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ELITE PERSPECTIVES AND PREDICTIVE POTENTIAL:
PARK IN KOREA 1963-1972

by

Brian Borlas

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ELITE PERSPECTIVES AND PREDICTIVE POTENTIAL:  
PARK IN KOREA 1963-1972

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Western Michigan University, 1981

This study is concerned with the analysis of suppressive control policies in a centralized and monocratic political system. As the central elite figure in the Republic of Korea from 1961 until 1979, Park Chung-hee directed the growth of a political system which continually reinforced his own personal power. Park's reactions to challenges and crises led him to a policy of systemic manipulation and increased suppression of personal freedoms.

The existence of a large body of writing and speeches by Park makes it possible to examine the development of his personal philosophy as well as providing the basis for a directional content analysis regarding his tendency towards suppression. The increase in Park's concern with maintaining personal control is reflected in the gross fluctuations of those statements categorized as suppressive or non-suppressive. Finally, these fluctuations form the basis for the possibility of predicting future suppressive actions by a central monocratic figure.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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This thesis is dedicated to my Mother and Father for their unswerving love and support.

Brian Borlas
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CHAPTER I

Introduction

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the underlying elite perceptions which determine the growing utilization of suppressive sanctions in the Republic of Korea during the Third Republic. The principle elite actor during this period is President Park Chung-hee. This analysis will attempt to discover Park's attitudes and rationales which served to determine the suppressive nature of political development in Korea.

In order to discuss the problem of suppression and its effects upon a political system in light of elite perspectives, it becomes necessary to examine the general over-all development of the various spheres of Korean growth as they relate to performance based legitimacy of the government. Our primary interest, however, will be the relationship between the political philosophy of Park to the actual functioning of his regime as a developmental political system. In order to place the political philosophy of Park into a comparative framework, it is essential to develop a methodology which is linear. Since the perspective of one man changes as he is influenced and shaped by events, his public statements should reflect such changes. Man is also a shaper of events, and the comparison of his actions with his statements should reveal a pattern of related changes. We will attempt to discover and analyze the changes of Park's thought against a backdrop of his actions as the primary molder of the Korean
political system, and we will compare his actions which may be termed suppressive against his written statements which rationalized that suppression.

The Literature

The literature relevant to our problem serves to establish the direction for this inquiry. The examination of this literature leads to three basic conclusions: a) South Korea has experienced dramatic economic growth since 1961; b) the nation has also experienced an increase in political suppression; and c) the personal role of Park Chung-hee has served to determine both of the preceding conclusions. Given the importance of Park's role, it becomes necessary to discover the policy intentions and personal perceptions of Park in order to more fully understand the meaning of the direction of the political arena in Korea.

Charles Frank, Kwang Suk Kim, and Larry Westphal have collaborated on an econometric analysis of the South Korean economy in a work entitled *Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: South Korea*. The authors examine the relationship between trade and exchange rate policies and how those policies affect resource allocation and growth. The rapid growth of the economy is dependent in part on the stability provided by President Park.¹ Likewise, the authors cite Korea's cultural homogeneity and the wide success of

education programs in the alleviation of illiteracy as further factors contributing to this stability. Finally, the weakness of collective bargaining mechanisms tends to keep real wages stable and profits high to stimulate investment demand. According to the authors, the rapid rise of the economy has been followed by a decrease in unemployment, especially in the industrial sector. Likewise, they find that the relative distribution of income is fairly even throughout the sectors of the economy. While the authors present a generally favorable picture of the growth of the Korean economy under Park, they conclude their study with the following reservation:

Unfortunately, South Korea's economic gains have been accompanied by a great deal of political repression. Labor unions have been very much discouraged and there exists in many cases employer abuse of unskilled workers, reminiscent of nineteenth century sweatshops in Western nations. The poor performance in the area of human rights and in the labor policy is tempered by a favorable performance in terms of income distribution . . .

A less complimentary analysis of the Korean economy is presented in Kim Nak-kwan's article "Is Korea's Export Promotion Scheme Consistent with Her Industrialization." Unlike the previous study which endorses Korea's concentration upon exports, Kim presents the argument that the increasing percentage of the GNP represented by exports tends to make the Korean economy overly dependent upon the fluctuations of the world economy. Cheul W. Kang's article

\[\text{Frank, et al., op. cit., pp. 223-224.}\]
\[\text{Ibid., p. 243.}\]
\[\text{Seim Nak-Kwan, "Is Korea's Export Promotion Scheme Consistent With Her Industrialization?," Koreana Quarterly, 15, 1-2 Spring 1973, pp. 40-48.}\]

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"Wages, Productivity and Foreign Trade: Some Aspects of Korean Economic Development," takes further exception to the conclusions of Frank et al. Kang writes:

The meager fruits of the recent economic growth of Korea have not been distributed to the workers in terms of higher real wages until recently, but they have been shared by the population in general in terms of greater employment. Finally, one further article by T. C. Rhee provides an excellent inventory of the problems still confronting the Korean economy. Rhee lists eight of the most crucial issues: 1) Low per-capita national income and a widening rich-poor gap; 2) an urban-rural gap; 3) disorganized and unrealistic industrial growth based upon export industries; 4) serious trade deficits; 5) poor management and corruption; 6) a huge foreign debt; 7) uncontrolled inflation; and 8) repression and a dangerous political atmosphere.

Although the economy has improved since 1973, the factors cited by Rhee are still pressing problems. Generally, however, it may be concluded from this examination of the economic development of Korea under Park that although several serious problems exist within the Korean economy, the total picture is largely favorable.

In terms of political development, the literature paints an entirely different picture. Before beginning our examination of Korea's political development, we must treat the literature con-

---


cerning the theoretical assertions relevant to this thesis.

Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell define five major variables which bear upon the problem of comparative political development. While they affirm that the concept of legitimate force is a continuous thread that runs through the action of a political system, thereby giving that system its special character, they look further into the relationships of systemic variables to the coercive power of government. Five major factors are: 1) stability; 2) resources; 3) developments in other social systems; 4) the functioning pattern of the system itself; and 5) the response of the system elites to challenge. The theoretical relevance of these factors to our study varies, as we are primarily concerned with the functioning pattern of the system itself as well as the elite challenge response manifestation in the elite personification of Park. Almond, however, explores these basic themes in greater depth in his earlier writing, "Comparative Political Systems," which, among other things, addresses more specifically the interaction of legitimate coercion and excessive coercion upon the political system. According to Almond, the political system is "... the patterned interaction of roles affecting decisions backed up by the threat of physical compulsion." When the threat of physical compulsion becomes suppressive, the system lapses into the totalitarian state model.

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7 Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, Boston, Little and Brown Co., 1966, chap. II.

Almond argues that it is in the nature of the totalitarian system to defy the analysis of popular acceptance. The structures which determine suppression usually focus upon dissent. Two predominant characteristics of the totalitarian system according to Almond are the importance of coercive roles and the functional instability of decentralized power roles. The highly centralized nature of the Korean system and the excessive coercive pressure allows us to characterize that system as totalitarian.

Two important qualities lacking in the Korean scene are isolated in S. N. Eisenstadt's "Political Modernization: Some Comparative Notes." These factors are the spread of political power, which would indicate a decentralization of power not evident in Korea, and, the ideological accountability of the rulers to the ruled. Finally, Eisenstadt distills the problem of political modernization down to the ability of the system to adapt to changing demands.

The necessity for systemic adaption is also found in Joseph LaPalombara's "Political Science and the Engineering of National Development." LaPalombara goes a step further and identifies three areas of a system which must develop challenge response mechanisms. These are political institutions, the persons who occupy roles in those institutions, and the capability of both to deal with the problems of creating a nation state. In the case of South Korea,


10 Joseph LaPalombara, "Political Science and the Engineering
we must examine the challenge response of the predominant personality in Korean political institutions, Park Chung-hee.

One further theoretical study which bears greatly upon the discussion at hand is John Kautsky's *The Political Consequences of Modernization*. Kautsky addresses the problem of elite attempts to nullify opposition and the techniques utilized by that elite. The overly centralized nature of the Korean government and the attendant power concentration is a common model in modernizing states.

Kautsky writes:

> When confronted by the threat of potential and the beginnings of actual mass opposition, the modernizers is power react . . . by eliminating the opposition leadership by means of arrest, exile, or execution . . .

Kautsky also refers to the use of mass terror as a control mechanism, which he defines as being manifest in undefined, arbitrary offenses and a lack of procedural safeguards. Kautsky discusses the phenominological aspects of terror.

> Mass terror operates by instilling feelings of insecurity in all potentially oppositional elements, that is, in most of the politicized population, and that insecurity is created by substituting arbitrariness for certainty.

The consequences of mass terror upon a society such as Korea would tend to aggravate traditional political problems, most signifi-

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12 Ibid., p. 172.
cantly, the lack of horizontal organizations which could provide an area of elite recruitment as well as presenting a viable alternative to the Park regime. According to Kautsky, "under the pressure of ubiquitous fear, no one can be relied upon not to denounce his fellows, and any large scale antiregime organization . . . becomes impossible."¹³

The importance of the political party as an horizontal organization finds a place in much developmental literature. Y. C. Han studied the party role in Korea and presented the following theoretical assertion:

"... political parties can play a crucial role by linking the citizen to the government. Thus, the emergence of the political party, whether in democratic or totalitarian systems, clearly implies that the masses must be taken into consideration by the ruling group."¹⁴

The de-emphasis of the political party in the 1972 Yushin (National Revitalization) constitution, according to Han, clearly implies that such considerations have ceased to be of great importance to the Park regime.

The literature pertaining to the development of the political system in South Korea is wide and varied. However, two works are especially relevant to this study. They are Gregory Henderson's Korea, the Politics of the Vortex and Joungwan Alexander Kim's Divided Korea: The Politics of Development. Henderson examines the

¹³Ibid., p. 173.

¹⁴Y. C. Han, "Political Parties and Political Development in South Korea," Pacific Affairs, 42, 4, Winter 1969-70, pp. 446-64.

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traditional and modern arena of Korean politics and finds most
classic the centralist tendency of Korean politics. Henderson
theorizes that the highly centralized nature of Korean systems
creates a vortex which envelops and atomizes political actors as
well as preventing horizontal organizations which would tend to
counteract that tendency. Henderson's concept of the vortex and
its effects aptly demonstrates the theoretical arguments presented
by Kautsky and Han.

