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The Marxian and the Weberian Theories of Bureaucracy: Contradictions and Approximations

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THE MARXIAN AND THE WEBERIAN THEORIES OF BUREAUCRACY: 
CONTRADICTIONS AND APPROXIMATIONS

by

Khai Leong Ho

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The purpose of this study is to analyse (1) the basic elements in Marx's and Weber's theories of bureaucracy, and (2) the contradictions and approximations that appear in both the Marxian and the Weberian paradigms. An attempt is made to examine the dysfunctional aspects of bureaucracy in relation to the Weberian model, and the bureaucratization of socialism which is the unanticipated consequence of the Marxian model. The conclusion of this study indicates that the two seemingly opposite approaches, after all, have certain similarities in their theoretical framework and in their practical dilemma.
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Khai Leong Ho
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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to analyse (1) the basic elements in Marx's and Weber's theories of bureaucracies, and (2) the contradictions and approximations that appear in both the Marxian and the Weberian paradigms. An attempt is made to examine the dysfunctional aspects of bureaucracy in relation to the Weberian model, and the bureaucratization of socialism which is the unanticipated consequence of the Marxian model. The conclusion of this study indicates that the two seemingly opposite approaches, after all, have certain similarities in their theoretical framework and in their practical dilemma.

Review of Literature

The literature relevant to the study and which serves to establish the direction of this inquiry can be divided into three categories for our purpose:

(1) Literature on Marx's and Weber's conception of bureaucracy;
(2) Literature on the bureaucratic process of socialism, and
(3) Literature on the theoretical foundation and elaborations of the Weberian position on bureaucracy.

Interpretations of Marx's and Weber's conception of bureaucracy as separate entities are abundant. Andras Hegedus, a Hungarian
political economist, offers a Marxist interpretation of Marx's position in his *Socialism and Bureaucracy* (1976). After denouncing those contemporary sociologists who trace the scientific treatment of bureaucracy no further than Weber, Hegedus claims that scientific explanation of bureaucracy was first attempted by Marx. Marx, according to Hegedus, treated bureaucracy "as a set of substantive relations to which certain types of socio-economic administration or management give rise," and not as "the blundering of incompetent officials" (1976:9) as contemporary sociologists tend to interpret Marx.

Among the non-Marxist studies is Sherman Chang's *The Marxian Theory of the State* (1965) which attempts to interpret Marx's position on the state in terms of the historical and philosophical background, its perspective of the postcapitalist society, and its destiny in the future. However, Hal Draper's *Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution* (1977) offers the most comprehensive review of Marx's conception of the state and its bureaucracy. Draper has attempted to (1) trace the political development of the young Marx and his conception of the state and civil society from his criticisms of Hegel; (2) expound Marx's theory of the state in relation to authority, force, democracy, autonomy; (3) test the utilities of the so-called Bonaparte model in Marx's thinking, and (4) examine Marx's vision of the state beyond the European context.

As for the literature on Weber, Carl Fredrich's "Some Observations on Weber's Analysis of Bureaucracy" (1952) reaffirms the
contribution of Weber's Ideal-type to bureaucratic theories for his emphasis on the key concept of rationalization and de-mystification in relation to power in all social relationships. Another important aspect of Weber's hypothesis is revealed by Frederic Burins's "Bureaucracy and National Socialism: A Reconsideration of Weberian Theory" (1952) in which he demonstrates that Weber has over-estimated the political importance of the technical knowledge possessed by the bureaucratic expert.

Alfred Diamant's "The Bureaucratic Model: Max Weber Rejected, Rediscovered, Reformed" (1962), which has been praised as "one of the best short discussions of Weber's administrative theory available to us in English" (LaPalombara, 1966:88), provides a clarification from the Weberian viewpoint. After surveying the vast literature which has expounded, modified, or rejected Weber's theory of bureaucracy, Diamant claims that most of these studies have misunderstood Weber's work. Indeed, such a concern was also reflected in the work of Bendix (1977) and Mommsen (1974). Weber's writings on bureaucracy, Diamant observes, must be examined in the broader setting of his typology of political authority. The modern society does not only maintain the legal-rational type of authority, but also the charismatic and traditional types. The construction of types of administrative staffs must be preceded by the development of each type of authority accordingly. By doing so, then only is it likely that "Weber's analysis of bureaucracy might again be used profitably in research" (1962:61).
However, the comparative study of the two models are few. Among them, Bengt Abrahamsson in a work entitled *Bureaucracy or Participation: The Logic of Organization* (1977) has outlined the basic differences and similarities between Marx's and Weber's position on bureaucracy. Abrahamsson claims that Weber differs from Marx on at least three points: (a) unlike Marx, Weber did not see bureaucracy as a specific bourgeois phenomenon tied to capitalism. Instead, Weber saw the possibility of the autonomy of bureaucracy and the growth of bureaucracy as inevitable; (b) Weber did not see bureaucracy as a class organ but viewed it as an element of modern democracy. Weber, however, also viewed it as a threat to the democratic process. At the same time, Weber argued that among the accelerators of bureaucracy, the economic system is more important than the democratic political system. Thus socialism is viewed as a great stimulus, and (c) for Weber, the elimination of bureaucracy is not possible in an increasingly complex society which requires more and more professionalism and specialization. At the same time, Abrahamsson is quick to note the similarities of Marx's and Weber's models. He comments:

Weber's theory . . . connects the development of bureaucracy with the issue of the long-run material and political development of society. The capitalist production system and economy are two of the most important factors in Weber's explanatory scheme. In those respects, there are important similarities between Weber and the Marxist tradition (1977:79).
Another valuable study is done by Wolfgang Mommsen in his book *The Age of Bureaucracy* (1974). After admitting that Weber never dealt with Marx's theories in a systematic and comprehensive way, Mommsen remarks that

While Marx's theories were considered by Weber to be most valuable as a particular form of the ideal–typical construction, they were absolutely unpalatable to him as ontological propositions (1974:50–51).

Mommsen further observes that Weber rejects the Marxist belief that (a) the dictatorship of the proletariat was a suitable way of paving the way for a society in which oppression and suppression of classes would be abolished, and (b) the abolition of private ownership of the means of production in the industrial economy could solve the problems of bureaucratization (1974:59). These points are complementary to the analysis of Anthony Giddens's *Capitalism and Modern Social Theory* (1971). Gidden points out that Weber did not conceive the possibility of the transformation of the bureaucratization of social life through the occurrence of socialist revolution. Instead, the socialized economy would increasingly subject itself to bureaucratic administration in view of the fact that economic operations are taken up by the state (1971:236).

The readings discussed above indicate to a large extent the theoretical differences and similarities of Marx and Weber, and the important implications over the two paradigms of bureaucratic theories.
It would therefore be necessary to examine the original writings of Marx and Weber in order to discover the rational behind their philosophical debate.

The most comprehensive of Marx's work has been published in Marx and Engels: Collected Works (1975- ). However, for our purpose, the less comprehensive Selected Works of Marx and Engels, 2 vols. (1962) is used. Marx's criticisms of the state and its bureaucracy are scattered throughout his prolific writings. However, his most articulate position on bureaucracy is found in Contribution to the Critique of Hegels Philosophy of Law (in Collected Works, vol. 3), The Civil War in France, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, and The Class Struggle in France. In these works, Marx outlined his revolutionary views on the bureaucracy and the state and provided justification for their elimination. To a greater extent, Engels has helped to expand the negative notion of bureaucracy. His comments are mainly found in his The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State.

Weber's analysis of bureaucracy, unlike Marx's, is more systematic. It can be found in his Economy and Society (1978), Part I, Chapter III: "The Types of Legitimate Domination," Part II, Chapter XI: "Bureaucracy," and Appendix II, "Parliament and Government in Reconstructed Germany." In these essays, Weber outlined the basic characteristics of bureaucracy and its effects on social development.

The second category of literature is on the interpretation...
of the Marxist model and the bureaucratic process that are taking place in the socialist countries. The Marxist position of bureaucracy is best reflected in the writings and deeds of Lenin and Mao Zedong; for this reason both are chosen for our purpose of discussion. Lenin's State and Revolution presents a free variation of Marx's incomplete analysis of revolutionary processes in relation to the state and its bureaucracy. In this work, Lenin echoed many of the Marxist themes of bureaucratic organization: its use as an instrument of class domination, as a bourgeois apparatus, and the withering away of the state. Mao's statements on bureaucracy, however, are scattered throughout his work. His Selected Works, 5 vols. (1977) and Stuart Schram's The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung (1969) are consulted. All in all, Mao basically maintained the Marxist-Leninist position as far as bureaucratic structure in the post-capitalist society is concerned.

The literature which attempts to analyse the relationship between the apparatus of power and the social structure in the Communist countries is recent. Donald Hodges's The Bureaucratization of Socialism (1981) attempts to seek an explanation for the gap between the Marxist theory of bureaucratic exploitation and the actual expansion of bureaucracy in the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, China, and Cuba. Hodges claims that the managerial and technical expertise in the bureaucracy represent an important factor in production, which Marx, and for that matter the Marxists, have failed to consider adequately. Hodges further comments that the
reality in the Communist states does not fit into the classical Marxism, and that the bureaucracy, in an attempt to consolidate its own power, has become "a class for itself" (1981:60). The reason for this, taking the case of the Soviet Union, is that "the revolutionary elite grew tired of its proletarian class" (1981:130). In this process, the bureaucracy has to work with the working class, the petty-bureaucratic elements and the techni-bureaucratic stratum, and eventually class conflicts developed even in the post-capitalist society. Such conflicts, contrary to Marx's vision, have led Hodges to the following conclusion:

Communist practice is no longer monolithic but takes two principal forms: the centralizing tendency of the politbureaucracy and the decentralizing tendency of the technibureaucracy. What needs emphasizing is that both tendencies are anticommunist; both are critical in practice of Marxist theory. In fact, they show that Marx's working class is not the decisive agent shaping socialist revolutions. That agent is the bureaucratic class (1981:143).

The work by two Hungarian socialists, George Konrad and Ivan Szelenyi, reflects the similar theme. The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power (1979) analyzes the evolution and the rise of power of the bureaucratic intelligentsia in Eastern Europe and concludes that they have formed into a class. Such a conclusion runs parallel to Milovan Djilas' work (1957), which is one of the earliest to forward such an argument. Konrad and Szelenyi point out that the
cause of such a formation is the "rational-redistributive system" in the socialist countries. The bureaucracies in the rational-redistributive system, unlike the market system, are not subject in principle to the separation of power and to the distinction between policy-making and executive functions. In other words, there is no distinction between the political and economic spheres, and "no pluralism of ends" (1979:150). Moreover, there is no identifiable political control mechanism in the political party bureaucracies and this has enabled the bureaucracies to exercise power according to their own interest.

Similar conclusions to those of Hodges and Konrad and Szelenyi have been drawn by Maria Hirszowicz, a Polish sociologist. Her study, The Bureaucratic Leviathan (1980), provides another perspective on the withering away of the state as a myth in the Communist states. In her analysis, the Communist states have actually become bureaucratic systems which have extended rule over every level of social structure—the state has become the "sovereign bureaucracy" and the party is in charge. Hirszowicz observes that

The position of the party as the ruling class institution imposed a new hierarchy of objectives; the maintenance of power has become the primary goal and most spectacular feature of the communist administration. The administrative and managerial functions continue to be performed but superimposed over them as a dominating aim is the consolidation of power. Behind that drive, there is no other class, no other interests and no other institutions but the ruling party and its bureaucracy, with all its tentacles reaching throughout the state apparatus (1980:17).
Another book, *The Withering Away of the State?* (1981), edited by Leslie Holmes provides an important analysis of the role of the party and the state in the Communist countries. The Communist countries surveyed in this book are Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Indochina, the USSR, and Yugoslavia. After conceding that the future development (or decay) of these states is difficult to predict at the moment, Holmes concludes that "with the possible exception of Yugoslavia, there are few indications that the party/or the state is withering away in the communist world" (1981:272).

The third category is the literature on the elaboration and extension of the Weberian position on bureaucracy. Extension and critique by Weberian scholars on the ideal-type model are voluminous. It will do no justice to review each and every one of them here. One of the best overviews of the literature is done by Ferrel Heady's *Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective* (1979). Heady outlines the two dominant approaches to define bureaucracy following the Weberian tradition: (a) the structural approach and (b) the behavioral approach. Heady goes on to discuss the concepts of system transformation and how administrative systems—from the Weberian canon—are related to modernization, development, and change. The discussion focuses on the "mainstream" theorists from Weber, Parsons, Merton, Eisenstadt, Crozier, LaPalombara, and Riggs among others, and how two groups of scholars, basing their theoretical framework on Weber, view bureaucracy as usurpative or instrumental
in the political development of developing nations.

A. Dunshire's Administration: The Word and the Science (1973) provides another overview on the literature of administration and bureaucracy. Especially of interest is the second half of the book in which Dunshire discusses the pre-Weberian study of the state by Von Stein, Le Play, and Saint-Simon, and traces the development through Weber to the present approaches on organizational theory. Dunshire identifies two basic reactions to bureaucracy: the 'remedial' and the 'radical'. Most Weberian scholarship is undoubtedly the former one which emphasizes the technical benefits of an organizational structure and the notion that specialization of task and authoritative co-ordination can be obtained at an acceptable cost by controlling and mitigating the dysfunctional effects. The 'radical' reaction, which is the Marxian position, on the other hand, believes that the cost of bureaucratic structure outweighs the benefits and therefore it should be abolished altogether.

