Crime and Delinquency in Haiti: A Study of Crime in a Developing Country

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CRIME AND DELINQUENCY IN HAITI: A STUDY
OF CRIME IN A DEVELOPING COUNTRY

by

Gérard Mauze, Jr.

A Thesis
Submitted to the
Faculty of The Graduate College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the
Degree of Master of Arts
Department of Sociology

Western Michigan University
Kalamazoo, Michigan
June 1988
The primary intent of this study was an attempt at describing, understanding and analyzing the most common types, incidences and forces that produce crime and delinquency in Haiti. A secondary concern of this work was to do the ground work which would enable the formulation of testable hypotheses about the causes of crime and delinquency in Haiti.

Even though a number of developing nations face a rapid growth in their crime and delinquency rates, Haiti appears to maintain a relatively low crime rate.

The law-abiding behavior of Haitian youths is due to a number of factors: (a) the strong family ties and dependence on the extended family for the upbringing of the children, (b) strong belief in religion, and (c) a system of informal social control.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Now that the writing is done I am faced with a task which I fulfill with pleasure, but find by no means easy. I wish to acknowledge with thanks the help of those without whom I would not have undertaken, let alone finish this task.

"Crime and Delinquency in Haiti: A Study of Crime in a Developing Country" is a product of gregarious, face-to-face and mind-to-mind contact with numerous individuals, so many in fact, in so many different universities, research institutes and offices that it would be impossible for me to list them all. The support and encouragement of some of them, however, should not go unrecognized because they stand out as major guideposts along the way.

First, a special thank you goes to my major professor, Dr. Paul C. Friday, for his time, counsel and guidance. His encouragement and criticism have left me deeply indebted to him. I owe him much more than he suspects.

I also acknowledge Professors Lewis Walker and Thomas Van Valey who have greatly improved the study by their constructive, theoretical, and methodological suggestions
which provided insight and clarity.

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Also my parents, Gerard and Nirva Mauze, who have been a constant source of encouragement and inspiration throughout the years of my education, I want to express my sincere gratitude. Finally, to my wife Darlene, my children Jeanel and Jihane, who have been faithful witnesses of my nights of vigil and meditation, to them, I dedicate this work.

Gérard Mauzé, Jr.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

Of the many problems of social life today, one of the most critical is what appears to be a phenomenal increase in crime and delinquency in some countries. In 1979 the United Nations Crime Survey reported that crime was increasingly becoming a major world problem and its impact, variety, and extent, both nationally and internationally should not be underestimated. While the staggering increase in crime did not occur, its current rate in many countries is higher per capita than at any other time.

Originally, the study of crime and delinquency was confined to a single society or cultural context, primarily the United States, and to a limited extent, other North Atlantic industrialized countries. In the past couple of decades, however, the students of criminology (criminologists, penologists, correction experts, law enforcement officials, and juvenile specialists) began to consider the problem of crime within a broader cultural perspective. For example, Szabo's (1960) statistical study of rural criminality in France
and in Belgium, Mannheim's (1965) replication of American theories in different societies, De Fleur's (1969) study of delinquent gangs in Argentina, and Friday's (1970) testing of the theories of differential opportunity and differential association in Sweden can be seen as pioneering efforts in the field of comparative criminology.

The comparative work that has been pursued in this field has largely omitted developing nations and closed societies. Therefore, both the scope of our knowledge and the depth of our comprehension have been restricted. However, in the last few years some efforts have been made at rectifying these omissions. Such work by Clinard and Abbott (1973), Odekunle (1976, 1978), Salas (1979), Hartjen and Priyadarsini (1984), and various studies done by the Centre International de Criminologie Comparee (1972, 1973) are examples of a continuous and broadening interest in the study of deviance in developing nations.

This effort at understanding criminal behavior in developing countries to a large extent excluded the Caribbean basin. Therefore, the researcher's growing interest in comparative sociology and criminology, his involvement in developing countries in general, and his interest in the Caribbean and Haiti, more specifically, gave birth to this study.

A number of criminologists argue that conditions in
the developing countries have shown many similarities to those that suddenly produced a rapid increase of crime in Europe about a century or so ago (Clinard & Abbott, 1973; Shelley, 1981; Tobias, 1967). But this is speculation. Therefore the purpose of this paper is to explore the nature of criminality in a developing country and assess the limited data in terms of current theoretical ideas regarding the etiology and ecological distribution of crime. This is a purely descriptive study of a Caribbean country which is not only the poorest in the Western Hemisphere but has also never been the subject of any criminological review.

The twentieth century and its emphasis on development and industrialization is bringing pronounced changes, and among the more serious is the general increase in crime. In the literature it is often mentioned that one indicator of the socio-economic development of a country is its rising crime rate (Brillon, Rico, & Rizcalle, 1974; Clinard & Abbott, 1973; Toby, 1979).

The rapid growth of some developing countries can hardly occur without disturbing the structures and values of their traditional societies. As Mende (1972) says "development is synonymous with change and change brings instability" (p. 12). In Africa, for example, where the sudden change from a social organization based on the clan and the tribe to a modern type of society where family
ties no longer have the same meaning, has a tremendous impact on all elements of economic, social and cultural life (Brillon, 1973). Hence, severe social repercussions can be expected when the developing countries are attempting, in one or two generations to bring about transformations that have culminated from several centuries of development for most of the industrialized nations. For example, the developing countries are seeing a rapid rise in property crimes (Clinard & Abbott, 1973), an increase in sexual crimes such as rape, homosexuality, and prostitution (O’Callaghan, 1968; Salas, 1979), and an increase in drug-related offences such as trafficking, consumption and production (Shelley, 1981a). Juvenile arrests in Thailand showed a 350% increase from 1940 to 1964 (Lunden, 1968), and in less than 10 years from 1965 to 1970 cases of juvenile delinquency increased 200% in Madagascar (Wilner, 1969). Moreover, the overall crime rate of the developing countries in the first half of the 1970s has been calculated at approximately 800 offenses per 100,000 population, or approximately 40% of the rate recorded in developed countries. This amount is not static but has risen at the rate of 2.5% per year. Rates for female offenders have increased during this period at the accelerated rate of 30% per year (United Nations, 1977). Of the 25 countries with the highest rates of homicide in the 1960’s, 21 of them were developing

The policy makers of the developing nations in general, and the Caribbean and Haiti more specifically, are aware that the high rate of social change in their respective countries creates new conflict, particularly in the competition between the generally traditional systems of control and newly instituted ones. These policy makers are aware that, perhaps, at no other period in the history of the people of the developing countries have values and living patterns undergone such extreme alterations over the span of one lifetime.

Aware of the seriousness of the problem and its ramifications and repercussions which extend beyond national frontiers, developing nations are seeking international cooperation in an attempt to develop policies of social defense and planning strategies specifically designed to slow down and eventually eliminate these trends.

The development of planning strategies to combat crime in developing countries and the ultimate sharing of such information and knowledge, will help comparative criminologists identify common experiences and bring a better understanding of crime in developed countries as well. The students of crime have recognized the value of comparative inquiry and the extent to which our knowledge is enhanced by information derived from research in
diverse societies. As Glueck and Glueck (1964) recommended:

Comparative, coordinated, and interdisciplinary research should be carried out to determine the relative effects of programs in different countries, to develop a highly promising new field of comparative criminology in order to determine the uniformities and differences in casual influences, in predictive factors and treatment programs, and to develop a true science of criminology. (p. 204)

Furthermore, Mannheim (1965) challenges criminologists to do "replication of researchs designed to uncover etiologic universals operative as casual agents irrespective of cultural differences among the different countries" (p. xi). As a result of comparative studies, some correlates of crime appear to be found throughout the world—the significance of broken homes, unemployment, and the various indicators of social change (e.g., urbanization, industrialization, and migration or immigration) -- and cannot be overlooked (Newman & Ferracuti, 1980).

Goal of the Study

With this in mind, the primary intent of this study is an attempt to describe, understand, and analyze the most common types, incidences, and forces that produce crime and delinquency in Haiti. A secondary concern of this work is to do the ground work which will enable the formulation of testable hypotheses about the causes of crime and delinquency in Haiti. Through the different chapters of this thesis the areas that will be explored
will focus on the relation of criminal behavior to urbanization, industrialization, migration, and the social organization, the nature of crime, and some possible problems a researcher can expect to find while doing a sociological research in Haiti. Whenever possible, cross-cultural comparisons will be made and international data will be provided in an attempt to put particular sections of the study into comparative perspective.

These specific selections were made based on two criteria: first, the significance given to these topics by Haitian social scientists and authorities; and second, the availability of data and information. Crime and deviance of a strictly political nature has been excluded from consideration, primarily because it would be impractical to analyze in its totality. In some instances, however, the reader may conclude that the behavior discussed is political, but this is due to the nature of the Haitian political system, which is a highly centralized form of government.

It is hoped that this study will constitute a valuable contribution to the field of comparative criminology and to the scientific understanding of crime in developing nations. It is also hoped that this investigation will add to the available literature on crime in the Caribbean and Haiti in particular. As mentioned earlier, there is a paucity of material on the
sociological and historical aspects of crime in the Caribbean and Haiti—the need to study and evaluate crime in the context of Caribbean and Haitian history and society is overdue. Finally, it is hoped that this work will be a valuable asset to the Haitian government in its search for a better understanding of the factors or conditions conducive to criminal behavior as well as to recognize and appreciate the positive elements of the culture which has maintained social order for so long. With this understanding, the Haitian officials and policy makers will be better able to develop policies of social defense specifically appropriate to the Haitian situation.

Limitations of the Study

There are a number of limitations to this study. First, the majority of the information used was taken from records of police studies and court files. This constitutes an important limitation in that it has been adduced that victims of certain crimes will not report cases to the authorities (feeling that the police will not be able to do anything, afraid of being ridiculed by the public or friends, and the location of a police station far from the place of residence of the victims or because of traditional reasons where the problem is handled privately). So the conclusions will be drawn only on what has been reported (which may amount to about one-third of
the incidents).

Although the accuracy of such data is often criticized, it is generally acknowledged as the main source of crime data in Haiti. Despite its limitations, the crime statistics reported in the "Bulletin Trimestriel De Statistique" can still be employed usefully in providing data (even though limited) for criminological research.

A second limitation is the researcher bias effect.¹ Attempts have made to adopt an unbiased and impartial attitude toward the subject matter, but undoubtedly, the personal experience of the researcher has influenced the perspective in this work. The researcher was born in Haiti and lived there until 1963, leaving at age 10. Since then, he has traveled extensively in Africa, Europe, and America. The author has returned to Haiti on numerous occasions, most recently to do the research for this work. However, it is hoped that his American training and sensitivity may mitigate any evident bias and it is hoped that his scientific objectivity and impartial examination of social processes will shed some light on the understanding of this society and on similar problems.

¹This is the bias a researcher is inclined to project into his methodology and treatment that subtly shapes the data in the direction of his foregone conclusions. The researcher's past, what he expects to find, where he directs his attention, and the way in which he interacts with subjects all may alter the subject's own expectations and motivational states, and can affect the results.
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encountered in other nations.

Review of Related Literature

The literature relating to crime and delinquency in developing nations in general and Haiti in particular is still in its embryonic stage and generally dated to the 1970's. Nevertheless a number of insightful and relevant books and articles dealing with this topic are available.

Marshall Clinard and Daniel Abbott (1973) have done a pioneering work on crime in developing countries. Their book is one of the few that attempts a comparison of crime in the developed and developing countries. Within the framework of a number of theoretical constructs derived from criminological research in the United States and Europe, the authors have brought together most of the existing findings on crime in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and the results of their extensive research in Uganda. Throughout the book they have tried to show the similarities and differences between the developed and the less developed countries. They also have discussed the incidence, types, and forces that produce crime in the third world. In Uganda, the authors gathered trend data on crime of the country as a whole and on Kampala, the capital.

The Clinard and Abbott study tested to see if certain sociological theories of crime apply to the developing
countries, primarily the theory of differential association, that is, the view that criminal behavior is learned in association or interaction with others and secondly, the theory of differential opportunity, which proposes that differential access to certain goals in a society and to illegitimate means to achieve these goals accounts for crime. It is very important to find out whether crime in developing countries is committed primarily by youth and learned from companions, as it appears to be in most developed countries. The authors argued that delinquent youth groups and gangs do not appear to be confined to developed countries. They reported that "the more important new type of juvenile delinquency found in nearly all parts of the world is the formation of juvenile gangs which commit delinquency acts" (Clinard & Abbott, 1973, p. 195).

A number of reports prepared for the United Nations on Asian crime pointed out how extensively groups are involved in crime. For example, juvenile gang activities were reported as being extensive in Colombo, Ceylon (Panakel, 1960) and a study of 382 juvenile offenders in Bangkok showed that 235 or 62% committed their acts in groups (Nagel, 1967).

Official statistics in Thailand distinguish between robbery and gang robbery in which three or more persons participated. "The latter has increased much more rapidly
than robbery or other serious crimes. The 1959-1963 average for reported gang robberies each year was 2,538, for the two years 1964-1965 it was 3,344, or an increase of 31.8 percent" (Clinard & Abbott, 1973, p. 196).

A Malaysian report on juvenile delinquency stated that youth from the slums allies himself with others in similar circumstances and together they as a group find the strength to reject the value system of society replacing it with one of their own (Mohamed, 1970).

A major principle formulated by students of criminal behavior is that it is learned by processes of differential association. As in developed countries, Clinard and Abbott (1973) demonstrated that the major social groups that transmit and perpetuate criminal norms in developing countries are youth and adult gangs, they argue that delinquent groups retain a strong level of influence over criminal behavior in developing countries.

Both laymen and criminologists have attempted to explain crime in developing countries as being the direct result of economic deprivation or the inability of persons to achieve the economic and/or educational goals of a society by legitimate means. These approaches have included such theories as Anomie and differential opportunity. In their study of crime in developing countries Clinard and Abbott (1973) have tried to test the theory of Anomie, differential opportunity and crime.
The model of Anomie—the disjunction between societal goals (values) and the institutionalized means used to obtain these goals or values—has been vigorously criticized as an explanation of deviant behavior in modern societies (Clinard, 1964). However it is possible that Anomie is more applicable as a partial explanation for some of the social forces leading to increased crime in countries undergoing rapid development; for example, "in developing societies goods in considerable amounts and varieties are suddenly made available to the general population. Under colonial rule these goods existed but they were available only to foreigners and a small group of the local elite" (Clinard & Abbott, 1973, p. 177). Although the majority of these countries are independent and developing, the low living standard still give these material possessions a high status value in an urban perspective, therefore, "the relative deprivation by those who feel disadvantaged may be correlated with the crime rates in countries in the process of development" (p. 177). In a study of juvenile delinquency in Mexico, Manzanera (1968) reported that a leading cause of the high rates was the gross difference between the incomes of the rich and the poor.

Building primarily from this model Anomie, another well known theory, that of differential opportunity developed primarily to explain the growth of delinquent
gang behavior among urban youth has been altered somewhat to account for crime and deviance.

In general terms, the theory of differential opportunity states that delinquent gang behavior grows whenever legitimate means to the attainment of the success goals, such as economic and higher educational opportunities are blocked (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960).

According to the differential opportunity theory, the primary means of attaining economic success goals in industrial societies is education. With the necessary education the individual learns the life style and mannerisms, the skills, and the values required for advancement in a modern society. The lower class persons, because of insufficient income, poor school facilities, and inadequate preparation, have limited access to education and therefore to the possibility of a better paying job which is critical to his achievement, wealth, and status. In French East Africa, as soon as the young people acquire a modicum of schooling, they refuse to do any manual or farm labor, and yet they are lacking the necessary skills to succeed in the urban milieu. Many lower class persons react to these restrictions on opportunity by adopting illegitimate means such as crime to attain their goals, their choice depending on their exposure to these means. Clinard and Abbott (1973) state that this theory of crime and deviance has not been
extensively tested in developed countries. Sociologists such as Luchterhand and Weller (1966), Friday (1970), and Short and Strodtbeck (1965) have made an attempt at testing the theory but the results have been confusing.

As far as the application of the theory of differential opportunity in developing countries is concerned, almost no specific research has been done, although certain related data and claims are available from few places, such as DeFleur's (1970) work in Argentina. Clinard and Abbott (1973) mentioning the study of Sheth which was done in Bombay, where many juveniles are neither employed nor going to school, it might be expected that nearly all of those arrested would come from this group. In actuality the study showed that 11.9% were in school, 16.3% were employed full time, and 18.9% were employed part time, or a total of approximately one-half of the total group (Sheth, 1961).

A number of African studies have claimed that crime is related to a lack of economic and educational opportunity. Freed (1963), in his study of crime in South Africa relates delinquency to the lack of education among Africans. He argues that "facilities for native education on the Reef were inadequate and opportunity for schooling existed for only a third of the children. Furthermore, low occupational status were strongly associated with crime" (Freed, 1963, p. 212). Another study of juvenile
delinquency in Southern Rhodesia linked the increase in gang delinquency to differentials in the opportunities for increased educational and economic opportunities. Gang members were unemployed youths from poverty-stricken backgrounds who had little opportunity to attend school (Ibbotsom, 1956). In another study done in Zambia, comparison of delinquents and non-delinquents revealed no difference in the economic level or in the occupational status of the fathers. "The delinquents were lower in educational attainment than the non-delinquents but higher than the average educational level of the country as a whole" (Clifford, 1967, p. 179).

None of the above studies systematically tested the theory of exploring in detail the educational and occupational backgrounds of offenders and non-offenders. In their own study done in Uganda, Clinard and Abbott (1973) made a real attempt to discover if there was, in fact, a relation between differential opportunity and criminal behavior. Their analysis considered a number of critical factors in the theory of differential opportunity: occupational and educational differences, material and educational aspirations, and perceived opportunity. Their sample consisted of 164 offenders from Kampala who had committed property offenses, aged 18 to 25; the non-offender control group consisted of 206 young males of the same age from two slum communities in
Kampala. The major conclusions of the Kampala study were "the absolute deprivation did not distinguish between offenders and non-offenders: approximately similar proportions of offenders and non-offenders were unemployed or had no education. The offenders were over represented in the class that had a few years of education or low level jobs" (p. 186).

Clinard and Abbott (1973) also studied urbanization and crime in developing countries. Looking at the differences between urbanization in less developed and developed nations the authors argue that "marked differences are found between the economic growth process in the less developed countries and that characterizing the more advanced nations, differences that have had a marked effect on the course of their urbanization. . . . the urbanization of developing countries is proceeding more rapidly than did the developed countries" (pp. 78-79). Thus, the extent of the problems in large urban population concentrations, without the adequate national economic bases for employment and rising standards of urban living characteristics of the less developed countries, is often referred to as "overurbanization." According to this viewpoint, industrialization and the rate of economic development have failed to keep pace with urbanization. Urban unemployment is extensive, and housing and services inadequate.
These factors have significantly affected the growth of crime in urban areas. Delinquency and crime rates appear to be lower in rural than in urban areas in developed countries and a similar situation exists in the developing nations. According to Kupperstein and Toro-Calder (1969) juvenile delinquency is heavily concentrated in the urban sectors of Puerto Rico and, if statistical data for a number of industrial areas in Mexico are correct, juvenile delinquency is related to industrialization and urban growth there as well (Quiroga, 1957). Also, in Cuba crimes committed by juveniles seem to be concentrated in urban areas. Urban delinquency, according to Salas (1979) constitutes 74.8% of the national total. And Clifford (1963) argues that juvenile delinquency in Africa, South of the Sahara, is likewise an urban problem.

When it comes to age and urban crime, young males commit most of the crimes throughout the world, and the population of the less developed countries consists primarily of the young. The age pyramid has a very wide base: in some African nations south of the Sahara 40% of the total population are under 15 years of age and more than 60% are under 21. In Zaire some 60% of the population is under 25 (Clinard & Abbott, 1973), in Haiti about 52% of the population is less than 20 years old and more than 42% is less than 14 years old (De Ronceray,
1973), similarly, in the Dominican Republic half of the population is under 16, and in the Ivory Coast 52% of the population is less than 20 years old (Greffier & Clement, 1970). Moreover, in the majority of these countries, the national increase is estimated at 2.5 to 3.0% per annum, which doubles the population in 30 years and thus further increases the proportion of youth in the population.

As a country responds to outside influences and forces inherent to modernization, such as industrialization and urban population concentration, its youth are particularly affected. For example, the young who are native of Dakar are delinquent at a much younger age than those living in the rural areas. As Hugot (1968) puts it, the young people reject dependence on their families, the schools favor their emancipation, also the mass media, and of the former social systems, almost nothing remains. Traditional rites of coming into manhood are gone, special celebrations no longer have the same fullness . . . and they are now passing to the individual experiences without preparation.

Another area of study by Clinard and Abbott (1973) was the problem of migration to the city and crime. Their research showed that a crucial factor in the involvement of the migrants in criminal activities is their initial adjustment to the city. Moreover, they were less likely to have maintained contacts with relatives and tribal
In conclusion, the authors argue that almost all of the sharp increases in crimes against property in a less developed country occur in the cities. Moreover, crime is concentrated in the primate cities, or in a few large urban areas. In addition they argue that increased crime in less developed countries can be expected primarily because in these countries young people predominate, the growing cities attract the young, and it is the young who are most noticeably affected by the way of life in the city and who are drawn more easily into criminal activities.

Deviance in Cuba

A valuable work on crime and delinquency in developing nations is Luis Salas's study of deviance in Cuba. His work gives an added dimension to the problem since Cuba is only 100 miles from Haiti. Like Haiti, it is an island and a developing country. As a socialist country Cuba offers an interesting comparison.

Salas (1979) states that during the initial period of the revolution common crimes were relegated to a secondary role while counter revolutionary acts were prioritized. As the system has become institutionalized, however, crime and other forms of social disorder have received increased attention.
In *Social Control and Deviance in Cuba* Salas argues that the Cuban government gives two explanations for the causes of delinquency. First, the political explanations tend to place blame on capitalistic influences and second (non-political explanations) explain the phenomenon in psychological and functional terms.

Cuban criminologists have maintained, like some other socialist criminologists, such as Strangov, Palicarsci, and Viktorov, that the principal, and to some extent, sole cause of delinquency and crime were the class conflicts inherent in capitalist society. Therefore, as communism is built, crime will gradually disappear. Explanations for the existence of delinquency in Cuban society focus around the concept that blames a great deal of deviance on remnants of capitalist society. In addition, the government feels that Cuban youth are the targets of a concerted effort by the United States aimed at their corruption. These fears, according to Salas, have caused the government to make statements on dress, music, and literature concerning youth.

The non-political explanations revolve around the failure of basic institutions such as the family and the school charged with the socialization of Cuban youth. To a lesser degree the blame is put on "secondary" organizations such as the Union of Young Communists, the army, and a number of mass organizations.
Prior to the revolution, Cuban families were heavily influenced by Spanish and Latin American traditions in which the husband was the sole breadwinner while the wife fulfilled the role of child-rearing and maintained a submissive attitude within the family. After the revolution, attempts were made to incorporate women into productive roles in industry or in revolutionary organizations. The government has primarily blamed failures of families on a lack of political culture and consciousness among some families, but has not attributed any of these problems to the developmental model that has emancipated women from traditional child-rearing roles and drawn them into the labor force.

