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POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

by

Woo-Sung Koh

A Thesis
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Faculty of The Graduate College
in partial fulfillment of the
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POLITICAL LEadersHIP AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

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This thesis has attempted quantitatively to establish a positive relationship between political leadership and national development in South Korea during the period from 1948 to 1982.

The major concepts used in this study are political leader (President or Prime Minister), task elite (Cabinet Minister), and national development (political stability and socio-economic development). The social background data of the South Korean cabinet ministers were obtained from newspapers, journal articles, and biographical dictionaries.

Since the inception of the Republic of Korea in 1948, the various regimes have contributed to bring about South Korea's success with national development. However, their records have varied. Their differences in achievement are a function of different political leaderships caused by changes in political leaders' values and developmental orientations and the consequent changes in the patterns of their task elites recruitment and national development.
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Woo-Sung Koh
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

The purpose of this thesis is to explore the relationship between leadership change and the pattern of national development in the Republic of Korea.

Since liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945, Korea has experienced much political change and instability including American military occupation in South Korea and the territorial division of Korean peninsula (1945-1948); a devastating war between South and North Korea (1950-1953); a Student Revolution (1960); a Military Revolution (1961); Revitalizing Reforms (1972); and lastly the assassination of President Park Chung-Hee (1979) (Wade and Kim, 1978: 15). However, since 1961, South Korea has shown an unprecedented growth as a nation, shedding the old image of a 'have-not' and 'not-viable' politico-economic entity. Average annual growth rate of GNP per capita in 1970-79 was 10.6 percent. In 1979, South Korea achieved a per capita GNP of $1,624 together with an export total of $15.1 billion. It is a remarkable record of growth. Per capita income had by 1979 increased 7 times since 1970, and some 20 times since 1960, while exports
had grown 17 times since 1970, which was a prodigious 460 times more than the 1960 level. In the process, South Korea has been able to transform itself from an underdeveloped agrarian society to a rapidly industrializing middle income country. It has also become more urban. Indeed, never before in the history of modernization has a nation effected such a rapid change in its super- and infra-structures. To be sure, South Korea has become a showcase among the developing nations in bringing about a rapid economic growth and maintaining socio-political stability (Kim and Kang, 1978: i; Kim, 1980: 32; Kim, 1981: 14-15).

There are many reasons behind this success story of South Korea. They could include technical innovation, new market demands, findings of new resources, organizational changes, role differentiations in bureaucracy, political leadership, internal stability, foreign aid policy, educational development and skilled manpower, value changes of the population, national problems faced, both physical and social infrastructures provided in the 1950s, and so on. Particularly significant, however, is the input of national development planning by political leadership (Whang, 1970: 4-5). This leadership aspect in South Korea's national development will be investigated in this thesis.
Theoretical Background

According to Edward Shils, "no new state can modernize itself and remain or become liberal and democratic without an elite with force of character, intelligence and high moral qualities" (Lee, 1968: 182). Tsurutani (1973: 27) also points out, "Because political leadership determines goals, selects methods, and gives direction, society develops or fails to develop according to the extent to which its political leadership is intelligent, creative, skillful, and committed. Without this requisite function of political leadership, there is no progress, no direction, no development."

In the transitional countries, the question of political leadership has been studied in the context of nation building and modernization of traditional societies. After World War II, when many of the developing countries emerged from colonial rule, the political leadership realized that political freedom without freedom from economic, social and cultural backwardness was meaningless. Thus, the breakthrough to modernity was conceived by the political leadership as the strategic path to economic and social freedom after the achievement of political independence. In this perspective of nation building and modernization, the role of political leaders is critical for the smooth transition from the traditional to the
modern societies. For one thing, it involves the dissemination of new values consistent with modernization and the evolution of new institutions and structures that would embody this new set of values (de Souza, 1978: 1).

However, the concept of national development remains elusive and it is without any clear and well-defined meaning. Economists see national development primarily in terms of man's application of technology to the control of nature's resources in order to bring about a marked increase in per capita GNP. Sociologists and social anthropologists are concerned with characteristics that differentiate the modern societies from the traditional. Political scientists are interested not only in the question of who exercises power but also in how governments increase their capacity to innovate change, respond to demands for change, and cope with social conflicts, focusing on the problems of nation building (Lee, 1971: 13).

For this thesis, national development can be defined as a process of acquiring a sustained growth of a system's capability to cope with new, continuous changes toward the achievement of progressive political, economic, and social objectives. Here, national development is seen as both process and goal. The term "modernization" is used interchangeably with the term "national development" (Lee, 1968: 4-5).
As a goal, national development is the desired future state of affairs - a politically, socially, and economically integrated society with built-in capacities for continuous adaptation and growth, and regularized processes and methods for the resolution of conflict and the generation of change. Its essential feature is stability (Tsurutani, 1973: 5).

As a process, national development is a series of complex and novel changes - economic, social, and political - to be brought about by the application of modern industrial and organizational technologies and by the skills, imagination, and resolve of political leadership. Its essential feature is instability (Tsurutani, 1973: 6).

The modernization process, as the bridge between modern and traditional societies, implies the following nine characteristics. These characteristics are: 1) a revolutionary process; 2) a complex process; 3) a systemic process; 4) a global process; 5) a lengthy process; 6) a phased process; 7) a homogenizing process; 8) an irreversible process; and 9) a progressive process (Black, 1976: 30-31). In other words, national development involves more than just industrialization and democratization. As a historical-evolutionary process, national development process is seen as a complex set of interrelated processes which could be viewed by different social strata of the people of various countries in quite different ways.
Thus, choices must be made by the political leadership of the newly emerging nations for development purposes (Asiatic Research Center, Korea University, 1965: 805-807).

When traditional societies are initially confronted by modernity, and when some of their prominent members become the advocates of a new and challenging way of life, the political leaders may adopt one of a variety of courses. They may combat the new ideas and persecute the innovators as heretics; or they may discuss, then accept some and reject others; or they may find them to be valid and attempt a fundamental reorganization of their institutions accordingly (Black, 1966: 68-69). Thus, the role of political leadership is indeed the most crucial factor to be ascertained in the process of modernization.

Political leadership is a directing center of all actions and decisions pertaining to the national development. Dynamism, change, industrialization, independence, influence, power, internal unity: these are some of the attributes of modern societies and many developing states have been trying to achieve them. Their political leaders have sought to refashion their old societies and to pattern the changes on the successful experiences of other countries (Welch, Jr. (Ed.), 1967: 2).

In the process of national development, political leadership performs a number of roles rather than a single role. These roles depend on which goals political leaders
wish to achieve or which issues are most salient for the society at the time.

In most transitional societies, nation building and socio-economic progress are two fundamental and interrelated goals of national development. It requires the improvement of the capital equipment of the economy, the enhancement of the symbolic grandeur of the society, the creation of national unity, the furtherance of an indigenous modern culture, and the operation of a set of modern political institutions (Shils, 1964: 116).

To deal with these overriding goals, according to Esman (1966: 61-64), political leadership must cope with a series of major tasks: 1) achieving security against external aggression and ensuring internal order; 2) establishing and maintaining consensus on the legitimacy of the regime; 3) integrating diverse ethnic, religious, communal, and regional elements into a national political community; 4) organizing and distributing formal powers and functions among the organs of central, regional, and local governments and between public authority and the private sector; 5) displacement of vested traditional social and economic interests; 6) development of modernizing skills and institutions; 7) fostering of psychological and material security; 8) mobilization of savings and of current financial resources; 9) rational programming of investment; 10) efficient management of facilities.
and services; 11) activating participation in modernizing activities, especially in decision-making roles; and 12) achieving a secure position in the international community.

These tasks are best performed through systematic development planning. Development planning refers to deliberate, rational, continuous efforts by political leadership to accelerate the process of development and to channel it into desired directions by means of the comprehensive and detailed choices of objectives and the determination and allocation of the resources necessary for their achievement. It is comprised of five components: 1) definition of the purposes for which development is being undertaken; 2) determination of the resources actually and potentially available for achieving the specific goals and targets of the development plan; 3) selection of the means whereby resources can be mobilized to achieve the specific goals and targets; 4) formulation of specific programs within the general plan; and 5) provision for its implementation (Colm and Geiger, 1962: 46-52).

In this study, the major concepts are political leader (independent variable), task elite (intervening variable), and national development (dependent variable). Specifically, the variables which are being utilized are political priority, value, attitude, and development plan. The term "political elite" or "elites" can be used
synonymously with "political leadership." Political leadership means the body of topmost decision-makers with legal and/or actual responsibility. In operational terms, it can be divided into two subcategories: political leader and task elite. Political leader means the chief executive - President or Prime Minister. Task elite is a member of the State Council - the Cabinet Minister. The variables of national development used in this study include political stability and socio-economic development.

Hypotheses

Successful undertaking of the task of national development calls for the generation and maintenance of two vital phenomena: stability and change. In the absence of stability, no meaningful long-range programs of social reform can be implemented. Social engineering is impossible in a condition of chaos. On the other hand, programs of change and reform have a natural tendency to disrupt and undermine stability. Thus, how to promote change, hence modernization, while still maintaining stability, is the most crucial problem for any developing country. It is indeed the central task for political leadership, for it is political leadership alone that can mediate these two necessary but often incongruent requirements for national development by rendering them
mutually reenforcing. In other words, the capacity for national development lies ultimately in its political leadership's manipulative skill in, creative intelligence for, and unwavering commitment to, generating and maintaining stability on the one hand; and effectively mobilizing and creatively utilizing the human and material resources that exist in society for the task of national development on the other (Tsurutani, 1973: 32).

In this perspective, the central hypothesis of this study is that political leadership is the ultimate determinant of South Korea's success with national development. Relationship between leadership changes and changes in the development pattern will be examined during the period from 1948 to 1982. Leadership changes involve not only personnel changes but also concomitant changes in the values and developmental orientations of political leadership.

The hypothesis is further elaborated as follows:

Hypothesis-1. Political leadership is a critical variable in national development in the Republic of Korea.

Since the inception of the Republic of Korea in 1948, the various regimes have attempted to bring about economic prosperity and democracy to the country. However, their records have varied. Their differences in achievement are a function of different political leadership. Political leadership here means incumbents of key
governmental politics.

Hypothesis-2. There is a significant association between social background of task elites and elite recruitment patterns of political leaders in the Republic of Korea.

The various quantitative studies of Korean political leadership (Bark, 1967; Choi, 1974; Chung and Pae, 1977; Hahn and Kim, 1976; Hahn and Kim, 1964; Han, 1973; Han, 1975; Kihl, 1976; Kihl and Kim, 1976; Kim and Woo, 1976; Kim and Pai, 1980; Lee, 1968; Lee, 1974; Lee and Bark, 1975; Whang, 1970) have shown changes in the pattern of and the criteria for elite recruitment in the five regimes which South Korea has had. They have also shown changes in their values and attitudes. This hypothesis expects that the social backgrounds of task elites closely reflect the values and attitudes of the political leaders.

Hypothesis-3. There is a significant relationship between the values and attitudes of political leadership and the patterns of national development in the Republic of Korea.

Lester G. Seligman (1971: 240-41) sees elite recruitment pattern as both reflecting and affecting the social system. As an indicator of development and change, elite recruitment illuminates various changes in the social system: economic changes, political structure, and the level of politicization. This hypothesis shows that
change in political leaders' values and attitudes and in their task elite recruitment patterns will bring about corresponding different phases of the development process in South Korea. Change is defined as differences in quality and quantity over time.

The Data and the Method of Analysis

The first hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) deals with the performance of political elites in achieving political stability and socio-economic development in South Korea. The origin, nature, and purpose of national development in South Korea will be analyzed to test this hypothesis. The five different administrations which South Korea has had will be compared. Investigated will be such questions as: 1) who the political elites have been; 2) what their achievements have been; and 3) what reciprocal effects 1) and 2) have had upon the political structure and socio-economic development.

To test the second hypothesis (Hypothesis 2), a quantitative analysis will be necessary. The data used in this study were initially collected by Professors C. I. Eugene Kim and John P. Lovell. The data were obtained from newspapers, journal articles, and biographical dictionaries. Their information includes such variables as Year of Birth, Place of Birth, Education, Foreign Travel and Residence, Occupation, and Party Affiliation.
The theoretical model of this study is adopted from Frederick W. Frey's *The Turkish Political Elite*.

During the period from 1948 to 1982, various forms of government have existed in South Korea. But, to facilitate my study, they can be divided into two types of government: civilian regime and military regime. Focusing on the social backgrounds of their cabinet ministers, this section of the study will inquire into such questions as: 1) what sorts of persons have reached the cabinet level of power; 2) what differential changes have been responsible for their rise in power; and 3) whether or not the task elites do differ in the social backgrounds in the two regimes—civilian and military.

