only 2 percent of them trust women to be on top executive positions such as ministers. Once again Pew's survey confirms this attitude toward women from a different perspective by showing that 53 percent of Nigerians (the highest among the surveyed Muslim countries in their sample) clearly disagree to allow women to decide on veiling (Pew 2003a).

Regarding the attitudes toward democratic hardware, the negative experiences of military interventions and high levels of corruption and manipulation of elections in both countries have its impact on the attitudes of ordinary Muslims toward the visibility of elections and democratic procedures (Aborisade 2002; Jafri 2002; Jawed 1999; Ujo 2000). Only 20 percent of the pooled respondents from Nigeria and Pakistan showed some satisfaction with the performance of political parties and elected officials. A 57-year Pakistani respondent commented on the web-based version of the survey by saying:

The survey overlooked the role of the military… I never voted for a government without being overthrown by a coup… There is no need for elections if the officers see themselves better politicians.

A Nigerian respondent described elections as "an arena for bribery and corruption" that makes it absolutely undemocratic and un-Islamic. Another Nigerian and four Pakistani respondents made similar comments. This criticism of democratic institutions is very common in both countries. Moreover around 70 percent of the respondents in both countries chose "not

sure" if democratic institutions such as parliaments, elections and parliaments are against Islamic sharia or not.

A notable observation is related to the public acceptance of the label "democracy." For instance, 60 percent of the Saudis, 50 percent of the Yemenis, and 53% of the Omanis disagree or strongly disagree to liken "democracy" to the Islamic system of shura which they prefer more. Yet this ratio goes down very sharply in the countries such as Libya (40 percent), Tajikistan (25 percent), Pakistan (27 percent) and Nigeria (30 percent) where the word democracy is commonly and publicly used by the Westernized intellectual entrepreneurs or even by politicians.

The Sudan, Pakistan, Yemen and Nigeria in particular are examples of countries that have periodic elections that themselves are causing more problems than to both the democratic hardware and software. These fraud and risk-free elections make individuals increasingly less trustful in their values which deeply harm the democratic hardware in the minds of the public. Besides in deeply divided societies, the easiest way for political competitors to win votes is by appealing to ethnic, tribal, religious constituencies which is very destructive of the social fabric of society and thus worsens the public attitudes toward democratic software.

Based on this reading of the political cultures of these countries, one can partially explain why these countries have not seen mass-initiated or mass-supported democratic transitions. In three of the seven cases where elections are common, the turnout in most of the elections was around 35 to 41 percent according to the usually exaggerated official sources (World Bank 2001). This reading of these cultures indicate that unless major cultural shifts occur, any elite-led democratic transitions, if it happens at all, will need to address the issue of non-tolerance toward women (as in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria and Libya), other sects of Muslims (Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Pakistan and UAE), non-Muslims (Pakistan, Nigeria and Yemen). Holding other non-cultural factors constant, one may anticipate that even if the ruling elite decides to administer a genuine democratic transition or occupying forces try to tilt these countries onto democracy, most likely they will find themselves forced to adopt one of two strategies:

1-   To adopt, at least for the short-run, some form of exclusionary democracy (i.e. by excluding given sects of society) analogous to most Western democracies that disfranchised women or other minorities for quite some time until there is a higher level of support for the proceduralist aspects of democracy among those who are already franchised.

2-   To adopt the quota system by allocating certain number of seats to women and other minorities. It is highly possible that these seats can be less than the actual ratio of women and other minorities for the total population to appease the illiberal majority in the short run.

These two strategies may help countries shirk the possibility of unsuccessful transitions that may lead to domestic tension (i.e. civil war) if it is not already there.

These two strategies assume that well crafted democratic hardware can coexist with poor democratic software. The support for this assumption comes from some established democracies that have managed to survive even with relatively low level of democratic software. Israel is a case in hand. According to a survey conducted by Israel Democracy Institute, 57 percent of the Jewish citizens of Israel support forcing the Arab citizens of Israel (their *de jure* fellow citizens) to deport Israel while 53 percent of them objected to giving Arabs full citizenship

rights. Additionally 77 percent believed that Arabs should not take part in any "vital decisions" (al-Hayat, May 18, 2003). Taking these indicators together, one would put Israelis' support for democratic software, as operationalized in this project, not far from the Sudan and Tajikistan.

Building upon the experience of Israel, a good policy recommendation to democracy builders in the previous Muslim countries is to proceed with cautious and gradual democratic hardware reforms without upsetting the fragile social fabric of society due to low levels of tolerance, sense of equality and trust.

C. Moderate Software and Moderate Hardware Category

The prospects for democratization increase the more one moves right-ward in Figure 3.1 since the support for democratic hardware increases. The circle in the middle of Figure 3.1 refers to cultures that are less resistant to socio-political differences and more accommodating or democratic institutions and procedures. These cultures include 11 groups of Muslims (including the 91 Iraqi respondents) and most notably two minorities: Lebanese Muslims and Muslims of European countries. Turkmenistan is in a problematic position mainly because of the low level of support for democratic institutions and procedures. Except for Iraq, all Muslims of these countries were exposed to the initial steps of democratic transition (such as the Gambia, Indonesia and, Bangladesh) or at least some liberalization process (such as Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Turkmenistan) in the past twenty years. Unlike cultures of the first group that are relatively less supportive of democracy either on institutional/procedural or socio-political tolerance/trust bases, Muslims of the middle circle of cultures seem to be more ready to enter the democratic era as far as it is not fiction or part of a self-survival mechanism on the regimes' part. According to a Syrian intellectual, "Syrians are ready to die for Hafez al-Assad and Bashar al-Assad on one condition: give them the right to choose that for themselves… through free elections."

Most of these cases, with the exception of Muslims in the European Union countries, are products of the third wave and they are embodiments of Huntington's saying that: "A general tendency seems to exist for third-wave democracies to become other than fully democratic" (Huntington 1996b). All these cultures currently have some sort of public elections. Some of them are new to elections such as Qatar and Bahrain while others have never witnessed competitive multi-party elections such as Syria and Iraq. A third group has had bloody experiences with elections, including Lebanon and Algeria. Kuwait stands alone as the country that fully disfranchises women which makes it the opposite of Indonesia and Bangladesh with their female heads of governments.

The Gambia is constitutionally a presidential republic yet despite democratic institutions there is no fair chance for the opposition to check and balance the government. Turkmenistan is a country under dictatorial rule with the lowest support for democratic hardware in this group of countries (53 points). With the exception of Muslims of Turkmenistan and of Europe, approximately 40 to 46 percent of the Muslims of other countries in this group characterize their current political system as exactly in the middle between fully free and a full dictatorship which reflects their tendency to see the pros and the cons of the status quo and to compare it with what real democracy looks like. An Algerian professor of sociology, commented on this finding that "most of the people in these countries, with the exception of Iraq, Syria and Turkmenistan,

can opine and talk freely yet they are not politically effective. They are like one-eyed men. They cannot say that they cannot see but they cannot say they see well like normal people either."

Despite the fact that the mode of the responses was toward the middle point of partially free and partially dictatorial, only 10 percent of the respondents in countries like Iraq, Syria or Algeria perceived their countries as free or partly free. This ratio increases dramatically to be around 40 percent in the case of Muslims in EU countries and Lebanon. Yet around high 20 and 30 percent of the respondents of the rest of the countries think that their countries are free or partially free.

Surprisingly, the data suggests that Qatar has the highest level of support for democratic software in this group of cultures (around 62 points). Actually Qatar, along with Bahrain, is often quoted as a good example of modernizing and liberal elite that is ahead of its own people. The semi-city-state of Qatar has made the best use of its coherent social fabric and small population by putting the issues of women on the locus of the attention since the assumption of Hamad Bin Khalifa al-Thani the government in 1995. The number of Qatari women joining university is higher than Qatari men with full political rights (al-Sharq al-Awssat, April 20th, 2003). Around 49 percent of Qatari respondents, the highest ratio in all Gulf States, think that Qatari women can be voted in to the parliament and assume ministerial positions. This finding on its own merit is a possible answer to a question raised in the New Yorker in 2002. Under the title of *Democracy by Decree* the reporter asked: "Can one man propel a country in the future?" (Weaver 2000) The answer seems to be yes. Though, there is no data available about the Qataris' attitudes toward democratic aspects before 1995, Qatar's political culture puts it in the highest rank comparing to all other gulf states in terms of its support for democratic software and second to Kuwait in terms of support for democratic hardware.

In terms of democratic software, it scores even higher than Jordan, Tunisia, Iran, Senegal, and Mali that definitely preceded it in their liberal/democratic transitions. Kuwait on the other hand lacks this support for women's enfranchisement with around 45 percent refusing to support women's right to participate in politics at all. Lebanon, Indonesia and Syria's relatively clear deficit in software is hardly attributed to the public's attitude toward women. Only 5 percent in Indonesia, 7 percent in Lebanon and 13 percent in Syria think that women should not be entitled to vote in public elections. In a clear support for the respect for women, the Pew project showed that 86 percent of Muslims in Indonesia, and 90 percent of Muslims in Lebanon endorse women's right to decide on wearing hijab; an attitude that can generally speaking described as modernist or liberal. However, in the three countries there is high level of intolerance and lack of trust toward non-Muslims and toward different sects of Islam (especially Lebanon). Around 17 percent of the Indonesian respondents do not agree that Christian and Jews would participate in politics at all and only 3 percent give them right to fully participate as ministers. Indonesians however, are more tolerant toward their own fellow Muslims from other sects; only 5 percent of the respondents think that Muslims from other sects should be deprived from their political rights. The effect of the Lebanese civil war on Muslims' low level of tolerance toward Lebanese non-Muslims is clear but still high comparing to other countries that experienced similar tragedies such as Tajikistan, Nigeria and Pakistan. Fairly less tolerant than Indonesians, 33 percent of the Muslims of Lebanon who responded to the survey consider it right to disfranchise all non-Muslims and only 5 percent favor the right of non-Muslims to assume top executive offices such as ministers. The shadows of the civil war are still around in

Lebanon even during basketball games where one hears slogans of racial and religious bigotry. In a recent basketball game, the fans of al-Riady (the "Sportive"), mostly Muslims, shouted "Syria .. Syria" in reference to their support of the Syrian army that empowers Lebanese Muslims. In response, the fans of al-Hikma (the "Wisdom"), mainly Christians, shouted "USA" and "Hakim.. Hakim" in reference to the Christian leader of the so-called Lebanese forces who was famous for killing his Muslim opponents during the civil war (al-Sharq al-Awssat, June 8, 2003).

Conversely, the Lebanese Muslims seem to be relatively but not highly more tolerant toward inter-Islam sectarianism with around 27 percent supporting the disenfranchisement of Muslims from other sects while still only 6 percent would give them full political rights. Syria is somewhat similar to Lebanon regarding the attitudes toward Muslims from other sects while dramatically less tolerant towards non-Muslims, especially the Jews, with around 70 percent supporting their total disenfranchisement. The long war against Israel is the first factor to come to mind to explain this finding. However, the level of intolerance noticeably decreases to 16 percent of the respondents in favor of disfranchising Christians. Only 10 percent of Syrian Muslims think that their other fellow Muslims from other sects should be disenfranchised.

Not taking other factors into account, mass-led democratic transition is a possibility in these countries that occupy the middle circle of Figure 3.1; yet it is not highly likely given the moderate level of support for democratic hardware. This does not mean that there are no political demands for economic or social reasons. But these demands are most likely to fall short of demands for real democratic transition.

However, elite-led democratic transition (or one forced from abroad) would not meet much resistance at the mass level, provided that appropriate institutional design strategies are followed since the level of tolerance is not that high either (Hadenius 2001).

The case of Iraq is significant in this regard. The 91 Iraqis who responded to this survey showed a relatively acceptable level of tolerance and trust toward each other (53 points) which is actually higher than Indonesia, Syria, Algeria, Lebanon and Kuwait. There is nothing in the current data that shows Iraqis to be exceptionally anti-democratic. However, as mentioned earlier, the countries in the middle circle do not have the level of tolerance that would make a quick resort to elections a smart move. An Iraqi liberal commentator supported the coalition forces' reluctance to hold elections in Iraq right now. "Iraqis have to move toward democracy cautiously and gradually… Though, the odds of a democratic Iraq are high, democracy needs training" (al-Qashtini 2003).

The circle in the middle contains as well the average of all Muslims including the ones that were coded as others since the number of the respondents from their respective countries did not meet the criterion of 480 respondents for each country. The average Muslims, regardless of their respective countries, are relatively but not highly tolerant toward women, non-Muslims and Muslims of other sects with a score of 54 points. In other words average Muslims are not as necessarily and inherently intolerant as the stereotype suggests. Besides, an average Muslim scores around 60 points of support for democratic institutions and procedures as far as they are real and genuine.

D. High Hardware and High Software Category:

The symmetry between support for democratic hardware and software continues with the group of cases in the upper right corner of the graph labeled the relatively most democratizable cultures. These countries are relatively the most democratizable given their high level of tolerance and trust and support for democratic institutions and procedures.

That is why when it comes to explaining why some of these countries have not already achieved stable democratic governments, the data suggest that one should search for non-cultural explanations. For instance, Moroccans have the highest level of support for democratic institutions and a relatively high level of tolerance, yet it is not a constitutional monarchy following the Westminster model. The monarch still plays a crucial rule that makes the political parties effectively administrative parties (Gillespie and Youngs 2002). This finding actually can be explained by the fact that the independence was achieved mainly by the efforts of the al-Istiqlal (Independence) Party founded in 1944 and through a lot of negotiations and coalitions inside an elected parliament. Besides the successive Constitutions of Morocco, in a rare exception in all Muslim countries, starting from 1962 the constitution emphasized a representative government, elected parliament and multi-party system under a strong monarchy. One can argue that the lack of a stable democratic system in Morocco cannot be attributed to the individuals' attitudes, as the pooled data suggest, but to the role played by the king (Bourqia and Miller 1999; Layachi 1998).

Turkey on the other hand has the highest level of socio-political tolerance in terms of culture and very high support for democratic institutions. But military interventions to protect and safeguard the secular system along with a somewhat illiberal constitution pose a great obstacle toward full democratization. Based upon both the survey data and the focus group discussions, Turkey has a publicly tolerant culture that does not reflect on the practices of its government, especially in its military arm. One should recall that the public already voted in a woman with hijab into the parliament. It was the secular government, induced and supported by the military that disqualified her, not the Turkish people (Saktanber 2002). Even the Kurdish issue does not seem to be the battle of Turkish individuals but of the military inducing successive governments since 1924 (Ibrahim and Gèurbey 2000). According to a Turkish student of engineering, "there is no guarantee that the military would not strip the president himself of his constitutional rights. They can change the constitution or even tear it up in an hour." This reading of Turkish culture is compatible with the findings that democracy was not constantly seen as a top priority by Turkish official politicians (Heper and Sayari 2002). The last elections reflected the disappointments that the Turkish voters had toward all parties that have been in power since the military gave up power in early 1983 (Kedourie 1996).

Muslims in the U.S. seem to be more supportive of democracy than any other Muslim minority compared to India, Europe and definitely Lebanon. For instance, 57 percent of American Muslims believe that women should be given all political rights without reservations. This ratio goes down to 51 percent in case of EU Muslims and 41 percent in case of Indian Muslims.

With the exception of Iran, almost all other societies in this group have (semi-) secularist constitutions and governmental platforms. This finding supports the arguments made by some secularists that secularism once introduced to Muslim societies will increase the level of

tolerance and peaceful co-existence among religions and sects (Baghdadi 1999). Another support for this claim is the position of Iran in Figure 3.1 in terms of its democratic software. Only Jordan scores below Iran in this group of countries. Iranian scores around 55 points in the scale of democratic software not because Iranians are intolerant rather because "they do not go in terms of their tolerance to the level of infringing upon the roots of their religion" as an anonymous Iranian reformist lawyer commented. This analysis finds support in the pooled data. In the four questions regarding the political rights of Christians, Jews and other non-Muslims, women and Muslims from other sects the mode was to allow all of them to vote and to become members of the parliament. Yet the second most supported option was to give them full political rights including becoming top executives which suggests that Iranians in general are tolerant but cautious.

Table 3.2
Attitudes toward Jews and Christians in the Whole Sample (T-Test)

	Mean	Std. Err	Std. Dev.	T
Christians	2.799	.007	1.052	39.316
Jews	2.639	.008	1.111	

N= 20457 and 2-tailed test.

Note: A T-ratio above 1.96 indicates that there is a statistically significant difference between the means at confidence level of .95.

Table 3.3
Difference in Tolerance toward Jews and Christians in Morocco (T-Test)

	Mean	Std. Err	Std. Dev.	T
Christians	3.351	.029	.685	1.265
Jews	3.344	.029	.696	

N= 558 and 2-tailed test.
   Note: A T-ratio below 1.96 indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the means at confidence level of .95.

The relative deficit in Jordan's democratic software is attributed mainly to the clear polar skewness regarding the political rights of women where between 33 percent of the respondents refuse to give women any political rights and 42 percent who want to give women full political rights. Another factor that seems to be responsible for the relative deficit of democratic software in Jordan is the attitude toward Muslims from different sects and tribes with 55 percent of the respondents refusing to give others any political rights. As one of the respondents commented, this may be because of the fear of the effect of tribalism and sectarianism on the unity of the country rather than because of prejudice or bigotry.
   There are some lessons and observations that can be discussed in summary points as follows:

1- The pooled data suggest that the tolerance toward Jews is much less than the tolerance toward Christians in all Muslim countries except for the case of Morocco where the Jews have always been part of the social fabric as Table 3.2 and 3.3 shows. In Table 3.2, given the large value of t (39.3) one rejects the hypothesis that Muslims treat Christians and Jews alike and accept the alternative hypothesis that Muslims are more tolerant toward Christians than toward the Jews.

2- There is almost consensus among all the interviewees, secularists and Islamists alike, that this discrepancy in tolerance between Jews and Christians can be attributed to the Qur'an clear criticisms of the Jews and Muslims' sympathy and solidarity with their brothers in Palestine. However, the above result is applicable to all Muslim societies except for Morocco where there is no statistical difference between the way Muslims of Morocco perceives Christians and Jews as demonstrated in Table 3.3 .

3- Intra-Islam factions are associated with less tolerance toward non-Muslims in countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait (where Sunni are the majority), along with Bahrain and Iran (where Shiite is the majority). That is to say there is a statistically significant difference between the levels of tolerance toward non-Muslims versus Muslim minorities with relatively higher level of tolerance toward non-Muslims. Muslims, in countries like Indonesia, the Gambia, Egypt, Nigeria, India, Malaysia, Turkey, Qatar and Bangladesh, are generally tolerant. Yet this tolerance is higher toward Muslims from other sects than toward non-Muslims mainly because these countries do not actually have significant Muslim minorities from other sects. Pakistani and Sudanese Muslims are alike in their lower level of tolerance toward Muslim and non-Muslim minorities alike. Muslims from countries like Morocco, Senegal, Mali, Lebanon, UAE and Oman do not have statistically significant difference in tolerance between Muslims of other sects and non-Muslim minorities in their respective countries.

However, as Table 3.4 shows, in general Muslims have a tendency to show tolerance toward their fellow Muslims from other sects more than tolerance toward non-Muslims. This difference in tolerance can be attributed to which can be attributed to the fact that most Muslims do not live in countries that have intra-Islam sectarian divisions. That is why intra-Islam sectarian division can be a real obstacle toward democratization in the countries that have these divisions (e.g. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia). However, as a general comment on how these intra- and inter-religion divisions may impede the democratic transition, Pew's 2003 survey showed that nearly four-in-ten of the American citizens "would not vote for a well-qualified Muslim for president" (Pew 2003b). A noticeable number of Americans would not vote for a qualified evangelical (15 percent), a Jew (10 percent), a Catholic (8 percent) or an atheist (52 percent) (Pew 2003b). Thus the cultural influences of inter- and intra-religion divisions are not a peculiarly Muslim phenomenon but it can be more acute and troubling in some countries more than others.

4- Rigid attitudes toward women's political efficacy in general are a male rather than a female phenomenon as Table 3.5 suggests. That is to say, with the exception of Turkey and Tajikistan, all sampled data refer to the clear tendency among women to support their own political rights more than men do. In Turkey and Tajikistan, there were no statistically significant differences between Turkey's men and women support for women's rights and likewise Tajikistan's men and women relatively lower lack of support toward women's political rights.

Even in countries with little support for women's political rights on average, women are more tolerant than men.

Table 3.4

Difference in Tolerance toward Muslim and Non-Muslim Minorities (T-Test)

	Mean	Std. Err	Std. Dev.	T
Non-Muslims	2.652	.010	1.065	-8.6966
Muslim Minorities	2.727	.009	1.052	

N= 11168 and 2-tailed test.

Note: A T-ratio above 1.96 indicates that there is a statistically significant difference between the means at confidence level of .95.

Table 3.5

Difference in Tolerance toward Women (T-Test)

	N	Mean	Std. Err	Std. Dev.	T
Male	15476	2.696	.008	1.050	-34.131
Female	7738	3.176	.010	.909	

N= 15835 and 2-tailed test.
Note: A T-ratio above 1.96 indicates that there is a statistically significant difference between the means at confidence level of .95.

2. The Influence of Cultural Entrepreneurs on the Masses

Building on the last chapter's discussion of how Muslim intellectuals and ulama/scholars (cultural or intellectual entrepreneurs) introduce different and uncompromising readings of Islam's compatibility with democracy, this section will examine how these tense debates influence the public culture. In other words, does one expect the public mind to reflect the same division and tension? Besides, how can one relate the division among the four types of intellectuals and ulama/scholars to the cultural map of different cultures as portrayed in Figure 3.1? The response to these two questions requires us first to classify the respondents to the survey into Islamist traditionalists, Islamist modernists, liberal secularists and autocratic secularists.

Table 3.6 identifies four criteria to distinguish among the respondents who fall into the four groups. Question 2.8 is a very straightforward and reliable criterion for one's position as a secularist or Islamist since it directly asks respondents to (strongly) agree or strongly disagree to the famous statement of Muslim brotherhood that Islam is deen wa dawla / religion and state. Those who chose "Not sure" are excluded from the classification. However, since the attitude toward democracy specifically is much more delicate, the three other questions (2.4, 2.7, and 2.28) were used to differentiate between modernists (who argue for the compatibility of Islam

and democracy) and traditionalists (who argue the opposite) among Islamists and between liberals (who advocate democracy) and autocrats (who advocate autocracy) among secularists.

Table 3.6
Classification of Respondents' Attitudes toward Democracy

	Islam as a source of political doctrine (Q. 2.8)	Is Islam and elected polity compatible? (Q. 2.7)	Associating democracy with negatives? (Q. 2.4)	Definition of Democracy (open-ended) (Q. 2.28)
1. Traditionalist Islamists	(Strongly) Agree	(Strongly) Disagree	(Strongly) Agree	(Very) Negative
2. Autocratic Secularists	(Strongly) Disagree	Not Applicable	(Strongly) Agree	(Very) Negative
3. Modernist Islamists	(Strongly) Agree	(Strongly) Agree	(Strongly) Disagree	(Very) Positive
4. Liberal Secularists	(Strongly) Disagree	Not Applicable	(Strongly) Disagree	(Very) Positive

Traditionalist Islamists have been identified in the survey as those who consistently refuse the values and institutions of democracy since they are un-Islamic. The best exemplification of this mentality is Ali Belhaj (a leader of Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front that almost won the 1988 elections) who said: "when we are in power, there will be no more elections because God will be ruling." Hadi Hawang of Partai Islam Sel-Malaysia (PAS) echoed the same mentality by saying: "I am not interested in democracy. Islam is not democracy, Islam is Islam" (Quoted in: Pipes 1995)

Traditionalists have been identified from their takes on 1) Islam as state and religion (slogan raised by Islamic groups throughout the Muslim world); 2) their negative definition of democracy (an open-ended question) and 3) their belief that Islam and publicly elected and accountable government are incompatible. Modernist Islamists, unlike traditionalists, have been identified as those who consistently accept both the values and institutions of democracy since they are Islamic or Islamizable (condoned by Islam) in both their definition of democracy and their response to the same mentioned questions. Modernist Islamists in general argue that democracy is a priority over sharia not priority of supremacy but priority of order. Analogously, the street is prior to the mosque since you need to pass by the street before you go to the mosque.

Autocrats are those who consistently (strongly) disagree to the linkage between Islam, as a religion, and the state, as a political institution, and oppose democracy, as not suitable or not the top priority of Muslim countries, thus should be dropped or postponed.

These attitudes were captured in the responses to questions 2.4 and 2.28. Liberals are the sub-group of secularists who consistently accept democratic norms and institutions in their responses to these two questions. It is noteworthy that if any respondent does not show consistency in answering questions such as agreeing to question 2.7 and at the same time

agreeing to question 2.4, he/she is dropped from the classification. Keeping that in mind, the data suggest that the Muslim public culture reflects the same division among intellectuals and ulama/scholars in 86 percent of the cases. It is important to note that around 4.5 percent of the respondents did not respond to two or more of the questions mentioned in Table 3.6. However, it is very difficult to assess why the remaining 9.5 percent of the respondents who actually responded to almost all the questions did not fall into any of the four categories. They may have misunderstood a question or more, they may be simply inconsistent or adopt an outlying position that could not be met by the four positions advanced by Muslim intellectuals and ulama/scholars. Based on tabulations of the 21,143 respondents who consistently fall into one of the four categories, Table 3.7 that shows the relative percentage of each one of these groups by country.

Table 3.7 can be very informative in a variety of ways. First, it suggests that educated Muslims are predominately Islamists (either traditionalists or modernists). This finding in itself confirms Islamists' argument that they control streets and mosques while secularists control palaces and media. Only in Tajikistan (55 percent), Turkmenistan (58 percent), Mali (57 percent), Tunisia (58 percent), Albania (62 percent) and Turkey (68 percent)are secularists in the majority.

An Islamist modernist commented on the results of the 2003 elections in the Egyptian syndicate of journalism where the opposition (mainly pan-Arabists and Islamists) won two third of the seats that: "When true and genuine democracy prevails, it will definitely lead to the unequivocally opposite direction to the current trends in Arab politics" (Howaidi 2003b). Let it be clear that since the great majority of Muslim countries are not governed by liberal or modernist elites, according to the working definitions articulated in this project, this data, though not qualified for generalization about all Muslims, confirms this past statement.

Third, there is a common factor that characterizes all the countries with a secularist majority: Muslims were forced through governmental policies to be secular (through secular system of education, mass media and the governmental control over Islamic institutions) either by communist regimes (Ex. Albania, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan), or Muslim rulers who decided to westernize their countries through non-democratic means (Ex. Turkey, Mali and Tunisia).

Apparently, other rulers in other Muslim countries were not that successful. With the exception of Tajikistan, in five of the previous six cases, and totally unlike the elites, the majority of public attitudes are more liberal than their autocratic rulers.

Fourth, since the modernist Islamists and the liberal secularists are the only two groups of the repertoire of the cultural positions available to Muslims that seek co-existence with each other, albeit with a very high level of self-restraint, they deserve more attention. It is almost impossible to imagine a scenario by which a peaceful alteration of power could ever happen in a country governed by traditionalists or autocrats. Yet one can imagine, assuming that each group of cultural entrepreneurs will act according to their declared discourse, that the only two groups that may accept, even reluctantly, democracy to be the only game in town are the liberals and modernists. Added up together they have formed the seventh column entitled 3+4.

Table 3.7
The Percentages of the Four Cultural Categories in 32 Muslim Countries

	1 Trad.	2 Auto.	3 Mod.	4 Lib.	1+3 Islamists	3+4 Democrats	Democratiz-ability
Turkey	1	5	31	63	32	94	Most
Senegal	9	0	68	23	77	91	Most
Morocco	9	0	72	19	80	91	Most
Albania	5	6	33	57	38	90	Most
Egypt	3	7	63	27	66	89	Most
Tunisia	6	8	37	50	42	87	Most
Iran	2	12	79	7	81	86	Most
USA	10	8	33	50	53	83	Most
MALI	2	15	50	33	43	83	Most
Gambia	3	15	54	29	56	82	Most
Turkmenistan	11	9	31	49	42	81	Most
Malaysia	14	6	62	18	76	80	Most
EU	15	5	47	33	62	80	Most
India	10	16	50	23	61	73	Possibly
Kuwait	17	11	41	32	58	73	Possibly
Bangladesh	20	8	48	24	68	72	Possibly
Jordan	20	9	48	23	68	71	Possibly
Qatar	23	8	45	24	68	69	Possibly
Bahrain	23	10	58	10	81	67	Possibly
Syria	26	7	40	27	66	67	Possibly
UAE	30	3	60	7	90	67	Possibly
Lebanon	20	14	31	35	51	67	Possibly
Algeria	25	10	33	33	58	66	Possibly
Indonesia	28	7	40	25	68	65	Possibly
Oman	31	5	46	18	77	64	Least
Libya	27	9	59	5	86	64	Least
Yemen	35	1	46	17	81	63	Least
Sudan	26	12	55	7	80	62	Least
Pakistan	24	15	42	19	66	61	Least
Nigeria	31	14	38	17	69	55	Least
Tajikistan	11	36	35	19	45	54	Least
Saudi Arab	46	2	48	4	95	52	Least
Average	*18.34*	*8.41*	*47.69*	*25.72*	*65.13*	*73.38*	*Possibly*

Source: web and written survey 2002

To avoid the arbitrary classification of societies, one can suggest a continuum where societies with the highest percentage of democrats (column 3+4) are the most democratizable

and societies with the least percentage of democrats are the least democratizable. In this column, Muslims of Turkey, Senegal, Morocco, Albania, Egypt, Tunisia, Iran, USA, Mali, the Gambia, Turkmenistan, Malaysia, and the European Union countries are the most democratizable cultures. If we compare this list of countries thus far, with the exception of Muslims of Turkmenistan and EU, this result confirms the cultural map of democratic hardware and software as presented in Figure 3.1. This confirmation is crucial since three of the four questions (2.8, 2.7 and 2.28) were not used in building the scales of democratic hardware and software as portrayed in Figure 3.1. Thus, two different types of questions lead to a similar result which increases the reliability of the data. Actually, one should not be concerned about shift in the status of the Muslims of the EU since they were among the highest supporters of democratic hardware and were more tolerant than Iran, Tunisia, and Jordan that were in the category of the most democratizable cultures in Figure 3.1. The actual surprise is the shift in the Turkemani Muslims' position toward the 'most democratizable' category. Though, there is no enough data to explain the shift, one can argue that the legacy of the state-imposed secularism and distorted understanding of democracy under the Soviet Union may explain part of the discrepancy. No other discrepancies between positions of countries in Figure 3.1 and Table 3.6 except for the downward shift of Jordan from the most democratizable category to the possible democratizable and UAE into the opposite direction. Once again, the shift is fallacious since Jordan was actually the lowest score of democratic software country in the category of most democratizable cultures. Thus, moving backward in Table 3.1 should not be a surprise. UAE as well shift upward to become possible democratizable, though it has one of the least supportive cultures of hardware but this does not mean that they are anti-democratic. It is just that they do not need it, but in case they need it, they may adopt it.

Second, Table 3.6 suggests that average Muslims' political culture is not necessarily democratic but definitely democratizable. As shown, 73 percent of Muslims overall (irrespective of country) are either modernist Islamists or liberal secularists.

Based upon Table 3.6, one can ask if the intellectual civil war that was based upon lack of trust and defaming one's opponents has its impact on a cultural civil war among ordinary educated Muslims. The following section will try to answer this question.

3. Illiberal Democracy Debate

How liberal are Muslims? A balanced and moderate level of democratic checks and boundaries benefit both democratic procedures and liberal values. Unlimited democracy harms liberal principles by favouring "discriminatory measures benefiting the various groups supporting the majority [besides,] it is also doubtful whether in the long run democracy can preserve itself if it abandons liberal principles" (Hayek 1978:143).

The available data can help examine educated Muslims' attitudes toward some aspects of liberal democracy. Muslims are claimed to be illiberal even if they are democratic. This discrepancy suggests that they may accept the means and mechanisms of participation and democracy such as elections, parties, and parliament with the minimal level of democratic values associated with it such as equality and tolerance for loyal "others." Yet they do not go the further step toward the protection of others' liberties of religion, belief, speech, assembly, and property even if they are perceived to be radically different (Zakaria 1997). Democracy, in terms of procedural hardware, is proposed to be more acceptable by Muslims than liberal, non-Islamic

values (Kramer 1999) which increases the possibility of accepting democracy only among those who think alike. Other studies found Muslims less tolerant toward homosexuals and atheists (Norris and Inglehart 2002; Pew 2003b). According to a Sudanese Sheikh who talks very comfortably about Islamic democracy: "a Muslim tolerant of homosexuality is not a Muslim since he tolerates what he is asked not to tolerate. It is kabeera/grand sin that takes one to hellfire."

In this section, the less ideologically liberal Muslims are, the more they reflect the intellectual civil war depicted in the previous chapter. Thus, a measurement of political and ideological liberalism serves two purposes: First, it helps examine if democracy functions as a disposable "ladder" that is abused by some groups and will be burned once they are in power. Judging the intentions of others is rather impossible but the data in this survey functions as a tool of affirmation if this tendency exists. Second, liberalism is a system of values that merits examination in itself especially when it comes to adopting liberal attitudes toward who are ideologically different: secularists versus Islamists and vice versa.

In other words, Muslims' software (socio-religious and political liberal attitudes at the individual level) was important but not enough to judge the democratizability of different cultures since these cultures divide as well on the ideological Islamist-secularist axis. The pages to come will introduce another measurement of Muslims' (il)liberal attitudes toward the rights of their ideologically political opponents to establish legal political parties and thus to compete for power. No democracy can emerge and flourish if elections are not coupled with mutual respect for both the liberal and democratic rules on the parts of the majorities and minorities toward each others' right to exist and function.

It should be clear that the measurement of ideological liberalism used here is based on a normative scale that assumes full acceptance of others' ideologies and acknowledges their rights to exist. It is a normative scale since it is practically impossible to find such a level of mutual acceptance in any modern polity.

Even Germany – widely held to be a consolidated liberal democracy – outlaws parties of the extreme left and right (Communists and Nazis). Their reasons are based in their own history, together with the logic that both extremes are committed to using democratic means to end democracy. Most Germans support the laws. The U.S. has hate speech laws, and campuses have the right and the judicial procedures in place to expel students who engage in hate speech. Yet this does not make either Germany or USA illiberal societies.

Despite these examples, this project adopts the normative scale that assumes full acceptance of others' ideologies. This choice is due to the fact that it is the only possible unbiased tool that enables us to compare Muslims' positions without making judgments about individual intentions. For instance, secularists accuse Islamists of being opportunistic who want to use democracy and dispense with it once they are in power. Though, one can make some good guesses about whether this is true or not in each Muslim society individually, these guesses are not empirically verifiable in most cases.

In the current survey, the respondents have been asked to respond to two questions that captured their tendency to allow "Islamist" parties and "non-Islamist" parties such as communists, socialists and liberal in general to compete for power. Neither of the questions differentiates between genuinely democratic parties and opportunistic ones. Thus, the questions assume that if an Islamist refuses all the "non-Islamist" parties regardless of their commitment to

democracy, then it is a clear indication that he/she adopts an illiberal position toward non-Islamic (alien) parties and ideologies. Likewise, if a secularist refuses all Islamist parties, regardless of their attitudes toward violence and democracy while there is no single Muslim society without some modernist Islamists who believe in the compatibility of Islam and democracy, then he/she adopts an illiberal attitude.

The four Tables 3.8-1, 3.8-2, 3.9-1 and 3.9-2 demonstrate Muslims' attitudes toward the legal establishment of liberal, communist, and socialist parties in their respective countries and their attitudes toward allowing Islamist movements to form legal political parties.

The last columns in Tables 3.8-1 and 3.9-1 explicitly demonstrate the polarization in attitudes among Muslims regarding forming parties. Around 37 percent of Muslims, holding their countries of origin constant, (strongly) disagree with giving liberal, socialist and/or communist political parties the right to exist as captured by question 2.27. Table 3.8-2, which is another way of demonstrating Table 3.8-1, shows that half of those who (strongly) disagree that these parties ought to exist (36.59%) are the traditionalists (18.39%) for religious reasons. However, autocrats as well are responsible for around 20 percent of refusing this type of parties (6.9/36.6). This is consistent with their tendencies to set the idea of having multi-party system on a low level in their list of priorities. The attitude of modernist Islamists who, given their other answers, represent the most liberal and pluralistic face of Islamists is very intriguing. Around 20 percent of them refuse to legalize such "alien" parties (Table 3.8-1) which puts them in a very close position to traditionalists. Though democratic in general, one modernist of each five in the pooled data does not seem to be liberal enough to accept parties that are based upon non-Islamic ideologies.