Joungwan A. Kim approaches the problem from a different
perspective. He concentrates his study upon the development of con­
trol through the manipulation of three critical factors: guns, funds,
and organization. Kim discusses the failures of previous regimes
in obtaining control over these elements and further discusses the
tactics and effects of the current regime's success in this area.
Kim presents a lucid and highly detailed picture of the events and
pressures acting upon the Park government. One important aspect of
the Park government which Kim delineates was the persistent coercive
pressure from the government exercised against the populace. Kim
writes:

By the time of the 1967 elections, the government's pervasive
control of the society through indirect means was well
known. Conversations of sensitive subjects became noticeably
hushed, and the glance over the shoulder began to take on the
characteristic of a national nervous tic.16

15Gregory Henderson, The Politics of the Vortex, Cambridge,

16Joungwan Alexander Kim, Divided Korea: The Politics of
The process of Park's gaining greater control over the system is demonstrated in the writings concerning his constitutional manipulations and tend to center around the Fourth Constitution. In Chae-Jin Lee's analysis of the political effects of the 1972 constitution, Park's increased control becomes a central theme. Park's ability to restrict civil liberties and to run for office an unlimited number of times seriously disrupted the development of a political system based on democratic norms. Lee writes: "Viewed from the perspective of general democratic norms, the entire sequence of South Korea's domestic political development during 1972 was an unfortunate step backward."\(^{17}\)

C. I. Eugene Kim discusses the nature of the constitutional reform as it relates to the concept of an emergency regime.\(^{18}\) It is the extent and duration of the government's emergency powers which determines this classification. Kim goes on to analyze the components of the new constitution in light of its strong emphasis on the emergency powers granted to Park. The necessity for these emergency reforms was the result of the changing international scene, most crucially U.S.-P.R.C. detente. The reduction of the American military presence in Asia as well as South Korea's perceived threat from the North created a situation of uncertainty. Finally, the


imbalanced nature of the economic development combined with the
general world-wide recession of the early seventies served to create
a situation which allowed Park to rationalize the extreme emergency
decrees.

The readings previously discussed indicate to a large extent
the importance of the personal role of Park Chung-hee in the develop­
ment and manipulation of the Korean political system. It would
therefore be necessary to examine the writings of Park himself in
order to attempt to discover the rationales behind his emergency
outlook. Park's writings usually take the form of collected
speeches and statements, although he has also written in book form.
His more recent statements may usually be found in [Korean News],
which are the official policy handouts of the regime. In one of his
earlier essays, Our Nation's Path: Ideology of Social Reconstruction,
Park outlines his concepts of development as well as providing
rationales for the 1961 military coup. Almost a decade later, Park
discusses the problems of modernization in his book, To Build a Nation.
A comparison of the two books proves interesting. In the earlier
writings Park espouses the cause of a liberal democracy in Korea,
while in the later text, the tone changes to one of the necessity
to avoid greater liberalization of the system. The central question
of this thesis arises at this point: Do the policy changes which
occur over this period reflect the changes of Park's political
philosophy? If such is indeed the case, then future changes in
Park's statements may forecast changes in policy, thereby allowing
a careful observer to predict such change.
Park's two volumes of *Major Speeches* provide us with a year by year chart of his conceptual growth. Spanning a period between 1963 and 1972, the speeches allow us to compare policy changes by year to alterations of philosophy. All that is needed is a methodological base upon which we may rest such an analysis.

A useful tool for the analysis of this kind is the method known as content analysis. Content analysis as an analytical tool has been utilized with a degree of success and has produced a body of theoretical literature. According to George Gerbner, the chief concern of content studies is to determine "... overall patterns and boundary conditions within the cognitive process ...". Gerbner goes on to delineate four measures and terms of analysis: attention, emphasis, structure and, most relevant for this study, tendency. Tendency is concerned with "... the directionality of presentation—the explicit or contextual judgement of qualities of phenomena expressed in the presentation." A useful, general definition of content analysis may also be found in Bernard Berelson's *Content Analysis in Communication Research*. Berelson states: "Content analysis is a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of


20Ibid., p. 131.
Indeed, it is the tendency of Park's statements which are of paramount interest in the attempt to examine the relationship between his policy action and stated philosophical goals. Alexander George in his essay "Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches to Content Analysis" further distills the theory: "... content analysis is employed as a diagnostic tool for making specific references about some aspect of the speaker's purposive behavior."^{22} George goes into greater detail with his explanation of the concept of direct method of analysis. He states:

Direct method, which bypasses propaganda strategy, can be successfully employed only if content features can be found which occur regularly and only when a certain type of elite policy intention, expectation, estimate, or situational factor occurs.\(^{23}\)

The direct method relies upon one step inferences from the content indicator to the elite policy intention. The regularly occurring factor in this case is the growing suppressive control preoccupation of the Park regime.

In order to distill a body of writings into quantifiable data it becomes necessary to devise a set of categories concerning the recurring situational factors implied in the impetus of the study.


23. Ibid., pp. 18-19.
According to Ole Holsti, "... the most interesting and significant content analysis studies will continue to depend on categories specifically developed for the topic at hand."\(^{24}\) We have attempted to formulate categories of content specifically geared towards Park's suppressive rationales. Rather than concentrating upon the direction of his total preoccupations, we have elected to limit ourselves to what we feel to be the major de-legitimizing aspect of the Park regime: the question of human rights.

We have examined literature which pertains to the topic in four areas: economic growth in Korea; political development in Korea; theories of political modernization; and, methods of content analysis. We have determined that economic growth in Korea is tempered by several imbalances, but that the general picture is one of relative health. It has also been revealed that the political atmosphere is controlled and suppressive. Our theoretical examination of political development reveals that the concept of legitimate force is the backbone of any governmental organization, but that modernizers in power also have a tendency to react to opposition by overstepping the bounds of legitimacy in the application of that force. Likewise, it is the opinions and perceptions of the political actors who occupy positions in the system which serves to determine the nature of that system. Finally, it has been shown that an analysis of Park Chung-hee's speeches and writings as they relate to the problem of suppression is both viable and relevant.

\(^{24}\)Ole Holsti, op. cit., p. 115.
Hypotheses

We have constructed a sequential framework of hypotheses which, when considered together, illustrate the progression of the Korean state under Park. Likewise, once the development of control tactics has been established, we will trace the change in Park's attitudes over his period of control. Chapter Two will examine the effects of Park's perspective upon the development of the phenomenology of the Korean political system. In this respect, the initial hypothesis is:

1. The development of a coercive political structure has occurred which allows Park a personal and relatively complete control over that structure.

Chapter Three will treat the political philosophy of Park regarding the necessity for the maintenance of such a repressive political structure. If we assume that Park has controlled the events leading to his high level of control over the system, it may be hypothesized that:

2. Park views the coercive power structure and his continued personal leadership role as essential to the well-being and development of the Korean nation.

Given the assumption that Park's statements reflect his orientation, which, in turn, affects his actions, Chapter Four will attempt to trace the relationship between his actions and his statements. A further assumption in this regard is that as the perceived need for an effect exists, the statements concerning that need will occur.
Conversely, if such a need is not evident, such related statements will not occur. Therefore:

3. Suppressive statements vary with the perceived need and effectiveness of internal controls. Further:

a) Increases in suppressive statements precede suppressive acts.

b) Lower control levels will stimulate a rise in suppressive statements assuming the original control orientation of the speaker.

c) Effective control measures tend to reduce or eliminate suppressive statements.

Methodology

In order to test the initial hypothesis concerning the development of a coercive political structure, it will be necessary to treat the developments of the period under discussion in an historical framework. Likewise, in order to compare the progression of events with the progression of Park's attitudes, a 'Suppressive Time Line' will be developed which will trace suppressive actions by the government on a year to year basis. The time-line will serve as the basis for comparison with the linear quantification of suppressive statements.

In an attempt to justify the second hypothesis concerning Park's view of his own role and the necessity of that role, an analysis of Park's writings and speeches as a body of thought is required. Since the primary concern of this thesis is the suppressive
rationale, this chapter will largely ignore Park's statements concerning foreign affairs, economic policy, and other issues, other than those statements which were utilized as suppressive rationales. The sub-divisions of this chapter are: 1) Human rights; 2) Anti-Communism; 3) Politics, politicians and the masses; 4) The primacy of economic development over political freedom; 5) The press and freedom of speech; and 6) Park's self-perception.

The fourth chapter will attempt a content analysis of a restricted body of Park's statements found in the two volumes of Major Speeches which span the ten year period under discussion. Although it would be more significant to apply the content analysis method to the total body of Park's statements, such a task of quantification is far beyond the resources available for a study of this scope. By imposing this limitation it is also possible to regulate the amount of per-millage material per year as the yearly material of the speeches is roughly the same in these volumes. Specific categories have been constructed into which suppressive and anti-suppressive statements will fall. The occurrence of such statements will be divided by the number of pages of yearly material resulting in a ratio representing the number of statements per page per year. Since the quantity of material utilized in this analysis is limited, the values occurring will be too small for the application of tests of significance. However, we feel that simple observation of gross fluctuation should prove valid for a study of this scope.

The categories will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter Four. However, a brief summary of those clusters is in order at this point.
Cluster One: Control statements grouped into three sub-clusters. These statements are chosen for their bearing on the problems of suppression and legitimacy.

1a. Cooperation and unity statements linked with a threat message.

1b. Anti-mass statements which perceive the masses and the political process as being inimical to progress.

1c. Statements calling for restrictions on speech and the press.

Cluster Two: Anti-control statements which form the corrolary to Cluster One statements.

2a. Statements which affirm the democratic concept as a viable factor in development.

2b. Statements supporting free speech and press.

2c. Statements supportive of the mass role and of political processes for problem solving and development.
CHAPTER II

The Park Regime

It is our contention that the tenure of Park's control was marked by the process of political decay as demonstrated by the suppressive control policies of his regime. This chapter will attempt to analyze the functional growth of suppression as a predictable response to perceived crisis situations. Greater internal controls formed the major response of the Park government to those types of situations. The government tended to perceive threats to its legitimacy as a determinant of crisis. Since the bulk of the regime's legitimacy was performance based, any factors which served to erode government performance in the areas of internal and external stability, economic growth and military security, tended to aid in the creation of a growing crisis situation. Likewise, any direct threat to the regime itself such as alternate modernizers and anti-government activity was also viewed as contributory factors to a given crisis period.

This chapter will briefly outline recent Korean history as it relates to the concept of growing perceived crises and Park's response to those crises in the form of greater control over the state. In order to compare the historical variables presented in this section with the fluctuation of Park's statements in the content analysis chapter, it becomes necessary to construct a time line of the period under discussion outlining the periods of building crisis.
and the responses of government to those crises. We will examine
the responses of the Park regime from the coup of 1961 through the
Yushin Reforms of 1972 which resulted in Park's almost complete
control over the Korean political arena.

