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The Cultural Roots of Behaviorism

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THE CULTURAL ROOTS OF BEHAVIORISM

Juan Mario Herakovic, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1983

This thesis traces some of the economic, social, religious and political events that played an important role in the development of behaviorism in the United States. The effects of the Enlightenment, the dislocation of moral and social values, the decline of religion, political upheavals and increased immigration, are seen as destabilizing elements in American society. Emphasis is placed upon the specific values of the American society, and the way in which these values remained constant throughout the social history of the United States. As such, behaviorism represents a scientific approach to the historical continuity of ideas within the nation.
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Juan Mario Herakovic
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Twentieth century America witnessed the emergence of a new psychology. Although many of the principles of its philosophy, such as the use of rewards and punishers to produce desired behaviors, were as old as humankind, it was not until the publication of "Psychology as the Behaviourist Views It" in 1913 that J. B. Watson launched these laws and principles as a comprehensive system for the management of behavior. Even though this psychological theory was born out of scientific principles, the scientific community was less than eager to adopt it, if not outright hypercritical. The dislike that behaviorism caused in segments of the psychological establishment was perhaps best and most radically expressed by J. Jastrow (1929) when he commented:

For anyone, whatever his attainments or achievements, to make the presumptuous gesture of claiming for his variety of 'behaviorism' or any other 'ism' the sole warrant of science, to discard all the labors of his fellow psychologists as misguided rubbish, to inform the many workers in the field of heredity that they are in the false scent and to repeat the information to the psychiatrists, to predict that in a few years under the adoption of Watsonian behaviorism all the important problems will be solved, to set forth a new dispensation, contrasting the darkness and futility of all psychology before 1912 (this is a Messianic year that Watson has adopted for his era) and subsequent light (without sweetness) to mislead and misguide the public by misinterpreting the positions of fellow psychologists as continuing the soul psychology of an obsolete tradition, all this disqualifies any member of the scientific guild from the consideration to which his previous scientific contributions - as in the present instance - may have amply entitled him. (p. 456)
A psychology that was capable of stirring such deep passions can only be interpreted as behaviorism meaning different things to different people. For Watson and his followers, behaviorism was the triumph of truth and science; the occasion to cut ties once and for all with the past, a past that was represented by supernaturalism, searches for the soul, introspection and charlatans.

Conversely, Watson's detractors charged him with all kinds of criticisms and fallacies ranging from his methodology to his metaphysical position and subsequent rejection of introspective techniques (Heidbreder, 1933; Jastrow, 1929; Mackenzie, 1977). The attack on Watson and his theory was not only made by discontented or outraged psychologists, he was also under cross examination by "those who were endeavoring to save religion, ethics, and freedom of the will from the onslaughts of the marauders" (Roback, 1937, p. 11).

Most of the attacks on Watson and the behaviorist idea fail to understand the great complexity of ideas upon which this combination of biology, psychology, and social theory is based. These attacks, to a certain extent, are not the expression of discrepancies over fact and form in the academic and scientific community. Partially, they can be construed as the fears of either side, behaviorists and antibehaviorists, to be under the influence of each other. This fear, as we shall see, has its equivalent in the tension between intellectuals and antiintellectuals over the centuries in the American culture.

To understand the rise of behaviorism, it is necessary to understand the needs and wishes of a society at a given moment in a given place. These needs and wishes are not always easy to discover, since
most of the time they are implied rather than explicitly stated, and may not express the wishes of the majority of the people, but rather those of the forces that control society. In any case, this elite has or attempts to have the control direct or indirect, persuasive or coercive, over the welfare, security and stability of the majority. It is the elitist position of promoting egalitarianism among human beings and the institutions that are part of society, while at the same time denying to the members of society the right to self direction. In that sense, it is implied that human beings have more capacity to do harm than good and that, left to themselves, most humans cannot direct themselves and, in fact, need direction provided by other humans.

This need for direction in the pursuit of the betterment of societies was not a new theme in America. The improvement of human life, the ways to achieve it, and the ultimate goal for which it was to be achieved rested upon an idea. That idea was the Kingdom of God in America. As Niebuhr (1937) explains it, "The Kingdom of God in America, so regarded, is the American Kingdom of God; it is not the individualization of a universal idea, but the universalization of the particular. It represents not so much the impact of the gospel upon the New World as the use and adaptation of the gospel by the new society for its own purposes." (p. 9) The creation of the Kingdom of God in America was brought by the early settlers who colonized these lands. Over the centuries, this idea of a perfect religious society acquired a more secular tint, and visions of a great society were pursued by the late President Lyndon B. Johnson.
Taken in the context of the ideals that inspired the forefathers of America, behaviorism was the scientific approach to the creation of a perfect society. In many ways, Watson's ideas, which were continued further and expanded by B. F. Skinner, represent an historical continuity of striving after an ideal.

In the pursuit of these types of dreams, Watson and Skinner were not alone. As Morawski (1982) points out, between 1915 and 1930, there were four utopias published by psychologists of excellent reputation, such as G. Stanley Hall, William McDougall, Hugo Münsterberg and John B. Watson. Morawski maintains that "these utopias clearly reflect Baconian thinking, not in a simple resemblance to New Atlantis, but in their dedication to explaining how psychology as a science is instrumental to human welfare." (p. 1083) Furthermore, she upholds that "in their epistemological thinking, the four psychologists essentially attempted a unification of psychology as a knowledge system and as a social instrument." (p. 1083)

Of these utopias, it was Watson's behaviorism that was built more as a comprehensive system, enduring in that way the passage of time. But this utopian thinking was not the product of academia or abstract philosophical thinking that was dissociated from everyday thought and reality. In this sense, Morawski affirms that "when viewed in the broader context of the period of 1915 to 1930, these writings cannot be interpreted simply as anomalies, as peculiar pastime of professionals, but must be seen as plausible answers to perceived crises both in academic psychology and in American society." (p. 1083)

Social scientists, in general, and psychologists, in particular,
cannot dissociate themselves or their work from the needs and values of that society in which they live. This responsiveness is by no means new. As David Leary (1980) suggests, the social and moral concerns that troubled and inspired modern psychological research are the same concerns that motivated philosophers such as Locke and Descartes, that is, "to improve the quality of human life." (p. 305)

When psychologists attempt new cures, therapies, systems, or entirely new approaches, they respond to their upbringing, education, socioeconomic pressures, and what they perceive as the needs of that society. In accordance with this, John Broadus Watson was no different. He and B. F. Skinner were products of the American culture and, as such, they responded to what they perceived were some of its needs and values.

In the context of the present thesis, I will use the word "culture" to mean the traditions, values, beliefs, and behaviors, that is, the idiosyncrasies of the American people. It should also be added that reference is made to behaviorism as an overall idea and system of life for a society, and that this should be distinguished from behavior modification and/or behavior therapy. The latter are tools by means of which behaviorism attempts to achieve an end, rather than an end in themselves.

In this thesis, I shall attempt to bring forward some of the elements that may have played an important role in the shaping of this psychological theory. These social elements, religious, political, economic, and cultural factors were mostly neglected by social scientists when describing the rise of behaviorism. It is beyond
any doubt that Watson's work while at the University of Chicago was heavily influenced by environmentalism, peripheralism, functionalism, and associationism so prevalent at that university at that time. It may also be argued that Russian physiologists such as Pavlov, Sechenov, and Bekhterev had already influenced scientific communities around the world with their conditioning of organisms. While all these explanations may shed light on how behaviorism acquired its principles and techniques, that still leaves the ultimate purpose of the theory largely unanswered. To analyze this purposefulness, one must begin to look at the social conditions that contributed to the rise of behaviorism in the United States.
CHAPTER II

THE ENLIGHTENMENT

In analyzing the historic roots of behaviorism, the role of ideas of the eighteenth century western world played a crucial function in the shaping of the attitudes and beliefs in general of the two subsequent centuries. This great milestone was the Enlightenment.

Few social or scientific movements had an impact on the history of humankind as the Enlightenment did. Perhaps the only other period in which man had such confidence in the powers of reasoning was the Greek era encompassing the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. (Burrel, 1972). But the Enlightenment that started in the eighteenth century in Europe was more complex and far reaching than any social, cultural, or scientific movement attempted ever before by humans. This period, whose effects are presistently being felt today, was pervasively characterized by iconoclastic values. The implication of this process of tearing down old theories and beliefs and replacing them with new, empirically validated ones, goes beyond the mere discovery of principles and laws in physics, chemistry, astronomy and the rest of the sciences. The magnitude of its importance resided in the underlying idea of the process of secularization. In the view of Cox (1966), "Secularization is the liberation of man from religious and metaphysical tutelage, the turning of his attention away from other worlds and toward this one." (p. 15) Man was free at last to pursue a rational and scientifically based approach to discover the real
mechanisms and ultimate truth of this universe. As Frank Manuel (1951) states, "The medieval conception of human impotence gave way to a marvelous surge of self-confidence, a buoyancy, an optimism which, though at times was diluted by grave misgivings and doubts, remained overwhelmingly the spirit of the age." (p. 35)

The philosophes, the writers who took it upon themselves to elaborate on the newly acquired ideas, believed that the same laws that governed our physical world could be applied to human beings and that they could be studied simply by employing direct observation (Hampson, 1968). The philosophes surmised that the new discoveries could help the betterment of mankind, and that the same methodology that was employed in the scientific process could be used in solving the problems of societies (Clive, 1960).

The writers of the Enlightenment shared a common denominator in their beliefs; that is, an increased optimism and a boundless faith in the capabilities of humankind. They felt that the moment had arrived for man to be projected forward and occupy the place he deserved in nature. They believed that man shared certain characteristics with animals, such as the instinct of self-preservation, but that he also was endowed with a natural benevolence. They did not believe that man was intrinsically bad and, in that way, opposed prevalent theological views of morality (Hampson, 1968).

This climate of infinite belief in man and his relationship to the universe as the basic source of harmony was clearly asserted when Baron D'Holbach (1970) wrote, "The source of man's unhappiness is his ignorance of nature." (p. viii) In his view,
The civilized man, is he whom experience and social life have enabled to draw from nature the means of his own happiness; because he has learned to oppose resistance to those impulses he receives from exterior beings, when experience has taught him they would be injurious to his welfare. The enlightened man, is man in his maturity, in his perfection; who is capable of pursuing his own happiness; because he has learned to examine, to think for himself, and not to take that for truth upon the authority of others, which experience has taught him examination will frequently prove erroneous. (p. 12)

The Enlightenment generated a climate of exhilaration, of secular spiritual rediscovery. Science, and modern social and political thought were struggling for a place that the philosophes thought that they deserved in society; and, on the other hand, Christian dogma was fighting for survival. In the eyes of the philosophes, the Christian churches "had thrown the protective mantle of religion about the inequities of society" (Manuel, 1951, p. 6). No longer were the promises of life after death seen as the supreme reward for which people would trade in good behavior. Rewards and punishments had to be of an earthly nature. After all, a person could not reward or punish behaviors or beliefs with intangible rewards and punishers; it somehow did not fit the prevailing belief of the philosophes.

But it was also not a question of extreme forgiveness. Appropriate behaviors had to be rewarded and deviations had to be chastised. In keeping with a more prevailing line of thought at the time, the consequences that followed human actions had to be measurable and verifiable. As Geoffrey Clive (1960) suggests, "Thus Christianity slipped in the back door again. Hell for the sinner and paradise for the repenting in the eighteenth century becomes happiness for the
virtuous and misery for the illbehaved. The contrived ending of
eighteenth century novels is a classical expression of this faith.
Prostitutes and highwaymen come to a bad end; English gentlemen and
virgins can expect to live happily ever after." (p. 37)

The threat that the Enlightenment posed to the Christian Church
was based on several aspects. Perhaps the most compelling one was
the replacement of God as the absolute source of truth and center of
all human undertakings for the boundless belief in the powers of the
human mind (Heather, 1964). This posed a very serious question of
the breaking of an order that, one way or another, was enforced for
centuries. Another source was the prevalent deistic belief that
God may have created the Universe, but that mankind was now left to
fend for itself. This position was even carried further by other
thinkers who flatly denied the existence of God, resorting to agnosti-
cism or atheism (Heather, 1964).

But if explanations for human behavior and natural phenomena
were sought elsewhere, the people expressing these views did not
constitute a majority. To a greater extent, religious thought and
belief was still prevalent and by no means obscured by the philo-
sophes' secularism (Heather, 1964).

When looking at the scientific discoveries of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, it is important to realize that they, in
themselves, were not as important as the ideas and beliefs that they
helped to generate. As Cragg (1964) suggests, "The eighteenth
century was not a period notable for scientific advance. It was,
however, an age profoundly affected by the scientific outlook." (p. 216)
The scientific discoveries were important inasmuch as they contributed to a better understanding of man. Since men were no longer considered helpless creatures, this, in turn and by implication, made them complex entities. Naturally then, the following step was to study man. In that way, "the new science inspired a new psychology" (Cragg, 1964, p. 216). The reasoning, keeping up with the times, was simple and logical. If man was to become king of his own world rather than a follower of a supreme command, it was logical to concentrate efforts on the understanding of men. Therefore, "the age of Enlightenment made the study of man into a science" (Gay, 1969, p. 167). Furthermore, Gay maintains that "not content with making psychology into a science, the Enlightenment made it, among the sciences of man, into a strategic science" (p. 167). The primordial reason that Gay offers for this strategic nature is that it allowed the philosophes a scientific base from which they could argue against religious thought.

Evidently the philosophes were testing new grounds that, if proven correct, would have disturbing consequences for religious faith and dogma. The most immediate of these consequences was the danger of a breakdown of a societal order that was based on Christian faith, morality and control. As Cobban (1960) maintains, "Religious faith was the principal victim of the new ideas, and the undermining of religion had far reaching results, for the whole existing pattern of political and moral behaviour seemed to be based on religion, and to survive only by virtue of the religious sanction" (p. 75). The prevalent morality was based on the moral authority of the Church.
which, in turn, was based on the people's belief that the ultimate source of authority was the scriptures and God's commandments. If the moral authority of the Church was questioned, then the end product could be the breakdown of social morality. In turn, this had some grave implications for the state and their rules. As Cobban suggests, "Never perhaps has there been any century so intensely concerned with the problem of social morality as the skeptical and infidel eighteenth century" (p. 75).

