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**GUIDING THE WILD HEART: STEERING THE STATE
SAFELY BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS**

by

Robert P. Brown

**A Dissertation
Submitted to the
Faculty of The Graduate College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Public Administration
School of Public Affairs and Administration**

**Western Michigan University
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GUIDING THE WILD HEART: STEERING THE STATE SAFELY BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS

Robert P. Brown, D.P.A.

Western Michigan University, 1994

Organizational life and social culture compel individuals toward more radical manifestations of individualism as bureaucracy and society increasingly define personal relationships by rules, regulations and rights. Otherwise incompatible with individualism, this actually contributes to individual and group differentiation when individuals function simply as technicians without the opportunity to gain fulfillment, and they experience existential isolation, becoming detached from their moral and spiritual side. For identity in and control over their own lives, people engage in even more individualistic behavior: working, planning, attaining, or rebelling. The true meanings of freedom and individual rights are perverted and trivialized by this radical individualism as a way of fighting back, but it too has corrosive effects that diminish individual autonomy.

Through a history of individualism culled from U.S. history and the history of Western philosophy, this paper describes what role the individual played in philosophical and political thought from the early Greek and Western religious influences up to and including modern times. The purpose of this research is to (a) develop a theoretical, normative model of authentic individualism—a journeyman philosophy--

that can be adopted by the individual citizen and public administrator as a basis for action; and (b) consider the ramifications of that model for organizational theory, leadership theory, and ethics in government.

The resulting model of authentic individualism focuses on self only in the context of social responsibility and larger considerations of the whole. An other-regarding world view emerges from this model whose essence is in human dignity and commonalty and which: (a) judges every decision by whether it protects or undermines the dignity of the human person; (b) teaches government and organizational leaders to view people as morally developmental individuals driven by values, principles and the desire to do good rather than acquisitive wants, needs, and desires for goods; (c) forces organizations to take a greater societal role with the same responsibility toward others as is expected of individuals; (d) helps managers define their organizations to facilitate total personhood, rather than to demean the individual by treating humans as property; and (e) defines management as a sacred trust for the well-being of others placed in one's care.

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Western Michigan University, 1994

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To my 1989 Cohort in public administration who helped me on my way; to my committee members who guided me along the way; and especially to my wife whose example and inspiration lighted the way.

Robert P. Brown

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Overview

Individual rights have been the driving force behind the laws, social framework, and collective psyche of the people of this country for two centuries. In the United States, freedom is embodied in the concept of individualism, and the U.S. Constitution, particularly the Bill of Rights. In 1987, the nation celebrated the 200th anniversary of the U.S. Constitution. The Bicentennial of the Bill of Rights was also recently observed. With the Third Millennium dawning in just seven short years, one can scarcely think of an activity more important to humanity than continued attention to and dialogue on this subject.

This paper presents a history of individualism culled from U.S. history and the history philosophy. First, this work examines various concepts of individualism that arose in Western philosophy and United States history. It describes what role the individual has played in philosophical and political thought up to and including modern times. It also describes the role of the individual in American history and political development to the present day and attempts to give meaning to the concept of freedom by examining the treatment of individualism in philosophical thought during the Medieval World's ascent to freedom until the Renaissance and Reformation, followed by Western

civilization's escape from freedom during modernity. The same kind of examination is made of history in this country. Thereafter, because history seems to be governed by a certain kind of dialectic--thesis, antithesis, synthesis--the paper attempts a synthesis (although not in the Hegelian sense) of individualism from Western philosophy and U.S. history toward a normative theory of authentic individualism.

A synthesis of authentic individualism from philosophy and history such as this necessarily presupposes an individualistic stance from the outset. This study does not seek to replace individualism with collectivism, but to moderate individualism's harsher elements. At the other extreme, this study takes the presence of government as a given and does not offer a model of individualism that replaces government, or even one that advocates minimal government. Instead, this theory is offered to public administrators and the public alike as a guide for individual conduct during the Third Administrative State in the spirit of giving all, including government, a more humane outlook. Finally, the practical effects of authentic individualism on public administration will be explored, including leadership theory, organizational theory and ethical considerations.

Conceptually, this study is now divided into four parts (see Appendix A for initial division of five parts). Chapter I of part one defines individualism in a discussion of the literature and introduces the concept of authentic individualism. Chapter II describes the study method and the intellectual processes followed to completion. Parts two and three (Chapters III-VIII) examine the political and social ideas related to

individualism as they appear in Western philosophy and U.S. history. Chapter III traces development of the concept of the individual from the Ancients through the Greeks. From there, Chapter IV carries the inquiry from St. Thomas Aquinas through the Renaissance and Reformation to the scientific revolution. Then Chapter V brings the study of individualism in philosophy up to modern times. Chapter VI examines individualism in the developing United States, and Chapter VII continues the analysis through revolutionary times, ending in Chapter VIII with its evolution during modernity. A model of the individual for each period is derived in the summaries of parts two and three at the end of Chapters V, VIII and X. Chapters III-VIII are the data for development of the model of authentic individualism in part four (Chapter IX). Chapter IX is devoted to a description of the need for, conceptual basis for, and development of a new world view for public life. It then becomes the basis for a discussion of the implications that authentic individualism holds for Public Administration in Chapter X.

Purpose of the Research and Research Question

According to Bertrand Badie (Birnbaum, 1990, pp. 96, 114), the state's ideal-type form is diametrically opposed to relations which link those who care for one another, who understand one another, and who live together, organizing shared experience and constructing natural and spontaneous solidarity. The purpose of this paper is twofold: First, it will develop a theoretical, normative model of authentic individualism that can be adopted by the individual citizen and public administrator as a basis for

action that promotes understanding, agreement, friendship, and family and neighborhood relations. Second, it will consider the ramifications of the model for organizational theory, leadership theory and ethics in government.

In order to fulfill all of the objectives described above, it was necessary to find answers to the following questions:

1. What has been the role of the individual in Western political thought?
2. What has it become in the United States?
3. Is this model appropriate?
4. If not, what should it be?
5. What are the implications for Public Administration in the new model?

These issues direct the inquiry and bring focus to the research. From them emerged a single research question: What is American individualism?

Though this study is heavily philosophical and historical and finds its conceptual framework partially embedded in modern principles of cosmology, the above purpose does not suggest an attempt to develop a metaphysics of history, or to engage in metaphysical interpretations of the meaning of history. Neither is it the intent of this work to study the first principles of reality, the problems of being, or the structure of the universe. Nor is it the intent here to discover the underlying causal forces that govern social change. This effort is much more modest; to identify some of the possible socio/historical influences on development of individualism; to discuss what individualism has become; and to offer an

alternative theory of individualism based on other-regarding, relational criteria.

Literature Review of Individualism

Public administration literature has not focused much attention on individualism. To the extent it has been explicitly discussed, it usually appears briefly, undefined and abstract, as something against which other theories, such as community, are proposed. It may also appear as an unstated methodology behind other proposals, such as a plea for personal autonomy in new organizational theories, but it has not received detailed attention in the public administration field. However, it has been given considerable attention in the literature generated in social science, political science, philosophy, and also anthropology. Nevertheless, even in these fields, the comprehensive historical approach to studying and defining individualism employed here has not been used in the literature before.

Arieli (1964) writes that the term individualism was coined by the Saint-Simonians to characterize the condition of humanity in nineteenth-century society. The concept was part of a comprehensive social criticism and was used to describe the negative and destructive character of the society. It was set against the ideal of an organic and unitary social order held together by traditions, common purpose, and functional interdependence. The doctrine of Saint-Simon was a conscious attempt to create a new synthesis from the revolutionary elements of the enlightenment and the conservative reaction. Such a synthesis could only be reached by a re-examination of historic experience. A new

methodology and conceptual framework would grasp the historic reality, discover its laws, and so recognize the basic needs and aims of man. Saint-Simon introduced the term individualism to describe a doctrine based on individual reason, rights, and interests. This doctrine presumed to build society into "an agglomeration of selfish individuals without past and without future, without piety and without dignity, without faith and without loyalty" (Arieli, 1964, p. 221). The basic data that the Saint-Simonians had to deal with was the turbulent period through which the world had passed since the French Revolution. The failure of the revolution to achieve its postulated aims had revealed the inadequacy of the rationalistic and liberal approach and had discredited liberalism in particular and political ideologies in general. It was in this context that the Saint-Simonians introduced the term individualism as a generic principle from modern times manifested in liberalism, laissez-faire attitudes, atheism, materialism, skepticism, Protestantism, and utilitarianism. The term individualism stood for spiritual rootlessness, destructive rationalism, utilitarianism, hedonism, and exploitation under the disguise of laissez-faire. However, the term individuality, on the other hand, stood for human dignity, the capacity of man to grow in reason and morality, for liberty, equality, and fraternity.

The concept of individualism in our society seems to have first been discussed by Alexis de Tocqueville 150 years ago. This French visitor of the 1830s, defined individualism as "a calm and considered feeling which disposes each citizen to withdraw into the circle of family and friends" and "threatens to grow as conditions get more equal" (Bellah et al., 1985, p.

414). As wealth spreads, he continued, such individuals "owe no man anything and hardly expect anything from anybody" (p. 11). According to Arieli, Tocqueville also distinguished between individuality and individualism. For Tocqueville, the former inspired man to shape his own destiny, capacities, and faculties as an active member of a society with which he identified and jealously maintained his own liberty. The latter involved a withdrawal from society, and therefore a loss of strength and character which created apathy toward the public weal and left uprooted man only enjoyment of the feeble pleasures of privacy. Individualism in its indifference toward society destroyed the individual. However, America picked up the term individualism to describe the Jeffersonian ideals of self-government, free society, and the rights of man. Its value content changed completely with its transplantation to America. The term was synonymous in the old world with selfishness, social anarchy, and individual self-assertion, whereas it denoted self-determination and moral freedom in America. Instead of the European negative value, individualism was closely connected with the Puritan tradition and came to describe the primacy of conscience and reason which gave sovereignty to the individual over himself and the abrogation of all authority. Individual dignity and the spiritual value of the individual human soul with its perfectability became the central doctrine of American democracy and the founding concept of the American nation.¹

In defining individualism, some writers invested it with the attributes of a discrete and describable theory. Lukes (1974) sums up individualism's prescriptions in three ideas: (a) a view of government

based on consent of the citizens, which may but need not be in the form of a social contract; (b) a view of political representative as that—not of orders, estates, social function, or social class—but of individual interests; and (c) a view of government's purpose as confined to enabling, satisfying and protecting individuals' wants, interests, and rights with a clear bias toward laissez-faire and against influence, alteration, interpretation, invasion, or abrogation of such wants, interests, and rights.² These principles stand on the bedrock of liberty and equality, but do not include fraternity, or community, according to Lukes. This latter value is not a cardinal ideal of individualist thought.³

For Hiskes (1982) individualism is a collection of disparate ideas with five fundamental threads of individualist thought that do not always coalesce into the same fabric. First, there is belief in the ultimate, or paramount moral principle of the supreme and intrinsic value and dignity of the individual human being. He notes:

The paramount dictum of individualist thought is 'ultimate moral principle of the supreme and intrinsic value, or dignity of the individual human being.' Individuals have morale worth qua individuals, according to this doctrine, regardless of their special characteristics or their relationship to other people, to God, or to any social or political entity. (p.12)

A second important element noted by Hiskes for individualism is the notion of autonomy or self-direction according to which an individual's thought and action is his own and not determined by agencies or causes outside of his control. Autonomy, or self-direction, rejects conformity and outside control but places emphasis upon individual responsibility or accountability for action. Individualism is unwilling to recognize the

sociology of knowledge approach and places much emphasis upon the idea of individual responsibility and accountability for action. A third important individualist concept is that of privacy, or private existence in a public world, an area within which the individual should be left alone by others and be able to do and think whatever he chooses in order to achieve his own view of the good life. Fourth is faith in the efficacy and value of self-development, or growth, which assumes uniqueness of each individual, progressive development of human beings, and morale progress.⁴ The purpose of government is confined to enabling individuals' wants to be satisfied, individuals' interests to be pursued, and individuals' rights to be protected. Lastly, individualism pictures the individual abstractly as existing with invariant human psychological features which determine behavior and specify interests, rights, and needs.⁵

Hiskes disputes the exclusion of community and attempts to demonstrate that individualism is a communitarian as well as a libertarian doctrine. He does this to overcome what he believes are legitimate criticisms that individualist political theory over-emphasizes political rights, freedom and the pursuit of narrow self-interest. Once the individualist concept of community is embraced, the concern for others inherent in it will ensure no abuses of freedom, rights, or self-interest. The ability of individualist theory to accept community will largely determine its acceptability as a philosophy for organizing the contemporary political world.⁶

Laszlo (1963) sees individualism as the idea that society consists of the sum total of the social existences of individual beings within it, and tends to be determined by individuals. He contrasts it with collectivism, which is based on the thought that the existence of man, i.e., his relations to the group, will be the determinate of his being. Laszlo believes that the individual being and social existence are synthesized in the givenness of each person and should not be conceived separately, but should be attributed to the very same entity, called man. He posits three combinations of components in a possible concept of man: (1) individual being as primary and social existence as secondary; (2) social existence is primary and individual being as secondary; and (3) individual being and social existence as qualitatively equal manifestations.⁷ Laszlo believes that society is neither merely the contemporaneous existence of independent individuals nor the existence of a collective social body. Rather, society must be conceived from both points of view; that is, it must be studied as an individual and as a socially existent entity.⁸

Accordingly to Laszlo, political theories that envisage a society built upon the rights and freedom of the individual being, where a person's position in the social order is seen to correspond to his being rather than to his existence, systematize an individualist idea of society. On the other hand, theories based on an ontology of existence take men in the context of social relevance and consider their existential relations to be those of essentially social entities. In these theories man appears as a sum total of his existential relations which corresponds to his collective group. Theories built upon this ontology systematize a collectivist idea of society.

Laszlo believes that political theories may conceive of society as the co-existence of discrete individuals, but they must also introduce some concept or idea to account for the social sphere of economy, culture, and politics. In his view, political theories are obliged to harmonize their idea of society with their conception of reality in general. There can be no fully individual being in human society devoid of social aspects, fully abstracted from a network of relations within a group, just as there can be no purely social entity without having individuality of discrete beings. Out of the struggle of thesis and antithesis emerges synthesis, representing a new quality. But as Laszlo notes, extreme forms of collectivism and individualism do not accept flexibility in interpretation of their basic premises or believe there is validity in other varieties of political thought.

Gilbert (1990) sees individuality emerging as a part of social and political relationships and not in some atomistic vein. He rejects moral relativism and attempts to establish an objective political theory called democratic individuality based on mutual recognition of persons. Using as a springboard the universal judgments that slavery and genocide are monstrous and abhorrent and not merely matters of opinion, Gilbert makes a claim of empirical proof that moral discovery occurs, and that humans have a sufficient rationality, empathy, and sympathy to participate in political life and to have rights and duties. This claim of empirical ethical discovery serves as the central justification for his theory of limited moral objectivity which he describes as a version of moral realism. Gilbert's theory rejects any notion of individuality that supposes an isolated, utterly self-subsistent creature in conflict with

communitarianism or a simple truth that all social, political, and moral life is relational. Instead, this theory holds that notions of mutual recognition, capacity for moral personality, and self-respect underpin individuality and support reasonable theories of the self.⁹

Moral realism responds affirmatively to the question: Does our ethical inquiry give us knowledge of facts about human-well-being? It adheres to the meta-ethical notion of objectivity based on broad distinctions in ethical and political knowledge--distinctions between a common good and the rule of particular interests and between initial theories of such a good and subsequent historical discoveries about it.¹⁰ Gilbert's theory is based upon (a) Aristotelian eudaimonist ethics, in which acting for the good of others is seen not as an abnegation of self but as a choice to be a certain kind of person, and (b) a full conception of autonomy, individuality, and self-respect, which he draws from Hegel and Rawls. The former according to Gilbert, sought to revive an ancient understanding of the common good in the midst of a seeming chaos of individual pursuits that characterized civil society and sought to articulate the invisible spirit of the laws or the commonalty of abstract right that reconciles individuals. Democratic individuality rejects the kind of social theory that imagines natural characteristics of isolated individuals--preferences that are instinctively or genetically driven--which, then, determine social interaction. In its place is substituted a eudaimonist theory that fleshes out the basic Rawlsian claim of creativity in all-talented, universal individuals with a theory stressing the commonalty and mutuality of respectful persons.

Gans (1988) speculates that individualism may be as old as human history. He defines individualism as "the pursuit of personal freedom and personal control over the social and natural environment. It is an ideology—a set of beliefs, values, and goals—and probably the most widely shared ideology in the U.S." (p. 1). Gans sees multiple individualisms, e.g., corporate, narcissistic, and popular. His explication of popular individualism coincides with what is often conceived of as radical individualism. Practitioners of Gans' popular ideology "support the welfare state—as long as it keeps their welfare in mind" (p. x). The adherents to popular individualism hold jobs rather than pursue careers, hope to be free to choose goods, services, and ideas relevant to self-development, desire something for nothing, as in more government services and lower taxes, and want public services because they are free and leave more earnings to be used in pursuit of user values. These popular individualists want government to guard their pay and savings against inflation, help with college expenses, clean up the environment, and make sure that they can work and enjoy the fruits of their labor. At the same time, they would like government to cut spending in general. For them, citizen participation in government is too strenuous. An increase in anti-social behavior, such as bullying, racism, and greed is associated with this brand of individualism. Gans also notes that almost all critics agree we must surrender parts of our individual interests to begin movement toward a solution to societal problems in the U.S. This is a point which Mario Cuomo addressed at the 1984 Democratic National Convention where he agreed "we will have to surrender small parts of

our individual interests, to build a platform we can all stand on" (Bellah et al., 1987, p. 303).

The popular individualists, as Gans has described them, have almost all the qualities of radical individualists. To the values Gans notes, only two should be added to round out the radical individualist's personality. One, is the belief that he or she, or their group, is special among the human population. Bellah et al. (1987) say a belief that we are all unique is a basic tenant of American individualism. They observed that we imagine ourselves as special creations, set apart from other humans. Perhaps that accounts for the second new value of the radical individualist, the assumption in the national belief system that the appellation American applies only to citizens of the United States whose ancestors arrived after the Pilgrims.

To Bellah et al., individualism is a very complex system of ideas about the nature of social life and the foundations of morality. They believe "the great irony of modern individualism is the belief that individualists should find themselves independent of social institutions flourishes against a backdrop of ever expanding systems of social control" (p. 11). They label the attitudes described above as the first language of American individualism.¹¹ At various times they call it radical individualism, expressive individualism, or utilitarian individualism. Whatever its name, this first language "feeds an 'illusory quest for private fulfillment' that 'often ends in emptiness'" (p. 198). Jobs and careers have replaced callings, the family teaches self-reliance as the cardinal virtue of individuals, a feeling develops that "you got to try everything at least

once," and modernity--a culture of separation--arises. In it the rational, self-interested individual emerged as economic man, and he made trade, exchange, and competition the "coordinating mechanism[s] of social life" (Bellah et al., 1985, p.20). Because this radical, American individualism undermines the conditions of existence, Bellah and his associates see the most important tasks today as that of recovering "insights of the older biblical and republican traditions" (pp. 35-36).

Berman (1970) attempts a politics of authenticity in which individuality will not be subsumed or sacrificed at the same time the ideal of community is honored. The moral basis of this political critique is the ideal of authenticity which refuses to force every individual into competitive and aggressive impasses that prevent individual feelings, needs, ideas, and energies from being expressed. Against inauthenticity, which is the determination of men to hide themselves not merely from others, but from themselves, Berman pits authenticity, which he defines as man's capacity for life, freedom, spontaneity, expressiveness, growth, and self-development. In a system where everyone is always trying to deceive everyone else and bend others to their own purposes, in short, where radical individualism is practiced on a daily basis, authenticity permits the heart--the source of man's most intense and deep personal feelings--to express itself.

Heller et al. (1986) see a modern crisis of individualism in which bureaucratic management and economic and political behavior surrender the wholeness of personality and drain it of its distinct substance until it becomes flattened or fragmented. They too adhere to a theme that

organizes many modern endeavors against radical individualism. That notion is authenticity, a theme common to many domains from psychoanalysis to social theory and from existentialism to ethnography and literature. No matter what the coloration, authenticity inevitably revolves around an opposition between, on the one hand, the inauthentic life produced by economic and administrative mechanisms of modern mass society, and on the other hand, the possibility of moral responsibility and autonomous choice of the individual. Schneewind (Heller et al., 1986) attributes the word autonomy to moral philosophy where it meant the ability of a society or group to make its own laws. The responsibility for its adoption lies with Kant, who used it as the central idea of his ethical theory that morality is constituted by the requirement that we act out of respect for a moral law that we ourselves make. The defining feature of the autonomous agent, in Kant's view, was the ability to guide one's own actions by the choices of one's will and whatever one wills is good. The modern search for objectivity can be seen as an attempt to escape the relativism of Kant's autonomous agent. Against his individualistic view can be placed the Phaedrus—a Platonic view of the individual as essentially constituted by values and aspirations as opposed to needs, wants, and desires. In contradistinction to individuality which is based on distinctiveness, the Platonic view begins with the recognition of values. Souls are individuated by what they most deeply care about.

Avineri and De-Shalit (1992) pit community in opposition to individualism. They state that beginning in the 1980s the most crucial and substantive challenge to Neo-Kantian theories emerged from scholars

who were called communitarians and debate between individualists and communitarians has become one of the most important and fascinating issues of political philosophy. They describe the debate between communitarians and individualists as both methodological and normative. The communitarians argue that the premises of individualism such as the rational individual who chooses freely are wrong or false and that the only way to understand human behavior is in reference to social, cultural, and historical contexts. Communitarians assert that the premises of individualism give rise to morally unsatisfactory consequences, among them unjust distribution of good.

Both communitarian and individualist theories begin with the image of the individual. However, communitarians claim there are social attachments which determine the self and require that behavior be analyzed in view of people's aims and values rather than tending to distinguish, as individualists do, between who one is and the values one has. The communitarian community is more than a mere association; it is unity in which the members are individuals. It is in contrast with the individualist conception of community, where a free person is conceived of as freed from the dictates of nature and the sanction of social roles. Communitarians argue this fails to make any sense of our obviously pervasive social life.

Individualists see the non-communitarian community as based on cooperation for mutual advantage, where theoretical and instrumental character of social relationships is emphasized. Individualists criticize communal morality as being relative to the community itself and argue

that when moral relativism is embraced it makes no sense to complain about the abuse of human rights in other societies. They argue that moral principles are universal and capable of being discovered by the detached philosopher. Normatively speaking, communitarians argue that personal autonomy is better achieved within the community than outside. The individual can only maintain identity within a society or culture of a certain kind, and community is therefore a need of the individual, who has intrinsic value to the community itself and to relations with other members of the community. On the other hand, some individualists adamantly reject any attempt to derogate the priority of liberties. They claim rights should not be pushed aside for the sake of any idea of a general good and that the role of government is to insure basic rights and not promote or sustain any idea of the good life. Other individualists agree that the concept of community as a good is not alien to individualism, but that this does not necessarily contradict the priority of the right, while still others go so far as to concede that community is a need in the sense that a value of one's own life is only a reflection of and derivative from the value of the life of the community as a whole. Most individualist theories subscribe to the proposition that the right is prior to the good and, the individual is prior to the collective.

Hiskes (1982) describes four forms of community. The first form of community described by Hiskes is the organic unity, or *Gemeinschaft*, as a naturally existing being. Community is founded upon common or united interests and results in a perfect unity of human wills. In this form of community members in the aggregate or individually do not contain all

elements manifested by the community and the community itself is greater than the sum of its parts. In this type of community the organic whole can manifest a will as a singular and unitary whole, and it is permissible to say that the community acts as a singularity, that such actions are willful, and that the community as a whole has rights. According to Hiskes, the organic community wields a significant degree of control by the communal center, an idea which he says is rejected by all proponents of individualism.

The second type is the community of public interest. It is not organic with a single center of consciousness, but consists of myriad of centers of life and consciousness, of true autonomous individuals who are merged in no corporate unity and whose purposes are lost in no corporate purpose. Unity in this sense is best defined as some aspect of the individuals themselves or as some characteristic they possess. A social relationship which constitutes the community does not exist between, among, or around individuals but is within them as a part of their very being and every individual possesses the relationships of the community as a part of his own physiological constitution. In the community of public interest, the individual will is subject to socialization and even partially determined by its connection to other individual wills. Because it consists of both individual and socialized aspects, it is itself said to contain the social relations of the community. This will is also interest-determined in that it is guided by the interests of the people, permitting considerable individual freedom and autonomy in the pursuit of personal advantage and gain.

The third type of community is community of private interests in which the interests of private persons bind them together as they seek their own advantage. This type of community is primarily concerned with preserving individual freedom and relative autonomy in a communal setting. The existence of authority, or governance, is the key to the community of private interests and it is obsessed with preserving individual autonomy in the face of any communal threat. As a result, this type of community is vulnerable to the criticism that such a concept of a community renders that term virtually meaningless.

The fourth type of community described by Hiskes is the anarchist community of respect. This type of community exists because the intellectual diversity of persons not only motivates but forces individuals to participate in the reciprocal opening of the soul. No person is complete or self-sufficient intellectually, but needs others, their knowledge, and special abilities to complete his own. The anarchist community is one marked by a mutual sharing or reciprocity--not only one's intellect, but of one's feelings and very self. Full development of individual gifts--individuation, cannot be attained by the individual in isolation. The freedom of every individual is simply the reflection of one's humanity or human rights in the consciousness of all free men, and freedom is the source of one's dignity and sense of self-worth. Freedom to exercise one's own independent judgment and unique rationality is the source of the anarchist's self-respect and underlies their repudiation of government. The capacity for independent judgment is what makes individuals worthy and it cannot be freely given up or contracted away without compromising

the dignity and worth of the individual as a human being. The community of self-respect rejects an institutionalized system of authority in favor of interpersonal, face-to-face confronting of deviant behavior that covers the entire spectrum from rational argument to intense pressure, including public censure. It, therefore, becomes questionable whether such solutions impinge upon personal freedom to any lesser degree than would an institutionalized form of authority.

In conclusion, Hiskes outlines a fifth type of community called community as caring. This community involves three distinctive normative considerations: First, it is valued as the object of a particular attitude. Second, it is a relationship between persons characterized by the sharing of moral values. Third, it is itself a particular moral value or sentiment. Community as caring construes the social fact of community as a special quality of individuals, not of the group, which exists within individuals, not between them. Community as caring has also a distinctly normative way of viewing the concept, because it involves the recognition of the value of a community by those within it and those considering joining. What is shared in community as caring is more than interests. It requires the widespread acceptance of certain ethical clusters or sets of moral values, of which it is itself one. Lastly, community as caring is by nature non-ideological in its approach to the role of authority since its consensus upon ethical norms insures an equal amenability towards decentralized and disbursed authority structures as towards centralized ones. According to Hiskes, in order to find a road from self-interest to community, individualism must promote a transformation in the

individual's perception of himself by demanding that the actions and interests of others be considered and objectively evaluated at all times. Without such a transformation individualism cannot accept community and cannot escape denunciation for narrow pursuit of self-interest.

Tucker (1980) classifies individualism as three types--radical, utilitarian, and possessive. In an attempt to persuade Marxists that there is something to be learned from liberal writers, Tucker notes that although there is little to be said in favor of an individualism which takes its orientation from a conception of the individual as essentially the proprietor of his own person for which he owes nothing to society, this is itself an extreme position and not all individualists can be classified as possessive individualists. He recognizes it is possible to endorse a conception of rights which is primarily egalitarian and individualists do not deny that they are in a real sense creatures of culture and as such totally dependent on community of others for the development of human capacities.

Possessive individualism is founded in a special conception of natural rights that holds freedom from coercion as the fundamental political value, so that what is regarded as important is that individuals be free from any relations other than those they have entered into voluntarily. This brand of individualism supports the claim that individuals owe nothing to society for the skills which they acquire when they are trained to accomplish sophisticated tasks. It also rejects any attempt on the part of government to act in the name of distributive principles of justice or principles which reflect a commitment to some

special purpose such as the leveling of wealth, the establishment of equality of opportunity, or the elimination of poverty, and it holds that these necessarily involve exploitation of the individual.

Tucker also describes utilitarian individualism as one of the traditional theories that is hostile to the notion that there are natural rights. In place of the assumption of natural rights, utilitarian individualism places concern with maximization of the general good by promoting efficient policies for it. Even in the economic spheres of life, utilitarians have been able to build a commitment to welfare as long as the market system of allocation itself is not undermined by taxation so high that incentives are destroyed and the productive system is cutback from expansion and efficiency.

Radical individualism is the third kind described by Tucker who associates it with Dworkin's and Rawls' two theories of rights which subordinate liberty to some principle of equity grounded in a commitment to the democratic ideal of mutual respect among citizens. Various theories also conclude that all teleological approaches in ethics subordinate rights claims in an unacceptable way to some conception of the collective good. Therefore, in Rawls' justice-as-fairness the conception of the right is prior to that of the good and the proposition that individuals have a natural right to mutual concern and respect takes an intermediate position between utilitarianism and possessive individualism.

Tucker claims that individualists aim at establishing a science of society which is universal, which they believe is possible because human

responses and ways of adapting are general, not specific to particular cultural periods, and may come to be known. These individualists are therefore skeptical of all explanations which attribute to social entities' purposes apart from the concerns of the persons who function within them. They deny that history has any special goal and resist any temptation to explain social institutions using an assumption that society has needs distinguishable from the individuals who form it. Thus, such individualists do not suppose that people are not changed by their values, but only that sociologists should not dispose of the individual entirely when providing social explanations. Although they are cautious in their judgment of the extent to which individuals can be said to be shaped and molded by life in community with others, they would admit that individuals acquire social dispositions. They, however, resist the temptation to see social life in organic terms and argue that socialization does not produce such extreme changes in people that no general characteristics of human nature remain. They oppose theoretical approaches in which cultural factors loom as an overwhelming obstacle in the way of the development of a general science of society.

Homer (1983) sounds a call for responsible individualism based on a theory of character. First, he notes that the collectivist tradition emphasized man's obligation and duty to the state, while the individualistic tradition dwelled on the individual and was less concerned with establishing a cooperative relationship between man and the state. Then Homer attempts to define character in the individualistic perspective to be used as a counterpoint to what he calls the collectivist

traditions that dominate thinking. The resulting character is individualism, borne in the synthesis of will and reflection. According to Homer, this is made possible by the methods of existential phenomenology and in particular the idea of valuative empiricism. Valuative empiricism requires the person of character to evaluate himself with respect to political and social life. One of good character may choose to participate in politics, but is under no obligations. For Homer, human choice extends beyond the need for political alternatives and he rejects the oppressiveness of the exertion to participate. He rebels against the tyranny of being obligated to participate and defines character as a frame of reference acquired by withdrawing from the world, examining the enduring question of how to live well in the proximity of others, and returning to the world with a well-articulated set of preferences.

Bettelheim's (1960) formula for achieving autonomy in a mass age is that man's heart must know the world of reason, and reason must be guided by an informed heart. Bettelheim sees the achievement of self-realization, the preservation of freedom, and the adaptation of society to both as the overwhelming problem of the modern age. In order to manage such a feat, heart and reason can no longer be kept in their separate places. This requires a subtle balance between individual aspiration, society's right for demands, and man's nature; an absolute submission to any one of them will never do. Bettelheim believes that the solution is not found in the simple beliefs of our forefathers where intellectuals now look for comfort, but lies in finding ways to make this an age where humanity dominates. When this is done, autonomy no longer

implies that the individual has or should have free reign. Instead, Bettelheim believes that if man's instincts were unchecked society could not exist. Therefore, the order requires a consciousness of freedom based on the continuous balancing and resolving of opposing tendencies within one's self and between self and society. Such inner controls are built only upon the basis of direct personal relations and not by obeying society's demands. They are only internalized by identifying one's self with people whom we love, respect, or admire; people who have made their demands their own just as we did, by identifying with persons they respected. When either the individual's idiosyncrasies or the power of society reign supreme then both eventually cease to exist.¹²

Proceeding from a structural anthropologist's approach to the study of political culture in America, Merelman (1989) found that the deep structure of American political culture emerged as mythologized individualism. He argues that this mythologized individualism prevents the American people from recognizing economically generated group differences by transforming such differences into eradicable consequences of poor personal choices. Mythologized individualism helps crystallize major features of the American political landscape. For example, because the ideas of choice, development and growth are central components of mythologized individualism. According to Merelman, Americans use individual choice as a cultural indicator to distinguish between their own culture and other societies, between the good societies where individual choice flourishes and bad societies where they believe it does not. Moreover, mythologized individualism invites Americans to question all

impositions of group power, including the social imposition of culture itself.

Quoting Victor Turner, Merelman finds the root paradigms of culture in a basic tension between the category of structure (civilization, hierarchy, delimited roles) and the category of *communitas* (nature, equality, diffuse roles). According to Turner, during periods of structure people experience each other indirectly and partially through the medium of specialized social positions and delimited functions. During periods of *communitas*, people experience each other directly and holistically through the medium of shared, often ecstatic, or extreme experiences. Cultures can be comprehended in part as oscillations between these two types of human connection.

On the contrary, structural anthropologists such as Emile Durkheim insist that cultures are collective representations that the study of individual attitudes cannot identify. Following Durkheim, structural anthropologists assert that culture cannot be reduced to individualistically-based entities. In other words, individuals are carriers, not generators, of culture. The relationship between individuals and culture is dialectical; that is, if individuals are not simply passive receptacles of culture, neither are they culture autonomous generators. Durkheim argues that the collective generates and imposes culture which then persists because individuals are vulnerable to the power of the collectivity.

Perry (1944) sees the individual as the seat of value. He recognizes that the nature of the individual is penetrated and conditioned a thousand

different ways by society; that the minimum human entity is the triad of mother, father and child; that human experience and development are inseparable from familial and tribal relationship; that human beings are economically interdependent. In recognizing what Perry calls undeniable facts, he rejects individualistic doctrines that place the individual prior to society on the basis that the latter is an artificial construction, or doctrines that assume individuals can live without society and can achieve their highest possibilities in isolation.

Nevertheless, the final values of life begin and end with the individual. The good life cannot be imputed to society, but resides in the individual:

Only the individual can fit the conclusion to the evidence, within the circumference of his own experience and thought. Only the individual can store up the experience of the past and use it for the interpretation of the future. Only the individual can establish an order of preference, and choose from a range of alternatives. Only the individual can by understanding the inference govern his actions by a general principle. Only the individual can subordinate means to ends, and create an hierarchy of interests under the regulation of a dominant purpose. These functions of the human individual are the attributes of personality, and elevate the good life to a personal plane. (Perry, 1944, p. 451)

All of these considerations, Perry believes argue against imposing any uniform creed upon all members of society and argue in favor of allowing the individual to act according to his own conscience and his own reason.

While the individual is the seat of all value, Perry accepts humanity as the universal recipient of good, because the meaning of individual is not one individual, but all individuals. An individual's happiness is good, but an individual has a duty toward all individuals and all distinctions between man and man are irrelevant. Accordingly, while the

individual is the moral finality, the principle of inclusiveness, or universalism, is the co-equal complement of individualism.

Erich Fromm approaches individuality from a social psychology perspective in his 1941 book Escape From Freedom. He had been working on a character structure of modern man and the problems of interaction between psychological and sociological factors. However, because of political developments of the time and the dangers he thought they implied for "individuality and uniqueness of personality" (Fromm, 1969, p. vii), he interrupted that study to concentrate on "one aspect of it which is crucial for the cultural and social crisis of our day: the meaning of freedom for modern man" (p. vii).

The emergence of the individual from original ties, Fromm calls individuation. Before individuation, individuals have primary ties to the outside world that restrict freedom but provide feelings of security, orientation, belonging and roots. One aspect of the process of individuation is "growing aloneness" (pp. 39-40, 44-47), a cutting-off of the ties that bind. When economic, social and political conditions do not allow realization of individuality, while at the same time the primary ties have been lost, the lag makes freedom an unbearable burden. "Powerful tendencies arise to escape from this freedom into submission, or some kind of relationship to man and the world that promises relief from uncertainty, even if it deprives the individual of his freedom" (pp. 47, 52).

Fromm states that Medieval society of the twelfth through fourteenth centuries was characterized by a lack of personal freedom in contrast to modern society. People were not deprived of individual

freedom, because the individual did not exist. Primary ties still existed; people did not conceive of themselves or others as individuals. Awareness of self as a separate individual had not yet developed. Individuals were conscious of themselves only as a race, people, party, family, or some other general category (pp. 57-60). This structure of society and personality changed in the late Middle Ages, especially in Italy. Unity and centralization became weaker; capital, economic initiative and competition grew; a new moneyed class developed; growing individualism began to affect all spheres of human activity (pp. 57-62).

The Renaissance was a culture of the wealthy. The lower classes who did not share the wealth a power of the ruling class lost the security of their former status and became a shapeless mass to be exploited, flattered, threatened and manipulated. Despotism arose simultaneously with individualism; freedom and tyranny were interwoven. The Renaissance was the beginning of modern individualism (pp. 63-66).

According to Fromm, a spirit of restlessness began to pervade life toward the end of the Middle Ages. Work became an increasingly supreme value. Efficiency assumed the role of one of the highest moral virtues. Wealth and material success became the all absorbing passion. With the beginning of capitalism all classes of society began to move (pp. 76-77). Competition brought insecurity, isolation and anxiety. The individual became the master of his fate, but was simultaneously freed from those ties that gave security and a feeling of belonging (pp. 78-80).

Lutheranism and Calvinism were the new religions of the urban middle class, the poor in the cities, and the peasants. By their teachings,

these new doctrines intensified the feelings engendered by the new economic order. At the same time they enabled the individual to cope with an otherwise unbearable insecurity (p. 81). In the beginning of the sixteenth century, these religions gave expression to feelings of insignificance and resentment, destroyed confidence in God's unconditional love, taught people to despise and distrust themselves and others, and capitulated before secular power. Luther freed people from the authority of the church, but subdued the individual by a much more tyrannical authority, that of a God who insisted upon complete annihilation of the self as a condition of salvation. Loss of individual pride and dignity prepared people psychologically to submit themselves to economic productivity and accumulation of capital (pp. 102-103). Calvin, too, preached a doctrine of insignificance and powerlessness of the individual. The individual should not feel as master of self. Virtue for its own sake leads to vanity. Though good works could never lead to salvation, unceasing human effort to live by god's word was essential (pp. 104-105, 110). Their doctrines presented a picture of the qualities of man such that individuals believed they ought to feel as they did (pp. 120-121).

Devotion to work, passion for thrift, readiness to make one's life a tool, and a compulsive sense of duty were all characteristics taught by these new religions that became productive forces in capitalistic society. These new doctrines not only gave expressions to feelings of the middle class, but, by rationalizing and systematizing this attitude, they intensified and strengthened it (pp. 121-122).

In the economic, personal and political spheres, modern relationships have assumed a character of manipulation and alienation. Man even sells himself and feels himself to be a commodity. The relationship of one individual to another lost its direct and human character and assumed a spirit of manipulation and instrumentality. Laws of the market ruled personal and social relations (pp. 123-124, 139). The rise of capitalism not only freed people from the traditional ties, but also contributed tremendously to positive freedom, to the growth of an active, critical, responsible self. One of the general characteristics of a capitalistic society, the principle of individualistic activity, has advanced both positive and negative freedom, but not proportionally (pp. 128-129). While the individual has grown in a degree unheard of before, the lag between freedom from and freedom to has grown as well. The disproportion between freedom from any tie and the lack of possibilities for positive realization of freedom led Europe to a panicky flight from freedom into new ties or complete indifference during the period in which Fromm wrote Escape From Freedom (pp. 52-53). In the United States today, an unholy combination between an economic/technological framework for thought and the bureaucratic social system is preempting human responsibility for ethical social behavior with pure self-interest.

Theory Development: A New Model--Authentic Individualism

Freedom ought to have an ethical content as in John Winthrop's moral freedom (Bellah et al., 1985, p. 29), which decries natural liberty or the freedom to do whatever one wants, in favor of true liberty to do "that

only which is good, just and honest," the kind of liberty for which you would put up your own blood and treasure and "stand for with the hazard of your lives" (p. 29). It should not mean just freedom from the demands of others or freedom to feel powerful. While it certainly includes the right to be left alone and not to have to share another's values, ideas, or style of life, freedom must of necessity carry within it a sense of responsibility to and for others.

In his first inaugural address (Bellah et al., 1987), Thomas Jefferson recognized that freedom certainly includes the right to speak and write what you think, but he also urged unity of heart and mind among the citizenry. He said:

Let us, then, fellow citizens, unite with one heart and one mind. Let us restore to social intercourse that harmony and affection without which liberty and even life itself are but dreary things. And let us reflect that having banished from our land that religious intolerance under which mankind so long bled and suffered, we have yet gained little if we countenance a political intolerance as despotic, as wicked, and capable of as bitter and bloody persecutions. During the throes and convulsions of the ancient world, during the agonizing spasms of infuriated man, seeking through blood and slaughter his long lost liberty, it was not wonderful that the agitation of the billows should reach even this distant and peaceful shore. (p. 28)

"We know it in its harshness as a lack and a struggle rather than a superfluity of powers" (Barrett, 1979, p. 287). It becomes more "fully real to us in those situations when it is literally a matter of life and death" (p. 287).

The foregoing literature review of individualism and discussion of freedom suggests several considerations for authentic individualism. An individualistic focus on self has validity for authentic individualism only

in the context of social responsibility and is tempered by larger considerations of the whole. The authentic individualism model that emerges has an exchange emphasis whose essence is in the process of interaction among individuals. Accordingly, development of the authentic individualism theory was guided by the following parameters. Authentic individualism must: (a) protect the individual from the majority, (b) exalt human dignity, (c) reject self-interest as the defining standard, (d) retain objective values, (e) permit subjective choice of the individual conscience, (f) preserve the notions of common good and public interest, (g) conceive of institutional purposes as positive and caring, (h) combine science, technology and humanity, (i) require independent, critical thought, (j) value responsibility to and for others, (k) weave ethical content throughout, (l) rise above individual rights, (m) embrace more than absolute freedom to act, (n) provide for spiritual and moral fulfillment, (o) place limits on individuality, (p) include self-realization, (q) promote goodness and betterment of others, (r) contain obligations as inner restraints, (s) obtain a balance between conformity and individuation, and (t) seek unity of heart and mind (soul) among people. Obviously, any theory can only succeed in varying degrees to accomplish such ambitious objectives. However, the point is not to solve all problems connected with moral judgment in politics, but to achieve a journeyman philosophy that makes it possible to work on the moral troubles of the present.

Accordingly, freedom must not be equated merely with individualism, nor is it necessarily guaranteed by exercising individual

rights. The ignorant or mindless exercise of individuality actually impinges on freedom's guarantees. The destructive manifestations of individualism and technicism arising in our society from the bureaucratic experience and from uninformed interpretations of freedom and individual rights endangers freedom's very existence. This extreme form of individualism severely impinges the freedom of others and the peace of the community. Greater emphasis on individual autonomy is not likely to be a successful solution to the limitations imposed upon freedom by the bureaucratic operant theory of social control as Mayer (1992) calls it. Yet individualism is an indelible part of the national make-up and history in the U.S. Rather, an answer to those restrictions lies somewhere between freedom's invisibility in the bureaucratic experience and the limitless boundaries it is afforded by today's radical individualism.

To spare its members the effects of existential isolation, any organization must return to them a sense of spiritual and moral fulfillment. There must be a renewed sensitivity to the questions that the institutions of modernity tend to dissolve. Accordingly, this paper addresses the obligations that freedom spawns as protection against the tyranny of technicism and radical individualism, and the baseness that they nurture in our society. These obligations of freedom are costs incurred for having a lack of restraint in laws, constitution, cultural background, social structure, national character and individual natures; a price that must be for the incredible independence exercised daily without further thought. Some of these obligations of freedom are love, compassion, forgiveness, and the ethical leadership. These obligations are

not imposed from the outside; they are not immutable rules that rigidly govern conduct. The obligations of freedom are simply inner restraints that must be exercised by individuals and organizations alike if freedom is to last in our country.

If this nation is to survive the atomistic effects of radical individualism and rational technicism as anything more than just a symbol of what true liberty was, the obligations of freedom must be practiced every day by every citizen. Freedom is a form of protection against baseness and cruelty burgeoning in the belly of society. Without the obligations that go with freedom, the frailty of its foundation, the looseness of its ties and the weakness of the threads holding it together will give way to upheaval within. The quest for freedom is a necessary result of the growth of culture and the history of humanity is a history of growing freedom. Yet that term is used to rationalize many actions with a high price in human suffering. May (1981) correctly lamented, "How important that we discover its authentic meaning!" (p. 14).

The obligations of freedom are clearly not present in government officials using their public positions to benefit themselves or their business partners. The obligations of freedom do not permit politics and public administration to become the personal playground of the politician or administrator. There is no room in the responsible affairs of government for personal vendettas, vengeance, or pay-backs for real or imagined slights of the influential and the powerful. Certainly one should not become the target of such an attack merely for having exercised political prerogatives.

Freedom and individuality have grown up together, but they are not coextensive. Individuation has advanced the cause of freedom, yet they are not one and the same. Unrestrained individualism can become its opposite. Therefore, to preserve freedom, it is necessary to conceptualize individuality as bounded by appropriate limits. The discussion in this paper suggests that freedom lies in an active and spontaneous realization of self, tempered and guided by a belief in the essential goodness and betterment of others. Freedom may even be found in instrumental action predicated on responsible recognition of the rights and individuality of others, compassion, empathy and caring in all interpersonal relationships. Such authentic individualism will advance the cause of freedom in both bureaucracy and society.

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CHAPTER II

IMPORTANCE OF THE PROJECT AND RESEARCH METHODS

Problem Statement: Relevance of a Study of Individualism to Public Administration

Quest for Control

Several authors believe that the structure of organizations and the culture they nurture force organization members into pre-established molds that rob the employee of individual identity and opportunity for self-expression. These writers see the relationship of individual with organization as a struggle for individuation and control over one's own personality.

Hummel (1987) writes that bureaucracy has succeeded society. Indeed, he says bureaucracy is a new society and a new culture. In this new bureaucratic social order, emotional tension and pain are commonplace for workers and arise from the dependence of individuals on organizational structure. Organizational identity replaces individual personality, while individual conscience and competence are forced out by hierarchy and the division of labor.

Hummel suggests that bureaucracy is not capable of "goals and policies that require caring human interaction" (p. 6). Its "need for control may impose a form of social interaction incompatible with situations in

which people need to care for each other" (p. 6). While bureaucracy makes people more interdependent, it pushes them "farther apart by replacing mutually oriented social action by rationally organized action" (p. 19).

Hummel reminds us that Max Weber saw bureaucracy as the ultimate control instrument. According to Hummel, "The effective political imperative . . . [in this nation] is: follow your own interest, and the public be damned" (p. 103). The individual quest for control is also recognized by Stivers (Bailey, 1992) as occurring in and coming from bureaucracy. She too sees it as a force in our individual lives in reaction to the bureaucratic experience.

MacIntyre (1981) agrees, stating that the concept of rights associated with bureaucratic individualism combines with the bureaucratic organization--which makes its claims in terms of utility--to form "a matching pair of incommensurable fictions" (p. 68). MacIntyre develops the notion of "bureaucratic individualism," which has emotivism as its creed. Emotivism is a theory based on the idea that all moral judgments are nothing but individuals' subjective preference.

MacIntyre believes it is only the overwhelming dominance of bureaucratic institutions that keep us from degenerating into anarchy (Bellah et al., 1987, p. 198). The failure of the Enlightenment Project in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to discover "rational foundations for an objective morality" (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 107) has led to Weberian individualism. The contemporary vision of the world, according to MacIntyre, is predominantly Weberian. He concludes that nothing less than rejection of a large part of the ethos of the "distinctively modern and

modernizing world" will provide the "rationally and morally defensible standpoint from which to judge and to act" (p. viii).

Riesman (Bellah et al., 1987) sees the issue as one of personal choice. He believes choice in our society is channeled through highly individualized behavior. Tradition is splintered with the increasing division of labor and stratification of society. With the "growth of habits of scientific thought" (p. 67), non-economic cultural views give way to rational, individualistic attitudes. Veroff (Bellah et al., 1987) states that this turning inward for self-definition means individual achievement becomes the whole story. It urges distance from, rather than connections to others (p. 154).

A similar point of view was shared by Dewey (Bellah et al., 1987) writing at the onset of the Great Depression in 1929. He said loyalties that once held individuals and gave them a unity of outlook have disappeared. The "business mind" has become "deplorably pervasive" (p. 389). According to Bellah et al., a "blind economics mechanism" (p. 377) has allowed a powerful faction of winners to assume leadership roles who cannot sustain the moral coherence necessary for a truly high quality life. As long as this "conception possesses our minds" (p. 391), Dewey believes rationalization and individuality will prevail.

Bureaucracy and our political imperative not only nurture, but over emphasize, individualist values such as self reliance, hard work, competition, property and remuneration to the point that they become our governing social values. Moral decisions are transformed into economic analyses, as individuals are pitted against one another in their

belief that self-actualization comes from triumph over others. Ricci (1990) unwittingly illustrated this in describing his grandfather in a recent column for the Detroit Free Press:

[H]e had an immigrant's wariness. He was suspicious, insecure, determined not to be taken advantage of. . . . He worked like a beast. When he came home from the steel mill, on summer days, my father remembers, his blue work shirt frequently was crusty white with dried sweat. Providing for his family [economically] was the meaning of his life. (p. 1E)

His grandfather's life was controlled by economic circumstances and prevailing social theory of the nation.

It is here that the debate between market theorists, individualists and their protagonists begins to take shape. The more individualist or market oriented the theory, the less room there seems for truly necessary human considerations of empathy, caring, responsibility and other communal concerns. In his book Head to Head (1992), as well as elsewhere, Lester Thurow, Dean of the Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, urges resource and development (R & D) aimed at process improvement and education of the workforce in technology as solutions to international migration of capital, natural resources, business and scientific discovery. As a result of the inability to capture these economic necessities within the borders of any given nation, wages and prices will fall to the lowest world levels, the dual economy of rich and poor will become more extreme, and the capacities of government and education will diminish. Thurow believes renewed devotion to education and relevant R & D will slow, if not halt, this process of economic dislocation and degeneration in the United States.

In contrast, Sullivan (Bellah et al., 1987) elaborates on a dissimilar theme:

[I]f ethos and mores remain heavily individualistic and competitive, then Americans will continue to define the goals of economic organization in essentially private terms. . . . American hegemony in international politics and trade, the economic and technological cornucopia which has been the premise of that method of accommodation, is rapidly running dry. In these conditions, the option of a genuinely cooperative economic democracy becomes a particularly unlikely choice from the basis of self-interested calculation. Thus the interrelation between public institutions and mores has today become particularly salient. (p. 398)

Sullivan defines the problem as "finding a way to transcend conceptually a purely utilitarian understanding of politics and a way to challenge the domination of social relationships by bureaucratic management and the workings of capitalist economics" (p. 394).

Mayer (1992) posits an operant theory of social control as today's prevailing social theory. The administrative state and its logic have become the "primary motive forces for allocating society's resources" and is "the forum for the bulk of interactions within American society" (p. 2). This constitutes an "entrenched, dominating world view framing the social world of administrators" (p. 3), which Mayer has dubbed the operant theory of social control. The operant theory reflects structural patterns and actions oriented toward technicism, "which has become the determining, shaping and constraining mode of thinking-and-acting in Western society" (p. 5).

The operant theory shapes socio-political relationships and guides choices for appropriate governmental action. "In each case, the intent is to rationalize administrative processes" (p. 6). This rationalization of

processes encompasses bureaucracy, client, worker, employee, manager, citizen and representative. According to Mayer, this rationalization of thought orients our individual and collective social action into narrow, instrumental channels and often produces unhealthy social, psychological and emotional results.

Barrett (1979) suggests this sort of theory as well. He believes technology is not the pure servant of freedom simply because it increases our powers and multiplies our opportunities. In pursuit of these powers the "organic sense of our relatedness" is lost or, as Heidegger states, one "lose[s] the sense of Being itself" (p. xx). For Barrett, "technology of behavior" leads to alienation and homelessness as the "deepest themes in modern culture" (pp. 113, 147-148). The question as Barrett sees it is whether "mankind will decide for liberty or sink under some modern form of tyranny" (p. 246). His answer is to substitute the quest for freedom for the quest for control.

One major effect of technique is the diminution of freedom. Starting in Medieval times, the growing influence of scientific principles in a capitalist economy and strivings for increased efficiency brought about extreme rationalization of thought. As a consequence, bureaucracy has become the predominate organizational form for getting things done. However, as Hummel (1987) notes, it concentrates power at the top, practices control and domination over individuals, replaces mutually oriented social action with rationally organized action, and leaves people feeling powerless, isolated, fearful, and full of anxiety. Rigid and unyielding conformity to the structure and rules of social or

organizational life diminishes individual development, denigrates the accomplishments of the society or organization and robs the leader of the confidence, trust and status necessary to influence others. The task for an organizational or social leader is to help the organization or society define and follow moral values, but permit freedom in the content of such values.

Yet, there is a paradox in freedom; the dichotomy between the pernicious effects of radical individualism and the controls that might be imposed to harness them. The horns of the dilemma are (a) abolish liberty and give everyone the same passions, opinions and interests, or (b) permit freedom to descend into an anarchy of opposing, conflicting and competing interests and influences. An unrestrained pursuit of happiness and individual rights also has denigrating effects on government, society, and individuals. Some balanced standard of human decency more exalted and difficult to attain than the base instinct of self-interest or the mind-forged shackles of conformity must guide conduct in and out of government.

The Confluence of Radical Individualism and Bureaucratic Control

Writers like Hummel (1987) should not be misunderstood concerning the effects of bureaucracy on the individual. Hummel notes that while bureaucracy brings individuals physically closer together, it limits by rules and regulations the ways in which a bureaucrat may respond to the social needs of the citizenry. While this effect would thus appear incompatible with individualism, it actually causes individual and

group differentiation. It is not so much the separation of individuals. Indeed, any organization brings individuals in closer physical proximity to one another. Rather, it is separation from the moral resources necessary to live a full and satisfying existence. Members of modern organizations are usually called upon to perform their functions simply as technicians, without the opportunity to do something good and experience the fulfillment that comes from that. In contrast, they are so often left with the feeling of having actually done something bad, that they become detached from their moral and spiritual side and experience the loss as emptiness for which they cannot find a cause. The effect on the individual that Hummel and others describe is labeled existential isolation by Giddens (1991).

Rationalization of social interaction has further atomistic effects. Reasserting control over their lives as a result of the bureaucratic experience, people engage in even more individualistic behavior, working, planning, consuming and attaining. Born of a fundamental misunderstanding of true freedom's roots, arrogant assumptions about individual rights begin to flourish in undeserved legitimacy. Soon radical individualism emerges as a way of fighting back and contributes to a paradox of growing individualism and loss of freedom in U.S. society today. In this context the true meanings of freedom and individual rights are perverted and trivialized. As radical individualism matures, individual rights become the watchwords for an uninformed sentiment, "This is a free country. You should be able to do what you want."

An example is James Fallows' book More Like Us (1989) which teaches that our society is unique, that it is important we not become a normal society. He writes that the United States is in decline and has lost the mandate of heaven that confers legitimacy on rulers, but has been slow to recognize it. Fallows' answer is that we need to build on our traditions of self-reliance, individuality and, ironically, our anti-traditionalism. In short, "[w]e need to be more like us" (p. 12). This example demonstrates symptoms of a radical individualism that now permeates society, fed by modernity, technicism, bureaucracy and rationalization. Because radical individualism fits with a constitutional heritage of individual rights and is legitimated by uninformed sentiment about freedom, socially objectionable behavior is practiced, tolerated, and reinforced in this nation until it becomes morally indistinguishable from legitimate expression. In *The Federalist* No. 10 Madison wrote, "The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man." (Fairfield, 1981, p. 18). Freedom is more than the free exercise of individual rights. This does not mean a return to the mores of fifty or a hundred years ago, or to past principles or practices that were irrationally constricting. "Yet in our desperate effort to free ourselves from [that] . . . past, we have jettisoned too much, forgotten a history that we cannot abandon" (Bellah et al., 1985, p. 83).

This study deals with the relational tensions between individual and state, individual and group, and individual and organization which, in one aspect or another, have been a subject of concern in political, philosophical and social thought since the earliest times. However, not

until the days of European Enlightenment did the individual become the focus of attention for philosophers, social scientists and political thinkers. Many such thinkers today believe the existing dissatisfaction and loss of faith are the result of modernity--a cultural of greed and separation that has its roots in the Enlightenment--arising from the effects of technicism, extreme rationality, pervasive economic thinking, and the bureaucratic experience reinforced within the organizations and institutions affecting peoples' lives.

The Confusion of Economics and Technique
With Loss of Spiritual and Moral Purpose

Any thinking individual who qualifies as even a casual observer of life in the United States today recognizes that there is among the people of the nation a spiritual malaise that manifests itself as general dissatisfaction and anger with government and the quality of the country's leadership. In 1992, two out of three Americans believed the nation was in decline--economic, moral and spiritual. Poll after poll disclosed that 1992 was expected to be the year of the challenger in politics. Incumbents resigned in droves for reasons related directly or indirectly to the degradation of politics; many more were expected to be turned out by the electorate. As it happened, incumbency did not prove to be the anathema expected in the 1992 election results. Nevertheless, the 1992 campaign and election process clearly disclosed public displeasure with government and its officials. The 103rd Congress saw the greatest number of newcomers in over 40 years, as 110 fresh faces were elected to the House of Representatives. Despite the collapse of confidence in government, there

is belief in the general goodness of those ideals upon which Americans have always been taught their nation was founded. Along side the loss of faith today is a latent, fervent desire by individuals to believe again in a government and society with moral direction and to experience the individual satisfaction that comes from making moral choices.

When asked, most people today define their dissatisfaction in economic terms, which is understandable in a society where economic achievement defines individual worth and the value of government. For example, when asked what the top priority of the federal government should be, American leaders being polled named "strengthening the domestic economy to improve our international position," and the general public named "protecting U.S. jobs" as the top foreign policy goal. "We were shocked by the domestic economy response the 'influentials' gave," said the director of the Times Mirror Center that had done the polling.¹ Pursuit of economic and technological solutions to problems of human interaction and socialization in the United States seems to dominate the thinking of decision-makers and the nation's populace at large. The economic and technological framework as the dominant paradigm for public thinking and problem-solving treats social problems as discrete cause and effect events and excludes the complex, indeterminate, interfusion of human based considerations inherently present in those problems. Despite obvious shortcomings in the market model's ability to solve political and social problems of scarce resources, environmental degradation, and enhancing human capital on a national scale, there is still strong sentiment that econometrics and technologic

will provide world-wide salvation if the workforce is educated and trained in its modern application. However, reliance on an economics and technology framework to such a great extent that it is employed even for the purpose of analyzing one's own feelings, hides an underlying frustration and emptiness arising from the lack of moral meaning in one's experience with government, bureaucracy and society that is engendered by that very framework itself.

There may be something in the history of this nation and/or the philosophy upon which it was founded, and the resultant social development, that accounts for leaders and followers alike placing uncritical reliance on the economic point of view and weds them to technological solutions without giving serious consideration to the fundamental, life-sustaining human purposes underlying their choices. Some evidence for such an historical influence may exist in the burgeoning mens' movement in this country, which is represented, at least in part, by the writings of Robert Bly (1990) in his book Iron John.

The Industrial Revolution too often required a father to leave home to earn a living and provide material goods for his family, and the definition of father that emerged was one of absenteeism. Modern men now reject this model and the choices or lack thereof that it imposes upon them. While the old definitions of father as the absent bread winner collapse into disrepute, modern man is left crying or silent, looking for a government and society that will support return to a communal self. An opportunity for resurrecting confidence in government and the nation's leaders is there for anyone who can restore the peoples' belief in essential

goodness as the primary purpose of government and offer them the personal satisfaction that comes from participating and sharing in decisions with moral purpose.

The Clash of Individual Responsibility With Technicism

Other writers see individualism in the organizational, social and political context as an issue of personal responsibility. In the collision of self with technicism, these commentators urge public administrators and employees to develop a formal or informal code of professional responsibility that emphasizes responsible social action over rational technicism.

Denhardt (1981, p. 126) states that autonomy implies responsibility. He seeks a clearer sense of or a new frame of reference for, autonomy, responsibility, individuation and praxis (pp. 14, 132). For him, the organization's lack of a conscience accelerates loss of responsibility:

From the standpoint of moral responsibility, bureaucratic theory provides an important justification for individual error. Being impersonal, the organization is amoral, without conscience. To place the blame for improper action on the organization is to relegate this issue to a state oblivious of moral consequences. Personal value is mediated by group standards, and, lost in rational impersonality, the question of responsibility becomes meaningless. The individual, the organizational member, though perhaps feeling slight remorse, is no longer liable. (p. 85)

Serious and unconstrained self-reflection leads to self-knowledge and responsible social action (p. 113). Rather than become self-indulgent, this self-reflection provides a new basis for social obligations. Indeed, the

essence of freedom for the individual resides in the process of interaction with others.

