When Gallantry was Commonplace: A History of the Michigan Eleventh Volunteer Infantry January 1863 to September 1864

Thornton
WHEN GALLANTRY WAS COMMONPLACE: A HISTORY OF
THE MICHIGAN ELEVENTH VOLUNTEER INFANTRY
JANUARY 1863 TO SEPTEMBER 1864

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The purpose of this thesis was to trace the role of the Michigan Eleventh Volunteer Infantry in the last eighteen months of its enlistment during the American Civil War. During this period the regiment was engaged at Chickamauga, Missionary Ridge, and in the Atlanta campaign.

An extensive search was made through the existing primary sources. During this search much new information was discovered and used to evaluate the role of this forgotten but gallant regiment.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

For the Union Armies, the Battle of Stones River, fought on December 31, 1862 and January 2, 1863, was a fitting conclusion to the old year and a prophetic beginning for the new. For the Union, 1862 was a year of frustration and the last day was no exception. On December 31, the right flank of General William Rosecrans's Army of the Cumberland was driven back three miles and nearly broken. That evening Rosecrans met with his corps commanders to discuss the situation and the possibilities for continuing the battle. The early consensus was to retreat into the fortifications of Nashville. Major General George Thomas voiced an objection to the idea. Rosecrans redrew his lines on January 1 and waited for Confederate General Braxton Bragg to make his move.

On January 2, Bragg ordered an assault on the left flank of the Army of the Cumberland. Rosecrans was ready. He had reinforced the left and had placed fifty pieces of artillery to command the route of any assault on that flank. The Confederates were repulsed with the loss of eighteen hundred in less than one hour of fighting. The following day Bragg began to withdraw through Murfreesboro to take winter quarters about thirty miles to the south. Although losses were about thirty-three percent on each side, Rosecrans and the Union had the field and Murfreesboro. It was a narrow victory, but a badly needed one. For the Union, 1863 was to be the year of great victories that
set up the long drives of 1864.

For many of the Eleventh Michigan Infantry, Stones River was also a watershed. They were almost halfway through their three-year enlistment. Until this time the Eleventh had met only frustration in their desire to meet the enemy in combat. The regiment had been raised in southern Michigan, principally in St. Joseph County, in August of 1861. They were in camp and training for over a month before they were finally mustered into service. This long delay was due to a dispute between Colonel William May and the Republican administration of Governor Austin Blair.

Throughout their service, the Eleventh Michigan suffered more from the effects of disease than from Confederate bullets. Smallpox had appeared in the regiment before they left White Pigeon on December 9, 1861. When the regiment arrived in Louisville, they were quickly isolated near Bardstown, Kentucky. They remained in quarantine nearly three months. On March 6 the regiment was sent to Belmont, Kentucky, and the companies spread out along the Louisville and Nashville Railroad to guard against Confederate cavalry raids.

April of 1862 was a month of change for the Eleventh. On the first, Colonel May resigned and was replaced by Lt. Colonel William Stoughton of Sturgis. May was well liked by the men and had passed his officer's examination, but he had been a sick man from the beginning. In the middle of the month the regiment's useless Austrian muskets were replaced with Springfield rifles. At the end of the month Stoughton was ordered to take the Eleventh to Nashville.

Until the movement that culminated in the Battle of Stones
River, the Eleventh operated out of Nashville. Much of this time was spent in fruitless dashes from the city attempting to capture Confederate cavalry raiders in Kentucky and Tennessee. None of these efforts resulted in the battle that the regiment desired. Nonetheless, the regiment was shrinking. In June of 1862 the regiment had only 501 enlisted men fit for duty of a force of 866. Sickness, accident and desertion had claimed 163 men.

In September the Eleventh Michigan was finally put into a brigade. They became a part of a brigade of Brigadier General James S. Negley's Eighth Division of the Army of the Ohio along with the Nineteenth Illinois, the Eighteenth Ohio and the Sixty-ninth Ohio. As a part of Major General George Thomas's corps, the Eleventh's hope to be in a battle rose. However, when most of the army went north to the Battle of Perrysville, Negley's and Palmer's divisions were left behind to defend Nashville.

At Stones River the Eleventh was in the battle that its members had sought for nearly a year and a half. The men always looked back at this battle with great pride. William Stoughton wrote to Michigan Adjutant General John Robertson in 1866 that the Eleventh Michigan was particularly distinguished on the two following occasions—The Battle of Stone River, Jan (Dec) 31, 1862 when it occupied the right of Negley's Division and sustained the shock of the enemies' charge after our right had given way, holding the ground until nearly surrounded when it cut its way out through the cedars. Also on the 2nd of Jan, 1863, when it was the first to cross Overall Creek and led the final charge against the enemy.1

1William L. Stoughton to John Robertson, 21 December 1866, Regimental Service Records, Eleventh Infantry, Michigan State Record Center, Lansing, Michigan. The spellings in this and all other quotations are as they appear in the originals.
1863 began then with Eleventh Michigan established as a veteran combat unit. They had proven to be steady under fire and determined in the face of frustration and had come to the attention of the commanding officers of the army as a trustworthy unit. The first fruit of this new esteem was duty as provost guard in Murfreesboro.¹

¹This introduction drew very heavily for facts, but not necessarily for interpretation, from Wayne C. Mann, "The Road to Murfreesboro: The Eleventh Michigan Volunteer Infantry from Organization Through its First Battle" (M.A. thesis, Western Michigan University, 1963).
CHAPTER II

ON DUTY AT MURFREESBORO

The two wrecked armies stumbled away from the battlefield at Stones River. Bragg retreated southeast to a defensive line between McMinnville and Tullahoma. Rosecrans dug in south of Murfreesboro to protect the thirty miles that he had won. Both armies were weakened by the loss of thirty-three percent of their personnel and heavy losses of transportation animals.

On January 4, 1863 Negley’s division including the Eleventh Michigan moved to the north side of the railroad as an advance force. The following day the division moved in pursuit of the retreating Confederates and "marched quietly into Murfreesboro."¹ Rosecrans stopped just south of Murfreesboro and began the six month process of rebuilding the Army of the Cumberland and its transportation, not advancing against Bragg until June 24.

January 5 was a day that was etched into the memories of the men of the Army of the Cumberland and the Eleventh Michigan. That day the army issued half-shelter tents to replace the big Sibley tents. These "dog kennels" were pronounced "miserable" by Ira Gillaspie of

Company C. Daniel D. Rose of Company A wrote home that the tents were "the poorest things that ever soldiers stayed in." The half-shelter tents quickly became known as pup-tents.

On January 10 the Eleventh moved into Murfreesboro as provost guard. Colonel William Stoughton of the Eleventh Michigan had been appointed provost marshal on the eighth. Stoughton had served as the prosecuting attorney for St. Joseph County, Michigan from 1856 to 1860 and was at the time of his enlistment the United States District Attorney for the District of Michigan. The regiment remained in Murfreesboro for six months except for a brief expedition to Columbia, Tennessee. The provost guard duty was a pleasant interlude for the Eleventh. Although the duties were constant, they were not hard. Most of the men were quartered in buildings which gave greater protection and warmth than tents. This was a great advantage since the winter and spring were unusually rainy.

As comfortable as life was in Murfreesboro, it was still the dull routine of camp. In the first weeks everyone was busy with the aftermath of the Battle of Stones River. Ira Gillaspie recorded that

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2Daniel DeVine Rose to Sara Rose, 18 January 1863, possession of L.W. Thornton, Centreville, MI. (Hereafter cited as Rose Letters.)

3William L. Stoughton to Charles Lanman, 18 November 1868, Charles Lanman Papers, Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library, Detroit, Michigan.
he was corporal of the burial guard on January 31. "We buryed 27
dead bodeys and one extra leg and three arms. The wounded men are
dieing off very very fast now." On February 10 he wrote, "I was agane
of the buryal party. Buryed 48 bodeys. The wounded dies very fast
now, but it seemes thare is more of the rebils that dies than of our
men."\(^1\) However, the primary duty was guarding prisoners and buildings. This was done by the men on an every-other-day schedule.

Camp life brought out the business instincts of the soldiers. Trading in stamps, stationery, and food, and loaning money were the major activities. Daniel Rose did business in writing paper which he had his mother send him.\(^2\) Benjamin F. Bordner of Company D reported "Some of the boys are getting rich pedling and buying and selling. They buy apples at twenty-five to thirty dollars per barrel and retail them out for forty. . . . I and one of the boys went and bought a barrel of apples at twenty-five dollars and a half barrel of flour and some sugar. Then took some of our extra sowbelly and fried it out for shortening. Then we went to making pies (and they were good). In five days we had all worked up and how much do you suppose we cleared. Well I will tell we made just forty dollars clear of all in five days."\(^3\)

\(^1\)Diary of Ira Gillaspie, p. 46-47.

\(^2\)Rose Letters, 29 January 1863, 13 February 1863.

\(^3\)Benjamin F. Bordner to Mr. and Mrs. Hill, 2 April 1863, Ness Collection, folders 64, 65, 66, Michigan Historical Collection, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
On February 25, the regiment was paid four months pay and still had two months' backpay coming. For the privates this was fifty-two dollars. Ira Gillaspie sent twenty dollars to his wife, loaned eighteen dollars, and kept the rest for himself. Daniel Rose, who was worried about his widowed mother, sent seventy-five dollars home. His fifty-two dollars of pay, money that was repaid to him, and twenty dollars that he borrowed made up the sum. However, he did keep some money for himself. He wrote to his friend Mark Richards of the Nineteenth Michigan, "By the by we have received our little 'Nine Cents' you know how good it makes a man feel to have a 'green back' or two in his pocket even if it is at about sixty percent discount for gold, but alas how soon it vanishes."

One event that did not pass unnoted by the regiment was February 24, 1863. This was the halfway mark in their enlistment. Gillaspie came to the end of his journal four days later and expressed the feeling of many in the regiment. "February the last—I must now finish up this book. I have now ben a soldier just 18 months and four days. One half of the time I enlisted for but I am willing to quit soldiering as soon as our Union is restored but should it, the South continue to defy the athoratys of the United States I am willing to remain in the armey for years yet. Thus endth the first year and a half of my life as a soldier. My energy is with my country

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1 Diary of Ira Gillaspie, p. 48.
2 Rose Letters, 28 February 1863.
3 Rose Letters, 1 March 1863.
During the first weeks of March both James King and Daniel Rose denounced the Copperheads and peace men in the North. Apparently, this was a reaction to the Michigan Democratic Party Convention held in Detroit and reported in the Three Rivers Western Chronicle on February 18. The Western Chronicle also reported the results of some St. Joseph County elections which the Democrats won. James King, after reviewing the prospects for a victory by General Grant at Vicksburg, said, "The prospect looks more cheering... than it ever did before. All there is to cloud or shadow is the sympathy shown these black hearted traitors by a few, No I will not say a few, But by some of the northern Peace Men... They find fault with Proclamation of the President and in every act of the Administration. Why don't they find fault with the Southern Confederacy who have trampled all rights and Liberties under foot." The day before King wrote, Daniel Rose said, "The Copperheads of the north are hurting us as much as the rebels for they are regular stimulant (so to speak) to the rebels. They look to them for succor before long." On March 12 he wrote, "I wish that I was at home a while. Some of them traitors would keep quiet or else I would get most mightily thrashed (which I flatter myself is not apt to be done). I would as soon fight traitors at home

1 Diary of Ira Gillaspie, p. 48.

2 James W. King to Sarah Jane Babcock, 3 March 1863, James W. King Papers, Regional History Collection, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan. (Hereafter cited as King Letters.)
as here. I think I would flatten out a few copper heads or at least silence their hissing tungs."¹

On March 12, T. Buchanan Reed spoke at the court house in Murfreesboro. Reed was a well known poet and painter who during the war served as a Major on the staff of Major General Lewis "Lew" Wallace. His greatest service was on the lecture platform. Rose referred to the speech as spirited, but James King wrote home a long, detailed description of the event. He repeated this in a letter to the Three Rivers Reporter. For the men of the Eleventh who were concerned about the actions of the Copperheads at home, Reed's message was that "the masses of people at home would stand by the army."² It must have been enough to convince King and Rose since neither of them mentioned the Copperheads again.

Later, in early June, the Eleventh had an opportunity to meet the nation's leading Copperhead, Clement L. Vallandigham. Vallandigham was arrested in Dayton, Ohio, on May 5 by orders of General Ambrose E. Burnside commanding the Military District of Ohio. He was tried by a military court and sentenced to Fort Warren in Boston Harbor. Vallandigham became a national figure as a martyr for the peace movement. President Lincoln was embarrassed by the affair and defused the issue by commuting the sentence and banishing Vallandigham to the Confederacy.

According to Captain Borden M. Hicks, of Company E, it was the Eleventh

¹Rose Letters, 2 March 1863 and 12 March 1863.
that "had the pleasure, as well as duty, of escorting Vallandigham through our lines, and turning him over to his avowed friends, our enemy."\(^1\)

On April 6 the regiment presented Colonel Stoughton with a six hundred dollar sword. The men subscribed the money to buy the sword. Considering that the privates only received thirteen dollars per month, it was a princely gift. Captain Benjamin Bennett of Company D, who was commanding while Stoughton acted as provost marshal, took the regiment to the parade ground, and the Colonel was invited to come and drill them. When he arrived there was a large crowd on hand to watch the ceremony, including the brigade commander, Colonel Timothy R. Stanley, and the division commander, Brigadier-General James Negley. Captain Melvin Mudge, of Company B, presented the sword to Stoughton. Negley told Stoughton that "it was a great honor to receive so magnificent a present, but the greatest honor of all was to be the leader of such men as the noble Eleventh."\(^2\) These were the kind words that volunteer units remembered all their lives. When James King reported the incident to *Three Rivers Reporter*, he concluded "Our Regiment has never been praised as highly as some, but for

\(^1\)Borden M. Hicks, "Personal Recollections of the War of the Rebellion", *Glimpse of the Nation's Struggle*, Sixth Series, Papers Read Before the Minnesota Commandery of the Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States, January 1903–1908. (Minneapolis, Minn.: Aug. Davis, 1909), p. 527. (Hereafter cited as Hicks, Personal Recollections.)

all that Stoughton is a bully Colonel, and leads the bulliest Regiment that ever went into a fight."\textsuperscript{1}
CHAPTER III

CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN

On June 24, 1863, Rosecrans finally moved against Bragg. Secretary of War Stanton, Major-General Henry Halleck, and President Lincoln had all been pressuring Rosecrans to move. On June 16 Lincoln had Halleck ask, "Is it your intention to make an immediate movement forward? A definite answer, yes or no, is required." Rosecrans replied with both yes and no: "In reply to your inquiry if immediate means tonight or tomorrow, no. If it means as soon as things are ready, say five days, yes."1

Everything about this campaign is controversial: the delay in starting, the nature of the objective, and, in particular, the Battle of Chickamauga. The only agreement is that Rosecrans's tactics in Tennessee were brilliant. The six months delay in moving against the Army of Tennessee tried the patience of everyone. Washington wanted Rosecrans to engage Bragg to make sure that Johnston could not be reinforced against Grant in Mississippi. However, Rosecrans thought that if Bragg was driven from Tennessee he would surely join Johnston to overwhelm Grant.2

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Major-General George Thomas, commander of the Fourteenth Corps, later testified that "The apparent inactivity of the army of the Cumberland during its stay in Murfreesboro was due really to the severity of the winter, which rendered it almost impossible to move large bodies of men on the ordinary roads of the country, and to the difficulty of procuring animals to refit the transportation and equip the cavalry and artillery."¹ During their first three months at Murfreesboro the men of the Eleventh confirmed the heavy rains. Gillaspie noted in his diary on February 1, "It rained all day hard I tell you. I never have seen it rain so much and so long and so hard as it rains hear."² James King mentioned hard rains and impassable roads on February 28, March 13, and March 23, but on April 7 he wrote, "The roads are in good [he crossed out 'splendid'] condition and everything in readiness to make a forward move."³ He also cited a rumor which he discredited, but which might provide an insight into Rosecrans's delay. "Yet we may not leave here for many weeks if Bragg is receiving the reinforcements they say he is, our General may await his coming and be glad to receive him behind our own fortifications. They could not whip us . . . with five times our force. Let us fight them from the position we now occupy. But I hardly think they will venture back here again. . . ."⁴

¹Report of Thomas, p. 39.
²Diary of Ira Gillaspie, p. 47.
³King Letters, 7 April 1863.
⁴Ibid.
When the Army of the Cumberland finally began its march it rained hard for two weeks, turning the roads and countryside into quagmire. As late as June 30, Daniel Rose, writing from the convalescent camp in Murfreesboro, said, "It has been raining ever since the troops commenced moving. They seem to always move in a storm. . . ." On July 5 he added, "The water in the river is so high that we can with difficulty get some to drink for it has drowned out our springs. We have had a great deal of rain lately. . . ." On August 16, when Rosecrans began to move his army across the Tennessee River, King wrote, "Now that we have orders to move the rain begins to fall in torrents." If the Army of the Cumberland had waited for good weather and roads, they would not have moved until 1864.

The Eleventh at the time of the Chattanooga campaign was part of the Second Brigade of Negley's division (the Second) of the Fourteenth Army Corps. The Second Brigade was under the command of Colonel Timothy R. Stanley and consisted of the Nineteenth Illinois, the Eighteenth Ohio, the Eleventh Michigan and Battery M of the First Ohio Light Artillery. The Nineteenth Illinois was General John B. Turchin's original regiment. Turchin, a former Tsarist officer and veteran of the Hungarian War of 1848-49 and the Crimean War, had trained the Nineteenth into the best-drilled unit of the Army of the Cumber-

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1Rose Letters, 30 June 1863.