Under the new light, the organized Christian religion was seen as morally corrupt and decadent, and whose time had arrived to be changed by a more precise scientific concept of the human being. Timasheff (1957) provides us with a glimpse of the ideals and aspirations of this era when he reproduces excerpts of the pamphlet written by the Comte Henri de Saint Simon in 1813. In that pamphlet, Saint Simon maintains:

Morals and politics will become 'positive' sciences. The trend from many laws particular to many individual sciences toward a single and all embracing law will be completed. Science will become the new spiritual power. Society must, therefore, be reorganized and, in this way, humanity will enter the third great period of its history, the first, or preliminary, having ended with Socrates, and the second, or conjectural, having persisted until the time of Saint Simon's writings. (p. 17)

August Comte carried the idea of positivism even further. He wanted the development of societies to be based on "scientific moral codes, and a positive religion, which would constitute a binding spiritual power directed by sociologist-priests" (Thompson, 1975, p. 15). For Comte, positivism had two main purposes, "to generalize our scientific conceptions, and to systematize the art of social life"
Comte saw his positivism better endowed as a spiritual power and "more in accordance with the spontaneous tendencies of the people and of women than Catholicism" (p. 5). As A. R. Standley (1981) suggests:

Like others whose training was in the sciences, Comte had a vision of a new world created by the scientists. The first step in this creation seemed logically to be the application of scientific method to social, political and economic data. The rigorous training of the scientists, he felt, enabled them to observe accurately, to solve problems logically, and to test out hypotheses empirically. If scientists could only turn their microscopes and telescopes on human affairs, they might provide the leadership so desperately needed. (p. 30)

Under Comte's motto, LOVE, ORDER, PROGRESS, the future was a bright idea under the tutelage of positivism.

For the enlightened philosophes, it was a frantic search. A search for new evidence of a natural world that could be understood and explained in terms of physical laws that were precise, objective, and empirically verifiable. And their discoveries had very distressing properties because they pointed at very different concepts of the world than they were used to. Quickly their perceptions and interpretations were transformed. Not all of them were accurate or reflected an unbiased view of the world. On the contrary, once the first discoveries pointed to the possible existence of general and uniform rules guiding our physical world and the universe, the philosophes incurred the major problem of overgeneralization.

The approach of the philosophes was a curious blend of science, optimism and stubbornness. They faced their tasks with candor, energy and a shrewd optimism basic to those who know that they are on the
right path. This optimism was almost blinding. It did not occur to them that they could be wrong. They were too preoccupied pursuing their new secular version of the world to be disturbed with such a minor detail.

At the other end of the spectrum, it was the man, the woman, the average citizen in whose name all these changes were made and promoted. That average citizen was caught between tradition and modern thought. On one side was the ruling class composed of the nobility, clergy, and bureaucracy with their vituperative denunciation of the new ideas that, in their understanding, would lead to a social and moral breakdown. On the other side were the philosophes and scientists with their harangues in favor of a brave new world that should find itself by its own means.

For the average citizen, things were not easy. All changes have distressing properties and this one was no exception. Up until that time, every person in the social hierarchical scale, with few exceptions, knew what his/her place was. It had been that way for centuries. That climate of conformity had been transmitted from generation to generation, from parent to child, from ruler to ruled. In its social movements, it had been a very docile and static world. A world where people were compensated for their earthly behaviors with promises of supernatural rewards.

By its own questioning of authority, the Enlightenment produced a dramatic change. Under the new perspective, man did not need to rely on or be handed explanations about the origin and true nature of things; from then on, man was the provider of explanations. But the
questioning of authority was not limited to the scientific and moral authority of the Church and state. It also involved a secular rebellion that challenged the extensive ownership of land and means of production. LIBERTE, Egalite, Fraternite, was the motto of the revolution that beheaded a king and queen, and also managed to influence the lives of everyone else in Europe and the Americas.

But the literary and scientific unrest of the age of Enlightenment, that would fuel the ideals of the French Revolution, was different from the other movements for scientific freedom. Its main distinction rested on the fact that it was not just another intellectual dissent that would be ventilated in the elegant literary meetings and scientific academies. The profound change in the concept of man, his physical environment, and his social relation to other men would substantially change the masses. For the first time, the masses were the center of attention. From then on, everything revolved around them. Men were the object of attention of scientists and philosophers. But they were no longer studied in their relationship to God; now they were studied in their relationship to other men. The masses, as such, realized the power to change things. The old restraints that were effective on the masses in the past were now losing their effectiveness.

In the Enlightenment movement, there was an underlying realization by the men who were trying to bring about the changes in societies. That realization was of crucial importance if the social and scientific revolutions were to succeed. It involved the need for humankind to believe in the possibilities of science, just as much as they had
believed in the possibilities of religion. The new discoveries had to build an implicit, secular religion if social order was to be preserved. The scientists were to be the priests and ministers that would spread the new gospel based on scientific theory and evidence that, above all, could be empirically verifiable.

But if the Enlightenment movement was achieving all these transformations for glorifying mankind, it also contributed to seeding some doubts and confusion in the same people that it was trying to help. Basically, it forced a reexamination of the self understanding and world understanding that, up to that point, was very clear to them. The social status, wealth, education, and overall possibilities of progress of a person were, for the most part, clear and apparent from birth. People who were born peasants or aristocrats knew what their boundaries were, and these remained very much constant throughout their lives. In this way, understandings of liberty, justice, distribution of wealth, access to education and others were no longer accepted or taken for granted. The world as our ancestors envisioned it no longer existed. The philosophes set in motion the wheels of a process over which they lost control immediately after it started. The masses were now on the scene and playing a very important role. The whole politico-cultural outlook was now subject to new rules. Although the people themselves were not all that aware of these changes, for the most part, they were happy with the new gains and unsure of what tomorrow would bring. But their attitudes, their conception of authority, morality and discipline were irreversibly changed. The establishment, represented by the nobility and clergy, also failed to
realize the implications of what was happening.

A verbal exchange between Louis XVI and the Duke of Liancourt expresses the changes that were taking place in a short, precise and blunt way. When the French Revolution was an irreversible fact, Louis XVI was still failing to realize the magnitude of the events. On the night of the fall of the Bastille, the King received a visit from the Duke of Liancourt and, learning the news of what was going on, Louis XVI said, 'Why, that is a revolt!' 'Sire,' answered Liancourt, 'it is not a revolt, - it is a revolution' (Carlyle, 1929, p. 161).

The change in outlook on morals and values that the Enlightenment movement brought forward can be considered the common denominator upon which many of the social, cultural-religious, and scientific upheavals of the following centuries were based. It wasn't until the world of the natural started prevailing over the world of the supernatural that mankind would pursue a more secular approach to ideas and problems.

The most important feature of the Enlightened world was the amount or quality of its scientific discoveries as much as the underlying realization that the philosophes helped in bringing forward. That realization was an increased belief and confidence in the possibilities of man. That positivism of Saint Simon and Comte, deeply rooted in the new "spiritual powers" of science, was a reflection of an increased belief and feeling of the times. With the new scientific discoveries now free of binding traditions and the metaphysical tutelage of religion, this planet held a promise of becoming the best of the worlds, or so it seemed.
Ironically, from its very first moment, the very initiation and spreading of this idea of a rational world created an irreversible fact. That was, the dislocation of the structure, hierarchy and order of a world that relied on a mass of principles unified under a religious code. In many ways, the iconoclastic beliefs that the Enlightenment helped to spread became its major obstacle. To create an orderly world based on science and technology, they had to undermine the belief in mystical powers and supernatural worlds. To do so, they had to stress the almost infinite potential of man, his "natural desire" for freedom, and his reliance on other men. When people started learning and adopting these principles, they altered a whole existing belief pattern, based on respect for authority and tradition. This led to a reexamination of oneself, place in this world and relationship to others. The world of authority gave way to the world of the "me". Societies were permanently altered. The insistence from there on was that God was everywhere in nature. To lead a more harmonious life, one had to discover the fundamental principles that ruled this universe. The blinding faith in God, and his representative on earth, the Church, had to be transformed to a blinding faith in the powers of science and technology. The goals of the churches in Europe seemed to be at odds with the new discoveries that were leading to different interpretations of how the world was made and functioned. Perhaps this animosity had its roots in the centuries of religious dominance that could not easily be overcome.

The new ideals and discoveries had an even greater impact in the United States of America. As Commager (1977) stated, "The old
world imagined, invented, and formulated the Enlightenment, the New World – certainly the Anglo-American part of it – realized it and fulfilled it" (p. xi). The main reason behind this assertion lay in the fact that perhaps no other country had such an ideal situation as the new American Republic did. The task facing the philosophes from Europe and America was quite different. The Americans did not have a tradition, as the Europeans did, of tyrannical rulers and social inequality that had been entrenched for centuries. Therefore, it was much easier to forge ideals into concrete programs without the resistance of segments of society that had a lot to lose. As Commager (1977) furthermore maintains, the important concept lies in the outcome or the consequences of the Enlightenment in the Old World and America, and not in the way or order that the two originated it or influenced the other. Because the ideals of the Enlightenment did not bloom in Europe the way they did in America, the success of the American experiment rested, in part, in the degree of homogeneity of its population as compared with the European population. At that point in time, "American society was simple and undifferentiated, American economy pastoral and modest, the American mind provincial and unsophisticated" (Commager, 1977, pp. 125-126).

For the most part, the experiments with social changes and religious freedom could be attempted without the violence and unrest that these same changes would cause in Europe (Nye, 1974). But why would an entire nation the size of the United States, that could very well allow for cultural, ethnic and religious diversity, maintain such a degree of cohesiveness? Well, the answer should be sought in the
sense of mission that the colonizers of this land had and that sense of mission was very much embodied in the Protestant puritan tradition.
CHAPTER III

RELIGION IN AMERICA

Although the separation of State and Church was more pronounced in America than it was in Europe, this does not mean that the nation was free of religious influence. On the contrary, its influence was perhaps even greater than that of Europe, but it manifested itself in a more subtle way. "Religion in America takes no direct part in the government of society, but it must be regarded as the first of their political institutions; for it does not impart a taste for freedom, it facilitates the use of it" (de Tocqueville, 1970, p. 59). Supporting this idea, Commager (1977) presents what he considers an American paradox. As he views it, "Where in the Old World religious differences divided society and were thought pernicious in the New they made for unity." (p. 166) The common denominator for that unity was that sense of mission that the early settlers brought with them and grew with the republic. Jefferson and many of his contemporaries respected and admired the cultural heritage of Europe, but were also aware of the present realities of the cities of Europe, which were moral decay and poverty. On the other hand, America represented the promise, the future. "America could offer the friend of liberty not only a heaven but also the opportunity to participate in the building of a new, virtuous civilization" (Cassara, 1975, p. 21). America, in many ways, represented a different reality. Most of the early settlers came to America with the vision of creating a Protestant
Republic. Theirs was a struggle to create a free Republic; they realized that the secular and religious realms had to be separated to avoid repeating the same experiences of Europe. As Bailyn (1967) suggests, "...the settlers of America had emigrated to create in a new land civil and ecclesiastical governments purer, freer than those they had left behind." (p. 83) Instead of instituting religious persecution, they created a civil religion by means of which the Protestant idea could spread and flourish, thus enduring the passage of time.

The early settlers had common characteristics that served to unite them in the face of the challenge posed by the untamed landscape. As Schlesinger (1933) explains it, "All were of European and mainly Protestant blood, belonged to the industrious middle or lower middle classes, and sought a permanent home and brighter prospects for themselves and their children" (p. 7). The Protestant Puritan ethic was always closely associated with the national character and creed of the United States. "The life and character of the American society were shaped by the small town, and its religions. They were necessary to enforce strong codes of community sanctions in a hostile environment; they provided meaning and justification for work and restraint in subsistence economies... The Protestant ethic and the Puritan temper in the United States were the world-view of an agrarian, small-town, mercantile and artisan way of life." (Bell, 1976, pp. 55-56)

While the early settlers may have had a variety of common features, interests and ideals, they did not have an overwhelming unity of thought and action. They remained distrustful of the intentions of
each other. Perhaps this distrust was based on a fear that autocratic, or totalitarian systems of government such as those of the nobility in Europe, could be instituted in the new land. It was for this reason, at least in part, that the idea of a government of laws rather than a government of men was sought. The tensions between the different groups that composed the American colonies were more and more evident with the arrival of different groups of settlers. Even though most immigrants were welcomed, some reservations and animosity were obvious. This was not as noticeable in the competition for jobs or land as it was in the idiosyncracies, customs, and, mainly, religious beliefs, as was the case with the New England Puritans.

Although America remained a country where freedom of creed was protected under the Constitution, in a subtle way, Protestantism remained the dominant force. This was accomplished in part by way of having elected officials that held deep Calvinist Christian beliefs. In part, it was also due to having Anglicanism officially established in New England and the Southern colonies. Protestantism was also useful in helping the settlers in their colonizing efforts. "Protestantism seemed an ideal religion for those who wanted to 'tame' a landscape and lead it from its 'wilderness' condition into a fair replica of the best in Old World civilization." (Albanese, 1981, p. 251)

The Protestant ethos pervasively permeated most of the spheres and levels of the Republic. But it was a different reality than the one that the forefathers who had arrived on the Mayflower had envisioned. Toward the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of
the twentieth, the arrival of immigrants from almost every corner of the world brought ethnically different groups together who brought along their customs, traditions and lifestyles; this also meant more religious diversity and sectarianism. But even if Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Buddhists, etc. were then allowed to express and practice their beliefs without prosecution, "Protestantism acted as the dominant and public religion of the United States." (Albanese, 1981, p. 248) In this regard, Albanese maintains that "the oneness of religion in America was historically present from the time the English colonies were established. But it also grew with the years, so that various parts of the common witness acquired new features and became more prominent or - like the Calvinist belief in predestination to heaven and hell - gradually faded." (p. 29) The shift in interpretation, from predestination to the possibility of salvation, that Jacobus Arminius instituted against the core of the Calvinist doctrine was of critical importance. Under the Arminian perspective, man was not born predestined to heaven or hell. In his view, it was God's will that all believers could and should be saved; therefore, every man could attain salvation if he repented his sins and worked for his place in heaven. This position implicitly proposed focusing the attention on the behavior of the individual so as to make him prone to salvation. If man behaved properly, he could attain the final reward, that is, eternal salvation. For Jacobus Arminius, the maximum concern was the happiness that could be enjoyed by all of the people (Parsons, 1958).

One of the most notable characteristics of Protestantism was
the pattern of activism of its members. This activism was reflected in what Albanese calls "mutually reinforcing" ways. Members of the religious community had to be active in spreading the Protestant dogma if this one was to survive. This was important especially in America where a religious organization had to be active to make sure that its future was insured. This blended almost naturally with the American culture. In that way, American culture has been characterized by the impulse and vitality of its members in general. As Albanese sees them, "Americans, as people, were doers more than thinkers... To be active was to be oriented rightly in this world. To be fast was to be happy and whole." (p. 255)

This characteristic of activism influenced the Puritan code in three distinctive ways. They are: reductionism, anti-intellectualism and ahistoricism. The concept of reductionism was a way of simplifying abstract considerations when complying with the Protestant dogma. Things had to be presented in a clear, concise, inelaborate way. Abstract concepts had to be scaled down and presented in a way that would leave no room for error or digression. The American Protestant community was on its way to building a new society following God's architectural designs. To do so, and for the thousands of people who would carry on that mission, the general principles had to be stated in terms of all or none. A strict code of principles and behavior had to be built so as not to leave the interpretation of these principles to the individual. In that sense, it was a pragmatic religion. A religion that clearly stated the do's and don'ts; what was right conduct and what was wrong conduct. (Albanese, 1981)
The reductionistic idea in the Protestant practice had nothing to do with the capabilities of the people to conceptualize abstractions. It was rather a precautionary move to establish, firmly and unequivocally, what was acceptable or not. In that way, and for the ordinary citizen, the Protestant dogma was concise and clear-cut. It attempted to avoid the confusion and misunderstandings of religion in Europe. If the American Protestant experience was to succeed, it had to build a solid foundation based on clear-cut rules.

