4-2016

The Behavioral Revolution in Contemporary Political Science: Narrative, Identity, Practice

Joshua R. Berkenpas
Western Michigan University, jberke23@msn.com

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/dissertations

Part of the Political Science Commons, and the Social History Commons

Recommended Citation
http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/dissertations/1427

This Dissertation-Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate College at ScholarWorks at WMU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please contact maira.bundza@wmich.edu.
THE BEHAVIORAL REVOLUTION IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL SCIENCE:
NARRATIVE, IDENTITY, PRACTICE

by

Joshua R. Berkenpas

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate College
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Political Science
Western Michigan University
April 2016

Doctoral Committee:

Emily Hauptmann, Ph.D., Chair
John Clark, Ph.D.
J. Kevin Corder, Ph.D.
John G. Gunnell, Ph.D.
The behavioral revolution of the 1950s and early 1960s is a foundational moment in the history of political science and is widely considered to be a time in when the discipline shed its traditional roots by embracing its identity as a modern social science. This dissertation examines reference works published between 1980 and 2012 in order to gauge the contemporary significance of the behavioral revolution. The behavioral revolution is discussed in many foundation narratives throughout reference works like dictionaries, encyclopedias, and handbooks. After sixty years, why does the behavioral revolution still figure centrally in the way political scientists remember their discipline’s past? I answer this question by developing a political theory of mythology that focuses on the nexus between narratives, identities, and practices in communities like academic political science. This mythological nexus provides significance to identities and practices through the repetition of narrative elements centered on the story of the behavioral revolution. I analyze the narrative context of each mention of the behavioral revolution in reference works, discuss how they answer a need for significance, and show how they
provide models for practice in a community. The dominance of practices in political science like quantitative analysis stem from professional identities that are shaped by the repetition of narratives about the behavioral revolution. The behavioral revolution mythology also works to marginalize political scientists whose identity and preferred practices are more in-line with humanistic disciplines like history or philosophy. A political theory of mythology makes it possible to understand why narratives about the behavioral revolution continue to be central to identities and practices and may shed new light on how political science can embrace the plurality fostered by its disciplinary mythology.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The writing of this dissertation has been a Heraklean task. Like the gods and goddesses who helped Herakles complete his labors, the advice of my advisers proved essential to the task of finishing this dissertation. Most important among these advisers is Emily Hauptmann, the chair of my dissertation committee, and my long-term adviser on all things academic. Without Dr. Hauptmann as my guide through the purgatory of proposal drafting and dissertation writing, I would never have been able to commence much less complete this journey. The advice of Kevin Corder, another member of the dissertation committee, proved to come at a pivotal stage in the proposal writing process. It was Dr. Corder’s advice that pushed me from a diachronic to a synchronic perspective, which ultimately made it possible to develop the political theory of mythology presented in this dissertation. John Clark also served on the dissertation committee and while less hands on during the writing process, his imagined feedback helped structure the work presented here. Above all, Dr. Clark’s role as ‘conscientious objector’ pushed me to keep this dissertation grounded in the realities of contemporary political science and stay alert to the significant ways that the discipline changed after the behavioral revolution. Lastly, my outside committee member is the eminent political theorist and disciplinary historian John G. Gunnell. Dr. Gunnell’s work has been an inspiration for my own and his influence is evident throughout the dissertation. His quick responses to my emails and his deep insight
into the history of political science was an important asset throughout the dissertation writing process.

Word cannot adequately express my gratitude for the steadfast love and support of my family during the period I wrote my dissertation. Their confidence in my ability to finish was unwavering; despite the occasional ribbing, “You’re not done with that yet” or “When are you going be done anyway?” I thank my mother Nancy, my sister Rachael, my sister Sarah, her husband Cheick, their daughter Wilhelmina, my brother David and his son Noah. It is also a pleasure to thank my wife Erin for her ardent support over the period I wrote this dissertation. Erin cheerfully read drafts of chapters and her feedback is evident in many of the chapters that follow. Erin was a consistent beacon of joy, even in what could be a gloomy day in the epic journey of dissertation writing. Finally, I offer a mūthos for baby Berkenpas who will join our family soon: May you live a life of philosophia and wonder.

Joshua R. Berkenpas
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................................................................................ ii
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................ x
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................. xi

CHAPTER

I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1
   The Behavioral Revolution Mythology and Disciplinary Identity..... 1
   The Behavioral Revolution in the Discourse of the Discipline....... 5
   “Discursive Object,” History, Mythology .................................. 21
   Selection Criteria for Reference Materials ............................... 28
   A Political Theory of Mythology .................................................. 36
   The Mythological Nexus ................................................................. 39
      Mythology as Authoritative Speech .................................... 41
      Narrative, Identity, and Mythology ........................................ 43
   The Narrative Context ................................................................. 45
   The Subfield Context ................................................................. 46
   The Referents to the Behavioral Revolution .............................. 47
   Referents and Tropes ................................................................. 52
   The Thematic Context ................................................................. 53
   Mythological Analysis of the Behavioral Revolution: An
   Example ....................................................................................... 58
   The Narrative Context ................................................................. 59
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table of Contents – Continued</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Mythological Nexus</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Overview of Dissertation</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. A POLITICAL THEORY OF MYTHOLOGY</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meanings of Myth and Mythology: The Passage from $M$ū$thos$ to Logos</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Poets</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Historians</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Philosophers</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logos Opposed to $M$ū$thos$</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M$ū$thos$ as the Plot of a Tragedy</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M$ū$thos$ as Authoritative Speech</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Mythological Nexus and the Spartan Herakles Mythology</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Narrative Dimension</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Dimension of Identity</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Practical Dimension</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Mythology and the Behavioral Revolution</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. THE BEHAVIORAL REVOLUTION MYTHOLOGY IN CONTEMPORARY DICTIONARIES</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritiveness and the Prescriptive Force of Mythology</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prescriptivism and Descriptivism in Dictionaries</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Selection Criteria</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table of Contents – Continued

CHAPTER

Absence and Exclusion ................................................................. 118
Authoritativeness, Generality, Mythology ........................................ 119
Narrative Context and the Behavioral Revolution Mythology ........... 128
The Subfield Context ................................................................. 130
The Referents to the Behavioral Revolution ................................... 131
The Thematic Context of the Behavioral Revolution ....................... 132
Political Science in General ....................................................... 133
The Behavioral Revolution in the DPA ........................................... 139
The Subfield of International Relations ......................................... 150
The Subfield of Political Theory .................................................. 157
The Behavioral Revolution Mythology in Contemporary
Dictionaries .................................................................................. 166

IV. THE BEHAVIORAL REVOLUTION IN ENCYCLOPEDIAS ........... 171

Introduction .................................................................................. 171
General Selection Criteria ............................................................ 172
Absence and Exclusion ................................................................. 175
Authoritativeness and Encyclopedias ............................................. 177
Authority and Internationality ...................................................... 180
Narrative Context and the Behavioral Revolution Mythology ........ 183
The Subfield Context .................................................................... 184
The Referents to the Behavioral Revolution ................................. 185
Table of Contents – Continued

CHAPTER

The Thematic Context of the Behavioral Revolution
Mythology........................................................................................................ 189

Political Science in General ............................................................................ 190

The Subfield of International Relations ...................................................... 207

The Subfield of Political Theory .................................................................... 212

The Theme of Continuity and Restoration ................................................... 219

Political Science in General ............................................................................ 220

The Subfield of Political Theory .................................................................... 226

The Theme of Lament and Loss .................................................................... 227

The Behavioral Revolution in Encyclopedias .............................................. 230

V. THE BEHAVIORAL REVOLUTION MYTHOLOGY IN
HANDBOOKS .................................................................................................... 234

Introduction ..................................................................................................... 234

General Selection Criteria ............................................................................. 235

Absence and Exclusion in Handbooks............................................................ 238

Authoritativeness and Generality in Handbooks .......................................... 239

Narrative Context and the Behavioral Revolution Mythology ................. 243

The Subfield Context in Handbooks............................................................... 244

The Referents to the Behavioral Revolution ................................................ 246

The Thematic Context of the Behavioral Revolution ..................................... 249

Political Science in General ............................................................................ 251

The Subfield of American Politics ................................................................. 269
Table of Contents – Continued

CHAPTER

The Subfield of Comparative Politics .......................................................... 280
The Subfield of International Relations ...................................................... 284
The Subfield of Political Theory ................................................................. 294
The Behavioral Revolution Mythology in Handbooks .............................. 304

VI. A POLITICAL THEORY OF MYTHOLOGY: NARRATIVE, IDENTITY, PRACTICE.......................................................................................... 309

The Mythological Nexus and the Narrative Context of the Behavioral Revolution ......................................................................................... 310

Representation and the Concept of Metonymy ........................................... 316

The Dynamic of Identity Production ........................................................... 318

The Power of Political Mythology and the Discourse of Disciplines .......... 323

Disciplinary History and a Political Theory of Mythology ......................... 327

What Other Research Might Be Done ....................................................... 329

Coda .............................................................................................................. 331

APPENDICES

A. Reference Works Listed by Subfield ...................................................... 337
B. A Typology of Referents to the Behavioral Revolution ......................... 341
C. The Conceptual Referents to the Behavioral Revolution ....................... 344
D. The Themes to the Behavioral Revolution ............................................ 346
E. The Biographical Referents ................................................................. 348
Table of Contents – Continued

REFERENCE WORKS CITED ................................................................................. 351

BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................. 355
LIST OF TABLES

1. Mentions of the Behavioral Revolution in Reference Material .......... 32
2. Mentions of the Behavioral Revolution by Subfield ..................... 35
3. Referents Across Reference Materials, By Percentage ................. 48
4. Characteristics of the Mythological Nexus ................................. 90
5. Most General Dictionaries ................................................... 119
6. Referents to the Behavioral Revolution in Dictionaries ............... 131
7. Top Five Referents in Dictionaries, Number and Percentage .......... 132
8. Most General Encyclopedias ................................................. 173
9. Mentions of the Behavioral Revolution by Subfield, Encyclopedias .... 185
10. Referents to the Behavioral Revolution in Encyclopedias ............. 186
11. Top Five Referents in Encyclopedias, Number and Percentage ....... 187
12. Most General Handbooks ................................................... 237
13. Mentions of the Behavioral Revolution by Subfield, Handbooks ...... 244
14. Referents to the Behavioral Revolution in Handbooks ................. 247
15. Top Five Referents in Handbooks, Number and Percentage ........... 249
LIST OF FIGURES

1. The Ancient Image of Herakles (Ca. 4th Century BCE) .......................... 89
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Every significant human enterprise gives rise to an extensive mythology centering on its goals, procedures, and achievements. Whether that enterprise be sports or war, business or science, there exists in the mind of the spectator an image, often oversimplified, of what the enterprise is all about (Norman Jacobson 1958, 115).

The Behavioral Revolution Mythology and Disciplinary Identity

By the year 1968, David Easton had been carried high by the cresting wave of behavioralism. In retrospect, however, it is possible to discern that he knew the crest could not rise forever and the wave was bound to wash into shore. Easton was a principal champion of behavioralism since he began his career in the early 1950s, and from his position at the University of Chicago, he had risen to the highest position of rank and prestige afforded in an academic discipline. Indeed, one year later he was to serve as president for the American Political Science Association (APSA), a prestigious and high-profile position held by many behavioralist before and after Easton’s presidency.¹ In his presidential address, titled “The New Revolution in Political Science,” Easton gave voice to the concerns of a growing number of political scientists who were unhappy with the behavioral orthodoxy and he discursively ushered in what he called the “post-behavioral

---

revolution.” This new revolution, Easton hoped, would redirect the efforts of some political scientists toward more practical, policy-related, and relevant research.

Writing in the 1968 *International Encyclopedia of Social Science*, in an entry titled “Political Science,” Easton begins with a curious idea, saying “political science in mid-twentieth century is a discipline in search of its identity” (1968, 22). Easton continues by saying, that it is “through the efforts to solve this identity crisis it has begun to show evidence of emerging as an autonomous and independent discipline with a systematic theoretical structure of its own” (22). This is a curious idea, since many have seen the 1960s as a time of behavioral hegemony in political science; yet somehow for Easton, this was also a period in which the identity of the discipline was in question.

Given that Easton is writing fifty-seven years ago, one might think that the “identity crisis” he spoke about in his encyclopedia entry would have subsided and that political science would finally have figured out what it is and what it does as a discipline. Yet, as many have commented over the years, political science appears to be impervious to any hegemonic disciplinary identity (Farr and Seidelman 1995). The apparent crisis in identity is due in part to the political nature of the discipline. Many of the objects of study have not changed much since the 1930s, as political scientists have long studied power, the Presidency, Congress, the Supreme Court, voting behavior, public opinion, international relations, and comparative government (Dryzek 2006; Adcock 2007). What changes, and what necessarily must change is the content of these objects; people interact with these

---

2 Discussing the topics that many believe changed during the behavioral “revolution,” Dryzek says, “if the behavioral revolution’s main tenets are behavior, science, pluralism, and system, then ‘traditionalists’ had little reason to oppose it” (2006, 490). So, then, asks Dryzek, what “was the behavioral revolution” if not a revolutionary shift in topics and techniques in political science? He answers that the behavioral revolution “was a selective radicalization of existing disciplinary tendencies, especially when it came to behavior, science, and pluralism as description and explanatory theory” (490).
objects and their behavior both shapes and is shaped by them. Moreover, the study of these political objects gives rise to contestation over the reality of the object being studied. Political scientists, like other social scientists, construct their objects of study by building off previous research and by attempting to contribute to the discourse of the discipline by going beyond prior research. These political objects are therefore constantly changing over time and so general laws or the last say on any topic remain elusive.

For many in political science today the history of the discipline is not well-known, and the so-called “crisis of disciplinary identity” I alluded to at the outset is either unknown or thought to be a thing of the past. Nevertheless, I argue, that this “crisis” is deep-seated in the condition of being political scientists. This is not a condition to be lamented, but it does require a better understanding of the discipline’s past and the way it continues to influence the present. For the majority of political scientists today, disciplinary identities and practices are fostered through a disciplinary mythology. Disciplinary identities are closely tied to the story of political science which, in its simplified mythological form, sees behavioralism as a new beginning in the history of the discipline, and one in which the mainstream of the discipline embraced the now dominant identity as a social science.

Reflecting on the need for disciplinary history in the wake of the end of behavioral dominance in the late 1960s, the comparative political scientist Gabriel Almond invoked George Orwell, British novelist and author of the dystopian novel 1984, saying “whoever controls the interpretation of the past in our professional history writing has gone a long way toward controlling the future” (1988, 835). Indeed, Almond’s view of the state of the

---

3 Gunnell has recently put the matter in the following terms: “The social sciences are marked both by their changing perceptions of their subject matter and by a need to consistently respond epistemically and practically to changes in that object of inquiry – or to confront problems that have arisen from a failure to recognize such changes” (2015, 414).
discipline in 1988 compared to the 1950s and early 1960s was quite dystopian, as he argued there were many “separate tables” or isolated enclaves of political scientists who did not talk to each other. There appeared to be no end to the fragmentation of the discipline. Almond’s point is an important one, but only to a limited degree. Since most political scientists do not spend a lot of their time researching or writing about the discipline’s past, the effect of this kind of control over its future is quite limited. There is surer impact within the subfield of disciplinary history which has been addressing issues related to disciplinary identity, the rise of behavioralism, the behavioral revolution, and the post-behavioral era, for over thirty years now. Disciplinary history continues to grow and provide a valuable service to the way that political scientists remember their collective past; it no doubt has an impact on professional identities in the present.\footnote{James Farr, a prominent disciplinary historian, recently included the following members of the subfield of disciplinary history: “John Gunnell, David Ricci, Rogers Smith, James Farr, John Dryzek, Stephen Leonard, Terrence Ball, Emily Hauptmann, Robert Adcock, Shannon Stimson, Mark Bevir, Arlene Saxonhouse, Ido Oren, Brian Schmidt, Erkki Berndtson, Michael Kenny, Michael Stein, Nicolas Guilhot, William Scheuerman, Timothy Kaufmann-Obsborn, Mark C. Smith, and others” (2015, 245).}

Disciplinary history as a genre of political science writing is largely a creation of the behavioral revolution and a wider disciplinary search for identity. Here, “identity” is understood in collective terms and has to do with questions about “who we are,” and “what we do.” The behavioral revolution is often understood by disciplinary historians to be a foundational period and another episode in the ongoing crisis of identity affecting the entire discipline of political science (Easton 1968; Farr 1993; Gunnell 2004, 47; Gunnell 2007; Farr 2007). These accounts are problematic since, to my knowledge, there is no systematic account of why behavioralism and post-behavioralism are constitutive of disciplinary identities today. One major contribution of this dissertation is explaining the link between
narratives about the past and identities in the present through a political theory of mythology.

In the following section, I look specifically at the way the founders of behavioralism and historians of political science have understood behavioralism and the behavioral revolution. I introduce readers who may be unfamiliar with the tradition of writing about the development of behavioralism and to the way that political scientists have understood the concepts of behavioralism and the behavioral revolution over time. I address the problem of disciplinary identity by treating the “behavioral revolution” as a discursive object.\(^5\) This type of discursive history makes it possible to focus on the ways that political scientists, reflecting on the past of the discipline, take it for granted that behavioralism/post-behavioralism are constitutive of contemporary disciplinary identities.

The Behavioral Revolution in the Discourse of the Discipline

Behavioralism was remembered as giving to the discipline of political science in the United States its principle identity and enduring denomination (Farr 1995, 219).

The behavioral movement in political science arguably began with the efforts of one malcontent who was in the right position at the right time to voice what many were thinking or at least open to thinking (Eulau 1969, 5). The figure of David Easton stands at the beginning of the behavioral period, and his work in the early 1950s sets the stage for

\(^5\) In Gunnell’s terms, the study of “discursive or conventional objects” also involves the following related issues: “the nature of social phenomena; the cognitive and practical relationship between social inquiry and its subject matter; the concepts of interpretation and representation; the problem of knowledge of other minds; and what is involved in making descriptive and normative judgments about the subject matter” (2013, 83; see also Gunnell 1993).
the debates about behavioralism (and later “post-behavioralism) which followed. In his 1951 “The Decline of Modern Political Theory,” Easton is trying to establish a type of theoretical identity orientation he believes is lacking in political science. Drawing on the dynamic of identity production Easton defines this orientation to theory in opposition to the then mainstream conception of “theory,” which today is what we would recognize as the history of political thought. For Easton, this conception of “theory” was too “historicist,” in the sense that it was too focused on the past, and not sufficiently interested in the formulation and testing of hypotheses that might build a general theory of politics useful in the here and now (Easton 1951). Much the same critique is leveled against traditional political theory as the history of political thought in Easton’s 1953 classic *The Political System: An Inquiry in the State of Political Science*. Here Easton once again lectures his contemporaries about the failures of traditional political theory, and the need for the development of general theory such as the type of systems theory he develops to explain the workings of the U.S. political system.

“The idea of a new form of theory is a major focus of early behavioralism in the U.S.” In *The Political System*, this desire to create general theory is expressed in the

---


7 General theory or “causal theory,” of which Easton says, is “a synonym for systematic empirically-oriented theory about political behavior” (1951, 51).

8 Easton elaborates on his general systems theory in two follow up books to *The Political System – A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (1965) and *A Framework for Political Analysis* (1965).

9 In the Preface to the Second Edition of *The Political System* (1971), Easton gives an early retrospective account of the impact of his 1953 work on the rise of behavioralism: “The first sounds of the behavioral battle had been heard, but neither the nature of the conflict, nor its outcome, were as yet clear. At this very early and ambiguous stage in the behavioral revolution, The Political System strove for an interpretation of what was happening and offered some suggestions that hopefully made some small contribution to hastening the transformation” (ix-x). See also Heyck (2014) for a discussion of how the social sciences in general were going through major changes that embraced “a new way of understanding science and nature emerged and flourished in the human sciences between roughly 1920 and 1970” (2014, 1).
language of adopting scientific method and “a scientific approach to social knowledge,” which Easton finds the majority of his fellow political scientists reluctant to fully incorporate into their work (6). Throughout his career, Easton advocated for a form of general theory to be at the center of behavioral political science. But as I discuss below, after a revolt against behavioralism in the 1960s and early 1970s, a less grand version of behavioral theory would prevail (Gunnell 1993, 262).

In the history of political science there is an ongoing cycle of authors proclaiming identity crisis in the discipline. Easton’s proclamation and quest for general theory is a consequence of a revolt against traditional political theory. Prior to the 1950s, traditional political theory was at the core of disciplinary identity, but behavioralism threw this image into crisis. The late 1960s, in turn, began a revolt against “behavioralism,” and a sustained critique of the mainstream of political science under the banner of the Caucus for a New Political Science. Some elements of this critique of the discipline’s behavioral identity were then rekindled in the early 2000s in a second revolt against the legacy of behavioralism under the name of “Perestroika.” Today, though the revolts have subsided and, political scientists get on with their work, disciplinary historians have begun to dig more deeply into how and why behavioralism has been and continues to be central to disciplinary identities.

In the early 1960s, behavioralism appeared to dominate the discipline. A case in point is Robert Dahl’s classic 1961 APSR article, “The Behavioral Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest,” in which he declares the

---

10 The Political System also contains Easton’s famous definition of politics as the “authoritative allocation of values for a society” (1953, 129-131).
ultimate victory of behavioralism over the identities and practices of political science. The concept of the “behavioral revolution” does not appear in Dahl’s article, although one could argue that he anticipates it. In 1963 Heinz Eulau, a prominent member of the first generation of behavioralists, published his classic *The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics* and sealed his status as a champion of behavioralism.

The first signs of a coming revolt appeared in the early 1960s with a high-profile debate among political theorists over the significance of behavioral dominance in the discipline. This debate came to a high pitch in 1962-1963 when a now well-known collection of essays edited by the University of Chicago political philosopher Herbert Storing that attacked the behavioral mainstream for its lack of imagination and impoverished sense of the past. The 1962 Storing volume titled *Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics*, led to what one recent commentator has dubbed “The Wolin-Strauss Dust-Up of 1963” (Barber 2006). This is the subtitle given to Benjamin Barber’s contribution to the *APSR* centennial issue, in which he discusses how the authors of chapters in the Storing volume responded to the strong criticism leveled by two political theorists writing at the University of California, Berkeley, John Schaar and Sheldon Wolin. Schaar and Wolin open their critique by saying that “the study of politics has become increasingly scientific: that is, behavioral, quantitative, empirically oriented, experimental

---

12 In 1961, Dahl also publishes *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City*, which was a behavioral and pluralist response to more sociological and radical studies of community power. See also Dahl 1955 *A Preface to Democratic Theory*, which is widely regarded as a classic behavioral statement in democratic theory. For two earlier review articles where Dahl pursues a behavioral agenda, see his 1955 “The Science of Politics: New and Old”; and his 1958 “Political Theory: Truth and Consequences.”

13 For example, Dahl discusses Truman’s 1955 article “The Impact on Political Science of the Revolution in the Behavioral Sciences,” whose title clearly anticipates the phrase “the behavioral revolution.”

14 Eulau was an early advocate of behavioralism; and along with Samuel Eldersveld and Morris Janowitz produced one of the first behavioral readers in 1956, titled *Political Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research*. 
where possible, rigorous, and precise” (1963, 125). For this “new political science,” Schaar and Wolin say, a thoroughgoing philosophical treatment is needed, and though the Storing volume promises such a treatment, it fails, since it is merely “polemical” and “ideological” (128).

This early “dust up” between political theorists shows that critics of behavioralism in the 1960s were not on the same page about why it should be opposed. The revolt against behavioralism is reflected institutionally in 1967 and the rise of the New Caucus for Political Science and the many anti-behavioralists who voiced their concerns over the state of the discipline dominated by behavioralism (McCoy and Playford 1967; Surkin and Wolfe 1970). By the end of the decade, Easton, by now a well-known champion of behavioral political science, uses the phrase “the behavioral revolution” explicitly in his discussion of “Political Science” in the International Encyclopedia of Social Science (Easton 1968). Interestingly, it was the very next year that Easton would serve as APSA president and discursively usher in the “post-behavioral revolution” with his presidential address “The New Revolution in Political Science.”

My previous discussion of Easton’s proclamation of an “identity crisis” in the discipline should now make more sense. Growing disenchantment with behavioral dominance in the discipline in the 1950s and early 1960s is expressed in Easton’s declaration of a crisis of disciplinary identity and his discursive recognition of a “post-behavioral revolution.” In the same APSR volume that Easton’s “New Revolution” address

---

15 Writing in 1958, the political theorist Norman Jacobson criticized the “perversion … of the ideal of precise vocabulary” by many of his contemporaries (119). He notes how the idea of “precision” is quickly becoming “technical and exclusive,” dealing “less and less with a comprehensive view,” and a concept which increasingly represents “a weapon of scientific authority” (120).

16 “The behavioral revolution” is also used in in 1968 Journal of Politics article by Neil A. McDonald and James Rosenau titled, “Political Theory as Academic Field and Intellectual Activity.”
appears, Wolin published his classic critique of behavioralism and defense of traditional or “epic” theory.\(^7\) By this time, Wolin has accepted the fact of behavioral dominance and the reality of the “behavioral revolution.” Wolin moves from a recognition that scientific “method is the central fact of the behavioral revolution,” calling this perspective “Methodism,” and counter-posing it to his preferred vision of political theory or epic theory (1969, 1063-1064). Wolin wished to separate from the behavioral mainstream, having gone so far as to petition for a separate department for political theory at the University of California, Berkeley just a few years earlier (Hauptmann 2004).

In the early 1970s, work on “behavioralism” is dominated by the ongoing controversy between behavioralists (Somit 1974; Greenstein and Polsby 1975; Freeman 1977) and anti-behavioralists (Surkin and Wolf 1970; Graham and Carey 1972). This situation would be altered considerably with the political theorist and disciplinary historian John Gunnell’s contribution to the discourse of the discipline. Gunnell began publication in the philosophy of science, but by the late-1970s he had turned his attention to the history and discourse of political science. Beginning in 1978, with the publication of the article “The Myth of the Tradition,” Gunnell would almost single-handedly (for a time) constitute the genre of disciplinary history in the U.S. “The Myth of the Tradition” is Gunnell’s first articulation of an ongoing critique of the subfield of political theory. It was also an early anticipation of the so-called “new historiography,” following the work of Quentin Skinner and others, that proved so influential in the U.S. and the U.K.\(^8\) Here, as elsewhere, Gunnell

\(^{17}\) In Wolin’s 1969 “Political Theory as a Vocation” article he contrasted behavioral theory with what he called “epic political theory,” which is characterized by Emily Hauptmann as a form of theory in which the “scope is sweeping,” and one that “should entail deep political commitments as well as ‘an appreciation of the historical dimensions of politics’” (2005, 211; Euben 2000, 69).

claims that there is in reality no such thing as the “tradition” of political theory, and instead he argues that this “tradition” has been invented in the discourse of political theorists writing about their subfield’s history (Gunnell 1986, 1988). In short, the tradition is a discursive object and not a historical event (Gunnell 2004a).19

Due in large part to the early work of Gunnell, this was also a period of strong skepticism about previous accounts of the discipline’s past, and revisionist historical study emerged which was aimed at determining the “real” history of political science. Whig and presentist histories were soon under attack by other members of the burgeoning subfield of academic disciplinary history.20 The British political scientists Stephan Collini, Donald Winch, and John Burrow’s 1983 That Noble Science of Politics, is a case in point. The authors complain that “the present theoretical consensus of the discipline, or possibly some polemical version of what that consensus should be, is in effect taken as definitive, and the past is then reconstituted as a teleology leading up to and fully manifested in it” (1983, 4).

The discursive presence of the “behavioral revolution” would dramatically increase in the political science of the 1980s with the growth of the subfield of disciplinary history and its renewed critique of behavioralism and contemporary identities in political science. In 1983, the first APSA state of the discipline volume appears with an article by Gunnell titled “Political Theory: Evolution of a Sub-Field.” In this article, Gunnell makes the relationship between the subfield of political theory and behavioralism clear. Giving a central section the heading “The Behavioral Revolution: 1950-1959,” Gunnell recounts

---

19 As I discuss more fully below, while the behavioral revolution is understood herein to be a discursive object, I do not therefore argue that it did not happen.
20 “Whig” and “Presentist” histories are quite similar in that they both tell the story of the discipline from the perspective of the present. Whig histories differ from presentist in that they are overtly celebratory and insist on a narrative of progress leading to the present and most advanced stage in the discipline’s history.
how the behavioral movement led to marginalization of the subfield of political theory, which increasingly became isolated from the mainstream of the discipline. David Ricci’s 1984 *The Tragedy of Political Science* may be read as an ironic twist on these Whig histories that had been dominant up until the mid-to-late 1980s (Collini, Winch, and Burrow 1983; Farr et al. 1990, 600). Instead of focusing on a theme of progress in a narrative often beginning in classical Greece, Ricci adopted the theme of tragedy. He argues that in its quest for the incompatible goals of both science and democracy, political science has realized neither and found itself in a period of prolonged crisis. Raymond Seidelman and Edward Harpham’s 1985 book *Disenchanted Realists: Political Science and the American Crisis, 1884-1984* adopts a similar critical stance. Both Ricci and Seidelman and Harpham, in different ways, take the dominance of behavioralism in the discipline for granted, and see their historical accounts as interventions against that dominance.

By the end of the decade, the now dominant “historicist” mode of doing disciplinary history is evidenced by the concerted rejection of Dryzek and Leonard’s (1988) thesis that the writing of history cannot be neutral and thus is inherently to some degree presentist (Nelson 1998, 41). In response to Dryzek and Leonard’s article, “History and Discipline in Political Science,” James Farr, John Gunnell, and Raymond Seidelman respond in 1990 by jointly, if in their own ways, calling for a more historicist disciplinary history in their “Can Political Science History Be Neutral?” All five of these authors make up what might

---

21 On this theme of a quest for a science of politics for democratic society see Gunnell (1986); and Rogers Smith (1997).
be called the first generation of disciplinary historians and their contributions to the subfield continue to this day.\footnote{22}

The 1990s witness a further flowering of the subfield of disciplinary.\footnote{23} The general story of the discipline’s past is outlined in the early 1990s with two authoritative edited volumes from Farr and Seidelman \textit{Discipline and History: Political Science in the United States} (1993) and Farr, Dryzek, and Leonard \textit{Political Science in History: Research Programs and Political Traditions} (1995). The 1990s are marked by the growing realization of diversity and plurality and that there will be no new revolution with comparably broad ambitions after behavioralism lost its centripetal force in the late 1960s (Farr, Dryzek, and Leonard 1995).

Thirty years after the first revolt, the political theorist and disciplinary historian James Farr’s essay “Remembering the Revolution: Behavioralism in American Political Science” is one of the earliest in which the behavioral revolution is made the subject. For example, Farr says “what has come to be known as the ‘behavioral revolution’ marked a dramatic moment in the forensic history of political science in the United States” and ushered in a rapid and “fundamental transformation in the identity of the discipline as a whole” (1995, 198). By 1995, the behavioral revolution had become part of the discipline’s

\footnote{22} Behind the scenes during the growth of disciplinary history in the mid-1980s was the work of John Gunnell at the State University of New York, Albany. In addition to being series editor for the 1985 Seidelman and Harpham book, he also supervised the publication of (among others) a 1986 collection of essays critiquing Gunnell’s work and edited by John S. Nelson \textit{Tradition, Interpretation, and Science: Political Theory in the American Academy}, and a 1987 volume edited by Terence Ball \textit{Idioms of Inquiry: Critique and Renewal in Political Science}.

\footnote{23} The decade begins with a collection of retrospective accounts of the behavioral movement and the changing fortunes of behavioralism over time. \textit{Political Science in America: Oral Histories of the Discipline} contains the interviews of several of the founders of behavioralism in the U.S.: Almond, Truman, Dahl, Eulau, and Easton (Baer, Jewell, Sigelman 1991). Many of the accounts given by the founders of behavioralism are suspect from a historicist perspective since it appears that they are often selectively telling the story of the rise of behavioralism and in a way to highlight in a positive light their contribution and enduring legacy.
identity, structuring the way members view the past and how they recount that story in the present, and ultimately how they go about their work as political scientists and educators over time. For example, Farr stresses the continuing importance of the behavioral revolution to identities in contemporary political science. The many “remembrancers” of the discipline’s history teach us “that our interests in the behavioral revolution and its proclamations are not contingent or antiquarian ones” (1995, 221). In retrospect, Farr continues, it is equally important to remember how “our interpretations of the behavioral revolution are necessarily bound up with our search for present and future identity” (221).

In the mid-2000’s the continuing importance of behavioralism and the behavioral revolution to disciplinary identities is abundantly evident. In 2004, Dennis Mahoney publishes a disciplinary history titled Politics and Progress: The Emergence of Political Science. Though Mahoney is focused on the early history of the discipline, he mentions the importance of behavioralism in his conclusion when he says “the behavioral revolution after the Second World War was based to some extent not only on the negation of science in the public service but on the assertion of the incompatibility of science with public service” (149-150). Mahoney ends with a call for further revival of “political philosophy” in the Straussian tradition of “natural right,” which might finally be “capable of confronting the crisis of the American regime, which is also the crisis of civilization” (150).

In 2005, Dryzek takes the opportunity to comment on the Perestroika movement in his “A Pox on Perestroika, a Hex on Hegemony.” In this chapter he also demonstrates the continuing importance of behavioralism to the identity of the discipline. Speaking of “hegemony” in terms of the mainstream of the discipline, Dryzek says “the contemporary hegemony is constituted in part by the commitment to quantification that is one legacy of
the behavioral revolution” (2005, 515). “Behavioralism,” Dryzek discusses earlier, “had a scientific and positivistic self-image, also favoring quantitative methods” 514). Dryzek also contributes to the 2006 APSR centennial issue in which many authors discuss the legacy of behavioralism and its contemporary importance to disciplinary identities. Dryzek weighs in on the debate about the “revolutionary” nature of behavioralism in his contribution titled “Revolution Without Enemies: Key Transformations in Political Science.” For Dryzek and other disciplinary historians (e.g. Gunnell, Farr), the behavioral moment in the history of the discipline does not qualify as a “revolution,” since in Dryzek’s definition of the term, behavioralism did not face any organized resistance, which of course, contributed to its apparent success (487). 24

In their 2010 contribution to the subfield of disciplinary history titled simply “Political Science,” Robert Adcock and Mark Bevir note how “the curtains were rising on what has come to be known as the ‘behavioral revolution,’ in which a movement of scholars set out to make political science more ‘systematic’ by transforming both its methods and theories” (74). 25 In this chapter the authors expound on the point that behavioral topics did not suddenly emerge after 1950 and how “the behavioral revolution in techniques encompassed more than surveys” (81). The authors conclude on this score, “the character and legacy of the behavioral revolution in techniques do not lie solely either aggregate

24 Two further examples from the APSA centennial issue are relevant. Speaking to the way that positivism infused mainstream identities of the discipline, Barber says, “the behavioral revolution … constituted the positivism battles … of the 1960s and 1970s” (2006, 541). In a similar vein, the political theorist David Kettler reminds his readers that “unlike proponents of the model of normal science associated with the behavioral revolution, for whom the disciplinary agenda was to be largely determined by the refinement of methods” (2006, 533).

25 Bevir explains the behavioral revolution in terms of “a broad epistemic shift in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This shift was one from developmental historicism to modernist empiricism as the dominant mode of knowing human life” (2006, 74)

studies or surveys, but rather in the competition and cooperation between the two. Their interplay remains to this day a driving force of quantitative political science” (83).

The study of behavioralism, the behavioral revolution, and their importance to contemporary identities is ongoing among historians of the discipline. In his 2007 article, “Interpreting Behavioralism,” Adcock demonstrates the growing sophistication of the field when he says “in its first twenty years the image of a behavioral revolution thus evolved from a rallying cry of young behavioralists looking confidently to the future, into the feared other of antibehavioral scholars bemoaning the present” (181; Adcock 2010; Hauptmann 2012). Indeed, Adcock notes that “by the early 1980s use of the image [of the behavioral revolution] would shift again: no longer conjuring up either future promise or contemporary combat, it settled down as the received way to envision the recent past” (181).

From the early 1990s onward, there has also been a tendency toward greater specialization and division of labor evident within disciplinary history. This tendency is seen in Gunnell’s internalist, and indeed “genealogical” treatment of the historical evolution of the subfield of political theory in his 1993 The Descent of Political Theory: The Genealogy of an American Vocation. Here Gunnell shows that the subfield of political theory has embraced an identity based on what are in his view two incompatible goals: the theory of politics and its practice. 26 Here, in Gunnell’s view, the subfield has been alienated from the discipline, the public, and itself.

26 In his 1986 Between Philosophy and Politics, Gunnell makes a similar argument. He also makes his feelings about the subfield of political theory quite clear: “Political theory has, I believe, become an increasingly effete but pretentious activity whose self-image and claims about what it does and would do are conspicuously out of touch with its actual practice. For an activity so avowedly committed to reflection, criticism, and political transformation, it seems peculiarly resistant to authentic self-examination and actual involvement in the uncertainties of existential political action, even within the cloisters of the academy where it enjoys the potential privileges of citizenship” (ix).
Like Farr and Seidelman (1993) and Dryzek (2006), Gunnell claims that the so-called “behavioral revolution” was less a revolution than a reaffirmation of already existing tendencies in the discipline. In Gunnell’s revisionist terms, “although the behavioral movement was revolutionary in that it was an attempt, and ultimately successful one, to break away from certain forms of institutional, historical, and legalistic research that tended to dominate much of the practice of political science, it was in many respects a distinctly conservative revolution” (1993, 142). A second major innovation on the mainstream and dominant narrative is the recognition on Gunnell’s part that the behavioral revolution was stimulated by the critical stance of the many émigré political theorists who came to the U.S. during WWII. Here Gunnell says “the behavioral revolution” was not in the main “a revolt against an obsolescent indigenous idea of political theory and political science” (142). Instead, Gunnell argues, the behavioral revolution “was in large part a revolt against an alien philosophical incursion and a response to a hostile intellectual ambience that by the mid-1940s was presenting an increasingly articulate challenge to the traditional image of political science” (142). This was a challenge mounted from within the discipline and from members of the subfield of political theory.

The trend in disciplinary history toward greater specialization and division of labor is evident in the work of Brian Schmidt, a disciplinary historian of international relations and a former student of Gunnell. In his 1998 Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations, Schmidt extends the study of disciplinary history to the realm of International Relations (IR) and argues that the growth in the subfield of disciplinary history is important to combat “disciplinary identities mortgaged to positivism” (6). The “eclectic atmosphere of the 1990s,” has necessitated the growth of
disciplinary history in political science and the social sciences (6). In the late 1990s and continuing into the 2000s, positivism is often still closely associated with the legacy of behavioralism and the behavioral revolution. Here, Schmidt notes how “during the course of the behavioral revolution, political science increasingly came to understand its past and present history in positivist terms. As long as philosophical positivism was secure about the metatheoretical foundation it attributed to science, political science was equally secure about its scientific identity” (6). Specific to the subfield of IR, Schmidt recounts the IR scholar John Vasquez’s division of the history of the field which consists of “three stages: the idealist phase; the realist tradition; and the “behavioral” revolt” (22). Vasquez is a well-known IR scholar and as Schmidt points out, “this sort of synoptic history of the field as evolving through a sequence of distinct phases or periods is endemic to most introductory texts” (22).

The 2000s and the period leading up to the present is a period characterized by another bout of vigorous criticism of the behavioral/post-behavioral mainstream in political science represented by the so-called “Perestroika” movement (Monroe 2005). This second revolt against behavioral dominance in the discipline clearly showed that the first revolt had been unsuccessful and moreover that the power of behavioralism in political science was as strong as ever (Gunnell 2015). Indeed, this fact partially accounts for the continued growth of disciplinary history and its ongoing fascination with the rise to dominance of behavioralism and the “behavioral revolution.”

Schmidt tells a similar tale in his 2002 article titled “Together Again: Reuniting Political Theory and International Relations Theory.” Schmidt is discussing the European context and efforts to define international relations theory; as late as 1966, he says, “across
the Atlantic the behavioral revolution was sweeping the discipline and creating deep-seated cleavages among American political scientists that would sharpen the divide between PT and IR” (119). “PT” here standing for political theory, Schmidt continues saying, “in many ways, PT, which by the 1950s was essentially synonymous with the study of the history of political thought, bore the brunt of the behavioural challenge” (119). Schmidt recognizes the formative influence of Easton on rise of behavioralism “who was one of the main voices in the behavioral revolution” (119). The identity of political theory was divided between normative and empirical “within the midst of the behavioral revolution” (121). Thus, in subfield of IR, “the wedding of realism to positivism within the context of the behavioral revolution proved to be an even greater impediment to the development of normative theory” (122).

The French political scientist Nicolas Guilhot has focused on the rise of behavioralism and the behavioral revolution as major explanatory factors in his writing. In his 2011 “The Realist Gambit: Postwar American Political Science and the Birth of IR Theory,” Guilhot begins by noting how the subfield of IR was effected by the identity crisis brought about by behavioralism. Central to the re-construction of “disciplinary identities” were debates over the meaning of theory in IR (128). This was due in part because “[as] political science and other disciplines became increasingly integrated under the research standards that would define ‘behavioralism,’ the territorial status of IR became contentious” (128). Behavioralism may have been dominant, Guilhot points out, “others, however, resented the methodological pluralism of the behavioral revolution. They
considered the promise of an empirical science of politics an illusion; for them, politics was not entirely rational and could not be comprehended by scientific rationalism” (129).\(^{27}\)

The political theorist and disciplinary historian Emily Hauptmann’s research has increasingly focused on the role of philanthropic grant-making agencies on the rise of behavioralism and the success of the behavioral revolution. In Hauptmann’s contribution to the *APSR* centennial issue, “From Opposition to Accommodation: How Rockefeller Foundation Grants Redefined Relations Between Political Theory and Social Science in the 1950s,” she argues that the Rockefeller Foundation greatly contributed to the formation of disciplinary identities of political theorists through the Foundation’s program in Legal and Political Philosophy (LAPP). For Hauptmann, the timing could not have been more fortuitous as “the LAPP was created in the early 1950s, a time when the identity of ‘political theory’ in the discipline was inchoate and the behavioral revolution was just beginning” (2006, 644).

In a continuation of this line of research, Hauptmann focuses on the Ford Foundation’s support of behavioralism in a 2012 article “The Ford Foundation and the Rise of Behavioralism in Political Science.” Here, Hauptmann reminds her readers, “behavioralism is still a powerful presence” (154). Hauptmann concludes her article by noting how “many political scientists saw the promise of a methodologically sophisticated discipline as one of the behavioral revolution’s greatest achievements” (171). Indeed, Hauptmann argues, many of the questions disciplinary historians and other political scientists have had about the “behavioral revolution – its indeterminate origins and aims,

\(^{27}\) A central example of this resistance is the German émigré and noted IR scholar Hans Morgenthau whose 1946 *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics* is a classic statement. These themes and the importance of Morgenthau to the behavioral resistance are elaborated in the same volume in a chapter by Schmidt titled, “The Rockefeller Foundation Conference and the Long Road to a Theory of International Relations.”
its rapid success – begin to clear up once Ford’s program is drawn into the analytic frame” (171). For Hauptmann, Ford Foundation support proved pivotal in the development and success of behavioralism, and it was not coincidental “that the behavioral revolution began shortly after Ford launched its Behavioral Sciences Program” (171).

“Discursive Object,” History, Mythology

Within disciplinary history, the historicist approach to the history of political science is now dominant. The behavioral revolution is largely taken for granted in the history of political science. The goal is to better understand what happened, who was involved, and what new sources can be found to shed greater light on the past. This is what one might call a traditional historicist account in disciplinary history, but not all disciplinary histories do not take the pastness of the past for granted.28 A good example is the work of Gunnell whose historicism might perhaps be better classified as a form of revisionism. Gunnell works to upset the standard picture of the behavioral revolution, reinterpreting the standard time line and emphasizing continuity before and after the so-called “behavioral revolution” (Gunnell 2004b, 2005, 2013).

My work on the topic of the behavioral revolution is different from both of these historicist approaches. The political theory of mythology I develop in this dissertation is focused on the contemporary period in political science (1980-2012) and asks why the

---

28 The “pastness of the past” is a phrase from T.S. Elliot’s “Tradition and Individual Talent” (1920): “The historical sense involves a perception, not only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence; the historical sense compels a man to write not merely with his own generation in his bones, but with a feeling that the whole of the literature of Europe from and within it the whole of the literature of his own country has a simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous order. This historical sense, which is a sense of the timeless as well as of the temporal and of the timeless and of the temporal together, is what makes a writer traditional. And it is at the same time what makes a writer most acutely conscious of his place in time, of his contemporaneity.”
behavioral revolution still matters today. In this dissertation, I offer a systematic account of why it is that political scientists continue to insist on the importance of behavioralism for disciplinary identities by showing the way that narrative, identity, and practice are closely interwoven in a “mythological nexus” found in the discourse of the discipline.

When I turn to the reference material of contemporary political science in Chapters Three, Four, and Five, I put into practice what I consider to be a form of “discursive history.” This is a special form of historical analysis that focuses on the words, concepts, arguments, etc. that authors use in their efforts to contribute to a particular body of discourse. Discussing the subfield of political theory, Gunnell says a “discursive history” is “an account of the evolution of the discourse of political theory in the context of a formal academic practice” (Gunnell 1993, 11). In an alternative formulation, Gunnell says a discursive history is an approach that “in tracing the conversation and threads of argument, it moves back and forth between various literary forms and contexts, between arguments and rejoinders to those arguments” (1993, 12). I emulate this process, only the temporal focus is on the recent past as represented in contemporary reference works (1980-2012).

“Critical internal discursive history,” in Brian Schmidt’s understanding, is an approach where the aim is to “recapitulat[e] the main contours and content of a circumscribed realm of discursive activity conventionally designated” (1998, 11). Schmidt is a former student of Gunnell and disciplinary historian of international relations. He continues explaining the meaning of “critical internal discursive history, saying it works “to recover, and differentiate, the actual discursive realm of disciplinary history from the variety of rhetorical and legitimating histories that currently populate the field (1998, 11).  

---

29 As an approach to understanding the discourse of a community is similar to James Farr’s (1995) “forensic” approach to the history of political science.
Thus, I approach the behavioral revolution on the level of “discourse” or the narratives of members of the political science community. The foundation narratives that I find in contemporary reference works combine to form an analytically distinguishable discourse in which many members contribute, and from which they draw on for their sense of membership and professional identity.

Some historians of political science refer to the behavioral revolution as a “discursive object” (Gunnell 1993, 2004a, 2013, 83; Schmidt 1998, 2002, 10). In general terms, the adjectival form of “discourse,” or “discursive,” signifies that the object being modified is a type of speech act that is meant to contribute to and modify the common/shared speech or “discourse” of a community. Gunnell often makes use of the example of the “great tradition” in the history of political thought. Here Gunnell maintains that the “great tradition,” although often cited as a genuine tradition stretching from “Plato to NATO,” is a recent invention of political theorists trying to give shape to the academic field in the 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s. The idea of the “great tradition” of political thought is, in this view, something created in language and in the discourse of a community (1987, xi). Another example comes from Schmidt who argues that the reputed “great debates” that are often viewed as real debates in the history of IR, are in fact constituted in the discourse of that community.30

While I borrow the term “discursive object” from Gunnell and Schmidt, there are two important differences in use to keep in mind. First, I employ it in a non-critical and non-polemical way.31 In my view, the presence of “discursive objects” is a normal

---

30 I discuss Schmidt’s take on the “great tradition” in more detail in Chapter 5, pp. 271-276.
31 A prime example for Gunnell is the political theorist Sheldon Wolin’s 1960 contribution to the history of political thought, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought. In Gunnell, important insights about the nature of discursive objects is somewhat muddied by his insistence that these
outgrowth of a community’s efforts to understand itself – its history, its goals, its challenges, etc. – through language, writing, and by contributing to discourses of various kinds. Thus, while the “behavioral revolution” is a discursive object, this does not mean that it did not happen or deny that fundamental and lasting changes occurred during the period. Second, I view the behavioral revolution as a “discursive object” not because it is a myth or because it never happened, but since the entity referred to in the writing of reference work authors was first created by political scientists retrospectively trying to understand the changes that happened during the early behavioral period. The language of “revolution” was adopted some years after behavioralism had become central to disciplinary identities and practices. Indeed, the widespread use of the term “the behavioral revolution” does not become prominent in the discourse of political science until the mid to late 1960s (Berkenpas 2016). Kuhn (1962) certainly added to the widespread acceptance of the term “revolution” in the phrase “the behavioral revolution,” as exemplified in a spate of APSA presidential addresses in the early to mid-1960s (Truman 1965, Almond 1966, Easton 1969, Deutsch 1971).

Does the designation of the behavioral revolution as a discursive object deny the historical reality of massive, rapid, and fundamental changes in the identity and practice of political science during the behavioral period? Clearly something clearly happened during this period. The identities and practices of the discipline changed after the “behavioral revolution,” and the way that “what we do” as political scientists was fundamentally and

objects are also “myths” – thus his infamous characterization of “The Myth of the Great Tradition” (Gunnell 1978). Gunnell’s use of “myth” is contrary to my use of “mythology” since he views it as a falsehood and illusion which arises out of discourse of the discipline. In this sense, the idea of a “discursive object as myth” becomes rather polemical accusing authors of unwittingly falling victim to a fiction that deeply compromises their work (Gunnell 2004, 2). Wolin forcefully responds to Gunnell’s critique in his contribution to Nelson (1987).
permanently transformed. The way the behavioral revolution is remembered in the reference material I evaluate certainly reflects a number of important and lasting changes to the way members of the discipline did their work as political scientists. In the context of mentions of the behavioral revolution, authors repeatedly recall the growth of statistical and quantitative studies and highlight how these largely supplanted traditional practices in the mainstream of the discipline (especially the History of Political Thought). Other changes commonly cited are the growth in departments, number of political scientists, and the social organization of the discipline in the 1950s and 1960s. The influx of new political scientists accompanying the expansion of higher education, the prestige and “new expertise of academicians as a class,” after WWII grew hand in hand with the rise of behavioral dominance (Ricci 1984, x). This growth of behavioralism in political science was also encouraged by grant-making foundations like Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie (Hauptmann 2006, 2014, 2016).

These reflections on the discursive status of the “behavioral revolution” bring me to the political theory of mythology I develop in this dissertation. The “behavioral revolution” is not a “myth” in the sense that it did not happen as we saw with the examples of the “great tradition” of political thought or the “great debates” in the subfield of IR. Like the “great tradition,” however, it has become a discursive object and through a process of mythology has become central to contemporary disciplinary identities and practices. This is a point about how the concept functions in the contemporary setting, moreover, and less a point about the historical reality of the concept itself.

---

32 This point was raised by Dr. John Clark during this dissertation’s defense.
33 It is important to distinguish the “great tradition,” which is a myth (false and/or illusionary), from the “behavioral revolution,” which is a historical reality. I submit that we can recognize that both concepts have become reified and used by contemporary political scientists for various rhetorical purposes including
A political theory of mythology can be understood as an “order of rhetoric” which operates at a deep level of consciousness/unconsciousness. The persuasive appeal of mythology is not usually transparent to those exposed to it. Unlike a direct appeal to emotion (pathos), expertise (ethos), or logical reasoning (logos), which involve an active choice of acceptance or rejection of the speakers point by an audience, an appeal by mythology (mūthos) works differently by appealing to what appears to be an incontrovertible truth and the practical wisdom of a community. As I show throughout this dissertation, this prescriptive force is made possible because of the widespread distribution and prevalence of the “behavioral revolution” in the discourse of the discipline, and the fact that this concept is embodied by a common stock of narrative referents. Narrative referents like the names of the founders of behavioralism (Merriam, Lasswell, Dahl, Easton) and important institutions (University of Chicago, the University of Michigan), are narrative elements which through variation and repetition over time adhere to the mythological concept of the “behavioral revolution.” When they draw on these narrative elements authors simultaneously reinforce their status as explanatory factors, while also extending the power of the mythology to work as persuasive force in the discipline today.

In sum, the “behavioral revolution” is a discursive object which tends to be reified and used as an explanation of the present state of the discipline; why, for example, quantification and statistics are dominant, and why empirically-oriented theory is the order of the day, and why these are all developments to be celebrated, reasons given for why the

---

34 The concept of “prescriptive force is further developed in Chapter Three.
present is better than the pre-behavioral past. The behavioral revolution mythology is made up of a massive web of interlocking elements which already exist in the discourse of the discipline and which are extended and deepened year after year. The fact that so many political scientists over the years have discussed the “behavioral revolution” in similar terms, has led to a common understanding of what happened. This common understanding allows the concept to be reified and treated as an explanation for the present state of the discipline. Again, a political theory of mythology allows one to understand why the “behavioral revolution” continues to be relevant to contemporary political scientists (because it explains the present in terms of the past), and more importantly because it posits a causal mechanism that explains its presence (since it is central to contemporary identities and practices).

Like many contemporary disciplinary historians, I argue that the behavioral revolution is integral to the identity of political science today. In contrast to these approaches, I offer an explanation for why the behavioral revolution continues to provide meaning to the past and significance to identities and practices in the present. I do this through an analysis of the “mythological nexus” in entries found in dictionaries, encyclopedias, and handbooks. The “behavioral revolution” is transmitted through the discourse of the discipline: it is a discursive object that political scientists use in their narratives, and which works to substantiate contemporary identities and practices. This is the meaning of the “mythological nexus” I develop in this dissertation. When the dimensions of narrative, identity, and practice are simultaneously at work in the context of the behavioral revolution, mythology is at work. The fact that the “behavioral revolution”

---

35 I thank Emily Hauptmann for her suggestion for the last two clauses of this sentence.
is central to a disciplinary mythology does not mean that it did not happen. Whether the “behavioral revolution” is an “event” is beside the point and irrelevant to the argument of the dissertation. I argue instead that the behavioral revolution, as it is presented in contemporary reference materials, works as a mythology; that is, it is a discursive object that works to substantiate contemporary identities and justify dominant practices. In short, I argue that the behavioral revolution mythology works today to substantiate the discipline’s image of itself as a social science which draws its power from repeated retellings of a set of foundation narratives about the origin of contemporary political science and its subfields which has now grown strong enough that this self-reflexive discourse has produced its own mythology.

Selection Criteria for Reference Materials

I aim to discover how the behavioral revolution is remembered and reported in the contemporary reference material of political science and to understand what work the mythology of the behavioral revolution does in the discipline today. Contemporary reference works are the main sources for my findings and what I conclude about the behavioral revolution mythology: encyclopedias, handbooks, and dictionaries. These reference works are an authoritative distillation of the mainstream in the discipline. I turn to these reference materials in order to see whether and to what degree the behavioral revolution still matters to contemporary political science.

Reference work material is a good source to answer my questions about the importance of the behavioral revolution to the contemporary state of the discipline for several reasons. To begin with, the concept of the “behavioral revolution” remains in wide-
spread use in contemporary dictionaries, encyclopedias, and handbooks. Most of this reference material is written by high-ranking members of the profession, and as I discuss more fully below, can be taken as authoritative for the discipline. In addition, this large body of material is relatively well-bounded as set of source material and to my knowledge it has not been systematically studied. The vast majority of these reference works I examine were published in the 2000s, but I also consider several older reference works going as far back as 1980. The end-point of 2012 was chosen because that was the most recent date of publication for a relevant reference work found prior to my dissertation proposal defense. I chose the date 1980 since it is a full decade after the beginning of the “post-behavioral revolution” (Easton 1969); and so it is a good time begin the search for the behavioral revolution being worked into the discourse and identity of the discipline. In other words, if political science is truly “post-behavioral” from the 1970s on, then one might expect that the behavioral revolution is no longer important to how these works present the discipline (Farr and Seidelman 1995). Instead, I found that the behavioral revolution still matters to political scientists writing entries in reference works. Given this finding, I set out to understand and explain the ongoing significance of the behavioral revolution in the discipline through the lens of myth and mythology.

I developed five general selection criteria to find appropriate reference material. The first two selection criteria are primary in the sense that if they led me to mentions of the behavioral revolution, then I would apply selection criteria three through five to entries with the reference work. The general selection criterion I developed are:

(1) The reference work is on political science in general.

(2) The reference work is on the subfields of political science in general.
(3) The entries are on political science in general.

(4) The entries are on the subfields in general.

(5) The entries contain mentions of the behavioral revolution.

The first and most basic selection criterion is that the reference work be general in nature. At first, the encyclopedias, handbooks, and dictionaries I encountered were selected because they had titles which promised to contain content explaining the scope and nature of the discipline in general. In the few documents I found specifically addressing the concept of “generality,” McLeod et al. say “a general story is thought to be of concern to a relatively large audience that shares a common status and universal interests, and its information potentially applicable or of every member of that audience” (2009, 2). Similarly, by “general” I mean that the reference work was designed to appeal either to all political scientists or at least to all members of one of its major subfields. The most obvious of the general encyclopedia reference works were those which have the phrase “political science” in their title, such as the Encyclopedia of Political Science and the International Encyclopedia of Political Science.

I am fortunate that there has been somewhat of a boom in the production of reference material in the contemporary period (1980-present). This abundance of material makes my claims about the centrality of the behavioral revolution to the contemporary discipline more plausible, since there are a large number foundation narratives which repeat key elements constituting its mythology. Most of the reference works are published in the late 1990s and 2000s, but there are important examples going back to 1980 which better fit with the contemporary period than those before 1980 (see Appendix A). This is the case

36 Once again, the “major” subfields I evaluate are American Politics, Comparative Politics, Political Theory, and International Relations.
since these reference works were written in what is widely considered to be the “post-behavioral” era, and if the discipline has left behind the behavioral revolution by the early 1980s, then it should not figure as prominently as it does in the examples I analyze.

I have identified eight dictionaries, nine encyclopedias, and eighteen handbooks which serve as my source material to document the prevalence and use of the concept of the behavioral revolution. I use this material to demonstrate that the behavioral revolution has a significant presence in recent reference works on political science. There are of course many other sites besides these reference works to which one might look to evaluate the importance of the behavioral revolution in contemporary political science (e.g. disciplinary history, textbooks, journal symposia, etc.). I do not completely ignore these other sources, but as with disciplinary history, I use them to provide support for my arguments, and not as a specific site for my empirical analysis. As I will discuss more fully below, I searched for mentions of the behavioral revolution in general entries on political science and its major subfields, and I do not propose to give a comprehensive accounting of all the possible literature that could be included in this universe.37

In the first stage of analysis, I draw from every relevant general reference work entry on political science in order to construct the “narrative context” in which I analyze each occurrence of the phrase “the behavioral revolution.”38 I find an abundance of the narratives about the behavioral revolution in the reference works devoted to contemporary political science. In all the reference material I discovered one hundred and fifty-two

37 I am specifically interested in the diverse ways that political scientists tell the story of the behavioral revolution in reference work entries. I excluded entries which did not include mentions of the behavioral revolution. Of course, I still searched any and all promising entries, but only those that contained mentions of the behavioral revolution were included in my analysis of the behavioral revolution mythology.

38 Along with the mythological nexus, the narrative context is central to a political theory of mythology. I discuss these key analytic constructs more fully below as well as throughout the dissertation.
mentions of the phrases “the behavioral revolution,” “the behavioral movement,” or “the behavioral revolt.” The large number of mentions of the behavioral revolution indicates that its memory and reports on its significance is important in contemporary political science. Table 1 displays the number of reference works I analyzed, the number of entries that contained mentions of the behavioral revolution, and how many times the behavioral revolution was mentioned by each reference work. I list all the reference works and the abbreviations I use in Chapters Three, Four, and Five in Appendix A.

Table 1

Mentions of the Behavioral Revolution in Reference Material

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Reference Works</th>
<th>Number of Entries with Mentions</th>
<th>Mentions of the Behavioral Revolution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dictionaries</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encyclopedias</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handbooks</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

39 The phrase “the behavioral revolution” is by far the most common, with “the behavioral movement” having the second most mentions, followed by “the behavioral revolt.” The last phrase is most evident in the literature of international relations. Unless otherwise noted, when I refer to the “behavioral revolution” in general, I am also referring to mentions of the “behavioral movement” and the “behavioral revolt” although I will cease listing all three every time.
From this set of reference works, I conduct an analysis of a particular foundation narrative, the behavioral revolution in the academic community of political science. Once I selected a universe of reference material, I began to search within the dictionaries, encyclopedias, and handbooks. In my iterative research procedure, I always started from the base of knowledge I developed up to that point of starting new basic research. Given what I learned about the appearance of mentions of the behavioral revolution in previous research, I searched the table of contents, index, and read over the articles to find the mentions of the behavioral revolution which make up the empirical core of this dissertation. In the best case scenario, there is an index entry for the “behavioral revolution,” and I included the article in which it was found.\footnote{40} At other times, I included an entry because of its title or a section heading which has the phrase “the behavioral revolution” in it. As the political scientists Peregrine Schwartz-Shea and Dvora Yanow point out, at all points during the research process I relied on “the role of prior knowledge,” that is my understanding of contemporary political science and past searches to find the mentions of the behavioral revolution (2012, 25-26, 38).

I used an iterative research process and my prior knowledge of the discipline to make distinctions among the reference work entries, classifying them into the major subfields of American, comparative, political theory, and international relations. In terms of chapter structure, I have organized the mentions of the behavioral revolution by subfield. In my initial searches of the reference material, I consulted entries on “political science” in general. This initial search quickly brought in the subfield of “political theory”

\footnote{40 In most cases I do not include the entire entry as I focus on a section that contains the foundation narrative of the behavioral revolution. This is especially true for encyclopedia and handbook articles which tend to be several pages long. Dictionary entries tend to be much shorter, rarely surpassing a couple paragraphs.}
as an additional search category. Once I admitted political theory into the search criteria, it seemed prudent to include the other major subfields of American, comparative, and international relations. Consequently, I decided to look for narratives in the general entries on “political science,” “American politics,” “comparative politics,” “political theory,” and “international relations.” These subfields along with the general category of political science allowed me to collect a large number of foundation narratives which had the behavioral revolution at their core. There is also overrepresentation of political theory and international relations which are a major focus Chapters Three and Four, while American and comparative politics are discussed only in Chapter Five. In addition, a handful of entries were chosen because they were relatively general in scope and based on prior knowledge promised to contain mentions of the behavioral revolution. These latter entries were on the topics of “behavioralism,” “science of politics,” and “conceptions of power.”

In Table 1.1, I’ve reported the mentions of the behavioral revolution by subfield entry. I used my prior knowledge about the discipline of political science to make distinctions among reference work articles and to decide its subfield category. An instance of a “focus on political theory,” shown in Table 1.1, is designated if that entry occurs in a reference work devoted to political theory, the entry is on political theory, and/or the author is a political theorist. An instance of a “focus on political theory,” then, may also occur in a general reference work on political science and still be included if the entry is specifically on political theory and/or the author is a political theorist.
Table 2

Mentions of the Behavioral Revolution by Subfield

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political Science in General</th>
<th>Political Theory</th>
<th>American Politics</th>
<th>International Relations</th>
<th>Comparative Politics</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dictionaries</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encyclopedias</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handbooks</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Subfields are ordered by the total number of mentions of the behavioral revolution.