Background

Korea represents an exception of most of the standard
developmental problems. She has traditionally been a highly
centralized and homogenous state. Currently, South Korea enjoys a
high level of industrial growth and a significant degree of economic
success. This measure of economic development has effected a rising
expectation on the part of the people for more equal distribution
of the nation's resources in a situation where the bulk of value
rests at the top of the economic pyramid. At the same time, an
increasingly more sophisticated urban population is feeling the
restrictive pressure of a centralized and authoritarian political
structure. Dissatisfaction with the regime is regarded as threatening
and is responded to with greater control mechanisms. Korea's highly
centralized government has been a traditional factor throughout
Korean political history. The central power locus has been the
focus of ambition and dissent. Likewise, this factor has created a
traditional lack of horizontal institutions which, in turn, determined
a failure in developing a gradual and cohesive structure linking
the masses and the peripheral elites to the central power source.
Gregory Henderson, writing in his Korea, the Politics of the Vortex,
describes the traditional power structure as "... a great vortex,
summoning men rapidly into it, placing them briefly near the summits of ambition, and then sweeping them out, often ruthlessly to execution or exile."¹

From 1905 until 1945, the period of Japanese colonial control was characterized by forced modernization and coercive stability. The Japanese government suspended the political fermentation of the decaying Yi Dynasty. However, the introduction of revolutionary concepts of self-determination from the West helped create a strong nationalist sentiment among the people. Combined with Korean resentment at Japan's annexation of Korea, the Japanese attempt at assimilation of the peninsula was doomed. With the close of the Pacific War in 1945 and the ouster of the Japanese, the old patterns of the political vortex were reintroduced.

The three years of American military trusteeship in South Korea from 1945 until the first general election in 1948 was exemplified by gross unpreparedness and confusion on the part of the Americans. Maintaining a strict anti-communist perspective, the military command eventually eliminated all leftist elements in the South, leaving the aging leader of the Korean independence movement abroad, Syngman Rhee, as the main choice of the Americans by a process of elimination.

The First Republic under Rhee did not serve to improve either the economic well-being of the Korean people, nor did it

¹Henderson, Korea, the Politics of the Vortex, op. cit., p. 31.
create an atmosphere of political development. According to Se-jin Kim, in his *Politics of Military Revolution in Korea*, Rhee "... built his political organization at the expense of representational government."² Rhee utilized the executive branch of government as a personal tool of power. He instigated divisive rivalries in the military and the government in order to negate the threat of a unified opposition. His preoccupation with power politics determined that the serious socio-economic ills confronting the nation were largely ignored. Rampant corruption among the increasingly senile ruler's advisors and blatant tactics of election-rigging eventually culminated in a widespread popular uprising against the regime in 1960 referred to as the Student Revolution. The general uprising and the unwillingness of the military to support the tottering structure of Rhee's regime forced him into exile and caused the collapse of the First Republic.

The resultant Second Republic failed in short order as a result of its inability to bring about the drastically needed reforms ignored by the previous government. Although the reasons for the failure of the Second Republic are manifold, the chief factors contributing to what Henderson refers to as a return to "the gates of chaos" could be said to be primarily a lack of identification of the new elite with the forces which created the revolution. Likewise, a failure of the new elite to consolidate sources of funds and power

in order to function effectively in the heady atmosphere of popular revolt. Headed by Chang Myong, a liberal political figure and an opponent of Rhee, the nine months of the Second Republic were marked by a frantic scramble to consolidate power in a period of rampant crime, crippling inflation, daily mass demonstrations, industrial decay and a severe spring famine.

A faction of field-grade officers in the Korean military under the direction of Col. Kim Jong-pil and Major General Park Chung-hee had begun to consider the necessity for intervention on the part of the military in order to deal with the growing internal crisis which had intensified in the last days of the Rhee government. While this junta adopted a wait and see attitude during the Second Republic, it soon became apparent to the military leaders that the new government was equally ineffective in dealing with the crisis situation. In May 1961, this military junta executed a well conceived and virtually bloodless coup, forcing the resignation of Chang and the imminent demise of his government. It is at this point that the control of Park Chung-hee becomes predominant. The junta took swift and decisive steps to stabilize the economic, social and political arenas. Under Park's control, South Korea has made tremendous strides in the economic sphere, unfortunately at the expense of political development. We will now attempt to present the period of Park's control in light of his response to those crisis situations which occurred in the ten year time span of this thesis.
The Crisis of Consolidation and Legitimacy Building

Although the events of the tenure of Park's regime include a myriad of factors, we will concentrate upon the political tools utilized by the government which would tend to have suppressive effects. We refer to control factors which would tend to limit pluralist inputs and disrupt the formulation of horizontal institutions, and those actions which indicate a manipulation of the political system for that end.

The chaotic state of national affairs brought about by the breakdown of civil order during the fall of the First Republic and continued throughout the Second Republic created a crisis of control and stability for the new military junta. The almost daily mass demonstrations, the still crucial economic and social ills left over from the First Republic persisted. The period from 1961 through 1963 sets the pattern for the response mechanisms of the Park regime when confronted by crisis situations. The period is marked by direct rule of the military, martial law and a ban on political organizations and activities. Central power was vested in the Junta's Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (S.C.N.R.). The S.C.N.R. issued a series of decrees in 1961 which included the dissolution of all political and social organizations and a sweeping press control law which forced the closing of over one thousand publications across the nation. 3 1961 also witnessed the creation of the Korean

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3Kim, Divided Korea, the Politics of Development 1945-1972, op. cit., p. 265.
Central Intelligence Agency (K.C.I.A.) which functioned as both an internal and external security organization. The K.C.I.A. served a dual function: as well as a security organ, it also provided an organizational base for the establishment and funding of Park's own political machine. During the two year ban on political activities the K.C.I.A. became involved in a series of scandals ranging from the building of the Walker Hill Resort for foreigners to the importation of several thousand illicit pinball machines in an attempt to secure a firm fiscal foundation. In spite of the loss of faith created by the exposure of the scandals, Park himself seemed to lose little visibility in the eyes of the people. His well publicized and seemingly endless crusade against rampant governmental corruption gave him a degree of reform legitimacy. Although his efforts yielded major results in terms of personnel turn-over, little was actually done to alter the system which bred corruption.

In order to avoid serious internal and external opposition to the junta's reforms, the military declared itself a temporary "caretaker" regime which would hold free elections in 1963 when the situation had been stabilized and the old political forces of corruption had been purged. Prior to the 1963 election, little had been done to alter the political situation in Korea. The ban on political activities insured that new political figures had no means to create organizational bases and that the old school politicians would be the only actors capable of presenting any kind of political opposition to the regime. The fear of returning the country to the hands of the old politicians caused serious pressure upon the military
junta. The greatest desire of the military regime was to insure that their efforts had not been wasted. By 1963 Park had emerged as the dominant figure in the junta and came to be regarded as the only man capable of avoiding a return to the incompetence and corruption of the previous regimes. Although Park had stated that he had no desire to pursue a political career, by the end of 1962 he had resigned his commission in the military, thereby making him eligible as a civilian candidate for president. Direct pressure from within the junta caused Park to officially declare himself a candidate under the threat of a second military coup should the country fall back into the same political hands. It is perhaps at this point that Park began to perceive himself as the only figure capable of saving the state from total chaos and destruction. Although the junta had been building a political base through the K.C.I.A., the general ban on political activities was lifted only thirty days before the national election. As a result of this subtle systematic manipulation, the opposition to the Park candidacy was scattered and divisive. In spite of his tremendous advantage, Park was nonetheless elected with a less than overwhelming mandate. He received less than fifty percent of the total vote, losing heavily in the more politically sophisticated urban areas.⁴

The birth of the Third Republic in 1963 presented Park with an opportunity to stabilize and consolidate his control. He realized

the necessity for large economic advances in order to achieve a measure of performance based legitimacy. In order to secure the success of his first Five-Year Plan, he sought additional financing by expanding his aid inputs and attempting to increase the scope of Korean trade. This impetus led the government into what has been referred to as the two most controversial actions of the period: the attempt to normalize relations with Japan; and the dispatching of troops to Viet Nam in order to garner favor and funding from the Americans.

The opposition to the Japan-Korea Normalization Treaty presented the Park government with its first serious threat to national stability. The desire to normalize relations with Japan was founded upon the principle that increased aid and trade would benefit economic development in Korea as well as increasing the international status of the R.O.K. The proposed treaty took the form of reparations from the war and provided for additional grant-like loans from the Japanese. The great opposition to the treaty was rooted in the generations-long anti-Japanese resentment among most of the Korean people, and a basic distrust of the Park regime. The most widespread arguments against the treaty were centered on the belief that the terms were a humiliating defeat for the Korean people and the bulk of the funds would be siphoned into the Park political machine. The growing crisis in the years 1964-1965 was marked by widespread

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and chaotic mass protests. The lack of civil control and the growing tradition of violent protest remained a problem from the days of the student revolution in 1960. The streets had become a forum for dissent.

Park's response to this crisis of civil order set the tenor of his future response mechanisms. The huge student protests and riots resulted in the eventual interjection of army units into Seoul in 1964 in order to maintain order. Martial law was declared that same year. The lifting of the martial law decree aptly points out Park's method of systematic manipulation. Park refused to lift the martial law until the assembly agreed to the passage of his Press Ethics law which provided for the tighter control of the Korean news media. Indeed, the government's attack upon the opposition centered on the highly developed Korean press. The government's control over much of the banking system gave Park another means to carry the attack to the press. By placing restrictions on credit to the major papers and ordering businesses receiving government approved loans to boycott those papers for advertising, the regime managed to silence or severely limit a vocal opposition element.

The final passage of the treaty again evidenced the tactics of extra-systemic manipulation by Park and his supporters. Schools and universities in Seoul were closed the day before the signing of the bill but student violence continued in protest to the government. In an attempt to stalemate the passage of the treaty bill, the opposition in the Assembly resigned en masse. Their action back-fired seriously. The government party was given a one party
legislature which promptly ratified the treaty with no opposition. Four days later that same one party assembly voted to send 20,000 troops to aid the American effort in Viet Nam. The U.S., under pressure to legitimize its actions in Indo China, sought wider participation in the conflict and was willing to accept the economic and supply responsibility for the Korean expeditionary force as well as providing for the replacement of those troops in Korea proper.\(^6\) Two important consequences resulted. The Korean army was developed into a well equipped, experienced and highly professional army, while at the same time, the use of Korea as a staging area for the American war effort resulted in a vast influx of valuta into the Korean economy.

The following year witnessed an increase in the Korean military presence as well as a dramatic increase in foreign capital in the form of grants and loans. A significant percentage of these funds are thought to have been channelled into Park's political organization by means of a system of kickbacks. Joungwan Kim writes,

> Since private loans required government approval and repayment guarantees, the Korean party receiving foreign loans was required to pay a percentage, (popularly believed to be 10-15 percent and sometimes as much as 20 percent of the loan amount), in payoffs to obtain the necessary guarantees. The system, of course, applied to foreign loans from other nations as well.\(^7\)

In 1966 and 1967, Korea received a total of 256.1 million dollars in commercial loans. Given a kickback ratio of ten percent, some 25.6

\(^6\)Kim, Divided Korea, op. cit., p. 262.