Embedded in that reductionistic view was the feeling of anti-intellectualism. This anti-intellectual feeling was mostly transported from Europe by the early settlers and maintained by their descendants. The mainstream of that attitude had British roots. In Leonard Woolf's (1959) view, "no people had ever despised and distrusted the intellect and intellectuals more than the British" (p. 68). Although this assertion may be considered an overgeneralization and may require certain qualifications, it provides an idea of the cultural context where American anti-intellectualism had generated.

For the most part, in the early colonial period, America was to provide sanctuary to people who were escaping religious, political, and social intolerance and persecution. As a result, these people had a good deal of animosity toward "organized society" (Hofstadter, 1963). For these people, organized society meant the establishment of the same type of institutions that they were escaping from in Europe. In their view, these European institutions were led by intellectuals or at least perceived intellectuals whose goals and way of life were dissimilar to those of the masses. The masses who
emigrated to America were fully determined not to allow the European experience to happen again.

Hofstadter (1963) maintains that "anti-intellectualism is usually the incidental consequence of some other intention, often some justifiable intention" (p. 22). Indeed, that is the case in the American experience. The fear or resentment of intellectuals in America was a by-product of an even greater fear that was firmly established in the American culture rather than a fear of intellectuals per se. That greater fear was the always latent possibility of not fulfilling that great society, or Kingdom of God in America. Intellectuals with their elaborate, controversial and indecisive theories could not provide the type of leadership that the people wanted. In their reductionistic view, people were distrustful of anything that was not familiar to them or that they could not fully understand. If these people were to build the model civilization that they wanted, the leadership had to be different from the intellectual one of the European type. Intellectuals, in that sense, were seen as a barrier to the fulfillment of a final goal.

This pattern of anti-intellectualism that was so embedded in the Puritan values found one of its major strongholds in the Baptists. This was especially true during the first part of the nineteenth century. As Warren Sweet (1952) saw it, "Among no other religious body was the prejudice against an educated and salaried ministry so strong as among Baptists, and this prejudice prevailed not only among frontier Baptists, but pretty generally throughout the denomination in the early years of the nineteenth century." (p. 111) By
the middle of the nineteenth century, things started to change some­what and more preparation was required of the ministers.

Anti-intellectualism as an overall trend in the American culture was not concerned with negating or excluding intellectual life from society. In that sense, it depends on how one defines intellectual­ism and the uses it has in a culture. For the Americans, anti­intellectualism meant gaining practical skills that could be employed in everyday life rather than epistemological considerations. Indeed, American culture was characterized by its pragmatism. This acknowledge­ment was seen everywhere. As Jules Verne (1962) put it, "The Yankees, the best mechanics on earth, are natural born engineers, as the Italians are natural born musicians, and the Germans are natural born philosophers." (p. 9) Over the years, this became known as Yankee ingenuity. Knowledge had to have a practical usefulness and purpose; otherwise, it was a waste of time. This concept of anti­intellectualism was closely tied to those of reductionism and activism. Behind that anti-intellectualism was a deeply engraved desire to make things simple and clear in life, to reduce complexities to easily understandable concepts and ideas because only people who clearly understood what the goals were and how to get to them would then work in pursuit of these goals.

This pragmatism, which is one of the salient features of the American culture, can be considered a form of religious dogmatism. In that way, one of the main reasons for the growth of anti­intellectualism was the enormous importance of the different revival­ist movements that sprung up over different periods of time. For
many anti-intellectuals, good is what is practically visible, therefore, implicitly making the world of ideas a waste of time.

The third distinctive influence was that of ahistoricism. Placed in the context of the American experience, it was a moral freedom from the ties with European history. This disregard of the past was easier to accomplish in America than it was in Europe. America was a new experience that did not have the monuments erected to glorify a past as Europe did. For the Americans, it did not make sense to dwell in the European past. For one thing, it may have brought the people into contact with, or even paying respect to, a system that the leading early settlers considered morally inadmissible and practically unfeasible. In addition, the emphasis was on the here and now. The present and the future were to be worried about, not the past. The North American Colonies were vast territorial dominions that had to be explored and settled. The people accomplishing these tasks needed to be reassured with the promise of a bountiful future rather than moral obligations to historical roots. It was a process of Americanization. The New World required that ethnic and cultural customs and traditions be terminated in favor of an American culture. This idea of an Americanization process, on which I will dwell in more depth in later pages, was very much present in the New World from the early settlers up to the 1970s when a countercurrent in American society started a search for historico-ethnical roots among the diverse groups of which the American society was composed. This emphasis on the here and now was also seen in the religious institutions. The Episcopalians and the Methodists, for example, were

Another behavioral pattern that very much characterized Protestant America was moralism. As Albanese views it, "The activism of Protestant Americans and their wish to simplify life led to a concern for the rules of action. Morality became the uppermost test of Christian witness and the key reality in Christian life." (p. 258) These rules of action were destined to augment and heighten the realization of the pioneers' ideals of a Protestant America. Rules of temperance, abstinence, and prohibition are examples of this desire for perfectability and design. In the pursuit of the great ideals of the Kingdom of God on earth and a Protestant America, moralism was intensified, with varying success, at all levels in different times. Moralism was designed as a set of rules for society, in this case the American, and became its uppermost test and attribute. "Hence, moralism knitted together Americans of many persuasions, whether ordinary or extraordinary, and whether Protestant or non-Protestant. The point was that moralism was no longer simply a feature of Protestantism: it had become a general characteristic of American culture." (Albanese, 1981, p. 263) It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the general attributes or shortcomings of morality in America. Morality, per se, interests us from the viewpoint of how it influenced a culture and the capability of that culture to follow rules on behalf of a common design and goal. This morality that was to become a characteristic of the American people also somewhat influenced their proneness to follow rules in general. The reader should be cautioned
that the capacity of the Americans to follow rules is not an original or particular characteristic of this culture. Indeed, all nations and societies follow rules; where they differ is in the degree or commitment to which they follow the rules. In the case of America, the rules of morality were followed with a relatively high discipline considering the adverse circumstances of new territories that had to be colonized and settled. In that sense, the Puritan Protestant tradition can be credited with accomplishing the task they set out to accomplish. This general characteristic of following rules, especially when they were presented in a clear, concise, and unmarred way, was to have a great influence in the development of behaviorism.

If for the Protestants, activism, simplicity, and a moral outlook and attitude were important, they acquired their importance as a way of life by means of which they would gain access to the millennium. Millennialism, as presented by Albanese (1981), can be interpreted in a strict or in a loose sense. In the former view and as presented in the book of Revelations of the Christian New Testament, "millennialism refers to beliefs regarding the thousand year period at the end of time closely connected to the second coming of Jesus" (p. 275). In the second meaning or more loose sense, "millennialism can mean religious beliefs in any tradition in which there is an intense expectation that the end of the present world order is near. Millennialists see radical change in the future." (p. 275) In general, millennialism has a common denominator that is the anticipation that an era of peace and prosperity will take place at the end of the millennium. This type of millennial thought was very prevalent in the mainstream
of the American culture of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Millenialists were divided into two groups - premillennialists and postmillennialists. Premillennialists believed that Jesus would make his appearance before the millennium was over and his presence on earth would bring about the era of peace and prosperity. On the other hand, the postmillennialists believed that Jesus would come after the millennium and that his coming would be due to the works of the Church and its people. Premillennialists believed that the evil in the form of the Antichrist would come to reign on earth before a final battle in which Satan would be ultimately defeated. Signs of catastrophe and general unrest together with worsening general conditions would be signs that would indicate the end was near. Just the opposite was true for the postmillennialists. In their view, overall signs of improvement were taken as signaling that the end of the millennium was approaching; this, in turn, reinforced their beliefs and made them more determined to keep working for the salvation and regeneration of human souls. By 1875, there was a resurgence of premillennialism. The resurgences of premillennialism beliefs closely followed the resurgences of Fundamentalism.

But there was another major difference between pre- and post-millennialists. Premillennialists were not interested or concerned with social reforms. Their main emphasis was the salvation of the individual but in terms of the eternal salvation, the attainment of the Kingdom of God in heaven. Improving social conditions or striving for better societies were irrelevant in their view, because the
work of the Antichrist would make it futile. Jesus was the only one who could defeat the devil and bring peace and progress. Post-millennialists, although much less numerous than the premillennialists, also spread their gospel at the end of the American Civil War. Their gospel, the Social Gospel movement, was not only concerned with other worldly rewards and necessities but with the here and now. The task of the Social Gospel was in improving social conditions. "For them, the Kingdom was not merely a spiritual reality but a material transformation of human society in which poverty, ignorance, and disease would be banished." (Albanese, 1981, pp. 277-278)

Human perfectability and progress were around the corner. This ideal state for any nation was ambitiously sought by the Americans. They were to create a model state and, in that way, fulfill God's designs. At the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries, influential philosophers such as Condorcet were fueling the idea that human perfectability was of cardinal importance and could be of indefinite nature. The American Revolution and the subsequent constitution were seen as examples of the boundless possibilities for humankind. Many Americans were influenced by the works of Condorcet, especially his suggestion "that mankind had passed through nine epochs of civilization, each better than the last, and that the tenth, soon to come, would be by far the best of all. The United States, they felt, might well be the harbinger of that fortunate tenth." (Nye, 1874, p. 25)

This idea of human perfectability through reason and the building of a virtuous civilization did not antagonize the Church and the
philosophers in America the way they did in Europe. Although the sep­
aration of Church and State was seen as a necessity, especially in light of the Old World experience, the goals of the secular and reli­gious world were not necessarily in conflict. Both were working to­ward similar ends and, what is also important, they shared the same ethnic and cultural background. The realms of the secular and reli­gious worlds in America could be thought of as the rails in a rail­road track. They run parallel to each other, in the same direction and for the same goal. Although they do not touch each other, they share and rest on the same crossties which constitute their foundation. This shared commonality was one element that softened the friction. Another element was the Puritan perception that ministers were also laymen. In this view, they spread the Word of God for a determined amount of time during the week and engaged in regular lay chores the rest of the time. Although this perception was debatable since few ministers completely adhered to that image, it served to diminish the criticism of anticlericals upon the churches in America as compared with the criticism of the European churches and ministry (Cassara, 1975).

This process of secularization, that is, the division of the supernatural and temporal powers, was not seen as catastrophic in America as it was in Europe. American religion and secularity were capable of coexisting. Although they were often presented as mutu­ally exclusive, this was far from being the case (Greely & Rossi, 1972).

By the time John Broadus Watson was born, the ideals of the Enlightenment had already developed and spread throughout America.
Although the speed with which these ideals propagated was by no means even, the Enlightened outlook managed to influence societies to different degrees. The scientific outlook could not be dissociated from the already well entrenched religious beliefs. In that way, certain characteristics were observable in the United States after the Civil War. The most noticeable, perhaps, was the struggle for survival of the defeated South in the post-war era of the shattering American Civil War. Their struggle was not only a struggle for economic survival, but expanded to include a struggle for identity, tradition and maintenance of the values so dear to them. Of these values and traditions, religion and social order and hierarchy were at the top of their list of priorities. They were trying to avoid and resist the inevitable influence that the winner exercises over the loser. "While Northerners assimilated modern science into an idealistic view of man and the universe, John (Watson) was growing up in the 'struggling and painful poverty' of the South after the Civil War. He [J. B. Watson] was trained in a rigorous Baptist faith whose ministers considered New England transcendentalists 'pantheistic infidels' and opposed the liberal and humanitarian tendencies of Northern Protestantism."

(Birnbaum, 1973, p. 14) Afraid of being drawn into the same lifestyle, the Southern states were pressing to preserve their own lifestyle, values, and morals through their religious communities. For the most part, this was to be done through a strict discipline and preservation of faith. This strict discipline and preservation of faith were closely followed by Emma Watson, John's mother, whose struggle and hard work were not only aimed at her children, but also to a dissipated
husband with whom Emma was very dissimilar in character. Watson's mother and the climate she managed to impose in her household were typical of the prevailing atmosphere in the Southern Baptists' congregations at the end of the nineteenth century.

While great distrust remained between the North and the South after the Civil War, both sides also remained bonded by common characteristics. In many ways, history, tradition, and religion were commonalities that united the Americans. Up to the middle of the nineteenth century, America was united because of that common past. But if the past acted as a unifying element, the future and the present realities were seen by sectors of society as the divisive element. The hiatus between the North and the South was not always clear-cut or evident. While the North was more willing to accept new norms and liberal lifestyles, this was by no means generally accepted. This dichotomy was best exemplified in the lifestyles of the urban and rural areas. Sectors of the population of northern states were also concerned with the liberalizing tendencies and the secular outlook that societies were taking. The deterioration of religious dogma and, in their view, the resulting breakdown of societal order, were seen as the consequences of the rise of secularism. In America, religion was more than the fulfillment of spiritual needs. The country, for the most part, was colonized by settlers who emigrated from Europe, escaping religious intolerance and persecution. For them, America represented the possibility of creating a free state; a nation where ideals could not be persecuted and everyone would have a chance to practice his or her beliefs. America also represented
the fulfillment of an idea of creating a perfect state where the coming millennium could be realized according to God's wishes.

It was precisely to protect the fulfillment of these ideals that the religious sects of America were ready to take the cause to its last consequences. Religious fundamentalism was a reaction to this state of affairs. Congregations were more tightly bonded by the fear of what could happen if the secular world prevailed than by the intrinsic nature of their beliefs. Covered with the mantle of evil, secularism was presented as the antichrist that was trying to prevent the millennium from becoming a reality. Of all the institutions of society, the Church was the one that would suffer the effects of the Enlightenment the most. With the establishment of a reductionistic reasoning and the belief that not only objects but subjects cannot be changed, the control over the masses was no longer unquestioned.

John Broadus Watson was born and raised in a household with strict adherence to the Protestant ethic. Since early childhood, Watson attended the Reedy River Church where his mother was very active in congregational work. His grandfather was the founder of one of the churches in Greenville, and young Watson was named after John Albert Broadus, a local minister who later became a major figure in Baptist theology and education (Birnbaum, 1973). Watson's early years coincided with one of the revivalist movements that was taking place in the South. Hearing the preachings of Broadus, Watson learned of a theology that Broadus described as Calvinistic "rooted in the doctrine of Paul and Augustine" (Birnbaum, 1973, p. 16). The minister also stressed science as an important element in the education of
ministers as well as psychology, and a "theology based on the laws of evidence and the principles that cause and effect reigned everywhere." As Birnbaum (1973) further maintains:

In his widely read volume on the preparation of sermons, Broadus placed the principles of evangelical preaching on an empirical foundation. He recommended British associationist psychology for the laws of human thinking modified by the evangelical doctrine that the emotions quickened thought. The causes of human behavior were the passions. Fear and anger were strong emotions which could be used to stimulate men to 'freedom from sin and... all fear of sinning.' Anticipating twentieth century theories of conditioning, he described words or acts as 'shocks' which, when repeatedly associated with a strong emotion, formed the habits which were the foundation of a Christian life. (p. 20)

One of the countercurrents in Protestantism, that of the Arminian heresy, prepared the way for a different interpretation of how to view the individual. In Arminius' view, every individual deserved to be saved, thus opposing the doctrine of Predestination. This shift in attitude prepared the way for education and works to be part of the way in which an individual could be saved. In turn, this required a more active participation of the individual and the community to strengthen behaviors that would lead to salvation.