Importantly, modern technology provides an important way to verify my searches. After I find a mention of the behavioral revolution in a reference work, I made a scanned copy of the entire entry. In the past, this might have meant simply making Xerox copies of each entry, but I am now able to digitally scan each entry and create a PDF document. This step has an additional salutary outcome, since I was able to convert these standard PDFs into searchable documents using Adobe Acrobat Pro. This has allowed me to go back and double-check my findings using the search or “find” function to see if there are any additional mentions I may have missed. I scanned and searched for “the behavioral revolution” (using Adobe), in every preface and introduction, every article on “political
A Political Theory of Mythology

In this dissertation, I develop a political theory of mythology in which “mythology” is understood to be a special case of authoritative speech which develops within the discourse of a community. Two important distinctions are in order. First, I make an important distinction between “myth” and “mythology.” As I discuss in more detail in Chapter Two, most of the literature that I use to construct a contemporary theory of mythology is focused on what authors refer to as “myth.” Many times, however, these same authors are talking about what can also be understood in terms of “mythology.” In my usage, “myth” refers to a specific narrative, while “mythology” refers to a family of narratives which work together to provide meaning and significance for contemporary identities. Take the example of the Italian political theorist Chiara Bottici and her seminal 2007 work, *A Political Philosophy of Myth*. “Myth,” says Bottici, “is a process, one of continuous work on a basic narrative pattern that responds to a need for significance” (2007, ii). While myth and mythology are not the same, Bottici’s understanding of myth and its relation to narrative is very similar to my understanding of mythology. In Bottici’s terms: “Myths are narratives that provide significance to our actions and conditions of existence” (2010, 915). In another example, writing with Benoît Challand, Bottici gives an important definition of “political myth” which is very close to my own definition of

41 In the future, to have all the reference works digitized and easily searchable could lead to new frontiers of research in the direction indicated by this dissertation.
“political mythology.” Here the authors say they understand “political myth” as “the continual process of work on a common narrative by which the members of a social group can provide significance to their political conditions and experiences” (Bottici and Challand 2006, 15).

Throughout this dissertation, I will demonstrate what “work” is being done on the common narratives of the behavioral revolution I examine. I return to the way that Bottici’s work helped me develop a political theory of mythology in Chapter Two. In the chapters of this dissertation devoted to encyclopedia, handbook, and dictionary entries, I demonstrate how contemporary political scientists invoke the behavioral revolution in a way that contributes to its mythologization. Much like Bottici’s “myth,” I view “mythology” in terms of a relatively stable set of foundation narratives which come together and work as a form of persuasion or authoritative speech accepted by a community because it explains present reality in terms of a shared past. In this technical sense, the story of the behavioral revolution is preserved in a mythology or a system of foundation narratives which draw on repeated use of narrative elements important to dominant identities and practices of the discipline.

In addition, the concept of “significance” must be introduced at this early stage in the dissertation. I follow contemporary theorists of “political myth,” like Bottici, and argue that mythology is important because it answers a need for significance important for the construction of identity and for justifying dominant practices. A need for significance is a reflection of a need for membership within a community. Mythology teaches one how to be a member of the community by emulating the actions of exemplary figures. The need for significance is answered by the discourse of a community and it is this nexus between
the authoritative speech of the discipline along with its dominant identities and practices in which mythology’s power lies.

In analytic terms, political mythology is made up of three interrelated components: a narrative dimension, a dimension of identity, and a practical dimension. I call the confluence of these dimensions the “mythological nexus.” I derive these dimensions from a reading of the classicist literature on myth and mythology and from contemporary theories of political myth. Every human community needs mythology because it answers a need for significance. In my understanding, then, the human need for significance is filled by a mythological nexus. When all three dimensions are manifest in the discourse of a community, then mythology is at work.

Related to but distinct from the mythological nexus is the “narrative context” of a political theory of mythology. The narrative context is the analytic means to show mythology at work. The narrative context makes it possible to expressly identify the mythology of the behavioral revolution in the writing of political scientists, while the mythological nexus makes it possible to understand why these elements are present. As I discuss more fully below, the narrative context is made up of three components: the sub-community setting, the referents of a mythology, and the thematic presentation of foundation narratives. In foundation narratives of the American Republic, for example, the figure of George Washington is repeatedly invoked. Over time, and by virtue of this repetition, this figure comes to serve as an important element in the story of America’s founding. In addition to important founding figures in a community’s foundation narratives, there are also important dates, institutions and concepts which are repeatedly invoked by different authors telling similar versions of a community’s foundation
narratives. These names, dates, institutions, and concepts are what I call the “referents of mythology.” The other two narrative elements important for distinguishing mythological speech are the theme of the narrative and determining the community to which the author is speaking.

The Mythological Nexus

The process of mythology is constituted by three interrelated dimensions: the narrative dimension, the dimension of identity, and the practical dimension. It is important to stress that the sequence of these mythological elements is not linear. Instead, each dimension works together simultaneously, as a process. Rather than a sequence of steps that add up to mythology, we have a mythological nexus. In this section I take each dimension in turn, but it should be kept in mind that they are interrelated and work together simultaneously to produce and reproduce mythology.

I begin with the narrative dimension. Here we are primarily interested in the importance of foundation narratives to members of historically evolving communities. The story of the behavioral revolution is an example of a foundation narrative. It is within the foundation narratives that one can identify the narrative elements out of which mythology is constructed and that provide significance to identities as well as practices. This also brings into view the other dimensions of mythology: identity and practice.

The dimension of identity is bound to the narrative dimension in that foundation narratives answer significant questions about the origin of a community, how this narrative is interpreted, and so what it means to be a member of that community in the present. As I discuss below, narrative is powerful precisely because it works to substantiate identities
which then influence the actions and practices of individuals. These “narrative identities” are constructed at both the individual and collective level. Thus, we can speak of both the way an individual’s identity is influenced by foundation narratives as we can speak of the way the discipline as a whole is similarly influenced.42

The *dimension of practice* refers to the works forms that make up a way of life in a human community. In general terms, there are five general forms of practice in academic political science:

1. Research: reading and writing and the canons of making valid inferences and making arguments.
2. Teaching: creating syllabi, giving lectures, grading, mentoring students.
3. Service: working on department committees, other university commitments.
5. Policy Work: for public and private agencies.

These forms of practice are influenced by, and in turn, influence a sense of professional identity for both individuals and for the discipline in general. In other words, part of becoming a member of the community means adopting the practices that define the identity of the community. Thus to be a lawyer means to adopt the practices that make up that profession: legal research and writing, appearances in court, etc. Here we turn to the practical dimension of mythology where the dominant practices of a community are legitimated. These practices are legitimated in at least two senses. First, they are legitimated through actual practice: the work forms that dominate a community are usually

---

42 Of course, the “narrative identity” of a group is a more abstract concept useful for analytic purposes. I am not proposing that any such collective entity actually exists and has agency in the way that individuals do.
quite self-evident to its members just as most communities are quite active in making sure members adopt to dominant practices. One learns what roles are appropriate for members of the community and generally speaking, one follows those roles (Abbot 2001). In another sense, these practices are justified through what one might call “meta-practice” or the writing about practice. In many human communities dominant practices are legitimated, and in an important way reproduced, by narratives about those same practices. In the reference material I analyze, many of the entries explicitly discuss these practices.

The construction of mythology involves the authoritative production of meaning and the significance for communities over time. Mythology is a process that changes over time as differently situated speakers use narrative and discourse more generally to communicate with other members of the community, often in ways that substantiate identities (both individual and community) and justify practices. “A myth typically expresses itself through variants,” Bottici explains, “in each context the same narrative pattern must generate different variants in order to accommodate the new circumstances” (2010, 917). In the context of narratives about the behavioral revolution, authors from different subfields and different power perspectives, (whether mainstream or not), must take the historical reality of behavioral dominance seriously, even as they work in different ways of recounting the story “to accommodate the new circumstance” of the present.

Mythology as Authoritative Speech Ideas of authority, legitimacy, and common sense point to the way mythology powerfully shapes identities and practices in communities like political science. While all writing seeks to be authoritative to a degree, the burden is especially strong for reference materials. Reference materials are unique in the way that they set out to be authoritative for specific communities of readers. For
example, the fact that encyclopedias, handbooks, and dictionaries are always edited by senior, well-established, high-status members of a profession lends them authority. In addition, the entries themselves are meant to be a distillation of the common sense of the discipline at the time of publication. When the authors write about the history of contemporary political science, they do so with an eye toward providing an authoritative account that will be accepted by their fellow members of the academic community (Sica 2001, 4501). Finally, reference works also draw on the authoritative reputation of publishers such as Oxford University Press. Throughout this dissertation I discuss the particular way authoritativeness works in encyclopedias, handbooks, and dictionaries.

The meaning of “authoritativeness” in reference works is important since the political theory of mythology developed in this dissertation is viewed, in part, as a general example of authoritative speech. The authoritativeness of mythology comes from the way the dimensions of narrative, identity, and practice work together. A core argument, then, is that the confluence of these dimensions – what I have called the “mythological nexus” – produces authoritative speech in the sense that it is persuasive for members of the political science community. As I discuss below and in more detail in Chapter Two, the mythological nexus works to provide significance and makes sense of members’ experiences within the discipline. The mythological nexus is powerful because it draws on and reinforces members of the discipline’s sense of self in a common or “practical” sense. In contemporary reference works, the mythology of the behavioral revolution is used by contemporary authors to situate their relation to disciplinary practical sense by drawing on the authority of a common set of narratives about the past. In terms of the mythological
nexus, these narratives influence identities (“narrative identity”) which in turn, influence and are influenced by dominant practices in the community.

**Narrative, Identity, and Mythology**  Mythology is expressed in the discourse of a community. Contemporary reference works are one part of the discourse of political science. One way to establish authoritativeness is to draw on foundation narratives that already work to legitimate mainstream identities and dominant practices. Authors of reference works depend on these narratives because they make sense of their experience and provide significance to their sense of membership in the community (i.e. the narratives are “authoritative”).

The interconnection of mythology and authoritative speech like that found in contemporary encyclopedias, handbooks, and dictionaries is not well-understood by the political science community today. The construction of identity in relation to a community’s past gives rise to powerful foundation narratives that explain the present in terms of the past. Narrative is the combination of discursive elements in speech or writing for the purpose of communication. A system of mythological elements can be identified in the narrative discourse of all human communities. In my view, this universalism derives from the fact that people are by nature political. In Aristotelian terms, people are endowed with the capacity for speech and this is a form of action which constructs identities and shapes practices. People use their capacity for speech to communicate and this enables them to come together, organize, establish power relationships, and build communities involving power, rule, and order (Sheldon 2006). As the folklorist Jack Zipes recently put the matter, “humans began telling tales as soon as they developed the capacity of speech” and “people told stories to communicate knowledge and experience in social contexts”
Crucially, human beings use their capacity for speech to tell stories about their lives and experiences (Arendt 1958, Ch. 5).

In order to fully appreciate the power of mythology today, it is important to understand how narratives impact identities and practices. The link between narrative, identity, and practice is at the core of what I call the “mythological nexus.” The underlying idea is that human beings construct their identities through narratives, and that these narratives are therefore powerful forces influencing the actions of individuals and the practices of groups. In his *Narrative Politics: Stories of Collective Action*, the political scientist Frederick Mayer say that human beings are “story telling animals” who “are compelled by the dramatic imperative of a collective story in which they have come to see themselves as actors” (2014, 2; 3). People are moved to act by the narratives they have come to accept as significant for their lives and their identities (Scholes and Kellogg 1968).

Narrative identities are powerful. Once an individual adopts an identity based on narratives of belonging to a group – say as a Republican or a Democrat – then this identity influences practices – e.g. voting for your party’s political candidate. Belonging to a community is a powerful force in human affairs as people want to belong, want to identify with a group, and by this affiliation are forced to behave in ways that are distinctive of the group. If one fails to practice what one’s identity demands then this can lead to identity crisis or an undermining of personal character, trustworthiness, and affective ties to the group. As Mayer says, “much of human action is narrative enactment” (77). In this way, Mayer argues, “when we enact a narrative, we just as inevitably seek to cast ourselves acting appropriately, legitimately, and morally … we not only use narrative to justify our

---

43 It is for similar reasons that the philosopher and linguist Ludwig Wittgenstein once referred to human beings as “ceremonious animals” (Bottici 2007).
actions, we act in ways that can be justified by a story in which our character did the right thing” (77; see also p. 97). The narrative enactment of the story of ourselves creates a powerful “dramatic imperative” which impels people to act, spurring them to action (77). This is so because when stories are told that invoke an important part of one’s identity – indeed one’s character – then one is forced to choose, either live up to one’s narrative identity or abandon one’s principles and jeopardize one’s character.

The Narrative Context

The behavioral revolution mythology is a process and system (or “nexus”) that provides significance to identities and practices. The mythological nexus is made evident through an analysis of the narrative context of foundation narratives in a community’s discourse. In Chapter Two, I show how I developed a political theory of mythology with a discussion of foundation narratives about ancient Sparta known as the “Return of the Herakleidae.” In Chapters Three, Four, and Five I analyze foundation narratives of the behavioral revolution in political science. Each time I identified a mention of the behavioral revolution, I extracted the relevant portion of the overall entry and included it in my set of foundation narratives. The way authors talk about the behavioral revolution in this extracted portion of their overall entry is what I refer to as the “narrative context.”

The analysis of the narrative context of mentions of the behavioral revolution make it

---

44 Here the focus is on collective identity but it is important to keep in mind that working alongside collective identity is personal identity. As Mayer points out, “when called upon to answer ‘who are you?’ to another, or ‘who am I’ to oneself, the answer is always a story” (74); and “the stories of our life, therefore, not only answer the question ‘who am I?’ but also enable us to see our lives as meaningful” (75; see also p. 105).
possible to see that these elements work together to provide significance to contemporary identities and dominant practices in contemporary political science.

Although there is a dominant narrative of a successful transformation of political science along behavioral lines, there is diversity in the way authors draw on the narrative context. Instead, and much like the way ancient mythology has come down to us through the ages, the behavioral revolution mythology is made up of fragments; that is, it is made up of narrative elements which authors of reference work material appropriate in unique and creative ways. This represents a major contribution of this dissertation, as I am able to show how differently situated authors recount the story of the behavioral revolution in different ways, relying on different referents, speaking to different audiences, and employing different themes. Importantly, however, a political theory of mythology allows one to see how a great diversity of contributions to the authoritative discourse of the discipline, despite their fragmentary nature, congeal and produce significance for the community; a significance which is essential for the maintenance of disciplinary of identities and dominant practices.

The narrative context is the means to demonstrate the existence of mythology in the reference work of contemporary political science. The narrative context of the behavioral revolution mythology is made up of three elements: the subfield context, the referents to the behavioral revolution, and the narrative theme. In this section, I discuss how I put together each one of these narrative elements and why they are important to the narrative context of the behavioral revolution.

*The Subfield Context* Subfields in an academic discipline serve to divide members of the community into different sub-communities with distinct identities and practices. The
subfield context refers to the specific community addressed by the author of the reference material. The communities I draw attention to in this dissertation are represented by the subfields of American politics, comparative politics, international relations, and political theory. The subfield context is determined primarily by the subject of the entry. For example, an entry on “Political Theory” is judged to be an example of the general subfield category of “Political Theory.” Some of these categories are less straightforward and required some interpretive license on my part. For example, entries on “Behavioralism” are judged to be examples of the category of “General Political Science.”

An appreciation of contemporary mythology requires bringing the level of analysis down to the “practical” level, or the level of the dominant practices in a specific human community such as academic disciplines and their subfields. An academic discipline is an especially fruitful site for investigating the work of mythology today because the connection between authoritative speech, professional and community identities, and dominant practices can be understood by evaluating that community’s discourse. Subfields have different experiences within the discipline and this is manifest in the varied ways authors attempt to answer the need for significance implied by the mythological nexus. Since mythology arises out of the confluence of narrative, identity, and practice, it makes sense to look for the range of ways that it is manifest within contemporary political science and its subfields.

The Referents to the Behavioral Revolution

The referents to the behavioral revolution are biographical, conceptual, and institutional reference-points or touchstones employed by authors within their narratives of political science after the behavioral revolution. In Table 1.3, I present the variation in referents across the reference materials.
By comparing mentions of the behavioral revolution across reference entries, I was able to identify four categories of referents to the behavioral revolution: biographical, referring to leaders of the behavioral revolution; conceptual, referring to the ideas that became dominant in the course of the behavioral revolution; institutional, referring to the institutions that were either important to the establishment of behavioralism or were constructed during the revolution itself; and finally temporal, referring to the time period in which the behavioral revolution took place. Some of the more important referents identified in this dissertation are as follows: prominent figures like Charles Merriam, Harold Lasswell, David Easton, and Robert Dahl; concepts like the scientific method, traditional theory, and social science; and institutions like the University of Chicago and the University of Michigan.

Table 3

Referents Across Reference Materials, By Percentage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Conceptual</th>
<th>Temporal</th>
<th>Biographical</th>
<th>Institutional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dictionaries</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encyclopedias</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handbooks</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

45 These categories reported in Appendix B fit into a scheme of narrative elements needed to tell or “emplot” a story made up of the who (people), the what (concepts), the when (temporal period), and the where (institutions).
It is striking that despite its widespread use throughout the reference material, the behavioral revolution is never explicitly defined; rather it is taken for granted as a constitutive moment in the history of the discipline. A political theory of mythology helps make sense of the dearth of explicit definitions of the “behavioral revolution.” From the standpoint of mythology, it becomes less puzzling that there are few explicit attempts to define the “behavioral revolution.” This is because the behavioral revolution is so closely tied to the identity of the discipline that it is often taken for granted, a fait accompli, and so constitutive of the discipline, that although it is mentioned often, it is not defined. The significance of each mention of the behavioral revolution depends greatly on the narrative context in which it appears. One part of this context is the referents used alongside mentions of the behavioral revolution. The standard cues that I relied on to find these mentions of the behavioral revolution were ones I developed over time and have evolved into the “referents to the behavioral revolution” listed in Appendix B.

After I reviewed each mention of the behavioral revolution, and examined the context within the text in which a mention appeared, I discovered a patterned set of empirical referents. A crucial step in my analysis of the reference material was the construction of a typology of referents to the behavioral revolution. Through an iterative process, consisting in multiple readings of the same set of texts, I systematically reviewed mentions of the behavioral revolution in order to discern any common patterns and develop a typology of categories that contain the specific referents to the behavioral revolution (George and Bennett 2005; Collier et al. 2012). This iterative reading brought to light the common names, places, concepts, and contexts that individual authors use in order to argue or narrate their point (see Appendix B). At this point, the typology showed a clear
minimum threshold of six mentions across reference materials. In other words, though many of the referents I discuss in this dissertation had dozens of mentions across the reference material, there was a clear minimum number of mentions shared by a majority of these referents. Thus, the minimum number required to be included as a referent to the behavioral revolution was six mentions across the reference material.

The presence of biographical referents is one prominent characteristic of the behavioral revolution mythology. Who are the biographical referents to the behavioral revolution? In the reference works, the biographical referents repeatedly mentioned alongside mentions of the behavioral revolution are Charles Merriam (1874-1953), Harold Lasswell (1902-1978), David Easton (1917-2014), and Robert Dahl (1915-2014).46 These figures are mentioned more than any others within the context of specific mentions of the behavioral revolution. Beyond cataloging such mentions, a major part of this dissertation is working to show what mythological work each mention does to establish and reinforce the identity of the discipline. For example, the repeated use of the biographical referents of Merriam, Lasswell, Easton, and Dahl in particular, help fix a set of individuals among a large number of possible options. What work is done when contemporary authors invoke these referents, and what role do they play in the mythology of the behavioral revolution? As we will see with the other referents to the behavioral revolution, these biographical referents serve as compressed symbols that lend significance to the behavioral revolution for contemporary political scientists. In other words, it makes it possible to share in a community’s past through the repetition of the same narrative elements that are important for bolstering current practitioners’ identities.

46 See Appendix E for a brief bibliography of each of these figures.
The second category consists of the conceptual referents to the behavioral revolution. The conceptual referents that emerged are as follows: social science, the scientific method, quantitative methods, traditional political theory, and empirical theory. While in the early stages of my work, I relied more heavily on finding the temporal referent of the 1950s and 1960s and the biographical referents, I gradually saw that the conceptual referents were by far the most important cues to look for when trying to identify mentions of the behavioral revolution in the reference work material. These concepts and the ideas they represent are repeatedly mentioned in the context of the behavioral revolution. As reported in Table 1.3, at least half of all referents across reference materials are conceptual in nature. I report the relative importance of each conceptual referent to the dictionaries, encyclopedias, and handbooks in their respective chapters.

The third category consists of institutional referents to the behavioral revolution. Among these institutional referents there are the University of Chicago, the National Opinion Research Center, the Social Science Research Council, the University of Michigan, the Survey Research Center of the Institute for Social Research, the Interuniversity Consortium of Political and Social Research, and the American National Election Studies, the National Science Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Rand Corporation. None of these institutional referents alone reach the threshold of inclusion of six mentions, but when appropriately combined with similar referents all of the major institutional referents reach that threshold. For example, if the “University of Chicago” is combined with the National Opinion Research Center (located at the University of Chicago) then it reaches the threshold of six mentions within the context of mentions of the behavioral revolution across the reference material.
Finally, the typology showed that many authors relied on a temporal context to situate their mentions of the behavioral revolution. Thus, I included a temporal referent category which is made up of two different referents: either mentions of the time period 1950 and 1960s or mentions of WWII. In Table 1.3, we see that such a temporal referent is the second most employed in the context of the behavioral revolution across reference materials. It is also important to note that among disciplinary historians there is debate about the time-span of the behavioral revolution, and in particular whether it began in the 1940s, 1930s, or perhaps earlier. In the mainstream version of the behavioral revolution, however, the time period of the 1950s and 1960s is commonly mentioned. This periodization also fits the dominant narrative of the behavioral revolution where the movement grew out of political scientists’ experiences during WWII working in various capacities for the federal government.

Referents and Tropes In my usage, a trope is a narrative device that authors use to move the story along and generally occur at important points in the plot – e.g. at the beginning, middle, or end of a narrative.\textsuperscript{47} Moreover, tropes are repeated in creative combinations by authors over the course of constructing a narrative. In the academic community of political science, these tropes are well-known and can be invoked in the process of story-telling in order to turn or advance the overall narrative. It is in this sense of serving as “figures” or turning points in larger narrative structures that these referents can also be thought of as tropes of discourse. For example, when authors begin discussing

\textsuperscript{47} The word “trope” is derived from the Greek τρόπος (tropos) which meant “turn, way, trope;” today it can mean both “a figurative or metaphorical use of a word or expression” and/or “a conventional idea or phrase” (The New Oxford American Dictionary 2005, 1804). John N. Nelson defines trope in the following way: “Trope comes from the ancient Greek word for ‘turn,’ as in a change of direction in space or a change of fortune in the course of events” (1998, xvi). Hayden White defines a trope as “literally a ‘turn’ or deviation from literal speech or the conventional meaning and order of words” (1999, 104).
“scientific method,” an important referent to the behavioral revolution, they are simultaneously relying on an important trope in foundation narratives of the behavioral revolution, while invoking a powerful referent to the behavioral revolution. A referent can be a trope, but more commonly tropes are ideas associated with a referent. For example, when an author is discussing the drive toward “interdisciplinarity” during the behavioral period, they are using “interdisciplinarity” as a trope to move the narrative along. This trope of “interdisciplinarity,” as we’ll have the occasion to see in this chapter as well as Chapters Four and Five, is not a referent itself, though it is closely associated with the social science referent. Other common tropes found in the reference material are as follows: post-behavioralism, internationalization, and Americanization.

The Thematic Context  I understand the mythologization of the behavioral revolution to be a creative process constantly being updated as authors emphasize different narrative elements in their retellings of the story of the behavioral revolution. The theme of a narrative, according to the classicist Martin, represents “the construction of significance backwards in time [and] appears to be as dynamic an element as plot” (1986, 127). Northrop Frye recounts how literary criticism often understands theme as “a sense of what the work of fiction was all about” (1961, 589). Here, of course, I am extending these insights to works of non-fiction such as reference works. I understand the theme of a narrative to be the patterned use of narrative referents. The theme is constructed by authors in the course of writing each narrative. The theme of a narrative is employed by authors do part of the work of providing the behavioral revolution with significance for contemporary political scientists.

48 For recent assessments of “interdisciplinarity” see Aldrich (2014), and Jacobs (2014); see also Wissoker 2000.
Most narratives about the foundation of contemporary political science develop a theme which takes the success of the behavioral revolution for granted. Contemporary reference works, as I discussed above, seek to establish their authoritativeness in part through appealing to the largest possible number of members of the general community to which they are addressed. In order to remain “authoritative” for the discipline, moreover, narratives must be continuously augmented by a ritualistic practice of retelling the story of a transformed political science after the behavioral revolution. An inherent aspect of a dominant narrative of successful revolution is that it draws on the common sense of a community representing the status quo as a historical outgrowth of developments in the past: often one does not have to take a stand, and does not have to be critical.

In the reference material, most authors start from the dominant narrative of successful revolution, but there is variation in the way that they draw on the narrative context. I analyze foundation narratives in the discourse of contemporary political science in terms of three general themes which authors employ when recounting the story of the behavioral revolution. I found a continuum in the dominant narrative of successful revolution: from Whig to Historicist to Lament. Some of these differences within the narrative of successful revolution can be accounted for by considering the perspective of the author writing the entry. Some authors write from a more overtly Whig perspective explicitly celebrating the triumph of behavioralism in political science (e.g. Pye 2006). A majority of authors write from a more moderate perspective, are historicist in orientation and do not overtly celebrate the triumph of behavioralism; nevertheless, most recognize its

---

49 In historicist circles, a “Whig” perspective is one in which an author narrates the past as a progression from worse to better, from barbaric to civilized, with the present era representing the highest stage of development yet attained.
rapid rise, successful transformation of the discipline, and its ongoing influence on the discipline today. Finally, on the opposite pole of the continuum from the Whig theme is the lament theme that recognizes the triumph of the behavioral revolution while lamenting its successful transformation of the discipline.

In reference works a theme of lament and loss is rare. In this theme, in other words, the remaking of the discipline by the behavioral revolution becomes a story of a lost heritage or degeneration from a golden age, and one where political science is reconstituted in an impoverished form to conform to modern scientific norms and practices through an explicit rejection of traditional modes of doing political science including most of what had been the subfield of political theory. This theme is completely absent from the dictionary entries, but is at work in a limited way in encyclopedias and handbooks. Significantly, however, this theme is quite prevalent outside the reference material. This other literature might be classified as “anti-behavioral” in which authors work to challenge what they argue has become the mainstream of political science. Outside the reference material the theme of lament and/or loss is especially strong within the subfield of political theory in which many authors recount historical narratives of the decline, rebirth, and marginalization of political theory after the behavioral revolution (Strauss 1962; Schaar and Wolin 1963; Wolin 1969; Seidelman 1985; Ricci 1987; Mahoney 2004). Here authors lament the loss of the formerly central position of political theory in the discipline and regret the scientific turn embraced by the mainstream after the behavioral revolution. Given the political theory

---

50 In Adcock, Bevir, and Stimson’s account, for example, “behavioralists promoted a positivist vision of empirical theory that had great influence across much of the discipline, but found little support within what became the subfield of political theory” (2007, 11). The authors explain how the subfield of political theory became the center for resistance, “political theory became dominated instead by an alternative new agenda that is an epic tradition that was rooted in émigré critiques of the flaws of liberal modernity and of modernist forms of social science associated with it” (11).
of mythology developed in this dissertation, the absence of themes of lament and loss makes sense, since this theme directly challenges the dominant story of a successful revolution. This theme does not find a substantial place since reference materials are a reflection of the disciplinary mainstream and since it tends to undermine the authority of the dominant theme and.

By contrast, the second greatest number of entries develop a Whig theme which celebrates the successful transformation of the discipline by the behavioral revolution. By and large, these entries describe the history of the discipline or a subfield in terms of the triumph of behavioralism, substantiating already existing identities, and justifying already dominant practices of the community. For the more optimistic Whig, the behavioral revolution is widely regarded as a positive transformative event in the history of political science in which the discipline was successfully changed from traditional to scientific; this is seen as something to celebrate in the present. Of course, as in Kafka’s *Metamorphosis*, a transformation is not always a good thing. But in this context, the authors are clearly celebrating the triumph of political science after the behavioral revolution.

The historicist theme is the most common theme in the reference material. Within this theme there is variation from traditional to more revisionist historiography. As I discussed above, traditional historicist accounts focus on getting the facts right, placing the object of study in historical context, and trying to learn as much as possible about the people and institutions involved. A historicist who develops a revisionist theme accepts does these things too, but they also seek to intervene in the way the past can be taken for granted in traditional historicist accounts. Throughout the dissertation the revisionist theme is best represented by the work of John Gunnell whose historicist theme I
characterized as one of continuity, restoration, or reformation. This theme is meant to upset the standard historicist account, which often sees the behavioral revolution as a fundamentally transformative event in the history of the discipline. Here the theme that structures the narrative is that the “revolution” accompanying the rise of behavioralism was more of a reformation as the profession which more or less stayed the course that had been set in the 1920s and 1930s at the University of Chicago (Gunnell 1993; 2013).

One reason I believe this theme has found its way into the reference material in a much more substantial way is that it does not entail an explicit critique of the mainstream discipline in the way the lament and/or loss theme often does. The theme of continuity and restoration does not substantially upset the dominant narrative of revolution since it is still recognizes the success of behavioralism in transforming both identities and practices in the discipline (although this is often treated as less than an “event” and more a “discursive object” developed in the way political scientists think and talk about the past). An additional wrinkle in Gunnell’s revisionist theme is his focus on the challenge posed to the mainstream of political science in the late 1940s and 1950s by a group of prominent and influential émigré scholars primarily writing from within the emerging subfield of political theory. In this subtype of the historicist theme, the focus is on continuity in the evolution of the discipline as the behavioral revolution was in many ways a conservative re-imagining of an American liberal political science than a wholesale destruction of the old with the new built on its rubble (Gunnell 1993; Adcock 2014).
Mythological Analysis of the Behavioral Revolution: An Example

In every reference article I analyze, the behavioral revolution is not specifically the object of analysis. Once again, this is due to the fact that the entries covered are much more general, focused as they are on political science in general, its major subfields, and related concepts. The behavioral revolution is named when an author employs a foundation narrative to substantiate an argument about the past or make a claim about the present. Since the behavioral revolution is often mentioned but never defined, I argue that these authors provide the story of the behavioral revolution with significance by relying on the narrative context associated with the mythological nexus constituting identities and substantiating practices after the behavioral revolution.

For longer reference work entries, I have only excerpted the portion of the text containing the foundation narrative of the behavioral revolution. This also means that there has been somewhat of a narrowing of the overall context of the mention. In other words, I am not interested in the entire entry, what points are being made, what arguments are put forward, etc. This is because I am focused on the behavioral revolution, how it is employed and in particular how taken together, the narrative context of themes, referents, and subfields constitute a mythological nexus important to identities and practices in contemporary political science. For example, among the contemporary encyclopedia entries we encounter Gunnell’s contribution to the Encyclopedia of Political Science, “Political Science, History of:”

In the United States, David Easton’s The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science (1953) set the agenda for the next decade by defining political science as the study of the “authoritative allocation of values” and making the case for moving beyond mere factual research and historical and traditional forms by advancing
empirical theory and adopting the methods of the natural science. The behavioral “revolution,” for which Easton was often the principal spokesperson, transformed the practice of political science and increased the substantive and methodological contributions on a variety of subjects, including survey research and voting behavior. It was, however, less a revolution in many respects than a recommitment to the visions of both the scientific study of politics and liberal democracy that had informed the discipline for nearly half a century; it was also, in part, a response to the first significant challenge to those visions (2010, 1283).

The Narrative Context

One way mythology works is through authoritative or persuasive speech found in a community’s foundation narratives. Mythology can be identified by looking at the narrative context, paying attention to the way the story is presented, what common referents are drawn on, what subfield is addressed, and what theme is employed. There is no clear subfield context here, and so I classify this foundation narrative as “political science in general.” Gunnell’s foundation narrative is full of referents to the behavioral revolution. These referents signal key elements of the plot that makes up this version of the story of the behavioral revolution, who was involved and what happened and they are among the primary narrative touchstones employed by authors discussing the history of political science after the behavioral revolution. For example, David Easton (1917-2014) is a key biographical referent to the behavioral revolution and is mentioned often in the reference works. Gunnell also invokes two important conceptual referents often found in the context of mentions of the behavioral revolution. The traditional theory and empirical theory referents appear together, which is often the case in the reference works reviewed. As I discuss throughout this dissertation, one reason these and other conceptual referents appear in pairs is because of the dynamic of identity production. Early in the history of
behavioralism, “empirical” or “behavioral theory” was trying to define itself, and it often did so in opposition to what was called “traditional theory” (Gunnell 1993; Hauptmann 2005). Today, these categories are well-known and repeated together often in the reference material I analyze in this dissertation. In this narrative there is also a “scientific method” referent invoked when Gunnell says political science “adopt[ed] the methods of natural science” (1283).

Another part of the narrative context is the theme of the narrative. Within the reference material, Gunnell is the most prominent author developing a historicist-revisionist theme focused on continuity before and after the behavioral revolution. Here, in a move that is consistent with Gunnell’s writing outside the reference work genre, he takes a step back from the dominant narrative of successful revolution and argues that behavioralism is better understood in terms of a recommitment to already existing trends in the discipline. A second important part of this theme of continuity is the narrative about the émigré challenge of mainstream political science from within the subfield of political theory. This narrative, as we’ll see many times in the chapters to follow, is also used to tell a story of continuity. In other words, although there was a robust challenge of the behavioral mainstream by émigré scholars, this challenge was largely overcome by the behavioral mainstream through the marginalization of the subfield of political theory (Gunnell 1993).

The Mythological Nexus

The mythological nexus is constituted by the dimensions of narrative, identity, and practice. Each of these dimensions is at work in Gunnell’s foundation narrative of the
behavioral revolution. The narrative element is obvious when we look at specific instances of foundation narratives. The bigger point is that mythology is constituted through the discourse of a community. This is one example of a narrative about the behavioral revolution and is part of a larger constellation of narratives which contribute to the discourse of the discipline.

The dimensions of identity and practice are closely interrelated. Often it is better to look for practices associated with the behavioral revolution in order to gain insight into the form of identity being supported by the author’s narrative. Here Gunnell makes a point that is widely acknowledged in writing about the behavioral period when he says that there was a change in “the practice of political science” involving research into “survey research” and “voting behavior” (1283). The academic practices of conducting surveys and doing voting behavior research are, as Gunnell and others have pointed out elsewhere, outcomes of the behavioral movement in political science. These practices then become associated with the mainstream identity of political science through a complex interaction between practitioners seeking to maintain membership in the community through the consumption and production of discourse. In other words, one’s narrative identity is constructed by and through the discourse of the discipline, which is simultaneously influenced by the practices of the researcher and the community to which he or she wishes to contribute.\(^{51}\)

---

\(^{51}\) Of course, these transformations are not driven by reference materials which tend to play a legitimating role much later. Initially, this role is played by the broad discourse of the discipline, and it is only much later that one can regularly find foundation narratives of the behavioral revolution in the reference material of the discipline. As I discussed above, this is also part of the reason for electing the contemporary time period of 1980-2012 for my investigation. Interestingly, perhaps the earliest use of the phrase “the behavioral revolution,” is found in David Easton’s 1968 entry on “Political Science” in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. 
Chapter Overview of Dissertation

In Chapter Two, I demonstrate a pivotal shift in the meaning of the word “myth” during the period of transition between the archaic and classical periods of Greek history. In particular we see how the meaning of “myth” increasingly comes to be defined in opposition to the concept of logos, “reason” and/or “rationality.” This movement is one of increasing logocentrism (Bottici 2015). I review different meanings of myth and mythology and develop the central meaning of mythology as authoritative speech similar to the ancient epic meaning of myth as mūthos. I further develop the analytic construct of the “mythological nexus” by showing how the dimensions of narrative, identity, and practice were at work in the context of ancient Sparta. I analyze the mythology of Herakles and the associated foundation narratives about the return of his descendants who settled southwestern Greece. Through this analysis I am able to draw a parallel to the formation of identities and practices in contemporary political science which similarly relies on foundation narratives and a mythological nexus. The behavioral revolution mythology is derived from foundation narratives that draw on the discipline’s past to provide significance to identities and practices common to the academic community.

A political theory of mythology helps answer the question of why the behavioral revolution continues to be an important part of the way that political scientists remember the history of the discipline. I develop the concept of “significance” as introduced by Bottici (2007) and argue that the reason mythology is powerful is because it is through the nexus of narratives, identities, and practices that significance is produced. This form of significance is crucial to human beings understanding of their place in the world, their common sense, and practical wisdom.
The substantive core of this dissertation is represented by Chapters Three, Four, and Five, which focus on contemporary dictionaries, encyclopedias, and handbooks respectively. In these chapters, I apply the lessons learned from the myth and mythology literature reviewed in Chapter Two, and I show how members of the political science community, much like members of the ancient Spartan community, contribute to a mythology through their speech or discourse broadly conceived. I show that contemporary political scientists repeatedly draw on the narrative context of the behavioral revolution because it helps make sense of the current state of the discipline.

I discovered hundreds of mentions of the behavioral revolution in the contemporary reference material. A political theory of mythology helps explain the strong presence of the behavioral revolution in the reference material by focusing on how the speech acts (mūthoi) of political scientists contribute to a community’s discourse about itself and therefore influence shared identities and dominant practices. I also demonstrate how the foundational mythology of the behavioral revolution works to justify a dominant image of political science whose practices are quantitative and not humanistic thereby marginalizing other approaches to creating knowledge such as qualitative and interpretive research.

In Chapter Three, I focus on contemporary dictionaries of political science. I begin with an important trope in lexographic studies: the distinction between writing dictionaries in either a prescriptivist or descriptivist way. The prescriptivist project, along with nearly half of the dictionary entries with mentions of the behavioral revolution, is a discursive artifact of the Plano et al. volumes first published in the 1970s, with later editions in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. In many respects, these dictionaries reflect the optimism and hope for a discipline united by a language and practice dominated by behavioralism. In
terms of narrative context, these prescriptivist entries are written by generalist political scientists who are reporting what for them is the received understanding of the topics defined in their dictionaries. It is remarkable how often the behavioral revolution is mentioned in dictionary entries on topics ranging from “political science,” behavioralism,” “postbehavioralism,” “empiricism,” “science,” “political psychology,” and “political theory.” In contrast to these prescriptivist entries with mentions of the behavioral revolution, there are the more self-described descriptivist entries found in dictionaries like the *Key Concepts in Politics* (2000). A key finding in this chapter is that even when dictionaries are intended to be descriptivist in orientation, when it comes to narratives about the behavioral revolution they nevertheless carry a “prescriptive force.” The reason these narratives carry a prescriptive force is due to the behavioral revolution mythology. In other words, since mythology is authoritative speech and since political scientists both draw on and contribute to this authoritative speech, the mythology of the behavioral revolution carries with it a prescriptive force which provides significance to the experiences and deeds of members of the community. Throughout the chapter I highlight the close relationship between the narrative context and the mythological nexus of the behavioral revolution. I elaborate on how political scientists draw on the narrative context in ways that substantiate the dimensions of narrative, identity, and practice which comprise the mythological nexus of the behavioral revolution.

In Chapter Four, I demonstrate the behavioral revolution mythology through an analysis of contemporary encyclopedias. As with Chapter Three, I draw attention to the narrative context of mentions of the behavioral revolution and how these instances illustrate the dimensions of the mythological matrix developed in this dissertation. As with
dictionaries, only the subfields of international relations and political theory are represented. Throughout the chapter, I show how the referents to the behavioral revolution map onto the dimensions of the mythological nexus. This close association between narratives about the behavioral revolution to both identities and practices in the discipline help demonstrate the presence of a disciplinary mythology in contemporary political science. I show once again that although there is a dominant narrative of a successful revolution after behavioralism, there is still variation in the way that authors draw on the narrative context. Different referents are employed and different themes are developed, but I show how all these elements nevertheless contribute to the power of the behavioral revolution mythology in contemporary political science. Chapter Four also has a special thematic organization. I begin by recounting the differences between Whig and standard historicist accounts and then I devote two sections to the themes of continuity and lament respectively. In these sections, I emphasize the distinctiveness of the theme of continuity and to a lesser extent the theme of lament.

In Chapter Four I continue developing the idea of authoritativeness in reference materials. Of all the types of reference material I cover, the editors of the encyclopedias devote the most space to explicitly discussing why their encyclopedia should be taken as authoritative. These discussions add support to a political theory of mythology centering on the authoritative speech of the discipline. Chapter Four also brings into focus the important tropes of “Internationality” and “Americanization.” Like those of other reference materials, authors of dictionaries discuss their efforts to make their dictionaries as “international” as possible. This “internationality” generally means that the editors have made a good faith effort to make the encyclopedia representative in terms of the
distribution of authors from around the world. In practice, however, a disproportionate number of authors are political scientists trained and working in the U.S. This is partly due to the other important trope of “Americanization.” The underlying idea here is that the dominant form of political science in the world is American-style (behavioral) political science, to such a degree that other countries and their university systems have modeled their identities and practices on it. The trope of “Americanization” also helps explain why the story of the behavioral revolution in American political science is told by international authors and often with a triumphal narrative of successful revolution.

In Chapter Five, I analyze the behavioral revolution mythology in contemporary handbooks. As with Chapters Three and Four, the focus is on showing the relationship between the narrative context and the mythological nexus which are the key analytic components of a political theory of mythology. Among handbooks I found the greatest variation in narrative context. This is especially true of the subfield context found in handbooks. For the first time, the handbooks allow for a discussion of all the major subfields discussed in this dissertation. In this chapter there is the most material to cover, as there has been a significant growth in the number of handbooks available to political science in last decade. This growth is largely driven by the Oxford University Press series of handbooks on the social sciences, of which I focused on the ten-volume *Handbooks of Political Science*. Crucial to the political theory of mythology developed here, this array of handbooks representing many subfields demonstrates variation in their employment of narrative context. In other words, we see differently situated authors who nevertheless bring in the behavioral revolution when discussing the history of political science. This chapter also represents the most extensive explanation of the themes authors develop in
their narratives of the behavioral revolution. There are many examples of both the Whig and historicist themes and a handful of narratives that develop a theme of lament and/or loss after the behavioral revolution.

Chapter Five also affords the opportunity to further develop the idea that behavioralism influenced European political science through “Americanization.” This is the case since authors writing from a European background, and in many cases from a European home institution, recount the story of the behavioral revolution in Whig and traditional-historicist ways. This is another sign of the mythologization of the behavioral revolution, as its commonly-shared narrative context is drawn on by scholars from across national boundaries. In short, this chapter shows the reliance on the story of the behavioral revolution and the multiple ways that it contributes to contemporary identities and dominant practices in the discipline.

Chapter Six is the conclusion of the dissertation. In this chapter I report the general findings and conclusions of the dissertation. I focus on five major findings. First, I highlight the close relationship between the narrative context and the mythological nexus which is at the heart of a political theory of mythology. I discuss the importance of the repetition and variation of elements that make up the narrative context and then move into a discussion of the second major finding involving the process of metonymy. The process of metonymy whereby one entity comes to represent another proved to be an important bridging concept that linked the narrative context and the mythological nexus. Throughout Chapters Three, Four, and Five I highlighted the way the referents to the behavioral revolution mapped onto the dimensions of identity and practice. The third major finding was that the oft-cited “crisis” in disciplinary identity is a misleading idea given the dynamic
of identity construction. Since identities are defined in opposition to other identities it is not possible to escape these apparent “crises” in disciplinary identities.

When set in the framework of a political theory of mythology, the intractability of debates about identities in political science begins to make more sense. These debates about identity and related practices occur through narrative (and discourse more broadly) and are part of the mythological nexus of the behavioral revolution. I highlight the close relationship between the dimensions of identity and practice, and how these dimensions often imply the other. The fourth major finding I highlight is the power of mythology and the existence of its prescriptive force in the discourse of the discipline. I emphasize the “political” in a political theory of mythology by discussing the concept of “power” and how the behavioral revolution mythology influences identities and practices in contemporary political science. The fifth finding concerns how my approach has both drawn on and diverged from those found in the field of disciplinary history. A summary finding emerges at this point which I summarize in the slogan: Change Narratives – Change Identities/Practices. This summary finding is emphasized in the closing coda in which I discuss the paradox of disciplinary identity and the ways that it is resolved through a political theory of mythology. I close by noting that while political science may not be able to escape a disciplinary mythology, they can change its form by changing its content. In other words, political scientists can change their narratives, and if the mūthos of political science were sung in a new key, there would follow changes in dominant identities and professional practices.
A POLITICAL THEORY OF MYTHOLOGY

“Thus he spoke and then they listened and obeyed.”

Introduction

In this chapter I develop a political theory of mythology which explains the ongoing significance of the behavioral revolution in political science today. The sense of mythology I develop springs from my reading of classicist research and a recovery of an ancient meaning of *mūthos* as “authoritative speech.” Mythology is understood to be a discursive phenomenon and one involving authoritative speech acts of a special type. In this sense, a person hearing the authoritative speech or *mūthos* of another who is superior in social rank, power and prestige, is persuaded by that speech because it is taken as authoritative and binding on the addressee. In the ancient Greek context, these speech acts are authoritative in the sense that they are uncritically accepted and the person who is addressed is forced to obey the speaker. This is the meaning of the epigraph from Homer’s *Iliad* with which I begin this chapter. The behavioral revolution mythology works in a similar fashion and acts as a prescriptive force on disciplinary identities and practices.

In terms of mythology, the behavioral revolution is made up of a set of foundation narratives that are important for the constitution of disciplinary identities and practices. Foundation narratives about the behavioral revolution in the reference material I evaluate are understood as authoritative “speech acts” that draw on and contribute to mythology.

52 There are many different variants of this basic formula in the *Iliad*. See the Center for Hellenic Studies for a comprehensive listing: http://chs.harvard.edu/CHS/article/display/5538.
Although no one is forced to obey the speech of another, the prescriptive force of the narratives is able, through the significance generated in a mythological nexus, to reflect an authoritative understanding of what dominant identities and practices are for current and new members of political science. Along with the classicist literature, contemporary political theorists’ work on myth and mythology led me to an understanding of mythology as the confluence of three dimensions: narrative, identity, and practice. These three dimensions constitute the mythological nexus and provide significance to members’ experiences in the discipline.

The mythological nexus provides what I call “significance.” This concept of “significance” as I employ it is inspired by the work of Chiara Bottici. In her Philosophy of Political Myth, for example, Bottici defines “political myth” in much the same way I define political mythology:

A political myth can be defined as the work on a common narrative by which the members of a social group (or society) provide significance to their political experience and deeds (2007, 14; see also 200, 243).

The behavioral revolution mythology is constructed in the discourse or “common narrative” of the discipline of political science. The concept of “significance” explains why foundation narratives are important to the identities and practices of a community. I build off Bottici’s work by specifically showing how this “significance” is generated through the combined force of the three dimensions comprising the mythological nexus: narrative, identity, practice. Bottici continues with her definition of “political myth”:

Thus, what makes a political myth out of a simple narrative is not its content or its claim to truth, but first, the fact that this narrative coagulates and produces significance, second, that it is shared by a group, and third, that it can come to address the specifically political conditions under which the group operates (2007, 14).
The first dimension of narrative “coagulate[s] and produce[s] significance” as well as discourses important to identities and practices of a group. The “specifically political conditions” correspond to the dimensions of identity and practice. In the above block quote, the dimensions of identity and practice are referred to as “political experience” and “deeds” respectively. These three dimensions form a mythological nexus which “coagulate” and “produce significance.” A political mythology provides significance; that is, it works to answer questions about who we are and how one fits in to a community (the dimension of identity). Mythology also provides significance through justifications for dominant practices – why we perform certain activities and not others and what practices one must adopt in order to be accepted as a member of the community (the dimension of practice). This is the essence of the mythological nexus which makes up the framework for analyzing a political theory of mythology. A major goal of this chapter is to explain how I develop this framework and how it might apply to an academic community like contemporary political science.

I begin with a section on the meanings of myth and mythology that is important to understanding the way I developed a political theory of mythology. This part of the chapter is organized around the passage from μῦθος to logos in the ancient Greek setting. I recount how between the archaic period and the beginning of the classical era (ca. 800 to 480 BCE), it is possible to witness a change in meaning as the Greek word logos was substituted for μῦθος. During this time, the Greek word for “myth” or μῦθος lost its traditional meaning as “rationality” and/or “reason,” and would acquire the negative connotations of “irrationality” and “illusion” familiar to a contemporary ordinary language understanding of “myth.” To avoid potential misunderstanding, I substitute the word
“mythology” for the word “myth.” In most cases, as with Bottici, the authors I draw on are discussing “myth,” but I argue that the phenomenon in question is better designated as “mythology.” I elaborate on the different meanings of myth I encountered in the literature, and point to the way I recovered an ancient meaning of myth and mythology, which predates its substitution by logos: myth/mythology as authoritative speech. I analyze narratives about the so-called “Return of the Herakleidae” in ancient Sparta and show how the mythological nexus works in this context and outline how it is applied to the academic community of political science in Chapters Three, Four, and Five. In the conclusion, I return to a discussion of a political theory of mythology, the mythological nexus, and the mythology of the behavioral revolution in contemporary political science.

Meanings of Myth and Mythology: The Passage from Mūthos to Logos

Myth and mythology have long played important roles in the way communities remember their foundational moments, who the key actors were, how territory was occupied, and what adversaries and what challenges had to be overcome (Malkin 1994). According to the linguist Joseph T. Shipley, “the origin of Greek mūthos: myth, is lost in the mists of prehistory” (1984, 259). In this section, I attempt to recover an ancient meaning of myth I find useful for understanding mythology today. A major goal of this chapter is to recover an ancient meaning of myth and mythology as “authoritative speech.” This meaning of myth and mythology derives from pre-classical Greek meaning of the concept of mūthos, which is translated as “myth” and which I understand as “mythology.” In this section I begin the work of recovering mythology as authoritative speech by discussing how this meaning was originally lost as the term logos gradually came to
supplant the word *mūthos* in the discourse of classical Greece. This change in meaning corresponds with the adoption of writing in the Greek world, the attenuation of oral culture, and the attendant specialization and conflict over the nature of authoritative knowledge. This preliminary exercise is important due to the ongoing influence of the classical distinction between that which is fantastic and irrational (*mūthos*) and its opposite, that which is real and rational (*logos*). I discuss the passage from *mūthos* to *logos* in the ancient Greek context. I show how among the new classes of historians and philosophers, *mūthos* lost its privileged position as the *sin qua non* of authoritative speech to a more differentiated meaning of *logos* which came to replaced it.

Ancient Greece is unique because an original record of a fundamental transition in the meaning of the word “myth.” The names of poets like Homer and Hesiod (ca. 7th/8th century BCE) stand in the beginning of this transformation; both treated myth as truth and part of history. Later, classical historians like Thucydides found the use of myth to discuss the human past unpersuasive, while classical philosophers like Plato finally rejected myth (*mūthos*) outright as illusionary and misleading in the name of a new form of rationality and human reason (*logos*). Throughout this section I discuss the meaning of mythology employed in this dissertation and ways that contemporary authors’ use of “myth” is similar to my use of “mythology.”

The Poets

During the transition from archaic (800-480 BCE) to classical (510-323 BCE) Greece, it is possible to make out the beginning of a fundamental change in the meaning of the Greek word for myth or *mūthos*. This change of meaning occurred simultaneously
with the diffusion of reading and writing in the ancient world. As many classists remind their readers, before the advent and dissemination of writing and literary criticism, the mythical past as told by the oral poets was the past, and the historicity of these stories were taken for granted as authoritative and legitimate (Graf 1993; Malkin 1994; Hamilton 1998, pp. 10-13). Before writing became widespread in ancient Greece, the practice telling traditional tales, drawing on an oral tradition, was heavily reliant on the stories of the gods and heroes of ancient Greek (pre) history. Many of these stories of Greek mythology were spoken orally either in public as with the image of the travelling bard or in private as with the image of the Old-Wives Tale (Nagy 2013). These stories of the time before time (in illo tempore) served to ground identities and justify practices in the present by explaining the here and now (Malinowski 1926; Graf 1993).

With the invention of writing and dissemination of reading came the first attempts to collect the traditional stories and compile them into continuous prose narrative (Vernant 1988, 205; Martin 2003, 6). Different authors drew on different characters, themes, motifs, and empirical referents in order to provide significance to a community’s collective identity as well as to justify dominant social practices. As this process of translation continued over the centuries, the Greek people produced a brilliant flourishing of culture, including the classic tragedies and comedies, which were performed at festivals and other public venues (Buxton 1982, 11; Nagy 2013, 23). Increasingly, the memory of the past involved prose narratives serving as a link between past and present. These narratives and discourses came to play a role in the general education (paideia) of the ancient Greeks, and a source from which members of a community drew on for their sense of identity and to justify dominant practices.
A change from an oral to a literary culture is accompanied by a new form of specialization in society: the rise of historians and philosophers. These new vocations relied on the written word and responded to, as well as contributed to, emerging historical and philosophical discourses. At the core of this transformation in ancient Greek society was the ensuing conflict over the nature of authoritative knowledge. For example, the classicist R.G.A. Buxton credits the “growth of argumentative speculation” in 6th century Ionia to two important factors. First was “the rise of literacy, which facilitated the comparison and criticism of rival views” (1982, 8). A second important factor was the “rise of the polis” or city-state culture in ancient Greece (8). Similarily, the classicist Oswyn Murray credits the “Ionian enlightenment” with the expansion of writing in the ancient Greek world: “Men of course spoke in prose, but they composed in verse. Composition in prose is related to a new need, that of precise and critical analysis; and it is a product of the Ionian enlightenment” (1980, 25).

An important part of recovering the ancient meaning of mythology as authoritative speech involves appreciating what myth meant to the poets of ancient Greece. In the beginning of Greek (pre)history, the poet was the authoritative voice of culture and its heritage. The first written records we have are from the poets of Greek antiquity. “The earliest surviving literary evidence for the history of Greece is poetic,” Murray points out in his Early Greece, and “the advent of writing in the eighth changed the position [of the

53 Murray continues saying, “the effort to formulate a critical scientific theory matters, which began in Miletus with Thales in the early sixth century, led to the first known Greek work in prose, Anaximandros’ book on nature of about 550” (1980, 25). Tudor emphasizes how the Ionian philosopher Xenophanes was part of a movement of “religious skepticism” which complemented the other movements toward a new rationality (1972, 17).

54 The diffusion of writing seemed to coincide with the rise of a pan-Hellenic consciousness, which according to the classicist Edith Hall, “seems to reflect the primacy of the polis in the archaic period as the unit to which ethnic identity was attached” (1989, 8-9).
poet] only slowly … and it was not until the middle of the sixth century that prose literature began to develop” (1980, 21). With respect to archaic poetry (c. 800 – 480 BC), “accounts or discourses that were indisputably authoritative were called mythoi” (Bettini 2006, 196). We know this because of a few early written poems which survive to this day. Perhaps the most well-known of all Greek poets is the late-Archaic Ionian epic poet Homer.

“In Homer,” the classicist Jan Bremmer tells us, “the narrator of mythoi was the poet, the aoidos, who was society’s bearer of tradition and its educator par excellence (1989, 4). Indeed, “literary forms such as the epic have frequently served as vehicles for transmitting myths inasmuch as they present an authoritative account;” the classicists Bolle and Buxton continue, “the Homeric epics were both an example and an exploration of heroic values, and the poems became the basis of education in classical Greece” (1994, 721).

The figure known as Homer was a poet of the archaic period in Greek history (ca. 800-480 BCE), and is often credited with producing two of the greatest works of Greek and Western civilization: the Iliad and the Odyssey. In his Ancient Greek Hero in 24 Hours, the classicist Gregory Nagy recounts how these works were “venerated by the ancient Greeks as the cornerstone of their civilization” (2013, 9). Indeed, says Nagy, “Homer and Hesiod are the repository of knowledge that provides the basics of education for all Hellenes” or ancient Greeks (5; 17). Despite modern disputes about the historical reality of Homer and the contemporary poet Hesiod, it is clear that “the Greeks of the classical period thought of Homer and Hesiod as their first authors, their primary authors” and both

---

55 Indeed, Murray credits an “Ionian enlightenment” in the 6th century for the origins of a “critical scientific theory of matter” and concurrently the “first known Greek work in prose, Anaximandros’ book on nature about 550” (1980, 25). The epic poet Homer (7th/8th century BCE), the philosopher Xenophanes (570 – 475), and the historian Herodotus (484-425) were all born in Ionia (present-day western Turkey and the islands off its coast).
were credited by the early historian Herodotus as genuine authors of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* (Homer) and the *Theogony* and the *Work and Days* (Hesiod) (5).

The medium of story-telling in ancient Greece was poetry – or more specifically the singing of songs drawn from longer poems like the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. Nagy puts the matter this way: “the process of remembering in ancient Greek song culture requires a special medium, *song*” (50; emphasis in original). For modern observers the mediums of song and poetry are distinct entities, but for the ancient Greeks there is no such distinction at work. “The epic poetry of the Homeric *Iliad* and *Odyssey*,” Nagy continues, “derives from such an oral tradition of singing, which is a process of *composition-in-performance*” (2013, 50; emphasis in original). Thus, Nagy concludes, “in Homeric poetry, the basic medium of remembering is heroic song, or *kleos*” (50). Drawing a parallel to the theory of speech acts developed by the British philosopher J.L. Austin and the “song culture” of ancient Greece, Nagy emphasizes the fact that “Homeric poetry can be considered a speech act in its own right because it is a *medium that is performed*” (59; emphasis in original).

*Mūthos* was a speech act in the sense that the words which were spoken or “performed” were taken as authoritative for the addressee; the person hearing the *mūthos* was persuaded by the authoritative speech of the myth-maker. Nagy recounts how in ancient Greece, “*mūthos* ‘is a speech-act indicating authority, performed at length, *usually in public*, with a focus on full attention to every detail’” (2014, 38; emphasis in original; quoting Richard Martin 1989, p. 22). In the epic poems of Homer, for example, “any

---

56 The root *kleos* can also be translated as “fame” is part of the name Herakles (Hera = the goddess Hera; and kleos = fame) – see G.W. Bowersock (2014).

57 In pre-classical times, myth could also mean the story or narrative as communicated by the speaker, rhapsodist, or citizen in the Assembly. What motivated the poet or speaker, according to Scholes and Kellogg, was a “re-creative” impulse. Not simple creativity but re-creation through the “retelling of a traditional story” (1968, 12). Not simple storytelling for the sake of entertainment but a drive to satisfy “the mythos itself – the story as preserved in the tradition which the epic story-teller is re-creating” (12).
story that is called a *mūthos* is a genuine and true, because it is said for the record; the modern derivative myth has obviously veered from this meaning” (38).

Classicist scholarship also shows how before the introduction of the word *historiē* for historians and the word *logos* for philosophers as a foil to *mūthos*, these terms were used interchangeably. As the classicist Jan Bremmer points out, the traditional poets “came under attack from philosophers and historians – authors who wrote in prose and did not subject their opinions to the censure of community in public performance” (1989, 5). According to Murray, the poet Hecateus’ work was “not merely a retelling of the hero myths, but a critical attempt to rationalize them, and, if not produce history from them, at least make them portray a relatively normal human world” (1980, 26). It was, as Murray points out, the “logos-writers” like the historian Herodotus who “collected together … the results of an oral prose tradition … weaving together the stories with all the skill of a traditional artist into a prose epic” (1980, 31). The transition away from oral tradition serving as the authoritative basis of rationality in society to one where discourse through writing was predominant had begun. But the movement from *mythos* to *logos* really comes into its own with the writing of the first historians of ancient Greece.

The Historians

Specialization in prose writing by historians and philosophers challenged the older authority of the poets of the oral culture. During the classical period, a strong distinction was introduced between the truth-value of both history and philosophy. It is with the invention of historical and philosophical discourse that the meaning of myth as authoritative speech is lost and replaced with a sense of irrationality and a disjunction with
reality. The historian Suzanne Saïd points out how today, “it is obvious that muthos is not coextensive with our ‘myth,’” which is ordinarily equated with falsehood and/or illusion (2007, 77). Saïd continues noting how throughout ancient Greek history, there is “no explicit contrast between muthos/logos/historiē” (2007, 77). Saïd questions mainstream historians’ accounts that place the origin of the distinction between mūthos (false stories) and logos (true accounts) with Herodotus (484-425 BCE), asserting that it truly began with another early historian, Thucydides (460-395 BCE).58 Herodotus, the famous founder of history, cannot stand at the beginning of the substitution of logos for mūthos since as Saïd puts it, he “nearly always uses logos and legein to introduce what we would call a ‘myth’” (77).

Thucydides was an Athenian writing at the height of the city’s power in the 5th century BCE. Like other writers of the imperial period, Thucydides differentiated his work from the poets like Homer and Hesiod who used mythological elements – stories of gods and heroes and miracles and actions beyond the capacity of any human being – to add authority to their accounts of the community’s past. “In fact it is in Thucydides (1.21) that we first find the word coined, maybe by Thucydides himself, on the root muth- with a distinctly negative content: in his programmatic remarks, muthōdes designates what is to be excluded from the history of the Peloponnesian War” (2007, 78). Thus, the redefined meaning of myth and mythology is exemplified in the work of Thucydides who crafted a distinct form of historical narrative that aimed to provide a more rational account of the past.

---

58 Saïd takes Thucydides to be a founder of a modern distinction between true history (historia légein) and irrational myth (muthos); more recent studies have called this modern distinction into question (Calame 2003, 27).
The phenomenon Saïd describes can be understood as an early example of the invention of an analytic concept which depends for its meaning another concept to which it is categorically opposed. The process of definition by opposition is clearly on display with respect to the concept of “myth” in ancient Greece. A new concept is valorized (logos = “reason”) while an old one (mūthos = “story, tale, or narrative”) is redefined by opposition to the new (mūthos becomes equivalent to falsehood or illusion). Moreover, according to Saïd, “when one looks at the uses of mythōdes and muthikos in Greek historiography after Thucydides, it is tempting to say that it is history that made ‘myth’ – or better, “the mythical” – into the antonym of history” (78). The political theorists Christopher Flood correctly points out how after the 5th century BCE in Greece, the meaning of “myth” would become tied to its “opposition to logos, connoting the use of language in the service of reasoning” (2002, 6). From the classicist literature, Fritz Graf (1993, 2) also argues this point, saying it was only with the early prose writers of history that the two terms began to differentiate and mūthos came to denote an “implausible story” (Herodotus) or “the fabulous” (Thucydides).

The writing of history (discursive history) as opposed to its “composition in performance” (Nagy 2013, 50) sought to be realistic in its portrayals of the gods and heroes and would be faithful to the way that human beings actually live and occupy the world. For example, Thucydides wrote his historical work not “to win the applause of the moment, but as a possession for all time” (Book I, 1.22). This famous statement is often read by modern interpreters to mean that Thucydides was making a point about the truth of his work in contrast to the fantasy and illusion purveyed by poets and other tellers of traditional tales. In this tradition of interpretation, Thucydides is credited with trying to get the facts
right, rejecting the poetic and mythological and leaving behind a veritable account of Greek history (Malkin 1994, 5; Cassirer 1946, 53). In Saïd’s interpretation of Thucydides, the mythological elements are to be rejected from an account of true history because “the miraculous aspects of traditional tales that have nothing to do with the ‘truth’ – they do not admit testing – but are attractive and entertaining” (78). In short, Thucydides’ portrayal of the Peloponnesian War focused on the activity of men and women and not on any mythical intervention of the gods or fantastic story-telling of archaic poets like Homer and Herodotus.

