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OFFICIAL DISCOURSE AND PUBLIC OPINION IN POST-COMMUNIST SOCIETIES: THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT-AFFILIATED INTELLECTUALS

by

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Adviser: Dr. James M. Butterfield

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Post-Communist countries are unique in the sense that they are undergoing not a single, but multiple transitions. The extent of social change underway in this region is truly monumental and researchers are faced with the daunting task of studying the extent of this transformation. Change is most evident when one studies formal institutions. But lies beneath, on the level of value orientations? The answer to this question helps us understand the real progress of post-Communist countries towards the goals of their transitions.

What were the political, ideological, economic, foreign policy, and ethnic relations attitudes of the post-Communist Russian and Polish elites and publics, and were there any changes? Were original liberal attitudes on both the elite and the popular levels replaced by organic-statist/conservative orientations? What were the areas of consensus and disjunction between the elites and the publics? The project traces the relationship between the elite and publics’ attitudes along five issue domains, cross-culturally and over the entire post-Communist period. This is the first study of its kind.

This dissertation uses both quantitative (statistical analysis and an extensive review of public opinion data collected by Russian and Polish national polling organizations) and qualitative (content analysis of public statements of Russian and Polish intellectuals) methods to explore the evolution of public opinion in post-Communist societies.
Polish government-affiliated intellectuals) methods. Comparison between elite and public attitudes shows values that are shared by both post-Communist governments and the general populations, and exposes motivations of post-Communist decision-makers.

I find that organic-statist evolution of the Russian elite’s value orientations is incomplete; some original liberal elements survived. Likewise, the organic-statist shift in public opinion was not absolute; there remains considerable popular support for political democracy and pro-Western foreign policy. In Poland, both the elite and the public consistently supported modified liberal values.

The Russian elite and the general population agree on organic-statist values, as only politically authoritarian, ideologically conservative, anti-Western, and nationalistic preferences are found on both the elite and the popular levels. In Poland, inclusive democratic, ideologically mixed, moderately etatist, and pro-Western attitudes (i.e., moderately liberal value orientations) are shared by both the elite and the population at large.
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CHAPTER I

OFFICIAL DISCOURSE AND PUBLIC OPINION IN POST-COMMUNIST SOCIETIES: THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT-AFFILIATED INTELLECTUALS

Post-Communist Elite and Public Attitudes: Towards a New Research Agenda

Russia and East European countries are unique in the sense that they are undergoing not a single, but multiple transitions. They simultaneously reform their political, economic, social, constitutional, cultural, and national structures. The extent of social change under way in the region is truly monumental. But so is the challenge of studying this change. How can researchers begin to approach the daunting task of measuring the extent of contemporary transformations in the post-Communist societies?

The change, of course, is most evident when one studies formal institutions and objective patterns of behavior. From this perspective, the countries of the region are not that different — all now have regular elections, democratic constitutions, and market-based economies. But what lies beneath, on the level of attitudes and value orientations?

Research of values and attitudes is difficult, but indispensable. It helps us understand why Russia is increasingly moving in an authoritarian, statist, and nationalist direction and has fractious relations with the West, while Poland is succeeding in building substantive democracy and is moving towards the integration with the West as fast as it can. In other words, the research of values and beliefs tells us more about the real progress of post-Communist countries towards the goals of their transitions. The significance of this dissertation is in exploring the less obvious answers and in linking elite and public attitudes, a project that is still in the formative stages in the post-Communist scholarship.

How does one study public and elite attitudes? Analysis of public attitudes is fairly
straightforward. Most researchers look at the results of public opinion surveys. Assessing the elite’s attitudes is more challenging. High-ranking government officials are unlikely to grant researchers interviews; they also do not participate in regular surveys. In exploring the elite’s attitudes, I examine the official discourse of government-affiliated intellectuals.1

Early in their post-Communist transitions, former Soviet and East European countries shared a very similar anti-Communist, pro-democratic set of value orientations on both the elite and the popular levels. Yet, today the elites’ discourses of post-Communist countries vary dramatically. On the one hand, in countries such as Poland, discourse has been consistently liberal, democratic, capitalist, ethnically tolerant, and pro-Western (henceforth, “liberal”) – despite the almost cyclical rotation among liberal and social-democratic political elites. On the other hand, in Russia, with its continuity of the political elite,2 official discourse has recently shifted to emphasize a strong state, law and order, revival of national values, and independent foreign policy (“organic-statist” henceforth), after a long period in which it was decidedly liberal.

Although the shift in Russian official discourse was documented by both Western and Russian media, its nature, political consequences, and the extent of popular support still await systematic analysis. Similarly, the Polish elite’s continuing adherence to liberal discourse requires comprehensive investigation. Analysis of official discourse articulated

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1 By official discourse, I mean government-affiliated intellectuals’ public statements produced for domestic mass consumption that deal explicitly with values, norms and policies. I use the terms “official discourse,” “elite discourse,” “statements/documents of government-affiliated intellectuals,” “discourse of government-affiliated intellectuals,” and “elite value orientations” interchangeably. For more detailed elaboration of these points, see the “Conceptual Framework” Section.

2 Putin, the current president of Russia, is Yeltsin’s hand-picked successor. He was elected to continue the previous course and supported by the political elite on the basis of his guarantees of stability. Putin’s team includes many familiar faces.
by government-affiliated intellectuals is important because it shows patterns in the elite’s value orientations and can be compared to both public attitudes and actions of the elite.

In this dissertation, I offer answers to three research questions: 1) What were political, ideological, economic, foreign policy, and ethnic relations value orientations of the post-Communist Russian and Polish elites and the general publics and were there any changes? 2) What were the areas of consensus between elites and public in the two countries? and 3) Did changes/continuities in the elite’s value orientations translate into policy outcomes?

My goals are to 1) explore the shifts and continuities in both Russian and Polish official discourse (the elite’s value orientations) and public opinion; 2) determine the values shared by both elites and publics in the two countries; 3) examine the role that government-affiliated intellectuals play in post-Communist societies, 4) investigate the political implications of the continuity or change in official discourse; and 5) comparatively explore and isolate factors that stabilize liberal orientations on both the elite and the popular levels.

**Brief Comparative Assessment of Russian and Polish Case Studies**

Russia and Poland, although not exactly identical, share important similarities. These similarities make them particularly suitable for a comparative analysis. Both are located in the same geographical region and have economic, historic, and cultural ties to each other. They share a very comparable recent history and political experience. The Communist period in each country was characterized by the political monopoly of the Communist parties, suppressed civil societies, the absence of meaningful political competition, lack of alternative channels of interest articulation, intense indoctrination,
and popular mobilization through numerous state and party channels facilitated by rapid cadre replacement.

Both countries practiced a socialist model of economic development in which the state not only steered the economy, but owned the means of production and engaged in extensive macro- and micro-economic planning and distribution. Although attempting to eliminate social inequality and class divisions, both countries had some degree of social differentiation with the party nomenklatura and elite specialists on the top of the social ladder and agrarian workers at the bottom. Despite economic shortcomings, Communist regimes in Russia and Poland achieved high levels of education, brought about at least partial gender equality and created extensive social welfare programs. When the Communist regimes fell, both states had to undertake multiple transitions from authoritarianism to democracy, from command economy to free market, and from an antagonism with the West to a pro-Western foreign policy. In both countries, the first democratic elections in the late 1980s-early 1990s brought new elites to power.

Despite fundamental similarities, the two case studies do possess some finer differences that are worth mentioning. Russia and Poland became Communist through strikingly different processes. Communism was a product of indigenous development in Russia, while in Poland it was imposed from the outside. The very duration of the Communist period was different. Soviet Communism lasted for seventy-four years, during which new political and economic institutions (including one-party rule, state-controlled economy, and social protection net) took root and produced their own legacies. Poland was Communist for approximately forty years. In contrast to the Soviet Union, whose Communist course - with the exception of Khrushchev’s “Thaw” - was never
seriously challenged, Poland experienced the first cycle of liberalization as early as the late 1950s.

The role of nationalism in generating pressures for democratic reforms was very significant in Poland, but virtually non-existent in Russia. The two countries had different geopolitical positions and economic specialization. The Soviet Union was a military superpower, whose economy was based on heavy industry at the expense of consumer goods and the agrarian sector. Communist Poland, a predominantly agrarian country that did not completely eliminate private ownership of land, never had superpower ambitions and was in essence reduced to being a Soviet satellite.

In the late 1980s, the Communist regimes in both countries started to crumble. Poland undertook a democratic transition in the Fall of 1989, when the first semi-democratic elections took place following a series of roundtable talks between the Communist soft-liners and the opposition. Russia embarked on the democratic path in 1992, after a conservative coup d'etat failed to stop the disintegration of the USSR. The modes of transitions -- negotiations in Poland and the failure of the hard-liners’ coup in the Soviet Union -- were undeniably different. Despite the differences in processes by which democracy and capitalism were introduced, both countries faced a similar problem -- an urgent need to create new economic, legal, and political institutions. Their immediate post-Communist agenda, however, had two important particularities.

First, Russia faced an additional problem -- the problem of “stateness.” Shortly after the failed coup of 1991, the former Union republics began to declare their

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Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan’s term. They claim that “without a sovereign state there can be no democracy” and that “agreements about stateness are logically prior to the creation of democratic institutions.” Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation.
independence and sovereignty. Russia had no choice but to start building its own institutions. Ostensibly the most powerful republic within the Soviet Union, Russia did not have the trappings of traditional statehood. Its capital was the capital of the Soviet Union, and its governmental offices were home to the Soviet government, rather than the Russian one. In contrast, Poland had clearly established state structures and its stateness was not seriously contested either territorially or symbolically. Secondly, Poland had no alternative to the democratic idea. During the Communist period’s cycles of liberalization, democracy emerged as the only viable alternative to the existing Communist structures and foreign domination. In Russia, however, the idea of an authoritarian path to reform was at least as prominent as the democratic agenda, even at the time of the Communism’s collapse.4

In the decade that passed since the initial transitions, the differences did not disappear. Although both countries engaged in post-Communist transformations almost simultaneously, by the late 1990s, Poland enjoyed greater economic prosperity facilitated by rapid economic transformation. Polish GNP per capita was $4,570 and GNP calculated as purchasing power per capita stood at $10,130. The numbers for Russia were lower -- $2,140 and $7,820 respectively. Poland’s annual economic growth between 1990 and 1999 was 4.7 percent, while the Russian economy declined by 6.1 percent per annum. However, by the end of the 1990s Polish economic growth slowed to 1.2 percent

per year, while Russia posted a respectable 5 percent average growth in 2000-2002. As a result, Russian and Polish GDP/PPP almost converged ($8,377 and $9,051 respectively).\(^5\)

In social terms, the Russian population’s living standards declined sharply. The average life expectancy is decreasing (average life expectancy is sixty-one years for men and seventy-three for women), crime and corruption are widespread, and social differentiation is striking (the Gini index is approximately fifty percent). Almost seven percent of the Russian population lives below the $1 a day extreme poverty line. At the same time, although experiencing certain social problems (the rise of radicalism, neo-nazism, unemployment, and poverty), the Polish elite was more successful in guiding its population through difficult economic transition. Social inequality in Poland is much lower, with the Gini index being thirty-three percent. The average life expectancy is seventy-four years (sixty-nine for men and seventy-seven for women). Only five percent of the Polish population lives below the $1 a day extreme poverty line. The quality of life index (a measure that includes GDP growth, life expectancy and infant mortality) is 2.67 out of 3 for Poland and 1.33 for Russia.\(^6\)

The 1990s were a turbulent decade for the Russian state, not only in terms of threats to territorial integrity, but also in terms of crime and corruption, failure to provide personal safety, and inability to maintain its industrial infrastructure. The sudden retreat of the state in Russia in the 1990s stands in contrast to the more activist and legitimate


Polish state. Although in the decade since the democratic transition Poland went through serious economic and political tribulations, it did not experience a crisis of the state.

Although both countries pursued political democracy, Poland fared better than its Eastern neighbor. Russia’s democratic future remains uncertain, if not downright doubtful. The Polish political process is characterized by free, fair, and regular elections on parliamentary, presidential, and local levels as well as multipartism and high voter turnout. It has numerous active and independent NGOs and trade unions. The Polish mass media are independent, uncensored and increasingly private. Russia scores lower on all these issues. Its politics is characterized by hyper-presidentialism, electoral irregularities, disproportional use of administrative resources, and predictability of voting results. Freedom of the press took a turn for the worse in Russia, with the state asserting its control over the independent mass media and reversing their privatization. Russia is also criticized for civil rights violations in Chechnya. Another unique feature of the Russian political scene is the emergence of so called “political technologies” and “political technologists” also known as “black PR.” These terms describe unorthodox campaign practices, including frivolous and unsubstantiated reports in the media and dirty campaign tricks (for instance, putting a candidate with the same last name as a front-

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7 In 2003, Freedom House rated Poland’s political rights as 1 (the highest), and its civil liberties as 2. Overall, Poland received a status of “free country.” Russia scored 5, 5 and “partly free” respectively. See Freedom House, *Freedom in the World*.

8 According to Freedom House ratings, in 2003 Polish democratization score – combined score for electoral process, civil society, independent media and governance – was 1.63 out of 7, and its rule of law score – a number that combines constitutional, legislative and judicial framework and corruption index – was 2.00 out of 7. Russia was rated 4.88 out of 7 on the democratization score and 5.13 on the rule of law score. Specifically, Poland’s civil society score was 1.50, while Russia scored 4.25; the independent media score for Poland was 1.75 for Poland and 5.50 – for Russia. See Freedom House, *Nations in Transit. 2003: Democratization in East Central Europe and Eurasia*, http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/nattransit.htm. In the Freedom House ratings, the lower the number, the more democratic the country’s political process, the stronger its civil society, and the more independent the country’s mass media are.
runner on the ballot, or impersonating a candidate during campaign visits and meetings with prospective voters).\(^9\)

Finally, Russia is a multi-ethnic state with several nationalist and secessionist conflicts, including the two Chechen wars. Poland is largely mono-ethnic and mono-religious state, with localized ethnic problems (anti-Semitic and anti-Roma attitudes and practices as well as the issue of migrant workers/traders from the East).

The finer distinctions between Russia and Poland should not obscure the fact that the similarities between the two cases by far outweigh the differences. In fact, Russia and Poland are the most similar cases I could select for a comparative study. Even though the cases differ in terms of intensity and complexity of Communist legacies (e.g., crisis of the state and longer duration of the Communist period in the Russian case), and degree of success in addressing these legacies, these are clearly differences of degree, not kind. Thus, although not completely identical, the case studies are similar in enough relevant respects to justify a meaningful comparison.

**The Dissertation’s Relationship to Existing Theoretical and Empirical Debates**

1. **Problems of Post-Authoritarian Transitions**

   **Theoretical Perspectives on Democratic Transition and Consolidation**

   Ultimately, my research falls under the rubric of democratic transition and consolidation. I am more interested in the consolidation stage, i.e., what happens after the first democratic elections. Democratic consolidation presupposes stabilization of democratic rules and universal acceptance of democracy as “the only game in town.” But

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\(^9\) Yeltsin’s 1996 presidential election campaign marks the beginning of these practices. They were an undisputed part of the 1999 parliamentary and 2000 presidential elections, in which previously unknown candidates scored spectacular victories.
how do we know that democracy is accepted by all? Unlike the more elitist transition stage (cf. elite pacts during transition), the consolidation phase highlights the significance of social consensus on the desirability of democracy and requires a certain "disaggregation." Consolidation studies look at both the elite and the popular levels. This dissertation also subscribes to the "disaggregated" perspective. It documents the evolution of both the elite's value orientations and public opinion and looks at the area of consensus between elites and general publics in post-Communist societies. It also suggests that democratic consolidation occurs only if there is congruency between pro-democratic public opinion and pro-democratic elite orientations.

Another dividing line in the democratization literature cuts across the issue of pre-conditions for democracy. One group of scholars believes that democracy requires specific economic, cultural, political, and social conditions, while others see democracy as adaptable to a variety of settings. The later group also argues that effective


institutional design can overcome the determinism of legacies. I argue that researchers of
democratic consolidation need to look at another important variable – the relationship
between the elite’s value orientations and public opinion.

Multiple Transitions and Their Particularities

Comparatively, East European and post-Soviet countries are unique. This
uniqueness comes from the number and character of post-Communist tasks that these
countries face. Unlike other former authoritarian regimes, countries of the region had to
undertake not only political and ideological transitions but also transform their
economies. Multiple transitions present special practical and theoretical challenges. Linz
and Stepan identify five arenas whose transformation is required in order to successfully
complete multiple transitions. These arenas include the constitutional, economic,
political, bureaucratic, and civil society spheres. Unlike former authoritarian countries in
Latin America, Southern Europe and East Asia, which already had market economies and
whose reforms involved only the political and constitutional arenas, East European and

Wole: Democracy in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991)),
Putnam et al. (Robert Putman, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Y. Nanetti, Making Democracy Work:
Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993)), and Lipset (Seymour
(February 1994): 1-22) represent the first camp. Elster et al. (Elster et al., Institutional Design in Post-
Communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea), despite their institutional design roots, also
reluctantly acknowledge the almost deterministic role of legacies, another term for pre-existing
conditions. Rustow (Dankwart Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,”
Comparative Politics 2, no. 3 (April 1970): 337-63), Di Palma (Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft
Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990)),
Karl (Karl, “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America”), O'Donnell and Schmitter (Guillermo
A. O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions
about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991)), Przeworski (Adam
Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin
America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991)), Crawford and Lijphart (Beverly Crawford
and Arend Lijphart, “Explaining Political and Economic Change in Post-Communist Eastern Europe: Old
Legacies, New Institutions, Hegemonic Norms, and International Pressures,” Comparative
Political Studies 28, no. 2 (1995): 171-200), Lijphart and Waisman (Lijphart and Waisman,
Institutional Design in New Democracies), Linz and Stepan (Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic
Transition) belong to the second school.

Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition.
post-Soviet countries had to transform their constitutional, political, economic, and civil society arenas simultaneously. Lijphart and Waisman concur. According to them, the least favorable sequence of transition is a simultaneous economic and political transformation. There is an inherent conflict in such a transition, a conflict between the competitive logic of the market and the logic of political and economic equality essential for the consolidation of democracy. Close to the problem of compatibility between democracy and the market is the literature on “disembedded liberalism.” I capture the conflict generated by multiple transitions on both the elite and the popular levels.

2. Political Sociology of Intellectuals

This project focuses on government-affiliated intellectuals -- actors who articulate the discourse or the program of action of the elite. The literature is divided between those who support functionalist, sociological and socio-economic definitions of intellectuals and those who argue along humanist and socio-ethical lines. The first type of analysis views intellectuals as one of the several social groups. Intellectuals simply perform a particular function in a society (production or re-evaluation of ideas) or are characterized by similar sociological characteristics (education or occupation). The second type of

14 Although Ruggie (John Gerald Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983)) coined the term, Polanyi (Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: the Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston: Beacon Books, 1944)) was the first to describe the actual “embeddedness.” Ruggie credits Polanyi with noticing the connection between social structures and economic organization.
analysis views intellectuals as a distinct and homogeneous group distinguishable by unique ethical, moral, and romantic characteristics (civic consciousness, humanity, compassion, belief in the "common people," etc.). The disagreement between the two schools appears to lie mainly in assigning different functions to the intellectuals.

Secondly, there is a difference in assessing the relationship between intellectuals and the political elite. The functionalist school, new class developmental theorists, conflict theorists, and some contemporary Russian and East European authors see


Lipset and Brym, *Intellectuals and Politics*; Shils, "The Intellectuals and the Powers;" Parsons, "The Intellectuals."


Dahrendorf, "The Intellectual and the Society."

intellectuals as part of the political elite. They contend that intellectuals and the political elite either share similar political interests, or that the political elite depends on intellectuals' expertise. Conversely, socio-ethical theorists see intellectuals as bearers of universal, as opposed to elite, interests and values. These authors stress the oppositional stance of intellectuals vis-à-vis the state elite. My research is situated within the first, sociological and socio-economic, camp. Even a causal glance at Russian and Polish politics indicates that intellectuals do actively cooperate with the state and the political elite. But the degree of this cooperation requires systematic investigation.

3. Meanings of Discourse

Broad Theoretical Discussions

There are two basic ways to view discourse. Postmodernists, following the theoretical lead of Michel Foucault, believe that discourse makes conventional and socially constructed norms and practices appear natural. According to this view, discourse is constructed to incorporate some elements of reality, but its main function is to justify existing patterns of domination. Thus, discourse is always about power. “Masses” or dominated groups contribute nothing to its construction or modification. In short, discourse is “superordinat[ed] over the practices on which [it is] based;” it is


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“detached from contextual constraints and functional conditions, guiding the underlying practices.”

However, there is another, more objective, interpretation of discourse. Discourse is an “interpretive schema that simplifies and condenses the world outside.” Such a definition of discourse lacks the sinister and necessarily manipulative elements of postmodernist accounts. It is a less politicized and a more instrumental view. Discourse is the expressive equivalent of action; it has consequences and can be studied to gain insights into the actors’ motivations, political and moral claims for stasis or change, suggested remedies, relationships between actors, their self-placement on the political continuum and larger ideological vision. In essence, it is a link between ideas and instrumental action. Discourse both guides the actors and constrains their choices, but actors also use it to achieve their goals. In both cases, discourse has important political consequences. It influences action. I view discourse as a good approximation of actors’ value orientations and programs of action that are set against a larger cultural/ideological landscape.

The new institutionalist literature dealing with the nature of collective action helps identify several important characteristics of discourse. Discourse is stable; it has a

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28 Please see “Conceptual Framework” section for more detailed discussion of these points.
"constraining influence ... over participants, as it shapes their activities in patterns that are ... self-consistent;" changes in discourse are usually incremental and done at the margins; moments of dramatic change in discourse occur only during cataclysmic events. My project investigates both the changes and continuities of discourses.

Literature on Post-Communist Discourse

Sociological and socio-economic literature on intellectuals highlights an important connection between the political elite and intellectuals, i.e., intellectuals’ involvement in the articulation of dominant ideas. Traditionally, authors examining the elements of political discourse in post-Communist countries limited their investigation to the intellectuals’ involvement in discourse creation during the revolutionary periods. Naturally, the role of intellectuals is the greatest during ideological breaks which enable the creation of new symbols and terms. Several East European authors, however, look at the role of intellectual elites in articulating discourse in a more static setting (post-Communist phase).


31 Dimitrijevich emphasizes the role of independent Serbian intellectuals in creating post-Communist nationalist discourse (Nenad Dimitrijevic, “Words and Death: Serbian Nationalist Intellectuals,” in Intellectuals and Politics in Central Europe, ed. Andreas Bozoki (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999)). Bozoki looks at the evolution of Hungarian post-Communist official discourse and the conflict between organic-statist and liberal factions of the Hungarian elite (Bozoki, “The Rhetoric of Action”). Eyal et al. contend that there is an affinity between the discourses of former Hungarian dissident intellectuals and technocratic bureaucrats as they attempt to socially engineer capitalism without capitalists (Gil Eyal, Ivan Szelenyi, and Eleanor Townsley, Making Capitalism Without Capitalists: Class Formation and Elite Struggles in Post-Communist Societies (London: Verso, 1998)).
Closer to my own investigation, several recent studies analyze the stages of interpretation and reinterpretation of key elements of political discourse in post-Communist Russia and Poland (e.g., “freedom,” “power,” “accountability,” “national interests,” “European integration,” “abortion,” “rights of minorities,” “meaning of politics,” etc.). Yet these works present discourse as static; they are concerned with discrete categories of discourse without any attempt to see the constellation of attitudes. The majority of authors (with the exception of Trutkowski), although discussing the attitudes of various social actors (including the opposition), fail to investigate the relationship between the communicators of discourse and their audiences.

Instead of a static analysis of a singular concept in the discourses of various social actors, I trace the evolution of political, ideological, economic, foreign policy, and ethnic relations value orientations of one influential group (government-affiliated intellectuals) in a cross-cultural setting and over time. I also compare a combination of the elite’s value orientations in Poland and Russia.

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orientations (measured through the analysis of government-affiliated intellectuals’ public statements) to relevant public attitudes.

4. Public Opinion in Post-Communist Societies

In this project I attempt to answer two fundamental research questions posed in the public opinion literature: 1). What were the public and the elite’s attitudes in post-Communist Russia and Poland and were there any changes? 2). Did the post-Communist elite and the public’s attitudes move in the same direction? As such, my investigation builds upon two important directions in the contemporary literature – an examination of particular characteristics of public opinion (including rationality/irrationality and stability/change debates) and the analysis of the relationship between public opinion and the elite’s attitudes and policy initiatives. In investigating this relationship, my primary goal is to show the areas of consensus and disjunction between official discourse (the elite’s value orientations) and public opinion and to suggest the degree of congruence between the two. I am not interested in proving a causal relationship between them. The nature of the actual linkage and the process by which public opinion reaches the elite lie outside the scope of this work.

Characteristics of Public Opinion

There are two concurrent debates on the nature of public opinion. Both go beyond the mere description of public attitudes. At their heart lies the question of desirability of the public’s political input – a cornerstone of contemporary empirical and normative democratic theory. The first debate relates to the question of whether public opinion is rational, informed, and structured or irrational, volatile, and devoid of structure and substance. Realist skeptics claim that public opinion should not matter in the political
processes, since public attitudes are short-lived, poorly articulated, and ill-informed. Their revisionist opponents are perhaps unduly optimistic in assigning instrumental rationality and fixed structure to public attitudes, while downplaying the public’s lack of knowledge or the low salience of most foreign policy issues for the general population.

Middle ground theorists contend that although public attitudes are unstructured and poorly informed, they are not random and do not amount to non-attitudes.

The second debate considers stability and change in public opinion and is closely related to the rationality debate. More recent scholarship claims that, contrary to the earlier, realist assertions, public opinion is stable and is subject to only minor changes. A middle ground school emerged here as well. According to it, public opinion is stable, but

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is subject to rapid, and often substantial changes (even in western democracies, but, especially in the post-Communist societies).37

**Does Public Opinion Matter to Decision-Makers?**

Studies on the impact of public opinion compare public opinion to the policy actions of the elite. Although early research38 questioned the desirability of public input into political processes, later studies assigned a crucial role to public opinion as a cornerstone of a democratic society. Yet several authors39 found that the policy-makers are motivated by misperceptions, rather than correct knowledge of public opinion, while others40 reported the absence of any substantial impact. Nonetheless, scholars occasionally found that the elite uses public opinion as a basis for its actions.41 Current scholarship supports the view that public opinion’s influence is not fixed; rather, it fluctuates. Although some scholars report an absence of impact during their research


timeframe and others document the strong influence of public opinion, historical data give credence to both views.\(^{42}\)

This dissertation takes the findings from the US and Western Europe and extends them to Russia and Poland. Like Holsti, I see a "need for public opinion research in which evidence about the United States is placed in a broader comparative context."\(^{43}\) In fact, my analysis follows the footsteps of the recent ground-breaking scholarship on post-Communist public opinion and its effect on elites.\(^{44}\) But, rather than analyzing a static snapshot of public opinion in a single country, common in the scholarship on the relationship between post-Communist public and elite attitudes, I examine public opinion throughout the entire post-Communist period and add a comparative perspective by

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\(^{43}\) Holsti, *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy*, 204.

\(^{44}\) Zimmerman's comparative study of the Russian elite and public's attitudes prior to 2000 found the elite to be more pro-Western, pro-democratic and pro-capitalist than the general population (William Zimmerman, *The Russian People and Foreign Policy: Russian Elite and Mass Perspectives, 1993-2000* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002). Shiraev and Zubok concluded that public opinion was behind Russia's 1999 anti-Western foreign policy consensus (Erik Shiraev and Vlad Zubok, "Public Opinion and Decision-Making in Russia: the Impact of NATO Expansion and Air Strikes on Serbia," in *Decision-Making in Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*, ed. Briggete Nacos, Robert Y. Shapiro, and Pierrangelo Insernia (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000)). D'Anieri's discussion of the anti-Western shift during the 1996 Russian presidential elections, which he attributes to an increasingly anti-Western public sentiment, is also useful in my overall investigation (Paul D'Anieri, "Russian Foreign Policy: Continuity, Revolution and the Search for Status," in *Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective: Domestic and International Influences on State Behavior*, ed. Beasley, et al. (CQ Press, 2001)). This analysis also builds upon Miller and Klobucar's examination of the impact of new Russian national identity on the elite behavior. The scholars found the new identity to be more politically authoritarian, but supportive of economic reform and ethnic inclusiveness. They also discovered that the political elite gets its clues from the new set of public values (Arthur H. Miller, and Thomas F. Klobucar, "A New Russian National Identity, Or Just Nostalgia for the Past?" (paper presented at the annual Mid-West Political Science Association Meeting, Chicago, IL, April 2001)). Kurczewski's treatise on the meaning of the parliamentary representation in post-Communist Poland compares various political, economic, ideological attitudes of the members of the Polish Parliament and the general public. Kurczewski discovered significant differences between the actual public attitudes and the representatives' perceptions of them. More importantly, the author showed the extent to which public opinion matters to the Polish political elite (Jacek Kurczewski, *Postowie a opinia publiczna. Z badan nad przedstawicielstwem w Trzeciej Rzeczypospolitej [Representatives and Public Opinion. Study of Parliamentary Representation in the Third Republic of Poland] (Warsaw: Instytut Stosowanych Nauk Społecznych, 1999)).

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examining both Russian and Polish data. My dissertation also analyzes post-Communist public opinion according to multiple issue domains (political, ideological, economic, foreign policy and ethnic relations categories). Finally, I use more systematic data (results of numerous public opinion surveys) and methods (extensive review of public opinion data, multivariate regression and correlation analyses).

**Conceptual Framework**

1. Operationalizing Discourse As Measurement of Elite Value Orientations

Discourse is difficult to quantify or objectify. Techniques to measure and study discourse abound. The formalist school of discourse analysis looks at texts as sources of meaning independent of their authors or contexts (and their normative biases, intentions, or conventions). Functionalists contend that texts are manifestations of collective and individual ideologies. Finally, discourse measured as utterances is, in the words of Bakhtin, “a link in the chain of speech communication, which cannot be broken off from the preceding links that determine it both from within and without giving rise within it to unmediated responsive reactions and dialogic reverberations.... The entire utterance is constructed while taking into account possible responsive reactions for whose sake, in essence, it is actually created.”

I adopt a definition which is close to a functionalist approach. In my work, discourse is understood as a verbal equivalent/representation of an ideology or a comprehensive doctrine. This ideology is primary. The words simply reflect a particular ideological system. The verbal articulation of beliefs, and not the belief systems

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themselves, is the focus of this dissertation's analysis. A person may not share the ideology that she/he verbalizes. Indeed, ideology may be appropriated for the sake of political expediency. In both cases, what is important is the verbal actualization of specific ideological postulates either genuinely held by a communicator or adopted for political purposes.

Discourse is also social phenomenon. It requires both a communicator and an audience. Trutkowski's notion of the social representation of ideological and political beliefs and Bakhtin's characterization of discourse as utterance are similar to my understanding of discourse. In other words, discourse is "a flow of verbal communication between actors which creates scenarios for relationships and events." It allows the listener to understand both the communicator's interpretations of reality and her/his intentions and implicit assumptions. When articulating discourse, communicators not only express their own opinion, but also anticipate the audience's reaction and repeat or refer to notions co-produced with other members of the communication community.

Discourse of government-affiliated intellectuals, who are the subject of this dissertation's analysis, is also more than just a verbalized personal opinion. Government-affiliated intellectuals do not function in a vacuum, blissfully unaware of their audience's concerns or other intellectual alternatives. Their discourse is not a unidirectional monologue; it is situated vis-à-vis the general public and the political elite. This position makes government-affiliated intellectuals different from other important articulators of comprehensive doctrines, for instance, political journalists. The latter are not required to popularize the elite's views among the general population and to inform the elite of the

46 Trutkowski, Social Representations of Politics; Bakhtin, "The Problem of Speech Genres."
47 Steinberg, The Roar of the Crowd, 78, note 1.
popular reaction and reception. The venues in which the works of government-affiliated intellectuals appear have large readership (be it a leading newspaper or a book published by a popular press) and are designed to reach and persuade the public. Government-affiliated intellectuals also position themselves vis-à-vis their intellectual rivals and show how their views are different (mostly, better) than those of their opponents.

If, methodologically, analysis of ideology presupposes comparison between individual viewpoints of an intellectual or a statesman and already known ideological constants, discourse analysis is based on reconstructing general but a priori unknown patterns from communicator’s oral or written statements. The best method to study these statements is content analysis, i.e., making inferences from systematic and objective identification of certain explicit characteristics of texts. Content analysis can use discrete words or look at the words as a part of a larger text (phrases, sentences, paragraphs). I look at the attitudes towards certain words (see Appendix A), which can only be inferred from a wider textual frame. This method is close to relational content analysis.

The articulation of ideas and value orientations is oral and written. However, for the retrospective analysis employed in this work, only written data were used, as people tend to misreport their attitudes with the passage of time.\textsuperscript{48} Discourse, as I define it, is contained in a collection of published interviews, speeches, reports, memoirs, articles, transcripts of press conferences, and books addressed to the domestic public. I was interested in written statements designed for mass consumption, not for a specialized

\textsuperscript{48} I could have analyzed the interviews broadcast during my research stay in Russia and Poland. In fact, such attempts were occasionally made. For instance, Yegor Gaidar, former Prime Minister, and current director of the Institute of the Problems of Transitional Period, gave several interviews to the Echo of Moscow radio station. Unfortunately, it was impossible to know about such interviews in advance and therefore to engage in any kind of systematic collection and analysis of such data.
audience or for private circulation. Importantly, it is also discourse designed for domestic consumption, not for Western audiences.

Another clarification concerns my choice of the term *official discourse*. I make a distinction between *official discourse* and *oppositional discourse*. Although Russian and Polish elites are not monolithic and there are significant differences between intellectuals directly affiliated with the state and the intellectuals who actively oppose the ruling political elite, my emphasis is on the former. *Official* is a crucial word here. By *official discourse*, I mean public discourse voiced by intellectuals who actively cooperate with the state.

I differentiate between liberal and organic-statist (conservative) official discourse. Liberal discourse encompasses support for the principles of inclusive democracy, liberal ideology, free market, pro-Western foreign policy, and ethnic tolerance. Organic-statist (conservative) discourse, on the other hand, consists of positive references to authoritarianism or managed democracy, conservative/statist ideology, governed-market economic system, anti-Western/independent foreign policy and ethnic nationalism. I am aware that liberal and organic-statist discourses are not necessarily mutually exclusive and elements of one can coexist within the framework of another. Moreover, liberal categories may be justified by references to elements of organic-statist discourse. I address these issues by looking at the balance of categories and coherence in discourse, isolating predominant value orientations and employing qualitative content analysis.

One can, of course, study official discourse (and the elite’s value orientations) by analyzing statements of the political elite. Yeltsin and Putin, Wałęsa and Kwaśniewski as

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49 For instance, appeals to the Russian pre-Revolutionary past to justify market reforms or civil liberties are not uncommon.
well as numerous Russian and Polish Prime Ministers addressed the Duma and the Sejm, wrote memoirs and letters, delivered keynote speeches, gave interviews, and proposed state toasts. But such statements are too infrequent and declarative and thus too crude to allow one to make inferences about the evolution of official position. Politicians tend to articulate slogan-like discourse and are not known for their elaboration of comprehensive doctrines. A more complete picture emerges from the works of government-affiliated intellectuals, whose social function is to articulate discourse and the elite’s beliefs to the public. During the research period, government-affiliated intellectuals produced a copious body of written documents that reflects fundamental political and ideological values. Their works explain, rather than declare. They contain a publicly oriented and systematic articulation of comprehensive political doctrines and reflect the official governmental position.

I am not concerned with the question of who is the original source of official discourse. I am well aware that government-affiliated intellectuals do not necessarily create discourse independently. Frequently they serve the political elite or are themselves part of the political elite. I approach the study of discourse from a different angle – by reading the works of those who offer the best understanding of the official position and the elite value orientations. The published documents of government-affiliated intellectuals are also more easily accessible to both the general public and the researcher. It follows that the works of government-affiliated intellectuals are more suitable for the analysis of the official discourse.
2. Defining Government-Affiliated Intellectuals as Discourse Communicators

In contrast to the socio-ethical literature that views intellectuals as a homogeneous category of moral defenders of the people, this study approaches intellectuals as a differentiated socio-economic group of professional creators and disseminators of ideas. It focuses on government-affiliated intellectuals, defined as socially active, highly educated professionals (leading governmental economists, presidential advisers, ideologists, members of government), residing in important political centers and articulating value orientations and discourse of the post-Communist political elite.

I am interested in the official, not the oppositional, intellectual elite. Of course, representatives of the intellectual opposition may, and often do, influence the political elite. But such a connection is unofficial, if not outright clandestine, and difficult to monitor. In short, my focus is on the people whose ideas can be openly requested and used by the political elite. The degree of support that a particular intellectual renders to the ruling regime is another sign of his/her elite status. Government-affiliated intellectuals advise, recommend, explain, and advocate governmental actions. They do not engage in systematic criticism of governmental policies.

The group of government-affiliated intellectuals is not homogeneous. It is functionally differentiated. Members of the first sub-group, or “intellectuals-politicians,” combine primary political activities with intellectual undertakings, including the articulation of discourse and the elite’s value orientations. Intellectual activity is secondary for this type of government-affiliated intellectuals. It is a continuation of their political agenda. The rare disclosures of the motivations behind their actions are very

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50 For instance, Dugin, the permanent contributor to the ultra-nationalist oppositional newspaper Zavtra, is an important discourse communicator and an influential contemporary ideologue.
important because they represent a crystallized official position. In Russia, Yegor Gaidar (in his capacity as acting Prime Minister in 1992-1994), Anatolii Chubais (Deputy Prime-Minister in 1992-1997), German Gref (current Minister of Trade and Economic Development), Aleksei Kudrin (current Minister of Finances) belong to the first sub-group. In Poland, Leszek Balcerowicz (during his tenure as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finances in 1989-1991 and 1997-2000), Bronisław Geremek (Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1997-2000), and Grzegorz Kołodko (current Minister of Finances and member of the Cabinet in 1994-1997) represent the same sub-group.

Members of the second sub-group, or the “intellectual circle” of official presidential, governmental, or parliamentary advisers, experts, consultants, and ideologues, surround the political elite but do not strictly speaking belong to it. The main function of the second sub-group is the creation of databases of ideas, recommendations, and ideological justifications for the political elite’s decisions and actions. Members of the “intellectual circle” are not public officials. Hence, they do not make political decisions and are not accountable for the consequences of their recommendations. But their statements are important, since they reflect value orientations and positions of the elite. Gleb Pavlovskii (Putin’s adviser), Adam Michnik, (influential journalist and the Polish political elite’s confidant), or Waldemar Kuczyński (Wałęsa’s and Buzek’s economic adviser) are the most typical representatives of this sub-group.

How does one become a government-affiliated intellectual? It usually occurs when the views of a particular intellectual coincide with the views of the political elite; the elite then either appoints intellectuals to official posts (i.e., members of government) or employs them as advisers and ideologues. Being closely affiliated with the political
elite, government-affiliated intellectuals can articulate official positions. In their capacity as allies or members of the political elite, government-affiliated intellectuals have easy access to the press. Their works are publishable as long as they occupy positions close to the political elite. A change in their discourse, therefore, is not likely to be a function of market pressures and literary fashion. In fact, it is an indicator of the transformation of the political elite's views and value orientations.\textsuperscript{51}

"Government-affiliated intellectual" is not a normative label. It does not assume a qualitative difference between government-affiliated intellectuals and the rest of the intellectual community. Indeed, many discourse communicators are conventionally viewed as lacking sufficient intellectual capacity to be classified as "intellectual."\textsuperscript{52} I am not, however, interested in the subjective judgment of the "intellectuality" of a particular government-affiliated intellectual. In my work, "government-affiliated intellectual" is a sociological and functionalist category.\textsuperscript{53} A person who belongs to the group of "politicians-intellectuals" or to the political elite's "intellectual circle" is considered a "government-affiliated intellectual."

I use the term \textit{cultural entrepreneur} as distinct from \textit{organic intellectual}. The former originates in the new institutionalist literature and the sociology of intellectuals. The new institutionalist literature applies the term \textit{cultural entrepreneur} predominantly to

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{51} This statement should not be confused with a claim of a universal causality between the orders of the political elite and discourse of government-affiliated intellectuals. I simply assert that the value orientations of the political elite and government-affiliated intellectuals move in the same direction, irrespective of whose position, a politician's or an intellectual's, changed first. It is impossible for a government-affiliated intellectual to dissent from the official line and to retain his/her position. Government-affiliated intellectuals can either convince their political patrons and allies or comply with the latter's opinion.

\textsuperscript{52} For instance, in private conversations, some intellectuals, including Satarov, were characterized as mere administrators. In other cases, my interlocutors doubted Kudrin's or Uliukaev's "intellectualism."

\textsuperscript{53} For a more detailed discussion of this contentious topic, see Chapter I.
\end{footnotesize}
politicians or statesmen. I add intellectuals to this list. The sociological literature on intellectuals, on the other hand, describes intellectuals' position vis-à-vis society, but does not always use the term itself. Cultural entrepreneurship implies intellectuals' relative independence from society and their leadership in initiating and disseminating ideas. Closely related to the term cultural entrepreneurs is the notion of the elite's ideologues. I use these terms interchangeably. The term organic intellectuals (credited to Gramsci) suggests that intellectuals are attached to a specific class or society in general, thereby reflecting and articulating broader societal interests. Close to the term organic intellectual is the idea of intellectuals as social interpreters.

3. Measuring the Political Implications of Elite Value Orientations

This research does not presume that policies necessarily follow discourse. Discourse can be used to legitimize policies ex post facto. But by looking at the degree of congruence between discourse and policies, one can make inferences about political implications of discourse. My interest lies not so much in the establishment of causality, i.e., the discourses shaping policies or policies shaping discourses, but in the investigation of the possible link between discourse and policy. Indeed, the relationship may be


57 See Bauman, Intimations of Post-Modernity and Kurczewska, Party Leadership.
dialectical and mutually reinforcing. But I assume that there is a relationship and the change in one may have an impact on the other.

4. Defining and Measuring Public Opinion

This study acknowledges that official discourse and public opinion are organized in different ways. While elite discourse tends to be characterized by ideological clarity and relatively consistent articulation of political and economic categories, public opinion may be vague, inconsistent, poorly articulated and short-lived. Thus, I use different standards of evidence. I employ statistical analysis of long-term trends in public opinion and content analysis of government-affiliated intellectuals' official statements.

Conceptually, I measure and define public opinion through surveys. For the purpose of my analysis, I assume that the political elite and government-affiliated intellectuals monitor public opinion by analyzing survey results over time. The significance attributed to public opinion is a fairly new phenomenon in both countries.

At least one author is skeptical about the reliability of surveys as a method of measuring public opinion in Russia. Kagarlitskii (2001) contends that in Russia respondents internalize desired responses and give an interviewer the "best" answer. However, this potential problem is not a uniquely Russian phenomenon. Numerous sources on American public opinion surveys also discuss researcher-induced biases and other shortcomings of the survey method. There are various techniques to minimize

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58 Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems."
59 Although the Hungarian elite started to monitor public opinion through surveys long before the breakdown of Communist regimes, in Russia and Poland, the first surveys were not commissioned until the mid- to late 1980s.
60 Beginning with Converse's "The Nature of Belief Systems," many American political scientists and sociologists pondered the validity of public opinion surveys. For a useful summary of different problems and ways to correct them, see John Zaller and Stanley Feldman, "A Simple Theory of the
these drawbacks. Kagarlitskii himself proposes to measure public opinion by looking at the results of elections or the number/nature of strikes. These are valid points, and such information can serve to confirm or disprove public opinion surveys. Unfortunately, such data are not representative. Moreover, polling organizations' pre-elections surveys give an extremely accurate estimate of election results -- a testament to increasing professionalism of Russian and Polish pollsters. It is, therefore, my contention that public opinion surveys in Russia and Poland are as useful as their western equivalents.

**Hypotheses**

The following is my general hypothesis: Prior to the democratic transition, oppositional intellectuals in Russia and Poland articulated major principles of liberal discourse. Although Russian public opinion initially supported liberal principles, after 1992 a dissonance emerged as the public started to support a more organic-statist discourse. Government-affiliated intellectuals, whose discourse reflected the elite’s value orientations, continued to articulate a liberal discourse. After the 2000 presidential elections, government-affiliated intellectuals also started to endorse more organic-statist principles in their discourse. However, actual policies that followed the new organic-statist official discourse may be still inconsistent with the public opinion mandate. In contrast, liberal discourse and public opinion in Poland were congruent and consistent. Liberal policies in this country were likewise stable and continuous.

More specifically, I operate from six hypotheses:

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62 The election of pro-Communist and nationalist deputies during the 1993 parliamentary elections indicates the beginning of the process.
Hypothesis 1: During the research period, both Russian public opinion and official discourse (a proxy for the elite’s value orientations) changed from liberal to organic-statist categories. In Poland, both public opinion and official discourse remained liberal. However, the liberalism in this country was never as extreme as in Russia; it was tempered by the advocacy of social protection and nationalism.63

Hypothesis 2: In Russia, a basic societal consensus between the elite and the general public emerged around organic-statist values, while in Poland, the elite and the public found common ground in modified liberal orientations.

Hypothesis 3: In Russia, congruence between the elite and the popular attitudes did not appear until the 2000 presidential elections. In Poland, official discourse and public opinion were always congruent.

Hypothesis 4: The role of Russian government-affiliated intellectuals in articulating official discourse and the elite’s value orientations changed from independent cultural entrepreneurs who created and supported post-Communist liberal discourse to a more organic role which incorporated public opinion. The dual (organic and entrepreneurial) role of Polish government-affiliated intellectuals never changed.

Hypothesis 5: In Russia, the changes in official discourse (the elite’s value orientations) and policies do not always correspond to one another, but on several occasions, changes in discourse were a good indicator for changing policy direction. In Poland, continuity in official discourse matched continuity of policies.

63 According to Ilya Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, 6) in Poland reliance on nationalism, rather than liberalism, served as the “source of political legitimacy” in the post-Communist period. My formulation is less dramatic. I claim only that liberalism was modified by advocacy of nationalism and social protection.
Hypothesis 6: Based on my case studies, consistently liberal post-Communist discourse occurs when a) it is tempered by advocacy of social protection and nationalism and b) there is a liberal consensus between the elite and the public and government-affiliated intellectuals, who articulate official discourse, draw upon both the elite and the public's preferences, i.e., play a dual (organic and entrepreneurial) role.

All hypotheses are descriptive. I present relationships which are dialectical and mutually reinforcing rather than linear and causal. I aim to explore shifts in public opinion, official discourse, and policies as well as the changing role of government-affiliated intellectuals.

Data

This study utilizes 1) public opinion surveys\textsuperscript{64} at the VTsIOM (Center for Study of Public Opinion, Moscow), the CBOS (Center for Study of Public Opinion, Warsaw) and the ISSWU (Institute for Social Studies at Warsaw University)\textsuperscript{65} archives; 2) public statements (speeches, interviews, books, articles, etc.) produced by government-affiliated intellectuals for domestic consumption between 1989/1992 and 2002\textsuperscript{66} available at the Russian State Library, Russian National Library, the library of Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences (INION), the Polish National Public Library, and the libraries of Warsaw University and Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences; 3) descriptions of actions by governmental officials dealing with political system, relationship between the state and society/individual, economic system, foreign policy, and ethnic relations contained in news compilations.

\textsuperscript{64} Attitudes towards political parties, media, democracy, market, economic reforms, welfare, tolerance, the West, foreign policy, collapse of the USSR, NATO, the EU, migrant workers, etc.


\textsuperscript{66} Documents representative of the shift in official discourse.
The timeframe for my research covers the period from 1992 to 2001 in Russia and from 1989 to 2002 in Poland. In 1992, following the demise of the USSR, Russia became *de facto* independent. In the Fall of 1989, the first semi-democratic elections took place in Poland. These dates are generally accepted as starting points of the post-Communist period in each country. 2001 and 2002 are the dates when I completed the Russian and Polish phases of my field-work. I spent ten months in Russia and six months in Poland, collecting original data on the value orientations of the elite and acquiring and classifying secondary statistical and event-analytical data.

**Methods and Procedures**

This study used both objective and systematic quantitative methods (statistical analysis, quantitative content analysis, event analysis) and interpretive and contextual qualitative approaches (qualitative content analysis). In bringing together “story telling” and “positivist quantification,” I follow the well-taken recommendations of the leading political science methodologists. It is the first study of its kind in post-Communist scholarship.

1. **Affiliation Sites**

In Russia, I was formally affiliated with VTsIOM (Moscow), while in Poland, I received full affiliation at IFIS PAN (Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences) and CBOS (Warsaw).

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2. Content Analysis

To analyze official discourse (the elite’s value orientations) and to document possible shifts and continuities, I traced evaluations of textual indicators in government-affiliated intellectuals’ public speeches. The list of intellectuals was based on my own knowledge of the Russian and Polish case studies. It was later verified through external sources. Results of content analysis of official discourse were then compared to results of an extensive statistical review of public opinion. Basic congruence between public opinion and official discourse indicated a consensual relationship in which government-affiliated intellectuals may be assumed to play a more organic role; an inconsistency between the two signaled conflictive relationship in which government-affiliated intellectuals play the role of cultural entrepreneurs.


To measure public opinion I utilized results of surveys conducted by Russian and Polish national polling organizations and compared discrete elements of public opinion (political, ideological, economic, foreign policy and ethnic relations) to appropriate categories of official discourse (the elite’s value orientations) in the two countries. I reviewed long-term trends in public attitudes and used conventional statistical methods to explore social determinants of and possible relationships between various public attitudes. Various Polish and Russian polling organizations, including my affiliation sites (VTsIOM, CBOS, and ISSUW) routinely monitor changes in public opinion but such monitoring largely uses one-dimensional and static parameters which are treated as
unrelated. To obtain a multidimensional picture of public opinion I used multivariate regression and correlation analyses.

4. Event Analysis

To assess actual policies, I utilized event analysis of actions of the ruling elite along the five issue-areas (political, ideological, economic, foreign policy and ethnic relations). Actions were classified according to a particular category (i.e., political, ideological, economic, foreign policy and ethnic relations ones), coded (as reflecting either liberal or conservative/organic-statist principles) and aggregated by category and year. The evolution of actions of the political elite along the five issue domains was then compared to the value orientations of the elite and to public preferences.

There are several suggested methods to measure the character of the relationship between public opinion and the elite’s discourse and actions, including historical research of the elite’s statements dealing with the importance of public opinion, interviews with the elite, matching of policy changes with majority opinion, juxtaposition of legislative policy votes with preferences of constituents, comparison between changes in public opinion and changes in policy, and evaluation of trends in public opinion and policy over time. I compared trends in public opinion and the elite’s value orientations and actions over time to see if both move in the same direction. However, unlike historical research

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68 For instance, only specific attitudes are explored; no consideration is given to the analysis of several related parameters that comprise organic-statist or liberal constellations of public attitudes.

of statements by the members of the elite or interviews with the elite, my methods do not help to answer the more complex question of how public opinion reaches the elite. I offer anecdotal evidence and personal observations from VTsIOM and CBOS, with which I was affiliated during my field research.

Organization

Chapter II. The Russian Case: Unstable Liberal Discourse

The second chapter analyzes a specific case in which official discourse shifted dramatically from a set of liberal orientations to organic-statist ones. I use content analytic data extracted from government-affiliated intellectuals' public statements to show when and how the change took place.

Chapter III. The Russian Case: Elite-Public Consensus on Organic-Statist Values

This chapter analyzes results of statistical analysis and an extensive review of Russian public opinion surveys and discusses event analysis of the actions of the Russian political elite. Comparison between the long-term trends in public opinion and official discourse is used to demonstrate areas of congruence and disjunction between the elite and public's attitudes.

Chapter IV. The Polish Case: Stability of Modified Liberal Discourse

I discuss data on the Polish elite’s political, ideological, economic, foreign policy and ethnic relations attitudes. Based on content analytic data from the public statements of Polish government-affiliated intellectuals, I demonstrate that official discourse of the Polish government-affiliated intellectuals was mostly liberal and stable. Stability of
discourse indicates that regardless of the composition of the Polish government, there are basic common values shared by all factions of the Polish ruling elite.

Chapter V. The Polish Case: Elite-Public Consensus on Modified Liberal Values

This chapter analyzes results of statistical analysis and an extensive review of Polish public opinion surveys and discusses event analysis of the actions of the Polish political elite. Juxtaposition of the long-term trends in public opinion with official discourse and policies is used to show value orientations shared by both the Polish elite and the population at large.

Chapter VI. The Elite's Value Orientations and Public Opinion in Post-Communist Societies: A Comparative Perspective

This chapter provides a comprehensive assessment of the relationship between the Russian and Polish post-Communist elite's value orientations, on the one hand, and public opinion, on the other. I examine political implications of stability and instability of the original liberal attitudes of the elite and the public. I also present the comparative implications of my findings and isolate factors that lend stability to post-Communist liberal value orientations on both the elite and the popular levels.
CHAPTER II

THE RUSSIAN CASE: UNSTABLE LIBERAL DISCOURSE

The Russian case was selected to illustrate the instability of both elite and public liberal orientations. This chapter presents and analyzes Russian data on elite attitudes towards politics, ideology, the economy, foreign policy, and ethnic relations. Based on the hypotheses outlined in the previous chapter, I expect to find a difference between the discourse employed by government-affiliated intellectuals in the early 1990s and their current discourse. This change can be gradual or abrupt. It can be total or partial.

More specifically, I hypothesized that discourse of Russian government-affiliated intellectuals (a proxy for the elite’s value orientations) changed abruptly from supporting liberal positions to upholding organic-statist ones in 1998/1999, i.e., after the economic default and Putin’s appointment as Russian Prime Minister. I anticipated that around this time references to democracy, liberal ideology, free market, pro-Western foreign policy, and tolerant ethnic relations were replaced by discussion of organic-statist (conservative\(^{70}\)) concerns of authoritarianism, conservative ideology, governed market, anti-Western/independent foreign policy, and nationalism. In other words, during the post-Communist period, discourse of Russian government-affiliated intellectuals and the elite’s value orientations underwent a complete and radical transformation. The goal of this chapter is to confirm or reject these hypotheses.

\(^{70}\) Here and henceforth, I use the term “conservative” to denote a uniquely European/Russian phenomenon. Unlike contemporary American conservatism whose defining features include defense of laissez-faire capitalism, traditional social structures and values, minimal role of the state, religious revival, economic protectionism, and stricter immigration controls, its European counterpart is organized around authoritarian, statist, etatist, isolationist, and nationalist principles.
Procedures for Content Analysis of Russian Government-Affiliated Intellectuals’ Discourse

1. Sample Selection

In contrast to other researchers of post-Communist discourse, who use samples derived from a specific journal, newspaper, or TV program for a specified period of time, I used a sample of intellectual discourse communicators. I am not so much interested in where discourse appeared, as in who articulated it and what was articulated. Obviously, discourse of government-affiliated intellectuals in its original form is unlikely to appear in the oppositional media outlets. Secondly, concentrating on a specific medium runs the risk of missing other published works (e.g., books or chapters in books).

When selecting a sample of communicators, I used my own knowledge of the Russian case as well as external sources that detailed the relationship between the

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72 Even if political adversaries would publish the statements of government-affiliated intellectuals, such statements are likely to be abridged or distorted. The same “strawman” strategy, of course, applies to the governing elite itself. Certainly it is not above the manipulation of the rivals’ views.
political elite and government-affiliated intellectuals. My sample included 40 intellectual communicators of official discourse (the elite’s value orientations). Not all of them were simultaneously included into the sample of post-Communist “government-affiliated intellectuals.” The group underwent substantial rotation. But, collectively, the works of these intellectuals represent the body of government-endorsing intellectual discourse and reflect value orientations of the post-Communist governing elite during the research period.

I analyzed 249 publications authored by 26 discourse communicators including Igor’ Bunin, Director General of the Center for Political Technologies; Gennadii Burbulis, Yeltsin’s closest ally, State Secretary of RF and First Deputy Prime Minister in 1991-1992, subsequently President of Strategiia Foundation; Sergei Chernyshov, conservative philosopher, important ideologue, director of Russian University, and close friend and ally of Gleb Pavlovskii; Anatolii Chubais, Deputy Prime Minister in 1992-1998 in charge of privatization, Chief of Presidential Administration in 1996-1997,

Books by Yeltsin’s insiders Filatov (Sergei Filatov, Sovershennoe ne sekretno [Absolutely Non-'Top-Secret'] (Moscow: Vagrius, 2000)) and Baturin (Yu. M. Baturin, et al., Epokha Yeltsina: ocherki politicheskoi istorii [Yeltsin’s Epoch: Sketches of Political History] (Moscow: Vagrius, 2001)) provided additional information on the intellectuals recruited by the political elite during the post-Communist period. These sources also placed selected discourse communicators among the most influential government-affiliated intellectuals.

Although my original sample included about 120 people, many of them did not fit pre-established selection criteria. For instance, some intellectuals represented the political elite proper (e.g., Chernomyrdin, Nemtsov, S. Ivanov, etc.), oppositional intellectual elite (e.g., Lavinskii, Glaz’ev, Kagarlitskii, etc.), journalists (Kiselev, Svanidze, Leont’ev, Sokolov, Dorenko, Pozner, etc.), or speechwriters, secretaries, referents of the acting politicians (Pikhoia, Baturin, Kostikov etc.).

For instance, Yegor Gaidar’s publications after his removal from the governing elite (after 1995) and, especially, after his falling out with the current government-affiliated intellectual circle (after 1999), were excluded. Likewise, works by Simon Kordonskii, published prior to 1999, i.e., before his recruitment to the positions of power, were not analyzed. For a more detailed discussion of rotations among Russian post-Communist intellectuals, see Table 1.

The validity of the Russian sample was further confirmed through additional independent sources. The website of the Fond effektivnoi politiki [Foundation for Effective Politics] (http://www/fep.ru/publications/pr) and internet publication strana.ru (http://www.strana.ru/topics/201/) routinely compile lists of the one hundred most influential Russian intellectuals. Strana.ru also publishes a list of the one hundred most influential Russian politicians (http://www.strana.ru/publications/03/).
currently a Chairman of the Board of Directors of RAO EES; **Aleksandr Dugin**, ultra-conservative philosopher, founder of “Eurasia” socio-political movement, adviser to Gennadii Seleznev, Speaker of Duma and presently an important unofficial ideologue; **Yegor Gaidar**, Acting Prime Minister in 1992-1994, subsequently a Director of the Institute of the Problems of the Transitional Period; **Yevgenii Iasin**, Minister of Economy in 1994-1997, currently President of Economic Academy; **Andrei Illarionov**, Director of the Institute of Economic Analysis, a member of the Governmental Commission for Economic Reform since 1998, currently an Economic Adviser to the president of RF; **Aleksei Kara-Murza**, professor, Director of Center for Philosophic Analysis of Russian Reform Movements, co-President of Moscow Liberal Foundation, important ideologue; **Sergei Karaganov**, Deputy Director of the Institute of Europe, member of the Presidential Counseling Board, and Chairman of the Committee for Foreign and Defense Politics of RF; **Sviatoslav Kaspe**, Deputy Director of the Institute for Development of Regional Education, chief analyst of Russian Public Politics Center, and a close ally and co-author of Aleksei Salmin; **Mikhail Krasnov**, Presidential Aid for legal issues in 1995-1998 and subsequently a Vice-President of INDEM; **Simon Kordonskii**, Director General of the Center for Civil Society and Private Property in 1993-2000, consultant of the Foundation for Effective Politics, currently Head of Presidential Counseling Board; **Aleksandr Livshits**, Yeltsin’s aid and assistant in 1994-1996, Minister of Finances in 1996-1997, currently professor of economics; **Vladimir Mau**, member of Gaidar’s team, currently a Director of the Working Center of the Governmental Commission for Economic Reform and a member of the Scientific Board.