\(^7\)Ibid., pp. 264-265.
million dollars was diverted to political funding.\(^3\)

The new capital also allowed the government to expand its control over the society. Increased funding for the K.C.I.A. allowed that organization to become omnipresent. K.C.I.A. funds and agents infiltrated all activities of a vaguely political nature. The government's response to the dissension following the Treaty Crisis resulted in increased surveillance of the population and continued fiscal attacks on the press. These reactive control techniques fostered the growth of an atmosphere of secret police. J. A. Kim writes:

> By the time of the 1967 elections, the government's pervasive control of the society through indirect means was well known. Conversations on sensitive subjects became noticeably hushed, and the glance over the shoulder began to take on the characteristic of a national nervous tic.\(^9\)

The great success of the first Five Year Plan which ended in 1966 served to provide the Park government with a degree of performance based legitimacy. A general inclination to place emphasis upon economic development at the expense of political and human development became manifest at this point. The primacy of economics over politics is an issue which permeates Korean society. In a study conducted by Young-ho Lee, it was found that while a majority of those sampled favored political growth before economic growth, a significant percentage (37% of the citizens and 39% of legislators) felt that political development could be ignored in favor of the

\(^3\)Ibid.

\(^9\)Ibid., p. 265.
continued rapid growth of the economy. In a sense, Park's attitudes may be seen as a reflection of a large portion of society. We feel that such a dichotomy is unnecessary as political growth and economic growth are not mutually exclusive propositions. Park won the 1967 election with a greater plurality than ever before, although the overall voter turn-out was reduced.

Internal and external developments serve to define the nature of the next major crisis period to which the Park regime is forced to respond. The growth of factionalism within Park's party and the inability of those factions to agree upon an acceptable successor to Park caused him to accept the inevitability of his continued presence as the only actor capable of holding together the divisive elements in the party. However, in order for Park to run for a third term it would first be necessary to manipulate the system once again. The constitution of the Third Republic of 1963 limited the number of presidential terms to two. The amendment crisis of 1969 centered around the proposal to alter the constitution in order to allow Park to run for a third term. The widespread negative popular reaction manifested itself in another period of disruptive student protests and political opposition. Opposition party members in the Assembly went so far as to barricade the rostrum in a futile attempt to block the passage of the amendment. The crisis continued to


build as some 3,000 students surrounded the Assembly in protest. Park managed to circumvent his opposition by simply holding the vote after curfew in an unused part of the Assembly building. This not only gave Park a one-party Assembly, but due to the curfew, the streets were clear of disruptive student protestors. As in the 1963 election and the Japan Treaty crisis, Park manipulated the system in order to negate the power of oppositional elements. His reliance upon ends rather than political means becomes a serious obstacle to the process of political development.

The Economic Crisis as a Threat to Legitimacy

Although the Korean economy made significant strides under Park, the period of the early seventies witnessed the greatest threats to Park's performance-based legitimacy derived from the economy. As pointed out earlier, T. C. Rhee delineates seven major problems of the Korean economic sphere. These are: 1) low per capita income and the widening rich-poor gap; 2) an urban-rural gap; 3) disorganized, unrealistic industrial growth; 4) trade deficits; 5) poor management and corruption; 6) a huge unmanageable foreign debt; and 7) uncontrolled inflation. The continuance and aggravation of these factors in the late sixties and early seventies helped to define what Park perceived as the growing economic crisis.

If we examine the rates of income and expenditure in recent

12 Kim, Divided Korea, op. cit., pp. 275-276.

years, the trend of inflation may be viewed in very real terms as it affects basic purchasing power in Korea.

Rate of Increase

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Expenditure | .65 | .85 | .86 | .89 | .87 | .89 | .94 |

Until 1970 income increased at a greater rate than necessary expenditures, indicating a real gain in terms of consumer surplus and living standards. The trend is reversed in 1970, resulting in a net loss for the consumer, although the illusion of growth was maintained. Such a loss of buying power would tend to create greater dissatisfaction for the workers as their share of the increased national wealth declined.

The concentration of Park's developmental plans upon export industry has caused the development of the rural sector to suffer. The domestic production of grain began to decline in 1970, causing a serious grain shortage as well as a heavier reliance upon the United States as a supplier of food. The foreign debt and the import-export imbalance is directly affected by the necessity to

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greatly increase grain imports. The trend in domestic grain production may be seen in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Grain Production (x 1,000 metric tons)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>7930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>7375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>7057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>8284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>7953</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>7863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>7817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>7911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>8057</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The grain problem took a dramatic turn in 1969, compounding the problem of low domestic production and the poor balance of trade situation. Although some argue that it is to Korea's comparative advantage to ignore agriculture in favor of more profitable export commodities, the real effect of such a policy for the masses is negative. By transforming food into export commodities, the necessary import of food causes increased prices to the consumer. Likewise, the heavy dependence upon U.S. imports tends to limit the autonomy of the state. The grain problem served to aggravate existing economic problems and aided in the creation of an economic crisis, which, when combined with Park's perceptions of the political crisis, allowed him to make the rationale for his almost total control over the society.

In 1971, the winding down of the war in Viet Nam combined with food shortages, the failure of some 200 foreign loan investments and a three and a half billion dollar foreign debt determined a shortage in the external funding which had bolstered the economic

policies of the regime since the mid-sixties. By the close of the year, the Nixon tariffs on textile imports and a general dissatisfaction with wages combined to provide greater pressures upon the legitimacy of the administration.

The Political Crisis

The doubts and accusations plaguing the election of 1971 served to threaten stability of the country. Opposition to Park was generated in a population still chafing under the 1969 constitutional revision and the omnipresence of the K.C.I.A. Park's showing in the provinces was higher than usual in spite of the extended rural slump. This indicates, perhaps, that the less sophisticated rural voters are more easily manipulated through key village officials. The more sophisticated urban electorate, which is better informed and less amenable to such traditional forms of manipulation, gave Park his lowest support in recent years.16

Park's Democratic Republic Party lost almost 20 percent17 of the seats held in 1967 in the Assembly. Conversely, the opposition had nearly doubled its seats, climbing to almost 45 percent of the available seats. This shift in assembly support created a situation

which Park regarded as unstable and threatening. The external threat became an important issue to Park at this point as well. The American pull-out in Viet Nam and detente with China created for Park the perception that Korea was isolated by hostile Communist powers. The fear of the loss of U.S. support further served to create the atmosphere of crisis.

The Yushin Reforms and Legitimacy

This section will examine two forms of legitimacy in light of qualitative performance of the regime and the effects of the constitutional reform upon the development of consensual-systemic legitimacy. It is our contention that the tactics of Park in office have served to destroy any pretensions his government might have had for a consensual-systemic legitimacy. Park had managed to place himself above and beyond the political arena through the Yushin reforms of 1972. The reforms provided for Park's lifetime presidency and manipulated the assembly elections so as to give Park control over the legislative body as well. Chae-jin Lee writes: "Viewed from the perspective of democratic norms, the entire sequence of South Korea's domestic political development during 1972 was an unfortunate step backwards."\(^18\)

The aspects of electoral reform in the new constitution which

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we find to be indicative of decay reinforce the traditional centralist pattern as well as being a step away from democratic norms. Under the constitution of the Third Republic, the Assembly was elected from 153 districts on the basis of popular vote. An additional 51 representatives were indirectly elected proportional to the votes received by each party. Likewise, only party members were allowed to hold office in an effort to build horizontal organizations. Under the "reformed" system, the two highest vote-getters in 73 districts win seats in the Assembly. Indirectly elected members are no longer chosen on a proportional basis but are now nominated by the president and approved by the National Conference which serves as a rubber stamp for Park's authority. There are 73 indirectly elected Assembly members who owe their support to Park personally.\textsuperscript{19}

The Yushin reforms had the effect of destroying any chance of effectively challenging the regime from within the system. The Assembly had been neutralized as an avenue for institutionalized opposition, thereby reinforcing the traditional pattern. The relative parliamentary strengths of the DRP and the opposition graphically illustrate the effects of the new reforms, as shown in the table which follows.

Finally, although the Yushin reforms managed to eliminate serious threats to the regime from the Assembly, the reforms also brought about a serious decline in the importance of the DRP itself. One-third of the Assembly, the indirectly elected members, had been

\textsuperscript{19}Sung-il Choi, "The Electoral Reform," op. cit., pp. 1092-1101.
Parliamentary Strengths of the DRP and its Opposition Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>DRP Directly Elected</th>
<th>DRP Indirectly Elected</th>
<th>Opposition Directly Elected</th>
<th>Opposition Indirectly Elected</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
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</table>

forced to sever their ties with the party, making them directly responsible to Park himself. The fact that it was no longer necessary to maintain party connections delayed the process of decentralization as well as democratic innovations. Sung-joo Han writes: "The Yushin Constitution not only weakened the opposition and the legislative and judicial branches of the government, but also brought about a drastic reduction of the ruling Democratic Republic Party."22

The curtailment of representative inputs had one important consequence for the future of the Korean system: the inability to effect change from within the system itself. The inability to provide for peaceful, institutionalized change is a dangerous phenomenon in

20Ibid.


22Ibid.
a highly politicized nation such as Korea. Just as the blatant extra-legal tactics of the Rhee regime sparked the Student Revolution, so too the suppressive tactics of Park contributed to a volatile situation. Not only did the democratic process suffer under coercive systems, but potential instability through dissatisfaction increased as well.
SUPPRESSIVE TIME LINE

YEAR


ECONOMY

BUILDING ECONOMIC STABILITY

POLITICAL CRISIS

LEGITIMACY

ELECTION

JAPAN TREATY CRISIS. MASS DEMONSTRATION

OPPOSITION TO VIETNAM INVOLVEMENT

SUPPRESSIVE RESPONSE

MILITARY JUNTA PRESS CONTROL MARTIAL LAW

MARTIAL LAW ARMY INTO SEOUL

POLITICAL BAN

CURRENT

SYSTEMIC MANIPULATION

BIRTH OF KCIA AS POLITICAL BASE AND FUND RAISER

LIFTS POLITICAL BAN 30 DAYS BEFORE ELECTION

PARK RESIGNS COMMISSION

1 PARTY ASSEMBLY

TO RATIFY JAPAN TREATY

SCHOOLS CLOSED
SUPPRESSIVE TIME LINE

YEAR


ECONOMY

LARGE INFUX OF CAPITAL AND RAPID ECONOMIC GROWTH.

GROWTH SLOWS.
END OF VIET-NAM AID.
3.5 BILLION DEBT.
NIXON TARIFFS

POLITICAL CRISIS

REATIONS AGAINST GOVERNMENT CONTROL.
PARK'S 2ND TERM COMING TO AN END.
FEAR OF ISOLATION POOR DP SHOWING IN ELECTION.

SUPPRESSIVE RESPONSE

KCIA INFILTRATION INTO ALL ORGANIZATIONS.

EMERGENCY REGIME.
MARTIAL LAW.

SYSTEMIC MANIPULATION

10% KICKBACK FROM FOREIGN LOANS TO PARTY.

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO SECURE 3RD TERM FOR PARK.