2Ibid., 5 July 1863.

3King Letters, 16 August 1863.
The Eighteenth Ohio had been brigaded with the Nineteenth Illinois since 1861, and Colonel Stanley of the Eighteenth ultimately replaced Turchin as Brigade commander in September 1862. Turchin commanded the Third Brigade of Reynolds's division (Fourth Division) during the Chattanooga campaign.

The Army of the Cumberland's campaign to secure Middle Tennessee and Chattanooga during 1863 can be divided into three major parts. The first, from June 24 to July 16, consisted of Rosecrans's movements to the Tennessee River which forced Bragg back into Chattanooga. The second, from August 16 to September 20, was the series of movements which resulted in Bragg's evacuation of Chattanooga and culminated in the Battle of Chickamauga. The third phase was the Federal victory at Missionary Ridge on November 25 which broke the Confederate siege of Chattanooga. Rosecrans commanded the first two stages of the operation but was relieved of command as a result of Chickamauga. U.S. Grant commanded the final phase as the commanding general of the western theater with General George Thomas in charge of the Army of the Cumberland. In the final phase the Army of the Cumberland was heavily reinforced by Hooker commanding the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps of the Army of the Potomac and General William T. Sherman commanding the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps of the Army of the Tennessee. Hooker brought 20,000 men plus transportation, and Sherman added 17,000 to the forces in and around Chattanooga.

Bragg's Army of the Tennessee was heavily reinforced prior to the Battle of Chickamauga. General Simon Bolivar Buckner brought Bragg his corps of 8,000, which had held Knoxville until Rosecrans's movement began, and General Ambrose Burnside moved against the city from Kentucky. General Joseph Johnston sent two divisions and two separate brigades for a total of 11,500 men from Mississippi. And, in the greatest transportation achievement of the Confederate government in the entire war, General James Longstreet brought 15,000 men from the Army of Northern Virginia. These reinforcements at Chickamauga gave Bragg a rare edge for a Confederate commander, numerical superiority.
CHAPTER IV

THE FIRST PHASE OF 1863 CAMPAIGN

The Middle Tennessee Campaign

When Rosecrans began the army's forward movement on June 24, the orders came so suddenly that even the rumor mill was caught off guard. James King's letter of June 21 gave no hint of a move. "There is nothing new in regard to war news in the Army."\(^1\) Then on June 23 he wrote a hasty note saying, "Orders have been received to march tomorrow morning. In what direction I am unable to state." He appended a line in the next day, "The Army is moving South."\(^2\) John J. Bloom noted in his diary, "We got orders to march but where I daunt no."\(^3\)

Alexander McCook's Twentieth Corps and George Thomas's Fourteenth Corps were to carry the main attack against Bragg by moving down the macadamized Manchester Pike through Hoover's Gap. Hoover's Gap was one of four openings through the hills that had separated Bragg and Rosecrans armies for six months. Hoover's Gap was a "narrow valley about three miles long, surrounded by high hills covered

\(^{1}\) King Letters, 21 June 1863.
\(^{2}\) Ibid., 23 June 1863.
\(^{3}\) Diary of John J. Bloom, Company E of Eleventh Michigan Infantry, (Privately owned, Three Rivers, Michigan), 23 June 1863. (Hereafter cited as Bloom Diary.)
with a dense, heavy growth of timber."\(^{1}\) Colonel John T. Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry seized control of the Gap on the first day and held it until the infantry moved up. The Eleventh stopped a few miles short of the gap since Negley's division was acting as the reserve. Although heavy rains on the twenty-fifth slowed the movement, Negley's division moved into the gap in support of Thomas's other divisions. There was continual skirmishing, but the Confederates did not make a concerted defense of their lines in Tennessee.

On the morning of June 27 Thomas's advance units entered Manchester without resistance. Negley's division still acting as support was the last to arrive at about eight o'clock in the evening.

On the twenty-eighth Thomas sent Wilder's mounted brigade on a raid behind Confederate lines to disrupt their rail connection with Chattanooga, the main supply base for Bragg's army. The bulk of the Fourteenth Corps was rushed south toward Tullahoma to support Major General Philip Sheridan's division of Major General Alexander McCook's Twentieth Corps. Negley's division remained in Manchester and made a small demonstration to the east toward Hillsboro. No Confederate forces were encountered to the east.

On June 29, Negley started his division south toward Tullahoma. The Eleventh acted as guard for the division ammunition train. On July 1 Negley's division was engaged in a sharp skirmish at Elk River south of Tullahoma. John J. Bloom of Company E described the action in his diary, "we marched about 3 miles south of the Tolihoma Road

\(^{1}\)King Letters, 19 July 1863.
and at 4 PM we formed our skirmish line and we skirmish threw the woods and picking hucklebery & we walk wright in the rebel skirmish line and they opened on us and we fought 2 hrs and the Rebels fell back across Elk River and it got dark and we fell back about 1/2 mile and we got our supper and staid the night. Rain and Mud.\(^1\)

He added on the following day that "at 10 AM the Dutch battery open on them and noct down there brest works at Elk River and the Rebels left and we had a Good Time to see them run."\(^2\)

On July 8 the Eleventh went into camp near Dechard Station at the foot of the Cumberland Mountains. Rosecrans halted the whole advance to repair the railroad between Bridgeport and Murfreesboro. The forward movement would not start again until August 16. Bragg retreated to Chattanooga, fifty miles up the Tennessee River from Bridgeport.

Daniel Rose wrote his mother from the convalescent camp in Murfreesboro on July 18 and expressed the general optimism about the campaign.

Our regiment hasn't been in any fight (except for a little skirmish) since they left here. The railroad is repaired as far south as Elk River. The Rebels have possession of Chattanooga yet but I don't think they will much longer for 'Old Rosey' is bound to advance as fast as he can have the railroad repaired. He will soon have the 'rebs' out of this state. At the rate of our present success it will not take many months more to crush the rebellion entirely.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) Bloom Diary, 1 July 1863.

\(^2\) Ibid., 2 July 1863.

\(^3\) Rose Letters, 18 July 1863.
Rosecrans's six-week delay not only troubled the Washington officials but, also, the men behind the lines. Rose wrote again on August 4 that, "our grand army seems to have stoped again probably to let the rebs get organized."¹ He was to get a closer look as he was sent forward to join the regiment at Cowan on August 15.

Rosecrans now faced the second phase of his campaign to drive Bragg out of Tennessee. He began the campaign with a marked numerical superiority but ended on the battlefield at Chickamauga badly outnumbered. The cautious, brilliant moves that characterized the earlier parts of the campaign were lost in the final aspects. Rosecrans became an opportunist after the beginning of this phase. His original goal was to flank Bragg out of his defensive works at Chattanooga, but it became a campaign either to destroy Bragg or to strike deep into Georgia. Rosecrans was handicapped by a lack of cavalry which could have provided him intelligence on his immediate front. He was, moreover, badly misled by the information that he received from Washington about the Confederate reinforcement of Bragg, especially from the Army of Northern Virginia. Only a week before the Battle of Chickamauga, Halleck told Rosecrans that Bragg was reinforcing Robert E. Lee when exactly the opposite was true.²

Rosecrans planned to take his army across the Tennessee River at a number of crossings downriver from Chattanooga while demonstrating

¹Ibid., 4 August 1863.
with cavalry and mounted infantry units at crossings north of the city. Once across the river Major General Thomas Crittenden's Twenty-first Corps would move northeast against Chattanooga, and Major General George Thomas and the Fourteenth Corps would move southeast over the mountains towards LaFayette and Dalton, Georgia. Finally, Major General Alexander McCook's Twentieth Corps would go still farther south crossing the mountains at Alpine and Summerville, arriving just north of Rome, Georgia. Part of Rosecrans's overall planning was Ambrose Burnside's projected move against Knoxville, Tennessee.

On August 16 Rosecrans began to move his troops closer to the Tennessee River. Thomas's huge Fourteenth Corps which made up almost half of the 57,000 man Army of the Cumberland was to cross at four different places. Negley's division was scheduled to cross the pontoon bridge at Caperton's Ferry. The Eleventh marched over the Cumberland Mountains to Stevenson, Alabama on August 17. Daniel Rose reached the regiment from the convalescent camp at Murfreesboro on August 16.
CHAPTER V

SECOND PHASE OF 1863 CAMPAIGN

From the Tennessee River to Chickamauga

Rose wrote home that "Monday morning early we started over the mountains on a march with our knapsacks on. We marched slow but our load and hot weather gave us considerable fatigue."\(^1\) King pointed out that "Now that we have orders to march the rain begins to fall in torrents."\(^2\) Both Rose and King commented on the fertility of the valley north of Stevenson; King said it was one vast cornfield.\(^3\)

Although the Eleventh did not cross the Tennessee River until September 1, preparations were under way much earlier. King reported on August 23, "Pontoons have been moving all day and without a doubt by the last of the week the main body of the army will be across the river. The Railroad is in use between here and Murfreesboro. Trains of cars loaded with provisions and supplies for the army is constantly arriving and the greatest activity prevails."\(^4\)

On August 24 the regiment celebrated two years service in the army. In a letter to Western Chronicle, Frank H. Love of Company D des-

\(^1\) Rose Letters, 21 August 1863.
\(^2\) King Letters, 21 August 1863.
\(^3\) Ibid., 23 August 1863.
\(^4\) Ibid.
cried the scene. The officers had contributed thirty dollars "to buy a barrel of beer for the boys." After a parade and the manual of arms, "the boys 'tipped the tickler' to the tune of two years in the service of Uncle Sam." After speeches by Colonel Stoughton and others, "the boys marched to their quarters, singing the 'Battle Cry of Freedom.'"^1 At this time the regiment had 415 present for duty out of 565 enrolled.2

On September 1 the Eleventh marched through Stevenson towards the pontoon bridge at Caperton's Ferry. The regiment crossed the Tennessee River during the night. According to James King the regiment had to wait for the moon to rise before crossing the pontoons.3 Daniel Rose wrote, "We crossed the river in the night so we had a poor chance to see it. It is quite a large river about forty rods across. It took fifty-nine boats to make a pontoon bridge across it. It is more than three times as large as the St. Jo."^4 Most of the regiment's supply train carrying twelve-days rations went up stream on the north side of the river to cross at Bridgeport.

Once across the river, Thomas planned to concentrate his corps at Trenton, Georgia on Sand Mountain. Between the Tennessee River and Lafayette, Georgia, there are three mountain chains standing parallel

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^1 Three Rivers (Michigan) Western Chronicle, 9 September 1863.


^3 King Letters, 5 September 1863.

^4 Rose Letters, 5 September 1863.
to the river. Sand Mountain next to the river is divided from Lookout Mountain by Lookout Valley. Lookout Mountain is separated from Pigeon Mountain by a cul-de-sac called McLemore's Cove that is open at the northeast end. Chickamauga Creek runs through McLemore's Cove to enter the Tennessee River near Chickamauga.

On September 2 Negley's division turned northeast and marched along the river towards the Bridgeport crossing. The following day the division moved south across Sand Mountain to Trenton, Georgia, the concentration point for the corps. Rose wrote that "we had to repair the road so it took until afternoon to get up the train. We stayed on top of the mountain that night. There is a table land on top of about ten miles in extent and quite level for this country. There is considerable pine, chestnut and a little hemlock. It is very thinly settled. . . ."\(^1\) Apparently even with the road repaired it was a difficult ascent as Bloom noted "We helpt the Teems over Coon Mountain."\(^2\)

Negley's division now became the advance unit of the Fourteenth Corps. On September 8 the Eleventh had been given the duty of clearing Stevens Gap of fallen trees and other obstructions. Lieutenant Stephen Marsh headed the detail that cleared the gap, and by two o'clock in the afternoon the regiment was in McLemore's Cove. The regiment had a sharp skirmish with the Confederates when it reached the east end of Stevens Gap. When the Eleventh had driven them back about a mile, Stoughton took a defensive position around the gap. Negley apparently

\(^1\)Ibid.

\(^2\)Bloom Diary, 3 September 1864.
thought the regiment was too isolated and exposed because he ordered the Eleventh back to the top of the mountain at approximately midnight. Stoughton protested the withdrawal, but the orders stood, and the regiment reached the top about two o'clock in the morning.

The following day the Second Brigade (Stanley) and the Third Brigade (Sirwell) went down Stevens Gap into McLemore's Cove. The First Brigade (John Beatty) went down through Cooper's Gap just to the north. On reaching McLemore's Cove, Negley sent Stanley's brigade on reconnaissance towards Dug Gap in the Pigeon Mountains. Opposed by only a small force of cavalry, the brigade pushed them across the cove toward Dug Gap. The Eleventh succeeded in capturing a few prisoners including a lieutenant.¹

As early as September 5, the regiment had heard that Bragg was evacuating Chattanooga. On the day that the Eleventh came down into McLemore's Cove, the last of Bragg's forces left Chattanooga to concentrate at LaFayette, Georgia, on the south side of Pigeon Mountain. The main route to LaFayette from McLemore's Cove was through Dug Gap. At this point Negley's division was facing Bragg's entire army.

Rosecrans was urging Thomas to attack Bragg with his leading units. The commanding general was, of course, being pushed by Washington, but he was also not informed that Bragg was receiving heavy reinforcements. Indeed, Rosecrans was being misled. Halleck notified him on September

that "a portion of Bragg's army was reinforcing Robert E. Lee in Virginia." Rosecrans without any encouragement believed that Bragg was in head-long retreat, and Bragg was doing everything possible to maintain this illusion. At this time the Union army was in three columns spread over seventy miles of mountainous roads. Bragg had an opportunity to destroy the three corps of the Army of the Cumberland individually.

On September 10, with two divisions still crossing Lookout Mountain and one still farther behind in Lookout Valley, Thomas moved Negley across McLemore's Cove towards Dug Gap. The skirmishing was heavy from Chickamauga Creek to the gap. By early afternoon, Negley discovered that he was in serious trouble. To his north in McLemore's Cove was Confederate Major General Thomas C. Hindman's division of Polk's corps, and Lieutenant General D. H. Hills's entire corps was moving through the passes of the Pigeon Mountains. Bragg had tried to get his unwieldy army to attack Negley from the moment his division came into McLemore's Cove. Negley made strong demonstrations against the forces that opposed him in the late afternoon. However, he became increasingly convinced that his position was too exposed in front of Dug Gap and at nine o'clock in the evening withdrew Stanley's and Sirwell's brigades towards Chickamauga Creek.

Thomas was in the cove on the afternoon of the tenth. He decided that although Bragg was retreating there were still strong Confederate

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forces between Negley's position and Chattanooga. As a result he hurried General Absalom Baird's First Division to Negley's support.

On September 11 at eight o'clock in the morning Baird's two leading brigades (Starkweather's and Scribner's) reached Negley. Heavy skirmishing began across the front as General Simon Bolivar Buckner's corps moved to support Hindman and prevent Negley's withdrawal to Stevens Gap. In the early afternoon Lieutenant Stephen Marsh of the Eleventh climbed a tall tree to observe the movement of the enemy forces and report it to General Negley and his staff who were at the base of the tree. Marsh was under Confederate fire during the entire time. He reported to Negley that the Union position was being flanked on the left by a large force of cavalry.¹

Realizing that Baird and he were heavily outnumbered, Negley began his withdrawal towards the high ground around the mouth of Stevens Gap. When Baird had come up in the morning, Negley had placed his two brigades at Davis Crossroads where the road from Crawfish Springs crossed the road leading from Stevens Gap to LaFayette. Negley's command was at this time directly in front of Dug Gap south of the crossroads. The first problem was to secure a line of withdrawal and the mouth of Stevens Gap. Beatty's brigade was ordered to send one regiment to Bailey's Crossroads near Stevens Gap and to hold it against the cavalry. Once the divisional train was moving Beatty's, Scribner's and possibly

¹Report of Thomas, p. 66-67. See also, Belknap, Michigan Organizations, p. 111. Negley's report on the action at Davis Crossroad, which is in Thomas' Report, states that this event happened at 1:00 P.M., but in Belknap it was reported to have happened at 4:00 P.M.
Sirwell's brigades were ordered back across Chickamauga Creek to protect the train and to secure the left flank. Starkweather's brigade of Baird's division was withdrawn and placed on high ridge with ten pieces of artillery. To protect these moves Stanley's brigade was skirmishing heavily. When all was ready, Stanley crossed Chickamauga Creek withdrawing to a ridge about one thousand feet from the Creek. Here the men quickly prepared breastworks. The regiments were positioned with the Eighteenth Ohio on the right facing a cornfield, the Eleventh Michigan in the center, and the Nineteenth Illinois on the left. Directly in front of the Nineteenth was a stone wall which flanked the route of the Confederate attack. Parts of the Fourth Indiana Battery of Starkweather's brigade were placed on the flanks and in the center of Stanley's men. The Confederate infantry moved through a cornfield in front of the Eleventh Michigan and the Eighteenth Ohio, and a cavalry unit came through a woods on the left. The Nineteenth advanced along the stone wall and poured a destructive volley into the flank of the cavalry, driving them from the field. The entire brigade then concentrated on the cornfield, but the Confederates kept coming, finally moving some artillery into the cornfield. At that point the brigade hastily withdrew over the ridge, many of the Eleventh leaving their knapsacks which had been taken off to build the breastwork. Daniel Rose wrote "we had to withdraw in a hurry and left our knapsacks with them [the Confederates] so I lost nearly everything I had paper, envel-

1The whereabouts of Sirwell's brigade is a bit of a mystery. Belknap, Michigan Organizations, p. 111, placed it with Beatty, but Negley does not mention it in his report.
opes, and stamps and my pictures. . . ." Borden M. Hicks of Company E recalled in later years, "I had hung my haversack on the limb of a tree, we were ordered to fall back and take position behind one of the other brigades. The enemy were so close on us that the boys left their knapsacks. . . . I had gotten back about two or three rods when I realized I had deserted my base of supplies, so back I charged in the teeth of the enemy, and snatched by haversack. . . ."2

When the Confederates topped the just vacated ridge they were struck by the combined volley of Negley's rear guard. The Confederates withdrew, Negley and Baird were safe, and the next day Thomas brought the remainder of his corps through Stevens Gap into McLemore's Cove.