In Cuba, the educational system bears a heavy responsibility for the moral and social education of the child; however, in the last few years it has been beset by a number of problems such as truancy among many of its students, lack of discipline in schools, teachers are young and inexperienced and also a shortage of teachers is a serious problem.

Since the early 1970s Cuba has reported an increase in crime and delinquency. Crimes committed by juveniles seem to be concentrated in urban areas. For example, delinquency in Havana was almost 50% of the national total at times and "the most recent figures indicated that urban delinquency constitutes 74.8% of the national total"; this
is explained by Cuban officials by the fact that there are more conditions that favor crime in the cities than in the rural areas (Salas, 1979, p. 21).

At present, 50% of the Cuban population resides in urban areas, with the capital (Havana) containing 19.6% of the national population and 64.2% of the urban population. While in most developing nations the primacy of the urban center is normally accompanied by a disproportionate concentration of industry and services to the detriment of rural areas, the case of Cuba is an exception. Since the revolution the government has devoted considerable amount of resources to the development of the rural area, while ignoring the needs of the urban sector. "Accompanied by serious problems of housing and transportation, this largesse may serve to explain the higher rates of crime and murder in the urban centers" (Salas, 1979, p. 84).

A disturbing factor in juvenile crime to the Cuban government seems to be the predominance of property crimes and the high degree of educational failure. In addition, figures released by the Ministry of the Interior (Dominguez, 1978; Salas, 1979) showed that over 75% of the delinquents came from broken homes; a fact consistent with non-socialist ideas of delinquency.

As expected, data on the ages of the juvenile offenders show concentrations in the 15- to 17-year old age groups, and males are over-represented in the offender
population.

Recent figures indicate that thefts are on the increase, and one of the most significant characteristics of the thefts is the high level of juvenile participation. In addition, a great many of these crimes involved adults working with juveniles.

Unemployment has been another factor that Cuban authorities have linked with criminality. In 1977-78 the number of unemployed persons arrested increased by 76% in relation to the same period from the previous year. The majority of these unemployed delinquents were charged with property crimes. The only crime in Cuba where females tend to predominate is prostitution. During the early years of the revolution efforts at eradicating prostitution were apparently successful. In the last few years, however, indications are that there has been a rise in this crime due, according to Cuban authorities, to the increased availability of consumer goods and increased international interaction.

A similar situation exists in Haiti. The island lies along the main routes from South to North America (this is the case for the whole Caribbean basin), thus, tourism is particularly high and a strong relationship between tourism and the growth of crime is emphasized. During conversations with Haitian lawyers and social scientists, one of the views expressed to the researcher was that
tourists foster expectations of higher living standards and provide an obvious target for theft. It was also their views that a higher number of tourists or Haitians who come to visit participate in criminal activities, especially in illicit trafficking and smuggling. In Cuban society there appears to be no serious drug problem, but the primary drug use is marijuana.

A large part of the Cuban system's early socialization efforts has been unsuccessful and thus the society is suffering from the loosening of social bonds and non legal controls. It appears that the instability produced by the new economic and political order coupled with the breakdown of groups and lack of deference to positions of authority have caused the rapid rise in criminality that Cuba is experiencing at the present time.

Urbanization and Crime

Marshall B. Clinard (1953) has studied the impact of urbanization on criminal behavior over three decades and argues that urban life with its impersonality of relationships, its anonymity, its rapid change, its cultural heterogeneity, its conflicting moral codes, and other disturbing factors is more conducive to crime than the relatively simple rural mode of life. His research study was made with the aim of determining the relationship between urbanization and crime, particularly
crime against property, and suggests as a general hypothesis, that the relative incidence of urban features of life accounts for the differential in crime rates of different areas. The specific hypotheses tested involved the incidence of such urban characteristics as mobility, impersonal relations, differential associations, non participation in community organizations, organized criminal culture, and a criminal social type in the life-experience of offenders from areas of varying degrees of urbanization. These are all factors which, on the surface at least appear to have some bearing on the Caribbean countries.

In the Clinard study (1953), offenders from areas of slight and moderate urbanization considered themselves mobile persons.

Mobility, facilitated by the auto, gave the rural offenders participation in a larger impersonal world. The more important contacts of the rural offenders were largely in the area outside their home communities; their attitudes toward other persons tended to be impersonal. (Clinard, 1953, p. 241)

Among the rural offenders the place where the crime occurred was generally not the same as the residence of the offender. The crime frequently was committed in another community in order (a) to secure opportunity for the crime; (b) to avoid detection by those who, because of personal contacts, knew the offender; (c) not to commit an offense against someone whom the offender knew. In the everyday life of those living in the city the opportunity
is present for an impersonal relationship in committing a crime, whereas in farm and village communities it must be sought.

As far as community participation is concerned, Clinard found that the rural offenders did not participate as frequently in community organizations and groups as did rural non-offenders. A large percentage of offenders from areas of both limited and moderate urbanization—36.7 and 21.2%, respectively, were found to have participated in no community organizations. Both farm and village offenders participated in significantly fewer organizations than did non-offenders. This seemed to indicate, the presence of urban phenomena in the life careers of the rural offenders.

In his attempt to test differential association, Clinard (1953) found that the networks of criminal relationships vary directly with the amount of urbanization of the areas from which the offenders came. In rural areas, as compared with the transitional areas of a more urban culture, there was little in the way of a criminal sub-culture. Contact of rural offenders with the criminal norms had been either entirely absent or of an occasional nature. Delinquent gangs, which were present among farm and village offenders, were of a loosely organized character in comparison with city gangs. Among city offenders gangs played a very important role, but it
did not appear to play a major role in the lives of far
offenders.

Clinard suggested that in the heterogeneity of the
urban community, the existence of a criminal culture
reinforced a criminal social type, characterized by
criminal techniques, criminal argot, and a definite
progressive criminal life history. He found that
offenders from areas of slight or moderate urbanization,
in contrast with city offenders, were not definite
criminal social types. The rural offenders did not
conceive of themselves as criminals; the more urbanized
offenders did. The author found that over 90% of the farm
offenders were first arrested after they were seventeen
years of age, while 40% of the city boys were arrested
before this age. Clinard feels that this late entrance
into delinquent behavior appears, in part, to be a product
of differential association, which varies with different
degrees of urbanization. A characteristic of the rural
offenders was that they did not regard their actions as
crimes or themselves as criminals. Offenders from the
cities had had extensive contacts with other deviant
social types such as prostitutes, pimps, racketeers, and
fences.

In conclusion, the early work of Clinard stated that
cities offer more fertile fields for crime, and the small
town and farm appear unlikely to furnish equal
opportunities for criminal involvement.

Subsequent studies on urbanization (Christiansen, 1960; Clifford, 1964; Clinard, 1964; Ecotman, 1954) have all reached similar conclusions:

1. The greater the urbanization, the higher the rate of property crime.

2. The higher the rate of mobility, and subsequently anonymity, the higher the rate of crime.

3. Differential association or exposure to criminal norms is significantly related to offending. As urbanization increases, networks of relationships conducive to criminality increases.

4. Urbanization facilitates the development of criminal careers characterized by early involvement in crime, progression in the commission of increasingly serious offenses and in the leading of criminal techniques and argot.

Christiansen (1960) argues that industrialization and urbanization are linked, at least to some extent, as cause and effect. He goes on to say that there is a widespread view that a similar relationship exists between urbanization and crime. Looking at the relationship between industrialization and urbanization on the one hand and delinquency on the other he suggests that urbanization reduces the possibility of informal social control, subsequently enabling the urbanized citizen to yield more
easily to illegal temptations than his rural counterpart. Overall, the difference between urban and rural crime is the degree of isolation, and the degree of homogeneity of the population from both a biological and sociological point of view (Friday, 1983).

Some of the historical work comparing different areas within a city and their crime rates may be a pro pos to patterns in developing countries. For example, the classical studies of Shaw and McKay (1929) concluded that: (a) delinquency is very unevenly distributed in the city of Chicago, (b) delinquency is highest in the low-rent areas near the central part of the city and near commercial and industrial sub-centers, (c) delinquency rates decrease with the distance from the center, (d) one of the striking facts is that the same neighborhoods have remained the most delinquent ones throughout a thirty-year period in spite of radical changes in nationalities and racial composition of the population.

Sutherland and Cressey (1978) point out some possible interpretations for the concentration of delinquents near the industrial and commercial centers of large American cities. In terms of social organization in the neighborhood Sutherland argues that the problem of crime and delinquency have appeared mostly in areas of physical deterioration, congested population, decreasing population, economic dependency, rented homes, few
institutions supported by the local residents, parent-teacher associations do not exist, nor do other community organizations which are supported principally by the people of the neighborhood. Because the population is mobile and heterogeneous, it is unable to act with concert in dealing with its own problems. In such areas, Christiansen (1960) says, three types of residents are found: recent immigrants, remnants of the earlier groups, and failures in the better residential districts who have been forced to move back into the cheaper rent areas. In addition, he goes on to say, there is also found the highest incidence of backward children, of feeble-minded and insane persons, and most psychopaths. "Consequently, delinquency and crime are characteristics of the population living in such areas" (Christiansen, 1960, p. 7). Sutherland and Cressey (1978) emphasized that the most important finding is that the delinquency rate remained practically constant over a thirty-year period in spite of an almost complete change in the national composition of the population (Sutherland and Cressey, 1978). Therefore, this indicates that the delinquency rate is a function related to the area rather than the type of people who reside there.

The various studies mentioned above indicate that there are significant rural-urban differences in the volume of crime committed and moreover there is a
significant positive relationship between city size and violence, in addition a number of investigations show that offences against property are relatively more frequent in cities than in the country.

William Clifford (1976b) reviewed crime patterns in 20th century African states and Tobias (1967) looked at crime pattern in England in the 19th century. There are three important parallels between these studies. Under conditions of economic development there are large numbers of migrants, itinerant individuals moving to the urban centers in search of employment. In Africa this leads to a dissension of tribal controls and identification; in 19th century England it led to rootlessness and lack of integration or anomie.

In both contemporary developing nations and 19th century England, the increase in criminal behaviors was primarily due to cultural instability, the weakening of informal social control, and the exposure to conflicting social standards. The problem is intensified when the rate of social change is rapid, the degree of social change is high and when the gap between the breakdown of old social institutions and the creation of new institutions is great (Tobias, 1967, p. 148).

Tobias argues that the outrages and acts of violence that were continually committed in Europe during the 19th century took place primarily near the metropolis;
furthermore, the large town served as nurseries and hiding places for the criminal classes. The larger towns had obvious advantages as bases for criminal activity, in the shape of greater opportunity for crime and greater opportunity of escape after its committal.

In Europe during the 19th century crime was directly linked to the effect of economic and social conditions, in particular poverty and population growth. Presently, in developing nations, and Haiti is no exception, the same ideas seem to prevail. Those who come to the cities from the countryside or from smaller towns find themselves in a bewildering place, in which many of their former standards do not apply and in which they lack the support of a small, cohesive community to which they had been accustomed.

Studies in both developing nations and 19th century Europe showed that many in the cities were first generation residents, they were young and with no specific skills which caused a lack of employment possibilities. Moreover, these newcomers were likely to end up in the poorest and most disreputable part of the cities. Therefore, the standards they adopted tended to be those of the criminal class. Other social factors were also involved such as education and the gulf between classes.

Tobias (1967) argues that the youngsters of 19th century England were criminals because of lack of work and
because of the "pernicious effects of a morally unhealthy urban development" (p. 96). Once sent to Australia they were often honest because they found there "an opportunity for honest work, they could grapple on equal terms with anyone else. They lived in smaller and more cohesive communities and were not faced with the temptations of an attractive criminal world" (p. 97).

These problems faced by England during the industrial revolution are similar to the ones faced by the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Louise Shelley's work on crime and modernization (1981b) is worth mentioning since she made a pioneering attempt to draw together the large research literature on crime in many countries in so far as it bears on the relationship between crime and the modernization process of industrialization and urbanization. Moreover, the study is historically based, and it compares developed and developing countries as well as socialist and capitalist nations.

Shelley (1981b) argues that the extent and speed of the urbanization process, the degree of industrialization, and changes in the social structure of society will affect the level, form, and distribution of criminality as well as the nature of the offender population. Furthermore, she acknowledges a relationship between the phenomenon of crime and the geographical mobility of the population,
changes in social and familial structure, and the economic organization of society.

As a number of sociologists before her, Shelley (1981) also concludes that the changes in criminality that were observed in Britain two centuries ago with the advent of the industrial revolution have been repeated again as other societies have undergone similar transitions to modernity, and neither socialist nor capitalist counties in their efforts to develop their economies have avoided the criminogenic consequences of modernization. Thus, the universality of the crime problem in modern society suggests that both the process of development and the achievement of development are conducive to criminality.

In her research, Shelley (1981b) found that the crime patterns prior to development had changed as a result of the developmental process. She observed that France, Germany, and England had significant crime rates prior to the industrial revolution. What has changed is not the levels of total criminality but rather the patterns of criminal activities. From the end of the 17th century, she argues, there has been a considerable diminution in murders and acts of physical aggression. Offenses against property seem to take over from crimes of violence; theft and swindling, from murder and assault. Property crime was the predominant form of urban criminality, occurring at greater rates in cities and towns than in the
countryside, and rural areas were characterized by a high level of violence and a low level of property crime.

Property offenses were rare in rural areas because most individuals had little worth stealing, while crimes of violence were common because of the numbers of rural festivals and, since families resided in the same community for centuries, hostilities among families were common and continued through successive generations which often led to the resolution of familial differences through blood feuds or violent assaults against the members of an opposing clan or family.

Nevertheless, rural areas show an overall crime rate lower than that in towns and cities. Thus, crime has become one of the most tangible and significant costs of modernization.

Shelley (1981b) relied on previously collected data to determine the impact of the process of development on crime and the criminal population, thus she was able to make some definitive statements concerning the consequences of modernization for contemporary criminality.

**Crime Problem in Nigeria**

Odekunle (1978) analyzes the crime problem in Nigeria in the light of its line of development, that is, the capitalist economic system. The present situation in
Nigeria, he argues, is similar to that in many other developing countries oriented toward a free enterprise economy which effect is unemployment, obvious and relative poverty, frustration, mental illness, which is conducive to criminality.

Nigeria appears to have a serious crime problem. Of the fifty countries that sent in figures for their prisoner populations to the United Nations for the year 1974, Nigeria ranked 16th and placed a higher 13th with regard to the number of persons awaiting trial. Furthermore, the same document reveals that 45 of every 100,000 Nigerians are imprisoned "criminals" (Odekunle, 1978). The explanation that Odekunle offers for criminal conduct in Nigeria is the impact of the political and socio-economic order of the society.

The type of socio-economic order under which Nigeria operates, dictates, in large part, the type, magnitude, and seriousness of the country's crime problem. In addition, the form, emphasis, and extent of success for failure of social control and crime prevention programs, is in large part, a function of the operative order.

Property crimes appear to be widespread in Nigeria, and armed robbery is also prevalent, while in socialist countries property crime is rather low. While law enforcement and justice administration officials spend a lot of energy arresting and prosecuting the "poor"
offenders, crimes committed by better positioned members of the society are really not "crimes." Bribery, fraud, corruption, white-collar, corporate, and organized crime are not prosecuted. The capitalist economy is inherently crime producing, argues Odekunle, not so much because it has taught Nigerians to compete, but because it creates the "economic man" who accumulates wealth and property at the expense of others.

A substantial degree of conformity cannot be expected in Nigeria where a majority of the population does not really participate in the wealth, power, and prestige that are the constituents of its capitalist system. They have little or nothing at stake; they have no reason to be deterred from criminal behavior.

As far as the powerful are concerned, even if their crimes are discovered, the probability of arrest, prosecution, conviction, or imprisonment is very low, moreover, the benefit of the doubt is given to those with wealth and prestige while money is available to them to hire well-connected and influential lawyers, to bribe character witnesses, and to pay, if convicted--since they are usually given the alternative of a fine. Therefore, Odekunle concludes, the problem of crime, as well as its social and economic "causes" and consequences, is a continuous indictment of, and challenge to, the inequality-ridden capitalist social order in Nigeria.
Ebbe (1981) and Igbinovia (1984) believe that Nigeria has a crime problem. For more than two decades, the volume of crime has continued to increase annually in that country and most of the crimes that were known or reported to the police were crimes against property and persons, rather than offenses of perjury and forgery; more crimes against property are committed than crimes against persons. As is the case in many developing countries, Ebbe and Igbinovia note that numerous offenses in Nigeria go unreported. As a result, police records do not reflect an accurate account.

Very little is known about the characteristics of victims in Nigeria, but information available from diverse sources (i.e., media, social scientists) indicate that victimization is highest among: (a) the young, (b) the unemployed, (c) city or urban residents, (d) the poor, (e) males, and a typical inmate in Nigerian prisons is poor, comes from a broken home, is an anonymous stranger in the city, is married, and has many dependents.

Ebbe (1981) and Igbinovia (1984) conclude that crime is increasing at an alarming rate in Nigeria (more crimes are committed in certain Nigerian states than in others) and the police appear ineffective in controlling most crimes.
Most social research done in Haiti is anthropological and ethnological in nature. Criminological research in Haiti has been minimal. The few Haitian criminologists who are doing research have been trained in the legal profession, and thus, are lacking the sociological expertise that North American criminologists show.

The lack of Haitian criminological studies is probably due to:

1. The lack of interest in comparative criminology and the developing countries in general, and the Caribbean and Haiti more specifically.

2. The isolation of Haiti from world affairs.

3. Shortage of Haitian criminologists and sociologists—not only are there few persons trained in criminology but the numbers with general social science backgrounds are limited, as are library resources. Furthermore, a majority of the research done dealing with crime is devoted to criminal law and procedure.

4. The rudimentary state of sociological statistics and information in Haiti and its crime problem—Haiti does not have at this moment a collection of data amenable to statistical analysis which includes any data on numbers and types of offenses committed, nor any record of the personalia of the offenders themselves. (In an attempt at rectifying these problems, an institute of social
research—Centre Haitien d'Investigation en Science Sociale, [CHISS] was established recently in Port-au-Prince, whose primary goal is to collect and analyze adequate and accurate data.)

5. An apparent low crime rate in Haiti as a whole. Ulrick Noel's (1966) book has as its main objectives (a) the study and description of the deviation of juveniles, adult offenders; and the social conditions that are conducive to their behavior; (b) the treatment of delinquents or adult offenders in the centers of reeducation, institutions, and prisons; and (c) a discussion of probation, even though not widely used in Haiti.

Noel—who is one of the few criminologists in the country and was trained in the French positivistic tradition—argues that because of the density of the population and because the majority of the population is economically poor, a number of peasants, in particular the youth, find their way to the cities where they either work as "servants and maids" and because of a lack of moral directive they drift toward an independent life of prostitution and vagrancy. Noel goes on to say that in the residential areas, the youngsters who commit infractions against property are not the result of necessity but rather that offenders are trying to copy a personality that they have seen in movies or read in
books. (The researcher is not convinced that the latter is a viable explanation since a very small percentage of the youth population are literate.)

The lack of official statistics does not allow Noel to give the quantitative aspect of the phenomenon, however, he argues that his years as judge and as professor allow him to advance the thesis that most of the delinquents had a father who was delinquent. The populous neighborhoods, the ghettoes, the slums, and the overcrowded areas of the cities in Haiti are, according to Noel, the principal breeding ground of a criminal subculture for the youth.

Households characterized by a lack of "culture-stimuli," i.e., lack of education, books, and access to "cultural" experiences in the society (mostly the populous neighborhoods) provide a context in which youngsters show a number of problems such as maladjustment in school, truancy, lack of respect for parents and elders. The author feels that these individuals are slowly decreasing because of the policy of social defense practiced by the government which emphasizes the creation of a "social police" made of specialized personnel who during the day and evening go to the areas that seem to be conducive to delinquency such as the commercial, industrial, and slum areas in order to intervene early against the young delinquents.
Even though crime is felt to be relatively low in Haiti, Noel made an attempt to look at a number of conditions that may be conducive to criminal behavior. First, what little crime that occurs is seen from a physical geographic point of view. Haiti is a tropical country, Noel argues, and the seasonal or regional variations of its climate, torrential rains, humidity, droughts, and the winds affect the emotional state of its inhabitants and may cause an increase in Haitian criminality.

In the rural sections, violent behaviors, such as voluntary homicide, fires, assaults and battery, burning of farms reach a peak during the summer months, when the temperature is the highest. The time of harvest in the rural areas is a time of excessive use of alcohol which parallels observed increases in violent acts.

In cities, on the other hand, police actions tend to help keep these types of behavior to a minimum. Noel argues that the rural sector show a higher number of violent offenses than do the urban sector. He also feels that with better statistical information, one will be able to determine for a specific season what section of the country is more crime-prone. Crimes against property are more likely to occur during the winter months because of the shortness of the days.

Another condition Noel feels is conducive to criminal
behavior in Haiti is the economic geography. He argues that the economic factor very often determines the place of residence and the reason for emigration. When one of these elements change, the ultimate outcome is changed. In this idea, one can distinguish between: (a) urban criminality and rural criminality, (b) criminality of the different cities, (c) zones of criminality within the cities.

Noel argues that even though there is a lack of official statistic, to prove it, criminality is quantitatively higher in the Haitian cities than in the rural centers. The rate of criminality registered in the cities is seen to be primarily the result of over population; in particular the consequence of internal migration from the rural areas to the cities, and the industrialization of the urban centers. Noel argues that in Port-au-Prince, especially in the working zone where the population density is always rising, one has noticed an increase in delinquency. Noel goes on to say that this increase in anti-social behavior is not linked to the population but to a zone or a neighborhood. (These findings tend to share the same conclusions as Shaw and McKay's [1969] study of Chicago and its concentric zones.)

The third condition suggested by Noel is that the ethnic geography is conducive to criminal behavior in Haiti. By this he assumes, as would be expected from his
perspective, a neo-Lombrosian, phenotypical, biological perspective. Noel feels that since the present Haitian population is an amalgam of individuals from different tribes of Africa and to some extent mixed with Europeans, it may be necessary to look at whether these different ethnic backgrounds were criminally oriented. While raising the specter of ethnic differences, Noel did not find any correlation between one's physical and ethnic background and criminal behavior.

Gerard Gourgue (1955), a Haitian criminologist, has attempted to make the Haitian citizens in general and the government in particular aware of the rising problem of juvenile delinquency and the importance of establishing rehabilitation centers and having judges specialize in juvenile delinquency. It is his contention that Haiti is confronting, perhaps more than any other country, some very serious problems caused primarily by the highly dense population structure. There is a massive in-migration to the urban centers, especially Port-au-Prince. These overpopulated centers are conducive to the development of juvenile delinquency, due to the high degree of anonymity, lack of parental control, lack of education, and differential association.

