Intimacy in Context: A Theory of Interpersonal Relationships

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INTIMACY IN CONTEXT:
A THEORY OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS

by

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To define intimacy, interpersonal relationships are divided into four major categories that encompass the whole range of interpersonal behavior: strangers, acquaintances, friends, and intimates. These are seen as progressive stages, defined by the individual's subjective, affective orientation, and discernable by behavioral indicators. Strangers are divided into total, encountered, and familiar strangers, acquaintances into mere and friendly acquaintances, and friends into just friends, casual friends, and close friends. The process culminates in intimacy which is divided into three aspects: psychological, the necessary aspect, biological, and ideological. Total intimacy is the presence of all three. This framework has explanatory and predictive value, and is therefore seen as a sociological theory of the middle range or a grounded formal theory, with implications for mental health. It is supported by numerous empirical findings of sociological, psychological, and anthropological research, and by theoretical elaborations of several prominent sociological theorists.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................ ii
LIST OF TABLES ........................................ vi
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................ vi

Chapter

I. INTRODUCTION ........................................ 1
   Statement of the Problem .......................... 1
   Characteristics of a Theory ..................... 9

II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON FRIENDSHIP AND INTIMACY .......................... 15
   A Global View of Friendship ...................... 16
   Use of the Word "Intimacy" ......................... 28
   Types of Intimate Friendship .................... 54
   Summary ............................................. 72

III. THEORETICAL CONTEXT: FROM STRANGERS TO INTIMATES ............... 73
   Introduction ...................................... 73
   Strangers .......................................... 83
   Acquaintances ..................................... 94
   Friends ............................................ 123
   Intimates .......................................... 155
   Summary ........................................... 179

IV. SOCIETAL CONTEXT: THE SEARCH FOR INTIMACY ............................. 181
   Societal Background ................................ 181
   Search for Intimacy ................................ 192
   Implications for Mental Health ................... 201
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS. ........................................ 209
    Testing the Theory ................................................ 209
    Epilogue ............................................................. 235

BIBLIOGRAPHY. ........................................................... 241
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Levels of Friendship ..................... 125
2. Strong Values and Friendship ................ 217
3. Weak Values and Friendship ................. 218
4. Conflict Potential and Intimacy .......... 219
5. Pattern Variables ......................... 220

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Affective Pyramid ..................... 82
2. Aspects of Intimacy ......................... 161
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

Interpersonal relationships form a major part of human interaction. According to symbolic interactionism, society consist of interpersonal behavior. The basic premises of this theoretical orientation came from the thought of Mead who, although impressed with Darwin's evolutionary theory, nevertheless did not espouse the social Darwinism (Timasheff & Theodorson, 1976, p. 235) or positivism of nineteenth century sociology. Emulating the natural sciences, the positivists (such as Comte and Spencer) concentrated on the aspects which the human society has in common with the rest of nature and paid less attention to the aspects that differ. As Lenski (1974) acknowledges, however, it is the "behavioral breakthrough," unique to humans, which makes human society (p. 15). One central aspect of this uniquely human social behavior is affective relationships, which are embedded in the general interaction and interdependence that forms society.

Simmel (1858-1918) was the first major theorist in the
sociological tradition who took social interaction as the core of society. Rejecting the organistic theories of Comte and Spencer, he advocated sociology as the study of the forms and patterns of human interaction (cited in Coser, 1977, p. 177). Consequently, as Schwartz and Jacobs (1979) describe,

His [Simmel's] image of society was of millions of individuals simultaneously interacting with, for, and against one another, on a day-to-day basis. When they did this, they made little patterns between themselves which combined into larger patterns, ultimately forming "society." (p. 188)

To a large extent, later sociology, preoccupied by its identity crisis between science, philosophy, and humanities, and anxious to be identified as a science, has frantically attempted to follow the positivist pattern. This organic view of society, following Durkheim's organic solidarity, has a somewhat opposite approach from the view advocated by Simmel. Symbolic interactionism, however, follows Simmel's approach; especially this is so with the dramaturgical theory of Goffman which is built on Simmel's theoretical formulations (Schwartz & Jacobs, 1979, p. 189). Yet even these do not totally encompass all forms of interpersonal behavior, but generally concentrate on the less personal level. The acquaintance process has been amply documented by many (e.g. Newcomb, 1961; Homans, 1950, 1974), and organizational and role behavior have also received considerable attention (e.g. Homans, 1974; Goffman, 1959, 1961, 1963, 1967), but the affectively higher forms of interpersonal behavior, namely, friendship and intimacy, are only lately beginning to be included as appropriate
areas for sociological inquiry. As yet, however, they do not appear to form a substantial part of any existing general sociological theory. Parsons' theory of social structure and personality (1964) can be considered an exception, although its focus is more on personality formation and the interaction between social structure and personality. This study is an attempt to look at society through affective relationships, and belongs to the phenomenological school of thought.

In anthropology, which has long been interested in kinship patterns, the study of friendship sneaked into the discipline at the beginning of this century "in the cultural guise of blood brotherhood" (Paine, 1974, p. 11); i.e. in its relation to kinship. By 1930's, it had developed into "promising beginnings" which, according to Paine (p. 13), have not been sustained. Yet anthropology has probably acquired more knowledge about the social context of friendship than has sociology with its newer interest in the topic. Perhaps in both disciplines, as Schofield (1964, p. 2) suggests, research on friendship has largely focused on activity rather than the relationship.

It is to be noted, however, that the same basic problem is approached from several directions and under several subject headings within different fields of social science. The predominantly anthropological literature on friendship, the social psychologically oriented, new literature on intimacy, and the more psychological or counseling literature on loneliness; all fundamentally seem to address the same problem. Yet, in each of these orientations, the central issue is somewhat floating
in the air, with few connecting links with the rest of the behavioral spectrum.

Intimacy has traditionally been researched with the context of marriage and family, anything outside of marriage being categorized as friendship. This has led to some ambiguities. The word "friendship" has been used—as it is used by the general public—to denote almost any relationship, ranging from acquaintances to intimates. One example of this is provided by Paine (1974, p. 6). Referring to Goffman (1966) and Leyton (1972), he finds it "illuminating to consider 'casual friendship' as acquaintanceship." This confuses the meaning of friendship. There is a long way from a chance chat with a neighbor to giving one's life for a friend; yet both of these extremes, and all stages in between, are generally included in the concept of friendship. It is understandable that this is the case with the general public, popular literature, and the media; that the social sciences have little more clarity to offer is more difficult to understand.

Some classification schemes have been suggested recently in anthropology and general literature (e.g. Du Bois, 1974; Reisman, 1979). While these are helpful and definitely a step forward, they either have insufficient categories to include all the many and varying degrees of friendly interpersonal behavior, or they offer too few clear behavioral indicators or operational definitions to facilitate such classification. The literature, then, largely remains a chaos. Terms, data, ideas, definitions, propositions, and suggestions are hopping
around like a group of children playing with balloons. Any surface attempt to put them together would be just as colorful; Schwartz and Jacobs (1979), in fact, compare such an attempt to a "patchwork quilt" (p. 354).

Terminology itself represents this chaos. In addition to the above mentioned (and apparently almost interchangeable) terms of acquaintance, friend, and intimate, there are references to "just friends," "casual friends," "best friends," "expedient friendship," "inalienable friendship," "disposable friendship," "differentiated friendship," "transitory relationship," "joking relationship," etc., with few guidelines as to the organization of these concepts. Furthermore, within friendship, different qualities (e.g. instrumental and affective) cause confusion. Kin relationships further complicate the matter, causing arguments whether friendship is supplementary to kinship or vice versa. The fact that friendship is a combination of various attributes (Paine, 1974, p. 13) and found in a variety of voluntary or socially prescribed relationships, calls for a comprehensive theory where its relation to other types of bonding can be clearly seen.

Under the title of affective relationships, all these varieties can come together. Although the spectrum is wide, in all references to friendship there is an implicit assumption of gradations, or different levels of the relationship. It seems there must be a logical progression where all these different levels will fit in. These implicit assumptions do not always coincide between the various writers;
especially close friendship and intimacy are often used interchangeably (e.g. Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1954). The word "intimacy," furthermore, is used without careful consideration of its "true" meaning, resulting in a rather careless overuse. In short, the problem with existing research of affective relationships is not so much lack of data, although those also are needed; rather, the various research results are begging to be organized into an affectively progressive framework where any future data can also be plugged in. Such a general organizing principle could explain ambiguities, answer some of the "why's" of interpersonal behavior, and perhaps predict a typical response in a typical situation.

One possible reason why such a comprehensive framework has not yet been provided is a too narrow vision. As in so many substantive fields, the problem is approached from within, leaving the larger context wanting. Looking at friendship or intimacy by itself, as if it were a separate process or an independent piece of behavior, can cause confusion because other, related concepts are not accounted for. The key to understanding a part is to have at least some concept of the whole. Specialization before the groundwork is done does not lead to a high degree of understanding.

This order, from the general to the specific, has implications for the study of deviance, to give an example. In the natural sciences the order has been followed more than in the social sciences. A physician attempting to treat illness has first learned how the healthy human body functions, and a
biologist does not attempt to explain the deviance of a single rat before s/he has observed the behavior of the majority. A multitude of variables affect even normal behavior, and before these are known, little is gained by concentrating on deviance. On the other hand, when the general pattern is understood, there is a better basis for the study of deviance.

In the study of human behavior, however, this order has not always been followed. To continue our example of deviance, the problem is often approached from the problem end, which is not the most scientific method. For example, labeling does take place but the labeling theory does not fully answer the question why some individuals and not others within the same social group become labeled. The "odd" behavior of the to-be-labeled deviants still goes largely unexplained. Intimate behavior is not deviance, but it could also be understood better within a general framework of interpersonal behavior where it can be seen in context.

Sociology is not as fortunate as the natural sciences in that few, if any, general laws, applicable at all times in all places, have been found. In 1950, Homans pessimistically concluded that the discipline has not yet established a "single general proposition about human behavior" (p. 115). In 1979, Schwartz and Jacobs note that sociology "has yet to generate a single 'law' of human behavior, in the sense that the word 'law' is applied in the physical sciences" (p. 376). Perhaps this has been one reason for the more modest approach: concentrating on problems or specific behaviors. The more general
approach, however, can provide a context for the specific, thus yielding broader understanding even if no generally valid proposition can be reached.

To summarize, the problem addressed in this thesis is the lack of a theory of interpersonal relationships that can explain and predict behaviors connected with intimate relationships and incorporate all types and degrees of affective investment, explain present ambiguities, and direct future research. Supplying such a theory could make the sociology of affective relationships a substantive area of inquiry within the discipline. This would have direct implications for mental health, since various sources (e.g. Beers, 1945; Schofield, 1964; Cohen, 1961, p. 352; Rogers, 1957, 1959, 1967) agree that interpersonal relationships bear heavily on it.

Perhaps the state of the field of "philemics" (Davis, 1973, p. xiii) is such that a researcher is justified to follow Simmel (1950) and concentrate on the construction of theory. Simmel "says explicitly that, while later generations will need to develop better methods for checking theoretical formulations, today's task of developing significant theory cannot wait" (cited in Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p.155). The task Simmel left for later generations has largely been fulfilled. But now the time seems to have come for theory to catch up with methods. Especially this is so in the affective end of interpersonal relationships and its derivative, loneliness, where a formal theory of sociology is "yet to be generated" (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 155).
Characteristics of a Theory

Without theory, there is no science, since "science demands more than facts, more than careful description" (Timasheff & Theodorson, 1976, p. 3). However meticulously these descriptions have been written or facts proven, if they are unconnected they have little value. Science is the tree in which all branches come together. Empirical observations are the leaves and the twigs, propositions the smaller branches and theories the major branches. As leaves and twigs form a branch, separate empirical studies can yield a theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, call this "grounded theory"). Yet leaves and twigs are meaningless without the supporting branch from which they draw their nourishment and which connects them to the tree. Thus, "theoretical considerations and theoretical concepts, implicitly or explicitly, have an essential role in shaping the direction of research, in directing observation, in guiding description itself" (Timasheff & Theodorson, 1976, p. 3).

Theory in sociology has generally been understood in terms of grand theory, the logico-deductive type, which represents the greatest degree of generalization and stays on the macro-level. Few of today's sociologists seem to have the courage to attempt generating it; Sorokin and Parsons are perhaps the latest examples. Merton (1968) advocates the construction of "theories of the middle range," or "logically interconnected
sets of propositions from which empirical uniformities can be derived." These are to be "used in sociology to guide empirical inquiry" (p. 39). These theories of the middle range, Merton continues,

lie between the minor but necessary working hypotheses that evolve in abundance during day-to-day research and the all inclusive systematic efforts to develop a unified theory that will explain all the observed uniformities of social behavior, social organization and social change. (p. 39)

This type of theory, according to Merton, "cuts across the distinction between microsociological problems . . . and macrosociological problems" (p. 63). One example of this is Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism*.

Merton describes this as follows:

For surely this monograph is a prime example of theorizing in the middle range; it deals with a severely delimited problem—one that happens to be exemplified in a particular historical epoch with implications for other societies and other times; it employs a limited theory about the ways in which religious commitment and economic behavior are connected; and it contributes to a somewhat more general theory of the modes of interdependence between social institutions. (p. 63)

The attributes of a middle-range theory, according to Merton (1968, pp. 68-69) are the following:

1. Middle-range theories consist of limited sets of assumptions from which specific hypotheses are logically derived and confirmed by empirical investigation.

2. These theories do not remain separate but are consolidated into wider networks of theory . . . .

3. These theories are sufficiently abstract to deal with differing spheres of social behavior and social structure, so that they transcend sheer description or empirical generalization. . . .

4. This type of theory cuts across the distinction between microsociological problems, as evidenced in small
group research, and macrosociological problems, as evidenced in comparative studies of social mobility and formal organization, and the interdependence of social institutions.

5. Total sociological systems of theory . . . represent general theoretical orientations rather than the rigorous and tightknit systems envisaged in the search for a "unified theory" in physics.

6. As a result, many theories of the middle range are consonant with a variety of systems of sociological thought.

7. Theories of the middle range are typically in direct line of continuity with the work of classical theoretical formulations.

8. The middle-range orientation involves the specification of ignorance. Rather than pretend to knowledge where it is in fact absent, it expressly recognizes what must still be learned in order to lay the foundation for still more knowledge. It does not assume itself to be equal to the task of providing theoretical solutions to all the urgent practical problems of the day but addresses itself to those problems that might now be clarified in the light of available knowledge.

The "grounded theory" approach of Glaser and Strauss (1967) represents another school of thought in sociological theorizing. Identifying with the phenomenological school (p. 6) which concentrates on the present and subjective reality, they conceive of theory formation as "the discovery of theory from data systematically obtained from social research" (p. 2). Such "grounded theory," they believe, "will be more successful than theories logically deduced from a priori assumptions" (p. 2). This, however, does not imply that the generation of new theory should proceed in isolation of existing grounded theory; rather, "in social research generating theory goes hand in hand with verifying it," a concept Glaser and Strauss see involving no conflict (p. 2).
Glaser and Strauss divide theory into substantive and formal, both of which may be considered as "middle-range" in Merton's classification. They explain:

By substantive theory, we mean that developed for a substantive, or empirical, area of sociological inquiry, such as patient care, race relations, professional education, delinquency, or research organizations. By formal theory, we mean that developed for a formal, or conceptual, area of sociological inquiry, such as stigma, deviant behavior, formal organization, socialization, status congruency, authority and power, reward systems, and social mobility. (p. 32)

As seen by Glaser and Strauss,

The interrelated jobs of theory in sociology are:
(1) to enable prediction and explanation of behavior; (2) to be useful in theoretical advance in sociology; (3) to be usable in practical applications—prediction and explanation should be able to give the practitioner understanding and some control of situations; (4) to provide a perspective on behavior—a stance to be taken toward data; and (5) to guide and provide a style for research on particular areas of behavior. Thus theory in sociology is a strategy for handling data in research, providing modes of conceptualization for describing and explaining. The theory should provide clear enough categories and hypotheses so that crucial ones can be verified in present and future research; they must be clear enough to be readily operationalized in quantitative studies when these are appropriate. (p. 3)

The two major requirements of a theory, according to Glaser and Strauss, are "(1) parsimony of variables and formulation, and (2) scope in the applicability of the theory to a wide range of situations, while keeping a close correspondence of theory and data" (pp. 110-111). The scope is also emphasized by Merton (1968). This means that a large array of situations can be explained by a few concepts while maximizing comparison groups (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 179). A theory unifies scattered results of various research endeavors.
(Timasheff & Theodorson, 1976, p. 10); yet its use is not limited to sociologists. While "theory can be developed only by professionally trained sociologists," it "can be applied by either laymen or sociologists" (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 249). A theory "is a theory because it explains or predicts something" (p. 31).

Theory construction is always a creative enterprise. Thus, "if one prizes learning about daily life above other goals of formal sociology, one does best to approach one's task as an art rather than as a science (as positivists understand science)" (Schwartz & Jacobs, 1979, p. 334). However the observations have been made, as Timasheff and Theodorson (1976) conclude,

There is always a jump beyond the evidence, a hunch, corresponding to the creative effort. But every theory thus obtained must then be subjected to verification. It is considered verified, in a preliminary way, if no known fact or generalization seems to contradict it. If there is contradiction, the tentative theory must be rejected or at least modified. (p. 10)

Yet even verification is not final because later findings or generalizations may invalidate it. "In empirical science, theory is never final" (Timasheff & Theodorson, 1976, p. 10); rather, it is a process, "an ever developing entity," modified not only by new research but also by every application (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 242).

The theory proposed in this thesis appears to be close to the grounded, formal type, covering a conceptual area of inquiry. It should also qualify for a middle-range theory, being wide in scope and yet of a delimited concept, that of interpersonal
relationships, with affective orientation as the unifying principle.
CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON FRIENDSHIP AND INTIMACY

While friendship has been the subject of philosophical treatises for thousands of years, its related concept, intimacy, is new on the scene. The word intimacy has been present in the English language from time immemorial. In 1714 its meaning was defined as "closeness of observation, knowledge, or the like," according to Oxford Universal English Dictionary (1937, p. 1034). It has, however, come to vogue only in the seventies. It is found neither in the 1964 edition of A Dictionary of the Social Sciences nor in the 1968 edition of the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. The Social Sciences Index for periodical articles includes intimacy as a subject heading only beginning in 1979. Desmond Morris' Intimate Behavior (1971) was the first book published on the topic, both to his and this researcher's knowledge. It was soon followed by several others, but it is interesting to note that the "conversation" about intimate behavior was started by a zoologist.

As Morris notes (p. 7), there has been an abundance of
papers and volumes on associated topics that touch some aspects of the problem. One such topic is friendship, which has been commented upon, explained, and discussed since classical times. Books on friendship generally start with Aristotle, Plato, or other classical writers, and include the story of David and Jonathan in the Old Testament, perhaps the oldest friendship on record. Intimacy has probably been taken for granted as an essential aspect of friendship and family relationships, and therefore has not been discussed separately. In these contexts, however, there are countless direct or indirect references to it. Since "this ancient subject" is again "within the 'spirit' of the times" (Hutter, 1978, p. vii), it will be first examined in its larger context and then narrowed down to the notion of intimacy as such.

A Global View of Friendship

Anthropological and Classical Background

To get to the basic, panhuman quality of some phenomenon, anthropological reports usually prove to be helpful. This is on the assumption that when something familiar to us is also found in precivilized societies, it must reflect a universal aspect of human nature. This seems to be the case with friendship.