Table 3.8-1
Tolerance toward Non-Islamist Political Parties %

	Tradition.	Autocrat	Modern.	Liberals	Total
(Strongly) Disagree		69.72	20.36	5.55	36.59
Not sure	0	17.40	23.60	7.54	15.07
(Strongly) Agree	0	12.88	56.04	86.9	48.35
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Pearson chi2 (12)= 12000 Pr = 0.000

Table 3.8-2
Tolerance toward Non-Islamist Political Parties % (Different angle)

	Tradition.	Autocrat.	Modern.	Liberals	Total
(Strongly) Disagree	18.39	6.89	10.06	1.24	36.59
Not sure	0	1.72	11.67	1.68	15.07
(Strongly) Agree	0	1.27	27.69	19.37	48.35
	18.4	9.9	49.42	22.29	100

Pearson chi2 (12)= 12000 Pr = 0.000

Yet when one considers the 23 percent of modernists who are skeptical (not sure), a preponderance of evidence supports the claim that some modernists are more democratic and less liberal. That is to say, they accept democratic mechanisms and institutions as means of participation and competition but only among those who accept the Islamic frame of reference. This finding was supported by many of the focus-group discussions with many pro-democracy interviewees who very reluctantly accept even to discuss why a communist party may exist in a Muslim country given what they know about Marx's often quoted opinion about religion. Does this mean that the secularists who put traditionalists and modernists in the same basket are right? There is a possibility here for this reading at least in the case of 20 percent of the illiberal democratic modernists. Some modernists, when given the opportunity to actually govern such as in the Sudan under the current "Islamic" regime, were not much different from despotic autocratic secularists. Thus, it is safe to infer that not all modernist (democratic) Islamists are liberal. The proportion of illiberal modernists Islamists, according to this data, is around 20 percent of all modernists.

However, some liberal secularists as well have reservations on allowing some non-Islamic parties to exist particularly the communist and socialist ones. As shown in Tables 3.8-1 and 3.9-1, 5.5 and 18.8 percent of the nominal liberals seem to be conditional liberals; that is to say they have reservations and concerns about Islamist and non-Islamist parties' commitment to the democratic rules and liberal values. An Algerian professor called himself a "conditional liberal." He added: "I am liberal before I am a democrat.

Table 3.9-1
Tolerance toward Islamist Political Parties %

	Tradition.	Autocrat	Modern.	Liberals	Total
(Strongly) Disagree	98.9	96.67	0.42	18.81	30.51
Not sure	.91	1.51	10.07	26.04	11.76
(Strongly) Agree	.20	1.82	89.5	55.15	57.73
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Pearson chi2(12)= 19000   Pr=0.00

Table 3.9-2
Tolerance toward Islamist Political Parties % (Different angle)

	Tradition.	Autocrat	Modern.	Liberals	Total
(Strongly) Disagree	16.7	8.87	0.21	4.73	30.51
Not sure	0.15	0.14	4.91	6.56	11.76
(Strongly) Agree	0.03	0.17	43.65	13.88	57.73
Total	16.89	9.17	48.76	25.17	100

Pearson chi2(12)= 19000   Pr=0.00

Democracy may eat itself by giving illiberals the right to deprive me from all my rights." Thus, he is liberal on one condition; liberalism does not wither away at any point of time no matter what the system of government is. Yet he sees no future for liberalism if Islamists take over. "They think that they are the soldiers of Allah and speak in His name." The Algerian professor's attitude is not an exception. Dr. Hazem Hosni of Cairo University, though liberal in general, prefers the current regime in Egypt, even if it may not be fully democratic to "a totalitarian theology under Islamists."

The percentage of liberals who show no tolerance toward Islamist political parties is around 18.8 percent (Table 3.9-1). Thus almost one fifth of the nominal liberals seem to be conditional liberals to say the least, contradictory or opportunistic liberals to echo the Islamists' criticisms of secularist positions. A Syrian independent Modernist Islamist whom I interviewed in UAE waged a harsh criticism on liberal secularists since they talk the talk of liberalism but walk the walk of autocrats. "They like elections only if it gets them to power." Howaidi of Egypt made a similar observation when some nominal liberals criticized the illiberal elections that may bring Nasserists and Islamists into power (Howaidi 2003c). This analysis gives an indication for how the lack of trust and opportunistic tendencies exists in roughly 20 percent of modernists who do not actually adhere to the principles of co-existence and tolerance with non-Islamic ideologies and 18 percent of liberals follow the same path.

Sa'id al-'ashmawi of Egypt, a prominent and leading secularist figure in the Arab world, is sure that the great majority of Muslims, if given the opportunity to elect their representatives, will fall into the trap of the demagogic Islamists. I have to concur that 40 percent, but still not the majority, of the interviewees in the focus-group discussions in Egypt, UAE, and Algeria affirm al-'Ashmawi's fears. Some adopt Islamic rhetoric and discourse in a suicide way of thinking. A Syrian student studying in al-Azhar University, for one, clearly states that: "Islamists are the only hope for us now. We tried everything and failed. Let us try Islam." When I raised the possibility of Islamists being worse than current rulers, a scary nightmare that many secularists have, I received the following response from a student of medicine in Algeria: "Allah is going to punish Islamists if they misuse Islam but we did what is right; we chose the best whom we know to defend Allah's cause. If they betray Allah, it is their responsibility." This way of thinking has been characterized as suicide-thinking in the sense that one chooses the best for him/herself, to clear his/her consciousness, without thinking of the ramifications of his/her choice on others. A Moroccan-American citizen justified his support for Islamists by saying: "They deceived us by Allah and we accepted the deception." When I asked why, he said: "We are deceived anyway!"

It seems that some of those who prefer the Islamic agenda choose it according to culturally embedded rational calculations that render deception under Islamic umbrella better than deception under alien slogans. These modernist Islamists and nominal liberal secularists who are certainly pro-democratic procedures and tolerant toward women, non-Muslims and Muslims from other sects do not show enough liberal stamina to push themselves to accept the right of each others' parties to legally exist. Once again they represent 20 percent of modernists Islamists and 18 percent of the nominal liberals according to the pooled data and pose a real threat toward viable democratic transitions in the Muslim world in general.

However, looking at the other side of the coin, approximately 56 percent of modernist Islamists accept and tolerate the existence of non-Islamic parties (Table 3.8-1) at the same time

55 percent of liberals accept the existence of Islamist political parties (Table 3.9-1). This last finding may reveal that the classification of the previous four ideal types needs more articulation since only 55 percent of the liberals seem to be fully liberal and 18 percent seem to be conditionally liberal. Likewise, only 56 percent of modernist Islamists are genuine Islamist democrats who adhere to the walk and talk of democracy.

Since 47.7 and 25.7 percent of Muslims are modernist Islamists and liberal secularists (Table 3.7), then around 41 percent of Muslims captured by this survey pass the three tests of liberal democracy: 1- democratic software (minimum level of tolerance and trust needed for democracy to function); 2- democratic hardware (support for the democratic processes and mechanisms) and 3- liberal values (acceptance of the "other" ideologies).

Intra-cultural comparison is useful in this regard. In Table 3.10, a measurement of liberalism/illiberalism was developed based upon the comparative percentages of those who support or do not support the existence of parties that are based on the "other" ideologies whether it is Islamist for secularists or un/non-Islamic for Islamists. Since liberalism is an attitude toward whom and what one disagrees with, the first two columns represent the percentages of Muslims who (strongly) refuse to allow Islamist or secularist (liberal, communist, or socialist) parties to legally exist in their respective countries.

To classify relatively liberal, semi-liberal and relatively illiberal cultures at the aggregate level, a tentative criterion was developed to reflect the relative acceptance of the parties that adopt ideologies Muslims happen to refuse. Thus, if only 15 percent (maximum of 30) or less of Muslims in a given country refuse to legalize both types of parties adopting the "other" ideologies, this country has a relatively or comparatively liberal culture among its Muslims. If 16 to 24 percent (maximum of 48) Muslims in a given country refuse to legalize both types of parties adopting the "other" ideologies, this country has a relatively or comparatively semi-liberal culture among its Muslims. If 25 percent (maximum of 50) or more of the respondents refuse to legalize both types of parties, it is considered to have a relatively illiberal culture among its Muslims. Thus, a country like Albania is among the relatively liberal cultures because only 9 (less than 15) percent of its Muslims object to have non-Islamic parties. Yet a country like Nigeria is relatively illiberal since 34 percent of its Muslims refuse to allow Islamic parties while 49 percent have the same attitude toward secularist ideologies. With this type of polarization, there is a clear indication of lack of ideological liberal environment and, thus, a tense ideological and cultural civil war among Muslims of Nigeria.

If this measurement of political and ideological (il)liberal cultural environment is reliable, one can classify the 32 cases into the demonstrated categories with Albania, Turkey, Iran, Egypt, Morocco, Senegal and the Gambia among the comparatively most ideologically liberal cultural environments in the Muslim world. Yet the Sudan, Syria, Alger1ia, Tajikistan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Qatar, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Yemen, Oman, UAE, Libya, Indonesia, and Lebanon are among the least politically and ideologically liberal cultural environments in the Muslim world.

Table 3.10

Attitudes toward Political Parties Based on Islamic or Non-Islamic Ideologies (%)

	* (Strongly) Disagree to Islamist Parties	** (Strongly) Disagree to Non-Islamist Parties	Relatively liberal & Illiberal Culture	Skewness in Support for ideologies	Cultural Tendency
ALB	18	9	Liberal	-9	Pro-secularist
TUR	14	15	Liberal	1	Pro-Islamist
IRN	9	23	Liberal	14	Pro-Islamist
EGY	11	22	Liberal	12	Pro-Islamist
MOR	7	22	Liberal	15	Pro-Islamist
SEN	7	20	Liberal	13	Pro-Islamist
GAM	15	23	Liberal	8	Pro-Islamist
MALY	21	28	Semi Liberal	7	Pro-Islamist
USA	24	24	Semi Liberal	0	Equal
IND	22	31	Semi Liberal	9	Pro-Islamist
JOR	25	37	Semi Liberal	13	Pro-Islamist
KUW	20	30	Semi Liberal	10	Pro-Islamist
TUN	18	16	Semi Liberal	-2	Pro-secularist
TRK	23	19	Semi Liberal	-4	Pro-secularist
MALI	18	27	Semi Liberal	9	Pro-Islamist
EU	18	29	Semi Liberal	11	Pro-Islamist
LEB	34	38	Illiberal	4	Pro-Islamist
INS	39	37	Illiberal	-2	Pro-secularist
LIB	38	43	Illiberal	5	Pro-Islamist
UAE	42	41	Illiberal	-2	Pro-secularist
OMA	43	42	Illiberal	-1	Pro-secularist
YEM	43	46	Illiberal	3	Pro-Islamist
PAK	30	41	Illiberal	11	Pro-Islamist
SAU	44	55	Illiberal	11	Pro-Islamist
NIG	34	49	Illiberal	15	Pro-Islamist
QAT	27	39	Illiberal	12	Pro-Islamist
BAN	27	35	Illiberal	8	Pro-Islamist
BAH	28	37	Illiberal	10	Pro-Islamist
TAJ	47	28	Illiberal	-19	Pro-secularist
ALG	29	33	Illiberal	4	Pro-Islamist
SYR	25	36	Illiberal	11	Pro-Islamist
SUD	25	45	Illiberal	19	Pro-Islamist
average	26	32	Semi-liberal	6	Pro-Islamist

* Pearson chi2(124) = 3200 Pr = 0.000, ** Pearson chi2(124) = 1700 Pr = 0.000.

By looking at the last row in Table 3.10, 26 and 32 percent of average Muslims would object to having Islamist or non-Islamist parties respectively. Taken together, these people who object to legalize either types of parties represent 58 of Muslims. This other way of calculation confirms the previous finding that around 41 percent of Muslims are genuine liberals whether modernists or Islamists. With the exception of Muslims of the U.S. who on average treat both types of political parties similarly, all Muslim cultures have a tendency to favor Islamist or secularist parties. In a scale from +19 to -19 the skewness in support for ideologies among Muslim cultures captured in the survey is measured.

The more a culture supports Islamist parties the closer it gets to +19 it scores and vice versa. Cultures that scored relatively around 0, such as Muslims of the U.S., Turkey, Tunisia, Oman, and Indonesia are more equally balanced in their acceptance (ex. Turkey) or refusal (ex. Indonesia) of both types of parties.

Some cultures, however, are clear in their acceptance and preference for Islamic ideologies to be officially transformed into Islamist political parties such as in the Sudan, Morocco and Iran. Other cultures showed evident tendencies toward secularist parties most notably in Tajikistan and Albania with a clear lower degree. Out of 32 cultures, only seven cultures seem to be supportive of secularist parties than Islamist parties.

With the exception of Malaysia and Yemen, the Table 3.11 clearly predicts that if these countries run free and fair elections with relatively massive participation on the part of educated Muslims, the political map and power structure will radically shift in favor of new powers.

Out of the 24 cultures that support having Islamist parties only seven countries occasionally and officially allow such types of parties or associations (Jordan, Morocco, Turkey, the Sudan, Indonesia, Pakistan and Iran) which reflect the gap between what the elite allows for ordinary Muslims to choose from and what ordinary Muslims want for themselves. Among these seven countries, Islamists are somehow represented in the political arena either as government (Turkey, Iran and the Sudan) or opposition (Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, and Indonesia).

The preponderance of evidence suggests that Islamists have more presence in the street than secularists. Islamists can meet Muslims in mosques that abundantly exist in almost all major streets in virtually all Muslim cities and towns.
Most Muslim autocratic governments have closed the political system to such an extent that the secular forces (liberal, Marxist, nationalist and socialist) "have been totally marginalized, and the only ideology that people can gravitate around has been that of political Islam. The Islamists have provided the only viable alternative to these governments" (Weaver 1999).

One last conclusion may be inferred from the previous analysis regarding the secular/Islamist tension. Though some researchers (Fish 2002; Lewis 2002; Norris and Inglehart 2002) focused on the unequal position of women in Muslim societies as one of the core reasons for lack of democracy, this study proposes another, and possibly more important, factor that may account for the lack of democracy which is mistrust and suspicion that sharply divides Muslims into "minority of secularists who have no trust in Islamists and the majority of Islamists who have no respect for secularists" as noted a professor of University of Tehran.

4. Change Vs. Status Quo

The foregoing analysis provides some idea about the general tendency among Muslims regarding democracy and liberalism without actually asking the fundamental question: are Muslims satisfied with the status quo? If Muslims are content with their mostly non-democratic political systems, then one cannot be more Catholic than the pope.

The survey directly asked the respondents to choose between the incumbents and democratic rulers. As shown in Table 3.11, only UAE can be considered to have a pro-incumbents' political culture. Ninety-three percent of the respondents think that the status quo is better than a democratically elected ruler. Oman comes second with 65 percent of the population prefer the un-elected incumbents over publicly elected one.

The other cultures clearly are not supportive of the status quo at least in comparison with the first two cases. The Muslims least supportive of incumbents are the Kuwaitis, Egyptians, Syrians, Moroccans, Sudanese, Malians, and Gambians.

Around 31 percent of Saudis are in favor of democratically elected rulers. This result is consistent with the fact that citizens of Saudi Arabia scored around 43 points on the scale of support for democratic hardware.

Yet as a university professor from Riyadh commented: "Most Saudis want change but not necessarily democracy. If democracy leads to change, they may reluctantly accept both." Malaysians and Yemenis seem to be dubious about what democracy can bring better than the status quo with around 48 and 43 percent of the respondents not sure about democracy or incumbents.

"All democratic developments in the Arab and Muslim world since 1967 have benefited Islamists mainly." Dr. Nevin Mousa'd of Cairo University observed. She predicts that the more Muslim countries open up politically, the more Islamists will benefit from the growing levels of dissatisfaction among the masses. One cannot agree more.

The focus-group discussions tried to shed more light on those who are pro-incumbent (around 14 percent on average) even if they are not democratically elected. One interesting finding is that most of these pro-incumbents adopt the logic of "dictators but…" That is to say there is always a tendency among pro-incumbent Muslims to justify the autocratic practices of the rulers on grounds like fighting foreign enemies or keeping the national unity (Sudanese interviewees), achieving domestic stability (Egyptian interviewees), re-distributive (socialist) policies (Libyan and Emariti interviewees), achieving independence (Algerian interviewees), or the application of sharia/Islamic legislation (Saudi and Iranian interviewees).

These groups of Muslims who adopt the strategy "dictator but…" would not accept being ruled by "sinner but…" That is to say, when the interviewees who supported the incumbents were asked if they support a sinner ruler (I consistently used the name of President Bill Clinton as an example), they clearly refused to support a "sinner but…" logic of thinking. Modernists in general refused the false dilemma of either "sinner but" versus "dictator but." They prefer a third scenario of a devout Muslim who acts according to shura and respects the public will. No heed was given to the issue of personal piety by secularists. A democratic liberal ruler is preferred to the "sheikh of Islam if the sheikh of Islam is not publicly elected and keeps his understanding of Islam to himself," An American of Lebanese origin commented.

Table 3.11
Pro-democratic or Pro-incumbents (%)

Society	Pro-Incumbents	Not Sure	Pro-Democratic Rulers	Total
UAE	93	3	4	100
OMA	65	37	18	120
TUR	37	6	57	100
ALB	35	7	58	100
IND	34	11	55	100
QAT	34	18	48	100
SEN	34	14	52	100
MALI	32	11	57	100
JOR	16	28	56	100
LIB	15	30	55	100
PAK	15	35	50	100
TAJ	14	31	55	100
ALG	13	35	52	100
INS	13	38	49	100
LEB	13	18	69	100
SAU	12	51	31	100
BAH	12	29	59	100
BAN	12	27	61	100
MALY	12	48	40	100
IRN	11	36	53	100
NIG	11	36	53	100
TUN	11	34	55	100
TRK	10	21	69	100
YEM	10	43	47	100
GAM	6	24	70	100
MOR	6	31	63	100
SUD	6	26	68	100
SYR	6	23	71	100
EGY	5	20	75	100
KUW	4	8	88	100
Average	20	25	55	100

Source: web and written survey 2002

These pro-incumbents, according to the survey, are 14 percent of Muslims in general and 10 percent of the focus group participants.

5. The Elasticity of Demand for Democracy

From Table 3.11, one infers that around 55 percent of Muslims in general support democracy over incumbents who are generally undemocratically elected. However, are Muslims ready to pay the price of democracy? That is to say, assuming that the only way for Muslims to achieve democracy is through mass-led series of demonstrations, strikes and public demands following the East European path toward democracy, are they ready to do that?

The term of elasticity of demand for democracy is useful in this regard. In micro-economics, the term elasticity of demand is used to reflect the sensitivity of quantity demanded to price changes. In other words, to what extent is a person ready to sacrifice his money (in this case his/her freedom or even life) to gain the demanded commodity (in this case political rights)? The demand for drugs by addicts is inelastic; that is no matter how expensive the drug is, the addicted person has no other choice but to pay what is needed. However, demand for flowers or perfume is very elastic. A very small increase in their prices may lead to a very sharp decline in the demanded commodity.

How do Muslims perceive their political rights: necessary drugs or luxurious flowers?

The data pooled in the survey help shed some light on this issue by resorting to the answers of two questions in the survey (2.14 and 2.20). The first question reads: "To achieve their political rights (ex. freedom of expression and freedom of association), Muslims should…" Four options are offered ranging from violent opposition to rulers to patience and prayer to Allah.

The second question reads: "There are individuals who are killed or sent to jail because they publicly ask for their political rights. Do you agree or disagree with what they do?" The respondents are given five choices starting with strongly agree through strongly disagree. Confirmatory factor analysis was run to verify that the two questions measure the same dimension. Varimax rotation followed by Cronbach's test of reliability and internal consistency showed that the responses expressed a high level of internal consistency (a = 0.91). The responses to the two questions have been standardized and re-scaled as reflected in Table 3.12. A culture with high points is more ready to sacrifice for democracy, thus the demand for democracy is less elastic. That is to say, no matter how much one has to sacrifice for one's political rights, he/she is ready to pay the price.

Some cultures seem to be more ready to sacrifice for democracy than others. Iran, Turkey, Mali, Senegal, and Malaysia are the highest in this regard. Arabs as a distinct group of Muslims seem to be the least ready to sacrifice for democracy. Countries like Morocco and Egypt – each having strong public support for democratic hardware and software as well as relatively liberal cultures – rank 16 and 24, respectively, in a list of 32 countries.

These two countries have cultures that are compatible with democracy but they are not likely to sacrifice for it. Thus, if they are given democratic freedoms and procedures as a gift from their rulers, they will accept them but the chances of mass-led democratization are relatively low comparing to the cases of Iran and Turkey.

Table 3.12
Muslims' Relative Elasticity of Demand for Political Rights

Elasticity	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Scale from 28 to 100
SAU	743	-2.27	1.53	-3.62	1.92	28.06
UAE	545	-2.20	1.95	-3.62	2.64	29.53
YEM	396	-1.89	1.55	-3.62	2.64	35.83
LIB	512	-1.58	2.06	-3.62	2.64	41.89
OMA	458	-1.52	1.95	-3.62	2.64	43.20
QAT	464	-1.01	1.46	-3.62	2.64	53.46
TUN	495	-0.86	1.74	-3.62	2.64	56.32
TAJ	449	-0.81	1.62	-3.62	2.64	57.48
MOR	575	-0.69	1.70	-3.62	2.64	59.81
TRK	478	-0.68	1.64	-3.62	1.52	59.99
JOR	634	-0.65	1.69	-3.62	2.64	60.56
PAK	1473	-0.60	1.77	-3.62	2.64	61.65
SYR	577	-0.55	1.48	-3.62	2.64	62.61
KUW	438	-0.52	1.90	-3.62	2.64	63.22
BAH	395	-0.51	1.80	-3.62	1.52	63.43
SUD	532	-0.49	1.44	-3.62	1.52	63.82
EGY	1277	-0.43	1.47	-3.62	2.64	65.03
LEB	430	-0.30	1.96	-3.62	2.64	67.69
NIG	543	-0.25	1.97	-3.62	2.64	68.64
ALG	515	-0.06	2.42	-3.62	2.64	72.43
EU	708	0.57	1.73	-3.62	2.64	85.13
INS	1208	0.61	1.66	-3.62	2.64	85.87
BAN	825	0.82	1.72	-3.62	2.64	90.07
USA	984	0.85	1.46	-3.62	2.64	90.63
ALB	447	0.95	1.41	-3.62	2.64	92.74
IND	1357	0.98	1.48	-3.62	2.64	93.33
GAM	478	0.99	1.41	-3.62	2.64	93.48
MALY	1072	1.14	1.31	-3.62	2.64	96.43
SEN	517	1.19	1.25	-3.62	2.64	97.60
MALI	510	1.21	1.20	-3.62	2.64	97.89
TUR	948	1.26	1.10	-3.62	2.64	99.01
IRN	1031	1.31	1.16	-3.62	2.64	100.00

Source: web and written survey 2002

In Iran, even if Khomeini's ideology is read to be controversial, one thing seems to be clear-cut: Khomeini instilled in the Iranian public mind the notion of equating political rights to religious obligations. If in Islam issues and things can be classified into obligatory/wajib, recommended/mostahab, acceptable/mandob, hated/makrouh and forbidden/haram, Muslims'

political rights are largely conceived part of the obligatory/wajib aspects such as prayer and fasting in the Iranian public culture. According to an Iranian journalist, "If I die for my right to freely publish what I believe in, I'll die as shaheed/martyr." The Iranian students' demonstrations shouting "death to dictatorship" and denouncing the banning of reformists' newspapers such as Salam are mainly Iranian phenomenon.

Most demonstrations in the Muslim world are not for democracy or democratic rights; rather they are anti-American or anti-Israeli, or for solving economic problems. What is worse is that the demonstrations do not pay off. A Sudanese female student noticed that most of her colleagues demonstrate for non-political issues while "the whole problem is political… We are given the right to demonstrate but not to effect, to waste our time and energy shouting but not to really change anything. I gave up the habit of demonstrations."

Another survey conducted by al-Ahram Center for Strategic Studies found that around 75 percent of Egyptians pointed to democracy as their favorite political system but when asked about their priorities only 7 percent set political reform as their first priority comparing to economic and social problems, achieving Arab or Muslim unity and the liberation of Palestine. The director of the Center commented that the Egyptian public mind distinguishes between democracy and solving the socio-economic problems of the country and other relevant goals (Sa'eed 2003). Alarmed by this possibility, I asked all the interviewees who participated in the focus groups in the countries I visited the following hypothetical question: "would they accept a contract with a ruler like Saddam Hussein to be their life-time ruler on the condition that he would actually liberate Palestine?"

Surprisingly, the great majority of the educated Muslims (around 73%) whom I asked this question responded affirmatively. Assuming that I gave them a loaded question, I followed up with the following comment: "Lifetime Saddam Hussein means no political freedoms for all your lifetimes." This fact did not change many of their attitudes.

It is important to note that only in Turkey, Iran and Muslims of the U.S., the majority of the interviewees did not accept the proposed contract. Counselor al-Bishri of Egypt had a telling comment on the attitudes of the 73 percent of Muslims: "In the Muslim mind, issues of personal freedoms come second to the issues of Umma's freedom." He stated that the Egyptian liberation movements tried to achieve the two goals at a time: "Independence and the Constitution." Most Muslim countries, including Egypt, achieved national independence of military occupation but without achieving personal and political freedoms. There are three explanations that seem to complement each other for the attitudes of Muslims: First, The Muslim mind prioritizes (other) Islamic imperatives over personal freedoms.[17] Second, the occupation of Palestine is perceived to be the number one issue in the mind of all Arabs and most Muslims. It is as if the Muslim body has a bleeding nose, and finds it very difficult to focus on any thing else. A twenty year old lady from UAE commented on the hypothetical Palestine/Saddam deal by stating that: "At least with a free Palestine, we can say that we achieved something meaningful for our religion."

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[17] A Syria whom was interviewed in the U.S. commented: "Dignity not life is the most valuable thing I have. Israel humiliates not only the Palestinians or Arabs, but all Muslims." When I challenged his logic by stating that he hates Israel more than he loves life, he concurred but assured me that life without dignity is not worth living.

Third, Saddam Hussein is not seen as being as bad as Israel. Statistically Saddam Hussein killed more Muslims than all Israeli wars with Arabs did. But who knows that? With the exception of the Kuwaiti and Saudi media after 1991, most government-owned Arab mass media refrain from disseminating the dirty laundry of other Arab governments, lest their own laundry should be published too. But this is not the case regarding Israel's usage of Western (mainly American) weapons to kill their brothers and sisters in Palestine. As a Pakistani engineer reckoned, "Saddam Hussein is not the enemy of Muslims. He is the enemy of Kuwait. Israel is the enemy of Muslims." When I demonstrated to him, among others, that Saddam Hussein killed more Muslims than Israel did, he accused him of being a tool in the hands of Israel the U.S. Though the rest of the Pakistani interviewees disagreed with him, they perceived Saddam to be a less threat to them than Israel.

The 70 Muslim interviewees (27 percent) who refused to accept the Saddam/Palestine deal have interesting arguments to make: "Israel wins because it is a democracy, we will not defeat Israel with Saddam in power," an Egyptian student of business commented. Sixty-six other interviewees voiced similar thoughts. With the exception of three respondents who were not that enthusiastic about the whole issue of liberation of Palestine because it is a Palestinian issue, the great majority of the 70 interviewees valued democracy as an necessary means for a better life and a free state of Palestine.

Arabs in general (around 89 percent) accepted the Saddam/Palestine deal while non-Arab Muslims showed lower support for it (around 61 percent). One inference that can be made with some level of certainty is that most Muslims perceive the issue of national independence from non-Muslim powers to be more worth sacrifice and resistance than resisting their own corrupt autocratic rulers.

6. Muslims and the Myth of the Golden Age

The respondents were given thirteen political systems and asked to choose the one that comes close to their "best / ideal / favorite" one. They were given as well the option of "none of the above." In the following question in the survey, they were asked in an open-ended format to state why they chose the political system they chose. After a daunting process of coding, the results are presented in the Table 3.13.

Table 3.13 reveals a number of intriguing trends among Muslims. The percentage of those who chose "none of the above" (40.6 percent) is beyond one's expectation given the fact that the range of the proposed thirteen political systems cover almost all types of political systems that one can anticipate in modern world from unconstitutional monarchies (Saudi Arabia) to constitutional monarch (e.g. Britain;); from most totalitarian (e.g. Iraq) to most democratic (e.g. USA and France); from most secular (e.g. India and Turkey) to least secular (e.g. Afghanistan under Taliban, and Iran); beside all other system in between such as Jordan, Egypt and the Sudan. A quick look at column (4) in the previous Table demonstrates that around 48 percent of traditionalist Islamists chose none of the mentioned system to represent their best or ideal political system.

Though to a lower degree but still a clear trend, 14 percent of modernist Islamists find no single political system that actually reflects their ideal system of government. Secularists seem to be more down to the earth in this regard. Only 2 percent of the autocrats and 1 percent of

the liberals dream of a system that is not in the list. Traditionalist Islamists are known to perceive democracy to be antithetical to Islamic government; thus, it is self-explanatory to find them distribute the rest of their preferences among the Sudan, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan under Taliban. These three political systems ascribe themselves to be defending and abiding by Islamic Sharia.

It is noteworthy that Iran, though self-described as an Islamic country was not widely chosen by traditionalists. The twenty seven sunni traditionalist interviewees deliberately avoided Iran as their ideal system because Iran is Shiite. Shiite, according to the vast majority of traditionalists, are not Muslims at all. Their political system is not a possibility mainly for reasons of creed. "Whoever does not adopt the prophet and his companions' system of lfe and government cannot be right" said an Emeriti graduate student. As a confirmation to the classification of Muslims into traditionalists and others, it is clear that the percentages of traditionalists who chose the U.S., France, India, and UK to be their best/ideal system of government is 1 percent as shown in the last row.

Table 3.13
Respondents' Ideal Political Systems

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Freq.	% Total	% select self-country	% Modern-ists	% Tradition-alists	% Autocr-ats	% Liberals
Iraq	43	0.18	0	0	0	11	0
Turkey	102	0.42	12	18	1	5	**22**
Jordan	173	0.71	11	5	2	21	10
Pakistan	311	1.28	8	1	4	18	4
Egypt	395	1.62	3	2	1	19	6
Sudan	398	1.63	15	5	12	9	3
S. Arabia	401	1.65	14	1	14	1	0
UK	503	2.06	34	10	1	1	**14**
India	546	2.24	23	6	0	2	**12**
France	955	3.92	31	7	0	1	**10**
Afghan	2,989	12.27	-	3	14	2	0
Iran	3,372	13.84	27	17	3	6	6
USA	4,072	16.71	37	11	0	2	**12**
None	9,883	40.56	-	14	48	2	1
Total	24,365	100		100	100	100	100
% Support Democracy		24.93		34	1	6	48

Source: web and written survey 2002

When most of the intellectuals and activists whom I interviewed learned that four out of every ten educated Muslims prefer none of the thirteen mentioned political systems, they advanced different interpretations such as lack of information about these systems, vagueness of the question, ignorance, nostalgia to the previous golden ages of Islam, among others. However, this last one of nostalgia seemed to be the most appealing, given the fact that the trend of refusing all current political systems is almost limited to Islamists whether modernists or traditionalists (48 and 14 percent) comparing to autocratic and liberal secularists (2 and 1 percent). This issue will be visited shortly.

Back to Table 3.14, it is interesting to note that out of the 14 percent of the traditionalists who chose Saudi Arabia to be their best/ideal political systems, only 2 (out of the 14) percent were Saudis. That is to say, that the great majority of the traditionalists who choose Saudi Arabia to be their best/ideal system of government, are either not well-informed, un-informed or mis-informed about Saudi Arabia. A Saudi traditionalist Sheikh who was critical, but not publicly, of the Saudi regime, attributes this lack of support among Saudis for their own political system as opposed to the support of other traditionalists for the Saudi system to the effect of the façade. I interpreted his analysis to be "it looks Islamic; it talks Islamic; it says it is Islamic; so it must be Islamic."

However, the Saudi citizens themselves, since they know better, they do not tend to support their own political system to be their best/ideal political system. Only 14 percent of the Saudis perceive their political system to be the best/ideal one (column 2). Comparatively speaking, the Saudi political system is more legitimate than the Iraqi, Egyptian and Pakistani with 0 percent of the Iraqis (most of them were not in Iraq during the survey), 3 percent of the Egyptians, and 8 percent of the Pakistanis who think of their political systems to be their best/ideal political systems. Surprisingly, Jordanians, Sudanese and Turkish are not much better in the way they perceive their political systems. One can infer that there is a legitimacy dilemma in these countries with these numbers in mind. However, based upon the focus group discussions, it was clear that most of the respondents confuse the political system with the current government. In other words, it was clear among interviewees that they deemed the government's performance inexorably intertwined with the structure of the political system. "Once they hate the government they hardly accept the rules and institutions of the system" as a Sudanese Professor argues.

Iranians seem to be the most satisfied Muslims who live in a Muslim country with their political systems; 27 percent think it to be the closest to their best/ideal system of government. However, with a deeper look at the responses of the Iranians, it becomes clear that over 90 percent of the Iranians who prefer their own systems are actually traditionalists. A 21 year female traditionalist student from Iran, thinks that:

> Allah has made Iran the refuge of all true Muslims… It will never remain as such unless all true Muslims vote, write, teach, preach and die to keep it so… The West and its collaborators from other neighboring countries do not want Iran to remain as is, since it symbolizes their moral vacuum. They want us [Iranians] to be like them. But insh'aa Allah, this will never happen.

This voice and the like are highly satisfied with the current Iranian regime and think of themselves as guardians of Allah's message against Allah's enemy. When I explored who Allah's enemies specifically are, I found that they are a very vast and inconsistent circle of conspirators from West to East with one common goal in the mind of the traditionalists: to devour Islam. This circle includes their fellow Iranians "who prefer the Western style of life, food, songs, dress, and social relationships over Allah's way of life," an Iranian student said.

Muslims who live as minorities in democracies, even with troubles such as in India, seem to be more satisfied with their own political systems. This satisfaction reaches its peak in the U.S. (37 percent) and goes to its lower end in the case of India (23 percent). Keeping in mind that this data was collected immediately before the new measures taken by the U.S. government toward Muslims after September 11th, one suspects that this percentage would be sharply lower were the survey to be conducted now.

However, these results as is show that Muslims in general are not satisfied with their own respective political systems and search for a better one.

Both modernists and liberals prefer the Turkish model (18 and 22 percent respectively). Dr. Essam Al-'Eryan of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood praised the Turkish system and proposed it to be a viable system that can allow all voices to be heard on equal footing. Of course he lamented the role of the military as negative in this regard. But he clearly preferred it to the Iranian model that for him is another example of an authoritarian regime but with an Islamic dress. Based upon this finding, the Turkish model can be a good model that most Muslim democrats (Islamists and secularists) may agree upon.

However, the support for democratic regimes is another feature that is common among modernists and liberals with 34 and 48 percent support respectively. These two figures are shown in the last row of Table 3.12 and have been calculated by adding up the percentage of the supporters of the four stable democracies in the model (italic). The support for Taliban was relatively high only among 14 percent of the traditionalists. This percentage is relatively low mainly because it is still not as good as the golden age of Islam especially with the civil war of brothers in Afghanistan a UAE female teacher pointed out. The autocratic secularists favored mostly Jordan possibly because it is more stable with rare social unrest compared to other autocratic regimes. One should remember that in Jordan Islamists are allowed to participate in election and have their own political associations. They have their own complaints regarding being deprived of participating in government no matter how many seats they win and of the support the king gives to his own preferred political associations. Egypt is a good example of a stable relatively liberalized country where the masses are left to mind their own personal business as if they resigned from the public sphere, according to Dr. Bahgat Qurani of the American University in Cairo. The support for Iraqi model appears only among autocrats. One will find out in the next Table that the support for Iraq under Saddam Hussein has no democratic or Islamic reasons. The same can be said about autocrats those who supported the democratic systems of the West. This support has nothing to do with democracy; rather it is a matter of personal (not political) freedoms, economic advancement and technology. Liberals, as depicted in the last column of Table 3.13, clearly prefer the Western models of democracy (48 percent) and the Turkish model comes second (22 percent) as a clear support for their own liberal positions. Their support for Jordanian political system (10 percent) is based largely on its capacity to peacefully absorb Islamists into the political system.

However, it seems that Muslims are not as uninformed as some of the intellectuals and activists whom I interviewed suggest. Rather, they have their own synthesis of Islam and democracy. For instance, most of those who choose stable democracies to be their best/ideal political systems were not captives of the fallacious "either Islamic or democratic" way of thinking. Conversely, they advanced arguments based upon Islamic and democratic references at the same time as it is clear from column (4) in Table 3.14.