Another factor Gourgue (1955) feels is a cause of delinquency in Haiti is that the Haitian population, almost entirely rural, is disseminated over the
mountainous areas of the country. This fact is of importance, because the children are not able to attend school, hence, when they migrate to the cities a majority of them are without any adult supervision, lack employment, and are exposed to delinquent acts. Educating these children, Gourgue feels, is the first step toward prevention, and on a wider scale that of social defense.

The criminal justice system in Haiti is seen to be lacking in the establishment of tribunals or courts to specialize in youth offenders. There are no special juvenile detention facilities. Gourgue (1955) suggests that one will never be able to re-educate a youngster by putting him in a prison with adult offenders.

Gourgue (1955) also feels that the social progress of a country is linked to its economic development. Therefore, he argues that unless the Haitian people in general and the government in particular start systematically to use the resources of the country in order to lift it away from the group of countries called "under-developed," Haiti will not be able to progress socially.

Some Conclusions

It is quite apparent that the literature that has been reviewed displays many elements in common in explaining the cause of crime in countries which are in
the process of development.

According to the existing literature, some have suggested that a significant relationship between urbanization, industrialization, and crime exists. It appears that the process of modernization causes a breakdown of traditional social forces, hence, an increase in mobility, impersonality, and association with delinquent groups.

The process of urbanization and industrialization becomes complicated by the nature of development. It appears that patterns of crime are higher in societies which develop under a capitalist economic system, leading to the conclusion that the rates of crime are affected by the extent to which the social system effectively integrates, co-opts, or otherwise reduces the alienation often associated with migration and economic expansion (Adler, 1983; Friday, 1983).

Another consensus seems to be that in developing nations the increase in crime is caused by the young people who predominate in the growing metropolis. It is also the young who are most noticeably affected by city life and who are drawn easily into criminal activities. It also appears that crime and delinquency in countries undergoing the process of development are affected by lack of economic and educational opportunity and low occupational status of its citizens.
Not all countries with developing economies have more crime. Cuba and the Ivory Coast, for example, have been able to restrict their criminal activities to a manageable level. Haiti also appears to have little crime. Some factors inhibiting crime in Haiti are the role the extended family plays in educating the young, strong government control over the society, and strong religious commitment. These and other factors will be reviewed and explained in the following chapters.
CHAPTER II

THE SOCIOGRAPHY OF HAITI

Introduction

For most readers the only information they have on Haiti is that it is a poor country that had until recently a repressive dictatorship and that boatloads of peasants often tried to sail to the United States. But, of course, the country is much more.

This chapter offers a more general overview of the country in order to offer the reader a wider social context in which to understand the pattern of crime in the country. This overview is aimed at sensitizing the reader to the dynamic of life on this island and therefore aid in grasping the implications of economic growth and modernization for the Haitian people.

Area, Geography, and Climate

The Republic of Haiti occupies the western third of the Caribbean island of Hispaniola, the eastern two-thirds is occupied by the Dominican Republic. Its north coast is washed by the water of the Atlantic, and its south shore by the Caribbean Sea. The Hammond Almanac (1980) states that the entire territory, including that of its dependent
Figure 1. Haiti: Hispaniola and Its Position in the Antilles

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Figure 2. The Republic of Haiti
islands, is about 10,714 square miles or 27,000 km² (approximately the size of the state of Maryland).

In the aboriginal language, the word Haiti means "high land." In fact, about three-fourths of the country’s total area is mountainous. There are three forested mountain ranges; the mountain ranges, which follow a roughly east-west axis, make internal communication difficult and have contributed to the development of regionalism.

Even though Haiti is in the same latitude as Senegal, it enjoys a mild tropical climate. There are only two seasons: rainy and dry seasons. The altitude, the number of mountains, the number of supplementary streams and rivers that flowed on into the ocean bed from the extremely high mountains streams and rivers, the vegetation maintained in certain region by the abundance of rain, help to correct the excess of latitude. Therefore, the country benefits from a variety of micro-climates which not only allow Haiti to cultivate products that are tropical but also those products that are normally grown in much colder climates.

Origin of the Population

One can roughly divide the inhabitants of Haiti in three categories. The first and largest group is the blacks, approximately 90% of the population. The second
group comprise the people of color known as "mulatres" which is about 7% of the population. Finally, there are the whites who are only about 3% of the total population. Most Haitian ethnologists, however, divide the population in two groups of races: (a) the blacks, as the first group, and (b) the mulatres and whites as the second group. This racial division is the most important fact of life in Haiti. It dominates the country's whole existence. It is also, in the words of one of Haiti's ablest thinkers, Alcius Charmant (cited in Heinl & Heinl, 1978, p. 18), "the supreme evil of our Republic, the virus that ravages it and the road to its ruin."

With the massive importation of slaves and the successful agriculture of sugar cane, indigo, coffee, and cocoa, Haiti was, during the 1700's, France's wealthiest colony (Leyburn, 1966). In fact, "the total trade of what is now known as Haiti was once estimated as greater than all of England's thirteen North American colonies put together" (Diederich & Burt, 1969, p. 12).

The majority of these slaves came from the whole Western Coast of Africa, starting from Senegal all the way down to South-West Africa. The present Haitians are, consequently, the descendants of these different nationalities mixed among themselves and also sometimes with the whites. As a result, Haiti is an amalgamation of ethnic groups that is a real curiosity from an
ethnographic point of view.

History

The history of the Haitian society falls conveniently into five major periods:

1. The period of Spanish mercantilism from 1492 to 1630 based on the search for gold.
2. The French period of plantation economy based on the slavery of the blacks imported from Africa from 1630 to 1803.
3. The Haitian period from 1803 to 1915.
4. The American occupation from 1915 to 1934.
5. The contemporary period (1934 to present) (De Ronceray, 1973).

Christopher Columbus discovered Haiti on his first voyage (December 6, 1492) and named it "La Isla Espanola" (The Spanish Island). It was later known by its latinized name, Hispaniola. The Spanish conquered the entire island, including its native population of Arawak Indians. Spanish brutality combined with smallpox, soon imported from Europe, exterminated the Indians, therefore the import of African blacks as slaves was necessary to work the gold mines and later the canefields.

The French did not arrive until early in the 17th century when a few wanderers settled on the Isle of La Tortue (Tortuga), off the northwest coast of Hispaniola.
They raided the mainland for Spanish cattle which ran wild. Their custom of curing meat over green-wood fires on spits or grills called "boucans" earned them the name "boucaniers," later anglicized to buccaneers.

The French gradually infiltrated the Western part of Hispaniola and established legal claim to it through the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697. The use of the French language and admiration for the French culture shown by educated Haitians today had their origins in the French colony.

Repercussion of the French Revolution of 1789—with its avowed principles of liberty and equality—crossed the ocean to Haiti. Present day Haitians take pride in the fact that they gained their independence in 1804 after defeating French forces sent by Napoleon to put down a slave rebellion; and they are proud of the fact that Haiti is the world's oldest Black Republic. Although the economy of the country suffered badly after the departure of the French, the modern day Haitian peasant, despite his poverty, cherishes his self-reliance and economic independence.

Foreign powers have recognized the importance of the Windward passage, which separates Haiti from Cuba and serves as an important link connecting Central America and South America with North America and Europe. Through the years Haitians have witnessed shows of force by foreign powers anxious to protect their interests in the country;
and in 1915 when Germany was winning victories in World War I, there were rumors that Germany sought a naval base in Haiti. "The United States, sensitive to the strategic location of Haiti near their recently opened canal across the Isthmus of Panama, and preoccupied both with private investments in Haiti and the impending world war, occupied the country until 1934" (Knight, 1978, p. 107).

From 1804 to 1986 Haiti had a very eventful history—42 heads of states of which 1 committed suicide, 3 were killed by revolutionaries, and 7 finished the term of the presidency. Boyer had the longest term of presidency—25 years, and Fignole had the shortest term—one month. In general, the history of Haiti has been a series of revolutions with all that they bring: destructions, fires, looting, and misery.

Demographic Make-Up

With a population of approximately 6 million, Haiti is one of the most densely populated countries in the world (Young, 1982). Life expectancy at birth is about forty-eight years, and the birth rate is about 42 per 1,000 of the population. It is unequally distributed with approximately 75% in the rural areas and 25% in the urban area (Hopkins & Arthur, 1983). The rate of infant mortality is 200 per 1,000 births. Only 70% of young Haitians have a chance to live up to three years of age.
The sanitary conditions are defective—30% of children born in the rural areas are exposed to and die of tetanus during the first thirty day of life. The population is relatively young: 52% is less than 20 years old and more than 42% is less than 14 years old.

Table 1 compares Haiti with the neighboring countries. The statistics show that the islands of Jamaica, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic have made great strides in controlling their birth rate and in decreasing their infant mortality.

In Haiti, approximately 3 million people comprise the active economic population; of that number 79% are concentrated in the agricultural sector, 7% are in the industry and commerce, and 14% are in the services. It is estimated that open and concealed unemployment affect more than 60% of the economically active population in the cities and more than 50% in Port-au-Prince. The per capita income is $260. On the average, every working person has about two or three unemployed persons of whom he takes care directly or otherwise. Table 2 compares the work force distribution of Haiti and the neighboring islands. It shows that Haiti has the lowest per capita

1If a baby survives tetanus, prevalent because the umbilical cord is often cut with unsanitary instruments such as a machete or a broken piece of glass, he/she later faces the weakening effects of malnutrition and parasites. These undermine his/her stamina and make him/her susceptible to such diseases as malaria and tuberculosis.
Table 1

Vital Statistics of Haiti and Neighboring Islands*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Birth Rate per 1,000 of Population</th>
<th>Life Expectancy at Birth</th>
<th>Infant Mortality per 1,000 Live Births</th>
<th>% of Urban Population</th>
<th>% of Doctors per 100,000 Population</th>
<th>% of Natural Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Statistical information taken from *The World Almanac and Book of Facts (1983)*

*Table compiled by author*
Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Per capita Income---US$</th>
<th>% in Agriculture</th>
<th>% in Industry</th>
<th>% in Services (Government)</th>
<th>% in Manufacturing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>260.00</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1,163.00</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican</td>
<td>1,221.00</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic</td>
<td>1,340.00</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Table compiled by the author
income and the highest percentage of its population in agriculture. Cuba’s labor force is approximately 2,848,030 people; Jamaica’s labor force is 859,500 people; and the Dominican Republic’s labor force numbers close to 1.5 million people.

In Haiti, the excessive demographic density and the lack of working opportunity have caused the migration from the rural areas to the cities (especially Port-au-Prince) and from the cities to foreign countries such as the United States and Canada. Echoing this observation, Knight (1978) states that the testimony to the failure of the regime to improve the economy or create a social climate conducive to the comforts of its citizens lay in the massive exodus of Haitians in the late 1950s and throughout the ’60s, and ’70s.

When Francois Duvalier assumed power in 1957 a significant number of educated members of the urban middle class and political opponents went abroad to the United States, Canada, Africa, and other countries of the Caribbean and Latin America. Deteriorating economic and political conditions during the mid-60’s sent Haitians who were poorer and less educated to other countries. Hopkins and Arthur (1983) state that 75% of the Haitians entering the United States as residents and non-immigrants have come since 1968. During the presidency of Jean-Claude Duvalier (1971-1986) there has been a new phenomenon, that
of the "boat people" which reached into the poorest sectors of Haitian society.

Migration from country to town has been predominantly a "push movement" that has not been accompanied by a strong urban lure. Urban Haiti in the late 1970s and early 1980s has yet to develop an industrial base sufficient to make jobs available to the migrants from the countryside, and the limited information available does not indicate that the urban migrants have found their lives improved substantially by the change.

External migration appears to have been large enough to have had some effect on the population level. Immigration since World War II has been negligible, but emigration may have resulted in a net population loss of as many as 50,000 people annually since the mid 1960s (South America, Central America and the Caribbean, 1986).

Some writers feel that the substantial emigration has been useful in the sense that it has had a moderating effect on population growth in the already crowded country. Qualitatively, however, it has resulted in a "brain-drain," a relative heavy lose of professional and skilled personnel. According to a report by the Organization of American States, this emigration was "the second-highest proportion among emigrants from seventeen Latin American countries surveyed" (Numa, 1978, p. 78).

In spite of the problems caused to the development of
the country by the "brain-drain," the Haitian economy has benefited substantially from the presence of its citizens in foreign lands--primarily due to the amount of money they send to their relatives and friends back home. According to De Ronceray (1973), in 1967 Haitians in exile sent approximately $13.2 million to friends and relatives back home. Furthermore, an article in Newsweek (McGrath & Fuller, 1982) commented that Haitian immigrants, both documented and non-documentated (legal and illegal), send home about $100 million a year in hard currency, twice what the island's coffee crop earns. Loyal to friends and family, as well as conscientious in repaying the loans which make the exodus possible, the Haitians abroad sent proportionately huge sums of money back home. Annual estimates as high as $100 million have been made (Weinstein & Segal, 1984). Moreover, the constant travel of Haitians back to Haiti for the holidays (Christmas, Mardi Gras, and Summer) has greatly helped the economy--especially the service sector--in the purchase of local artifacts and the use of hotels and restaurants.

Language

Haiti is bilingual. Its inhabitants simultaneously use French and Creole. Haiti is the only republic in the western hemisphere of French (or French-Creole) language and culture.
The French language, inherited from the French colonization, is understood and spoken by approximately 10% of the population, mostly the upper and middle class urbanites. Creole is the language of the common people but is understood and spoken throughout the society.

For this 10%, the two languages are used side by side and are frequently interchangeable within a sentence. In informal situations, both public and private, Creole predominates.

Although Creole borrows heavily from 17th-century French and slightly from Spanish, English, and West African tribal languages, it can only be described as Haitian. Even though some find similarities between the Haitian creole and the dialects spoken in the Louisiana bayous, Martinique and Guadeloupe, they are akin to the "Haitian tongue" as Schweitzerdeutsch is to German.

In Haiti, the use of French and Creole during the colonial and independence period set speech patterns and attitudes for the next century. French was established as the language of intellect, culture, refinement, social distinction, and of the elite. It was spoken only by whites and educated mulatto freedmen. When the slaves gained their freedom, the greatest barrier between the various classes of colored peoples was broken down, and all Haitians became legally equal. Thus the maintenance of the French language and lifestyle became a vital
distinction between the two groups and a necessary means
of ensuring the mulattoes' status over the former slaves.

Traditional attitudes towards Creole began to change
during the 20th century. For example, the first attempt
at a Creole text appeared in 1925 and the first Creole
newspaper in 1943. Very often the black consciousness and
nationalist movements have been tied to the desire to
extend Creole usage, and social protest literature has
used the peasant's language for both practical and
ideological reasons.

The constitution of 1957 stated that Creole would be
recommended over French where there was insufficient
knowledge of the latter. In 1969 a law was passed
acknowledging the existence of Creole and granting it
legal status; it could be used in some institutions
(Congress, law courts, and clubs) but not in accredited
educational institutions. However, the new constitution
that was written in 1987 gave Creole equal status to
French, thus giving Haiti two national languages. This
gives the 80% of the population who speaks only Creole
equal access and prestige in the society.

Social Structure and Social Stratification

The majority of the authors who have studied this
problem divide the contemporary Haitian society into three
classes: (1) the upper class, (2) the middle class, and
(3) the peasantry. In this trilogy, the peasant is considered a cultural link to Africa, the bourgeoisie is culturally linked to Europe and the middle class is perceived as culturally ambivalent and insecure (De Ronceray, 1973; Duvalier & Denis, 1958).

Throughout its history, the social system of Haiti has been marked by a dual heritage, that of the French colonial and that of the African slave. During the colonial period, a social and racial configuration was introduced when a small minority of the wealthy whites had control over the lives of their black slaves. A rigid color-based stratification system evolved that enhanced initial cultural differences. As independence arrived, the white elites were ushered out, giving Haiti an opportunity to develop new values and institutions. The new mulatto elite opted for the social mode of their predecessors, and kept Roman Catholicism, the French language and culture, and light skin color as criteria of high social position.

The slave masses that fought alongside the mulattoes gained little more than emancipation and subsistence plots after independence. The lifestyles that had evolved during slavery were adapted to their new peasant status with only minimal changes. They maintained their own religion (voodoo) and their own language (Creole) and continued to center their lives on African and slave-based
family and market patterns (Weinstein & Segal, 1984).

The late 20th century has seen the initial erosion of the traditionally dichotomous society and the emergence of a nebulous middle class. Expanding economic opportunities have resulted in differentiation within social strata, and political awareness has given impetus to the incipient middle sector. Geographic isolation and regionalism are breaking down as rural inhabitants become more mobile and seek opportunities outside their ancestral villages. Although members of the elite retain their exalted position as the last bastion of prestigious French culture, the group has opened its ranks to wealthy, educated, non-elites, forming a broader based upper class. In spite of these signals of change, the overall social structure has not been deeply affected. At the base of the social pyramid the peasants' life is unchanged.

Even though new groups are developing, the balance of power has remained with the 5 to 10% of the population possessing wealth, education, and social prestige. Finally, there has been no effective amalgamation or adoption of lower class norms. Creole and voodoo, despite their pervasiveness, have never been formally acknowledged by the upper class, who remain culturally segregated. Traditional class criteria such as color, education, languages, birth, and wealth are still employed to designate status. The middle class is ambivalent about
its double heritage and has developed little class solidarity.

Upper Class

The Haitian upper class traditionally constituted less than 10% of the total population and in the mid-seventies composed from 2 to 5% (Weil & Weil, 1973). This decline was precipitated by the mass exodus of the upper class to foreign nations during the Duvalier regime.

In the past, social position was determined by birth, and class solidarity was reinforced by traditional values and marriage within the group. This fragment of the society was cosmopolitan and possessed education, wealth, and social prestige. The criteria that distinguished elite are disdain for manual labor, industry, and commerce in favor of the more gentlemanly professions of law, medicine, and architecture. The elite woman never worked, devoting all of her time to home and family. In sharp contrast to other Latin American countries, the Republic of Haiti has not had a landed oligarchy. A few wealthy citizens have owned homes in the country, but the land itself has belonged to the peasant since Independence (1804). Property ownership has existed, but it was urban land that brought in the rental income.

Traditional elite status pre-supposed descent from freed mulattoes followed by several generations of legal
### Table 3

**Social Stratification of Haitian Society**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stratum</th>
<th>Percentage of Population</th>
<th>Income Source and Language Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elite</td>
<td>2-5%</td>
<td>Wealthiest group in Haiti. Income derives from government jobs, commerce, intellectual professions—never from manual work; French-speaking. Domicile is predominantly urban; high concentration in capital city.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Stratum</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Came into existence after WWII; culturally ambivalent and insecure; speak French; well educated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban lower class</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>Derive their income from marginal employment and self-employment; display preference for speaking Creole; some speak French.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasants</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>Poor; derive their incomes from manual labor from the land. They live in rural areas; Creole-speaking. African heritage.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
marriage. Class solidarity was rooted in a strong family system, blood relationships, and common heritage. The interlocking family ties were carried to such an extent that all elite appeared to be related. The Haiti elite adopted the French social institutions and exhibited extreme francophile attitudes, manifesting elegant deportment, fiery patriotism, and European savoir faire.

Light skin was highly prized and was accompanied by the notion of the superior intelligence of the white race. On the other hand, the prejudice lodged against the black peasants was far more cultural than racial in nature. Rural dwellers exhibited the characteristics that the elites found most degrading about their country: illiteracy, poverty, slave heritage, belief in voodoo, and a lack of cultural refinement, French culture in particular.

A final determinant of elite status was geographic. From the earliest days of the republic the elite formed an exclusively urban enclave in the predominantly rural society. The geographic split enhanced the cultural differences between the elites and the masses, keeping the former in the mainstream of national and world trends at the expense of rural isolation.

The Duvalier government (Papa Doc in particular) stressed negritude, a pride via blackness and the African heritage and in the past few decades there has been a
marked relaxation of social boundaries as a result of the weakening position of the elites. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the elite was still considered the paragon of Haitian society, although inert political persecution and extensive emigration had undermined their significance. Their political power was rapidly declining, and their social and economic position was weakening. As a consequence, their stratum is no longer recognizable as an elite caste. It has opened into an upper class composed of the elite and nonelite elements sharing similar standards of living and prestige but not a common social life. For members of the upper class, the family has remained the focal point for love and loyalty. Social life revolves around an extended kinship system and interaction through upper class social clubs.

The criteria for upper class status reflect the change in its composition. Increased immigration from Europe and intermarriage with foreigners has brought German, Danish, and Syrian names to rosters once exclusively French. Broader opportunities for education and wealth have introduced individuals of humbler origin into the ranks of the upper class. Wealth, always vital in maintaining a high standard of living, has done much to weaken the color barrier and raise personal status. A famous Haitian proverb expresses it thus—"the rich black is a mulatto; the poor mulatto is a black."
Although many norms have been relaxed to broaden the base of upper class membership, other standards have been maintained and even reinforced: the value of the French culture, language, Roman Catholicism, and education. Individuals aspiring to high status must adopt these standards and emulate the lifestyles and customs of the traditional elite. Despite the increase in black consciousness in the arts, little genuine affinity with Africa is felt among the upper class; the psychological and cultural ties remain with France. Moreover, as French culture is found only in the urban areas, the upper class has remained concentrated in the cities, thus reinforcing the rural-urban dichotomy.

Middle Stratum

There was little room for a middle class in the two-caste system existing in Haiti before the 20th century. However, the middle stratum has become more sharply defined since the 1940s because of changes that occurred during the American occupation and thereafter. In particular the changes took place during the regime of former president Francois Duvalier, who reflected his middle class origins through numerous political appointments.

The middle stratum is still a residual segment caught between the upper and lower classes and constitutes only
4% of the entire population. Class solidarity and identity are virtually non-existent, as are common class values and traditions. It remains an essential urban catchall category. The majority of its members are concentrated in the capital, and are of provencial or foreign extraction.

The chief distinction between the middle class and the lower class are economic and cultural. Criteria for membership include a non-manual occupation, a moderate income, education, and a mastery of French. More than half the middle class is dependent upon the government for its occupational security. The other half is variously employed as professionals, businessmen, shopkeepers, and teachers. The army has always been one of the most important channels of upward mobility because it gives one status and some economic security.

Family heritage and color are of less importance among members of the middle stratum than among their upper class contemporaries. Their marriage and family patterns are more flexible, allowing them to choose spouses from other classes. Middle class Haitians are upwardly mobile, as are their children, and they perceive education and urban residence as two essential keys to achieving higher status. They attempt to emulate the lifestyles of the elite, while resenting their social prestige and light skin color.
Urban Lower Class

The urban lower class constitutes about 6% of the total population and about half of the urban population (Heinl & Heinl, 1978). It is concentrated in Port-au-Prince and other coastal towns. The coastal towns have a more urban orientation primarily due to the effect of tourism, international economic development, adequate means of communication (roads, telephone, etc.), the availability of educational facilities, and the existence of sanitary installations. The urban lower class has grown in the last few years because of increased migration from the countryside. Realizing that moving to the city is the only viable means of upward mobility, these rural individuals have come in search of education for their children and employment for themselves.