The fight of September 11 was called the Battle of Davis Crossroads, but in the minds of the men it was only a skirmish. Daniel Rose wrote on September 13, "our division had a small engagement."3 However, the losses of the Eleventh were heavy; three killed and thirteen wounded. Sergeant James T. Lovette of Company A was among the dead.

On September 12 the regiment remained in camp and rested. In the late evening a heavy picket line was established about a mile and a half in front. A detail of sixty men from the Eleventh under the command of Lieutenant James M. Whallon of Company C was part of this force. "Just before dark the officer in charge of the pickets received notice from the field officer of the day that the enemy was massing heavily in

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1Rose Letters, 13 September 1863.

2Hicks, Personal Recollections, p. 527-528.

3Rose Letters, 13 September 1863.
front of the line held by guards from the Eleventh, and that indica-
tions were that he would attack in force at that point about daybreak
the next morning.\(^1\) About midnight the entire division was called up
but nothing happened. In fact, Thomas's corps combed the area from
Stevens Gap to Dug Gap the next day without finding any Confederates.
General Bragg had turned his attention to Crittenden's corps to the
north.

\(^1\) Belknap, *Military Organizations*, p. 112.
CHAPTER VI

THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA

From September 13 to September 16 Thomas's corps remained at Stevens Gap patrolling and searching the south end of McLemore's Cove while they waited for McCook to join them. On September 17 the Fourteenth Corps began to move northeast on the LaFayette Road to join with Crittenden. By the end of that day Rosecrans had managed to reunite his army. Negley's division led the corps, halting when he met with Van Cleve's division of Crittenden's Twenty-first Corps. Negley was followed by Baird and then Brannan. Reynolds's division was divided with one brigade guarding the passes through Pigeon Mountain on the right flank of the march and Wilder's mounted brigade scouting ahead of the corps. Thomas ordered his division commanders to have each man carry twenty rounds in his pockets as well as a full cartridge box. That evening McCook's leading units connected with Thomas's right.

On September 18 Thomas's corps, following Dry Valley Road, passed in the rear of Crittenden's corps. Baird's division led the corps northeasterly toward the Widow Glenn's house with Brannan following. Negley's division had relieved Palmer's division of Crittenden's corps to the north of the Lee and Gordon Mill during the night. When McCook relieved Reynolds from guarding the passes in McLemore's Cove, his two remaining brigades (Wilder was already on the field) hurried forward but were now behind Johnston's division of McCook's corps and Palmer's division of Crittenden's corps on the road to Glenn's. The route of
march mixed the divisions and left Thomas in command of troops from all of the corps.

Negley's division skirmished with the Confederate forces from early morning until the afternoon of September 19. That morning he sent the division's wagon train, except for ammunition and ambulances, to Chattanooga by Dry Valley Road. James King of the Quartermaster staff for the Eleventh was with this group. He wrote, "The next morning (September 19) we received orders to move the train to the city. This was Saturday. We could feel the throb of cannons and hear the roar of musketry as we left."\(^1\) Negley reported on his division's actions of the morning and early afternoon of September 19 as follows:

Very early in morning the enemy advanced a heavy line of skirmishers upon Beatty's front, which was a very exposed position, and engaged his pickets sharply for some hours. 11:30—Enemy appeared in force flanking two batteries within 400 yards of Beatty's position, which was followed by a fierce cannonading, during which Bridge's battery of Beatty's brigade, sustained a loss in men and horses. A part of Beatty's line being gradually driven back (but soon re-established). I sent one regiment (Eighteenth Ohio volunteer infantry and a section of Schultz's battery), of Stanley's brigade, to his support. 12:30 p.m.—Beatty repulse the enemy. 2:30 p.m.—General McCook's corps had passed to the left of my position, leaving me on the extreme right; General McCook assuming command.\(^2\)

John M. Bloom of Company E summed it up better, "and at 8 AM a general engagement commenced and a heavy firing was kept up all day."\(^3\)

To the north near Reed's Bridge, the Battle of Chickamauga had begun. As the battle swung south paralleling the LaFayette Road, Rose-

\(^1\)King Letters, 4 October 1863.

\(^2\)Report of Thomas, p. 68.

\(^3\)Bloom Diary, 19 September 1863.
crans gave Thomas, commanding the left, the divisions as they came on
the field. A division was committed to battle and would drive the Con-
federates back only to be flanked when the next Confederate unit was
committed. In this manner Brannan was supported by Baird and in their
turn, Johnston, Palmer, Reynolds, and Van Cleve were committed to the
battle. The command was hopelessly confused. Thomas commanded two of
Crittenden's divisions and one of McCook's. McCook had two of his own
divisions, Davis and Sheridan, and Wood's division of Crittenden's
corps and Negley from Thomas's Fourteenth Corps. Crittenden was a corps
commander without a corps.

At 3:30 in the afternoon Rosecrans pulled Negley's division from
the extreme right to his headquarters at the Widow Glenn's house.
Thomas was calling in his remaining division. Negley apparently only
took Sirwell's and Stanley's brigades, leaving Beatty with McCook.
The brigades quickly marched the three miles to Glenn's arriving about
4:00 p.m. They were just in time. Major General Alexander P. Stewart's
"Little Giant" division of Buckner's corps had broken through the center
of Rosecrans's line. Stewart's leading units caught Van Cleve before
he could close on Reynolds. This was a dangerous moment for the Union
as a gap had existed all day between Thomas's right and McCook's left.
Bragg had been so intent on flanking the Union left and driving the
Army of the Cumberland back down into McLemore's Cove that he never
exploited this weakness. Thomas realized the danger to his right, and
to help check it he brought Brannan's division off the left flank to
shore up the rapidly crumbling center.

Negley's men came up the Dry Valley to Rosecrans's Headquarters
and turned down the slope toward the battle.

At about 4 o'clock p.m. the Brigade with their arms at support, led by the band to the tune of the "Red, White and Blue" passed down this road towards the point of tumult and strife. About half way down the slope General Rosecrans was seen standing on a rise in the ground at the left of the road, as each company gained his front, arms were brought to the shoulder as a salute, which in each case was returned by the General. As the colors passed by him they were dipped in his honor and on returning the salute, he said: "Make it warm for them, Michigan boys." This was answered by a cheer from the men and the General added: "I know you will."

As Negley's two brigades came down the slope and headed northeast from the Widow Glenn's toward Brotherton field, Brannan was moving southwest. The two Union divisions struck the Confederates on both sides, "driving the rebels before them like chaff before the wind." John J. Bloom recorded, "at 5 p.m. we maid a charge and drove them back 1/2 mile and stoped and gave them about 60 rounds a peace. . . ." Stewart's penetration of the Union line was turned back. Brannan and Negley remained in the line where Van Cleve had been.

After driving the Confederates back, Negley's command withdrew from the LaFayette Road to a woods where they built a barricade of rails and logs. The regiments of Stanley's brigade detached one company for picket duty during the night. John J. Bloom of Company E recorded, "we fell back to fense and a continuel firing was kept up

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1 Belknap, Michigan Organizations, p. 113.
2 Ibid., p. 113.
3 Bloom Diary, 19 September 1863.
all night and we was on Picket and we almost Frose to Death.¹ Years later Captain Borden M. Hicks recalled, "At dusk we threw up a line of works, and sent one Company out as skirmishers, then the balance layed down on their arms for rest, it was so cold that it was impossible to sleep and we got very little rest. I was informed by one of the resi­dents of the battlefields, that ice formed that night, this was told me some thirty years after the war, and his memory might not have been good, but it certainly was very cold, especially for men who had just loaned their blankets to Longstreet's men."² (Hicks was referring to the loss of the knapsacks at Davis Crossroads.) Negley reported on the last part of the fight of September 19 as "6 p.m.—Stanley and Sir­well were ordered to push the enemy back vigorously, so as to connect our line with the troops on the left. A sharp engagement with the enemy immediately followed, lasting until 7:30 p.m., during which time our line was pushed forward from one-half to three-quarters of a mile, but I was unable to connect with any of our forces on my right or left."³ Apparently Negley did not meet with Brannan on the field.

Stanley's and Sirwell's men fortified a line just west of the LaFayette Road and spent a cold night with a cold supper and no fires. Company E of the Eleventh spent that night on the picket line. John Beatty brought his brigade up during the evening. He was withdrawn from the picket line near Crawfish Springs about five o'clock. This was the

¹Ibid., 20 September 1864.
²Hicks, Personal Recollections, p. 528.
³Report of Thomas, p. 68.
same hour that Stanley and Sirwell were "double-quicking" towards the rebels northeast of Widow Glenn's. "Arriving at the springs, the boys were allowed time to fill their canteens with water, when we pushed on the Chattanooga road to a ridge near Osborn's, where we bivouacked for the night. . . . While the boys were preparing supper, a very considerable engagement was occurring not far distant to the east and south of us."¹ This must have been the attack of the Confederates on the extreme right of Rosecrans's army, the repulse of which ended the fighting in that section for the day. This would mean that Beatty stopped before dark.

Rosecrans met with his corps commanders after the fighting died down. There were adjustments to be made in the line. McCook's corps was moved to the left or north to contact with Thomas's right or southern flank. Crittenden's command was re-established by pulling Wood's and Van Cleve's divisions out of the line to act as the reserve just behind the junction of Thomas and McCook.

Before attending the meeting with Rosecrans, Thomas had left orders for the construction of strong fortifications made of logs all along his front. His concern with the necessity of strengthening the left was apparent from the beginning. Baird's division on the extreme left of the army was ordered to bend his line back to the LaFayette Road. At two o'clock in the morning of September 20, Baird reported to Thomas that he could not do this as he would have too few men to defend the

center and right of his position. Sometime between this report and
six o'clock, Thomas requested that Rosecrans send Negley to hold the
extreme left next of Baird.

Glenn Tucker in *Chickamauga: Bloody Battle of the West* implies
that Thomas made the request immediately upon getting Baird's report
although he says "consequently."

Rosecrans replied that Negley's division would be sent
immediately. The movement of this division and its con­
sequent replacement in the line by Wood's division would
come to have a decisive bearing on the battle of the
twentieth, but its progress toward the left was slow in­
deed for such an officer as Thomas, who as he catnapped
that night seems to have had his subconscious mind on a
watch for the arrival of Negley. Dawn came, then 7 a.m.,
but not Negley.

However, Freeman Cleaves in his biography of Thomas says,

At two o'clock that morning, Sunday, September 20, Thomas
received a message from General Baird reporting that his
left did not quite extend to the road and that he could
not reach it without weakening his line. Thomas then went
back to sleep but aroused himself at six o'clock when he
sent a note to Rosecrans asking that Negley take position
on Baird's left and rear. Negley, who was in poor physical
shape, had been consistently behind schedule during the
movements of the last two days, and unfortunately for all
concerned he was to prove late again.2

General Thomas said in his own report on the battle that when he
received Baird's report, "I immediately addressed a note to the general
commanding requesting General Negley be sent me to take position on


2Cleaves, *Thomas*, p. 164. Negley cannot be faulted for his be­
havior up to this point, and he had not been late. As to him being
"in poor physical shape," Cleaves does not give his sources for this
information.
General Baird's left and rear, and thus secure our left from assault.\textsuperscript{1} Whenever the order was first given to Negley to move to the left, he had not done so when Rosecrans began his inspection early in the morning of the twentieth. Tucker says that Rosecrans now personally ordered him to the left, "and the commanding general directed him [Negley] to go to Thomas at once."\textsuperscript{2} This was about 6 a.m. Negley in his report said, "Military operations were suspended until 8 o'clock a.m. in consequence of a dense fog."\textsuperscript{3} For whatever reasons, when Rosecrans returned to the center after inspecting the left with Thomas, Negley had not moved, and McCook had not closed in to the left to replace Negley. Rosecrans took matters in his own hands and ordered Crittenden to replace Negley with Wood's reserve division. Rosecrans continued to the right where he consulted McCook. When he returned to the center, Negley was still in the line. Negley told Rosecrans that Wood had not moved up to replace his division. At this point John Beatty's brigade arrived, and Rosecrans ordered him on to the left to report to Thomas. General Beatty reported to Thomas at 8:00 a.m. Thomas ordered that Beatty's brigade be placed perpendicular to the rear left of Baird's line. Beatty later described the situation, "Baird's line appeared to to run parallel with the road [LaFayette Road] and mine running to the rear crossed the road."\textsuperscript{4} Rosecrans then found Wood and, after severely

\textsuperscript{1} Report of Thomas, p. 46.
\textsuperscript{2} Tucker, Chickamauga, p. 204.
\textsuperscript{3} Report of Thomas, p. 68.
\textsuperscript{4} Beatty, Memoirs, p. 246.
upbraiding him in front of his staff for his failure to move earlier, ordered him to replace Negley.

Negley began to withdraw his command after Rosecrans's last visit. All of the accounts from the Eleventh tell how they began to leave and were then ordered back to prevent the Confederates from seizing their previous fortifications. Stanley's brigade had begun to move to the left. Hicks remembered that, "Our Colonel noticing that no troops had occupied our place and that the Johnnies were making for the works that we had just left, ordered us about, and it was a foot race for twenty or thirty rods, to see which would get there first, whether we were nearest or the swiftest sprinters, I do not know, but we got there."¹ When the Eleventh reached the line the Confederates were about fifty feet away, and the regiment got in a volley to stop them. The Nineteenth Illinois and Eighteenth Ohio reached the line then to drive them back.² The brigade was brought off the line again as soon as the Confederates were driven back. Sirwell's brigade apparently had not yet left the line.

Negley's story is at variance with that of the Eleventh.

... the remaining two brigades of my command were not relieved until 9:30 when one brigade was sent from Gen. Wood's division for that purpose. In withdrawing these two brigades the enemy availed himself of the change, and pressed so hard upon the relieving force that I was compelled to halt, and send one [underlining is mine] of the brigades back to assist in re-establishing my former line, also to protect my ammunition train which was passing at the time. Those serious detentions had

¹Hicks, Personal Recollections, p. 529.
²Belknap, Michigan Organizations, p. 114.
the effect of separating my division, and destroying the unity of action in my command, which I was unable to restore during the day.

I deeply regret the circumstances which rendered this subdivision necessary, actually placing two of my brigades beyond my personal supervision. 10 AM—On being informed that General Thomas's left was being turned I left Sirwell's brigade to follow with the artillery, and pushed Stanley's brigade forward under a heavy fire to the left of General Thomas's line, where Stanley met the enemy in heavy force.

Negley's story breaks down at this point. He begins his excuse and apology too soon. Until ten o'clock he had the same two brigades that he had had under his direct supervision since the afternoon of the nineteenth. There is no record that Stanley moved forward under heavy fire. For whatever reason once the second brigade moved to left, they never saw Negley again on the field at Chickamauga. According to his later report he was ordered by Captain W. B. Gaw of Thomas's staff to take charge of all artillery and point it south, although he also took credit for the placing of Bridge's battery of Beatty's brigade and Smith's Fourth Regular Battery which helped save Thomas's extreme left that morning.

However, General Thomas was not interested in cannons aimed south. He was concerned about his left being turned from the north. Thomas said in his report, "This order General Negley, in his official report, mentions having received through Captain Gaw, but from his description of the position he assumed, he must have misunderstood my order, and

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Report of Thomas, p. 68-69. Negley said he sent back one of his brigades which would indicate that it was Sirwell's since it was left behind. However, at the end of this section of his report, Negley spoke of two brigades.
instead of massing the artillery near Baird's left, it was posted on
the right of Brannan's division, nearly in the rear of Reynolds's
right.\footnote{Ibid., p. 47. The final words on Negley's conduct on September 20
at Chickamauga were written by Ambrose Bierce, "A Little of Chickamauga"
Ambrose Bierce's Civil War, ed. by William McCann, (Chicago, Gateway:
1956), p. 35. Bierce recalling the events later in the afternoon after
the retreat of the right wing of the Army of the Cumberland stated that,
"On my way [to Thomas] I met General Negley and, my duties as topographi-
cal engineer having given me some knowledge of the lay of the land,
offered to pilot him back to glory or the grave. I am sorry to say my
good offices were rejected a little uncivilly, which I charitably at-
tributed to the general's obvious absence of mind. His mind, I think,
was in Nashville behind a breastwork."}

Fortunately for the Union army, Bragg's early morning attack had
been delayed, but when it came at 10:00 a.m., it was almost too much
for Thomas's extreme left. The danger to the left was greatly in-
creased by a last minute change in the position of John Beatty's bri-
gade by Captain Gaw, the same member of Thomas's staff who, according
to Negley, had ordered the massing of artillery in the wrong direction.
Beatty wrote,

Fifteen minutes after this line was formed [this was
the line that ran perpendicular to Baird's], Captain
Gaw of General Thomas's staff, brought me a verbal
order to advance my line to a ridge or low hill, fully
one-fourth of a mile distant. I represented to him
that in advancing I would necessarily leave a long in-
terval between my right and Baird's left, and that I
was in the position that General Thomas himself told
me to occupy. He replied that the order to move for-
ward was imperative and that it was to be supported
by Negley with the other two brigades of his division.
I could object no further, although the movement
seemed exceedingly unwise. . . .
Beatty was caught by the rebel attack before he established the new position and was driven back along the LaFayette Road.