To answer these questions, the various social background items will be tabulated as much as possible to learn which characteristics will be regularly associated with each other. Then the change and continuity in their composition in the two regimes will be compared, and finally different patterns of task elite recruitment by political leaders will be explored.

Hypothesis-3 deals with how different leadership values and attitudes influence the patterns of national development in South Korea. To test this hypothesis, this thesis will try to answer such questions as: 1) did political elites from divergent social backgrounds exhibit significantly different types of political priority; and
2) was there any clear association between the distinctive leadership values and attitudes and measure of economic development. The different national development process of the two types of regimes will be also compared, using the time-orientation approach advanced by Hahn-Been Lee in his Korea: Time, Change, and Administration.
CHAPTER II

ROK POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AS MODERNIZER

In this chapter, the origin, nature, and purpose of national development in South Korea will be analyzed and the five different administrations which South Korea has had, since its independence in 1948, will be compared.

Political Stability

Since the Liberation of 1945, the political pendulum of South Korea has swung back and forth three times: from a representative-oriented system to an executive-dominant system during the First Republic (1948-60); reemergence of a representative-dominant model during the Second Republic (1960-61); and reappearance of the executive-controlled system since 1961. During this period, South Korea has also had eight constitutional changes and five different Republics (Kim and Cho, 1972: vi).

When Korea was liberated from Japanese colonialism by the allied powers in 1945, the southern half of the Korean peninsula that was occupied by U.S. forces experienced the wholesale importation of Western democratic concepts. The first Constitution in 1948 incorporated an extensive list of personal rights and vested major power in the
legislature in reaction to the long history of executive dominance under traditional dynastic rule and Japanese colonialism. However, many of its provisions remained alien to a majority of the Korean people. The political structures were not found on the existing political realities of South Korea; in fact, there existed a huge gap between the ideological aspirations and the realistic capabilities of the new political system. Such incongruity and disparity were to cause tension and disturbances rather than harmony and stability (Kim, 1981: 226; Oh, 1968: 191-92).

In August 1948, the first nationally elected Constituent Assembly gave birth to the First Republic of Korea, and elected Syngman Rhee as its first President. President Rhee was educated in the United States and a life-time nationalist against Japanese colonialism. He was to be a democratic President. However, from the beginning, an unchallengeable position of one-man leadership triumphed over democratic constitutionalism in the Rhee regime. Many causes could be attributed to this development (Oh, 1968: 191-192).

First of all, there was an acute shortage of trained manpower in every field, particularly in the governmental bureaucracy and political organizations. During the Japanese colonial rule over Korea which lasted 35 years, the Korean people had only a limited opportunity to serve
in the colonial administration. In fact, 95 percent of
the higher civil service positions were filled with the
Japanese. Even among the clerical posts, two-thirds of
the senior clerkships were exclusively reserved for the
Japanese. Thus the Koreans who had any experience in
government during this period were largely lower level
clerks (Cho, 1976: 84).

The Korean people also had a limited political
experience. Political parties in Korea were only post-
World War II developments. They emerged outside of the
anti-colonial independence organizations, partially due
to the weak nationalist movements staged abroad by exile
groups and to the refusal of the American occupation
authorities to recognize the legitimacy of the anti-
Japanese Korean Provisional Government. Many parties
were also either factions or groups of factions. Many
of them were built around a leader or group of leaders,
and they disappeared with them. Factional maneuvers
hampered leadership cohesion and frustrated any effective
recruitment of competent elites (Chai, 1972: 26-27).

Another cause was the fratricidal Korean War between
South and North Korea. The war was devastating. The
whole country became dislocated. Internal stability and
militant anti-Communism became twin watchwords in South
Korea and the democratic features of the original
Constitution was put aside. Furthermore, the political
pendulum swang from a representative system to an executive-dominant system and Rhee's autocracy became firmly established. As a result, the assemblymen yielded to Rhee in the legislature. The Liberal party, which was formed by Rhee in 1951, served faithfully as Rhee's personal political tool. The bureaucracy also pledged its allegiance to Rhee and assisted him as the ways and means of its own self-preservation. Corruption and bribery flourished in the government (Kim, 1976: 42; Oh, 1968: 192-94; Wright (Ed.), 1975: 11).

In April 1960, the seemingly invincible Rhee regime collapsed in the hands of students who protested the massive and blatant riggings of the Presidential election in the preceding month. The demise of Rhee brought about a basic alteration in political system and style. In reaction to the Rhee regime, a new Constitution which was promulgated on June 15, 1960 provided legislative supremacy in the place of executive supremacy. The strong presidential system was supplanted by a collectively responsible cabinet system, and administrative powers were vested in a prime minister responsible to the National Assembly. In other words, the political pendulum swang again from an executive-dominant system to a representative-dominant model. Following the new Constitution, on August 23, 1960, a cabinet system of government was created in the Second Republic under the
premiership of Chang Myun. At a glance, it seemed that South Korea was on its way to experiencing a truly representative democracy. However, excesses of the parliamentary system and intra-party squabbles led to crippling political immobilism. Furthermore, continuing unrest and various demonstrations did not allow the Chang regime to pursue strong policies for coping with the pressing multiple problems arising from the overthrow of the First Republic. This Second Republic was overthrown by a military revolution on May 16, 1961, only nine months after its inception (Kim, 1976: 43).

During the military junta period (1961-63), the military leaders, led by General Park Chung Hee, re-established political authority and were able to stabilize the chaotic political situation. In the meantime, they also adopted a new Constitution and General Park Chung Hee himself became President of the Third Republic.

Under the new Constitution, the Third Republic became a highly centralized administration state. The political pendulum swung again from a representative-dominant model to an executive-controlled system. Under Park's leadership, the Assembly was controlled by the Democratic Republican Party, which was organized as Park's new political vehicle. Also, the Park regime introduced a new administrative reform plan and modern techniques of public management to enhance governmental efficiency. Thus, with
enhance governmental efficiency. Thus, with a subservient party, a captive parliamentary majority, and the effective operation and dynamism of governmental agencies, the Park regime had established political stability. The Park regime was further strengthened following the October 1972 Revitalizing Reform, which resulted in the creation of the Fourth Republic. Under the October Revitalizing Reform, the political structure became a paragon of executive predominance, and policy-making and executing functions were completely centralized in the hands of the President (Kim, 1974: 134-35; Kim, 1976: 44-45).

Park's authoritarian regime was terminated by his assassination on October 26, 1979. His assassination created a political vacuum. The democratic euphoria created by Park's assassination was short-lived however. There followed another authoritarian military rule, led by General Chun Doo Hwan. General Chun himself became President of the Fifth Republic, following a new Constitution on October 22, 1980. Under the new Constitution, the Fifth Republic has remained a highly centralized administrative state (Lee, 1981: 125-43; Shim, 1980: 22).

Economic Development

A recent World Bank report describes the phenomenal development of the South Korean economy in these words:
"From a position uncomfortably close to the bottom of the international income scale and without the benefit of significant natural resources, South Korea embarked on a course of industrial growth that became one of the outstanding success stories in international development" (Korean Overseas Information Service, 1979: 463). Behind this success story, the role of dynamic political leadership has been considered an essential determinant.

During 1945-53, the political events severely limited the potential of the South Korean economy. The departure of Japanese management and technical know-how created a shortage of trained manpower; North Korea's refusal to supply electricity to South Korea made it necessary for South Korea to develop its own power sources nearly from scratch; traditional trade with North Korea and Japan was ruptured. To make matters worse, almost all extant industrial facilities and urban centers were either destroyed or heavily damaged during the Korean War. The estimated total damage reached $3 billion. The production capacity of principal manufacturing industries in 1951 was only 15 percent of the pre-Korean War period in production; 20 percent in machinery; 35 percent in chemicals; and 35 percent in textiles. The war also brought about hyper-inflation: price increased 18 times between 1950 and 1953 (Chung, 1980: 277; Korean Overseas Information Service, 1976: 6).
After the end of the Korean War in mid-1953, the Rhee regime concentrated its efforts on the rehabilitation of the war-devastated country. The efforts were carried out with foreign aid, mainly U.S. assistance. As a result, during 1954-57, industrial facilities were restored to the pre-war level. Industrial production rose by an average of 20 percent a year, and economic growth marked an average of 5.5 percent. In 1957, the nation achieved 7.2 percent economic growth. This period was characterized by moderate growth. However, the country suffered from an alarming rate of inflation, averaging 40 percent per annum. The inflation pressure proved a further deterrent to domestic savings, and encouraged consumption, speculation, and more bank borrowing. The easy credit and overvalued currency brought about misdirection of investment. Many of the new plants were catered for inflated domestic demand. The development achieved during this period relied heavily on foreign aid rather than on a self-supporting economy (Korea Annual, 1980: 108; Kim, 1976: 117; Lee, 1969: 48-49).

Alarmed by this trend, the Rhee regime introduced a stabilized program in 1958. Taxes were raised, capital spending cut back, the budget deficit eliminated, bank credit tightened, and the foreign exchange rate was stabilized at 500 won to one dollar. As a result, prices were stabilized for the first time since the war, and the
rate of inflation was reduced to an annual average of 10.4 percent. But the pace of economic development slowed down and unemployment mounted. To remedy the economic stagnation, the Rhee regime established an Economic Development Council within the Ministry of Reconstruction to draw up an overall development plan. A "Three-year Economic Development Plan" was adopted by the Council. These efforts were too late and too little. Political unrest mounted. The Rhee regime was finally overthrown by the April 1960 student revolution, and no "Three-year Plan" was implemented during the Rhee administration (Lee, 1969: 37-38; Chung, 1981: 277).

As soon as it took power, the Chang regime of the Second Republic directed the Economic Development Council to prepare a new "Five-year Economic Development Plan" and invited a Rand Corporation expert to advise in its formulation. At the same time, the Chang regime organized public hearings for administrative reform, public finance and banking, industrial structure, public enterprises, international balance of payments, employment and standard of living, and regional development. The Chang regime also established a Committee on Government Organizational Reform, one of whose tasks was to devise a new administrative structure to efficiently execute economic development plans (Jones and Sakong, 1980: 46-47).

However, as stated earlier, the Second Republic
proved powerless against the multiple problems arising from the overthrow of the First Republic. Crippling inflation beset the already hard pressed families who had fixed incomes—particularly the public officials—and industrial production showed a continuous decline. During the one year period under Premier Chang, the price of rice went up 60 percent, and other items such as coal and oil jumped more than 23 percent, while production dipped more than 12 percent. In less than a year since its establishment, the Chang regime was overthrown by the military revolution of May 1961. Thus, like its predecessor, the Chang regime's "Five-year Economic Development Plan" was never implemented. The next attempt at planned economic development was made by the military regime (Kim, 1976: 117).

Since its assumption of power in 1961, the Park regime energetically carried out a bold institutional reform and industrialization program with rapid development of the country's self-sustaining economy. Structurally, a major institutional innovation was introduced in June 1961, when the Park regime organized an Economic Planning Board (EPB). EPB took over planning responsibility from the Ministry of Reconstruction, and the head of EPB was given the title of Deputy Prime Minister. This elevated position for the chief of the national planning agency signified the seriousness of the Park regime's planning
effort. The agency was also to coordinate and control conflicts among the various economic ministries. In addition, various special committees were established, including the Central Economic Committee, the Economic Minister's Meeting, the Economic Vice-minister's Meeting, the Meeting for Annual Plans and its sub-groups among related ministries (Jones and Sakong, 1980: 48-49).

These various institutional reforms were accompanied by a series of Five-year Economic Development Plans and the Park regime was successful in completing the First (1962-66), the Second (1967-71), and the Third (1972-76) Plans. The Fourth Plan was carried out in 1977-81.

The First Plan was to build industrial foundation. An average annual growth rate of 7.1 percent was projected in the plan. To accomplish these objectives, the Park regime adopted a set of basic principles: open-door economic system; self-reliant base consolidation; manufacturing and export oriented industrialization; and social overhead capital expansion. The Park regime saw a short cut to the goal of industrialization in the expansion of social overhead capital, the exploitation of energy resources and other key industries, and the fostering of the export and import-substitute industries and set out to create factors conducive to an independent growth of the economy. During the first plan period, an average annual growth rate was 8.3 percent. The primary
industry grew by 5.3 percent annually on the average during the period, the secondary industry by 15 percent, and the tertiary industry by 8.9 percent. The overall progress was attributable to 1) a determined will to develop the national economy, in which the government and the people were firmly united; 2) concentrated government support for problem industries; 3) overcoming of natural hazards in the agricultural sector, resulting in increased farm productivity; and 4) a series of government policies such as readjustment of the monetary interest rates to actual market rates, liberalization of trade, and adoption of a floating exchange rate system, which sought to give flexibility to the economy (Korean Overseas Information Service, 1976: 68-74; Korea Annual, 1980: 109).