Basic Propositions

Four basic propositions are considered in this study:

(1) While Weber maintained the superiority of bureaucratic organizations and the inevitability of the bureaucratization process in social development, he also acknowledged the inhumanity of and the dangers posed by bureaucracy, and he wanted it to be checked and controlled. Marx, on the other hand, rejected the legitimacy of
bureaucracy in the political system altogether, and viewed it as an instrument of political oppression and economic gratification of the propertied.

Thus the two paradigms are at the opposite ends of the continuum. It has also been determined that their influence upon subsequent theoretical efforts have been substantial. However, it is our second proposition that:

(2) The Marxian model of bureaucracy faces a dilemma and certain contradictions between theory and practice.

Likewise, such dilemma and contradictions are also found within the Weberian framework, although not to the same extent. Thus our third proposition is that:

(3) While the Marxists such as Lenin and Mao are vigorously attacking bureaucratic organization as a despotic autocracy of civil servants and as an instrument for class exploitation, the most self-critical, constructive, and scholarly examinations of the dysfunctions of bureaucracy are coming from the Weberian camp.

Given the above statements, this study will examine the Marxian and the Weberian encounter with the bureaucratic dilemma. In light of this, our fourth proposition is that:

(4) The continual criticisms of the "malady of bureaucracy" in the Weberian model, and the rapid growth of bureaucratic organizations in the socialist countries suggest an approximation of the two models in both theory and practice.
Methodology

In order to test the first proposition concerning the basic difference of Marx's and Weber's models of bureaucracy, it is necessary to go into two sources. First, the original writings of Marx and Weber will be examined. Since the primary interest of this study is Marx's and Weber's views on bureaucratic organizations, the first chapter will include a discussion of Marx's and Weber's conception of human development in relation with bureaucracy, and will largely ignore Marx's and Weber's statements on law, economy, religion, philosophy and other issues, other than those concepts and statements which were utilized for bureaucratic formulations. Second, the writings of Marx's and Weber's interpreters must be consulted. Since the literature is varied and abundant, our approach will be selected to search for guidelines to the interpretation of Marx and Weber.

In an attempt to justify the second proposition concerning the dilemma of Marxian model of bureaucracy as theory applied in practice, an analysis of bureaucratic theories by some Marxists is required. Lenin and Mao are selected among other Marxists primarily because they are both theorists and statesmen of Marxism, and because the countries under their ideological control amount to a third of humanity. In this respect, Lenin's What is to be Done? and State and Revolution, in which he outlined his theoretical interpretation of Marxist bureaucracy, are the focus of our analysis. However,
it is not easy to discuss Mao's contribution to the Marxist analysis of organization as he was not systematic in such a subject, as noted previously. However, an attempt is made to synthesize his interpretation of bureaucracy and his anticipation of the bourgeois society from his selected writings and events that have occurred in China under his stewardship.

The third chapter will attempt a content analysis of some definitions of bureaucracy in the Weberian tradition. The emphasis will be placed on the dysfunctional aspects of bureaucratic organizations in the modern Western societies. Although it would be more significant and meaningful to include the discussions of the role of bureaucracy in the political, economic, and social arena of the developing states, such a task of quantification is beyond the available scope of this study. By imposing this limitation, it is possible to focus on the central interest of this thesis, namely, the contradictions and the dilemma of bureaucratization in modern society.

Finally, the fourth proposition concerning the approximation and consensus of the models is discussed in the forth chapter as a conclusion. Evidence produced by this study suggests three trends: (a) there is a rapid expansion of the bureaucratic organizations in modern society as Weber has predicted, and as against the wishes of Marx; (b) there is also a growing concern for such a rapid proliferation and growth of bureaucratic interference in all spheres of social and political life of the citizenry, as was the concern of
both Marx and Weber; and (c) there is an theoretical and practical approximation, amidst differences in phraseology, concepts, environmental situations and social and political systems, between the Marxian and the Weberian models.
CHAPTER I

The Legacy of Marx and Weber

The theoretical contributions of Marx and Weber have substantially influenced the two paradigms that are prevailing in contemporary social thought: the radical and the orthodox paradigm (Chilcote, 1981). Indeed, the various schools of sociological and political thinking have claimed their theoretical parentage from Marx and Weber (Atkinson, 1972). The legacy of both men have paradoxically poised a serious dilemma in the synthesis of modern political philosophy (Lindblom, 1982). Their contributions should therefore inevitably be the starting point for investigation into the definitional scheme and classificatory arrangements of bureaucracy.

Much of Weberian theory has been assimilated into Western contemporary thought and hailed as of greatest heuristic value of interpreting the Western capitalist states, especially the American society (Tiryakian, 1975). Such a task was mainly taken by Talcott Parsons who has refined many of Weber's general propositions into sets of statements that have been employed in a wide range of comparative investigations. Although there exist serious criticisms of his interpretation of Weber's work (Cohen et al, 1975), Parsons has reaffirmed Weber's refutation of Marxism with his own formulation of human history (1929:40). Indeed, while Roth (1965) acknowledged
the influence of Marx on Weber, he concluded that Weber has never used a Marxian terminology.

While Weberian theory has become the mainstream of social orthodox thinking, primarily because of its intrinsic scholarly superiority as a comparative approach to macrosociological investigations, Marxist thought, in contrast, has been subordinate in its influence, most obviously in the Western scholarly tradition. This perhaps can be explained by its "reductionist" nature (Roth, 1977:XV). However, Marxist ideas in their neo-Marxist form are making a comeback by Third World developmentalists. Such a prevalence of Marxist ways of thinking in the less developed countries are said to be caused by the unpleasant relations with the industrialized and capitalist West, and the strains experienced during the early period of industrialization (Wessen, 1976:118).

Despite many similarities in their viewpoints (Lichtheim, 1961; Zeitlin, 1968) and the common agreement on the characterization of liberalism as bourgeois ideology (Ashcraft, 1972), Marx and Weber held opposing views on social structure, development and the bureaucratic order (Bendix and Roth, 1971; Giddens, 1971; Atkinson, 1972). This dichotomous classification provides an initial pretext for considering and contrasting the influence of Marx and Weber on bureaucratic theories.
Marx and the Dialectical Analysis of
Human History and Bureaucracy

Dialectic and Historical Materialism in Development

Marx's view of developmental process is deeply rooted in his materialistic interpretations of human history. He saw most theories as bourgeois and ideological and therefore meaningless as far as the explanations of social transformations are concerned, and rejected the philosophical idealism and its socio-political implications derived from Hegel. He sought a clear and direct view of the world and in particular its developmental process through historical periods from primitive communism, feudalism, capitalism, and ultimately communism. In essence, Marx's ideas of development was evolutionary (Chodak, 1973:24) and his theory was tied to his understanding of dialectical and historical materialism.

For Marx, the economic understanding of history is essential to history viewed as class struggle. Since the foundation of society is built upon the means of production, control over them is of greatest importance; therefore, the propertied class is in perpetual conflict with the laboring class who are exploited. It was the "productive forces" and the "non-productive forces" that were in conflict at crucial historical junctures. Thus, to Marx, political conflicts were in reality economic and class conflicts. In short, Marx wanted to prove:
(1) that the existence of classes is only bound
up with particular historical phases in the
development of production; (2) that the class
struggle necessarily leads to the dictatorship
of the proletariat; (3) that this dictatorship
itself only constitutes the transition to the
abolition of all classes and to a classless
society (Marx and Engels, 1975:57).

Marx therefore tied the developmental process very closely
with economic change. Marx believed that economic-technological
change can transform the superstructure, the balance of human
culture. Change for Marx is a reflection of a dialectical contraction
in the diverse social forces emerging from conflict.

In summary, Marx's historical materialism emphasized the
grounding of theory on the facts of economic and technological
reality. Historical materialism, therefore, provides the necessary
perspective of development. For Marx,

History is nothing but the succession of the
separate generations, each of which exploits:
the capital funds, the productive forces handed
down to it by all preceding generations . . .
this conception of history depends on our ability
to expound the real process of production, starting
out from the material production of life itself,
and to comprehend the form of intercourse connected
with this and created by this mode of production
. . . as the basic of all history (Marx and Engels,

Marx interpreted development from the economic point of view,
as historical process of "an immense accumulation of commodities"
(Marx, 1967, vol. I:35), and tied closely to the political developmental process with the economic perspective. The economic perspective, then, is in turn tied closely to the state, which is the most important means that would control the means of production.

The state, for Marx, is a government dominated by the bourgeoisie and serves the economic and political functions of one class at the expense of others. The notion of an independent bureaucracy which soars above society as an alienated expression of its perverted power is central in Marx's conception of the state and its bureaucracy.

**Bureaucracy as a Class Organ**

The critical analysis of the Hegelian notion of the state led Marx to a fundamental formulation of bureaucracy (Avineri, 1972; Liebich, 1982). Hegel believed that the bureaucracy could solve the conflict between the state and the civil society, and could stand as a neutral arbiter. Marx, however, contends that the conflict is irresolvable in this fashion, and the "solutions" between the individual and groups and the state are purely formal, and therefore unworkable. What began as Hegel's prescription for conflict resolution ended with the total domination of the individual and groups by the political state, and the bureaucracy will only use the commonweal to further the interest of the economically dominant class. It is, in effect, a licensed institution for class domination, and therefore, a class organ. This notion is best expressed
by Engels:

The state is nothing but the organized collective power of the possessing classes, the landowners and the capitalists, as against the exploited classes, the peasants and the workers. What the individual capitalists . . . do not want, their state also does not want. If therefore the individual capitalists deplore the housing shortage, but can hardly be persuaded even superficially to palliate its most terrifying consequences, the collective capitalist, the state, will not do much more (Marx and Engels, 1962, vol. I:547).

Marx further demotes Hegel's universal class to just another class with selfish interests. To Hegel, bureaucracy is a means to an end for the citizenry—thus he defends it; but to Marx, it is the means which serves the interests of the economically dominant class—he attacks it. The bureaucracy, according to Marx, possesses the central power of the state and at the same time is possessed by it.

Alienation

Marx's conception of the bureaucracy is that it represents the economically dominant class standing above society, but at the same time alienated from society. This is the main feature of Marxian bureaucracy: alienation. The characteristic of detachment in officialdom's relationship to the mass of the people, and the gulf it creates will produce more tensions between them. It is Marx's strong conviction that the "alienation" element in the
bureaucracy is not only undesirable, but also self-destructive. The tensions produced in the class conflict between the economically dominant class and the economically less-dominant class will eventually explode and bring about a proletarian revolution which controls the state apparatus. As Marx foresees, the state bureaucracy itself is historically an alienated organizational form which tends to come into contradiction with the social forces that gave rise to it.

The Hierarchical Structure of Bureaucracy

In Marx's judgement, the hierarchical structure of the bureaucracy becomes the chief abuse of the bureaucrats. The state exists as various bureaus are connected by relations of subordination and they are passive to obedience. It is this hierarchical structure that makes the bureaucrats think that they are all powerful. They will pursue the class struggle by attaching to themselves symbols and ideology which, paradoxically, will alienate them further from the masses and therefore unconsciously breed the seeds of self-destruction.

Thus, the true purpose of the hierarchization is to submerge in secrecy, mechanistic action, faith in authority and the quest for higher positions. Marx remarks that "in bureaucracy the identity of the interests of state and of the particular private purpose is to establish that the interests of state become a particular private purpose confronting other private purpose" (Marx and

The Incompetence of Bureaucracy

Marx also attacks incompetence in the bureaucracy. Under the existing circumstances, the bureaucracy identifies the interest of the state and its own private goals. The state, as Marx has said again and again, is degraded into an institution for segregated interest. It demands that the people put unlimited trust in the officialdom, while the state holds unlimited distrust of all non-officials. This is the basic defect which Marx sees in such an institution which is not checked at all by any other form of institutions.

The "Withering Away" of the State

It is Marx's conclusion that class conflict has undermined the unity of the society, and the instruments of political power are created to safeguard the economic power of the propertied. As the coercive and repressive functions of the bureaucracy become more preeminent, the intensity of class conflict will increase and with it the danger of revolution. Therefore, according to Marx and Engels, the abolition of the state involves three steps: the overthrow of the bourgeois state by revolution, the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the "withering away" of the proletarian bureaucracy. Engels expressed this in the following statement from his Anti-Dühring:
As soon as there is no longer any class of society to be held in subjection; as soon as, along with class domination and the struggle for individual existence based on the anarchy of production hitherto, the collisions and excesses arising from these have also been abolished, there is nothing more to be repressed which would make a special repressive force, a state, necessary . . . the interference of the state power in social relations becomes superfluous in one sphere after another, and then ceases of itself. The government of persons is replaced by the administration of things and the direction of the processes of production. The state is not "abolished", it withers away (Marx and Engels, 1962, vol. II:138).