Within the urban lower class there are several groups or substrata all dependent upon the criteria of regular employment. Jobs are scarce within this category because there is little industry to absorb the burgeoning migration. Consequently, there is much unemployment or marginal employment. The service sector is taken from this group, comprising domestics, shoe shiners, and day laborers. The tourist industry also provides some

1Because towns of the interior have a much more rural orientation, their residents are classified with the peasantry.
employment for this group. Others are self-employed as shopkeepers, artisans, lottery ticket vendors, and market women. The urban lower class displays social heterogeneity and a lack of class consciousness. They are a group whose orientation is changing from a rural to an urban way of life, but they still manifest many of their peasant characteristics. Most members of this group display a preference for speaking Creole, and common law marriage and voodoo are still prevalent. However, there are higher percentages of legal unions, strict Roman Catholics, and French-speakers than in the rural areas.

The political nature and strength of the urban lower class is subject to debate. Both labor and communist movements draw from this stratum, although the great majority identified with Francois Duvalier who recruited his militia from their ranks. Nevertheless, members within this group are subject to political manipulation by those more powerful than they. Their degree of political articulateness and their ability to effect economic reform has not been determined.

One of the outstanding characteristics of this group is their preoccupation with educating their children. Despite economic hardships for their parents, a real effort is made to keep these children in school for the duration of the official 6-year curriculum. Through education and through political participation, some of the
more ambitious individuals in this stratum are achieving mobility into the middle class.

Peasants

At the bottom of the social ladder, constituting about 85% of the population, are the peasants (Heinl & Heinl, 1978). Of these only 5% are relatively well off and merit the Creole distinction of "gros habitant" or "gros neg" (expressions for rural persons of wealth and power). The "gros habitant" sub-class derives its status from its large land holdings and leadership positions within the community.

In spite of greater wealth, this group is categorized with the peasants for a number of reasons. First, the "gros habitants" identify with the rural masses much more than they do with the urban classes. Although they may have absolute political, social, and economic control within their area, their status is regional, and they wield no power on a national level. In contrast to urban dwellers, this group does not rely extensively on cash income to maintain a certain lifestyle, and possesses few, if any, modern conveniences.

The status of these individuals is related to their place in the rural economy and in local politics. In addition to possessing more land, the "gros habitants" may bring in more income by renting oxen or by conducting a
local business, such as a coffee or corn mill. The "gros habitant" manifests his wealth by having a larger home or more common-law wives than his poorer neighbors. He is careful not to appear too prosperous, however, for he then may become the target of black-magic spells cast by jealous peasants. Politically, the "gros habitants" control rural Haiti. Many become the "chef de section" (sheriff) of their community and serve as a liaison between the national and local governments.

Despite their rural orientation "gros habitants" are aware of the city, and many of its members have urban goals. The degree of adult education may range from complete illiteracy to a few years of primary education, yet the children of upper class peasants may be enrolled in urban schools. The more ambitious of these children may remain in the city and thus provide a primary source for the incipient middle class.

On the national level, Haitian peasants are politically impotent, economically substandard and socially ostracized. Yet the other 15% of the Haitian population is dependent upon them. Not only is the country's economy almost entirely dependent upon the export crops that the peasants produce, but also the world's image of Haitian folk customs, religion, and language is based on the African slave heritage. On the other hand, the peasant is not dependent upon the
activities of the rest of the population for his existence. He consumes little that he does not produce himself and is the most self-sufficient member of the society.

The lifestyle of the rural Haitian has remained virtually unchanged throughout the history of the republic. His technology has not evolved much beyond that of his African ancestors, and the social structure of his community is reminiscent of the slave society: his language is Creole, his religion is voodoo, his marriages are common law, and his value system and livelihood are based on the land.

Unlike peasants in most of Latin America, the majority of rural Haitians have owned their land since independence in the early 19th century. Land is the most valuable rural commodity, and the peasant and his family will go to great lengths to accumulate a few more acres. His family will aid him financially and give him moral support by participating in voodoo ceremonies to gain the favor of the local gods and family spirits. The desire for property is not likely to decrease in the future as it is propagated within the family, attached to other positive values, and reinforced by proverbs and songs. As the peasantry becomes literate and educated, they will very likely be more aware of their collective strength both politically and economically since they own the vast
majority of Haiti's agricultural land.

Peasants within an average 50-100 member community are a closely knit group and are often interrelated. In this and other ways their lifestyles bear a striking resemblance to African social patterns. Men may have several common-law wives living in relative proximity to one another. Although a monogamous legal marriage is the ideal, common-law marriage is the rule and is not censured by the community. Because of the character of marital unions, the resultant family is centered on the mother's permanent presence and stability. The sense of cooperation and togetherness within the community is reinforced by the prestige of the eldest male family member and by the household gods, as well as through the "combite." The "combite" is an agricultural mutual aid society whose basic purpose is the communal cultivation of crops. It encompasses all adult males and combines the practical and utilitarian aspects of a communal work society within the recreational and ceremonial aspects of a social club.

Legal marriage probably only accounts for 15-20% of all unions. The rest are either temporary or convenient arrangements or come under the title of "placage" which is an ancient custom in Haiti going back into colonial times. Paul Moral, in his book *Le Paysan Haitien* discusses the prevalence of their "free-union" by historical precedence, the adherence to voodoo which runs somewhat against religious marriage, the peasant's stubborn resistance to or fear of legal entanglements which might endanger his future, and probably, most important of all, the costs of legal and religious marriage.
The peasant woman also plays a prominent role in the economic activities of rural Haiti. Her work and social life are combined in the market system in which she, not the male, is the key figure. Any profit or accumulation of capital will be used in a number of ways. If the peasant family is upwardly mobile, the extra income may be used to educate the children. Because of her status as a link between the rural community and the urban market, the peasant woman is an important instrument in potential modernization.

Religion

Roman Catholicism

Although Roman Catholicism has been the official religion of Haiti, it has never been a prominent influence outside the urban areas. Catholicism did not penetrate French colonial Haiti to the same degree it did the Spanish colonies, this was largely because of the attitude of the colonials. The buccaneers and planters were chiefly interested in enriching themselves and were unconcerned with making converts among slaves. The majority of the planters were "indifferent and insolent toward the church and regarded the priests working among the slave masses as a potentially subversive force" (Weil & Weil, 1973, p. 49). Therefore, the Vatican became disillusioned, first with the attitude of the French
colonials and later with that of the new republic. (The Constitution of 1805 had separated church and state and had declared marriage to be a civil rather than a religious contract.) However, the newly installed elite officially reinstated Catholicism as the national religion with the concordat of 1860 and welcomed the French and Belgian priests whose lifestyle and values were so similar to their own. By this time, though, it was too late for the Roman Catholic church to develop into a powerful or wealthy institution since the land, often a source of church revenue in Latin America had already been apportioned to the peasants. The elite themselves retained the nonchalant attitudes of the colonial planters and, although anxious to set a good example, exerted no social pressure to attend mass. For the elite, the church was a symbol of their link with the outside world and a bulwark against the voodoo of the black masses.

The majority of the priests have been French-speaking Europeans who confronted a profound cultural gap between themselves and their rural parishioners. Roman Catholic values were respected by the peasants, but actual compliance with these norms, such as legal monogamous marriage, was sporadic. The expense of dressing oneself for mass or preparing for a church wedding or other rite was often prohibitive for the average peasant. Consequently, Catholicism and the priests came to be
associated with the elite and to some extent the "gros habitants" who could afford to participate fully in church activities.

The church has also been opposed or de-emphasized by black nationalists. The hierarchical, centralized organization of the church was thought to lend itself to political organization and was consequently feared by those in power. President Duvalier exemplified this negative attitude, and during much of his time in office kept a running battle going with the Roman Catholic clergy. His opposition culminated in the expulsion of several provincial bishops, the archbishop of Port-au-Prince, and eventually in his own excommunication by the Vatican.

At present, many priests are striving to re-orient and redirect the church and its values. More priests are becoming interested in the peasant and are moving from the domain of the urban upper class to the countryside. More Roman Catholic vocational training centers, hospitals, and rural schools have been the result of their efforts. An increasing number of priests are Haitian-born and the archbishop is Haitian. This redirection of the church was instrumental in the ouster of President Jean-Claude Duvalier from power in 1986.
Protestantism

After voodooism, Protestantism is the second religion in Haiti and estimates of its strength vary from 10 to 30% of the total population. The Protestant missionaries concentrated their efforts mainly among the lower class. A few peasants were converted to the evangelical and fundamentalist denominations because of similarities to the emotional form of worship and the possession of voodoo. Protestantism did not flourish in rural areas, however, because it could not coexist with voodoo. The Protestant clergy encouraged education and economic development. In the last few years there has been a rapid growth of Protestantism, including Baptists, African Methodists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Seventh-day Adventists and even some "cult" churches. The American Protestant Episcopal Church has the greatest influence among the Protestants (Logan, 1968).

In general, Haiti encourages freedom of public worship to a greater degree than do most nations where Catholicism is the official religion.

Voodooism

The word voodoo comes from the Dahomean term meaning "god," but the religion itself cannot be identified with a particular tribe. It began to emerge in the years between 1730 and 1790 when the importation of slaves was at its
zenith and flourished during the period of isolation from 1805-1860 (De Ronceray, 1973).

Voodoo is the true religion of the Haitian masses, although it is not officially recognized and is denigrated by the upper classes. As do all religions, it encompasses a set of beliefs and practices dealing with the spiritual forces of the universe, and serves as an intermediary between these forces and mankind. Voodoo helps its followers over the hurdles of life: being born, "placage," wedding, pregnancy, dying, and the infinite variety of obstacles that lie between. It lacks a formal theology, printed scriptures, and hierarchical clergy, and a system of catechism. Rather, it is an informal religion of action, created by and suited to the rural life of the peasant. It functions as a spiritual release, a vehicle of socializing and recreation, and a loose form of social control.

Voodoo was suppressed under the first three rulers because of its potential for sedition. Until Duvalier's regime, the governments chose either to ignore it or to disdain it. Duvalier adopted a new stance and openly favored voodoo. He used it effectively to buttress his regime among the lower class. Voodoo is based on a belief in the Christian God and lesser Haitian and African deities, called "loa." God is ultimately good and omnipotent but is conceived to be rather remote and not to
be bothered with the small details of everyday human existence. This is the realm of the "loa," who are consequently closer to the Haitian peasant. The "loa" possess the same desires and weaknesses as do mankind. As neither man nor "loa" are entirely good nor bad, sin and moral law are not dictated by the gods and are not a part of voodoo.

Possession is one of the most vital aspects of voodoo. It occurs at public religious gatherings when a participant feels himself to be entered (influenced or controlled) by one of the "loa." At such times the individual personality becomes subverted, and the possessed person manifests the characteristics of the deity. When an individual is first "mounted" by a "loa," he becomes his "horse," or servant and is baptized to solidify the relationship. Throughout his lifetime, the individual will pay particular allegiance and homage to that god. Only at death is the "loa" removed so that the man's soul may ascend to God—the Christian God.

Possession is a profound experience because it is believed to be the revelation of divine will of the "loa" through the medium of the common man. Peasants welcome the experience and express neither surprise nor fear if a fellow dancer suddenly sheds his own personality for that of a "loa." After an individual is "mounted" by a "loa," he is treated with deference and respect by other
community members.

The priests and priestesses of voodoo—"houngans" and "mambos," respectively—receive their training as apprentices. There is no formal structure or hierarchy; thus each priest informally establishes himself/herself in an area, his reputation and prestige growing with his proven effectiveness as curer and diviner. The "houngan" and "mambo" more closely resemble medicine men than they do Roman Catholic priests. Their duties include cures and divination, in addition to acting as officiant at voodoo services. The majority have lives outside their religious calling and are often full, if not prominent, participants in community affairs. They are highly respected members of their society and often rise to a position of political eminence.

Whether in the West or in Africa, magic can be seen as an imitation of a religion. Black magic aims, by certain occult means, to subject divine will to human will. In voodoo, these entities remain clearly differentiated, and its priests are not allowed to engage in magical practices under pain of severe sanctions, they are instead to do beneficent works known under the name of "charite" or "manger-les-ames" or "manger-pauvres." Therefore, voodoo, as any other religion, has humanitarian purposes (Duvalier, 1968).

The dance is intimately associated with the voodoo
religion and occupies such an essential place in it that
one could almost define voodooism as a religion expressed
through the dance. The drum which beats the rhythm of
these dances has become the very symbol of voodooism. Its
songs are hymns composed in honor of the divinities.
These songs are powerful and original, sometimes slow and
nostalgic, sometimes rousing. During the ceremonies
singing is always accompanied by dancing; the actual
dances vary from one rite to another. The principal
musical instruments played at these ceremonies are drums;
they are made of oak, mahogany, or pine and covered with
ox-hide. The main symbols employed in voodoo ceremonies
are called "veve." They are drawn by hand on the ground
with ashes, flour, or oatmeal.

The Future of Voodoo in
Haitian Society

The Haitian society has entered an age of mutations
and no element of its structure can escape the changes.
The medium of mass communication, a new conception of the
family and the role of women, the notion of economic
planification and the political system and its obligation
to the people are just a few institutions that are being
affected.

Voodoo, as a component of the social structure, is
also expected to undergo some transformation. It tends to
be commercialized in the cities. The expansion of tourism
is bringing a growing democratization of the worship service and a correlation of regression of the mysterious and the sacred.

The adepts of voodoo are being solicited more and more for folklore show and exhibitions which give the worship service an appearance or trademark of economic production, which consequently brings a level of secularization.

A number of Haitian scholars feel that just as the Christianity of the Middle Ages is not the Christianity of today, so voodooism will lose ground. It is, they feel a religion of the night, and electrification and the spread of literacy in country districts will cause it to decline.

Another group of Haitian scholars feel that one must not expect the reduced importance of voodoo with the progress of industrialization in Haiti. Voodoo, as the religion of the masses, will evolve with the progress that will take place. It will fit the borders of the economic development. They argue that Protestantism and Catholicism did not disappear with the industrial development of the Western World, and Japan, which became an industrial power, did not lose its religion as a result. One is wrong, therefore, they argue to make of voodoo a primitive religion that the industrial civilization will destroy. The observations of a number of writers (CHISS, 1973) show that those who were born in
voodooistic circles stayed voodooists all their life, even when they are educated and went to universities and up the social ladder. The non-voodooists are those who since their birth have been surrounded by religious institutions.

Without a doubt, voodoo is still one of the strongest influences in rural Haiti. It serves to enhance family solidarity on the one hand, whereas on the other it enhances the mistrust of those outside the kin group. It exercises a form of local social control and organization through common belief and participation in voodoo rites. On the national level the low status of voodoo and its exclusive nature—as opposed to the international character of Roman Catholicism and Protestantism—have served to reinforce the isolation of the peasant believers. Because of its magic and dancing, it is effective for releasing aggression and frustration, as well as for providing entertainment and recreation. Finally, it provides the peasant with a workable explanation of his universe and gives him meaning and direction.

Education

Education is, without a doubt, one of the most serious problems facing Haitian families today. The precariousness of the economic conditions and the
mediocrity of the infra-structures are in a large measure determined by the incapacity of the masses to exercise a rational, thoughtful, and technical action on the material and human environment.

During the colonial regime, schooling had been limited to the French elite, to such an extent that the first chiefs of state in the independent country were illiterate.

Although public education in Haiti is free at all levels and compulsory by law at the primary stage, the government has been unable to provide enough classrooms and teachers. As a result, about 80% of the total population is illiterate. Many of the upper and middle class families who can afford the cost send their children to school overseas (U.S., Canada, France, Belgium).

Private schools outnumber by far public schools especially in the capital city Port-au-Prince and in Cap-Haitien. It is a desperate situation in the rural areas. It is estimated that about 250,000 of a population of more than one million school-age children attend schools. The average rural public school teacher has from 75-100 students in a class (Valdman, 1982). Most of them have completed only a few grades more than their students and are not competent in French, the only officially permitted medium of instruction until 1979. School enrollments are extremely low (due probably to overcrowding, no nearby
Table 4

Estimated School Enrollments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>No. of Schools</th>
<th>Children of School Age</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>No. of Students</th>
<th>% in School</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>1,113</td>
<td>379,200</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>268,264</td>
<td>70.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra-urban</td>
<td>1,732</td>
<td>1,220,800</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>253,363</td>
<td>20.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>246</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>52,250</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,694</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,099</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1980)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: South America, Central America and the Caribbean, p. 363.

Despite a national market severely limited by poverty and illiteracy and a political climate that has fluctuated between anarchy and tyranny, Haiti has always had a distinguished intelligentsia—one that has included many prolific writers. In fact, it has been estimated that "on a per capita basis the country's writers are accredited with more book titles (many of them published in France) than any other country in the Western Hemisphere except the United States" (Weil & Weil, 1973).
Urban schools are modeled on the French pattern and provide the groundwork for classical studies at the secondary level. In theory, the rural system reflects the influence of the United States and endeavors to adapt schooling to the needs of rural life. In practice, however, its curriculum is similar to that of the urban schools except that practical courses in agriculture and home economics are included.

Girls slightly outnumbered boys in the urban classrooms, in the countryside boys were in a majority of more than two to one. Dropout rates, excessive throughout the system, tend to be much higher in the country than in towns (only about 3% of the rural students who begin school will complete the primary cycle). The University of Haiti has a total of about 4,000 students of whom 50% attend the law school and medical schools. In terms of the interest of the economy, a still more important factor may be the continued over-emphasis on the production of lawyers and the insufficient production of professionals in such needed fields as engineering, agronomy and teaching.

The Economy

The Haitian economy practically stopped growing 1980-1981. The GNP for 1980 was $1,375.8 million (Inter-American Development Bank, 1981). The Growth of the GNP
for 1981 was almost zero ($1,380.0 million).

The balance of trade for 1980 and 1981 was negative. Total exports for 1980 were $211.7 million while imports were $294.6 million.

Agriculture remains the most important source of foreign exchange. It provides the sole occupation open to the bulk of rural residents, who make up an estimated 80% of the total population. Due to a lack of adequate irrigation and proper soil conservation, the agricultural sector is very vulnerable to both droughts and heavy rains.

The manufacturing and construction sectors were the principal growth sectors in the country during the 1970s, in terms of both employment and value added. The increase in construction was encouraged by large public investment outlays while office and residential construction was financed mainly by remittances from Haitians living abroad.

The manufacturing sector is divided into two distinct subsectors: (1) producing predominantly for the domestic market (cement, garment, food stuffs), and (2) producing almost exclusively for the export market (small assemblies or processing firms, sporting goods, electronic equipment). As a result of Haiti's extreme poverty, the domestic market for finished goods is very small.

The mining sector, and with it much state revenue,
disappeared in 1983, when the U.S. owned Reynolds company closed its bauxite mine in view of the present world market prices and the high production costs of Haitian bauxite. Because of its low alumina and high silicon content, the rate of return was very low.

Even though the average national income per head is below $300, the wealthiest 1% of Haitians account for 44% of the national income, but pay only 3.5% back in taxes. During the Duvalier years, few taxes were collected from the wealthy. With the new National Council of Government (CNG) in place and new presidential elections scheduled for late 1987, it is hoped that this alarming situation will quickly change.

Government Institutions

The system of political and administrative organization of Haiti go back to the first days of independence in 1804. Inspired by the colonial model, it has been modified only slightly under the American occupation from 1915 to 1934.

Constitutions in Haiti have always been personal charters of current rulers. New heads of state regularly have refashioned the document to suit their needs and
interests. Consequently, Haitians had over twenty constitutions since the first in 1801. All constitutions reflect the desire of the head of state to accumulate power, permitting him to relegate the legislature, the courts, and other institutions to a secondary position if he chose.

Universal suffrage and direct election of the president and legislature came to Haiti in the 20th century. The legislature had the task of selecting presidents. Until recently only a tiny minority in Port-au-Prince participated in the electoral process.

The only hope to participate in the economic and political system is to establish personal ties with the powerful and the rich. Power is personalized at all levels. If one has the family and friendship ties with those in power, one’s interest will be safeguarded and one will be respected; if not, one is excluded from participation and plays the role of victim of government and business. These prosperous families try to place a relative in key ministries and in the officer corps of the army. At every level in this society personalization is the key to power and resources.

1Under Duvalier alone the constitution was revised in 1957, 1961, 1964 (to make him president for life), it was amended in 1971 (to ensure that his son would succeed him), in 1983 it was rewritten again. After the ouster of Jean-Claude Duvalier, a new constitution was written in 1987.
The Exercise of Power

The Constitution of 1964 (Caribbean Data Book, 1983, p. 150) states that the national sovereignty resides in the universality of the citizens and the exercise of this sovereignty is delegated to three powers: the legislative, the judiciary, and the executive. These three powers are to exercise their duties independently, but in fact, until 1986 the Haitian political regime was presidential. The Assembly may be adjourned or dissolved by the president before expiration of the term. In the Duvalier constitutions the president of the republic appoints and fires all persons, and the 1983 constitution allowed the president (J. C. Duvalier) to name the next president for life.

The Legislative Power

Before 1957 the congress of Haiti had 37 deputies and 21 senators. However, since the constitution of 1964 the legislative power was exercised by a unicameral legislative chamber called "Chambre Legislative," composed of 58 deputies elected by a plurality of votes for a 6-year term.

The modification of 1971 fixed at 18 years the age required for assuming any civil and political responsibilities and allowed the president to designate his successor. To be elected deputy one must be Haitian, have

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never renounced its nationality, have lived five years in
the district he wants to represent. The deputies are
elected for a 6-year term and can be indefinitely re-
elected. The new Constitution of 1987, however, re-
emphasized that the legislative power will be exercised by
two representative chambers, a chamber of deputies and a
senate. It fixed at 25 years the age of eligibility for
deputy and 30 years of age for senators. The number of
deputies will not be less than 70 and elected to 4-year
terms. The number of senators have been fixed to three
per department and elected to 6-year terms and can be
indefinitely re-elected.

The Judicial Power

The judicial power is exercised by a court of
Cassation (which is the equivalent to the US Supreme
Court), courts of appeal and inferior courts (civil and
justice-of-the-peace courts). The judges of the Court of
Cassation and Courts of Appeals are appointed for ten
years and those of the civil courts and lower courts for
seven years. Justice is rendered according to the French
tradition. Codes inspired by those of Napoleon were
issued in 1825 together with a more peculiar Rural Code
that governs the conduct of country life. There is a
justice of the peace in every commune, as well as primary
courts at departmental capitals.
Regional Administration

Haiti is administratively divided into nine geographical departments, the smallest administrative division being the "Section Rurale" (rural section). It is the principal cell of the national organism. In the process of organization and development of the economic, social, and cultural forces of the country, the "Section Rurale" plays a major role. The "Section Rurale" is directed by "un Chef de Section" (a chief of section or sheriff).

The Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure

The penal code of Haiti (Rigal, 1958a) was first promulgated in August 1835 and was amended nine times between 1846 and 1935. It recognized three categories of offenses—felonies, misdemeanors, and police contraventions—and defined the penalties imposed for them. Punishments enumerated are: death, imprisonment for life with forced labor, imprisonment with forced labor for a specific number of years, and jail for a specific period. Punishment not requiring detention are banishment, loss of civil rights, and placement under special police surveillance.

Death sentences were carried out by firing squad in a public area designated in the writ of condemnation. The 1987 constitution, however, abolished the death penalty.
Men condemned to forced labor are employed on public projects; women are employed inside the prisons.

Accomplices receive the same punishment as the primary offender. There is no punishment for offenses committed by persons acting under duress or under circumstances beyond their control, and mitigating circumstances may change punishments. Punishments for contraventions of minor police regulations range from small fines to jail sentences of from 1 day to 6 months.

The Code of Criminal Procedures (Rigal, 1958b) was last amended in February 1958. According to the code, urban and rural police are responsible for investigating felonies, misdemeanors, and police violations against persons or property. The justice of the peace or the judge investigates the act and determines whether or not a trial is to be held. Criminal trial is always by a jury of 12 individuals (actually 13 are chosen in case one is not able to attend the trial) whose function is to decide the guilt or innocence/condemnation or liberation of the accused. All Haitians 20 years or older who enjoy full civil and political rights, are not incapacitated, and have not committed a previous offence are eligible for jury duty.

The Code reiterates certain articles in the constitution that guarantee civil rights and individual freedom. No one may be arrested, detained, or prosecuted
except in those cases set forth in the laws. Arrest and detention may take place only on warrant from a legally competent official. No one may be kept in detention for more than 48 hours without being brought before a judge competent to rule on the legality of his arrest and unless the judge approves the detention in a decision based on the study of all the available evidence.

Although the Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedures (Rigal, 1958a,b) were designed to ensure that justice was administered and that individual rights were fully protected, this has not been the case, for example, during the presidential regimes of Paul Magloire, Francois Duvalier, and to some extent Jean-Claude Duvalier. Many individuals were summarily arrested and detained for months or years without benefit of trial (during those years Haiti has seen the highest increase of individuals leaving its shore for countries with better human rights record in North America and Europe).

At the expense of the legislative and judicial branches, the executive branch has for many years controlled all aspects of governmental structure.

Some Conclusions

It is hoped that the preceding outlined a global picture of the Haitian social structure by giving a synopsis of the demographic, political, religious,
cultural, and economic realities and how they affect the individual’s social interactions. This view of the sociography of Haiti is necessary in order for the reader to better understand the milieu in which the study was done.

What has been described is a Haiti that consists of two separate but interlocking worlds: the rural masses from whom has emerged an original and vibrant culture and the urban-based elites who have been unwilling to tackle the enormous economic and social problems the country has faced. The peasants live in a world of deeply imbued religious faith and popular culture. The elite prides itself on its ties with French and European culture, and its business dealings with North America.

More and more, however, Haiti is becoming a society built on class rather than color. There is a modest, mostly black, urban middle class which is becoming sensitive to the need for social mobility.

Great changes are underway in Haiti. The departure of Jean-Claude Duvalier brought an end to the centralized presidential rule and an opening of the society. The new constitution of 1987 and the return of migrants promise to liberalize and democratize the country.
CHAPTER III

THE NATURE OF CRIME IN HAITI

Crime in Haiti presents different problems than those of developed countries and even some developing countries. Some of the differences relate to the type of offenses, others to the degree of importance attributed to the crime, and still others have to do with the uniqueness of the crime.

From the late 1950s to the early 1970s--during the presidency of Francois Duvalier--common crimes were relegated to a secondary role while "counter revolutionary" acts or behaviors defined as political in nature were prioritized. During these years all behaviors that were considered a problem or a threat to the survival of the Duvalier dictatorship were targetted and the emphasis was placed on the controlling and eliminating of politically undesirable persons. By 1971 and the coming to power of Jean-Claude Duvalier most of the people believed to be a nuisance to the government were either executed, in prisons, or in exile. Consequently, as the system became institutionalized and political threats reduced, crime and other forms of social disorder received increased attention.

Clinard and Abbott (1973) argue that because of a
lack of security measures and the habits of most people, opportunities for theft are much greater in the less developed countries than in the more developed ones. However, in Haiti, the homes of the wealthy are secured with locks and chains on all outside doors, locked gates, high walls around the buildings with glass on top. Many employ watchmen throughout the night and sometimes elaborate security systems have been devised for the homes.

On the other hand, in the common man's household, theft requires little skill since their homes have neither doors nor locks and are poorly constructed. Often more than one family shares a small sleeping area utilizing it in shifts. For these reasons most property offenses in Haiti are committed by the poor against the poor; thus the stolen articles being of little monetary value. Theft of food and clothing prevail, but car theft is almost unknown.

In this respect Haiti is similar to developing countries of Africa. A sample of prison inmates and juvenile delinquents in Uganda, Cameroun, and Ghana showed that the following items were most often cited as stolen objects: coat, radio, chicken, suitcase, tires, shoes, clothing, cigarettes, food, and money (Clinard & Abbott, 1973). This is true for Haiti as well.

In the last few years, other developing nations
(e.g., Nigeria, Kenya, Jamaica) have recorded a rapid increase in crimes of violence. Haiti has not experienced a similar trend. Robbery, petty larceny, and street fighting remain the predominant types of deviant behavior.

In dealing with the nature of crime in Haiti, it is important to realize that Haiti's past affect the manner in which deviance is perceived and dealt with, furthermore, her cultural patterns affect the way that behavior occurs and the manner in which it is viewed.

Voodoo and Crime

Unlike other developing countries, the presence of a belief in voodoo in Haiti impacts the pattern of crime. According to statistics, approximately 90% of the Haitian population is Catholic and the rest is Protestant. These numbers, however, hide the fact that voodoo is practiced by 80% of the population. Voodoo is what the Haitian really puts his trust in.

Students of Haitian culture are at odds about the impact of voodoo on the society. Some argue that it is functional and others feel that it is criminogenic. The influence of voodoo is seen at times as functional because it keeps people in line, helps keep law and order (the law of the ancestors and how to live). Furthermore, many individuals argue that due to the influence of the religion (voodoo) Haiti, has one of the lowest crime rates.
of any nation.

On the other hand, voodoo is seen as a criminogenic factor. It is argued that a number of offences, especially violent offences are committed by voodooists residing in the rural sector of Haiti. For instance, the voodoo gods are credited with formidable power of making the earth fruitful or barren, thus, the peasants tend to substitute modern farming techniques for the will of the spirits or loas. A bad harvest, therefore, is very often attributed to the evil spells of the neighbors who resort to malefic spirits to cause harm. Thus hate, jealousy, and distrust hang over the Haitian countryside. Also, the idea that a number of voodoo practitioners turn individuals or enemies into zombies is widespread. Incredibly, Haitian criminal law recognizes the existence of zombies. Article 246 of the old penal code states that "use of substances whereby a person is not killed but reduced to a state of lethargy, more or less prolonged . . . if following the state of lethargy, the person is buried, then the attempt will be termed a murder" (Rigal, 1958a, p. 56). In the black-magic realm of the zombies are the "ouangas" or symbols which cause harm to a person. Peasants believe that a "bocor" (sorcerer) can cause sickness or even death with the "ouanga." The seriousness of this attitude is reflected in an old Haitian law which strictly forbids their use under any circumstances.
The idea of religious affiliation and crime is not unique to Haiti. Salas (1979) argues that a large number of violent crimes in Cuba are committed by Afro-Cubans who belong to the Abakua and Naniga sects. India appears to have a similar problem (Somerville, 1931).

In Haiti, folktales are commonly told of children or animals being abducted for sacrificial offerings. Even though it is widely assumed that most of these myths are false, sermons in Christian churches seem to reinforce these fears. In rural Haiti, most people do not believe in death by natural causes. Except in rare instances, all death is considered suspicious. When someone dies one must find the cause. The deceased may be the cause of his own death by violating a rule or a prohibition, or he could be the victim of a curse due to voodoo or sorcery (witchcraft). The questions that the relatives or friends of the deceased ask are not those which come to "westerner" minds when one of their relatives die (What disease did he have? Was he involved in an accident?) In rural Haiti, when searching for the root of the evil, the first questions asked are: Who was jealous of him? What evil did he do? With whom did he have a problem? In short, Who killed him?

Voodoo would be at the origin of many deaths that "westerners" consider natural. Other societies confront the same problem as Haiti; for example, the Tiv of Nigeria
(Bohannan, 1960).

As can be expected, it is very difficult to prosecute these cases. Very often it is impossible to prove or show that a malefic act was committed by an individual since in most cases the individual has to go through a "Hougan" or voodoo priest who has special invocations or ceremonies to make before an action can be taken.

Infanticide

In the Haitian milieu, the crime of infanticide is very rare. One of the reasons is that the Haitian family has a very strong support mechanism and is always ready to support its children in need. Even if a girl is rejected by her lover, she will always feel accepted and wanted at home.

In the majority of the cases the perpetrator of this crime is a single mother whose attempt to abort the pregnancy has failed. Very often her lover is an accomplice by giving his assistance.

The rationale for his crime is based on economic and social difficulties faced by the mother and/or by the refusal of the baby's father to admit to the paternity—thus leaving the mother by herself to deal with this problem. This offence is done so clandestinely that it is a real challenge to government officials. After the death of the baby, he/she is usually left on the side of public
highways or abandoned in a pit or hole very late in the night.

Table 5
Arrests Made by the Police and Armed Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infanticide</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Exploitation of Juveniles by Adult Criminals

In Haiti, as well as in a number of developing countries, juveniles are involuntarily involved in deviant activities or practices. Due to the economic condition, mendicity (i.e., begging) is widespread. Very often, under orders of adults (poor parents and relatives) young adolescents are sent into streets of the cities to beg for money. In Port-au-Prince the tourists are prime targets. It is not unusual to see mothers carrying their young children in their arms in an attempt to appeal to the compassion of "passers-by." In very few instances adults predetermine the amount of money to be collected, and in still rarer occasions juveniles are told to rob "passers-by" of their wallet or the street vendors of food and small articles and then disappear in the crowd. This kind of behavior is more prevalent in other developing nations of Africa (e.g., Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria) (Clinard &
Abbott, 1973). In these countries the adults sometimes accompany and follow the juvenile from a distance to see how he is operating. In Haiti, whatever the economic condition of the family, very rarely does the parent tell the child to steal.

To understand the problem of juvenile delinquency in Haiti one must refer to the social structure of that country, where the "stress" of poverty is such that the forms of social pathology are often but a reflection of an extremely deficient economic infrastructure.

Basically, three types of delinquent acts are found in Haiti: the first category include behaviors judged delinquent by an external observer (a foreigner) but not by the milieu, since these behaviors represent an aspect of the local custom. This is the case of a number of people who urinate in the streets (font pipi dans les rues). This behavior could be considered in other countries as an exhibitionist manifestation, but in Haiti it is considered normal. Also cock fighting, gambling on the sidewalks, are forms of deviance generally acceptable. During carnival and Mardi Gras even public sexual displays are tolerated.

A second category of behaviors are those considered delinquent by the milieu but that have been traditionally tolerated. An example of these behaviors would be cases of children working in houses of prostitution (a form of
procureness but also a way to earn a living); vagrancy (wanderer, vagabond, tramp), and begging on the streets as well as the attacks on the Haitian American Sugar Company (H.A.S.C.O.). Train convoys are attacked by some adolescent groups with the goal of taking a bundle or two of sugar cane which will be used for the supper of their families or friends.

Table 6
Decisions Taken by the "Forces Armees d'Haiti" Following Arrests: 1973-1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Release by the police</td>
<td>8,746</td>
<td>3,693</td>
<td>9,538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dismissed by the courts</td>
<td>12,554</td>
<td>7,020</td>
<td>14,738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referred to prosecutor</td>
<td>767</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>1,596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In abeyance</td>
<td>6,125</td>
<td>5,004</td>
<td>10,676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convicted/sentenced</td>
<td>10,511</td>
<td>6,732</td>
<td>15,581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-specified</td>
<td>3,369</td>
<td>3,492</td>
<td>6,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>42,072</strong></td>
<td><strong>26,642</strong></td>
<td><strong>58,454</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Institut Haitien de Statistique, Department des Finances et des Affaires Economiques, Bulletin Trimestriels de Statistique, 1976.

Finally, the third category of delinquent behavior comprise those which are considered so by the police authorities and the law: burglary, breaking and entering-
-especially the night burglary of residential houses. In Haiti, professional burglars or thieves, murder, as well as suicides are extremely rare.

Theft by Servants

Since Haiti has a high percentage of unemployed, it is very common for households of the well-to-do, foreign residents, and those of the rapidly growing middle class to have more than one servant working for them. For the most part, household servants are female. They do most of the cooking, take care of the children, and at times do the shopping at the open markets. Some male servants are also hired to do the security work such as staying alert at night in an attempt to prevent thieves and burglars from getting in. The male servants also wash the cars, do house cleaning chores, and other physically demanding jobs.

There are no regulations governing wages and hours of work. Provisions of the labor code do not apply to servants. In the majority of cases the servants reside with the employer, they are given free room and board and are paid a minimal amount each month. Every so often, the servants are allowed to go to their towns or villages of origin to visit their parents and relatives.

Stress is put on the personal reliability of all household servants; furthermore, they are under a lot of
pressure not to steal or break anything in the house. However, even the most honest domestic often cannot resist some acts of theft when he/she finds him/herself surrounded by readily available items that not only cannot be obtained through purchase but also can be disposed of fairly easily.

It is not difficult for the servants to rationalize their acts when they are employed in houses where extravagance and waste are often evident. Furthermore, the opportunities for theft are constantly present and varied. The most common stolen items are money, clothing, radios, and food.

In Haiti, a number of children work as servants. Parents who are economically weak and have many children and cannot take care of them would rather see them work as servants than see them malnourished or die of starvation. Many parents "give" their children to those families—a form of "informal adoption." These children work for the "adopted" families in return they are sent to school.

In a study done by Devesin (1975) in Petion-ville (a suburb of Port-au-Prince) an attempt was made not only to find out the types of objects which are most often stolen by servants, but to also find out the extent of children working as servants. In 69% of the cases the children were girls and 34% of them were boys. Six percent of them were between 6-9 years old; 68% were between 10-15 years
old; 21% were between 16-18 years old; and 7% were over 18 years old. Fifty-nine percent of the children came from the southern part of the country. (This is probably due to geographical location—it is closer to Port-au-Prince, also, the south is more prone to natural disasters such as hurricanes and cyclones, which destroy houses, and plantations.)

The educational level of these children appears to be very low. According to the study, 73% of the children have never been to school, only 7% of them have had some schooling, either before or during their employment as domestics. The items that the children most often stole were money, food, and clothing (very similar to adult servants). In an attempt to get rid of the stolen items quickly, the servants contact relatives or friends who reside in the capital city to come by the house of their employment and get the items. This is often done when the owners are out in the town or late at night when everyone is sleeping.

Drug Offences

Drugs are one of the major problems, one of the big headaches of capitalist countries, and up to this point most developing and closed societies have been able to control this problem. Recently, however, the use, cultivation, and trafficking of drugs have become a
serious problem for these governments.

In Jamaican society the use of marijuana is widely accepted. In Cuba, however, the government has adopted harsh measures aimed at sellers and users of both marijuana and narcotic drugs. In justifying these sanctions, the authorities have explained that the usage of drugs is a factor in the corruption of society and constitutes a serious harm to the individual as well as presenting a social and economic danger for humanity. Sentences have been especially harsh for foreign nationals, who are often arrested after their craft has been forced to land on Cuban territory.

The Caribbean basin is located in the heart of the drug traffic coming from South America to markets in the United States. Haiti, because of its political and economic isolation, has been spared the drug problem.

Since the mid-1970s the use of narcotics and drugs have surfaced. It has become such a problem that a Drug Act was enacted. Act 60 states that the illicit use of narcotics is punishable by a fine of 5,000 to 10,000 gourdes\(^1\) or six months to two years of imprisonment (Carre, 1980). In case of recidivism, both actions will be taken (the person will be fined 10,000 gourdes and spend two years in jail). A foreigner will be expelled from the country and will not be allowed to ever return.

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\(^1\)The official change is 5.00 gourdes for $1.00.
Trafficking in drugs is illegal in Haiti. Haitian lawyers admit that the cultivation of marijuana is not widespread, and if it is planted at all, it is most likely hidden in fields with other products such as corn.

Those individuals who came to the attention of the police as drug users or traffickers have been for the most part foreigners (an unusually high number of Columbians), also individuals who are well-to-do or the children of the elite in power. Also in the group are Haitians who have lived overseas and returned to Haiti either permanently or on vacation. Moreover, Carre (1982) who has observed public trials¹ in Haiti comments that the drug offenders who came to trial seem to disproportionately represent the bourgeoisie. Most have completed secondary school; they are often the children of merchants and businessmen, and they are often painters, musicians, and artists. They are mostly male, and the age range varies between 20 and 30.

In conversations with Haitian scholars, it is the consensus that drug is not widespread among the indigenous population. The main source of marijuana is foreigners; this thinking, at least, is the predominant attitude of the police. Interestingly, they do not emphasize alcohol addiction as drug abuse. Anyone, of any age, can buy

¹Those present at the public trial include not only the judges, offenders and defense, but also all people who in some fashion have an interest in the proceedings. Trials are open to the public.
alcohol at any time during the day. There is, however, a jail sentence or penalty for those who have car accidents while under the influence of alcohol. In the rural areas where the income of the peasants is very low, it is assumed they cannot afford the more expensive marijuana. Therefore, in the rural areas one finds almost exclusively the use of alcohol.

Armed Robbery

One of the rapidly increasing crimes in countries undergoing development is armed robbery. Robbery with violence has become such a concern that some countries such as Uganda, Kenya, and Zambia have advocated the death penalty for it (Clinard & Abbott, 1973). Moreover, in the early 1970s Nigeria publicly executed by firing squads more than 40 persons for armed robbery. This type of crime is seen as a serious offense because armed robbery is not only an attack against property, but also presents a serious threat to the victim.

In Haiti, armed robbery is not as serious a concern as it is in many other developing countries. The reasons for this are that first, fire arms are not sold to the public (arms cannot be bought in stores). Second, no one is allowed to have fire arms unless it is given by a government organization, such as the police, the army, or the department of the interior. Third, every year, the
person to whom a fire arm was given must renew the license, otherwise the fire arm will be taken away.

During the Duvalier years, only a select group of individuals were given fire arms. These individuals are either government officials or individuals assigned to defend the regime, such as the Volunteers for National Security (VSN).

The last couple of years have seen an increase in armed robbery. One often-used tactic is for individuals to dress in army uniforms and stop cars on deserted highways for an "alleged" military search; however, as they start the search, they pull their guns and rob the passengers of their belongings and escape into the night. Government officials have not been able to find out if these robbers are military personnel or individuals disguised in army uniforms. Also, armed robberies in which knives and machetes are used have increased. In the past year, since the ouster of Jean Claude Duvalier from power, the report and incidences of armed robbery have dramatically increased.

White Color Crime

Another rapidly increasing crime in developing countries is white collar crime and corruption in government and business. A majority of business persons in Haiti embezzle money and violate import, export, and
currency-control regulations. Furthermore, politicians and government employees make financial gains by granting favors and providing tax exemptions to businesses.

Government corruption is an acute problem in Haiti and many officials have amassed large fortunes in political offices. Too often the money that is to be used for economic development is diverted to the high officials’ bank account in foreign countries. This is not a recent problem. Haitian history is riddled with corruption of public officials. Furthermore, it is well documented that government officials routinely pursed the public coffers for their own benefit. A detailed study on Canadian Development Aid to Haiti says little progress has been made in Haiti in reducing the notorious misuse of public revenues for private purposes by Haitian government officials. Huge sums are still diverted in countless different ways (Latin America and Caribbean Contemporary Record, 1985). Furthermore, the Haitian elite, which is Haiti 1% of the population, takes home more than 40% of the national income; moreover, the richest 1% of the population pays only 6% of its estimated income in taxes, including export taxes (Inter-American Development Bank, 1981).

Besides Haiti, other developing nations such as Zaire, Nigeria, Ghana, and the Central African Republic are notorious for this kind of behavior. (In Zaire many
individuals make ample use of what is known as Article 15. In clearer terms this means Zaireans give way to corruption: teachers sell diplomas. No official form is available from a civil servant without a tip.) Moreover, the president of Zaire has come under sharp criticism for alleged misappropriation of state funds. He has amassed a large fortune but contends he does not get more from Zaire's state coffers than his annual endowment voted by parliament which is estimated at approximately 10% of the entire state budget.

Undoubtedly, the benefits of holding a political office in a country as poor as Haiti are enormous. Not only is there the salary, there are also many possible additional side benefits (as in Zaire, to get a passport, to get merchandise through customs, or to get important papers, it is not uncommon for a bribe to be a propos).

In addition, foreign corporations, in an attempt to exploit the cheap labor force and get tax exemptions, are known to corrupt government officials. At the present time, since Haitian labor appears to be cheap, more corporations will establish in Haiti, hence the opportunities for corruption can be expected to continue for some time.

Homosexuality

Officially, homosexuality is not defined as a
criminal act if it is practiced among consenting adults. It is, however, prosecuted if minors are involved.

Societal disdain for homosexual behavior has always been strong in Haitian culture, especially in the rural areas. Similarly, strong societal disdain is observed in Hispanic cultures such as Cuba (Salas, 1979) and Mexico (Krase & Sagarin, 1980).

The word "massissi" is one of the most derogatory words in creole. The rural Haitian attitude towards homosexuality seems to continue to reflect stereotypes and beliefs influenced by "macho" concept of virility. Furthermore, the man who has two or more mistresses or women is seen as a sexual athlete. The richer the peasant (gros habitant) the more women he is expected to have. One of the worst fates that could come to a father is to find that his son is a "massissi" (homosexual) and one of the worst names a child or adolescent can be called is "massissi."

As a whole, Haitian social scientists feel that homosexuality is not a serious problem in Haitian society due primarily to the strong informal control, labeling, and shunning. The withholding of the social support of the peer group can constitute severe punishment.

In the last few years, however, there has been a rapid increase in homosexual activities in the urban areas. No one the researcher has talked to seems to know
the cause, nonetheless some assumptions have been made. For example, the influx of return migrants from North America and Europe seem to diminish the stigma attached to this behavior in the urban milieu. Secondly, this practice is "acceptable" among the younger members of the Haitian government. It is rumored that a number of Haitian officials under the Duvaliers were either bisexual or homosexual (some were homosexuals of circumstances); thus, homosexuality is seen, by rural Haitians, as a reflection of bourgeois corruption, wealth, and power.

In the last few years, Haiti has become a favorite vacation sport for American and European homosexuals, making this behavior less "bizarre." Finally, the conception that Haitian homosexuals use drugs and are too Americanized is prevalent. Due to extreme poverty, a number of young Haitians sell themselves to foreign homosexuals in order to survive.