The Second Plan (1967-71) was an extension of the First Plan. Its overall objective was to lay a foundation for achieving self-sustaining economy in the early 1980, by balancing international payments, financing investments domestically, and achieving full employment. The prime objective was to modernize the industrial structure. Adherence to the principles of market economy was advocated in the plan to infuse vigor into the national economy. The high annual growth rate of 11.4 percent in this period stemmed from growth in the manufacturing sector and social overhead capital, as well as an expansion of exports. The mining-manufacturing industry
grew by 21.1 percent. Commodity exports grew by 35.2 percent. In the social overhead capital sector, the expressway linking Seoul and Busan, Daejeon and Gwangju, and Seoul and Gangreung were partially completed. This made one-day nationwide transport a reality (Korean Overseas Information Service, 1976: 74-80; Korea Annual, 1980: 109-111).

The principal objective of the Third Plan (1972-76) was to establish harmony between growth and stability, combatting the problems carried over from the 1960s. If the accomplishments of the first two plans may be summed up as the laying of a sound basis for economic growth, the function of the Third Plan was the realization of a mature national economy. High priority was given to intensive development of the rural economy, export promotion, and the fostering of heavy and chemical industries. During the plan period, despite the strains and difficulties imposed by unfavorable developments in the world economy, particularly the oil crisis of 1973, the South Korean economy attained an average annual growth rate of 11.2 percent, exceeding the target of 8.6 percent (Korean Overseas Information Service, 1976: 80-93; Korea Annual, 1980: 111-12).

The Fourth Plan (1977-81) called, for the first time, for improvements in social welfare. It was to improve the standard of living in terms of both quantity and quality.
With the development ideals of growth, equity, and efficiency, the basic objectives of this plan were: 1) to establish a self-supporting growth structure; 2) to concentrate on social development; and 3) to effect significant improvement of technology and the level of efficiency in the economy, competing internationally in heavy and chemical industries. The average annual growth rate of GNP per capita in 1970-79 was 10.6 percent. In 1979, South Korea achieved a per capita GNP of $1,624 together with an export total of $15.1 billion. It is a remarkable record of growth. Per capita income had by 1979 increased 7 times since 1970, and some 20 times since 1960, while exports had grown 17 times since 1970, which was a prodigious 460 times more than the 1960 level (Korean Overseas Information Service, 1976: 98-99; Kim, 1980: 32).

Social Development

The Liberation brought about a dominant ideology - the ideology of equal opportunity. This potent ideology gave birth to two important policies of land reform and educational expansion (Lee, 1968: 67).

In June 1949, the Rhee regime promulgated a land reform program to redistribute some 23 percent of the total arable land in South Korea. Although this program had scarcely been started when the Korean War broke out in June 1950, the Rhee regime was able to carry out a
fairly effective land reform program and brought about great changes in the structure of rural society. The reform created independent farmers and undermined the consanguineous bond of the Yangban (the core of the pre-modern force) who lost its economic basis. Subsequently, however, the "Land Reform Law" became ineffective because of the resale of land despite the law prohibiting it. The pressure of rural population and political unrest worsened the situation during the Chang period. Some 40 percent of rural families were still reported to own less than a half hectare of land, when a half hectare was considered the minimum support to a family. The Park regime was effective in remedying this situation through its development efforts. For instance, a wide spread land development program added 25 percent more arable land to the country by 1971. Development in industry and in agricultural processing and fishery helped absorb rural workers wholly or part time into new occupation. These efforts have been further strengthened by the "New Community Movement" since 1971, which has raised rural income, improved standard of living conditions, and modernized the work attitudes of the rural people (Lee, 1968: 74-75; Koh, 1963: 66-70; Lyman, 1975: 251).

Development in education was truly of revolutionary proportions in the post-Liberation period. When the Compulsory Education System at the primary level was
initiated by the Rhee regime, education in South Korea began to change. An American education model was adapted to the existing Japanese-traditional system. The consequent encouragement of mass education was eagerly accepted by the people who had been denied much education during the Japanese colonial occupation (1910-45). However, the Rhee regime was unable to give strong financial support to public education. About 15 percent of the total operational expenses for public elementary education was borne by the national government, another 10 percent by the local government, and the remaining 75 percent by the parent-teacher associations. This system of financing public primary education continued during the Chang regime. However, this system has been changed since 1961. The Park regime established the policy of a completely free elementary education. The practice of collecting fees from the students under various pretexts was outlawed, and the parent-teacher associations were abolished. The Park regime also made progress in coping with other long standing problems of education. To deal with the problem of poor quality and the perennial shortage of teachers, the system of teacher training replaced the high-school level institute with the status of two-year teachers' colleges, which were all state-operated, and their numbers were increased. As a result, there were 6,450 elementary schools and 831 branches with 117,290 teachers across the

These two policies - land reform and education - were the cornerstones in the ensuing process of leveling the traditional social structure, increasing social mobility, and ushering in the twin processes of urbanization and literacy. They also provided the base for economic development. In fact, social development and economic development progress simultaneously.

If economic development were indicated by such criteria as increases in production, in per capita national income, and in consumption measured as per capita use of electric energy, social development could be indicated by such criteria as improvements in the fields of education, health, nutrition, housing, and social security. South Korea has achieved a wide-ranging social development along the above indicators of development. For instance, expanded work opportunity reduced unemployment from 4.5 percent in 1970 to 2.7 percent in 1979. Life expectancy increased from 65 in 1970 to 68 years of age in 1975, resulting from improved medical services and the expansion of medical care insurance system, while the population growth rate dropped to annual 1.7 percent by 1975. The urbanization rate grew from 42.4 percent in 1966 to 58.2 percent in 1975, and it is expected to reach 67 percent

The rapid spread of modernization tends to create negative social problems and social welfare becomes one of the most important problems in the process of social development. Under the First and the Second republics, the objective of social welfare was focused on the relief of immediate social ills, including relief to flood and fire victims, distribution of free grain during bad crop years, placement of orphans in institutions or adoptive homes, aid to disabled veterans, and programs for family planning. These programs met only a limited success. However, since 1961, following the successful economic development plans, the Park regime has performed the institutional development of social welfare remarkably and legislated several important measures, including the Livelihood Protection Law (1961), the Calamity Protection Law (1962), the Child Welfare Law (1961), the Prohibition from the Fallen Deed Law (1961), the Military Relief Compensation Law (1961), the Industrial Accidents Insurance Law (1963), the Medical Insurance Law (1963), and the National Welfare Pension Law (1973). On the basis of these laws, the Park regime has expanded social welfare programs. Some of the important welfare programs are: 1) facilities relief; 2) housing relief; 3) poverty relief; 4) calamity relief; 5) self-support guidance; 6) children's welfare; 7) women's welfare; and 8) social
security. The budget in social welfare sector has also grown about 6 times, from 110,887 million won in 1970 to 691,872 million won in 1977. Furthermore, the Fourth Five-year Economic Development Plan (1977-81) called for improvements in social welfare as one of its basic objectives. The targets of this objectives were as follows: 1) minimize unemployment by expanding employment opportunities; 2) improve quality of education and develop an education system which will be consistent with the expected demand for manpower; 3) solve national housing problems by promoting housing construction; 4) establish an overall public health program and develop a low-cost health delivery system; 5) encourage an increase in the proportion of publicly-held firms and enhance the social responsibility of business; 6) gradually adopt a minimum wage policy and improve working conditions; 7) strengthen cooperation between employer and employee; 8) reduce population growth rate and prevent the concentration of population and industry in urban areas; 9) provide for environmental conservation and minimize pollution; and 10) expand and improve the social security system and promote wealth accumulation of the middle income class (Koh, 1975: 51-52; Korean Overseas Information Service, 1976: 99-100).

In sum, since independence in 1948, South Korea has not seen a peaceful transfer of power, but experienced
some important changes. The First and the Second republics introduced modern political institutions. Particularly, since 1961, South Korea's political system has rapidly gained in stability under the highly centralized government and its political stability has significantly contributed to modernistic national development. Kundaehwa (modernization) has become a full-fledged political symbol and the focus of national development has become economic development. However, economic development in the South Korean context implies far more than the usual complex of economic indicators. It connotes the expansion of societal infrastructure, the greater sense of national purpose, and the groundswell of rising popular expectations created by more than a decade of booming prosperity. In this development, the role of dynamic political leadership and capable task elites has been considered essential if a backward nation is to leap into a period of economic expansion.
CHAPTER III

POLITICAL LEADERS: THEIR VALUES AND DEVELOPMENTAL ORIENTATIONS

Values and attitudes are the internalized standards of an individual which give order and direction to his thoughts and behavior, and political leaders' values and attitudes are important in determining their major courses of political action (Whang, 1970: 24-25). Differences in the values and attitudes of political leaders in South Korea are an important indicator for understanding their political courses of action for national development.

As a transitional society, South Korea has been confronted with many changes such as demographic, socio-cultural, ideological, technological, economic, and political. These changes, furthermore, include a great variety of characteristics. They differ in terms of speed, weight, and length of time. The various attitudes toward such changes by political leaders in South Korea are reflected in their different values and attitudes.

According to Hahn-been Lee (1968: 6-9), there are three basic attitudes toward change: positive, negative, and ambivalent. These different attitudes influence and modify the tendencies arising from the different time perspectives of past, present, and future. A combination
of time perspective and attitude toward change produces a
general guideline of action. Lee called it "time
orientation" and divided it into three types: escapist,
exploitationist, and developmentalist.

According to Lee, escapists have a negative attitude
toward change. They distrust time and the future. In a
process of relentless change, time becomes a burdensome
pressure, and the past is being grounded to pieces and
senselessly used up as raw material in the fabrication of
an unthinkable future. From a perspective of the past,
the outcome is escapism. This is a stance of weakness
under pressure. It tends to be a negative, backward-
looking orientation toward change. Exploitationists have
an ambivalent attitude toward change between the positive
and the negative. Under the pressure and tension of
change, their time perspective is neither looking backward
nor seeing the future as meaningful. Their ambivalent
attitude is owing to weakness of inner identity coupled
with a lack of clear and consistent purpose for the
future. From a perspective of the present, they try to
maximize short-run returns through manipulation of the
existing circumstances. Developmentalists have a positive
attitude toward change. They trust time and the future.
To them, time opens up a wonderful opportunity to increase
the scope of knowledge and to search for the unknown
future. From a perspective of the future, it is linked to
the idea of development, because development requires a conception of time in terms of a long-range, upward line or spiral. This is a belief that time is a helpful instrument available to man in his struggle for a better future.

In this regard, it may be hypothesized that the values and attitudes of President Park Chung Hee were of more developmentalist orientation than those of President Syngman Rhee and Premier Chang Myun. The following section is a brief comparison of their different developmental values and attitudes. More specifically their orientations in the following areas will be compared: 1) achievement orientation; 2) change orientation; 3) future orientation; and 4) overseas orientation.

Achievement Orientation

Achievement orientation means in part one's commitment to growth, especially economic growth. When the achievement orientation is directed toward economic purposes, it could help bring about rapid economic development to the society.

President Rhee was prominent in the anti-Japanese movement in the first decade of this century, served time in jail, spent 33 years in exile in the United States as the foremost Korean nationalist, returned to Korea in 1945 in the political chaos of liberation and became the leader
of anti-Communist political forces. In 1948, he was elected First President of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and led the country through the devastation of the Korean War and its aftermath. Success in this environment required charisma and expertise at political intrigue rather than administrative and managerial talent (Jones and Sakong, 1980: 40-42).

President Rhee was a prolific speaker and enjoyed impromptu addresses. His favorite method of reaching the people was through public speeches, which were reported in full in the local newspapers. Using invaluable symbols of Korea's fight against both the Japanese and the Communists, President Rhee exploited his image as "father of his country" and repeatedly stated that national unity of South Korea and unification of South and North Korea were his ultimate goals. His ambition to become President of a united Korean republic was a logical outgrowth for his essentially messianic outlook (Oliver, 1960: 278-279, 329; Koh, 1963: 1; Allen, 1960: 237).