This pattern of activism, religious or secular, became a part of the American culture. This pattern was present in Watson's behavioral theory. It was an active psychology rather than a passive one. It carried the influences of activism in three distinct ways. It was reductionistic in the sense of simplifying complex, abstract, and obscure interpretations of consciousness into easily graspable concepts that could be learned precisely by the average person. Rules were clear, concise, and explicit; they did not leave room for
personal interpretations. It was a clear-cut theory that carefully avoided ambiguities.

In this way, it was also anti-intellectual. While using a descriptor such as anti-intellectual may have negative connotations, in Watson's theory, it should be interpreted as a psychology that was to be put in everyday use. It was a pragmatist approach to solving specific problems, rather than dwelling on epistemological considerations. From a very early age, Watson was exposed, through his father, to the importance of gaining practical skills. In his autobiography, which is notorious for its lack of detail about his childhood, he says:

At nine years of age I was handling tools, half-soling shoes and milking cows. At 12 I was a pretty fair carpenter. This manual skill has never lost its charm, and in the Summers of 1909 and 1910 I built a ten room house from blue prints. (Watson, 1961, p. 271)

Coming from a pragmatic culture, Watson responded with a pragmatic theory. In that way, his theory was culture-specific.

Another example of activism, with the three distinctive characteristics of reductionism, anti-intellectualism and ahistoricism, can be found in Skinner's (1968b) discussion of the advantages and disadvantages as well as how one goes about teaching "thinking". While it is not denied that it may have some importance in human affairs, it may not be taught precisely or objectively; therefore, it is not "objective" and it may lead to undesirable results.

It is not far-fetched to assume that the religion that was permeating throughout the country at all levels would leave a mark on Watson, who lived his adolescence in a strict religious community.
But in Watson's case, it was not the dogma that affected him, but rather what has been termed "civil religion". In Albanese's (1981) view, "Civil religion refers to a religious system that has existed alongside the churches, with a theology or mythology (creed), an ethic (code) and a set of symbols and rituals (cults) related to the political state. As a shorthand, we may say that civil religion has meant religious nationalism." (p. 284)

That religious nationalism was part of the Protestant ethos, which perceived America as its natural and destined domain, where all the visions of the Protestant leaders would become true. These visions of a Protestant America created a civil ideology with established opinions of what the nation should be and how it should be ruled; in that way, the Church exceeded its supernatural domain and became a temporal power.

In the United States, the notion of a Protestant Kingdom of God on earth influenced the idea of a chosen nation to a great extent. Furthermore, as Albanese (1981) maintains, "Civil religion in this country was an attempt to create a nation and a nation-state, partially on the basis of the English Puritan national heritage, partially on the basis of more universal symbols derived from the Enlightenment, and partially through symbols that grew out of American political history." (p. 285)

While at the University of Chicago, where he completed his graduate training and received his doctorate, Watson learned that science and religion do not necessarily need to be dissociated. This was the case when he took courses about the psychology of religion, such
as the one taught by Ames where he "learned the theological signifi-
cance of psychology for modernist Protestants... (To Ames) scientific
consciousness was the instrument of the religion of the future."
(Birnbaum, 1964, pp. 28-29)

The secular and scientific study of religion increased dra­
matically in the twentieth century. It was the continuation of the
search for a set of rules and laws with which human behavior could be
controlled on the basis of tangible reinforcers rather than super­
natural promises. This task was undertaken by Skinner who further
expanded and elaborated it on the basis of Watson's original proposi-
tion. In Skinner's (1965) analysis of the Techniques of Religious
Control, he maintains that:

The principle technique is an extension of group and
governmental control. Behavior is classified, not
simply as 'good' and 'bad' or 'legal' and 'illegal',
but as 'moral' and 'immoral' or 'virtuous' and 'sinful'.
It is then reinforced or punished accordingly. Tradi-
tional descriptions of Heaven and Hell epitomize posi-
tive and negative reinforcement. The features vary from
culture to culture, but it is doubtful whether any well-
known positive or negative reinforcer has not been used.
To a primitive people who depend upon forest and field
for their food, Heaven is a happy hunting ground. To a
poverty-stricken people primarily concerned with the source
of the next meal, it is a perpetual fish fry. To the
unhappy it is relief from pain and sorrow or a reunion with
departed friends and loved ones. Hell, on the other hand,
is an assemblage of aversive stimuli, which has often been
imaginatively portrayed...

The reinforcers portrayed in Heaven and Hell are far
more powerful than those which support the 'good' and 'bad'
of the ethical group or the 'legal' and 'illegal' of gov-
ernmental control, but this advantage is offset to some
extent by the fact that they do not actually operate in the
lifetime of the individual. The power achieved by the
religious agency depends upon how effectively certain
verbal reinforcements are conditioned - in particular the
promise of Heaven and the threat of Hell. Religious edu-
cation contributed to this power by pairing these terms

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with various conditioned and unconditioned reinforcers which are essentially those available to the ethical group and to governmental agencies. (pp. 352-353)

But, regardless of the secular forces and the winds of change that science brought about, religion in America managed to survive. It did so because the beliefs and the way of life it proposed were deeply entrenched in the ethos of the American society. Religious influence, throughout the United States, had permeated all levels and segments of society. It was, as Chesterton (1968) described it, "a nation with the soul of a church" (p. 12).

Of all the religions, this survival was especially true of the Protestants. Puritan Protestantism did not survive intact or unchanged. Indeed, it suffered many conceptual, as well as cosmetic changes. But its core concept and the ideology for which it stood evolved over time until they became firmly entrenched in America's civil religion. As Bell (1976) views it:

This was the fate of Puritanism. Long after the harsh environment that fostered the initial ideology had been mitigated, the force of the belief remained. As Van Wyck Brooks once noted so pungently: 'When the wine of the Puritans spilled, the aroma became transcendentalism, and the wine itself commercialism.'

As an idea system, Puritanism underwent a transfiguration over a period of 200 years, from rigorous Calvinist predestination, through Edwards' aesthetic illuminations, into the transcendentalism of Emerson, and it finally dissolved into the 'gentil tradition' after the Civil War. As a set of social practices, it was transmogrified into the Social Darwinist justifications of rampant individualism and money-making (as Edmund Morgan has observed, Benjamin Franklin earned his own money; John D. Rockefeller thought his came from God) and the constricting codes of small-town life. (p. 61)

As stated before, Protestantism and its transformation into a
civil religion did not remain unchanged. It could not survive in its old form and methods. Rather, it was transformed and remained embedded in new theories. One of them was behaviorism. In that way, behaviorism represented a secular and scientific approach to an old ambition, that is, the creation of a modern, technical, and moral utopia. The struggle that scientists carried out under the banner of behaviorism represented the historical continuity of an old item in American society. The behavioristic proposal carried the influence of the Enlightenment in that its proponents realized that the transition from a spiritual to a secular realism was inevitable. But if the religious influence, as such, was receding, the ideals for which it stood needed to be preserved. If the Protestant ethic struggled for the realization of a model culture, so did secular theories that attempted to replace it. Behaviorism was one of them. Its main concern was the preservation of a culture, in this case the American and it took the cause with the same impetus and energy that characterized its predecessors. The main difference was that now it did not favor the maintenance of what it considered archaic and obsolete forms, namely, organized religion. Rather, it took the defense of the ideals contained in its civil religion. As such and partially, it also supported the maintenance of a status quo. The old ideals had to be preserved but, this time, for a new, model society. What had changed were not the goals but rather the ways and means. In the eyes of many, the conditions present at the end of the nineteenth century were alarming enough so as to propose radical and dramatic changes.
CHAPTER IV

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS:
THE RISE OF THE SOCIAL GOSPEL

By 1890, the frontier line in the United States, so much heralded and immortalized in epic novels, started to disappear and close a cycle in American history. It closed a cycle of rugged individualism, of fighting for survival in a hostile environment, and the idea of a boundless and limitless territory ended. It also forced an examination of the social and political institutions, their composition and utility. It did so because the social conditions were changing rapidly. The end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth marked the beginning of an era in which towns and cities mushroomed; with this urban increase, there was a consequent increase in the populations of these cities. From then on, the social nuclei increased and people were forced more and more to live in integrated societies to insure their economic survival. The climate that the Republic was experiencing and the profound transformations that were taking place were perhaps best expressed by Frederick J. Turner (1911).

The transformations through which the United States is passing in our own day are so profound, so far-reaching, that it is hardly an exaggeration to say that we are witnessing the birth of a new nation in America. The revolution in the social and economic structure of this country during the past two decades is comparable to what occurred when independence was declared and the Constitution was formed, or to the changes wrought by the era which began half a century ago, the era of Civil War and Reconstruction. These changes have been long in preparation and are, in part, the result of world-wide forces of reorganization incident to the age of steam production and large-scale
industry, and, in part, the result of the closing of the period of the colonization of the West. They have been prophesied, and the course of the movement partly described, by students of the American development; but after all, it is with a shock that the people of the United States are coming to realize that the fundamental forces which have shaped their society up to the present are disappearing. Twenty years ago, as I have before had occasion to point out, the Superintendent of the Census declared that the frontier line, which its maps had depicted for decade after decade of the westward march of the nation, could no longer be described. To-day we must add that the age of free competition of individuals for the unpossessed resources of the nation is nearing its end. It is taking less than a generation to write the chapter which began with the disappearance of the line of the frontier — the last chapter in the history of the colonization of the United States, the conclusion to the annals of its pioneer democracy. (p. 217)

The transition of the nineteenth to the twentieth century witnessed an America that was growing richer and more powerful. The economy of the American system was based on capitalism and a free market. The connection between the capitalistic system and the Protestant outlook has already been established by Max Weber (1958) in his analysis The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. In Weber's view, the Calvinistic asceticism is mainly responsible for the rise of the capitalistic spirit on which capitalism flourishes. Indeed, the Industrial Revolution was in part responsible for the rise of cities where thousands of rural populations and immigrants were attracted by the possibility of better paid jobs and better conditions. No doubt, for many of them there was an actual improvement of their standard of living, yet substandard by a general view. In the eyes of many, Protestantism was too closely tied with the maximum exponents of that capitalistic system. Churches in general, although they did not overtly support the nature of the system, did nothing to break the status quo either.
By the end of the nineteenth century, the erosion that science and technology were causing on religion was noticeable. Many of the teachings of the Church were considered anachronistic, and the social outlook that the Church supported or condoned was considered unethical by elements within the Church. (It should be noted that the author uses the word "Church" to encompass different denominations that shared common Protestant historical roots, beliefs, and methods and whose divergencies were more rhetorical than conceptual.) The unification of thought and wishes of the American society acquired a pervasively Protestant tone that managed, at least to some extent, to impose its values. The national motto, "E PLURIBUS UNUM," was a reality; but, that "one" that was the synthesis of all the diverse immigrations was not a new product that shared equally all of the influences of these immigrations. The culture where that "one" was born and raised was permeated by the values of the Puritan ethic and that Puritan ethic supported the notions of liberty and freedom, especially in the area of governmental control and interference.

Indeed, in America, the laissez-faire philosophy of economics inherited a great deal from its British ancestry, and created the seed bed for an industry to grow rapidly. But, the American economic system was growing and grew more rapidly and extensively than its European counterpart. As Visser'T Hooft (1963) suggests, the coexistence of the Industrial Revolution with a laissez-faire philosophy was characterized, in America, by a rugged individualism. The industry was thus in the hands of individuals who had the determination to subdue the environment and who, by being in a new land, did
not have binding social traditions that may have put added social restraints on their behavior, as was the case in Europe.

The process of industrialization coupled with an increased immigration changed the demographic characteristics of America. The three decades encompassed between the presidencies of Grant and McKinley witnessed the rapid development of cities. In the year 1900, forty percent of America's population resided in urban areas, as contrasted with 1870 when the number did not exceed twenty percent. In the forty-year period ranging from 1860 to 1900, the number of communities whose population exceeded 8000 persons rose from 141 to 547 (Olmstead, 1960).

Up to that point, the country relied on the farms for its basic economy, but this trend was changed by the rapid industrialization. In this regard, by 1919, the emerging industrial corporations were employing "86 percent of all wage earners and were producing more than 87 percent of the total value of products" (Olmstead, 1960, p. 476). The people who manned these industrial centers were mainly drawn from rural areas, and immigrants from Europe. The entrepreneurs who developed industry, oil, banking, etc., and who became incredibly wealthy, did so by exploiting every angle of the laissez-faire doctrine with a merciless and relentless determination. Many of the magnates of the industrial and financial world were adherents to beliefs embedded in a social Darwinism. One of the maximum exponents of this theory was Andrew Carnegie. "As Carnegie propounded the theory in 1889, where there was free competition in business it was inevitable that there should be a higher standard of living. The
process would of course involve painful social readjustment, as the weak gave way before the strong, but the survival of the fittest was the way of life." (Olmstead, 1960, p. 477) This theory also had a theological back-up and it was called the doctrine of God's Providence. Responsive to this doctrine, the majority of the clergy avoided any confrontations with capitalism, although they were concerned about the social conditions. Rather than dealing with the issue directly, they attributed causality to the sinfulness and chose evangelism as the balm that would soothe social inequality, poverty, and misery.

At that point in time, it was undeniable that organized religion, especially Protestant and Catholic, was more responsive to the requests of the upper classes than to the needs of the lower ones. This was represented "...to some extent by the older Protestant sects whose ministers, immersed in intellectual controversy, often failed to satisfy deeper spiritual needs" (Schlesinger, 1967, p. 12). It was also represented by:

...the failure of the church to adjust itself to the unprecedented conditions created by rapid urban and industrial growth. American Protestantism, the product of a rural, middle-class society, faced a range of problems for which it had neither experience nor aptitude. In the cities the building of church edifices lagged behind the advance of population; the shifting of residential districts left once prosperous houses of worship stranded and abandoned on the bleak shores of factory and slum neighborhoods...It was generally true of large cities that those parts which needed most religious attention got least.