Beatty started a desperate search for help. "On the way and before proceeding far, I met the Second Brigade of our division, Colonel Stanley, advancing to my support."\(^1\) Indeed, everyone who could be spared from other duty was being rushed to Baird's left. Thomas sent several regiments of Palmer's reserve and Van Der Veer's brigade of Brannan's reserve. These were placed between Baird's division and the LaFayette Road. Next to them across the LaFayette Road was Stanley's brigade with Stanley still commanding. He was wounded about noon and command passed to Colonel Stoughton of the Eleventh Michigan. Finally on the extreme left was Beatty's brigade.

The story of what Stanley's brigade did on the Federal left was remembered consistently. Belknap wrote:

Soon the Brigade again started for the left. It marched off at quick time for about a mile and a quarter, passing along the rear of the line where the battle was raging fiercely. On reaching the left of Baird's Division, who were fighting desperately from behind log works which they had built during the night before, the command took a position in the edge of the woods at the north end of Kelly's field. Its line was formed at right angles to the general line of battle and facing north; the Eighteenth Ohio being on the right of the Eleventh and extended nearly to the LaFayette Road. The Nineteenth Illinois was posted a few rods in the rear of the other two regiments as a support. In front of the line was quite a dense thicket of grubs and underbrush, beyond which was an open woods of heavy timber. For a few minutes all was quiet in front, during which time the low underbrush for a few rods in advance of the line was cut down and carried back and piled in front of the Brigade to more effectually screen its position. This gave the men who lay behind this screen a

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 248.
clear view out into the open woods in front while they were entirely out of sight of those advancing from that direction. General John Beatty now came up with a part of his Brigade and formed on the right, extending the line across the Lafayette Road to the east. While waiting in this position Colonel Stoughton passed along the line and ordered the colors dropped upon the ground to the rear, and after ordering several soldiers to keep their heads down, said: "Boys, we've got them. Let every man take aim as if he were shooting at a target, and be sure and not waste a bullet. Aim at their legs and you will drop their front rank. No troops in the world will stand and have their front rank shot down. As soon as you fire we will charge and capture the balance." About that time the "Rebel Yell" was heard, and the Colonel said, "Pay strict attention to orders and we will make those fellows sing a different song."

In the meantime the enemy had driven the skirmish line and were coming on at a double quick, unconscious of what awaited them. On arriving within twenty feet of Stoughton's line his flag was raised abruptly in their front as he gave the command, "Aim, fire, charge." There was a simultaneous report from every gun in the two regiments and the enemy's front line instantly dropped to the ground and were placed hors de combat; and the survivors broke to the rear in the wildest confusion. The Brigade instantly charged and passed over a windrow of dead and wounded at the point where they received the Federal fire. The enemy fled, precipitately throwing away everything that impeded them in their flight. The Brigade pursued them through the woods for over sixty rods and across McDonald's field capturing hundreds of prisoners. Among those captured by the Eleventh was Brigadier General Daniel W. Adams, commanding the leading Brigade, whose sword and field glass were brought to Michigan by members of the regiment. To the Eleventh therefore, belongs the honor of capturing the only rebel general officers taken in that battle.  

Captain Borden M. Hicks later recalled,

We took up a new position in Kelley's field, just to the left of the road, where we concealed ourselves in the underbrush, and awaited the oncoming of the Confederates, who were now flushed with victories. When within two or three rods of our line, we opened fire on them, their front rank went down, the rear rank was nearly put out of

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1Belknap, Michigan Organizations, p. 114-115.
business, and we captured nearly all of the balance, including General D. W. Adams who was in command of the rebel forces making this charge—our regiment captured General Adams, yet there are no less than six regiments who claim the honor of having captured him, but as the best proof would say that I had his sword, others members of our regiment had his field glasses and revolvers, belt and so forth. I carried his sword on the charge we now made to the McDonald field, going into the charge with a sword in each hand, and looking as savage as a meat ax. Here we took many more prisoners. 

A detail from the Eleventh conducted these prisoners to Chattanooga. John Bloom noted in his diary "a general engagement commence and our Regiment was ordered to make a charge and we gave them a volley and then charge them double quick and drove them 1/2 mile and we took one hundred prisoners and captured a General out of Longstreet Division. . . ." Bloom had believed the Eleventh were fighting Longstreet's troops ever since Davis Crossroads. There can be little doubt that Beatty and Stanley broke Adams's advance, and it is very probable that they also put the finishing touches on the efforts of Helm's division to take Baird. Stovall's advance in the same area was undoubtedly stopped by Van Der Veer and Barnes.

Although the left of the Army of the Cumberland was temporarily secured, Longstreet, commanding the left wing of Bragg's Army of Tennessee, took advantage of an opening in the center of the Union army. This gap in the line occurred when General Thomas J. Wood, who had replaced Negley in that section, was ordered by Rosecrans to support Reynolds by withdrawing behind Brannan. Rosecrans's order to Wood was received

1Hicks, Personal Recollections, p. 539.
2Bloom Diary, 20 September 1863.
at 10:55 a.m., and directly across from the resulting gap Longstreet ordered 23,000 Confederates towards the Federal lines at 11:00 a.m.¹

Wood met Thomas as he was executing this order, and Thomas reported "I ordered General Wood, who had reported to me in person, to send one of his brigades of his division to General Baird."² This was the Third Brigade of Van Cleve's division, commanded by Colonel Sidney M. Barnes, and it helped reinforce the left.

By the time Stanley had things sorted out on the left, it was apparent to Thomas that he would have to establish a new line on his right along the ridge of the Missionary Mountains known as Horseshoe Hill and Snodgrass Hill. This was where he had suggested to Rosecrans relocating the federal right wing the night before.³ The Eighty-second Indiana Infantry under Colonel Morton C. Hunter of Brannan's division retreating from the Confederate breakthrough, refused to retreat farther than Snodgrass Hill and became the first unit to take a position on the new right.

Thomas began to send units to Snodgrass Hill from his extreme left. It was a short march. When Stanley was ordered to fall back to the right and rear, the brigade changed direction, and as they began to move,

[Brigadier General Marcellus] Stovall's brigade of Breckenridge's division opened a heavy fire on its left flank and rear from the direction of the Lafayette road. The brigade immediately changed front, facing east, and a terrific fire

¹Tucker, Chickamauga, p. 258.
²Report of Thomas, p. 47.
³Cleaves, Thomas, p. 163.
was kept up for some time, the contending forces moving slowly to the south, the enemy apparently trying to outflank Stanley's brigade. On reaching a point in the woods west of the north end of the Kelley field, and about due east of the Snodgrass house, the enemy disappeared. In this movement to the right the regiment lost more men than at any other point during the two days' battle.

Stovall's Confederates proceeded on behind the Union left.

Stanley, now freed, once again turned the brigade toward the sound of firing from the army's right. However, he was now much farther south. The brigade reached Snodgrass Hill near Snodgrass House about noon.

Northeast of the Snodgrass house one of the ridges—the only one cleared of timber—trails off and descends to the more gently rolling Snodgrass farmlands. On this cleared ridge, where the brigades of Harker and later Hazen joined Stoughton, some of the early and late desperate actions of the Snodgrass Hill battle were fought. Here Kershaw unloosed the initial bolt of Longstreet's assault on Thomas position, and here the Alabama brigade led by the New York City-bred Archibald Gracie delivered its bloody attack as the battle neared its close.

It was at this time that Colonel Stanley left the field wounded, and Colonel William Stoughton took command of the brigade. Lt. Colonel Marvin Mudge took charge of the Eleventh.

After Stoughton cleared the top of the ridge of Confederate skirmishers, he,

placed the 11th Michigan and the 19th Illinois Volunteers in line of battle in a strong position under cover of the hill, leaving the 18th Ohio to support a section of the 4th U.S. artillery. . . . Soon after the Brigade had taken this

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1 Belknap, Michigan Organizations, p. 249. This is a quote from "The Oration of Sergeant James W. King" on the dedication of the Michigan Eleventh monument at Chickamauga Battlefield.

2 Tucker, Chickamauga, p. 330.
position the enemy made a spirited attack on a hill to my right occupied by the left of Brannon's Division apparently driving our troops back. I at once ordered the 11th Michigan and 19th Illinois Volunteers to their support, these Regiments advanced at a double quick and charged upon the enemy driving him from the hill.¹

Stoughton took command of the troops between Brannan on the right and Wood on the left. He continued in his report of the battle,

I. . . placed my forces [this is after the above described action] along the crest of the hill, the 19th Illinois on the right and the 11th Michigan Volunteers on the left and constructed a rude breastworks. My Brigade was by far the largest if not the only organized force on the hill and I accordingly assumed command [of] the fragments of the Regiments on the hill and all men found in the rear were placed in the most available positions.²

In his analysis of the Battle of Chickamauga, Glenn Tucker said of the Confederate attack on Snodgrass Hill, "When he was recalling the battle in later years, Longstreet said he made twenty-five assaults in all on Snodgrass Hill. However, he may have broken them down, they continued all afternoon and each seemed desperate and protracted. Instead of twenty-five, it was really one of sustained duration."³ The first of the great concentrated assaults was Kershaw's attack on Har-ker, Hazen and Stoughton. Kershaw began a series of attacks against the eastern slope of Snodgrass Hill that were repulsed again and again. Borden Hicks recalled, "The slope in our front was strewn with the


²Ibid.

³Tucker, Chickamauga, p. 356.
enemy's dead, so thick that you could almost walk on them. . . .”

The constant firing of the guns with their black powder charges were beginning to foul them. By 3:00 in the afternoon the Eleventh was short of ammunition, and the men were hungry and thirsty. Most of them had last filled their canteens on the day before at Crawfish Springs. Some had begun to replenish their supply from the dead Confederates on the slope. At one point the whole regiment was waiting for the next attack and a chance for pursuit that would give them an opportunity to get cartridge boxes, canteens and knapsacks of the dead. Shortly after 3:00 they had their opportunity. Using the same tactic that worked so well against Adams earlier in the day, Stoughton allowed the Confederates to charge closer and closer. At a hundred yards they began their rebel yell and at ten yards the entire command fired a volley into the charging ranks and instantly counter-charged with fixed bayonets. Stoughton's men followed the Confederates for about two hundred yards. As they returned to their positions on the hill, the Eleventh cut the canteens and cartridge boxes off the enemy dead. The Confederates used fifty-seven caliber Enfield rifles and the Union was supplied with fifty-eight caliber Springfields. Indeed, it was easier to load the smaller Confederate ammunition in their own fouled rifles.

The laconic John Bloom noted in his diary, "we fell back to the hill and a continu el firing kept up till 4 PM and then the Rebels made a charge on our Brestwork and they got repulse. . . .”

1Hicks, Personal Recollections, p. 530.
2Bloom Diary, 20 September 1863.
last great assault of the day. The attack of Archibald Gracie's bri-
gade and John H. Kelley's brigade was the last assault against the
Union lines at Chickamauga.

Colonel Stoughton in his official report, said:

At 4 o'clock the enemy made a vigorous attack upon our posi-
tion and a conflict ensued, which in its fierceness and dura-
tion has few parallels. Our troops, without exception, 
maintained their ground with unfaltering courage, and the 
few who recoiled from the storm of bullets were rallied and 
returned with renewed ardor. The enemy was in heavy force 
and fought with the most determined obstinacy. As fast as 
their ranks were thinned by our fire they were filled up 
with fresh troops. They pressed forward and charged up to 
our line, firing across our breastwork, and planting their 
colors within one hundred feet of our own. A dense cloud 
of smoke enveloped our lines, and in some places the posi-
tion of the foe could only be known by the flash of his 
guns. At 6 o'clock the enemy still held his position, and 
as a last resort I ordered up the Eighteenth Ohio, and ral-
lying every man that could be got, charged forward with a 
cheer upon his colors. His flag went down and his line 
broke and he fell back from the hill.¹

Captain Brenner of the Nineteenth Illinois wrote,

The assault by the rebels between four and five o'clock was 
most desperate. The foe succeeding in forcing back a part 
of the left of the Nineteenth and the right of the Eleventh, 
advancing to the rail breastworks. There was no confusion 
in the ranks of the troops forced back, however, nor did 
they retire over one hundred and fifty feet. The Eighteenth 
Ohio immediately advanced, and with its help we soon re-
gained the line, which the Confederates had held not to ex-
ceed twenty minutes, if that long. Nor did they at any 
time advance beyond the rails. We maintained this recovered 
position until after dark, and there we repulsed all the 
numerous assaults made by the enemy.

¹Stoughton's Report. Also quoted in Belknap, Michigan Organi-
za-tions, p. 118.

²J. Henry Hayne, ed., The Nineteenth Illinois, (Chicago: M. A. 
The historian of the Eighteenth Ohio recalled in later years,

At 5 p.m. Gen. Preston's division joined Kershaw's in a final effort to capture the ridge. Gen. Gracie's brigade, moving directly toward the front of Stanley's brigade, pushed up to the crest, and for a time the confederates held the works. This was the crisis. Gen. Beatty, coming from the right of the line, called upon Col. Grosvenor to move the 18th double quick to the works, about 300 feet away. The Colonel promptly ordered the regiment forward, & himself and Gen. Beatty charged with it. The barricade was retaken, and several Confederates captured. The enemy now retired in haste to the base of the hill, and the battle was at an end.

Gracie's losses in his attack on Stoughton's brigade have been compared with those of Pickett at Gettysburg. Gracie lost over seven hundred men. "Nothing in this battle, marked with gallantry so frequent that it becomes commonplace, surpassed the courage of these two brigades [Gracie and Kelley] as they watched their ranks thin minute by minute and still doggedly refused to yield an inch of ground." The flag of the Second Alabama was pierced by eighty-three bullets. Yet they were repulsed by a make-shift command led by Colonel Stoughton of the Eleventh Michigan.

No one can follow the fortunes and actions of the Eleventh Michigan and the Second Brigade without feeling a need to refute the later reports by John Beatty. Beatty managed to somehow lose an entire brigade between the morning action against Adams and the move to Snodgrass Hill. Beatty wrote his book in 1879 and has been quoted ever


since. This is his description of the afternoon on Snodgrass Hill from his Memoirs:

Supposing my regiments and General Negley to be still on the field, I again dispatched Captain Wilson in search of them, and in the meantime stationed myself near a fragment of the Second Brigade of our division, and gave such general directions to the troops about me as under the circumstances I felt warranted in doing. I found abundant opportunity to make myself useful. Gathering up scattered detachments of a dozen different commands, I filled up an unoccupied space on the ridge between Harker, or Wood's division, on the left, and Brannan, on the right, and this point we held obstinately until sunset. Colonel Stoughton, Eleventh Michigan, Lieutenant Colonel Rappin, Nineteenth Illinois, Lieutenant Colonel Grosvenor, Eighteenth Ohio, Colonel Hunter, Eighty-second Indiana, Colonel Hays and Lieutenant Colonel Wharton, Tenth Kentucky, Captain Stinchcomb, Seventeenth Ohio, and Captain Kendricks, Seventy-ninth Pennsylvania, were there, each having a few men of their respective commands; and they and their men fought and struggled and clung to that ridge with an obstinate, persistent, desperate courage, unsurpassed, I believe, on any field. I robbed the dead of cartridges and distributed them to the men; and once when, after a desperate struggle, our troops were driven from the crest and the enemy's flag waved above it, the men were rallied, and I rode up the hill with them, waving my hat and shouting like a madman. Thus we charged, and the enemy only saved his colors by throwing them down the hill. However much we may say of those who held command, justice compels the acknowledgment that no officer exhibited more courage on that occasion than the humblest private in the ranks.¹

In his official report to Thomas after the battle he was less presumptuous. "Supposing them (his brigade) to be near I made every effort to find them and find my division commander. Failing in this, I stationed myself near the 2nd Brigade of our division then commanded by Col. Stoughton of the 11th Michigan and gave such general directions to him and the troops about me as under the circumstances I felt warranted

¹Beatty, Memoirs, p. 250.
in doing."¹ This is not to demean his courage or his usefulness. He stayed and served and served well. Stoughton in his report said, "During the fight Brig. General John Beatty rode upon the hill and assisted materially in sustaining and inspiring the men, his assistance there and also in sending men forward was timely and very valuable."² It is meant rather to put his role at Snodgrass Hill in perspective.

Thomas began to withdraw his left at about 5:30 p.m. with Reynolds's division. Stoughton's brigade was one of the last Union units to leave the Chickamauga battlefield. Beatty went to tell Stoughton to withdraw "near eight o'clock", but he was already moving. Stoughton in his report said, "About 8 o'clock orders came from Genl Brannan to retire, and the Brigade quietly formed and marched in good order to Rossville. About half an hour before we left, a raking fire was poured into our ranks by the enemy from a hill to our right which had been occupied and as we supposed was still held by Genl Granger's Reserve Corps."³ One of the men from the Eleventh was sent to inform the commander of the unit to the rear that they were firing into a Federal brigade. The soldier returned to report the Confederates had captured the Twenty-second Michigan and the Eighty-ninth Ohio. A half an hour later two of the men of the Eleventh went to the top of the hill to the right and returned to report that there were no Union troops along the hill in that direction. John Bloom of Company C recorded, "9 PM

²Stoughton, Report.
³Ibid.
fell back 3 mile toward Chattanooga and got three days racisme and stopt fore the night. We left our kild and wounded on the Battle Field.¹ Subsequent memoirs remembered the hour somewhat later. Bordan Hicks recalled, "About ten p.m. we received word to quietly leave the battlefield and fall back to Chattanooga this was the first intimation that we had received that the battle had gone against us."² The Eleventh Michigan was, indeed, one of the last Union units to leave the field.