Paine (1974) assumes "that certain human needs of an affective kind are universal, and in our own society they are taken care of by friendship" (p. 118). Friendship appears, however, in other societies as well, although it may take
different forms. In fact, Paine calls friendship "a socio­logical and cultural device in respect to which there exist different alternatives" (p. 119). While its behavioral manifesta­tions and linguistic connotations vary from culture to culture, the "sentiments attached to the concept of friendship have . . . the appearance of being universal" (Schwimmer, 1974, p. 49).

For the broadest definition of friendship, Aristotle's use of the Greek word philia is usually quoted. This "all-embracing love" combines the good, the useful, and the pleasant aspects of a relationship, can bind together kin and non-kin alike, and at once denotes both love and friendship (Schwimmer, 1974, pp. 50-51; Davis, 1973, p. 293; DeWitt, 1954, p. 250).

Many of the preindustrial societies seem to have retained at least some of the distinctive qualities of the Greek philia. Schwimmer (1974) conceives of each person as having a "philia set," which "is always equal to the sum of the friendship and kinship sets" (p. 51). For example, the "Orokaiva have a philia system comprising distinctive kin and non-kin membership categories" (p. 68). Schwimmer maintains, however, that the "basic categories tend to be built out of the symbols of kinship." According to him, friends are "raw recruits to the philia-system," providing allies to prevent loneliness, but retaining qualities of kinship (p. 70).

Some societies (e.g. Tangu and Zuni) advertently blur the kinship categories by using kin terms in addressing friends, or spouses of friends. Roberts (1965) tells of himself being
called first a friend and then a "younger brother" by some Zunis (p. 42), and Schwimmer (1974) describes how the wife of a friend is called a "sister" among the Tangu (p. 53). This device is especially used between adults who are already married, to "restrict the possibility of sexual involvement. This enables them to maintain a socially close relationship without sexual overtones" (Johnson, 1980, p. 363). Also, as among the Zuni, this opens support systems which are not available to mere friends. Another way of combining kinship and friendship is indicated when, within kin, a "favorite" brother, sister, uncle, etc., is chosen (Schwimmer, 1974, p. 50).

Schwimmer defines friendship as a "residual category within the philia universe," containing a "regular process for the recruitment of strangers" (p. 69). This recruitment of "the objects of philia from outside the kinship system is, to a far greater degree, the result of free choice" (p. 50), and its claims and demands are not as high as in kinship.

Not in all societies, however, is the choice free. Ethnographers write about "bond friendships" in cultures which apparently cannot afford the "sociological luxury" of autonomous friendships (Paine, 1974, p. 127), or where such practice simply has not yet been adopted. The Hausa of Northern Nigeria is one such culture (p. 118). The "Orokaiva have institutionalized friendships of several types, some of which are hereditary" (Schwimmer, 1974, p. 57). These institutional friendships, however, seem to be rapidly vanishing (Pitt-Rivers,
1968, p. 413).

Not only where kinship ties are "ambiguous and aptative" does friendship take place, but also it is "because of the constraints placed between kinsmen and because the kin roles are strong and unambiguous that one may have to move outside the sphere of kinship proper to find 'brotherly love' and friendship" (Paine, 1974, p. 120; referring to Burridge, 1957, and Schwimmer, 1970). "What Pitt-Rivers says of ritual kinship is also true of friendship in many situations: as it 'avoids being implicated in the internal dissensions of the kinship structure, for it involves no structural issues . . . it is what cognatic kinship aspires to, but cannot, be'" (Paine, 1974, p. 120, original emphasis; referring to Pitt-Rivers, 1968a, p. 412).

Eisenstadt (1956) sees ritualized personal relationships as a mechanism of social control in cases of internal strains. He considers the strong bonds, the emotional security, and the mutual obligations of ritualized friendships an "insurance against unexpected risks and calamities," since "the performance of these obligations is assured through a special personal bond which transcends the usual existing groupings and categories of people and cuts across them" (pp. 92-93). As Schwimmer (1974) concludes, "friendship thus becomes a dynamic dimension of kinship" (p. 57).

Ramsøy (1968) also takes friendship as a "residual cultural category," "supplementing sexual and familial ties" and subsuming close and expectedly enduring ties" (p. 12).
Paine (1974), however, refutes the idea of a residual relationship and asserts that "friendship manifests its own structure, strategies, and principles of selection" (p. 135). Although he admits to the occurrence of at least some aspects of friendship in all cultures, he emphasizes the distinctive qualities and requirements (e.g. privacy) of friendship in the Western middle class culture, calling it a "luxury" which many other cultures cannot afford (pp. 121, 127; cf. Oden, 1974, p. 90).

Leyton's (1974) study of friendship in a village in Ireland supports Paine's assertion. There were definite class differences in the friendship patterns of the villagers. Generally, his subjects used the word "friend" mainly for kinsmen, and the word "mate" or "chum" was used in referring to non-kin friends with whom the person had "a voluntary and preferential alliance" (p. 96). In general, Leyton defines "friendship as a form of compact between individuals; an institution which was best regarded as but one of several organizing principles which men used to bind themselves one to another" (p. ix).

Spencer's theory of friendship (Smith, 1935) is built on the classical foundation. According to this, friendship is based on virtue, equality, and similarity. "Friends have but one soul," which makes a friend "a second half" (pp. 27, 39). Hence, a person can have "only one genuine friend" (p. 43), a notion supported by a statement of Henry Adams, a man supposedly rich in friendships: "one friend in a lifetime is much; two are many; three are hardly possible" (Reisman, 1979,
Aristotle, who also regarded virtue as the basis of ideal friendship, considered it wise to limit the number of such friends since this kind of friendship is demanding (pp. 34-35). Even in contemporary times, this has been found to be true. Maslow (1954) found that his "self-actualizing" people generally had few friends because they tended to give their friends a lot of themselves and therefore did not have time for many (p. 218). Naegele (1958) concludes the same from his research (p. 244).

Since to Spencer friendship is primarily a virtue and not "a mere social relation" (Smith, 1935, p. 39), "friends' goods are common goods." Under these circumstances, "false friendships could not last" (p. 27). This is quite a different viewpoint from that of Freud, to whom all love was self-love, and the choices of friends were either narcissistic or anaclitic, "determined by attachments to parents when they were depended upon for survival" (Reisman, 1979, p. 48).

Douvan (1977), a social psychologist, idealizes friendship as the "closest approximation and prototype" of an interpersonal relationship. Douvan considers the interpersonal relationship as "an ideal type which probably does not occur in reality," but which is somewhat approached in close friendship. This ideal, which Buber calls I and Thou, is a "non-mechanical, nonmanipulative contact between equals as whole persons," whereas other relationships (e.g. the parent-child and the marital relationship) "are more heavily circumscribed by norms and are therefore farther along the continuum toward
pure role relationships" (p. 18).

After reviewing the classical theories and practices of friendship in their social and political context, Hutter (1978) concludes that, even in modern times, friendship is a lasting relationship based on deep affection, inspired by the pursuit of shared values and goals, and indispensable to the creative development of personality. Friendship motivates individuals to strive for self-overcoming and provides them with the courage necessary for coping with the negativity of self. (p. 175).

Types of Friendship

In the social science literature, friendship has been categorized in various ways. Perhaps a classic by now is Cohen's (1961) cross-cultural study in which he classifies four types of friendship (pp. 352-353) in four types of societies (pp. 314-318), respectively. (1) In a maximally solidary community with definite social and/or physical boundaries, Cohen found "inalienable friendship" which was entered into ritually or ceremonially and was assumed to be permanent with quasi-legal sanctions, privileges, and obligations. (2) In a solidary fissile community, which also had definite boundaries but where mobility was permitted, Cohen found "close friendship" which approximated inalienable friendship in emotional and social propinquity but which had elements of personal choice and which could be withdrawn. (3) In a non-nucleated society, composed of isolated family groups, friendship seemed to take the form of "casual friendship" with no duties or liabilities, implying neither allegiance nor affiliation, not
recognized culturally, perfunctory, lax, and almost without direction or intention. Finally, (4) in an individuated social structure, competitive, personal profit and success oriented, "expedient friendship" was the prevalent form. This was non-emotional, contractual, directed toward some gain, and independent of legal and religious sanction. "The kinds of friendship into which people enter," Cohen concludes, "are not only the results of their predispositions to acquire friends but also of the kind of society in which they live" (p. 382).

Cohen's classification, perhaps one of the earliest of its scope, is generally considered helpful, although the coupling of each social structure with a particular type of friendship "is regrettably artificial" (Paine, 1974, p. 5). Wolf (1966) is much more parsimonious in his categories, distinguishing only between two main types: expressive or emotional (or affective), and instrumental friendship (p. 10). These apparently approximate Aristotle's concepts of "pleasant" and "useful" (Paine, 1974, p. 3). While both could be viewed as utilitarian to a certain degree, the purely utilitarian, or instrumental, friendship does not seem generally accepted in today's Western society. Rather than "being affective or instrumental per se," Paine claims, "friendships are composed of these countervailing elements in different degrees" (p. 13). As early as 1936, Firth notes "the moral sanction which attaches to the performance of material, nonritual services" (p. 269), and Nemek (1972) discusses friendships among fisher-
men at various "levels of affective investment."

Coming closer home, Du Bois (1974) points out that friendship in the English language covers a whole range of relationships, from "best friends" to "buddies" (p. 16). "A distinction is not even always made between friendliness (meaning only the custom of cordiality and goodwill) and friendship." Noting that a voluntary-preferential dimension is common to all friendships (p. 17), she provides a classification scheme of three categories which she correlates with Aristotle's virtue, pleasure, and utility (p. 19): (a) Exclusive friends: primarily expressive, dyadic, nonmarital and nonkin, between the same sexes, assumed permanent and involving the greatest degree of intimacy; (b) Close friends: with both expressive and instrumental qualities, prizing the other for virtue or talents but not necessarily for his or her whole personality, dyadic but not exclusive, with limited confidences and not necessarily lifelong duration; (c) Casual friends: largely instrumental, the other is prized for roles played in the life of ego, with interaction limited by situational and expedient contexts, frequently recreation.

Du Bois also presents a scale of emotional intimacy in types of friendship:

Of first importance is the satisfaction of an inherent bio-social dynamism, namely intimacy. This may be equated with the category of best friend. Of next importance is the validation of one's own worth and this may be equated with the need for good friends. Of third importance is the consensual validation of certain aspects of one's world, a need which may be equated with casual friends. (p. 24)
This classification is based on Sullivan's theory of the "chum" relationship as basic to the later development of deeper intimacy (Sullivan, 1953, p. 245).

Reisman, in his Anatomy of Friendship (1979), divides friendship to three categories: friendship of reciprocity, friendship of receptivity, and friendship of association. He relates historical stories to illustrate these types. As an example of friendship of reciprocity, which he deems the deepest, he draws from Cicero the story of Damon and Phintias. Theirs was the perfect, true, ideal friendship, characterized by mutual loyalty, affection, and generosity, even willingness to go to death on behalf of the friend. Rare in real life, it is commonly portrayed in literature, movies, and television. The second category, friendship of receptivity, is illustrated by the well known Old Testament story of David and Jonathan. Reisman defines this as a one-sided relationship where Jonathan, the prince, was the major contributor and David, the shepherd, soldier, and fugitive, the recipient. Finally, Reisman draws from Shakespeare's Julius Caesar—its own illustration of friendship in its various forms—the story of Brutus and Cassius as an example of the third category: friendship of association. This is a casual, chance friendship, brought on by circumstances or put on for appearances. "If they were not united by a common enemy, they might be at each other's throat" (Reisman, 1979, p. 16); this characterizes such friendship in its minimal form.

Apparently, as Bensman and Lilienfeld (1979) note, friend-
ship "can be established on almost any basis of intimacy, ranging perhaps from the friendship of convenience to total psychological intimacy" (p. 118), and the concept covers a wide range of relationships.

**Popular Definitions of Friendship**

For a popular definition of friendship, Reisman (1979, pp. 102-103) quotes a survey done by Phillips and Metzger (1976). They sent a questionnaire of 38 open-ended questions and 375 statements (agree or disagree) to about 500 people, both children and adults. Summary of the results showed that 20 percent could not define what a friend is. Of those who did offer a definition, about 30 percent said "a friend is someone they talk with and spend time with," 25 percent described "a friend as someone who would not hurt them and whose behavior is predictable, and 15 percent termed a friend as "someone they like and who returns their affection." Intimacy, or sharing confidences, was also considered important, judging from other statements in the questionnaire.

In another contemporary study, Leyton (1974) reports a sample of adolescents describing a friend as "someone you feel relaxed with," or "somebody you don't have to talk to when you don't feel like it" (p. 98). Naegele (1958) provides yet another study of popular definitions of friendship. Collaborating with a psychiatrist, he recorded the discussion of twenty high school seniors (10 boys and 10 girls) on friendship. According to these subjects, friendship "implies some
kind of reciprocal closeness between two or more people who are free not to be close" (p. 234). This implies conscious choice, so much emphasized in the classical notion of friendship as a virtue. The other popular definitions quoted above appear also to put in practical terms some of the same aspects of friendship that philosophers and scholars have discussed in their profound treatises. One of these is openness.

Simmel (1950) urged that the analysis of friendship be concerned with "the degree of invasion and reserve within the friendship relation . . . the question of discretion, of reciprocal revelation and concealment" (p. 236). This seems to refer to trust and openness, so much emphasized in the popular statements and considered by Naegele (1958) the most prominent feature of friendship. Being yourself, keeping confidences, wearing no masks, "you are free," and friendship "becomes an exemption from society, especially if the latter is defined with reference to judgments and masks" (pp. 243-244).

This notion, friendship as an escape from the impersonal and unauthentic society, does not seem to appear in the classical sources generally cited. It does, however, have a place in the philosophy of Epicurus, whose was the "copyright of friendship" (DeWitt, 1954, p. 310), and whose Garden became a refuge from the competition of the society. It also plays a dominant role in contemporary philosophy of friendship and intimacy, especially since the past decade when, as was noted in the beginning of this chapter, the emphasis on intimacy suddenly came to vogue.
Use of the Word "Intimacy"

There is not a great leap from friendship to intimacy; in fact, these two concepts often overlap considerably, so that much of what is written about one also applies to the other. Aristotle's or Spencer's ideal friendship could also be called an ideal intimate relationship. Oden (1974) essentially expresses the same thought in his introduction to intimacy: "Insofar as one experiences an intimate relation he experiences a beholding of another person in his or her essential depth; he knows the other person from the inside out, deeply, internally" (p. 3). Oden points out, as does Davis, that the word intimacy comes from a Latin word, intimus, which means inner or innermost. The German word for it is Innigkeit. Bensman and Lilienfeld (1979) are on the same track: "Psychological intimacy implies the interpenetration of selves, of personalities" (p. 99).

Oden's (1974) discussion of intimacy is on the basis of transactional analysis, which defines intimacy as a "game-free relationship" (p. 45; cf. Berne, 1963; Harris, 1969). According to this theory, the "Child" in us is in constant need of strokes. Oden summarizes Berne (1964, pp. 15-20 succinctly:

There are six ways people can structure their time in order to get strokes . . . : withdrawal, ritual, activities (or work), pastimes, games, and intimacy. When two or more persons are not withdrawing, meeting ritualistically, working, or playing games or at pastimes, then they are experiencing intimacy. (Oden, 1974, p. 89)

In other words, the other sources of strokes are hindrances to...
intimacy, which will occur if these are removed and "a genuine interlocking of personalities" (Berne, 1961, p. 86) can take place. Oden, however, affirms the sociological function of withdrawal, work, ritual, pastimes, and games, which he deems "necessary for interpersonal health," and therefore valuable in their own right. Life cannot be a continual intimacy.

In his historical sketch, Gadlin (1977) avoids a definition of intimacy, referring to the "changes in the social meaning of interpersonal closeness." He points out that "our vocabulary often changes more slowly than do behaviors, attitudes, values, and consciousness." According to him, words like "love," "affection," "closeness," and "caring" do not have the same meaning today as they had in Colonial America (p. 33). The difficulty of a definition is also lamented by Davis (1973), who holds that the word "intimacy" is much too complex a concept to be defined succinctly" (p. xvii). He considers "love" a psychological concept and "intimate relations" a sociological concept, and proposes a new science of the relations of intimates, which he calls PHILEMICS (p. xiii). His comprehensive treatment of the topic indeed lays an excellent foundation for the new science.

In spite of the drawbacks, Davis does offer a tentative definition of intimacy:

An intimate relation (often popularly called a personal relation or, by social scientists, a primary relation) is an ongoing social interaction between individuals that consists of a large number of intimate behaviors. (p. xvii-xviii)

He includes in these behaviors the "internal movements of the
mind," or experiences, as well as the "external actions of the body." For a definition of intimate behaviors, he "simply and tautologically" takes it as "that which most people in a particular society consider to be intimate behavior" (p. xvii). Davis' definitions have the sound of a copout, but this may be the only safe course to follow since the discussion on the topic is far from agreement.

**Intimacy and Sex**

To some writers (e.g. Mazur, 1973), intimacy immediately connotes sex. Not surprisingly, Freud also belongs to this group. The nonsexual love in ordinary friendship, according to Freud, is really sexual love which is "aim inhibited" or blocked (Freud, 1949, p. 71; Reisman, 1979, p. 50). Others (e.g. Morris, 1971; Ramey, 1975, 1976) consider it essential that at least a "potential sexual component" is included along with the "intellectual, social, and emotional components" (Ramey, 1976, pp. 15, 87). While Mazur goes almost completely sexual, and Ramey emphasizes potential sexuality (even as a "shortcut to intimacy," p. 138), Morris considers mere "bodily contact" rather than sexual relations the essential feature of intimacy. Bensman and Lilienfeld (1979), who do not hold it necessary for friendship to be connected with intimacy, nevertheless see the difficulties involved if psychological intimacy is to be achieved and maintained without physical intimacy (p. 143).

Davis (1973) identifies "four species of the genus inti-
mates: friends, lovers, spouses, and siblings." To him, "friends are intimates insofar as they engage in all intimate behaviors except sexually related ones" (p. xviii). Presumably, sexual relations would put them into the category of lovers or spouses. He even accuses the Freudians of putting "their genitals where their heads should be" (p. 107).

Kilpatrick (1975) also deplores the connotation of intimacy as "lovemaking without love" (p. 15). Dahms (1972) and Morris (1971) call it sexual athletics," and Oden (1974) entertains the thought that "sex may be alienating to intimacy as well as enabling of it. Sex without interpersonal intimacy," he declares, "is like a diploma without an education. Intimacy is closer than sex" (p. 33).

Aspects of Intimacy

Whatever the observable behaviors may be, intimacy is a complex relationship, appearing in a multitude of forms and contexts. Howard and Charlotte Clinebell (1970, pp. 37-38) list twelve different types or strata of intimacy which, although primarily referring to marriage, apply to many other close relationships as well:

Sexual intimacy (erotic or orgasmic closeness)

Emotional intimacy (being tuned to each other's wavelength)

Intellectual intimacy (closeness in the world of ideas)

Aesthetic intimacy (sharing experiences of beauty)

Creative intimacy (sharing in acts of creating together)
Recreational intimacy (relating in experiences of fun and play)

Work intimacy (the closeness of sharing common tasks)

Crisis intimacy (closeness in coping with problems and pain)

Conflict intimacy (facing and struggling with differences)

Commitment intimacy (mutually derived from common self-investment)

Spiritual intimacy (the we-ness in sharing ultimate concerns)

Communication intimacy (the source of all types of true intimacy)

This list, explained more fully on pp. 29-31 in the Clinebells' book, is perhaps the most comprehensive classification available of the types and aspects of intimacy and the behaviors expressed within it. It lacks, however, a category for physical non-sexual intimacy. This could probably be included in the communication, although indications are that there is more than communication involved in the touch or embrace of an intimate.