During and after the Korean War, however, President Rhee realized that his goals were realistically beyond his reach. But this avowed pursuit of national unity and unification of South and North Korea produced several results. On the one hand, he had won his long fight to get the needed material aid from the United States for building a substantial ROK defense force and economic
reconstruction. On the other hand, his goals concealed the difficulties in domestic economy, and prevented his political opponents from challenging his presidency (Oliver, 1978: 433; Koh, 1963: 1).

President Rhee thus devoted much energy to political action rather than administrative and economic development. From his experience of infighting among exile factions in Hawaii, he was exposed to the techniques of survival among political groups whose weapons were conspiracy and assassination. When he returned to Korea, he took a "blackjack" along. One of his strong weapons was a political machine which advanced his own policies. During the Rhee administration, National Assembly was often intimidated by arrests and the declaration of martial law. Although President Rhee did not have administrative experience prior to becoming President of South Korea, he did indeed have great confidence in his own ability and decided himself all administrative matters. He had neither the time nor the energy to make all the necessary decision, yet he would not delegate authority to others. An appalling amount of his time was spent on trivia, including the signing of documents and the greeting of visitors. The cabinet met at varying intervals, but it was prone to go for long periods without meeting at all. It was characteristic of the Rhee administration that the cabinet had little function in policy-making; it merely
listened to President Rhee expound it. South Korea had no policy-making mechanism. This paralysis of the decision-making process was further aggravated by President Rhee's penchant for cabinet reshuffles (Allen, 1960: 219-236; Koh, 1963: 55-56; Chung, 1962: 16-17).

President Rhee knew little of economics, but could not be shaken of his conviction. His concerns were not with economic growth. Economic development was viewed as a part of economic recovery and an extension of economic stabilization, and economic planning was considered as a basic tool of Communists. He believed that American aid could help revive South Korea's blasted and divided economy. He told the people, "American technicians are helping us to organize the coal mining and electricity generating programs upon which our hope of industrialism is based. American fertilizers are providing the basis for the best crop year in our history." However, the U.S. aid program was directed more to importation of consumer goods than to the building up of basic production facilities, and aggravated South Korea's tendency to consumption, rather than production, and fostered a consumption-first economy. This ran diametrically counter to the direction the South Korean economy should have taken for the attainment of self-sufficiency (Allen, 1960: 238-239; Oliver, 1960: 278-280; Chung, 1962: 124; Whang, 1970: 32-36; Oliver, 1978: 481-482).
Following the demise of the Rhee regime, Chang Myun, the Premier of the Second Republic, made conscious efforts to respond to the mounting problems in the country. However, he had neither the charisma of President Rhee nor any solid basis of political power. He studied in the United States. Following his return to Korea in 1925, he devoted himself to education in Korea within the Catholic Church, first in Pyongyang and later in Seoul. For 17 years, until the end of the Second World War, he served as superintendent of a Catholic Commercial school in Seoul (Hahn, 1975: 305; Han, 1974: 115).

Premier Chang had had little experience or contact with political activities when he turned to political life in 1946. He showed a considerable degree of timidity and indecisiveness in situations which required strong determination and immediate action. He often disappeared in the critical situation and took no action. For instance, when South Korea was experiencing the political crisis of 1952, which involved intimidation of the National Assemblymen by the military and national police, he was scheduled to read a declaration against President Rhee's scheme for a constitutional amendment at a meeting of anti-Rhee politicians. He disappeared, however, from the political scene and stayed in a U.S. military hospital located in South Korea. His five-day disappearance following the military Revolution of 1961 was another
example (Han, 1974: 116-117).

As a matter of fact, Premier Chang's Democratic Party regime did not come to power through its own efforts. Premier Chang's political rise was also due to the conflict between the "old" and the "new" factions in the Democratic Party. He was a compromise choice and his power base was uncertain. To form a parliamentary majority, for instance, he attempted to organize a coalition cabinet consisting of "old" and "new" faction members as well as of independents. However, the independents could not be brought into stable coalition with his party because of their heterogeneity in membership and wide variety in political ambitions and views. At the same time, the "old" faction became hostile to the "new" faction and finally formed a separate party called the "New Democratic Party." Furthermore, he could not readily count on the support of his own faction because of their rebellious and demanding attitudes. In spite of his compromising efforts, he eventually failed to deal with such cleavages effectively, and consequently lost much of the support and loyalty for his regime (Han, 1974: 136-137, 176-177; Chung, 1962: 82-83; Lee, 1968: 138).

Premier Chang's Democratic Party, which took over power in the wake of Student Revolution in 1960, was not prepared to take charge of government. In their desperate struggle against the Rhee regime, they neither experienced
any exercise of power, nor developed any administrative
decision-making. The government was weak and inefficient

The Chang regime was, furthermore, not capable of
normalizing social order or of controlling the street
demonstrations. It was unable to combat the hitherto
unheard of anti-American, neutralist, and openly pro-
Communist policies advocated by radical politicians and
newspapers. Meanwhile, national economy was in a
shambles: millions of unemployed were without relief, the
farmers were desperate, and, in the cities, organized
gangsters and hooligans made life miserable and unsafe for
small businessmen and citizens. Actual starvation
occurred in some parts of the country and the term "spring
hunger" in Korea was even more applicable than usual.
Even though Premier Chang formulated some action programs
and economic development plan, his personal weakness and
the party politicians' preoccupation with internal
squabbles relegated those programs to a mere prototype

In contrast to President Rhee and Premier Chang,
President Park showed more commitment to the nation's
economic development. He emphasized that "without a hope
for an economic future, reforms in other fields such as
politics, social affairs, and culture could not be
expected to yield fruit," or "without economic
reconstruction, there would be no such things as triumph over Communism or attaining independence." He believed that creation of a self-supporting economy through planned economic development was a key to national development as well as a precondition for unification. His commitment to growth was manifested in two aspects: the first was the share of his time devoted to economic matters; the second was the degree of support given to achievement-oriented bureaucrats, technocrats, and entrepreneurs (Park, 1970: 171-175; Jones and Sakong, 1980: 43, 291-292).

According to one study, President Park's average daily schedule included receiving 14 callers to his Blue House office, presiding over at least one meeting, and traveling 120 kilometers. President Park often presided over the government conferences, participated in the public ceremonies and gatherings, and conducted on-the-spot checking. On the briefing room in his office, he posted up a great variety of maps and charts to enable him to oversee the whole developmental efforts. Even when he pushed a workload through the day and on up to midnight, according to one report, he took to his bedside pen and paper for last-minute thoughts or further information (Kil, 1972: 20-21, 79).

As a military man, President Park also knew how to use the staff organization. He increasingly relied on the governmental bureaucracy, whereas President Rhee and
Premier Chang used political parties, youth groups, and cronies to achieve their goals. President Park mobilized the entire executive branch to make decisions based on expected economic outcomes. During the Park administration, the symbols of "national development" and "economic development" predominated government policies and actions. The Park administration is credited with the adoption of economic development plans, institution of comprehensive planning and control system, and revamping of many sluggish government corporations (Jones and Sakong, 1980: 47-49; Lee, 1968: 173).

Change Orientation

Traditionally, Korean society has been under the strong influence of Confucianism, which advocated the status quo. Social change in traditional Korea was accepted only on an incremental basis. Even today, it is very likely that older persons would be more Confucian-oriented and more conservative than younger persons. President Park's background which is different from President Rhee or Premier Chang is instructive in this connection. When Rhee became President of South Korea in 1948, his age was 70. Chang's age was 61 in 1960. Both were born in the 19th century. On the other hand, Park was 44 years old when he became a leader of military coup in 1961 (Choi, 1974: 20; Oh, 1968: 128; Han, 1974: 115).
Since South Korea was liberated from Japanese rule, considerable change has taken place in the society. Especially in the 1950s, profound changes took place in the educational field and the military subsociety. However, President Rhee remained old and traditional. President Rhee's age tells much about him.

As a young man, President Rhee was educated in a Protestant missionary school, and joined in the Independent Club Movement which was one of the major indigenous moves toward modernization in Korea at the end of the last century. By the age of twenty, he became a street corner agitator for modernization and democratic reforms of the decadent monarchy. His mind was bursting with ideas for the improvement of the state and cutting his traditional topknot was to demonstrate his commitment toward reform. After the Japanese annexation of Korea, his book, The Spirit of Independence, became the bible of the Korean independence movement. However, more than half a century elapsed between his reformist days and his assumption of actual political leadership in the post-war years. When he became President in South Korea's first republic, President Rhee was already an old man. The passage of time had eroded his youthful zeal for reform. Furthermore, his egotism and the inflexibility which characterized his old age and preconceptions made it impossible for him to accept criticism, or to change his
President Rhee was jealous of associates. He regarded them as his political rivals. He was self-confident of his ability to lead a newly independent republic. He drove most self-respecting officials out of the government and insisted on "yes-men" around him. As a result, he was surrounded by a screen of secretaries, guards, and his Liberal Party politicians and gradually isolated himself from the people. The Liberal politicians utilized President Rhee's lack of information for their own purposes. Their power was abused and corruption was widespread. In the end, President Rhee was forced out of power by the 1960 Student Revolution. Because of mental and physical infirmities of old age, President Rhee failed to keep contact with the people and lost his awareness of their needs and desires. He failed to build political and other institutions that could absorb and channel the new energies and resources in the country for the purpose of modernization (Allen, 1960: 181, 238-239; Chung, 1962: 252-253; Cole and Lyman, 1971: 26-27).

Since the Student Revolution of 1960, the Korean intellectuals became more politically active. This new generation began to distinguish itself from the old generations and demanded for generation change in every sphere of society. They were for change and their change
orientation was expressed in "antagonism against the flatters of power holders," "the development of a self-supporting economy," and "rationalization of individual life." To meet their demands, Premier Chang purged many pro-Rhee senior bureaucrats and permitted a great degree of free expression, publication, and open political activity. "Economic Development First" became a symbol and the bureaucracy was opened widely to post-Liberation college graduates. However, the Chang regime was weak and unstable (Whang, 1970: 20-21; Cole and Lyman, 1971: 31-33).

The Chang regime's weakness was shown in the legislation of special retroactive laws. The purpose of the laws was to punish illicit profiteers and anti-democratic law-violators, but vacillating legislative discussions postponed the sweeping reform of old evils. Premier Chang's attempts to apply old laws instead in the revolutionary period met fierce reactions from the intellectuals and students (Han, 1971: 14-15).

Following the 1960 Student Revolution, the relatively liberal political atmosphere provided leftist politicians and other political groups with an opportunity to organize and advocate their radical views. Premier Chang attempted to bring about chimerical reconciliation not only between the radical and conservative groups, but also between the anti-Rhee and pro-Rhee forces. However, his
attitudes were basically conservative. He tried to improve the existing system and keep its underlying ideological values intact (Han, 1971: 15-19).

Premier Chang's Democratic Party leadership was of the same age and shared much of the same social and educational backgrounds as the leadership of the Rhee regime. The Liberal and Democratic parties were politically like twins and no real ideological differences existed between them. Furthermore, bribery, graft, nepotism and favoritism were widespread. Cabinet change also followed cabinet change and destroyed the continuity and efficiency in the executive branch of the government (Lee, 1968: 134; Park, 1970: 166-171; Chung, 1962: 85-86).

After successful military revolution, General Park claimed that his revolution was a revolution of national reform, and its essential purposes were the fundamental transformation of political climate and the renovation of social and economic systems. To accomplish these goals, he insisted that new forces must be formed and they must undertake such tasks as construction of maximum constitutional reforms, change of generation levels, purification of society, and improvement of various institutions. He also emphasized that the Military Revolution was an extension of the Student Revolution. He asserted, "if the Student Revolution overthrew the Liberal Party on the surface, the Military Revolution overthrew the Liberal
Party inside which wore the mask of the Democratic Party and sought to satiate its appetite." At the time of the April 19 Student Revolution, the motto of students was "withdrew established generation." In this regard, General Park's belief was correlated with the idea of generation change. It demanded the transformation of the elite of the society from one type of individual to another and from one group of people to another, with different values and attitudes (Park, 1970: 22-24, 54-56, 106-107; Whang, 1970: 15-21).

Since the Third Republic of Korea was created with General Park himself as President, President Park coopted many intellectuals and other civilians as well as a large number of retired military officers into his regime. The sources of past evils - dogmatism, corruption, irregularity, injustice, and incompetence were attacked and sincerity, cooperation and emphasis on action were emphasized. He insisted on the creation of a new political climate where there were no grounds for petty heroism and name-peddling. He mobilized professors and politicians. He coopted scholars to create a philosophy of revitalization; intellectuals to highten popular enthusiasm for reconstruction; and businessmen to strive within their industries. He encouraged workers and peasants to perspire in their works; students to renovate themselves in austerity; solidiers to be fearless; and
public officials to dedicate themselves to service. In the meantime, President Park introduced various institutional changes necessary for effective economic decision-making (Kim, 1981: 16; Park, 1970: 171-176; Chung, 1962: 127-128).