Prostitution

Prior to 1971 prostitution was not widespread in Haiti. Since then, however, large numbers of prostitutes are practicing this trade.

As in most developing countries, prostitution in Haiti is almost exclusively an urban phenomenon. The close personal relationships, the rigidity of custom and values prevent any disapproved practices from existing and
expanding in the rural setting. As a matter of fact, the Haitian women must be modest, discreet, and reserved.

The sexual relations of women before marriage is severely condemned. (In the mid '70s a young graduate nurse in Port-au-Prince lost her job and her diploma because she became pregnant while not married.) In the countryside, after a wedding in which the bride is discovered not to be a virgin, the angry husband takes his new in-laws a symbolic gift of an opened bottle of Coke and a hollowed-out loaf.

The situation is quite different in the cities. Men migrate to them without women, furthermore the rigid sex codes inhibit premarital relations, and the rapid increase in tourism during the last years provide a demand for the services of the prostitute.

Houses of prostitution or brothels with as many as 60 or 70 girls are common in Port-au-Prince, especially in the section of Carrefour. In the slum areas the practice of prostitution is also common.

The ranks of prostitutes are filled by women from diverse backgrounds. The majority are natives but a substantial number are immigrants from the Dominican Republic and Columbia. Most native prostitutes are poorly educated and come from slum neighborhoods or rural areas. According to Fortune (1977), in 95% of the cases prostitution in Haiti is a direct consequence of poverty.
and hunger. Similarly, in the majority of Latin-American countries, the determining causes of prostitution are practically the same: poverty, familial disorganization, lack of preparation to assume a career, rural exodus, and in the cities, lack of housing which brings a familial promiscuity. In the more developed countries of Latin America it is noted that industrialization and inflation may be a factor (Rico, 1978). Thus a number of Haitian prostitutes walk the streets. However, the more sophisticated or "westernized" girls hang out at bars, dance halls and hotels and go with anyone who has money to pay them.

One of the reasons for the flourishing trade is a unique legal condition under which prostitution itself is not sanctioned by the penal code. As a matter of fact, the section of Carrefour where most of the so-called "bars-of-the-evening" are located are government inspected, medically checked by the government doctors weekly, and they are usually "on limits" which means that no case of venereal disease has been reported originating from there.

In the majority of the "bars-of-the-evening" the population is evenly distributed between 50% Haitians and 50% from the Dominican Republic. The rooms are usually small with no running water or bathroom. Usually after everyone has gone two girls share one of the rooms as home
In another "Bar" 60% of the girls were Spanish-speaking from the Dominican Republic. They ranged in age from late teens to early twenties and usually can only spend a month under their visa restrictions before they return to their normal ordinary jobs in their own country. Their parents usually are not aware they have gone "professional."

In most of the cases, prostitution among Haitian women is in general not linked to other kinds of criminal activity.

Characteristics of Offenders

The state of data gathering by various agencies of crime in Haiti leaves much to be desired. Nevertheless, the researcher was able to look at some criminal cases which had appeared in court. The data registered the age of the offender, the offense, relation of the victim to the offender (if any), the sex of the offender, his/her place of birth and residence (if different). Even though the material gathered is small (N = 500), it is believed that the data will shed some light on the wider offender population and the result can shed some light about the pattern of crime in Haiti.

In this sample, the average age of the offender was 32.1 years. This shows that juvenile delinquency is not a
serious problem in Haiti. Adolescents are not very involved in delinquent activities. From this data, it appears that the criminal population is considerably older in Haiti than in many other countries. In Haiti very few offenders are under 18 years of age, compared with Cuba, where in 1977 juveniles accounted for 33% of all robbery arrests (these figures reflect on minors under the age of 16 (Salas, 1977). In Sweden, they found that 60% of all persons suggested for a crime the first time was under the age of fifteen (Friday, 1970). Even though the Haitian population as a whole is relatively young (52% is less than 20 years old and more than 42% is less than 14 years old), the offender population is much older (Table 6).

Migration patterns may be one reason for the older age of the offender population in Haiti. Before age 17-18 most Haitian children are under the tutelage of their families. Most adolescents remain at home to help with farming and the raising of cattle. Secondly, adolescents are expected to uphold the family name and not discredit it. Thirdly, Haitians usually do not leave home until after the completion of school or after marriage. Thus, they are constantly under the watchful eyes of their parents or extended relatives.

Sexual Breakdown

Although limited data may be available for the entire
Table 7
Average Age by Crime
Haiti, 1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offense</th>
<th>Average Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rape/attemped rape</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>37.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polygamy</td>
<td>41.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forgery</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the author from data collected at Court de Cassassion—1975.

In the Republic of Haiti, there is even less detailed statistical information on the offenses and characteristics of arrested offenders. This is because such data are not readily obtainable, furthermore, they are very difficult to compile and tabulate since most of the work is done by hand. The available information for 1975 in which the data were compiled show that the offender population was 98% male and 2% female. Haiti seems to have a sharp differential in the arrest rate for man and woman. (A similar pattern exists in Kenya where 89% of convicted persons were males compared with about 8% female [Muga, 1975].) Several factors seem to reduce female arrests. First, the restricted role of Haitian women—even though
the Haitian woman is the backbone of the economy (they are the ones who walk long distances carrying heavy loads of produce to markets; they are servants and cooks; they work on the farm), the society is male oriented and they dominate the economic, social, and political sectors. A second factor is the state of prostitution in Haiti. Unlike many other countries, prostitution is not a criminal offense in Haiti. In fact, in most countries, it is one of the most frequent crimes among women, even though the law is seldom enforced. Since prostitution is legalized in Haiti, there are no arrests made for this behavior, thus keeping the number of female offenders to a minimum. Thirdly, inadequate institutional facilities to accommodate female prisoners make the police reluctant to make arrests except for serious offenses. In Haiti, as in most countries, males are overrepresented in the offender population.

Other Data

It was also found that in 60% of the sample, the criminal offenders did not commit the crime in their place of birth. In other words, their place of birth was not the same as their place of residence. Many had left their village for a more urban setting. Finding themselves in a conglomeration of people, removed from their rural and familial types of control, they lost their inhibitions.
Thus, the involvement in deviant behavior. This correlates with other countries such as Zambia, where it was found that nearly half of the delinquents were migrants (Clifford, 1967). A Ghanian study also found that the majority of offenses in the larger cities were committed by the young from country areas (Tooth, 1956).

Even though in 60% of the cases the offender did not commit the offense in his/her place of birth, in 86% of the sample, the offender knew the victim. It is often argued that due to the heterogeneity of city life, opportunities for impersonality and anonymity are present; thus the likelihood of involvement in crime. This does not appear to be the case in Haiti. One factor is that in most instances crime is handled informally within groups, without involving law enforcement agencies, only in cases of serious offenses. Usually, the offender is dealt with on the spot either by being beaten or shunned by the group—the offender feels "safer" stealing from an acquaintance than from a stranger who would most likely call the police. Secondly, as mentioned in a previous chapter, Haitian migrants tend to travel with friends and relatives. Furthermore, they live in the same area—only 35% move from their town to the city alone. Consequently, if you travel together and reside in the same area, you will most likely steal from this same area since in Haiti public transportation is rudimentary. There is a marked
scarcity of bicycles, because most cannot afford them. As a result people mainly walk. Thus the distance they can cover is limited. Therefore, most of the crimes committed in an area are by people who reside there or are in close proximity; thus they are mostly known by members of the community. Thirdly, Haiti has a high unemployment rate (more than half of the adult population), consequently, many people work as servants and maids in the homes of the well-to-do and of the growing middle class. These servants often cannot resist some acts of theft when they are surrounded by items they cannot purchase but can also dispose of fairly easily. These factors explain why in our sample the percentage of offenders who know their victims is so high.

Some Problems of Doing Research in Haiti

Recent years have seen a rapid expansion of criminological research, especially comparatively. However, a number of factors complicate the task of the investigator planning to study crime in developing countries in general, and Haiti more specifically. Studied very little, Haitian criminality and the social reactions that it incites, offer criminologists an untapped field for investigation.

However, sociologists who plan to ascertain the nature and extent of crime committed in Haiti should be
reminded that strict adherence to certain theoretical and/or methodological approaches in hypothesis construction and testing may not be advisable due to the lack of systematic cross-cultural replication and validation of field instruments. Therefore, any attempt to apply only a single research strategy is likely to yield spurious data.

In general, official statistics in countries undergoing development are subjected to critical examination. Some major questions raised are:

1. The limitations of the data presented to outsiders—many developing countries withhold vital data on crime so their countries will not appear to have a serious problem with deviant behavior.

2. The characteristics of arrested offenders—Are they really representative of those committing crime?

3. The official statistics—Do they reflect the actual amount of crime?

4. Do biases arise when the offender’s political affiliation is opposite that of the present government or ruling class?

5. Do arrest rates merely represent shifts in the level of enforcement rather than increased criminality? A concrete example is Cuba. In 1978, after criticism by Fidel Castro and other prominent figures, the police arrest notes increased by 7% (Salas, 1979).
Probably, in most countries crimes known to the police is the best available index, since it represents crimes reported to the police by individuals (either the victims or a witness) or crimes discovered by the police and noted in their records. Even so, in Haiti crime known to the police is not a good indicator of criminal activities primarily because persons very often do not report criminal offenses to the police. Traditionally, crime is often handled informally within groups or among the individuals without involving the police except in the case of serious offenses such as homicide. (This is especially the case among lower income groups.)

A similar pattern is seen in India. A study shows that about 25% of a sample interviewed failed to report crimes committed against them. The primary reason for this was that the individual, family, or group may not welcome the intrusion of outsiders and prefer to handle the matter themselves (Bayley, 1970). Secondly, the distance to a police station may be too great. As is very often the case, individuals are too far from a police station or "chef de section" to report an offense and other means of communication are lacking. This is especially true in a country as Haiti where the roads are in poor condition and telecommunication is basically nonexistent outside of the capital city. Thirdly, the victim does not expect much result from the police investigation.
The expectation of productive outcome is too meager, as in the case of property offenses such as farm animals.

In Haiti, as in most countries, the official crime statistics do not represent an accurate picture of the real amount of criminal behavior. The latter is always greater than the amount reported to the police. The police data is only a sample representation of delinquency and crime in the total criminality, the remaining unknown crimes being the "dark figures" of criminal statistics is everywhere a serious problem when examining the dimensions of crime and delinquency.

It appears, in Haiti, as is often the case in both developed and developing nations, differential arrest and conviction affect to a greater degree the lower class person and those who live in the slums. In Cuba, the lower classes with low educational achievement are overrepresented among the offender population (Salas, 1979). Clinard and Abbott (1973) also suggest that most prison inmates (in any country) come from the lower classes. Furthermore, an individual is more likely to report an offense to the police if the person who committed the offense is from the lower class. Moreover, the police itself will hesitantly pursue or investigate a suspect who has money or influential connections. They will, however, vigorously investigate if the suspect is poor, illiterate, and has no connections or friends in the
government or high places.

In many countries in development, but Haiti in particular, an individual who commits an offense but is a member of a special government force (Volunteer of National Security—Tonton Macoutes, or the Leopards) or a supporter of the regime is very often released and not even apprehended by the police. However, if it is found that the individual does not fit the above categories, he/she is most of the time arrested, severely beaten, and as Clinard and Abbott (1973) maintained, "third degree" methods of interrogation are used.

Access to secondary data and information is very difficult: the social scientists must be willing and able to "bribe" the officials (pass money under the table) to get access to a minimum of information. The difficulties are intensified by other factors inside Haiti. For example, statistics on social problems and criminality are fairly unsophisticated, if collected at all. Most data appear in the "Guide Economique de la Republique d’Haiti." Other data can be found as the "Revue de la Faculte d’Ethnologie" and reports or stories which appear in Haitian newspapers.

In Haiti, as in many developing countries, sociology is a recent addition to the social sciences and criminological studies are traditionally pursued by lawyers, anthropologists, psychologists, or ethnologists.
In reviewing foreign crime statistics, criminologists are faced with the problem of legal definitions for crimes which sometimes are accepted as being universal, yet there are vast differences in statutory and penal codes.

With the increase in comparative studies, many sociologists find developing nations an untapped milieu where western theories can be re-tested, and since most data in comparative sociology involve written or spoken languages, the research is relatively dependent upon the accuracy of translation. Friday (1976) mentioned at least four factors which affect meaning equivalence in translations: (1) the lexical meaning of words, (2) the syntactical context of words, (3) the availability of translators, and (4) the cultural context of words. With this in mind, great care should be used when using questionnaires or doing interviews in Haiti.

As outsiders, sociologists may be objects of suspicion. Foreign governments often imagine risks in research by foreign scholars. These suspicions are magnified when the research area deals with social problems such as poverty, mental illness, or crime. Very often, these foreign social scientists are seen as a threat to national pride and in some cases as promoting subversion or espionage.

The state of criminological research in Haiti is based primarily on the European tradition, which is almost
exclusively oriented toward the legal, biological, medical, and psychiatric aspects of criminality, while the psychological and sociological aspects have been practically neglected.

Consequently, in Haiti lawyers and medical workers/psychiatrists are most interested in the study of crime. Some more recent studies have been inspired by North American sociological theories (Caree, 1980) and in Latin America, Bugalli (1972).

Much of the work done has attempted to reproduce the experience of other countries, without adjusting or steering them. They are therefore, in general devoid of originality and without a wide scope. Furthermore, the lack of adequate research facilities make it very difficult to incorporate the available information and compare them with other world research in the field.

European and North American books and materials occupy the primary place. Thus there is a real possibility of Haitian social scientists being in a situation of dependence and cultural isolation. It is important therefore that Haitians and western sociologists look at the community and social structure of the country and area to develop a criminology that is Haitian or Caribbean in nature.
Some Conclusions

Research in the relationship between crime and juvenile delinquency and national development indicate a systematic increase in certain forms of crimes. Of significance are thefts, especially armed robbery, auto theft, and increased corruption in business and government. Also in the forefront are drug-related offences and prostitution.

As has been shown in this chapter, at the present time, Haiti does not share with other developing countries an increase in armed robbery, but there is some; and auto theft is virtually non-existent. One probable reason is that in Haiti the number of cars is very low. It is estimated that there are approximately seven autos per 1,000 people, which gives a total of about 35,000 to 40,000 cars in a country of 6 million inhabitants.

The use, trafficking and cultivation of drugs, in particular marijuana, can be expected to rise drastically due to the geographical location of Haiti, the number of return migrants to the country, the increase in tourism, and the amount of money that is to be made by anyone involved in such activities. At this time, however, it seems that marijuana users are more generally those who have been abroad. It is possible that they have chosen to reject the every-day values of the Haitian society in which they live and to show through smoking marijuana, as
both an illegal and symbolic gesture, that they do not wish to assimilate.

The corruption of officials and politicians in high places is a serious problem. It considerably slows the economic development of Haiti. Most likely this behavior will continue because of the transient nature of political appointments. Individuals appointed to political office feel they should amass as much money as they can before they get replaced.

A brief description of some of the problems inherent in using Haitian data was done. The primary purpose of this review has not been to claim that they should be ignored but to indicate some of the pitfalls to readers interpreting their information. Many western criminologists have been reluctant to undertake research in the Caribbean Basin on forms of deviancy because of the lack of adequate data. Others take the data at face value without questioning their validity. This deficiency should spur the search for alternative or complementary information sources.

Even though the sample studies was small, it helped provide a clearer picture of the total situation in Haiti. Official figures on deviance are useful if they are taken for what they are: statistics regarding the control of socially undesirable persons.

Unlike many countries, the data collected shows that
Haiti's youth are not disproportionately involved in criminal activities. As a matter of fact, juvenile delinquency is not a concern. On the other hand, like many other countries, Haitian males commit most of the criminal activities while the female population commit only 2% of the criminal offenses.

The Haitian study showed that most of the offenders did not commit their crimes in their place of residence, but yet they knew the victims.

Basic research in the area of crime and delinquency is lacking in Haiti at the present. What is available is often routine official statistics of only limited value. The researcher hopes that the various United Nations programs and the interest of academicians in comparative criminology will help in the future to further the inclusion of more studies of crime in the Caribbean and Haiti.
CHAPTER IV

THE PROCESS OF MODERNIZATION AND CRIME

Introduction

A number of studies have demonstrated that the process and impact of modernization, that is, the extent and speed of the urbanization process and the degree of industrialization, has a distinct and generally consistent effect upon the rise and forms of criminal behavior (Shelley, 1981a,b; Tobias, 1967). Moreover, some criminologists believe that one measure of the effective development of a country is probably the rising crime rate (Clinard & Abbott, 1974). These students of crime argue that countries in which the process of industrialization and urbanization is taking place and/or continuing must expect further increases in their crime rate (Christiansen, 1960).

Urbanization\(^1\) or the physical change of any given group of people from the countryside to the city is a

universal phenomenon dating back to the industrial revolution. The urbanization process has become a general trend in many of the developing countries since World War II, and social scientists, in particular sociological criminologists, have made it a major object of study.

In a number of developing nations, due primarily to the absence of social planning,1 the metropolis has attracted large groups from the countryside. In spite of the fact that a metropolis may objectively offer no job opportunities for newly arrived rural groups, it is nevertheless associated in the minds of the rural population with the potential of finding work. Consequently, the extent of the problems in large urban population concentrations, without the adequate national economic basis for employment and rising standards of urban living characteristic of the less developed countries (Clinard & Abbott, 1973). This viewpoint states that the rate of industrialization and economic development have not been able to keep pace with urbanization, as a result, urban unemployment is extensive, and housing and service inadequate (Lopez-Rey, 1970). This transition, or un-stopable movement of masses from the rural way of life to the anonymous city is conducive to increased rates of urban criminality.

1 According to Shelley (1981b) most of the developing countries do not control population mobility.
Industrialization was a rather slow process up to the latter part of the 18th century; however, in the last 150 years, this process has accelerated to a remarkable degree in the Western societies. On the other hand, the process of industrialization has become an accepted pattern in some developing nations since World War II. Others, such as Haiti, have only begun their industrialization process in the latter part of the 20th century.

In broad terms, industrialization is used to connote development characterized by an increasing utilization of mechanical power in production, transportation, agriculture, and other economic activities. Christiansen (1960) argues that one measure of industrialization is the percentage of manpower available for work in factories.

It is generally accepted that juvenile delinquency was a rare phenomenon prior to the advent of industrialization and urbanization (Friday & Hage, 1976; Shelley, 1981b). This was due to the fact that adolescents had little independence and were closely supervised by their parents. The urban environment of industrialized societies, parental employment outside of the home, and the idea of relative deprivation (individuals feel deprived in comparison to the standard of living of their fellow city residents) contributed to the development of youth crime that is frequently peer-oriented.

Friday (1980) acknowledges that in most parts of the
world both delinquency and youth crime tend to show a rapid and systematic increase. The pattern has been demonstrated in studies worldwide: in Europe (Christiansen, 1960), in Africa (Clinard & Abbott, 1973), in South America (Hauser, 1960), in the United States (Clinard, 1974), in Israel (Shichor & Kirschenbaum, 1977).

In retrospect, it appears that the transition from the agrarian way of life to the anonymous city with insufficient employment for its residents is conducive to increased rates of urban criminality.

Exceptions to This Pattern

Though the positive correlation between higher crime rates and economic development appear to be quite firmly established, important exceptions to this pattern are evident. Some countries have been able to avoid the major disruptive forces of modernization, thus, have been spared the spiraling crime rates of the contemporary period.

Success in preserving traditional values have enabled Japan and Switzerland to maintain a relatively low crime rate. Similarly, by controlling internal migration, some socialist countries, too, have avoided some of these impacts.

From the end of World War II to the present, Japan had an unparalleled industrial growth and urban concentration. Adler (1983) notes that as the role of
industries expanded, the number of Japanese employed in agriculture declined from 30% to 10% in 1980.

The Japanese economic "miracle" is widely recognized and publicized and remains—besides the world's high inflation and energy crisis—to some extent untarnished. Even in the troubled 1980s the Japanese juggernaut seems unrelenting. The United States and much of Western Europe are in recession, but Tokyo's trading companies and manufactures continue to grow, pushing exports to record levels and offsetting their huge energy bills with impressive gains in productivity. However, the Japanese social "miracle" of containing, and in some cases reducing the amount of crime committed during the period of unprecedented industrial growth and urbanization has yet to be fully recognized and appreciated (Clifford, 1976a).

Some possible explanations for Japan's declining crime rates have been expounded. First, it can be seen in terms of the process of economic growth that the country has experienced in the postwar years. The economic growth and prosperity of Japanese society in the postwar period provided a good and improved standard of living for most of the population and gave the citizens legitimate opportunities of advancement, thereby reducing their need to turn to illegal means to achieve their goals (Christiansen, 1976). Second, the homogeneity of the country. Adler (1983) remarks that the people are of one
race, all Japanese-speaking, except for a small number of indigenous caucasoid people (Ainu), 600,000 Koreans, and an insignificant minority of other foreigners; its degree of centralization, and its common social and cultural heritage provide a cohesiveness not present in other developed countries (Bayley, 1976).

Furthermore, Japanese society is bound together by a social contract that is startlingly effective. Its civic logic is mutual obligation, hierarchy (a traditional reverence for the aged—the elderly are treated with great respect, in addition, the emphasis on authority, loyalty, and deference remain in place despite much individual mobility), and the overriding primacy of the group. There is an intricate network of behavior norms which subjects the individual to the needs of the group. There are, in short, overlapping and integrating role relationships that exert an informal social control on individuals which is often absent in other urban, industrial societies (Fenwick, 1983).

Third, Japan’s geographical location (island status) and isolation helped preserve its traditions and ensure continuity within the society. Forth, the preservation of informal social controls within the school, family and community and the effectiveness of formal control through the criminal justice system have served as strong deterrent to criminal behavior (Adler, 1983; Clifford,
A very original attempt to increase the availability of police officers to the population is the "police box" or Koban, which are one room offices set up on street corners. Throughout Japan there are approximately 16,000 of these "police boxes." In addition to their traditional duties of patrolling neighborhoods and apprehending criminals, officers give directions, process lost-and-found articles, control traffic, summon aid for drunks, settle domestic disputes, and regularly drop in on senior citizens living alone. Thus, the police is an integral part of the community. Probably the success of the "police box" system is reflected by Japan's startling low crime rate.

The control of criminality has affected all major categories of property crime such as theft, fraud, and embezzlement, and a marked decrease for the most serious offenses—homicide, robbery, bodily injury, extortion, and rape—has been noticed (Christiansen, 1976). Moreover, for offenders 20 years and over, the trend has been constantly on the decrease.