For summarizing the literature on intimacy, Dahms' (1972) three-layer pyramid appears most useful. He divides intimacy into three different types, forming a pyramid with the higher order intimacy on top. Intellectual intimacy, the "intimacy of ideas and verbal interactions," forms the base. The next layer is physical intimacy, including touching, hugging, and caressing. The highest in the hierarchy is emotional intimacy, which is characterized by mutual accessibility, naturalness, and non-possessiveness, and which is a process (pp. 20-21). Dahms considers this type of intimacy a necessary but overlooked requirement for survival.
Dahms' four characteristics of emotional intimacy provide a useful classification scheme which can incorporate most aspects discussed by other writers. Each category, while broad and comprehensive, is also closely connected with every other category. For this reason, it is best to consider these categories as open and flexible, conceptual tools rather than discreet slots.

**Mutual accessibility**

This first category means open, complete access, free of criticism, and that on both sides (Dahms, 1972, p. 38). This would presuppose equality. Each partner feels free to go to the other with his or her problems. Peers have, in fact, been found to be sought after at least as much as professional helpers even in severe crisis situations (p. 41).

Since the publication of William Schofield's *Psychotherapy: The Purchase of Friendship* (1964), a considerable amount of discussion and research activities have been directed toward the notion of friendship as therapeutic. This idea, much advocated by Rogers (e.g. 1957, p. 368), is supported by Goodman (1970, pp. 348-371) but refuted by Reisman and Yamokoski (1974). Using volunteers from a psychology class and their self-chosen "friends," Reisman and Yamokoski recorded the interaction pertaining to the friend's serious problems. This method was supplemented by having the subjects choose between various types of responses to problems on a questionnaire. Empathic responses were found to be infrequent, and the conclusion was made that friends are not agents of therapy.
This method, however, raises serious questions. Staged encounters can never be real, even between friends; much less between casual friends drafted for the purpose (no attempt was apparently made to assess the degree of intimacy in the relationship). Perhaps the only way to get at reliable information would be eavesdropping, but that has its practical and ethical problems. Responding to questions, on the other hand, is merely an intellectual exercise and may reflect the person's knowledge (or lack of knowledge) of counseling methods more than his or her orientation to a real life situation. Thus it seems doubtful that real friends exhibit as little empathy as Reisman and Yamokoski claim.

Dahms (1972) points out that psychotherapy could be viewed as one-way accessibility in which the client pays the therapist to enter the client's world. Rogerian therapy, however, emphasizes some openness also on the therapist's part. It could probably be concluded that this factor works both ways to a certain extent: close friendship does seem to have some therapeutic qualities although it cannot be equated with psychotherapy, and good therapists do provide some aspects of friendship to their clients although this falls short on mutual accessibility.

Closely related to accessibility, or perhaps to be included in that category, are trust and confidentiality. Since we do not trust strangers, we do not deem them accessible. In fact, a stranger exhibiting inviting gestures generally creates suspicion and is shunned. There is, however, the phenomenon
of confiding in strangers, which is a form of intimacy that can take place in instances like long bus rides. Perhaps the person thus opening up to a stranger takes this stranger somewhat in the role of a therapist to whom it is safe to reveal secrets because one does not expect to see that person again. Similarly, one generally chooses a doctor or a therapist whom one does not expect to see in private life. In these instances, the very remoteness of the confidant creates certain trust. This, however, is rarely mutual, as is the case in friendship. Friendship presupposes mutual trust and "tends to create areas of trust" (Eisenstadt, 1974, p. 143).

By studying the behavior of "infants and lovers," Morris (1971) infers that "the degree of physical intimacy that exists between two human animals relates to the degree of trust between them" (p. 145). This is perhaps even more true of emotional intimacy. Bensman and Lilienfeld (1979) consider trust the main necessity or precondition of intimacy. This trust is assuming that it is safe to expose oneself, and that underneath "is a level of depth of understanding, love, friendship, and affection," that would suspend judgment (p. 110). A stranger may suspend judgment for the very reason of being a stranger (i.e. not taking the matter seriously); a friend suspends judgment because of personal affection.

Because of this trust, intimacy includes revealing secrets. Accessibility, then, must include the assurance that there is a "communication closure" (Paine, 1974, p. 128) where confidential information will remain. Confiding in strangers may
feel safe on the assumption that there are no mutual ac­quaintances to whom the revealed secrets could leak out. For professional confidants, their professional ethics require silence on personal information revealed to them. In friend­ship, again, this "closure" is because of one's personal inter­est interest in and regard for the other. Paine calls this type of personal, private friendship a "terminal relationship," which means that even "the content or conduct of a friendship is not carried into social interaction with other persons." The extent to which this is followed depends on the degree of intimacy, but certain confidentiality is no doubt an important characteristic of any intimate friendship.

Palisi (1966) found the highest degree of intimacy to be "indicated by willingness to confide in friends about personal matters." The second is "feeling free to talk to friends about almost any topic," and the third "willingness to ask favors of friends." These are measures, he feels, each of which "dis­criminates very well between intimate and nonintimate close friends" (p. 223). This classification pertains to both ac­cessibility and naturalness, and therefore provides a suitable bridge to the following section.

**Naturalness**

Dahms' second category, naturalness, can incorporate many of the most important aspects of friendship and intimacy, referred to in many different words. Dahms (1972) explains his use of the word in the sense the Greek Stoics used it, acceptance of people "as they are, not for their ability to
change themselves to meet another's requirements or to play a role assigned to them by others." They "are free to be themselves, to expose their frailties and strengths" in a "natural, role-free interaction" (p. 45). Rogers' (e.g. 1957) terms genuineness, unconditional positive regard, warmth, and acceptance are included here. People are accepted as persons, although some aspects of their behavior may not be condoned (cf. Cooley, 1914, p. 200).

The "role-free" aspect of this natural, open acceptance is termed by Gadlin (1977) as "informality," which he considers to be a "primary indicator and accompaniment of intimacy." He points out that "impersonal relations tend to be formal, and personal relationships informal" (p. 36). "Love . . . is the foremost component of such spontaneity," Fromm (1941, p. 261) writes. To Kilpatrick (1975), this means a "relaxation of the definition of self" (p. 224), and to Moustakas (1972) the meeting between I and Thou—using Buber's term—in which "each says what he means and means what he says" (p. 67). All masks are removed.

Goffman, with whose name the dramaturgical theory—hiding behind masks—has come to be identified, seems not to think that such openness is possible. He reserves "the term 'sincere' for individuals who believe in the impression fostered by their own performance" (Goffman, 1959, p. 18). "He tends to identify what a person really is with the techniques he uses to manufacture his mask and to defend it" (Davis, 1973, p. 308). Davis, however, identifies what a
person really is with "what he takes himself to be, which is what he uncovers and covers over rather than how he presents and protects." Davis continues:

What a person takes to be his "real self" is the one he needs the least psychological energy to present . . . and the most to protect. Since one's real self is so enjoyably effortless to put forth, yet so dangerously vulnerable to any attack, it can be shown only to intimates who are trusted not to harm it. (p. 308)

Davis notes earlier (p. 103) that "an individual in gesellschaft identifies his essence more closely with the qualities he hides than with the qualities he displays." Removing the mask, then, would be letting the others see him as he really is. This is what Dahms and Gadlin, among others, seem to refer to when they write about "role-free" or "informal" interaction.

Total openness means also empathy and congruence, two crucial components of intimacy, greatly emphasized by Rogers in his theory of client-centered therapy. Empathy, to Rogers (1957, p. 364), means "to sense the client's private world as if it were your own." The person thus places himself in the frame of reference of the other (Katz, 1963), or, to use a colloquial expression, is able to "stand in his shoes" (Oden, 1974, p. 15). Reisman and Yamokoski (1974) do not consider empathy an aspect of friendship, but one may question the degree of friendship their self-selected sample represented.

Congruence, an aspect closely related to empathy, is described by Rogers as having one's self-concept in accordance with one's experience, being "integrated, whole, genuine" (Meador and Rogers, 1973, p. 135). Oden explains it as "each
partner's capacity to feel his own feelings," being in touch with one's own experiencing process. He asserts that "persons who have difficulty coming close to themselves have difficulty coming close to others." Empathy and congruence, as aspects of total openness, would facilitate a state described by Oden (1974): "To the degree that I am able to experience myself as understood by my partner, and my partner experiences himself as understood by me, intimacy is possible" (p. 16).

This honest openness to experience leads to another, less pleasant, aspect of intimacy. To be congruent, one must admit to feelings of anger, frustration, etc. Communicating this to the other does not generally result in pleasant feelings; hence, conflict is an integral part of any intimate relationship. Douvan (1977) considers this to be typical to the formative stages since "no two human beings are identical," but as the relationship matures, "those differences that cannot be ironed out are eventually accepted" (p. 26). Also, according to Douvan, "hostility is often used ... as a last ditch effort to salvage waning intimacy." Persons in a cooling relationship with both history and equity feel that an "attack is likely to engage the deeply personal," and "any intimacy is better than none" (p. 27).

Oden (1974) concurs. "Hostility is a closer relationship than indifference," he writes, and an angry scene "much more intimate than one characterized by boredom or innocuousness." To him, it is "the intimacy most deeply nourished by affection that is most capable of constructive conflict or 'fair fighting'"
(p. 18). Dahms (1972) also seems to agree. Although on p. 55, referring to the Milgram studies on obedience where proximity resulted in less severe shocks, he suggests that emotional intimacy tends to decrease the likelihood of negative effects of relationships" ("It is difficult to hurt a 'me'!"), he concludes on pp. 92-93 that "someone must matter very much to us in order to make us angry," and that "conflict within a deep relationship can help facilitate the mutual process of growing together." Avoiding conflict may lead to some "avoidance behavior" like the anthropological "joking relationship" (Paine, 1974, p. 121). Although indicating some friendliness, this may serve to keep certain individuals at a "safe" distance, thus avoiding conflicts that growing intimacy would bring. Encounter groups, attempting to achieve intimacy in the shortest possible time, cannot afford a "joking relationship." Therefore the relationships generated in them will either never spark, will burn out (in fight), or suddenly flame (an example of the last is given by Moustakas, 1972, pp. 65-66). Joking relationship, then, can be taken as a temporary (or lasting) departure from naturalness.

Apparently, conflict in intimacy is not only possible, but desirable as well. It is inseparable from naturalness which, in turn, is one of the most vital aspects of an intimate relationship.

**Non-possessiveness**

Another vital aspect is non-possessiveness, Dahms' third characteristic. In fact, perhaps more than any other of the
four, it denotes unconditional love and caring. Fromm emphasizes "retaining the separateness and integrity of one's own self" (1955, p. 31) as well as "the spontaneous affirmation of the others" (1941, p. 261) as integral to love. Overstreet (1949) asserts that "the love of a person implies, not the possession of that person but the affirmation of that person. It means granting him, gladly, the full right to his unique manhood" (p. 103).

Perhaps it is this aspect that separates friendship from traditional marriage which is based on passionate, jealous, possessive, and exclusive love (e.g. Kilpatrick, 1975, pp. 195-217), even to be considered a duty (Kierkegaard, 1946, p. 293; Gadlin, 1977, p. 36 on Puritan marriage). On the other hand the new, open ended marriages, according to Mazur (1973) and Ramey (1975, 1976), do not have this jealous, exclusive quality. In these "peer marriages" (Ramey's term) the boundaries between friendship and marriage have become blurred.

Sullivan's (1953) definition of intimacy also incorporates this aspect of non-possessiveness. In his discussion of the preadolescent "chum" relationship, which he considers the basis for later intimate relationships, he emphasizes "collaboration," by which he means "adjustments of one's behavior to the expressed needs of the other person" (p. 246). This could mean also the other's need for expansion. Lovers, enemies, and avoiders "erect boundaries of exclusion," Mills (1967) writes, but "friends are free to expand ... a friend of a friend is a friend" (p. 129). Caring delights in the independence
of others, not in the possession of them" (Dahms, 1972, p. 47). The exclusiveness of intimacy results not from jealous possession of the other but from the depth of the relationship.

As Ramey's use of the term "peer marriage" indicates, equality is another integral aspect of non-possessiveness. Any "superior-inferior" relationship (e.g. parent-child, employer-employee) suggests possessiveness at least to a certain degree. This inhibits the development of intimate friendship at least the inequality is—at least temporarily—laid aside, like when a father plays games with his children or when a supervisor and his or her subordinate are friends outside the work situation. Conversely, when intimates have to function in an unequal work situation, their private relationship must be set aside. This may bring problems when, for example, a social climber employs a relative whom s/he has left behind in a lower social class. Leyton (1974, pp. 93-104) discusses this problem in his study of friendship in an Irish village, where the Elite found it hard to employ their relatives. Workroles seem to inhibit the development of full intimacy since superiority and inferiority are not conducive to intimacy (Dahms, 1972, p. 47).

Consideration of the confessional nature of intimacy introduces another aspect of equality in the relationship. A friend functions as "a receptacle into which to spill the surplus emotional residue of private experience," Davis (1973, p. 32) explains. Bensman and Lilienfeld (1979) note that
"the burdens of intimacy are most easily shared when the parties to a would-be intimate relationship are in equal need of, and have equal resources for, intimacy" (pp. 160-161). In a footnote they suggest that because of inequalities in personal development and resources, sharing the loads of intimacy becomes fragile, and "there arises the opportunity and need for impersonal confession," such as to the clergy, psychiatrist, or medical doctor. Some may even prefer this type of confession since it requires no obligation on the confessor's part as friendship does while it helps to preserve privacy and maintain a certain image in his or her personal life. Confession to strangers gives some of the same advantages. The give and take of friendship, on the other hand, opens an exchange, a pooling of both griefs and joys which "redoubleth joys" but "cutteth grief in halfs" (Bacon, 1963, p. 72).

The non-possessive friendship or intimacy of two equals also seems to include reciprocity, at least to some degree. "The code of the corner boy requires him to help his friends when he can and to refrain from doing anything to harm them," William Whyte writes in his Street Corner Society (1943, p. 256). Especially "actions which were performed explicitly for the sake of friendship were revealed as being part of a system of mutual obligations" (p. 257). Furthermore, he notes that leaders were more faithful in fulfilling obligations than were the fringe members, which would indicate their greater commitment as friends. One could speculate that this was at least one reason why they became leaders.
Du Bois (1974) uses the concept of intimacy "to mean confidence (in the sense of confiding) and reciprocal responsibility" (p. 18). The emphasis here is on the reciprocal as opposed to the complementary aspect of a relationship, one that Bensman and Lilienfeld (1979) call "a non-calculated reciprocal gift," the gift of intimacy itself. This "involves placing oneself in the hands of another," as when "responding by confession to the confession of another" (p. 111). Confession thus becomes the gate to deeper intimacy. "To avoid confession, one feels one must not accept confession" (p. 158), but by not accepting another's confession one implies a desire to limit the development of a deeper friendship. "Friendship," then, "implies both the sharing of information, of secrets, and the withholding of such information" (p. 148). As Oden (1974) notes, however, this can only happen "by mutual consent, never by unilateral desire" (p. 4).

Even the notion of positive regard, which includes warmth, liking, respect, sympathy, and acceptance, connotes reciprocity. "If the perception by me of some self-experience in another makes a positive difference in my experiential field," Rogers (1959) comments, "then I am experiencing positive regard for that individual" (p. 207). Thibaut and Kelley (1959) further explain this aim of receiving something in a relationship:

We have asserted that individuals will remain in a relationship only as long as the outcomes it yields are superior to those attainable in their respective best alternative relationships. Put more simply, we assume that each person enters and remains in the best of the relationships available to him. (p. 64)
This leads to the notion of gain which—like economic transactions—is based on exchange going beyond reciprocity. But the gain does not come without cost. "Some people understandably would prefer to live in relative isolation," Oden (1974) notes, "rather than take on the potentially burdensome responsibilities of intimacy" (p. 27; cf. Blanchard, 1970). Perhaps it is this unwillingness to pay in kind that makes the therapists' offices crowded; it is easier to pay in money. Reciprocity, however, is an integral part of non-possessiveness in an intimate relationship.

Process

Finally, intimacy is a never-ending process, with both history and future, requiring constant attention (Dahms, 1972, p. 49). "A relationship that is not growing is shrinking," Ramey (1976) observes. "There is no standing still in life" (p. 49). According to Dahms (1972, p. 49), "divorce could be viewed as the failure to evolve and/or maintain emotional intimacy. After emotional intimacy disappears, physical intimacy follows, soon only the chatter about daily routine (intellectual intimacy) remains," which may be followed by a divorce. To maintain a close relationship, on the other hand, involves "a dialectic among personal, interpersonal, and societal orientations to the relationship, and a dialectic between internalization and externalization" (Raush, 1977, p. 186). Furthermore, love "implies constancy" (Kilpatrick, 1975, p. 15), and

Genuine intimacy occurs only with the passage of time,
with repeated social interaction, with the discovery of common intellectual, social, emotional, and cultural responses. And these responses usually emerge slowly, where each social interchange results in increased affection as well as a deepening knowledge of the other. (Bensman & Lilienfeld, 1979, p. 111)

Howard (1970), after a year's travelling from one encounter group to another and observing that none of the people she encountered came to be really important to her or she to them, concludes that her friendships "take a year, sometimes several, to ripen." And she was "not persuaded that behavioral science can hasten the process" (p. 246).

According to Ramey (1976), however, something can hasten the process. "In the normal course of events," he writes (p. 139), "it could take two years to develop a friendship about to the point where, with luck, it could be sufficiently deep and open to provide support for an individual or couple without any other ties in the community." He recommends hastening the process with sexual intimacy, because "the vulnerability associated with making love serves as a shortcut method of establishing extremely candid grounds for relating that might take months or years to build in nonsexual relating" (p. 138).

Almost all sources cited in this thesis (perhaps all but Mazur) would accuse Ramey of reversing the ideal order (see p. 30). Experience has shown that shortcuts are generally not authentic. In this case, a shortcut would become a substitute or "pseudo-intimacy" at best, and pure "sexual athletics" at worst (not mentioning real damages). Encounter groups attempt a shortcut by employing conflict—as well as affection—as ways of bringing out the deep feelings and encouraging openness.
As Howard's experience shows, however, few meaningful relationships, if any, have resulted from these brief encounters. There is no proof that sexual shortcuts can be more successful in the long run. Relationships must be built on something more basic.

One of the basic things is identity. Erikson (1950), in his discussion of trust versus mistrust as the first of his eight stages of man, considers "consistency, continuity, and sameness of experience" important in providing "a rudimentary sense of ego identity," which is deepened by the repetition of experience and familiarity (p. 219). Later, in the stage of identity versus role diffusion, this sense of identity—"the accrued confidence that the inner sameness and continuity are matched by the sameness and continuity of one's meaning for others" (p. 228)—becomes an important guiding factor in relationships. Various ideologies and totalitarian doctrines compete for the total commitment of the youth, and although some role diffusion does occur, and is deemed by Erikson as healthy and normal for further development of the ego, by conjecture it could be said that this "accrued confidence" will help the young person to keep his or her mind open—even when committed to a cause (cf. Conway & Siegelman, 1978). Continuity is essential in achieving this confidence.