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77 One publication authored by Aleksashenko, Iasin’s colleague and frequent co-author, was counted as Iasin’s publication.
of the Center for Strategic Programs; Vyacheslav Nikonov, President of Politika Foundation, Vice-President of the Association of Centers for Political Consulting (president A. Salmin), member of the Presidential Political Board, and Foreign and Defense Policy Board; Alexander Panarin, philosopher, professor of Moscow State University, important ideologue; Gleb Pavlovskii, director of the Foundation for Effective Politics, member of the Strategic Programs Center, and Adviser of Presidential Administration; Aleksei Salmin, member of the Presidential Counseling Board in 1995-1997, currently President of Russian Public Politics Center, President of the Association of Centers for Political Consulting; Georgii Satarov, Presidential Aid for Internal Issues and Relations with Parliament in 1993-1997, subsequently a President of INDEM; Sergei Shakhrai, Deputy Prime Minister in 1992-1994; Aleksandr Shokhin, Deputy Prime Minister of RF, Minister of Labor and Economy in 1991-1994 and briefly in 1998; Leonid Smirniagin, member of Presidential Counseling Board in 1993-1997; Anatoli Sobchak, Mayor of St. Petersburg in 1991-1996, member of the Presidential Counseling Board in 1993-?, Putin’s intellectual mentor; Aleksei Uliukaev, consultant for the Government of RF in 1991-1994, deputy director of Gaidar’s Institute, currently Deputy Minister of Finances; Sergei Vasil’ev, Director of the Working Center of the Governmental Commission for Economic Reform in 1991-1994, currently Deputy Minister of Economy.78

Many prominent government-affiliated intellectuals whom I originally selected for my sample, including Aleksei Kudrin, Minister of Finances in the Kas’ianov Government; Emil’ Pain, Yeltsin’s adviser for ethnic policy; and German Gref, current Minister of Trade and Development and author of the governmental economic program,

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78 See Appendix C for the brief biographies of Russian government-affiliated intellectuals.
did not leave publicly accessible statements. Although the sample is not exhaustive, it is representative and sufficient for a valid analysis.\textsuperscript{79}

The unit of analysis was one publication. Its size or format did not matter. Only the content of the statement was important. Regardless of whether the statement was a newspaper interview, article, chapter in a book, or monograph, what mattered was the articulation of relevant ideas.

2. Operationalization of Categories for Content Analysis

Public statements of selected communicators are a source from which content analytic data can be extracted. In the course of Russian content analysis I used five liberal and five organic-statist categories which were paired into five dichotomies/issue domains. Each dichotomy contained a liberal and an organic-statist category\textsuperscript{80}: 1) democracy-authoritarianism (political dichotomy); 2) liberalism-conservatism/statism (ideological dichotomy); 3) free market-governed market (economic dichotomy); 4) pro-Western foreign policy -- anti-Western/independent foreign policy (foreign policy dichotomy); 5) ethnic tolerance – nationalism (ethnic relations dichotomy).

Choice of Dichotomies

The choice of dichotomous (liberal – organic-statist) categories is essential.\textsuperscript{81} The given database does not contain any other ideological divide. The categories of socialist discourse\textsuperscript{82} are missing, since in post-Communist Russia communicators of socialist

\textsuperscript{79} See Appendix E for the list of sources analyzed during the content analytic part of the Russian research.
\textsuperscript{80} I do not attach any normative significance to the terms “liberal” and “conservative.” They are used simply to delineate opposing positions.
\textsuperscript{81} For a detailed descriptions of liberal and organic-statist dichotomous categories please see Chapter I.
\textsuperscript{82} Such categories would include people’s democracy (political issue domain), socialist ideology (ideological issue domain), state regulation (economic domain), socialist integration (foreign policy
discourse were excluded from the political elites. In other words, the post-Communist Russian official discourse was a dialogue between liberals and their organic-statist (conservative) counterparts, since only liberals and conservatives were included in the intellectual elite, as I define it.

No extant work analyzes Russian discourse both longitudinally and according to several dichotomies (ideological, political, economic, foreign policy and ethnic relations). This is the first attempt to study the body of written statements that comprise Russian official discourse and the elite’s value orientations systematically i.e., not only chronologically but also according to several categories along the liberal-organic-statist divide. Certainly, chronological examination is valuable since it shows the evolution in liberal and conservative attitudes. But analysis of different dichotomies/issue domains is valuable since it exposes patterns within the overall discourse and reveals the relative importance of specific dichotomies in the overall discourse.

Extracting Categories from the Text

Each category of discourse can be detected in a text by a set of specific textual indicators and their synonyms (see Appendix D). The original textual indicators that I use in this analysis were first drawn from the political science literature and then refined in the course of the pilot reading of several selected works of government-affiliated intellectuals. Having textual indicators helps highlight the meanings that communicators attribute to specific categories.

domain) and socialist internationalism (ethnic policy issue domain). However, these categories, which would transform my dichotomies into tripartite constellations, are visibly absent from the Russian post-Communist elite discourse.
In the political dichotomy the liberal category of democracy is measured through references to “separation of power,” “checks and balances,” “parliamentarism,” “federalism,” “elections,” “multiparty system,” “constitutionality,” “freedom of information/press” and “viable opposition,” while the conservative category of authoritarianism manifests itself in the textual indicators of “concentration of power,” “presidential republic,” “unitary state,” “ideological control,” “elite-based decision-making,” “controlled opposition,” “one party system,” “political expediency.”

In the ideological dichotomy the category of liberalism is defined through references to “natural human rights,” “negative freedoms,” “state’s accountability to an individual,” “respect for the conflict of interests,” “civilian control over state’s repressive apparatus,” whereas the category of statism/conservatism is measured through the textual indicators of “socially constructed human rights,” “positive freedoms,” “state’s superiority over citizens,” and “presence of uncontrolled force at state’s disposal.”

In the economic dichotomy, the liberal category of free market engenders beliefs in “market as a dominant economic mode,” “private property,” “initiative and competition,” “efficiency,” “economic justice,” “selective social support,” “liberalization of foreign trade,” and “quick and radical reforms,” while the conservative category of governed market is measured through references to “state economic regulation and preservation of state sector,” “social justice and economic guarantees,” “price control,” “universal social support,” “collective forms of property,” “support for domestic producers,” and “support for gradual and nationally-specific reforms.”

In the foreign policy dichotomy the liberal pro-Western category is defined through the textual indicators of “the West is a partner,” “global values supersede..."
national interests," “support for international organizations," “economic integration," whereas the conservative independent or anti-Western category manifests itself in the textual indicators of “fluid alliances with all parties," “national interests are more important than international commitments," “international organizations are for protection of national interests," “protection of Russians abroad," and “imperial restoration of the USSR."

Finally, in the ethnic relations dichotomy the liberal category of ethnic tolerance is defined as “equality of all ethnic groups," “existence of universal values," and “peaceful solutions to ethnic conflicts," while the conservative category of nationalism is measured through references to “inequality of ethnic groups," “uniquely Russian national values and ideas," and “military solutions to ethnic conflicts."

As was shown in numerous content-analytic studies in general and in recent Russian and Polish works\(^\text{83}\) in particular, one cannot make meaningful inferences by simply looking at predetermined or fixed textual indicators. The words “freedom," “democracy," “stability," “law and order," “market," “national interests," “European integration" and many others may have significantly different meanings depending on the context in which they are used.\(^\text{84}\) My analysis is no exception. To alleviate this problem, I used synonyms for textual indicators in each category (Appendix D). Synonyms emerged


\(^{84}\) For instance, freedoms can be natural or socially constructed, positive or negative. Similarly, national interests can mean interests of the state, interests of industrial complex, or interests of civil society.
during the pilot reading of selected works. Their list expanded as I analyzed the government-affiliated intellectuals' actual public statements. Synonyms are particularly important for two reasons. First, they help make the content analytic data more uniform across time. Second, they make data more comparable across communicators. For instance, the economic debate about the relative importance of shock vs. therapy in "shock therapy" is in essence a debate about the universality or particularity of economic reforms. It is also a debate whether Russia's previous legacies are important and deterministic necessitating the gradual, therapeutic, and socially responsive reform, or whether economic laws are universal and, the initial shock notwithstanding, radical transformation invariably leads to an assured success. Close to the first, gradualist, position is the argument that the most suitable route for Russia is the Scandinavian/Prussian economic path. The radical camp, on the other hand, usually endorses the American economic model even though the circumstances of its inception are the least similar to Russian conditions. Consequently, "universal neo-liberal economic development" textual indicator was synonymous with "shock therapy," "American model," and "rapid reform." The "specific economic development" textual indicator was synonymous with "third economic path," "Russian economic path," "Scandinavian/Prussian model," and "gradual reforms."

3 Coding Criteria

Each occurrence of a textual indicator was coded according to evaluative criteria. The number of mentions was not recorded, only the overall attitude toward a particular textual indicator. The assigned values ranged from "-1" ("negative assessment of
textual indicator”) to “+1” (“positive assessment of textual indicator”). Value “0” was assigned if a textual indicator was evaluated neutrally.

Positive evaluations (“+1”) were recorded if a textual indicator was associated with: a. positive epithets (e.g., “desirable,” “necessary,” “appropriate,” “urgently needed,” etc.); b. positive verbs used in connection with an indicator (“should be promoted,” “should be included,” “must be adopted,” “need to be reached,” etc.); and c. goals or instruments leading to positive outcomes (“partnership with the West leads to investment and economic growth,” “our goal is to support domestic producers,” etc.).

Conversely, negative evaluations (“-1”) were given if a textual indicator was associated with: a. negative epithets (e.g., “undesirable,” “baneful,” “terrible,” etc.); b. negative verbs (“should be eliminated,” “have to be avoided,” “do not include,” etc.); and c. negative outcomes or mechanisms leading to negative outcomes (“association with the West brought nothing but disappointments for Russia,” “support of ineffective domestic industries is the reason for Russian economic failures,” etc.).

A neutral evaluation (“0”) is a cumulative evaluation that is based on the presence of both positive and negative attitudes toward a particular indicator. For instance, phrases “social protection of the population is ineffective, but unavoidable,” “liberal market theory is correct, but was applied erroneously,” “although current political system is excessively authoritarian, it reflects objective distribution of power” contain both positive and negative assessments of the textual indicators. The overall evaluations of such indicators were recorded as neutral. Even if a textual indicator was predominantly assessed as positive or negative, the mere existence of the opposite evaluation made the overall value neutral.
4. Examples of Evaluations

The following citations, taken from the database, illustrate the coding of textual indicators:

Political Dichotomy. In the phrase “Restoration of a unitary state obviously leads to the final destruction of Russia and its disappearance from the world’s political map”, textual indicator “unitary state” (conservative category of authoritarianism) is valued as “−1” (case c, association with negative outcomes). The phrase “Federalization sometimes assumes irrational and destructive forms... Nonetheless, in general, federalization is a healthy and objective process” contains textual indicator “federalism” (liberal category of democracy). It was assigned a value of zero (neutral meaning), since it is associated with both positive and negative epithets.

Ideological Dichotomy: In the fragment “Only authority of the state in Russia is extremely serious, progressive, and definite. Spiritually-intense, culturally-powerful, creative, and superhuman Russian state does not require human freedoms” textual indicator “dominance of the state interests over personal ones” (category conservatism) is represented by its synonym ("superhuman state that does not require human rights"), which is evaluated positively (case a, association with positive epithets). In the citation “Vulgar clichés of ‘open society’ and human rights,” textual indicator “human rights” (category liberalism) is valued negatively (case a, association with negative epithets).

Economic Dichotomy: The phrase “Undoubtedly, the market, with predominantly state control, excessive and constantly changing tax system, and strong tradition of bureaucratic corruption continues to re-create illegal shadowy relations” contains a negative evaluation of textual indicator “state enhances market performance” (conservative category of governed market) (case c – association with negative
outcomes). "Market moralizes society to a certain degree" is an example of a positive value assigned to textual indicator "market is a principal agent of economic development" (liberal category of free market) (case c – association with mechanisms leading to positive outcomes).

Foreign Policy Dichotomy: The phrase "Today practically the whole non-Western world, which historically experienced Western pressure, feels itself a victim of forced history. Pressures from the West push the rest of the world into West's Promethean adventure, while the West rejects out of hand any attempt to re-examine historical processes from other points of view" contains a negative evaluation of the textual indicator "partnership with the West" (liberal category of pro-Western foreign policy) (case c – association with a negative outcome). The phrase "Russia should not join the 'Third World'. Her place is in the 'First'" contains synonyms of two textual indicators – "partnership with East and South" ("Third World") (conservative category of anti-Western/independent foreign policy) and "partnership with the West" ("First World") (liberal discourse). The first indicator is assigned negative value (case b – association with negative verbs). The second one is valued positively (case b – association with positive verbs).

Dichotomy of Ethnic Relations: The phrase "We must give an impulse to the idea of history, i.e., idea of Russia" contains the textual indicator "need to promote national values, national ideas" (conservative category of nationalism). This textual indicator is valued positively (case b – association with positive verbs).
5. Stages of Quantitative Content Analysis

The Russian content analytic phase of my research consisted of four steps. First, I
selected a group of government-affiliated intellectuals based on publications detailing
intellectuals’ biographies and the degree of their cooperation with the political elite as
well as on my own expertise in the Russian politics. Next, I isolated three distinct phases
within the post-Communist period that roughly corresponded to three presidencies –
Yeltsin’s first and second terms and Putin’s current tenure. Subsequently, the group of
government-affiliated intellectuals was divided into three subgroups: 1) intellectual
communicators of official discourse during the early Yeltsin period; 2) discourse
articulators of the late Yeltsin period; and 3) communicators of official discourse during
the Putin era (see Table 1). Doing so ensured that I analyzed works of intellectuals who
were actively cooperating with the government. Then, I located all publicly accessible
statements produced by these intellectuals during the last ten years. Finally, I performed a
content analysis of these public documents and recorded results in coding tables (see
Appendix D).

Finally, the values of individual textual indicators were aggregated
chronologically (by year) and thematically (by category) (see Tables 2 and 3). For each
year I calculated the mean for every textual indicator and for every category (sum of
values divided by the number of mentions of a given textual indicator/category). Figures
1-5 depict the results of the content analysis in the most general way. They trace the
evolution of the government-affiliated intellectuals’ discourse and the elite’s value
orientations during the last ten years.
Table 1

Subgroups of Russian Government-Affiliated Intellectuals

|---|---|---|

*Asterisk denotes presence in more than one sub-period.

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Table 2

Summary of the Evaluations of Categories and Textual Indicators of Russian Liberal Discourse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories: Textual Indicators</th>
<th>Means (sum of evaluations divided by the number of mentions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Years:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democracy:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separation of Powers, System of Checks and Balances</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentarism</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free and Fair Elections</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multipartism</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutionality</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Media</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federalism</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability of Government</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean for Category</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liberal Ideology:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights are natural and Inalienable</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Rights and Freedoms</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Values</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State is for Citizens, Rights of Individual are Supreme</td>
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Table 2 continued

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<th>Small and Effective State/Minimal State</th>
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<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>0.7</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>-0.3</th>
<th>0.5</th>
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<td>Respect for the Conflict of Interests</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Rule of Law</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean for Category</td>
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<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
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</table>

Free Market Economic Model:

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<th>0.9</th>
<th>0.7</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>1</th>
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<th>-0.2</th>
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<td>Weak Social Protection/Address Social Protection</td>
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<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic Justice</td>
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<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Low Taxes</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Balanced Budget</td>
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<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
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<td>Universal Neo-Liberal Development</td>
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Table 2 continued

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<th>Pro-Western Foreign Policy:</th>
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<th>1</th>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians Abroad Are on Their Own</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Integration with Former Soviet Republics</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean for Category</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tolerant Ethnic Policy:</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>0.3</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>-1</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equality of Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peaceful Solutions of Ethnic Problems</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universal Values</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean for Category</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### Table 3

Summary of the Evaluations of Categories and Textual Indicators of Russian Conservative (Organic-Statist) Discourse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories: Textual Indicators</th>
<th>Means (sum of evaluations divided by the number of mentions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Years:</strong></td>
<td>92  93  94  95  96  97  98  99  00  01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Authoritarianism</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monopoly of Power</td>
<td>-1  -1  -1  -0.5  0  -1  -9.5  -0.2  -0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Republic</td>
<td>0  -0.5  0.5  0.3  0  -0.5  0.5  0.3  0  1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nominal Elections/Alternatives to Elections</td>
<td>-1  -1  -1  -0.6  0  1  0.5  0.3  0  1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-Party System, Controlled Opposition</td>
<td>0.5  -1  0  1  1  -0.5  0  0.3  1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unconstitutionality, Political Expediency as a Substitute to Constitutionality</td>
<td>-1  -1  -0.4  0  -0.6  -0.5  -0.5  -1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inequality of Citizens in Political Process</td>
<td>-0.3  -1  0  -1  0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Control Over Mass Media</td>
<td>-1  -1  -1  -1  0  0.3  1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unitary State</td>
<td>-1  1  -1  1  1  0  -0.6  0.5  1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence of Accountability of Government</td>
<td>-1  -1  -1  -1  0  0  0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean for Category</strong></td>
<td>-0.8  -0.6  -0.7  -0.3  -0.3  -0.4  -0.2  -0.2  0.1  1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Liberal Ideology: Statist/Conservative Ideology:

| Rights Are Socially Constructed/Given by Community | 1  -0.6  -1  1  0  1  1 |

58

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Table 3 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive Rights and Freedoms</th>
<th>-1</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Values</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Interests Are More Important Than Individual Rights</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Repressive State Apparatus</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity of Interest, Social Harmony</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawlessness</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean for Category</td>
<td><strong>-0.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Governed Market Economic Model:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Enhances Market Performance</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>-0.4</th>
<th>-0.1</th>
<th>-0.3</th>
<th>-0.3</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>-0.3</th>
<th>0.5</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong Social Protection/Universal Social Protection</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Justice</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Taxes</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possibility of Budget Deficit</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternatives to Voucher Privatization: Privatization by Workers, Nationalization (Collective and State Property)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soft Monetary Policy, Special Credits</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protectionism</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control And Regulation of Prices</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3 continued

| Selective Support of Priority Industries | 0   | -0.4 | -0.4 | -1   | -0.2 | -0.5 | -0.1 | -1   | 0.7 |
| National Economic Model                 | -0.2| 1    | 1    | 0.7  | -1   | 0.5  | 1    | 0.5  | 0   |
| Mean for Category                       | -0.4| -0.5 | -0.2 | -0.7 | -0.6 | -0.4 | -0.1 | -0.4 | 0   | 0   |

Independent or Anti-Western Foreign Policy:

| South or East is a Partner               | 1   | 1    | 0    | 0.3  | 1    | 0.3  | 1    | 0.5  | 0   |
| Multipolarity                            |     | 1    | 1    | 1    | 1    |      |      |      |     |
| Realistic Foreign Policy                 | 1   | 1    | -0.3 | -0.2 | 1    | 1    | 0.6  | 0.3  | 1   |
| Increase in Defense Spending             | 0.5 | -1   | -1   | 0.3  | -1   | 1    |      |      |     |
| Protection of Russians Abroad           | -1  | 0.3  |      | 1    | 1    | 1    |      |      |     |
| Imperial Restoration of USSR            | 1   | 1    | -0.3 |      | 1    | 0.8  | 0.5  |      |     |
| Mean for Category                        | 1   | 1    | 0    | 0    | -1   | 0.8  | 0.8  | 0.7  | 0.6 |

Nationalistic Ethnic Policy:

| Inequality of Ethnic Groups              | -1  | -1   | -1   | -0.9 | -1   | -0.3 | -1   | -1   | -1  |
| Military Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts   |     | 0.5  | -0.5 | -0.8 | -1   | -1   | 0.3  | 1    |     |
| National Values, National Ideas          | -1  | 0.3  | 0.3  | 0.4  | 1    | 0.3  | 0.7  | 0.7  | -0.2|
| Mean for Category                        | -1  | -0.3 | -0.1 | -0.3 | -0.3 | -0.4 | 0.8  | -0.3 | 0.3 |

Quantitative Content Analysis of Russian Government-Affiliated Intellectuals' Discourse

Evaluation of every dichotomy went through specific periods characterized by the domination of either liberal or organic-statist value orientations. Depending on the
principal mode of evaluation, I distinguish between liberal or organic-statist periods in the evolution of a particular dichotomy. A transitional period describes a situation in which neither liberal nor organic-statist orientations prevail.

Evolution of Political Dichotomy

Figure 1 can be divided into three parts. During the first period (1992-1994), democracy is an absolute preference of Russian government-affiliated intellectuals, while authoritarianism is soundly rejected. In 1993,\textsuperscript{86} there is a slight decline in democracy's attractiveness and simultaneous modest advance of authoritarianism. During the second, transitional,\textsuperscript{87} period (1995-1999) democracy's attractiveness gradually erodes, while authoritarianism enjoys growing support from elites. Both democratic and authoritarian lines approach zero. This suggests a period of acute conflict in which neither alternative is able to garner unambiguous support. During the third period (2000-to present), authoritarianism wins as the most desirable Russian political model.\textsuperscript{88} In other words, democracy, a preferred political system of the first period, increasingly loses intellectuals' support and is finally replaced by authoritarianism. Government-affiliated intellectuals' increasing fascination with authoritarian political options may be a sign of group interests. I will return to this issue in the next chapter when I compare political preferences of the elite and the public.

\textsuperscript{86} In the Fall of 1993 Russian democracy experienced one of the most serious challenges to date. Yeltsin disbanded the acting parliament and political violence spilled out onto the streets.

\textsuperscript{87} Henceforth, the term transitional is used to describe a period which combines both organic-statist and liberal elements.

\textsuperscript{88} A. A. Galkin and Yu. A. Krasin, Rossiia na pereput'e: Avtoritarizm ili demokrattiia. Varianty razvitiiia [Russia at the Crossroads: Authoritarianism or Democracy. Variants of Development] (Moscow: Vies' mir, 1998) come to the same conclusion based solely on personal observations. My findings confirm their findings with empirical data.
Evolution of Ideological Dichotomy

Figure 2 can also be divided into three periods. During the first period (1992-1996), liberal values are consistently preferred to the statist orientations. In 1996, after the first democratic presidential elections and Yeltsin’s call to search for the new ideology, liberalism becomes seriously challenged by conservatism^{89} (statism). The uncertainty lasts until 1999 when the statist ideas become dominant. The ideology of Putin’s government-affiliated intellectuals is an unambiguous statism. Although government-affiliated intellectuals no longer support the liberal ideology, liberalism is not completely discredited. It is noteworthy that ideological liberalism, under favorable circumstances (i.e., more liberal public opinion), can still be resurrected, while the complete discrediting of democracy in political discourse all but precludes its easy rehabilitation.

^{89} Here, as previously, I use the term “conservative” in its European/Russian sense. In addition to support for tradition, family values, and law and order, characteristic of American conservatism, a European version incorporates strong statist elements.
Evolution of Economic Dichotomy

Figure 3 reveals that Russian government-affiliated intellectuals consistently favor the free market model. Only the 1998 default casts doubt on this economic course. After a brief debate, the free market model prevails. In contrast to ideological liberalism and democracy, evaluation of economic institutions, created during the reforms of 1992-1993, remains stable. Economic liberalism (belief in free market) appears to be a core belief of Russian government-affiliated intellectuals. At the same time, the governed market model is not completely discredited. Hypothetically, under favorable circumstances, it may become attractive.
Figure 3. Dynamics of Economic Models' Evaluations by the Russian Elite

Evaluation of Foreign Policy Dichotomy

Figure 4 is the most complex to interpret. However, it too can be divided into three periods. The first, moderately pro-Western, period (1992-1996) contains neutral or positive attitudes towards the West. The elite’s support for anti-Western course steadily weakens. During the second period (1996-1999) a series of confrontations between Russia and the West contributes to an increasingly negative evaluation of the West. Simultaneously, there is a growing interest in the restoration of Russia’s superpower status. The peak of these attitudes occurs in 1999 (Kosovo and NATO expansion to the East). The current, moderately anti-Western, period (1999-present) is characterized by neutral attitudes toward the West and persistent interest in Russia’s superpower status as one of the poles in the multipolar international system. Such dynamics correspond well to the major international events of the last decade.⁹⁰

⁹⁰ During the first period, there were no open confrontations between Russia and the West, while the second period included the Kosovo air strikes, tensions in regards to Iraq, announcements of plans to
The elite’s foreign policy views are unstable. A future return to a pro-Western position cannot be ruled out.

Evolution of Ethnic Relations Dichotomy

Figure 5 shows that since 1992 ethnic tolerance and respect for the rights of ethnic minorities have declined considerably. Not surprisingly, the nationalistic attitudes peak in 1994-1995 (the first Chechen war). Around the 1996 presidential elections, government-affiliated intellectuals temporarily return to ethnic tolerance. In 1999 (the second Chechen War), however, the attractiveness of the nationalist approaches increases dramatically. Simultaneously, ethnic tolerance and principles of ethnic peaceful coexistence lose supporters among government-affiliated intellectuals. In general, the current period can be labeled as moderately nationalistic. Today, neutral attitudes towards ethnic tolerance coexist with moderately positive evaluation of nationalist principles. Nationalist ideas do not dominate absolutely and ethnic tolerance is not excluded from the range of options. The Russian elite still does not have a clear vision of its own preference for ethnic policy.

During the first period, government-affiliated intellectuals preferred a democratic and ethnically tolerant state with a liberal ideology, free market economy, and moderately independent foreign policy. Currently, their ideal polity is an authoritarian and a moderately nationalist state with a statist ideology, a free market economy, and an independent or anti-Western foreign policy (see Table 4).

include Baltic states into NATO. Today, Russia and the West have both common interests (e.g., anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan) and points of dispute (e.g., Chechnya, SDI).
Figure 4. Dynamics of the Foreign Policy Alternatives' Evaluations by the Russian Elite

Figure 5. Dynamics of Ethnic Relations Alternatives' Evaluations by the Russian Elite
Table 4

Five Most Preferred Categories in the Beginning (1992-1994) and at the End (1999-2001) of the Post-Communist Period in Russia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Tolerance</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>State (Conservative) Ideology</td>
<td>2.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Ideology</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>Independent or Anti-Western Foreign Policy</td>
<td>1.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>Free Market</td>
<td>1.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Market</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>Nationalistic Ethnic Relations</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent or Anti—Western Foreign Policy</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysis of the Relative Importance of Individual Dichotomies in the Overall Discourse and Periodization of Discourse According to Dominant Dichotomies

Figure 6 shows the evolution of the relative importance of each dichotomy, measured as the prevalence of its elements in overall discourse. It shows that economic dichotomy predominates. Nonetheless, it becomes less prominent over time, although there are certain exceptions to this tendency (1993 – start of mass privatization, 1998 -- default). The relative importance of the ideological dichotomy in the overall discourse increases slightly. Its peak occurs in 1996 (the presidential

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91 As follows from the table, the last period lacks the consensus of the first one. As mentioned in the text, there is less agreement on contemporary ideology, foreign policy, or ethnic relations.

92 Pro-western foreign policy orientation was also quite popular – 1.77.
elections). The dynamics of the political dichotomy has a weak positive trend. Its relative importance peaks in 2000 (the second presidential elections). The foreign policy dichotomy is relatively stable. Its visibility increases in 1999 and 2001 (Kosovo, the anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan), while in 1993, 1996, and 2000 (major internal political events) its importance declines. The dichotomy of ethnic relations (the least important dichotomy) is chronologically the most stable. Its relative importance increases only in 1994 (the first Chechen war), 1996, and 2000 (the presidential elections). In these years it ranks fourth among the five dichotomies. All dichotomies, except the economy, have a tendency to increase their prominence in the overall discourse of government-affiliated intellectuals.

Figure 6. Frequencies With Which Individual Dichotomies Are Mentioned in Discourse of Russian Government-Affiliated Intellectuals

The changes in relative importance assigned to particular dichotomies reveal the structural shift that occurred in the overall discourse. The first, economy-centric period took place in 1992-1993. In the next, heterogeneous, period (1994-1998), the economy ceased to dominate the discourse agenda, while other dichotomies grew in
importance. The contemporary period (1999-present) is clearly more ideology- and politics-centric.

The structural changes in discourse, to a great extent, are consequences of the rotation within the intellectual elite. Until 1994, governmental economists articulated the economy-centric discourse (Gaidar, S. Vasil’ev, etc.). The economists were prevalent (nine out of fourteen communicators) among selected articulated of discourse (see Table 1). Their main goal was to popularize economic reforms and their discourse largely omitted ideological and political references. The post-1994 heterogenic discourse was articulated by both governmental economists (Shokhin, Iasin, Livshits) and intellectual ideologues (Satarov, Salmin, Nikonov, etc.). Indeed, according to Table 1, among twenty discourse communicators of this period, eight were economists. After Putin’s election, the role of active politicians as discourse articulators approached zero. Out of sixteen selected communicators only four were economists (see Table 1). They were replaced by professional ideologues (Pavlovskii, Kordonskii) who concentrated on the articulation of ideology- and politics-oriented discourse.

**Qualitative Content Analysis of Russian Government-Affiliated Intellectuals’ Discourse**

A fuller understanding of the changes in official discourse and the elite’s value orientations can be achieved through a qualitative presentation.

1. **Discourse of the First Period: Qualitative Presentation**

The quantitative content analysis presents the discourse of the first period (1992-1993/1994) as democratic, ideologically and economically liberal, pro-Western
and ethnically tolerant (i.e., containing liberal orientations). Qualitative content analytic presentation supports the previous findings:

"Scenario of the restoration of the unitary state ... will most likely lead to the total breakdown of Russia and its vanishing from the political map of the world" (Aleksashenko et al. 1992, 17). "The process of federalization has a healthy and objective character" (Iasin et al. 1993a, 34). "A country can only be strong and rich if its citizens are strong and rich.... National security is, first and foremost, not the security of the state, but the security of society, i.e., security of citizens. This is primary. The security of the state structures and institutions is, at best, secondary" (Uliukaev 1995, 74). "Undoubtedly, economy, where the state dominates, with hyper and inconsistent tax system, with strong tradition of bureaucratic corruption, continues to reproduce illegal, shadowy economic relations.... The market to a great degree moralizes the society" (Bunin 1994, 368-369). "Russia should not join the 'Third World'. Her place is in the 'First' one" (Iasin et al. 1993c, 39). "The authors do not consider that the Russian society has some particular traits that would force it to live under autocracy or dictatorship" (Iasin et al. 1993a, 10).

2. Discourse of the Second Period: Qualitative Presentation

Quotations from the qualitative content analysis confirm the previous conclusions about the discourse of the second, transitional period (1995-1998/1999). According to the earlier quantitative content analysis, the discourse of the second period contains both liberal and conservative categories.

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93 The first period for the ideological dichotomy extends to 1996.

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In contrast to the first period, which placed the most attention on economic components of discourse, communicators of the second period are more comfortable with using political and ideological categories. The new interest in non-economic explanations is understandable considering that government-affiliated intellectuals of the second period include not only neo-liberal economists (who tend to view politics through the prism of economic determinism), but also conservative legal scholars, sociologists, philosophers, and political scientists (see Table 1). “In the last analysis, dysfunctions of the modern polity emerge not as a consequence of technical, or economic dead-ends and contradictions of development, in a narrow, abstract sense. Originating in the sphere of spirit and culture, dysfunctions become denser … assuming their forms and partially following their logic and partially giving them their own energy. Consequently, the correction of these dysfunctions is not only technical or social, but also a spiritual and cultural task” (Salmin 1997, 426).

Liberal authors of the second period continue to think in binary oppositions. This appears to be a defense mechanism against encroaching conservative agenda. “Today, there are two simple alternatives: either democratic open society, based on private property and equality of all before the law, where the state is only one of the social institutions, or the state which has all the power and all the property, which looms over the society as a demiurge. Such state is not a pure ideal, not an ‘end in itself.’ It materializes in bureaucratic institutions, in bureaucratic oligarchy. In such a state, there is a state corporatist type of property, which is controlled by the closed social stratum of new nomenklatura. Society becomes a colony of the state. This is where a real alternative lies. It is a choice between two options. First option
presupposes that the state will again tower over the society, that the 'heavy but tender' hands of the state will break the skeleton of civil society. The second one calls for final and radical reform of the state, which will become one of the elements of society. I am convinced that today the first path is a guarantee for a 'special' ('our own way' if you will) road to the 'Third World' and to the national catastrophe. The second path leads towards the developed countries, with their modern social and economic structures" (Gaidar 1995a, 86-87). “On the one hand, there is a closed, highly monopolized, national economy, which is protected from the world market by customs and legal barriers (including state monopoly over foreign trade). On the other hand, there is a modern, open market economy, which leads to the growth of efficiency based on international competition” (Mau 1995, 54).

Politically, the authors of the second period no longer hurry to reject authoritarian ideas. “Enlightened dictatorship,” “controlled opposition,” and “unitary state” become a staple of discourse. “Today, I must admit, I do not categorically reject this idea. Speaking abstractly, at certain times dictatorship would be, perhaps, a blessing for Russia. Particularly, if one takes into account our national specifics, our psychology and history, economic conditions in the country, legal nihilism” (Krasnov August 9, 1996). “There are too many parties … this confusion is a consequence of growth” (Shokhin November 10-16, 1997). “Federalism in Russia occurs from the top, while the regional public opinion is very passive and the regional elite is occasionally resistant to the idea. Contemporary leadership of the country is indeed sharing the power leverages purely voluntarily” (Smirniagin 1998, 58).
During the second, **transitional** period, there is a noticeable shift away from the liberal *ideology* and its respect for human life. Instead, tradition, law and order and family values are extolled. “The spiritual revival of Russian people is only possible through the return to its century-old traditions of spirituality, industry, patriotism, faith, family values ... life of society will become really stable only when it will be built on the traditional morals and ethics. On the positive pole of this continuum, we, undoubtedly, see family values, values of spirituality, virtue, faith, Russian patriotism, discipline, law and order” (Nikonov 1994 in 1999, 12, 19-20).94

In the *economic sphere*, defense of the free market coexists with a belief in desirability of stronger state structures, social support, support for domestic producers (through selective support in form of state investment) and more pro-active and independent foreign trade.

Outspoken liberals (Mau, Illarionov) continue to criticize state economic regulation while defending pro-market positions. “Such significant size of state expenditures obstructs economic growth” (Illarionov 1995, 23). “Gaidar’s resignation and his replacement by V. Chernomyrdin led to the triumph of irresponsibility of monetary authorities” (Illarionov 1995, 59). “There is a need to decrease the budget deficit to the minimum. There is a need to practically liberalize the fuel and energy sector and foreign trade. Another task is the radical reform of the social sphere based on private insurance and savings and elimination of discrimination of the private sector in social sphere, transformation of universal benefits towards selective [means-tested] support of the most needy” (Illarionov 1995, 137-138). “And although we can

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94 This quotation is taken from an essay which first appeared in 1994 and was reprinted in 1999 as part of a compilation (see Appendix E).
curse the dominance of imports, it is the imports that keep the prices low” (Mau 1995, 82).

“Social democrats” (Shokhin, Krasnov, and Livshits), a weaker but noticeable group, introduce the new, governed market ideas. “I think that the problem of our market, of the present period in the development of market economy, is in the weak presence of the state” (Shokhin September 11, 1997). “For some unexplainable reason, the first government of reformers was not ready to deal with the state regulation, a regulation that is completely natural and appropriate for the market economy. Why was it not initiated?” (Livshits 1994, 119-120). “The state should be responsible for protection of basic social rights of an individual, be an arbiter in solving social conflicts” (Livshits 1994, 151). “In contrast to other countries, our state should assume a dual responsibility: first, it should play a social function assigned to it by the market, and second, play a role that is not envisioned by the market canon, i.e., care for innocent and, in essence, helpless victims of totalitarian regime. The state should care for them until the end of their lives. The private sector is unable to do this. The state sector can. We need relatively strong state sector....” (Livshits 1994, 178). “The time of ‘wild capitalism,’ the time of state as a ‘night watchman’ is gone” (Krasnov 27 January, 1995).

In the category of foreign relations, there is a growing support for independent or even anti-Western foreign policy: “Russia should finally stop underestimating the states located to the south of CIS borders. While maintaining the capabilities to prevent potential threats to its security emanating from this unstable region, Russia should not share the Western biases in regards to Islamic world and
should be open to cooperation with Islamic countries. Hopes to establish non-polar world, community of universal harmony and cooperation, to integrate Russia into the community of civilized nations, united under the label ‘West’, which were the basis for the concept of ‘European house’, as well as initiatives to disband military and political blocks, came out to be illusions. The West is increasingly suspicious towards Russia; it is losing its interest in it, and is visibly disrespectful towards Russia’s interests. Only by preventing the weakening of its defense potential, Russia can maintain freedom of maneuver and independence in international politics, without being concerned about pressure and blackmailing or desires to threaten its security and vital interests” (Nikonov 1994 in 1999, 26, 28).

3. Discourse of the Third Period: Qualitative Presentation

Data from the quantitative content analysis presents contemporary official discourse as promoting stronger and more centralized state structures, a statist relationship between individuals and the state, independent or moderately anti-Western foreign policy, and revival of Russian national values. Yet, the free market model continues to be popular among contemporary discourse communicators. Unlike the second period, the current discourse is not a simple reassessment of the previous course. It operates with entirely new vocabulary. Qualitative content analytic data from the third period’s discourse illustrate its most typical traits.

While during the second period the liberals were moving towards more moderate positions, their conservative critics penned a programmatic opus titled *Inoe* (which can be translated as *Different, Other, Alternative, Alien, or Opposite*). It

\footnote{See previous footnote.}

\footnote{See footnote 70 in this chapter.}
appeared in 1995, but its authors (Kordonskii, Pavlovskii, Shchedrovitskii, Chernyshov, Panarin) became the intellectual elite of the Putin period. Its problematique is also indicative of the third period's agenda. United by the rejection of Western liberalism, its authors promote the Russian idea in economic, foreign policy, ideological, political, and national spheres. Interestingly, conservatives employ argumentation and evidentiary bases that are dramatically different from the liberal reasoning. If liberals use inductive and empirical analysis, conservatives rely on deductive and philosophical reasoning. Inoe provides important insights into the intellectual roots of contemporary discourse. The following discussion of Inoe is intended as a brief historical expose of contemporary conservatism and should not be confused with discussion of the discourse of the third period itself.

Inoe is predominantly an ideological argument. It propagandizes conservatism as the third way, an alternative to both communism and liberalism. In fact, however, Inoe is an alternative only to liberalism, since communism is no longer a popular option. Liberalism, which Inoe's authors charge with having a simplified world view (i.e., ideal vs. material, body vs. soul, particular vs. universal, progress vs. regress, etc.), rampant individualism, misguided rationality, and the faulty idea of progress, is rejected in favor of the organic vision of society, dominance of state over society, conservative values, and return to tradition.

A scathing critique of liberalism permeates Inoe: "All major actors of the 'reform process' were traveling abroad for ten years and still continue to travel using

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97 Pavlovskii was affiliated with the government as early as 1996 when he became an adviser to the Presidential Administration.

98 For instance, Uliukaev (1996) cites economic indexes for Chile as proof of the free market's superior performance, while Illarionov (1995) and Gaidar (1997) operate with real budgetary numbers to show the negative effects of "excessive" taxation.
not their own, but a sponsor’s, money. And the path of Russian reforms is naturally transformed into a ‘shopping tour’” (Pavlovskii 1995, 378-379). “They [liberals] simply changed their faith. Instead of fanatic adoration of one great doctrine, they found (on a side, as usual) another doctrine (Chicago school of economics) and are ready to revise the whole national history according to its recipes, even if the ‘irrational’ majority does not support them” (Panarin 1995, 139). “One should admit one thing: the contemporary ruling elite is not suitable for the role of ruling elite. Its creative potential is not adequate.... The present elite’s econometric way of thinking is based on social and cultural ignorance, i.e., inability to recognize hidden energy of big goals (national and civilizational self-affirmation of people who being challenged by history were able to mobilize for the appropriate response), in post-war economic miracles of West Germany, Japan, and Europe” (Panarin 1995, 137).

In place of “relativistic” and “positivist” liberalism, conservatives offer new statist ideology and organic visions of society. “The people are not the mere aggregation of now living people, but a community that keeps the national spirit and legacy of the past generations” (Panarin 1995, 141). Inoe contains a startling, almost Hegelian, raison d’etat. “Without the state the ideology cannot be elaborated and the geographical space will become desolate.... The Russian state is an end in itself” (Kordonskii 1995, 211-212). “Only authority of the state in Russia is extremely serious, progressive, and definite (including the notion of power/authority of the state as national identification, as our collective identity).... Simultaneously, it is the most advanced, the most globally competitive product that we have.... I call it the Russian type of power.... The state is not abstract. It solves problems. It is extremely effective
form of control of big territories where there is a lack of communications or they do not function effectively.... Spiritually-intense, culturally-powerful, creative, and superhuman Russian state does not require human freedoms" (Pavlovskii 1995, 387-389).

Inoe's contributors are dissatisfied with the homogenizing effects of Western values on Russia. "Deprived of real national attributes, [the ruling regime] grasps at words that are simply souvenirs from afar...." (Pavlovskii 1995, 368). "Russia sits in the western sandbox, where puppy dogs and kids are playing with the deflated ball of modernization" (Pavlovskii 1995, 256). "Russia by its very definition is the other, the third, something in between. As a result, when we use these ... imported terms, all the questions about Russia that can be asked using these terms are useless" (Chernyshov 1995, 260). "Perhaps, one conclusion (which was reached by modernization theory a long time ago) can be made: any attempt to mechanically transport Western values and examples leads to very negative consequences" (Panarin 1995, 145). "National self-identification cannot be borrowed. It does not come from the outside. It does not follow from some objective criteria. It is a range of decisions, part of which is irrevocable. The problem of the new state is a problem of the idea for the new state. There is no such an idea in Russia" (Pavlovskii 1995, 372).

Equipped with a national idea, however, Russia has a chance of revival. "We need to initiate the movement for the idea of history, the idea of Russia" (Chernyshov 1995a, 374). One proposal is the idea of the state, because "the state in Russia is preferable to current reality" (Pavlovskii 1995, 353). Another is the idea of "Russia as the Third Rome." "The inspiring idea of Eurasianism consists of the idea that the
The fate of post-industrial epoch depends largely on the fate of Russia. If Russia restores its status as the 'Third Rome', then the chances of post-industrial society to become an alternative to the global industrial ghetto (which is antithetical to nature and culture) will increase.... The Russian mission is to promote such poly-centrism by creating a balance to the mono-centric model forced by the US" (Panarin 1995, 148).

Inoe’s neo-conservative agenda also includes a national model of economic development. It is another blow to the liberals’ core beliefs. “But the market and money even in their crudest representations happened to be compatible neither with social structure, nor with customary relations between the center and regions, nor with industrial structure, i.e., they were not compatible with the state” (Kordonskii 1995, 169). “The major question is how to successfully modernize Russia using national model” (Kara-Murza 1995a, 167).

Inoe provides the first glimpses into conservative rhetoric of the third period. By 2000, Inoe’s conservative phraseology, however, is no longer marginal. It enters the mainstream discourse. During the third period the new conservatives and reformed (and by now also quite conservative) liberals converge around the ideas of a strong authoritarian state, an independent or anti-Western foreign policy, and a Russian revival. These ideas, nonetheless, coexist with surviving and even strengthening free market (liberal) economic beliefs.

The discourse of the third period is clearly a discourse of the new era. Gleb Pavlovskii, the most important ideologue of the Putin’s era, is quick to point this out: “We are at the breaking point. The old epoch ended and the new one began” (Pavlovskii 01.14.2000). “These are fragments of the old political system. We need to
move into the new political state” (Pavlovskii 16 June 2000). “For Putin’s majority, Putin is a leader of the opposition to the old regime” (Pavlovskii 4 July 2000). “Putin is totally revising the previous type of foreign policy (which was developed in the 1990s)” (Pavlovskii 22 March 2001). “On the eve of the new epoch, society has a different mood” (Pavlovskii 26 March 2001). “It was necessary to avoid the situation in which the major actors of the previous epoch were still functioning. These actors were stopped. Some of them have disintegrated” (Pavlovskii 13 April 2001). “Current moment in the life of a state and society is transformational and implicitly critical” (Pavlovskii 19 November 2001).

Politically, there is a convergence of liberals and conservatives as both justify authoritarianism. Conservatives bluntly call for undemocratic measures. “If it is ineffective for solving the problems of the state, then there is no need for the free press” (Pavlovskii, 2 February 2000). “Acceptance of imperial nature of Russia – not the Russian Federation (as one of its possible institutional forms), but Russia as a political body, is inevitable.... Imperial power structure works more effectively than shoddily constructed substitutions that we have today, precisely because it does not end at the level of rulers, but goes above them [to values].... Recently, even some liberals started to admit that within the imperial legacy there are components conducive to the liberal value system. For example, Uliukaev, one of the premier liberals, writes in his programmatic article, ‘Pravyi povorot’ ['Right Turn']: ‘The precise difference between an empire and colonial or despotic state is that the former gives representatives of all people equal opportunities for participating in public and political life of their country’. We need not only to project federation on empire
(which, at the end, always remains a speculative action), but to construct federation as an empire” (Kaspe 2000, 61, 63, 65, 68).

Contemporary liberals endorse authoritarianism because of its ability to preserve liberal economic values. The authoritarian state that does not threaten private property and the market should not be categorically opposed. “The weakness of the state cannot be overcome based on democratic procedures, because democratic power institutions are unable to form and maintain stable popular support” (Mau, 1999, 179). “Of course, political authoritarianism is not the most favorable factor for the renaissance of liberal values. However, political authoritarianism and the market can easily coexist (and did historically) and even complement each other” (Mau 1999, 185-186). Only “the state [which] has a powerful reason to increase its interference into ... economic life of a country, which violates fundamental freedom of business” (Mau 1999, 186), would alarm liberals.

The third period’s ideology vigorously rejects liberalism. “Clichés of ‘open society’ and ‘human rights’ are vulgar” (Dugin 1999a, 660). “Contemporary liberalism ... was transformed ... into intolerably authoritarian dogmatism” (Panarin 1999, 21). “They consider themselves representatives of Progress in the foreign and alien environment. Therefore they are not ashamed to profess periodically that the major enemy is in one’s own country, and they are not ashamed to label the majority of the people who oppose them as either an anti-socialist, petty-bourgeois crowd or a red-brown anti-democratic mass” (Panarin 1999, 47). “Today they are ‘Europeans and liberals’, and tomorrow they will sell the whole Europe for five cents. All they need is to ensure safe travel to the inauguration of the US presidents. This ideology
includes the crumbs of the Western liberal project, which is castrated and devoid of real European roots, i.e., Christianity” (Pavlovskii 8 May 2001).

An alternative to “rootless” liberalism is seen in traditions and spirituality. “Perhaps, the imperative of preservation of cultural legacy is no less important today than the imperative of environmental protection” (Panarin 1999, 80). “An important spiritual dimension is vanishing. This leads to the monstrous degradation of spiritual and moral life. The sin does not even mask now, it loudly announces its rights. It is clear that this threatens to erode the very foundation of the civilized existence, threatens to push us into social Darwinism. Therefore, society will have to restore the status of spiritual power as a mobilizing power which creates norms and corrects the action of other social forces” (Panarin 1999, 56).

Another alternative is the strengthening of the state – the only capable actor. This option is the most consistently articulated by Pavlovskii: “In Russia, ... society is more corrupt than the state” (Pavlovskii 12 July 2000). “The place where society is supposed to be is empty. This allows the actors who have nothing to do with the society, i.e., our parties and TV channels, to represent society” (Pavlovskii 13 April 2001). “Society in Russia exists only within the state and as a function of the state” (Pavlovskii 28 June 2000). In other words, “strong Russia must have strong state” (Pavlovskii 21 December 2000). “He [Putin] faces a real task – a need to transform the state apparatus into his own, obedient tool. Putin needs to know when to say ‘Heel’” (Pavlovskii 20 July 2000). “I always thought that the simple existence of the state is the giant benefit for a society. You can do whatever, but, please, preserve the state” (Pavlovskii 2 February 2000).
Liberalism, however, was not totally defeated. Liberals continue to defend economic liberalism as the foundation of the post-industrial epoch. "Preservation of liberal principles of the market economy is preferable for the future development of the country from the economic and political standpoints" (Mau, 1999, 185). Although conservatives emphasize the statist and/or national model of economic development and social protection, their voice is mostly peripheral and has little effect on the overall balance of economic discourse. "Today the apologia for 'market selection' assumes sinister proportions of social Darwinism. Today it means decisive revision of tradition of Christian compassion and new pagan cult of force. Not surprisingly, the current onslaught of liberalism and libertarian ideology is accompanied by a retreat of social civilization, by minimizing social programs and mechanisms of social protection of population defeated by aggressive and greedy economic environment. It creates an atmosphere of a cult of limitless force, a philosophy of success at any cost" (Panarin 1999, 19).

In the foreign policy sphere there is a heightened anti-American sentiment. The US is described as an unambiguous enemy. Even Europe is seen as an alternative to US hegemony in the international relations: "In no other place of the planet has the conflict between the culture and civilization reached such a degree as in the contemporary US. American global expansion in some respect represents a squeezing of culture by technical civilization, where the technical advances aggressively compensate for its innate cultural defects" (Panarin 1999, 10). "Today practically the whole non-Western world, which historically experienced Western pressure, feels itself a victim of forced history. Pressures from the West push the rest of the world
into West’s Promethean adventure, while the West rejects out of hand any attempt to re-examine historical processes from other points of view” (Panarin 1999, 48). “And only now, in the context of the most painful defeat by the West, Russia gets rid of its Western ideals. It starts to understand the West not based on its liberal propaganda, but in its naked imperialist form. This imperialist force steadily realizes the old program of a Faustian individual who desired to make the whole world the object of his will” (Panarin 1999, 84).

The anti-American rhetoric of the third period finds its logical conclusion in the words of Eurasionist philosopher Dugin, one of the important ideologues of Putin’s period: 99 “[the US] is an alarming and sinister country on the other side of the ocean, without history, customs, roots. It represents an artificial, aggressive, obtrusive reality, deprived of spirit and focused only on the material world and technical efficiency. It is cold, insensitive, shining with neon of advertisements and senseless luxury, which contrasts sharply with pathological poverty, genetic degradation, and conflicts of all sorts between people, material things, nature, and culture…. Today it claims its planetary dominance. It claims the triumph of its way of life, its civilizational model over all other people of the Earth. It triumphs over us. It sees ‘progress’ and ‘norms of civilization’ only in itself and denies all others the right to their own path, culture, and value system” (Dugin 1999a, 657-658).

As a leader of the non-Western World, Russia can play a leading role in the new world order if it recognizes its uniqueness and plays its cards right. “The non-Western world today is more complex than the West, not only due to its ancient spiritual tradition and deeper memory, but also because its internal structure is

99 See footnote 72 in this chapter.
dualistic: it includes both its own and foreign elements, which are reworked to suit local context” (Panarin 1999, 67-68). “The East is the mysterious birthplace of great civilizations, religions, mystical intuitions, and revelations” (Panarin 1999, 72). “It is not accidental that the old Russian allies in the Arab world, on the Indian subcontinent, and in the Pacific rim region still count more on Russia’s return as a superpower than on the possibilities of already existing or fast-growing economic giants (like Japan or China)” (Panarin 1999, 13). According to Karaganov (2000, 101), “A certain mutual distancing between US and Russia will be necessary for a certain period…. As usual, development and deepening of cooperation and friendship with China are both quite desirable and mutually advantageous.”

Contemporary discourse is increasingly nationalistic. “Mystical Russia is undoubtedly a profound reality of national psychology. It is the internal continent. It synthesizes in itself the ideology of a giant nation…. Russian people are the godly imperial people” (Dugin 1999a, 576, 577). “The mystery of Russian people lies in the fact that it is spiritually and culturally cemented. These people form (like the ancient Jewish people before) a theocratic phenomenon in history” (Panarin 1999, 98).100

Russian Government-Affiliated Intellectuals on the Relationship Between Public Opinion and Policies

Although this chapter is predominantly concerned with presenting the evolution of the post-Communist elite’s value orientations, it also touches upon another important research question: What is the relationship between elite discourse

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100 It is noteworthy that the authors of Inoe and contemporary conservatives resist the use of the world “Rossiiane” (Russians in the civic sense), and use “Russkie” (Russians in the ethnic sense) instead. Pavlovskii claims that “Rossiiane” is a mere substitution of the Soviet people.
and public opinion? Content analysis of government-affiliated intellectuals' public statements outlines the first contours of this relationship.

The first shift in elite discourse chronologically occurs after the 1993 *Duma* elections which are commonly viewed as a serious blow to the contemporaneous political elite and its course. The changes in the intellectual elite’s discourse that follow the results of the *Duma* elections (a possible measurement of public dissatisfaction with elite’s agenda) suggest that public opinion played a significant role in the evolution of government-affiliated intellectuals’ discourse. If this is correct, changing public opinion affected intellectual discourse in two ways. First, public dissatisfaction could have contributed to the ruling elite’s increasing reliance on conservative intellectuals (see Table 1) who, in turn, introduced new conservative elements to the discourse. Second, it may have caused a conservative shift in the discourse of remaining liberal intellectuals. In either case, the sequence of events is noteworthy. Changes in public opinion preceded changes in intellectual discourse. I will return to this question in the next chapter.

There is at least some evidence that government-affiliated intellectuals were sensitive to public opinion and media coverage of their actions. According to Krasnov (legal adviser to Yeltsin and author of numerous Yeltsin decrees), he paid attention to “the reaction of the press and the public” (Krasnov November 29, 1995). “The majority of the population, despite the apparent polarization, is nonetheless visibly more in favor of a moderate and balanced [economic] course” (Iasin et al. 1993b, 52).

Interestingly, public opinion receives the most coverage in the intellectual discourse of the third period. Contemporary communicators constantly cite the public
as their reference group. “This problem is reflected in the public opinion surveys, when the stable majority of population prefers Brezhnev’s period as the most stable and prosperous” (Mau 1999, 117). Similar evidence can be found in Salmin’s recommendations to Putin after his election. Obviously, while developing a new strategy for Russia, Salmin is aware of the opinion climate: “At the moment of presidential change in Russia, its society reached an almost universal consensus about the idea of desirability of law and order and strengthening, empowering the state and making it healthier” (Salmin 2000, 40). Similarly, Bunin (2000, 64) in his assessment of Putin’s federal reform cites public opinion as a justification for launching such an innovation: “Recently, federal reform has become not just another project, but a reality. Public opinion surveys show that the population supports strengthening of ‘presidential vertical axis’. The public supports it not carelessly but rather pragmatically.” He also points out the weak appeal of liberal ideology for the mass public: “Liberal ideas are extremely unpopular in Russian society” (Bunin 1999, 213). Pavlovskii, the main ideologue of Putin’s regime, constantly cites Putin’s approval rating as the basis for Putin’s policies. His claims that the majority is behind Putin are a clear reference to public opinion and its significance for the elite. “Our foreign policy aims to achieve social consensus. Society must understand what type of foreign policy we conduct. In this case, we will get public support. This is an important moment. Before, foreign policy was often dictated by a particular group or by ideological interests. This approach ended” (Pavlovskii 26 November 2001). “Restoration of the state after ten years of disorder is the central expectation of the majority” (Pavlovskii 28 June 2000). “Today President Putin is a leader of the mass...
movement for the restoration of the state” (Pavlovskii 2 June 2000). “There is a new, mystical connection between Putin and the masses” (Pavlovskii 21 December 1999).

**Russian Government-Affiliated Intellectuals on the Relationship Between Intellectual and Political Elites**

Finally, what is the nature of the relationship between government-affiliated intellectuals and the political elite? Do the government-affiliated intellectuals simply follow the orders of the political elite by explaining and justifying their actions? Or do government-affiliated intellectuals act independently? The answer is both. Usually, the intellectual elite simply rationalizes policies *ex post facto*. But it also generates ideas for policy-makers. “I am an expert. My influence is purely that of an expert” (Pavlovskii 11.24.2001). Another admission of intellectual leadership comes from Karaganov: “Members of CIDP [Council for Internal and Defense Policy – expert group consisting of government-affiliated intellectuals] immodestly (but not without pleasure) recalled that certain reports, forecasts and recommendations of CIDP were translated directly into policies, almost to the last ‘t’” (*Strategiia dlia Rossii...* 2000, 7). Putin’s efforts to reform federal structures illustrate a specific case of intellectual leadership. Putin started to employ the phrase "vertical axis of power" in May 2000, well after its first use by Krasnov, Satarov and Shakhrai (2000, 207, 213) who called for “the ‘vertical axis of power’ to be better spelled out in the Constitution” as early as 1998.

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101 According to the foreword to the chapter on the Constitutional reform (see Appendix E, *Strategiia dlia Rossii: povestka dnia dlia prezidenta-2000* [Strategy for Russia: Agenda for President-2000] (Moscow: Vagrius, 2000, 57-104)), CIDP working groups discussed the Constitutional reform and published its recommendations (including the strengthening of “vertical axis of power”) as early as 1998. Putin was appointed Prime Minister in August 1999. Obviously, the idea was first created by the intellectuals and then borrowed by Putin.

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Conclusions

A priori, I hypothesized that official discourse changed abruptly from liberal categories to organic-statist (conservative) ones in 1998/1999, i.e., after the economic default and Putin’s appointment as Russian Prime Minister. I expected to find changes along all five dichotomies. However, the data from content analysis of Russian government-affiliated intellectuals’ public statements supports a slightly different account.


Yet, the victory of organic-statist (conservative) discourse did not mean the total eradication of liberal components. Some elements of liberalism, especially support for the liberal economic model, a core category for liberals, continued to exist. As a result, the contemporary discourse amalgamates the ultra-liberal economic lexicon with a typically conservative political phraseology. This inconsistency is attributable to the mixed composition of the contemporary Russian intellectual elite, which, in turn, is a result of the longevity and adaptability of the original liberals.
Putin’s government still draws on the remnants of liberal intellectuals, who by now largely limit themselves to the defense of economic liberalism. However, liberals also try to reconcile the cognitive dissonance embodied in a self-contradictory hybrid, where the logic of the market with its belief in rationality, independence, and responsibility of the individual clashes with a state-centric, authoritarian, paternalistic, and nationalistic organic-statist model (see, for instance, Mau above). They appear to argue that a free market and an authoritarian, statist, isolationist, and nationalistic environment are not inherently incompatible but rather mutually reinforcing. Whether liberals themselves believe that their position is consistent or not, its contradictory nature is conspicuous to an outside observer.

Obviously, liberal discourse was much more seriously modified than its conservative counterpart. After 1998/1999, the only difference between the current liberal discourse and its conservative alternative is the greater emphasis that liberals place on the role of the market in economy. The difference between liberal and conservative assessments of political, ideological, and foreign policy directions is rather nominal. It is a difference of degree, not kind. Neither liberals nor conservatives exclude authoritarianism as a positive factor of Russian political development. The difference is only in the duration of authoritarian stage. If liberals view authoritarianism as a temporary and instrumental measure, able to eventually bring democracy, conservatives consider authoritarianism an end in itself. Ideologically, liberals favor strengthening the state and limiting personal freedoms only as expedient measures. For conservatives, the state’s interests are sacred. According to them, the state is a demiurge, or at the very least, a guardian, without
whom society cannot exist. The strengthening of the state thus becomes a vital task. In foreign policy, liberals' desire to strengthen Russian positions *vis-à-vis* the West is inspired by the hope that, as a superpower and strong partner, Russia will be in a better position to strike an alliance with the West. Conservatives are skeptical about the very idea of the partnership with the West. Although contemporary liberals admit Russian uniqueness, they do not consider such an exceptionalism worthy of support and promotion. Conservatives, on the contrary, insist on the development of unique national idea. Thus, liberals differ from their conservative counterparts only in their assessment of final (and quite remote) goals. The means to achieve these goals are almost identical.

The European right-left division helps one understand the evolution of Russian government-affiliated intellectuals' discourse. Liberal discourse in the early 1990s contained leftist political, ideological, foreign policy, and ethnic elements (i.e., was democratic, rational, pro-Western and tolerant). Beliefs in the free market and a minimal economic role for the state were its only rightist components. Original organic-statist discourse corresponded to leftist positions on the economy (governed market model, more active role of the state in economic development) and to rightist positions in politics, ideology, foreign policy, and ethnic relations (i.e., it supported authoritarianism, statism, isolationism and nationalism). Obviously, the rightist positions represented the core values for both liberals and conservatives. Neither liberals nor conservatives were prepared to compromise on the rightist elements of their respective discourses. Not accidentally, contemporary discourse is a synthesis of
rightist elements of the two discourses (see Table 4).\textsuperscript{102} Original leftist elements of both liberal and conservative discourses were dropped. This transformation is, perhaps, a response to demands of more conservative public opinion – a question that will be explored in the next chapter.