The Philosophers

The meaning of mūthos as authoritative speech is further redefined in the discourse of the early Greek philosophers. Bottici observes how in the western tradition, the birth of philosophy has been repeatedly viewed as an “exit from myth” and passage to a new form of rationality (2007, 10; Graf 1993). In classical Greece, philosophical discourse began to define itself in opposition to myth and poetry more generally. For example, Graf discusses how it was the philosopher Plato (428-348 BCE) who “set his new art of dialectic apart by using more sharply defined concepts, opposing logoi, propositions demonstrable with the aid of dialectic, to mythoi, which for him were often lies” (1993, 2). Of course, Plato famously made use of mythological tales in his own philosophical writing (Cassirer 1946, Chapter 6).

In Approaches to Greek Myth, the classicist Lowell Edmunds agrees that the philosophers were contributing to the redefinition of myth and rationality. It is “only with Plato [that] the opposition between true or reasoned logos and false or irrational mythos
arise. This opposition became, in modern times, the foundation of the scientific study of myth, of modern mythology” (1990, 14). Edmunds continues, “Plato is, in fact, the first to use the word ‘mythology’ as a collective expression for the culture he repudiates, as he is the first to compose his own myths” (14). Graf elaborates later in the book when he says, “Plato’s most important myths express what is inexpressible in dialectical, argumentative discourse (logos)” (1993, 187). After Aristotle, however, this use of myth in philosophical and scientific discourse became increasingly rare (191).

The new philosophers appear to have set the terms mūthos and logos in opposition and in a way that people have found congenial down to this day. There are two distinct meanings of mūthos that arise among philosophers in ancient Greece: mūthos opposed to logos, and mūthos as the plot of a tragedy. Since these meanings are still prevalent in contemporary usage I review them, before I return to the more ancient meaning of mūthos as authoritative speech which stands at the core of the political theory of mythology I develop in this dissertation.

Logos Opposed to Mūthos  During the classical era, ancient historians and philosophers, especially those calling democratic Athens their home (Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle), began to question the ordinary meaning of authoritative speech as mūthos, preferring instead logos as a rational mode of argumentation as the basis for authoritative speech. These historians and philosophers found the authoritative speech and persuasive power of mūthos suspect since it did not require logical argumentation and active acceptance or rejection by the ones exposed to it. Instead, logos was preferred because it did not command obedience, but drew its persuasive power from its ability to allow the better, more reasoned, argument to win the day (Kim 2010). The primary meaning of
“myth” changed from myth as authoritative speech; in the sense of verbal utterances which produce desired actions by an addressee; to an understanding of myth largely opposed to *logos*.

The written record of this shift in meaning is preserved in the writing of authors like Thucydides, Plato, and Aristotle. *Logos* makes it possible to fix the truth of a matter in writing while also giving rise to criticism of claims to truth. Aristotle’s philosophy evinces this common “logocentrism.” In an entry on “logocentrism,” for example, the literary critic David Macey says, “Aristotle uses *logos* to mean the rational principle or element of the soul as opposed to the irrational principle of desire” (2001, 233). In a similar way, Plato embraces the *logos* as the basis for authoritative speech. In the *Republic* Plato famously denounces both myth and poetry in general except, of course, for those “noble lies” which were required if the classes were to be socialized into their proper roles. This exclusion of myth from the education of citizens of Plato’s *Republic* was tempered by the need to provide a unifying ground for citizenship in the community. In short, Plato recognizes the need for a body of shared narratives which explain the origins of society, its dominant practices, and the prevailing system of social rank and power. This meaning of “myth” as the equivalent to falsehood and illusion is dominant

---

59 Macey points out that “the Greek *logos* has a wide range of meanings, and designates both a rational or intelligible principle and a structure or order that provides phenomena with an origin, or that explains their nature. Hence the common use of the suffix ‘ology’ to designate a branch of study or knowledge” (2001, 233).

60 Plato’s discussion of the “noble lie” is in the *Republic* (414b-415d). Desmond Lee translates the Greek *gennaion pseudos* as “magnificent myth” (2003, 115); G.M.A. Grube translates the same phrase as a “noble falsehood” (1992, 91). In the political theorist and noted philologist Hannah Arendt’s telling, the modern rendering of “noble lie” is misleading since Plato could not have meant “lie” as we understand it today and “rested on a misreading of a crucial passage (414C) in the *Republic*, where Plato speaks of one of his myths – a ‘Phoenician tale’ – as ψενξοδ. Since the same Greek word signifies ‘fiction’, ‘error’, and ‘lie’ according to context … the text can be rendered with Cornford as ‘bold flight of invention’ or be read with Eric Voegelin … as satirical in intention; under no circumstance can it be understood as a recommendation of lying as we understand it” (1967, 109; fn. 4).
to this day, but it must be not be equated with the understanding of mythology developed in this dissertation which is much closer to older meaning of myth as “authoritative speech.”

*Mūthos as the Plot of a Tragedy* Writing near the end of the classical era in ancient Greece, Plato’s student and fellow philosopher Aristotle was able to define “myth” quite narrowly as the plot of a tragedy. The literary critics Scholes and Kellogg remind us how “myth” carried the meaning of a “traditional story;” such that “in the transmission of traditional narrative it is of necessity the outline of events, the plot, which is transmitted” (12; Graf 1993, 1). Scholes and Kellogg tell us how this ancient meaning is preserved in Aristotle’s use of the word myth (*mūthos*) which refers to the plot of a tragedy. It is this Aristotelian understanding of plot (*mūthos*) that Scholes and Kellogg say is “the soul of any literary work that was an imitation of action” (12). In their total composition, narrative elements always constitute *mūthos*. In this meaning the *mūthos* or plot becomes the “soul of the narrative,” the part of narrative that lingers in consciousness, and the part of a narrative that stays with the reader. In a similar fashion, the literary critic Northrop Frye summarizes Aristotle’s concept of plot (*mūthos*) as “the life and soul of tragedy (and by implication of fiction generally): the essence of fiction, then, is plot or imitation of action, and characters exist primarily as functions of the plot” (1961, 588). In general, then, *mūthos* as plot is “the sequence of events” in a narrative (591).

This definition of myth as the plot of a narrative is still quite common among social scientists and literary critics but one that fails to capture the dynamism and significance of mythology to communities like contemporary political science. For example, the

---

61 There is a large body of literature that discusses the rise of *logos* at the expense of *mūthos* – see for example: Jaffe (2013); Bettini (2006).
sociologist George Steinmetz, echoing Aristotle and Frye’s understanding of *mūthos* as plot, says that narratives have “a beginning, middle, end structure … [that] describes some sort of change or development, as well as a cast of dramatis personae (1992, 490). The *Dictionary of Narratology* defines “mythos” in terms of “a plot, an arrangement of incidents. For Aristotle, *mythos* consists in the selection and possible rearrangement of the units constituting *logos*” (Prince 2005, 56). But as the literary critics Herman and Vervaeck point out, this narrow definition of narrative as a sequence of events is “highly problematic” beginning with the meaning of the concept of “event” (2005, 11). Terms drawn from narratology such as narrative, plot, theme, trope, event, etc. are contested concepts, and are used in a specialized sense particular to this dissertation to describe the narrative context of the behavioral revolution mythology.

*Mūthos as Authoritative Speech*

An important contribution of this dissertation is the recovery of an ancient meaning of myth and mythology as “authoritative speech.” Bracketing contemporary ordinary language meanings of myth and mythology, I argue that the mythology of the behavioral revolution is a form of authoritative speech central to identities and practices today.

Prior to the intervention of classical writers like Thucydides, Plato, and Aristotle, the distinction between *mūthos* and *logos* was not standardized in the historical and philosophical discourse of Athens or the Greeks more generally. Indeed, before writing,

---

62 In a similar vein, the political scientist Dvora Yanow notes how narratives have a spatial dimension of beginning, middle, and end; that there are actors and/or characters; and how spatially the narrative takes place in a setting (2007, 586); see also Bottici 2007, p. 209.

63 According to the *Dictionary of Narratology*, *logos* is the “subject matter; topic; thought; argument. For Aristotle, the imitation of a real action, or *praxis*, constitutes an argument or *logos*, providing the basis for the *mythos*, or plot” (Prince 2003, 49).
all communication occurred via speeches or oral performances meant to persuade, educate, and entertain. A special class of speech acts were persuasive in themselves and were known as *mūthos*. This ancient meaning is evident in the epigraph from the *Iliad* at the beginning of this chapter: “Thus he spoke and then they listened and obeyed” (*Iliad* 14.133 9.79; 25). Here, myth is associated with an ancient meaning of “forceful speech” or speech that is intended to command, which is different than many contemporary definitions of myth as falsehood and illusion or the plot of a narrative.

In the classicist Richard Martin’s *The Language of Heroes: Speech and Performance in the Iliad*, he focuses on the speech acts of the heroes, kings, and gods, viewing them as *mūthos* or as he defines it, an “authoritative speech-act” (1989, xiv). Nagy writes in the Foreword that “myth” in this sense can be understood as “a means by which society affirms its own reality” (xi). Martin finds that in the *Iliad* Homer overwhelmingly utilizes the word “myth” in its meaning as an authoritative speech act. Indeed he finds “that all but 12 of the 167 occurrences of the stem *muth*—(noun and verb forms) in the *Iliad* can be categorized as marking proposals and commands or threats and boasts” (22). “More abstractly,” as Martin puts it, “*mūthos* in the *Iliad* is always the speech of one in power, or of someone, for example a boasting warrior who is laying claim to power over his opponents” (22). In short, says Martin, “the word *muthos* implies authority and power” (22).

---

64 Martin’s insight is accomplished through the creative application of performative speech act theory in which the central insight of scholars like J.L. Austin and J.R. Searle is that “the word is the action” (1989, xi). Performative speech act theory starts from the insight that an utterance or speech act is an action; that is, the word is the deed. For example, take the marriage ceremony in which the phrase “I do” is performative in the sense that the speech act itself constitutes and simultaneously maintains the institution of marriage. For seminal works, see Austin (1962); and Searle (1969).
Martin points out how the beginning of the *Iliad* is full of *muthoi* or authoritative speech acts. One early example discussed by Martin is how “Agamemnon commands Khryses to depart and the heralds to fetch Briseis by using a ‘powerful speech’ (*krateron d’ epi muthon etelle* – 1.25, I.326).” Throughout the *Iliad*, Martin explains, “the authority underlying *muthoi* is acknowledged in the audience’s response to a given speech act; the addressee is most often persuaded” (22). To be sure, when discussing “Homeric assemblies,” or the scenes in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* where speakers argue in the company of others, the classicist R.G.A. Buxton recounts how the assembly’s “working depends on the authority of those who convene and run them. The power of persuasion is the prerogative of the ‘kings’, the nobility, the ‘heroes’” (1982, 6). This forceful persuasion is especially strong when there are great differences in social rank where the inferior party is forced to obey the authoritative speech of a social superior. Things are different when the speakers are more equal in social status. When Achilles and Agamemnon are arguing, for example, their speech is full of *mūþos* and these statements become competing claims to ultimate authority and power.

In its ancient meaning, myth was a *mūþos* or an authoritative speech act which commanded obedience from those to whom it was spoken. This meaning of authoritativeness with respect to mythology is captured by the classicist Maurizio Bettini who says that, “in archaic poetry accounts or discourses that were indisputably authoritative were called *mythoi*” (2006, 96).65 Drawing on a naturalistic analogy, Bettini explains, “the speech that the hawk delivers ‘with force’ (*epikratéos*) to his prey the nightingale is, in fact, *mythos*” (96). This is also the basic understanding which I wish to

---

65 The Greek word for “myth” is variously transliterated as *mūþos*, *mūþos*, *mythos* by classicists.
extend to a political theory of mythology. While not as forceful as a command, there is nevertheless a certain “authoritative” value to the mythology of the behavioral revolution. This forcefulness comes from the significance provided by the three dimensions of the mythological nexus. All three dimensions – narrative, identity, and practice – work together simultaneously and provide significance to the experiences of members of various human communities. Mythology derives its force of persuasion from the confluence of its three dimensions and can seem just as natural as the screech of a hawk before it attacks and consumes its prey.

In this section I have recovered the ancient meaning of myth and mythology as authoritative speech. I showed that mythology was once considered authoritative because it was the speech of the poets who were the primary educators and guardians of authoritative knowledge for the ancient Greeks. A mythology arises out of the discourse, narratives, or shared speech of a community and is an authoritative source important to understanding norms for membership as well as providing a guide to practices.

The Mythological Nexus and the Spartan Herakles Mythology

He [ = Herakles] used to travel all over the boundless earth and all over the sea, veering from his path and wandering off, all because of the missions assigned to him by Eurystheus the king. He [ = Herakles] performed many reckless things on his own, and he suffered many such things in return. (Homeric Hymn to Herakles). 66

Herakles is known for his supernatural strength, short temper, and for donning the trophy of the Nemean lion slain in completion of one of his eleven labors. Figure 2 shows

66 Quoted in Nagy (2014, 622).
a Roman copy of a fourth century BCE Greek statue of the hero and his son Telephos. Legend has it that Herakles fathered as many as eighty sons; those that conquered the Peloponnese were his great grandsons (Guirand 1968, 176).

Figure 1

The Ancient Image of Heracles (CA. 4th Century BCE) 67

Note: Public Domain Photo (http://bit.ly/1tZpYTQ)

I now turn to a demonstration of the mythological nexus and a political theory of mythology in the context of the ancient Greek city-state of Sparta. I show how the three dimensions of narrative, identity, and practice form a mythological nexus that provide significance to the experience and deeds to members of the community of ancient Sparta. The mythological nexus is at the center of the political theory of mythology I develop in this dissertation and is the analytic frame of reference I use to identify mythology at work in the discourse of communities like the ancient Spartans or contemporary political science.

67 This image of Herakles was fully incorporated into Roman mythology. For example, as the classicist G.W. Bowersock points out: “The emperor Commodus, who reigned from 180 to 192 AD, represented himself as a reincarnation of Heracles, complete with lion skin and club” (2014, 33). See also Stafford 2012, 149-150.
This framework consists of three dimensions all of which must be present for a mythology to be at work: a narrative dimension, the dimension of identity, and a practical dimension.

In Table 2, I summarize the characteristics of each dimension.

Table 4
 Characteristics of the Mythological Nexus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions of Mythology</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Narrative</td>
<td>Foundation Stories; Public Speech; Contributions to Discourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>Sense of Self and/or Community; Identity and/or Community Identity (“Common Sense”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practice</td>
<td>Activities that Define a Community and an Individual’s Sense of Membership (“Practical Sense”)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mythology is a discursive process composed of a set of narratives that take the form of authoritative speech which a community draws upon for its sense of identity and to justify its practices. One set of foundation narratives important to ancient Sparta is known as the “Return of the Herakleidai.” In what follows, I show how the political theory of mythology is evident in the ancient Spartan setting. I demonstrate the way the mythological nexus is at work in the foundation narratives of ancient Sparta centering on the figure of Herakles. I show how the Spartan people relied on these narratives for their
community and individual identities and closely related within this nexus, they also relied on these narratives to justify practices common to the community.  

The Narrative Dimension

There can be a great number of stories shared by a community but some are more important than others. Immensely important to human communities are foundation narratives. A classic example of mythology arising from the repetition of foundation narratives is found in the religious stories of world religions like Christianity and Islam. Both the Bible and the Koran are full of stories about the foundation of the religious community providing both inspiration as well as education for members of the community and which work to substantiate identities and justify practices in the present. In the case of Judaism, for example, the Old Testament stories of Moses and Joshua leading the Jewish people to the “promised land” in modern-day Palestine are central to secular and religious practices (e.g. Zionist militarism and Passover), as they are to identities and narratives of the Jewish and later Israeli people defending their imagined historic homeland.

Narratives are one part of the mythological nexus. Mythology arises when a community shares in the practice of story-telling about their historical foundation. A common pool of narrative elements (the narrative context) is established from which members of the community can draw on when they are telling their version of the already

---


69 Discussing the role of myth for religious festivals devoted to the gods, Graf reminds his readers that “one could always use myth to justify political claims of one kind or another. That myth was exploited by religious centers for political purposes, for example, is hardly surprising” (1993, 177).
established tale. In her *Founding Fictions*, the historian Jennifer R. Mercieca (2010) shares important insights on the nature of narrative in relation to human thought:

Human beings think in narrative: we constantly invent stories to explain and order our perceptions of the world. Narratives are fundamental to what it means to be human and therefore central to how we create communities – human beings cannot live and act together without narratives to organize themselves (28).\(^{70}\)

A crucial component of mythological narratives is that they provide significance to both contemporary identities as well as the practices of a community. These narratives answer questions about what it means to be a member of a community and what practices are associated with that identity.

Foundation narratives about the Greek hero Herakles are a typical example of how mythology works in the here and now by drawing on the past to inform current and past experiences of a community. In many Greek communities, the stories of Herakles served to provide a link between the people who lived there and the distant past in which they could all share and draw on for community identities and practices. Narratives about Herakles come down to us through a series of fragmentary poems which drew on Greek oral tradition (Hamilton 1942/1998). I summarize this set of foundation narratives as follows: Sparta was originally founded by Herakles who left the land to his decedents. Many generations later, the descendants of Herakles were involved in the so-called “Dorian Invasion,” conquered the area where Sparta was to be founded, and agreed that there would be two kings. The foundation narrative says that in order to hold and cultivate the area of the Peloponnese known as Laconia or Lacedaemon, the Spartan people had to win the city and hinterland in warfare and enslave a large population of

---

\(^{70}\) See also Arendt (1958) and her view of human beings as story-telling animals.
helots. There are many variations of this story of Herakles and his decedents told by a variety of authors (Stafford 2012, 139). These narratives work to provide significance through the mythological nexus: the foundational mythology about the descendants of Herakles worked to substantiate identities (being Spartan as opposed to Messenian, Athenian, or Persian) and to justify dominant practices (e.g. warfare and slavery).

For the ancient Spartan people, narratives about the epic hero Herakles were integral to their dominant practices as well as their sense of self as members in the community. These narratives also explain the present in terms of the historical and mythological past to justify claims to the land (Hornblower and Spawforth 2003, 686). In his *Myth and Territory in the Spartan Mediterranean*, the classicist Irad Malkin discusses the “Return of the Herakleidai” in terms of “charter myths” or “foundation myths.” Malkin explains, “the need to say ‘This is my land’ does not emerge out of the blue; in a collective political framework it is usually stimulated from the outside, often through a direct challenge to some real or coveted possession or territory” (35; see also Flood 1996 pp. 14-15). People tell stories about the origin of a community to provide a basis in the land and the past for identities and practices in the present. Communities tell these stories in order provide an origin for the community in which members can relate spatio-temporally thus providing a basis in the land and the past for identities in the present.

The Spartan people, like many others in Greece and elsewhere (notably Rome), relied on narratives about the hero Herakles to understand their city’s founding. As the classicist Emma Stafford recounts the return of the Herakleidai “is alluded to as early as the seventh century BC in the works of the Spartan poet Tyrataios (fr. 2.12-15W): ‘For

---

71 On the concept of a “charter myth” as a type of foundation mythology, see Malinowski 1974.
Zeus himself, son of Kronos, husband of fair-crowned Hera, gave this city to the Herakleidai, with whom we left wind Erineos and came to the broad Peloponnese” (2012, 139). Thus, the foundation narrative provided the citizens of Sparta and many of its colonies with a basis or grounding in the past which helped to explain who they were and why the social structure appeared the way it did.72

Narratives like the Return of the Herakleidai represent an example of “historical myth” in the limited sense that it came “to play a political role” in those communities which accepted it as such (Malkin 1994, 4). “Ancient foundation stories (ktiseis)” like the story of the Herakleidai founding Sparta are “historicizing myths telling of immigrations and foundations, as if by narrating history rather than recounting legends of the gods” (4). Indeed, these mythical stories where understood by the Greeks to be historically true; at least “down to the end of antiquity” (Graf 1993, 121). According to the classicist Fritz Graf says, “it was self-evident to most Greeks that heroic myth, if not divine myth as well, related the events of their past, and that this historical reality could be detected in the myths or reconstructed from them” (1993, 121; Hamilton 1998). Graf makes this point more emphatically: “In fact, myth, especially heroic myth, was regarded as history throughout antiquity” (140).

The story of the Return of the Herakleidai served as a foundation narrative which appeared in a number of forms (both in the oral and written tradition). An authoritative source for classicists, the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*’s entry on “Heraclidae,” begins as follows: “The myth of the return of the descendants of Heracles to the Peloponnese functioned, above all, as a charter myth for the division of the Peloponnese between

---

72 As Emma Stafford points out, “according to the sixth-century AD geographical dictionary by Stephanus of Byzantium *(Ethnika* 303-304) as many as twenty-three cities” were named after Herakles (2012, 156).
different Dorian states” (686). This is the essence of foundation narratives which constitute the Spartan mythology of the return of the Heraklids. Sparta is situated in the southern portion of the Peloponnese: a peninsula which makes up the southwestern portion of the Greek mainland. The so-called “Dorian invasion” is a highly contested narrative about the “Dark Ages” in Greek pre-history. After the collapse of the Mycenaean civilization circa 1100 BCE, Greek civilization collapsed along with the palace culture that had sustained it. The Dorians were a collection of tribes in northern Greece who descended upon the Peloponnese and established their rule over the people who lived there. The actual history of the Dorian migration is unknown, but the fact of their dominance in the Peloponnese was buttressed by a mythology made up of a set of narratives known collectively as the “Return of the Herakleidae” (Buxton 1994).

The Dimension of Identity

The dimensions of identity and practice are difficult to distinguish analytically since they are closely interrelated. I cover them independently here, but it should be kept in mind that identities and practices are co-constituted as identities depend on certain practices and certain practices come to define certain identities. In his *Myths and Memories of the Nation*, the historical sociologist Anthony Smith discusses how foundation narratives, what he calls “descent myths” are central to modern ideologies such as nationalism. These myths and/or mythologies are powerful because they “plac[e] the present in the context of the past and of the community” and “interprets present social changes and collective endeavors in a manner that satisfies the drive for meaning by providing new identities …
and restoring locations, social and territorial, that allegedly were the crucibles of those identities” (1999, 62).

Somewhat different from Smith, the historian Gérard Bouchard discusses the importance of foundation narratives, what he calls “founding or master myths,” in his *National Myths: Constructed Pasts, Contested Presents*. Every nation or “society relies on a set of founding or master myths” which are far more complex than ideology alone and are “basic, comprehensive, and relatively stable symbolic configurations that act as a matrix and dictate the production of secondary or derivative myths more amendable to change” (2013, 4). A key part of the dynamic of identity formation is the contrasting of the inside to the outside: concepts of one’s-self are constructed through contrast with others (e.g. my professional identity is an academic rather than a lawyer or a business owner, etc.). These “social myths” are important to “identities and belonging, they set forth visions of the past and the future of society, they promote symbols that allow for collective mobilization (for better or worse), they foster resilience, and they reinforce social ties” (4).

Identity production in relation to a community’s origin gives rise to powerful foundation narratives that explain the past in terms of the present, and narratives about the foundation of human communities serve to substantiate group and individual identities in the present. The idea of origin is important because it appears to anchor our understandings about who we are as individual members of various human communities. Many of the early writings in archaic Greece took the form of genealogies or long lists of the names and relationships between people, the gods, and the land. For example, the classical Greek poet

---

73 For more on Bouchard’s overall approach to “social” and/or “master myths” see his concluding chapter “National Myths: Overview.”
Hecataeus (c. 550-476), wrote his famous *Genealogies* in the form of a chronology. Hecataeus told the story of the Greeks through a genealogy; their connections to each other, the land, and the gods. A list of names and of family relations may seem insignificant to modern eyes; yet, as Graf points out, even though “genealogy may appear to have been just a chain of names and not a form of mythical narration … nearly every name entails a story” (1993, 127; White 1974, 1981).

The desire to name the origin of human communities answers a need for significance in the present that is supplied by narratives about the past. The need for a connection between myth and genealogy is part of identity production. Here too there is an example of mythology as authoritative speech and the politics of persuasion – ‘we’ need to do this, behave thus – which also involve and the phenomena of power, authority, and legitimacy in human communities. Much like modern day “charter myths” and “master myths,” narratives about the mythological figure of Herakles served to provide a link between the people and the distant past in which they could all share and draw on for personal and community identity. Graf discusses how “the myth of the return of the Heraclids explained the dialects and ethnic groups that existed in the Peloponnnesus after the Bronze Age, and it legitimated the political groupings associated with them” (1993, 134-135; Whittaker 2014).

In the ancient Greek context, for example, narratives about the Return of the Herakleidae helped justify the Spartan people’s sense of self as a warrior community who won back the land of their ancestors. They thought of themselves as descendants of Herakles and it was therefore their birthright to occupy the lands in the south of the Peloponnese. The people of the Peloponnnesus, especially the Spartan people, use the story
of the return of the descendants of Herakles to ground their sense of self in historical/mythical time. Spartans living in classical times could make sense of their experience of being socialized into the Spartan state through narratives about the return of their ancestors, thus linking them personally to one of the greatest heroes of Greek pre-history.

The Practical Dimension

I now turn to the practical dimension and the way that these foundational mythologies serve as justifications and models for action in the present. Narratives about the Return of the Herakleidai and the identities that it helped substantiate also served to justify the practices of slavery and social mobilization for warfare. In Sparta the mythology of the descendants of Herakles drew on foundation narratives which justified the power and authority of the ruling class known as the Spartiates. In this section I draw extensively on Hall’s 2014 Introducing the Ancient Greeks: From Bronze Age Seafarers to Navigators of the Western Mind. Hall devotes a chapter titled “Spartan Inscrutability” to the unique character and institutions of the people known as the Spartans. The practical and symbolic relevance of Herakles to their foundational mythology is admirably illustrated by Hall. Here I highlight four practices that were integral to Spartan identity and which were justified by foundation narratives of the Return of the Herakleidai: warfare, education, slavery, and dual monarchy.74

The Spartan community was organized around institutions for warfare. Narratives about the exploits of Herakles and his descendants were central to identities and practices

---

74 Another practice influenced by the Herakles mythology was Marriage (Hall 2014, 169; Vernant 1988).
essential to warfare. Discussing the famous “300” who fought under king Leonidas against the Persian invasion of 490 BCE, Hall says “Leonidas, like all Spartans, genuinely believed he was a direct descendant of Heracles” (2014, 160). This belief in heroic lineage translated into stories of self as well as everyday practices incidental to warfare: “One of the Spartan’s own patriotic marching songs stressed this ancestry: ‘You are the race of Heracles the Invincible, so take courage’” (160). Hall points out that “unlike the Athenians, who stressed that they sprung from Attic soil, the Spartans based their claim to the kingdom on a myth of violent invasion” (171). The Spartans were “led by Zeus into the Peloponnese and were a permanent army of occupation,” and this belief was unquestionable as the Spartans “liked to think that the foundations of Spartan institutions had been the necessary response to chaotic strife and were not to be tampered with in any way” (171).

This practical sense of the community lent preference for male children; the deformed and weak routinely were left to the elements and certain death. At the age of seven, the boy children of Sparta joined the other men of the city, living in common lodging and practicing for warfare. Hall describes this lifestyle eloquently: “[The Spartan boy] was subjected to an austere lifestyle and arduous training, aimed at creating excellent soldiers with a developed sense of shame and obedience” (172). Hall continues with a fascinating glimpse of Spartan society as classicists understand it today:

Between the ages of twenty and thirty the Spartiates were in an intermediate position. They could grow their hair long but still slept in a state dormitory, were not yet allowed to hold office and probably not to attend meetings of the Assembly. Three hundred best soldiers in each year at the end of this period were selected as the crack troops for the army. Spartiates over thirty were expected to fight until they were sixty and continue to exercise appropriately; gymnastics were compulsory. The penalty for refusing to go to war or for desertion was death (172-173).
Education is another institution affected by foundation narratives and the practices and identities associated with the Herakles mythology. “The Spartans legitimized” their education system, Hall explains, “by developing an account of their early history to explain it” (171). Another example relevant to education is the word “Spartan,” which according to the linguist Donald Ayers has come to mean “rigorous, austere, disciplined” (1986, 175).

Here, Ayers summarizes, “the Spartans were famed as the bravest and hardiest warriors of Greece:”

Everything about their training from earliest childhood was designed to make them able to endure the rigors of military service and to instill in them a single-minded devotion to their country. At the age of seven, boys were taken from their mothers and sent to train in barracks, where they were made to do without any of the usual comforts. They were forced to wear thin clothing and go barefoot in winter, to sleep without covering, and to forage for their food. So that the citizens of Sparta would have nothing to distract them from their dedication to the state, they were forbidden to own private property, and their family life was rigidly restricted. All this resulted in an admirable simplicity and incorruptibility; hence Spartan is usually a complimentary term (175).

The link between foundation narratives, community identity, and its educational practices is typical of all human communities which successfully reproduce themselves over time.

The practice of slavery was also institutionalized in part by the power and authority of the Herakles mythology. On the level of practice, the narrative of the Return of the Herakleidae served to justify slavery on a society-wide scale.75 Spartan society was in part based on organized slavery and the domination of a neighboring population of Messenia who were reduced to the status of “helots” (Cartledge 2003; Hall 2014). This practice was justified was by remembering how the Spartans were descendants of Herakles and therefore had a birthright to the land. Thus the practice of slavery was justified through

75 For another powerful example, see Tudor (1972, Ch. 4) on the “Myth of the Aryan Nation.”
narratives of divine authority granted to the Spartans to take the land and enslave the former occupants of the territory. The Spartan slaves were known as “helots” – said to originally been made up of a people from the land of Helos. Later, as Hall points out, “the Spartans also conquered Messenia and added the Messenians to the helots” (173). As a class, the Helots provided all the agricultural labor that the Spartan ruling class needed to meet its basic needs. The Helots were subject to violent subjugation and daily humiliation by the Spartan people. Hall describes the life of the Helot in which “each Spartiate warrior was responsible for disciplining the helots who worked the land and belonged to him, and this arrangement resulted in humiliating and intimidating practices” (173). The helot class, Hall continues, “had to wear a rough uniform of a dogskin cap and leather tunic, and it was laid down that they ‘should be beaten a fixed number of strokes annually, so they would not forget that they were slaves” (173).

Another relevant practice supported by the Herakles mythology is the institution of dual-monarchy or diarchy. Hall points out that this system of rule has been influential as a model for limiting authority in any one person or institution and the Sparta kings “inherited their position as members of two distinct dynasties, the Agids and Eurypontids, both of which claimed direct decent from Heracles, son of Zeus” (172). “Sparta was ruled by a diarchy,” Malkin elaborates, and “its two royal houses both supposedly descended from Heracles. The Return, the constitutive myth of the foundation of Dorian Sparta under the leadership of the Herakleidai, thus also legitimated the Spartan kingship” (10). The story of the return of the Herakleidai allowed the ancient Spartans to explain and justify their present state of affairs – to explain why, for example, the system of political rule was
a dual monarchy and why that ruling class dominated the territory known as “Sparta” and the consciousness of the people known as “Spartans.”

In sum, the narrative of the Return of the Herakleidae served as a foundation narrative which appeared in a number of forms (both in the oral and written tradition); and it provided the citizens of Sparta as well as many of its colonies with a basis or grounding in the past helping to explain who they were and why the social structure appeared the way it did in their present experience (Malkin 1994, 1998). How is the development of mythology in ancient Sparta relevant to contemporary political science? In both cases we are interested in foundation narratives and their connection to a community’s dominant identities and practices. The foundation narratives about the return of Herakles descendants in ancient Sparta illustrate how the past is used by communities not only to explain their present condition but also to provide models for behavior. I employ this framework for analysis in Chapters Three, Four, and Five. In these chapters I show how the behavioral revolution is at the center of a disciplinary mythology important to contemporary political scientists’ identities and practices.

Political Mythology and the Behavioral Revolution

It is now possible to begin to see what I mean when I say that the modern academic enterprise of political science relies on a mythology for professional identity as well as models for behavior in the present. Building off my demonstration of the mythological nexus in the example of ancient Sparta, I demonstrate in Chapters Three, Four, and Five how the dimensions of narrative, identity, and practice are at work in the reference material of contemporary political science. Mythology is a discursive process constructed by
authoritative speech acts or mūthoi that are manifest in a mythological nexus that provides
significance to identities and practices of a historically evolving human community.

In this conclusion, I summarize how I developed the idea of the mythological nexus
from contemporary political theory literature on myth and mythology and I begin to make
explicit a parallel that I have been working to develop between ancient and contemporary
mythology. In her *A Philosophy of Political Myth* Bottici summarizes the 20th century
philosopher Hans Blumenberg’s account of myth:

[Myth] is not a product that is given once and for all, but is instead a
process of the continual reworking of a basic narrative core or
mythologem. Blumenberg conveyed this idea through the German
expression *Arbeit am Mythos*, which literally means “work on myth.” If
myth consists of the work on myth, not only are there no single myths
which are given once and for all, but the same mythologem also changes
over time because, on each occasion, it is reappropriated by different
needs and exigencies. In order to work as a myth, a narrative must
always answer a need for significance (*Bedeutsamkeit*). If it cannot do
so, it simply ceases to be a myth” (2007, 7-8).

There are three important points about a political theory of mythology evident in this
paragraph. First, mythology is not an object “given once and for all, but is a process of …
continual reworking.” This point is evident in the narrative dimension of the mythological
nexus. Authors work from and contribute to a narrative context which they draw from and
in which they set their narratives. Taken together, this discourse about the foundation of
the community works as a form of authoritative speech, which I find at the core of a
political theory of mythology. Authoritative speech acts regarding the founding of the
community draw on a narrative context and this means that mythology is constantly being
“worked on” in a continual process of imitation and renewal.

The narrative context essentially parallels the idea of “a basic narrative core or
mythologem.” Authors drawing on a community’s foundation mythology are both limited
by the narrative context and free to modify it within the limits set by standards of acceptability within the community. Thus, the narrative context or “mythologem also changes over time because, on each occasion, it is reappropriated by different needs and exigencies.” There is repetition and variation in the way the mythological narratives are told. This repetition and variation centers on the narrative context of a mythology (its mythologem) and this mythology provides significance to the experiences and needs of members of a community. In other words, as I emphasize throughout this dissertation, the mythological nexus of the behavioral revolution persists because it is through the continual work on narratives about the behavioral revolution that members of the contemporary discipline are able to make sense of their experiences in the profession, construct their professional identities, forge their professional group memberships, and justify the sorts of professional practices they deem central to that identity. The narrative context is therefore constitutive of both professional identities and practices which perpetuates and strengthens its power through the authoritative speech acts which make it possible in the first place.

A succinct definition of “political myth” is offered by Bottici and Challand in their article “Rethinking Political Myth”:

[Political myth is] the continual process of work on a common narrative by which the members of a social group can provide significance to their political conditions and experience (2006, 315).

The dimensions of narrative, identity, and practice which make up the mythological nexus are evident in the above definition of “political myth” by Bottici and Challand. To begin

---

76 I should acknowledge a bit of circularity here. This circularity should not be feared as it is inescapably part of the process of interpretation (another manifestation of the so-called “hermeneutic circle”). The circularity comes about through the close inter-relationship between the three dimensions of the mythological nexus. Mythology is a process and should not be viewed in linear terms. Instead, the three dimensions of narrative, identity, and practice interact and are co-constitutive of significance which in turn makes the authoritative speech acts found in the discourse of a community mythological.
with, the narrative dimension is prominently highlighted. Narrative is essential to forming identities today. Indeed, these “narrative identities,” as Mayer has put it, result in a “dramatic imperative” or a requirement for certain kinds of action and practices and the exclusion of others (Mayer 2014; Buxton 1994). Bottici and Challand’s reference to “significance” is central to a political theory of mythology and the close connection between narrative, identity, and practices in the discourses of human communities. For these authors, a key reason that political myth is powerful today is because it answers a need for significance, and I argue that this significance arises out of the mythological nexus and the interplay between narrative, identities, and practices.

The narrative dimension is essential to an adequate understanding myth today. In terms of a mythological nexus, narratives about the return of the descendants of Herakles parallel the foundation narratives of the behavioral revolution. The idea that mythology “takes place around a narrative” is evident in that the mythology in question centers on the narrative context about the behavioral revolution. In contemporary political science, foundation narratives of the behavioral revolution serve the mythological function of providing significance for identities and practices in the present. The core of the foundation narrative runs like this: in the 1950s and 1960s the behavioral revolution reconstituted the discipline of political science by rejecting its traditional forms and by embracing modern scientific identities and practices shared by other social sciences. The way the behavioral revolution mythology works today substantiates the discipline’s common sense about its shared past, which draws on the power of repeated retellings of the foundation narratives of the discipline. These repeated retellings are powerful because they draw on and reinforce dominant narratives about a community’s past. Mythologies are political and
powerful because they are comprised of the authoritative speech of members of the community which provide significance to experiences that are important to the way that communities remember their past, thus influencing identities and practices in the present.⁷⁷

The practical dimension of the mythological nexus is evident in the work of contemporary political theorists of “political myth” who emphasize how myth today is “instrumental.” For example, the political theorist Christopher Flood emphasizes the practical dimension I have in mind when he says, “myths thus provide a form of temporal and spatial guide” (1996, 34). Understood in instrumental terms, mythology becomes a spur to action and a motivation for common practices among a community (Sorel 1908).⁷⁸

In the early 20th century, the French philosopher Georges Sorel argued in his 1908 Reflections on Violence that people can be spurred to action through “political myths” (Tudor 1972; Buxton 1994; Bottici 2007). In their Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal, the political theorists Ball and Dagger recount the potential power of Sorel’s “myth of the general strike,” which Sorel thought could bring about revolution against the capitalist state if enough people believed in it. In Ball and Dagger’s terms: “If enough people could be brought to believe in the myth of the general strike, however, their efforts, fueled by this belief, would indeed lead to a successful revolution” (1991, 183). Thus, this type of “myth,” through its influence on people’s beliefs, and its power to make sense of people’s experiences, can spur people to action.

---

⁷⁷ As the classicist Sophie Mills summarizes this important point: “Every human being experiences a continuous interplay between past and present, because only by constantly referring to what is known already can the present be understood and preparations for the future be made” (1997, 1).

⁷⁸ Contemporary political theorists of myth are focused on the instrumentality of myth and how it can serve as a spur to action affecting the future. A prominent example here is Sorel’s “Myth of the General Strike.” Sorel understood this myth as working to spur workers to action when the historical conditions were met.
Here too, we see the close resemblance of this conception of “political myth” to one of “political mythology” I develop in this dissertation. Political mythology is not just any narrative since it must provide significance to past experience and motivate action in the present. Bottici and Challand elaborate on the practical dimension, saying “political myths are expression of a desire to act and not to reconstruct the past. If they look at the past, they do so from the perspective of a ‘politics of the past’ that is directly aimed at producing an action in the present” (2010, 23). The point is that narratives working as a foundational mythology operate on individual members of the community in such a way as to spur them to action. This was the case in ancient Sparta and it is the case in contemporary political science. In the ancient Spartan context, narratives about the return of the descendants of Herakles serves as a basis for the community’s warlike identity and as a justification for practices associated with war and the enslavement of a large portion of its subject population. In contemporary political science, narratives about the behavioral revolution serve to substantiate professional identities ranging from the dominant behavioral/scientific identity to more marginalized professional identities such as the political theorist.

The mythological nexus is also comprised of the dimension of identity which is closely associated with the dimensions of narrative and practice. The political philosopher, Ajume Wingo also uses the idea of “political myth” in a similar way as I am using the term “mythology.” In his Veil Politics in Liberal Democratic States, Wingo says, “myths typically present the origins of a society in ways that flatter people who live in it, representing the community as part of a divine plan or as the legacy of a hardy, virtuous race of heroes who tamed the wild frontier” (2003, 13). This representation of the
community’s identity is presented in its discourse or narratives about its foundation. While the behavioral revolution mythology hardly comes close to claiming “divine” inspiration, it can be said that this narrative is composed of several “hardy” and “virtuous” heroes, in the figures of Charles Merriam, Harold Lasswell, David Easton, and Robert Dahl. And of course, the “wild frontier” tamed by our heroes was the intellectual terrain of “science,” which in many foundation narratives was *terra incognita* before the behavioral revolution. Wingo also explicitly recognizes the practical dimension of mythology: “As fabricated stories of a community’s beginnings, however, these tales actually speak to that society’s end – its aims, values, and purposes” (13).79

In sum, the mythological nexus highlights the way communities remember their foundations through narratives about their past and how these narratives provide significance to identities and practices in the present. In terms of the behavioral revolution mythology in contemporary political science, this practical nature of mythology, the way the narratives “speak to that society’s end – its aims, values, and purposes,” is powerfully attested to in the following passage by the disciplinary historian James Farr:

> But the important point here is that Ricci and Seidelman show us – as do Easton and Eulau and many other remembrancers – that our interests in the behavioral revolution and its proclamations are not contingent or antiquarian ones. They make clear that the present postbehavioral era can be understood only with reference to behavioralism and that, even then, the behavioral revolution is open to different interpretations. Our interpretations of the behavioral revolution are necessarily bound up with our search for present and future identity (1995, 221).

79 Bottici and Challand similarly discuss the importance of the practical dimension of mythology: “Myths tell stories, they state the origins of things, and, thus, at the same time, where they are going. In this way, they provide a ‘ground’ and they do so by answering the question ‘whence?’ rather than ‘why?’” (2006, 319). Indeed, political myths are “determinations to act” (321).
In this passage, it is clear that the way political scientists remember the behavioral revolution is important today. As members and “remembrancers” of the academic discipline of contemporary political science, we now largely understand ourselves and our everyday practices with reference to a narrative about the past that has the behavioral revolution at its core. The mythology of the behavioral revolution is a product of the discourse of the discipline and is comprised of the authoritative speech of political scientists who draw on and contribute to a narrative context that provides significance to their identities and practices.

In Chapters Three, Four, and Five, I show how political scientists from across the major subfields rely on narratives of the behavioral revolution in their reference work entries. Why is it that over sixty years later the behavioral revolution still figures so prominently in the way contemporary political scientists tell the story of the discipline’s past? I answer this question through the political theory of mythology developed in this chapter. In the contemporary reference work of political science, foundation narratives of the behavioral revolution mythology ground identities in the past and guide behavior in the present. Contemporary reference work authors repeatedly draw on a common narrative context to tell the story of the behavioral revolution. They do so from different subfield perspectives, and by developing different themes, but they nevertheless all contribute to the perpetuation of the behavioral revolution mythology. They do this because of a shared need for significance which is provided by mythology as the authoritative speech of the discipline.
CHAPTER III

THE BEHAVIORAL REVOLUTION MYTHOLOGY IN CONTEMPORARY DICTIONARIES

Authoritativeness and the Prescriptive Force of Mythology

In this chapter I show how the mythology of the behavioral revolution is reflected in contemporary dictionaries of political science, 1980-2012. Before I do so, however, I begin by situating dictionaries as an authoritative genre and discuss the evolution of two ways of compiling them: prescriptivist and descriptivist. This discussion is important because it allows me to develop another crucial concept which is central to understanding the power of mythology and how it provides significance to identities and practices of a community. As I discussed in Chapter One, the concept of authoritativeness plays a role in both the way compilers of reference materials understand their work as well as in the political theory of mythology developed in this dissertation. Mythology is understood as a form of authoritative speech that arises in the discourse of a community.

I argue that in the case of narratives about the behavioral revolution, this “authoritativeness” is influential if not binding on the discipline of political science. Thus far I have argued that this influence has arisen out of the mythological nexus where narrative, identity, and practice coagulate to provide significance to experiences and deeds of members of a community (Bottici 2007). In this chapter I further develop the idea of mythology as authoritative speech by adding the concept of “prescriptive force.” A major finding in this chapter, and one that applies across reference materials, is that all authors contribute to the behavioral revolution mythology since all draw on and contribute to the
narrative context of the behavioral revolution. They therefore add to the authoritativeness or prescriptive force of the mythology. Early dictionaries in political science overtly sought to be prescriptivist in orientation in the sense that they intended to prescribe a vocabulary to the discipline. Later dictionaries move away from overt calls for standardization and regulation of the community’s language and become more descriptivist in orientation. Another major finding in this chapter, however, is that even if the intent of the overall reference work is descriptivist in nature, when it comes to narratives about the behavioral revolution, these entries nevertheless contribute to the prescriptive force of the behavioral revolution mythology.

In the remainder of the chapter, I demonstrate how the narrative context and the mythological nexus work together to produce significance and the prescriptive force that ensures the persistence of the behavioral revolution mythology. In this chapter, as with Chapter Four, the only major subfields represented are international relations and political theory. American politics and comparative politics do not have relevant entries until Chapter Five on the handbooks of contemporary political science. In my discussion of the narrative context of the behavioral revolution, I further clarify what I mean by the dominant narrative of the behavioral revolution. In short, I argue that there is an overarching and dominant narrative of the behavioral revolution to which all authors are indebted in their entries. In short, this dominant narrative is one of a successful behavioralism which for better or worse permanently transformed the practical and ideational configuration of the discipline. The fact of behavioral triumph is taken for granted, even though there is variation in the way authors draw on and contribute to the narrative context of the behavioral revolution mythology. Thus while there is variation in the themes developed
by different authors, both Whig and historicist themes, still contribute to the behavioral revolution mythology. They start from the fact of the dominant narrative, and by drawing on the narrative context try to either reinforce, modify, or subvert it. The result in all cases is the same: authors entries reinforce and add to the significance provided the mythological nexus of the behavioral revolution. Throughout the chapter I focus on the interplay between the dimensions of narrative, identity, and practice, thus demonstrating the prescriptive force of the behavioral revolution to the discipline today.

Prescriptivism and Descriptivism in Dictionaries

In his *English Words from Latin and Greek Elements* (1986) Donald Ayers discusses these general interpretive camps. The first is prescriptivist: according to Ayers, “those who would *prescribe* the language, by dictating to people what they should and should not say or write” (17; emphasis in original). The second is a descriptivist: “those who would *describe* the language, by simply recording what it is that people say and write without giving value judgments” (17; emphasis in original). These styles of writing dictionaries are important as we see both in the contemporary dictionaries of political science. Entries written in the 1980s are more likely to be prescriptivist, while entries written in the 1990s and 2000s are more likely to be descriptivist. In this chapter, and

---

80 One might think that if there are a significant number of entries that subvert or modify this mythology, will this not have the cumulative effect of eroding it over time? (I thank Emily Hauptmann for raising this point). The key here is the dominance of a narrative of a successful revolution. This dominant narrative is comprised of a narrative context which all authors draw from in their particular narratives. Since these particular narratives, even when the intent is subversive of the dominant narrative, still draw from and reinforce the narrative context, these narratives contribute to the behavioral revolution mythology. In order to substantially change the mythology the discipline must embrace a new dominant narrative and construct a new narrative context, which as I discuss in Chapter Six, will necessarily lead to changes in dominant identities and practices.
among compilers of dictionaries of political and social science, there is a perceptible movement from a strong prescriptivist desire to standardize and purify the language of academic political science, to a more descriptivist drive to capture the diversity and range of meanings associated with important words in the discourse of the discipline. I also discuss how even in later dictionaries where the overall intent is to be “descriptivist” in orientation, the specific narratives about the behavioral revolution nevertheless add to the “prescriptive” force of the behavioral revolution mythology.

Efforts to standardize the meaning of words begins with the advent of writing. The Sumerian and Akkadian empires compiled lists of words and their equivalents in other languages as early as 2300 BCE; the Chinese have a claim to the first language-specific dictionary as early as the 3rd century BCE. Dictionaries were compiled for the great Muslim empires between the 8th and 14th centuries BCE. In Christian Europe of the 13th, 14th, and 15th centuries many bilingual dictionaries translated between local languages and Latin. In the 16th century, during the European Renaissance, the first efforts to write down and guard national languages against corruption and decline emerge. For example, in the 16th century Tesoro de la Langua Castellana o Española was published by Sebastián de Covarrubias, which was the baseline for the state-sponsored Diccionario de la Lengua Española published by the Spanish Academy in 1780. In this tradition, the privileged dialect of the Spanish language was Castillano, which was primarily spoken in the central fertile valley region of Castile.81

Ayers (1986) discusses the impulse to guard and purify national languages through the foundation of academies and the writing of dictionaries. One long-standing model for

---

81 In this section I draw on a variety of sources which might be broadly categorized as “History of the English Language” texts. The most important have been Ayers 1986, Roberts 1998, Lynch 2003, and Crystal 2006.
the prescriptivist camp is the French Academy. “Against a constant wash of criticism,” Ayers relates, “the French Academy, since its inception in the 1630s, continues to this day its adamant and conservative attitude toward the intrusion of foreign elements into the French language” (17). The prescriptivist purpose of the French Academy, Ayers continues quoting the Academy itself, “is to keep French ‘pure and eloquent’ and cleanse it of its impurities” (17). In his classic “A Brief History of English” the linguist Paul Roberts notes how “the first English dictionary was published in 1603” and merely consisted of “a list of 2500 words briefly defined” (1998, 27). During the English Enlightenment of the 17th and 18th centuries, scholars were convinced English was degenerating and in need of regulation. As Roberts points out, there were “many people of the eighteenth century … [who] proposed to polish and prune and restrict English, which they felt was proliferating too widely” (27). For example, the Scottish philosopher David Hume remarked in 1741: “The Elegance and Propriety of Stile have been very much neglected among us. We have no Dictionary of our Language, and scarce a tolerable Grammar” (quoted in Lynch 2003, 4).

Alexander Pope, an English poet, considered compiling his own dictionary to arrest the perceived decay, and many elites of the day hoped for an English Academy; something similar to the French Academy (Roberts 1998). It was time for a standard dictionary to settle all disputes (Lynch 2003). Living in the age of the European Enlightenment and in the wake of the English Civil War (1642-1651) and the Glorious Revolution (1688), writers and other public figures like Daniel Defoe and Jonathan Swift were prescriptivist in outlook

---

82 The most important dictionaries of the time were Samuel Johnson’s English Dictionary (1755) in England, Noah Webster’s American Dictionary of the English Language (1828) in the U.S., and the still definitive Oxford English Dictionary (1884) in Great Britain (Roberts 1998, 27).
and urged the establishment of an English Academy or another authoritative institution that would regulate and govern the English language (Ayers 1986). In 1697, the writer and journalist Defoe called for an English academy that might be of “sufficient authority for the usage of words, and sufficient also to expose the innovations of other men’s fancies … and have liberty to correct and censure the exorbitance of writers” (17; quoted in Ayers). Indeed, Defoe continues, the English Academy should be “the judges of style and language, and no author would have the impudence to coin without their authority” (17; quoted in Ayers). Similarly Swift, another English writer of wide renown, called for the standardization, regulation, and protection of the English language:

Some method should be thought on for ascertain and fixing our language for ever … I see absolutely no reason why any language should be perpetually changing … Besides the grammar part … they will observe many gross improprieties, which however authorized by practice, and grown familiar, ought to be discarded [and] utterly thrown out of our language” (quoted in Ayers, 17).

The controversy between prescriptivists and descriptivists continues today, “although – at least in the making of dictionaries – descriptivism has won the day” (Ayers 1986, 18). This fact is reflected in the ever-growing size of contemporary dictionaries such as the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) which attempts to capture the full range of a word’s use in contemporary English. In David Crystal’s Introduction to Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary, he makes a descriptivist point when he says, “the plural, ‘definitions’, is important: most words in a language have more than one sense. Some, as we have seen, have dozens. Abstract words pose particular problems, but all words require definitions that are clear, succinct, well-sequenced, and contrastive (with words of related meaning)” (Crystal 2006, xvii). Thus we see the blending of both a descriptivist call for recording multiple definitions as well as a prescriptivist call for precise definitions. The earlier
dictionaries of political science I examine are more overtly prescriptivist in intent, while later dictionaries take a descriptivist orientation more seriously. Even though this is the case with the intent of dictionary authors, and is probably the case with the majority of their entries, when it comes to narratives about the behavioral revolution, there is still a prescriptivist force which contributes to the persistence of the narrative context and the mythological nexus of the disciplinary mythology.

In this chapter, I evaluate eight contemporary dictionaries. I continue this discussion of prescriptivism/descriptivism and dictionaries of political science below. Before I get too far into this chapter, however, I introduce the general selection criteria I used to identify the specific dictionaries that I discuss throughout this chapter.

**General Selection Criteria**

For this dissertation, I developed five general selection criteria to locate appropriate reference material. The first two selection criteria are primary in the sense that if they led me to mentions of the behavioral revolution, then I would employ selection criteria three through five. The general selection criterion I developed are:

1) The reference work is on political science in general.

2) The reference work is on the subfields in general.

3) The entries are on political science in general.

4) The entries are on the subfields in general.

5) The entry contains mentions of the behavioral revolution.

I developed this set of most general selection criteria over the course of several rounds of basic research into the contemporary reference material available to political science. The
time period I investigate is 1980-2013. First, I look for dictionaries with either “Social Science” or “Political Science” in their titles; or the names one of the discipline’s major subfields, “American Political Science,” “Comparative Political Science,” “International Relations,” or “Political Theory.” Far fewer dictionaries meet these first two general selection criteria than the encyclopedias and handbooks I examine in subsequent chapters. Overall, the number of relevant entries within these dictionaries were also less than those in either encyclopedias or handbooks.

Once I selected a dictionary based on the general selection criteria, I applied these same criteria within them searching for mentions of the behavioral revolution. This means that I always searched the front matter of the dictionaries and then proceeded to look for general entries that might have mentions of the behavioral revolution. Within the dictionaries the entries found to have mentions of the behavioral revolution are as follows: Political Theory (x3), Political Science (x2), Behavioralism (x2), Empiricism, Science, Political Psychology, Political Sociology, Dahl, Eulau, Social Science Approach, and Traditionalism. It is also worth noting here that fully half of the entries with mentions of the behavioral revolution occurred in dictionaries written by Jack Plano and his associates, and of these all but one occur in the 1982 *Dictionary of Political Analysis*. The entries themselves vary in size from short paragraphs to longer entries of a couple pages. The length of the entries also differs markedly from both encyclopedias and handbooks which tend to have entries of several pages to complete essays.

---

83 These general selection criteria and the time period this dissertation covers are discussed more fully in Chapter One.
Absence and Exclusion

As Samuel Johnson reached the publication stage of his *Dictionary of the English Language* (1755) he realized that a portion of his work could not be included and he was thus faced with “the vexation of expunging” a great deal from the final form (2003, 35). While it is true, not everything can be included in any work, one can be transparent about everything that has been excluded as much as what has been included in it. In this chapter there is a great deal of reference material that I have excluded since the selection criteria were not met. There are many dictionaries and many more entries within them that meet the general selection criteria except for the final and most important one – mentions of the behavioral revolution. One example of this within the dictionaries is the relatively large number of entries on “behavioralism” which do not mention the behavioral revolution. Out of eleven entries published between 1980 and 2012, only three of them contained mention of the behavioral revolution and so was included in the reference material that I evaluate in this dissertation.\[^{84}\] The dictionaries that met all the selection criteria and are included in this chapter are listed in Table 3.1.

---

Table 5

Most General Dictionaries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dictionary</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Publisher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>The Dictionary of World Politics</em> (DWP, 1990)</td>
<td>Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham</td>
<td>Simon and Schuster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Key Concepts in Politics</em> (KCP, 2000)</td>
<td>Andrew Heywood</td>
<td>Palgrave</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Authoritativeness, Generality, Mythology

It is not only agreement in definitions but also (odd as it may sound) in judgments that is required; [This is] agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life (Wittgenstein 1968, 241-242).

In this section, I return to the above discussion about dictionaries as an authoritative genre only with greater emphasis on contemporary dictionaries on political science. In contemporary dictionaries of political science there seems to be a movement from prescriptivism to descriptivism. In the 1980s, there is a strong prescriptivist emphasis by the authors of dictionaries, while in later dictionaries, it seems a more descriptivist outlook
is emphasized. For example, in its Forward the *DPA* (1982) is prescribed as “an uncommonly useful book for a discipline that badly needs to clean up its language” (xiii).

The admonition for political science “to clean up its language” comes from the political scientist Frank Sorauf in the Foreword to the *DPA*. Sorauf’s account exemplifies the close relationship between authoritativeness and generality. I derive the factors that lend reference works authoritativeness from an analysis of their front matter. These factors of authoritativeness emerge from the relationship between authority and generality. The first three are general characteristics of authoritativeness, while the fourth and fifth are specific manifestations of the desire to be authoritative in reference works:

1) The reference work is general and meant for all members of the mainstream of the community addressed.

2) The ideas and practices covered in the reference material are meant to reinforce and reflect the “practical wisdom” of the mainstream.

3) The high level of agreement on terms and their predominant meaning that reinforce and reflect the “common sense” of the mainstream.

4) Authority is shown by including high-profile, high-status members of the community as editors of the reference work and of individual entries.

5) Authority is shown by including as many “international” authors as possible.

Reflecting the first and third characteristics, Sorauf says the *DPA* is authoritative in intent because it is a “book for all political scientists;” and one that can help the discipline “achieve some greater consensus on its vocabulary” (xiii). Here is, as in Chapter One, the close connection between authoritativeness and generality: the dictionary claims to be

---

85 Sorauf was Regents Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota and author of such books as *Inside Campaign Finance: Myths and Realities* (1992); Sorauf passed away in 2013.
authoritative in part because it is meant for all political scientists. The second characteristic of authoritativeness is invoked when Sorauf says about the authors of the dictionary that “where the profession lacks consensus, they have chosen the route of the mainstream; they have also wisely avoided the doctrinaire and the idiosyncratic” (xiii). Here is an appeal to the authority of the mainstream based on the already conventional and therefore dominant meanings of words and concepts that make up the vocabulary of the discipline. Indeed, along with the third characteristic, Sorauf says the embrace of the “new rigor demands greater precision in and agreement on language than the discipline has ever before achieved” (1982, xiii). Here the connection between authoritativeness and generality is evident: the discipline of political science depends on the standardization of its language which crucially depends on a high level of agreement on its central terms and concepts.

A dictionary is meant to help standardize and make the language readily accessible by all members of the discipline. In the “Series Statement” at the beginning of the *DPA* (1982), the series editor Jack Plano discusses how “the political and social sciences suffer more than most disciplines from semantic confusion” (ix). Since “precise language is the primary tool of every scientific discipline,” the *DPA* is “dedicated to overcoming this confusion by thorough, accurate definitions of the central concepts, institutions, and events in each subject field” (xi). In sum, reference works and entries are “authoritative” because they are meant to appeal and make sense to the vast majority of members of the discipline, they are designed to reflect the ideas and practices that are currently dominant in the mainstream of the discipline, and because they serve to legitimate the mainstream of a community’s already established sense of self, its dominant identity, and speaking to its shared experiences as to its common sense and practical wisdom.
In contrast to the *DPA*, the *Dictionary of the Social Sciences* (*DSS*, 2002) is an example of a descriptivist style of dictionary writing. In the Preface to the *DSS*, the editor Craig Calhoun situates the need for a new dictionary in the context of the remarkable growth of the social sciences.86 The expansion of the social sciences along with the university system and the modern state combined to support “both the division of the social sciences into separate disciplines and the generation of interdisciplinary fields” (2002, xi). In this context of expansion and “proliferation of fields and subfields” the social sciences have invented “new terms [and] new usages” which may lead to “precision” – albeit a type of precision “always in need of interpretation” (xi). More often than not, however, this precision is discipline-specific and so different fields work to “generate their own distinctive terminologies, [and] they give apparently identical terms different meanings” (xii).

The meanings of social science concepts also vary by time and place and “have different nuances of meaning in different contexts” (xii). In the past, this confusing state of language has led to prescriptivist calls for standardization and regulation. At least in the rhetoric of more recent dictionaries, however, this state of the language is accepted as the status quo in the mainstream. Another difficulty related by Calhoun is that the language of social science is largely based on ordinary language. Echoing the *DPA* (1982) only with a descriptivist stance, Calhoun recalls how it can be tempting to assume that “everyone knows what ‘class’ or ‘community’ or ‘capitalism’ means,” but more often than not in the social sciences these concepts are “term[s] of art carrying reference to a specific analytic

86 Calhoun is the principle editor of the *Dictionary of the Social Sciences* (*DSS* 2002) and long-time contributor and president of the Social Science Research Council (1999-2012). Calhoun is Director of the London School of Economics and Political Science and the Global Distinguished Professor of Sociology at New York University. He received his Ph.D. from Oxford University in 1980 (Sociology and History).
problem and sometimes also an implicit distinction” from other related concepts (2002, xi). The proliferation of social sciences and the multiplication of discipline-specific jargon creates a situation where the general public is alienated from the meanings implied in social science discourse. Hence, two purposes of the DSS are to help social scientists speak to each other across disciplinary divides, while also assisting members of the general public who are interested in some concept or dispute in the social sciences.

Calhoun specifically mentions political science and sociology as two social science disciplines that can benefit from the DSS and “will find the Dictionary especially useful because their fields are notable for both their internal diversity and the porousness of their boundaries” (2002, xii). Needless to say, this is a different perspective than we’ve witnessed in the 1982 DPA. In the DPA the members of the community were admonished to “clean up their language” and the dictionary was understood as a means to stabilize and fix the language of the discipline, while in the DSS, dictionary writing is understood in a more descriptivist fashion, where the emphasis is on recognizing the diverse and fluid nature of language and recording the many uses and meanings that words can have in the social sciences.

In the Preface to the DSS Calhoun discusses the volume’s ambition to authoritativeness: “Our aim throughout has been to present an authoritative account that will enable readers to understand both the specific meanings of terms and the intellectual issues at stake in their use” (xiv). One way to see the characteristics of authoritativeness discussed above is to focus on the ways they are reflected in practical steps taken by editors of reference materials. Two practical manifestations of the desire to establish

---

87 Calhoun mentions only the first edition of the Encyclopedia of the Social Science (1968), David Sills, Ed. as an example of “high quality” reference work in the social sciences (2003, xvi).
authoritativeness are by recruiting high-ranking members of relevant disciplines and to include as broad an “international” body of contributors as possible.

As Calhoun says later in the preface, there are two associate editors who worked with him on the dictionary. All three worked for the Social Science Research Council at the time of publication; Calhoun was acting president. Calhoun discusses how in an effort to establish the authoritativeness of the DSS, the editors conducted a survey of “disciplinary dictionaries, encyclopedias, and textbooks” that showed how “some authors confused their personal views for authoritative definitions” (xvi). Calhoun and his co-editors have “resolved to avoid this error” (xvi). Thus the attempt is to be authoritative is bolstered by including high quality members from several disciplines on the editorial board and by including two associate editors to balance the final product. This balance of perspectives is meant to prevent bias and improve the quality of the final product. In and additional attempt at establishing authoritativeness the DSS sought to be as “international” as possible. The DSS is “international” since it “is produced by many people for whom English is not a first language” (xiv). This reflects the first characteristic of authoritativeness discussed above, since the intent is to include and/or appeal to as many potential readers as possible. As we’ll see again in Chapters Four and Five, such an appeal to “internationality” is an important element of a reference work’s authoritativeness.