Table 3.14
Explanation of Selected Best/Ideal Political System

| | | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | |
| | | | Democratic | Islamic | Combin- | Other | |
	Freq.	Percent	Reasons	Reasons	ation	Reasons	Total
Iraq	43	0.18				100	100
Turkey	102	0.42	32	11	21	36	100
Jordan	173	0.71	3	5	31	61	100
Pakistan	311	1.28	10	8	22	60	100
Egypt	395	1.62	9	15	21	55	100
Sudan	398	1.63	5	72	11	12	100
S. Arabia	401	1.65	1	82	3	14	100
UK	503	2.06	55	11	23	11	100
India	546	2.24	47	12	20	21	100
France	955	3.92	51	7	28	14	100
Afghan	2,989	12.27	0	68	0	32	100
Iran	3,372	13.84	5	11	78	6	100
USA	4,072	16.71	52	13	25	10	100
None	9,883	40.56	2	74	18	6	100
Total	24,365	100	20.9	29.9	23.2	26.0	100

Source: web and written survey 2002

The respondents were asked to spell out why they made their choices. A summary of the responses is presented in Table 3.14. In the table, the respondents who choose each system are classified into one of four reasons: purely democratic reasons, purely Islamic reasons, a mix of democratic/Islamic reasons and other reasons (such as liberating occupied territories, affection with a place, economic advancement…etc.) Around 74 percent of Muslims who did not find any of the thirteen political systems appealing were propelled by Islamic reasons. According an UAE citizen who chose none of the mentioned systems, "None of these systems come close to the Islamic state established by the prophet. They are not designed to make Allah's word above all other words" This reasoning is very common among most traditionalists (around 93 percent) and some (around 6 percent) of modernists.

This reasoning as well supports the secularists' argument about Muslims' nostalgia that makes them live in the golden past with all its glory and splendor. Thus, they are less practical in

terms of their capacity to develop socio-political systems that are more compatible with modern life.

According to a secularist intellectual: "it should be known that the dead are controlling the contemporary Arab and Muslim societies…To date, we have not solved the problem between 'Ali and Moa'weya or al-Hussein and Yazeed and even failed to swallow them"[18] (Saleh 2003b). The data definitely support this claim in at least 40 percent of how Muslims perceive the world they live in.

What seems to be more interesting is the tendency of many modernists to argue that the British, Indian, French and American political systems are Islamic systems of government in the way they are structured. "Had Muslims been able to independently develop their own systems of government, they would have come up with a French system of government with the president as the caliph and the ministers as his aides while the parliament is ahl al-hal wa al'aqqd" a Tunisian respondent said. "The colonial era distorted the natural development of the Islamic caliphate. The Ottoman Empire started political reforms in the 19th century but the West did not want us to outdo them," a Malaysian respondent said. "Islam is justice. Whatever achieves justice is Islamic. Thus democracy is as Islamic as prayer and fasting" and Iranian respondent said. "The U.S. system is like the Islamic caliphate system. The differences are just in names," a Malian respondent said. "The British system is the best one to fit modern Islamic state" a Nigerian respondent said.

7. Concluding Remarks

The conclusion of this chapter has two purposes: First, to discuss how the country-level variation in democratic hardware and software can be observed by the appeal to the five mechanisms that were discussed in the body of the literature. Second, to shed some light on the prospect of democratization in these countries based upon the society-level data.

a. Explaining the Society-Level Variation

In the introduction to this chapter, five hypothetical mechanisms were proposed to account for the effect of Islam on Muslims' perception of democratic hardware and software. In Table 3.15, one finds that the five proposed mechanisms significantly correlate with societies' democratic software and hardware.

The correlation coefficients clearly show that a Muslim society would score highest on the democratic hardware and software scales and thus have a relatively democratizable society if:
1. The distribution of attitudes indicates that autocrats and traditionalists are in the minority and modernist Islamists and liberal secularists are in the majority.
2. Muslims are ideologically liberal in the sense that they accept the existence of political parties even if they endorse opposing ideologies.
3. Muslims have negative attitudes toward the undemocratically elected incumbents.
4. Muslims are ready to sacrifice for their political rights.

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[18] Ali, his son al-Hussein, Moa'weya and his son Yazeed are the leaders of the Islamic wars that occurred in the first century of Islam and ended up with division of Muslims into Sunni and Shiite.

5. Muslims do not adopt fantastic ideas about what government can or should be and thus, accept a democratic system of government.

This society-level analysis sheds some light on why and how Muslim societies in general perceive the democratic alternative. Yet this analysis does not help us understand why some pro-democracy individuals may exist in anti-democratic societies or vice versa. To examine this, chapter four will deal with individual-level data.

Table 3.15
Testing the Effect of the Five Hypothetical Mechanisms

	Software	Hardware
% of Islamist and Secularist Democrats	0.71***	0.79***
% of Muslims Accept "other" Ideologies	0.82***	0.81***
% of Muslims Support of Status Quo/Incumbents	-0.69***	-0.81***
% of Muslims Ready to Sacrifice for Political Rights	0.27**	0.31**
% of Muslims Choosing Democracies as Ideal System	0.74***	0.83***

Number of cases = 32
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***<.001 – two tailed tests.
Source: web and written survey 2002

b. Prospectus of Democratization

In an attempt to explain the emergence and evolution of norms in the international system, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) identify three-stage life-cycle of norms: (1) norm emergence, (2) norm acceptance, and (3) internalization. This three-stage cycle may help us differentiate among four theoretical types of Muslim sub-cultures. *First*, there are some sub-cultures that are in the stage of rejection of democratic norms and institutions either because it is deemed harmful or haram/taboo. *Second*, there are some sub-cultures where democracy has emerged in the discourse of some intellectual entrepreneurs (intellectuals and ulama/scholars) but has not been widely accepted among the masses. A *third* group of Muslims' sub-cultures showed higher level of support for democracy but democracy is not seen as the first priority in the public mind. Thus they will accept if it is given to them as a gift from the ruler. But they are not ready to fight for it. Acceptance of democracy can be attributed to the effort the modernist Islamist and liberal secularist intellectuals, ulama/scholars and activists. A *fourth* group of Muslim sub-cultures reached a higher level of democratic internalization in the sense that democracy is not a luxury for the mass majority of the public. Rather it is the solution to their problems and thus they are ready to pay its price in the format of public demands associated with risk.

Based upon the previous four categories, Muslim cultures can be divided according to the previously discussed issues into four types of sub-cultures: 1- sub-cultures that reject democracy in terms of its software, hardware and hence democratizablity mainly for lack of liberal attitudes toward others including "other" ideologies; 2- sub-cultures where the democratic notions of government emerged but have not gained roots into the culture yet mainly because of

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the lack of support for its norms; 3- sub-cultures where democracy is accepted in general with relatively high level of tolerance toward "other" ideologies yet without being the top priority in the sense that individuals accept it as a gift rather than to sacrifice for it; 4- sub-cultures where democracy has been internalized and individuals perceive it as necessary for solving other socio-economic problems. Thus, they tend to accept "other" ideologies as part of the rules of the democratic game.

Table 3.16
Typology of Muslim Cultures

	Rejection		Emergence		Acceptance		Internalization	
	1 Steady	2 Shaky	Steady	3 Shaky	4 Steady	5 Shaky	6 Steady	7 Shaky
Cultures	UAE Oman Libya	S. Arb. Yemen	None	Sudan Pakist. Niger. Indon. Tajik.	Qatar Bahrain Moroc. Tunisia Jordan Algeria	Gambia Leban. Turkem. Kuwait Syria Egypt Bangld.	Turkey Mali Seneg. India Alban. USA EU	Iran Malaysia
Software	M/H	L	H	L/M	H	M/H	H	M/H
Hardware	L/M	L	M	M	M/H	M/H	H	H
Democrat-izability	L	L	L/M	L/M	M/H	M/H	H	H
Liberal	L	L	L/M	L/M	M/H	M/H	H	M/H
Status quo	H	L	H	L/M	M/H	L/M	H	L/M
ELAST.	H	H	H/M	H/M	M	M/L	L	L
Ideal sys.	D*	Not D	D	D	D	D	D	D

Source: web and written survey 2002

These cultures as well differ in their perception of the status quo and their tendency to sacrifice for their political rights. Some cultures seem to be more comfortable in what they believe in. They are almost in a case of cultural/political equilibrium. For example some cultures perceive themselves as non-democratic and do not want democracy. Thus they are classified as steady rejectionists of democracy. However, other cultures seem to be in turmoil; there is no support for the status quo or incumbents but at the same time clear desires for change. This change may not necessarily be democratic but it is desirable. These cultures are classified as shaky since they bear the values of their own change.

In Table 3.16, there is a typology of the thirty two cultures examined in this survey. Under category 1, there are five cultures that can be seen as in general in a case of rejection of democratic government as understood in the West. These countries are UAE, Oman, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. However, there is a subtle difference between them.

The first three cultures are in a steady rejection of democracy while the other two are in a shaky rejection of democracy. This difference can be inferred from the internal consistency among the seven indicators. For instance, the prevailing culture in UAE does not indicate that it will witness mass-initiated demands for democracy in the near future, ceteris paribus. It is a country with a relatively high level of socio-political acceptance of minorities but with very little support for what they do not have which is democratic hardware. Besides, there is a relatively high support for the status quo and incumbents with a high elastic demand for democracy. All the indicators refer to the fact that there is a steady rejection for the democratic system of government as understood outside of UAE. However, the cultures of Saudi Arabia and Yemen are in a shaky rejection of democracy due to the low/mild level of support of the incumbents and status quo yet with the majority preferring non-democratic systems over the democratic ones mainly for religious reasons.

No culture met the criterion of steady emergent democratic culture yet five Muslim cultures are suggested to be in the category of emerging democracy albeit in shaky position. These countries are the Sudan, Pakistan, Nigeria, Indonesia and Tajikistan. These countries have low or mild level of support for democratic software as one of the reasons that make them in a shaky position. Thus, once the autocratic government weakens its grip, ethno-religious tensions is highly to erupt. However, they have a relatively mild support for democratic hardware (between 52-57 points in a 100 scale as shown in Figure 3.1). Given the fragile democratic software, the possibility of successful democratization is relatively low or mild at best especially with all of them full into the category of ideologically illiberal cultures (Liberal 10) which indicates that there is a highly possibility of rejecting parties that adopt ideologies "other" ideologies whether Islamist or secularist.

However, being in a shaky position has another indication for the future. There is a clear lack of support for the status quo and clear desire for a change. But there is no guarantee that this change will be democratic or non-democratic change such as replacement of an autocrat with another one. It was clear however, that the majorities in most of these countries are pro-democratic political systems (including Turkey) when they were asked about their ideal/best system of government. Ceteris paribus, Indonesia is the country that comes closest to successful transition toward accepting democracy in this category. The data shows that Indonesians' elasticity of demand for democracy is 85 points in a 0 to 100 scale which means that relatively speaking Indonesians are ready to sacrifice for their political rights more than all other countries in this category.

Thirteen cultures accept democratic norms and procedures yet do not perceive it to be their first priority thus the elasticity for demand of democracy is low/mild generally speaking. Six of these cultures seem to be relatively steady in the sense that though the support of the status quo is low yet the elasticity of demand for democracy is mild as an indication of how luxurious it is perceived. All other indications seem to be pro-democratic with relatively high levels of democratic software, hardware, democratizability, acceptance of "other" ideologies and choice of democratic systems (including Turkey) to be their best/ideal systems of government. Ceteris paribus, these countries are most likely to remain as it unless a decision on the part of the elite takes the move toward democracy. The cost of suppression on the part of the rulers is not that high and the propensity to demand political rights on the part of the masses is not high either which make the status quo, thought not anybody's perfect alternative, an equilibrium. These

cultures represent a good example of what Professor Ahamd Yusuf of Cairo professor labeled "the happy slaves." Even with some liberal gestures or steps toward political openness, back and forth, they were mainly due to the desire on the part of the elite to diffuse public anger or assimilate world norms without solid increase in public demand for democracy.

However, some other cultures do not reveal the same level of equilibrium or steady position due to the relatively mild elastic demand for political rights and low/mild support for status quo (category 5). These cultures, though accepting of democracy, are comparatively less tolerant toward minorities and women comparing to the cultures that are steadier and more accepting of democracy (category 4). But for this relative deficit in democratic software, these cultures would have been more inclined toward moving to the democratic internalization category given the relatively low support for the status quo and tendency to sacrifice for their political rights.

There are nine other cultures that show great support and appreciation for democracy including seven steady cultures and two shaky ones. All cultures that appear in category six have one common factor: all of them witnessed some sort of peaceful alteration of power in the past ten years. This observation may suggest that there is a dialectic relationship between democracy and culture. In other words, once democracies are in place they tend to create the culture conducive to them. This observation sounds true given the fact that these countries have very high level of support for democratic software, hardware, liberal attitudes toward "other" ideologies, relative support for the status quo and election mechanisms, beside their low elastic demand of democracy. Steady internalization of democracy is the antithesis of the steady reject of it. Another common factor among the cultures that internalized democracy is that none of them is actually an Arab country.

Muslims of Iran and Malaysia share almost all the characteristics of steady democratic internalization except for lower level of democratic software, less liberal position toward "other" ideologies and lower level of support toward the status quo.

Comparing the means and percentages among cultures could be misleading if other endogenous factors are influencing the attitudes of the individuals regardless of their respective countries. The multivariate regression models will be necessary to compare the individual attitudes of Muslims from each country after including controls for demographics, and strength of religiosity as introduced in chapter four.

CHAPTER IV
MUSLIMS' ATTITUDE TOWARD DEMOCRACY:
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL ANALYSIS

In this chapter, the focus shifts from society-level analysis to individual level analysis. I am considering the possible factors and actors that militate both for and against Muslims' support for democratic software and hardware.

Without replicating the discussed theoretical foundations for the hypotheses discussed in the first chapter, the following equation summarizes the examined variables:

Support for democratic hardware and software is hypothesized to be a function of demographic characteristics, familiarity with democracy, the effect of Islam, and trust in numerous political actors as credible agents of democratization or autocracy.

I use several variables to measure the effect of each group of factors. Relative income, education, age and gender are used to gauge the possible impact of the demographic characteristics. The familiarity with democracy can be derived from previous political participation and residence in a democracy for year or longer. The effect of Islam on the attitudes toward democracy can take three dimensions: religiosity, support for political Islam and compatibility between shura and democracy. The extent to which Muslims trust political incumbents, the West and the ulama as credible agents of democratization or autocracy is hypothesized to influence Muslims' attitudes toward democracy.

Regarding the model specification, it is highly anticipated that different variables will affect attitudes in different ways in different countries. To minimize the probability of omitted variable bias, I include a large number of variables in the models. Since the models have ample observations per country, including all the projected variables does not present any problem related to degrees-of-freedom. But there is an efficiency cost. Including a number of irrelevant variables in each country model does reduce efficiency, but the benefit is that one can directly compare model performance across countries. In other words, to avoid biases and increase comparability, I decided to sacrifice the efficiency of the standard errors in final models.

To improve the efficiency of the model, I choose a statistical modeling technique (Zellner's Seemingly Unrelated Regression or SUR) that estimates the parameters of the system, accounting for heteroskedasticity, and contemporaneous correlation in the errors across equations. The estimates of the cross-equation covariance matrix are based upon parameter estimates of the unweighted system. To release some of the assumptions of the SUR system of equations, the whole models were replicated using multiple logistic regressions. There was hardly any discrepancy between the two modeling techniques. In other words, the substantive results are virtually identical. Appendix 10 has the SUR technical tables.

The final SUR model is reported in this chapter and used as the basis of testing the hypotheses. SUR produces linear regression models whose coefficients are easy to interpret and draw lessons from.

However, to test the efficiency problem, separate models were run to control for the effect of these variables separately and then simultaneously in the 32 cases. There are no serious discrepancies among the case-by-case models with the control for variables and the final aggregate models with all the variables.

The length and depth of the discussion of the variables differ depends upon the empirical

and theoretical significance of these variables. For instance, the debate over subjection of women in Muslim countries has always been on the research agenda of researchers. Consequently, it deserves more investigation than for instance the effect of relative income. Besides, some variables are captured in this survey for the first time and thus will be discussed in more detail due to their uniqueness. Trust in the incumbents, the West and ulama are examples of such data.

Table 4.1 summarizes the SUR and multiple logistic regression estimates. Horizontally, the table lists the variables hypothesized to influence Muslims' attitudes toward democratic software and hardware. The effect of each variable is reported in two columns: one for the impact on democratic software (Sof) and the other for the impact on democratic hardware (Hdw). The impact may be positive (increasing one's support for democratic software or hardware) and thus given the sign (+) or negative (decreasing the support for democratic software and hardware) and thus given the sign (-). The cells are either empty (indicating the lack of statistical significance) or have stars (indicating the existence of statistical significance). These stars reflect the SUR models' tests of significance. Three stars (***) in the body of the Table mean that the respective variable has a statistical significance at 0.01 level, (**) at 0.05, and (*) at 0.1. The point estimates and standard errors are reported in Appendix 10.

This table can be read horizontally to demonstrate the hypothesized variables that the literature suggests their capacity to explain why certain Muslims are pro- or anti-democracy in each society. For instance, democratic software is mostly supported in Albania by female Muslims who are relatively rich, well educated, tend to vote in public elections, resided in a democracy long enough to experience democracy, believe in the compatibility between shura and Islam, trust incumbents, believe that the West is sincere about supporting democratization in the Muslim world and tend not to trust the ulama as genuine agents of democratization.

The table can be read vertically as well to show the (in)consistency of certain variables across cases. For instance, the variables of relative income have contradictory impact on Muslims' attitudes toward democratic hardware across Muslim societies. Relatively affluent Bahrainis tend to be less supportive of democratic hardware than relatively disadvantaged Bahrainis. Conversely, Muslim Indians become more supportive of democratic hardware the higher their incomes are.

A quick vertical look at the table suggests that some variables have more explanatory power than others. For instance, the effects of gender, residency in a democracy, and the perceived compatibility of shura and democracy explain positive attitudes of educated Muslims toward democracy. Trust in the West as a genuine "democratizer" does not seem to be of great impact on how Muslims perceive democracy.

1. Demographics

Demographic characteristics such as income, education, gender and age are among the most standard yet still debatable possible variables that affect one's attitude toward many issues, including democracy. Some scholarship attributes Muslims' antagonism against the West to some demographic aspects such as poverty, poor health conditions, growing number of youth as a percentage of population, failure of development and lack of education (Abootalebi 2000; Sachs 2001; Stern 1999, 2003).

Table 4.1

Explaining Attitudes toward Democracy: Factors and Actors

| Pos/Neg | 1- R. Income | | | | 2- Education | | | | 3- Age | | | | 4- Female | | | | 5- Vote | | | | 6- Reside in Dem. | | | |
	Sof +	Sof -	Hdw +	Hdw -	Sof +	Sof -	Hdw +	Hdw -	Sof +	Sof -	Hdw +	Hdw -	Sof +	Sof -	Hdw +	Hdw -	Sof +	Sof -	Hdw +	Hdw -	Sof +	Sof -	Hdw +	Hdw -
Albania	*				*		**						**		***		*		***		***		***	
Algeria					***		**						***								***		***	
Bahrain			*		***		***				*		***		*						***		***	
Bang.					***		***						***		***		*		***		***		***	
Egypt					***		***						***		**		*				***		***	
Europe	***		*		**		**						***		*		***		**					
Gambia	*		*								*		**		*						***		***	
India	*		***		***		***		***		***		***		**		**		***					
Indon.	**				***		***				*		***		***						***		***	
Iran					***		*				**		***		***		**		***		***		**	
Jordan	**		***		***		***						***		***						***		***	
Kuwait		*	*		***				***		**		***				**				***			
Lebanon					*				**				**		***								***	
Libya					**		**						**		***						*		***	
Malaysia			**		*		*						***		***		**				***		***	
Mali					***		***				***		***		***				*		**		***	
Morocco			***		***		***						***		***		**		***				**	
Nigeria		**					***				***		***						*		***		***	
Oman			***												***						**		***	
Pakistan					***		***		**				***		**						***		***	
Qatar			***		***		***						***		**						***		***	
S. Arabia			***			***	***		***			*	*		***								***	
Senegal					***		***						***		***		***		***		***		***	
Sudan					***		***						***								***		***	
Syria					***		***						***								***		***	
Taj							***		***				***		**						*		***	
Tunisia					***		***		**		*		**		***						***		***	
Turkey	*		*		***		***					***	***				***		***		***		***	
Turkm.					***								**								***			
UAE			**			***			***			*	*		***								***	
USA			**		***		**			*			**		***		**		***					
Yemen							***						***								*		**	

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Table 4.1 — Continued

	7-Relig.				8-Shura/Dem.				9-Pol. Islam				10. Incumbents				11. West				12. Ulama			
	Sof		Hdw		Sof		Hdw		Sof		Hdw		Sof		Hdw		Sof		Hdw		Sof		Hdw	
	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
Albania					*		**						***	*			*		*			*		
Algeria			***		*		**			*												*		
Bahrain		***			**		**						***	*								*		***
Bang.		***			***		**						***		***							***		***
Egypt	***				***		***		***				***		**							*		
Europe		**	***		***		**						***		***							**	***	
Gambia		*			***		***						***					**					***	
India		***			***		***		**													***	*	
Indon.		***	***				**			***			**									***	***	
Iran	***				***		*						***		***							*		***
Jordan		***			*		***						***		*							***	*	
Kuwait		***			*		***						**		***							**		***
Lebanon			**				***			***			***		*							*		**
Libya							**						***									*		*
Malaysia			***		*		**								*							**		**
Mali	**				**		**			***			***		*		*							
Morocco		*			***		***						***		**								**	
Nigeria		***					***			**			***		**							***		**
Oman		***	**		***		***						***			**						***		
Pakistan		***			***		***			**			***		***							***		***
Qatar	***		***		**		***						***		*		***					**		
S. Arabia		***	***		**		**			***												***		***
Senegal		*			*		**						***		**			***					***	
Sudan		*			**		***			**			*		**							**		
Syria					***		***						***		**							*		
Taj							*								**									
Tunisia					*		***		***				**		*									
Turkey			***		**		**		***				**		*									
Turkm.		*					**						***											
UAE		***	**				**			*			***			*								**
USA					**		**						***		***		*		***		**			
Yemen		***	***		**		**			**			**		**							***		**

In the Western experience, it is said that more educated and better off individuals who generally belong to the middle class will adhere to values conducive to democracy (Bermeo 1997; Kaufman 1997). However, an in-depth examination of jailed Egyptian radical Islamists in 1980 revealed that the typical member is "young (early twenties), of rural or small-town background, from the middle or lower middle class, with high achievement and motivation, upwardly mobile, with science or engineering education, and from a normally cohesive family".

In other words, they are "significantly above the average in their generation" while among the most extremist (Ibrahim 1980).

With this type of conflicting normative and empirical accounts, the pooled data may help determine if demographic characteristics influence Muslims differently across societies or there is a uniform pattern in all societies.

To do that, the most important demographic characteristics suggested by the literature (i.e. relative income, education, age and gender) were examined.

a. Effect of Relative Income

A 9-point scale variable was developed to gauge the relative income of the respondents. This variable is hypothesized, as indicated in the theoretical chapter, to reflect the effect of socio-economic status on individual attitudes toward democracy. Dahl's conclusion regarding the pre-World War II polyarchies in Italy, Germany and Spain suggest that the failure to provide economic needs and to maintain public order spurred the shift toward dictatorship (Dahl 1971). That is to say, if dictatorships provide necessary needs to individuals, they would become less supportive of change, even if it leads to democracy. The following quote illustrates this relationship in the Muslim context:

> "[W] ith new means of surveillance, repression, and wealth-extraction made available to rulers by modern technologies and methods, governments have become less dependent than ever on popular goodwill…With no need for taxation, there is no pressure for representation." (Lewis 1993b:54-55)

This hypothesis is crucial especially in some countries that are accused of buying legitimacy (Luciani 1995) under the slogan of "no taxation, no representation." Sherman proposes the following quote as a support for the role of prosperous economy in establishing consolidated non-democracies: "the correlation between income and democracy holds within all but one region/culture. . . The one exception is Islam for which there is no significant correlation. . . Among Arab nations there is a negative correlation between wealth and freedom" (Sherman 1998). Another account refuses any link between wealth and Muslims' attitudes toward modernity in general (Pipes 2002).

The available data helps us test this relationship afresh at the democratic software and hardware dimensions.

A. Democratic Software

As Table 4.1 demonstrates, relatively high income produces more support for democratic software in Albania, Europe, the Gambia, India, Indonesia, Jordan and Turkey. In other words, relatively richer people tend to be more tolerant toward women and minorities. By controlling for the effect of education, one finds that relative income lost its significance in the cases of Indonesia and Jordan, which indicates that relative income has its significance mainly due to its effect on education that functions as an intervening variable in these two cases.

However, relatively high income has the opposite effect in two other countries: Kuwait and Nigeria. Differently put, the relatively affluent Muslims who responded to the survey tend to be less supportive of democratic software in the cases of Kuwait, and Nigeria. Controlling for the effect of relative income did not change the significance of other coefficients, which suggests that the negative effect of relative income on democratic software in Kuwait and Nigeria is not due to the interaction with other variables.

Finding out the mechanisms of causality between relative income and negative support for democratic software needs more scrutiny with more empirical data.

However, there is no statistically significant relationship between relative affluence and democratic software in the other 23 cases even after controlling for the effect of other variables. In other words, Muslims' relative economic status does not help explaining the political attitudes of Muslims toward minorities and women.

B. Democratic Hardware

The impact of relative income is more significant in explaining Muslims attitudes toward democratic hardware than their attitudes toward democratic software. Relatively high income produces more support for democratic hardware in Europe, the Gambia, India, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Turkey and USA. These countries share very few common economic, cultural or political characteristics. From the most capitalist and affluent countries of the world (e.g. USA and Europe) to a number of the poorest economies in the world (the Gambia and India), there could be different mechanisms that make relatively affluent Muslims in these countries support democratic procedures and mechanisms. As Dr. Bahgat Kourani of Montreal University pointed out in an interview with him in Cairo, the rich may be appreciative of the connection between democracy and their economic status and the poor in these countries are hopeful to reach the same pattern.

However, relatively high income produces less support for democratic hardware in the case of Jordan, Oman, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain. This result suggests that, with the exception of Kuwait, all Arab (semi-) rentier states produce relatively undemocratic affluent individuals. A plausible explanation is that most of these relatively rich people are worried about losing their status if democratic changes are introduced into their societies.

Why are the Kuwaitis' relatively rich individuals more supportive of democratic hardware and less supportive of democratic software? The structure of the Kuwaiti respondents to this survey indicates that around 58 percent of them are Islamists and the 71 percent of them are men who believe that "Kuwaiti women are not suitable for outdoors challenges" as a respondent put it. Whether this attitude is related to Islam, tribal tradition or both is not as important as the fact that it exists. At the democratic hardware dimension, the history of representative politics in Kuwait since the adoption of the 1962 constitution indicates that some democratic elements existed in the past without necessarily leading to abrupt shifts that may jeopardize the privileged status of the most affluent citizens in Kuwait (Byman and Green 1999).

In the rest of Muslim societies, being relatively rich or poor did not bring much explanation of Muslims' attitudes toward democratic hardware.

b. Effect of Education

Education has always been proposed to be a very important factor in shaping individuals' political attitudes. It is suggested that for highly educated people, the cost associated with acquiring information about how democracy in other countries is low and as a result they exhibit more support for democracy since empowers them. On the other hand, the least educated pose a threat to democracy in the face of any socio-economic dislocation (Lipset 1983). Thus, education is hypothesized to instill and reinforce liberal and democratic values such as equality, support for socio-political tolerance, respect for individual liberty and democratic institutions as suggested by theory and evidence from other cultures (Gibson and Duch 1993) and (Flangan 1982). In the Muslim context, it is argued that education was one of the most important reasons behind the weakness of civil society and democratic praxis (Diamond et al. 2003).

I use a 5-point scale to measure the level of education. As indicated in Table 4.1, this study finds that education does not have any effect on either democratic hardware or software in two countries: the Gambia and Oman. This result suggests that more education in these countries does not necessarily mean more or less support of democracy. However, education has a significant effect on democratic software and/or hardware in the rest of Muslim societies.

A. Democratic Software

Education has a negative effect on democratic software in the cases of Saudi Arabia and UAE. This result is very alarming since it suggests two types of findings: First, more education does not necessarily mean more tolerance in all societies. Assessing the impact of education requires understanding the contents of the curriculums that lead to less tolerance toward women and minorities. Second, this result as well casts some doubts on the role of school and colleges as agents of democratic socialization in these two countries. "The domination of higher education by the ulama has led to a general rise in complaints by Saudi students about the curriculum's lack of relevance to their everyday practical needs" (Yamani 2000).

Some interviewed Saudi intellectuals were clear in their criticism of rote learning in Saudi schools with barely any avenues for developing critical mentality. Some Saudi ulama/scholars refused this link between education and intolerance (al-Buraiq 1994; Ibn Baaz 2002).

A Shiite Saudi was quoted saying: "The religious curriculum in Saudi Arabia teaches you that people are basically two sides: Salafis, who are the winners, the chosen ones, who will go to heaven, and the rest. The rest are [Shiite] Muslims and Christians and Jews and others" (al-Ahmed 2002).[19]

The negative effect of education on democratic software in the case of UAE stands as a real surprise in a country where 72 percent of registered students in higher education are females. However, a plausible explanation for this negative impact is the role of age. By

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[19] The Saudi government has started a program of "revising school curriculums, condemning Islamic extremism and easing restrictions on the press" and working hard on "promoting a tolerant and pluralist vision of Islam" in the Saudi education system that may result into a different type of graduates Kristof, Nicholas D. 2002a. "Can This Marriage Be Saved?" *New York Times* November 1, 2002.. This revision has been adopted as part of the war on terrorism and anticipated political reforms.

controlling for the effect of age, one finds that education loses its negative significance, which means that education has its effect through age.

Besides, though the UAE women occupy more school and college seats than men (the ratio in high schools in 2002 was 2.7 to 1), most education experts find that Emeriti society in general still does not encourage women to work outside the fields of education and some governmental positions (AbdelGalil 2003).

What is interesting is that Pakistani educational system has not appeared in this survey to be anti-democratic despite the 8,000 religious schools, or madrassas, that are considered by many to be incubators for Islamic militants (Iqbal 2003). A good possible explanation for the lack of effect of these types of madrassas that teach only traditional curriculum of Quran, Arabic and Urdu studies on the attitudes toward democracy is that most of these schools function as parallel education system that is not under the supervision or control of central government. Thus, unlike Saudi education, most educated Pakistanis do not send their children to these madrassas. Besides, it is extremely difficult for students who go to these madrassas to join college later on.

B. Democratic Hardware
Unlike the cases of Saudi Arabia and UAE, more education leads to more support to democratic hardware and/or democratic software in all other countries holding other variables constant. This finding implies that more education in these countries drive both tolerance toward women and minorities and support toward democratic mechanisms up.

An intriguing result is that education does not have a negative effect on democratic hardware in any of the cases studied in this project and has a positive effect on democratic hardware in 25 cases. This relationship between education and support for democratic hardware suggests that Muslims with advanced education support democratic institutions and mechanisms more than Muslims without advanced education. This finding in itself is important since it supports some of the claims made by some scholars that Muslims' lack of support of democracy is not a peculiar function of Islam's influence on Muslims' political culture but rather a common problem that Muslim societies share with other developing countries (Abootalebi 2000). Besides, it supports the argument that mass literacy, economic modernization, urbanization, and the flow of information associated with the communications revolution, lead to the rise of the middle class that is usually supportive of democratic procedures and mechanisms (Sivan 1997). Based on a similar analysis, a prominent researcher projected that mass education, along with independent mass media, would have the same impact on Muslims like the impact of printing press on sixteenth-century Europe (Eickelman 1999).

The policy recommendation associated with these findings is that if Muslim governments intend to advance genuine democratic reforms they need to review their curriculums to make sure that they do not advance anti-democratic norms. For instance, Saudi education is in need of revision to accommodate Muslims from all sects and women as politically equal. The rest of Muslim countries need not only to fight illiteracy but also to expand in post-high school education that increasingly creates positive impacts for democracy.

<u>c. Effect of Age</u>

As indicated earlier, it was found that the young are more enthusiastic about change (Inglehart 1997) and (Bahry and Silver 1990), but not necessarily about democracy. However, age is an important variable among Muslims. Some reports suggest that there is a tendency among young Muslims, who form the majority of Muslims nowadays in most Muslim countries, to resort to religion and religious thinking in the last two decades. This tendency has become a concern for the West since those religious young men resent Western values (al-'affifi 2002).

In this study, one finds that the 5-point scale of age does not have any effect on either democratic hardware or software in 14 cases, but does in the rest.

<u>A. Democratic Software</u>

Other things being equal, age has a positive effect on enhancing democratic software in India, Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Tunisia and UAE. This result by itself sounds very alarming. Older people are more tolerant toward non-Muslims, Muslims from other sects and women than younger people in these cases. If this trend holds in the future, this means that these societies may end up having relatively less tolerant cultures. Some scholars note the relative erosion of tolerance in India with the election of the Hindu party of Bharatiya Janata comparing to the older generation that used to support the secular Conference Party (Jayal 2001). In Lebanon, older people are more tolerant of minorities and women than younger people despite the fact that most of old people still remember the 15-year civil war. However, Dr. Samir Salmani, a Lebanese sociologist, pointed out that older people do not want to repeat the cultural environment of the civil war in contrast with the younger generation which has been socialized into a sense of defeat.

Only among Muslims of the US have do older people support democratic software less than younger people. However, around 73 percent of the respondents from the US are under the age of 30 which is a good indication that they assimilate the relatively tolerant democratic culture of the US. In the rest of the cases, the age of respondents does not have any impact on their level of tolerance toward minorities and women.

There is the possibility that age has its effect on democratic software through other intervening variables such as education and relative income. Controlling for the effect of these other variables did not change the significance or direction of age's influence on democratic software in any of the cases.

<u>B. Democratic Hardware</u>

Older Muslims in the Gambia, Indonesia, Kuwait, Mali, Nigeria and Tunisia tend to be more supportive of democratic hardware than younger Muslims in these countries.

However, older Muslims in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Turkmenistan and UAE are less supportive of democratic hardware than the younger generations. Some researchers find it easier to explain why older people are inimical to democratic procedures than younger people by referring to the historical experience of older people whose dissatisfaction is higher and their knowledge of their backwardness is noticeable. Elderly Muslim men and women have no local history of democracy on which to draw. As democracy has blossomed in Western states over the past three centuries, Muslim societies have usually lived under colonial rulers, kings, or tribal and clan leaders.

The great majority of Muslims are born and have lived in autocracies. Even the attempts of nationalist governments to launch ambitious programs of mass education failed to serve the purpose of political development mainly because of the logic of mass-mobilization and indoctrination rather than focusing in basic freedoms and civil rights (Eickelman 1992). New generations have access to electronic communications and the media that educate younger about democratic standards.

d. Effect of Gender

The issue of women's political status has been debated for centuries. The data available for this project may be helpful in shedding some fresh light on this issue. For instance, Islam was described in a 1920 article as "a religion that ignores the personal existence of an entire sex…[thus it] can hardly hope to survive outside the dark places of the earth" (Kinross 1920). Others refer to the impact of an "interpretation of Islam that relegates women to second-class status" (Karatnycky 2002) on democratization in the Muslim world as extremely negative. Although this interpretation definitely exists and its impact is confirmed (Fish 2002), it is not clear if women have been socialized or forced to believe in this interpretation. Put differently, do Muslim women perceive their political roles in the same way Muslim men do? This data categorically suggests that educated Muslim women in all countries are more supportive of democratic software and hardware than Muslim men. This result should be understood only within the context of the pooled data that captures educated women. United Nations figures put illiteracy rates for Muslim women at up to 55 percent (World Bank *World development report* 2001).

Some scholars, relying on ethnographic research and deep knowledge of specific societies (Ahmed 1992; Ahmed 2001; Barakah and Nasif 2001; Bayes and Tohidi 2001; Engineer 2001; Rosen 2002; Shahidian 2002), have emphasized the relatively high degree of subordination of women in Muslim societies. The data of this study show at least that there is an overall awareness among educated Muslim women of their plight. The focus group discussions add some depth and propose an important recommendation.

While talking to most men in the focus-group discussions, I found a general trend in which the most modernist and liberal male ideologues talked as if they were traditionalists when the discussion pertained to the status of woman. Almost 78 percent of the men interviewed in the focus-group discussions advanced various arguments about women's home-based duties such as taking care of the kids and bringing up good families. I did not find enough support for a famous claim made by some researchers that women are responsible for their own plight by socializing their daughters on the principle that their role in life is secondary to men's missions (Farjani 2002b; Hijab 1988; Mernissi 2003). Rather it was clear that men have this gender-bias toward their missions in life even if they do not use Islamic argumentation. This claim may be applicable to illiterate women but definitely not to educated women as captured in this project.