President Park made a fundamental shift in administrative philosophy. The new philosophy consisted of three elements: 1) a strong goal orientation and a high regard for institution as a means for carrying out the goals; 2) a willingness to replace inappropriate means with alternative means; and 3) a willingness to expand institution as necessary to achieve the goals. President Park's values and attitudes toward national development served the bases for change (Jones and Sakong, 1980: 47-48).

Future Orientation

As earlier stated, impatient waiting for nearly half a century had eroded President Rhee's youthful zeal for building a better nation and planted in his mind an escapist time orientation. His image of Korea was of the country that had existed before her capitulation to Japan, and hence he felt that Korea had to be restored to her former integrity at the first opportunity (Lee, 1968: 79-80).

President Rhee repeatedly stated, "without
unification, none of other gains could matter very much." He believed that unification could ultimately solve domestic problems. Economic problem was secondary to him.

To President Rhee, economic development was a part of economic recovery and an extension of economic stabilization. He considered economic planning as a basic tool of Communists. He preferred liberal Jeffersonianism. But he lacked economic knowledge and programs. Furthermore, future-oriented public officials were aggravated by Rhee's insistence on "yes men" and maintenance of the status quo. As a result, the Rhee regime's exploitationist orientation was translated into a short-run control program, which depended upon foreign economic aid (Oliver, 1978: 433; Oliver, 1960: 271; Allen, 1960: 235-239; Lee, 1968: 178).

During the Rhee regime, U.S. grant-type aid totaled $2.7 billion, and some significant future-oriented programs were attempted. However, the Rhee regime failed to develop such basic industries as electricity, coal, fertilizer, and cement, and such overhead capitals as transportation and communication. One reason was that they lacked a program. Another was that American aid was more consumer oriented and the politicians often misused it for political purposes. This situation resulted in a breakdown of a momentum of political and socio-economic development (Korea statistical yearbook, 1959-81; Chung, 1962: 18; Park, 1970: 36-38).
The fall of the Rhee regime disclosed a chaotic economic picture. South Korea was importing about 15 times as much as she exported annually, and the rates of inflation and unemployment were quite high, averaging respectively about 10 percent and more than 20 percent each year. To halt the rocketing price index and to provide jobs for the unemployed, Premier Chang attempted some significant future oriented economic development plan and action programs. The "National Construction Service (NCS)" program was announced in December 1960 and its detailed plans was made public in February 1961, and a Five-year Economic Development Plan starting in 1962 was adopted early in 1961 (Han, 1974: 207-209; Lee, 1968: 132-134).

As a "New Deal" type of public works program, the NCS program declared that it would absorb millions of the unemployed, especially the educated unemployed, into such projects as irrigation, reforestation, land reclamation, road building, and dam-building. A new Rural Development Authority was to be entrusted with community development projects, agricultural extension services, and cottage industries. The Five-year Economic Development Plan also called for the intensive development of sources of electric power to meet additional immediate needs and anticipated future demands. Major emphasis was being placed on the promotion of small industries, especially those oriented toward export, to help improve South
Korea's imbalance of trade and alleviate unemployment. Both programs required a strong leadership and a concerted national coalition. However, the inadequacy of Premier Chang's ability had little chance for these programs to succeed. A chronic schism within his Democratic Party seriously undermined those programs. In addition, most of the largest businesses were reluctant to make new investments because of uncertainty and fear concerning the possibility of punishment for their illegal wealth accumulated during the Rhee regime. Private savings in the major banks decreased considerably, because of the "sense of economic crisis" felt by many savings account holders. As a result, many of the measures adopted by the Chang regime concerning economic development failed to enhance the popular confidence and support which the Chang government hoped to receive (Han, 1974: 209-211; Chung, 1962: 84, 94-95; Lee, 1968: 131-135).

President Park was born into an extremely poor farming family in a tiny village. From his early life, he understood that without economic affluence, a freer and more equitable life was impossible, and believed that elimination of want and poverty was the first step toward building a better nation. He said: "Condition of poverty awoke me many times and cemented my resolve. Poverty has been my guide and my benefactor. Thus, I cannot part with this guide and benefactor for even one hour out of the
twenty-four." To him, time opened up a wonderful opportunity for a better future. He often declared that "Where there is a desire, there is a road to be found," or "It is difficult, even in this age of scientific progress, to forecast the weather 24 hours ahead, but leader must maintain an unswerving attitude and fortitude in overcoming any unforeseen obstacles." His future orientation undoubtedly contributed to the vigorous adoption of the Five-year Economic Development Plans and the "Saemaul (New Community) Movement" in South Korea (Oh, 1968: 135; Park, 1970: 191; Kil, 1972: 147-149; Chung, 1962: 254).

As a long-range development program, the chief objectives of the Five-year Economic Development Plans were to provide a better living standard and to increase welfare and subsidy programs. President Park was convinced that a self-supporting economy could not be achieved by foreign aid alone. During his regime, four successive five-year economic development plans were carried out, and economic development and modernization became the single most important theme of the government. Vivid changes and developments could be seen everywhere. The poverty and aimlessness that marked the country at one time were replaced by a new confidence and determination to bring about an affluent society (Park, 1979: 67-112).

Following the successive economic development plans, President Park also introduced the "Saemaul Movement" in
1971. He emphasized that the "Saemaul Movement" was the great new forward movement of the people for the achievement of the country's supreme objectives of "modernization and unification." He contributed his personal utmost to the movement. The Saemaul Movement stood for "we can live better." Its guiding principles were "diligence, self-help, and cooperation" (Kil, 1970: 159-164).

This movement that originally started in the countryside has spread to cities and factories and begun to involve the whole gamut of South Korea's national life as a pan-national movement. Progressing from its initial goal of creating more affluent villages that are both thrifty and wealthy, the movement has introduced a life of decency and culture in the midst of affluence and humanism. Furthermore, the confidence of "we can live better" has helped promote national regeneration and the sense of pride for the generations to come (Korea Annual, 1980: 192-194; Park, 1979: 67-112).

Overseas Orientation

As explained earlier, President Rhee's overseas experience was not self-motivated, but was the result of Japanese colonialism. As a boy, President Rhee's first contact with the West was a dramatic one. When he was nine, an epidemic of smallpox left him blind in both eyes. His parents sought relief in various herb remedies without
success. Only as a last resort did they determine to take the young boy to a foreigner, Dr. Horace Allen, who was later to become American minister in Seoul. Dr. Allen's medicines restored to President Rhee the gift of sight. President Rhee's experience with Dr. Horace Allen stimulated his further interest in the West. At the age of nineteen, President Rhee attended the Paichai School which was founded by a Methodist minister, Henry G. Appenzeller. There he learned of the Western World and came to think of the West as the power center of the world. At that time, he was also involved in the struggle to maintain Korean independence from Japanese aggression. When his agitation failed, he was forced to leave the country. His choice was to go to America (Allen, 1960: 21-25).

During his long exile life in the United States, President Rhee received reeducation in Western thought and earned three academic degrees. He earned an B.A. degree from George Washington University, an M.A. in European History from Harvard University, and a Ph. D. in Political Science at Princeton University. He eventually married a European and traveled widely as a roving head of Korea's provisionary government (Oliver, 1978: 4-5; Lee, 1968: 79-80).

As a political exile, President Rhee pursued two major goals - to win diplomatic support for the exiled
government and to build popular understanding and sympathy for Korea among the American public as well as in other foreign countries. However, he was constantly frustrated by foreign disregard of his efforts and his country's political claims. He developed a negative attitude toward foreign countries. They were not really friends. His friendly reference was only to the United States. In other words, his overseas orientation was limited to a specific country (Oliver, 1978: 4-5).

After the Korean War, President Rhee advocated a pacific anti-Communist alliance. He was, however, strongly anti-Japanese. He was also completely incapable of accepting those nations that were indifferent to the question of Korean unification (Allen, 1960: 238).

Within the economic field, President Rhee disliked any kind of foreign loans and collaboration with foreign countries. His economic thought was partially colored by the fact that Japanese loan to Korea during the Yi dynasty was one of the reasons why Japan was able to force the Annexation Treaty between Korea and Japan in 1910 (Whang, 1970: 48-49).

Unlike President Rhee, Premier Chang's overseas experience was self-motivated. Premier Chang was born to a reasonably wealthy Catholic family. After studying English at the YMCA institute for about three years, he went to the United States to study education and religion.
at Manhattan College and returned to Korea five years later. His Catholic background and knowledge of the English language were instrumental in his appointment to South Korea's Interim Assembly in 1946 by the American Military Government, and also helped him to serve as the first South Korean ambassador to the U.N. and later to the United States (Han, 1974: 115-116).

Premier Chang received much credit for his successful effort to persuade the U.N. to render official recognition of the South Korean government in December 1948. As a Catholic, he brought to the government a broad base of additional support from abroad, and his moderate views and quiet personality kept him from having enemies. In February 1951, he was appointed prime minister by President Rhee (Han, 1974: 115-116; Oliver, 1978: 206).

Once in power as the political leader of the Second Republic, Premier Chang's overseas orientation was especially apparent in the foreign policy area. Premier Chang renounced the reckless policy of unification by force, advocated by the Rhee regime, and stated that he would strive for free election throughout Korea for unification within the framework of the United Nations Charter. He also declared plans to widen the country's diplomatic relations, including the establishment of ties with various Afro-Asian states as well as the Free World. He indicated that South Korea would seek to achieve
admission to membership in the U.N., and further to extend its diplomatic relationship. While the Rhee regime was unwilling to make any distinction between the Communist and the non-aligned countries, a new attitude of Premier Chang called for readjustment of South Korean foreign policy toward Japan and friendly neutral nations. Particularly Premier Chang stressed that diplomatic relations between South Korea and Japan should be made normal as soon as possible on the principle of mutual respect and reciprocity (Chung, 1962: 83-84; Koo, 1975: 216-217).

President Park's educational experiences were very different from those President Rhee and Premier Chang. He entered the Japanese Military Academy of Manchukuo in 1940. Two years later, he graduated from the Academy at the head of his class, and was immediately enrolled in the Regular Course of the Japanese Imperial Military Academy in Tokyo and graduated at the third of his class in 1944. His successful performance in competition with Japanese and other foreigners could undoubtedly have increased his confidence in his own ability to work abroad and to succeed. He also attended the advanced course of the United States Army Artillery School for special training (Park, 1970: 238; Whang, 1970: 48-49; Chung, 1962: 137-138).

After the Military Revolution in 1961, General Park declared, "the doors of the nation are boldly opened to
the world. Relations with the United States are most important, but visits will be made to the neutralist bloc nations as well, and their delegations are welcomed."

During the Park regime, his commitment to international cooperation provided a new turning point in the South Korean foreign policy. Diplomatic relations were expanded and negotiations with Japan were concluded. In addition, economic diplomacy was energetically promoted to induce foreign capital. Because of South Korea's small-scale domestic market and lack of natural resources, President Park believed that a self-supporting economy could not be achieved by foreign aid alone. He strived for attracting foreign loans and investments as well as promoting export. To attain multilateral economic cooperation, his approaches were not limited to the Free World, but they embraced the neutral bloc nations and even the Communist nations (Park, 1970: 69-70, 87-89; Korea Annual, 1980: 81-86).

The above discussions show that President Park was more achievement-oriented, more change-oriented, more future-oriented, and more overseas-oriented than either President Rhee or Premier Chang. President Park showed more developmentalist orientation than the civilian political leaders that South Korea had had.
CHAPTER IV

TASK ELITES: THEIR SOCIAL BACKGROUNDS AND RECRUITMENT PATTERNS

One of the hypotheses of this study is that changes in the political leaders' values and developmental orientations will bring about corresponding changes in the patterns of their task elites recruitment particularly between the civilian regime and the military regime of President Park and Chun in South Korea. This chapter will examine these differences, focusing on the social backgrounds of the cabinet ministers during the period from 1948 to 1982.