Changes in discourse appear to reflect the rotation within the group of government-affiliated intellectuals. Table 1 illustrates this point. During the first period, only liberal intellectuals were affiliated with the ruling political elite. While liberals retained their positions during the second, transitional period, the intellectual elite was increasingly recruited from a conservative pool. Currently, conservatives are dominant among government-affiliated intellectuals. Liberals appear to be squeezed out. This in itself is indicative of trends among the Russian elite, which is becoming increasingly conservative.

There is an interesting intra-group conflict characteristic of the contemporary Russian intellectual elite. The new cohort of conservative intellectuals who were recruited to serve the political elite in the mid- to late 1990s represents a clear break with the first wave of liberal government-affiliated intellectuals. The former were highly successful under the communist system and enjoyed mainstream social positions and all the trappings that the late Soviet regime had to offer. Almost all came from Moscow, St. Petersburg, or Yekaterinburg (the largest and most developed cities in Russia), were educated at Russia’s premier universities, hold advanced graduate degrees, and had high-ranking research or teaching positions at prestigious

\textsuperscript{102} Gleb Pavlovskii, one of the most important contemporary government-affiliated intellectuals, agrees: “The new regime is rightist, national-liberal.... Putin must formulate his ideology; obviously, it is a rightist, national-liberal ideology” (see Appendix E, Gleb Pavlovskii, “Tezis ob ukrepleniï vertikali vlasti dolzhen byt’ skorrektirovan” [“Thesis Concerning Strengthening of the State Vertical Must Be Corrected”], http://www.strana.ru, 13 November 2001).
universities or think-tanks. They were ideological moderates, neither fully condemning the communist system, nor virulently supporting it. Working as editors-in-chief of major communist journals (e.g., Gaidar), teaching Marxism-Leninism at the universities (e.g., Burbulis), or having successful research careers (e.g., Chubais) prior to the collapse of Communism, intellectuals of the first period were recognizable, available, and easily recruitable. As ideologues of the new regime, they continue to enjoy comfortable lifestyles.

The second group, i.e., conservative intellectuals, who is currently dominant among the Russian intellectual elite, spent the late Soviet years in obscurity, if not in opposition to the communist regime. Unlike liberals, conservatives came from Russia’s peripheries (Odessa, Tomsk, Donetsk, Kharkov), went to the second tier universities, often dropped out, did not hold advanced graduate degrees. They were more bohemian; many joined the ranks of dissidents (e.g., Pavlovskii). Their professional careers were stymied. In short, this group was less co-opted by the Soviet regime, and more marginalized. Conservative intellectuals, who remained in the margins after the collapse of communism, witnessed how their more opportunistic colleagues cruised to even higher and more comfortable positions in new Russia. They suspected that the post-Communist discourse of liberals was motivated by pursuit of material benefits and personal advancement. Not surprisingly, Inoe’s critique of liberalism is highly personal. Its authors charge liberals with a lack of commitment, pandering to new, fashionable slogans, and betrayal. Changes in discourse, therefore, are at least partially the result of a frontal attack by the second wave of conservative intellectuals on the first, more successful one. In this attack,
liberal elements of discourse did not stand a chance. This attack started even before Putin's rise to power.

But the changes in discourse are also a function of the conservative evolution of the original liberal intellectuals. Although some liberals survived the transition, their current value orientations bear strong resemblance to conservative positions. For example, Mau defends political authoritarianism as a protective environment for nascent market; Chubais advocates the revival of the liberal empire (to incorporate former republic of the USSR) and promotes a stronger army. One of the contemporary liberals’ tactics is to limit their discourse agenda to the defense of economic liberalism, while circumventing other dichotomies altogether. Illarionov is especially noteworthy for this strategy.

This finding, of course, begs the question of why liberals chose these tactics. Two explanations are equally plausible. Liberals used these strategies as survival tactics or, alternatively, their original pro-democratic, ideologically liberal, pro-Western, and ethnically tolerant orientations were a disposable veneer. Answering this question requires certain contextualization of post-Communist history. The post-Communist regime, whose political and intellectual elites were recruited from more progressive elements of the late Soviet system, was constantly on the verge of collapse. Reforms that were initiated after the collapse of the Soviet Union (especially economic decentralization) were contradictory and often self-defeating. They most certainly did not enjoy public support (as the next chapter will demonstrate).

But even without expert knowledge of public opinion trends, one cannot fail to notice that the Russian population actively resisted the reforms (especially market
transformation). As early as 1993 (i.e., the beginning of the transitional period) there was already popular dissatisfaction and protest. The liberal economic reforms initiated in the early 1990s brought disastrous results for the general population. Studies by the World Bank and numerous Western scholars paint a devastating picture of de-industrialization, widespread poverty, the precipitous fall of GDP, collapse of many social services, and privatization irregularities.  

The 1993 and 1995 Duma elections brought the Communist and nationalist opposition in control of the parliament and forced serious concessions on the part of the governing elite (most notably, sacking of liberal Prime Minister Gaidar and replacing him by centrist Chernomyrdin). In 1996, the original post-Communist elite barely escaped a certain defeat during the first free presidential elections, when the Communist candidate, Gennadii Ziuganov, led in the polls up until a month prior to the elections. Only a strong PR campaign and a compromise with the third finisher, Aleksandr Lebed', allowed Yeltsin to score a narrow victory.

In 1998, Russia experienced its worst economic crisis in the first decade after the fall of communism. Unable to repay its international and domestic debt obligations, Russia defaulted on payments, triggering massive investment and capital flight. The ruble plummeted and the popular discontent soared. These changes

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precipitated the replacement of the reformist Prime Minister, Sergei Kirienko, by Yevgenii Primakov, a representative of Brezhnev’s elite. Uncertain about the continuity of the course he initiated, Yeltsin resigned on the New Year’s eve of 2000, naming Vladimir Putin (a vestige of the late Soviet period) his heir apparent and boosting the latter’s chances in the 2000 emergency presidential elections.

Thus the conservative evolution of the liberal discourse can be seen as a conscious strategy that allowed the elite to deflect popular discontent and to minimize risks to itself and its reforms, especially economic ones. The change in discourse appears to be a survival tactic on the part of both intellectuals and politicians who recruit them. But the fact that the liberals’ commitment extended only to liberal economic ideas, while democratic, ideologically liberal, pro-Western, and ethnically tolerant beliefs were easily sacrificed to pacify the dissatisfied population is also rather suggestive.

It is logical to assume that authoritarian, statist, anti-Western, and nationalist elements present in Russian official discourse since 1993/1994 (i.e., during the transitional period) are borrowed exclusively from the discourse of the Communist opposition. However, my examination of the evolution of government-affiliated intellectuals’ discourse offers an equally plausible supposition. These elements could have been appropriated from the conservative lexicon. After all, liberal intellectuals, who articulated original post-Communist discourse, directed their critique against the communists, but rarely against the conservatives. Unlike communists, conservatives were never deliberately excluded from the official discourse articulation. During the transitional period organic-statist (conservative) ideology could have entered official

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The evolution of official discourse and the elite’s value orientations was gradual rather than abrupt and total. The period of transition from liberal to organic-statist discourse (1994/1995-1998/1999) was quite lengthy and presents special analytical value in itself. My analysis did not confirm the original hypothesis concerning the total replacement of liberal categories by the organic-statist ones. Liberals succeeded in protecting economic liberalism (free market), the core category of their discourse, while conservatives were able to defend ideological, political, foreign policy, and ethnic relations categories (that lie at the core of their discourse) by sacrificing the governed market model, peripheral for them.

In the next chapter, I will juxtapose the evolution of official discourse and the elite’s value orientations with the dynamics of public opinion and the evolution of actual policies. Such a comparison answers several questions: What role do intellectuals play in post-Communist societies? Do they serve only as elite ideologues or do they perform a function of intermediate agents between society and its elite? Does public opinion have a real impact on the actions of the elite and if so, what is the nature of this linkage (how, under what circumstances, on what issues, to what extent and by what process does public opinion reach the elite)? Does official discourse have any implications for policy-making?
CHAPTER III
THE RUSSIAN CASE: ELITE-PUBLIC CONSENSUS ON ORGANIC-STATIST VALUES

Outline of Chapter’s Research Agenda

In the previous chapter, I determined that the discourse of Russian government-affiliated intellectuals changed from democratic, liberal, free-market, pro-Western, and ethnically tolerant to authoritarian, conservative, free market, moderately anti-Western, and nationalistic. In this chapter, I present a dynamic picture of public attitudes in post-Communist Russia and compare trends in public opinion to trends in official discourse. Such juxtaposition illuminates the congruence and incongruence between the public and government-affiliated intellectuals’ attitudes. I also investigate whether changes in public attitudes precede, coincide with, or follow corresponding changes in the elite’s discourse. Another important question addressed in this chapter is the political consequences of the changes in official discourse. How does official discourse compare to the actual policies? To answer these questions, I present and analyze data from an extensive review and statistical analysis of public opinion surveys as well as event analysis of actions of the political elite.

I will show that Russian public opinion drifted in the authoritarian, conservative, economically etatist (i.e., pro-governed market), anti-Western, and nationalistic directions, but retained some original liberal elements, including pro-democratic and pro-Western beliefs. I will also demonstrate that public and elite attitudes frequently move in the same direction, but that there is no absolute congruence between the two. Where the elite’s own clan interests, either economic or political, are in conflict with dominant
public beliefs, the elite relies on its own set of values and ignores public demands. Importantly, my analysis reveals that the consensus between the elite and the public emerges only around organic-statist beliefs. In political and foreign policy issue domains, the public’s liberal attitudes fail to reach the elite, while in the economic sphere, the elite’s liberalism is not shared by the general population which continues to believe in the governed market model.

**Procedures for Comparing Public Opinion to Elite Value Orientations and Actions**

In Chapter I, I discussed a variety of methods used to analyze relationship between public opinion and the elite’s value orientations and actions. In my dissertation, I choose to compare trends in public opinion and the elite’s discourse and actions over time to see if both move in the same direction. However, unlike historical research of statements by the members of the elite or interviews with the elite, my methods have certain limitations. They do not help to answer the more complex question of how public opinion reaches the elite. I offer anecdotal observations from VTsIOM (Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion), with which I was affiliated during my field research. Even during my short stay in VTsIOM, I witnessed several requests for public opinion information coming from the presidential administration and think tanks associated with the executive branch.

For the second phase of my Russian research, I used results of surveys conducted by VTsIOM from 1992 to 2002. Specifically, I used data from the following surveys:
Table 5
Characteristics of Russian Public Opinion Surveys

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Representative sample</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample size</td>
<td>2,000 respondents</td>
<td>1,600 respondents</td>
<td>4,000 respondents (1993), 3,000 (1994) and 2,400 (1995-2001)</td>
<td>1,600 respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of survey points</td>
<td>88 points, including 64 points in cities and 24 points in rural areas in 29 Russian provinces</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>102 points, including 83 in cities and 29 in rural areas in 39 Russian provinces</td>
<td>58 points, including 42 points in cities and 16 points in rural areas, in 26 Russian provinces (1995-1998) 83 points, including 68 points in cities and 25 points in rural areas in 33 Russian provinces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although I rely on the secondary data collected by VTsIOM, one of the most respected and well-established Russian national polling organizations, many of the survey results have never before been published outside Russia. The sheer volume and diversity of the data I present and analyze in this chapter are new to non-Russian audiences. The introduction of new comprehensive data on Russian public opinion is valuable in and of itself. More importantly, consistency and breadth of observations
carried out by VTsIOM as well as the quality of its longitudinal public opinion data make research of the trends in Russian post-Communist public attitudes not only physically possible, but methodologically more reliable.

My review of public opinion data began with identifying the questions that were both asked repeatedly during the research period and were the closest in meaning to the textual indicators of the content analysis. Although there is no exact fit between the two types of data, they are sufficiently similar to allow valid comparisons. The percentage of people who favored a particular answer option for a given survey question was equivalent to the value assigned to a textual indicator.104

During the second stage of statistical review, I produced graphs of the evolution of public attitudes along five issue domains (political, ideological, economic, foreign policy and ethnic relations).105 The results are presented in Section “Chronological Evolution of Russian Public Attitudes According to Individual Issue Domains.”

Next, I probed relationships between various public attitudes and social and demographic parameters and performed statistical and correlation analyses to flesh out possible relationships between attitudes themselves. Results of the statistical and correlation analyses are presented in Section “Social and Demographic Determinants of

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104 For instance, in the question “What is the best economic system?” answer “the one based on the leading role of the state” was treated as an equivalent of a positive evaluation of the textual indicator “state as the main agent of development” (governed market category of the organic-statist discourse), while response “the one based on the leading role of the market” was analogous to a positive evaluation of the textual indicator “market as the main agent of economic development” (free market category of the liberal discourse).

105 To simplify figures and improve their readability, I deliberately omitted “I do not know,” “other,” and similar answer options. This explains why on certain figures, the sum of values does not add to 100 percent. When applicable, I also combined responses measuring intensity of a particular attitude into one category. For instance, on some figures, response option “I am satisfied” consists of responses “I am very satisfied,” “I am satisfied,” and “I am rather satisfied,” while response option “I am dissatisfied” may contain answers “I am rather dissatisfied,” “I am dissatisfied,” and “I am very dissatisfied.” The same applies to answer option measuring trust or distrust.
Russian Public Attitudes” and Section “Relationships Between Various Elements of Russian Public Opinion.”

Chronological Evolution of Russian Public Attitudes According to Individual Issue Domains

1. Political Issue Domain

The questions selected for this issue domain included:
- “Would Russia be better off if everything remained as it was before 1985?”
- “Is Russia moving in the right direction?”
- “What is your assessment of Russia’s political situation?”
- “What is the best political system?”
- “What type of a state would you like Russia to be?”
- “What political party do you prefer?”
- “Do you support a presidential republic?” (2)
- “Do you support disbanding the Parliament?”
- “Do you support having a political opposition?”
- “How many political parties should Russia have?”
- “What is your perception of the role of the mass media?”
- “Should the mass media reflect an independent opinion?”
- “Should Russia be a monarchy?”
- “Should the army govern the country?”
- “Should we trust the president?”
- “Should we trust the Parliament?”
- “Should we trust the mass media?”
- “Should we trust provincial governments?”

Figure 7. Would Russia be Better off if Everything Remained as It Was Before 1985?

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I disagree that Russia would be better off if everything remained as it was before 1985

I agree, Russia would be better off if everything remained as it was before 1985

---

106 I use two types of questions gauging popular support for presidentialism. First question includes “I do not know” answer option (Figure 11), while the second one is more categorical and offers dichotomous “yes” or “no” answer options (Figure 12).
Authoritarian Attitudes

Figure 7 demonstrates that during the research period Russians were dissatisfied with the current, ostensibly democratic, political situation. Yet, it is difficult to argue that Russians totally reject democracy. The question measures not only the desire for a more authoritarian political system, but also nostalgia for the socialist economy, superpower status, and the restoration of the Soviet Union. Whatever the interpretation, there is an undeniable retreat from more liberal positions to more organic-statist ones (including the desire for the Soviet political system) that occurred in early 1994.

The dissatisfaction with democracy is also apparent in Figure 8. Although measuring a complex attitude, which includes not only political, but economic and social orientations, Figure 8 shows that Russians only recently started to accept the political and economic changes initiated in the early 1990s. More specifically, the public was consistently skeptical about the Russian political situation. An overwhelming majority of Russians viewed the political situation as explosive or tense (Figure 9).

![Figure 8. Is Russia Moving in a Right Direction?](image-url)
Figures 10-14 gauge public attitudes towards specific political institutions (presidentialism, parliamentarism, and the mass media). A significant number of Russians, almost 40 percent, support disbanding the Parliament (Figure 10). Although the Russian public has conflicting views on the concentration of power in the executive branch (Figure 11), given more deterministic answer options ("yes" or "no"), it opts for a presidential republic (Figure 12). The percentage of Russians who think that the mass media should reflect the official position rather than offer an independent opinion is on the rise (Figure 13). Russians' attitudes towards the mass media are consistent with the popular view that the media's major role is to inform the audience about events (Figure 14). As such, the mass media should follow official line, rather than provide their own interpretation.

![Figure 9. What Is Your Assessment of Russia's Political Situation?](image-url)
Figure 10. Do You Support Disbanding the Parliament?

Figure 11. Do You Support a Presidential Republic?

Figure 12. Do You Support a Presidential Republic? (2)
The mass media should express their own, independent points of view. The mass media should express an official position.

Figure 13. Should the Mass Media Express an Independent Opinion?

Figure 14. What Is Your Perception of the Role of the Mass Media In Society?
Mixed or Democratic Attitudes

Although Figure 16 confirms the shift away from democratic preferences towards more authoritarian political systems (Soviet, uniquely Russian or monarchist\textsuperscript{107}), Figure 15, depicting answers to a different set of options, reveals that democracy is far from being discredited. Electoral competition between communists and democrats reflects the democratic-authoritarian divide among Russians. Figure 19 shows that both democrats and communists have stable support. The strong position of communists (who comprise the Russian political opposition) explains growing public support for political opposition (Figure 20). Russians also exhibit a propensity for multipartism (Figure 21). But the number of people who favor authoritarian options of having one dominant party or having no parties at all is on the rise. Together, these authoritarian options currently garner the support of 41 percent of Russians.

\textsuperscript{107} Yet monarchy remains a stable preference for about 10 percent of Russians (see Figure 17) and military dictatorship attracts only 10-15 percent of popular support (see Figure 18).
Figure 16. What Type of a State Would You Like Russia to be?

Figure 17. Should Russia be a Monarchy?

Figure 18. Should the Army Govern the Country?
Figure 19. What Parties Do You Prefer?

Figure 20. Do You Support Having a Political Opposition?

A comparison between the levels of trust towards the presidency, which is always closely associated with a person in office, and the parliament, that represents an institution, reveals the president to be a winner of this contest (Figures 22 and 23). This finding is consistent with the American data – US presidents are commonly more trusted than is the Congress. But, even among the less personified institutions (parliament, mass
media, provincial governments), the legislative branch enjoys the lowest degree of popularity. Russians are also unsympathetic to both the mass media and provincial authorities (Figures 24 and 25).

![Figure 21. How Many Parties Does Russia Need?](image)

![Figure 22. Should We Trust the President?](image)

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We should not trust the Parliament
We should trust the Parliament

Figure 23. Should We Trust the Parliament?

We should not trust the mass media
We should trust the mass media

Figure 24. Should We Trust the Mass Media?

We should not trust provincial governments
We should trust provincial governments

Figure 25. Should We Trust Provincial Governments?
Russians, although doubting democracy and its institutions, did not completely abandon their initial democratic beliefs. Democracy is less discredited among the public than among the elite. The public is almost evenly divided between “democrats’ and “authoritarians.” One part of the population increasingly supports democratic norms and orientations, while the other gradually drifts in an authoritarian direction. On the democratic side, Russians prefer a multiparty system to a more authoritarian single dominant party system. Generally, they favor having a political opposition. But a majority also supports controlled mass media, concentration of power in the executive branch, and disbanding the parliament. There is a certain democratic fatigue, as Russians increasingly long for the Soviet political model and have reservations about current political situation.

The elite and the public’s political attitudes moved in somewhat varying directions. The political ambiguity of public opinion, which espouses both authoritarian and democratic orientations, is observed throughout the research period. Public opinion remains mixed, even though the components of the mix change. Attitudes of government-affiliated intellectuals unambiguously drift in the direction of authoritarianism. Democracy’s growing unpopularity among the Russian elite does not parallel the political ambiguity of public opinion. Government-affiliated intellectuals pay attention to the authoritarian tendencies of public opinion, but disregard its democratic aspirations.

2. Ideological Issue Domain

The ideological issue domain is represented by the following questions:
“Is dictatorship the best solution to all Russia’s problems?”
“What is more important, order or democracy?”
“Whose interests are more important, the state’s or the individual’s?”
“What is the best relationship between the state and society?”
“What idea can unify Russia?”
“Should we trust the army?”
“Should we trust state security forces?”
“Should we trust the Orthodox Church?”
“Are you worried about the weakness of the state?”
“Are you worried about corruption and bribery?”
“Are you worried about the growth of crime?”
“Are you worried about the threat of military dictatorship?”
“Are you worried about the crisis of morality and culture?”

Conservative Attitudes

Russian public opinion is essentially conservative. For my purposes, I define “conservatism” and “statism” as the following complex of public attitudes: belief in law and order; support for strengthening the powers of the state (including repressive state apparatus) to fight crime or to restore the strength of the state vis-à-vis society; endorsement of traditional values, including conservative religious beliefs designed to minimize perceived crisis of morality. Russians increasingly perceive dictatorship as the best solution to Russian problems. By July 2000, nearly 40 percent of Russians approved of human right restrictions, typically associated with dictatorship, while only 43 percent opposed it. Moreover, since 1992 the share of people agreeing that dictatorship is the best solution to Russian problems nearly doubled (Figure 26). Persistent conservatism is visible in the answers to question: “What is more important, order or democracy?”108 (Figure 27). The share of people who favored order remained stable at 75 percent, while freedoms and human rights, associated with democracy, consistently garnered a low 10-11 percent of support.

108 In this context, democracy is not a political category, but the Russian synonym for the liberal notion of personal freedoms.
Figure 26. Is Dictatorship the Best Solution to All Russia's Problems?

Figure 27. What Is More Important, Order or Democracy?

Figures 28 and 29 show that the levels of trust for the army and state security forces (institutions associated with repressive state apparatus) are slightly higher than the levels of trust for other social and political institutions, including mass media and provincial governments, and significantly higher than the trust in parliament. The degree of trust towards these institutions increased in early 1998, the period when perceptions of state weakness, the growth of crime, and rampant corruption reach their peak (Figures 32 - 34). Positive feelings towards the army and state security forces are also illustrated by
the fact that only 5 percent of Russians worry about the threat of military dictatorship (see Figure 35).

Figure 28. Should We Trust the Army?

The level of trust towards the Orthodox Church, although imperfectly, indicates conservative orientations. Figure 30 suggests that Russians approve of more traditional values, associated with the Orthodox Church, especially given their concern about the crisis of morality (Figure 36).

Figure 29. Should We Trust State Security Forces?
Finally, Figure 31 shows that Russians favor more conservative values of stability, strong state, law and order and social protection as unifying national ideas. Liberal ideals of freedom and joining the “modern world” are significantly less popular.

![Figure 30. Should We Trust the Orthodox Church?](image1)

![Figure 31. What Idea Can Unify Russia?](image2)
Figure 32. Are You Worried About the Weakness of the State?

Figure 33. Are You Worried About Corruption and Bribery?

Figure 34. Are You Worried About the Growth of Crime?
Figure 35. Are You Worried About the Threat of Military Dictatorship?

Figure 36. Are You Worried About the Crisis of Morality and Culture?

Liberal Attitudes

Figures 37 and 38 show that Russians' conservatism is not absolute and that liberal values are not completely alien to the general population. In the 1990s, the percentage of people who believe that personal interests are more important than interests of the state increased from 50 to 70 percent. Although data concerning the best
relationship between the state and society is limited, it is, nonetheless, telling. Statist orientations are not pervasive. A majority of Russians believe that society should control the state (Figure 38).

Despite some liberal inclinations, the Russian public champions conservative and statist values. The strongest conservatism can be detected in Russians' preference for order (a synonym for the strong state) over democracy (understood as a synonym for civil rights and liberties), increasing acceptance of dictatorship as the best solution to Russian problems and mostly positive attitudes towards repressive state institutions and the conservative Orthodox Church. The public's conservatism and statism is exemplified by the pervasive concerns about the weakness of the state, widespread corruption, crime rate, and the crisis of morality. The strengthening of conservative sentiment occurred in 1993-1994.

![Figure 37. What Interests Are More Important, the State's or the Individual's?](image)

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Figure 38. What Is the Best Relationship Between the State and Society?

At present, both government-affiliated intellectuals and the public are ideologically conservative. If the elite’s unambiguous political authoritarianism is not matched by the similar levels of the public’s authoritarianism, the former’s current ideological conservatism may be a response to public opinion. At least, ideological conservatism can be found on both the elite and the popular level and represents a shared value in contemporary Russia.

3. Economic Issue Domain

The most useful survey questions for this issue domain include:

“What is the best economic model?”
“How fast should market reforms proceed?”
“What is Russia’s economic situation?”
“What is your assessment of Gaidar’s/liberal reforms?”
“Should the state guarantee a job to every able person?”
“On whom does prosperity of an individual depend?”
“How much social protection should the state provide?”
“What price policy on food would you prefer?”
“How should the state control prices?”
“Are you worried about potential economic crisis?”
“Are you worried about the price growth?”
“Are you worried about increasing social stratification?”
“Should market reforms be continued?”

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Public Preferences for Governed Market Model

In general, Russians increasingly prefer economic etatism or belief in the governed market (Figure 39). Figure 40 shows that in the last 10 years Russians’ willingness to proceed with quick and radical economic changes diminished. Simultaneously, a more conservative sentiment favoring slower and more cautious changes gained momentum. Russians were never satisfied with Gaidar’s liberal reforms (Figure 41). The number of people who rejected reforms was always much greater than the number of people supporting the liberal economic course.

Figure 39. What Is the Best Economic Model?

The negative assessment of Gaidar’s liberal reforms and the market in general is not surprising, when one looks at the public’s perception of the post-Communist economic situation. The public consistently viewed the economic situation as bad or very bad, a trend that was only recently reversed (Figure 42). The growing rejection of the market and market reforms is also exemplified to persistent worries about significant social problems perpetuated by the reforms, including the growth of prices (Figure 48),
economic crisis and the decline of production (Figure 49), and growing social stratification (Figure 50).

Figure 40. How Fast Should Market Reforms Proceed?

Figure 41. What Is Your Assessment of Gaidar's Liberal Reforms?

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Figures 43 – 47 depict Russians’ attitudes towards specific economic policies. They reveal Russians’ propensity for a strong paternalistic state. Believing that prosperity of an individual depends on the state (Figure 45), Russians expected the state to guarantee employment (Figure 43) and provide universal social protection (Figure 44). Russians overwhelmingly supported state control of prices on all, or, at least, some products (see Figure 46). Even presented with a choice between a card system (a vestige of the Soviet distribution system, according to which a person was assigned a strict quota of limited foodstuffs and consumer goods per month) and subsidies to the underprivileged, Russians seem to increasingly embrace a card system (Figure 47).
the state is not obligated to guarantee a job to every able person
the state is obligated to guarantee a job to every able person

Figure 43. Should the State Guarantee a Job to Every Able Person?

the state should protect all
the state should protect those in need
the state should protect those who cannot take care of themselves
the state should not provide any social protection

Figure 44. How Much Social Protection Should the State Provide?
Figure 45. On Whom Does Prosperity of an Individual Depend?

Figure 46. How Should the State Control Prices?
Figure 47. What Price Policy on Food Would You Prefer?

Figure 48. Are You Worried About Price Growth?

Figure 49. Are You Worried About Potential Economic Crisis?
Figure 50. Are You Worried About Increasing Social Stratification?

Public Preferences for Free-Market Model

Despite strong pro-governed market economic values, Russians want to continue with market reforms (Figure 51). Only in 1995, amidst the wage arrears crisis, and in the aftermath of the 1998 economic default, the determination of the Russian public wavered.

Figure 51. Should Market Reforms be Continued?

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Almost universally, Russians supported economic policies consistent with the governed market model. Worried about the price increase, intensification of social stratification and crisis of production, Russians consistently favored a stronger economic role of the state and more gradual economic change. Yet they generally also endorsed a continuation of market reforms.

While the public favored the governed market model, government-affiliated intellectuals supported the liberal economic strategy (see Chapter II). If in the beginning of the research period, there was a weak consensus on the desirability of market reforms between the elite and the public, by the late 1990s, the elite could no longer count on popular support for its liberal economic reforms. Public opinion had virtually no impact on the economic attitudes of the elite. But the elite is also incapable of swaying public opinion with its free market rhetoric. This phenomenon is especially noteworthy, since economic preferences are the strongest for both the elite and the public.  

4. Foreign Relations Issue Domain

Questions selected for this issue domain include:
“What is the goal of Western countries in regards to Russia?”
“Should Russia cooperate with the West?”
“Do you consider yourself European?”
“What is your attitude towards the European Union?”
“Should Russia join the European Union?”
“What is your attitude towards the US?”
“Does the US pose a threat to Russia?”
“What is your attitude towards Germany?”
“Should Russia join NATO?”
“Should Russia fear NATO?”
“Should Russia fear former Soviet republics joining NATO?”
“Should Russia fear Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joining NATO?”
“What should Russia do in regards to Iran, Iraq, Syria?”

109 Public opinion literature conclusively demonstrates that the public’s economic attitudes are the strongest and the most decisive during the elections. In the previous chapter, I also demonstrated that economic attitudes, and especially economic liberalism, lie at the core of the elite’s beliefs.
“What is your attitude towards China?”
“How can Russia retain its status as a superpower?”
“Do you support union with Belorus?”

While there is a visible increase in anti-Western sentiment among government-affiliated intellectuals, there are signs that Russians are not as anti-Western as previously reported. In fact, their pro-Western orientations are stable or even increasing. Throughout the research period, Russians appear to be almost evenly split along the anti-Western and pro-Western divide (see figures below).

**Anti-Western Attitudes**

A growing number of Russians (almost 70 percent in 2001) thinks that the West is interested in destabilizing Russia (Figure 52). Kosovo, tensions around UN inspections in Iraq, and other foreign policy disputes resulted in increased fear of the US (Figure 53). The number of people who think that the US poses no threat or poses only a minor threat to Russia declined from 78 percent in 1996 to 32 percent in 2000. The share of people who believe that the US poses a major or significant threat to Russia rose from 22 percent in 1996 to 68 percent in 2000.

In general, Russians oppose joining NATO, a logical consequence given the contentious relationship between the transatlantic alliance and Russia (Figure 54). The Russian public also increasingly fears NATO. In 1999, 63 percent of the population expressed negative feelings about the alliance, although in 1997 only 44 percent had this attitude (Figure 55). Although Russians accept Central European countries’ membership in NATO, they are less sympathetic to the former Soviet republics joining the alliance. If in 1996 only 20 percent of Russians feared former Soviet republics joining NATO, in 2001, with an increasing probability of Russia’s immediate neighbors becoming members...
of the alliance, 50 percent shared this attitude. Simultaneously, the number of people not opposing potential membership of former Soviet republics in NATO declined from 57 percent (in 1997) to 30 percent (2001) (Figure 56). The shift occurred in 1999, after the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia.

The number of Russians who favor assistance to Syria, Iran, and Iraq, regardless of the Western opposition, increased from 13 percent in 1997 to 25 percent in 2001. The option suggesting an alliance with the West against these countries is the least favored option and is on the decline. However, the majority believes that Russia should pursue its own interests in regards to these anti-Western countries (Figure 57). Strengthening anti-Western sentiments and growing support for alliance with the non-Western world are visible in Figure 58, depicting attitudes towards China. After Kosovo, Russians view China in an increasingly favorable light. Currently, almost 70 percent of Russians have a neutral, positive, or very positive attitude toward this country. Between 70 and 80 percent of Russians consistently supported strengthening political and economic ties with Belorus (Figure 59).

![Figure 52. What Is the Goal of the Western Countries in Regards to Russia?](image-url)
the US does not pose any threat or poses only a minor threat to Russia
the US poses either some or a serious threat to Russia

Figure 53. Does the US Pose a Threat to Russia?

Russia should not join NATO
Russia should join NATO

Figure 54. Should Russia Join NATO?

Russia should fear NATO
Russia should not fear NATO

Figure 55. Should Russia Fear NATO?
Figure 56. Should Russia Fear Former Soviet Republics Joining NATO?

Figure 57. What Should Russia Do in Regards to Iran, Iraq, and Syria?

Pro-Western Attitudes

Despite strong anti-Western attitudes, an increasing number of Russians favors cooperation with the West (Figure 60). After the disappointment of the late 1990s (1998-1999), when Russia experienced serious frictions with the West (due to the situation in Iraq, NATO's expansion to the East, and Kosovo), Russians now strongly support cooperation with the West (almost 80 percent). Since 1992, the number of people who
either occasionally or always consider themselves European increased from 38 to 63 percent (Figure 61). Although the share of people with a favorable opinion of the EU declined (from 67 to 50 percent) and the share of people with negative assessments of the EU increased from 3 to 12 percent, Russians overwhelmingly have a very positive attitude towards the European Union (Figure 62). Russians also support joining the European Union (60 to 65 percent) (Figure 63).

Attitudes towards specific western countries, including the US and Germany, are predominantly positive and stable. The only bout of anti-Americanism occurred in 1999 during the Kosovo operation (Figure 64). Other disputes between Russia and the US did not affect Russians' views of the US. Germany was always viewed positively (Figure 65). Although Russians resent NATO expansion, they do not oppose Central European countries joining NATO (Figure 66). With the passage of time, increasingly fewer Russians express fear of these countries being NATO members. Even though during the post-Communist period, the number of people who believe that Russia should retain its status as a military superpower increased from 9 to almost 20 percent, the share of people who believed that Russia can be a superpower only through economic development remained stable. Overwhelmingly, Russians support economic, not military, strength as a basis of the superpower status of their country (Figure 67).

110 It appears that the sudden outbreak of anti-Americanism are a direct public response to the elite's and mass media's "information blows," in which for a very short time the US is described either as a source of all Russia's recent misfortunes or as a cunning international player interested only in the win-lose outcomes. Although my analysis does not extend to the period after 2001, the data collected around 2002 Winter Olympics organized by the US (where Russian athletes suffered relative defeat), during the "chicken wars" in the spring of 2002 or after the launch of the Operation "Iraqi Freedom" confirm that the effect of such "precise targeting" of the US by the elite is intense, but limited to a very short time span.
Figure 58. What Is Your Attitude Towards China?

Figure 59. Do You Support Union with Belorus?

Figure 60. Should Russia Cooperate with the West?
Figure 61. Do You Consider Yourself European?

Figure 62. What Is Your Attitude Towards the European Union?

Figure 63. Should Russia Join the European Union?
I have a negative or very negative attitude towards the US

I have a positive or very positive attitude towards the US

Figure 64. What Is Your Attitude Towards the US?

I have a negative or very negative attitude towards Germany

I have a positive or very positive attitude towards Germany

Figure 65. What Is Your Attitude Towards Germany?

Russia should not fear Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joining NATO

Russia should fear Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joining NATO

Figure 66. Should Russia Fear Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic Joining NATO?
It follows that Russians are split between those who favor a moderately pro-Western and moderately anti-Western course. The balance between the two conflicting approaches was disturbed in 1995/1996 (NATO’s eastward expansion, tensions around UN inspections in Iraq) and in 1999 (NATO’s air strikes against Yugoslavia), when anti-Western attitudes prevailed. However, pro-Western attitudes rebounded by 2000.

In contrast, the anti-Western attitudes of the elite clearly triumphed over more pro-Western position. If the shift towards stronger anti-Western proclamations in official discourse that occurred in 1996-1999 parallels the changes in public opinion, the current anti-Western stance of government-affiliated intellectuals does not reflect public opinion. In fact, the elite espouses stronger anti-Western views than the population at large. Public opinion continues to embrace some pro-Western orientations, while the government-affiliated intellectuals all but abandoned their original pro-Western stance. Russian public opinion presents certain disadvantages for pursuing an internationalist and pro-Western foreign policy. Russian public opinion is prone to abrupt anti-Western bouts, all to
readily exploited by the nationalist and anti-Western forces. But it also provides a strong potential for building partnership with the economically developed West. The Russian elite can count on tentative public support for this foreign policy course, if it is indeed on the elite’s agenda (which, as shown in the previous chapter, is not the case).

5. Ethnic Relations Issue Domain

Questions in this issue domain can be roughly divided into two parts. The first group of questions deals with attitudes towards various minorities living in Russia (Azeris, Armenians, Jews, Muslims, non-Russians in general and migrant workers). The second group includes questions about Chechnya.

**Tolerant Attitudes**

Figures 68-70 show an increase in neutral and sympathetic attitudes towards ethnic minorities, which are traditionally viewed with hostility in Russia. Figure 71, which documents Russians’ attitudes towards migrant workers (mostly from Slavic republics of Ukraine and Belorus), reveals a similar dynamic.

![Figure 68. How Do You View Armenians and Azeris?](image)
Nationalistic Attitudes

In general, despite the overall neutrality towards some minorities, there is an increase in xenophobic attitudes towards non-Russians. The number of people who think that non-Russians pose a substantial or major threat for Russia increased from 30 to 56 percent (Figure 72). The growth of xenophobia translates into increasing popularity of
the idea of Russia for Russians. By the end of the research period, the number of its supporters reached 60 percent (Figure 73).

![Graph showing attitudes towards migrant workers working in Russia]

Figure 71. What Is Your Attitude Towards Migrant Workers Working in Russia?

Nationalism is especially apparent in the questions measuring public attitudes towards Chechens and the Chechen problem. Figure 74 shows that Russians have negative attitudes towards Chechens. By 1998 the majority of Russians viewed Chechens either with fear and distrust or caution and annoyance. The elite definitely had sympathetic public opinion background in launching the second Chechen war. In fact, by 1999 Russians increasingly favored the military operation in Chechnya. Although after February 2000 the number of supporters for the military operation declined, it still enjoys a considerable popularity (Figure 75). The second Chechen war also contributed to the popular approval of the federal government’s Chechen policy (i.e., the military solution to a dual challenge of ethnic secession and separatism). If in 1997 only 50 percent of Russians approved of the Kremlin’s handling of Chechnya, by 1999, 90 percent of the population considered the federal Chechen policy correct or at least partially correct (Figure 76).
Non-Russians living in Russia do not pose any threat or pose only a minor threat to Russia

Non-Russians living in Russia pose some or a major threat to Russia

Figure 72. Do Non-Russians Living in Russia Pose a Threat?

I think that the idea of Russia for Russians is no different than a Nazi statement

I support the idea that Russia is for Russians

Figure 73. Do You Support the Idea of Russia for Russians?

I view Chechens either with distrust and fear or with caution and annoyance

I view Chechens either with indifference or with sympathy

Figure 74. How Do You View Chechens?

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Although ostensibly sympathetic to minorities with a history of being discriminated against (Azeris, Armenians, Muslims, and Jews\textsuperscript{111}), a majority of Russians is by no means tolerant. Even given the generally acknowledged sensitivity to ethnic

\textsuperscript{111} One has to be somewhat skeptical analyzing these trends. Invariably, the interviewer and later the interpreter of survey results comes across the problem that respondents might have withheld a truthful response, given official condemnation of anti-Semitic and anti-Caucasian outbursts. The public may be more “sincere” in expressing anti-Chechen attitudes, since official discourse also often contains virulently anti-Chechen statements.
questions in public opinion surveys and social taboos prohibiting public expressions of ethnic hatred and bigotry, Russian respondents express strong xenophobic attitudes. The Russian public grew increasingly less tolerant of Chechens and more supportive of the idea of “Russia for Russians.” The majority no longer shuns the military solutions to ethnic problems and generally supports the second Chechen war.

There is a degree of consensus between the elite and the public concerning the treatment of the ethnic problems that confound Russia. In general, however, the elite’s nationalism is less extreme, which can be explained by the necessity to stand for elections in a multiethnic state.

***

Public opinion in Russia thus functions as a certain environment in which official discourse and policies are being articulated and made. It is subject to shifts in some areas (economic etatism), but more often one observes a lack of consensus (ambiguities in political, ideological, foreign policy and ethnic relations issue domains). Public opinion contains both liberal and organic-statist elements (although with the passage of time, liberal attitudes have a tendency to weaken, and organic-statist attitudes tend to strengthen). The question for the elite is what types of public attitudes to promote and champion. The relationship between the elite’s value orientations is not causal; it is more complex. The Russian case proves Converse’s observations that there are certain linkages between the elite’s and the mass public’s attitudes. In Russia, these linkages tend to form around organic-statist values of political authoritarianism, strong state, order, defiance of the West and ethnic nationalism. The relationship thus is not unlike game

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theory. The elite is taking cues from the public. But the former only chose to incorporate those motifs and themes from public opinion that are most congruent with the elite’s policy aspirations and own interests.

While organic-statist (authoritarian, conservative, anti-Western, and nationalistic) elements of public opinion can also be found on the elite level, the latter failed to incorporate surviving democratic and pro-Western public attitudes into its discourse. Likewise, government-affiliated intellectuals were unable not only to convince the public of their ideologically more liberal and ethnically more tolerant values, but also to “sell” their free market ideas (a core concept for the elite).

Russian public opinion presents both advantages and disadvantages for building a democratic and ethnically tolerant state with liberal ideology, free market economy, and pro-Western foreign policy (i.e., the state which would reflect liberal orientations). Public opinion constrains the elite in ideological, economic, and ethnic minority policy areas. But it also has a better potential for building democratic society and for partnership with the economically developed Western countries. The Russian elite can count on public support for these policies, if they are indeed on the elite’s agenda.

In addition to taking select cues from the public that satisfy the elite’s own plans and interests, there is another type of relationship between the elite and public opinion. The Russian case is a good illustration of Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann “spiral of silence” thesis. Noelle-Neumann claims that public opinion cannot be interpreted only as an aggregation of individual views. Instead, one should look at and analyze the relationship between the majority’s and minority’s preferences. The prevalence of one view over

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113 I will return to this issue in the concluding, sixth chapter.

another is crucial. If, at one point of time, the ratio between two conflicting public views was 60-40, the minority (40 percent) would be less likely to vocalize and defend its views (that are perceived as loosing). Logically, at the next point of time, the ratio may change to 70-30. In the Russian case, pro-democratic, pro-Western, liberal, tolerant minority is already under pressure to voice its preference in the face of growing organic-statist majority. But this pressure is compounded by the definite choice of the elite, which clearly favors organic-statist elements of public opinion. The elite thus can reinforce the dominant tendencies in public opinion and make expression of dissident views less likely. Although Russian public opinion contains both liberal and organic-statist factions, the state support of the latter makes the existence and even survival of liberal public attitudes very problematic, if not downright impossible.

Social and Demographic Determinants of Russian Public Attitudes

This section briefly discusses the sources of public attitudes. The literature on the role of public opinion in policy-making suggests that both elite and public attitudes depend on the symbolic factors (partisanship, ideology), rather than objective (social and demographic) characteristics. For instance, Wittkopf and Hinckley discovered that both the elites and the public react to symbolic issues, not domestic conditions. In other words, age, education, income, and gender matter less than one’s party identification or ideological preferences. Although I cannot test for the impact of ideology or partisanship

115 I tried to see if the relationships between various public attitudes and social and demographical indexes changed from year to year. Initially, I calculated models for several select variables for every year the question was asked. However, the difference in predictors from year to year was insignificant and I opted for the cumulative models.
on the public attitudes, I can outline the extent to which social and demographic factors are important for the understanding of several public attitudes.\(^{117}\)

Current public opinion literature describes the impact of certain modernization variables, including education, occupation, and the size of settlement on the individual views. The following section confirms previous findings with the Russian data. When performing statistical analysis, I violated several basic assumptions of multivariate linear regression. I am aware that my dependent variables are not measured on the interval scale. Strictly speaking, my variables are ordinal, not interval. However, for my project I treat them as ordinal to show the relationships between social and demographic parameters and individual political, ideological, economic, foreign policy and ethnic relations views. Secondly, I am also aware of the problem of heteroskedasticity, a problem where a researcher does not know the real distribution of the error term for various observations on the variables. Since the true distribution of the error term is unknown, one cannot make accurate predictions and has difficulties with properly testing the hypothesis. I address this problem by looking at the distribution of the error term (squared residual) across observations on the independent variables. Although for all variables the error term (variance) was not identical, the disparity was not great, which means that heteroskedasticity was not severe. Among all the predictors, education had the strongest relationship with various public attitudes.

In political sphere, education is the strongest predictor of a person's political views. Table 6 demonstrates that the more educated the person, the more he/she supports an independent mass media. Education is also positively correlated with a negative

\(^{117}\) Only statistically significant relationships are reported. Responses coded "as I do not know" or "no answer" were omitted.
assessment of the political situation in the country. The more educated the person, the
less he/she trusts political institutions. Education also influences party preferences.
Finally, the more educated the person, the more he/she rejects authoritarianism (Soviet
system) as a political model. Occupation has an impact on the degree of trust towards the
parliament, i.e., the lower the occupational status of an individual, the more he/she
distrusts the Duma [lower chamber of Russian parliament]. Also, occupation is related to
the preference for the Soviet political system. The higher the person’s occupational
status, the less supportive of this idea a person is. Age has a weak, but statistically
significant, relationship with attitudes towards the mass media (the older the person, the
more he/she perceives the mass media as distorting events) and preferences for type of
political system (the older the person, the more he/she favors the Soviet system).

Gender plays a role in combination with other predictors. Older women tend to be
more hostile to the mass media than older men. Educated men are more supportive of an
independent mass media than are their female counterparts. Compared to educated men,
educated women are more likely to see the political situation as explosive. Educated and
older men feel more distrust towards the Duma than do educated and older women.
Educated men and highly placed women are more likely to oppose the Soviet political
system.

Answers to ideological questions can also be best predicted by education. Education has a negative relationship with the degree of trust towards state security
forces. The more educated the person, the less he/she trusts state security forces (cf.
levels of trusts towards political institutions). Education is also related to the view on the
relative importance of personal vs. state interests. The more educated the person, the
more he/she values his/her own interests. Paradoxically, the more education a person has, the more he/she prefers strong state to an independent society. Gender. Educated women are less likely to trust state security forces than educated men, but the former are also more likely to support a strong state (Table 7).

Table 6
Results of Regression Analysis of Select Russian Political Attitudes According to Gender, Education, Age, and Occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variables</th>
<th>Positive attitudes towards the mass media</th>
<th>Positive attitude towards the mass media independence</th>
<th>Positive assessment of Russia’s political situation</th>
<th>Degree of trust towards the parliament</th>
<th>Degree of trust towards the president</th>
<th>Perception of the best political system</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.000 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.002 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.003** (0.001)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.004** (0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.004** (0.001)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.003** (0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education: 125</td>
<td></td>
<td>126</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>128</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

118 Attitude towards the mass media is measured on a 4-point scale where 1 is “mass media always objectively reflect events,” 2 – “mass media often objectively reflect events,” 3 – “mass media often distort events,” 4 – “mass media always distort events.”
119 Attitude towards the independent mass media is measured on a 5-point descending scale with 1 being total support for mass media independence and 5 being total opposition.
120 Assessment of the political situation is measured on a 4-point descending scale where 1 is “favorable” and 4 is “explosive.”
121 Degree of trust towards the parliament is measured on a 3-point descending scale, where 1 is “definite trust,” 2 is “rather distrust,” and 3 is “definite distrust.”
122 Degree of trust towards the president is measured on a 3-point descending scale, where 1 is “definite trust,” 2 is “rather distrust,” and 3 is “definite distrust.”
123 Perception of the best political system is measured on a 3-point ascending democratic scale with 1 – being preference for the Soviet system, 2 – preference for the current system and 3 – preference for western democracy.
124 Age is measured in an 8-point ascending scale where 1 is the youngest age interval (18-29) and 8 is the oldest (90-99). This applies to all models and all tables.
125 For this model, education is measured on a 9-point ascending scale with 1 being the lowest level of education and 9 being the highest.

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Table 6 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Male</th>
<th>-0.056** (0.006)</th>
<th>-0.093** (0.006)</th>
<th>0.011 (0.033)</th>
<th>0.060** (0.012)</th>
<th>0.015** (0.003)</th>
<th>-0.100** (0.033)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.055** (0.004)</td>
<td>-0.061** (0.005)</td>
<td>0.096** (0.028)</td>
<td>0.045** (0.011)</td>
<td>0.014** (0.002)</td>
<td>-0.074** (0.031)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| R-squared: |
| Male       | 1.6% | 4.0% | 0.2% | 0.8% | 0.2% | 1.5% |
| Female     | 1.6% | 2.2% | 0.4% | 0.3% | 0.2% | 1.7% |
| N=         | 12,253 | 22,170 | 160,104 | 51,952 | 50,693 | 12,773 |

Notes:
- Ordinary Least Squares Regression
- All estimates obtained from SPSS
- **p<.05
- *p<.10

In the economic sphere, age is the most important predictor. Older people tend to view results of liberal reforms as a failure and to favor slowing down economic change.

These results are not surprising, given that older people, especially pensioners, are among the biggest losers of the liberal economic reforms undertaken in the early 1990s. It is

126 For this model, education is measured on a 3-point descending scale with 1 being the highest level of education and 3 being the lowest.
127 For these models, education is measured on an 11-point ascending scale with 1 being the lowest educational level and 11 being the highest.
128 For this model, education is measured on a 3-point descending scale with 1 being the highest level of education and 3 being the lowest.
129 For these models, occupation is measured on a 10-point descending scale with 1 being the highest occupational level (manager) and 10 being the lowest (unemployed).
logical to conclude that in this issue domain, age is closely correlated with class and income in shaping a person’s perception of contemporary economic changes.

Table 7
Results of Regression Analysis of Select Russian Ideological Attitudes According to Gender, Education, Age, and Occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Degree of trust towards the security forces(^{130})</th>
<th>Views on the relative importance of personal and state interests(^{131})</th>
<th>Views on the ideal relationship between state and society(^{132})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.000 (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.002)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.000 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.002 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-0.010** (0.004)</td>
<td>-0.047** (0.011)</td>
<td>-0.010** (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.014** (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.046** (0.009)</td>
<td>-0.130** (0.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Occupation:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.000 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.014 (0.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.000 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.020 (0.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{130}\) Degree of trust towards state security forces is measured on a 3-point descending scale with 1 being “definite trust,” 2 being “rather distrust” and 3 being “definite distrust.”

\(^{131}\) Relative importance of state vs. personal interests is measured on a 4-point scale where 1 is a belief that personal interests are always more important and 4 is a belief that state interests are always more important.

\(^{132}\) Views on the ideal relationship between the state and society are measured on a 4-point scale where the higher the number, the more the respondent prefers an independent society.

\(^{133}\) Education is measured on an 11-point ascending scale where 1 is the lowest level of education and 11 is the lowest.

\(^{134}\) Education is measured on a 9-point descending scale where 1 is the highest level of education and 9 is the lowest.

\(^{135}\) Education is measured on a 6-point ascending scale where 1 is the lowest level of education and 6 is the highest.

\(^{136}\) Occupation is measured on a 10-point descending scale where 1 is the highest occupational level and 10 is the lowest occupational levels.
Table 7 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th></th>
<th>Female</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.637**</td>
<td>2.029**</td>
<td>2.048**</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.093)</td>
<td>(0.302)</td>
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<td>2.691**</td>
<td>1.902**</td>
<td>2.481**</td>
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<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.089)</td>
<td>(0.252)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>35,058</td>
<td>5,871</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
Ordinary Least Squares Regression
All estimates obtained from SPSS
**p<.05
*p<.10

**Education.** Although more educated people, who were traditionally employed by the state sector, did not fare well during the economic transformation, they are supportive of the free market reforms. The less educated the person, the more he/she favors slow and cautious economic reforms. **Occupation** is one of the best predictors of how a person views economic reforms. The higher the occupational level of a respondent, the more he/she is in favor of quick radical change. **Gender.** Older men have less favorable views on results of liberal economic reforms than do older women. Older and less educated men are more in favor of slowing down economic reforms than their female counterparts (Table 8).
Table 8

Results of Regression Analysis of Select Russian Economic Attitudes According to Gender, Education, Age, and Occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Positive assessment of Gaidar’s (liberal) reforms(^{137})</th>
<th>Views on the desired speed of economic reforms(^{138})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.039** (0.012)</td>
<td>0.022** (0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.021** (0.010)</td>
<td>0.012** (0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.043** (0.006)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.000 (0.003)</td>
<td>0.021** (0.005)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Occupation:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.000 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.011** (0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.000 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.011** (0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2.270** (0.041)</td>
<td>1.611** (0.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2.343** (0.039)</td>
<td>1.688** (0.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R-squared:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N=</strong></td>
<td>9,169</td>
<td>39,070</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
Ordinary Least Squares Regression
All estimates obtained from SPSS
**p<.05

\(^{137}\) Assessment of the liberal economic reforms is measured on a 4-point descending scale where 1 is the highest assessment, 4 is the lowest assessment.

\(^{138}\) Desired speed of economic reforms is measured on a 2-point scale where 1 is “we need quick radical change” and 2 – “we need slow cautious change.”

\(^{139}\) Education is measured on a 3-point descending scale where 1 is the highest level of education and 3 is the lowest.

\(^{140}\) Occupation is measured on a 10-point descending scale where 1 is the highest occupational level and 10 being the lowest.
Answers to foreign policy questions are influenced by education, age, and occupation. Education has a positive relationship with the attitudes towards the European Union, US and China. The more educated a person is, the more positive the attitude he/she has to these countries and regional organizations. Interestingly, education contributes to a more positive assessment of not only the Western countries (the EU, the US), but also of China. Age has a weak, but statistically significant, relationship with attitudes towards the European Union. The older the person, the more negatively he/she feels towards this organization. Occupation. Occupation is positively related to the attitudes towards the United States. The higher the occupational status of a person, the more he/she views the US positively. Gender. Educated men view the European Union more favorably than their female counterparts. Older women are more hostile toward the European Union, while for men there is no statistically significant relationship between age and attitude towards the European Union. Education is a predictor of the attitudes towards the United States and China only for women; for men there is no relationship between education and attitudes towards these countries. Men occupying higher positions are more pro-American than women at the same occupational level (Table 9).
Table 9

Results of Regression Analysis of Select Russian Foreign Policy Attitudes According to Gender, Education, Age, and Occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variables</th>
<th>Positive attitudes towards the European Union</th>
<th>Positive attitudes towards the US</th>
<th>Positive attitudes towards China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.004 (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.003 (0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.007** (0.002)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.141** (0.032)</td>
<td>0.014 (0.011)</td>
<td>-0.028 (0.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.103** (0.018)</td>
<td>0.031** (0.010)</td>
<td>-0.052** (0.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Occupation:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.035 (0.018)</td>
<td>0.020** (0.006)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.001 (0.016)</td>
<td>0.013** (0.006)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1.405** (0.179)</td>
<td>2.489** (0.070)</td>
<td>3.761** (0.269)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1.641** (0.170)</td>
<td>2.446** (0.062)</td>
<td>3.592** (0.251)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R-squared:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

141 Attitude towards the European Union is measured on a 4-point descending scale where 1 is “I have a very positive attitude towards the EU,” 2 – “I have a positive attitude towards the EU,” 3 – “I have a negative attitude towards the EU” and 4 – “I have a very negative attitude towards the EU.”

142 Attitude towards the US is measured on a 4-point descending scale where 1 is “I have a very positive attitude towards the US,” 2 – “I have a positive attitude towards the US,” 3 – “I have a negative attitude towards the US” and 4 – “I have a very negative attitude towards the US.”

143 Attitude towards China is measured on a 5-point descending scale where 1 is “I have a very positive attitude towards China,” 2 – “I have a positive attitude towards China,” 3 – “I have a neutral attitude towards China,” 4 – “I have a negative attitude towards China,” and 5 – “I have a very negative attitude towards China.”

144 Education is measured on a 3-point descending scale where 1 is the highest level of education and 3 is the lowest.

145 Education is measured on a 9-point ascending scale where 1 is the lowest level of education and 9 is the highest.

146 Occupation is measured on a 10-point descending scale where 1 is the highest occupational level and 10 is the lowest.
Table 9 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>1.3%</th>
<th>0.2%</th>
<th>0.1%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>7,747</td>
<td>19,834</td>
<td>3,620</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
- Ordinary Least Squares Regression
- All estimates obtained from SPSS
- **p<.05
- *p<.10

Occupation is the most important predictor for responses to questions about ethnic relations. Interestingly, the lower the occupational status, the more the person opposes the idea of Russia for Russians. At the same time, the lower the occupational level, the more favorable the assessment of the federal policies in Chechnya. Education. Education is a one of the good predictors of how a person views federal policies in Chechnya. The less educated the person, the more favorably he/she assesses the federal policies in this republic. Age. The older the person, the more favorably he/she views the federal government’s Chechen policy. Gender. Less educated men and men with lower occupational status tend to view federal policies in Chechnya more favorably than their female counterparts (Table 10).
Table 10
Results of Regression Analysis of Select Russian Ethnic Relations Attitudes According to Gender, Education, Age, and Occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variables</th>
<th>Positive attitude towards the idea of Russia for Russians (^{147})</th>
<th>Positive assessment of the federal government's Chechen policy (^{148})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.004** (0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.004** (0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-0.010 (0.011)</td>
<td>-0.139** (0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.004 (0.009)</td>
<td>-0.126** (0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.011** (0.005)</td>
<td>-0.024** (0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.014** (0.005)</td>
<td>-0.017** (0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1.831** (0.058)</td>
<td>2.827** (0.083)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1.693** (0.050)</td>
<td>2.768** (0.079)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=</td>
<td>8,110</td>
<td>4,376</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

\(^{147}\) Attitude towards the idea of “Russia for Russians” is measured on a 3-point scale where 1 is “I completely support idea of Russia for Russians,” 2 – “it is a good idea, but we need to be careful implementing it” and 3 – “it is a bad idea, the idea of Russia for Russians is no different than a Nazi statement.”

\(^{148}\) Attitude to the federal government’s Chechen policy is measured on a 3-point descending scale where 1 is “policy is absolutely right,” 2 – “policy is right, but badly implemented” and 3 -- “policy is completely wrong.”

\(^{149}\) Education is measured on a 3-point descending scale where 1 is the highest level of education and 3 is the lowest.

\(^{150}\) Occupation is measured on a 10-point descending scale where 1 is the highest occupational level and 10 is the lowest.
Ordinary Least Squares Regression
All estimates obtained from SPSS
**p<.05
*p<.10

Relationships Between Various Economic, Political, Ideological, Foreign Policy, and Ethnic Relations Elements of Russian Public Opinion

In this section I discuss public attitudes that are linked together. First I describe related attitudes within each issue domain. Next, I show that, just like official discourse (or the elite’s value orientations) elements of public opinion also form distinct liberal and organic-statist constellations. Finally, I offer some correlations between select political, ideological, economic, foreign policy and ethnic relations public attitudes and several composite variables, including assessment of Russia’s post-Communist course, attitudes to post-1985 developments, the extent of regret about the demise of the USSR, and evaluations of the current political and economic situation. To explore the larger themes in public opinion, I performed correlation analysis\textsuperscript{151} which confirmed the existence of the two major divisions (liberal and organic-statist) within Russian public opinion. Only survey questions that were asked repeatedly in the same type of survey (Express or Monitoring) were analyzed. Since all answer-options were normally distributed, I was able to explore the selected survey questions cumulatively, as part of newly created, combined databases.

\textsuperscript{151} In the course of the correlation analysis, I deleted the values for answers “I do not know,” “I am not sure,” and other indeterminate options. The correlation tables reported in this section are based on “ substantive” answer options.
1. Related Ideological Attitudes

I found that the Russian public’s ideological views fall neatly into conservative/liberal divide. People who support order over democracy also tend to favor dictatorship as a means to solve Russia’s problems. Alternatively, a more liberal segment of the Russian public both prefers democracy (a synonym for civil liberties) and rejects dictatorship (Table 11). The same correlation is reported in Table 11a (Appendix F).

Table 11

Preference for Order and Support for Dictatorship (Monitoring surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is more important order or democracy? (1—order, 2—democracy)</th>
<th>Is dictatorship the best solution to contemporary Russia’s problems? (1—yes, 2—no)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Correlation 1.000</td>
<td>.174**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed) .000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N 25,305</td>
<td>881</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Is dictatorship the best solution to contemporary Russia’s problems? (1—yes, 2—no)</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation .174**</th>
<th>.000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed) .000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N 881</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>2,040</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

2. Related Economic Attitudes

Tables 12-14 show the existence of economically liberal and economically etatist combinations of public beliefs. Respondents who favor radical economic reforms (which in the Russian case is synonymous with the neo-liberal “shock therapy”) also tend to support a continuation of liberal economic reforms and to evaluate Gaidar’s “shock therapy” positively. Pro-reform respondents also tend to believe in the free market as the
best economic system. On the other hand, proponents of the cautious approach to the economic transformation and believers in the governed market model tend to reject neoliber al economic course.