White (Harmon & Mayer, 1986) also emphasizes a sense of personal responsibility as an important normative idea for the administrator (p. 52). It may be defined in the general terms such as fairness, justice, and equity, or it may take the form of a formal code or principles (pp. 50-51). Likewise, Follett (Harmon & Mayer, 1986) wrote of responsibility in the personal sense, referring to the self-understanding and self-realization that individuals experience in collaborative endeavors (p. 343). Hummel (1988) too sees bureaucracy as robbing its members of their values. Personal responsibility--acting in keeping with mutually defined meanings--becomes "systemic accountability" (p. 5). He exhorts organizational participants to claim personal responsibility for their actions (p. 174). Harmon and Mayer (1986) say personal responsibility "clarifies the difference . . . between professionalism and mindless technicism" (p. 402). Responsibility is acknowledging that one's actions affect people's lives. Individuals are each responsible and "can be held accountable by other members of society--for the consequences of the collective action" (p. 403).

Merton (Chandler, 1987b) also equates rational technicism with loss of responsibility. Merton notes that experts and specialists "come to be indoctrinated with an ethical sense of limited responsibility" (p. 12). Similarly, personal responsibility is also an important criteria in Chandler's concept of civil servant as trustee (p. 153). More importantly, it

was present in the Founders' call for virtue in public administration (p. 105).

Bellah et al. (1985) note that individuals today feel little responsibility for others, even husband and children. Responsible only for themselves, these individuals have "no reliable way to connect" their "own fulfillment to that of other people," either family "or the larger political or social community of which" they "are inevitably a part" (pp. 16-17). Accordingly, "freedom to be left alone implies being alone" (p. 23). It means being free "as much as possible from the demands of conformity to family, friends, or community," separate "from the values imposed by one's past or by conformity to one's social milieu" (p. 24). Thus, freedom to succeed also means freedom to fail, because nobody will help you. President Reagan's remark, "I am not my brother's keeper; I am my brother's brother," epitomizes this loss (Chandler, 1987b, p. 283).

Robert Coles, in Civility and Psychology (Bellah et al., 1987), makes a similar point. He states:

Civility has to do with allegiance—a sense that one's behavior ought to be, under a range of circumstances, responsive to, and respectful of, certain standards. . . . Now we have moved to the standard of the intensely private—ironically, a public phenomenon. (p. 191)

Coles' civility subordinates personal feelings to shared imperatives; individual impulse, whim and fancy to transcendence. The pursuit of happiness and inalienable rights are "connected, immediately, to other issues (life itself, and liberty) and [are] . . . a part of a long statement, with all sorts of provisions, cautions, reminders, denials, and prohibitions" (p. 193).

Autonomy and self-expression are offered by many writers, thinkers, and critics as a solution to the effects of modernity, yet there is a paradox in this advice: individual autonomy put in action and carried to its logical conclusion has its own adverse effects. Therefore, complete and unrestricted personal freedom is illegitimate, limitations on personal autonomy are necessary, and some synthesis of the two extremes between absolute freedom and conformity is called for. For the first time, this paper distills from the history of individualism in the United States and Western political theory and philosophy a paradigm for self-realization by the individual citizen and public administrator.

Public administrators certainly participate in, if not preside over, the bureaucratic experience. It is, therefore, vitally important for them to completely understand that experience and equip themselves to shape its form and course for government organizations and the larger community. Accordingly, public administrators must learn how to combat the effects, such as disillusionment, anger, technicism and extreme rationality, that emerge from the tensions between individual and government, individual and organization (bureaucracy), or individual and society. This need is only confirmed, strengthened and made more urgent by the realization that the second 500 years since Columbus arrived in America has already started and the Third Millennium will soon begin.

Significance of the Work

Hiskes (1982) extracted certain fundamental ideas that underlie individualism's many and varied manifestations. In doing so, he

described what he thought was the best way to conduct such a study, even as he declined to follow his own advice:

Perhaps the most thorough route to the definition sought would be to begin with the Protestant Reformation thinkers such as Luther and Calvin, to examine their ideas, and to trace the seeds planted by them as they flower in the individualist ideas of Hobbes, Locke, Bentham, Mill, Kant and a host of others. Such an examination would be enlightening but clearly too demanding of both time and space to be carried out here. (p. 12)

The methodology described but left unused by Hiskes is the approach adopted here.²

While this study is very much like the one Hiskes proposed but did not implement, it is different in some important respects. It is less detailed and broader but more complete than the one he suggested. Hiskes believed that the seeds of individualism were planted in the Enlightenment, so he proposed to begin there and make a very detailed study of fewer political thinkers since that time. In fact, though the seeds of individualism flowered in the Enlightenment, they were planted by the ancient Romans, Greeks and Christians perhaps as much as 15 centuries before that time. This work begins there and traces the development of individualism up to the present day.

Additionally, Hiskes did not explicitly propose to consider development of the theory in the United States as this project does. Also, his proposal appeared to be narrowly focused on individualist thought, whereas the present work examines both political thought and events in American history that shaped individualism into the form it takes in the United States. Finally, it analyzes the appropriate relationship and balance between the de-stabilizing effects on government and society of complete

individual autonomy on the one hand and the stifling effects of conformity from social existence on the other. So, as compared to Hiskes' proposal, this work is considerably more comprehensive in its historical beginnings, more empirical in its reliance on historical events in America, and more current in its emphasis on evolution of individualism to its present state in the United States today.

Even though individualist ideation can be traced to the Ancients, where this study begins, one might ask: Why study ideas of these philosophers at all? The answer lies in the attempt to return public administration to its roots in history and political philosophy. As Tocqueville recognized over 150 years ago, no country in the civilized world pays less attention to philosophy than the United States. Yet philosophy has great value in a complicated world where many persons have no real foundations or sets of beliefs, by providing a reasoned framework within which to think. Philosophy has two important aims: First, it offers a unified view of the universe in which one lives. Second, it develops critical thinkers by sharpening one's ability to think clearly and precisely. By accepting a particular philosophy, a person can begin to seek certain goals and to direct a life of behavior. These all seem to be important purposes in today's world where government leaders and the public alike have failed to adopt a political and social philosophy from which to address the problems they face and upon which to found solutions.

Assumptions

This study, like most others, contains certain assumptions: First, an assumption that the dissatisfaction expressed by the people of the United States has its roots in a lack of moral meaning rather than in economics. Second, is an assumption that a sense of participation in moral decision-making is spiritually uplifting and will decrease the level of dissatisfaction being expressed today. A third supposition also exists in this study; the assumption that individualist experience, learning and feeling, which ignore ethical considerations, are partly responsible for the emptiness of spirit and lack of moral purpose being expressed in the United States today. These remain assumptions throughout the study; that is, they are neither tested nor sought to be proven herein. Nevertheless, there is valid reason for assuming the truth of these assumptions. The first two assumptions serve as the basis for over 2000 years of moral training in the Western world and assume prominent places in the most modern management and organizational theories. Moreover, all these assumptions gain validity from an individual psychological perspective in that guilt from routinely ignoring ethical considerations can certainly result in the spiritual emptiness and malaise, or even depression, experienced by individuals today.

Research Design, Key Features of the Study Method, and Indicators of the Concept Being Examined

Clearly, this history of individualism, development of a normative theory of individualism, and consideration of the theory's impact on

public administration does not lend itself well to quantitative methods. However, that fact does not detract from the significance or value of this project. Quantitative and qualitative research techniques are not distinct, yet quantitative orientations are often given more respect, presumably because of the tendency to regard science as related to numbers and implying precision. Those who criticize qualitative research as void of validity, lose sight of the probability factor and significant chance for error inherent in quantitative practices, replace them with an assumption of certainty, and equate the term empirical with quantification. Marshall and Rossman (1989) assert qualitative methods have become important modes of inquiry for the social sciences (p. 9).

They see qualitative research as systematic inquiry in a natural setting rather than an artificially constrained one like an experiment (p. 10). Whether the chosen research method emphasizes the positivist view borrowed from the natural sciences or employs observation of behavior routines, experiences or natural settings, both are doing science. Science in this context is defined as a specific and systematic way of discovering and understanding how social realities arise, operate and impact on individuals and organizations (p. 9). Even such an ardent supporter of quantitative methods as Donald T. Campbell recognizes the "crucial role of pattern and context in achieving knowledge" (Yin, 1989, p. 9). Indeed, any research is worth doing if it builds knowledge and explores some part of the research cycle that is unknown or has not been explained well before (Marshall & Rossman, pp. 22-23). Observation, experimentation, testing, and data collection appear as only one part at the bottom of that

cycle, while theory and model development, to which this paper is devoted, constitute two separate and complete parts appearing at the top of the cycle (p. 23).

In practice, the nature of scientific truth is often subtle and contentious. The image of science as a pure and objective distillation of real world experience is an idealization. At the heart of the scientific method is the construction of theories that are essentially models of the real world and much scientific talk concerns these models rather than the reality. Scientists often use the word discovery to refer to some purely theoretical advance. The philosopher Thomas Kuhn argues that scientists build their conception of reality around certain conceptual paradigms. A paradigm is a framework of thought, or conceptual scheme, around which the data of the experiment and observation are organized. After a paradigm is adopted it is tenaciously retained and abandoned only in the face of glaring absurdities. When the paradigm shifts, not only do scientific theories change, but the scientists' conception of the world changes as well. Paradigms shape scientific theories and exercise a powerful influence over methodology and conclusions drawn from experiments. Experimental scientists who pride themselves on their objectivity time and again massage their data to fit with preconceived notions of what the data ought to say (Davies & Gribbin, 1992, pp. 7, 18, 23; Lerner, 1991, pp. 40, 52-57, 385-424).

Though qualitative studies have not predominated in the social sciences, qualitative research has clearly left its mark conceptually and theoretically and resulted in lasting contributions to social understanding.

Social science research is the process of trying to gain a better understanding of the complexities of human interaction. No better methods exist for accomplishing this purpose than qualitative research strategies.

Research Strategy--Data Collection:
Historical (Documentation) Analysis

The mere fact that this study is historical and theoretical does not excuse loose, unstructured, or sloppy research practices. Neither does it exempt the study from complying as nearly as possible with rigorous procedures designed to improve validity and reliability. Marshall and Rossman (1989) assess the strengths of qualitative methods as greatest for exploratory or descriptive research of the kind contemplated here (p. 46). They define descriptive research as documenting the phenomenon of interest. A descriptive study asks, "What are the salient behaviors, events, beliefs, attitudes, structures, and processes occurring in this phenomenon?" An exploratory study's purpose is to investigate little understood phenomena. Such research asks, "What are the salient themes, patterns, or categories shaping, or occurring in, this phenomenon?" (p. 78). These are just the kind of questions that this project is designed to examine.

Qualitative research seeks answers by examining the various social settings and the individuals that inhabit them; how humans arrange themselves in these settings and make sense of their surroundings through symbols, rituals, social structures and social roles. Such procedures provide a means of accessing unquantifiable facts, sharing in

understandings and perceptions of others, explore how people structure and give meaning to their daily lives, and learn how they make sense of themselves and others (p. 6). They permit examination of life-worlds of emotion, motivation, symbols and their meanings, empathy and other subjective aspects of evolving lives of individuals and groups.

According to Berg (1989), qualitative research refers to the meanings, concepts, definitions, characteristics, metaphors, symbols and descriptions of things, in contrast to counting and measuring. Marshall and Rossman call it immersion in the everyday life of the chosen setting (p. 11). Berg (1989), Yin (1989), and Marshall and Rossman agree that qualitative strategies include historical analysis and document, or textual, analysis (Berg, pp. 2-3; Marshall & Rossman, pp. 76-77; Yin, p. 13).

Histories are most often useful for answering how and why questions, or for exploratory studies asking what (Yin, pp. 17-19). Histories can be done of contemporary events or the dead past, when no access or control is available over behavioral events. In such cases, an investigator must rely on other histories, documents and cultural artifacts as the main source of evidence (p. 19). According to Marshall and Rossman, some of the strengths of historical analysis are: (a) obtaining large amounts of expansive and contextual data quickly; (b) ease in establishing generalizability; (c) usefulness in documenting major events, crises, or social conflicts; and (d) facilitating discovery of nuances in culture (pp. 102-03). Major weaknesses are: (a) dependency on honesty of those providing data, and (b) high dependence on the ability or the researcher to control bias (p. 104).

This paper is a study of individualism in Western political thought and such an analysis requires thorough sociological and political research. All political thought is influenced by the institutionalized application of a rationalized scheme and is the result of historical-social conditions, plus the effect of the political principle of the government (Laszlo, 1963, p. 8). This kind of inquiry is very much like that described in the preceding few paragraphs. Therefore, a social-historical approach is appropriate for a study of this kind.

The conceptual tools must be developed first; basic political thought must be defined; social and political schemes must be analyzed; and popular political thought must be clarified. Accordingly, this work is divided conceptually into parts. Parts one through three (Chapters I-VIII) are devoted to a definition of individualism and an introduction to authentic individualism, a description of the study methods, and an explication of the historical structure of the different theories and principles of individualism. Using a historical examination of the role of the individual from pre-Socratic Greece, through Renaissance Europe and pre-revolutionary U.S., to modern day political thinking in the United States, this work examines individualism and develops a summary of the individual for five different periods of history. From these periods, two models of individualism are constructed based on the history of Western philosophy and United States history. From this history of the individual, a model of authentic individualism is synthesized in part four for use by citizens and public administrators as a guide to action during the Third Administrative State. After a description in Chapter IX of the need for and

conceptual framework of a new world view in public life, the paper concludes in Chapter X with a discussion of the implications authentic individualism holds for ethics, leadership and group theory.

This paper uses a historical approach; the data was obtained from histories and historical writings in Western philosophy and political thought. The periods of historical examination were: (a) ancient (pre-Socratic), (b) Classical (Roman and Greek), (c) medieval Europe, (d) Renaissance Europe, (e) pre-revolutionary U.S., (f) developing U.S., and (g) modern U.S. Writings from ancient, classical, medieval and modern philosophers and histories of their works were examined for evidence of developing thoughts about the social and political role of the individual and any evidence of individualism in political life. Included were selected writings of such philosophers and political thinkers as Plato (Socrates), Aristotle, Augustine, Hobbes, Machiavelli, Locke, Tocqueville, Madison and Jefferson.

The same approach was applied to the history of the United States. Historical works and documents were examined to develop models of the individual for the revolutionary U.S., the industrial U.S., the post-depression U.S., and contemporary U.S. over the last two decades. Then a synthesis of these models, or a meta-model, was developed called authentic individualism; a model for more socially responsible action of the individualist in the Third Millennium. Finally, an assessment was made of the consequences and relevance for Public Administration of this new model of the individual. Consideration of its implications for group theory, leadership theory and ethics are all discussed.

Analytic Strategy--Chronology (Time Series)
Analysis and Descriptive Framework

To take all of Western culture as the province of this paper was to inevitably invite frustration and failure. Though the inquiry in this paper is broad, certain analytical strategies were used to limit its scope. The above discussion of the historical method to be implemented in this study discloses a time series view of the individual at various times in the history of the United States and Western political thought. This comparison over time identifies the cultural developments influencing evolution of the role of the individual and the concept of individualism.

Any individual political scheme derives from the thinker's actual experience and is a product of its times. Much depends upon an investigator's own style of rigorous thinking, along with presentation of evidence and careful consideration of alternative interpretations. The ultimate goal is to treat the evidence fairly, to produce compelling analytic conclusions and to rule out alternative conclusions. One way of doing this was to develop a case description, or a Descriptive Framework for organizing the study, as an analytic strategy, such as the one contained in Appendix A. Such a strategy is particularly useful when, as here, the original purpose of the study is descriptive (Yin, p. 107). Moreover, a chronology as used here is a special form of time-series analysis and constitutes another analytic mode used to trace events (or concepts) over time (pp. 118-119).

Particular emphasis was placed on examining the following cultural categories which have the greatest significance for a study of this sort: (a)

philosophy, (b) religion, (c) government, (d) politics, and (e) science. Less emphasis was accorded examination of those categories having smaller but still some significant importance to a study of individualism, such as transportation, commerce, manufacturing, law, family life, communication, economics and education. This study did not concentrate on such cultural categories as art, literature, trade, language and music, which have less direct ability to provide useful descriptors of individualism.

Within the cultural categories, indicators of the status accorded the individual and the importance of individualism appear in certain conceptual relationships such as (a) man and society, (b) government and individual, (c) authority and liberty, (d) individual and community or collectivity, (e) individualism and conformity, (f) having/doing and being, (g) control and freedom, (h) stability and anarchy, and (i) man and God.

One of the dangers of this type of study is losing sight of the original objective of examining individualism as it has evolved in U.S. history and Western political thought and getting side-tracked by the sheer volume of data. Such a loss of focus was avoided by confining the search to data likely affecting the above relationships. Searching the data for evidence of these relationships served as a control against over breadth of the study.

The Conceptual Diagram of the study in Appendix B illustrated the steps described above through which this study passed. It depicted a process of winnowing by application of cultural categories and control indicators to the great mass of historical data. This process ultimately

resulted in development of a model of authentic individualism and discussion of its implications for Public Administration.

Endnotes

1. The Times Mirror Center for The People and The Press, a research foundation of the Los Angeles Times' parent company, asked questions of 3200 members of the general public and 650 American leaders of recognized power from news, business, entertainment, academia, science, religion, and state and local governments. These results were reported in Hanchette, J. (1993, November 20). U.S. and the world: Americans closing ranks, poll shows. Lansing State Journal, p 3A.

2. This entire study is historical in nature, and part two (Chapters III-V) explicates the character of the individual embedded in the history of Western philosophy. Part three (Chapters VI-VIII) describes the individual that emerged from the developing United States history and isolates characteristics of the individual bound-up in modern United States culture. Chapters III-VIII become the "data" from which a theory of authentic individualism is synthesized in part four (Chapter IX). As data, Chapters III-VIII are not the author's original creation, but constitute facts culled from histories and historical documents written by others. Therefore, aside from the chapter summaries, parts two and three (Chapters III-VIII) are almost entirely taken from outside sources, subject of course to the winnowing discussed in this chapter and the organizational process imposed by the author. Chapter IX (part four) addresses the need for, builds a conceptual framework for, and develops a model of a new paradigm--personal philosophy or an alternate perspective--for individual action of the public administrator and citizen. Chapter X (part four) concludes with a discussion of the impacts upon implementation in public administration of organizational theory, leadership theory, and ethical theory if the authentic individualism paradigm is employed by an individual public administrator.

CHAPTER III

THE INDIVIDUAL OF EARLY WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

Synopsis

Homer and Hesiod, early Greek poets and philosophers, suggested a peculiarly indivisible synthesis of the individual and the universal. Capricious, vain, and individualistic Gods represented human desires within a cosmos rather than a chaos. This cosmic theme was taken up in the Milesian Monistic philosophical concept of process, or ordered change and was absorbed into the world process Heraclitus called logos. Later, the Sophists injected a new element of skeptical pragmatism into Greek thought and man soon became the measure of all things. These Sophistic scientific views mediated a transition from an age of myth to an age of practical reason and led to Pluralism in place of religion. Such views found a home in Pythagorean theory, but Pythagoreanism's atomistic flavor caused rebellion first by Socrates, then Plato and later Aristotle, who sought compassion, unity, moderation, and enlightened self-interest in place of discord and war. Plato's and Socrates' transcendent individual soul and Aristotle's social animal all sought universal permanence. This line of thought enticed Roman Stoics to stress the importance of positive social duties to replace self-interest. The wreck of the Roman empire laid the ground work for a deeper peace assured by religion and Augustine's human predicament. The Christian discovery of God overthrew Classical

philosophy and gave the West an unchanging universe and a sinful, bespotted, corrupt, and ulcerous view of man that dominated attitudes for more than 1,000 years. The message of an all good and loving God from Jesus gave way to the message of obedience from Paul, and the synthesis of God and man from St. Thomas was replaced by the all-powerful and vengeful God of the universal priesthood from Luther and Calvin. The church dominated a descending, theocratic theme of government and law that soon rotted from corruption within to be pushed aside by individualism and science. Renaissance man and power politics, with the rise of the nation state and capitalism, released the individual from institutions and encouraged focus on this-worldly affairs. Scientific reason placed God, the human mind and human soul in an immaterial reality separate and apart from the material reality of the human body and rational brain.

Ancient Mind--Age of Deities

Because the history of philosophy has no definitive starting point, this study begins with what is known about the pre-Socratic philosophy of the Greeks.¹ The first of those is Homer, who worshipped during a time of woes innumerable impetuous, vain and selfish gods, not because they were good, but rather because they were powerful. Far from the omnipotent being that Christians later conceived their God to be, Greek gods were often harassed by members of their households and interfered capriciously in human affairs. In the blue sky there always lurked a thunderbolt from an impulsive Zeus. Numerous works demonstrate that

Homer was much more impressed by the chaotic and the irregular than by the systematic and the predictable.

Hesiod saw a single, pervasive order with a moral law that bound gods and men alike. During a time of troubles, he conceived of the gods as fashioners of a rule of justice (law) and saw them as figures who right wrongs, correct abuses, and lift up the downtrodden. Whereas Homer saw divine punishment directed against human insolence and gave expression to the warrior code of his milieu, Hesiod's moral life was conceived differently and the supreme offense was oppression of the weak by the strong. Hesiod's gods were no longer controlled by caprice, but had the moral integrity to choose and the power to enforce the rule of law. Hesiod shook the old notion of fate, rejected indifference to humanity, and embraced a concept of pervasive moral law.

These early Greeks expressed a view that man differed from nature, having an obligation to live in a characteristically human way, to carry out certain actions, and to abstain from others based on a feeling of pride in human being. This was a sense of noblesse oblige--man must live up to his responsibilities as man--and was quite different from any feeling that man must obey a divine overlord's commands. These notions also connected with another key Greek concept of moderation, which was thought to be also a peculiarly human trait. Greeks believed men embodied inner-discipline and self-restraint and thought they ought to live by uniquely human law in their dealings with one and another. By Hesiod's time, the operation of this moral law was no longer conceived of as being in the hands of arbitrary and temperamental Gods.

Thales, another Greek philosopher lived in Miletus and believed in a single cause of everything else. He was, therefore, a Monist and remained discontented until he had reduced the diversity of the world to unity. Thus, he held a notion of a single, unifying principle and a secular point of view, which led him to seek meaning in natural events and processes rather than divine doings. Through Thales, advance in knowledge based on theories--public assertions, not private fantasies--became possible. For him, statements about the world were open to criticism, revision, or rejection on the basis of their internal consistency and theoretical evidence. In contrast to the views of Homer and Hesiod, Thales's ideas presented the first rudimentary concept of process, and presented the first opportunity for social advancement and improvement.

The Milesian philosophers that came after Thales sought to escape the question: What is the stuff out of which the world is made? They substituted the concept of process, or ordered change and somewhat later, Heraclitus, who was influenced by the Milesian thinkers called this change according to the measures. This view, therefore, sounded very modern and it looked for regular relations among a variety of events rather than self-identical, enduring things. Heraclitus thus envisioned political life to be a struggle based on a reality in which everything flowed and changed all the time. To the Milesian Monistic philosophic view that reality resulted from the natural events rather than divine doings, Heraclitus added the belief that man's chief good was to listen, to become attuned, and even to become absorbed into the world process which he called logos. This term eventually came to denote a transcendent source of archetypes and

providential principle of cosmic order that, through the archetypes continuously permeated the created world. Whatever Heraclitus meant by this term, later Stoics and Christians placed a theological strain in his view of there being a universal order in the world.

On the other hand, Parmenides argued that everything was what it was, so that it could not become what it was not. Change was thus incompatible with being and only the permanent aspects of the world could be considered truly real. Democritus proposed an ingenious escape from this dilemma in the fifth century B.C. He hypothesized that all matter is made up of tiny indestructible units, which he called atoms. The atoms remained unchanging, having fixed size and shape, but they moved about in space and combined in various ways making the larger bodies which they constituted seem to alter. In this way permanence and flux were reconciled, all change in the world was attributed simply to the rearrangement of atoms, and the doctrine of materialism was born.²

The old religion of Homer and Hesiod was undermined by the views of Ionian scientists, Heraclitus and later Xenophanes and others, as a new science began to replace religious faith in much the same way that occurred in Europe and America during the second half of the last century when old fundamentalism and a literal bible was undermined by Darwinism. However, unlike American forbears to whom religion was an important luxury, religion played a much more prominent role in an increasingly secular Greek life. The prominent role of religion in that life made its collapse more acute, with very serious repercussions for Greek

society. As a result, religion declined and Pluralism arose in early Greek thought.

Monism of the Milesian type was succeeded by Pluralism as the basic assumption of Greek thought, which conceived of the world process as a continuous cycle in which all of the basis elements were completely mixed up like a well tossed salad. In this mix of random combinations, a successful relationship sooner or later occurred. No God planned it and the fact that humanity, with the faculties that existed therein, developed at all was a temporary and accidental result of this casual mixture of elements. Pluralists did not seem to reconcile the rational, thinking mind with the purely chance operation of the world process as they saw it. Not until Plato did philosophers fully recognize the problem of reconciling a purposive and valuational conception of man with a notion of a mechanistic universe.

The next step in the development of Pluralistic philosophy occurred with the Pythagoreans, who reduced the cosmos to mathematical relationships between particles and entities. Not much is known about Pythagoras but it is guessed that his Pythagorean order was primarily a religious fraternity similar to a medieval monastery, where political power was joined with worship and the pursuit of learning and science was cultivated as the means to spiritual redemption. Their most notable achievement was the concept of cosmos--the notion that the universe was not a chaotic hodgepodge, but a thoroughly ordered system in which every element harmoniously related to every other. However, this concept also appeared in Hesiod's thought and that of the Milesians. For them order

was something imposed on basic chaos, whereas the universe was ordered for the Pythagoreans' because all of its parts are related to one another mathematically. Pythagoras taught withdrawal from the world to engage in dispassionate contemplation of reason and mathematics. A Pythagorean idea that the universe was well ordered and thus intelligible through pure reason was taken up by Plato and passed into Christian theology as one of the great heritages of the modern mind.

Pythagoreanism and Atomism compliment each other remarkably. The former's emphasis on mathematics and the latter's view that reality consists of entities varying only in shape, size, and velocity, seem to have provided the conceptual basis from which modern physical theory began. Only the dominance of Platonism and Christianity and their emphasis on other-worldliness prevented the possibilities of the combination between Pythagoreanism and Atomism from being immediately seen. Consequently, the world waited until the seventeenth century for that combination to be completed.

Classical Mind—Age of Politics

Plato and his student, Aristotle, were the dominant philosophers of the Classical period, which can be described as the years between 450 B.C. and 450 A.D.³ One cannot hope to fully understand their writings and political philosophy without also understanding something of the general mood of Athens during Plato's life. That mood was set by the Peloponnesian War, which was fought during the period 431-404 B.C. Athens' chief rival in the Peloponnesian War was Sparta, a City-State of

disciplined and warlike people, who proposed a solution radically different from that of Sparta to the disaffection of lower classes. Athens expanded the franchise to all adult male citizens present at any meeting of the Assembly as the final authority of the state. Sparta's elite ruled in constant fear that Athenian democracy would foment rebellion among Spartan serfs.

Athens was ruled by old aristocratic families who controlled votes in the Assembly somewhat like modern political bosses in the United States as late as the 1950s. Athens was a vigorous, commercial democracy with a loose union of lesser independent agricultural states that were supplied with industrial goods from Athens and relied on protection by the Athenian fleet. Sparta had long regarded itself as the primary power in Greece, and Athens now challenged and even surpassed Sparta. Athens imposed embargoes on some of the lesser commercial states destroying their business and some of those, including Corinth, entreated the Spartans to join in a campaign against the Athenian expansionist policy. War began quietly in 431 B.C. with an attack on a minor ally of Athens.

For the next twenty-seven years it continued, while Athenian demagogues controlled policy. Throwing away several chances to reach an understanding with Sparta, they abandoned an earlier defensive strategy and were defeated in a foolhardy offensive expedition into Sicily. Though Athenian naval and military forces were decimated in the Sicilian expedition, the war continued for another ten years while bitterness over the hopeless struggle grew as the years passed. The war led to increasing criticism of Democratic institutions and political debate became less and

less objective. Ideological struggle broke out in every city and Athens itself divided into mutually distrustful groups, resulting in treasonable plots and corresponding purges.

This civil war shocked the Greeks who had a high regard for political unity; a unity forged atop family, clan, and tribe loyalties not easily submerged. National unity and a profound love for the city molded the Athenian citizen. So recently achieved to give the mass people a sense of belonging to the State, these concepts were now the subject of bitter dispute. Precious unity was lost in the partisan dissensions of the Peloponnesian War as the old ideal of respect for law, religion, custom and patriotic duty to one's city lost force and gave way to the beliefs of a new type of man developing under the pressure of decades of war. The new Athenian man was a cynic who believed that might makes right and rejected old loyalties and virtues, unless they were expedient or helped him accomplish his private ends. Thucydides, a Greek historian in the fifth century B.C., gave this description of the prevailing attitude:

The meaning of words no longer has the same relation to things but was changed by them as they thought proper. . . . In a word, he who could outstrip another in a bad action was applauded, and so was he who encouraged to evil one who had no idea of it. The tie of party was stronger than the tie of blood, because a partisan was more ready to dare without asking why. . . . The seal of good faith was not divine law, but fellowship in crime. . . . Revenge was dearer than self-preservation. Any agreements sworn to by either party, when they could do nothing elsewhere binding as long as both were powerless. . . . The cause of all these evils was the love of power, originating in avarice and ambition, and the party-spirit which is engendered by them when men are fairly embarked on a contest. . . . Striving in every way to overcome each other, [party leaders] committed the most monstrous crimes: yet even these were surpassed by the magnitude of their revenges which they pursued to the utmost, neither party observing any definite limits either of

justice or public expediency, but both alike making the caprice of the moment their law. (Jones, 1970, pp. 53-54)

Plato was old enough to have fought through the last four or five years of the war with Sparta. He grew up in these years of defeat and of moral, social and economic dissolution.

Plato was born in 427 B.C. to a distinguished Athenian family and to a position of leadership. He could have been expected to play a leading political role as a matter of course in the overthrow the democratic government. However, reacting to his education-through-violence and cultural malaise produced by war, Plato learned from the excesses of the oligarchs and the savagery of the revived democracy that the will of the few was no better than the will of the many.

Socrates had made more of an impression on Plato than anyone else. The former grew up at the time of Athens' greatest power and success, fought bravely in the war with Sparta, and performed all of the political duties that the democratic state had expected of its citizens. But he was not a politician, he differed from his fellows in knowing that he knew nothing, and he spent his days occupied in the task of proving to the Athenians their ignorance about things they had hitherto believed themselves well informed. Socrates' realistic and down-to-earth common sense was combined with cool skepticism about ordinary beliefs and opinions. He placed his own convictions in opposition to the public's and was inevitably disliked and misunderstood by the majority as a result. His indifference to public opinion and association with Oligarchs--enemies of democracy--led to persecution, from which he neither attempted to defend himself nor tried to escape. Ultimately, hatred and religious piety led to

his imprisonment and trial. Thus, Socrates was the first individualist--an individualist's individual--succumbing to the tyranny of the majority for his beliefs; the great individualist who dared question popular belief.

Socrates built his own philosophy from and against the humanism and pragmatism of Sophistry, which was challenged by the impersonality of Ionian science. The natural philosophers attempted to give the whole of nature an intellectual foundation by accounting for all diversity and change with the notion of alterations according to unchangeable laws in a common underlying substance. This naturalistic view of the world neglected morals and the human condition in the search for absolute first principles. Sophistry replaced this view with a practical concern for the here and now that exchanged speculation about the nature of the universe for attention to the world of human experience. They held that man is the measure of all things and thus introduced a relativity that recalled man to himself. Nevertheless, because they believed achieving human excellence (their good) could not be accomplished outside society, the cultivation of man was viewed as necessarily political. In short, the Sophists, Thrasymachus among them, tried to present men as deserving of the respect of their contemporaries. In their return to man, Socrates followed them. However, they defined virtue as success in acquiring social, political, and economic status, with which Socrates disagreed.

Against this background, Socrates came on stage to ask questions science and Sophistry had ignored about the nature of a human self. His prime concern was not with fault of the political structure, but with the relation of individual to society. He was an inner-directed, inward man

who enjoined individuals to know thyself. The Sophists had preferred probability to unobtainable truth and had sought the uncritical consent of the many rather than the intelligent agreement of the few, but Socrates did the opposite. He insisted on the truth of one's own critical reflection by questioning the majority's accepted modes of thought and embodying human excellence, education, and virtue in one's life. He skillfully dismantled Thrasymachus's view that justice is merely the interests of the strong and that social mores are protests of the weak. In its place, he introduced the concept of common good and defined it by what fulfills human nature rather than what men think they need. This self-fulfillment--the fulfillment of one's nature, or the realization of one's proper potential--was given the Socratic name *eudaimonia*. A modern word for it is happiness, however, *eudaimonistic* theory is broader than simple fulfillment of one's desire. Its full meaning includes whatever is in accordance with humanity's real and essential nature. Consistent with this theory, Socrates' ethics held that wrong-doing and evil were not the result of weak will, sinful disposition, or bad faith, but of ignorance (lack of knowledge) to be remedied by education. Accordingly, Socrates taught that virtue is any knowledge that makes the individual good. Such knowledge, truly practical knowledge--wisdom (*phronesis*)--is self-knowledge of one's nature, of what one needs, or lacks, or must have to fulfill one's human essence. Socratic human virtues were:

1. Courage to do that which is worth doing and fearing that which is not.

2. Temperance through self-control, health of mind and sobriety of thought as restraint against unbridled desire, unopposed passions or unrestrained freedom.

3. Justice in a state existing for the good of its citizens with laws, customs, and rules of conduct that regulate spheres of influence, mediate conflicting demands, allocate functions and duties, and limit power over others for the purpose of preventing discord and facilitating harmonious functioning of the whole community.

4. Piety, or holiness, whose essence is virtue itself.

All these principles espoused by Socrates have come to be called Socratic Humanism, because he wedded the Sophistic return to man with the concern, caring, compassion, and empathy he found lacking in the majority's indifference to wisdom and virtue. He dared ask questions his contemporaries dared not answer.

When the citizens of Athens put Socrates on trial and executed him for impiety, or belief in human power, soon after his 70th birthday, Plato was shocked into a philosophical career. He left the country to travel abroad, then returned to Athens and created the Academy as an intellectual center to which he dedicated himself until he died about 347 B.C. From this institution graduated Plato's most famous student, Aristotle. Though Plato was too young to have been of one of Socrates' closest friends, he set out to defend the latter's memory in a series of biographical dialogues. Plato's political philosophy is such a blending of his and Socrates' opinions that Plato's theory can be taken to mean the theory of Socrates-Plato. Socrates' death confirmed Plato's aristocratic bias,

convincing him that a state ruled by many is inevitably inefficient, indecisive, and irresponsible, because the many are ignorant, emotionally unstable, and narrowly self-centered. This belief that most men are egoistic heathenists led him to espouse rule by an elite few as the model for government. Not until philosophers (chosen from the elite guardians of the State) became kings or kings become philosophers--until supreme power and knowledge resided in the same person--could real improvement be possible.

According to Plato, the universe was constructed of ideal Forms, or ideas, that could not be observed, but were uncovered only by reason and contemplation of mathematical law. Plato carried over into his own philosophy Pythagoras's dualism between detached thought and action. Plato illustrated the relationship between the shadow world of direct experience and the world of Forms with a metaphor. Prisoners in a cave with their backs to the light could only observe objects (direct experience) by their shadows on the cave wall as those objects passed by the entrance. These imperfect projections constituted the world of observations. Only the world of immutable ideas (Forms) was illuminated and made intelligible by the sun. The championing of human reason wrenched society from ancient authority, but the divorce of thought and action made work degrading and became the world view of the slave holder. Plato thus gave primacy to being over becoming.

Many describe Plato as genuinely interested in the individual and a few might even say he thought man in some sense prior to society. This view is supported by the elitist outlook apparent in his doctrine of

selecting Philosopher Kings and Guardians upon individual merit. It also finds support in his analogy of man as an animal. Both of these concepts are very individualistic in a modern sense. In the Republic, he wrote, "And where freedom is, the individual is clearly able to do as he pleases? Clearly" (Glendon, 1991, p. 1). On the other hand, it is said that Plato was not very heartily concerned and was even hostile toward the individual. This view is taken from the concern he expressed with types, classes, and professions rather than the conflict between individual and society. Severest of all are those who view Plato's teachings as totalitarian and hateful of the individual. These views do not seem to be supported, though it can be clearly stated that he was hostile to the raw individualist might-is-right school represented by Thrasymachus. Indeed, Plato saw the self-seeking individual as hostile to society and characteristic of a diseased state of affairs within society.

Plato held that man was an animal, a zoon politico, strongly instinctual and sometimes rational, with desires to associate and live in communities. The best life was in an association of individuals, the good life for an individual was possible only in a community, and communal life was necessary for self-fulfillment (and was therefore good). Since politics was the art of communal living, man was both a political and social creature who, as such, had moral and political responsibilities. The problem of being a good man was inseparable from the problem of being a good citizen. Likewise, the state was an organism that arose out of the needs of mankind and in which existed the kind of interrelations that were found between the member elements of an individual organism.

Therefore, the state shared the same moral and political responsibilities as the individual and justice called for self-discipline in the interest of the larger life. The organ that disciplined itself for the sake of the whole was at the same time promoting its own long-run interests. Since the individual was an organ, anything that hurt the organ sooner or later hurt it. The greatest good of the State was unity and the greatest evil was discord. Man was an organism whose functions needed to be brought into balance and harmony. The world and man formed an organic unity while being and value coincided; the more being anything had the higher it stood.

The Greek polis was overtly more repressive than most kinds of modern Western society. Plato presents an extreme of this in his Laws where he demands citizens not take any initiative unless authorities approve. In the Republic, however, man is an active creature with individual responsibility as a participant in society. The Socratic message still retaining vitality in the Republic is a plea for human renewal. Perhaps the Laws, where Socratic principle is dead and where the individual grabs what identity he can from society, reveals Plato in his old age, himself trapped by the entropic forces he foresaw in the Republic.

One might say that Greek history in general and Plato's philosophy in particular showed traces of heroic individualism. Plato regarded the individual as a temporary union of soul and body and his philosophy clearly placed development of the individual below that of the republic. This was perhaps consistent with his religiously oriented point of view. The profile of Plato is with his eyes on the heavens, but the point of view

of his most famous student was distinctly more practical and earthly. Aristotle's philosophy which ascribed more importance to the individual, was less intensely metaphysical and relied on empirical observation and rationality.

Aristotle was born in 384 B.C. when Plato was forty-three years old and Socrates had been dead for fifteen years. He obtained his education at Plato's Academy, where he stayed for twenty years, not all of them as a student. He departed the Academy only after Plato's death in 347 B.C. when he disagreed with the head of the institution over emphasis on mathematics and mathematical knowledge. After tutoring Alexander, son of King Philip of Macedonia, he set up his own school in Athens, the Lyceum, in 335 B.C.

The similarities between Plato's work and Aristotle's is immediately apparent. Though he departed from Plato's beliefs in many respects and sometimes criticized his mentor, Aristotle was fundamentally a Platonist and his work can only be understood as an effort to reformulate the insights of Plato. For Aristotle, the rule of law was of major importance and should be the main factor in all constitutions. As Plato was in favor of the free philosophical intelligence of individual rulers properly trained for the work of government, Aristotle's answer was balanced in favor of the rule of law.

Rightly constituted laws should be the final sovereign; and personal rule, whether it be exercised by a single person or a body of persons, should be sovereign only in matters on which the law is unable, owing the difficulty in framing general rules for all contingencies to make an exact pronouncement. (Baker, 1958, p. 127)

It follows that Aristotle adhered to a particular concept of justice and political association. To him, good in the sphere of politics was justice, and justice consisted of what tended to promote the common interest. His conception of distributive justice was that he who contributed most to the end of the state--the performance of good actions--was greater than the democratic criterion of free birth or the oligarchical criterion of wealth. Those who contributed more to the performance of good actions in and by the association, and thereby showed greater civic excellence, deserved more from the polis. Aristotle's political philosophy concerned life in a political association--the state, or polis. A polis was an association of citizens in a polity, or constitution; an association of households and clans in a good life for the sake of obtaining a perfect and self-sufficing existence.

In a democratic polis, the people (the demos), were Sovereign but citizens, or polites, received recognition in any polis. Citizenship was dependent upon participation and the political life of the polis. The citizen was defined as one who shared in the administration of justice and the holding of office. According to Aristotle, man was an animal impelled by his nature to live in a polis. He suggested two ends for the state: (1) to satisfy a natural impulse to live a social life, and (2) to promote the common interest in the attainment of good. The latter required those institutions, such as a system of justice, which were necessary to such a life. The purpose of the polis was the good life and the institutions of social life were means to that end. This life was the chief end served by the state, both for the community as a whole and for each individual. If it

was not so, a political association becomes a mere alliance no different from other forms where members live at a distance from one another. Good was obtained through the union of all in the form of political association. The polis belonged to the order of compounds, which meant it was like all of the things that formed a single whole, a whole composed, nonetheless, of a number of different parts. There were two sorts of compounds--the mechanical and the organic. Wholes were of the second or organic kind: they had a form (organic unity). This was an important concept in Aristotle's philosophy, which defined the relationship between the rights of individual citizens and rights of the community.

A polis was a whole because it was an organic union of the demos (people) in the form of a political association for the attainment of a common end, the good of all. The body of those who are sovereign was the general body of citizens who have no individual claims based on wealth or goodness, but a common claim based on common freedom. The rights of individuals were tempered by strivings of an organic whole for the common interest of all. What was right must be understood as what was equally right and the latter was for the benefit of the whole state and the common good of its citizens. Aristotle saw individuals as integral parts of the polis who, though separate and autonomous, shared the identity of the whole and bore a responsibility to it.

Aristotle held that the world was eternal and uncreated. Man and the world were in a process of development, not yet completely itself, waiting for further development beyond itself. The world presented itself not as collection of utterly separate and discrete things, but as a collection

of multiple interrelated particulars. Every element in the universe could be known by transcending element, by seeing it in relation to other elements in the universe. Each individual was the fulfillment of purpose inherent in some other individual. Human behavior could only be explained in terms that the lower structures from which it developed and the higher structures towards which it was unfolding.

The excellence of a good citizen and that of a good man were not in all cases identical. It was possible to be a good citizen without possessing the excellence of a good man. However, the excellence of both the good man and the good citizen coincided in four particular forms of goodness—temperance, justice, courage, and wisdom. Each of these virtues was a mean of its excess and deficit. For example, courage was the mean of cowardice and foolhardiness. Aristotle's mean built on the traditional Greek notion of moderation. Accordingly, man fulfilled himself in different ways under differing circumstances. What was right for a man to do depended on his milieu, which differed from individual to individual and occasion to occasion. Whereas Plato believed there was the right thing to do and the Sophists believed there was no objective right, Aristotle maintained a right-relative-to-me. Because moral virtue was thus variable, individuals must have built a habit of virtue (truthfulness, justice, courage, and so forth). Moral virtue was the disposition to choose; it was not just an act, but an act flowing from a disposition, attitude, state of character, or habit of decision. This is the Greek concept of eudaimonia; the fundamental integrity of listening to one's daimon, or inner voice.

Aristotle thus saw acting for the good of others, not as an abnegation of self, but as a choice to be a certain kind of individual.

Aristotle rejected the world of timeless forms for the world as a living, developing organism. The cosmos was interfused with purpose and living things were ascribed immanent souls. This was an animistic universe that was ungenerated, imperishable and eternal--without beginning in time. It also laid stress on process through progressive goal oriented change, so it might be supposed that Aristotle gave primacy to becoming over being. Less dramatically affected by war than Plato, Aristotle accorded more respect to the choices afforded the individual in a social setting. Nevertheless, unity of the whole was still an overriding concern and individual will was governed by the common interest. An individual defined as transcending self for the good of all, sought fulfillment by developing his own higher potentialities through knowledge and right reason.

Unlike Aristotle, the Atomists believed in an objective, public reality, but a reality which had no affinity with humanity. This reality is the kind of world modern science discloses; a world of energy that, by some curious coincidence, behaves in ways mathematical minds can understand but is utterly indifferent to the questions moral natures ask. Plato denied this concept of reality; he thought man was not merely a neutral knower who was curious about the world and indifferent to everything except knowing what reality is. Rather, Plato believed man was a moral, aesthetic, social and religious creature as well. He affirmed the old Greek notion of cosmos; that the world and man form an organic

unity. These notions and many others were brought out in Plato's myth of the cave in which any man fortunate enough and well endowed enough to extricate himself from the cave of ignorance saw that the sun and all it illuminates was one, beautiful and good. That is to say, being and value coincide and those who attained this vision became rulers in Plato's politics. Elite rule by the enlightened few, as symbolized in the myth of the cave, battled with democratic principles.

In the late classical period, Roman thinkers attempted to modify Stoicism to function usefully as a social philosophy in the Roman empire. These Roman Stoics gave elaborate descriptions of the various duties of mankind which replaced interest so that an aesthetic and altruistic tone continued to dominate their thought. One of these, Marcus Tullius Cicero, was a Roman lawyer whose talents brought him to the counselorship in 63 B.C. At this time the Roman Republic was in its last period and various contestants for supreme power fought in bloody civil wars. Against the view that each individual's own pleasure was his sole good, Cicero affirmed the Stoic notion that the chief good consisted of choosing in accordance with nature and rejecting what was contrary to it. In other words, good for Cicero was to live in agreement and harmony with nature. In this regard, he believed no phase of life could be without a moral duty; all that is morally right depends on the discharge of such duties and all that is morally wrong on their neglect. For Cicero, reason, not Hesiod's divine will or Plato's enlightened self-interest, was the ultimate sanction for doing one's duty. Moreover, Cicero taught that the

law of nature was applicable to all men equally and, as citizens of one State were equal, all men were subject to one law.

Another of the Roman Stoics, Epictetus, demonstrated the religious tendency of Stoicism in a rather strikingly evident manner. He taught that man should accept whatever God gives; that is, whatever life brings. Again, since all were equally God's creatures, they were all equally members of one community. One lost one's self-identity in this community and as a member of a greater union, sacrificed himself willingly, if need be, for the sake of that larger whole of which he was a part. This line of thought could and did lead others to stress the importance of more positive social duties. One of these others, Marcus Aurelius, lived from 121-188 A.D., was a member of a distinguished Roman family, oriented his thought around the central concept of nature, and believed everything disappeared from the cosmos by passing into something else, where change was orderly and regular. This orderliness was evidence to Aurelius that the universe was rational and intelligent and was, in fact, one living being, possessed of a single soul. Like Epictetus, Aurelius emphasized social duties such as an obligation to behave altruistically, to act scrupulously, to accept unaffected duty and love, to act unselfishly, to avoid the lie and to practice justice in thought.

Aurelius's appeal to stiffen the back and endure until the end reaffirmed social duties. In affirming obligations toward one's fellow man, he looked back to the classical community based upon a sense of law and order and of balance and moderation which was one of the principal marks of the classical spirit. Thus, Aurelius's emphasis on duty

abandoned the self-interest of Plato and Aristotle and this shift from interest to duty seemed to reflect a change in the culture giving the impression that it had become tired and discouraged. Just when Greek intellectual achievement reached its climax during the fourth century B.C., Alexander the Great swept down from Macedonia through Greece. The qualities of Greek evolution--restless individualism, proud humanism, and critical rationalism--now precipitated its downfall. Divisiveness, arrogance, and opportunism that shadowed their nobler qualities left them myopic and unprepared for the Macedonian challenge.

About 200 A.D. Sextus Empiricus summarized the long and varied development of philosophical Skepticism. Like the Epicureans and the Stoics, the Skeptics sought peace of mind, but the Stoics held it was reached by recognizing individuals to be tiny fragments in an infinite whole. On one hand, the Epicureans believed peace of mind was reached by coming to know that the universe was a vast mechanism in which the gods did not and could not intervene. On the other hand, Skeptics thought it was reached by realizing that there was no conclusive evidence one way or the other for any of the beliefs by which men live. Accordingly, the underlying value system of Skepticism supported a view that late classical culture was a tired and discouraged society in which peace of mind had replaced positive goods such as social progress and self-development. In this tired culture, the ground work had been laid for that deeper peace assured by a transcendent and other-worldly religion.

Endnotes

1. The principal sources of philosophical history used in this study are: Jones, W. T. (1970). A history of western philosophy (2d ed.)(Vols. 1-5). San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich; and Tarnos, R. (1991). The passion of the western mind. New York: Harmony Books.
2. Davies, P., & Gribbin, J. (1992). The matter myth. New York: Simon and Schuster, p. 10. Aristotle was largely responsible for pushing the notions of Democritus, but he did not even mention Anaxagoras, for which he has been criticized by other philosophers. Cf. Cleve, F. M. (1965). Giants of pre-Sophistic Greek philosophy (Vol 2). The Hague: M. Nijhoff. Yet, it appears that Anaxagoras, an older, pre-Sophist contemporary of Democritus, made a similar proposal earlier that nous (mind) enclosed all space, or atoms, and created, ordered and directed all--engendering the doctrine of spiritual consciousness embracing all, including the material. In Christian philosophy, Plotinus (125 A. D.) was the principal proponent of Anaxagorean views. Of course, the mystics of all time, both East and West, embrace the immanence view of the devine mind of all, uniting all.
3. Other references used for explication of Plato's philosophy were: Plato. (1986). The republic. Buffalo, New York: Prometheus Books; Rankin, H. D. (1964). Plato and the individual. New York: Barnes and Noble. Aristotle's views also came from: Baker, E. (Ed.). (1958). The politics of Aristotle. London: Oxford University Press.

CHAPTER IV

THE INDIVIDUAL OF THE DARK AGES

Synopsis

First a contributor to, then a victim of, this energetic and unstable society, the Christian Church underwent cataclysmic changes that undermined central authority and orthodoxy. Arising out of the Papal corruption and ecclesiastical abuses, Luther baptized a universal priesthood of believers. Personal interpretation of the Bible and communication with God, and primacy of the individual conscience combined with and reinforced the process toward individuation, competition, and economic expansion already underway. Development of the scientific method propelled these forces forward as the church weakened and a transformation of political and moral ideals revived learning and interest in the sounds, smells, and sights of nature. A quantitative, mechanistic view of nature displaced the theological at the same time nation states, capitalism, and self-improvement became the new model. The logic of science suggested a chasm between empirical, observable things-in-themselves, and the subjective human mind. This logic drove out values, which were mere appearances in a world of fact. Obviously, this Hobbesian self-interested view fit very neatly with the individualist dedicated to self-improvement and the acquisition of wealth and power. Seeking to avoid this amoral view and still accept the new

science, Descartes concluded that mind and body were completely separate substances so that the sciences of each could not contradict. This left a place for value in the universe as a part of the mind, but failed to stem the tide of egoism that spread throughout the Western world. Hume rebelled against this view and launched an attack on rationalism that aroused Kant and others to attempt a rational philosophy on a different basis. Kant saw Hume's attack as dangerous, contributing to the Romantic action against the mood of the Enlightenment. The Romantics saw the universe as richer, bigger, and more varied and exciting than thinkers of the Age of Reason. They believed reason imposed artificial, man-made structures on thought that failed to grasp the largeness of reality--an immensity that baffled science--and failed to recognize the continuous, living, dynamic nature of the universe. Kantianism and Hegelianism fought against these detractors and sought to rehabilitate rationalism by reuniting mind and body through ordered experience. Within this new view, self and objects were not distinct substances, nor mutually independent, but ordered elements in experience where all knowledge contains elements drawn from experience yet supplied by the mind itself. These philosophies embodied a great shift from a static view of the universe to one of evolving through time.

Medieval Mind--Age Of Faith

Greek political thought emphasized independence, autonomy and self-realization in an interdependent social arrangement. This was irrelevant to those who survived the collapse of classical culture and the

wreck of the Roman Empire. The fall of Rome around 200-450 A.D. was a devastating occurrence that profoundly impacted the course of Western philosophy. Augustine recorded the period as one of moral deterioration during which the Roman State descended from the "heights of excellence into the depths of depravity": The young were so corrupted by luxury and greed that "the degradation of traditional morality ceased to be a gradual decline and became a torrential downhill rush" (St. Augustine, 1984, p. 69). In early times it was love of liberty that lead to great achievements; later it was the love of domination and the greed for praise and glory that led the plunge to extinction. It was important for people in that early time to die bravely or to live in freedom. However, after liberty had been won, a passion for glory and a desire to acquire dominion took over and the commonwealth perished through its moral depravity.

During the centuries it took for the collapse of classical culture, the idea of a human predicament gradually emerged. Reflecting a sense of insecurity and pessimism with which man had to come to look at this world, Augustine fully shared this mood. Classical philosophy, overthrown by the Christian discovery of God and modified through Augustine's writings, gave birth to a new kind of man that was born out of the disorder and disillusion of the classical world and was destined to dominate the West for centuries.¹ This man had an extraordinary, even abnormal, sense of sinfulness and guilt, which came from Augustine's estimate of the miserable predicament of mankind that was to dominate social attitudes for more than a thousand years. Augustine's influence and those feelings of guilt and sinfulness, passed to us through Calvin and

the Puritans, is too pervasive to escape. Understanding one's self today means trying to understand Augustine.

In the Middle Ages the ultimate criterion for all knowledge and sanction for all conduct was not the light of reason, but the authority of divinely inspired text and institution. What distinguishes the Medieval mind from the modern mind is that the latter largely lost this outlook and now shares the secular point-of-view of the Greeks. For them and for today's society, life on earth is its own end, but for Medieval man life's true end was beyond this world. During this time, man's proper relation with the Creator became the primary concern of the Western world for some twelve centuries.

After the death of Marcus Aurelius in 180 A.D., Rome saw a succession of weak and incompetent rulers. For eighty years, not a single ruler died peacefully and between 235-249 A.D. there were no less than seven emperors. Near the end of the century a line of strong rulers appeared, but the Empire had already lost its vitality and been laid waste, commerce had been disrupted, and cities deserted. Because only the strongest measures could halt their ruin, Diocletian radically altered the character of the principate when he came to the throne in 284 A.D. Diocletian abandoned all traces of republican government and became a despot surrounded by the ceremony of an oriental monarch. He was now called lord and master and his subjects, even those of highest rank, were obliged to prostrate themselves before him.

A sense of helplessness and defeat was produced in the populace, no doubt by the pressure of external events and the physical crumbling of the

Empire and civil strife, but also by Diocletian's internal reorganization of the Empire. Government became more remote and more despotic, social and political organizations grew larger, and individuals lost the sense of controlling their own destinies. As their vast Empire went to pieces before their eyes, they drew comfort from the belief in an omniscient, omnipotent, all good deity who was strong enough and wise enough to guide the affairs that human personalities could no longer control. Disappointment grew over the inability of the Empire to cope with economic crises and barbarian invasions. Mystery cults and other movements, contemporary with the rise of Christianity, all rejected the old humanistic-naturalistic ideal in favor of supra-human excellence achieved only through some supra-natural agency. Popularity of these cults brought hope to the masses and reflected widespread uneasiness. To its contemporaries, Christianity was just another mystery cult, an obscure and inconsequential Jewish sect of very small significance.

The Roman authorities were quite indifferent to what a man believed as long as he conformed outwardly to the rites of State religion. When Jesus repeatedly preached the imminent coming of the kingdom, the ordinary man in the street understood it in a political sense and took the promised kingdom to be a revival of an autonomous Hebrew monarchy that would throw the Romans out and establish peace, freedom, and prosperity. For the Romans themselves, this Messianic hope naturally created serious political problems, and since they had been so lenient with the Christians, they could not understand why the latter

refused to conform. To Roman officialdom, Christians seemed dangerously immersed in the blackest superstition.

Jesus's teachings lacked any social ethic; social philosophy was not prominent in his thoughts because he was other-worldly and emphasized inwardness. Jesus began with God, not with man. For him the good life consisted in pleasing God, not in developing to its full form man. Jesus also emphasized love and cooperation with one's neighbor, not for mutual profit and enjoyment, but because of the common fatherhood of God. This sense of common fatherhood emphasized the essential equality of all men. Jesus's view was therefore genuinely altruistic, outgoing, and democratic. Because Jesus put aside Greek interest in egoism, courage, self-congratulation and socially-oriented conduct, the questions became how to combine Greek insight into quality with the Christian emphasis on equality and how to create opportunity for all, rather than to select the fortunate few.

Paul's vision of the coming of the kingdom was less a final day of accounting or day of judgment than it was a spiritual state--the individual's union with his savior. To be saved was to be united with Christ. When one died, one became not only dead to sin, but alive to God through a union with Jesus Christ. Paul was unconcerned with the question about how the divinity came to reside in a particular human being, the man Jesus, son of Joseph, the carpenter of Nazareth. This question of how divinity came to reside in humanity was addressed by the unknown author of the gospel according to John:

In the beginning the Word existed. The Word was with God, and the word was divine. It was he that was with God in the beginning.

Everything came into existence through him, and apart from him, nothing came to be. . . . So the Word became flesh and blood and lived for a while among us, abounding in blessing and truth, and we saw the honor God had given him, such honor as only a Son receives from his Father. (Jones, Vol. 2, 1970, pp. 50-51)

John, as this author has been named by tradition, moved in a different world than Paul. The term translated as Word is the Greek *logos*. Word, or *logos*, is a term drawn from Greek philosophy that was foreign to the mystery cults and to ancient Judaism. To John, Jesus Christ was not Paul's resurrected God; instead, he was more exalted and more abstract--the *logos* of Hellenistic philosophy. As noted earlier, the *logos* conception had faint beginnings in Heraclitus and further development in Stoicism. The Stoics affirmed existence of a creative and generative force which they called the *logos* and had conceived to be in some fashion divine. For John, Jesus was simply the eternal and divine *logos*, the Word of God which took on human shape and which acquired habitation at a particular point in space and time.

John attempted to interpret the *logos* to the advantage of Christianity, making the new religion philosophically respectable among the learned of the day. It was an attempt to make God closer to the people that sprang from the end of the old Classical culture's emphasis on self-respect, autonomy and independence. The *logos* represented primarily a sense of personal inadequacy, and a corresponding need of external support that John shared with so many of his time. God sent his only begotten Son (the *logos*), himself divine but dependent on God, into the world so that through him the world might be saved. Though John emphasized the tender mercy of the Father, this personal interpretation of

the logos doctrine with which it was fused passed into the future of the church.

Developing Christianity was directed largely toward the uneducated and the illiterate, but when Christianity became socially respectable rational Platonism proved both a model and a threat. After Diocletian abdicated in 305 A.D., Constantine established himself as emperor and issued an edict of toleration under which Christianity obtained the status of a State religion. The result of pressures of institutionalization, movements within the church began to appeal to the magic of the sacraments and a worship based on fear of God and of hellfire instead of love and identification with the divine. As this institutionalism progressed, orthodoxy submerged responsibility and free will. Authority, inner-suffering, sincerity, and God-reality replaced reason, knowledge and social understanding. Pessimism and the human predicament became the predominant paradigms, from which arose a tension between the institution and that rare creature, the genuine individual. St. Augustine's work is understandable only as part of this Christian struggle for supremacy, orthodoxy, and a philosophical base. He formulated an ideology for the new alliance between the Church and the state, reconciled Christians with imperial rule, and converted the Church into a powerful buttress of secular authority.

St. Augustine was born in North Africa in 354 A.D. After teaching Rhetoric in Rome, he became attracted to Neo-platonism. He suffered an agonizing conversion to Christianity in 386 A.D. and was baptized the next year. In 391 A.D. he was ordained a priest against his wishes and five years

later was chosen Bishop of Hippo. He worked prodigiously, until he died in 430 A.D. as invading vandals besieged Hippo, fashioning the first philosophical explication of Christianity. As a result of his works, he came to be known as the great Doctor of the Latin Church.

Though his general philosophical view was Platonic, Augustine's outlook was theological rather than civic and he approached life in this world from a vantage point totally distinct from the Classical thinkers. With the fall of the Roman Empire, Christianity transformed itself into a State religion. As the old Empire lost its grip, a new kind of sovereignty emerged, in which the church eventually assumed control and replaced dissolving political sanctions with sacerdotal ones. Christian philosophy differed radically from Classical. In Christian thought God was the primary and almost the exclusive object of concern. The Greek good was replaced by God, and man's relation to nature gave way to his relation with an absolute perfect being. Thus, Christians always felt a sense of failure; never being as good as one ought to be and never measuring up to that perfect being.