In 1980, for example, there were 1.4 murders per 100,000 people, against 10.2 per 100,000 in the United States. The incidence of robbers was 1.9 compared with 234.5 in the United States. As a matter of fact, violent crimes of any kind are rare, one reason for this is
probably the strict gun control laws, which allow no civilian to own a gun except for hunting. In the last few years the only categories of criminal behavior in which Japan has experienced growth are traffic offenses and offenses committed by juvenile males between the age of 14 and 15 years old (Christiansen, 1976; Shelley, 1981a). Indeed Japanese officials are having real concerns in the areas of youth crime and activities by youthful radical extremists. Fenwick (1983) suggests that since 1979, the arrest rate for juveniles has continued to increase, while the adult rate has declined slightly. As a matter of fact, of all arrests for serious offenses in 1979, 38.9% were juveniles between the ages of 14 to 19. Moreover, the comparative 1980 statistic was 42.5%.

The changing social conditions within Japan appear to be related to the increasing rates of delinquency. Again, Fenwick (1981, 1983) argued that with rapid economic development and modernization, a number of social relationship areas (family, school, community, work) have lost or reduced their capacities for integrating youth. Consequently, an increased attachment to peers which enhances the probability of delinquency.

Switzerland is a highly developed, urbanized, industrialized, and affluent country. It ranks among the five most affluent industrialized nations in the world after the United States, Japan, the Federal Republic of
Germany, and Sweden; it ranks third in the world in per capita income and more than half of the country's inhabitants live in places of 10,000 or more population. Nevertheless, trend analyses have shown a general stability in crime rates, or even a decrease, over the past 25 year (Clinard, 1978). Moreover, one study concluded that as general affluence become more prevalent in the country, crime rates remained about the same, or even decreased (Frey, 1968). Furthermore, criminological studies done in Switzerland have consistently found a general decrease, or at most a minimal increase in criminality over the years (Clinard, 1978; Eve & Cassani, 1984; Vaz & Casparis, 1971).

There appears to be a consistent accent on the acceptance of what adds up to the "common good"—Referendum, instead of action groups, loyalty, non-violent settling of differences, and a commitment to local responsibility. It remains a highly conservative society with social change closed down by constant submission of legislation to the popular vote (referendum). Also of importance is Switzerland's unique pattern of industrialization—high modernization with slow urbanization. As industrialization took place, factories were built in rural and semi-rural areas, thus industry did not foster the dislocation of massive numbers of workers. Almost 60% of the people live in Cantons where
they were born and grew up. Even if they work in neighboring cities, many reside in their places of birth—180,000 daily commute to work in Zurich (Clinard, 1978). As a result, Swiss cities became trade, cultural, and intellectual centers, thus slums, which have been seen as highly criminogenic by many sociologists, have never developed within Swiss society as they have in the centers of many developed countries (Clinard, 1978, 1966; Shelley, 1981a). Very few cities exceed 600,000. The urban population went from 43.4% in 1940 to 58.3% in 1979, an increase of only 15% over a 40-year period (Adler, 1983).

Unlike Japan, Switzerland is neither centralized nor homogeneous as the country is divided up into many Cantons (about 26) that are highly autonomous. In addition, the country is also divided linguistically and culturally (more than four major languages are spoken in Switzerland—German, French, Italian, and Romanch). Furthermore, the culturally diverse native population has been even more greatly diversified by the influx of large numbers of migrant workers from Italy and other less developed countries (Pradervant & Cardia, 1965). Nevertheless, throughout the country, strong social controls operate in the form of rigid family discipline, a less flexible lifestyle for teenagers than in most industrialized countries, and good communication between generations. Close family structure has been preserved in Switzerland,
and a study done by Vaz and Casparis (1971) reveals that youths prefer to spend their time in the company of adults rather than their peer group.

The crime rate has remained extraordinarily low. The absence of a tradition of violence has resulted in little use of firearms in crime commission despite the fact that every male Swiss citizen keep his government-issued firearms at home.

The Swiss are prone to attribute the recent youth demonstrations to the emergence of the drug culture, although the question cause and effect appears debatable to many. Yet, not even the "youth movement" with its drug culture, has made a serious dent into the Swiss crime figures. In Switzerland the citizens assume an important role in the operation of the criminal justice system and the assumption of "governmental responsibilities" by the citizenry provide a certain counterforce to the development of criminality (Clinard, 1978).

Though the cities of Switzerland are among the most affluent in Europe, the population stability and the perpetration of strong Calvinistic traditions result in low rates of criminal activities. Strong religious beliefs have also been found to control to some extent, criminal behavior in a number of developing countries (Pinatel, 1971). In Switzerland, the deterrent effect of the non-official or non-legal social control, the
preservation of a close family structure and the correctional approach which is relatively non-punitive and aiming at re-integration of the offender into the community, among other things, have been successful in controlling the frequency of crime commission.

The rapidly industrializing socialist countries of Eastern Europe maintain that the assumption that criminal activities tend to increase with the process of modernization do not apply to them. They contend that the rate of crime commission in their country is declining. Furthermore, they argue that criminal behavior is inherently alien to socialist society, and that crime will wither away under socialism and disappear under communism.¹

Soviet social scientists argue that under Tsarist Russia the level of crime rate had been one of the highest in the world, however, since the inauguration of the Soviet System, even though the process of industrialization and urbanization have been rapidly growing, the number of crimes have been declining (Viktorov, 1969). Similar statements have been made by other socialist democracies of Eastern Europe (Vigh, 1986). They have set themselves the aim to continuously and systematically

¹This assumption is probably true, however, the majority of socialist criminologist offer no hard data to support this contention—for example, see the reports of the various United Nations congresses on the prevention of crime and the treatment of offenders.
combat crime. The adoption of this aim, according to socialist criminologists, kept the number or gravity of crimes, offenses, or other negative manifestations to a minimum; consequently, in Bulgaria, the characteristic trend of crime is one of steady decrease, with predominance of small crimes and with absence of organized crime (Palicarsci & Stangov, 1977). This is so even though Bulgaria has one of the fastest growing economies in Eastern Europe and since 1969 the urban population has exceeded the rural population. According to Adler (1983) these rapid changes have occurred within the context of an overall planning process—the development of each town is accompanied by establishment of housing projects, cultural and communal centers, adequate transportation service and a vast army of social services. Furthermore, the country has an ethnically homogeneous population. The basic unit of society is the family. The institution is revered, assisted and protected. Even though society as a whole takes over many of the functions of child-rearing, there is pressure put on parent to be highly responsible in their social duties and to maintain a healthful home environment. Considerable significance is placed on education, both moral and intellectual. An important feature of the education is its emphasis on psychophysical growth, aimed at teaching how to join together in collective action, to be loyal to each other, to be aware
of the consequences of one's own actions and to obey instructions of elders. The establishment of a proper attitude towards the public life that surrounds them, towards nature and the native town or village, is an important task of moral education. In Bulgarian society, in which the family remains the basic unity and which massively involves the public in overall crime prevention, seems to be effective in creating conditions in which crime is infrequent.

The German Democratic Republic (GDR) has seen, since 1946, a rapid reduction of crime in general, but also the disappearance of certain crimes such as dope-trade, forgery of currency, murders organized by gangs, and bank robberies (Buchholz, Harman, Lekschas, & Stiller, 1974). From early childhood through university, education is a primary concern of the GDR. All young people have both the right and the duty to learn a trade and everyone is guaranteed a job upon completion of requirements. Along with formal education, the populace has informal learning experiences by participation in various organizations such as the Free German Youth, the German-Soviet Friendship Society, and the numerous athletic organizations and clubs keep the life of the country’s youth full, active, and useful. Also, through governmental planning, despite the phenomenal economic growth, the population is basically situated in manageable population centers whose social
infra-structure is intact.

The problems of criminological data are very acute in the socialist countries. They consciously withhold their crime figures from international organizations, therefore, less is known about the entire crime picture in socialist countries than in other nations of a comparable level of economic development. Despite the absence of published crime data and of comprehensive criminological statistics, some data are available to a select group of scholars who use them for administrative and planning purposes.

Some studies done in Eastern Europe (Connor, 1972; Kossowska, 1976; and Lekschas, 1971; Shelley, 1981a) show that these countries—Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland, GDR—have a serious alcohol abuse problem. (In Bulgaria, alcohol-related criminality was never a major problem, however, drug traffic is more prevalent due to Bulgaria’s location on the natural drug traffic route from the Near East to Central and Northern Europe.)

Abuse of alcohol is seen as a cause of secondary deviance. In the Soviet Union, for example, drinking is held responsible for juvenile delinquency, vandalism, loss of work, family breakdown, and problems of health (Krase & Sagarin, 1980). Moreover, the Soviet Union’s Interior Minister recently acknowledged that drinking accounted for almost half of all crimes committed in the Soviet Union.

The process of modernization in the socialist
countries of Eastern Europe has also led to increased rates of property crime, in particular socialist property, crime among juveniles and females. Nevertheless, the socialist countries have succeeded partially in averting the spiraling crime rates that have often accompanied industrialization by encouraging citizen participation in the criminal justice system, by having large police forces in each country patrol urban areas and restricting the internal mobility of the population. (The internal passport that is used in the Soviet Union and Bulgaria in particular, not only controls the individual's residence but also his travel as the internal passport is needed to purchase plane and train tickets as well as to obtain a room in a hotel.) Thus, wanted criminals experience great difficulty in travelling because of the need to constantly show their passports (Shelley, 1981a). Strong institutional controls are exercised by the school, the workplace, and the party apparatus. All of these factors help reduce the likelihood of crime commission.

Despite the above variations from the prevailing hypotheses about crime and industrialization/urbanization, most of the countries which are now in the process of modernization face a serious challenge—the rapid increase in criminality. Wolf (1971) points out that crime rates increase with increasing developmental status of a country as compared with contemporary nations. This does not
imply, according to Clinard and Abbott (1973), that increases in the amount of crime are greater in less developed countries, but rather, that the rate of increase is more acute at this point in their history.

Haiti and Modernization

Haiti provides unique conditions to the study of criminal behavior in a developing country. As mentioned in the previous chapter Haiti has been, for decades, isolated from world affairs, thus was basically immune from outside influence. Secondly, its government is highly centralized and the political situation has remained stale for at least two decades until 1986 with the ouster of Duvalier from power. Thirdly, Haiti's attempt to modernize is recent and thus provides an opportunity to study the impact of modernization in its infancy.

To some extent, Haiti is presently undergoing the transition from rural/agricultural to industrialized/urbanized society.

Haiti's population experiences an annual growth rate of 2.50%. Its actual population is approximately 6 million and according to calculations, at this present rate the population may reach 8 million by the 1990s.

Urbanization increased from 12.2% in 1950 to 20% in 1970 to over 27% in 1980. During the period of 1950-1975
the population of Port-au-Prince grew very rapidly from 145,543 to 625,000 inhabitants. This is to say that in less than thirty years the population has increased almost sixfold in the city (Table 7). In all probability this trend of expansion is likely to continue during the next decade.

Table 8

Population of the Eight (8) Principal Cities of Haiti

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cities</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1982</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Port-au-Prince</td>
<td>143,345</td>
<td>493,332</td>
<td>625,000</td>
<td>800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cap Haitien</td>
<td>24,617</td>
<td>46,217</td>
<td>52,220</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gonaives</td>
<td>13,634</td>
<td>29,261</td>
<td>33,837</td>
<td>34,209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cayes</td>
<td>11,608</td>
<td>22,065</td>
<td>24,931</td>
<td>34,090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeremie</td>
<td>11,048</td>
<td>17,624</td>
<td>19,227</td>
<td>18,493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint-Marc</td>
<td>9,401</td>
<td>17,263</td>
<td>19,354</td>
<td>24,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port-de-Paix</td>
<td>6,405</td>
<td>13,913</td>
<td>16,151</td>
<td>15,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacmel</td>
<td>8,643</td>
<td>11,391</td>
<td>11,995</td>
<td>13,730</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1In personal conversations with a number of Haitian scholars they felt that the actual population of Port-au-Prince is much more than the official statistics indicate, it is probably over 1 million inhabitants.
The growth of the city is not merely a result of a rise in the birth rate, but also of the migratory movement of the rural population to the cities, in particular the major cities of the north and south of the country, but more specifically Port-au-Prince. The agricultural system of land distribution and production does not provide work opportunity for the ever increasing population, hence large proportions of unemployed, especially the rural poor, move to the urban centers, in this case mainly Port-au-Prince, the capital, in hope of possible employment and a better way of life. Thus, the accelerated urbanization that characterizes Haiti and most other developing nations, is the logical result of the rural exodus much more than the natural increase in urban population.

These individuals are moving to cities already overburdened by populations of unskilled poor living hand to mouth in squalid squatter communities. Although migration to the urban centers levelled off somewhat in the early part of the 1980s as the capacity of the town to absorb labor became partly saturated. The greatest flow of population was to Port-au-Prince, whose share of the country's total population rose from 11% to 17% between 1970 and 1980. In Jamaica, 30% of the population lives in the urban areas of Kingston (Allen, 1982). The problem of

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1The normal increase in the population of Abidjan, for example, is 2.1%, whereas the annual increase, due to immigration, is 8%.
rural migration to the cities is complicated by the fact that most of the hopeful migrants are poorly equipped for urban living, many are unable to read or write and are basically unemployable in the industries the country is trying to build.

In a study done by the Centre Haitien d'Investigation en Science Sociale (CHISS, 1973) regarding the psycho-social reactions of the rural migrants in Port-au-Prince, it found that in 48.5% of the cases migrants were illiterate; 29.7% had received only an incomplete primary education; and 13% had received an incomplete secondary education. The average age of the migrants was 24 years but the maximum frequency was about 20 years old.

Of those interviewed, 37.7% were unemployed, 30.3% had a job, 9% said they took care of their families, 8.1% were children working as maids or servants. The rate of unemployment can appear more important if one considers the nature of work the 30.3% of those who claim they are employed are involved in. It really is a "disguised-employment" since the majority of them are doing odd jobs such as parttime street vendor, or sell retail which do not bring any sizable income, or individuals who are helping their families without receiving any wage, or those whose incomes are below the minimum legal wage--it is estimated that in this informal sector approximately 80% of the employed population belong. Furthermore, De
Ronceray (1973) argues that chronic underemployment affects more than 60% of the workforce in the cities and more than 40% of the working force in Port-au-Prince.¹

As expected, in 64.9% of the cases the migrants were single, while only 15% of those who migrated were either "placee" or married. There is no major statistical differences in the sexes, both sexes seemed to be equally represented.

Dickenson and Claxe (1983) suggest that many women migrate as part of the family and do not have separate motives for mobility, such as the volume of independent female migration in Latin America and the Caribbean that most cities and town record excess women. In many parts of Asia and the Middle East on the other hand, migration is a male phenomenon. Women and children stay on the land, maintain the cultivation of subsistence crops, and provide a secure village base to which men can return.

In the same study the CHISS also found that in 87.2% of the cases the migrants went directly from their place of origin to Port-au-Prince without stopping in intermediary cities and only 7.7% had lived in another city before coming to Port-au-Prince and 1.1% had lived in two intermediary cities. These statistics correlated with Clinard and Abbott’s study (1973) done in Uganda in which

¹P. McGrath and T. Fuller in Newsweek, February 1982, pp. 24-29, states that in the capital city unemployment exceeds 50%.
they found that most of the Kampala migrants had moved directly to the city from their original homes. Seventy-one percent of the migrant offenders and 48.6% of the migrant non-offenders had a village setting as their only points of reference. This shows that Haiti does not practice in great length like many developing countries such as Upper Volta, Niger, and Columbia, what one calls stage or step migration, wherein migrants move first to small towns, then to a large city. The majority of the migrants in Haiti move directly to the urban centers. This is the case because the other cities and towns do not offer much economic opportunity. Also because of television, radio, and road building, the usual staged migration process has been circumvented. Through the media and traveling relatives, the rural peasants learn how much better even the poorest city life is than the rural life, and they head for the city along the roads the government has so conveniently built for them.

It seems that migration is an irreversible phenomenon. To the question: Will you ever go back and live in your city of origin? 55% said no, 28.2% said yes, and 15.2% did not know (CHISS, 1973).

Most of the major cities of developing nations consists primarily of migrants from the rural areas. Even though this growth is generally attributed to an economic "push" from an overpopulated agricultural area, the
significance of a "pull" factor of city life must be taken into consideration. A number of Haitian scholars feel that the most important "pull" factors for the migrants are:

1. **Hope of economic improvement**: They feel that moving to the cities is the only chance for employment, economic betterment, and the promise of a better life.

2. **Natural disasters**: The geographical location of Haiti has made it a target for cyclones, hurricanes, inundations, and droughts (from 1954-65 there have been five cyclones and hurricanes which have affected mostly the southern part of the country). In 1980 Hurricane Allen destroyed most of the rice, bean, and coffee crops of the island. These natural disasters have pushed the peasants to Port-au-Prince for help such as food, housing, medicine, jobs.

3. **Social excitement**: Being dissatisfied with life in the rural communities, a number of young adults move to the cities for excitement. Life in the cities appear to be very attractive with its movies, discotheques, and night life (this concept of the cities has been acquired by radio broadcasts, newspapers, as well as through friends and relatives who had the opportunity to visit the cities).

4. **Educational opportunities**: A number of individuals came to the urban areas, in particular Port-au-
Prince for higher educational purposes. They feel that the only way for upward mobility and a chance to break the chain of poverty is through educational attainment.

5. **Political factors**: Conflicts with individuals or groups, and the persecutions that follow push a significant number of individuals to migrate to the cities. These political conflicts are caused primarily by powerful political individuals who robbed the poor peasants of their crops, cattle, and even wives. To escape death or imprisonment they move to the cities where they cannot be found.

6. **Family attractions**: Very often relatives in the city tell other relatives of the possibilities that the city offers. Also they come to the city to be close to their loved ones.

This unorganized migration of individuals from the rural areas to the urban centers has had an adverse effect on the country. The lack of manpower to cultivate the land has caused a decrease in agricultural production and the dislocation of the rural family. Secondly, once in the cities with no marketable skills, the migrants very rapidly add to the numbers of prostitutes, beggars, delinquency and crime, slum areas, and unemployment. The excessive demographic density and the lack of employment opportunities have caused not only an internal migration from the countryside to the cities, but also a migration
from the cities to foreign countries. This external migration has helped ease, to some extent, an explosive urban situation, more noticeably overpopulation, the job market, the overcrowded school system, political tensions, and conflicts.

From independence to the late 1960s, Haiti's industrialization has been for all practical purposes non-existent. Haiti has been categorized by the United Nations as one of the 25 least developed countries. Moreover, Haiti is the only Latin American country in the group of the 30 least developed countries in the world, which contains 21 from Africa and 3 from Asia (United Nations, 1982).

Since the early 1970s, due primarily to political changes, favorable government policies, and low labor costs, a significant number of manufacturing industries specializing in export items have been established in Haiti, in particular Port-au-Prince.

Haiti has put a lot of emphasis on the export of light manufactured goods. Table 9 ranks 45 developing countries according to their export of light manufacturing per capita—Haiti ranks fourteenth.

In the years since 1971 Haiti's export of light manufacturing have experienced their most rapid growth. Light manufactured exports to the United States have grown from $16.5 million in 1971 to $24.3 million in 1972 and
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Manufactured Exports Per Capita</th>
<th>Manufactured Exports, 1971 (millions $)</th>
<th>Total Population (millions) 1971</th>
<th>GNP Per Capita 1971</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>478.0</td>
<td>1,913</td>
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<td>74.0</td>
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<td>416</td>
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<td>Israel</td>
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<td>Korea</td>
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<td>0.6</td>
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<td>Jamaica</td>
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<td>729</td>
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<td>Mexico</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>689</td>
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<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>933</td>
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<td>Iran</td>
<td>5.6</td>
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<td>29.8</td>
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<td>33</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<td>Malaysia</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<td>116.5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Brazil</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.2</td>
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<td>Columbia</td>
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<td>Export Value</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<td>India</td>
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<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>0.7</td>
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*Source: (1975, Summer). Inter-American Economic Affairs, 29(1),
Light manufactures include: Leather and footwear, textiles, clothing, engineering and metal products.
$38.7 million in 1973. While in 1967 total light manufactured exports were only 3.8 million.

This trend is expected to continue for a number of reasons. In Haiti, unskilled labor is available in virtually unlimited supply and Haiti's recent experience encourages further similar investment through a "demonstration effect" (Rotberg & Claque, 1971). Secondly, recent delegations from the United States Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), the Caribbean Basin Initiative Team, and the state of Florida have recommended that Haiti becomes the center for United States industrial expansion in the Caribbean. Employment in the light manufacturing industries in Haiti increased from 10,000 in 1971 to 25,000 in 1973, but the linkage effect of the growth of the light manufactured industries are more difficult to estimate. For example, the construction industry which has been growing at an annual rate of more than 20% since 1968 is most likely due to the light manufacturing plants (Morrison, 1974). Consequently, the chance of finding a job has pulled thousands of rural Haitians to Port-au-Prince. Between 1970 to 1980, the population of the capital nearly doubled. Most of the newcomers live in overcrowded parts of the town which lack even the most basic services.

Industrial expansion will encourage even more Haitians to come to Port-au-Prince, although current
projects by US companies will only create about 3,000 to 5,000 new jobs. The problem became more acute when in the course of the decade 1970-1980 the manpower supply increased by nearly 17%; since demand only increased by 11%, overall unemployment rose from a little over 10% in 1970 to nearly 15% in 1980. It is estimated that it would have been necessary to create approximately 366,000 additional jobs in order to avoid this rise in unemployment (Caribbean Databook, 1983).

Other developing countries face the same problem. For example, at the present time there are 29 African cities of more than 500,000 population, while just 20 years ago there were 3. The urban population is expected to quadruple again in the last quarter of this century. In Lagos it has been impossible for municipal authorities to keep pace with the flood of new residents. In 1970, Nigeria had two cities that exceeded 500,000 in population. Today it has at least nine, with at least three of them exceeding one million people.

It is evident that Haiti, along with other developing countries, is facing serious economic and demographic problems due primarily to the process of modernization. Moreover, some theories of crime in developing nations explain that the process of modernization also brings an increase in criminal activities. This has been shown in Uganda by Clinard and Abbott (1973), in Puerto Rico by...
Kupperstein and Toro-Calder (1969), and in Mexico by Manzanera (1968).

Crime and Haiti

On the basis of the official information on crime measured by the number of offenders both in Port-au-Prince and the nation as a whole, it is possible to conclude that Haiti does not have a serious crime problem. Table 10 shows the number of minors incarcerated for various offenses (including status offenses) from the years 1955 to 1975.

It can clearly be seen that the overwhelming number of offenses committed were by male minors, with a rate of three times that of females. This pattern appears to be accepted internationally (Friday, 1980).

Since 1955 one finds a steady decrease or at times a slight increase in the number of minors who were incarcerated. The table also reveals that males tend to be in most cases older than their female counterparts. In 1966, 1967, and 1968 over 600 juveniles were arrested, most for vagrancy, but seven juveniles averaging twelve years of age were arrested for murder.

Table 11 demonstrates that the number of adult offenders is higher than the number of juvenile offenders even though 52% of the population is under twenty years of age.
offenders is higher than the number of juvenile offenders even though 52 percent of the population is under twenty years of age.

