The Moral Majority: The Fundamentalist-Christian's Fight Against Humanism and Pluralism in American Politics

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THE MORA L MA JORITY: 
THE F UNDAMENTALIST-CHRISTIAN'S F IGHT 
AGA INST HUMANISM AND PLURALISM IN AMERICAN POLITICS

by

James A. Kruis

A Thesis
Submitted to the
Faculty of The Graduate College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the
Degree of Master of Arts
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The Moral Majority claims to be nonreligious but they are actually a very religious reaction against humanism and pluralism, fighting their battle from behind a facade of legitimate moral issues. Their reaction against humanism is due to their failure to distinguish properly between religion and morality. Their reaction against pluralism is a result of the fact that pluralism has been overextended and thus weakened, making it vulnerable to attack. In place of humanism and pluralism the Moral Majority advocates more freedom: freedom from government interference and freedom to solve social problems with "moral, spiritual" solutions.

The Moral Majority could make a positive contribution to American politics by reestablishing the relative pluralism of the Founding Fathers and disestablishing the philosophy of absolute pluralism.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

For me Professor William Ritchie is the best among all the professors I have had the privilege of knowing. After reading the first draft of this thesis over a year ago, he aptly called me a "basket case." Whatever progress I have made since then toward being a "Master of Arts" has been only with his very substantial aid.

James A. Kruis
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony*, Samuel Huntington (1981) says America is not explained well by political theories that make economic and materialistic interests the central issue because in America, unlike most countries, morality is more often the key issue in its political conflicts. He says:

> It is precisely the central role of moral passion that distinguishes American politics from the politics of most other societies, and it is this characteristic that is most difficult for foreigners to understand. (p. 11)

In a more pithy phrase Huntington says, "America has been spared class conflicts in order to have moral convulsions" (p. 11).

Two recent examples of the moral convulsions cited by Huntington are the civil rights protests of the early 1960s and the Viet Nam War protests at the end of the 1960s and early 1970s. Huntington would predict another moral convulsion by the end of the 1970s: it was at that time that

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the Moral Majority arose and it could be argued that the Moral Majority is that moral convulsion.

However, the Moral Majoritarians are not essentially moral activists, as they claim to be. They are essentially religious protestors who have slid over into the moral sphere. They are using morality as a facade behind which they are advocating their religion. That is, although the civil rights protests, the Viet Nam War protests, and the Moral Majority all address legitimate moral concerns, the Moral Majority is also fighting the "religion" of humanism and trying to replace it with their own religion. The religious right is trying to replace humanism with their own concept of freedom as determined by their religion.

The subject of this thesis is the religious right's reaction against humanism, especially as it appears in the political arena as anti-pluralism, and finally the Moral Majority's mistaken efforts to replace humanism and pluralism with their concept of freedom.

Jerry Falwell, founder and president of the Moral Majority, claims his moral protests are the same as those of Martin Luther King, Jr. and the civil rights protests. According to Fitzgerald (1981) writing in the New Yorker,
Falwell now says he changed his mind about the role of preachers in politics because of such issues as abortion and school prayers. But it was the civil rights movement that prompted that first political speech. In October of 1980, . . . he asserted that he and his fellow ministers were now doing exactly what King and his fellows had done. (p. 111, emphasis added)

But, again, Falwell is not doing exactly what King had done. For instance, King (1964) called his organization the "Southern Christian Leadership Conference" and affiliate organizations also called themselves "Christian" such as the "Alabama Christian Movement for Human Rights."

In contrast Falwell denies the religious nature of his movement. Instead of calling the Moral Majority "Christian" or "fundamentalist" or even "religious" Falwell (1981b) says in Newsweek,

The Moral Majority is not a Christian or a religious organization. . . . We are made up of fundamentalists, evangelicals, Roman Catholics, conservative Jews, Mormons, and even persons of no religious beliefs who share our concerns about the issues we address. (p. 17)

Similarly, in Christianity Today Falwell ("Interview with the Lone Ranger," 1981) says,

The most aggressive leaders in the Moral Majority are fundamentalist pastors. That isn't necessary, because the Moral Majority is not a religious organization; it's political. (p. 31)
In *The Fundamentalist Phenomenon* Falwell (1981a) says, "Moral Majority is a political organization and is not based on theological considerations" (p. 188). Again, in the pamphlet that the Moral Majority sends to prospective members Falwell (n.d.) says, "We are not a religious organization."

Despite the fact that the Moral Majority constantly denies its essentially religious orientation, they regularly raise explicitly religious issues. For instance, in the same *Newsweek* article quoted above in which Falwell says the Moral Majority is not a religious organization, Falwell also says,

The First Amendment prohibits the government from establishing a church (as had been done in England!). It does not prohibit the churches from doing anything, except collecting taxes. Any person who suggests that separation of church and state requires more than this--that it requires churches to remain silent on "political issues" or preachers to be neutral on candidates or religious organizations to pursue only "spiritual goals"--is simply grinding his own ax rather than reading the law. (p. 17)

Why does Falwell emphasize the right of religious organizations to be politically involved in the same article where he denies the Moral Majority is a religious organization? The overt religious concerns of the Moral Majority
appear more clearly in their lists of purportedly moral issues. In one place Falwell ("Enforcing God's Law," 1981) says there are four categories of concern that gave rise to his organization. He writes,

As a private citizen, I organized the Moral Majority, Inc. in June of 1979. . . . Our activities center on four main points.

First, we take a pro-life position. Since the Roe vs. Wade Supreme Court decision in January 1973, more than six million unborn babies have been legally murdered in America. . . .

Second, we are pro-family. Government legislation is becoming the number one force for the destruction of the family. In addition, the feminist movement, the children's rights movement, the entertainment industry, humanists in secular education, pornographers and others seem dedicated to the destruction of the monogamous, traditional American family.

And we are pro-morality. Humanism, with its emphasis on moral relativism and amorality, challenges every principle on which America was founded. It advocates abortion-on-demand, recognition of homosexuals, free use of pornography, legalizing of prostitution and gambling, and free use of drugs, among other things.

Above all, we are pro-American: The very existence of the free American state is threatened in this decade. The free-enterprise system is endangered by the advent of socialism. Our national defense is virtually nonexistent in the face of the Soviet arms buildup. The refusal of elected leaders and bureaucratic mercenaries to acknowledge the commitment of international communism to world conquest jeopardizes
our national security. (p. 40, emphasis on humanism added)

In *Listen America!* Falwell (1980) has five categories of concern and the religious issue of humanism is again tucked in among the moral issues. Falwell writes,

> While sins of America are certainly many, let us summarize the five major problems that have political consequences, political implications, that moral Americans need to be ready to face.

1. **ABORTION**—Nine men, by majority vote, said it was okay to kill unborn children. . . .

2. **HOMOSEXUALITY**—In spite of the fact that the Bible clearly designates this sin as an act of a "reprobate mind. . . ."

3. **PORNOGRAPHY**—The four-billion-dollar-per-year pornographic industry is probably the most devastating moral influence upon our young people. . . .

4. **HUMANISM**—The contemporary philosophy that glorifies man as man apart from God. . . .

5. **THE FRACTURED FAMILY**—With a skyrocketing divorce rate. (pp. 221-223, emphasis added)

Four of the five issues cited by Falwell at least focus on human relations and therefore can be deemed moral issues, but humanism—"the contemporary philosophy that glorifies man as man apart from God"—is obviously a religious issue and does not fit well in the list. It certainly would not be on the agenda of a truly nonreligious
organization.

There is an analogy in the tests often given to elementary school children. That is, school children might be asked to pick the item that does not fit in a list, such as apple, banana, orange, pear, and shotgun. This simple test measures the ability to distinguish between fruit and weapons. The Moral Majority's inclusion of religious issues in their catalogue of purportedly moral concerns suggests they do not distinguish properly between religion and morality.

In Chapter III, the foundational chapter of this thesis, religion and morality will be properly distinguished for the Moral Majority. The upshot of Chapter III is that the Moral Majority's attack on humanism has no merit whatsoever. Their fight against humanism is certainly not a fight for morality; it is a fight against secularization, it is a religious fight, and it is fought from behind a facade of legitimate moral concerns.

With Chapter III in the background, with religion and morality properly distinguished, Chapter IV contains the nucleus of the thesis. In Chapter IV the moral issues are temporarily ignored in order to accurately observe the
religious conflict between fundamentalism and humanism in the political arena. The fundamentalists not only attack humanism but they deny the humanists their right to a voice in the polity. In other words, their religious attack on humanism is also a political attack against pluralism.

A few examples of the attack on pluralism can be found in Tim Lahaye's (1980) book *The Battle for the Mind*. Lahaye is a Baptist preacher, a co-founder of the Moral Majority, and head of the California State Chapter. He writes,

Only when enough morally minded voters recognize that humanists are not qualified to hold public office . . . will they vote in pro-moral leaders. (p. 36)

and

A humanist . . . is not fit to govern us or to train our young. (p. 46)

and

We must remove all humanists from public office and replace them with pro-moral political leaders. (p. 10)

and

No humanist is qualified to hold any government office in America--United States senator, congressman, cabinet member, State Department employee, or any other position that requires him to think. (p. 78)
In a less direct attack, the head of the 700 Club and founder of the Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN), Pat Robertson (Robertson & Slosser, 1982), says in The Secret Kingdom,

Today, the United States struggles under a social philosophy of pluralism. There is no unified reality. Many disparate, frequently cacophonous voices echo from one shore to another. Confusion is triumphant. (p. 177)

The main question in Chapter IV is: Why are fundamentalists attacking pluralism? More accurately the question is: Why are the fundamentalists attacking pluralism now? After all, their fight with humanism is as old as fundamentalism and therefore their attack on humanism is expected, but the religious right's aggressive attack against pluralism at the national level proceeded with a quantum leap at the end of the 1970s. Which changed to bring on the attack--fundamentalism or pluralism? My thesis is that pluralism changed. Pluralism has been expanded beyond the limits demanded by its own nature. Pluralism has been violated and weakened by this expansion. When anything is weakened its enemies are encouraged to attack and that is precisely what the fundamentalists are doing in the form of the Moral Majority.
As will be reviewed in Chapter IV of this thesis, pluralism began with traditional religions such as Protestantism, Catholicism, Judaism, Quakerism, and nonbelief or secular humanism, and, of course, many other religions and philosophies. In 1868 pluralism was officially extended to include various races, especially Blacks. In 1920 pluralism was expanded to include women. So far most people would say the expansion of pluralism from the traditional religions to include various races and both sexes has strengthened rather than weakened pluralism. However, in 1965 pluralism was expanded to include birth controllers and in 1969 pluralism was expanded to include pornographers. In 1972 pluralism was expanded to give singles the same status as married people, at least with regard to buying contraceptives. Finally, in 1973 pluralism was again expanded to include abortionists.

It will be shown that somewhere during this expansion pluralism was mistakenly taken to be an absolute principle rather than a relative one as intended by the Founding Fathers. Originally various religions and philosophies sanctioned pluralism but now that has been reversed: pluralism has been used to sanction various ideas and practices.
Pluralism has been made an end rather than a means. It has been made absolute. This establishment of absolute pluralism is tantamount to the establishment of chaos.

It is not because humanists are included in the franchise that pluralism is a problem. Pluralism is a problem because it has been absolutized and thereby made an ally rather than a foe of immorality, crime, and anarchy. The real religious conflict is not between the Judeo-Christian ethic and humanism because humanists largely endorse that ethic. The real religious conflict in the political arena is between absolute pluralism and monotheism, which are not compatible. The establishment of absolute pluralism is the repudiation of monotheism. Again, the rise in immorality is a mere epiphenomenon of the establishment of absolute pluralism and the repudiation of monotheism.

A remedy for monotheists within the spirit of the First Amendment would be to disestablish absolute pluralism and reestablish relative pluralism. Relative pluralism is the likely political doctrine for monotheists in the United States because relative pluralism is apparently as close as one can get to monotheism within a democratic society. Relative pluralism is the secular complement of monotheism.
However, the Moral Majority's alternative to the abuse of pluralism is neither monotheism nor relative pluralism. Instead they advocate reactionary pluralism and freedom. Their concept of freedom is most important. We can see it as Falwell (1980), in *Listen America!*, quotes approvingly from Roger Freeman's *The Sum of Good Government*:

> Instead of desiring freedom from government interference: instead of looking to the government primarily as a source of protection from foreign or domestic enemies and not as the provider of services and benefits, Americans have embraced the very centralized government the Founding Fathers urged them to fear and hold in check. (p. 60)

An accolade to freedom is invariably well received in the United States. Huntington (1981) says it is part of the virtually unquestioned American Creed. However, Issiah Berlin (1962) points out in *Four Essays on Liberty* that freedom from something always entails freedom to something. When Falwell advocates freedom from government interference, he is also advocating freedom to something. Falwell and the religious right also advocate freedom for religion to solve the problems now addressed by government. At least Falwell is calling to be free of the government's efforts to solve pseudo-problems.

This other side of freedom from government

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interference—the freedom to—is touched upon by Ed McAteer who is a co-founder of the Moral Majority and current head of the Religious Roundtable. McAteer ("Roundtable's President," 1981) says,

I speak from my heart as well as my head. I personally deeply believe that our economic woes, our military woes and our political woes are not really our woes. Those are not our problems. They are a result of our problem. Our problem is a moral, spiritual problem. All of these others are a result of that problem, and so, therefore, I am 180 degrees positioned against those who say that the only thing to handle is the economic problem. I do not have the ability to articulate how deeply I feel about this. I feel our number one priority is to stop murdering babies. From a Biblical standpoint. {sic} History proves that. . . . It has the judgment of God on us. So I'd say the number one priority is to take care of our moral problems first, and these others will adjust themselves. I believe that deeply. And so everything else would be a Band-Aid until we handle those problems. (p. 7)

In other words, our economic, military, and political woes are really "moral, spiritual" problems. The religious right believes that the "moral, spiritual" problems must be solved first but they cannot be solved as long as the government interferes by providing services and benefits.

In broad terms of formal logic the reasoning of the religious right proceeds as follows: If government cannot glorify God and the government provides services and
benefits, then someone besides God, namely man, must receive the credit or glory for the services and benefits provided. If man as man apart from God receives credit or glory for services and benefits provided by government, then that government has established the religion of secular humanism which is "the glorification of man as man apart from God." Immorality and finally the judgment of God follow inevitably from this establishment of secular humanism, according to the Moral Majority. This point of view will be completely reviewed along with its flaws in Chapter IV.

An entire circle has now been outlined in this introduction. The starting point was the Moral Majority's failure to distinguish between religion and morality. This failure causes or encourages the Moral Majority to attack humanism as being morally inferior rather than addressing the real foibles of humanism as a religion. In addition the Moral Majority attacks pluralism because it has been weakened by overextension. In the place of humanism and pluralism, the Moral Majority advocates more freedom from government interference and freedom to solve social problems with their "moral, spiritual" solutions. So, while the starting point of this analysis was a failure on the
part of the Moral Majority to distinguish between religion and morality, the end is a failure to distinguish between religion and the social-economic-political sphere. The final upshot is that the Moral Majority fails to properly distinguish between the religious and the secular in general and conversely they fail to properly integrate their religion with the secular.

Before the circle outlined in this introduction is retraced in the body of this thesis, the Moral Majority should be properly introduced in a less controversial way. That is the purpose of Chapter II. An overview of the Moral Majority will be given. Its continuum of commitments, sister organizations, constituency, tactics, influence, finances, and numerical strength will be touched upon.

Chapter V reviews the criticisms of the Moral Majority. The criticism in this thesis is that the Moral Majority fail to integrate religion with the secular and consequently fail to make their potential contribution to politics. Other more popular criticisms to be reviewed are that the Moral Majority lacks compassion, is anti-intellectual, rigid and uncompromising, and paranoid.
Chapter VI is a summary and conclusion in which the issues analyzed in this thesis will be reconstructed from a primarily historical rather than analytical point of view.

Since the Moral Majority is first of all, at least relative to politics, reacting against humanism, humanism should also be introduced. Humanism in this paper will be thought of as a religion, even though most humanists would say that it is not a religion. Humanism is called a religion here because the first major task of this paper is to ascertain how humanism and Christianity compare with each other relative to morality. Calling Christianity a religion and calling humanism something else would invite differences in terminology to cloud the more important question of whether one of these two entities is superior on moral grounds.

M. Negri (1981) points out that there are many forms of humanism and he cites General, Ancient, Classical, Theistic, Atheistic, Communistic, and Naturalistic. There are, of course, also secular humanism and Christian humanism. In literature humanism is also less frequently called evolutionary, new, academic, strict, theocentric, anthropocentric, heroic, integral, dualistic, bourgeois,
proletarian, literary, Socratic, authentic, and pseudo.

The Oxford English Dictionary (1971) defines humanism in part as:

1. Belief in the mere humanity of Christ...
   Obs...

2. Character or quality of being human; devotion to human interests.

3. Any system of thought or action which is concerned with merely human interests (as distinguished from divine), or with the human race in general (as distinguished from individual); the Religion of humanity.

4. Devotion to those studies which promote human culture.

The third meaning above is closest to the usage of the word humanism in this paper.

Corliss Lamont (Lahaye, 1980) points out that Justice Hugo Black referred to humanism as a religion in Torcaso vs. Watkins when Black said,

Among religions in this country which do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others. (p. 128)

The Encyclopedia Britannica (15th ed.) defines humanism as:

Humanism, an attitude of mind attaching prime importance to man and human values, often
regarded as the central theme of Renaissance civilization.

The New Catholic Encyclopedia (1967) defines secular humanism as:

It may be defined as any philosophical, political, or cultural affirmation of man as the principal object of concern, to the exclusion of all religions or theological theses about his origin and destiny. Secular humanism, however, sometimes identifies itself as religious, as in the two significant humanist manifestoes.

The definition immediately above is probably the most common. Humanists often treat, or at least try to treat, all religions the same or exclude them from consideration. Again, humanism in this thesis will be put in the category of religions.

Corliss Lamont (1965), past president of the American Humanist Association, says in A Philosophy of Humanism,

Since the earliest days of philosophic reflection in ancient times both East and West thinkers of depth and acumen have advanced the simple proposition that the chief end of human life is to work for the happiness of man upon this earth and within the confines of the Nature that is his home. . . . This man-centered theory of life has remained relatively unheeded during long periods of history. While it has gone under a variety of names, it is a philosophy that I believe is most accurately designated as Humanism. (p. 3)

The religious right itself often claims humanism is a religion primarily because they believe the First Amendment
has been used to restrict religions and, consequently, if humanism is not a religion, they have some advantages over the religious right. Whatever the merits or demerits of that position, that is not the motive for calling humanism a religion in this paper.