Unlike the Greeks, Augustine had no room for reason. He taught the divorce of body and mind, and advocated separation of the rational and spiritual. His authority was the inspired Word of God, not rational Empiricism and he believed the universe was moved by the love of God. He defined ultimate reality as perfection, and happiness, or felicity, as the chief desire of the State, obtainable only through worship of the one true God. For the Greeks, morality was a social ethic and its aim was happiness. Greek ethics were optimistic, as man could look forward to

being good and being happy. If he was unsuccessful, the failure was one of ignorance that knowledge could cure. To the contrary, morality was a department of religious practice for the Christians. The Christian ethic was pessimistic; falling away from the ideal was not ignorance, it was sin.

Sin, the willful rejection of the commands and wishes of an all-powerful Father, was a special kind of evil connected with a self-conscious will. Instead of being cured by knowledge, bad conduct was insoluble by human means and man required outside assistance in order to act virtuously. Perfection was never attainable--not because perfection is merely an ideal state towards which all strive and no one can ever fully attain--but because of man's inherent shortcomings, moral deficiencies and evil will. Citizenship in the City (community) of God was salvation attained through the worship of the one true God and the rejection of all false Gods. True justice was a supreme essential for the government which must take account of man's duty to God, without which kingdoms (states) were not kingdoms. If there was no weal of the people and no association of men united by a common sense of right, there was no justice and no commonwealth. Injustice was not inevitable in government, but justice could be found only in the commonwealth whose founder and ruler is Christ.

Augustine shared the Classical belief that man was a social animal and that the individual was judged by participation in community. Community was not each and every association in the population, but an association united by a common sense of right in a community of interest:

God chose to make a single individual the starting-point of all mankind, and that his purpose in this was that the human race

should not merely be united for a society by natural likeness, but should also be bound together by a kind of tie of kinship to form a harmonious unity, linked together by the 'bond of peace.' (St. Augustine, 1984, p. 547)

Friendship extended all the way from immediate family and City to the whole world, including nations with whom a man was joined by membership of the human society and even to the whole universe. The wise man was social and carried responsibility for his own household, both in the order of nature and within the framework of society. The father of a household governed in such a way to promote the peace of the City, because the life the City was inevitably a social life.

Like Plato, Augustine abhorred change and held that reality was immutable and impervious to it. Since God was the perfect being and nothing could be more than perfect, change meant being less than perfect, a departure from the ideal. For Plato, this meant everything had a perfect form that did not change and represented reality. For Augustine, this meant God and the universe were unchanging. The peace of the whole universe was a tranquillity of order; an arrangement of things equal and unequal in a pattern which assigned each to its proper position. For both Plato and Augustine, perhaps arising out of the disorder of their times, order was of paramount importance and chaos was to be avoided at all costs.

Like Plato and Aristotle, the two dominant philosophers of the Classical period, Augustine and Thomas Aquinas were dominant figures during the Medieval period. A similar continuity of thought and feeling existed between them, because they shared a common core doctrine and faith as Christian thinkers, but these two figures were separated by eight

centuries. This resulted in the development of new ideas, attitudes and values during the long period between Augustine's death and Thomas's birth. During this eight-century interval, sometimes referred to as the Medieval interval, the Dark Ages descended over the West.

The capture of the City of Rome propelled the Empire toward what must have seemed the end of the world. The frontier, not merely broken, was destroyed and no legions were left to round up the barbarians. These nomads knew no law except unwritten tribal customs brought with them from their primitive communities in the East. Commerce and industry, which had depended upon an imperial economic system, uniform coinage and the wonderfully engineered Roman roads, disintegrated altogether. Under these circumstances, arts and letters naturally suffered, and in these catastrophic times men not only lost the art of writing, they lost the art of reading. When Augustine was a youth even Christians got reasonably good Classical educations, but a few generations later, literacy was a rarity even among the ruling classes. Truly a dark age engulfed the West.

Nearly anything that survived at all was chiefly the result of the church's existence, which flung itself with passion into the zealot's mission of converting Arians and pagans to orthodoxy. By the end of the Dark Ages, Christianity was more widely spread and orthodoxy more firmly entrenched than ever before. The church emerged from this ordeal stronger than it had ever been before the fall of Rome but, of course, profoundly changed from the primitive institutions of earlier times. The early church had been episcopal and not papal. But by the next century, the bishops of Rome claimed primacy over all other bishops and a

supreme temporal authority, extending even to primacy over Christian kings and princes. The two-power doctrine between King and Church of Augustine's time had changed and a Christian king, qua Christian, was a subject of the pope.

By the eleventh century, the church--no longer an other-worldly society of brothers--had grown into a great secular institution. The popes became temporal monarchies with great power, far greater than any of the secular sovereigns. By the thirteenth century, the church was so indispensable to Western society that any sudden abandonment of its secular role would have been disastrous. This is not to say the average man was an out-and-out other-worldly aesthetic. Rather the average man--immersed in his ordinary life and profoundly touched by any other-worldly appeal, even when most absorbed in this personal world--believed that his earthly life derived whatever significance it had from a life beyond. This sense of transitoriness and dependency gave the Medieval mind an ambivalence which sharply distinguished it from the modern.

Feudalism developed concurrently with the this-worldly institution of the primitive church and emerged from the chaotic times before the dissolution of the Roman Empire with more and more responsibilities.² As the central government proved incapable of performing its proper functions, men of property in the various parts of the Empire collected taxes and, in the course of time, became responsible for the administration of justice on their estates. The life of the community came to depend on a complex set of personal relationships--in which the Greek and Roman notion that every citizen stands in an identical relationship to the State

and owes it his whole individual loyalty--was replaced by the notion of personal loyalty to the immediate overlord. Thus, the church and feudalism, the two great institutions of the Middle Ages, colored every phase of Medieval life.

For the greater part of the Middle Ages, ideas relating to the public sphere were shaped by Roman concepts and Christian doctrines concerning the structure of society as a corporation. They led without great effort to the thesis that the Christian was a member of the all-embracing, comprehensive corporation, the church. In Pauline language, the Christian became a new creature and underwent a metamorphosis during the sacramental act of baptism. As a result of the working of divine grace, the act of baptism divested man of his natural humanity and he became a participant of the divine attributes. This had the important consequence that the individual no longer shaped his own life in accordance with his natural, human insight and was no longer endowed with autonomous, indigenous functions. As a member of the corporation, of the church, the law was given to him, not made by him. The individual became absorbed in the church which was itself governed on monarchical principles--a descending or theocratic theme of government and law--according to which original power was located in one supreme authority.

These basic principles relative to the individual as subject to higher authority are contained in the Pauline letters. In his letter to the Romans, he stated the belief that every soul should be subjected to higher authorities, including princely power, because whatever power there was

came from God. "What I am, I am by the grace of God."³ What concerned and distinguished the Christian was his faith and because he had faith he obeyed the law. Obedience was indubitably the message of Pauline doctrine. Paul's message that the individual had no autonomous character made understandable Augustine's view that obedience to the command of superior authority was the hallmark of the Christian. This concept of superior and inferior, one above the other, summed up the status of the individual within a pure descending doctrine. It was this conception of inferior status which explained the prevailing Medieval view on the inequality of men and led to development of the concept of majority and its corollary of obedience.

This view of individuality was carried over into the body corporate of the kingdom as well as applying to the ecclesiological. The individual was less in the position to assert autonomous rights under the body corporate of the kingdom, because the King's power itself was not derived from the people of the kingdom or any individuals, but from divinity. The fundamental presupposition in Medieval society was that the individual accepted his standing, divested himself of his individuality, and followed direction from above. This subjugation of the individual was also contained in the concept of common father propounded by Classical Roman writers and Paul himself. Pursuant to this concept, the ruler was placed in a position with regard to his subjects as that of the father to his family. According to this doctrine, God was the father of all man. These concepts resulted in the individual as subject having no rights whatsoever in the public field.

On the contrary, what mattered was the public weal, public welfare, the public well-being, the good of society itself at the expense of individual well-being if necessary. Society was one whole, indivisible, and the individual was such an infinitesimally small part that his interests were easily sacrificed at the alter of public good. In this descending theme of government, property was considered an issue of divine grace, and the ruler was the full owner of all of the property of his subjects and could dispose of it as he saw fit. Disregard of the interests of the individual was not a disregard of rights because the individual did not have autonomy within this framework, but rather was a sign of his complete absorption in society. Society was a large organism in which each member had been allotted special function which he pursued for the common good. An individual did not exist for his own sake, but for the sake of the whole society. Everything moved on an objective level of a divine plan which purposely disregarded the importance of an individual's contributions and initiative. The Medieval emphasis on the collectivist phenomenon successfully prevented emergence of individual rights.

Despite the descending theme of government just discussed, the lower reaches of the community took for granted that the individual had precisely those rights which had been denied him by those in authority above him. In the reality of transacting everyday business, Medieval man participated in associations, unions, fraternities, guilds and communities, which considered the individual a full member. These were communities of equals, not initiated from above or legislated by a superior, but practiced as a natural way of conducting the business of the village. These

expressions of communal will provided a subterranean, invisible platform which proved of considerable assistance in the process of emancipating the individual.

Once the feudal system lost its military trappings, a practical system of government arose that accorded the individual considerable standing. Characterized by a strong personal bond between the feudal lord and the feudal vassal, rights and duties on both sides forged the first strong individual ties. A legal bond with mutual rights and duties created a kind of equilibrium reciprocal in nature where the obligations flowed one to another. Legal means for resisting a feudal lord and repudiating the feudal contract by the vassal existed under certain circumstances. Individual-personal relationships were created that did not exist in the descending form of government due to the institutionalization of faith. These relationships caused one great Medievalist, Sidney Painter, to say that the fundamental features of the feudal system passed into our political tradition, and individual liberty as part of the fundamental law was of feudal origin.⁴ Within the feudal function of kingship, law was made by counsel, consent, cooperation, and teamwork, prompted by the individual and his personal relationship between the king (as feudal lord) and his tenants. During the turn of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the seeds for future constitutional development and standing of the individual in society were nurtured.

Also during this time, those seeds which had been sown by the early Christians and Greeks were rediscovered and fertilized. The doctrinal background for such developments was the Medieval adjustment of the

Platonic system. Plato's personification of the Philosopher King was a sure sign that the individual had receded from a position which would have enabled to take part in formulating the law. The Platonic system, through its amalgamation and absorption into the Christian theme became the backcloth of Medieval views on political and social organization. The junction between Platonic and Christian ideas was established in the idea of Philosopher King attaining a status approximating that of divinity. This background laid the foundation for Thomas Aquinas's flexible adjustments of Aristotelian concepts into the Christian framework.

Major works of Aristotle which had become inaccessible during the twelfth century became accessible again in the West during the thirteenth century. This rediscovery of Aristotle's works influenced a more vigorous intellectual life during the thirteenth century. From their reading of Aristotle, Medieval writers also encountered empirically based methods different from anything the West then knew. A gradual expansion of people's intellectual horizons awakened a great desire for knowledge. As a result, great universities began to spring up, a period of great artistic flowering began, and there was a remarkable revival of this-worldly interests. The central problem of the thirteenth century philosopher was to find a place for these "this-worldly" ends as reflected in the science, arts, manners and customs, and political institutions.

The thinkers of the eleventh century had wedded themselves to a painstakingly thorough examination of two technical problems in philosophy--the status of universals and the relation between the spheres

of faith and reason. Realists held that universals, as the objects of reason were called, were realities with incorporeal existence separate from sense particulars. Corresponding to Plato's forms, every individual particular was seen as an image, or reflection, of its eternal archetype. The Realists felt this fully concordant with doctrine. The view that particulars are less real than universals and that they derive their truth from archetypes fit very neatly with the accepted doctrine about the relative unreality of this world as compared to the next. However, some of the critics of Realism concluded that a universal is merely a name—merely the noise of the word written on paper. These critics were labeled Nominalists and believed that only individuals are real. This was in conflict with Christian doctrine, because it followed that the Trinitarian Godhead of orthodoxy could not exist, which necessarily meant there were three gods rather than one. These were questions that had to be settled before a synthesis of the thirteenth century could be undertaken. Before the appropriate sphere for the use of reason within Christian thought was delimited and justified, no philosophical system developed by rational arguments could be secure.

Neither extreme Realism, which held universals to be wholly, independent objects nor extreme Nominalism, which denied any sort of objective status to universals, was acceptable. In order to demonstrate that a science of philosophy was possible it was first necessary to demonstrate that universal statements and universal words actually referred to objects that somehow existed. Some sort of compromise seemed to be in order. The compromise reached was conceptualism which was strikingly similar to Aristotle's theory even though it was an independent achievement.

Conceptualism was based on the notion that what the universal word names was not a Platonic form, but a concept formed by the mind. Therefore, without the activity of human intellects there would be no universals. The Conceptualists believed that, though it was true all that exists were individual particulars, various such particulars had similar properties. These observable likenesses formed a universal idea and this common likeness was a common cause of the universal concept signified by the universal word. A universal, therefore, existed in the individual particulars as a common likeness, and in the human intellect as a concept formed as the intellect focused its attention on the likeness. In laying down the lines for a solution to the controversy over universals, Conceptualism showed how scientific knowledge could be vindicated and it made possible the great synthesis of the thirteenth century. The philosophical synthesis that finally emerged was the crowning achievement of the Middle Ages.⁵

Thomas Aquinas was born in 1225 A.D. in southern Italy. In 1257 A.D., he obtained the Doctorate of Theology Degree and engaged in lecturing and writing, interrupted by frequent journeys in service of his Dominican Order and the church. He died in 1274 A.D. when not yet fifty years of age, but he stands functionally to the Middle Ages as Plato and Aristotle do to the Classical world. Thomas was more than a theologian and the problems of his time were more than purely theological problems. To the Classical mind, the essential human problem was how to be happy, how to get into a right relationship with oneself and one's fellow man. In contrast, the Christian outlook was determined by belief in an omnipotent

God and loving father. The supreme good to the early Christian was to get into a right relation with his God-Father. However, as society slowly emerged from the darkness of the early Middle Ages and began to rebuild culture and civilization, men inevitably felt renewed interest in this-worldly things. The Empirical-Naturalistic point of view espoused by Aristotle was antagonistic to the Neo-Platonic mysticism that had dominated Christian thinking. Therefore, the central problem for Thomas Aquinas in the Middle Ages was to reconcile the Christian and Classical views of man and the world.

As early as 1210 A.D., fifteen years before Thomas Aquinas's birth, church authorities forbade teaching Aristotle's natural science. Thus, it took considerable courage to maintain, as Thomas Aquinas did, that Christian insights were one-sided and required supplementation--that though man is the child of God he is also a natural animal. In this Thomas Aquinas too was a true individualist; it was one thing to recognize that the Classical mind had made significant discoveries that could be noted to supplement the Christian view, but quite another to actually work out the needed synthesis. The difficulty of the task to which Thomas Aquinas set himself should not be underestimated, because the Christians had radically altered the conception of every part of the Classical scheme. For the Christian, man was, in Augustine's words, crooked, sordid, bespotted, ulcerous, helpless and depraved. The sort of synthesis to be effected between two such radically differing views required a formula that went far beyond any earlier thinker.

Thomas agreed with Aristotle that man is a natural being with natural ends described by Aristotle, but to Thomas man was more than the natural being Aristotle supposed him to be. Christian insight disclosed that he was also a child of God who had a higher end--loyalty and obedience to God, his Father, and his Creator. God created a world in which many different degrees of truth, goodness and reality existed. The many different levels of reality, or species of creatures demonstrate the infinite variety of the divine nature. Like photographs taken on a different angle which show an object from different viewpoints, the diversity and multiplicity of the creatures echoed the infinity of the original. Despite the fact that divine providence both foresaw all that would happen and caused it to happen as it has been foreseen, Thomas maintained that some events were truly contingent. For some things God's providence prepared necessary causes so that they would happen of necessity. Others might happen by contingency according to the disposition of their approximate causes. This contingency without which human freedom was illusory, necessitated moral responsibility. Man possessed free will and exercised freedom from coercion, but that is not to say that man's will was uncaused. Rather, there was a dual causality according to which human will was attributed to free choice and to God. How man exercised free will and what determined an act good was not simply whether it fulfilled some desire or provided happiness, but whether it was in accord with the objectively characterized form man common to all men. Because man was in this sense more than Aristotle

thought him to be, the supreme good was individual happiness achieved through knowledge of God.

Thomism brought with it a notion of obligation in which the Christian good consisted not so much in realizing a state of affairs as in obeying God's commands. For Thomas, the primacy of the Christian ethic of duty arose in return for the gift of knowledge for which man had the burden of responsibility. Such responsibility was the duty to obey one's conscience as an interpretation of natural good, and as a disposition to right reason. Still following Aristotle, Thomas also held that virtue was a mean between too much and too little. The Christian ideal was not complete chastity and utter poverty, but a real synthesis of Classical and Christian views resulting in balance and moderation. Thus, the good of the whole community depended in Thomas's view upon a distribution of effort between spiritual and temporal affairs. This view also permitted Thomas to view men as social animals who delighted in the society of their fellows and established friendship as a human good. To the Greek cardinal virtues of justice, temperance, prudence and fortitude, Thomas added the theological virtues of faith, hope and love. For the ordinary human, cardinal virtues were sufficient in Thomas's view for assigning virtuous character and acting upon them. Thomas called them political virtues because they were virtues germane to man as a political animal. They were achieved by one's own efforts, but the theological virtues were supernaturally induced and depended entirely on God's grace. Though all of the natural virtues were concerned with love and conformed to

Augustine's generic definition of virtue as the order of love, the love of God was utterly different.

Under Thomism the State performed the dual role of exacting obedience to natural law and educating persons. This conformed externally to the injunctions of natural law, but flowed from virtuous dispositions. Because natural man could be satisfactorily fulfilled according to Thomas's view only by cooperation with others, a State was essentially good that provided authority and order to men's lives aimed at the common good, rather than at self-interest. Similarly, because men cannot exist without authority in their lives, their ruler should aim at their good, not at the principle of political dominion. To Thomas Aquinas, the notions of man and Christian corresponded to two different categories of thought. Thomism had now spawned a veritable dualism of things. Fidelis Christianus corresponded to the supernatural and the citizen to the natural. Fidelis had to share attention with the civis. Man was a natural product and as such, demanded attention which then brought about man's political community. The individual was a full participant and a natural member of the State, or the congregation of men. He who had been overshadowed for so long by the Christian was now resuscitated and reinstated. Natural man, washed away by baptism, was reborn and viewed as a constituent member of the State. Accordingly, the gulf that existed in Pauline and Christian doctrine between natural man and the Christian was bridged. The core of the new doctrine was that natural man himself had emerged independent and autonomous within the framework of the natural order. Government was no longer laid

down by law given to a subjected mankind, but instead was the servant and protector of the interests of liberated man himself. Man's own human dignity was well on its way to be recognized in its full human value and potentiality.⁶

Renaissance and Reformation--Age of Reason

Beginning in the Renaissance period, defined here as 1400 to early 1600 A.D., beliefs gradually began to change.⁷ The vertical relationship of man to God was eventually replaced by a network of horizontal relationships connecting individuals to their social milieu. The good life changed from a right relationship with God to an efficient relationship with one's fellow man. Medieval political thought, with its emphasis on the infinitely good God and the finitude and sin of man, could not satisfy Renaissance man, shaped by capitalism, new money, the ideals of Humanism and the Protestant Reformation. This new man was an individualist increasingly concerned with the world and its values. During the Renaissance, attention turned from godliness and heavenly matters to the way things happen on earth.

The success of the scientific method led to its criteria being applied to all other fields. The importance of mathematics grew immensely and, as measurement and experimentation became the source of all truth, the world was conceived of as a giant machine. Medieval philosophy was drowned by the scientists' discovery of nature. At the same time, Naturalism--defined as the disposition to ignore moral considerations and to concentrate on ascertaining the facts about power and the means of

attaining it--re-emerged as a legitimate philosophy. There is nothing novel about Naturalism; it is as old as Thrasymachus, but was buried for centuries beneath the religious orientation of the Middle Ages. It arose again during the fifteenth century and became an accepted part of the complex changes called the Renaissance.

The Renaissance point of view was intensely dynamic and the ambitious were free to choose among almost limitless possibilities. Old virtues stood in the way of progress: piety and charity were dangerous impediments to advancing the new society. For example, a man who felt bound by contracts was severely limited in his actions and religious scruples became a handicap, leading to the secularization of value. In place of old values, power became the focus of attention. At the beginning of this period, Niccolo Machiavelli, the spokesman for realism, introduced reason as the reality in politics.⁸ He urged rulers to use force, severity, deceit and immoral acts to achieve national goals. In the latter part of this period, human reason was elevated to the position of highest authority and man's interests shifted from the supernatural to the natural.

Machiavelli was an Italian statesman and student of politics who lived between 1469 and 1527 A.D. Born in Florence as a son of a jurist, he became a leading figure in the Republic of Florence after the Medici family was driven out in 1498 A.D. He served as head of the second Chancery and first secretary of the council of the Republic for fourteen years. The Medici family returned to power and dismissed Machiavelli from his office in 1512 A.D. when King Ferdinand of Spain in Holy League with the Pope took control of French Milan and Florence. Accused of conspiring

against the new regime the next year, Machiavelli was at first arrested, tortured, imprisoned, and finally released on order of Pope Leo X. The last fourteen years of his life were spent writing books on history and politics, as well as poems and comedies, becoming a leading literary figure of the Renaissance. Best known for his book The Prince, which established him as the father of the modern science of politics--what came to be called realpolitik--he set down rules that the prince should follow to keep political power.

In The Prince, Machiavelli espoused the idea that a ruler need not trouble over means, but must use any means, no matter how wicked, to strike down his enemies and make his people obey. The book was dedicated to His Magnificence Lorenzo de Medici and was undoubtedly intended to bring to Machiavelli the favorable attention of the Medicean government. Machiavelli's purpose for dedicating The Prince to the Medicis did not work and he was never entrusted with public office again. However, largely as a result of his book, his name has come to stand for all that is deep, dark, and treacherous in statesmanship.

Distinguishing between what man actually does and what he ought to do, Greek political theory tried to ascertain behavioral norms, a function that Machiavelli rejected. For him, there were only two questions: Whatever men aimed at was good and their acts toward attaining their aims were virtue. Machiavelli recognized and isolated one of the leading elements of the new political ideal of the West, the idea of power politics. The essence of his conception was the conviction that most men were stupid, venal, irrational, and quite incapable of governing

themselves intelligently and effectively. He believed most men were moved by passion and ambition rather than by reason. Men were so selfish and short-sighted that a strong power was required to keep them from destroying themselves. It followed that the only feasible government was a strong monarchy. This is the point of view of the political Naturalists.

The first instrument of power Machiavelli offered the prince was force, which should be employed ruthlessly, because it was much better to be feared than loved. Essentially a warrior, a ruler had no other objective or concern, except war and its practices. Cruelty is no exception in the Machiavellian principles of power politics. The wise ruler will never mind being identified as cruel, so long as his actions have the effect of keeping his subjects united and loyal. The second instrument of power, always backed by the first, was propaganda, of which religion was the most valuable. The wise prince persuaded the masses that he was devoted to their interests, though in point of fact, he made no real concessions to them. Like cruelty, dishonesty was not a vice: A prudent prince never kept his word if doing so was contrary to his interests.

Machiavelli's doubts about traditional virtues arose out of his darkly pessimistic view of human nature. In his view, men were so deeply self-interested that they broke the bonds of love whenever it was useful. Man could never be expected to keep faith and only fear of punishment and the consequences of behaving badly controlled conduct. He conceded it would be praiseworthy if indeed princes exhibited the full range of qualities usually held to be good. But the way men lived was so

different from how they should live that this was impossible. If a ruler departed from general practice and persisted in doing what he ought, his power would be undermined rather than maintained. Therefore, a prince who wished to maintain his position in the world must act immorally when it became necessary.

To avoid contempt among his people, the prince must avoid seeming changeable, pusillanimous and irresolute by spurning neutrality (a sure sign of weak-mindedness), undertake mighty schemes of the kind that keep the entire populace in a state of perpetual wonder and amazement, and spend money visibly on such things as holidays and feasts for the masses. A ruling prince loads his counselors with so many honors and so much wealth that they come to depend on him completely. This assures their faith and avoids the need for them to seek greater rewards elsewhere. National security justifies the most despicable acts designed to seek the desired end without regard to the means used. Public office seekers do so only for the power, prestige and future profit that it offers.

No one in the principality is overly concerned with the common interests, because no sense of commonalty or shared humanity exists. Rather, individual self-interest, a preoccupation with personal rights, and accumulation of wealth drives the entire nation, including the rulers and the ruled. Decisions are not made in the long-term interests of the nation as a whole, but for short-term interests and profit taking. Economic interests are the first and foremost considerations and every question,

public or private, is decided on that basis rather than a shared belief in what is right or good for the whole.

As Naturalism was revived Machiavelli and others rediscovered the secular learning of the Ancients; the poems, dramas, essays, that had been lost for centuries. With this emphasis upon the literary form of the Classics, it was impossible not to absorb something of the Classical point of view of man as an autonomous, independent, rational being. As this occurred, the long-forgotten appreciation of the value and dignity of human personality, pride and self-respect resurfaced. As this movement spread, it acquired self-consciousness and those who shared this new taste described themselves as Humanists. Because of the shift in the focus of values to man and his affairs, Humanism broadened into an ideal of the self-culture, with emphasis on human, rather than supra-natural values. In this milieu, the individual person was no longer submerged as in the Roman Empire, nor simply a member of an interdependent social group as in the Greek polis. New political and social ideals--money, power, and the physical expansion of Europe to America and to Asia--created an unstable society in which the energetic and ambitious could rise. The new-model man of the Renaissance was more dynamic, individualist, and self-centered than typical Classical man.

Early in this process, the church urged scholarship and contributed to the depth and pervasiveness of the Renaissance spirit by an active patronage. As the movement developed, however, the new ideal gradually replaced the old Christian conception and not until the Reformation brought the church face to face with destruction did it react

against the new learning. The Reformation occurred in the conception of man's relation to God and was radically opposed to that which dominated the Middle Ages. The Christians, Humanists, and others combined in a revolt against a papacy that had taken measures to increase its revenues when traditional sources were no longer sufficient in the changing economic scene. Early in the fourteenth century, the worst of the papal abuses occurred, the Popes having become hardly more than an instrument of monarchical policy in France and the same tendency having occurred in other European states. The Popes confiscated funds that had originally been assigned for local use, imposed collection of fees, and farmed out to a banker or to an expert the unpalatable job of extracting the last penny from unwilling debtors. As reluctance to pay made collection difficult, the source of new revenues was developed in the sale of benefits and offices. As disputes over title to the offices resulted in expensive lawsuits, the Roman pontiff made a threefold profit; the benefice was awarded, then the annates were collected, and finally court costs were assessed. Thus, the papal court became a useful source of revenue and the Popes gave it primary jurisdiction over cases formerly heard in Episcopal courts.

Offensive as these practices were, the selling of indulgences came to be the historically crucial abuse. This practice had its roots in the primitive church where a backsliding member repented and either fasted, suffered lashes or made a contribution to charity, whichever the congregation chose. Over centuries, passion became private and determination of the nature of the satisfaction passed from the

congregation to the priest who imposed a penance to be worked off as punishment. To avoid difficulties arising from decentralized administration of this penance system, the notion of a treasury of merit was developed. As the moral standards of the papacy declined, the market value of indulgences was not overlooked and the Popes launched into the large-scale business of selling what amounted to an insurance policy against possible inconveniences in the life to come. Payment of a sufficient sum insured the purchaser of safety, regardless of the inner-state of his soul.

However, there was nothing unique about the Popes and men everywhere were becoming more this-worldly. Attempts by Christians, Humanists, and others at reform came to nothing in the short-run, but they nevertheless contributed indirectly to the Reformation and attacks on ecclesiastical abuses moved a large audience. By the end of the fifteenth century, a body of opinion inimical to the existing regime had developed inside the church that thought the church ought to give up meddling in civil affairs and return to the poverty and simplicity of former days. Nevertheless, no thought was given to breaking up the church and the pre-eminence of the Pope was not challenged, because the Reformers regarded themselves as members of one Holy and Apostolic Church.

For 1000 years the church had laid down the rules for economic, social and religious life and all were subject to the Roman Pontiff. Around 1396 John Huss gave communion to worshippers, let them drink wine from the chalice, and encouraged them to read the bible themselves. For this challenge to Catholic Church dogma he was summoned by the Pope

to explain himself, which he ignored. His next challenge was to oppose the sale of indulgences, for which he was excommunicated by the Pope himself. Later imprisoned for heresy, he was ordered to surrender to authority by recanting his beliefs. Upon his refusal, he was burned at the stake for his dissent against church dogma.

One hundred years later, Martin Luther's dissent gave freedom of choice to the commoner and split Europe in two after 1000 years of being told what to do and what to believe by the church. Born in 1483 A.D. as the son of peasants, he attended one of the leading universities of Germany, a center of Humanistic studies. Like Augustine and so many other Christians, Luther was oppressed by a sense of sin and believed that his primary need was to find God. Luther discovered there was more to the Bible than appeared in church services and he found in Paul a doctrine of salvation by faith alone rather than by the works of penance, alms giving or asceticism. Luther had tried every conceivable manner to achieve union with God but failed. He soon came to recognize that a just and merciful God had sent his only begotten son to save mankind. Therefore, salvation was available as a matter of faith by belief in the Lord Jesus and in the mercy of God.

A depressive, Luther believed man everlastingly sinful, became an obsessive disciplinarian, and entered an Augustinian monastery to please God. While practicing his prayers he came to the vision that salvation was for all who believed. Each person had a direct relationship to God and did not need the church to mediate that relationship. He too became outraged at the Papal indulgences being sold to remove guilt, and he

posted 95 reasons against the practice. In the mid-1400s Luther used the new printing press to persuade the general public to his teachings against the church. For this he was excommunicated and given 60 days to present himself. Luther answered the call when summoned but refused to retract a thing. For his obstinance, Charles V condemned him as a heretic, after which he was kidnapped by Frederick the Wise. Alone with his beliefs, he set about translating the bible and published the new testament for the priesthood of the common man.

In 1525 A.D. peasant revolts threatened his teachings and he sided with the Princes who slaughtered the new dissenters 120,000 fold. With this decision, Luther became one of the harshest reactionaries of his time. Refusing to allow any new thinking, his dogma achieved a new establishment to rival the old. His reformation caused a counter-revolution leading to the bloody Crusades that ended with the toleration of unorthodox views during the Renaissance. Openness, toleration and dissent became values in themselves as protections against orthodoxy's descent into tyranny.

Luther's doctrine undermined the whole sacerdotal system of the church and the institutions that perpetuated it. It legitimized a universal priesthood of believers which made sacraments and priests unnecessary to mediate between the worshiper and his God. The authority of the Bible, as interpreted by every individual for himself, substituted for the authority of the church. Once Luther had taken this stand, the church immediately set about trying to destroy him. Though few Princes dared to protect Luther, the rest did not oppose him. This fact shows how far from

Medieval norms society had already moved by the beginning of the sixteenth century. In the Middle Ages, no secular ruler would have dared to protect such heresy. Now some princes did so because they sympathized with his attack on papal abuses, he had an immense popular following that would have been dangerous to oppose, and they could use the religious revolt to free themselves from ecclesiastical control and extend their own power.

Despite help from the princes, Luther's revolt succeeded only because he founded a new church--Protestantism--and gave dissidents a strength they lacked as individuals. Essential for the preservation of the movement, the new church nevertheless created a dilemma because Luther found himself in the position of the earliest Christians, having to choose between individual religion and the requirements of institutionalism. For example, Luther insisted on the sacrament of baptism probably because of the exigencies of institutionalism. A church organization required a definite mark of membership. Accordingly, the new theology soon became as inflexible and orthodox as the old and those who opposed it even by a hair's breath were cast into outer darkness. For instance, the Anabaptists who denied the need for infant baptism were treated without mercy.

Luther's doctrine of justification by faith accepted Augustine's denial of free will. Literally, Luther believed that an end to be sought by the state was the preservation of peace. To him, men were so sinful and vicious that without a sovereign to keep them in order they would quickly dispatch one and another out of this world. He concluded that men sin if

they lie to government, deceive it or are disloyal to what it has ordered and commanded. Moreover, Luther taught that wicked authority was authority still in the sight of God. This political theory was poles apart from the Medieval ideal of the limited monarchy and it fully underwrote the most extreme claims of the new-type sovereign. While insisting on the subject's absolute duty of obedience to the prince, Luther had to extricate the Protestant princes from a corresponding duty to obey their Catholic emperor. Though everything said in support of the princes equally justified the peasants' revolt against their lords, Luther bitterly opposed such insurrection.

The core of Luther's Protestant insight was in the certainty of every individual conscience and Protestantism rested on the immediate, felt-data of conscience. This commitment to the primacy of conscience was an expression of one of the basic motifs of the dawning new world--Individualism. The emphasis on what is subjective and private, on the dictates of the individual conscience, on the politics of subjective feeling, were new dimensions in modern culture. They created the fundamental problem of how to balance the need for order, discipline and obedience against the value of freedom and spontaneity, and how to achieve the controls necessary for economic and political survival without destroying civil liberties. Thus, the great strengths of Protestantism were also its greatest weaknesses and the questions it failed to answer persistently plague society to this day.

Whereas the Middle Ages prized institutions, the Renaissance and the Reformation deprecated the value of institutions as compared with

individuals. In order to give the new individual an easy start, one was permitted to break away from institutions to preserve independence and to determine one's own destiny, making the individual superior and capable of fending for oneself. The Renaissance thought this ability lay in power: The Reformation thought it was found in conscience. Now economic and social developments fashioned a man who was intent on this-worldly affairs and a completely secular universe revealed to this new man how he could satisfy his new desires. Even though this strain appeared in Luther and Machiavelli, several centuries were to pass before the West became fully conscious of all that the new attitude involved and the choices which the new age faced.

The method that evolved for doing this combined two different elements, one empirical and one deductive. Once this method began to yield reliable results, almost everyone saw that both these elements were necessary, but difference in emphasis on the primacy of one or the other led to radically different theories and different concepts of the implications of scientific method. Though poles apart, the Humanists and the Empiricists found a meeting ground, the revival of learning and an interest in nature. Development of the scientific method was a part of a widespread movement of thought reflected in the transformation of political and moral ideals in the weakening of the church. At work was a growing passion for exploration that sent men in search of new worlds and a realistic artistry that delighted in the sounds, smells, and sights of nature. One theorist who taught science and artistry was Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519 A.D.). He demonstrated that there were uniformities in

nature that close observation, coupled with experiment would reveal. One hundred years later the same spirit led William Gilbert to improve the compass, determine measures of latitude, and develop other navigational aids. His work helped bring the earth down to scale and show it as a natural object among others and demonstrate the pervasiveness and simplicity of natural law.

After Gilbert came Francis Bacon, who acted as a publicist for science as he sought the power and the good things it brings and rejected deductive methods in favor of inductive. Bacon sold the value of science to others on the theme that knowledge is power. Born in 1561 A.D. in the full tide of the Renaissance, he undertook a total reconstruction of the sciences, arts and all human knowledge. His great instauration, as he called it, refashioned everything and assumed that virtually everything that passed for knowledge was error and that the human mind was inadequate for obtaining knowledge. Bacon saw that a purely deductive science was not a natural science and rejected the main tendency of Medieval science to favor the deductive method by starting from propositions of the highest order of generality. He concluded that, though observation was fundamental, it was insufficient: The evidence of the senses must be helped and guided by a certain process of correction. To fulfill this need to guide observation at every step, Bacon developed the inductive method. This method involved experimentation to establish lower orders of generality upon which higher orders were then based. This new method implied that the real constituent entities of the universe were not natures or essences, but events.

Using Bacon's method, Copernicus developed his heliocentric hypothesis and Kepler his three laws. Not until Galileo, however, were empirical observations organized into a deductive and demonstrative structure. At the time of Galileo's death, the outlines of modern culture were plainly drawn--national territorial states, capitalist economy and self-improvement were the new model. This scientific concept of reality substituted a quantitative mechanistic view of nature for the qualitative and theological look of the Middle Ages. By the time Galileo died in 1642 A.D., the Western world had changed radically from the Medieval. Faint outlines of modern culture began to appear in national in the form of territorial states and capitalist type economies. Colonization in America was progressing at a rapid pace and the conception of a single, unified Christendom was shattered. The man fashioned by this culture was an enterprising personality--a man on the make. Loosening of the old social structure was making him an individualist, dedicated to the acquisition of wealth and power, alert to the possibilities for self improvement and determined to compete more or less successfully in a capitalistic economy. The Greek ideal of all-around development of the individual no longer held great appeal as a quantitative and mechanical view of nature was increasingly substituted for the teleological conception from the Middle Ages.

Early modern philosophers that followed the Renaissance sought to solve the problem of mind versus matter by a dualism in which immaterial reality was provided a sphere or domain outside and beyond the material reality that the new science was rapidly exploring. In this

sphere of immaterial reality, they proposed to locate God and the human soul. However, at least one of these early modern philosophers adopted a different course; Hobbes, a Monist, rejected the notion of immaterial reality.

Faith in Science

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679 A.D.), an English philosopher and political theorist, served as secretary to Sir Francis Bacon and tutored the Prince of Wales, later Charles II, in mathematics. He fled to the European continent during the English Civil War, traveled widely, and met many European philosophers and scientists. Two developments in his time influenced his thought; one was the new system of physics being worked out by Galileo and others; another, was the English Civil War. Hobbes was unsympathetic with Parliament's struggle against the Crown's invasion of ancient rights and the religious sentiments of the Puritans. He believed the freedoms about which they shouted cloaked their own selfish interests. The Parliamentarians, for example, sought a grip on supreme power rather than liberty and justice for the people. Hobbes felt man's inhumanity to man made an all-powerful government essential.

His most famous work, Leviathan, was published in 1651 A.D. and demonstrated both these early influences on his thought.¹⁰ He attempted to place moral and political philosophy on a scientific basis, and he was obsessed with fear of anarchy. In Leviathan he denied the social being of man and described the state of nature as anarchy, which he said every person sought to escape. Man, driven by competition, defiance, and glory,

was unfit to live in communities, and was moved chiefly by selfish considerations, appetites, desire for power, and fear of others. He believed in the general inclination of all mankind to pursue power ceaselessly until death. But Hobbes believed the fact is that men did live communally for survival, even if they are wholly unfit to do so, only to avoid the destructive consequences of their own greed. The question became how to control these unruly congregations and, for those like Hobbes who had rejected the authority of the church, final authority was found in the secular arm—a temporal sovereign.

Hobbes' materialistic and mechanistic philosophy was founded on the emerging laws of physics that predicted the motions of heavenly bodies. He applied the same rationale to earthly bodies and believed the whole universe could be analyzed as behavior of material particles moving in accordance with simple mechanical laws. Nothing but a body in motion, each individual was no more than a region of the material plenum, distinguishable only by the motions occurring there, consisting purely as changes in spatial relations of the parts of human bodies. These changes were completely determined by prior events—other changes in the region we call ourselves or in contiguous regions. Powers of the mind such as thinking, perceiving, imagining, and remembering were all simply motions in the body.

Whereas the Greeks believed themselves living in an intellectual community where their minds were in contact with a rational and common real, Hobbes saw a chasm between the individual mind and material reality. Instead of believing that reason would lead to agreement,

he felt the necessity for a sovereign with unlimited powers to compel agreement. In such a state there was no nonsense about rights or good, since whatever the sovereign said was right, good, lawful, or true. Similarly, there was no question of just or unjust, or invasion of civil rights, since justice and right are whatever the sovereign permitted. This view obviously gave short shrift to the venerable and ethically important notions of freedom and individuality.

The mechanistic analogy employed by Hobbes also had no room for values, which he saw as purely subjective. Since values could not be interpreted in materialistic terms, they were relegated to the status of mere appearances. As such, they existed only in individual experience and there was no public realm for them; no place for value in Hobbes' world of fact. Hobbes' views are important because they disclose what a philosophic synthesis must avoid. If Medieval philosophy is one extreme where the scientific view of reality was ignored and concentration given to the valuational view, then Hobbeism was the other extreme in which the valuational point of view was ignored in favor of the scientific. Hobbes' successors asked how--in the physical world of matter in motion where selfish interests, personal rights, and economic decision-making dominate--can one find a place for human spontaneity, significance of human life, and validity of thought.

Rene Descartes (1596-1650 A.D.) was a contemporary of Thomas Hobbes, but held to none of the Hobbesian principles of self-interest. Instead, Descartes underwent a mystical experience from which he believed he discovered a new scientific method for achieving absolute

certainty. This was a universal and infallible method of reasoning that he worked out over a period of years and that became a set of twenty-one rules for directing the human mind toward a solution to all human problems. Like Hobbes, Descartes fell in love with mathematical certainty but where mathematics had been a manipulation of signs for Hobbes, for Descartes mathematical reasoning was the basis for a great metaphysical structure upon which a system of values and a god could be erected. Descartes believed in an objective, rational order to the world that the mind infallibly discerned in clear and distinct intuitions, and in native power to know a reality that is fundamentally rational. By making reason adequate and equal in all men, Descartes laid an intellectual foundation for democratic social and political institutions. His theories and understandings of the nature of man permitted education to raise all men to the level of enlightened and responsible citizen. Thus, for him mathematical knowledge was an absolute that provided insight into an objective and rational real.

Classical philosophers like Plato and Aristotle would have sided with Descartes against Hobbes as would most Medieval philosophers. All these thinkers believed in the reality of universals, subrogated perception to reason, and held that the real is rational. About the only philosophers who would have been sympathetic to the Hobbesian view were Medieval Nominalists like Machiavelli. Philosophers like Descartes were in the rationalistic descent from Plato, whereas philosophers of the empirical school were descendants of the Medievalists who emphasized the factuality rather than the rationality of the world. Descartes shared Plato's

underlying sense that knowledge implies the existence of true universals. Descartes called God the single, supremely real entity in which this truth resided. Plato himself remained a Rationalist, regarding reason as self-sustaining and self-validating without placing emphasis on divine light. Yet Descartes did not think of reason as completely secular as Plato, Aristotle, and Hobbes had. Descartes was not willing to let reason remain utterly secular believing that behind it there lurked a personal and transcendent God. This appeal to God's goodness allowed a place for final causes in a mechanistic universe. The physical world was God's creation even though it ran according to mechanical law and could be completely understood without reference to universal purposes or final causes. In this way Descartes preserved the teleologically-oriented world of the Middle Ages without undermining the physical theory that scientists were developing.

Attempting to find a *via media* that would accept the new physics without ending in a completely secular, amoral, and Hobbesian view of the universe, Descartes developed a compromise. This Cartesian Compromise was exceedingly simple: If mind and body are completely different kinds of things, and if the truths about each follow from the distinct nature of each, it is impossible for the science of minds and science of bodies to contradict each other. Theology therefore had no reason to interfere with the study of physics and physicists no reason to claim special competence regarding spiritual truths. Whereas both Plato and Aristotle believed the mind knew reality itself, Descartes believed that the mind had only an idea of a universal. Thomas followed Aristotle's lead and

held that all knowledge, even knowledge of the most generic of universals, was collected by the mind from the particulars of sense. From the Thomistic point of view, Descartes was guilty of the sin of intellectual pride by holding that the human mind had direct access to an absolute and eternal truth.

Inevitably, objects of sense perception were less than real, if mind and matter were completely distinct substances, but sense perception could be explained by proposing their interaction. Descartes argued that mind and body were separate—mind was concerned with spiritual truths, while body was governed by the laws of physics. Because changes in the body actually result in the body feeling pain, or experiencing pressure, one must conclude that the Cartesian Compromise failed, but this should not blind us to the virtues of his theory. Descartes discerned that a satisfactory modern philosophical synthesis must do justice to both a sense of human freedom and to the claims of a universal mechanism. It must concern itself with the actual and existent law, but rise above the here and now. It must recognize that thought is rooted in perception and perception in body, and must find a way for thought to reach a rational truth. The new scientific method had both an empirical and a mathematical element, but the inferences that philosophers drew about the nature of knowledge were distorted by the exaggerated role of one such element and minimization of the other. Thus, for example, Descartes emphasized the mathematical element, made mathematical certainty his ideal, and formulated his criterion of truth and reality accordingly.¹⁰

On the other hand, John Locke (1632-1704 A.D.) and his followers relied on sense perception to obtain knowledge about the world, emphasized experimental verification, and exhibited skepticism about the possibility of achieving absolute certainty. Contrary to the complexity of Cartesian dilemmas, Locke aimed at a common sense philosophy preferring the concrete and practical, and starting with reason. Locke, as much a Rationalist as Descartes, made rational thought of the kind he employed as a physician his prototype. Built into his belief was a familiar Cartesian assumption that the world consisted of two different kinds of things, minds and bodies. Locke called these states of minds ideas and believed they somehow represented the world external to bodies. Locke assumed that truth was experience and that the mind was a surface on which experience writes. This theory was called historical plain method, according to which the mind is at its beginning an empty surface and that all its ideas come from experience. Only this experience confirmed or disconfirmed beliefs and the mind knew nothing but its own states.

The ethical theory that Locke developed in connection with these understandings, held that good was not knowledge of God like St. Thomas and other Medieval philosophers had surmised, but pleasure. For Locke, the ethical problem was simply one of ascertaining which, of all the acts in any given situation, was productive of the greatest positive good. Of those various acts, the one that maximized pleasure was the greatest good. Locke believed that God had established divine law with men's best interests (their long-term greatest positive good) in mind. Therefore, following God's law would maximize pleasure and the function of any

political theory was to discover what kind of state organization was most likely to bring civil law into conformity with divine law. As a Rationalist, Locke held that rationality was expressed in eternal ethical verities that man was capable of understanding. However, the world of fact with which historical plain method was designed to deal, contained no universal or necessary connections. Locke often wrote as if doing one's duty was a good in itself, but insofar as pleasure was the sole good, the motive for obeying moral law was not a sense of duty. Because obedience had no intrinsic worth, the motive was simply a calculation of long-range advantage.

Locke took a more flattering view of man than Hobbes, crediting him with a social nature and a high capacity for enlightenment. Locke's political theory rested on an assumption that law, as an eternal verity, guaranteed everyone certain inalienable rights and imposed certain duties. Because these rights and duties were imposed on one as a human rather than as a citizen, Locke called that condition in which individuals related by moral rather than political ties the state of nature. In the state of nature, individuals formed themselves into a political state, because they believed the advantages would outweigh the disadvantages. The state of nature was not itself a political state, but was what ought to be the case in all communities. It was not a condition in which someone actually found themselves, but was simply the inalienable rights and duties that belong to men as men. In other words, rights of the individual were to be respected in others as well as asserted for oneself. These rights had moral bounds and their observance was a moral obligation of individual conscience.

Man's chief duty was not to interfere with other men's rights, defined as life, health, liberty, and possession. The shortest way to state Locke's position is that people, a collection of autonomous and independent individuals, were and remained sovereign. However, people were not sovereign in the Hobbesian sense, because Locke believed political power was limited by the laws of nature. One could not be compelled to join a community and could be compelled after joining only because he consented to accept the decisions of the majority when he joined the community. Under such circumstances, force against recalcitrant minorities is morally justified, providing no fundamental rights are violated. Locke was thus one of the first political thinkers to emphasize the importance of consent.

His insistence on fundamental right reflected the growing sense of individuality that became one of the marks of the new age. Another mark of Locke's new age thinking was the right to property, which he believed arose as an extension of bodily labor. He also gave an analogous account of the origins of money. Ironically, though Locke believed man could collect too much property, he believed that because money does not spoil it is not immoral for men to accumulate more than they can use. Accordingly, Locke advocated economic inequality through a political theory based upon equality among men. For Locke the function of a state was to implement and secure for the people those rights they ought to have; that is, life, liberty, and property.

The Lockean state, with its emphasis on the autonomy, independence, and equality of all citizens, sacrificed the power that Hobbes

and Machiavelli believed essential for efficient administration. This laissez-faire state accorded government only power enough to regulate abuses and prohibit acts that conflicted with the common good. It did not grant great power, much less unlimited power. Because Lockean men were essentially decent and self-respecting, they could govern themselves given an opportunity and a good education. Education played an important role in the democratic laissez-faire state and Locke was full of suggestions about educational reform to achieve this end. He was thinking at that time primarily of formal education even though it is now generally believed that the whole social and physical environment is part of the educational process. His concept of laissez-faire put great emphasis on positive action to produce the kind of citizen that political democracy required and moral decency demanded. The spirit of the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights were thoroughly Lockean: Indeed, the American ideal today is still the Lockean state. His emphasis on maximization of pleasure, rights, experience, and laissez-faire all contributed to the growth of Individualism.

David Hume (1711-1776 A.D.) reformulated Locke's theory into the empirical criterion of meaning, an account of reality in which abstract ideas were formulated either as faint ideas or lively impressions. This view held that knowledge came from experience rather than rationality and empirical data and perception formed the basis for reality. Hume saw no reason in the nature of things why any event should be followed by any other event. For example, there is no more reason why the sun should rise tomorrow than there is any reason why writing the word

necessary should cause cars to backfire. Therefore, it followed that the pretensions of natural sciences to demonstrable reality were false. If Hume was correct in his thesis, the sciences would be limited to historical statements, that is they could report only past observations. The net result of Hume's analysis was that all knowledge of objects was merely knowledge of spatiotemporal relations among simple ideas or impressions. This kind of knowledge Hume called knowledge of matters of fact. Concepts like reality, mind, and substance, Hume dismissed on grounds that they are unobservable. This philosophical position is known as empiricism. Nevertheless, Hume agreed with the Rationalists that there are absolutely certain, demonstrable truths.

Resting authority for conduct on the church, on Descartes' proposals for an absolutely certain science of conduct, and on Locke's attempt to demonstrate the principles of ethics, were all examples of a tendency of thought that Hume believed affirmed virtue as nothing but a conformity to reason. This view that morality can be grounded in reason is still widely held, but is one against which Hume rebelled. He argued against Egoism on three grounds: First, he believed that it contradicted facts about conduct, by not taking into account such dispositions as benevolence, generosity, love, friendship, compassion and gratitude. Second, to hold that real motivation is always self-interest commits to a very complicated psychological theory that always rationally calculates self-interest in all situations. Third, self-love could not be man's only good, for its satisfaction depends wholly on the satisfaction of various particular desires. In other words, self-love is an abstraction invented by

an overly rationalistic psychology. Therefore, the ultimate basis of moral judgment could not be reason, but must be some sense of feeling. Moral judgments were not independent of subjective feelings--not in the sense that an agreement about moral appraisals was impossible--but in the sense that they could not be demonstrated by a process of deductive reasoning like that employed in mathematics. Disagreements over moral appraisals could nevertheless be overcome, because men living in a social world found it advantageous for them to agree on common, or standard evaluations.

Hume believed there were rational principles in the universe that provided a basis for intelligent choice and enlightened conduct, but when he searched in experience for these principles he failed to find them. Hume's attack on Rationalism aroused Kant from his dogmatic slumbers by demonstrating that the old Rationalism was no longer viable. Under these circumstances, philosophy could choose to conclude that something was wrong with the premises from which it had started and begin to work out a rational philosophy on a different basis, which is what Kant chose to do. He was followed in this project by philosophers as unlike as Hegel and Whitehead, who continued Kant's effort to rehabilitate Rationalism. However, in the nineteenth century and in our modern times the choice to take refuge in some sort of extra-rational authority has been followed by those seeking a revival in Catholicism, Romanticism, or political Totalitarianisms of the right and the left. Another choice for philosophy was abandonment of the quest for certainty, acceptance of provisional solutions as long as they work, and readiness to discard them when

changing conditions make them no longer appropriate, which has been the solution favored by Pragmatists and radical Empiricists. Hume probably would have sympathized with these latter philosophers, but he did not work out a pragmatic theory of experience. The theory that knowledge occurs as a result of human interaction with the environment did not appear until much later. Hume's atomistic views of experience further encouraged growth of individualism by appealing to experience, perception and subjectivism, rather than to reason and unitary identity.

Endnotes

1. This excessively pessimistic view of man probably stemmed from a profound brooding over his own life and agonizing inward conflict.
2. The following description of Feudalism is from; Ulmann, W. (1966). The individual and society in the middle ages. Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press. The earlier discussion of Augustine's work was also extracted from: Saint Augustine. (1984[1467]). City of God. London: Penguin Books
3. The Holy Bible, First Corinthians, 15:10.
4. Ulmann (1966), p. 68.
5. Jones (1970), Vol. 2, pp. 189-190, 196.
6. Ulmann (1966), pp. 123, 129.
7. Information about the Renaissance was likewise gleaned from: Cassirer, E. (1963). The individual and the cosmos in renaissance philosophy. New York: Barnes and Noble.
8. Machiavelli's politics were supplemental with: Skinner, Q. & Price, R. (Eds.). (1990). Machiavelli's: The prince. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

9. Tuck, R. (Ed.). (1991). Hobbes: Leviathan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

10. The paradox is that Descartes reformed the entire structure of Western knowledge and provided the foundations for modern science from insights that came to him in three visionary dreams. The basis for rational, reductionist, positivist science—which rejects subjective knowledge—was conceived subjectively in an unconscious state.

CHAPTER V

THE INDIVIDUAL OF MODERN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

Synopsis

The harsh effects of Industrialism and urbanization on the laboring class, and repression in Europe from institutional failure to adjust to change in values, expectations, and ways of living, led to much more practical, utilitarian, and pragmatic philosophies that emphasized social theory, alienation, existence, and being. These were intensely personal philosophies that focused laser-like attention on individual circumstances in the life-world of everyday experience. Emerging from them came the hard, courageous, creative Nietzschean Overman, who faced his anxiety, exploited it, suspended the ethical and prospered in the battle for meaning in an absurd world in which God was dead.

In an attempt to revive a universe with purpose, direction, and proportion, twentieth century thinkers tried to break out of the Kantian framework. In that paradigm the objective world had been a construct of a synthesizing mind working on and organizing the senses. Modern theories conceive of the mind and self less mechanistically as creative, active, intuitive, continuous, unfolding, and evolving. Some are pragmatic, finding truth in what works. Others are scientific, searching for an objective pattern in a universe of loose and separate encapsulated entities. Still others are phenomenological, finding meaning in the

interfusion, or interconnectedness, of all things and reconciled to living with uncertainty in a world requiring that moral choices be made with incomplete knowledge.

Collapse of Confidence

In a word, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries can be characterized as optimistic, so it is not surprising that this Age of Reason came to be called the Enlightenment. Europe was emerging from a long period of superstition and bigotry and the new science was revealing the universe as a vast, but fundamentally simple mechanism. In this orderly universe, behavior could be subject to prediction and hence to control in the interests of improving material and social well-being. There seemed no reason why unlimited progress was not possible.

The Philosophes, with nothing but contempt for Christianity, could be regarded either as a body of formal philosophical beliefs or as an institution wielding political power. These philosophers rejected the concept of divine intervention in the world and, in order to deal with a closed, completely regular system, they developed common views of order. For example, Montesquieu believed that laws determined human conduct, that these laws could be discovered by essentially empirical methods, and that they could be utilized to resolve social conflicts making life better in every respect. Given adequate education, men would be able to solve all the problems that arose in the course of their lives. Because men were, by and large, capable of running their own affairs, laws could be kept to a minimum, laissez-faire political and economic systems could

survive, and moral theories based on self-respect, decency and the dignity of man were logical outcomes. These enlightened thinkers believed reason, presently exploring the external universe, could be turned within to fashion a social order that would reflect the rationality of the cosmos.

However, the optimism did not last as industrialism resulted from application of science and technology. A process that was expected to result in unlimited improvement, actually led to urban slums in which many workers were far worse off than unenlightened peasants of feudal times. The French Revolution, which had ridden high on issues regarding the rights of man and had been held by its supporters to herald a new Age of Reason and democratic freedom, collapsed into a reign of terror. Far from being rational creatures in control of their destinies, men seemed driven by hate and fear. They were moved less by enlightened self-interest and cool benevolence than by irrational and destructive aggressions against one another. The man who emerged in the nineteenth century was very different from the one that appeared during the Renaissance and dominated Europe for two centuries. While the latter had been self-confident and self-assured, capable of mastering his environment if need be, the new nineteenth century man was uneasy, anxious, alienated and introspective. Increasingly unsure of himself, he doubted the validity of his values, his ability to communicate in a meaningful way with others, and even his ability to know himself.

This was Dostoevsky's Underground Man; masochistic, living by his feelings, profoundly pessimistic, passionately fond of destruction and chaos, endlessly introspective, and afraid or even unable to divulge

himself. A major change that led to this shift was Hume's discovery that there was no necessary connection among matters of fact. He had in effect driven a wedge between reason and nature, and his views were far more revolutionary than he realized. Among Hume's contemporaries, Kant--deeply committed to the Enlightenment ideal--was almost alone in recognizing the destructive force of Hume's attack on reason and in realizing that some compromise was necessary to answer Hume. Kant's philosophy constituted one of the fundamental turning points in the history of Western thought.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804 A.D.) was born to Pietist parents, members of the Protestant left who believed that true religion was a matter of inner-life and emphasized simplicity and obedience to moral law. Kant's principle work, Critique of Pure Reason, sought to remedy the situation in which eighteenth century philosophy found itself. Descartes aimed at putting the new physics on a firm philosophical foundation by providing a field in which physical inquiry could be carried on undisturbed by theological scruples. He believed that he had accomplished this by dividing reality into the distinct substances of matter and mind. However, the Rationalists pressed Descartes' rationalistic bias to its logical conclusion, aiming at certainty. Starting with mathematics--the ideal of all knowledge--they wrote off perception as mere confused thinking. Locke and his followers pursued an opposite course, ending up with an equally frustrating conclusion which was concerned less with certainty than with the actual world of experience. Unfortunately, the assumption that people are aware only of their own mental states leads

nowhere, because one does not know an external world, only ideas. Meanwhile, the working scientists, unperturbed by philosophical doubts about the nature of their work, continued making advance after advance that seemed to confirm the Hobbesian vision of the world as thoroughly mechanistic. As a result, Hobbes' challenges to the traditional religious view of the cosmos were more formidable than ever.

It was obvious to Kant the Cartesian compromise had failed; the only question remaining was exactly where it had gone wrong. Accordingly, Kant undertook a more rigorous and sophisticated analysis of the nature of the scientific method, by emphasizing the striking contrast between natural science before and after Galileo. He accepted the empiricists' premise that all knowledge begins with sense data--our experiences with the world--except that a priori knowledge necessary for any thought to take place at all. According to his hypothesis, knowledge is a cooperative affair in which both mind and object make a contribution, and mind contributes the relations while objects contribute the relata. To Kant, this consideration completely altered the conventional notion of the mind's relation to its objects and meant that the mind was not passive, but active and that Locke's metaphor of the blank tablet was profoundly mischievous.

Kant's hypothesis that the mind sorted experience into standard patterns, solved the problem of pure reason that Kant saw in prior philosophy. Although all knowledge begins with experience as Locke and other Empiricists had insisted, it did not necessarily follow that it all arises out of experience. Indeed, all knowledge, not just scientific knowledge,

contains elements that are drawn from experience, but supplied by the mind itself. To Kant, self and objects were neither distinct substances nor mutually independent, but were ordered elements in experience, elements in the spatiotemporal manifold. Kant drew a distinction between what is within and what is outside the spatiotemporal manifold. In his view, one cannot know the moral self, because knowledge is limited to what is within this manifold. Values are not in Kant's spatiotemporal manifold, but are a part of experience as are faith, belief or other practical sources of knowledge. Thus, Kant actually proposed to replace the Cartesian dualism of substances with a dualism of kinds of experience. There were things called knowledge in experience and there was also in experience an appreciation of values which was called faith. Kant's moral theory was based on primacy of right, rather than on a concept of good or happiness, in which duty was a central theme.

He developed three formulations of duty: (1) the categorical imperative--an act by application of a rule, (2) treatment of persons as ends, never as means only, and (3) acting with an autonomy of will that recognizes shared humanity. From this perspective, a moral act is one that is taken from principle--that a regular, explicitly formulated, and carefully thought out rule and performed because it is seen as an instance of the rule. The capacity of the human mind to form categorical imperatives--such as telling the truth, keeping promises and repay debts--was of immense practical importance to mankind. It instilled in one a sense of duty to perform actions by reviving the maxim. Kant also described another imperative duty to treat humanity as having an

intrinsic value just because one is human. Whereas Locke for the most part emphasized the rights of men as men, Kant emphasized the duties they owe as men. These duties could be thought of as deriving their obligatory character from one primary obligation--the duty to treat men as ends in themselves. Kant's third account of duty was autonomous will, which made autonomy the basis of the dignity for every human and every rational creature. It required one to act in accordance with the principle that the laws to which one was subject were those of one's giving, even though they were at the same time universal. Autonomy was respect for personality which in turn held respect for ourselves; not, of course, for private selves but for the humanity we share with other men.