In later life, "the presence of other people who have shared our past or who at least can affirm our memory of the past" can help give a sense of continuous identity which can become "a lifeline across times of personal crisis" (Kilpatrick,
1975, p. 4). An experience of Victor Frankl, a noted Austrian psychiatrist, illustrates this. Frankl was imprisoned in Nazi concentration camps from 1942 to 1945, and had lost his wife and most of his family in the camps or gas chambers. An enthusiastic rock climber, Frankl gathered around him others who shared this interest. By recounting their old memories and sharing their hope of seeing the mountains again, "they were, for moments at least, able to rise above their hopeless situation" (Fabry, 1968, pp. 13-14).

Discussing new experiences in a later work (1974), Erikson asserts that "a sense of continuous selfhood always demands a balance between the wish to hold on to what one has proven to be and the hope to be renewed." Integrating new relationships to one's "philia set" also seems to demand this kind of balance and some semblance of history and continuity.

Today, new relationships are the order of the day. But what happens to continuity in this case? Sullivan believed that "understanding the present did require a careful analysis of the past" (Klineberg, 1952, p. 218). It would seem important, then, that prospective friends would know as much as possible of each other's past. With today's geographical mobility, however, one often comes to the situation where, if any relationships are to be established, they must be made with partial strangers whose history is not known. While some (e.g. Toffler, 1970; Rogers, 1968) would advocate leaving the past alone and building the relationship on the common, present reality, Weiss (1973), among others, emphasizes the importance
of history for an assurance of the other's trustworthiness. In the absence of a common history, he recommends linkages through relatives, old friends, or other acquaintances. "The community in its collective memory maintains a dossier of its members," he hints, "and appropriate inquiry will usually make the contents of the dossier available" (p. 194). So, one must listen to the gossip before committing oneself!

Geographical mobility is not, however, the only change in today's world. There is social mobility as well. As opportunities open for each person to follow his or her potential, friends and equals of ten years ago may now be socially far apart. Yet real friendship, according to Bensman and Lilienfeld (1979), is persistent. Although the partners may have at least partially reconstituted their personalities according to success or failure, new information, developing talents, etc., real friendship "signifies the continuity of the self and the unwillingness of the individuals in question to surrender their historical selves in exchange for the current demands of an ever moving present" (p. 122). Mills (1967) defines as friends "a pair who are faithful to one another—who remain loyal to the other even though the other is or becomes other than what one wishes him to be." Even when time has elapsed, friends "can pick up where they left off" and quickly fill the gap. There is a respect for each other as persons, and "though time, space, and events are important, they do not determine the relationship" (p. 129).

Such an ideal friendship requires a high degree of com-
mitment. "Feelings are subject to change," Kilpatrick (1975) notes, but "love that is based on a chosen commitment . . . is secure against the vagaries of sentiment" (p. 220). Mobility, however, makes people hesitant to commit themselves. "Commitment to others is difficult enough in a stable society because it entails not only the risk of rejection but also the risk of involvement" (p. 35); in a mobile society it becomes doubly so. Today's "other-directed" person (Riesman, 1950) is careful not to get overly involved with any one of the many others lest this will reduce his or her overall sociability. Adding to the risks of rejection and involvement the risk of separation at the next moving time will almost tip the balance. One may have been hurt by so many separations that it seems safer to close up lest there will be another hurt.

Another conflict with commitment comes from the desire for self-actualization. Kilpatrick (1975) calls for a balance between these two, and between responsibility and gratification. He refutes the idea that deep meaning can be found solely in self-actualization and gratification, and notes that Maslow's "self-actualizing " people "were invariably deeply committed individuals" who limited their friendships to a few (p. 192). Kilpatrick continues:

Constancy . . . is a decision that some doors will remain forever closed. To maintain fidelity is to decide in as many words: "Yes, someone better, someone more exciting, may very well come along--but that is an opportunity I will have to pass up." That is the price we pay for constancy. (p. 237)

Life always involves choices, and intimacy is no exception.
Ramey (1976) also writes about commitment, and refutes the claim that autonomy and commitment are opposed, with autonomy equivalent to growth and commitment to stagnation. He asserts that "it is in groups committed to growth that the most noticeable growth occurs, not in individuals committed to autonomy" (p. 149). Also, in a dyadic relationship, Ramey advocates the growth of each partner as the precondition for the growth of the relationship (p. 49). By this "growth" Ramey seems to refer to what Maslow calls "self-actualization," i.e. the fulfilment of the potential of each person.

Few will argue with the necessity for growth, but not all agree with the notion that the growth itself should be the explicit aim. Kilpatrick (1975) seems to imply that growth is a byproduct of a commitment to something else than one's own growth, even in groups. Commitment to growth still has a narcissistic ring. Although based on Maslow's theory of self-actualization, this later emphasis on growth (e.g. Rogers, Ramey, etc.) does not seem to follow Maslow completely. The self-actualizing persons Maslow studied apparently were "lost" in a cause, in a commitment to the good of others or in giving a contribution to humanity in general (e.g. art), which gave them an "oceanic" feeling of identification with the universe (Maslow, 1954, p. 216). Their self-actualization seemed to have come precisely from this commitment.

Commitment to their few friends, however, was no small part of their total commitment. Intimacy always involves a choice, and the choice is not only between people but between
competing forms of commitment as well. Time is limited. Sometimes friendship can become an obstacle to achievement. Naegele (1958) points out that the notion of achievement "tends to treat people as means," so "the valuation of friendship must to some extent be done at the expense of accomplishment, for it takes time." For this reason, Naegele asserts, "the valuation of friendship must . . . have consequences of an institutional order" (p. 237). Decisions are based on personal values, i.e. on what gives the person the most rewards, the greatest rewards usually being outside self-gratification.

Maslow's (1954) self-actualizing people seemed to have resolved this dilemma as all other dilemmas and dichotomies (p. 233). Their friendships, it seemed, were integrated with or subordinated to their achievement and self-actualization. Although achieving people, they gave at least some time and attention to intimate friends. But they knew where to stop, their priorities were straight. They did not allow their social life to become an end in itself. Life in general, and friendship in particular, was to them a process, attended to, nurtured, and priced. And their friendships were characterized by non-possessiveness, naturalness, and mutual accessibility.

Summarizing Statements

For a popular definition of intimacy, Oden (1974) asked groups of persons "to recall in fantasy a moment of intense closeness or warm personal fulfilment with another person," in other words, genuine intimacy. The following character-
istics emerged from the responses as the most common patterns (pp. 5-10):

Spontaneity, feeling-flow, openness
"emotive nakedness with no defenses"

Closeness, presence, availability
"at-oneness or communion"—"a single organism"

Sharing, renewing, beholding
renewing a commitment to some common task

Ecstasy, freedom, levity

Awe, cohesion, letting be
"all things seemed 'put together'"

Giftlike quality, surprise
"mutual trust was at the core of the relationship"

Mystery, timelessness, wholeness
"one feels a cosmic embrace through the embrance of the other"

Except perhaps for the characteristics of awe and mystery, all of the above could be included in Dahms' (1972, pp. 20-21) four aspects of intimacy which formed the framework for this section of the review of literature: mutual accessibility, naturalness, non-possessiveness, and the process quality.

The responses of Oden's subjects also show the variety suggested by Levinger (1977). People probably define closeness, he conjectures, "in terms of approaching another, even losing one's self in the other" (p. 140). This implies a wide spectrum. The above definitions, furthermore, show both "self-oriented" and "other-oriented" (Levinger's terms) aspects of closeness.

Oden (1974) also gives a comprehensive definition of intimacy that is worth quoting and is usable as a summary:

Intimacy is an intensely personal relationship of sustained closeness in which the intimus sphere of each
partner is affectionately known and beheld by the other through congruent, empathic understanding, mutual accountability, and contextual negotiability, durable in time, subject to ecstatic intensification, emotively warm and conflict capable, self-disclosing and distance respecting, subject to death and yet in the form of hope reaching beyond death. (pp. 24-25)

The above definitions perhaps adequately pull together the aspects of intimacy discussed in the literature explicitly devoted to the subject. Examination of literature and research results in the broader area of interpersonal relationships in general, however, suggests aspects that may hitherto have been overlooked in the context of intimacy. Furthermore, the reasons for the apparently frantic search for intimacy in today's Western society still remain largely unexplained. The purpose of this study is to place intimacy in this larger theoretical and societal context and therefore be able to explain many of the ambiguities and predict behaviors pertaining to intimacy. Before launching into this project, however, it will be beneficial to have a brief look at the literature on the various types of intimate relationships.

**Types of Intimate Friendship**

**Dyadic versus Polyadic**

In actual life, intimate relationships are lived in several different forms and combinations. The one that automatically comes to mind when intimate behavior is discussed is the dyad. The best known and most common dyad is, of course, the married couple, but since marriage is an area of study in itself and not directly of interest with the focus
of this study, it will only be touched on in other contexts, not explicitly discussed. Suffice it to say that marriage is merely a dyadic relationship which has been legalized and institutionalized, and governed by its special norms and obligations.

The dyad, however, is basic to intimacy, although there can be dyads that are not intimate. Levinger (1977) writes:

Many years ago Georg Simmel (1908) wrote that the dyad is the true locus of intimacy; its members are not distracted by the presence of others, and they know that both partners are necessary for the unit's continuation—which is not so in groups of three or more members. (p. 143).

It should be noted that for this same reason, the dyad is also the most fragile of all human groups; if one partner loses interest, it is the end of the group (Schwartz & Jacobs, 1979, p. 186).

Because of the greater attention and emotional investment of a dyad in their relationship, the partners tend to become oblivious to others around them, "all wrapped up in each other," and "somewhat careless of their social obligations" (Slater, 1963, p. 359). Slater considers this dyadic withdrawal—"a popular theme in the myths, legends, and dramas of Western civilization"—to be always short-lived, and "a permanent lifelong dyadic withdrawal . . . unimaginable, for there is no instance of such a phenomenon in the fantasy productions of any culture" (p. 359). Mills considers this withdrawal narcissistic. "While they dissolve the physical and psychic boundaries that separate them, they shield themselves against the outside world." Fusing their self with the other, each
one's identity is diffused within the pair (p. 127). Growth is not possible in this relationship, according to Mills; rather, as Slater suggests, they are oriented toward death, the only possible state where permanent withdrawal can take place.

Slater comments, furthermore, that opposition to such dyadic intimacy is often found in youth groups that are formed on common interests. "Solidarity in such groups often runs high, and avoidance of even momentary pairing is usually a firmly upheld norm," Slater (1963) explains. "Extreme prohibitions are also characteristic of utopian communistic communities, religious and otherwise, such as the Oneida experiment." The reason may be more the fear of "libidinal contraction" rather than sex, according to Slater (p. 349).

Schwartz (1974) concurs. Studying friendship in a small community, which he called Northern Harbor, on an island off Newfoundland, he found that, according to affective criteria, friendship did not exist in that community. Yet the people were sensitive to emotion, responding to the "subtle cues" (p. 92). Schwartz concludes:

The form that friendship takes in Northern Harbor reflects, then, this response to affectivity. It is as if emotion, particularly strong and volatile emotion, poses a threat to the social order. Thus, intimacy and dyadic relations in general are guarded against; instead, polyadic friendship provides the necessary vehicle for expressing the values of loyalty, collective support, and durability in social relations. (p. 92)

He mentions similar expressions on the kibbutzim by Bettelheim (1969). There also intimacy, especially dyadic friendship, is
suppressed, "though in this case, the expressed ideology is communal and collectivist, whereas individualism and self-reliance are stressed in Northern Harbor."

Whenever dyadic relationships did occur in Northern Harbor, they were superficial, temporary, unstable, and task-specific. Polyadic relations, Schwartz found, "have exactly the opposite character; they are stable, enduring, entail generalized obligations, and embody fundamental social values."

In modern bureaucratic societies, the dyad is expected to "function as the repository for the deepest human values, while polyadic relations are institutionalized through bureaucratic structures and reflect the superficial role-playing aspects of the social order." Furthermore, individualism is generally assumed to be associated with dyadic relationships, "since these must be voluntarily established, while polyadic relations are associated with corporate ideology." The opposite was true for Northern Harbor. "Here, dyadic relationships are a threat to the ideology of individualism, whereas the polyadically structured crowd is seen to be the ideal device for protecting individualism" (Schwartz, 1974, p. 92). Unfortunately Schwartz does not discuss marriage and family patterns in Northern Harbor. These would complete the picture and enable one to see the interconnections between various types of affective ties.

Mills (1967) does not see dyadic and polyadic friendships as necessarily a dichotomy. To him, they are more or less integrated. After discussing the unique qualities of friend-
ship, such as its goal freedom and freedom from restrictions of time and space, its capacity to incorporate differences, and its capacity for expansion, Mills concludes that friendship "is a prototype of the quality of socio-emotional relations which, when existing for the collectivity as a whole, enable the group to subdivide into separate operating parts and still retain emotional commitment to their original unit" (p. 129). Rather than being antithetical to the function of the group, as Slater's lovers seem to be, friendship is the very basis for the group feeling, according to Mills. Adler's *Gemeinschaftsgefühl*, usually translated as "social interest" or "social feeling," is actually this kind of group feeling. Friendship simply expands to include the whole group. The crucial distinction here is between lovers and friends; lovers are self-contained, friends can expand.

Ramey (1976) also emphasizes the expansion capacity of even intimate friendship. In fact, it is because of this capacity—or need—for expansion that he feels, like Slater, that a dyadic relationship will not work for long, not even in marriage. He recommends as ideal the already existing practice of building intimate networks of "peer couples" who "maintain their relationship because they want to, not because they are obliged to" (p. 54). He does not seem to be optimistic, however, about the capacity of complex living groups (e.g. communes) to retain this emotional commitment or primary group feeling. "Joining a complex living group," to him, "is analogous to marrying a whole group instead of an individual"
(p. 33). Because of the "pull of the outer society," such "marriage" will find it difficult to survive, as even so many dyadic marriages do.

"Multiple relationships naturally become competing relationships," Ramey (1976) continues, "any one of which might become primary." This connotes an apparently inherent need for primary relationships, which necessarily must be exclusive at least to a certain extent. Ramey tells of an 18-year old daughter of a peer couple who "found it very difficult . . . translate their open relating to where she was at the moment because she had no primary relationship already built on solid ground" (p. 93).

Developmental and social psychological considerations, furthermore, seem to support the need for exclusive dyadic relationships. A child can be intimate with his or her whole family, but—as Sullivan (1953, p. 246) has demonstrated—with the dawn of maturity comes the need for a confidant, the need for mutual sharing that seems best facilitated in a dyadic relationship. Professional confidants (clergy, doctors, counselors, psychotherapists) can be substitutes at best. Polyadic friendships can fulfil only some aspect of this need, since polyadic friendship is a group, subject to group dynamics.

With the formation of a group, certain norms begin to develop, in the interest of which individuals must put aside some aspects of their selves that would not be conducive to the best interests of the group. This "negotiated consensus" of a "mutual set of obligations and expectations" (Vander
Zanden, 1977, p. 160), in turn, is not conducive to the total, nonjudgmental (Bensman & Lilienfeld, 1979, p. 110) acceptance of individuals as unique personalities. Norms inevitably lead to judgments. Although in dyadic relationships some mutual obligations and expectations also develop, they are reciprocal and more limited, with less outside interference (Simmel, 1908) and pertaining more to the relationship itself than to one's conduct outside of it. Furthermore, leadership issues emerge in a group setting, and total intimacy involves equality (Dahms, 1972, p. 17). Group relationships can achieve this openness and equality only to a certain extent, and would therefore provide only "pseudo-intimacy," or ideological intimacy, as will be seen later.

**Therapy as Friendship**

"The term 'peer' implies equality," Bensman and Lilienfeld (1979, p. 114) note, while "'friendship' does not necessarily have that implication," although an attempt at equality is made by putting official roles aside. A friendship that does not at the same time qualify for a peer relationship would be classified as a "receptive" friendship by Reisman. The "purchased friendship" of a therapist to a client is a prototype of such a relationship. Even if real friendship develops between the two, it is "more likely to be receptive than reciprocal" (Reisman, 1979, p. 221).

The notion of psychotherapy as friendship was briefly discussed earlier (pp. 33-34) as an example of non-mutual
accessibility. In this context it is brought as an example of a type of friendship or intimacy Reisman calls receptive. Another form of this friendship is a specifically organized companionship that has sometimes—partly for experimental purposes—been provided for children with problems at school. Goodman (1970) describes such a project with positive results which show that friendship can be therapeutic, at least for certain problems. We could here probably safely turn this conclusion around and say that friendship can occur also in a therapeutic setting, and the type of friendship will most likely be receptive. Although this may not include all the aspects of a mutually spontaneous and reciprocal friendship, it utilizes some of its qualities for the benefit of the receiver.

Friendship and Gender

In the classical sources, friendship is always depicted as taking place between two men. This made Gertrude Atherton exclaim: "The perfect friendship of two men is the deepest and highest sentiment of which the finite mind is capable; women miss the best in life" (from The Conqueror, Book III, Ch. 12, cited by Reisman, 1979, p. 20). This claim was based on "the intense, devoted comradeships among philosophers and soldiers" at the time when women were left in the background. The restricted position of women may have kept them away from opportunities for friendship, and being socialized to compete for male attention may have hampered the formation of friend-
ships between women. One should not, however, conclude that
friendships between women, or cross-sex friendships, did not
occur. They must have, but since the classical literature
describes ideal friendship as that based on virtue, and only
the enlightened men, never women, had virtue, women's friend-
ships did not qualify.

In the Oriental societies, male-male friendship is still
if not deeper, at least more expressive than in the Western
society. In Europe or America, men are seldom, if ever, seen
holding hands in public. In fact, there seems to be a "cultural
prohibition" on the demonstration of intimacy between men
(Lewis, 1978, p. 108). Morris (1971) points out, however,
that this has not always been the case. As an example he cites
an occasion when two medieval monarchs met, and the king of
France led the king of England by the hand to his tent, the
dukes following the example (p. 125). Gradually this custom
faded until now, in Western societies, handholding is re-
stricted to the male-female relationship.

Morris (1971) attempts to correct some of these what he
considers erroneous social attitudes:

1. Interpersonal intimacy unduly "softens" a male.
This is false, according to Morris. Such relationships rather
strengthen him, "as they do with a loved child who explores
more readily."

2. Bodily contact implies sexual interest. Morris
considers this also a false statement. Non-sexual love is
possible between two men, two women, or between a man and a
woman, just as it is possible between a parent and a child. "Love is love—an emotional bond of attachment—and whether sexual feelings enter into it or not is a secondary matter" (pp. 236-237). Because of the overstress of the sexual element, the result has been a massive inhibition of our non-sexual body intimacies and this has applied to relationships with our parents and offspring (beware, Oedipus!), our siblings (beware, incest!), our close same-sex friends (beware, homosexuality!), our close opposite sex friends (beware, adultery!), and our many casual friends (beware, promiscuity!). Morris concludes that "if our pair-bond sexual intimacies were intensive and extensive enough, then there should be non left over to invade the other types of bond relationships, and we could all relax and enjoy them more than we seem to dare to do at present" (p. 237).

The present inhibitions indeed appear to adversely affect especially men. Although men still report more same-sex friendships than women do, "most of these are not close, intimate, or characterized by self-disclosure." Lewis (1978) observes that "many American males in adult life have never had a close male friend nor known what it means to love and care for a male friend without the shadow of some guilt and fear of peer ridicule" (p. 108; citing Komarovsky, 1974, Pleck, 1975, and Goldberg, 1976). Yet men also yearn to break the barriers of the traditional male roles, as Clark (1972), a psychologist who has worked frequently with all male groups, has observed: Men need more from one another than they believe they are permitted to have. Expression of positive affect, or affection, between men is seriously inhibited in our culture. Negative affect is acceptable. Men can argue, fight, and injure one another in public view, but they cannot as easily hold hands, embrace, or kiss. When
emotions in any area are blocked in expression, they seek other outlets, in distorted form if necessary. (p. 368)

Pleck (1975) found in a national sample that 58 percent of all males questioned had not told their best male friend that they liked him.