In summary, Chapter II is a general introduction to the Moral Majority. Chapter III is foundational. The point is that the Moral Majority mistakenly attacks humanism on moral grounds rather than on religious grounds. Religion and morality are properly distinguished. Chapter IV is the center of the thesis. The purpose is to clearly observe the religious conflict between fundamentalism and pluralism without getting the moral issues out of place. Freedom is reviewed as the Moral Majority's alternative to humanism and pluralism. Monotheism and relative pluralism are suggested for the real solution. Chapter V is not essential. In it various criticisms of the Moral Majority are reviewed. Chapter VI is a summary and conclusion in which major issues analyzed in this thesis are reconstructed from a primarily historical perspective rather than an analytical perspective.
CHAPTER II

THE MORAL MAJORITY

The purpose of this chapter is to present an introductory overview of the Moral Majority before the following chapters address the more abstract issue of their reaction against the religion of humanism and against the politics of pluralism.

A Continuum of Commitments

Efforts to ascertain the numerical strength of the Moral Majority often suggest that people are either 'for' or 'against' this highly controversial organization. For instance, Falwell claims on television that 84% of the population are 'for' the Moral Majority. His figure is based on a Gallop Poll which says 84% of the population believe that the Ten Commandments are still valid guides for living. However, Martin Wattenberg (Chandler, 1981), a University of Michigan professor, says that according to his poll only 5.9% of the population "feel particularly
close to . . . evangelical groups active in politics, such as the Moral Majority" (p. 1). Other estimates fall between 5.9 and 84%.

Very few people probably have feelings clear enough to say they are either 'for' or 'against' the Moral Majority. It is more accurate to think in terms of a continuum of commitments. As Lipset and Raab (1970) point out in The Politics of Unreason,

There are several ways in which individuals can relate positively to a social movement. They can join it; they can consistently support it, in voting, in financial contributions, and so on; and they can expressively approve of it when asked. The Joiners obviously do all three; the Supporters approve, but do not join, the Approvers do not join or consistently support. The common term "social movement" confusingly embraces different combinations of these three levels of commitment at different times. The Joiners clearly are part of a movement. In a political context, the preferential Supporters are properly considered part of a movement, the fellow travelers. But the Approvers are more of a Sympathetic Audience than part of the movement. (pp. 288-289)

Thus, if we think of a social movement as a continuum, we have (1) the Joiners, (2) the Supporters, and (3) the mere Approvers in descending order of commitment to it. For this thesis the Moral Majority will be treated as a continuum of commitments.
Daniel Yankelovich (1981) does see the Moral Majority as a continuum of commitments. He claims that parents who are not committed for their own sake might support an organization such as the Moral Majority out of concern for their children. Yankelovich asks,

How could . . . parents, people who want their lives to be based on choice and want the same for their children, conceivably find any common ground with the Moral Majority? The answers lie in the intrinsically uneasy tension between the activists in any social movement and its broader constituency. It is in the nature of a social movement that many people can align themselves with it without supporting the full range of its programs. (p. 10)

Yankelovich is saying the same thing as Lipset and Raab except he calls the joiners "activists" and he focuses on the way children influence their parents' level of commitment. He also says,

Adults who now live a life of choice while keeping their own moral center intact are capable of doing so because their upbringing instilled in them a clear sense of right and wrong. We need to recognize that we have been neglecting the question, broadly put, of what is best for us as adults, assuming--all to comfortably--that the answer would do for both questions. It will not. A continuing failure to face this reality will serve to strengthen the Moral Majority. (p. 10)

So, the Moral Majority is a continuum of commitments.

Children tend to increase their parents' level of
commitment to the Moral Majority.

Sister Organizations

Many people who share only a few minor items in the Moral Majority's agenda will join other organizations that make those items their major concern. Thus there are sister organizations whose joiner-activists must be included among the supporters and approvers of the Moral Majority.

Some secular organizations related in this way to the Moral Majority are the direct mailing company of Richard Viguerie, the Conservative Caucus of Howard Phillip, the National Conservative Political Action Committee headed by Terry Dolan, and the Heritage Foundation run by Paul Weyrich, who also runs the Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress.

One of the larger religious organizations that approve of the Moral Majority but remain distinct is the 700 Club, with Pat Robinson at the helm. The 700 Club owns and operates the Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN) which is the second largest cable TV network. The 700 Club also includes the Freedom Council, whose function is prayer and alerting the faithful to the latest attacks on their religious freedom by the secular humanists.
The issue that keeps the 700 Club and the joiner-activists of the Moral Majority apart seems to be the gifts of the Holy Spirit. The 700 Club members speak in tongues and make divine faith healing an integral part of all their television programs. In contrast, Falwell has said on television that he and his church have never participated in a divine faith healing service and they never would. In other words, the 700 Club and the Moral Majority are apparently joined by the fundamentals of the Christian faith and their common reaction against the renunciation of God on the part of secular humanists, but the 700 Club's low keyed approach and gifts of the Spirit keep them from becoming joiner-activists of the Moral Majority. Robertson said on television that he approves of the Moral Majority but that their tactics are too harsh.

Another one of the larger religious organizations included in the Moral Majority but probably falling short of being joiner-activists is the Religious Roundtable. The Roundtable is roughly the elite of the Moral Majority. It consists of businessmen and executives of large corporations who support causes of the religious right but do not get involved in mass movements. Its founder and
leader is Ed McAteer who is a former sales manager for the Colgate-Palmolive Company. McAteer ("Roundtable's President," 1981) organized and works for the Religious Roundtable because in his words,

I saw that the people that were representing the local school board were not reflecting the views of the people in that city. I happen to live in a city that boasted of having more churches than service stations, and yet the decisions that were being made by the school board were not in line with the thinking of the people. (p. 2)

Besides the conservative secular organizations and the religious organizations with political aims, there are also religious organizations without political aims that approve of the Moral Majority. This category includes groups headed by Jim Bakker, Kenneth Copeland, Billy Graham, Rex Humbard, James Kennedy, Oral Roberts, James Robinson, Robert Schuller, George Stanley, and Jimmy Swaggart. These can be broken down again into those that fulminate against secular humanism, namely Bakker, Falwell, Kennedy, and Robinson and those who almost never fulminate against secular humanism, namely, Copeland, Graham, Humbard, Roberts, Schuller, Stanley, and Swaggart.

The very largest organization that is closest to the Moral Majority but nonetheless distinct is the Southern
Baptist Convention, which has thirteen million five hundred thousand adult members. ("Roundtable's President," 1981).

The next closest group is probably the evangelicals, who were estimated to be 40 to 50 million strong in 1976 when Menendez (1976) wrote *Religion at the Polls*. In 1980 Ted Moser in *Christian Century* estimated evangelicals to be 50 to 70 million strong. The appendix at the end of this thesis contains a list of forty-three new right organizations that share some of the goals and aspirations of the Moral Majority.

Constituency

The constituency of the Moral Majority is purportedly pluralistic. Falwell (*Moral Majority Report*, 1980) says,

Moral Majority strongly supports a pluralistic America. While we believe this nation was founded on the Judeo-Christian ethic by men and women who were strongly influenced by Biblical moral principles, we are committed to the separation of church and state.

Moral Majority is a political organization and is not based on theological considerations. We are Americans. We share similar moral convictions. We are opposed to abortion, pornography, the drug epidemic, the breakdown of the traditional family in America, the establishment of homosexuality as an accepted alternative lifestyle and other immoral cancers which are causing the U.S. to rot from within.
Mormans, Jews, Catholics, Protestants, Fundamentalists and all other Americans are involved in our struggle to return this nation to moral sanity. (p. 27)

Anson Shupe and William Stacey (1982) deny that the Moral Majority is pluralistic. In Born Again Politics and the Moral Majority they say,

What, indeed, are we as citizens to make of the Moral Majority and the New Religious Right? Studies have demonstrated, both in our own Texas findings and in national opinion polls, its factually low esteem among the general population and among clergymen in particular. We have shown the rather clear limitations of its support: fundamentalist (white) Christianity. We found no multi-racial, interdenominational support base for the New Religious Right even in the Bible-belt south. In fact, the movement's supporters were the most likely to be anti-Semitic and anti-Catholic of our respondents. These are not matters of arbitrary speculation or our personal opinions. Rather they are hard facts. (p. 103)

Shupe and Stacey are correct about the Moral Majority, if they mean the joiner-activists. The joiner-activists of the Moral Majority are White, fundamentalist Christians. However, Falwell is also correct that the Moral Majority is pluralistic, if we include all the supporters, approvers, and mere partial approvers in the ranks of the Moral Majority, as Falwell no doubt does. Pluralism will be covered more thoroughly in Chapter IV, but it should
be noted here that this species of pluralism is reactionary pluralism. Reactionary pluralism is united by opposition to a common enemy rather than pluralism united by positive goals that subdue differences. Anyone who is more against abortion, pornography, homosexuality, secular humanism, government interference, etc., than for positive alternatives could be included among the reactionary pluralists of the Moral Majority.

Tactics

Because the Moral Majority is essentially an evangelical (in contrast with sacramental) religious organization, their main tactic is preaching. Furthermore, while their overtly religious preaching still centers on the local church, even when televised, their political preaching is geared primarily toward television and secondarily through the mail as a kind of follow-up solicitation of support.

The use of television as a mass marketing tool is not new. Neither is the use of television as an arm of the political image builders. According to Vance Packard (1957) in The Hidden Persuaders, television became a primary factor in elections during the 1952 and 1956 presidential
campaigns. Packard says,

By the 1952 Presidential campaign the professional persuaders had been welcomed into the inner councils by at least one party. Stanley Kelley, Jr., of Brookings Institution, made a study of the 1952 campaign, which he reported in his book *Professional Public Relations and Political Power* (1956). He said: "The campaign . . . reveals some interesting differences in the place occupied by professional publicists in the councils of the opposing parties. The strategy, treatment of issues, use of media, budgeting, and pacing of the Eisenhower campaign showed the pervasive influence of professional propagandists. The Democrats used fewer professionals, were less apt to draw upon commercial and industrial public-relations experience in their thinking, and their publicity men apparently had less of a voice in the policy decisions of the campaign." The Democrats, of course, took a shellacking and, Kelley suggested, had learned their lesson and would make greater use of public relations and advertising men in 1956. (pp. 182-183)


Machiavelli first recognized the importance of illusion in government, and advised his Prince:
"Everyone sees what you appear to be, but few understand what there is within; and those few will not dare contradict the opinion of the majority, which is reinforced by the majesty of the State. . . . Common men believe only what they see. . . . Therefore, a Prince will not actually need to have all the qualities previously mentioned, but he must surely seem to have them."

(pp. 201-202)

Falwell says he began the Moral Majority as a congressional lobby and says he was surprised at the overwhelming response from the population as a whole. Tina Rosenberg (1982) explains Falwell's surprise in The Washington Monthly,

Falwell has been the beneficiary of a phenomenon with which political journals should be familiar: what's described as powerful often ends up as being powerful. (p. 29)

It seems that in 1960 television took a close race from Nixon and gave it to Kennedy and, in the 1980s, television has become so powerful it creates a political movement virtually overnight. The key to building television movements according to Rosenberg is the competition between the networks for coverage of colorful and controversial figures such as Falwell. The expanding coverage is designed to beat the competition and inadvertently builds the movement.

Flo Conway and Jim Siegelman (1982) in Holy Terror

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ascribe the power of the religious right not to network coverage alone but to television in concert with the telephone and direct mail solicitation. They claim that the religious right has an entire "propaganda machine" in place that gives it the potential of indoctrinating the entire population as the Nazis have and Communists do. Quoting from Jacques Ellul's Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes, Conway and Siegelman (1982) say,

Propaganda must be total. The propagandist must utilize all of the technical means at his disposal—the press, radio, TV, movies, posters, meetings, door-to-door canvassing . . . to draw the individual into the net of propaganda, each technique must be utilized . . . and fused with other media, each of them reaching the individual in a specific fashion and making him react anew to the same theme—in the same direction. (p. 273)

and in their own words they say,

We are here in the presence of an organized myth that tries to take hold of the entire person. Through the myth it creates, propaganda imposes a complete range of intuitive knowledge, susceptible of only one interpretation, unique and one-sided, and precluding any divergence. This myth becomes so powerful that it invades every area of consciousness . . . controls the whole of the individual, who becomes immune to any other influence. (p. 273)

Now doubt, the religious right's preaching of God's judgment, hell fire, and imminent destruction for America
does at times amount to the tactics of terror.

Influence

The actual influence of the Moral Majority is widely debated. The *Conservative Digest* ("Shift of Religious Voters," 1981) says,

The religious Right had a hand in banishing liberal Democrat Birch Bayh of Indiana from the Senate. He was soundly defeated by Rep. Dan Quayle, 33, a member of an independent Bible church. Indiana's Moral Majority coalition, led by Indianapolis pastor Greg Dixon, was a key factor in the stunning defeat of Democratic House Whip John Brademas, a House veteran of 22 years. He was beaten by businessman John Hiler, 27, a Catholic. Brademas, a United Methodist layman, is a member of the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches. . . .

Religious conservatives and anti-abortionists were active in the defeats of Democratic senators George McGovern of South Dakota, Frank Church of Idaho, Robert Morgan of North Carolina and Gaylord Nelson of Wisconsin. . . .

In Texas, businessman Jack Fields, 28, a Baptist, defeated incumbent Democratic congressman Bob Eckhardt, a Presbyterian. (p. 12)

Again, the influence of the Moral Majority is not due to a well developed platform that the voters see and want implemented. The Moral Majority has merely encouraged their supporters and approvers to vote trusting that the outcome would be in their favor.
Falwell claims to be responsible for the registration of two million new voters in the 1980 election and Reagan has claimed the new right has four million new voters. Falwell has projected eight million new 'Moral Majority' voters for 1984.

According to a current study by Arthur Miller and Martin Wattenburg ("Politics from the Pulpit," 1983) the election of Reagan was the only one in which any decisive influence of the Christian right could be definitely ascertained. They also point out that, while only six percent of the population "feel particularly close to evangelicals active in politics such as the Moral Majority" (p. 6), a substantially larger segment of the population shares its religious values. They say,

Three out of every four Americans indicated that religion played an important part in their lives and nearly half felt that the Bible is God's Word, but less than one-third felt positively about activist evangelical groups like the Moral Majority. (p. 6)

and,

It could be argued that many more people than indicated by ratings of the "Moral Majority" share the religious beliefs espoused by the new Christian right, but that their beliefs have not yet been fully politicized. . . . for one reason or another they do not translate these values
into political attitudes or actions. . . . clearly, this theoretical possibility holds considerable potential for the religious right. (p. 5)

In other words, Miller and Wattenburg say that the Moral Majority has probably influenced many elections but was decisive only in Reagan's election. The Moral Majority has the potential of much more influence because many of those who share their religious beliefs have not connected them with politics.

The thesis here is that the valid connection between the Christian right's religious beliefs and political attitudes is not only missing but, even worse, the Moral Majority tries to make an invalid connection between the two. That is, the religious right fails to see the connection between monotheism and pluralism (which will be covered in Chapter IV) but, even worse, they try to make an invalid connection between religion and morality (the subject of Chapter III) which cannot—despite the efforts to make it do so—carry over into politics.

Finances

In order to have the influence they do have, in order to run their so called propaganda machine, the Falwell organization takes in about thirty million dollars a year,
according to Fitzgerald (1981), and often they spend it faster than they take it in. The Falwell organization also spends money on causes it does not advertise, such as an elaborate mansion for Falwell which his people say he deserves. The most common fund-raising activity begins with a mailing list from Viguerie or by offering some free trinket on television such as an American Flag, pins that resemble the footprints of a ten-week-old fetus, or the world's smallest Bible, which is a Bible on microfilm.

The 700 Club offers a telephone counseling service, partly to get names of potential supporters and to expand "the Lord's work" or to stop abortion, pornography, homosexuality, and the "amoral" secular humanists.

John Kater (1982) says in *Christians on the Right* that Falwell takes in 60 million dollars rather than the 30 million that Fitzgerald claims. Kater says,

The income generated by the television preachers is worth noting. The annual receipts from Falwell's "Old-Fashioned Gospel Hour" total $60 million, only slightly higher than the Christian Broadcasting Network's $58 million. The "PTL Club" generates $25 million per year, the "700 Club" $30 million, and Robert Schuller's "Hour of Power" $11 million. Most of the $16 million to build the Crystal Cathedral came not from those who attend but from Schuller's television audience. (p. 4)
Numerical Strength and Organization

With the above qualifications in mind, it seems that the joiner-activists of the Moral Majority are about 400,000 strong. The New York Times estimates 500,000 and Falwell cites 400,000 on television. The Moral Majority Reports go to 840,000 homes according to its own circulation figures. If, for lack of a better figure, we use evangelicals to finally estimate the supporters of the Moral Majority, we can say there are 60 million supporters of the Moral Majority. Again, if, for lack of a better figure, we double the number of evangelicals to estimate the approvers, there are about 120 million approvers of the Moral Majority or 120 million people who support a significant part of its program.

The main Moral Majority organization is incorporated and officially registered as a congressional lobby in Washington, D.C., despite the fact that it acts more like a political party and does most of its work in Lynchberg, Virginia, using Liberty Baptist College students as a prime source of labor. In addition to the incorporated lobby there is a Moral Majority foundation which is supposed to be an educational institution and there are various
state and local organizations that use the name "Moral Majority" but are officially separate and independent of the national lobby.

The 400,000 joiner-activists consist of 1.7% of the 1980 population, which at first sight might seem insignificant. However, if, for instance, only 3.8% of the mainland Chinese are joiner-activists of the Communist Party, as Fox Butterfield (1982) claims in *China: Alive in a Bitter Sea*, then the 1.7% seems more significant than if seen in the light of naive ideas about majority rule.

The declining commitments to the main political parties should also be taken into account. According to Lahaye and others, 72,000 members of the Moral Majority are clergymen and presumably have more than average clout, at least within their enclaves.

**Summary**

The Moral Majority consists of about 400,000 joiner-activists and millions of supporters and approvers. They have had a loud voice in the political affairs of the U.S. since their political inception in 1979. They have influenced many elections but have most likely been an important factor only in the election of President Reagan.
Their power is derived mainly from television, partly due to network coverage and largely due to their own astute use of television in concert with the telephone and direct mailing. The main concerns of this thesis are their attack against secular humanism, their attack against pluralism, their efforts to replace pluralism with their concept of freedom, and finally, their failure to see how religion and the secular are properly related in human affairs.
CHAPTER III

THE MORAL MAJORITY VERSUS HUMANISM

The main purpose of this chapter is to show that, although the Moral Majority claims to attack humanism because humanists are "immoral and amoral," this explanation of the organization's motives is not plausible. This is not a plausible explanation because humanists are not in any way morally inferior to nonhumanists. Stated conversely, the morality of the ethos officially endorsed by both the religious right and humanists is practically the same, while the religious differences are stark, especially when the religious right is compared with the more extreme secular humanists. Therefore it is more likely that the Moral Majority is attacking humanism for religious rather than moral reasons.

Distinguishing properly between religion and morality will not only help to see the conflict between the religious right and humanism more clearly, as the primarily religious fight it is, but distinguishing properly between
religion and morality will also lay the groundwork for the next chapter in which the conflict with pluralism in the political arena will also appear as an essentially religious battle. Unless religion and morality are properly distinguished in order that the important but merely epiphenomenal moral issues can be set aside, those moral issues will stand in the way of accurately observing the religious strife in the political arena.