In all groups, women have portrayed themselves as being treated unfairly socio-economically by men but not by Islam. Interviewed Muslim women clearly accused society of depriving them of the rights stated to them according to sharia/Islamic legislation. On making the distinction between Islam as a creed and cultures, interviewed women consensually agreed that male-centered cultural norms do not give women a fair share even by Islamic standards. A Saudi university graduate young lady with a degree in marketing, stated that: "Allah's rules are

respected and will be respected in Saudi Arabia. We [women] do not want to dress inappropriately in streets or intermingle impolitely with men in offices… Women should keep wearing the abayas/ black cloaks because Allah dictates chastity on us; not because men decided so." Fatema Nour of Iran refused the Western criticism of Islam's treatment of women. "I can wear bikini, listen to music, and sing… but not in front of men… Some [Muslim] men do not understand Islam or abide by its rules. They harm Islam's image and there are always people who are ready to blame everything goes wrong on our religion."

Once the issue of women taking office and participating in politics has been introduced, many women (roughly 20 percent of the interviewees) begin to quote fatwas/religious verdicts that forbid women from having superiority over men on political matters. It is noteworthy that the classification of men into traditionalists, modernists and secularists does hold when men expressed their attitudes toward women's public roles, since most of them appear to be of traditionalist tendencies. However, most Muslim educated women interviewed in all countries are modernists (60 percent) or liberal (15 percent). They argue for more active role for women in politics. Liberal women quote Islamic and Western examples. Modernist women barely make any references to the West.

Modernist and liberal women quote the examples of many Muslims women who govern(ed) important Muslim countries and were not less efficient than men.

No single Muslim woman in the focus group discussions or on the open-ended questions criticized Islam as a creed. Actually quite the contrary, even among the most secular of them, there is a clear rejection to any attempt to track Muslim women's plights to the sharia/Islamic legislation but to the man-centered schools of fiqh/jurisprudence that degrade women. They are asking for an Islamic version of equal but separate rights and facilities.

Another intriguing observation is that most interviewed women, even secular ones, are critical of the Western model of man-woman relationship. As a Turkish female sociologist comments: "American movies scare Muslim conservatives. They are worried that if they give women their rights, Muslim societies will be like Western societies." As a supporter of the Islamist governing party in Turkey, she thinks that her mission is to educate the masses that a Muslim woman can be free in an Islamic way and not necessarily to follow the paths of Western women or veiled women of Afghanistan. Most interviewed women think that Islamic principles give them the negative freedoms that any woman may aspire to: freedom from sexual harassment, freedom from pornography, freedom from selling their bodies to market commodities. The real challenge they face pertains to the positive freedoms that Islam has given to them but Muslim men deprived them from. Atop of these freedoms is their freedom to have equal opportunity with men in workplace and public offices. As the feminist Iqbal Barka of Egypt put it: "The opportunity to fix what men messed up."

Is there a way to empower Muslim women against man-dominated culture?

One of the major advantages of focus group discussions with educated women is their capacity to nail down their perception of a solution. "Empowering women through quota system in political positions" was suggested by an Algeria female lawyer and human rights secular activist, and was unanimously supported by all the modernist and liberal female interviewees of the focus group discussions in almost all eight countries. Her logic assumes that Muslim rulers have to deal with women in the same vein that mothers deal with their children. Otherwise, the

subordination of women to men will continue even if many Muslim women are increasingly educated.

A Sudanese female student of medicine concurred. She thinks that most women are not aware of their potentials and do not know how to defend their political rights. It is the responsibility of governments in Muslim societies to allocate resources and positions to women. From her perspective, if governments decide to do that, they will succeed.

A contrast between Morocco's and Iran's experiences is indicative in this regard. Though Iranian women are active in almost all socio-economic and political arenas, they are still lagging behind when they compete with men. Women occupy only 4 percent of the Iranian parliament seats. Applying the quota system in Morocco raised the number of women in Morocco parliament from two to 35 and five of them won seats that were open to both sexes (11 percent of the seats as mentioned earlier).

Some recent developments show us that though culture matters but it is not that insurmountable if the political elite decides to empower women.

The Qatari experience strikingly speaks for progressive stands taken by the elite toward women. In a clear contrast to the highly conservative traditions of the Arabian peninsula, a Qatari woman has become a minister of education and another woman was appointed as the Dean of the School of Sharia where tens of male ulama/scholars work.

The Qatari Constitution does not only mention the equality between sexes (article 34) but emphasizes the responsibility of the government to empower women (article 19). From an Islamic point of view, if a woman can run the affairs of a school of sheikhs and ulama, while the male gatekeepers of Islamic traditions have no objection to that, then she is entitled to do so many other things.

Practically speaking, the Qatari government has been working hard the past two years to bridge the gap between women and men in education, employment opportunity, and political positions (al-Ansari 2003). There is not much difference between the culture of Qatar and the culture of Saudi Arabia where women are not allowed to drive cars and until December 2001 did not have personal identification cards because their faces should not be exposed to strangers. All the appointed Shura Council of Saudi Arabia are males and the only allowed elections of Trade Chambers are limited to men. However, there is a clear difference between the political elites in the two countries. A Saudi citizen showed me a free booklet (with no author or publisher) where the following quote by the famous Islamic scholar Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (12th century) appeared: "Women should stay at home, do not see men and men should not see them. If a woman had to go outdoors, she must be in extremely awful clothes…. etc.).

Yet the Saudi government decided to allow women to participate in the national dialogue on reforms in the country, through video-conferencing from separate rooms, but with a growing respect for their role in society.

A famous example that has been used to underscore the role of culture and tribalism in degrading women's political status in Muslim countries is the Kuwaiti example where the Supreme Court and the (50-male member) Parliament refused to give Kuwaiti women the right to participate in politics. Both decisions invalidate a decree issued by the prince in 1999 to enfranchise women. However, one of my Kuwaiti interviewees argued that the prince was not fully serious about enfranchising women. "Had he been fully supportive of it, he would have got it." Is it a matter of a peculiar Kuwaiti culture? The answer does not seem to be yes. If it is a

matter of culture, how can we explain that educated Kuwaiti women have top positions as bureaucrats, academicians, journalists, and diplomats, but they are not allowed to vote in public elections? Besides, it is very difficult to come up with significant cultural differences among the Gulf States.

Additional evidence to support the supremacy of the political actors' agenda over the cultural/religious factors is the role of women as justices. Though there are over 1000 Arab justices, Egypt appointed its first female justice only in 2003. Approximately 50 percent of Morocco's justices and 67 percent of Sudanese justices are women (Ibrahim 2002). Female justices have been in Morocco since 1959, the Sudan since 1962, Tunisia 1975, Yemen since 1990, Lebanon since 1966, and Jordan since 1995.

Iqbal Baraka thinks that Muslim men fear women's progressive and reformist ideas. "They do not want to give women the chance to know their potentials." According to Baraka, men, mainly Islamists, use religion and cultural traditions to subdue women throughout the Muslim world (See also Mernissi 1991). There is some evidence in this data that clearly supports the fact that women are more supportive of democratic hardware and software than men.

According to Togan al-Faisal, the first woman to be elected into the Jordanian parliament in 1993, opposition to women' public role is not based on religion or culture but on "political agenda." Her evidence is twofold. First, King Hussein of Jordan appointed two women in the Jordanian parliament after she was elected in 1993 contrary to the conservative and tribal culture that emphasized honoring women by staying at home for decades. Second, though members of the Muslim Brotherhood of Jordan were very critical of women's participation in politics based on religious and cultural reasoning during the 1989 elections, they retreated after her being elected in 1993 elections. The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, contrary to their previous discourse, appointed a woman in their Shura Council for the first time in the whole Arab region and later nominated a woman to get elected (al-Faisal 2003). Had it been an actual religious and cultural mandate, the late King and the Islamic groups should not have shifted directions that quickly.

If Sweden has the highest percentage of women's representation in Parliaments (54 percent) and US women occupy 41 percent, Senegal and Morocco (19 and 11 percent respectively) are the highest among Muslim countries mainly because of the political support women get from the governing elites.

What seemed interesting is that the attempts to empower women were always coupled with progressive interpretations of certain verses of the Qur'an and sunna/sayings and praxis of the Prophet Mohamed beside underscoring certain incidents and paying little heed to others.

2. Experiencing Democracy

a. Previous Political Participation

Following a proceduralist reading of voting in meaningful elections as the main form of political participation (Dahl 1989; Downs 1956; Sartori 1962; Schumpeter 1976), this project measures political participation in the countries that have public elections through voting. It may be suggested that people who vote are definitely pro-democracy. Actually Bollen refused to use

voting as a vindication of democracy because it has been widely common in non-democratic countries. He actually cited data from 1970s to show that countries like North Korea, Romania and Bulgaria among others had very high levels of voter turnout (Bollen 1980). Thus it is not clear if voting would necessarily lead to more support for democracy or not. In the countries studied in this project, only Turkey has compulsory voting.

The variable of voting has not been used in the cases of Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain and Libya.

A. Democratic Software

Intuitively one may anticipate that individuals who participate in politics through voting are usually more open-minded regarding tolerating the right of minorities and women to run for office and participate in the democratic process. However, this result is true only among Muslims of Albania, Bangladesh, Europe, India, Iran, Malaysia, Morocco, Turkey and USA. These countries have two important characteristic in common. First, they all have a relatively long tradition of elections with clear opportunities given to minorities and women. Besides, these countries occupy the top right corner of Figure 3.1 that shows that they have the most compatible aggregate attitudes toward democratic software and hardware.

Second, this finding suggests as well that people who tend to vote are more liberal and modernist than being traditionalists. The traditionalist position contradicts the democratic spirit that focuses on voting for the best candidate regardless of faith. Typical traditionalists refuse Muslims' participation in elections since it is bed'a/ man made innovation. However, some non-typical traditionalists accept participating in elections only under extreme conditions. For instance, women should not vote or participate and male Muslims should vote only for Muslims even if a non-Muslim candidate seems to be better than a Muslim candidate quoting some verse of the Qur'an such as (221, ch. 2). (Islamweb.net/fatwas, Fatwa # 5141).

This result may be of a good support to Dr. William Ritchie's dialectical relationship between democratic mechanisms and democratic political culture. He states that "democracy tends to create the type of culture conducive to its sustainability." In other words, people who value democratic institutions and participate in their dynamics end up supporting the civic spirit that favors individuals' rights to participate in politics on equal footing. Besides, people who are tolerant and trustful of minorities and women think positively of the capacity of democratic mechanisms such as voting in fulfilling the task of giving a fair outlet for minorities and women in expressing their interests.

B. Democratic Hardware

As expected, the more people are voting in public elections, the more supportive they are of democratic hardware in Albania, Bangladesh, India, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, USA, Turkey, Senegal, Iran, and Europe. However, what is more interesting is why this relationship is limited only to Muslims of eleven societies. In other words, how can some individuals' participation in elections have no affect on their support for democratic hardware?

The answer comes from many observers who noted that meaningless or fake elections are increasing in Muslim world. "Most of these elections barely change anything" as Dr. Bahgat Qurani in Cairo commented.

Out of the 53 countries with Muslim majorities, around 50 of them officially hold some sort of elections and referenda. They are close to Sartori's description of some elections as

"nothing more than the people's periodic renunciation of their sovereignty" (Sartori 1962:24). Most Muslim countries that hold elections can be best described as electoral authoritarian regimes that "neither practice democracy nor resort regularly to naked oppression" (Schedler 2002:36) which explicitly implies that elections on their own rights are necessary but not sufficient for a polity to become a democracy.

If one uses Przeworski's criterion that "no country in which a party wins 60 percent of the vote twice is a democracy" (Przeworski 1992: 126), one will conclude that elections virtually and irregularly matter only in seven Muslim countries: Albania, Iran, Senegal, Bangladesh, Mali, Turkey and Indonesia.

In the rest of Muslim countries, some elections are "shams that nobody can take seriously; others are occasions of struggle that nobody can ignore" (Schedler 2002: 38). This study shows that participation in elections is a good predictor of democratic hardware only in countries where elections actually matter. In Iran, even if elections produce a relatively weak president and parliament while the actual authority remains in the hands of the Supreme Leader, the regression results show a significantly positive relationship between voting and support for democratic hardware. Actually most Iranians still hope that voting will eventually advance reforms through electing liberals and moderates into the presidency and parliament (Jahanbegloo 2003).

In Bangladesh, elections are largely an opportunity for exchanging seats between Shaikha Hesseina (the daughter of Muguid al-Rahman, the founder of Bangladesh) and Khaldha Dheya (the widow of the Dheya'a al-Rahman, the President of Bangladesh in the 1970s). One Bangladeshi respondent described the Bangladeshi elections as "ceremonial" in their impact but Bangladeshi people "still think that elections tell whoever in power that we can change you."

Voting by Muslims of Pakistan did not have an impact on their support for democratic hardware though elections were periodic occasions for changing the seats of the Prime Minister between Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto. "Most Pakistanis welcomed [Musharraf's] coup in hopes that the military would institute long-awaited-structural reforms" to the 11-year of misgovernance under what most Pakistan experts considered democratic rule until 1999 (Shah 2002: 72).

There is no democracy without elections but in most Muslim countries there are elections without democracy, elections that breed dictatorship. An Iranian journalist clearly refuses to describe his country's polity as a democracy though he participated in all the elections took place in the Islamic Republic. As a journalist himself, he measures democracy by freedom of expression and press. He referred me to the international reports on freedom of press. By checking the *Reporters Without Borders'* first worldwide press freedom index, one finds that Muslim countries that have elections are very poorly placed. Indonesia is number 57, Turkey is number 99, Bangladesh is number 118, Pakistan is number 119, and Iran is 122, which clearly indicates that elections have not been translated into substantive respect for freedoms and rights.[20] Most of the moderate interviewees expressed their concern that liberal Iranians may end up giving up voting because it does not matter.

Another angle was introduced by a lawyer from Algeria. She champions democratic reforms but not from a feminist point of view. From her perspective, the real challenge that faces

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[20] http://www.rsf.fr/article.php3?id_article=4116

Muslim countries is not the right of women to vote and participate; rather, it is the efficacy and relevance of the elected councils even if fully dominated by men. In patrimonial and hierarchical societies the structure of power makes all relevant decisions come from top to bottom even with decorative public elections. Thus, these so-called representative institutions are not effective anyway and consequently voting does not increase or decrease the trust in these institutions because they are exactly the same thing. When I asked: why do people vote then? She quoted many examples of people who vote for money, to take a vacation from work on the day of elections or because of appealing to ethnic and religious commitments but "not because of any trust in the politicians" they elect. If one searches for good illustrations of Zakaria's illiberal democracies (1997), these electoral authoritarian regimes in the Muslim world can serve best.

A note of caution should be made regarding some Muslim societies where real and effective elections are not allowed (e.g. Libya, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and until recently Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman). Ruling families and elites provide some access to their citizens by "holding regular, but informal, meetings where citizens can air complaints, petition for redress of grievances, or otherwise try to influence decision-making" (Byman and Green 1999). In most cases, this informal access to elites becomes more effective in defending their interests than regular voting process, as one of my interlocutors indicated. Based on the focus group discussions, it was noted that individuals who have informal access to government officials are less supportive of democratic procedures such as elections, voting, and the whole idea of representation. However, it opens up the gates of nepotism and weakens the role of institutions and creates an accountability-free culture.

b. Residence in a Democracy

This variable is measured by a dummy variable coded one for Muslims who have lived for a year or more in a democratic country (North America, Europe, Japan, or India). This variable was dropped from the models of democratic countries such as USA, Europe or India because all Muslims who have the nationality of these countries have already lived there for a year or more.

There are two controversial debates regarding the impact of living in the West. Some studies suggest that living in the West by itself does not have any effect on Muslims' attitudes toward modernity. Overall, the perpetrators of the September the 11th attacks lived in the West enough to experience democracy but did not get influenced by it (Pipes 2002). One can quote as well the example of Sayyid Qutb who became more radical after visiting the US (al-Khaledi 1987). Other Muslim intellectuals who lved in the West as students or visitors were highly impressed by socio-economic and political modernization and assimilated the Western experience in building their intellectual programs. Some researchers refer to the triumph of the US in the Cold War as another factor that ensured "the growing impact of the U.S. democracy and of American popular culture in the Islamic lands… This kind of relationship is further encouraged by westward migration" (Lewis 1993b).

The pooled data helps to test the effect of residing in a democracy for a year or longer on their attitude toward democracy.

As Table 4.1 demonstrates, holding other variables constant, in almost all cases, all Muslims who lived in a democratic country for a year or more are more supportive of both democratic hardware and software than Muslims who never had enjoyed this experience. This

result indicates that travel and living in a democracy is one of the most, if not the most, influential agents of democratic socialization.

Some focus group discussions conducted in the US and others conducted with Muslims who lived in a democracy for a year helped to understand the impact of living in a democracy on Muslims coming from non-democratic countries. Most Muslims who were interviewed were impressed by the peaceful rotation of power. A Palestinian student (three years in the US), commented that democracy means that "people can choose their ruler and not to wait until he dies.", a Pakistani student, (four years in Canada and Britain) liked the freedom of religion in Canada: "I pray without fearing being arrested for letting my beard grow." A Saudi student (in the US for 5 years) suggested that the "rulers of Muslim countries should come and stay in the US for two years to learn how to govern." A Lebanese administrator (3 years in the US) thinks that the democratic system is an Islamic system. "If there were a modern Caliphate, it would be like the US." He had in mind two aspects, federalism and democracy, but with one caveat. He does not approve using the word democracy: "it will contaminate the Muslim mind." Instead he wants to call it shura system.

An Egyptian engineer worked in Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Germany and USA (4 years in the US and Germany). He thinks that the US has the fairest and most just system. "There is no discrimination in the US. If I am more qualified than a US-born American, I'll get the job and be the boss of other Americans. This cannot happen in Iraq or Saudi Arabia… American [democratic] system is more Islamic than all Arab nominally Muslim countries."

An Emarati student (18 months in the US) who has a lot of reservations on what he calls "excessive freedoms" but still very much impressed by elections, Congress, and most of all the Supreme Court idea. His class on American Political System was a lot of fun. It described to him what Muslims need to do in their countries. Another Sudanese student (14 months in the US) positively commented on the capacity of the American society to accommodate different religions, ethnic groups and languages.

Though Muslims who live(d) in the US are not fond of the US foreign policy, as will be discussed later, most of them maintain that democracy works great for Americans and can work for Muslims with necessary modifications to accommodate Islamic sharia/Islamic legislation such as making sure that certain basic Islamic teachings cannot be violated.

There is a small number of the interviewees who are critical of the democratic ideal itself. Their main criticisms focus on the defects in the mechanism such as the effect of money on the campaigning and electoral process, the perceived control of Jewish lobby over the US political agenda and "the freedom of wrongdoing" as a Nigerian female puts it.

In sum, there is a clear positive impact of living in a democracy for a year or more on Muslims' support for both democratic hardware and software. Definitely, Muslims' experience in the US cannot speak for Muslims in Europe or India. But the comments of these Muslims reveal that democratic principles are contagious and that Muslims are quick learners. Once they are exposed to *real* democracy, most likely they will assimilate it.

3. The Effect of Islam

How much influence does Islam have on individual Muslims' attitudes?

In this section, the main task is to understand how Muslims' attitudes toward democracy gets affected by their adherence to Islam in terms of observing Islamic rituals

(religiosity,) understanding of the relationship between shura/mutual consultation and democracy and their perception of Islam as a source of political ideology or as deena wa dawla/religion and state.

It has been argued that Islam itself has no impact on the political attitudes of Muslims. "The roots of Islamic radicalism must be looked for outside the religion, in the real world of cultural despair, economic decline, political oppression and spiritual turmoil in which most Muslims find themselves today" (Amirahmadi 2002).

An eminent scholar of Islam started his book by stating that: "My own experience of Islam began with a surprised and uncomfortable recognition that things are not what they seem" (Gilsenan 1982:9). Later on he explains: "So we should be especially wary of assuming that it is Islam is the most important area on which to focus" (Gilsenan 1982:20).

Conversely, Islam's impact on Muslims' attitudes and behavior has been a core aspect of the neo-orientalists' analysis of the undemocratic tendencies among Muslims. "Such familiar pairs of words as lay and ecclesiastical, sacred and profane, spiritual and temporal, and the like have no equivalent in classical Arabic or in other Islamic languages" (Lewis 1999:28).

> Islam remains a religion of the Dark Ages. The 7th-century Koran is still taught
> as the immutable word of God, any teaching of which is literally true. In other
> words, mainstream Islam is essentially akin to the most extreme form of Biblical
> fundamentalism. (Johnson 2001).

It was reported as well that the late Nobel laureate and poet Octavio Paz once argued "Islam today is the most obstinate form of monotheism in a world that otherwise accepts plural truths" (Gardels 2003).

Muslims, on average, are claimed to be more influenced by their religion than other monotheists. For instance 17 percent of the books issued in the Arab world are religious while this percentage is 5 percent in other parts of the world (Farjani et al. 2002).

Empirically, the Gallup survey of nine Muslim countries maintains that "religion dominates daily life in the Islamic world" (Gallup 2002).

Politicians, such as the German foreign minister, have doubted the capacity of religious and orthodox Muslims to have an "an Islamic path toward modernity and to a society that is established on human rights, individual freedom and equality among men and women" (Fisher 2002).

Fearing that using the three variables of Muslims' commitment to Islamic rituals (religiosity), Islam as a political ideology, and compatibility between shura/mutual consultation and democracy may lead to multicollinearity, the test has been run and found that, though there is a theoretical relationship between them, empirically there is no multicollinearity. The model has been run after controlling for the effect of each one of the three variables. Only in the cases of Yemen and Malaysia, one finds that dropping out the variable religiosity led the variable of support to Islam as a political ideology to lose its significance.

a. Religiosity

Religiosity in this project is measured as the combined factor of two indicators: drinking alcoholic beverages and observing daily prayers (alpha= .926 as discussed in appendix 8.)

A. Democratic Software

The more Muslims observe Islamic rituals, the less they are supportive of democratic software in the cases of Bahrain, Bangladesh, Europe, the Gambia, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, UAE and Yemen. This is a very intriguing result especially since it is applicable to a sizable number of countries. Besides, these countries have very rare aggregate characteristics in common in terms of history, economic status and political experiences. Religiosity here definitely means that people who observe Islamic rituals are less tolerant toward minorities and women in general. Does this result mean that sins make people more tolerant? This finding makes sense if committed Muslims are predominantly traditionalists. However, traditionalists in all these countries combined are around 16 percent of the respondents while religious people (who observe 80 percent of the rituals) are approximately 27 percent of the respondents. The resort to focus group discussions was a must to understand why a committed Muslim would be less tolerant toward women and minorities than a less committed Muslim. There was a consensus among the interviewees that committed Muslims tend to attend sermons and listen to Islamic audiotapes that make them objects of a certain type of Islamic rhetoric. This answer makes committed Muslims' attitudes a function of the discourses disseminated by ulama/scholars who give sermons and communicate through audiotapes which is an issue that will be discussed soon.

Why didn't this type of effect appear in other countries such as Egypt and Iran, especially since they are known for having extremely vocal and efficient official and unofficial ulama/scholars? I took this question to Dr. Salim al-Awa of Egypt who has very solid ties with ulama/scholars and Islamic thinkers throughout the Muslim world. He did not show any astonishment regarding these results based upon his knowledge of most of the countries that are studied here. For instance, he thinks that the Saudi and gulf states' religious discourse has not been pluralist. This discourse is changing right now but it will take time for these changes to have an effect on peoples' minds. Regarding Egypt and Iran, he argues that the majority of committed Muslims in these two countries specifically are not absolutists because of the nature of the pluralist religious discourses of the salafi (traditionalists and conservatives) and progressive ulama/scholars. They are part of the mainstream moderate reading of Islam that "lives and lets others live."

Dr. al-Awa's analysis rationalizes why committed Muslims in Egypt, Iran, and Mali are more supportive of democratic software than people who pay less head to Islamic rituals. In the rest of cases there is no statistically significant relationship between the two variables.

B. Democratic Hardware

The more Muslims observe Islamic rituals in Europe, Indonesia, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Senegal, the Sudan, Turkey, the more they are supportive of democratic hardware.

The more Muslims are religious, the less supportive of democratic hardware they become in cases of Saudi Arabia, UAE, Yemen and Algeria. In the rest of the cases, there is no statistically significant relationship between religiosity and support for democratic mechanisms and procedures.

This result suggests that Pipes make the second group of Muslims speak for all Muslims when he stated that Muslims refuse freedom since it sanctions "disposable marriages, sexual

license and abortion on demand as much as it does self-government and the rule of law - and they decline the package" (Pipes 2003). In other words, this data suggests that Pipes' analysis is generally valid in the cases of religious Muslims in Saudi Arabia, UAE, Yemen and Algeria but not all Muslims.

<u>b. Perception of Islam as Religion and State</u>

This is a discussion of the effect of Islam not as a religion but as a political ideology. Thus the more people (strongly) agree to the slogan of Islam as a religion and state, the more one is Islamist.

The less one believes in it, the more secularist one is. Some commentators have made democracy contingent upon secularism in the Middle East (Binder 1988; Gellner "Islam and Marxism" 1991, 1992; Sharabi 1988; Tibi 1998). Most researchers in the West and secularists in the Muslim world think that Islamists-in-power are a huge drawback for the cause of democratization in the Muslim world. Two reasons are usually advanced. First, for neo-orientalists, Islamists are the clearest embodiment of the genuinely anti-democratic Islam. Islam is inherently anti-democratic, and Islamists are the most anti-democratic.

Second, Islamists who reached power did not prove to be as democratic as they had claimed while in opposition as in the case of mullahs in Iran and Hassan al-Turabi in the Sudan. Besides, the Islamists of Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria admittedly sent a clear message of anti-democratic rule.

Some commentators preached a gloomy future for democracy in the Muslim world because of widespread political Islam especially among young men and women.

Muslim secularists make it clear that the resort to political Islam, which is unequivocally anti-democratic in their minds, has reasons on the ground. First, the failure of all secular programs of political and economic development and military defeats in major wars since independence in 1950s and 1960s. In the words of an Egyptian secular intellectual as interviewed by New York Times in Cairo:

> It's easy for the average Egyptian to say, we tried modernity but it didn't take us anywhere and we didn't become Europe," said Tarek Heggy, a wealthy Cairo businessman and political analyst. "It's easy for him to say, we tried pan-Arabism and it didn't work. And, if he's a simple-minded person, he might say they didn't work because God wasn't with us. (Sachs 2001).

Others concur; Muslims are less influenced by "scriptural principles than by immediate political, social and economic needs" (Abrahamian 1993).

Second, some secularists argue that ulama/scholars, sheikhs and imams of mosques have poisoned the well of secularism in the Muslim world by "quoting certain verses that lead Muslims to believe that secularism is equal to disbelief and infidelity" as an Iranian female housewife explained. Her comment called for Holyoke's motive behind coining the term of secularism in 1854 in his famous book *Principles of Secularism*. Holyoake noted that he needed an ethical term to convey the value of the non-religious arena without equating it with terms such as "infidel, skeptic and atheist" (Holyoake 1860). Holyoake's success in the West is as magnificent as his failure in the Muslim world where the term has been rejected by the masses

as a loanword or neologism and its connotation has become popularly antithetical to Islam itself rather than to political Islam.

If these assertions are true then one expects Muslims who believe in Islam as a source of political ideology to be less tolerant and trustful of women and minorities and less supportive of democratic procedures and mechanisms.

All other reasons that were discussed in the focus group discussions or mentioned by area and religion researchers did not add much to the two previous reasons but confirmed one result: secularists should stay away from using the term 'almaneya/secularism as a label for what they believe in. Except in Tunisia and Turkey, the word has become an assault on Islam and Muslims' beliefs even if they are against Islamists' attempts to take over government.

A. Democratic Software

The SUR models as discussed in Table 4.1 indicates that the association between political Islam and lack of tolerance and support toward women and minorities have some validity in some countries but not others.

The more one is supportive of the Islamist ideology in Egypt, India, Tunisia, and Turkey, the more they are supportive of democratic software. There is no surprise in these four countries since one already knows that they have a group of the most tolerant cultures in the 32 Muslim societies discussed in this project. However, the result itself raises an important point regarding how tolerant the adherents to political Islam are in these four countries. The seeming paradox is solved by Tariq al-Bishri of Egypt: "What does secularism do? It creates pluralism and coexistence among different religions. This is Islam. It has a long history of justice, pluralism, coexistence and perseverance of rights of non-Muslims." As an Islamist thinker himself, he finds the result appealing and assuring that the majority of Islamists at least in Egypt are still "prescriptively good Muslims with tolerant attitudes." A recent survey in Iraq showed that 90 percent of Iraqis want democracy instead of any other type of government but still two thirds of them believe that Islam should play a major role in governance and "(61%) agreed that the government should be made up mainly of religious leaders″ (ORI 2003).

Although Western commentators have found it difficult to apprehend the contradictory trends among the Iraqi public, this project sees no contradiction here because Islam is inherently tolerant and suitable to democracy in their minds. "The Middle East was deprived of an important prerequisite for secularization, i.e. a religious hallucination" (Boroujerdi 1994). The religious hallucination throughout the Middle Ages of Europe and during the religious wars helped to refine the role of organized religion away from the public sphere.

Another interesting observation in this regard is that Islamists in officially secular countries (e.g. Tunisia and Turkey) seem to be more tolerant than secularists or than Islamists in non-secularist societies. This result is very counterintuitive. There is a possible explanation here. The process of official secularization does not necessarily mean cultural secularization. Turkey's officials have tried to force secularization for decades and the country ended up with a democratically elected Islamist party. Iran's Pahlavi family imposed secularization on almost all state's institutions and ended up with an Islamic revolution. Algerian Islamists were almost in power in 1988 despite 150 years of French colonialism and 26 years of secular regimes. Islamists are the main opposition group in almost all officially secular states from Indonesia to Mauritania.

In Turkey, Ataturk closed all madrassas [religious schools], forced the Sufis underground and forced men and women to wear Western dress. In Iran, Shah Reza Pahlavi gave orders to shoot at hundreds of demonstrators protesting compulsory Western dress. In that environment, you can see how secularization is experienced as an assault (Armstrong 2002).

What is going on?

Ernest Gellner argues that: "no secularization has taken place in the world of Islam"(Gellner "Islam and Marxism: Some Comparisons" 1991:2).

I would not go as far as Gellner. Arguably political Islam has been concealed under the pressure of secularization but most Muslims are not persuaded that Islam and politics are like Christianity and politics. As Hamed Ramadan of the Sudan put it: "when you read the Qur'an you find many verses discuss governance issues such as hodod/ penal codes, shura/mutual consultation, and responsibility of Muslims to apply Allah's hokm/rule. What shall we do with them? Ignore them or re-write the Qur'an to please the secularists?" No secularist government in the Muslim world, despite indoctrination and intimidation, seemingly could convince most Muslims of how to deal with these verses from a secular perspective. A prominent Muslim intellect echoes the Muslim mind by stating that: "Secularism is necessarily atheistic" (Rahman 1982:15).

"Many Muslims recognize the conundrum: when a government tries to impose a new version of religious correctness, it is a political act, and no one has yet figured out how to remove religion from politics without paying a price" (Sachs 2001b). The price has always been some form of repressing basic political and civil rights and eventually autocracy.

However, official secularization has had one positive effect for the cause of democracy: it taught modernist Islamists that they are feared because of not showing enough tolerance toward their religious and ideological opponents and not enough commitment toward the democratic ideals. Consequently, it has become a tradition in all Muslim countries that modernist Islamists denounce any acts of terrorism in their home countries, congratulate non-Muslims on their religious feasts, nominate a woman or more for public office, publicly declare their respect for democracy and commitment to abide by it if in power, and adopt the most liberal interpretation of debatable verses and hadiths/sayings of the prophet. Whether modernists will be committed democrats or not when in power is an issue beyond the results but they are definitely changing their discourse to debunk the secular attacks on them.

However, the good news about Islamists' tolerance did not expand beyond the mentioned four cases. Islamists of Algeria, Indonesia, Lebanon, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, UAE and Yemen are less tolerant toward women and minorities than secularists of the same societies which confirms the fears of secular intellectuals and neo-orientalists. With the exception of UAE, all these countries have been through violent tension in the past 30 years where Islam has been either a cause or justification for the tension. This tension seems to be of a negative effect on the level of tolerance and support for minorities' political rights.

B. Democratic Hardware

Unlike the diverse impact of support for political Islam on democratic software, this project finds no statistically significant differences between Islamist and non-Islamist individuals'

attitudes toward democratic hardware in any of the cases. This result confirms the logic of differentiating between democratic software, that seems to be more problematic, and democratic hardware.

C. Compatibility of Shura and Democracy

As stated in chapter three, most Muslims tend to think of an ideal Islamic political system as one based on shura/mutual consultation to the extent that some thinkers propagated the concept of *shuracracy* to refer to the Islamic political system (Nehnah 1999).

Thus the project explicitly asked the respondents to relate shura/mutual consultation to a publicly elected government (hereafter democracy). The logic behind this question can be best understood by the following quote:

> [T]he existence of democracies depends, other things being equal, on the popularization of the idea of democracy, in the sense that a clear understanding of what democracy is about is a major condition (although not the only one) for behaving democratically. For wrong ideas about democracy make a democracy go wrong (Sartori 1962:5).

Arguably, the more Muslims perceive democracy as a modern application of Islamic shura/mutual consultation, the more they are supportive of it in terms of its software and hardware. Whether this is true or not is left to the empirical examination based on the pooled data.

In one of the most consistent results in this model, one finds that people who believe in the compatibility of shura and democracy are more supportive of democratic hardware and software. This effect is present in almost all cases. However, by looking at Table 4.1, one notices that this effect on democratic hardware is stronger (according to the number of stars) and more frequent comparing to the effect on democratic software. Muslims in countries such as Indonesia, Lebanon, Libya, Nigeria, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and UAE become more supportive of democratic hardware, the more they believe in the compatibility of shura and publicly elected and accountable institutions. However, in these same countries their belief in the compatibility of shura and democracy does not have any impact on democratic software. A possible explanation stems from the fact that the process of Islamic shura/mutual consultation was usually limited to pious Muslims rather than to non-Muslims or ordinary men. Though the prophet Mohamed himself was known to consult everybody including women and non-Muslims, many Muslim ulama/scholars, fearing the plots and conspiracies of hypocrites and non-Muslims, limited the candidates for shura/mutual consultation to the most pious among the umma/nation. Muslims of the these societies who support democratic institutions and mechanisms as modern applications of shura/mutual consultation do not extend these applications to mean trust and tolerance toward non-Muslims and women.

However, there is no one single case of negative impact of Muslims believing in compatibility of shura and democracy on Muslims' support for democratic software and hardware.

This result lends some confirmation for claims of the prevalence of Islamic impact over the Muslim collective mind. Besides, it gives credit to the modernist Islamist reading of the compatibility between Islam and democracy.

Focus group discussions were an indispensable source of explanation to most of these results. To learn how Muslims relate shura/mutual consultation to democracy, I sought their opinions on why this system of shura/mutual consultation did not hold throughout the Muslim history and was applied only on the discretion of the leader. Most respondents concurred that the system of shura/mutual consultation assumes a certain level of iman/piety on the part of the ruler and the ruled. However, there was almost complete consensus on blaming the rulers and their corrupt henchmen including some ulama al-sultan /scholars of authority to corrupt the inherently noble principle.

For instance, most interviewed Muslims do not think of the rightly guided caliphs as rulers in the literary sense of the word. They are just *governors* who do not make up rules. They just govern according to these Allah-given rules and at best if there are different interpretations of Allah's rules, then they can choose, upon consultation, the one that best fits. Thus, under Islamic sharia/Islamic legislation, there is no place for arbitrary authority without infringing upon key Islamic principles. That said, the system of shura/mutual consultation collapsed when the caliphs became rulers.

This answer took the discussions to the issue of democracy and its capacity to drop the assumption of iman/piety on the part of the rulers and the ruled. The interviewees were asked: "can democracy be introduced as a replacement of shura/mutual consultation?"[21]:

1- Shura/mutual consultation is superior to democracy but democracy is still good (36 percent of the interviewees agreed).

2- Shura/mutual consultation is equal to democracy. Democracy and shuracracy are synonyms. Democracy is just a modern representation of shura/mutual consultation (33 percent of the interviewees agreed).

3- Democracy is evil or even apostasy. Shura is not only superior to democracy but it is its antithesis (12 percent of the interviewees agreed).

4- Democracy is inherently superior to shura/mutual consultation (11 percent of the interviewees agreed).

The first two groups of the interviewees that clearly form the majority think that democracy is genuinely compatible with Islamic principle of shura/mutual consultation but not necessarily from an Islamist point of view. In other words some secularists believe that Islam's principle of shura/mutual consultation, which was actually practiced by Arabs before Islam, means that Islam in inherently pluralistic. Modernists argue that some aspects of democracy are Islamizable as means to the common end of fighting dictatorship.