By rigorously limiting knowledge to the spatiotemporal manifold, Kant made room for an appreciation of individuals as moral beings with rights and obligations to others. Freedom was thus entirely in accord with the general solution to the problem of pure reason. Freedom fell within the province of what Kant called faith, which was not an ungrounded belief in something that contradicts science, but was a sensitivity to and appreciation of values. Put differently, freedom conformed to Kant's central theme that knowledge of objects and appreciation of values, including the value of being a person, are simply modes of experience too different from one another to ever conflict. Kant's fundamental thesis was that these were two kinds of reality and hence different criteria of meaning and truth. Values could not be assessed by the criteria proper to facts unless values disappear. This analysis of substance in a spatio-

temporally organized manifold paved the way for rehabilitation of the valuational point of view.

The Age of Reason sustained three basic assumptions: (1) a rational order of eternal truths, (2) a mind capable of understanding truths, and (3) a will capable of acting in accordance with them. The business of rational men everywhere was to apply this whole body of truths to the ordinary affairs of daily life. "We hold these truths to be self evident . . . ," said the American founding fathers. Accordingly, nineteenth century philosophy came to be seen as a series of attempts to deal with the problems created by the collapse of the world view of the Age of Reason. The new complex of attitudes could be brought under the rubric of Romanticism and could be viewed as an action against the mood of the Enlightenment, in particular, against its conception of knowledge.

One of the first writers to support Romanticism was the French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778 A.D.) whose career ultimately had a great impact on education, literature, and political philosophy.¹ Suffering through most of life with emotional distress, inferiority, and guilt and called a perfect example of an outsider in society, he nevertheless became the most important writer of the Age of Reason. Growing more vain, inconsiderate, and suspicious, he became an opponent of society in the 1750's and quarreled bitterly with his former friends, a group of philosophers called the Philosophes. In 1762, the French government condemned his work and he fled to Switzerland to escape persecution. The next year he accepted refuge in England from the Scottish philosopher David Hume. The year after, he quarreled with

Hume and returned to France where he wrote autobiographical works justifying his conduct. His work prized feeling over reason, impulsiveness, and spontaneity over self-discipline, and self-expression over conformity. Some of his ideas greatly influenced the development of the French Revolution.

Rousseau believed that man in a state of nature--isolated and without language--was good, without motivation or impulse to limit one another, but man was not a social being. As soon as men began to live together in society, they became corrupt and evil from society's tendency to nurture aggression and egotism. He believed society should be reorganized into completely controlled communities, where training, guidance, propaganda, censorship, elimination of privacy, and suppression of special interest groups were used to control ideas.

Suggesting a principle that the integrity and dignity of the individual more than anything else must be guarded by government, Rousseau said, "The public confederation . . . would by right be dissolved if in the state a single person who might have been helped were allowed to perish. . . . The welfare and liberty of each single citizen are the common cause of the whole state" (Perkins, 1974, p. 134). Only free nations know the true value of man and the respect owed persons. However, because the idea of state is unnatural to self-interest, the ruler must eradicate private interest to guarantee the civil equivalent of natural liberty and earn the love of the people. Individual ambition alienates men from the state and places them in competition as in the state of war.

The enlightened ruler therefore uses education to make possible a contrat social, or society by consent, and bring to bear science, will, and action.

Because property is easy to use and hard to defend, directly tied to preservation of life, and motivates most citizens to give law an emotional hold over their actions, it is the most sacred of all rights of citizenship and in some respects more important than liberty itself. Nevertheless, property, possessions, pleasure, and power are not guaranteed by society above the subsistence level. Liberty in the form of association to defend and protect the whole, while recognizing the precise relation of each individual to the congregation, is guaranteed. Freedom of the self--separation from other selves or usurpation by them and isolation as in the state of nature--is guaranteed. Each citizen is a free-wheeling individual who helps shape the whole through one's uniqueness rather than allow the whole to reduce one to conformity. Rousseau's concern is with the union of wills to form a collectivity or sovereign, without standardizing or diminishing the uniqueness of each, in which the wills are no longer alone but become parts of a whole.

This amounts to replacing liberty as unrestricted passion with liberty as general will, an artificial equivalent of nature. It is a mission to change the condition of man: (a) from the solitary, totally independent, potentially perfectible primitive state; (b) to civil society, prepared by the legislator, where man is part of a greater whole, at liberty and uncompromised by others; (c) without passing through the natural state of war in which one is independent but no longer solitary, one is threatened with enslavement by the strongest, and one's uniqueness is replaced by

the worst kind of conformity. The purpose of the collectivity is not to inhibit uniqueness, but to protect the general will and shelter the selves from the battering forces of vanity.

To the Romantic mind, the universe seemed bigger, richer, more varied and exciting, and more unified than the thinkers of the Age of Reason had allowed. The focus of the Romantics was in an attack against reason, which had imposed artificial and man-made provisions destroying the living whole of reality. Though a diversity of views burgeoned among the Romantics, there was considerable unanimity. All were impressed by the largeness of reality and an immensity that baffled the methods of science, against which the whole human enterprise seem petty and trivial. Romantics rejected the Enlightenment perception of man as unique and different from all the rest of nature because he alone possessed reason. With the downgrading of reason, Romanticists thought of man as a part of nature, dependent on nature for bodily sustenance and for his highest thoughts and noblest aspirations. They also rejected the Enlightenment view of a universe made up a large number of separate entities, and viewed the universe as one continuous living and dynamic being. This Romantic idea of reality was immensely complex--too complex to be exhaustibly explained by the neat conceptual schemes of eighteenth-century Rationalism.

One of the most complex philosophies of this period is that of G. W. F. Hegel. Before discussing his views, it must be stated that there is no agreement regarding the nature of those views. However, it does seem fair to say that he carried the Kantian analysis of mind and matter even

further by taking a developmental view of the mind changing, evolving, extending and unfolding itself and its experience. For Hegel, the ultimate truth was consciousness, not substance, as the proponent of reality. In his view the notions of an independent and unchanging self disappeared. The mind was not independent because it could never get away from its own content. Like Kant, Hegel believed self and object were not distinct and unchanging entities, but were structures that arise within experience. There can be no object without self and no self without object. However, while Kant's conception of mind was largely static, Hegel's was developmental; mind was not a disinterested judge contemplating a realm of already existent objects, but an inner force creating and shaping the outer, observable forms. Hegel believed that traditional Rationalism, or Raisonment, as Hegel termed it, consisted in classifying everything willy-nilly into one or another of science's pigeonholes. Raisonment ignored the nuances that make each thing an individual.

Hegel's social philosophy of right was concerned throughout with human freedom. He believed that the substantive aim of the world was to be achieved through individual freedom. In its first stage, freedom was concerned with the concept of personality, the level at which all problems appeared merely as problems of maintaining certain abstract rights conceived of as belonging to all as persons. At this level, individuals were complete and autonomous: They continuously emerged, developed, and were replaced by higher forms of themselves and had certain abstract rights. The next level was morality, in distinction from the lower level of abstract right. Here, in the synthesis of morality and right, which Hegel

called the ethical life, the notion of right is negated by the notion of good, and individuals enter into a compact with others for the benefits to be gained and also for the good of society.

Hegel believed an individual finds good in the larger whole of which one feels a part, beginning with the family. Above the individual was civil society and above that the State. Hegel believed that organizations developed an externality of will in which individuals find their good in the larger whole of which they feel a part. This was absorbed into the supreme type of social order which he called the State. For Hegel, the State is the true individual; it is not a collection of independent individuals; its members are related to it as an organ of an organism; citizens lose their independence in the unity of the state; the absorption of the citizen is complete and nothing survives that is good for the individual in isolation. It can be seen Hegel's revision of Kant's doctrine was profoundly important because it embodied a great shift from an essentially static view of the universe to a conception of the universe as evolving through time. Also, while Kant had not valued what men actually achieved, but instead the motive from which they acted—that is, the purity of their will, those philosophers who came after Kant were much more practically oriented. They recognized that Europe faced major economic and social problems as a result of the failure of institutional structures to adjust to immense changes occurring in men's values, expectations, and ways of living.

When Hegel died in late August of 1831 A.D., agitation over the Reform Bill before the British Parliament was at its height. In 1840, the

work day still averaged twelve to thirteen hours and occasional holidays had to be made up. Children entered factories when they were nine years old and were expected to perform the hardest labor. Nearly as many children were employed as adults in mines--167,000 compared with 191,000. Pay was pathetically low and owners reduced their labor costs further by arbitrary fines for breakage and bad work. People were shocked by such conditions, the laboring class itself began to agitate for reform, and passage of the Reform Bill in 1832 was a great victory for the middle and lower classes. In continental Europe, repression instead of Parliamentary compromise was the order of the day and dissent had no outlet, eventually welling up into outbreaks of open violence in 1848.

Out of reform-minded thinking emerged the Utilitarian philosophers, whose interests lay primarily in social theory and basic principle which they believed could be proved by empirical means. Utilitarian philosophy held the end aim of a legislator should be the happiness of the people in matters of legislation and general utility should be the guiding principle. John Stuart Mill's essay On Liberty is a typical application of the greatest happiness principle. Instead of arguing, as eighteenth-century Rationalists had, that liberty is a self-evident right, he tried to show the greatest good for the greatest number was promoted by a Utilitarian calculation of the consequences of outcomes. "Individuality is the same thing with development, and it is only the cultivation of individuality which produces, or can produce, well-developed human beings" (Jones, 1970, Vol. 4, p. 168). Accordingly, Mill showed antipathy toward the Hegelian ideal of transcending finite individuality in that

larger self, the State. Mill's argument exhorted every individual to fashion his own destiny unrestrained by a police or public opinion.

Comte, who could be considered the founder of Positivism, carried forward and applied empiricism and pragmatism more systematically, and mixed in a negative point of view. Comte believed that emotion dominated and most men and only a few were capable of setting down and using scientific methods to ascertain answers to problems. The entire difficulty in Comte's view was to enable administrators to put scientific knowledge to work in improving the conditions of society. Hence, Comte was the administrator par-excellence. Although the social world looked like a mighty maze to the layman, to the administrator it fell into a relatively simple pattern. Comte thus followed the Platonic tradition both in the sense that there was a definite set of answers and that he believed only relatively few people were capable of discerning and acting on them. However, Comte went further by attempting to apply to the study of man the empirical methods of the natural sciences. He advocated a highly organized and tightly controlled society of the kind economic planning has made familiar today.

Similarly, Marx's reality was co-extensive with Kant's spatiotemporal manifold; that is, there is no transcendent realm beyond the world to be encountered in experience. In these respects, Marx belongs, like the Positivists, to the empirical and scientific tradition that combined optimistic belief in the inevitability of progress with a belief that human nature and the physical universe conformed to simple laws discoverable by science. For Marx, as well as Hegel, alienation was a

central concept. The Enlightenment philosophers had simply not experienced alienation as a problem, because they had found the world they lived in to be basically congenial, but the nineteenth century saw alienation come to be regarded as an inevitable part of the human condition. It arose from the sense that man, alone in an indifferent or hostile universe, was estranged not only from nature but from other men and even from one's self. The nineteenth century was one of tension and change with upheaval so great that even today we are struggling to adjust. The Industrial Revolution, with its production of distress, poverty, disease, and alienation appears as an inevitable feature of the human condition from which man is redeemed, if at all, only by grace. Nineteenth century philosophical thinking abandoned the Enlightenment's belief in immutable truths and inalienable rights and held on to iron laws of development that could be ascertained by applying scientific method to the study of man.

For many years this ethos remained dominant in Europe and America but a counter-movement, hardly noticed at first, emerged to make the self a decider and chooser. This focus on subjectivity was in one respect a part of mainstream Western thought, for interest in self had been a characteristic of philosophy since Descartes. With the advent of world war, and the callous injustice done to Negroes in America, the dominant philosophy of reasonableness and progress began to appear naive. In the early twentieth century, man again began to feel estrangement from the natural world and philosophers began to regard Augustine as an unusually honest and perceptive psychologist. The new counter-

movement represented by Soren Kirkegaard and Friedrich Neitzsche condemned the culture that produced such alienation and estrangement. They thought that becoming a complete self was more important than improving one's relation with one's environment. Kirkegaard's philosophy was an intensely personal one that grew directly out of his deeply felt life experiences and this Existentialism was the dominant mover of his philosophy. He believed things existed for agents as objects to be encountered and mastered. He asked the question, "What am I to do?," rather than "What am I to know?" He equated existence with an agony of being in a predicament and thought that man was faced with either-or choices requiring a commitment and a personality. Kirkegaard believed that nothing could be proved and that a leap of faith was necessary. He held that man was finite, God was infinite; man was a sinner, God was merciful. It was essential for each man to recognize these relations, to act on them, and to give himself utterly and completely to God. Kirkegaard's philosophy embraced radical subjectivity in which no rational, scientific or economic procedure could heal the break within the self and between the self and its world; only a leap of faith could accomplish that, and God was this faith.

Neitzsche, whose life spanned almost exactly the second half of the nineteenth century, was born when Hegel had been dead only thirteen years. At that time, Mill was thirty-eight years old and Kirkegaard was thirty-one. During his life, the optimistic mood of the Enlightenment was ending and the democratization, industrialization and urbanization of Europe were seen to be having unpredicted consequences resulting in

commercialization, vulgarization, and impersonalization of life. He believed more than did Hegel that thinking and perception are acts of interpretation in which desires, memories, and passions effect the object perceived or thought about, reflecting a focus on the individual's needs and problems. He held nothing but contempt for Kirkegaard's leap of faith, advanced the hypothesis that God was dead, and found fulfillment precisely in the hardness and courage with which he faced up to the terrible truths he had discovered. Neitzsche saw the vast majority of people as weak, merciless, greedy and murderous. To him, religion and transcendent ethics were instruments preserving the unfit and subordinating the strong to accept small virtues of small people. He called this a slave morality and saw it as one way the weak waged battle against anxiety. He believed only a few perceptive individuals--the Overmen--recognized this, exploited it, mastered themselves, suspended the ethical, and exerted their will, power, hardness, courage, and creativity.

Both Neitzsche and Kirkegaard reflected attention to the individual person and his individual needs and problems, as the name of their philosophy Existentialism suggests. This point of view is passionate, not neutral, practical not speculative, subjective not objective. It thoroughly rejected the Enlightenment's belief in self-respect and high regard for human nature.

William James (1842-1910 A.D.) believed philosophy should inform people about the world and help them make a successful adjustment, which depended less on holding beliefs that were true than on holding beliefs that suited individual temperament. James believed life consisted

of innumerable points where one must choose and he held that an individual is free to choose what he or she shall do. He was concerned that one really does choose, or decide what to do, at each of these points, rather than acting capriciously or casually and evading the problem by putting trust in so-called moral law handed down by some allegedly superior authority. James's ethics were a serious and intensely personal matter and depended not so much on a theory of good or theory of obligation, as on an appeal to people to become concerned about choice and the whole moral tone of their lives.

For the entire history of philosophy from Descartes to James, there had been in effect a series of efforts to overcome the Cartesian dualism that had infected philosophy. Starting with James's doctrine of pure experience, one could solve the mind-body problem through consciousness, because dualism seemed plausible or inevitable only if minds are conscious and bodies are not. James held that if we look at pure experience, without the distortions introduced by metaphysics, no distinct entities existed between mind and matter:

My thesis is that if we start with the supposition that there is only one primal stuff or material in the world, a stuff of which everything is composed, and if we call that stuff 'pure experience,' then knowing can easily be explained as a particular sort of relation toward one and another to which portions of pure experience may enter. The relation itself is part of pure experience. (Jones, 1970, Vol. 4, pp. 304-305)

James was one of the first philosophers to adopt what subsequently came to be called the phenomenological approach; that is, an approach that seeks to start from, and confine itself to, a description of experience as it comes.

James's vision was one of an open universe, growing, incomplete, and unpredictable in its outcome. To live in such a universe people needed flexibility, resourcefulness, a sense of humor, and readiness to gamble on their convictions and to live with insecurity while enjoying it. These are qualities James prized, but prized above all others was individuality. James's vision was one of a pluralistic universe—a universe only by courtesy, for there was nothing to fit among its parts. James anticipated some of the major themes of twentieth century philosophy with his Existentialist emphasis on the centrality of choice and phenomenological emphasis on pure experience. Pure experience saw no moral absolutes, justified belief in whatever works, gave value to whatever can and whatever suits. In doing so, it boosted individuality and made reality highly subjective.

One of James's contemporaries was Charles Sanders Pierce (1839-1914 A.D.). He too rejected idealism and positivism and was empirically oriented. Sanders propounded: (a) Tychism, which takes the universe as an evolutionary development according to habits which the selves develop; (b) Synechism, which he said sees mental life as a continuum rather than encapsulated events; and (c) Community, which teaches that interests do not stop at our own fate, but must embrace unlimited devotion to collective rather than individual pleasure. Pierce became a formidable critic of individualism.

Quest for Objectivity

Four themes strongly mark twentieth century culture--a concern with science, a worry over consciousness, a preoccupation with language, and an urge to recapture objectivity and revive belief in a universe with purpose, direction, and proportion. Nineteenth century philosophy had moved largely within the Kantian paradigm and almost all of the twentieth century can be viewed as a series of attempts to break out of the Kantian framework. Kant proposed that minds and objects were mutually involved and that truth consists in the agreement of objects with minds. To put it differently, knowledge of nature was possible, but only because the mind did not merely react or respond to a completely independent external world, but constructed the form--the structure, not the details--of the world of its experience. This hypothesis promoted mankind into a place of prominence as the constructor of experience. For Kant, the mind was no longer a Cartesian substance contemplating other Cartesian substances from outside and at a distance. Now the objective world became a construct, a product of the synthesizing activity of mind working on and organizing the materials of sense. The immediate response to Kantianism that emerged strongly in the beginning of this century was to re-establish an objective reality and escape the relativism of Hegel and Nietzsche that seemed to follow Kantianism. This pursuit of objectivity took three main paths: (1) a revival of Realism, (2) a revolution in logic, and (3) a phenomenological method.

Though differing markedly among themselves, Henri Bergson, John Dewey, and Alfred North Whitehead are three thinkers that can be grouped together under a philosophy of process. Bergson and Whitehead represented the metaphysical trend that survived Kant's criticism and dominated much of nineteenth-century thought. Dewey represented the empirical, anti-metaphysical trend that has also been an increasingly powerful influence on Western thought. Bergson's metaphysics was Romantic in its emphasis on dynamism and continuity, its denial of reason as a means to know the inner-nature of reality, and its assertion that reality can nonetheless be known--in intuition. Whitehead reaffirmed the capacity of reason to know reality and he sought to establish a new categorical scheme of metaphysically valid concepts. Dewey was skeptical of both the possibility and the desirability of building philosophical systems and represented the great drive for social reform that had developed in the late Nineteenth Century. All three of these philosophers were reformers, not rebels, who believed in the possibility of progress which they thought could be promoted by intelligent action on the part of individuals.

Bergson believed in a superior kind of knowledge called intuition by which people have direct and immediate access to the nature of reality. Taking self as the starting point, he viewed self as active, not a static encapsulated substance. The self was revealed in intuition as a continuous, unfolding new experience that would incorporate the past while moving steadily into the future. He distinguished between dynamic religion and open morality on the one hand, and static religion and closed

morality on the other. The former was a religion in morality of love and freedom; the latter one of obligation and law. He believed that reason and intelligence cause individuals to think of themselves as distinct from the community of which they are really an organ, which disrupts morality and order and must be counteracted by other forces. Kirkegaard and Nietzsche had been deeply suspicious of the Enlightenment's idea of progress. Bergson, still committed to progress, though not to the Enlightenment's belief in reason, believed that mankind might be on the verge of making a new creative advance. For centuries men and women had made a cult of comfort and luxury, but he believed that they were approaching a new period of Asceticism and Mysticism.

Dewey's theory was a version of ideas loosely identified as pragmatic. It is sometimes said that Pragmatism is a typical expression of the American ethos. William James popularized Pragmatism by trying to show that the conclusions of science are not as authoritative as they may seem. Instead, he espoused the principle that truth existed if a particular activity works. Dewey's Pragmatism was called Instrumentalism.² It reflected his view that the mind is directive and active rather than merely an observer or recorder of information. In this respect, he shared Kant's and Hegel's belief that experience is a product in which mind plays a decisive role. However, Dewey emphasized a world to be lived in and acted upon. He saw human beings not as passive spectators of a neutral world, but as organisms plunged into an environment that infiltrates their very nature. He also believed no final adequate descriptions (or laws) could be found, only more and more adequate instrumentalities for

dealing with change and growth. He also embraced freedom of intelligence, or mind, and rejected freedom of action:

Unless freedom of individual action has intelligence and informed conviction back of it, its manifestation is almost sure to result in confusion and disorder. The democratic idea of freedom is not the right of each individual to do as he pleases, even if it be qualified by adding 'provided he does not interfere with the same freedom on the part of others. . . .' The basic freedom is that of freedom of mind and of whatever degree of freedom of action and experience is necessary to produce freedom of intelligence. (Jones, 1970, Vol. 5, p. 83)

Dewey also saw values as simply the practical, social, and human problem of intelligent choice, as facts to be discovered in nature just as any other fact. Dewey placed significant faith in the advocacy of bold intelligence and believed that problems created by technology could be solved by technology. The acceptability of his account depended to a large extent upon people being content to live relativistic and uncertain lives.

Dewey said individualism was born in a revolt against established systems of government, deeply tinged by fear of government, and activated by desire to reduce it to a minimum and limit the evil it could do. Since established political forms were at the time tied up with institutions, especially ecclesiastical, recourse was by appeal to inalienable sacred authority resident in the protesting individuals. Examples of this are the efforts of John Locke to limit the powers of government by calling forth prior non-political rights inherent in the individual. Its classic expression is found in the writings of the French Revolution which at one stroke did away with all forms of association, leaving the bare individual face to face with the State.

Dewey has the individual acting from crudely intelligized emotion and habit, rather than rational consideration. Habit is the mainspring of human action, the fly-wheel of society, which keeps us all fighting the battles of life. It keeps the fisherman at sea, the miner in darkness, and the country-man in his log cabin. It alone keeps the most repulsive and hardest walks of life from being deserted. Life has been impoverished not by predominance of society in general over individuality, but by domination of one form of association over other actual and possible forms. To learn to be human is to develop through give-and-take communication an effective sense of being and an individually distinctive member of a community who appreciates its beliefs, desire, and methods, and contributes to its conversion of powers into human resources and values. The essential need is improving the methods and conditions of debate, discussion, and persuasion, freeing and perfecting the processes of inquiry, and disseminating conclusions.

For Dewey, warranted assertability replaced truth. It was arrived at by interaction with the environment until the latter was modified and made acceptable to us. A belief had warranted assertability only when the consequences of holding the belief are satisfactory. Dewey put philosophy to the service of society. He disagreed with Transcendentalists because they encouraged atomistic individualism, and with Determinists because they reduced the individual to insignificance and did not respect experience. He sought public ends, not private, and believed truth was what worked for the group, not the individual. Morality was social, not

individual and was observed by cooperative action. He became the guide, the mentor, the conscience of the American people.

The basic orientation of Whitehead's mind was quite different from that of Dewey's. Whereas Dewey thought of his task primarily in terms of solving a variety of fairly immediate, concrete problems, Whitehead thought in terms of a long range and systematic interpretation on the whole range of experience. If Dewey is seen as representing the empirical spirit of the modern mind, Whitehead can be fairly said to have represented the Rationalist tradition. He conceived philosophy in the realistic spirit of philosophers who attempted to break out of the Kantian paradigm and reaffirm objectivity. He believed philosophy was simply a search for a pattern in the universe and though he was convinced that one can never formulate it completely or finally, there was a pattern—that was the realistic strain in his thought. Since humans are finite beings, he believed that complete grasp of this pattern is totally denied us. In the final analysis, belief in an order of nature is an act of faith; not Kirkegaard's leap of faith, but a faith in the continuity of things, in an objective truth, in a cosmological principle. Whitehead advocated a philosophy of organism, that sought to reunite Descartes' separation of mind and matter and restore the reputation of knowledge of the latter. An organism was defined as a "unit of emergent value, a real fusion of the character of eternal objects, emerging for its own sake" (Jones, 1970, Vol. 5, p. 83). Thus, all things are interfused. He also founded the so-called process school of theology which rejects creation out of nothing in favor of a universe with no beginning. Instead of creation *ex nihilo*, God's creative

activity is manifested in the ongoing process and creative advance in nature's activity. The main advantage of this philosophy was a place for value in a world of fact.

A feature of twentieth century philosophy was a re-emergence or revival of an analytical tradition in philosophy that can be traced far back into the past to Hobbes. Characteristic of the analytical tradition is a commitment to Atomicity, that is, to the belief that the universe consists of a very large number of independent and encapsulated entities. Common to all of the philosophers of this tradition is the conviction that these entities of which the universe is composed are only externally related, in Hume's language, loose and separate. One of the leaders in the revival of the analytical tradition was G. E. Moore (1873-1958 A.D.). Division of complex entities into simple ones and inspection of these simple items were two steps in a method based on Moore's assumptions that the universe consisted of a vast number of absolutely simple items and that analysis, if carried far enough, always terminated on one of these items. Analysis, then, was the process of isolating for inspection one or more of the various entities which collectively made up the universe. Unlike philosophers who started from the assumption that reality is a complex unity, not a collection of simples, Moore believed that understanding of any item comes from inspecting that item in splendid isolation from every other item. Moore is generally regarded as one of most influential philosophers in the first half of this century and his view carried forward, through Bertrand Russell, to the Positivists.

Moore and Russell, almost exact contemporaries at Cambridge, were friends as well. Both held the universe to be a collection of wholly independent, discreet entities and analysis to be the method by which humans come to know the nature of these entities. Nevertheless, because they differed so much temperamentally they developed very different philosophical positions. Driving Russell was an interest in mathematics and pursuit of certainty, an interest as powerful as that which had animated Descartes. He believed that the primary business of modern philosophy was criticism. For Dewey the important element of the scientific method had been its experimentalism and its tentativeness. In contrast, Russell believed that science yielded the truth about things. Therefore, in Russell's view there was nothing to be said about ethics as a philosophical theory, because all knowledge is limited to science and science had nothing to say about values. In his view, values were not a part of the inventory of the universe and constituted only individual desirings which differed markedly from culture to culture. Despite these views, Russell was deeply interested in metaphysics, which distinguished him from the Logical Positivists.

In the early 1920s, a group of Viennese intellectuals consisting of mathematicians, physicists, sociologists, and economists met weekly and called themselves the Vienna Circle. After acquiring popularity elsewhere in Europe and the United States, the Vienna Circle began to call their movement variously Logical Empiricism, Scientific Empiricism, and Logical Positivism. Positivism was, in fact, one of the last survivors of eighteenth and nineteenth-century culture and was passionately anti-

metaphysical. This movement insisted that knowledge is limited to experience, reliable information about the world can only be obtained through use of the scientific method, and everything transcendental, other worldly or supra-natural should be eliminated from the Positivist's view. They wanted to use philosophy to destroy all of philosophy except for that part that could be called the logic of the sciences. To them, all problems were technological, not intrinsically human, and could be solved by the application of a rational intelligence armed with a scientific methodology.

Generalizing from the principle that only the sciences can properly be called knowledge, the Positivists formulated a criterion of meaning that came to be called the verifiability principle. This principle stated that propositions for which no means of verification existed were literally meaningless. In this, the Positivists possessed an instrument that totally destroyed metaphysics. Since according to the verifiability principle all meaningful assertions must be capable of verification by empirical observation, ethical assertions must be either empirically verifiable or nonsense. According to the principle itself, all meaningful assertions were either tautological or empirical. This meant that the principle itself had to be an empirical hypothesis to escape circularity. Because the Positivists could not easily attempt to verify the verifiability principle, they lost their nucleus. But it was their Emotivist theory of ethics, that ethical expressions assert nothing and only give in to feelings, that was Positivism's greatest weakness and later led to it being transformed beyond recognition.

Call of Being--Phenomenology

Along side the analytical tradition, grew another set of basic assumptions called the Phenomenological Tradition. Philosophers of the Phenomenological Tradition entered a totally different world in which it seemed possible to agree with Kant that human experience was limited to phenomena, while at the same time denying that the objects thus experienced were constructs. In contrast to the encapsulated simple items of the analytical tradition, Phenomenological philosophers were impressed by the interconnectedness of things--for them experience was a river, not a collection of loose and separate sense data. They held that if one learns to attend carefully--if one cultivates a special attitude which they called reduction--one discovers that one is directly aware of an immense variety of entities and acts not otherwise open to thought. The Phenomenologists were unwilling to write off as subject the experiential world, the life-world as they called it. They rejected the bifurcation of nature to which physics had committed modern culture, and they shared the sense expressed by Romantic poets that all things are interfused together, the sense of the presence in everything of everything else.

One of these Phenomenologists, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938 A.D.), was on a quest for certainty in which his passion for clarity led him from mathematics to logic, to philosophy, and from philosophy in general to Phenomenology as a special kind of seeing that could be cultivated by training and practice. Husserl believed that the natural sciences seem to exclude subjective or spiritual aspects of humanity.³ This point of view

has come to be the model by which all true science is judged. Only sciences of fact are viewed as true sciences, and a science of fact treats the world in the same manner as the natural scientist. This paradigm is easily adopted in human sciences, because human science is always entangled with nature. But the domination of the natural scientific paradigm distorts the human sciences by supporting a naturalistic attitude that conceives of nature not as a real world of everyday life, but as a collection of ideal structures arrived at through very elaborate procedures of idealization, abstraction, and formalization. Thus, the objective reality of the natural sciences is itself a theoretical construct. This means there are not two realities of nature and spirit, objective and subjective. Rather, there is one world viewed from two different attitudes. In Husserl's philosophical view, there should be a clear priority of spirit, because natural sciences conceal their very origin in human subjectivity.

Central to Husserl's method was what may be called the Phenomenological stance. Part of this stance is what Husserl called bracketing, which is an attempt to suspend judgment and doubt everything. What Husserl meant by doubt does not mean disbelieving something, but suspending belief in everything that can possibly be doubted. In so doing, he maintained that one comes to see clearly and unambiguously the true nature of different modes of being. Phenomenology is thus the science of being. Just as any object looks different from different angles, bracketing can be oversimplified by stating that it is an attempt to suspend judgment about what one observes and to see the object from all points of view. Husserl thus thought of man

chiefly as an observer, or a spectator of reality. Other Phenomenologists saw man as a doer, not merely a knower, but they perceived man as an alien, cast into an indifferent universe where he was forced, willy-nilly, to act and to chose. The Phenomenological movement thus underwent a dual development.

One of those directions was taken by Martin Heidegger (1889-1976 A.D.), who believed that Phenomenology was the science of Being, rather than the science of beings that Husserl had made it. Heidegger employed the analytical term *dasein*; human being or mode of being human. In contrast to Husserl's view of man as a knower, Heidegger saw man as a concerned creature--concerned above all for his fate in an alien world. Man stood in concerned relation to the object of his or her knowledge. Thus, in Heidegger's view, Phenomenology became the science of human existence. For Heidegger, to be a man was to have a world; to be in the mode of *dasein* was to have a nature that endures through time; to possess the ability of being something different at some future time, of choosing, of facing possibilities. Humans are being-in-the-world by showing concern, living ahead and facing a future of alternatives and possibilities, seeking to understand, and finding a world of things (*ready-to-hand*) as potentialities for human use in various ways. *Dasein* does not passively react to its world, but does something to, with, or about that world.

Heidegger totally rejected all theories of the spectator type that assume knowledge as a matter of beholding from the outside. *Dasein*'s mode of being-in-the-world was toward the world and being-toward-the-world was essentially to be concerned. Ultimately, then, all meaning was

for all--not for you or me personally--but for *dasein*, for human beings. This was a unitary theory which emphasized the whole and, where analytical philosophers put their emphasis on the articulated parts, Heidegger emphasized the structured whole and believed an understanding of the articulated whole made the parts understandable. Heidegger also believed that a human predicament existed called facticity, thrownness, and fallenness (inauthenticity); to live authentically is to avoid seeing others as a competitive they and to live in the *dasein* by perceiving others as having being as we have ours. Authenticity is a moody understanding of one's own mortality and of one's freedom to live up to one's innermost potentialities. It is an ability to live genuinely in the mode of being-with-others and to perceive men and women as others having being, instead of allowing one's experience of others to collapse into an anonymous they. Inauthenticity is that mode of being in which people are lost in and dominated by the world; the condition in which people believe they understand everything, but in which they really understand nothing, because of superficial and external understandings. It is the scientific attitude, being busy, preoccupied and manipulative.

The scientific attitude that Heidegger deplored is called technik and makes a fundamental distinction between calculative thought and contemplative thought.⁴ The former was connected to a type of thinking motivated by measurement and search for results. Its most powerful expression is in the aim of modern science at manipulation and control. A calculating person is one who seeks to gain advantage, to get ahead, to plan for the future, to quantify, to take stock, and to keep everything in

order. This thinking betrays a fundamental need of certainty and security that wants to know exactly where things are and precisely what they are doing. Contemplative thinking seeks neither measure nor control, but questions the meaning of things and encompasses the essential task of philosophy, the thinking of Being. Technik embodies a logic of domination which underlies technical, calculative thought, and a tendency always to think only in terms of role or function. Heidegger also believed that science was affected by practical concerns, which invalidated the claim that science tells us something true about reality. Instead, this planetary age of calculative thinking extended by technology has come to dominate everything and everything is dominated by one mode of thinking. It dominates the world to the extent that it becomes impossible to conceive of humanity in a non-technical way.

The other branch of Phenomenology was represented by Jean-Paul Sartre who developed it in a fashion that Heidegger repudiated. Despite a common Phenomenological orientation and a shared conviction that man's state is one of alienation, Heidegger and Sartre had very different motives and experiences. Sartre was impervious to the Romantic sentiment-of-being that effected Heidegger's thought. Phenomenology appealed to Sartre because it revealed harsh Existential truths that every individual needed to face and overcome to become an authentic individual, reconciled to living with uncertainty. In order to become an authentic individual Sartre believed one had to face real moral decisions, see through the social self, and surmount the moral crisis that this revelation entails. When this was done one would not find neatly tucked

away beneath the social self an authentic self or an immortal soul or transcendental ego, but simply consciousness. To be authentic one had to experience doubt and suffer anguish in an attempt to discover one's self and what one ought to do. Authenticity was not a category of being, but a category of acting, or becoming. Since the authentic self was not a category of being, the only self that is was the reconstituted social self. A person is an authentic self in choices made through initiative without adopting other's standards or following other's advice. One is only insofar as one acts and action is not simply behaving or having things happen to one, but involves being an authentic social self. Sartre held that the project one chooses determines the actual world one lives in. Since one's choice of this fundamental project was absolutely spontaneous, one was wholly responsible for and could not pass this responsibility on to others or be excused by blaming the time, place, or circumstance. This was freedom, there was no way to escape, and one could not evade responsibility by refusing to choose. In this view, there was one kind of life that was categorically wrong, the life that tries to escape responsibility by retreating into and never emerging from the social self. Sartre argued that to escape responsibility was to involve oneself in a logical contradiction of choosing not to choose.

Over the years, Sartre became more and more impressed by the problem of scarcity, which he concluded led to regard for others as mere objects who were used for one's own ends. Hence, scarcity inevitably led to violence. For this, Sartre faulted Capitalism and idealized Marxism. Nevertheless, Sartrean man was solitary, because to commit oneself to a

cause, however noble, required joining a group and combining with others--not only forming a movement but institutionalizing. This meant surrendering one's freedom and becoming a thing, exactly what Sartre despised about Capitalism.

Albert Camus was a contemporary of Sartre's born in Mondavi, Algeria in 1913.⁵ When he died in 1960, Camus had achieved fame as a writer and public figure. He grew up among simple people, many of whom were illiterate. He witnessed their enduring dignity through hardship, hunger, and physical suffering and retained a strong sense of empathy for those whose lives were consumed by unrelenting labor and whose aspirations were rarely fulfilled. His father died during the battle of Marne in World War I. Though his family and friends knew poverty, they lived in a beautiful and sunny environment in Algiers, close to the sea. Their poverty did not necessarily imply misery and desperation. Though he witnessed the brutal evil of which human beings are capable, he found hope that came from the hills over-looking Algiers where the blue sky merged with the blue of the ocean.

Camus brought a perspective on things in which human drama is dwarfed by an unseeing, unhearing, and uncaring planetary and cosmic process. Awe and love for the myriad beauties and graces of nature permeate his view of natural human context. He saw no conflict between this view and the obstacles, suffering, and death nature imposed on man. When nature inflicts hardship Camus resists it and tries to alleviate its destructiveness, but he passionately rejoices in and embraces nature's beauty, healing, and liberating dimensions.

Camus was critical of Christianity, blaming belief in an all-powerful God for Totalitarianism, and pleading for a return to pre-Christian, Classical Greek idea of measure, or limits to human action grounded in a common human nature. He saw the twin Christian affirmations of an omnipotent God who wills the torture and death of Jesus, as encouraging resignation to injustice and the sanctification of suffering. In contrast, he called for revolt against injustice and suffering and taught people to look at human life and their natural surroundings for whatever sacredness is to be found. He thus replaced a Christian God with nature, universal guilt with specific responsibility, Christ with all victims of oppression, neighbor-love with limits and moderation, salvation with amelioration, and the Kingdom of God with the Kingdom of the human heart. His church was the human community whose reality is not Christ but the solidarity of persons in their common life and suffering.

Camus agreed with Socrates that evil is the result of ignorance, or lack of knowledge; rather than corrupt inclinations or malevolence. Similarly, he affirmed the intrinsic value of individual life in its full humanness and the dignity and integrity of personhood. He espoused a philosophy of limits founded on the value of individual human life, fully human values, and the finiteness and fallibility of our knowledge. In Camus' view modern Western life was characterized by appallingly destructive excess and all or nothing extremes, such as:

1. Man is nothing but his historical destiny.
2. The present is nothing but a phase in building the future.

3. Nature is nothing but material for human production and consumption.

4. Individual freedom is nothing but bourgeois self-deception.

5. Individual life is nothing significant compared to collective existence.

Camus labeled these the life-denying excesses of modern times, which one could reject while simultaneously affirming and protecting human life by the practice of moderation and respect for human solidarity and values. A philosophy of limits, he wrote, is a philosophy "of calculated ignorance and risk. He who does not know everything cannot kill everything."⁶

Summary

The individual from early Western philosophy is characterized primarily by religiosity. Though this characteristic alternately expanded and waned, it seemed to peak with Hesiod, Homer, and again with Augustine, later with St. Thomas, and still later with Luther and Calvin. During these periods of influence, the individual was submerged or made secondary as obedience of God's commands or the Church's edicts ascended to dominate reality. In the interim periods, individualistic tendencies emerged and re-emerged with increased popularity of science and/or restored faith in rationality. While man's religious character predominated and dampened his individualism in seventeen centuries between 750 B.C. to 1600 A.D., it should not be concluded that individualism did not exist. Individualistic attitudes and characteristics

emerged and can be identified that indelibly influenced the Western concept of man that later coalesced in the 400-year period, 1600-2000 A.D.

The individual in early Western philosophy began a transformation from first religious superstition and mythology, to transcendent ordered change and world process, to practical reason, rational understanding, and secular politics. From the worship of all powerful Gods and burgeoning economic dominion over others, evolved an individual primarily motivated by self-interest, who saw war as a means of advancing privileged status. Hesiod, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and the Roman Stoics all fought against this excessively individualistic point of view, stressing in opposition the notion that individuals were part of a greater good in the associations with and interrelationships among one another. The true individual embodied an essential human nature, in which resided the moral integrity to choose and social responsibility to place inner-discipline, self-restraint, and unity ahead of personal gain, oppression of the weak, or accumulation of power. However, their points of view did not prevail in Greece or Rome as evidenced in Athenian society's condemnation of Socrates to death by drinking poison Hemlock and in Western society's own demise as the wreck of fallen Rome. During this time, precious little individualism in the true sense was practiced. Socrates lived and taught an authentic individualism that challenged the prevailing view. He pitted strength of character and fulfillment of humanity's essential nature against accumulation of power and he lost out to tyranny of the majority in an ultimate test of strength for individual human will. For a short time, the

radical individualism of Thrasymachus prevailed and success was defined as social, political, and economic status, but this humanly constricting view soon led to social malaise and loss of energy culminating in a tired and discouraged society seeking peace of mind and relief from the human predicament, rather than passionate anticipation of and preparation for the future. When Alexander the Great swept down from Macedonia, divisiveness, arrogance, and opportunism--the shadow side of radical individualism--left Western society unprepared to meet the challenge. The penalty for embracing radical individualism and rejecting essential human kindness, compassion, and caring was 800 years of social, artistic, and cultural degeneration. Not until the writings and teachings of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle were rediscovered did Western culture begin to recover.

The most striking aspect of modern Western philosophy of the last 600 years is that the individual came fully to the fore, dominating philosophy throughout the period. From Machiavelli's power politics based on self-interest of the ruler to Hobbes' anarchist; from Locke's pleasure principle to Rousseau's contrat social; and from Hegel's interest in human freedom to the Existentialists' preoccupation with individual existence, concerns of the individual have occupied center stage in modern philosophy since Renaissance times. With some exceptions during this period, only the Phenomenologists have departed significantly from this predominant view of the individual's unassailable primacy in the world and the universe. The Socratic individualism against conformity has enjoyed precious little popularity in practice, while

economic man prospers in seeming perpetuity. The unavoidable consequence of this narrow, singular reality is that humans are left isolated, unconnected, fragmented, and unfulfilled in their own particularity.

By the mid-1600s an individualist emerged that was no longer dependent body and soul on institutionalized religion and uninterested in all-around development of mind through contemplative collection of knowledge. Accumulation of wealth and acquisition of power replaced concerted development of character, integrity and compassion. A competitive, calculative, naturalistic attitude dominated thinking, supported and nurtured by the success and popularity of the scientific method. Failure of institutional structures to adjust to social changes led to revolution, revolt, rebellion, and war. The individual that survived was pessimistic in an unconcerned and uncertain cosmos. Not surprisingly, therefore, individual concerns intensified as attention was directed to problems of consciousness, experience, freedom, autonomy, happiness, and rights. The warrior archetype dredged up by Machiavelli was carried on by Christian soldiers of the Reformation and was transformed into the modern fighting man through the imagery of Dostoevsky's destructive, masochistic underground man and Nietzsche's hard, powerful, and courageous Overman.

The Age of Reason's misplaced faith in the scientific world of fact soon led to a Collapse of Confidence in the nineteenth century. The industrialization arising out of science and technology produced slums, poverty, and abuse instead of unlimited improvement. With the advent

of World War came the Existentialist frustration with an absurd world in which God was dead and the preoccupation with the individual continued. During the twentieth century, philosophy is attempting to escape Kantian subjectivity and return to an objective reality. Some philosophers offer a life-world in which self is not a static encapsulated substance separated from all other encapsulated substances, but a continuous, unfolding, evolving, developmental organism interconnected with others. In this world view, individual particularity is recognized as having corrosive effects upon self as well as the social fabric. As a result, it advocates a more responsible individualism in which collective concerns are accorded increased priority, and the unrelenting pursuit of utilitarian pleasure is replaced by the personal satisfaction that comes from raising moral choice above efficiency and economy.

Endnotes

1. The ideas of Jean-Jacques Rousseau on the individual were obtained from: Perkins, M. L. (1974). Jean-Jacques Rousseau on the individual and society. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
2. The following description of Dewey's philosophy is extracted from; Dewey, J. (1927). The public and its problems. New York: Henry Holt.
3. These comments on Husserl's views on science came from: Buckley, R. P. (1992). Husserl, Heidegger and the crisis of philosophical responsibility. Boston: Kluwer Academic.
4. Ibid.
5. Ellison, D. R. (1990). Understanding Albert Camus. Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, p. 1.

6. Woelfel, J. W. (1975). Camus: A theological perspective. New York: Abingdon Press, p. 117.

CHAPTER VI

RUGGED INDIVIDUALISM FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED STATES TO ROMANTICISM AND REFORM

Synopsis

European values were from a society of rich and poor, controlled by priests, governors, and male heads of family which sought to beat down stubbornness or stoutness of mind. The Puritan First Comers emphasized faith, works, duty, property, self-interest and doctrine, and taught a passion for righteousness and for getting at the root of everything. Because the early Puritan colonies were primarily trading posts, they developed a distinctly mercantile perspective in which economic feasibility and reality controlled the decision-making process. This view hardened class lines and the distinctions between rich and poor, and made possible pecuniary profit and sale of slaves or other indentured servants. As a result, this nation was not born free but born servant and master, slave and free, tenant and landlord, poor and rich.

Private property as a primary force developing the growth of the country cannot be underestimated. Colonial governments acquired property from Indians and offered it at bargain prices to settlers, so little national separatist feeling arose in the colonies prior to 1775 as colonists wanted to preserve the expansive freedoms they had already acquired.

The constitution itself was a conservative document designed to preserve, secure, maintain, develop and correct those freedoms already enjoyed only by some and those things political and religious that already existed. It and the Bill of Rights put property in the place of happiness, accepted the Hobbesian war of one against all, adopted Hamilton's mercantile image of life, and saw man as the Machiavellian and Hobbesian creature of rapacious self-interest.

Little surprise toleration declined as the power of the common man arose to the fore during Jacksonian Democracy. Old Hickory, rough hewn out of live oak, reinforced the rugged individualist image of frontier life. Westward movement, building, creating, inventing, urbanization and new methods of transportation hastened industrialization and spurred the corporate form. Dollar worship and materialism became the most significant American values. Despite these manifestations of greed and self-interest, there existed also a belief in the divinity of human nature that appeared in some as intense individualism. This was one of America's busy ages, in which every man had some semblance of work, but it was marked by fear of expressing unpopular views, less independence and more bending to majority rule.

For millions of farm hands, clerks, teachers, mechanics, flatboatmen and rail-splitters, Abraham Lincoln represented the traditional ideal of the Protestant Ethic: hard work, frugality, temperance, and a touch of ability applied long and hard. In his time, an inability to rise on the economic scale was individual failure, an outward sign of an inward lack of grace--

idleness, indulgence, waste, or incapacity. This conception of the competitive world was intensely and even inhumanely individualistic.

Colonial Heritage

As Western civilization developed into Renaissance Europe and was dominated by the religion of Popes, the government of Kings and the frenzy of money, another culture was evolving rapidly along different lines. Native Americans were known for their hospitality, humanity, belief in sharing, and unfamiliarity with the concept of private property. Columbus wrote in his log that the Arawaks of the Bahama Islands ran to greet him and brought food, water, and gifts as he and his men came ashore. He wrote that the Indians willingly traded everything they owned and were quite submissive, and yet Columbus's first thought upon encountering this group of simple people was to enslave them. He noted in his log that they could be subjugated entirely and made to do whatever he wanted with as little as fifty men.¹ He concluded that they would make very good servants: "They are fit to be ordered about and made to work, to sew and do aught else that may be needed" (Cohen, 1992, p. 104). These Arawaks were much like the North American Indians, whose culture taught solidarity with the group, equality in status, sharing of possessions, individual autonomy, and refusal to submit to overbearing authority. When Columbus and his successors arrived on the North American continent, they did not enter an empty wilderness, but a world that was as densely populated in some places as Europe itself and that held a complex culture embracing human relations more egalitarian than in Europe.

About a thousand years before Christ, while construction of extraordinary structures was occurring in Egypt and Mesopotamia, the Zuni and Hopi Indians of New Mexico built comparable structures in villages consisting of large terraced buildings. Before European explorers arrived, these people used irrigation canals and dams, and produced ceramics, weaved baskets, and made cloth out of cotton. By the time of Christ and Julius Caesar, a culture of so-called mound builders developed in the Ohio River Valley whose fortifications exceeded three and half miles long and enclosed one hundred acres. These Indians planned and executed a complex trading system extending from the Great Lakes to the Far West and the Gulf of Mexico. As the mound builder culture declined about 500 A.D., another arose to the west in the Mississippi valley. These Indians built huge earthen mounds as burial and ceremonial places near a vast metropolis that may have housed thirty thousand people. One hundred feet high, these mounds were constructed on a rectangular base larger than that of the Great Pyramid of Egypt. Also, from the Adirondacks to the Great Lakes in Pennsylvania lived the league of Iroquois, which included many tribes and thousands of people bound together by a common language. They owned land in common and worked in common, hunting together and dividing the catch among members of the village. Houses were common property shared by several families, and the concept of private ownership of land and homes was foreign to them. A French Jesuit priest who encountered them in the 1650s wrote, "Their kindness, humanity and courtesy not only makes

them liberal with what they have, but causes them to possess hardly anything except in common" (Zinn, 1980, p. 20).

The Pilgrims arriving in New England were not coming to vacant land, but to territory inhabited by many tribes of Indians. Those Indians had cleared and tilled innumerable stretches of open fields and made the land easier to hunt game. The Pilgrims at Plymouth were assisted by those Indians who had survived smallpox caught from European fishermen. These Indians taught the new settlers how to plant corn, helped feed the colonists, and taught them to adapt old customs to a new environment. There were only two Indian attacks on the Virginia colonists in the first thirty-five years of their presence here. Clearly, the land was not desolate wilderness occupied by wild men. It had been made productive of food and shelter by the Indians already in residence there. Yet their failure to divide it up into private plots for individual, as opposed to community, use became an excuse for purloining the land. John Winthrop, the Governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, created an excuse to take Indian land by declaring the area legally a vacuum. Proclaiming the Indians had not subdued the land, he concluded they only had a natural right to it, which had no legal standing, rather than a civil right. Moreover, the Puritans appealed to the Bible, Psalms 2:8: "Ask of me, and I shall give thee, the heathen for thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession." They also justified their use of force in taking the land by citing Romans 13:2: "Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation" (Zinn, 1980, p.14). The desire for and

acquisition of land soon became a consuming and motivating force as the colonies expanded and the nation's boundaries were pushed inexorably westward.

Alexis de Tocqueville, traveling America from England for nineteen months in 1831-32, studied the democratic experience here and made it a point to observe social phenomena in this country. Of the treatment afforded the Indians he said:

The Spaniards were unable to exterminate the Indian race by those unparalleled atrocities which brand them with indelible shame . . . but the Americans of the United States have accomplished this twofold purpose with singular felicity, tranquilly, legally, philanthropically, without shedding blood and without violating a single great principle of morality in the eyes of the world. (Bradley, 1945, p. 355)

Tocqueville noted that great tribes of the east--the Narrgansetts, the Mohicans, the Pequots no longer existed. The Lenapes, who received William Penn one hundred fifty years before had disappeared. Tocqueville himself met with the last of the Iroquois, who were begging alms. He found that a traveler "must penetrate more than a hundred leagues into the interior of the continent to find an Indian" (p. 336). Observing their destruction Tocqueville said, "the manner in which the latter change takes place is not difficult to describe" (p. 337).

The insidiousness of this extermination of a culture is most apparent in the example of Goyahkla (Geronimo), the Apache renegade who refused to succumb until 1886 while his band of sixteen warriors, twelve women and six children were being pursued by five thousand U.S. troops. He was not a chief but a medicine man: Nevertheless, he was the last great leader to stand against the tide of Manifest Destiny. Even he was

lied to by General Nelson Miles who told him he would be reunited with his family within five days, his sins would be forgiven, and his people would be settled on a reservation if only he would give up and surrender. Few of them ever saw their homeland again and Geronimo would spend his remaining years signing autographs and performing The Last Buffalo Hunt in expositions where prominent Apaches were exhibited like trophies. Finally, after coming to bitterly regret having surrendered to Miles, Geronimo fell from his horse on a winter night in 1909, lay in a ditch till morning, and at age 85 succumbed to pneumonia four days later.²

In contrast to Indian shared concerns, European values were molded in a separatist society of rich and poor, controlled by priests, governors, and male heads of family who sought to beat down stubbornness, or stoutness of mind. Still, the Indians were more rugged than any of the Europeans who later came to be called individualists, able to find bounty, survive, and prosper in a land cruel to Europeans. The earliest Virginian and Puritan Old Comers faced insufferable hunger and hardship and were desperate for labor enough to grow food to stay alive. The winter of 1609-1610 was the starving time when, crazed for want of food, these Puritans roamed the woods for nuts and berries, dug graves to eat corpses, and died in batches until five hundred Colonists were reduced to sixty. During that winter, many of the people lived in cave-like holes dug in the ground and were

driven thru insufferable hunger to eat those things which nature most abhorred, the flesh and excrements of man as well as of our own nation as of Indian, digged by some out of his grave after he had lain buried three days and wholly devoured him; others,

envying the better state of body of any whom hunger has not yet so much wasted as their own, lay wait and threatened to kill and eat them; one among them slew his wife as she slept in his bosom, cut her in pieces, salted her and fed upon her until he had clean devoured all parts saving her head. (Zinn, 1980, p. 24)

Even later immigrants did not have to await their arrival to the mainland of America before experiencing such extraordinary degradation. A musician traveling from Germany to America around 1750 wrote of his voyage:

During the journey the ship is full of pitiful signs of distress--smells, fumes, whores, vomits, various kinds of seasickness, fever, dysentery, headaches, heat, constipation, boils, scurvy, cancer, mouth-rot, and similar afflictions, all of them caused by the age and the high salted state of the food, especially of the meat, as well as by the very bad and filthy water. . . . Add to all that shortage of food, hunger, thirst, frost, heat, dampness, fear, misery, vexation, and lamentation as well as other troubles. . . . On board our ship on a day in which we had a great storm, a woman about to give birth and unable to deliver under the circumstances was pushed through one of the portholes into the sea. (p. 43)

These hardships and sufferings, the European values of settlers, and a Western history of slavery dating to ancient Greece made possible pecuniary profit by shipping and selling slaves and other indentured servants, hardening class lines and sharpening the distinctions between rich and poor. As a result, the country was not born free but born servant and master, slave and free, tenant and landlord, poor and rich.

Puritan Ethic

The story of Plymouth Colony started when King Henry VIII made his break from the Pope. Within a century, religious reformers questioned their religion and pronounced new dogmas in both England and on the

continent. When King James I succeeded Elizabeth in 1602-03, England was religiously divided between Catholics, Anglicans, and a great variety of Protestants. Among them were the Puritans, who constituted a movement within the Church of England but were not a distinct sect or denomination, and the Separatists who had modified Puritan thinking until they wanted to be completely separate from the official church. The Puritans had been persecuted in England and hoped King James, who was a Calvinist, would lead them into the City of God, a church/state. When this did not happen, the Puritans looked toward the New World as their New Canaan. Puritanism thus found itself in the position of defying authority. Nevertheless, those Puritans who migrated to the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1630 rejected the principle of separation altogether, despite the Separatist origins of the congregational polity they defended.

The Colony of New Plymouth was established by approximately one hundred Separatists from Holland who had fled England for religious freedom. Holland had allowed considerable freedom for religious dissent, but had become economically depressive and morally degenerate. The Separatists, later called Pilgrims, were a splinter group of the Puritans and they established Plymouth Plantation, the second nucleus (after Jamestown, Virginia) of the English-American empire. The Separatists were accompanied across the ocean in that 1620 voyage by Strangers not of their faith, but with whom they were required to travel to obtain support for their venture from businessmen called Adventurers, who ventured capital into the New World settlement in the hope of great profits. These

Adventurers, some of whom were undoubtedly Separatists themselves or at least of Puritan persuasion, were hard-nosed entrepreneurs who had obtained a patent to colonize the northern part of the Virginia territory.

Puritanism was a religious movement dedicated to living a New Testament life while making a living. It taught a passion for righteousness, for getting at the root of everything, and for restoring the church of the early Christians. Puritans claimed descent from St. Paul and Augustine, and the main body of their doctrine was medieval Christianity. Puritanism was a reformation not a revolution, a traditional doctrine rather than an innovating doctrine. Later, Calvinism was more revolutionary; Calvinists were the shock-troops of Protestantism, according to Perry (1944). The task of Calvin and his followers was to define Protestantism, whose individualism and sectarianism tended to anarchy. Calvinism was characterized by doctrinal rigidity, the strictest rectitude and rigorous ethics that fixed moral responsibility directly on the individual. It was a hard doctrine that did violence to human nature by confronting man with salvation or damnation. This choice was filled with utmost anxiety for the fate of one's soul was at the mercy of forces over which the individual had no control.

Puritanism emphasized faith and works, duty and doctrine. Puritans desired to approach God directly without any intermediary, and to glorify God and do his will as the first concern for receiving future happiness. New England was God's Christian experiment, but the Puritans rejected ritual and ancient pageantry found in Catholic worship. Combined with their religious belief was a pragmatic way of doing and

thinking that has had profound effects on the character and mind of U.S. citizens, the birth of what was later commonly called the Protestant Ethic. Puritans placed no stigma on manual labor, so yeoman and workman, blacksmiths, wheelwrights, carpenters, joiners, cordwainers, tanners, ironworkers, spinners, and weavers were the backbone of the community. Puritan doctrine taught each person to think of themselves as a significant, but sinful unit to whom God had given a particular place and duty, a calling. Though Puritanism was a religious movement, the early colonies were primarily trading posts, so they developed a distinctly mercantile perspective in which economic feasibility and reality controlled the decision-making process.

The Mayflower left the coast of England destined for the northern Virginia territory at a point roughly where Manhattan is today, but it sailed further north, outside the Virginia limits. Since the landing had not occurred as planned in the Virginia territory, some of the group asserted that they had the right to live as they wished and take orders from no one. Because of this first appearance of faction, it was thought good to combine into one body and submit to such government and governors as common consent could agree and choose. Accordingly, all free adult males present signed the Mayflower Compact, which stated essentially that the individual would subject himself to majority rule.

According to their agreement with the Adventurers, settlers were to live a socialistic life, sharing everything in common for seven years, when the profits of the company were to be totaled and divided according to the number of outstanding shares. However, before seven years elapsed many

were complaining that the industrious were supporting the lazy. At that point, it was decided to give every man, woman, and child the use of one acre of land to be cultivated as they wished for their own crops. They would all still cultivate the remainder as common lands for the company. This was known as the division of land and it began a custom in the colonies, the impact of which cannot be underestimated on the development of the United States. Soon, eight of Plymouth's leading men purchased the shares of the Adventurers and gave new land grants for private use to most of the settlers then residing in Plymouth.

By 1627, the concept for colonizing Plymouth Colony had changed considerably. The settlement had no royal charter to support it and only a patent for residing in the Virginia territory, but Plymouth nevertheless remained outside the jurisdiction of Virginia and assumed self-government. The colonists had agreed in the Mayflower Compact to form a democracy that would not be practiced in their homeland for several centuries. The large non-Separatist population of Plymouth Colony prevented implementation of a church-state as was subsequently established in adjoining Massachusetts Bay Colony. Consequently, Plymouth obtained a reputation for having less rigid and more moderate government. Moreover, for those who measured progress in terms of large-scale industrial and commercial expansion, settlement on the shallow shores of Plymouth Harbor prevented the Colony from ever achieving the size, prominence, wealth, or importance of Massachusetts Bay Colony or New York.

Plymouth Colony was a poor colony and everyday life was geared to hard economic reality. Whenever anything untoward occurred, the first question was: Who will bear the charge? Economic feasibility also spilled over into the requirements of justice since communities living just above the subsistence level did not have surplus wealth to invest in penitentiaries for long term prison sentences. Economic harshness permitted some families to rationalize putting-out one or more children for servitude under a contract, or covenant, that was to be strictly observed by both parties. Yet, the community could not stand by and see an individual or family without food, shelter, or clothing, and if no one else paid the costs, the community would. Thus, these Puritans had a definite mission--to establish a community rather than a mere colony, where they could put their ideals into practice. Yet even then, this community had an economic harshness about it, quite unlike the indigent civilization that preceded the Puritans in the New World.

Ultimately, Plymouth Colony was transferred into the Massachusetts Bay Colony, largely as a result of Plymouth's failure to obtain a royal charter and England's displeasure at the way Plymouth persecuted the Quakers. Nevertheless, Puritanism's stress on faith and works proved an excellent implement for subduing the environment and land in New England. "Never waste precious time" became a basic American tenant, and "An hour's idleness is as bad as an hour's drunkenness" became a maxim that kept people busy when the climate did not (Morison, 1965, p. 73). Lacour-Gayet (1969) and Russell (Feinberg & Kasrils, 1984) believe Puritanism was responsible for America's economic

prosperity. By teaching men the iron will to forego present pleasure for future reward, habits of discipline and saving produced the capital needed for individualism. The necessity and duty of work, the rejection of pleasure, and the refusal to compromise pursuit of eternal life all worked to the benefit of the economic order.