The data used in this section were initially collected by Professors Kim and Lovell. Their information includes such items as Year of Birth, Place of Birth (Province, Urban/Rural), Education, Foreign Travel and Residence, Occupation, and Party Affiliation. In the coding plan, periodization was structured to correspond to the terms of South Korea's National Assembly. During 1948-1982, there were 435 cabinet ministers. Of these cabinet ministers, some enjoyed their positions for several years, while others did so only for a few months (See Table 1). Furthermore, some served in different cabinet positions in the same period. When this happened, the pattern of career development is emphasized in the coding plan.
Table 1
The Period of Incumbency in the Cabinet

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministries</th>
<th>Total years</th>
<th>Average years</th>
<th>Civilian years</th>
<th>Military years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Aug. 1948 - Jan. '82</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Planning Board</td>
<td>Dec. 1963 - Jan. '82</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Aug. 1948 - Sept. '80</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>1.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Affairs</td>
<td>Aug. 1948 - Sept. '80</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>Aug. 1948 - Jan. '82</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>Aug. 1948 - Sept. '80</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Defense</td>
<td>Aug. 1948 - Dec. '79</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>1.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Aug. 1948 - May '80</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture &amp; Fisheries</td>
<td>Aug. 1948 - Oct. '80</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce &amp; Industry</td>
<td>Aug. 1948 - Sept. '80</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>1.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy &amp; Resources</td>
<td>Dec. 1977 - Jan. '82</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>May 1961 - Jan. '82</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health &amp; Social Affairs</td>
<td>Jun. 1949 - Sept. '80</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>1.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>Aug. 1948 - Oct. '80</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1 (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministries</th>
<th>Total years</th>
<th>Average (years)</th>
<th>Civilian years</th>
<th>Military years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>Aug. 1948</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Oct. '80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture &amp; Information</td>
<td>Jun. 1961</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-May '80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Administration</td>
<td>Dec. 1963</td>
<td>3.98</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Oct. '79</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Unification Board</td>
<td>Feb. 1969</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Jan. '82</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science &amp; Technology</td>
<td>Apr. 1967</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Sept. '80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without Portfolio</td>
<td>Aug. 1948</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-May '61</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mar. 1963</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Nov. '80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X=1.50 \quad \bar{X}=1.04 \quad \overline{X}=1.63 \]


Note. The cases of the incumbent ministers are not included in the computation.

The following section compares the various social background variables of South Korean cabinet ministers such as Year of Birth, Urban and Rural Place of Birth, Place of Birth by Province, Level of Education, Place of College or University Education, and Prior Occupation. It also compares their differences between the two regimes and concludes with the findings of different patterns of
task elites recruitment by political leaders.

Social Backgrounds of the Cabinet Ministers

Age

Table 2
Year of Birth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Civilian Regime</th>
<th>Military Regime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rhee</td>
<td>Chang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>before 1900</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901-1910</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911-1920</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921-1930</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931-1940</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Base)</td>
<td>(48)</td>
<td>(23)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The cases of "no information" are not included in the computation.

Table 2 shows that cabinet ministers of the military regime are younger than those of the civilian regime. The median age of the former is located in the 1911-1920 decade, while the latter is in the 1901-1910 decade.
Moreover, most of the Chun government cabinet ministers were born as late as the 1921-1930 decade.

Cabinet ministers between the two regimes grew up under different socio-cultural conditions. Considering Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910, a median age of 1901-1910 decade suggests that the civilian government cabinet ministers were born when Korea was still under the traditional Yi dynasty and spent their childhood in the Confucian tradition. In contrast to the cabinet ministers, the military government cabinet ministers with a median age of 1921-1930 decade implies that they were born and grew up during the Japanese occupation of Korea. Furthermore, most of their early life was spent in the period of independence movement. It is natural, therefore, that they acquired a high degree of nationalistic feelings and their nationalistic feelings could have contributed to their later developmentalist orientation (Kim, 1974: 138-139).

The military government cabinet ministers are more change-oriented than the civilian government cabinet ministers. In the Korean context, age tends to correlate with one's traditional Confucian orientation. The Confucian orientation implies conservatism. It is inimical to change (Choi, 1974: 20).

Place of Birth

When urban-rural places of birth are compared, Table
### Table 3

Urban-Rural Place of Birth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Civilian Regime</th>
<th>Military Regime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rhee Chang Total</td>
<td>Park Chun Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>60.9 27.4 50.0</td>
<td>27.8 29.2 37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City over 100,000 (in 1930)</td>
<td>0.0 9.1 2.9</td>
<td>6.5 12.5 10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of 20,000-100,000 (in 1930)</td>
<td>4.3 0.0 2.9</td>
<td>5.5 12.5 9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural--all others in Korea</td>
<td>34.8 63.6 44.1</td>
<td>60.2 45.8 76.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (Base)</td>
<td>100.0 100.0 100.0</td>
<td>100.0 100.0 100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(23) (11) (34)</td>
<td>(108) (24) (132)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note.** The cases of "no information" are not included in the computation.

Table 3 shows that more cabinet ministers of the military regime were born in rural areas than those of the civilian regime. The percentage of the Seoul-born cabinet ministers declined from 50.0 percent during 1948-1961 to 37.0 percent during 1963-present. The most striking differences occurred between the Rhee and the Park governments. About seventy percent of the Rhee cabinet ministers were born in Seoul, whereas 27.8 percent of the Park cabinet ministers were born in the capital city. Those who were born in rural areas are more socially mobile. They have directly
experienced significant changes in their own lives through the move from rural to urban areas. These experiences could have made them more acceptable to change (Whang, 1970: 80).

In comparing data for urban-rural places of birth, the cabinet ministers of the Park government interestingly resemble those of the Chang administration. As the following table shows, however, the Park cabinet ministers are more representative of different provinces in the country.

Table 4 shows that Seoul, North and South Kyongsang provinces are over-represented in all regimes, whereas North and South Hamgyong provinces and Cheju province are under-represented. However, the rank ordering of provinces in which more than seven percent of cabinet ministers were born shows interesting regional differences among the four regimes (See Table 5). Table 5 shows that in addition to Seoul and Kyongsang province, the Rhee cabinet ministers come mostly from Chungchong and Kyonggi provinces; the Chang cabinet ministers from Pyongan and Cholla provinces, a well-known stronghold of the Democratic Party, the Park cabinet ministers from Kyonggi and Chungchong provinces; and the Chun cabinet ministers from Cholla, Chungchong, Kangwon, and Hwanghae provinces. Furthermore, according to Table 4, the Park cabinet ministers come from 14 different regional areas, while the Rhee cabinet ministers come from 12 areas; the Chang cabinet ministers, 11 areas; and the Chun cabinet
Table 4
Place of Birth by Province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Civilian Regime</th>
<th></th>
<th>Military Regime</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rhee Chang Total</td>
<td>Park Chun Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyonggi</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Chungchong</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Chungchong</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Cholla</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Cholla</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Kyongsang</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Kyongsang</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kangwon</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheju</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hwanghae</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Pyongan</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Pyongan</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Hamgyong</td>
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<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Hamgyong</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Base)</td>
<td>(278)</td>
<td>(49)</td>
<td>(24)</td>
<td>(73)</td>
<td>(177)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The cases of "no information" are not included in the computation.
Table 5
Rand Ordering of Province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Civilian Rhee</th>
<th>Regime Chang</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>N. Kyongsang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Kyongsang</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>N. Pyongan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyonggi</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Kyongsang</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>Kyonggi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Chungchong</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>N. Cholla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Chungchong</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>S. Cholla</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Military Park</th>
<th>Regime Chun</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Kyongsang</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>N. Kyongsang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Kyongsang</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>S. Kyongsang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyonggi</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>S. Cholla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Chungchong</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>S. Chungchong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kangwon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hwanghae</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above findings show a couple of other interesting characteristics. First, most cabinet ministers of both military and civilian regimes tend to come from the more heavily populated and relatively urbanized regions of the country. The influence of urban life may be more closely related to one's achievement and career development than the rural ties (Hahn and Kim, 1964: 29-31). Second, contrary to a common assertion that the Park regime is governed by people from North Kyongsang province (the home province of President Park), Park's cabinet ministers show a more geographical balance in recruitment. Regional favoritism in the recruitment of cabinet ministers is more apparent in the Chang and the Rhee regimes than in the Park regime (In case of the Chun regime, it is too early to evaluate) (Kim, 1975: 11).

Education

Education is generally viewed as an intrinsic good worthy of honour and prestige and as an important instrument for self-protection, self-gain, and social mobility. Particularly in Korea, education is equated with upward social mobility (Zonis, 1971: 64; Kim, 1975: 12). Table 6 shows that most cabinet ministers in Korea received at least college or university level education. It indicates that a higher level of education is crucial
Table 6
Level of Education (percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Civilian Regime</th>
<th>Military Regime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rhee Chang Total</td>
<td>Park Chun Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary or less</td>
<td>0.0 0.0 0.0</td>
<td>0.6 0.0 0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>30.4 9.5 23.9</td>
<td>14.9 9.4 14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College or Univ.</td>
<td>65.2 85.7 71.6</td>
<td>73.2 46.9 69.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Graduate</td>
<td>4.4 4.8 4.5</td>
<td>11.3 43.8 16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0 100.0 100.0</td>
<td>100.0 100.0 100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Base)</td>
<td>(46) (21) (67)</td>
<td>(168) (32) (200)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The cases of "no information" are not included in the computation.

Secondary includes Middle School, Technical and Vocational School, and High School.

College or University includes Senmon, Some College, and College or University graduate.

For achievement to a cabinet-level position in South Korea.
Comparing the levels of formal education of cabinet ministers, however, some significant differences among regimes are observed.

Of the four regimes, the Chang and the Chun cabinet ministers are more highly educated; slightly more than 90 percent of both cabinet ministers received at least college or university level education. In the Rhee regime,
about 70 percent of cabinet ministers belong to the highly educated group. For the Park cabinet, the figure is three fourths. An outstanding feature of the military regime, especially the Chun cabinet, reflecting in part the technocratic and managerial orientations of the regime, is a high proportion of cabinet ministers with post-graduate education (See Table 6).

Noteworthy differences between civilian and military regimes are also shown for the place of college or university education. According to Table 7, the largest group (44.7%) of cabinet ministers of all regimes attended colleges or universities in Japan, including those who attended Keijo (Seoul) Imperial University during Japanese colonial rule. The second largest group graduated from Korean (23.4%) and American universities (23.3%). However, all cabinet ministers who attended Korean universities were found among the military regime. Neither the Rhee nor the Chang cabinet ministers were educated in Korean universities. Age differences are reflected in these differences. Korean college or university education is a post-War phenomenon. Only following the Liberation, South Korean colleges or universities have produced a large number of graduates. The number of college or university students was about 8,000 in 1945. This number has increased to as many as 500,000 in 1980, a 62-fold increase. At the end of 1979, there were 84 four-year
Table 7
Place of College or University Education  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Civilian Regime</th>
<th>Military Regime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rhee Chang Total</td>
<td>Park Chun Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rhee Chang</td>
<td>Park Chun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul Nat'l Yonsei, Korea</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or Ewha Univ.</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>46.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Univ. in Korea</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keijo Imperial Univ.</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(before 1945)</td>
<td></td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperial Univ. in Japan</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(before 1945)</td>
<td></td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Univ. in Japan</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States Univ.</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Foreign Univ.</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Base)</td>
<td>(210)</td>
<td>(29)</td>
<td>(47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(18)</td>
<td>(131)</td>
<td>(32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(47)</td>
<td>(163)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The cases of "no information" are not included in the computation.

Other Foreign University includes college or university in China, Manchuria, and other foreign countries.
regular colleges or universities, 100 graduate schools, 11 two-year teachers' colleges and 127 miscellaneous vocational colleges in South Korea. The cabinet ministers of the military regime are the products of post-Liberation Korean education. They are more indigenous and less Western in education than their counterparts of the civilian regime (Korea Annual, 1980: 208-214; Kim, 1975: 13).

Between the cabinet ministers of the civilian and the military regimes, there have been significant generation changes. These changes are indicative of a serious cleavage between the older generation of political leadership and the upcoming younger generation (Hahn and Kim, 1964: 28-29). As has been shown in Table 2, there is a progressive decline in the median ages of cabinet ministers of the four regimes. The decline appears more drastic in the case of the military regime's cabinet ministers.

Occupation

One's occupation plays a major role in his socialization process. It is a major channel through which one acquires an experience of the larger world. The prior occupations of cabinet ministers are important indicators showing differences in their job-orientation, values and attitudes (Quandt, 1970: 182-183; Whang, 1970: 73).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Civilian Regime</th>
<th>Military Regime</th>
<th>(percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rhee</td>
<td>Chang</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Profession^a</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politician^b</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet Post</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucrat</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>37.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business^c</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others^d</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 (100.0)
(Base) 95 20 115 136 24 140 176

Note. The cases of "no information" are not included in the computation.