Before the state finally withers away, there will be, Marx maintains, a transitional period of power when the proletariat is in charge. This is "a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat" (Marx and Engels, 1962, vol. II:30).

The Paris Commune

It is clear that the functional and technical importance of the bureaucracy are not in Marx's mind. Marx did not, in his criticisms of Hegel and later writings, make his own system complete, leaving many questions unanswered. Lichtheim comments that "Marx for some reason shirked the problem of the bureaucracy" (1961:110) in the post-capitalist society. However, the best indication of Marx's views on the political aspects of the post-proletarian revolutionary society is perhaps found in his description
of the Paris Commune which was later invoked in Lenin's writing and
Mao's Great Leap Forward and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolu-
tion and where it was so brazenly misrepresented.

The Paris Commune, set up in 1871, had to be viewed as a
significant preoccupation in Marx's thought. For Marx, the Commune
represents a society in revolt against the state, a model for future
society where the working class will have its own choice of govern-
ment and administration. The effect of the Commune's actions would
have liberated men from the tyranny of capitalism. The Commune was,
Marx alleged,

a thoroughly expansive political form, while
all previous form of government has been
emphatically repressive . . . .It was essentially
a working class government, the product of the
struggle . . . against the appropriating class,
the political form at last discovered under which
to work out the economic emancipation of labor

This concept of Commune was in many ways an embodiment of
certain nineteenth-century anarchist ideas. The fact that it failed
did not deter Marx's disciples to explore further the possibility
of its existence.

Thus Marx explicitly opposed the bureaucratic structure in the
political state, and implicitly advanced the notion that such a
structure would ultimately destroy the developmental process and
stability in the polity. The bureaucrats are the chief culprits for
deterring the transformation of human history in general, and the
ultimate triumph of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie in
particular.

Unfortunately, Marx has failed to tell us what types of
features the bureaucracy will take in a classless and stateless
society. Except his description of the Paris Commune, which
actually failed, we find no evidence of such a specific bureauca-
tic model. Perhaps because of this, there were considerable practi-
cal confusions and chaos over the Communist bureaucratic structure
with those who followed Marx.

Weber's Conception of Bureaucracy
and the Rationalization of Development

Development and Capitalism

The assessments of the contribution of Weber on development
seem to be contradictory. Talcott Parsons asserts that Weber
contributes "a general evolutionary view in the development of
human society" (1968:lx). But Bendix suggests that "Weber was not
interested in developmental theories" (1977:326). In any case, the
nuances in Weber's thought no doubt deserve serious and careful
study.

Weber's analysis of development is a long-range one. He
focused on the transformation and historical comparisons with the
assessment of a given distribution of power with a view toward
changing it. Weber explicitly addressed questions of how to bring
about change—parallel to Marx's interest. The general thrust of Weber's work was to outline the political, economic, and psychological requirements of a new capitalist state which is dominated by two central interests: (1) the political instability of certain social systems—and the strategies which are available to certain politically dominant groups for coping with political crises, and (2) the global and permanent significance of certain types of structural breakdown in patrimonialism, antiquity and feudalism (Turner, 1981).

In particular, Weber wanted to determine what types of political breakdown were conducive to the development of capitalism in various social structures. Weber's concept of development is based on the general premise that all pre-modern political systems were, by contrast with bureaucratically administered modern politics, typified by massive structural instabilities, which accordingly were conducive to capitalist development and the rise of the modern state.

Bureaucratization as Rationalization

To Marx's emphasis on the mode of production as determining relations in society, Weber added the content of communal values, the character of political power and organizations as important determinants. Weber's stress on bureaucracy and its development in industrial society was partly an effort to show that bureaucratization would not be exclusively a product of capitalism, but could be brought about in many kinds of society, including socialist ones.
Indeed, Weber believed that society under socialism would not escape bureaucratization, but on the contrary, would be more subject to it. He wrote:

Only by reversion in every field—political, religious, economic, etc. to small-scale organization would it be possible to any considerable extent to escape bureaucracy's influence. . . . Socialism would, in fact, require a still higher degree of formal bureaucratization than capitalism (1978, vol. I:224-225).

Weber clearly considered the development of legal rationality to be a major consideration in Western civilization. To him, capitalism was the highest form of rationalization, and he isolated different aspects of rational bourgeois capitalism: secularity, maximization of efficiency, bureaucratization and professionalization.

For Weber, it was bureaucratization which characterised modern Western society. With the increasing complexity society and its structure, the need for rational administration expand both quantitatively and qualitatively. Weber remarked:

The development of modern forms of organization in all fields is nothing less than identical with the development and continual spread of bureaucratic administration. This is true of church and state, of armies, political parties, economic enterprises, interest groups, endowments, clubs, and many others. Its development is, to take the most striking case, at the root of the modern Western state (1978, vol. I:223).
Domination in economically advanced societies is based on the rationality of industrial capitalism, which in its modern form becomes inseparable from industrial organization extended to society as a whole and to control through bureaucratic administration. Weber wished to show to what extent bureaucratic organization is a rational solution to the complexities of modern problems. In this respect, he went beyond the "machine" model in many significant ways.

Weber went to the extent of proclaiming that "the future belongs to bureaucratisation" (1978, vol. II:1401), because bureaucracy has the technical superiority over any other form of organization. The fully developed bureaucratic apparatus compares with other organizations exactly as does the machine with non-mechanical modes of production. Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of material and personal costs—these are raised to the optimum point in the strictly bureaucratic administration, and especially in its monocratic form (1978, vol. II:973).

The rationalization of bureaucracy, the separation of church and the state that leads to secularization, and the gradual institutionalization of parliamentarianism all form integral elements of the developmental model. At the same time, the growth of bureaucratisation, too, has helped in the modernization of the new states. Weber wrote that "the progress toward bureaucratic officialdom ... has been the equally unambiguous yardstick for the modernization
of the state, whether monarchic or democratic" (1978, vol. II:1393).

**Characteristics of the Bureaucratic Model**

The characteristics of Weber's bureaucratic model have been condensed and presented by Blau:

1. "The regular activities required for the purposes of the bureaucratically governed structure are distributed in a fixed way as official duties."
2. "A specified sphere of competence . . . has been marked off as part of a systematic division of labor . . ."
3. "The official "is subject to strict and systematic discipline and control in the conduct of his office."
4. All operations are governed by "a consistent system of abstract rules . . .[and] consist in the application of these rules to particular cases."
5. "The organization of offices follows the principle of hierarchy; that is, each lower office is under the control and supervision of a higher one."
6. Officials are "subject to authority only with respect to their impersonal official obligations."
7. "Candidates for bureaucratic positions are selected on the basis of technical qualifications. In the most rational case, this is tested by examinations, or guaranteed by diplomas certifying technical training, or both. They are appointed, not elected."
8. "Being a bureaucratic official "constitutes a career. There is a system of 'promotions' according to seniority or to achievement, or both." (Blau, 1966:1-2).

In short, characteristics of the classical Weberian model include administrative efficiency made possible by an insistence on professional skill for advancement, impersonal discipline, hierarchy of authority, elaboration of unambiguous written rules,
and specialization of functions in response to expanding social activity. Such a model institutes in society a stabilization of the socioeconomic order.

At the same time, Weber argued that the bureaucratization of life brings with it an increasing probability of democratic practice, although ultimately presenting a threat to democratic systems. The requisites of democratic practice are tolerance, precise legality, and representative government. Within this context, a highly efficient administrative order extracts social resources and utilizes them in realizing socially determined goals, while at the same time, mediating the competing demands of the citizenry.

The Political Role of Bureaucracy and its Control

Weber dealt with the political role of bureaucracy and the possibilities of it becoming the power-wielder in the political system and its related problems. "Bureaucracy," Weber wrote, "is the means of transforming social action into rationally organized action. Therefore, as an instrument of rationally organizing authority relations, bureaucracy was and is a power instrument of the first order for one who controls the bureaucratic apparatus" (1978, vol. II:987).

In his scholarly writings, Weber seemed to put emphasis on the types of legitimation and on bureaucracy as a superior technical instrument, whereas in his political essays, bureaucrats are treated
as a status group with vested interests (Beetham, 1974). Weber also noted that bureaucracy would be a threat to the stability of Western culture with the advance of capitalism. Such an advance would inevitably accompanied by the development of ever more efficient bureaucracies. Mommsen remarks that

Weber envisaged that this process was likely to eventually result in the emergence of a 'new iron cage of servitude', in which all forms of value-oriented social conduct would be suffocated by the almighty bureaucratic structures and by the tightly knit networks of formal-rational laws and regulations, against which the individual would no longer stand any chance at all (1974:57).

Thus Weber realized that as bureaucratization increases, the power of the bureaucrats will tend to increase due to two interconnected characteristics of bureaucratic organization: (1) the practical effectiveness and the indispensibility of bureaucratic organization, and (2) the expertise and technical knowledge of the bureaucrats and the so-called "administrative secrets" controlled by them.

To be sure, Weber was totally aware of the negative consequences of bureaucratization—the tendency of officials to ignore questions of substantive justice in adhering to formal rules, the impersonality of organizational relationships, the "amorality" of bureaucracies willing to serve whatever elements gain control over them, and the antidemocratic implications of bureaucratic hierarchy.
Given this expansion and misuse of bureaucratic power, Weber maintained that such political power and bureaucratic domination be controlled under "the committees of a powerful working parliament" (1978, vol. II:1420). Wright has interpreted Weber as saying that

a strong working parliament accomplished three essential things: First, it provides the institutional means for effectively controlling the unrestrained power of the bureaucracy; second, it generates the talented political leadership necessary for responsibly direct bureaucratic activity; third, it provides the mechanisms for holding that leadership accountable (1974:75).

Thus Weber recognized a dichotomy between the polity and the administration and wanted to draw a sharp distinction between the roles of the politicians and the bureaucrats; but he also noted that administrative problems, no matter how technical they might seem, are in many ways influenced by political considerations. Such ambiguity in Weber's treatment of bureaucratic interest and public-policy importance reflects a dualism in Weber's thinking (Diamant, 1962). On the one hand, legal-rationality of Weber's ideal-type led him to consider bureaucracy as a neutral tool, and on the other hand, his own political experiences taught him that the power interests of the bureaucracy may threaten the mastery of political leadership.
Theoretical Considerations

In many aspects, Marx and Weber hold opposing views on the functions of the state and bureaucracy. Agreement can perhaps only be found in the bureaucratic structures. In essence, the class-domination feature of the bureaucracy maintained by Marx does not seem to fit into orthodox functions of the bureaucracy, namely, in the words of Weber, "to transform social action into rationally organized action" (1978, vol. II:1403). In light of this, the following areas of criticism of Weber's and Marx's model of the state and bureaucracy can be considered:

(1) The origin of the bureaucracy and the state. In the Marxian model, the state (and its bureaucracy) is a power that arises as a result of the irreconcilable class antagonism and class conflicts. It rests upon the economic conditions of production which determine different classes of society and reflect the desire of the economically dominant class in controlling the means of production. It is, in essence, a class organization. Weber acknowledges the economic bases of the bureaucracy, but he rejects the notion that it arises out of class conflict. He maintains that the bureaucracy derives from the legal-rational form of authority which is the highest form of secularization in society.

(2) The features of bureaucracy. The Marxian model features four characteristics of the state and its bureaucracy, namely, organizing inhabitants by territories, creating a force and power
of coercion, levying taxes and contracting public debts, and providing privileged positions for state officials (Chang, 1965). These characteristics are deeply embedded in the concept of class antagonism, and, in many ways, assume the continual existence of the division of society into classes brought about by a mode of production based upon private property. The end result is the exploitation of working class. Weber, like Marx, was concerned with the end result of these characteristics of bureaucracy. However, unlike Marx, Weber has drawn a sharp distinction between the political and the technical features of bureaucracy. It is not primarily a centralized organ of decision, or a set of political organs, it is an enormous machinery of bureaus, composed of two contradictory elements: on the one hand, political personnel with their political functions, and on the other, administrative personnel and their instrumental functions. In describing it thus, Weber, using his ideal-type construction, has rationalized the bureaucratic order.

(3) The function and purpose of bureaucracy. It is evident that the function and the purpose of bureaucracy, according to Marx and Engels, are nothing but the oppression of one class by another. It is a vehicle for the reinforcement of the powers of the bourgeoisie. Its existence is a proof that the class conflicts and class antagonisms still exist. It also has the purpose of protecting private property. Like the Weberian model, Marx and Engels too touched on the mediating role of the bureaucracy between the rulers
and the ruled, but in different phraseology. With the advance of industrialization and capitalism, the repressive functions of the state and its bureaucracy would increase. The following statement from *The Communist Manifesto* best summarises their position: "The executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie" (1965:61).

Weber seems to agree with Marx as far as the political functions of bureaucracy are concerned, though with many reservations and elaborations. The political functions of bureaucracy, however strong and repressive they might seem, can be regulated and checked by the parliamentary institutions, and certain political pitfalls can be avoided. The ideological utility of bureaucracy threatens its rationality and neutrality, according to Weber, but it can be limited. Furthermore, Weber has added the administrative functions of bureaucracy, which to him provide the ultimate importance of the existence of the bureaucratic order. For Weber, the technical superiority of bureaucratic administration makes its purpose more meaningful in terms of rationalization.