In 1973, Jack Plano, Milton Greenberg, Roy Olton, and Robert Riggs published the Political Science Dictionary (PSD). In this preface the seeds of later calls for precision (in the 1982 DPA) are already planted. While this dictionary falls outside the time period this

---

88 The associate editors for the DSS are Joe Karaganis and Paul Price; the other editorial board members are James Peacock in anthropology, Andrew Schotter in economics, and Aristide Zolberg in political science (2003, xvi).
dissertation covers, this early edition by Plano and his associates contains content that of many of the later dictionaries like the DPA continue to use. In addition, there is a strong prescriptivist Preface, which bears mentioning briefly here. The Preface to the PSD begins with the section heading “The Function of Language in Political Science.” A key reason for these authors to compile a dictionary in political science was to improve “precision” in language use.

Why is precision in language so important? The authors offer three specific reasons in the 1973 volume which are nowhere restated in such detail in their later dictionaries. First, say the authors, “language development may tend to encourage the kind of rigor and precision that is essential to the application of the scientific method in behavioral studies” (vii). In 1973, the quest for a political science modeled on an interpretation of the scientific method of the natural sciences served as a justification for a new dictionary dedicated to precise language. Second, precise language is necessary to meet another key element of a modern science or the goal of a progressive accumulation of knowledge: “To provide means for building the cumulative storehouse of knowledge on which every discipline rests” (vii). Finally, the precision of language in political science is necessary for members of the profession to communicate with one another in an efficient and practical manner. All this is presented in a straightforward and unproblematic way in the early-1970s. Of course, any human community of sufficient size and duration will develop a specialized language which draws on but also modifies the dominant language most members of the community speak. Political scientists in the U.S., U.K., Australia, etc., draw on the English language to communicate. Over time a specialized language develops within the
community that makes it possible to communicate abstract and complicated ideas to members in a relatively efficient manner.89

I can now answer the question ‘Why is precision of language important?’ For Plano and the other authors of the *PSD*, words and “concepts constitute the building blocks of the discipline” (1973, viii). A major goal of the *PSD* is to allow the student of political science to understand the technical language of the discipline, to be able to look up and understand unfamiliar or uniquely utilized words, as well as similarly allowing the non-specialist to appreciate the jargon of the discipline. Thus, the authors relate, “it is hoped that this dictionary will enable anyone with an interest in politics to tackle the literature of the field with greater understanding and confidence, and to build an awareness of the need for precise expression in the discipline” (ix).

In a prescriptivist vein, the authors say that political science is uniquely in need of precision due to the fact of “mass participation in a democratic system” which means that many or most citizens feel they are in command of the language of politics (ix). Yet, this use of the language of politics by everyday members of society, “tend to produce conflicting definitions and a popularized language that lacks definitional rigor and precision” (ix). Professors and students may use the word “democracy” in completely different ways, journalists and consumers of media may use the word “power” in different and incompatible ways. “The result of such ‘definitional pluralism,’” the authors continue, “is that often persons interested in political study and research fail to communicate

89 See for example, “American Voices,” and “The History of English” in the *New Oxford American Dictionary* (2005, pp. xxvii-xxxvii and pp. 2019-2021 respectively). Like the pieces I referred to in the beginning of this chapter, these are part of general histories of the English language. These works and others like them are quite useful for understanding how language has changed and evolved over time, and for gaining insight into the role that dictionaries have played in that development.
effectively with each other and with the general public because they do not ‘talk the same language’” (ix).

Writing in 1958, the political theorist Norman Jacobson criticized the “perversion … of the ideal of precise vocabulary” by many of his contemporaries (119). He notes how the idea of “precision” is quickly becoming “technical and exclusive,” corresponding “less and less with a comprehensive view,” and a concept which increasingly represents “a weapon of scientific authority” (120). To be sure, traditional goals of political lexicography are important – e.g., to provide a tool for looking up and learning about unfamiliar words. But there is also a more generalized reason at work. Hence, the prescriptivist call for the language of the discipline to be rendered in a standardized and authoritative way. As with the example of national communities working to safeguard their preferred and dominant forms of language at the expense of regional dialects, the PSD and its successors have set out to purify the language of the community by giving an authoritative and standard account.

A major assumption of the prescriptivist orientation is that there is a correct form of the language, that at a given point in time, there are widely-accepted standard meanings of words that can be recorded and transmitted to members of a community through the medium of a dictionary. While it once may have seemed acceptable and desirable to standardize language through authoritative prescription of the vocabulary of a community, today it seems anachronistic to espouse such views much less try and codify them in the form of a dictionary. Despite a move from prescriptivism to descriptivism over the time period this dissertation covers, the majority of the dictionaries covered are prescriptivist.
On multiple occasions in this chapter I highlight the prescriptive force of the behavioral revolution mythology. What I mean by “prescriptive force” is that since the behavioral revolution mythology provides significance to the experiences of members of the discipline, it becomes constitutive of disciplinary identity and practices. There is no escape from the mythology that defines the identities and practices of contemporary political science and this is reflected in the dictionary entries covered in this chapter. This is especially evident in the somewhat paradoxical fact that more recent dictionaries claim to be, and in general are substantially more descriptive than prescriptive in orientation. Yet, when it comes to the narratives about the behavioral revolution, the mythology imposes a prescriptive force on members of the academic community. There is also an irony at work in the earlier and more prescriptivist dictionaries. These more prescriptive entries recount how behavioralism established a scientific identity and practices associated with positivism and the scientific method which include value-neutrality and the clear separation of facts and values. Even so, the way the narratives work to substantiate scientific identities and justify dominant practices in a mythological nexus is itself a prescriptive force that influences members of the discipline.

Narrative Context and the Behavioral Revolution Mythology

In this chapter I evaluate eight dictionaries and sixteen entries by following authors’ narratives about the behavioral revolution. Fully half of the entries are found in two dictionaries written by Jack Plano and various co-authors.90 As with Chapters Four and

---

90 Plano (1921-2002) was an IR scholar and Professor of Political Science at Western Michigan University and received his Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin, Madison (1954). Robin was a political scientist at Western Michigan University. I have found no biographical information about Robert Riggs.
Five, I organize my discussion of contemporary dictionaries by narrative context. The first thing to keep in mind about the narrative context of the behavioral revolution is that there is a dominant narrative which takes the success of the behavioral revolution for granted. There are no examples of authors claiming that the behavioral revolution did not successfully transform the discipline of political science. Where there is variation among authors is in the way they interpret that narrative in their own accounts of the significance of the behavioral revolution. This variation revolves around the three elements which make up the narrative context of the behavioral revolution: subfield context, referents, and theme. In addition to the specific subfield specific category, dictionaries, encyclopedias, and handbooks include entries that are intended for political science in general. Among dictionaries, the majority of entries are in the “political science in general” category. Two subfields are represented in the dictionaries – international relations and political theory. In all three genres of reference works the subfields of international relations and political are overrepresented, with the other subfields of American politics and comparative politics only appearing in Chapter Five.

Throughout the remainder of this chapter, I focus on the other two elements of the narrative context, the referents to the behavioral revolution and the theme developed. The majority of entries contribute to a Whig theme celebrating the success of the behavioral revolution in transforming the discipline from its traditional roots to the modern social science familiar to political scientists today. There are also a handful of historicist themes but no examples of the theme of lament and/or loss. The last element in the narrative context are the referents to the behavioral revolution. Different authors draw from a common stock of referents to construct narratives about the state of political science before,
during, and after the behavioral revolution. These referents are crucial evidence demonstrating how the political theory of mythology I develop in this dissertation works. In particular, the conceptual referents are central to the mythological process since they point to both the dimensions of identity and practice that along with the narrative dimension make up the mythological nexus. Indeed, a major goal of this dissertation is to show the three dimensions at work in the discourse of political science and so to provide evidence for the existence and power of the behavioral revolution mythology.

The Subfield Context

The major subfields represent a convenient and authoritative way to see the work of mythology at the discipline and subfield levels. In this chapter, the entries I analyze are overwhelmingly focused on the discipline of political science in general; though there are subfield specific entries in international relations and political theory. This sample leaves out both American politics and comparative politics. Political theory and international relations are the only subfield specific entries discussed in Chapter Four on encyclopedias, while in Chapter Five on handbooks, all of the major subfields are represented. It is also important to keep in mind that the most general entries on “political science” are written for all members of the community and so they are presumably written with the major subfields in mind. Within the general political science category, I also discuss entries on topics such as “behavioralism,” “postbehavioralism,” “empiricism,” and so on. The entries on these topics are taken to belong to the general category of political science. As I discussed in Chapters One and Two, the work of mythology occurs at the level of specific
communities. Thus, to truly appreciate the mythology of the behavioral revolution it is necessary to see it at work in different disciplinary settings.

The Referents to the Behavioral Revolution

A referent is a common name, word or phrase that is repeatedly mentioned in the narrative context of the behavioral revolution. The distribution of these referents in contemporary dictionaries is reported in Table 3.2. As is evident here and throughout the chapter, there are a relatively large number of conceptual referents in the dictionaries. These referents represent mentions of significant concepts in the context of the behavioral revolution. For example, the concept of “traditional theory” is very important to the story of the behavioral revolution, primarily as a foil to the type of theory that behaviorists advocated. The importance of the traditional theory referent is also reflected in Table 3.3 where I report the number and percentage of the top five referents in contemporary dictionaries. Out of a total of sixteen entries covered in this chapter, ten of them mention “traditional theory” at least once in their narratives about the behavioral revolution.

Table 6

Referents to the Behavioral Revolution in Dictionaries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Biographical</th>
<th>Conceptual</th>
<th>Institutional</th>
<th>Temporal</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dictionaries</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7

Top Five Referents in Dictionary Entries, Number and Percentage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Referent</th>
<th>Entries with Referents</th>
<th>Percent with Referents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Theory</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific Method</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empirical Theory</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Science</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quantitative Methods</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Thematic Context of the Behavioral Revolution

A political theory of mythology centers on the construct of a mythological nexus made up of the confluence of the dimensions of narrative, identity, and practice, which is manifest in and by authoritative speech such as that found in reference works. In this chapter, a Whig theme of triumph and successful revolution is dominant. The Whig theme is primarily developed by the early dictionary entries authored by Plano and his associates. In later dictionaries, a traditional historicist theme emerges which does not celebrate behavioral dominance but takes it for granted and tries to explain it in a descriptivist fashion. In Chapters Four and Five, there is more variation in themes employed, but in these dictionary entries the Whig theme is dominant. In the 1950s and 1960s, or so the
dominant Whig theme relates, the behavioral revolution remade the discipline and reconstituted political science by rejecting tradition and embracing modern scientific norms and practices shared by other social sciences. In terms of mythology, the dominant narrative of a triumphal behavioralism helps to substantiate the discipline’s scientific identity as a member of the modern social sciences and help legitimate dominant practices associated with that identity such as statistical analysis and survey research. I now turn to evaluating dictionary entries in terms of both narrative context and the mythological nexus. As we will see repeatedly in Chapters Four and Five, the narrative elements of the narrative context are repeatedly invoked, reinforce and are reinforced by the ongoing work on mythology, thereby increasing the mythological power to maintain the ideational and practical structure of the discipline.

Political Science in General

In the first part of this section on political science in general, I follow the narrative of the behavioral revolution as presented in eight entries written by Plano and his associates. There are two relevant dictionaries published by Plano covered in this chapter: the second edition *Dictionary of Political Analysis* (*DPA* 1982) edited by Jack Plano, Robert Riggs, and Helenan Robin, and the eleventh edition *American Political Dictionary* (*APD* 2002) edited by Jack Plano and Milton Greenberg. In total there are eight entries by Plano and his associates covered in this section. I ordered my discussion to piece together the story of the behavioral revolution as recounted in these eight entries. I begin

---

91 Robin was a political scientist at Western Michigan University. I have found no biographical information about Robert Riggs.
with the most general entry from the later APD on “political science,” and then compare it to the only other entry on “political science” with mentions of the behavioral revolution – in Craig Calhoun’s *Dictionary of Social Science* (*DSS* 2002). Though both of these dictionaries were published in the same year, the former takes a prescriptivist approach while the latter takes a descriptivist approach. Even so, and as I discuss below, both are prescriptivist when it comes to narratives about the behavioral revolution. I then return to the earlier DPA and the seven entries in it which mention the behavioral revolution. Taken together, the entries by Plano and his associates stand as a strong version of the Whig theme of the behavioral revolution, while Calhoun’ account is more historicist, measured and nuanced in its thematic structure. Finally, I will briefly discuss two biographical entries which discuss the behavioral revolution in the APSD.

The *American Political Dictionary* (*APD* 2002), edited by the political scientists Jack Plano and Milton Greenberg, began publication in 1962. The 2002 version is the eleventh edition. In their entry on “Political Science,” Plano and Greenberg situate political science in its “broadest philosophical sense” in ancient Greece, which for a long time provided a definitive model for research, and one which was mainly interested in the “normative determinations of what ought to be and with deducing the characteristics of the ideal state” (2002, 23). In contrast to the ancient tradition of political science, and beginning with the political philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli, Plano and Greenberg discuss how modern political science has placed “its emphasis on direct empirical observation of political institutions and actors” (23). In these opening statements, traditional political

---

92. Greenberg is Emeritus Professor and former Provost and Interim President at American University.
93. I reviewed the first edition and there has been remarkably little change in the content of the dictionary from the first edition to the eleventh.
theory and empirical political theory are juxtaposed and reflect two opposing identity orientations in the discipline. This dimension of identity is explicitly linked with the practical dimension as the authors continue developing their Whig theme of a triumph after the behavioral revolution.

Plano and Greenberg continue their narrative, observing how “in the 1950s and 1960s, a behavioral revolution stressing the systematic and rigorously scientific study of individual and group political behavior swept the discipline” (23). Here the Whig theme is made explicit through an emphasis of four significant and positive changes to the discipline after the behavioral revolution. The first great change amounts to a wholesale transformation of the academic community following the behavioral revolution which “swept the discipline.” Second, introducing the important trope of interdisciplinarity, the editors of the ADP say, the discipline “moved toward a closer working relationship with other disciplines, especially economics, geography, sociology, anthropology, psychology, social psychology, biology, ecology, statistics, and communication sciences” (23). As we’ll see more fully in Chapter Four and Five, interdisciplinarity is closely associated with the social science referent and a key part of the meaning of the behavioral revolution in political science. In other words, part of the reason political science has valued interdisciplinarity is because this is a general goal of the modern social sciences as they have developed in the U.S (Aldrich 2014; Jacobs 2014).

Now the practical dimension of the mythological nexus and the close relationship between identity and practice comes into view. Within the narrative context of the behavioral revolution, the scientific method referent reflects images of the types of practices that were adopted and became dominant in the discipline. Interestingly, and
regardless of theme, the scientific method referent is repeated often in narratives about the behavioral revolution. While the tone and ultimate trajectory of narratives differ by theme, they almost always make use of the scientific method referent. Thus, for Plano and Greenberg another consequence of the behavioral revolution is that “increasingly students of political behavior have used the scientific method to create an intellectual discipline based on postulating of hypotheses followed by empirical verification and the ascertainment of probable trends” (2002, 23). Emphasizing a Whig theme, these authors discuss how the behavioral revolution was an important impetus for leaving behind the discipline’s traditional roots, and taking on a new more scientific identity, was the adoption and application of the scientific method in a wide variety of research settings. Plano and Greenberg’s story about how the discipline has changed as a result of the behavioral revolution notes a final consequence for the practice of contemporary political science in the statement that “statistical and mathematical analysis by computer has become the major analytic tool of the discipline” (23). Here the level of practice is made explicit and we see that one consequence of the new social scientific identity after the behavioral revolution was the adoption of research practices involving “statistical and mathematical analysis.”

The 2002 Dictionary of Social Science (DSS) is an example of a dictionary written with a descriptivist framework which seeks to capture the diverse range of meanings in use at the time of publication. Interestingly though, when it comes to narrating the foundation of behavioral political science, the Whig theme is evident. As is nearly always the case in the narratives I evaluate in the reference materials, the behavioral revolution is not the subject of the entry and is not being explicitly defined. In the DSS the reality and historical significance of the behavioral revolution is taken for granted and its story is cast in a way
that develops the Whig theme. The narrative both draws on and contributes to the mythology of the behavioral revolution and its prescriptive force provides significance to contemporary identities and practices in the discipline. The entry on “political science” is written by the sociologist and historian Craig Calhoun and begins like the *DPA* by invoking the ancient lineage of the discipline. Granting an expansive lineage to the contemporary discipline, Calhoun recounts how “the discipline of political science dates back to the systematic study of states and the social order in ancient Greece” (2002, 367). When Calhoun mentions the behavioral revolution in his entry on “Political Science,” he says, developing Whig theme, that “behavioralism dominated the field [of political science] from the late 1950s to the early 1970s” (368). Although the time period may be taken to imply that the influence of behavioralism is no longer dominant, this is not the gist of the rest of Calhoun’s narrative. Instead, this is a triumphal narrative similar to the one above, focusing on the changes in the discipline after the behavioral revolution including a “broadened conception of politics” which went beyond the state and focused instead “in David Easton’s words, [on] the ‘authoritative allocation of resources’ in the community, however and wherever it occurred” (368). The scope of political science expanded from narrow “political” concerns with institutions and political elites to an interdisciplinary approach, which in Easton’s work centered on the concept of system.

Reflecting changes in the practices of political scientists, Calhoun discusses the introduction of “new methodologies [which] also played an important role, including the development of survey research and quantitative methods” (368). Once again, we see the importance of the behavioral revolution in introducing new practices such as “survey research and quantitative methods” which are today standard and dominant in the
Calhoun continues in a more Whig manner when he says “the ‘behavioral revolution’ was also exported to other countries, where political science was typically a less autonomous field” (368). This expansion of American-style political science is an important legacy of the behavioral revolution which points to the two interrelated ideas of “Americanization” and “Internationalization.” These ideas often serve as tropes in triumphal narratives of a dominant American political science being exported to other countries (e.g. in Western Europe or Japan following WWII). The paradoxical relationship between “internationalization,” implying a growing contribution by political scientists outside of the U.S., and “Americanization,” implying that political science in other countries are becoming more like their American counterparts, will be discussed more fully in Chapters Four and Five.

A final change discussed by Calhoun is another example of the Whig theme of a triumphal behavioralism. “In this context,” Calhoun tells us, “behavioralism provided a means of separating the empirical study of political behavior from the legal, historical, economic, governmental, and philosophical concerns that traditionally informed the study of politics” (368). Here is another link to the dimensions of disciplinary identity and practice associated with the behavioral revolution mythology. The new identity as social science is defined in opposition to the traditional identities. Traditional identities are in Calhoun’s account, “the legal, historical, economic, governmental, and philosophical,” which are terms summarizing the types of practices dominant in the discipline prior to the behavioral revolution. In other words, prior to the revolution, one could identify as a political scientist and a legal scholar, a political scientist and a historical scholar, and so on. As we’ll see repeatedly in this dissertation, within narratives about the foundation of
behavioralism after WWII, authors routinely set up these types of identity relations where one entity – e.g. “traditional concerns” – is used as the conceptual other of the now dominant entity – e.g. “behavioralism.” Closely related in the mythological nexus, identities and practices are repeatedly juxtaposed within the narrative context of the behavioral revolution.

Calhoun ends his narrative with the trope of opponents of behavioralism and the so-called “post-behavioral” movement beginning in the late 1960s. In Calhoun’s narrative, the dominance of behavioralism is challenged beginning in the 1960s. This challenge began, in part, through the skepticism of those who doubted the usefulness of a positivistic version of scientific method for the social and human sciences. Thus, as Calhoun summarizes this point, there were “critiques of behavioralism’s scientific methodology, which lacked an account of how values informed research and the interpretation of ‘facts’” (368). This idea of challenges to behavioralism and the rise of post-behaviorism appear often toward the end of authors’ entries covered in this dissertation. The difference in accounts is often subtle and hinges on whether the author thinks the dominance of behavioralism has been beneficial to the discipline or whether they think that on balance more was lost than gained in the wake of the behavioral revolution.

The Behavioral Revolution in the DPA

I now turn to five entries with mentions of the behavioral revolution found in Plano, Riggs, and Robin’s 1982 DPA. I begin with their entry on “behavioralism” which I supplement with an entry with the same name from Heywood’s 2000 KCP. Following these entries, I discuss four from the DPA: “post-behavioralism,” “empiricism,” “science,”
and “political psychology.” In this section we also witness the continued Whig theme of successful transformation of the profession after the behavioral revolution and the consequent shifts in identities and practices of the discipline. Throughout the section I highlight the way that the mythological nexus of the behavioral revolution is at work providing significance to the experiences and deeds of contemporary political scientists.

Behavioralism  Behavioralism is the subject of a number of entries in reference works. Here I discuss two that specifically mention the behavioral revolution. The DPA (1982) is the earlier example and is written by Plano, Riggs, and Robin. In this entry on “Behavioralism” the Whig theme of triumph and successful revolution is quite evident. The significance of behavioralism is described in terms of the behavioral revolution. As the authors put it, “the behavioral ‘revolution’ in political science, although it had earlier roots, emerged as a major force in the 1950s and consolidated its position in the discipline during the 1960s” (1982, 14). In addition to the “consolidated” position and dominance of behavioralism, the triumphal narrative continues when the authors characterize the debates about the identity of political science. What seems clear in retrospect, the authors observe, is “that behavioralism was more than merely a new approach, that it somehow related to the basic values and objectives concerning the nature of the discipline and how pursuit of knowledge about politics should be conducted” (14).

The behavioral revolution ushered in an entirely transformed way of being a political scientist, changing both the identities of political scientists as well as the dominant practices of the profession. “As the revolution matured,” Plano, Riggs, and Robin explain, “a new behavioral emphasis on methodology and the use of quantitative tools of analysis swept the field of political science” (14). These sweeping changes in the practices of
political scientists “increasingly became the main focus of scholarly efforts, as reflected in journal articles, books, research grants, and professional conferences” (14). The authors proceed to emphasize the triumph of the behavioral revolution in political science: “The changes wrought in the discipline by the behavioral emphasis on scientific methods and perspectives may now be regarded as permanent” (14). Thus, it seems clear the authors think that the new scientific identity has brought about a permanent change featuring the dominance of such associated practices as quantification and statistics. The discipline has permanently adopted a behavioral identity in the sense that it is focused on scientific method guiding practice and employing quantitative methods in the study of politics.

In the *KCP* (2000), Andrew Heywood also has an entry on “Behaviouralism” that mentions the behavioral revolution. Early on, behavioralism focused heavily on the observable or that which could be measured and quantified and was inspired by empirical positivism (Gunnell 1993, pp. 192-195). In its early phases, as an approach to social science, behavioralism is characterized by “the belief that social theories should be constructed only on the basis of observable behavior” (85). Heywood explains how behavioralism “developed out of positivism” and became important to behavioral identities and associated practices such as “the collection of quantifiable data through research surveys, statistical analysis and the construction of empirical theories that have a predictive capacity” (85).

The significance of behavioralism for contemporary political science is to be found in “the so-called ‘behavioral revolution’ of the 1950s” (85). Heywood develops a Whig theme and says the behavioral revolution “made behavioralism the dominant force in US

---

94 Heywood is an English scholar (hence “behavioural”) who has published many books on politics and political theory with Palgrave-MacMillan.
political science and a powerful influence elsewhere, notably in the UK” (85). As is often the case, the mention of the behavioral revolution is used to explain the shift in the discipline away from its traditional roots. The mythological nexus is clearly at work: the identities associated with behavioralism are highlighted in opposition to those associated with traditional political science just as practices associated with behavioralism such as quantification and statistics are opposed to those associated with traditional political science like constitutional analysis and normative theory. Thus, Heywood observes, “the attraction of behavioralism was that it allowed political analysis to break away from its concern with constitutions and normative theory, and gave the study of politics, perhaps for the first time, reliable scientific credentials” (85). Because of the behavioral revolution and its re-orientation of the discipline, behavioral scholars were able to embrace scientific method and the practice of quantification. The newly dominant approach is exemplified “by political analysts such as David Easton (1979), [and the belief] that politics could adopt the methodology of the natural sciences through the use of quantitative research methods in areas such as voting behaviour, and the behaviour of legislators, lobbyists and municipal politicians” (85). In the development of this Whig theme, Calhoun both draws on and contributes to the narrative context of the behavioral revolution, providing significance to experiences and deeds of political scientists, and adding to the prescriptive force of the disciplinary mythology.

**Post-Behavioralism** In the conclusion of their entry on “behavioralism” Plano, Riggs, and Robin mention traditional theory. In the “1960s and 1970s,” the authors say, there “emerged a widespread recognition that policy relevance is also of value and that traditional approaches to the study of politics retain much that is valid and useful” (DPA
Here we see the trope of post-behavioralism which is common throughout dictionary, encyclopedia, and handbooks. Typically found at the end of a narrative, these nods to “post-behavioralism” are often, as it is here, an accommodationist gesture to opponents of behavioralism. The recognition that behavioralism had not been able to maintain its dominance in the discipline, even in its post-behavioral form, becomes more evident in dictionaries published in the 1990s and 2000s. In 1982, the idea of “post-behavioralism” was relatively new, and the authors of the DPA place it in the context of a continuation of disciplinary trends begun with the behavioral revolution.

In the DPA (1982) entry on “Postbehavioralism,” Plano, Riggs and Robin define it as “an intellectual movement in political science, dating from the 1960s, that asserts the obligation of political scientists to become more ‘relevant’ and concerned with values and to use their special knowledge to improve society” (110). The authors define the post-behavioral movement as more of a continuation of the earlier behavioral revolution and its emphasis on the scientific method than rejection or critique (and hence not that “post” behavioral after all): “the postbehavioralists would reverse some of the priorities associated with the behavioralist movement by placing substance before technique, social relevance before pure science, and political action above academic neutrality” (111). Plano, Riggs, and Robin recognize that the post-behavioral movement would “reverse” some of behavioralism’s main tenets and would have some success especially with more methodological critiques of scientific practice (e.g. the fallacy of a fact-value dichotomy). Even so, in the wake of the post-behavioral protest, “the discipline has since moved toward a postbehavioral synthesis in which the values and methods of science, tempered with a realistic appreciation of the limits of scientific inquiry, are joined with a renewed concern
for human values and the applications of political knowledge” (111). Thus, post-behavioralism becomes a more “tempered” and mature form of a still dominant behavioralism focused on the “values and methods of science” and policy relevant research. This narrative of a post-behavioral mitigation of the theoretical and practical excesses of the behavioral revolution is also part of the dominant narrative of revolution and triumph. Even though the behavioral revolution as originally articulated was unable to achieve all its goals for the discipline, it was nevertheless successful enough to permanently change the discipline from a traditional one to a behavioral one, clearly evident in the name chosen for the era of “post-behavioralism.”

Empiricism  An important part of both behavioralism and post-behavioralism is the idea of “empiricism” in political science. Plano, Riggs, and Robin (1982) discuss the definition of empiricism by contrasting it with the adjective “normative.” This is another example of the dimension of identity at work, as empirical and traditional orientations to political science are explicitly opposed to one another. “In political science,” the authors tell us, “empirical theories can be contrasted with normative theories (that is, what *is* in contradistinction to what *ought* to be), and with deductive theories” (43; emphasis in original). Here we see the powerful positivist, empirical-normative dichotomy, which continues to structure discourse and influence the identity of the discipline more broadly. This is a point that I emphasize throughout the dissertation: the idea that the post-behavioral movement in political science shed some of the theoretical excesses of the behavioral revolution and especially its reliance on stronger versions of positivism. Many post-behavioralists explicitly disavowed the so-called “fact-value dichotomy in which early
behavioralists claimed to be able to be “value-neutral” or even “value-free” in their research.

“...This change in orientation,” the authors explain, “...was produced by the behavioral revolution of the 1950s and 1960s, with its emphasis on more rigorous and systematic methods and more precise answers to political questions” (43). The mythological nexus is clear: identities (“orientations”) changed and so did dominant practices in the discipline. In some parts of the discipline, the authors argue, bringing in the dimension of practice, “empiricism is broadly equated with the use of scientific method or the behavioral study of politics” (43). Practices associated with “the use of scientific method” are closely related to behavioral and scientific identities in the mythological nexus of the behavioral revolution. Writing in the early 1980s, the authors give another example of the practices that emerged out of the behavioral revolution: “In recent years, political scientists have emphasized the gathering of facts and the development of empirical theory in contrast to the greater normative concerns of the past” (43). Here too, part of the narrative context, is the development of a Whig theme of triumph of behavioralism and the elevation of scientific method over the more traditional and “normative” concerns of the discipline before the behavioral revolution.

The narrative’s plot is moving from a general claim that political science has embraced the empirical-normative dichotomy in both theory and practice to one of a discipline recognizing the limits of a scientific approach and the stronger version of behavioralism in the 1950s. Once again, Plano, Riggs, and Robin gesture toward post-behavioralism and to the critics of behavioralism. For some in the discipline, the authors relate, the limits of empiricism and empirical theory become evident “when data are
inadequate or their measurement imprecise. In such cases deductive knowledge may prove to be more dependable than empirical knowledge” (1982, 43-44). The limits of empiricism in political science also surface if one considers “normative questions [to be] important to the discipline, and such issues resist resolution by empirical analysis” (44). Here again the authors make a brief nod to those who might be deemed “anti-behavioral” in orientation, either attempting to restore the discipline to its traditional and “normative” state or else working to push the discipline in an altogether different direction.

Science  Plano, Riggs, and Robin begin by relating the significance of “science” in political science and defining it in opposition to “traditional” political science. “Political science has traditionally consisted of a more or less systematized body of knowledge, including a variety of explanatory theories” (138). This body of knowledge and theory is destined to be replaced, as it was left to modern political science to “produce theories subject to empirical verification in a fashion that might be called scientific” (138). It was only in the behavioral period that political science embarked on a truly scientific journey, modeling itself on the theories and practices of other modern social sciences. Thus, the “theory-building approach,” the authors tell us, “through methods that can be replicated by others, has become common (but by no means universal) only since the onset of the behavioral movement in the discipline” (138). The theory-building approach, one gathers, is what others have called “hypothetico-deductivism.” (Godfrey-Smith 2003). Here the goal is to explain the world by coming up with hypotheses which can be falsified, testing those hypotheses using data derived from observation, and so verifying that the hypothesis is either falsified (not true) or unfalsified (true until proven false). The significance of the behavioral revolution to contemporary practices is further elaborated when the authors say
that “dating from the 1950s [political science] is forging a claim to the status of science through increasing concerns for the application of the scientific method” (138). Again, Plano and his associates are reporting a strong version of a positivist methodology that was dominant during the behavioral revolution. This narrative of the behavioral revolution can be read as providing significance to contemporary identities and practices and a contribution to the prescriptive force of the disciplinary mythology.

**Political Psychology** In their entry on “political psychology,” Plano, Riggs, and Robin mention Harold Lasswell. Lasswell is an important biographical referent in the narrative context of the behavioral revolution. Here the narrative discusses how Lasswell pioneered political psychology as an approach and a practice in political science in the 1930’s, typified by the seminal book *Power and Society* (1950), written along with another important behavioralist, Abraham Kaplan. The new field of political psychology “received impetus from, and in turn was a major contributor to, the political science ‘behavioral revolution’ of the 1950s and 1960s” (105). Indicating the triumph of behavioralism the authors, writing in the early 1980s, note how “psychological terms have now become a pervasive part of political science discourse” (105). And while there is a gesture toward post-behavioralism when the authors remind us that political science is a “heterogeneous, pluralistic enterprise,” after the behavioral revolution there is enough of a foothold of psychological studies that “expectations of permanency” are not unfounded (105). Thus a permanent change in the discipline after the behavioral revolution has been the incorporation of political psychology as a distinct research community usually thought of as a specialty within the subfield of American political science.
Biographical Referents  There are two entries focused on the biographies of two major figures of the behavioral revolution: Robert Dahl and Heinz Eulau. In the *American Political Science Dictionary* (APSD 2002), Glenn Utter and Charles Lockhart mention the behavioral revolution twice in two entries devoted to them. Next to Easton, Dahl is the most frequently mentioned in the narrative context of mentions of the behavioral revolution in the reference material I analyze in this dissertation. Indeed, as Utter and Lockhart note, Dahl (1915-2014) was “one of the more influential American political scientists of the postwar period” (75). Dahl was a champion of behavioralism in political science and “he played an important role during the 1960s in leading the behavioral revolution in political science” (75). Dahl received his Ph.D. from Yale University in 1940 and “after military service during World War II he received an appointment at Yale (1946) and taught there until his retirement as professor emeritus” (1986). This is a common experience of members of the behavioral generation, many of whom temporarily left academia and worked for the government on behalf of the war effort during WWII (Baer et al. 1991; Gunnell 1993).

In Chapters Four and Five the invocation of several political scientists – Charles Merriam, Harold Lasswell, David Easton, and Robert Dahl – serves to provide meaning and significance to the behavioral revolution. In narrative theory, this is an example of metonymy, in this case, a person becoming associated with an event, which is common in historical writing and mythological studies. In contemporary political science, these names are part of a mythological nexus and serves to substantiate identities and justify practices.

---

95 Utter (Ph.D. SUNY, Buffalo 1969) is Professor and Chair of Political Science at Lamar University (Texas); and Lockhart (Ph.D. SUNY, Buffalo 1971) is a Professor of Political Science at Texas Christian University.
Eulau was an important figure during the behavioral period even though he was not mentioned enough in the material I examined to be included as a referent to the behavioral revolution. In this entry, Eulau is credited with supporting the behavioral revolution and for his efforts to institutionalize the movement. According to Utter and Lockhart, “Eulau provided great impetus to the political behavior movement of the 1950s and 1960s,” given that he was instrumental “in establishing what is now called the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research [ICPSR]” (108). Utter and Lockhart continue by relating a strong association between the behavioral revolution and the now dominant practices of quantitative and statistical research, noting that even though Eulau was “trained as a political theorist, he strongly advocated the introduction of statistics and research methodology into graduate programs” (108). This is another common experience of behavioral scholars, many of whom wrote political theory dissertations and then went on to reject much of traditional theory preferring to use it as a foil for defining the new approach of behavioralism (Baer et al. 1991; Hauptmann 2005). The link between mythology and practice is evident here as the authors explicitly mention statistics in the context of the behavioral revolution. The practice of doing quantitative research is central to the identity of those who are already using these techniques in the discipline; the origin of these practices is recounted in foundation narratives of the discipline. The dimensions of narrative, identity, and practice constitute the mythological nexus which brings these elements together and providing significance to experiences.

96 While there is some room for debate with respect to the actual level of involvement by Eulau in the establishment of the ICPSR at the University of Michigan, if one takes Eulau’s APSA oral history as authoritative then as the editors recount, Eulau “was instrumental in the establishment of the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research and served as the first chairman of its executive council (1968-70)” (Baer et al. 1991, 179). Of course, this dating in the late-1960s for the “first executive council” seems rather late given the ICPSR was founded in the early-1960s (Emily Hauptmann; Personal Communication).
The Subfield of International Relations

In this section I switch focus to a pair of dictionaries devoted to the subfield of International Relations (IR). Both dictionaries are written by the British scholars Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham: The *Dictionary of World Politics* (*DWP* 1990) and The *Penguin Dictionary of International Relations* (*PDIR* 1998). Given the limited biographical information I found on Evans and Newnham, it is difficult to say whether they welcomed or were critical of the introduction of behavioralism in European IR. In the Preface to the *DWP* the authors do mention that the authors come from opposing identity orientations, saying that Newnham was “coming from a background more sympathetic to the social scientific approach,” while Evans background was in “the classical or traditional aspects” (1998, xi).

These dictionaries tell the story of the behavioral revolution from the perspective of IR and the authors’ interpretation of its impact. In Evans and Newnham’s account of the behavioral period, there are some IR scholars who embraced the behavioral study of international relations while others vigorously opposed it. It is also possible that authors who are not proponents of behavioralism may, in the process of writing about the discipline’s past, construct themes that support the dominant narrative of triumph and revolution. Indeed, authors who draw on the narrative context of the behavioral revolution inevitably contribute to its persistence and ultimately add to the prescriptive force of the mythology.

---

*As of 1998, Graham Evans was a Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Wales, Swansea, and Jeffrey Newnham was also at the University of Wales, Swansea.*
Evans and Newnham’s “Social Science Approach” in the *Dictionary of World Politics* (*DWP* 1990) is a quintessential example of an entry relying on and reinforcing the mythology of the behavioral revolution. The actual mention does not occur until the end of the entry, though the entire entry is full of referents to the behavioral revolution.\(^9_8\) For this entry I trace how the authors develop a historicist theme and one in which the narrative accepts the fact of the behavioral revolution and tries to show how it impacted the subfield of IR in the U.S. and Europe. I also continue to highlight the usage of referents and the way that they reflect the dimensions of identity and practice in the mythological nexus of the behavioral revolution.

The entry title, “The Social Science Approach,” is itself a referent to the behavioral revolution. The authors begin with an important historicist point noting how the discipline of political science had already emerged prior to 1945, when “the most famous faculty was located at the University of Chicago under the leadership of Charles Merriam” (1990, 368). This is an important point found in historicist-themed narratives of the behavioral revolution, which often finds its origin in the work of the so-called “Chicago School” of political science in the 1920s and 1930s (Farr 1995, 210-211). Charles Merriam is often invoked in this narrative since he was so instrumental in establishing the new science of politics at Chicago and since so many of his students would go on to be leaders of the behavioral revolution and hold top positions in the profession (Farr 2007, 92-96; Karl 1974).\(^9_9\) Evans and Newnham’s narrative continues by explicitly mentioning two well-
known students of Merriam at the University of Chicago, Harold Lasswell and Gabriel Almond. Here the repetition of these biographical referents is central to the narrative context developed. Evans and Newnham note how “after 1945 political scientists such as Lasswell (1948) and Almond, nurtured in the Chicago tradition of social science, began to move into international/world politics” (368).100

In the narrative context of the behavioral revolution, the identity dimension of the mythological nexus is often a focus. When authors discuss a period of change or “revolution,” there is a need to say what the new was opposed to and how, in this case, the behavioral approach was able to establish itself in opposition to what was there before or the “traditional” in IR. In Evans and Newnham’s terms, these newer efforts by the Chicago School broke into “a field traditionally reserved for historians, lawyers, philosophers and strategists: the so-called ‘classical’ tradition” (368). The authors claim that these changes in the identities and practices of IR were more evident in the U.S. than in Europe and as examples they mention the journal World Politics founding in 1948, the publication of James Rosenau’s (1961) International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory, and Robert Dahl’s (1961) “The Behavioral Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest.” Of this latter piece, the authors note in passing: “Earlier, Dahl (1961) labeled ‘behavioralism’ as a protest movement” (1990, 369). In Europe, though “the classical tradition was more entrenched and less willing to welcome these changes, preferring to see them as challenges instead” (368). Hedley Bull (1966), for example, is an IR scholar who is commonly cited as an example of “the unfavorable reaction [toward American-style behavioralism] from many European-based scholars”

100 Almond is another important figure in the history of behavioralism in political science, but he is not mentioned in as many entries as the primary biographical referents covered in this dissertation.
For Evans and Newnham, then, “the impact of the growth of a social science of world politics was delayed and somewhat diffused in Europe” (368).

The story of the fortune of behavioralism in Europe is an important subplot in the overall mythology of the behavioral revolution. The idea is that the behavioral revolution would eventually transform political science in Europe. Narratives of this transformation vary, however, with historicist themes focusing on the delayed incorporation after a period of spirited resistance – as seems to be the case in Evans and Newnham’s narrative – to Whig themes celebrating the Americanization of the discipline in Europe after WWII and to such an extent that European departments have modeled themselves on counterparts in American behavioral political science.

Evans and Newnham observe that, within the field of IR, “traditional analysis simply left a vacuum which was filled by borrowing concepts, theories, and techniques of the mainstream social sciences” (1990, 369). If the main plot in a triumphal narrative is one of behavioral dominance after a successful revolution, then another important subplot is the idea that traditional political science in all its subfield specific variations had simply exhausted itself and was awaiting a new movement to sweep away the old. The authors discuss how Easton’s influence was felt in IR. “In 1969, Easton, a leading exponent of the deductive mode of systems analysis, proclaimed a ‘new revolution’ in political science and characterized the epoch as ‘postbehavioral’” (369). Here once again the outer boundary of what is typically considered to be the behavioral revolution is represented by Easton’s 1969 APSR speech “The New Revolution in Political Science.” Easton’s role in “the behavioral

101 Of course, there was also resistance in the U.S. to the incursion of behavioralism into the field of IR. One prominent example is Hans Morgenthau who was at the University of Chicago during the behavioral period and who was a consistent critic of behavioralism in the discipline (Donnelly 1995; Adcock 2007; Little 2007).
approach,” as Evans and Newnham recount, challenged the tendency of political scientists of the 1950s and 1960s to display a type of “‘empirical conservativism.’” The post-behavioral revolution in political science, as conceived by Easton (1969), was a call for “a new emphasis upon the study of values and, conversely, for the abandonment of the value-free approach” (369).

Prior to 1969, Easton’s work is linked with a “definite proliferation of broad-based perspectives and paradigms” in IR (369). Thus, Easton’s emphasis on general theory led to the proliferation of “empirical” theory which is also linked with “a definite proliferation of broad-based perspectives and paradigms [such as] regime analysis, hegemonic stability theory, the society approach, the new interest in power, and dependency theories” (369). In Chapters Four and Five I discuss other entries from the subfield of IR which address this connection between behavioralism and diverse paradigms in IR.

As of the early 1990s, the authors find that “the social science approach” in IR “shows itself to be a buoyant, if somewhat unruly, flock of activities” (369). The field is probably overdue, the authors speculate, for “another round of methodological introspection” much like in the past, when “the behavioral movement post-1945 and the post-behavioral trends of the last two decades” (369). Here the authors have named a common synonym for the behavioral revolution, the behavioral movement, and concluded their contribution to its ongoing mythologization. The behavioral revolution is not the subject of this entry, and is not even mentioned until the very end of the narrative. The mythological nexus of the behavioral revolution is nevertheless clearly on display through

---

102 As Easton himself made clear in his elaboration of “systems theory”; his approach was not limited to the national level and could be extended to study the international or world system (1965a; 1965b).
the significance provided by its narration to contemporary identities and practices in IR. The rise of the “social scientific approach” in IR (an approach very similar to and in some contexts probably synonymous with the behavioral approach to political science in general); draws on the narrative context of the behavioral revolution and adds to the prescriptive force of disciplinary mythology.

Evans and Newnham are also authors of the *PDIR* (1998). Once again this is a dictionary dedicated to IR and in this case the authors mention the behavioral revolution in their entry on “Traditionalism.” This is another example of an entry title that maps onto one of the primary referents to the behavioral revolution. The concepts of “traditionalism” or quite often “traditional theory” are important in the narrative context in which the behavioral revolution is mentioned. In most cases, including the one presented here, tradition is set in opposition to the form of theory and epistemological approaches advocated by proponents of behavioralism. Evans and Newnham develop a historicist theme which neither celebrates or laments the triumph of behavioralism in political science. The mythological nexus is evident as the authors juxtapose theoretical orientations (traditional theory vs. empirical theory) and their association with practices associated with them (e.g. the employment of “intuitive, subjective judgments unsupported by empirical evidence”). Thus, Evans and Newnahm discuss how traditionalism is “sometimes called the ‘classical’ or ‘non-scientific’ approach [as it came] to describe the methodological position adopted by opponents of the behavioral revolution in the study of international relations” (540-541). For example, behavioral IR scholars like Kaplan (1966) criticized traditionalists for their overreliance “on idiosyncratic, highly personalized insights from history, philosophy, political theory and law and consequently tend to employ intuitive,
subjective judgments unsupported by empirical evidence to explain international phenomena” (541). In the reference material, the opposition of empirical theory to traditional theory is quite common and forms a central pillar of the narrative context of the behavioral revolution.

The mythological nexus of the behavioral revolution is also at work. Especially relevant here is the dimension of identity which defines one entity in opposition to another. The new behavioral theory or approach to political science is contrasted to the “traditional” approach or theory. In short, the “traditional” weaknesses are overcome through the adoption of/adaptation to behavioralism. In this entry, the vehicle for the message is the foundation narrative about the origin of contemporary IR. The prescriptive force of the mythology is evident here as the narrative works to provide significance to present identities and practices by recounting how behavioralism came to predominate in the subfield of IR. When viewed retrospectively, it seems clear that behavioral practices have been legitimated in IR (in both the U.S. and Europe). These practices are explicitly mentioned when the authors talk about the way the newly marginalized traditionalists responded to the assault on their profession by the behavioralists. In the authors’ terms, these traditional scholars became anti-behavioral and argued “that scientific methods involving strict standards of proof and verification, quantification, measurement and the construction of hypothetical models are wholly inappropriate when dealing with a subject matter that involves human purpose” (541).103

Scientific method and increasing use of quantitative methods are the hallmarks of behavioralism and the practices which came to dominate IR. As I discuss throughout this

103 The authors do not explicitly name the “traditionalists” they have in mind, although they do provide a citation to Hedley Bull (1966).
dissertation, these practices and their retrospective legitimization through historical narratives both creates and maintains contemporary professional identities as it does to legitimate and maintain dominant practices like quantitative methods.

The Subfield of Political Theory

In this section, I discuss three entries titled “Political Theory.” These entries are found in the *Blackwell Dictionary of Twentieth-Century Social Thought* (BDTST 1993), the dictionary *Key Concepts in Politics* (*KCP* 2000), and the *Dictionary of Political Analysis* (*DPA* 1982). As a subfield, political theory has thoroughly differentiated itself from the mainstream of contemporary political science. One reason for this differentiation is the marginalization of contemporary political theory after the behavioral revolution (Gunnell 2011). Many of the proponents of behavioralism were trained in the traditional mode of political theory, but for various reasons they were unsatisfied with their “traditional” training in the history of political thought (Gunnell 1993; Hauptmann 2005). One common manifestation of this dissatisfaction among the behavioral revolutionaries was an outright rejection of traditional political theory and a searching for a new type of theory they were struggling to define (Easton 1953; Dahl 1961; Baer et al. 1991). The definition and identity of “theory” in political science continues to be contested. This tension and uncertainty with respect to the meaning and significance of political theory within contemporary political science is manifested in a central pillar of the narrative context of the behavioral revolution. In terms of the mythological nexus, authors repeatedly juxtapose different versions of political theory and link them to associated practices. Thus, in the course of the contest over the identity of theory its meaning is
defined in opposition to what it is not. For example, the new behavioral theory in all its variants is routinely defined against an often caricatured monolithic “traditional” political theory.

The *BDTST* (1993), which is a general dictionary devoted to 20th-century “social thought,” contains an entry on “Political Theory” written by the European political theorist David Miller. Miller’s narrative is an example of one that develops a historicist theme and begins with a discussion of positivism. Throughout this section, the positivist movement is an especially important trope for political theorists recounting the foundation narrative of the behavioral revolution. Positivism allows historicist authors to push back the standard timeline of the dominant narrative of the behavioral revolution, typically dated from the 1950s and early 1960s, back to the 1930s and 1940s. With its focus on deductive and general theory, the accumulation of facts, and separation of facts and values in research, positivism in political science allows a more historicist explanation for the existence and contemporary dominance of practices such as quantitative methods, statistics, and other practical manifestations of efforts to adhere to and apply scientific method to the world of politics.

Positivism also serves, in many cases, to explain the rise of the social sciences and its role as an important impetus for political scientists to abandon traditional orientations and approaches. During the behavioral revolution there was a marginalization of practices not central to the new social sciences in the U.S. after WWII. The groundwork for this marginalization was laid in the positivist movement of the 1920s and 1930s. The positivist movement in political science, Miller observes, “had the immediate implication that all

---

prescriptive and value judgments, including the judgments about different forms of society and government offered by political theory, were subjective in character; in the most extreme version, they were seen simply as expression of personal feeling” (1993, 488; emphasis added). In terms of the prescriptive/descriptive binary I opened this chapter with, Miller is saying that positivism led to a descriptivist turn in political theory. Thus, the impact of positivism on political theory was two-fold: “philosophers turned their attention away from problems in ethics and political theory to concentrate on logic, epistemology, philosophy and (later) philosophy of language” (488). On the other hand, Miller continues, “social scientists attempt to develop a purely empirical science of social behavior, freed of all evaluative elements” (488). This latter attempt to emulate a positivist model in social science, Miller recalls, “was especially marked in political science, where the postwar years witnessed the so-called ‘behavioral revolution,’ the application of quantitative methods to political phenomena such as voting behavior with the aim of creating a science of politics on positivist lines” (488). Here the mythological nexus is explicit as new identities and practices emerged in the wake of the behavioral revolution. Political science increasingly embraced quantitative practices and a positivist ontology.

With philosophers and social scientists working in the grip of positivism, traditional political theory suffered to such an extent that its “viability … as an intellectual enterprise” was called into question. Miller also invokes the “death” of political theory, a common narrative trope, when he says these changes in identities and practices are “epitomized in the title of an essay by the English political philosopher Isaiah Berlin, ‘Does Political Theory Still Exist?’ (1962)” (488). Here is a common idea often expressed in narratives about the history of political science. There are signs that Miller may not be sympathetic
to the changes in the discipline after the behavioral revolution. Miller’s entry is rather historicist and descriptivist in nature. The invocation of the “death” of political theory in his dictionary entry on “political theory” signals that Miller is at least aware of the less optimistic and sometimes quite pessimistic ways that political theorists have interpreted the triumph and dominance of behavioralism after WWII. Indeed, the so-called “death” of political theory is a standard trope for “traditional” political theorists trying to understand their sense of marginalization after the behavioral revolution. These narratives and the accompanying theme of lament and loss after the behavioral revolution are more common outside the reference material.  

Another entry on “Political Theory” emphasizes the positivist movement and its relation to the behavioral revolution is written by Andrew Heywood in his KCP (2000). Heywood’s entry, like Miller’s above, develops a historicist theme that explains the behavioral revolution growing out of the context of the positivist movement in the social sciences. Heywood’s narrative about the history of political theory recounts how “the status of political theory was seriously damaged in the twentieth century by the rise of positivism and its attack upon the very normative concepts that had been its chief subject matter” (99). Heywood recognizes that though the claim that political theory was dead or dying “in the 1950s and 1960s is an exaggeration,” there were nevertheless momentous changes to the identities and practices of political scientists during this period. It was “the onset of the ‘behavioral revolution,’” Heywood continues to explain, “and the passion for all things scientific persuaded many political analysts to turn their backs upon the entire

105 The texts I have in mind are “epic” and anti-behavioral writing such as Wolin 1969 – see Chapter 1 of this dissertation, “The Behavioral Revolution in the Discourse of the Discipline.”
106 The KCP is unique in that it is the only “dictionary” that does not have that designation in its title, but the book is clearly organized as a dictionary.
tradition of normative thought” (99). Here we see the mythological nexus at work through the interrelationship between identities and practices: empirical and scientific opposed to traditional and normative. Importantly, Heywood does recognize that the “passion” for positivist science waned somewhat after the 1960s and “the previously sharp distinction between political science and political theory has faded” (99). The subfield of political theory is strongly differentiated both at the level of identity and the level of practice from the mainstream of the discipline (Gunnell 1993). Interestingly, however, both mainstream political science and the subfield continue to narrate the behavioral revolution in ways that substantiate identity, legitimate practices, and contribute to its ongoing mythologization.

In their effort to establish an authoritative voice, authors writing entries in reference works speak for the mainstream of the discipline or their respective subfields. Thus far in this section, I discussed two entries on “political theory” written by practicing political theorists. Both Miller and Heywood take for granted the dominant narrative of the triumph of behavioralism in political science after WWII. It is entirely plausible that neither Miller nor Heywood are celebrating behavioralism but, and this is the crucial point, they are nevertheless forced by historical circumstance to recognize the rise of behavioralism and its ongoing power shaping both disciplinary identities and justifying dominant practices. Since behavioralism or its post-behavioral variant are central to dominant identities and practices, authors of reference material must start from that recognition which, in turn, forces them to contribute to the behavioral revolution mythology through the repetition of referents and themes. Importantly, despite the descriptivist intent of the dictionary, the presence of the mythology of the behavioral revolution is accompanied by a prescriptive force that provides significance to contemporary identities and practices. In order to be
true to the descriptivist purpose of a dictionary entry on “political theory,” moreover, both authors have found it necessary to recount the main outlines of the narrative of successful revolution. This is true as long as an important caveat is kept in mind: they do so with the addition of the trope of the “death” of political theory which is well-known among political theorists, and is a narrative which helps provide significance to a sense of marginalized identities and practices among political theorists today.

I conclude this section with the chronologically earliest entry is written by Plano, Riggs, and Robin in the *DPA* (1982). Though these authors are not political theorists, their entry on “political theory” is a good representation of how mainstream behavioral scholars viewed the subfield in the early 1980s.\(^{107}\) It is also instructive to see how Plano et al.’s discussion of political theory differs from Miller and Heywood’s accounts above. Unlike Miller and Heywood’s historicist accounts, this entry clearly contributes to the Whig theme of behavioral dominance after WWII. The entry also contains the most developed narrative on the impact of the behavioral revolution on the subfield of political theory and clearly demonstrates the behavioral revolution mythology at work in contemporary dictionaries of political science.

Discussing the significance of political theory for political science in general, the authors say that “every viable discipline requires a body of theory to give order, focus, and meaning to its subject matter” (109). This role of giving order and standardization was fulfilled by empirical theory which increasingly supplanted traditional theory. “In the wake of the behavioral revolution,” the authors explain, “empirical theory – with its attachment to the scientific method – virtually eclipsed the rationalist and normative concerns of political science.

\(^{107}\) This point is evident in how well the authors’ narrative of the behavioral revolution with respect to the subfield of political theory compares to the narratives of other authors more firmly located within the subfield.
political philosophy as the central subject of the discipline” (109). Here the dimensions of identity and practices are evident. “Political philosophy” stands in for political theory and is clearly opposed to a triumphal “empirical theory,” which is linked to practices associated with the scientific method and that are defined in opposition to traditional practices and its “rationalist and normative concerns.”

The authors continue with another common trope in this context, the story of resistance by minority sects within political science against behavioral hegemony beginning in the 1970s (Almond 1990). One key indicator of this ongoing resistance, and the rise of “post-behavioralism,” was a growing rejection of key aspects of the behavioral credo – the “fact-value” dichotomy and a strict separation between the “empirical” and the “normative” components of political analysis (Dahl 1961). For a time during the behavioral revolution, it appeared that the empirical and normative could be strictly separated. The empirical could remain the focus of analysis, while the normative implications were bracketed and left unspoken, implicit, and for the reader to infer. As of 1982, however, the authors think it is fair to say that “most political scientists now recognize that the discipline can gain intellectual strength, more practical relevance, through a synthesis (or at least peaceful coexistence) of the empirical and philosophical systems of thought” (109).

This is another example of what has become a relatively common accommodationist trope in the mythology of the behavioral revolution. This accommodationist stance was also evident in the DPA as Plano et al. routinely mention the trope of anti-behavioralism, here coming from the subfield of political theory, managing to force some concessions from behavioralists leading to the so-called “post-behavioral”
era we live in today. After the counter-revolution of anti-behavioralists and the proclamation of a “new revolution” by Easton in 1969, it seemed the days of a strong positivist version of behavioralism may have been numbered, and space may have been opening up for more diverse and eclectic forms of theory and practice in contemporary political science. Indeed, this trope of diversity and eclecticism seems to be the “rhetoric of the day;” even as the behavioral revolution mythology continues to be as powerful as ever (Connolly 1967). This paradox is made possible by the powerful nexus of narrative, identity, and practice that constitute the mythology of the behavioral revolution. This is so because mythology supports dominant behavioral practices and identities, while allowing for and accommodating fragmentation on the periphery.

Authors recounting the history of political science are hard pressed to resist the prescriptive force of the behavioral revolution mythology. They must draw on and contribute to the narrative context of the behavioral revolution in order to talk about it and in the process they contribute to the production of significance for contemporary identities and practices integral to its mythological nexus.

The foundation narrative of contemporary political science continues to draw on images of “science” inspired by the positivist movement of the 1930s and 1940s in the U.S.

---

108 The phrase “rhetoric of the day,” for example, is used by the political theorist William Connolly in his 1967 Political Science and Ideology: “Thus conflict theorists claim that the consensus approach fails to distinguish the legitimation of power as expressed in the dominant rhetoric of the day from the actual hard facts of coercive power” (15); Nelson 1998).

109 In a recent “reflections symposium” in Perspectives on Politics dedicated to understanding the Perestroika movement of the early 2000s in political science, Kristen Renwick Monroe says it was successful in allowing a “shift in the discipline’s attitude toward methodological pluralism” (2015, 423). On the other hand, the movement failed in shifting the mainstream of political science as measured by its success in “challenging the existing power structure” of the APSA which “remains elitist, still dominated by the traditionally-prestigious universities” (424). Monroe concludes that the Perestroika movement is ongoing, and it “constitutes a battle that even now remains to be fought. Sadly, it can still be lost, to the detriment to us all” (424).
Positivism was particularly important to the founders of behavioralism’s conception of what “science” ought to be – i.e. rigorous, systematic, hypothesis driven and deductive. These stronger versions of a positivist political science are reflected in the political theory entries reviewed in this chapter. Plano and his associates recount the narrative of the behavioral revolution from a triumphal perspective but are also forced by historical circumstances to recognize the mitigation of earlier stronger versions after the so-called “post-behavioral revolution” (Easton 1969). At the same time, but coming from very different perspectives, Miller and Heywood, recount a similar narrative only with the addition of the “death” of political theory trope. Thus, we see in each case the success of the behavioral revolution in changing dominant identities and practices leading to the recounting of similar narratives.

“A myth typically expresses itself through variants,” Bottici and Challand explain, “in each context the same narrative pattern must generate different variants in order to accommodate the new circumstances” (2010). In the context of narratives about the behavioral revolution, in other words, authors from different subfields and different power perspectives (whether mainstream or not) must take the historical reality of behavioral dominance seriously even as they work in different ways of recounting the story “to accommodate the new circumstance.” The “new circumstance,” of course, points to the perspective of the author in question as well as their hoped for contribution of their entry, whether to celebrate behavioral dominance or merely to recount it as a fact. In both cases, however, the behavioral revolution mythology is strengthened and its potential for influencing contemporary practices and identities is further consolidated.
The Behavioral Revolution Mythology in Contemporary Dictionaries

Mythology is a discursive process that takes the form of authoritative speech (Martin 1989; Bottici 2007). The prescriptive force of narratives about the behavioral revolution arises out of the significance produced by its mythological nexus and authors’ creative appropriation and contribution to its narrative context. The prescriptive force of the narratives of the behavioral revolution is explicit in the early dictionaries by Plano et al. Later dictionaries expressly take a descriptivist turn even though when it comes to narratives about the behavioral revolution authors are drawn into a mythological nexus, as they are impelled to draw on and contribute to a common narrative context. As I established in Chapter Two, authors rely on the authoritative speech afforded by mythology which works to bring together a community’s foundation narratives, its identity, and practices. This conjunction of dimensions forms a mythological nexus in which foundation narratives interact with identities and practices. The mythological nexus is extremely powerful and tends to reinforce itself over time, especially since it provides significance to the experiences of members of the academic community. This is the essence of a political theory of mythology and it helps explain why contemporary political scientists continue to recount the narrative of the behavioral revolution as the refoundation of the discipline in the 1950s and early to mid-1960s.

The behavioral revolution mythology is made up of historical narratives about the refoundation of the discipline after WWII. These foundation narratives are important for individual and community identities. Sometimes, writers of reference books explicitly recognize this, as did political scientist Aaron B. Wildavsky in his Forward to the *American Political Science Dictionary (APSD 2005)*, where he notes how “inevitably, our personal
identities are wrapped up in and expressed through our collective persona” (viii). Both individuals and communities construct identities from historical narratives; none are more important than foundation narratives like that of the behavioral revolution (Farr 1988, 1995). Finally, these two dimensions interact with a practical dimension of mythology. Since a majority of members of the community also understand the same practices to be authoritative, their repetition in narrative helps justify dominant practices vital to professional identities after the behavioral revolution.

When Plano and Greenberg (*APD* 2002) place the idea of being more scientific alongside the practice of adhering to scientific method they are linking scientific identity to practices understood to be representative of the discipline. These two interacting elements are joined by a third: foundation narratives. Foundation narratives are about the origin of the community, its principal architects, what challenges were overcome, what institutions were built, and which ideas came to predominate in the discipline. The narratives discussed in this chapter all place the foundation of contemporary political science in the behavioral era. Such narratives reinforce identities that are already preeminent in the community; this fact takes on added significance by justifying dominant practices in the performance of political science.

The foundation narratives discussed in this chapter are written for reference works and are meant to be authoritative and general enough to appeal to a large audience within the discipline. Outside the reference work literature there are many writings which work

---

110 Wildavsky was a public policy scholar who was Chair of Political Science at the University of California, Berkley (1966-1969), president of the APSA (1985-1986), and founding Dean of the Graduate School of Public Policy (1969-1977) at Berkeley. I have not found any mentions of the behavioral revolution in the *APSD*.  

167
to subvert these dominant narratives. These types of narratives are structured by a theme of lament and/or loss after the behavioral revolution. Overall, however, I have found very few narratives in dictionaries, encyclopedias, or handbooks that develop a lament theme. This may be because their basic force subverts the mainstream of the discipline and therefore may be interpreted as either inappropriate for a reference work or simply wrong and therefore not worthy of inclusion.

In this chapter, I have shown the extent to which contemporary dictionaries of political science rely on the mythology of the behavioral revolution in their foundation narratives. I demonstrated how dominant behavioral practices are repeatedly invoked in different disciplinary contexts through authors’ foundation narratives. These same practices, such as statistical analysis or survey research, are performed by political scientists with the tacit knowledge that those actions stand a high chance of being accepted by their peers. This tacit dimension is made possible by mythology both in the discourse of the discipline (as reflected here in dictionaries) and in those practices integral to professional standing and disciplinary identity (Polanyi 1983). In the course of matriculation, for example, dominant practices as reflected in course work as well as in the research methods one learns, are internalized and inevitably influence one’s identity or sense of self as a member of the community (Abbott 2010). More importantly, these dominant practices are reflected in the dictionary entries because reference works are meant to be authoritative and to be a representation of the collective wisdom of the large mainstream in the discipline. In other words, it makes sense that political scientists today

---

111 See Chapter One for a discussion of literature that works to subvert the dominant narrative of triumph and revolution after the behavioral revolution.

112 On the theme of lament and loss, see Chapter One pp. 52-53.
continue to take on a scientific identity and have organized their professional practices around that identity, because these are already dominant in the discipline. Part of the reason they are and continue to be dominant in the discipline is due to the mythology of the behavioral revolution.

As I have begun to demonstrate in this chapter, and will continue to show in Chapters Four and Five, the behavioral revolution mythology influences the future course of the community by setting boundaries on widely accepted standards of professional excellence as well as establishing expectations about the types of practices that are appropriate to the profession today. For example, when Plano, Riggs, and Robin discuss the “change in orientation” toward a more empirical political science, I read this as a change in the identity of the discipline (1982, 43). This change in identity is linked to practices when Plano, Riggs, and Robin say “this change in orientation was produced by the behavioral revolution” (33). The link to changes in practices, in turn, is evident when they say the behavioral revolution had an “emphasis on more rigorous and systematic methods and more precise answers to political questions” (33).