Table 12

Preferred Speed of Economic Reform and Support for the Continuation of Liberal Economic Reforms (Express surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Should economic reforms be continued?</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation (2-tailed)</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Should economic reforms be continued?</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation (2-tailed)</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What type of economic reforms would you prefer? (1—speedy, radical reform; 2 — slow, cautious change)</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>3,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should economic reforms be continued?</td>
<td>.155**</td>
<td>3,146</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 13

Support for the Continuation of Liberal Economic Reforms and Preferred Economic Model (Monitoring surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Should economic reforms be continued?</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation (2-tailed)</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Should economic reforms be continued?</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation (2-tailed)</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What economic model is the best? (1—governed-market, 2—free market)</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>3,146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should economic reforms be continued?</td>
<td>-.496**</td>
<td>3,146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What economic model is the best?</td>
<td>-.496**</td>
<td>3,146</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
### Table 14

**Preferred Speed of Economic Reform and Assessment of Gaidar’s Reforms (Express surveys)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What type of economic reforms would you prefer (1—speedy, radical reform; 2—slow, cautious change)</th>
<th>What do you think about Gaidar’s reforms (“shock therapy”)? (1—Gaidar’s reforms were necessary and correct, 2—Gaidar’s reforms were necessary, but badly implemented, 3—Gaidar’s reforms were wrong)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5,162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N</td>
<td>.104**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,707</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**

### 4. Related Foreign Policy Attitudes

Attitudes to the US, Germany, and perception of the threat emanating from NATO form distinct pro-Western and anti-Western clusters. On the pro-Western side, there is a clear relationship between positive attitudes towards several Western countries. People who view the US positively, also tend to view Germany positively. People who have positive attitudes towards the US, are also less likely to fear NATO. On the anti-Western side, respondent’s negative attitudes to Western countries tend to translate into fear of NATO (Tables 15 and 16).
5. Related Ethnic Relations Attitudes

Finally, there are clearly demarcated tolerant and nationalistic groupings within the Russian public. Respondents who sympathize with at least one traditionally
discriminated minority, tend to embrace all other discriminated ethnic groups. Alternatively, if a person is intolerant of one traditionally discriminated ethnic minority, he/she is more likely to reject all other ethnic groups. Interestingly, the strongest correlation is between attitudes to Chechens, on the one hand, and attitudes to Azeris (another Caucasian group) and the Roma, on the other (Table 17).

6. Constellations of Public Attitudes from Different Issue Domains

Is the economic liberalism/etatism reported above linked to any other public attitudes? Logically, one would expect economically liberal respondents to show greater degree of ideological liberalism and ethnic tolerance. My analysis confirmed these expectations. People who espouse liberal ideology (support for civil rights and rejection of dictatorship) tend to believe in the free market and continuation of liberal economic reforms, while ideologically conservative respondents (who favor order and dictatorship over protection of civil rights) are more likely to support the governed market model and to object to on-going liberal economic reforms as well as the speed and radicalism of these reforms (Table 18). Supporters of the market reforms are also more tolerant towards ethnic minorities who have traditionally been discriminated against in Russia. In particular, people who support the continuation of liberal economic reforms are also more likely to view Jews and Chechens favorably. More etatist respondents, on the other hand, are more likely to hold stronger xenophobic attitudes (Table 19).
Table 17

Positive Attitudes to Jews, Azeris, Chechens, and Roma (Monitoring surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>to Jews</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.295**</td>
<td>4,813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>4,813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.241**</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>4,813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.192**</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>4,813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to Azeris</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.295**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>4,813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.542**</td>
<td>4,813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.483**</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>4,813</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|           | ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Table 18
Related Ideological and Economic Attitudes of the Russian Population (Monitoring surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is more important order or democracy?</th>
<th>Is dictatorship the best solution to contemporary Russia's problems?</th>
<th>What economic system is the best?</th>
<th>Should economic reforms be continued?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25,305</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>2,511</td>
<td>14,507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>881</td>
<td>2,040</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,511</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>7,214</td>
<td>5,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14,507</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

a Cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant.
Table 19
Related Economic and Ethnic Relations Attitudes of the Russian Population (Monitoring surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Should economic reforms be continued?</th>
<th>Should economic reforms be continued?</th>
<th>Should economic reforms be continued?</th>
<th>Should economic reforms be continued?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1 — reforms should be continued, 2—reforms should be stopped)</td>
<td>(1 — sympath, 2— neutrality, 3— caution, 4—fear, distrust)</td>
<td>(1 — sympath, 2— neutrality, 3— caution, 4—fear, distrust)</td>
<td>(1 — sympath, 2— neutrality, 3— caution, 4—fear, distrust)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.136**</td>
<td>.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,807</td>
<td>2,807</td>
<td>2,807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes to Jews</td>
<td>.136**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.295**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,807</td>
<td>4,813</td>
<td>4,813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes to Azeris</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>.295**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.286</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,807</td>
<td>4,813</td>
<td>4,813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes to Chechens</td>
<td>.055**</td>
<td>.241**</td>
<td>.542**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,807</td>
<td>4,813</td>
<td>4,813</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Table 19 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes to Roma</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>2,807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.192**</td>
<td>4,813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.483**</td>
<td>4,813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.576**</td>
<td>4,813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>4,813</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

7. Composite Variables and Select Political, Ideological, Economic, Foreign Policy, and Ethnic Relations Attitudes

In today’s Russia there is an important general divide, one that cuts across nostalgic and critical public attitudes, on the one side, and progressive and sympathetic ones, on the other. Strictly speaking, the first grouping is a good (although not absolute) approximation to the organic-statist constellation of public attitudes. People who regret the demise of the USSR and believe that Russia would be better off if everything remained as it was before 1985 (beginning of Perestroika) clearly endorse more authoritarian political system, collective-centered (as opposed to individual-centered) ideology, state-controlled economy, and revival of Russia as a super-power. The second grouping is close to the liberal constellation of public attitudes. People who accept the demise of the USSR and see post-Communist Russia in relatively positive light are likely to accept a more decentralized political system, individualistic vision of society, mixed (if not outright free market) economy, and Russia’s diminished role on the international arena. Tables 20 and 21 demonstrate that nostalgia for the USSR is strongly correlated with a rejection of Russia’s post-Communist course, while acceptance of the post-USSR reality correlates with a positive assessment of Russia’s current development.
Among political attitudes, the degree of support for multipartism (one of my democratic indicators) is positively correlated with the acceptance of Russia’s post-Communist development. The more a person accepts the post-Communist order, the more likely he/she is to favor multipartism (Table 22).

Table 20

Attitudes to the Demise of the USSR According to Assessment of Russia’s Post-Communist Course (Express surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Is Russia moving in a right direction? (1—Russia is moving in a right direction, 2—Russia is moving towards a dead-end)</th>
<th>Do you regret demise of the USSR? (1—yes, regret, 2—no, do not regret)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is Russia moving in a right direction?</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you regret demise of the USSR?</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>-.185**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,804</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 21

Attitudes to Post-1985 Developments According to Assessment of Russia’s Post-Communist Course (Express surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Is Russia moving in a right direction? (1—Russia is moving in a right direction, 2—Russia is moving towards a dead-end)</th>
<th>Would Russia be better off if everything remained as it was before 1985? (1—yes, 2—no)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is Russia moving in a right direction?</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>13,439</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Table 21 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Would Russia be better off if everything remained as it was before 1985?</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
<th>N</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.315</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>12,760</td>
<td>16,004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 22

Attitudes to Democracy According to Assessment of Russia’s Post-Communist Course (Express surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Is Russia moving in a right direction? (1—Russia is moving in a right direction, 2—Russia is moving towards a dead-end)</th>
<th>How many parties should Russia have? (1—Russia should have one dominant party, 2—Russia should have two well organized parties, 3—Russia should have several parties)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is Russia moving in a right direction?</td>
<td>-.071**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How many parties should Russia have?</td>
<td>-0.071**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

It is interesting to see what motivates conservatives who favor order over civil rights and welcome dictatorship as a means to solve Russia’s contemporary problems. Tables 23 and 23a-c (Appendix F) reveal that dictatorship-oriented respondents are the people who are dissatisfied with Russia’s current political and economic situation and who long for a revival of the USSR. Clearly, conservatives are people who did not find their place in today’s Russia and who are disillusioned with the general direction in which contemporary Russia is moving.

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Table 23
Preference for Order and Support for Dictatorship According to Attitudes to Post-1985 Developments and Evaluations of the Current Political and Economic Situation (Monitoring surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>What do you think about economic situation in Russia? (1—very good, 2—good, 3—average, 4—bad, 5—very bad)</th>
<th>What do you think about political situation in Russia? (1—favorable, 2—calm, 3—tense, 4—explosive)</th>
<th>Would Russia be better off if everything remained as it was before 1985? (1—yes, 2—no)</th>
<th>What is more important order or democracy? (1—order, 2—democracy)</th>
<th>Is dictatorship the best solution to contemporary Russia’s problems? (1—yes, 2—no)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.338**</td>
<td>-.094**</td>
<td>-.063**</td>
<td>-.065**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>83,818</td>
<td>66,208</td>
<td>3,823</td>
<td>21,263</td>
<td>1,837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>.338**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-.151**</td>
<td>-.155**</td>
<td>-.128**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>66,208</td>
<td>71,862</td>
<td>2,861</td>
<td>11,552</td>
<td>1,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>-.094**</td>
<td>-.151**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.278**</td>
<td>.350**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>3,823</td>
<td>2,861</td>
<td>4,284</td>
<td>1,845</td>
<td>1,786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>-.063**</td>
<td>-.155**</td>
<td>.278**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.174**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>21,263</td>
<td>11,552</td>
<td>1,845</td>
<td>25,305</td>
<td>881</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 23 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Is dictatorship the best solution to contemporary Russia's problems?</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.065**</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>1,837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.128**</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.350**</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1,786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.174**</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,040</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Similarly, economic attitudes can be explained by respondent's evaluations of Russia's economic and political situation. People who have a positive political and economic outlook, who consider Russia's post-Communist course as correct, and who reject pre-1985 status-quo, tend to support a continuation of liberal economic reforms, even in its most radical form, as well as Gaidar's "shock therapy." They are also more likely to believe in the free market (Tables 24-27; 24a-b in Appendix F).

Table 24

Preferred Economic Model and Support for Continuation of Liberal Economic Reforms According to Attitudes to Post-1985 Developments and Evaluations of the Current Political and Economic Situation (Monitoring surveys)

| What do you think about economic situation in Russia? (1—very good, 2—good, 3—average, 4—bad, 5—very bad) | What do you think about political situation in Russia? (1—favorable, 2—calm, 3—tense, 4—explosive) | Would Russia be better off if everything remained as it was before 1985? (1—yes, 2—no) | What economic model is the best? (1—governed-market, 2—free market) | Should economic reforms be continued? (1—reforms should be continued, 2—reforms should be stopped) |
Table 24 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What do you think about economic situation in Russia?</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.338**</td>
<td>83,818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>66,208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What do you think about political situation in Russia?</td>
<td>.338**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>66,208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>71,862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would Russia be better off if everything remained as it was before 1985?</td>
<td>-.094**</td>
<td>-.151**</td>
<td>3,823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>2,861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What economic model is the best?</td>
<td>-.097**</td>
<td>-.102**</td>
<td>5,359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>4,114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should economic reforms be continued?</td>
<td>.198**</td>
<td>.233**</td>
<td>51,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>43,680</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* Cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant.
Table 25
Assessment of Gaidar’s Reforms According to Assessment of Russia’s Post-Communist Course (Express surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Is Russia moving in a right direction? (1—Russia is moving in a right direction, 2—Russia is moving towards a dead-end)</th>
<th>What do you think about Gaidar’s reforms (“shock therapy”? (1—Gaidar’s reforms were necessary and correct, 2—Gaidar’s reforms were necessary, but badly implemented, 3—Gaidar’s reforms were wrong)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is Russia moving in a right direction?</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What do you think about Gaidar’s reforms (“shock therapy”)?</td>
<td>194**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 26
Preferred Speed of Economic Reform According to Attitudes to Post-1985 Developments (Express surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Would Russia be better off if everything remained as it was before 1985? (1—yes, 2—no)</th>
<th>What type of economic reforms would you prefer (1—speedy, radical reform; 2—slow, cautious change)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Would Russia be better off if everything remained as it was before 1985?</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What type of economic reforms would you prefer</td>
<td>-.162**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Table 27
Preferred Speed of Economic Reform According to Assessment of Russia’s Post-Communist Course (Express surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Is Russia moving in a right direction? (1—Russia is moving in a right direction, 2—Russia is moving towards a dead-end)</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is Russia moving in a right direction?</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>20,784</td>
<td>.042**</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>17,282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What type of economic reforms would you prefer</td>
<td>.042**</td>
<td>17,282</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>20,418</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The majority of foreign policy public attitudes is correlated with respondent’s assessment of Russia’s post-Communist course. The more approvingly a respondent views Russia’s post-Communist period, the more likely he/she is to have positive attitudes towards the US and NATO, to allow membership of Eastern European countries and the former Soviet republics in this organization, to support Russia’s EU membership, to see the West as Russia’s partner, and to reject union with Belorus (the most anti-Western country among the post-Soviet republics). Alternatively, respondents with more critical assessment of Russia’s post-Communist course tend to be more anti-Western (Tables 28-33).
Table 28

Attitudes to the US and Perception of NATO's Threat According to Assessment of Russia's Post-Communist Course (Express surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Is Russia moving in a right direction? (1—Russia is moving in a right direction, 2—Russia is moving towards a dead-end)</th>
<th>Attitude to the US (1—very positive, 2—rather positive, 3—rather negative, 4—very negative)</th>
<th>Should Russia fear the NATO? (1—Russia should definitely fear NATO, 2—Russia should rather fear NATO, 3—Russia should rather not fear NATO, 4—Russia should definitely not fear NATO)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.087**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,996</td>
<td>2,656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>.087**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,656</td>
<td>3,134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>-.130**</td>
<td>.571**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,819</td>
<td>2,655</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 29

Perception of Threat from Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic Joining NATO According to Assessment of Russia’s Post-Communist Course (Express surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Is Russia moving in a right direction? (1—Russia is moving in a right direction, 2—Russia is moving towards a dead-end)</th>
<th>Does Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic’s membership in NATO resent a threat to Russia? (1—definite threat, 2—substantial threat, 3—minor threat, 4—no threat)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>Is Russia moving in a right direction?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>(1—Russia is moving in a right direction, 2—Russia is moving towards a dead-end)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>.087**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,819</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Table 29 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Is Russia moving in a right direction?</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>5,181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic’s membership in NATO resent a threat to Russia?</td>
<td>-0.050**</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>3,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 30

Attitude to the Former Soviet Republics Joining NATO According to Assessment of Russia’s Post-Communist Course (Express surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Is Russia moving in a right direction? (1—Russia is moving in a right direction, 2—Russia is moving towards a dead-end)</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>3,404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is your attitude to former Soviet republics joining NATO? (1—definitely positive, 2—rather positive, 3—rather negative, 4—definitely negative)</td>
<td>.072**</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>2,718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is Russia moving in a right direction?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is your attitude to former Soviet republics joining NATO?</td>
<td>.072**</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>3,250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
### Table 31
Perception of the Relationship Between Russia and the West According to Assessment of Russia's Post-Communist Course (Express surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Is Russia moving in a right direction? (1—Russia is moving in a right direction, 2—Russia is moving towards a dead-end)</th>
<th>What is the relationship between Russia and the West? (1—they are friends, should strengthen their ties, 2—they are enemies, Russia should decrease its dependency on the West)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Is Russia moving in a right direction?</strong></td>
<td>Pearson Correlation 1.000 Sig. (2-tailed) .071** N 3,508</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation .071** Sig. (2-tailed) .000 N 3,508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What is the relationship between Russia and the West?</strong></td>
<td>Pearson Correlation .241** Sig. (2-tailed) .000 N 3,810</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation 1.000 Sig. (2-tailed) .000 N 3,810</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**

### Table 32
Attitudes to Joining the EU According to Assessment of Russia’s Post-Communist Course (Express surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Is Russia moving in a right direction? (1—Russia is moving in a right direction, 2—Russia is moving towards a dead-end)</th>
<th>Should Russia join the EU? (1—definitely yes, 2—rather yes, 3—rather no, 4—definitely no)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Is Russia moving in a right direction?</strong></td>
<td>Pearson Correlation 1.000 Sig. (2-tailed) .071** N 3,508</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation .071** Sig. (2-tailed) .000 N 3,508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Should Russia join the EU?</strong></td>
<td>Pearson Correlation .071** Sig. (2-tailed) .000 N 2,872</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation 1.000 Sig. (2-tailed) .000 N 3,329</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**
Finally, there are important correlations between individual ethnic attitudes and a respondent’s assessment of the current political and economic situation. People who are dissatisfied with contemporary political and economic developments (i.e., those who do not like post-Communist semi-democratic political system and the mixed economy) are more likely to be xenophobic than the people who were able to fit into and ultimately accept new political and economic realities. The latter are less anti-Semitic and less intolerant towards Azeris and the Roma (Table 34).
# Table 34

Attitudes to Jews, Azeris, Chechens, and Roma According to Evaluations of the Current Political and Economic Situation (Monitoring surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What do you think about economic situation in Russia? (1 — very good, 2 — good, 3 — average, 4 — bad, 5 — very bad)</th>
<th>What do you think about political situation in Russia? (1 — favorable, 2 — calm, 3 — tense 4 — explosive)</th>
<th>Attitudes to Jews (1 — sympathy, 2 — neutrality, 3 — caution, 4 — fear, distrust)</th>
<th>Attitudes to Azeris (1 — sympathy, 2 — neutrality, 3 — caution, 4 — fear, distrust)</th>
<th>Attitudes to Chechens (1 — sympathy, 2 — neutrality, 3 — caution, 4 — fear, distrust)</th>
<th>Attitudes to Roma (1 — sympathy, 2 — neutrality, 3 — caution, 4 — fear, distrust)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.386**</td>
<td>.035**</td>
<td>.057**</td>
<td>.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.232</td>
<td>.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,454</td>
<td>4,135</td>
<td>4,454</td>
<td>4,454</td>
<td>4,454</td>
<td>4,454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N</td>
<td>.386**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.055**</td>
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** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
The correlation analysis uncovered two groupings of public attitudes -- organic-statist and liberal. The divide discernible in Russian public opinion is somewhat different from the organic-statist -- liberal divide found among the Russian elite. If the Russian elite supports a set of attitudes in which a positive assessment of political authoritarianism, conservative/statist ideology, anti-Western foreign policy, and ethnic nationalism coexist with the belief in the principles of the free market, there is stronger degree of internal consistency in public attitudes. Russians who endorse organic-statist or liberal attitudes in one area are more likely to approve similar attitudes in all other issue domains. For instance, people with liberal political attitudes (those who reject political centralism of the USSR or pre-1985 Russia, approve of Russia's post-Communist political development and support multipartism), are also more likely to hold liberal attitudes in ideological (rejection of restriction of civil rights and freedoms and denouncement of dictatorship as a means to solve Russia's problem), economic (endorsement of the free market economic model and acceptance of the mixed economy), foreign policy (positive attitudes towards the West, NATO, and the EU), and ethnic relations (tolerance) issue domains. Conversely, politically authoritarian respondents tend to hold ideologically conservative, economically etatist, anti-Western and xenophobic beliefs.

**Conclusions About Relationship Between Russian Public Opinion and Elite Value Orientations According to Individual Issue Domains**

To measure the congruence between public opinion and the elite's attitudes I compared trends in public opinion to trends in government-affiliated intellectuals' statements. Politically, Russian public opinion shifted towards greater authoritarianism.
This shift occurred between 1993 and 1996. However, there is not a complete rejection of democratic institutions and norms. At the same time, there is a clear break with original democratic ideas among the elite, a break which occurred in 1998, after the shift in public opinion. Although the growing authoritarianism of public opinion is replicated on the elite level, the elite does not share the public’s surviving democratic orientations. At present, the elite is more authoritarian than the Russian public. The elite’s authoritarian preferences appear to be not a mere reaction to anti-democratic tendencies of public opinion, but a sign of personal, perhaps economic, interests. After all, government-affiliated intellectuals perceive political decentralization as detrimental to the market (see Chapter II, Section “Discourse of the Third Period: Qualitative Presentation”). This concern for the market economy is born not only out of strong economic convictions. Both government-affiliated intellectuals and their political patrons are among the few beneficiaries of Russia’s on-going liberal economic reforms.

_Ideologically_, unlike government-affiliated intellectuals, Russians were always conservative and state-oriented. The strengthening of the public’s ideological conservatism occurred in 1993-1994, while a similar shift in official discourse (elite attitudes) did not happen until 1999. In this issue domain, official discourse clearly followed changes in public opinion. There is a degree of consensus between the elite and the general public, as both came to endorse ideological conservatism by the end of research period.

_Economically_, Russian public opinion always favored the governed market model and rejected the principles of economic liberalism. The elite, however, consistently preferred the free market model, a preference which stands in marked opposition to an
increasingly negative public assessment of the market and market reforms. Together with anti-democratic preferences, economic liberalism, insulated from the impact of public opinion, appears to be another deep-seated clan interest of the Russian elite. As narrow strata who benefited from the free market reforms, both intellectual and political elites are eager to defend the free market ideas.

In the area of foreign policy, Russians are split between those who favor a moderately pro-Western direction and a moderately anti-Western course. The balance between the two conflicting approaches was disturbed in 1995/1996 (NATO's eastward expansion, tensions around UN inspections in Iraq) and in 1999 (NATO's air strikes on Yugoslavia), when anti-Western attitudes prevailed. However, pro-Western attitudes rebounded by 2000. In contrast, anti-Western discourse among government-affiliated intellectuals clearly triumphed over a more pro-Western direction. If the shift towards stronger anti-Western proclamations in official discourse that occurred in 1996-1999 parallels the changes in public opinion, the current anti-Western stance of government-affiliated intellectuals is not shared by the public at large. It appears that the elite can count on the support of the public during confrontations with the West, but the former displays its own anti-Western bias during more amicable periods.

In the area of ethnic relations, there is a clear-cut increase in nationalistic attitudes among the Russians. The decline of ethnic tolerance started in 1993. By 1998 Russians came to espouse strong nationalistic preferences. In 1998, government-affiliated intellectuals also embraced mild nationalism. The decrease of ethnic tolerance among the elite parallels the similar process among the general public. Both elite and public attitudes appear to move in the same direction, with changes in public ethnic beliefs preceding the
transformation of elite orientations. However, compared to rampant public nationalistic displays, official discourse is only moderately nationalistic, a possible sign that nationalism is not an entrenched trait of the Russian elite.

Russian public opinion data conforms to the conventional wisdom concerning the demographic determinants of public opinion. Not surprisingly, more educated and younger people and people with better jobs are more in favor of democracy, liberal ideology, a free-market economy, a pro-Western foreign policy and ethnic tolerance. Older and less educated people as well as pensioners, the unemployed, and blue-collar workers support authoritarianism, a conservative ideology, the governed market model, an independent or even anti-Western, foreign policy, and nationalism. Many attitudes are related to each other. Among the most important conclusions of the statistical analysis is that Russian public opinion is more internally consistent and is guided by an easily discernible logic. There is a clear demarcation between liberal and organic-statist public attitudes.

Changes in official discourse are better understood when compared against the demands of public opinion. Such comparisons allow to see if the elite has a public mandate for the transformation in its discourse and action. During the research period, only free market economic category of the original, liberal, discourse survived intact, despite consistently hostile public opinion. Although the elite’s market ideas are self-sufficient, changes in other categories of official discourse are congruent with changes in public opinion. The elite’s current rejection of the liberal ideology or ethnic tolerance appear to be temporary tactical maneuvers to pacify Russian public opinion which unambiguously endorses ideological conservatism and ethnic nationalism. These attitudes
may not represent deep-seated elite orientations. There are, however, grounds for concern about democratic institutions or pro-Western course in foreign policy, because despite public opinion favoring both, the Russian elite opted for authoritarian or anti-Western positions. Democracy appears to be the most threatened category of the original, liberal, discourse.

Although my evidence suggests that public opinion and the elite's attitudes are related, the exact nature of this relationship is rather complex. In some areas there is congruence between changes in public opinion and official discourse (political authoritarianism, ideological conservatism, anti-Western foreign policy, nationalism), while in others there is a total disjunction between public opinion and elite response (democracy, pro-Western foreign policy, and, especially, the governed market model).

The analysis up to this point leaves us with one final consideration: What are the policy implications of changes/continuities in elite and public attitudes? In particular, are there issue domains in which the political elite sides with public opinion? And do changes in discourse of government-affiliated intellectuals precede or follow changes in actual policies? Is discourse used to inspire policy changes or merely to sell it to the public ex post facto?

**Political, Ideological, Economic, Foreign Policy, and Ethnic Relations Actions of the Russian Political Elite: Event Analysis**

To investigate the complex relationship between public opinion, official discourse, and actual policy initiatives, I compared results of event analysis to the outcomes of both content analysis of discourse and an extensive review of public opinion surveys.
1. Sample Selection

Only events involving the top members of the executive branch (president, Prime-Minister, Foreign Minister, Defense Minister, Minister of Press, other members of the Cabinet, and their high ranking staff), such as signing laws and presidential decrees, announcing important economic measures, signing treaties, visits to foreign countries and hosting foreign delegations in Russia, military maneuvers, statements concerning the foreign policy problems, executive decisions concerning the future of Chechnya, etc., were selected. The descriptions of events were taken from Rossiia-2000 and the archives of Russian National News Service. A total of 1078 events was analyzed. All events were assumed to have equal weight.

2. Event Analysis Procedures and Evaluative Criteria

Selected events were classified according to five issue domains (political, ideological, economic, foreign and ethnic policy). For instance, signing a Power Sharing Treaty between the federal center and a province (democratic category), Federation reform, or attacks on an independent mass media (authoritarian category) were classified as political events. Reductions of state security forces (event reflecting a liberal ideology) or empowering the state to listen to private phone conversations (event reflecting statist/conservative ideology) were classified under ideological issue domain. Price liberalization (free market category), or a governmental decision to support domestic agrarian producers (governed market category) were placed under the economic rubric. An order to send Russian troops to cooperate with NATO in Bosnia (pro-Western category), Yeltsin’s denunciation of NATO for the war in Kosovo, or signing the Russian-Belorussian Union treaty (independent or anti-Western category) were classified...
under foreign policy domain. The start of the military operation in Chechnya (nationalistic category) or peaceful (political and economic) resolution of ethnic conflict in Karachaevо-Cherkessiia (tolerant category) were classified as ethnic policy events. Classified events were aggregated by year (see Figures below).

3. Evolution of Actions of the Russian Elite

Politically, the actions of the Russian political elite changed towards greater authoritarianism in 1999 (Figure 77). The authoritarian shift in official discourse (2000) followed the shift in the actions of the political elite. It appears that the new authoritarian agenda of the political elite is endorsed by government-affiliated intellectuals and has a support of a more authoritarian segment of the general public. At the same time, surviving democratic attitudes, held by a significant number of Russians, are no longer found in either official discourse or policies.

![Figure 77. Overall Evolution of the Russian Elite's Political Actions](image)

Figure 77. Overall Evolution of the Russian Elite's Political Actions

Figure 78 shows that the actions of the political elite in ideological issue domain were consistent with the demands of the conservative public. Government-affiliated intellectuals, whose ideological orientations were originally much more liberal, appear to
modify their positions in response to the dual conservative demands of their political patrons and the general public. In this area, official discourse was used to promote already popular conservative policies of the political elite.

Figure 78. Overall Evolution of the Russian Elite's Ideological Actions

Figure 79 demonstrates that from the very beginning (early 1994) free market ideas, relentlessly advocated by government-affiliated intellectuals, had a strong backing from the political elite. Public economic attitudes appear to matter neither to government-affiliated intellectuals, nor to the political elite. Liberal economic policies clearly represent elite’s agenda and program of action, which is not only fully elaborated in official discourse, but also implemented through actual policies. But the realization of the elite’s free market project faces the unsympathetic public which favors the governed market option.
Figure 79. Overall Evolution of the Russian Elite's Economic Actions

Figure 80 indicates that the political elite shifted its foreign policy course in 1995, the same year the anti-Western reaction among the public at large reached its peak. The discourse of government-affiliated intellectuals also changed around the same time. Clearly, anti-Western public attitudes could and were used as a basis for the Russian response to counter Western advances, or, at least, as a "smokescreen" for the anti-Western policy turn. There was a public mandate for the anti-Western resistance carried out by the Russian intellectual and political elites during NATO’s proposed expansion. In 1999 the political elite responded to the weakening of anti-Western attitudes among the general public and its actions became less anti-Western. Yet, in general, the political elite’s actions remained anti-Western long after the public returned to more balanced and pro-Western positions. In this instance, the interests of the public and the political elite did not coincide. Government-affiliated intellectuals, whose anti-Western attitudes never subsided, sided with their political patrons, rather than with society. Both government-
affiliated intellectuals and public opinion drifted toward more nationalistic attitudes to ethnic relations. Yet, the political elite resisted this shift and remained moderately tolerant (Figure 81). Government-affiliated intellectuals clearly were more sensitive to public opinion. However, public opinion itself was xenophobic.

![Figure 80. Overall Evolution of the Russian Elite's Foreign Policy Actions](image)

![Figure 81. Overall Evolution of the Russian Elite's Ethnic Policy Actions](image)
Figure 82. Overall Evolution of All Types of Actions of the Russian Elite

In general, according to Figure 82, actions of the political elite became more organic-statist in 1995 – a point that corresponds to the middle, transitional, period in the evolution of official discourse (1994-1998). Government-affiliated intellectuals’ discourse is clearly related to the actions of the political elite. In fact, the degree of correlation between the discourse of government-affiliated intellectuals and actual policy choices of the political elite is much stronger than the correlation between official discourse and public attitudes. Russian government-affiliated intellectuals seem to be less of a link between society and the political elite and more of the ideological prop for the latter. This is not surprising given that government-affiliated intellectuals are closely affiliated with the state’s executive structures. In the phrase government-affiliated intellectuals, government-affiliation matters more than the role of the intellectual as an intermediary between the state and society. In the instances when government-affiliated intellectuals might have responded to the demands of public opinion, and transmitted it to
the political elite, public opinion itself was authoritarian, illiberal, anti-Western, and xenophobic.

Russian government-affiliated intellectuals’ willingness to heed only the organic-statist elements of public opinion is rather telling. Not only does there exist a permissive domestic environment, but international constraints, capable of changing behavior of Russian actors, are conspicuously absent. In post-Communist East European countries, public opinion is also xenophobic (see Chapter V), but an important incentive of the imminent joining the European Union, an organization which unambiguously rejects any type of nationalism, conditioned East European elites to distance themselves from the public’s nationalism. In the absence of incentives associated with the entry into the EU and other Western organizations, the Russian elite can get away with more elements of organic-statism than their East European counterparts (see Chapter V).

The public’s attitudes occasionally reach the political elite through government-affiliated intellectuals. In the post-Communist period, government-affiliated intellectuals may have served as linkages between anti-Western, authoritarian, and conservative public demands and corresponding policies, casting the actions of the political elite as a response to the domestic pressures. There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that government-affiliated intellectuals requested the results of the public opinion surveys. The presidential Administration and Council as well as Gaidar’s Research Institute152 were and still are among VTsIOM’s frequent clients. Although these observations do not prove conclusively that the elite responds to demands of public opinion, it hints in the

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152 Elite intellectuals, whose public documents were analyzed in the previous chapter, worked for either presidential Administration or presidential Council. Gaidar’s Institute for Transitional Economics is a liberal research institution closely affiliated with Yeltsin’s government, which continues to be influential in Putin’s era. Gaidar himself was an architect of Russian liberal economic reform and a Russian PM in 1992-1994.
direction of mutually reciprocal relationship between the elite and public opinion. There are, at least, some indications that public attitudes are not irrelevant for the governing elites. However, more often, government-affiliated intellectuals and their political patrons articulated and acted upon their own interests and beliefs.

The reasons for government-affiliated intellectuals’ and their political patrons’ insensitivity to the pro-Western and pro-democratic sections of public opinion may lie in the nature of Russian electoral politics. The pro-Western and pro-democratic faction of the Russian public already supports the current elite. In order to attract voters from the opposite, pro-Communist side, governing elites would rather compromise on the low-salience foreign policy issues or even on political matters than on their core economic beliefs of the free market. Anti-Western and authoritarian discourse may be a reflection of elite’s rational electoral calculations.

The elite takes its cues from public opinion, but only when it suits its interests. This may actually be a ground for cautious optimism. Since the anti-Western course in foreign policy or authoritarianism is not a function of anti-Western or authoritarian public opinion, there are fewer constraints on the Russian elite’s democratic and pro-Western aspirations (even if at present there are no such aspirations) than previously acknowledged. The Russian elite could count on the support of the public, which remained immune to the elite’s anti-Western and authoritarian discourse, if it embarks on these paths.

**Conclusions**

1. Government-affiliated intellectuals drifted toward more authoritarian, conservative, moderately anti-Western and moderately nationalistic positions, but they
continued to support the free market. The shift started as early as 1994/1995 and was largely complete by 1999/2000 (the time of Putin's election).

2. Public opinion is politically mixed and supportive of a dualistic foreign policy. Russians are also nationalistic, ideologically and economically conservative, consistently supporting statist ideology and the governed market economic model.

3. Actions of the political elite show a shift toward more authoritarianism and an anti-Western foreign policy. The political elite's ideological conservatism, belief in the free market economy and ethnic tolerance remains stable.

4. Government-affiliated intellectuals were sensitive to authoritarian, anti-Western, nationalistic, and, recently, ideologically conservative elements of public opinion, but not to economically etatist, pro-Western, and pro-democratic public orientations. Intellectuals played the role of cultural entrepreneurs in rationalizing the free market ideas of their political patrons. They also defended their own ideologically liberal positions against the more conservative stances of both the political elite and the public.

5. Discourse of government-affiliated intellectuals rarely triggers changes in policies. It is used to explain the policies *ex post facto* or to convince the public.

6. Public opinion enters policies either directly (e.g., shared conservatism of the general public and the political elite) or via the discourse of government-affiliated intellectuals in the political and foreign policy domains (e.g., authoritarian and anti-Western consensus between the elite and the public). Public opinion reaches the elite's ethnic policy discourse, but not actual policies. Public opinion has virtually no presence in either economic discourse or in resulting policies.
7. The consensus among the post-Communist Russian elite and the general public emerged exclusively around organic-statist values and principles. During the research period, the public and elite's attitudes converged around political authoritarianism, conservative ideology, and anti-Western foreign policy (all are elements of the organic-statist set of beliefs). Elite and public opinion diverged on the issues of democracy, economic liberalism, pro-Western foreign policy, and ethnic toleration (all are elements of the liberal set of beliefs).

8. Russian public opinion is more internally consistent and logical than the discourse and value orientations of the elite. Unlike their elite, whose current belief system combines liberal economic postulates with political authoritarianism, ideological conservatism, anti-Western and xenophobic attitudes, Russians tend to either support exclusively liberal orientations or to go in the organic-statist direction. Importantly, however, liberal camp among the Russian public is much weaker and less numerous than its organic-statist alternative.
CHAPTER IV
THE POLISH CASE: STABILITY OF MODIFIED LIBERAL DISCOURSE

The Polish case was selected for two reasons. First, it illustrates stability of elite and public orientations. Second, it shows that the instability reported in the Russian case is not a universal phenomenon, common to all post-Communist societies. As such, the Polish data added a comparative perspective to my analysis and facilitated a better understanding of the complex relationship between the elites and the publics in post-Communist societies. Although the Polish and the Russian cases share Communist legacies and are, therefore, fundamentally comparable, they represent two distinct models of the relationship between the attitudes of government-affiliated intellectuals and the preferences of the general public, which I call post-Soviet and Eastern European. In this chapter, I present empirical evidence to analyze the evolution of Polish elite attitudes towards politics, ideology, the economy, foreign policy, and ethnic relations and compare it to the Russian data.

In Chapter II, I showed that, initially, Russian government-affiliated intellectuals subscribed to an unadulterated version of liberal discourse, a version that, ultimately, proved unsustainable. In the case of Poland, however, I expected to see that the original discourse of government-affiliated intellectuals, although mostly liberal, also contained significant organic-statist (conservative) elements, especially in the areas of economic policy and ethnic relations. I hypothesized that during the post-Communist period,

153 The labels “liberal” and “conservative” (“organic-statist”) are context dependent, as the Communist past of both Poland and Russia greatly affects and alters what it means to be a “liberal” or a “conservative” in either one of them today. Also, as discussed in Chapter II, I use the term “conservative” to denote a uniquely Russian/European phenomenon. Unlike contemporary American conservatism whose defining features include defense of the free market capitalism, traditional social
attitudes of both Polish government-affiliated intellectuals and the public were moderately liberal and stable, while Russian government-affiliated intellectuals’ preferences shifted from strong liberal to strong organic-statist positions, a change which was not always accompanied by a parallel shift of public opinion. The short-term changes in Polish official discourse occurred around the time of the elections and subsequent rotations within the political elite. In general, however, I anticipated that the preferences of Polish government-affiliated intellectuals at the end of the research period resembled those in the beginning of the research period.

More specifically, I hypothesized that, politically, Polish government-affiliated intellectuals remained loyal to the initial inclusive understanding of democracy. In the ideological sphere, I expected to find that Polish government-affiliated intellectuals continued to embrace liberal principles of discourse. I hypothesized that throughout the research period Polish government-affiliated intellectuals favored both the free market and the governed market models. In the area of foreign relations, I expected to find a strong and stable pro-Western consensus. Finally, I anticipated to see an enduring combination of ethnically tolerant and nationalistic attitudes. My hypotheses were partially confirmed.

structures and values, minimal role of the state, religious revival, economic protectionism, and stricter immigration controls, its European counterpart is organized around authoritarian, statist, etatist, isolationist, and nationalist principles.

154 Analysis of nationalistic/ethnically tolerant attitudes in Poland, a fairly homogeneous country, is justified on three grounds. First, Poland has the problem of migrant workers/traders (mostly from Belorus, Ukraine, and Russia), whose presence often evokes strong xenophobic feelings. Second, Poland is subject to persistent anti-Semitic and anti-Roma reactions; despite the relatively low numbers of these minorities in today’s Poland, their role in the Polish society and history is assessed highly negatively by the Slavic majority. Finally, Poland is characterized by a strong degree of “outward” nationalism, a consequence of centuries-long foreign domination. As a result, there is an enduring debate about what it means to be Polish vis-à-vis other nations/cultures. One of the possible answers is the vision of “Pole as Catholic,” a conception which excludes all “others” from the definitions of Polishness. Of course, the ethnic problems in Poland do not have the same resonance as the ethnic
Procedures for Content Analysis of Polish Government-Affiliated Intellectuals’ Discourse

1. Sample Selection

As discussed in Chapter II, I operate with a sample of intellectuals whose public speeches reflect an official governmental position. As was the case in Russia, when selecting a sample of discourse communicators, I drew upon my own knowledge of the Polish case as well as insights from published accounts of confidants of the Polish political elite.¹⁵⁵ My original sample included 49 intellectual communicators of discourse who suited my criteria.¹⁵⁶ Not all of them were simultaneously included in the sample. The group of “government-affiliated intellectuals” underwent substantial rotation.¹⁵⁷ But, combined, the works of these intellectuals form the core of government-endorsing intellectual discourse and reflect the official position of Polish post-Communist governments.¹⁵⁸

Polish content analytic data was derived from 239 publications by 37 representatives¹⁵⁹ of Polish intellectual elite including Leszek Balcerowicz, deputy Prime

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¹⁵⁶ Although initially my sample was even larger and included 81 individuals, many of them did not fit my own selection criteria. For instance, it included representatives of the political elite proper (e.g., L. Miller, J. Buzek, A. Kwaśniewski, etc.), non-mainstream intellectual elite (e.g., father Rydzyk, etc.), influential intellectuals in their own right, who do not cooperate with or endorse the political elite (J. Szacki, E. Wnuk-Lipiński, J. Holzer, etc.), or the immigrant intellectual elite residing in Europe or the US for a significant period of time (Z. Brzeziński, J. Gedroyc, L. Kolakowski, A. Walicki, etc.). Upon more rigorous examination, I restricted the sample to 49 discourse communicators.
¹⁵⁷ For instance, works of Tadeusz Mazowiecki which appeared between 1994 and 1997, i.e., when he was in opposition, were excluded. Likewise, works of Jerzy Wiatr, written during his oppositional period, were not analyzed. For a more detailed discussion of the rotations among Polish government-affiliated intellectuals, see Table 36.
¹⁵⁸ The validity of the sample of discourse communicators was further confirmed by an independent source. Biała Księga polskiej sceny politycznej [White Book of Polish Political Scene] (Warsaw: ARS Print Production, 1997) lists the most important political actors in post-Communist Poland. It mentioned the majority of selected communicators.
¹⁵⁹ Russian data included 249 works by 26 communicators.
for reform of social security (1997), chief adviser of the Ministry of Finances in the
governments of Oleksy and Cimoszewicz (1995-1997), Minister of the Economy in the
government of Miller (2001-present); Cezary Józefiak, influential economist close to
president Wałęsa, member of the Council of Monetary Policies (since 1998); Jarosław
Kaczyński, head of Presidential Administration of president Wałęsa (1990-1991),
member of the Upper Chamber of Parliament (1989-1991) and the Lower Chamber of
Parliament (1991-1993); Józef Kaleta, member of the Lower Chamber of Parliament
(since 1991), one of the important economists of the Left; Grzegorz Kołodko, deputy
Prime Minister and Minister of Finances in the governments of Oleksy, Cimoszewicz,
Pawłak, and Miller (1994-1997, 2001-present); Waldemar Kuczyński, chief adviser to
the government of Mazowiecki, Minister of Privatization in the government of Bielecki
(1990-1991), chief economic adviser to Prime Minister Buzek (1997-2001); Jacek
Kuroń, Minister of Labor and Social Protection in the government of Mazowiecki (1989-
1990), member of the Lower Chamber of Parliament (since 1989), presidential candidate
(1995); Ryszard Legutko, conservative philosopher, important ideologue, editor-in-chief
of Arka, connected to conservative elements of the government of Buzek (1997-2001);
Janusz Lewandowski, Minister of Privatization in the governments of Bielecki and
1997-2001); Aleksander Piotr Luczak, member of the Lower Chamber of Parliament
(since 1989), deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Education in the
governments of Pawłak and Oleksy (1993-1995), chairman of the Committee of

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160 One publication by Lech Kaczyński, Jarosław Kaczyński's twin brother and close ally, one
publication authored by Grzegorz Kostrzewa-Zorbas, close friend and ally of Jarosław Kaczyński, one
publication by Antoni Macierewicz, Jarosław Kaczyński's ally and co-founder of conservative Ruch
dla Trzeciej Rzeczypospolitej, were counted as Jarosław Kaczyński's publications.
Scientific Research in the governments of Oleksy and Cimoszewicz (1995-1997);


Many prominent government-affiliated intellectuals who suited my selection criteria and whom I incorporated into the original content-analytic sample, including Lech Nikolski, Minister for European Integration in the government of Miller (2001-present) and Miller’s adviser and confidant; Michal Jagelło, deputy Minister of Culture (since 1990); and Jan Maria Rokita, senior administrator and shadowy ideologue in the government of Hanna Suchotska (1992-1993), did not produce publicly accessible statements. Although my sample is not exhaustive, it is, nonetheless, sufficient for a valid analysis.¹⁶¹

The unit of analysis was one publication. Its size or format did not matter. Only the content of the statement was important. Regardless of whether the statement was a newspaper interview, an article, a chapter in a book, or a monograph, what mattered was the articulation of attitudes with respect to specific textual indicators (see Tables 37 and 38).

¹⁶¹ See Appendix I for the list of sources analyzed during the Polish content analytic stage.
2. Operationalization of Categories for Content-Analysis

Content analytic data is extracted from the public statements of selected Polish intellectuals. In the course of Polish content analysis I used five liberal and five organic-statist (conservative) categories, which were paired into five dichotomies/issue domains. Each dichotomy contained a liberal and an organic-statist (conservative) category: 1) inclusive democracy -- managed democracy (political dichotomy); 2) liberalism/secularism/liberal Catholic ideology -- conservatism/statist ideology/conservative Catholic ideology (ideological dichotomy); 3) free market -- governed market (economic dichotomy); 4) pro-Western foreign policy -- independent/pro-Eastern foreign policy (foreign policy dichotomy); 5) ethnic tolerance -- nationalism (ethnic relations dichotomy).

Categories employed during the Polish phase of content analysis differ from categories used during the Russian phase. This variation reflects the difference in the menu of options available to Russian and Polish communicators. For instance, if Russian government-affiliated intellectuals can openly discuss authoritarianism, their Polish counterparts avoid this topic altogether. For the latter, political dilemma is reduced to inclusive vs. managed democracy. In other cases, the categories are identical (see, for instance, economic categories of the free and the governed market). Regardless of the labels assigned to the categories describing discourse in a particular country, I try to

162 I do not attach any normative significance to the terms “liberal,” “organic-statist,” or “conservative.” They are used simply to denote opposing positions.
163 “Managed democracy,” unlike its earlier equivalents, “elite democracy” and “delegative democracy,” which are traditionally reserved for Western and Latin American contexts respectively, is the term that is often applied to the post-Communist countries. Therefore, I chose to use it and not its older, context-specific, synonyms. In essence, managed democracy is not very different from the other two. It presupposes certain limitations on the ability of the public to exercise its rights in the political process and includes control of the opposition and the mass media, highly structured (and often predetermined) elections, elite autonomy, political centralization, and disdain for political parties as avenues of popular interest accumulation.
capture the spectrum of pro-governmental intellectual discussion and, ultimately, official position on politics, ideology, the economy, foreign policy, and ethnic relations.

**Choice of Dichotomies**

The choice of liberal -- organic-statist (conservative) categories is as essential in Poland as it was in the Russian case. The Polish database does not contain any other ideological divide. The categories of socialist discourse are missing, since in post-Communist Poland communicators of socialist discourse were excluded from the positions of power.

I deliberately avoid analysis based on party divisions, an analysis so often criticized in the Polish literature. Instead, I propose to look at the liberal – organic-statist dichotomy. My research question is: irrespective of partisanship, is there a shift from liberalism to organic-statism in the discourse of Polish government-affiliated intellectuals?

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164 See footnote 82 describing categories of the Russian socialist discourse.
165 Suffice to mention Piotr Ikonowicz of PPS (Polish Socialist Party).
166 Many researchers (see, for instance, Janusz Reykowski. “Spór między prawicą a lewicą: oś konfiktu społeczno-ekonomicznego” [“Debate Between the Right and the Left: Axis of Social and Economic Conflict”], in Naród. Władza. Społeczeństwo [People. State. Society], ed. Aleksandra Jasinska-Kania and Jacek Raciborski (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 1996); Jerzy Józef Wiatr. Nie zmarnowaliśmy tych lat: sejm, rząd, lewica [We Did Not Waste Those Years: Parliament, Government, the Left] (Warsaw: Adam Marszałek, 1998) contend that the distinction between the Right and the Left is not very useful, since many Polish parties espouse hybrid ideologies. My research, however, measures the attitudes towards various categories of liberalism and organic-statism (conservatism) irrespective of the combinations in which these categories appear in the programs of political parties.
The Polish political scene defies simple liberal -- organic-statist division. According to Table 35, only two types of actors, liberals and populists, can be qualified as liberal and organic-statist (respectively). Liberals with their belief in inclusive democracy, liberal ideology, individualism, modernity, free market, pro-Western foreign policy, and ethnic tolerance are the closest to my definition of the liberal orientation. The Populists' program corresponds to my definition of organic-statism which includes the support for managed democracy, belief in tradition, solidarity, and Christian values, endorsement of the governed market, a penchant for isolationist foreign policy, and nationalism.\(^{167}\) If liberals were included in the post-Communist political elite, pure

\(^{167}\) This discussion is close to what Paweł Śpiewak, "Polskie reformy, polski kapitalizm" ["Polish Reforms, Polish Capitalism"], in *Spór o Polskę 1989-1999 [Debates about Poland 1989-1999]* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2000) describes as Polish liberal and conservative discourses. According to him, the former encompasses a belief in western economic model of the free-market, democracy, individualistic vision of society, liberal values of responsibility, progress, globalization of international relations and ethnic tolerance. Radical conservative and populist parties espouse conservative discourse, in which the governed market elements are merged with categories of

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### Table 35
Polish Political Scene Divisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Dimensions</th>
<th>Economic Conservatism (Governed Market)</th>
<th>Economic Liberalism (Free Market)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideological and Ethnic Relations Dimensions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideological Conservatism (Conservative Ideology, Statism, Catholic Conservatism) and Nationalism</strong></td>
<td>Populist parties, radical conservative parties, Christian/National Democrats (Samoobrona, KPN, RdR, PChD, SLCh, ZChN, PSL, LPR)</td>
<td>Conservative parties (KLD, PK, PC, AWS, PiS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideological Liberalism (Liberal Ideology, Secularism, Liberal Catholic Ideology) and Tolerance</strong></td>
<td>Social Democrats, secular Left (SLD, UP)</td>
<td>Liberals (UD, UW, PO)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
organic-statists remained on the margins of Polish politics.\textsuperscript{168} However, elements of
organic-statism, to a varying degree, are present in the programs of social democrats and
conservatives, important actors on Polish post-Communist political scene. The former
espouse liberal orientations in all categories except the economy. Conservatives, on the
other hand, combine liberal economic beliefs with organic-statist ideological and ethnic
views. It follows that in post-Communist Poland the political elite included
representatives of liberal, conservative, or social-democratic, but never socialist, camps.
Accordingly, pro-governmental intellectual discourse contained exclusively liberal and
organic-statist elements.

As in the Russian case, no extant work analyzes Polish discourse both
longitudinally and according to several dichotomies (political, ideological, economic,
foreign policy, and ethnic relations). Several Polish researchers, including Boski (1993);
Reykowski (1993; 1996); and Wiatr (1998), indicate the existence of three cleavages.
Wiatr differentiates between economic, religious, and de-communization divisions.
Reykowski and Boski note that the Polish political elite is divided along economic (free
market vs. governed market), religious (secular state vs. participation of the Catholic
Church in public life), and national (nationalism vs. universalism) dichotomies. Although
outlining dividing lines, none of these authors provides empirical evidence to support his
contentions. This is the first attempt to study the body of written statements that comprise
the discourse of Polish government-affiliated intellectuals (and, hence, the official
position of Polish post-Communist political elite) both chronologically and according to

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item managed democracy, conservative (often Catholic) values, isolationist international relations, and
nationalist views.
\item The only exception is Polish Peasant Party (PSL) which forms a coalition with Social Democrats
(SLD).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
several dichotomous (liberal-conservative) categories. Chronological examination is valuable since it shows the evolution of liberal and organic-statist attitudes. The comprehensive analysis of several dichotomies/issue domains is also important, since it exposes patterns in the overall discourse and reveals the relative importance of specific dichotomies to the overall structure of discourse.

Extracting Categories from the Text

To extract each category of discourse from the text I use a set of original textual indicators and their synonyms (see Tables 37 and 38). The indicators were selected from a pilot reading of several works written by Polish government-affiliated intellectuals. Having textual indicators helps highlight the meanings that communicators attribute to specific categories.

In the political dichotomy, the liberal category of inclusive democracy is measured through positive references to “active citizenry,” “societal control over elites,” “public opinion,” “local self-government,” “defense of minorities’ political rights,” “free media,” “multipartism,” “elections are to make social demands evident and translate them into policies,” “constitutionality,” “parliamentarism,” “political opposition,” while the organic-statist category of managed democracy refers to “government as a guarantor of citizen’s well-being,” “government consists of the best people,” “elite autonomy,” “centralization,” “media are to inform citizens, not to criticize government,” “individuals, not parties are important in political conflicts,” “elections are for selection of the best people,” “political expediency governs political behavior,” “presidentialism,” “restrictions on political opposition.”
In the ideological dichotomy, the category of liberalism/secularism/liberal Catholicism is defined through positive references to “negative freedoms,” “separation of church and state, secular state,” “modernism, progress,” “liberal values,” “weak state, state for citizens, state as a night-watchman,” “vision of individual as rational and independent,” “conflict of interests,” “liberal rights,” “reasons for crime are economic and social,” “society and elite are fundamentally similar, society is self-sufficient,” whereas the category of statism/conservatism/Conservative Catholicism manifests itself in the favorable assessments of textual indicators of “positive freedoms,” “church as foundation of the state, political participation of church in state affairs,” “traditions,” “Christian values, conservative values,” “strong state, developmental state,” “vision of individual as part of organic whole,” “societal consensus, common good,” “elite is responsible for society,” “defense of traditional relations,” “order,” “death penalty.”

In the economic dichotomy, the liberal category of free market engenders beliefs in “market as main agent of economic development,” “quick privatization,” “selective social protection,” “economic justice,” “price liberalization,” “liberalization of free trade,” “low taxes,” “balanced budget,” “universal neo-liberal economic development,” while the organic-statist category of governed market refers to the positive evaluations of the following textual indicators: “state can help market in economic development,” “slow and selective privatization,” “universal social protection,” “social justice, equality,” “price control,” “protectionism,” “tax increase,” “deficit spending,” and “national economic model.”

In the foreign policy dichotomy, the liberal pro-Western category is defined through the positive references of textual indicators, including “European integration,”
“NATO membership,” “globalization,” “relations with the West,” and “idealistic interpretation of foreign relations, internationalism,” whereas the organic-statist independent or pro-Eastern category manifests itself in the textual indicators of “Poland outside EU,” “Poland outside NATO,” “isolationism,” “relations with East and South,” and “realist interpretation of foreign relations.”

Finally, in the ethnic relations dichotomy, the liberal category of ethnic tolerance is defined as “ethnic equality,” “multiculturalism,” “peaceful solutions to ethnic problems,” “universal values,” “respect for ethnic minorities,” while the organic-statist category of nationalism is measured through positive references to “ethnic inequality,” “preservation of national culture and traditions,” “military solution to ethnic conflicts,” “national values and ideas,” and “anti-Semitism.”

Analysis of the Polish data faces the standard problem of different meanings assigned to the textual indicators. By simply looking at predetermined or fixed textual indicators, one cannot make meaningful inferences. The words “rights,” “freedom,” “ethnicity,” “equality,” “law and order,” “market,” “European integration” and many others may have significantly different meanings depending on the context in which they are used. This problem, however, can be alleviated. Synonyms can easily reveal the spectrum of meanings assigned to a specific textual indicator. The latter attribute of synonyms is especially important in my analysis because, depending on a word/combination of words being used, a particular indicator may be placed under different categories.

169 See Chapter II, Section “Extracting Categories from the Text,” for a more detailed discussion of this issue.

170 For instance, “European integration” may mean “Eurobureaucracy,” “Poland’s joining the EU,” or “Europe of fatherlands.” “Freedom” can mean “freedom to” or “freedom from.” Equality may be understood as “equality of opportunity,” “material equality,” “partial equality,” or “total equality.”
The synonyms, which were refined in the course of content analysis, reflect the nuances of meanings that can be attributed to textual indicators and help to make content analytic data more uniform. They homogenize data across communicators and across time. For instance, although different Polish communicators may praise family, religious community, or nation as an important social structuring block, one important message conveyed by all these examples is a positive evaluation of the “organic vision of society,” irrespective of the “organism” in question. Support for “economic justice” is understood regardless of whether a communicator endorses the terms “competition,” “efficiency,” “equality of opportunity,” or “natural character of inequality.” Alternatively, support for “social justice” is expressed through positive references to “redistribution,” “equality of material conditions,” or “protection of the weak members of the society.” Discussions about Poland’s membership in the European structures evolved from the debate between those who supported “European House” and those who favored “Europe of Fatherlands/local communities” to “Europeanists” versus “Eurosceptics,” supporters of quick integration into the EU and proponents of cautious attitudes towards the European bureaucracy. Regardless of the wording, I measure attitudes to “EU membership” or to “Poland being outside the European structures.”

3. Coding Criteria

Each occurrence of a textual indicator was coded according to pre-determined evaluative criteria. The number of mentions was not recorded, only the overall attitude toward a particular textual indicator. The assigned values ranged from “-1” (“negative assessment of textual indicator”) to “+1” (“positive assessment of textual indicator”). Value “0” was assigned if a textual indicator was evaluated neutrally.
Positive evaluations ("+1") were recorded if a textual indicator was associated with a) positive epithets (e.g., "desirable," "necessary," "appropriate," "urgently needed," etc.); b) positive verbs used in connection with an indicator ("should be promoted," "should be included," "must be adopted," "need to be reached," etc.); and c) goals or instruments leading to positive outcomes ("partnership with the West leads to investment and economic growth," "our goal is to support domestic producers," etc.).

Conversely, negative evaluations ("-1") were given if a textual indicator was associated with: a) negative epithets (e.g., "undesirable," "baneful," "terrible," etc.); b) negative verbs ("should be eliminated," "have to be avoided," "do not include," etc.); and c) negative outcomes or mechanisms leading to negative outcomes ("Eastern neighbors always threatened Polish independence," "global values will destroy our Polish way of life," etc.).

A neutral evaluation ("0") is a cumulative evaluation that is based on the presence of both positive and negative attitudes toward a particular indicator. For instance, phrases, "social protection of the population is ineffective, but unavoidable," or "although results of European integration may be destructive for Polish economy, we do not have an alternative to the multi-million hard currency investment it will bring," contain both positive and negative assessments of the textual indicators. The overall evaluations of such indicators were recorded as neutral. Even if a textual indicator was predominantly assessed as positive or negative, the mere existence of the opposite evaluation made the overall value neutral.
4. Examples of Evaluations

The following citations, taken from the database, illustrate the coding of textual indicators:

**Political Dichotomy.** In the phrase, “I believe that Poland must have strong presidential power,” textual indicator “presidentialism” (organic-statist category of managed democracy) is valued as “+1” (case b, association with positive verbs). The phrase, “We should create parliamentary mechanisms to protect the minority against the inevitable arbitrary nature of the majority,” contains textual indicator “protection of minority’s rights” (liberal category of inclusive democracy). It is assigned a positive value, since it is associated with a positive verb (case b).

**Ideological Dichotomy.** In the fragment, “There is no well-being of the state without well-being of the citizens. The greatness of the nation and the state can only be achieved when the citizens are happy and prosperous,” textual indicator “state is for the citizens” (category of liberalism) is represented by its synonym (“well-being of the state is the well-being of its citizens”), which is evaluated positively (case c, association with positive goals and outcomes). In the citation, “Our country needs a strong state... which would realize the common good,” textual indicators “strong state,” “common good” (category of conservatism) are valued positively (case b, association with positive verbs and case c, association with positive goals and outcomes).

**Economic Dichotomy.** The phrase, “The best results are generated by an economy strongly connected to the international market,” contains a positive evaluation of the synonym of textual indicator “liberalization of foreign trade” (“economy connected to the international market”) (liberal category of free market) (case c, association with positive goals and outcomes). The phrase, “I believe that the idea of social justice is a beautiful
and correct idea,” is an example of a positive value assigned to textual indicator “social justice” (organic-statist category of governed market) (case a, association with positive epithets).

Foreign Policy Dichotomy: The phrase, “It is in our interest that now, when Poland has relative freedom of maneuver, it uses its chance and joins the West as soon as possible,” contains a positive evaluation of the textual indicator “partnership with the West” (liberal category of pro-Western foreign policy) (case c, association with positive goals and outcomes). The fragment, “I support a Europe of local communities.... They [the liberals] propose the supranational federation. This cannot be accepted,” contains synonyms of two textual indicators – “European integration” (“supranational federation”) (liberal category of pro-Western foreign policy) and “Poland outside the EU” (“Europe of local communities”) (organic-statist category of independent foreign policy). The first indicator is assigned a negative value (case b, association with negative verbs). The second one is valued positively (case b, association with positive verbs).