(4) The future of bureaucracy. Weber declared that "the future belongs to bureaucratisation"; Marx and Engels believed that the state and its bureaucracy will finally "wither away." Both were equally ardent in their belief, and paradoxically, both were correct in their own ways. To be sure, Weber was equally concerned with the negative results of bureaucratisation—as a threat to the democratic system, personal liberty, and ultimately humanity—as he was
concerned with the demystification of the world by this process as bureaucracy is "the most rational known means of exercising authority over human being" (1978, vol. I:223). The growth of bureaucracy will certainly threaten vigorous democracy as there exists a tendency for some interest groups to take over the administrative functions for their own purpose. However, Weber did not see the ultimate elimination of bureaucracy as a possibility. As Abrahamsson puts it:

It is, however, theoretically conceivable to dispose of bureaucracy by returning to a social system composed of very small organizations, yet it is evident that Weber did not see this as a real alternative. While bureaucracy can be controlled under certain circumstances through parliament, the contradiction between democracy and bureaucratic rule nonetheless appears to be permanent (1977:65).

In certain aspects, Weber was limited by his own vision of the future development of socialism. His writing on socialism was written before the Bolshevik Revolution and therefore his comments were mainly based on his experience with the socialist parties in Europe.

Many scholars have gone deeper into the dysfunctional features and the paradoxes of the Weberian model of bureaucracy. Despite its technical effectiveness and efficiency, the Weberian model contains many loopholes as presented in the democratic process. Similarly, Marx's vision embodied in real states was hampered by the penetration of the party-bureaucratic-state machinery into every level of
society in the Communist states, as in the case of the Soviet Union and China. Paradoxically, Marx's and Weber's prophetic visions were realized, partially at least, in the opposite stratum of the other's rival formulation.

The Influence and the Debate

The theoretical contributions on bureaucracy by Weber have influenced the field of public administration in certain important aspects. In the traditional orthodox study of bureaucracy, it is clear that political scientists have adopted many persuasions of the Weberian ideal-type model. At the same time, they are deeply disturbed by the trade-offs they have to make for bureaucratization. Research and analysis by Parsons, Blau, Mises, Jacoby, Presthus, Crozier among others affirm the rationalization and legality of Weber's model and confirm the importance of a modern bureaucratic structure for modernization and efficient political development. However, they too emphasized the malady and defects of bureaucratic organizational structures. Other scholars, including Merton, Selznick, and Gouldner, have suggested important dysfunctional consequences of bureaucratic organization while confirming Weber's essential propositions that bureaucracies are more efficient than are alternative forms of organizations.

Meanwhile, the strict Marxist interpretation of bureaucracy has been fading into the background. Its images have only been
reflected in the works and deeds of Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, and Mao. As theorists and statesmen, Lenin and Mao were the modern Marxist spokesmen for the eradication of the state and bureaucracy, and with their own experiments, had taken a step further than Marx.

On a more pragmatic and scholarly level, the Marxian concept of bureaucracy has been revised and synthesized into more meaningful explanation of organizational theories (Goldman and Houten, 1977; Heydebrand, 1977).

The two models are seemingly apart at opposite ends. However, a closer examination indicates that partial reconciliation can be made, and theoretical and practical gaps, however wide they might be, seem to have narrowed.
CHAPTER II

THE BUREAUCRATIC DILEMMA OF THEORY AND PRACTICE: THE MARXIAN MODEL

Marx's vision of bureaucracy and the state remained a theoretical framework unrealized within his lifetime, perhaps giving out a little spark of reality in the Paris Commune. It was Lenin, with his revisionism, who has put life into the classical Marxist theories of the state and applied them in the reconstruction of social and political structures in Russia. While the rest of the world was moving toward increased bureaucratization under different political systems, the Soviet Union under Lenin was beginning to experiment with Marx's vision of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the elimination of the state after the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. Similarly, Mao adapted Marxism-Leninism to an underdeveloped, semi-dependent, non-European country, and China underwent the same ideological commitments to abolish the bureaucratic apparatus as a ruling institution over the working class. We will examine their interpretations and extensions of the Marxian notion of bureaucracy, the non-theoretical, practical considerations and the reality that prevailed out of the debureaucratization process.
Lenin and the Withering Away of the State

Lenin's hatred of Tsarist Russian bureaucratism has been one of the powerful motivating forces in his resolve to revolutionize Russia. In *State and Revolution*, Lenin started from the orthodox Marxist proposition that the state is the product of the irreconcilable class conflicts and the means by which the ruling class enforces its rule over the masses. By definition, "the State is a special organization of force: it is an organization of violence for the suppression of some class" (1969:320). Lenin continued:

The state is a product and a manifestation of the irreconcilability of class antagonism. The state arises where, when and insofar as class antagonisms objectively cannot be reconciled. And, conversely, the existence of the state proves that class antagonisms are irreconcilable (1969:267).

Lenin followed Marx's argument of the state with modifications, however. His views must be examined from their historical context. The state is not only defined in terms of its nature of control, but also in terms of suppression of class struggle and class domination. Lenin also viewed bureaucracy as a basic structure through which the capitalist class rules. The dependence of bureaucrats on the bourgeoisie makes it possible for the petty-bourgeois parties to control the various bureaucratic positions and thus their power. Bureaucratic organization, Lenin argued, would prevent mass participation and
impede the realization of working class interests. To this end, bureaucracy is functional to capitalism. As such class conflicts become sharper, and the proletariat would eventually take control of the events in form of revolution. After the successful overthrow of the capitalist class, they would then form a classless society and establish the administration of society by the whole population. The state, then, no longer exists--it "withers away."

After the "withering away" of the state, what will be the new forms of institution and how will they differ from the old structures? For Lenin, the rise of socialism requires that the bourgeois state institution be destroyed, and replaced by "representative institutions." Quoting Marx, Lenin put forward the idea of the Paris Commune and "proletarian democracy" with "a dictatorship of the proletariat" to check and control the suppression of classes.

Simultaneously with an immense expansion of democracy, which for the first time becomes democracy for the poor, democracy for the people, and not democracy for the money-bags, the dictatorship of the proletariat imposes a series of restrictions on the freedom of the oppressors, the exploiters, the capitalists (1969:327).

In Lenin's mind, the administration of the new proletarian state will be carried out not by highly paid administrators possessed of special knowledge, but by ordinary citizens receiving workers' wages, except in highly technical positions. By populari-
zing the administration, Lenin hoped to erase the centuries-old barrier between people and the state. Referring in numerous passages to Marx's view of the Paris Commune, Lenin even advocated a system whereby the whole distinction between legislative and executive functions will be erased. However, Lenin was cautious that highly technical positions are not to be confused with the role of the bureaucrats, and he was quick to draw a distinction between them:

The question of control and accounting should not be confused with the question of the scientifically trained staff of engineers, agronomists and so on. These gentlemen are working today in obedience to the wishes of the capitalists, and will work even better tomorrow in obedience to the wishes of the armed workers (1969:337).

At the same time, however, Lenin wanted the proletarian dictatorship to be highly centralized in order to smash the last remnants of the bourgeois regime that has centralized its own power and to operate a vast integrated economic mechanism which the bourgeois has built up.

After the revolution, however, within months after taking office as Chairman of the Council of Peoples' Commissars, Lenin found himself coping with some of the same evils that had long beset the Tsarist bureaucracy. In a letter to Rothstein in 1921, Lenin wrote: "The bureaucrats are tricky types; they are many
rascals among them, arch-opportunists" (Tucker, 1975:716). In another letter to Tomsky the same year, he echoed the same theme: "I hereby transmit to you information on an astonishing manifestation of red-tape, negligence, bureaucratization and heavy-handedness in a most important practical matter" (Tucker, 1975:714-15).

Bureaucracy has been defeated, yet the bureaucrats remained in their old positions. This, in a nutshell, shows the immense practical problems which stand in the way of representative administration—problems deriving from national economy, cultural underdevelopment, and century-old, firmly established privileges (Abrahamsson, 1977:42).

It was Lenin's battle against these shortcomings of the bureaucracy that cast the Communist Party in the role of guarantor of efficiency and effectiveness.

In his fundamental work on the Party, What is to be Done?, Lenin reasserts the role of the Party as assuming the role of leading all exploited classes in the revolution. It would be capable of uniting, training, and organizing a vanguard of the proletariat and the working class. By 1919, the Party and the state were inextricably linked and the dictatorship of the proletariat has been transformed to the dictatorship of the Party. This gradual shift "was aided and abetted by three main factors: the fact that the Party found power thrust into its hand; the growth of bureaucracy; and the lack of an effective workers' role" (McLellan, 1979:100).
Lenin's assumption that a tightly disciplined Party must preside over the bureaucratic operations can be found in the way he used the Party after the revolution. Doubtless he himself did not foresee to what extent the Party would be involved in day-to-day management of the new political system—for it was the growth of the Party's bureaucracy that made possible the Party's growing practice of direct involvement in state administration and economic management.

Thus Lenin realized, against his wishes, that the post-revolutionary bureaucratic apparatus did not decline but, on the contrary, was expanding at a rapid rate. He explained this phenomenon by the "immaturity of socialism." Once socialism reaches the stage of communism, then only could the withering away of the state be realized (Mouzelis, 1967).

The problems confronted by Lenin during his efforts for the debureaucratization process is best summarized by Abrahamsson:

The problems that confront Lenin's model of debureaucratization are dependent to a great degree on what Lenin saw as the long-run solution for the elimination of bureaucracy, i.e., the intensification of the productive forces. On the one hand, we find that a precondition for this intensification would be the proper cultivation of technical, scientific, and administrative competence. But on the other hand, we see that in order to make this cultivation as effective as possible, at least a certain amount of distinction of work tasks would become necessary. This, of course, involves risks of professionalization, permanence in positions, economic advantages and other social privileges. Furthermore, officials may attempt to consolidate their own positions
by making their tasks appear too complicated to be executed by others (1977:51).

A State Bureaucracy Strengthened:
The Case of Soviet Union

Lenin's disappointment with the anticipation that as socialism developed, the state and its repressive organs would gradually diminish in scope is perhaps best described by Stalin's explanation of Marx's dialectics. Stalin wrote:

We stand for the withering away of the state. At the same time we stand for strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is the mightiest and strongest state power that has ever existed. The highest development of state power with the object of preparing the conditions for the withering away of state power—that is the Marxist formula. Is it contradictory? Yes, it is "contradictory". But this contradiction is bound up with life, and it fully reflects Marx's dialectics (1955, vol. XII:381).

This perhaps is one of the finest example of the psychological utility of the concept of the dialectic by Stalin. In practice, Stalin increased the power of the state and used it not only as a means of forced industrialization and collectivization, but also for the maintenance of a vast military complex and ubiquitous police.

After Lenin and Stalin, Khrushchev was anxious to demonstrate that the state was indeed withering away, as a means of showing the
world that Soviet Union was moving towards Communism under his tutelage. However, under the leadership of Brezhnev, "a more stable institutional structure has been established, and ... attempts to induce the withering away of the state have been abandoned. In fact the trend has been in quite the opposite direction" (Hill et al, 1981:208). It is clear that the state administration has been improved to resolve the growing complexities and problems facing the Soviet society. In terms of bureaucratization, it means a vast expansion of managerial, engineering, technical, and scientific professionals who constitute the elites in an increasingly industrialized society.

If the state bureaucracy in the Soviet Union is hardly withering away, then the Party is even stronger, growing both in size and functions. Lenin's idea of their relationship is that of subordination, but this is somewhat distorted during Stalin and Khrushchev era. The principle of dual subordination—which means that party and state are interdependent in terms of a network of strict hierarchial divisions combined with overlapping control by party and state organ over the same operations (Fainsod, 1958; Hough, 1969)—applies perhaps only in theory. In reality, the Party as the ruling institution directs and decides policies and superimposes them on the state so as to consolidate power. Indeed, the notion of party state best describes the Soviet administrative system today (Skocpol, 1979; Hirszowicz, 1980).

The study by Alf Edeen (1960) shows considerable evidence
that the state apparatus in the Soviet Union has been expanding since the Revolution rather than "withering away." In his study, Edeen compares the pre- and post-Revolution statistics on working personnel in the state administration, the police and the judicial systems—excluding the armed forces—and comes to the conclusion that the increase in administrative apparatus in numbers in the Soviet Union is over five-fold from 1897 to 1929 (1960:176). Such observations have reflected the fact that a theoretical framework of bureaucracy which has its origin in Marx's doctrine seems to be falling apart, and presents itself as one of the most serious contradictions in socialist history (Hoover, 1970:303). As Skocpol remarks:

The Soviet Union featured huge and constantly expanding state administrative organizations. This was true both because the Soviet regime was, from 1921 onward, of intrinsically greater political weight than the relatively politically weighty and bureaucratic tsarist state, and because the Soviet state pushed industrialization much faster and through more directly political administrative means after the middle 1920s (1979:226).