YUSHIN CONSTITUTION RE-APPORTIONING LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATION.
CHAPTER III

Suppressive Rationales

In the previous chapter we have established the continual suppressive progression which ran through the Park regime. In this chapter we will attempt to explore Park's attitudes concerning the necessity for the maintenance of that suppressive element. It is our contention that Park had come to view his continual control over society as absolutely essential to the growth and security of the nation. Likewise we find that Park had come to regard himself as the only possible figure capable of providing that control and offering rational developmental programs. He viewed the concept of opposition as divisive and threatening rather than as a source of alternate inputs to the decision-making process. He considered politicians and the process of politics as ineffective and dangerous to his own goals of development, which are defined in terms of economic development and military security. Park's actions as head of state reflected these orientations aptly: he tended to resort to extra-systemic measures and constitutional manipulation in order to continually reestablish the basis of his control over the nation.

This chapter will examine a large body of Park's writings and public statements in an attempt to illuminate the progression of his control orientation as he shaped and, in turn, was shaped by the events in South Korea from 1961 until 1972.

We have been able to delineate six major topic areas which
recur throughout Park's statements. Each topic area will be analyzed in light of the changes in perspective over the years. The topic areas are:

1. Human Rights. Writings in this section will be concerned with concepts of personal freedom.

2. Anti-Communism. Statements concerning the nature of the threat from North Korea and its effects on the nature of internal controls and suppression.

3. Politics, Politicians, and the Masses. This Area explores Park's perceptions concerning the viability of the democratic political process and the ability of the masses of his country to function within such a system.

4. The Press. Park's attitude concerning the news media and the need to control the flow of information are examined.

5. The Primacy of Economics. The crucial importance of continual economic development at any cost was central to Park's perception of the need to maintain suppressive controls.

6. Park's Role. This final section will attempt to discover Park's perception of his role in the development of South Korea.

These six topic areas will be explained in greater depth utilizing the writings of Park in an attempt to more closely understand the philosophical development of Park Chung-hee.
Abbreviations

In order to make the voluminous amount of footnotes that such a study must require somewhat less unwieldy, we have devised a system of abbreviations for identifying the quotes used within their proper published context. A given quote will be followed by the citation in parentheses with the date. We feel that such a method will allow a greater sense of continuity as well as helping to sequentially discover the growth of Park's thought.


Human Rights

Park's perception of the concept of human rights is defined by those qualifiers which he imposed upon the idea. Human rights are considered desirable but only in certain circumstances. In this unit we will attempt to discover those qualifiers on freedom which Park utilized as suppressive rationales.

The earliest writings of Park in power exhibited a relatively strong emphasis upon the necessity for wide-spread human rights in
order for society to be a qualitative good. The exigencies of power politics in the Korean sphere profoundly affected his perceptions, and his concept of the role of freedom in society altered with each new pressure. Freedom was always seen as containing limitations. In 1962 Park wrote, "... development and progress is possible only with democratic freedom and initiative." (O.N.P., 1962, p. ix).

Freedom, however, is an amorphous term. Park qualified, "The greater the freedom, the greater the spirit of service." (O.N.P., 1962, p. 44). Freedom was therefore seen as containing limitations of national interest and entailing certain obligations. In later years, as Park confronted opposition in various forms, he tended to lay greater emphasis upon those obligations rather than the benefits of freedom.

The role of the state in insuring personal freedom hinges upon the survival of the state. Threats to the state, for Park, tended to threaten the larger freedom. In order to guarantee the freedom of the state, it is sometimes necessary to restrict individual freedoms. A case in point, Park, writing in 1962, stated,

> There is bound to come in the foreseeable future a society in which every individual can fully enjoy basic freedoms and rights to live, to think and speak, to participate in political activities . . . We must guarantee the right for everyone and anyone to think and speak the way he chooses. . . . how dangerous it would be if Communist imperialism, in the disguise of democracy, made use of the freedom of thought and speech in their propaganda and agitation.  

(O.N.P., 1962, pp. 38-9)

The dichotomy of freedom which occurs in the previous statement creates a fertile atmosphere for the rationales which enabled the
regime to restrict the freedom of dissent within the society.

The pressures of the 1963 election seemed to make Park more preoccupied with problems of controlling a volatile and not always rational anti-regime movement. In his 1963 inaugural address Park emphasized the need to sacrifice immediate personal freedom in order to insure an atmosphere of stability to facilitate development. The chief threat to that stability was seen as, "... political and social insecurity caused by non-cooperation and factional strife." (O.N.P., 1962, p. 19). The question of "cooperation" becomes of paramount interest at this point. The need to forgo personal gratification so that the state may remain stable and all may prosper is crucial.

The volatile anti-governmental demonstrations concerned with the 1964-65 Japan Treaty negotiations served to further calcify Park's attitudes about the need to impose limitations on the freedom of expression. His 1962 statement illuminates the paradox inherent in his approach: "I think it is one thing to guarantee freedom of speech and quite another to allow distorted, irresponsible and immoderate freedom of speech." (Mj.Sp., I, 1963, p. 287). Likewise, Park stated in the same speech, "It is my belief that the liberty of the people, or the security of the nation, cannot be undermined just because of freedom of speech." (Mj. Sp., I, 1963, p. 287). Park managed to separate freedom of speech from the concept of the people's liberty with almost surgical dexterity. The freedom to agree with the government was always guaranteed and served as no measure of personal liberties.
As the national controversy in opposition to the Korean-Japan Treaty mounted in 1965, Park began to realize the necessity to rely more heavily upon the concept of "cooperation" as a major qualifier of personal liberty. He stated: "... freedom we cannot now maintain easily. We must cooperate and have wisdom and courage to obtain and keep such freedom." (Mj. Sp. I, 1965, p. 40). Cooperation becomes essential if one considers Park's growing conviction that only his ideas were viable. All "reasonable men" must eventually arrive at those same ideas as Park might propose. This thinking process reveals two characteristics of Park. On the one hand the concept that there are single solutions to complex social problems, rather than a wide range of paths, and on the other hand, that opposition to the one path of social reform may be negated with clear conscience. Therefore the necessity for cooperation, enforced cooperation if need be, is linked to the threat of loss of freedom. In 1966 Park stated: "... diverging opinions actually lead to understanding which, in turn, makes possible that degree of cooperation which is essential to our time and in our area." (Mj. Sp. I, 1966, p. 47).

In his 1967 acceptance speech for presidential candidacy Park reemphasized the need for unity in order to insure national survival. The idea of internal and external threats to the nation's continued success and security congealed into a major suppressive rationale, rather than a rallying cry to focus national production. The need for unity in the face of threats (economic, political, military) is evidenced in the following passage. "To enable our
nation to maintain its eternal life in this stern age of competition, and further to make our future glorious, we must, with stronger unity and more strenuous endeavors, keep our march going . . ." (Mj. Sp. I, 1967, p. 195). At this point Park had largely phased out of his speeches his earlier emphasis of human rights and had gravitated instead toward the necessity for unity and cooperation.

By 1969 Park's definition of democracy managed to neatly exclude those implied concepts of freedom and liberty. His 1969 statement is both pithy and absolute: "The nature of democratic society may be summed up in the phrase: 'rule of the law'." (Mj. Sp. I, 1969, p. 85). The increasing pressures of the seventies, the Nixon economic restraints against Korean imports, and the security problem envisioned due to the start of big power detente combined to cause Park to calcify his position concerning the importance of concepts of unity and cooperation over concepts of national and personal freedom.\(^1\) Park's perceptions concerning the validity of dissent within society developed from a classical interpretation into a suppressive rationale as the masses attempted to exercise those freedoms in a manner unacceptable to Park. The greater the stresses he encountered, the more he became convinced of the necessity for greater controls over society.

**Anti-Communism**

The nature of the communist threat and the powerful anti-

communist sentiment of the South Korean people as a result of the destruction of the 1950-53 war provided Park with an important rationale for the need for tight internal controls. The emergency nature of continued Northern hostility allowed him to utilize a Lockian rationale which affirmed that only recurring and predictable situations fell within the realm of law. Emergencies, by definition are neither recurring or predictable and necessitate the use of extra-legal actions by the government. John Kautsky discusses the utility of a clearly recognizable external threat to a modernizer in power. The communist threat allowed Park to identify, "... all real and imagined enemies with the external enemy."² This method of identification is important in that the opponents to the regime may be classified as agents of the external foe, thereby placing them out of that society. The exclusion of opposition from a regime's concept of a society allows that regime to believe that the society is firmly supportive. Kautsky warns that the eventual result of such an indentification is a condition wherein, "The preoccupation of the regime with the external enemy . . . gives to its policies a paranoid character."³

One of the primary rationales for the increase in internal suppression was the communist threat. This negative ideological stance is reminiscent of the tactics of Syngman Rhee during the First Republic. In 1962, Park condemned Rhee's utilization of the communist

³Ibid.
menace: "... oppression of the people was justified in the name of anti-communism." (O.N.P., 1962, p. 19). In the Korean political arena, where the memories of the civil war are still strong, anti-communism is a very real popular cause. It is also a cause which lends itself all too well to the manipulations of those in power. In a statement delivered at a rally before sending a military expeditionary force to Viet Nam, Park referred to "... the just and righteous cause of anti-communism." (Mj. Sp. I, 1965, p. 237).

Park's view of the Northern regime is aptly illustrated by his 1969 statement to the people of the North "... who are under communist persecution." (Mj. Sp. I, 1968, p. 246). The emergency nature of the communist menace became the threat to the nation which necessitated the 1972 coup in office. Fearful of decreased U.S. support following the pronouncement of the Nixon Doctrine, Park sought to tighten internal security in order to abrogate the threat of guerrilla insurgency from fifth columnists. In a special statement issued late in January 1975 Park reemphasized the seriousness of the northern threat:

As for international politics, the possibility of the outbreak of local wars has been increasing, despite the efforts for detente among world powers. Under these circumstances the North Korean Communist are frantically attempting to obliterate our freedom and even existence. (Korean News #141, Jan. 23, 1975, p. 2)

The highly publicized exposure of an internal communist plot was announced late in February, 1975. It was claimed the defunct People's Revolutionary Party still had underground operational members in the South. It was also claimed that during the 1973 elections...
they conspired with students and other communists to overthrow the government. The Justice Ministry claimed that the organization was "... an anti-state organization designed by the North Korean Communists to overthrow the Republic of Korea by violence and establish a Communist regime in the South." (Korean News #147, Feb. 1975, p. 2). The important point is that the regime is quick to identify students and other internal opposition of a non-communist nature, with the communist menace from the North. Park reaffirmed this identification in a later speech concerned with the downfall of South Viet Nam to the communists. National security and internal controls were regarded vital because "Some students and religious persons are talking about democracy and freedom of speech. But can we enjoy them when the North Korean Communists attack the South and occupy the whole territory?" (Korean News #150, Apr. 4, 1975, p. 1).