Dichotomy of Ethnic Relations: In the phrase, “We need to underscore the threat that other cultures may represent for Poland,” synonym of the liberal textual indicator “multiculturalism” (“other cultures”) is evaluated negatively (case c, association with negative goals and outcome). The phrase, “In contemporary Poland, anti-Semitism is a shameful sickness and it should be eradicated using appropriate tools,” contains the textual indicator “anti-Semitism” (organic-statist category of nationalism). This textual indicator is valued negatively (cases a and b, association with negative epithets and verbs).
5. Stages of Quantitative Content Analysis

The content analytic phase of my research on the Polish case consisted of four steps. First, I selected a group of government-affiliated intellectuals. Next, I refined four distinct phases within the Polish post-Communist period that roughly corresponded to four parliamentary cycles: liberal period (1989-1993), social-democratic period (1993-1997), mixed liberal period (1997-2001), and mixed social-democratic period (2001-present). I then divided the group of government-affiliated intellectuals into four subgroups: 1) intellectuals associated with the political elite during the first liberal period; 2) intellectuals affiliated with the ruling regime during the second social-democratic period; 3) intellectuals associated with the political elite during the third mixed liberal period; and 4) intellectuals affiliated with the governing elite during the fourth mixed social-democratic period. Such subdivisions ensured that I collected data exclusively from government-affiliated intellectuals actively cooperating with the government and that all sub-periods were represented.

Next, I located all publicly accessible statements produced by the government-affiliated intellectuals during the research period. I performed a content analysis on these documents and recorded results in coding tables (see Appendix H). Finally, the values of individual textual indicators and categories in general were aggregated chronologically (by year) (see Tables 37 and 38). For each year I calculated the mean for every textual indicator and category in general (sum of values divided by the number of mentions of a given textual indicator/category). Figures 83-87 depict the results of content analysis in the most general way. They trace the evolution of the discourse and value orientations of Polish government-affiliated intellectuals during the post-Communist period.
Table 36

Subgroups of Polish Government-Affiliated Intellectuals¹⁷¹

|---|---|---|---|

¹⁷¹ An asterisk denotes intellectuals present in more than one period.
### Table 37

Summary of the Evaluations of Categories and Textual Indicators of Polish Liberal Discourse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category: Textual Indicator</th>
<th>Means (sum of evaluations divided by the number of mentions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Years</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inclusive Democracy:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Citizenry</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal Control Over Political Elites</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Opinion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Self-Government</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense of Minorities’ Political Rights</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Media</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multipartism</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections Are to Make Social Demands Evident</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutionality</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamnetarism</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Opposition</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean for Category</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liberal Ideology/Secularism/Catholic Left:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Freedoms</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separation of Church and State, Secular State</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernism, Progress</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Values</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak State, State as a Night-Watchman</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vision of Individual as Rational and Independent</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict of Interests</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Rights</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasons for Crime Are Social</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society and Elite are Equal, Society is Self-Sufficient</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 37 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mean for Category</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>0.82</th>
<th>0.73</th>
<th>0.43</th>
<th>0.46</th>
<th>0.7</th>
<th>0.8</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>-0.08</th>
<th>0.69</th>
<th>0.41</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>0.75</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Free Market Economic Model:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market as a Main Agent of Economic Development</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>-0.67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quick Privatization</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selective Social Protection</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Justice</td>
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<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price Liberalization</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberalization of Foreign Trade</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Taxes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Balanced Budget</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universal Neo-Liberal Economic Development</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean for Category</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pro-Western Foreign Policy:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Integration</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1</td>
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Table 38

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Conservative Ideology/Statism/Catholic Conservatism:
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<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean for Category</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>-0.86</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Quantitative Content Analysis of Polish Government-Affiliated Intellectuals' Discourse

Evolution of Political Dichotomy

As hypothesized, Polish government-affiliated intellectuals exhibit positive attitudes towards inclusive democracy. Despite some slight variation, the overall trends are clear. Positive evaluations of inclusive democracy consistently outweigh the negative evaluations of managed democracy. The latter is viewed in a decidedly negative manner. The only minor surges in its popularity coincide with the parliamentary elections (1993/1994 and 1997/1998) and may be a sign of electoral populism. As part of the election campaign, government-affiliated intellectuals tend to describe their political patrons, the political elite, as more knowledgeable of and better suited to conduct political processes than the population at large. Intellectuals’ misgivings about inclusive democracy also appear to be triggered by a mistrust of the general public who may prefer political opponents of the ruling elite. As a result, during national elections, inclusive

Figure 83. Dynamics of Political Systems' Evaluations by the Polish Elite

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democracy, a political system in which the general population is given a stronger role, becomes more suspect, while elite, or managed democracy is viewed more favorably.

Evolution of Ideological Dichotomy

Contrary to my initial hypothesis, the ideological preferences of Polish government-affiliated intellectuals underwent a transformation. In general, the Polish intellectual elite drifted in the direction of ideological conservatism. The increasing popularity of conservatism, whose appeal nearly doubled during the research period, rather than the firm rejection of liberalism, accounts for this shift.

Figure 84 can be divided into two periods. During the first period (1989-1998), both liberal and social democratic intellectuals associated with governing political elites shared a commitment to ideological liberalism (with an exception of conservative periods in 1993 and 1997). Characteristically, conservative upsurges occur around the time of parliamentary elections. If the 1997 increase coincides with political strengthening of the conservatives after the 1997 parliamentary elections, the 1993 rise is more difficult to explain, given that the 1993 elections were won by the ideologically liberal, albeit pro-governed market, Social Democrats (SLD). Conservative overtures to the general public around the time of the parliamentary elections could be a sign of SLD’s courting more conservative voters. I will return to this discussion in the next chapter when I analyze relationship between Polish post-Communist public opinion and the elite’s value orientations.

172 A coalition of conservative AWS and liberal UW won the elections this year.
During the current parliamentary cycle (1999-present), however, intellectual discourse is heterogeneous, with both ideological options presenting strong alternatives. This heterogeneity signals acute ideological struggle, the outcome of which is by no means decided. Importantly, this struggle is not a function of the rotation between the post-Communist political elites. Both liberal-conservative (1999-2001) and social democratic (2001 – present) intellectual elites lack a defining ideology.

This ideological conflict might be further reinforced by the clash within the Catholic Church, a dominant force shaping Polish ideological scene. Polish Catholicism is not homogeneous. It consists of two distinct wings, each with its own traditions, spokesmen, media outlets, and, most importantly, ideological program. The left wing of progressive or humanist Catholicism is characterized by beliefs in human dignity and rationality, democracy, secular state, more liberal social mores, universal values, while right wing of conservative Catholicism is known for its almost Augustinian mistrust of the human beings, nationalism and endorsement of Polish uniqueness and messianism,
espousal of rabid anti-Semitism, and attempts to center public life around religious
principles (including the end of the separation of the church and state, graphic anti­
abortion campaigns, etc.). Each camp has a strong presence in the Polish politics and
society. Even the Pope's ideological positions defy simple characterizations. On the hand,
his proclamations about democracy, European integration, and tolerance place him
squarely in the camp of liberal Catholics. On the other hand, his social stance on
abortions and gays reveal a more conservative agenda.

Evolution of Economic Dichotomy

During the research period Polish government-affiliated intellectuals held mixed
economic attitudes (see Figure 85). Although the free market model was viewed
favorably -- in fact, more favorably than the governed market model -- its advantage has
been slipping. The free market alternative lost some of its appeal, while the neutral
evaluations of the governed market model, despite periodic swings, are stable. Economic
attitudes of the Polish intellectual elite are especially sensitive to parliamentary elections
cycles.

\[ \text{Figure 85. Dynamics of Economic Models' Evaluations by the Polish Elite} \]
Figure 85 can be divided into four periods which roughly correspond to the electoral changes within political (and intellectual) elites. The first period (1989-1992) coincides with Balcerowicz' liberal economic reforms. Not surprisingly, the free market model is evaluated favorably. In 1993-1997 social-democratic elites come to power and government-affiliated intellectuals embrace the governed market model. When the Left is replaced by the center-Right coalition, the free market model is viewed more positively (1997-2001). Currently, intellectuals affiliated with the center-Left governing coalition favor the governed market model.

**Evolution of Foreign Policy Dichotomy**

Visibly, the Polish intellectual elite prefers a pro-Western foreign policy option to the independent or pro-Eastern course. Yet, the overwhelmingly pro-Western stance of Polish government-affiliated intellectuals conceals ambiguous attitudes towards independent or pro-Eastern policy. A particularly strong conflict between pro-Western and pro-Eastern foreign policy orientations occurred in 1995 and 1997, i.e., during the period when Poland and Russia were engaged in a bitter disagreement over NATO’s eastward expansion. The revival of independent or pro-Eastern foreign policy course also took place under social democratic political elites, who are traditionally more sympathetic to the Eastern option. It appears that only intellectuals of social-democratic persuasion seriously consider the Eastern foreign policy direction. But even they view it

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173 Grzegorz Pozarlik confirms stability of Polish post-Communist foreign policy discourse. “Polish Political Parties and Discourse on Polish Raison D’Etat on the Eve of the European Union Membership.” In *Between Animosity and Utility: Political Parties and Their Matrix*, ed. Hieronim Kubiak and Jerzy J. Wiatr (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2000) who analyzed Polish political discourse on the eve of the EU ascension and found the general consensus among all parties of Polish political scene regarding the European integration. The differences are insignificant and concern speed, strategy, and cost-benefit analysis of Poland’s membership in the EU, not the fundamental question of membership itself.
only as a diplomatic maneuver to offset dangers associated with a frustrated Russia.

Figure 86. Dynamics of Foreign Policy Alternatives' Evaluations by the Polish Elite

Evolution of Ethnic Relations Dichotomy

Throughout the research period, Polish government-affiliated intellectuals consistently subscribed to tolerant attitudes. Behind this stability, however, there is an ambiguity regarding nationalism. The conflict between tolerant and more nationalistic views is especially pronounced in 1993 and 1996. A nationalistic upsurge during the SLD term (1993-1997) may be viewed as electoral strategy to win additional votes. Although the SLD expresses tolerant ethnic views, a nod in a nationalistic direction certainly would not jeopardize the votes of its core electorate (which identifies with the Social Democrats' stand on the economic issues), but could bring additional votes from more nationalistic constituencies. However, nationalistic attitudes appear to be a temporary tactical maneuver and not an inherent feature of Polish government-affiliated intellectuals. Such apparently populist electoral strategy is significant. A fact that a ruling elite can employ populist organic-statist slogans and discourse during an election, but

174 Compare this strategy with my discussion of the reasons for anti-Western discourse of Russian liberal intellectuals in Chapter III and the analysis of the Polish elite's political and ideological preferences in this chapter.

225
later distance itself from them indirectly speaks to the overall stability of dominant liberal discourse. As with managed democracy, which enters the elite’s discussions only during election years, ethnic nationalism is neither serious nor enduring option.

![Figure 87. Dynamics of Ethnic Relations Alternatives' Evaluations by the Polish Elite](image)

Figure 87. Dynamics of Ethnic Relations Alternatives' Evaluations by the Polish Elite

***

Ultimately, discourse of Polish government-affiliated intellectuals did not change. If in the beginning of the research period they championed an ethnically tolerant, pro-Western, democratic state with liberal ideology and the free market economy, at the end of the 13-year period covered by my research, their ideal polity looked remarkably similar (see Table 39). Polish government-affiliated intellectuals not only remained loyal to their original liberal preferences, but, in some cases, strengthened their convictions (pro-Western foreign policy, liberal ideology). Only the free market model lost its appeal. At the same time, conservative ideology and the governed market model, two elements of the organic-statist discourse, reinforced their positions. Ideological and economic issue domains represent areas of the most acute conflict. However, even in the areas, in which
the elite leaned more towards the conservative pole of the dichotomy, original liberal orientations still prevail.

Analysis of the Relative Importance of Individual Dichotomies in the Overall Discourse and Periodization of Discourse According to Dominant Dichotomies.

Figures 88 and 89 show the evolution of the relative importance of each dichotomy, measured as the prevalence of its elements in overall Polish discourse. Throughout the research period, economic discussions predominated. The importance of economic issues in overall discourse increased with time and peaked in 1996-1997 and

Table 39
Five Most Preferred Categories in the Beginning (1989-1991) and at the End (2000-2002) of the Post-Communist Period in Poland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Tolerance</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>Pro-Western Foreign Policy</td>
<td>2.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Western Foreign Policy</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>Liberal Ideology</td>
<td>2.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusive Democracy</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>Inclusive Democracy</td>
<td>2.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Ideology</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>Ethnic Tolerance</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Market Model</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>Conservative Ideology</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* As follows from Table 39, the last period lacks the consensus of the first one. As mentioned in the text, there is less agreement on contemporary ideology or economic policy.
2002, around the parliamentary elections and during the important EU negotiations. In general, the economy is more prominent in the discourse of the social-democratic elites (1993-1997 and 2001-2002) than in the discourse of their liberal opponents. Political and ideological issues are inherently interconnected. They represented the dominant themes of the original intellectual discourse, but their importance decreased with time. The popularity of the debate about foreign relations, on the contrary, has a tendency to strengthen. Ethnic relations are the least important reference point in the intellectual discourse of this period.

![Figure 88. Frequencies (Relative) of Mentions of Various Dichotomies in the Discourse of Polish Government-Affiliated Intellectuals](image)

It follows from the analysis summarized above that the structure of Polish elite intellectuals' discourse changed. The first period (1989-1992) is characterized by the domination of political and ideological elements of discourse. In the following period (1993-1997) discourse became primarily economic. Contemporary discourse (1998-
present) is organized around two important structuring elements – political-ideological and economic.

The periodization reflects rotations among Polish government-affiliated intellectuals. Liberal intellectuals tend to be more concerned with the political-ideological and foreign policy issues, while social democratic intellectuals concentrate on the economic debate. The structural changes in discourse thus reveal that, despite a general consensus on the post-Communist priorities, social-democratic and liberal intellectuals prefer different paths to achieve these goals. For liberals, success comes from a stable

Figure 89. Trends in Relative Importance of Individual Dichotomies in the Discourse of Polish Government-Affiliated Intellectuals

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democratic system and partnership with the West, while for social democrats success is built on the solid foundation of the governed market. More importantly, the periodization suggests that after experimenting with discrete (economic or political) elements of official discourse, the contemporary Polish intellectual elite is increasingly engaged in a more well-balanced discussion.

**Qualitative Content Analysis of Polish Government-Affiliated Intellectuals' Discourse**

Unlike Russian government-affiliated intellectuals, their Polish counterparts consciously tried to sustain the principles of the original, liberal discourse. “The change should be limited only to accents, nuances, and instruments. This is the best for our [Polish] case” (Skubiszewski *Rzeczpospolita* 29 September 1993). The following quotations demonstrate the stability of or minor modifications in Polish intellectual discourse in the post-Communist period. Since there is no appreciable difference between the original and the current discourse of Polish government-affiliated intellectuals (with the exception of ideological and economic issue domains), I opted to organize quotations by dichotomies/issue domains and not according to the sub-periods used in the chapter discussing the Russian content analytic data.

1. Political Dichotomy

According to my quantitative content analysis, Polish government-affiliated intellectuals consistently favor inclusive democracy. The following quotations, arranged in chronological order, support this conclusion. Regardless of their loyalties to liberal, conservative, or social-democratic political elites, all government-affiliated intellectuals upheld the principles of inclusive democracy. The greater frequency of quotations during
the early post-Communist period reflects the dominance of the political and ideological issues in the structure of overall discourse rather than a decline in support for inclusive democracy.

"Government must create mechanisms which will allow it to listen to the voice of public opinion.... We want public opinion to have an influence on the state affairs in Poland and we will listen to its voice" (Mazowiecki Rzeczpospolita 13 September 1989). "Society must have an opportunity to observe the process of decision-making, must have a chance to learn about the arguments, and, finally, must have an opportunity to express its opinion through the mass media as well as various organizations which articulate interests and views of diverse social groups" (Geremek 1990, 292). "Parliamentary democracy is ... an important ingredient of our vision of the future" (Najder Rzeczpospolita 29 December 1989-1 January 1990). "The most urgent task now is the creation of real territorial self-government which means building democracy from below" (Mazowiecki Trybuna Luda 19 January 1990). "We should create parliamentary mechanisms to protect the minority against the inevitable arbitrary nature of the majority" (Zakrzewska Prawo w zmieniającym się społeczeństwie 1992). "I see the most important remedy for current, unhealthy situation in the authentic, not merely declarative, involvement of citizens in the process of governing. It can be done through local self-government, through all cells of social life, in which a vast number of people can realize themselves" (Strzembosz Powsiągłość i Praca 4 1993). "Obviously, the future state must be a parliamentary democracy...." (Zakrzewska Państwo i Prawo 11 1993). "It appears, however, that if a country accepts a strong presidential model ... its current difficulties will only deepen and political conflicts will intensify" (Wiatr Myśl
Socjaldemokratyczna 3-4 1994). “Institutions of parliamentary democracy are essential elements of democratic system” (Michnik 1995, 127). “It must be a vision of Poland in which civil society will be an everyday partner of state institutions and will be able to identify with these institutions” (Michnik 1995, 130). “The parliamentary system is safer than the presidential system, or even a mixed presidential-parliamentary system” (Wiatr 2001, 33).

2. Ideological Dichotomy

Polish government-affiliated intellectuals are uncertain about the best ideological option. During the research period, the balance between liberalism and conservatism changed in favor of the latter. In recent years (1999 – present), conservative overtones dominate intellectual discussions. The following quotations, arranged chronologically, show the mixed ideological leanings of Polish government-affiliated intellectuals and their increasing interest in conservatism.

Liberal orientations are evident in the statements that reject a religious state, social/positive freedoms and support the weak definition of the state (state for the citizens) and liberal values: “There is no well-being of the state without well-being of the citizens. The greatness of the nation and the state can only be achieved when citizens are happy and prosperous” (Zakrzewska Krytyka 36 1991). “The postulate of a confessional state is not acceptable” (J. Kaczyński 1992a, 159). “The government and state administration should not teach the citizens about moral values and acceptable lifestyles” (Hall 1993, 68). “We are convinced that the idea of a secular state does not contain any alarming elements” (Zakrzewska Więź 6 1993). “State is and must be neutral” (Wiatr 1993, 112). “I support secular schools, schools without religious instruction” (Zieliński...
"To speak about social [positive] freedom is a dangerous rhetoric" (Michnik 1995, 606). "The school cannot be an institution which forces a single standpoint" (Wiatr 1998a, 65).

Conservative themes include positive evaluations of morality, Christian values, common good, strengthening the criminal justice system, and the developmental state: "One needs a well-defined vision of a common good, a common goal. I think that today there is no such a vision. ...[W]e still need a vision which would be based on basic moral values and would allow us to incorporate Christian ethics" (Najder Rzeczpospolita 29 December 1989-1 January 1990). “I think that today our society must recognize that the Polish state is the highest value in public life” (Najder Rzeczpospolita 17-18 February 1990). “I believe that the ban on the death penalty is wrong. It is not only illogical; it is immoral” (J. Kaczyński 1992b, 149, 152). “Our country needs a strong state ... which would realize common good and not the interests of particular strata” (Parys 1993a, 79). “We should relate to the world of moral values, honesty, hard work ethic. This is an alternative to the propositions of the liberals, or to what, at least, dominates their vision, i.e., concern for individual motivation, entrepreneurial abilities, and desire to take charge of one’s own life. I support the Christian inspiration, I support the presence of the Church in the public life, I support serious treatment of fundamental issues, including respect for the right to life” (Hall 1993, 136-137). “I am concerned first and foremost, about certain recidivism of pathological features of our national character.... I refer to the overgrowth of the Polish individualism, which leads to permanent conflict and lack of ability to act collectively.... Private interests become more important than common good; individual ambition and group interests outweigh common interest” (Nowak-Jeziorański 1999, 128).
“The position that there is no place for Christian values is an anti-intellectual position”
(Bartoszewski 16 November 2000, 167).

3. Economic Dichotomy

Polish government-affiliated intellectuals are divided between the free market and the governed market models. The rivalry between the two models is primarily a function of rotations among the Polish political elite in general and government-affiliated intellectuals in particular. Unlike other areas, intellectual economic attitudes seem to depend on the differences in economic agenda of ruling elites. This time I subdivided the quotations according to the four electoral cycles during which liberal and social-democratic elites alternated. The intensity of the discussion was significantly stronger in the beginning of the research period. Currently, the fervor of economic debate subsided.

During the first, liberal, period (1989-1993) both liberal and conservative intellectuals promoted the free market model: “Privatization … must be started as soon as possible and on the broadest possible scale” (Mazowiecki Rzeczpospolita 28 May 1990). “A radical program of economic liberalism is imperative for democratization” (Geremek Tygodnik Powszechny 17 April 1990). “The government must not regulate prices” (Kuroń 1991, 8). “We always understood the necessity of protecting the program of Balcerowicz…. Balcerowicz’ plan was great and we wanted to protect it” (J. Kaczyński 1991, 92, 122). “I knew for a long time that the very idea of planned transformation of our economy is erroneous. We must introduce free market immediately, quickly, which means that we must liberalize prices and freeze wage” (Kuroń 1991, 14-15). “The best results are generated by the economy strongly connected to the international market” (Balcerowicz 1992, 110). “The state budget must be
balanced, which means that the state should not spend more than it collects” (Kuczyński 1992, 100). “We must privatize and privatize quickly” (Balcerowicz Przegląd Polityczny, Special Issue 1993).

During the second, social-democratic, period (1993-1997) the free-market model is criticized, while the governed market model is viewed positively: “The mistakes of the economic policy were not simply technical problems, i.e., they were not the partial (or even main) result of wrong economic analysis. Their fundamental error was a dogmatic acceptance of the neo-liberal program and in forcing the changes dictated by neo-liberalism at any cost…. Doctrinaires of neo-liberalism subconsciously followed communist doctrinaires who governed Poland during the last forty years and who forced wrong solutions in the name of the doctrine, even though it was a different doctrine then” (Wiatr 1993, 35). “All civilized countries whose economy is developing dynamically and effectively have a social market with a substantial degree of state intervention. There the share of public financing is steadily increasing…. State economic intervention is especially imperative in Poland…..” (Kaleta 1993, 2). “The state cannot move away from its responsibility for enormous unemployment and increasing pauperization of society. It has a responsibility to provide social security to the society” (Kaleta 1993, 11). “Changes in the type of property like other changes in economic system must take place during many years. The distance between socialism and capitalism cannot be passed in one giant leap” (Modżelewski 1993, 45). “Populism is a response to the outcomes of socially erroneous and often irresponsible and unimaginative neo-liberal economic policy…. It is exactly neo-liberalism that breeds populism” (Kołodko 1993, 129). “I support a social market, which means that I support a market economy in which some market processes
are controlled by the state, especially when the market cannot solve its own problems” (Zielinski 1995, 267). “The state has a vital role in the economy including industrial development” (Kołodko 1996, 19). “Social justice is not only a desirable element of human behavior or personal relationship, but it is also an important principle of the legal system” (Winczorek Rzeczpospolita 25 June 1996).

The attractiveness of the free market model returned during the third, liberal, period (1997-2001): “We should relieve the state of some of its responsibilities in the areas of education, health, social security, job accidents, and old age protection.... The less the state is involved, the better for the society, which will then form a strong ability to count on itself and to be thrifty. This is how [initial] capital can be accumulated” (J. Kaczyński 1997, 145) “The economy must be based on the free market, low and simple taxes, clear law, good public finances (absence of deficit), and be privatized” (Balcerowicz 1999b, 179).

During the fourth, social-democratic, period (2001-present) intellectual economic preferences changed in favor of the governed market option: “The naïve faith of some of politicians and economists that the quick privatization and liberalization of the market will result in a natural development of the economy, spectacular growth of production, and national well-being must be corrected” (Kołodko 2001b, 73). “The state is, thus, efficient, if it corrects market accesses, and helps the market to function better. The state should fulfill these functions....” (Kołodko 2002a, 79).

4. Foreign Policy

The quotations selected for this dichotomy illustrate the stability of Polish elite intellectuals’ pro-Western attitudes. The quoted statements also reveal remarkable
similarity between the positions of liberal, conservative, and social-democratic elites.

"European and North American directions of our foreign policy have priority"

(Skubiszewski Życie Warszawy 24 July 1991). “It is in our interest that now, when Poland has a relative freedom of maneuver, it uses its chance and joins the West as soon as possible” (Olszewski 1992, 62). “The goal which stood and still stands before Poland is the issue of real entry into Western structures, both security structures [NATO] and economic organizations.... The most important road for Poland is integration into Western European structures” (J. Kaczyński 1992a, 87, 94). “The thought that we should isolate ourselves from the European Union means that ... we will remain in our poverty and backwardness, which will quickly deepen” (Kuroń 1992c, 226). “We already adopted a correct decision about Poland’s integration into the European Union” (Najder 1993, 267). “Ideas and projects which separate our country ... from Western European or trans-Atlantic security structures are mere illusions.... Such ideas, if realized, threaten to push us towards civilizational backwardness and jeopardize our security ” (Skubiszewski Rzeczpospolita 29 September 1993). “We see the main guarantee of Polish security in the European-Atlantic option of foreign policy, including NATO membership” (Wiatr 1998a, 102). “The fact that Poland belongs to the European Union is beyond discussion” (Bartoszewski October 2, 2000). “We now stand in the presence of our historical calling, our ascension into the European Union” (Nowak-Jeziorański 2001, 206).

5. Ethnic Relations

Despite different political persuasions, government-affiliated intellectuals are able to reach a consensus on ethnic issues. Selected quotations demonstrate intellectual support for ethnic tolerance and condemnation of ethnic hatred: “Chauvinism and
xenophobia bring about intolerance, condemn national culture to be provincial and weak. Those are deadly threats” (Michnik Gazeta Wyborcza 29 January 1990). “We would like for other ethnic groups to feel that Poland is their home, that they can cultivate their language. Their culture enriches our culture” (Mazowiecki Trybuna Ludu 19 January 1990). “It is a known fact that the current manifestations of anti-Semitism in our country … destroy the image of our young democracy, create obstacles on our road to cultural and spiritual integration with Europe. But much more important than the image of Poland abroad is the harm that anti-Semitism inflicts on our national and Christian ethos” (Turowicz Tygodnik Powszechny 17 February 1991). “Anti-Semitism has an evil shadow” (Michnik Gazeta Wyborcza 22 April 1991). “Traditions of the state without the Inquisition stakes, republic of numerous peoples, open and tolerant society are among the most beautiful Polish traditions” (Michnik Gazeta Wyborcza 22 April 1991). “Anti-Semitism is a sickness, which, although it applies to a small fraction of the Polish public life, has a tendency to grow stronger…. Anti-Semitism is a malignant virus, which first inserts itself in one cell of the body only to eventually poison and kill the whole organism” (Michnik Gazeta Wyborcza 22 April 1991). “I feel immediate resentment when I hear about the uniqueness of the Polish people, their sense of mission” (Michnik Polityka Polska December 1990 – February 1991). “I … support a tolerant state, a state which would have a place for numerous and diverse cultures, different biographies and points of view. I support a state which will create long-lasting democracy, I support open society, which is able to protect itself against barbarian invasion of hatred. Anti-Semitism always speaks the language of this barbaric hatred” (Michnik Gazeta Wyborcza 22 April 1991). “In contemporary Poland anti-Semitism is a shameful sickness and it should be
eradicated with appropriate tools” (Najder 1993, 96). “I do not approve … the language of national discrimination, rejection of certain categories of people based exclusively on their past, religious, ethnic, or cultural identity” (Michnik 1995, 562). “History teaches us that attempts to assimilate or discriminate against ethnic groups, to limit their freedom or use force against them always end up in defeat and threaten the state” (Nowak-Jeziorański 1999, 202).

**Importance of Public Opinion for Polish Government-Affiliated Intellectuals**

Initially, the discourse of Russian government-affiliated intellectuals omitted any references to public opinion. However, intellectual articulators of contemporary conservative discourse came to rely on public opinion as a justification for the elite’s actions. In Poland, on the other hand, public opinion was especially important in the beginning of the research period: “There is certainly a public opinion consensus [regarding directions of Polish foreign policy] about which we are now talking” (Skubiszewski *Trybuna* 06-07 April 1991). “This is when we created a Department of Public Opinion Research. That department was, of course, a new undertaking in our post-socialist administrative structures…. The department met once every two weeks and published its own bulletin, which contained current public opinion trends. It also conducted its own research. Once a month it asked the respondents a series of identical questions, mostly concerning assessment of economic situation. Occasionally, additional questions dealing with the issues, which were of a particular importance to us [the government] were asked, e.g., attitude to privatization” (Balcerowicz 1992, 67). “Public opinion has already been showing negative attitudes towards contemporary economic and social changes” (Wiatr 1993, 11). “When public opinion surveys did not reveal support
for the program of the Right, the Rightist politicians started to contend that sociologists were biased and treated survey questionnaires with suspicions” (Najder Rzeczpospolita 16-17 October 1993). “However, society does not consist of the professors of economics (or sociology) and the popular attitudes may not be identical with the attitudes prevalent in the academic seminars or governmental offices.... Not accidentally, sociological research shows that society prefers Sweden as an ideal economic and social model.... Capitalism, which was built in 1989-1993, did not have social support.... Public opinion was very divided on the issue of de-communization” (Wiatr 1993, 48, 50, 51, 73).

At the end of the research period Polish government-affiliated intellectuals became somewhat disaffected with public opinion. In fact, they even viewed public opinion with caution: “This shows the crisis of public opinion and its negative influence” (Nowak-Jeziorański 2001, 214)

**Polish Government-Affiliated Intellectuals and the Political Elite**

The relationship between Polish government-affiliated intellectuals and their political allies is discussed very sparingly. An ideal relationship is an arrangement in which intellectuals lead, not follow: “The choice of the examples to follow depends on the intellectuals engaged in politics” (Wiatr 1993, 98). However, direct references either to the ability of intellectuals to translate their ideas into actions of the political elite, or to intellectuals’ willingness to promote preferences of the political elite, characteristic of the Russian case, are absent in the Polish database.
Conclusions

Prior to the empirical verification of my research propositions, I hypothesized that original liberal discourse of Polish government-affiliated intellectuals was not pure; it also included organic-statist elements. Put slightly differently, in the beginning of the research period, Polish government-affiliated intellectuals supported inclusive democracy, liberal ideology, the free-market economic model, pro-Western foreign policy, and ethnic tolerance, but also had pro-governed market and nationalistic preferences. I expected original attitudes to remain stable throughout the research period. These hypotheses were partially confirmed.

Indeed, from the very beginning, Polish government-affiliated intellectuals favored inclusive democracy and a pro-Western foreign policy. The hypothesis about the coexistence of governed market attitudes with free market orientations in the original intellectual discourse was also confirmed. However, I was unable to find a strong presence of nationalistic attitudes; Polish government-affiliated intellectuals were mostly tolerant. Instead, elements of organic-statist discourse were found in the ideological dichotomy. Therefore, the original discourse of the Polish elite intellectuals was confirmed to be liberal with appreciable organic-statist modifications in the economic and ideological dichotomies. In general, even in the two most conservative dichotomies, liberal orientations were dominant. This modification allowed Polish government-affiliated intellectuals to sustain the initial, moderately liberal discourse.

The stability hypothesis was also only partially supported. Although political, foreign policy, and ethnic relations attitudes remained liberal, there was a shift towards greater ideological conservatism and stronger support for the governed market model.
Yet the shift did not bring about the total replacement of original, liberal orientations even in the two areas which experienced the strongest changes.

It follows that there is a significant degree of conflict in the ideological and economic issue domains. The conflict in these spheres is attributable to the electoral competition between liberal and conservative elites (ideological divide) and between liberal and social-democratic elites (economic disagreements). My findings confirmed the major cleavages in Polish politics reported by numerous Polish researchers – i.e., the conflict between the economic alternatives and the competition between liberal and conservative ideologies. Interestingly, the economic direction is subject to intense debate in Poland, while in Russia support for economic liberalism (the free market model) is an invariant entity despite tremendous public opposition to it. Polish government-affiliated intellectuals are also less economy-centric than their Russian counterparts. Political and ideological issues occupy prominent positions in Polish intellectual debate. From the very start, Polish government-affiliated intellectuals framed the government’s economic reforms in political terms, not as an exclusively economic agenda.

Despite the rotations within Polish government-affiliated intellectuals and existing cleavages, there is consensus in three out of five issue areas. This indicates that regardless

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of the composition of the Polish elite and the differences in ideological and economic views, inclusive democracy, pro-Western foreign policy, and tolerant ethnic relations represent shared values. They are important goals in themselves, not merely the means to other objectives. These orientations, rather than economic liberalism, as in the Russian case, represent invariant elements of Polish intellectual discourse. The implications of such consensus for the consolidation of democracy will be discussed in the concluding chapter.

Although to date there are no changes in the substance of Polish intellectual discourse, such a scenario cannot be ruled out. Economic attitudes and ideological preferences are unstable and can change depending on the outcome of electoral competition.

Currently, the discourse of Polish elite intellectuals includes appreciable organic-statist elements (religious or statist ideology and pro-governed market sympathies). However, unlike in the Russian case, where liberal free-market economic attitudes coexist with ideologically conservative preferences and belief in an authoritarian state, the Polish combination of conservative ideology and the governed market model is at least more internally coherent.

European left-right labels were useful in explaining the evolution of attitudes of Russian government-affiliated intellectuals. These labels are also applicable to the Polish case. Liberal discourse is predominantly leftist. It consists of the leftist elements in political, ideological, foreign policy, and ethnic relations areas (i.e., is inclusively democratic, liberal, pro-Western, and ethnically tolerant). Support for the free market is its only rightist element. Organic-statist discourse, on the other hand, is predominantly
rightist. It includes rightist elements in political, ideological, foreign policy, and ethnic relations spheres (i.e., support for managed democracy, statism, isolationism, and nationalism). Its only leftist element is the support for the governed market model. It follows that original discourses of Polish and Russian government-affiliated intellectuals were predominantly leftist. However, Polish and Russian intellectuals subsequently parted ways.

Currently, the discourse of Polish government-affiliated intellectuals includes rightist elements in the economic and ideological dichotomies and leftist elements in political, ideological, economic, foreign policy, and ethnic issue domains. Both leftist and rightist elements strengthened their presence in Polish intellectual discourse. However, the leftist strand is visibly stronger, as it is present in five issue areas, while rightist elements are discernable only in two issue domains. Such dynamics are in line with Jarosław Kaczyński’s observation about relative weakness of Polish rightist intellectuals. ¹⁷⁷

In Russia, the current discourse of government-affiliated intellectuals corresponds to rightist positions in politics, ideology, economics, foreign policy, and ethnic relations (i.e., support for authoritarianism, statism, free market, isolationism, and nationalism). Obviously, the rightist orientations represented the core values. The original leftist positions of the liberal agenda were dropped, while the leftist elements of organic-statism were not included. Not accidentally, the contemporary discourse of Russian government-affiliated intellectuals is exclusively a synthesis of rightist elements of the two discourses.

¹⁷⁷ "As far as intellectuals are concerned, the Left has a certain advantage. We [the Right], regrettably, cannot appropriately use the few intellectuals that we have" (Jarosław Kaczyński, Czas na zmiany [Time for Change]. Conversation with Michał Boniewicz and Piotr M. Rudnicki (Warsaw: Spotkania Editions, 1992, 99).
Before turning to external explanations (i.e., public attitudes and priorities of the political elite) for changes and continuities in intellectual discourse, an examination of internal reasons is in order. In Russia, the conservative transformation of intellectual discourse was a function of two processes. First, there was a gradual replacement of the original liberals by more conservative intellectuals. Second, surviving liberals evolved in a conservative direction, to the point where the liberal and the conservative discourses could and did merge together. The relative stability of Polish intellectual discourse, on the other hand, is an unlikely outcome of continuous rotation among the government-affiliated intellectuals. Yet, the alteration of elites did not affect the discourse. All Polish actors agree on inclusive democracy, pro-Western foreign policy, and ethnic tolerance and are uncertain about the best ideology to guide them. The only area in which the rotation of cadres is felt is the economic area.

The fact that the discourse of Polish government-affiliated intellectuals followed a strikingly different pattern from that of Russian government-affiliated intellectuals during the post-Communist period is substantively important for my comparative analysis. But it is also methodologically significant. It means that content analysis of elite discourse and attitudes that I devised can and does register these differences. My method has been proven to be sensitive to country variations.

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Compared to the Russian elite, for whom only economic liberalism proved to be indispensable, Polish government-affiliated intellectuals are more committed to the principles of liberal discourse. In Poland, liberal orientations survived (albeit in a modified form). But to what degree has the ability of Polish government-affiliated
intellectuals to sustain liberal principles been helped by a more favorable public opinion? And to what degree did the discourse of intellectuals reflect the priorities of the political elite? The next chapter will compare attitudes of government-affiliated intellectuals to trends in Polish public opinion and the actions of the political elite proper. Do government-affiliated intellectuals bring public demands to the attention of the political elite? Or do they simply explain and advocate actions of the political elite? In other words, I intend to see whether the discourse of Polish government-affiliated intellectuals reflects these intellectuals’ own group interests, the political orders of the political elite, or the state of Polish public opinion. In the final sixth chapter, I will compare my answers to these questions to the Russian findings. These comparisons are designed to show the different roles that government-affiliated intellectuals play in post-Communist Poland and Russia (as I hypothesized in Chapter I).
CHAPTER V
THE POLISH CASE: ELITE-PUBLIC CONSENSUS ON MODIFIED LIBERAL VALUES

Outline of Chapter’s Research Agenda

Content analytic data from the previous chapter demonstrated that Polish post-Communist official discourse was moderately liberal and stable. Despite increasing support for conservative ideology and the governed market model, Polish government-affiliated intellectuals also continued to endorse important elements of liberal discourse, including inclusive democracy, liberal ideology, the free market economic model, pro-Western foreign policy, and ethnic tolerance. In this chapter, I look at the evolution of Polish public opinion during the post-Communist period. Juxtaposition of the trends in official discourse with the dynamics of public attitudes will show to what extent Polish elite attitudes reflect public opinion and the nature of the relationship between official discourse and public attitudes. In other words, was Polish post-Communist public opinion as stable and liberal as the official discourse of the elite? Is the organic-statist shift in ideological and economic orientations of the elite a nod in the direction of changing public opinion or an unrelated process? If there is an organic-statist realignment among the general public, does it precede or follow the changes in elite preferences? To answer these questions, I present data from an extensive review and statistical analysis of Polish public opinion data.

The second question addressed in this chapter concerns the political implications of stable official discourse. I look at the degree of congruence between official discourse
and policy initiatives of the political elite. What is the relationship between elite's verbal program of action and its actual realization? Do actions precede, coincide with, or follow verbal articulation of ideas? Answers to these questions will help determine the relationship between government-affiliated intellectuals as discourse communicators and the political elite proper. I will investigate whether government-affiliated intellectuals are a sub-group of the political elite, or an independent actor representing society. I employ event analysis to trace the evolution of the political elite's actions in five areas (political, ideological, economic, foreign policy, and ethnic relations) and then compare trends in actual policies to the trends in official discourse.

In this chapter, I will demonstrate that throughout the research period Polish public opinion was democratic, ideologically and economically mixed, pro-Western, and nationalistic. Although Poles supported an organic-statist orientation (in ideological, economic, and, especially, ethnic relations areas), their attitudes may be characterized as moderately liberal. I will also show that there is a greater degree of congruence between Polish public opinion and the elite's discourse (but not always their actions) than reported in the Russian case. However, even in Poland, the relationship between public opinion and the elite's attitudes is not absolutely congruent. The elite is reluctant to incorporate the public's nationalism, a preference that is at odds with the elite's other initiatives and aspirations (especially, Poland's membership in the European and trans-Atlantic political, economic, and military organizations). Finally, I will show that, unlike the Russian case, where public-elite agreement emerged around organic-statist preferences, in Poland the social consensus is built around liberal values.
Procedures for Comparing Public Opinion to Elite Value Orientations and Actions

As already outlined in Chapters I and III, I compare trends in public opinion and official discourse over time to see if both move in the same direction. Although suitable for initial exploration of the public-elite relationship, this method has one limitation: it is less helpful in showing the exact mechanisms and channels by which public opinion reaches the elite. As in the Russian chapter (Chapter III), I offer anecdotal evidence of public opinion's significance to the Polish elite, evidence that I observed during a stay at CBOS (Center for Public Opinion Research), my affiliation site.

Sample

For the statistical part of my Polish research I used two types of data. First, I examined results of PGSS (Polish General Social Surveys) conducted by ISS UW (Interdisciplinary Institute for Social Studies, Warsaw University). Second, I analyzed the results of public opinion surveys conducted by CBOS. The brief descriptions of the different types of surveys are presented in Table 40.

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179 On one occasion, I also used results of PGSW (Polish General Electoral Survey), conducted by CBOS for the Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences in October 2000. PGSW had a random all-Polish sample of 1,048 respondents.
Table 40
Characteristics of Polish Public Opinion Surveys

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics of Particular Survey/Type of Survey</th>
<th>Years Conducted</th>
<th>Sample Type</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regular CBOS surveys:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 40 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual CBOS surveys:</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>Representative sample of randomly selected Polish adults</th>
<th>1,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Co myślisz o prywatyzacji [What Do You Think About Privatization?]</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Representative sample of randomly selected Polish adults</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wschód, Zachód a Polska [East, West and Poland]</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Representative sample of randomly selected Polish adults</td>
<td>1,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ekonomiczny wymiar życia codziennego [Economic Dimension of Everyday Life]</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Representative sample of randomly selected Polish adults</td>
<td>1,208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sprawy międzynarodowe [International Issues]</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Representative sample of randomly selected Polish adults</td>
<td>1,149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systemy partyjne [Party Systems]</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Representative sample of randomly selected Polish adults</td>
<td>1,521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Państwo a obywatele</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Representative sample of randomly selected Polish adults</td>
<td>1,521</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Selection of Survey Questions and Steps of Analysis

During the Russian phase of my analysis, I was faced with a task of collecting and presenting comparable data that would illustrate the trends in both official discourse and public attitudes. The Polish case was no different. Content-analytic and statistical data are not identical. Content analytic data are numerically expressed evaluations of specific...
researcher-determined textual indicators, while the results of public opinion surveys are aggregated answers to the questions designed by other researchers. However, specific survey questions are comparable to textual indicators and the percent of people who favored a particular option for a given survey question is equivalent to the value assigned to a textual indicator. The task then is to select questions that a) have meanings similar to textual indicators of content analytic categories and b) are asked repeatedly. The last criterion constitutes a mechanical limitation on a researcher, as not all suitable survey questions can be traced chronologically. However, for each of the five issue domains, I was able to select a number of survey questions that were both similar in meaning to textual indicators and asked repeatedly.

Next, I performed an extensive statistical review and produced graphs of the evolution of public attitudes in five areas (political, ideological, economic, foreign policy, and ethnic relations). Results of statistical review are examined in Section “Chronological Evolution of Polish Public Attitudes.”

The last two sections of this chapter present a closer look at the social and demographic determinants of various public attitudes (age, income, gender, education, degree of religious belief, size of place of residence) and the relationships between public attitudes themselves. Results of statistical and correlation analyses are discussed in Section “Social and Demographic Determinants of Polish Public Attitudes” and Section “Relationships Between Various Polish Public Attitudes.”

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180 To simplify graphs and improve their readability, I deliberately omitted “I do not know,” “other,” “I am ambivalent,” and similar answer options. This explains why on certain graphs, the sum of values does not add to 100 percent. When applicable, I also combined responses measuring intensity of a particular attitude into one category. For instance, on some graphs, response line “I am satisfied” combines answer-options “I am very satisfied,” “I am satisfied,” and “I am rather satisfied,” while response line “I am dissatisfied” may contain answers “I am rather dissatisfied,” “I am dissatisfied,” and “I am very dissatisfied.” The same applies to answer options measuring trust or distrust.
Chronological Evolution of Polish Public Attitudes According to Individual Issue Domains

1. Political Issue Domain

The following questions tap into the Polish public’s political attitudes:

“Is democracy always the best political system?”
“Do you support dictatorship?”
“Does democracy have any alternatives?”
“Are you satisfied with democracy?”
“What does democracy mean to you?”
“To what degree do you identify with the democratic system?”
“What political party do you prefer?”
“Would Poland be better off if it did not have the Sejm?”
“Are political parties necessary for democracy?”
“What does an independent press mean to you?”
“What is the goal of politics?”
“Are anti-democratic forms of government better than democratic ones?”
“To what degree are you interested in politics?”
“Are you active in the civil society organizations?”

Among the explanatory variables for Poles’ political views are:

“Did Poland’s political situation improve since 1989?”
“What is your opinion of the current political situation?”
“Are you satisfied with the current political system?”

Democratic Public Attitudes

Figure 90 reveals unqualified public support for democracy. During the research period Poles never betrayed their original democratic orientations. Moreover, their support for democracy even strengthened. The same conclusion can be reached after analyzing Figure 91. Poles soundly reject authoritarian government of a strong-hand as a means to eliminate corrupt bureaucracy and political conflict. Even if a question mentions democracy’s weak points, Polish respondents still prefer an imperfect democratic system to all other alternatives (Figure 92). Although not as clear-cut, Figure 93 also indicates pro-democratic attitudes. If, initially, Poles were skeptical about democracy, by 1997 they became satisfied with it.

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Figures 90. Is Democracy Always the Best Political System?

Figures 94 and 95 provide a deeper look into Poles' attitudes toward democracy. They also paint a more complex picture of public democratic orientations. Although the majority of Poles associates democracy with positive notions of freedom and human rights (Figure 94), the degree of self-identification with the democratic system is relatively low (Figure 95). Nevertheless, despite a certain democratic skepticism, after 1993 a slightly greater segment of the Polish population identifies with democracy.

Figure 96 indicates that Poles overwhelmingly favor democratic parties. Among the major political players with the strongest societal support are the democratic parties of the Left (SLD, UP, and PSL) who can count on about 50-60 percent of the electorate. Post-Solidarity Center-Left (ROAD/UD/UW and PO), Center-Right (AWS) and Right (PC/PiS and LPR) democratic parties garner about 30-40 percent of electoral support. The radical populist (and anti-democratic) party Samoobrona consistently polls at 2-3 percent of popular support, although recently its popularity increased to 10 percent.

According to Figure 97, Poles strongly oppose disbanding of their parliament, the Sejm.
Figures 98, 99, and 100 show deeply felt democratic commitments. A majority of Poles perceives political parties as indispensable for the normal functioning of democracy. The general public also consistently supports the independence of the mass media and opposes governmental control over them.

Figure 91. Do You Support Dictatorship?

Figure 92. Does Democracy Have Any Alternatives?
Figure 93. Are You Satisfied with Democracy? (PGSS)

Figure 94. What Does Democracy Mean to You?

Figure 95. To What Degree Do You Identify with the Democratic System?
Figure 96. What Party Do You Prefer?

Figure 97. Would Poland be Better off if It Did Not Have the Sejm?

Figure 98. Are Political Parties Necessary for Democracy?
Anti-Democratic Attitudes

Although Poles strongly support elements of inclusive democracy, there are several attitudes that show anti-democratic tendencies. Poles see the main goal of politics as providing order and security in the country. More democratic priorities (freedom of speech and ability to influence democratic decisions) are distant second and third choices (Figure 101). Polish public opinion is consistently divided between those who agree that anti-democratic forms of government may be preferable to a more democratic one and those who endorse democracy unconditionally (Figure 102). However, one cannot label Poles outright undemocratic; after all, the anti-democratic option is supported by less than fifty percent of the population.
Figure 100. Should the State Control the Media?

Figure 101. What Is the Goal of Politics? (PGSS)

Taken together, Figure 103 and 104 reveal that despite an increased interest in politics, an absolute majority of Poles is passive in the civil society. Although about 50 percent of Poles have interest in politics, only 20 percent of the public can translate this interest into active participation in the civil society.
Figure 102. Are Anti-Democratic Forms of Government Better Than Democratic Ones?

Figure 103. To What Degree Are You Interested in Politics? (PGSS)
Figure 104. Are You Active in the Civil Society Organizations?

Such inconsistent political attitudes can be partly explained by Poles’ attitudes about the overall political situation. Although the Polish public believes that since the collapse of Communism the political situation has changed for the better (Figure 105), the majority is critical of democracy as it exists in Poland today. Poles perceive the current political situation as far from the ideal and in need of major modifications (Figures 106 and 107). The last two figures reflect a distinct disjunction between Poles’ desire for a greater democracy and their evaluation of the practical realization of this ideal.

Polish political attitudes are mostly democratic and remarkably stable. Not only do Poles support democracy in general, they also favor more inclusive democratic forms and reject more elitist forms where political parties, opposition, and mass media are denied an active role in political decision-making. Inclusive democratic attitudes of the Polish public are congruent with inclusive-democratic principles of official discourse. However, Poles are visibly dissatisfied with the practical realization of their political
ideal. As a result, they are unable to identify with democracy and reluctant to participate in the civil society.

Figure 105. Did Poland's Political Situation Improve Since 1989?

Figure 106. What Is Your Opinion About the Current Political Situation?
Figure 107. Are You Satisfied With the Current Political System?

2. Ideological Issue Domain

The following survey questions measure ideological preferences (i.e., Poles' views on the ideal state-society and church-state relationships):

- "Should the Catholic Church play a stronger role in the Polish politics and state affairs?"
- "What is your opinion of divorce laws?"
- "Should euthanasia be legalized?"
- "What do you think about pre-marital sex?"
- "What do you think about sex education in public schools?"
- "Should abortion be allowed?"
- "What do you think about homosexuals?"
- "Do you support the death penalty?" (2)
- "Should the state be legally accountable?"
- "Should atheists be allowed to speak publicly?"
- "Should atheists be allowed to teach in public schools?"
- "Can human rights and freedoms be restricted to fight crime?"

Liberal Attitudes

In the Polish context, attitudes towards the Catholic Church serve as a bellwether for a larger divide between conservatives and liberals. Conservatives are likely to be strong proponents of the Catholic Church, while liberals, although practicing Catholics,
are more critical regarding the Church’s role in the society and politics. Poles increasingly favor a separation of the Church and state and a decrease of the role of the Church in politics and state affairs (Figure 108). Figures 109-112 show that Poles have liberal views on the issues of divorce, euthanasia, pre-marital sex, and sex education in public schools. Figure 113 demonstrates the generally liberal perception of the relationship between the individual and the state among the Poles. It illustrates that Poles reject the notion of double legal standards applied to the state and prefer that the state be legally accountable rather than efficient.

Figure 108. Should the Catholic Church Play a Stronger Role in the Polish Politics and State Affairs?

Figure 109. What Do You Think About Divorce Laws? (PGSS)
Figure 110. Should Euthanasia be Legalized? (PGSS)

Figure 111. What Do You Think About Pre-Marital Sex? (PGSS)
Finally, Poles exhibit a certain degree of tolerance towards atheists (i.e., opponents of organized religion). They would allow (although not overwhelmingly) atheists to speak publicly and to teach in public schools (Figures 114 and 115). However, these attitudes have weakened.
Conservative Attitudes

Figures 116-118 demonstrate the strength of law and order sentiments among the general public. Both the CBOS and PGSS surveys show Poles to be supportive of the death penalty and willing to sacrifice human rights to fight crime. The number of Poles who support the death penalty increased from 50 to 75 percent (according to CBOS surveys) or remained stable around 70 percent (according to PGSS) (Figures 116 and 117). Almost 70 percent of Poles are prepared to forgo their human and civil rights in exchange for safety (Figure 118). Poles are also conservative in their attitudes towards abortion. They consistently oppose the more liberal pro-choice position (Figure 119). A degree of conservatism is also visible in Figure 120 which deals with the attitudes towards homosexuals. Generally, Poles are reluctant to accept homosexuality as a legitimate lifestyle.

Figure 114. Should Atheists be Allowed to Speak Publicly? (PGSS)
Figure 115. Should Atheists be Allowed to Teach in Public Schools? (PGSS)

Figure 116. Do You Support the Death Penalty?

Figure 117. Do You Support the Death Penalty? (PGSS)
I agree with restrictions of human rights and freedoms in order to fight crime

we should not limit human rights and freedoms even if it means more rampant crime

Figure 118. Can Human Rights and Freedoms be Restricted to Fight Crime?

abortion should be allowed for any reason
abortion should be totally banned

Figure 119. Should Abortion be Allowed? (PGSS)

homosexual relations are always or almost always wrong
homosexual relations are never wrong

Figure 120. What Do You Think About Homosexuals? (PGSS)
Polish public opinion appears to be split between conservative and liberal inclinations. Although tolerant of atheists, secular in their outlook on the church-state relationship, supportive of divorce and convinced that the state ought to be accountable to society, Poles also favor the death penalty, reject abortion and alternative lifestyles, and are ready to sacrifice their civil liberties to combat crime. It is worth mentioning that while conservative preferences are stable, or even increasing in prominence, the public’s liberal orientations are weakening. The Polish elite is likewise split between liberal and conservative ideological options; conservative orientations of the elite have shown a tendency to strengthen. Comparison of trends in both the elite’s and the public’s attitudes demonstrates that the mixed ideological preferences of government-affiliated intellectuals and the general public are congruent. Conservative public opinion appears to compel even social-democratic and liberal elites, who would otherwise be likely to voice ideologically liberal discourse, to espouse a more conservative position.

3. Economic Issue Domain

The following questions were selected to illustrate general economic attitudes:

"Is free market capitalism advantageous for Poland?"
"Are you in favor of economic socialism?"
"What do you think about privatization?"
"What do you think about the speed of privatization?"
"Do you trust the private companies?"
"Do you trust state enterprises?"

Answers to these questions reveal the overall public attitudes to the free-market and interventionist models. To demonstrate Poles’ views on specific economic policies, I selected the following survey questions:

"Does the state have an obligation to provide free medical care?"
"Does the state have an obligation to guarantee jobs?"
"Should the state use taxes to create new jobs?"
“Should the state guarantee minimum income?”
“Should the state subsidize agriculture?”
“Should the state raise taxes to create new jobs?”
“Does the state have an obligation to protect private property?”
“Should the state bail out bankrupt enterprises to preserve jobs?”
“Is having extremely rich people natural?”
“Is having extremely rich people advantageous for Polish society?”
“Is having extremely rich people just?”
“Should the state reduce income inequalities?”
“Should the rich pay higher taxes?”

Among the explanatory variables for Poles’ economic attitudes are the following questions:

“Did the Polish economic situation improve since 1989?”
“What do you think about the current economic situation?”

The economic issue domain presents a picture of highly conflicting public attitudes. Virtually no preference was held by a large majority. During the research period, the desirability of free market capitalism has decreased, but socialism, although not totally discarded, did not replace the market as an acceptable economic alternative (Figures 121 and 122). Similarly, there is an acute conflict in the public’s evaluation of privatization. Two types of opinion – a positive view of privatization and a negative one – are in constant collision with each other (Figure 123). This conflict is also evident in Poles’ opinions about the speed of privatization. The population is divided between those who view the privatization process as moving too slowly and those who see it as moving too fast (Figure 124). Although the majority of Poles feels confident about private companies, the public is even more confident about state enterprises (Figures 125 and 126). The conflict on the level of general attitudes further translates into a clash regarding particular aspects of economic policy.
Governed Market Attitudes

Poles support a strong redistributive welfare state that would provide free medical care, tax the rich, guarantee jobs, and protect domestic agriculture (Figures 127-131, 138, and 139). Whether a product of socialist legacies or a reaction to new market realities, the public’s governed market preferences are either stable or have a tendency to increase.

Free Market Attitudes

Despite strong etatist preferences, Poles also exhibit propensity for economic liberalism. A majority rejects tax increases to finance the creation of new jobs (Figure 132), although, evidently, not the use of existing taxes to solve the unemployment problem (Figure 129). The general public believes that the state should protect private property (Figure 133). Poles also perceive income inequalities as natural, positive, and even advantageous for the Polish society and economy (Figures 135-137). Poles are against financing bankrupt enterprises even if it means saving jobs (Figures 134). However, the popularity of the free market economic alternative decreased with time.

Conflicting economic attitudes may be a consequence of the Poles’ realization that although the command economy of socialism is flawed, the free market does not always bring the desired economic improvement. Even though respondents overwhelmingly believed that the Polish economic situation improved since 1989, they perceived it as far from the ideal (see Figures 140 and 141).
Figure 121. Is Free Market Capitalism Advantageous for Poland?

Figure 122. Are You in Favor of Economic Socialism? (PGSS)

Figure 123. What Do You Think About Privatization?
Figure 124. What Do You Think About the Speed of Privatization?

Figure 125. Do You Trust the Private Companies? (PGSS)

Figure 126. Do You Trust State Enterprises? (PGSS)

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Figure 127. Does the State Have an Obligation to Provide Free Medical Care?

Figure 128. Does the State Have an Obligation to Guarantee Jobs? (PGSS)

Figure 129. Should the State Use Taxes to Create New Jobs?

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Figure 130. Should the State Guarantee Minimum Income? (PGSS)

Figure 131. Should the State Subsidize Agriculture?
Figure 132. Should the State Raise Taxes to Create New Jobs?

Figure 133. Does the State Have an Obligation to Protect Private Property?

Figure 134. Should the State Bail Out Bankrupt Enterprises to Preserve Jobs?
Figure 135. Is Having Extremely Rich People Natural?

Figure 136. Is Having Extremely Rich People Advantageous for Polish Society?
Figure 137. Is Having Extremely Rich People Just?

Figure 138. Should the State Reduce Income Inequalities? (PGSS)

Figure 139. Should the Rich Pay Higher Taxes? (PGSS)
Like the Polish elite, the general public is divided on the issue of preferred economic model, but the majority favors greater state intervention and is skeptical about free market capitalism. In the economic category, public opinion and official discourse are synchronous. Both the elite and the public struggle to choose the most desirable economic model. Both, however, gravitate towards the governed market model.
4. Foreign Policy Issue Domain

The following questions were selected to reflect popular perceptions of desired directions in foreign relations:

"Can Poland count on the West?"
"With what countries should Poland cooperate politically?"
"With what countries should Poland cooperate economically?"
"What is the best way to guarantee Poland’s security?"
"Do you support Poland’s membership in NATO?"
"Do you support Poland’s membership in the EU?"
"What do you think about the USA?"
"What do you think about France?"
"What do you think about Germany?"
"Is reconciliation with Germany possible?"
"What do you think about Belorus?"
"What do you think about the Ukraine?"
"What do you think about Russia?"
"Is Russia a threat to Poland?"
"Why does Russia oppose Poland’s membership in NATO?"
"Should Russia’s opposition to Poland’s membership in NATO be taken into account?"
"Did Poland’s relations with other countries improve since 1989?"

Pro-Western Foreign Policy Attitudes

The first block of questions deals with the general pro-Western orientation of Polish public opinion. Although initially suspicious of the Western intentions, by 1995 the majority of Poles believed that their country could count on the help of the West (Figure 142). Figures 143 and 144\(^{180}\) depict Poles’ preferences for political and economic foreign partners. In both cases, Poles chose the Western countries. Interestingly, Poles have trans-Atlantic sympathies when it comes to a preferred political ally and European leanings when deciding on an ideal economic partner.

\(^{180}\) For survey questions depicted in Graphs 64 and 65, respondent could select several answer options. Thus the sum of answers exceeds 100%.
Throughout the post-Communist period, Poles overwhelmingly supported their country's membership in NATO (Figures 145 and 146). Poles also strongly endorse economic and political cooperation with the European Union (Figure 147).

The next section confirms Poles' pro-Western preferences. Analysis of the attitudes to particular countries reveals Poles' gravitation to the West. Among the most positively evaluated nations are the US (Figure 148), France (Figure 149), and Germany (Figure 150). The positive and neutral attitudes towards these countries by far outweigh negative perceptions. Increasingly, Poles view their old adversaries, the Germans, in a positive light and believe in the possibility of reconciliation (Figure 151).
Poland should cooperate politically with the US
Poland should cooperate politically with Germany
Poland should cooperate politically with Russia

Figure 143. With What Countries Should Poland Cooperate Politically?