Thus, the state would not wither away, at least not in the foreseeable future (Hoover, 1970; Hough, 1973). The task of economic modernization and political development would require authoritative, large-scale resolution that would continue to grow, rather than to diminish. The transformation of the economy and
social development with the rising level of education and mass involvement in the developmental process would indeed need a more sophisticated administrative system than hitherto (Hill et al, 1981: 209).

A Romanticist's Attack on Organization: Mao's Vision of Bureaucracy

With the launch of Great Leap Forward in 1958 and The Great Cultural Revolution in 1967, Mao Zedong, with his Marxist armor, attacked organization and bureaucracy with romantic fervour. Like Lenin, the Marxist concept of class struggle stands at the core of Mao's organization theory. What Mao has done in essence is to say that the bureaucracy can be used as a primary and as autonomous a source of oppression, domination and exploitation by the capitalist class, just as the case of possession of private property. Mao alleged that it should be 'smashed' altogether. Bureaucratism in post-revolutionary China was unacceptable to Mao. A few excerpts from his "Twenty Manifestations of Bureaucracy" should reveal what was in Mao's mind:

2. They [bureaucrats] are conceited, complacent, and they aimlessly discuss politics. They do not grasp their work; they are subjective and one-sided; they are careless; they do not listen to people; they are truculent and arbitrary; they force orders; they do not care about reality; they maintain blind control. This is authoritarian bureaucracy . . .

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5. They are ignorant; they are ashamed to ask anything; they exaggerate and they lie; they are very false; they attribute errors to people; they attribute merit to themselves; they swindle the central government; they deceive those above them and fool those below them; they conceal faults and gloss over wrongs. This is dishonest bureaucracy.

16. They fight among themselves for power and money; they extend their hands into the Party; they want fame and fortune; they want position, and if they do not get it they are not satisfied; they choose to be fat and to be lean; they pay a great deal of attention to wage; they are cosy when it comes to cadres but they care nothing about the masses. This is the bureaucracy that is fighting for power and money . . . (Quoted in Whyte, 1974:43).

These criticisms of bureaucracies by Mao come from his understanding of the bureaucratic way of life in Imperial China. The brutality and injustice of bureaucracy which Mao saw and read have no doubt influenced his conception. Mao synthesized Leninism and applied it to China's backwardness, and called for a total transformation of the bureaucratic apparatus.

Apart from its Marxist commitments, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was also directed against Liu Shaoqi who differed and diverged from Mao, among other issues, in the correct nature and functions of bureaucracy. Liu was leaning towards elitism and centralization and stressed hierarchial command and organizational discipline. Mao, in contrast, stressed "operational flexibility, organizational decentralization, and the active role of the rank and file" (Kau, 1972). Mao, with political power at hand, managed to eliminate Liu in the end and went ahead with his
Mao's trouble, however, was quick to come. The Cultural Revolution attacked not only the state bureaucracy and organization, but also the machinery of the Communist Party itself. Some of the younger and more precipitate Red Guards leaped to the conclusion that Mao was in effect calling for the abolition of the whole national apparatus of the state, and for the implementation of the communitarian Paris Commune idea advocated by Marx. When the revolutionary Red Guards got out of hand, Mao himself relied heavily on the People's Liberation Army to seize control of the situation. This dilemma of theory and practice was strikingly similar to Lenin's.

Mao essentially borrowed the Soviet model of administration and organization, especially during the Kiangsi period (Kim, 1973). What emerges from Mao's extensive writings and reports is that his theory of organization minimized elaborate, specialized bureaucratic structures, and was thus contrary to the Weberian notion of structural differentiation and functional specificity in modern organizations. Mao attempted to combine the functions of government and mass organizations into one "mass line" style of work, as a solution to administrative problems and, like Lenin, he tried to mobilize the masses to participate in the policy formulation process at the basic level of government.

In 1958, having been relatively successful in his drive to collectivize and now desperate to reverse agricultural stagnation,
Mao was apparently emboldened to go beyond tested forms of agricultural and economic organizations under socialism. Thus he began to innovate through communes, decentralization and mass mobilization, and in the process departed from the Soviet model.

The communes were created in 1958 with a blue print of Marx's utopia. They were autonomous cells of society, which would carry on agricultural, industrial, cultural and even military activities in a self-sufficient, highly autonomous way, thus greatly reducing the tasks of the central state organization. In Mao's theory, such an organizational control would depend on local organizations and their cadres, who were trained and charged with the responsibility of maintaining a class relationship with the peasant masses. The efficient functioning of this style of administration, Mao hoped, would lead an enormous reduction in the size of the state bureaucratic apparatus.

Mao and his supporters launched three campaigns to prevent the growth of large-scale organizations. They are the hsia fang campaign, the policy of "walking on two legs," and the decentralization campaign (Whyte, 1974:46). One of the objectives of the launching of the hsia fang campaign is to reduce the size of administrative staffs of large organizations by sending the staffs to lower posts (Hsia fang, literally "sending down," means the downward transfer of elite groups to the mass to learn from them). The policy of "walking on two legs" emphasized small, rural, locally financed enterprises as well as large, modern, centrally financed
urban ones. The financed enterprises were supposedly less bureaucratic in organizational forms, and they were encouraged in the agricultural sector where the unit of production was the commune.

In Mao's judgement, decentralization also provides a means of combating bureaucratization by transferring some powers from the central government to the provinces and within individual enterprises to give more power to sub-units. However, there exists a conflicting result which Mao himself did not anticipate, that is, while decentralization could reduce bureaucratization, the total number of those engaged in administration will not necessarily be reduced, because it may require the expansion of the organizational units to which responsibility is decentralized. Mao, again like Lenin, found himself trapped in his own framework.

By the end of 1958 and early 1959, there was considerable disruption of agricultural production, and therefore Mao was forced to begin his retreat from the early concept of the commune. Consequently, while Mao carefully avoided the Soviet collectivization debacle up to 1957, he fell after that into the same trap as his Soviet predecessors.

To be sure, Mao never came close to the realization of eliminating the bureaucracy altogether. In reality, the Chinese Communist regime under Mao underwent a series of bureaucratic variations from rationalization to radicalism (H. Harding, 1981). Mao's self-contradictions and achievements are perhaps very similar to Lenin's. Kraus commented that in spite of the fact that Mao was
anti-bureaucratic in his attitudes, he was nevertheless the top man in the hierarchy leading the bureaucracy. "If Mao was clearly identified with the opposition to bureaucratic faults," wrote Kraus, "he was no less obviously associated with the proud successors of a social group which he helped to fashion" (1981:12).

A State Bureaucracy Strengthened: The Case of China

The policies under Mao, it can be said, came short of their ideological commitments. The bureaucratic problems in modern China, as in the case of the Soviet Union, are deeply rooted in the legacies of the Imperial regime and its socialist experience after the revolution. In many ways, the Chinese fell into the same trap as its Soviet predecessor in the deeds of debureaucratizing the state apparatus. Instead of the proletariat taking over the administrative apparatus as envisioned by Marx, Lenin and Mao, the latter has grown even greater in power and larger in size. The displacement of the old ruling classes has raised the autonomy and influence of the bureaucrats. The Chinese political system in the pre- and post-Mao era, in this regard, remains a "bureaucratic polity," in which power and decision-making are limited to a small number of hierarchically organized elites of officials (Pye, 1981:86). Indeed, the Chinese Communist Party after the revolution worked within a system of full-time salaried administrators, operating within rigid and formal bureaucratic structures. This trend was intensified by the intro-
duction of the civil service scheme which accompanied the economic reforms of socialist transformation (Kraus, 1981:4).

Various studies have confirmed such a trend. Work by Funnell (1971:6) shows that the number of Communist state cadres, or white collar and administrative personnel in government organs and enterprise, has increased from 3,310,000 in 1952 to nearly 8 million in 1958. Thus, the regime, using its cadres, has penetrated into every level of the Chinese society. "The Communists," Barnett wrote, "have largely destroyed both the old elite groups and most of the traditional social institutions, substituting for them a new Communist Party elite and new Communist-established and -dominated mass organizations, and have extended the formal bureaucratic instruments of Party and Government rule down to the village level" (1967:428-429).

Another recent study by Harry Harding (1981) claims that the Chinese regime, from the beginning of its establishment, has been undergoing bureaucratization in various forms—"the rationalizing approach believes in perfecting bureaucracy, the external remedial approach advocates controlling bureaucracy, the internal remedial approach proposes modifying bureaucracy, and the radical approach insists on destroying bureaucracy" (H. Harding, 1981:17)—and it is these various elements that constitute the confusion and dilemma of Chinese public policy.

The leadership under Deng Xiaoping after Mao's death offered new evidence for bureaucratic expansion when the focus of bureau-
crtanism has shifted from political issues to administrative issues (Morgan, 1981; King, 1980). With the reintroduction of efficiency and productivity as criteria for economic and political decisions in China at the present time, the state apparatus assumes much of the responsibility for accepting the contributions of an effective state organization. The Four Modernizations campaign would require professionalism and technological knowhow, and above all organizational effectiveness and administrative competence, which China lacks. It is predictable that the Chinese would actively establish these bases for modernization. In this regard, "it would be quite inappropriate to suggest that the Chinese state is withering" (Krug, 1981: 75).

Some Critical Remarks

While Lenin and Mao have followed Marx in their conception of state and bureaucracy, they have added some other characteristics and modified the theoretical structure with their practical experiments. Their extensions of Marxian theories must be viewed in their own historical context. At the same time, it is remarkable to see how they stretched Marx's notion of stateless society with their own interpretations.

Marx, like Weber, characterized bureaucracy by division of function and hierarchy. Lenin's and Mao's views differed from this and did not include hierarchy among the characteristics of bureau-
cracy. For Lenin, even in the so-called "second stage' of socialist society, he never mentioned the abolition of hierarchy though he referred explicitly to the other characteristics of bureaucracy that would be abolished. Mao, on the other hand, wanted to get rid of it altogether.

For one thing, Marx, with his urban background, did not foresee the essentiality of rural administration in the post-revolutionary society. At best, the Paris Commune idea fits only his background and period. Lenin, and to a greater extent Mao, applied this concept for agricultural management, and for the purpose of reducing the size of the state bureaucracy, and quite understandably met failure. They were taken aback by the confusions and chaos with the substitution of experts with amateurs, together with the growing expansion of bureaucratic apparatus after the proletarian revolution.

It can be argued that in the continuum of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, there are two situations for the status of the state: that the state itself is becoming stronger or that it is yielding power to the party apparatus. Leslie Holmes argues that only "in the latter case, ideologists can claim that 'the state' is withering away; but this is true only in a highly normalistic sense, in that the functions of the state are taken over by an equally small --or even smaller--group of party officials. Hence the distribution of power . . . is not significantly altered' (1981:1). In this sense, the Communist regimes are still regarded as having bureau-
cratic types of political system where the allocative decision-making is still made by the "bureaucratic class" (Hodges, 1981).

The Weberian model perhaps can be considered here. In spite of its weaknesses, bureaucracy cannot be avoided, let alone be eliminated. The elimination of one bureaucratic apparatus will again create another. Weber wrote, "When those subject to bureaucratic control seek to escape the influence of the existing bureaucratic apparatus, this is normally possible only by creating an organization of their own which is equally subject to bureaucratization" (1978, vol. I:224). So far, the events in the socialist countries as exemplified by the Soviet Union and China have proved Weber right.
CHAPTER III

THE MODERN BUREAUCRATIC PARADOXES:
THE WEBERIAN MODEL

The trend of bureaucratization in those states which claimed their ideological inspiration from Marx in many ways confirms Weber's belief that bureaucracy is here to stay and no complex society can rid itself of it. It is also clear that the necessity of administrative apparatus for societal development is not in question in the Weberian literature. Indeed, the emphasis of early-Weberian scholars on the study of bureaucracy was upon processes and methods for insuring incisive actions, and its eventual growth in an increasingly bureaucratized society. Following the Weberian viewpoint, they regard bureaucratic structures and functions to be the major components in the development of political legitimacy in a system.

However, modern scholars are more self-critical in their approach toward bureaucratic organizations. Their experience in the Western modern societies creates feelings of profound distrust and helplessness vis-a-vis the ever-increasing bureaucratic power. They realize that behind the rationalization of bureaucratization lie the issues of individual liberty, political freedom and organizational effectiveness. Thus, as far as the dysfunctions of bureaucratic organization are concerned, Weberian scholars seem to agree with the Marxist view that bureaucracy is but a "parasite" in society.
Weber maintained that the survival of bureaucracy depends very much on its superiority, which in turn rests upon its formal rationality, over other forms of organization. From this starting point, various efforts have been made to approach bureaucracy in terms of the organization's basic structural characteristics. These writers have enumerated the structural dimensions of bureaucracy with minor variations in their formulation, both in content and in method, and have arrived at substantial agreement (Heady, 1979:52).

Richard H. Hall (1962) has tabulated characteristics of bureaucracy as listed by a number of scholars, including Weber, Friedrich, Litwak, Merton, Udy, Heady, Berger, and Parsons. From the various lists of characteristics, Hall picked up the six most important dimensions of bureaucracy:

(a) a well-defined hierarchy of authority;
(b) a division of labor based on functional specialization;
(c) a system of rules covering the rights and duties of positional incumbents;
(d) a system of procedure for dealing with work situations;
(e) impersonality of interpersonal relationships, and
(f) selection for employment and promotion based on technical competence.