The *first group* (36 percent of the interviewees) believes that shura/mutual consultation is superior to democracy from two different aspects. First shura is a religious, social and economic principle. Democracy, from their point of view is a political system only. One of the interviewees in Libya states that "Muslims are required to consult on everything they are doing. Even a man is required to consult his wife on their daughter's future husband." The obligation of a husband to consult his wife is truly an Islamic principle but most of the interviewees have not

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[21] Around eight percent of the interviewees did not hold consistent or clear attitudes.

noticed the lack of legal and political mechanisms and guarantees to apply the principle of shura/mutual consultation in any of the mentioned arenas.

Second, some of the interviewees referred to the different roots of the two systems.

In a democracy, man is the master of the world. What his mind guides him/her to be true, then it is true without making references or abiding by any moral or ethical codes. In other words, man's fallible mind is sovereign in democracies. Thus, the people are the source of the law and the law in turn is to ensure the will of the majority even if they defy all ethical and divine principles. A Syrian physician who was interviewed in Saudi Arabia quoted the incidents of colonialism, slavery, racism throughout Europe and North Africa as examples of how the rule of the majority may lead to unethical results. Shura/mutual consultation, conversely, is limited to the arenas where Allah "has not revealed His just commands… Only in these areas, Muslims can consult and make decisions on one condition which is not to violate Allah's rules."

Despite their belief that shura/mutual consultation is superior to democracy, the first group favors democratic institutions and mechanisms as acceptable tools to implement the great principle of shura/mutual consultation. An Algerian female graduate student used the example of the car in comparison to the horses that early Muslims used for transportation.

The *second group* of Muslims (33 percent of the interviewees) who believed in the absolute compatibility of shura/mutual consultation and democracy emphasized the similar essence of both shura/mutual consultation and democracy. Limiting rulers' arbitrary rule and the consequent rule of law are common purposes of both shura and democracy. Thus, both of them are on equal moral footing.

To this group of interviewees, "had the prophet lived in the 20th century, he would have prescribed a democratic system of government … with excluding the taboos" as an Algerian Islamist put it. An Iranian student and activist pointed out: "During the prophet's time, sharia/Islamic legislation functioned as a complete code of ethics that stipulates for every contingency. Muslims deliberate and eventually the prophet judges. There is no prophet any more." This logic leads some Iranians to think highly of democracy without assuming superiority of Western values over their Muslim counterparts. The best exemplification of this attitude is Sheikh Mahfoud Nahna's concept of shuracracy as a "a Catholic marriage between *shura* and democracy" (Kutty 1998).

The *third group* of interviewees (12 percent) finds it impossible to compromise God's supremacy (represented in sharia/Islamic legislation) by transferring decision-making to human actors (through democracy). Without repeating what was said about traditionalist Islamists in the second chapter, the interviewees who think that shura is superior to democracy postulate that the outcome of shura is not binding by any quantitative measurement (majority rule for instance). The only criterion is to meet Allah's pleasure. None of the interviewees could come up with an empirically verifiable way to judge if one's opinion meet's Allah's pleasure without assuming that (some) humans have perfect access to God's will and intentions. If this were the case, why would they need consultation from the outset? An Algerian interviewee in a somewhat loud voice accused me of "repeating by rote the Westerners' logic of thinking."[22]

Since no one has such access to Allah's will, then nobody should claim that he/she knows better than others. The *fourth group* finds that democracy, with its separation of powers

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[22] My physical safety guided me to change the topic and accept his answer as the final word.

and institutionalized checks and balances, superior to shura/mutual consultation that is inherently an Arab practice that existed before Islam and fitted well the tribal nature of pre-Islamic Arabia. This position does not mean that Islam is incompatible with democracy. They echo the traditional secularist position that Islam as a religion has been used to justify different political and economic systems based on one's choice of holy texts and their interpretations.

Three observations can sum up the effect of Islam on Muslims' perception of democracy at the individual level. First, it is important to note that all the interviewees, even secularists, perceive Islam in absolute terms. In other words, Islam, in the mind of most Muslims, is equivalent to Truth, Good and Beauty. If democracy is good then it is Islamic. If it is bad, it is not Islamic. This assertion is related to almost every other issue. To most of my interlocutors, a good Muslim cannot do such a horrible thing such as the September 11th attacks. If the attacks were committed by Muslims, then they are not good Muslims. The Gallup survey supported this finding by showing that sixty-one percent of the 1000 Muslims polled said they did not believe Muslim groups carried out the September 11 terrorist attacks and around 21 percent said that they were not sure (Gallup 2002).

Second, Islam is a very important vehicle for Muslims to differentiate between what is acceptable and not acceptable around them. According to Muqatder Khan, "Islam is common sense. But to convince Muslims of certain conclusions, one has to color his argument with an Islamic discourse." In other words, any position with an Islamic logic and rhetoric acquires more legitimacy and appeal among most Muslims. I found this logic very common among the overwhelming majority of the interviewees and in the positive association in the Muslim mind between shura/mutual consultation and democracy.

Third, this impact of Islam on Muslims' perceptions of democracy is not a spontaneous phenomenon. Rather, it is the outcome of the effort of ulama/scholars, sheikhs and imams who function as cultural entrepreneurs and agents of political socialization. The overwhelming majority of Muslims who read the Qur'an hardly relates it to everyday affairs. They usually need the ulama/scholars to interpret the verses for them. If a Muslim is introduced to democracy as antithetical to Islam's principle of shura/mutual consultation, the chances that he/she refuses democracy is very high and vice versa (Maddy-Weitzman 1997).

The following section will focus on the political actors who are perceived as responsible for the perpetuation of autocracy and credible agents of democratization. Three actors in particular will be discussed: the incumbent rulers, the West and ulama/scholars.

4. Who is to Blame?

Who, in the mind of Muslims, are the actors responsible for political dictatorship in the Muslim world? Can they function as credible agents of democratization? The two questions are highly related.

a. The Legitimacy of the Incumbents

One of the questions asked the respondents to convey their opinion about which is better for Muslim countries, current rulers or publicly elected rulers. As stated in Table 3.11, it was clear that almost all Muslim polities face a legitimacy crisis. However, to what extent does

this lack of public support to the incumbents influence Muslims' support for democratic hardware and software?

A. Democratic Software

Except for the cases of India, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and Tajikistan where there is no statistically significant effect for rulers' legitimacy and democratic software, there is a statistically positive effect of Muslims' preference of a publicly elected rulers on democratic software. This result indicates that Muslims perceive most of their rulers as not as tolerant as the respondents would prefer.[23]

B. Democratic Hardware

There is no relationship between the incumbents' legitimacy and the preference for democratic hardware in the cases of India, Indonesia, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Turkmenistan. Differently put, in these five countries there was no impact of individuals' support for the incumbents versus publicly elected politicians on their support for democratic hardware.

Except for the previous cases in addition to United Arab Emirates and Oman, it is clear that Muslim people tend to be more supportive of democratic hardware, the more they support having publicly elected rulers instead of the incumbents, holding other variables constant. In other words, Muslims who do not support the incumbents, and perceive them as illegitimate, tend to be the most supportive of democratic hardware in almost of all cases except in UAE and Oman (beside the five mentioned cases where there is no significant relationship). In these two countries, Muslims who are supportive of the incumbents tend to be less supportive of the democratic hardware. These two countries are clear outliers in the support of their citizens to their incumbents and thus deserve more scrutiny. A Syrian intellectual who lived in both countries for years referred to the phenomenon of economic satisfaction.

Among most UAE citizens, there is a clear support for the current regime headed by Sheikh Zayid al-Nahyan who founded UAE. Besides, UAE has the highest GNP per capita (around $22,800) in all the 32 cases of predominantly Muslim countries.

Though the 2.8 million-population is highly heterogeneous with around 72% of them non-citizens, there is not much difference in terms of political rights between citizens and non-citizens. Despite the lack of official data, around 90% of UAE citizens are Sunni Muslims while around 7% of them are Shiite (World Bank 2001). Though some illicit tension exists among Sunni and Shiite Emiratis, the high level of income and political stability with relative social freedoms comparing to neighboring countries clearly offset this tension. Based upon the interviews with Emirati citizens, it was clear that democracy is not on the agenda of the publics and the political status quo is highly desired. As one of the interviewees in UAE indicates: "Westerners… do not understand our system. We do not need to vote to check the government and solve problems. Voting is going to upset the social balance in society."

In Oman's case, Sultan Qabus Bin Said's personality and his modernization efforts have rendered him a clear support among Omani citizens. Some political reforms including the elected shura council with limited powers and the enfranchisement of women led the country one step

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[23] It does not seem to be clear cut whether individuals' support for democratic software and hardware affects their lack of support for the incumbents or vice versa. In other words, this relationship can be seen as cyclic where one is enforcing the other.

on the path of tactical liberalization. The relatively mild skewness in distribution of income with $8,200 GDP per capita offsets the possibly disturbing effect of religious plurality among different sects of Islam (Barnett 2003).

The focus group discussions revealed three trends among Muslims' attitudes toward their rulers.

First, several cases have been made regarding how Muslims are passive and parochial subjects because Islam habituates them to obedience and indoctrinates Muslims in fear.

> Muhammad ruled in accordance with the will of Allah as revealed to him and translated into his own will. Nothing could have been more irrelevant to his rule than the consent of the governed. There was no room for "we the people" or for legislation by elected representatives of the people because the whole body of laws as laid down in the Sharia was valid and binding for all times. That is the reason why parliaments in Muslim countries even today are rubber-stamp bodies. Neither citizens' right to criticize nor to dissent from their rulers are recognized. Islam admonishes Muslims to obey Allah, his prophet and those in power, as it admonishes women to obey men, because "men are a degree above them (Ali 2000).

Moreover, Mirza Agha Kermani was once reported saying: "The rise of the Western powers as masters of the world, and the decline of Muslim nations into abject servitude, are due to one fact only. In Europe, governments fear the people. In Islam people fear the government" (Taheri 2003c).

Most Sunni jurists argued that "a ruler is not removable from power unless he commits a clear, visible, and major infraction against God (i.e., a major sin)" (Abou El Fadl 2003). This major sin can be as grave as preventing Muslims from prayer as one of the hadiths/sayings of the Prophet states. This argument has been used or misused to refer to Muslims as passive not because of fear but as religious duty (al-'Azm 1969; Lewis 1988).

These quotes suggest a clear causal relationship between fear, obedience and silence on the part of the masses and the perpetuation of autocracy in the Muslim world. This fear has had its effect on the intellectuals as well: "From South Asia to North Africa, an entire generation of Muslim intellectuals is at this moment under threat: Many have already been killed, silenced, or forced into exile" (Ahmad and Rosen 2002).

I have not noted enough support for this sense of fear or obedience among the interviewees. Quite the contrary; there was a mixture of rebellion and disillusion. Most interviewed Muslims, men and women, young and old, have a clear sense of dissatisfaction with their rulers but with no clear alternative plan. Dr. Hassan Hanafi of Cairo University refused putting all Muslims in the basket of obedience and fear. He differentiates among four types of rebellious responses that have existed in the Muslim history since the 8th century and still prevail in Muslim societies. First, there is the militant opposition which is like the Kharijite/dissidents. Second, there is the manifest opposition according to the famous Islamic principle of enjoining the good and forbidding the evil that was institutionalized into the ancient institution of hisba/observing moral codes in markets. Contemporary Muslims still enjoin the good and forbid the evil through modern opposition parties and independent intellectualism. Third, there are secret movements that wait for the opportunity to take over power such as the Shiite under the

Sunni caliphate. Fourth, there are others who resort to patience and awaiting obedience such as ancient schools of Sufism and mysticism. There is more support in the focus group discussion for this 4-category classification than the over-generalizing argument that puts all Muslims in the category of fear and obedience.

Out of all the 188 Muslims whom participated in focus groups, there was only one person who advanced this duty of submission to the ruler as a religious duty. Thus, at least within the pooled list of the participants, there was hardly any support among the educated Muslims for obedience to their current rulers as a matter of Islamic commitment.

Second, some Muslims oppose incumbents and support democratically elected politicians instead from an opportunistic view of democracy. In other words, some of the participants did not deal with democracy as valuable in its own right but rather as a reflection of the desire to replace incumbents with a specific alternate elite rather than an absolute commitment to majority rule. This position reflects a short-run interest in alteration of power. There is no systematic way of measuring this short-run advocacy of democracy, yet it is very alarming because it means that democracy, to some at least, is judged by the government that results from it. A Sudanese student studying at al-Azhar in Egypt stated that: "Democracy that brings al-Mirghani [an opposition figure] into power will not be accepted by him or his tribe." A Tunisian professor interviewed in the US believes that democracy is equally as good as any other means to get rid of the incumbent. There is enough support in the group discussions that some Muslims are less committed to democratic principles than others. However, the survey did not capture this difference.

Third, the overwhelming majority of the interviewed Muslims do not trust that the incumbents will give up power voluntarily. "The rulers do not give up power unless forced" according to an Algeria secondary school teacher. A Saudi computer engineer echoes the same argument: "Swearing by Allah, [the rulers] consider themselves above questioning or accountability…. The only way to reform the system is by threatening their thrones. Then they will pay attention to the public's demands."

Take Saudi Arabia as a test case for this argument. In Saudi Arabia, the rebellion of 1979 in Mecca propelled the government to suggest establishing the powerless Shura council. The unrest calmed down. Some commentators link the re-emergence of the Shura council 14 years later to the liberation of Kuwait and the crisis of legitimacy that swept over the whole region. After the bombings in Riyadh (May 12th, 2003) , it is expected that more reforms will be debated and possibly advanced (al-Khazen 2003).

A Shiite professor of journalism was interviewed in the US who was exiled in Germany for 11 years. He blames the dearth of democracy on the autocratic rulers. "Within four months after ousting Saddam Hussein, Iraqis issued 190 newspapers representing all possible Islamic (Sunni and Shiite) Marxist, liberal, nationalist, pan-Arabist, anti-pan-Arabism, Kurdish and independent trends and streams," he argued. In other words, autocratic rulers are the ultimate factor behind the dearth of freedoms in Muslim countries. A female poet and liberal intellectual from Pakistan concurs that Muslim rulers are responsible for Muslims' plights. "Arab and Muslim rulers are fond of Napoleon, Bismarck and Machiavellian politics rather than being students of Washington, Locke or Mill."

<u>b. The West as a Credible Agent of Democratization?</u>

For almost two years, the US has mounted strong rhetorical and diplomatic campaigns toward democratization in Muslim countries in general and in the Middle East specifically. The US assumes that a democratic Middle East will be safer and eventually less hostile toward the West following the Kantian famous axiom of "democracies do not fight each others." Two problems here: first, is the West trusted by Muslims to act as a credible agent of democratization? Second, is a more democratic Muslim world will be less hostile toward the West?

The two questions were investigated at the survey, focus group discussions and the elite interviews.

The respondents in the survey were asked to (strongly) agree or (strongly) disagree to the following questions: "The West (USA and its allies such as Britain and others) does not want Muslims to freely elect their rulers." Let one introduce a note of caution. This survey was run before the US invasion of Iraq. Thus, the results may be dated but still convey some significant indications of how Muslims perceive the West's attempts to establish democratic constitutions and parliaments in their countries following the shock and awe model of democratization: "After defeating enemies, we did not leave behind occupying armies, we left constitutions and parliaments" (Bush 2003).

At the descriptive level, the percentages of respondents' confidence that the West is really sincere in boosting pro-democratic changes in the Muslim world is very low throughout the Muslim world and even in the US itself.

This distrust in the Western commitment to democracy reaches its minimum level in four Arab countries. None of them seems to be a surprise: Syria, the Sudan, Libya and Yemen. Between 72 and 73 percent of educated Muslims in these four countries (strongly) agree that the West (the US and its allies) do not want Muslims to freely elect their rulers.
The same position continued after President Bush's public and diplomatic campaigns to democratize the Middle East and Muslim world.

> For months, newspapers throughout the Arab world unleashed a barrage of angry articles that denounced the Bush administration's stance on democracy, calling into question its sincerity, and attacking it as a smoke screen designed to distract attention from Bush's real agenda: to grab Iraq's oil and give Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon a free hand in dealing with the Palestinians (Ottaway 2003).

To take the average of all Muslims surveyed in this project, one finds that only 8 percent of Muslims (strongly) trust that the US really supports free and fair elections in the Muslim world including only 17 percent of American Muslims who trust the US interest in democratic Muslim world.

This result confirms the findings of the Gallup survey of 2002:

> The people of Islamic nations also believe that Western nations do not respect Arab or Islamic values, do not support Arab causes, and do not exhibit fairness towards Arabs, Muslims, or in particular, the situation in Palestine (Gallup 2002).

An Emirati modernist Islamist videotaped the following statement by Sen. John McCain: "Why does not the U.S. force Saudis do something revolutionary like allowing women to sit in the driving seat of the car?" (McCain 2002). A group of Muslims in a casual meeting, though critical of subordination of women in Muslim countries, highly begrudged the senator's comment since it reflects a great deal of disrespect for their traditions.

To examine the effect of Muslims' trust in the West as an agent of democratization, the SUR models as portrayed in Table 4.1 show that this five-point scale variable in itself does not explain much. In other words, trusting or the lack of confidence that the US and its allies do not want or hinder democratic elections in the Muslim world does not have an effect on the support for democratic hardware or software except in the cases of Muslims of Albania and the US. This result along with Table 4.1 tells us that since most Muslims, regardless of their democratic preferences, distrust the West (distrusting the West is almost a constant) then there is no enough variability to explain the variability in the attitudes of Muslims toward democracy.

Fearing that this result may be the artifact of this specific question, I used another 3-point scale question that was meant to measure the relationship between the West (among other factors) and autocracy in the Muslim world. The question reads: "Which one of the following reasons can best explain why dictatorship prevails in the Muslim world? (Check all that apply.)" One of the possible options is "The West (by supporting authoritarian rulers)." A three-point scale was developed to quantify the respondents' choice among: a very important reason, a somewhat important reason and not a reason at all.

By using the 3-point scale instead of the 5-point scale in the regression models, three differences occurred comparing to the original models. The Malaysian and Senegalese became more supportive of democratic hardware, the more they blame the West for supporting authoritarian rulers. The significant relationship between trusting the West and support for democratic software among the Albanians disappeared in the models using the data of the 3-point scale question.

However, the descriptive statistics of the 3-point scale question show a highly consistent tendency among Muslims to blame the West for supporting Muslim authoritarian rulers.

How would Muslims defend their argument that the West is behind their political plights? It is enough to sit down with a Muslim, no matter how simple-minded, to find them mentioning the crusades, colonialism, detaching Muslim nations by imposing arbitrary political borders, nurturing repressive rulers, and support for Israel among many other infractions by Western countries. An Indonesian used the Western support for the independence of East Timor and lack of support to the self-determination of Palestine and Chechnya.

Four broad lessons can be learned from Muslims' open discussions of the role the West plays in their political lives and West's capacity to work as an agent of democratization.

First, Western support to Muslim rulers is not perceived positively by most Muslims even if this support takes the form of economic and military aid. On several occasions, my interlocutors talked about the West as the Muslim rulers' real constituency. Judged by the focus group discussions, most Muslims perceive the negative role of the West as the "in, out and on" game: To keep the West *in* the Muslim world, it needs the anti-Western rulers *out* of power and instead the West's henchmen should stay *on* top of power. Thus, the West works very hard to make sure that elections will never bring their enemies into power. With the exception of UAE, there was a clear sense of resentment and lack of trust in the minds of most Muslim

interviewees on the role the West plays in their countries. "Why would the West support both Iran and Iraq fighting each other? Why would the West turn the cold shoulder to the army's intervention in Algeria? Why would the West support the Mujahideen and then destroy them? Why would the West encourage Saddam to invade Kuwait and then push him out? They know what they want. Tell them that we know what the want too," Shaikh H. al-Hamid of Saudi Arabia argued in an interview with him.

"The West has an agenda to be superior over the Muslim world. They will achieve it as far these […] rulers work for them," an Egyptian science teacher said. A Syrian male working in the field of information systems in the US said: "They [i.e. the West] want their own tailored version of democracy that serves their own interests." In his mind, if the West encourages democracy, it is this kind of democracy that will not lead them to deal with Arab nationalists or Islamists.

Second, this lack of trust on the part of Muslims is highly related to a sense of humiliation among most educated Muslims. They have a holy scripture that tells them that they are the best nation to come to humanity because of their capacity to enjoin the good and forbid the evil, while practically this is not the case. A group of Tunisian highly educated Muslims complained that in their country they have to shave their beards and to avoid showing up for many prayers at mosques fearing being suspect Islamists. Ben Ali eliminated all Islamist opposition through police action, nationalized all the mosques, locked their doors except for prayers and is strictly monitoring the sermons of its government-employed prayer leaders who are often heard make supplication for the President as part of the prayer rituals. My Tunisian interlocutors, who are by no means fanatics or extremists, attribute this perplexing situation to the elites' attempts to Westernize the country by force. This feeling that Muslims are just following the Western model without having a real say in their affairs exacerbates the sense of humiliation among Muslims. "Is it his father's farm to run it as he pleases? Why does not he have real elections and let everybody express his solution?", one of the interviewees lamented referring to the ruler of his country.

> Instead of being one of the leaders of world civilization, Muslims found themselves quickly and permanently reduced to a dependent bloc by the European and later the American military, economic, political and cultural dominance (Armstrong 2000).

This type of reasoning took the discussion into the thesis of clash of civilizations.
There is a general agreement among most of the interviewees that there is a clash of civilization between the West and the Muslim world. However, for Muslims it is the West's war on Islam rather than the war of Islam on the West.

A Libyan professor of business administration who lived for eleven years in five European and North American countries stated that: "Muslims have been the target of the West since the 8th century. The West knows that there is a religion behind us that teaches us not to be like them in their worship of the dollar." He wanted to teach me the following lesson: "The West is not Christian. It has no God. The only God they have is the dollar and franc. Their place of worship is the stock market".

The Libyan professor, among others, is very articulate in portraying the Arab and Muslim leaders as the defenders of the Western interests in the Muslim world. Whether this is

true or not is another question. But what really matters is that there is a widespread resentment among the masses against the West.

It is not true that Muslims are anti-Western democratic political values. Most Muslims may have clear reservations on other socio-economic values but not democracy. It is puzzling that most Muslims who are in favor of Western democratic values and systems find the West responsible for not helping Muslims assimilate these values and systems by supporting autocratic regimes. It is a paradox that an Algerian taxis driver who lived in France for six years clarified by saying: "Democracy is like a success-recipe. Whoever owns it has the key to success. The West does not want us to have it and blame us on being unfit to have it. "

Graham Fuller, former Vice-Chairman of the National Intelligence Council at CIA, demonstrated the same puzzle: "Many Muslims are very angry since they prefer to adopt Western values of democracy, human rights and pluralism but they cannot" (Fuller 2001).

Antagonism against the West is not limited to violent traditionalists. Yet violent traditionalists put the West, rulers of Muslim countries and whoever is silent about their wrongdoing in the same basket. A famous quote by al-Zawahri is highly striking:
"We have chosen to blow up the Egyptian embassy in Pakistan instead of the U.S. embassy due to shortage in resources" (al-Zawahri 2001).

All the interviewed made it clear that killing Westerners is not their first choice unless they are forced to do that. Yet they argue that if there is a clash of civilization then it is because the West wants it.

For instance among three of the Saudi ulama/scholars who were absolutely opposed to the US role in Desert Storm unequivocally renounced the violence of September the 11th regardless of who committed it. As one of them put it: " A crime is a crime. Islam does not condone killing innocent people for any reason" (al-Rashid 2001).

Third, Muslims in general think of the West as conspirators against Islam and Muslims. In other words, Muslims on average tend to think of the West as weaving a conspiracy against the Muslim world. As two Iranian secular researchers, living in the US, put it: "To Muslim minds, the West and its ways have become a powerful myth – evil, impenetrable, and incomprehensible… But sadly, the great and brilliant works of the West's 'Orientalists' have found no echo in a Muslim school of 'Occidentalism'" (Boroumand and Boroumand 2002: 15-16).

This was true as well about the publics. When al-Qa'eda was blamed for the attacks of September the 11th it was reported that:

> Many people in Cairo reacted with anger and disbelief. "Every time it has to be Muslims to blame, every time!" shouted Amaal abdel Rabboh, a housewife of 42, outside a mosque on Friday. "Our blood is cheap, eh? No, our blood is precious and the American blood is water. Bin Laden is just an excuse to occupy Afghanistan (Sachs 2001).

Many Muslims do not think that the description of the war against terrorism as a crusade was not a slip of a tongue but it was an accurate depiction. "For a couple of thousands of people dying in New York, tens of thousands of Muslims die in Afghanistan. What about those who died in Palestine, Iraq, Somalia, the Sudan and Kashmir?" Mustapha from Algeria exclaimed.

Muslims who believe in the Zionist-Western conspiracy against them usually starts by thinking that whatever is wanted by the US and its allies will be in Israel's interest thus it is against Muslims' benefit. A Jordanian housewife in UAE, used the example of the Jordanian government's campaign on birth control to show how the American government puts pressure and provides medical aid to the Jordanian government to lower the number of citizens as a service to the Zionist project in the region.

The conspiracy theory as employed by most Muslims has its objective grounds according to Abdullah Al-Nefessi (Political Science professor, Kuwait) who referred to a five-stage Western plan to distort the evolution of the Muslim world and uprooting it from its origin: The violence against Muslims during the military occupation; partitioning the Muslim world into heterogeneous states and countries; solidifying this partitioning and division through creating capitals, flags, diplomatic recognition and the linguistic westernization by making using the Arabic language illegal; the economic dependency on the West and creating and supporting the existence of Israel to save the gains of the last four tactics (Al-Nefessi 2002).

Fourth, there is a specific antagonism against the US. Most of the respondents equate the West with its leader: the US. For instance, the Gallup survey found that the overall view was not a positive one for the United States: 53 percent of the Muslims questioned had unfavorable opinions of the United States, while 22 percent had favorable opinions in the survey that was conducted before invading Afghanistan and Iraq (Gallup 2002).

A student of Assut University (in Upper Egypt) quoted the famous Egyptian play by the name of "My Mother America" where the US is portrayed as the evil mother of the poor Arabs. In the play the US sponsors a project for the rights of donkeys while clearly violating the rights of the Arab human beings by stealing their wealth, supporting their enemies and propagating their image as terrorists. The Islamic thinker Mohamed Omara of Egypt clearly states that Muslims are not against the American science, values, technology or individuals. They are against the US project to control and reshape Muslims' minds. As a modernist Islamist himself he thinks that his mission is to debunk this project by uncovering the elements of strength in Islam and developing an Islamic authentic alternative.

However, the evidence from other sources suggests that this anti-Americanism is not limited to Muslims. "Even in close allies like South Korea, there has long been a deep strain of anger among ordinary people at supposed American arrogance, bullying and high-handedness" (Kristof 2002b). However, the US ambassador to South Korea Thomas C. Hubbard argued that: "When Koreans were able to express their anger in the late 1980's and early 1990's, they let off steam and the frustration dissipated. In short, we may be best off if radical clerics in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan remain free to denounce us" (Kristof 2002b).

Due to my ignorance of Korean culture, I cannot draw any lessons from the Korean situation. However, I can safely state that America is largely seen throughout the Muslim world as the rulers' ally and the peoples' enemy. Even if one focuses on the US record as an agent of democratization and a harbinger of human rights in the region, the US has very little credibility among Muslims.

If Paul Wolfowitz, the US Deputy Secretary of Defense, offered Turkey to work as a role model of democracy to the Muslim world (2002), an Egyptian writer, before Wolfowitz made his suggestion, stated that: "The U.S. wants all Muslim countries to be like Turkey that bombards its people with series of pornographic movies and episodes" (Mahmoud 2001).

Another commentator argued that the American position toward democracy is purely opportunistic. When the Emeriti Zayid Center for Research questioned US policies in the Middle East and invited researchers who doubted the role of al-Qaeda in the attacks of September the 11th, the US pressured on the Emeriti government to close down the Center. The Emeriti government concurred. Meanwhile the US has pressured the Egyptian government to set free the Egyptian-American sociologist Sa'ad el-Din Ibrahim whose policies are in tandem with the US interests in the region (Howaidi 2003d).

One can never exaggerate the negative effect of US diplomatic, economic and military support to Israel on its image among Muslims. Given this notorious reputation, can more democratic Muslim world decrease the level of anti-Americanism? Theoretically, there are good reasons to argue for yes and no. Anti-Americanism could increase with more anti-American forces in power. However, it may decrease if the US is no longer perceived as the ally of the autocratic governments. There is enough empirical evidence to support the first argument. The second one is a mere speculation. A law professor from Bahrain asked if the US would support democracy in oil-producing countries that might result in increased oil prices. In his mind, the answer would be no.

c. Ulama as Agents of Democratization?

There is a debate among Islam researchers about the roles that mosques and ulama/scholars, khateebs/preachers and (sheikhs) imams/leaders of prayers play in shaping the Muslim mind[24]. Some accounts state that:
"Muslims are addicted to religion. Thus any attempt to reform Muslims' affairs will fail unless it starts from Islam" (Omara 2002b).

This kind of discourse is repeatedly instilled in the Muslim mind by all religious figures (al-Buraiq 1994; al-Gazza'eri 1984; al-Qaradawi 1980). It is argued that mosques will always be among the most important agents of moral and political socialization in the Muslim world (Neusner 1996; Sharot 2001; Zaman 2002). The only exceptions to this rule are Tunisia (Ismail 2003; Tamimi 2001) and Turkey (White 2002).
"[The ulama] were the purveyors of Islam, the guardians of its tradition, the depository of ancestral wisdom, and the moral tutors of the population" (Marsot 1972: 149).

Moreover, ulama/scholars and officially sanctioned preachers are finding it very hard to monopolize the tools of literate culture. Mass education and mass media are eroding the monopoly that ulama/scholars used to have over the Muslim mind for centuries (Eickelman 1999).

More specifically the political role of the ulama/scholars shifted dramatically after the abolition of the institutions of waqf/endowments and their transition to salaried state technocrats (Mohamed 1989; Nettler et al. 2000; No'man 2003). Traditionally they used to channel the demands of the masses to the rulers and to advise the rulers to enjoin the good and forbid the evil. Since most Muslim ulama/scholars have become salaried officials in mostly failed states (secular or Islamist), most Muslims lost trust in their attempts to legitimize illegitimate rulers and

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[24] These terms will be used interchangeably in this section.

regimes. Islamists in opposition are now filling this vacuum of trust (Anderson 1997; Esposito 1992; Shariati and Rajaee 1986).

Is it true that ulama/scholars have lost their influence over Muslims' schema of thought or are they still credible source of socialization in the Muslim world? If they still have a role, how does this role affect Muslims' support for democratic hardware and software?

Two questions are used to gauge the influence of ulama/scholars, sheikhs and imams as credible agents of socialization.

The first question intentionally avoids the issue of democracy. It reads: Regarding the Arab/Israeli conflict, whose opinions do you trust most? The respondents were given four options and the opportunity to write down "other." The four options were the government, official ulama/scholars, independent ulama/scholars and independent intellectuals. The distinction between official ulama/al-Islam al-rasmi and independent ulama/al-Islam al-sha'bi is very critical since the official ulama/scholars are limited to government-imposed agenda and positions. Table 4.2 summarizes the responses.

Judged by the issues of the conflict in Palestine, it is clear that Muslims in general trust ulama/scholars more than other sources (government officials and independent intellectuals) in all the cases except for Albania, Turkmenistan, India and Mali. However, and more interestingly, Muslims trust independent ulama/scholars who represent al-Islam al-Sha'bi more than those who represent the official Islam or al-Islam al-rasmi without any exception. This result might have been expected in countries that have not adopted Islam as its official ideology. Yet it was found in the cases of Iran and the Sudan that base their legitimacy on Islamic ideologies and both have very rigid anti-Israeli and pro-Palestinian stances.

Fearing that the question about the Arab-Israeli conflict may have its own biases, another question (2.23) was developed to focus on the issue of democracy. The respondents were asked to explain who may be responsible for the spread and continuation of dictatorships in Muslim polities. Among the possible options available was the "[t]he SCHOLARS (sheikhs who are opposed to democracy)." The respondents can choose between "a very important reason," "somewhat important reason," or "not a reason at all."

The responses to this question took a normal distribution in almost all cases with a clear majority (between 57 percent in Turkey and 83 percent in India) choosing "somewhat important reason." A young Sheikh from Algeria, argues that this is a "fair answer… because the ulama/scholars carry the amana/covenant of Allah to lead Muslims to His way and most of them could not deliver." He thinks that their failure of deliver attributes to their current limited role that is why they are "somewhat responsible for all the difficulties not only the dictatorship issue."

A Turkish imam of a fairly large mosque in Istanbul adds another dimension that the mosque is the first place where young Muslims learn about "the Prophet and his companions and most importantly where they get their moral frame of reference."
The frame of reference is an absolutely important concept to understand the ulama/scholars' influence. Muslim ulama/scholars discuss things and issues in terms of halal/acceptable and haram/forbidden by Allah rather than in terms of legal and constitutional or illegal and unconstitutional. The paradox stems from the fact that in modern Muslim societies, not everything considered halal by the ulama is considered legal by the state.

Table 4.2
Credible Sources of Political Socialization

Country	Govern-ment	Independ. Intellectuals	Official Ulama	Independ. Ulama	Total Ulama
Qatar	9	30	30	31	61
Senegal	19	18	26	37	63
Tajikistan	23	26	24	27	51
Iran	31	11	24	34	58
Saudi	17	16	24	43	67
UAE	31	18	23	28	51
Gambia	21	25	23	31	54
Nigeria	17	20	22	41	63
Banglad	11	34	21	34	55
Morocco	19	19	21	41	62
Albania	21	32	20	27	47
Turkmen	13	39	19	29	48
Malaysia	13	33	19	35	54
Tunisia	13	29	19	39	58
Jordan	11	26	19	44	63
Algeria	19	24	18	39	57
Pakistan	14	26	18	42	60
Kuwait	16	18	18	48	66
Egypt	13	22	17	48	65
Turkey	3	37	17	43	60
Mali	13	40	16	31	47
Libya	11	36	15	38	53
Yemen	18	27	14	41	55
Lebanon	19	25	14	42	56
Syria	20	22	13	45	58
Sudan	13	18	12	57	69
Indonesia	18	30	11	41	52
EU	1	42	8	49	57
US	0.42	47	4	49	53
India	4	53	2	41	43

Source: web and written survey 2002

For instance wearing hijab in government buildings is religiously fardh/obligation according to the overwhelming majority of ulama/scholars yet in Tunisia and Turkey it is illegal. Drinking alcoholic beverages, allowing interests on loans and bank deposits and showing inappropriate movies and music on national TV are "politically" legal and "religiously" haram, which is absolutely inimical to the traditional understanding of Islam as both religion and state. Ulama/scholars have a word to describe all these discrepancies: secularism.

Secular outlets and agents of socialization such as governmental schools, state controlled TV stations and papers in most Muslim countries are highly condemned by ulama/scholars as the source of all evils. Most Muslims get exposed to this anti-secular discourse at very young ages which creates the first frame of reference that is absolutely anti-secular since these secular intellectuals and politicians are enemies of authentic Islam.

Many Ulama/scholars clearly state that authentic Islam, not the one taught at government schools and preached by official ulama/scholars, is incompatible with secularism because in a secular state there is no place for divine laws (which are the core of Islam), and secular laws are against Islam. Thanks to these ulama/scholars, democracy has been introduced to the Muslim world as an alien Western secular panacea.

Mohsan Al-'awaggi, an independent modernist scholar from Saudi Arabia, criticizes the official ulama/scholars for being state-driven and not Allah-driven in their khotbas/sermons. "They were very harsh in criticizing those who committed the September 11th without being as frank in condemning what is happening in Palestine, Kashmir, Afghanistan or elsewhere because the Saudi government prevents them from doing that."

I met Sheikh K. of Tunisia in the US. He is an imam of a mosque and a hafez which means that he memorized the entire Holy Qur'an. He is very critical of the Tunisian government since it created a French education system in a Tunisia. According to him, "the government has overhauled all education curricula from kindergarten to the universities to emphasize equality among all religions; as if Islam is just one option available to Muslims." To him and most Muslims, Islam is the correct religion since it does not associate anybody or anything with Allah, unlike all other religions.

K. resumes, "all the verses that emphasize chastity, women as mothers and housewives and polygamy were expunged from all textbooks as if Bin Ali (the President) corrects Allah."

When I asked him if he preaches these objections in his country, he said of course not. He is trying to do his best as a good Muslim within the government-imposed boundaries.

The solution that most secular governments found is to nationalize Islamic outlets such as mosques, Islamic houses of publications and the Islamic waqf/endowments. Muslim governments managed to make the unofficial ulama/scholars run but could not silence them. Their tapes and books are available and are widely and passionately heard and read by young Muslims.