In sum, all three dimensions of mythology work simultaneously through narratives about the foundation of the discipline which together legitimate practices and thereby construct and maintain dominant forms of identity. I argue that this justification is forged through practice and an iterative process characterized by repetition of elements as well as creative modification brought about in a complex disciplinary feedback process. This process of discipline-making is evident in the way the behavioral revolution is portrayed in reference materials like dictionaries. The prescriptive force of the behavioral revolution mythology is part of this process and ensures that political scientists will continue to rely
on it in their own contributions to the discourse of the discipline. The mythological nexus is an example of *poesis* or “making” in which authors from a variety of disciplinary positions construct narratives, identities, and practices. In effect, mythology *makes* human communities through the authoritative speech it allows in a community’s discourse – especially foundation narratives which answer questions important to identity and associated practices. One major goal of this dissertation is to show that this mythological process is in fact at work in the discipline and more specifically in reference works.
CHAPTER IV

THE BEHAVIORAL REVOLUTION MYTHOLOGY IN ENCYCLOPEDIAS

“Encyclopedias, those anthologies of received ideas” (Calame 2003, 3).

Introduction

The modern definition of “encyclopedia” derives from the ancient Greek (egkuklios paidei) which meant “general education.” In her introduction to the Encyclopedia of Government and Politics, the political theorist Mary Hawkesworth says of the encyclopedia genre: “Although the concept originates from the Greek egkuklios paidei or general education, the notion of an encyclopedia in contemporary parlance invokes a far more ambitious and political project” (2004, 4). This “political project” was evident in Chapter Three and the efforts of Plano and his associates to compile an authoritative and standardized dictionary for political science. This effort to prescribe the language of the discipline has more recently been moderated by the now more common effort to describe the language in use of the discipline at the time of composition. Despite the explicit effort to compile encyclopedias in a descriptivist and non-prescriptive way, when it comes to narratives about the behavioral revolution, the prescriptive force of the mythological nexus is at work. In the encyclopedia entries I analyze in this chapter, there is more of a tendency to describe the discipline and its subfields, but I will also highlight examples of

113 Among the first modern encyclopedias are the British Cyclopaedia (1728), the French Encyclopédia (1762), and the Encyclopedia Americana (1838). In his classic The Myth of the Britannica, Harvey Einbinder says “although ‘encyclopaedia’ is a Greek word meaning ‘learning in a whole circle,’ or a complete system of education in the arts and sciences, the modern idea of an encyclopedia was unknown to the Greeks” (1964, 19). See also Sica (2001).
prescriptivism. Often the prescriptive force of an entry only becomes evident when mythology is brought into the analytic frame. It is also important to keep in mind that even if there is little overt effort to prescribe goals for political science, there is always the power of selection and exclusion. Authors choose what to discuss in their entries and what not to discuss and this selectivity is an exercise of power and part of the “political project” Hawkesworth describes.

In this chapter, I focus on the narrative context and the mythological nexus of the behavioral revolution. Consisting of the repetition and variation of common narrative elements of subfield, referent, and theme, the narrative context signals that a mythology may be at work. The mythological nexus, in turn, provides significance to the experiences of political scientists and explains why the behavioral revolution continues to figure prominently in the discourse of the discipline. The first portion of the chapter focuses on the framework for selecting and evaluating encyclopedia entries. The substantive parts of this chapter focus on the mentions of the behavioral revolution and the narrative elements which accompany each mention. By analyzing the narrative context of mentions of the behavioral revolution across encyclopedia entries, and linking them to the dimensions of narrative, identity, and practice which comprise the mythological nexus, I am able to demonstrate the existence of the mythology of the behavioral revolution in contemporary political science.

General Selection Criteria

In academic political science today, the foundational narrative often repeated in speech and writing is the story of the behavioral revolution. I evaluate thirty-five mentions
of the behavioral revolution across eight encyclopedias and sixteen entries. In this chapter, I rely on evidentiary material drawn from eight general encyclopedias. These are the *most general* reference works available; all contain entries on “political science” or its major subfields which rely on historical narratives about the impact of the behavioral revolution on the intellectual and institutional development of the discipline. By “most general,” I mean that the encyclopedias are addressed to all social scientists, to all political scientists, or to all political scientists within a subfield. The encyclopedias that meet the criteria of most general are listed chronologically in Table 4. These eight encyclopedias make up the full universe of most general encyclopedias from the contemporary period, 1980-2013:

Table 8
Most General Encyclopedias

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Encyclopedias</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Encyclopedia of Political Science (EPS, 2010, CQ Press)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I identified five characteristics that make up the criterion for “most general.” Once again, the general selection criterion I developed are:

1) The reference work is on political science in general.
2) The reference work is on the subfields in general.
3) The entries are on political science in general.
4) The entries are on the subfields in general.
5) The entry contains mentions of the behavioral revolution

First, the reference work must appeal to all political scientists regardless of subfield, specialty, or national context. The *International Encyclopedia of Social Science (IESS)* and the *International Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral Sciences (IESBS)* are most general in this respect since they appeal to all social and political scientists. At a second level of generality, reference works may be tailored specifically to political science in general. The *International Encyclopedia of Political Science (IEPS)* and the *Encyclopedia of Political Science (EPS)* share similar aspirations towards generality as the previously mentioned *IESS* and *IESBS* only with respect to political science in the US and the world. The *EPS* and the *IEPS* are the only encyclopedias that are specifically focused on the discipline of political science in general. The *Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Theory (BEPT)* and the *Encyclopedia of Political Theory (EPT)* are both focused on the subfield of political theory, and as expected also contain historical narratives about political science.

---

114 The *IESBS* is explicitly mentioned by the general editor of the *IESS* William Darity who says in his Introduction: “Closer to the intent and philosophy to the second *IESS* is the *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences* (2001) edited by Neil Smelser and Paul Baltes. This extensive, high-quality reference work also is predicated on the ‘experts’ culture dictating the content of the encyclopedia” (2008, xiv).

115 The French philosopher Denis Diderot famously comments on how he felt his *Encyclopédie* (1762) “will surely produce an intellectual revolution,” and one can reasonably expect that this is similarly the intention of modern editors of academic encyclopedias (quoted in the *IEPS* 2011, li).
after the behavioral revolution. There are three internationally focused encyclopedias, the already mentioned IESS, the IEPS, and the IESBS. Finally, there is the Encyclopedia of Government and Politics (EGP), and the Oxford Encyclopedia of American Political and Legal History (OEAPLH), whose titles where general enough to draw my attention and in which I have discovered historical narratives about political science after the behavioral revolution. In practice, this means I have included entries which contain historical narratives and mentions of the behavioral revolution that are (1) on political science in general, (2) on the major subfields in general, or (3) entries are related specifically to the behavioral revolution in political science (e.g. Adcock on “Behavioralism” in the EPT116). In total I cover eight encyclopedias, sixteen entries, and thirty-five mentions of the behavioral revolution.

Absence and Exclusion

I systematically searched the front matter of every general encyclopedia that I encountered. Many of the editors’ prefaces and introductions did not contain foundational narratives or mention the behavioral revolution in political science. One example of this is the EPT edited by Mark Bevir.117 There are no mentions of the behavioral revolution in the introductory material written by Bevir, even though in other venues he has used the term quite liberally (Bevir 2010; Adcock, Bevir, and Stimson 2007). Other examples of

---

116 There are two other entries devoted to the subject of behavioralism: Vassilev (IESS 2008) “Political Science, Behavioral,” and Falter (IEPS 2011) “Behavioralism.”
117 Bevir is a Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for British Studies at the University of California, Berkeley.
general encyclopedias are the *EGP*, edited by Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan\(^{118}\); and the *EPS*, edited by George Thomas Kurian, James E. Alt, Simone Chambers, Geoffrey Garret, Margaret Levi, and Paula McClain.\(^{119}\) In the *EPS* there is a preface by Kurian and an introduction by Alt, Chambers, Garret, Levi, and McClain, but there are no mentions of the behavioral revolution. These entries and many like them have thus been excluded because they did not meet one or more of the general selection criteria discussed above.

My primary task has been to find and analyze narratives about the behavioral revolution. Due to the general selection criteria developed in this dissertation most of the contemporary encyclopedias available have been excluded and are absent from my analysis. Given the large number of contemporary encyclopedias available, I could not possibly cover them all. In their introduction to the *IESBS*, for example, Neil Smelser and Paul Baltes discuss the “encyclopedia ‘industry,’” and they note how though their own Amazon search yielded “nearly 6,000 encyclopedias for purchase,” most of these are made for specialist audiences, “covering only delineated subparts of disciplines and topical areas of inquiry” (2001, xiviii). The editors have something else in mind for their encyclopedia which is a “continuous effort to assemble the whole range of knowledge – vast and complex as it is – of the social and behavioral sciences in one place” (xiviii). This is another

---

\(^{118}\) Hawkesworth is a Distinguished Professor of Political Science and Gender Studies at Rutgers University. At the time of publication, Maurice Kogan (1930-2007) was a Professor Emeritus of Government and Public Administration at Brunel University, London. I have classified this encyclopedia a general encyclopedia on the subfield of political theory. Hawkesworth provides an introduction titled “Political Science in a New Millennium: Issues of Knowledge and Power,” but she does not refer to the behavioral revolution.

\(^{119}\) Kurian has been editor for a large number of reference works and is the founder and president of the Encyclopedia Society; Alt is a Professor of Government at Harvard University; Chambers is a Professor of Political Science at Toronto University; Garrett was Vice Provost and Dean of UCLA International Institute; Levi is a Professor of International Studies at the University of Washington; and McClain is a Professor of Political Science at Duke University.
important reason I developed the “most general” category. By design, I am only looking at the most general of all available encyclopedias.

Many other encyclopedias deal with the subject matter of political science but do so from more specialized perspectives. For example, there are other encyclopedias in political science like the *Encyclopedia of Power* (2011), the *Encyclopedia of Politics, the Media, and Popular Culture* (2009), the *Encyclopedia of Women and American Politics* (2008), the *Encyclopedia of Latin American Politics* (2002), etc. Yet it is unlikely that these more specialized reference works will contain entries on the discipline in general. Nevertheless, I specifically searched each one of these encyclopedias and as expected none of them contained general entries on political science and the major sub-fields or mentions of the behavioral revolution. I have therefore excluded these more specialized encyclopedias at the outset since they are unlikely to contain historical narratives about the behavioral revolution and on the grounds that they do not aspire to speak to all of contemporary political science. As I explain more fully below, I do not regard them as authoritative either for all political science or even for the specific subfields covered in this dissertation.

**Authoritativeness and Encyclopedias**

For this dissertation I developed five characteristics of authoritativeness that that emerge from the relationship between authority and generality. The first three are
general characteristics of authoritateness, while the fourth and fifth are specific manifestations of the desire to be authoritative in reference works:

1) The reference work is general and meant for all members of the mainstream of the community addressed.

2) The ideas and practices covered in the reference material are meant to reinforce and reflect the “practical wisdom” of the mainstream.

3) The high level of agreement on terms and their predominant meaning that reinforce and reflect the “common sense” of the mainstream.

4) Authority is shown by including high-profile, high-status members of the community as editors of the reference work and of individual entries.

5) Authority is shown by including as many “international” authors as possible.

These characteristics of authoritateness and authors’ explicit attempts to conform to them are evident in front matter of several encyclopedias discussed in this chapter. Entries on political science are authoritative in that the subject matter covered is general enough to appeal to a non-specialized audience. In other words, these entries are meant to accurately reflect the development and current state of the discipline of political science and in such a way that most contemporary political scientists would accept as authoritative.

In the preface of the *EPS*, for example, the editor in chief George Kurian says the encyclopedia was published by CQ Press in association with the APSA and “is an authoritative resource for political scientists and students of politics throughout the world”

---

120 These criteria of “authoritateness” are also important in handbooks. In Chapter Five, I discuss how handbooks, though the editors are all senior and often drawn from an international pool of political scientists, many of the individual entries written by more junior political scientists.
Once again, the encyclopedia has met the characteristics of authoritativeness because it has issued from high-profile and prestigious institutions and is meant for all political scientists “throughout the world.” Kurian does not comment specifically on what makes the encyclopedia authoritative, but he does implicitly invoke the first and second characteristic when he says the EPS is intended to be a “flagship” and “foundational resource for political science,” which is “primarily synchronic,” focused on contemporary trends, and so “presents the state of the art” in contemporary political science (lv).

Entries are authoritative since the authors most often selected by the editorial team are senior in academic rank, well-established, and presumably most capable of writing an authoritative entry on the scope and nature of the discipline of political science. That the entries are nearly always written by senior, well-established members of the discipline is related to the fact that these authors of subfield entries are often well-known specialists in the area on which the entry focuses. Specifically in the development of the social sciences in the U.S., specialization fosters expertise and this expertise is a source of authority and power. Seniority and specialization factors definitely make up a portion of the reference materials’ authoritativeness. There is little by way of overt declaration that only senior, well-established and positioned authors were chosen, but as I will comment on in footnotes for each author, the general editors and the vast majority of authors meet this standard.

In their introduction to the IESBS, for example, Neil Smelser and Paul Baltes begin by saying: “For several hundred years, encyclopedias have been a respected mode of

---

121 The APSA was pivotal to the production of the EPS as the organization “nominated the five members of the editorial board, and APSA’s membership formed the principal source for contributors” (lvii).
123 Of the eighteen General Editors, only Phillip Vander Meer is not a full professor; he coedited the OEAPLH with Donald Critchlow. Of the thirteen entry authors covered, Rossen Vassilev, Robert Adcock, and Thomas Biebricher are not full professors.
publication. In them, authors judged to be experts attempt to present the best of learned knowledge and scientific evidence they have to offer” (2001, xxxi). This twenty-six volume encyclopedia relies upon hundreds of experts to bring the state of the art to its pages and it is a good representation of how encyclopedias present authoritative knowledge. As we saw in Chapter Three, one manifestation of the desire to be authoritative is inclusion of high-ranking professionals from prestigious institutions in the discipline. Exhibiting aspects of each of the characteristics of authoritativeness, the editors tell us, this encyclopedia is also “meant to be comprehensive [with an] emphasis on Catholicism and on the truth value of the arguments and evidence” (xxxi).

**Authority and Internationality** Another aspect that lends an authoritative hue to these encyclopedia entries is the “international” scope of authors selected as well as their intended audience. Of the eight encyclopedias I’ve covered in this chapter, over a third are styled as international in nature: the *IESBS*, the *IESS*, and the *IEPS*. The international scope allows these encyclopedias to speak to political scientists around the world – presumably presenting a definitive image of the discipline – and one that scholars on (at least) both sides of the Atlantic would agree on. The *IEPS* is a general encyclopedia on contemporary political science edited by Bertrand Badie, Dirk Berg-Schlosser, and

---

124 Neil Smelser is emeritus sociologist at the University of California, Berkeley and Paul Baltes was a developmental and cognitive psychologist and director of the Center for Lifespan Psychology at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany. Baltes died in 2006.

125 Smelser and Baltes also offer a useful distinction between encyclopedia, handbooks, and dictionaries which are the three main authoritative sources or reference books which I cover in this dissertation: “Encyclopedias are designed to offer comprehensive well-organized, integrative, interthemeatic, and intensively cross-referenced presentations in depth. Dictionaries supply definitions of words and concepts without serious effort at integration and depth. Handbooks, as a rule, identify the current frontiers of knowledge without special commitment to comprehensiveness and the historical development of knowledge (xxxii; See also Alan Sica 2001 “Encyclopedias, Handbooks, and Dictionaries”).

126 I classify the “international” status of authors according to the following equivalencies: European = Ph.D. and Teach in Europe; European Transplant = Ph.D. in Europe but teach in U.S.; American Transplant = Ph.D. in U.S. but teach in Europe; American = Ph.D. and teach in U.S.
Leonardo Morlino. The eight volume *IEPS* is, by the editors’ own account, “the first truly international encyclopedia of its kind. It aims to give a comprehensive picture of all aspects of political life, recognizing the theoretical and cultural pluralism of the approaches and including the findings from other parts of the world” (xlix). Given the international scope and comprehensive nature of the *IEPS* “it can provide an essential and authoritative guide to the state of political science at the beginning of the 21st century for decades to come” (xlix). There are no mentions of the behavioral revolution in either the preface or introduction, but in its entries the *IEPS* contains by far the greatest number of mentions of any encyclopedia. In total there are eleven mentions in four entries.

Some editors’ introductions speak of the difficulty of preparing a truly international encyclopedia; especially since most active political scientists in the world live and work in the U.S. and Canada. With most academically trained political scientists receiving their training and subsequently working in North America, it is still not possible to put together an encyclopedia that adequately represents the global nature of the enterprise. In their introduction to the *IESBS* Smelser and Baltes report the “Geographic Distribution of First Authors” in their Table 3: “about 58% of the authors are from North America, 35% are from Europe, and 7% from other countries” (2001, xlvii). The editors note how they made a conscious effort to improve the national and regional representativeness of the entries though Western Europe and North America dominate the social and behavioral sciences.

---

127 The *IEPS* was sponsored by the International Political Science Association (IPSA) and published by Sage Publications. The *IEPS* is also unique in that its entire editorial board is made up of non-U.S.-based scholars. Badie is a French political scientist and international relations specialist. He is a Professor at the *Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris*; Berg-Schlosser is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at University of Marburg in Germany; Morlino is Professor of Political Science and director of Research Centre on Democracies and Democratizations at LUISS, Rome.
Finally, Smelser and Baltes attempted to include a representative sample of men and women, ultimately ending with 79% male authors and 21% female authors (2001, xlvii). There is also an inherent difficulty in parsing “American” versus “European” scholars. It is not uncommon for European scholars, while growing up in their home countries, either to receive their Ph.D. in the U.S. or at least have some interaction with the American establishment, whether through specialized training institutes, national or regional conferences, and through fellowships and grants. Many contemporary political scientists, although born in Europe, have received their Ph.D. in the U.S., had professional training in the U.S., or taught in the U.S. This fact makes it hard to classify mainstream political scientists’ scholarship as either “European” or “North American.”

An additional factor that muddies the water between the U.S. and Europe is the related trope of the “Americanization” of the discipline since WWII. As Badie et al. say in their “Introduction to Political Science” in the *IEPS*, “the so-called Americanization affected all of Europe as well as other areas of the world where native scholars, educated in North American universities, went back to conduct research and to teach” (2011, lxiv). The French political scientist Serge Hurtig relates this narrative in his *IEPS* entry on “Political Science, International Internationalization” in which he says that after WWII “European graduate students crossed the Atlantic, professors met foreign colleagues at professional conferences, and the gap [in scientific rigor] was progressively closed” (2011, 2015). In short, this “international” factor presents somewhat of a problem especially with respect to classifying political scientists in terms of their national origins.

---

128 See also, Hans-Dieter Klingemann (2007) *The State of Political Science in Western Europe.*
129 According to Nelson Polsby, it has been estimated “that today about 85 percent of all political science being studied worldwide is located in the USA” (*IESBS* 2001, 11699). See Gunnell (2002). See also, Adcock (2014).
What is clear, however, is that American Political Science dominates the international profession in both style and numbers. An important part of understanding what is distinctive about the hegemony of American Political Science is learning to appreciate the way the foundational narrative of the behavioral revolution works in a mythological way. The ascendance of American Political Science after WWII parallels the rise of the American state to a position of global dominance. Today, as this dissertation demonstrates, the foundational narrative of the behavioral revolution has broad significance for members of the discipline not only in the U.S. but in Europe, Japan, and the “global south” as well. As I will have occasion to comment on more fully elsewhere, the dominance of American political science internationally cannot be separated from the rise of American dominance of international affairs after WWII.

Narrative Context and the Behavioral Revolution Mythology

Mythology is built by a subtle over-time process of repetition of elements which eventually sediment into the narrative context. Mythology comes to light when we are able to observe the repetition and variation of elements around a core concept which, in this case, is the name given to the foundational moment of a community. In contemporary political science, this moment is represented by the mythology of the behavioral revolution and its attendant narrative elements which provide dominant practices and identities in contemporary political science with meaning and significance. Importantly, mentions of the behavioral revolution rarely if ever explicitly define what is meant by the “behavioral revolution.” Instead, the author of the entry assumes his or her readers already know the meaning of the behavioral revolution. Though it is never the direct object of the author’s
analysis, the narrative context of the behavioral revolution is nevertheless created through the repetition of common elements by different authors.

In the following sections, I focus on the level of narrative context and how it constitutes a foundational mythology. I discuss three elements of the narrative context: the field and/or sub-field addressed, the referents to the behavioral revolution employed by the author, and the theme employed in the narrativization of the behavioral revolution (White 1981). The subfield context, referents employed, and theme developed draw on a common pool of elements which authors draw on when they tell the story of the behavioral revolution. The variation and repetition of these elements over time add to the ongoing persistence of the behavioral revolution as a discursive object as authors both draw on the narrative context and modify it in creative ways. The narrative context shows that mythology may be at work, but in addition to sharing in a common narrative, it is necessary that they provide significance to the experiences and deeds of contemporary political scientists. This is the function of the mythological nexus which through the interaction of its three dimensions of narrative, identity, and practice, produce significance needed to make sense of the intellectual and institutional configuration of the discipline.

The Subfield Context

It is important to emphasize that I categorized the subfield entries by subject matter and not by the principal subfield association of the author. In this chapter political science in general, political theory, and international relations are over-represented relative to comparative politics and American politics. There are no general entries on American or comparative politics with mentions of the behavioral revolution. In Table 4.2 below, I
report the distribution of mentions among the subfields and note that the subfields of American and comparative politics are not explicitly represented. In Table 4.2 there are no entries with mentions specifically focused on either “comparative politics” or “American politics.” As a further element of the subfield component, I have included biographical information in footnotes about each of the authors and editors of the encyclopedias and entries I cover in this chapter.\textsuperscript{130}

Table 9

Mentions of the Behavioral Revolution by Subfield, Encyclopedias

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus on Political Science in General</th>
<th>Focus on American Politics</th>
<th>Focus on Comparative Politics</th>
<th>Focus on Political Theory</th>
<th>Focus on International Relations</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Encyclopedias</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Referents to the Behavioral Revolution

In addition to subfield context, I note the distribution of referents to the behavioral revolution. Referents are the names, ideas, places, and time periods that authors draw on to construct a narrative about the behavioral revolution. The variation and repetition in the

\textsuperscript{130} In Clyde Barrow’s entry on “Political Science” he says “the standard subfields are American government, comparative politics, international relations, political theory, public administration, and public policy, although the latter ‘applied’ fields have often been shifted into separate academic units, such as schools of public administration or public policy, while political theory is now actually practiced as often by historians, philosophers, and literary critics as by political scientists” (IESS 2008, 313). For a similar classification, see the EPS (2010, lix).
use of referents are an important part of the narrative context of the behavioral revolution. These referents are the material manifestation that shows that mythology is at work. In addition, I show how these referents represent and support the dimensions of identity and practice central to the mythological nexus of the behavioral revolution. The presence of the referents to the behavioral revolution shows that mythology may be at work, but in addition I show that these referents and the narratives they comprise provide significance to identities and practices in the contemporary discipline. Thus, the narrative context tells us a mythology may be at work, while the mythological nexus shows us that mythology is indeed operative and is providing significance to a community. I report the distribution of referents in the encyclopedia entries by category in Table 4.3.

Table 10
Referents to the Behavioral Revolution in Encyclopedias

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Biographical</th>
<th>Conceptual</th>
<th>Institutional</th>
<th>Temporal</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Encyclopedias</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Table 4.4, I report the five most prevalent referents to the behavioral revolution. The percentages indicate the degree to which these referents are dominant across encyclopedia entries. It is also evident that the conceptual referent of the scientific method is the most prevalent.
Table 11

Top Five Referents in Encyclopedias, Number and Percent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Referent</th>
<th>Entries with Referents</th>
<th>Percent with Referents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Scientific Method</td>
<td>11/16</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1950s and 1960s</td>
<td>10/16</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Theory</td>
<td>9/16</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quantitative Methods</td>
<td>7/16</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Easton</td>
<td>5/16</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These referents also map onto the identity and practice dimensions of the mythological nexus. As I discussed in Chapter One, authors in reference materials draw on a common pool of referents to develop a theme and narrate the story of the behavioral revolution. By creating a topology of referents (Appendix B), I have been able to discern a similarity between these referents and the dimensions of identity and practice. In short, the dimension of identity is represented by conceptual referents like “traditional theory” and “empirical theory,” while the dimension of practice is represented by referents like “scientific method” and “quantitative methods.”

---

131 In terms of literary criticism, these referents undergo a process of metonymy in which it stands for a larger idea or concept. For example, the referent “empirical theory” represents a cluster of ideas associated with including “general theory,” “positive theory,” “systems theory,” “structural-functionalism,” and “scientific theory” (see Appendix C for a full list of the ideas associated with each conceptual referent). See Prince 2003, Macey 2001.
In many respects, dominant images of traditional political theory are a reflection of contemporary understandings about what political science was before the behavioral revolution. The conceptual referent of “traditional theory” is quite prevalent in the historical narratives found in encyclopedias. As explained more fully in Chapters One, one reason for the repetition of the “traditional theory” referent is the dynamic of identity production. The conceptual referent of traditional theory often serves as the epistemological other for the new political science after the behavioral revolution. Similarly, the referent of quantitative methods furnishes the behavioral revolution with meaning by providing a description of what sorts of research activities political scientists are typically engaged.

The temporal and biographical referents are a special form of referent which can represent either or both dimensions of identity/practice depending on the narrative in question. The time period of the 1950s and 1960s is also mentioned often in the context of the behavioral revolution. There is a wide-spread agreement that the behavioral revolution was an event that happened in political science during the 1950s and early-1960s. This is of course also the typical timeframe employed in the dominant narrative of successful revolution. Yet, some authors employ a longer time period which calls the dominant one into question thus indicating divergence from the dominant narrative. Finally, the biographical referent of “David Easton” is often invoked in the context of the

---

132 The common image of political science before the behavioral revolution is made up of what are often perceived to be the antiquated modes of “traditional” political science: the legal, the historical, and the institutional approaches to understanding the political world. During the behavioral revolution political scientists used this “traditional” image of political science to criticize it and put forward their own image of a behavioral science of politics. One area of the new science that received a lot of attention was the nature of “theory” in political science. As with the discipline as a whole, “traditional” political theory was and continues to be associated with the legal, the historical, and the institutional approaches to studying the political world.
behavioral revolution. Easton is heralded by many contemporary political scientists as one of the founders of modern political science. A typology of referents to the behavioral revolution is reported in Appendix B.

The Thematic Context of the Behavioral Revolution Mythology

Among reference works the dominant narrative is one of a successful revolution which transformed political science from its traditional ways and practices into a modern social science. In this way of telling the foundation narrative of contemporary political science, the behavioral revolution works to radically shift the mainstream from “traditional” to “scientific.” Within this dominant narrative I identified three themes: Whig, Historicist, and Lament. Among the encyclopedias entries I reviewed, there are five narratives that develop a Whig theme, nine that develop a historicist theme, and one that develops a theme of lament and/or loss after the behavioral revolution.

In this chapter, I also discuss the uniqueness of the historicist theme developed by Gunnell. Unlike more traditional historicist accounts, Gunnell focuses on how the “behavioral revolution” is better understood as a restoration or a reconfirmation of already dominant trends in the discipline. The theme of lament is the inverse of a triumphal Whig theme and often consists of a central plot involving the behavioral revolution displacing “traditional” political science with a vulgar and dehumanizing “science.” One might expect a higher concentration of the theme of lament given the loss of traditional political

---

133 Although uncommon in the reference material, there are many good examples of political theorists lamenting the consequences of the loss of traditional political theory’s formally central place in the practice of political science. For example see Schaar and Wolin (1963), Wolin (1969), Mahoney (2004). For two classic if ironic takes on this theme see Seidelman (1985) and Ricci (1987). For a broader example of this theme, see Katzenelson (2004).
theory’s formally central place in the discipline. But this is not what I find. Instead, this theme is nearly non-existent with only one encyclopedia entry as an example. The theme of lament is often invoked in passing, when authors developing a Whig theme discuss the displacement of “traditional” political science by the new science of politics. In terms of lament, the narrative can become nostalgic and romantic; an imagined golden age of political science and political theory lost to the rationalizing forces of modernity.

I now turn to a substantive analysis of the narrative context associated with the behavioral revolution in contemporary encyclopedia entries on political science and two of its major subfields, international relations and political theory. This section is ordered by two organizational principles. First, I organize the material with mentions of the behavioral revolution by subfield classification: general political science, political theory, and international relations. I discuss each one of the entries that make up these subfield categories in terms of the theme developed in their narratives about the behavioral revolution. I also emphasize the use of the referents to the behavioral revolution and any patterns that emerge throughout. Finally, I this organization around the narrative context helps me demonstrate how significance is produced through a mythological nexus important to the construction of disciplinary identities and dominant practices.

**Political Science in General**

I classified seven entries as political science in general. Within these entries all but two have the general phrase “political science” in their titles; the two exceptions are titled “Behavioralism.” I begin with an entry by Nelson Polsby who was a well-known

---

134 See Appendix A, I for a list of authors and entry titles covered in this dissertation.
behavioralist political scientist. Polsby’s article is titled “Political Science: Overview” and is found in the *International Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral Sciences (IESBS 2001)*, edited by the sociologist Neil J. Smelser and the psychologist Paul B. Baltes. In developing his overview of political science, Polsby constructs a Whig theme of political science transformed after the behavioral revolution. Polsby makes a point of emphasizing that political science has developed along with the other social sciences. Beginning his narrative in a postwar temporal context, Polsby says, “with the growing influence from the 1950s onward, a so-called ‘behavioral revolution’ took place in which political scientists in many subfields of the discipline sought to introduce into their work the rigorous intellectual habits of the other social sciences” (2001, 11700). Polsby elaborates on what it meant to catch up with the other social sciences during the behavioral revolution in terms of behavioralists’ “concern for evidence and for structuring their inquiries so as to alert investigators to unexpected or generally applicable outcomes e.g. by referring to null hypotheses, or by adhering to falsificationist standards of proof” (11700). Here the mythological nexus comes into view as there are both an empirical theory referent (the dimension of identity) extracted from “concern for evidence” and a scientific method referent (the dimension of practice) extracted from “referring to null hypotheses, or by adhering to falsificationist standards of proof.”

---

135 Polsby was born in 1934, received his Ph.D. in political science at Yale University in 1961, before teaching as a full professor at the University of California, Berkeley in 1967. Polsby was also editor of the *APSR* from 1971 to 1977, co-editor of the influential *Handbook of Political Science* (Greenstein and Polsby 1975), and worked diligently to improve the “institutionalization” of professional political science (Utter and Lockhart 2002, pp. 319-320). Polsby died in 2007 at the age of seventy three. Polsby was given the additional task of heading the political science section.

136 The second edition of the *IESBS* is now available under the general editorship of the sociologist James D. Wright.
In keeping with a Whig theme, Polsby sees the developments accompanying the behavioral revolution in a positive light, which he tells us, have “facilitated storage and retrieval of information and led to the accumulation of findings in several branches of the discipline” (2001, 11700). These remarks and the previous mentions of “null hypotheses” and “falsificationist standards of proof” are examples of a scientific method referent to the behavioral revolution. The referent of scientific method stands as a proxy for the type of practices that have been adopted by the mainstream of the discipline. As Polsby continues his narrative, he proceeds to mention that while these positive improvements in the “practices” associated with scientific method in political science accompanied the behavioral revolution, they did “not wholly supplant more traditional modes of inquiry such as the close readings of classic texts or the clarification or at least discussion of key concepts such as ‘democracy’ or ‘power’ or ‘coalition’ or ‘party’” (11700).

The “traditional theory” referent to the behavioral revolution is common in the encyclopedia entries. In the triumphal Whig narratives of political science after the behavioral revolution, the “traditional” – especially the legal, historical, and normative variants – stands in for the imagined other of the new science of politics. In a few cases, the traditional is discussed in a substantive way, but more often than not, the “traditional” is simply inserted as the opposite or epistemic other to the new “scientific” (behavioral) political science. In Polsby’s entry, this juxtaposition of the new scientific practices of political science with its traditional ones serves to justify or at least recognize as a fait accompli the dominant understanding of “science” in political science inspired by images of the triumph of the scientific method over tradition.

---

A political theorist who has contributed to the mythology of the behavioral revolution is Clyde Barrow. Barrow’s entry on “Political Science” is in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (*IESS* 2008), edited by William Darity, Jr. This encyclopedia is the second edition and the successor to the well-known and often cited first edition edited by Edward Sills (1968). Barrow develops a historicist theme emphasizing continuity from the positivist movement of the 1920s and 1930s.

In Barrow’s narrative there are three revolutionary moments in the history of political science: the positivist revolution, the behavioral revolution, and the postbehavioral revolution. I focus on the first two of these moments that correspond with two section headings in the article. Under the section heading “The Positivist Movement,” Barrow begins with the observation that “during the 1920s, political science began a paradigm shift that culminated in the behavioral revolution of the 1950s” (2008, 312).

The positivist movement of the 1920s laid the groundwork which made the behavioral revolution possible. The identity of political science became more “scientific” as it incorporated practices associated with what was understood to be scientific method in the natural sciences. Barrow explains that “the first aspect of this paradigm shift was a redefinition of the meaning of ‘science’ … [along] the same methodological foundations as the natural sciences” (312). In terms of mythological nexus, this is a point that reflects the practical dimension. The practices of political science were transformed along positivist lines which increasingly came to believe that “there is a single ‘scientific method’

---

138 At the time of publication, Barrow was a professor and chair of political science at the University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth. Barrow is currently Director of the Center for Policy Analysis and Chancellor Professor, University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth, Department of Public Policy.

139 Darity is the Samuel DuBois Cook Professor of Public Policy, African and African American Studies and Economics; as well as the Director of the Duke Consortium on Social Equity.
that starts with the formulation of a hypothesis, followed by empirical observation or experimentation, which leads to falsification or verification of the initial hypothesis” (312). Barrow’s entry shows an explicit link between practices associated with the positivist image of scientific method and a newly emphasized “scientific” disciplinary identity. Political science was not alone in seeking the vaunted authority of positivist science which was valorized and supported by other social sciences as well as promoted from outside academia “The federal government,” Barrow observes, “was anxious to bring about the same types of technical success in the social sciences as had been achieved” by the hard sciences since the world wars (312).

Both identities and practices were transformed in the wake of the positivist movement and then consolidated during the behavioral revolution. Barrow’s narrative continues to emphasize the positivist movement in the 1920s and 1930 bringing in important institutional and biographical referents to the behavioral revolution. These referents are linked to conceptual referents associated with the mythological nexus and the dimensions of identity and practice. The Social Science Research Council (SSRC), for example, “employed empirical and statistical methods of the type advocated by positivists” (312). The University of Chicago, which given its early adaptation of positivist methods under the leadership of Charles Merriam was, as Barrow puts it, “designated as the SSRC’s showcase institution” (312). The importance of the SSRC in this period of transition should not be underestimated as it was among the early grant-making agencies to “distribut[e] funds to political scientists and political science departments for fellowship and training in the new empirical methods, for the development of new courses in statistics and behavioral research design, and general department building along the Chicago model” (312).
Barrow’s narrative includes a number of biographical referents that are part of the common pool of referents to the behavioral revolution. Authors of reference book entries vary in the figures they invoke and establish slightly different genealogies of the founding heroes of the revolution. Here, Barrow’s entry emphasizes several early figures of the movement mentioning Merriam, who “is often called the father of behavioral political science,” and two of his students, Harold Lasswell and V.O. Key (312). In his *New Aspects of Politics* (1925), Barrow relates, “Merriam called for a science based on observation of real governments and political behavior although he remained skeptical about an overly quantitative political science” (312). According to Barrow, “this skepticism was retained by Harold D. Lasswell and V.O. Key, who were both students of Merriam and important transitional figures between the positivist movement in the 1920s and the behavioral revolution of the 1950s” (2008, 312). This mention of Lasswell is as a biographical referent, and while Key (1908-1963) was important to the development of behavioral political science, his name is rarely invoked in the context of mentions of the behavioral revolution in the contemporary reference material.140

In a section titled “The Behavioral Revolution,” a Whig theme becomes evident as Barrow relates that the changes in the identities and practices of the discipline began during the positivist movement were “consolidated” and that behavioralist achieved a “break with earlier practice of political science.” The positivist influence, Barrow relates, “reached its apogee in the ‘behavioral revolution’ of the 1950s, which consolidated the discipline’s paradigm shift, first, by codifying behavioral methodology, and second, by finally rejecting

---

140 Key (1908-1963) was actively involved in the SSRC’s Committee on Political Behavior in the 1950s, and he was president of the APSA (1958-1959). For an account of his legacy in the profession, see Utter and Lockhart’s *APSD* biographical entry “Key, V.O., Jr.” (2002, pp. 202-205).
outright the concept of the state” (2008, 312). By the 1950s, early theories of the state (no examples are provided) had been called into question, since these failed to meet basic positivist methodological criteria (e.g. value-neutrality and verification/falsification). “The behavioralists broke with the earlier practice of political scientists,” Barrows observes, “by claiming to have discovered a ‘value-neutral’ science and by viewing all earlier works on politics as merely a storehouse of hypotheses for empirical falsification or verification” (312-313).

Barrow closes by invoking debates about the meaning of “theory” that would play a central role in the process of identity formation during and after the behavioral revolution. On the level of the mythological dimension of identity, Barrow juxtaposes traditional political theory with empirical political theory. Thus, the behavioralist “attitude toward political philosophy widened the long simmering rift between empirical political science and normative political theory with the latter regarded as ‘unscientific’ legacy of the discipline’s past” (313). Here Barrow has explicitly counterpoised the two primary referents associated with the “scientific” (empirical political theory) with “tradition” (normative political theory). “Empirical theory,” since Barrow invokes the preferred and triumphant “empirical political science,” which is opposed to the defeated “normative political theory” or “traditional theory,” and is widely regarded as the “unscientific legacy of the discipline’s past.” This theme is common to accounts of the behavioral revolution where “state theory,” “legal theory,” and other traditionalisms are superseded by identities associated with “empirical theory” and behavioralism.
Immediately following Barrow’s entry on “Political Science” in the *IESS* (2008), is an entry titled “Political Science, Behavioral” written by Rossen Vassilev.¹⁴¹ In Vassilev’s narrative he develops a Whig theme focusing on a change in identity of political science from traditional to empirical along with the triumph of associated practices understood to be applications of scientific method such as statistics and quantification. Citing Heinz Eulau (1915–2004), Vassilev says that “behavioral political science has attempted to apply the methodologies of empirical natural science to the study of politics and government” (*IESS*, 315).¹⁴² Here the dimensions of identity and practice are both evident as the behavioral identity is linked to practices associated with natural science and scientific method. The behavioralists, following Eulau, called for “political scientists to study behavior, not institutions” and thus behavioralists have “focused analysis on the political behavior of individuals and groups, rather than on their formal roles or the structures within which they function” (315). When Vassilev mentions the behavioral revolution, he directly associates it with scientific method and more indirectly with quantitative methods. “Although little consensus exists about the exact characteristics of the so-called ‘behavioral revolution’ in political science,” Vassilev explains, “the scientific method of the behavioralists emphasizes the collection of observable data and the use of statistical analysis based on many recorded cases” (315). The link between identity and practice in foundation narratives demonstrates the presence of the mythological nexus. Here we see the behavioral revolution mythology at work relating both how political science changed

¹⁴¹ At the time of publication, Vassilev was a lecturer in political science at Ohio State University where he received his Ph.D. in 2000. Vassilev is somewhat of an outlier among encyclopedia entry authors since he is a comparativist by training, and he is not senior or well-established as an academic.

¹⁴² Once again, the threshold for inclusion among the biographical referents is six mentions across reference materials, and so Eulau, with five mentions, is not included.
after the revolution and how the dominance of the scientific method and quantitative methods in the practices of political scientists came to be.

Vassilev’s entry provides another example of the mythological nexus at work as he continues juxtaposing identities and practices associated with the behavioral revolution. Vassilev designates the “traditional approach” as the ontological other (the dimension of identity) of behavioral political science. In terms of practice, the traditional approach to political science was focused on the concept of the state and used “detailed description of historical data, political institutions, constitutions, and legal systems, earning traditionalists the label of ‘hyperfactualists’” (315). The distance from contemporary political science makes these practices sound foreign, and their opposition to contemporary scientific identities and quantitative practices works to justify the latter at the expense of the former. In the same paragraph, for example, Vassilev notes how traditional political scientists eschewed “quantitative methods” since they “doubted the ‘scientific method’ of the natural sciences could be successfully applied to the investigation of the more indeterminate human behavior” (315). For mostpolitical scientists today, these doubts about what is now central to identities and practices seem preposterous and the effect of the narrative is to reinforce the dominant narrative and mythology of the behavioral revolution.

Vassilev elaborates on the way behavioralists understood “theory” as a form of “generalization” that “see[s] a close relationship between theory and empirical research in the sense that theory should be ‘verifiable’ by analysis of observed behavior, the process of seeking and interpreting empirical data should be guided by theory” (316). Indeed, Vassilev deepens the association to the behavioral revolution with positivist conceptions of scientific method. According to Vassilev, “behavioral political science claims to be
‘value-neutral’ in the sense of separating fact from value and describing political phenomenon without judging their goodness or morality” (315).

Vassilev contributes to a Whig theme when his narrative takes a presentist turn that explains the ongoing dominance of behavioralism in terms of the success of the behavioral revolution. In his discussion of “behavioralist-oriented political scientists,” Vassilev is speaking in the present tense and it seems clear that he is referring to contemporary behavioralists. Behavioralists, Vassilev tells us, “try to be more rigorous and disciplined in their research, seeking scientific precision by quantification and measurement of collected data” (315). Here the mythology of the behavioral revolution directs contemporary political scientists to dominant practices in the discipline and the story of the rise of behavioralism provides the justification. This use of “quantification” signals underlying positivist assumptions that are imbedded in quantitative research practices, i.e. these studies are designed to “control” for the human element through “rigorous” modeling which reputedly makes one’s findings valid, reliable, scientific, and authoritative.

Further developing the Whig theme, Vassilev reinforces the standard timeframe associated with the revolution (the 1950s and 1960s) and makes a rare mention of Thomas Kuhn. Vassilev continues saying, “the ‘behavioral revolution’ in the science of politics emerged as a major force in the 1950s and won over much of the field during the 1960s” (316). Behavioralism not only “won over” the discipline, it brought with it a “new

\[143\] References to Kuhn are common in the behavioral (1950-1968) and post-behavioral (1969-2000) literatures. But explicit references to Kuhn in association with the behavioral revolution in the contemporary reference material of political science are rare. In Vassilev’s terms: “For years its supporters and detractors debated whether or not behavioralism represented a Kuhnian ‘scientific revolution,’ producing a ‘paradigm shift’ in the basic values and objectives concerning the nature of political science and how the pursuit of systematized knowledge about politics should be conducted” (316). The mention of Thomas Kuhn in association with the behavioral revolution is common in the wider literature of political science, but it does not reach the threshold for inclusion of six mentions among the primary referents to the behavioral revolution discussed in this dissertation.
emphasis on methodology and the use of quantitative tools of analysis,” which as Vassilev
tells us in a clearly triumphal tone, “swept the field” of political science in the 1950s and
1960s (316). Vassilev also summarizes a strong positivist definition of “behavioral
political science,” which is “concerned with the cumulative acquisition of law-like
generalizations about human behavior and suggests a close relationship with the other
social sciences” (316).144 Vassilev’s narrative emphasizes a Whig theme and fits well with
other reflections of the dominant narrative of the successful transformation of identities
and practices during and after the behavioral revolution. Both the identities and practices
of the discipline were transformed as behavioralism “swept” and “won over the field,”
transforming political sciences into a positivist-inspired science like other social sciences
in the American academe.

Jürgen Falter is the author of an entry on “Behavioralism” written for the
develops a Whig theme that emphasizes the triumph of behavioralism and transformation
of identities and practices in political science after the behavioral revolution. Falter’s
narrative begins as he situates his narrative in the context of once perennial debates about
the nature of scientific method that early behavioralists were trying to develop. “If at the
beginning of the behavioral movement,” Falter says, “its spokespeople assumed that
empirical and theoretical analysis units could be made to coincide – that is, the levels and
observation and statement match – soon this behavioral-psychological remnant was
abandoned” (141). In this somewhat veiled use of the “behavioral movement,” I believe

144 Even so, among contemporary behavioralists there is widespread recognition that the field has moved
beyond (and left behind) the fact-value debates and any claims to bias-free observation or “value-neutral”
reporting of results common to early positivist literature (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2002, 480).
145 Falter is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Mainz, Germany.
Falter is saying in a cryptic way that the early behavioralist belief in strong positivist prescriptions for value-neutrality; that “levels of observation and statement match,” or that the researcher could observe and report on the world in an unbiased and dispassionate fashion was “abandoned” in the wake of the revolts against behavioralism.

Falter shifts his narrative to an institutional focus when he next mentions the behavioral revolution. The institutional context is the American Political Science Association (APSA). According to Falter, “after 1956, the profile of the *American Political Science Review* also changed dramatically, indicating a gradual change in the discipline. Clearly, the quantitative element was gaining ground” (139). Falter continues explaining the success of behavioralism in transforming the identity and practice of political science in terms of the institutional significance of the APSA: in the “years after 1964, almost all APSA presidents came from the behavioral movement or were at least related to it. In the course of only 1 ½ decades, behavioralism had succeeded in fundamentally changing political science in the United States” (2011, 139). This is clearly a contribution to a Whig theme of triumph and success of the behavioral revolution since, in Falter’s assessment, the behavioral movement “succeeded in fundamentally changing political science.” The mythological nexus is quite evident here. The narrative develops a Whig theme that stresses the fundamental and lasting changes leading to the dominance of a behavioral identity and associated practices such as quantitative methods.

One can get a sense of the rise of the dominance of behavioralism in political science when we consider, as Falter has, how the APSA is the main institution with which a plurality of political scientists identify and recognize as authoritative in the discipline. The “success of behavioralism,” Falter continues developing a Whig theme, was made
possible by “effective leaders” (such as David Easton who is explicitly mentioned), a number of “important publications” (not specified), and “a number of other favorable conditions” such as the willingness of funding agencies to provide support to behavioral research (138). At this point, the work of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) is brought into the narrative. As Falter puts it, “in addition to the funding policies of the great foundations, the significance of the fact that the Social Science Research Council and its committees provided the behavioral movement with organizational vehicles for the development of American political science cannot be overemphasized” (2011, 138).146

Falter continues developing his Whig theme with an explicit quantitative methods and a biographical referent to the behavioral revolution. “It is an achievement of the behavioral revolt,” Falter tells us, “that today empirical-quantitative studies are a matter of course. As for the methodological-statistical refinement of analysis, for a long time empirical political science has been acting on the same level as its neighboring disciplines” in the social sciences (142). Here again we see important mythological consequences for contemporary practices and identities in the discipline. After the behavioral revolution “empirical-quantitative studies are a matter of course,” implying that in contemporary political science the empirical identity and quantitative practices are dominant.

Falter brings his foundation narrative to a close by recounting how “the bitter quarrels between doctrines from the 1950s to the 1970s have been replaced by a peaceful coexistence of many approaches and theoretical positions” (142). This narrative of a

---

146 On the Rockefeller Foundation, Ford Foundation, and the Carnegie Corporation’s contributions to these developments, see Hauptmann (2006), (2012), and (2015) respectively.
and eventual accommodation within the discipline, is foretold by one of the heroes of the behavioral revolution, Robert Dahl. Dahl is routinely discussed as an example to emulate and cited as an example of good research in political science. It was Dahl who, according to Falter, had “almost prophetic qualities when he subtitled a 1961 article with an early obituary for the behavioral movement in political science, ‘Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest’” (142). Dahl’s article is a classic and is often cited in the context of the behavioral revolution. Falter’s historical narrative draws to a close by eulogizing one of behavioralism’s greatest champions and powerfully attests to the dominant narrative about political science after the behavioral revolution.

Shifting now to the *Encyclopedia of Political Theory* (EPT 2010), the disciplinary historian and political theorist Robert Adcock develops a historicist theme in an entry on “Behavioralism.” “In conclusion,” Adcock says, “it is worth emphasizing two points about behavioralism’s transformation of techniques [in political science]” (2010, 114). Counter to some ways of telling the story of political science after the behavioral revolution, Adcock correctly points out that “the surge in quantitative work gave way to stabilization during the 1970s. Subsequent decades have seen a ratcheting up in the technical complexity of quantitative work, but the proportion of the American discipline doing such work has not increased” (2010, 114). Thus, although quantitative methods may be dominant today, they are by no means hegemonic. A historicist and revisionist theme is evident here, since Adcock is working against dominant narratives and emphasizing how pluralist heaven.\textsuperscript{147} and eventual accommodation within the discipline, is foretold by one of the heroes of the behavioral revolution, Robert Dahl. Dahl is routinely discussed as an example to emulate and cited as an example of good research in political science. It was Dahl who, according to Falter, had “almost prophetic qualities when he subtitled a 1961 article with an early obituary for the behavioral movement in political science, ‘Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest’” (142). Dahl’s article is a classic and is often cited in the context of the behavioral revolution. Falter’s historical narrative draws to a close by eulogizing one of behavioralism’s greatest champions and powerfully attests to the dominant narrative about political science after the behavioral revolution.

Shifting now to the *Encyclopedia of Political Theory* (EPT 2010), the disciplinary historian and political theorist Robert Adcock develops a historicist theme in an entry on “Behavioralism.” \textsuperscript{148} “In conclusion,” Adcock says, “it is worth emphasizing two points about behavioralism’s transformation of techniques [in political science]” (2010, 114). Counter to some ways of telling the story of political science after the behavioral revolution, Adcock correctly points out that “the surge in quantitative work gave way to stabilization during the 1970s. Subsequent decades have seen a ratcheting up in the technical complexity of quantitative work, but the proportion of the American discipline doing such work has not increased” (2010, 114). Thus, although quantitative methods may be dominant today, they are by no means hegemonic. A historicist and revisionist theme is evident here, since Adcock is working against dominant narratives and emphasizing how

\textsuperscript{147} “Pluralist heaven” is the political scientist E.E. Schattschneider’s term that he uses to criticize proponents of pluralism: “The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent” (*The Semisovereign People*, 1960). See also Dahl (1982, 107); and Jeffrey Isaac (1988).

\textsuperscript{148} At the time of publication, Adcock was an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the George Washington University. Adcock received his Ph.D. in 2007 from the University of California, Berkeley. In addition to writing entries, Adcock was also one of the editors serving as the section editor for both Comparative Theory and Empirical Theory (Bevir 2010, xxxii).
the transformation of techniques after the behavioral revolution was that “the tide of quantitative work stabilized at different levels in different subfields” (114). This historicist point about the diversity among subfields is one I emphasize throughout the dissertation.

The behavioral revolution had different impacts on different subfields, and so the revolution has a variable legacy depending on the subfield in question. In short, quantification and statistics did not dominate all subfields: “Although the behavioral revolution pushed qualitative work to the periphery in studies of American politics,” Adcock concludes, “it retains major roles in studies of comparative politics and international relations, and nary a number ever appears among scholars devoted to historical and normative, as opposed to empirical or positive, political theory” (114; emphasis added). Here, there is the now common juxtaposition between “empirical” and “normative” identities is clear and the latter is explicitly linked to practices associated with quantitative methods. Of course, this is more evidence demonstrating the presence of both the narrative context as well as the mythological nexus of the behavioral revolution.

Thomas Biebricher’s article in the *EPT* (2006) is titled “Science of Politics” and he develops a Whig theme. Biebricher begins his narrative in the context of post-WWII disillusionment about the Enlightenment project of human progress through modern science: it “is against [a] background of reservations and skepticism that the protagonists of the Behavioral Revolution of the 1950s try to revive the notion of an ambitious quasi-natural science of politics” (2010, 1240).149 Biebricher follows this sentence by invoking the biographical referent of David Easton. “Influential scholars,” Biebricher tells us, “like

---

149 Biebricher was a DAAD Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida (2003-2009) and has held a variety of positions in North America and Western Europe (http://ies.ubc.ca/thomas-biebricher).
David Easton, Roy Macridis, and David Truman chide the political scientists of the first half of the century alternatively for their legal formalism, parochialism, lack of methodological rigor, or thinly veiled normative biases” (1240). Here the dimension of identity is evident as we are told that behavioralists “chided” their more traditional predecessors.

Biebricher discusses how behavioral identities were made possible by positivism and associated practices. “Most, if not all, proponents of a behavioral science of politics,” Biebricher tells us, “subscribe to a positivist ontology and epistemology,” which he defines as the belief in “an intelligible (social) reality that exhibits regularities, which can be known through methodologically rigorous and, if possible, quantitative research relying on observable actions (i.e. facts)” (2010, 1240). This definition of positivism is immediately followed by the mention of the behavioral revolution and another quantitative methods referent. Biebricher continues: “The behavioral revolution thus ushered in a new attempt to develop nomothetic science of politics” (1240). Although “nomothetic” is not frequently used in the U.S., it is still common enough in the philosophy of science and literature in Europe.150 The nomothetic is often contrasted with the idiographic, where the former is understood to follow a positivist scientific method and the latter follows an interpretive or humanist logic of inquiry. Biebricher continues by placing the behavioral movement which, “lasting until the 1960s, the behavioralist era is distinguished by an almost

150 In their Introduction to the IEPS, Badie et al. explain the distinction between idiographic and nomothetic in the context of the “new, post-World War II empirical political science” (2011, lxii). Idiographic is “historical” research “focused on the analysis of specific unique events;” while nomothetic political science “is characterized by epistemological and methodological assumptions of other social sciences … [and] in terms of expectations of empirical findings … with a more general scope (regularities, patterns, laws)” (lxii). In their preface to the EPS, the editors say they “devote considerable number of entries both to the nomothetic, or abstract, side of political science and to the empirical side” (lv). See also Mark Bevir (2008) and Alan C. Isaak (1985).
unprecedented confidence and determination with regard to the pursuit of a true science of politics that would simultaneously demarcate political science from other disciplines and establish its authority as science vis-à-vis non-academic political actors” (1240). These efforts to “demarcate political science” implicitly refer to the other social sciences which political science were, and to some degree, continue to differentiate. Political science also sought the authority of “science” modeled along positivist lines which government and other funding agencies valued.

Biebricher most explicitly develops a Whig theme when he focuses on the triumph of behavioralism in contemporary political science. This triumph is expressed in now dominant practices in political science: “the two dominant approaches of the discipline, formal modeling and quantitative statistical analysis” (1240). In Biebricher’s analysis, the behavioral revolution serves as the central moment when the discipline embraced its positivist-inspired identities and developed the now dominant practices of quantification and formal modeling. Thus, the mythological nexus is on display in this entry. The authoritative narrative of an encyclopedia entry highlights the close connection between contemporary identities and now dominant practices after the behavioral revolution.

Serge Hurtig’s *IEPS* (2011) entry on “Political Science, International Institutionalization” develops a Whig theme and is a rare example of an author relying primarily on institutional context to convey the significance of the behavioral revolution. Hurtig begins by highlighting how the behavioral revolution is in part characterized by “theoretical and methodological innovations or improvements” which “originated in the United States and spread everywhere” (2011, 216). Here the Whig theme is evident in the

---

151 Hurtig was born in Romania and became a French citizen in 1952. He is Editor of *International Political Science Abstracts* and long-time leader in the International Political Science Association (IPSA).
presentist nature of the account as well as the trope of “Americanization.” Utilizing a Whig theme, Hurtig observes how many of these “innovations or improvements:”

The ‘behavioral revolution’ of the 1960s, which emphasized rigorous analysis of political processes – sophisticated treatment of quantitative data, comparative analysis, and the study of new fields – decisively supported by nongovernmental bodies such as the Social Science Research Council and the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, has had lasting influence despite its excesses (216).

Here Hurtig has emphasized the “lasting influence” of behavioral practices, notably the “sophisticated treatment of quantitative data,” and noted several important institutional referents that supported these developments. Speaking of the discipline in the U.S., Hurtig continues employing a Whig theme of triumph and “dominance” noting that “American political science has remained dominant, thanks to the number and variety of U.S. university institutions” (2015). This is an important statement of the impact of these institutions on the lasting power and authority of behavioral political science in the U.S. and Europe. 152 This entry is Whig-triumphal and demonstrates the degree to which the behavioral revolution mythology has spread beyond the borders of the U.S. and has a presence in Europe.

The Subfield of International Relations

There are two articles written on the subfield of international relations which contain mentions of the behavioral revolution. John Vasquez and Marie Henehan’s entry on “International Relations Theory” is found in the EGP (2004). 153 The authors develop a

---

152 Other institutions Hurtig mentions in the context of the behavioral revolution are the ICPSR and the ANES at the University of Michigan, the NSF, and the RAND Corporation. 153 Vasquez is the Thomas B. Mackie Scholar in International Relations at Illinois University at Urbana-Champaign, and Henehan is a Lecturer in Political Science, also at Illinois University at Urbana-Champaign.
Whig theme focusing in a presentist way on behavioral dominance of identities and practices in the subfield of IR. Vasquez and Henehan begin their entry by discussing the meaning of “theory” in two distinct traditions, that of the “tradition of political philosophy” and that of “a new conception of theory in world politics: scientific theory” (857, emphasis in original). This is an example of the mythological nexus at work on the level of identity. Essentially, there are two types of theory whose identities are defined in opposition to the other: traditional theory and empirical (“scientific” or “behavioral”) theory. Of course, in the dominant narrative of a triumphal behavioralism, it is the latter form of orientation toward theory which prevails.

The movement away from the long tradition of political philosophy began as early as “the scientific revolution” of the 17th and 18th centuries. Eventually, “the idea of a social science increasingly influenced thinking about world politics, including that of the classical realists, who adopted a positivist conception of history” (857). Even though classical realists of the postwar era were “influenced by the language of science,” the authors say, they “still saw the attempts to understand the empirical primarily as a way of guiding practice,” and really not all that different than traditional political philosophy (857). It was different, Vasquez and Henehan say, “with the onset of the behavioral revolt in political science, [where] a sharp separation was made between empirical and normative analysis” (857). The tradition of practical analysis where empirical and normative intermingled was rejected as “empirical analysis restricted to description and explanation and subject to

---

154 In the subfield of IR, classical realism was an attempt to understand and prevent the occurrence of world wars. This approach was “realist” in the sense that it saw states as rational actors pursuing their interests; and the only way to check the power of states was with greater power. Hans Morgenthau (1904-1980) is often credited with being a founder of classical realism. See for example, Brian Schmidt (2011). See also, Colin Elman (2005).

155 The authors refer to the “behavioral revolt” instead of the “behavioral revolution,” a common substitution in the subfield of IR.
the scientific method, while normative analysis was left to fend for itself” (857). Here there is a clear juxtaposition of theoretical orientations, where those who identify as “scientific” theorists adopted positivist-inspired scientific method, while those traditionalists or “normative” theorists were left behind. Note two the dimension of practice at work in the mythological nexus: the theoretical identity or orientation of the behavioralist is closely connected with the practices associated with positivist-inspired scientific method.

In terms of narrative context, the theme is clearly Whig-triumphant and accepts the dominance of science over tradition after the behavioral revolution. In this brief foundation narrative, the authors have demonstrated how the behavioral revolution impacted the field of IR by making it “scientific” in a behavioral sense of following the scientific method and rejecting normative theorizing or traditional political philosophy. Thus, the behavioral revolution, or as Vasquez and Henehan refer to it, the “behavioral revolt,” is associated with the early insistence among empirical theorists on separating the “normative” from the “empirical” (the positivist fact-value dichotomy), and the elevation of “scientific method” as the preferred mode of doing “scientific theory.” The Whig theme is also evident in the authors’ conclusion that states the “best hopes” for sound theory in IR “still reside in the use of the scientific method” (873). In order to understand the world scientifically after the behavioral revolution it is important to avoid “the problems with traditional theorizing” as well as some variants of “postmodernism, constructivism, and feminism” where Vasquez and Henehan say, practice “has assumed certain empirical patterns that were never fully documented” (873). The drive for “scientific theory” is best accomplished, the
authors conclude, at “the mid-range level” where over time reliable “islands of theory” can be built up (873).

Gunther Hellemann’s entry in the IEPS (2011) is titled “International Relations as a Field of Study.” Hellemann develops a historicist theme that qualifies the dominant narrative by extending the time period and focusing on resistance to the scientific approach in IR. Hellemann reflects on the dominant narrative in IR which sees the subfield transformed from a more primitive to a more scientific state in the latter half of the 20th century. Hellemann begins his narrative saying that “the formative period of IR up to the 1950s” was characterized by approaches and methods “considered to be a part of the humanities rather than the (social) sciences” (2011, 1312). This statement sets up his extended focus of on resisters to the scientific approach in IR. Hellemann discusses how the discipline was different prior to the 1950s and in particular how scientific identities had not been influenced by positivism and the fact-value dichotomy. As Hellemann puts the matter: “Accordingly, the distinction between the empirical and the normative, drawn in a particularly strong fashion in the course of the ‘behavioral revolution,’ was mostly not deemed appropriate” prior to the 1950s (1312). Hellemann continues to qualify the dominant narrative of a transformed political science stating that “‘science’ was already cherished among IR novices” (1312). Here once again the mythological connection between identity and practice is on display “Yet [science] was not yet as strongly associated with a notion of the natural sciences as was the case in the 1960s and 1970s” (1312). Due to the behavioral revolution, IR scholars increasingly came to view themselves and their

\[156\] Hellmann is Professor of Political Science at Goethe-University, Frankfurt.
\[157\] For a classic rebuttal of behavioralism in IR, see Bull (1966).
work in “scientific” terms – terms which are closely linked with the natural sciences and images of practices associated with scientific method.

Helleman focuses on the resistance to the incorporation of behavioral “science” in IR, and further developing a historicist theme, he says that despite a “revolutionary shift to the new mantra of ‘applying scientific methods,’” there were many in the field, mainly “older IR scholars,” who found this change to be “a misguided fixation on an ideal of science that was wholly inadequate for the subject matter of international politics” (1312).158 “‘Classical’ approaches and methods continued to have their followers,” says Hellmann, and even these approaches:

Benefitted themselves from the behavioral revolution – the wave of the future seemed to be an understanding of ‘science’ that required ‘an articulated secondary language that permits precision and replicability’ (Kaplan 1966) as well as sophisticated techniques for gathering and processing data (1312).

Here Helleman’s narrative turns Whig and presentist when he discusses the triumph of practices and identities now associated with the behavioral revolution in IR. The mythological nexus is clearly at work as now dominant practices associated with scientific method and quantitative methods such as “sophisticated techniques for gathering and processing data,” contrasted to the now obsolete “classical” or traditional theory approaches now left behind as the “wave of the future” takes its course. As is nearly always the case in the narratives of triumph and domination after the behavioral revolution, moreover, Hellmann defines science in international relations in opposition to tradition.

---

158 A potential source of confusion, here traditional theory in IR is also known as the “classical approach” and is often opposed to the “Scientific approach” which is associated with “classical realism” and “neorealism.” For a critique of the scientific approach see Bull (1966). See also Guilhot (2011).
Jeffrey Isaac’s *EGP* (2004) article titled, “Conceptions of Power” contains one mention of the behavioral revolution and develops a historicist theme as he adds a point of historical depth to the dominant narrative of the behavioral revolution in political science. Isaac sees the behavioralist or “voluntarist model” of power going back to a “certain reading” of the early-modern political theory writing of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and especially David Hume. It was, as Isaac relates in his entry, “a certain reading of these texts [that] became the basis for the behavioral revolution in power research” (58). Behavioral political scientists re-read these classic texts and with this new vision crafted an empirical theory of power. Isaac’s mention of the behavioral revolution draws on two of the behavioral revolution’s biographical referents, Lasswell and Dahl. According to Isaac, “The writings of Lasswell and Kaplan (1950), March (1953), Simon (1953), and Dahl (1957) all treat power as a relation of empirical causation, whereby one agent prevails over another in a conflict some sort or other” (2004, 57).