Poland should cooperate economically with European countries (sum of all countries)
Poland should economically cooperate with Russia, Ukraine, or Belarus (sum of all countries)
Poland should cooperate economically with the US

Figure 144. With What Countries Should Poland Cooperate Economically?

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Figure 145. What Is the Best Way to Guarantee Poland's Security?

Figure 146. Do You Support Poland's Membership in NATO?
Figure 147. Do You Support Poland's Membership in the EU?

Figure 148. What Do You Think About the US? (PGSS)
Figure 149. What Do You Think About France?

Figure 150. What Do You Think About Germany? (PGSS)
Figure 151. Is Reconciliation with Germany Possible?

Figure 152. What Do You Think About Belorus?
Independent/Pro-Eastern Foreign Policy Attitudes

While Poles feel sympathy towards the Western nations, they are deeply suspicious about their eastern neighbors, including Russia, Ukraine, and Belorus (Figures 152-154). Negative attitudes towards these countries predominate. The Polish public is
also consistent in its belief that Russia, which in the popular perception did not relinquish its aspirations in the region, poses a threat to Poland (Figure 155). If in the beginning of the post-Communist period only 40 percent of the Polish population viewed Russia with suspicion, currently about two-thirds of Poles suspect that Russia has imperial designs. These suspicions are further evident in Poles’ perception of the reasons behind Russia’s opposition to Poland’s NATO membership. Two-thirds of the population believe that Russia opposed the Polish bid for NATO because of a desire to regain power in the region (Figure 156). Naturally, Poles are averse to taking alleged Russian imperialism into consideration, when deciding on whether their country ought to join NATO (Figure 157).

Figure 155. Is Russia a Threat to Poland?
Russia opposes Poland's membership in NATO because it sees NATO as a threat.

Figure 156. Why Does Russia Oppose Poland's Membership in NATO?

Poland should take into account Russia's position when attempting to join NATO.

Figure 157. Should Russia's Opposition to Poland's Membership in NATO be Taken into Account?

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Figure 158. Did Poland's Relations with Other Countries Improve Since 1989?

Figure 158 helps explain overwhelmingly pro-Western foreign policy preferences of the Polish public. In general, Poles perceive their foreign relations as the most improved area during the post-Communist period. Taking into consideration that during the post-Communist era Poland's foreign policy choice was unambiguously pro-Western, such an assessment testifies to the Polish public's overall satisfaction with and endorsement of the current, pro-Western foreign policy direction.

Poles exhibit strong and consistent pro-Western attitudes. The strength of pro-Western preferences is not only stable, it is progressively increasing. The peaks of pro-Western attitudes occurred in 1995, 1997, and 1999, i.e., at three key moments when Poland made important decisions to join the Western world (NATO and EU memberships). Poles reject pro-Eastern foreign policy directions. The Polish elite, too, is decidedly pro-European and pro-Atlantic. However, the latter is much less certain about the Eastern question.
5. Ethnic Relations Issue Domain

_ Ethnic relations _ issue domain is represented by the following questions:

“What do you think about the Jewish people?”
“Who is responsible for anti-Semitism in Poland?”
“Do the Jewish people have a disproportionate influence on the Polish politics?”
“Do the Jewish people have a disproportionate influence on the Polish economy?”
“What do you think about the Roma minority?”
“What do you think about Poles of Ukrainian origins?”
“What do you think about Poles of Russian origins?”
“What should be done with the refugees living in Poland?”
“What should be done with the foreigners working in Poland?”
“What is the religious connection between the Poles and the Jews?”
“Do the Jewish people have a disproportionate influence on the Polish culture?”
“What do you think about Poles of German origins?”
“What do you think about Poles of Belorussian origins?”

Intolerant Public Attitudes

Figures depicting public attitudes towards Poland’s ethnic minorities, including Jews, Roma, Ukrainians, and Russians present the Polish population as considerably intolerant. This is especially noteworthy given the fact that the presence of ethnic minorities in the Polish society is on the decline. Figure 159 illustrates one of the strongest ethnic prejudices held by Poles. Almost 50 percent of Poland’s predominantly Slavic population dislikes the Jewish people, whose presence in contemporary Poland was drastically reduced following the WWII Holocaust and post-war immigration. Anti-Semitism assumes other subtler forms. More than one-third of Poles assigns blame for their anti-Semitic behavior to the Jews themselves (Figure 160). The Slavic majority also perceives Jews as playing a disproportionate role in the Polish politics and economy (Figures 161 and 162). Very similar attitudes are depicted in Figure 163, which presents Poles’ views on the Roma minority. Almost two-thirds of the Polish population have

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181 The explicit wording of the answer options is noteworthy. There is an undeniably negative connotation attached to the “the Jewish people have too strong an influence” response.

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reservations about this ethnic group. Although Poles’ attitudes towards Russian and Ukrainian minorities are improving, they are still essentially negative (Figures 164 and 165).

Poles increasingly oppose assisting the refugees (Figure 166) and are consistently skeptical about foreigners residing and working in Poland (Figure 167). With official unemployment at 20-30 percent of working population, Poles appear to be overly protective of their jobs and citizenship benefits. Behind the xenophobic public positions are not only traditional ethnic prejudices, but social and economic worries typical of a society with a highly uncertain economic present and future.

Figure 159. What Do You Think About the Jewish People? (PGSS)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Figure 160. Who Is to Blame for Anti-Semitism in Poland?

Figure 161. Do the Jewish People Have a Disproportionate Influence on Polish Politics?

Figure 162. Do the Jewish People Have a Disproportionate Influence on the Polish Economy?
Figure 163. What Do You Think About the Roma Minority?

Figure 164. What Do You Think About Poles of Ukrainian Origins?

Figure 165. What Do You Think About Poles of Russian Origins?
**Tolerant Attitudes**

Despite rampant anti-Semitism, Poles recognize a religious affinity between Catholicism and Judaism (Figure 168). Poles also do not blame Jewish people for “corrupting” Polish culture (Figure 169). However, all these attitudes show a very fragile balance between anti-Semitic and more tolerant attitudes. At best, there is a very tentative weakening of virulent anti-Semitism among the Polish public. Besides, if Poles are more accepting of their Jewish neighbors on the cultural/religious level, the Slavic majority is certainly much more intolerant when it perceives the Jews as a threat to its important economic or political interests (Figures 161 and 162). When judging Poles of German and Belorussian descent, Poles are slightly more tolerant. Figures 170 and 171 demonstrate either positive or neutral attitudes towards these ethnic groups.

![Figure 166. What Should be Done with the Refugees Living in Poland?](image-url)
foreigners should be allowed to work in Poland without any conditions

foreigners should not be allowed to work in Poland at all

Figure 167. What Should be Done with Foreigners Working in Poland?

the Jews are our older brothers in faith

the Jews are not our older brothers in faith

Figure 168. What Is the Religious Connection Between Poles and the Jews?

the Jewish people have too much influence on the Polish culture

the Jewish people do not have too much influence on the Polish culture

Figure 169. Do the Jewish People Have a Disproportionate Influence on the Polish Culture?
Figure 170. What Do You Think About Poles of German Origins?

Figure 171. What Do You Think About Poles of Belorussian Origins?

The Polish public appears to be much less tolerant than the elite. Although during the research period, the intensity of intolerant public views subsided, xenophobic beliefs continue to appeal to the majority of the Polish population. The public's tolerant attitudes, although mostly stable, are much weaker. The nationalistic

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shift in public opinion is gradual and constant. Conversely, Polish government-affiliated intellectuals are consistently tolerant in their ethnic preferences. The ethnic relations issue domain thus presents the only case where the Polish elite disregards nationalistic public opinion in favor of more tolerant positions.


Finally, several general questions were selected to explain the overall public evaluation of the Polish situation since 1989. These questions tap into all five issue domains and help confirm or reject conclusions drawn from the individual areas. The following questions were selected for this purpose:

- "Is Poland moving in the right direction?"
- "Was the initiation of systemic reforms in 1989 worthwhile?"
- "Did the general situation in Poland improve since 1989?"
- "What do you think about reforms started in 1989?"
- "What is your political preference?"

![Figure 172. Is Poland Moving in the Right Direction?](image-url)
Answers to general questions reflect an ambiguity in the assessment of the post-Communist period. Although a majority consistently believed that the reforms initiated in 1989 were worthwhile (Figure 173), with an exception of the period between 1995 and 1998, an increasing number of respondents thinks that Poland is moving in the wrong direction (Figure 172). According to Figure 174, a majority of Poles sees an improvement in the country’s general situation. Yet Figure 175 paints a more pessimistic picture. It shows that for the majority of respondents the 1989 reforms brought about more bad than good.

Figure 176 demonstrates the struggle between the leftist and rightist political orientations in the post-Communist period. If the rightist views enjoyed a minimum advantage in 1989-1991, they were seriously challenged during 1992-1994 period, only to return as the public’s preferred political orientation in 1994-1999.
Poles are divided in their assessment of the post-Communist period. The absence of social agreement is further reinforced by a constant struggle between rightist and leftist orientations among the general public. However, compared to Russians, Poles feel more positively about the changes that took place in their country since 1989. The popular approval of the direction in which Poland has been moving during the last thirteen years helps explain why the Polish public is more likely than its Russian counterpart to accept new democratic norms, pro-Western foreign policy, and mixed economic and ideological directions.

Figure 174. Did the General Situation in Poland Improve Since 1989?

Figure 175. What Do You Think About Reforms Started in 1989?
There is a remarkable similarity between the Polish elite’s value orientations and the public’s political, ideological, economic, and foreign policy attitudes. Pro-democratic, conservative, mixed ideological (both conservative and liberal views) and economic (a combination of the free market and etatist attitudes), and pro-Western elements of public opinion are also found in the discourse of government-affiliated intellectuals. Consistent support for inclusive democracy and pro-Western foreign policy orientations as well as the growing popularity of ideological conservatism and economic etatism in the elite’s discourse can count on popular endorsement. Only ethnic relations preferences of the public and the elite are incongruent. The elite does not incorporate the public’s ethnic intolerance into its discourse. Likewise, the public is immune to the elite’s ethnic tolerance.

The Polish public is much more supportive of liberal orientations than its Russian counterpart. The modified liberal project of Polish government-affiliated
intellectuals is not endangered by the organic-statist pressures of public opinion (with
the exception of ethnic relations issue domain). Official discourse is as liberal as
public opinion in the political and foreign policy domains, as mixed as public opinion
in the ideological and economic spheres, and more liberal in the ethnic relations
category. The differences between the public’s and the elite’s ethnic attitudes show
that public opinion is not always perceived as being suitable for incorporation into
official discourse. The Polish elite can isolate decidedly illiberal elements of pubic
opinion and protect official discourse from the impact of nationalistic public
orientations.

Polish public opinion presents visible advantages for building a democratic
state with liberal ideology, free market economy, and pro-Western foreign policy
(i.e., the state which would reflect liberal principles). Public opinion constrains the
elite’s liberalism only in the ethnic policy areas.

**Social and Demographic Determinants of Polish Public Attitudes**

This section outlines the extent to which social and demographic factors are
important for understanding Polish public attitudes.¹²² For this part of my analysis I
used only the results of PGSS surveys (1992-1999). PGSS surveys are more
systematic and thus represent a better database for fleshing out important
relationships between particular public attitudes and social and demographic
determinants as well as the relationships between various public attitudes themselves.

I tried to see if the relationships between various public attitudes and social
and demographic indexes changed from year to year. Initially, I calculated models for

¹²² Only statistically significant relationships were reported and only “meaningful” responses were
used. Answers coded as “I do not know” or “no answer” were omitted.
several select variables for every year the question was asked. However, the
difference in the predictors was insignificant and I opted for the cumulative models.
Their results are reported in the tables below. When performing statistical analysis, I
violated several basic assumptions of multivariate linear regression. I am aware that
my dependent variables are not measured on the interval scale. Strictly speaking, my
variables are ordinal, not interval. However, for my project I treat them as ordinal to
show the relationships between social and demographic parameters and individual
political, ideological, economic, foreign policy and ethnic relations views.

*Income* is the strongest predictor of political, foreign policy, and ethnic
relations attitudes. *Degree of religious belief* is the most important determinant of
ideological and economic preferences. *Education* had the strongest impact on the
foreign policy attitudes.

1. Social and Demographic Determinants of Political Attitudes

All social and demographic predictors are important in explaining political
attitudes, but *income* and *degree of religious belief* are the strongest predictors of how
a respondent would view discrete elements of contemporary Polish democracy and
previous political regime. *Education*, although an important explanatory variable, is,
in many instances, co-linear with *income*. *Age* and *size of place of residence* are
weaker, but still important, determinants of a respondent’s political views. Gender
also affects relationships between political attitudes and their social and demographic
predictors (Table 41).
Table 41
Results of Regression Analysis of Select Polish Political Attitudes According to Gender, Size of Place of Residence, Education, Age, Family Income and Degree of Religious Belief

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Feelings about communism as a form of government</th>
<th>Degree of trust in the government</th>
<th>Degree of trust in the press</th>
<th>Degree of trust in TV</th>
<th>Degree of Trust in the Polish Supreme Court</th>
<th>Degree of trust in the Polish Sejm</th>
<th>Degree of trust in the Polish Senate</th>
<th>Satisfaction with the current political situation in Poland</th>
<th>Degree of satisfaction with democracy in Poland</th>
<th>Degree of interest in politics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size of place of residence</td>
<td>-0.031** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.006** (0.002)</td>
<td>0.007** (0.002)</td>
<td>0.008** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.010** (0.002)</td>
<td>0.009** (0.002)</td>
<td>0.038** (0.004)</td>
<td>0.013** (0.004)</td>
<td>-0.020** (0.003)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

184 The variable “feelings towards communism as a form of government” is measured on a 4 point ascending scale where 1 is “communism is the worst form of government” and 4 is “communism is the best form of government.”
185 “Degree of trust in the government” variable is measured on a 3-point descending scale where 1 is “a great deal of trust” and 3 is “hardly any trust.”
186 “Degree of trust in the press” variable is measured on a 3-point descending scale where 1 is “a great deal of trust” and 3 is “hardly any trust.”
187 “Degree of trust in TV” variable is measured on a 3-point descending scale where 1 is “a great deal of trust” and 3 is “hardly any trust.”
188 “Degree of trust in the Polish Supreme Court” variable is measured on a 3-point descending scale where 1 is “a great deal of trust” and 3 is “hardly any trust.”
189 “Degree of trust in the Polish Sejm” variable is measured on a 3-point descending scale where 1 is “a great deal of trust” and 3 is “hardly any trust.”
190 “Degree of trust in the Polish Senate” variable is measured on a 3-point descending scale where 1 is “a great deal of trust” and 3 is “hardly any trust.”
191 The variable “degree of satisfaction with the current political situation in Poland” is measured on a 6-point descending scale, where 1 is “very satisfied” and 6 is “very dissatisfied.”
192 The variable “degree of satisfaction with democracy” is measured on a 6-point descending scale, where 1 is “very satisfied” and 6 is “very dissatisfied.”
193 The variable “degree of interest in politics” is measured on 5-point descending scale where 1 is “extreme interest” and 5 is “no interest at all.”
194 Here and henceforth, the independent variable “size of place of residence” is measured on a 8-point ascending scale where 1 is “a small village” and 8 is “a city of 500,000 or more.”
Table 41 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Male</th>
<th>0.070 ** (0.004)</th>
<th>0.020 ** (0.004)</th>
<th>0.002 (0.004)</th>
<th>0.010 ** (0.004)</th>
<th>0.015 ** (0.004)</th>
<th>0.020 ** (0.007)</th>
<th>-0.008 (0.007)</th>
<th>-0.066 (0.005)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.008 ** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.007 ** (0.002)</td>
<td>0.012 ** (0.009)</td>
<td>0.008 ** (0.002)</td>
<td>0.006 ** (0.004)</td>
<td>0.031 ** (0.004)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.004)</td>
<td>-0.066 ** (0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.008 (0.008)</td>
<td>0.027 ** (0.006)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.006)</td>
<td>0.005 (0.005)</td>
<td>0.013 (0.007)</td>
<td>0.018 ** (0.006)</td>
<td>0.024 ** (0.010)</td>
<td>0.040 ** (0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-0.056 ** (0.005)</td>
<td>0.012 ** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.010 ** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.020 ** (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.016 ** (0.004)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.003)</td>
<td>0.006 (0.003)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.047 ** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.016 ** (0.002)</td>
<td>0.007 ** (0.002)</td>
<td>0.018 ** (0.002)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.002)</td>
<td>0.007 ** (0.002)</td>
<td>0.004 (0.002)</td>
<td>-0.008 ** (0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.012 ** (0.005)</td>
<td>-0.053 ** (0.004)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.007 ** (0.004)</td>
<td>0.027 ** (0.004)</td>
<td>-0.023 ** (0.004)</td>
<td>0.011 (0.006)</td>
<td>0.011 (0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.030 ** (0.009)</td>
<td>-0.056 ** (0.006)</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.006)</td>
<td>-0.013 ** (0.006)</td>
<td>0.023 ** (0.007)</td>
<td>0.050 ** (0.006)</td>
<td>-0.042 ** (0.006)</td>
<td>0.009 (0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.021 ** (0.005)</td>
<td>-0.064 ** (0.004)</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.004)</td>
<td>-0.016 ** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.026 ** (0.004)</td>
<td>-0.021 ** (0.004)</td>
<td>0.026 ** (0.007)</td>
<td>0.027 ** (0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family income</td>
<td>-0.025 ** (0.005)</td>
<td>-0.045 ** (0.004)</td>
<td>-0.018 ** (0.004)</td>
<td>-0.021 ** (0.004)</td>
<td>0.006 (0.005)</td>
<td>-0.033 ** (0.004)</td>
<td>0.187 ** (0.006)</td>
<td>-0.164 ** (0.007)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

195 Here and henceforth the independent variable “education (years of schooling)” is measured on a 17-point ascending scale, where 1 is “one year of school completed” and 17 is “seventeen years or more of school completed.”

196 Here and henceforth, the independent variable “age” is measured on a 7-point ascending scale where 1 is “18-30 years” and 7 is “81-100 years old.”
Table 41 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Degree of religious belief(^{198})</th>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Degree of religious belief(^{198})</th>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Degree of religious belief(^{198})</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.063** (0.009)</td>
<td>-0.020** (0.007)</td>
<td>-0.010 (0.006)</td>
<td>-0.012 (0.008)</td>
<td>-0.029** (0.004)</td>
<td>-0.023** (0.007)</td>
<td>-0.160** (0.011)</td>
<td>-0.160** (0.012)</td>
<td>-0.122** (0.009)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.048** (0.006)</td>
<td>-0.035** (0.005)</td>
<td>-0.003 (0.004)</td>
<td>0.010 (0.006)</td>
<td>-0.019 (0.005)</td>
<td>-0.025** (0.007)</td>
<td>-0.180** (0.008)</td>
<td>-0.168** (0.006)</td>
<td>-0.125** (0.006)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.182** (0.018)</td>
<td>0.106** (0.013)</td>
<td>-0.026** (0.012)</td>
<td>0.013 (0.011)</td>
<td>0.020 (0.015)</td>
<td>0.072** (0.013)</td>
<td>0.101** (0.014)</td>
<td>0.104** (0.020)</td>
<td>0.134** (0.023)</td>
<td>-0.091** (0.017)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.082** (0.034)</td>
<td>0.120** (0.025)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.023)</td>
<td>0.004 (0.022)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.027)</td>
<td>0.072** (0.013)</td>
<td>0.088** (0.013)</td>
<td>0.104** (0.043)</td>
<td>0.050 (0.046)</td>
<td>-0.064 (0.034)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.124** (0.020)</td>
<td>0.175** (0.015)</td>
<td>-0.012 (0.013)</td>
<td>0.041** (0.013)</td>
<td>0.006 (0.016)</td>
<td>0.100** (0.014)</td>
<td>0.128** (0.025)</td>
<td>0.062** (0.027)</td>
<td>0.077** (0.027)</td>
<td>-0.185** (0.019)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.087** (0.062)</td>
<td>2.247** (0.023)</td>
<td>2.095** (0.042)</td>
<td>1.903** (0.039)</td>
<td>1.701*8 (0.051)</td>
<td>2.280** (0.045)</td>
<td>2.226** (0.045)</td>
<td>4.266 (0.075)</td>
<td>3.741** (0.081)</td>
<td>4.986** (0.057)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14,101</td>
<td>12,884</td>
<td>12,744</td>
<td>13,259</td>
<td>11,688</td>
<td>12,344</td>
<td>12,242</td>
<td>13,887</td>
<td>15,567</td>
<td>17,272</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
Ordinary Least Squares Regression
All estimates from SPSS
** p<0.05
* p<0.10

\(^{197}\) Here and henceforth, the independent variable “family income” is measured on a 15-point ascending scale where 1 is “0-500 PLN per month per family” and 15 is “100,000-200,000 PLN per month per family.”

\(^{198}\) Here and henceforth, the independent variable “degree of religious belief” is measured on a 3-point descending scale where 1 is “a strong believer” and 3 is “a non-believer.”
**Income** has a strong independent effect on the political views of a respondent, including 1) satisfaction with the current political situation; 2) satisfaction with democracy (the higher the income, the stronger the satisfaction with the current political situation and democracy); 3) interest in politics (the higher the income, the stronger the interest in politics); 4) feelings towards communism (the higher the income, the more skeptical a person is towards communism as a form of government); 5) degree of trust in various political institutions, including the government, press, **Sejm**, and Senate (the higher the income, the more trust a respondent feels towards these political institutions). It appears that income is strongly related to a respondent's political efficacy, self-identification, and satisfaction with the current, democratic political system (Table 41).

**Degree of religious belief** has a robust independent effect on 1) interest in politics (the less a person believes, the more he/she is interested in politics); 2) trust in the government (the less a person believes, the less he/she trusts the government); 3) feelings towards communism (the less the person believes, the better his/her attitude to communism as a form of government); and 4) satisfaction with the current political situation in Poland (the less the person believes, the less satisfied he/she is with the current political situation). Although stronger religious beliefs may distract a person from politics, religiosity contributes to stronger trust in the government, better political efficacy, and more unambiguous rejection of communism as a form of government (Table 41).

**Education** is clearly related to **income** and in some cases does not have an independent effect on political views of a respondent. In general, more educated
people tend to be more interested in politics, more skeptical about communism, more satisfied with the current political situation and democracy. However, education has a different effect on the degree of trust in various political institutions. The higher the education, the less confident about political institutions a respondent is (Table 41).

Age has a weak, but statistically significant, relationship with almost all political variables. Older people are less interested in politics, more supportive of communism, less satisfied with the current political situation and democracy. The effect of age on trust in various political institutions is not uniform. While older people are more confident about the government, Sejm, Senate, and TV, they are less likely to trust the Supreme Court. Similar to age, size of place of residence also has a weak, but statistically significant, relationship with various political variables. The bigger the size of place where a respondent resides, the stronger his/her interest in politics, the more skeptical he/she is about communism, the less satisfied he/she is with the current political situation and the less he/she trusts various political institutions. Urban dwellers tend to doubt both the current, democratic political system (and its political institutions) and the previous Communist one (Table 41).

Gender plays a role in explaining political attitudes. Female non-believers are more inclined to accept communism than their male counterparts. Only older women trust the government and TV and distrust the Supreme Court, are dissatisfied with the current political situation and democracy, and are less interested in politics, while there are no statistically significant relationships for men. Conversely, only higher income men trust the press. Education has an effect on respondent’s satisfaction with the current political situation only for women (the more educated the woman, the
more she is satisfied with the current political situation). It appears that female (and especially older female) respondents tend to feel left out of the current political system and are more likely to distrust its institutions (Table 41).

2. Social and Demographic Determinants of Ideological Preferences

The most important predictor of ideological preferences is the degree of religious belief. Strong believers are more conservative, while non-believers exhibit more liberal views. Believers are less tolerant and are more likely to oppose pre-marital sex and homosexuality. Strong believers are more likely to see the Catholic Church as playing an insufficient role in Polish society and to desire a stronger participation of this institution in the public life. They are also more confident about the Catholic Church. Conversely, non-believers are more tolerant and endorse the combination of liberal views (pro-choice, pro-homosexuality, etc.) (Table 42).

Age has a similar, albeit somewhat weaker, effect on the ideological preferences. Older people tend to be more conservative. Similar to the Catholic congregation, older people are more likely to oppose pre-marital sex and homosexuals. They are more likely to favor the Catholic Church’s playing a stronger role in the Polish life and are more confident about the Church. Younger people, on the other hand, are more liberal (Table 42).

Education, size of place of residence, income, and gender are considerably less important in predicting ideological preferences of a respondent. Education, as expected, determines a more liberal ideological orientation. More educated people are more likely to accept homosexuality. Size of place of residence has a similar effect. Residents of bigger cities are more skeptical about the Catholic Church. Gender
contributes to stronger religious conservatism of a respondent. Female believers tend to be less tolerant than their male counterparts. *Income* has no effect on the ideological preferences (Table 42).

### Table 42

Results of Regression Analysis of Select Polish Ideological Attitudes According to Gender, Size of Place of Residence, Education, Age, and Degree of Religious Belief

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Support for pre-marital sex&lt;sup&gt;198&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Positive attitude towards homosexuals&lt;sup&gt;199&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Perception of the role of the Catholic Church in the Polish society&lt;sup&gt;200&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Degree of trust in the Catholic Church&lt;sup&gt;201&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.042** (0.004)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.033** (0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (degree)&lt;sup&gt;202&lt;/sup&gt;:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.067** (0.005)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.064** (0.008)</td>
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<td>0.049** (0.005)</td>
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<td>-0.080** (0.012)</td>
<td>0.056** (0.008)</td>
<td>-0.075** (0.007)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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198 The variable "support for pre-marital sex" is measured on a 4-point scale where 1 is "pre-marital sex is always wrong" and 4 is "pre-marital sex is not wrong at all."

199 The variable "attitudes to homosexuals" is measured on a 4-point scale where 1 is "homosexuality is always wrong" and 4 is "homosexuality is not wrong at all."

200 The variable "perception of the role of the Catholic Church in the Polish society" is measured on a 5-point scale where 1 is "the Church has far too much power" and 4 is "the Church has far too little power."

201 The variable "degree of trust in the Catholic Church" is measured on a 3-point scale where 1 is "a great deal of trust" and 3 is "hardly any trust."

202 Here and henceforth the independent variable "education (degree)" is measured on a 9-point ascending scale where 1 is "incomplete elementary education" and 9 is "complete higher education."
Table 42 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Degree of religious belief:</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Constant</th>
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<td>(0.026)</td>
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<td>2.8%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
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Notes:
Ordinary Least Squares Regression
All estimates from SPSS
** p<0.05
* p<0.10

3. Social and Demographic Determinants of Economic Attitudes

Among social and demographic predictors of economic attitudes, *degree of religious belief* is the strongest. There is a certain Christian (in the Polish case, Catholic) ethos which accounts for the relationship in which strong believers are more likely to see existing income inequalities as too drastic and are more likely to support the state intervention, including income redistribution, job creation, and guarantees of minimum income. This is not surprising, given that the Polish Catholic Church, in general, and Pope John Paul II, in particular, are squarely on the side of market critics. However, Catholic-endorsed state intervention does not mean support for socialism. On the contrary, the more religious a person is, the less he/she favors economic socialism and the more he/she distrusts state enterprises (Table 43).
Education and income have very similar independent effects on economic attitudes. People in the highest educational and income brackets are reluctant to see the state interfere in the economy, especially in the redistributive sphere. The higher the level of education and income, the weaker the perception of income inequalities, the less support for the state intervention and socialism, the less trust in state enterprises and the more trust in the private companies (Table 43). It appears that educated and richer people unambiguously prefer the market and privatization.

Age, on the other hand, has an opposite effect on the economic preferences. The older the person, the more clearly he/she sees income inequalities and the more receptive he/she is towards the state’s intervention to reduce income inequalities, create jobs and provide minimum income. Older people are also more supportive of socialism and have more confidence in state enterprises (Table 43). As in many other post-Communist countries, older people, who draw their income from the state pension funds, are the clear losers under economic liberalization. My analysis only confirms their dissatisfaction with the new, market realities.

Size of place of residence, is the weakest predictor. However, it too is useful in explaining economic preferences. Residents of bigger cities, where unemployment is lower and the personal income is higher than the national average, are less likely to agree that income inequalities in Poland are too high and that the state should interfere in the economy (to reduce inequalities, guarantee jobs and provide minimum income) than their rural counterparts plagued by unemployment and poverty. Urban dwellers are also less likely to support economic socialism and tend to distrust state enterprises (Table 43).
Table 43
Results of Regression Analysis of Select Polish Economic Attitudes According to Gender, Size of Place of Residence, Education, Age, Family Income and Degree of Religious Belief

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Dependent Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size of place of residence:</td>
<td>Perception of income inequalities in Poland</td>
<td>0.007**</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support for income redistribution-1</td>
<td>0.055**</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support for income redistribution-2</td>
<td>0.030**</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Belief in the government’s obligation to provide jobs</td>
<td>0.019**</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Belief in the government’s obligation to provide minimum income</td>
<td>0.017**</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support for economic socialism</td>
<td>0.022**</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Degree of trust in state enterprises</td>
<td>0.007**</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Degree of trust in the private companies</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

204 The variable “perception of income inequalities in Poland” is measured on a 5-point descending scale where 1 is “I strongly agree that income inequalities are too high” and 5 is “I strongly disagree that income inequalities are too high.”

205 The variable “support for income redistribution-1” is measured on a 7-point descending scale where 1 is “government should reduce income inequalities” and 7 is “government should not attempt to reduce income inequalities.”

206 The variable “support for income redistribution-2” is measured on a 5-point descending scale where 1 is “I strongly agree with income redistribution” and 5 is “strongly oppose income redistribution.”

207 The variable “belief in the government’s obligation to provide jobs” is measured on a 5-point descending scale where 1 is “strongly agree” and 5 is “strongly oppose.”

208 The variable “belief in the government’s obligation to provide minimum income” is measured on a 5-point descending scale where 1 is “strongly agree” and 5 is “strongly oppose.”

209 The variable “degree of support for economic socialism” is measured on a 5-point descending scale where 1 is “I absolutely support economic socialism” and 5 is “I categorically oppose economic socialism.”

210 The variable “degree of trust in state enterprises” is measured on a 3-point descending scale where 1 is “a great deal of trust” and 3 is “hardly any trust.”

211 The variable “degree of trust in the private companies” is measured on a 3-point descending scale where 1 is “a great deal of trust” and 3 is “hardly any trust.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Education (degree)</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Age:</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Family income:</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Degree of religious belief:</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
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<td>0.022**</td>
<td>0.049**</td>
<td>0.028**</td>
<td>0.020**</td>
<td>0.024**</td>
<td>0.018**</td>
<td>0.011</td>
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<td>(0.004)</td>
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Table 43 continued

<table>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.557**</td>
<td>1.773**</td>
<td>1.482**</td>
<td>1.208**</td>
<td>1.350**</td>
<td>3.421**</td>
<td>1.881**</td>
<td>2.418**</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
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<td>(0.069)</td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13,261</td>
<td>13,288</td>
<td>14,965</td>
<td>15,380</td>
<td>15,236</td>
<td>13,573</td>
<td>11,180</td>
<td>11,068</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
Ordinary Least Squares Regression
All estimates from SPSS
** p<0.05
*p< 0.10
Finally, gender was found to occasionally influence relationships between social and demographic predictors and economic attitudes. Only religious women perceive income inequalities in contemporary Poland as too high and only religious men show strong opposition to socialism as economic model. Only male residents of bigger cities are likely to see existing income inequalities as normal. The effect of age and education on the support for redistribution is much stronger for men. Only educated women are more likely to oppose the state’s intervention to provide jobs. Older men are more likely to support the state’s obligation to provide jobs and tend to endorse economic socialism more often than older women (Table 43).

4. Social and Demographic Determinants of Foreign Policy Attitudes

Among the social and demographic predictors of foreign policy attitudes are education, income, degree of religious belief, age, and, to a lesser degree, gender. Income and education have a very similar effect on the attitudes towards various countries and the perception of the world as threatening Poland’s independence. The higher a person’s education and income, the more favorably he/she views Ukraine, and even Russia (i.e., countries which do not evoke strong positive reactions among the ordinary Poles) and the less he/she perceives the world as threatening Poland. The stronger the degree of religious belief, the better the attitude towards the US. Age has a different effect on a respondent’s attitudes towards Poland’s western neighbors (Germany and the US) and on feelings towards countries to the East (Ukraine). While younger generations feel more positively towards Germany and the US, they are less enthusiastic about Ukraine. Conversely, the older generation’s Communist socialization is a plausible explanation for this cohort’s more positive outlook on
Ukraine and greater skepticism in regards to the US and Germany. Richer, younger, and more educated respondents appear to be more internationalist. Gender influences popular perceptions of Poland’s eastern neighbors. Only educated females have more positive feelings towards Ukraine and Russia (Table 44).

Table 44
Results of Regression Analysis of Select Polish Foreign Policy Attitudes According to Gender, Size of Education, Age, Family Income and Degree of Religious Belief

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Positive attitude towards Germany 211</th>
<th>Positive attitude towards the US212</th>
<th>Positive attitude towards Ukraine 213</th>
<th>Positive attitude towards Russia214</th>
<th>Perception of the external threat to Poland’s independence215</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education (degree)</td>
<td>-0.063 (0.033)</td>
<td>0.088** (0.029)</td>
<td>0.134** (0.029)</td>
<td>0.011** (0.002)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-0.127 (0.063)</td>
<td>-0.042 (0.054)</td>
<td>0.111 (0.056)</td>
<td>0.020** (0.005)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.032 (0.039)</td>
<td>0.138** (0.038)</td>
<td>0.147** (0.034)</td>
<td>0.008** (0.003)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age:</td>
<td>-0.152** (0.016)</td>
<td>-0.082** (0.013)</td>
<td>0.113** (0.014)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-0.092** (0.029)</td>
<td>-0.030 (0.024)</td>
<td>-0.090** (0.025)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.165** (0.019)</td>
<td>-0.098** (0.016)</td>
<td>-0.123** (0.017)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family income:</td>
<td>0.240** (0.022)</td>
<td>0.169** (0.019)</td>
<td>0.042** (0.019)</td>
<td>0.063** (0.005)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

211 The variable “attitudes towards Germany” is measured on a 10-point ascending scale where 1 is “strongly dislike” and 10 is “strongly like.”
212 The variable “attitudes towards the US” is measured on a 10-point ascending scale where 1 is “strongly dislike” and 10 is “strongly like.”
213 The variable “attitudes towards Ukraine” is measured on a 10-point ascending scale where 1 is “strongly dislike” and 10 is “strongly like.”
214 The variable “attitudes towards Russia” is measured on a 10-point ascending scale where 1 is “strongly dislike” and 10 is “strongly like.”
215 The variable “perception of the external threat to Poland’s independence” is measured on a 3-point ascending scale where 1 is “the world seriously threatens Poland’s independence” and 3 is “the world does not threaten Poland’s independence at all.”

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Table 44 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Male</th>
<th>0.184** (0.036)</th>
<th>0.173** (0.032)</th>
<th>0.032 (0.033)</th>
<th>-0.052** (0.009)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.258** (0.027)</td>
<td>0.165** (0.024)</td>
<td>0.041 (0.0024)</td>
<td>0.065** (0.006)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Degree of religious belief:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Male</th>
<th>-0.333** (0.049)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.544** (0.093)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of religious belief:</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-0.333** (0.049)</td>
<td>-0.544** (0.093)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.284** (0.058)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Constant:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Male</th>
<th>4.618** (0.166)</th>
<th>7.912** (0.014)</th>
<th>4.274** (0.173)</th>
<th>3.846** (0.125)</th>
<th>2.039** (0.013)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>7.912** (0.014)</td>
<td>4.274** (0.173)</td>
<td>3.846** (0.125)</td>
<td>2.039** (0.013)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R-squared:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Male</th>
<th>2.4%</th>
<th>0.5%</th>
<th>1.8%</th>
<th>0.4%</th>
<th>1.8%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Male</th>
<th>11,853</th>
<th>12,874</th>
<th>12,722</th>
<th>12,910</th>
<th>12,188</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

Ordinary Least Squares Regression
All estimates from SPSS
** p<0.05
*p< 0.10

5. Social and Demographic Determinants of Ethnic Preference

The PGSS database contains only one relevant ethnic variable, the degree of anti-Semitism. *Income* has the strongest relationship with the degree of anti-Semitism. The higher the income of a respondent, the less anti-Semitic he/she is. *Education* has a similar, but weaker impact on the degree of anti-Semitism. Younger people are slightly less anti-Semitic than their adult counterparts. *Gender* also has effect on the degree of anti-Semitism. Only educated men are less anti-Semitic (Table 45).
Relationships Between Various Polish Public Attitudes

In this section I discuss important constellations between various public attitudes. I analyze how different political, ideological, economic, foreign policy, and ethnic relations attitudes of the Polish public are linked to each other to form liberal and organic clusters not unlike the value orientations of the Polish elite. To explore

Table 45

Results of Regression Analysis of Degree of Polish Anti-Semitism According to Gender, Size of Place of Residence, Education, Age, Family Income and Degree of Religious Belief

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables:</th>
<th>Dependent Variable: Degree of Anti-Semitism(^{216})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education (degree):</td>
<td>0.069** (0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.108** (0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.036 (0.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age:</td>
<td>-0.063** (0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-0.071** (0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.064** (0.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Income:</td>
<td>0.152** (0.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.154** (0.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.146** (0.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.356** (0.155)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{216}\) The variable “degree of anti-Semitism” is measured on a 10-point scale where 1 is “I strongly dislike the Jewish people” and 10 -- “I strongly like the Jewish people.”
Table 45 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R-squared</th>
<th>1.4%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>7,949</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
Ordinary Least Squares Regression
All estimates from SPSS
** p<0.05
*p< 0.10

the larger themes in public opinion, I performed correlation analysis\(^{217}\) which confirmed the existence of the two major divisions (liberal and organic-statist) within Polish public opinion. Only survey questions that were asked consistently in every PGSS survey (1992-1999) were analyzed. Since all answer-options were normally distributed, I was able to explore the selected survey questions cumulatively, as part of newly created, combined database.

Table 46 shows that pro-democratic respondents (the ones who reject communism as a political system and are more satisfied with democracy in Poland) have mixed ideological leanings. On the one hand, they are more likely to oppose the death penalty and abortion; on the other, they are more accepting of homosexuals. However, people who take a stronger interest in politics tend to be more supportive of all liberal causes. It appears that interest in politics is the factor that best explains a respondent’s more liberal ideological outlook, while anti-Communist and pro-democratic beliefs tend to result in a split ideological position. The same relationships

\(^{217}\) In the course of the correlation analysis, I deleted the values for answers "I do not know," "I am not sure," "no answer," and other indeterminate options. The correlation tables reported in this section are based solely on "substantive" answer options.
are evident in Table 46a (Appendix J). Political attitudes of the Polish public also form distinct authoritarian and democratic clusters. People who have a positive attitude towards communism are also more likely to be dissatisfied with democracy and the current political situation and be disinterested in politics, while anti-Communists tend to see Polish democracy and the political situation in general in a more favorable light and to take a greater interest in politics (See Tables 46, 47 and 48. Tables 47a and 47b (Appendix J) show a similar picture.
Table 46

Relationships Between Political and Ideological Attitudes of the Polish Public

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes to communism (1—worst kind, 4—good)</th>
<th>Are you satisfied with democracy in Poland? (1—very satisfied, 5—very dissatisfied)</th>
<th>How interested are you in politics? (extremely, 5—not at all)</th>
<th>Do you favor or oppose death penalty? (1—favor, 2—oppose)</th>
<th>Should abortion be up to a woman? (1—yes, 2—no)</th>
<th>What do you think pre-marital sex? (1—always wrong, 4—never wrong)</th>
<th>What do you think about homosexual relations? (1—always wrong, 4—not wrong at all)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes to communism</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.129**</td>
<td>.146**</td>
<td>-.094**</td>
<td>-.067**</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>-.027*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,581</td>
<td>7,247</td>
<td>7,556</td>
<td>7,079</td>
<td>6,794</td>
<td>7,275</td>
<td>6,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.129**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.049**</td>
<td>-.061**</td>
<td>-.084**</td>
<td>.029*</td>
<td>-.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>.182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,247</td>
<td>8,104</td>
<td>8,088</td>
<td>7,552</td>
<td>7,213</td>
<td>7,744</td>
<td>7,362</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 46 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
<th>N</th>
<th></th>
<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
<th>N</th>
<th></th>
<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
<th>N</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>How interested are you in politics?</strong></td>
<td>.146**</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>7,556</td>
<td>.049**</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>8,088</td>
<td>8,788</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.048**</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>7,552</td>
<td>.054**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Do you favor or oppose death penalty?</strong></td>
<td>-.094**</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>7,079</td>
<td>-.061**</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>7,552</td>
<td>7,552</td>
<td>-.048**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>8,128</td>
<td>.077**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Should abortion be up to a woman?</strong></td>
<td>-.067**</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>6,794</td>
<td>-.084**</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>7,213</td>
<td>7,696</td>
<td>.054**</td>
<td>.077**</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>7,207</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What do you think pre-marital sex?</strong></td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>.101</td>
<td>7,275</td>
<td>.029*</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>7,744</td>
<td>8,277</td>
<td>-.123**</td>
<td>-.096**</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>7,712</td>
<td>-.279**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Sig. indicates significance level; **p < .01; *p < .05.**
Table 46 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What do you think about homosexual relations?</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>N.027*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.110**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.049**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.234**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.260**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7,362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7,869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7,359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7,082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7,621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7,909</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Table 47

Relationships Between Political and Economic Attitudes of the Polish Public

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes to communism (1—worst kind, 4—good)</th>
<th>Are you satisfied with democracy in Poland? (1—very satisfied, 6—very dissatisfied)</th>
<th>How interested are you in politics? (1—extremely, 5—not at all)</th>
<th>Should government reduce income differentials? (1—strongly agree, 5—strongly disagree)</th>
<th>Should government provide minimum income? (1—strongly agree, 5—strongly disagree)</th>
<th>Do you favor or oppose socialism as economic system? (1—very much favor, 5—totally oppose)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed) N</td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed) N</td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed) N</td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed) N</td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed) N</td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed) N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.129**</td>
<td>.146**</td>
<td>-.122**</td>
<td>-.158**</td>
<td>-.096**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,581</td>
<td>7,247</td>
<td>7,556</td>
<td>7,384</td>
<td>7,491</td>
<td>7,446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.129**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.049**</td>
<td>-.120**</td>
<td>-.118**</td>
<td>-.076**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,247</td>
<td>8,104</td>
<td>8,088</td>
<td>7,873</td>
<td>8,015</td>
<td>7,956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.146**</td>
<td>.049**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-.109**</td>
<td>-.170**</td>
<td>-.097**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,556</td>
<td>8,088</td>
<td>8,788</td>
<td>8,442</td>
<td>8,654</td>
<td>8,574</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Predictably, there are two well established constellations within the public’s political and economic attitudes: the authoritarian-etatist one (people who support communism are likely to favor governmental intervention and socialism as an economic system) and the democratic-economically liberal one (those who are satisfied with democracy and interested in politics tend to reject government’s redistributive and interventionist efforts and economic socialism) (see Table 47). A

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
very similar conclusion emerges from Tables 47a and 47b (Appendix J). Respondents dissatisfied with the current economic situation and favoring governmental intervention tend to be dissatisfied in the current political situation, democracy as it exists in Poland and estranged from politics. Conversely, those who see the current economic situation as good and those who reject governmental etatism and economic socialism are more likely to be satisfied with the current political situation, democracy and involved in politics.

Table 48 reveals very interesting, albeit not unexpected, relationships. More pro-Western respondents are also more pro-democratic, i.e., they tend to reject communism as a political system, be more satisfied with democracy and be more interested in politics in general. More pro-Eastern respondents are likely to endorse communism, but they are also satisfied with democracy and interested in politics. Respondents with an internationalist outlook on foreign policy tend to reject communism, be satisfied with democracy, and be interested in politics. More isolationist respondents, on the other hand, are more likely to support communism, be skeptical about democracy and apolitical.
Table 48

Relationships Between Political and Foreign Policy Attitudes of the Polish Public

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Attitudes to Germany (1—strong dislike, 10—strong liking)</th>
<th>Attitudes to the US (1—strong dislike, 10—strong liking)</th>
<th>Attitudes to Russia (1—strong dislike, 10—strong liking)</th>
<th>Does the world threaten Polish independence? (1—seriously threatens, 3—does not threaten at all)</th>
<th>Attitudes to communism (1—worst kind, 4—good)</th>
<th>Are you satisfied with democracy in Poland (1—very satisfied, 6—very dissatisfied)</th>
<th>How interested are you in politics? (1—extremely, 5—not all)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes to Germany</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.325**</td>
<td>.256**</td>
<td>.197**</td>
<td>-.048**</td>
<td>-.084**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8,492</td>
<td>8,268</td>
<td>8,163</td>
<td>8,267</td>
<td>7,756</td>
<td>7,409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>883</td>
<td>8,448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes to the US</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N</td>
<td>.325**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.097**</td>
<td>.045**</td>
<td>-.075**</td>
<td>-.094**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8,268</td>
<td>8,341</td>
<td>8,061</td>
<td>8,165</td>
<td>7,663</td>
<td>7,319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7,789</td>
<td>8,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 48 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes to Ukraine</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
<th>N</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
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- 2** indicates significance at the 0.01 level.
- 1** indicates significance at the 0.05 level.
- .000 indicates no significance.
Table 48 continued

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**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**
According to Table 49, there are two distinct clusters of public attitudes:
ideologically conservative-economically etatist (respondents who support death
penalty and oppose pre-marital sex and homosexuals tend to favor governmental
intervention to provide jobs, redistribute income and provide minimum income) and
ideologically liberal-economically liberal (pro-choice respondents are more likely to
resist governmental intervention). A similar picture is presented in Table 48a
(Appendix J). Finally, there are interesting conservative and liberal constellations of
ideological attitudes. Conservative respondents who favor the death penalty are more
likely to be anti-gay, but they also tend to favor abortion and pre-marital sex. Liberal
attitudes of allowing abortion, homosexual relations, and pre-marital sex tend to go
together (Tables 46, 49, and 50).
Table 49

Relationships Between Ideological and Economic Attitudes of the Polish Public

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Do you favor or oppose death penalty? (1—favor, 2—oppose)</th>
<th>Should abortion be up to a woman? (1—yes, 2—no)</th>
<th>What do you think pre-marital sex? (1—always wrong, 4—never wrong)</th>
<th>What do you think about homosexual relations? (1—always wrong, 4—not wrong at all)</th>
<th>Should government reduce income differentials? (1—strongly agree, 5—strongly disagree)</th>
<th>Should government provide jobs? (1—strongly agree, 5—strongly disagree)</th>
<th>Should government provide minimum income? (1—strongly agree, 5—strongly disagree)</th>
<th>Do you favor or oppose socialism as economic system? (1—very much favor, 5—totally oppose)</th>
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Table 49 continued

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<td>152**</td>
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Table 49 continued

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<th>Should government provide minimum income?</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Do you favor or oppose socialism as economic system?</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
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</table>

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
Table 50 shows a significant relationship between a respondent's ideology and his/her foreign policy views. More internationalist foreign policy public attitudes translate into ideological liberalism and tolerance, while more isolationist beliefs are more likely to be associated with conservative ideological tenets. People who see the outside world as benign and non-threatening tend to oppose the death penalty, support abortion at women's discretion and be more tolerant towards pre-marital sex and homosexuals. Conversely, respondents who perceive the world as threatening are more likely to favor the death penalty and oppose abortion, pre-marital sex, and homosexual relations.
Table 50

Relationships Between Ideological and Foreign Policy Attitudes of the Polish Public

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes to Germany (1—strong dislike, 10—strong liking)</th>
<th>Attitudes to the US (1—strong dislike, 10—strong liking)</th>
<th>Attitudes to Ukraine (1—strong dislike, 10—strong liking)</th>
<th>Attitudes to Russia (1—strong dislike, 10—strong liking)</th>
<th>Does the world threaten Polish independence? (1—seriously threatens, 3—does not threaten at all)</th>
<th>Do you favor or oppose death penalty? (1—favor, 2—oppose)</th>
<th>Should abortion be up to a woman? (1—yes, 2—no)</th>
<th>What do you think about homosexual relations? (1—always wrong, 4—not wrong at all)</th>
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Table 50 continued

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<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
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<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
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<th>N</th>
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<td>7,646</td>
<td>7,740</td>
<td>7,422</td>
<td>8,128</td>
<td>7,207</td>
<td>7,712</td>
<td>7,359</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should abortion be up to a woman?</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>.033**</td>
<td>.044**</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>-.017</td>
<td>.077**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-.279**</td>
<td>-.234**</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>.651</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.526</td>
<td>.155</td>
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<td>7,371</td>
<td>7,288</td>
<td>7,384</td>
<td>7,070</td>
<td>7,207</td>
<td>7,733</td>
<td>7,436</td>
<td>7,082</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What do you think about pre-marital sex?</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N</td>
<td>.047**</td>
<td>-.025*</td>
<td>-.032**</td>
<td>-.033**</td>
<td>.047**</td>
<td>-.096**</td>
<td>-.279**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.260**</td>
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<td>.000</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>.003</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8,044</td>
<td>7,931</td>
<td>7,835</td>
<td>7,929</td>
<td>7,590</td>
<td>7,712</td>
<td>7,436</td>
<td>8,312</td>
<td>7,621</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What do you think about homosexual relations?</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N</td>
<td>.029*</td>
<td>-.028*</td>
<td>.058**</td>
<td>.057**</td>
<td>.077**</td>
<td>.049**</td>
<td>-.234**</td>
<td>.260**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
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<td>.010</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7,649</td>
<td>7,532</td>
<td>7,457</td>
<td>7,543</td>
<td>7,215</td>
<td>7,359</td>
<td>7,082</td>
<td>7,621</td>
<td>7,909</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Table 51 reveals an interesting relationship between the foreign policy and the economic preferences of the Polish public. Although respondents with favorable views on Germany, Russia, and the Ukraine and respondents with a more benign view of the outside world in general tend to reject the governed market or socialistic forms of the economy, pro-American respondents tend to be more economically etatist, although not supportive of socialism as an economic system. In general, both pro-Western and pro-Eastern respondents are skeptical of economic socialism.

Economic attitudes themselves fall into two neat clusters. People who oppose one type of governmental intervention into the economy tend to reject all other etatist or redistributive measures as well as socialism as an economic model. Economically liberal respondents are also more likely to be satisfied with the current economic situation. Conversely, supporters of redistributive politics are more likely to expect the government to provide jobs, secure minimum income, and favor economic socialism. They tend to see the current state of the economy as unsatisfactory (see Tables 47, 49 and 51 as well as Tables 47a-c and 49a in Appendix J). Finally, there is also a clear link between how a respondent reacts to foreign countries and his/her perception of the threat emanating from the world outside. If a person holds a positive set of beliefs about foreign countries, he/she is unlikely to perceive the world as threatening Poland’s independence (Tables 49, 50, and 51).
Table 51

Relationships Between Economic and Foreign Policy Attitudes of the Polish Public

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes to Germany (1—strong dislike, 10—strong liking)</th>
<th>Attitudes to the US (1—strong dislike, 10—strong liking)</th>
<th>Attitudes to Ukraine (1—strong dislike, 10—strong liking)</th>
<th>Attitudes to Russia (1—strong dislike, 10—strong liking)</th>
<th>Does the world threaten Polish independence? (1—seriously threatens, 3—does not threaten at all)</th>
<th>Should government reduce income differential? (1—strongly agree, 5—strongly disagree)</th>
<th>Should government provide jobs? (1—strongly agree, 5—totally disagree)</th>
<th>Should government provide minimum income? (1—strongly agree, 5—totally disagree)</th>
<th>Do you favor or oppose socialism as economic system? (1—very much in favor, 5—totally oppose)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes to Germany</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.325**</td>
<td>.256**</td>
<td>.197**</td>
<td>.117**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Correlation</td>
<td></td>
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<td>.000</td>
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<td>N</td>
<td>8,492</td>
<td>8,268</td>
<td>8,163</td>
<td>8,267</td>
<td>7,756</td>
<td>8,195</td>
<td>8,371</td>
<td>8,302</td>
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Table 51 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude to the US</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Attitude to Ukraine</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Attitude to Russia</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Does the world threaten Polish independence?</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
<th>N</th>
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<td></td>
<td>.325**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.097**</td>
<td>.045**</td>
<td>.049**</td>
<td>-.021</td>
<td>-.036**</td>
<td>-.045**</td>
<td>.089**</td>
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<td>8,268</td>
<td>8,341</td>
<td>8,061</td>
<td>8,165</td>
<td>7,663</td>
<td>8,069</td>
<td>8,226</td>
<td>8,169</td>
<td>7,677</td>
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<td>.097**</td>
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<td>.588**</td>
<td>.102**</td>
<td>.054**</td>
<td>.078**</td>
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<td>8,237</td>
<td>8,163</td>
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<td>7,068</td>
<td>8,129</td>
<td>8,065</td>
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<td>.197**</td>
<td>.045**</td>
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<td>8,267</td>
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<td>8,163</td>
<td>8,353</td>
<td>7,654</td>
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<td>8,236</td>
<td>8,178</td>
<td>7,691</td>
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<td>.117**</td>
<td>.049**</td>
<td>.102**</td>
<td>.070**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.098**</td>
<td>.122**</td>
<td>.072**</td>
<td>.070**</td>
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<td>7,756</td>
<td>7,663</td>
<td>7,571</td>
<td>7,654</td>
<td>7,956</td>
<td>7,719</td>
<td>7,855</td>
<td>7,799</td>
<td>7,414</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 51 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Should government reduce income differentials?</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Should government provide jobs?</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should government provide minimum income?</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you favor or oppose socialism as economic system?</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| | .043** | .021 | .054** | .051** | .098** | 1.000 | .501** | .427** | .152** |
| | .000 | .065 | .000 | .000 | .000 | .000 | .000 | .000 | .000 |
| | 8,195 | 8,069 | 7,068 | 8,075 | 7,719 | 8,485 | 8,426 | 8,366 | 7,774 |
| | .058** | -.036** | .078** | .052** | .122** | .501** | 1.000 | .567** | .165** |
| | .000 | .001 | .000 | .000 | .000 | .000 | .000 | .000 | .000 |
| | 8,371 | 8,226 | 8,129 | 8,236 | 7,855 | 8,426 | 8,794 | 8,567 | 8,654 |
| | .031** | -.045** | .029* | .040** | .072** | .427** | .567** | 1.000 | .106** |
| | .005 | .000 | .010 | .000 | .000 | .000 | .000 | .000 | .000 |
| | 8,302 | 8,169 | 8,065 | 8,178 | 7,799 | 8,366 | 8,567 | 8,623 | 7,856 |
| | .045** | .089** | -.010 | .091** | .070** | .152** | .165** | .106** | 1.000 |
| | .000 | .000 | .402 | .000 | .000 | .000 | .000 | .000 | .000 |
| | 7,782 | 7,677 | 7,599 | 7,691 | 7,414 | 7,774 | 8,654 | 7,856 | 8,001 |

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Conclusions About Relationship Between Polish Public Opinion and Elite Value Orientations According to Individual Issue Domains

To measure the degree of congruence between Polish public opinion and official discourse, I compared trends in public attitudes to trends in the elite’s value orientations. Politically, Poles continued to support democratic principles. Original democratic ideas among the elite also survived intact. Both the elite’s and the public’s political attitudes move in the same direction. Democratic commitment appears to be a shared value for both the elite and the public.

Ideologically, Poles held fairly conservative, but not necessarily more statist, positions. Official discourse, which is currently divided between liberalism and conservatism/statism, seems to reflect the mixed ideological attitudes of the public. This means that, at the very least, elite and public attitudes are congruent.

Economically, Polish public opinion always exhibited strong governed market preferences, while retaining some free market elements. Poles believe in a strong social protection and in the state’s obligations to provide the population with social benefits. But they are also moderately supportive of privatization. The Polish elite is similarly undecided on the issue of the preferred economic model. The evolution of elite attitudes towards greater economic etatism may be directly or indirectly attributed to mixed public attitudes. Even if the changes in the elite’s attitudes are a function of electoral competition between liberals (who champion the free market ideas) and social-democrats (supporters of the governed market model), the economic conflict between the liberal and social-democratic elites itself is similar to the split electorate.
In the area of foreign policy, Poles overwhelmingly and consistently support a pro-Western option and reject pro-Eastern orientation. The elite is consistent in its pro-Western discourse, yet volatile on the issue of pro-Eastern foreign policy. Clearly, the elite’s and the public’s attitudes move in the same direction.

In the area of ethnic relations, the Polish public exhibits a strong and consistent degree of nationalism. Ethnic relations is the only area in which the Polish elite, which remained moderately tolerant, clearly ignores nationalistic public opinion. This suggests that the Polish elite is selective when incorporating organic-statist public attitudes into official discourse. If Polish government-affiliated intellectuals are not averse to using conservative ideology or economic etatism, they are reluctant to uphold ethnic intolerance, even if it comes from the public.

Social and demographic factors have a predictable effect on various Polish public attitudes. Younger, more educated and higher income respondents tend to be more democratic, liberal, pro-market, internationalist, pro-Western, and tolerant. Religion (Catholicism) has a complex effect on the public attitudes under consideration. In Poland there is a powerful Catholic ethos which is both ideologically conservative and economically etatist.

Several clear demarcation lines are discernible within individual issue domains: authoritarian-democratic (political issue domain), conservative-liberal (ideological issue domain), and governed market-free market (economic issue domain). There are no discernible groupings of variables into pro-Western/anti-Western dichotomy. If a person likes a foreign country, he/she is more likely to like
all others, irrespective of their geopolitical location. Instead, there is a more prominent internationalist-isolationist divide.

More interestingly, my analysis reveals the existence of two distinct groupings of public attitudes: 1) democratic—ideologically split (anti-abortion, but also anti-death penalty and pro-gay)—economically liberal—internationalist and 2) authoritarian—ideologically split (pro-abortion, but pro-death penalty and anti-gay)—economically etatist—isolationist. The ambiguous relationship between political preferences and ideological inclinations stems from the fact that in the Polish context democracy and anti-authoritarianism are associated with both conservative and liberal ideological preferences. In fact, both Polish conservatives and liberals are equally likely to reject communism (a proxy for political authoritarianism) and support democracy.

More liberal public opinion in Poland allowed the original, liberal discourse to survive intact. During the research period, only one category of the original discourse, i.e., ethnic tolerance, was threatened by nationalistic public opinion. Even when the elite’s original liberal attitudes weakened (ideology, the economy), they were not totally replaced by the organic-statist elements.

Although there is a greater degree of congruence between Polish official discourse and public opinion than reported in the Russian case, this relationship is not perfectly harmonious. If in some areas there is a near perfect resemblance between public opinion and official discourse (democratic orientation, mixed ideological preferences, indeterminate economic views, and pro-Western foreign policy), in the
ethnic relations issue domain there is a significant disjunction between public opinion and the elite’s response.

I conclude this chapter with an analysis of the relationship between Polish public opinion, official discourse, and actual policies. This discussion is crucial to answering the questions of policy implications of stable value orientations of the Polish elite and general population. It also suggests whether important policies in post-Communist Poland represent dominant trends in public opinion and enjoy popular support. Finally, it sheds light on the function of discourse as policy legitimizing mechanism.

**Political, Ideological, Economic, Foreign Policy, and Ethnic Relations Actions of the Polish Political Elite: Event Analysis**

To investigate the complex interplay between public opinion, official discourse, and actual policy initiatives, I compared results of event analysis of the political elite’s actions to the outcomes of both content analysis of official discourse and an extensive review of public opinion surveys.

1. Sample Selection

Only events involving the top members of the executive branch (President, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Defense Minister, other members of the Cabinet, and their high ranking staff) and representative of the national legislative and judiciary bodies (Sejm, Senate, the Supreme Court, Constitutional Tribunal), such as adoption of laws and decrees, declarations about constitutionality or unconstitutionality of legislative actions, announcements of important economic

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218 Here, unlike in the Russian case, I added legislative and judicial elites to the sample. In Poland, a parliamentary-presidential republic, legislative and judicial branches play an important role.
measures, ratification of foreign policy treaties, visits to foreign countries and hosting foreign delegations in Poland, military maneuvers, policy initiatives dealing with refugees, etc., were selected. Event analysis data came from chronicles of events collected and published by several Polish authors. A total of 941 events was analyzed. All events were assumed to have equal weight.