Religion and Morality

The confusion of religion and morality, a failure to properly distinguish between the two, runs throughout the literature of the religious right. Cal Thomas (1981), vice-president of communications for the Moral Majority says,

Secular humanism is an incorrect view of mankind placing the created at the center of all things rather than the Creator. From such a presupposition flow inevitable moral and ethical consequences that I believe have proved detrimental to the best interest of the human race. (p. A26)

Of course the first part of Thomas' statement is a basic tenet of the Christian faith. In the Holy Bible St. Paul says, "For they exchanged the truth of God for a lie, and worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator" (Romans 1:25). However, no moral or ethical consequences whatsoever flow from this tenet of the Christian faith.
The presupposition that nature is the uncreated center of the universe does not necessarily lead to an ethical system any different from that based on the presupposition that God the Creator transcends nature. In fact, no morality whatsoever flows from either supposition.

St. Paul says,

What then are we any better than they? No, in no way: For we . . . are all under sin; as it is written, There is none righteous, no not one; There is none that understandeth, There is none that seeketh after God; They have all turned aside, they are together become unprofitable; There is none that doeth good, no, not so much as one. (Romans 3:9-12)

St. Paul does not say those who make the Christian presuppositions about God are any better than others in any way. St. Paul also says, "Faithful is the saying, and worthy of all acceptation, that Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners; of whom I am chief" (I Timothy 1:15). St. Paul says I am chief of sinners. He does not say I was chief of sinners.

Besides, St. James points out that even the devil makes correct presuppositions about God. St. James says, "Thou believest that God is one; thou dost well: the demons also believe, and shudder" (James 2:19). If sound morality stems from correct presuppositions about God the Creator, then the devil must be moral because the devil according to the Bible
knows that God the Creator, not nature, is the center of the universe.

The Christian witness in the Bible is always to the love and power of God and never to any pseudo-superiority over non-Christians, which is a sure sign of counterfeit Christianity.

If morality did stem from correct presuppositions about God, and immorality from incorrect presuppositions, then how did the ancient Greeks derive the Moral Majority's presumably correct position on abortion from their nature gods and goddesses? The Hippocratic Oath (Encyclopedia Americana, 1982) was written long before any Greek had heard about Christianity and that oath says,

I swear by Apollo . . . and all the gods and goddesses that . . . I will not give to a woman a pessary to produce abortion. With purity and with holiness I will pass my life and practice my art. (p. 218)

In 1982 C-span cable news televised a live program in which the Soviet ambassador to the United States was lecturing to a group of American high school students visiting the Capitol. The Soviet ambassador said that the rampant pornography in the United States would never be allowed in the Soviet Union because it was so blatantly immoral. Does the Soviet ambassador make correct
presuppositions about God? He probably doesn't even believe God exists and yet his position on pornography is the same as Cal Thomas'. It is also a fact that Adolph Hitler eliminated a great deal of pornography during his rise to power. Did Hitler make the correct presuppositions about God?

The radical Theory of Evolution runs contrary to Christian presuppositions about God the Creator, yet the morality of the Moral Majority can be derived from evolution just as easily as from Christianity. For instance, an evolutionist can believe abortion, as artificial selection, is a violation of natural selection and as such just as contrary to the laws of nature for them as it is contrary to the laws of God the Creator for Christians. In Social Darwinism in American Thought Richard Hofstadter (1959) says in the very last sentence of his book:

There is nothing in nature or a naturalistic philosophy of life to make impossible the acceptance of moral sanctions that can be employed for the common good. (p. 273)

Even if correct morality did stem from presuppositions about God, non-Christians are free to make any presupposition that Christians make. A lawyer working for the religious right, John Whitehead (1977), says in
The Separation Illusion, "Even the unregenerate man can prosper if he has Christian presuppositions as his foundation" (p. 71).

Francis Schaeffer, a leading thinker of the religious right, says science was born out of the Christian world view and yet people can become good scientists without making the religious right's presuppositions about God. If non-Christians can be good scientists without becoming Christians, then why can't they become good people without becoming Christians? As Lahaye (1980) quotes Schaeffer,

Indeed, at a crucial point the scientific revolution rested upon what the Bible teaches. Both Alfred North Whitehead . . . and J. Robert Oppenheimer . . . have stressed that modern science was born out of the Christian world view. . . . As far as I know, neither of the two men were Christians or claimed to be Christians, yet both were straightforward in acknowledging that modern science was born out of the Christian world view. (p. 101)

Again, Schaeffer acknowledges that Whitehead and Oppenheimer were and are eminent scientists and not Christians. If good science is not dependent on Christianity, why would morality be dependent on Christian presuppositions?

Similarly, in Children of Light, Children of Darkness, Reinhold Niebuhr (1932) says that non-Christians are often
superior to Christians and, furthermore, non-Christians should be commended when they are superior. Neibuhr uses Luke 16:8-9 as his source which says, "And his lord commended the unrighteous steward because he had done wisely; for the sons of this world are for their own generation wiser than the sons of light. And I say unto you, make to yourselves friends of men of unrighteousness."

No morality or ethics inevitably flows from the presuppositions of Christianity that is necessarily different from the morality or ethics of secular humanists. In other words, both confront the same reality and both can acknowledge the same ethics whether those ethics are perceived as being a part of nature or as flowing from the Creator of nature. As St. Paul says in Romans 1:20, "The things of God are clearly seen in the things that are made."

There is no way—absolutely no way—to derive any inevitable morality or ethics from any presupposition about God. However, this statement does need qualification. After all, if God is the Creator, if everything except God himself is created by God, then are not morality and ethics also created by God? Therefore couldn't Thomas avoid his problem with presuppositions by asserting that
morality and ethics flow from God the Creator (not presuppositions about God) and, since secular humanists do not accept God the Creator, they are therefore inevitably immoral? No, because according to this theology secular humanists are also created by God, and why would morality and ethics inevitably flow from God the Creator to a created Christian that are any different from the ethics or morality that flow from God the Creator to a created secular humanist?

Christians can claim to know and to have a superior God, the God who is all-powerful and all-loving, but Christians cannot validly claim to be superior to non-Christians in any way.

This is not an argument for positivism or religious neutrality. The nature of God (i.e., the deity, ultimate reality, etc.), or the perceived nature of God, makes all the difference in the world. The argument here is merely that God, or presuppositions about God, must be coordinated with man or the presuppositions about man. No morality or ethics flow from presuppositions about God as God apart from man.

Theological statements about God alone do not carry
over into social theory without adjusting for the differences between God and man. Correct presuppositions about God are not a sufficient foundation for social theory. Correct presuppositions about man are also necessary and they must be coordinated with those of God. Traditional Christianity, at least within the bounds of theology, has coordinated presuppositions about God and man relative to Christians and non-Christians by means of the doctrines of common grace and special grace which are supposedly two ways in which God is glorified, that is, two ways in which the final goal of Christianity is attained.

If there is no basis for claiming that the secular humanists, or humanists in general, are inherently immoral, then how do we explain the Moral Majority's assertion that they are? There seem to be two important reasons for the fundamentalists' attack upon secular humanists. They are: (1) a need for a demonic scapegoat when a divine savior does not appear to be working and (2) the weakness of secular humanism which makes it vulnerable to attack. I will cover each of these reasons in turn.

The Demonic Scapegoat. Corliss Lamont (1981), past president of the American Humanist Association, says,
Like demagogic politicians, demagogic organizations need a demonic scapegoat, and they have chosen humanism. (p. A26)

Eric Hoffer (1951) has worked this idea out, not just as it applies to the Moral Majority, but for all "true believers" in his book *The True Believers:*

It seems that, like the ideal deity, the ideal devil is one. We have it from Hitler—the foremost authority on devils—that the genius of a great leader consists in concentrating all hatred on a single foe, making "even adversaries far removed from one another seem to belong to a single category." When Hitler picked the Jew as his devil, he peopled practically the whole world outside Germany with Jews or those who worked for them. "Behind England stands Israel, and behind France, and behind the United States." Stalin, too, adheres to the monotheistic principle when picking a devil. Formerly this devil was a fascist; now he is an American plutocrat.

Again, like an ideal deity, the ideal devil is omnipotent and omnipresent. When Hitler was asked whether he was not attributing rather too much importance to the Jews, he exclaimed: "No, no, no!... It is impossible to exaggerate the formidable quality of the Jew as an enemy." Every difficulty and failure within the movement is the work of the devil, and every success is a triumph over his evil plotting. (p. 87)

Only the use of demonic scapegoats is being attacked here: scapegoats as such are not the issue. In the Bible the idea of scapegoats as saviors is a common theme. In the Old Testament on the Day of Atonement a goat was led out of camp and into the desert to die, taking with it
symbolically the sins of the Jews. In the New Testament John the Baptist introduces Jesus of Nazareth as "The lamb of God that takes away the sins of the world" (John 1:29). Divine scapegoats are not the same as demonic scapegoats. Demonic scapegoats are not saviors but are presumed to be the origin or at least the efficient cause of evil.

The demonic scapegoat theory fits the Moral Majority like a glove. Two features of this theory as described by Hoffer are (1) the enemy must be unified because the reactionary believer's unity is dependent on the perceived unity of the enemy, and (2) the enemy's formidable qualities must be exaggerated because the impetus of the reactionary force is also dependent on the force being opposed.

The first feature of Hoffer's demonic scapegoat theory appears when Tim Lahaye (1980) says Adolph Hitler is a secular humanist (p. 119), as if the opposition were the Nazis of pre-World War II Germany. The differences between, let's say, Hitler and John Dewey are immense and to put them in the same category of secular humanism is like saying that the Spaniards who conducted the Inquisition and Mother Teresa are both Christians.
The second feature appears in Lahaye's book when he exaggerates the strength of the secular humanists. He says,

A small but dedicated cadre of humanists has infiltrated the most influential pathways to the minds of our people: education, the media, organizations, and government.

Government, education, media, and organizations are ... predominantly controlled by humanists. (p. 186)

Falwell (1981a) more accurately says in The Fundamentalist Phenomenon, "Fundamental, evangelical, and charismatic organizations have enjoyed almost complete domination of the media--particularly radio and television" (p. 19).

It seems that Lahaye attributes great influence to humanists in the media, despite the inconsistency even with his own cohorts, because the power of the Moral Majority is largely, if not exclusively, dependent on the power of the opposition. The demonic scapegoat is clearly at work in the following Lahaye (1980) fulminations:

Most people do not realize what humanism really is and how it is destroying our culture, families, country, and one day, the entire world. Most of the evils in the world today can be traced to humanism, which has taken over our government, the United Nations, education, television, and most of the other influential things of life. . . . I believe there is yet time for us to defeat the humanists and reverse the moral decline
in our country that has us on a collision course with Sodom and Gomorrah. (p. 9-10)

and,

Homosexuality has run wild, resulting in mass murders unprecedented in American history (twenty-two trash bag victims in California, thirty-four victims in Chicago, eighteen victims in Houston). An incredible increase in promiscuity, premarital sex, trial marriages, VD, abortions, and so forth has soiled our social fabric. These immoral expressions of amorality can scarcely be blamed on Christianity and biblical morality. But they can be laid right at the door of the atheistic, amoral humanism that permeates our country. (p. 145)

and,

Today's wave of crime and violence in our streets, promiscuity, divorce, shattered dreams, and broken hearts can be laid right at the door of secular humanism. (p. 26)

Secular humanism is probably declining, while the religious right is gaining in numerical strength. Richard Neuhaus (1982) describes the collapse of secular humanism in Christianity Today:

The collapse is evident in many spheres of our culture. It is seen in legal philosophy's protest against a sterile positivism. It is seen in the physical and theoretical sciences that increasingly point us not merely to puzzles to be solved but to mysteries to be revered. It is manifested in the popular and, perhaps to a lesser extent, in the fine arts. In education and the social sciences it is manifested in the debunking of the myths of value neutrality. And, of course, it is manifested in the
renascence of religion in which our society and others are unmistakably engaged.

As the sacred is irrepresible, so the present decline of secularism may be irreversible—for better and for worse. Certainly it is for worse in the ignorant polemic of the New Religious Right against what it calls secular humanism. It is a polemic that maligns the noble tradition of Christian humanism, and it disdains God's love for the secular—that is, this world. (p. 16)

A reciprocal growth of fundamentalism is described by Lahaye (1980),

Thirty years ago, I only knew of two large churches—over 1,000 in attendance. Today there are over 100 such churches, with some "superchurches" running over 15,000 in membership. But it isn't just churches that have grown. Over 110,000 Bible-believing churches are spread throughout the country. One denomination I know (The Baptist Bible Fellowship) started from zero 28 years ago. Today it numbers over 2,500 churches, some of which are among the ten largest in the nation. In addition, millions of people attend 'the electric church' of TV every Sunday. This was unknown, 30 years ago. During these 30 years, one phenomenon has helped to slow the humanist juggernaut considerably: the growth of Christian publishing.

If we had sufficient space, we could detail the scores of parachurch ministries, the over 350 Christian radio stations, Christian broadcasters, and the cable and satellite TV that is reaching millions more in our country.

Without a doubt, Christianity is on the rise in America—Gallup confirms that—yet we are daily confronted by the fact that our nation's morals are deteriorating rapidly. The reason ought to be clear by this time. (pp. 185-186)
Lahaye's reason which "ought to be clear" is of course that secular humanists control key positions in government, the media, schools, etc., but couldn't the rise in immorality be due to the group that says immorality is the consequence of presuppositions about God, when the devil makes correct presuppositions about God? Couldn't the rise in immorality, with plausibility, be due to the group that claims to be morally superior? Couldn't the rise in immorality be due to the group that is so confused it cannot tell the difference between a moral issue and a religious issue? Couldn't the rise in immorality be due to the group that measures Christianity in terms of church membership, quantity of publishing and broadcasting, rather than according to the Biblical standards (Galatians 5:22) centering on the fruits of the Spirit such as love, joy, peace, etc.? Couldn't the rise in immorality be due to the group that is rising rather than the one that is declining? Couldn't the rise in immorality be due to the group that needs a demonic scapegoat?

The Vulnerability of Humanism. Besides the demonic scapegoat, there is the second explanation for the Moral Majority's attack upon secular humanism. Although
vituperation dominates their statements, the religious right no doubt also sense intuitively that there is a foible in the religion of secular humanism. If they did a rational analysis, which I fail to find in their literature, their criticism of secular humanism would proceed as follows.

The vulnerability of secular humanism is not difficult to find because the secular humanists themselves admit to it. That is, in the tradition of Christians who face up to their sinful nature the secular humanists "confess" the weakness of their position. For instance, Paul Kurtz (1980), professor of philosophy and frequent spokesman for secular humanism says in _Humanist Ethics_,

> The humanist is faced with a crucial ethical problem: Insofar as he has defended an ethic of freedom can he develop a basis for moral responsibility? Regretfully, merely to liberate individuals from authoritarian social institutions, whether church or state, is no guarantee that they will be aware of their moral responsibility toward others. (p. 15)

and

> Does humanist ethics have a theory of moral responsibility? Can it provide a ground for obligation? The critics of secular humanism maintain that it fails to do so. There is the familiar argument against "relativistic ethics." Without some belief in God, we are admonished,
obligation collapses. This argument is as old as ethics itself. The Theist believes that if religion is absent, ethical duty has no source. Many philosophers have been concerned with this challenge. Kant attempted to provide a foundation for ethics without deriving it from God—though he was confronted in the last analysis with moral antinomies. (pp. 13-14)

Erich Fromme also faces the problem of ethics for humanists. *Man for Himself* is on the psychology of ethics and in it Fromme (1965) claims to give us a solution:

Must we . . . give up objectivity if we choose humanism? Or is it possible to establish forms of conduct which are objectively valid for all men and yet postulated by man himself and not by an authority transcending him? I believe, indeed, that this is possible and shall attempt now to demonstrate this possibility. (p. 25)

Fromme concludes his analysis,

To sum up, **good in humanistic ethics is the affirmation of life, the unfolding of man's powers. Virtue is responsibility toward his own existence.** Evil constitutes the crippling of man's powers; **vice is irresponsibility toward himself.** (p. 29)

As this author understands it, Fromme is saying that man is ethical because man must be responsible to himself. This is the same as a fundamentalist saying that the Bible is true because the Bible says it is true and the same as a scholastic saying God exists because existence is an attribute of the highest conceivable reality. It is a rational
defense for the believer and totally unconvincing for the unbeliever.

Again, the foible of secular humanism, shared by all proselytizing religions, is that it cannot demonstrate that it has an objective basis for its beliefs and morality. The question is: What basis is there for remaining faithful to the ethos under pressure? What is the origin of the ethos? For the fundamentalists the origin of the ethos is the Deity who transcends mankind and man's propensity toward evil. For the secular humanists the origin of the ethos is mankind himself or a secular nature which does not necessarily transcend evil.

Apparently the Moral Majority believes that, if man is the origin of the ethos, then man can change the ethos. If man can change the ethos, then he will do so anytime the ethos demands a sacrifice. If man changes the ethos anytime it requires a sacrifice, man is inherently immoral. Put another way, if man is the origin of the ethos, then why isn't the ethos of Adolph Hitler just as good as the ethos of Albert Schweitzer or Mother Teresa? Secular humanism, and humanism in general, with its primary concern for mankind is, in the mind of the Moral Majority,
inherently relativistic, amoral, and evil. Of course not only the Moral Majority but many others (Marxists, for instance) use this criticism of liberalism and the ethically neutral state.

The secular humanists can counter by saying that the God of the fundamentalists is nothing more than the product of their own imagination and as such does less to make people moral than belief in mankind or a normative human rationality. The point is that the controversy is primarily religious, since it is over the origin of the ethos and remaining faithful to the ethos under pressure. The content of the ethos and the inherent morality of the disputants has not, to the author's knowledge, been properly investigated by either side and therefore the charge made against the morality of humanism on the part of the fundamentalists is unjustified.

There is a sense in which the controversy between the religious right and the secular humanists concerns the content of the ethos rather than the origin of and faithfulness to the ethos. Richard Beis (1981), a professor of philosophy, says,

Today we face many new moral judgments, disregard for the environment is now seen as morally
bad. Discrimination on the basis of race, sex, color, religion, or non-religion, for the most part, is no longer acceptable. Laissez-faire capitalism is facing searching inquiry. Codes of ethics for lawyers, doctors, accountants, and corporate administrators are being reassessed. Exploitation of the poor, women, and uneducated is under attack. And, with reciprocal vigor, we are broadening those human rights which we regard as integral to justice and morality....

The medical profession, scientists, and the public are evaluating the rightness of organ transplantation, genetic engineering, psychosurgery, behavior control, artificial prolongation of human life, the use of humans in experiments, artificial insemination, cloning, a definition of death. The solution to these questions will surely impose new moral requirements on all of us.