These mentions to the heroes of behavioralism are an important part of the narrative context as authors frequently employ these figures in order to establish a genealogy providing biographical context and significance to the behavioral revolution (see Appendix B). Here again the mythological nexus is strengthened as the work on power by luminaries such as Lasswell and Dahl serve to provide identities with meaning and significance to practices which resulted from the behavioral revolution. These founding fathers are

---

159 Jeffrey Isaac is the James H. Rudy Professor of Political Science at Indiana University and Editor in Chief of the political science journal *Perspectives on Politics*. Isaac’s Ph.D. was supervised by Robert Dahl at Yale University.
explicitly linked with an empirical orientation to political theory which focused on “empirical causation” and scientific practices associated with behavioralism.

Robert Adcock’s *EPT* (2010) entry is on “Empirical Theory.” Empirical theory is a common referent and is central to the narrative context of the behavioral revolution. Similar to Isaac above, this entry is not explicitly written about the subfield of “political theory.” Among encyclopedia entries there are two entries with titles specifically on the subject of “Political Theory” (Inoguchi 2010 and Gunnell 2010, see below). Adcock’s entry is a good example of a narrative that implicitly supports the dominant narrative of a successful revolution in the discipline’s identities and practices in the 1950s and early 1960s. Adcock develops a Whig theme that while not overtly celebratory is nevertheless presentist and takes for granted the success and ongoing dominance of the behavioral revolution today. Some might wonder why an entry written by a disciplinary historian and political theorist is not classified as historicist rather than Whig. As I discuss on numerous occasions, all authors contribute to the dominant narrative of a behavioral revolution that transformed identities and practices in the discipline. The way this story is told – the theme developed – varies by author. Most often these foundation narratives attempt to reflect historical reality in a rigorously accurate manner. But through the variation and repetition of the behavioral revolution’s narrative context all authors contribute to its mythologization.

Adcock’s entry is not overtly celebratory but he does develop a Whig theme in his narrative about the behavioral revolution. In a short and highly condensed paragraph, Adcock makes use of a number of common referents associated with the behavioral revolution. Reflecting on contemporary identities, Adcock says “the pursuit of empirical
theory was a key component of the post-World War II behavioral revolution in American political science, and it continues to occupy an important place in the discipline today” (2010, 424). Making a presentist and therefore Whig point, Adcock says empirical theory continues to be important in the discipline. Empirical theory is “framed by two core beliefs” (424). Of these beliefs, the first “assigns theory a pivotal role in social science: Theory is needed to focus the choice of empirical research topics and to integrate the results of such research” (424). Here Adcock has made use of the common association of the behavioral revolution with the development of the social sciences in the US, which is often linked, as it is here, with a new concept of “general theory” in postwar social science, in this case “empirical theory.” “The second belief,” Adcock continues, “prescribes features that a theory should display if it is to successfully play this role. It must logically distinguish between is and ought statements and articulate an analytic framework of concepts and relationships characterizing what is” (424, emphasis in original). The association of the scientific method inspired by positivism with the behavioral revolution is also evident since Adcock mentions the fact-value dichotomy (“is and ought”) which is a key part of the empirical-normative divide forged by positivism making the behavioral revolution possible in the 1950s and 1960s.

Adcock’s narrative continues developing a presentist and Whig theme. In contemporary political science, the positivist division between empirical and normative “is widely accepted in most subfields of the discipline” (424). Earlier examples of general empirical theory such as “David Easton’s systems theory, Robert Dahl’s pluralism, and Gabriel Almond’s structural-functionalism … lost favor during the 1970s” (424).160

160 See Easton (1955) for an early example of a systems approach to general empirical theory. See also Easton 1965a, 1965b, 1966.
Despite the fact that these examples of empirical theory have largely been found wanting, Adcock says that the beliefs in general and “integrative” theory as well as the utility of the fact-value dichotomy “continue to underlie what most American political scientists today have in mind when they extol the importance of building and testing theory” (424). Indeed, empirical theory “continues to occupy an important place in the discipline today” (424). Cleary, empirical theory is still important to the discipline today, and as Adcock explains, it was brought into the mainstream by the behavioral revolution. While not overtly celebratory or “triumphal,” Adcock’s Whig theme nevertheless focuses on the way that behavioralism was successful and that the behavioral revolution continues to dominate identities and practices in the discipline. Adding to the mythological power of the dominant narrative, Adcock’s narrative relates how the behavioral revolution successfully redefined the theories and practices of political scientists, bringing empirical theory and associated practices into the mainstream of the discipline.

The Japanese political scientist Takashi Inoguchi writes on “Political Theory” in the _IEPS_ (2010). Inoguchi has used the empirical-normative dichotomy to organize his presentation of the practices that make up contemporary political theory in political science (as opposed to the subfield of political theory), dividing the entire universe of political science into four “normative” schools and six “empirical” schools.

Inoguchi develops a historicist theme and in a very condensed paragraph he reduces fifty years of political science history by repeating a common chronology centered on three

---

161 Inoguchi is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Tokyo, and since 2009, he is president of University of Niigata Prefecture, Japan.

162 Inoguchi references two of the contemporary handbooks I discuss in Chapter Five. “As noted before,” Inoguchi relates, “schools of empirical political theory are difficult to classify (see Robert Goodin, 2009; Robert Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingermann, 1996, Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, 1975)” (2058). These are references to other reference works that I discuss in this dissertation and a good example of how, practically speaking, these reference works are authoritative and can and do stand alone as citations.
periods. Inoguchi is classified as developing a historicist theme because of the presentist nature of his narrative and the way that he qualifies the dominant narrative of a triumphal behavioral revolution. This way of telling the story, while not overtly celebratory, is nevertheless a part of the dominant narrative: political science is transformed from traditional to scientific in the wake of the behavioral revolution, passing through a period of revolt against and modification of behavioralism, and ending in a period of tolerance and methodological pluralism under the benign stewardship of a behavioral/post-behavioral mainstream. Once again it is not necessary that the author explicitly celebrate the behavioral revolution for it to be an example of the dominant narrative. Quite often in a historicist theme, for example, the author takes the historicity of the dominant narrative for granted and assumes that the behavioral revolution transformed the discipline and that the present configuration of the political science is a reflection of those changes. This is another core component to mythology which draws on the community’s common sense about a dominant narrative with which different authors rework the narrative context to either tell a story of “triumph” or one of “success.” In either case, narratives about the behavioral revolution support the dominant narrative while either explicitly or implicitly justifying the present state of practice while bolstering disciplinary identities with a past worth remembering.

In Inoguchi’s entry on “Political Theory,” the contemporary state of political theory in political science is explained through a narrative which begins with the behavioral revolution and ends with Perestroika. This narrative helps Inoguchi explain the diversity of schools of political theory even as he subsumes them under the broader categories like “empirical” and “normative.” Inoguchi sets up his narrative by recounting several
milestones in the history of political science in order to explain the evolution of these schools of political theory. There are three familiar periods in the history of political science: “the behavioral revolution (the 1950s through the 1960s),” “the postbehavioral revolution (the 1970s through the 1980s),” and “the ‘perestroika’ movement in the American Political Science Association (the 1990s through the 2000s)” (2058).

“With the behavioral revolution,” Inoguchi’s observes, “systems theory and behavioralism became prominent” in the discipline (2058). Systems theory is a form of empirical theory and Inoguchi explains its rise, in part, by invoking the behavioral revolution. There is no elaboration on the concept of the behavioral revolution and it is assumed that the reader is probably familiar with the event in the history of the discipline. Under the heading of “Systems Theory,” Inoguchi notes how Easton was “dissatisfied with the state of political science in the 1940s, which was very different from what it is today” (he doesn’t elaborate on political science in the 1940s). Here the identity/practice dimensions of the mythological nexus come into view as Inoguchi is discussing new “scientific” orientations to theory in Easton’s efforts in the 1960s “to make political science a scientific discipline” while also linking them with practices such as “empirical testing of theoretically formulated hypotheses on the basis of systematically generated data” (2058). According to Inoguchi, “the behavioral revolution was raging in the United States concurrently with the acceptance of systems theory thinking” (2058). Thus, part of the explanation for the success of systems theory was that the behavioral revolution was

---

163 Inoguchi refers to Easton in another context when he says “during the revolutionary period of behavioralism, Easton’s A Framework for Political Analysis of Political Life may be called the bible of behavioralism” (2059).
“raging.” If the behavioral revolution was “raging” then it makes sense that there were a large number of adherents and so as a research paradigm quite successful.

This language gives the impression that behavioralism was already dominant and might lead one to think that this is an example of the Whig theme at work in historical narrative. Even so, Inoguchi’s continues developing a historicist theme which turns to qualifying the dominant narrative of a triumphal behavioralism in political science:

A mild disillusionment with both systems theory and behavioralism in political science, concurrent with the turmoil in the world during the 1960s and early 1970s. In other words, the limitations of systems theory were deeply felt. Easton himself confessed later that his systems analysis and behavioralism had clear limits (2058).

Although systems theory as advocated by Easton is associated with the significance of the behavioral revolution, in contemporary international political science it is less important. By the late 1960s, growing discontent within the discipline led to the formation of the Committee for a New Political Science and David Easton’s famous 1969 APSA presidential address where he ushers in what he dubbed the “post-behavioral revolution” which attempted to make political science more policy oriented and lasted through the 1970s and 1980s. Another “revolution” occurred when dissidents within the discipline again made their voice heard in the so-called “Perestroika” movement. “With the postbehavioral revolution,” Inoguchi continues his narrative, “new attempts were made beyond the behavioral revolution and the perestroika movement tried to make political science more interpretive, reflective, context sensitive, and path dependence attentive, on the one hand, and more focused on institutions as contrasted to individuals” (2058).164

---

164 A similar definition of “classical” or traditional political theory is found in Takashi Inoguchi’s IEPS entry on “Political Theory,” who defines “classical philosophy” in terms of “prescientific and pre-empiricist statements about what justice is, how it should be achieved, and how it should be conceptualized” (2011, 2052). “Classical political theory focuses on text critique and robust argumentation … Empirical political
this instance, we witness the importance the “postbehavioral revolution” and the “perestroika movement” as additional temporal markers which help mark time after the behavioral revolution.

The Theme of Continuity and Restoration

Among encyclopedia entries, there is a second variant of the historicist theme, a revisionist theme, which is developed in detail by the disciplinary historian and political theorist John Gunnell. Part of the reason Gunnell is a primary contributor to the revisionist theme of continuity and restoration is due to his more sophisticated take on historiography which focuses on the “internal” history of political science and takes as his task to reveal the actual discursive history that can only be accessed by looking at what historically situated authors actually said, the debates that they responded to, and when available their explicit intentions for writing.

In this section, I emphasize the distinctiveness of Gunnell’s contribution to the mythology of the behavioral revolution by discussing in some detail the specifics of how the revisionist theme of continuity and restoration works with the narrative context to produce meaning for professional identities and significance for disciplinary practices. Like the other entries discussed above, the behavioral revolution is not explicitly defined. Instead its significance is conveyed by the narrative context in which the behavioral revolution is mentioned.

---

theory focuses on hypotheses testing conducted according to positivistic practices or a systematic reality check” (2052).

165 John Gunnell is Distinguished University Professor, Emeritus, State University of New York, Albany. Gunnell is also a member of this dissertation’s committee.
Gunnell explicitly refutes narratives of triumph and revolution and in so doing provides a revisionist-historicist (hereafter simply revisionist) qualification to the dominant narrative of the behavioral revolution. One might think that his use of the theme of continuity might also work to refute the mythology of the behavioral revolution and actually counter-mythological. In his effort to cut against the mainstream, however, Gunnell has both contributed to the mythology of the behavioral revolution and provided an alternative way of telling the foundational story of contemporary political science. Paradoxically, though, Gunnell has relied on the common narrative elements which actually do the work of mythologizing the foundational moment of contemporary political science. And so his work to revise the dominant narrative of the behavioral revolution nevertheless contributes to its ongoing mythologization.

Political Science in General

My discussion of Gunnell’s revisionist theme begins with his entry “Political Theory and Political Science” in the Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Thought (BEPT 1991). Gunnell offers a revisionist theme which goes beyond historicist efforts to extend the timeline of the behavioral period in the U.S., emphasizing continuity rather than change, and by casting light on the role of the émigré scholars in the behavioral revolution. “Although the ‘behavioral revolution,’ that by the mid-1960s came to constitute mainstream political science,” Gunnell begins, “did not take shape until the 1950s, the sentiments that it represented had already been expressed in the 1940s” (387). This mention of the behavioral revolution disrupts the typical temporal setting of the 1950s and 1960s, and extends it back to the 1940s, where Gunnell sees the historical antecedents of
the behavioral approach in Charles Merriam and Merriam’s student Harold Lasswell. This is an important move in setting up a counter-theme as it lessens the revolutionary import of the 1950s and 1960s and demonstrates continuity with previous trends in the discipline. As Gunnell puts the matter: “These sentiments were in many respects those of Merriam and Lasswell, and part of the problem was the sense that little progress had been made toward realizing the scientific ideal that political scientists had, at least in principle come to embrace” (387).

Here the mythological nexus is evident in the linkage of the dimensions of identity and practice. As we have seen previously, the name David Easton stands for the both the dimensions of identity and practice; i.e. through a process of metonymy his name evokes both an “empirical” orientation to understanding political theory as well as the practices associated with it. Thus, Gunnell says “the central tenet of behavioralism, as articulated by individuals such as David Eason, was the development of a science of politics modeled after the methodology of the natural sciences” (387).

At this point, and if we ignore the important temporal shift back to the 1940s and the work of Merriam and Lasswell at the University of Chicago, Gunnell’s narrative might qualify as an example of a standard historicist theme. The distinctiveness of Gunnell’s revisionist theme becomes more evident in a second mention of the behavioral revolution. Related to the theme of continuity and restoration is one of Gunnell’s signature claims about the behavioral revolution or the impact of the émigré scholars on the identities and practices of the discipline. Part of the distinctiveness of the revisionist theme is that it does not take for granted the success of the behavioral revolution in changing the discipline’s identities and practices like a Whig theme, nor does it merely try and qualify the dominant narrative
as does a standard historicist theme. Instead, the revisionist theme challenges the dominant narrative and argues that important parts of that narrative are incorrect. In Gunnell, this revisionist theme rejects the idea that the behavioral revolution was an example of a successful transformation of the discipline driven solely by the initiative of its leaders like Dahl and Easton. Instead, historicist and revisionist themes are developed which see less transformation and more continuity in the mainstream of the discipline, where the status quo was at best interrupted by WWII and the émigré challenge to behavioralism and liberal notions of democracy.

The so-called revolution is better understood as a continuation of prior trends in the discipline’s identities and practices because, as Gunnell explains, “the behavioral revolution, despite the transformations it effected in the research programs of the discipline, was in many respects a conservative revolution which reasserted those basic values of the field” (1991, 388). Much of the impetus for the behavioral revolution, especially with respect to the behavioralists’ notion of “traditional theory,” was driven by a challenge to the mainstream from newcomers within the subfield political theory. There was an influx of émigré scholars in the 1930s and 1940s, many of them German scholars fleeing Nazi persecution. Given their experience fleeing Europe, many émigré scholars were quite skeptical of the liberal democratic values that dominated US culture, which in their view, were implicated in the rise of fascism and totalitarianism in 20th century Europe.\[166\] Many of these took up an anti-behavioral stance, especially with respect to

---

\[166\] Here Gunnell mentions Strauss, Arendt, Eric Voegelin, Theodor Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse (1991, 388). As is more evident below, Strauss, Arendt, and others are often mentioned in the context of “traditional theory”; these individuals amount to the “heroes” of traditional political theory, especially for those political theorists who made up the Berkeley School of Political Theory. On these developments, see Hauptmann 2004 and 2005. See also Katznelson (2004).
behavioral understanding of theory in social science. Thus, in Gunnell’s revisionist theme, the reason for the so-called behavioral revolution was that the mainstream of political science reacted to the attacks on its dominant identities and practices with a conservative counter-revolution against the émigré scholars who primarily occupied places in the subfield of political theory.

In an *EPS* (2010) entry titled “Political Science, History of,” Gunnell mentions the behavioral revolution twice in a section titled “The Behavioral Era and the Reconstitution of Science and Democracy.” A key to appreciating Gunnell’s contribution to the revisionist theme of continuity is evident in his use of the term “reconstitution” in the title of this section. Among reference material Gunnell is virtually a lone voice adopting a counter-theme to the dominant narrative of triumph and revolution emphasizing continuity punctuated by the disruption of the World Wars and the émigré challenge. This challenge to the discipline’s identities and practices was ultimately overcome by the reconstitution the mainstream of the discipline along lines that had already been developing before the wars.

The mythological nexus is also evident in Gunnell’s narrative as he draws from the narrative context of the dominant narrative in constructing his revisionist theme. In terms of the dimensions of identity/practice, Gunnell links both traditional theory to its associated practices as well as empirical theory to its associated practices. After the behavioral revolution, Gunnell relates, the “American commitment to empirical and quantitative studies was widely accepted and promulgated along with more historical and institutional forms of research” (1283). Gunnell’s narrative of reconstruction continues with a mention
of one of the “heroes” of the behavioral revolution, David Easton. “In the United States,” Gunnell explains:

David Easton’s *The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science* (1953) set the agenda for the next decade by defining political science as the study of the ‘authoritative allocation of values’ and making the case for moving beyond mere factual research and historical and traditional forms by advancing empirical theory and adopting the methods of the natural sciences (2010, 1283).

This statement is immediately followed by the first mention of the behavioral revolution. In Gunnell’s terms, “the behavioral ‘revolution,’ of which Easton was often the principal spokesperson, transformed the practice of political science and increased the substantive and methodological contributions on a variety of subjects, including survey research and voting behavior” (1283). Thus, the behavioral revolution is linked with the rise of an empirical identity in political theory associated with practices thought to conform to the scientific method of the natural sciences including survey research. In contrast, traditional identity orientations to theory in their “historical and traditional forms” were rejected by the new “science” of political science.

At this point one might be tempted to count this statement as an example of a Whig theme of successful revolution and as a narrative where political science was permanently transformed after the behavioral revolution. But this is not the whole story for Gunnell. As we’ve seen above, instead of focusing solely on the successful transformation of techniques after the World Wars, it is an important revisionist point to see how the controversy about political theory amongst behavioralist scholars was largely driven by émigré scholars and their criticism of both the idea of science and its relationship to liberalism and democratic governance. As is typical of his elaboration of the theme of reconstitution, Gunnell says the behavioral revolution “was less a revolution in many
respects than a recommitment to the visions of both the scientific study of politics and liberal democracy that had informed the discipline for nearly half a century” (1283). This is the same point we saw in Gunnell’s previous entry and one he makes repeatedly in his larger body of work.

In this entry, Gunnell elaborates on the significance of the émigré “challenge” to mainstream political science in the 1950s and the 1960s. “By the 1950s,” due to both the Cold War context and the influence of the émigré challenge, Gunnell observes, “liberalism became a highly contested concept” (1283). The contestation around the meaning of the concept of liberalism “began to infiltrate the discipline and form a counterpoint to the postwar behavioral movement in political science, and its rededication to a scientific study of politics based on emulating what was assumed to be the methods of natural science” (1283). Thus, it is important to recognize that the behavioralists in the 1950s and 1960s were in many respects responding to what amounted to a challenge to mainstream political science and its commitment to American-style liberal democratic theory.\footnote{On the significance of the émigré impact see also Ball (2001, pp. 113-117).}

In sum, the distinctiveness of Gunnell’s revisionist theme contains two primary elements: a theme of continuity rather than fundamental change or break with the past, and the importance of the émigré challenge to the rising behavioral mainstream in the 1950s and early 1960s. Mainstream American political scientists responded to this challenge by re-asserting their commitment to both “science” and “democracy,” and as Gunnell understands it, produced a conservative counter-revolution, reinforcing an already existing set of commitments to science and democracy. This point is overlooked by mainstream narratives that develop a Whig theme of a successful revolution in the discipline. For the
majority of authors, it seems, the émigré influence on the discipline is irrelevant to telling the story of political science after the behavioral revolution. Political science was transformed in spite of the émigré challenge, and in discussions of the behavioral revolution their story and their reasons for protest are largely silenced and ignored.

The Subfield of Political Theory

Gunnell further elaborates on the central importance of émigré scholarship to the behavioral revolution in an entry in the EPS (2010), titled “Political Theory.” Here the focus is on the substantive change in identities and practices in the subfield of political theory. As a disciplinary identity the history of political thought was once central to dominant practices but with the behavioral revolution the entire field changed dramatically. As we saw above, Gunnell’s revisionist theme emphasizes how it was behavioralists’ rejection of an émigrés’ challenge to democratic theory in the U.S. that began a “radical change in the literature associated with the history of political theory” which “instigated, in part, the behavioral movement” (1294). Gunnell continues developing the revisionist theme and emphasizing how the behavioral revolution was less a revolution than a successful counter-movement by the mainstream in political science. The core of Gunnell’s narrative is restated when he says:

Although it is often assumed that the behavioral revolution in political science, which defined the discipline during the 1950s and 1960s, involved a rejection of the history of political theory in favor of what it characterized as the emulation of the natural sciences and the development of scientific theory a radical change in the literature associated with the history of political theory instigated, in part, the behavioral movement (2010, 1294).
Importantly, there is a relatively high concentration of referents accompanying these mentions of the behavioral revolution. In this highly condensed passage, and in his effort to challenge the dominant narrative of successful revolution, Gunnell has added to the power of the mythology through the repetition of several of its key referents.

Instead of a triumphal “revolution” Gunnell sees a second theme of continuity and the “reconstitution” of already existing trends in political science. Gunnell concludes the section by restating the core of the second theme: “Behavioralism was in many respects a reaffirmation of and a recommitment to both the account of liberal democracy and the methods of studying politics that had dominated the discipline for a generation” (1294). This revisionist theme leads to different conclusions about the history of the discipline and in terms of historical accuracy I think Gunnell is largely correct. What we must keep in mind, however, is that this dissertation is focused on the present and the way the behavioral revolution is remembered and talked about in the reference material of political science. Thus, even though the theme of continuity is substantiated by historical research of the highest quality, the repetition of the referents in the context of mentions of the behavioral revolution contribute to its mythologization. Nevertheless, Gunnell’s perspective is unique in the reference materials and adds a unique way of drawing on the narrative context and contributing to the mythological nexus of the behavioral revolution.

The Theme of Lament and Loss

Among encyclopedias, there is only one entry that develops a theme of lament and loss. Given the fact of a dominant narrative, it is not that surprising that the theme of lament and loss is rare in the reference material. This is because the theme of lament and
loss focuses on what has been lost after the behavioral revolution and in contrast to the
dominant narrative casts the behavioral revolution as a mistake leading to more harm than
good. As further evidence of the power of the dominant narrative, even the theme of lament
and loss draws on and contributes to the narrative context and mythological nexus of the
behavioral revolution. It is also not surprising that this encyclopedia entry comes in a
collection written by and for historians, the *Oxford Encyclopedia of American Political
and Legal History* (*OEAPLH* 2012), edited by Donald T. Critchlow and Philip R.
VanderMeer.168 There are no mentions of the behavioral revolution in either the preface
or introduction. The first and only mention of the behavioral revolution is in this
encyclopedia’s entry on “Political Science,” written by a scholar from outside the
discipline, Wilfred M. McClay.169

McClay’s mention of the behavioral revolution comes at the end of his entry but
the majority of the foundation narrative comes towards the beginning. There are several
common referents, but since they are not strictly in the context of a mention of the
behavioral revolution, I have not included these in Appendix A. I think it is instructive,
however, to note how the mythology of the behavioral revolution can be at work even when
the specific phrase is not invoked. Thus, the mythological nexus is evident when McClay
begins discussing the mid-century transformation of political science, saying “the founders
of modern political science sought to make the field more ‘scientific’ precisely by
distancing it from moral philosophy, focusing instead on value-neutral, quantitative study
of human behavior” (111). Here the traditional identities associated with moral philosophy

---

168 Critchlow is a Professor of History at Saint Louis University and VanderMeer is an Associate Professor
of History at Arizona State University.

169 At the time of publication McClay was SunTrust Bank Chair of Excellence in Humanities at the University
of Tennessee at Chattanooga.
are juxtaposed to scientific identities associated with practices like quantitative methods. McClay explicitly draws on the narrative context of the behavioral revolution when he mentions Harold Lasswell and Charles Merriam who he says “explored the influence of psychology, particularly mass psychology, upon modern politics” (111-112). In the context of changing “subject matter” of political science, McClay also mentions the “anti-heroes” of the behavioral revolution, Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin, and Hannah Arendt who challenged behavioral dominance in the 1950s and 1960s (111).

McClay is a historian reflecting on what the human sciences lost in their mid-20th century turn to science and away from tradition. The context in which McClay mentions the behavioral revolution is the most critical of any of the mentions. During the behavioral era, McClay develops a theme of lament and loss, there was a “steady retreat from the consideration of the ‘political’ per se” (2012, 112). This loss is evident, McClay observes, in “twentieth-century American political science, particularly after the postwar ‘behavioral revolution,’ [which] increasingly reduced politics to the social, economic, the psychological, or the cultural” (112). Drawing on one of the “heroes” of traditional, epic, and classical political theory, McClay continues, “Arendt warned against this process, particularly the tendency to conflate the ‘social’ with the ‘political’” (112). McClay elaborates the political significance of the behavioral revolution and the connection between contemporary political science and contemporary politics:

Arendt’s observations were perhaps borne out by the perceived erosion of the public realm in the late twentieth-century America. That problem could not be addressed without reviving an older tradition of reflection on politics, as a distinctive form of human activity involving public deliberation by citizens in public spaces (112).
Seen from this angle, the behavioral revolution, while powerful and transformative, is not celebrated or simply accepted, but lamented as a loss of an integrated and holistic political science. This theme allows McClay to draw a distinctive conclusion, as he says, contemporary political science cannot “escape its normative dimension because that dimension is implicit in the very concept of politics” (112).

The Behavioral Revolution in Encyclopedias

In this chapter, I reviewed the narrative context and the mythological nexus that taken together constitute the mythology of the behavioral revolution. Foundation mythologies are common to all human communities and serve two major functions. First, they provide common narrative elements which, through repetition by different authors, tell the story of how the community was constituted, who participated in its constitution, and what challenges its founders overcame. These foundational stories become a mythology when a large number of members of the community repeat its narrative elements in speech and writing. Second, these stories of origin answer important questions about the identity of the community and provide a sense of belonging to individual members. This crucial aspect of what makes the variation and repetition of narrative elements important to mythology is what I captured in the concept of the mythological nexus.

The behavioral revolution mythology is made up of foundation narratives about how the contemporary academic community of political science came to be. This community, the dominant narrative goes, experienced a profound intellectual and institutional transformation which altered the character of the discipline, shifting its
mainstream from traditional to scientific and establishing such now common practices as survey research and other quantitative methods (Robin 2001, pp. 27-29). The authors of these encyclopedia entries, most of them senior political scientists, draw on a common pool of referents to give meaning to the behavioral revolution. The behavioral revolution is remembered for how it facilitated a new professional ethos focusing on scientific method and calling for the practice of using quantitative methods to test empirical claims of researchers. In some cases, these accounts also reflect the authors’ experience as political scientists, some of whom began teaching during the 1950s and 1960s.

In terms of the narrative context, I have considered the way authors draw on these referents to talk about the influence of behavioralism in different subfield communities. The behavioral revolution had different impacts on different subfields, and so we should expect variation in the story of the revolution and for elements of its narrative context to be repeated differently depending on the subfield in question. In this chapter, I have shown how political scientists explain the present state of the discipline in general and in the subfields of IR and political theory in particular by telling the story of the behavioral revolution. Important differences between the subfields of political theory and international relations have been noted, and yet as we’ve seen, the vast majority of these encyclopedia entries discussed in this chapter rely on the dominant narrative of a discipline transformed after the behavioral revolution.

Authors draw from and contribute to a common pool of referents to the behavioral revolution. The behavioral revolution is rarely defined; instead authors convey its significance by the use of specific groups of referents. The dominant narrative is also evident in the distribution of referents to the behavioral revolution discussed in this chapter,
many of which serve to justify the dominance of empirical and quantitative research as well as acting to support the related mainstream image of political science as a social science. It is not necessary for an individual author to employ all of the referents in order for the account to be mythological. The behavioral revolution is more than the sum of its referents. What is crucial is that authors from across subfields and specialties repeat referents from a common pool, taken together at the aggregate or macro level, constituting a mythology.

Throughout this chapter I have focused on the theme developed in each narrative about the behavioral revolution. I demonstrated how the Whig, Historicist, and Lament of Loss themes differed from one another and I argued that despite these differences they all contribute to the mythology of the behavioral revolution. This is due to their drawing on the common pool of narrative referents to the revolution and the fact that variation and repetition produces significance important to identities and practices. The dominance of narratives of successful transformation of the discipline in the 1950s and early 1960s is one sign of mythology. This dominance is evident regardless of theme developed, yet it is still important to track these themes because it is part of the repetition and variation of narrative elements that makes mythology so powerful.

The narrative context works in tandem with the mythological nexus to produce significance to the experiences and deeds of contemporary political scientists. Mythology is not constituted by the mere mentions of the behavioral revolution, which in any case is

\[^{170} \text{The importance of science is as old as political science, but as we've seen, the desire to make political science \textit{"}scientific\textit{"} and the corresponding image of \textit{"}science\textit{"} in political science today are reliant on the mythology of the behavioral revolution. The dominance of the empirical approach to political science is as we've seen a product of the 1950s and 1960s and now influences the discipline through the mythology of the behavioral revolution.}\]
not defined, but through the repetition of a common stock of narrative elements (theme, referent, and subfield). As discussed in Chapter Two and in the introduction to this chapter, the narrative context works to provide significance through the dimensions of the mythological nexus. I have shown throughout this chapter how authors invoke the narrative context of the behavioral revolution in a way that engages the dimensions of identity and practice.

These findings makes sense given a political theory of mythology. As I discussed in Chapter Two, a central function of a foundational mythology is to provide meaning to identities and significance to practices in contemporary communities. The dominance of the narrative of successful revolution makes sense to individual members because the current discipline, as reflected in the reference materials, is – or imagines itself to be – dominated by a behavioral or scientific orientation which legitimizes and indeed calls for research which adheres to the scientific method and makes use of quantitative methods to verify its empirical claims. The behavioral revolution is a mythology – a collective narrative which answers a need for significance and provides models for practice in a community (Bottici and Challand 2006, 315). Political science was transformed by the behavioral revolution and this change is reflected in the present state of the discipline and its major subfields. Yet, as I will continue to emphasize, repetition of narrative elements alone is not enough to constitute a mythology; as the repetition of elements itself shows, they are important because they give significance to identities and legitimacy to current practices.
CHAPTER V

THE BEHAVIORAL REVOLUTION MYTHOLOGY IN HANDBOOKS

Introduction

Mythology is a discursive phenomenon involving authoritative speech-acts of a community which work together to provide significance to that community’s experiences, its identities, and its practices. In this chapter, I report the results of an analysis of entries that mention the behavioral revolution in contemporary handbooks. This analysis proceeds in the same fashion as in the previous two chapters. I isolate mentions of the behavioral revolution, analyze their narrative context, and then discuss the ways in which an author’s account draws on and contributes to the behavioral revolution mythology in contemporary political science. As with both dictionaries and encyclopedias, in this chapter I demonstrate how authors creatively appropriate elements of the narrative context of the behavioral revolution (subfields, referents, and themes).

In this chapter, I show handbook authors repeatedly drawing on the same dominant narrative of behavioralism’s success in transforming the discipline: behavioralism is a fait accompli and something to be explained rather than an object to be contested. This shared starting point, however, does not lead to identical narratives. Instead, the repetition and variation of the elements of the narrative context show that mythology may be at work. To make this next step in the argument, I show how the referents to the behavioral revolution map onto the dimensions of identity and practice which along with the dimension of narrative constitute the mythological nexus at the heart of a political theory of mythology. Once again, there is evidence for the proposition that the behavioral revolution matters
today because its narrativization provides significance to identities and practices. Mythology as authoritative speech, finally, has a prescriptive force which makes it difficult to recognize as it becomes part of the common sense of a community. This means, of course, that even those authors who are critical of behavioralism and develop themes of lament and loss are nevertheless contributing to the prescriptive force of the behavioral revolution mythology. This is because of the durability and persistence of the dominant narrative of the behavioral revolution which all authors recognize and build from; differences in narratives emerge in the way authors creatively employ elements of the narrative context.

General Selection Criteria

Many editors of handbooks discuss what makes their reference works distinctive with respect to other forms like encyclopedias and dictionaries. Handbooks are seen as authoritative collections of essays that bring together all the experts in the discipline or a subfield. This is different from either encyclopedias or dictionaries which often aspire to comprehensiveness in covering the topics and vocabulary of the discipline respectively (Sica 2001). Margot Light and A.J.R. Groom, for example, differentiate their handbook from other forms of reference material in their introduction to *International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory (IRHCT 1985)*. The *IRHCT* is designed to be a “guide” to international relations and “to stimulate, even to provoke the reader. But it is also, perforce, a selective guide, rather than an encyclopedia or compendium” (2).

In their introduction to the *Handbook of Political Theory and Policy Science (HPTPSs)*, Edward Portis and Michael Levy discuss the difficulty of living up to the
standard of an instruction manual “or a compilation of basic facts and procedures” (1988, xv). This fact is due to the lack of consensus in the discipline on such basic terms as “theory,” “policy analysis,” and “science.” Thus despite the name given to it, “this volume clearly cannot be a handbook” like those found in the natural sciences (xv). Instead, the authors clarify, “a handbook in social science typically consists of a collection of articles, each surveying the issues and notable literature in a recognized subfield of the general discipline (e.g. Greenstein and Polsby 1975)” (xv).¹⁷¹

My search for the behavioral revolution in contemporary handbooks of political science began with identifying the most general reference works available between 1980 and 2012. Once again, the general selection criterion I developed are:

1) The reference work is on political science in general.
2) The reference work is on the subfields in general.
3) The entries are on political science in general.
4) The entries are on the subfields in general.
5) The entry contains mentions of the behavioral revolution

First, I searched for general titles on the social sciences, political science, or one of the major subfields. There were many more handbooks than encyclopedias that fit the criteria for generality as with the 1982 *International Handbook of Political Science*, or whose titles were addressed to the specific subfields I cover in this dissertation (American politics, comparative politics, international relations, and political theory) as with the 1985 *International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory*. Within the handbooks I searched

¹⁷¹ It is also interesting to note that the editors’ preface explicitly disavows being “comprehensive,” at least in comparison to a 1975 four volume Greenstein and Polsby handbook: “While we cannot hope to have provided a comprehensive coverage of all recent developments of consequence, we nonetheless hope to have touched upon most of the main currents in the disciplines” (xv).
the front matter, index, and any general entries on political science, one of the major subfields, or a topic relevant to the behavioral revolution (e.g. “behavioralism”). I have listed the specific entries by subfields that contain mentions of the behavioral revolution in Appendix A of this dissertation. In Table 5 I have listed the handbooks covered in this chapter.

Table 12
Most General Handbooks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Handbooks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Handbook of Political Science (IHPS 1982)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The State of the Discipline I (SDI 1983)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory (IRHCT 1985)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handbook of Political Theory and Policy Science (HPTPS 1988)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The State of the Discipline II (SDII 1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Handbook of Political Science (NHPS 1996)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handbook of International Relations (HIR 2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The State of the Discipline III (SDIII 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis (OHCPA 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions (OHPI 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxford Handbook of Public Policy (OHPP 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics (OHCP 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxford Handbook of Political Theory (OHPT 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxford Handbook of International Relations (OHIR 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (OHLP 2008)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Absence and Exclusion in Handbooks

If handbooks did not meet the general selection criteria they were excluded from analysis. The most important criteria here was the absence of mentions of the behavioral revolution which of course means that the item would be excluded. Between 1982 and 2003 I discovered eight general encyclopedias and I am confident that all general handbooks during this period have been included. The field of handbooks goes through quite an expansion beginning in 2006 with Oxford University Press’ entrance into the handbook market. After 2006, I specifically focused on the ten-volume Oxford Handbooks of Political Science which are focused on the following general areas in political science: Political Theory, Political Institutions, Political Behavior, Comparative Politics, Law & Politics, Public Policy, Political Economy, International Relations, Contextual Political Analysis, and Political Methodology. Of these, only the Political Economy handbook is absent from analysis as it has not yielded mentions of the behavioral revolution.

In addition to the ten-volume Handbook of Political Science, Oxford University Press has published a number of other handbooks that meet the requirement of most general
applied in this chapter: The *Oxford Handbook of American Elections and Political Behavior*, the *Oxford Handbook of the History of Political Philosophy*, and the *Oxford Handbook of Political Philosophy* are not part of the ten-volume Oxford Handbooks of Political Science. These handbooks have been included since their titles were general enough to draw my attention and since they contain mentions of the behavioral revolution. Still, a large number of handbooks have been excluded. A recent count by the author of every Oxford handbook that might be included under the broad canopy of political science yielded one-hundred and fifteen results. Obviously, I could not go through them all and so I focused on the ten-volume Oxford Handbooks of Political Science which is explicitly designed to appeal to political science in general, as well as a handful of other Oxford handbooks that came to my attention in the process of research. Even though my search criteria led to a large number of excluded handbooks, there are still twenty-one that have been included.

**Authoritativeness and Generality in Handbooks**

I derive the factors that lend reference works authoritativeness from an analysis of their front matter. These factors of authoritativeness emerge from the relationship between authority and generality. The first three are general characteristics of authoritativeness, while the fourth and fifth are specific manifestations of the desire to be authoritative in reference works:

1) The reference work is general and meant for all members of the mainstream of the community addressed.
2) The ideas and practices covered in the reference material are meant to reinforce and reflect the “practical wisdom” of the mainstream.

3) The high level of agreement on terms and their predominant meaning that reinforce and reflect the “common sense” of the mainstream.

4) Authority is shown by including high-profile, high-status members of the community as editors of the reference work and of individual entries.

5) Authority is shown by including as many “international” authors as possible.

Compared to the dictionary or encyclopedia entries it is less likely that handbook entry authors will be senior in academic rank, although many are still eminent scholars in the discipline. The narratives of the behavioral revolution are thus conveyed with a sense of authority: the type of authority that comes from seniority and mastery of practices central to identities in a community. Under the leadership of political scientist Robert Goodin, for example, the Oxford University Press has published a series of ten handbooks specifically focused on the discipline of political science. The ambitions for this collection are high, as *The Oxford Handbook of Political Science* notes on its title page – “This series aspires to shape the discipline, not just to report on it” (2009, ii). This blunt statement of intent meshes well with the first factor of authoritativeness. Since the authors self-consciously try to “shape the discipline,” moreover, these works promise to be rich sources for uncovering the structure and impact of the powerful behavioral revolution mythology in political science.

A sense of authoritativeness is also evident twenty years earlier in the *New Handbook of Political Science* (*NHPS* 1996) edited by Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. In the Foreword to the *NHPS*, the political theorist and then International
Political Science Association (IPSA) president Carole Pateman says, “the New Handbook provides an unusually comprehensive and systematic discussion of all the major areas of the discipline” (1996, xi). In addition to covering the first factor of authoritativeness in its appeal to all members of the discipline, the NHPS also presents the “state of the art” by authors who are “all leading authorities in their fields” (xii). Drawing on the fourth factor of authoritativeness, this means their work can be taken as authoritative as it “offers a sure, reliable and expert guide through the broad expanses and thickets of the discipline and its sub-divisions” (xii).

In the Handbook of International Relations (HIR 2002), edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, discuss how their specialty handbook is authoritative since it is addressed to all members of the IR subfield, it is written by experts in the field, and because it is intended to be “international” as possible. According to the editors of the HIR, the “Handbook is intended to fill what we submit is currently a significant lacuna within the discipline: providing a single volume of extensive, systematic and authoritative overviews of the state of the art within the various sub-fields of the discipline” (xv).172 The authors recognize other handbooks such as Greenstein and Polsby (1975) and Goodin and Klingemann (1996) but these editions are not focused on “the entire spectrum of IR as a field of scholarly endeavor” (xv). In addition, the HIR goes beyond previous handbooks by attempting first to bring in authors with “the best possible expertise to participate” and secondly, “to make this a truly international (or at least trans-Atlantic) enterprise” (xvi).

172 Risse has been Chair and Professor of International Relations at the Free University of Berlin since 2001. At the time of publication Simmons was an Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley. She is currently Clarence Dillon Professor of International Affairs at Harvard University. An internet search did not reveal any biographical details on Carlsnaes.
In the front matter of handbooks there is also a clear connection between authoritativeness and the trope of “internationality.” Goodin and Klingemann bring in the fourth factor of authoritativeness, which they say is accentuated by the number of “international” political scientists commissioned to write articles. Compared to the original 1975 eight volume *Handbook of Political Science* edited by Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, the editors say “the *New Handbook* is conspicuously more international than the old, with just under half of our 42 contributors having non-North American affiliations” (*NHPS* 1996, xiii). This remarkable feat has been made possible by, the handbook’s origins in the IPSA, and secondly, as Goodin and Klingemann relate, “due in much larger part to genuine internationalization of the discipline over the last two decades” (xiii).

The one volume *International Handbook of Political Science* (*IHPS*, 1982) is the first handbook that attempted to approach something like “international” status in terms of coverage of political science by political scientists around the world. As the editor William Andrews makes plain in his preface, reaching full coverage and representativeness was a nearly impossible task. In the end, Williams managed to cover twenty-seven countries and, even with “80 percent of the goal, the gaps are disappointing” (1982, xi). Andrews discusses the internationality of the discipline in his introduction, titled “Freaks, Rainbows, and Pots of Gold.” Despite the founding of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) under the auspices of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNSECO) in 1950, “the discipline continues to lead a spotty global existence. Only thirty-nine national associations belong to the IPSA (compared to 151 members of the UN) and some of them appear to exist on
paper only” (1982, 2-3). In terms of political scientists themselves the U.S. “has 75 or 80 percent of the world’s supply” (3).

Narrative Context and the Behavioral Revolution Mythology

The narrative context consists of several elements: the field or subfield addressed, the referents employed, and the themes developed in telling the story of the behavioral revolution. I analyze each entry to see how the concept of the behavioral revolution is employed in narrative. I also bring in three dimensions of the mythological nexus – narrative, identity, and practice – and show how the referents to the behavioral revolution convey meaning about the discipline’s past relevant to its current state. I begin by identifying mentions of the behavioral revolution. I discovered thirty-five entries with narratives containing one hundred and one mentions of the behavioral revolution in the contemporary handbooks.

There are far more handbooks than either dictionaries or encyclopedias which met the general selection criteria for this dissertation. In terms of narrative context, this means that handbooks have yielded the most variation, giving more coverage of major subfields and more examples of the theme of lament and loss. There are far more mentions in handbooks than in either encyclopedias or dictionaries, and as I’ll discuss in a moment, this leads to a large number of referents to the behavioral revolution. Unlike the encyclopedias and dictionaries covered, all of the major subfields are represented in this chapter. Finally, there is a greater variety of theme discussed in this chapter. These last

173 Today there are fifty-two member nations in the IPSA (http://www.ipsa.org/membership/collective/list; accessed November 14, 2014).
two points are due to the large number of handbooks published by Oxford University Press in the 2000s. Since there are far more general handbooks than either dictionaries or encyclopedias, there was a greater probability that all the major subfields would be represented and that there would be more examples of the lament theme. Of course, since reference materials are meant to be authoritative for the discipline as a whole, it also makes sense that themes of lament and loss are quite rare.

The Subfield Context in Handbooks

Part of the narrative context of mythology is the community or subcommunity addressed by the text or speech in question. When analyzing an academic community like political science there are a number of different communities or subfields which we might expect rely on narratives about the behavioral revolution to different degrees. This difference is captured in Table 5.2 which shows the distribution of mentions of the behavioral revolution by subfield classification.

Table 13

Mentions of the Behavioral Revolution by Subfield, Handbooks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus on Political Science in General</th>
<th>Focus on Political Theory</th>
<th>Focus on American Politics</th>
<th>Focus on Comparative Politics</th>
<th>Focus on International Relations</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Handbooks</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This chapter is in part organized by subfield. Unique to this chapter, all the major subfields are represented; there are entries that mention the behavioral revolution in handbooks devoted to American politics, comparative politics, international relations, and political theory. Subfields serve to enforce distinctions among members of the political science community which some members may not readily adopt or identify. As Kirkpatrick and Andrews point out in their 1982 *IHPS* entry on the “United States of America,” there is “no standard and generally followed identification of subfields” in political science; although “the most frequently used breakdown includes American government and politics, comparative government and politics, international or world affairs, political theory, research methods, and public administration” (366). By the mid-1990s, the *NHPS* (1996) is organized by subfields or “subdisciplines.” The subfield divisions which were absent in the earlier version of the handbook, but as Goodin and Klingemann argue and highlighting the connection between authoritativeness and generality, “some such subdisciplinary affiliations are, and virtually always have been, the principle points of allegiance of most members of the discipline” (xiii). These divisions of contemporary political science into subfields are authoritative because they “represent what seem to constitute the dominant configuration of the discipline at present,” not because the authors are trying to argue that subdisciplines are “hermetically sealed” or do not change over time (1996, xiii-xiv).  

---

174 The *NHPS* (1996) consists of one volume with nine sections and is primarily divided by subfield classification: the first one on “The Discipline,” which is followed by one section per subfield of political science: (1) Political Institutions, (2) Political Behavior, (3) Comparative Politics, (4) International Relations, (5) Political Theory, (6) Public Policy and Administration, (7) Political Economy, and (8) Political Methodology.
Katznelson and Milner (2003), editors of the third and most current of the APSA State of the Discipline volumes, chose not to organize it by subfield. As the editors say, “we resisted the most prominent possibility that would have divided the book into the four conventional subfields (American, comparative, international relations, and political theory), plus perhaps a methods section, because we do not think that this division advances the discipline. The subfields increasingly inform and blend into each other” (2003, xiv-xv). In terms of handbooks on the discipline in general, this is a rather unusual approach to organization. Most handbooks, indeed most reference words, are organized explicitly or implicitly around the major subfield distinctions. This more common approach is a testament to the strength of these divisions which now organize the discipline at the level of the department, influence hiring practices, and more broadly structures how many political scientists think about the way the discipline is organized.

The Referents to the Behavioral Revolution

Due to the greater number of contemporary handbooks of political science there are significantly more referents to the behavioral revolution compared to either dictionaries or encyclopedias. As I discussed in Chapters Three and Four, my approach has been to search for mentions of the behavioral revolution in narratives about the foundation and evolution of contemporary political science. Next, I isolate each of the referents to the behavioral revolution. Similar to what I found in dictionaries and encyclopedias, the behavioral revolution itself is rarely explicitly defined. Instead, the behavioral revolution is embedded in a narrative context made up of subfield community, referents, and theme. The referents are also important for recognizing themes or how referents are employed, which ones are
included and/or excluded, all of which can lend narratives thematic focus. Table 5.2 presents the distribution of referents across the handbook entries.

Table 14
Referents to the Behavioral Revolution in Handbooks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Biographical</th>
<th>Conceptual</th>
<th>Institutional</th>
<th>Temporal</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Handbooks</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The narrative context is the means to see the mythology of the behavioral revolution at work, while the mythological nexus is the explanation for why the narrative context is sustained in the discourse of the discipline. This connection between narrative context and mythological nexus makes up the political theory of mythology developed in this dissertation.

In terms of the mythological nexus of the behavioral revolution, the referents serve to substantiate the dimensions of identity and practice in narratives. Table 5.3 presents the most common referents to the behavioral revolution in the handbook entries. The top five referents are all conceptual referents with the trio of traditional theory, scientific method, and empirical theory appearing in nearly half of all narratives about the behavioral revolution. As I discuss throughout the chapter, authors repeatedly rely on these conceptual referents to provide significance to their experiences within the academic discipline of political science. For example, in many narratives, the “traditional theory” referent is opposed to the “empirical theory” referent. By a process of metonymy these referents
come to stand for the dimension of identity in a political theory of mythology. The conceptual referent of either “traditional theory” or “empirical theory” is invoked because it stands for identity orientations that continue to be defined by opposition. In other words, an important part of what the “empirical theory” referent means is that it is not “traditional theory” (and vice versa). To add depth to this definition by opposition, authors also regularly bring the practical dimension of the mythological nexus and link it to the dimension of identity. Thus, to define “empirical theory” in opposition to “traditional theory” often entails linking the former with practices associated with scientific method and quantitative methods such as statistics. The conceptual referents like “traditional theory” and “scientific method” are most commonly found in relation to mentions of the behavioral revolution, while biographical (e.g. David Easton), Temporal (e.g. 1950s and 1960s), and Institutional (e.g. the University of Chicago) are also well-represented (See Appendix B).
Table 15

Top Five Referents in Handbooks, Number and Percentage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Referent</th>
<th>Entries with Referents</th>
<th>Percent with Referents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Theory</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific Method</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empirical Theory</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Science</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quantitative Methods</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Thematic Context of the Behavioral Revolution

In addition to the referents, it is also important to identify variation in thematic content. To do so, I pay attention to the overall narrative to see whether the story is told in one of three variations: Whig, Historicist, or Lamenting of Loss. These categories of theme were developed over the course of writing this dissertation and represent three standard categories which all narratives about the behavioral revolution can be classified. Thematic context has to do with the way the story is told. What purpose does the author appear to have in telling the story the way he or she does? In part, then, a theme depends on the way the referents are employed by an author in a particular narrative. As I emphasized in Chapter One, it is important to recognize that a theme is not the same as a narrative. A theme is part of narrative (it’s one of the narrative elements); it is therefore important to
keep these concepts analytically distinct. While there is a dominant narrative of a successful revolution in the discipline along behavioral lines, the way this story is told depends on whether the author celebrates triumph (as in a Whig theme), accepts behavioral dominance without being celebratory (as in a historicist theme), or rejects behavioral dominance and works to subvert the dominant narrative (as in a theme of lament of loss). Theme refers to the structure of the narrative and in its amalgamating capacity similar to mythology which combines elements from multiple narratives over time and place. In other words, in much the same way that mythology draws on the variation and repetition of its narrative context, a theme is composed by the creative employment of narrative elements for the purpose of communication.

In this chapter I discuss twenty-six examples of narratives found in contemporary handbook entries that mention the behavioral revolution. This is the first chapter in which the full range of the general subfields of political science are covered together: there are six entries on political science in general, eight entries on American politics, three on comparative politics, three on international relations, and six on political theory. There is also a range in thematic context employed by authors of handbook chapters with nine of them classified as developing a Whig theme, fourteen developing a Historicist theme, and three developing a theme of Lament. It is interesting to note that the majority of the Whig themes come in handbooks published prior to the 2000s indicating, perhaps, that critiques of Whig narratives and other “legitimating histories” have begun to reach the ear of the disciplinary mainstream.
Political Science in General

I begin with a 1982 political science entry in the one volume *International Handbook of Political Science* (IHPS) edited by William Andrews. The IHPS is organized by country, and the only entry which contained mentions of the behavioral revolution is titled, “United States of America,” written by Evron Kirkpatrick and William Andrews. Kirkpatrick and William’s article is an example of a Whig theme that celebrates the rise to dominance of behavioralism in political science. The narrative about postwar political science, begins in a section titled “The Behavioral Revolution.” By the early 1960s, the discipline of political science had made significant advances in knowledge about the political world, and had experienced growth in the numbers of practicing political scientists as well as the number of works published by political scientists. “With this expansion,” the authors tell us, “came a new self-consciousness by political scientists about their corporate identity, purposes, and organization” (1982, 369).

This newly emergent awareness and “self-scrutiny” is, the authors tell us, what first gave rise to “the behavioral revolution” (369). “Political scientists expressed dissatisfaction with research work done in political science and with the results it produced,” Kirkpatrick and Andrews observe, many political scientists during the behavioral revolution were “influenced by developments in the natural sciences, in mathematics and statistics, in the other social sciences, and perhaps even more by such students of science and the scientific method as Morris R. Cohen” (369). Here the mythological nexus is clear in the important connection between a scientific identity (a

---

175 Kirkpatrick (1911-1995) received his Ph.D. from Yale University in 1939 and was director of the APSA from 1954-1981. This entry is in part based on Kirpatrick’s chapter “The Impact of the Behavioral Approach on Traditional Political Science,” in Ranney (1962).
“corporate identity”) modeled on the natural sciences as well as the associated practices of mathematics and statistics.

In a rare attempt to explicitly define the behavioral revolution, the authors say “despite the variety of interests and talents among the carriers of the behavioral revolution, its salient characteristics can be identified” (370). A Whig theme celebrating behavioral dominance is evident when the authors say “the behavioral movement gained control of the commanding heights of the American political science profession during those years, especially the leading offices of the American Political Science Association and its *Review*” (371). Kirkpatrick and Andrews remind their readers “political scientists in the behavioral movement, believing in the unity of the social sciences, borrowed concepts, approaches, techniques, and vocabulary from other social sciences” (372). These interdisciplinary borrowings were essential to the establishment of the theoretical identity associated with empirical theory as it was “through such borrowing, structural-functionalism and general-systems theory entered the discipline” (372). Indeed, the authors state in a triumphal fashion, “studies in all fields of political science showed the impact of the behavioral movement” (372).

Finally, the authors bring in the context of criticism of behavioralism in the 1960s and 1970s. According to the authors, during this time “a comprehensive new attack was

---

176 The characteristics of the behavioral revolution identified by Kirpatrick and Andrews are as follows: 1) a focus on individual behavior and not on concepts like the state, 2) a belief in the unity of the social sciences, 3) calls for precision in data collection, 4) calls for more quantitative studies and statistics, 5) a belief in the desirability of distinguishing the empirical from the normative, 6) a widespread disparagement of the history of political science, 7) a shared goal of “systematic, empirical theory,” and 8) increased professionalism (1982, 370). The dimensions of identity and practice in the mythological nexus are evident in the juxtaposition of traditional political theory with empirical political theory and the associated practices of quantitative methods and statistics.

177 The rise of behavioralism in the discipline was enhanced by institutions like “Survey Research Center” at the University of Michigan which, facilitated a program of “massive generation of data and effective analysis” (372).
launched against the entire political science profession in the United States and its basic norms, although the behavioral movement was its principle target” (374). These attacks “mostly associated with the radical politics of the so-called New Left” sought to undermine the very identity that the behavioral movement had begun to establish (374). Kirkpatrick and Andrews dismiss these criticisms of behavioralism and the type of political science it helped create on the grounds that “the reason, objectivity, and freedom they attack as false gods are the very foundation of the scholarly ethic” (374). “Fortunately,” the authors tell us, “the activists have attracted little support in the profession” (374). Political science in the early 1980s has weathered these criticisms, and remains firmly behavioral in both scientific identities inspired by the natural sciences, as well as in terms of dominant practices like quantification and statistics. Here, then, is an early and relatively straightforward example of the mythological nexus at work in the discourse of the discipline.

A New Handbook of Political Science (NHPS, 1996) is edited by Robert Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. In the introduction is titled “Political Science: The Discipline” there are six mentions of the behavioral revolution. Goodin and Klingemann’s theme is Whig in that they celebrate the success of behavioralism, especially with respect to the professionalism in the discipline afforded by the new beginning of the behavioral revolution. The authors discuss how by the late-1990s “political science, as a

---

178 At the time of publication Goodin was Professor of Philosophy at the Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University, Canberra; while Klingemann was Director of Research Unit III at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Socialforschung and Professor of Political Science at the Free University, Berlin. Goodin is currently Professor of Government at the University of Essex and Distinguished Professor of Social & Political Theory and Philosophy at Australian National University. As I discuss more below, Goodin’s presence looms large over reference materials, especially the ten-volume Oxford Handbooks of Political Science of which he is the general editor. Klingemann is now Professor Emeritus at the Berlin Social Science Center.

179 In the Forward to the NHPS, Carole Pateman notes the support of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) in the making of the new handbook. Pateman was the first woman president of the IPSA, from 1991-1994.
discipline, has become increasingly mature and professionalized” (1996, 4). By “professionalism” the authors mean “that there is increasing agreement to a ‘common core’ which can be taken to define ‘minimal professional competence’ within the profession” (6). Here the mythological matrix is on display as the authors link professional identities to dominant practices in the discipline. The authors say that “increased professionalization” is evident in the fact that political scientists “share at least a minimal grounding in broadly the same methodological techniques and in broadly the same core literature” (1996, 14-15). “The depth and details of these common cores vary slightly” they continue, “but virtually all political scientists nowadays can make tolerably good sense of regression equations, and virtually everyone is at least loosely familiar with broadly the same corpus of classics in the field” (15).

In the section titled, “The Maturation of the Discipline,” the authors begin by referring to the French Revolution and to the “Jacobins” (pro-revolution) and the “Thermidorians” (anti-revolution or reactionary). The authors say that “the ‘behavioral revolution,’ in its heyday, was from many perspectives a thoroughly Jacobin affair; and it would hardly be pressing the analogy too far to say that the reaction was decidedly Thermidorian to boot” (10-11). As with any revolution, in other words, there are supporters of the new order and critics who preferred the revolution had not begun in the first place. The authors continue to explain the relevance of their analogy drawing on the mythological association between the traditional political theory identity and the practices commonly related to it. The “early behavioral revolutionaries, for their part, were devoted to dismissing the formalisms of politics – institutions, organizational charts, constitutional myths and legal fictions – as pure sham” (11). These “formalisms of politics” are what
once constituted the identity and practice of traditional theory before the behavioral
revolution. “Those whom the behavioral revolution left behind,” on the other hand, made
full use of traditional theory and “heaped Olympian scorn upon the scientific pretensions
of the new discipline, calling down the wisdom of the sages and of the ages” (11).

Goodin and Klingemann note that “there are many ways of telling and retelling
these disciplinary histories, with correspondingly many lessons for how to avoid the worst
and achieve the best in the future” (1996, 13). The authors mention the behavioral
revolution again in a footnote at the end of this paragraph: “Indeed, judging from Warren
Miller’s (chap. 10 below) account, the early history of past breakthroughs – in his case, the
behavioral revolution – was similarly characterized by cross-disciplinary conversations of
just this sort” (13, footnote 20). Goodin and Klingemann also note how behavioralism has
gone through changes and “there has been a virtual meltdown of the fact vs. value
distinction, that old bugbear of the behavioral revolution in its most insistently positivist
phase” (20). Thus, although behavioralism has become less stridently positivistic and so
perhaps “post-behavioral,” the fact of the behavioral revolution and its importance to the
discipline’s history is clearly part of what makes political science a profession.

Also writing for a general political science audience Gabriel Almond’s entry in the
*NHPS* is titled “Political Science: The History of the Discipline.”

---

180 The authors narrative of “maturation” continues by noting how following the behavioral revolution there
was a “rational choice revolution” which like the former revolution, “many famous victories were scored …
but while much was gained, much was also lost” (11; the authors do not elaborate on what was [“gained” or]
“lost”).

181 In the final section “The Shape of the Profession: A Bibliometric Analysis,” there are no clear referents
to the behavioral revolution accompanying this mention. The authors say with respect to the results of their
bibliographic analysis, “we see quite strikingly the residues of the ‘two revolutions,’ first the behavioral
revolution and then the rational choice one, on the contemporary profession” (24).

182 At the time of publication, Almond (1911-2003) was a Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Stanford
University. Almond attended graduate school at the University of Chicago (Ph.D. 1938) and in his historical
complex and unlike most narratives about the behavioral revolution exhibits a theme shift. Almond’s narrative begins developing a historicist theme that does not celebrate the dominance of behavioralism but seeks to qualify and add historical depth to the dominant narrative of the behavioral revolution. In the latter portion of the narrative, however, Almond’s narrative turns to a theme of lament as he recounts the loss of a central identity afforded by behavioralism and its research practices. Almond’s history of political science goes back to the ancients and ends in present-day controversies over “pluralism” in the discipline and whether the profession is really in a “post-behavioral, post-positivist age, a discipline divided, condemned to sit at separate tables” (1996, 89).183

In Almond’s chapter, his foundation narrative begins with a section titled “World War II and the post-war behavioral revolution” (68). Almond says “the Chicago School continued its productivity up to the late 1930s, when the University administration under Hutchins attacked the value of empirical research in the social sciences” (68).184 Due to the actions of Hutchins, Almond argues, “Lasswell and Gosnell resigned, and Merriam’s retirement brought the productivity of the Chicago Department of Political Science almost to a halt” (68). Even so, Almond argues, “the Chicago School had reached a mass which assured its future” (68). Almond gives the example of “Lasswell continuing his work at Yale, inspiring [among others, Robert] Dahl” (68). These actions by Hutchins would end the momentum of the Chicago School in leading the development of positivistic political

---

183 Instead, Almond concludes, the “literature from the ancients to until the present day, demonstr[ates] a unity of substance and method, and [is] cumulative in the sense of an increasing knowledge base, and improvements in inferential rigor” (89). On the separate tables metaphor see Almond (1989).
184 Robert Maynard Hutchins (1899-1977) was president (1929–1945) and chancellor (1945–1951) at the University of Chicago who, as Gunnell puts it, “turned, by the mid1930s, toward a neo-classical Aristotelian/Thomist natural law philosophy and against the university’s social science establishment” (1993, 132).
science and can be read as a foreshadowing of a more explicit theme of lament developed later in Almond’s narrative.

Almond recalibrates his narrative a bit, and focuses on how “World War II turned out to be a laboratory and an important training experience for many of the scholars who would seed the “behavioral revolution” (68). In terms of the mythological nexus, here the focus is on the practical dimension and the changes to dominant practices that accompanied the rise of behavioralism. Almond includes a social science referent when he discusses how “the war effort created pools of social science expertise which, on the conclusion of the war, were fed back into the growing academic institutions of the post-war decades” (68). As an example, Almond recalls how Lasswell worked for the Department of Justice to “develop[e] systematic quantitative content analysis for the monitoring of the foreign language press, and the study of allied and enemy propaganda in the United States” (68). Continuing his discussion of academic governmental service during WWII, Almond says “survey research techniques, other kinds of interviewing methods, statistical techniques, especially sampling theory, were brought to bear on the war-related problems of the various [government agencies]” (69). In Almond’s narrative, the movement toward a more quantitatively sophisticated discipline began with the Chicago School in the 1920s and 1930s, and then receives significant refinement during WWII before it is dispersed throughout the discipline after the war and the onset of the behavioral revolution. Important to this dispersement was the institutional support of the

---

185 Like many of the founders of contemporary political science (e.g. Merriam, Lasswell, Easton, and Dahl) Lasswell also served the U.S. government during WWII. For accounts of their own recollections of these experiences see the collection of oral histories in Bear et al. 1991.