Back in Chattanooga, Quartermaster James King loaded a wagon with rations for the Eleventh and started for the battlefield on Sunday, September 20. Three miles out of Chattanooga he began to run into stragglers who told him about the retreat of the right of Rosecrans's army. The supply train was ordered to stop. "We lay here from noon until dark while down the valley came the boom of cannon and the roar of musketry. It was Stone River enacted again. Just as darkness set in we received orders to move forward. I reached the Regiment about 9 or Ten o'clock. They had fought all day against appalling odds and had held their ground... They were in the best of Spirits and had lost lightly considering the desperate fighting which had taken place."³

For all the fighting, the Eleventh Michigan did not suffer heavy losses at Chickamauga. The regiment had 5 killed, 42 wounded, and 19 missing, for a total of 66. These were small losses for a regiment

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¹Bloom Diary, 20 September 1863.
²Hicks, Personal Recollections, p. 530.
³King Letters, 4 October 1863.
that was engaged on both days. Indeed, the losses of the Second Brigade of Negley's division were not heavy: 20 killed, 146 wounded, and 49 missing, for a total of 215. In Negley's division the heaviest losses were suffered by the Twenty-first Ohio of Sirwell's brigade that Negley sent to Brannan on September 20. This regiment lost 243 men with 147 missing. One of the reasons the brigade's losses and those of the Eleventh were light was the small number of men who were missing and probably captured.\(^1\)

In after years the actions that had seemed commonplace on the battlefield came to appear greater and greater. On October 21, 1895, William G. Whitney of Allen, Michigan, was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for acts of heroism under fire on September 20, 1863 at Chickamauga. At the battle Whitney was the Sergeant of Company B of the Eleventh. One of the affidavits used in his application was from Private James Rayner. "In 1863, September 20, while in line of battle at Chickamauga, Ga. at Snodgrass Hill, late Sunday afternoon and after the rebels had made several charges and had as many times been repulsed, the ammunition of our company became exhausted. The rebels were about to charge again when William G. Whitney went outside our temporary works, went among the dead and dying rebels outside, and at great exposure to himself, cut off and removed the cartridge boxes from the rebels and brought them within our own lines for our own use and which were used with good effect in again repulsing the enemy."\(^2\)


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As Thomas's command moved toward Rossville on the evening of September 20, he met Sheridan and Negley who had organized parts of the retreating wing of the Army of the Cumberland around Rossville. Once the troops were fed and rested, Thomas deployed his command and returned units to their original corps commanders. In his report of the battle it appears that Thomas kept the overall command, placing the corps and divisions to suit his own plans. This would have been possible as Rosecrans did not leave Chattanooga.

Negley's division had the responsibility of holding the Rossville Gap. Sometime between three and four o'clock on the morning of September 21, the Eleventh and the other regiments of Stoughton's brigade were called out to help hold the Rossville Gap. The brigade was placed directly across the LaFayette Road which the retreating Union army had followed toward Chattanooga. John Bloom in his diary always referred to the Rossville Gap as "Skidatle Gap."

On the afternoon of September 21 the Confederate cavalry of Nathan Bedford Forest made a concentrated attack on Negley's division in the Rossville Gap. Negley reported, "2 p.m.—The enemy advanced a heavy force, with artillery on the Lafayette road, and on the crest of the mountain. After a brisk engagement with artillery and musketry, he was checked in the gap by Stanley's brigade and driven from the mountain crest by a gallant charge of the Fifteenth Kentucky, General Beatty's brigade."¹ John Bloom wrote,"and at 3 p.m. the Rebel got there Jackass battery on the mountain and give us grape and canister

¹Report of Thomas, p. 70.
and our Regiment run the rebels the other way and our cornal raley the Regiment and we stopt till 10 p.m."¹

At nine o'clock in the evening the army began to withdraw into Chattanooga. Thomas had prepared for this by sending back the wagons, ambulances, and artillery before dark. Negley's division started back about 10 P.M. Thomas covered this final movement with a very heavy screen of skirmishers. Stoughton had command of the skirmish line that covered the final withdrawal from the Battle of Chickamauga. He had the Fifteenth Kentucky from Beatty, the Thirty-seventh Indiana from Sirwell and the Sixty-ninth Ohio from Stanley. The Sixty-ninth Ohio had come up from Cowan, Tennessee, with McCook's division of the Reserve Corps but was not engaged at Chickamauga. Stoughton also kept two companies of the Eleventh. The picket line withdrew at four o'clock on the morning of September 22 and marched into Chattanooga.

Daniel Rose wrote his mother from Chattanooga on September 27 and said, "we have passed through another heavy fight our loss was heavy but no greater than the enemies. Our regiment lost 7 killed 41 wounded and about 20 missing. We was a little worsted."² It is a laconic summary of one of the hardest fought and bloodiest battles of the war. The Army of the Cumberland and the Confederates each lost twenty-eight percent of their men in the two days of Chickamauga.

¹ Bloom Diary, 21 September 1863.
² Rose Letters, 20 September 1863.
CHAPTER VII

THE THIRD PHASE OF THE 1863 CAMPAIGN

The Siege of Chattanooga and the Battle of Missionary Ridge

When the Eleventh reached Chattanooga, the orders were to fortify. Work began immediately on Fort Negley. Rose wrote his mother on September 27, "Since we came here, we have been fortifying night and day, incessantly."\(^1\) John Bloom recorded in his diary that the Eleventh worked day and night on September 22, but that the work was completed by the twenty-fifth. On September 23 Rosecrans gave the troops a ration of whiskey. Many of the men of the Eleventh did not drink and probably sold or gave their share to others because Bloom reported "some of the boys got tite."\(^2\)

One week after the battle of Chickamauga the Confederates allowed Rosecrans to send ambulances to the battlefield for the dead and wounded. Chattanooga was well supplied with military hospitals that had been built by the Confederates. The major problem was to transport the wounded. Most of the dead were left to the Confederates. Many of them were still unburied months later. The ambulance train left on September 28 and returned the next day. Bloom said, "our Train of Ambulances came in from Chickamauga with our wounded. It was an awful sight."\(^3\)

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\(^1\) Rose Letter, 27 September 1863.
\(^2\) Bloom Diary, 23 September 1863.
\(^3\) Ibid, 29 September 1863.
When the army of Braxton Bragg occupied the south side of the Tennessee River, it controlled the river route for supplies for the Army of the Cumberland. The Confederates were not slow in closing the water route and disrupting the land routes. Chattanooga was under siege.

By September 27 the realities of the siege condition of the Union army became apparent. Bloom described it as, "Tuff time on quarter ration."

The Eleventh had been under siege at Nashville in 1862 and had experienced reduced rations. However, there had only been two divisions in Nashville. The surrounding countryside was rich and productive, and the main armies were off in Kentucky. On the second of October the supply train of the Eleventh was caught in a Confederate raid. James King wrote, "The worst blow which we have received is the burning of a train of supplies between here and Bridgeport. Our Regimental Teams were among them. Billy Davis was in charge of our train but made his escape. I should have went with them but it being the end of the month, the Quarter Master said I had better remain and make out the reports. Many of the Teamsters were taken prisoners and some of them killed. Billy was back to day at the spot where they were captured and everything is a perfect mass of ruins." From the ninth of October to the thirteenth the Eleventh was foraging in Washington Valley, thirty miles northwest of Chattanooga. According to John Bloom the expedition was successful, "We went up the valey 10 miles and

1 Ibid., 27 September 1863.

2 King Letters, 4 October 1863.
loted up our Teems and came back 10 miles. However, foraging would not keep Rosecrans's huge army supplied, and things got worse.

In Washington the War Department was finally taking measures to reinforce the Army of the Cumberland. Indeed, the entire western theater of the war was being evaluated. As early as September 25 General Joseph Hooker became commander of a relief force from the Army of the Potomac composed of General O. O. Howard's Eleventh Corps and General Henry Slocum's Twelfth Corps. Hooker's force had twenty thousand men and ten batteries of artillery. In one of the great logistical feats of the war Hooker's army traveled to Bridgeport, Tennessee from Virginia with a hundred train cars of baggage in just twelve days.

On October 3 General William T. Sherman's Army of the Tennessee left Vicksburg with seventeen thousand men. Sherman's army went by water to Memphis, and then overland along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad line, rebuilding it as they went. They would take six weeks to reach Bridgeport, but by then the crisis was over.

Secretary of War Stanton had more on his mind than the reinforcement of the Army of the Cumberland. He was planning to replace Rosecrans. On October 3 General Grant was ordered north to meet with an "officer of the War Department" at Louisville, Kentucky. On October 16 Grant and Stanton met in Indianapolis as they were making connections for Louisville. Once there, Stanton handed Grant two sets of orders; both created a Military Division of the Mississippi with Grant as commander. One order left the department commanders as they were, and

1 Bloom Diary, 11 October 1863.
the other removed Rosecrans from command of the Army of the Cumberland. General George Thomas, commander of the Fourteenth Corps, was to be given the Army of the Cumberland. Grant was told to choose which set of orders he wanted. Grant chose Thomas.

On October 19 Rosecrans was informed of the change. It was exactly one month from the start of the Battle of Chickamauga. Thomas was ordered to take command of the Army of the Cumberland and to "hold Chattanooga at all hazards." Thomas immediately wired his new commander, "We will hold the town until we starve." Interestingly, although Rosecrans and Thomas were both much respected by the men of the Eleventh, there is no mention of the change in command in any letters or diaries.

Grant arrived in Chattanooga on October 23 and personally approved a plan which Thomas and his staff had developed to open a supply line to Bridgeport. The situation must have been desperate as Bloom recorded in his diary on October 26, 27 and 28, "Nothing to eat." On the twenty-eighth the "Cracker Line" was opened and on the twenty-ninth there were quarter rations. The following day there was mail. The siege was over.

During October and November, as the two armies lay face to face there developed a kind of truce and camaraderie between the enlisted men of the two armies. Bloom recorded on October 3, "I was on Picket at the Rolling Mill and Alferd G. Wright went out with a Flag of Truth and ex-


2 Bloom Diary, 26-28 October 1863.
changed papers and got a correct account of there killed and wounded."

Rose wrote his mother on October 4, that,

The "reb" pickets are in sight of ours. I should think about eighty rods apart but there is no shooting between them and ours. They stood in plain sight and so did we. Both pickets had orders not to fire unless the others advanced. One of "Co. E" boys of our regiment held up a paper and then he saw a "reb" do the same. They both advanced and met about half way between the lines, shook hands, talked a short time, exchanged papers then each returned to his respective post, so you can see how much the "reb" soldiers and ours hate each other. There is another place where both pickets get water out of the same creek, they on one side and ours on the other. At night we could plainly see their camp fires on the side hills in front. Their army and ours are not over three miles apart. We could plainly hear their brass band nearly as plane as our own. They played well but we couldn't hear what tunes they played."

There were less pleasant duties than listening to "reb" brass bands and digging rifle pits. Rose wrote "Old Mr. Wilcox from near Centerville came here after his boy but he was buried the day before he arrived. He died on the 29th from wounds received in the battle of Chickamauga on the 20th of Sept. He was a noble young man and a good soldier. His loss is felt by all of his fellow soldiers. The old man felt very bad about him. He took all of his things home with him." Bloom also noted a death in his company, "at 2 PM we buried Irvin Snyder from his wound received from Chickamauga." Snyder had joined Company E in its original enlistment as a Corporal. He was a Sergeant Major when

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1Ibid., 3 October 1863.
2Rose Letters, 4 October 1863.
3Ibid., 5 November 1863.
4Bloom Diary, 6 October 1863.
he accepted the surrender of Brigadier General D. W. Adams, the only Confederate officer of that rank to be captured at Chickamauga. Snyder had kept Adams's sword. He was twenty years old when he died.

During the siege of Chattanooga the entire Army of the Cumberland was reorganized. The Eleventh Michigan became part of the Second Brigade of the First Division of the Fourteenth Corps. Brigadier General Richard W. Johnson commanded this division. He had led the Second Division of McCook's Twentieth Corps at Chickamauga but had fought under Thomas's command. Brigadier General John H. King was in command of the Second Brigade which consisted of Fifteenth, Sixteenth and Nineteenth United States Infantry, the Nineteenth Illinois, the Sixty-ninth Ohio and the Eleventh Michigan. Colonel Stoughton of the Eleventh was the senior officer under General King and led the brigade at Missionary Ridge. The brigade took 1,541 men and officers into that battle.¹

Once the problem of supply had been solved Grant considered taking the offensive. This was forced on Grant in part by the concern of the War Department for Burnside at Knoxville. Bragg on November 4, sent Longstreet and his command of fourteen thousand to drive the Union forces out of eastern Tennessee, an area that was dear to Lincoln's heart. Grant attempted to use the badly supplied Army of the Cumberland.

On the 7th [November], before Longstreet could possibly have reached Knoxville, I [Grant] ordered Thomas, peremptorily to attack the enemy's right, so as to force the return of the troops that had gone up the valley. I directed him [Thomas] to take mules, officers' horses,

or animals wherever he could get them, to move the necessary artillery. But he [Thomas] persisted in the declaration that he could not move a single piece of artillery and could not see how he could possibly comply with the order. Nothing could be done but to answer Washington dispatches as best I could; urge Sherman forward, and encourage Burnside to hold on. . . .

Thomas's lack of transport animals was very serious. As late as November 23, when Grant had the Chief of Artillery, General J.M. Brannan move forty pieces of artillery from the Army of the Cumberland to support Sherman on the left, "he [Brannan] had to use Sherman's artillery horses for this purpose, Thomas having none." The implication that Thomas did not move against Bragg on November 7 because he was afraid or reluctant was contradicted by Grant's own words.

The head of Sherman's column reached Bridgeport on November 14, and the general hurried ahead to Chattanooga to meet Grant. During the morning of November 16 Grant, Sherman and Thomas inspected the entire front at Chattanooga and developed a general plan of battle. Sherman would cross behind Thomas and take the left wing of the line. He would then start the attack attempting to roll up the Confederates on Missionary Ridge, or at least cut off Bragg's communications by seizing the rail lines south of the ridge. Hooker would move around Lookout Mountain in order to attack the right end of the ridge. Thomas, occupying the center, "was to assault while the enemy was engaged with most of his forces on his two flanks."

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1 U. S. Grant, Memoirs, p. 324.
2 Ibid., p. 333.
3 Ibid., p. 327.
Grant wanted Sherman to begin the attack on the 21st, but bad weather and bad roads delayed the Army of the Tennessee. Grant then ordered an attack for November 22, but again there were delays. On the following day without Sherman, Grant moved Thomas into action on the left center. Grant was forced to move in hopes of relieving some of the pressure on Burnside in Knoxville or at least preventing Bragg from moving in that direction. The object of Thomas's attack was a hundred-foot-high hill called Orchard Knob. This hill was about a mile from the Union defensive works. Johnson's division did not participate in the attack of the twenty-third. The Eleventh Michigan was on picket duty with most of the division. John Bloom thought the fighting was farther northeast where Sherman was to assault the Confederate line for he recorded in his diary that "Gen. Sherman is driving the Rebels & captured 6 hundred prisoners. Good news."\(^1\)

On November 24 Sherman crossed the South Chickamauga creek and began his assault on the left (northern) end of Missionary Ridge. Although he made headway, the country was broken and heavily fortified. Thomas's Army of the Cumberland had already taken the object of their planned assault for the first day on the twenty-third and therefore did not go into action on the twenty-fourth. They were spectators for one of the most memorable events of the war. The Eleventh was on picket on the extreme right of the forces facing Missionary Ridge, and were in an excellent position to watch the Battle of Lookout Mountain. John Bloom wrote, "I was on picket at the foot of Lookout Mountain and

\(^{1}\)Bloom Diary, 23 November 1863. Bloom often had the names of officers and units wrong.
at 8 AM the fight commence and Gen Hooker drove the Rebels off the Mountain and he captured about 2 thousand prisoners. This charge I have witness with my own eyes and it was a beautiful sight to see. . . ."¹ Rose wrote, "Wednesday morning Hooker's men waved their flag on the peak of Lookout, it was a glorious sight. Where we were on picket we could see all of the fighting."²

Grant set the twenty-fifth as the day for a concerted push by the combined forces of Sherman, Thomas and Hooker. Sherman, who was not as far along the Ridge as Grant thought, was to attack at sunrise. Thomas was informed "your attack which will be simultaneous, will be in co-operation. Your command will either carry the rifle pits and the ridge directly in front of them or move to the left, as the presence of the enemy may require."³ Hooker was to consolidate his victory of the twenty-fourth and to assault the right flank of Bragg's army. Grant watched the battle from Orchard Knob and, when Sherman's drive failed, Thomas's assault was tied to Hooker. However, when Hooker was delayed, Grant had to relieve the pressure on the left with a frontal assault by the Army of the Cumberland. The movement of the troops had resulted in some mixing of the commands, but Thomas had four divisions arranged from right to left: Johnson, Sheridan, Wood and Baird.

Johnson placed his two attacking brigades with Brigadier General

¹Ibid., 24 November 1863.
²Rose Letters, 28 November 1863.
³Report of Thomas, p. 131.
William Carlin's First Brigade on the right and Colonel William Stoughton's Second Brigade on the left. Stoughton in turn divided his brigade into two wings for the assault. The left wing consisting of the regular United States Infantry units was under the command of Major John R. Edie of the Fifteenth Infantry. Colonel M. F. Moore of the Sixty-ninth Ohio commanded the right wing which was composed of the volunteer units. Moore had commanded the brigade during the absence of King and Stoughton. The Eleventh was led by Major Benjamin Bennett of Burr Oak. Lt. Colonel Melvin Mudge had been wounded at Chickamauga and was not with the regiment.