The fall of Viet Nam provided Park with a graphic tool for illustrating the very real dangers of communism. He maintained that the fall of Viet Nam was due to the fact that "... its public opinion is split and it is plunged into confusion." In the same statement Park warned: "Any act contributing to a split of national opinion or misleading the public will only serve the enemy." (Korean News, #153, Apr. 29, 1975). Park managed to bridge the logical gap which connected any opposition with the external foe. The freedom which Park proposed had come to be identified with anti-communism, no matter what the cost to personal liberty. Once again the dichotomy between national and personal freedom in the thought system of Park becomes manifest.
The only significant alteration of Park's long-standing anti-communism until 1979 occurs during the abortive North-South talks of 1972. The goals of the talks were to "... preclude a recurrence of war, to mitigate tensions between the South and the North, to seek a national unity transcending differences in ideology, thoughts and system, and to achieve a peaceful and independent unification ..." (North-South Dialogue in Korea, #1, 1973, p. 1). Soon after the failure of the talks, Park returned to his traditional position. As an excuse to quell the mounting opposition to his policies, Communism was neatly linked with dissent. According to Park, "If the people indulge in splitting the national opinion, unable to comprehend the grave situation in which we find ourselves today, the security of the nation will fall prey to power struggles again, resulting in the tragedy of incurring reinvasion by the North Korean Communists." (Korean News, #139, Jan. 1, 1975).

The presence of a clearly identifiable external foe provided the Park regime with a ready-made rationale for internal suppression. Park determined that all opposition was divisive and that divisiveness led to national weakness, allowing the Northern menace to prevail. Only with the suppression of dissent can the nation guarantee that such a weakness never occurs. Therefore, for Park, opposition to his policies was directly related to a treasonous desire to overthrow the government and replace it with Communism.

Politics, Politicians, and the Masses

Park's attitudes concerning the nature of politics, politicians,
and the masses explains to a great extent his heavy-handed and manipulative policies regarding the Korean political system. Park's negative perception of politicians, forged in the bitter and divisive atmosphere of the earlier republics, underwent little significant change during his time in office. Operating out of a static conception regarding the inefficiency of politics as a problem solving mechanism, Park considered politicians as a class to be obstructionist, self serving, and morally corrupt. The perception of the necessity to control the actions of this class is strongly connected to Park's ultimate usurption of the powers of state in 1972.

In 1962 Park spoke of the "... corruption of the greedy former politicians . . ." (T.C.T.R.A.I., 1962, p. 47), and referred to the cause of the revolution as a "clean-up": "The object of a clean-up is trash--the old politicians." (Ibid., p. 63). On February 27 of that same year Park requests that "... all politicians should abandon selfish obsessions and dedicate all their energy to the country . . ." (T.C.T.R.A.I., 1962, p. 100). Park's decision to participate in civilian politics is explained as the result of political divisiveness: "I arrived at the conclusion that if I turned power over to these people I was giving them tinder for a third revolution." (Ibid., p. 103). Park perceived politicians as a destabilizing force in the Korean context. This perception led to the negation of opposition to the regime.

Hand in hand with Park's negative perception of politicians was his view of politics as an inefficient and dangerous problem-solving mechanism. While condemning the corruption of the Second
Republic, Park revealed a basic attitude toward the process of politics: "... a specially favored class sprang into existence. This class joined hands with the monster, politics, and brought into being a corrupt and privileged bureaucracy ..." (T.C.T.R.A.I., 1962, p. 37). In a 1965 address Park stated,

The chronic political uneasiness which has characterized our political scene of the last 20 years has, I think, resulted from a lack of political leadership, platform, and the ideals of political parties. (Mj. Sp. V. 1, 1965, p. 294)

Park firmly settled the question of viable political parties in the 1972 Yushin Constitution by largely obrogating their necessity to office seekers in contrast to the provisions of the Third Republic Constitution. Park's so-called coup in office served to place him above the "monster, politics" as well as allowing him a personal control over the political arena.

Park had little faith in the political maturity of the Korean masses. This perception forms yet another rationale for delaying any mass oriented pluralistic reform in the Korean system. Early in his rule Park expressed the need to transform the people in order to promote development. He wrote in 1962: "Without a human revolution, social reconstruction is impossible." (O.N.P., 1962, p. VII). The nature of mass political retardation was rooted, according to Park, in the traditional Yi Dynasty. He wrote: "Perhaps the most evil vestige of all was the stunted growth of the masses as a political force." (Ibid., 1962). This "stunted growth" of the political ability of the masses formed a major rationale for Park's continued control.
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In spite of the high levels of literacy and exposure to mass media, Park still maintained that the quality of mass inputs was extremely low. In his 1975 New Year's message Park attacked his opposition on the basis of their obstinancy, rather than over policy cleavages. "Some have repeatedly gone to the extreme of opposing everything the government does just for the sake of opposition, without bothering to reflect upon whether it is right or wrong." (Policy Series, #22, 1975, p. 14.) Park even went so far as to warn opposition elements that their opposition would be viewed as "... blurring the sense of national security among the people." (Policy Series, #21, 1974, p. 13). This statement is doubly instructive in that it not only demonstrates the politician's lack of scruples, but affirms the malleability of the masses as well. Becoming more blatant as internal control mechanisms become more overpowering, Park warned: "In this regard, politicians in our country or some intellectuals who indulge in such irresponsible rhetoric should be careful about themselves." (Ibid., 1974).

Park's perceptions of politics, politicians, and the masses negated the possibility of his shifting the emphasis of the Korean system to allow for greater pluralist inputs. Politicians were seen as inherently corrupt and divisive. Political process was viewed as inefficient and dangerous. The masses themselves were seen as a potential threat to the regime which must be controlled because of their lack of political sophistication. The effects of these perceptions were the increased personal absolute control over the system by Park and a high level of internal suppression.
The Press

Although it is readily apparent that Park's views concerning free speech were a facet of his greater control orientation, a similar facet of that orientation must be his perception of the press and news media. Park's actions regarding the press are an apt reflection of his view of the need to control dissent. The Korean news media was certainly no exception to the general chaos of the Second Republic. Widely circulated scandal sheets and the proliferation of blackmail schemes by self-styled journalists served to aggravate a dangerous and unstable political situation. Lifting the press controls of the First Republic backlashed strongly. Park became convinced that the press was a dangerous element if left to its own devices and that some degree of control was necessary. In 1962 he wrote: "Journalists would never had desired the kind of freedom they enjoyed under the former (regime), the freedom that was given to a bogus journalism which hurt, directly and indirectly, the press that was pursuing the right path. Thus the government restored the dignity of the press and saved the press from a crisis." (T.C.T.R.A.I., 1962, p. 92). In 1963 Park addressed himself to what he regarded as the duties of the press. "The general principle that freedom is accompanied by responsibility can be applied to journalism." And, "Our journalists are asked to consider carefully what social effects it would bring about if the press, due to its over emphasis on its own freedom, neglects its responsibility; and what results the evil effects would produce in the long run."

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Press opposition was regarded in the same light as all opposition; as dangerous and pointless obstructionism to the rational policies of the Park regime. He wrote again in 1968:

I cannot but point out that there are still a few journalists who, faithful to the ideology of their newspapers, negate, oppose, or ignore a certain issue against their real intention by turning a deaf ear to the voice of their own conscience and reason which demands them to affirm and support it.

(Ibid., 1978, p. 100)

The above statement is a masterful stroke of self-deception. It affirms Park's strong conviction of his own infallibility as well as the obstinate nature of the opposition. The press must be contained and controlled as all potential threats to the central power must be contained and controlled.

The Primacy of Economic Growth Over Political Development

The importance of the economic sphere was always of primary importance to the Park regime. Since the bulk of the regime's legitimacy was performance based, the growth of the sector is essential to the continuance of that legitimacy. Park wrote in 1962: "One of the most immediate crises faced by our nation today is that we have yet to be liberated from poverty." (O.N.P., 1962, p. 35). Park viewed the debilitated nature of the economy to be the primary contributor to the chaos of the Second Republic. "Such extreme poverty was the direct cause of theft, robbery, murder, and other
social crimes; it offered the route and channel for Communist infiltration, and it posed the greatest threat to liberal democracy itself." (O.N.P., 1962, p. 37). It is interesting to examine the shift in Park's perception of the causal sequence between economic growth and stability. In 1962 he stated that "... economics precedes politics and culture." (T.C.T.R.A.I., 1962, p. 26). Six years later, after being initiated into the pragmatic realities of Korean politics, a shift of emphasis occurred. He wrote: "The basic policy of our administration may be summed up in short as, 'A plant named prosperity grows in the soil called stability.'" (Mj. Sp., 1968, p. 335). Poetic license aside, this statement served as an important rationale for an increasingly rigid control system. Political development must wait for economic growth and the two concepts seemed almost mutually exclusive to Park. For example, according to his 1971 statement: "Through the experience of this decade, we have proved to ourselves, and to others, that democracy can flourish only upon an economically fertile soil." (Mj. Sp. V. II., 1971, p. 92).

Park's continued emphasis upon the necessity for cooperation and unity in order to insure the economic success of his regime will formulate a major suppressive category in the next chapter. His use of the linked-threat message in order to minimize opposition to his politics were a blatant attempt to use the economic progress as a threat to attempt to control the rising tide of anti-regime sentiment. He managed to make the significant connection between national security and the state of the economy. His identification
of opposition with the external enemy allowed him to justify the continuance of a rigidly controlled police state.

**Park's Self Perception**

Although contemporary psychologists would wince at the use of the term "Messiah Complex," for the purposes of our study we find it to be a useful tool in gaining a deeper perspective upon the self-perceptions of Park. We have attempted to examine the way in which he viewed the world and political structure around him. We must now turn to Park's view of himself and his role within a system for which he was largely responsible.

Park looked upon himself as the personal savior of the Korean nation. He viewed his role as one of tremendous self-sacrifice and heroic effort. In conjunction with these views was his perception of his personal indispensibility. Given this his actions regarding opposition, and the rationales he gave for these actions, we find that a deeper analysis of Park himself is necessary.

The inevitability of the military coup functioned as a constant in Park's perception. He soon came to believe that without the coup, the nation would have been destroyed. In 1962 he wrote: "We have arrived at the solemn moment whereby hangs the very fate of our people—whether we live or die, rise or fall." (O.N.P., 1962, p. 17). The importance of the revolution becomes personalized into the importance of his own role by 1966. Consider the following quote:

The pages of history are strewn with the shameful wars in which the power of righteousness to protect human dignity
has been constantly challenged by onrushing waves of injustice and evils, and with images of heroic persons who willingly sacrificed themselves to uphold the conscience of the times . . .  

(Mj. Sp., 1966, p. 71)


The combination of religious overtones, Park's insistence upon the evils to Korea which he considered his alternative, as well as his perception of his own "righteousness" served to tinge his personality with overtones of what we must loosely refer to as a kind of political messiah complex. Not only had he "saved" the nation from the evils which would destroy the Korean people, but he accomplished the "sacred mission" at the cost of a great personal sacrifice. Opposition to such a "heroic" figure was naturally regarded with contempt. His personalization of the growth of the Korean economic and military stance was soon followed by his personalization of the system which spurred Park on to increase the suppression of opposition.