^a Liberal Profession includes professional and technical careers - educators, bankers, lawyers, medical doctors, journalists, engineers, etc.

^b Politician includes political party career and National Assemblyman.

^c Business includes self-employed businessman and public enterprise managerial position.

^d Others include farmers, laborers, etc.
Table 8 (Continued)

Base of 36 means the period of military junta (1961-63).  
Base of 176 includes cabinet ministers of military junta period (1961-63).

Table 8 shows that a largest proportion of cabinet ministers in all regimes had bureaucratic backgrounds. A significant difference between civilian and military regimes exists, however. The military origins of the Park and the Chun cabinets, as well as their administrative backgrounds and technocratic experiences, are clearly born out. In the military regime, unlike the previous civilian regimes, as many as one fifth of its cabinet ministers are recruited from the ranks of professional military officers. Particularly, during the military junta period (1961-63), 55.6 percent of the cabinet ministers had a military background, whereas no military was represented in the Chang cabinet. The military oriented personnel in the Park cabinet clearly stood for efficiency and rationality in government. The military is often the most modern, institution in the Third World developing societies (Whang, 1970: 76; Kim, 1981: 12).

Table 8 also shows that cabinet ministers of the military regime are more non-politically oriented than those of the civilian regime. The Chun cabinet ministers tend to be the least political of ministers in the four
cabinet. The recruitment of political party leaders and national assemblymen has been minimal in the Chun regime. Most political are the Chang cabinet ministers - more than one half of them had party or national assembly careers. In the Rhee cabinet, about one fifth of the cabinet ministers had political party or national assembly careers. For the Park cabinet ministers, this figure is less than one tenth.

Table 8 also shows that the number of Western-educated professors among the cabinet ministers has gradually increased in proportion to those of liberal profession. If these two groups are compared, the percentage of college professors is 39.9 percent for the Rhee cabinet whereas that figure is 100.0 percent for the Chun cabinet. There is no liberal profession is represented in the Chun cabinet other than college professors. In addition, one of the interesting findings of this table is an increase in the percentage of prior cabinet-post background. About 33 percent of cabinet ministers of the military regime had prior cabinet minister positions, while the figure is less than one fifth for cabinet ministers of the civilian regime.

These trends represent more administrative-orientation of the military regime. The cabinet ministers of the military regime appear more familiar with the techniques of modern management and programming than those of the civilian regime.
Patterns of Cabinet Minister Recruitment

One of the basic assumptions in this section is that the social background study of cabinet ministers will show the recruitment patterns of task elites by political leaders. The above discussion thus far has shown that there are significant differences between cabinet ministers of the civilian and the military regime in terms of their social backgrounds as well as their values and developmental orientations. The assumption is that the values and attitudes of task elites are identical with the values and attitudes of their political leaders because the political leaders' values and developmental orientations determine the patterns of or the criteria for the recruitment of their task elites. In this respect, it seems reasonable to infer that the political leaders have brought about changes in the patterns of or the criteria for the recruitment of cabinet ministers in order to make them responsive to their values and developmental orientations. The following is a summary of major differences in the recruitment of cabinet ministers in South Korea's civilian and military regimes.

1. The cabinet ministers of the military regime are younger than those of the civilian regime. Since 1961, the recruitment pattern has been changed and the younger generation task elites have been recruited under the
influence of change-oriented political leaders.

2. Most cabinet ministers of all regimes come from the more heavily populated and relatively urbanized regions of the country. However, the cabinet ministers of the military regime were born more in rural areas and represented more provinces than those of the civilian regime. The criteria for task elite recruitment has been more achievement-oriented and more change-oriented since 1961.

3. The attainment of higher education is an absolute prerequisite for advancement to a cabinet-level position. Most of the cabinet ministers received at least college or university education. However, the cabinet ministers of the military regime are more highly educated and more technically oriented than those of the civilian regime. They received more post-graduate education. Furthermore, higher education in South Korea has become progressively Korean oriented and most cabinet ministers of the military regime received higher education in Korea whereas none of the cabinet ministers of the civilian regime received such Korean education. The task elite recruitment pattern has become more technocratic-oriented and national-oriented since 1961.

4. A significant number of former civil servants are found among the cabinet ministers of all regimes. However, there are some outstanding features of the
cabinet ministers of the military regime as compared with the cabinet ministers of the civilian regime. For instance, 1) more of them have a military background; 2) more of them are transferred horizontally from one ministry to another; and 3) more of them are recruited from the academic field. The military-oriented cabinet ministers are basically administrative and action-oriented. The university professors also represent one of the new and modern social forces particularly since the 1960 Student and the 1961 Military Revolution. These professors are on the whole young and have been exposed to the West. Re-recruitment of former cabinet ministers is related to the task orientation of political leaders.

On the whole, compared with the cabinet ministers of the civilian regime, the cabinet ministers of the military regime seem to reflect more closely the values and developmental orientations of political leaders for national development. Since the military assumption of power in South Korea in 1961, the pattern of elite recruitment has become more achievement-oriented, more change-oriented, more future-oriented, and more overseas-oriented.
CHAPTER V

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND
THE PATTERNS OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The basic assumption of the third hypothesis is that changes in political leaders' values and attitudes and in their task elites recruitment patterns will bring about corresponding changes in the patterns of national development. To test the above hypothesis, this chapter will discuss the different patterns of economic development under the various South Korean regimes and highlight differences between the military and the civilian regimes. Comparison will be made particularly regarding resource allocation and various other action programs.

Resource Allocation

In Chapter III, it was shown that the political leaders of the civilian regime emphasized national unification and military expansion as their goals, while those of the military regime stressed national development through planned economic development. These differences in leadership values and attitudes contributed to different priorities in the allocation of budgetary resources in South Korea.

Table 9 shows that more budgetary resources have been
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>General Expense</th>
<th>Defense Program</th>
<th>Economic Program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>48.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>55.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>49.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>45.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>43.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 9 (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>General Expense</th>
<th>Defense Program</th>
<th>Economic Program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>44.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>45.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957-1960((X))</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1981((X))</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>38.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note. Data from the fiscal year of 1948-56 is not available.

allocated to economic programs than to defense programs since the fiscal year of 1961. During the fiscal years of 1957-60, the average percentage of expenditures for defense programs to the total government expenditures was 33.0 percent, while the average percentage of the economic programs was 22.0 percent. However, during the fiscal years of 1961-81, the average percentage of expenditures for defense programs to the total budget expenditures has dropped from the level of 33.0 percent to 27.2 percent, while the average percentage of economic program expenditures has increased from 22.0 percent to 38.3 percent.
### Table 10
Consumption, Investment & Foreign Aid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Consumption (%)</th>
<th>Investment (%)</th>
<th>Foreign Aid % of GNP</th>
<th>Amount ($1,000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>179,593</td>
<td>116,509</td>
<td>58,706</td>
<td>106,542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>161,327</td>
<td>236,705</td>
<td>326,705</td>
<td>382,893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>89.0</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>321,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>222,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>199,245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>232,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>84.1</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>216,446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>85.4</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>149,331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>131,441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>103,261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>97,018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 10 (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Consumption (%)</th>
<th>Investment (%)</th>
<th>Foreign Aid</th>
<th>Amount ($1,000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>% of GNP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>105,856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>107,264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>82,636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>51,217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>5,089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2,146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1,155</td>
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<td>1976</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1,740</td>
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<td>1977</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data from the period of 1948-1952 and 1979-1981 are not available.

Table 10 deals with the pattern of disposition of available resources between government consumption and investment. The trend of government investment to the total available resources declined during 1953-1960, while the percentage of government consumption increased. At
the time, the economic programs of the civilian regime were highly dependent on the situational and political changes. A regressive motivation in politics and administration became dominant in the 1953-60 period: instead of utilizing the legal framework for political, social, and economic development of the country, the civilian political leadership at the time chose to exploit it for their own political purposes; instead of moving forward toward the future, they satisfied themselves with exploitation of the present; and instead of adding to the momentum of recovery hitherto attained and directing it toward further growth, they chose to concentrate on consumption. The result was that they neglected the long-range development of the economy and relied on extravagant public consumption to gain popularity (Lee, 1968: 99-101).

Since 1961, however, the table shows that allocation to governmental investment has been increasing. The distribution of resources became a purposive and planned process. The military regime seems to have given priorities to long-term investment for economic growth rather than current consumption.

Table 10 also shows an interesting relationship between government investment and foreign aid. During the fiscal years of 1954-1960, the amount of government investment and foreign aid seems to show a positive relationship. The civilian regime at the time viewed
economic development as an extension of economic stabilization and recovery based on foreign aid. During the period from 1948 to 1960, South Korea received 2.7 billion dollars of U.S. grant aid. A large-scale infusion of foreign aid made it possible for the South Korean economy to rebuild the war damaged productive facilities, but it did not provide any basic long-term development projects and failed to develop such basic industries as electricity, coal, fertilizer, and cement. Furthermore, all or almost all of the raw materials, consumer goods, imported grains, and foodstuffs imported were purchased with foreign aid funds, making the South Korean economy totally dependent on foreign aid (Park, 1970: 25-51, 171-174; Korea Annual, 1980: 108-109). Since 1961, however, South Korea has become less dependent on foreign aid. Table 10 shows that the percentage of government investment has increased since 1961, while the amount of foreign aid has declined. These changes seem to show a more self-supporting economy for South Korea and planned allocation of government budget for further industrialization and development.

Action Programs

Different values and developmental orientations between the civilian and the military regimes in South Korea have brought about different action programs and different capacities to initiate, guide, and sustain
actions leading to national development. The different action programs to be investigated include: 1) short-range or long-range programs; 2) domestic or overseas programs; and 3) intra-ministerial or inter-ministerial programs. Short-range or long-range programs mean the number of years during which a program is operated and/or effective. Domestic or overseas programs are the number of countries and international organizations involved in the programs. Intra-ministerial or inter-ministerial programs are viewed as the number of ministries involved in the formulation and implementation of the programs. Involvement is also defined in terms of the special conferences and committee meetings held for the purpose of coordination (Whang, 1970: 106).

**Long-range Programs**

The projection of positive future images is one of the important aspects of political leadership for national development, for instance, in the form of long-range economic development programs which suggest courses of action for the future. In this section, a long-range program is defined as a program which is to be operative over a period of five-years or longer.

As earlier stated, the South Korean civilian political leadership before 1961 possessed an escapist or exploitationist time orientation, which was translated into
short-range programs. During the period of the civilian regime, most of the economic programs tended to follow the annual cycle of the budgetary process. There were few budgetary appropriations of continuous expenditure type beyond the annual budget period. What development plans there were such as the Rhee regime's Three-year Economic Development Plan and the Chang regime's Five-year Economic Development Plan were never implemented due respectively to the 1960 Student and the 1961 Military Revolution.

Since the military assumed power in 1961, however, a considerable number of long-range programs have been formulated and implemented. The First Five-year Economic Development Plan was formulated in 1961, and it was followed by the other five-year plans through 1981. The regime also implemented various other long-range programs such as the Seven-year Food Grain Production Plan (1967-71), the Five-year Technical Development Plan (1962-66), the Five-year Electricity Development Plan (1962-66), and the Ten-year Land Development Plan (1967-76). Furthermore, some programs encompassed more than a decade. For instance, the "Saemaul Movement" was launched in 1971 as a continuous pan-national development program and a long-term education plan (1979-1991) was announced on November 22, 1978 (Korea Annual, 1980: 192-193, 208-214; Park, 1979: 67-88; Whang, 1970: 110-112).
Overseas Programs

When the national economy grows, political leadership's overseas commitment tends to expand and bring about overseas-oriented economic policies such as foreign trade policies, including export promotion policies. Rapid economic development in the less development countries of the world generally depends on favorable international economic environments as well as domestic economic conditions. In this regard, the ratio of the overseas programs to the total economic development plans is an important indicator of political leadership's performance for national development.

During the civilian regimes of President Rhee and Premier Chang in South Korea, their main economic objectives were: 1) rebuild the infrastructure and industrial capacity that had been destroyed by the Korean War; 2) maintain strong military forces to forestall any new attacks from the North; and 3) improve the private consumption levels within the limits of domestic production and available foreign assistance. These objectives called for high levels of investment and of government and private consumption. But, the Rhee regime emphasized eventual reunification of South and North Korea. President Rhee was hopeful that unification would give access to the electric power and heavier industries of the North. He
was unwilling to build up the South as an independent and integrated economy. He tried only to cope with immediate and short-run problems of security, hunger, and survival, and sought to mobilize additional resources by maximizing foreign aid. Once again his values and attitudes toward national economic problems were basically domestic-oriented (Cole and Lyman, 1971: 164-170).