The underlying assumption of the Moral Majority is wrong, and their consequent actions are clearly misguided. Their energies would be far better spent were they to grapple with the moral problems of the present. (p. 44)

Falwell (1981a) does address racial injustice, world hunger, artificial insemination, selective breeding, genetic engineering, and euthanasia (pp. 206-212). Nevertheless, Beis is generally correct that liberals tend to address "new" moral problems, while the fundamentalists are primarily obsessed with the moral issues of abortion, pornography, and homosexuality. However, if we assume that the controversy is where the disputants oppose each other, the conflict is still overwhelmingly religious and/or
political—but not moral. Liberals on the national scene do not advocate the abortions, the pornography, and the homosexuality that the fundamentalists oppose. Liberals do stand against state involvement in these matters. Conversely, the fundamentalists do not usually take strong stands on the "new" moral issues. Again, the conflict is primarily over the origin of the ethos and faithfulness to the ethos under pressure and not significantly over the content of the ethos.

In short, humanists are not vulnerable to the moral attacks by the Moral Majority. They do have the usual religious vulnerabilities which the Moral Majority does not address.

The Vulnerability of the Moral Majority. The Moral Majoritarians' position that they are nonreligious moral activists is their most vulnerable position. Of course, once they properly distinguish between religion and morality, other vulnerabilities might appear, but this is the most obvious. For instance, the incoherence is obvious in the overview of Lahaye's (1981) *The Battle for the Mind*. The first half of his book, at least the first 100 pages, is dedicated to showing that morality is based on God and
creation, while immorality is based on atheism and evolution. These two views are presented as being "180 degrees in opposition" (p. 28), and Isaiah 55:8 is the proof text which says, "God's ways are not man's ways." Lahaye says,

The humanist doctrine of evolution has naturally led to destruction of the moral foundations upon which this country was originally built. (p. 64)

However, in the second half of the book the foundation disappears. Lahaye says,

Knowing pastors as we did, we all recognized that the basis of our cooperation was moral, not theological, and to launch an organization led by pastors, operated by pastors, and subject to pastoral control. They would then lead their people to work as moral activists. (p. 199)

In other words, Lahaye says that the Moral Majority consists of "moral activists" who work together without that which they themselves claim is the only basis for morality.

Even if the basis of morality were theology, the Moral Majority would still be morally impotent because there is no significant theological unity in the Moral Majority. R. Levine (1981) wrote a satirical piece in The Washington Monthly where he points out that Falwell has called the Pope the anti-Christ. Bailey Smith, head of the Southern Baptist Convention, has said God does not answer the prayers

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of a Jew, and a lot of Mormon theology is bizarre to most Baptists, despite the fact that Mormons tend to meet or exceed most of their official moral code.

The Moral Majoritarians are not primarily moral activists. It is much more plausible to say that they are religious activists fighting secular humanism as well as secularism and humanism in general. They are fighting their religious battle from behind a facade of legitimate moral issues.

If humanism is not the enemy of the religious right, if humanism does not stand over against the official morality of the Moral Majority, then how should humanism and fundamentalism be compared? If humanism and fundamentalism are not enemies, at least if humanism and fundamentalism should not be enemies, then what is the relation between them?

Christian Humanism and Secular Humanism Compared

The differences between fundamentalism and the religion of secular humanism are so great that a direct comparison of the two is very difficult, if not impossible. Fundamentalism consists almost solely of doctrines and beliefs or adherence to "the fundamentals." Their doctrine
of salvation by faith, not works, makes them look askance at the secular humanists and humanists in general who tend to analyze human behavior above all and eschew putting life into any doctrinal categories.

Of course it is easy to merely list the differences between fundamentalism and secular humanism as Lahaye (1980) does in his book. Some are: creation versus evolution, theism versus atheism, the dependence of mankind versus the autonomy of mankind, and so forth; but such a comparison is worthless without citing the point of contact, the common ground, the background, the context, against which the differences are being put in relief. As the author understands it, the point of contact, the common ground, between fundamentalism and secular humanism is Christian humanism. Christian humanists share some of the fundamentals of fundamentalism, but the behavior of Christian humanism is usually closer to that of secular humanism. Consequently, this thesis will proceed with a comparative analysis of Christian humanism and fundamentalism. The effect will be an indirect comparative analysis of fundamentalism and secular humanism.

To the author's knowledge, there are three good ways
to compare Christian humanism and secular humanism. There is a simple intuitive way, there is the historical perspective, and the theological perspective. They proceed in that order as follows.

The simple intuitive way is suggested by Neuhaus in a quotation given above. Both Christian humanists and secular humanists have a love for the world. The difference is that Christian humanists love the world as God's creation, while secular humanists love the world as a self-subsisting entity. This love of the world is therefore the basis for comparing the two faiths; it is the basis for cooperation, and of course, conversely, the difference between created and uncreated nature keeps them spiritually distinct. A deeper analysis, which is foregone here, would ask: Is there any difference between Christian humanism and secular humanism, if God the Creator created a self-subsisting entity by having it participate in his own self-subsisting Being?

From a historical perspective a point of contact between Christian humanism and secular humanism is the Protestant Reformation. Francis Conovan (1981) suggests this when he says,
The historical genesis of liberalism and the state it formed is no simple thing. It was the product of many factors, and what they were and how they interacted is a matter of considerable dispute among scholars. But for our present purpose it is safe to say that liberalism was a response to the situation created by two great movements, the Reformation and the Enlightenment. (p. 25)

Fredrick Copleston (1953) sees secular humanism branching off of Christianity during the Renaissance around the fourteenth century. In A History of Philosophy: Late Mediaval and Renaissance Philosophy he says,

The bulk of Renaissance thinkers, scholars and scientists were, of course, Christians; and it is as well to remember the fact; but none the less the classical revival, or perhaps rather the Renaissance phase of the classical revival, helped to bring to the fore a conception of autonomous man or an idea of the development of the human personality which, though generally Christian, was more 'naturalistic' and less ascetic than the mediaval conception. And this idea favoured the growth of individualism. Even among writers who were devout Christians one can discern the conviction that a new age for man was beginning. This conviction was not due simply to classical studies, of course; it was due to the complex of historical changes which were taking place at the Renaissance. (p. 29)

The seeds of secular humanism could also be traced back to St. Thomas in the thirteenth century when he re-established the realm of nature as an object of human rational understanding of God's creation.
Of course secular humanism could even be traced back to ancient Greece as Lamont (1965) does in *A Philosophy of Humanism*. Lamont also points out that humanism can be traced back to the Bible where there is respect for nature and primary concern for life on earth. Regardless, the humanist view became very pronounced at the Reformation: according to Max Weber (1958) in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, and R. H. Tawney (1981), in *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, Protestants turned more toward this-worldly concerns. It was still the world of God's creation and not usually as a self-subsisting entity, but nevertheless "the world" received more and more attention. Ethics and economics became functionally less dependent upon religion in the way that modern mankind tends to think of mathematics or physics as being independent of religious dogma.

According to Weber it was during the post Reformation period that prosperity became a sign of salvation for Calvinists, while, in contrast, vows of poverty in the Roman Catholic Church continued to be a more important sign of Christian spirituality—and, for that matter, still are, at least in Catholic religious orders.

Another step toward modern humanism was taken during
the Enlightenment when the origin of the ethos was presumed to be man himself, or at least the Creator, the Origin of life, was reduced from God "Our Father who art in heaven" to being a "First Principle." During this time science and technology, industrialization, mass literacy, and general optimism about the future of life on earth all appeared as allies of humanism—humanism in general and secular humanism in extreme.

In short, the Reformation, as transformed by the Enlightenment and other forces of modernity, is an historical event which serves as a point of contact for Christian humanism and secular humanism. It was a time when those who loved the world as the creation of God and those who loved the world as a self-subsisting entity began to form more clearly entrenched camps.

Christian humanism and secular humanism can also be compared from a theological perspective. Peter Berger (1961b) does this in The Precarious Vision, where he says,

It remains true that for Protestants to damn the secularization process has in it some of the qualities of a dark-haired father blaming his daughter for not being a blonde. . . .

There are more important reasons for desisting from the damnation of the "world come of
age" than a sense of historical authorship on the part of Protestantism. Bonhoeffer has expressed this in his call for a "secular," a "religionless" Christianity. The God of the Christian faith wants man's freedom. It is only thus that the miracle of the incarnation can be understood. An old Jewish myth speaks of the creation of the world as an act of contraction (tsimtsum) on the part of God. It was necessary for God to take back into Himself some of His infinity so that there should be room for the world to appear. Simone Weil has (probably unknowingly) given expression to this Jewish idea of tsimtsum, but related it to the Christian concept of God's kenosis (humiliation, self-emptying) in Jesus Christ:

"On God's part creation is not an act of expression but of restraint and renunciation. God and all his creatures are less than God alone. God accepted his diminution. He emptied himself in this act of his divinity; that is why Saint John says that the lamb had been slain from the beginning of the world. God permitted the existence of things distinct from himself and worth infinitely less than himself. By this creative act he denied himself, as Christ has told us to deny ourselves. God denied himself for our sakes in order to give us the possibility of denying ourselves for him. This response, this echo, which it is in our power to refuse, is the only possible justification for the folly of love in the creative act."

We would suggest that man's "coming of age," his possible liberation from the kind of religion which depends on illusion and bad faith for its psychological motor forces, is part of the same renunciation of God. (pp. 178-179)

As the author understands it, Berger is saying that the act of creating and redeeming entails, at least
originally, contraction and humiliation. That is, originally the Deity is replaced by man. God gives mankind dominion over "the earth." God the Original Creator makes man the created creator. It is presumably humiliating for the Deity to be replaced by man, especially overly-proud and sinful man. However, in the act of redemption God replaces (or re-replaces) man with God. God takes (or re-takes) mankind's position. Once again, God is center of the universe, only now, having gone through creation and redemption, God is glorified by his humanity.

The important point is that the secular humanists' renunciation of God from this theological perspective is not unplanned opposition to the will of God but it is more of an incompletely phase in the process of glorifying God. From this perspective the renunciation of God on the part of the secular humanists could even be compared with St. Peter's three denials of Jesus at his trial. St. Peter had to deny Jesus three times before his "coming of age" which for him was the age in which Peter functioned as "the Rock," upon which Jesus built his church.

Not only could St. Peter be considered a secular humanist, at least during his denial, but Jesus himself

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according to the Apostles' Creed "descended into hell" and hell is always defined as separation from God, whatever else it might also be. According to this episode Jesus is, again, a secular humanist or at least more of a secular humanist than a fundamentalist.

If the renunciation of God on the part of the secular humanists can be compared with the renunciation of God on the part of God himself or, compared with the renunciation of God on the part of Christians, then the secular humanists insofar as they renounce God could conceivably be the future agents of God's salvation. Regardless, from this Christian perspective it is God that places man as man apart from God at the center of the universe as part of his plan to reestablish himself as center only now with the added glory of his humanity.

If the renunciation of God serves as the theological point of contact between Christian humanism and secular humanism, then what is the difference between them? The difference is that Christians return or have returned to God for his glorification after the renunciation. Of course genuine Christians return to God in demythologized form, since with the renunciation there is an experiential basis
for distinguishing between the Truth of God and its mythical forms.

Recapitulating, there are at least three ways of comparing Christian humanism and secular humanism. Intuitively both love the world, the difference being that one loves the world as God's creation and the other loves the world as a self-subsisting entity. Historically each can be traced back to the ancient Jews and the ancient Greeks but they emerge during the Reformation as two clearly entrenched camps. Theologically both, at least on occasion, renounce God, the difference being that Christians return to God for his glorification following the renunciation.

The basis for comparing Christian humanism and fundamentalism is, of course, the fundamentals, which they share. The difference between fundamentalists and Christian humanists is apparently a matter of priorities. Christian humanists seem to accept the overwhelming secularization of society and take the natural fruit of the Holy Spirit—love, joy, peace, longsuffering, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, meekness, and self-control as described in Galatians 5:22 as the final test of the Human
Spirit (I John 1:4 "prove the spirits, whether they are of God"). In other words, human behavior is the primary concern of Christian humanists, even while retaining salvation by faith, not works.

The religious right does not generally acknowledge Christian humanism. Francis Schaeffer (1981) comes close to acknowledging the possibility of Christian humanism when he says,

> Christians should be the most humanitarian of all people. And Christians certainly should be interested in the humanities as the product of human creativity, made possible because people are uniquely made in the image of the great Creator. In this sense of being interested in the humanities it would be proper to speak of a Christian humanist. This is especially so in the past usage of that term. This would then mean that such a Christian is interested (as we should be) in the product of people's creativity. (p. 23)

However, the problem emerges when Schaeffer says, "These two religions, Christianity and humanism, stand over against each other as totalities" (p. 54). He criticizes humanism by saying, "Humanism is the placing of Man at the center of all things and making him the measure of all things" (p. 23).

However, the antithesis between Christianity and humanism, when there is any, is not over whether mankind
is the center and measure of all things. The difference is over whether or not this patently undeniable state of affairs occurred under its own impetus or under the direction of a higher reality. Did mankind become the center and measure because the Deity was renounced, thereby opening a void to be filled or partially filled by mankind, or did mankind become the center and measure by overcoming a non-human nature? The difference can be important. In the former case mankind's salvation lies in surrender to the Creator and redeemer in order to fill the God-shaped void left by the renunciation of God, while in the latter case mankind's salvation lies in dominating and overpowering whatever nonhuman nature that remains standing between man and a satisfactory or utopian life. Regardless, Christians and humanists can agree that Man is the center and measure of all things. Christianity and humanism do not stand over against each other as totalities.

Fundamentalism without any regard for human behavior does stand in diametrical opposition to humanism that has no regard for the fundamentals. Very few humanists and very few fundamentalists apply a strict "either-or" Manichean mentality to these categories. It is difficult
to understand its appearance in the work of Francis Schaeffer.

Summary

The Moral Majority claims to be attacking humanism because humanists are "immoral and amoral"; however, this is not a plausible explanation. The morality officially endorsed by both the fundamentalists and the humanists is substantially the same. The religious differences between fundamentalism and humanism are stark. Therefore it is more plausible that the Moral Majority is primarily a religious organization fighting its battle with humanism from behind a facade of legitimate moral issues. The Moral Majority does not distinguish properly between religion and morality, and conversely, they do not properly integrate their religion with the secular. It could be said that instead of denying themselves and taking up the cross, as a way of entering the secular world, the Moral Majority denies their religion and takes up morality.
CHAPTER IV
THE MORAL MAJORITY VERSUS PLURALISM

It appeared in Chapter III that the Moral Majority is primarily a religious organization fighting its battle with humanism from behind a facade of legitimate moral concerns. Religion and morality were distinguished for the Moral Majority. The Moral Majority also attacks pluralism. In order to see the religious conflict between fundamentalism and pluralism clearly, the moral issues must be temporarily set aside. The moral issues, although important, are merely epiphenomenal and will cloud the more important religious conflict, if the moral issues are given inordinate importance.

The Extension of Pluralism

The thesis here is that the Moral Majority is atta...
religious right is doing in the form of the Moral Majority.

The overexpansion of pluralism has, of course, occurred over a long time, and consequently, it must be observed from a historical perspective. One of the best summaries of the history of pluralism, or at least one of the best summaries of the birth of political pluralism in the U.S., is given by Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black in the 1947 *Everson* v. the Board of Education (1947) case. The decision itself was to allow the State of New Jersey to pay the cost of children's transportation to parochial schools. The expenditure for transportation to church schools was justified on the grounds that only the school children benefited directly from the expenditure and the church schools were not being subsidized. The history of the birth of pluralism written into the case by Black is as follows:

The First Amendment, as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth, . . . commands that a state "shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ." These words of the First Amendment reflected in the minds of early Americans a vivid mental picture of conditions and practices which they fervently wished to stamp out in order to preserve liberty for themselves and for their posterity. Doubtless their goal has not been entirely reached; but so far as the Nation moved toward it that the expression "law respecting an establishment of
religion," probably does not so vividly remind present-day Americans of the evils, fears, and political problems that caused that expression to be written into our Bill of Rights. Whether this New Jersey law is one respecting an "establishment of religion" requires an understanding of the meaning of that language, particularly with respect to the imposition of taxes. Once again, therefore, it is not inappropriate briefly to review the background and environment of the period in which that constitutional language was fashioned and adopted.

A large proportion of the early settlers of this country came here from Europe to escape the bondage of laws which compelled them to support and attend government-favored churches. The centuries immediately before and contemporaneous with the colonization of America had been filled with turmoil, civil strife, and persecutions, generated in large part by established sects determined to maintain their absolute political and religious supremacy. With the power of government supporting them, at various times and places, Catholics had persecuted Protestants, Protestants had persecuted Catholics, Protestant sects had persecuted other Protestant sects, Catholics of one shade of belief had persecuted Catholics of another shade of belief, and all of these had from time to time persecuted Jews. In efforts to force loyalty to whatever religious group happened to be on top and in league with the government of a particular time and place, men and women had been fined, cast in jail, cruelly tortured, and killed. Among the offenses for which these punishments had been inflicted were such things as speaking disrespectfully of the views of ministers of government-established churches, non-attendance at those churches, expressions of non-belief in their doctrines, and failure to pay taxes and tithes to support them.

These practices of the old world were transplanted
to and began to thrive in the soil of the new America. The very charters granted by the English Crown to the individuals and companies designated to make the laws which would control the destinies of the colonials authorized these individuals and companies to erect religious establishments which all, whether believers or non-believers, would be required to support and attend. An exercise of this authority was accompanied by a repetition of many of the old-world practices and persecutions. Catholics found themselves hounded and proscribed because of their faith; Quakers who followed their conscience went to jail; Baptists were peculiarly obnoxious to certain dominant Protestant sects; men and women of varied faiths who happened to be in a minority in a particular locality were persecuted because they steadfastly persisted in worshipping God only as their own consciences dictated. And all of these dissenters were compelled to pay tithes and taxes to support government-sponsored churches whose ministers preached inflammatory sermons designed to strengthen and consolidate the established faith by generating a burning hatred against dissenters.

These practices became so commonplace as to shock the freedom-loving colonials into a feeling of abhorrence. The imposition of taxes to pay ministers' salaries and to build and maintain churches and church property aroused their indignation. It was these feelings which found expression in the First Amendment. No one locality and no one group throughout the Colonies can rightly be given entire credit for having aroused the sentiment that culminated in adoption of the Bill of Rights' provisions embracing religious liberty. But Virginia, where the established church had achieved a dominant influence in political affairs and where many excesses attracted wide public attention, provided a great stimulus and able leadership for the movement. The people there, as elsewhere, reached the conviction that individual religious liberty
could be achieved best under a government which was stripped of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions, or to interfere with the beliefs of any religious individual or group.