This duality in Islamic discourse is not new. It always existed in the history of Muslims. Early ulama/scholars had to fight the rulers' transgressions. Thorough the first 13 centuries of Islam, the independent ulama/scholars counteracted the ambitions of the rulers, fend off the hypocritical stances of the official ulama/scholars and support the grievances against the injustices of the rulers.

Assuming that the ulama/scholars' impact is still significant on most educated Muslims, does this impact help or hinder the cause of democracy. Column 12 of Table 4.1 shows the statistical significance of the effect of ulama/scholars on democratic software and hardware in Muslim societies. To gauge the relevance of the ulama/scholars as credible agents of political socialization, a dummy variable was generated where 1 indicates trust in ulama/scholars (official independent) and 0 is for other.[25]

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[25] There was no enough variation on the variable about the responsibility of ulama/scholars for dictatorship that is why it was not used.

The more Muslims trust ulama/scholars as agents of socialization, the less they are supportive of democratic hardware and/software in all the cases except Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan (where there is no statistically significant effect), the Gambia, Mali, Qatar and Senegal (where the trust in ulama/scholars increases the support for democratic software and/or hardware). All cases are formally secular states except for Qatar. However, the relatively liberal environment in the small emirate gives the independent ulama/scholars the freedom to express their views to the extent that it is almost impossible to differentiate between the official and unofficial positions of the ulama/scholars.

The overall result in this study indicates that in most Muslim countries, the credibility of ulama/scholars is associated with attitudes that are not conducive to democratic software and hardware. This result needs explanation.

A physician from India residing in the US whose father is an imam of a mosque in Ahmadabad, feels sympathetic with the ulama/scholars who excel at memorizing the Qur'an, books of hadith/sayings of the Prophet and many ancient interpretations without learning enough geography, sciences, philosophy and mathematics. With lack of preparation, they do not look at the future. Democracy for these so-called ulama/scholars is "alien and improper." The ulama/scholars "longingly keep repeating the virtues of the thirty-year reign of the al-Khulafa al-Rashidoon / the rightly-guided caliphs since they were the golden era of Islam."

This comment reflects a similar observation by Armstrong that Muslim societies are "divided and split between an elite intelligentsia who have a Western education and understand what's going on and the vast rank and file who are essentially left to rot in a pre-modern ethos" (Armstrong 2002).

An engineer from Algeria who does not seem to be a Muslim any more, decided to give up attending Friday khotbas/sermons. In his mind, the khateeb (one who gives sermons) is shallow and does not address the serious challenges of Muslims. "Why do we still discuss the issue of hijab, application of hodod/Islamic penal code or how to clean oneself for prayer while [there are] no jobs, no money and no hope?" He thinks that attending such Khateebs/preachers are not only irrelevant but harmful since they make people pre-occupied of the useless.

An American citizen of Libyan origin thinks that Islam has become the opium of Muslims: "Khateebs/preachers preach to us to obey the ruler as far as they do not prevent us from prayers. How come? They are corrupt, traitors, and ignorant. How can I listen to an employee who teaches me nothing?"

An Iranian female liberal thinker agrees to the use of ulama/scholars by rulers as tools legitimating their authority. Being Shiite, she explains how the ulama/scholars preach that the infallible Twelfth Imam went on concealment. The Shiite have been suffering under the political oppression of the unjust awaiting the return of this concealed Imam as savior. "This is stupidity," she said, "I questioned this belief and challenged a female scholar but she has no logic. She believes blindly and does not allow for multiple interpretations."

This comment on lack of plurality sounds familiar to people who have studied all religions. Gilsenan reached a similar result:

> The text is made esoteric and becomes the special preserve of scholars, who
> are self-defined as the only ones who can really understand it. The text becomes
> an instrument of authority and a way of excluding others or regulating their

access to it. It can be used to show that others are wrong and we are right; what is more, we have the right to be right and they do not! We know (Gilsenan 1982:31).

I asked some of the imams who were interviewed if it was possible for them to discuss issues such as democracy, elections, political equality with non-Muslims in their khotbas/sermons. The answer in almost all cases was no. A sheikh from Saudi Arabia said he could not and no khateeb could do that since "this is the minbar/stand of the Prophet of Allah and we cannot dare saying what he did not say."

A sheikh of a well-know mosque in Cairo thought that he could not use the word democracy in the sermon of Friday. He did give a sermon on shura/mutual consultation and how it was practiced by the Prophet and his companions. He is convinced that democracy is not like shura/mutual consultation. Democracy may lead Muslims astray but shura/mutual consultation is only bounded by Allah's imperatives.

In a clear example of the influence of this sheikh on his followers, my attempt to show how democracy has positive sides that may be necessary for Muslims to consider failed. The three attendees showed clear support for his argument and started quoting verses, mostly out of their context to condemn the effect of the West on Westernized Muslims like myself.

This statement is reminiscent of a quote by Ahmad Nawafal, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, who said: "[i]f we have a choice between democracy and dictatorship, we choose democracy. But if it's between Islam and democracy, we choose Islam" (Pipes 1995).

Some of the interviewed Muslims tended to defend the role of ulama/scholars as politically bounded by the autocratic rulers. Many of the interviewees quoted several names of ulama and sheikhs who have been jailed due to criticizing the rulers or galvanizing the masses around themselves. This persecution of ulama and sheikhs has hindered their roles as reformists and increased their roles as conservatives. Thus, the depiction of ulama as responsible for the continuation of autocracy, at least to some of the interviewees, is like blaming the victims that they are not powerful enough to defend themselves.

Muslim ulama/scholars have been depicted as either catalysts for autocracy or its victims. However, they can be part of the solution as well. Take Iran as a test case. Obedience to unjust rulers and awaiting the concealed imam has been a tradition in the Shiite creed for over 12 centuries. However, this creed was turned upside down when imam Khomeini made ijtihad/independent reasoning and coined the concept of vilayat-i faqih. This ijtihad it was spelled out in full in Article Five:

> During the Occultation of the Wali al-Asr [i.e., the Twelfth Imam] (may God hasten his reappearance), the wilayah and leadership of the Ummah devolve upon the just ['adil] and pious [muttaqi] faqih, who is fully aware of the circumstances of his age; courageous, resourceful, and possessed of administrative ability, will assume the responsibilities of this office   (The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Article 5).

This effort on the part of the Iranian ulama/scholars showed that such well-entrenched concepts and principles can be questioned and eventually altered. This pro-democratic role played by clerics has been heard of in Catholic societies. The map of the world after WWII did

not have any single democratic polity in societies with a Catholic majority. Yet by the 1960s, "the attitudes of Catholic clergy and those victimized by oligarchies and tyrannies" (Karatnycky 2002:105) helped diminish their legitimacy.

One can argue that unless fighting dictatorship becomes prioritized in the public agenda through the efforts of ulama/scholars and others, the future of democracy in the Muslim world will be highly contingent on the free will of the ruler.

5. Concluding Remarks

This chapter aims at providing some focused analysis of why some Muslims in the same society and across societies adopt different or even contradictory attitudes toward the two dimensions of democracy: hardware and software. To give a general, and definitely less accurate, description of how Muslims relate to democracy one can differentiate among three types of variables:

First are variables that consistently furnish more support for democracy across and within societies in general:

1- With the exception of Saudi Arabia and UAE, the more Muslims get educated, the more they support democracy holding other variables constant.
2- Muslim Women are more supportive of democracy than men in all Muslim societies holding other variables constant.
3- Muslims who resided in a democracy for a year or longer endorse democracy more than Muslims who did not have this experience holding other variables constant.
4- Modernist and liberal Muslims who believe in the compatibility between shura and democracy strongly furnish support to democracy than those who have doubts about this compatibility holding other variables constant.
5- Muslims who are not satisfied with the incumbents tend to be more supportive of democracy holding other variables constant.
6- In most cases, the more Muslims have an experience with political participation through voting, the more they support democratic hardware and software holding other variables constant.

Second variables that have contradictory effects across cases:

1- Increasing relative income has a generally positive effect on Muslims' attitudes toward democracy in the cases of Albania, Europe, the Gambia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, , Turkey and the US. More income has the opposite effect on other cases such as Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. Relatively affluent Muslims of Jordan are more tolerant but less supportive of democratic mechanisms and procedures. Kuwaiti relatively affluent Muslims have the opposite trend: support democratic hardware and less tolerant toward women and minorities.
2- Older people are found to be more supportive of democracy than younger people in the cases of the Gambia, India, Indonesia, Kuwait, , Lebanon, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Tunisia, holding all other variables constant. However, older people are found to be less supportive of democracy in the cases of Bahrain, Iran, Turkey and USA. Older Muslims of Saudi Arabia and UAE are more tolerant but less supportive of democratic mechanisms.

3- More religious people are found to be more supportive of democracy in general than non-religious people in the cases of Europe, Iran, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco, Senegal, the Sudan, Mali, and Qatar. However, religious people in the cases of Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Europe, the Gambia, India, Jordan, Kuwait, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Yemen. More religious Muslims in Oman, Indonesia, and Europe are more supportive of democratic hardware and less supportive of democratic software.

4- The trust in the ulama/scholars as credible agent of socialization is associated with positive support for democracy on the part of Muslims in the Gambia, Mali, Morocco, Qatar, Senegal and USA. However, this trust of ulama/scholars is associated with negative support for democracy on the part of Muslims in Albania, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Syria, Yemen. However, this trust in ulama/scholars leads the Muslims of Europe and Indonesia to more support of democratic hardware and less support for democratic software.

Third, there are two variables that did not have the expected explanatory power:

1- Blaming the West for the continuation and spread for dictatorships in the Muslims world and thus refusing it as a credible agent of democratization is so common among pro- and anti-democracy Muslims alike that it ended up having no statistical effect on the attitudes of Muslims toward democracy except in the cases of Muslims of the US and Albania.

2- The attitudes toward political Islam measured by Muslims' attitudes toward the concept of Islam as a religion and state are found not to be as helpful in explaining the attitudes of Muslims toward democratic hardware at all. Yet Islamists who believe in the previous slogan were found to be less tolerant toward women and minorities in the cases of Algeria, Indonesia, Lebanon, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, UAE and Yemen. Islamists of Turkey, Tunisia India and Egypt are found to be more tolerant toward women and minorities than non-Islamists.

VI. THE CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Although there are few points of consensus in modern social science, the incompatibility of Islam and democracy is a candidate for one of them. Many students of Islam and the Middle East operate from the implicit if not explicit assumption that Muslims have one creed (Islam), and thereby one culture and collectively share a disdain for modernity and reject democracy as a formula of governance.

A thorough reading of the scholarship on Islam and democracy in the West suggests that most students of Islam and the Middle East resort to theological, juristic and philosophical arguments to link Islam to autocracy. This scholarship relies mainly on secondary sources when addressing this relationship and arguably assumes that Muslims are prisoners of an eternal and uniform culture. In most cases, it is either implicitly or explicitly assumed that this culture hardly changes or evolves since it is genuinely associated with Muslims' creed. This resistance to change has been suggested to be the core of the affinity between Islam and autocracy.

This project has addressed a different, though related, empirical puzzle: do the attitudes of ordinary educated Muslims stand as an obstacle toward the adoption of democracy?

This puzzle calls for empirical/behavioral methodological tools that bring into focus contemporary Muslims' attitudes rather than ancient jurists' contributions. In other words, the project tries to shift attention from ancient Islamic texts to contemporary Muslims' mindsets.

Unfortunately, the great majority of Muslim governments do not allow researchers to conduct empirical research freely in their societies. Thus, the triangulation of different, and possibly imperfect, methodological tools, such as text and speech analysis of intellectuals' discourses, surveys of educated Muslims, focus-group discussions and interviews with intellectual elites, is the most viable and scientifically defensible strategy to color a picture that has been drawn mainly with a white-black (either/or) brush.

1. Summary of Findings

a. The project has served to debunk the cultural determinism of the typical neo-orientalist position. Cultural determinism has two major problems: First, it ignores the other factors that may affect Muslims' attitudes and behaviors, such as individual demographics and political actors. "It is one thing to argue that culture matters. It is quite another to argue that it is all that matters" (Sabra 2003). Second, it ignores the diversity inside culture. Muslim intellectuals, let alone ordinary educated Muslims, are not identical in their responses to the common concerns that face them, which in turn indicates that Muslims are the makers of their culture as well. As a result, students of Islam should supplement their discussion of Muslims' culture with Muslims' sub-cultures.

b. As a corollary, when one tries to respond to Senator McCain's question of "why authoritarianism is the only game in Muslim towns," (McCain 2002), one has to be careful not to resort the easy answer, the purported uniformity and uniqueness of Muslim culture, as the neo-orientalists would argue. This project has generated sufficient empirical and systematic evidence to demonstrate that educated Muslims are heterogeneous enough to defy any one-size-fits-all kind of cultural explanation.

c. Muslim intellectuals and ulama/scholars have been found to be part of the problem of democratization in most Muslim societies due to their uncompromising readings of Islam and democracy. As Makiya[26] put it, "Instead of recognizing our own fallibility and frailty, we Arab intellectuals-secular and non-secular alike-have, on the contrary, been perfecting in the last quarter of a century a different kind of language, one that is constantly preoccupied with blaming others for problems that are largely-although not completely-of our own making" (Makiya 2002).

d. It is not true that "[R]eligious traditions are usually constant within societies, they are variables only across societies" (Fish 2002). This project finds enough variation in Muslims' attitudes both across societies and within societies to rebut this assertion. A quick look at tables 3.7, 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12 clearly illustrates that inside each Muslim society, no matter how democratic or undemocratic it seems to be, there are representatives of each sub-culture: traditionalists, modernists, liberals and autocrats.

e. This project shows in a systematic way that not all secular Muslims are liberal, since some are autocrats, and not all Islamists are anti-democratic traditionalists, since some are modernists. Traditionalists search for an Islamic government that is not similar or even close to any other un-Islamic government. This system of government is the antithesis of what has been known as representative democracy. Modernists search for a governmental system that is compatible with Islam rather than being idiosyncratically Islamic. To them most aspects of democracy are compatible with their reading of Islam, or at least Islamizable. Secularists do not pay heed to Islamic justifications of any sort of government since Islam, like other religions, is subject to plural interpretations.

f. At the level of society, a Muslim society would score highest on the democratic hardware and software scales and thus be potentially democratizable if:

g. The distribution of attitudes indicates that autocrats and traditionalists are in the minority and modernist Islamists and liberal secularists are in the majority.

h. There is a majority of Muslims who are ideologically liberal in the sense that they accept the existence of political parties even if they endorse opposing ideologies.

i. There is a majority of Muslims who have negative attitudes toward the undemocratically elected incumbents.

j. There is a majority of Muslims who are ready to publicly demand and sacrifice for their political rights.

k. There is a majority of Muslims who do not adopt utopian ideas about what government can or should be and, thus, accept a democratic system of government.

l. The traditionalist narrative is but one narrative and is actually in the minority in most Muslim societies. Saudi, Yemeni, Sudanese, Pakistani and Nigerian societies are the most plagued with this inherently anti-democratic narrative. Thus, these societies' political cultures are clear obstacles to democratization. While not all traditionalists are ready to use violence against their societies or rulers, the danger of violent traditionalists comes from the fact that they, no matter how few they are, can put the whole democratic transition and demands for democracy on hold. In Muslim countries such as

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[26]Kanan Makiya is the Iraqi expatriate author of *Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny and Uprising in the Arab World* (1993) and *The Republic of Fear* (1989) under the pseudonym Samir Al Khalil.

Algeria, Lebanon, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Nigeria, and the Sudan, where the roots of democratic praxis and norms are still nascent, violence gives the autocratic governments of the region the pretext to tighten freedoms, impose martial law, violate basic rights and claim the incompatibility between democracy and their societies. It is noteworthy that the democratic transition can continue even if violence erupts. Actually, it is argued that democratization can help lessening tension and violence. Spain pressed on its democratization process despite all the violence committed by ETA (Linz and Stepan 1996).

m. Some Muslim societies exhibit public claims for internalizing democracy in the Muslim world. These societies have a majority of modernist Islamists and/or liberal secularists. Turkey, USA, EU, Albania, India, Malaysia, Mali, Senegal, Tunisia, Iran, Egypt and Morocco have enough pro-democratic Muslims. In these societies, it is difficult to argue that culture stands as an obstacle toward democracy. If these societies are still under autocratic governance, the evidence suggests that one should search for non-cultural reasons for why they do not democratize.

n. Some Muslim societies, despite the existence of a relatively strong traditionalist discourse, have had some liberal and modernist intellectual elites that inject democratic norms in the Muslim mind. The evidence suggests that some societies are in a transition stage to accept, but not yet to internalize, democratic norms such as Qatar, Bahrain, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Algeria, the Gambia, Lebanon, Turkmenistan, Kuwait, Syria, Egypt and Bangladesh. However, others are still in the state of norm-emergence such as the Sudan, Pakistan, Indonesia and Tajikistan.

o. The Islamist ideology is embraced by the absolute majority in all 32 societies with the exception of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Mali, Tunisia, Albania and Turkey (Table 3.7). This result indicates two important lessons: 1) At least in the short to medium run, no democracy can emerge with the marginalization of Islam as a source of political ideology or Islamists as political actors. 2) Free and fair elections in most of Muslim countries would lead Islamists to power, holding other variables constant.

p. A notable observation should be made regarding the gigantic gap between Muslim rulers and Muslim publics as showed in Table 3.11. This gap can be described as a legitimacy crisis. In other words, if Muslims were given the opportunity to change their rulers, they generally would do so. Other surveys confirm the same results. Though some Muslim rulers are committed to the coexistence between Israeli and Palestinian states, a Pew survey found that 90 percent, 85 percent, 85 percent, and 72 percent of citizens of Morocco, Jordan, Palestinian, and Kuwait, respectively, disagree with their governments' official positions (Borting 2003). Though the attitude toward Israel is not the only reason for the crises of legitimacy, the previous statistics demonstrate the gaps among the rulers and the masses.

q. Assuming that the only way for Muslims to achieve democracy is through mass-led series of demonstrations, strikes and public demands following the East European paths toward democracy, the prospects for democracy do not seem promising in Arab countries in general comparing to Muslim non-Arab countries such as Iran, Turkey and Mali, as demonstrated in Table 3.12. On average the elasticity of demand for democracy among Arabs is much higher than among non-Arab Muslims.

r. The individual-level analysis aims at explaining why Muslims, who live in the same society, adopt different or even contradictory attitudes toward democracy. The variables that shape Muslims' attitudes across societies can be divided into three types:

First, variables that consistently furnish more support for democracy across and within societies in general:

a. With the exception of Saudi Arabia and UAE, the more Muslims get educated, the more they support democracy, holding other variables constant.

b. Muslim women are more supportive of democracy than men in all Muslim societies, holding other variables constant.

c. Muslims who resided in a democracy for a year or longer endorse democracy more than Muslims who did not have this experience, holding other variables constant.

d. Modernist and liberal Muslims who believe in the compatibility between shura and democracy strongly support democracy compared to those who have doubts about this compatibility, holding other variables constant.

e. Muslims who are not satisfied with the incumbents tend to be more supportive of democracy, holding other variables constant.

f. In most cases, the more Muslims have an experience with political participation through voting, the more they support democratic hardware and software, holding other variables constant.

Second, variables that have contradictory effects across cases:

a. Increasing relative income has a generally positive effect on Muslims' attitudes toward democracy in the cases of Albania, Europe, the Gambia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, Turkey and the US. More income has the opposite effect on other cases such as Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. Relatively affluent Muslims of Jordan are more tolerant but less supportive of democratic mechanisms and procedures. Kuwaiti relatively affluent Muslims have the opposite trend: they support democratic hardware but are less tolerant toward women and minorities.

b. Older people are found to be more supportive of democracy than younger people in the cases of the Gambia, India, Indonesia, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Tunisia, holding all other variables constant. However, older people are found to be less supportive of democracy in the cases of Bahrain, Iran, Turkey and USA. Older Muslims of Saudi Arabia and UAE are more tolerant but less supportive of democratic mechanisms.

c. More religious people are found to be more supportive of democracy in general than non-religious people in the cases of Europe, Iran, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco, Senegal, the Sudan, Mali, and Qatar. However, religious people in the cases of Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Europe, the Gambia, India, Jordan, Kuwait, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Yemen. More religious Muslims in Oman, Indonesia, and Europe are more supportive of democratic hardware and less supportive of democratic software.

d. The trust in the ulama/scholars as credible agents of socialization is associated with positive support for democracy on the part of Muslims in the Gambia, Mali, Morocco, Qatar, Senegal and USA. However, this trust of ulama/scholars is associated with

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negative support for democracy on the part of Muslims in Albania, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Syria, Yemen. However, this trust in ulama/scholars leads the Muslims of Europe and Indonesia to more support of democratic hardware and less support for democratic software.

Third, there are two variables that did not have the expected explanatory power:

a. Blaming the West for the continuation and spread for dictatorships in the Muslims world and thus refusing it as a credible agent of democratization is so common among pro- and anti-democratic Muslims alike that it ended up having no statistical effect on the attitudes of Muslims toward democracy except in the cases of Muslims of the US and Albania.

b. The attitudes toward political Islam measured by Muslims' attitudes toward the concept of Islam as a religion and state were not found to be helpful in explaining the attitudes of Muslims toward democratic hardware at all. Yet Islamists who believe in Islam as a religion and state were found to be less tolerant toward women and minorities in the cases of Algeria, Indonesia, Lebanon, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, UAE and Yemen. Islamists of Turkey, Tunisia, India and Egypt are found to be more tolerant toward women and minorities than non-Islamists.

2. Policy Recommendations

If one wants to summarize the whole cultural map of Muslim societies regarding the issue of democracy and autocracy, it is safe to say that there are two broad types of sub-cultures in the Muslim world: the culture of "dictatorship, but…"[27] and the culture of "democracy-as-a-must." The former is the sub-culture of two groups of Muslims: 1) Traditionalist Islamists who argue that a just autocratic ruler who abides by sharia/Islamic legislation and defends its tenets is the most legitimate ruler of all. 2) Autocratic secularists who argue in favor of a Hobbesian ruler who maintains the state's sovereignty and defends it against its foreign and internal enemies. In both cases, Muslims behave as rational actors who find that the advantages of having an autocratic ruler outweigh having a democratically elected one.

The "democracy-as-a-must" sub-culture is the one that is adopted by modernist Islamists and liberal secularists. Modernist Islamists treat democracy, as far it does not contradict the clear-cut taboos of Islam, as a vehicle to fight dictatorship and ensure pluralism in society. Liberal secularists argue that democracy is the core component of modernity that should be adopted on secular grounds.

Democracy has no future in Muslim societies unless the "democracy-as-a-must" sub-culture becomes the dominant culture. "Democracy must triumph in theory before it can be realized in practice. Muslims must widely and unambiguously accept that Islam and democracy are compatible and that meaningful faith requires freedom" (Khan 2003).

There are some practical lessons to be learned from this project to make "democracy-as-a-must" sub-culture dominant:

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[27] "Dictatorship, but…" refers to the type of culture that permits benevolent dictatorship such as stating that Nasser of Egypt was dictator but he was pan-Arabist and true socialist and so on.

First, advocates of democracy in the Muslim world should make more efforts to Islamize democracy rather than democratizing Islam. Islamizing democracy is a philosophical, theological and juristic endeavor that aims at finding Islamic roots for democratic norms and praxis. Many sayings and actions of the Prophet Mohamed can be endorsed as the Islamic roots of majority rule, moral and political equality of women and non-Muslims, obligatory shura, and the eradication of apathy and "dictatorship, but…" culture.

However, many secularists adopted a self-defeating strategy by democratizing/secularizing Islam through distorting Islamists' image, debunking ulamas' roles, copying Western experiences, implanting secular solutions and heightening the intellectual civil war. This process has been perceived by many Muslims as a Western attack on their legacy and identity. Using Islamic teachings to reform Muslims' culture sounds like the most feasible strategy in most of the societies studied in this project.

Rachid al-Ghannouchi (1996), the founder of the Tunisian Islamic movement, al-Nahda, believes that:

> Once the Islamists are given a chance to comprehend the values of Western modernity, such as democracy and human rights, they will search within Islam for a place for these values where they implant them, nurse them, and cherish them just as the Westerners did before, when they implanted such values in a much less fertile soil.

The process of Islamization of democracy is based on three assumptions:

First, democratic norms and praxis are not entirely Western. They are the mankind's shared efforts to fight despots and tyrants anywhere and anytime. Muslims have made their contribution to this goal by emphasizing the values of unity, respect for order, equality, peaceful coexistence and pluralism in addition to their effort to abolish slavery and emancipate humanity throughout its history.

Second, "Wisdom is the goal of the believer, wherever he/she finds it, he/she should learn it" as Prophet Mohamed said. Early Muslims did not find it anti-Islamic to learn systems of administration from the Persians, irrigation from the Egyptians, and philosophy from the Greeks. They can learn from others what they lack without necessarily finding it anti-Islamic.

Third, Muslims' experience with governance was distorted due to the mis-governance of corrupt rulers under the Ottoman Empire and European colonialism. Democratic impulses began to escalate in Europe in the early 18th century onward, which was the period during which most Muslim countries began to fall under the colonial control of the Europeans who distorted the class structures and cultural priorities of Muslim societies. Thus, the best way to correct for this historical lapse is to catch up and learn what Muslims should have authentically invented or developed.

The second lesson pertains to the importance of the actors' behavior in creating the "democracy-as-a-must-culture." Students of democracy have debated which variables have supremacy in regard to explaining successful democratic transitions: crafting (actors' behavior) or prerequisites (contextual variables). The advocates of crafting school underscore the importance of the political actors who have the commitment and skills to minimize their powers and to maximize the powers of the electorate. The pre-requisites school emphasizes the

importance of certain values that need to exist no matter how committed the elite are to values of democracy. These values are mainly associated with a secular reading of religion and its role in public life and the level of development of each society. It is said that "virtually all of the non-oil-producing high income or upper-middle-income counties, with the exception of Singapore, are democratic" (Huntington 1996b). Almost all countries considerably influenced by the West, with the exception of Cuba, Pakistan and Algeria, are democratic.

This study suggests that political actors and cultural entrepreneurs have specific tasks to play in building the necessary blocks toward "democracy-as-a-must" culture.

a. Role of Ulama

There have always been lively debates within the Islamic tradition on who has the historical right to interpret Islam and its teachings (Wright 1992). This historical, and possibly eternal, debate is settled in the minds of most educated Muslims who trust independent over official ulama/scholars and ulama/scholars in general over intellectuals in most Muslim societies. This trust of ulama/scholars as agents of democratization has been particularity clear in the significant effect of Muslims' perception of democracy as an extension of shura on their support of democracy.

Esposito eloquently characterized the challenge ahead for Muslim ulama/scholars and intellectuals:

"A major issue in democratization in Muslim societies is whether or not scholars and leaders have successfully made the transition from listing 'democratic doctrines of Islam' to creating coherent theories and structures of Islamic democracy that are not simply reformulations of Western perceptions in some Muslim idioms" (Esposito 1996).

The effort of the 80-year-old sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi of Egypt is one of the most successful attempts to Islamize democracy. His book on the *Fiqh of Islamic State* (2001a) is a notable attempt to demonstrate the Islamic underpinnings of democracy in the Sunni Muslim world. This book has been often quoted by other modernist ulama/scholars and intellectuals in their books, booklets, and sermons. It has given informal permission to many other ulama/scholars to use the originally alien word of "democracy" without necessarily referring to it by its equivalent Islamic references such as (popular) shura/mutual consultation.

Al-Qaradawi's attempt, along with others, has made democracy acceptable by many Muslims, but it is still not perceived as a must. In contrast, waging jihad against Israel or American troops in Iraq or Afghanistan is a must according to all modernists.[28] Thus, a Muslim who dies while waging this type of jihad believes s/he will go to heaven. But there is no such emphasis on jihad against dictatorships in their rhetoric (seeEl-Affendi 2001).

Take Syria as a case-study. In 2000, ninety-nine Syrian intellectuals published a demand for greater democracy and freedom of expression in a rare, direct appeal for political reform in Syria. The petition calls the Syrian government to join the world's "common language" of democracy "by expanding civil liberties, liberalizing press freedoms and releasing political

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[28] Pacifist traditionalists and modernists would not use violence against their own rulers or societies but can do so against colonial powers.

prisoners" (Schneider 2000). One can argue, based on the findings of the current research, if this petition for democracy is signed and aggressively endorsed by ulama/scholars, the popular pressure over the Syrian government would have been substantially augmented. Without aggressive support on the part of the ulama/scholars, these petitions for democracy will be perceived by most Muslims as elitists' demands for their own narrow interests.

Out of 7829 audio-tapes available at islamway.com and islamweb.net, I found only 15 tapes that attack dictatorship in the Muslim world. One tape, by Yusuf al-Qaradawi with the title of *Democracy in Islam*, explicitly defends democracy, universal suffrage, elections, voting and representative government as a full package. Unfortunately, the attempts of ulama/scholars to Islamize democracy are still few in number and shallow in effect. Another tape is by Sheikh Sa'id Marrawi, most likely from Syria, who was critical of democracy. However, he referred to one possible positive thing. It is better than dictatorship. "No Islam and no freedom is worse than no Islam with freedom."

The scarcity of audio-tapes that that seek to Islamize democracy may be partially explained by the positions of autocratic governments. Such governments attack these attempts as a part of the Islamists' propaganda to hijack the *disposable democracy of one-man, one-vote, one-time*. However, optimistic researches perceive the attempts to Islamize democracy as a gradual Aggiornamento (following the Vatican II) to reform Islamic discourses (Ansary 2003). It is gradual in the sense that a greater number of ulama/scholars and Islamic thinkers do not try to discard traditional religious (wrong) doctrines but to re-interpret them under the lights of modern needs.

b. The Role of the US

Especially after the events of September 11th, understanding Islam and Muslims has become a matter of national security for the US. The war on terrorism, in return, has been seen as an American crusade against Muslim countries. Several surveys have shown that the US is seen as a real danger by Muslims and the US should be fought. For instance, more than 70 percent of Muslims in Turkey, Indonesia, Pakistan, Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco and Palestine are disappointed that the Iraqis did not fight the US invasion and support the military operations against American troops in Iraq (Borting 2003).

This project shows that the US emphasis on democratization is perceived by most Muslims as part of its crusade against Islam. The distrust of the US surpasses all ideological, demographic and societal differences in the Muslim world. It is the only variable that is so invariant that it explains nothing in the variation in attitudes among Muslims toward democracy in any Muslim society.

However, the war on terrorism has taught students of Islam and the Middle East some lessons:

First, despite the difficulty of transplanting a Madisonian democracy into the desert of the Muslim world without careful understanding of Muslim culture, the pressure for democracy has increased Muslims' self-criticism. The campaign against the religion that systematically produces terrorism according to Western media, the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq made the Arab and Muslims shudder. It certainly gave Muslim intellectuals and activists more grounds for the criticizing the status quo and those responsible for it. Iraq in the mind of the

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region's intellectuals is not an outlier. All Muslim countries can be Iraq if they challenge US interests (al-Khouri 2003).

One intellectual likened the invasion of Iraq in 2003 to Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798. The French invasion of Egypt awakened Egypt and the Middle East from the mentality of the middle ages. Likewise, the US invasion of Iraq poses another challenge to the embalmed totalitarian ideologies of the region, mainly pan-Arabism and Islamic fundamentalism (Saleh 2004).

Second, the US can prevent Muslims from doing certain things but cannot force them to do others. In other words, the US has the capacity to usher the camel to the lake but cannot force it to drink. For instance, the US exerted enough pressure on the Pakistani government to stop the 20,000 self-funded Madrassas but it cannot force the Pakistani population to be tolerant toward each other or to actively participate in free and fair elections which, in Pakistan, they do not have to begin with.

The experience of the past two years indicates that the US cannot create real democrats on the ground, but it can put the autocratic Muslim regimes on the defensive. It moved from the cell of "do nothing" to correct for the misgovernance of "our" allies to the cell of "something should be done." Yet tough choices should be made: "Between the realist's option of 'do nothing' and the romantic's option of "elections now" lies a third path -- gradual yet persistent liberalization" (Mustafa and Makovsky 2003).

The US can increase its demands for democracy in the Muslim world by getting engaged in a dialogue with the liberal secularists and modernist Islamists who can themselves pressure the rulers for democratization. Yet the US should make a clear commitment that its invasion of Iraq is an exceptional decision that will not occur in any other cases. Muslims in general would not accept democracy under the American flag.

c. The Role of Rulers

It was argued that the lack of democracy in Arab and Muslim societies cannot be attributed only to non-democratic rulers but to the characteristics of the culture in general. Some anecdotes have been used to support the cultural argument. For example, the Kuwaiti parliament prevented women from voting and the anti-Semitic tone that prevails in the uncensored programs of Al-Jazeera TV station (Zakaria 2001).

In a non-deterministic vision of the future of democracy in the Muslim world, Zakaria (2001) proposes that democracy is possible in Arab/Muslim countries if an autonomous private sector leads society toward modernism. As a result, he advises the U.S. to focus more on private sector development in these countries. The assumption here is that capitalism somehow will lead to or facilitate democracy.

Unfortunately, this argument overlooks the economic ramifications of political misgovernment in Muslim countries. These ramifications had many catastrophic results on the economic landscape in all Muslim societies, with the exception of Malaysia and UAE. This study shows how Muslims themselves blame their rulers for their plight. Macro-economic indicators as well support this argument. For instance, in the early 1970s, the GDP per capita in the Arab Gulf states was less than $1,000 yet it jumped to $12,000 in late 1970s due to the sharp increase in oil prices. Nowadays it is around $10,000 (yet the discrepancy increased between $20,000 in UAE and less than $10,000 in Saudi Arabia). A quick comparison with

South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore shows that their GDP per capita increased from $740, $1,132 and $3,040 to $15,530, $20,500 and $22,300 respectively (World Bank 2001).

A Saudi political scientist argues that Muslim rulers in general set up their political agenda on the assumption that the economic realm should be dependent upon their political agenda which is in turn a function of their self-survival strategies (Al-Hamad 2003). In short, the flourishing of private sector in the Muslims world will be faced with all the problems of nepotism, corruption and lack of law that are mainly the wrongdoing of the autocratic governments.

However, this analysis should not lead to the hasty conclusion that getting rid of the autocratic rulers is always and instantly good. Although autocratic rulers in most Muslim countries are illegitimate in the eyes of their own people, one should not assume that their sudden and abrupt absence means transition toward democracy. This was the assumption of the "shock and awe" strategy adopted in the Operation Iraqi Freedom. In other words, it was assumed that Iraq was Iraq because of Saddam and Afghanistan was Afghanistan because of the Taliban. Consequently, it was presumed that once Saddam and the Taliban were ousted, Iraq and Afghanistan would become democracies. The experiences of the last three years in Afghanistan and Iraq teach us that Saddam was Saddam because of Iraq and the Taliban were the Taliban because of Afghanistan. In other words, for a ruler to hold a country such as Iraq or Afghanistan together, he should be like Saddam or Taliban (and exclude the possibility of being Madison).

The collapse of the state institutions in Afghanistan, Iraq and, for that matter, Somalia, after ousting Taliban, Saddam and Barre is not a mere coincidence. There are structural and cultural factors behind these three incidents. In most Muslim countries, the authority of individual rulers, legitimacy of regimes and sovereignty/unity of states are inextricably interwoven.

Sudden and abrupt shifts in power in almost all countries of the region will not only diminish the authority of the rulers but also threaten the legitimacy of the regimes (thus the structure of power) and imperil the unity of the states themselves. This is exactly what happened in Somalia immediately after the overthrow of President M. S. Barre in Jan. 1991, Taliban in 2001 and later in Iraq after ousting Saddam Hussein from office in 2003. The absence of Saddam Hussein meant no Ba'thist regime and endangered the unity of Iraq as a state. If the U.S. presses for similar abrupt shifts in power in Saudi Arabia for instance, this will likely affect not only the persons who currently hold power but the whole legitimacy of the Saudi family and the whole unity of the Saudi state with its current borders. Save for Egypt and Tunisia which have very solid social fabrics, this analysis can be applied to almost all other Muslim countries.

Thus, though most incumbents are not legitimate and can be easily removed from power, they are functional in holding the societies with overlapping cleavages together.

3. Limitations of the Project

The results of this project should be understood within the limitations of the sample. These limitations can be characterized in two aspects.
1- One-snapshot Project

This data is at best a snapshot of the attitudes of educated Muslims between the age of 18 and 50 during the period from May 2002 and August 2002. In other words it is not a longitudinal study that captures dynamics. Consequently, it does not speak for Muslims after five

years or so. Political cultures are social organisms that dynamically mutate and evolve in response to socio-political events and challenges (Berger 1989; Catterberg 1991; Lasser 1996). Political culture is analogically like an old person who moves very slowly in response to the events and incentives that occur around him/her. Many events in the Muslim world call for further investigation of Muslims' political culture. Take Saudi Arabia as a case study. In post-September 11th Saudi Arabia, "the word *Islah* (reform) has become on all lips." (al-Fassi 2003). Saudi officials declare specific steps toward initiating the public participation in the Kingdom. Prince Sultan bin Abdel-Aziz (deputy prime minister of Saudi Arabia) promises real political reforms. He states that he refuses the notorious 99 percent election results other Arab countries. According to him, "manipulating elections is the easiest thing the kingdom can do."