Despite the other-worldly outlook and rigorous ethics, Puritanism also justified man's attainment of wealth and earthly happiness. The energy with which one pursued the calling was evidence of his godliness and was rewarded in this world and the hereafter. Combined with democracy, which affirmed the coincidence of individual and universal happiness, Puritanism provided a sublimation of worldly success. In both beliefs the moral unit was the responsible individual, deserving of reward or punishment. The concrete human individual is the soul of Puritan individualism. In this soul are found the internal realities of desire, purpose, subordination, will, choice, freedom, self-consciousness, memory, expectation, inference, prudence, and obedience.

Both Puritanism and democracy also gave their blessing to laissez-faire. It was seen as a doctrine of painless piety by which the individual could seek private gain and serve the will of God and the good of mankind. Puritan individualism's assimilation into the texture of America was possible only because of its affinity with laissez-faire capitalism.³ The characteristics of Puritan individualism are described by Perry (1944):

The code of worldly prudence was in harmony with the puritan's self-reliant individualism. It was an application to livelihood and business of the puritan emphasis upon the integrity of the human soul and of its characteristic prerogatives. It was the economic form

of the puritan's idea of retributive justice, with its emphasis upon dessert and individual responsibility. And it expressed the puritan's temper of personal independence. For though he was willing to admit his dependence on God, he looked to this as a means of emancipation from dependence on men and on nature. Salvation was the only gratuity that he was willing to accept. Wealth which he earned for himself was both a manifestation and a condition of self-reliance. It was a product of his own will and at the same time an instrument of freedom. (Perry, 1944, p. 301)

According to Perry, Puritanism may properly be reproached because it confirmed the narrowness and hardness of secular life. It encouraged men to be forever striving, moving, and making, but has not taught graciousness or tenderness. An emphasis on instrumental goods of livelihood and wealth neglected beauty, contemplation, and social intercourse. Despite its rigid ethics, Puritanism represented economic life as retributive and disciplinarian rather than as cooperation through science to provide equitable satisfaction of human needs. The history of Puritanism exhibits as its deepest motives the interplay between two universal goods in conflict; social solidarity and individualism.

Puritanism was the sharp edged instrument which hewed liberty, democracy, and a certain brand of humanitarianism out of the American wilderness. Inherited from religious predecessors, it is the driving force behind the sense of moral responsibility expected from public officials in the United States.

Puritanism springs from the very core of the personal conscience--the sense of duty, the sense of responsibility, the sense of guilt, and the repentant longing for forgiveness. No [Western] man, if he grows to maturity, escapes these experiences. Every man, sooner or later, feels himself rightly exiled from paradise and looks for a return. (Perry, 1944, p. 627)

As an unseen guide in the unconscious, the Puritan "comes aboard, like a good pilot; and while we trim our sails, he takes the wheel and lays our course for a fresh voyage" (Perry, 1944, p. 268).

Through belief in the Holy Trinity and the Bible as the divine word of God, Puritanism sought to sweep away Renaissance practices. But its acceptance of the notion of universal priesthood and individual self-worth, its ethic of having and doing, its economic perspective, and its advancement of private property all helped to pave the way in the New World for rising individualism and capitalism from Renaissance Europe.

Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights

Once the raging fires of Puritanism were banked in New England, people began to fall away from this antique faith. By the 1720s, Puritanism was losing hold of the colonies as a moral force; however, an emphasis on works, property, and self-interest continued to grow. Though people still attended meeting and kept the Sabbath holy, others became what was vaguely called Arminian, believing that good works and a free Catholic spirit were sufficient for salvation. To combat this soft attitude, a revival of Orthodox Calvinism known as the Great Awakening began in 1734 among New England Congregationalists and Middle Colony and Southern Presbyterians. As the people of the Old West were falling away from traditional churches, the Awakening descended like a whirlwind sweeping up lost souls, offering the common man a new sense of his significance, and expanding with the frontier a strong Christian tradition. Calvinist theology had made God everything and man nothing, giving

men value only through toil, work, and suffering. The Awakening indirectly contributed to the American Revolution by helping develop a new independent American.

Colonists felt inferior to the average Englishman and sought social status to prove their worth. Ownership of land gave status that nothing could shake, so the growing interest in private property was the primary force developing the growth of the country. Anyone who underestimates the importance of land as an enticement fails to comprehend the value system of the seventeenth-century Englishman. Colonial governments acquired property from the Indians and offered it at bargain prices to settlers who spilled from Pennsylvania down the Shenandoah into the "Old West" of Virginia and the Carolinas.

Crossing the Atlantic could seldom have been a pleasure before the clipper-ship era, but it was never tougher than in the eighteenth century. Bad drinking water, putrid salt meat, excessive heat, crowding, lice, rough seas, sickness, foul air, dysentery, scurvy, typhus, canker, and mouth-rot, all acted to discourage new settlers. Nevertheless, free land enticed tens and hundreds of thousands. Whether 50 acres free in North Carolina, 640 acres for three shillings in Virginia, or 100 acres for 5-15 pounds in Pennsylvania, the migration of immigrants seeking private property propelled the boundaries of the country southward and westward for approximately 150 years.

The vital stake in all the wars and diplomatic maneuverings after 1700 was the American West. The question was whether England, France, Spain, or, as no one could then foresee, an American Republic would rule

the West. When George Washington and 150 men from the Virginia militia confronted the Canadians at Great Meadows in Western Pennsylvania, a shot in that western wilderness sparked off a series of world shaking events that reached their culmination 30 years later. In 1783, Major General George Washington resigned his commission as commander in chief of the United States Army after winning independence for a republic not even dreamed of in 1753. Nevertheless, little national Separatist feeling existed in the colonies prior to 1775, because colonists wanted to preserve the expansive freedoms they had already acquired. The situation between England and the colonies had its points of friction, but was far from explosive, as British subjects in America were then the freest people in the world. Colonial assemblies had acquired far more autonomy than, for example, Ireland then enjoyed. Indeed, many interventions of the English government and colonial administration had been to protect minority groups against majorities, or small colonies against big ones; for instance, the Quakers and the Anglicans against the dominant Puritans.

Every path of conciliation with England was kept open as Daniel Boone and other long hunters pushed the boundaries of exploration westward through Kentucky. Refusal of the King to grant these new lands to those with land warrants was bitterly resented. In the meantime, Boston bristled with Redcoats brought to help enforce British power over colonial governments, but loyalty to the King was still strong and America as a whole did not want independence. Thus, irrepressible conflict did not ignite spontaneously and efforts at final reconciliation were made

repeatedly. These continued right up until George III proclaimed a general rebellion existed in August of 1775 and commerce was cut by Parliament that December. Belief that the American Revolution was on behalf of a united people is a myth peaked by the Declaration of Independence.

Discussion of independence was brought to a crisis by Thomas Paine's pamphlet Common Sense. Espousing principles of American liberty, Paine argued that the King had forfeited his right to loyalty and obedience by failing to honor the compact between him and the people to protect their rights. Drawing on John Locke's Second Treatise, Thomas Jefferson removed honor to the King as a barrier to revolution by basing the Declaration of Independence on this compact theory of inalienable rights whose violation by the Prince dissolves the compact and permits subjects to throw off their allegiance. Jefferson modified Locke's theory that man entered political society to protect his property, substituting the Greek pursuit of happiness as an example of inalienable rights along with life and liberty. This concession to the well-being of the whole did not survive constitution making.

Though beginning with the word we, the constitution put property in the place of happiness. It was essentially a conservative document designed to preserve, secure, maintain, develop, and correct those freedoms already enjoyed by only some and those things political and religious that already existed. In a blow to the concept of unity of the whole, the mixed constitution was designed to recognize self-interest and to encourage faction. The theory for this was that the minority would not likely have a common interest separate from the whole or the majority.

Our constitution-makers accepted the Hobbesian war of one against all, Hamilton's Puritanistic mercantile image of life, and saw man as a Machiavellian and Hobbesian creature of rapacious self-interest, but wanted him free to practice Jeffersonian individualism. To assure ratification and further elucidate individual liberties that some believed were already embodied in the Constitution, the Bill of Rights was later adopted. These amendments also nourished self-interest and faction, but sought control over it by fragmenting power and emphasizing individual rights. At the time, colonial America was a middle-class society governed for the most part by its upper classes. Those upper classes found a wonderfully useful device for binding the loyalty of the middle class during the 1760s and 1770s. That device was the language of liberty and equality which could unite just enough to fight a revolution against England without ending either slavery or inequality. Thus, the American Revolution was not fought to obtain freedom, but to preserve the liberties that Americans had already had as colonials. Independence was not a conscious, secretly nurtured goal, but a reluctant last resort to preserve life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness as America had come to know it.

The American constitution-makers were enlightened people who knew their rights and the limits of power and who, unlike any other people before them, aimed to think before they felt. "Never was there a People whom it more immediately concerned to search into the Nature and Extent of their Rights and Privileges than it does the People of America at this day" (Wood, 1969, p. 5). These Americans sought nothing less than a comprehensive knowledge of history and of mankind and to be

well-versed in all of the various governments of ancient and modern states. The result was a phenomenal outpouring of political writings--pamphlets, letters, articles, sermons--that has never been equaled in the nation's history. Mingled with their historical citations were repeated references to natural-law writings of Enlightenment philosophers and common-law writings of English jurists. No sense of incompatibility existed in their blend of history, rationalism, and scripture, as all were mutually reinforcing ways for arriving at precepts about human and social behavior. Figuratively speaking, the records of all peoples in all situations were ransacked, including those of Aristotle, Plato, Livy, Cicero, Sidney, Harrington, and Locke. The jumble of references from every conceivable time and place inevitably led to tensions and conflicts over priority. Nevertheless, the colonists were selective in their use of British literature by focusing on those writings which expressed what may be termed an opposition view of English politics. The expressions which they found most attractive and most relevant to their situation and needs were precisely those with the least respectability and force in England. The theory of government that they clarified possessed a compelling simplicity; politics was nothing more than a perpetual battle between the passions of the rulers and the united interests of the people. Whatever is good for the people is bad for the governors and whatever is good for the governors is pernicious to the people. In other words, politics was viewed along a classic power spectrum ranging from absolute power of a single person on one end to absolute power in the hands of all the people at the other end.

The ideal of politics since Aristotle had been of course to avoid either extreme, the degeneration into tyranny on the one hand or anarchy on the other. Many concluded that the greatest danger to Republicanism was not magistral tyranny or aristocratic dominance, but "faction, dissension, and consequent subjection of the minority to the caprice and arbitrary decisions of the majority, who instead of consulting the interest of the whole community collectively, attend sometimes to partial and local advantages" (Wood, 1969, p. 502). "To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and form of popular government," said Madison, was the "great desideratum of Republican wisdom" (p. 502). Consequently, the American constitution-makers attempted to bring federal authority all the way down to the individual as distinguished from the corporate or collective capacity. It was their intent to extend the authority of the union to the person of the citizen. They believed a government of the union must be able to address itself immediately to the hopes and fears of individuals and must provide a national legislation over individuals. In the end, the Constitution did not attempt to coerce sovereign bodies, or states, in their political capacity, but the convention opted for a Constitution in which Congress would exercise its legislative authority directly over individuals rather than over states. In that way the laws of Congress were thought to be binding on individuals rather than the state and singled out the individual for legal coercion.⁴

Wild, Wild West

Washington's and Jefferson's Republican principles of toleration declined as the power of the common man rose to the fore during the period of Jacksonian Democracy. No champion of the poor or the common man, Jackson was loved by the general populace anyway. The "Gineral" proved immensely popular because he encouraged active participation in politics by the common man. Against the ossified Jeffersonian Republicans, he championed the cause of ordinary folk. In 1788, Benjamin Franklin remarked that Americans were prone to pay too much regard to their rights and too little to their duties as citizens. He noted that they had amply demonstrated their proficiency in overthrowing governments, but now something very different was required of them--the capacity of submitting to restraints upon their freedom and of yielding obedience to laws of their own making. It was soon found that Americans were not very proficient at accepting limits in a nation of boundless resources. Rejecting the precepts of Republicanism, Andrew Jackson's slogan was: Let the people rule. His administration is credited by many with bringing democracy--long opposed by Madison and the Federalists--to America.

Born in a log cabin, Jackson became one of the founders of the Democratic party in 1832. A simple way of thinking--everything black or white--and the habit of command became key notes of Jackson's policies. Old hickory, rough hewn out of live oak, accustomed to being obeyed, with a sense of honor, and a gallant attitude, appealed to the populace and

reinforced the rugged individualist image of frontier life. Jackson brought the Spoils System practiced in many states to the federal government. The consequence was more power to party organizations, dilution of politics with the incompetent and corrupt, and catering to mediocrity. Another consequence of Jacksonian pandering to popular sentiment was the policy of driving the Eastern Indians west of the Mississippi. As a soldier, Jackson had fought the Indians and he resented the fact that the Indians in the east owned much of the best farmland. By the end of his administration, almost all Indians in the East—including the Creek, Cherokee, Choctaw, and Chickasaw—were moved west of the Mississippi. Thousands of Indians, cheated out of their land, died during the forced migration along the Trail of Tears. Jackson himself had made his money by selling land to new settlers, buying it for as little as ten cents an acre and selling it for as much as three dollars and acre.

Jackson's hair-trigger temper involved him in many duels and this no doubt contributed to fear of disagreeing with him. Deference to the opinion of others being a condition of social intercourse on a democratic level, the period was marked by fear of expressing unpopular views, less independence and more bending to majority rule. Catering to prejudices of the middle class and the poor whites, a tide of ill-educated, provincial politicians perpetuated slavery and prevented emancipation. Moreover, the westward movement recovered momentum and the fun of building, creating, and inventing dominated consciousness. Urbanization and new methods of transportation hastened industrialization and spurred the corporate form. Because democracy wanted results and stressed useful

knowledge, an anti-intellectual spirit developed. This led to glorification of buckskin-clad, bearded, lean fur trappers, traders and trail guides of the Great Plains and Rocky Mountain (Mountainy Men), and the proud, upstanding, independent mountain hunters and fishermen of the Ozarks and Appalachians. These lone operators were admired and revered for their aura of the self-made man. This brand of American reigned throughout the Jacksonian democratic period from 1828 to the Civil War.

During that whole time, American policy toward the natives of North America continued the old world process of one highly developed civilization, race or people pushing out a weaker one that would not be absorbed. In the United States, as elsewhere in the nineteenth century, conquest and expansion became an absorbing pastime. America was intoxicated by the map. Oregon fever in 1842, the California Gold Rush in 1849, and the Pike's Peak Gold Rush in 1859 began a westward rush of long-whips and Conestoga wagons that did not end until after the Oklahoma Territory was settled. Far from dispensing the blessings of liberty and egalitarianism, the Jacksonian era is more accurately described as an age of inequality, class consciousness, and dominion by the propertied. It was a time of pragmatism and opportunism, when the old politics of ideology by a benevolent aristocracy gave way to the new politics of ambition, demagoguery, expediency, simplistic speech making, and indirection on issues.

This period also saw the intensification of industrial development. One of America's busy ages, every man had some semblance of work before he had learned to employ leisure. Labor fared poorly, working

people during the era lived lives of unparalleled precariousness, and conditions of the laboring poor ranged from dismal to abysmal. Dollar worship and materialism became the most significant American values. The preacher Theodore Parker told his congregation: "Money in this day is the strongest power of the nation" (Zinn, 1980, p. 216). Despite these manifestations of greed and self-interest, there existed also a kind of transcendentalism, a belief in the divinity of human nature, that was part of the intellectual overtone of democracy or a flowering of the Puritan spirit. It appeared in some as intense individualism.

The Jacksonian American character did much to influence the American mind or intellect. That character has been described as

coarseness and strength combined with acuteness and inquisitiveness; that practical, inventive turn of mind, quick to find expedience; that masterful grasp of material things, lacking in the artistic but powerful to affect great ends, that restless, nervous energy; that dominant individualism, working for good and for evil, and withal that buoyancy and exuberance which comes with freedom. (Pessen, 1978, p. 6)

Jackson himself certainly seemed to equate true manhood with violence and a refusal to accept criticism. His contempt for authority and law that characterized his youthful and early adult life in Tennessee is clearly discernible in his later acts:

The arrogance, the disingenuousness, the cruel disregard for the rights of Indians, the highhandedness, the egotism bordering on egomania, the intolerance, the joy in hating, the emotionalism, the pettiness, the vindictiveness, that marked his career before 1828 continued to manifest themselves afterwards. (p. 322)

Jackson's character seemed to parallel the character of the nation at the time.

That character has been described by a number of foreign visitors who do not present a very attractive picture. These visitors described the Jacksonian era American as rude, curious, humorless, and of a dull character. Americans were said to take themselves too seriously and show excessive gravity, making a toil of pleasure. These visitors were not sure whether Calvinism or other factors were to blame for these unattractive traits. Some believed that the cruelty displayed so often by so many Americans was shocking. Violence was a much observed trait and these visitors were amazed that respectable men would throw themselves savagely on someone else who had inadvertently provoked them. Less frightening but no more attractive was American selfishness, about which it was stated that no one was more dedicated to the gratification of his own physical wants than the American. Other characteristics observed by visitors to the United States were lack of self-confidence, self praise, insatiable hunger for flattery, and vanity. Inveterate complainers, Americans were intensely practical, utilitarian, and shrewd. They were concerned with immediate outcomings and success rather than long-range consequences or ethics, more capable of mechanical invention than of theoretical scientific innovations, and clever but not profound.

In the period of changing ethical standards during the 1830s, a thief often passed for an honest man. Americans were also described as anti-intellectual and other-directed with a vengeance. There was no doubt that in small things and large Americans guided their behavior by the anticipated reactions of their neighbors. Social corrosion rather than inner conviction accounted for much and inordinate deference to majority

opinion resulted in sterile intellectual conformity. Lack of moral independence, worship of opinion, and fear of singularity were frequent criticisms of the American character. American hypocrisy towards Negroes and Indians was severely censored as were their own claims that they were a very moral people. The transcendent American value according to most contemporaries was materialism, love of money and a tendency to judge things according to a monetary standard. Many Americans indeed practiced dollar worship described as vulgar materialism, which was accompanied by opportunism and expediency. Moreover, Americans were often criticized as having no respect for tradition, adopting whatever proved to be advantageous, and showing disrespect for the law.⁵

The portrait of the Jacksonian painted by contemporary observers of the time was of a good natured but essentially shallow person

clever but not profound, self-important but uncertain, fond of deluding himself, living almost fanatically for the flesh (although not knowing too well how), straining every fibre to accumulate the things he covets and amoral about the methods to be used, a hypocrite who strains at gnats and swallows camels, an energetic and efficient fellow albeit a small one, who takes comfort in—as well as his standards of behavior from—numbers. (Pessen, 1978, p. 29)

Aggressively egalitarian in their public relations with one another, early Americans were quite the contrary in their personal relations in private life. Proud and boastful, they brooked no criticism from foreigners. A tradition of lawlessness went back to colonial times, and became a permanent feature of American life, kept alive and nourished by the frontier. Risk takers in the all-absorbing pursuit of wealth, Go Ahead

was the password of American railroads despite rickety roadbeds and innumerable accidents.⁶

In America, people spoke dollars and price more than anywhere else. Public works like bridges, and so forth, were always discussed in dollar terms rather than construction or engineering terms. The American soul was shaped by loneliness, yet strict economic calculation was a concrete reality.⁷ Tocqueville (Bradley, 1945) said he knew of no country where the love of money had taken a stronger hold on the affections of men. Conveniences of life were uppermost in every mind. Tocqueville saw America as the most serious nation on earth. Serious and almost sad, even in their pleasures, the source of American disquietude and restlessness in the midst of abundance seemed to be their taste for physical gratifications. Lest one think too ill of the Jacksonian American, it should be understood that materialism, excessive seriousness, anti-intellectualism and obsession with success flourished in Britain too. These were traits that sprang up wherever a booming commercial economy was emerging.

Civil War

These social conditions and American characteristics exhibited during the Jacksonian era presented fertile ground for a new Evangelism (a second Great Awakening) based on the salvation of all and the individual exercising free choice to achieve it. Calvinism's innate sinfulness and condemnation to hell with all its torments could be avoided by a simple, mortal act of will. Revivalism was pragmatic,

materialistic, and anti-intellectual, but took religion out of the hands of clergy, stressed the significance of the individual, and brought religion to the people in a language they understood. In the face of American irreverence, the secularism of a materialistic people, and selfish individualism, the reformers actively tried to improve the social, economic, and political arrangements during the 1830-1870 period. Encouraged by religious revivalism, confidence in human progress and human will, and the notion that individual efforts mattered, the Antebellum reformers first sought total societal change beginning with individuals. Lowering their goals later in the period from attacking sin to seeking civil service laws, honest elections and free trade, reformers tried to harness individualism in the name of responsibility to mankind. However, such goals were only achieved with the zeal of their later counterparts, the Progressives of the 1900-1916 period and the New Dealers of the 1930s, who believed that solutions to the evils of modern life had more to do with industries and cities than with the sinful hearts of individuals.

Arising after the War of 1812, Antebellum reform crested in the 1830s and 1840s and declined in the 1850s. During this time, America generated what would be the most fervent and diverse out burst of reform energy in its history. The origin of this reform effort lay in a combination of theological and economic developments that led many to assume that the world did not have to be as it was and that individual efforts mattered. Because politicians held out no promise of leading the transformation of the United States in a virtuous fashion, the task fell to the reformers

almost by default. Politicians disgusted reformers by catering to the electorate's lowest common denominator. No promise was too extreme, no spectacle too extravagant, if it resulted in votes. Consequently, Evangelical Protestantism provided most of the ideological and organizational foundation for Antebellum Reform. The second Great Awakening raised expectations that the Kingdom of God on earth was imminent and similar notions led to a quickening of religious fervor after 1800.

A belief emerged that the United States was chosen by God to fulfill a great mission and the idea of a national destiny was accepted and used by reformers. While Calvin had maintained that human beings were innately sinful, nineteenth-century preachers made the claim that human effort could bring about a thousand years of peace, prosperity, harmony, and Christian morality. In doing so, they were abandoning a line of theology stretching from Calvin through early American Congregationalism and Presbyterianism. These beliefs were important for reform because they taught individuals that things were wrong with their situation, and yet gave them confidence that they could make it better and could accomplish almost anything on their own if they really wanted to.

Separatist notions that kept the Colonies from uniting against the King, briefly overcome by the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, flared up again in 1861 with the Civil War. Abraham Lincoln's paramount objective was to save the Union, not to save or destroy slavery. He was first and foremost a politician, creating his own humble image and his ambition was the little engine that knew no rest.

The presidency quieted his ambition, shook his image of politics as an exhilarating game, and chastened his exercise of power. This personal transformation allowed him to mold common sentiment to that of his own vision for the United States. The goal was to bring back the South with slavery intact. Only when emancipation became a military necessity did Lincoln relent to radical pressures to free the slaves, and he did so only in those States loyal to the United States. Nearly 540,000 people lost their lives in the pursuit of or fighting against his vision for the nation. As a result, he is a Christ-like legend in political mythology; a great man who shouldered the torment and moral burden for sinful people, suffered for them, redeemed them with hallowed Christian virtues, and was destroyed at the peak of his success.

There was no appetite in the North for a war to eliminate slavery, but fierce agreement boiled with the desirability of maintaining the Union. By manipulating a Confederate attack on Fort Sumpter, Lincoln was able to unify Northern sentiment for a defensive war to save the Union, sacred principles of popular rule, and opportunity for the common man. For millions of farm hands, clerks, teachers, mechanics, flat boatman, and rail splitters, Lincoln represented the traditional ideal of the Protestant Ethic; hard work, frugality, temperance, and a touch of ability applied long and hard. In his time, an inability to rise on the economic scale was individual failure, an outward sign of an inward lack of grace--idleness, indulgence, waste, or incapacity. This conception of the competitive world was intensely and even inhumanely individualistic. Moreover, the demands of Christian virtues and the success myth of the

Protestant Ethic were incompatible; the ambition necessary for success melded with the Christian sin of pride and clashed with Christian disdain for material worship. In this way, individualism as it had evolved by Lincoln's time was heavily conflict laden and easily a cause of dual-edged guilt for both economic success or lack thereof. The vital test of democracy for Lincoln and his contemporaries was in fact an economic test.

Nevertheless, as the Civil War years approached, slavery could not be ignored. Though Lincoln was a follower and not a leader of public opinion on this issue, he took the slavery question out of the realm of moral and legal dispute and, dramatized it in terms of free labor's self-interest, and accorded it a universal appeal. The slavery issue became politically permanent in the mid-1840s and when anti-slavery forces gained control of the political branches of government in 1860, they aspired to more than abolition of slavery. Many of those associated with the anti-slavery movement decided that the time had come to restore morality throughout government. In that sense, the Civil War became a marker as a moral watershed. Nevertheless, Lincoln moved towards emancipation only after all his other policies had failed. Even then the Emancipation Proclamation of January 1, 1863 contained no indictment of slavery, but simply based emancipation on military necessity.

During the same time frame, the United States was undergoing great changes in other respects as well. By 1860 there were thirty-three States, including two, California and Oregon, on the Pacific Coast, while there had been only eighteen States in 1815, with none farther West than Louisiana. In 1815 the United States had totaled around 1.7 million acres,

but by 1860 it had reached its present continental limits and had added about 1.2 million square miles. Similarly, in 1814 there were 8,400,000 Americans, yet on the eve of the Civil War there were 31,443,321. All of these changes led to a fracture in American unity that could not be repaired without a war to preserve the Union, or a permanent division of it and the prospect of an interminable series of internecine wars. Long and bloody as it was, the Civil War probably prevented more wars and the fracturing of the United States into several confederacies. Even as the war raged, the Western expansion continued.

In the mid-1800s, an estimated 300,000 went West in search of free land, escape from crowded cities, religious freedom, gold, or adventure. Along the 2,000 mile Oregon Trail so many trekked across the continent to establish homes in the far Northwest that gouges carved by sliding wagons are clearly visible in the crest of hills and those same wagons carved five-foot-deep grooves in the sandstone, while footpaths from all those who walked beside the wagons can still be seen. The weather on the plains was a brutal 115 degrees in the summer and minus 40 in the winter, and the soil was so hard that wooden plows skittered over it like skates over ice. Yet still they came. After the invention of the metal plow, sod busters moved in and swiftly transformed the Midwest into the bread basket for the nation. As a result, Congress enacted three landmark laws in 1862 to open up the West: the Homestead Act which offered any American citizen or any alien intending to become a citizen 160 acres of western land absolutely free; the Morrill, or Land-Grant Act, providing for the establishment of public colleges and universities throughout the country;

and the Pacific Railroad Act which made grants and loans to aid construction of the first transcontinental railroad.

In 1873, Winchester Repeating Arms Company unveiled a .44 caliber repeater rifle that became known as "the gun that won the West." Three years later, the Battle of Little Big Horn occurred ending with the slaughter by the Sioux and Cheyenne of the 7th U.S. Cavalry under Lieutenant Colonel George Custer. Then, fourteen years later about 300 Sioux were massacred by the Army in the Battle of Wounded Knee, the last major Indian resistance to White expansion in the West. This brought to an end the carnage begun in 1830 by passage of the Indian Removal Act which allowed President Andrew Jackson to move the eastern tribes westward. At that time, Jackson replied to critics of this policy by saying, "[Once we] open the eyes of those children of the forest to their true condition, [they will realize] the policy of the general government toward the Red Man is not only liberal, but generous."⁸ Ralph Waldo Emerson thought otherwise when he wrote, "the name of this nation will stink to the world."⁹

Endnotes

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CHAPTER VII

THE INDIVIDUAL OF ROMANTICISM AND REFORM

Synopsis

A rags-to-riches mythology in America matured between Appomatox and 1900, an era of public scandals, corporate profiteering, unequaled economic growth, and financial ruin--the age of Robber Barons and Rebels, cynicism and Spoilsmen. Economic analysis of problems--begun on Plymouth Plantation--came of age and began to dominate public and private decision-making. With a taproot in the Protestant Reformation, the doctrine of industrious life pervaded society and a conviction developed that every man had a right to come into his own.

Manifest Destiny, born from a philosophy of survivalism and Christian righteousness, provided the rationale for profound cruelty. The year of the massacre at Wounded Knee, 1890, was officially declared by the Bureau of the Census as the close of the internal frontier. The nation had changed character; it was on the threshold of a new age in which the Captains of Industry would lead the people to unparalleled wealth and modernity, but it all collapsed in the fecund 1890s. The coarse, materialistic civilization that emerged from the Civil War produced a practical breed of political reformers. Determined to restore the American spirit he called the fighting edge, Teddy Roosevelt advocated the heroic, soldierly virtues of the hunter, cowboy, frontiersman, and naval hero.

The reformers he represented tried to remedy by more individualism the evils that were the inevitable result of already existing individualism.

The Progressive era ended with the outbreak of WW I and the Roaring Twenties emerged as a time of prosperity and fun only at the top. On the surface there had been over thirty years of prosperity, and it was the dawn of a Golden Age. Hoover declared a final triumph over poverty and wrote a book expounding his philosophy of untempered individualism. Yet wild financial speculation was prevalent in the financial markets, the conditions for American workers were grim, and the economy was fundamentally unsound. The Jazz Age was merely a diversion from the serious social and economic problems, and preoccupation with personalities served as a convenient source for collective self-denial about true conditions.

The Great Depression resulted in grinding poverty for millions and began an inexorable march toward further reforms. Hoover restrained the government by his laissez-faire philosophy that nature would cure all, and his survival-of-the-fittest Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon wanted it to go right to the bottom. He believed people would work harder and live moral lives, values would be adjusted, and enterprising people would pick up the wrecks of less competent.

Helpless, humiliated and deceived by these politicians, the country voted for welfare and security of simple folk--the transfer of wealth from rich to poor by action of government. There was never a stronger mandate in American history for repudiation of laissez-faire and the individualism of business and finance. Freedom of action justified in the

simple life of the last century could no longer be tolerated. The age of the New Deal dealt a death blow to American individualism as it had been practiced up to that time.

Soon, growing Soviet strength and the Korean War fueled national paranoia about communists. McCarthyism whipped it to a feverish pitch and other abridgments of individual liberties soon became common place. A conspiracy theory that creeping Communism would smother the American Way of Life haunted a generation of Americans. Ultimately, this fear led to the Cold War and forty years of influence for the military-industrial complex. Post-war economic prosperity pushed these fears to the back of the collective unconscious, America was able to get about the business of business, and a fat consumer market was born.

The nifty fifties, a rock and roll age, tough and sexy, bloomed to shunt aside the fear and danger in Khrushchev's promise to bury the West. While images of mushroom clouds dominated their unconscious and plans for fall-out shelters and civil defense sought room in their consciousness, the American people went on a decade long spending binge to divert their attention. Appearances, style, conformity and popularity became passions as the population became more alike in housing, dress, habits, possessions, problems and number of children. In spite of widening prosperity, old inequalities of wealth remained and rising intolerance experienced a revival. Consensus existed in the U.S. that America was the greatest country on earth, superior to all contemporary, and even to most past, civilizations. Criticism of the effects of capitalism,

the government or the American Way of Life made the speaker suspect and was to be avoided.

Industrialism--The Gilded Age

The late 1800s was also an era of public scandals, corporate profiteering, unequaled economic growth, and financial ruin--the age of Robber Barons and rebels, cynicism, and Spoilsmen. Corruption in and out of government was commonplace, and everyone tried to make a fast buck. The Daddy Warbucks rags-to-riches mythology in America matured between Appomattox and 1890. The notion grew that being poor was a sign of personal failure and being rich was a sign of superiority. Thinking in economic terms and solution of problems by economic analysis--begun on Plymouth Plantation--came of age and began to dominate public and private decision-making.

Innovations in transportation, manufacturing, and farming swept the country. The greatest march of economic growth and transformation in human history capitalized on a country rich with minerals and a huge supply of human beings bent to unhealthful, back breaking and dangerous work. As a consequence, people learned obedience to authority and work became the core of the moral life. The Puritan Work Ethic, equating work and Godly virtue, combined with feverish development and ruthless competition to work a transvaluation of life. Early artisan shops, farms, and counting houses gave way to mills, factories, sweat shops, machinery, and subdivided labor. Mass wage earners gave the moral primacy of work a place of unequaled commitment.

This era produced an ethos reverberating with the word duty and spread an infectious model of active conscientious doing. With a taproot in the Protestant Reformation, the doctrine of industrious life pervaded society and politics. It was nurtured by universalizing the obligation of work and methodizing the time of workers. A passionate conviction developed that every man had a right to come into his own and the industrialists stood squarely on the mythology of opportunity for the common man. Survival of the fittest was applied in philosophy and industry, public opinion idealized unscrupulous attainment of wealth, and business became a term used to describe unsavory activity justified by the exigencies of economic expansion.

Observers from other countries have noted American fascination with business.¹ The idealization of businessmen--like its opposite the unconcern for the intellectual--has been blamed for America's inability to create a group of people who make public service a lifetime concern. Commenting that the U.S. rarely develops such dedicated public servants in positions of administrative power, one foreign observer states:

It is undeniable that the archetype of North America, the model or hero to be imitated, is not the scholar or even the intelligent man, but the successful businessman . . . who succeeds, through his tenacity and cleverness, in amassing a fabulous fortune. . . . Moreover, all education that the child receives, from his parents or in the school, is conducive to building the model. The youth spends his vacation not in rest or in intellectual self-improvement, but in earning money, selling magazines, or washing dishes and glasses in soda fountain. (Joseph, 1959, pp. 295-296)

Bertrand Russell, described by the newspaper press of his time as "one of the world's most extravagant individualists," deplored the American ethic that "what we do is get on in our business, and get a fortune which we can

leave our descendants" (Feinberg & Kasrils, 1973, Vol. I, pp. 98-99). In preparation for one of his New York lectures in 1929, he said:

America has more respect for businessmen than it has for learned men. The economic opportunities in America are so tremendous that the businessman is bound to have far more prestige than the learned man. When the time comes in American that money-making will be more difficult and earnings will be less, then I think we will see that the people will turn to education. (p. 111)

This business worship occurs despite the fact that working people of the railroads, mines, textile mills, steel mills, and auto plants faced the clubs of policemen, the machine guns of soldiers, and the contempt of strike breakers to get an eight-hour day and a living wage.

But Americans are known for their double standards,² in business ethics and whole areas of life that lack moral responsibility, or purpose.³ Bertrand Russell's (Feinberg & Kasrils, 1973, 1984) visits to America found, in a land where human rights were idealized, gross inequalities in wealth and power, interference with academic freedom and civil liberties, racism and persecution of minorities. Anthropologist Margaret Mead described another disquieting American view:

The traditional picture is perfectly clear. The self made man, while he is rising from newsboy to multimillionaire by his own efforts, is drivingly ambitious, loyal mainly to his own interests, and ready to ride roughshod over his employees and his rivals. (Mead, 1967, p. 288)

Sharp business practices were admired by the mid-Nineteenth Century American as well. It was slick to outdo another. The Midwest expression for having been cheated was yankeed.⁴ Mead believes that such disparity between American expressed ideals and American behavior breeds cynicism, self-indulgence, distrust, apathy, fear, and corruption.

Russell agrees that Americans are unable to face reality except in a mood of cynicism. He blames a far too strict set of ideal rules for virtuous politics that can be met by no one and, therefore, permit no politician to be virtuous. Clearly, the standards of behavior for politicians and businessmen are contradictory and contribute to cynical attitudes.

Mead also believes such cynicism "could well form the basis of an American fascism, a fascism bowing down before any character strong enough and amoral enough to get away with it, to get his" (Mead, 1965, p. 203). Others too have recognized this tendency in Americans who are "eager to put their trust in one, two, or three Great Men who would lead them to salvation and relieve them of the anxiety of the unknown" (Joseph, 1959, p. 78). This is conformity in its most pernicious form, born not of meekness, passive acceptance of dogma, or strong centralized government, but of industrious, competitive striving for superiority and victory over others. Conformism is said by outside observers to lie at the core of American life.⁵ Every traveler to America in one study was struck by the uniformity of ideas.⁶

Tocqueville saw American conformity as little independence of mind and inadequate securities against tyranny of the majority.⁷ He also saw it in separation among people:

Despotism, which by its nature is suspicious, sees the separation among men the surest guarantee of its continuance, and it usually makes every effort to keep them separate. No vice of the human heart is so susceptible to it as selfishness: a despot [Machiavelli's prince] . . . stigmatizes as turbulent and unruly spirits those who would combine their exertions to promote the prosperity of the community; and, perverting the natural meaning of words, he applauds as good citizens those who have no sympathy for any but themselves. (Bradley, Vol. II, 1945, p. 102)

Zinn (1990) recognized American conformity in the 1960s Milgram experiment in which two-thirds of the volunteers gave what they thought were electrical shocks to human subjects, even when the latter feigned agonizing pain. Experimenter Milgram said the fundamental lesson of his study was that ordinary people simply doing their jobs can become agents in a terrible destructive process. Both Henry Commager (1950) and Bertrand Russell (Feinberg & Kasrils, 1983) observed that twentieth century America was remarkable for the decline of significance of the individual. Russell saw a submission to leaders, loss of individual responsibility, and the habit of individual thought, hysterical fanaticism, and a condition of servility, indifference, persecution of men of independent mind, and tyranny of the herd. It was not new, having its roots in Puritan colonies, but Russell thought it the worst feature of America.

Commager (1950) describes the nineteenth-century American as impatient, accustomed to prosperity, resentful of anything that interfered with it, and outraged at any prolonged lapse of it. Whatever promised to increase wealth was good, which brought tolerance of speculation, exploitation of natural resources, and the worst manifestations of industrialism. This gave a quantitative cast to American thinking on everything. A man's worth was material worth, solution to problems were therefore always quantitative, and everything yielded to the sovereignty of numbers. Accordingly, no philosophy that got much beyond common sense was ever of any interest, except practical instrumentalism.⁸ Tocqueville (Bradley, 1945) attributed this boundless

passion for wealth to an inexhaustible supply of natural riches and resources. Commager (1950) agreed that America rarely had need to build for the future because it was easier to skim the cream off the soil, forests, mines, or business investments, abandon them and go on to something new. Boundless free will, optimism, infinite possibilities, and confidence in the ability of the next generation to look after itself came from inexhaustible resources, a spacious universe governed by immutable laws, and a benevolent God. Similarly, writing in 1949 Bertrand Russell (Feinberg & Kasrils, 1973, 1984) also attributed the American preoccupation with utility and material outlook to a large country, not yet overpopulated, with immense resources and greater wealth than any country in Europe or Asia.

Energy and order, freedom and regimentation, individualism and conformity warred with one and other. While the American joiner arose from growing uniformity, a mission-like desire for distinction and a sense of self perpetuated the howling wilderness image of the frontier. As a part of the vision that a moral life was hard work and hard-bitten determination, the most picturesque phase of the Wild West was glorified, led by cattle droving cowboys. Just when the demands of industrialization drained America's soul, the spare frame, pithy and profound speech, bow-legged stride, and six-shooter of the authentic cowboy captured the popular imagination. This taste for the great open spaces and the free hardy life, with horse and rifle accounts for the popularity of Teddy Roosevelt and his Rough Riders of 1898. Unfortunately, it is also largely responsible for the feeling that the only good Indian is a dead Indian and for wiping out

the Indian villages of the Great Plains. Manifest Destiny, born from a philosophy of survivalism, provided the rationale for profound cruelty. In fact, the year of the massacre at Wounded Knee, 1890, was officially declared by the Bureau of the Census as the close of the internal frontier.

By the 1890s America had changed character: It was on the threshold of a new age in which the Captains of Industry would lead the people to unparalleled wealth and modernity. However, it all collapsed in the fecund 1890s. The year 1893 saw the biggest economic crisis in the country's history. After decades of wild industrial growth and uncontrolled speculation, 642 banks failed and 16,000 businesses closed. Caverns of discontent opened, politics lost equilibrium, and the people groped for a remedy. The popular esteem for wealth that sanctioned and blessed industry also rewarded cunning and hardness of heart. Industrialization heaped desperation and despair on the working class, casting seed for the rise of organized labor.

Marxism, Socialism, and Reform

Anger from the realities of ordinary life emerged as the twentieth century opened. Elihu Root in his presidential address before the New York State Bar Association in 1912 described the difficulty being faced at that time:

In place of the old individual independence of life in which every intelligent and healthy citizen was competent to take care of himself and his family, we have come to a high degree of interdependence in which the greater part of our people have to rely for all the necessities of life upon systematized co-operation of a vast number of other men working through complicated industrial and commercial machinery. Instead of the completeness of individual

effort working out its own results in obtaining food and clothing and shelter, we have specialization and division of labor which leaves each individual unable to apply his industry and intelligence except in cooperation with a great number of others whose activity conjoined to his is necessary to produce any useful result. (Morison, 1965, p. 811)

Based on Frederick W. Taylor's scientific management, division of labor theories and time motion studies, industry tried to control every minute of the worker's energy and time. This system, which treated workers like standard parts, was well fitted for the emerging auto industry, but it further eroded individuality, humanity, and conditions of the work place.

Perry (1944) has noted that after the middle nineteenth century growth of the cult of materialism and positivism, America grew queasy as the flavor of life became unsavory. It was the apotheosis of the Captains of Industry, symbols of the self-made man, the march of technological progress, and the social benefits of competitive ambition. However, their sordid motives, unscrupulous behavior, exploitation of labor and unholy alliance with political bosses belied their professed public service and painted them as monsters rather than demigods. As a consequence, Socialism prospered, Socialist candidates began to succeed in local elections, and fear of spreading Socialism increased the pace of progressive reform to head it off.

World War I, Communism, and the Age of Heroes

Disillusionment from failed promises of the industrialists led to a succession of leaders that came to be called Progressives. They realized that interdependence had replaced the independent life of early America,

requiring government action to curb the arrogance of organized wealth and poverty amid plenty. During the administrations of Theodore Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson, legislation passed state and federal levels to regulate railroads, pipelines, banks, monopolies, hours and wages, meat packing, and to provide for income taxes, worker's compensation, and safety inspections of factories. The Progressives replaced the laissez-faire creed of the lawyers, bankers, and industrialists with government action. As a result of abuses by the Robber Barons and Spoilsmen, the people were in an angry mood, permitting American revivalism of the Great Awakening to sweep away much of the cynicism and apathy that had characterized politics for the previous thirty years. The coarse, materialistic civilization that emerged after the Civil War produced a practical breed of political reformers with steady nerves, strong ambitions, tenacity, and flexible scruples. Many of these Progressives were college graduates who believed in the perfectibility of man, and an open, non-deterministic society capable of changing for the better.

Foremost among them was Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt believed, for example, in the Hamiltonian notion of making the federal government truly national through a broad interpretation of the general welfare clause of the Constitution. Determined to restore the American spirit he called the fighting edge, Roosevelt fought the fat materialism of the wealthy and the lurking menace of the masses by advocating the heroic, soldierly virtues of the hunter, cowboy, frontiersman, and naval hero. He displayed a passion for sudden violence and a trigger-like willingness to use troops for putting down strikes. With no passionate

interest in the humane goals of reform, he saw himself as an arbiter between rich and poor and custodian of the stern virtues necessary for the United States to play its destined role of mastery in the world theater. Create, act, take a place, be somebody, was his advice. He believed only a warped, perverse, and silly morality condemned conquest of the American West. Thus, Roosevelt and the reformers he represented tried to bolster individualism; to remedy by more individualism the evils that were the inevitable result of already existing individualism. Achievements of two generations of boundlessly individualistic and ambitious entrepreneurs eclipsed the old, individualistic workshop economy and replaced it with a new, faceless world of system, large scale enterprise, and intricate bureaucracies.

The Progressive Era ended with the outbreak of World War I. When that war ended in 1918, fifty thousand soldiers had died, and bitterness spread through the country. The first efforts at organizing labor were downed by force and the Socialist party was falling apart from the impact of the drive for national unity during the war. With the Socialists weakened, a Communist party was organized and trade unionism began to develop in earnest. On the surface, there had been over thirty years of prosperity between 1897 and 1929, which had seen a marked increase in American wages and standard of living. It was the dawn of a golden age. In 1928, Herbert Hoover declared a final triumph over poverty and wrote a book expounding his philosophy of untempered individualism. In it he declared equality part of the claptrap of the French Revolution. But the Roaring Twenties was a time of prosperity and fun only at the top. Wild

financial speculation was prevalent in the financial markets, but the conditions for American workers were grim, and the economy was fundamentally unsound. The Jazz Age was merely a diversion from the serious social and economic problems just below the surface. Hero worship and preoccupation with personalities served as a convenient source for collective self-denial about true conditions.

Rural America was moved to the city and the invention of the internal combustion engine was a material key to a Great Change as horsey America was becoming motor-conscious. In 1900, automobiling was one of those things, like playing golf and smoking cigarettes, which politicians did not dare to be seen doing. Woodrow Wilson believed that there was nothing more a picture of the arrogance of wealth, or anything likely to spread socialistic feelings in the country more than the snobbery of motoring. Nevertheless, Henry Ford's assembly-line of mass production made the Model T, called the Tin Lizzy or flivver, affordable to farmers and skilled workers like. It was not long before the Ad-Men made motoring a respectable pastime. Before the auto revolution was over, the automobile would give each individual the freedom of movement never before experienced, permitting the worker to live miles from his job.

Depression, World War II, and The Ad-Men

At times nothing is more misleading than personal experience, as when it embraces only success. Herbert Hoover was a bright and energetic businessman and believer in the unregulated profit system. For thirty-two years covering Hoover's entire maturity, from the end of the 1893

Depression to the crash of 1929, this system suffered no major set-backs. Since his childhood, Hoover had seen a marked rise in American wages and standards of living and to him the system plainly worked, and it worked well. In his book, American Individualism, he admitted that untempered individualism would produce many injustices, but asserted that individualism in the United States had been tempered by equality of opportunity:

Our individualism differs from all others because it embraces these great ideals: that while we build our society upon the attainment of the individual, we shall safeguard to every individual an equality of opportunity to take that position in the community to which his intelligence, character, ability, and ambition entitle him; that we keep the social solution free from frozen strata of classes; that we shall stimulate effort to each individual to achievement; that through an enlarging sense of responsibility and understanding we shall assist him to his attainment; while he in turn must stand up to the emery wheel of competition. (Morison, 1965, p. 812)

To Hoover, human progress was the result of opportunity for the individual to use his personal skills as best he could. The most an individual could expect from the government was liberty, justice, intellectual wealth or common equality of opportunity, and stimulation. Opportunity, individualism, laissez-faire, and personal success were all in the dominant American tradition of the time. In the language of Jefferson, Jackson, and Lincoln such ideals were fresh and invigorating, but in the language of Herbert Hoover they became stale and oppressive. During the crisis of the 30s, Hoover's essential beliefs became outlandish and unintelligible almost overnight. He was the last Presidential spokesman for the hallowed doctrines of laissez-faire, until revived by Ronald Reagan in 1980.

At the time of the crash, most of the nation's wealth was concentrated in the hands of only a small percent of the people and large depressed segments of society--farmers, textile workers, and coal miners--lacked sufficient income to meet much more than their minimal needs. Corporate profits were up, production was up, and income was up, prompting President Coolidge to declare in 1925 that the business of America is business. The full flush of fiscal euphoria brought swollen profits and abundant credit to bear in wild get-rich-quick speculation, but when it came down, it came down fast.

The stock market crash of 1929 marked the beginning of the Great Depression, ended the self-deception of the Twenties, resulted in grinding poverty for millions, and began a march toward further reforms. For six months, no one even admitted the existence of a Depression, while Hoover's laissez-faire philosophy--that nature would cure all--restrained government action. His survival-of-the-fittest Secretary of the Treasury, Andrew Mellon, wanted it to go right to the bottom: "People will work harder, live a moral life. Values will be adjusted, and enterprising people will pick up the wrecks of the less competent people" (Hofstadter, 1973, p. 387). Business and government leaders repeatedly stated that the worst had passed, but the worst did not pass until mid-1932 when stocks hit rock bottom.

Indeed, a readjustment of values did occur. Sociologist John Dewey considered the condition of the American public as early as 1927, when he said the public seemed to be lost and bewildered. Disillusioned by the Robber Barons and Spoilsmen, the public created a crisis in American

individualism. There was never a stronger mandate in American history for a new program, or a clearer repudiation of laissez-faire and the individualism of business and finance. Feeling helpless, humiliated, and deceived by the Capitalists, the country voted for welfare and security of simple folk--the transfer of wealth from rich to poor by action of government. Fearing the American system needed desperate measures to be saved, they were ready to take a chance on the New Deal.

Almost every man of wealth, with resources to weather the Depression, wanted the downward spiral to hit rock bottom, smash the labor unions, and re-establish the free labor market of the previous century. However, what they got was quite different from what they wanted, as the age of the New Deal dealt a severe blow to American individualism. Freedom of action justified in the simple life of the last century seemed no longer tolerable. The Welfare State was born in the United States and it probably saved the capitalist system. The thesis that government is ultimately responsible for the welfare, employment, and security of the populace became generally accepted. The State became a medium for humanistic self-expression and the New Deal demonstrated that there was no inherent conflict between authority and freedom. Expansion of governmental functions shored up and buttressed a capitalist system tottering on the brink. Rather than weaken or destroy it, the New Deal saved American capitalism by ridding it of its worst abuses and compelling an accommodation of the larger public interest. Though big business and finance lost status while labor and the ordinary citizen

gained power, the New Deal still left so much to private enterprise that the entire economy was strengthened.

The period just prior to the stock market crash was also the Golden Dawn of total advertising. A torrential output of consumer goods began, including such new products as radios, electric refrigerators, faster cars, shinier bathroom fixtures, and plusher caskets. The soft sell that had dominated advertising began to harden as competition increased pace with the volume and variety of manufactured goods. A great post-war boom ushered in the age of advertising and by 1925, magazines and newspapers owed a large part of their total income to ad revenue. The ads of the Twenties shared several traits with the decade itself, such as brashness and lack of scruples, as many ads pushed quasi-factual and pseudo-scientific claims. But the decade's dominate and identifying trend in advertising was the use of psychology by appealing to secret emotions that motivated people to buy. Rather than facts, advertisers planted in the readers' minds a connection between products and pleasant feelings of freedom, excitement, and romantic adventure. Psychological insights were applied with increasing effectiveness as the decade wore on, and advertising and mass production became twin cylinders keeping the motor of modern business running smoothly.

Consumerism, Conformity, and McCarthyism

As conditions in the nation improved, advertising still encouraged continued consumption by holding out the promise of leisure for all. After 1935, Keynesian economics and the Roosevelt administration made

serious efforts at improving mass purchasing power. Some believed that the glorified producer--economic man--had thwarted the promise of Capitalism and what the nation needed was to treat the worker as consumer. These market oriented critics argued that the Declaration of Independence recognized the primacy of consumption in the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Likewise, Adam Smith took the position that consumption was the sole end and purpose of all production. Abundance would assure a decent level of consumption for everyone and permit devotion of one's energies to non-economic interests in life. As a result of these pressures, government and business policy began to focus upon the expansion of private choice and the acquisitive impulse, which survived the Thirties and Forties, and blossomed again in the Fifties.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau proposed two responses to modernization: One rested on an ideal of individual autonomy, the other on the collective city-state. Both constituted a critique of modernity that stressed its corroding effects on the authentic self, civic participation, and community. Key themes in the debate were authority, true individuality, authenticity, and the need for institutions to address the imbalances of modernity. Rousseau laid out a dream of secular happiness that has haunted the West since.⁹

Emersonian individualism daringly proclaimed that only the individual was natural, while society was artificial and corrupt. John Dewey wanted to reverse this value. He hoped that the United States could find room for an ideal of individual autonomy, or true individuality, in a vision of community, cooperation, and independence.

A rebel against the solitary excesses of nineteenth-century individualism, Dewey searched for the great community which would restore the lost individual. He undertook an Emersonian effort to fuse the contraries of the one and the many--to consolidate material abundance, rationality, science--and develop new possibilities for cooperation, communal and participatory modes of learning, and civic action in impersonal cities.

At about the same time the Progressives and David Riesman added their voices to the ongoing dialogue. The nub of the debate between the Progressives and Riesman was the nature of true individuality in the modern world. The Progressives set into motion a series of shifts in American social character that Riesman called other direction. Their search for community to replace the obsolete, but powerfully entrenched individualism was a significant reversal of American intellectual life. In the name of autonomy, Riesman rebelled against the Progressive groupiness of social thought.

At the height of his Progressive phase, Dewey was a booster of progress and other Progressive ideals. Though he was committed to an ideal of fulfilled individuality, his Progressive insistence on the group character of all life celebrated group life in ways that showed the Progressive blind spot toward conformity. He had experienced the moral regime of inner direction as lacerating and held its ideal of conscience responsible for loneliness, alienation, and inner desolation. He opposed the old moral style of self-scrutiny, rigid character, obsession with motives and inner purity. He attempted to replace the dark solitude of private, individualistic conceptions of morality with sunlit, public standards. He

wanted to replace the Emersonian inner torment of subjectivity with social, communal, and objective standards. In place of rhetoric and guilt, he wanted action ethics that focused on visible consequences. This instrumentalism shared the Progressive confidence in the application of industry and science to all of life, and expressed the Progressive ideal of efficiency. He explored the possibility that science and technology would create new shifts in society and values away from economic individualism. He argued that the scientific outlook by itself was inadequate. In this he joined Emerson, Thoreau, and Whitman to denounce economic individualism as a threat to the human soul. Competitive individualism eclipsed true individuality under the force of oppressive inequality.¹⁰

Riesman thought Dewey a magnificent example of the kind of autonomy possible in the age of inner direction. These inner directed people were of unbending principle equipped with an inner psychological gyroscope to carry them through new situations. Work, success, independence, manliness, character and internalized guilt equipped them to master a continent. The other-directed in contrast represented a world in which other people, rather than a material environment, represented the chief arena in which to strive. Instead of a gyroscope, these people employed an infinitely sensitive radar screen. Spontaneity, openness, sensitivity, and responsiveness equipped them in an age of abundance and consumption. Relentless concern over the judgment of the group was their mechanism for enforcing right behavior. This conformity most concerned Riesman, who believed Tocqueville was right that the

American disease was conformity. His cure was a subdued, chastened ideal of autonomous individuality. Yet the true nature of individuality eluded a definitive answer in Dewey's age of the lost individual and Riesman's era of the lonely crowd.¹¹

No personality expressed the American popular temper during the age of the New Deal better than Franklin D. Roosevelt. Roosevelt was warm, personal, concrete, and impulsive, and his capacity for change, flexibility, experimentation, and growth was enormous, whereas Hoover had been remote and abstract. When FDR came to power, the people wanted experiment, activity, trial, and error, because stagnation had gone dangerously far. Roosevelt accurately read the mood of the country when he said, "The country needs and, unless I mistake its temper, the country wants bold, persistent experimentation. It is common sense to take a method and try it. If it fails, admit it frankly and try another. But above all, try something" (Gans et al., 1979, p. 6). Only a leader with an experimental temperament made the New Deal possible.

When he took office, the economic machinery of the nation had collapsed and its politics was disintegrating. Therefore, during the emergency, Roosevelt had practically dictatorial powers. People who had something to lose were fearful and sought any way out that would still leave them in possession. In 1945, FDR told Congress that power must be linked with responsibility and could defend itself only within the framework of the general good. The New Deal provided a heart-warming relief of distress and imprinted its values so deeply that Republicans were compelled to endorse it in their election platforms.

After moving into the oval office, Roosevelt is said to have sat alone for a few moments and then shouted for his aides. One of his first acts was calling a special session of Congress which strengthened the financial system by passing his emergency banking bill unchanged in just thirty-eight minutes after convening. Deposits exceeded withdrawals when the banks opened four days later and the immediate panic was over. Sensing opportunity, FDR kept lawmakers in session for the next one hundred days and used a firmer rein on an uneasy nation than it had felt since the days of FDR's cousin, Teddy Roosevelt. In the process, he permanently altered the conduct of American life. When Congress adjourned approximately one hundred days later, fifty new laws assured government action and fifteen major messages streamed from the White House to Capitol Hill. These acts sought to employ the jobless, to develop the backward Tennessee Valley, to support crop prices, to repeal Prohibition, to stop home foreclosures, to insure bank deposits, and to stabilize the economy. In response, Alf Landon reportedly said that the iron hand of a dictator is preferred to a paralytic stroke.

The country was on a permanent war economy during the next thirty years, but it had big pockets of poverty. Though there were enough people at work, making enough money, to keep things quiet, the distribution of wealth was still unequal and had not changed much from 1944 to 1961. During that time, the lowest fifth of the families received five percent of all the income while the highest fifth received forty-five percent. In 1953, 1.6 percent of the adult population owned more than eighty percent of the corporate stock and nearly ninety percent of the

corporate bonds, and about two hundred giant corporations dominated the business scene.¹² Nevertheless, corporations and industrial might gained respect, Capitalism remained intact, and hysteria about Communism built a climate of fear.

The left, influential in the hard times of the Thirties, declined as World War II weakened labor militancies and patriotism pushed for unity of all against enemies overseas. Growing Soviet strength and the Korean War fueled a national paranoia about Communists, whipped to a feverish pitch by McCarthyism. Loyalty oaths, fear of speaking out, and other abridgments of individual liberties soon became common place in a contagion of fear. McCarthy called the terms of Truman and FDR twenty years of treason during which he said they conspired to deliver America to the Reds. As utterly preposterous a theory as this was, the country was almost torn apart. Efforts to root out subversives from government, colleges, and businesses ruined the careers and reputations of thousands. McCarthy was one of the most colossal liars in history and perpetuated a conspiracy theory that haunted a generation of Americans with the thought that creeping Communism would smother the American Way of Life. Ultimately, this fear led to the Cold War and forty years of influence for the military-industrial complex.

By the mid-Thirties, America's working man was headed toward a deadly showdown with management. When a Senate committee wanted to know in 1928 why a coal company kept machine guns in its coal pits, Chairman of the Board Richard B. Mellon replied you could not run the mines without them. In 1935, hired guns still loomed over the toughest

company towns, where a word about the union could get a man beaten up or killed. In those harsh times, losing one's job as opposed to losing one's life, was about the mildest punishment given a union organizer. Businesses routinely hired strike breakers both to fill the jobs of strikers and to wield machine guns, night sticks, and tear gas. These tactics permeated industrial management, including Ford Motor Company and General Motors, who used policeman to beat picketers with clubs and spray them with buckshot and tear gas. After John L. Lewis told Michigan Governor Frank Murphy that the latter should listen to the spirit of his grandfather rather than employ the National Guard to evict the strikers, Murphy--whose grandfather had been hanged in the Irish Rebellion--tore up his order to activate the Guard. After forty-four days of losing profits at a rate of a million dollars a day, General Motors finally agreed to bargain with the United Automobile Workers in the seventeen plants that had been struck. In four months time, the UAW had won its drive for acceptance and organized the majority of General Motors workers.

Never in American history was an event more anticipated yet more of a surprise than the attack on Pearl Harbor. When it happened, it seared the American consciousness and propelled the United States into a war that it had been desperately trying to avoid. No sooner had Americans managed to accept the shocking reality of Pearl Harbor than they faced another grim circumstance that never before experienced; that is, continuing disasters on the battlefield. In Guam, Kuwait, Hong Kong, Borneo, Singapore, and the Philippines, America and its allies endured a series of defeats. The allies were not able to start onto the offensive until

late 1942, and when the flow of the war did shift, American marines and GIs leapfrogged from one obscure Pacific outcropping to another: Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Eniwetok, Saipan, Eulithi, Hiroshima, and Okinawa. America conducted war on land, sea, and air while production of armaments and equipment proceeded apace back at home.

Nevertheless, not all wartime sacrifice was received popularly. Even though Americans did not have to suffer the excruciating effects of war on their homeland, their individualistic nature chafed at WPB Directive No. 1, which instituted rationing in January 1942. It came as quite a shock to Americans and almost everything they enjoyed was affected--meat, coffee, butter, cheese, sugar, and gasoline. In accordance with by now well-known characteristics of American pragmatism, it was not long before gas chiseling and ration stamp fraud became a national scandal. While the war raged, Joe Louis became a boxing great, bobby soxers attained high fashion, the football hero was cheered and fussed over, the fraternity initiate went his perilous rounds, and most high school and college kids indulged in time-killing that was inelegantly but accurately known as messing around. Pep rallies, smooching, making-time, roller skating, hanging around, listening to records, and striving to become or pursue the big-man-on-campus occupied American teenagers.