When better accommodations existed, the working class commonly regarded the church - with its fine upholstery, stained glass windows and expensive chairs - as an institution where ill-clad worshipers were unwelcomed and where the Nazarene himself would have been snubbed. As someone has observed, in religion nothing fails like success. The pulpit, increasingly beholden to contributions from the rich,
ordinarily ignored or condoned the terrible injustices from which the wage-earning multitude were suffering, In one instance, reported by Professor Ely, when the bakers' union petitioned five hundred clergymen of New York and Brooklyn to preach sermons against compulsory Sunday labor, all but half a dozen ignored the appeal... To laborites, religion seemed a sort of capitalistic soothing-syrup. (Schlesinger, 1967, pp. 12-14)

But if the majority of the churches remained relatively unconcerned with improving or denouncing social conditions, a smaller group of clerical leaders took upon themselves the task of questioning the economic and social aspects of the American society. They represented the antithesis to the religious establishment which, in their view, condoned the inhumane doctrine of laissez-faire. What the denouncing clergy saw were rapidly growing cities in which there were lonely crowds in congested dirty streets, full of crime, where people labored long hours in sweat shops for a minimal pay (Olmstead, 1960, pp. 475-480). These radical thinkers, who met an increased and powerful opposition in the industrial and business communities, were also initially battled by the religious establishment who perceived the function of the Church as helping man escape sin and gain entry into the Kingdom of God in Heaven. For many cynics, this was nothing but the tacit approval of the state of affairs and the maintenance of the status quo. But there were also some technical problems by which Protestantism could not shift its direction, even if the leading clergy wanted to do so. Up to that point, the relationship between God and man was a private affair and, in that way, the whole theory had an individualistic foundation. "However, the denominational adaptations to the social and economic conditions of the
agricultural-commercial civilization of the early nineteenth century was not calculated to prepare Protestants to confront the problems of the industrial era. The individualistic social ethic combined with the traditional assumption that piety was a personal issue to raise a formidable obstacle to the recognition of the social dimensions of religion." (Persons, 1958, p. 410)

A new chapter in the social history of the United States began to unravel. New forces that emerged directly out of the laissez-faire doctrine started commandeering the life of the nation. As Morison, Commager, and Leuchtenburg (1980) suggest, "The age was memorable not for statesmen as in the early years of the Republic, or for reformers and men of letters, as in the middle years, or for soldiers as during the Civil War, but for titans of industry and masters of capital." (p. 77) In the days of the colonies and early years of the Republic, the power was held by traditional institutions within society, such as government officials and the Church; now, that power was more difficult to detect and it obeyed no particular laws but those of profit. Furthermore, as Morison et al. (1980) suggest,

Political power and social prestige naturally gravitated to the rich. As a matter of course they exerted a decisive influence on politics and parties. They controlled newspapers and magazines; subsidized candidates; bought legislation and even judicial decisions. The greatest of them, such as John D. Rockefeller or J. P. Morgan, treated state governors as servants, and Presidents as equals, in the exercise of power...They [the rich] built gothic churches, and listened gladly to the gospel as expounded by a Bishop Lawrence who assured them that 'godliness is in league with riches'...Business even formulated a philosophy which drew impartially on history, law, economics, religion, and biology in order to justify its
acquisitiveness and its power: we give this philosophical potpourri the name Social Darwinism. (pp. 78-79)

Undoubtedly, the rapid expansion of the industrialization process managed to influence and benefit, to different degrees, the entire population. But this increased wealth that the nation as a whole was experiencing also served as evidence that America was far from united or reaching a consensus. Because the wealth was not evenly distributed, the price being paid for that wealth did not equally affect all the segments of the population. In general, it served to show that there were serious fissures in the foundation over which the Republic was built. This fact was best expressed in the confrontations that took place at the turn of the century.

The rapid rise of science and technology that boosted the industrial capacity to unprecedented levels, did not benefit those who manned the machines the most. Many of the workers not only suffered the consequences of poor working conditions and substandard living conditions, but also faced the depersonalizing effect that industrialism brought along. In a mass production process, the feelings of personal responsibility are weakened as well as the relationships between leaders and workers. The fact that workers organized into unions as a way of resisting employers' pressures and whims did not help in creating an aura of harmony either (Visser'T Hooft, 1963). The relationship between labor and capital in those days was marked by antagonism and struggle. As Morison et al. (1980) maintain, "As machinery came to represent a large part of capital investment, it was thought necessary to accomodate the worker to machinery rather
than machinery to the worker." (p. 82) To make things even more difficult, capital began organizing into large corporations that, one way or the other, managed to influence almost every facet of life. To defend itself, labor became increasingly unionized; if the worker was to stand a chance against capital, he would have to rely on the solidarity of his fellow workers, since his power to face an impersonal corporation was minimal.

For the people who held the capital, the state of affairs did not constitute unethical or abusive practices, not did they lose any sleep over moral concerns. They had the backing of organized religion, government, money, and, lately, pseudo-scientific social theories. This was the case with the "...principle of 'the survival of the fittest,' derived from Darwinian biology and applied to the affairs of mankind by the great English philosopher Herbert Spencer and by his many American disciples. 'If we do not like the survival of the fittest,' wrote Professor Sumner, 'we have only one possible alternative, and that is the survival of the unfittest. The former is the law of civilization; the latter is the law of anti-civilization.'" (Morison et al., 1980, p. 79)

Not everyone perceived that problems existed in American society, and were much deeper and serious than they were led to believe. In many cases, this did not reflect an antagonism or refusal to face reality. Even with the depression of the last years of the nineteenth century, America remained incredibly wealthy, and its overall standard of living was superior to most of the other countries. This idea of the richness of America pervaded at all levels and this "amazing
increase of prosperity in the nation dulled the sense of acuteness of social problems" (Visser'T Hooft, 1963, p. 30).

But some members of the religious community did not agree with the social conditions of America at the turn of the century. These concerned voices were those of the preachers and ministers that witnessed the social and working conditions of the masses on a daily basis. Out of this unrest, the Social Gospel was born. As Carter (1971) explains it, "[the social Gospel] appeared first here and there in the pulpits of individual dissenters, ranging across the spectrum of Church organization and theology from Anglicans to Congregationalists. These men were, very often, men whose bourgeois complacency had been eroded away by firsthand experience with the poverty of an urban parish (Walter Rauschenbush) or with labor unrest (Washington Gladden)." (p. 11)

An effective alliance of the establishment, represented by the industrial, business and religious communities, centered a massive attack upon the Social Gospelers. In the view of the establishment, the proposals of the Social Gospel were not only inadmissable, but were seen as a threat to all that America stood for. This capitalistic ideology that had religious backing was making a stand so as to leave no doubt about what "America's national ideology" was and the extent to which the system would go to enforce this mainly Social Darwinian ideology. What they considered to be at stake was not so much an economic ideology and system, but the morals, ethics, and idiosyncracies of the Republic. This idea of a total unity of thought and action, that can be considered an outgrowth of the original idea
of a Kingdom of God on earth, treated dissention in a harsh way. Theirs was a rather mystical view of a society where opposition was seen as the work of the forces of evil against the Christian, Protestant, Kingdom of God on earth. So, if the Social Gospel movement was so virulently attacked, what was it that they proposed?

Basically, they were concerned with the betterment of society and the improvement of social conditions. In view of this, "Its varied spokesmen [of the Social Gospel] agreed at least that social improvement was not either impossible, irrelevant or irreligious." (May, 1949, p. 171) The leaders of this movement saw the Church as responsible for narrowing the gap that existed between the upper and lower classes. In this way, the first pointed fingers and raised voices came from the Episcopalians and Congregationalists, joined later on by the Methodists and Baptists. The Social Gospelers emphasized the absolute presence of God who ruled over human affairs and stressed the need for a brotherhood of all men.

In view of the proponents of the Social Gospel, a brotherhood of all men was improbable when magnates such as Cornelius Vanderbilt owned 1/218th part of the total wealth of the nation. The extreme differences between the haves and the increased number of have nots "were regarded by certain writers as not only a disgrace to American civilization but also as a threat to its stability" (Hopkins, 1940, p. 100).

While it was true that the majority of the Protestant clergy remained tilted in their support of the leaders of business and industry, this movement from the mainstream American Protestantism
in the 1870s sought to develop social action to ameliorate the conditions created by industrialism. It basically moved the focus of attention away from the concept of individualism, so embedded in the Protestant ethos and individual salvation, to a more socialized conception of men as a part of a whole system. In that way, man had to rely on other men for his salvation and this interdependence would hopefully benefit the most. Their beliefs, postmillennialist in nature, were the core idea after which the Social Gospelers strived. The struggle and realization for a better society would mark the beginning of the millennium in which a better or even ideal society would exist, contrasting with the ideas based on Social Darwinism that were more prevalent at that time.

The Social Gospelers stressed the idea of cooperation between people rather than competition. As in a family setting, social life should become personalized and avoid the depersonalizing effects of industrialism. As Visser'T Hooft suggests, the "family of mankind and 'world brotherhood' became the favorite expressions for the ideal of the social gospel" (p. 52). It implied a deep transformation and substitution of values and the existing order. Basically, the Social Gospel was based on a deep belief in the idea that progress is possible and that pursuing that progress would lead to an increased sense of morality and spirituality.

The Social Gospel believed that the human being and the social environment where they lived could be changed; it opposed historically prevalent views that the forces which compose human beings and societies are fixed and unchangeable.
Some of these implicit ideas that the Social Gospel had could be traced back to the ideas and principles that the Enlightenment had put forward. Visser'T Hooft, elaborating on ideas presented previously by A. C. MacGiffert, lists the influences that the Enlightenment had on the Social Gospel:

1. - The Enlightenment put the common moral virtues in the forefront;
2. - it made benevolence the all-embracing virtue and substituted the good of man for the glory of God as the highest end of life;
3. - it gave rise to the idea of the indefinite perfectability of man and society. (p. 122)

That change to emphasize the common moral virtues marks the beginning of an era where there was a gradual shifting from dogmatic theology to a search for more practical ethics. For the moral values that the Social Gospel stressed so much were heavily embedded in the pragmatism of the Deistic Enlightened approach that accentuated concrete and tangible concepts of religious life. The mystical and supernatural aura of religion that the Protestants, in their desire for reductionism and simplification, were transforming, was then accelerated even more by the concentration on goodness and behavior that the Social Gospelers were promoting.

That second point of the benevolence and good of man was also based on enlightened views of mankind. Again, that shift in emphasis was to heighten human happiness and joy. For humans were no longer viewed as inherent sinners, and the purpose of them following God's rules and commands was happiness and joy in the temporal world and order. Although the Enlightenment was responsible for changes in outlook, it could not be considered the only thing responsible
since modern science and revivalism also contributed to these changes.

The third point where the Social Gospel showed its influence from the Enlightenment was in the optimistic view of man and society that the Enlightened men of the eighteenth century had. If man was not inherently bad, and man was capable of being modified, then progress and a better society were not possibilities but actual probabilities.

Perhaps the main reason for the rise of the Social Gospel was the devastating effects that rapid urbanization was creating as a consequence of industrialization and the migration and immigration that it had created. It was the first generalized attempt to socialize religion, to make it more humanitarian and to try to prevent its dissociation from the poor and the destitute.

But that belief in human plasticity and perfectability fomented an undue expectation of men and society. In that way, they also became dissociated from reality in their search for a utopia. They misjudged the extent and importance of the problems that they were dealing with and the goals they were trying to achieve. Thus, they concentrated their efforts on tasks that were very difficult to arrive at; failure to achieve concrete goals was ultimately detrimental to its function and, in that way, the Social Gospel lost momentum.

But if the Social Gospel started vanishing in the twentieth century as a social movement, its ideas remained, somehow modified, in other ideas and social movements. It should be remembered that the surge of the Social Gospel was concommitant with the rise of the social sciences - sociology, political science, and psychology.
among others.

Many saw these new social sciences as a threat to the establishment and to society in the same way in which they regarded the Social Gospel. These were the adherents to Social Darwinism, and the laissez-faire theory of economics and politics. Economists such as Richard T. Ely, and social scientists such as W. D. P. Bliss, favored more controlled societies as a way of preventing social injustices. This climate of concern for the social aspects of religion started a movement in which religion was divested of its supernatural properties and was seen as joining other social sciences for the betterment of mankind. This movement constituted the basis of social religion. Its main characteristic was its temporal property. It was the social religion of the here and now. It was a religion that tried to reconcile humans with humans in addition to humans with God. In some way, there were discrepancies between social religion and the Social Gospel. While the Social Gospel had almost a boundless faith in men, social religion had to be attached to the nature of its dogma and, in that way, still spoke of man who, if left alone, would not improve but degenerate and eventually cause his own destruction in this world. Some authors, such as Simon Patten (1911), attempted to look at the social foundation of religion and listed ten essential theological doctrines in social terms:

1. - The doctrine of one supreme God.
2. - The doctrine of the fall of men, or of social degeneration.
3. - The doctrine of regeneration or the reincorporation of social outcasts into society, in contrast with the doctrine of elimination.
4. - The doctrine of personal uplift through contact, influence and suggestion, in contrast with the doctrine of evolution through biologic variation.
5. - The doctrine of progress through peace and love, in contrast with progress through conflict.
6. - The doctrine of the Messiah, or of lofty inspiring leadership, in contrast with the material concept of civilization.
7. - The doctrine of service, in contrast with self-centered aggression.
8. - The doctrine of social responsibility, in contrast with individual rights.
9. - The doctrine of personal responsibility, in contrast with fatalism or external domination.
10. - The doctrine that the wages of sin are death. (pp. 4-5)

It was becoming evident to conservative segments that religion through its churches could not provide the leadership and social control for modern America that it had in previous centuries. The secularization process that was based on science and technology needed a more strict and scientific approach to address the issues of stability and social control. The rise of the social sciences reflected an attempt to deal with these issues.

It was not a question of changing ideals and goals that were important in the American culture. What was discussed were the ways and methods that had to be changed to maintain the same goals. Something had to change so that things would remain the same. In many ways, it was the idea of the Puritan settlers to build a Christian nation that would be substantially different from the European experience and a model for the world. Every effort was geared to the construction of that Republic. This religious zeal "evolved into the political mission of the United States. The goal was to serve as the exemplar to the world of the new national state based on republican, middle-class, and Protestant principles." (Carlson, 1975, p. 5)
These goals remained the same; the problem now centered on how to achieve these goals with the resources at hand in view of a decline of religious control.

Aggravating the problem and giving it a sense of urgency were two unrelated events that were seen as having a potentially threatening effect on the United States. The first one, at the international level, was the increased influence of the Marxist interpretation of the distribution of wealth. This economic interpretation of societies was on a direct collision course with the prevalent capitalistic outlook in America. These two philosophies regarded each other as its arch-enemy and no place for accommodation was seen as possible. In America, the growth of Marxism in Europe was seen as another sign of the decline and problems of the old world that should be prevented at all costs from being transferred to the new world. The second event, at the national level, that was causing uneasiness in America was the growth of the populist movement. As Canovan (1981) explains, "In the last decade of the nineteenth century a radical populist movement appeared with startling suddenness in the United States, lasted long enough to give the American political establishment a severe shock, and then faded away as quickly as it had come." (p. 17)

While it is true that the issues at stake that caused the rise of the populist movement were power plays as well as real needs and urges of depossessed sectors, its perceived threat to the system and establishment was its major effect.