The movement toward this end reached its dramatic climax in Virginia in 1785-86 when the Virginia legislative body was about to renew Virginia's tax levy for the support of the established church. Thomas Jefferson and James Madison led the fight against this tax. Madison wrote his great Memorial and Remonstrance against the law. In it, he eloquently argued that a true religion did not need the support of law; that no person, either believer or non-believer, should be taxed to support a religious institution of any kind; that the best interest of a society required that the minds of men always be wholly free; and that cruel persecutions were the inevitable result of government-established religions. Madison's Remonstrance received strong support throughout Virginia, and the Assembly postponed consideration of the proposed tax measure until its next session. When the proposal came up for consideration at that session, it not only died in committee, but the Assembly enacted the famous "Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty" originally written by Thomas Jefferson. The preamble to that Bill stated among other things that

"Almighty God hath created the mind free; that all attempts to influence it by temporal punishments or burthens, or by civil incapacitations, tend only to beget habits of hypocrisy and meanness, and are a departure from the plan of the Holy author of our religion, who being Lord both of body and mind, yet chose not to propagate it by coercions on either . . . ; that to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical; that even the forcing him to support this or that teacher
of his own religious persuasion, is depriving him of the comfortable liberty of giving his contributions to the particular pastor, whose morals he would make his pattern.""

And the statute itself enacted

"That no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burdened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or belief.""

This Court has previously recognized that the provisions of the First Amendment, in the drafting and adoption of which Madison and Jefferson played such leading roles, had the same objective and were intended to provide the same protection against governmental intrusion on religious liberty as the Virginia statute. . . . Prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the First Amendment did not apply as a restraint against the states. Most of them did soon provide similar constitutional protections for religious liberty. But some states persisted for about half a century in imposing restraints upon the free exercise of religion and in discriminating against particular religious groups. In recent years, so far as the provision against the establishment of a religion is concerned, the question has most frequently arisen in connection with proposed state aid to church schools and efforts to carry on religious teachings in the public schools in accordance with the tenets of a particular sect. Some churches have either sought or accepted state financial support for their schools. Here again the efforts to obtain state aid or acceptance of it have not been limited to any one particular faith. The state courts, in the main, have remained faithful to the language of their own constitutional provisions designed to protect religious freedom and to separate religions and governments. Their
decisions, however, show the difficulty in drawing the line between tax legislation which provides funds for the welfare of the general public and that which is designed to support institutions which teach religion.

The meaning and scope of the first Amendment, preventing establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, in the light of its history and the evils it was designed forever to suppress, have been several times elaborated by the decisions of this Court prior to the application of the First Amendment to the states by the Fourteenth. The broad meaning given the Amendment by these earlier cases has been accepted by this Court in its decisions concerning an individual's religious freedom rendered since the Fourteenth Amendment was interpreted to make the prohibitions of the First applicable to state action abridging religious freedom. There is every reason to give the same application and broad interpretation to the "establishment of religion" clause. The interrelation of these complementary clauses was well summarized in a statement of the Court of Appeals of South Carolina, quoted with approval by this Court in Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 730: "The structure of our government has, for the preservation of civil liberty, rescued the temporal institutions from religious interference. On the other hand, it has secured religious liberty from the invasion of the civil authority."

The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbelief, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may
be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and State."

(pp. 8-16, emphasis on religion added)

Black's analysis is highly questionable. For instance, in The Separation of Church and State: Historical Fact and Current Fiction, Robert Cord (1982) makes a very strong case that the Founding Fathers did not mean to deny government the right to "participate in the affairs of any religious organization or groups and vice versa," as Black says. Cord contends that the First Amendment was merely intended to make government participate equally in the affairs of all religions and philosophies to the extent it participated in any one and vice versa if any one religion or philosophy had a voice in government, then all other religions and philosophies had to be given an equal audience. Pluralism in this view was never based on the separation of church and state but rather on the equal participation of all churches or groups of non-believers in state affairs and on equal state support for all religions and philosophies.

In Cord's view the principle of the separation of
church and state is derived from pluralism due to administrative nightmares and problems of entanglement, but the principle of separation of church and state cannot stand on its own merits; separation of church and state is dependent on pluralism properly understood. After all, even the Constitution of the Soviet Union demands separation of church and state but this is not compatible with religious freedom as long as it is not based on pluralism.

Peter Berger (1961a) gives an analogy of Cord's view of pluralism in The Noise of Solemn Assemblies, where he says,

A sociological understanding of the situation could be formulated by saying that the American state is, indeed, separated from any one religious body, but that it is emphatically not separated from religion in general. A more colorful way of saying the same thing would be to use a picture from a different area of life. The judicial definition implies the existence of a divorce. The sociological perspective rather suggests a polygamous arrangement in which all wives share equally in the favors dispensed by the husband-state and in which there are careful rules to prevent any one wife from acquiring a position of special privilege. If there is anything at all to the famous "wall of separation," it is a device of judicial architecture to ensure equal access to the royal chamber for all the inmates of this political harem. (p. 59)

So, it seems that Justice Black and many others believe
that separation of church and state means keeping religion out of politics, while Cord, Berger, and many others believe that such an understanding of separation of church and state is tantamount to the denial of religious freedom unless it is based on the principle of pluralism understood as the equal participation of all religions and philosophies in the political process. Of course there is the obvious problem of admitting religions to the political process while keeping churches out. How does one separate religion from the churches?

Regardless of whether or not separation of church and state without pluralism amounts to the denial of religious freedom, it is the enormous expansion of pluralism that has made pluralism weak and vulnerable to attack. Justice Black mentions Protestants, Catholics, Jews, Quakers, Baptists, and non-believers or secular humanists as the original holders of the franchise. There were, of course, many others (i.e., right of free speech, petition, and assembly, which essentially apply to individuals and are thus treated as constants in this analysis), but we can work with these as the charter members. Pluralism expanded with a quantum leap in 1868. The Constitution was amended to officially
include all races in the franchise along with the original religions. The Constitution, by means of the Fourteenth Amendment, now reads in part,

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

With Blacks and the elimination of slavery in mind, this amendment prohibiting the state government from discriminating on the basis of race is understandable. The original franchise admitting all religions to the polity as equals has now been expanded to admit all races to the polity as equals. This expansion of pluralism presumably strengthens pluralism rather than weakens it.

In 1920 pluralism expanded again with another quantum leap (at least officially) to include women in the franchise. The Constitution was amended for the nineteenth time, and it now reads in part, "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex."
So, pluralism now includes both sexes and all races along with the original religions. Again, presumably pluralism has been strengthened by this expansion of pluralism and restriction on government.

The history is interrupted here to make the following three points: (1) Pluralism from now on in this review is expanded by the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions rather than by constitutional amendment. The court begins using the word "privacy" and in this context privacy, pluralism, choice, liberty, and equal protection are interchangeable. If anyone is given a "choice," then the alternatives must have "equal protection." If the state gives "equal protection" to two alternatives where previously only one of them was sanctioned, we have moved from monism to pluralism. (2) The court begins basing its decisions on the expansion of pluralism rather than on the restriction of government, which are similar but not identical. This is a point to which the thesis will return later. (3) As the history of the expansion of pluralism is traced, it will not be possible to say exactly when it was expanded beyond its own limits. Just as the difference between night and day is gradual yet striking, so also the
violation of pluralism is gradual and just as striking.
We now enter the historical twilight zone of the expansion of pluralism.

In June of 1965 the U.S. Supreme Court said birth control was a matter of privacy and could not be restricted by the states. The case was Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) where the court said,

> We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights--older than the political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. (p. 486)

With this decision birth controllers are given equality before the law with those who reproduce. Birth controllers join the sexes, the races, and the original religions as holders of the franchise.

In April of 1969 the court expanded pluralism again. This time obscenity was made a matter of privacy. The court said in Stanley v. Georgia (1969) that the state had an "important interest . . . in the regulation of commercial distribution of obscene material" (pp. 563-564), but the state can have no "statute forbidding mere private possession of such material" (p. 564). The court continued,

> If the First Amendment means anything, it means
that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what film he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds.

And yet, in the face of these traditional notions of individual liberty, Georgia asserts the right to protect the individual's mind from the effects of obscenity. We are not certain that this argument amounts to anything more than the assertion that the State has the right to control the moral content of a person's thoughts. (p. 565)

During the ten years following Stanley v. Georgia the court has made many ambiguous and contradictory rulings, but from 1969 through the present, materials that everyone admits are obscene nevertheless have equal protection before the law. Pluralism now includes all religions, all races, both sexes, birth controllers, and immoral pornography.

In March of 1972 the court expanded pluralism to include single people along with married people at least with regard to buying contraceptives. The court held that privacy is not merely in marital status but privacy inheres in individuals.

In January of 1973 the court brought abortionists into the franchise. That is, in Roe v. Wade (1973) Justice
Blackmun said for the majority of the court,

The right of privacy . . . founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. (p. 153)

Justice Douglas said in a concurring opinion,

We recognize the right of the individual, married or single, to be free of unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. That right necessarily includes the right of a woman to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. (p. 213)

The obvious question is: What are the limits of pluralism? If in the eyes of the state all religions and all philosophies are the same, if the races are no different, if the sexes are identical, if birth control and reproduction are irrelevant, if single and married are equal, if the morality of one person's mind has the same standing in a court of law as the morality of any other person's, if there is no difference between live birth and abortion, then how can the state distinguish between right and wrong, good and bad, just and unjust? If the state cannot make these distinctions, then what right does it have to govern?
James Hitchcock (1981) addresses the question of the limits of pluralism in Law and Contemporary Problems. He says,

The story of America is the story of the gradual extension and unfolding of that pluralism, the full encompassment of more and more diverse groups and hitherto proscribed beliefs and behavior. Liberty is regarded as capital which cannot simply be allowed to lie secure but must always be expanded, often with considerable elements of risk. Although many would have difficulty expressing the moral sources of that imperative, liberals are generally convinced that there exists a moral obligation in America to broaden continually the limits of its tolerance. So far as racial, ethnic, and religious groups are concerned this point has, at least in principle, been won completely. It has now been extended to other categories of people, such as women as a group, who are assumed to have specific rights which must be guaranteed apart from the guarantee of rights to all citizens; to cultural minorities like homosexuals; and to all those who profess "deviant" ideas or ways of life. . . .

Probably not since the days of slavery has American politics confronted issues with moral roots running so deep as those now on the political agenda. Questions like abortion, the relationship between men and women, and the personal sexual behavior are not easily dealt with in a political context, and instinctively politicians in times past have tried to evade questions likely to touch such deep nerves. But the commitment to a steadily expanding pluralism makes confrontation with such questions unavoidable. With most traditional struggles over equality won at least in principle,
the new frontiers necessarily are defined in places hitherto inaccessible to political intrusion.

This new phase of the struggle for equality will of necessity test the limits of American pluralism in ways they have never been tested before. This will occur (and indeed is already occurring) in part because it raises issues that go to the heart of deeply held and fundamental moral beliefs which cannot be easily compromised and where the mutual respect, which makes democratic dialogue possible, is often lacking. (Abortion is an obvious example. Some people regard it as one of woman's most basic rights, others as the deliberate killing of a helpless human being. In such circumstances there is not much room for "statesmanlike" solutions.)

Another test of the limits of pluralism is the question as to what unifying principle remains at the heart of a society as that society becomes more and more diverse, especially in terms of accepted moral values. At some point does the legitimization of some positions necessarily require the constriction of others? It will be the purpose of this paper to argue that, where fundamental values are involved, this is precisely the case, and the question, which touches many areas of social life, will be considered primarily from the point of view of those issues which touch directly or indirectly on religious belief and practice. (pp. 5, 7)

Is there "a moral obligation in America to broaden continually the limits of its tolerance?" What are the "limits of pluralism?" What "unifying principle remains at the heart of society as the society becomes more and more diverse?"
Again, Pat Robertson (Robertson & Slosser, 1982) says in *The Secret Kingdom*:

Today, the United States struggles under a social philosophy of pluralism. There is no unified reality. Many disparate, frequently cacophonous voices echo from one shore to another. Confusion is triumphant. (p. 177)

Is the confusion due to pluralism or the abuse of pluralism? Does a plurality of religions inevitably lead to the violation of the ontological integrity of the ethos?

The author's thesis is that pluralism was violated when it was used as an end rather than a means. Pluralism as a means is a valid political philosophy; a unifying principle. Pluralism as an end-in-itself is tantamount to chaos.

Apparently pluralism began as a means. Pluralism began as a way for people to live together, each of whom had commitments higher than pluralism. Protestants advocated protestantism but accepted pluralism as a way of living together in a society where not everyone was Protestant. The same is apparently true of Catholics, Jews, Quakers, Baptists, and secular humanists. Apparently there were no pluralists as such among the original franchisees. Put another way, it was various religions and philosophies that
established pluralism—pluralism did not establish various religions and philosophies, at least not originally.

Nevertheless, beginning at least as early as *Stanley v. Georgia* the reciprocal began occurring. Pluralism, under the rubric of privacy, began to sanction and grant status to various positions. In all the so-called privacy decisions there is no defense of the decriminalization of abortion, pornography, and homosexuality higher than the appeal to pluralism and privacy. Again, abortion, pornography, and homosexuality are never defended in their own right but always defended by choice, equal protection, privacy, and pluralism.

In other words, the difference in question is highlighted if one attacks each of the holders of the franchise. If one attacks Protestantism, a Protestant will defend exactly what is being attacked, namely, Protestantism. If one attacks Catholicism, a Catholic defends Catholicism. The same is true of Jews, Quakers, and secular humanists. Even if one attacks Blacks and women, people will defend the equal humanity of those people. Now attack abortion on demand, pornography, homosexuality and no one defends it, at least no one in a significant decision making...
capacity at the national level. Instead privacy, pluralism, choice, equal protection, and liberty are eloquently defended. Why? It is because the serious defense of abortion on demand, etc., demands the use of pluralism as an end rather than a means.

In the previous section of this chapter Blacks and women were counted among the legitimate holders of the franchise because they strengthened rather than weakened pluralism. This is so because the case for their admission need not appeal to pluralism, privacy, choice, etc., but the case can be made for their humanity. Any idea or person that can stand on its own without appeal to pluralism and privacy has the potential of contributing to pluralism and the doctrine of privacy.

When the court says, "The right to privacy is broad enough to encompass the woman's right to terminate her pregnancy" the court is correct only if privacy is used as an end rather than as a means. Furthermore, if privacy is an end, then it is broad enough to encompass the right to terminate any life whatsoever.

The topic here is religion and politics but a broader look at pluralism would presumably confirm that pluralism is inherently a means rather than an end. That is, even
when pluralism is stretched as it must be for discovering the truth, and for facing various scientific theories, or for just coping rationally with great social diversity (like it or not), pluralism is still necessarily limited by a commitment to something higher than pluralism. The use of pluralism as an end rather than a means, the absolutizing of it, weakens it, establishes chaos, and makes pluralism vulnerable to attack. This is a situation that the religious right feels it can and must take advantage of.

Absolute Pluralism, Relative Pluralism, and Reactionary Pluralism

The absolute value of the court's morality decisions is not the issue. However, each of the court's decisions has two relative values. They can be taken as a restriction on government or as an expansion of pluralism. Just as the absolute value of plus and minus one million are identical, the relative values are nevertheless very different (i.e., relative to the dollar amount on the bottom line of a profit-loss statement).

Historical circumstances suggest that the events of the day pushed the court toward restricting government. Huntington (1981) describes the climate during the 1960s
and 1970s as follows:

The exposure to which political authority was subjected in the late 1960s and early 1970s was unique in modern history, aside from the investigations by revolutionary regimes of their predecessors. During the 1960s various liberal and radical groups and publications intensified their efforts to expose the operations of those in authority, particularly with respect to foreign policy and the Vietnam War. The great age of exposure did not begin, however, until 1971, when Daniel Elsberg found a newspaper outlet for the Pentagon Papers. This was followed by further revelations concerning the conduct of the war and, in the summer of 1972, by the beginning of Watergate, which slowly gained momentum and dominated the national media for the next two years.

... In due course, also, the gradual release of the Nixon tapes dramatically revealed the casualness and banality, meanness of motive and narrowness of purpose, that may characterize political leaders at work. (p. 159)

In the Best and the Brightest David Halberstam (1972) also gives a powerful description of the "meanness of motive" and "narrowness" of purpose that may characterize political leaders at work.

The tenor of the court's opinions read as if the benefits of removing political authority (characterized by meanness of motive) over the private personal decisions of the citizenry would more than compensate for the cost of turning loose the abortionists, pornographers, and
homosexuals. Similarly, the court seems to say that the country stands a better chance with pluralism and privacy (which has proven itself workable in many ways) in moral issues than with government interference in these matters, since government is banal and casual.

This argument has some merit, as long as pluralism and privacy do not collapse due to overexpansion. The benefits of expanding a balloon are attained only until the balloon bursts, at which time the expansion becomes dramatically counterproductive.

When government is expanded and pluralism is expanded, the void created does not need to be filled with abortion, pornography, and homosexuality, even when those issues are the occasion for the expansion. Woodward and Armstrong (1981) suggest in *The Brethren* that Blackmun thought the role of government in personal decisions would be replaced at least somewhat by other organizations such as the church, the family, and the school. Woodward and Armstrong say,

Blackmun encountered picketing for the first time in his life when he gave a speech in Iowa. He understood the position of the anti-abortion advocates, but he was deeply hurt by the personal attacks. He felt compelled to point out that there had been six other votes for the decision, besides his, that the Justices had tried to enunciate a constitutional principle,
not a moral one. Law and morality overlapped but were noncongruent, he insisted. Moral training should come not from the Court but from the Church, the family, the school. (p. 283)

How can the church, family, and school improve their operations, while the state is in effect establishing the political philosophy of absolute pluralism? How can moral training overcome immorality that is sanctioned by the established political philosophy of absolute pluralism?

If the entire situation is analyzed in terms of pluralism, there are three kinds of pluralism. There is (1) the original relative pluralism where various franchisees are committed to something higher than pluralism but accept it as a means of living together. There is (2) absolute pluralism where pluralism is used as an end. Here the franchisees are given standing not because they share the others' commitment to relative pluralism and something higher but for the sake of expanding pluralism itself. Then there is (3) reactionary pluralism, which is pluralism that accepts anyone who opposes the common enemy. Reactionary pluralism is dependent on the unity of its opposition in order to remain intact. This third sense is the sense in which the Moral Majority itself is pluralistic, as it claims to be.
Falwell (1980) says,

We are quickly moving toward an amoral society where nothing is either absolutely right or absolutely wrong. Our absolutes are disappearing, and with this disappearance we must face the sad fact that our society is crumbling. (p. 101)

Falwell has it backwards. The problem is not the disappearance of moral absolutes but the appearance of political absolutes. The appearance of pluralism as an absolute is at the heart of the national political problem. The rise in immorality is an epiphenomenon of the appearance of political absolutes. Falwell (1981c) also says,

The Moral Majority is simply a 'reaction' to the 'action' begun by liberals as they sought to dismantle our moral heritage. (p. 28)

Of course the liberals do not seek to dismantle our moral heritage. They sought to expand our political heritage of pluralism and, in fact, did so to the point of making it the equivalent of a god. Again, the moral issues are merely an epiphenomenon of the religious-political situation.