Summary

Utilizing the writings of Park Chung-hee over a fifteen year period we have attempted to explain the philosophic orientation behind his policies of suppression. We have classified the available writings into six areas of recurring concern and have followed the
development of his political philosophy during that period of time. Park's writings have in common the central unifying theme of the necessity of internal control in order to stabilize and develop. Concepts of freedom and human rights are subordinate to duty and cooperation with the politics of the regime. The press must not agitate against the government thereby damaging the stability of the system. The threat of the Communists to the North requires strict unity of opinion and creates the concept of the identification of internal dissent with the external foe. The economy can only flourish in a stable atmosphere of cooperation and non-dissent. Politicians are inherently corrupt and the process of politics itself is inimical to progress. The masses are politically immature and easily manipulated. The total picture then required the continued tight personal control of Park as the only man capable of saving the nation from disintegration and chaos, as well as the unquestionable support of the masses for his policies.

If good intentions do indeed form the paving blocks of the road to hell, then we are forced to consider the sincerity of Park's personal philosophy. Politicians are after all not noted for the reliability and veracity of their public statements. It is important to note that Park never considered himself a politician. He placed himself above politics and thereby seriously crippled the political development and institutionalization of his system. In the final chapter we will assess the sincerity of Park's philosophy by comparing the fluctuations of statement content with his responses to crises confronting his system. If we find a correlation between the
fluctuations of his statements with the policy changes of the regime, we will also be able to affirm the reliability of the content analysis as a useful predictive tool where such public statements of a leader are available and the necessary background and policy intentions are known.
CHAPTER IV
Categorization

In an attempt to derive the most meaningful trends in the attitudinal shift of Park we have derived categories which rely on clusters of statement types. Two antithetical clusters comprised of three sub-clusters were devised. Since it is readily apparent that one of the chief objections to Park's regime both in Korea and the United States was the increase in policies of suppression and rigidity, we must make certain a'priori value judgements concerning the intent of a given statement as it relates to increased control. It is at this point that the validity of this study must come under closest scrutiny. It would be too easy to include a statistically "significant" number of dubious entrees in order to reflect our own procedural bias. We have attempted to minimize this possibility by attempting to be as specific as possible in detailing not only the types of statements which are to be included in a given category, but also those variations which should be excluded as well. The clusters and sub-clusters are grouped as follows:

Cluster One: Control Statements

These are statements which when followed in their logical conclusion would manifest fewer mass inputs, affirm the inability of the masses to operate a pluralist system, and deny the validity of alternative modernizing policies.
Sub-Cluster, Code Ia: Statements by Park which call for greater unity from the masses for the regime in the face of a given threat.

Although cooperation and unity are worthy goals in a developing state, when these concepts are conceptually linked with threat statements, the sum of meaning becomes greater than the parts. Indeed, since the declaration of National Emergency in 1972 paved the way for Park's almost total control over a populate infiltrated with secret police, the threat statement can be directly linked to the need for tighter control.

'Cooperation' statements not linked with a threat message are excluded from quantification. We define the linked threat message as being composed of statements which predict the qualitatively bad consequences whose results are conditional upon the failure of the masses to cooperate with the regime. In Park's speeches these consequences are the eventual Communist take-over of the state, the destruction of the economic success, and a return to the general instability and chaos which characterized the Second Republic. One final consideration must be the validity of these threats. The threat from the Communist North is real but not of an emergency nature: the balance of forces on either side of the parallel makes the prospect for an invasion of the scale of 1950 unlikely. The recent world wide economic recession has indeed affected Korea. However, it is doubtful whether or not the success of the economy hinged upon the docile support of the regime by the masses at this point. Finally, a return to the instability of 1960 is also unlikely. Indeed the process of stabilization and control effected
by the military has provided fifteen years without serious threat to institutions of state.

**Sub-Cluster, Code Ib:** Statements which affirm the inability of the masses and alternative modernizers to provide the regime with viable inputs.

These statements include affirmations of the corruption and petty obduracy of politicians as a group. Although politicians in Korea have never been noted for their high levels of civic responsibility, the first step towards a more pluralistic system which provides for peaceful transfer of control is a political class which is trained as an embryonic elite. Likewise, denigration of politicians implies the perception that such men are power rivals. Their retardation as a class serves to destroy legitimate power transfer, inhibits long-range stability, as well as alienating that class which should serve as the transmission belt of ideas from both the masses as well as the regime.

A perceived inability of the masses to function in a democratic system leads directly to the perceived necessity of control. Therefore, statements which denounce the people as being unworthy of the state form the remainder of this sub-cluster.

**Sub-Cluster Ic:** Statements which place limitations upon the right of free speech and press.

The right to agree with a given regime is almost always guaranteed. The right of dissent, however, is rarely evident. This cluster is composed of statements which directly refer to speech
or press and the need to control those functions. While there may be a fine line between freedom and license in this respect, the record of the Park government has been taken into account in the formulation of this category. The fact that Press laws restrict the more respectable papers and journals as well as the 'scandal rags' which flourished in the Second Republic is significant.

Cluster Two: Anti-Control Statements

This cluster represents statements whose conceptual impact is the antithesis of Cluster One. Therefore, statements of a pluralist and democratic nature concerning alternative inputs to the regime, supportive statements concerning the populace and politicians, and the desirability of freer expression or any statements supportive of these concepts are to be included.

Sub-Cluster, Code 2a: Statements which uphold the ideal of democracy as being manifest within greater freedom from mass control.

This grouping must be the most basic and self explanatory. If it is at all possible to detect a speaker's purposive behavior from his public statements, an orientation toward greater freedom from control should be readily apparent.

It is essential to bear in mind that such 'democratic' statements do not necessarily reflect Park's orientation. Such statements may only be attempts to present his regime in a favorable light in an attempt to garner support. The fact that Park felt the need to win the support of the masses indicates to an extent that those
masses have a viable input for the legitimacy of the regime.

Sub-Cluster, Code 2b: This cluster is comprised of statements which favor or espouse the necessity for freedom of speech and press. Park's clearly negative stand towards dissent indicates that this cluster should function on a low level of statements. Statements which call for voluntary press restraints as opposed to regime imposed restraints are to be included in this cluster.

Sub-Cluster, Code 2c: This final cluster is concerned with Park's perceptions concerning the political system as 'system'. Statements in favor of politics, the role of politicians as problem solvers, and the desirability to include the masses in the decision making process are included.

These anti-suppressive clusters will be examined against periods where the regime felt impelled to persuade the populace rather than to coerce them. Such periods would be prior to elections, during periods of rampant civil disorder, and the potential threat of such disorder. Serious declines in this cluster of statements would indicate that the need to placate the masses is low. A period of control would determine low efficacy on the part of both the masses and opposition politicians.

Data Collection and Utilization

We have organized the speeches contained in Major Speeches, Volumes One and Two, by Park according to year. The total number of full pages of text rounded to the next full page was then
tabulated. The yearly variance of total pages made it necessary to divide the number of statements in each year into the number of total pages per year. We thereby achieved ratios of statements per page, per year in all six of the sub-clusters as well as aggregate ratios for the two main Clusters. Our array of ratios was then graphed along the period of the speeches, 1964-1972. The Time Line of Suppressive actions presented in Chapter Two was superimposed over the cluster graphs in order to discover whether or not any similarity between change in the cluster values could be related to important points on the Time Line. Several striking correlations occurred between most of the clusters and the Time Line. We will now present and examine the fruits of our research by cluster.

**Cluster I, a**

This cluster is comprised of linked-threat cooperation messages. In the ten year span, three major peaks appear: in 1964, 1968, and 1971. 1964 presented the fledgling regime with serious anti-government opposition and civil disorder due to the Japan-Korea treaty negotiations. Riots in the spring were soon followed by the declaration of martial law in July. Park's reactions to this opposition is aptly reflected in the 1964 peak. The ratio declined sharply in 1965. This year witnessed a brief period of a one party assembly which not only ratified the controversial Japan treaty, but also strengthened the financial base of Park's party through the
influx of foreign capital. Compared to 1964, 1965 is a period of declining crisis and relative stabilization. 1966 and 1967 witnessed a drastic vertical climb of statements to the highest peak in 1968. Although this period included the greatest economic success in Korean history, the regime was nonetheless engaged in the process of extending controls throughout the society. The KCIA took advantage of this new source of funding and permeated student groups, political and social organizations and conducted harrassments of the opposition. Although Park won a plurality in the 1967 election, he lacked a firm base of popular support. Only the burgeoning economic development compensated for the decline in personal liberties. By 1971 loss of economic development provided Park with an additional threat. The rise of these statements as well as the increased control techniques indicates that Park wished to further stabilize his position in power. Likewise, this trend indicates that the personal freedoms allowed were greater leading up to the peak than the peak.

1968 is the major peak in this cluster. The following year witnessed a drastic decline in I, a. statements. We see that the year following the peak contains a major suppressive move on the part of the regime. Through systemic manipulation Park was able to amend the constitution to allow himself to run for a third term as well as exercising greater discretionary controls over the populace. If we view the statements rising to the 1968 peak as leading up to greater control, as well as being a reflection of the perceived need for greater control, the sharp dip occurs in the period of effected control, i.e., the 1969 amendment. It is important to note that the
sharp decline in this cluster in 1969 is nonetheless above the 1964 peak. This would indicate a lessening of statements but would also maintain a high perceived need for control indicating that the control is greater, not the perception of the need less.

The situation alters for the regime in the seventies. The material success of the nation was in jeopardy and the showing in the 1971 election was plagued with accusations of irregularities. If we may view Park's 1972 coup in office as a major suppressive point, then the sharp rise in I, a. statements in 1971 echoes the previous peak. The perceived need for control evidenced in the speeches preceded the action by the regime to 'solve' the problem with which the statements are concerned. The sharp drop in the year of effected control indicates Park's tighter control over society.

Code Ia statements are the most significant cluster numerically and their pattern reflects the norm of the aggregate totals. Codes Ib and Ic differ from the pattern slightly due to the specific nature of their contents.

Code Ib. Ib statements are negative statements concerning the viability of politicians and the masses to effectively provide inputs to a rational development policy. As these are statements which would tend to place the regime in disfavor among those elements of society, their fluctuation is more closely dependent on the need to mollify the masses as opposed to the necessity to rationalize effected controls. Code Ib peaks in 1964 and 1968 like Ia, but the third peak occurs in 1972 after increasing from 1969. We feel that
due to the serious and pervasive nature of the 1972 system change as compared to the relatively minor change in 1969, the need to rationalize Park's unlimited personal control was great enough to sustain the code cluster through the year of effected controls. After 1972 the statements tail off sharply as the actual control makes opposition elements in politics less of a threat. It is important to note that all three peaks in the first two sub-clusters occurred on the same point in five out of six cases and within one year in the sixth case.

**Code Ic.** Ic is concerned with statements calling for controls over free speech and the news media. It is the most unique category due to the definite nature of press controls. The media is a small target and easily indentified. Therefore its control requires simple legislation and fiscal manipulation. Ic peaks twice in 1964 and 1966 and disappears from the speeches by 1969. 1964 was the year of the first Press Ethics law which was followed by a sharp reduction of Ic statements. 1966 was the year that more extensive control over the press was achieved through the technique of overextending credit to the press to the point where the government could control their activities. By 1969 the statements disappear indicating the control or submission of the major opposition to the regime in the press.