The Eleventh was called back from picket duty about eight o'clock in the morning and issued three days rations. The brigade assembled in line of battle in a wooded area behind their position in the coming attack. They waited there until nearly four o'clock in the afternoon, looking at the imposing heights of Missionary Ridge. The Confederates had not been idle during their two month occupation of the ridge. A line of rifle pits stretched along the base, a line of breastworks had been constructed about half-way to the top, and another with artillery redoubts went the length of the top. During the day the troops listened to the guns on the left where Sherman had bogged down.

The object for Thomas's four divisions was the line of rifle pits at the base of the ridge, and the signal to advance was to be the rapid, successive firing of the six 10-pound Parrott rifled cannons at Orchard Knob. Finally at 3:45 the guns were fired and the entire line began to move. In front of the wooded area where the men had waited was an open field of a half mile and then the ridge. It was another three-
quarters of a mile at about a forty-five degree angle to the top. ¹

When the line emerged from the woods, the men immediately came under fire of the Confederate cannons from the top of the ridge and the rifles from the base. The Confederate Enfield rifles were very accurate at 800 yards. The Eleventh started at the double-quick but broke into a flat-out dash at top speed for the rifle pits. This willingness to break ranks and run probably saved many from the terrible fire that was directed at them. Daniel Rose wrote soon after the battle that, "the top of the ridge seems a perfect blaze."² Hicks recalled "a blinding storm of shot and shell."³

When the racing Union troops reached the rifle pits, there was a confused hand-to-hand struggle between the opposing forces, but many of the surprised Confederates just surrendered. The men of the Eleventh remembered the following minutes as a time of catching their breath. However, it was apparent as the artillery on the crest was redirected that the rifle pits could not be held. It was either on up the ridge or back to their original position. Quartermaster Sergeant James King, who was among the attacking troops, later recalled that someone yelled, "On up the ridge... the man who gave that order was within a few yards of us but whose voice it was has never been known by the men of the 11th, yet no comrade in that regiment or that brigade will ever

¹Hicks, Personal Recollections, p. 532.
²Rose Letters, 28 November 1863.
³Hicks, Personal Recollections, p. 533.
The call was repeated all along the base of Missionary Ridge. Others were shouting, "Remember Chickamauga! Remember Chickamauga!" The entire line of Union troops surged up the steep face of Missionary Ridge.

Probably the only people more surprised than the Confederates by the charge up Missionary Ridge were Grant and Thomas. Grant turned to Thomas and demanded, "Thomas, who ordered those men up the ridge?" "I don't know; I did not," was the reply. But Thomas asked Major General Gordon Granger, commander of the Fourth Corps and in charge of the assault, if he had ordered the move. "No," said Granger, "they started up without orders. When those fellows get started all hell can't stop them." Grant then muttered that someone would pay if the assault was a failure.

As the Union line swept up the ridge, it became a series of "regimental flying wedges, with their colors forming and leading the apex." Color-Sergeants had a high casualty rate that day. The colors of the Nineteenth Illinois went down three times. Color-Sergeant John M. Day of the Eleventh, who had carried the colors at Chickamauga, was killed.

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1James King, "History of the Eleventh Michigan Infantry", James W. King Papers, Regional History Collection, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan, n.d.


4Hicks, Personal Recollections, p. 533.
The flags of the Eleventh went down twice and were finally carried to the top by Captain Borden Hicks of Company E and Captain Charles Coddington of Company A.

When the fleeing Confederates reached the top, the firing grew more intense as the artillery firing down hill on the oblique did not have to worry about hitting their own troops. The Union artillery did their part; King said, "the Union siege guns in Fort Wood could be readily distinguished as they sent their huge projectiles shrieking over the heads of the Union forces into the rebel position, exploding caissons, tearing to pieces men and horses and causing terrifying havoc."¹

In Stoughton's brigade, Colonel Moore's wing of volunteer units reached the top before the regulars. Just before the leading members of the brigade reached the top, the Confederate defenders fled down the other side. Indeed, all along the crest of the ridge the Confederate line was crumbling. However, here and there pockets of defenders kept up the fight. One such unit of about four hundred infantry and a battery of six guns was still in action just to the right of the brigade's position on the top. It was in the fight against this position that James King was wounded. His right arm was broken just above the elbow, "by a Minie ball fired by a Confederate soldier not six rods away."² Borden Hicks later told a story about this part of the attack.

I placed myself behind a tree about six inches in diameter, kindly remember that I was not as fleshy then as

¹King, "History".
²Ibid.
now, and besides we had a knack of shrinking ourselves to about the size of a match when exposed to fire. As I stood behind this tree facing to our right, watching a battery of six guns, whose position projected to our front, with my sword hanging in my left hand, a Johnnie up in front thought it would be well to pick off an officer, so he blazed away at me, his bullet struck my sword, the sword struck me on the leg, making a black & blue spot for a few days, and this was the only wound I received while in the service.¹

As more rifles were brought to bear on the Confederate position they also broke and ran. After a short chase, the Union troops began cheering. Bloom recorded it as, "three cheers for Gen. Sherman and three grone for Gen. Bragg."²

James King walked from the top of Missionary Ridge into Chattanooga to the hospital. He had received special permission from Stoughton to join in the attack. When he told Major Bennett, Bennett "said James, you are a little fool. A lot of us will die tomorrow on that ridge. I shall not come out of battle alive."³ Bennett was killed about half-way up the front of the ridge. The losses of the Eleventh were not heavy; six killed and twenty-eight wounded or about thirteen per cent.⁴

The Eleventh and the rest of the Second Brigade spent the night on Missionary Ridge and early the next morning they joined in the pursuit of the retreating Confederates. The second brigade led the division as it went southeast, accompanied by Major General John M. Palmer, the Fourteenth Corps commander. As the Confederates retreated they des-

¹Hicks, Personal Recollections, p. 534.
²Bloom Diary, 25 November 1863.
³King Letters, 17 February 1902.
troyed the bridges so the pursuit was slow. However, between eight
and nine o'clock in the evening of the twenty-sixth, the division caught
up with them just south of Graysville. Palmer stayed with Stoughton
and the Second Brigade. Johnson in his report of the action said,
"Colonel Stoughton's brigade was, by the direction of the corps com-
mander, directed to advance on the Ringgold [road] and to its crossing
with the Lafayette road, and to attack the enemy vigorously. This move-
ment was made in gallant style, and about 9 o'clock a volley was fired
into Stewart's rebel division, the men of which scattered in all direc-
tions, throwing away their arms, abandoning their colors, and leaving
in our possession three Napoleon guns, two caissons, with horses, har-
ness, &C., and quite a number of prisoners."¹ Rose put the number of
prisoners at two hundred.² Bloom recorded that after the fighting the
Eleventh built a big camp fire and "stait till morning."³ The Eleventh
was sent back to Chattanooga the next morning with the prisoners and
captured artillery. On the twenty-eighth Bloom said, "I was in camp and
took a good rest."⁴

Daniel Rose summed up the Battle of Missionary Ridge: "it pays us
well for Chickamauga. We captured near a hundred pieces of artillery.
Bragg has been thoroughly routed from as strong a position as he ever
had and it is a complete victory."⁵

¹Report of Thomas, p. 159.
²Rose Letters, 1 December 1863.
³Bloom Diary, 27 November 1863.
⁴Ibid., 28 November 1863.
⁵Rose Letters, 1 December 1863.
On December 2 the Eleventh Michigan moved to Rossville, Georgia, and went into winter quarters. "Rossville existed in location, and name only, it being the home of a Mr. Ross, who had quite a palatial house which was made use of for a Hospital. Rossville lays south of Chattanooga about five or six miles."\(^1\) The Regiment remained at Rossville until March 15, 1864.

The time in Rossville Gap was spent on picket at Rossville Gap or, according to Bloom, "Skidatle Gap," and on camp duties. Many of the men made handicrafts. John Bloom made pipes, rings and other things from laurel root. He also did much of the sewing for his company and for the regiment. Cooking, baking, gathering wood and washing clothes took a good deal of the time. Not all these activities produced successful results. John Bloom cooked a "mess of dumplings" and reported "we had a joley time of eating our wetstones."\(^2\) However, Dan Rose wrote his mother, "We are living first rate now since we draw flour and do our own baking and cooking. We are all or nearly all good cooks by experience. I spent my Christmas and New Years as all other days; the duties to do and no excitement but had a good chicken pot pie new years."\(^3\)

\(^1\)Hicks, Personal Recollections, p. 536.
\(^2\)Bloom Diary, 19 January 1864.
\(^3\)Rose Letters, 4 January 1864.
James King, the quartermaster sergeant, was eating well also. He wrote, "... I visited the city of Chattanooga today and made the Colonel and Holbrook a visit and had good time generally. Staid to dinner and returned just in time to take supper with the Boys. We did not have hard Tack for supper as you would suppose but our very intelligent American of African descent made us some warm biscuit which would have been called eatable in a land where people pretend to live. The other articles I will not name but consider them to numerous to enumerate."¹ Daniel W. Holbrook had enlisted in Company A in August, 1861. He was wounded at Stones River and discharged for disability on October 28, 1863, at Chattanooga.

During off-duty times the men visited Chattanooga and the surrounding battlefields. Both Rose and Bloom had their pictures taken in Chattanooga. Rose was quite taken with the realism of one of his portraits. He wrote, "Mother, that picture I did not send as a present but for myself if I should live to get home. It looks very Natural. The scene is as familiar to me as home and it memories I will always cherish. I can tell you more about it if I get home. I want to have a heavy curly black walnut frame put on it and a good thick clear glass. I dont care if it costs five dollars. It is a very choice picture."² Visits to Chickamauga battlefield were made. Rose noted that "a detachment went out on the battlefield of Chickamauga."³ Lieutenant

¹ King Letters, 9 March 1864. (Underlining is King's.)
² Rose Letters, 15 January 1864.
³ Diary of Daniel D. Rose, 24 February 1864. The diary of Private Rose is in the possession of L. W. Thornton, Centreville, Michigan. (Hereafter cited as Rose Diary.)
Stephen Marsh of Company A "went to Chickamauga Battlefield." Neither of them recorded any details of these trips. However, John Bloom wrote, "Jan. 20 2 P M a detail went out on Chickamauga Battlefield to take Captain C. W. Newbury body up and bought it to camp. Jan 21. I was in camp and at 10 A M we went to the burial session and buried Captain C. W. Newbury at the Solgers Grave Yards. Solem Day To Co. E." Trips to Missionary Ridge are recorded in more detail. Rose wrote home that "One of the boys got a bush from the ridge where our regiment charged up in the last fight we had. It was about six feet long and the branches spread between four and five feet. It had twenty-six bullet marks on it so you can imagine how the missells of death flew around us. Another little tree has thirty-one bullet marks." Rose went for a "stroll on Missionary Ridge" on March third and saw a "dead Rebel."

There were camp diversions. According to Bloom, "the Boys are enjoying them self. Riding each other on a Pole and throwing each other in the ditch. Soloman Shirey is the Capt of the Pole Riding." Rose told his mother, "nothing to break the monotony of camp life except an occasional game of ball or slag taner as we call it."

1 Diary of Stephen P. Marsh, Lieutenant, Company A Eleventh Michigan Infantry, January 1864 to September 1864 (typed copy of original made by Wayne Mann, Regional History Collection, Western Michigan Archives, Kalamazoo, Michigan), 3 March 1864. (Hereafter cited as Marsh Diary.)

2 Bloom Diary, 20–21 January 1864.

3 Rose Letters, 1 February 1864.

4 Rose Diary, 3 March 1864.

5 Bloom Diary, 8 February 1864.

6 Rose Letters, 1 February 1864.
However, Rose wrote to his brother, "There was a dance out about three miles last night but as I was on guard I didn't attend but I was told that there was about sixty boys and only eight girls so they had to frequently hang the girls up to drean. There is some very nice and decent girls near here and I think that we will some day have a civil country dance."¹ Some enterprising showman must have brought a diorama to Rossville. Bloom said, "I went to the painting show or eye meusium. It was a good show."²

The government made a major effort during the winter of 1863-64 to reenlist the three-year regiments as veterans. The bonus was three hundred dollars and a thirty-day furlough. "A small effort was made a few days ago to reenlist our regiment in the veteran service but there was only a few felt inclined to try the service for three years longer."³

There was great concern from the folks at home over this question. Dan Rose wrote his mother as early as February 4, "I know that it panes you to think that I comtemplate reenlisting and I hasten to ease your mind on that point. Large inducments are offered now—the largest that ever have been offered. Never the less for your sake I will not reenlist yet, at least, but I would if one of the other boys was at home but as it is I will wait until I get home and stay awhile if I live long enough. Although I like the service well enough to serve another term but you can rest assured that I will not enlist again

¹Rose Letters, 21 March 1864.
²Bloom Diary, 18 February 1864.
³Rose Letters, 28 February 1864.
while circumstances are as they are at home."¹ When Daniel Rose enlisted in the summer of 1861, he had left three brothers home with his widowed mother. All of them enlisted in other Michigan regiments. James King was trying to assure his sweetheart that he was not going to reenlist. He returned to camp after a furlough for the wound that he received at Missionary Ridge. Finally, on April 12 he wrote, "Now, Dear Jenny, I will answer the question you asked of me at home. Whether I intended reenlisting in the Army. I can say Jenny that I shall not stay longer than my period of enlistment which expires the 24th day of August 1864. Now that is plainly answered is it not."² He had to reassure her again two weeks later, "You wished me to write and tell you whether I intended reenlisting or not. I think I can answer you to a certainty Jenny that I shall not."³ In the end not many in the Eleventh chose to reenlist.

The reasons for not reenlisting were given occasionally but often changed. King felt his broken arm was not strong enough for another three years. Indeed, he was almost discharged for disability. Rose said he would return to care for his mother but later added that he thought the fighting would end in 1864. Although he noted, "Soldiers will be needed for a long time yet and have enough to do to."⁴ Rose wrote to his brother, "I think there will be no need of our reenlist-

¹Ibid., 3 February 1864.
²King Letters, 12 April 1864.
³Ibid., 26 April 1864.
⁴Rose Letters, 28 February 1864.
The Eleventh was fairly successful in recruiting new soldiers. Hicks recalled that the regiment received 150 to 175 recruits from the North. This was especially true of Company A which was from the Mendon-Leonidas area. Rose told his mother, "Last night twenty-eight more recruits arrived. Making in all sixty for our Co. but we can't keep them all for it would make our Co more than full." To his brother, Rose wrote, "... we had to turn over about a doz to other Co's that enlisted for our Co and there is more yet in Mich. that enlisted for our Co but we can't take them. You can see by this what a reputation our Co has at home. ... All that didn't live at Leonidas had had to go to other Co. Our commissioned officers are all from Leonidas so you can see that Leonidas just about runs this Co. now." Captain Charles Coddington, Company A, must have cut an impressive figure on his recruiting trip to Michigan in January and February. The regiment had a total of 600 by May 1864.

This hint of village and township rivalry does not appear any other place in the sources about the Eleventh. However, Rose noted in his diary on April 28, 1864 that he had preferred charges against Captain Charles Coddington. The following day he wrote his only bit-

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1 Ibid., 17 March 1864.
2 Hicks, Personal Recollections, p. 536.
3 Rose Letters, 17 March 1864.
4 Ibid., 12 March 1864.
My stay is perceptably growing shorter and every day makes it shorter. It makes me buoyant with hope thinking of my return but I may hope in vain for there is time and chances enough yet to make my stay eternal. I would not think of returning while my country needs me but for you. . . . If Charles or Joel was at home then I could shape my course as best suited me but now I have to sumbit to circumstances that I can't control. But in the army as a private soldier is a poor place to plan, we are governed entirely by circumstances and officers, when and where they say go or what they say do that is our duty as we are sworn to obey our officers no matter how unjust. Mother, you must know that it has been hard for me to be a slave for nearly three years but I know that is serving my country.

The bounty for enlisting was a sore point with many, and Dan Rose was representative. "I blame our government for giving such large bounties to new recruits. They ought to enlist for the same that we did. If they would not, then the draft should take place. I wish I could be there to tend some of the war meetings for they are taxing us to pay recruits and we do the fighting." 2

On February 28, 1864, seventy-four enlisted men from the Ninth Michigan were transferred to the Eleventh. 3 These were the men who did not reenlist when that regiment signed for the veteran service. The Ninth had spent most of its enlistment as the provost guard of the Fourteenth Corps under Colonel John G. Parkhurst. Most of them were detailed to jobs at corps headquarters. John O. Rossetter, for example, was detailed as a saddler and harness maker. John C. Love and Hugh

1Ibid., 29 April 1864.

2Rose Letters, 28 February 1864.

Anderson were detailed to General Palmer's escort. John C. Love was apparently glad for the change. "I am heartily glad that I have got out of that regiment."¹ John Bloom noted on February 12 that, "we got 30 new recruits from the 9th Mich. for our Regiment."² This was probably the number that was actually incorporated into the Eleventh.

On March 15, 1864, the Eleventh left Rossville for Graysville which was about twelve miles east. At Graysville the regiment rejoined the Second Brigade of the First Division of the Fourteenth Corps. The brigade consisted of the Fifteenth, Sixteenth, Eighteenth, and Nineteenth United States Infantry Regiments and the Sixty-ninth Ohio, Nineteenth Illinois and Eleventh Michigan volunteer regiments. Just prior to the move, Company A received twenty more recruits from the training barracks in Grand Rapids. Most of these men had been recruited in the Mendon-Leonidas area. Since the first of the year the regiment received sixty-eight recruits and fifty-nine were for Company A.