Absolute Pluralism versus Monotheism

In Chapter III, I said this was no argument for positivism or religious neutrality. Morality is not a function of religion, at least not directly, but it does not follow
that religion makes no difference to politics. So, what
difference does religion make in the establishment of abso­
lute pluralism? As suggested in the introduction, absolute
pluralism is the antithesis of monotheism. The establish­
ment of one is the repudiation of the other. Put another
way, relative pluralism is the only pluralism compatible
with monotheism. The Judeo-Christian ethic is not under
seige, as the Moral Majority claims, although it is an un­
intended casualty: Judeo-Christian monotheism is under
attack. Theodore White (1978) gives a simple summary of
monotheism in In Search of History where he says,

The old religion was, as I have said, as much
history as ritual. There are almost as many dif­
ferent sects of Jews, who quarrel with each other,
in both the new and old forms of our religion,
as there are among Protestants. But if a thread
ties them all together, it is the thread of the
Shma--the incantation "Hear, O Israel, the Lord
our God, the Lord is One." The cantillation of
this phrase was set long before the Crusades and
the persecutions that scorched the Crusaders' trail;
but its intonation shrieks with the agony
of medieval Europe, where Jews were burned at
the stake for their faith. We learned in Hebrew
school that those Jews wailed the Shma even as
the flames licked up at them; and we children
argued, on our way home at night, whether it was
sensible to give up your life rather than kiss
a cross. Most of us admitted to cowardice; but
we stood in awe of the countless forefathers who
had chosen to burn rather than change their
faith, and the Shma was the call of their courage.
The idea behind the Shma is the unity of all happenings; it was an idea of prehistoric shepherds who put out, in a world of idols, superstitions and numerous gods of random passions and contrary impulses, the new idea that there was but one God, who gave order to the entire universe. The mind set of all great Jewish thinkers since those shepherds has been to bind the variability of observed phenomena into one all-embracing theory. . . . Thus, over the centuries, those Jewish thinkers who have moved out and been accepted in the larger world stage have been bearers of some one seductive all-embracing theory which is as unifying as the Shma. At its spectacular best, this mind set yields Einstein's unified-field theory, stretching from microcosm to macrocosm, binding energy to matter by irrefutable laws, substituting $E=mc^2$ for the Shma. At its most humanly compelling, the mind set produces a Christ, who replaces the tribal vengeance of the Old Testament with a theory of mercy and universal brotherhood that embraces every tongue, sex, skin color, and strange custom. Whether it is the all-embracing economic and dialectic theory of Marx, or the patterning of sex, ego and the repressions of modern man as in Freud's world, the passion of Jewish thinkers for a single, universal theory in every field of knowledge or behavior has been persistent, creative—and frequently subversive to settled establishments and order throughout Western history. (pp. 25-26)

On the surface the expansion of pluralism appears to be the epitome of monotheism, as White describes it. Hasn't pluralism been expanded to "embrace every tongue, sex, skin color, and strange custom," as White says the mind set of monotheism demands? However, absolute pluralism is actually the antithesis of monotheism. White also says,
"The idea behind the Shma is the unity of all happenings" and, at least as written in the Supreme Court opinions, there is no unity behind the inclusion of undefended immorality in the franchise.

The decriminalization of abortion and pornography was not based on the unity of all happenings but instead upon the duality of state and morality. It was based on the dichotomy of private and public. It was based on diversity rather than unity. So, again, the religious conflict is not between humanism and the Judeo-Christian ethic, as the religious right mistakenly presents it. The religious conflict is between the monotheism of the Judeo-Christian religion and the recently established absolute pluralism which is its antithesis.

Can we find more truth in the position of the religious right? As suggested by White, monotheism is based on the unity of all happenings. As such, do monotheists have a tendency to overemphasize unity and fail to give diversity its due? Do secular humanists tend to be pluralistic? If so, is it plausible that secular humanists might be responsible, more responsible than monotheists, for the rise in immorality, not as a function of religion,
but as a function of their pluralism without the implication of relativity stemming from monotheism? Is pluralism without monotheism inherently absolute? Again, if so, are the non-monotheistic secular humanists responsible for the establishment of absolute pluralism and the current rise in immorality? In other words, although secular humanism cannot be held responsible, if taken as a religion, can it be held responsible, if taken as a political philosophy?

For instance, consider the following paragraphs by Lamont who is a spokesman for a significant minority of secular humanists. In *A Philosophy of Humanism* Lamont (1965) says,

A repeated mistake that system-building philosophers, especially those of the idealist school, have made is to assign to the universe a fictitious unity. The great Cosmic Mind of Idealism binds together the entire universe in a unified totality, and all-encompassing monism. Humanism rejects this conception. We speak loosely of the universe to designate the whole of reality; but when we come to analyze the matter closely, we find that the infinitely diverse world of Nature is a many rather than a one, a multiverse rather than a universe. Here Humanists, in supporting the idea of pluralism instead of monism, have taken cue from William James, though they disagree with other aspects of his philosophy. James wrote:

"Things are 'with' one another in many ways, but nothing includes everything or dominates over everything. . . . The pluralistic world
is thus more like a federal republic than like an empire or a kingdom. . . . Monism, on the other hand, insists that when you come to reality as such, to the reality of realities, everything is present to everything else in one vast instantaneous co-implicated completeness."

There are complicated and far-reaching inter-relationships throughout Nature, but there are also constant cross-currents and conflicting forces. There are partialunities, to be sure, but no one, vast, overarching unity. The different entities that make up the world enter temporarily into identifiable systems, like that of the human body itself; but there is no one system, completely unified, that fuses together tightly all the sub-systems. Through the law of gravity every particle of matter has, of course, a physical effect, however, infinitesimal, on every other particle of matter in the universe; but this does not entail such a close interwelding of material units that a universal monism results.

While all material entities are related to one another in respect to gravity, most of them are totally unrelated at any one time to most others in most ways. . . .

No matter how far back, in our analysis, we push the cause-effect sequences of the universe, we are certain to discover a plurality of event-streams that can be accurately described only in terms of a plurality of principles. There was no one event that started the universe going, and in fact no beginning at all. For Humanism, matter is ever active in individual, discrete forms. Individuality in this sense is an ultimate principle of the universe. The constant activity in the world radiates from many centers. This radical pluralism of Nature means that the cosmos is a vast, complex absolute and universal determinism expounded by certain religions and philosophies. (pp. 153-154)
One obvious problem with Lamont's radical pluralism is that it excludes monism, but in doing so it takes a monistic position itself. It is the reappearance of the old paradox—there are absolutely no absolutes. However, more to the point we must ask: Is it plausible to assume, given this radical or absolute pluralism on the part of some secular humanists and, given the apparent absence of radical pluralism on the part of the Judeo-Christian religion, and given the mistaken establishment of absolute pluralism in the United States with its dependent epiphenomenon of immorality, that the secular humanists are in some sense responsible for the rise in immorality?

Based on the literature, no case can be made that the secular humanists are inevitably any less moral than Christians, but that is not the question. Are the secular humanists somewhat more responsible than Christians for the eruption of immorality on the part of those who (in the context of absolute pluralism) have not rationally been categorized as being either Christian or secular humanist?

The author believes Falwell and the religious right could make a case along these lines, although it would be superficial. That is, although the secular humanists might
be more responsible for the establishment of absolute pluralism than monotheists, it was necessary to establish pluralism in the first place because of the monistic tendencies of various religions and philosophies. If monism and monotheism had not made relative pluralism necessary in the first place, it is doubtful that some secular humanists would have had the occasion to take it as an absolute and establish it as such. Again, some secular humanists might be immediately responsible for absolute pluralism but it could not have been taken as an absolute if it had not been established first as a relative principle counter-balancing monism or fanatical monotheism. Apparently on the whole, monism and/or fanatical monotheism is as responsible for the establishment of absolute pluralism as is secular humanism, regardless of whether secular humanism is taken as a religion or as a political philosophy. This is apparently the case, even though some secular humanists might be more immediately responsible, while monists and monotheists might be responsible from a greater distance.

Freedom and Other Alternatives to Pluralism

Instead of advocating the reestablishment of relative
pluralism, as an alternative to the established absolute pluralism, the religious right advocates reactionary pluralism within their own organization and more freedom for the country.

The freedom from government interference and freedom to solve social problems with moral, spiritual solutions has been thoroughly introduced in the first chapter of this thesis. The formal logic of the religious right has also been spelled out. There is another way to approach the religious right's alternative to pluralism. That is, the Moral Majority is concerned about the judgment of God.

Ed McAteer says the United States is under the judgment of God and Falwell frequently says the same thing.

Falwell (1980) also quotes the Bible saying,

If my people, which are called by my name shall humble themselves and pray and seek my face, and turn from their wicked ways, then will I hear from heaven, and will forgive their sin, and will heal their land. (p. 216)

He continues, "The time for national repentance of God's people has now come to America" (p. 217).

If the purpose of God's judgment is to bring people to repentance, and government is providing "services and benefits" that meliorate problems without demanding
repentance, then the government is interfering with God's program. So, again, the religious right does not see government merely as interference with their religious freedom to solve social problems with their "moral, spiritual" solutions but as interference with God's operation.

Apparently, then, it is not merely pluralism that the religious right is reacting against but all of government's efforts to solve social problems. It is in this light that the tremendous growth of government must be seen in order to understand the Moral Majority. The quickened pace of government interference is documented by Friedman and Friedman (1981) in *Free to Choose*, where they say,

The pace of intervention quickened greatly after the New Deal--half of the thirty-two agencies in existence in 1966 were created after FDR's election in 1932. Yet intervention remained fairly moderate and continued in the single-industry mold. The Federal Register, established in 1936 to record all the regulations, hearings, and other matters connected with the regulatory agencies, grew, at first rather slowly, then more rapidly. Three volumes, containing 2,599 pages and taking six inches of shelf space, sufficed for 1936; twelve volumes, containing 10,528 pages and taking twenty-six inches of shelf space, for 1956; and thirteen volumes, containing 16,850 pages and taking thirty-six inches of shelf space for 1966.

Then a veritable explosion in the government regulatory activity occurred. No fewer than twenty-one new agencies were established in the next
decade. Instead of being concerned with the specific industries, they covered the waterfront; the environment, the production and distribution of energy, product safety, occupational safety, and so on. In addition to concern with the consumer's pocketbook, with protecting him from exploitation by sellers, recent agencies are primarily concerned with things like the consumer's safety and well-being, with protecting him not only from sellers but also from himself.

Government expenditures on both older and newer agencies skyrocketed—from less than $1 billion in 1970 to roughly $5 billion for 1979. Prices in general roughly doubled, but these expenditures more than quintupled. The number of government bureaucrats employed in regulatory activities tripled, going from 28,000 in 1970 to 81,000 in 1979; the number of pages in the Federal Register from 17,660 in 1970 to 36,487 in 1978, taking 127 inches of shelf space—a veritable ten-foot shelf. (pp. 180-181)

and,

One simple set of statistics suggests the magnitude of the change. From the founding of the Republic to 1929, spending by government at all levels, federal, state, and local, never exceeded .12 per cent of the national income except in time of major war, and two-thirds of that was state and local spending. Federal spending typically amounted to 3 per cent or less of the national income. Since 1933 government spending has never been less than 20 per cent of national income and is now over 40 per cent, and two-thirds of that is spending by the federal government. . . . Federal government spending alone is more than a fifth for non-defense spending alone. By this measure the role of the federal government in the economy has multiplied roughly tenfold in the past half-century. (p. 83)
This government interference was at one time restricted by the courts, but more recently the court has been aiding and abetting in government interference. This is suggested by Nathan Glazer (1976) in "Toward an Imperial Judiciary?" where he says,

In the past the role of activist courts was to restrict the executive and legislature in what they could do. The distinctive characteristic of more recent activist courts has been to extend the role of what the government could do, even when the government did not want to do it. The Swann and Keyes decisions meant that government must move children around to distant schools against the will of their parents. The Griggs decision meant that government must monitor the race and ethnicity of job applicants and test-takers. The cases concerning the rights of mental patients and prisoners, which are for the most part still in the lower courts, say that government must provide treatment and rehabilitation whether it knows how or not. Federal Judge Weinstein's ruling in a New York school desegregation case seems to say that government must racially balance communities. And so on.

An interesting example of this unwilled extension of government action is that of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). It did not wish to issue rules preserving pure air in areas without pollution or imposing drastic transportation controls. To the EPA, this did not seem to be what Congress intended; but under court order, it was required to do both. Similarly, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) apparently did not want to move against the Negro colleges of the South, now no longer segregated under law but still with predominantly black enrollments, nor was this in the interests of those colleges, or their
students, or indeed anyone else—but federal judges required HEW to do so.

In these, as in other cases, government is required to do what the Congress did not order it to do and may well oppose, what the executive does not feel it wise to do, and most important what it does not know how to do. How does one create that permanently racially balanced community that Judge Weinstein wants so that the schools may be permanently racially balanced? How does one create that good community in Boston public housing that Judge Garrity wants so that vandalism repair costs may be brought down to what the authority can afford? How does one rehabilitate prisoners? Or treat mental patients? Like Canute, the Judges decree the sea must not advance, and weary administrators— hectored by enthusiastic, if ignorant, lawyers for public adversary centers—must go through the motions to show the courts they are trying. (pp. 109-110)

Apparently in the eyes of the religious right this explosion of government programs is interference with their own programs. So, again, the religious right's attack is not merely because pluralism has been abused and weakened but also because of what pluralism is not. A pluralistic or humanistic government inherently interferes with God's program, even if social problems are meliorated.

There are at least two major shortcomings in this argument. First, even if humanism is "the glorification of man as man apart from God," the glorification of man is inherently the glorification of God, if God created man,
as the religious right claims. That is, the glorification of man is the glorification of God, just as the glorification of a Chevrolet is the glorification of General Motors. This is true whether one knows that Chevrolets are built by General Motors or not. So, there might be many grounds for opposing government programs, but the fear that humanism or secular humanism might get the credit, making God jealous and bringing on his judgment, is not one of them.

Second, if government programs are interference and social problems are sent by God as judgment, then why should there be any government at all? Why should the government even protect our shores against foreign invaders? Couldn't the foreign invaders also be the agents of God's judgment and, as such, not to be interfered with, except by means of "moral, spiritual" solutions? Should government aid to the blind be withheld until they repent and God "heals the land?" In other words, the Moral Majority's argument is often one for strict libertarianism, which is something they as a whole clearly do not want.

While the joiner-activists of the Moral Majority advocate freedom as an alternative to humanism and pluralism, part of the religious right advocates Christianity as an
alternative political philosophy. For instance, the Episcopal Church's House of Bishops advocates the "Lordship of Jesus Christ" as the social philosophy of the church. In The New Religious Political Right in America (Hill & Owen, 1982) we read the following proclamation by the Episcopal Bishops,

To fail to vote or to be uninformed in voting is a denial of the biblical faith that Jesus Christ is Lord: the Lord of politics, economics, education, and social systems, as well as our personal and family lives. (p. 63)

Similarly, Gabriel Fackre (1982) reviews the "theological underpinnings" of the religious right and concludes in The Religious Right & Christian Faith,

The religious Right . . . must be a resolute commitment to its own framework of faith . . . and . . . attend to the one Word, Jesus Christ . . . and . . . in the light of that Word we too shall make our political decisions. (p. 105)

If Jesus Christ is Lord of politics, economics, education, social systems, as well as personal and family life, then he must also be Lord of mathematics, chemistry, biotics, and the psychic, as well as Lord of history. More to the point, if Jesus is Lord over all of life, then isn't all of Jesus Lord over all of life? This would include the humanity of Jesus. If the humanity of Jesus is Lord of
human life, then how is such a commitment distinct from humanism?

So, not only do those who advocate the Lordship of Jesus as a political philosophy automatically embrace a form of humanism but, having done so, the religious right fails to show how decisions made on the basis of a commitment to Jesus would be any different from decisions made on the basis of a commitment to reason, science, history, or secular humanism.

In *A Time for Anger* Franky Schaeffer (1982) acknowledges the problem. He says,

> For those of us who would like to have an impact on our culture, and to those for whom "religious freedom" means more than the right to preach a shallow, simplistic gospel, this book may perhaps serve as a statement of purpose. (author's forward)

Regardless of what religious freedom means for the religious right, it apparently entails in their mind the feasibility of Christianity as a political philosophy and apparently it means, at least occasionally, more than religious freedom. However, it is not obvious what their political philosophy of Christianity might entail besides anti-humanism and antipluralism.

Let's recapitulate. We can divide the religious
right's alternatives to humanism and pluralism into three categories. These are: (1) the joiner-activists of the Moral Majority advocate freedom for the country and reactionary pluralism for themselves; (2) a part of the religious right advocates the gospel or the Lordship of Jesus Christ as a social philosophy, but in doing so they are forced to embrace humanism and, even if they did not embrace humanism, they fail to show how a commitment to the gospel makes any difference; and (3) there is a part of the religious right that does not advocate freedom, reactionary pluralism, nor the gospel as a social philosophy. This third alternative will now be considered.

A group of four authors (McCarthy et. al., 1981) at the Calvin Center for Christian Scholarship advocate pluralism. Their recent book is called Society, State, and Schools and it is subtitled "A Case for Structural and Confessional Pluralism." These authors claim there are three basic alternative social philosophies, namely, individualism, collectivism, and pluralism. They espouse pluralism and go on to say that pluralism has two dimensions, namely, structural and confessional.

The structural dimension of the Calvin Center's

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pluralism is not difficult to understand. As they describe it:

At the bottom pluralism is anchored structurally in the ordered reality of creation. The world came into existence not as chaos, but as cosmos, a harmonious whole with a unified orientation and direction. Life is fundamentally of one piece. It has a unifying focus. Therefore our rich diversity of social tasks does not end in fragmentation. As life unfolds historically, taking on ever more complex and differentiated forms, this profound unity remains intact. (p. 38)

They also quote from Bonhoeffer's *Ethics* saying, "The world is relative to Christ, no matter whether the world knows it or not. This relativeness of the world to Christ assumes concrete form" (p. 39).

The Calvin Center's pluralism with its structural dimension is similar to relative pluralism in this thesis. The confessional dimension, although not clear to this author, seems to be similar to the "something higher" of pluralism which is necessary to prevent it from being taken as an absolute. However, this author fails to see how the confessional could be a dimension of pluralism.

In more logical form the problem is: either the confessional "dimension" limits or gives structure to pluralism or it does not. If it does not, it is meaningless baggage
tacked on to a senseless pluralism. If it does give structure to pluralism, it cannot be a dimension of pluralism but it must be something higher than pluralism itself.

Put another way, it seems that the Calvin Center, like the joiner-activists of the Moral Majority, deny or suppress their religion in order to enter the political sphere with their essentially religious orientation, just as Falwell denies his religion in order to become politically active. However, this author denies that any case for pluralism, other than the untenable absolute case, can be made without a clear sustained commitment to something higher than pluralism itself.

Of course the Calvin Center does have a commitment higher than pluralism but nowhere do I see both their higher commitment and their case for pluralism integrated in a way that would significantly set them apart from the joiner-activists of the Moral Majority. Either they relegate their religion to pluralism in an untenable way or they display the commitment to something higher apart from any commitment to pluralism itself. The Calvin Center seems to have the same problem distinguishing between the religious and the secular (and integrating the two) that
the more radical religious right has.