186 Of course, Lasswell was prominently employed as the head of the War Communication Division at the Library of Congress during the war, and probably had limited obligations for the Department of Justice (Emily Hauptmann, personal communication).
University of Chicago and the University of Michigan developing the practice of survey research in political science. As Almond puts the matter, after WWII these institutions made it possible to “produc[e] a literature and a professoriate that contributed substantially to the ‘behavioral revolution’” (70).187

Almond’s historicist theme continues as he discusses the impact of WWII on the discipline. In Almond’s terms, “much of German social science scholarship was effectively transplanted to the United States,” and many of the “exiled” scholars “made important contributions to the behavioral revolution in the United States as well as to the various trends which attacked it” (76).188 With the exception of Gunnell (discussed below), this is an important historicist point which is rarely emphasized in narratives about the behavioral revolution. In effect, Almond recognizes that émigré scholars were not a monolithic group as some joined the behavioral revolution and some were anti-behavioral and attacked the transformation of identities and practices in the U.S. Of the émigré scholars who opposed behavioralism, many of them of Jewish descent, were highly skeptical of any claims of human progress driven by either “science” or liberal democracy – both, it was often noted, were also key elements of the culture and discourse of Weimar Germany – a regime preceded the Nazis’ rise to power, WWII, and the attempted genocide of European Jews.

“In the first decades after World War II,” Almond continues developing a historicist theme as he explains how European higher education was rebuilt along American lines.

187 Another institutional example is the “Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR)” established at the University of Michigan in 1961, which is “maintaining in machine-readable form a rapidly growing archive of survey and other quantitative data” and “it has administrated its own summer training program in quantitative methods” (70).
188 This is a somewhat underemphasized point in the reference material. Unlike Gunnell, for example, Almond emphasizes that there were émigré scholars who contributed to the behavioral revolution rather than criticizing it.
Indeed, in Almond’s assessment, “what was new in the social sciences was mostly American in origin” (77). Here the trope of Americanization is once again evident as American political science is understood to be dominant after WWII and increasingly hegemonic internationally. Europeans, Almond tells us, followed developments in American social science and “the break from legalism and the historical approach in the study of governmental institutions, political parties and elections, interest groups, public opinion and communications had been accomplished in American universities and research centers” (77). In terms of the mythological matrix, Europeans followed American political scientists in their rejection of traditional identities and practices and embraced the new identity as a social science, empirical theory, and quantitative practices. One testament to the importance of these breakthroughs in the American academy was the fact that they were “backed up by American philanthropic foundations [who] were missionaries for the renewal of European scholarship and for the assimilation of the American empirical and quantitative approaches” (77). An example of Americanization follows as Almond explains “young European scholars supported by Rockefeller and other foundation fellowships visited and attended American universities by the dozens” (77).

Almond’s narrative transitions from a historicist theme to a theme of lament of loss toward the end of his chapter. He observes how it is a commonplace within the mainstream of disciplinary history that the behavioral era is over, and that the discipline now celebrates diversity and lacks a central identity. For Almond, however, these developments are not

---

189 Discussing the internationalization of American-style political science to Western Europe after WWII, William G. Andrews observes how in some countries “the discipline arrived on American or Soviet bayonets” (IHPS 1982, 3); see also Adcock 2014.
to be celebrated and he laments the former strong central identity produced by the behavioral revolution after WWII:

The recent historians of political science, cited above, ask us to adopt a pluralist view of political science. The methodenstreit—the methodological war—of the 1970s and 1980s, they tell us, has ended in a stalemate. The idea of a continuous discipline oriented around a shared sense of identity has been rejected. There are as many histories of political science, they say, as many distinct senses of identity, as there are distinct approaches in the discipline. And the relations among these distinct approaches are isolative. There is no shared scholarly ground. We are now, and presumably into the indefinite future, according to these writers, in a post-behavioral, postpositivist age, a discipline divided, condemned to sit at separate tables (89).

Almond’s narrative begins by developing a historicist theme that does not celebrate the rise of behavioralism as in a Whig theme. In the end though, Almond turns to a theme of lament which bemoans the lost status of a movement which he had helped to build. While Almond laments the plurality of research identities and practices in the discipline, he clearly supports behavioralism and the practices which are central to maintaining the mythological nexus in the discourse of the discipline. These identities and practices afforded by behavioral dominance are now missing in a discipline that continues to be gripped by an ongoing crisis of identity.

A good follow-up to Almond’s historicist-lament theme is drawn from the third issuing of Political Science: The State of the Discipline volume by the APSA. The lead article is by the editors of the volume, Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner titled, “American Political Science: The Discipline’s State and the State of the Discipline.”

190 In his biographical entry on Almond, Charles Lockhart notes that “while Almond’s functional orientation had become far less widely accepted by the 1970s, the field of comparative politics concomitantly lost the sense of direction that his work had once provided” (Utter and Lockhart 2002, 7).

191 Katznelson is a Professor of Political Science at Columbia University and Chair of the Social Science Research Council. Katznelson was president of APSA 2005-2006. Milner is the B. C. Forbes Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and the director of the Niehaus Center for...
The theme developed here is historicist as the authors construct a presentist narrative that does not celebrate behavioral dominance and works to qualify the dominant narrative of the behavioral revolution. Early in their introductory chapter, the editors are discussing the diverse ways that the history of political science may be told. Katznelson and Milner say they “are familiar with the typical ways in which the history of political science is told” (2003, 6). First, there is “an early legal-formal constitutionally oriented discipline [that is] supplanted by a more scientific, behavioral impulse” (6-7). In this “familiar” narrative, the authors continue, “behavioralism was replaced by a more heterogeneous postbehavioral period during which many approaches have emerged, some of which push toward unification of the discipline via a method-specific research program” (7). This “familiar” rendering of the discipline’s history is already evident in both of the previous handbook entries I discussed, and continues to be manifest throughout the remainder of this chapter. This is a succinct statement of the dominant narrative of the discipline’s history; a foundation narrative around which the behavioral revolution mythology is constituted. The theme here is historicist as the authors recognize the success of behavioralism in permanently transforming the discipline while neither celebrating nor lamenting these developments. The authors draw on the narrative context and link it to the mythological nexus of the behavioral revolution; and by virtue of repetition of elements, they enhance the power of the disciplinary mythology in the discourse of political science.

In historicist fashion, Katznelson and Milner qualify the dominant narrative, remarking that “these histories are both too simple and too complex” (7). In the first place, “their simplicity results from a tendency to overstate the internal consistency of a given

Globalization and Governance at Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School. At the time of publication Milner was James T. Shotwell Professor of International Relations at Columbia University.
period within and across subfields. Thus, for example, even after the behavioral revolution had transformed American politics, in 1968 the founders of *Comparative Politics* lamented the relative weakness of this scientific impulse in their domain” (7). Here the authors recognize that the impact of the behavioral revolution varied by subfield even as they assert that all parties recognized the success of the behavioral revolution to transform the discipline’s identities and practices. Here the authors recognize the success of behavioralism in their historicist theme as they repeat the idea that behavioralism successfully transformed the discipline. Katznelson and Milner conclude their narrative saying “underneath its flux, political science has been uncommonly continuous in its central concepts and substantive themes” (7). So while the identity and practices of the discipline were transformed, it is an important historicist point to recognize that the “central concepts and central themes” of political science have remained continuous over time.

Similar to Katznelson and Milner’s title, the Introduction to the *Oxford Handbook of Political Science (OHPS 2009)* is titled “The State of the Discipline: The Disciplining of the State.” Here, Robert Goodin has returned after his co-editorship of the *NHPS*, and is now general editor of the ten-volume Oxford Handbooks of Political Science. Goodin’s introduction is a distillation of accounts, a “poll of polls” if you will, and his understanding of the behavioral revolution, as well as the significance of the common set of referents, is a good example of mythology at work. Goodin begins developing his historicist theme drawing on the work of the disciplinary historian John Dryzek. The behavioral revolution

---

192 A similar type of “bibliometric” analysis is found in the Introduction to the *OHPS* (2008), discussed below.
is invoked twice in a discussion of the “periodic ‘great debates’ within the profession [and] their Manichean, Good versus Evil form” (10). 193

Goodin asks his readers to “remember the equanimity with which the behavioral revolution was originally greeted by those then ruling the profession” (10). To substantiate his point about the calm and collected manner in which the mainstream of political science greeted the behavioral movement, Goodin brings in Dryzek’s contribution to the 2006 *APSR* centennial issue titled a “Revolutions without Enemies: Key Transformations in Political Science.” Here Goodin quotes a section of Dryzek’s which is a good example of one way the narrative context of the behavioral revolution can manifest in the discourse of the discipline and how it is commonly related to the dimensions of the mythological nexus. Here the identity dimension is prominent as traditional political theory and empirical political theory are opposed:

If the behavioral revolution’s main tenets are behavior, science, pluralism and system, then “traditionalists” had little reason to oppose it. Research on behavior at the individual levels was already being done in the 1930s and 1940s … and those who did not do it had little objection to those who did. The commitment to science was of long standing … Pluralism as empirical theory was hardly new – indeed, the “latent theory of the traditionalists as … [a] ‘parallelogram of forces’ …” sounds a lot like pluralism. (Dryzek 2006b, 489-90).”

The point Goodin is ostensibly making here is that there was no serious challenge to the mainstream of the discipline by behavioralism. A counter-point might be “Strauss’s vituperative ‘Epilogue’ to Storing’s 1962 *Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics*” which directly critiqued the behavioralism, but this challenge, as Goodin puts it, “the mainstream

193 Goodin interprets these great debates (such as “Behavioralist or traditionalist”) in terms of artificial binaries which are designed to force one into choosing between two opposing and mutually-exclusive categories. Goodin further feels that these “either-or” categories are false-dichotomies and the products of “academics on the make” and “‘youngsters in a hurry’ … not the settled judgments of seasoned practitioners confident in their place in the profession” (10).
studiously ignored” (11). I discuss this story of the Straussian challenge more fully in the political theory sub-section below.

Goodin’s historicist theme is developed around the trope of “the next big thing.” Goodin continues to relate how like all revolutions or “next big things,” there will undoubtedly be a “modal tendency of distribution whose two tails will inevitably go to war with one another, trying to force the sensible middle into taking sides” (20). And so it “was the case with the behavioral revolution, with systems theory and structural-functionalism, with rational choice, and so on” (20). Goodin reviews the history of political science and narrates three revolutions. The first revolution occurred with the institutional founding of political science “at the very beginning of the twentieth century” (Goodin does not explicitly mention the ASPA here), and is characterized as a “turn away from the dilettantish do-gooderism of the American Social Science Association and toward systematic and professionalized study of political processes” (13). Here, Goodin’s historicist theme works to qualify the dominant narrative of behavioralism’s success in transforming identities and practices in the discipline. Goodin observes how early political science began its progression toward the present state of discipline and professionalism by breaking away from the amateur-nature of the American Social Science Association.

Goodin’s narrative takes a turn toward a more Whig theme when he begins discussing the success of the behavioral revolution in transforming identities and practices using language associated with the Whig theme such as “break” and “consolidation” which are read as going beyond merely recounting the rise of behavioralism and embracing these

---

194 Goodin remarks in a footnote that “the most vitriolic complaints come from those left behind, [for example] Straussians venting their spleen against then-orthodox behavioralism” (20).

195 For more information on this transformation see Ross 1991, Adcock 2003.
changes albeit in a less than explicit way. Thus, Goodin says that “the second successful revolution shaping the US discipline was the behavioral revolution of the 1950s” (13). This revolution, Goodin tells us, was a “self-styled break away from the previous preoccupation with what is formally supposed to happen and toward how people actually behave politically” (13). Goodin mentions the behavioral revolution for a fifth time when he says that “David Truman pitched the behavioral revolution to the Social Science Research Council” (SSRC) in terms of the “next big thing.” Truman was trained under Merriam at Chicago and he says that behavioralism should not be thought of as a subfield or sub-specialty since “it aims at stating all the phenomenon of government in terms of the observed and observable behavior of men … the aim includes the eventual reworking and extension of most of the conventional ‘fields’ of political science” (21). Here too the Whig theme is evident as Goodin relates how behavioralism was able to transform or “rework” all of political science or at least “most of the conventional fields.” This is a good example of the complexity of narratives and how themes can shift within them. Here Goodin is quoting from Dahl’s seminal 1961 “Epitaph for a Monumental Protest” which develops a strong Whig theme and is often taken as an authoritative and well-known source explaining the success of the behavioral revolution in transforming the identity and practices of the discipline.

Goodin explains that sometimes a handful of “medium size things” combine into the “next big thing” as was the case with behavioralism. In a statement that clearly demonstrates the mythological nexus at work, Goodin says “the behavioral revolution

\[196\] The third revolution in Goodin’s historical narrative was a “rational choice revolution of the 1970s,” of which he expresses his preference.
\[197\] Truman (1951); see also Dahl (1961).
consolidated realist skepticism about actual adherence to formal rules and ideal standards across several domains … together with new experimental and observational methodologies and statistical techniques for assessing their findings (Merriam 1921; Key 1954)” (21). In terms of narrative context, the theme is Whig-triumphal as the behavioral revolution “consolidated.” In terms of the mythological nexus, this “consolidation” of behavioralism occurred by opposing traditional identities with behavioral ones and replacing traditional practices with quantitative practices such as statistics.

The first chapter of the *Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology* (2008) is titled “Political Science Methodology” and is written by the editors Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady, and David Collier. The authors develop a historicist theme that contributes to the dominant narrative of the behavioral revolution without celebration. The introductory chapter is focused on a statistical analysis of the presence of behavioralism in the discourse of political science over time. This is similar to the bibliometric analyses of Goodin and Klingemann (1996) and Goodin (2009). The editors have taken mentions of “causal thinking” in JSTOR articles from 1910 to 1999 as their starting point; noting a marked increase in mentions beginning in the 1950s, peaking in the 1970s, and leveling off thereafter (Figure 1.1, p. 4). In addition to “causal thinking,” the editors set out “to measure the extent of the behavioral revolution” by looking for the words “behavior” and “behavioral” (7). When the editors compiled these categories using a JSTOR search they discovered that mentions of “behavior-behavioral” have a slight uptick already in the 1930s

---

198 At the time of publication Box-Steffensmeier was the Vernal Riffe Professor of Political Science and Sociology at the Ohio State University; Brady was the Class of 1941 Monroe Deutsch Professor in the Charles and Louise Travers Department of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley; and Collier is Robson Professor in the Charles and Louise Travers Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley.
and 1940s, taking off and far surpassing any other term in the 1950s and continuing to rise in the 1990s approaching fifty percent of articles. The editors elaborate on the “convergent validity” of their study by noting how “the articles of those people known to be the leaders of the behavioral movement used these terms more frequently than the authors of the average article” and a second point, they say the words “behavioral” and “behavior” are found “to be closely related to the behavioral movement” (8).

Throughout this section the practical dimension of the mythological nexus is evident as the editors continuously link the behavioral revolution with practices like quantitative methods and statistics. Box-Steffensmeier, Brady and Collier remark that “two obvious methodological tools of the early twentieth century are correlation analysis (Pearson 1909) and regression analysis (Pearson 1896; Yule 1907), although we shall see, only regression analysis provided at least rhetorical support for causal inference” (6). Discussing Mark Bevir’s chapter in the handbook, the editors note that “Bevir (chapter 3) provides some explanations for the rise of causal thinking as the “behavioral revolution’s” reaction to the nineteenth century’s teleological narratives about history (‘developmental historicism’) and early twentieth-century emphasis on classifications, correlations, and systems (‘modern empiricism’)” (6). The editors continue to explain that “the behavioral

---

199 The second most mentioned term was “correlation” which, took off in the 1960s, plateauing around twenty percent in the 1970s and rising again in the 1990s. Third, was “causal-causality” which has a very similar curve as the “correlation” category. Finally, “regression” begins a steady growth in the 1960s and appears to be growing beyond the twenty percent mark in the late-1990s (7).

200 The “leaders of the behavioral movement” were determined by a process where individuals ‘known to be ‘behavioralists’ from 1950 to 1980 – we coded sixteen of the 31 presidents in this way (Odegrard, Herring, Lasswell, Schattschneider, Key, Almond, Dahl, Easton, Deutsch, Lane, Eulau, Leiserson, Ranney, Wahlke, and Miller)” (footnote 3, p. 8). These mentions of Lasswell, Dahl, and Easton have been noted as biographical referents to the behavioral revolution in Appendix E.

201 In Bevir’s chapter he says “it is worth emphasizing that this new concept of science was all that was really new about the so-called ‘behavioral revolution’” (52). Bevir affirms, moreover, that “neither techniques nor the topics associated with behavioralism were particularly novel … [instead] what behavioralists challenged was the modernist empiricist view of science” (52).
revolution took a somewhat different direction and emphasized general theories and the testing of causal hypotheses” (6). Here too the mythological link between theory and practice is evident as the theoretical orientation of the discipline tended toward general theory and practices associated with hypothesis testing.

Throughout the chapter the editors have been interested “to find out about the impact of the new techniques (regression or correlation) or changes in values (the behavioral revolution) on causal thinking” (16). The authors report the results of a “simple regression equation” on a series of singular and interaction terms (e.g. “behavior” and “behavior x regression”) saying along with the ninth mention, “interestingly, only the ‘behavior x regression’ interaction is significant, suggesting that it is a combination of the behavioral revolution and the development of regression analysis that ‘explains’ the prevalence of causal thinking in political science” (18). In conclusion, the editors invoke the mythological nexus and the dimensions of identity (“scientific values”) and practice (“regression”): “that values and inventions both help explain the [rise of] ‘causal thinking’ in political science. The behavioral movement furthered ‘scientific values’ like causal thinking, and regression provided an invention that provided political scientists with estimates of causal effects with minimal fuss and bother” (30). Here finally a dash of the Whig theme is evident as the behavioral revolution is taken as a new beginning that repudiated traditional political science and replaced it with the now dominant identities and practices associated with quantification and statistics. Indeed, the new mentality afforded by the behavioral revolution has changed the disciplinary landscape to such a degree that today these practices are employed “with minimal fuss and bother.”
The Subfield of American Politics

I capture the diversity of the subfield of American politics by organizing this section into four sub-sections: American Political Behavior, Judicial Behavior, Research Methods, and Institutions. The continuing relevance of the behavioral revolution for contemporary political science and its ongoing mythologization is evident in these research specialties in American politics.

American Political Behavior  Russell Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann chapter is called “Overview of Political Behavior: Political Behavior and Citizen Politics” (OHPS 2009).202 Dalton and Klingemann’s narrative of the behavioral revolution is a clear example of the Whig theme of an ascendant and now dominant behavioralism. The triumphal and celebratory theme is evident as the authors claim the behavioral revolution “transformed” political science first in the U.S., later in Europe, and finally to the rest of the world. The standard time period is extended into the 1970s in order to accommodate the later arrival of behavioralism to European political science.

“The behavioral revolution,” the authors narrate, “transformed research on American politics and then European politics in the 1960s and 1970s” (321). Referring to behavioralism, as a “methodology,” Dalton and Klingemann say that “in the past two decades, this methodology has broadened to the field of comparative politics as the expansion of empirical research and the behavioral approach now have a near global reach”

202 Dalton is a comparativist who received his Ph.D. from the University of Michigan in 1978 and has been Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Irvine since 1990. Dieter-Klingemann earned his academic degrees from the University of Cologne (1966: Dr. rer. pol.) and from the University of Mannheim (1978: Dr. habil.). He has held academic positions at the University of Cologne (1966-74), the Center for Survey Research (ZUMA), Mannheim (1974-80), the Free University of Berlin (1980-2002), the Social Science Research Center Berlin (1989-2003). Klingemann has also taught political science at the University of Michigan (http://www.sagepub.com/authorDetails.nav?contribId=505560; last accessed August 19, 2014).
Methodological advances in American politics have also been registered – in a Whig vein – internationally: as “great progress in developing the empirical evidence that describes the political values for most nations in the world” and so “the growing empirical evidence has also reinforced the importance of key theoretical concepts that were developed during the early behavioral revolution” (327). The authors elaborate on the Whig theme of triumph saying “the world has changed when public opinion surveys in China (and other developing nations) are possibly more common than surveys of the American public in the early years of the behavioral revolution” (322).

In terms of the mythological nexus, Dalton and Klingemann’s narrative shows how closely the dimensions of identity and practice work together. The authors make use of an equivalence between behavioral identities and the practices associated with doing empirical work in political science. In short, behavioralism “as a methodology” essentially becomes “empirical research.” This equivalence is an essential component of the narrative context because it is so closely associated with both practices and identities brought to dominance by the behavioral revolution. The repetition of both the empirical theory and quantitative methods referents provide significance to experiences in the present and provide these identities/practices with significance. In Dalton and Klingemann’s terms, “the behavioral revolution – or empirical research as a methodology – involves a range of political phenomenon” (322). The association of the behavioral revolution with “empirical research as a methodology” helps bridge the gap between the 1950s and today. Since contemporary practices – especially in the subfield of American politics – are considered to be primarily quantitative in nature, this construction aptly explains how these practices
became dominant with the new behavioral identity of political science in the 1950s and early 1960s.

The well-known behavioral political scientist Warren Miller contributes a chapter to the NHPS (1996) titled, “Political Behavior, Old and New” (NHPS 1996). Miller mentions the behavioral revolution in the context of the “new” behavioral studies in political science and highlights three significant changes which differentiate the old from the new behavioral studies. Miller’s theme is historicist as he recognizes important changes in the discipline after the behavioral revolution but without overtly celebrating or lamenting them in his narrative. The first two changes involved the rise to dominance of quantitative techniques like statistics in the discipline. This dominance demanded that political scientists stay “up-to-date in Method City” (1996, 301). A second improvement was in computer technology making large-scale statistical analysis more feasible. Miller continues, linking empirical identities with associated practices, and says “the first years of the behavioral revolution were marked by a veritable explosion of empirical studies based on data collected from large and politically significant populations” (301).

Miller (1925-1999) was Regents' Professor at Arizona State University where he taught since 1982. Miller also taught at the University of Michigan from 1951 into the 1990's, and was a professor there from 1956 to 1980 http://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/03/us/warren-e-miller-74-expert-on-american-voting-patterns.html; accessed August 19, 2014). Miller was president of the APSA (1979-1980) and one of the principle authors of “a landmark in political science,” the study of voting and electoral behavior, The American Voter (Utter and Lockhart 2002, 275).

Of course, one place political scientists could stay “up-to-date in Method City” was at the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan. Miller helped found this institution and was its founding executive director from 1962 to 1970 (Utter and Lockhart 2002, 275).

Relevant here a chapter in the OHAEPB (2010) by Lonna Rae Atkeson titled “The State of Survey Research as a Research Tool in American Politics.” Atkeson explains how “survey research has offered a rich source of data for scholars, journalists, market-research, government agencies, and others to understand the preferences, opinions, and motivations of the American electorate” (10). Atkenson continues in the next sentence: “Prior to the Second World War and the behavioral revolution in political science, survey research was primarily the purview of marketing firms (Gallup, Roper, and Crossley)” (2010, 10; emphasis added). The development of survey research began with “a heavy reliance on self-administered surveys in the Second World War, especially the Studies in Social Psychology in World War II: The American Soldier (Stouffer et al. 1949), which lent its name to the later American Voter (Campbell et al. 1960), [and] led to it becoming a primary research technique within the discipline” (10).
“However,” Miller observes, “by virtue of traditional academic culture, and in the absence of any alternative, exploitation of each new data collection in the 1950s was largely restricted to the principle investigators and their graduate students” (301). Thus, “the third crucial change,” facilitating the expansion and rise to dominance of quantitative practices like statistics, “has been in the social organization of access to data” which has greatly improved (1996, 301). Increasingly, Miller also emphasizes, behavioral scholars have made their data available to others facilitated in no small part by the National Science Foundation and other grant-making agencies.206

Judicial Behavior The introduction to the Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (OHLP 2008) is written by Keith Whittington, R. Daniel Kelemen, and Gregory A. Caldeira and is titled “The Study of Law and Politics.”207 Here the theme is Whig as the authors celebrate behavioral ascendance noting how its consolidation helped political science “realize its promise.” The editors begin by explaining how “the field within political science that studies law and politics was once widely known as ‘public law.’ For many, it is now known as ‘judicial politics’” (9). Developing a Whig theme, the authors observe how “the behavioral revolution of the 1960s shifted the disciplinary center of gravity from the study of constitutional law and doctrine to the study of courts, judges, and

206 Earlier in Miller’s article he stresses the institutions that were crucial during the behavioral period. Among those he mentions in the beginning of his article are: “the Political Behavior Program of the University of Michigan’s Survey Research Center,” “the Social Science Research Council,” “the Council Committee on Political Behavior,” “the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences,” “the private foundations, including Rockefeller, Carnegie, Russell Sage, and Markle,” “the Ford Foundation,” “the National Opinion Research Center at Chicago,” “the Institute for Social Research at Michigan,” “SSRC,” “American Political Science Association,” “National Science Foundation,” “International Political Science Association,” and “UNESCO” (1996, 294-295).
207 At the time of publication Whittington was William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Politics at Princeton University; Kelemen was an Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University; and Caldeira was Distinguished University Professor, Ann and Darrell Dreher Chair in Political Communication and Policy Thinking, and Professor of Law, Ohio State University.
company” (9). The emphasis on the transformation brought by recognition of that the behavioral revolution was able to “shift the discipline’s center of gravity” is a sign that the authors are developing a Whig theme. The editors continue saying that “the political process by which courts are constituted and legal decisions are made and implemented is central to empirical research in the field” (9). The behavioral practice of doing “empirical research” has focused on the decision-making of justices but increasingly, judicial and legal scholars are branching out to study courts in broader settings. In what is the best expression of the Whig theme, the editors say the behavioral revolution was “consolidated.” Leading figures in the subfield “have long operated on different frontiers of the field, helping to make and consolidate the behavioral revolution in law and politics and to realize its promise over the decades” (14). These developments are clearly celebrated as the phrase “realize the promise” indicates; one does not realize the promise of something you think is insignificant or pernicious – only something you think is promising.

**Research Methods** Michael Martinez’s chapter is titled “Why is Turnout So Low, and Why Should We Care” (*OHAEPB* 2010). Martinez develops a Historicist theme that focuses on opposition to behavioralism and highlights the growth of quantitative studies after the behavioral revolution. Martinez concludes his chapter by noting “as the behavioral revolution in political science began several decades ago, contras warned that the emphasis on new analytical tools would shift our attention away from theoretically meaningful and normatively important concepts, such as justice, toward more easily quantifiable concepts” (119). Here is an example of the dimensions of identity and practice in the mythological matrix at work: the practices associated with quantification are opposed

---

208 At the time of publication Martinez was a Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida.
to the traditional “normative” concerns of political science. Martinez continues “voter turnout was perhaps the prototype among the latter: turnout is easily countable, and relatively inexpensive data would provide large numbers of cases amenable to powerful statistical techniques” (119). Martinez continues developing the opposition between traditional political theory and behavioral political theory: “Early critics and their Perestroikan descendants largely accepted the premise that we would be able to successfully model voter turnout and other easily measureable concepts, but wondered whether we will have stripped ‘politics’ out of the question in the process” (119). Hence the recurrent revolts against the dominance of behavioral identities and practices in the discipline and which continue to focus on the “political” rather than the “science” in contemporary political science.

Institutions In the American subfield there are a relatively large number of chapters devoted to the study of institutions in contemporary political science that mention the behavioral revolution. In the Preface to the Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions (OHPI 2006), written by R.A.W. Rhodes, Sarah Binder, and Bert Rockman, there are two mentions of the behavioral revolution. The authors’ narrative develops a historicist theme that does not celebrate behavioral dominance but nevertheless draws on and contributes to the narrative context. In terms of the mythological nexus, the new behavioral identity of political science is explicitly juxtaposed to traditional political theory (“historical, legal, and philosophical”).

---

209 Martinez continues: “Early critics and their Perestroikan descendants largely accepted the premise that we would be able to successfully model voter turnout and other easily measureable concepts, but wondered whether we will have stripped ‘politics’ out of the question in the process” (119).

210 At the time of publication Rhodes was a Professor of Political Science and Head of Program in Research School of Social Science, Australian National University; Binder was a Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution and Professor of Political Science at George Washington University; and Rockman was Professor of Political Science and Head of the Department at Purdue University.
Rhodes, Binder, and Rockman begin their narrative saying that not too long ago traditional political science “emphasized the study of formal-legal arrangements as its exclusive subject matter” (xii). “Recent decades have seen a neoinstitutionalists revival in political science” and though “often caricatured,” earlier traditional studies of institutions in political science were “rooted in law and legal institutions, focusing not only on how ‘the rules’ channeled behavior, but also on how and why the rules came into being in the first place, and, above all, whether or not the rules worked on behalf of the common good” (xii). Citing Dahl’s 1961 APSR article the editors continue developing a historicist theme focused on the rejection of traditional identities in the wake of the behavioral revolution: “As political science foreswore its historical, legal, and philosophical foundations,” Rhodes et al. explain, “it borrowed deeply from economics, sociology, anthropology, and social and (later) cognitive psychology – the currents of knowledge that formed the bases of the behavioral revolution (Dahl 1961)” (xii).

The editor’s narrative about the rise of new institutionalism continues to rely on a contrast with traditional institutional studies which were the target for behavioral criticism that focused on how the actual behaviors of individuals varied remarkably from “normative” theories of the 1930s and 1940s (xii).211 This change in focus led to criticism of behavioralism and to a:

A suspicion that less sophisticated versions of the behavioral revolution had run their course – that ‘opinions’ were free-floating and unhinged from incentives to behave on them and that opinions were being treated

---

211 James March and Johan Olsen also discuss these opposing identities in their chapter titled, “Elaborating the ’New Institutionalism’” (OHPI 2006). The authors observe how “the behavioral revolution represented an attack upon tradition where government and politics were primarily understood in formal-legal institutional terms” (161). Traditional theory in its “formal-legal institutional” was attacked by the new institutionalism for its “focus on formal government institutions, constitutional issues, and public law was seen as ‘unpalatably formalistic and old-fashioned’ (Drewery 1996, 191)” (161).
as increasingly endogenous, that is, individuals had either more or less structure to their beliefs (xiii).

Thus, it was soon discovered, that opinions alone were insufficient information to explain behavior, and that institutions must be brought back into the mainstream. Here the new institutionalism is narrated as a “post-behavioral” development and one in which incorporates the perceived strengths of behavioral research such as quantitative analysis while also insisting on the importance of institutions on the development of political opinions and behavior.

Jean Blondel has written a chapter in the *OHPI* (2006) titled “About Institutions, Mainly, but not Exclusively Political.” At the time of publication Blondel was a Professorial Fellow at the European University Institute, Florence and Visiting Professor, University of Sienna (Italy).

Blondel is a French comparative political scientist but the narrative of the behavioral revolution is focused on the role of institutions in political science in general. Blondel develops a historicist theme which highlights the initial neglect of institutions in the early behavioral period which was later recovered under the banner of “new institutionalism.”

Blondel begins with the observation that “if institutions are regarded as central in a social science discipline, it is in political science” (716). Blondel recognizes the “rapid pace” of development in the discipline after WWII: “This has been the case during the long process of maturation of the subject from its very early beginnings to the increasingly rapid pace of its development up to the Second World War” (716). Blondel then turns to sets the rise of the new institutionalism in the context of the traditional study of political institutions which had been maligned by the behavioral movement in political science. “After an interlude of almost two decades during which,” Blondel observes, “the importance of...
political institutions was newly recognized, regaining some of prestige, which “under the impact of the ‘behavioral revolution,’ had been lost” (716).

Blondel notes post-behavioral developments in the discipline and the how “political institutions saw their crucial position once more restated as a result of the ‘new institutionalism’ wave started in the 1980s by March and Olsen” (716). Prior to the rise of the new institutionalism, however, the concept of an “institution” was not well-developed in political science. Indeed, this was part of what behavioralism protested against in their turn away from the old institutionalism in political science. According to Blondel, “up to the emergence of the behavioral revolution, the empirical study of politics seemed to be coextensive with the study of political institutions” (718; Eulau 1969). The study of institutions continues to be marginalized up until the 1990s. Today the study of institutions has been recovered. In terms of the mythological nexus, this narrative is a testament to the lasting power of the behavioral revolution to influence identities and practices.

Klaus Von Beyme’s chapter in the OHPI (2006) is titled “Political Institutions – Old and New.”213 Von Beyme’s develops a historicist theme that qualifies the dominant narrative about the behavioral rejection of traditional institutional study. Von Beyme’s narrative begins with the observation that “the development of institutional theory after 1945 proved to be oscillating between waves of neglect and rediscovery of institutions” (2006, 748). Recalling one of the central narratives of the behavioral revolution, Von Beyme says “the attempt to make political science finally scientific stood against the accepting [of] institutional analysis as the center of research” (748). The behavioral

213 At the time of publication Von Beyme was Professor Institutsprofil, zentrale Einrichtungen, University of Heidelberg. He is currently Professor of Political Science Emeritus at the Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences of the University of Heidelberg.
revolution and “the ‘new science of politics’ in the USA,” Von Beyme explains, “used the term ‘institution’ in the vague sense of neighboring social sciences, such as sociology and anthropology, as ‘a pattern composed of culture traits specialized to the shaping and distribution of a particular value (or set of values)’ (Lasswell and Kaplan 1950, 47)” (748). Von Beyme continues to explain that “the ‘behavioral revolt’ was directed against the old institutionalism, but did not avoid institutions all together” (748). Von Beyme’s analysis takes on a skeptical tone when he discusses the “premature” nature of Dahl’s 1961 “epitaph” (748). Later political scientists like John Wahlke’s APSA presidential address (1979) included a content analysis of APSA articles and he concluded that “old-fashioned institutional studies prevailed even in this journal which was considered to be the ‘battle organ’ of the victorious behavioral revolt” (748). Thus, although the behavioral movement malignèd the traditional study of institutions, political scientists continued to study them throughout the behavioral era.

In the subfield of American politics, Gavin Drewry’s NHPS article “Political Institutions: Legal Institutions” contains two mentions of the behavioral revolution accompanied by two examples of a traditional theory referent.214 Drewry’s historical narrative is unique as he adopts a theme of lament and loss. Drewry explicitly advocates for better recognition among political scientists that law and politics “are very closely interconnected” (1996, 191). Drewry laments the fact that, as he sees it, “the quantum of legal peppering found in political science has not been nearly as abundant as it might be” (191). Drewry explains that this state of affairs has come about because there has “been a countervailing tendency among some political scientists to reject legal approaches to their

214 At the time of publication Drewry was Professor of Public Administration at Royal Holloway and Bedford New College, University of London.
discipline as unpalatably formalistic and old-fashioned” (191). As we’ve seen, “legal approaches” are part of the traditional theory referent and this fact is reinforced here by Drewry’s choice to describe it as “formalistic and old-fashioned” which are also common epithets associated with the traditional theory referent.

“The famous ‘behavioral revolution’ in American political science was substantially a reaction” to a widespread perception of antiquated legal studies (192). Drewry continues developing a theme of lament saying that “behaviorists, having thrown away the formalistic bath-water, are not easily persuaded that there might be good arguments for retrieving and reviving the discarded legal baby” (192). The second mention of the behavioral revolution comes in a section titled, “The neglect of legal aspects of politics in the UK.” The choice of the world “neglect” signals a theme of lament if not loss. It was this “legally based approach,” Drewry’s narrative continues with a second traditional theory referent: as a “tradition died in the interwar years, and UK political scientists ceased to draw much inspiration from the discipline of law” (194). Drewry continues developing his theme of lament and says “this neglect,” as Drewry mentioned earlier, “was later compounded by the anti-formalist sentiments implicit in the ‘behavioral revolution’ reaching Britain in the 1970s” (194). In keeping with a theme of lament, Drewry also highlights how the Americanization of political science in Europe is not something to be celebrated but questioned and perhaps lamented.
The Subfield of Comparative Politics

In the *NHPS* (1996) Guy Peters writes the chapter on “Political Institutions: Old and New.” Peters’ narrative is an example of a historicist theme in which the author recounts the impact of the behavioral revolution without being celebratory or triumphant in tone. Peters explains the rise of the new institutionalism in comparative politics, and begins his narrative by saying that the “old institutionalism” was fairly common in political science up “until at least the early 1950s” (1996, 205). During the behavioral period, however, “scholars (Eckstein 1963; Macridis 1955) advocating the newer, more scientific approaches to politics generally associated with the ‘behavioral revolution’ maligned the old institutionalism and pointed out a number of deficiencies in that body of research” (205). Here the mythological nexus is evident as Peters repeats the common juxtaposition between the “old” or traditional political institutionalism to the new “scientific” institutionalism. The new identity is defined in opposition to the new one. The old practices are characterized by Peters as a type of “descriptive research” and was opposed and “contrasted with some of the vague characterizations of government as the ‘black box’ in systems analysis of politics so much in fashion in comparative politics during the height of the behavioral revolution” (206). Here too the later entrance of the new institutionalism in political science and the subfield of comparative politics is registered as we see that the new institutionalism was seen as an improvement on earlier behavioral studies. For example, Peters says, “in comparative politics the period of advocacy for scientific politics

---

215 At the time of publication, Peters was Maurice Falk Professor of American Government at the University of Pittsburgh.
was characterized by systems approaches intended to be sufficiently general to be useful for all types of government (Easton 1965)” (206).

Peters continues differentiating the new from the old and says that “the new institutionalism differs from its intellectual precursor in several ways, all reflecting its development after the behavioral revolution in political science” (206). These changes involved with the new institutionalism were “characterized by an explicit concern with theory development and by the use of quantitative analysis” (206). Once again, the behavioral revolution is linked with dominant practices associated with quantitative methods. In addition to these new practices, the new institutionalism took on a new theoretical orientation, no longer “content to describe institutions the newer version seeks to explain them as ‘dependent variables’ and, more importantly, to explain other phenomena with institutions as the ‘independent variables’ shaping policy administrative behavior” (206). The new institutionalism also “looks at actual behavior rather than only at the formal, structural aspects of institutions” and grew out of “the public policy movement” and focused much more on the governmental process (207).

A general article on the subfield of comparative politics is provided by Laurence Whitehead and is titled “Comparative Politics: Democratization Studies” (NHPS 1996).216 Discussing comparative politics in the context of democratization studies, Whitehead draws on the lead article in the first edition of the journal Comparative Politics in which Harold Lasswell argues there is always likely to be a demand for comparative analysis driven by policy elites in the U.S. and other “imperial” countries (354).217 According to

---

216 At the time of publication Whitehead was a Fellow in Politics at Nuffield College, Oxford (UK).
Whitehead, Lasswell’s “conclusion was reassuring for the future of comparative politics, since he believed that the ‘core knowledge’ of our discipline had been changed by the ‘behavioral revolution’ in a direction which permanently expanded the demand for comparative analysis based on scientific methods of theory-formation and data collection” (355). I take this as an example of the Whig theme of the behavioral revolution mythology. In terms of the significance of the behavioral revolution and the mythological nexus, the identity of political science is understood to have permanently changed the embrace of the scientific method and practices associated with quantitative methods.

Another handbook entry on the subfield of comparative politics is by Lucian Pye’s chapter titled “The Behavioral Revolution and the Remaking of Comparative Politics” (OHCPA 2006). Pye’s is the only reference entry that has the behavioral revolution in its title and is an excellent example of the behavioral revolution mythology at work. Pye develops a Whig theme that celebrates the transformation of political science by the behavioral revolution before his narrative turns to a theme of lament when he recounts how behavioralism was soon met with serious challengers for hegemony in the discipline.

Pye begins developing his Whig theme, recalling the excitement that accompanied political science in the years “right after the Second World War” (2006, 797). “The shock waves of the ‘behavioral revolution,’” Pye observes, were “initiated at the University of Chicago during the interwar years were bringing new life to a discipline that had long been mired in the study of constitutions and institutional structures” (797). This Whig

---

218 At the time of publication Pye (1921-2008) was Ford Professor of Political Science Emeritus at MIT.
219 Pye received his Ph.D. from Yale University in 1951. He was also president of the APSA (1988-89). In a biographical entry, Donald L.M. Blackmer notes that “like many other young scholars immediately after World War II, Pye was deeply affected by the multidisciplinary currents that came together to create the so-called behavioral revolution in political science. Particularly influential early mentors were Gabriel A. Almond and Nathan Leites … (Utter and Lockhart 2002, 332).
narrative is already triumphal in its assessment of political science before the behavioral revolution which was “mired” in its traditional ways. Pye contributes to the Whig theme of behavioral triumph saying that it was “the Chicago School, led by Charles Merriam, Harold Gosnell, Quincy Wright, and Harold Lasswell shifted the focus of study onto dynamic processes, the play of power, and free reign to use all the methods and concepts of the other social sciences” (797). Pye continues emphasizing the importance of the University of Chicago to the success of the behavioral revolution: “The products of the Chicago department, who included Gabriel Almond, William T.R. Fox, V.O. Key, David Truman, Herman Pritchett, Ithiel Pool, Alexander George, and many more, were bringing the behavioral revolution to departments across the country” (797).

Pye continues developing his Whig theme of triumph when he says, “what was exceptional about the behavioral revolution was that all these diverse concepts and approaches were easily integrated and there was little inner tension or clashes” (798). The Whig theme of triumph is evident here – the changes in the emphases on theory and science were “easily” and widely accepted. In Pye’s telling, there was “little inner tension or clashes” and most agreed that “the goal was usually what was thought of as the scientific method of testing generalized hypotheses (Hempel 1965)” (798). In Whig fashion Pye recounts how the identity of the subfield of comparative politics was remade by the behavioral revolution and as expected given the theory of political mythology developed in this dissertation, he links contemporary identities of being “scientific” to practices associated with scientific method.

The arch of Pye’s Whig theme now takes a turn toward lamenting for the loss of behavioral hegemony in the discipline. Pye’s narrative takes on a theme of lament and loss
as he recounts how “instead of the unified front of the early behavioral revolution, there was now competing, and indeed feuding elements” (802). Indeed, as Pye relates, “no longer was there any clear sense of where the frontiers for the advancement of knowledge lay. New fashions came along, such as rational choice, but there was no hegemonic approach” such as the Chicago School once offered the discipline (802). Pye laments how “the comfortable living together of different approaches that characterized the behavioral revolution at its height was replaced with feuding sects (Almond 1990)” (802). Finally, the theme of lament and loss is reinforced in the last mention of the behavioral revolution in Pye’s chapter. Surveying the state of the discipline Pye is uncomfortable with the fragmentation and lack of unity; and it is “hard to spot any development that seems to have the potential for capturing the enthusiasms of a generation of political scientists the way the behavioral revolution and political modernization did in their time” (803). It is an unfortunate fact, Pye relates, that “there seems to be a perverse form of balance of power at work in the discipline so that if any approach shows signs of creative life and promise, the practitioners of the other theories are quick to gang up and pick holes in the potential new leader” (803).

The Subfield of International Relations

In Colin Wight’s “Philosophy of Social Science and International Relations” (HIR 2002) he develops a historicist theme that qualifies the dominant narrative of the behavioral revolution. In a section titled “Adolescent IR: The Legitimation of Science,” Wight observes how the “systematic use of the philosophy of science within IR” began with

---

220 Wight is Professor of Government and Political Relations at the University of Sydney (AU).
Vasquez’s seminal *The Power of Politics*, which links this development with the “behavioral revolt” (28). Wight notes that despite the fact that “this ‘revolt’ had been taking place within political science and other social sciences since the 1950s, it did not begin to emerge into IR in a substantive way until the 1960s” (28). Qualifying the dominant narrative, Schmidt argues that “the role of the Chicago School of political science generally goes unrecognized in the dominant accounts of the development of behavioralism” (28).221

The mythological nexus is evident in Wight’s focus on the dimension of practice which in behavioralism is associated with forms of positivism in political science. “In 1950,” Wight recalls, “Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan explicitly argued that their attempt to provide framework for political science was informed by developments in logical positivist philosophy of science (Gunnell 1975222; Lasswell and Kaplan 1950)” (28). “This turn to the philosophy of sciences,” Wight continues developing his narrative, “was validated by David Easton (1953, 1965223), who very clearly did influence the ‘behavioral revolt’ in IR” (28). As Wight puts these matters, “a key component of logical positivism that served to legitimate the turn to the philosophy of science was its ‘unity of science thesis’” (Lane, 1966) (28).224

---

221 Wight continues with a list of “sources of the ‘behavioral revolt’” in IR: “Deutsch (1953, 1964), Kaplan (1957), Schelling (1960) and Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (1954, 1962); (Hollis and Smith, 1990; Vasquez, 1998; Schmidt, Chapter 1 in this volume)” (28).

222 Wight cites Gunnell’s 1975 *Philosophy, Science, and Political Inquiry* often in his narratives about the foundation of the contemporary study or IR.

223 Easton’s 1965 is cited often in Wight’s narrative.

224 Wight continues to explain: “This, of course, is self-validating; logical positivism declares that the sciences can be united and logical positivism defines the content of science. So any social science deserving of the label science needs logical positivism just as logical positivism provides the legitimation for the turn to the philosophy of science” (Bhaskar, 1986) (28).
Wight’s narrative also invokes the dimension of identity as he juxtaposes traditional political theory and empirical political theory. Thus, Wight says, “this usurping of the label science was to be an important move in the ‘great debate’ (Dunne, 1998) between traditionalists and scientists, because essentially the label science was conceded to logical positivism” (28). Wight continues qualifying the dominant narrative focusing on the role the philosophy of science played in defining “theory” in IR. As Wight puts the matter, this is “an important point and highlights something often missed in disciplinary discussions relating to the study of IR [and as] the model of science that underpins the ‘behavioral revolt’ in IR is based upon a very specific philosophy of science and not the practice of scientists (Gunnell 1975: 19)” (28). Indeed, Wight continues saying that “despite claims to be following the scientific method, behavioralism was actually an attempt to implement a particular philosophy of science that was dominant at that time” (28-29). This philosophy of science was logical positivism which Wight points out later became simply “positivism” so he uses the construction “logical positivism/positivism.”

Wight identifies two further characteristics central to the behavioral revolution in IR. As Wight puts it, “operationalism and instrumentalism were at the heart of the ‘behavioral revolt’, and both are firmly embedded within logical positivism/positivism (Gunnell 1975)” (29). Wight continues drawing on the narrative context of the behavioral revolution and in particular referents associated with both identities and practices in contemporary political science. The empirical theory identity is closely linked with practices associated with the positivist scientific method: “The commitment to operationalism is generally well understood: since, the validity of a theory ultimately rests

---

225 This is a point that Gunnell has continued to elaborate, see for example Gunnell (1975; 1998; 2011).
on the ‘facts’, all concepts that are considered to be scientific or empirical must be defined operationally” (29). Wight continues recounting how “within behavioralism this has generally been taken to mean the language of observation (Gunnell 1975; Nicholson, 1996a). Less well understood is the closely related instrumentalism that pervaded logical positivism/positivism” (29).

Wight continues to develop a historicist theme in his narrative about the behavioral revolution. “Another neglected aspect of the behavioral revolution within IR,” Wight observes, “is the extent to which its adherents conceived of themselves as going beyond social science and instituting a ‘behavioral science’ (Easton 1965: 18)” (30). Wight continues reinforcing his historicist narrative: “The ‘behavioral revolt’ was not only about placing IR on a more scientific basis, but about taking part in an ambitious attempt to unify all of the human sciences into a seamless whole” (30). The central importance of Easton to contemporary IR is made evident as Wight continues developing his historicist theme: “David Easton accepted that prior to the ‘behavioral revolt’ the social sciences were deserving the label science (Easton 1965: 22);” and, moreover, Easton “accepted the ‘behavioral revolt’ could not only be about the introduction of more scientific rigor … [as] more rigor would mean ‘rigor mortis,’ as its critics from the traditional point of view … have been so quick and correct to point out” (Easton, 1965: 22). Wight continues, “in a very Comteian manner, Easton saw the behavioral movement as the next stage in the development of human knowledge, where the human sciences would be united into one research programme, centered on the notion of behavior” (30). Finally, Wight summarizes with a final mention of the behavioral revolution. “Whatever the overall impact of the
‘behavioral revolt’ on the discipline, it legitimated a turn to the philosophy of social
and the philosophy of science” (30).

In the subfield of international relations (IR) the plot of narratives often takes the
form of a progression of “paradigms.” A good example of this is a chapter by Michael
Banks titled “The Inter-paradigm Debate” in the one volume *International Relations: A
Bank’s chapter develops a historicist theme summarizing the evolution of the field of IR
in terms of three dominant paradigms – realism, pluralism, and structuralism (1985, 9). In
the beginning, a form of idealism prevailed in the discipline only to be replaced after the
paradigm failed to anticipate or help explain the atrocities attending WWI and WWII. As
Banks tells the tale, “realism-idealism” (idealism or liberal realism) was dominant between
1918 and 1950 and was gradually replaced during the first great debate when its challenger
behavioralism “erupted” (10). Behavioralism as the second great paradigm of IR often
took on the guise of a “crusade for empiricism and scientific procedures” and, as a
movement, it often “provoked a confrontation with traditionalist which lasted through the
1960s” (10). Once again, the mythological nexus is evident here as within the context of
the behavioral revolution the new “empirical” identity is linked with practices associated
with “scientific procedures” and opposed to traditional identities.227

Banks highlights the dimension of identity associated with debates about theory in
political science. “The behavioural movement and its aftermath” Banks tells us, “produced

226 Light is Professor Emeritus in the department of international relations at the London School of Economics
and Political Science. Groom is Professor Emeritus of International Relations at Kent University (U.K.).
Banks taught international relations at the London School of Economics and Politics until 2003.
227 Both of these movements were “state-centric” and fundamentally realist in orientation (11). After 1970,
there developed a third debate, the so-called “‘inter-paradigm’ debate” leading to a questioning of the realist
core of IR and the emergence of structuralism and pluralism as viable contenders.
a series of fine commentaries on theory, among which the lively, easily read account by Morgan is notable” (12). Banks continues his discussion of the impact of behavioralism on IR and gives John Vasquez credit for providing a “devastating critique of realism … illustrating the strengths of behaviouralism better than any other study, and its discussions of epistemology, of anomalies and their relation to general theory … make it one of the most significant works published in IR since 1945” (12). Vasquez also pointed out the weaknesses of behavioralism in IR. According to Banks, “Vasquez demonstrates two things conclusively: that the behavioural movement like postwar traditionalism before it, was dominated by realist assumptions; and that realist general theory cannot properly explain world politics” (12). In other words, Vasquez’s “devastating critique of realism” demonstrated that behavioralism in IR was in realist in orientation, and therefore, like its predecessor forms of realism, incapable of fully understanding the international political system. Vasquez serves as an important biographical referent in the story of the subfield of IR after the behavioral revolution. As I discuss more below, many authors bring in Vasquez in their discussion of the behavioral revolution in IR.

Brian Schmidt is a disciplinary historian of IR and written a handbook chapter titled “On the History and Historiography of International Relations” (HIR 2002). Schmidt’s chapter develops a historicist theme that revises the dominant narrative and recognizes continuity rather than a revolutionary break during the behavioral period. The first mention

228 P.M. Morgan (1981).
229 Vasquez’s seminal work in IR is his 1983 The Power of Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism where he introduces the concept of the “Behavioral Revolt.”
230 A.V.S. de Reuck’s “Anthropological Aspects” chapter in the IRHCT (1985) mentions the behavioral revolution once. In this mention there is a temporal referent and the conceptual referent of the social sciences. “Since the ‘behavioral revolution’ of the 1960s, scholars of international relations (IR) have sought to enrich their field with insights borrowed from other disciplines” (1985, 194). The rest of the short chapter is about anthropological work that might contribute to contemporary international studies.
231 Schmidt is currently an associate professor at Carleton University, Ottawa (CA).
of the behavioral revolution comes in Schmidt’s section titled “The Great Debates.” As mentioned in Banks (1985) above, in the subfield of IR, historical narratives often take the form of a periodization between three “great debates.” Once again, the first “great debate” in IR was the conflict between the so-called “idealist” and “realist” camps. Idealism was the order of the day prior to WWII and is often discussed as the less rigorous and less scientific other of realism in IR. In Schmidt’s terms, “almost every historical account concedes that the realists won the first debate and, as a result, reoriented the field in a more practical and scientific direction” (10). We saw an example of this narrative in Banks above, and according to Schmidt, “this story of the ‘debate’ between ‘idealists’ and ‘realists’ continues to exert a strong influence on how the field understands its own history, and this accounts in part for the perpetual need to retell the tale of how IR was once rooted in idealism but was fortunate, after the Second World War, to have embraced realism” (2002, 11).

The mythological nexus is evident throughout Schmidt’s narrative as he continuously juxtaposes opposed identities and associated practices. “The second great debate … took place within the context of the behavioral revolution that was already deeply impacting the social sciences, especially political science, and which pitted ‘traditionalist’ against ‘behavioralists’ or ‘scientists’ (11). It is also worth noting how in this case “traditional” is explicitly opposed to “behaviorist” which is, in turn, directly associated

232 A student of John Gunnell, Schmidt characterizes these “debates” in terms of “analytical constructs” used by IR scholars as “organizing devices” in their writing (10). The historical narratives about the so-called “great debates” take the transition between paradigms which they represent for granted, becoming pervasive as “dominant self-images of the field,” “self-evident,” and “conventional wisdom” (10). As Schmidt says, “it is not entirely clear that all of the debates have actually taken place,” that is whether there was an actual debate between practitioners of IR during the time period in question or whether these debates have been constructed and applied retrospectively by contemporary scholars trying to understand the history of the field” (10). Schmidt discusses “Gunnell’s framework of the orders of discourse” more fully on pages 14 and 16.
with “scientists,” implying of course, that traditional theory was not “scientific” in the sense understood by behavioral political science. Realism as a behavioral science in IR eschewed “the ‘classical approach’” in favor of “the ‘scientific approach’” (11). Schmidt elaborates, associating empirical political identities with practices associated with the scientific method:

As in the case of political science, the debate became polarized between those who believed that the methods of the natural sciences, or at least those described by logical-positivist philosophers of science as the hypothetico-deductive model, could be emulated and adopted in the study of international politics, versus those who argued that the study of the social world was not amendable to the strict empirical methods of the natural sciences” (11).

Schmidt says that debates over positivism have “surely not diminished” and there is now “a common view that the debate helped to foster the scientific identity of the field through widespread acceptance and utilization of scientific methods which aided in the task of developing a cumulative theory of international relations” (2002, 11). This is a clear example of the mythological nexus at work as “scientific” identities are associated with practices that make up the positivist scientific method.

The third “great debate” is by Schmidt’s account, “more ambiguous” than the first two, but can be characterized as a period in the early 1980s commonly understood as an “inter-paradigm debate … among realists, pluralists, and structuralists” (11). This interparadigm debate is the least well-defined and as some have pointed out, the “third debate” did not end in the replacement of an older paradigm but the recognition of what Ole Weaver (1996) characterized as “a pluralism to live with” (quoted in Schmidt, p. 12). Schmidt’s historicist criticism of the discursive construct of the “great debates” is continued in a section titled, “What’s Wrong with the Image of the Great Debates?”
Schmidt’s narrative continues operating on the mythological level of identity as he opposes traditional identities with scientific identities. The “‘second great debate’ or the ‘traditionalism versus scientism debate’” is, as Schmidt says, “typically construe[d] it as a debate about the scientific status of the field” (13). Schmidt’s historicist goal is to understand how these developments came to be and what concepts and theories can best explain them. Here the basic plot is that the field of IR became more scientific as realism supplanted idealism. This portion of the narrative is also operating at the identity level of the mythological matrix as the identities of traditional political theory and empirical political theory (the “scientific approach”) are counterpoised in the context of the behavioral revolution.

In contrast to Banks’s (1985) assessment of Vasquez above, Schmidt suggests that behavioralism was not so much an example of IR realism as it constituted its own distinct paradigm. For example, Schmidt gives Lijphart (1974), who “claimed that the ‘traditionalism-science debate of the 1960s was more substantive and fundamental than the earlier debate between idealism and realism’; and “he argued that the behavioral revolution in IR resulted in a new paradigm ‘the behavioral paradigm’ – that was at great odds with the substantive claims of the traditional realist paradigm” (13). Schmidt continues summarizing a familiar narrative found in the subfield of IR, one where the idealists are cast in the form of traditional political theory while the realists are defined in opposition as the empirical political theory or the behavioral-scientific approach:

The traditionalists – those who approached the study international politics from a legal, philosophical, historical, or inductive point of view – lost out to what was perceived as a scientific approach that sought to emulate the methods of the natural sciences. The result was that IR became more scientific, realism lost its dominant position, and the field was brought more in line with the other social sciences (13-14).
In this part of Schmidt’s narrative, the “scientific approach” of behavioralism constituted a distinct paradigm and was able to overcome realist dominance in IR.

Part of what made behavioralism distinctive was its focus on an international system of states. This “idea of a system was central to the behavioral revolution but its application to IR took on a number of distinctive and problematic properties” (13). Even as “the systems approach (Easton, 1953) was meant to replace the study of the state, which behavioralists deemed to be archaic and contributing to the backwardness of the discipline,” these influences did not reach IR for another decade, and the “concept of system did not supersede the focus on the interaction of states since it would have risked the very identity of the field (Little, 1978, 1985)” (13). Finally, in terms of narrative context, the practices associated with behavioralism in IR were “increasingly quantitative, analysis of the units (states)” (13).

Schmidt now picks up his narrative centered on the work of John Vasquez and his impact on the field of IR. Vasquez’s The Power of Politics (1983) helped to refocus critical discussion of the so-called “great debates” and made room for alternative interpretations of IR’s past – including the possibility that these debates are discursively constituted. The “second debate,” for example, “was really only a pseudo debate which was largely confined to methodological issues and did not involve substantive aspects of the subject matter of international politics” (2002, 14). Vasquez’s work, Schmidt makes an important historicist

---

233 Richard Little elaborates on the significance of systems theory to the behavioral revolution in his IRHCT 1985 chapter titled “Structuralism and Neo-Realism.” “Systems thinking,” Little tells his reader, “was only one dimension of the putative behavioral revolution” (1985, 80). Little continues his brief narrative with a quantitative methods referent and says: “In practice, the revolution was more commonly associated with the introduction of numerical analysis to the discipline” (80). Finally, he continues, “realists made no secret of their distaste for the statistical side of behaviorism and their attack precipitated the so-called Great Debate;” and “realists argued that in order to employ statistical techniques it was necessary to make extraordinarily crude and naïve assumptions about international politics” (80).
point, was an effort to show that “behavioralists largely worked within a realist paradigm” and so there was no fundamental transformation of the understanding of theory in IR – only the introduction of different methods. Thus, in terms of the mythological nexus, Schmidt argues that there was no transformation of disciplinary identities which were continuous. What changes occurred happened at the level of practice and the acquisition of new methods of research.

Schmidt further develops his historicist theme revising the dominant narrative and arguing for continuity in disciplinary identities. Schmidt quotes the IR scholar Kal Holsti: “Holsti endorses this view and argues that the ‘behavioral revolution did not inaugurate a new way of looking at the world, a new paradigm, or a new set of normative problems’” (14).234 In line with his historicist theme, Schmidt concludes the paragraph quoting affirmatively from Vasquez (1998, 42), saying one consequence of this “revisionist interpretation is the view that the ‘field has been far more coherent, systematic, and even cumulative than all the talk about contending approaches or theories implies’” (14). Here Schmidt’s historicist theme is employed to question the revolutionary import of the behavioral revolution and posit his “revisionist” conclusion that the behavioral movement represents more continuity in the discipline’s history than is commonly acknowledged.

The Subfield of Political Theory

The lead entry in the first volume of Political Science: The State of the Discipline (APSA 1983) is written by the disciplinary historian and political theorist John Gunnell.

234 Kal Holsti (1998, 33) “Scholarship in an Era of Anxiety: The Study of International Relations During the Cold War.”
Gunnell’s chapter is focused on the subfield of political theory and is titled, “Political Theory: The Evolution of a Subfield.” The behavioral revolution figures centrally in Gunnell’s narrative with nine mentions. In this early example of Gunnell’s reference work, his narrative develops a historicist theme with an emphasis on continuity within the discipline before and after the behavioral revolution. In later reference work entries, Gunnell adopts and almost single-handedly supports this emphasis on continuity and reconstitution of mainstream political science which took shape at the University of Chicago in the 1930s and 1940s, was interrupted by a German émigré challenge, and then reconstituted in the 1950s and 1960s.

Gunnell begins by quoting from a Journal of Politics article by William Anderson who says in 1949 “there was definitely a need for more work in the ‘field of scientific method’ that would yield a body of testable propositions concerning political nature and activities that are applicable throughout the world’” (Gunnell 1983, 12). Clearly there was a “growing conviction” in the discipline that a new type of theory was needed that included closer attention to the “scientific method” including the need for “testable propositions” (12). In many respects this shift in the identity of political theory from traditional to scientific “summed up the governing motif of the forthcoming behavioral movement, but it was also a reaffirmation of a basic faith” (12). Gunnell sees the behavioral movement as a “rekindling of the scientific mood” which might help advance “liberal values” in the wake of the devastation of “World War II” (12).

In these passages and those that follow, many elements of the narrative context as well as the mythological nexus are evident. The practices associated with scientific method are closely linked with the identity of behavioralism. Gunnell’s historicist theme is evident
as he first recognizes the success of the behavioral revolution in transforming the discipline, but he argues that this was less a revolution and as he puts it here a “rekindling of the scientific mood” that was only interrupted by WWII.

In a section titled, “The Behavioral Revolution: 1950-1959,” Gunnell develops a historicist theme saying there was nothing new about the discipline seeking the authority and mantle of a “scientific” identity. Even so, Gunnell observes, “the behavioral revolution was a theoretical revolution” (12). Bringing together the mythological dimensions of identity and practice, Gunnell says the behavioral revolution brought about an “unprecedented metatheoretical consciousness about scientific theory and scientific explanation” (12). Additional changes involved the rejection of “liberal reform and social control” in favor of the development of “pure theory” (12). The change in the identity of “theory” is evident in the fact that many founders of behavioralism in political science were “by training political theorists of the historical and normative kind” (13). Leaders of behavioralism like Easton, Dahl, and Eulau wrote dissertations “in traditional political theory,” only to later embrace a “scientific” identity defined in opposition to their former “traditional” identities (13).

Gunnell’s narrative continues when he discusses how the so-called “decline” of political theory was a fairly common narrative in the 1950s and early 1960s. The political philosopher Leo Strauss, an anti-behavioralist for whom the “very notion of theory in modern social science, as exemplified in the behavioral movement signified the ‘decline of political philosophy’” is juxtaposed by Gunnell to Easton, who criticized the traditional “identification of theory with the history of political theory [which] was symptomatic of the ‘decline’” (17). Founders of behavioral political science, like Easton, regarded political
philosophy and its political science analog “the history of political theory” as an antiquated version of what would become behavioral, scientific, or empirical political theory.

Traditional political theory continued to lose ground to identities and practices associated with empirical political theory, and according to Gunnell “while most social scientists viewed theory as ‘a systematic and self-conscious attempt … to explain diverse phenomena that have been or can be observed,’ theory in political science had traditionally involved much more than this ‘explanatory’ type” (25). Traditional political theory (as opposed to “scientific” or empirical political theory), Gunnell points out, “continued to include various dimensions of political philosophy or normative theory and ideology, that were inconsistent with the ‘behavioral revolution’ and the conception of theory in political science as a whole” (25).