Writing in 1943, Margaret Mead described the American character as follows:

We have a certain kind of character, the American character, which has developed in the New World and taken in a shape all its own; a character that is geared to success and to movement, invigorated by obstacles and difficulties, but plunged into guilt and despair by catastrophic failure or a wholesale alteration in the upward and

onward pace; a character in which aggressiveness is uncertain and undefined, to which readiness to fight anyone who starts a fight and unreadiness to engage in violence have both been held up as virtues; a character which measures its successes and failures only against near contemporaries and engages in various quantitative devices for reducing every contemporary to its own stature; a character which sees success as the reward of virtue and failure as the stigma for not being good enough; a character which is uninterested in the past, except when ancestry can be used to make points against other people in the success game; a character oriented towards an unknown future, ambivalent towards other cultures, which are regarded with a sense of inferiority. (Mead, 1967, p. 193)

At war's end there was considerable readjusting to be done, which did not proceed at all well. A large portion of the public in 1950-52 saw nothing but failure--the Soviet prominence, loss of the Korean War, and conflict with China. Malaise, suspicion, and frustration were heightened by the charges and innuendoes of the House Committee on Un-American Activities and the demagoguery of Senator Joseph McCarthy. In 1953, "Ike" the World War II hero, became President and rather than becoming a dynamic initiator of policies, he smoothed over difficulties and mediated conflicts. While he presided, international upheaval changed the old world order. At a terrible price of forty million killed worldwide by the war, the United States and the USSR, second rate powers in 1939, emerged as the world's economic and military superpowers.

The war had accelerated revolutionary developments in atomic weapons, jet airplanes, rockets, computers, and other technologies, which contributed to a vast social, economic, and technological revolution that transformed the face of the nation. After a brief recession in 1957, post-war economic prosperity pushed the decade's earlier listlessness to the back of the collective unconscious. As a result, America was able to get on with its

business of business and mammoth organizations with international operations ceased being merely corporations and became institutions. Without a guiding principle, but with terrific power, they affected people's lives enormously. In 1910, major industries had not wanted college graduates, but now young organization men sought jobs in big firms, hoping to become an executive. By 1956, one hundred thirty-five corporate giants owned forty-five percent of all industrial assets and business's star was on the rise again as people bought executive rugs and rented executive apartments.

The Cold War, Civil Rights, and Vietnam

The Fifties, like the Twenties, salved a national hangover from the war years. First, the atomic bomb, then the H-bomb, the Cold War, Russian ascendancy, and Khrushchev's promise to bury the West replaced permanent peace and led to puzzlement with world events. Yet the Fabulous Fifties, the Nifty Fiftys--the Rock-and-Roll Age, tough and sexy--bloomed to shunt aside the fear and danger. The economic boom was about to transform American ideals and a fat consumer market was just being born. While images of mushroom clouds poisoning the atmosphere dominated their unconscious and fall-out shelters and civil defense plans sought room in their consciousness, the American people went on a decade long spending binge to divert their attention. Television was only one of hundreds of appliances for the home that were developed in the late Forties and the Fifties. But it opened a mass market never before available and the Ad-Man wielded remarkable influence. America

preoccupied itself with baseball, Marilyn Monroe, 3-D movies, cramming Volkswagens and telephone booths, the hula hoop, sack dresses, short shorts, crinoline, and pop-it-beads. Appearances and style became more important in politics and out, conformity and popularity became passions, and the population became more alike in housing, dress, habits, possessions, problems, and number of children. As basic civil rights were suspended, as the FBI investigated job applicants for low-level government positions, as McCarthy employed Hitler's big lie technique, and as suspicion and intolerance pervaded life, America bought washers and dryers, toasters, can openers, TVs, freezers, vacuums, incinerators, air-conditioners, and a myriad of other products that they did not need for their health or happiness. Keeping up with the Jones's preoccupied America and materialism, already an obvious American characteristic, reached new proportions.

The automobile's importance to the Fifties cannot be exaggerated. As it became responsible for one-sixth of GNP and provided mobility, status, freedom, and privacy, forty-one thousand miles of roads were built with public funds to accommodate it. Yet in spite of widening prosperity, old inequalities of wealth remained, and the poor could now see through the TV what it was missing. Segregation was outlawed, but there was still only token integration and rising intolerance permitted the KKK to experience a revival in the mid and late Fifties. It was going to take a popular movement to change the effects of hate and fear. Religion boomed in the Fifties, but worshippers wanted comforting and inspiring sermons, not appeals to shun materialism or advance social justice. This

lack of concern for larger issues paved the way for social activism in the next decade.

Consensus existed in the United States that America was the greatest country on earth, superior to all contemporary and even to most past civilizations. Criticism of the effects of Capitalism, the government or the American Way of Life made the speaker suspect and was to be avoided. Moreover, the nation was shocked by Sputnik into believing that General Eisenhower had let the United States fall behind the Russians and that America was now losing the world-wide war against Communism. Reinforcing the paranoia generated by McCarthyism, the Korean War, and the Cold War, Sputnik set the stage for acceptance of the domino theory that propelled the United States into Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam during the Sixties.

In the decade of turmoil and instability that was the 60s, a few things seemed to have dominated over all others: the Kennedys and their deaths, the arms race, the black emergence, the Vietnam War, and the Beatles. When the decade opened, Ike was still in the White House, but the campaign for President between John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon was in full swing. When JFK and Jackie entered the White House in 1961, they exhibited a magical blend of elegance and vibrance which brought a short-lived feeling of vigor, public interest, and renewed optimism. However, before long the feeling grew that events were slipping out of control. On May 5, 1960, relations with the Soviets worsened when Francis Gary Powers was shot down in an American military U-2 flight over that country. Moreover, when J. F. Kennedy took

office, people believed relations with Cuba could hardly get worse, an error soon to be corrected. On April 17, 1961, Kennedy launched an invasion of Cuba so poorly planned that Castro needed only four days to destroy it. Also, on August 13, 1961, a wall went up between East and West Berlin and later in October, 1962, the United States, the USSR, and Cuba were involved in the most dangerous moment of the Cold War. Until this Cuban missile crisis was resolved, school children began practicing hiding under their desks again. This crisis, the Bay of Pigs, the Berlin crisis, civil rights violence, Vietnam, and Kennedy's assassination soon led to moral questioning and loss of faith in the establishment.

The 1960s enjoyed the longest period of sustained economic growth in modern history, making years of real progress for ordinary Americans. This success led some to believe that prosperity would be so great that real poverty would be largely abolished in the United States. Everything in the country seemed to be getting better and better, and minorities were generally invisible. Civil rights laws were passed in 1957, 1960, and 1964, but they were enforced poorly or they were ignored. That began to change in 1963, when Martin Luther King's "I Have A Dream" speech thrilled two hundred thousand Black and White Americans. Yet certain sentences critical of the national government and urging militant action intended to produce stronger note of outrage were censored by the march leaders. Nevertheless, in 1965, Congress again reacted to Black revolt and turmoil and world publicity with more civil rights legislation. The plight of Blacks in America was precisely and poignantly expressed in signs carried by picketers in the Memphis sanitation workers strike that read, "I am a

man." Then in 1967, the greatest urban riots in United States history came from the Black ghettos in Newark, Selma, Detroit, and Watts.

The mid-Sixties had seen young men indicted for refusing to register for the draft. The slogan "Hell No We Won't Go" and "Hey Hey LBJ/How Many Kids Did You Kill Today?" reverberated across the nation. Many registrants burned their draft cards and two even burned themselves. When the bombing of North Vietnam began in 1965, indignation increased and a remarkable change in sentiment took place. It began with teach-ins at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, Michigan, but by 1970 hundreds of thousands were appearing for Washington peace rallies, including middle class professionals, and priests and nuns unaccustomed to activism. By 1968, the opposition to the Vietnam War was pressing in from all sides and the campuses were feverish with sit-ins and strikes during the first semester of the 67-68 academic year when 204 separate demonstrations were conducted. Indeed, 1968 was indelibly a year of strife and loss, with Tet, Mi Lai, and that awful spring when first M. L. King, Jr. and then R.F.K. were killed by assassins. Another kind of riot also occurred at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago.

In 1965, when the bombing of North Vietnam began, a hundred people gathered on the Boston Common to voice their indignation. By October 15, 1969, the number of people assembled on the Boston Common to protest the war was one hundred thousand. Perhaps two million people across the nation gathered that day in towns and villages that had never seen an anti-war meeting. By 1970, the Washington peace rallies

were drawing hundreds of thousands of people and in 1971 twenty thousand came to Washington tying up Washington traffic while expressing their disgust with the killing still going on in Vietnam. The climax of the protests came in 1970 when Nixon ordered the invasion of Cambodia. On May 4, national guardsmen killed four students at Kent State University in Ohio and another was paralyzed for life. Watching Americans in uniform kill American teenagers on television galvanized public opinion against the war, and withdrawal of United States troops begun in 1970 was complete by 1974.

The Sixties did not involve just civil rights or political activism. Despite another decade of economic growth, there was a general rebellion against the artificial oppressive ways of living that had survived the Fifties. There was new suspicion of big business profits as the motive for ruining the environment and with the loss of faith in big powers--business, government, religion--there arose a stronger belief in self, whether individual or collective. The belief grew that people could figure out for themselves what to eat, how to live their lives, and how to be healthy. Traditional education was also re-examined and the schools who had been teaching values of patriotism and of obedience to authority were challenged not just on the content of education, but on the style, the formality, the bureaucracy, the insistence on subordination to authority. Never in American history had there been more movement for change concentrated in so short a span of years. It touched every aspect of life: marriage, sex, childbirth, dress, music, art, sports, language, religion, literature, death, and schools. Many Americans were shocked by the new

temper, the new behavior. Individualism, suppressed for the decade of the Fifties or more, reasserted itself in the Sixties and early Seventies.

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CHAPTER VIII

RADICAL INDIVIDUALISM AFTER DISILLUSIONMENT AND LOSS OF FAITH

Synopsis

Chief Justice Earl Warren resigned in 1969, ending an era of the court that brought individual civil rights to the forefront of every American's consciousness. From its desegregation decisions to the school prayer, criminal rights, abortion and one-man-one-vote decisions, the court aroused fervent passions and boosted individualism again, this time by making everyone aware of their personal rights. The Sixties involved civil rights and political activism, but there was also a general upheaval against the artificial, oppressive ways of living from the Fifties that touched every aspect of life: marriage, sex, child birth, dress, music, art, sports, language, religion, literature, death and schools. Individualism, suppressed for a decade or more, reasserted itself in the Sixties and early Seventies.

When John Kennedy took office in 1964 there was a short-lived feeling of vigor, public interest and renewed optimism, but Kennedy's assassination contributed to moral questioning and loss of faith. When the assassination of M. L. King was followed closely by the assassination of R. F. Kennedy, the country began coming apart. The Watergate scandal continued a decline in politics from which the nation has yet to recover.

In its place was substituted a high-tech, consumer-oriented mass society that wanted more money for less work, more government benefits with less government and taxes, and greater individual freedom without responsibility.

Attention to self pushed out attention to others as the narcissist personality seemed to spring from the American public. Living for yourself and the moment, not for your predecessors or for the future, became the prevailing passion in government, society and business. As success came to require more attention to youth, glamour and novelty than it did to conscientious and competent handling of job assignments, creation of self became the highest form of creativity.

In the 1980s, this self-indulgence of the Seventies was carried a step further, as self-interest was put into action. The values of public purpose, insofar as they were reflected in the traditional institutions receded and the values of private interest moved forward. Americans wanted their share of the pie and devoted themselves to attaining it. A crisis in ethics began in the decade: from recruiting college athletes to trading stocks and bonds, from Watergate to Soonergate, from the TV evangelist to the sports training room, from the Savings and Loan's boardroom to the halls of Congress, and from police chief to mayor, America underwent a national crisis in ethics, but America was not paying attention. It was a decade of excess that ended with society in paralysis, unable to address the important issues of the day. Widespread problems existed in ethics, global warming, environmental contamination, disposal of toxic and nuclear wastes, drug

abuse, ineffective education and the widening gap between rich and poor. Instead of aiming at solutions, the public practiced self-deception.

This madness continued in the Nineties as the newest crime fads became drive-by shootings, car-jackings, and dropping heavy objects from highway overpasses onto cars passing below. The ill effects of a growing ethic of purely personal rights and concerns became even more apparent. Truth became as disposable as a candy wrapper and the lie became expected in the automobile showroom, in sports, in advertising, in politics and in the courts. By 1990, public officials were no longer leaders, but were expected to be CEOs of a corporate body and rational technicians, slashing budgets and personnel, as voters refused to pay even the cost of services then in place. In 1992, two out of three Americans believed the nation was in decline--economic, moral and spiritual. The Nineties also saw atomization of entire societies as personal rights and parochial interests defined action rather than tolerance and common humanity.

Self-Actualization in the 70s

Chief Justice Earl Warren resigned in 1969, ending an era of the court that had brought individual civil rights to the forefront of every American's consciousness. By its desegregation, school prayer, criminal rights, abortion, and one-man-one-vote decisions, the court aroused fervent passions and boosted individualism by making everyone aware of their personal rights. When the assassination of Martin Luther King in 1968 was followed closely by the assassination of Robert F. Kennedy only two months later, the country began coming apart, and by the early 70s, the

system seemed out of control. With the Watergate scandal, a decline in politics occurred from which the nation has yet to recover.

The Nixon White House was threatened by action of the masses. After the 1968 Chicago convention, at which no one was safe from the police, Nixon took the police state to new heights. His administration sought to quell disturbances, to defeat demonstrations and to dampen rising individualism by resort to dirty tactics and illegal means. When these tactics were disclosed to the public and the President was implicated, he was forced to resign or be impeached. Faith in government was never lower than in 1974. A mood of pessimism existed in higher circles, which spread through the rest of society as people lost faith in their leaders. A lack of understanding the course of modern history and inability to subject it to rational direction revealed itself. The age of abundance seemed to have ended and past lessons seemed irrelevant or dangerous. A flight from politics occurred and the government, the military, the President, the Congress, and business all suffered diminution before the public. William Simon, Secretary of the Treasurer, urged businessmen in 1976 to show the human side of Capitalism. President Carter directed his appeal to those beleaguered by the powerful and the wealthy, but Americans did not want to attend the poor. They were preoccupied with inflation rising faster than wages and unemployment rates at eight percent and higher.

The Beatles came to represent a counter-culture that embraced everything new from clothing to politics. This culture probably sprang from the Beatniks of the Fifties and early Sixties, a handful of Bohemians that practiced free love, took drugs, repudiated the straight world, and

generally showed which way the wind was blowing. The Beatles' music and lifestyles had a great affect on the young. They led the march of fashion away from Mod and into the hairy, mustached, bearded, beaded, fringed, and embroidered costumes of the late Sixties. The group later broke up, but they had made their mark. Beatlemania coincided with a more ominous development in the emergence of the counter-culture--the rise of the drug prophet Timothy Leary. The popularity of drug use among the young induced panic in the old. States passed harsher and harsher laws, campaigns against the drug traffic were launched periodically, drug use seemed to go up either way, and the generation gap widened. During the Sixties, drug use remained a deviant practice and a source of great tension between the generations. However, drugs encouraged conformity among the young to turn-on-and-drop-out, draining off potentially subversive energies.

This counter-culture developed a hedonism that perhaps contributed to the feelings of need for self-actualization in the Seventies. With the Watergate scandal, politics was replaced by a high-tech, consumer-oriented mass society that wanted more money for less work, more government benefits with less government and taxes, and greater individual freedom without responsibility. Attention to self pushed out attention to others and knowledge about one's self and one's place in the world became an important pursuit. The consciousness movement of the Seventies resulted in mass self-examination and therapy established self as the successor to rugged individualism. The authoritarian personality of economic man gave way to psychological man; haunted by anxiety, out to

find a meaning in life, demanding approval and acclaim, requiring immediate gratification, perpetually unsatisfied and restless, craving without limits, and extolling cooperation and teamwork while harboring deep anti-social impulses. Americans retreated to purely personal preoccupations and what mattered was psychic self-improvement. The narcissist personality seemed to spring from the American public and a survivalist mentality where the world view centered solely on self was a characteristic of the Seventies.

According to the University of Michigan Survey Research Center, trust in government was low in every section of the population as early as 1970. Of professional people, forty percent had low political trust in government and sixty-six percent of unskilled blue-collar workers had low trust. Those polls were said to show "widespread, basic discontent and political alienation" (Zinn, 1980, p. 530) Even after Nixon resigned in August of 1974 and other actions were taken to purge the rascals and to restore the country's health, America was still suspicious and hostile toward government leaders, the military, and big business. A July, 1975 Lou Harris poll looking at the public's confidence in the government from 1966 to 1975 reported confidence in the military had dropped from sixty-two percent to twenty-nine percent, in business from fifty-five percent to eighteen percent, and in both President and Congress from forty-two percent to thirteen. In 1973, another Harris poll reported the number of Americans feeling alienated and disaffected with the general state of the country climbed from twenty-nine percent in 1966 to over fifty percent. After President Ford succeeded Nixon, the percentage of alienated was

fifty-five percent. Even so, that survey showed that the people were troubled most by economic circumstances, specifically inflation. This was confirmed by public opinion analysts testifying before Congress in the Fall of 1975, who reported "that public confidence in the government and in the country's economic future is probably lower than it has ever been since they began to measure such things scientifically" (p. 545).

These surveys demonstrate that the feelings of discontent went beyond Blacks, the poor, and the radicals. It had spread among skilled workers, white-collar workers, and professionals. Perhaps for the first time in the nation's history, the lower and middle classes were also disillusioned with the system. This all led to decreasing government legitimacy:

The essence of the democratic surge of the 1960s was a general challenge to existing systems of authority, public and private. In one form or another, this challenge manifested itself in the family, the university, business, public and private associations, politics, the governmental bureaucracy, and the military services. People no longer felt the same obligation to obey those whom they had previously considered superior to themselves in age, rank, status, expertise, character or talents. (Zinn, 1980, p. 547)

All this produced problems for governance of Democracy in the 1970s.

Living for yourself, not for your predecessors or posterity or even for the future, became the prevailing passion. Older traditions of self-help atrophied, eroding everyday competence, and the individual became more and more reliant upon the State, the corporation, or other bureaucracies. Authority figures in modern society lost credibility and aggressive impulses arose to replace empathy for others. The organization man was cast aside by the bureaucratic gamesman, who avoided intimacy, pitted

himself against others, felt little loyalty to the organization, and tried to use it for his own ends. The upwardly mobile shifted their focus from technical mastery to control of players' moves. The inner-direction of previous generations was replaced by the other-directed type of today. Ambitious young men now had to compete with their peers for the attention and approval of their superiors. As success came to require more attention to youth, glamour, and novelty than it did to conscientious and competent handling of job assignments, creation of self became the highest form of creativity. This describes a way of competitive life that carries the logic of individualism to the extreme of a war of one against all and pursues happiness to a dead end, narcissistic preoccupation with self. It has been contrasted with the rugged individualist of early America:

In the nineteenth-century American imagination, the vast continent stretching westward symbolized both the promise and the menace of an escape from the past. The West represented an opportunity to build a new society unencumbered by feudal inhibitions. But it also tempted men to throw off civilization and to revert to savagery. Through compulsive industry and relentless sexual repression, Nineteenth-Century Americans achieved fragile triumph over the id. The violence they turned against the Indians and against nature originated not in unrestrained impulse but in the white Anglo-Saxon's super ego, which feared the wildness of the West because it objectified the wildness within each individual. While celebrating the romance of the frontier in their popular literature and practice, Americans imposed on the wilderness a new order designed to keep impulse in check while giving free rein to acquisitiveness. Capital accumulation in its own right sublimated appetite and subordinated the pursuit of self-interest to the service of future generations. In the heat of the struggle to win the West, the American pioneer gave full vent to his passivity and murderous cruelty, but he always envisioned the result--not without misgivings, expressed in a nostalgic cult of lost innocence--

as a peaceful, respectable, churchgoing community safe for his women and children. (Lasch, 1978, p. 10)

Early Americans lived a vigorous, instinctual, self-interested existence, but people nowadays have become so dependent upon the State, the corporation, and other bureaucracies, that they tend to be consumed by rage and inner anger for which the bureaucratic society can devise few legitimate outlets. Defenses against desire cause anger and that anger that gives rise in turn to new defenses against rage itself. The result is a people that are bland, submissive, and sociable on the outside but who seethe from anger within.

Self-Aggrandizement in the 80s

In the 1980s, the self-indulgence of the Seventies was taken a step further, as self-interest was put into action. Anecdotal examples of such self-indulgence throughout society are legion: seemingly random killings on the highways and in the movie theaters from coast-to-coast; children neglected, abused, and murdered by their parents; houses and other buildings burned in our cities for fun on Devil's Night; abortion bombings; ex-President Reagan accepting two million dollars from the Japanese for implementing policies favorable to them while he was President; the HUD/Silent Sam Pierce scandal; defective military equipment provided by dishonest suppliers; investigations of judges at all levels of the court system; destructive parties by college students numbering in the thousands; Material Girl as rock star of the 80s; the drug scourge; college football heroes fighting with police and sponsoring beer parties for the hundreds in attendance; administrators of colleges

paralyzed by the civil rights of offending sports players; debate over flag burning while so many important issues go wanting; the ethics package in Congress tied to a thirty percent pay increase; bumper stickers that read "Whoever Dies With The Most Toys Wins"; TV evangelists bilking their flock out of millions of dollars in the name of salvation; the Iran-gate sale of arms to the Ayotolla and, of course, the inability to reduce the deficit, cleanup toxic wastes, or dispose of nuclear wastes because neither special interest nor the citizenry can reach agreement.

Moreover, a 1989 survey of college students at one university shows evidence of alienation and self-indulgence: twenty-eight percent of the students almost never discussed issues of deep personal significance with an adult; fifty-two percent said that they want to learn on their own terms; fifty-five percent reported that they know someone who has values and beliefs that cannot make any sense to them; thirty-two percent stated they know someone who has made or talked about making a suicide attempt; and sixty-five percent report spending equal or more time in the social side of college than in the academic one, while only twelve percent report spending more time on the academic side; fifteen percent reported that members of the minority should adopt the values of the majority; fifty-one percent responded that they do not care about university policies concerning alcohol consumption because they consider that to be a private matter; and seventy-two percent report that the reason for their career choice is that it earns them enough to be reasonably comfortable.¹ A similar survey in 1990 of college freshmen found "making more money"

was a "very important factor" (Huer, 1990, p. 16). This attitude toward money was a big jump from twenty years earlier.

This lure of money also invades the schools, traps minority students and others, and robs them of their future. Veronica Vega, age 16, of Robert E. Lee High School in San Antonio has 20-hour days in which she spends 6.5 hours scanning groceries, six hours in school, takes care of her four year old brother, and tries to find time for homework. Finally home by 11 PM, she starts her home work at midnight and by 2 AM she is asleep on her books. The alarm is set for 6 AM, when she will dress her brother, take him to day care, and start all over. By week's end she will spend 35 hours at school, 36 hours at work, and eight hours on homework.²

Last year she was getting A's in school and played a clarinet two hours a day. She once dreamed of going to MIT and exploring the heavens for NASA, but she took a \$5 an hour job not because she needed to but because she wanted to, her grades have now turned to C's and D's and she received her first F. "I'm really messing up," she says. "I used to love school. Now I hate it" (Bensimkon, 1993, p. 76). She has started sleeping through classes, she gets sick often (mostly from stress she thinks), she has missed seven days in the last six weeks, and a volatile relationship with her mother is exacerbated by exhaustion. "I started working because I wanted to get out of the house. It's addictive. I can't stop," she says. "I have major bags under my eyes, but I don't want to give up the little luxuries I have" (p. 78). But Veronica is not unusual: 66

percent of U.S. high school students work and it is jeopardizing their futures.³

The 1980s saw an administration loosely controlled by an old, forgetful, uninspiring, but extremely popular President who had been elected twice on a platform of trickle down economics that favored private interests over the public interests. In a world where one percent of the nation owned one-third of the wealth, envy and class anger burgeoned in America. Americans wanted their share of the pie and devoted themselves to attaining it. Self-indulgence became the American credo. Economization of the world diminished and denigrated the public sphere. The values of public purpose, insofar as they were reflected in the traditional forms of government, receded as the values of private interests moved forward.

Life conceived of as a competitive struggle in which joy consists in getting ahead of one's neighbor has been called the major cause of unhappiness in America. A secondary cause is the necessity for subservience to large organizations. The bureaucratic impersonality of vast collective units submerge the individual by failing to provide for independence of mind.⁴ The Profit Ethic—economic consideration as the central feature of American culture—became a subconsciously internalized state of mind in which politics and everything else are subordinated to economics. Beginning and ending with individual self-interest, the Profit Ethic is an all encompassing and overwhelming generalization of life and thought that has no obligation to be human. This economic ethos has become such an established fact in American life that saying anything

uncomplimentary about it is positively un-American and few are conscious of greed as a factor. It cannot conceive of a value in anything unless it is visible, measurable, and obtainable in specific terms. Therefore, this ethic has no need for spirituality, morality, or humanity. What began as an explanation by Adam Smith of economic exchange in a marketplace is now the driving force behind a society and a cultural obsession. We are selfish and we are proud of it.⁵

The Profit Ethic has advanced so far in the United States that capitalism has been replaced by commercialism. As an advanced form of capitalism, commercialism is more psychological and cultural than real. It is a widespread practice and belief that money-making is the purpose of life and self-interest is the God-given nature of mankind. The total resources of government, science, and technology are devoted to the enterprise of making money:

It is the general cultural adulation of money—an almost theological acceptance of money as the supreme purpose in life. It is in the definition of life for every decent young man and woman in America; it is in the curriculum of schools and colleges . . . it is also in the theoretical and intellectual assumption of human nature that self-interest is a natural part of existence. It is . . . [not] a moral struggle between good and evil . . . [for] the issue has been generalized and moralized as an ethical system and established as a national commitment. (Huer, 1990, p. 19)

Commercialism is a national creed that dominates the soul to such an extent that freedom is perverted into a struggle to dominate, to enlarge oneself over others.

The modern commercial American even distrusts competition out of an unconscious association of it with the urge to destroy:

Hence he repudiates the competitive ideologies that flourished at an earlier stage of capitalist development. . . . He extols cooperation and teamwork while harboring deeply antisocial impulses. He praises respect for rules and regulations in the secret belief that they do not apply to himself. (Lasch, 1979, p. xvi)

This brand of American has had his own way for so long that he has no heart for the difficulties of attaining happiness. Rather, he wants it bestowed upon him because he thinks it is one of his personal rights.

Finally, the primacy of competition in the global marketplace drove out all concern for the human effects of economic decisions. Responding to criticism for moving production to Mexico to cut costs, one corporate president expressed the business credo for the Nineties: "We live in a global economy. We have to be competitive. We always hate to close a plant, but we have to do anything to survive [Emphasis supplied]" (Oniski, 1993, p. 1E). Answering a critic who raised the lack of humanity for Americans in such decisions, the same executive said, "He doesn't understand the global economy at all" (p. 1E). To the lack of humanity in paying Mexican worker's an average of \$2.50 per hour, he said their wages were not significantly lower than their U.S. counterparts.

Self-aggrandizement in the Eighties is exemplified by the Leveraged Buy Outs (LBO) of corporate raiders. In such LBOs, top management would borrow heavily to complete deals then to repay the debt they typically sold junk bonds, dismembered the companies, and eliminated jobs to cut costs. In pursuit of huge speculative profits, these new managers added no value to the corporations they dismembered, but often left them saddled with such large amounts of debt that they never recovered. For example, the twenty-five billion dollar leveraged buy out

of R.J.R. Nabisco that took place in the last year of Ronald Reagan's presidency has become a symbol of greed in the decade of the Eighties. Reportedly, R.J.R. Nabisco was making a billion dollars a year before the buy-out then it nearly went broke after. The size of the R.J.R. Nabisco deal stunned even the greedmeisters like R.J.R.'s former president. Nevertheless, other companies, such as Safeway, went through similar deals, then rushed to shrink operations and fired thousands of workers. Other riskier deals were financed with high-interest loans that were nicknamed junk bonds. Michael Milken, the darling of the Wall Street set, defrauded hundreds of millions of dollars from investors seeking profits in the private sector in junk bond deals.

Unabashed greed was a sign of the times in the Eighties and is no better illustrated than by such exploits. On April 10, 1992, Savings and Loan Officer Charles Keatings was given the maximum sentence of ten years for fraudulently selling bonds from his American Continental Corporation which he knew was unstable at the time of the sale. The decade of Oliver North's impudence and unabashed defense of his lying, and of Charles Keatings' and Ivan Boeskey's valueless rides at the top, featured the longest, uninterrupted period of growth on record, the taming of inflation, modest unemployment, modest interest rates, and entrepreneurial dynamism. However, it was also the decade when fundamental social problems were ignored, the rich grew richer, the poor got poorer, and middle class got squeezed while the deficit multiplied more than it had in all of the previous American history combined.

A crisis in ethics also began in the decade of the Eighties. From recruiting college athletes to trading stocks and bonds, from Watergate to Soonergate, from the TV evangelists to the sports training room, from the Savings and Loans boardroom to the halls of Congress, and from police chief to mayor, America underwent a national crisis in ethics, but America was not paying attention. During the same period, widespread problems existed, such as ethics, global warming, environmental contamination, disposal of toxic and nuclear wastes, drug abuse, ineffective education and the widening gap between rich and poor. Instead of engaging in broad and continued public debate aimed at devising solutions, the public practiced self-deception. Public consciousness was consumed by trivialities as a diversion from the stark reality of daily existence. Examples of trivial issues that received wide spread attention were Aspen, Colorado's ban on wearing of furs, a Constitutional Amendment to ban burning the flag, and whether or not to keep Chief Illini at the University of Illinois.

These diversions seem to act as palliatives which suppress the nagging necessity for having to decide larger issues. Daily reports of drug abuse, child abuse, highway violence, shootings in theaters, Devil's night burnings, abortion bombings, and drugged destruction on college campuses numbed the mind. Twenty years of the affects of untrammelled individualism stupified the general public, leaving them lethargic, apathetic, and completely cynical. The attitude of the Eighties is personified in the nomination of the Material Girl as the rock star of the decade and epitomized by building the 96-acre, 4.6 billion square feet, 350-store Mall of America in Bloomington, Minnesota, which some have

called the last gasp of the Eighties excess. With its fourteen cinemas and seven-acre amusement park, it is a fitting example of a decade of excess that ended with society in paralysis, unable to address the important issues of the day.

Malaise in the 90s

The madness of the Eighties continued in the Nineties as a drive-by shootings, car jackings, and dropping heavy objects from the highway overpasses onto cars passing below became the newest crime fads. Everywhere people were hurting, angry, and frightened with little reason to be hopeful after two years of economic depression in 1992. The government leaders, especially the President, had denied that there was even a recession and people felt utterly powerless--unable to control or influence decisions. In that same year, two out of three Americans believed the nation was in decline--economic, moral, and spiritual. Four in ten said working hard did not guarantee fair treatment. A majority believed that getting a good education did not insure getting a good job. Almost half said they could not count on their views being considered in the political process.⁶ Voting rates declined as most Americans obtained their political information from thirty-second sound bites. Lacking information to evaluate political claims, they were more susceptible to manipulation by emotion-laden campaign commercials, manipulative political slogans, and divisive appeals to fear and prejudice and this is exactly what the public received from the candidates. As Clinton and Gore pandered the middle class, Bush and Quayle centered their efforts on

emotional appeals to winning the peace and being an economic super power. The ill effects of a growing ethic of concern with purely personal rights became even more apparent.

By the time the 1990s arrived, public leaders were expected to be more efficient managers rather than bold leaders; they were expected to deal more with the budget's bottom line than with ethical leadership. Risk taking and controversy were to be avoided as were public statements on social issues and a passionate advocacy of principles. Public organizations likewise were thought of merely as corporate entities with the need for efficient delivery systems. Public accountability came to be defined as minimal expectations and narrow efficiency rather than social advancement and human understanding.

Public officials were expected to be CEOs of a corporate body, rationale technicians, slashing budgets and personnel, as voters refused to pay taxes even to cover the costs of services then in place. This lamentable scenario considers public employees and citizens as consumers and requires public officials to deal more with the bottom line than with compassion for pain and suffering. However, this condition is directly proportional to a preoccupation with economic questions that descended over a nation already ruled by economic decision-making. As the process of alienation and withdrawal accelerated, special interests filled the breach, shaping public policy outcomes even more than before. Thus, a vicious circle resulted in greater voter cynicism. On the 200th anniversary of the Bill of Rights, the American Bar Association reported the results of a survey that disclosed Americans do not understand freedom, civil rights,

or the Constitution.⁷ To Americans, truth became as disposable as a candy wrapper in the Nineties and standards were lowered everywhere. The lie became expected in the automobile showroom, in advertising, in politics, in the courts, and in the doctor's office where HIV patients were defrauded with quackery. Finally, the Nineties saw atomization of societies--the ethnic passion in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and intolerance and breakdown in community here. Personal rights defined action rather than tolerance and common humanity.

On January 15, 1992, the twelve nations of the European community recognized the independence of both Croatia and Slovenia. Leaders of the Serbian controlled Yugoslav government considered this edict an international breakup of Yugoslavia, and several days later fighting began between Croats and Serbs after a seven month ceasefire. That fighting continued into 1993 with a literal slaughter of Bosnian Muslims by the Serbs as Europe watched with no apparent revulsion and certainly with no action. On February 21, 1992, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution allowing for the deployment of thirteen thousand peace-keeping troops in Croatia who were largely used in relief efforts and transportation of refugees rather than military efforts. On April 7, 1992, the United States recognized the independence of the three Yugoslav republics: Bosnia-Harzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia. However, the United States did little more than the Europeans, although the country was perhaps more vocal in its denunciation of Bosnian Serb's ethnic cleansing policy than the rest of the world. Before then, more than

fifty thousand people were estimated to have died in Yugoslavia's civil war since it began in 1991.

Similarly, on June 20, 1992, Czech and Slovak leaders agreed to the formation of a national caretaker government as a prelude to dividing Czechoslovakia into two separate countries. On August 4th, the UN demanded access to Serbian detention camps after reports of torture and murder. United States officials later confirmed that Serbs executed three thousand Muslims in May and June. In the meantime, anarchy reigned in Somalia, where war and draught ravaged the nation and relief efforts, inadequate for months, were stymied by warring clans that looted food storage centers and made delivery of supplies a deadly good deed. In November, the United Nations Security Council ordered a naval blockade of Yugoslavia, stopped distributing food in Somalia, and refused to return its workers until their safety was assured. Later, the United States sent tens of thousands of troops into Somalia to protect relief workers and assist them in distribution of supplies received from around the world, but refused to intervene in any way between the Bosnian Serbs and Muslims. Only after the passage of several months and considerable public pressure, the United States began air drops of food and supplies into besieged Bosnian villages and cities.

The Nineties also saw the tumbling of the Berlin Wall and the breakup of the Soviet Union and Soviet Block. On January 2, 1992, the Russian Federation eliminated state subsidies of goods and services, causing soaring prices and riots across the country. These affects of the split were preceded by confrontations in Latvia and the Northern Balkans

as they sought independence. At first, Gorbachev and the Communist Party struggled for power, then Gorbachev and Yeltsin vied for authority, followed by Yeltsin's wrangle with the Communists, while the United States lent only lip service to support. Not until 1993 did the United States, followed by the seven leading economic powers, offer substantial aid to Russia to assist reforms and the cause of freedom.

A tide of hate, anger and rage against immigrants and ethnic groups has rushed over Germany and England as Neo-Nazi skinheads and the Neo-Fascist British National Party gain legitimacy among the mainstream. This anti-immigrant sentiment has also swept most of Western Europe as intolerance, racial hatred and viciousness intensify. In reaction to this ugliness, national boundaries are closed and doors that once offered freedom and opportunity have been slammed shut.⁸ Atomism occurred at home too and the Nineties also saw intolerance and diminution of community here as personal rights or separate interests defined action rather than tolerance and common humanity. Despite the fact that the aspirations of our pluralistic society seem to be intertwined more than ever, divisions between segments of society seem to widen. Hate crimes are on the rise nationally and reached an all-time high in 1992 in Michigan, prompting one commentator of the Michigan scene to observe:

From ethnic cleansing in Bosnia to starvation in Somalia, the gloomy litanies accumulate, shrouded in the guise of war, hate crimes, intimidation, harassment, and subtle acts of insensitivity. Meanwhile, fear and ignorance, coupled with a fair measure of herd mentality, threaten to derail constructive responses to age-old conflicts. (Jones & Baron, 1993, p. 1)

Some, such as Western Michigan University President Diether H. Haenicke and history professor Donald L. Fixico believe the most useful function of a university is to teach various diverse groups that despite separate and unique concerns, humanity shares common experiences and problems. Yet this is apparently not happening. As noted by Western Michigan University professor of public affairs and administration, Peter Kobrak, "Ninety percent of minority students study in schools that are 90 % racially segregated" (p. 1). Kobrak believes this kind of residential segregation contributes to and helps shape bigotry in America.

While these concerns suggest more social mixing is necessary, the trend seems to be the other way. Western Michigan University professor of history, Lewis H. Carlson—who specializes in the historical significance of racism and diversity—propounds a different point of view:

Throughout history, America has had a single perspective--that of the white Eurocentric male. We've been conservative, nervous, not accepting of change. The melting pot theory was one of the worst myths ever perpetuated; it denigrated cultural heritage, saying 'put aside what you were and become Americans.' (Jones & Baron, 1990, p. 1)

Yet, the cultural diversity hailed by Carlson and teaching of the virtue of tolerance seems to have the opposite effect. From cafeterias to dorm rooms racial fragmentation is spreading on college campuses. Ethnic pride and identification, not assimilation, is the chosen goal by minorities and many non-minority students are confused and resentful.⁹

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. (1992) expounds on this trend in The Disuniting of America, in which he says racial and ethnic conflict will replace ideological conflict as the explosive issue of the times. He opines

that the point of America was to forge a new culture, not to preserve old cultures. The curse of racism was the failure of this experiment; this glaring contradiction of racism still cripples America. He sees a cult of ethnicity among non-Anglo whites and among non-white minorities to denounce the melting-pot, to challenge the concept of one people, and to promote, protest and perpetuate separated ethnic and racial communities. He argues this philosophy sees America as a nation of groups rather than of individuals, and he believes that these separatist tendencies can only result in fragmentation, resegregation and tribalization of American life.

This self-segregation and rebellion against racism and the homogeneity of the melting-pot is enforced by its own brand of conformity which creates group animosity against minority students who are not for the cause.¹⁰ The legitimate goal is not group against group, but a salad bowl in which each ingredient is distinct in the mix. Minority students, as all humans, do not want to be recognized as part of an amorphous, identity-less conglomeration, but want respect for their individual and personal talents. Says University of Detroit Mercy's Lyn Lewis, chairman of the sociology department, "One of our roles is to guide. While the students may think one thing, it is incumbent upon us to broaden the students' perspective and let them know the long-range effect of certain behavior" (Gilchrist & Arellano, 1993, p. 1F). Therefore, the effort must be directed toward developing a social and individual philosophy that encourages interaction and commonalty while preserving individuality, one that recognizes human dignity in a social context.

Modernity and Beyond

Leinberger and Tucker (1991) believe that the radical materialists of the Seventies and Eighties have performed a useful public service. By living out the logic of their creed, they expose the folly of believing in a behaviorist model that every desire should be gratified and that unbridled indulgence somehow magically leads to a greater good. They ripped away illusions about the inherent goodness of the authentic inner nature of man. Leinberger and Tucker believe that the search for self-fulfillment of the radical materialist is drawing to close. The ideal of the authentic self is in retreat, having been undermined from within and attacked from all sides. In its place, is a cosmic shift in Western thinking currently underway that has many names--poststructuralism, post-modernism, discourse theory, Hermeneutics, interpretative anthropology, critical theory, and numerous others. This paradigm shift is taking place among the offspring of the organization man, and it questions the pervasive ideology of individualism and the problematical nature of self-fulfillment. Out of the slow and agonizing death of the authentic self, there is arising a new social character based upon the concept of person rather than self. The change in emphasis to person refers to an evolving conception of what constitutes an individual and indeed makes someone an individual. It is an individualism predicated not on self which connotes a phenomenon that is inner and isolated, but upon person which is external and connected to the world. The self-contained individualism of the past is being replaced by an ensembled type of individualism:

'The core of cultural values, freedom, responsibility, and achievement are all assumed to require self-contained individualism for their realization. In the current climate of world life economic competition, many have become to question the strength of American character and to advocate firming up its individualistic base in order to make America more competitive in global markets. In other words, people have not challenged the centrality of self contained individualism, but rather its failure to have been properly nurtured. The ensembled type of individualism is either not mentioned in these discussions about restoring American greatness or . . . is criticized for undermining those very qualities said to be central to our national success.' (Leinberger & Tucker, 1991, p. 419)

Leinberger and Tucker believe that, prescriptive calls for self-contained individualism notwithstanding, the new person is the kind of dominant social character we are likely to get and the challenge of coming decades will lie not in trying to whip people back into shape, but in understanding them and not in trying to protect organizations from them, but in accommodating organizations to them. Seeing how narratives of care may humanly be elaborated in a mobile and fragmented society is the way to begin to restore American competitiveness as well as American compassion.

Jencks (Gans et al., 1979) recognizes that Anglo-American economic thought for the past three hundred years has been dominated by the cynical view that all attempts to reduce the prevalence of selfishness are utopian. Instead, efforts have concentrated on trying to limit the damaging consequences of pervasive selfishness. In this vision, society is simply a machine for resolving conflicts between selfish individuals and perhaps in helping them to pursue shared objectives more effectively. It is not a system for making people less selfish or reshaping their selfish

impulses. Jencks says that Thomas Hobbes was the first theorist to argue that society could be organized around entirely selfish motives. Later, of course, our own system of government came to be built around the same assumptions and ideals.

Leinberger and Tucker also explicate the social character described in David Riesman's book The Lonely Crowd. According to Riesman, the tradition-directed character type predominated in traditional societies, the inner-directed type predominated in nineteenth-century America, and the other-directed type came to dominate by the time Riesman was writing. Shame guided tradition-directed individuals, guilt guided inner-directed individuals, and anxiety guided other-directed individuals. Each of these character types represented a mode of conformity. To these three historical modes of conformity, Leinberger and Tucker add a fourth; the subject-directed character type. This character is remarkably, even alarmingly, open-ended—like the culture he or she inhabits. This new social character is headed down a course between subjection and subjectivity and operates on a model of the individual traditionally gendered as female. It does not fit the picture of either the hardy-self-reliant individualist of pre-organization-man days or of the enviable authentic self that arose in reaction to him.

Giddens (1991) attributes existential isolation to modernity. He defines modernity as the institutions and modes of behavior first established in post-feudal Europe, but which became increasingly world-historical in their impact during the twentieth century. He states that modernity can be understood as roughly equivalent to the industrialized

world, taking industrialism to refer to the social relations implied in the widespread use of material power and machinery in production processes. A second dimension of modernity is capitalism, where that term is used to describe of system of commodity production involving both competitive product markets and the commodification of labor power. Giddens says that new mechanisms of self-identity are shaped by and also shape the institutions of modernity. He believes modernity institutionalizes radical doubt and insists that all knowledge takes the form of hypotheses; that is, claims which may very well be true are always open to revision and may at some point have to be abandoned. This modern world in which we now live is for Giddens quite distinct in profound respects from that inhabited by human beings in previous periods of history. He believes modernity is in many ways a single world, having a unitary framework of experience, yet at the same time it is one which creates new forms of fragmentation and dispersal.

Giddens finds that personal meaningless--the feeling that life has nothing worthwhile to offer--is a fundamental problem in late modernity. This existential isolation is not so much a separation of individuals from others as a separation from the moral resources necessary to live a full and satisfying existence. Giddens believes that the world of late modernity produces a situation in which humankind in some respects becomes a we facing problems and opportunities where there are no others. He sees unifying features in modernity that establish a single world where none existed previously. Giddens sees self-identity and globalization as two poles of the dialectic of the local and global as a result of conditions of

modernity. Giddens disagrees with Baumeister's and Durkheim's claims that the search for self-identify is a modern problem with its origins in Western individualism. He rejects the idea that each person as a unique character with special potentialities was alien to pre-modern culture. He holds the view that individuality has been valued--within varying limits--in all cultures throughout history.

Giddens sees the overriding emphasis of modernity as subordination of the world to human dominance. This control orientation combined with the internal self-referencing system of modernity results in what Giddens calls the sequestration of experience. The sequestration of experience is characterized by a movement of modernity on the level of individual experience away from guilt, so that self-development in modernity occurs under conditions lacking moral conscience and containing substantial moral deprivation.

In response to modernity, Giddens advocates an emancipatory politics, which is essentially a politics of others. In Giddens' emancipatory politics, freedom and responsibility stand in balance. The individual is liberated from constraints, but is not thereby rendered free in any absolute sense. Therefore, emancipatory politics attempts to assist the individual in developing an inner-authenticity, or framework of basic trust according to which life is understood as a unity against the backdrop of shifting social events. Such emancipatory politics essentially concern public debate of existential questions. Repressed existential issues relating to the moral parameters of existence are actively recovered and brought forward into public debate. To combat the impacts of modernity, Giddens also

advocates in place of a self-reverential lifestyle one based on pure relationships. This lifestyle of pure relationships is based upon trust, commitment, and intimacy, in which the individual does not simply recognize the other, but finds self-identity in negotiations and development of intimacy with others.

Lindblom (1990) observes that most treatises on social problem solving expect good problem solvers not to pursue the will of God or some other abstract ideal, but rather the satisfaction of human dispositions called preferences, wants, needs, or interests. However, Lindblom believes that neither preferences nor wants nor needs nor interests sufficiently specify just what it is that people pursue when engaged in problem solving. Rather, he believes that to identify or formulate a social problem requires not simply cold rationality, but some sensitivity of feeling or effect with respect to other people that develops only in social interaction. This requires the problem solvers to bring their own values into the equation. In America, Lindblom says these values include such attitudes and beliefs as hostility to socialism, endorsement of competitive personal relations, belief that freedom depends on private enterprise, and private values as distinguished from social group, political, or religious moral values. Lindblom believes such values result in mutual impairment, unending exercises in coercion, intimidation, obfuscation, disorientation, and suppression of information.

In response to this situation, Lindblom posits two prescriptive models. The first is what he calls the vision model, which is as old as Plato, of a scientifically-guided society. This model is well-articulated in

Francis Bacon's idealization of science, in Descartes' insistence on proof and rational design, in Saint-Simon's administration of things, in early twentieth-century American progressivism, and in Marxist scientific socialism. However, the alternative model, one he calls the self-guiding society, has not been well-defined in the history of thought. Self-guiding society is based upon lay investigation of social problems that may be beyond hope of solution or amelioration because political functionaries or ordinary citizens will not recognize or bear the costs of a remedy. In the self-guiding society, there are no correct solutions and the usual test of a good solution is whether it has been well-thought out, rather than whether it achieves an approximation to the correct solution. The self-guiding model also tries to step toward amelioration by accepting errors as part of learning and by envisaging a constant reconsideration and redefinition of methods for dealing with problems. It acknowledges the impossibility of anyone ever achieving a full grasp of the relevant complexities and accepts the fact that society sometimes compels action in ignorance. It rejects the model of political, expert, or scientific elites guiding social change or problem solving and views those as methods of social control and of man's mastery.

The self-guiding model also considers how to distribute power or the capacity to impose it in an appropriate way rather than entertain hopes of minimizing its use. In a self-guiding society, problem solving emerges not always from deliberation or design, but as by-products of people's attention to other concerns or problems. The model does not regard society as a purposive organization and postulates a great deal of indeterminacy. The

advocates of this model call neither for harmonious anarchy nor benevolent authority, but for institutions and leadership that will accept a citizenry of investigators who use politics to reach problem solutions. The self-directing society also is multi-pluralistic, but relies heavily upon mutual adjustment which reaches outcomes through interaction among a multiplicity of problem solvers or decision makers, all partisan participants. The self-directing society rejects the myth of the non-partisan decision maker and realistically accepts the fact that policy is arrived at through the contestation of multiple partisan participants.

Coser (1991) argues, in contrast to the view that a plurality of social roles is a source of alienation, that alienation is likely to occur where the conditions for individuation are absent. Alienation occurs in modern organizations mainly at the lower rungs of the hierarchy where workers are not offered the opportunity of multiple and complex social relationships. Coser believes that people develop a notion of who and what they are in interaction with others, a process in which confirmation is sought and modification is achieved step-by-step. This a process of socialization, or progressive development and the understanding of interpersonal relationships.

According to Coser, understanding others, or acquiring the ability to put oneself in the position of others, is the essence of social interaction. This perspective to see things relatively is an important landmark in the development of individuation. Individuation is the awareness of who one is in relation to others. This individuation occurs when a person makes the effort to differentiate and to synthesize an array of relationships

in different demands, expectations, and orientations. According to Coser, poverty and powerlessness are the main sources of alienation, rather than plurality of life worlds forced upon each individual by modernity.

Summary

Something has to account for the slavery and conquest that dominated the early period of U.S. history. There must be a cause for the ancestral belief in the right to enslave one population and destroy another. Dogged insistence upon pushing the national boundaries in spite of the war, suffering, and hardship that resulted must have an explanation. In this search for meaning, the most significant observation from early U.S. history is the persistent survival of separatist forces that tend to atomize the polity into helpless, functionless, non-principled, solitary drifters without unitary purpose. These forces were present at the drafting of the Mayflower Compact, they attended the signing of the Declaration of Independence, they relentlessly drove the national boundaries westward, they fueled the Civil War, and they embraced industrialism and laissez-faire capitalism. Separatist forces line the path between individualism and social solidarity continually agitating for excess of the former over the latter. In the developing U.S. these forces were fear, status, rights, property, wealth, conformity, freedom, religion, destiny, and intolerance. They interacted to create certain consequences first leading to independence from Britain and then propelling the U.S. toward anarchy several more times: the rapid expansion of the western frontier and decimation of the Indian population was a lawless frenzy; the

Civil War was an obvious rebellion to perpetuate enslavement; the industrial abuses of the late 1800s, depression in the 1890s, and subsequent labor revolts brought bloodshed and suffering; and the 1920s saw criminals become heroes. America seems to have adopted Calvinism's tendency to anarchy without its sense of individual responsibility. These unstable conditions and the separatist forces giving rise to them evolved from beliefs born in the country's Puritan past, harbored during its industrialization, and brought to full bloom in the modern era.

Puritanism's economic reality, or mercantile outlook, and a philosophy of abundance seem to have combined and strengthened one another resulting in idealization of business, a myopic view of the common good, and a degeneration of politics and government. Puritan communalism was abandoned for incessant personal striving. The individual was awarded priority over the collective, but the purely personal was given priority over a transcendental individual. Individualism came to mean personal particularity rather than singularity of thought. The populace became risk takers in terms of physical safety and economic reward, but not in intellectual terms. There was a failure to nurture the Puritan soul of the concrete individual and its internal realities of prudence, self-consciousness, and memory; and human prerogatives were elevated above the integrity of the human soul. A substitution of status as the justification for wealth replaced Puritanism's godliness, without acceptance of the latter's responsibility, duty, or guilt. America adopted Puritan pragmatism, but not its rigid ethics.

The Early Americans were emancipated from dependence, but self-reliance became a disability as inability to accept others led to loneliness and intolerance. They accepted religion, but lacked spirituality and refused to learn anything from the Indian culture except that which worked for survival. The practice of democratic freedoms flourished without democracy's equality of human interests. Hypocrisy, duality, and duplicity were characteristics when it came to either racial equality or tolerance of the Indian population. Faction was practiced as a personal right before the Mayflower Compact, after which conformance to majority rule was made a civil obligation.

That which is worth saving from this period are: the Puritan and Native American value of shared concerns; the Calvinist and Puritan sense of individual responsibility; the Puritan recognition of the integrity and soul of the concrete individual with its internal realities, constitutional protections for minorities and direct connection to the individual citizen; the graciousness, tenderness, beauty, contemplation, social intercourse, and singularity of thought of Jeffersonian Republicans; the altruism of the Antebellum reformers; the realism of the Progressives; plus the prudence of purpose, sober reflection and energy of the good Puritan pilot. These qualities of the early American spirit--unlike the usual reverence paid to self-reliance, industriousness, hard work, determination, competition, rugged individualism, faith, and pragmatism--can form a solid foundation for a fresh determination of the proper balance between social unity and unfettered individual action.

This study of individualism in modern America discloses a paradox of parallel forces that must be resolved to stay on the quest for happiness in the future. That paradox is as old as humanity itself; that of striking an appropriate balance between stifling conformity and atomistic individualism. During the years of the developing U.S., the balance favored economic expansion and intensive personal striving for material advance. This may have been an appropriate balance for that period of unlimited resources and geographical expansion, though the legacy of the native American strongly suggests otherwise. When one had despoiled or no longer enjoyed the environment then, one could pack-up and leave it behind in that day and age.

In the modern U.S., self-interest that was supposed to play the role of virtue in America, became the dominant view for individual action. Instead of recognizing as the Founders did that self-interest was a real but destructive force in the world that required other real countervailing action, modern Americans abandoned any effort to contain it. Ignorance or misunderstanding of the Founders' negative perception of self-interest led modern Americans to mistake that earlier realistic recognition of it in U.S. culture--by attempting to use it in the role of virtue--as positive legitimation for a credo of self-interest in public policy and personal conduct. Accordingly, self-interest climbed from playing the role of virtue to being a virtue in American life, and aspiration to moral excellence was eclipsed by the modern conception of self.

While self-interest could assume this mantle without debilitating effects when resources were limitless and confrontation of problems could

be avoided or ignored by moving-on, it no longer works that way. Self-interest as it is practiced in modern America has resulted in certain negative forces associated with modernity. Racism in modern America has replaced conquest of the Wild West. Hate has replaced the old intolerance, and greed has replaced wealth and status. In addition, the forces of conformity, alienation, and obsession with personal rights have become powerful rivals for predominance in the American psyche. Americans and their leaders must confront the forces of modernity and develop methods for ameliorating them. One step in this extraordinarily difficult task is adoption by every American of a philosophy honoring human dignity and prizing social responsibility to govern personal action and public policy. The following explication of authentic individualism is one such model for individual conduct that attempts to alleviate the destructive excesses of conformity and individualism.

Rather, than viewing these forces as countervailing one another at opposite ends of the spectrum, authentic individualism conceives them as parallel forces. Like electromagnetic field lines, these forces intertwine one another in a helical pattern. The function of the public administrator is to steer the straight field lines about which these forces spiral. Authentic individualism attempts to avoid dependence on either and draws only enough source energy from each of these forces to make that course feasible.

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CHAPTER IX

CHANGING THE PARADIGM

Synopsis

Many thoughtful people believe science and technology can greatly change the course of economic and social evolution. But science must be coupled with a world view that recognizes the importance of enhancing human dignity before it can be a powerful force for good. Big Bang cosmology, central to all current theories of matter and energy, sees much the same universe as medieval scholars did--a finite cosmos created ex nihilo, from nothing, perfection of which is impossible, and which is degenerating to a final end. St. Augustine included this view in his doctrine of creation ex nihilo, a profoundly pessimistic and authoritarian world view denigrating all earthly endeavor and condemning material existence. Before Einstein's Relativity in 1905 and quantum physics, Western humanity believed the universe to be composed of solid objects occupying empty space. This Newtonian-Cartesian view of matter as inert substance, formed and shaped by external forces, became deeply ingrained in Western culture and led to a view of humans as no more than a collection of material particles--skin encapsulated objects--with no necessary relation to one another.

Changes in cosmology such as particle physics and thermal dynamics are molding a transformation that sees an infinite universe

evolving and changing over infinite time. This toward-the-future outlook can encourage social progress, offer renewed hope, and provide the motivation human beings need to join together in collective efforts rather than to fragment into the anarchy of self-centered groups. An evolving universe of which humankind is a part is a powerful concept for religion and science, but it requires a primary human component as the guiding inspiration.

Moreover, modern medical theory does not divide sensing from understanding as the Cartesian separation of mind (soul) and body (materiality). What one perceives and feels about the perception (mind) affects the body and its health. Consciousness impinges upon tissues at the cellular levels. The non-material mind influences the material brain and body, and vice versa.

These new ways of looking at the universe, the mind, and the body demonstrate that, important though it is, a purely objective, scientific, quantitative, and mechanistic framework of understanding reality is insupportable. A new world view is emerging in which reality is more subjective in the sense that man is inextricably intertwined with nature and one another so that he does not conceptually stand apart from it or others and has no right to dominate over it or them. In this vein, two streams of philosophy--one anti-scientific, the other tending toward scientism--merged in existential phenomenology, which views man intersubjectively, or being-through-others. This making-one-another-be is the indispensable condition for an authentic, personal existence. In such a framework, rights are not personal possessions to be played like trump

cards, but are concepts for the way you treat others derived from human dignity.

It seems that individualism is rapidly leading into anarchy, not because of too much attention to nonconformity, but because of losing moral consensus, a sense of community, willingness to sacrifice for a shared future, and understanding that competition, isolation and top-gun status does not provide meaning or dignity to human life. Creating unique individuals cuts off from others and makes strangers without community or cosmos. This is a clarion call for a paradigm of cultivation to replace the old, outworn Lockean individualist one. Instead, public administration needs a new identity to replace the management paradigm within which it has operated for more than a century. After all, as Wallace Sayer (Chandler, 1987a) has already noted, business and public administration are alike in all unimportant respects. Likewise, Gary L. Wamsley et al. (Chandler, 1987a) observed in the Blacksburg manifesto that public administration is more than generic management; it is administration of public affairs in a political context.

A new concept of reality should be substituted for the old that recognizes limits on autonomy and control. In search of such a philosophy, it is paramount to account for the incontrovertible fact that all life is kin and only about .1% difference in the DNA of a human (99.9% is held in common) distinguishes one from another. We are all vastly more alike than we are different. The age old philosophical problem is to find a syncretic balance between the individual and the collective, the few and the many, the majority and the faction, the Wild Heart and the

conformist. The authentic individualism paradigm developed in this paper is an attempt to find such a syncretic balance in a synthesis of the individual from Western philosophy and United States history.

Authentic individualism rejects the Newtonian-Cartesian mechanistic view of the universe and human existence as self-contained objects occupying empty space. Authentic individualism is evolutionary--not in the sense of static activity or inert substance waiting for change to evolve--but in the sense of individual development and change on a daily basis. Humans are more than mere parts of a machine, or even of a process; they are the process, the focus and the ends-in-themselves. Authentic individualism sheds the pessimism, finality and futility of conventional cosmology and existentialist philosophy in pursuit of a optimistic look toward-the-future view of humanity. It struggles to escape the restrictive effects of pure reason in scientific and economic approaches to problem-solving and decision-making. Competition and particularity demand change rather than reverence; they are part of the problem, not the solution.

Authentic individualism retains primacy of the individual whom it teaches to become other-interested. Instead of social duties owed to society, obligations of freedom more like Thomism's natural virtues are owed one another out of respect for human life and individual worth. Though the single individual is the starting point of all humankind, that single individual is the result of a universal process and shares kinship with everything and everyone. As a result, one owes responsibility to

others as to one's self for the common origin and dignity all inherit from nature.

Within a framework of limits and moderation rights are concomitant; that is, they are bestowed on one another by individuals who respect their shared dignity and common origin. An individual's chief duty is not to serve himself while avoiding interference with the rights of others, but to assure concomitant rights are respected by looking out for the well-being of others. Therefore, authentic individualism derides market-oriented, laissez-faire theory in favor of an active, positive, and compassionate state devoted to the well-being of its citizens rather than their economic status.

It is an Other-world in which human conduct is governed not by expectations of others, but conduct is directed toward development of self and others. While authentic individualism accepts the developmental nature of man's ethical conscience, it discards absolute freedom as the expression of man's essence. Rather, it adopts human dignity as the moral norm and embraces the notion that law is only the minimal expression of man's obligations to others. The individual is prior to society in the sense that attributes of humanity reside in each person.

Instead of Madisonian self-interest in the role of virtue, the moral sense of personal conscience must be nurtured and developed to understand and accept a world of common origin and shared human interests. The harsh, compassionless profit orientation of the business mind becomes the Other-world of human commonalty and public good. Separatist and divisive feelings are ameliorated by habituating a practice of

exhibiting the concrete, authentic, caring individual soul in every-day face-to-face encounters.

Need for a New World View

Both modern and historical accounts of murder and mayhem, racism, exploitation, political terror and human atrocities barely leave room to harbor any good feelings about human nature:

A person who contemplates this endless litany of tragedy and misery would be pardoned for concluding that man is at best a selfish and aggressive animal whose predatory instincts are only partially and occasionally controlled by some combination of powerful institutions and happy accidents. He would agree with the famous observation of Thomas Hobbes that in their natural state men engage in a war of all against all. In this respect they are worse than beasts; whereas the animals of the forest desire only sufficient food and sex, humans seek not merely sufficient but abundant resources. Men strive to outdo one another in every aspect of life, pursuing power and wealth, pride and fame, beyond any reasonable measure. (Wilson, 1993, p. 1)

The need for a change in point of view in strictly human terms inside and outside of public administration could not be more poignantly demonstrated than in the words of the suicide note found in the briefcase of White House counsel Vincent Foster, that said: "Here ruining people is considered sport."¹ Many thoughtful people fear that problems have become too big to handle, that human nature prevents us from dealing with them, and that humanity has lost its way.