The Calvin Center's (McCarthy et al., 1981) case for pluralism with a structural and confessional dimension is in the final analysis a case for "educational pluralism" (p. 207), which means equal state financing for Christian-parochial schools to be achieved by means of legislation, litigation, and a constitutional amendment. The last paragraph of their book reads,

Concentrated efforts on all three fronts, legislation, litigation, and a constitutional amendment, may produce a new era in American education, and through it a revitalization of the social institutions of the family, the church, and the school. (p. 208)

Regardless of the Calvin Center's wholly untenable case for pluralism which is finally a case for state funding of their schools, it does raise some questions for pluralism and education. Some questions are: Have the courts in an effort to be religiously neutral eliminated the something higher of pluralism from the state financed schools and in effect made chaos of their official educational philosophy? How can the courts--in the name of pluralism--relegate those committed to something higher than pluralism to a private sphere, when a commitment to something higher than pluralism is the only thing standing
between pluralism and chaos? Are the state financed public-humanistic schools committed to something higher than pluralism or not? If they are, then how is their commitment to something higher any less religious than the commitment that the Christian-parochial schools have to something higher? If they are not, then what is the difference between the state financed schools and state financed chaos? Is the state obliged by the First Amendment to finance pluralism, which without something higher is chaos, while at the same time obliged not to finance schools committed to something higher that makes rational pluralism possible?

Summary

Pluralism has been expanded from the original franchisees to include all religions, both sexes, birth controllers, singles, as well as blatantly immoral pornography, homosexuality, and abortion on demand. In effect, pluralism which was once relative has been taken as an absolute. The establishment of absolute pluralism in the place of relative pluralism has resulted in chaos and the religious right has taken advantage of the situation. In the place of absolute pluralism the Moral Majority has advocated
reactionary pluralism for themselves and freedom from government and freedom to solve social problems with their "moral, spiritual" solutions. Parts of the religious right openly espouse the Lordship of Jesus Christ as a political philosophy and some advocate pluralism with a confessional and structural dimension. However, regardless of the alternatives the religious right cannot espouse a non-humanistic Christian political philosophy that makes any difference to the political scene. At the heart of their problem seems to be a failure to coordinate their religion with the secular. Either they must deny their religion in order to enter the secular sphere or they enter the secular with a religion that does not allow them to make a positive contribution unless attacking humanism and/or pluralism is a contribution.
CHAPTER V

THE MORAL MAJORITY VERSUS ITS CRITICS

The main criticism of the Moral Majority in Chapter III was that they fail to distinguish properly between religion and morality. The main criticism in Chapter IV was that the Moral Majority mistakenly perceives the rise in immorality as a function of humanism, when it is more likely a function of the establishment of absolute pluralism. The political problem is not the disappearance of moral absolutes, as the Moral Majority constantly claims. The political problem is the appearance of a political absolute. Furthermore, the political problem relative to religion, the Judeo-Christian religion particularly, is that absolute pluralism is the repudiation of monotheism. There is no direct assault on the Judeo-Christian ethic on the part of humanists as the religious right often asserts.

The purpose of this chapter is to set the criticisms found in this thesis next to some of the more popular criticisms. This is not an essential part of the thesis but
intended for clarification and deepening of the main chapters, III and IV. The criticisms found in this thesis are not easily compared with the more popular criticisms because they are written at different levels. To illustrate the difficulty, consider the failure of the Moral Majority or any of their critics to even mention monotheism as a key idea in the disputes over the Moral Majority. There are valid criticisms of the Moral Majority's religion, their psyche, their politics, etc., but apparently no critic has made a valid criticism of their religion and their politics in one coherent assertion. At least if anyone has done so, it has been done at an impressionistic or intuitive level and not on an analytical level.

The plan for this chapter is to first review the popular criticisms of the Moral Majority at the intuitive or impressionistic level. After that, four of the criticisms, namely, that they lack compassion, are anti-intellectual, are rigid/uncompromising, and are paranoid, will be analyzed further. The deeper analysis of these four criticisms is not intended to be complete but merely suggestive as to how the popular criticisms might be raised to a higher analytical level. Finally, there will be a section to
once again criticize the Moral Majority for their failure to be monotheistic—only here in the context of the more popular criticisms.

General Review of Criticisms on an Intuitive Level

During the fall of 1981 a judge in Nebraska temporarily locked Faith Baptist Church in order to prevent it from being used as a school because it was not licensed as a school. In order to alert the faithful, Falwell held a television extravaganza called "A Thanksgiving Special from a Padlocked Church." A reporter from the Omaha World Herald ("Moral Majority Report," 1982) wrote the following letter to the Falwell organization expressing some common impressions that people have of the Moral Majority:

First and foremost, you should know that I feel that fundamentalists are the most single-minded, self-righteous, tunnel-visioned fools I have ever met. That feeling was not nurtured before I listened to Falwell; it came after hearing the crying of fundamentalists about my "bias reporting."

Anyone who attended the rally and didn't leave feeling like a used and abused prostitute must be a complete idiot. Since you obviously saw nothing wrong with the way Falwell used you, I will have to assume that you are in that group. I would give a week's salary to talk with Falwell for an hour. The man is a con artist. He is a politician who has the money--thanks to people
like you—to hop around the country at his heart's whim. Typically, he carries a camera crew along so he can use the film to raise more money through the T.V. show.

It didn't bother you that they used a phoney padlock without telling the T.V. audience that it was phoney? If not, your alleged deep religious beliefs may not be as deep as you and your "brothers" claim. . . .

I hope the state laws dealing with fundamentalist schools are changed. You can teach your kids all the crap you want, I don't really want to know about it. I just hope that when your kids reach adulthood--assuming they still have a mind to think with--that you will be able to explain why you subjected them only to such a narrow line of thinking. I would spit in my father's eye had he done to me what you are doing to your children.

Your problem is that you don't deal with logic—you deal with idiocy. Please don't pray for me; I don't need your help. Pray for your children—they'll need it somewhere down the road of life. (p. 4)

Similarly, Isaac Asimov (1981), the prolific author of science and science fiction and also a professor of biochemistry, gives the following warning to the people of Canada in Macleans:

It is these ignorant people, the most uneducated, the most unimaginative, the most unthinking among us, who would make of themselves the guides and leaders of us all; who would force their feeble and childish beliefs on us; who would invade our schools and libraries and homes. I personally resent it bitterly and I warn the people of
Canada that if the Moral Majority win more victories here, they will be with you there. (p. 6)

Asimov claims the Moral Majority is "a closed system without possibility of error" and they are also blind. He quotes the Bible when he says, "If the blind lead the blind, both shall fall into the ditch" (Matthew 15:14).

_Time_ ("Pulpit Bullies," 1981) covers Senator Barry Goldwater's response to the Moral Majority when it says, "Goldwater . . . finds the New Right's righteousness especially distasteful, even though he admits he shares many of their moral views" (p. 27).

In the same article, Goldwater himself is quoted as saying:

I'm frankly sick and tired of the political preachers across this country telling me as a citizen that if I want to be a moral person I must believe in A, B, C, and D. Just who do they think they are? (p. 27).

Goldwater continues, they are "rigid . . . uncompromising . . . self-righteous . . . pulpit bullies" (p. 27).

Later in the article, Falwell says Goldwater really agrees with the Moral Majority. Falwall says, "In his heart he knows he's wrong" (p. 27).

The Moral Majority is most commonly criticized for an apparent lack of compassion. For instance, Ralph Chandler
(1981) says,

The religious right does not say much about poverty. Neither does it say much about such issues as starvation, hunger, human rights, the extravagant and competitive use of the world's resources, the crimes of the American penal system, and the torture of prisoners in many parts of the world. (p. 25)

He also says the Moral Majority is "demonstrably immoral on biblical grounds" (p. 2).

Similarly, J. C. Bennett (1981) says:

How anyone who claims to be thoroughly biblical can be so little impressed by the passions of the prophets for social justice or by the identification of Jesus with the poor and in general with the victims of society is beyond my understanding. (p. 1021)

Richard Mouw (1981), professor of philosophy at Calvin College, joins in this theme by asking, "Where in the Moral Majority's program do we detect something of God's compassion for the poor and oppressed of the earth?" (p. 15).

Besides being found lacking in compassion, the Moral Majority is also often described as paranoid. Chandler (1981) says the religious right is caught up in a "cauldron of paranoia" (p. 40).

Similarly, Bart Giamatti ("St. Giamatti and the Moral Majority," 1981), president of Yale University, says the Moral Majority are "peddlers of coercion" and "angry at
change." They are "rigid in the application of chauvinistic slogans." They manifest "a new spirit of meanness" in a resurgent bigotry" (p. 1161).

Former Senator George McGovern wrote an article for Playboy called "The New Right and the Old Paranoia." His television interviews suggest that he has little to say beyond the statement that the new right is paranoid.

Again, four of these criticisms will be considered further with the intention of suggesting how they might be analyzed more completely.

The Moral Majority Lacks Compassion

The criticism that the Moral Majority lacks compassion, besides being found in the quotations above from Chandler, Bennett, and Mouw, is also made by Brown (1980), Monsma (1981), and Neuhaus (1982), among others.

Apparently the Moral Majority lacks compassion because they emphasize the judgment of God instead of the fatherhood of God. As Einstein (1954) says in Ideas and Opinions, "Are we not all children of one father, as it is said in religious language?" (p. 52).

Presumably, Einstein has Malachi 2:10 in mind which says, "Have we not all one father? hath not one God
created us? Why do we deal treacherously every man against
his brother, profaning the covenant of our fathers?"

Again, from the Judeo-Christian perspective the basis
for compassion is the oneness and the fatherhood of God.
Yet the Moral Majority, although it regularly proclaims the
judgment of God, as mentioned previously, ignores the one-
ness and the fatherhood of God completely, at least in their
politics. In this author's opinion, the Moral Majority not
only lacks compassion but they lack the basis for compas-
sion. The brotherhood of mankind is dependent on the
fatherhood of one Creator.

The critics of the Moral Majority on this point are
not clear. They raise the following logic and subsequent
questions. Either compassion is an end in itself or it is
a variable, dependent on generation by a higher being. If
it is an end in itself, then what is the basis for dis-
tinguishing between compassionate and not compassionate?
If it is a variable, dependent on a higher being, then is
that higher being the Creator? God our Father? The State?
The Community? Nature? History? These are questions which
the critics of the Moral Majority would answer in a sound
analysis of the Moral Majority's lack of compassion.
In short, the criticism that the politics of the Moral Majority lack compassion could be made stronger. From a Christian perspective they lack the basis for compassion; they fail to see that the fatherhood of God takes priority over the judgment of God. As long as God is a judge more than a father, there will be no compassion.

The Moral Majority is Anti-Intellectual

Falwell (1981b) responds to this criticism by saying, "As a fundamentalist, I personally object to categorizing fundamentalists as bellicose and anti-intellectual" (p. 17).


Clarence Darrow said in Dayton that his intention was to prevent "bigots and ignoramuses" from controlling the schools. This view of the fundamentalist intellect would continue to prevail in
the liberal community. Stewart Cole populated his History of Fundamentalism with "religiously disturbed" defenders of "antiquated beliefs," contending against "open-minded seekers for the truth that makes man free." According to H. Richard Niebuhr "inadequate development of educational institutions" and "the distrust of reason and the emphasis on emotion" resulted from the isolation, poverty, and hardships of farm life. Norman Furniss observed that "ignorance . . . was a feature of the movement; it became a badge the orthodox often wore proudly." Fundamentalists' "distorted opinions," said Furniss, were based on "complete misunderstanding" of evolution and modernism. They had to resort to coercion because they "were aligning themselves against ideas that had the weight of fact behind them. . . ." These interpretations gained some stature in the American historical community when Richard Hofstadter identified the "paranoid style" of fundamentalist thought as a species of "anti-intellectualism" reflecting a "generically prejudiced mind."

As Hofstadter showed, anti-intellectualism was a feature of American revivalism, and fundamentalists were certainly not free from this tendency. The suggestion that the ancestors of Ph.D.s were monkeys and baboons was always good for a laugh from an anti-evolution crowd. Likewise the titles of the learned were enumerated "D.D., Ph.D., L.L.D., Litt.D."--ending with "A.S.S." Even the well-educated and usually humorless Reuben Torrey would stoop to this. Moreover, some champions of the Bible school movement were beginning to assert that Bible education was the only proper education, not just an expedient for lay evangelists, as it was originally conceived. There was a strong tradition in America that the Bible in the hands of the common person was of greater value than any amount of education. As William Jennings Bryan often said "It is better to trust in the Rock of Ages, than to know the age of the rocks; it is better for one to know that he is
close to the Heavenly Father than to know how far the stars in the heavens are apart." (p. 212, footnotes omitted)

Fitzgerald (1981) catches the modern day spirit of anti-intellectualism at Liberty Baptist College, the educational arm of the Falwellian empire. Fitzgerald says,

As an outsider soon discovers, there is no real point in talking to more than one of them on a topic of general interest, for there is a right answer to every question, and Nancy James or William Sheehan can give it to you as well as any of the pastors. Or, if that particular person can't, it's simply because he or she lacks the specific information. "I'm totally against the E.R.A.," Nancy James told me during a visit I paid to her house. When, for the purposes of discussion, I recited some of the pro-E.R.A. arguments, she listened seriously and apologized for being so uninformed on the subject. I thought at the time that the arguments had made some impression on her, but later, as I was leaving, she came out after me to apologize again and to say, "I will find out more about the E.R.A. I know I'm against it. I'm just not sure exactly why."

For Thomas Road people, education—in the broad sense of the word—is not a moral and intellectual quest that involves struggle and uncertainty. It is simply the process of learning, or teaching, the right answers. The idea that an individual should collect evidence and decide for himself is anathema. Last spring, Falwell told his congregation that to read anything but the Bible and certain prescribed works of interpretation was at best a waste of time. He said that he himself read all the national magazines, just to keep up with what the others were saying, but that there was no reason for others to do so.
(His church members seem to follow this advice faithfully; their weakness, when they have any, is in the realm of television watching.) He and his fellow-pastors attack the public schools for teaching "immorality," "secular humanism," and other evils. But what bothers the most pious members of his congregation is not just that the schools teach the wrong answers; it is that the schools do not protect children from information that might call their beliefs into question. When I asked Jackie Gould whether she would consider sending her children to something other than a Bible college, she said, "No, because our eternal destination is all-important, so you can't take a chance. College so often throws kids into confusion." The purpose of education, then, is progress in one direction, to the exclusion of all others. (p. 73)

The anti-intellectualism of the Falwellian Fundamentalists is not explained by the critics, even though it is often described. Could the anti-intellectualism of the fundamentalists be a symptom of mild psychosis? Their split between a religious and a secular frame of mind has some of the characteristics of a split personality. For instance, as demonstrated previously in this thesis, LaHaye says the only basis for morality is their religion and then he becomes nonreligious moral activist without theological considerations. This split is like the classic split personality.

Corbett H. Thigpen and Hervey M. Cleckley (1957) describe the multiple personality in *The 3 Faces of Eve*:
There are not two different personalities with completely dissimilar ideation, but rather one personality at two stages of . . . life. As a characteristic for this type of case, the predominant personality is amnesic for the existence, activities, or behavior of the secondary or subordinate system, while the secondary personality is aware and critical of the predominant personality's activities and attitudes. The latter reaction is quite similar to the ego-conflict in obsessive compulsive disturbances. (p. 263)

In the case of the religious right, the predominant personality is the secular which is an amnesic for the secondary or religious personality. The religious personality is in turn aware and critical of the secular. In other words, the secular personality of the Moral Majority can deny the religious but the religious does not deny the secular and in fact remains critical of it.

Of course this is not a complete analysis but merely suggestive of the type of work that the critics of the Moral Majority (those who claim the Moral Majority is anti-intellectual) would have to do if they were to get beyond their impressions and into sound analysis.

Regardless of the psychic conditions behind the fundamentalists' anti-intellectualism, their scholarship is certainly stunted. For instance, Falwell (1980) says in Listen America!, "Life is a miracle. Only God Almighty
can create life. God said, 'Thou shalt not kill.' Nothing can change the fact that abortion is the murder of life" (p. 143).

However, there is also a secular fact that God does not enforce his injunction against abortion. Abortions are performed with coat hangers in filthy cellars. The problem is to bring Falwell's religious facts and the secular facts together in a coherent view.

Even the religious right itself admits their scholarship is often less than enlightening. For instance, Samuel Hill and Dennis Owen (1982) acknowledge the simplistic, if not anti-intellectual, mentality of the religious right. In *The New Religious Political Right* they say,

> Fundamentalist churches have not operated on the basis of a body of general moral principles that can be brought to bear on ethical problems with some sense of predictability. Instead, they have sought to match each individual problem with an appropriate biblical verse, a kind of moral proof-texting. Abortion is wrong because God knew Jeremiah while the prophet was still in the womb; internationalism is wrong because the tower of Babel episode presents a divine endorsement of nationalism; inflation is wrong because the prophet Amos says disapprovingly, "Ye have made the ephah small and the shekel great"; welfare is wrong because Acts says that those who do not work shall not eat; and somewhere in the book of Proverbs lurks a clear endorsement of capitalism. So it goes,
particular texts for particular problems, but little in the way of a coherent body of ethical principles. (p. 130)

In addition the commandment that says, "Thou shalt not steal" countenances private property and "Thou shalt not covet" means that it is sinful even to contemplate the seizure of another man's goods. "Honor thy father and thy mother" means the family, not the state, is the basic social unit. Prohibitions against false witness and adultery mean that contracts should be honored and double-dealing eschewed.¹

In short, the scholarship of the Moral Majority is simplistic and they are often anti-intellectual. The criticism seems to be valid, although it has not been thoroughly explained.

The Moral Majority is Rigid and Uncompromising

Many of the Moral Majority's critics point out that the Moral Majority is rigid and uncompromising. Supposedly they are a closed system without possibility of error. However, Richard Mouw (1981) says,

There can be no doubt that the program of the Moral Majority is an evolving program. Recently I traveled to a college where I was to give a speech on the Moral Majority. When I arrived at
my motel room, I turned on the TV set just at the beginning of an hour-long interview with Jerry Falwell on William F. Buckley's "Firing Line." I was impressed at how many times Rev. Falwell attempted to qualify, modify, or retract earlier statements. My impression was of a person systematically softening earlier hard-line positions. (p. 14)

Mouw does not give examples of changes in the Moral Majority; however, at least in regard to Falwell, they are available. In fact, not only is there change but there is admission of error. Three examples are:

(1) Falwell ("Interview with the Lone Ranger, 1981) says, "I was an 18-year-old college sophomore studying mechanical engineering at the time I was converted. Two months later, in 1952, I felt the call of God to full-time service" (p. 31). From this it seems clear that (a) Falwell was wrong, (b) he admitted he was wrong, and (c) he changed.