The populists' demands upon the government ranged "from government ownership of railroads to popular referendums and from monetary
inflation to the banning of strikebreakers. The Populist candidate in the 1892 Presidential election, James Weaver, polled over one million votes." (Canovan, 1981, p. 17) For the establishment, it was yet another sign that, if things were left out of control, the bright future of American society would not be so bright, if there was any future at all.

The country as a whole was undergoing dramatic changes. As Andre Maurois (1963) perceived:

The United States at the end of the nineteenth century, was suffering from growing pains. The country had grown too fast; its population, industry, and technical ability had increased so rapidly that they had outgrown its institutions. These institutions now cramped the country like clothes that are far too small. The country needed a medicine that would really work; it needed far reaching reforms. The Americans knew this. Many of them had come from Europe to live in a Golden Age upon an untrodden soil: they had found no more than an Age of Gilt. And yet they still passionately believed that one day everything would be for the best in this best of continents...By the beginning of the twentieth century, the contrast between this dream of equality and the inequality of real life was becoming frightening. (pp. 1-6)

Over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there was a gradual but potent shift from a religious to a secular idea of the Kingdom of God in America. The reasons for this religious decline are undoubtedly many. What is of interest to us is the end product; that is, the decline of the hegemony of the religious Protestant America, that changed in favor of a secular Protestant America. The latest one is an outgrowth of the former one. It is a state where the religious influence had declined, but whose ideas are very much imbedded in what it called its civil religion.

During the nineteenth century, however, Protestantism
declined. By 1900 secular forces far exceeded religious influences in shaping the life of the nation. Protestantism declined because it failed to remain relevant to the changing times. It had served the needs of the simple agrarian society of pre-Civil War America. Early American institutions rested on concepts which religion had helped shape. Until well into the nineteenth century, society continued to accept religion's supernatural explanations of man and the universe as revealed in the Bible. Slowly, however, but with ever increasing speed, the modern world destroyed the simplicity of early America. The new sciences explained away the world of the supernatural. The higher criticism of the Bible cast doubt on the validity of the ultimate source of Protestant truth. On the more mundane level, technology revolutionized transportation, communications and the way in which Americans made their living. Industrialization created social, economic, and political problems and raised moral and ethical questions for which traditional religion had no answers. In the maelstrom of these new forces Protestantism, like states'-rights politics and laissez-faire economics, seemed outmoded. American Protestantism found its world undermined. (Spain, 1967, p. vii)

Evidently, much of this religious decline could be attributed to the influence of the Enlightened ideals. The deistic belief that was replacing organized religion created a generalized feeling of a need to race for perfection, a secular perfection. The goals remained the same; how to achieve them changed. Americans did this task of striving for perfection with an almost unsurpassed confidence and self-assurance. As Nye (1966) views it, "This confidence in their ability to handle whatever history threw their way had much to do with the positive achievements of Americans in the latter portions of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth." (p. 21)

But if the overall mood was that of confidence and assurance, this mood did not encompass the entire population. It was true that the possibilities that the future had to offer at that time seemed boundless, but it was also true that the progress that technology...
and industrialization were bringing about did not impress everyone in the same way. Industrial America was entering an era of rapid changes. These changes in values and needs at the turn of the century, from a simple to a complex society, were bound to cause distress. As Schlesinger (1962) saw:

In the Middle West and the North Atlantic states rural America, like a stag at bay, was making its last stand. The clash between the two cultures — one static, individualistic, agricultural, the other dynamic, collectivistic, urban — was most clearly exhibited in the former section, for the march of events had already decided the outcome in the East. (p. 53)

As people moved to the cities, they cut ties with their hometowns, past, traditions, families, norms, and the like. Their behavior was not under close scrutiny as was the case in a smaller town. Cities provided for anonymity and a loss of control. It was precisely out of this industrialism and consequent urbanization, and the detriment of the influence exercised by the churches at a general level, that secularization found a fertile climate in which to grow. It had its roots in the climate created by the Enlightenment that forced a reexamination of the understanding of the self, the world, and the relationship among people. The concentration of people in urban centers,

constitutes a massive change in the way men live together, and became possible in its contemporary form only with the scientific and technological advances which sprang from the wreckage of traditional world views...Urbanization means a structure of common life in which the diversity and the desintegration of tradition are paramount. It means an impersonality in which functional relationships multiply. It means that a degree of tolerance and anonymity replace traditional moral sanctions and long term acquaintance-ships. The urban center is the place of human control, of rational planning, of bureaucratic organization and the
The urban center is not just in Washington, London, New York, and Peking. It is everywhere. The technological metropolis provides the indispensable social setting for a world where the grip of traditional religion is loosened, for what we have called a secular city. (Cox, 1966, pp. 1, 4)

The possible breakdown of social order was not only seen as the result of the decline of religious scrutiny. Economic conditions that may worsen, as happened in the recession of the last decade of the nineteenth century, were also seen as contributing agents to chaos and unrest. If economic conditions worsened and people in the cities did not have a source of income as a result of loss of employment, they also did not have a piece of land upon which to base their existence.

The rise of the cities in America, with its consequent concentration of the population, and the changes and corruption that it brought along, were seen as challenges to the Protestant Republic. This challenge, or the perception of it, was the result of the cities harboring large groups of people, especially immigrants. It was irrelevant that these immigrants could not pose a real threat to the life of the nation; the perception was that they were and, as such, they were treated accordingly. This perceived threat was the result of different ideologies having to coexist, and the main problem stemmed from their religious differences. As Ostrader (1970) explains,

Except for the new immigrants and their children, the nation was overwhelmingly Protestant. The new immigration then under way was overwhelmingly non-Protestant, and it was continuing to increase in volume; but old stock Americans did not think of these immigrants as influencing the national character in any positive way, though some thought they were threatening to destroy it. (p. 44)
The rules by which most of the people lived and obeyed did not have the same meaning to the new immigrants as they did to the Anglo-Saxons. Overall, it had been an orderly world where people lived and worked following precise rules of conduct prescribed by the Protestant Church. With the decline of the Church and the changes made in the values system by the ethnically different immigrants, the orderly America that the forefathers wanted was threatened. To save the free and democratic state, certain concessions had to be made even if they implied a loss of a certain degree of freedom and increased social control. In response to this perceived need, E. A. Ross (1914) wrote a book, Social Control, where he defended and justified the Puritan's conscience and that it would prevail among an elite that would exercise the social control of the American society. Immigrants, especially those from a different ethnic group than that of the Anglo-Saxon Protestant Puritans, were favorite targets of these attacks. A scientific social control was to be developed to hold together all these people representing different backgrounds. Another sociologist, Luther Lee Bernard, viewed "scientific social control as similar to the control exercised in the past by religion" (Birnbaum, 1973, p. 54).

Times of crisis, or perceived crisis, are when calls are made for stronger leadership and more control over the population. For some in America, these conditions were present.

Scientists in general and social scientists in particular were concerned with the social conditions present across the United States and, in particular, with the social conditions in urban centers. But
the concerns that scientists had were by no means similar in means and ends. Most of them realized that morals and codes of ethics were changing at an accelerated pace and that the institutions that were supposed to oversee the normal functioning of the country, either lagged behind the times or plainly could not do the job anymore. In its frantic advance in science, technology, and industry with the consequent social changes, the United States outgrew the provincial and parochial controlling institutions that formed the backbone of America's controlling process. As Mannheim (1950b) perceived:

As long as society was regulated by a natural interplay between small self-contained units, mutual controls could work. One individual could control the other, or one group the other, or the group the individual. Just as in economic life where huge combines with their monopolies replace free competition between small enterprises, so in other spheres complex social units arise that are too arbitrary to reorganize themselves, and must be governed from the center. (p. 7)

Social scientists from the diverse backgrounds of sociology, psychology, political science, and others tried to form coherent theories and proposals that would bring this perceived "chaotic" state under control. These issues, that included the decline of religion, threat of communism, societal disintegration, were and continued to be very lively issues throughout most of the twentieth century. As Mannheim (1950b) analyzed:

As we contemplate the chaotic state of unregulated capitalist society, one thing becomes quite clear: the present state of society cannot last long. We have seen that social chaos may remain latent as long as no major crisis occurs. But whenever mass unemployment or war brings the tension to a climax, new solutions must be found. By this time the world has learned that such crises are not chance, but that both mass unemployment and wars are inherent in the system. Thus the two basic
evils will not disappear without a conscious and systematic attack on them. This of itself indicates that the age of laissez-faire is over and that only through planning can catastrophe be avoided. (p. 21)

Social tensions in American society were growing. It would be preposterous to oversimplify them in their origin, extent, and consequences. In general, they shall be viewed as the natural distress that follows any radical change involving human affairs. The accelerated pace with which America was developing to its potential also marked the watershed between two different Americas. On one side was the old, the traditional, the conservative America; a country that viewed with suspicion any radical changes that arose within its society. On the other hand was the new, the confident America, in search of its destiny. Curiously, those who opposed the liberalizing tendencies failed to realize that the ideals of the old America largely remained in the new one. In the old French saying, "Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose."

But the generalized nervousness at the turn of the century was undeniable. In a very perceptive paper, George M. Beard (1881) analyzed some of these causes. For him, the causal factors were modern civilization, specialization within industry, necessity of punctuality, modern communications, noise, repression of emotion, liberty, rapid development and acceptance of new ideas. In regard to the last point and in his own words, "The rapidity with which new truths are discovered, accepted and popularized in modern times is a proof and result of the extravagence of our civilization." (p. 64)

Responding to this generalized anxiety, social scientists like
J. B. Watson, G. Stanley Hall, William McDougall and Hugo Münsterberg proposed theories that would bring the state of affairs under control. Their crusades were not new elements in American history. They resulted from a benevolent, compassionate, and sincere outlook and feeling for this world; however, they also tended to be simplistic, authoritarian, one-sided and rigid. Theirs was a rebellion against perceived inequalities, inefficiency, and the immorality of an old system that could not adapt to the challenges of new times.

A contemporary of J. B. Watson was the Social Gospel movement, destined to ameliorate some of the dehumanizing conditions created by industrialization and the prevalence of Social Darwinism and laissez-faire philosophies. John B. Watson shared some of the values that the Social Gospelers promoted. Theirs was a rebellion against established religion and the social consequences of industrialism. Watson's concern was expressed in the preface to the second edition of *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist* (1924):

> Civilized nations are rapidly becoming city dwellers. With this increase in the concentration of homes there come changes in our habits and customs. Life becomes complex. The strain of adjusting ourselves to others increases daily. We are just waking up to the fact that while chemistry and physics, or rather their industrial applications - by giving us light, heat, telephones and a thousand other indispensable luxuries - have provided the motives for our living together, they are helpless when called upon to teach us how to dwell together wisely and happily. (p. xi)

The perfectionistic search to condition individuals for an ideal society, for a society "fit for human habitation," was the idea of improving social conditions to achieve an ideal society that would mark the beginning of the millennium so prevalent among the

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postmillennialists at that time. For that purpose, Watson had the right religious exposure in his upbringing. He may not have done it for the same principles that the religions were advocating, but indeed he did it. His was a secular version of the same idea; that secular idea that the philosophes ambitioned was now picked up by Watson and his followers and converted into a crusade. For them, it was a struggle to convert people to the goodness of science embedded in behaviorism. Those who became converted to the "behavioristic gospel" became part of a large brotherhood of believers in the infinite possibilities of science.

They shared the deep, almost "mystical" belief that, through the use of science and technology, all problems could be solved. Since their start, behaviorists were recognized as a fraternity of true believers in the endless possibilities of humankind. These characteristics were recognized by other authors such as Heidbreder (1933) when she maintained:

...behaviorism has become more than a mere school of psychology; it has become a crusade against the enemies of science, and in this role it has taken on, even more than have most schools of psychology, something of the character of a cult. Its adherents are devoted to a cause; they are in possession of a truth that not all men have the courage or the wit or the knowledge to accept; and much of the strength of behaviorism as a living movement is derived from this fact. (p. 259)

Watson's ideals had their counterpart in the American Protestant ethos. What he proposed were rules to be followed, in the form of contingencies, so that the individual could lead an organized life in an organized society. These rules were the secular counterpart
of the rules of morality of the Protestant code that were very much a part of the American culture. In addition, his psychology did not dwell in the past. It did not take the past into account except tangentially. It concentrated on the immediate problems of the individual rather than complicated searches in the past for symbols and traumas. As Mannheim (1950a) viewed:

Behaviourism is interested in human beings only as part of the social machine, not as individuals but only as dependable links in a chain of action. The behaviour of a human being is simplified to such an extent that it becomes measurable in an elementary way. Natural behaviour, as it is formed by living adaptations, is observed so carefully and analyzed into such abstract components and factors that it can be reconstructed by psycho-technics with an excellent chance of success. (p. 214)

Behind all this analysis of the behavioristic potential lay the idea that human progress and perfectability were not only possible but actually probable. One more factor that, in the view of many, was making these theories necessary had already reached dramatic proportions. America's "melting pot" was far from being what the forefathers had envisioned.
CHAPTER V

THE PROBLEM OF THE "MELTING POT"

Traditionally, the United States has always been regarded as a nation of immigrants who came to these shores in search of freedom and opportunity. While this ideal was regarded as one of the virtues of the nation, the feelings that were generated were by no means equal.

In general terms, immigration was divided into two groups. On one side were the "old" immigrants of Protestant Anglo-Saxon stock, and on the other side, the "new" immigrants of Catholic stock from Southern and Eastern Europe. These two main groups differed in more than just religion, background and customs; they were "idiosyncratically" different. From the very beginning, the old settlers firmly and unequivocally established the idea and principle that these territories were part of a new Christian Protestant Republic. As Schlesinger (1968) explained, "The English settlers, while thus combating a wild new continent and its wild inhabitants, where meanwhile coming to terms with white settlers of other stocks - to such an extent that they began proudly to see themselves as the most cosmopolitan people on the face of the globe." (p. 7)

The different groups that immigrated to the United States settled in colonies and in ethnic neighborhoods thus reflecting the differences that separated them. This was the case with the Dutch in New York, the French in seaports, and the Germans who were escaping...
political upheavals and religious prosecution and poured into the Pennsylvania area to concentrate on farming. "From continental Europe outside Germany came Jews of Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch origin, Finns and Swiss; and from the British Isles other than Ulster and England arrived native Scots, Celtic Irish, and Welshman. But these accessions by comparison constituted hardly more than a trickle." (Schlesinger, 1968, p. 9)

Tensions remained between these groups, since not all of them were regarded as "contributing" to the Republic. An example of this distrust can be seen in Benjamin Franklin's attitude in regard to foreigners when he participated in political activities in Pennsylvania. He perceived the German residents as a potential threat, and as people who did not integrate themselves totally to the culture. In his view, "[the Germans] will shortly be so numerous as to Germanize us instead of our Anglifying them" (Schlesinger, 1968, p. 10).