2. Event Analysis Procedures and Evaluative Criteria

Selected events were classified according to five issue domains (political, ideological, economic, foreign, and ethnic policy). For instance, the adoption of the law guaranteeing freedom of the press (inclusive democratic category) or attacks on the opposition, especially the left, through tightening of the lustration procedures (elite democratic category) were classified as political events. Liberalization of anti-abortion laws (event reflecting a liberal ideology) or the decision to introduce religion in school (event reflecting conservative/statist ideology) were classified under the ideological rubric. Price liberalization (free market category) or the governmental decision to subsidize gas for domestic agrarian producers (governed market category) were placed under the economic issue domain. Negotiations with NATO (pro-

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Western foreign policy) or trade contracts with Russia (pro-Eastern foreign policy) were classified as foreign policy events. Anti-Semitic statements by the President (nationalistic category) or criminal proceedings against anti-Semitic members of the political elite (tolerant category) were classified under the ethnic policy rubric. Each event was assigned a numeric value (+1, if event/policy initiative reflected liberal principles and −1, if event/policy initiative embodied organic-statist principles). Classified events were then aggregated by year (see graphs below).

3. Evolution of Actions of the Polish Elite

Political Actions. Figure 177 depicts the Polish political elite as committed to the principles of inclusive democracy, a commitment, which, surprisingly, diminishes during the presidential elections years. This fact is attributable to the specifics of the two latest presidential elections, in which the incumbent president had to campaign against the background of the opposition-controlled parliament. Incumbent president Wałęsa, for instance, insisted on disbanding the SLD-controlled Parliament during the 1995 campaign, while prior to the 2000 elections, the post-Solidarity-controlled Parliament intensified efforts to introduce lustration and de-communization mechanisms harmful to the left opposition, in general, and incumbent president Kwaśniewski, in particular. The parliamentary elections years, on the other hand, restore the democratic balance. This finding confirms the Linz hypothesis -- presidentialism, institutionally a more divisive system, seems less conducive to inclusive democracy, especially in the context of the newly democratized societies.

The figure also demonstrates that the general political orientation of the Polish post-

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Communist elite is unaffected by the internal rotations within this group. Both the Left and the Right are equally supportive of inclusive democracy. The temporary "lapses" in democratic course are attributable to the institutional factors of Polish politics, not to political orientations of parties controlling the institutions. There is a significant degree of congruence among political attitudes of all three of my research subjects. Throughout the post-Communist period, the Polish political and intellectual elite as well as the general public consistently supported substantive democratic ideas.

![Graph showing overall evolution of Polish elite's political actions](image)

Figure 177. Overall Evolution of the Polish Elite's Political Actions

Figure 178 shows that the rotations among the Polish political elite matter for this group's general ideological outlook. In 1989 – 1993, conservative representatives of the political Right controlled both executive and legislative branches. The most conservative political team (government of Olszewski) came to power in 1992, a fact reflected in Graph 92. Afterwards, in 1993-1997, a liberal government of Suchotska
and social-democratic governments\textsuperscript{221} of Pawlak, Oleksy, and Cimoszewicz partly rehabilitated ideologically liberal principles. Then, in 1997, after the electoral victory of the center-Right coalition, the actions of the Polish political elite took a slightly more conservative turn. Importantly, this trend was not reversed even after the election of a leftist (and more liberal) coalition in 2001. Overall, during the research period, Polish political elites practiced moderately conservative principles. There is a certain degree of congruence between ideological leanings of the political elite and the population at large (their constituencies). Both are moderately conservative, but the political elite is slightly more conservative than the general public. Recently, even the social democrats came to support a conservative course. There are at least some indirect signs that the public’s conservatism is important for the Polish elite. From this perspective, the modification of the ideological agenda of liberal and social democratic elites is very telling. However, liberal value orientations, relatively strong among the public and the elite, appear to be less compelling in guiding the actions of the political elite.

![Graph showing the overall evolution of the Polish Elite's Ideological Actions](image)

Figure 178. Overall Evolution of the Polish Elite's Ideological Actions

\textsuperscript{221} Polish social democrats are liberal ideologically (see Chapter IV).
Figure 179 shows that, in general, the political elite supported the neutral economic course which combined both the pro-market and etatist elements. This course is consistent with economic indeterminacy of attitudes among both the general public and the elite itself. The public’s economically mixed attitudes appear to compel the political elite to practice (and the intellectual elite to justify) cautious and balanced economic policies. This equilibrium may be a direct result of public’s economic pressures or an indirect product of electoral competition between more economically liberal post-Solidarity political parties and more etatist social-democratic parties. Government-affiliated intellectuals can draw on the public’s economic caution without antagonizing the political elite.

Figure 179. Overall Evolution of the Polish Political Elite’s Economic Actions

*Foreign Policy Actions.* Figure 180 reveals some unexpected results. The Polish political elite engaged in pro-Eastern or independent actions in 1993 and 1999, dates which coincide with important pro-Western breakthroughs for Polish foreign policy.
In 1993, Poland became an associated member of the EU. In 1999, it was formally admitted to NATO. What can explain the pro-Eastern "deviations?"

The answer lies in the efforts to garner support of Poland’s eastern neighbors (mostly Russia) for a new, pro-Western foreign policy direction. Polish diplomacy sought to appease Russia, Ukraine, and Belorus by frequent visits and promises of good neighborly relations. The brief pro-Eastern "relapses," nonetheless, cannot overshadow the fact that throughout the research period, the Polish political elite consistently favored the pro-Western direction. There is a considerable consensus among all three research subjects on the desirability of pro-Western foreign policy. This consensus, however, does not extend to the Eastern direction of Polish foreign policy. If there is an unambiguous public endorsement of the pro-Western foreign policy and rejection of the pro-Eastern one, both the intellectual and the political elite face a more difficult choice. Practical considerations of maintaining good relations with the eastern neighbors explain the differences between public’s clear dismissal of and elite’s non-committal stance on pro-Eastern foreign policy. The elite (both political and intellectual) practices the pro-Eastern course at their own risk.

![Graph](image-url)

Figure 180. Overall Evolution of the Polish Political Elite's Foreign Policy Actions

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Figure 181 reveals that the Polish political elite is not very active in the area of *ethnic relations*. Poland is, after all, an ethnically and religiously homogeneous country with an insignificant minority presence. The absence of fundamental ethnic conflicts accounts for the relative tranquility in this issue domain. All the actions included in this area deal with the Polish-Jewish relations, by far the most pressing ethnic problem in contemporary Poland. Although the Jewish minority virtually disappeared from Poland, attitudes towards Jews continue to dominate official discourse and Poles’ self-definition as a nation. If the Polish public exhibits strong nationalistic and xenophobic attitudes, the overall ethnic relations policies of the political elite are tolerant. Government-affiliated intellectuals also support tolerant positions. In this area, the elite relies on its own tolerant value orientations, and not on more nationalistic public opinion.

Overall, the Polish political elite was engaged in actions consistent with original, liberal principles (Figure 182). The stability of the public’s moderately liberal attitudes is matched by both the stability of official discourse and the consistency of the practical political agenda. However, the elite effectively blocks the nationalism of the general population.

The discourse of Polish government-affiliated intellectuals clearly bears a stronger resemblance to public opinion than to the orientations of the political elite. Because official discourse in Poland strongly resembles patterns of public opinion, Polish intellectuals, unlike their Russian counterparts, appear to be more sensitive to public pressures and less dependent on their allies and patrons, the political elite. If in the Russian case, the government affiliation component in the phrase government-
affiliated intellectual was dominant, in the Polish case, it was the intellectual that mattered more.\textsuperscript{222} Although there is a significant degree of congruence between discourse of government-affiliated intellectuals, public opinion, and actions of the political elite, at least on one occasion, where there was a discrepancy (ideological liberalism), the discourse of government-affiliated intellectuals resembled public opinion. At the same time, Polish intellectuals were unable to transmit the political elite’s message of ethnic tolerance to the public. The argument is weaker in the case of unstable elite preferences for pro-Eastern foreign policy. Uncertain positions are rarely persuasive enough to be translated into public opinion.

Figure 181. Overall Evolution of the Polish Political Elite's Ethnic Relations Actions

\textsuperscript{222} I will return to this finding in the concluding chapter.
Moderately liberal public attitudes have more chances of being incorporated into official discourse and, to a lesser degree, into actual policies. Some organic-statist public orientations, including ideologically conservative and economically etatist views, are also taken into consideration by government-affiliated intellectuals and their political patrons, while others (ethnic nationalism) are ignored. The explanation for such selectivity lies in external incentives. Imminent entry into the EU and long-anticipated NATO membership may account for the Polish elite's insularity to the public's nationalism. The EU will accept a certain degree of economic etatism and conservative ideology (after all it is comprised of countries with long historical traditions of the governed market and conservatism), but it will not stand for ethnic nationalism and chauvinism.

Modified liberal attitudes of the Polish population, including preference for inclusive democracy, ideological conservatism, mixed economic views, and pro-Western foreign policy orientation are also shared and practiced by the Polish political elite. The
consensus between the elite and the public emerges around modified liberal, not organic-statist, principles (the latter phenomenon is characteristic of the Russian case).

**Conclusions**

1. During the research period, the Polish elite continued to favor principles of inclusive democracy, pro-Western foreign policy and ethnic tolerance, while its ideological attitudes became increasingly more conservative and its economic views remained progressively indeterminate. These value orientations, by and large, were the foundation of the post-Communist policies. However, if ideologically liberal principles continued to co-exist with more conservative orientations in the discourse of the Polish elite, its actions did not show this ideological conflict. On the contrary, the elite always acted conservatively.

2. Polish public opinion retained its original inclusive-democratic, economically and ideologically mixed, pro-Western, and nationalist elements.

3. Polish government-affiliated intellectuals clearly served as intermediaries between the public and the political elite; their discourse bears a remarkable degree of similarity to the public's political, ideological, economic, and foreign policy aspirations. Where public opinion and policy initiatives of the elite did not coincide, Polish intellectuals appear to have sided with a more liberal party. When public opinion was more ideologically liberal, discourse of government-affiliated intellectuals was sensitive to the public's ideological preferences. However, intellectuals also supported the more ethnically tolerant political elite in defiance of openly nationalistic public opinion.
4. In the areas of congruence between the elite's discourse and actions (inclusive democracy, ideological conservatism, pro-Western foreign policy, and ethnic tolerance), the question of cause and effect between discourse and policy is irrelevant. Discourse is used to both inspire and popularize policies. In the case of a disjunction between surviving ideological liberalism of discourse communicators and persistent ideological conservatism of the political elite, discourse has little impact on policies. Neither does the political elite need intellectual support to sell its conservative policies to the liberal segment of the public.

5. Policies in the political, ideological, economic, and foreign policy areas (inclusive democratic, conservative, and pro-Western influence) can count on popular support, since they are largely congruent with the public sentiments. Public opinion is important in the formulation of ideologically liberal discourse, but not policies. It has absolutely no effect on the ethnic relations discourse or resulting policies adopted by the elite.
CHAPTER VI
ELITE VALUE ORIENTATIONS AND PUBLIC OPINION IN POST-COMMUNIST SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

This chapter provides a comprehensive assessment of the relationship between the Russian and Polish post-Communist elites' value orientations and public opinion. I examine the political implications of stability and instability in the original liberal attitudes of the elite and the public. I also present the comparative implications of my findings and isolate factors that lend stability to post-Communist liberal value orientations on both the elite and the popular levels.

Chapter Outline

Before I proceed with some final considerations of the relationship between the elite's value orientations and public opinion in the post-Communist countries, I return to my original hypotheses to see which ones were confirmed and which ones can now be rejected. Then, I outline the differences in the evolution of the Russian and Polish elite and publics' value orientations along five issue domains, discuss the implications of consensus and disagreement among the post-Communist elites, analyze the consistency and ambiguity of public attitudes and isolate factors that lend stability to the liberal orientations among the Russian and Polish elites and publics found at the beginning of the research period. I also reflect on the divergent empirical results my two case studies produced and offer possible explanations for this outcome. I move on to discussing the relationship between the elites' value orientations and public opinion in post-Communist Russia and Poland and
commenting on the nature of this relationship. Finally, I discuss the project’s contributions to existing debates in the political science literature and its comparative implications. Throughout this chapter I also address some of the limitations of my study.

There are significant differences in the evolution of both the elite’s value orientations and public opinion in the post-Soviet and East European countries. The Russian case is characteristic of the post-Soviet model, while the Polish case illustrates the East European type of the elite-public relationship. These suppositions are suggestive rather than definitive; I simply do not have empirical data to prove or disprove them. I also contend that the differences are attributable to the nature of the original elite and public attitudes and the areas of consensus that emerged between the elite and the public. The described differences have important implications for studies of democratic consolidation, multiple transitions, post-Communist public opinion and official discourse as well as for empirical democratic theory.

**Research Hypotheses Revisited**

Hypothesis #1. During the research period, both Russian public opinion and official discourse (a proxy for the elite’s value orientations) changed from liberal to organic-statist categories. In Poland, both public opinion and official discourse/the elite’s value orientations remained liberal. However, the liberalism in this country was never as extreme as in Russia; it was tempered by the advocacy of social protection and nationalism.

Hypothesis 1 was only partially confirmed. The organic-statist evolution of Russian official discourse and the elite’s value orientations was incomplete; some
original liberal elements, most notably economic liberalism, survived. Likewise, the organic-statist shift in public opinion was not absolute. Although there are strong signs that the Russian public is ideologically conservative, economically etatist, and nationalist, there remains considerable popular support for political democracy and pro-Western foreign policy. In Poland, modification of liberal discourse and public opinion did not occur along anticipated issue domains. While economic etatism did play an important role in tempering the original liberal orientations of both the Polish elite and the general public, ethnic nationalism was a factor only on the popular level. However, organic-statist attitudes among the elite were found in another issue domain, the ideological one. The Polish elite’s ideological liberalism was modified by a strong support for conservative ideology.

Hypothesis #2. In Russia, a basic societal consensus between the elite and the general public emerged around certain organic-statist values, while in Poland, the elite and the public found common ground in modified liberal orientations.

Hypothesis 2 was confirmed. Indeed, the Russian elite and the general population agree on organic-statist value orientations, as only politically authoritarian, ideologically conservative, anti-Western, and nationalistic preferences are found on both the elite and the popular levels. Surviving democratic and pro-Western public attitudes no longer penetrate to the elite level, while the elite’s strong commitment to the free market failed to garner support among the general population. In Poland, inclusive democratic, ideologically mixed, moderately etatist, and pro-Western attitudes (elements of the moderately liberal value orientations) are shared by both the elite and the population at large. The only public preference not found on
the elite level is ethnic nationalism (organic-statist element). The Polish elite remains ethnically tolerant (liberal element).

Hypothesis #3. In Russia, congruence between elite and popular attitudes did not appear until the 2000 presidential elections. In Poland, official discourse and public opinion were always congruent.

Hypothesis 3 was subject to major modifications. As I demonstrated in Chapter III, there is no absolute consensus between the Russian elite and the general public. The partial organic-statist consensus that I reported in my discussion of hypothesis 2 started to emerge as early as 1993/1994, not in 2000, as I originally suspected. However, it is true that by the time Vladimir Putin was elected president this consensus coalesced firmly. Putin’s election and the political, ideological, foreign relations, and ethnic relations changes that followed it can be viewed as a logical conclusion of the processes which started in the early 1990s, not as an abrupt break with Yeltsin’s course. In Poland, I observed the stability of both the public and the elite’s moderately liberal attitudes. A liberal consensus between the elite and the general public that was formed in the beginning of the research period was largely preserved. Despite the fact that the ethnic tolerance of the Polish elite was not shared by a more nationalistic general public, ideological and economic value orientations of the elite, which originally were more liberal, became more congruent with more conservative and statist preferences of the Polish population.

Hypothesis #4. The role of Russian government-affiliated intellectuals in articulating official discourse and the elite’s value orientations changed from independent cultural entrepreneurs who created and supported post-Communist
liberal discourse to a more organic role which incorporated public opinion. The dual
(organic and entrepreneurial) role of Polish government-affiliated intellectuals never
changed.

Hypothesis 4 was also only partially confirmed. Although as the post-
Communist period progressed, Russian government-affiliated intellectuals
increasingly voiced value orientations consistent with the general public’s mandate,
they remained insulated from public opinion’s continuous economic etatism and its
surviving democratic and pro-Western elements. Russian government-affiliated
intellectuals thus were neither fully organic, nor fully independent from the public.
They espoused public attitudes when doing so did not contradict the interests of the
political elite, but ignored the public when the latter’s views conflicted with the
dominant elite’s value orientations. In the situation of convergence between the elite
and the public’s value orientations reported for Poland, government-affiliated
intellectuals were largely spared the necessity to choose sides in the conflict of value
orientations that confounded their Russian counterparts. Polish government-affiliated
intellectuals could remain loyal both to the society and the political elite.

Hypothesis #5. In Russia, the changes in official discourse (the elite’s value
orientations) and policies do not always correspond, but on several occasions,
changes in discourse were a good indicator for changing policy direction. In Poland,
continuity in official discourse matched continuity of policies.

Hypothesis 5 was confirmed. In Russia, changes in discourse meant
appreciable changes in policies (in political, ideological, and foreign policy areas),
while the stability of economically liberal discourse corresponded to consistently
liberal economic policies. However, at least in one issue domain (ethnic relations), the change in discourse did not signify changes in actual policies. The Russian political elite abstained from openly nationalistic actions, despite the popular mandate and its own propensity for it (visible in official discourse). Instead, the political elite, even taking into account two Chechen wars that were conducted during the post-Communist period, publicly condemned instances of ethnic hatred and tried to diffuse potentially combustible conflicts in Tatarstan, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, and North Ossetia through decidedly peaceful, diplomatic means. In general, in Russia, changes in policies preceded changes in discourse, a finding that suggests that discourse was used to justify policies *ex post facto* rather than to bring them about. In Poland, in the situation of relative stability of modified liberal discourse, liberal policies were implemented consistently. Since there is a basic congruence between official discourse and policy actions, the question of the cause and effect is less relevant in the Polish case. Discourse is used to both popularize existing policies and inspire new ones.

Hypothesis #6. Based on my case studies, consistently liberal post-Communist discourse occurs when a) it is tempered by advocacy of social protection and nationalism and b) there is a liberal consensus between the elite and the public and government-affiliated intellectuals, who articulate official discourse, draw upon both the elite and the public's preferences, playing a dual (organic and entrepreneurial) role.

The data support the final sixth hypothesis as it was originally formulated. Discussions in the previous four chapters demonstrated that the stability of liberal
discourse is a function of: a) the intensity of discourse itself (that is whether it is extreme or moderate) and b) liberal consensus between the elite and the public and therefore the absence of a dilemma for government-affiliated intellectuals who do not have to choose between being organic representatives of the public or being cultural entrepreneurs serving the elite.

My findings suggest that the Russian and Polish cases present dramatically different models of the evolution of the elite’s value orientations and public opinion in the post-Communist period, models that I call Post-Soviet and Eastern European. Below I summarize the most important differences in the evolution of elites’ value orientations and variations in the trends in public opinion in the two countries.

Evolution of the Elite and Publics’ Value Orientations in Post-Communist Russia and Poland and Factors That Lend Stability to Liberal Orientations Found at the Beginning of the Research Period

A more detailed examination of the differences in Russian and Polish post-Communist attitudinal trajectories is useful in appreciating the diversity of the elite and the publics’ political, ideological, economic, foreign policy, and ethnic relations preferences in the two countries as well as suggesting directions in which the elite and the popular attitudes are moving. In this section I concentrate on descriptive account of differences; their possible causes are discussed in the section “Explanations of Empirical Findings.”

1. Political Issue Domain

In the years since the Soviet Union collapsed, the Russian elite drifted from a strong commitment to democracy towards a much more favorable evaluation of authoritarianism, while Russian public opinion was and remains politically mixed.
There is no complete rejection of democratic institutions and norms on the popular level, a rejection which has become so characteristic of the Russian elite. On the democratic side, Russians preferred a multiparty system, favored having a political opposition and had positive attitudes towards the Western type of democracy. But a majority also supported government control over the mass media and concentration of power in the executive branch.

Throughout the research period, the Polish elite continued to believe in the principles of inclusive democracy. The Polish public likewise retained its original democratic aspirations. Not only did Poles support democracy in general, they also favored more inclusive democratic forms and rejected more elitist arrangements where political parties, the opposition, and the mass media are denied an active role in the political process.

In this area, the differences between Russia and Poland manifest themselves on both the elite and the popular levels. The contrast between the Polish and Russian elites' political preferences is especially stark, given the similarity of their social and political status and the degree of their initial support for democracy. It appears that the Russian elite, who increasingly favors authoritarianism in defiance of mixed public opinion, is more motivated by its own changing priorities, while the Polish elite, regardless of the political loyalties of its members, presents a strong democratic potential. On the popular level, the difference between political preferences of Russians and Poles, although not as pronounced, is still significant. My findings suggest that democracy in Russia was never fully embraced by the population at
large, a trend that continued throughout the research period. In post-Communist Poland, on the other hand, democracy always enjoyed a strong popular commitment.

2. Ideological Issue Domain

Ideologically, both Russian elite and public opinion drifted towards greater conservatism. By the end of the 1990s, members of the Russian elite favored a statist ideology, while ordinary Russians unambiguously preferred order (a synonym for the strong state) over democracy (a synonym for civil rights and liberties), accepted dictatorship as the best solution to Russian problems and had positive attitudes towards repressive state institutions and the conservative Orthodox Church.

Like its Russian counterpart, the Polish elite moved in the direction of greater conservatism after initial support for ideologically liberal positions. However, the evolution of the attitudes of the Polish elite took place in one importantly different way. The Polish elite’s liberalism was always considerably tempered by the presence of a viable conservative option, while the Russian elite’s position was originally much more pro-liberal. Polish public opinion was consistently split between conservative and liberal inclinations. On the one hand, Poles were tolerant of atheists, secular in their outlook on the church-state relationship, supportive of divorce and convinced that the state is accountable to society. On the other, they also favored the death penalty, rejected abortion and alternative lifestyles, and were ready to sacrifice their civil liberties to combat crime. It is worth mentioning that while conservative preferences are stable, or even increasing in prominence, the Polish public’s liberal orientations are weakening. The struggle between different ideological preferences among the Polish elite is by no means over. Yet a final turning towards conservatism
would not be out of character, given the Polish elite’s long-standing interest in this ideology.

In this area, the two cases differ only in the degree of elites’ ideological commitment. The evolution of the Russian elite’s ideological views is particularly interesting. Although by 1998 the Russian elite made its choice in favor of ideological conservatism, such a turn is rather unexpected, given a prolonged dominance of liberal orientation. The very fact that the elite in Russia resisted the ideological conservatism of the population for so long, while the Polish elite was comfortable with incorporating conservative sensibilities popular among the Polish public is noteworthy. It suggests a stronger adherence to the principles of ideological liberalism among the Russian elite.\(^\text{223}\)

3. Economic Issue Domain

During the research period, the Russian elite consistently favored the free market model over the governed market option. The Russian public, on the other hand, exhibited strong etatist preferences, with the exception of a very brief period immediately after the collapse of the Communist regime, when Russians supported free market economic reforms. Worried about price increases, intensification of social stratification and decline of industrial output, Russians consistently favored a stronger economic role for the state and more gradual economic change.

The economic preferences of the Polish elite were mixed. Neither the governed market nor the free market model muster ed absolute support. Moreover, the

\(^{223}\) An argument that the Russian elite was not inherently conservatively- or statist-oriented appears in A. Baranov et al., Rossiia v poiskakh idei: Analiz pressy [Russia in Search of an Idea: Analysis of the Press]. Working Materials, Issue 1 (Moscow: Consulting Group under the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, 1997). The authors report that in 1996 Yeltsin appealed to government-affiliated intellectuals to come up with new, statist ideology.
Polish elite grew increasingly critical of the liberal economic model, while the
governed market option became as acceptable as the free market model. The Polish
public was likewise divided over its preferred economic model, but the majority
favored greater state intervention and was skeptical about free market capitalism.
Although Poles were strongly etatist, they did not completely reject economic
liberalism, as was the case in Russia. For instance, they viewed the privatization
process favorably.

There are more pronounced differences between the economic value
orientations of the Russian and Polish elites than between the economic preferences
of the Russian and Polish publics. Economic liberalism is the strongest value
orientation of the Russian elite. Moreover, this orientation has so far remained
completely unaffected by public demands. The Polish elite, on the other hand, is more
flexible in its economic views. Although the Russian and Polish publics differ in their
degree of support for economic etatism and acceptance of economic liberalism, it is a
difference of degree, not kind.

4. Foreign Policy Issue Domain

The Russian elite's foreign policy views changed from moderately pro-
Western to moderately anti-Western, while the public's foreign policy preferences
were ambiguous. Although anti-Western sentiments, including distrust of NATO and
Western countries' intentions regarding Russia and support for clearly anti-Western
alliances, continued to increase in prominence, pro-Western orientations, including
positive attitudes towards the US and the EU, also remained strong.
The Polish elite sustained its original pro-Western attitudes. Importantly, elites of all political persuasions share pro-Western foreign policy orientations. Regardless of party membership and economic or ideological views, all actors agree on a desirability of partnership with the West. Pro-Western attitudes of the Polish public, especially support for the cooperation with NATO, the EU and Western countries, were always strong and actually increased in strength during the research period, while pro-Eastern (or independent) preferences, including alliances with Russia and other Eastern neighbors, were never popular. The peaks of pro-Western attitudes occurred in 1995, 1997, and 1999, when Poland made important decisions to join NATO and the EU.

The differences in the evolution of foreign policy official discourse in Russia and Poland mirror the divergent foreign policy paths taken by the two countries. By the end of the research period, Russia was firmly entrenched in its role as a challenger and critic of the US, while Poland became a staunch supporter of the US. The ambiguous foreign policy attitudes of the Russian public suggest a lack of popular consensus on Russia’s role in today’s international system. Ordinary Poles, on the other hand, clearly see themselves as part of the new, unifying Europe.

5. Ethnic Relations Issue Domain

Ethnically tolerant attitudes tended to decrease among the Russian elite. The Russian public likewise drifted towards a greater degree of nationalism, as the population at large grew increasingly less tolerant of non-Slavic ethnic minorities and more supportive of the idea of “Russia for Russians.” The majority no longer shuns military solutions to ethnic problems and generally supports the second Chechen war.
The Polish elite is less nationalistic than its Russian counterpart. Ethnic
tolerance enjoys the stable support of the elite. At the same time, even in Poland,
nationalistic attitudes tended to increase in strength, although the nationalistic
trendline in this country is more gradual than the nationalistic trendline in Russia.
Unlike their elite, the Polish public drifted in a nationalistic direction. Poles exhibited
a strong degree of anti-Semitism, expressed negative attitudes towards the Roma,
Russian, and Ukrainian minorities, and resented refugees and migrant workers.

Differences between the Russian and Polish elites' ethnic beliefs are
particularly interesting, given the similar degree of the public's nationalism in both
countries. Clearly, the Polish elite does not accept an ethnically based nationalism,
even if the general population endorses it.

6. Implications of Consensus and Disagreement Among the Post-Communist Elites

In the course of my analysis of elites' value orientations and official
discourses in the two countries, I discovered that the group of liberals and
statist/conservatives that comprised the Russian elite during the research period can
agree on only one liberal value - the free market economic model. In all other issue
domains, consensus within the Russian post-Communist elite emerged only on the
organic-statist values (authoritarianism, conservative ideology, independent/anti-
Western foreign policy, and moderate nationalism). Surviving liberals had to modify
their original positions in response to the growing presence of statists/conservatives
among the elite.

In Poland, on the other hand, constant rotations between liberal and social
democratic elites had virtually no effect on the popularity of liberal values, including
inclusive democracy, pro-Western foreign policy, and ethnic tolerance. There, the conflict involved ideological and economic orientations, a clear indicator of electoral competition among the Polish liberal, conservative, and social-democratic elites. Despite uncertainty regarding Poland’s future economic and ideological direction, all indicators point to democratic consolidation. Regardless of various political persuasions, ideological debates and economic disagreements, all Polish actors accept inclusive democracy as a desirable goal.

In the Russian case, not only is democracy not consolidated; it is actually the most endangered element of the original liberal project. On the other hand, the future of the free market in Russia is virtually assured.

7. Implications of Consistency and Ambiguity of Post-Communist Public Opinion

My findings show that during the post-Communist period, there was a certain degree of similarity between Russians’ and Poles’ views on desirable ideology, the economic system and the model of ethnic relations. The differences in these areas are differences in nuance and degree, not kind. In both countries, the majority of the population believed that ideological conservatism, economic etatism, and nationalism were legitimate post-Communist options. In the political and foreign policy areas, however, the differences are very pronounced. Poles’ original democratic and pro-Western orientations were consistent and strong, while Russians’ democratic and pro-Western views coexisted with the substantial authoritarian and anti-Western preferences. The Russian public’s attitudes appear more ambiguous than Polish public opinion. The only invariable element of Russian public opinion is economic
etatism. In Poland, there are two stable and definite elements of public opinion — support for inclusive democracy and pro-Western foreign policy.

The latter fact suggests differences in the core popular beliefs in the two countries. Like their elite, Russians are much more economy-centric, while Poles seemed to move beyond purely economic concerns to politics and foreign policy domains. The contrast is especially interesting, given the fact that economic hardships in both countries are equally grave and the contemporary economic situation in Poland may, in many ways, be even worse than the economic situation in Russia. By the late 1990s, Poland experienced one of the highest rates of unemployment in the region and its resource-poor economy grew dependent on the import of energy resources. The inefficient agrarian sector still makes up a sizeable part of the overall economy and presents a source of great concern for domestic economists and agrarian parties as well as European funding agencies, particularly on the eve of Poland’s full EU membership. Enterprise bankruptcy is widespread, as are corruption and economic crimes. Yet, despite economic concerns, Poles believe in democracy and a pro-Western course, while Russians appear to endorse strongly the governed-market economic model as the only solution to post-Communist tribulations.

8. Factors That Lend Stability to Liberal Orientations of Russian and Polish Elites and Publics Found at the Beginning of the Research Period

The research suggests that stability of original post-Communist liberal orientations of the elite occurs when: a) liberalism is modified and b) liberalism of the elite is shared by the population at large. If these conditions are satisfied, rotations within the elite and subsequent changes in the elite’s program of action do not affect the stability of official liberal discourse.
Stability of the original liberal orientations among the post-Communist public occurs when: a) liberalism of public opinion is modified and b) the elite endorses similar liberal attitudes and does not send strong organic-statist signals to the public.

**Explanations of Empirical Findings**

I attribute the *differences in the value orientations of the elites* in Russia and Poland to five factors. These explanations are suggestive rather than definite, and their verification lies outside the scope of this project.

The first concerns the nature of the belief systems of the elite itself. Clearly, for the Russian elite only economic liberalism proved to be indispensable, while the Polish elite appears to have always believed in inclusive democracy, a pro-Western foreign policy course, and ethnic tolerance. Elites’ commitments are quite strong on their own; they do not always depend on the public opinion climate. For instance, the Russian elite’s loyalty to the free market economic model exists independently of public opinion, as does the Polish elite’s commitment to ethnic tolerance. These belief systems are shaped by immediate self-interest (the Russian elite clearly benefited from the neo-liberal economic course) or by external factors (the Polish elite is reluctant to heed nationalistic public opinion in defiance of possible, in fact highly likely, European and transatlantic sanctions that nationalistic official discourse and actions would trigger). Where the elite internalized liberal value orientations (either due to personal convictions, self-interest, or external pressures), it tended to be consistent and convincing in their articulation. Where the elite paid only lip service to the liberal principles of democracy, partnership with the West, human rights, and
ethnic tolerance, these attitudes were easily dropped, even if the public did not necessarily demand such changes.

Second, the character of post-Communist public opinion clearly plays a role in shaping the elite's attitudes. The effect of public opinion on the elite's value orientations is neither direct nor causal; rather it serves as an environment that conditions the elite's choices and preferences. Indeed, public opinion can either reinforce the existing elite's value orientations or modify them. Public opinion's liberalizing effect on the orientations of the elite works only if the elite's priorities are liberal to start with and if public opinion itself is unambiguously liberal. More often, public opinion weakens the elite's liberal orientations and strengthens its the organic-statist positions. Conceivably, in the Polish case, public opinion both reinforced the elite's commitment to inclusive democracy and pro-Western foreign policy and modified the elite's ideological and economic views in the organic-statist direction. In the Russian case, public opinion's impact on the elite's value orientations is limited to making the latter more organic-statist. The liberal effects of Russian public opinion on the elite are non-existent. The only explanation for this varied effect of public opinion is that there is more receptivity to liberal views among the Polish elite, while the Russian elite's capacity for incorporating liberal public opinion is minimal due to its members' lack of personal commitment to liberal principles.

Third, the nature of domestic politics in Russia and Poland is important to explaining the differences in these cases. Russian elections are increasingly reduced to a "fixed" competition among the actors who do not offer real alternatives to one

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224 See also Section “Comparison of the Relations Between the Elite's Value Orientations and Public Opinion in Post-Communist Russia and Poland” in this chapter.
another. All major contenders advocate a strong state, restoration of the national idea, independent foreign policy, law and order, and statist ideology (i.e., policies consistent with organic-statist principles). The democratic or liberal opposition, with its emphasis on human rights, the free market, democratic development, and more amicable relations with the West, is marginalized and denied access to the mass media and other electoral resources. As a result, the ruling Russian elite tends to ignore more liberal principles since their bearers have minimal political weight. In Poland, there is a real electoral conflict that centers around the economy and, to a lesser degree, ideology. The liberal and conservative (ideological cleavage) as well as liberal and social-democratic (economic cleavage) factions of the Polish elite vie for votes by trying to maximize gains in the context of ideologically and economically mixed public opinion. The Polish elite, however, is aware that the majority of voters, regardless of their stance on economic and ideological issues, is in favor of inclusive democracy and pro-Western foreign policy. The elite adjusts its discourse in order to maximize return on the votes. In sum, the presence or absence of real electoral competition plays a role in the degree to which certain principles (both liberal and organic-statist) are important to the political elite.

Fourth, the nature of larger systems of beliefs in each country also plays a role. In Poland, Catholicism has always been and remains an important political, social and cultural institution. The Polish elite’s commitment to Catholicism, a religion which emphasizes community, social solidarity and family values, is genuine; it is not a mere nod in the populist direction. This may explain why ideologically conservative and economically etatist value orientations are not alien to
the Polish elite and could be fairly easily incorporated into its discourse. In Russia, however, despite the ostensible recent religious revival and the elite's obligatory participation in important Orthodox religious observances, the elite remains secular in nature. Thus, it is unaffected by the Orthodox ethos with its socially conservative and redistributive overtones. Not surprisingly, ideological liberalism and individualistic free market beliefs, both of which are much closer to secularism than to the Orthodox religious doctrine, find a more receptive soil among the Russian elite.

Another important difference in the overall Zeitgeist in the two countries is the viability of authoritarianism as a political option. Authoritarianism was never completely discredited in post-Communist Russia, even on the elite level. On the contrary, it has always been available and well articulated as an alternative to democracy. In Poland, there is no serious discussion of the return to authoritarianism. The different menu of political options in my case studies appears to frame elites' political attitudes quite differently.

Finally, international ties and priorities are also useful in explaining the differences between the elites' attitudes in the two countries. The Russian elite can espouse anti-Western, anti-democratic and nationalistic sentiments precisely because it would not face the international sanctions or, at very least reprimands, that such attitudes/discussions usually generate. Russia is removed from Western international structures, including NATO and the EU, has no real prospects of joining them, and, as a result, is unaffected by the democratic and tolerant norms and rules promoted by the West. Conversely, the Polish elite that traditionally aspired to and finally secured membership in the Western international organizations has to reconcile its attitudes
and actions with Western standards. The Polish elite is both eager and under pressure from the EU to conform to Western norms, including ethnic tolerance, even if these are not always shared by the population at large. It knows that the EU and NATO will accept a certain degree of economic etatism and conservative ideology (after all, these organizations include countries like France and Germany with long-standing records of the governed market model and more statist ideology), but these organizations will not stand for a slightest hint of ethnic intolerance. This explains why the Polish elite feels safe in incorporating the ideological conservatism and economic etatism of the general population, but steers clear of the public’s nationalism.

I attribute the differences in popular attitudes in the two countries to four factors. These explanations are also purely exploratory rather than definite.

First, historical factors clearly are important. In Russia, where the Communist period was longer and penetrated the society more deeply, there are stronger legacies of authoritarianism. The Communist period is still viewed with considerable nostalgia, and its most notorious elements (including purges) are not fully condemned. Conversely, in Poland, Communism was not only an elite enterprise, it was superimposed on the nation from the outside, did not enjoy wide-spread social support, and did not leave a long tradition of fascination with authoritarian political systems. Communism is irrevocably discredited in Poland, at least in the political sense, although not necessarily in terms of social protection. The inter-war home-grown brand of non-Communist authoritarianism (presidential dictatorship of Pilsudski) is likewise interpreted negatively as a deviation from the democratic and liberal European traditions that Poland is so eager to trace throughout its history.
In the area of foreign policy, Poland had a well-pronounced Western orientation; historically, it tried to strike alliances with France (the Napoleonic wars, the interwar years of the twentieth century) or the US (First and Second World Wars). Its Eastern neighbors, on the other hand, were traditionally viewed with suspicion and contempt. If Poland historically gravitated in the Western direction, Russian foreign policy was always a balancing act between its Eastern and Western vectors, and the victory of western-oriented diplomacy was often perceived as a source of Russia’s international failure and humiliation. The Communist portrayals of the West as a geopolitical class enemy of the Soviet Union only reinforced an already existing anti-Western bias. Not surprisingly, anti-Western and anti-democratic views, which historically had much stronger traditions in Russia, are present in today’s Russia to a larger degree than in Poland.

Second, value orientations of the post-Communist elites also play a role in explaining why democratic and pro-Western preferences are much stronger among the Poles. In Poland, the elite sanctioned democratic, pro-Western attitudes. Polish public opinion was not only uninhibited, but actually encouraged in developing these attitudes. In other words, there existed a favorable environment for the public’s democratic and pro-Western preferences. In Russia, the elite endorsed authoritarian and anti-Western attitudes as early as the mid 1990s and the public faced significant obstacles in upholding alternative points of view which were not sanctioned by the regime. The spiral of silence that I discussed in Chapter III, a process in which dissenting views among the population decreased, is clearly in play here.
Closely related to the spiral of silence explanation is the extent of political control over information. Obviously, a part of the Russian opposition articulates democratic and pro-Western positions. Ironically, during the parliamentary and presidential elections campaigns of 2003-2004, the Communists became one of the strongest defenders of freedom of speech, political opposition, meaningful elections, and non-interference of the state into business affairs. Of course, the democratic opposition always championed these principles as well as better relations with the West. But the mass media are currently under almost total political control of the ruling elite. If there were alternative sources of information, the Russian public could have access to other, democratic and pro-Western positions, but these views are not easily accessible. As a result, the democratic and pro-Western attitudes of the public exist in an unfavorable environment, known in Russia as the "information blockade."

Finally, I argue that the actual experiences with post-Communist political institutions, the nature of the post-Communist relations with the West, and the elite's willingness to modify its radical economic course may account for the differences in popular democratic, foreign policy, and economic attitudes. In the Polish parliamentary republic, control over political institutions is subject to intense, but mostly fair contestation. Democracy is a game with an uncertain outcome in which yesterday's losers can become today's winners. As a result, various actors have a stake in the uncertain democratic game. In Russia, numerous democratic elections were tarnished by accusations of unfair competition (charges of the illegitimate use of administrative and information resources go as far back as the 1993 parliamentary elections) and predictable results. Many democratic institutions (like the Duma) were
deliberately discredited by the political elite in the executive branch. Consequently, democracy, as it exists in Russia today, is viewed with suspicion. There is also no denying that, as Western and Russian strategic interests clashed, the relations between Russia and the West in the post-Communist period were uneven at best and tumultuous at worst. Poland’s foreign policy interests were largely congruent with Western priorities. As a result, their relationship was much more amicable.

Interestingly, despite the similarities and consistency in the application of shock therapy (the radical neo-liberal economic program) in the two countries, the neo-liberal economic model was significantly more discredited among the Russian population than among ordinary Poles. This development cannot be blamed solely on the economic model itself. Original slogans of shock therapy in Poland were quickly modified by social democrats who came to power in 1993 and whose economic priorities included a more socially responsive and gradual governed-market model, which was popular among the Polish public. This may account for a more favorable evaluation of a free market model in Poland. In Russia, the elite’s free market slogans were not revised until very recently (and this process was quite selective and often rigged – cf. the Khodarkovskii affair).

**Relationship Between Elite Value Orientations and Public Opinion in Post-Communist Russia and Poland**

In Russia, only organic-statist elements of public opinion (political authoritarianism, ideological conservatism, anti-Western foreign policy, and ethnic nationalism) penetrated official discourse and the elite’s value orientations. The Russian elite recognizes the existence of surviving liberal (pro-democratic and pro-Western) public attitudes, but believes it can safely ignore them. Conversely, the
Russian elite failed to convince the public of the desirability of the free market economic model, the elite’s core liberal belief. The post-communist Russian elite and the public found consensus around organic-statist principles, while liberal values proved to be divisive. Moreover, in the absence of pressure from Western organizations on policies and official discourse and given an increasingly uncontested domestic political arena, the Russian elite has a free hand in adopting organic-statist elements of public opinion and ignoring more liberal public attitudes.

In Poland, moderately liberal public opinion has better chances of reaching the elite and being incorporated into official discourse. Likewise, the elite’s liberal proclamations find a receptive audience in generally more liberal public opinion. The Polish elite is less accommodating when faced with the organic-statist attitudes of the public. Although the elite is willing to incorporate popular conservative ideology and economic etatism, it is reluctant to heed the public’s nationalism. The penetration of the EU and NATO’s norms into Polish political culture may account for the elite’s unwillingness to cater to public xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and chauvinism. Liberal values, and not organic-statist positions, appear to represent common ground for the Polish elite and the public.

It follows from the previous discussion that public opinion in the two countries contains both liberal and organic-statist elements. The question for the elite is what types of public attitudes to promote and champion. The relationship between the elite’s value orientations and public opinion is not strictly speaking causal; it is more complex. My case studies support Converse’s observations that there are

certain linkages between the elite and the mass public’s attitudes. In Russia, these linkages tend to form around organic-statist values, while in Poland they emerge around modified liberalism. The relationship thus is similar to game theory. The elite is taking cues from the public. As part of the game, the elite is very much interested in what the other player is doing. There is also an element of asymmetry between the elite and the public. After all, it is the elite who decides what public attitudes it will represent and encourage. The former only chose to incorporate those motifs and themes from public opinion that are most congruent with the elite’s policy aspirations and own interests.

I argue that public opinion was congruent with the elite’s value orientations when: a) the elite’s concessions to public opinion would gain electoral advantage for the elite (incorporation of anti-Western public attitudes in Russia and the Polish elite’s sensitivity to ideologically conservative and economically etatist public attitudes); b) public opinion coincided with the elite’s self-interest and beliefs (incorporation of authoritarian elements of Russian public opinion and inclusion of Poles’ pro-democratic and pro-Western orientations); and c) the public overwhelmingly and consistently opposed the elite’s views and the elite itself lacked a well-defined self-interest (incorporation of the Russian public’s ethnic nationalism and conservative ideology).

Alternatively, public opinion was ignored when: a) concessions to the public would not bring any additional votes (rejection of Russian public opinion’s pro-Western orientations); b) the public’s demands and the elite’s self-interests and beliefs were incongruent (the case of the Russian public’s economic etatism and the
Polish public’s nationalism and anti-Semitism); and c) public opinion was ambiguous and perceived by the elite to be a license to lead, not follow (the elite’s ignoring democratic preferences of the Russian population).

The elite’s ability to shape public opinion was likewise mitigated. In Russia, the public is resistant to economic liberalism despite strong signals emanating from the elite, while in Poland, the population remains nationalistic despite consistent efforts by the elite to change these attitudes. Perhaps the experience of the public and the deep-rooted ethnic clichés that run counter to official proclamations explain the inability of consistent elite attitudes to penetrate to the popular level.

**Importance of Consensus Between Post-Communist Elites and General Publics**

What happens when the preferences of the elite coincide with the priorities of the general public? Is this a positive or a negative factor in a post-Communist society? The question taps into the issue of public opinion’s impact on the political process – one of the cornerstones of both the public opinion literature and contemporary democratic theory. Answering this question is important not so much for its normative aspect as for its empirical value. Do the countries in which the preferences of the elite and the public coincide have a better record in successfully completing multiple post-Communist transitions?

Intuitively, if public attitudes penetrate to the level of the elite, the former has a chance to influence and shape important policies. Consequently, such policies might have better chances of being popularly accepted and implemented. Also, congruence between elite and public attitudes could lead to a more democratic decision-making processes. Conversely, if the elite does not listen to public opinion, the reforms,
designed solely by the elite, may experience popular resistance or even stall. The public may feel alienated from the political process.

Another important issue is whether or not congruence between elite and public attitudes occurs on liberal or organic-statist issues. As we have seen, elite-public consensus exclusively on liberal issues generates certain tensions. Democratic principles of strong popular involvement in political processes, political equality, and the elite's accountability may clash with the free market's weak social responsibility and tendency to generate significant economic inequality. Another potential conflict involves a strong role for the population in domestic politics associated with inclusive democracy and the relative loss of decision-making autonomy inherent in a pro-Western foreign policy course, where solutions affecting domestic issues may be dictated from the outside. It is easy to see that while democratic consolidation is helped by meaningful political participation, emphasis on the responsibilities of the individuals, the sanctity of their rights, outside re-enforcement of democratic rules and the absence of ethnic cleavages and divisions, it might be hampered by economic inequalities and the relative lack of control over foreign policy, both of which are at odds with democratic postulates.

Comprehensive elite-public consensus on organic-statist issues also generates tensions. While consensus on the logic of the governed market, a system which decreases the economic inequalities and redistributes economic gains more equitably, some organic-statist postulates (including social consensus and reciprocity) and the ability to control foreign policy may have a positive effect on democratic consolidation and successful economic transition, agreement on other organic-statist
elements (including authoritarianism and nationalism) is undeniably baneful for a democratic process as well as for the process of nation-building.

Coming back to the empirical question posed in the beginning of this section, I argue that multiple post-Communist transitions are more likely to occur successfully when the elite and the general public reach consensus on a combination of liberal and organic-statist principles, i.e., on modified liberal principles. While democratic and ethnically tolerant (i.e., liberal) consensus is important, it is equally important to have a consensus on mixed ideological, economic, and foreign policy principles. In this respect, Poland is much closer to fulfilling criteria for a successful completion of multiple post-Communist transitions. The future of Russian post-Communist reforms, which are guided exclusively by organic statist consensus, is uncertain. Furthermore, many of the original goals of the Russian transition have, at the moment, clearly changed.

**Research Contributions to the Existing Theoretical Debates**

This work is situated within the literature on the political sociology of intellectuals, public opinion, and democratic transitions and consolidation. In each of these sub-fields of political science there are important debates that are still unsettled. The role that intellectuals play in societies (and especially in Eastern European societies), the characteristics of public opinion and its impact on the actions of elites, and variables that account for successful democratic consolidation still require empirical exploration and verification.

In the area of the political sociology of intellectuals, my research gives credence to the socio-economic camp. I disagree with the socio-ethical school that
argues that intellectuals form a unique social class, which is characterized by a heightened sense of responsibility for the society at large and by an oppositional stance vis-à-vis the ruling elite. Indeed, I found that intellectuals do cooperate with the state. But the nature of this cooperation is different in the two countries I analyzed. Russian government-affiliated intellectuals tend to be more involved with the state; their responsiveness to the society is rather limited. The value orientations of Polish intellectuals, on the other hand, often coincide with public opinion.

If in the Russian case, the term government-affiliated intellectual has a stronger emphasis on the government affiliation, in the Polish case, it is the intellectual responsiveness to the society that matters more. Obviously, Russian intellectuals see their function in defending the elite, not in championing the interests of the population. On one level, Russian government-affiliated intellectuals may be faced with the more difficult task of understanding the dominant mode of Russian public opinion; after all, Russians support both democracy and authoritarianism and favor both pro-Western and anti-Western foreign policy. The elite’s preferences in these areas are much clearer. But this does not explain why Russian intellectuals are not sensitive to the very pronounced economic etatism of the public. I offer another explanation. Russian government-affiliated intellectuals partake in the activities of the elite, whose clan and electoral interests, as we have seen, do not necessarily include democracy, redistributive economic policies, and amicable relations with the West. Elite status and the fear of losing it (should an intellectual decide to champion the demands of the public at the expense of the elite) shape Russian intellectuals’ perception of the best economic model, political system, or foreign policy. These
incentives are much more powerful than the public interests. In Poland, it is easier for intellectuals to represent society, since public opinion is less ambiguous and more congruent with the priorities of the elite.

But contemporary elite and public preferences can go only so far in explaining the differences between post-Communist intellectuals. Communist legacies and historical factors are equally important. The differences are clearly a function of divergent biographies intellectuals discussed in this dissertation. During the Communist period, Polish intellectuals actively resisted the regime by advising the opposition, being imprisoned or exiled. In other words, they had experience in championing societal concerns over the state's agenda. Russian intellectuals, on the other hand, were never in opposition to the Communist state (with an exception of a handful rather obscure oppositional figures, including Pavlovskii and Kordonskii). On the contrary, they actively cooperated with and promoted the state's interests, having served as editors-in-chief of officially sanctioned publications or heads of prestigious academic institutions. Contemporary Polish intellectuals simply continue to serve society, their ally during the Communist period. Modern-day Russian intellectuals, who never (with an exception of a brief period of Perestroika in the late 1980s) antagonized the regime and its elite, habitually bolster the state.

Closely related to the issue of different intellectual biographies during the Communist period, is the nature and type of authoritarian regimes that preceded the democratic transformations in the two countries. In Poland, authoritarianism was softer and punctuated by frequent cycles of liberalization. It tolerated independent societal structures, including an active Catholic Church and intellectual clubs.
associated with it. Moreover, it allowed intellectual contacts with the West, studies of public opinion, and even the existence of respected and intellectually robust sociological schools. The shorter and milder Communist period in Poland (intellectuals were exiled, but never killed) also permitted a certain intellectual continuity (many pre-Communist intellectuals were able to mentor new generations of intellectual cadres). In other words, the ideological erosion of Communism in Poland clearly led to the emergence of an independent ethos among Polish intellectuals. The more repressive Communist state in Russia, on the other hand, prided itself in creating new, Soviet intellectuals – ideological adepts of the regime – a process facilitated by decimation of the old intellectual cohorts, intimidation, or co-optation. Thus the nature of preceding authoritarianism also conditioned the actions and discourse of Russian and Polish intellectuals in the post-Communist period.

Polish intellectuals, who were allowed certain independence, remain today a part of society. Russian intellectuals, who were forced to actively cooperate with the Communist regime to give it a veneer of intellectual legitimacy, appear to be more dependent on the state even after Communism collapsed.

The dissertation answered the questions inspired by the public opinion literature that I posed in the introductory chapter, namely, what was the evolution of the Russian and Polish post-Communist elite and public attitudes and to what extent did public opinion matter to the elite? The last question can be asked slightly differently: what values did the post-Communist Russian and Polish elites and publics have in common? The answers to these questions have important implications (as I showed above) not only for our knowledge of the elite and the publics’ attitudes in
the post-Communist countries, the character of the relationship between them and the
trends in their evolution, but also for our understanding of successful democratic
transitions and consolidations. Instead of the traditional analysis that argued that
when assessing democratic process one needs to look at either the political culture\(^{226}\)
of the population or the elite's value orientations,\(^{227}\) I claim that we need to consider a
more comprehensive picture that includes both the elite and the mass levels of
analysis. The mere examination of the elite or popular commitment to democratic
norms is also not enough in assessing democratic prospects. One needs to look at the
attitudes in ideological, economic, foreign policy and ethnic relations areas to see
what other obstacles may interfere with the process of democratization.

The dissertation also advanced our understanding of the post-Communist elite
discourse. I looked at the evolution of several elite value orientations, a task not
undertaken before. In contrast to previous conclusions in the literature,\(^{228}\) I found that

\(^{226}\) See, for instance, Gabriel A. Almond and Sydney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and
Shift in Advanced Industrial Societies* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990); and Samuel P.
Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of

\(^{227}\) Suffice to mention works by Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Lawrence Whitehead,
eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Larry
Diamond, Juan Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries* (London:
Adamantier Press, 1988); Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," *Comparative
Politics* 23, no. 1 (October 1990): 1-20; or Jon Elster, Claus Offe and Ulrich Klaus
Preuss, *Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea* (Cambridge:

\(^{228}\) Researchers of post-Communist political discourse usually treat various social actors as a
homogeneous group. According to their interpretations, all Communists, conservatives, democrats, or
liberals articulate a similar set of values/concepts. See, for example, discussions by A. Temkina and V.
Grigor'ev, "Dinamika interpretativnogo protsesssa: transformatsiia v Rossi" ["Dynamics of
Interpretation Process: Russian Transformation"], in *Sotsial'nye issledovaniia v Rossi: samopoznanie
obshchestva* [Social Research in Russia: Self-Understanding of Society] (Moscow: Polis, 1998); B.
Mezhuev, "Kontseptualizatsiiia 'natsionalnogo interesa' v politicheskikh discussiiakh" ["Conceptualization of 'National Interests' in Political Discussions"], in *Sotsial'nye issledovaniia v Rossi: samopoznanie
obshchestva* [Social Research in Russia: Self-Understanding of Society] (Moscow: Polis, 1998); Grzegorz
Pożarlik, "Polish Political Parties and Discourse on Polish *Raison D'Etat* on the Eve of the European Union
Membership," in *Between Animosity and Utility: Political
even the discourse of a relatively homogeneous group, government-affiliated intellectuals, is not necessarily uniform (it may combine elements of both organic-statist and liberal orientations). It is fluid and has a tendency to evolve. Initial post-Communist discourse rarely survives; instead, it assumes mixed or new forms as a country progresses beyond the original transition. Interestingly, I also found that changes in discourse are not necessarily a function of rotations between elites. They may rather be a function of changing value orientations of the same elite.

Yet, despite additional answers to the questions raised by the public opinion and democratization/multiple transitions literature, we still do not know how public opinion reaches the elite. Does it come directly from the public opinion polling institutions at the request of the elite, or does it filter in through specialized research institutions, lobbying groups, or political parties? Future in-depth interviews with the members of the political elite or archival research of their documents will be helpful in answering this question.

**Larger Empirical Implications of the Dissertation**

The first important conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis is the multi-linearity of development even within a relatively homogeneous group of post-Communist case studies. Despite significant similarity between the Russian and Polish cases, the outcomes of their post-Communist transitions are markedly different. If the Russian elite and public found consensus on the organic-statist...
principles, the Polish situation is characterized by a general agreement on modified liberal values. In both countries, different sets of attitudes proved to be indispensable to elites and publics. In Russia, there is a disjunction between the core beliefs of the elite and the public. The elite is consistently committed to economic liberalism, while the public consistently champions governed market ideas. The Russian public, on the other hand, remains moderately pro-democratic and pro-Western, while the elite is increasingly authoritarian and anti-Western. In Poland, both the elite and the public tend to believe in inclusive democracy and a pro-Western foreign policy, and both have multiple answers to the question of the best ideology and economic model. Obviously, there is a greater degree of social cohesion in Poland. The role of government-affiliated intellectuals was also found to vary from country to country.

My work shows that the new democracies of Eastern Europe are not fundamentally different from other older democracies. The elites in new democracies are confounded by the same problems as their counterparts in the West, including the popularization of policies to the public (to which it may or may not be sympathetic), drawing on popular support as a basis for policies, and trying to survive in the atmosphere of unfavorable public opinion.

One also needs to look beyond the performance of formal institutions when assessing the status and, more importantly, the prospects of the post-Communist reforms. Although elites in both cases ostensibly succeeded in creating the formal post-Communist political, economic, and legal frameworks, there are grave concerns about the future developments in Russia, where the elite chose to reject its original priorities, even in the context of relatively favorable public opinion. After all, if the
purpose of elections is to mask the authoritarian preferences of the elite and the absence of meaningful competition, as seems to be the case in Russia, elections are obviously not always democratic.

I consider two implications of my study the most important. First, elite positions in the new democracies are not necessarily shaped by the demands and pressures of public opinion. In addition to public opinion's impact, the elite's own interests, including its members' personal beliefs, economic preferences as well as the external pressures to which they are subject, can be equally effective in structuring the elite's values. On one level, the absence of linkages between the elite and the public violates important assumptions of democratic theory and practice. Elites seemed to be autonomous. But that does not mean that the elite is not interested in public opinion or that it does not matter to it. The mere fact that the elite's and the public's attitudes do not coincide implies a certain independence of public opinion. It also suggests alternative means of information gathering, opinion formation and political competition. Clearly, even in contemporary Russia, for all the criticisms of its democratic record, public opinion has some degree of independence and is not totally controlled by the elite. Despite its tight grip on the mass media, the Russian elite understands that there are limits to its ability to manipulate public opinion.

But the independence of public opinion and desire of the elite to measure it are only one side of the continuum. On the other side of this continuum is the desire of the elite to capitalize on public opinion, which is equally important. Why does the elite in Russia, which is apparently moving away from a democratic path, still consider the results of public opinion surveys important? The government's recent
crackdown on VTsIOM, the Russian polling organization that until Fall 2003 remained relatively independent of the state’s control, reveals the significance of public opinion data for the Kremlin. Results of public opinion can be used either for or against the ruling political elite, another sign that a country has some degree of political contestation, even if it is moving away from a democratic path. The fact that public opinion is studied and contested even in the most problematic post-Communist countries (e.g., Russia) separates them from the countries with zero political competition (cf. Saudi Arabia or North Korea). Researchers who study Russia and other post-Soviet states may find grounds for cautious optimism in this finding, despite otherwise gloomy predictions regarding democratic prospects in these countries.

229 In late August 2003, as part of “privatization” (a process in which the state actually acquired controlling share of stakes), the government replaced the management of VTsIOM, most notably, its director, former Soviet dissident, Yuri Levada. Prior to August 2003, VTsIOM was a “federal state enterprise,” a company in which the state had no shares. After the re-organization, it became “state share-holding company,” which the state dominates. Ostensibly, the struggle for control over the last independent public opinion polling organization was economic. The state claimed that the new type of ownership and management would help VTsIOM to simplify its operations and improve its profitability. The conflict itself was conveniently labeled “economic” (a phrase that is increasingly used to describe the crackdown on the political opposition in Russia). Despite fairly sympathetic media coverage and Levada’s good reputation among the journalistic and scholarly elites, in September 2003 VTsIOM’s director was sacked and replaced by Nikolai Fedorov, a protégé of the government. De facto and de jure, the government took control over the last “bastion” of independent public opinion data gathering. Since then, VTsIOM re-grouped; all its employees (with the exception of one) followed Levada and left the old structures to form a new public opinion polling organization, VTsIOM-A (or Analytical Service of VTsIOM). Yet, the crackdown was not over. During a recent visit and conversations with VTsIOM-A’s employees (December 2003) the author learned that, although VTsIOM-A retained the majority of its clients and partners, it still does not have a permanent office and is forced to move from one location to another. Moreover, in January 2004, the Anti-Monopoly Committee of the government (an equivalent of the US Anti-Trust Commission) ruled that VTsIOM-A cannot use the abbreviation of VTsIOM in its name and would have to change its name completely (see archives of an independent radio station “Echo of Moscow,” www.echo.msk.ru, January 22, 2004). In a situation when the “brand name” (as the decision about the VTsIOM name implies) is vital, this action is another stab clearly designed to punish VTsIOM-A and make its work almost impossible. Russian analysts suspect that the government’s dissatisfaction with VTsIOM is caused by the latter’s survey results showing a decline in the popularity of the second Chechen war and relatively low numbers of electoral support for the pro-Kremlin political party, United Russia, on the eve of the 2003 parliamentary elections.
Secondly, my research touches upon another important question – how public opinion affects the chances for successful post-Communist reforms. Benjamin Page\textsuperscript{230} contends that the elite’s attitudes (or, in his words, policy makers’ attitudes) on a couple of policy issues in the US history were shaped by public opinion. The mere introduction of certain problems to the public forum created an outcry, which in turn resulted in better decisions. Page maintains that opinions of the ordinary people were right. Moreover, it was ultimately beneficial that the policies on which he focuses were re-shaped by public opinion. The question is then whether or not the countries in which the public has an impact on the policy formation have better policies. In both questions, the public opinion literature and democratic theory (or an empirical and a normative issues) intersect.