(2) In the same article, Falwell says,

When I was a boy in Virginia, in a redneck society patriotism was just a part of life. Whatever was American was right, whether it was right or not. I had an overdose of patriotism as a boy. I also grew up in a segregated society. I was segregationist, and Thomas Road church was five years old before I'd flushed that out of my system. I thought segregation and spirituality were the same. I would have fought you over saying I was prejudiced; I would say it was scriptural. When I first baptized a Black man in this church, it caused quite a ripple. (p. 31)
Again, it seems obvious that Falwell was wrong, he admitted he was wrong, and he changed.

(3) Fitzgerald (1981) says in The New Yorker,

Falwell now says he changed his mind about the role of preachers in politics because of such issues as abortion... but it was the civil-rights movement that prompted that first political speech. In October of 1980, just before Reagan's visit to Lynchburg, when he called that sermon "false prophecy," he asserted that he and his fellow ministers were now doing exactly what King and his fellows had done. His repudiation of the sermon makes it clear that his change of position was little more than a political change from support of the status quo to attack upon it. (p. 11)
The Christian faith cannot be the basis of a sound and sober way of life. Such a way of life always demands that the metaphysical question of human existence be sealed up and bottled away. Not only must one give no thought to mystery, death, anguish and guilt, but there must be none of the ecstacies that tear one away from the serious pursuit of socially acceptable goals. (p. 176)

There do seem to be some moments of ecstacy for the Moral Majority. A moment of comic ecstacy is reported in Macleans: During one of Falwell's "I love America" pageants some homosexuals were heckling Falwell. Concluding his program as usual by holding hands and praying, Falwell said to the crowd, "Everyone join hands . . . homosexuals join hands too . . . Oh! You already have" (Haiven, 1981, p. 22). Falwell calls himself "good ole Jerry" among his intimates (Ibid., p. 24).

Regardless of the changes and moments of ecstacy in the Moral Majority, there seems to be no movement toward integrating their religion with the secular. This writer sees no movement on the part of the Moral Majority toward discovering how the religious and the secular are coordinated. There appears to be no belief in the fatherhood of God over the judgment of God which would make them compassionate. There seems to be no movement toward integrating the
religious with the secular which would allow them to be scholarly rather than simplistic and anti-intellectual.

The Moral Majority is Paranoid

The final popular criticism of the Moral Majority to be reviewed here is that they are paranoid. Is the new right merely the old paranoia, as George McGovern says? Let's compare the old paranoia with the new paranoia. For instance, one of the classic old paranoids is Robert Welch. His paranoia took the form of The Blue Book, The Politician, and the John Birch Society. The Blue Book was published in 1959 and the first section is called, "Look at the Score . . . ." He says,

For the truth I bring you is simple, incontrovertible, and deadly. It is that, unless we can reverse forces which now seem inexorable in their movement, you have only a few more years before the country in which you live will become four separate provinces in a world-wide Communist dominion ruled by police-state methods from the Kremlin. . . . To illustrate and support this statement I am going to ask you to look for a little while with me at some tedious and perhaps even painful history. (p. 1)

The second section of The Blue Book is called "But Let's Look Deeper . . . ." Here Welch says, "To analyze and understand these weaknesses we have to go deeply into both the political history and the philosophical history
of the human race" (p. 33).

The third section is called "And Deeper Still . . . ." Here, Welch says "As will become more clear . . . the young man I admire most of all of all those America has produced was a fundamentalist preacher named John Birch" (p. 47).

It gets deeper and deeper, and to understand we must look "into both the political history and philosophical history of the human race." The only thing that is clear in the book, no matter how deep it gets, is that Welch admires John Birch and he is completely paranoid about the Kremlin Communists who will take over the country during the early 1960s.

Now compare this with the new "paranoia." Does Falwell ask us to look deeper and deeper and deeper into political history and philosophical history to find what he is trying to show? He does not. He cites facts and figures which anyone can see and anyone can verify. Falwell (1980) says:

I cannot keep silent about the sins that are destroying the moral fiber of our nation. As a minister of the Gospel, I have seen the grim statistics on divorce, broken homes, abortion, juvenile delinquency, promiscuity, and drug addiction. I have witnessed firsthand the human wreckage and the shattered lives that statistics can never reveal in their totality.
With the dissolving of our absolutes, America now has a high crime rate that costs the taxpayer $2 billion a year. In the past 10 years violent crimes have increased 174 percent in America. Murder is up 129 percent. Aggravated assault is up 139 percent. A serious crime is committed every 83 seconds. One murder is committed every 27 minutes.

Drug addiction and alcoholism are in pandemic proportions. Suicide is growing at a frightening pace. More than 400,000 heroin addicts live in the United States (60,000 in California alone), and 22 million Americans smoke marijuana. The No. 1 drug and health problem is alcohol, and there are more than 9 million alcoholics in the United States. Retail sales of alcohol in one recent year totaled $32.5 billion.

We have teenagers who are experimenting with sex in the most vile form, while teenage pregnancies, incest, and sexual child abuse are rampant problems. Gonorrhea is now contracted by more than 2 million Americans each year. It is the most common infection recorded by public-health officials, and it is increasing so rapidly among the nation's young people that medical authorities are desperately searching for a vaccine against it. About 65,000 women become infertile each year because of its infection.

Dr. Harold M. Voth, M.D., made this statement at the Eagle Forum on October 23, 1977: "It comes as no surprise to me that suicide is a national symptom. These youngsters are lost and filled with anguish and finally, overcome by despair, they terminate the most precious gift of all—life itself. It is heartbreaking to listen to the outpourings of the young who see what life has to offer but who cannot grab hold and make their own lives go forward. The causes lie within them, and those disturbances were created by imperfect family life. Loneliness is becoming a national illness. People
are not just lonely because they are alone. They are lonely because they are empty inside, and that comes from not having had good family life as children."

According to a recent study undertaken by The John Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public Health, nearly two thirds of U.S. females (63.3 percent) have premarital sexual intercourse by 19 years of age. It is predicted that teenage pregnancies are expected to escalate in the 1980s. Early in 1979 the Stanford Research Institute estimated annual welfare costs at $8.3 billion, including all cash-support payments and food outlays by the federal, state, and local governments to households containing teenaged mothers or women who first became pregnant in their teens.

A thriving new industry floods into the nation's homes through pornographic literature and television programs. Film producers and magazine writers now exploit innocent little children in an attempt to make money from child pornography. It is a fact that more than 20 million sex magazines are sold at our American newsstands every year. The United States will soon be the pornographic capital of the world with 780 X-rated theatres.

America's families are in trouble. America's homes are the stabilizing factors in our society, yet the family is disintegrating at an alarming rate. Nearly 1 out of 2 marriages is ending in divorce, as the divorce rate is now 46 percent. According to the United States Census Bureau more than 1.3 million unmarried couples are living together.

Two thousand American children die annually from child abuse (over 70 percent from injuries inflicted by stepfathers—the result of divorce). Each day more than 4,000 unborn babies are destroyed by abortion (over 1 million annually).
The IRS has made abortion clinics "charitable" organizations, therefore exempt from taxes. (pp. 101-103)

The people who write off the Moral Majority as a resurgence of the old paranoia that predicted that the Russians would be ruling our land in the 1960s are failing to note this difference between the old and the new paranoia. This is similar to the classic fable of the boy who kept crying wolf, when there was no wolf, which consequently rendered his warning ineffective.

The old paranoia is crying wolf again, but this time we do not need to look deeply into the dark to see this wolf. Instead, the old paranoia is describing the wolf in detail and up close. Maybe this time there is a wolf.

Obviously the Moral Majority is paranoid in that they believe the problem is the humanist philosophy of the secular world. Of course humanism is not a threat to theism and the secular is not a threat to true religion. Nevertheless, state sanctioned chaos is a threat to society and something could be done regardless of the fact that it is the paranoids who are, in their own way, sounding the alarm.

The Moral Majority Fails to be Monotheistic

While the more popular criticisms of the Moral Majority
are largely valid, the most poignant criticism of the Moral Majority is that they fail to be monotheistic. Not only do they fail to be monotheistic but they are actually polytheistic. For instance, Lahaye (1980) says, "Instead of recognizing that the elimination of absolutes always produces chaos, . . . the humanists . . . established a two-pronged attack on man's mind, through books and education" (p. 34).

Similarly, Falwell (1980) says, "Our absolutes are disappearing, and with this disappearance we must face the sad fact that our society is crumbling" (p. 101).

For true monotheists there is only one absolute. For polytheists there is more than one absolute. The Moral Majority is clearly polytheistic. In other words, a plurality of absolutes is the functional equivalent of absolute pluralism. Order, not chaos, is encouraged by the elimination of false gods (i.e., absolutes other than the one absolute).

This bemoaning of the disappearance of "our absolutes," this worship of false gods, is not uncommon among the religious right. It suggests they do not understand the fundamentals of the Christian faith. Étienne Gilson (1970)
considers monotheism of utmost importance to the Judeo-Christian religion. In *God and Philosophy* he says,

> The first character of the Jewish God was his unicity: "Hear, O Israel: the Lord our God is one Lord." Impossible to achieve a more far-reaching revolution in fewer words or in a simpler way. (p. 38, footnote omitted)

The failure of the fundamentalists to see the importance of monotheism is not a recent development. Even *The Fundamentals*, which is a twelve volume work, written from 1909 through 1912 as a complete defense of fundamentalism, does not mention monotheism among its catalogue of the basics of the Christian faith. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Moral Majority blames humanism rather than absolute pluralism for the rise in immorality, since the fundamentalists with their plurality of absolutes are themselves absolute pluralists. In religious language they are polytheistic in their writings, even though at times they no doubt pay lip service to monotheism.

In summary of this chapter, there are many valid criticisms of the Moral Majority, but invariably they are made on an impressionistic or intuitive rather than on an analytical level. The most stricking thing about the popular critics of the Moral Majority—or the Moral Majoritarians

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themselves, for that matter—is their absence of any reference to monotheism as the key idea in understanding the Moral Majority as a religious incursion on a pluralistic polity.
CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Although fundamentalism and humanism can be traced back to the ancient Greeks or even to the ancient Jews, it was during the Protestant Reformation that fundamentalism and humanism began to take on their modern forms. During the Protestant Reformation there was an increased concern with the things of the world and it is this concern for the world that provides a background against which fundamentalism and humanism can be compared. After the Protestant Reformation, for instance, Calvinists often made prosperity a sign of salvation in contrast to the vows of poverty which remained more important in the Catholic Church. This was of course also the post-Renaissance period which is characterized as a re-birth in humanism as classical learning, and this was also the period which led into the explosion of scientific knowledge during the 16th century. The entire 14th, 15th, and 16th centuries seemed to be characterized by a growing concern for this world, as
opposed to the other-worldly concerns of religion and philosophical speculation. In addition to science and technology, there was mass literacy, industrialization, and capitalism all contributing to the rapid secularization of society. Nevertheless, this concern for the world remained largely a concern for the world as God's Creation.

At least two distinct branches of western civilization grew out of this concern for the world. One branch was the secular humanists, who through the Enlightenment and other forces of modernity, took their concern for the world and reduced God the Creator from "Our Father who art in heaven" to a First Principle and in effect conceived the world as a self-subsisting entity. The secular humanists eschewed traditional religion, although a significant minority did call themselves religious and did attempt to codify their beliefs in the two manifestoes of 1933 and 1953.

Another branch was the Christian fundamentalists who clung tenaciously to some of the fundamentals and, at least partly in reaction to the secular humanists, became concerned with ultimate reality over against the secularization of the world as it was developing. Historians give the modern fundamentalists their own distinct identity in
1909 with the publication of The Fundamentals (n.d.).

Christian humanists stood between the secular humanists and the fundamentalists. Christian humanists did not eschew traditional religion, as the secular humanists did, but also, unlike the fundamentalists, Christian humanists fully accepted the increasing secularization of society. Christian humanists went along with secularization as an apparent part of God's plan of making man the center of concern in the universe.

In the meantime (because of the religious disputes between the many branches of civilization growing out of the Reformation, the Renaissance, and the Enlightenment) pluralism was established as the official philosophy in the United States. This was largely in reaction to the wars of religion in Europe and due to bitter fighting between sects in the American colonies. In terms of the First Amendment, government was to "make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Apparently there were no pluralists as such among the original franchisees. Pluralism was a means for people with commitments higher than pluralism to live together in harmony. In other words, pluralism was
relative, not absolute.

Pluralism was a tremendous improvement over the wars of religion in Europe and the fighting between sects in the colonies. In 1868 pluralism was officially expanded to include all races as well as religions and philosophies. In 1920 pluralism was officially expanded to include both sexes. During the 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court expanded pluralism by including singles, birth controllers, pornographers, homosexuals, and abortionists in the franchise.

Somewhere during this expansion of pluralism a new philosophy appeared in the American ethos. It certainly appears in the court's morality and privacy opinions. In the place of relative pluralism—pluralism as a means to a higher end—pluralism was taken as an absolute. Pornography and abortion were admitted to the franchise for the sake of pluralism itself, whereas originally pluralism was only for the sake of harmony among those committed to something higher than pluralism. This establishment of absolute pluralism caused or encouraged a dramatic rise in immorality and it even amounted to the establishment of chaos. For the Jewish religion and—to a lesser extent—the Christian religion, the establishment of absolute pluralism
was an indirect repudiation of monotheism, as well as the repudiation of relative pluralism. In addition, the establishment of absolute pluralism was a function of a rise in immorality, or even chaos. Murder, aggravated assault, rape, suicide, drug abuse, alcoholism, venereal disease, and pornography, to name a few, all took a swing upward, while educational achievement, or at least mass literacy, declined.

During the early part of the twentieth century, just prior to the establishment of absolute pluralism or at least just prior to the appearance of absolute pluralism in the Supreme Court's pro-privacy morality opinions of the 1960s and 1970s, secular humanism began to wane. Secular humanism began to lose some of its prestige, if not its plausibility. Two world wars suggested that mankind might be more dependent on outside help than the strictly man-centered religion of secular humanism could provide. In addition, twentieth century physics began to look like the old-time religion or religions: the mysteries of modern physics began to look like the mysteries of Buddhism while the systems of modern physics were claimed by Catholics and Calvinists, among others, to resemble the systems of
their respective theologies. Furthermore, the "big-bang" sounded to overtly religious people like the sound of sudden creation. The astronomers said the beginning of the universe, as we know it, occurred only fifteen billion years ago, which, while still much farther back than the Bible suggested, was not nearly far enough back for unaided evolution to occur according to the laws of probability. The second law of thermodynamics said that de-evolution was likely, and evolution was impossible unless there was energy being obtained from outside the universe. The missing link in evolution became many missing links. These developments encouraged fundamentalists to enter the public arena over against the humanists who were always openly influential in public affairs.

Nevertheless, despite the encouragements that the fundamentalists could glean from modern day developments, secularization was still an overwhelming fact and the religion of the fundamentalists had still not taken that fact fully into account. In order to be taken seriously in the political arena the fundamentalists had to deny their religion or at least deny that part that was not coordinated with the secular. This denial of their religion meant they
would have to advocate it from behind a facade. The rise in immorality provided the facade of legitimate moral concerns behind which they could advocate their religion, while setting aside those elements of their religion that would not fit in a secular society, as it was understood by the fundamentalists.

Just as the Ultra-Brite toothpaste ads hide behind a facade of "sex-appeal" in order to increase the manufacturer's market share when the product really has no more to offer than clean teeth; just as ads tout Sure deodorant as "confidence," Coast soap as the "eye-opener," and Michigan Bell Telephone as the "knowledge business"; so also the fundamentalists entered the political sphere as "non-religious moral-activists."

In short, the first error of the Moral Majority was their failure to coordinate their religion with overwhelming secularization of society. The second error was to enter the political arena as moral activists when they had no practical moral program whatsoever; they were essentially religious activists who really believed that their religion was the final solution to the country's problems. The third serious error of the Moral Majority
was to blame the secular humanists for the rise in immorality, when the secular humanists were no more to blame than any other religion or philosophy. Fourth, because the Moral Majority denied their religion and blamed secular humanism for the rise in immorality, they were blind to the real cause or encouragement of immorality, which was the establishment of absolute pluralism amounting to the repudiation of monotheism. The rise in immorality was not due to an attack upon the Judeo-Christian ethic as the Moral Majority claimed. The rise in immorality was due to an attack on relative pluralism and the monotheism of the Judeo-Christian religion (and other religions and philosophies).

Despite the publicity they received and despite the decisive influence they apparently had in the election of President Reagan, the Moral Majoritarians have fallen severely short as moral activists. Not only were they too rigid and paranoid, and lacking in the requisite compassion and the intellectual support, but they also had to work with the basic contradiction of their own position. Their position was that the basis of morality is religion, while they themselves claimed to be nonreligious and
without theological considerations. Consequently they fulminated against the disappearance of moral absolutes, when the problem was the appearance of political absolutes that were incompatible with true religion.

What about the future? Falwell (1981c) says, "We are here to stay. We are not going away. We intend to broaden our base, to speak to more issues and, instead of being 'reactors,' to be leaders in the battle to restore this nation to her moral foundations and principles" (p. 28).

Since fundamentalism has been around at least since the Reformation, it is likely that they are here to stay, as Falwell says. However, they will not become leaders by broadening their base. Their only hope of becoming leaders is by first of all coming to grips with monotheism, which is a fundamental of the Christian faith. More specifically, the Moral Majority must work out the relation between monotheism and pluralism in order to make a valid contribution to the political scene. Relative pluralism--pluralism limited by something higher than pluralism itself--is probably the only unifying principle in our society and therefore relative pluralism becomes more and more important, especially as hedge against chaos, as society becomes more and more diverse.
FOOTNOTE

1Examples are taken from The Roots of Capitalism, (Chamberlain, 1965, p. 46) where it describes how Christians have found the Lockean creed and the right to life, liberty, and property in the Old Testament.
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APPENDIX

New Right Organizations

Evangelical

Christian Action Council
Christian Coalition for Legislative Action
Christian Voice
Christian Voice/Moral Government Fund
Coalition for the First Amendment
Coalition for Religious Liberty
Conservative Victory Fund
Coral Ridge Ministries
The Freedom Council, The 700 Club
Moral Majority, Inc., Moral Majority Foundation
National Christian Action Coalition
National Organization to Involve Concerned Electorate (NOTICE)
Religious Roundtable
Television Evangelist
"Washington for Jesus" Rally

Secular

American Conservative Union
American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC)
American Life Lobby
Citizens for Constructive Education
Citizens for the Right to Bear and Keep Arms
Committee for Positive Change
Committee for Responsible Youth Politics
The Conservative Caucus (TCC)
Freedom of Choice, Inc., The Committee for the New Majority
Fund for the Conservative Majority
Heritage Foundation
Kingston Group

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Leadership Foundation
Life Advocates
Life Amendment Political Action
National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC)
National Pro-Life Political Action Committee
National Right to Work
National Tax Limitation
Pro-Family Coalition
Pro-Family Forum
Public Service Research Council
Richard A. Viguerie Company (RAVCO)
Republican Study Committee
Second Amendment Committee
Stop ERA
Washington Legal Foundation
Young Americans for Freedom

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