In its culturally prescribed ways, however, male friendship occurs commonly in Western society. Tiger (1974) sees it "as a direct expression or sublimation of male-bonding propensities which are species specific." One aspect of this male bonding is anti-femaleness. He cites "myriad formalizations of this propensity," such as secret societies, sporting clubs, political organizations, etc. which, to him, "indicate the strength of the bonding inclination as is also the range, obtuseness, and improbable elaborateness of many of its expressions," such as initiation ceremonies, humiliations, discomfort, fears, etc. Females, according to him, are far less likely to create such societies or to engage in such violent and demanding expressions. He suggests, referring to Cohen (1965), that "social organizational correlates of sex differences may be considerable in this matter" (pp. 47-48).

Du Bois (1974) also claims that all types of friendship, but especially best friends, "are found to be both empirically and normatively more significant for men than for women." For example, in the traditional Chinese society and in Mexican middle-class society "women are not meant to have friends; they have kin and neighbors" (pp. 27-28). Leyton (1974) found the same to be true in the Irish village he studied. Because

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of greater social and geographical mobility, Du Bois continues, men have "greater opportunities for forming preferential and voluntary relationships" (p. 28). This must have been true already in the classical societies where woman's life was highly restricted. Whenever friendly relations developed between female kin and neighbors, they were classified under these titles rather than under friendship.

"You have come a long way baby" (an advertisement of Virginia Slims Cigarettes) may, however, apply to this as well as to many other areas in the history of womanhood. Crawford (1977) interviewed middle-aged married couples (306 subjects) and found that women were more likely than men to have close friends, and the likelihood of having a friend did not change for a woman as she grew older. When asked to name a friend, women named an individual more often, whereas men named a couple.

Leyton (1974) has a bit different story. He found adult female friendship extremely rare in Aughnaboy of Ireland. The reason was a lack of "opportunities for kinless married women parallel to those for kinless workmates to establish bonds with nonkin" (p. 97). And he observed parallel psychiatric casualties:

Indeed, the psychiatric staff at the county's medical hospital has noted a high incidence of mental illness and nervous breakdowns among women who have married into Aughnaboy and found themselves at once kinless and friendless, without channels for the development of non-sexual emotional bonds. (p. 97)

Morris (1971) affirms the yearning of women for physical
intimacy:

recent American studies have revealed that in certain instances women are driven to use random sex simply for the purpose of being held in someone's arms. When questioned closely, the women admitted that this was sometimes their sole purpose in offering themselves sexually to a man, there being no other way in which they could satisfy their craving for a close embrace. (p. 237)

In other words, sex was used as an excuse for receiving physical intimacy. One could speculate that this aspect might have been present also in the recently publicized Jean Harris-Dr. Tarnower relationship (Adler and LaBrecque, 1981, p. 42; Peer, 1981, p. 38) which led to a murder because of jealousy in a love relationship where Harris was replaced by a younger woman. Using a later stage (sex) to achieve the earlier stage (physical intimacy) seems like putting the cart before the horse. According to Morris (1971), "this complete reversal leaves no doubt about the separation of the two," physical and sexual intimacy (p. 237).

Ideally, then, intimate friendship can be completely removed from sexual connotations, enabling any human beings, regardless of their gender, to enjoy the closeness and warmth it provides, and rendering sex roles inconsequential. As Riesman (1973) notes, however, at least in America "cross-sex, nonsexual ties of deep intimacy are rare and precarious," and "we do not for the most part find them customary or comfortable." He considers a partial reason to be the conventional assumption that "the erotic elements in such a tie will necessarily take active sexual form" (p. xv).

Even in adolescence, attempts at cross-sex friendships...
on mere friendship basis generally come to awkward situations. Davis (1973) describes it well:

Each party may assume a different potential for association. The boy may wish to become a lover; the girl may wish to have a friend. Cross-sex first encounters are less likely to be spontaneous and more likely to be awkward than same sex first encounters, because each party is less certain of the other party's intentions for their potential relationship. Moreover, cross-sex first encounters are more likely to be unsuccessful than same sex first encounters because love relations are univalent (unlike friendships, which are multivalent), and either party may announce that his one opening is closed. (p. 28).

Also in Naegele's (1953) research, both boys and girls (high school seniors) agreed that friendship does not cut across sex lines. If it does, it becomes love. Attitudes on this, however, may have changed in the most recent years.

One could, of course, cite countless examples where these normative constraints have been broken, though probably more so in later adulthood. Booth and Hess (1974) specifically explored "the structural opportunities and normative constraints affecting the cross-sex friendships of men and women."

Presenting interview data from 800 middle aged and elderly urban residents they conclude that, "while only a minority report cross-sex friends, they constitute a significant segment of the interpersonal resources of a number of adults." There were sex differences, however. "Women had fewer opportunities and were subject to more constraints with respect to the formation of cross-sex friendship ties than men" (p. 38). Those women who did have male friends were most likely employed, married to a husband with a white-collar occupation, and members of professional and recreational voluntary associations.
These friendships apparently precluded sex, and a rather large proportion of them were initiated by the woman's husband. With increasing age there was a decrease in the number of male friends, which the authors suggest could have been caused by the death of the husband (p. 46). Physical intimacy, however, was not discussed by the authors.

**Friendship and Age**

**Adolescent friendship**

Family relationships have generally been considered crucial for the later development of other relationships. Erikson's theory is one example of this. Friendships, however, seem to be important as well. Duck (1973) notes that "extensive psychological construing comes into existence only relatively late in development," and predicts that "friendship in preadolescent children will be of a functionally distinct sort from that encountered in adults" (pp. 148-149). Other sources (e.g. Sullivan, Du Bois, Reisman) seem to support this assertion. Sullivan (1953), however, considers the preadolescent "chum relationship" as the prototype for all relations of intimacy in later life (p. 214). In the juvenile era, friendships appear primarily in the form of ego-centric peer groups, which Reisman (1979) calls "friendships of association" (p. 51), but in the adolescent stage the capacity to love begins to appear, culminating in the development of the first real, deep friendship, which has the quality of Reisman's "reciprocal friendship."

Deep as these "chum relationships" may be, friendship in
adolescence is still "a means of making tentative choices" (Bensman & Lilienfeld, 1979, p. 139), based on common interests which point toward the future. The friend becomes a "sounding board" for ideas, uncertainties, defeats or victories, giving feedback without judgment or condescension, and providing "validation of all components of personal worth" (Sullivan, 1953, p. 246). The capacity for selflessness is developed in this relationship, and the young person's "self-image can be corrected (or warped), adjusted, embellished" (Du Bois, 1974, p. 24). These friendships, then, have far reaching consequences, as Bensman and Lilienfeld (1979) point out:

The friendships that arise in this period tend to be deeper and longer-lasting than all other friendships. They can and usually do serve as a reference point for the total subsequent life of the individual, regardless of changes in career, in life history, in relative success and failure. These friendships become a stable point of reference, at times equal to those provided by the family, in the total life of an individual. (p. 139)

It appears that these adolescent friendships take place both in dyadic and polyadic form, and perhaps often dyads functioning within the larger group of friends. This is evident from William Whyte's Street Corner Society (1943), which has been cited as one of the best studies on friendship (Ramsøy, 1968). In this urban "gang," "relations were voluntary and spontaneous" (Schwartz, 1974, p. 75), yet deep and enduring. Schwartz cites hippie communes as another example of polyadic friendship, although, as noted above, such group intimacies have their problems. The adolescent peer group in general, according to Schwartz,
precedes the dyadic friendship of adulthood in modern society. . . . the adolescent is excluded from participation in the bureaucratic institutions of the adult world; thus, he is forced to rely on his own immediate resources for the development of social organization. Here, friendship is paramount. It is the basis for not only affective support and confirmation of present identity, but for instrumental activity as well. (p. 75)

Adolescent society, according to Schwartz, resembles the intermediate type (rural-urban) relationship not structurally prescribed, but voluntary. And he hypothesizes that "in adolescent society, polyadic rather than dyadic friendship is most likely to occur" (Schwartz, 1974, p. 75).

Friendship in old age

Not much research has been done about friendship in old age. While one hears about the loneliness of the American aged (e.g. Ember and Ember, 1973, p. 22), other sources assert that this is not as much a problem for the aged as for the young. In old age, Bensman and Lilienfeld (1979) describe, friendships are not particularly intimate, because they are part of the culture of old age where there is less need for defenses. Thus, "not having to influence the public world allows for the expression of the self in ways that are not generally permissible among mature adults" and youth. Often there is mutual boasting and revelation of sins. As if by his age the individual earns "the right to act out the private and the intimate in public, in almost the same way as does the infant," and warranting the same tolerance. Consequently, Bensman and Lilienfeld conclude that intimacy has very little value when given or received.
Unfortunately, this assertion cannot be evaluated in light of research results since, to this researcher's knowledge, there are none. The literature on intimacy reviewed above would suggest that stripping down one's defenses is the precondition of friendship, which would make the old, like children, more apt to form friendships. The fact that Bensman and Lilienfeld's book is an exploration into the public and private spheres of life rather than friendship or intimacy as such, may explain this apparent discrepancy. As Paine (1974, p. 137), they conceive of friendship as an escape from the bureaucracy and impersonality of public life within which the working age generation must function and maintain a front. In old age, there is apparently less need for the confessional aspects of friendship since the aged need not function in the bureaucracy and consequently need not hide their private experience as younger people do. Furthermore, the aged may engage more than younger individuals in confession to strangers, or are perhaps more willing to do so.

Thus it seems that one's need for intimacy in old age, if not less than in younger age, is of a different nature. This, however, does not negate the need for support and companionship which seems obvious. Lynch (1977) cites numerous examples of the often fatal effects of losing one's life companion, and a large number of these is from among the aged. This would suggest a need for intimacy. More research is needed to determine the nature of friendship and intimacy in old age.
Cross-age friendship

Friendship across a wide age-gap seems to be rare, although possible. Naegele's (1958) adolescent subjects agreed, or rather, took for granted, "that friendship cannot bind those who markedly differ in age" (p. 246). Wide differences in age were felt to be incompatible with the presumed equality in friendship. Reisman's (1979) "receptive friendship," however, could probably accommodate even wide age differences. In this case, each would receive different benefits from the other rather than exchange the same rewards as in a reciprocal friendship.

Summary

It appears that the tendency and need to form close and intimate interpersonal relationships is one of the universal qualities of human nature. In one form or another, such relationships are found in all cultures and among all groups of people. Some groups may express their need for intimacy more explicitly than others, and some periods in time seem to bring the emphasis on intimacy to the forefront more than others. As was noted, this seems to be the case with the most recent decades in the United States. To understand this trend better, it is beneficial to look at intimate relationships not only in their societal context but also in the theoretical context of the entire spectrum of human relationships, of which this desire to share one's innermost with another forms an integral part.
CHAPTER III

THEORETICAL CONTEXT: FROM STRANGERS TO INTIMATES

Introduction

This chapter is an attempt not only to show what facilitates intimacy, but also to place the concepts of friendship and intimacy on the continuum of the acquaintance process. The best way to do this is to construct a complete classification scheme for all types of social behavior, from its elementary forms to its most advanced manifestations, viewed through the window of the individual's personal, affective orientation. This enables one to see where the behaviors and relationships one is interested in will fit. Furthermore, the interrelationships between different levels and forms of affective behavior give explanatory and predictive power to this framework, thus making it a sociological theory (as was claimed in the first chapter). The justification for this claim is the social psychological view of sociology as the study of people on planet earth living together. What gets them together, what keeps them together, and what pulls them apart; these constitute the vital aspects of the field, including all sociologies of
In this study, the focus is mainly on the first two, getting together and keeping together. Institutions are probably the most important method the society has created for a large number of people to stay together, and some of the mechanisms they use will be briefly discussed. This study, however, is not about institutions; rather, it is about the intricate and fragile methods individuals construct within and without the institutions to enjoy and perpetuate their togetherness. The larger picture of the societal network is necessary because—in keeping with the theory of relativity—things can only be defined in relation to other things, and one must have a concept of the whole before a part can be meaningful.

Most, if not all, sociological theories could be boiled down to interpersonal behavior. "Society exists wherever several individuals are in reciprocal relationship," Simmel (1921, p. 348) writes. Symbolic interactionism is built on this philosophy by simply adding symbolism. Structural functionalists concentrate on those aspects of the interaction that appear to work, and conflict theorists on the aspects that do not work. What else is conflict but clashing human relationships?

This approach has been used by several theorists in addition to Simmel. Cooley, Mead, Sullivan, Homans, and many others have explicitly made interpersonal relationships the center of their theories. Social psychology, in fact, is
considered by many as synonymous with the study of interpersonal relations (Cottrell & Foote, 1952, p. 181). According to Johnson (1952), Sullivan "was solely responsible for the formulation of the interpersonal relations theory, which recognizes the inescapable interaction of the individual and the social order, and which recognizes that personality, as such, is manifest in interpersonal situations only" (p. 208).

This interaction does not stop with the formulation of personality; the personality is continually affected by the society through social interaction. Parsons, in his *Social Structure and Personality* (1964), thoroughly examines this not only interdependence but "interpenetration" between personality and the social system. The main content for the personality comes from the social system through socialization, but "the personality becomes an independent system through its relations to its own organism and through the uniqueness of its own life experience" (p. 82). Parsons continues:

> At all stages of the socialization process, from the sociological side the essential concept of role designates this area of interpenetration. From the personality side, a corresponding concept of relational needs may be used, of which the psychoanalytically central one of the need for love may serve as an example. (p. 82)

This interpersonal view of society is especially suitable for the study of mental health. A psychiatrist and a student of Adolph Meyer, Sullivan virtually identified his field with social psychology (Cottrell & Foote, 1952, p. 181), defining mental health as "competence in interpersonal relations" (p. 203). This tradition has been carried on in much of the
sociological work on mental health (e.g. Szasz, Scheff, etc.), although the theoretical background of this is more in social problems in general (e.g. labeling theory) than in psychiatry. Among psychiatrists, many others beside Sullivan—Adler for example—have considered all personal problems and conflicts as interpersonal (Dreikurs, 1953, p. 3).

At this point it is important to make a distinction between the two major forms of interpersonal behavior (from the relational viewpoint): encounters and relationships. A relationship is built out of separate encounters, and it forms the structure into which all individual encounters are connected, thus giving meaning to each encounter (cf. Vander Zanden, 1977, p. 57, on "meaning"). When the encounters cannot be connected into a relationship-structure (although they may be connected to other structures, e.g. institutions), they remain separate and meaningless as interpersonal encounters. Whatever meaning these encounters have comes from some other structure or instrumental purpose into which they may be connected. From this viewpoint, instrumental interpersonal behavior is merely a set of separate encounters, and if this type predominates at the expense of relationships, the individual may experience meaningfulness. Mere encounters do not satisfy the "relational needs" Parsons refers to.

The theory that follows has its starting point in Homans' theory of social behavior as an exchange, rewards and punishments being the determining factors. In the latter half of the continuum, however, it departs from Homans' theory.
Homans views organizational behavior as the most advanced form, classifying "personal loyalties" in the elementary forms which emerge even within the institutional setting (Homans, 1974, p. 366). This follows the evolutionary tradition, the progress from simple to complex, which may be responsible for the "step-child" position that affective relationships have received at best in sociological literature. The theory proposed here takes a somewhat opposite approach. In this, personal loyalties belong to the latter end of the continuum; they represent relationships and thus, in the affective sense, are more advanced than the impersonal behaviors—or encounters—of organizations.

The underlying assumption here is that the simple-to-complex view of social behavior is not the only possible one. "The trouble with civilized men is that they cannot live with the institutions they have themselves invented," Homans (1974, p. 373) writes. Even Durkheim (1949), though in some ways apparently impressed by the division of labor and the growing institutions which held much promise (organic rather than mechanical solidarity), nevertheless concluded that "happiness . . . . does not become greater because activity becomes richer," and "progress does not greatly increase our happiness" (pp. 244, 250). The opposite seems to be the case, according to Durkheim. Noting that suicide (excluding the altruistic type) "scarcely appears except with civilization," he "proves" that "the general happiness of society is decreasing" (pp. 246, 249).
Later history seems to support Durkheim's conclusions. Although progress has taken place in many universalistic areas—efficiency, equal opportunity, and social justice, to name a few—the particularistic aspect of individual human happiness does not appear to have increased. New problems have risen to counteract the benefits gained. Institutions tend to swallow their own purpose in their ever growing complexity, and individuals are lost in the mechanism of the "higher purpose." Perhaps the time has come to consider another type of progression, not a rival but a complementary one; one that looks at this progress from a human perspective. Social exchange provides a suitable starting point.

According to Homans, social life is possible through a sustained sequence of exchange. The most elementary unit of social exchange is interaction, which Homans (1950) defines the following way:

When we refer to the fact that some unit of activity of one man follows, or, if we like the word better, is stimulated by some unit of activity of another, aside from any question of what these units may be, then we are referring to interaction. (p. 36)

The behavioral concept of stimulus-response seems identical with this definition. We respond to others and they respond to us. These repeated responses or encounters are the building blocks of relationships.

Homans (1974) defines the concept of interpersonal relationships as "the repeated exchanges of rewards between men" (p. 51). These repeated exchanges "are the very guts and marrow of social life." To understand them one must "consider
the sequence of actions—that is, the effect of past actions on present ones" (p. 57). To trace the sequence, one must go back to the beginning, the very start of a particular interaction chain. Once people are "thrown together under these circumstances" (without competing others with potentially equal or greater rewards), Homans writes, "once they have exchanged some action not positively punishing, they are apt to repeat the exchange and ultimately develop what we have called a relationship, a repeated exchange of rewarding actions of different kinds" (p. 145).

What follows is simply an elaboration of this sequence: "thrown together," repeating the interaction, and building a relationship. People are "thrown together" a great deal; that is what urban life is all about. There are numerous encounters with a great variety of people. Furthermore, there is communication probably more than ever before, at least certain kinds of communication. Yet loneliness is becoming a social problem, as Riesman (1950), Slater (1976), Weiss (1973), Gordon (1975), Lynch (1977) and others have documented.

Rather than looking at the problem from the loner's end, attempting to trace the reasons for his or her isolation, the theory proposed here takes the opposite approach. What facilitates interaction that is meaningful enough for all parties concerned to be repeated, and repeated again? What makes it meaningful? In other words, how do those get together who will eventually stay together (this need not mean cohabitation), and what are the forces that keep them together in a close or
intimate relationship? These are some of the questions addressed on the following pages.

No claim is made, of course, that what is presented here is the only possible classification scheme of social behavior. As was noted earlier, other classifications of friendship have been made, and the acquaintance process has been documented in great detail by theorists such as Thibaut and Kelley (1959), Newcomb (1961), and Homans (1950, 1974). On a larger scale, Douvan (1977) identifies three levels of "social environmental variables": the interpersonal (involving whole persons), the social organizational (the role system), and the cultural (shared beliefs)(p. 17). Riesman (1950) incorporates all social life in his tradition direction, inner direction, and other direction. To this researcher's knowledge, however, there is no theory published in the literature that can look at the organized, institutionalized society from the viewpoint of the personal, affective component, and incorporate all human relationships on a continuum according to this criterion. The theory presented in this chapter provides one such possible framework.