His brother Crown Prince Abdullah promised expanding the role of the Shura Council and raising the bar of accountability and transparency (al-Sharq al-Awssat, June 9, 2003). The Saudi royal family promised the first local elections in the year 2004. A national dialogue under the auspices of the Crown Prince has started in response to many written and oral petitions by Saudi academicians, modernist Islamists, liberal intellectuals, business men and women, and leaders of tribes. A famous petition signed by 100 Saudi public figures in January 2003 specifically asked for political, bureaucratic and economic reforms with a clear emphasis on crafting a written constitution for the Kingdom instead of the claim that the Qura'an is the constitution.

Another petition in April 2003 signed by 450 public figures including many Shiite Muslims asks for equality between Shiite and Sunni Muslims in top executive and legislative positions in addition to more freedoms for them to practice their religion.

The royal family established the Institution of King Abdul Aziz for National Dialogue to institutionalize the demands for reform. Though practically speaking nothing happened on the political landscape of the Kingdom, it is clear that the demands for reform have come on the public agenda of the masses and elite as well (Abo Taleb 2004).

The Saudi royal family knows that the cost of oppression has become extremely high for domestic and external reasons. The fact that fifteen out of the nineteen perpetrators of the September 11th attack were Saudi citizens put the Saudi society and state on the defense. The Saudi version of Islam, known in the West as Wahabism, has become under attack. Saudi Arabia is changing. The famous claim that since Saudi Arabia was never colonialized it thus possesses the pure and authentic reading (since it was never contaminated by the influence of the west), is diminishing.

Domestic developments as well make many Saudis, actually many Muslims, see the benefits and freedoms of globalization without benefiting them. The majority of Saudis are well-educated and have access to a substantial amount of available websites and satellite dishes. "My mother didn't go to any school at all, because then there were no girls' schools at all," A Saudi female physician said. "My older sister, who is 20 years older than me, she went up to the sixth grade and then quit, because the feeling was that a girl only needs to learn to read and write. Then I went to college and medical school on scholarship to the States. My daughter, maybe she'll be president, or an astronaut" (Kristof 2002c).

The same can be said about so many other countries that have been facing changing challenges. Turkey with an Islamist party in power is introducing a new model that deserves to

be studied. This model has been labeled: "religious or pious secularism" and is suggested to be the exemplar for Iraq (Gawad 2003).

The unpopular decisions taken by the Assembly of Guardians in Iran is creating more tension among young men and women who are not ready to sacrifice their freedoms due to excessively conservative interpretations of some debatable and controversial verses, hadiths/sayings or fatwas/religious verdicts of grand imams.

2- Big-Picture Project

This project is not about any specific country or society. It is about 32 Muslim societies in comparison to each other. This broad sample of societies means that one has to sacrifice complexity and nuance for the sake of comparability and generality. "An appreciation of complexity sacrifices generality; an emphasis on generality encourages a neglect of complexity. It is difficult to have both" (Ragin 1987:54).

That is why it is important for future research to take a smaller number of cases to strike a different balance between generality and complexity. The existing survey, or at least something similar, will allow researchers to compare and generalize. By using the same survey again, Islam and Middle East researchers can obtain panel-data that would eventually help create an Islamic barometer to gauge developments in Muslims' political culture.

APPENDIX 1
GLOSSARY OF TERMS

1. **Ahl al-hal wa al-'aqd:** the people who have the power of contract with the ruler. The vast majority of Muslim jurists argued more pragmatically that ahl al-hall wa al-'aqd are those who possess the necessary *shawka* (power or strength) to insure the obedience or, in the alternative, the consent of the public.

2. **Al-Muraja'at:** is a sect of Islam that was known for postponing the final verdict of a sin doer until the Day of Judgment. Traditionalists criticize modernists since a typical modernist would not kill an apostate but just advise him/them to repent.

3. **Al-salaf al-saleh**: The pious predecessors. Al-salaf al-saleh is a concept used to refer to the early companions of the prophet and traditionalists tend to extend it to all ancient scholars who spent their lives studying and preaching Islam.

4. **Al-Tawheed:** monotheism

5. **Al-wala' wa al-bara'a**: alliance to Muslims and disloyalty to non-Muslims

6. **'Aqeeda**: creed

7. **Bay'a**: (or *Bay'ah)* is an oath of allegiance to the ruler on the condition that he obeys Allah's sharia.

8. **Bed'a**: (or Bid'a) man made innovated practices introduced in the religion of Allah. The Prophet stated that: "every Bid' a is a deviation from the true path and every deviation leads to Hellfire."

9. **Caliph:** (or Khalif) Successor. A title formerly given to a Muslim political leadership of the umma.

10. **Da'wa**: (or Dawa) inviting Muslims and non-Muslims to a better understanding of Islam.

11. **Fatwas:** Religious verdicts A legal verdict given on a religious basis. the sources on which a fatwa is based are the Holy Qur'an and hadiths/saying of the Prophet.

12. **Fiqh:** Islamic jurisprudence or he science of ascertaining the precise terms of the sharia/Islamic legislation.

13. **Fitnah:** internal divisions or civil strife

14. **Hadith:** (singular of ahadiths) which are the sayings of the prophet Mohamed. After his death, the hadiths were tested for accuracy and collected into organized bodies of material. Hadiths of the pophet are second in authority to the Qur'an.

15. **Hodod**: (or Hudud) The limits ordained by Allah and Islamic penal code.

16. **Ijma':** A consensus view among Muslims especially of Muslim ulama/scholars on any Islamic principle.

17. **Ijtihad:** independent reasoning or original interpretation of problems not precisely covered by the Qur'an or the hadiths.

18. **Ikhtlaf:** Differences and divisions of opinions on religious matters. Such diversity is permissible as long as the basic principles of Islam are not affected. It is the opposite of ijma'/consensus.

19. **Imam:** A person who leads the prayer, a Muslim Khalifa or a famous Muslim scholar in fiqh.

20. **Jahilliyya**: (or Jahiliyyah and Jahiliyah) the state of ignorance such as the pre-Islamic era that preceded the revelation of the Qur'an.

21. **Kharijite**: (or Kharijies) Used to refer to dissidents or outsiders. Its root goes to a group of Muslims who turned against Ali (the fourth Caliph) and killed him while praying.

22. **Khateebs:** (or Khatibs) preachers at mosques.
23. **Khiraj:** (or Kharaj) properties of the nations Muslims occupy or tax imposed on the revenue from land taken from non-Muslims to ensure their equal rights under Islamic law.
24. **Madhab:** sub-tradition and school of fiqh/jurisprudence.
25. **Mutazila:** (or Mutzilah) the term applies to members of a theological school that flourished in Basra and Baghdad in the 8th–10th century. The Mutazila were the first Muslims to use the categories and methods of Hellenistic philosophy to derive their dogma. The tenets of their faith included the oneness of God, free will and responsibility for one's actions, and the justice of God and the consequent inevitability of reward in heaven or punishment in hell. Their doctrine of a created (as opposed to eternal) Quran held sway (827–49), but was ultimately abandoned. Mutazili beliefs were disavowed by Sunni Muslims but accepted by Shiites
26. **Qiyas:** analogical reasoning and considered by most ulama/scholars as the fourth source of fiqh/jurisprudence by Sunni scholars (after the Qur'an, hadiths and ijma'). Shiite scholars accept the first three but instead of the Qiyas, they emply 'aql or reason (i.e. cost benefit analysis).
27. **Sadd al-dhari'ah**: blocking the means to illegality. This principle means the lawmaker and/or ulama could claim that behavior that is lawful ought to be considered unlawful because it leads to the commission of illegal acts.
28. **Sharia:** (or Shariah) Islamic legislation. The revealed and the canonical laws of the religion of Islam.
29. **Sheikhs or imams**: (or Shaikh) is a title or a nickname for an elderly person or a religious leader in a community. This title is also given to a wise person. It is used here to refer to the leaders of prayers
30. **Shura:** mutual consultation to Islamist modernists it is Islam's equivalent to Western democracy.
31. **Taqlid**: Imitating and emulating the salaf or the predecessors in their praxis and opinions.
32. **Umma:** (or ummah) the Islamic nation or community regardless of political borders, languages or ethnicities.
33. **Waqf:** Endowment. A charitable trust in the Name of Allah, usually in perpetuity, and usually for the purposes of establishing the Deen of Islam, teaching useful knowledge, feeding the poor or treating the sick.
34. **Zandaqqa:** heresy can be traced back to the early Abbasid era to depict any deviation from the authentic central understanding of Islam as understood during the prophet's life and the 40 years after his death. In the second century of Islam (8th century A.D.) many of the Farsi (nominal) Muslims declared Islam while kept practicing their own traditional (un-Islamic) rituals. All these practices were described as religious zandaqqa yet when these same people rebelled against the central authority the word has gained political connotation. It is important to keep in mind that since there is no religious structure in Islam analogous to the Catholic Church, the allegations of zandaqqa remained very political, selective and partial.

APPENDIX 2
DATA COLLECTION

The research question of this project focuses on the attitudes of ordinary Muslims. It requires, consequently, obtaining first-hand data from Muslims. To do that, the researcher had three possible choices. First, drop the idea of the survey and obtain secondary sources. Second, drop all sensitive, and necessarily serious, questions. Third, target the individuals who have enough education to respond to a written survey about such politically sensitive issues. The third option was the most viable both for logistical and theoretical reasons.

Practically, convincing educated Muslims to participate in a survey about politics with serious questions was doable comparing to do the same thing with illiterate Muslims. Second, the educated Muslims are important because they are politically the most relevant and they harbor most if not all demands for democratic reforms for the future. That is why any response or discussion with non-educated Muslims, thought rare, were tossed away.

Another issue was related to how to approach the educated Muslims. Written and telephone surveys are the most famous ways for surveying people in open societies. The issue of the reliability of these two tools were raised given the sensitivity of the questions asked. After consulting with a number of area experts, the face-to-face written surveys were preferred over telephone surveys for two reasons: first there will be the possibility of explaining to the respondents any questions. Second, there will be the possibility of having focus group discussions with some of the respondents to add depth to the survey through discussing certain questions and explore further attitudes that are not captured by the written survey.

However, many observers and participants in the pilot study commented that in some countries, the respondents will still think that their responses will be monitored by government agents and thus they will be reluctant to reflect their actual attitudes. Beside, restrict anonymity and verbal assurances before handing in the surveys, two other solutions to this potential problem are used. First, whenever and wherever possible the surveys were administered by native academicians and research centers who are both perceived as trustworthy and not known for working for governments' agents.

Second, there should have been another systematic tool to check for the impact of the suspicion of governmental surveillance. Another survey administered through the web by emailing Muslims the URL of a website and asking them to respond to the same identical questions of the written survey was developed to reflect. Technically, this kind of web-based survey is drawn from a non-probabilistic controlled-quota sample in the sense that there is no known probability for the possibility of including all Muslims who have access to the Internet into the frame of respondents. However, some non-probabilistic can be more representative than others if there are known possible sources of biases.

Obtaining survey responses from two different tools poses a methodological challenge and provides a methodological opportunity to examine the efficiency of the two tools as well. Theoretically, there can be one of two broad scenarios: 1) The two tools are in conflict mainly due to the fact that Muslims who have access to the Internet are a homogenous group of Muslims who think alike and thus are not representative of the broader population of educated Muslims. 2) The two tools are complementary in gauging Muslims' attitude since both pooled samples are drawn from the same population.

It is found that there are no statistically significant differences between the attitudes of Muslims who responded to the written and web-based surveys

To test these two broad scenarios, a question about how many times a week the respondents to the written survey have access to Internet was added. ANOVA has not reported significant differences between the means of those who have daily access to the Internent and those who do not have access to the Internet. To confirm the previous finding, ANOVA was used against to compare the responses from the two samples regarding the questions relevant to the purpose of this dissertation. Again, no statistical difference was found in all cases. As a third step to confirm the complement of both tool, preliminary regression analysis was utilized to make sure that the demographics do not have contradictory effects based on the tool used. Except for age, there was no difference between the coefficients obtained from the web-based survey and the written survey.

This lack of significant discrepancies can be explained by the fact that, the two tools (the web and written surveys) targeted almost the same population of urban, educated and non-poor Muslims. Yet ANOVA suggests that most respondents were less self-restraint in their criticism of their governments and support for elected accountable governments in the web-based survey comparing to the written one which may be explained by the freedom of expression they enjoy in cyberspace comparing to written surveys.

This finding has been confirmed by the fact that with the exception of question number 2.24 that reads: "Do you think that Muslim countries should have democratic rulers instead of the current political rulers?" The respondents to the web-based survey were significantly more critical of their rulers than the respondents to the written survey and the focus group discussions in Saudi Arabia, the Sudan and Libya.

a. Web-administered Survey

Literature on web-administered surveys raises concerns regarding technical problems and representation problems. The technical problems are centered on "the lack of standardization among operating systems, servers, and browsers." (Smith 2002) Smith noted in her paper that "browser incompatibility problem" was among the most challenging problem in using web-based survey. However, it seems that this problem has become less relevant in the advancement of severs protocols and the standardization of HTML and JAVA programming (Pitkow and Kehoe 1999).

With this kind of technological progress[29], other measures are highly recommended. Those measures include reliable server to save the data and well-organized plan of sending out emails and putting the pop-up ads in a relatively long span of time to prevent web-conjuncture. Pilot examination of the server and the mechanism of sending out emails (either through web cgi script or Mailto Action) and pre-testing of their reliability is a highly recommended measure in this regard (Kennedy, 2000) .

I followed those technical recommendations and depend upon the free survey suite of University of Virginia that has been recommended to me by professor David Hartmann of Sociology department and the director of Kercher Center for Social Research at WMU. He

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[29] The technological progress has gone into three directions: "the adoption engine, the user interface, and the server interface" (Colleen and Pitkow. 1996).

uses this service quite often and assures me that it is quite reliable. Besides, I have already pre-tested it and showed great convenience and reliability.

Some other problems may occur due to the attempts of some people of submitting their responses more than once. The literature suggests tracking users through identifying their ISP's and limit the responses coming from one ISP to one respondent (Dillman 2000). This solution is not practical for this project's purposes due to the absolute anonymity promised to the respondents and required by HSIRB-WMU. Besides there is always the possibility that more than one person responds from the same computer. A case of a whole family responding from the same ISP or people who use internet cafés are two expected cases in mind. I would opt for another solution, which is to compare the responses to the open-ended questions. If there are two or more identical responses in all questions, including the open-ended questions, they will be tossed away. Microsoft Access is a database package that performed this task with great efficiency.

The rather more challenging concern about using web-administered surveys is the problem of representation that leads to sampling errors. According to Smith, "Perhaps the most critical problem with Internet-based research is the practical impossibility of probability sampling, that one can only tentatively generalize to a very specific population, if at all" (Smith 2002). After discussing different accounts of this problem she concludes that "we do this all the time" whether we use web-based, telephone based or paper-based surveys. None of them is completely random. The solution that Smith advances is to "learn more about [the respondents'] demographics" which will enable "generalizability to well-studied segments of the overall population."

Two econometricians examined five decades of sampling mathematically and theoretically and suggested that that the great majority of the sampling methods that social scientists use do not actually produce random samples unless we ignore the impracticality of most of the underlying assumptions (Ullah and Breunig 1998).

In other words, if the web-based is generally biased toward people who are above average in education and experience with computers (Bowker and Dillman May 2000) and we know the structure of this bias through asking explicit questions about the demographics of respondents we can limit our generalizations to the specific category. This solution makes more sense than to abandon using the revolutionary advantage of web-administered survey besides, it is not recommended for researchers to throw away data.

The advantages of using web-based survey are numerous. "The advent of web surveying means it is now possible to bring a survey instrument to hundreds of thousands of people and process the results for a cost that would previously only have allowed a few hundred responses to be tabulated" (Dillman and Bowker 2000).

In the Muslim context specifically, web-based survey has a very important advantage which is it is the only possible data-gathering tool that does not require the approval and necessitate the full supervision of non-democratic governments that usually have no experience, let alone respect, for this type of research. Part of the way web-based survey can be defended in the Muslim world context is that we cannot beat something with nothing. Another advantage that web-based surveys have over paper-based surveys is related to the environment of skepticism in authoritarian countries. Most of the written surveys done on non-democratic countries have shown a very high degree of conservative and mild responses due to the fear of

being questioned or detained in the future (Elder 1976; Verba 1971). However, in the web-based survey with absolute anonymity, most respondents are presumed to be less concerned about being monitored by authorities (Solomon 2001).

The Sampling technique:

In the Web-based survey a quota controlled sample is convenience sampling, but with the constraint that proportionality by strata be preserved.

Maximum variation sampling is the goal of controlled quota sampling, in which the researcher purposively and non-randomly tries to select a set of cases, which exhibit maximal differences on variables of interest. Further variations include extreme or deviant case sampling or typical case sampling. That is why the 55,100 email addresses were obtained from 35 diverse web-sites, chatting groups and email-lists and in five different languages (English, Arabic, Urdu, Farsi and French). Upon consulting Muslims from Arab, African and Asian countries about the most-frequently visited websites and chatting rooms, the emails were purposively and proportionally distributed among regions taking into consideration most and least conservative websites.

According to the statistics gathered from the United Nations[30] approximately 42% of Muslims are under the age of 18. Besides, around 45% of Muslims who are above 18 are illiterate. Calculated together, only 26% of Muslims above 18 can actually read and write. Thus almost 74% of the 1.2 billion Muslims are out of the reach of all behavioral tools available to examine their beliefs. That is to say, any generalization drawn from the web-based survey will be at best limited to around 300 million Muslims who are literate and above the age of 18.

Appendix 2 lists the number and percentages of people who had access to the Internet in January 2001 (9 months before the survey was run on the web). The last columns are the most relevant for examining the percentages of Muslim individuals who have access to the Internet in various countries of the world as percentage of the total population. The average is around 10.8% of Muslims have access to the Internet. However, the variance is too high (323.6) which indicates that there are number of outlier cases that drive the average into exaggerated figure. After excluding ten countries which have very high Internet access and meanwhile have small minorities of Muslims (as depicted in the last column), the average is now 2.9% and the variance is relatively reasonable (33.4). This information suggests that those who had access to the Internet in Muslim countries in January 2001 are slightly more than 2.9% of total Muslims, which are around 34.8 million individuals.

This figure represents the total number of individuals who actually had access to the Internet in Muslim countries in the year 2000 (after excluding Muslim minorities in the highest ten countries providing Internet to their residents). Since I am only interested in the adult Muslims, it is reasonable to expect that these 34.8 million individuals who represent 12 percent of the 300 million individuals who represent the target population.

The researcher met the problem of the diversity of languages among Muslims who live in more than 80 countries of the world. After exploring different attempts and consulting a wide range of Muslims from different backgrounds and speak different languages, the most reasonable choice is twofold: first to rely mainly on an English version of the survey with

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[30] http://esa.un.org/unpp/index.asp?panel=2, the calculation of this percentage calculated through adding the percentage of population at age 0-14 to the percentage of population 15-17 in almost all countries that have notable (3% and above) percentages of Muslims.

transliterating the most technical concepts and words into Arabic and Urdu; second to allow for Arabic and French speakers the ability to respond to an Arabic and French versions of the same survey. Pilot examination of the clarity of the language and reliability of the questions and their words led to different iterations of the same survey. Based upon several tests of the survey in different contexts by English, French, Arab and Urdu speakers in the U.S., Egypt, and Iran, three versions of the survey were developed and used: English, French and Arabic.

b. Paper-Based Survey

The same questions of the web-based were used in a face-to-face written survey in Egypt, UAE, Pakistan, Algeria, Libya, Malaysia, Iran and Turkey, as well as among Muslim students who are doing their studies at three American universities (Western Michigan University, Colorado University and University of Michigan). The attempt to administer a written survey in Saudi Arabia failed.

As always, the target population (the population for which information is required) and the survey population (the population actually covered) differ for practical reasons, even though they should, in actuality, be the same. It has been extremely difficult to obtain a balanced sample of all educated Muslims from all parts of each country. That is why, it has been necessary to impose geographical and career limitations excluding certain parts of the target population because they are inaccessible. Thus, the respondents to the written-survey have been college students.

I made subjective judgments (which were cross-checked by regional specialists) concerning the best estimate of which schools and colleges to be chosen to be representative of each country.

Appendix 5 lists the number of respondents who responded to the written survey. One question was added to the written survey which asked the respondents to indicate how frequent they surf the Internet to help control for the effect of the Internet and to examine the characteristics of the individuals who have access to the Internet. Three main characteristics of the respondents to the internet is that male Muslims serf the net more than females. Relatively affluent Muslims have access to the internet more than the relatively less advantages. Younger Muslims (40 years and below) spend more time on-line than older Muslims.

Egypt and the US in particular are two pivotal countries for the diversity of non-native Muslims who live in both of them.

The written surveys is used not only to check the consistency and reliability of the Web-based survey but as well to expand the generalizability of the results to people who do not necessarily have access to the Internet.

Comparison between available data and other samples

Fortunately, the Gallup survey, Pew survey project and Zogby International have run face-to-face surveys in different Muslim societies in the years 2002-2003 (Gallup 2002; Pew 2003a, 2003b; Zogby 2002). Comparing the demographics of the respondents to web-based and written surveys of this project with the educated Muslim respondents to these other surveys indicate clear oversampling of the relatively affluent over the relatively less advantaged and individuals under 35 over older people. These surveys indicated that they over sampled men and the urban literate.

Since I make no attempt to establish proportions of all Muslims who support or oppose democracy, it matters little whether the pooled data is a representative sample of all Muslims of the world or not. It is enough that it is representative of the educated Muslims who potentially pay enough head to political matters.

c. Intensive Interviews and Focus Group Discussions

An important part of this project is to randomly select a 3-11 respondents of the respondents to the written-survey and conduct focus-group discussion with them. These discussions took place among Muslim in eight societies (Egypt, Libya, the Sudan, UAE, Iran, Turkey, Algeria and the US).

Subjects were selected randomly and I talked to each potential interviewee explaining my purpose and followed this up with the possible benefits. I offered the respondents the opportunity to chat with me for around 30 minutes in a friendly get-together with beverages provided at my expense. The number of individuals invited for the focus group discussions was over 600 but only 188 accepted to participate.

Three advantages have been gained from conducting intensive interviews and focus group discussions.

1- This research method permitted respondents to reveal their convictions and uncertainties, their reasoning processes and emotional reactions, their foci for passion and indifference, their expertise and ignorance. From the interviews, I was able to evaluate the content, complexity, and strength of individual beliefs about Islam and democracy which definitely added depth to the survey analysis.

2- The survey explains findings through the correlation between certain characteristics such as gender and support to democracy; I interpret the relationship and infers that the female educated Muslims support democracy because democracy promote their socio-political positions. Intensive interviews explain this finding by discussing with female respondents what they expect and how they would feel about the effect of democracy on their lives. The conclusions from both types of research may be equally valid, even identical, but they emerge from different types of data, which are collected in different ways to yield different types of explanations for the same phenomenon.

3- Surprisingly the intensive interviews and focus group discussions throw light on certain aspects that are overlooked by quantitative tools that are "limited by either a failure of imagination or the exigencies of statistical techniques" (Hochschild 1981: 25). For instance, what if an educated Muslim woman makes a novel argument against democracy? Regression analysis will definitely ignore her position if there is statistically enough evidence that most educated women are pro-democracy. Intensive interviews and focus group discussions bring these potential anomalies into the focus of the researcher's attention.

The main disadvantage of the focus group discussion is that it is not as diverse and representative as the survey. However, this disadvantage is of little value in this project. A concern that a disproportionate number of the male (or female) respondents are more or less educated, rich or poor, or whatever, would be misplaced. These demographic considerations become important only in the pooled survey data since one seeks to infer from the sample how many and what kinds of respondents seek more or less democratic changes.

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d. Elite Interviews

Five to nine elite interviews with ulama/scholars, activists and intellectuals were conducted during visit to each of the previous eight countries in addition to Saudi Arabia. The interviewees were selected based on two criteria: first to represent the diverse ideological positions toward democracy; second to have been known for their roles as public opinion leaders in their respective countries.

The interviewees were asked to comment and reflect upon the descriptive graphs of the web-based surveys. Some of them asked for the results to be sent to them before conducting the interview and had extensive comments on them. Others interpreted the findings and used them in later references to defend their political causes.

Selection of Countries:

Four main reasons determined the selection of the countries whence the written survey, focus group discussions and elite interviews have been conducted:

1) They represent the geographical and religious diversity of the Middle East and Muslim world.

2) These countries represent a wide array of experiences regarding how both Islam and democracy are perceived from the masses' and elites' points of view.

3) I received a high number of responses in pilot tests of web-based survey from citizens of those countries.

4) The selection of countries is influenced by the researcher's capacity to secure reliable connections in those countries. These connections are instrumental to assist in getting access to the respondents who became potential focus group participants and respondents to the written survey.

APPENDIX 3
INTERNET USERS IN COUNTRIES WHERE MUSLIMS
HAVE NOTABLE PRESENCE

Interent Users

Country	Last Updated	Number of Users	% of Populating with Internet Access	Excluding Outliers
Albania	Dec.2000	12,000	0.34	0.34
Algeria	March 2001	180,000	0.57	0.57
Bahrain	March 2001	105,000	10.07	10.07
Bangladesh	Dec.1999	30,000	0.02	0.02
Egypt	March 2001	560,000	0.81	0.81
France	August 2001	11.7 million	19.65	
Germany	August 2001	28.64 million	34.49	
India	Dec. 2000	5 million	0.49	0.49
Indonesia	Jan. 2000	2 million	0.88	0.88
Iran	Dec. 2000	250,000	0.38	0.38
Iraq	Dec.2000	12,500	0.05	0.05
Jordan	March 2001	210,000	4.07	4.07
Kuwait	March 2001	165,000	8.08	8.08
Lebanon	Dec. 2000	300,000	8.38	8.38
Libya	March 2001	20000	0.24	0.24
Malaysia	Dec. 2000	3.7 million	16.98	16.98
Mali	Dec. 1999	10000	0.09	0.09
Morocco	March 2001	220000	0.72	0.72
Niger	Dec. 1999	3000	0.03	0.03
Nigeria	Dec.1999	100,000	0.08	0.08
Oman	Dec.2000	90,000	3.55	3.55
Pakistan	May 2000	1.2 million	0.85	0.85
Qatar	March 2001	75000	9.75	9.75
Saudi Arabia	March 2001	570,000	2.5	2.5
Senegal	Dec. 2000	40,000	0.4	0.4
Sudan	March 2001	28,000	0.08	0.08
Syria	March 2001	32,000	0.19	0.19
Tunisia	March 2001	280,000	2.89	2.89
Turkey	May 2000	2 million	3.05	3.05
UAE	Dec. 2000	735,000	31.02	31.02
UK	June 2001	33 million	55.32	
US	Aug 2001	166.14 m.	59.75	
Yemen	March 2001	14,000	0.08	0.08
		Average	**10.8**	**2.9**
		Variance	**323.6**	**33.4**

Source: http://www.nua.ie/surveys/how_many_online/index.html, 2/12/2003 3:30 AM

APPENDIX 4
THE WEB-BASED SURVEY

The process of writing the English version of the survey took 6 months. When formulating the questions, I had to consult with subject-matter experts and members of the target audience. Also, I examine questions from other surveys (used in Egypt, World Value Survey and Pew Research) on the same or similar topics.

Dr. Kevin Corder and David Hartmann reviewed the variables to be measured, and ultimately, the survey questions and response alternatives.

Dr. Jim Butterfield made certain that the questions are relevant to the survey objectives and information requirements, ensured that there was an established rationale behind each question and that the response categories are mutually exclusive and exhaustive and no double-barreled questions or tendentious language is used.

However, it is crucial that I have confident that the results are not artifacts of the particular survey tool used. To gain this confidence, I re-run the models twice using the data obtained from the two techniques separately and report only the general patterns that are the same whichever data I use.

<div align="center">Islam and Politics</div>

You are invited to participate in a research project entitled Islam and Politics designed to analyze the political attitudes of Muslims toward politics in general and more specifically toward democracy as Muslims understand it. The researcher who is conducting this survey is Moataz Abdel Fattah who is a faculty member at the School of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University and is doing his PhD in political science at Western Michigan University. Data obtained from this survey will be part of his dissertation project. Kindly note that you are only allowed to respond to the questions of this survey if you are 18 years or older. This survey is comprised of 48 questions and will take approximately 15-20 minutes to complete. Your replies will be completely anonymous; so do not put your name anywhere on the form. If you choose to not participate in this survey, please do NOT click "submit" button at the end of the survey. If you choose to not answer any question, simply leave it blank.

Returning the survey (by clicking "submit" button at the end of the survey) indicates your consent for use of the answers you supply. Please ask your Muslim wives/husbands, sons/daughters and/or friends (who are above 18 years old) to fill in this survey. I appreciate your cooperation. The data obtained by this survey will be public for researchers, individuals and institutes Muslim and non-Muslim in Muslim and non-Muslim countries. If you have any questions, you may contact Moataz Abdelfattah at 202-363-7220 or at moatazfattah@yahoo.com. On July 15th 2002, you may visit the following website to benefit from the data and see some graphs and aggregate tables summarizing the responses. **www.mzpolitics.com/data**

Contact Information

<div align="center">

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</div>

Part One

In this section, you will be asked to give us some information about your age, education, nationality...etc.

1.1. How did you learn about this survey?
      [ ]

1.2. What is your gender?
      [ ]   Female (girl/lady)
      [ ]   Male (boy/man)

1.3. What is your age?
      [ ]   18-24
      [ ]   25-29
      [ ]   30-34
      [ ]   35-39
      [ ]   40-50
      [ ]   Above 50

1.4. How far did you go in school?
      [ ]   Less Than High School Diploma
      [ ]   High School Diploma
      [ ]   Some College
      [ ]   Received Undergrad Degree (e.g. Bachelor)
      [ ]   Received an Advanced Degree (e.g. Masters or PhD)
      [ ]   No Response

1.5. What is your annual personal income level in your own currency (if you are still supported by your parents, indicate their income)?
      [ ]   Under 999
      [ ]   1,000 to 5,999
      [ ]   4,000 to 6,999
      [ ]   7,000 to 9,999
      [ ]   10,000 to 15,999
      [ ]   16,000 to 25,999
      [ ]   26,000 to 35,999
      [ ]   37,000 to 49,999
      [ ]   50,000 to 80,000
      [ ]   More than 80,000
      [ ]   Other, Please Specify: [ ]

1.6. What currency did you have in mind while answering the previous question? (Select based on country)

1.7.   Do you think that the elections or referenda (parliamentary, presidential or syndicates) that occur in your country, if any, are free and fair ?

[ ]   Very fair and free
[ ]   Somewhat fair and free
[ ]   Not fair or free at all
[ ]   My country does not have elections or referenda

1.8.   If you have the nationality (citizenship) of a Muslim country, select it from the following list. (If you are not from a Muslim country, go to the next question. If you are from a Muslim country, answer this question and skip the next one.)   [ ]

1.9.   If you are a Muslim who has the citizenship of a non-Muslim country, what is it?
[ ]

1.10.   What is your country of birth?
[ ]

1.11.   What is your original/native language?
1.12.   Which one of the following would best describe your status? (Check all that apply.)

[ ]   I am an Arab Muslim
[ ]   I am an African (non-American) Muslim
[ ]   I am a white American Muslim
[ ]   I am an African American Muslim
[ ]   I am a Muslim of a European nationality
[ ]   I am an Asian non-Arabic speaking Muslim
[ ]   I am a Muslim who does not fit into the previous categories
[ ]   I am not a Muslim
[ ]   Other, Please Specify: [ ]

1.13.   Which one of the following best describes your status:
[ ]   Sunni Muslim
[ ]   Shiite Muslim
[ ]   Other, Please Specify: [ ]

1.14.   Name three NON-Muslim countries in which you resided (stayed) for one year or more. If not, leave it empty (blank): [ ]

1.15.   How many times do you pray (make salat) daily?
[ ]   I pray 5 times a day without delay.
[ ]   I pray 5 times a day but not necessarily on time.
[ ]   I pray from 2 to 4 times a day.
[ ]   I pray once a day.
[ ]   I rarely pray.
[ ]   I do not pray at all.
[ ]   Other, Please Specify: [ ]

1.16. Are you satisfied with the performance of the political parties (if any) and (elected) representatives (if any) in your country of origin?
   [ ]   Very satisfied
   [ ]   Satisfied
   [ ]   Not sure
   [ ]   Unsatisfied
   [ ]   Very unsatisfied
   How many times have you voted in public elections or referendums (parliamentary, presidential
1.17. or syndicates)?
   [ ]   My country has elections, but I never voted
   [ ]   Voted once
   [ ]   Twice or more
   [ ]   Never voted because my country does not have elections
1.18. How many times have you had any sort of alcoholic beverages or wine (khamr)?
   [ ]   Never in my lifetime
   [ ]   Only once in my lifetime
   [ ]   Twice in my lifetime
   [ ]   Sometimes
   [ ]   Once a week or more.
   [ ]   Other, Please Specify: [ ]

Part Two
In this section, you will be asked to tell us how the best form of government looks like from your own perspective. For questions 2.1 to 2.11, please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the statements in each question.

2.1. Non-Muslims (ex. Christians, Jews or Hindus) should be allowed to build churches or temples to practice their religion in Muslim countries.
   [ ]   Strongly agree
   [ ]   Agree
   [ ]   Not sure
   [ ]   Disagree
   [ ]   Strongly disagree

2.2. Islamic sharia gives non-Muslims (Christians, Jews or Hindus) the right to have their own houses of worship in Muslim countries.
   [ ]   Strongly agree
   [ ]   Agree
   [ ]   Not sure
   [ ]   Disagree
   [ ]   Strongly disagree

2.3. Democracy is very close to shura (consultation) and can be adjusted to suit the Islamic sharia.
   [ ]   Strongly agree

[ ] Agree
[ ] Not sure
[ ] Disagree
[ ] Strongly disagree

2.4.   By allowing people to make their own laws, democracy replaces the will of Allah with the will of the people; that is why it is some type of disbelief (kofr).
[ ] Strongly Agree
[ ] Agree
[ ] Not sure
[ ] Disagree
[ ] Strongly disagree

2.5.   Islamic movements should be allowed to form political parties (ahzab) and run for elections (intikhabat).
[ ] Strongly Agree
[ ] Agree
[ ] Not sure
[ ] Disagree
[ ] Strongly disagree

2.6.   Political participation (for example voting in elections) is some type of enjoining the good and forbidding the evil (amr bi-al ma'roof and nahii a'an al-monkar)
[ ] Strongly Agree
[ ] Agree
[ ] Not sure
[ ] Disagree
[ ] Strongly disagree

2.7.   If we let Muslims elect their rulers, these elections will lead to homosexuality (shozoz), drinking wine (shorb al-khamr) and secularism (3almania).
[ ] Strongly Agree
[ ] Agree
[ ] Not sure
[ ] Disagree
[ ] Strongly disagree

2.8.   One popular saying is that "Islam is both religion and state" (deen wa dawla), Do you agree?
[ ] Strongly Agree
[ ] Agree
[ ] Not sure
[ ] Disagree
[ ] Strongly disagree

2.9. If Islamists reach government through elections in Muslim countries, they will stay in power (government) in the future even if people do not want them in power.
[ ] Strongly Agree
[ ] Agree
[ ] Not sure
[ ] Disagree
[ ] Strongly disagree
[ ] Please comment if you wish: [ ]

2.10. Political institutions and processes such as elections, parliament and political parties are against Islamic sharia.
[ ] Strongly Agree
[ ] Agree
[ ] Not sure
[ ] Disagree
[ ] Strongly disagree

2.11. The West (USA and its allies such as Britain and others) does not want Muslims to freely elect their rulers.
[ ] Strongly Agree
[ ] Agree
[ ] Not sure
[ ] Disagree
[ ] Strongly disagree

2.12. Which one of the following countries comes closest to your best (ideal/favorite) political system?
[ ]

2.13. Why have you chosen this country to be the closest to your best (ideal/favorite) political system?

2.14. To achieve their political rights (ex. freedom of expression and freedom of association), Muslims should:
[ ] challenge their authoritarian rulers VIOLENTLY even if they may be killed or jailed.
[ ] challenge their authoritarian rulers PEACEFULLY even if they may be killed or jailed.
[ ] express their negative feeling towards their rulers but NOT publicly.
[ ] be patient and pray to Allah to grant them better rulers.