The march to Graysville was uneventful and Dan Rose referred to it as "short but tiresome."³ The Eleventh set up camp only to move the whole thing on March 19 to be closer to the rest of the brigade. On that day they began target practice. This was a regular activity of the regiment until the beginning of the Atlanta Campaign. John Bloom recorded the best shot each time. This is the first mention in any

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¹John C. Love Letters, 4 March 1864, Ness Collection, University of Michigan, Michigan Historical Collection, Bentley Historical Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

²Bloom Diary, 12 February 1864.

³Rose Diary, 15 March 1864.
of the sources of target practice. There was some horse-play on the rifle range. On April 15 Bloom notes that, "Solomon Shirey poot a double load in his gun and it noct him over." There was also a lot of regimental and brigade drill at Graysville. General Thomas was preparing the Army of the Cumberland for the campaign.

The weather in northern Georgia was as varied as it was in Tennessee and constantly shocked the Michigan boys. On March 6, James King sent peach blossoms home in his letter and on March 22-23 it snowed ten inches. Many of the regiment were on picket duty during the heavy snowfall and suffered severely.

Between March 31 and April 5 the regiment was on picket duty at Parker's Gap in Tennessee about five miles from Graysville. Except for the rain it was difficult duty. Rose wrote, "We would have a good time while there but it was bad weather nearly all of the time. Still I went visiting in the valley among the Union citizens and had a good time." He also drew a sketch of the Gap which he sent home.

Toward the end of April the regiment began the final preparation for the Atlanta Campaign. Grant in the east and Sherman in the west were to move against the Confederates at the same time. Sherman began stripping the army of extra baggage. James King wrote, "Preparations have been going busily forward for an early move. All our surplus baggage has been sent to the rear and the army put in trim for a long

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1 Bloom Diary, 15 April 1864.
2 Ibid., 22 March 1864.
3 Rose Letters, 5 April 1864.
march. The weather is splendid and the roads in good condition. The amount of luggage that is now allowed the officers and men is very limited. A half a shelter tent to a man and one of the same to an officer constitutes their habitations. The transportation allowed to a Regiment when we came into the service was 14 teams. Now they talk of cutting it down to one. We have six teams at present and I cannot see but what we get along as well as when we had the 14 and, if they make it one, I am sure we can get along.'1

On May 2 the Brigade moved to Ringgold, the concentration point for the Fourteenth Corps. On May 6 the day before the start of the Atlanta campaign, the Nineteenth Illinois Infantry was transferred to General Turchin's Brigade (First Brigade, Third Division, Fourteenth Corps). The Nineteenth Illinois and the Eleventh Michigan had been brigaded together since 1862. The night of the sixth there was a "grand camp illumination." "Our 14 Army Corps was all lit up with candles and it was one of the best sight I ever saw. A scare for the Rebels."2 At sunrise on May 7 the final march into war began for the Eleventh.

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1 King Letters, 1 May 1864.
2 Bloom Diary, 6 May 1863.
CHAPTER IX

ATLANTA CAMPAIGN

In early May Sherman concentrated his armies in northern Georgia to strike at General Joseph Johnston's Confederate command at Dalton. The Confederates had been fortifying the Dalton area since their retreat from Missionary Ridge. The mountainous terrain gave clear advantage to the defensive position. Sherman's general plan for the campaign was to keep Thomas and the huge Army of the Cumberland in the center, constantly pressing and holding Johnston, while the smaller Army of the Ohio and the Army of the Tennessee attempted to attack the enemy's flanks or rear. Sherman began the campaign with nearly 100,000 men and 254 guns. The Army of the Cumberland had 60,000 men and 130 guns. Sherman's move in the west was to begin simultaneously with Grant's advance in the east against Lee.¹

The Eleventh Michigan was part of the Second Brigade (King) of the First Division (Richard Johnson) of the Fourteenth Corps (Palmer). At the beginning of the campaign the Second Brigade had a total of 2,590 men and officers, and when the Sixty-ninth Ohio returned from veterans leave on May 11, the number rose to 2,937. The Eleventh Michigan was the largest unit in the Brigade with sixteen officers and 428 men.

The regiment was carrying six hundred men on its muster books, but many were detailed for special duty. William Iddings of Company A was detailed as one of General Thomas' highly regarded scouts. Others were detailed to the escort of the Fourteenth Corps commander, Major-General John M. Palmer.

On Saturday, May 7, 1864, Sherman's command began a series of movements which resulted in the capture of Atlanta on September 2. The combined forces of the Armies of the Ohio and the Cumberland attacked the Confederate fortifications around Dalton while the Army of the Tennessee, under the command of Major General James B. McPherson, slipped south through Snake Creek Gap to break the Confederate rail connection at Resaca. This maneuver was designed to bring Johnston out of his fortifications at Dalton. The Eleventh Michigan marched through Ringgold and Tunnel Hill toward Dalton and first faced the Confederate defenses at Buzzard's Roost on the afternoon of May 9. For the next two days the regiment took its turn in the front line under heavy artillery fire. At night they lay in line of battle with all their equipment on. Although Johnston was kept busy at Dalton, McPherson failed to break the Confederate supply line at Resaca.

The Confederates began to move south to meet the flanking movement at Resaca on May 11. Sherman moved the Fourteenth Corps through Snake Creek Gap and the battle begun at Buzzard's Roost and Rocky

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2 John C. Love Letters, Ness Collection, University of Michigan, Michigan Historical Collection, Bentley Historical Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
Face was continued at Resaca. On May 12 the Eleventh moved about fourteen miles to the right, camping in Snake Creek Gap. On May 13 the regiment left their knapsacks under guard and moved toward the fighting. Having lost their "home away from home" once, they were not going to do it again. Rose wrote that they were "keeping nothing for shelter but our rubbers."\(^1\) On the fourteenth, the regiment moved forward to the front line of battle and received its first casualties of the campaign.

The diary entry of Stephen Marsh gave a terse record of the Eleventh at Resaca.

7 get rations, form lines move forward on left wheel one line in front 9 sharp skg [skirmishing] in front one man wounded chance shot 12 ben heavy work some charge drove rebs back 5 up in site of rebs breast work fire keeps up brisk and heavy we keep them down in their works drove them back 2 miles work heavy on their flanks 5[?] still rages heavy each holds line with desperation keeps up till dark I goe on line from 11 to one 2

Charles Powers of Company A was the wounded man.\(^3\) On the fifteenth the fighting was heavy. That night Johnston withdrew across the Oostanaula River.

The morning of the 16th the regiment "fell in ready for a fight," but it was "very quiet."\(^4\) At nine o'clock the Fourteenth Corp entered Resaca. By ten the railroad cars with supplies and mail were coming

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\(^1\) Rose Diary, 13 May 1864.
\(^2\) Marsh Diary, 14 May 1864.
\(^3\) Rose Diary, 14 May 1864.
\(^4\) Ibid., 16 May 1864.
into Resaca. Sherman's engineers and pioneer departments did a fine job of keeping the railroad repaired and operating throughout the campaign.

The pursuit of the retreating Confederate army began with the Fourth Corps (Howard) and Twentieth Corps (Hooker) of the Army of the Cumberland crossing the Oostanaula River on May 16.\(^1\) King's brigade followed, passing through Calhoun, Adairsville, Kingston and Cass Station.\(^2\) The route of the Fourteenth Corps was along the railroad. Daniel Rose was impressed with the countryside. He wrote, "Passed through the best looking and most level country that we have seen since leaving Murfreesboro, Tenn."\(^3\) The next day he added, "Country level and fertile like my own native home. Considerable wheat sown."\(^4\) On the 21st of May the last regimental wagon and team was turned over to the division. Marsh recorded, "send all our trunks to rear and get ready for 20 days hard fitting."\(^5\) On May 25, Hooker's lead division ran into Joe Johnston's army near Dallas, Georgia. Hooker committed his divisions as they came up, and the Battle of the New Hope Church was the result. Palmer's corps was in the rear of the Army of the Cumberland and was further delayed on the twenty-fifth by the passing of Hooker's supply train. When Johnson's division finally arrived at the

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\(^1\) O. R., 38, pt. 1, p. 142.
\(^2\) O. R., 38, pt. 1, p. 560.
\(^3\) Ibid., 17 May 1864.
\(^4\) Ibid., 18 May 1864.
\(^5\) Marsh Diary, 21 May 1864.

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front on the morning of the twenty-sixth, it was placed in reserve. As the Eleventh Infantry came up they passed a hospital with the wounded of the Nineteenth Michigan. Daniel Rose found his brother Charles among the wounded. "Saw Charles. He was wounded in the left hand and had had one finger taken off. Saw several more of the 19th slightly wounded."\(^1\) He wrote to his mother a few days later. "Charles was shot through the left hand and lost his middle finger. It was taken out back to the wrist and the fore and ring finger closed together so it will make quite a shapely three fingered hand. I am very thankful that it is no worse. He is now out of danger for this summer and maybe longer. He will undoubtedly have a chance to come home until he gets well."\(^2\)

On the night of the twenty-sixth Sherman decided to turn the Confederate right flank. The attacking column consisted of Wood's division of the Fourth Corps, Johnson's division of the Fourteenth Corps and McLean's brigade from the Twenty-third. Johnson had the left flank, Wood was in the center and was the advance unit, and McLean was the right. As Wood moved to the attack in the afternoon he was closely supported by the Third Brigade (Scribner's) of Johnson's division. Unfortunately, the attacking column did not overlap the Confederate right and was caught in a deadly cross fire.\(^3\) The men of the Eleventh certainly had no idea of what was expected of them. Rose,

\(^1\) Rose Diary, 26 May 1864.
\(^2\) Rose Letters, 30 May 1864.
who was usually very knowledgeable about the object and meaning in the maneuvers said, "At night moved to front and relieved the 4th A.C." Lieutenant Marsh revealed no insight into the purpose of the move to the left. Marsh did note that "4:30 firing commence in our front, 5:00 move to the front - heavy firing - form line - lie down - get up advance 100 yards - halt. Shell comes thick - goe to work build breast work - lots of wounded - hard fiting till after dark." The effort to turn the Confederate right was a failure, and the Union troops suffered heavy losses. "The total loss on the Union side was 1,732, of which Wood's share was 1,457, more than 25 per cent of the force taken into action." The Eleventh had three wounded.

After the failure of the assault on May 27, Sherman changed his battlefield tactics. With the exception of the frontal assault against the Confederate lines near Kennesaw Mountain on June 27, the massed attack by columns of brigades or demi-brigades was not used by the Union armies in the western theater again. "The usual formation was in two lines, the second only half as strong as the first and kept under cover from fire till the front line needed instant help. Coming up then with a rush, it would sometimes give the advance a new impulse.

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1Rose Diary, 27 May 1864.
2Marsh Diary, 27 May 1864.
4Marsh Diary, 27 May 1864. Details of this action can be found in O.R., 38, pt. 1, p. 193-194, 864-866, 594-595.
which would carry it" to victory. After the Battle of New Hope Church
the advanced line on both sides entrenched as soon as possible. Thomas
had shown the advantages to be gained from even the crudest defensive
works at Chickamauga. The typical method of entrenchment for the
Union was described by Jacob Cox.

A division having been moved to a place it was expected
to hold, the general in command, by a rapid reconnaissance
of the topography, determined the most available line for
defense, and directed brigade commanders to form their
troops upon it. . . . The skirmish line was kept in front,
the rest stacked arms a few paces in rear of the intended
place for the breastwork, intrenching tools were taken
from wagons that accompanied the ammunition train, or were
carried by the troops in the movement and each company was
ordered to cover its own front. Trees were felled and
trimmed, and the logs, often two feet thick, rolled into
the line. The timber revetment was usually four feet high
and the earth thrown from the ditch in front varied in
thickness according to exposure. When likely to be sub­
jected to artillery fire it was from ten to thirteen feet
thick at the base, and three feet less on the upper line
of the parapet. Skids or poles, resting on top of the
revetment at right angles to it, sustained the head log,
a horizontal loophole for firing under it being about three
inches wide. . . . As the troops became familiar with the
work, they were able to cover themselves with an intrench­
ment of this kind within an hour from the time they stacked
arms.

On May 28 Sherman developed his plan to move towards the left by
taking troops from the extreme right. The objective of the plan was
to gain control of the Alatoona Pass and to repair the railroad to
that point. However, the constant fighting prevented any movement
until June 1. From May 26 to June 5 the Eleventh Michigan occupied
the same position and was under constant fire. Dan Rose spent an un-

1Cox, Atlanta, p. 81.
2Ibid., p. 82.
comfortable birthday on May 28. "Lay in the rifle pits all day with skirmish line in front. Had to keep our heads under cover for fear of rebs 'minnies' that came to close for comfort."\(^1\) He was twenty-one years old that day. On the twenty-eighth Colonel Stoughton became the commander of the Second Brigade when the brigade commander, General King, replaced General Johnson who was wounded.

The constant firing of the Union and Confederate armies meant that the troops were in continual danger. There was no relief. The minnies were always too close for comfort. A member of Thomas's staff reported that there was "during May and June, a daily average expenditure of 200,000 rounds of musketry and 1200 cannon-shot; although for two weeks of that period there was scarely any firing."\(^2\) On the average the Army of the Cumberland used 94,500 musket rounds daily during the entire campaign.\(^3\) After the Confederates withdrew from the Dallas lines, Marsh recorded that the ground was covered with balls.\(^4\) Rose said that a house near the Confederate line "would equal a sieve for holes."\(^5\)

The constant firing and danger made life miserable but, when the rains began, the Eleventh discovered the real meaning of misery. Rose reported after a heavy rain on June 2, "our works was full of mud and

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\(^1\) Rose Diary, 8 May 1864.


\(^3\) Ibid.

\(^4\) Marsh Diary, 5 June 1864.

\(^5\) Rose Diary, 5 June 1864.
nearly water enough to run a small mill."\(^1\) The regiment was shocked when a bolt of lightning hit near their position. It was on this same day that the Army of the Ohio charged across Alatonna Creek in "a furious thunderstorm, which made it difficult to distinguish between the discharges of the enemy's artillery at close quarters and the rattling thunder."\(^2\) On June 3 after more rain Dan Rose could hardly believe his misfortune. "Oh! Misery where is thy end."\(^3\)

On June 5 Johnston withdrew to his next fortified line just north of Marietta, Georgia. Rose recorded, "Comparative Joy, Peace and Liberty again. The rain has ceased and the enemy has retreated from our front."\(^4\) That night he was able to wash his clothes for the second time in a month and take a bath. After nine days in the trenches, he probably needed it.

From June 6 to June 10 the Eleventh was near Big Shanty on the railroad line. Here they rested and drew some new camp equipment. On June 10 the regiment moved to the left. After twelve days of marching and skirmishing the brigade reached Kennesaw Mountain and relieved the Second Brigade of the First Division of the Fourth Corps in the entrenchments. The division stayed in the front lines of fortification from June 22 until the Confederates retreated on July 3. Most of the time the two opposing lines were not more than a hundred yards apart.

\(^1\)Ibid., 2 June 1864.
\(^2\)Cox, *Atlanta*, p. 89.
\(^3\)Rose Diary, 3 June 1864.
\(^4\)Ibid., 24 June 1864.
Rose recorded a close call for the Eleventh and the Second Brigade.

About 4 OC pm a detail of 150 men from the front of the brigade detailed to charge the front line of the enemy's works which are only about 15 rods from ours, supposing there was a very light line behind them. After we was drawn up in line behind our works, the rebs hoisted a flag of truce and firing was stopped and one of their officers (Col. Smith) of their regular army Gen. Clabourne's division, and three of our regular officers met between the works, shook hands and wanted to make arrangements for burying some of their dead that lay in front of our works but come to no conclusion. Their men mounted their works showing as strong a line as we had which put a stop to our contemplated charge. Luckey for us.

On June 27 Sherman tried to pierce Johnston's defensive line with two frontal assaults by the Army of the Cumberland. Both were repulsed with heavy losses. The Eleventh lay in readiness to support the charge made by Davis's division of the Fourteenth Corps but were not called on. Years later Captain Borden M. Hicks of Company E recalled this moment.

Word came to us one morning that a division of the Fourteenth Corps would make a charge on the works of the enemy and try and break through their line of works. Our skirmishers were detailed and reported to Brigade Headquarters and assigned their place in front, and, then we stood and waited nearly all day long for the command to charge, the works in our front were not over four rods apart, and we knew that it meant death to the charging column. It was the most trying day that we experienced in our whole term of service. Fortunately for us another division made the charge and were badly cut up and defeated as is most always the case in charging fortified positions.

Following the failure of the frontal assault, Sherman resumed his flanking movement. On the night of July 2 the Eleventh moved to the left

1Ibid., 24 June 1864.