In his summary of a McDonald and Rosenau’ article on the state of political theory, Gunnell’s historicist theme continues juxtaposing “scientific” empirical political theory with “normative” and “philosophical” traditional political theory. In the late 1960s, Gunnell provides a block quote from McDonald and Roseau (1968):

‘There was a growing appreciation of the theoretical relevance of the great works of political thought’ and, ‘perhaps as a reaction to the behavioral revolution, the inclination to treat them as historical artifacts, philosophical formulations, and ideological tracts has given way to a growing concern for probing their theoretical content’ (25).

Gunnell turns to the work of David Easton in the 1968 International Encyclopedia of Social Science entry on “Political Science.” Summarizing Easton (1968), Gunnell

235 Gunnell is quoting a 1968 Journal of Politics article by Neil McDonald and James Rosenau titled “Political Theory as an Academic Field and Intellectual Activity.” It is interesting to note two different meanings of “political theory” at work here. This meaning is essentially the inverse of the type of theory Easton was working to establish in the discipline at the same time; Easton saw general theory or empirical theory as a broadening of the narrow confines of traditional political theory (Easton 1965).

236 See also Wolin and Brecht’s IESS (1968) entry on “Political Theory”
says that political science after 1950 was still in search of a disciplinary identity, owing
largely to, as Easton puts it, “‘the reception and integration of the methods of science into
the core of the discipline’” (p. 282) (26). Gunnell continues when he says “the basic thrust
of this ‘theoretical revolution’ was a turn toward functional and systems analysis as
opposed to a focus on institutions such as the state” (26). Gunnell immediately follows
with a summary of Easton’s understanding of the new theoretical identity he advocated for:
“According to Easton, the core of the behavioral movement was a ‘shift from an
institutional and practical problem orientation’ to a pure science, and this shift was most
‘sharply revealed’ in ‘the subfield of political theory’” (26).

The Introduction to the *Oxford Handbook of Political Theory* (*OHPT*, 2006) is
edited by John Dryzek, Bonnie Honig, and Anne Phillips.237 A section titled “Relationship
with Political Science” begins as follows: “Political theory’s relationship to the discipline
of political science has not always been a happy one” (6). The editors’ narratives develops
a historicist theme and reaches back to the “founding of the discipline in the late nineteenth
century,” and they recount how since the beginning “there have been periodic
proclamations of its newly scientific character” (6). Speaking to the mythological
dimension of identity, the editors elaborate how “the ‘soft’ other for the new science has
sometimes been journalism, sometimes historical narrative, sometimes case-study
methods. It has also, very often, been political theory” (6). In terms of the mythological
nexus, the new behavioral science or what I’ve called “empirical political theory” is

---

237 At the time of publication Dryzek was a Professor of Social and Political Theory, Political Science
Program, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University; Honig was a Professor of
Political Science at Northwestern University and Senior Research Fellow, American Bar Foundation; Phillips
was Professor of Gender Theory and holds a joint appointment in the Department of Government and the
Gender Institute, London School of Economics.
defined in opposition to traditional theory. Indeed, “beginning in the 1950s,” the editors’ narrative continues, “behavioral revolutionaries tried to purge the ranks of theorists – and had some success at this in one or two large Midwestern departments of political science in the USA” (6-7).

Traditional political theory was rejected by mainstream political science, especially after 1950, and the rise of rational choice theory.

The editors explicitly bring in the dimension of practice when they discuss what types of research were rejected in the aftermath of the behavioral revolution. In particular, the editors quote the work of “William Riker (1982: 753) [who rejected] ‘belles letters, criticism, and philosophic speculation’ along with ‘phenomenology and hermeneutics’” (7). This traditional theory referent is further reinforced in the next sentence where the editors say, “for those driven by their scientific aspirations, it has always been important to distinguish the ‘true’ scientific study of politics from more humanistic approaches – and political theory has sometimes borne the brunt of this” (7). The political theorist Arlene Saxonhouse’s chapter in the OHPT is titled “Exit and Re-Entry: Political Theory Yesterday and Tomorrow.”

The mentions of the behavioral revolution come in a section titled simply “Inside.” Saxonhouse develops a theme of lament for the lost status of political theory in the discipline and begins by discussing an early episode in the growing revolt against behavioral hegemony in the 1960s. Here Saxonhouse says “within the academy, Leo Strauss and his followers did not accept politely the appropriation of political science by empiricists and the operationally minded such as Dahl” (2006, 846). Of course, as we

---

238 For the example on some political theorists’ response to the decision to stop offering political theory as a graduate field of study at Pennsylvania State University, see notes two and three in Kaufman-Osborn (2010).
239 At the time of publication Saxonhouse was the Caroline Robbins Collegiate Professor of Political Science and Women’s Studies at the University of Michigan.
saw in Chapter Four, it would be a pair of political theorists who would take up the
challenge of Strauss and his colleagues at Chicago.240

Saxonhouse narrative exhibits the influence of the mythological nexus as she
discusses dominant behavioral identities forged in opposition to traditional political theory
alongside the now dominant practices in political science like quantitative methods. In
addition, the biographical referent of Charles Merriam is clearly working (by means of
metonymy) on the dimensions of identity/practice and signifying both scientific identities
and practices associated with positivistic versions of the scientific method. Even though
“early practitioners of the behavioral movement may have written books on political theory
and on the canonical authors,” Saxonhouse explains quoting Charles Merriam, “at the same
time … they encouraged their colleagues and students to collect the statistical data that
would provide the ‘numbers and measurements … related to the significant hypotheses and
patterns’” (848; Merriam 1926). Saxonhouse elaborates on a theme of lament in the next
sentence and says “yet, the incursion of positivism into the practice of political science
eager to provide the data for political and social reform exacerbated the schism that left
political theory a poor cousin in the discipline” (848).

“Political theory,” Saxonhouse laments, “was denigrated and shunted aside for the
glory of the new methods of analysis, ones that opened up new vistas of politics unstudied
and even inaccessible before – public opinion, socialization, voting patterns” (848).

240 Schaar and Wolin’s 1963 APSR review essay “Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics: A Critique” was
a critique of a book edited by Herbert Storing (1962), titled Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics in which
the authors criticized the new behavioral science of politics. Saxonhouse recounts this episode in the history
of political science: “the gauntlet had been thrown down by Strauss, but the challenge was never officially
accepted by the profession of political science. It was instead, curiously, political theorists (not the
operationally minded empiricists themselves) who picked up the gauntlet and came to the defense of political
science” (847). See also, Barber (2006).
Saxonhouse continues her narrative discussing the secondary role that political theory would play relative to quantitative methods:

Although the political scientists at the dawn of the behavioral revolution, such as Charles Merriam, may have looked to Aristotle as a proto-social scientist, ‘scour[ing] all of the countries of the world for political information to be placed at his disposal’ … and some residual attachments may have kept Plato and Rousseau within the ken of political scientists, they paled in importance in a field that had the new quantitative techniques ready at hand to investigate the actual practice of political activities (848-849).

Once again the dominant practices of “quantitative techniques” is central to a narrative of the changes in the discipline’s identity after the behavioral revolution. Saxonhouse has developed a theme of lament over the once central place of political theory before the behavioral revolution which was replaced in the mainstream by the new identity of behavioral science and practices associated with quantitative methods.

A similar theme of lament after the behavioral revolution is found in the Introduction to the *Handbook of Political Theory and Policy Science* (1988), edited by Edward Byran Portis and Michael Levy.241 Here the theme of lament focuses on roads not taken due to the rise of behavioral dominance in the discipline. Summarizing the first chapter written by Michael Levy, the editors relate that “alternative views of the potential contribution of political theory to policy analysis and evaluation have been shaped by the evolution of political science” (1988, xvii).242 The authors continue developing the lament theme focusing on the role that traditional political theory could have played in policy analysis if it had not been for the behavioral revolution. “The development of the

---

241 Portis is Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University. Levy was a Professor of political science at Texas A&M University until 1985 and is currently Policy Director at the lobbying firm Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck.

242 There is also a chapter by Robert Goodin titled “Political Theory as Policy Analysis – And Vice Versa.” I mention this because Goodin is a major figure in the political science handbook industry.
behavioral movement in the discipline,” Portis and Levy tell us, “combined with the growing influence of analytic philosophy, involved a shift away from political evaluation and policy considerations” (xvii). Instead, the authors continue, “this movement left traditional political theory isolated and hard pressed to justify either its normative prescriptions or its claim to constitute some sort of usable knowledge” (xvii). Thus, traditional political theory and its “normative” practices, as the authors put it, “political evaluation and policy considerations” were marginalized in the discipline.

The behavioral revolution is found in a chapter written by Terence Ball, titled “The Value of the History of Political Philosophy” (OHHPP 2011).243 Ball develops a historicist theme that does not celebrate the rise of behavioralism in political science. Ball is discussing identities/practices associated with what is variously known as the study of the history of political philosophy, the history of political thought, the history of ideas, or what I have been calling “traditional political theory.” Ball wonders if the study of the history of political philosophy is incorrigibly value-laden “as one prominent political scientist complained at the onset of the ‘behavioral revolution’ in political science: ‘Political theory today is interested primarily in the history of ideas’ (Easton 1953: 236; compare Dahl 1956)” (48). Here Ball is recounting Easton’s complaint that traditional political theory merely consisted of the “history of ideas” or the history of political thought, which Easton proceeds to use as a foil to his preferred theoretical identity in empirical or behavioral political theory.

Ball points out that contemporary political scientists think that the study of the past ideas of the discipline is not needed to carry on with the work of political science today.

243 At the time of publication Ball was at the School of Government, Politics, and Global Studies at Arizona State University.
Indeed, one might think that it is “quite irrelevant to current research and theorizing” (48). To this idea, Ball interjects in a historicist fashion that “historically, modern political science derives from political philosophy … and political philosophy is in important ways a backward-looking enterprise” (48). The idea that one need not study the past came about “during the behavioral revolution of the late 1950s to the early 1970s,” and it was during this time says Ball, that “theorists agreed with behavioralists that one can be a very fine physicist without ever having studied the history of physics” (48-49). But of course, Ball insists, the study of the history of political philosophy cannot do without the past dimension and the values of researchers which invariably enter into the interpretation of the past.

John Gunnell’s chapter in the *OHHPP* (2011) is titled “History of Political Philosophy as a Discipline.” Gunnell begins developing a historicist-revisionist theme focusing on continuity in the discipline rather than abrupt or fundamental change. “It is often assumed that the behavioral revolution in American political science and its renewed and vigorous commitment to an empirical science of politics,” Gunnell says juxtaposing empirical political theory and traditional political theory identities, “involved a rejection of the history of political theory in favor of what it characterized as scientific theory” (64). In terms of the mythological nexus, the identities of traditional political theory and empirical political theory are clearly juxtaposed.

Gunnell further develops a historicist theme by focusing on continuity in the identity of political science before and after the behavioral revolution. Indeed, Gunnell argues the behavioral revolution was less a revolution and more a return or restoration of prior trends in the discipline after WWII. A key part of this alternative theme is the much neglected story of the émigré scholars who came to the U.S. and collectively constituted a
challenge to the mainstream of political science and its version of political theory (at the
time largely consisting of the history of political thought).\textsuperscript{244} “It was,” Gunnell explains,
“at least in part, a radical change in the literature associated with the history of political
theory that instigated and sustained the behavioral movement” (64). This émigré influence
was able to “produce a fundamental sea change” in the identity and practice of political
theory in the U.S. (64). The key point is that this “sea change” did not constitute a
successful challenge to the behavioral movement, but traditional political theory did
provide a convenient foil to what was considered scientific and empirical and not
philosophical and normative. The émigré challenge was unable to dislodge the new
identity of theory as behavioral and empirical political theory from the mainstream of
political science which after WWII and the behavioral movement was consolidated as
modern political science.

The Behavioral Revolution Mythology in Handbooks

In this chapter I have shown the way political scientists invoke the behavioral
revolution in their writing about the discipline’s past. In terms of narrative context, I
highlighted examples from all the major subfields of political science, demonstrated both
repetition and variation in referents, and shown how themes vary from Whig to historicist
to lamenting of loss. In terms of subfield context there are examples from American
politics, comparative politics, international relations, and political theory. These subfields

\textsuperscript{244} The émigré scholars, Gunnell tells us, were “mostly German … and gravitated toward the field of political
theory” and among whose members were “Leo Strauss, Hannah Arendt, and Eric Voegelin, as well as
members of the Marxist-oriented Frankfurt School such as Herbert Marcuse, Max Horkheimer, and Theadore
Adorno” (64-65).
make use of a common stock of referents which are important to the significance of the behavioral revolution. In this chapter, I have shown both variation in theme among the subfields but also that the majority of authors develop a historicist theme that accepts the success of the behavioral revolution in transforming identities and practices in political science, and then goes on to try and account for them in terms of historiography (i.e., something happened in the past, now let us find out more about the historical context and people involved). Although the Whig theme also has a strong presence, this is truer of pre-2000s handbooks, which leads me to believe that historicist critiques of Whig histories have had some impact on the contemporary discipline, especially those political scientists who think and write about the history of political science. The Whig theme also begins from the premise that the behavioral revolution happened and successfully transformed the discipline but then goes on to celebrate these changes. This theme seems to be common with retrospective accounts of authors who participated in the behavioral revolution such as the one of Almond early in the chapter.

Though the majority of these authors develop a historicist theme, it is important to note that there is also variation within historicist narratives. This variation generally occurs around whether the authors sees either continuity or change after the beginning of institutionalization of the discipline in the early 20th century. The historicist theme often builds off the dominant narrative of behavioral success after WWII and the 1950s when the discipline experienced rapid expansion in the number of departments and a corresponding growth number of practicing political scientists; several entries push this dominant narrative back to the 1930s and 1940s. John Gunnell’s work is a prime driver of a historicist theme emphasizing more continuity than change in the history of the
discipline since the early twentieth century. Gunnell and others who develop this thematic emphasis see the behavioral revolution as less than revolutionary and more of a “reconstitution” of a disciplinary identity that took shape much earlier. This theme of continuity is crucially dependent on recognizing the early establishment of the scientific project of political science in the early 20th century at the University of Chicago. This extension of the time-frame lessens the “revolutionary” importance of the behavioral period in the 1950s and early 1960s, and makes it possible to tell the story of political science from a greater distance from the present. This project to make political science finally “scientific” continues to this day despite ongoing challenges.

A second important element of the second theme of continuity in the discipline is the story of the many émigré scholars who fled war and persecution during the world wars. This is an important and often neglected point made by Gunnell in his attempt to revise the dominant narrative. In Gunnell’s telling, the behavioral revolution was hardly revolutionary since it did not change the basic identity of the discipline which had long seen itself as “scientific.” What did change was the technologies such as statistical analysis employed by political scientists in their ongoing quest for the mantle of scientific authority. What the story of the émigré scholars demonstrates is that the behavioral revolution was actually a conservative reaction by the mainstream of political science against new currents in the subfield of political theory which were critical of the discipline’s two main commitments: a science of politics and a political science for American-style liberal democracy. When the mainstream in the discipline embraced the label of behavioralism and effectively agreed that political theory would no longer be central to the discipline’s identities and practices a serious challenge to the mainstream was
effectively foreclosed. The behavioral revolution, in the historicist-revisionist theme of Gunnell, actually represents a strong reaction to mainstream political science which came to an end with the marginalization of political theory. Thus, the idea that there has been more continuity in the discipline’s identities and practices than the imagery of “revolution” might lead one to believe.

The primary referents that I emphasized in this chapter are those closely associated with the dimension of identity and practice in the mythological nexus. The dimension of identity is represented by debates over theory and specifically the way that contending images of theory define themselves in opposition to one another which is the essence the identity construction dynamic. In this chapter, I demonstrated how authors repeatedly draw on one of the two sides of the identity coin, emphasizing either “empirical” or behavioral political theory defined in opposition to traditional political theory or (in far fewer cases), traditional political theory is defined in opposition to empirical or behavioral political theory. As the political theory of mythology developed in this dissertation would have it, these identities are closely associated with practices that are repeatedly invoked in the same context of the behavioral revolution. Practices associated with quantitative methods like statistics and survey research are linked to empirical political theory while research practices associated with the history of political thought are linked with traditional political theory. This conjunction of elements in the context of the behavioral revolution is what I call the “mythological nexus” and it is here within this nexus that the significance is produced which assures the ongoing repetition of narrative elements and the persistence of the mythology of the behavioral revolution.
The behavioral revolution clearly matters to contemporary authors of handbooks entries. This chapter has demonstrated that members of the political science community need some way to ground their professional identities in a foundation or origin story about the contemporary discipline. The way the behavioral revolution mythology works today substantiates a community’s narrative sense about its shared past. It provides significance to contemporary identities and practices, and gains power through repeated retellings of these foundational narratives of the discipline.
CHAPTER VI

A POLITICAL THEORY OF MYTHOLOGY: NARRATIVE, IDENTITY, PRACTICE

If it is true that all thought begins with remembrance, it is also true that no remembrance remains secure unless it is condensed and distilled into a framework of conceptual notions within which it can further exercise itself (Arendt 2006, 220).

Several questions have been important in this dissertation. For example, why has the concept of the behavioral revolution been represented and remembered the way it is in the contemporary reference material of political science? Similarly, why is the behavioral revolution, a phrase describing a period in the discipline’s history some sixty years ago, still important in the writings of contemporary reference work authors? If this period in the history of the discipline is firmly in the past, then why does it appear that as a profession we cannot forget it? Why does the behavioral revolution still figure centrally in the way political scientists remember the history of the discipline and how does this remembrance serve to justify contemporary practices and professional identities?

In pursuing answers to these questions I have come to five general conclusions about the status and role of the behavioral revolution in contemporary political science. First, I came to appreciate the close relationship between the narrative context and the mythological nexus of the behavioral revolution. This relationship constitutes the essence of a political theory of mythology as I have developed it in this dissertation. A political theory of mythology is a framework for understanding the contemporary significance of the behavioral revolution, as represented by reference works. Second, I discovered a process of metonymy wherein the referents to the behavioral revolution represent the
dimensions of identity and practice central to the work of the mythological nexus. Third, I clarified and developed the idea of a dynamic of identity production. I showed how reference work authors, by drawing on the narrative context of the behavioral revolution, repeatedly define identities/practices in opposition to other identities/practices. As the construction “identities/practices” indicates, I found a very close relationship between these dimensions. Relatedly, I found that persistent complaints by political scientists about a “crisis of identity” in the discipline are misleading. This is the case since the dynamic of identity production is seen as an inherent part of discourse production as well as the construction and maintenance of disciplinary identities. Fourth, I elaborated on the power of mythology and how it works as a prescriptive force within the discourses of the discipline. I learned that mythology involves the related phenomena of “the political,” power, discourse, and discipline. Fifth, I differentiated my approach to discursive analysis from the more historicist approaches in contemporary disciplinary history. With this insight, and in conjunction with the idea that the so-called “crisis of identity” is misleading, I conclude that academic political science is not trapped by its disciplinary mythology, since it can change the narratives that comprise its nexus and therefore ultimately change its dominant identities and practices.

The Mythological Nexus and the Narrative Context of the Behavioral Revolution

Narrare (LT) “to tell”; derived from the adjective gnarus, “knowing” or “skilled.”

In this dissertation I have shown how a range of authors from inside and outside political science, as well as from across the major subfields of political science, recount the story of the behavioral revolution in their reference work entries. These entries
demonstrated how the behavioral revolution is still important for the identity of the discipline today.

I developed a political theory of mythology to answer my questions about the importance of the behavioral revolution in contemporary reference materials (1980-2012). A political theory of mythology allows one to understand why the behavioral revolution continues to figure centrally in narratives found in contemporary reference works. I showed that mythology is a form of authoritative speech transmitted through narratives about a community’s foundation that provides significance to identities and practices. I developed the concept of the *mythological nexus* and compared contemporary political science to other communities. Specifically, I looked to the ancient Greek context and foundation narratives about the city-state of Sparta. These narratives come down to us in fragments and have been pieced together by classicists to give us a picture of how the ancient Spartans relied on political mythology in their everyday lives. The dimensions of the mythological nexus worked together to provide significance to Spartan identities through narratives about the “Return of the Herakleidae.” These narratives about the foundation of the Spartan *polis* were widely known, repeated in Spartan society, and served to substantiate the community’s warlike identity as well as to justify practices associated with warfare. In Chapters Three, Four, and Five, I demonstrated how the mythological nexus is at work in the discourse of the discipline by analyzing contemporary reference works of political science.

Another contribution of this dissertation was developing Bottici’s concept of “significance” and clarifying its importance to constructing identities and practices in human communities. In this dissertation, I developed an explicit framework for
understanding this type of mythological “significance.” Mythology is known through narratives (or discourses more broadly). But mythology exceeds narrative in doing something very special which all human communities require: it “answers a need for significance” (Bottici 2007). All narratives consist of basic elements, but what makes discourse mythological is that its narratives expressly answer the basic need for significance in a human community. Narrative, as I discussed in Chapter One, is the combination of discursive elements in speech or writing for the purpose of communication (Abbott 2008; Cobley 2014). Human beings living and working in human communities rely on foundation narratives in order to make sense of the past as well as to orient themselves in the present (Honig 1993; Matthes 2000; Mercieca 2010, 28). These narratives and the broader discourses to which they contribute provide significance to individuals’ experiences by linking stories of a community’s past to identities and practices in the present (Flood 2005, Flood and Ball 1997, Flood and Hewlett 2000).

In this dissertation, I identified an overarching and dominant narrative of a successful behavioralism revolutionizing the identities and practices of political science. This is the core narrative of the behavioral revolution mythology as found in contemporary reference works. It is with this dominant narrative in mind that authors creatively construct their narratives of the behavioral revolution. Mythology is a process of authoritative speech making that is present when elements of foundation narratives are repurposed, yielding different configurations in different times and places (Bottici and Challand 2006; 2010; Bottici 2007). The repetition of common elements is the narrative context of the behavioral revolution. I showed how these narrative elements – subfields, referents, and themes – are used in different ways and with varying emphases by authors of entries within
the major subfields. In the repetition of this narrative, however, there emerges variation in the elements that make up the overall narrative context. The importance of variation and repetition to mythology is evident in the diverse ways that the story of the behavioral revolution is told by different authors; with each version drawing on a common narrative context, while allowing for creative combinations of elements.

Much like the way ancient mythology has come down to us through the ages, the behavioral revolution mythology is made up of fragments, of narrative elements which authors of reference work material appropriate in unique and creative ways. In short, I have shown how differently situated authors recount the story of the behavioral revolution in different ways, relying on different referents, speaking to different audiences, and employing different themes. A political theory of mythology allows one to see how a great diversity of contributions to the authoritative discourse of the discipline, despite their fragmentary nature, congeal and produce significance for the community; a significance which is essential for the maintenance of disciplinary of identities and dominant practices.

The variation and repetition of common elements of the behavioral revolution narrative is essential to the creation and maintenance of mythology. It is through the repetition and variation of narrative elements that the narrative dimension works (along with the dimensions of identity and practice) to provide significance to the experiences and deeds of members of the discipline today. Repetition and variation of narrative elements increases the power of mythology and its ongoing ability to influence identities and practices. It is by virtue of this variation and repetition of narrative elements across reference materials that a discursive system is formed. This mythological system is centered on the remembrance of the behavioral revolution. Consequently, members of the
political science community interact with the discourse of the discipline, construct identities, and learn about dominant practices.

The point about the power of repeated narratives in a community is admirably illustrated by the well-known narrative of the so-called “death” of political theory in the 1950s. In her summary of the way others have told the narrative Hauptmann says “the story [of political theory’s decline], now widely accepted … continues to gain power through frequent retellings” (2006, 643). This narrative discourse began in the 1950s and through many repetitions has become an integral part of the story of political science after the behavioral revolution. This is especially true for the subfield of political theory whose foundation narratives often start from a discussion of the purported demise of the field only to point out that political theory was in fact alive and well; although differently situated within the discipline than in the past (Gunnell 1993; Gunnell 2011; Berkenpas 2009). Hence, the identity of political theory is often tied to the narrative of its so-called decline in the wake of the behavioral revolution, followed by its subsequent revival in the 1970s. This so-called “revival” of political theory in the U.S. was accompanied by a proliferation of practices borrowed from adjacent fields such as philosophy, history, and literary criticism (Brown 2002, Hauptmann 2005).

In addition to the subfields and referents, theme is an important part of the narrative context. Part of the variation in the way narratives of the behavioral revolution are told is a result of how authors develop a theme in their reference work entries. The themes that emerged in the process of analyzing the foundation narratives in the reference material are: Whig, Historicist, and Lament. The historicist theme has a slightly higher representation being developed in 49% of entries, followed by Whig themes in 42% of entries, and lament
themes in 9%. Importantly, I identified two distinct trends within the historicist theme: a standard historicist account and a revisionist theme. The more common standard account is driven by the desire to accurately recount the history of the discipline and to do so in ways that conform to conventional historiography. It is worth mentioning that these accounts have increasingly grown more sophisticated as the “new historicism” and criticism of Whig accounts have grown more common (Gunnell 1986).

The revisionist account questions the standard historicist theme by shifting the time period often associated with the rise of behavioralism back into the 1930s and 1940s. This often has the effect of diminishing the “revolutionary” nature of behavioralism and making its rise appear more gradual and coextensive with the development of political science in the U.S. In addition, the revisionist account often brings in the influence of émigré scholars. With respect to the subfield of political theory, these émigré scholars played a major role in, as Gunnell (1993) puts it, the “descent of political theory.” Gunnell’s revisionist theme allows one to appreciate the way that the subfield of political theory has developed has been central to disciplinary identity. For example, the émigré influx into political theory and their challenge to behavioralism and liberal democracy in the 1950s and 1960s created a lot of tension in the discipline, but it also made it possible for the behavioral mainstream to finally assert its dominance over a “traditional” mainstream that had been developing since the early 20th century. The net effect of the revisionist theme is to lessen the “revolutionary” nature of behavioralism and to point to a story-line of continuity. The subfield of political theory is often the source of lament themes in the reference material. These authors often reflect on the way the subfield has been transformed and marginalized by the behavioral revolution. Authors writing about
subfields more closely aligned with behavioralism develop Whig or standard historicist themes. Thus, subfields like American politics, and to a lesser extent international relations and comparative politics, alternate between Whig and historicist themes.

Representation and the Concept of Metonymy

The behavioral revolution mythology works through the close nexus between the dimensions of narrative, identity, and practice. Importantly, in this dissertation I was able to demonstrate how the mythological nexus is represented in the contemporary reference material. I found that referents to the behavioral revolution like scientific method and quantitative methods, stand as proxies for types of practices, while others, like empirical political theory and traditional political theory, stand as proxies for types of professional and disciplinary identities. I found a close association between identities and practices represented by these conceptual referents throughout the reference material. Interestingly, and a point that shows the power of mythology, is that across the subfields, and across the reference material, there is almost universal use of the conceptual referents of “traditional theory,” “empirical theory,” “scientific method,” “quantitative methods,” and “social science.” This is true regardless of theme developed.

I drew important insights from literary criticism and the field of narratology which led me to see this process of representation in terms of metonymy. As the historian and literary theorist Hayden White puts it, “metonymy literally means only ‘name change’ but specifically indicates the substitution of the name of an entity by the name of another entity contiguous with it in time and space” (1999, 114). Throughout Chapters Three, Four, and Five, I discussed how reference work authors represent the dimensions of identity and
practice in the way they draw on the narrative context of the behavioral revolution. When an author invokes scientific method in the context of the behavioral revolution they are in fact invoking the practical dimension of the mythological nexus. “The most common forms of metonymy,” White continues, “are those which substitute the name of a cause for the name of an effect (as when substituting lightning for flash of light, suggesting that the lightning caused the flash) or the reverse; or the substitution of a proper name (Jove) for a quality (power) which the nominal referent possesses, or the reverse” (114, emphasis in original). It is the latter form of metonymy that is most common in the reference material. For example, in the case of the conceptual referents, often there is a straightforward substitution of a referent like scientific method for a quality – here a set of practices – associated with it. In the case of the biographical and institutional referents the process of metonymy is more complicated as these referents often represent both dimensions of narrative and identity. Hence, the common invocation of David Easton serves to represent both the qualities associated with behavioral and scientific identities as well as practices associated with (positivistic) scientific method.245

---

245 White continues: “Thus, for example, the use of the name Shakespeare for his works (as in ‘I love to read Shakespeare’) presupposes a relationship between the author (cause) and his works (effect) on the basis of which the substitution of the one for the other can be made (Cf. bottle for wine, i.e. container for thing contained; arms for battle, i.e., instruments for an activity; or crown for monarchy, i.e., part for the whole)” (114-115).
The Dynamic of Identity Production

Slay the dragon of disciplinary redefinition as we may, it insists upon rearing its head in new forms and to higher levels of conceptual sophistication (David Easton 1962, 24-25).

Political science is unusual—unique?—among academic disciplines in suffering the affliction of a chronic identity crisis. What other field has had such difficulty defining its character, purposes, even language, as has political science? (William G. Andrews 1982, 1)

Political science as an academic community is sustained by political scientists’ practical activity as well as their imaginative sense of membership in the community (Anderson 2006). Throughout this dissertation, such a “dynamic of identity production” has been evident. Easton’s work, for example, helped establish a new identity in political science oriented to a type of political theory which he understood to be a general empirical theory of national and international political systems (Easton 1990, 1991). This new form of political theory proved all the more important due to the “crisis of identity” diagnosed by political scientists since the early 1950s. Part of Easton’s project, and a move employed by many behavioralists throughout the 1950s, 1960s and beyond, was to work within an identity framework which defines a preferred form of “theory” in opposition to another.

The founders of modern political science began a quest to define the meaning of “behavioralism” in opposition to “traditional” political science early in the 1950s (Easton 1951, 1953; Truman 1951, 1955; Eulau, Eldersveld, and Janowitz 1956; Dahl 1955, 1956, 1958). The 1950s and early 1960s is a period of unfettered optimism about the possibilities of remaking the identity and practices of the discipline of political science. From the beginning of the postwar era, political scientists like Easton have wondered about the
identity of the discipline, and they have sought to define it in terms of their preferred form of political theory.

Central to disciplinary identities are meanings of “theory” in political science. David Easton’s 1951 “The Decline of Modern Political Theory” is an exemplary text, and by some accounts ushered in the behavioral period (Gunnell 2014). Easton’s work would culminate in a trilogy on the U.S. political system, beginning in 1953 with his classic The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science, and continuing in the mid-1960s with A Systems Analysis of Political Life (1965a) and A Framework for Political Analysis (1965b). Easton’s efforts to establish an empirical general systems theory in political science did not catch on in the mainstream of the discipline, but his effort to redefine political theory has been emulated by many authors throughout the behavioral period and continuing today.246

Building off and going beyond the work of the political theorists and classicist scholars, I developed a theory of political mythology, which also entailed important contributions to knowledge about narrative theory and the complex interplay between identity and practice in human communities like academic political science. In analytic terms, this theoretical framework is designated the “mythological nexus” and consists of three components: the narrative dimension, dimension of identity, and the practical dimension. In Chapters Three, Four, and Five, the dynamic of identity production is viewed through the lens of a mythological nexus. There are many examples of the mythological nexus at work, particularly in the way identity and practice are closely

246 One of the lasting legacies of the behavioral revolution is a more or less constant stream of works devoted in whole or in part to saying what “theory” is in political science (e.g. see White and Moon 2004). As I have been arguing in this section this is because notions of what constitutes “theory” in political science are so closely associated with identity/practice and the mythology of the behavioral revolution.
interrelated in the reference material. The dimensions of identity and practice in the mythological nexus provide significance of contemporary political scientists’ experience with the discipline.

In many ways the primary disciplinary identity at work in the entries is one of “behavioralism” or in more recent manifestations “post-behavioralism.” This identity is quite often represented in the narrative context of the behavioral revolution by the empirical theory referent, while other times the identity referred to is more tacit and broadly defined. Authors often invoke the idea of changes in “orientation” which map onto the dimension of identity. Other times the dimension of practice is highlighted as with the political theorists David Miller’s definition of the “behavioral revolution” as the “application of quantitative methods to political phenomenon” (*BDST* 1993, 488). A common way that the identity and practice dimensions of the mythological nexus are evident in the reference material is in the association between the “empirical theory” referent (ontological identity) and the “scientific method” referent (epistemological practice). These theoretical identities and associated practices are commonly invoked and juxtaposed in the reference material and are clearly central to the significance of the behavioral revolution today.

There can be several manifestations of this general finding about the close linkage between identity and practice in the mythological nexus found in reference materials:

1) Traditional theory’s identity is defined in association with traditional practices.

2) Traditional theory’s identity is defined in opposition to empirical theory identity or practices.

3) Empirical theory’s identity is defined in association with empirical practices.
4) Empirical theory’s identity is defined in opposition to traditional theory identity or practices.

In almost every case of a reference work author discussing the significance of the behavioral revolution in their narratives, at least one of these ways of linking identity/practice is evident.

At times though, identities are so closely tied to associated practices that it is sometimes difficult to analytically distinguish the dimensions of identity and practice. In part this is due to the fact that theoretical identities often imply practices and vice versa. If a positivistic empirical theory identity is invoked, then one can be sure that associated practices are at least implicitly implied and more often than not explicitly mentioned. The same is true of those theoretical identities associated with traditional political theory and its associated practices. Due to their close association in the mythological nexus the dimensions of identity and practice can be hard to analytically distinguish. In particular, I learned to appreciate how closely linked identity and practice are within the nexus, which is why I occasionally rely on the construction “identity/practice.”

Political scientists repeatedly define one theoretical identity in contrast to another: e.g., defining different forms of political theory – whether “epic,” “empirical,” “rational choice,” “traditional” – in opposition to another or others (Hauptmann 2004; 2005). In reference works, authors often invoked the idea of changes in “orientation”; traditional political theory in particular is used as a foil for a range of orientations to theory in political science. These orientations map onto the dimension of identity. Hence, these identities are not “traditional” because their practices are scientific and objective, verifiable, and therefore authoritative. For their part, traditional political theorists often defined
themselves in contrast to “behavioral” and “scientific” identities. Of course, today there is no longer a widespread sense of what “traditional” political theory entailed, and most political scientists do not know what theory (or practice) was like before the behavioral revolution. The “traditional” is often used in a formulaic fashion by listing the research traditions of history study, institutional study, legal study, and philosophical study, said to have been abandoned in favor of new forms of doing political science after the behavioral revolution. It is also worth noting that political theory has increasingly defined itself in opposition to mainstream political science, although contemporary political theorists increasingly define themselves in opposition to identities found outside political science (Brown 2002, Hauptmann 2005).

Clearly the way “theory” is defined in political science is closely associated with the dynamic of identity production in the discipline. The recognition of this dynamic, albeit mostly unacknowledged as such, is one reason commentators on the history of political science or the state of the discipline often claim there is a “crisis of identity” in political science. This sentiment is evident in the epigraph by Andrews when he explicitly invokes “chronic identity crisis” in political science and can be found throughout the literature of disciplinary history. As I will discuss more fully below, however, the idea that disciplinary identities are in “crisis” is misleading. This is because the dynamic of identity production (defining one identity in opposition to another) is an inherent part of the discipline. This insight gains further explanatory power when it is placed in the context of a political theory of mythology. In addition to the dimension of identity, the mythological nexus is

---

247 This point of the ignorance about political science before the behavioral revolution is generally true, but does not hold for disciplinary history and the minority of political scientists who devote considerable research energy to the history of political science.
comprised of the dimensions of narrative and practice. The mythological nexus produces significance important for the production of disciplinary identities and for justifying professional practices. Thus, as repeatedly the case in narratives found in the reference material, there is a close relationship between identity production and professional practices. A political theory of mythology argues the reason for this conjunction between narratives, identities, and practices is that their nexus provides significance to community members’ experiences. Far from being in “crisis,” then, the identities and practices of political science after the behavioral revolution are supported by a disciplinary mythology.

The Power of Political Mythology and the Discourse of Disciplines

The political theory of mythology developed in this dissertation is “political” because it is centrally concerned with power in academic communities and with how mainstream identities and practices become dominant and maintain dominance over time. Why are identities associated with behavioralism (or post-behavioralism) and practices associated with (positivist or post-positivist) scientific method dominant in the discipline? One answer is that this dominance arises out of the discourse of the discipline and the presence of a powerful mythology centered on the concept of the behavioral revolution. Mythology is authoritative speech and has a great influence on membership in communities, identities and practices. Narratives and discourses more broadly are seen as a powerful component of the mythological nexus. In this sense, the “power” of mythology is not lodged in any individual but is a form of collective power arising from the combined μύθος or authoritative speech of members of the discipline. This understanding of the power of mythology is also captured in the concept of “prescriptive force” developed in
Chapter Three. Here, the prescriptive force of mythology is political since it involves “power” and its ability to shape identities and practices through authoritative speech (*mūthos*) found in narratives and discourses more broadly.

In their discussion of the meaning of “discourse,” the European political theorists David Howarth and Yannis Stavrakakis explicitly define it in “political” terms in much the same way I understood it in this dissertation, focusing on power, identity, and practice. In particular, the authors emphasize that practices inform identities, which of course is true, although the political theory of mythology developed here views the relation between these dimension as reciprocal. Narratives (and discourses), identities, and practices congeal to produce significance in a mythological nexus:

We take *discourse* or *discourses* to refer to systems of meaningful practices that form the identities of subjects and objects. At this lower level of abstraction, discourses are concrete systems of social relations and practices that are intrinsically *political*, as their formation is an act of radical institution, which involves the construction of antagonisms and the drawing of political frontiers between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders.’ In addition, therefore, they always involve the exercise of *power*, as their constitution involves the exclusion of certain possibilities and a consequent structuring of the relations between different social agents (2000, 3-4; emphasis in original).

Here the authors have tacitly recognized the power of the mythological nexus in that they have correctly posited the close interrelationship between the dimensions of narrative or “discourse,” identity, and practice. They recognize the dynamic of identity production and correctly emphasize the power of these identities to both encourage and limit practices in a community. Of course, I would argue that what these authors have identified is the power of mythology, which brings together all these elements into a nexus, and that through
authoritative speech in narratives provide significance to identities and practices in a community such as academic political science.

The discipline of political science and its identity as a profession are similarly constructed by the practices that define it (Yanow 2005). In part, this interplay between identity and practice is what the behavioral political scientist Nelson Polsby had in mind when he noted that “all academic disciplines arise from the creative endeavors of individuals who are bound together by the sharing of certain life experiences. These occur as the result of graduate training, cohabitation in university departments, exposure to a common range of ideas, and adherence to special norms of discourse” (2003, Preface to *Annual Review of Political Science*). Here too, Polsby points to the “political” in a political theory of mythology, which involves the capacity of narrative or discourse more broadly to influence the practices adopted by individuals and discipline the identities of those wishing to be members of the community. This is the essence of the “mythological nexus” which views the dimensions of narrative, identity, and practice as part of a self-reinforcing process of political mythology.

The meaning of mythology I developed in this dissertation is captured by the political theorist Norman Jacobson in the epigraph with which I began this dissertation:

Every significant human enterprise gives rise to an extensive mythology centering on its goals, procedures, and achievements. Whether that enterprise be sports or war, business or science, there exists in the mind

---

248 Yanow’s definition of “discipline” in political science pays special attention to the dimension of practice: “By ‘discipline’ I mean to convey a collective of academics who share a set of professional practices (research, publishing, teaching, career trajectories and hurdles) and, if not a single unifying set of research questions, a sensibility about what in the wide world of human action merits attention and analysis … Such reflection brings to the fore what are otherwise, in other circumstances, the ‘common’-sense, taken-for-granted, tacitly known ‘rules’ for practicing this particular profession, at this time, in this place” (2005, 200).
of the spectator an image, often oversimplified, of what the enterprise is all about (Norman Jacobson 1958, 115).

Jacobson recognizes the power of mythology to influence all “human enterprise,” and it is precisely one such enterprise, the academic enterprise of political science, with which this dissertation is concerned.

Significantly, the enterprise of political science largely consists of the discourse of the discipline which is also the means to know that mythology is at work. Mythology is expressed in collective narratives or the discourse of a community. A discourse consists of a set of narratives broadly conceived, which either in writing or in oral communication, contribute to a community’s conversation about itself, its aims, accomplishments, and failures. At a very general level of analysis, we can speak of the discourse of civilizations, such as the “clash of civilizations,” so-called by the political scientist Samuel Huntington in his now classic book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, or at the level of nations, such as the American Dream (Bottici and Challand 2006, 2010). In contrast, I focused much more specifically on the discourse of one academic community, the discipline of political science. It is also true that within academic communities, individuals contribute to discourses through oral speech, whether in the classroom or other informal settings (meetings, emails, etc.). These are as yet unmined sites for mythological analysis. Although the oral communication of political scientists is part of the discourse of the discipline, I focused specifically on writing published by political scientists that is expressly meant to contribute to the discourse of the discipline. This is one reason I focused on contemporary reference works.

249 For an informed commentary on Jacobson’s essay, see Gunnell (1993, pp. 243-244). Here Gunnell begins saying “Jacobson’s essay was the first statement of some of the elements of what might be called the ‘Berkeley Thesis’ which would play a significant role in the discussion about political theory in the 1960s.”
Disciplinary History and a Political Theory of Mythology

What is or should be scientific about political science? What is or should be political about political science? The identity of political science depends upon the answers we give to these questions, and since our answers ineluctably will involve judgments about the history of our discipline, we can see in conclusion how our identity depends upon how we understand our history (Farr 1988, 1194).

I discussed in Chapter One how disciplinary historians come in many varieties and are motivated by different research agendas. Disciplinary historians agree that the behavioral revolution matters because it is a significant factor in defining the identity of the discipline as well as understanding its dominant practices. Within disciplinary history, the emphasis is on historical context as well as the internal contributions of authors to various discourses. Following Gunnell and others, these approaches are conventionally labeled “discursive history.” A discursive history in this sense looks to the discourses of communities in order to see what members have to say about the community and their place in it (Gunnell 1993; Schmidt 1998).

In contrast, I have placed debates about the identity of political science in a mythological framework which sees the identities and practices of the discipline springing from its discourse. Thus, while I have done a discursive analysis of reference work material, I have focused on the contemporary period (1980-2012) rather than on the more distant past in order to examine how the concept of the behavioral revolution functions in the discourse of the discipline today. In keeping with discursive history, I have demonstrated the repeated and close connection between identities and practices in narratives about the behavioral revolution. But I have added the explanatory leverage

---

250 For my discussion of “discursive history” see Chapter One, pp. 21-28.
gained from a political theory of mythology. Rather than take the behavioral revolution as a given, as historicist accounts tend to do, I pursued the question why the behavioral revolution is still central to the way identities and practices are presented in the reference material of the discipline.

The importance of remembrance to identity/practice in the present is recounted vividly by Ball, James Farr, and Russell Hanson in their 1989 Introduction to their edited volume, *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change*:

Remembering our past enables us to have a clearer – and perchance more critical – perspective on our present. Little wonder, then, that the modern state, East and West, attempts to control the past by rewriting history or, failing that, by obliterating memory altogether. Citizens adrift in the present and cut off from the past become more manipulable and pliable subjects. If we are not to remain lost in the present we have little choice save to retrace our steps. By uncovering and recovering lost meanings conceptual histories enable us to escape the politically stultifying confines of a parochial and increasingly dangerous present (4-5).

The remembrance of the history of political science today occurs largely through the discourse of the discipline. The narratives that political scientists tell about the history of political science after the behavioral revolution matter to the way that members understand their professional identities and justify dominant practices. The passage quoted above also points to an important difference between ancient political mythologies as I outlined them in Chapter Two and those which exist among political scientists today. In the ancient context, the idea is that a community can become trapped in narratives which solidify and become impervious to change. This is why the Spartan constitution was admired by philosophers like Plato, since it was resistant to change, and I would argue proudly guarding its foundation narratives which substantiated Spartan identities and justified its dominant practices. But today it is possible to “escape” these discourses with the rise of a
new dominant narrative about the foundation of modern political science. In short, political mythology in contemporary political science, while resistant to change, is not impervious to it. Once narratives about the foundation of political science shift away from the framework of “revolution” in the behavioral period, the likelihood that identities and practices of the discipline will begin to change will increase. In the form of a slogan, then, the lesson here is: ‘Change Narratives, Change Identities/Practices.’

What Other Research Might Be Done

There are a number of ways that a political theory of mythology and the research in this dissertation might be extended by myself or others in the future. To begin with, there is already research underway on “myth” and “political myth” in national settings. Ajume Wingo (2003) is one example of this; the European political theorist Christopher Flood is another. In his 2001 Political Myth, Flood discusses the ideology of liberalism and argues that “political myth is a form of ideological discourse” (13). Political myth is one form of ideological discourse, and Flood like Wingo is focused on very large-scale ideologies that cross national boundaries, like modern liberalism. These large-scale ideologies, I would argue, can also be understood in terms of a political theory of mythology and the mythological nexus that I have developed here. If modern liberalism is understood as a mythology then what are the identities and practices associated with it and where can an identifiable discourse be found that shows all three dimensions at work? Flood recognizes the dimension of identity when he says that “ideological competition and co-operation at national, sub-national, and international level are bounded by the opposition between we who are inside and they who are outside” (20-21). Future research
might look into the specifics of how the mythological nexus works both at a national level as well as an international level. Particularly interesting here are the role of ideologies such as liberalism and nationalism (e.g. Anderson 2006; A.D. Smith 1988, 1997, 1999; Lincoln 1999; Segal 2004; Stråth 2005; Bottici and Challand 2006, 2010).

Closer to the spirit of this dissertation, though, would be studies focused on other academic disciplines especially in the social sciences. Disciplines like sociology, anthropology, history, psychology, and economics have experienced similar transformations as political science on their road to becoming modern social sciences. In what ways does a political theory of mythology illuminate their disciplinary histories and shed light on their dominant identities and practices? Indeed, this line of research seems ripe for comparative analysis among these social sciences all of which share similar experiences and have similar identities and practices. To what degree, then, do they also share a common mythology?

More research can also be done on the workings of mythology in the discipline of political science. For example, one could look outside the reference work material to literature in the subfields of political science and do much the same type of analysis that I did in this dissertation. It would be interesting to see the extent to which both the narrative context and the mythological nexus I identified in this dissertation is at work in other disciplinary material. Specifically, I have in mind the analysis of textbooks, major journals and other publications. An analysis of the oral communication of political scientists would be more challenging, but perhaps could be gathered from published speeches and talks, through interviews conducted by the author, or through other means. To what extent does this oral communication match up with what has been found in this dissertation?
Coda

[It] is as if one were to reduce concord to unison or rhythm to a single beat (Aristotle *The Politics*, 2.5.14).

The good cannot be some common and single universal (Aristotle *Nichomachean Ethics*, 1096a 28-29).

[The question is] how to create a common rule in a context of differences (Wolin 1960, 61).

[It is] the problem of creating unity in a context of diversity, rival claims, unequal power, and conflicting interests (Pitkin 1993, 215).

The mythology of the behavioral revolution provides significance to identities and practices in contemporary political science through the authoritative speech found in sources like reference works. Authoritatively as discussed in Chapters Three, Four, and Five, is strengthened and reinforced by the mythology of the behavioral revolution. Authors speak with the authority conferred to them by the mythology of the behavioral revolution. They are able to draw on a common stock of narrative elements and construct narratives in ways that provide significance to identities and associated practices. The power of mythology is reinforced through variation and repetition of the narrative context. Authors focus on different identity/practice configurations in their narratives, but they do so in remarkably similar ways. They construct a narrative about the foundation of political science which is meant to explain the experience of practitioners today, and which when viewed holistically and in the aggregate, works as a form of authoritative speech providing significance to contemporary identities and practices.
Throughout the history of political science there have been persistent debates over the relative merits of a unified disciplinary identity versus fostering a pluralistic enterprise. This is the paradox of disciplinary identity in academic political science. As the epigraphs above point out, this question of the relationship between unity and plurality has been the object of contemplation since Aristotle questioned his teacher Plato over his insistence that unity be the goal of the good *polis*. In contrast, Aristotle and many political theorists since have recognized the need for diversity among the elements that compose a political community (Spicer 2010, 38-42). In the reference material there were those who lamented the loss of a perceived unity achieved under a behavioral disciplinary identity. For example, Almond laments the fragmentation of disciplinary identities after the so-called “post-behavioral revolution,” and complains that members of the discipline sit at separate tables which leads to balkanization and discord. One can discern this desire for unity in calls for “precision” in the language of political science discussed in Chapter Three. Others, perhaps the majority of political scientists (and political theorists), have embraced the rhetoric of pluralism as the guiding idea describing the identities/practices of the discipline today.

Throughout my analysis of the reference material, I showed one identity/practice being defined in opposition to another identity/practice. It remains true, with the political theorist Wendy Brown (2002), that the “outside constructs the inside and then hides this work of fabrication in an entity that appears to give birth to itself” (556). Here the focus is on the work of the “outside” or what I refer to as the “other” in the identity production dynamic. Brown asks us to pay attention to what is doing the work of “contour[ing] the edges” of what is situated on the “outside,” and to the epistemological other of the identity
in question (557). In the reference material I showed this process of identity construction at work within the context of the behavioral revolution mythology: whether it was identity opposed to identity, practice opposed to practice, or a combination of these dimensions placed in opposition.

Over forty years of practice, beginning with *Politics and Vision* and continuing through his last major effort, *Democracy Incorporated: Managed Democracy and the Specter of Inverted Totalitarianism* (2008), the political theorist Sheldon Wolin has lamented the state of political theory in the U.S., drawn attention to the consequences of a diminished political vision in society, and introduced a new form of social order he calls “inverted totalitarianism.” Speaking in another context, Wolin makes what I take to be a general statement about the dynamic of identity production highlighted in this dissertation. In his 2000 essay titled “Political Theory: From Vocation to Invocation,” Wolin laments the impoverished state of both the identity and the practice of the subfield of political theory as well as the lost ground of traditional liberal arts education in the U.S.

Wolin remarks in concluding that “the opposite is condemned to be oppositional” (2000, 21). The “opposite,” the “outside,” or the “other” in the identity/practice dyad is “condemned” in a dual sense. First, it is condemned to play a secondary and subordinate position to the preferred identity/practice. Second, and more important to understanding the dynamic of identity production in an academic community like political science, the subordinate identity/practice is made to be both the figurative and literal enemy of the

251 For the *NY Times* obituary for Wolin, see Grimes (2015). In a corruption of the term the “behavioral revolution,” Grimes mentions the “behavioralist revolution” in his obituary: “‘Politics and Vision,’ subtitiled ‘Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought,’ appeared at a time when American political science was under the sway of the behavioralist revolution, which emphasized the quantitative analysis of data rather than political ideas as a way to explain political behavior.”
dominant identity/practice configuration. This idea goes some distance in explaining the persistent bouts of identity crisis in political science. Since the early 1950s, behavioral identities and practices have been defined in opposition to traditional ones (and political theorists define their identities and practices in opposition to behavioralism). This way of narrating the foundational story of the political science community creates an “other” which is by definition subordinate to the dominant identity/practice it is defined against. Political theory has also consistently defined itself in opposition to the mainstream of political science, even if it has increasingly found “others” outside the discipline of political science (Hauptmann 2005).

Though many commentators get hung up on the apparent “crisis in identity,” this should not be viewed as a pathology to be cured, but a constitutive feature of the ongoing evolution of the discipline. It is important to recognize the dynamic of identity production and “othering” that drives the persistence of the behavioral revolution mythology in contemporary political science. A common answer to the paradox of disciplinary identity might be to accept the promise of pluralism in the discipline moving forward in time. Perhaps if political scientists ceased writing about one group’s identity/practice configuration in opposition to another groups’ configuration of identity/practice, they could recognize, finally, identity/practice in the plural, not disciplinary identity and professional practice, but disciplinary identities and professional practices. But this is unrealistic, since political scientists will continue to write and their writing will draw on and reinforce the dynamic of identity production and the dimension of identity of the mythological nexus.
If the mainstream in contemporary political science is dedicated to becoming a pluralistic enterprise, then it must heed Wolin’s warning, and recognize disciplinary “others” in a more productive way. It can do this by recognizing the power of disciplinary mythology and by remembering the paradox involved in seeking unified identity for the discipline. Remembering that to remain vital as an enterprise, the discipline requires contrasting identities. This knowledge can help political scientists to better know one’s self and one’s role within the community of political scientists. This finding of inherent plurality fostered in a mythological nexus also means that the behavioral quest for an ontologically and epistemologically unified political science cannot be (nor should it be) fulfilled, just as political theory’s quest for a pristine “political” is in vain. This means, finally, that the way the foundation narrative of the behavioral revolution is written about in the discourse of the discipline must ultimately change.

The political theory of mythology developed in this dissertation helps explain why the behavioral revolution still matters today and why this narrative is so important to the construction of disciplinary identities. But this discursive identity production has important consequences for the way that political scientists develop their professional and disciplinary identities. The narrative trope of “crisis of identities” is misleading since it is not possible to escape the dynamic of identity production nor the greater mythological nexus constituting the disciplinary mythology of political science. The discipline can, however, by embracing the lessons of the political theory of mythology I have developed, move beyond internecine revolts and warning about “crises of identity.” Once it is understood that mythology is a natural outgrowth of a community’s discourses and its efforts to understand its past and how this process provides significance to
identities/practices, it becomes evident that the elements that comprise its nexus can be altered and lead to changes on other dimensions. If the narratives change, the identities/practices will also undergo transformation.

Of course, not all political scientists are so optimistic that the route of disciplinary pluralism is the best way forward. For every political scientist who has celebrated the growing pluralism and diversity in the discipline there have been those who have lamented the fragmentation and lack of central focus. This is another dynamic in the discourse of the discipline that a political theory of mythology can help political scientists better understand. The disciplinary historian John Gunnell has recently registered his opinion on this long standing debate in the discourse of political science, saying that he is not “sanguine” about pluralism in the discipline, nor about the prospects that political science might continue happily as “one big academic Brady bunch” (2015, 273). Joking aside, Gunnell makes an important point which neither celebrates nor laments pluralism/fragmentation in the discipline. Instead, Gunnell invites us to “sing a different song and set aside parochial internecine debates and think more broadly about the basic nature of social inquiry and its cognitive and practical commitments” (274). Mythology as I discussed in Chapter Two is authoritative speech. In ancient times the narrative dimension was literally “sung” through the medium of oral and epic poetry. Today, the primary medium of “song” is narrative and discourse more broadly. A political theory of mythology, finally, is meant to contribute to the emergence of a new song and perhaps a new pluralism in political science.
Appendix A

Reference Works Listed by Subfield
Political Science in General

Nelson W. Polsby “Political Science: Overview” (IESBS, 2001, pp. 11698-11701)
Clyde Barrow “Political Science” (IESS, 2008, pp. 310-314).
Robert Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann “Political Science: The Discipline” (NHPS, 1996, pp. 3-45).
Robert Goodin “The State of the Discipline, the Discipline of the State” (OHPS 2009, pp. 3-61).
Andrew Haywood “Behavioralism” KCP, 2000, p. 85.
Craig Calhoun “Political Science” (DSS, 2002, p. 368).
Ira Katznelson and Henry V. Milner (SDIII, 2003, p. 7) “American Political Science: The Discipline’s State and the State of the Discipline.”
Wilfred M. McClay “Political Science” OEAPPLH 2012, p. 110-111

American Politics

Gavin Drewry “Political Institutions: Legal Perspectives” (NHPS, 1996, pp. 191-205)
James March and Johan Olsen “New Institutionalism” (OHPI, 2006, pp. 3-20).
Jean Blondel “About Institutions, Mainly, but Exclusively, Political” (OHPI, 2006, pp. 717-730).
Keith Whittington, R. Daniel Kelemen, and Gregory A. Caldeira “Introduction: The
Study of Law and Politics” (OHLP, 2008, pp. 3-18).
Michael Martinez “Why American Turnout is so Low, and Why Should We Care?” (OHAEPB, 2010, pp. 107-125).
Shanto Iyengar “Laboratory Experiments in Political Science” (CHEPS, 2011, pp. 73-88).

Comparative Politics


Political Theory

Jeffrey Isaac “Conceptions of Power” (EGP, 2004, pp. 54-64).
Takashi Inoguchi “Political Theory” (IEPS, 2011, pp. XX).
Arlene Saxonhouse “Exile and Re-Entry: Political Theory Yesterday and Tomorrow” (OHPT, 2008, pp. 844-858).
John Gunnell “History of Political Philosophy as a Discipline” (OHHPP, 2011, pp. 60-74).

**International Relations**

Michael Banks “The Inter-Paradigm Debate” (*IRHCT*, 1985, pp. 7-27).
Gunther Hellmann “International Relations as a Field of Study” (*IEPS*, 2011, pp. 1298-1316).
Appendix B

A Typology of Referents to the Behavioral Revolution
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Referents</th>
<th>Encyclopedias</th>
<th>Handbooks</th>
<th>Dictionaries</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conceptual</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Science</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific Method</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quantitative Methods</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Theory</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empirical Theory</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Biographical</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merriam</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lasswell</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easton</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahl</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Chicago</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Chicago</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSRC</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>University of Michigan</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Michigan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR/SRC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICPSR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANES</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foundations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ford</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockefeller</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAND</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWII</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950s and 1960s</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C

The Conceptual Referents to the Behavioral Revolution
(1) Traditional Theory
   (a) Traditional Theory
   (b) Classical Theory
   (c) Political Philosophy and Moral Theory
   (d) Normative Theory
   (e) Formal Theory
   (f) Legal Theory
   (g) Historical Scholarship
   (h) Institutional Studies (“Old” Institutionalism)

(2) Social Science
   (a) Social Science
   (b) Unity of Social Science (see Easton 1966, pp. 12-13)

(3) The Scientific Method:
   a. The Scientific Method (as the basis for a scientific logic of inquiry)
      i. The Unity of Science Thesis
      ii. Methodological Individualism
      iii. Operationalization and Instrumentalism
      iv. Natural Science
   b. Fact-Value Dichotomy
      i. Objectivity
      ii. Value-Neutrality (Wertfreiheit253)
      iii. Dispassion
      iv. Anti-Political
   c. Empirical-Normative
      i. Nomothetic/Ideographic

(4) Empirical Theory
   (a) Empirical Theory
   (b) General Theory
   (c) Positive Theory
   (d) Systems Theory
   (e) Structural-Functionalism

(5) Quantitative Methods:
   (a) Quantitative Methods
   (b) Statistics and Econometrics
   (c) Data Collection and Measurement
   (d) Survey Methods

252 Unlike the biographical and temporal referents, the conceptual referents are “composite” or “summary” in the sense that the five conceptual referents may be identified by proxy or by mention of any of the terms and phrases listed below each category. I used the same procedure with the institutional referents: the University of Chicago, the University of Michigan, and the Foundations.
253 See Gunnell in the EPT (2010) on “Value-Free Social Science.”
Appendix D

The Themes to the Behavioral Revolution
(1) Whig Theme – is Celebratory and tends to be Prescriptive: 254
   a. Whig History (Teleological Story of Progress)
   b. Triumph of Old vs. New (Rupture with the Past)
   c. Consolidation of Behavioralism
   d. Break; Revolution; Permanent Change
   e. Conflict between Old and New
   f. Americanization (Celebration of)

(2) Historian Theme – is not Celebratory and tends to be Descriptive and/or Revisionist:
   a. Presentist – i.e. “Neutral” description of what is; based on the dominant narrative of the success of behavioralism.
   b. Americanization (Neutral Description of)
   c. Qualify the Dominant Narrative (Revisionist History)
   d. Continuity in the Mainstream
   e. Successful Counter-Revolution
   f. Preservation/Restoration of Status Quo
   g. No Resistance (e.g. Dryzek 2006)
   h. Émigré Challenge

(3) Lament and Loss Theme – is not Celebratory and tends to be Prescriptive:
   a. Advocates for what has been Lost
   b. Loss of Unity (Hegemony of Behavioralism)
   c. Political Theory’s Lost Status
   d. Roads Not Taken
   e. Retreat and/or Escape
   f. Tragedy
   g. Disillusionment
   h. Revival

254 Characteristics of each theme are listed below each category.
Appendix E

The Biographical Referents
Charles Merriam (1874-1953)

Merriam helped establish the American Political Science Association (APSA) in 1903, worked to establish the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) in the 1920s, taught at the University of Chicago beginning in 1901, was president of the APSA (1924-1925), served in various capacities for the federal government, worked from the 1920’s forward to improve the methodological rigor of the discipline, and in this last respect, is “generally recognized as the father of the behavioral movement in political science” (Utter and Lockhart, 2002. *American Political Scientists: A Dictionary*, pp. 272-273); see also Barry Karl (1974) *Charles E. Merriam and the Study of Politics*.

Harold Lasswell (1902-1978)

Lasswell is well-known for his research in political communication and propaganda, his definition of politics as “who gets what, when, and how” (1936); Ph.D. Chicago (1927); University of Chicago 1926-1938; he taught at Yale University (1946-1978); and was president of APSA (1956-1957). See Almond (1987) “Harold Dwight Lasswell (1902-1978): A Biographical Memoir” *National Academy of Sciences*, pp. 247-274.

David Easton (1917 –2014)

Easton is Distinguished Research Professor Political Science at the University of California, Irvine. Easton received his Ph.D. from Harvard University in 1947, taught at the University of Chicago from 1947 until 1984, and was president of APSA (1968-1969). Easton is known for his advocacy of a behavioral approach to political science and specifically for his call to build general “empirical theory” and a “systems approach” in which he attempted to specify the requisites of a stable political system in structural-functional terms of “the authoritative allocation of values for a society.” In his APSA presidential address Easton famously declared the end of the behavioral era and the beginning of a “post-behavioral revolution” in which the mainstream would increasingly focus more on policy and politics and less on method and methodology (Utter and Lockhart, 2002, pp. 95-96).²⁵⁵

Robert Dahl (1915-2014)

Dahl is known for his “important role during the 1960s in leading the behavioral revolution” (Utter and Lockhart 2002, 75). He received his Ph.D. from Yale University in 1940 where he would teach for the rest of his career. Dahl was also president of the APSA (1966-1977). Dahl’s most well-known work is in democratic theory and his advocacy of the theory of pluralism. See also Power, Inequality, and Democratic Politics: Essays in Honor of Robert A. Dahl (1988).256

REFERENCE WORKS CITED

Dictionaries


Encyclopedias


Handbooks


Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science (CHEPS 2011). James N. Druckman and Donald P. Green, Eds. Cambridge UP.


Bettini, Maurizo. 2006. “Mythos/Fabula: Authoritative Speech and Discredited Speech.” 


357


358


No. 1, pp. 89-102.


—. 1981. The Creation of Mythology. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago UP.


Hall, Edith. 2004. *Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self-Definition through Tragedy*. NY: Oxford UP.

—. 2014. *Introducing the Ancient Greeks: From Bronze Age Seafarers to*
Navigators of the Western Mind. NY: W.W. Norton and Co.


Heyck, Hunter. 2014. “The Organizational Revolution and the Human Sciences.” ISIS,


Katznelson, Ira. 2003. *Desolation and Enlightenment: Political Knowledge After Total


Kim, Lawrence. Homer Between History and Fiction in Imperial Greek Literature. NY: Cambridge UP.


Long, David and Brian C. Schmidt. 2005. Imperialism and Internationalism in the
Discipline of International Relations.


——. 2013. Ancient Greek Hero in 24 Hours. MA: Harvard UP.


Nilson, Martin P. 1968. Homer and Mycenae.


Whittaker, Helène. 2014. Religion and Society in Middle Bronze Age Greece. Cambridge UP.