Cosmos and Society

Scientific thought and technology can greatly change the course of economic and social evolution. Science is inextricably tied to ideas about society, including religion; events on earth affect ideas about the universe; and social evolution and cosmology are closely intertwined, one affecting the other. Since the beginning of scientific inquiry, man has sought a Theory of Everything--a single set of equations, or first principles, that will explain all the phenomena of nature, including human behavior. In the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, European society reached its limits and was in deep crisis. Helped by science and resultant new thinking, the populace came to see that the old order was not divinely ordained. A new society of merchant, manufacturer, worker, and free peasant replaced the old order of lord and serf. Challenging authority, the scientific revolution offered in place of the finite, fixed, and limited medieval cosmos of the popes and kings an infinite universe and abolition of limits on mankind's achievements. In the seventeenth century, Thomas Hobbes applied the new science of his time to philosophy and politics by trying to explain humans as simple collections of discrete particles obeying the laws of physics. One hundred years ago Lord Kelvin stated that all the main problems of physics had been solved and only further accuracy "in the last decimal place" (Lerner, 1991, p. 3) was needed. He and Hobbes were obviously wrong, yet today we again hear scientists such as Stephen Hawking claiming a Theory of Everything is within their grasp.

At the end of the second millennium, Western society again stands at a crossroads and the future depends upon what people think and how they view the universe:

Over the past few years hundreds of people have expressed the belief that humanity is at a crossroads, facing either collective annihilation or an evolutionary jump in consciousness of unprecedented proportions. It seems that we are all involved in a process that parallels the psychological death and rebirth that so many people have experienced individually in non-ordinary states of consciousness. If we continue to act out the destructive tendencies from our deep unconscious, we will undoubtedly destroy ourselves and all life on our planet. However, if we succeed in internalizing this process on a large enough scale, it might result in evolutionary progress that can take us as far beyond our present condition as we now are from the primates. (Grof, 1992, p. 220)

Even as the Stalinist model in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe demonstrates its own inadequacy, it appears that Western society has begun to retreat as well. In the United States, Western Europe and Japan real wages are stagnant or falling. Average real wages in America have retreated to levels of the Fifties since their peak in 1973 and the median American family with two incomes earned less in 1989 than a single-income family did twenty years earlier.² As wages have fallen, leisure has dropped from twenty-six hours per week to sixteen and two hundred billion dollars in profits per year is diverted to corporate takeovers. This reversal of social advance has become global and all encompassing. In Europe, unemployment has been at or near ten percent for a decade. Factories around the globe are shutting down and steel production per capita dropped forty-four percent in the past fifteen years.³

Millions die of anarchy, malnutrition and disease in Africa and, simultaneous with economic decline, comes environmental degradation

in the form of deforestation, ozone depletion, air and water pollution, acid rain, and nuclear waste disposal. Modern capitalist countries have reached the limits of expansion. As Rome needed new slaves and feudal kingdoms needed new land, the expanding United States needed ever greater resources and the capitalists need new markets. The medicine that once healed now threatens to destroy; our strength is now tearing us apart. When hope is gone and social bonds disintegrate in an individualistic world, an orgy of greed, selfishness, aimlessness, and despair gains influence.

Cosmology studies how the universe as a whole—the entire physical world of space, time, and matter—came to exist, and how it will end. Conventional cosmology adds credibility to the counsels of despair today just as Augustine's cosmology did in fourth-century Rome and gives a scientific veneer and cosmic endorsement to the pessimism and despair in the prevailing ideas of leading thinkers today. The Big Bang of cosmology—the idea that the universe originated in a single cataclysmic explosion some ten or twenty billion years ago popularized in the pessimistic Fifties and Sixties—has become central to astronomy and all current theories of the basic structure of matter and energy. This old cosmology reinforces, and is reinforced by, society's dominate ideas, and the Existentialist ethos in which humans are alienated from the universe is the leitmotif of modern science.

Big Bang theorists see much the same universe as medieval scholars did—a finite cosmos created *ex nihilo*, from nothing, perfection of which is impossible, and which is degenerating to a final end. This

modern cosmic myth arose in a period of social crisis and retreat and bred a fatalistic pessimism. St. Augustine included the doctrine of creation ex nihilo as part of a profoundly pessimistic and authoritarian world view denigrating all earthly endeavor and condemning material existence. He interpreted the fall of Rome to the Visigoths as a consequence of cosmic decline beginning out of nothing and returning to nothing, with time and not in time. Similarly, by positing an end to all things, conventional cosmology implies one of two philosophical stances; a blind existential pessimism of humanity condemned to a meaningless existence, or a dualistic faith like the Middle Ages, finding meaning only in the world beyond. The social crisis of the present century gives credence to this old philosophical view.

Cosmologists are nearly unanimous in the belief that the universe originated in an immense explosion of an infinitely hot, point-like ball, or a singularity,⁴ smaller than the tiniest atom. In one-trillionth of a second all space, matter, and energy was created as the singularity expanded a trillion-trillionfold. This undoubtedly fantastic and bizarre concept dooms human purposes to decay, and hostile, alien forces in a universe that is a one-way street from explosive start to ignominious end. In this model, the future of the universe is doomed either to an end in the Big Crunch, collapsing into a universal black hole from which not even light can escape, or to expand and decay into the entropic nothingness of eternal, cold darkness. Wound up twenty billion years ago, the universe is now running down as is human progress on earth, progress or evolution is at best an accident, and decay will finally triumph.

The principles governing such a universe are only known by pure reason, guided by authority. Soon scientists will have discovered a Theory of Everything which will mark the final chapter in the quest for knowledge. In order to do so, they will rely on extraordinarily complicated mathematical models that no lay person and few scientists will understand and that cannot be duplicated for empirical observation. When they arrive at such a theory, scientists will be the experts of existence--new High Priests of reality--science will be indistinguishable from mythology, authority will be back in vogue with a new kind of King on the throne, and the populace will receive the word to be taken on faith from scientific authority. Yet this cannot be considered an inevitable phenomenon or ultimate limit upon human achievement. New ideas of an emerging scientific revolution bring an entirely different outlook.

Changes in the fields of cosmology, particle physics, and thermal dynamics are molding a transformation of how science views the universe.⁵ An opposing view to the Big Bang theory, plasma cosmology, sees an infinite universe evolving and changing over infinite time. In plasma cosmology there is no answer in science and no final authority, the universe is evolving from an infinite past to an infinite future, and human development is merely the latest stage of continual progress through unlimited time, so the very idea of an end to history is ludicrous. This new cosmology replaces Newton's universe with an open future that recognizes the creative and progressive nature of vast physical processes. No sharp division is drawn between living and non-living systems and the origin of life is seen as one step along the path of organization of

matter into ever more complex structures. This toward-the-future outlook encourages social progress, offers renewed hope, and provides the motivation human beings need to join together in collective efforts rather than to fragment into the anarchy of self-centered groups. The idea of an evolving universe, of which humankind is a part, is a powerful concept for religion and science.

Some say the Big Bang is a scientific version of Genesis, a universe created in a instant; therefore, the work of a creator. For these advocates the new cosmology eliminates the moment of creation and they argue that a deity precludes the idea of a universe infinite in time and space. Like medieval orthodox, they believe an infinite universe challenges the authority and infinite perfection of the deity. On the other hand, their opponents believe only a universe without limits is worthy of an infinite God and human beings in search of infinite knowledge. For these advocates, the moment of creation was simply development of order, not out of nothing, but out of the formless void of preexistent chaos, the waters of Genesis. For them, the universe of plasma cosmology lacks not only a beginning, but an end as well. This view avoids an end in the scorching heat of the Big Crunch or the frozen expansion of entropy and replaces it with an optimistic view of continual evolution and development. It, therefore, seems much more consistent with the concept of a compassionate and loving God; certainly more so than one that envisions a moment in the remote future when the last living being in the universe goes up in flames or is frozen to death in lonely, dark silence. The Big Bang reduces God to page turner in a history already written.

The Mechanistic Universe

Before development of Einstein's Theory of Relativity in 1905 and the rise of quantum physics, Western humanity believed the universe to be composed of solid objects occupying empty space. Newtonian-Cartesian science viewed the universe strictly as deterministic mechanical events, governed by cause and effect. This view led to mechanism as a belief system, which itself can be traced to Ancient Greece, but Sir Isaac Newton and his contemporaries of the seventeenth century gave it modern impetus. This Newtonian-Cartesian mechanistic paradigm, or conceptual scheme, interpreted the physical universe as merely a collection of material particles interacting in a gigantic purposeless machine, to which the human body and mind were insignificant.

The basic elements of this material universe were atoms, compelled to move in an orderly manner by fixed laws. Mankind exerted no influence and had only to discover the laws governing the machine. In this view, the notion of matter as inert substance, formed and shaped by external forces, became deeply ingrained in Western culture and often led to machine-mindedness, the tendency when looking for explanations to conceive of every situation by analogy to a machine. This image of the universe conceived of human beings and other life as accidental by-products that coalesced from a swirling, dazzling array of matter. Humans were no more than a collection of material particles, bounded by an outer surface—skin encapsulated objects. Consequently, Western populations inherited the tendency to think of themselves in everyday life as

autonomous, individual physical bodies with fixed and absolute boundaries. Humans simply occupied space with no relationship to their surroundings in any transcendental manner, and the differences between self and others made each individual sovereign and singular. Until recently, Newtonian science and Cartesian philosophy nurtured a very limited view of human beings.

Now an exciting new vision of the cosmos and human nature is emerging that has extraordinary meaning for individual and collective life. First, relativity theory exposed the universe to shifting and warping. In Einstein's Theory of Relativity, space is not three-dimensional, time is not linear, and space and time are not separate but are integrated into a four-dimensional continuum known as space-time. Viewed in the space-time of relativity theory, the earth's orbit is not a closed ellipse but is shaped like a coiled spring, or helix, extending through time. This occurs because each orbit of the sun finds the earth returning to the same place, but in a different time, advancing a year along the time axis for each orbit. From this perspective, boundaries between objects and distinctions between matter and space are less distinct. Instead of objects simply occupying empty spaces, the complete universe is seen as one never-ending field of varying density. The universe is an infinitely complex system of vibratory phenomena rather than an agglomerate of Newtonian objects.⁶

Second, newly discovered subatomic particles exhibit strange behavior that defies Newtonian principles. In place of Newton's deterministic machine and rigid rules of causality, quantum theory

substitutes an invisible and conflicting conjunction of waves and particles governed by the laws of chance. Called the wave-particle paradox, quantum particles behave in some experiments as material entities, and in others they appear with wave-like properties. In the so-called double-slit experiment, electrons pass through two slits in a wall simultaneously as if they are wavelike, but they strike a fluorescent screen in a single location as if they are particles. In fact, it even seems that the state in which these particles are observed and their location is not determined until the observation takes place.⁷ The behavior of particles such as electrons seems to vary according to whether they are watched or not and, in this context, the observer plays an active role in creating the reality itself. Thus, quantum physics presents a picture of reality in which observer and observed are inextricably interwoven in an intimate way and the effect of observation is fundamental to revealed reality. Quantum field theory reveals solid matter dissolving away to be replaced by weird excitations and vibrations of invisible field energy in which little difference remains between material substance and apparently empty space that itself "seethes with ephemeral quantum activity" (Davies, 1992, p. 14). The extreme proponents of this phenomena have even developed an extremely individualistic participating universe philosophy in which observers are central to the nature of physical reality and matter is ultimately relegated to the mind. Yet the quantum non-locality principle--in which all quantum particles exert influence on all other quantum particles--forbids one from considering even widely separated particles as independent

entities. Instead, "[t]he universe is in reality an interconnected whole" (Davies & Gribbon, 1992, p. 157).

Mind and Body

The Cartesian separation of mind (soul) and body (materiality) is not supported by modern medical thinking, which is coming to recognize the influence each has over the other. What one perceives and feels about a perception (mind) affects the body and its health. Consciousness impinges upon tissues at the cellular levels and the non-material mind influences the material brain and body, and vice versa.

Modern medical theory does not divide sensing from understanding. The brain's function is to extract the constant, invariant features of objects from the perpetually changing flood of information. This interpretation process is an inextricable part of sensation. The brain does not merely analyze images; it actively constructs a visual world.⁸ Therefore, the acquisition of visual knowledge cannot be separated from consciousness, because the latter is a property of the complex neural apparatus that the brain has developed to acquire knowledge.⁹

The brain uses past experiences (either its own, or that of distant ancestors embedded in our genes) to interpret incoming information. This computation of symbolic representation is largely unconscious.¹⁰ Accordingly, the unconscious can affect the conscious¹¹ as well as the body itself.¹² Learning can produce anatomic changes in nerve cells. The brain constructs cortical maps that are subject to constant modification based on use of the sensory pathways. Since all individuals are subject to different

environments, are exposed to different combinations of stimuli, and exercise sensory and motor skills in different ways, the actual architecture of each brain is different. This, along with unique genetic make-up, contributes to a biological basis for the expression of individuality.¹³

Moreover, the brain does not merely register external reality, but records concepts in the form of dormant records that, when reactivated, recreate varied sensations and actions associated with the particular entity or category of entities, such as those associated with the smell of brewing coffee.¹⁴ Memory consists of multiple components constructed around a network of neurons that access representational knowledge. This knowledge, or inner model of reality, governs behavior and is continuously updated along neural pathways to reflect changing environment and demands of incoming information. If the neural pathways fail, the brain views the world as a series of unconnected events rather than a continuous sequence.¹⁵

Spears Of Odin

Even if they have not actually seen them, most everyone has heard of the aurora borealis, or northern lights, a shimmering, often multi-colored, ever shifting curtain of light sometimes broken into spikes and streamers that move across the sky. The Vikings named these apparitions the Spears of Odin. Caused by electrical currents and magnetic fields, they provide the first glimpse of the plasma universe, the waters. Electromagnetism, the archetypal quantum field theory, helps explain the aurora and the universe. Powerful electrical fields can be generated by

moving an electrical conductor through a magnetic field. Ionized gases, or plasma, can act as a conductor by carrying an electrical current, a process that supplies energy for the auroral currents. Gases flowing past a magnetic field can act as a conductor generating an electrical field, distorting the plasma in the process, and pulling electrons in one direction and protons in another. As solar particles--protons and electrons--reach the earth's magnetic field an electrical potential results. Protons and electrons flow in opposite directions, spiraling along the earth's magnetic field lines down into the ionosphere and back again to complete the circuit. When they hit atoms in the ionosphere, the atoms are excited into powerful auroral storms.¹⁶

This is similar to the process building the structure of the universe according to plasma cosmology. The plasma universe is formed and controlled by electricity and magnetism, not just gravitation. Vast electrical and magnetic forces on a galactic scale account for the size, texture, and age of the universe. As electrically charged particles travel along magnetic field lines, some spiral around field lines as others move exactly along those lines of the magnetic field. Together they form a complex pattern of helical paths concentrated into spiraling filaments of plasma, current and magnetic field in an electromagnetic tornado. These filaments are wires carrying current in vortices of plasma that are twisted together like wisps of cotton spun and twisted into thread. The universe is a gigantic power grid with huge electrical current flowing in filamentary wire stretching across the cosmos.¹⁷ This picture of the solar system

created by plasma processes is incongruous, filamentary, dynamic, complex, and vast.

A galaxy rotating around a magnetic field would generate extremely powerful electrical fields leading to a system of filamentary currents along the plane of the galaxy, inward to the center and up along its axis, much like the current in a solar system. This is exactly what astronomers have observed for decades in mysterious radio galaxies, objects that shoot twin beams of energy to distant clouds in intergalactic space.¹⁸ Moreover, it is now known that the universe is indeed clumpy, or inhomogenous.¹⁹ The Cosmic Background Explorer (COBE) is a satellite launched in 1989 that discovered relics of lumpy structures that existed three hundred thousand years after the Big Bang is thought to have occurred. These fossils consist of variations in the faint microwave glow that permeate the universe and seem to confirm the fact that the ancient universe was inhomogenous.²⁰ In addition, surveys of great swaths of space disclose galaxies organized into vast sheets and filaments. Almost all the galaxies within a billion light-years of earth are clumped together in huge super cluster complexes that stretch across a substantial part of the known universe in gigantic filamentary ribbons about a billion light-years across, three hundred million light-years wide, and one hundred million light-years thick.²¹

Computer plotting of nearly a million galaxies discloses a lacy filigree of interwoven threads. This Cosmic Tapestry is confirmed by three-dimensional atlases of the known sky that reveal an interconnecting network of filaments strung like Christmas lights by thousands of galaxies.

Still larger structures stretch across the known universe; the Great Wall is a huge sheet of galaxies seven hundred million light-years across that form filaments of galaxies. Likewise, thin bands of galaxies evenly spaced about six hundred million light-years apart stretch across a quarter of the diameter of the observable universe.²² Similarly, computer simulations of helical plasma filaments (a) produce images that are nearly identical to the most commonly shaped galaxies from published atlases, and (b) forecast models that mimic the behavior of quasars emitting jets of energy.²³ Tiny spiral filaments of current and glowing plasma a few millimeters across resembling the mighty spiral galaxies of space can also be formed in the lab.²⁴ The above observations and simulations tend to confirm the inhomogenous, complex, vast, evolving, filamentary structure of the universe forecasted by plasma cosmology and tend to undermine the smooth and homogeneous universe assumed by conventional cosmology. The Spears of Odin offer an optimistic model of an interconnected cosmos, continually unfolding, developing, and renewing itself. This model will provide the renewed dedication, commitment, and responsibility necessary to propel the mind of modern man along the helical path of development and human understanding.

Conceptual Framework for Change

Existential Phenomenology

Soren Kierkegaard, the founder of existentialism, conceived of man as existence in relationship to God and of existence as intensely personal,

absolutely original and unique to the individual, without validity for others. Thus, says Luijpen and Koren (1960), his position was deliberately anti-scientific, or incapable of the dimension of universality claimed by science, and tended toward spiritualistic monism by exalting the individual subject over the material thing until the latter evaporated into mere consciousness. On the other hand, Edmund Husserl launched phenomenology as the science of philosophy to investigate man's consciousness or knowledge, which he called intentionality. This theory tended toward materialism, or scientism, using the term to describe absolutism of the physical sciences. Materialism posits man as a chain of processes or a moment in the endless evolution of the cosmos. It is itself a kind of monism in the way it disregards individual subjectivity, absolutizes objective things-in-themselves, and leaves room in reality for only the being of the material thing unconnected to any other thing and without subjective meaning.

The two streams merged and existential phenomenology was born in Martin Heidegger's philosophy of Dasein, or existence. The latter was an intermediate view that took into account the valuable insights of both materialism and spiritualism, while avoiding the extremes of both and not lapsing into the illusions of either idealism or positivism. Existential phenomenology opposes objectivity as the brute reality of Descartes' embrace of physical science and divorce of the subject from the world. Instead, man is viewed as conscious-being-in-the-world; the being of man is being-conscious-in-the-world. In other words, being-in means dwelling, being familiar with, being-present-to, or actively observing and

participating and not simply existing or occupying (Luijpen & Koren, 1969, pp. 20, 27, 33-34).

A subject's facticity, or the concept that his being does not include any potentiality, means he is up to a point fixed in that certain possibilities are excluded. An American cannot realize himself as a Frenchman, for example, but beyond that he has freedom to follow his own project, or potential being. Accordingly, human action is not a deterministic process, or mere discharge of forces. Rather, it is the execution of a self-project and autonomy of being with respect to the processes and forces acting upon him. The facticity of institutions, laws and other infrastructures do not produce human action. Instead, that originates in an individual's subjectivity, spontaneity and freedom.

Idealism tried to disconnect consciousness from the world and replace the darkness and confusion of the world with the clarity of the self-sufficient idea, pure self-reflection. On the other extreme, realism rejected innate ideas, maintained that perception finds reality, and held that all knowledge rises from experience. However, it too failed to bridge consciousness with the world because the individual subject, with his encapsulated consciousness, remained isolated from the world-in-itself. Phenomenology's idea of intentionality, or knowledge, as the mode of being-involved-in-the-world excludes both idealism and realism in their traditional form. Nevertheless, it is realistic, not in the objectivist sense of traditional realism, but in the sense that the individual subject experiences the real world and reality always in reference to the subject.

Phenomenology is often accused of being subjective or relative by adhering to a subjectivistic concept of truth. However, this is inaccurate because phenomenology does not deliver truth to the individual subject's arbitrary choice. Rather, truth expresses objectivity-for-a-subject, or is absolute in relation to the subject. In this way, the subject originates truth by giving things meaning for him. Indeed, being-in-the-world means being in it dynamically as a free subject, not merely the subject of processes and forces. Nevertheless, in doing so he cannot proceed arbitrarily and he must respect that which shows itself and be guided by it. He is not lord of being, only shepherd and guardian.

For Sartre, absolute freedom was the universal norm. In absolute autonomy man creates values, invents norms, and chooses his reality. Absolute freedom is depreciated by reliance on heavenly norms or pointing to passions as an excuse for deeds. At the same time, Sartre believed freedom imposed itself on every man as a subjective as well as an objective universal. This subjectivity must not be compromised by another; no individual may destroy another's subjectivity.

The impetus to honor another's freedom does not come from the law, but one's personal conscience. The conscience arises above its primitive forms and its biological, sociological and psychological infrastructures to become an adult conscience. Though the individual is free to choose his life's project, he is bound not to destroy another's subjectivity. This does not determine how to act in a concrete situation, since there are no norms-in-themselves for ethical conduct. Even universal moral norms would not guarantee a moral choice, because they

express moral demands in minimal fashion. An authentic moral life implies on the part of the individual an ever-renewed application to a task that is never finished. A moral man is always in progress, having to be, faithfully executing an ever more clear sighted conscience, rather than observing sharply but minimalistically defined laws. Moral life accomplishes more than the law and goes beyond automatic functioning under the law.

Being man is intersubjectivity, or being-through-others. Existence is co-existence; at no level is man absolutely alone. The presence of others makes being-through-others an absolute essential of man. The behavior and speech of others make an individual think, speak and act. This making-one-another-be is why existence is co-existence and is the indispensable condition for an authentic, personal existence.

Rights Talk

Mary Ann Glendon (1991) believes the effort to relieve our stuckness in personal particularity should eliminate or downgrade rights talk. Rights talk began to accelerate in the Fifties and Sixties with increased assertion of rights-based claims. Since then a tendency has arisen to frame every social issue as a clash of rights. She sees this tendency in the absence of limits in modern definitions of freedom, when people say one should be able to do as one pleases or that America means one can do what one wants. She also sees it in definitions of freedom that embrace license but ignore service or participation. This talk encourages the all-to-human tendency to place self at the center of one's moral

universe: It promotes short-run over long term, crisis intervention over preventative measures, and particular interests over the common good. Rights presented in this fashion are absolute, individual and independent of any necessary relation to responsibilities.

Our rights talk in its absoluteness, promotes unrealistic expectations, heightens social conflict, and inhibits dialogue that might lead toward consensus, accommodation, or at least the discovery of common ground. In its silence concerning responsibilities, it seems to condone acceptance of the benefits of living in a democratic social welfare state, without accepting the corresponding personal and civic obligations. In its relentless individualism, it fosters a climate that is inhospitable to society's losers, and that systematically disadvantages caretakers and dependents, young and old. In its neglect of civil society, it undermines the principal seedbeds of civic and personal virtue. In its insularity, it shuts out potentially important aids to the process of self-correcting learning. All of these traits promote mere assertion over reason-giving. (Glendon, 1991, p. 14)

Glendon says this exceptional solitariness of the American rights bearer is one aspect of hyperindividualism that pervades America.

Glendon believes that rights talk began with Locke's clever use of the word property in his Second Treatise on Government to elevate the lives, liberties, and estates of the rising classes in seventeenth-century England to near-mythic status. As a result, property became the central example of rights at risk in a republic. She also attributes the radical nature of this rights focus to America's acceptance of the version of individual liberty espoused in Mill's essay On Liberty. However, she also notes the failure to incorporate his stern sense of family and country, and his rejection of some life styles. Accordingly, America made normative a radical version of individual autonomy.

Assertion of absolute rights expresses infinite and impossible desires to possess totally, to be captain of one's fate and master of one's soul. Pathos and bravado deny the fragility and contingency of human existence and personal freedom. Exaltation of absolute individual autonomy slights the very young, the severely ill or disabled, and the frail elderly, as well as those who care for them, by implying that dependency is disdainful and to be avoided. Paying homage to radical autonomy and self-sufficiency also ill-serves hospitality and concern for the community. Accordingly, in place of rights talk Glendon suggests a rhetoric emphasizing individual duties as well as rights like that appearing in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, or the binding of citizen to community appearing in the West German Basic Law. Without re-focusing the unrealistic expectations of American rights talk to the common good, America will fragment into a cacophony of strident and conflicting voices. Indeed, a large collection of self-determining individuals cannot even be a society.

The Good Society

Bellah et al. (1992) sound a clarion call for a paradigm of cultivation to replace the "old, outworn Lockean individualist one" (p. 270). The public morality of John Locke has been separated from its Calvinist sense of obligation and the secular aspects of his teachings received attention outside his overall vision. Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness is exemplified by the solitary individual's appropriation of property and government is instituted for protection of that property. These atomistic

beliefs bloomed untempered by Locke's notion of moral order. This unfettered version of Lockean teachings became support for endless accumulation. The result is we still have a Lockean political culture, emphasizing individual freedom and affluence, but our economy and government are most un-Lockean, dominated by great corporations acting out of self-interest with an economically oriented government in tow. This world dwarfs the self it was meant to serve, which must submit to market forces. The Lockean language of individualism still seduces us, even though it no longer describes the institutions that govern us. We can no longer create the good life and enrich the lives around us, simply by striving for individual comfort and security. This Lockean notion of self-interest has such a hold on American public life that it blocks efforts toward a sustainable future. Under Lockean culture in America, individuals' perceptions of self-interest are more important than republican tradition, community and history. The Lockean ideal of the autonomous individual, embedded as it was in a complex moral ecology and a vigorous public sphere—neither of which exist now—is an outmoded concept. In the past two centuries, we have developed needs that our Lockean ideology cannot describe. "The nominalism that Locke represents both epistemologically and sociologically" (p. 295) no longer appeals to the best thinkers of the time.

Locke's philosophy resulted in the same view as Decartes' where knowledge was the mirroring of brute reality and physical science was the system of mirroring images. His view of the mind as tabula rasa, an empty slate for experience alone to write on, distinguished ideas of the

mind and qualities of the body. This distinction implied that knowledge is a purely passive mirroring of the world divorced from the subject. Only objective mirrorings could be known and only quantitative aspects could be mirrored, because the individual subject spoiled all other mirrorings by subjective contributions.

According to Locke, the right of property is an ownership right for the sole benefit of the proprietor. Ownership is defined exclusively as an extension of self, a private domain exclusive of the rest of mankind. This notion that the true benefit of property can be exclusive to the individual "is a deep-seated modern misconception of social and personal life" (Norton, 1991, p. 130). It reflects a modern moral minimalism that disregards higher stages of moral development.

Consequently, Bellah et al. propound the good society rooted in fundamental social understanding of human beings, rather than absolute rights. The common bond of humanity demands that government and other institutions respect and facilitate human dignity. Because we are caught in "an inescapable web of relationship with other human beings," each has the responsibility to see and interpret what is happening around us—our surrounding reality—and to act in anticipation of a response to our act. Institutions fail to challenge us to use all of our capabilities to attain a sense of enjoyable achievement and of contributing to the welfare of others. Personal freedom can only be attained along with the other virtues of care and responsibility. A relentless focus on individuals as utility-maximizers blinds us to a need to restructure institutions forged in

an age and atmosphere of numbing paranoia brought on by continuous war or threat of war.

Relationship

Dennard (1992) argues that public administration needs a new identity to replace the management paradigm within which it has operated for more than a century. In place of this old Ontology of Neo-Darwinism, she offers an evolutionary ontology of relationship, responsibility and human process. This new ontology attempts to understand the flow of social process, rather than only its parts and pieces, and it places questions of human purpose and evolution above efficiency and economic stability. Relationship replaces particularism as market imperatives and management technology take a back seat to concern about human purpose and human evolution. The conscious states of personal security, equilibrium and control as preoccupations in management theory are supplanted by the process orientation of self-organized systems. Felt concepts such as the public interest and the public good receive equal legitimacy with mental constructs such as incrementalism, satisficing, and rational decision-making models. The adversarial pursuit of self-interest loses out to the evolutionary development of identity. Becoming a purposeful agent in evolutionary development substitutes for reactive adaptation to consequences. Techniques of behavioral modification and attempts to define the laws of and to seek control over human behavior are pushed aside by compassion, character development and moral choice. Competition and strategy have less and less value as a sense of Others and

regeneration of human relationships gain authority and legitimacy. The new evolutionary ontology claims a difference in consciousness at the time of the Founding—one more attuned to responsibility and relationship than the business mind of today. Accordingly, the new paradigm coalesces around a constitutional order of democratic dispositions derived from shared humanity rather than interests.

Americans have learned to expect rights and eschew responsibilities, yet they yearn for a sense of order and community that strikes a balance. At some deep level, individualism is not enough; it must be softened by a sense of common purpose, meaning, community, connection, hope and spiritual satisfaction. In 1931, Albert Einstein addressed this need:

There is one thing we do know: that man is here for the sake of other men—above all for those upon whose smile and well-being our own happiness depends, and also for the countless unknown souls with whose fate we are connected by a bond of sympathy. Many times a day I realize how much my own outer and inner life is built upon the labors of my fellow-men, both living and dead, and how earnestly I must exert myself in order to give in return as I have received. (Woodworth, 1992, p. 506)

Shared Humanity

Sagan and Druyan (1992) recently addressed the broad question of who we are in their book Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors. They set out to find the roots of our stuckness in modernity, with its violence, injustice, nuclear threat, environmental decay, burgeoning population, national and ethnic divisions and lack of leadership. Some of the questions they asked were: Who are we? Why are we this way and not some other? Are

we capable of fundamental change or are we compelled by our remote past? Can we alter our character? Can we improve our societies? Can we make a better world? Are we wise enough to know how to change? Can we be trusted with the future? Beginning with a sense of dread, they found reason for hope. But they concluded that events of remote ages, long before humans came into being, are critical for an understanding of the trap our species seems to be setting for itself.

What they found in their examination of our past was not a nature red in tooth and claw, but a nature of cooperation and harmony. The sky, the earth and the universe are one; indeed, every atom that is down here was once out there. We inhabit a shallow zone of environmental clemency that compared to the size of the Earth is thinner than a coat of shellac on a schoolroom globe. Yet we are not unique among the creatures of the Earth, we are not central in a world made for us, and our Antecedent was not King of the Universe.

Instead, Sagan and Druyan note all life is kin and only about .1% difference in the DNA of a human (99.9% is held in common) distinguishes one from another. We are all vastly more alike than we are different. The most important conclusion gleaned from anatomical studies is the interrelatedness of all life on Earth. So, not from uncritical sentimentalism, but out of tough-minded scientific scrutiny come the deepest affinity between ourselves and other forms of life on Earth. There is a biological unity to the planet, where organisms live in intimate mutual contact. Moreover, one promising finding in artificial intelligence is that many small computers working in parallel without much of a

central processing unit do very well and sometimes better than the largest and fastest lone computer.

Sagan and Druyan also found change was the general order and impermanence characterized Earth's evolution. Physical reality has permanence, stability and regularity to it, but historical reality is fickle and fluid, and change plays a major role. We are each a tiny being who rides the outermost skin of one of the smaller planets for a few dozen trips around a local star. The longest-lived organisms on the planet endure for a millionth of its age. If the Earth were as old as a person, the typical organism would be born, live and die in a sliver of a second.

All forms of life are dependent on one another, but those at the top of the food chain are clearly the most dependent and the most inefficient. One thing therefore is abundantly clear: Humans who are at the apex of the predatory food chain are extremely dependent for life upon plants and animals lower down the chain and are accordingly more vulnerable to change. Therefore, it would make more sense to recognize the part of such life in us and to revere and nurture such life rather than claim dominion over it and uniqueness from it.

Wild Heart

A Wildness metaphor is used by many writers to explain reality in terms of expanded individuality and autonomy, or wildness of spirit. Stivers (Bailey & Mayer, 1992) brings this theme into public administration literature in the form of Wild Patience borrowed from feminist poet Adrienne Rich. Patience captures awareness and intimate

involvement in the world and takes a proactive stance toward the social nature of reality. Wildness is attachment rather than detachment and anchoring personal and communal values. Wild Patience abandons efforts to control complexity and adopts amelioration and clear-sighted facilitation in its place. Heart thinking replaces head thinking, trust and cooperation replace competition, feelings replace the hardened heart, and interconnectedness replaces autonomy and the separated self. Stivers urges a multiversalist paradigm which rejects the Cartesian rationalist detachment of the inwardly felt self from the outside universe. The self as individual knower and actor, separated and isolated from a reality which is known and controlled, is exposed as an outmoded conception. She argues for a new concept of reality that recognizes limits on autonomy and control. In it, Atomism and competitive particularity of autonomous individuals are conditions that demand amelioration as opposed to serving as justifications for Hobbes' Leviathan. Emphasis on individual rights, free choice, and administrative discretion of the autonomous knower are tempered and moderated by a relational, altruistic, developmental, other-oriented self. This authentic self recognizes dependence on others and originates in social interaction, which is of equal importance with autonomy. The dual aims of freedom and reciprocity are sought through developing process skills for interaction, social learning, and collaborative activity.

The Wildness metaphor is also used by Keen (1991) to describe the wild man—given to play, fantasy, sensuality, fun, and games—just under the surface of rational man. Accused of being irresponsible, amoral,

frivolous and infantile, this Dionysian man is essential for passion in manhood, lest man become too domesticated by the social order. A man loyal to the group, or guided only by tribal conscience, may exploit the stranger, destroy the alien, be ruthless to all outsiders, and still feel guiltless. Keen calls upon a higher standard of judgment, a transmoral conscience, a normative standard with which to measure manhood.

That standard dwells in citizenship to a commonwealth that transcends immediate time, culture, and locality. Here, a man is most virile for Keen when he insists not upon autonomy of will, but harmony with the will of God. Post-modern man is not a candidate for this heroic position:

The 'new age' man who is self-absorbed in his own feelings and committed to 'personal growth' [is not] a candidate for heroism. It is an illusion to believe that the virility men have lost can be recovered by anything except a new locational passion.

Our loss has been ontological, not psychological. A deficiency in meaning and in being. A refusal to care for what matters, a limpness in the face of the challenge of our history. The challenges seem overwhelming, and we are understandably to retreat into professions and corporations that swallow us, into private pleasures and high consumption. But let's call that what it is: moral cowardliness, abdication of responsibility, voluntary myopia. And if we continue on this path we will continue to feel empty and devoid of meaning. (Keen, 1991, p. 121)

Keen recognizes that Western culture is built on the notion of individual dignity and that the virtues of individualism were ratified by the American Revolution and by a frontier nation. Nevertheless, he expresses the fear that individualism is rapidly leading into anarchy, not because of too much attention to nonconformity, but because of losing moral consensus, a sense of community, willingness to sacrifice for a

shared future, and understanding that competition, isolation and top-gun status does not provide meaning or dignity to human life. Slavish devotion to the economic order is destroying the cradle of freedom. The iron law of profit depersonalizes humanity by valuing efficiency above compassion and by devotion to competitive goals of the corporation over loyalty to family. To Keen, this passive submission of anonymous masses in mindless conformity to competitive goals is the down side of individualism and weakens bonds to others and to nature. The medicine that once healed now threatens to destroy; what was strength is now tearing society asunder. Creating unique individuals cuts off from others and makes strangers without community or cosmos. Autonomy is an outmoded virtue.

For Keen, wildness is identification with mountains, forests, wolves, and lions; large expanses of untouched wilderness; and recognition that humanity is only a single species within a commonwealth of sentient beings. Wildness is a part of the journey out of self and into the world, away from me and into we, from particularity to community and from therapy to action. Only enjoyment and gratitude for life can give impulse to compassion for others:

If I were to diagnose the spiritual disease of modern men I would not concentrate on symptoms such as our lust for power, our insatiable hunger for gadgets, or our habit of repressing women and the poor. I would, rather, focus on our lack of joy. Most of the men I know are decent, serious, and hard-working, and would like to make the world a better place. What they are not is juicy, sensual, and fun. The most successful among us are far too busy to waste time on simple pleasures like jasmine and friendship. We have too many important things to do to appreciate the stream of delights that flows constantly through our nerve endings. As one of the

most hardworking world-saving friends said to me, only half in jest, 'I don't enjoy pleasure anymore.' (p. 171)

The art of compassion for others is obtained, according to Keen, through a combination of technical and administrative skills with vision, compassion, honesty, trust, personal growth and fulfillment, and the common good. Management is a sacred trust for the well-being of others placed in your care.

Bly (1990) uses the Interior Warrior and the Wild Man to illustrate his lament for lack of rituals initiating boys into manhood. The initiatory path that he envisions requires men to get in touch with the Wild Man caged within each. He distinguishes the Wild Man, who he likens to a Shaman or Zen priest, from the Savage Man, who does great damage to the soul, earth, and humankind. Through the Wild Man's initiation, men learn to worship the animal soul and awaken the Shaman. This calls up the grief of all nature, or the tears of things, and the consciousness possessed by mountains, rocks, waters, trees, and demons.

The image left by the Wildness metaphor used by the above authors is complete independence, autonomy, and separateness. This is, of course, not what the above three authors describe, but it is, nevertheless, the picture given by the choice of metaphor alone. Indeed, in describing relationships of the Interior Warrior, Bly paraphrases Jung on the value of distinctiveness:

We note that the hawk always remains a hawk, even when the hawk is living among owls; an owl remains an owl, even when living among porcupines. But human beings are suggestible and can lose distinction. When they merge into 'the masses,' as in Fascism, they fall into indistinctiveness. The Gnostics imagine the place called Pleroma, which is an enormous abundance, but also an

enormous indistinction. It is desirable, then, for men and women to aim for distinction consciously. It is dangerous if they do not do so. (Bly, 1990, pp. 166-167)

To which it might also be added, "It is dangerous as well if they do so to the extreme." The aim is not to be the Wild Man, but to be in touch with him; the need is to delicately brush the Wild Man and Wild Woman with the wing tips of our minds.

Nevertheless, Bly observes the propensity in American culture for people who do not make this subtle distinction and who want to be the Wild Man. The weakness of the Wildness metaphor is a need, not for a more atomistic conception of the individual that feeds our cultural weaknesses, but for a world view that defines self as a part of a greater whole, inextricably linked, in more than just economic or geopolitical terms, with all humanity. Bly recognizes this danger too by attaching the Wild Man to a community. In that community, he ascends and develops intellectually step by step until he is capable of recognizing the enormity of what he shares in common with others, especially women, the minutia of that which he does not, and the appropriate sacrifice that he owes to the community. Yet folklore is vivid with episodes in which the Wild Man is held in judgment and thrown into the fire by the community out of fear and anger over his distinctiveness and independence. The age old philosophical problem is to find a syncretic balance between the individual and the collective, the few and the many, the majority and the faction, the Wild Heart and the conformist. The authentic individualism paradigm developed in this paper is an attempt to find such a syncretic

balance in a synthesis of the individual from Western philosophy and United States history.

A New Model--Authentic Individualism

Authentic individualism is not revolutionary, but reformist. It is not an ultimate truth, or a social and political theory of everything that will explain all human behavior. Since the universe is contingent and not fully defined, a complete explanation can only be found in something metaphysical, and authentic individualism can only offer partial answers and principles for action valid in the context of late twentieth century American culture. Authentic individualism is not a discovery of objective principles out there from which solutions will coalesce. It is a construct of abstract ideas, idealistic inspirations and realistic assumptions, rather than a product of inductive reasoning. Accordingly, the general organizing principles espoused here are only tentative approximations intended to guide and encourage the individual and practitioner through an indeterminate, non-linear, chaotic, dynamic, and unpredictable world incredibly sensitive to external environment.

Authentic individualism rejects the Newtonian-Cartesian mechanistic view of the universe and human existence as self-contained objects occupying empty space. In place of that limited outlook, it adopts a relativistic and quantum frame of reference that space and time--indeed all components of the universe--are interrelated and interdependent, not merely interacting, in a never-ending continuum of evolution and development. This evolution is the purpose for humankind's existence;

conscious and conscientious development of humanity and the world is the reason for being; and no thing or no one is outside or without this other-interested purpose in life. Accordingly, authentic individualism is evolutionary--not in the sense of static activity or inert substance waiting for change to evolve--but in the sense of individual development and change on a daily basis. This is to say that self is not buried beneath the collective, subservient to group will, or mired in other-directed conformity. Rather, the highest expression of self is interest in and contribution to the flowering and unfolding of understanding, acceptance, and compassion in self and others.

Humans are more than mere parts of a machine, or even of a process; they are the process, the focus and the ends-in-themselves. Instead of collective skin-encapsulated objects--individual, inert, and ready formed--humanity is a sharing of commonalty across boundaries. Rather than accidental by-products of extra-terrestrial forces, humanity is a logical, ordered and important sub-system in an otherwise chaotic process of cosmic evolution from base substances, through life, and toward perfection. No part of humankind can be divorced from the rest, because the effects from that separated part reverberate through the remainder in a life version of quantum non-locality. Each individual plays a role in and has a responsibility to the whole, as each plays an active role in creating reality for all. Those who take this other-interested role seriously and practice it daily impart an invisible field energy to others as observer and observed become intimately interwoven one within the other. Those who do not accept other-interest, but embrace self-interest as the guiding

principle for politics and society contribute to a society and political "wave-particle paradox" of subjectivity in which one's essential nature, momentum or position--in short, reality--can never be determined until it is observed.

Authentic individualism sheds the pessimism, finality and futility of conventional cosmology and existentialist philosophy in pursuit of a optimistic look toward-the-future view of humanity: It struggles to escape the restrictive effects of pure reason in scientific and economic approaches to problem-solving and decision-making by emphasizing qualitative and value-laden criteria. It abandons authority as the only source of truth and accepts intuition in its place. It combats the harshness of extreme particularity with a balance of individual and group identity.

Authentic individualism implements the limits on autonomy and control offered by Camilla Stiver's *Wild Patience*. Competition and particularity demand change rather than reverence; they are part of the problem, not the solution. Recognition of dependence on and responsibility for others replaces strident clutching of individual rights. Stiver's authentic self acts as a repository for legitimate self-interest in attaining the good life for all, rather than the few. Calling upon the transmoral conscience of Keen's *Wild Man*, authentic individualism trades autonomy of will for harmony of human interests. Individual identity is attained through commitment to and sacrifice for the moral dignity of human life. Devotion to me and to the economic order is exchanged for compassion and the sacred trust for the well-being of others. Authentic individualism borrows Hiskes' community as caring which

construes the social fact of community as a special quality of individuals, not of the group, which exists within individuals, not between them.

Similar to Bly's *Interior Warrior*, authentic individualism keeps close at hand the vision of damaged soul, earth, and humankind perpetrated by Savage Man, who wants to be the Wild Man and Wild Woman and who carries distinction to an extreme. Authentic individualism holds close the enormity of what the *Interior Warrior* shares in common with the community and the minutia of the differences that exist. This viewpoint resists the notion that social, political, government, or business organizations should be inert substances reacting to forces from without, compelled by fixed conceptions along predetermined paths. Organizations and groups of people are seen within this framework as systems constructed by humans and guided by general organizing principles and encouragement of humans toward spontaneity, surprise, a sense of becoming, and moral meaning in life, work, politics, and government.

The philosophical base for authentic individualism comes from a synthesis of Western philosophy, but finds its place in the modern world under a phenomenological/noumenological philosophy label and interpretivist public administration theory. It begins by recognizing as Homer did the chaotic over the predictable, but refuses to adopt Homer's Warrior ethic and oppression of weak by the strong, or Thales' Monistic notion of a single unifying principle. Instead, it embraces Hesiod's concept of moral choice and dedication to humanity, the Milesian concept of

process and ordered changed, and Heraclitus' absorption into a transcendent world process called logos.

Authentic individualism is opposed to the doctrine of materialism given life by Democritus, nurtured by the Pythagoreans, cared for during its adolescence by the Atomists, and molded into full adulthood by the Logical Positivists. Accordingly, authentic individualism adopts the necessity seen by Plato for reconciling a purposive and conceptual nature of man with the universe in which he lives, but it rejects the mechanistic universe of Newtonian-Cartesianism. Humanity is neither a special and unique form of life created by an omnipotent being as in other-worldly religious thought, nor the accidental combination of elements as in Pluralist thought. The universe is neither the chaotic hodgepodge of Homer nor the thoroughly ordered system intelligible through pure reason seen by Plato and Pythagoreans. Rather, humanity is an ordered consequence of the same indeterministic creative process guided by general unifying principles as all other life and substance in the universe.

Authentic individualism recognizes the good in Socrates' refusal to conform and the need for minority protections against the popular majority sentiment. It adopts the Sophistic teaching of mutual respect, but discards the practical concern for here and now that led Thrasymachus and other Sophists to define man as the measure of all things. In this way, the Socratic fulfillment of individual potential in accordance with humanity's real and essential nature--eudaimonia--replaces autonomy of will and self-interest. In this conception of eudaimonistic individualism as in authentic individualism, there is no place for Plato's Philosopher Kings,

elite guardians of the state, or separation of thought and action. Rather, primacy is given to becoming over being, as thought and action are combined--that is, work and change are viewed as creative processes--and democratic, or group, interests are given primacy over the self-seeking individual.

The Socratic-Platonic plea for human renewal--a transcendent individual soul--was preserved in Aristotle's polis, where inter-related individuals developed and unfolded. Individuals shared the identity of the organic whole and had responsibility to it for exercising moral choice; a habit of virtue flowing from a disposition, attitude, or state of character. The same is true in authentic individualism which, like Socrates, awards collective interests primacy over the self-seeking individual, but retains primacy over the majority of the authentic individual, whom it teaches to become other-interested. These teachings adopt the notion of responsibility to the whole through Roman Stoic-like duties. However, instead of social duties owed to society, the obligations of freedom in this context--such as love, compassion, forgiveness, and ethical leadership--are more like Thomism's natural virtues and are owed to one another out of respect for human life and individual worth.

The secular point of view that the essential human problem is how to get into a right relationship with one's self and one's fellow man, and the interdependent nature of social relations of the Greeks is retained by authentic individualism. Augustine's pessimism, sinfulness, and depravity of man is rejected while his guilt, passed to us through Calvin and the Puritans, is embraced and ameliorated; guilt for the inequities and

injustices of rich over poor, white over black, conqueror over native, and the strong over weak that still form the basis of America's national character today. The guilt for these horrific abuses is recognized, felt, and alleviated through daily teaching and practice of the obligations freedom places on each individual.

Jesus' love of neighbor, his democratic equality, and his individual responsibility are the essential principles of authentic individualism. These exalted and abstract concepts form the basis for a creative and generative force--John's logos or Augustine's bond of peace--that formed and still molds the universe. Through this force the waters are calmed, and there is order in chaos, unity within diversity, moral will in politics, human dignity in life, and individual freedom. In place of pessimism and the human predicament as dominant paradigms, authentic individualism substitutes optimism and creative energies directed toward betterment of self and others. Failure is not a sin, but merely a lack of knowledge in an indeterminate world where knowledge is always imperfect. Though the single individual is the starting point of all humankind, that single individual is the result of a universal process and shares kinship with everything and everyone. As a result, one owes responsibility to others as to one's self for the common origin and dignity all inherit from nature.

Conceptualism's defense of universals as common likeness among individual particulars permitted the philosophical synthesis of St. Thomas Aquinas. Authentic individualism too accepts the existence of universal truths, although they may not always be fully understandable by reason alone. Rather, there are different degrees of truth, goodness, and reality as

recognized by St. Thomas. A diversity and multiplicity of viewpoints results from these different realities lived by each individual. Each individual has the opportunity to exercise free will; to shape lived reality in a way that reflects one's own character and hopes. An individual can never be fully free of the effects of others on one's own development. What reality one perceives is so impacted by experience and action of others that all share responsibility for lack of development in one of their milieu.

Authentic individualism encourages a Thomistic state in which the ruler and ruled alike aim at cooperation with others and the common good of all rather than self-interest. Autonomous individuals are interdependent and liberty consists of honoring the human dignity found in each person. The Naturalism and power politics of Hobbes and Machiavelli gain no support and play no part in authentic individualism. The Renaissance sense of limitless possibilities is replaced, not by existential hopelessness, but a sense of limits to what humankind can and should do in a natural environment. Only within a framework of limits or moderation can one of the basic motifs of individualism from the Reformation--primacy of the immediate, felt-data of conscience--have legitimacy. Without limits, freedom and spontaneity have no balance and excess destroys civil liberty for the individual.

Though sympathetic to Descartes' efforts at blending the new physics with a world of value and rejecting Hobbesian amorality, authentic individualism does not accept the Cartesian Compromise. Mind and body cannot be viewed as completely different kinds of things or separated into

distinct substances. To the contrary, trends in modern medicine and psychology view the mind and body as interdependent, affecting one another in profound ways. Indeed, it is not difficult to accept the proposition that states of mind can affect physical health or vice versa. Therefore, it is now quite clear that Descartes' philosophical synthesis--like Locke's historical plain method--is not supported by subsequent developments in science that now demonstrate all the minds' ideas do not come from pure experience, and sense perception is influenced by both mind and body.

Locke's emphasis upon attainment of property and pleasure as the greatest good encouraged simple calculation of long-range advantage. Likewise, his reliance upon autonomy, independence, and alienable rights directed interest inward and separated individuals from one and another. Unlike Lockean philosophy, authentic individualism sees individual development through interest in community as the chief good. Fundamental rights do indeed flow from individual dignity as humans rather than as citizen, and with rights go the balancing obligations of freedom that require responsibility toward others, but rights do not belong to men as men. Rather, rights are concomitant; that is, they are bestowed on one another by individuals who respect their shared dignity and common origin. These rights and duties are universal within the community of shared values, but they are not true for all times and all places. Instead, they are guidelines for conduct that represent the most likely path towards authentic individualism until greater knowledge and experience demonstrate a better alternative. An individual's chief duty is

not to serve himself while avoiding interference with the rights of others, but to assure concomitant rights are respected by looking out for the well-being of others. Therefore, authentic individualism derides market-oriented, laissez-faire theory in favor of an active, positive, and compassionate state devoted to the well-being of its citizens rather than their economic status.

This is Kant's universal imperative to treat humanity as having intrinsic value just because one is human and to respect shared humanity. Kant's philosophy sought to embrace Hume's rejection of Egoism, avoid his rejection of reason, and reunite mind and matter separated by Descartes, while still providing a place for the valuational point of view. Authentic individualism affirms Kant's emphasis on obligations, i.e., to treat humans as ends-in-themselves, but denies his separation of fact and value into distinct manifolds. Rather than ignoring unrelated values in a world of fact and vice versa, fact and value coincide and merge into one another.

As did Hegel and Nietzsche, authentic individualism views thinking and perception as acts of interpretation in which desires, memory, and passions affect the object perceived or thought about. However, it does not reflect existential attention on the individual person and his needs and problems as did Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. Rather, Hegel's ideal of a greater whole transcending finite individuality appears in authentic individualism not as the state, but as human dignity and shared origin, as does his developmental view of mind and matter as changing, evolving, extending, and unfolding in experience. Existential rejection of the

ethical, and concern with self and subjectivity is replaced in authentic individualism with an other-interested orientation and optimistic view of the universe in spite of man's demonstrated savagery.

Authentic individualism coincides in some respects with the thought of William James, who held that an individual is free to choose what to do, but that choice is greatly influenced by one's experience. His vision was of an open, growing, and incomplete universe in which individuals need flexibility and readiness to live with insecurity. However, authentic individualism avoids the intense individuality and subjectivism of James pure experience where there are no moral absolutes. It does so by following twentieth-century philosophy in a quest for objectivity.

Authentic individualism takes Bergson's reliance on intuition as a form of knowledge necessary for use by an active self in continuous, unfolding, new experience. It also shares his belief in a necessity to counteract by other forces the tendency of individuals to think of themselves as separate from the community. Likewise, it adopts Kant's, Hegel's and Dewey's belief that experience is a product in which the mind is active and directive, Dewey's view that no final absolute laws can be found but only more and more adequate instrumentalities for dealing with change, and the latter's conviction that freedom of mind and intelligence limits freedom of action. Similarly, it accepts Whitehead's interfusion of all things and his process theory in which reality is manifested in the ongoing process and creative advance of nature's activity.

The Phenomenologists agree with Kant, Hegel and Dewey that human experience is limited to phenomena, but deny that experiences are thus constructs of the mind. Instead, the life-world consists of both spiritual and sensory aspects as nature and everyday life are interfused. Authentic individualism follows Heidegger's phenomenological stance of being-in-the-world; a mode of being human in which concern for others dominates over a preoccupied, manipulative, and competitive they. Technik, what Heidegger saw as a scientific attitude of calculative thought, domination, role, manipulation, and control, is suborned to contemplative thinking and authenticity. Authenticity is an ability to live in a mode of being-with-others and to perceive others as having being. Sartre conceived of the authentic individual as one who experienced doubt, suffered anguish, and faced up to and made moral decisions. Authenticity was a category of acting, or becoming, a reconstituted social self with responsibility for choosing one's own project, or moral life. Authentic individualism affirms this phenomenological effort to repudiate Technik and seize authenticity.

It also welcomes Camus' limits to human action grounded in a common human nature and his kingdom of the human heart, where reality is in the common life of the human community and the full humanness, dignity, and integrity of personhood. It is a philosophy of limits founded on the value of the individual and the finiteness and fallibility of human knowledge. It is an Other-world in which human conduct is governed not by expectations of others, but conduct is directed toward development of self and others. While authentic individualism

espouses the developmental nature of man's ethical conscience, it discards Sartre's absolute freedom as the expression of man's essence. Rather, it teaches human dignity as the moral norm and embraces the notion that law is only the minimal expression of man's obligations to others.

Authentic individualism acquiesces in the proposition that environment can and does account for important aspects of human behavior and personality, but ultimately it is the individual who is the decisive factor in what he is and will be. How a person acts can alter what one is, and those who act bad soon become bad. But one's acts are not necessarily indicative of the true self, as one's inner thoughts and unconscious life constitute the real potential for development of the true person. Authentic individualism repudiates the *Gemeinschaft*, or greedy institution as Coser calls it, in which members are cognitively and emotionally oriented toward one another. Perhaps this was the failure of National Socialism and Heidegger's philosophy of *Dasein*, where orientation toward self was also misplaced. Instead, people must be oriented toward the transcendent human soul and common origin that all share, within a group and outside that group. Complete devotion within the group must be broken and integrated with occurrences and influences outside the community. Particularism, whether oriented toward the individual or the group, has the same corrosive effects.

Authentic individualism claims existentialism's allowance that man is central for creating possibilities for one's own existence, and the Emersonian conclusion that man is not merely a product of social forces. Authentic individualism believes individuals are not merely carriers, but

are generators of society, at the same time individuals are affected in important ways by society; there is synergistic relationship in which each affects the other, often without measurable cause and effect. It disavows Riesman's other-directed personality and Descartes' cogito ergo sum, which transformed the locus of meaning to the self. It supports Hegel's attempt to vest meaning outside the individual in a "quest for transpersonal meaning." But it renounces William Whyte's organization man and rejects the need for belongingness to a group in place of the need for moral purpose. Instead, moral purpose may be found in service to others. It acquires belief in group as a source of creativity, but discourages application of science to achieve belongingness, in favor of science as a tool or partial solution.

Authentic individualism forswears the Greek knowledge as virtue in favor of the Hebrew idea of virtue as good deed and the Stoic idea that good is in the individual. It accepts the pluralist theme that human events are determined by a large number of factors, but denies the pluralists' self-interested notion that all meaning resides in the individual and none in collectivities or transcendent beings. Authentic individualism rebuffs the Lockean paradigm of absolute rights and state of nature depictions of natural man as a solitary creature, and it denies Emersonian self-sufficiency, because they separate individuals from one another. It takes the view that freedom is realized by individual pursuits within a complex of groups and relationships: family, society, state, and world.

Authentic individualism is social individualism--law, custom, and social constraints vary widely. It is collective in the ethical sense--the individual can be transcended and protection of nature and growth of science is important along with freedom, happiness, rights, and autonomy. It agrees with Rousseau's conclusion that the frantic and brutal economic activity of modern man springs not from selfishness, but from desperate poverty and profound emptiness of self. Authentic individualism disagrees with Naturalism's rejection of spiritual meaning and its reliance on nature as the reality. It affirms Riesman's autonomy as a means to choice and protection against conformity, but rejects autonomy as an end. A person's status as human makes him important. The individual is prior to society in the sense that attributes of humanity reside in each person.

Authentic individualism perpetuates Socrates' and Alexander Solzhenitsyn's idea of norms of self-restraint in opposition to the West's lack of self-restraint and extreme limits of legal frames. It also maintains Hume's concept that behavioral dispositions are internalized through habit as they are shaped and molded through socialization. Moreover, it declines the notion of society as the sum total of social existences of individual beings and the notion that group relations are determinate of being, but accepts the proposition that society can mold the individual.

Authentic individualism recognizes that genes express themselves with force throughout our lives and our minds construct objective reality as interpretations of certain bodily states dictated by biology. Likewise, the effect of this information on our bodies can be influenced by our own

psychology and beliefs about the world. This means that relying solely on technology and environment to improve life is an inadequate strategy. All modern experimental work points to the importance for good health of our perception that the individual is in charge of his destiny. Therefore, social structures cannot relieve us of personal responsibility, but neither can we or our institutions abandon others without sympathy on the assumption that individuals can survive all challenges.

Authentic individualism abandons survivalism, manifest destiny and the soldierly values of the rugged individualist, spurns the laissez-faire economic analysis of the Robber Barons and Spoilsman, and objects to the intensely competitive culture of control of modern corporate America. In place of these outmoded concepts it substitutes Native America's community of shared concerns, the Calvinist sense of responsibility and obligation, the social orientation of the Puritans, the dignity and humility of American blacks, the perseverance of the American worker, and the individuality in thought of the Jeffersonians. Instead of Madisonian self-interest in the role of virtue, the moral sense of personal conscience must be nurtured and developed to understand and accept a world of common origin and shared human interests. The harsh, compassionless profit orientation of the business mind becomes the Other-world of human commonalty and public good. Separatist and divisive feelings are ameliorated by habituating a practice of exhibiting the concrete, authentic, caring individual soul in every-day face-to-face encounters.

Endnotes

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CHAPTER X

THE SOUL OF THE THIRD ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

Synopsis

Some ethical considerations flow from authentic individualism and related philosophies. Despite the pessimistic pronouncements of philosophers, psychologists, economists, political scientists and other experts and the images of human immorality, corruption, and exploitation that appear in the news as constant reminders that human nature is greedy, selfish, neurotic, and cruel, evidence exists that humans have a moral sense which is biological and behavioral in origin. The moral sense must compete with other senses, such as self-interest. How the struggle is resolved depends on one's character, circumstances and culture. As a result these moral sentiments are partial and incomplete guides to action. There is no single moral principle or trait on which to found moral philosophy or single good for political philosophy, only several partially consistent ones. Neither happiness nor virtue can be prescribed by rule. The universal strategy of aggression coexists in the unconscious with altruism, heroism, compassion, and self-sacrificing love for the young. The key is to elevate the latter over the former.

Failures in the ability or desire to do so mean man is not a consistently reasoning animal. Rather, he is profoundly affected by laws he can only partially understand. He is not fully conscious of what he is

and his freedom is not always open choice in a clear situation. Instead, he obtains increasing knowledge of his own real being only haltingly. It is only the full flowering of attributes for good over our shadow side that distinguishes humans. But nothing is preordained and the project of each individual is the responsibility to bring this balance to bear in life. The fundamental debate over the relationship of personal rights to social obligations is what moral development is about, and the highest form thereof is to maintain the balance, the tension, between rights and obligations.

Accepting a communal we as a valid ethical consideration in government, authentic individualism defines organizational community as consisting of the following components: purposefulness, openness, justice, discipline, caring, celebration, inclusivity, individuality, leadership, and spirituality. The ethic of community places others at the center of all human relations and assumes that no happiness is possible outside the community of human beings. In the organization, this inverted Theory of Obligation simply means adopting an ethic of placing people first and molding the organization to serve their well-being while they go about the task of meeting organizational objectives.

Developmental psychologists, such as Piaget, Kohlberg and Erikson reject the need, wants and passions approach to analyzing individual behavior. Instead, they describe individuals as passing through multiple, invariant, qualitative stages of moral development in which certain principles guide behavior. Individuals must make moral judgments, but they are not sufficient basis for ethical action. Moral judgments require

the reasoned assessment of the consequences of human actions for human beings. Work in the community is part of the larger work of self-actualization and it becomes the organization of diverse value-identification and different stages of moral development in the community. Thus, work becomes the propelling force of the community toward fuller development economically and spiritually.