**Cluster I, Total**

The total cluster graph was obtained by tabulating the sum
of all three clusters divided by the number of pages in a given year. As a result, this cluster is based on greater frequency and yields a higher ratio. The total Cluster I graph matches the path of Ia statements in that its peaks are in 1964, 1968 and 1971. This total graph reflects the response quality to internal situations in the speeches of Park. By observing the rise of suppressive statements it becomes possible to predict gross suppressive behavior.

Cluster II, Sub-Cluster IIa

Cluster II statements are non-suppressive statements which would imply less control from the regime should they be followed to their logical conclusion. Cluster IIa statements are concerned with the necessity for maintaining a pluralist system. Statements espousing freedom and democracy as goals of the state are included. Like the majority of statements in Cluster I, IIa peaks in 1964 and 1971. A third peak occurs in 1966, prior to the 1967 election. In the interpretation of the second cluster it becomes necessary to balance two conflicting concepts; that Park is sincere in his democratic statements, or, that his democratic statements are designed to place his regime in a more favorable light. We choose the latter due to Park's much higher level of suppressive statements and the control measures he imposed upon Korean Society. IIa statements decline sharply after 1974 during the treaty crisis, and then rise dramatically in 1966 before the election. After the 1966 peak, the statements decline steadily through 1969. Unlike most of the other clusters, IIa does not peak prior to the 1969 constitutional
revision. This is due in part, to the fact that in order to impress greater controls, Park was attempting to divert as much attention as possible away from the concepts of democracy embodied in the cluster. Many statements in this period concerned with freedom and democracy become linked-threat messages and therefore were included in Suppressive Cluster Ia. The statements rise to a final peak in 1971, prior to the Yushin reforms. The 1971 election combined with the most comprehensive control program yet introduced served to elicit democratic statements from Park as a part of the continual election campaigns of these two years, the election and later the referendum of 1972.

Sub-Cluster IIb. IIb is concerned with positive statements regarding freedom of speech and press. Not surprisingly, this code is very similar to cluster Ic which charts negative statements in the same area, although the graph is charted at a much lower level. Like Ic, IIb peaks in 1964 and 1966. We may explain the low incidence of these statements, as well as their peaks by the ease with which press controls have been effected in the sixties. Pro-media, free speech statements disappear after the 1966 peak. Indeed the significance of the very low incidence of these statements reflects that the maintenance of free press and speech are not considered important facets of Park's philosophy of government.

Sub-Cluster IIc. IIc concerns Park's statements in favor of the political process and the role of politicians and the masses in the decision making process. IIc follows what has become the 'classic'
pattern of peaks in this study. The peaks occur in 1964, 1968 and 1971. Unlike the other two sub-clusters in cluster II, IIc drops rather than peaking in 1966. We feel that this is due to the nature of the cluster type. Park was not only seeking the support of the masses at this time, but was also concentrating on eliminating rival politicians as well. Likewise, during the Japan Treaty crisis, Park's perceptions of the masses as capable of functioning in a democratic system declined seriously. The drop from 1964 to 1966 mirrors Park's transition from his more naive military perception of rule to a more cynical albeit realistic conception of the problems of control and development. The 1968 and 1971 peaks may be explained in light of propaganda strategy rather than a new found faith in the masses and alternative modernizers. If one can consider propaganda statements as persuasive in nature, then their decline is evidence of the perception that such persuasion is no longer necessary. Therefore we find that as in the first cluster of statements, once the effected control is manifest, the statements concerning that control disappear.

Cluster II Total

Cluster II totals also follow the classic pattern of peaks and valleys although at a much lower level than Cluster I totals. Cluster II varies in one respect, that is the additional peak in 1966, prior to the 1967 election. The 1964-65 decline reflects Park's disaffection with the possibility of democratic freedoms in terms of developing Korea into a modern state. The growth of his
control orientation is mirrored in this decline. The necessity to maintain his personal control required the periodic revival of the cluster statements in the years prior to major elections or serious control maneuvers. Therefore we find the peaks in 1968, followed by a sharp decline for the remaining two years of the study.

**Summary**

By tracing the two major clusters of suppressive and non-suppressive statement categories we have discovered that the actions of Park may be explained by the content of his speeches. Further studies of a more comprehensive nature conducted along these lines is indicated in order to determine the element of greater predictability of such a system. In the case of Park, however, the degree of control achieved in 1972 may make such a study superfluous. We have found this method to be useful in determining the elite policy intention of Park on gross questions as well as recognizing statements of a propagandistic nature as opposed to sincere manifestations of Park's perceptions. This method is only useful, however, when the cluster statements are compared to a time line of suppression or policy actions in order to gain the additional perspective needed to make the distinction between propaganda and policy intent.

The reliability of the predictive potential in Park's statements are only truly significant in that we have examined them in light of both Park's personal philosophy as well as the record of his actions as leader of the state in the period under discussion. The suppression of opposition in a state generally has the opposite
effect of the elite policy intention. It does not abrogate the
instability that such opposition causes, it merely pushes it under­
ground, making it potentially more dangerous to the stability of
the system. The lack of the concept of loyal opposition in Korean
politics was not attributable to Park, it is a long standing poli­
tical tradition. Park, however, did little to remedy that traditional
problem. Indeed, his quest for stability and solidarity at any
cost served only to aggravate that condition. With the abolition
of the necessity for politicians to run under the auspices of an
organized political party in the Yushin Constitution, Park set that
process back a significant step. By placing himself above the
political process he dealt a serious blow to the development of a
loyal opposition which would serve as not only a source of alternative
governmental inputs, but which would also serve as an institutionalized
method of directing opposition for the good of the national interest.

We feel that the suppression of dissent is the most dangerous
long-term course that a regime can follow. It increases the risk
in a 'high risk' system as well as creating an opposition which
will destroy all the mechanisms of institutionalized government at the
first opportunity. It is clear that the personalized nature of the
Yushin government makes it a dangerously unstable long-term system.
Park's determination that his personal role is essential as well as
his actions of systemic manipulation in order to assure the
continuance of that role, greatly reduce the chances for a peaceful
transfer of power and the continuance of the current constitutional
system. As the fall of Rhee aptly demonstrates, the collapse of a
government system, even if it is replaced by a superior system, has a serious deleterious effect upon all facets of national growth. It remains to be seen whether or not Park is able to maintain his personal control much longer. The chances for survival of his system were directly related to the political survival of Park himself.
suppressiveness statements

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Non Suppressive Statements

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CHAPTER V

Conclusion

This thesis has examined the role of the perceptual changes of the most elite actor in a personalized and suppressive developmental system. Park Chung-hee directed the growth of the South Korean government for eighteen years. The nature and direction of that growth was determined largely by the personal philosophy of Park himself. The obvious advantage of a monocratic system to the observer lies in the significant decrease of important variables which serve to determine that system. The disadvantage of such a state is that the lack of institutionalization of government makes the impetus of rule contingent upon the ever-changing personality and perceptions of the ruler. Therefore, while the policy of government varies with the perceptions of the principal figure, an in-depth analysis of that figure provides the social scientist with significant insight into the future direction such a controlled society may take. By the examination and categorization of the statements and concurrent actions of such an actor it becomes possible to examine not only the dictator's future policy changes in a specific direction, but also to discover the priorities of that ruler as well.

The technique of content analysis gives the researcher a valuable tool by presenting a quantifiable source of perceptual data. Content analysis is not an end in itself, however. It is the
identification of the causal link between statement and action which allows for any relevant understanding of the course of the regime.

The history of Park in power points to several basic and recurring policy actions. The chaotic nature of Korean politics and economics in 1961 necessitated the intervention of the military in order to stave off the threat of total annihilation. The emergency nature of the Park government was to remain an almost constant preoccupation. Opposition to the system was regarded as a threat to the system and treated suppressively. The system itself was secondary to the importance of Park. In order to maintain his perceived necessary control, Park manipulated the system time and again when it threatened to develop out from under that control. The manipulations ranged from the more subtle controls on the media and election campaign regulations to the more drastic Constitutional revisions of 1969 and 1972.

The need for suppression and control in the system were rationalized by Park in light of the phenomenal success his economic policies enjoyed throughout the late sixties and early seventies. Although much of the credit for this success is attributable to the vast influx of foreign capital augmented by the economic fall-out of the United States' Indo-China adventure, this growth nonetheless provided Park with a degree of performance based legitimacy. Economic success has traditionally been the primary rationale of dictators throughout history, from Caesar to Mussolini and Hitler. Economics provide an important mis-direction for the public attention which might turn toward the suppressive political atmosphere.
Like his more flamboyant predecessors in Germany and Italy, Park also utilized the threat of the external communist foe for the purpose of stifling dissent. The significance of the external threat not only reaffirms the emergency nature of the regime but also allows Park to exclude from the protection of society opposition elements which may be easily identified with that external threat. The continual suppressive attitude of the Park governments served to drive the opposition into underground and technically illegal channels. Systemic provisions for dissent allow the regime to identify opposition, provide a safety valve for internal pressures, and at the same time give the government a wider base of conceptual input. Park chose to forgo these advantages for the dubious security provided by the harsh control of that faction of society. Such security is only a temporary phenomenon along the increasingly vicious cycle created by suppression which tends to increase dissatisfaction. The ultimate results of such a policy serve to determine the common end that suppressive monocrats traditionally have shared.

The close connection between Park's policy and philosophic statements and his suppressive actions are readily observable in the fluctuations of the different statement categories presented and discussed in Chapter four. The suppressive statements peak just previous to major suppressive or manipulative actions by Park. This not only creates the possibility of a gross predictive potential of the actions of a monocrat but also affirms the validity of the technique when specific policy intentions categories can be developed.
The personalization of a political system allows for more efficient control and output. These are only two factors which contribute to a nation's political development. A political system should also allow for a long-term security for the members of that system in order for them to predict their future relationship to government. In a personalized system, the lack of institutional safeguards determine the death of that system with the death or expulsion of the monocrat. With the death of a system, the players are suddenly confronted with a new game and a new set of rules, creating a dangerous and unpredictable situation. The destruction of a government seriously threatens whatever advances that government may have achieved. In the case of Park, his performance based legitimacy and military security were in doubt almost at the moment of his death. The lack of mechanisms for the transfer of power is another danger in the non-institutionalized system. Park’s death created an atmosphere of struggle and fear which eventually led to fighting in Seoul and another military government.

At this point it is difficult to say what the fate of the Korean nation will be. One thing remains certain, however, that the question of human rights and government suppression will be of crucial importance in determining the nature and control of conflict and competition in Korea. The reinstitution of military rule appears to be a giant step into the past as far as political development is concerned. Once again Korea is forced to attempt the creation of a viable political system as in 1948, 1960, 1961, and 1972.
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