In many ways this particular attitude was a reflection of a more generalized feeling with which the different ethnic groups regarded each other.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the ethnic background of the immigrants as well as their religious preferences started switching from predominantly Protestant Northern and Western European to Catholic Southern and Eastern European. In some ways, it also meant a change in the idiosyncracies of immigration. According to the Dillingham Commission instituted in 1907 by Congress to review issues in immigration, the "old" immigrants, those from northern and western Europe, were considered as an immigration that came to America to
settle and develop roots in these lands. Although they did not share the same cultural background and language, these immigrants were rapidly assimilated into the American system and culture. On the other hand, the "new" immigrants, those of southern and eastern Europe who started arriving after 1833, were regarded as transient. This immigration was largely composed of unskilled laborers without capital or knowledge of farming and resorted to the cities in search of jobs. In urban industrial centers, they segregated into ethnic neighborhoods which made their assimilation into the culture much more difficult. (Jones, 1960)

The massive immigration that industrial America was witnessing was bound to create some problems and, in the eyes of many people, too many problems. Newspapers, like The Saint Paul Pioneer Press, The Philadelphia Enquirer, and The Chicago Herald among others, were questioning the wisdom of the open door approach to immigration. (Feldstein & Costello, 1974) To reinforce their position, violent strikes and riots, such as the Molly Maguire riots, the railroad strikes of 1877 and the Chicago Haymarket affair of 1886, provided the necessary arguments for nativists to engage in a public outcry for a more restricted immigration and more control over the working masses composed mostly of foreign labor.

There was a generalized anxiety among the nativists for the preservation of a culture and a value system that they saw as threatened by the "melting pot". This was also seen in the antagonizing positions that the Protestants and the Catholics took. As Jones (1960) stated:
Pre-Civil War nativism was, as always, a complex phenomenon, drawing its strength from a great variety of sources and only rarely finding expression in a single straightforward formula. Its most prominent theme was that of hostility to the Roman Catholic Church. The astonishing growth of Catholicism, mainly as the result of immigration, revived the fears of popery that had been so widespread in America in colonial days. The steady expansion of Catholic membership, reflected in the amount of church-building, the creation of new dioceses, and the rise of a Catholic press, produced in the 1830s a mounting wave of anti-Catholic literature and oratory. The outcry was more than a mere consequence of differences in religious belief. The characteristic feature of Protestant nativism was rather its constantly expressed fear that the Catholic influx threatened American institutions. (p. 148)

Jones (1960) also points out that the Pre-Civil War nativism was not only concerned with Anti-Catholicism, nor was it only a question of natives versus immigrants. Indeed, many of the supporters of this "Protestant Crusade" were themselves immigrants. Their fears also included that America was being flooded with "paupers and criminals", the political ideology of the foreigners, and the threat that they posed to the "morals, habits and character of the people, and the safety of our institutions..." (pp. 151-153).

Proportionally, the foreign-born segment of the population did not increase significantly. While it is true that in a fifty-year span from 1860 to 1910 the number of immigrants rose from four million to more than thirteen million, proportionally, they only increased from 13.2 percent to 14.5 percent of the total population. Demographically, they remained largely concentrated "east of the Mississippi and north of the Ohio River and of Mason and Dixon's line" (Jones, 1960, p. 208). In the same fifty-year span, foreigners constituted only a small fragment of the population in the south and in many of these areas there was an actual decline.
By the end of the nineteenth century, nativism was acquiring virulent overtones. Compounding the problem and fueling the xenophobic feelings was an economic depression that enhanced the inequalities, misery and problems that industrial America began to face. For conservative segments, the repetition of the European experience in America was becoming an unpleasant reality. In their view, the "new" immigration brought along elements of instability that had no place in American society. Furthermore, as Jones (1960) maintains:

With few exceptions, nineteenth century immigrants did not share the ebullience, the faith in progress, that characterized their native American contemporaries. Their European antecedents had taught them rather to be pessimistic, resigned, unhopeful of changing the existing order of things. As strangers to democracy, they still looked upon government primarily as an evil to be kept at arm's length, rather than as an instrument lying conveniently to hand. These tendencies were, perhaps, particularly marked among Catholics, whose religion stressed both the acceptance of authority and the subordination of earthly to spiritual values. But in addition to the Catholic Church, most of the other religious organizations to which immigrants belonged were generally to be found on the side of conservativism and orthodoxy. The reason for this was that, as a group, immigrant clergymen were congenitally suspicious of any organization which threatened to compete with them for the loyalty of their flocks; Lutheran pastors and Catholic priests vied with each other, therefore, in denouncing reform movements as materialistic, pagan, even sacriligious. (p. 231)

Underlying this religious suspiciousness and animosity was a deep nationalistic feeling. In the eyes of conservative leaders, the whole American democratic experiment was at stake. Somehow a feeling of insecurity and loss of control was developing. That insecurity stemmed largely from the perception that the new immigrants were more loyal to their heritage and traditions than to the needs and values of the new country.
Many persons, especially in the conservative sectors, saw the answer in the education of the people in the ideals for which the country stood. This "Americanization" process was not a new concept in America.

Americanization education entered the nation's culture early in the seventeenth century as a contribution of colonial New England. From the sermons of its pastors that urged the people to conform to the Orthodoxy of church and state to the effort to bring the 'savage tawny Indian' into the 'true faith' of the English, New England was the source of the American confidence in education as the best means for bringing the individual into conformity with his society...In the 18th century there were efforts to secularize this movement and make it more nationalistic and all encompassing. Benjamin Franklin was one of the outmost proposers of this system in what he called the 'happy mediocrity'. (Carlson, 1975, pp. 5-6)

But Ben Franklin was not alone in his vision of the new country. Other influential people, such as John Jay and Noah Webster, also viewed the need for this Americanization process. Its goal was the avoidance of hierarchical structures similar to those of Europe, such as a state church and a monarchy, and to help create "an American civil religion based on republicanism, the middle class, and nondenominational Protestantism" (Carlson, 1975, p. 7).

The Americanization process reached its zenith in the first quarter of the twentieth century. This process, that had its roots in the desires of many leaders to see the concretion of an experiment, was precipitated by the tremendous influx of immigrants to the United States, especially in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This immigration, as stated before, was idiosyncratically different from the original Puritan Protestant immigration. These "new" immigrants
from southern and eastern Europe represented a new challenge to the establishment in America. In the second half of the nineteenth century, this challenge was met by the radical and militant Anglo-Saxonism with force, and reunited the separatist tendencies of the North and the South into one solid union. But it was becoming increasingly evident that not all of the challenges could be met by the force of the arms. (Carlson, 1975) To do this would be to repeat the same policies and errors that Europe had made in meeting their challenges. Internally, the force of the arms was to be used as a last resort. To replace this use of violence, education was thought to be the best answer. This was also an American experiment to meet its own challenges presented by a heterogeneity of races, religions, cultures and beliefs that European nations did not have. As Carlson states [from 1914 to the early 1920s]:

self-styled patriots demanded that immigrants cleanse themselves of all 'foreignisms'. Factories established classes for the instruction of their immigrant employees in English, citizenship, and American customs. Y.M.C.A.'s and other community organizations offered similar programs. Under the label of citizenship education, the schools expanded and intensified the indoctrination of the immigrants and their children in Anglo-Saxon and Protestant values. Adult education developed into a Profession in the United States at this time largely as the result of this campaign that involved large numbers of volunteers and all levels of America's burgeoning educational experiment. (p. 8)

It was ironic that the same country that greatly stressed the values of freedom and independence, required so much of its newcomers. But, as Carlson sees it, it was a rationalization process where the individual was seen as gaining so much that his relinquishing of individual differences to benefit the common cause was perceived as beneficial for
everyone. They were building a new nation, a new culture. As George Santayana (1920) saw, "To be an American is of itself almost a moral condition, an education, and a career." (p. 168)

This idea of a strong, homogeneous and complying American population was what the "Americanizers" had in mind, although the ideals upon which America rested were those of freedom and liberty. These Americanizers believed that for people to enjoy this country, they needed to be totally assimilated into it. If the newcomers were left alone, the American society would become subgrouped and this would lead to chaos and division. The rapid industrialization that was taking place in the United States, with its concurrent urbanization resulting in precarious living conditions with dense populations, vice and crime, was offered as an example of what America was becoming. To save it from this, many of the Americanizers pressed for a more controlled state of affairs.

Perhaps the major achievement of Americanization education was the pernicious indoctrination of new Americans with a hostility towards nonconformity and a desire to rid themselves of any distinctive European cultural heritage. Immigrants and their children learned in the schools, in the factories, and in other community organizations that diversity led to divisiveness. People who looked, acted, or believed differently from the majority were described as threats to the security of the nation. In the name of national unity, Americanizers discouraged cultural variety in America and promoted nativism and racism among the successive waves of immigrants. (Carlson, 1975, p. 10)

The United States was seen as a chosen nation that could lead the world into better organized societies. For many, the pursuit and achievement of these dreams of grandeur and splendor were becoming a "raison d'etre".
No truth is more patent in American history than the fact that this nation is an Old Testament people. Our attitudes towards thrift and success in business, toward Sabbath observance, toward crime and punishment, and toward the taboos of sex morality give convincing evidence of this. The explanation is to be found, no doubt, in the vigor and pervasiveness of the Calvinist influence...The most common idea deriving from Old Testament sources was the notion that America was divinely appointed to fulfill a great mission in the history of our planet. In the opinion of some of the colonial leaders, the great events of the past had been consumated by God in order to prepare the way for the American triumph. (Burns, 1957, p. 11)

This ethnocentricity of perceiving one's culture as the ideal or most important one is not exclusive to the American culture, but shared by most societies and cultures. Where they differ is in the degree and commitment with which they pursue this vision. Many reasons may be argued for this aspect of the American culture, but the one that interests us is the historical continuity of ideas. When the early settlers came to America, they did so to fulfill a dream and a vision. The dream was the creation of a state substantially different from that which their ancestors had created in Europe, with liberty and justice for all; the vision was that they did this to fulfill a greater design. But, if the early settlers had this religious determination, demographic and social changes in America were considered threatening by the people who held similar beliefs of the realization of this dream and vision.

Josiah Strong, a Congregational minister who traced his lineage to Puritan New England, argued in 1885 that if the United States would overcome the perils of Roman Catholicism, Mormonism, immigration, intemperance, socialism, extreme wealth, and the growth of the carnal city, it could look forward to the voluntary adoption of the American way of life throughout South America, Africa, and the rest of the world. In his Our Country, a book that sold 176,000 copies by 1916, Strong urged Americans
to cleanse their nation so that it would possess 'the largest liberty, the purest Christianity, the highest civilization'. (Carlson, 1975, p. 73)

This struggle to indoctrinate people into the "American character and creed" ultimately had a political purpose. Its ultimate goal was the creation and maintenance of a great society. On commenting about the American creed, Samuel Huntington (1981) raises the argument that in the United States:

1. - Since the late eighteenth or early nineteenth century, there have existed in the United States certain basic political values and ideas that can be thought of as the 'American Creed'.
2. - This Creed has been broadly supported by most elements in American society.
3. - Although some modifications of the Creed have occurred over time, its central elements have changed relatively little in the course of two hundred years.
4. - In contrast to the situation in most European societies, this Creed has played and continues to play a central role in the definition of American national identity. (p. 14)

This national creed reflects the deep belief and confidence, although shaken at times, that the American people had in themselves, their country, and their institutions. Underlying this creed, there was a faith and reliance in the idea of progress. As Beard (1933) sees it, the concept of progress

...implies that mankind, by making use of science and invention, can progressively emancipate itself from plagues, famines, and social disaster, and subjugate the materials and forces of the earth to the purposes of the good life - here and now. In essence the idea of progress belongs to our own times, for it was unknown to the ancients and to the thinkers of the Middle Ages. (p. 3)

The American vision of a vital and great society was seen as threatened at different times and for different reasons. At the turn
of the century, the nativists perceived the Republic as being threatened by social forces such as immigration and different ideologies. To preserve the dream, social control was necessary. It was necessary because the different segments of the American society did not regard its democratic system in the same way. But the ultimate risk was not only the immigrants. In that sense, the illusion of democracy, liberty and freedom were seen as concessions that the establishment would make so as not to grant economic or structural concessions to immigrants or to the natives. What was necessary then was a more "scientific" management of the social forces. It was then that the social scientists, such as E. A. Ross and J. B. Watson, came into play. The behavioristic idea largely represents the scientific management of the behavior of the population. In and of itself, it represents the transition from an imprecise management of behavior to a scientific approach of an old aspiration.

Behaviourism is a typical product of thought at that stage of mass society in which it is more important, from the practical point of view, to be able to calculate the average behaviour of the mass than to understand the private motives of individuals or to transform the whole personality. In this sense behaviourism belongs essentially to the first stage of planning, where in the sphere of individual conduct, one seeks to induce reactions which will be 'correct' and appropriate to a thoroughly organized society, without, however, transforming the personality as a whole or even trying to adapt the entire personality to an entirely changed society in all respects...The sphere of life which behaviourism seeks to calculate and control is that of pure action - external individual behaviour. Moreover, it is interested in this only to the extent that it must be accurately understood in order to deal with it in corresponding practical situations. For this purpose one must exclude in advance all those meanings which conduct derives from inner motives and which make it really difficult to understand. (Mannheim, 1950a, pp. 213-214)
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

Perhaps the single most influential factor in the development of behaviorism was the fundamental change in beliefs and attitudes that the Enlightenment movement brought about. The distinctive characteristic of the Enlightenment movement was the questioning and reexamining of traditional authority, morality, social and family traditions. The philosophes put "man" in the forefront of all affairs, deeply believing in his natural benevolence.

By doing this reexamination of self-understanding and world understanding, the philosophes irreversibly changed a world order that was enforced for centuries. The principal victim of this secular revolution was, of course, organized religion. One major side effect of this weakening of religious thought and belief was that it also destroyed a source of political and social control. In general, if order was to be preserved and the existing controlling institutions were ineffective, then new ones had to be built. To achieve this, the philosophes realized that belief in the capabilities of science and technology was of paramount importance.

In the United States, as opposed to Europe, organized religion also suffered the consequences of the Enlightenment, but its overall deterioration was less than in Europe. This was the case because in America, religion and politics were capable of coexistence. Moreover, the former was largely embedded in the latter, and both worked toward the creation of the Kingdom of God in America, or the Great Society as
it has been known more recently. This civil religion of America was largely based on the Protestant Puritan ethic. As such "the oneness of religion was related to the continuance of a certain community, the early settlers and their offsprings, who were of Anglo-Saxon and northern European stock. But it was also related to the widespread adoption by others of the creed, code and cultus that the original community handed on. Although many times they were unaware of it, Catholics and Jews, Buddhists and Eastern Orthodox Christians could and did share in public Protestantism." (Albanese, 1981, p. 249)

Even when organized religion started declining its influence, the ideas for which it stood remained in its civil religion, or public Protestantism.

The nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however, brought problems and realities to the culture as a whole that were threatening the realization of the Protestant Puritan vision, that is, the final, model, Christian society. With the immigration of a myriad of races, customs, and religions, rapid urbanization, industrial development, social tensions, and declining effective religious control, traditional sectors of society felt threatened. This threat was the result of a feeling of insecurity by conservative sectors who felt that the stable and orderly society that Americans traditionally wanted was being contested.

Although the problem was not simple and had no easy solutions, it was simplified into a general idea of the forces of good against the forces of evil. Albanese (1981) attributes this simplification to an old idea; "The Puritans have been a melodramatic people. Some
of the later Protestant search to simplify was already theirs, for their millennialism divided the world into a battlefield between two forces. On one side were God and His saints; on the other, the devil and his agents. In this dualistic world, reality was made up of sharp contrasts - good and evil, heaven and hell, truth and falsehood. Even more, significant divine and human actions were perceived by their sharp contrast with the humdrum routine of everyday life." (p. 228)

But the battle to prevent chaos and restore order could not be waged by the Churches. Their influence, as an agent of social control, had declined. This was due in part to their internal divisiveness, the competition among the different churches and the increased secularism as a result of new explanations of natural phenomena that gave way with older beliefs.

The issue of increasing social control to preserve an orderly society was gaining adherents. Social scientists from diverse fields, sociology, psychology, political science, were responding to that need. Psychologists, such as Hugo Münsterberg, envisioned controlled societies. In Münsterberg's case, he established comparisons between his natal Germany with its more rigid social hierarchical structure and "orderly" way of life, and America which he perceived as chaotic and disorganized.

The crucial failing of American society as Münsterberg saw it, lay in too much freedom and too much equality - the obverse, in his terms, of community. Individual initiative and independence of mind had tamed a wilderness for pioneer America, but the complex conditions of the twentieth century demanded a renewed commitment to social purpose and the applications of German principles of efficiency. The individual had to learn to subordinate his own interests and goals to those of the society as a whole and to assume his proper role.
in the social organism. This meant above all, an increased respect for authority, whether represented by parents and teachers, political leaders, academic scholars or scientific experts. (Hale, 1980, p. 59)

But if Münsterberg somehow represented the transplantation of German ideals to American realities, there was a native American who also responded to these perceived needs, John Broadus Watson. Watson was not only an American product by nature of his birth, but, most importantly, he was idiosyncratically American. He was born and raised in the culture of his country and, as such, responded to some of its needs and values.

His main answer to the pressing problems was education, for he proposed:

I think behaviorism does lay a foundation for saner living. It ought to be a science that prepares men and women for understanding the first principles of their own behavior. It ought to make men and women eager to rearrange their own lives, and especially eager to prepare themselves to bring up their own children in a healthy way. I wish I had time more fully to describe this, to picture you the kind of rich and wonderful individual we should make of every healthy child if only we could let it shape itself properly and then provide for it a universe in which it could exercise that organization — a universe unshackled by legendary folklore of happenings thousands of years ago; unhampered by disgraceful political history; free of foolish customs and conventions which have no significance in themselves, yet which hold the individual in like taut steel bands. I am not asking here for revolution; I am not asking people to go out to some God-forsaken place, form a colony, go naked and live a communal life, nor am I asking for a change to a diet of roots and herbs. I am not asking for 'free love'. I am trying to dangle a stimulus in front of you, a verbal stimulus which, if acted upon, will gradually change this universe. For the universe will change if you bring up your children, not in the freedom of the libertine, but in behavioristic freedom — a freedom we cannot even picture in words, so little do we know of it. Will not these children in turn, with their better ways of living and thinking, replace us as society and in turn bring up their children in a still more scientific way, until the world finally becomes
a place fit for human habitation. (Watson, 1925, p. 248)

Watson's theory and proposal were born, in part, out of his experiences in conditioning procedures. But while these procedures represent the technical aspects of his knowledge and skills and were acquired in academia and laboratories, the overall characteristics of his theory had a close resemblance to certain values embedded in the Protestant tradition already described, that over periods of time, became part of the American culture.

In 1913 when Watson launched his manifesto, his theory was not well received in certain circles, mainly the academic and scientific communities. His disregard for traditional methods of psychology, such as introspection and exploration of the unconscious, created a barrier between behaviorists and "traditionalists" that would extend for much of the twentieth century. This dispute was more than just a dispute among academicians over facts. The roots of this discord were the distrust that the Puritan ethic had of the intellectual establishment. It should also be remembered that a good deal of the psychological principles and theories were, at that point, imported from Europe. Watson's theory was an American product created to deal with the specific problems of his society. If psychoanalysis can be considered a product from Europe, destined to remedy problems that European societies had, such as repressed sexuality, neuroses, and others, then behaviorism was destined to deal with some of the problems of the American culture. As pointed out by Hofstadter (1963), the American culture was a pragmatic one where the distrust of the intellectuals was great. Again, this anti-intellectualism was not an
opposition to the intellect per se, but rather the effect of the Protestant culture following specific goals. To pursue these goals, the ways and means as well as the leadership had to be clear and decisive. Intellectuals were perceived as lacking these conditions. In addition, they were perceived mainly as a European product, and the American ethos distrusted these conditions, as has already been discussed.

The clash between what was perceived as American psychology and foreign psychology can best be exemplified by the discrepancies between Watson and McDougall:

In a classic debate between the two protagonists of 'common-sense' psychology and Behaviorism, McDougall went at Watson with ill-concealed ferocity. Behaviorism was too simple an explanation of complex mental life, it was 'lopsided, extreme' said McDougall. Watson had been a 'good man gone wrong'. Persons of common sense must of necessity be on McDougall's side. Behaviorism was an audacious American movement which blandly assumed that no European (McDougall was originally a Britisher) could think straight about things because all of them were fettered by centuries of tradition. (Winkler, 1939, p. 303)

But the animosity was not only confined to Americans and Europeans. Behaviorism was also a rebellion against the American psychological establishment that perpetuated European ideas. Furthermore, as Winkler maintains:

Watson's psychology, Behaviorism, contains the general characteristics that we can recognize in Watson himself, the fun loving hillbilly who came to a cultural awakening in the breezy Midwest. Just so William James' psychology was characteristic of the continental culture in which he grew up in an overcivilized New England. Watson was an American with much of the pioneer striking out in him as a man and as a psychologist. James was an American also, but one with a hundred-year start which an established urban culture had contributed. The flowering of New England culture occurred before the War between the States, in a
By the time Watson launched this theory, the social tensions in American society were evident and social control over the masses was sought. While at different points through the centuries diverse societies felt threatened by external or internal forces, there was always a segment of that population who felt threatened the most and attempted, by all means at their disposal, to restore order and equilibrium to a system that they perceived as being in chaos and heading for self-destruction. This aspect of perceived threat was analyzed by Hofstadter in *Paranoid Style in American Politics*. For him, "the paranoid spokesman sees the fate of this conspiracy in apocaliptic terms, he traffics in the birth and death of whole worlds, whole political orders, whole systems of human values. He is always manning the barricades of civilization. He constantly lives at a turning point: it is now or never in organizing resistance to conspiracy. Time is forever running out." (pp. 29-30)

That nativism that was present at the turn of the century shared some of these paranoid characteristics. It would be very difficult to explain and understand these characteristics unless they are seen against the proper perspective of the religious background. It is here that the Protestant ethic and the perceived sense of mission played a very important role. As Norman Cohen (1957) explains:

The meglomaniac view of oneself as the Elect, wholly good, abominably persecuted yet assured of ultimate triumph; the attribution of gigantic or demonic powers to the adversary; the refusal to accept the ineluctable limitations and imperfections of human existence, such
as transcience, dissention, conflict, fallibility whether intellectual or moral; the obsession with inerrable prophecies - these attitudes are symptoms which together constitute the unmistakable syndrome of paranoia. (p. 309)

That feeling of persecution and threat in social changes in the composition of the American society is what caused the resurgence of nativistic feelings and the need for social control. It had to be American solutions for American problems. With their experience of the failure to control their social challenges by the force of the arms, European nations and churches could not be looked upon as a model. Instead, the American nativists thought of relying upon education as a way of incorporating people, wittingly or unwittingly, into a system that they felt was threatened. These feelings and the consequent demand for action were not the constant for the majority of the population nor were they present all of the time. As Hofstadter (1966) perceived:

The recurrence of the paranoid style over a long span of time and in different places suggests that a mentality disposed to see the world in the paranoid's way may always be present in some considerable minority of the population. But the fact that movements employing a paranoid style are not constant but come in successive episodic waves suggests that the paranoid disposition is mobilized into action chiefly by social conflicts that involve ultimate schemes of values and that bring fundamental fears and hatreds, rather than negotiable interests, into political action. Catastrophe or the fear of catastrophe is most likely to elicit the syndrome of paranoid rhetoric. (p. 39)

The "growing" pains of America cyclically elicited these types of reactions. Watson's rearing of children in "behavioristic freedom" was an attempt to deal with these issues in his time. Social unrest gave these social theorists a sense of urgency; again, this sense of
urgency tended to fluctuate, increasing or decreasing, depending on economic conditions and the like.

But Watson's theory cannot be conceived only as a social theory destined to bring about social peace. His theory is ultimately moral; for, as Heidbreder (1933) maintains, "Its prohibitions [of Behaviorism] are not merely the precautionary measures of science; they are defenses against a discarded view of life." (p. 260)

It is interesting to note, as Matson (1964) does, that "the reform which was contemplated was not the reform of institutions to meet the dynamic needs of men, but the reform of men to meet the static needs of institutions." (p. 58) In this way, Watson, although pretending to do something else, perpetuated the status quo and did little to narrow the gap between people, ideas and institutions.

J. B. Watson and B. F. Skinner represent the end-product of three centuries of profound changes in the economic, religious, political, philosophical, and social aspects of society. They were both children of the Enlightened ideas for they represented the rebellion against old and obtrusive conceptions of man and the universe. In addition, theirs was a positive, scientific and technocratic idea of the world. They represented the struggle for utopian ideas of society. For, as Skinner (1983) explains:

The New Atlantis was the first utopian story I read. A better world was possible, but it would not come about by accident. It must be planned and built, and with the help of science. Solomon's house in the New Atlantis was the model of the Royal Society, and the American Philosophical Society, which Benjamin Franklin founded on the model of the Royal Society, was dedicated to 'the promotion of useful knowledge'. It was the theme of the Enlightenment and, very early, of my own intellectual life. (p. 32)
Basically, Watson's and his followers' approach is known as modern materialism. William McDougall (1929) maintains that "Mechanistic science, then, is science that excludes, neglects, ignores or abstracts from the process of the world; and Modern Materialism is the assumption that such mechanistic science can in principle achieve a complete and satisfactory account of the world and of a man, his nature, origin and destiny." (p. 9) Apparently, the mechanistic assumption of modern materialism would be incompatible with religious beliefs. This would be especially detrimental, as McDougall emphasizes, for the common man. The everyday citizen would see his system of beliefs destroyed, or, at best, replaced by a system of abstract propositions that would hardly promote enthusiastic devotion or loyalty.

Regardless of McDougall's doubts about the efficacy of the system, human engineering was sought after. It was sought because it was believed that a technologically developed society could not be controlled by traditional means that were based on anachronical beliefs and methods. And human engineering was considered necessary to prevent the corruption and decline of a model civilization. What was feared the most were not the external forces as much as the internal ones. As Burns (1957) viewed it, "If the downfall of America ever happens in accordance with the predictions of her leaders, it will occur as a result of internal causes. Upon this, agreement has been practically unanimous." (p. 269) In the understanding of many, a carefully planned society would avoid the perils of a decline. To achieve a carefully planned society, human engineering was looked upon.

As Hayek (1952) suggests, the economic planning that became a
prevalent feature of the twentieth century, is an outgrowth of the boundless belief that scientific activity can and should permeate at all levels and all spheres of the life of a nation. That scientific activity, whatever its realms may be, has in the "engineer" the maximal expression. That "engineer", the person who relies on an organized and planned method of achieving the ends that it sets out to achieve, makes widespread use of science. Merle Turner (1967) provides us with a point of reference on why the systematized knowledge of science, its commitment to logic and observation and reliance upon data and methodological exploration seem so attractive to the user of science; in his view, these characteristics "seem somehow to bring to the person answers often more satisfying than any others he receives." (p. 169) Undoubtedly, science per se has a major advantage; an ordinary person will tend not to question the findings of science. Furthermore, as Turner points out, facts apparently have a place by themselves. They may not be the total answer to all the questions a person has, but they are indubitable. As a result, science will tend to stop the search for alternate meanings and explanations. By describing and explaining the world as it is, or science believes it to be, science has the added value of being very rewarding and comforting.

The "engineer" that Hayek (1952) speaks about is usually concerned with a single end, controls all the efforts directed toward this end, and dispose for this purpose over a definitely given supply of resources...[he] has complete control of the particular little world with which he is concerned, surveys it in all its relevant aspects and has to deal only with 'known quantities'. So far as the solution of his engineering problem is concerned, he is not taking part in a social process in which others may take independent decisions but lives in
a separate world of his own. The application of the techniques which he has mastered, of the generic rules he has been taught, indeed presupposes such complete knowledge of the objective facts; those rules refer to objective properties of the things and can be applied only after all the particular circumstances of time and place have been assembled and brought under the control of a single brain. His technique, in other words, refers to typical situations defined in terms of objective facts, not to the problem of how to find out what resources are available or what is the relative importance of different needs. He has been trained in objective possibilities, irrespective of the particular conditions of time and place, in the knowledge of those properties of things which remain the same everywhere and at all times and which they possess irrespective of a particular human situation. (p. 95)

Behaviorism was largely the result of this type of human engineering. Watson and later Skinner were largely interested in producing a "totalitarian technocracy" for their utopia. Watson and Skinner were interested in the betterment of "their society", which represents the continuation of an old American dream. They were genuinely concerned about its future when the traditional safeguards of morality, stability, and control were broken. In all of these aspects, they represented aspirations of parts of the American society. But they did not speak for the totality of the American culture because the unity that they sought never existed. The concern that their theories created in different circles, their ultimate purpose and ways were never dispelled by Watson and Skinner. This lack of agreement also reflects the concerns for freedom that the American culture has over systems that may curtail individual liberties. Seventy years after the launching of the behavioristic theory, the attack and defense of it still provokes strong epithets. The concerns that intellectuals had for behaviorism were perhaps best expressed by Hannah Arendt (1958)
when she said that "the trouble with modern theories of behaviorism is not that they are wrong but that they could become true, that they actually are the best possible conceptualization of certain obvious trends in modern society. It is quite conceivable that the modern age which began with such an unprecedented and promising outburst of human activity may end in the deadliest, most sterile passivity history has ever known." (p. 32)

Behaviorism, as a social organization and as a philosophical theory, may never win the hearts of the entire American society. Paternalistic, authoritative and disciplinarian, this theory appeals to segments of the American population, while it continues to be resisted by others. This clash is nothing new in American culture. In that sense, behaviorism represents a historical continuity of ideas, while the resistance it faces also represents the same continuity.
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