These characteristics in essence are a blue print of Weber's ideal-typical construction, and serve as the rationale behind the
rapid growth and presumably efficient system of bureaucratization. Such characteristics are important in the development of the sociology of organizations which is in perpetual "debate" with Weber's work. The debate has essentially focused on several issues: efficiency of bureaucratic organization, its rigidity, hierarchization, and the threats it poses to the democratic culture. It is appropriate then to look at the dysfunctions and paradoxes of bureaucratic organization as they provide important keys for observations about the nature of bureaucracy in the Weberian canon.

Paradoxes of Bureaucracy

Weber was concerned with the superiority of bureaucracy over other forms of organization. However, at the same time, he also highlighted the threats which would be posed by the bureaucracy to social structures, and expressed his criticisms of bureaucratic organization as an inefficient instrument based on the fact that bureaucratic procedures are slow, and that they develop rigidities that undermine effective action. These aspects of bureaucracy were seriously taken up by Weberian scholars as society becomes more and more bureaucratized.

Merton, in his famous essay "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality" (1952), develops an hypothesis concerning the structural sources of the occupational personality of the bureaucrats, and of major types of conflict between the bureaucrats and the clientele.
He further emphasizes the various features of bureaucracy which he considers as dysfunctional.

Merton, in essence, is concerned with rules as a response to the demand for control and stresses depersonalization of relationship which could lead to conflict in relationships with bureaucratic clientele. Such depersonalization, Merton maintains, will result in an increase in the rigidity of behavior of the bureaucrats, which, in turn, will have three major consequences as interpreted by March and Simon:

First, it substantially satisfied the original demands for reliability. Thus, it meets an important maintenance of the system . . . Second, it increases the defensibility of individual action. Simple categories rigorously applied to individual cases without regard for personal features can only be challenged at a higher level of the hierarchy. Third, the rigidity of behavior increases the amount of difficulty with clients of the organization and complicates the achievement of client satisfaction (1978:112).

To Merton, an early post-Weberian, some of the problems associated with pathological and self-defeating traits of the bureaucrats are connected with red tape, rigidity and inflexibility, excessive impersonality, and reluctance to exercise discretion. Such behavioral orientations are typical of the "trained incapacity" (1952:368) of the bureaucrats, which is contrary to the rationality of bureaucratic organizations.

Merton further maintains that the "displacement of goals" has
made the bureaucracy to adhere to rules and thus become very rigid. Adherence to rules, originally conceived as a means, becomes transformed into an end-in-itself (1952:365). In Merton's term, this is a process whereby "an instrumental value becomes a terminal value" (1952:365). Discipline becomes conformity, and bureaucrats would tend to seek their own interests under the system.

The following remark contains the types of dysfunctions suggested by Merton, and it deserves extended quotation:

The first type, which may be called over-organization, involves an excessive development of those bureaucratic routines which, kept within limits, are functionally necessary to the operation and a large administrative apparatus ... The second type is under-organization. This includes those bureaucratic ills, as instanced by nepotism, favouritism, graft, corruption, and the like, which upon analysis, are found to represent failure to live up to the requirements of bureaucratic structure. Some critics, adopting an attitude of anti-organization, do not define themselves to these pathologies, but oppose bureaucratic structure in principle. This attitude is commonly based on the values of a more simply organized society in which much of life's business could be conducted within a parochial sphere characterised by personal ties rather than by structures of impersonal relations (Merton et al, 1952:396)

Selznick (1949), on the other hand, emphasizes the delegation of authority which would bring about a series of unanticipated consequences. Like Merton, Selznick shows how these consequences stem from the problems of maintaining highly interrelated systems of interpersonal relations. Gouldner (1954), likewise, concerns himself with the consequence of bureaucratic rules for the maintenance
of organizational structure. These traits are labeled as "ailments of organization" (Morstein Marx, 1957), and "malady of bureaucracy" (Crozier, 1964).

Yet even if we assume that the bureaucrats are autonomous and make decisions rationally, there are limits upon their rationality. As Anthony Downs has pointed out, there will be certain biases when the bureaucrats exercise their authority. They can do so by the following ways:

1. Each official tends to distort the information he passes upward in the hierarchy, exaggerating those data favorable to himself and minimizing those unfavorable in him.
2. Each official is biased in favor of those policies or actions that advance his own interests or the programs he advocates, and against those that injure or simple fail to advance those interests or programs.
3. Each official will vary the degree to which he complies with directives from his superior, depending upon whether those directors favor or oppose his own interests.
4. The degree to which each official will seek out additional responsibilities and accept risks in performing his duties will vary directly with the extent to which such initiative is likely to help him achieve his own personal goals (1967:266).

The hierarchical structure and the increase in size of bureaucratic organization create unfavorable impact on the organization itself. Anthony Downs has suggested that large organizations have smaller control systems from their smaller counterparts. Control is impossible by any one man at the top of the hierarchical structure. Downs attributes this to the limitations on the mental capacity of those
at the top (1967:143). While control becomes increasingly difficult, coordination also becomes a problem. The sub-units of large organizations apparently begin to engage in activities that are out of the control system of those at the top of the hierarchical structure.

Thus, the head in the hierarchical structure should be aware of all the information concerning the organizations of his subordinates. As Tullock puts it:

The head of a hierarchy, the sovereign, has, as his principal problem in organizational efficiency, arranging the structure so that his inferiors reach decisions which he would have reached if he should have possessed as much information about the particular situation requiring decision as they do (1965:141).

Another aspect is that larger size of bureaucratic organization apparently minimizes the role that any single individual plays in the organization. This is connected with individual freedom and creativity in the organization. There will be tensions, if not conflicts, generated by any individual who attempts to meet the conditions set down by the bureaucratic order. Bureaucratic organizations, in the Weberian sense, will always seek control, discipline and standardization of the employees and tend to view man instrumentally. Very often, they apply quantitative, not qualitative standards to measure the expected results of employees' activities. In doing so, the bureaucracy limits itself to its own organizational logic and ignores the basic principles of work motivation. Therefore, basic
research and creativity are contrary to the bureaucratic order. It is, therefore, apparent that individual freedom and human creativity are often at odds with the bureaucratic order.

The size of a bureaucratic organization leads to even more elaborated hierarchical structure. If hierarchization goes beyond the requisite limits and justifiable dimensions, it would be an obstacle to professionalism and expertise—it would lead to an exclusion of the expert from the organization. This is based on one of the characteristics of hierarchial organization, namely, it prefers to base wage differentials not on specialized knowledge or the nature of the work performed, but on the position occupied in the organizational structure of the hierarchy. Furthermore, the one-sided hierarchial order of the organization would not allow the expert to perform his duties delicately, and his professional qualities such as motivations and aspirations would slowly disappear. Thus it is clear that the hierarchial order does not relate itself to specialized ability which an organization would need for advancement.

This brings us to Michels' "iron law of oligarchy." Michels believes that increase of size in organizations ensures a growing gap between leaders and followers, between the self preservation aims of the administrative staff and the ostensive raison d'etre of the organization (Michels, 1958). The existence of organization is parallel to the existence of oligarchy. Michels is clear about this:
Organization implies the tendency to oligarchy. In every organization, whether it be a political party, a professional union, or any other association of the kind, the aristocratic tendency manifests itself very clearly . . . As a result of organization, every party or professional union becomes divided into a minority of directors and a majority of directed (1958:418).

Michels' argument is that the size and complexity of organization is a contributing cause of its bureaucratization, which leads to another problem:

Michels' law of oligarchy is an expression of the inevitable and unrestrained tendency that the conflicts between the demands of efficiency and democracy are always solved to the advantage of those forces acting on behalf of efficiency, and therefore at the cost of democracy (Abrahamsson, 1977:66).

Indeed, the growth of bureaucracy as a threat to the democratic system is realized by Weber himself. This point is even more forcefully taken up by later Weberian scholars. Jacoby, for example, maintains that "the real problem that is posed by the bureaucratic process is its relationship to democratic values" (1973:198). Peter M. Blau too considers that bureaucracy may destroy democratic institutions, because power is concentrated among a few small interest groups. Thus, Blau concedes, their main interest will be to increase autonomy and to evade democratic control, consequently becoming a means which undermines the democratic process. "If this
is a paradox," Blau concluded, "it is also a challenge" (1966:265). Presthus too recognizes the problem, saying that big organizations "threaten the social equilibrium that makes democracy possible by encouraging both conflict and compromise" (1978:20). Tullock, confirming these views, claims that the bureaucratic system "tends to a reduction in both individual freedom and central control" (1965:221).

These concerns with the threat of bureaucracy on democratic culture clearly are Western biases and value-laden, reflecting standards from the Western frame of reference. These values are not in the concept of the Marxian model, which is clearly opposed to them.

Yet there are those who hold a more sanguine view on the democratic aspects of bureaucracy. Anthony Downs, for example, argues that the growing absolute level of control of bureaucracy over individuals did not in anyway restrict individual freedom. Instead, he gives two positive conclusions about bureaucracy: (1) contrary to belief, the individual freedom is actually expanding rapidly, and (2) that increased bureaucratization is actually one of the causes of individual freedom (1967:157). However, Downs is also cautious that "bureaucratization might someday become so extensive as to result in an overall reduction of freedom of choice" (1967:259).

Another significant generalization of bureaucratic deficiencies is the tendency of bureaucratic organization to resist innovation.
As society becomes more complex, the rate of social change has greatly increased and this seems to demand greater changes in the quality of life and institutions. Innovation, therefore, becomes necessary. However, big bureaucratic organizations are often characterized by "traditionalism, secrecy in communication, ascribed rather than achieved status, and concern with special privileges for members of the group rather than with functional policies . . . These are not qualities associated with innovation" (Thompson, 1969: 90). Change becomes difficult, and thus the structure and functions of organization becomes static. As Pressthus, consistent with Weber's fear, put it:

Latent individual and organizational interests blunt both the ability and the inclination of organizations to change. Personal and organizational goals of power and prestige challenge the larger social goals that presumably justify their existence in the first place (1978:322).

It is clear that as the rate of change increases, bureaucratic organizations in the tide of change are unavoidably affected. "If such organizations cannot adjust their internal mechanisms to absorb the change, the probability of organizational collapse is high" (Gawthrop, 1971:92).

The Dichotomy of Politics and Administration

It is clear that Weber realizes the threat of politics in the
bureaucratic process. Interest-vested politicians would undoubtedly use the bureaucratic apparatus to further their aims. Yet, as previously noted, Weber also acknowledges the important role which politicians play in the bureaucratic process. This is the point of departure of later efforts to separate politics from administration in the Weberian literature of public administration.

One of the earliest arguments was forwarded by Woodrow Wilson's "The Study of Administration" (1887). Wilson's argument—which is not in the Weberian canon—is that constitutional and political systems should not interfere with everyday bureaucratic processes. He began from the premise that administrative matters have to do with "special means" and not the "general plans" of government. He wrote:

The field of administration is a field of business. It is removed from the hurry and strife of politics; it at most points stand apart even from the debateable grounds of constitutional study. It is part of political life only as the methods of the counting house are a part of the life of society; only as machinery is part of the manufactured product (1887:221)

Wilson further emphasized that "administrative questions are not political questions." Being so, the political system should keep its hand off the administrative apparatus.

Although politics sets the tasks for administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices (1887:221).
Later analysis and research (Waldo, 1948; Appleby, 1949; Lepawsky, 1949) continue this argument of "politics/administration dichotomy." One of the most important points of departure was forwarded by Frank J. Goodnow (1900). Goodnow distinguished political functions from administrative functions with those analogous to the "mental operations" and those analogous to the "actions" of individuals. The former is the expression of the state will, and the latter is the operations necessary to the execution of that will—these two functions are respectively politics and administration.

Similar observations were made by W.F. Willoughby who made a distinction between "direction, supervision and control, on the one hand, and execution on the other" (1919:229). He made a further division of functions that is "distinctly political in character."

In a later treatment of the subject, it becomes apparent that politics is an inevitable and necessary part of the process of government, while administration, on the other hand, is to carry into effect the policies made clear by the political process (Pfiffner, 1935:9).

Such a theoretical dichotomy between administration and politics is understandable given the fact that some politicians might manipulate the bureaucracy to consolidate their own interests, and thus jeopardize the developmental process. But such an attempt, as Horowitz puts it, "ultimately remains an exercise in futility" (1982:229).

Dahl, in the same vein, reveals this problem of administration
in an article entitled "The Science of Public Administration: Three Problems" (1947). Dahl criticizes the assumption of the classical theorists that administration was a purely technical matter, value-free, unconnected with ends on purposes. He further attacked the concept of an "administrative man" who would be purely rational. Dahl concluded that administrative theory must also account for non-rational behavior and for influences inseparable from the particular environment—democratic, capitalist, industrial etc.