2.15. Regarding the Arab/Israeli conflict, whose opinions do you trust most?
[ ] Your Muslim government
[ ] Official religious scholars (Sheikhs appointed by the government)
[ ] Unofficial religious scholars (independent Sheikhs)
[ ] The Intellectuals (independent press)
[ ] None
[ ] Other, Please Specify: [ ]

2.16.   Some Muslim countries have Christian (massehi) minorities that want to participate in the political process as voters, members of parliaments and/or ministers. If you had the ultimate say in this regard, what would you allow them to do?
   [ ]   They should not be allowed to be part of the political process at all
   [ ]   They should be allowed to vote in public elections only
   [ ]   Beside voting, they should be allowed to be members of the parliament
   [ ]   Beside voting and parliament membership, they should be allowed to be ministers

2.17.   Some Muslim countries have Jewish minorities (yahood) that want to participate in the political process as voters, members of parliaments and/or ministers? If you had the ultimate say in this regard, what would you allow them to do?
   [ ]   They should not be allowed to be part of the political process at all
   [ ]   They should be allowed to vote in public elections only
   [ ]   Beside voting, they should be allowed to be members of the parliament
   v   Beside voting and parliament membership, they should be allowed to be ministers

2.18.   Do you think that Muslim women should be allowed to participate in the political process as voters, members of parliaments and/or ministers? If you had the ultimate say in this regard, what would you allow them to do?
   [ ]   They should not be allowed to be part of the political process at all
   [ ]   They should be allowed to vote in public elections only
   [ ]   Beside voting, they should be allowed to be members of the parliament
   [ ]   Beside voting and parliament membership, they should be allowed to be ministers

2.19.   On a scale of political freedom from 1 to 5, where 1 is a non-democracy/dictatorship (istibdad) and 5 is a free political system, how free do you consider your country of origin?
   [ ]   1 (full dictatorship)
   [ ]   2 (partial dictatorship)
   [ ]   3 (in between/in the middle)
   [ ]   4 (partially free)
   [ ]   5 (fully free)

2.20.   There are individuals who are killed or sent to jail because they publicly ask for their political rights. Do you agree or disagree with what they do?
   [ ]   Strongly Agree
   [ ]   Agree
   [ ]   Not sure
   [ ]   Disagree
   [ ]   Strongly disagree

2.21.   Based on Islamic shari'a how would you put your country of origin on the following scale?
   [ ]   1 Full non-Islamic government
   [ ]   2 Partial (to some extent) non-Islamic government

[ ] 3 In between
[ ] 4 Partial (to some extent) Islamic government
[ ] 5 Full Islamic government

2.22. If you were allowed to choose among three political rulers for your country of origin, which one of the following would you prefer?

[ ] A religious Muslim ruler who establishes the hodood of Islam in which his citizens cannot disagree with him or question his actions.

[ ] A religious Muslim ruler who establishes the hodood of Islam in which his citizens may disagree with him and hold him accountable for his actions.

[ ] A good ruler who is not necessarily a good Muslim but willing to give up power if he loses public support

2.23. Which one of the following reasons can best explain why dictatorship prevails in the Muslim world? (Check all that apply.)

	Very important reason	Somewhat important reason	Not a reason at all	Do not know
a. The WEST (by supporting authoritarian rulers)	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
b. The INDIVIDUALS (who are not ready for democracy)	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
c. The RULERS (who do not leave their positions)	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
d. ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY contradict each other	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
e. The SCHOLARS (sheikhs who are opposed to democracy)	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

2.24. Do you think that Muslim countries should have democratic rulers instead of the current political rulers?
[ ] Yes
[ ] No
[ ] I am not sure

2.25. Would you accept that your son/brother gets married to a woman from another religion (Christian, Jewish, …etc.)
[ ] Yes
[ ] No
[ ] I am not sure
[ ] Other, Please Specify: [ ]

2.26. Would you allow Sunni and Shiite to get married to each other?
     [ ] Yes
     [ ] No
     [ ] I am not sure
     [ ] Other, Please Specify: [ ]

2.27. Muslims who adopt Western ideologies such as liberalism, socialism or communism should be allowed to form political parties (ahzab) and run for elections (intikhabat).

     [ ] Strongly agree
     [ ] Agree
     [ ] Not sure
     [ ] Disagree
     [ ] Strongly disagree

2.28. In your opinion, what is democracy?
     [ ]

2.29. In your opinion, what is Islam?
     Some Muslim countries have Muslim minorities (ex. Shiite and Ahmadi) that want to participate
2.30. in the political process as voters, members of parliaments and/or ministers. If you had the ultimate say in this regard, what would you allow them to do?
     [ ] They should not be allowed to be part of the political process at all
     [ ] They should be allowed to vote in public elections only
     [ ] Beside voting, they should be allowed to be members of the parliament
     [ ] Beside voting and parliament membership, they should be allowed to be ministers
2.31. Please feel free to add comments if you wish.

APPENDIX 5
RESPONDENTS TO THE WRITTEN SURVEY

List of Respondents to the Written Survey

	Muslims Surveyed in Egypt	Muslims Surveyed in their Countries	Muslims Surveyed in the US	Total	Included/ excluded
Egypt	1617*			1617	Included
Nigeria	89		49	138	Included
Mali	36			36	Excluded
Gambia	49			49	Excluded
UAE	75	65*	45	185	Included
Yemen	85		83	168	Included
Sudan	145	279*	23	447	Included
Europe	87		31	118	Included
Bangladesh	122		74	196	Included
Kuwait	94		19	113	Included
Bahrain	84		18	102	Included
Indonesia	116		38	154	Included
Malaysia	114	490*	79	683	Included
Tunisia	107		12	119	Included
Morocco	102		23	125	Included
Senegal	113		74	187	Included
Pakistan	103	634*	135	872	Included
Libya	43	215*	8	266	Included
Iran		319*	23	342	Included
Turkey		200*	64	264	Included
Saudi Arabia			182	182	Included
Algeria	84	88*	26	198	Included
US			223*	223	Included
Total	3265	2290	1229	6784	

* Indicates samples that were selected randomly.

APPENDIX 6
RESPONDENTS TO THE WEB-BASED SURVEY

List of Respondents to the Web-Based Survey

Abbrev.	Country	Coded as:	Freq.
AFG	Afghanistan	Other	138
ALB	Albania	Albania	500
ALG	Algeria	Algeria	570
ARA	Arab	Other	5
AUS	Australia	Other	37
AZE	Azerbaijan	Other	12
BAH	Bahrain	Bahrain	530
BAN	Bangladesh	BANGLADESH	935
BEL	Belgium	EU	86
BOS	Bosnia Herzegovina	Other	53
BRU	Brunei	Other	28
CAN	Canada	Other	276
CHI	China	Other	9
EGY	Egypt	EGYPT	1346
FIJ	Fiji	Other	5
FRA	France	EU	239
GAM	Gambia	Gambia	489
GER	German	EU	196
GHA	Ghana	Other	18
IND	India	INDIA	1497
INS	Indonesia	INDONESIA	1331
IRE	Ireland	EU	23
IRN	Iran	IRAN	1138
IRQ	Iraq	Other	91
IVO	Ivory coast	Other	28
JOR	Jordan	JORDAN	687
KEN	Kenya	Other	36
KUW	Kuwait	KUWAIT	533
KYR	Kyrgyzstan	Other	10
LEB	Lebanon	LEBANON	534
LIB	Libya	LIBYA	597
MAD	Maldives	Other	15
MAI	Mali	Mali	521
MAL	Malaysia	MALAYSIA	1177
MAU	Mauritius	Other	48
MOR	Morocco	MOROCCO	627
NET	Netherlands	EU	33
NEW	New Zealand	EU	26
NIG	Nigeria	NIGERIA	579
OMA	Oman	Oman	494

Appendix 6 – Continued

PAK	Pakistan	PAKISTAN	1685
PAL	Palestine	Other	85
QAT	Qatar	QATAR	568
SAU	Saudi Arabia	SAUDI ARABIA	942
SEN	Senegal	SENEGAL	569
SIN	Singapore	Other	178
SOM	Somalia	Other	18
SOU	South Africa	Other	208
SRI	Sri Lanka	Other	55
SUD	Sudan	SUDAN	583
SUR	Suriname	Other	22
SYR	Syria	SYRIA	613
TAJ	Tajikistan	Tajikistan	497
TAN	Tanzania	Other	54
TOG	Togo	Other	24
TRI	Trinidad and Tobago	Other	42
TRK	Turkmenistan	Turkmenistan	504
TUN	Tunisia	Tunisia	546
TUR	Turkey	TURKEY	1058
UAE	United Arab Emirates	UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	595
UGA	Uganda	Other	22
UK	UK	EU	171
USA	USA	USA	1083
YEM	Yemen	YEMEN	488
ZAI	Zaire	Other	13
		Wholesale total	26120
		Total EU	774
		Total Other =	1530
		Total 31 cases>480	*23816*

Only countries with respondents 480 and above are recorded. Iraq, though has only 91
respondents, it was included for its policy implication relevance. Muslims from six European
countries are coded as EU. All other countries are recorded as "other." Total number of
respondents is 26,120. Yet only 23,816 come from the 32 countries that met the 480-
respondents, above 18 and below 50 Muslims criteria.

APPENDIX 7
THE HSIRB APPROVAL

Date: October 26, 2001

To: James Butterfield, Principal Investigator
        Moataz Abdelfattah, Student Investigator for dissertation

From: Mary Lagerwey, Chair

Re: HSIRB Project Number 01-10-07

This letter will serve as confirmation that your research project entitled "Islamic Norms and the Democratic Alternative: Cross-Cultural Examination of Muslims' Belief Systems" has been **approved** under the **full** category of review by the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board. The conditions and duration of this approval are specified in the Policies of Western Michigan University. You may now begin to implement the research as described in the application.

Please note that you may **only** conduct this research exactly in the form it was approved. You must seek specific board approval for any changes in this project. You must also seek reapproval if the project extends beyond the termination date noted below. In addition if there are any unanticipated adverse reactions or unanticipated events associated with the conduct of this research, you should immediately suspend the project and contact the Chair of the HSIRB for consultation.

The Board wishes you success in the pursuit of your research goals.

Approval Termination: October 17, 2002

Note: The document is on file at The Graduate College.

APPENDIX 8
FACTOR ANALYSIS

Principal Component Factor Analysis

Q #	Religiosity (2 questions)	Democratic Hardware	Democratic Software	Elasticity of Demands for Political Rights
1.15	1. How many times do you pray (make salat) daily?	(3 questions)	(4 questions)	(2 questions)
1.18	2. How many times have you had any sort of alcoholic beverages or wine (khamr)? *Alpha =*.926	*Alpha =*.875		
2.6 2.7 2.10	1. Voting is some type of enjoining the good and forbidding the evil. 2. Public elections of rulers will lead to taboos? 3. Democratic institutions and procedures are against Sharia.		*Alpha =*. 763	
2.16 2.17 2.18 2.30	1. Attitude toward participation of Christian minorities in the political process. 2. Attitude toward participation of Jewish minorities in the political process. 3. Attitude toward participation of Muslim women in the political process. 4. Attitude toward participation of Muslim minorities in the political process.			
2.14 2.20	1. The Risk Muslims take to express their demands for their political rights. 2. Appreciation for people killed or jailed because of their political rights			*Alpha =*.91

Note: Principal component factor analysis was used with varimax rotation and Kaiser Normalization. The total model predicts 78.8% of cumulative variance. The religiosity and support for democratic hardware scales were reversed so that a positive response expresses more religiosity and greater support for democratic hardware.

Cronbach's estimate of reliability and internal consistency is reported as Alpha.

Source: *Islam and Politics Survey*, (2002).

APPENDIX 9
DATA PROCESSING AND REGRESSION MODELS

Using the standard statistical procedures, I checked for missing data, outliers, perfect coollinearity among variables, and non-normality of variables.[31]

Regarding the missing data, using the SAS 8.2 command of PROC MI shows that there are certain variables that contain high percentages of missing responses. Besides, the missing responses were clearly missed at random (MAR assumption). To handle this problem of missing data, the researcher opted to the technique of *multiple imputation* that provides a useful strategy for dealing with data sets with missing values. Instead of filling in a single value for each missing value, Robin's multiple imputation procedure replaces each missing value with a set of plausible values that represent the uncertainty about the right value to impute (Rubin 1987). These multiply imputed data sets are then analyzed by using standard procedures for complete data and combining the results from this analysis. No matter which complete-data analysis is used, the process of combining results from different imputed data sets is essentially the same. This results in statistically valid inferences that properly reflect the uncertainty due to missing values.

SAS 8.2 has the MI procedure that creates multiply imputed data sets for incomplete *p*-dimensional multivariate data. It uses methods that incorporate appropriate variability across *m* imputations. Once the *m* complete data sets are analyzed using standard SAS/STAT procedures, PROC MIANALYZE can be used to generate valid statistical inferences about these parameters by combining the results. By averaging parameters across data sets to get single point estimates and calculating standard errors using variation within and between datasets. For scalar point estimate, the following formula was used.

$$\bar{q} = \frac{1}{M} \sum_{j=1}^{M} q_j$$

where q could be regression or logit coefficients, M is the number of datasets and q_j is the parameter estimate from the jth dataset.

For the scalar standard error estimate, the following formula was used:

$$se_q = \sqrt{\frac{1}{M} \sum_{j=1}^{M} se_j^2 + \left(1 + \frac{1}{M}\right)\left(\frac{1}{M-1}\right) \sum_{j=1}^{M} \left(q_j - \bar{q}\right)^2}$$

where se_j is the standard error estimate for the jth parameter; q_j is the jth parameter estimate; and M is the number of datasets.

M in this project = 5 and the MI was conducted for each country separately.

Since I use multiple indicators to gauge the same variables, the problem of collinearity was noticeable. The factor analysis helped combing collinear indicators together. There was no real

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[31] I have to thank Dr. Susan Carlson of WMU Sociology Department for providing the technical expertise regarding the multiple imputation techniques.

outlier or influential cases which is unlikely in a survey research. Upon running the primary regressions, the problem of heteroskedasticity was amazingly prevalent.

Heteroskedasticity:

Almost all the models used in this project are plagued by heteroskedasticity (HSK), a violation of the "equal variance of error term" assumption in OLS regressions. Since HSK does not lead to biased coefficients, but tends to mess up standard errors, thus disordering t-values and masking the potential relevance of a regressor. This is called "loss of efficiency" in econometrics. To solve this problem, I used the White robust estimation of the standard errors in both the SUR and multiple logistic regressions.

Seeming Unrelated Regression and Multiple Logistics:

Zellner's idea of combining several equations into one model to improve estimation efficiency ranks as one of the most successful and lasting innovations in the history of econometrics (Greene 2000). Thus Zellnar's seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) was used to account for the contemporaneous correlation between error terms in the two equations of democratic hardware and software for each society (Srivastava and Giles 1987).

To be more certain about the robustness of the SUR analysis, multiple logistic regressions (MLR) were run as well. The logistic regressions serve to examine the robustness of the SUR coefficients. That is why the stars reported in table 4.1 reflect the common results between the two types of regressions (SUR and MLR). For instance, the logistic regression in the cases of USA, Libya and Bahrain showed positive effect of Muslims who support political Islam on democratic hardware. Since this result was not supported by the SUR system and does not have theoretical significant explanation, Table 4.1 did not report the relationship.

Using the logistic regression as a check mechanism has the important advantage of dropping some of the most controversial assumptions of OLS and SUR such as the linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables, the multivariate normality and that the residuals are homoskedastic for each level of the independent variables.

APPENDIX 10
THE SUR RESULTS

	Explanatory	Albania		Algeria		Bahrain		Bangladesh	
		Soft	Hard	Soft	Hard	Soft	Hard	Soft	Hard
A	Relative Income	.147* (.085)	.033 (.052)	.028 (.089)	.111 (.082)	-.067 (.101)	-.119* (.068)	-.109 (.077)	-.001 (.046)
	Education	.331* (.169)	.193** (.098)	1.277*** (.169)	.328** (.158)	.418*** (.126)	.305*** (.083)	.606*** (.112)	.324*** (.066)
	Age	.16 (.169)	.147 (.102)	.079 (.156)	.078 (.107)	-.036 (.135)	-.159* (.089)	-.147 (.099)	-.065 (.062)
	Female	.762** (.322)	.53*** (.2)	.907*** (.308)	.337 (.23)	1.018*** (.333)	.376* (.209)	1.12*** (.236)	.587*** (.149)
B	Voting	.399* (.21)	.518*** (.132)	-.267 (.197)	.032 (.158)			.2* (.114)	.342*** (.124)
	Residence	1.166*** (.406)	.569*** (.192)	1.88*** (.722)	3.523*** (.899)	3.284*** (.691)	1.163*** (.286)	1.1414*** (.303)	.904*** (.194)
C	Religiosity	-.096 (.129)	-.025 (.067)	.018 (.083)	-.264*** (.064)	-.368*** (.099)	.011 (.065)	-.369*** (.067)	.012 (.047)
	Dem & Shura	1.403* (.737)	.16** (.08)	.233* (.123)	.191** (.085)	.276** (.133)	.173** (.085)	.26*** (.1)	.148** (.063)
	Religion & State	.026 (.183)	.126 (.102)	-.213* (.127)	-.101 (.119)	.269 (.188)	.073 (.127)	.086 (.15)	.167 (.161)
D	Incumb-ents/Dem	1.684*** (.253)	.28* (.169)	.051 (.25)	.118 (.179)	1.271*** (.223)	.269* (.155)	1.383*** (.197)	.538*** (.119)
	West/Dem	.217* (.122)	.129* (.071)	-.125 (.108)	.122 (.081)	.094 (.112)	.12 (.077)	.108 (.092)	.093 (.062)
	Ulama/Dem	-.053* (.029)	-.025 (.067)	-.231* (.132)	-.117 (.358)	-.571* (.293)	-.114* (.065)	-.367*** (.067)	-1.324*** (.439)
	Constant	-1.043*** (.343)	-.794*** (.144)	-.601*** (.181)	-.5*** (.109)	-.538*** (.142)	-.659*** (.221)	-1.827*** (.49)	-1.968*** (.609)
R^2		.165	.339	.337	.2	.213	.285	.228	.284

SUR Results — Continued

	Explanatory	Egypt		Europe		Gambia		India	
		Soft	Hard	Soft	Hard	Soft	Hard	Soft	Hard
A	Relative Income	-.101 (.065)	.038 (.04)	.16*** (.061)	.069* (.035)	.182* (.104)	.133* (.069)	.074* (.043)	.084*** (.03)
	Education	.931*** (.084)	.266*** (.05)	.229** (.117	.13** (.066)	-.108 (.107)	.148 (.094)	.568*** (.077)	.121*** (.047)
	Age	.095 (.102)	-.095 (.058)	-.055 (.14)	-.111 (.084)	.164 (.19)	.205* (.121)	.37*** (.117)	.341*** (.083)
	Female	.603*** (.195)	.263** (.12)	.665*** (.225)	.266* (.153)	.752** (.323)	.388* (.229)	1.001*** (.174)	.298** (.126)
B	Voting	.311* (.165)	-.023 (.096)	-.118 (.195)	.651*** (.107)	-.285 (.23)	.161 (.162)	.248** (.119)	.233*** (.08)
	Residence	1.035*** (.236)	.86*** (.119)			1.168*** (.365)	1.119*** (.237)		
C	Religiosity	.272*** (.066)	-.022 (.037)	-.186** (.073)	.155*** (.053)	-.246* (.143)	.058 (.094)	-.447*** (.051)	.022 (.038)
	Dem & Shura	.45*** (.095)	.254*** (.052)	.555*** (.119)	.623*** (.065)	.383*** (.132)	.316*** (.268)	.295*** (.072)	.206*** (.056)
	Religion & State	.736*** (.128)	.272 (.184)	.05 (.113)	.184 (.176)	-.275 (.424)	-.133 (.206)	.241** (.11)	.206 (.185)
D	Incumbents/Dem	1.038*** (.197)	.264** (.134)	1.92*** (.208)	.402*** (.13)	1.664*** (.277)	.159 (.206)		
	West/Dem	.051 (.079)	.164 (.105)	.136 (.117)	.109 (.104)	.115 (.121)	.061 (.092)	.14 (.865)	.191 (.127)
	Ulama/Dem	-.138* (.072)	.104 (.095)	-.584** (.236)	.172 (.949)	.302** (.14)	.622*** (.143)	-.597*** (.227)	-.24* (.136)
	Constant	-.225*** (.078)	-.533*** (.18)	-.475*** (.175)	-.468*** (.162)	-.701*** (.113)	-.205*** (.066)	-.715*** (.249)	-.813*** (.254)
R^2		.219	.314	.272	.334	.196	.198	.286	.334

SUR Results — Continued

	Explanatory	Indonesia		Iran		Jordan		Kuwait	
		Soft	Hard	Soft	Hard	Soft	Hard	Soft	Hard
A	Relative Income	.113** (.045)	.039 (.031)	-.07 (.063)	.016 (.047)	.176** (.083)	-.153*** (.054)	-.189* (.096)	.12* (.062)
	Education	.233*** (.084)	.183*** (.058)	.328*** (.078)	.096* (.051)	.911*** (.107)	.445*** (.067)	.471*** (.123)	.024 (.067)
	Age	-.013 (.089)	.113* (.06)	.09 (.089)	-.138** (.069)	.047 (.117)	.036 (.08)	.6*** (.171)	.16** (.073)
	Female	1.861*** (.204)	1.231*** (.144)	1.676*** (.19)	.346*** (.129)	1.437*** (.27)	.427*** (.151)	1.774*** (.291)	.004 (.164)
B	Voting	-.218 (.293)	.04 (.23)	.382** (.184)	.323*** (.11)	-.305 (.191)	-.135 (.115)	.629** (.261)	-.105 (.128)
	Residence	2.363*** (.368)	1.109*** (.285)	1.214*** (.225)	.347** (.139)	2.261*** (.314)	.754*** (.168)	1.489*** (.352)	.23 (.204)
C	Religiosity	-.369*** (.053)	.202*** (.037)	.477*** (.062)	-.021 (.035)	-.538*** (.085)	.006 (.055)	-.237*** (.083)	-.038 (.044)
	Dem & Shura	.091 (.074)	.111** (.054)	.341*** (.087)	.107* (.062)	.213* (.125)	.253*** (.082)	.36* (.215)	.421*** (.121)
	Religion & State	-.828*** (.081)	-.933 (.761	-.098 (.119)	-.044 (.095)	.06 (.194)	.014 (.094)	.061 (.202)	-.019 (.112)
D	Incumbents/Dem	.314** (.136)	.07 (.105)	1.19*** (.171)	.316*** (.121)	.765*** (.213)	.268* (.14)	.82** (.403)	1.501*** (.281)
	West/Dem	.099 (.071)	.009 (.051)	-.059 (.08)	.034 (.055)	-.183 (.116)	.032 (.062)	.18 (.119)	.056 (.067)
	Ulama/Dem	-.204*** (.053)	.202 (.371)	-.279* (.155)	-.593*** (.162)	-.372*** (.141)	-.594* (.326)	-.343** (.162)	-.571*** (.213)
	Constant	-.821*** (.152)	-.614 (.491)	-.602*** (.118)	-.545*** (.135)	-.771*** (.278)	-1.058*** (.37)	-1.488*** (.519)	-.856*** (.325)
R^2		.324	.41	.315	.282	.342	.448	.425	.56

SUR Results — Continued

	Explanatory	Lebanon		Libya		Malaysia		Mali	
		Soft	Hard	Soft	Hard	Soft	Hard	Soft	Hard
A	Relative Income	.058 (.069)	.07 (.06)	.123 (.083)	.033 (.053)	.06 (.039)	.059** (.026)	.083 (.099)	-.044 (.066)
	Education	.204* (.104)	.122 (.086)	.422** (.168)	.199** (.095)	.15* (.08)	.078* (.047)	.792*** (.154)	.368**** (.119)
	Age	.28** (.137)	.117 (.11)	-.013 (.166)	.071 (.099)	.064 (.093)	.05 (.058)	.203 (.189)	.336*** (.113)
	Female	.657** (.301)	.693*** (.217)	.687** (.319)	.553*** (.2)	.664*** (.182)	.35*** (.123)	1.195*** (.296)	.77*** (.203)
B	Voting	-.097 (.222)	.005 (.188)			.34** (.151)	.002 (.1)	.144 (.219)	.294* (.156)
	Residence	.255 (.382)	1.319*** (.268)	.791* (.405)	1.104*** (.191)	1.166*** (.223)	1.107*** (.132)	.761** (.364)	1.357*** (.207)
C	Religiosity	-.013 (.063)	.135** (.06)	-.11 (.131)	-.011 (.07)	-.091 (.075)	.307*** (.05)	.325** (.126)	-.007 (.057)
	Dem & Shura	.134 (.109)	.323*** (.088)	.144 (.134)	.205** (.08)	.131* (.074)	.124** (.05)	.33** (.157)	.29** (.125)
	Religion & State	-.806*** (.105)	.146 (.117)	.091 (.186)	.098 (.104)	.099 (.107)	.212 (.173)	-.534*** (.17)	.18 (.144)
D	Incumbents/Dem	.954*** (.272)	.318* (.165)	1.535*** (.254)	.201 (.168)	.072 (.137)	.186* (.1)	1.695*** (.287)	.397* (.21)
	West/Dem	-.057 (.123)	-.121 (.088)	.027 (.122)	-.001 (.071)	.053 (.069)	.031 (.045)	.101 (.117)	-.04 (.091)
	Ulama/Dem	-.379* (.199)	-.353** (.169)	-.195* (.114)	-.161* (.09)	-.158** (.076)	-.099** (.044)	.213* (.124)	-.021 (.019)
	Constant	-.587*** (.149)	-.453*** (.127)	-1.217*** (.437)	-1.256*** (.429)	-1.605*** (.478)	-1.126*** (.251)	-.874*** (.277)	-.318*** (.113)
R^2		.564	.237	.146	.339	.298	.481	.282	.231

SUR Results — Continued

	Explanatory	Morocco		Nigeria		Oman		Pakistan	
		Soft	Hard	Soft	Hard	Soft	Hard	Soft	Hard
A	Relative Income	-.01 (.091)	.269*** (.058)	-.196** (.083)	-.011 (.07)	.049 (.101)	-.226*** (.079)	-.037 (.06)	.029 (.042)
	Education	1.216*** (.261)	.526*** (.125)	.183 (.136)	.678*** (.109)	-.093 (.125)	-.057 (.093)	.449*** (.088)	.3*** (.061)
	Age	.305 (.188)	.123 (.101)	-.005 (.154)	.435*** (.108)	.092 (.166)	-.023 (.122)	.24** (.104)	.095 (.063)
	Female	.851*** (.283)	.613*** (.191)	2.922*** (.309)	.226 (.213)	.498 (.42)	2.525*** (.277)	.701*** (.203)	.301** (.122)
B	Voting	.639** (.295)	.421*** (.142)	.093 (.198)	.262* (.157)	Dropped	Dropped	.208 (.133)	.096 (.083)
	Residence	.113 (.336)	.608** (.276)	1.832*** (.637)	1.618*** (.517)	1.068** (.521)	2.423*** (.424)	.858*** (.201)	3.476*** (.346)
C	Religiosity	-.098 (.089)	.098* (.058)	-.313*** (.104)	.057 (.066)	-.561*** (.086)	.16** (.069)	-.413*** (.052)	.05 (.036)
	Dem & Shura	.622*** (.144)	.224*** (.086)	.154 (.106)	.331*** (.083)	.515*** (.142)	.536*** (.094)	.344*** (.073)	.149*** (.051)
	Religion & State	-.271 (.203)	-.067 (.113)	-.506** (.234)	-.226 (.143)	.197 (.195)	-.046 (.15)	-.284** (.118)	.173 (.28)
D	Incumbents/Dem	1.083*** (.313)	.435** (.176)	1.467*** (.235)	.378** (.163)	1.531*** (.239)	-.358** (.168)	1.354*** (.136)	.398*** (.095)
	West/Dem	.028 (.133)	.108 (.074)	.197 (.124)	.135 (.083)	.148 (.127)	-.076 (.093)	.034 (.021)	-.052 (.046)
	Ulama/Dem	-.282 (.514)	.26** (.116)	-.483*** (.173)	-.2** (.09)	-.094*** (.029)	.042 (.039)	-.432*** (.145)	-.496*** (.173)
	Constant	-.515*** (.078)	-.742*** (.091)	-.388*** (.144)	-.418*** (.126)	-.041*** (.013)	-.285*** (.109)	-1.276*** (.421)	-.937*** (.296)
R^2		.208	.251	.326	.286	.27	.254	.253	.198

		Qatar		Saudi Arabia		Senegal		Sudan	
	Explanatory	Soft	Hard	Soft	Hard	Soft	Hard	Soft	Hard
A	Relative Income	-.032 (.095)	-.164*** (.06)	.036 (.064)	-.209*** (.045)	-.137 (.085)	.063 (.052)	.09 (.09)	.079 (.059)
	Education	.333*** (.125)	.213*** (.075)	-.378*** (.107)	-.062 (.077)	.634*** (.144)	.64*** (.089)	.612*** (.122)	.436*** (.093)
	Age	.133 (.144)	.019 (.09)	.358*** (.095)	-.126* (.07)	-.129 (.145)	.078 (.085)	-.022 (.162)	.068 (.118)
	Female	1.76*** (.287)	.379** (.182)	.746* (.418)	1.617*** (.306)	1.019*** (.311)	.653*** (.189)	1.39*** (.344)	.21 (.262)
B	Voting	Dropped	Dropped	Dropped	Dropped	.849*** (.326)	.186 (.187)	-.356 (.217)	-.243 (.179)
	Residence	1.024*** (.351)	1.075*** (.223)	.932 (1.129)	2.214*** (.779)	1.988*** (.36)	.951*** (.219)	1.676*** (.62)	4.562*** (.457)
C	Religiosity	.31*** (.094)	.209*** (.061)	-1.338*** (.062)	-.422*** (.038)	.017 (.097)	.099* (.057)	.142 (.113)	.131* (.077)
	Dem & Shura	.316** (.124)	.218*** (.08)	.203** (.079)	.163** (.063)	.457*** (.127)	.161** (.076)	.322** (.134)	.262*** (.097)
	Religion & State	.036 (.203)	.034 (.137)	-.556*** (.15)	-.184 (.191)	.076 (.222)	.081 (.131)	-.621** (.252)	.359 (.275)
D	Incumbents/Dem	1.23*** (.212)	.289* .151	.151 (.14)	-.093 (.101)	.436* (.249)	.328** (.149)	.483* (.264)	.468** (.204)
	West/Dem	.147 (.112)	.038 (.075)	.014 (.081)	.054 (.065)	-.038 (.117)	-.076 (.07)	.143 (.116)	-.009 (.082)
	Ulama/Dem	.496*** (.147)	.19** (.078)	-.755*** (.193)	-.453*** (.163)	.364*** (.075)	.725*** (.102)	-.281** (.141)	.876 (.795)
	Constant	-.858*** (.321)	-.567*** (.131)	-1.34*** (.485)	-1.56*** (.573)	-.903*** (.304)	-.641*** (.15)	-1.454*** (.517)	-.859** (.341)
R^2		.243	.364	.416	.276	.252	.415	.282	.241

SUR Results — Continued

	Explanatory	Syria		Tajikistan		Tunisia		Turkey	
		Soft	Hard	Soft	Hard	Soft	Hard	Soft	Hard
A	Relative Income	-.101 (.083)	.062 (.067)	-.027 (.115)	-.002 (.074)	.076 (.048)	.024 (.052)	.087* (.049)	.062* (.035)
	Education	.89*** (.138)	.393*** (.121)	.037 (.147)	.562*** (.094)	1.457*** (.142)	.504*** (.088)	.632*** (.097)	.251*** (.055)
	Age	-.055 (.114)	-.129 (.08)	.494*** (.167)	.133 (.105)	.35** (.14)	.151* (.078)	.097 (.097)	-.235*** (.077)
	Female	1.699*** (.339)	.147 (.249)	1.319*** (.365)	.594** (.241)	.565** (.275)	.475*** (.172)	.63*** (.191)	.15 (.127)
B	Voting	-.041 (.228)	.112 (.171)	.233 (.239)	.004 (.164)	.182 (.234)	.172 (.139)	.346*** (.132)	.303*** (.088)
	Residence	2.464*** (.551)	3.198*** (.7)	1.044* (.548)	2.122*** (.295)	1.67*** (.368)	.844*** (.211)	1.325*** (.203)	.371*** (.124)
C	Religiosity	-.059 (.097)	-.083 (.054)	.159 (.135)	-.022 (.078)	.073 (.089)	-.082 (.055)	.054 (.056)	.076*** (.029)
	Dem & Shura	.328*** (.113)	.321*** (.079)	.21 (.138)	.152* (.083)	.224* (.115)	.252*** (.068)	.246** (.107)	.149** (.071)
	Religion & State	-.217 (.215)	.244 (.186)	-.046 (.182)	.167 (.112)	.304*** (.115)	.267 (.172)	.233*** (.087)	.156 (.16)
D	Incumbents/Dem	1.338*** (.225)	.427** (.199)	.174 (.253)	.273** (.108)	.587** (.249)	.266* (.152)	.41** (.204)	.234* (.12)
	West/Dem	-.116 (.106)	.115 (.085)	.096 (.123)	-.031 (.083)	.076 (.111)	.023 (.07)	.242 (.183)	.226 (.157)
	Ulama/Dem	-.259* (.153)	-.231 (.19)	.161 (.145)	-.301 (.236)	.279 (.182)	.252 (.184)	.213 (.15)	.237 (.188)
	Constant	-1.103*** (.329)	-1.538*** (.423)	-.731*** (.255)	-5.22*** (.176)	1.282*** (.434)	-1.198*** (.416)	-1.271*** (.478)	-1.916*** (.74)
R^2		.272	.151	.224	.32	.367	.405	.412	.439

	Explanatory	Turkmenistan		UAE		USA		Yemen	
		Soft	Hard	Soft	Hard	Soft	Hard	Soft	Hard
A	Relative Income	-.006 (.099)	.003 (.075)	.036 (.064)	-.109** (.045)	.038 (.044)	.07** (.029)	.013 (.105)	.041 (.064)
	Education	.922*** (.161)	.405*** (.117)	-.378*** (.107)	-.062 (.077)	.403*** (.086)	.16** (.064)	.271 (.216)	.618*** (.119)
	Age	.026 (.177)	-.234** (.117)	.358*** (.095)	-.126* (.07)	-.171* (.097)	.073 (.067)	.197 (.165)	.126 (.12)
	Female	.78** (.324)	.325 (.209)	.746* (.418)	1.617*** (.306)	.477** (.198)	.41*** (.134)	4.184*** (.603)	.528 (.36)
B	Voting	-.181 (.224)	.261* (.142)			.259** (.132)	.246*** (.094)	-.074 (.245)	.137 (.174)
	Residence	1.26*** (.366)	.754*** (.237)	.932 (1.129)	2.214*** (.779)			2.488* (1.341)	1.887** (.758)
C	Religiosity	-.172* (.102)	.037 (.072)	-1.338*** (.062)	-.082** (.038)	.01 (.06)	.064 (.04)	-.476*** (.113)	-.375*** (.065)
	Dem & Shura	-.052 (.146)	.215** (.091)	0.0 (.079)	.163** (.063)	.188** (.086)	.138** (.054)	.122*** (.029)	.203** (.087)
	Religion & State	-.016 (.151)	-.001 (.096)	-.26* (.15)	-.114 (.091)	.105 (.08)	.084 (.057)	-.572** (.231)	-.236 (.156)
D	Incumbents/Dem	1.587*** (.279)	.354** (.179)	.651*** (.14)	-.193* (.101)	1.068*** (.18)	.599*** (.105)	.56** (.279)	.394** (.174)
	West/Dem	-.005 (.124)	-.09 (.076)	.115 (.081)	.054 (.065)	.184* (.095)	.21*** (.058)	-.175 (.155)	-.008 (.097)
	Ulama/Dem	-.197 (.164)	.725 (.711)	-.755 (.619)	-.323** (.163)	.351** (.154)	.553 (.439)	-.552*** (.203)	-.263** (.105)
	Constant	-.862*** (.123)	-.546*** (.078)	-1.34*** (.458)	-1.12*** (.273)	-1.238*** (.124)	-1.514*** (.395)	-.775*** (.147)	-.678*** (.22
R^2		.213	.234	.416	.276	.307	.345	.232	.234

* significant at the 0.1 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the .01 level. Standard errors are in parentheses and corrected for heteroskedasticity. Given that I have no clear directional hypotheses for the effect of the variables, I use a two-tailed significance tests.

A= Demographics (relative income, level of education, age and gender).
B= Familiarity with Democracy through voting and residence in a democracy for a year or longer.
C= Islam's affect through observing its rituals (religiosity), the compatibility of shura/mutual consultation and democracy, and its ideological impact (Islam as religion and state).
D= Trust in Political Actors as Agents of Democratization (incumbents, the West, and ulama/scholars).

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