Social behavior is here conceived of as interactions between four major categories of people: strangers, acquaintances, friends, and intimates. Each category is divided into two or three subcategories. For strangers, acquaintances, and friends, these subcategories indicate progressive stages of interpersonal knowing, for intimates they are parallel components considered essential in the relationship. These, how-
ever, are merely conceptual categories, or ideal types, which do not appear in their pure form in real life. Most human relationships have aspects that belong to a higher or lower category than the category where the relationship belongs as a whole. Moreover, the categories are continuous rather than discreet. Conceptually clarifying lines have simply been inserted into the process of interpersonal knowing.

It is proposed that an individual needs all these levels of relationships, the lower ones out of necessity (because of limitations in resources, and because of the practical benefits of organization) and the higher ones for optimum mental health. Although a continuum would perhaps best illustrate the process, the relative number and hierarchy of these encounters and relationships may be best visualized in an affective pyramid of all interpersonal encounters in one's lifetime. A great majority of them remain separate encounters, and these form the lower stages in the hierarchy; some are built into relationships, represented by the higher stages in the following pyramid.
Figure 1: Affective pyramid

- Biological
  - Ideological
    - Psychological
      - Intimates (common identity)
        - Close friends (priorities rearranged)
          - Just friends (seek out each other, when "thrown together")
            - Mere acquaintances (seen repeatedly in terms of instrumental roles)
              - Familiar strangers (seen repeatedly, but no conscious communication)
                - Encountered strangers (encountered once or rarely, but no continued communication)
                  - Total strangers (from world population to one's community)

- Reward in
  - mutual
    - goals or work
    - instrumental gain
      - Expressive
        - Reward in mutual play
      - Interchangeable
        - Relationships
      - Friends
        - Enduring relationships
      - Intimates
        - Common identity

- Choice in terms of
  - persons when not performing instrumental roles
    - Choice of available persons in mutual instrumental roles
      - Choice in terms of instrumental roles

Encounter line: "thrown together" (encounter = mutual engagement of attention)
Strangers

The total population of the world minus one's acquaintances, friends, and intimates, constitutes this category. Some of the people are closer to the individual than others in geographical, social, psychological, intellectual, or ideological proximity, and their chances of meeting are therefore greater. This initial category is divided into three subcategories: total strangers, encountered strangers, and familiar strangers. Communication, on which the acquaintance process depends, also deserves a section of its own at this stage, although it plays a prominent role in the progression as long as the relationship lasts. In fact, the end of communication implies the end of the relationship. At this stage, however, communication provides the bridge between strangers and acquaintances.

Total Strangers

This is the population that one knows exists in the world, the billions of people. Many of them live in the same city, but the individual has not encountered them in any way. Modern news media modifies this category by making some of the otherwise total strangers into half-encountered strangers. By and large, however, the fact that these people exist makes little cognitive difference to the individual, neither are they usually accounted for in any planning, altruistic behavior providing a possible exception.

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In the illustration on page 82, this category consists of the ground under the pyramid. The higher to the surface (closer to the pyramid) the people are, the closer they are in proximity to our individual of interest. This includes physical, geographical, social, psychological, intellectual, or ideological proximity, or "the likelihood that their paths will cross" (Homans, 1974, p. 144). This likelihood could be called a "potential encounter," and chances for it will increase with the increase of any type of proximity, more so with the combination of any two or more types. Homans calls geographical proximity "a universal determinant of social relationships" (p. 144); if any other type of proximity will eventually lead to an encounter, it will have to be through geographical proximity. Communication can, however, begin with other types of proximity as well, perhaps increasingly so in today's world. Professional colleagues sometimes begin exchanging ideas (e.g. in publications) long before physically meeting each other, and having common relatives or friends likewise increases the likelihood of meeting. Other types of proximity, then, can increase the likelihood of geographical proximity, or the likelihood of a physical encounter. In addition, the nonphysical or nongeographical forms of proximity become the criteria on which relationships are built once the participants are close, as will be shown later.
The encounter line in Figure 1 (p. 82) is where the initial encounter takes place. Goffman (1961) defines an "encounter" as

a single visual and cognitive focus of attention; a mutual and preferential openness to verbal communication; a heightened mutual relevance of acts; an eye-to-eye ecological huddle that maximizes each participant's opportunity to perceive the other participant's monitoring of him. (pp. 17-18)

In this chapter, the word "encounter" refers to a less total engagement of attention. In physical encounters, it is simply the "single visual and cognitive focus of attention" (Goffman's first aspect) in the sense that each person notices the other. For the sake of conceptual clarity, it may be helpful to think of the encounter here as physical, implying geographical proximity (e.g. passing on the street). It can, however, be extended to nonvisual encounters where each participant "notices" the other in some other way. They can hear about each other through a common friend, or one can read the name or see a picture of the other in a paper, even write to a foreign pen pal, etc. In these examples, there is only half encounter until there is a response to the communication.

In whichever way or whichever form, the participants here are "thrown together" for the first time. Until now they have been total strangers who knew little or nothing about each other. Now the acquaintance process begins—or does not begin; all depends on continued communication.

There are two types of "thrown together" situations, and
all shades of combinations of the two. These are the involun-
tary, involving no choice, and the voluntary, based on choice. All humans are thrown to situations of both kinds, although the latter may be more a matter of degree than absolute free-
dom of choice.

An example of the first that is close to everyone is the family of orientation. No one chose to be born, and no one was able to choose his or her parents or siblings. In some cultures even one's family of procreation is not left to one's choice. Other people (e.g. parents) choose the marriage partner, and children come as they are given, not by planning. In such cultures the second, or voluntary, category is very small. Indeed, it is small even in the Western culture when one considers the cultural and societal forces that shape one's life. Since, however, individuals often seem to have to make choices between equally available alternatives, the view taken in this paper is that, to a certain extent, there is a freedom of choice. Phillips (1971), among others, heartily agrees (p. 58). This assertion is with full realization of the extreme behaviorist view which sees even one's choices as merely patterned responses, or the extreme deterministic view which knows no such thing as freedom.

Leaving philosophical speculations aside, the point here is the chance meeting of two or more people. They may have chosen the time, place, and the occasion, but they did not choose the other people who also showed up. Examples could make an endless list: sports events, entertainment, work,
school, neighborhood (to a certain extent), voluntary associations, travelling, etc. This is the "reservoir of unrelated others who can be approached and, if necessary, left behind again" (Naeglele, 1958, p. 235).

This initial encounter starts off the process—if it gets started. Communication is an integral aspect of it; in fact, there can be no encounter without communication. Some form of communication always takes place immediately if the participants are geographically close enough. It may be only a sight of a person from afar, or a mutual glance, but these are forms of communication. When there is no communication (i.e. not enough proximity), there has been no meeting and no beginning of the process. Even when an initial encounter has taken place, most of these "meetings" will forever remain undeveloped. There has been a sight, a glance, but no repeated interaction. The participants remain in the second category, encountered strangers, who for all practical purposes are the same as total strangers in that they are not accounted for in any action or plan, neither is there any relationship between them.

If the encounter has been powerful enough, and the communication meaningful enough, this can become a basis for more interaction. Two extreme examples of this would be love at first sight and a mugging, the first leading to attempts at getting to know the other and the second to attempts at prosecution. The latter represents indirect interaction which will stop at retribution, whereas on the positive basis the communication will continue (providing the interest is mutual),
leading to the formation of a relationship.

Familiar Strangers

In a traditional, Gemeinschaft, village community, this category did not exist, but it is a fairly large category in a modern, urban community. People continue to be "thrown together" and the encounter is sufficiently neutral that it warrants no further interaction, thus preventing the building of a relationship. There is no conscious communication, but gradually some faces begin to look familiar. Crowds that gather at certain events may be largely composed of the same people from time to time, or people may live on the same block and repeatedly pass each other. These people may become faces without names and little other knowledge of them. Sometimes names are displayed (e.g. store clerks or participants in certain conventions), but when no attention—or only passing attention—is paid to them, this equals not knowing the other's name. The "meeting" remains a separate encounter. This stage is a co-existence with strangers, accepting the fact that there is a limit to the number of persons one can know and have a relationship with. Furthermore, as Goffman (1963) has observed, encounters between such strangers (as any strangers) are controlled by social norms, even the fleeting eye contact constituting a delicate ritual of "civil inattention" (p. 84). For all practical purposes, familiar strangers also are little better than total strangers, although, if enough face-to-face encounters take place, the participants may begin to communi-
cate more explicitly.

Communication

To approach another person means to continue the communication process which was kicked off by the initial glance, for communication is the very "mechanism through which human relations exist and develop" (Cooley, 1914, p. 61). Cooley's list ranges from "the symbols of the mind" to "the means of conveying them through space and preserving them in time," i.e. the mass media and information storage systems. Expressions, attitudes, and gestures are some of the nonverbal symbols of the mind, and the proportion of them as compared to verbal, personal communication seems to be growing in the twentieth century world.

Simmel (1921) also writes about this:

Before the appearance of omnibuses, railroads, and streetcars in the nineteenth century, men were not in a situation where for periods of minutes or hours they could or must look at each other without talking to one another. Modern social life increases in ever growing degree the role of mere visual impressions which always characterizes the preponderant part of all sense relationship between man and man, and must place social attitudes and feelings upon an entirely changed basis. (p. 360)

Simmel goes on to say that "in general, what we see of a man will be interpreted by what we hear from him, while the opposite is more unusual" (p. 360). Erroneous visual impressions, then, may remain uncorrected when no verbal interaction can take place; hence the emphasis Simmel gives to "the glance in the eye" and its importance in conveying "the real personality, the real attitude, and the real impulse" (p. 358). "Man is
first known by his countenance," he continues, "not by his acts" (p. 359) and--we may add--words. Moreover, this "initial impression remains ever the keynote of all later knowledge of him; it is the direct perception of his individuality which his appearance, and especially his face, discloses to our glance" (p. 360). Duck (1973) calls this the "person perception," which he considers closely related, if not identical, to friendship formation (p. 90).

Homans (1974) also considers the initial meeting crucial; in fact, on it depends the chance for a relationship to develop. According to him, when the participants "have exchanged some action not positively punishing, they are apt to repeat the exchange" (p. 145). This is on the assumption that other conditions are conducive. Homans identifies the "other conditions" as "the absence of other persons who may be alternative sources of a reward that is sufficiently great in value to more than make up for the increased cost in distance covered to obtain it" (p. 175).

Granted the absence of such competing persons, social exchange between the original "thrown together" persons is likely to continue, according to Homans. The only reason seems to be an inherent human need to socialize. Davis (1973) considers one reason for this tendency to be that "humans are stimulotropic in the same way some plants are heliotropic: they continually orient themselves toward a source of stimulation in the same way certain plants continually orient themselves toward the sun" (p. 31). When nothing prevents it, humans will
initiate and continue social exchange. The pioneer psychologist William James, in his *Principles of Psychology*, expresses the same idea. Believing that people are guided by instincts, he "attributed friendship to an 'innate propensity' to seek company and to gain the favorable attention of others" (Reisman, 1979, p. 46).

But what are the "positively punishing" actions that would stop the progress? Cost (which receives much emphasis in social exchange theory) could probably include all potential losses, such as money, property, time, or effort. It could also include pain, whether physical or psychological. Perhaps even being seen in public with someone who is deemed undesirable by looks, manners, or reputation, can be a punishment in the form of embarrassment and loss of prestige. Furthermore, the place where the encounter takes place (e.g. a church, a bar, or a dark street corner) and the physical attributes, such as "colors, temperature, and noise level affect people's definitions of the situation and their subsequent behavior" (Phillips, 1971, pp. 61-62). Such situational factors have much to do with the assessment of the encounter as rewarding or punishing. If, however, the rewards (e.g. psychological rewards of helping) outweigh the costs, the situation may not be "positively punishing" even when it is undesirable, and the communication can continue.

When the meeting is positively rewarding, on the other hand, there is much more reason for continued communication. Perhaps the other invokes one's curiosity or admiration,
making him or her desire further contact. Such, for example, is the case with the classical "love at first sight." Even if the communication has been one-sided, there has been communication, probably by appearance. And when a person finds another's mere appearance rewarding, he or she will expect the subsequent exchange to be at least equally rewarding. Such expectations, furthermore, will increase the chances that the interaction will be rewarding in fact.

"It is impossible not to communicate," Ramey (1976) declares, "and the most important part of communication is nonverbal" (p. 9, original in italics). To him, communication is an ongoing adjustment of the definition of the relationship by both, or all, parties. Mead (1934) also spoke about

the peculiar character of human social activity . . . to be found in the process of communication, and more particularly in the triadic relation on which the existence of meaning is based: the relation of the gesture of one organism to the adjustive response made to it by another organism. (p. 145)

Society is only possible through shared meanings, and these meanings are communicated both verbally and nonverbally, each party carefully edging his or her way along, watching for cues from the other. Sullivan, more precise than Mead on many points according to Cottrell and Foote (1952), thus considered self as "a set of reflected appraisals" (p. 192), and Parsons (1964), in discussing Riesman's other-directed character, calls it "a caricature of Cooley's looking-glass self, where peers reflect each other in infinite regression like mirrors on barbershop walls." Moreover, "the other-directed person is
an agent himself to the agent he looks to" (p. 187).

Our "thrown together" individuals thus continue adjusting their own and each other's "definition of the situation" (Thomas, 1931), and adjusting their behavior accordingly. They organize, construct, and negotiate lines of conduct (Blumer, 1969, pp. 108-113) as they proceed with the interaction. According to Mead and Cooley, this interaction is the very basis of the formation of self. Cooley (1902) identified three elements in his "looking-glass self": (1) the imagination of our appearance to the other person, (2) the imagination of his judgment of that appearance, and (3) some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification. This feeling he calls "an imputed sentiment," which largely depends on the "character and weight of that other, in whose mind we see ourselves" (p. 152). This feeling is not, however, based merely on imagination. Nonverbal communication has a large part in it.

Argyle (1967), in fact, argued "that mental illness may be generated by an inability to operate with basic 'rules' about non-verbal interaction" (Buck, 1973, p. 151). This may hamper with shared meanings, which in turn may hamper the development of a relationship, since the budding relationship is built on these shared definitions and shared meanings, arrived at by both nonverbal and verbal communication.

According to Mead (1934), the vocal gesture has more importance than any other gesture. This is mainly so because of its usefulness in correcting ourselves. "One is more apt to catch himself up and control himself in the vocal gesture
than in the expression of the countenance," Mead observes. This way "the individual responds to his own stimulus in the same way as other people respond" (p. 65). For this reason, society begins with the individual, according to Mead.

Generally, however, such talking to oneself is not considered the major function of verbal communication. Rather, it is the vehicle of interpersonal contact, reaching where visual impressions cannot, and enabling exchanges more or less sophisticated according to the culture and language of the participants. As was noted earlier, verbal communication can be of use in interpreting visual impressions, according to Simmel. Furthermore, a person can use it to build and maintain a certain image in the eyes of the people who do not know him closely. It is the "script" in Goffman's (1959) dramaturgical theory, and it is a very important tool in impression management. Goffman, in fact, observes that people who fail to maintain personal fronts are often defined by others as mentally ill.

As our strangers have thus repeatedly exchanged communications, both nonverbal and verbal, and found them "not positively punishing," may be even rewarding, they have gradually developed the rudiments of a relationship; they have become acquaintances.

**Acquaintances**

Most of everyday social life operates on this level. The strangers who were once "thrown together" continue seeing each
other and communicating, but not for the explicit purpose of interacting with each other as persons. This can also happen, as with the follow-up of our much repeated love at first sight, but in that case the acquaintance stage is extremely short—if not skipped altogether—as the individuals focus directly on friendship or intimacy. This category is divided into mere acquaintances and friendly acquaintances, a special section being devoted to Gemeinschaftsgefühl, a "friendly" feeling of identification with one's society and the human family in general. Interchangeability of the encounters is the distinguishing characteristic of this category.

**Mere Acquaintances**

At the onset of this stage, the people continue the interaction for some ulterior purpose, or they simply continue to be "thrown together." According to Goffman (1967), if the people need an excuse to interact with each other when they meet, they are "unacquainted," whereas "acquainted" persons need an excuse not to interact when they meet (p. 2). These could be considered interesting subcategories of mere acquaintances; the ones needing an excuse to interact would border the familiar strangers category in the classification presented here, and the ones needing an excuse not to interact would be close to friendly acquaintances.

To use Homans' language of rewards, mere acquaintances receive most of their rewards from something else than their interaction, and only a "positively punishing" exchange would
stop it (provided there are no competing others). The indi-
viduals continue their work, school, recreation, voluntary
association activities, etc. along with the others and—to a
certain extent—oblivious to the others. There is a certain
indifference; the participants have little or nothing either
for or against each other. Conflict at this stage would be
punishing and stop the exchange, and preference of one person
over another would lead to the next stage.

Many families operate on the mere acquaintance level.
The members of such families are simply "thrown together" and
continue interacting because they have to (because it is ex-
pedient to do so), not because they want to. This, of course,
refers to a less than ideal family, which probably is not the
most common type. Even after reaching independence in mere
physical survival, most children continue living in their
parents' home until total independence becomes more rewarding,
and most parents would like to postpone that stage until late
adolescence at least. Often, however, other factors interfere.
When physical needs (food, accomodation, etc.) do not necessi-
tate leaving home, other values, such as education (no college
in one's home town) may cause it. In other cases—perhaps
with more maturity—sheer independence is a sufficient reward
to cause a separation from parents. This may be accompanied
by a relationship which is more rewarding than that with
parents and siblings. Such a separation, of course, is part
of the normal course of life, but presumably it takes place
sooner in the cases where family relationships are on the
lower acquaintance level. The most radical example of such departure is running away from home (i.e. leaving without parental consent), which may express a refusal of even acquaintance level relationship with parents. Continuing a mere acquaintance relationship means using home only as a place to eat and sleep, with little but necessary communication between family members.

Married couples whose communication has deteriorated to mere "intellectual intimacy," i.e. "chatter about daily routine" (Dahms, 1972, pp. 49-50), have in fact gone backward from the more advanced stages to the acquaintance stage. Sometimes a relationship can even be deliberately kept on this level because the partners realize that any more intimacy would bring unresolvable conflict. Staying at the acquaintance stage then becomes the only alternative to dissolving the relationship. In other cases, the partners deliberately choose to become strangers again, and—for all practical purposes, undo the whole process. Actually, however, it can never be undone since memories cannot be erased. Should the partners get together again, they certainly would have more to build on than total strangers have. Davis (1973) presents two directions of mobility in his "sociable mobility flow charts": upward and downward mobility, the downward ending with enemies (pp. xx). Lovers and friends can thus become either acquaintances or enemies—but never strangers—when their relationship deteriorates.

In the mere acquaintance stage, expedience overrides the
pleasure derived from being with the person. This may take the form of abiding with societal norms (as in family relationships) or "using" the other for instrumental gains (as in a predominantly instrumental "friendship"). In most cases, however, expedience simply demands limiting the interaction with a large number of people, which is the main reason why acquaintances is a much larger category than friends.