That bureaucracy should be uniquely apolitical, or instrumental, is a notion derived from the misunderstanding of the process of administrative decision-making. Given the rapid advancement of technology, the expertise required for administration is uniquely aloof from the rest of the people, and thus inevitably leaves out participation. Public administrators are bound by their identification with political processes. Hence, the network of authority and legitimacy are intermingled between politics and administration. Thus Tullock confesses:

There is no way this sort of ultimate policy formation by low-ranking personnel can be avoided; it will arise on occasion in all organizations, no matter how efficiently these are organized (1965:181).

Concluding Remarks

Bureaucracy is as frequently a target of criticism, from the Weberians as it is from the Marxists. However, while the burden of
complaint from the Marxists is the charge that bureaucracy is being used as an licensed institution for class exploitation and therefore should be eliminated altogether, Weberians more frequently complain of the pathologies and dysfunctions of bureaucracy and seek ways to check and regulate them.

The Weberians, in many occasions, agreed on certain views—the belief that bureaucrats are unimaginative, reluctant to accept new ideas, and extraordinary slow to abandon policies that are clearly unsuccessful. Many have rejected the image of public bureaucracy as an effective, equitable, and responsive problem-solving mechanism. In long-range terms, the application of the rigid, impersonal side of the executive bureaucracy has resulted in a steady compilation of perceived losses by an expanding segment of the polity.

It is also suggested that the hierarchial nature of the bureaucratic structure makes it inevitable that it would limit the use of experts, and the conflicts between experts and administrators within organizations are undesirable for inefficiency. These have represented a more fundamental case against the notion of bureaucracy as an efficient instrument. In short, rigidity in outlook on matters of policy is a pathology increasingly attributed to bureaucracy by critics from all segments of the Weberian paradigm.

Another criticism is that despite its claim of the machinery stereo-type, many of the assertions of efficiency and effectiveness could not be found in the model. There is a danger of the internal
structural mechanisms breaking down to cause bureaucratic organization to be a burden rather than a tool. Such internal paradoxes have created skepticism and recentment from many students of bureaucracy.

However, the Weberian critics of bureaucracy did not, in general, suggest a form of organization which would be superior to the bureaucratic organization as Weber defined it. Either they made points about the need for flexibility in the general model, or they fulminate against large-scale organizations in general, just as they rage against large-scale and complex society that made them possible (Hill, 1972: 17).

There are, of course, ways in which some of the pathologies of bureaucracy could be overcome. The establishment of a new agency, a change in the jurisdiction or resources vested in an existing administrative organization, innovation in the development of policy, the establishment of temporary organizations and competition, among others, are some of the cures available for the ills of bureaucracy (Rourke, 1976). In the same vein, Gawthrop has suggested other alternative forms such as the establishment of boundary-spanning units and the fusion of public and private administration (1971). It must be pointed out, however, that such solutions to the problem still involve the existence of bureaucratic organizations, and perhaps the creation of additional bureaucracies. These are certainly ironies and paradoxes that are confronting the existence of bureaucratic organizations in modern society.
CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS:
CONTRADICTIONS AND APPROXIMATIONS

The most plausible argument for the Weberian model and against the Marxian model is the process of bureaucratization which is quite obviously taking place in all forms of governmental and economic systems. On the other hand, the strongest argument against the Weberian model and for the Marxian model is that the pathologies and dysfunctions of administrative organization are too obvious and serious to be modified, let alone be concealed. The idea of bureaucracy, from the Marxian conception, has rarely been divorced from the feeling that it involves practical problems which demand radical solutions. The justification of the elimination of bureaucracy derives exactly from the latter argument. Whereas the Weberians would argue that the price paid for the positive consequences of administration is worthwhile, although elimination is the alternative proposed for the roots and branches of bureaucracy. Further, Weberians would argue that the strategy with the greatest probability of success is one of regulation, not elimination. The core of the debate, then, is centered on two major issues: the size and the functions of the bureaucratic apparatus.
Bureaucratization: A Comparison

Weber predicted that due to its technical superiority and its focused objectives, the bureaucratic organization will increase in size and strength in the capitalist and socialist countries, regardless of the "rationalities" which accompany it. Weber also projected the inexorable trends toward rationalization, secularization, and functional specialization, and at the same time warned that modern man would be trapped in a bureaucratic "iron cage" of his own alienated objectification (Mitzman, 1970). Granting the efficiency of bureaucratic organizations, Weber seriously questioned their effectiveness and sought ways of control. Weberian scholars, realizing the inevitability and indispensibility of bureaucratic structure, have concentrated on the other side of the bureaucratic coin, namely, the irrationalities and inhumanities of bureaucratization. The Marxists, likewise, are struggling with the scope of bureaucratization and hierarchization in their own ways, while rejecting the notion of bureaucracy as governmental interference, and they react with some degree of fatalism to the size and functions of modern organization.

Thus, the oppositions to bureaucratization are indeed great in both the Marxian and the Weberian approaches. The fundamental problems lie behind the type of economic systems that are operating in these countries. In the theoretical framework, the total command system and the laissez-faire system stand at the opposite ends of each other. The following figure shows this situation:
In the market system of laissez-faire, a few distinct characteristics stand out: (a) There are no government regulations on demand and supply in the economy; (b) The ownership of the means of production is strictly private; (c) There is a sharp division between owners and workers, and (d) There is no explicit concern whatever for distributive justice in the economic as well as the welfare system. In such situations, organizational functions are minimal and tend to work within their own limits.

The more one moves to the left, approaching the total command system, the greater the tendency for the growth of bureaucratic organizations, and most of the characteristics of market economy disappear. Government intervention becomes dominant in the economic, political and social life of individuals, who, in turn, tend to view bureaucracies suspiciously. The economy management in the total command system is, in fact, "a very peculiar mixture of centralized decision-making, general planning and bureaucratic procedures" (Hirszowicz, 1980:134). The bureaucratic administration is run in the form of total centralization, where the decisions are made at the top and are transmitted to the lower levels, while all information originates from below and proceeds to the elites for decision-making. In essence, the system provides a great stimulus for bureaucratic centralization and growth.
It is clear that most economic systems are somewhere between the two opposite ends; for example, the United States would be located in the right segment, while the socialist systems would be more to the left. While the capitalist systems have been undergoing the bureaucratization process as a result of changes in both the public and private sectors, the tendency for bureaucratic growth in the socialist states is much greater.

Indeed, the historical evidence and background to this study confirm such a trend. Our question, then, is what causes bureaucratization to increase in both the capitalist and the socialist states? Are there any similarities or differences between them?

In his analysis of capitalist bureaucracy, Anthony Downs puts forward four possible causes for the increasing bureaucratization in everyday life. They are connected with the tendencies of modern societies to grow (a) larger in total population; (b) more complex in specialization; (c) more sophisticated in technology, and (d) more urbanized, and wealthier per capita as time passes (1967:255-256).

To this list, two more possible causes can be added: the spoils system which some countries are practising, and the increasing tensions in international crises. In the case of spoils system—-or the patronage system—-the one who is elected to office appoints friends or political associates to public jobs, which are sometimes irrelevant and thus increase the size of the bureaucracy. This has been one of the most important characteristics of governments, especially in the United States. Although this practice of patronage
has been under strong attack for more than a century and the reform
effort to eliminate it has been successful in many respects, vestiges
of the practice remain.

However, this is a more serious problem in the developing
nations. The practice of nepotism has always prevailed over the
practice of recruitment based on achievement. It is clear that
qualifications are not always followed by functional administrative
posts. As Gunnar Myrdal puts it:

The overburdening of administration by
unnecessary discretionary controls, and also
the clumsy procedures and lack of rational
delegation which are partly caused by tradition
and partly by the proliferation of that type
of controls, have tended to dilute the corps
of officials by employing persons of less
competence and less integrity (1970:244).

This would inevitably cause a huge increase of public employees in
the bureaucracy, and would imply administrative inefficiency and
dishonesty.

The international crises in modern politics have occurred
through more intensive ideological differences, as well as greater
sophistication in modern weaponry. Intensive political and ideologi-
cal differences generate an extremely complicated web of relation-
ships among countries. Such conflicts and confrontations in the areas
of national defence, trade and politics frequently lead to the
expansions of bureaus and organizations in respective countries in
an attempt to manage and regulate critical events. Even if the crises
were to subside, the tendency is for the bureaucracy to maintain its size and management for later crises and the anticipation of them.

It is also clear that the implementation of foreign policies would inevitably lead to bureaucratic expansion. One of the reasons is that the organizational overlapping and duplication have failed to coordinate among the diverse agencies playing the role in foreign affairs (Rourke, 1972:66). Taking the case of United States national defence, Corson and Harris remark that the Department of War and Navy before World War II which had included 400,000 civilian and military personnel has transformed into the Department of Defense employing 3.7 million civilian and military personnel in its regular establishment in 1962 (1963:96). The annual budget has gone up from 900 million dollars to 53 billion dollars between the Wars. Such a bureaucratic growth in size and complexity were caused by the following reasons:

First, because of the growth strength—in terms of population, economic resources, and technological capacity to build more destructive weapons—and the obviously aggressive intent of the enemy . . . Second, the administrative job requires the continual replacement of present weapons (e.g. planes and tanks) with the most modern weapons that a rapidly evolving technology can produce . . . Third, the administrative can be planned effectively only if there is a continual flow of intelligence on a broad spectrum of matters ranging from logistics to factory location and design and the state of mind and heath of peoples all over the globe (Carson and Harris, 1963:77).
With the possible exception of the spoils system, the socialist states exhibit all the above characteristics, perhaps more distinct. Population growth is all the more obvious in the Soviet Union and China where the population is one of the major obstacles toward modernization and development. Sophistication in technology and specialization requires professionalism and demands a very elaborate hierachial structure in the Communist bureaucracy as it moves toward to compete with Western science and technology. Indeed, Lenin recognized this, and excluded the technical specialists from the 'administration.' (Abrahamsson, 1977:48). Similarly, the socialist states are becoming more and more urbanized in their efforts to raise the standard of living of their people. In addition, the international crises in the areas of trade and national defence confront the socialist states too.

The Marxian approach is most explicit and optimistic in the elimination of the state and its bureaucracy. However, evidence has shown that it is perhaps most deficient in its practical vision as far as the bureaucratization of society is concerned, as exemplified by the Soviet Union and China. Practically, it has failed to take into account three aspects:

(a) The socialist states have not been able to get rid of the bureaucratic legacies left by their imperial regimes, which they have succeeded in overthrowing. The organizational size and administrative functions of Tzarist Russian and Imperial China remain a major part of the bureaucratic problem faced by the new regimes.
Many of the pathologies are thus inherited, such as class bias, recruitments based on ascription and kinship, corruption, inefficiency and so forth.

One of the major problems after the Socialist Revolutions connected with the desire of modernization was the lack of experts and professionals who were capable of performing administrative and technical tasks which industrialization required (Fainsod, 1963:254). What remained from the pre-revolutionary bureaucracy were the dysfunctional characteristics and skills and attitudes that were adaptable to the new order. To keep the old bureaucrats in the administrative apparatus, the new regimes enlisted them and surrounded them with cadres and officers to ensure their loyalty, and thus added unnecessary burdens to the already over-sized bureaucracy;

(b) The economic system of socialist states has put a great demand on the states and its bureaucracy, making its disappearance impossible. The political and economic functions of the state bureaucracy have become increasingly apparent for the consolidation of power for the ruling party and the rationality of the planning economy (Hirszowicz, 1980; Hodges, 1981; Barnett, 1967; Skocpol, 1979). In the former, it is used as an indoctrination machinery. There is a need for the party cadres to penetrate into every level of society to spread the ideological commitments of the regimes. Similarly, if there is justice for economic distribution, there will inevitably be huge bureaucratic organizations to undertake the enormous task;

(c) The increase in specialization and technological sophisti-
cation toward modernization requires an elaborate bureaucratic structure. This has been pointed out by Lenin when he acknowledged the distinction between specialists and generalists (1969:337).

However, innovation for social change requires the development of both these groups and of the functions they perform. Although their size and functions are not always completely complementary, the division of labor excludes the possibility of meaningful elimination in regard to development. Consequently, there is no other solution left apart from training more specialists as well as generalist administrative staff.

The lack of fit between the Marxian model of bureaucracy and the actual historical pattern of bureaucratic evolution suggests more insistently than many contemporary Marxists may want to admit the need for rethinking some of the basics of Marxian approach. Indeed, Schumpeter once confessed:

I for one cannot visualize, in the conditions of modern society, a socialist organization in any form other than that of a huge and all embracing bureaucratic apparatus. Every other possibility I can conceive would spell failure and breakdown (1950:206).

True enough, the advocacy of the Marxian model for the efficiencies and irrationalities of bureaucracy remains valid for any societies; nothing in the last hundred years in the academic circle or social experiences have undercut the compelling, indeed necessary, potential
of that advocacy. The fact remains, nevertheless, that classical Marxism failed to foresee or adequately explain the autonomous power of the state as administrative and coercive mechanisms in the post-capitalist society.

Regardless of the political and moral consequences of the increased scale of organization, it appears that they are necessary and unescapable. The complexities of modern technology and the demand for coordinated delivery of goods and services really mean that modern society must adjust to the organizations it has created—and to control them if this is desired. In this aspect, Weber has gone far beyond Marx, or for that matter any Marxists, has hitherto attempted.