2Hicks, Personal Recollections, p. 539-540.
and relieved the Thirty-first Iowa Infantry of the Second Brigade, First Division of the Fifteenth Corps. In the morning Dan Rose wrote, "A glorious sight this morning before sunrise our flag floated on top of Kennesaw Mt, the enemy retreated last night."\(^1\)

At 8:00 A.M. the Eleventh joined the pursuit of Johnston's Confederates, passing through Marietta along the railroad line. The brigade caught up with the rear guard of the Confederates at Ruff's Station just north of Smyrna and a sharp fight began. On July 4, a skirmish line consisting of parts of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth United States Infantry and the Eleventh Michigan charged the Confederate line driving them back and holding the line under heavy fire. The Eleventh Michigan suffered severe losses. Colonel Stoughton was seriously wounded by a piece of shell and his right leg was amputated. Lieutenant Myron Benedict, Company F, had his arm amputated. The regiment had three killed: William Schochenbarger, Company C; Edwin White, Company F; and Bryon J. Liddle, Company D. There were eleven enlisted men wounded. Dan Rose called it, "the hottest place we have been on the campaign."\(^2\) Stephen Marsh of Company A was so weakened by dysentery that he had followed the regiment in a brigade ambulance. On the fourth he wrote, "11 Infty opens brisk 12 rebs open arty-Strike all around me-have to move-Wm Scocensparcer [Schochenbarger] killed in Co. C-I am not able to goe up. . . ." Later he added, "our regt suffers today. . . ."\(^3\)

\(^1\)Rose Diary, 3 July 1864.
\(^2\)Ibid., 4 July 1864.
\(^3\)Marsh Diary, 4 July 1864.
The brigade had fifty casualties in all.\(^1\)

The following day a detail from the Eleventh carried Colonel Stoughton back to Marietta on a litter. Stoughton requested that Quartermaster Sergeant James King stay with him until he was well enough to travel. The rest of the regiment joined in the pursuit of the Confederates. Rose reported that they marched ten miles but were only four miles from where they started. During the day the Eleventh finally saw the objective of the campaign; they were in sight of Atlanta. On the sixth Marsh climbed a tree for another look.\(^2\)

On the evening of July 6 the brigade took its place in the lines surrounding the last Confederate fortifications north of the Chattahoochee River. On the tenth Johnston withdrew across the river, burning the railroad bridge. From July 10 to July 17 the army stopped, rested and refitted.\(^3\)

The Eleventh crossed the Chattahoochee River by a pontoon bridge at 2:00 P.M. on July 17. Many of the original enlistees, who had joined the regiment on August 24, 1861, were counting the final days of their service. For Stephen Marsh it was the end of active service. Sick and unable to keep up with the regiment, he was finally sent back to the hospital in Chattanooga. The Army of the Cumberland had been forced to wait at the Chattahoochee River while part of the Union army crossed the river farther north and came down to drive the Confederates away from the crossing points. The Second Brigade went

\(^1\) O. R., 38, pt. 1, p. 561.

\(^2\) Rose Diary, 5 July 1864; Marsh Diary, 6 July 1864.

\(^3\) Rose Diary, 10-17 July 1864; O.R., Vol. 38, pt. 5, p. 507.
about three miles after crossing. The Fourteenth Corps was the extreme right of the advancing Union armies and on the eighteenth concentrated at the fork of Nancy and Peachtree creeks. Next to the Fourteenth was Hooker and the Twentieth Corps and on the left of the Army of the Cumberland was Howard and the Fourth Corps. The Army of the Ohio was to the left of Thomas moving toward Decatur and on the extreme left was the Army of the Tennessee. On the nineteenth the Fourteenth Corps began to cross Peachtree Creek in face of strong Confederate resistance. Sherman began to swing the left down to the east of Atlanta.¹

General John B. Hood replaced Johnston as the Confederate commander on July 17. The change resulted in an almost immediate shift in Confederate tactics as Hood moved to the offensive. On July 20 the Confederates assaulted the Union lines along Peachtree Creek with the bulk of the Confederate attack being against the Union left. For the Eleventh Michigan the Battle of Peachtree Creek started with a great deal of marching and very little fighting. They were ordered to strike their tents and move to the front at nine P.M. on July 19. After moving two miles to the front and then countermarching until "we were quite tired and out of patience,"² the regiment stopped for the night close to where they had started. On the morning of the twentieth the regiment moved to front lines on a different road, crossed Peachtree Creek, and put out skirmishers driving the Confederate

²Rose Diary, 19 July 1864.
skirmishers back. About noon the Confederate artillery forced them to entrench. Very heavy fighting was heard to the left, and the brigade immediately moved to the rear and then to the left at quick time passing the area of heaviest fighting in front of Hooker's corps. The brigade moved to the front again filling a gap between two divisions of the Fourth Corps. This put the brigade near the extreme left of the Army of the Cumberland. Although the heaviest fighting ceased at dark, skirmishing kept up all night.

The regiment served as the brigade pickets all day and night of July 21. There was little or no fighting during this time although artillery firing was constant. On the morning of the twenty-second the brigade rejoined their division. The line had been pushed forward and, when the Eleventh went to the front, they were within two miles of Atlanta. The division was under assault throughout July 23. During the early morning hours the Confederates charged the Third Brigade, and at 9:00 A.M. the Second Brigade. The picket line of the Second Brigade was driven in, but as Dan Rose wrote, "the line was soon established in its former position." The Eleventh had two men wounded in the fighting. Addison McCombs of Company G was seriously wounded and died. James Long of Company F was slightly wounded and later served in the reorganized Eleventh Michigan.

July 23 was a memorable day for the regiment. Henry Damon, who had been captured at Chickamauga, returned to Company A after escaping from Andersonville Prison. Damon had been taken prisoner on September

\[1\] Ibid., 23 July 1864.
20 when he had taken his wounded tentmate back to a log house where the wounded were being cared for during the fighting on Snodgrass Hill. It was dusk and Lieutenant Marsh told Damon to stay with the wounded to help. When the regiment withdrew after dark, he and the wounded were forgotten. After an unsuccessful escape attempt from the prison at Danville, Virginia, he was transferred to Andersonville. Damon escaped by getting a rebel uniform, and, when the guard detail came to take roll in his hut, he simply stood up, took out a notebook and joined the detail. This was on the evening of June 28. Once outside the walls he joined another escaping prisoner, William Smith, of the Fourteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry. The two of them entered Marietta, Georgia, on July 20.¹

From July 24 to July 27 the fighting died down to siege warfare. Everyone took his turn as picket, skirmisher, and reserve. Rose recorded an incident of these days, "Last night at 10 oc the bugles sounded the assembly then the forward call and we rose up in our works and got up a yell like a charge. At the same time the skirmishers fired a volley and kept up their fire for some time. The rebs opened with some of their batteries and we answered. It was done to develop the positions of their batteries. About 11 oc quiet was restored and we lay down to sleep."² Yet men were wounded and killed; it was not a play. Lyman Evans of Company D was wounded on the twenty-sixth.

¹ James W. King, Reminiscence of Army Life, James W. King Papers, Regional History Collection, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, n.d.
² Rose Diary, 25 July 1864.
Sherman began to move his army around to the right on July 27. The Army of the Tennessee moved from the extreme left that day. As each unit passed to the rear of the Army of the Cumberland, the skirmishers would advance their lines as close to the Confederates trenches as possible and then fall back. It took two days for the Army of the Tennessee to accomplish this maneuver. On July 26, George Dickinson of Company A was wounded in the demonstration to protest the movement to the right. Hood attacked the Federal army at Ezra Church on July 28 when the leading corps of the Army of Tennessee came around the Fourteenth Corps. No units of the Fourteenth were engaged at the Battle of Ezra Church.¹

On August 2 the Army of the Ohio passed around the Army of the Cumberland. The following day Johnston’s division of the Fourteenth moved to the extreme right of the Union army and went into the front in the area of Utoy Creek. On August 7 Sherman advanced the Twenty-third and Fourteenth Corps against the Confederate entrenchments. Cox said of this action that the troops met "opposition which General Sherman described in his despatches to Washington as a noisy but not a bloody battle."² For the Eleventh Michigan it was the bloodiest day of the entire Atlanta campaign.

Lt. Colonel Melvin Mudge of the Eleventh was commanding the brigade on August 7 and 8. The brigade advanced with the Eighteenth Regulars in front as skirmishers followed by the Fifteenth Regular

¹O. R., 38, pt. 1, p. 508.
²Cox, Atlanta, p. 194.
Infantry on the left and the Eleventh Michigan on the right. "A spirited and determined engagement ensued, which resulted in driving the enemy from his rifle pits, capturing a large number of prisoners and advancing our lines to within 150 yards of the enemy's main line of works."¹ Rose wrote, "At 5 oc we charged over the front line and took the rebs skirmish pits with quite a number of prisoners."² The brigade casualties in this fight were four officers wounded, twenty-two enlisted men killed and 146 wounded and seven missing.³ The Eleventh had fifteen killed and fifteen wounded.⁴ Lieutenant Edward Catlin of Company E died of his wounds. He was a veteran of the First Michigan Infantry that fought at First Bull Run. The Eleventh had three more men wounded on August 8 when the Confederates tried to retake their former position.⁵ At least two of the missing were found on August 11 when the Eleventh had a truce with the opposing Confederates to do some trading. The bodies of Daniel Baldwin and George Quay of Company E were found between the lines.⁶

The brigade remained in the position of August 7 until the army began the movement towards Jonesborough. The time of the Eleventh was running out, yet each day in the trenches men were killed and wounded.

²Rose Diary, 7 August 1864.
³O. R., 38, pt. 1, p. 563.
⁵Rose Diary, 8 August 1864.
⁶Ibid., 11 August 1864.
On August 19 the regiment came off the front lines and moved to the concentration area for the move to Jonesborough. Dan Rose recorded on August 23, "This completes my term of three yrs service for the U.S. in the army as I was mustered in Aug. 24th 1861 and still there is no order to be sent back. We consider that we have done our duty to our country."\(^1\) On August 25 there was a mutiny in the regiment. That day the regiment was ordered to go on the front line and "some few bolted and wouldn't go. The rest went on the line."\(^2\) Captain Borden M. Hicks recalled in later years, "I at once made up my mind that I would refuse to go on that detail, as the term of our service was up, and it meant sure capture of the skirmish line. ..."\(^3\) On August 26 Rose was complaining, "On the line going extra duty for 'Uncle Sam' after our time is out just on account of some miserable officers. With the hot sun pouring down on us and shells whizzing over our heads."\(^4\)

On August 27 orders finally came that relieved the Eleventh from duty. The regiment had lain all day under orders to fight or march. According to Dan Rose their release was due to the efforts of Captain Ephraim Hall of the Eleventh who was serving as the Acting Assistant Adjutant General, Second Brigade. "At night brought us the glad tidings that we was relieved from duty in the department then there was

\(^1\text{Ibid., 23 August 1864.}\)
\(^2\text{Ibid., 25 August 1864.}\)
\(^3\text{Hicks, Personal Recollections, p. 542.}\)
\(^4\text{Rose Diary, 26 August 1864.}\)
some lighter hearts."¹

On August 29 the Eleventh Michigan slept in a railroad depot at Chattanooga. Along the way they had picked up their sick, wounded and detailed men. Rose reported that Company A had increased from twenty-three on the line at Atlanta to forty-five in Chattanooga. On the last day at the front Company A had had only thirteen privates for duty.²

¹Ibid., 27 August 1864.
²Rose Diary, 30 August 1864.
CHAPTER X

RETURN TO MICHIGAN

And so they came out of Georgia, out of the war. The regiment left Marietta, Georgia, on August 29, riding in and on boxcars that were returning to Chattanooga for more supplies. Lt. Colonel Melvin Mudge had tried to get the regiment mustered out as early as August 3. This request was forwarded through the chain-of-command of the army but was disapproved. In his request, Mudge pointed out that seven of the ten companies of the regiment were mustered on August 24, 1861, and the last company joined on September 11, 1861. Written on the bottom of the request in an unidentified hand was "Sept. 10." According to army regulations, a regiment's term of service was not complete until the last company's time was served. The refusal of the men to go forward when their time had expired probably hastened their departure from the Atlanta front.¹

The Eleventh's relief from active duty was rather short. They arrived in Chattanooga at 4:00 A.M. on August 30 and left at 7:30 A.M. September 1, as part of a force that was organized to catch General Joseph Wheeler and his cavalry. Wheeler had been sent by Hood early in August to strike at Sherman's long railroad supply line. The Confederate cavalry had created a great alarm in eastern Tennessee, but

¹Regimental Papers, Arranged by Year, Month, and Date, Michigan Eleventh Infantry, Record Group 94, Box 1999, National Archives, Washington, D. C.
very little real disruption in the supply system. Both Rose and Bloom in their diaries say the regiment volunteered to go to eastern Tennessee.\(^1\) Hicks pointed out that Wheeler was threatening "the only line of road that we could take to get home, our boys went willingly, as this was fighting for our homes or at least for a way to get there."\(^2\)

The Eleventh spent their last two weeks of service as they had spent so many months at the beginning, in the hopeless pursuit of cavalry by rail and foot. The force was organized into three brigades. The Eleventh was part of the First Brigade along with the Fifty-first Indiana, the Fourteenth U.S. Colored, and the Second Ohio with Colonel Abel D. Streight commanding. Their old friends, the Eighteenth Ohio Infantry, were part of the Second Brigade.\(^3\) On the first day the troops went from Chattanooga to Murfreesboro with stops at Bridgeport, Stevenson, and Deckert.\(^4\) The Eleventh must have felt as if they were home. They camped that night in Fort Rosecrans.

On the following day the chase began. The troops marched to Lavergne before noon and seven miles back toward Murfreesboro. On the third they got sight of the Confederates, and on the fourth the Confederates fired at the Federal skirmishers. On September 6, the troops boarded the trains and roamed around eastern Tennessee for two days finally arriving in Athens in the afternoon of the seventh. The

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\(^1\) Rose Diary, 1 September 1864; Bloom Diary, 1 September 1864.

\(^2\) Hicks, Personal Recollections, p. 542.


\(^4\) Ibid., p. 855. Also Rose Diary, 1 September 1864.
The infantry marched for the next three days. On September 9, they caught Wheeler's rear guard and there was a skirmish. On the tenth the troops went into camp and did some heavy foraging "from the rebel citizens of the country." Rose recorded, "Lay in camp all day. Being nearly out of rations we had to forage our living. Sweet potatoes, chickens, hogs and other things in proportion had to suffer accordingly." However, John Bloom's company must not have done so well as he said on the eleventh that they had "nothing to eat, only apels and peaches - pordy near starve to death." On September 13 the regiment arrived back in Chattanooga.

Rose had noted on September 10 that the "last company's time expired today." The war was over for the Michigan Eleventh; all that remained was getting home. On the thirteenth, Lt. Colonel Mudge had to return to Atlanta "to do business that should have been done two weeks before but I won't blame him. It is the best that he knows." The regiment left Chattanooga on September 18 for Nashville. After a two-day wait they got transport to Louisville.

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1 O. R., Vol 38, pt. 1, p. 855; Rose Diary, 1-9 September 1864; Bloom Diary, 1-9 September 1864.
2 Ibid., p. 856.
3 Rose Diary, 10 September 1864.
4 Bloom Diary, 11 September 1864.
5 Ibid., 10 September 1864.
6 Ibid., 13 September 1864.
7 Ibid., 13 September 1864.
On September 22, the men visited their old Colonel William May and then crossed the Ohio River by ferry. They were headed north towards Indianapolis by sundown. From Indianapolis they went east to Sidney, Ohio, for their last fight. The regiment arrived in Sidney in the morning and had to wait for a train headed north.

When the Eleventh arrived in Sidney, it was obvious that some big event was planned. The local Republican newspaper editor came to the station to organize a meal for the troops and talk to the men. He informed the members of the regiment that Clement L. Vallandingham was to arrive on the next train from Cincinnati to speak to a Democratic Party rally for George B. McCellan. The editor encouraged the boys to give "three cheers for Lincoln." He then left the depot to organize lunch for the regiment.

Daniel Rose recorded the event. "We arrived in Sidney about noon, dismounted and saw Old Traitor Vallandingham ride past. We gave him three hearty groans & secart his team. The captured a small cannon that was fired for a salute for him. Received dinner from the Loyal young ladies of S. Changed cars and resumed our journey to the north taking our gun with us." The cannon was used to fire salutes to members of the Eleventh at their weddings and reunions "until it was bursted by an overcharge of gravel."  

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1"Democratic Meeting," Sidney Journal, (Sidney, Ohio), 30 September 1864.

2Rose Diary, 24 September 1864.

3Hicks, Personal Recollections, p. 542.
In Toledo, Ohio, the regiment moved from boxcars to coaches for the final leg home. They arrived in Sturgis at sunrise of September 25, 1864. Their first act was to march directly to Colonel Stoughton's home to pay their respect to the man who had led them through the great battles. By afternoon people were coming from all over the county. On the following day, many of the regiment attended a "Grand Republican Rally" at White Pigeon, where Stoughton and many others spoke.\(^1\) After the Republican meeting, some of the Eleventh "cleaned out a Vallandinghamites show."\(^2\) Many of "the boys" had been waiting for such an opportunity for two years.

On September 27, 1864, the regiment was given a reception in Sturgis with dinner, speeches and the works. They in turn drilled and performed the manual of arms. The troops turned in their weapons and received a ten day furlough until they could be mustered out. Then it was off to homes to be welcomed by family and friends and begin the process of relearning to be civilians.

When the regiment reassembled on October 7, the discharges and pay were still not ready, and the men were sent home again. On October 13 the regiment was finally paid and discharged. Rose noted that the discharges were dated September 13, 1864.\(^3\) "Of the 1004 men who left the rendezvous at White Pigeon in 1861 there were 340 mustered

\(^1\)Three Rivers Reporter, (Three Rivers, Michigan), 1 October 1864.

\(^2\)Rose Diary, 26 September 1864.

\(^3\)Ibid., 13 October 1864.
at the end of three years.\textsuperscript{1}

Forty-six years after enlisting, Borden M. Hicks probably summed up the feeling of most of the Eleventh. "No money consideration could buy my experience during that term of service, and no amount of money would induce me to again undergo it."\textsuperscript{2}

\textsuperscript{1}James W. King, The Eleventh Michigan Infantry, King Papers, Item #203. Regional History Collection, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan, n.d.

\textsuperscript{2}Hicks, Personal Recollections, p. 544.
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