Interpersonal behavior within a "cause," by and large, belongs to the acquaintance stage, since the people come together not to see each other but for an ulterior purpose. Although one's commitment to that cause may be comparable to intimacy (ideological intimacy), interaction between most of the people involved is on the mere acquaintance level. Religious denominations, social movements, indeed, all institutions operate on this level as a whole, although within them, as Homans (1974) notes, behaviors like "personal loyalties" take place (pp. 366-367). Efficiency requires that, at least to a certain extent, affective relationships be laid aside in the interest of the "higher purpose" and "intellectual significance" that institutions represent (Simmel, 1955, pp. 194-195). This philosophy has been observed in connection with the resistance to dyads in communistic communities (e.g. Slater, 1963; Schwartz, 1974; Bettelheim, 1969; pp. 56-57 in this thesis). In the democratic, "free" communities, perhaps because time is divided between work time and free time, dyads are permitted, but in other, more subtle, ways relationships between people in general are kept impersonal.
Homans (1974) gives an excellent definition of an impersonal relationship:

If a person enters into a single exchange with another person for some particular single kind of reward, and there are many persons easily accessible to him from whom he can get this reward, so that if one refuses it he can easily get it from another, we shall say that the relationship between the two persons is relatively impersonal. That is, the man behaves in much the same way toward any one of a large number of other men, and the same is true of their behavior toward him. His behavior is governed by the nature of the reward and not by the identity of the particular person he gets it from. (pp. 65-66)

In the framework of this thesis, such a "single exchange" would not be considered a relationship. For want of a better term, however, the term "impersonal relationship" is used.

A good example of an impersonal relationship is pointed out by Fromm (1941) in his discussion about the "importance" of a customer in a department store. "As an abstract customer he is important; as a concrete customer he is utterly unimportant" (p. 127). This is to say that a customer matters only as he enhances the business, not as a unique person. The same could be said about many other organizations, even of churches. When organizational success takes over as the major goal in a church, a member counts as a number on the record and as a contributor to the organization, but the concern for the salvation of his soul may be little better than lip service. Already in 1914, Cooley observed this as he wrote:

Perhaps something of this hostility to truth will linger in all establishments, however they may be humanized: they all involve a kind of vested interest in certain ideas which is not favorable to entire frankness. It sometimes appears that one who would be quite honest and stand for
human nature should avoid not only religious, political and educational alliance, but law, journalism, and all positions where one has to speak as part of an institution. As a rule the great seers and thinkers have stood as much aside from institutions as the nature of the human mind permits. (p. 186)

Very few, however, can make a living in today's world without being employed. The employer-employee relationship could, in fact, be considered a prototype of bureaucracy, and is therefore worth elaborating on in this context. In the Gemeinschaft society, "whole persons" were engaged in "meaningful and profoundly significant institutions and behavior patterns" (Simmel, 1955, p. 194), but production and collective security relied on more or less spontaneous efforts of individuals. As the culture develops, these patterns "are replaced by those which in themselves appear to be completely mechanical, external, and inanimate." But, as Simmel continues, "the latter have a higher purpose, which reaches beyond that of the earlier level of organization." To illustrate, Simmel cites examples such as the medieval knight versus the modern soldier, factory versus handicraft, and the overall "modern levelling and uniformity" (p. 195).

This development has led to a point where, according to Simmel,

organizations are too extensive and complex today to allow each of their members to express one idea completely, so to speak. Each of the members can have only mechanical significance without any meaning in themselves. Only as a member of the whole can he contribute his part toward the realization of an idea. (p. 195)

Parsons (1937) also writes about the ad hoc relationships in Gesellschaft, geared toward "specific acts or complexes of
action, within a framework of institutional norms." Quoting Tönnies, he concludes that "the relation is mechanistic," whereas the **Gemeinschaft** relation is organic, "for in order to understand the specific acts they must be seen in the context of the wider total relationship between the parties which by definition transcends these particular elements" (p. 691). Interestingly, the definitions of organic and mechanistic relationships, cited above, seem to be the exact opposites of Durkheim's (1933) mechanic and organic solidarity. The reason for this is that Simmel's and Parsons' view is on the individual in this case, whereas Durkheim's view is on the society as a whole.

Building on Parsons' theory, Eisenstadt (1956), in his cross-cultural study of friendship as ritualized personal relations, describes the "predominantly particularistic societies" as those in which

(a) the incumbents of the most important roles act towards other persons according to the familial, kinship, lineage, ethnic and other properties of those individuals in relation to their own, and (b) membership in the total society is defined in terms of belonging to some particularistic subgroup (lineage, caste, etc.), and the most important institutional roles in the political, economic, ritual, etc., spheres are allocated to such groups or their representatives. (p. 91)

In these societies, ritualized personal relations serve as mechanisms of social control; yet at the same time they "provide the individual with very strong bonds of personal-emotional security" (pp. 92-93). These are the bonds that bind people together in a traditional, **Gemeinschaft** society. Other means, such as societally imposed punishments, are needed in a
Gesellschaft, making it an "antagonistic cooperation" (Lenski, 1974, p. 34, quoting Sumner, 1960, p. 32).

The employer-employee relationship is central in the comparison of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, the latter being preoccupied with efficiency. As compared to individuals' random efforts, large scale organizations and institutions maximize the outcome of the available resources, making them stretch farther. This enables the addressing of problems from the viewpoint of the whole society rather than that of the individual members or their affective relationships. Important developments have indeed come about as a result of this universalism or macro-orientation, and these have benefited the individual members as well. While production is maximized, making affluence available to more people, personal favoritism is abandoned in the name of social justice. The distribution of the available resources thus no longer depends on the micro-level, particularistic efforts like tribal warfare; rather, there is an effort to distribute these resources (jobs, educational opportunities, etc.) equally to all members of the society through programs like affirmative action. The point of this discussion is, however, that these great moral gains have produced some undesirable side-effects, such as impersonality, of which the bureaucratic employer-employee relationship is an example.

A certain amount of impersonality, however, seems to be required for the maximum functioning of an organization, whether the aim is profit for the owners or greater utility.
for the whole society. In capitalistic countries, this aim seems to be personal gain, the rationale being that it is supposedly available to all who are willing to work for it. The professed aim of communistic ideology, on the other hand, is common good rather than capital gain. Both of these systems seem to result in impersonality as the general mode of societal relationships. Ineffective workers must be fired or demoted; considering the worker's identity often brings a conflict with the best interests of the business or industry. It was largely for this reason that Leyton's (1974) Irish Elite found it difficult to employ their relatives.

"Institutions are made up of persons, but not whole persons," Cooley (1914) writes; "each one enters into it with a trained and specialized part of himself" (p. 319). Here, then, the vast world of bureaucratic roles is plugged into the theory. Cooley mentions as examples "the legal part of a lawyer, the ecclesiastical part of a church member or the business part of a merchant." The person, on the other hand, representing "the wholeness and humanness of life," is antithetical to institutions. "A man is no man at all if he is merely a piece of an institution," according to Cooley; "he must stand also for human nature, for the instinctive, the plastic and the ideal" (p. 319). In other words, for optimum social and emotional well-being one needs expressive roles; instrumental roles tend to be concerned only with formal responsibilities and the specific task at hand (Demerath & Marwell, 1976, p. 267).
Cooley does not, however, consider a person as generally better than an institution, recognizing that "there are advantages on each side." He continues:

The person has love and aspiration and all sorts of warm, fresh, plastic impulses, to which the institution is seldom hospitable, but the latter has a sober and tried goodness of the ages, the deposit, little by little, of what has been found practicable in the wayward and transient outreaching of human idealism. The law, the state, the traditional code of right and wrong, these are related to personality as a gray-haired father to a child. However world-worn and hardened by conflict, they are yet strong and wise and kind, and we do well in most matters to obey them. (p. 322)

The higher purpose or greater common good and the accumulated wisdom, then, seems to justify some of the disadvantages. "This higher purpose will no longer permit them to retain the spirit and the rationale which under earlier social conditions gave to institutions and associations a terminus to their purposive activities" (Simmel, 1955, p. 195). Now institutions must operate by instrumental roles, and these necessarily call for impersonality.

Mills (1967) looks at this "higher purpose" as a goal orientation, an attempt to accomplish a common task. This goal "supercedes the individual," and therefore necessitates the rearranging of interpersonal relationships: "those who prefer to stay apart may be brought into close contact; enemies may have to forego fighting and lovers may have to stay far enough apart to get the job done" (p. 108). Mills even considers the possibility of having to break taboos and norms in this context. Summarizing Slater (1963, pp. 339–364), Mills continues:

All this leads to the general point that the attempt of
a number of individuals to reach a common goal tends to disrupt the existing structure of emotional and normative relations and to require a redistribution of energy, affect, and action. In this sense, the demands of entering into instrumental roles to accomplish a group goal introduces the classical conflict between self-oriented pairs (or cliques) and the group as a whole. (p. 108)

As part of organizations, individuals must stay on the acquaintance level. Indications are, however, that in other than totalitarian systems, where individuals are allowed to enjoy affective relationships, such needs are satisfied outside the organizational context and the task accomplishment can go on without libidinal interference. In other words, one can carry out instrumental roles as long as one is able to have expressive roles in some relationships. Both kinds of relationships are needed.

Increasing attempts are made, however, at "rechanneling energy and feelings associated with interpersonal relations into the collective effort, while at the same time leaving options for members to engage in a variety of interpersonal relations ranging from the more detached to the most intimate" (Mills, 1967, p. 109). In this age of other-direction (Riesman, 1950), interpersonal relations have become a popular religion, so to speak, which "almost obscures from view the world of physical nature and the supernatural as the setting for the human drama" (Riesman, 1952, p. 7). In Parsons' (1964) words:

The necessity for coping with this proliferation of 'others'—both at work and at play—and of seeking their approval is such that personal relationships in and of themselves become the main highway to self-definition, to identity; and in so doing, they tend to make other avenues seem like detours with guideposts. (p. 189)
At work, instead of responding to overt authority as such, the other-directed person is trained to respond "to subtle but nonetheless constricting interpersonal expectations" (Riesman, 1950, p. 296). "Human relations" departments or offices are mushrooming in all kinds of organizations. Superiors "act democratic," using their subordinates' first names and engaging in small talk, even admitting to "human fallibilities" (Bensman & Lilienfeld, 1979, p. 163). Riesman (1950) notes that the inner-directed boss never "saw" his secretary--both concentrated on the work, not on each other. Paternalism bridged the social gap. But he continues:

By contrast, the other-directed manager, while he still patronizes his white-collar employees, is compelled to personalize his relations with the office force whether he wants to or not because he is part of a system that has sold the white-collar class as a whole on the superior values of personalization. The personalization is false, even where it is not intentionally exploitative, because of its compulsory character: like the antagonistic cooperation of which it forms a part, it is a manipulative and self-manipulative mandate for those in the white-collar ranks and above. (pp. 311-312)

The Japanese have apparently avoided this problem by including personal concern and life-long commitment in their organizations. In the West, however, the best of these attempts are little better than artificial "pseudo-intimacy" (Bensman & Lilienfeld, 1979, p. 163), not able to resolve the conflict inherent in inequality, nor to transform the normative role relationships into spontaneous, nonnormative interpersonal relationships (Douvan, 1977, p. 17) because these do not appear conducive to the organizational goals. Such pseudo-intimacies are merely attempts to mask the organizational goals in a more appealing
covering. The label is changed while the contents of the can remain unchanged.

Lest these attempts succeed in reality, and the instrumental role relationships begin to transform into expressive ones, organizations have another strategy. In Goffman's (1959) language, the technique used to counteract "the danger of affective ties between performers and audience is to change audiences periodically." For an example, Goffman cites filling station managers who "used to be shifted periodically from one station to another to prevent the formation of strong personal ties with particular clients." If "such ties where allowed to form, the manager sometimes placed the interests of a friend who needed credit before the interests of the social establishment." The same has been done with bank managers and ministers, as well as "certain colonial administrators" (p. 215). This is a clear example of intentional impersonality which, as was noted earlier, seems to be conducive to organizational goals.

Impersonality also appears to permeate the more personal world. Even the supposedly spontaneous expressions of feeling in "informal" social life are masked in manners and polite rituals where the participants rarely expose their real thoughts. While the inner-directed man's emotions are still alive, Riesman (1950) notes, "the other-directed man allows or compels his emotions to heal, though not without leaving scars, in an atmosphere of enforced good fellowship and tolerance" (p. 279). Goffman (1959) also discusses the "disciplined performer's" ability to "suppress his spontaneous feelings in order to give
the appearance of sticking to the affective line." This in-
cludes suppressing "his emotional response to his private
problems, to his teammates when they make mistakes, and to the
audience when they induce untoward affection or hostility to
him" (pp. 216-217).

Goffman's *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1959)
describes precisely this acquaintance stage where most every-
day social life remains. The participants attempt to influence
the others' "definition of the situation" by the best possible
"impression mangement." Each one's behavior is impersonal to-
ward the other, concerned mainly with one's own gain. Because
of the humans' inherent need to socialize, interaction even on
this level is better than nothing, and necessity demands keeping
most relationships at this level. Time, energy, capacity, etc.
are limited; none can afford to carry very many of the relation-
ships to a more advanced--and more demanding--level. Yet there
seems to be a need for some deeper relationships. Duck (1973)
suggests that "all social encounters are potential friendship
situations unless something debars their fruition" (p. 31).
This far the association may have been mostly involuntary, now
the sifting process becomes more evident.

Friendly Acquaintances

At this juncture, some sentiment of friendliness begins
to appear toward certain acquaintances who, then, are preferred
above the others. This is to be distinguished from the false
friendliness discussed above. Here it is not an organizational
gimmick but occurs spontaneously. Perhaps the same block dwellers begin to greet each other and smile as they pass by, instead of taking another route. This is a friendly sentiment. Homans (1950) uses the word "sentiment" for any feeling, whether fear, hunger, thirst, liking or disliking of individuals, or approving or disapproving their actions (p. 38). Homans' sentiments appear to include what Maslow calls "needs." To Homans, however, a sentiment is only the type of behavior that can be observed, not merely inferred (p. 241), and friendliness is a mild sentiment" (p. 39).

"There are no 'natural' sentiments between people," Homans (1950) asserts, "not even between mother and child, apart from such repeated contacts." Referring to Whyte's Street Corner Society where "the Nortons hung out together," i.e. interacted frequently, Homans states: "Repeated social contacts define a group." He observes that "this frequent interaction was associated with sentiments of liking for one another," but makes no attempt to decide which comes first (p. 176).

Milgram's (1965, 1973) famous experiment suggests that proximity brings out feelings of natural empathy. Testing obedience to authority, Milgram recruited volunteers to act as "teachers" who were authorized to punish a "student" (an actor) whenever the "student" gave a wrong answer to a question. The punishments, as the "teacher" was told, were electric shocks ranging from 15 volts to 450 volts. In reality, the shock machine was a fake and the "student's" complaints or agonizing screams were pure acting. When the "student" or "learner" was
in a separate room, i.e. not in immediate physical proximity, the "teacher" felt more free to mete out the punishments at the urging or the experimenter. This observation has led to the conclusion that as the distance between the "teacher" and the "learner" decreased, "a certain sense of community was formed, making it more difficult to hurt the learner" (Dahms, 1972, p. 13).

Davis (1973) suggests that "a person will try to interact with those who will relate to him as an individual and as a whole" (p. xxii). This may provide at least a possible clue as to why some people are preferred above others. As was discussed above, institutions involve only parts of persons; the role-relationships tend to "pull him apart," whereas personal relationships "help him to 'pull himself together'" (Davis, 1973, p. xxii). Davis also identifies as "the first law of psychodynamics" this rule: "The more distant the self a person presents to another is from the 'idling' or 'disengaged' self he presents to himself when he is alone, the more psychological energy he must use up in order to sustain it" (cf. Hall, 1966). Impersonal role relationships, where "masks" must be worn, are psychologically tiring. "Acquaintances . . . feel the need to part from each other more quickly than intimates," Davis observes. Out of the myriad acquaintance relationships, then, one may choose the more psychologically relaxing and rewarding ones in which to invest his or her sentiment of friendliness.

The general interpersonal friendliness is a peculiarly American characteristic which is also exploited by the business
world (e.g. "Friendly Market"). It is a pleasant recognition of the other in passing, implying "disengagement and acceptance." "To value it, is to disvalue intensity" (Naegele, 1958, p. 241).

Reisman (1979) writes about American friendliness as follows:

Some social scientists note Americans act friendly too quickly and abandon their relationships too readily. Even casual American social contacts are marked by displays of friendliness that appear excessive and insincere—kissing, warm handshakes, promises to keep in touch, empty and vague invitations to "give me a call" and to "get together again some time." (p. 83)

Reisman describes how Kurt Lewin, a distinguished German social psychologist, was disappointed after spending a decade in the United States. He quotes Lewin as follows:

Compared with Germans, Americans seem to make quicker progress towards friendly relations in the beginning, and with many more persons. Yet the development often stops at a certain point; and the quickly acquired friends will, after years of relatively close relations, say goodbye as easily as after a few weeks of acquaintance. (pp. 83-84)

Perhaps this is because "the constant and varied stimulus of a confused time makes sustained attention difficult," as Cooley (1914, p. 100) observed long ago. It seems at any rate, to be one aspect of the overall superficiality of American life which is soon noticed by people coming here from other cultures. As "our popular literature is written for those who run as they read," carrying "the principle of economy of attention," we also "tend toward a somewhat superficial kindliness and adaptability, rather than sustained passion of any kind." Cooley concludes: "Generally speaking, mind is spread out very thin over our civilization" (p. 100). Parsons (1968) also, referring to the consumption rather than production orientation in this other-directed age, writes about the "consumption of . . . personal
relationships themselves, particularly those aspects that deal with 'the minutiae of taste or speech or emotion which are momentarily best'" (p. 188; cf. Riesman, 1954, p. 105). "The peer agents," then, "engaged in socializing each other in consumption preferences, in the last analysis, consume their own membership" (Parsons, 1964, p. 190; Riesman, 1950, p. 82). Human relationships have thus become a commodity.

There is little choice involved in the overall "friendliness" described above. The friendly acquaintance relationship, however, signifies the beginning of choices between available persons. Whether the relationship is going to grow—as in the case of a budding friendship—or remain on this level—as in the case of a professional service provider and a client—the first signs of personal involvement begin to appear. Parsons' (1951) "pattern variables" provide an excellent theoretical background that may explain the major reasons for a particular choice between available persons in a friendly acquaintance relationship.

According to Parsons (as interpreted by Demerath and Marwell, 1976, pp. 104-105), "any relationship faces five basic 'problems of orientation' which specify how people are to relate to one another." While the solutions are "generally normatively defined," these variables can help assess "the various combinations of factors which may characterize relationships in different ways." These are:

1. Affectivity vs. Affective Neutrality; i.e. the presence or absence of emotional involvement.
2. Self vs. Collectivity Orientation; i.e. evaluation standards as determined by interest in each individual's self or by interest in the needs or norms of a wider group.

3. Universalism vs. Particularism; i.e. a rational, general standard of assessment with no exceptions, or a special interest in a particular person.

4. Ascription vs. Achievement; i.e. basing the relationship on basic, ascribed characteristics (e.g. personality attributes), or on specific achievements or performance within the relationship.

5. Diffuseness vs. Specificity; i.e. importance of the relationship for a wide range of the participants' lives or only for some specific part.

It seems plausible to suggest that a would-be friend is the one whose orientation is affective (variable 1), who is interested in the self of the other rather than in some collective aim (variable 2), who considers the other as "someone special" (variable 3), and bases this consideration on the ascribed personal characteristics ("because you are you"; variable 4), and who considers the relationship important for a wide range of his or her life (variable 5). If all these orientations are mutual and other variables (such as proximity) are favorable, the friendly acquaintance stage is short, forming merely an intermediate stage on the way to the more advanced stages of friendship. If, however, one or more of these orientations is one-sided, the relationship will most likely stay on a lower level of friendship or retreat into the mere acquaintance stage.