Official government statistics published in 1969 indicates that 138,593 individuals were arrested for various offenses during the years 1966, 1967, 1968. The leading categories of crime were: those against property, disturbing the peace, those against persons. Of the total number of persons arrested in the years mentioned only 30,000, or 22 percent, were convicted of the charge or of a lesser offense. Again in 1977 the government published some statistical information about criminal activities and showed that 225,923 individuals were arrested during the years 1973, 1974, 1975, and 1976; however only 46,985, or approximately, 21 percent were convicted for the charge or for a lesser offense. The same pattern is true for the latest figures, 1983.

In 1971 there were 255 murders reported by the police, which is about six per 100,000 of population. And in 1976 there were 107 murders which gives about two per 100,000 of population.

During various conversations with Haitian lawyers and social scientists regarding the incidence of crime, most Haitian scholars agreed that Haiti does not have a serious crime problem. However, they attributed the growth of crime in Port-au-Prince to the continued annual increase
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. OFFENSES AGAINST PERSONS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assassinations (murders)</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempted murder</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempted suicide</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infanticide</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault and battery—accompanied by wounds</td>
<td>2,211</td>
<td>3,409</td>
<td>3,892</td>
<td>2,518</td>
<td>3,275</td>
<td>4,132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault and battery</td>
<td>4,188</td>
<td>4,784</td>
<td>5,007</td>
<td>3,819</td>
<td>5,251</td>
<td>5,623</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assault and battery—reciprocal (mutual)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3,531</td>
<td>3,311</td>
<td>2,443</td>
<td>2,942</td>
<td>3,372</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>369</td>
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<tr>
<td>Threats and premeditation (with malice)</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>195</td>
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<tr>
<td>False witness, perjury, slander, defamation</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>140</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carrying away, abduction of minors</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>772</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>261</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>II. OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC PEACE AND TRANQUILITY</strong></td>
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<td>Noise, public scandal, insults (slander)</td>
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<td>6,520</td>
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<td>Attacks on customs or morals, bad manners</td>
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<td>52</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>Cock fights, games of chance</td>
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<td>537</td>
<td>813</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>1,081</td>
<td>1,017</td>
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<td>Sortilege, piece of wizardry, of sorcery</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>591</td>
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<td>Inebriety, intoxication</td>
<td>909</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>734</td>
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<td>Madness</td>
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<td>Others</td>
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<td>1,219</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>78</td>
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<td><strong>III. OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY -- TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>9,879</td>
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<td>12,562</td>
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<td>Signature; usurpation of title; falsification of documents</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>Larceny; thefts</td>
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<td>12,037</td>
<td>13,263</td>
<td>10,337</td>
<td>14,780</td>
<td>14,929</td>
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<td>Contraband, smuggling, frontier violation</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>51</td>
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<td>Damages done to another's property</td>
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<td>23</td>
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<td>Violation of the privacy of a person's house</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>Fire, conflagration</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>96</td>
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<tr>
<td>Debts</td>
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<td>77</td>
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<td><strong>IV. OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER -- TOTAL</strong></td>
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<td>431</td>
<td>1,129</td>
<td>1,144</td>
<td>1,289</td>
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<td>Desertion, evasion of prisoners</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(escape from prison)</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disobedience</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegally carrying a firearm</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sedition--to talk treason</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration and emigration</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>741</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>V. VIOLATION OF AGRICULTURAL LAWS -- TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>584</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal slaughter or killing of animals</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deforestation and destruction of fields</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruel treatment of animals</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 11--Continued

Arrests Made by the Police According to Types -- 1971-1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V. Diversion, turning aside of water-course</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS -- TOTAL</td>
<td>2,795</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>4,232</td>
<td>10,055</td>
<td>11,461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle Accidents</td>
<td>961</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>3,430</td>
<td>2,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of traffic laws</td>
<td>1,460</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>2,154</td>
<td>6,617</td>
<td>6,874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of maritime laws</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>1,201</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1,679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. MISCELLANEOUS, DIVERSE CAUSES -- TOTAL</td>
<td>4,001</td>
<td>3,687</td>
<td>4,481</td>
<td>2,446</td>
<td>3,784</td>
<td>6,389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrest on warrant (mandate)</td>
<td>1,857</td>
<td>1,522</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2,535</td>
<td>4,057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrest for investigation</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>1,020</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispute</td>
<td>1,341</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>794</td>
<td>519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various infringements</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infringements on communal regulations</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infringements on sanitary regulations</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>1,903</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Official government statistics published in 1969 indicates that 138,593 individuals were arrested for various offenses during the years 1966, 1967, 1968. The leading categories of crime were: those against property, disturbing the peace, those against persons. Of the total number of persons arrested in the years mentioned only 30,000 or 22% were convicted of the charge of a lesser offense. Again in 1977 the government published some statistical information about criminal activities and showed that 225,923 individuals were arrested during the years 1973, 1974, 1975, and 1976; however only 46,985, or approximately 21% were convicted for the charge or for a lesser offense. The same pattern is true for the latest figures, 1983.

In 1971 there were 255 murders reported by the police, which is about six per 100,000 of population. And in 1976 there were 107 murders which gives about two per 100,000 of population.

During various conversations with Haitian lawyers and social scientists regarding the incidence of crime, most Haitian scholars agreed that Haiti does not have a serious crime problem. However, they attributed the growth of crime in Port-au-Prince to the continued annual increase in population, overcrowded and inadequate housing, unemployment, tourism, and the permanent return of a significant number of Haitians back to the country.
(returned migrants).

They argued that crimes in rural areas represented only a small percentage of the total, perhaps because the lack of variation in the economic status of the members of a small rural community minimizes temptation, also because the members of these small communities tend to know each other and thus resolve problems informally, and because the Haitian peasant does not resort to violence unless he feels severely threatened. The fact that rural property owners tend to keep zealous guard over their possessions may also account for the relative absence of crime in rural areas. Anyone entering another's property at night without light or without calling out to identify himself is liable to be shot or attacked. Also, members of a rural community are continually under the watchful eye of the chief of the military rural post in their community.

It is well known that official statistics do not give an accurate representation of the numbers and types of crime committed in a particular country—in this case, Haiti. Any published crime figure show a sample of offenses reported to the police or "Chef de Section" and will not represent cases dealt with informally. Even though one would increase the number of the official statistics by 10% to make up for the "dark" figures of crime, Haiti would, nevertheless, have a fairly low crime
rate, especially the juvenile rate,¹ and Port-au-Prince, with its enormous migrant population, maintains a steady crime level.

Sociologists attempting to study the correlation between migration from towns to cities and subsequent involvement in criminal behavior argue that the migrant frequently lacks a sense of community within the social structure—especially if he has made no long term commitment—furthermore, the transient nature of his stay in the urban milieu, along with the decrease in his familial support, prevents him from developing a sense of commitment to a community (Clinard & Abbott, 1973), and thus the real possibility of involvement in deviant behavior.

During his study of crime in Haiti, the researcher has found that most migrants to the cities came to stay permanently. In a study done by the CHISS regarding the psycho-social reactions of the rural migrants in Port-au-Prince, it found that 72% of the migrants said either they would not go back to their town of origin or most likely would not. Thus the Haitian migrants came with a commitment to succeed or to successfully participate in the new social organization of the city. Secondly, the

¹Haiti's juvenile crime is very low considering that more than half of the population—about 52%—is less than twenty years old and more than 42% is less than fourteen years old.
phenomenon of isolation or a psychological emptiness is not widespread. Of the migrants interviewed, 69.3% stated that they have in Port-au-Prince parents or relatives who welcomed them and facilitated their integration to the milieu, in addition, the individuals did not travel alone—51.5% had migrated with another member of their family, only 34.8% moved from their towns to the city alone. Therefore, it is important to note one fact, that is, the migratory phenomenon in Haiti has its own built in socio-cultural and psychological support which helped eliminate or by-pass the forms of adaptation—criminal adaptation—so frequent in industrialized milieu or environment. Thirdly, the Haitian milieu is characterized by a very strong belief in traditions, ancestral habits, and history. It is the lessons of the ancestors which guide the actions and inspires the decisions; thus, faced with a new environment the migrant does not readily accept or adopt new ideas and behaviors.

Greenberg (1965), Galindo (1969), Clinard and Abbott (1973) suggest that in a number of developing nations of Africa and South America persons from various tribes, linguistic groups, or regional backgrounds move to the larger cities and often must acquire a new local language. The inadequate or non-existing knowledge of the language is a contributing factor in producing maladjustment and subsequent crime in urban areas. In Haiti, this problem
is not a serious one. When the individual arrives in the new environment he is not in an unknown land. He finds greeting mechanisms which facilitate his integration to the urban environment similar to the one he just left in terms of its racial, linguistic, and religious make-up.

Studies and research on the etiology of crime and delinquency have not succeeded in pinpointing factors explaining the lack of criminality. Most of the studies of crime deal with the causes of criminality. Shelley (1981a) carried out a study correlating different crime rates with certain socio-economic and demographic indicators such as the proportion of the population which is illiterate and the proportion of the workforce in agriculture. Shelley found that some countries which have high rates of illiteracy also have low rates of juvenile crime. Furthermore, the finding is supported by the observation that low juvenile offender rates are also displayed by countries with a high proportion of the workforce in agriculture. This partially explains Haiti’s low crime rate. Even though Haiti is in the process of urbanization and industrialization, Haiti remains the least urbanized country in the Western Hemisphere with rural population densities of 300-400 per square mile (Segal, 1975). Furthermore, 85% of the Haitian population is illiterate. However, the factors seen as being most related to lower crime rates were the presence of close
kinship system, the controlling effect of religion, and a strong central government. There is a strong communal support and family solidarity in Haiti. The emphasis placed on the extended family (especially in the rural setting) allows other relatives to correct, guide, and educate the youngsters, where the nuclear family failed. Secondly, Haiti has a very strong religious belief which serves as a control mechanism, for example, voodoo exercises a form of local control and organization through common belief and participation in voodoo rites. Pinatel (1971) also found that traditional societies with strong religious beliefs have a low incidence of crime. Kirtley and Kirtley (1982) argue that in the Ivory Coast, the Senoufos practice an extremely disciplined approach to life. From birth to death, actions and thoughts are controlled by a complex social code and philosophy called "Poro." Its rigorous rules and severe initiations have one overriding aim: to create and maintain order. Thirdly, Haiti’s government which is aware of and if necessary can control the individual’s behavior helps provide an atmosphere of order and obedience to established laws.

Some Conclusions

It is generally accepted that the process and impact of modernization has an effect upon the rise and forms of
criminal behavior. This pattern has been demonstrated worldwide in studies by Christiansen (1960), Clinard (1960), and Shelley (1981b). Moreover, certain types of deviant behavior are occurring as a consequence of development. The more evident are: auto thefts, currency fraud, organized racketeering, and illegal exportation of workers (Brillon, Rico, & Rizkalla, 1974).

Some countries, such as Japan, Switzerland, and some socialist democracies, have, to some extent, controlled their crime rates.

In many developing countries the process of urbanization and industrialization bring mass migration from the town to the cities, and the ultimate involvement of many of the migrants in criminal activities.

In Haiti, this process has not, to this point, resulted in rapid increase in criminal behavior. Many assumptions can be drawn:

1. The process of urbanization and industrialization is a fairly recent phenomenon.

2. Haiti still has a large rural population who are still involved in agriculture and are for the most part illiterate—about 85% of the total population.

3. The existence of a close kinship system, a strong belief in religion and a strong central government.

4. The migrants to the Haitian cities find socio-cultural and psychological support which eliminate the up-
rooting phenomenon which is so common in urban settings.

The migrants in the urban milieu did not have a serious problem of identity because they had parents or relatives in the city and/or they had traveled with relatives. Also important is the racial, linguistic, and religious make-up of Haiti is fairly homogeneous, which help them retain their sense of identify and belonging.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

Many developing nations today face serious social problems, and the rapid growth of crime and delinquency in some poses dramatic challenges to citizens, governments, and social scientists.

The Caribbean Basin has limited resources which are already largely depleted and are being strained further by relentless pressures from rapid urbanization, widespread under- and unemployment, high population growth rates, unfavorable balances of payment, overburdened school systems, increasing dependence on foreign food and fuel and the closure of migration abroad as an option for social mobility.

It has been stated in different sections of this work that there has been a notable lack of research and availability of statistics on deviance and criminal behavior in Haitian society. Thus, this study was designed as an exploratory effort to investigate the forms and amounts, and to analyze the most common types, incidences and forces that produce delinquent and criminal behavior among the Haitian population.

The limited nature of the research on which the findings presented in the preceding chapters of this
thesis are based preclude the testing of specific theories of the causes of criminal behavior. It was not the researcher's intention to engage in such an undertaking, although it is hoped that the data will throw some additional light on various theories or some aspects of them.

The major findings of the study suggest that crime and delinquency are (at least relatively speaking) not a serious social problem in Haiti, and the population's fear of crime is not evident. This is in contrast to Jamaica, where the increase in crime is not only causing a serious disquiet but the fear engendered is the deep-seated fear of the hunted in the presence of the hunter. Moreover, violent crimes have risen dramatically in Jamaica. One particular concern has been the use of guns (Allen, 1982). Ten years ago the incidence of shooting with intent and murder was only in the range of 6-7 per 100,000 population; in 1970, shootings with intent had increased by 1900% and murders by almost 400%.

This is not to suggest that individuals and young people throughout Haiti do not misbehave or act in ways that violate the law. They certainly do, but apparently not to the extent that youth in post-industrial Western (or some developing) countries do.

The basic argument and assumption that the researcher is attempting to present here is that delinquency and
criminal behavior are kept to a manageable level and are not yet a serious problem in Haiti because either the socio-economic, political, or religious composition of the society does not allow or does not necessitate that it should be an issue of concern.

Haiti and other developing countries share a number of characteristics not usually found in developed countries which singularly or in combination help reduce the probability that delinquency will become, or be treated as a major issue of concern.

As a social problem, delinquency appears to be related to the stage of economic development a country has achieved. At this point in time, even though Haiti is attempting to develop itself economically, it remains one of the twenty-five least developed countries in the world. Furthermore, various aspects of interpersonal and social relationships in Haitian society which impede the development of delinquent conduct and inhibit formal/legal reaction to those youths engaged in such behavior reduce both the motivations and opportunities to deviate. Children are important members of the family; this reduces the probability that they will be seen as "outsiders." The extended family, the school and the population at large play a role in a child's upbringing.

The author experienced a situation while walking downtown Port-au-Prince. In a busy intersection, a young
man attempted to cross the street while the traffic signal was still green. An elderly lady shouted through the crowd and advised him not to cross, not only because of the danger of being hurt, but also to follow the traffic rules. This incident seems trivial, but it is an example of how one’s behavior is corrected by individuals who are not even related to the person. It is important to note that the Haitian individual (especially adolescents and children) is caught within this web of expectations to conform and not bring shame to his family and friends. What is most important is that youngsters in Haiti expect adults in their lives to keep them physically and emotionally safe.

The schools are in regular contact with the parents to inform them of their child’s overall behavior and academic performance. The communication lines between these two institutions are open; thus a problem (anti-social or academic) can be spotted at an early stage and preventive/corrective measures taken. The school sees to it that the child attends school and does not display anti-social traits—thus, it is very difficult for the deviant to operate undetected.

In many developing countries (some developed as well) education is not seen as a means for upward mobility, thus an involvement in criminal activities. In Haiti, even the slum dwellers view education as a means of achieving
success, this is why rural peasants send their children to the city for schooling and many parents who reside in slums will work very hard (as maids, street vendors, etc.) to provide an education for their children. Because of the Haitian’s strong belief and commitment to education as a legal means for upward mobility and a way out of poverty, apathy does not exist, thus involvement in criminal activity is minimized.

For over twenty-five years the Haitian political system had not changed. The Duvalier family had been in power during that period, and to maintain the status quo the government was politically and socially repressive on its citizens. Control agents were present throughout the life of the citizens, thus one was expected to conform not only politically but also socially. Similarly, other countries with strong central governments show a low incidence of crime—Cuba, Zaire, Lybia, Eastern European countries.

To show the appearance of "success" these countries must appear to the Western World that they are politically and socially stable with no serious crime problem. If a social problem is evident, it is dealt with harshly. The use of corporal punishment or even the threat of death is not uncommon. When the process of political liberalization and democratization begins, one will invariably notice an increase in criminal activities.
The Haitian society is very religious. Either Catholic, protestant, or voodoo, the population adheres to religious rituals. Religion in general emphasizes obedience to both secular and ecclesiastic laws and regulations. Be it the rural peasant doing his voodoo ceremony or the urban dweller attending church, the emphasis is on conformity. Religion—be it in Haiti, Switzerland, or the Ivory Coast—exercises a form of local control and organization through common belief and participation in its rituals.

In the past few years, because of Haiti’s geographical location, increase in urbanization and industrialization, the slow political liberalization and democratization, tourism and return migrants, the society has begun to experience some criminal activities. Of importance are:

1. Drug use and trafficking. At this time there appears to be no serious drug problems, but the use of marijuana is becoming increasingly common among the children of the upper class. It is even suggested that government officials, aware of the possibility of financial rewards, are becoming more involved in trafficking drugs to North America (apparently, they accept bribes from South American drug dealers to use Haiti as a transit point for their drugs en route to the United States and Canada).
2. Of special significance have been those crimes that directly affect the legitimacy of the government, e.g., corruption of public officials, embezzlement of public funds, black market and white collar crimes. Traditional forms of corruption which involve the performance or non-performance of an official duty in return for some form of recompense is widespread. One of the many reasons for Haiti's economic stagnation is the embezzlement of public funds.

3. Haitian offenders tend to be male. The lower classes seem to be over-represented, especially in the area of property (larceny and thefts) and violent crimes (assault and battery). Because of the lack of information and statistical data, it is impossible to determine the recidivism rate. As in other countries, delinquency involvement in Haiti tends to be most heavily concentrated among males of lower socio-economic backgrounds. However, no statistical breakdown is given as to which kind of offense is most common. If one assumes, however, that Haitian criminal activities are similar to other developing countries, then it can be deduced that they are largely property offenses.

4. Prostitution in Haiti is not sanctioned by the penal code. It is a flourishing trade. In most cases, prostitution among Haitian women is in general not linked to other kinds of criminal activities.
5. Homosexuality practiced among consenting adults is not criminal. It is prosecuted only if minors are involved. The initial repression was due primarily to the traditions of virility and machismo in Haitian culture. Also, homosexuals were seen as reflective of corruption of a decadent western culture, and were to be kept away from young people. Overt homosexual activity is not permitted; however, it carries less stigma with it as it is rumored that many government officials and members of the elite practice it. Furthermore, Haiti is a favorite vacation spot for European and American homosexuals.

Haitian scholars readily claim that their country does not have a serious crime and delinquency problem. Furthermore, the citizens have no abnormal fear of crime. Western culture and alterations in the stratification (power arrangements) of the country have not yet had an effect. Moreover, the nation is still fundamentally "under-developed" in character and modernization is still a slow process.

At this stage, because of the extensive control mechanism operative in Haiti, the deviant is denied a favorable environment in which to operate, even though the country is economically poor.

The incidence of crime is not an alarming problem in Haiti. The major urban areas, especially Port-au-Prince, do record offenses such as robbery, assault, mugging, and
street fighting. (The continued increase in population, overcrowded and inadequate housing, and unemployment will most likely contribute to the growth of crime in the capital city.)

Crimes in rural areas represent only a small percentage of the total. This occurs, perhaps because the lack of variation in the economic status of the members of the small rural community minimizes temptations and because the Haitian peasant does not resort to violence unless he feels severely threatened. The fact that rural property owners tend to keep zealous guard over their possessions may also account for the relative absence of crime in rural areas. Also, the members of a rural community are continually under the watchful eye of the chief of the military rural post in their community. However, as modernization continues and the feeling of relative deprivation increases coupled with an increasing number of returned migrants and the continuation of the democratization process, one can expect increased conflict among subgroups (rich/poor, urban/rural, French/Creole speaking, black/mulattoes/whites). In this regard, Haitians will most likely exhibit a greater tendency to resemble "westerners" by defining certain conditions as adverse and reacting to them.

Social change (modernization, migration, immigration, urbanization, industrialization) not only opens up
opportunities heretofore non-existent, but it also disrupts the unity of traditional relationships. Thus, to the extent that social disorganization (e.g. delinquency, crime, underemployment, alcoholism) is indeed linked to or stimulated by various aspects of modernization, and to the extent that these features are intrinsic to a modernized society, the researcher speculates and theorizes that in the decades ahead crime and delinquency in Haiti will increase although they may never command the proportions of public concern they do in many western and developing nations.

Crime and the Implication for the New Government

Enormous changes have taken place in Haiti since 1986. The unexpected ouster of President Jean-Claude Duvalier has ended twenty-seven years of Duvalier dynasty.

The level of political repression and regimentation and the formation of organizations (i.e., Tonton macoutes, leopards) specifically created to control the behavior of the group have also been able to reduce the rate of conventional crimes. During the Duvalier years, Haiti had consciously or unconsciously two ways to control its crime problem: group control directed from above (government repression) and group control regulated by tradition from below (strong informal social controls). Consequently, the low incidence of criminal behavior. With the sudden
change in government, the push for liberalization and democratization and the influx of returned migrants to the country there may be an increase in criminal activities.

It is well documented that societies with serious crime and delinquency rates are characterized by high level individualization, institutional disorganization, low degree of control over their members, urbanization, industrialization, changes that bring about increased contact with outside influences, and a breakdown of traditional social control mechanisms (Clifford, 1976a; Clinard & Abbott, 1973; Friday & Hage, 1976; Reckless, 1940). All these changes have not taken place in Haiti as of yet, but the changes in the political situation should be of concern to the new Haitian government and social scientists. The Haitian newspapers have reported an alarming increase in criminal activities especially armed robbery, breaking and entering, and murders. (It is possible that these incidents are retaliations of the population against ex-Duvalier men who themselves committed great atrocities against the people).

Nevertheless, the new government must be aware of the recollection of rising expectations (both economic and political) that is sweeping Haiti in the wake of the Duvalier departure. It is suggested that a rapid increase in human expectations followed by obvious failure to meet these expectations has been a prescription for violence.
and crime.

The massive return of migrants who have lived in North America and Europe are bringing with them value changes, mobility of population and the opening up of the society (Haiti was relatively isolated). With their economic power, they may widen the gap in classes and develop a new social group which may cause frictions between the Haitians who never left the country and those just returned.

Enormous challenges lie ahead for the new government (social, political, economic, language). Steps must be taken now in coordination with social scientists to help prevent the population (especially the youth) from involvement in crime.

The passage of the new Constitution (1987) which guaranteed equal rights to every citizen, made both Creole and French official languages and set up a mechanism for regular elections is a good start in breaking down class barriers. What is most important, however, is to support and maintain the preventive elements and these are found in the customary systems of informal social controls. Haiti's religions, family ties, and dependence on the extended family for the upbringing of the children, the constant contact and communication between the school and families, the culture in the sense of traditions, values and life styles and respect for the elders will be greater
determinants of behavior than the formulation of laws and reliance on the formal and legal system.
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