To make a claim like Page’s requires a lot of evidence. First, one has to prove that public opinion is stable, rational, well-informed, and structured.\textsuperscript{231} Second, one has to prove that the incorporation of public opinion results in policies that are different (and necessarily better) than the decisions that would have been adopted by the elite on its own. I am not making a categorical claim like Page does. I simply do not have enough data to prove such a claim, since measures of public opinion in post-Communist countries are not of a long standing. I therefore cannot say that the public is rational and always knows best. People may not have enough information, or the information may be (and in fact, in the case of Russia, is) controlled by the elite. Indeed, my claims are more modest. Post-Communist public opinion appears to be


\textsuperscript{231} And indeed, many scholars disagree with such characterizations, see Chapter I, Section “Characteristics of Public Opinion.”

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stable and reasonably articulated. During the research period, public opinion either impacted the discourse and actions of elites, or it was ignored. Where liberal public opinion was incorporated into policy initiatives and discourse of the elite, post-Communist reforms are visibly more advanced and consistent. Where public opinion either was overlooked altogether, or only its organic-statist elements deemed important, the quality and consistency of the reforms suffered.

I can now modify Page’s claim and relate it to post-Communist societies. Not every type of public opinion necessarily results in better or more consistent reforms. It follows that liberal public opinion plays a more important role in explaining and predicting the success of post-Communist reforms. This finding is significant, but not altogether unexpected. Indeed, the goals of post-Communist transitions, including democracy, human rights, a market-based economy, cooperation with the West, and ethnic tolerance, were inspired by a society-centric vision of development more consistent with liberal principles. Organic-statism, with its emphasis on the state-centered paradigm, was less conducive to successful post-Communist transformations. This finding also suggests that researchers who study post-Communist countries should look beyond mere institutional design issues or the impact of previous legacies when assessing prospects for successful reforms. Indeed, they should also take the nature of public opinion into consideration. Countries with more liberal public attitudes appear to have an advantage on the path to reforms.

When public opinion was overwhelmingly organic-statist, elites pursuing liberal reforms achieved more consistent results by ignoring the public, however undemocratic that might seem. In the Russian case, the elite’s commitment to
economic liberalism ultimately led to sustainable and relatively high rates of economic growth, the benefits of which are now beginning to be shared with the population at large. However, the Russian elite’s compromise on ideological liberalism, possibly to appease the conservative public, created social and political conditions (including the strengthening of a repressive state apparatus and an arbitrary application of law) that proved destructive to free market economic development. The recent arrests of oppositional businessmen and their lengthy detention on charges which are not universally applied sent the Russian stock market tumbling (however temporarily) and jeopardized foreign investment. In the Polish case, the elite’s decision to ignore the public’s nationalism ultimately paid off and Poland is now poised to become a full member of the European Union.

It follows that post-Communist elites may be wise in shunning the impact of public opinion. It can be decidedly intolerant and anti-democratic. This finding gives credence to more elitist accounts of democracy\(^{232}\) and skeptical interpretations of public political participation\(^{233}\) (accounts that treat public opinion with suspicion and mistrust) and not to more benign views on public opinion common in both

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\(^{232}\) Among the classical discussions of elitist forms of democracy, in which the public’s input into the political process is restricted to the elections of elite, are: Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1950); and Giovanni Sartori, *The Theory of Democracy Revisited* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1987).

empirical\textsuperscript{234} and normative\textsuperscript{235} (deliberative, participatory, discursive, etc.) democratic literature.

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Since I left Russia in the Summer of 2002, several important developments moved the country further in the organic-statist direction. Both the 2003 parliamentary and the 2004 presidential elections were marred by serious accusations of electoral fraud. Electoral campaigns were characterized by heavy governmental control over the media, excessive use of administrative resources, and the arbitrary nature of candidates' registration by the State Electoral Commission. During the actual elections, independent observers cited frequent examples of the illegal propaganda on behalf of the pro-Kremlin candidates and numerous ballot irregularities. The recent presidential election was particularly problematic. The incumbent president, Vladimir Putin, enjoyed the unprecedented (at least for post-Communist Russia) advantage of a virtually uncontested race facilitated by obedient media, silenced political opposition, a pro-incumbent parliament, and an intimidated business community.

In the Summer of 2003, the last national independent TV channel (TV-S) was closed, effectively ending the freedom of information dissemination in Russia. The only remaining oppositional media are the Moscow-based radio station Echo of Moscow, the New York-based Echo-TV and a handful of liberal newspapers in


Moscow and St. Petersburg. Their audiences are rather small, which may explain why the government still tolerates their presence. In the same summer, the government launched its next attack on oppositional businessmen. Vladimir Gusinskii and Boris Berezovskii, who challenged Putin during the first presidential campaign, now live in exile. Platon Lebedev and Mikhail Khodarkovskii, who funded and publicly supported the anti-Putin opposition, were imprisoned in the Summer and Fall of 2003 respectively on charges of tax evasion.

Following numerous terrorist attacks in 2002-2004 (including hostage taking in a Moscow theater, a Moscow subway bombing, and several commuter trains explosions in Southern Russia), the functions of repressive state institutions (including the ability of the police to stop, question and temporarily detain “suspicious looking” non-Russians) expanded. After a short period of amicable relations with the US in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, Russian foreign policy again took a strong anti-Western turn. Russia not only opposed the US-led invasion of Iraq and resisted US advances in the Trans-Caucasian region, but lashed out at the EU for its criticism of the second Chechen campaign and Russia’s electoral irregularities. Nationalistic and xenophobic tendencies also intensified, a fact all too evident in recent murders of Tajik and Afghani immigrants, fatal beatings of African students, and the stronger than expected finishes of the populist and nationalist LDPR and Motherland parties during the December 2003 parliamentary elections.

Yet despite a certain strengthening of organic-statist tendencies in Russia, liberalism did not completely vanish from the scene. In March 2004, Putin appointed
Russia's former chief EU negotiator Mikhail Fradkov as Prime Minister; the entire cabinet was also reshuffled. By and large, new cabinet appointments point towards a continuation of the liberal economic course. Taken together with my findings, the most recent developments in Russia suggest that although the future of democracy and a pro-Western foreign course in Russia is bleak, conditions for successful market transformation are much more favorable.

In the year since I left Poland, the country continued on the modified liberal path described in this dissertation. The discovery of an alleged governmental plan to exert economic pressures on the independent media (the Rywin affair) by Adam Michnik, editor-in-chief of Gazeta Wyborcza (Poland's premier newspaper), culminated in very public parliamentary hearings. Societal rejection of such repressive methods remains strong. Poland continues to participate in the US-led coalition in Iraq. As one of its most steadfast allies, it was entrusted with overseeing the international military contingent in Southern Iraq. In May 2004, Poland will become a full-fledged member of the EU.

However, other recent economic and ideological developments are more ambiguous and reflect the uncertainty of both the elite and of popular preferences. A new law that would liberalize public utilities and curtail social subsidies to the underprivileged is being vigorously debated in the Sejm. Poland, together with Spain, succeeded in blocking the adoption of the European Constitution, arguing that the document does not go far enough in recognizing the cultural uniqueness of each member-state and the Christian (read, Catholic) foundations of the European civilization. In short, the desirability of democracy and integration with the West are
universally accepted in Poland; the debates about ideology and the country’s
economic course, however, will continue for the foreseeable future.
APPENDIX A

Categories and Textual Indicators of Liberal and Conservative (Organic-Statist) Discourses Used in Content Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Liberal Categories: Textual Indicators</th>
<th>Conservative/Organic-Statist Categories: Textual Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy: Separation of powers and checks and balances</td>
<td>Authoritarianism/Managed Democracy: Monopoly of power, no checks and balances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentarism</td>
<td>Presidentialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular sovereignty</td>
<td>Alternatives to elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multipartism</td>
<td>One-party system, structured party-system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutionality</td>
<td>Political expediency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political equality of citizens</td>
<td>Political inequality of citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>State-controlled media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free media</td>
<td>Unitary state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federalism</td>
<td>Insulation of government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability and responsiveness of government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Ideology Rights and freedoms of individuals are natural</td>
<td>Statist/Conservative Ideology: Rights are given by the community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil (negative) liberties</td>
<td>Social (positive) freedoms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal values</td>
<td>Conservative values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State is for the citizens, rights of the individuals are supreme</td>
<td>State’s interests are superior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small and effective state apparatus</td>
<td>Strong repressive state apparatus, law and order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for difference and conflict of interests</td>
<td>Unity of interests, social harmony, unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of law, impartiality of law</td>
<td>Selective application of law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free-Market Economic Model: Market as principle agent of economic decision making, absence or small involvement of state in economy</td>
<td>Governed Market Economic Model: State to help the market, state regulates economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak social protection</td>
<td>Strong social protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic justice</td>
<td>Social justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low taxes</td>
<td>Higher taxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balanced budget</td>
<td>Possibility of budget deficit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private property, voucher privatization</td>
<td>Alternative ownership (partially state or collective)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strict monetary policy</td>
<td>Soft monetary policy (non-monetary economic leverages)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberalization of foreign trade</td>
<td>Protectionism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price liberalization</td>
<td>Price control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition, structural reform as a consequence of market</td>
<td>Competition can be distorted within the social pact, social contract (active structural involvement of the state in micro-economic policy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universal economic development</td>
<td>Specific economic development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Pro-Western Foreign Policy:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relations with the West</th>
<th>Relationship with the East and South</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unipolarity, mono-centric international relations</td>
<td>Multi-polarity, polycentric international relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Idealistic” international relations</td>
<td>Realist international relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in military spending for foreign protection</td>
<td>Decrease in military and defense spending for foreign protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of Russians abroad</td>
<td>Russians abroad are on their own</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return to the USSR – based on political, statist, arguments</td>
<td>Future of the USSR – economic (functional) integration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ethnic Tolerance:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic equality</th>
<th>Ethnic Nationalism:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peaceful solutions to ethnic conflicts</td>
<td>Military solutions to ethnic problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global values</td>
<td>National values, national ideas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX B

Selected Economic and Social Indices for Russia and Poland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Russian Federation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GNP per capita, 1999, $</td>
<td>3,960</td>
<td>2,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP measured at PPP (Purchasing Power Parity)</td>
<td>7,894</td>
<td>6,339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP's Average Annual Growth Rate 1998-1999, %</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP's Average Annual Growth, 1990-1999, %</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>-6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Population, 1999, %</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population below $1 a day, %</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Inequality, GINI index, 1996 -- Poland, 1998 -- Russian Federation</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>48.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality Rate, 1998, per 1,000 live births</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy, male/female, 1998, years</td>
<td>69/77</td>
<td>61/73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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APPENDIX C

Biographies of Russian Government-Affiliated Intellectuals

Bunin, Igor' Mikhailovich – born on February 25, 1945 in Moscow, 1970 graduate of Moscow State University (Department of History). Director General of the Center for Political Technologies. Doktor of Political Science. In 1973-1982, Bunin worked as a researcher at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences. During the next decade (1982-1992), he was employed as a senior researcher at the Institute of Comparative Political Science. Since 1993, Bunin became a director of Center of Political Technologies where he works to this day.

Burbulis, Gennadii Eduardovich – born on August 5, 1945 in Pervouralsk, 1974 graduate of Urals State University and 1978 Graduate of the Graduate School of the Urals Polytechnic University (Department of Philosophy). Kandidat of Philosophy. After graduation Burbulis worked as Associate professor at various universities in Sverdlovsk. In 1989, he became a deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet. In 1990-1991, Burbulis was in charge of Yeltsin’s presidential campaign. In 1991-1992, Burbulis served as State Secretary of RF and First deputy Prime Minister of RF. Subsequently, he served as a President of the Tsentr Strategiia [Strategy Center – a liberal think-tank close to Gaidar].


Dugin, Aleksandr Gel’evich – born on January 7, 1962 in Moscow, Dugin was expelled from Moscow Aviation Institute. Currently, he works as a president of Historical and Religious Association “Arktogeya,” editor-in-chief of “Elementy. Evraziiskoe obozrenie” [“Elements. Eurasian Review”]. Dugin is an ultra-conservative philosopher and an adviser to Gennadii Seleznev, Chairman of Duma. Presently, he is an important unofficial ideologue.

In this Appendix, I use two distinct academic titles common in the Russian context – Kandidat and Doktor. Both denote advanced graduate degrees. Kandidat is a close equivalent of the Western Ph.D. The best approximation to Doktor is a Ph.D. with a post-doc training and a significant record of publication. Doktor is the terminal graduate degree in Russia.

Iasin, Yevgenii Grigor’evich – born in 1934 in Odessa, 1963 graduate of Moscow State University (Economics Department). After graduation Iasin worked at the Central Economic and Mathematical Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences (together with Petrakov and Shatalin). In 1989, Iasin was invited by L. Abalkin to head the State Commission for Economic Reform (for Ryzhkov government), where he worked together with Iavlinskii (both co-authored economic program “500 Days”). In May 1991, Iasin left the government to create USSR Expert Institute for Scientific and Industrial Union (now Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs). In 1992, Iasin became representative of Gaidar’s government in Duma (combined this function with his directorship in the Expert Institute). In 1993, he was appointed the Head of the Working Group of the Russian Government and was elected President of Vysshaia Shkola Ekonomiki [Economic Academy]. In 1994, Iasin became the Head of Analytical Center for the Presidential Administration. From November 8, 1994 to March 17, 1997, Iasin was the Minister of Economy of the RF. In 1997 Iasin was appointed to a position of a Minister without portfolio for economic issues, internal, and foreign investment. Currently, Iasin works at the Center for Strategic Programs (he is close to Illarionov, presidential economic adviser). Iasin authored more than 200 scholarly publications.

Kara-Murza, Aleksei Alekseevich – born on August 17, 1956 in Moscow, 1978 graduate of Moscow State University. Philosopher, Doktor of Political Science, Doktor of Philosophy; Professor of Political Science of Moscow State University (since 1995), Director of the Center for Philosophic Analysis of Russian Reform Movements (Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences), co-President of Moscow Liberal Foundation, expert of Strategia [Strategy] Foundation; adviser to the government of the Russian Federation, Yel’tsin’s campaign adviser (1996), member of the Union of Rightist Forces, important ideologue.

Karaganov, Sergei Aleksandrovich – born in 1952 in Moscow. 1974 Graduate of Moscow State University (Department of Economics), 1978 graduate of the Graduate School of the Institute of the USA and Canada. Received degrees of Kandidat of Economic Sciences (1979) and Doktor of Historical Sciences (1989). Karaganov worked in the Institute of the USA and Canada (1978-1988), Institute of Europe (1988-present), and as an official expert for the Committee for International Relations, Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Presently, Karaganov serves as a Deputy Director of the Institute of Europe (since 1989), member of the Foreign Relations Board, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (since 1991), member of the Presidential Counseling Board (since 1993), member of the Consulting Board for the Security Council of RF (since 1993), Chairman of the Committee for Foreign and Defense Politics of RF (since 1994).


Kordonskii, Simon Gdal‘evich – born in 1944, 1974 graduate of Tomsk State University, Kandidat of Philosophy, Kordonskii describes himself as social philosopher, biochemist, sociologist, founder of the “administrative market” theory, and expert on commercial, state, and international structures. Permanent contributor and member of the editorial board of Vek XX i Mir [Twentieth century and the World] [conservative journal edited by Pavlovskii], Director General of the Center for Civil Society and Private Property (1993-2000), consultant of the Foundation for Effective Politics [think tank associated with Pavlovskii], Head of Presidential Counseling Board (2000-present). Close ally of Andrei Illarionov and Gleb Pavlovskii. One of the main contributors to Inoe.

Krasnov, Mikhail, Aleksandrovich – born in 1949 in Moscow. 1972 graduate of Moscow State University (Department of Law), 1997 graduate of the Graduate School of Moscow State University (Department of Law). Doktor of Jurisprudence. Upon graduation Krasnov worked at Iuridicheskaia Literatura [Legal Literature] publishing house, later taught at All-Soviet Legal Institute and worked as a senior researcher at the Institute of State and Law, Russian Academy of Sciences. Since 1993, Krasnov worked as an Assistant to presidential advisers and later as
Presidential Aid for legal issues (1995-1998). Since 1998, Krasnov also serves as a Vice-President of INDEM [think-tank founded by Satarov]. Krasnov is an author of more than 60 articles and books.


Mau, Vladimir Aleksandrovich – member of Gaidar’s team, returned to Gaidar’s Institute after the latter resigned from the post of the acting Prime Minister of RF. Currently Mau serves as a Director of the Working Center of the Governmental Commission for Economic Reform and as a member of the Scientific Board of the Center for Strategic Programs.

Nikonov, Viacheslav Alekseevich – born in 1956 in Moscow (grandson of V. M. Molotov), graduate of Moscow State (Department of History). Upon graduation, Nikonov taught at MSU and Caltech. In 1989 he became USSR’s youngest Doktor of Historical Sciences. In the late Soviet period, Nikonov worked as a senior researcher in the Central Committee of the CPSU, Assistant to the Chief of the USSR Presidential Administration, Assistant to Chairman of KGB. In 1993, he became a deputy of Duma (from the pro-governmental party PRES [Party of Russian Unity and Accord]) and Chairman of the International Security and Arms Control Committee. After his parliamentary career, Nikonov served as a President of Politika Foundation [conservative think tank], Klub 93, Center for Parliamentary Programs, Vice-President of the Association of Centers for Political Consulting (where Salmin is a president), member of the Presidential Political Board, Presidential Human Rights Committee, Presidential anti-Political Extremism Board, and Foreign and Defense Policy Board. Nikonov is the author of more than 300 publications (including several books).

Panarin, Aleksandr Sergeevich – born on December 26, 1940 in Donetsk region (Ukraine), 1966 graduate of Moscow State University (Department of Philosophy). Doktor of Philosophy, professor of Moscow State University (Department of Philosophy).

Pavlovskii, Gleb Olegovich – born in 1951 in Odessa. In 1968-1973 Pavlovskii attended Odessa University, Department of History, but did not graduate due to underground activities. In the 1970s, Pavlovskii was associated with Moscow dissidents (especially Mikhail Gefter), worked as a manual worker and then became co-editor of Svobodnyi Moskovskii Zhurnal POISKI [Search – A Free Moscow Journal] (1978-1980). In 1982, Pavlovskii was arrested for his work as an editor of
POISKI. After imprisonment, Pavlovskii returned to Moscow and created Club of Social Initiatives [one of the first legal oppositional structures]. In 1989, Pavlovskii became editor-in-chief of Vek XX i Mir journal and a founder of information agency Postfactum. Since 1995, Pavlovskii served as one of the directors of the Foundation for Effective Politics, member of the Strategic Programs Center [think tank for the Government of RF], Adviser to the Presidential Administration (since 1996), and editor-in-chief of Russkii Zhurnal and Strana.ru.


Smirniagin, Leonid Viktorovich – Kandidat of Geographical Sciences, associate professor of Geography (Department of Geography, Moscow State University), member of Presidential Counseling Board (1993-1997), specialist on federalism, political geography of Russia and the US.

Sobchak, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich – born on August 10, 1937 in Chita, 1959 graduate of Leningrad State University (Law School). Doktor of Jurisprudence,
lawyer, one of the founders of democratic movement during the late Perestroika period, Mayor of St. Petersburg (1991-1996), member of the Presidential Counseling Board (1993).


APPENDIX D

List of Synonyms of Textual Indicators for the Russian Phase of Content Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Textual Indicators</th>
<th>Synonyms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Democracy</td>
<td>Separation of powers and checks and balances</td>
<td>Horizontal decentralization, independent judiciary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parliamentarism</td>
<td>Parliamentary republic, parliament elects government, stronger role of parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Popular sovereignty</td>
<td>Meaningful elections, meaningful choice, competitive representation, possibility to recall deputies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multipartism</td>
<td>Presence of [various] parties, active, uncontrolled opposition, including Communists, political pluralism, protection of minorities, political competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constitutionality</td>
<td>Symmetrical federation (no special treaties with federal subjects), actions according to legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political equality of citizens</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>Grassroots, popular participation, popular control over politicians, volunteer associations, active citizenry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Free media</td>
<td>Ability to criticize the politicians, media can have a different opinion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Federalism</td>
<td>Clearly demarcated rights of the Center and regions, strong regions mean strong center, independence of regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accountability and responsiveness of government</td>
<td>Glasnost', critique of government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Authoritarianism</td>
<td>Monopoly of power, no checks and balances</td>
<td>Concentration of power, personal dictatorship, administrative command system, bureaucratic oligarchy, concentration of power in one branch, conflicts between branches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Presidentialism</td>
<td>Strong executive branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alternatives to elections</td>
<td>Descriptive representation, party/experts know(s) will of people, formal elections, elite agreement, possibility to buy elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-party system, structured party-system</td>
<td>Controlled opposition, two-party system</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political expediency</td>
<td>There are circumstances when the Constitution can be superseded, decreeim, asymmetrical federal relations, federal relations equal personal relations between center and regions (clientilism), relations based on political ideology, political reasons, demonstration democracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political inequality of citizens</td>
<td>Some categories should not participate in politics, economic inequality translates into political inequality, financial capital decides, pressure groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-controlled media</td>
<td>Control over media, information wars, ideological control, media to inform about the government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unitary state</td>
<td>Super-centralization of state, unitarism, absence of clearly demarcated state and federal prerogatives, need to create more offices representing center, increase in Center’s power, strong center means weak regions, vertical centralization, vertical power</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insulation of government</td>
<td>Inability to publicly criticize the leaders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Ideological Liberalism</td>
<td>Rights and freedoms of individuals are natural</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights and freedoms of individuals are natural</td>
<td>Right to life, property, happiness, self-realization, safety, human rights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil (negative) liberties</td>
<td>Freedom of speech, movement, assembly, belief, choice, freedom from</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal values</td>
<td>Modern values, activism, tolerance, legal resolution of conflict, achievement, independence, reason, individual responsibility for individual’s destiny, values of middle class, personal dignity, rationality, choice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State is for the citizens, rights of the individuals are supreme</td>
<td>State is to protect citizens, state is a house, state functions are to provide physical safety (law and order, defense) and institutional structures/environment for self-realization of citizens, state well-being = population well-being, independence of the individual from society/state, national interests are interests of the society, democratic stateness, liberal stateness, presumption of innocence, state and society’s interests may be different, minimalist understanding of the state</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small and effective state apparatus</td>
<td>Democratic (social) control over repressive apparatus, political independence of repressive apparatus, professional army, to combat crime is to combat its reasons (economic, legal), decrease in state apparatus, scaling down</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for difference and conflict of interests</td>
<td>Institutionalization of conflict, state cannot decide what interest are not worthy, individual autonomy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of law, impartiality of law</td>
<td>Equality of citizens before the law, respect for law, contract, private property, universality of law application, legal means of conflict resolution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Ideological Conservatism/Statism</td>
<td>Rights are given by the community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights are given by the community</td>
<td>Group membership and entitlements, belonging to a specific class, group as basis of identity, dependence on community for protection, pride for the community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social (positive) freedoms</td>
<td>Right to work, health, protection against sickness and old age, freedom to, not just rights, but responsibilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative values</td>
<td>Traditional values, ascription, solidarity, undifferentiation, collectivism, faith, irrationality, spirituality, instinct, feelings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State’s interests are superior</td>
<td>State can violate freedoms and human rights, raison d’etat, national interests are interests of the state, stability to strengthen the state and its government, state power is sacred, moral, spiritual basis of state, state integrity is more important than human life, law and order for empowering the state, maximalist understanding of the state</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strong repressive state apparatus, law and order</strong></td>
<td>Support for police, military and secret service, dictatorship of law, safety, increase in state’s muscles, repressive state apparatus knows how to protect the citizens, to combat crime is to combat its consequences (tougher punishment), increase in state apparatus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unity of interests, social harmony, unity</strong></td>
<td>Common good, social accord, consolidation of society, national agreement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Selective application of law</strong></td>
<td>Rule of force or economic might, force as method of conflict resolution, privileges of statesman and politicians, arbitrary application of law (NTV vs. the other channels), arbitrary decisions, appellation to power, state, “shadowy” justice, law, state does not obey its own laws, clientilism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5. Free Market Economic Model</strong></td>
<td>Market as principle agent of economic decision making, absence or small involvement of state in economy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic decentralization, deregulation, liberalization of the economy, private investments, state to minimize risks and uncertainty for market and to provide monetary policy, weak social protection and control over monopolies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weak social protection</strong></td>
<td>Marketization of social sphere, paid medicine, private pensions, payments for utilities, means-tested programs, address support, selective support, liberal model of welfare, creation of work places instead of individual social guarantees, development of private pension funds, insurance companies, minimization of state social burden</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic justice</strong></td>
<td>According to final result, efficiency, state support of only competitive industries (technology-intensive, science), bankruptcy, proportional justice, equality of opportunity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low taxes</strong></td>
<td>Absence of tax exemptions, decrease in state expenditures, decrease in number of taxes, flat rate taxes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Balanced budget</strong></td>
<td>Revenues not exceed expenditures, absence/decrease of budget deficit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private property, voucher privatization</td>
<td>Privatization by the producers, real people (not by the state and agents), decrease/elimination of state share in property, voucher privatization, free privatization, auctions, privatization controlled by market, priority of private property, including private property on land, high speed of privatization, protection of ownership rights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strict monetary policy</td>
<td>No printing of money for social programs or maintenance of production capacity, anti-inflationary measures, no increase in salaries, real money, real investment, strong currency, supported by real goods, no indexation, strict regulation of money mass</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberalization of foreign trade</td>
<td>Comparative advantage, open borders, low tariffs, deregulation of foreign trade, free exchange rate, absence of import quotas, transparent customs, foreign trade openness, open economy, gradual reduction of import tariffs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price liberalization</td>
<td>State is not responsible for prices, price deregulation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition, structural reform as a consequence of market</td>
<td>Anti-monopolism, survival of the fittest, equality of opportunity, leveled paying field, regulation of monopolies, open competition, de-monopolization, state investments only in objects of social infrastructure, which is neglected by the market</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universal economic development</td>
<td>American/Western/IMF model, shock therapy, Russian economy is not unique, legacies do not matter, or are not serious, economy reacts the same, liberalization first, then privatization and de-monopolization (synonym of rapid, shock reform)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
<p>| 6. Governed Market Economic Model | State to help the market, state regulates economy | Union of bureaucracy and industrialists, domination of bureaucracy, state-led industrialization, state capitalism, semi-liberal economics, state planning, state regulation, state control over the structure of economy, paternalism, reform by state muscles, derigeste, state interference, social market, preservation of state sector, mixed economy, active state regulation of the economy, including price regulation (on strategic and consumer goods), state purchases of produced goods, support of industries and science, tax exemptions, strong social protection |
| Strong social protection | Social suffering, stratification, poverty, hunger, homelessness, welfare, protection of all who needs it, Keynesian economics, state protection, universal benefits, state is responsible for a certain level of social well-being for everybody, including pensions, and compensation to bring income to the living minimum, state pensions and social security, conservative form of welfare state |
| Social justice | According to labor, inputs, support of ineffective industries (defense, agriculture, energy sector), equality of results, equal justice, just redistribution |
| Higher taxes | State revenues, increase in state expenditures, increase in number of taxes |
| Possibility of budget deficit | Reduction of budgetary deficit is not an end in itself |
| Alternative ownership (partially state or collective) | Nationalization, state-controlled privatization, preservation of state property, state’s share in privatized enterprises, necessity to have state commissioner to supervise privatization, paid privatization, where revenues go to the state, privatization that takes into account interests of workers (working collectives), mixed types of property, high share of state ownership, especially in basic industries, high share of worker collectives, self-management, limitations on land ownership, ban on land sales |
| Soft monetary policy (non-monetary economic leverages) | Possibility to print money, special credits, subsidies, emission, increase in salaries and pensions, paper investments, state control over monetary process, GKO's, inflation |
| Protectionism | High import tariffs, fixed exchange rate, protection of domestic producers and market, support of exporters, application of quotes for export and import |
| Price control | Price freeze, graduate price liberalization, price regulation, indexation |
| Competition can be distorted within the social pact, social contract (active structural involvement of the state in micro-economic policy) | Some interests are more important than others, state decides, natural monopolies, selective support of priority industries, financial exemptions to priority industries, industrial and financial corporations under state patronage, support of production, corporatism, lobbism, special conditions for priority industries, state as a purchaser of production, development of technology and science-intensive production by the state, state investments |
| Specific economic development | Russian economic path/model, Russia is unique, its legacies matter, its previous ideology matters, third path (Scandinavian model, Prussian model), gradual reform (privatization first, then liberalization of prices), nationally specific reform |
| Relations with the West | Part of the West (at least as a raw material supplier), or part of the modern global order, need to make alliance with the West, US, all democratic and economically prosperous states |
| Uni-polarity, mono-centric international relations | Atlantism, Americanism, Russia as a passive partner of the West |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Idealistic” international relations</th>
<th>Democracies do not go to war with each other, the only conflict is economic, internal threats to sovereignty (economic decline leads to Russia’s becoming raw materials’ colony, inability to strengthen border invites economic penetration), wars are only justified against undemocratic regimes or in self-defense, international organizations are for cooperation, there are larger ideals than national interests (human rights, democracy), NATO expansion, START II, integration in the EU, WTO, other western organizations, Western investments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decrease in military and defense spending for foreign protection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians abroad are on their own</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future of the USSR – economic (functional) integration</td>
<td>Economic integration with the former republics, moderate integration: first economic cooperation, then creation of political institutions, gradual integration, gradual union with Belorus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Independent or Anti-Western Foreign Policy</td>
<td>Relationship with the East and South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-polarity, polycentric international relations</td>
<td>Heterogeneous world, plurality of the polycentricity, Europe-centric vision, Russia as a pole, Russia as an active partner of the West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realist international relations</td>
<td>Military conflict with the West, conflict over spheres of interest, Kosovo, Iraq, SDI, protection and expansion of the territory, external threats to sovereignty, wars are inevitable, contentment, international organizations are to forward national interests, national interests, balance of power, export of arms, NATO in its Cold War form, freeze on arms control treaties, fluid alliances for national interests, UN’s Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in military spending for foreign protection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of Russians abroad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return to the USSR – based on political, statist, arguments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR = prestige, respect, easier life, imperial foreign policy, radical integration: first political, then economic integration, military re-incorporation of the former Soviet republics, quick realization of Russian-Belorussian Union.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. Ethnic Tolerance

| Ethnic equality | All religions, nations are good, ethnic tolerance, multi-confessionalism, multiethnic state, external reasons for ethnic conflict (not the characteristics of an ethnic group), civic nationalism, cooperation and friendship between different ethnic groups |
| Peaceful solutions to ethnic conflicts | Khasavyurt, cultural autonomy and development, economic pressures, negotiations |
| Global values | Consumerism, religion of humanity, democracy as a value, market as a value, western values, human values, universal values, modernization, patriotism = democracy and freedom |

10. Ethnic Nationalism

| Ethnic inequality | Ethnic groups are different, Islam, Caucasians, Jews, internal reasons for ethnic conflict (characteristics of ethnic group), ethnic nationalism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, Arian ideology, domination of one group over another |
| Military solutions to ethnic problems | War in Chechnya/military operations, ethnic assimilation |
| National values, national ideas | Patriotism, Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Russian uniqueness, Russian pride, Russian values, Russian cultural path, Russian morality, traditions, history, religion are the foundation of Russian state, sobornost', collectivism, togetherness, monarchy, patriotism = national revival |
APPENDIX E

Sources Analyzed During the Russian Phase of Content Analysis^238


^238 Some of the sources contained multiple interviews or articles. In such cases, only the major title is listed. Works containing multiple sources are delineated by asterisk (*). The total count of sources analyzed is 251.

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———. Rossiia v tsiklakh mirovoi istorii [Russia in Cycles of World History]. Moscow: Moscow State University Press, 1999.


———. “Politologi negativno otsenivaiut reshenie prezidenta” [“Political Pundits See the President’s Decision Negatively”]. Nezavisimaiia Gazeta 145, 10 August 1999.

———. Interview to Vek newspaper, 13 August 1999.


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“Kto stoit za pobedoi Edinstva – prem’er ili polittekhnologi?” [“Who Is Behind the Unity’s Victory – Prime Minister or Political Technologists?”]. NTV, Glas Naroda, 21 December 1999.

“O literature, intemete i budushchem” [“About Literature, Internet and the Future”]. Russkii Zhurnal, 12 January 2000.

“Vladimir Putin kak glavnii pretendent na prezidentskii post” [“Putin As the Main Candidate for Presidency”]. TV-6, Mesto vstrechi, 14 January 2000.

“Rossiia liubit voevat’? Vran’e!” [“Does Russia Like to Fight? No, This Is a Lie!”]. Novaia Gazeta 3, 24-30 January 2000.

“Tainyi sovetnik Kremlia” [“Secret Adviser to Kremlin”]. Argumenty i Fakty 5, 02 February 2000.


“Oligarkhov razgoniat, a gubernatorov ‘postroiat’ ” [“Oligarchs Will Be Dismissed and Governors Will Be Disciplined”]. Delovye Liudi 109, 29 April 2000.


“Spor o gosudarstvennom ustroistve Rossii” [“Discussion Regarding the Russian State”]. ORT, Vremia, 09 July 2000.


"Neobhodima srochnaia rotatsiia sostava politicheskikh igrokov" ["We Need the Urgent Rotation of Political Players"]. Russkii Zhurnal, 24 August 2000.


"Rossiiskaia destruktivnost', samaia destruktivnaia v mire" ["Russian Destructiveness Is the Most Destructive in the World"]. Izvestiia 175, 16 September 2000.


"Proshchaj, Belovezh'e! Kreml' vziat' silami bol'shinstva. Grazhdanskaia voina zakhlonchena" ["Farewell, Belovezhskia Pushcha. Kremlin is Taken By the Majority. Civil War is Over"]. Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 09 December 2000.

"Armiiia vne konkurentsii" ["Army is Without Competition"]. Granitsa Rossi 46, 21 December 2000.


"Rossiia obretaet sebia" ["Russia Acquires Itself"]. Krasnaia Zvezda 43, 6 March 2001.


"V tsentre vnimaniia kadrovye naznacheniia prezidenta" ["President’s Personnel Changes Are In the Focus of Attention"]. Maiak, 28 March 2001.


“Nam ne vygodny imperskie proekty, oni nas prosto ne interesuiut” [“We Do Not Need Imperial Projects, They Simply Do Not Interest Us”].


“Territorialnaia morfologiia rossiiskogo obschestva kak otrazhenie regionalnogo chuvstva v russkoi kul’ture” [“Territorial Morphology of Russian society as a Reflection of Regional Feelings in Russian Culture”]. In Regionalnoe samoosoznanie kak faktor formirovaniiia policheskoi kul’tury v
______. Interview with Sergei Istrzhembskii. VIP 6 (1992).
APPENDIX F

Relationships Between Various Russian Public Attitudes

Table 11a
Preference for Order and Support for Dictatorship (Express surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is more important order or democracy? (1—order, 2—democracy)</th>
<th>Is dictatorship the best solution to contemporary Russia's problems? (1—yes, 2—no)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>.415**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,696</td>
<td>1,992</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 23a
Support for Dictatorship According to Attitudes to Post-1985 Developments (Express surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Would Russia be better off if everything remained as it was before 1985? (1—yes, 2—no)</th>
<th>Is dictatorship the best solution to contemporary Russia's problems? (1—yes, 2—no)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>.277**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,540</td>
<td>5,212</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Is dictatorship the best solution to contemporary Russia's problems?</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.277**</td>
<td>5,212</td>
<td>6,174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 23b
Support for Dictatorship According to Assessment of Russia’s Post-Communist Course (Express surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Is Russia moving in a right direction? (1—Russia is moving in a right direction, 2—Russia is moving towards a dead-end)</th>
<th>Is dictatorship the best solution to contemporary Russia’s problems? (1—yes, 2—no)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Correlation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Sig. (2-tailed)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 23c
Preference for Order According to Assessment of Russia’s Post-Communist Course (Express surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Is Russia moving in a right direction? (1—Russia is moving in a right direction, 2—Russia is moving towards a dead-end)</th>
<th>What is more important order or democracy? (1—order, 2—democracy)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pearson</strong></td>
<td><strong>Sig. (2-tailed)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

430

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**Table 24a**

Preferred Economic Model According to Assessment of Russia’s Post-Communist Course (Express surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Is Russia moving in a right direction? (1—Russia is moving in a right direction, 2—Russia is moving towards a dead-end)</th>
<th>What economic model is the best? (1—governed-market, 2—free market)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Is Russia moving in a right direction?</strong></td>
<td>Pearson Correlation 1.000 Sig. (2-tailed) N 20,877</td>
<td>-.277** Pearson Correlation 1.000 Sig. (2-tailed) N 17,147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What economic model is the best?</strong></td>
<td>Pearson Correlation -.277** Sig. (2-tailed) N 17,147</td>
<td>1.000 Pearson Correlation .000 Sig. (2-tailed) N 20,179</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Table 24b

Support for the Continuation of Liberal Economic Reforms According to Evaluations of the Current Political and Economic Situation (Monitoring surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What do you think about economic situation in Russia? (1—very good, 2—good, 3—average, 4—bad, 5—very bad)</th>
<th>What do you think about political situation in Russia? (1—favorable, 2—calm, 3—tense, 4—explosive)</th>
<th>Should economic reforms be continued? (1—reforms should be continued, 2—reforms should be stopped)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What do you think about economic situation in Russia?</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>.386**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>4,454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What do you think about political situation in Russia?</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>.186**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should economic reforms be continued?</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>.186**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,661</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
APPENDIX G

Biographies of Polish Government-Affiliated Intellectuals

**Balcerowicz, Leszek** — economist; born in 1947 in Lipno (Wroclaw), graduate of Central School of Planning and Statistics (1970); *Solidarność* adviser; researcher at the Institute of International Economic Relations, Central School of Planning and Statistics, and the Institute of Marxism and Leninism (1971-1989); deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finances (governments of Mazowiecki, Bielecki, and Buzek, 1989-1991 and 1997-2000); chairman of *Unia Wolności* (since 1995); currently, professor at the Central School of Trade (Warsaw) and the chairman of Polish National Bank.

**Bartoszewski, Władysław** — publicist and historian; born in 1922, graduate of Warsaw University; imprisoned (1946-1949 and 1981-1982); General Secretary of Polish Pen Club (1972-1982); editor of *Tygodnik Powszechny* (since 1982); professor at Lublin University; ambassador to Austria (1990-1995); Minister of Foreign Affairs (governments of Oleksy and Buzek, 1995-1996 and 2000).

**Belka, Marek** — economist; born in 1952 in Łódź, graduate of Łódź University (1972, Department of Economics); researcher at Łódź University and the Institute of Economics, Polish Academy of Sciences (1973-1992), later its director (1993-1996); economic adviser to the president of Poland (1996-1997); deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finances (government of Cimoszewicz, 1997); currently head of International Coordination Committee in Iraq.

**Chrzanowski, Wicław** — legal scholar; born in 1923 in Warsaw, graduate of Warsaw University (1945, Department of Law); imprisoned (1948-1954); member of *Solidarność*, its treasurer (1988-1999); researcher at Warsaw University and Central Trade School (1945-1948) and Lublin Catholic University (1972-1989); head of Catholic Discussion Club (1956-1957); Minister of Justice and Procurator General (government of Bielecki, 1991); founder and chairman of *Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe*; Speaker of the Lower Chamber of Parliament (*Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe*, 1991-1993).

**Dąbrowski, Marek** — economist; born in 1951 in Bydgoszcz, graduate of Warsaw University (1974, Department of Economics); researcher at Warsaw University; Secretary of State in the Ministry of Finances (1989-1990); close ally of deputy Prime Minister Balcerowicz; author of state budgets during Balcerowicz’s tenure as Prime Minister (1989-1991).


**Geremek, Bronisław** — historian; born in 1932, graduate of Warsaw University (1955); imprisoned (1981-1983); *Solidarność* adviser; participant in the Roundtable Talks; scholar at Warsaw University; candidate for the post of Prime Minister (1991); Minister


Głapiński, Adam – economist; born in 1950, graduate of Central School of Trade (1972); member of Solidarność; researcher at Central School of Planning and Statistics; Minister of Economic Planning (government of Bielecki, 1991) and Minister of Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries (government of Olszewski, 1991-1992); member of the Lower Chamber of Parliament (Porozumienie Centrum, 1991-1993); currently Director of the Institute of Economic and Political Freedom.


Hausner, Jerzy – economist; professor at Kraków Economic Academy; adviser to Prime Minister (government of Cimoszewicz, 1997); Minister of the Economy (government of Miller, 2000-present).

Józefiak, Cezary – economist; born in 1932 in Łódź, graduate of Warsaw University (1956, Department of Economics); member of Solidarność; participant in the Roundtable Talks; researcher and chairman at Łódź University; member of Council of Monetary Policies (since 1998); founder of the organization “Reforms and Democracy.”


Kaleta, Józef – economist; born in 1925; graduate of Wrocław University (1954, Department of Law); researcher at Economic Academy in Wrocław, its vice-Chancellor (1979-1990) and Chancellor (1990-1993); economic adviser to ruling Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (1993-1997 and 2000 -present); member of the Lower Chamber of Parliament (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, since 1991).

Kołodko, Grzegorz – economist; born in 1949 in Tczew, graduate of Central School of Planning and Statistics (1972; Department of Economics); participant in the Roundtable Talks (side of the government); researcher at Central School of Planning and Statistics (1973-1988); Director of the Institute of Finances (1989-1994); member of the Economic Council, Council of Ministers (1989-1991); deputy Prime Minister and Minister of

Kuczyński, Waldemar – economist; born in 1939; graduate of Warsaw University (1966, Department of Political Economy); imprisoned (1968); Solidarność adviser, deputy editor of Tygodnik Solidarności (1980-1981); immigrant in France (1982-1989); researcher at Warsaw University; chief adviser to Prime Minister (government of Mazowiecki, 1989-1990); Minister of Privatization (government of Bielecki, 1990-1991); chief economic adviser to Prime Minister (government of Buzek, 1997-2001).


Legutko, Ryszard – philosopher, publicist, born in 1949; professor at Kraków Jagełlonian University; editor-in-chief of Arka; important conservative ideologue.


Michnik, Adam – historian, publicist; born in 1946 in Warsaw, graduate of Poznań University (1975, Department of History); imprisoned (1968-1969, 1981-1984, and 1985-
1986); Solidarność adviser; participant in the Roundtable Talks; editor-in-chief of Gazeta Wyborcza (since 1989); member of the Lower Chamber of Parliament (Obywatelski Klub Parlamentarny, 1989-1991); confidant of the Polish post-Communist political elite.

Modzelewski, Karol – historian; born in 1937 in Moscow; graduate of Warsaw University (1959, Department of History); imprisoned (1965-1967, 1968-1971 and 1980-1984); member of Solidarność; researcher at Warsaw University (1959-1964), Polish Academy of Sciences (1972-1983), and the Institute of Polish History (since 1987); honorable chairman of Unia Pracy (1992-1995); important social democratic ideologue.

Najder, Zdzislaw – literary scholar; born in 1930 in Warsaw; graduate of Warsaw University (1954, Departments of Polish Language and Literature and Philosophy); immigrant in the US (1981-1989); sentenced to death (in absentia); researcher at the Institute of Literary Studies (1952-1981); lecturer at Columbia University, Yale University, Northern Michigan University, Stanford University, University of Michigan; Director of the Polish branch of Radio Free Europe (1982-1987); adviser to president of Poland (1990-1991); adviser to Prime Minister (government of Olszewski, 1991-1992).

Nowak-Jeziorański, Jan – publicist, politician; born in 1913; immigrated after WWII; Director of the Polish Branch at BBS (1948-1951) and Radio Free Europe (1952-1976); important moral authority and confidant of Polish post-Communist political elite.

Olszewski, Jan Ferdynand – legal scholar, lawyer; born in 1930 in Warsaw, graduate of Warsaw University (1953, Department of Law); Solidarność adviser; participant in the Roundtable Talks; employee at the Ministry of Justice; researcher at the Institute of Legal Sciences, Polish Academy of Sciences; candidate for the post of Prime Minister (1990); Prime Minister (1991-1992); leader of conservative Ruch Odbudowy Polski (since 1996).

Orłowski, Witold M. – economist; born in 1962, graduate of Łódź University; Director of the Research Center for Statistical and Economic Studies; advisor to the Chief Negotiator for the EU membership; Director of the Center for Economic and Statistical Studies (since 1997); economic adviser to the president of Poland (1995-present).

Parys, Jan – sociologist; born in 1950 in Warsaw, graduate of Warsaw University (1974, Department of Sociology); Solidarność adviser; participant in the Roundtable Talks; employee at the Ministry of Justice; researcher at the Institute of Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences; director of Central Planning Commission (government of Bielecki, 1990-1991); Minister of Defense (government of Olszewski, 1991-1992); leader of conservative Ruch dla Trzeciej Rzeczypospolitej and Ruch Odbudowy Polski.

Rydzewski, Grzegorz – political scientist; born in 1953 in Warsaw, graduate of Warsaw University (1978, Department of Political Science); researcher at Warsaw University; Secretary of the government (governments of Pawlak, Oleksy, and Cimoszewicz, 1993-1996); chief of Administration of the Prime Minister (1997); chief adviser to Prime Minister (government of Miller, 2001-now).
Skubiszewski, Krzysztof — specialist on international relations; born in 1926 in Poznań, graduate of Poznań University (1949, Department of Law); Solidarność adviser (1986-1989); researcher at Poznań University and Institute of Legal Sciences, Polish Academy of Sciences; Minister of Foreign Affairs (governments of Bielecki, Olszewski and Suchotska, 1989-1993).

Strzembosz, Adam — legal scholar; born in 1930, graduate of Kraków Jagellonian University (1952, Department of Law); Solidarność adviser (since 1980); participant in the Roundtable Talks; researcher, later professor at Lublin Catholic University and the Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences; president of the Supreme Court (1990-1998).

Tischner, Józef — Catholic philosopher, priest; 1931-2000; professor and chair at Kraków Theological Academy; president of Vienna Institute of Human Sciences; important liberal ideologue and moral authority.

Turowicz, Jerzy — journalist, publicist; 1912-1999; participant in the Roundtable Talks; founder and editor-in-chief of Tygodnik Powszechny; important liberal ideologue and moral authority.

Wiatr, Jerzy Józef — sociologist; born in 1931 in Warsaw, graduate of Warsaw University (1954, Department of Philosophy); participant in the Roundtable Talks; researcher at Warsaw University, Military Political Academy, and the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences; chairman of the Department of Social Sciences, Warsaw University (1977-1980); Director of Institute of Marxism-Leninism (1981-1984); Minister of Education (government of Cimoszewicz, 1996-1997); member of the Lower Chamber of Parliament (Sąjudz Lewicy Demokratycznej, since 1991).


Zakrzewska, Janina — lawyer, specialist in Constitutional Law; 1928-1995; Solidarność adviser; participant in the Roundtable talks; professor of Warsaw University (1982-1989) and the Institute of State and Law (1989-1995); judge of the Constitutional Court; member of the State Elections Committee.

Zieliński, Tadeusz — legal scholar; born in 1926 in Kraków, graduate of Kraków Jagellonian University (1947, Department of Law); Solidarność adviser; researcher at Kraków Jagellonian University and University of Silesia; Polish Ombudsman (1992 – 1996); Minister of Social Protection and Labor (government of Cimoszewicz, 1997); member of Unia Demokratyczna.
### APPENDIX H

List of Synonyms of Textual Indicators for the Polish Phase of Content Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Textual Indicators</th>
<th>Synonyms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Inclusive Democracy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Active citizenry</td>
<td>Grassroots, popular participation, volunteer associations, civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Societal control over political elites</td>
<td>Transparency of government, accountability of politicians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public opinion</td>
<td>Foundation of political legitimacy is public opinion, referendum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local self-government</td>
<td>Decentralization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defense of minorities’ political rights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Free media</td>
<td>Media can criticize the government, private media, media can have a different opinion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multipartism</td>
<td>Parties reflect political views of citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elections are to make social demands evident</td>
<td>Elections are indicator of social demands, representatives = mirror, servants of electors, proportional electoral system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constitutionality</td>
<td>Rule of law, equality before the law, independent judiciary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parliamentarism</td>
<td>Separation of powers, checks and balances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political opposition</td>
<td>Former communists, national reconciliation, political pluralism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Managed Democracy</strong></td>
<td>Government is the guarantor of citizens’ well being</td>
<td>Government is responsible for citizens, government is a guardian, trustee of the public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government consists of the best people</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elite autonomy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Centralization</td>
<td>National government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Media is to inform the citizens, not to criticize the government</td>
<td>State-controlled media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Individuals, not parties, are important</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections are for selection of the best people</td>
<td>Descriptive representation, experts/party know(s) will of people, formal elections, elite agreement, democracy is strictly selection of elites, majority electoral system</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political expediency governs behavior</td>
<td>Ideological proximity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidentialism</td>
<td>Strong executive branch, charismatic leader</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions on political opposition</td>
<td>Anti-communism, de-communization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. Liberal Ideology, Secularism, Liberal Catholicism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative freedoms</td>
<td>Freedom from, personal freedoms, human rights, unalienable rights, freedom of speech, confession, movement, civil rights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separation of church and state, secular state</td>
<td>Laity of the state, neutral state, state education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernism, progress</td>
<td>Institutions can change person’s behavior</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal values</td>
<td>Equality of all views, activism, achievement, independence, individual responsibility, values of middle class, choice, “jasnogrod”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak state, state as a night-watchman</td>
<td>Minimal role of the state, state is for the citizens, small and effective state apparatus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vision of individual as rational and independent</td>
<td>Individualism, autonomy, humanism, privacy, personal dignity, rationality, reason</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict of interests</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal rights</td>
<td>Right to abortion, euthanasia, same sex marriages, feminism, equality of sexes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasons for crime are social</td>
<td>Decrease in the severity of criminal punishment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society and elite are equal, society is self-sufficient</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Conservative Ideology, Fundamentalism, Catholic Fundamentalism/Integrism</td>
<td>Positive freedoms</td>
<td>Freedom to, freedom to health, education, work, rest, social freedoms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecclesiastical state, church is a foundation of the state</td>
<td>Religious instruction in school, church’s active participation in social life, politics have religious dimension</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditions</td>
<td>People behave according to traditions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian values, conservative values</td>
<td>Compassion, love, sharing, acceptance of one’s lot, faith, endurance, “ciernogrod,” moral law, moral values</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong state, developmental state</td>
<td>Maximalist role of state, citizens cannot exist without state, increase in state power and state apparatus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vision of individual as part of organic whole</td>
<td>Stress on family, nation, organization, religious community, emotions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal consensus, common good</td>
<td>Collectivism, social cooperation, solidarity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite is responsible for society</td>
<td>Morality of elite</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death penalty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order</td>
<td>Sever punishment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense of traditional relations</td>
<td>Defense of traditional families, religious hierarchy, value of human life, rights of the unborn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5. Free Market, Laissez-Faire Capitalism</th>
<th>Market as a main agent of economic development</th>
<th>Absence or small involvement of state in economy (only in macro-policy, legal framework and protection of environment), economic decentralization, unlimited rights of the market</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quick privatization</td>
<td>Total privatization, re-privatization, private property</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selective social protection</td>
<td>Charity, private social protection, reduction of state’s assistance, reduction of state expenses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic justice</td>
<td>Competition, efficiency, equality of opportunity, profit, material inequality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price liberalization</td>
<td>Wage freeze</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberalization of foreign trade</td>
<td>Reliance on import, open economy, reliance on foreign capital, international economy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low taxes</td>
<td>Balanced budget</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universal neo-liberal economic development</td>
<td>Balcerowicz's plan, western advise, shock therapy, rapid reform (liberalization first, then privatization and deregulation)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Governed Market

<p>| Market can be helped in economic development | State intervention, social democracy, social market, state conducts micro-economic policy, welfare state, socialism with human face, economic democracy, industrial democracy, interventionism |
| Slow privatization | Controlled privatization, state/public property |
| Universal social protection | Strong social protection, conservative (family-oriented) social protection |
| Social justice, equality | Redistribution, equality of income, protection of the weak members of society |
| Price control | Protectionism |
| Tax increases | Support of domestic producers and exporters, reliance on domestic capital |
| Deficit spending | Rigorous, progressive tax policy for business and the richest part of society |
| National economic model | Scandinavian model, gradual reform, planned transition (privatization first, then liberalization of prices), economic Polish path, plan of Kołodko, legacies matter, Third road |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7. Pro-Western Foreign Policy</th>
<th>European integration</th>
<th>“Europejczyk,” unification, membership in the EU, European identity, Europe as union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Euro-Atlantic Option</td>
<td>NATO membership</td>
<td>Global identity, lack of borders, no-visa policies, transnationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Globalization</td>
<td>Global identity, lack of borders, no-visa policies, transnationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relations with the West (Germany, US)</td>
<td>Poland is part of the West, can help the West in regards of Russia and East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Idealist interpretations of foreign relations</td>
<td>Decrease in defense spending, world is moving towards peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Independent Foreign Policy</td>
<td>Poland outside EU</td>
<td>“Eurosceptyk,” “Europe of fatherlands,” Europe as loose association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poland outside NATO</td>
<td>Anti-imperialism, economic sovereignty, sovereignty, including local sovereignty, world threatens Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Isolationism</td>
<td>Anti-imperialism, economic sovereignty, sovereignty, including local sovereignty, world threatens Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relations with East and South (Russia)</td>
<td>Poland is unique in its geographic location, Poland is a leader of Central Europe, Russia is closer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Realist interpretations of foreign relations</td>
<td>Increase in defense spending, military conflict is inevitable, national interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Ethnic Tolerance</td>
<td>Ethnic equality</td>
<td>All nations and religions are good, civil nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multiculturalism</td>
<td>Jewish traditions, different biographies, cultures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peaceful solutions to ethnic conflicts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Universal values</td>
<td>Patriotism = democracy and freedom, to be a Pole is to be European, universalism, open society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Respect for ethnic minorities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Nationalism Xenophobia</td>
<td>Ethnic inequality</td>
<td>Some nations are better than others, discrimination</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preservation of national culture, traditions</th>
<th>National identity, national legacy, Polish pride, Polish values, Polish cultural path</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military solutions to ethnic conflicts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National values, national ideas</td>
<td>Catholicism as national idea, Messianism, Polish uniqueness, to be a Pole is to be Catholic, Poland is a kingdom of Virgin Mary, Polish Catholic particularism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Semitism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX I

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APPENDIX J

Relationships Between Various Polish Public Attitudes

Table 46a

Relationships between Political and Ideological Attitudes of the Polish Public

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes towards communism (1—worst kind, 4—good)</th>
<th>Are you satisfied with democracy in Poland? (1—very satisfied, 6—very dissatisfied)</th>
<th>How interested are you in politics? (1—extremely, 5—not at all)</th>
<th>Do you favor or oppose death penalty? (-1—favor, 2—oppose)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes towards communism</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are you satisfied with democracy in Poland?</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.160**</td>
<td>.143**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How interested are you in politics?</td>
<td>.160**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.082**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you favor or oppose death penalty?</td>
<td>-.108**</td>
<td>-.068*</td>
<td>.037**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Table 47a

Relationships between Political and Economic Attitudes of the Polish Public

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>What do you think about current Polish economy? (1—very good, 4—very bad)</th>
<th>Should government reduce income differentials? (1—strongly agree, 5—strongly disagree)</th>
<th>Should government provide jobs? (1—strongly agree, 5—strongly disagree)</th>
<th>Should government provide minimum income? (1—strongly agree, 5—strongly disagree)</th>
<th>Do you favor or oppose socialism as economic system? (1—very much favor, 5—totally oppose)</th>
<th>Are you satisfied with Polish political situation? (1—very satisfied, 6—very dissatisfied)</th>
<th>Are you satisfied with democracy in Poland? (1—very satisfied, 6—not at all)</th>
<th>How interested are you in politics? (1—extremely, 5—not at all)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What do you think about current Polish economy?</td>
<td>Pears on Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-.176**</td>
<td>-.168**</td>
<td>-.140**</td>
<td>-.148**</td>
<td>.453**</td>
<td>.380**</td>
<td>.094**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should government reduce income differentials?</td>
<td>Pears on Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.176**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.510**</td>
<td>.466**</td>
<td>.190**</td>
<td>-.181**</td>
<td>-.121**</td>
<td>-.061**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should government provide jobs?</td>
<td>Pears on Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.168**</td>
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<td>-.135**</td>
<td>-.132**</td>
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Should government provide minimum income?</th>
<th>Pears on Correlation</th>
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** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 47b

Relationships between Political and Economic Attitudes of the Polish Public

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How interested are you in politics?</th>
<th>Are you satisfied with democracy in Poland?</th>
<th>How interested are you in politics? (1—extremely, 5—not at all)</th>
<th>Should government reduce income differentials? (1—strongly agree, 5—strongly disagree)</th>
<th>Should government provide minimum income? (1—strongly agree, 5—strongly disagree)</th>
<th>Do you favor or oppose socialism as an economic system? (1—very much favor, 5—totally oppose)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,173</td>
<td>2,241</td>
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<td>2,060</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>income differentials?</th>
<th>tailed) N</th>
<th>9,607</th>
<th>10,683</th>
<th>10,744</th>
<th>10,681</th>
<th>10,859</th>
<th>9,746</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Should government provide jobs?</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N</td>
<td>-.129**</td>
<td>-.160**</td>
<td>.503**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.571**</td>
<td>.172**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should government provide minimum income?</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N</td>
<td>-.091**</td>
<td>-.089**</td>
<td>.436**</td>
<td>.571**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.110**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you favor or oppose socialism as economic system?</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N</td>
<td>-.142**</td>
<td>-.097**</td>
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<td>.172**</td>
<td>.110**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
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<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 47c
Relationships between Economic Attitudes of the Polish Public

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What do you think about current Polish economy? (1—very good, 5—very bad)</th>
<th>Should government reduce income differentials? (1—strongly agree, 5—strongly disagree)</th>
<th>Should government provide jobs? (1—strongly agree, 5—strongly disagree)</th>
<th>Should government provide minimum income? (1—strongly agree, 5—strongly disagree)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-.218**</td>
<td>-.222**</td>
<td>-.192**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N</td>
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<td>1.000</td>
<td>.512**</td>
<td>.461**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Should government provide jobs?</td>
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<td>-.222**</td>
<td>.512**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
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<td>.000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should government provide minimum income?</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N</td>
<td>-.192**</td>
<td>.461**</td>
<td>.603**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N</td>
<td>.000</td>
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</table>

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you favor or oppose death penalty? (1—favor, 2—oppose)</th>
<th>Do you favor or oppose socialism as economic system? (1—very much favor, 5—totally against)</th>
<th>Should government reduce income differentials? (1—strongly agree, 5—strongly disagree)</th>
<th>Should government provide jobs? (1—strongly agree, 5—strongly disagree)</th>
<th>Should government provide minimum income? (1—strongly agree, 5—strongly disagree)</th>
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<td>.057**</td>
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<td>.000</td>
</tr>
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Table 49a

Relationships between Ideological and Economic Attitudes of the Polish Public

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>differentials?</th>
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<td>.593**</td>
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<td>.571**</td>
<td>.172**</td>
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<td>Should government provide minimum income?</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
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<td>.439**</td>
<td>.571**</td>
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<td>.110**</td>
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<td>10,859</td>
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** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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CHAPTER I


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CHAPTER II


CHAPTER III


CHAPTER IV


CHAPTER VI


“Are Russians Undemocratic?” Post-Soviet Affairs 18, no. 2 (April-June 2002), 91-121.