Before 1961 in South Korea, the mobilization of human and material resources for the management of and actions involved in the economic programs were limited within the national territory, and the dominant source of foreign exchange was foreign aid. During 1953-1960, the average percentage of export and import to GNP was only 1.7 percent and 11.5 percent respectively. Nearly all of the exports were primary products such as tungsten, graphite, copper, kaolin, and talc, while major imports were food grains and manufactured goods. Most of the imports were financed by foreign aid grants from the United Nations Korea Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA), which provided relief through the United Nations Civil Assistance Command in Korea (UNCACK) during the Korean War, and the United States bilateral assistance program. Between 1954 and 1960, foreign assistance financed more than 70 percent of the total South Korean imports. From 1956 to 1958, the imports financed by U.S. aid exceeded 80 percent of the total imports. About 74 percent of the government investment

In contrast to the civilian regime of South Korea, the political leadership of the military regime was more overseas-oriented and its economic programs emphasized export expansion and foreign investment.

When the First Five-year Economic Development Plan was launched in 1961, the resource endowment and the domestic market became critical for rapid economic growth, because natural resources and capital goods were quite scarce, and the domestic market of the economy was limited. Thus, the political leadership of the military regime considered export expansion and foreign investment as the optimum solution to meet those problems (Whang, 1970: 112-117).

To expand exports, the military regime enacted many economic reforms and extended various conveniences to the business sector. A new budget and an Export Cooperation Law were enforced, and various tax laws were revised to increase domestic tax revenues and business internal savings. At the same time, there was organized a Korea Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA). The government also conducted various overseas publicity activities and provided its good offices for trade transactions and development of overseas markets, and it participated in various overseas fairs often sponsoring them. South
Korea's diplomatic relations also expanded. In 1978, South Korea had diplomatic relations with 122 countries compared to only 17 countries in 1950. The expanded activities of the overseas branches of KOTRA have also contributed to increase in export (Park, 1970: 76; Frank, Jr. et al, 1975: 15-17; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1979: 471).

To promote foreign investment, economic cooperation with foreign countries and/or international organizations has been emphasized. Starting with the International Cooperative Group for Korea (IECOK) in 1965, South Korea became a member of the trustee board of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1966, and took an active part in a number of meetings organized by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP). In addition, the government held a series of governmental and non-governmental talks with various countries for the conclusion of commercial treaties. Furthermore, the government pursued the introduction of foreign private capital from several private foreign lenders, particularly Japanese capital following the normalization of relationship between the two countries. The military government adopted new laws to encourage foreign investment and to provide guarantees
of repayment to foreign lenders. As a result, commercial loans from abroad grew tremendously in the mid-1960s. Under the leadership of President Park, South Korea became an exporting nation. Exports in 1961 totaled only $40 million, but they jumped above $15 billion in 1979. In 1955, South Korea exported to 18 countries but, in 1979, she exported to 142 countries (Korea Annual, 1980: 136-144, 151-158; Cole and Lyman, 1971: 181-186, 228).

**Inter-Ministerial Programs**

To meet the problems of national development is an complex undertaking and the various ministries concerned have overlapping jurisdictions and responsibilities. Economic development programs require highly coordinated actions and cooperative efforts among the ministries, and since 1961 South Korea has had various inter-ministerial programs across the jurisdictional lines of the existing ministries. In this regard, the ratio of the inter-ministerial programs to the total development programs should be regarded as an indicator of political leadership role in stimulating national development.

During 1948-1960, according to one study, 76 percent of the total economic programs were implemented by a single ministry, while, during 1961-1966, only 40 percent was handled by individual ministries (Whang, 1970: 17-18). In fact, during the Rhee regime, one-man dictatorship,
cabinet instability, and insecurity of tenure made it impossible for cabinet ministers to take concerted decision-making for national development, and maintenance of the status quo was their substantive concern. There were some exceptional cases such as the Five-year Coal Production in 1955 and the National Construction Service (NCS) program in 1960, but they experienced limited effectiveness due to meagre budget allocation and the 1961 Military Revolution (Wade and Kim, 1978: 21-24; Lee, 1968: 82-84, 130-133).

Unlike the civilian leaders, the military leaders were able to utilize their experiences with staff organizations and they were able to transform the relationship between political leaders and task elites from a one-way flow of influence to a two-way mutual interaction. Furthermore, many intellectuals and former cabinet ministers were recruited into the military cabinets and they seemed to have contributed to easy communications among cabinet ministers and cooperative and coordinated action programs across ministries. In addition to the National Service Program, which was initially designed by the Chang regime, most of the new programs such as consecutive Five-year Economic Development Plans and export promotion programs have been formulated as inter-ministerial programs (Jones and Sakong, 1980: 48; Whang, 1970: 117-122, 146-147).
For economic planning under the military leadership, the Economic Planning Board (EPB) is organized as the chief of the national planning agency and enjoys both budget and planning functions as well as responsibilities for foreign investment. The EPB also coordinates and controls activities of various economic ministries. The military regime also established various special committees for better coordination among ministries. The committees include the Economic Ministers' Conference, Vice-Ministers' Conference, Economic-Science Council, Office of Planning and Coordination, and Government and Ruling Party Joint Meeting. Furthermore, for better coordination among government, entrepreneurs, and the public, the Central Economic Committee was established, consisting of the Prime Minister as chairman, the Minister of EPB as vice chairman, all ministers concerned with economic affairs, and a few outside experts such as professors, journalists, and representatives of business associations (Jones and Sakong, 1980: 48-49; Wade and Kim, 1978: 223-227).

The export promotion programs have also become an inter-ministerial program. Since 1965, the Monthly Export Promotion Meeting chaired by the President has been a forum of multi-faceted information exchange. It consists of all economic ministers as well as the Ministers of Culture and Information and Foreign Affairs, leaders of
the Ruling Party, and representatives from business associations, banking institutions, and the KOTRA. In addition, various advisory committees were newly organized or strengthened. Twenty-nine of these advisory committees were in the Ministry of Finance; 27 in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry; 16 in the Ministry of Home Affairs; 15 in the Ministry of Education; 14 in the Ministry of National Defense; 11 in the Economic Planning Board; 10 in the Ministry of Transportation; and 9 in the Ministry of Communication. These advisory committees represent the demands and opinions of various and relevant groups in the policy-making and implementation process, and perform an important communication function by articulating government policy to their constituents (Jones and Sakong, 1980: 97; Wade and Kim, 1978: 216-217).
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

Summary of Findings

This thesis has attempted quantitatively to establish a positive relationship between political leadership and national development in South Korea during the period from 1948 to 1982. The central hypothesis of the thesis is that political leadership is the ultimate determinant of South Korea's success with national development. To evaluate such a relationship, the following set of sub-hypotheses has been investigated: 1) political leadership is a critical variable in national development; 2) there is a significant association between social backgrounds of task elites (cabinet ministers) and elite recruitment patterns of political leaders; and 3) there is a significant relationship between the values and attitudes of political leadership and the patterns of national development. To facilitate this study, furthermore, the five republics which South Korea has had were divided into two types of regimes: civilian regime (the First and the Second Republics) and military regime (the Third, the Fourth, and the Fifth Republics).

To test the first hypothesis, Chapter II analyses
the origin, nature, and purpose of national development in South Korea, focusing on the political leadership's performances on political stability and socio-economic development. To summarize the findings of Chapter II:

1. Since the inception of republican experience in South Korea in 1948, South Korea has had eight constitutional changes and five different republics. Following the constitutional changes, the political pendulum has swung back and forth three times: from a representative-oriented system to an executive-dominant system (1948-1960); reemergence of a representative-dominant model (1960-1961); and reappearance of the executive-controlled system since 1961. But the peaceful transfer of power has been notably absent in South Korean politics. However, South Korea has experienced political development since 1948. Modern political institutions and processes were introduced. Particularly since 1961, South Korea's political system has rapidly gained in stability under the highly centralized government. The political stability has significantly contributed to modernistic national development.

2. Economic development in South Korea connotes far more than changes in the usual complex of economic indicators. During the civilian regime, economic recovery and stabilization was emphasized. Since 1961, however, modernization through planned economic development has
become a full-fledged political symbol of the military regime and the country has experienced rapid industrialization and economic development. South Korea has been able to shed the old image of a 'have-not' and 'not-viable' politico-economic entity and become a showcase among the developing countries in bringing about a rapid socio-economic development and political stability.

As seen in Chapter II, however, the records of various regimes have varied. Their differences in achievement are a function of different political leaderships caused by changes in their values and attitudes and the consequent changes in their elite recruitment and policy emphasis. The second and the third sub-hypotheses are to investigate these differences.

Chapter III compares different values and development orientations of the political leaders between the civilian and the military regimes. Their values and attitudes determine the patterns of their task elites recruitment and national development.

When political leaders' values and attitudes between the two types of regimes were compared using the time-orientation approach, it was found that President Park Chung Hee was more developmentalist-oriented than either President Syngman Rhee or Premier Chang Myun. Comparing more specifically their orientations in the following areas such as achievement orientation, change orientation,
future orientation, and overseas orientation, here again noteworthy differences among them were found. President Rhee and Premier Chang emphasized national unity and unification, and democracy respectively, while President Park emphasized national development through planned economic development. Their different policy priorities for national development determined their major courses of political actions. The conclusions of Chapter III are that the values and developmental orientations of President Park were more achievement-oriented, more change-oriented, more future-oriented, and more overseas-oriented to achieve his goals than those of civilian political leaders.

To test the second hypothesis, Chapter IV analyses the social backgrounds of cabinet ministers in terms of such variables as Year of Birth, Place of Birth (Province, Urban/Rural), Level of Education, Place of College or University Education, and Prior Occupation. The analysis shows some significant differences between cabinet ministers of the two regimes. Their values and developmental orientations seem also to differ. The major differences between them could be summarized as follows:

1. The cabinet ministers of the military regime are younger than those of the civilian regime, and they are more change-oriented.

2. The cabinet ministers of the military regime were
born more in rural areas and come from a greater variety of provinces than those of the civilian regime and they are more achievement-oriented and more change oriented than their counterparts in the civilian regime.

3. More cabinet ministers of the military regime received post-graduate education and education in Korea, and they are more technocratic-oriented and more national-oriented.

4. The cabinet ministers of the military regime are more frequently recruited from professional military officers, former cabinet ministers, and college or universities professors than those of the civilian regime. The military government cabinet ministers seem more administrative-oriented, more technocratic-oriented, and more managerial-oriented than political-oriented.

With regard to national development, these findings show that the cabinet ministers of the military regime tend to reflect more closely their political leaders' values and developmental orientations. They seem to illustrate also that since 1961 the pattern of cabinet ministers recruitment has become more achievement-oriented, more change-oriented, more future-oriented, and more overseas-oriented.

The third hypothesis deals with the relationship between different values and developmental orientations of different political leaderships and the national
development process. In this connection, Chapter V finds:

1. The different leadership values and attitudes between the two regimes are reflected in the budgetary allocation between defense and economic programs and between government consumption and investment. As might be expected, during the military regime, the percentage of expenditure for economic programs to the total government expenditures increased and the percentage of government investment became greater. The change represents the military regime's commitment to the self-supporting economy, and planned allocation of government budget.

2. The different leadership values and attitudes between the two regimes contribute to different action programs such as short-range or long-range programs, domestic or overseas programs, and intra-ministerial or inter-ministerial programs. Chapter V shows that the patterns of national development has changed from short-range to long-range programs, from domestic to overseas programs, and from intra-ministerial to inter-ministerial programs under the political leadership of the military regime.

Postscripts

It is generally understood that the role of political leadership is the most crucial factor to be ascertained in the process of national development. However, as
Tsurutani pointed out, most of the political leadership studies have failed to contribute to a clear understanding of the relationship between the role of political leadership in the process of national development and their values and attitudes. Instead, dominant focus of these studies has been on the structure and recruitment patterns of political elites. Other studies have been concerned with the decision-making processes of political elites (Tsurutani, 1973: 23-24). This study is in part an answer to the above shortcomings.

To do this study more satisfactorily, however, information about the cabinet ministers' socio-economic origins, religions, language skills, training and travel abroad, etc. is needed in addition to age, place of birth, education, and prior occupation. In addition, as part of the political leadership in South Korea, the study could have been expanded to include an analysis of national assemblymen, supreme court justices, and service chiefs of the armed forces.
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