The mechanism underlying human moral conduct is the desire for attachment or affiliation. This is the kind of disposition that is gender related in our culture. Girls tend to acquire a moral orientation that emphasizes caring and harmony and boys direct their attention to managing dominance. These fundamental gender differences are remarkably resistant to change. These differences are also supported by recent brain research that suggests they might be biological. Social reconstruction requires more than equality of the sexes based on rights theory; it demands that feminine thought processes and viewpoints mold new social and organizational paradigms. Re-learning the good instincts, passionate creativity, and ageless knowing of the archetypal woman can free us from our rigid roles and restore our ability to hear the deep, life-giving messages of our own souls.

Members of today's organizations expect to be a part of decisions and to hold a more empowered job. In contrast to the wide acceptance of conformity and social assimilation of the past, people celebrate their differences today. In place of theory that demeans the individual, organizational leaders need to substitute a framework of human dignity. In the process orientation, goals are subject to continual revision as

awareness of new information requires change. Instead of moving along a predetermined path, mindful individuals see new choices and endpoints, and unexpected stumbling blocks become building blocks. A tolerance for uncertainty develops in the mindful manager, who sees problems as part of an ongoing process rather than disastrous deviations from the past. The office becomes a place where questions are encouraged, ideas are exchanged, and an error does not mean getting fired.

True individualism is impossible in organizations that demean the individual by treating humans as property. It therefore becomes the responsibility of organizations and managers to respect total personhood. They need not actively further it, but must define themselves and their functions in ways that do not obstruct, but facilitate worker's self-integrations. Management is a sacred trust for the well-being of others placed in one's care.

People in organizations and leaders of organizations need to change the way they think about their organization and the role organizations play in daily life. Organizations need to become a part of society, to take a greater (not bigger) societal role, to show the same responsibility toward others as an individual, and assume the same obligations. Since organizations are treated by the law as individuals, they must fulfill a more responsible social role, within their organizational boundaries and without. The individual derives meaning from the group and vice versa, and any conception that separates their identities fails to address the mutual process of adjustment and integration necessary for balance in the whole.

In 1957, Philip Selznick penned his tome on leadership called Leadership in Administration, which began to nudge leadership theory back toward the concerns of purpose and morality. This means the leader views the organization as an institution and has concern for its evolution as a whole. The effective leader is one who successfully integrates primary and secondary relationships. He mediates and tempers the organizational requirements to meet the needs of the person, promotes group loyalty and personal ties, demonstrates care for persons as persons, relies on referent power rather than solely legitimate power, encourages development or positive identification with the organization, and creates among peers and subordinates a degree of personal commitment and identification.

Modern leadership theory has become much more personal, existential, and concerned with the human component than the organizational. It is essential that leadership theory and leaders themselves return to an appreciation of the humanities and study of philosophy. This is particularly true in government, because its management, leadership and reform engages fundamental issues of political and social philosophy. Torbert believes organizations ought to exist in order to promote the development and self-realization of their members. This point of view involves refocusing the mind and achieving a mental transformation to the leadership way of thinking.

When of the proper mind, a leader is concerned with matters of the heart—the importance of self-respect, feelings, sense of worth and destiny. These issues are of enduring concern and represent the conflict between values of love and survival, harshness and compassion. To consider

these issues is to go beyond questions of technique to fundamental dimensions of the human soul. This amounts to simple recognition that organizations are people-driven. They exist for people, are designed by people, and work through people. Leave people out, and you drain the blood right out of the body. Moreover, the mindset or philosophy of the individuals and organization members determines the results achieved.

The philosophical thought that most closely accommodates these scientific views is process philosophy, which views the world as a process with definite directionality, rather than as a collection of objects or set of events. Process thinking leads to organismic, ecological views reminiscent of Aristotle's cosmology. The vision of Public Administrator that emerges from this process of becoming is the Steersman: guiding and encouraging public acceptance of right reason; always alert to random perturbations; piloting between Scylla and Charybdis, the dual perils of indeterminacy; constantly assessing available information to determine position; and continually making mid-course corrections for safe passage to the final destination; but open and flexible enough to take temporary shelter along the way if forced to do so by intelligible but unpredictable conditions.

Normative Ethical Considerations of Authentic Individualism

The Moral Sense

Some ethical considerations flow from authentic individualism and related philosophies. One of these is expressed by James Q. Wilson (1993), Collins Professor of Management and Public Policy at UCLA, who

adopts a profoundly hopeful view of human nature as fundamentally good and decent:

If modern man had taken seriously the main intellectual currents of the last century or so, he would have found himself confronted by the need to make moral choices when the very possibility of making such choices had been denied. God is dead or silent, reason suspect or defective, nature meaningless or hostile. As a result, man is adrift on an uncharted sea, left to find his moral bearings with no compass and no pole star, and so able to do little more than utter personal preferences, bow to historical necessity, or accept social conventions. (p. 5)

Wilson also notes that, while some people are criminals, most people are not and almost everybody acquires a conscience.

Despite the pessimistic pronouncements of philosophers, psychologists, economists, political scientists and other experts and the images of human immorality, corruption, and exploitation that appear in the news as constant reminders that human nature is greedy, selfish, neurotic, and cruel, Wilson presents evidence that humans have a moral sense which is biological and behavioral in origin. Contrary to the teachings of many social scientists and anthropologists that morality is entirely relative and cultural with no basis in science or logic, most humans possess a moral nature that is part of a collective unconscious and aspects of which—sympathy, fairness, self-control and duty—are universal.

Wilson sees moral confusion in the populace, not from loss of either moral bearings or religious commitment, or their giving way to immediate impulse or self-interest, but because most people try to talk themselves out of having a moral sense. Ordinary men and women wish to make moral judgments, but their culture does not help them. The learned often teach cultural relativism; that moral philosophy has no

factual basis. A cultural pressure exists to conform to the view that we must not judge others, that social problems are the result of social ills rather than individual responsibility, and that moral arguments are nothing more than expressions of feelings--the last vestige of stuffy, puritanical values--with no objective validity whatsoever. We are told that justice and morality are merely a matter of transient consensus about what attitudes are normal. As a result, many doubt they have a defensible philosophy or credible conviction.

By moral sense, Wilson means an intuitive or directly felt belief about how one is obliged to act when one is free to act voluntarily. Having such a moral sense is not the same as saying people are innately good, and its existence does not require universal moral rules. According to Wilson, the great errors in moral philosophy are the beliefs that truth can be known and that there is no truth to be known. The moral sense is no sure cause of moral action, because behavior is the product of our senses and dispositions interacting with our circumstances. The moral sense must compete with other senses, such as self-interest. How the struggle is resolved depends on one's character, circumstances and culture.

The restraints acquired on the exercise of our appetites are precarious, but not because they are rules imperfectly learned. Instead, they are not rules at all or even wholly learned. Indeed, they are not really the product of the higher regions of the brain (neocortex), but are products of the more primitive parts (the limbic system). Many self-seeking impulses can be kept on a short lease by more social ones as both are part of the primitive nervous system. Circumstances--the rewards, penalties

and rituals of daily life--constrain or subvert these precarious sentiments of the moral sense that arise from the most primitive, intuitive, and unconscious sources. As a result these moral sentiments are partial and incomplete guides to action. There is no single moral principle or trait on which to found moral philosophy or single good for political philosophy, only several partially consistent ones. Neither happiness nor virtue can be prescribed by rule.

Yet philosophers continue to search for principles that can account for the existence of social order. These principles fall into two categories. The first is rationalistic and individualistic. Hobbes' argument that government is needed because every man is enemy to every man falls here. Later thinkers dropped the emphasis on a powerful sovereign in favor of self-regulating systems occupied by self-interested individuals linked together by market transactions. The second is normative and communal: Here is Durkheim's thesis that order exists because a system of beliefs and sentiments held by members of society limit what those members can do, rather than government. In other words, social norms that are part of a collective consciousness induce people to live peaceably.

Thus, for some man is an animal, while for others he is social. In its worst form, radical individualism is mere self-indulgence; in its best form, it is life governed by conscience and cosmopolitan awareness. In its worst form, extreme communalism is parochial prejudice; in its best form, it is life governed by honor and intimate commitments. For Wilson, as for Aristotle, man is a social animal; a balance of self-regarding motives with other regarding ones. Moral life is senses in conflict and requires

striking a delicate balance among the moral sense and prudent self-interest. A good life is not living according to a fixed rule, but by habitual behavior of a life in balance. One becomes virtuous by practicing virtue, by acquiring virtues as one acquires crafts, and by the repetition of many small acts.

The Collective Unconscious

Some psychologists believe that social conditioning by culture and communism to think collectively is a cause for resurging nationalism and ethnic identity.¹ However, it seems that just the opposite would be true; that ingrained nationalistic collective thinking would cause ethnic divisions to disappear. Instead, they seem only to be suppressed, smoldering just beneath the surface. Social conditioning does not account for this, so some other explanation must exist. One such explanation could be that without the stability of either Leviathan or a moral center, fringe voices become louder, strident and abrasive; the attacks more bitter; leaders claim to represent a majority before consensus is reached; and civility eventually disappears. This happened during the Reformation, when Protestants and Catholics tortured, burned and hung one another, because they had no agreement on the source of truth. The English church finally arrived at the Elizabethan Settlement--the *via media*, or middle way--after it decided survival of the community was more important than victory of one "moral" faction. For it to work, civility, toleration and respect for individual differences had to be honored.

Another possible explanation for a re-awakening of cultural divisions was alluded to by Sagan and Druyan (1992) who believe all species have a model of reality mapped into their brains, which is incomplete and misses some aspects of the world. These models guide and influence our conduct even when we are unaware of it. Often our best ideas are served up to us out of our unconscious while we are thinking or doing something completely irrelevant. Ethnocentrism and xenophobia may be ancient survival strategies in a swiftly changing environment. This possibility has caused Dr. John Mack, Harvard University, psychiatrist to say:

Any political thinker who seeks a fellowship of all mankind . . . must recognize the psychological meaning of the identity of self with the nation. Failure to do so will limit such concepts as brotherhood of man to philosophical and utopian visions and imaginings. (Greenway, 1993, p. 1A)

The universal strategy of aggression coexists in the unconscious with altruism, heroism, compassion, and self-sacrificing love for the young. The key is to elevate the latter over the former.

Failures in the ability or desire to do so mean man is not a consistently reasoning animal. Rather, he is profoundly affected by laws he can only partially understand. He is not fully conscious of what he is and his freedom is not always open choice in a clear situation. Instead, he obtains increasing knowledge of his own real being only haltingly.

It is only the full flowering of attributes for good over our shadow side that distinguishes humans. Only more of a given propensity that appears in all life and less of another makes humans more than primates. A balance of dangerous tendencies with those on the other side of human

nature requires us to realize and control predilections we bear as remnants of our evolutionary history. But nothing is preordained and the project of each individual is the responsibility to bring this balance to bear in life. As St. Thomas Aquinas once said, "It is not possible to be ignorant of the end of things if we know their beginning" (Sagan & Druyan, 1992, p. 418).

The Communal "We"

The fundamental debate over the relationship of personal rights to social obligations is what moral development is about, and the highest form thereof is to maintain the balance, the tension, between rights and obligations. This antithesis rather than the synthesis is what justice is about and moral development is the wisdom to conduct justice. To resolve in some arbitrary way the argument over rights and obligations is to surrender society to the Anarch or the Behemoth at the price of democratic community.²

Jefferson said, it is a part of the American character to find means within ourselves and not to lean on others. In contrast, Erikson (1974) offers the observation "to be born . . . must mean the right to live in a community which chooses to guarantee, because it knows it lives by, the fullest development of each of its members" (p. 74). Erikson states there must be a network of direct personal and communal communication. He concludes:

American democracy, if it is to survive within the superorganizations of government and commerce, of industry and labor, is predicated on personal contacts within groups of optimal size--optimal meaning the power to persuade each other in matters that influence the lives of each. (p. 123)

The model for conduct of the organizational leader that rings clear in Erikson's message is tolerance, empathy and caring. According to Chandler, this was also the subtle message of Puritanism's last poet, Nathaniel Hawthorne; tolerance is true piety. Rigid and unyielding conformity to the structure and rules of organizational life diminishes individual development, denigrates the accomplishments of the organization and robs the manager who engages in such conduct of his leadership status.

A sense of community is fundamental normative ethical theme in public administration literature of the 1980s. The organizational leader's challenge is to foster this spirit in the organization; to answer the need for community while simultaneously allowing the fullest possible development of the individual's potential expertise and self-worth. This can only be accomplished by avoiding slavish adherence to the model of normal man. Morrow (Chandler, 1987a) discusses communitarianism briefly as an adjunct to American pluralism:

Communitarianism equated morality in government with local community values. Reformers . . . championed . . . wholesomeness that they believed characterized small communities in early nineteenth-century America. . . . Communitarianism was a distinctly antimajoritarian point of view because it stressed the development of consensus. Its attitude toward consensus building had much in common with the pluralist creed. (pp. 170-171)

Communitarianism was administered by well-educated and experienced administrative elites who were considered by the reformers to be well qualified to measure and appreciate the worth of such values.

Chandler (1987b) abhors the lack of the communal we in ASPA's principles of conduct. He believes judgments about right and wrong are

community decisions as well as private ones. "The translation of the code into the principles represents a loss of paradigm, and with it a loss of community. There cannot be a paradigm without a community" (p. 174). He also sees a necessity for interdependence and cooperation, once considered weaknesses of the American national character. Chandler (1983) says they "spring from a sense of common limits," which he deems important in these times of scarcity (p. 36). Also, Chandler's (1984) Roman model of high citizenship is based on a belief "in a community of civic friendship." Here, the state becomes a "moral community" (p. 201).

Cooper (Frederickson, 1984) argues that the ethical obligations of the public administrator are derived from the obligations of citizenship in a democratic political community: "The qualifications, rights, and obligations of citizenship, understood in this way, are defined and prescribed by the values, norms, traditions and culture of any given community in specific instances" (pp. 143-44).

Fleishman et al. (1981) have also adopted communitarian thinking. They would exchange liberal individualism for social interdependence:

The policies we implement in the name of justice, and the deliberations we undertake as to what the common good or the public interest requires, should be (and for most people, I believe, are) underwritten by a sense of social interdependence, of mutual sympathy and shared purpose, and of responsibility for one another's and the collectivity's well being. It is important not to sentimentalize this process. . . . But it is equally important to recognize that any adequate and sustained effort to realize the social good will require means and motives that go beyond the terms of liberal individualism. (pp. 166-167).

This concept of community, as it is described above, has its roots in pluralist theory. It is embraced by modern ethical theorists because its

democratic notion of consensus building brings the public administrator closer to the people from whom springs the authority to govern.

May (1981) argues that humanity exists as part of a community and should not ignore those who went before or those that come after. May sees community and responsibility as necessary parts of freedom. One can be free only as one is responsible. Westcott (1988) agrees that freedom and responsibility are inextricably interconnected.

To May, responsibility is more than moral teaching or another rule of ethical life. It is a part of the ontological structure of life, as is freedom: they are united. The freedom to act carries with it the responsibility to act, to talk, to be open, to share insights, to be compassionate, sensitive and "aware of the complex interrelationships of our human community" (pp. 100-101). May recognizes a tension between freedom as individual self-expression and freedom as participation. He concludes that American society has underestimated the significance of community. It is our destiny to live always in some form of community. Fromm (1941) states that there is one fundamental truth; ethical principles stand above the existence of the nation and by adhering to them the individual belongs to the community of all who share, have shared, or will share those beliefs.

Accepting a communal we as a valid ethical consideration in government, authentic individualism defines organizational community as consisting of the following components:

1. Purposefulness: Organizational members share in the goals of the organization, working together to strengthen their own characters and the integrity of the organization.

2. Openness: Freedom of expression is uncompromisingly protected, and civility is uncompromisingly affirmed.
3. Justice: The sacredness of each person is honored, and empowering the weak is aggressively pursued.
4. Discipline: There is well defined governance that guides behavior for the common good.
5. Caring: The well being of each individual is sensitively supported, and service to others is encouraged.
6. Celebration: The heritage of the institution is remembered, and rituals affirming both tradition and change are widely used.
7. Inclusivity: Commitment to the proposition of coexistence is crucial. Recent computer studies of developing organisms disclose that only adaptive agents thrive. Communities with a subcritical or low diversity of organisms lack the momentum to develop explosively into a new breed.³
8. Individuality: The rugged individualism of historical America is traded for a new ethic of soft individualism. This is an understanding of individualism which teaches that one cannot be truly oneself until one is able to share freely the weaknesses that all humans have in common.
9. Leadership: Community includes the flow of leadership that comes from the complete decentralization of authority. It can be conceptualized as a group of all leaders which sets aside hierarchy and control by experts in favor of lay contributions.

10. Spirituality: The competitive spirit and jingoistic boosterism that takes pride in being better is replaced by a spirit of peace or grace. It consists of the sense of cohesiveness and collective joy that each member experiences after shedding the selfish exterior and transcending the feeling of loss that follows it.

Huer (1990) sees the ethic of community as placing others at the center of all human relations and assumes that no happiness is possible outside the community of human beings. This ethic is all-encompassing for every member of the community, especially the weak, injured, and poor. As a result, he recommends a Theory of Obligation, which gives the weaker among us a break and disenfranchises the rich similar to the model now in use in the NFL. There the order of power is inverse and the teams with the worst record get the early draft picks and the best schedule the following season so that no one team becomes thoroughly dominant or dominated. In Huer's Theory of Obligation power is justifiable only to the extent it is balanced by its obligation to the social group. This requires an inverted politics that gives the less powerful some compensating power in order to balance the already powerful. Huer would do this by weighing votes in inverse relation to income level, so that the upper class gets no votes, the middle class gets one vote and the lower class gets two votes. In his view, this would correct inequality slowly, with justice and fairness, and without revolution or bloodshed. In the organization, this inverted Theory of Obligation simply means adopting an ethic of placing people first and molding the organization to

serve their well-being while they go about the task of meeting organizational objectives.

The Psychology of Moral Development

Morality is part of any reflective life, and ethical perspectives and deliberation shape culture and civic life. Moral reasoning is intrinsic to true humanity and unfolding patterns of moral perceptions can be seen in human persons and human communities.⁴ Human life is a pilgrimage; perpetual movement without arrival interfused with other persons and the environment; a quest for meaning and Logos inspired by the vision of who we are called to become.⁵ Growing persons require relationships and individual identity depends on feedback and stimulation from persons outside the self. In isolation both adults and infants weaken and often die. The greatest possibility for development of the greatest number of mature, moral individuals is in a political and social environment where the individual has maximum opportunity to develop an identity that includes all others, and where learning that only one group and that groups' set of values are important is muted.⁶ Even Albert Einstein, scientist though he was, recognized that it was essential to acquire an understanding of and lively feeling for values, and a vivid sense of the beautiful and of the morally good: "Otherwise he--with his specialized knowledge--more closely resembles a well-trained dog than a harmoniously developed person."⁷

Developmental psychologists, such as Piaget, Kohlberg and Erikson reject the need, wants and passions approach to analyzing individual

behavior. Instead, they describe individuals as passing through multiple, invariant, qualitative stages of moral development in which certain principles guide behavior. There are no disjunctive leaps in these stages, only an ascending journey, ebbing and flowing, upward to complexity and mature responses to life and experience. The Piaget-Kohlberg contribution to understanding moral reasoning and motivation fixes moral responsibility with each person. Not only are humans capable of self-determination, each is morally accountable for how experience is processed and the consequences of actions and intentions. Individuals must make moral judgments, but they are not sufficient basis for ethical action. Moral judgments require the reasoned assessment of the consequences of human actions for human beings.⁸ Practitioners and scholars in public administration, as well as organizational leaders elsewhere, must take account of the necessity for moral judgment in individuals and adapt organizational goals, missions and decision-making processes to facilitate it.

Generally speaking, this developmental view of individuals is consistent with authentic individualism and calls the practitioner and scholar in public administration, as well as any organizational leader, to embrace moral development as one of the motivating forces in individual life and adapt the organization to facilitate it. Yet moral development as brute fact, derived from common sense attitudes toward order and civility, is handmaiden to a panoply of authoritarian ideologies, because moral development ultimately rests on imposition of behavior through methods of authority or divinity. At the same time, the notion of

development of morals assumes a plurality of standards. Entering fully this contemporary conflict calls for a fusion of the democratic temper with the scientific credo, so as to avoid the dangerous quest for certainty and the complete relativity of values. Such a democratic persuasion of moral development is not a claim for unlimited moral possibilities or the impossibility of assessing moral standards, but the simple recognition that moral choices are not revealed verities that deductively or cosmologically flow from nature.⁹

Norton (1991) espouses a theory of politics based on classical concepts of virtue, Aristotelian eudaimonia, and modern developmental psychology. It rests upon the choice by human beings of the basic terms in which they conceive of themselves and accordingly conduct their lives. Eudaimonia is the Greek term for self-fulfilling conduct that denotes both a feeling and a condition. The feeling can be called happiness, but it is not the happiness of net desire-gratification. Eudaimonism holds that each person innately possesses potential excellences, or daimons, and also the aspiration to actualize these excellences. Because eudaimonism is a product of the will, it is labeled moral necessity by some. Humanity's lack of moral necessity is both its freedom and its predicament. As Norton sees it, humanity is a predicament of identity, or deciding what to become. This is itself a problem of acquiring the resourcefulness and force of character to overcome internal and external obstacles.

Eudaimonism is not an elitist theory as Norton conceives it, though it was in its Greek presentation. Norton couples it with democratic equality in the presupposition that to be a person is to be invested innately

with daimons; all persons alike are value-bearers. Neither is it a form of egoism. The worthy life it posits as the native motivation of persons is objective worth, not simply worth of the individual, but also to others. The objective worthy life will be of worth alike to others and its agent. Also, while a form of moral individualism, it does not conceive individuals as atomic. Atomic individuality is associated with social contract theory that treats individuals as antedating society and agreeing to associate. In contrast, eudaimonism views persons as inherently social from the beginning of life to the end. In the beginning they are mostly social products, receiving even identity from the community. Subsequent moral development leads not to total self-sufficiency, but to the self-identification, and autonomous, self-directed living, which is consistent with interdependence and a part of contributing to a community of others. Finally, eudaimonism is not ethical subjectivism. Exhibiting great concern for the self of each person--the subject--eudaimonistic individualism is the responsibility of each person to actualize objective value in the world. Living autonomously is determining for oneself what one's contribution to others will be and determining for oneself which values from the self-actualizing lives of others to use and how.

According to Norton, property is not an ownership right, but a use right. This flows from the community which obtains value from property and comes to depend upon it as greatly as the individual. Freedom divorced of moral responsibility, strips choice of any moral obligation save respecting others' rights. Choice in this view is private, subjective and arbitrary. But eudaimonistic choice is made pursuant to how it impedes

or contributes to the individual's moral work of actualizing the worth of self and others. Choices with regard to property cannot be wholly private, subjective and arbitrary, because eudaimonism includes considerations of a community of true individuals. This community is intermediate association between the individual and society-at-large where whole persons--not just their roles--interact, integrate and create interpersonal developmental outcomes. The community is united by shared beliefs embodied in institutions and practices. Community relations are caring relations, where caring is the most universalizable form of love (willing the well-being of others for their sakes) and mutual aid. Work in the community is part of the larger work of self-actualization and it becomes the organization of diverse value-identification and different stages of moral development in the community. Thus, work becomes the propelling force of the community toward fuller development economically and spiritually. Bureaucracy is the antithesis of this, achieving efficiency through depersonalization and transformation of true individuals into tools of production through interaction of roles and offices not among persons.

The consequent managerial philosophy flowing from bureaucracy can be summarized:

Employees are being paid to produce, not to make themselves into better people. Corporations are purchasing employee time to make a return on it, not to invest in employees to enrich their lives. Employees are human capital, and when capital is hired or leased, the objective is not to embellish it for its own sake but to use it for financial advantage. (Norton, 1991, p. 154)

This management theory totally robs individuals of their personhood and treats them no different—with no greater redeeming values—than money or private property. Research indicates that what today's workers see as normal has changed and they are not willing to just take orders.

Importance of Authentic Individualism for Group Theory

Gender Differences, Relationships and Rule-Based Management

The mechanism underlying human moral conduct, according to Wilson (1993), is the desire for attachment or affiliation. This is the kind of disposition that is gender related in our culture. Boys describe moral dilemmas in terms of justice while girls are more likely to do so in terms of care. Women assign a higher value to ongoing relationships, while boys are more concerned with rules. Girls tend to acquire a moral orientation that emphasizes caring and harmony and boys direct their attention to managing dominance.

These fundamental gender differences are remarkably resistant to change. Wilson notes research from Israeli kibbutzim that demonstrates this resistance. Even in a community where sex-differentiated roles were abolished, the signs of sexual identification continued to appear. The moral role played by women in the kibbutz tended to be expressive while the male role was instrumental. Wilson offers the following explanation for these findings:

The innately greater aggressiveness of males reflects not only a combative nature but the legacy of selection for domination. That tendency may be moderated or exaggerated by parental training. As young boys begin to take pleasure in childhood games, they discover

through spontaneous interaction that some principle for controlling aggression and allocating roles must be maintained if the game, and thus its pleasures, are to continue. When each person is, in varying degrees, asserting a desire to dominate, only two principles for moderating conflict are available: the authority of the most powerful or skillful participant, or the authority of norms that allocate roles either equally (for example, taking turns) or equitably (for example, awarding positions in the game on the basis of skill or effort). Whichever principle of authority is accepted, each tends toward the creation of rule-based systems organized around roles, claims and rights. Prolonged experience in rule-based systems, whether they rest on the authority of a dominant figure or on the legitimacy of the rules themselves, contributes to acquiring both a moral orientation that emphasizes justice or fairness and an hierarchical orientation toward the management of conflict and the organization of common undertakings. To borrow the phrase of Louis Dumont, males tend to become *homo hierarchicus*.

By contrast, to the extent that young girls are innately disposed to avoid physical aggression or, as a result of natural selection, partake of nurturant (protomaternal?) predisposition . . . they will find that their childhood will generate fewer competing demands for domination requiring rule-based management. (Wilson, 1993, pp. 186-187)

These differences are also supported by recent brain research that suggests they might be biological. Men and women differ not only in physical attributes and reproductive function, but also in the way they solve intellectual problems.¹⁰ The bulk of evidence suggests that effects of sex hormones early in life affect brain organization so that from the start the environment is acting on differently wired brains in girls and boys.¹¹ Some results of this are that men on average perform better than women on spatial tasks and mathematics reasoning tests. Women tend to be better than men at matching items--a skill called perceptual speed--and they have greater verbal fluency.¹²

Meyers (1988) and Estes (1992) both paint a picture of feminine archetypes that have been lost in Western thinking and stereotypes that live on without sustenance. Patriarchy and male dominance of large facets of community life cannot be fully explained by biology alone. Rather, they are value-laden concepts based on formal authority. While the influence of woman in gender-related behavior is power based in informal and unofficial modes of behavior, male authority is based on hierarchical arrangement and expressed in legal and juridical traditions. The power of women has no such cultural sanctions, but nonetheless can assert considerable direction in social interaction.

The association of Eve with sin, deceit, sexuality, suffering, lust and Satan has contributed to the perceived need for wiser and superior male figures to control, subdue, dominate subjugate and fear women. Contrary to these stereotypes, women have played significant and important roles in community economics, socialization, education and religious life, making far greater contributions to individual development than any of the male dominated institutions. In fact, those male institutions have largely been the purveyors of modern angst and moral emptiness.

Women may also be better improvisers--that is, more readily able than men to adopt strategies of making use of the resources available in times of scarcity. Bateson (1989) uses five case studies to show that women are more suited than men by virtue of training and experience to make-do with what is available and improvise creative outcomes. The male focus on single-minded pursuit of goals and tendency to move-on like the rugged individualist when the going gets tough does not serve well in

times of scarcity, or when events are indeterminate and there is nowhere else to run. Social reconstruction requires more than equality of the sexes based on rights theory: It demands that feminine thought processes and viewpoints mold new social and organizational paradigms. Meyers and Estes both urge us to learn or re-learn the good instincts, passionate creativity, and ageless knowing of the archetypal woman who can free modern people from their rigid roles and restore their ability to hear the deep, life-giving messages of their own souls.

Mindfulness and Process Orientation

Members of today's organizations expect to be a part of decisions and to hold a more empowered job.¹³ In contrast to the wide acceptance of conformity and social assimilation of the past, people celebrate their differences today. Lack of knowledge and skills for leading a diverse work force is a ticking time bomb for the insensitive organization. The challenge is to make room for differences, by fostering a work environment that naturally allows all organization members "to reach their potential in pursuit of organizational objectives" (Neely, 1992, p. F9).

In place of theory that demeans the individual, organizational leaders need to substitute a framework of human dignity:

Enhancing dignity is not about high silk hats and a string of pearls, but about being honorable and honoring others. It is about valuing the best efforts of another even if we could do better. . . . It is about challenging each other to do our best and being unwilling to accept shoddy work. It is about admitting another has hurt you by some action, forgiving that person, and trusting the one who caused your hurt to do better next time. It is about being unwilling to forgive the one who is unrepentant, knowing that accepting shallow

apologies denigrates all involved in the interaction. Dignity is about honesty, integrity, and quality. By giving it to others, it is bestowed upon ourselves. . . . When we withhold it from others, we deprive ourselves of it. (Rice, 1993, p. 1)

Lawler (1992) contrasts the old paradigm of control with an involvement approach in organizations. The involvement approach organizes work to be challenging, interesting, and motivating by viewing members of the organization as worthy and worthwhile. In contrast to the control approach which tries to program individuals with responses to all situations so that there is never any doubt about what they should do, Lawler recommends giving them general missions and philosophies as guides for their behavior and allowing them to respond to the client or customer as they see fit. They are also expected to improve the work system as time goes on so that it will operate at a high level of quality, solve problems on the job, and coordinate outcomes with others, without a controlling supervisor.

Langer (1989) contrasts the old outcome orientation with mindfulness, where the former is controlled by rigid rules and the latter by a process orientation. Mindless individuals repeat tasks in predetermined uses of information and the individual parts of the task move out of consciousness as only minimal clues necessary to carry out the process scenario are noticed and other signals do not penetrate. In the process orientation, goals are subject to continual revision as awareness of new information requires change. Instead of moving along a predetermined path, mindful individuals see new choices and endpoints, and unexpected stumbling blocks become building blocks. A tolerance for uncertainty develops in the mindful manager, who sees problems as part of an

ongoing process rather than disastrous deviations from the past. The office becomes a place where questions are encouraged, ideas are exchanged, and an error does not mean getting fired.

No entrepreneur, business manager, or government supervisor can claim to be a true individualist unless such a program is implemented as the life project of the organization. True individualism is impossible in organizations that demean the individual by treating humans as property:

Normative individuation requires a supportive context. To reestablish the foundations of normative individuality in self-knowledge, self-identification, and self-responsibility, it is imperative to strengthen 'intermediate associations' that buffer individuals against the conditioning effects of impersonal associations-at-large. (Norton, 1991, p. 155)

It therefore becomes the responsibility of organizations and managers to respect total personhood. They need not actively further it, but must define themselves and their functions in ways that do not obstruct, but facilitate worker's self-integrations. As Keen noted, management is a sacred trust for the well-being of others placed in one's care.

People in organizations and leaders of organizations need to change the way they think about their organizations and the role organizations play in daily life. Organizations need to become a part of society, to take a greater (not bigger) societal role, to show the same responsibilities toward others as an individual, and assume the same obligations. Since organizations are treated by the law as individuals, they must fulfill a more responsible social role, within their organizational boundaries and out.

The Paradoxes of Identity, Individuality and Movement

Peck (1987) describes our individuality as being embodied in three paradoxes. He says we are called to wholeness and simultaneously to recognize our incompleteness, called to power and to acknowledge our weakness, and called to both individuation and interdependence. In the organization these paradoxes appear in a somewhat different context. An individual must integrate the groups of which he is a part and groups must integrate the large array of individual differences of their members. A paradox of identity that hinders such integration arises out of the struggle of individuals and the group to establish a unique and meaningful identity where each is an integral part of the other. A paradox of individuality that also militates against integration exists in the conflict between the notion that group identity only comes from full expression of its members' individuality and the notion that full individuation only occurs when individuals accept and develop more fully their connection to the group. The group gains solidarity as individuality is legitimated, and individuality is established when the primacy of the group is affirmed.¹⁴

These coexisting opposites result in a vicious circularity that is intellectually frustrating and emotionally disturbing to individual members. Those who come to the group looking for what they can get face the message, "You can't get anything from here until you give!" These oppositional forces result in stuckness, where individuals hold back from the group making it a hollow cocoon that nobody wants to be a part

of. A group can only be a group when individuals put themselves into it, but it is hard to discover the connections necessary to form a group under conditions of caution, withdrawal and secrecy. As the group tries to reconcile these opposing forces by compromising the emotions or eliminating the contradictions, stuckness results from taking away the opportunity for expressing, exploring, and living with these emotions.¹⁵

A group leader needs to employ a paradoxical approach to issues such as identity and individuality to help relieve the stuckness and produce movement in the group. Such an approach sees individuals as created by and creating the group. The individual derives meaning from the group and vice versa, and any conception that separates their identities fails to address the mutual process of adjustment and integration necessary for balance in the whole. In order to address the discontinuities and differences that come from the conflicting demands of individuation and connections and to create movement, the group must implement three practices:

1. Go toward rather than away from the anxiety or fear associated with an issue or event. The more a group struggles to avoid the issues, the more likely it will get stuck.
2. The leadership role must seek to understand the relationship or link between seemingly opposite positions and suggest actions that examine the patterns of stuckness within the group.
3. Individuals and groups must reject the polarity of self and others and embrace the knowledge that each is defined through others within the group or other groups.¹⁶

Implications of Authentic Individualism for Leadership Theory

Return to Moral Leadership

According to Harmon and Mayer (1986), Luther Gulick was one of the Neo-Classical organization theorists for whom instrumental rationality was the essence of that part of human organizing known as administration. His acronym POSDCORB was used to describe the primary activities of the executive as center of all authority and power in the organization. Harmon and Mayer believe there were three primary consequences to the outlook Gulick's theory encapsulated. First, was a Wilsonian emphasis on means of administration with little attention to government's purpose. Second, was to highlight the need for the division of work leading to scientific principles of management and reliance on a bureaucratic hierarchy. Third, was the centrality of efficiency as the premier value by which to judge government. Yet a fourth consequence might be a movement away from the profound moral leadership concerns of Chester Barnard (1938). Primacy of empirical and instrumental concerns seemed to dominate the organizational leadership scene until the late 1940s and 1950s. In 1957, Philip Selznick penned his tome on leadership called Leadership in Administration, which began to nudge leadership theory back toward the concerns of purpose and morality. Selznick (1957) begins his essay with a thesis statement about leadership: "The executive becomes a statesman as he makes the transition from administrative management to institutional leadership" (p. 4). This means the leader views the organization as an institution and has concern

for its evolution as a whole. Selznick and Katz & Kahn (1978) agree, leadership is not a collection of traits. The latter classify it as a category of behavior. Similarly, Selznick calls it functioning as an integral part of the organization. He says an institutional leader is found in the area where policy-formation and institution-building meet. According to Selznick, the chief functions of institutional leadership are:

1. The definition of institutional mission and role: This is a creative task that entails discovery of the true commitments of the organization. Failure to set aims is a major source of irresponsibility in leadership.

2. The institutional embodiment of purpose: The task of leadership is not only to make policy, but to shape the character of the organization, sensitizing it to ways of thinking and responding.

3. The defense of institutional integrity: Institutional survival is a matter of interfusing the organization with values and a distinctive identity.

4. The ordering of internal conflict: Leadership has the dual task of permitting emerging interests a wide degree of representation and balancing power appropriate to fulfillment of key commitments.

Katz and Kahn (1978) note five types of power wielded by the leader: legitimate power, reward power, punishment power, referent power and expert power. Quoting others, they describe leadership as a boundary function:

'In general, if leadership is a boundary function, the relationship between a leader and his followers will depend to a major extent on the leader's capacity to manage the relationship between the

external and internal environments in a way that will allow his followers to perform their primary task.' (p. 532)

This notion corresponds with Selznick's idea that leadership occurs in the area where policy-formation and institution-building meet.

Like Boulding (1956), Katz and Kahn urge a systemic perspective. The effective leader is one who successfully integrates primary and secondary relationships. He mediates and tempers the organizational requirements to meet the needs of the person, promotes group loyalty and personal ties, demonstrates care for persons as persons, relies on referent power rather than solely legitimate power, encourages development or positive identification with the organization, and creates among peers and subordinates a degree of personal commitment and identification. Using examples that sound very much like Barnard's (1938) principles of communication, Katz and Kahn describe how the effective leader bridges the gap between primary and secondary relationships in many ways:

With respect to the instrumentality of the job for other groups and affiliations, effective leaders are positive and accepting. In dealing with subordinates they acknowledge these primary relations to which the job is secondary. . . . With respect to the instrumentality of the job for gratifying social needs in the work situation, effective supervisors are accepting and constructive. They regard the value of the group to each individual as a potential asset rather than a bureaucratic irrelevancy or a threat to authority. . . . In short, they deviate from the bureaucratic ideal by endowing the relationships in the work group with a primary quality, making them valuable and valued for themselves. (p. 556)

The primary relationships should involve face-to-face interaction, not remote organizational connections. They should be person specific, or particularistic, not universalistic, and they should be affectively connected, not rationalistically role-related.

Character development is important to organizations, as well as nations and professions, even if it means constructing or encouraging myths in furtherance of organizational identity. Barnard and Selznick agree that establishment of character and a moral identity in an organization is an important function of leadership. Barnard describes it as the faculty for creating morals for others. Selznick calls it embodiment of purpose; the infusion of values at all levels of the organization and constant measurement of the organizations activities against these ethical purposes. In any case, they both recognize identity formation as a critical experience in organizational life. The task for an organizational leader is to mold a loose social structure into a committed polity dedicated to the moral values he has defined for the organization and endeavor to bring out the individuals' best in support of the organization. However, Selznick's theory is still very much related to the functional and structural aspects of the organization.

Humanity and Leadership

Modern leadership theory has become much more personal, existential, and concerned with the human component than the organizational. DePree (1992), Torbert (1991), and Roestenbaum (1992) all think it essential that leadership theory and leaders themselves return to an appreciation of the humanities and study of philosophy. This is particularly true in government, because its management, leadership and reform engages fundamental issues of political and social philosophy.

Torbert believes organizations ought to exist in order to promote the development and self-realization of their members.

Max Depree, President and CEO of the Herman Miller corporation, says, "Leaders will plumb the depths of human authenticity, perhaps without ever reaching the bottom" (p. 59). They need to commit themselves to individual authenticity "with openness and expectation, with grace and humor" (p. 63). He recognizes that "[l]eaders must balance sensitively the needs of the people and of the institution" and leadership is a "posture of indebtedness" and the process of leading is the process of fulfilling commitments made to both persons and the organization (p. 19).

Although leadership cannot be adequately summed up in a list of character traits, DePree offers the following statements to begin describing it:

1. Integrity is the linchpin of leadership.
2. Vulnerability permits those who follow the leader to do their best.
3. Discernment--the detection of nuance and the perception of changing realities--lies somewhere between wisdom and judgment.
4. All the qualities of a good leader stem from awareness of the human spirit.
5. Courage in relationships means leaders resolve conflict, define justice, and keep promises.
6. A passionate sense of humor requires a broad perspective on the human condition and is essential to living with ambiguity.

7. Leaders have the intellectual energy and curiosity to turn decision-making into a process of frantically learning from your followers.

Depree acknowledges the "sacred nature of personal dignity" and believes the need for dignity, opportunity, and reward must move beyond the requirements of law and regulation, which represent "only the most basic and generalized statement of fair behavior" (pp. 52, 56). According to Depree, leadership and ethics are inextricably woven together, because leaders learn how to make a commitment to individual freedom and the common good, neither of which work on trickle-down theory. "Above all, leadership is a position of servanthood" (p. 220).

Depree also describes eleven promises that a leader makes to an organization and its members:

1. The organization expects the leader to define and express both in writing and, especially, through behavior the beliefs and values of the institution.

2. To carry out its work, the organization needs from the leader a clear statement of its vision and its strategy.

3. A leader is accountable for the design of the business.

4. A leader is responsible for lean and simple statements of policy consistent with beliefs and values, vision and strategy.

5. Equity is the special province of a leader.

6. A leader focuses not on her own image as a leader, but on the tone of the body of the institution.

7. A leader ensures that priorities are set, and that they are steadfastly communicated and adhered to in practice.

8. A leader ensures that the planning for the organization at all levels receives the necessary direction and approvals.

9. A leader reviews and assesses results primarily in three areas: key appointments and promotions, results compared to the plan, and the connections to key publics.

10. Leaders are accountable for the continuous renewal of the organization.

11. A leader ought never to embarrass followers.

Roestenbaum (1992) believes that work can be an opportunity for both personal and organizational greatness and such a point of view ennobles human nature and strengthens society. This point of view involves refocusing the mind and achieving a mental transformation to the leadership way of thinking. The authentic leader does not accept the mind as he or she finds it, but chooses to construct or wake up to the leadership mind, providing an inner space for conflict, paradox, and contradiction.

When of the proper mind, a leader is concerned with matters of the heart--the importance of self-respect, feelings, sense of worth and destiny. These issues are of enduring concern and represent the conflict between values of love and survival, harshness and compassion. Leadership requires hard thoughts about soft subjects. To consider these issues is to go beyond questions of technique to fundamental dimensions of the human soul.

This amounts to simple recognition that organizations are people-driven. "They exist for people, are designed by people, and work through

people. Leave people out, and you drain the blood right out of the body" (Roestenbaum, p. 15). As a result, Roestenbaum believes it is of the highest importance "to build cooperation on the common principles of humanity that bind us all" (p. 309). To do so, he thinks it necessary that middle management should devote one-third of its work time to leadership, and two-thirds to maintenance and managing. For upper management, the time devoted to leadership rises to fifty percent. He also believes one-third of the organization's resources (money, attention, emphasis, energy, and time) should also be devoted to leadership—not to production, administration, maintenance, or management. This training should be viewed as remedial work in the humanities. Ten years into the job, executives with a background of skills and no humanities will suffer, as will their followers. Moreover, the mindset or philosophy of the individuals and organization members determines the results achieved. See Figure 3 in Appendix D.

Transforming Work

Senge (1990) says the new view of leadership in the learning organization centers on the subtle and important tasks of mentoring, coaching, and helping others; leaders are becoming designers, stewards and teachers (pp. 340, 345). The leader's task is to design a learning process where people can deal productively with the critical issues they face and develop mastery in the learning disciplines. They focus predominantly on the purpose and systemic structure of the organization. The latter is the domain of systems thinking and mental models. Here, leaders are

continually helping others to see how different parts of the organization interact, how different situations parallel one another because of common underlying structures, how local actions have longer-term and broader impacts than the local actor realizes, and why certain operating policies are needed for the system as a whole. Also, by focusing on the purpose story and the larger explanation of where the organization is headed, leaders add an additional dimension of meaning (p. 353).

Organizational transformation (OT), discussed in *Transforming Work* (1984), edited by John D. Adams, is a new thrust, probably not yet a new field, in the early stages of emergence from human consciousness. It encompasses the traditional schools of thought about performance in the workplace such as organizational development. However, it focuses on creating a vision of what is desired in the organizational context from "a clearly articulated set of humanistic values" (p. vii). OT is an attempt to avoid the pitfalls found in the tried-and-true methods employed by experts. It wants to capitalize on beginner's mind to continually see with new eyes. It is the "willingness and ability to find those perspectives--social, psychological, historical, spatial, etc.--that provide the most functional interpretation of our situations" (p. 11). OT is a new paradigm, a proactive frame of reference, that calls for looking to the future and taking the initiative. It wants life to change, it wants society to change, it wants people to shed the fatalistic cloak of "hapless victim in a hostile universe" and become action-takers (pp. vi, 18-19, 25).

It means more than participation; it includes providing the training necessary to understand a change program and be aware of the cultural

norms that can help it succeed. Only if participation is informed can intelligent decisions be made based on sound information. OT believes that organizations can have a heart and compassion should be stimulated, accepted, encouraged and rewarded. Instrumentalism, in which material possessions are viewed as instruments for generating satisfaction, should be "supplanted by a 'sacred' outlook that seeks the intrinsic value of the human experience in the family and the workplace" (p. 69). It is a general belief theory that is based in part upon a "deep sense of vision or purposefulness," a balance of reason and intuition, and empowerment of people (p. 70). OT conceives of organizations as dynamic energy: moving, changing, shifting, pushing, pulling. Another OT concept is spirituality in the workplace, which denotes rejection of the business-as-money-generating-machine model in favor of "a clear sense of transcendent purpose—one that goes beyond oneself" (pp. 139-140, 143).

Attention to myths is also an OT emphasis. Myths are "the next step beyond belief structures"; the "prime mechanisms that affect the culture" of an organization; the most "basic, fundamental and ultimate" truths about us; "the story that we tell to explain the nature of our reality"; the study and understanding of myths and beliefs as "an interface between personal experience and cultural norms" (pp. 186-187, 220). OT is a new tool in the public administrator's equipment bag. It is a value laden approach—based on empathy, ethics and integrity—designed to enhance the performance of the organization system and its sub-units, and the personal well being of the individuals within them. It looks at each as affecting the other and recognizes their interconnectedness.

It is possible to postulate some ways in which the above discussions can be put into practice. First, the leader should formulate and articulate a vision for the organization over the long term, perhaps the next ten years. This vision should be in the nature of a paradigm reframing, i.e., a new view of the organization's values, purpose and mission stated in symbolic terms, using heavy words. This effort would be the first step in the process of building an organizational mythology.

Second, a task force should be established to develop goals based on the leader's vision and the internal strivings of the organization's members. Third, an interpersonal leader with training should be appointed. This should be someone who can relate to the members of the organization on a personal level and who can assist the heads of divisions with their organizationally related problems.

Fourth, a decentralized, client based organizational structure should be maintained. However, criteria for selection to run each division should be examined, reevaluated, developed and published by another task force. These criteria should be based on, and coincide with, the leader's vision and the goals of the organization.

Fifth, a standing committee should be selected by the organization's members to review qualified personnel and make promotions to head each division, and to the first assistant in each division having more than six members. Promotions should be based on the committee's judgment as to who will best fulfill the criteria and vigorously pursue the organization's vision and goals. Sixth, candidates eligible for promotion to these positions should be given relevant and intensive administration

related training in the way that humanities may be brought to bear on management and administrative issues. Organizational leaders should take leadership seriously by training everyone for leadership, framing meetings with leadership just as religious schools frame mathematics and science with devotionals, providing incentives for spending leadership time and effort, and promoting as the highest priority the spirit of leadership throughout the organization.

Seventh, the leader or his designate (perhaps the interpersonal leader) should adopt a walk around style on a continuing basis, in order to really get to know the organization and understand the problems faced at the unit level. Eighth, a formalized mentoring system should be established, in which new members of the organization are assigned an advisor to provide them insight and answer their questions for at least their first two years of employment.

Ninth, the depths of personal conscience, independent thinking, and autonomy should be actively explored by encouraging workers to think for themselves, accepting those who do, and rewarding success as a function of personal decision and resoluteness through merit, not organizational politics, bootlicking, or arbitrary dislikes. Tenth, there must be continuous integration of leadership philosophy into the daily work experience. Only by employing more humanistic, participative, value oriented methods can any organization hope to head off growing dissatisfaction. Without such efforts it may be doomed to an ever accelerating downward spiral as conflict grows and methods to control it escalate.

Summary and Conclusion

Public life and the way it is viewed in the United States today is in desperate need of revamping. The purely mechanistic view of individuals as skin-encapsulated objects with no spiritual or moral bond between them is outmoded and dangerous in an interconnected world growing ever more complex and diverse, where the resources for progress are also more scarce. Instead of such a self-oriented view of reality and the self-interested pursuit of progress it engenders, progress itself must be reformulated. Who we are and what we pursue as good in life needs redefining. This can begin with change in the way we view the world and perceive the reality that surrounds us. Authentic individualism is an effort toward helping change the perception of our environment.

Authentic individualism does not seek to make some political or ideological point, but seeks to lift up the human and ethical dimensions of public life. It asks three questions to be answered every day by institutions and individuals in their lives and work: What does this action do for people? What does it do to people? How may people participate in it? Human dignity is the starting point for moral decision-making. Morality in turn is a growing appreciation for what enriches human dignity and what truly injures it. Every decision must be judged in light of whether it protects or undermines the dignity of the human person. If that happens, people and institutions will stop treating individuals as acquisitive, driven by wants, needs, and desires for goods. Business and government will stop treating each other as tools to create a business climate and both

will put people first. Then each person will be treated as deserving of respect, driven by values, principles and the desire to do good.

Key parts of the foundation for authentic individualism can be summarized as follows:

1. Life is the organization of matter into growing and reproducing entities, and human life is simply more complex organization of matter into sentient and developmental entities. Dignity is present in all life and flows from the common origin of life and matter in the universe.

2. Being human is development of a moral sense that recognizes the dignity of life.

3. Each individual person possesses dignity that must be respected and enhanced by the government, employers and others; individual value is rooted in who we are, not what we do.

4. Respect for human dignity is relational, reflexive and Other-regarding; it requires individuals and institutions to govern their affairs according to the impact those affairs will have on humanity.

5. Bestowing respect requires concomitant responsibilities; individuals and institutions are responsible for their own actions and have a duty to define and follow their life project with due regard to the life projects of others.

6. The project of life is Authentic Individualism defined as independent, critical thought and compassionate devotion to development in self and others of human potential for good.

7. An authentic individual has identity and worth apart from the community and has primacy over the majority, but human dignity can be fully realized and protected only in community.

8. The will of the community may not be imposed arbitrarily upon the authentic individual, and the community works to develop individual human potential and enhance dignity.

9. The community can expect in return a real commitment from each individual and institution to support community by completing a life project of developing the potential for good in self and others.

10. Good is held in common by all and present in all; it is dignity itself, but can only be maintained through completion of a life project devoted to the development of it in self and others.

These principles lead to a paradox of perpetual renewal shown in Figure 2, Appendix C. Beginning with the dignity of life, if one cultivates respect for others and assumes responsibility to others, one embarks on a life project for good that leads to a community of individuals who value individual worth and exalt the dignity of life. When viewed in space-time, authentic individualists follow a helical path of evolution and development as shown in Figure 4, Appendix E. In this way they may transcend the organization, give it a new paradigm, or vision, and in the process transform it into a place healthy for humans.

One question that confronts physicists and philosophers alike is whether laws, such as the laws of physics, enjoy a transcendent existence. Are these laws discovered as though they are out there somewhere, or are they constructed by scientists as simply the best known explanation of

observed conditions? Are they invented as a result of our particular perspective? Could an alien civilization with a different evolutionary culture construct different laws? Scientists themselves cannot agree about whether quantum particles are real, concrete entities or simply potentialities and possibilities expressed by mathematical models. Some believe that objective reconstructions of reality are impossible, that attempts to do so are creative activities comparable to artistic impressions, that science advances by free-ranging imaginative leaps or inspiration rather than inductive reasoning, and that the essence of true reality is its immeasurability. These divisions in science point up the shakiness of any claim that we can ever know the whole truth.

One thing seems clear; many different laws can be fitted to a given set of data, and one can never be sure the correct set has been attained. The histories of science and philosophy are replete with examples of fundamental truths that turned out to be dispensable, fleeting, and particularistic. What today are called the laws of physics are only tentative approximations. Regardless of whether science will ever progress far enough to determine the correct set of first principles, only better and better approximations can be expected. Therefore, without deciding if a unique set of laws exist toward which science and philosophy converge, one must be satisfied that any given set under consideration at any given time demonstrates only a partial understanding. Whether invented or discovered, these laws are incomplete explanations of the ultimate truth that may never be fully revealed.

Moreover, the nature of the world is fundamentally quantum, with its inherent indeterminism. Efforts to discover base particles result in discovery of smaller and smaller pieces, the size of which seem to depend only on the size of the hammer, or particle accelerator, that is used. For a general quantum state, it is impossible to say in advance what value will be obtained by a measurement and only probabilities can be assigned. A particle cannot have a well-defined position and a well-defined momentum at the same time. This implies that the best any Theory of Everything can do is fix some sort of most likely world. It seems, then, that the physical universe is intelligible, but contingent; it is not compelled to exist as it is and could have been otherwise. Though it is ordered and rational, it cannot be fully explained by science. Though such an explanation may exist out there abstractly—bits and parts of it might be known and suggest its existence—the whole form cannot be known on the basis of rational thought. A full explanation must come from outside the physical world—in something metaphysical—because a contingent physical universe cannot contain an explanation for itself. If further progress in understanding is desired, one must embrace a different concept of understanding from that of rational explanation. Otherwise, the attempt to explain by cause and effect breaks down into an infinite chain, as illustrated in the effort to explain what supports the world by saying, "Its turtles all the way down."

Linear systems are central to traditional scientific analysis—understanding the parts of a complex system implies understanding the whole—but recent scientific work on chaos, self-organization, and

nonlinear systems theory has forced scientists to think more about open systems. Nonlinear systems must be understood in their totality—which in practice means taking into account a variety of constraints and conditions. Such systems are unpredictable and incredibly sensitive to influences by their external environments. They display ordered and law-like behavior, yet they are indeterministic and subject to random outside perturbations. These complex systems are more than the sum of their parts, and within a directed framework there remains an intimate amalgam of openness, freedom, chance, and choice. General organizing principles supervise their behavior, but these principles are outside the laws of physics which operate at the bottom level of individual particles. The study of nonlinear systems shifts emphasis away from lumpen matter responding to impressed forces toward systems that contain elements of spontaneity and surprise.

A compromise between the changing and the eternal and a reconciliation of becoming and being can be found in stochasticity. A stochastic system is subject to random and unpredictable fluctuations, but stochasticity is not anarchy. The system is subject to general principles that guide and encourage, rather than compel development along certain predetermined pathways. Although each individual quantum event is unpredictable, a collection of such events conform to statistical predictions, there is order in disorder, law-like behavior emerges from apparent lawlessness of random fluctuations, and chaos possesses statistical regularities.

Chaos is a type of non-linear behavior, as are most natural systems. Though no one can ever predict exactly how a chaotic system will behave over long periods, chaos is manageable, exploitable and even invaluable. To the casual observer, chaotic systems appear to behave randomly, but upon close examination they have an underlying order. The disorderly behavior of a chaotic system is a collection of many orderly behaviors. By perturbing a chaotic system in the right way, the system can be encouraged to follow one of its many regular behaviors. Also, a non-linear system could be stable when driven with a chaotic signal. The process requires finding the sub-systems that react to a chaotic signal in a stable way. Also, two systems can be coaxed to operate in phase by changing the periodic driving signal. Then the trick is to find the right kind of chaotic signal for each system. (Ditto & Pecora, 1993, p. 78.)

The philosophical thought that most closely accommodates these scientific views is process philosophy, which views the world as a process with definite directionality, rather than as a collection of objects or set of events. Process thinking leads to organismic, ecological views reminiscent of Aristotle's cosmology. The flux of time places primacy on becoming over being and the Newtonian rigid mechanistic view of the universe is replaced by stress on the openness and indeterminism of nature. A rock, a river, a cloud, or a person is regarded as a higher level of organization than a simple collection of atoms. A bottom-up view of causality in terms of interacting elementary particles combines with subtle acts downward from higher levels. Process reality accepts the world as a community of interdependent beings rather than a collection of individual cogs in a

machine. The vision of Public Administrator that emerges from this process of becoming is the Steersman: guiding and encouraging public acceptance of right reason; always alert to random perturbations; piloting between Scylla and Charybdis, the dual perils of indeterminacy; constantly assessing available information to determine position; and continually making mid-course corrections for safe passage to the final destination; but open and flexible enough to take temporary shelter along the way if forced to do so by intelligible but unpredictable conditions.

The steersman can benefit from some of the same principles that guide common, everyday navigators:

1. Continue education. No matter how long one must wait, everything one learns will come in handy.
2. Keep calm in the face of adversity. Given time to think clearly, there is generally a solution to most problems.
3. Fully evaluate the situation before making decisions. Plan as far in advance as possible for foreseeable scenarios. As the time for fast action approaches, it is generally too late for planning.
4. Know all of the equipment available and how to use it. Use all available technical information and scientific aids.
5. Consider available options and select one that offers the greatest probability of success. Be prepared to abandon the first option in favor of an alternative approach if necessary.
6. Use your eyes, ears and brain.

The organizational steersman also tries to identify that part of the organization around which the remainder can come into synchronistic

orbit, and the signal that will coax the two parts of the organization to synchronize. In today's American organizations the appropriate signal is one that respects and facilitates human dignity, one that offers the members of the organization the opportunity to make decisions according to general moral and organizational principles. With subtle acts downward he offers a guiding hand to synchronize the diverse energies of the organization. The steersman of an organization guides it like a pilot of a ship at sea. He has many quantitative instruments at his disposal producing data that are very useful during more-or-less routine situations. This methodology works very well so long as outside conditions remain within certain parameters. However, when conditions such as the weather begin to exceed normal conditions, it is only the intuition and judgment of the pilot and his crew that will steer a safe course. The task is to monitor multiple streams of information flow at the same time--including those of destination and progress along the way--not as in Langer's mindlessness, but as in the Greek notion of a steersman in a cybernetic state of monitoring progress toward fulfillment of moral purpose and organizational goals.

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Appendix A
Descriptive Framework

Descriptive Framework

Guiding a Wild Heart
REFOCUSING AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM
Dissertation Phase I

DEDICATION

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

PREFACE

INTRODUCTION

- A. Spears of Odin
- B. Cosmos and Society

**PART ONE: A MODEL OF THE INDIVIDUAL FROM WESTERN
PHILOSOPHY**

Introduction

Chapter I: The Individual in Early Western Philosophy

- A. The Ancient Mind - Age of Dieties
- B. The Classical Mind - Age of Politics
- C. The Medieval Mind - Age of Faith
- D. The Renaissance and Reformation - Age of Reason
- E. Summary

Chapter II: The Individual in Modern Western Philosophy

- A. Faith in Science
- B. Collapse of Confidence
- C. Quest for Objectivity
- D. Call of Being
- E. Summary

PART TWO: A MODEL OF THE INDIVIDUAL FROM THE DEVELOPING UNITED STATES

Introduction

Chapter III: The Rugged Individual in Revolutionary U.S.

- A. Colonial Heritage
- B. Puritan Ethic
- C. Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights
- D. Wild, Wild West
- E. Civil War
- F. Summary

Chapter IV: The Individual of Romanticism and Reform

- A. Industrialism - The Gilded Age
- B. Marxism, Socialism and Reform
- C. World War 1, Communism and the Age of Heroes
- D. Summary

PART THREE: A MODEL OF THE INDIVIDUAL FROM MODERN UNITED STATES

Introduction

Chapter V: Individualism After Disillusionment and Loss of Faith

- A. Depression, World War 2 and McCarthyism
- B. Consumerism and Conformity
- C. Civil Rights, Vietnam and Watergate
- D. Summary

Chapter VI: Radical Individualism

- A. Self Actualization in the 70s
- B. Self Aggrandizement in the 80s
- C. Malaise in the 90s
- D. Summary

PART FOUR: A MODEL OF THE INDIVIDUAL FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

Introduction

Chapter VII: Authentic Individualism

- A. Synthesis of Philosophies Toward a More Socially Responsible Theory of Individualism
- B. New Model for the Individualist in the Third Millennium
- C. Relevance for Public Administration
- D. Summary

PART FIVE: THE SOUL OF THE THIRD ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

Introduction

Chapter VIII: Consequences of Authentic Individualism for Leadership Theory

- A. Power vs. Developmental Leadership
- B. Individual Autonomy and Responsibility
- C. Leadership as a Group Function vs. the "Lone Wolf" Manager
- D. Summary

Chapter IX: Implications of Authentic Individualism for Group Theory

- A. The Bureaucratic Experience
- B. Consensus and Group Dynamics
- C. Transforming Work
- D. Communicative Interaction vs. Purposive-Rational Action
- E. Summary

Chapter X: Ethical (Normative) Considerations of Authentic Individualism

- A. Adopting a Communicative Ethics
- B. Renewing the Notion of a Public Interest
- C. Building a Communal "We"
- D. Summary

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Appendix B
Conceptual Diagram




Figure 1: Conceptual Diagram.

Appendix C
Paradox of Renewal




Figure 2: Paradox of Renewal.

Appendix D

Mindset to Results and Philosophy to Objectives Pathways





Figure 3: Mindset to Results and Philosophy to Objectives Pathways.

Appendix E
Authentic Individualism in Space-Time




Figure 4: Authentic Individualism in Space-Time.

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