Dysfunctions of Bureaucracy: A Comparison

The most relevant, and perhaps the most penetrating criticism by the Marxian model on bureaucratic organizations is its emphasis on the negative consequences and the dysfunctional aspects. Marx made it very clear that the social and administrative pathologies of the bureaucratic state, which are directly related to the mode of existence of bureaucracy, would eventually breed its own seeds of destruction. The hierarchical structure which alienates the officialdom from the masses, the red tape, the malpractices, corruption, irrationalism, the exploitation of classes and the self-seeking elites, all would lead to the final assault of its elimination. The question is not one of the necessity of setting up administrative
structure as such, but rather, partly one of whether bureaucratization in society surpasses the optimal level of efficiency, and partly one of the nature of its negative effects on people.

Therefore, it is no surprise that the Marxian preoccupation is to call for the elimination of the state and its bureaucracy for it conceives that the "bureaucratic disease" is catching up with the whole social structure and destroying it. The Weberian approach, however, while realizing such administrative and social pathologies, is not willing to trade bureaucratic institutions with anarchism. There is no total institutional substitute for bureaucracy, and practical experiences reaffirm the necessity for a multi-dimensional conception of bureaucratic structure.

In this regard, it becomes necessary to look at the practical management problems in the socialist countries and compare them with the dysfunctional aspects of bureaucracy which claims its inspiration from the Weberian ideal-type.

It has been determined that bureaucratization in the socialist regimes is enormous, and for the most part occurs as a phenomenon of scale. The most conspicuous dysfunctions of bureaucratic administration of these regimes are as follows:

(a) There is an excessive growth of rules and regulations. Bureaucratic formalism becomes the most striking symptoms and administrative procedures are so prolific that it becomes counter-productive;

(b) The inevitable rigidity of the organizational structure
has presented itself with enormous obstacles for efficiency and effectiveness;

(c) Overcentralization in the bureaucratic structure has caused unavoidable delays in decision-making on policies that needed immediate attention and action. This is due to hierarchization which in turn produces unnecessary delays;

(d) There is excessive time and effort spent on coordinating activities as the number of units and the numbers of levels need to be coordinated is so enormous in nature;

(e) There is the displacement of goals due to the organizational inducement which the administration provides and the nature of tasks to be performed. The subordinates are always concerned with what the supervisory organs conceived of their activities, and disregard the results achieved through such activities;

(f) There are the defense mechanisms characterised by secrecy against clients, customers and outsiders. This has enabled the administrative apparatus to avoid social control, the dismissal of complaints and consistent support by higher authorities (Hirszowicz, 1980:135-136).

These factors can be found throughout the socialist administrative system, and they are generally regarded as the unpleasant yet unavoidable traits of bureaucracy per se. If such pathologies are compared with the maladies of bureaucracy in the Weberian experience, the similarities immediately stand out. It is apparent that both systems have to pay a very heavy price for the positive results of bureaucratic administration, and it seems there is no
exception to the rule.

However, differences do exist, and they lie in the scope of bureaucratization in both systems. Whereas in the socialist system, bureaucratic dysfunctions and distortions seem to be an invisible force present everywhere, in the capitalist states they seem to be confined to selected areas of social, economic, and political life. There is also a continual spread of bureaucratic organizations into the private sector where its visibility is not so obvious. The market system with keen competition among the enterprises has partially eliminated some of the maladies in the productive forces of bureaucratic structure. The impact of administration is strong, and certainly more so in the socialist countries where all productive activities in the nationalized economy are integrated into the centralized system of command.

The Weberian model, in this regard, shares a certain consensus with the Marxian model. For Marx, the dysfunctional aspects of bureaucracy serve as the ideological justification of the separateness between the state and the civil society. Whereas the Weberians would argue that the bureaucratic pathologies have enlightened them to consider administrative control and balance seriously. To be sure, they expect that the advance of technology and specialized knowledge to overcome most of, if not all, the negative phenomena and characteristics of bureaucracy, and they attach particular high hopes to the ways by which they think inefficiency can be completely overcome.

Although Weber acknowledged the rationalization of bureaucracy
in social development, he nevertheless usually viewed this process with pessemistic resignation. Indeed the scope of bureaucratization would suggest some forms of mechanism for control. The Weberian model has discussed the dysfunctional aspects in great details. However, the problem of bureaucratic power was given special attention. Weber himself considered a very large number of mechanisms for limiting the scope of systems of authority in general and bureaucracy in particular. These mechanisms as noted by Albrow (1970) fall into five major categories: (a) collegiality; (b) the separation of power; (c) amateur administration; (d) direct democracy, and (e) representation.

In addition, there is the sixth category: concentrated executive authority or the plebiscitarian charismatic rule. This concept is interpreted by Mommsen (1974) as Weber's anti-authoritarian version of charismatic rule. Mommsen maintains that Weber was skeptical of the steady growth of bureaucratic structure which jeopardizes individual freedom.

He considered stagnation and ossification the real dangers of his age, rather than charismatic break-throughs. In his opinion, the fatal decline of dynamism and mobility in politics would be cured only by one antidote, namely "charismatic leadership." Charismatic leaders had to check the aspirations of the bureaucracy. They had to break up its deadly rule of routine by their unique capacity to set new goals and to open new paths in societies hampered by political stagnation and bureaucratic routine. It was up to them to keep the "open society" open against the inhuman forces of bureaucratization (Mommsen, 1974:93-94).
The Weberian model considers the free parliament—which is obviously absent in the state socialist system most clearly identified with the Marxian tradition—in the modern states to be of vital importance in checking bureaucracy. It emphasizes power with responsibility and accountability, and the need for parliamentary committee to safeguard the freedom for individual citizens. Indeed, there is perhaps no foundation for the fear that bureaucratization presents itself as a fundamental obstacle to representative government, or in this regard, an efficient administration for the people. The capitalist system has really operated under a system of "bureaucratic democracy," in which governmental decisions are made in bureaucratic settings, out of the public eye, without jeopardizing the representation of interest groups and the citizenry (Yates, 1982).

There are efforts by Weberian scholars to apply the ideal-type bureaucracy to the developing nations. The importance of governmental bureaucracy for a political system in the developing nations to develop "a high level of internal regulation, distribution, or extraction" (Almond and Powell, 1966:323) has been recognized. In the Weberian literature of public administration, there is a continual debate on the political role of the bureaucracy and the possibilities of its becoming the power-seekers in the political system. There is a continual shift between two points of view; those who view bureaucracy mainly as a stepping stone for the successful and efficient implementation of policies on the one hand (Braibanti, 1969; Esman, 1966, 1972; Brown, 1962; Heady, 1970;
Binder, 1962), and those who view bureaucracy as a stumbling block, or an instrument of power, making it the master of the people on the other (Riggs, 1963, 1964; LaPalombara, 1963; Goodnow, 1964). While there are empirical and theoretical differences between the two camps, there is no doubt that modern, complex, interdependent societies cannot get along without bureaucracy, thus confirming the Weberian viewpoint of bureaucratic functions.

Some Critical Evaluations

It is clear that the contradictions of theory and practice in the Marxian approach have created enormous problems for those who claim their inspiration from Marx. At the same time, criticisms of the pathologies in the administration cannot be ignored altogether. Similarly, there are paradoxes and ironies present in the Weberian theory, which cannot be resolved at the present moment. In this regard, both models share the practical problems in their own right.

The approximations of the Marxian and the Weberian models can be summarized as follows:

(1) Both models made extensive criticisms of bureaucratic organization and exposed the pathologies and dysfunctions of bureaucratic administration in modern societies. Indeed, the tone and substance of Weberians' and Marxists' critical comments are very similar and complementary (Merton, 1952; Neuman, 1952, Lenin, 1969; Mao, 1977). The major difference lies in the "solution"
of both models. For the Weberian, the most meaningful and probable solution is regulation; whereas for the Marxists, the pathologies and dysfunctions of bureaucratic organizations justify their elimination. The following figure illustrates this point:

**Marxian Model**

- The threats of bureaucracy:
  - (a) An organ for class exploitation;
  - (b) A means to advance the interests of the propertied;
  - (c) The incompetence of officialdom;
  - (d) Alienation of the State from the civil society;
  - (e) An ultimate threat for the realization of a classless society.

**Weberian Model**

- The threats and pathologies of bureaucracy:
  - (a) A threat to democracy and individual freedom;
  - (b) Rigidities and excessive impersonality;
  - (c) Resists innovation and change;
  - (d) Red tape, secrecy, corruption, etc.
  - (e) An ultimate threat to humanity.

A consensus that the presence of pathologies and dysfunctions in bureaucratic organizations are compelling

- Elimination
- Regulation

The criticisms of the Marxian model on bureaucratic organization such as the incompetence of officialdom, alienation and rigidities and so forth are relevant in both the models as evident from the practical consequences of both the capitalist and the socialist systems. The Weberian model, while acknowledging the rationality
and effectiveness of bureaucratic organizations, is sharing these criticisms with the Marxian model.

(2) Similarly, the size of the administrative apparatus must be considered as the major practical approximation between the two models. The Marxian position of the eradication and elimination of the state, however firm it may seem, has been shaken by the rapid growth of bureaucratic organizations in the socialist system. The prediction of Weber—that bureaucratization is inevitable in the future—proves to be consistent with the historical trend of societal development.

The figure above illustrates the argument. The Marxian model has diverted from the theoretical notion of the withering of the state to converge with the Weberian notion of bureaucratization in societal development. Such practical, non-theoretical consequences may have caught the Marxists by surprise, however. They are increasingly aware of the essentiality of bureaucracy in modernization and the developmental process in a country's economy and polity.
This is most apparent in the recent organizational reforms in China which are attempting to use the Weberian ideal-typical construction in bureaucratic organizations (King, 1980). In this regard, the theoretical triumph seems to belong to Weber rather than to Marx.

(3) The separation of administration from politics in the Weberian ideal-type is one of its major characteristics. This bifurcated vision derives from the Western belief that professionalism should be apolitical, or instrumental. As noted previously, the Weberian dilemma lies in this separation. Such a distinction seems to be impossible given the advancement of technological hardware and software which would inevitably leave out participation (Tullock, 1965:191; Horowitz, 1982:229). The Marxian model recognizes such a problem, though not from the technological point of view. Rather it acknowledges that bureaucratic theory is part of a comprehensive political theory and therefore is inseparable from values and systems of logic (Feron and Feron, 1972:63). From these points of view, it must be said that the advocacy of the Marxian model that the separation of administration and politics is impossible and unnecessary is not wholly true, nor is the Weberian belief that it should be so. Given the desirability and difficulties of such a separation, the Marxian and the Weberian models have failed to come out with a satisfactory solution.
Conclusion

Some efforts were made by socialist scholars to coordinate all formulations on bureaucracy under one common theoretical roof in order to finally arrive at a unified theory of bureaucracy (Heiskanen, 1976), but Abrahamsson has commented that "the views and ideas of different authors concerning the emergence of bureaucracy are so distant from each other as to render unification impossible" (1977:36). There is perhaps some truth in both views. While the contradictions between the bureaucratic theories—and within them—have proved to be irreconcilable, it is also apparent that many elements—particularly the practical consequences—of the models are merging into some forms of consensus.

Whatever the explanation of the similarities and differences between the Marxian and the Weberian approaches, one obvious implication of the similarities is that the two paradigms can probably learn a great deal from each other, probably more so for the Marxian from the Weberian. In the literature of Marxian bureaucracy, Weberian theorists will find vigorous and logical analyses of organization and the diagnosis of bureaucratisms bearing heavily on the concerns of human values. In the analysis of the Weberian approach, Marxists will find a rich store of ideas they seem to be toiling to reproduce independently. Such exchange of ideas could perhaps significantly modify their ideological concepts and to erase the distinction between ideological and scientific thinking.
Lindblom remarks that the conventional theory of democratic politics is in no way superior to the radical theory. Indeed, "conventional theory is embarrassingly defective. It greatly needs to call more heavily on radical thought" (1982:20). Perhaps in this spirit, the Marxian and the Weberian theories of bureaucracy would possibly link their differences.

Scholars in the two paradigms stand to gain by sharing their materials more extensively in the future than they have in the past. More important are the indications that theory in both areas is to a large extent imprisoned by the premises and perspectives and reasoning of an earlier day, trapped into recapitulating and refining familiar concepts instead of developing assumptions that might free theory from the cycling loop into which it has fallen. Although there are important exceptions, it appears that much modern writings and ideology in both paradigms tend to retrace established paths instead of finding new ones.

All things considered, it may be said that the administrative process has developed on more or less the same scale in countries where constitutional rule prevails and in those under authoritarian government. The same principle applies in the total command system and the laissez-faire market system. As Horowitz remarks:

Whatever the economic system, our epoch bears witness to a constant expansion in state power, bureaucracy, and administrative domination and disposition of people. The economic system a nation lives under has become less important than the fact of state growth and its allocative mechanisms (1982:233)
It is thus clear that no system can claim its superiority of efficiency and effectiveness over the other as far as the bureaucratization process is concerned. Ironically, the Marxian and the Weberian models, with all their complexities and differences, may yet find some comfort from each other's similarities of practical dilemma.
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