One such example of a one-sided and specific involvement is the relationship between a professional service provider and a client. It is therefore considered here as an example of a
relationship that stays on the friendly acquaintance level. Not every professional service, however, qualifies, the most belonging to the mere acquaintance level. The latter is the case when a person can receive the same service from another and deems both equally valuable (Homans, 1974, p. 65). The focus is thus on merely providing a specific service. What makes a service provider a friendly acquaintance to a client is the client's perception of the professional as one whose orientation to the client is on the personal and affective side of the relationship, thus bringing it closer to the qualities of friendship.

In terms of Parsons' "pattern variables," a certain doctor, counsellor, or minister may project warmth (variable 1) and consider the client's person in preference to any group goals (variable 2). Furthermore, although the service may be an example of the universalistic developments of the society, the professional may treat the client as the only one, a special, unique individual in his or her own right (variables 3 and 4), and the client may perceive this relationship as important for a wide range of his or her life (variable 5). This often is the case when the professional considers the client's entire social milieu (family, work, etc.), which really is part of the total personality. Some may consider this and others may ignore it. In other words, no other one may accept the client's whole person and respond to it as the particular one does (cf. Davis, 1973, p. xxii). Naturally, then, when the client needs services of a certain kind, s/he will choose from among the
providers of such services the ones who display the warmth, acceptance, respect, and personal interest in the client, regardless of the fact that to the professional, the client is only one among many. Clients may even be willing to incur greater cost, whether in fees, greater geographical distance, or both, to avail themselves of the services of their favorite professionals who may thus provide them with some validation of personal worth. Presumably, this becomes more crucial for individuals who lack close relationships in their private lives.

This friendly acquaintance between a professional and a client is as far as "friendship" between unequals can go, unless the inequality is laid aside. It is receptive, since the client is the sole benefactor of the interaction; the provider merely receives wages and professional fulfilment. While the service provider may project real "spirit of friendship" to the client, this must not be confused with friendship per se, which begins with mutual choice. The relationship of a therapist with a client, briefly discussed at several points in this thesis, is a classical example of such friendly acquaintance, and remains at that stage unless the clinical roles are set aside and both partners begin communicating as persons outside the clinical setting, at which point the borderline to friendship has been crossed.

This distinction becomes clearer as one considers some research results. Commenting on psychotherapy and friendship, Corrigan (1978) notes that perceived expertness was considered by the subjects more important for therapists, whereas for
friends perceived attractiveness was more important. Perceived trustworthiness was important for both. Though both were seen as "credible sources of help, they derive their credibility from having different qualities attributed to them" (p. 590). What a friend lacked in training and skill, s/he had in personal liking, trust, and similarity to the other; what the therapist lacked in these, s/he had in the professional expertise and knowledge. One is a professional service and taken as such, the other is a personal relationship and taken as such, although some of the benefits may coincide. In either case, however, it is the quality of the interpersonal encounter that counts (Rogers, 1962, p. 416; Schofield, 1964).

Perhaps it could be said, then, that it is inappropriate to consider psychotherapy as friendship per se, but that it includes certain qualities of friendship which are expressed in "the therapeutic relationship" and which can be seen as "a heightening of the constructive qualities which often exist in part in other relationships" (Rogers, 1957). Hence, as is seen in this chapter, friendship does not necessarily refer to a certain category of people, but to an affectual quality found in varying degrees in many social relationships, from acquaintances to intimates. Thus strangers, relatives, colleagues, and helpers are all potential friends, or rather, friendship as a quality can appear in all these (and other) relationships. And it can be a binding force that can make the whole society operate on a higher than merely mechanical level.
**Gemeinschaftsgefühl**

This word best describes such a binding, affective force. It is central in the writings of the German psychiatrist, Alfred Adler. According to The New Cassell's German Dictionary (1971, p. 179), Gefühl means "feeling, sentiment, emotion; touch, sense of feeling, consciousness." Erikson (1968) translates an original phrase of Freud, "dunkle Gefühlmechte" as "obscure emotional forces" (p. 21). In the translations of Adler's writings, Gemeinschaftsgefühl is generally rendered as "social feeling" or "social interest." This, however, seems to shortchange the Gemeinschaft part of the word which has more the connotation of community than society. Yet even "community feeling" may not accurately portray the meaning of this word, which can best be derived from the writings of the man himself who coined it or at least popularized it.

Dreikurs (1953), in his summary of Adlerian psychology, states that Gemeinschaftsgefühl is innate in every human being and is expressed in "man's urge to adapt himself to the arbitrary conditions of his environment" (p. 4). Adler (1964) considers the "only one single standard by which we can form an estimate of a human being" to be "his movement when confronted with the unavoidable problems of humanity." This is embodied in "the attitude taken towards our fellow men, vocation, and love" (p. 13). Dreikurs (1953) calls these "the three life tasks": work, love, and friendship, which "may be regarded as representing all the claims of the human community"
Freud's famous "lieben und arbeiten" (love and work) incorporates the same philosophy, but does not differentiate friendship from erotic love as Adler does.

Adler (1964) considers all three vital aspects of man's "movement," his attitude toward fellow men, vocation, and love, to be "linked with one another by the first." These "arise from the relationship of man to human society, to the cosmic factors, and to the other sex. Their solution decides the destiny and welfare of humanity" (p. 13). Dahms (1972) conveys the same urgency in his discussion of intimacy as a necessity for survival. Gemeinschaftsgefühl, to Adler (1964), is "the integrating factor in the style of life, and . . . this must be present in a decisive manner if all the problems of life are to be solved" (p. 169).

Another central concept in Adler's psychology is inferiority feeling, which arises when "the natural social interest of a human being reaches its limits" (Dreikurs, 1953, p. 20). According to Adler (1964), this is the cause of all problems in the world—from war to drunkenness. In fact, the security and the future of the human race depend on social feeling (p. 55). But how can it be acquired, for "as soon as an individual inferiority feeling is established, development of the social interest becomes impaired. One cannot develop a feeling of belonging if one considers oneself look down upon" (Dreikurs, 1953, p. 21).

This creates a vicious circle from which individuals struggle to get out because "the desire to feel belonging to
others is the fundamental motive in man." He therefore
tries "to get himself accepted at any cost by the community"
(Dreikurs, 1953, pp. 21-22). Here the Protestant Ethic
(Weber's term), the achievement motive, comes to the rescue.
The individual makes every attempt to climb to a higher level
than where he originally was, thus counteracting inferiority
and reaching a new acceptance. Yet balance must be maintained,
because personal superiority, struggle to be the first, is
"completely dissociated from social feeling" (Adler, 1964, p.
172).

_Gemeinschaftsgefühl_, in fact, seems to characterize
exactly this balance; it is "a deep feeling of identification,
sympathy, and affection" toward human beings in general.
Maslow (1954) found it in his self-actualizing people (p. 217),
and it also seems evident in Christ's admonition to "love Thy
neighbor as Thyself" (Luke 10:27). This excludes both the
feeling of inferiority and that of pride or superiority. If
there is any inequality, the best attitude toward those in a
lower position, according to Adler, is that of an older brother
to the younger (Maslow, 1954, p. 218), not of condescendence
but help. Whether this attitude is between brothers or
strangers, it exemplifies the spirit of friendship; conse-
quently, "the way in which an individual fulfils the task of
friendship is the best measure of the strength of his social
interest" (Dreikurs, 1953, p. 107).

Reisman (1979) also discusses _Gemeinschaftsgefühl_ and
its implications for friendship:
According to Adler, the individual's social interest was trained through friendship. By social interest, Adler (1973) meant a desire to gain a feeling of self-worth through serving people, which he saw as the only truly effective means to compensate for feelings of inadequacy. The various other maneuvers a person might adopt to overcome a sense of inferiority relied upon domination and control. It was in being of use to others that a person could best feel valuable, and it was in friendship that one received preparation for assuming such a role. Without having had friends, Adler believed the person was extremely handicapped in knowing how to interact in society and in achieving a sense of personal satisfaction. Not that all was lost, however, since he believed it was never too late to develop social interest. (p. 52).

Adler placed "'social interest' at the heart of his theory of personality and saw it as the only means whereby the inadequacies and unhappiness of people could be resolved" (Reisman, 1979, p. 178). Not being preoccupied with one's own wants, but being of service to others, having an interest in altruism, was to him a sure method that "choked-out loneliness and self-recriminations." Reisman continues:

People who are lonely are, by definition, distressed about their solitude, while people who are giving of themselves are, as they have been described, no longer preoccupied with themselves. They are preoccupied with a style of life dedicated to being helpful and unselfish. Every act of service reduces their loneliness, for no act of service to someone can be accomplished while feeling lonely. By definition, loneliness is foreign to the person with social interest. (p. 179)

This attitude would seem to enable the operation of more humane institutions, which would not call for artificial displays of pseudo-intimacy, nor forced human relations emphases. Simmel (1955) suggests that "an advanced culture broadens more and more the social groups to which we belong with our whole personality" (p. 163), but the individual is now made to rely
on his own resources more than used to be the case in the

tightly knit primary group. Adler (1964) considers Gemein-
schaftsgefühl "the ultimate fulfilment of evolution" (p. 275).
It is an "eternally applicable" model of "a communal form,"
which "could be thought of when humanity has attained its goal
of perfection." It is an ideal, "a goal that gives us our
direction" (p. 276).

This idealism has a classical ring. According to Aristotle's
political doctrine, "citizenship became co-extensive with friend-
ship," and "all politically active inhabitants of a state are
friends to one another, insofar as justice and equality of
rights obtain between them." Consequently, "both citizenship
and democracy were among the conceptual elaborations of the
theory of friendship" (Hutter (1978, p. 184) writes. The one
disadvantage in Aristotle's theory was that it was exclusive.
Epicurus, to whom also a league of friendship was the true
source and basis of human society (Farrington, 1967, p. 77),
extended his friendship—and the membership of his little
community—even to women and slaves (Festugiere, 1956, pp. 21,
30; Bailey, 1928, p. 223).

In Sparta, where the political system and lifestyle were
quite different from Athens, the value of friendship was also
realized. Simmel (1955) gives an interesting account of this:

Among the Syssitians of Sparta, fifteen men sat at one
table according to free choice. One vote was sufficient
to bar a man from joining the table. This "company of
the table" (Tischgenossenschaft) was then made the basic
unit of the army. Here the actual tendencies and sympa-
thies of the individuals intermingled with the ties of
neighborhood and of kinship as the basis for the formation
of a primary, communal group. The army organization, for which these tendencies and sympathies of individuals were utilized, was extremely strict and impersonal. Yet, the option of the Syssitian fellowship formed a flexible link between the army and the equally impersonal ties of locality and of kinship. The artional meaning of the table-company, based on free choice, buttressed the rationality of the organization. (p. 130)

Schwimmer (1974), in his description of the custom in some primitive societies to select a "favorite" brother, sister, uncle, etc., mentions that the selection of such individuals as well as non-kin friends, and the duration of their philial relationship, is "never determined by positive rule." And he concludes: "Usually only in such relationships can the ideal norms of the society be realized" (p. 50). Hutter, in his study of politics as friendship (1978), also speculates: "Given the conditions of modern society, both citizenship and democracy seem to be endangered with the decline of friendship" (p. 184). These remarks lend support to the importance of Adler's Gemeinschaftsgefuhl, although the authors do not explicitly mention it.

This spirit of friendship is evident even in modern, Western society. All altruism, voluntary associations with a helping goal, neighborhood associations, self-help and mutual help groups, etc., are expressions of it. From the total societal viewpoint, Gemeinschaftsgefuhl can be considered the most advanced form of human relationships. "It is the sign of a higher social development that group cohesion can transcend local ties and yet be thoroughly realistic and concrete," Simmel (1955, p. 143) observes. Yet there also seems to be more need to express the spirit of friendship in one's relation-
ships to kin, neighbors, colleagues, or whoever is nearby. The real Gemeinschaftsgefühl begins from home and only then reaches beyond.

From the individual viewpoint, however, such friendship with the society is not to be compared to primary relationships with a few chosen individuals. Close friendship and intimacy take the person to heights that mere identification with all humanity never can. It is the icing on the cake, so to speak, or the sugar in human life without which there is neither cake nor icing.

Friends

"Friendship directly reflects basic social needs and it is entirely correct to see it as a vital expression of the nature of Homo Sapiens," Tiger (1974, p. 48) writes. We have now arrived in our progression to the threshold of friendship. In this classification, friendship is not considered a supplement to familial ties, neither the structural prerequisite on which society is built (as in Greek classics). Rather, it is an affective concept running through the entire spectrum of human interaction in various degrees through all its stages. When it is the most important bind between individuals, these individuals are called "friends." It "competes with any formal contract" (Naegele, 1958, p. 236); some of the friendly acquaintances simply, for one reason or another, choose each other for more interaction. This interaction is accompanied by, if not facilitated by, sentiments of liking, which intensi-
fy as the relationship proceeds to a higher level. The degree of affective attachment, then, could be viewed as a beginning indicator of the level of friendship.

As was discussed in the review of literature (pp. 22-25), friendship has been classified in various ways in the social science literature. Du Bois' (1974, p. 19) classification of exclusive, close, and casual friends has many similarities to the one outlined in this chapter. Yet, because of the attempt here to align friendship on a continuum of all social relationships, a slightly different classification is needed. Du Bois' basic premise of voluntary choice seems correct. The distinguishing characteristic between friends and acquaintances is that friendship is based on mutual, voluntary choice between alternative available persons, whereas acquaintances (even when friendly) make such a choice only in terms of instrumental roles (e.g. going to a favorite therapist).

Depending on the degree of choice and commitment, i.e. the degree to which friendship is the major bind in the relationship, the category is here divided into three subcategories: just friends, casual friends, and close friends (see p. 82). As categories of people, these merge into the process, beginning where friendly acquaintance ends, and ending where intimacy begins. Many relationships, however, stay at their respective levels. One reason for this, according to Newcomb (1961), is that the participants "cease to acquire new information about each other." A person, then, generally maintains a whole range of these relationships, although the individuals
in the lower categories generally shift. Regression can also take place when the friendship is not attended to. It is tempting to suggest, however, that if attending to it feels like a duty it is not a genuine relationship. In a genuine relationship pleasure overrides duty, and time and attention, even patience and forbearance, are given because the partners want to do so, not because they have to.

The distinguishing characteristics and behavioral indicators of the three levels of friendship are summarized below.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Just friends</th>
<th>Casual friends</th>
<th>Close friends</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proximity</td>
<td>immediate</td>
<td>commuting distance</td>
<td>transcends distance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources spent</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>some</td>
<td>priorities rearranged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent of relationship</td>
<td>situation</td>
<td>locality</td>
<td>enduring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>specific</td>
<td>specific</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reward</td>
<td>in mutual goals or work</td>
<td>in mutual play</td>
<td>in relationship itself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness</td>
<td>front maintained</td>
<td>some front maintained</td>
<td>backstage exposed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social indicator&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>not invited home</td>
<td>not welcome without invitation</td>
<td>welcome at any time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involvement of self</td>
<td>formal aspects</td>
<td>informal aspects</td>
<td>total (subjectively felt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical intimacy&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>women: touch</td>
<td>women: hug or kiss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>men: handshake</td>
<td>men: touch or pat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>This has cultural variations. The behaviors indicated refer to the usual practice of the white American "core" culture.
**Just Friends**

This category begins the actual friendship process. As in all stages, many of the relationships that reach this stage will stay so (probably only if distance prevents too frequent interaction), others will cool off, and a few will proceed to higher stages. Characteristically, in this stage the participants actively seek each other when "thrown together" repeatedly. For example, certain students in the same class or members in the same voluntary association desire to sit next to each other or to spend "breaks" together. The motive is a desire for company in the role or activity that one would be engaged in anyway; i.e. pure sociability. There is a common cause (or a common enemy) for which they have come together; they have not come merely to see each other. But once they are in the same situation, they choose each other above the available others in the situation.

Mere proximity and preference of the person as compared to available others at that moment are enough to facilitate this relationship, which is not carried outside that particular situation and collection of people. In other words, the relationship does not measure up to relationships with others who are not at the moment geographically close. The designation "just friends" somewhat implies a shrug: "nothing more," and one often hears it said about cross-sex friendships. According to Naegele's (1958) high school seniors (from whom the term is borrowed), "just friends" means that the other is
a "known person but not an intimate," i.e. "between acquaintances and close friends" (p. 242). Considering the lack of clear categories in Naegel's study, this classification roughly coincides with the one presented here. It is the lowest of the three degrees of actual friendship. Reisman's "friendship of association" would also belong here, at least in its lowest form.

What, then, makes particular people choose each other? One major criterion in this selection is, again, proximity. Human beings are usually practical; they have to be because of limited resources. Just as geographical proximity started off the acquaintance process, it usually also starts off the friendship process, the latter simply being a continuation of the former.

Homans (1974, pp. 143-147) describes a study of friendship patterns conducted by Festinger, Schachter, and Back (1950) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's newly built married student housing. Without going to the details of the study here, it can simply be reported that friendship generally developed between next door neighbors. All the participants were new to the area, so presumably the potential relationships with most any of the tenants were interchangeable, holding the same rewards, and leading to interaction with those who were the closest (Homans, 1974, p. 144). These "impersonal" relationships (p. 65) were developed into friendships because of repeated interaction, according to Homans. The participants' need for affective social interaction--strangers
as they were in a strange community--could be considered an important reason for the repeated contacts. The unavailability of more meaningful relationships outside the housing unit and the interchangeability of those within it made most settle for those in closest proximity.

"The more interaction, the more affection," Homans (1950) writes in his original work on the topic, The Human Group, "and increased affection should further increase interaction" (p. 242). In his 1974 work, Homans refers to this proposition as a "practical generalization" that "stands up very well for many groups of men" (p. 64). This circular relationship

\[
\text{interaction} \quad \text{liking}
\]

is born out in much research, according to Homans. He does not claim, however, that interaction produced the liking; rather, it gave a chance for exchanging rewards, and "the reward produced the liking" (pp. 176-178).

According to this, a lack of interest in another could be taken as a lack of sufficient reward to be derived from associating with this other. It is logical, then, to proceed here by considering what in interpersonal relationships is rewarding to a person. Mere absence of positive punishment would seem to keep the relationship on an impersonal level. Something more positive is needed for it to deepen.

Physical attractiveness has been found to be one important determinant of who become the "chosen" for closer
relationships (e.g. Corrigan, 1978, p. 590). Davis (1973), however, suggests that "love relations tend to be based on both the manifest qualifiers of appearance and the latent qualifiers of personality, whereas friendships tend to be based solely on the latent qualifiers of personality" (p. 28). In the framework of this chapter, love and friendship are not different concepts; the most fulfilling love relationships are simply friendships that have become intimate. Maslow's (1954) self-actualizing subjects who married without regard to physical qualities (p. 259) seem to support this classification. Presumably, the self-concept and identity of these people was secure enough that they did not need to "show off" their powers of attraction. The relationship brought them rewards in other ways.

One of Homans (1950) propositions gives another starting point:

The more frequently persons interact with one another, when no one of them originates interaction with much greater frequency than the others, the greater is their liking for one another and their feeling of ease in one another's presence. (p. 243)

A study by Potashin (1946) supports this proposition. In his experiment with children in three grades of primary school, Potashin found that the amount of uninterrupted discussion on a given, standardized subject was far greater in pairs of friends than in pairs of non-friends. Naturally, friends were also chosen by the children as partners. Commenting on this, Homans (1974) notes:

Friends are certainly people that have rewarded one another in the past: to meet a friend as the other member
of one's pair in a new situation is to expect that his behavior will be rewarding, and one is apt to interact with him often, which gives him the opportunity to be rewarding in fact. (p. 177)

Reciprocity is the principle in this, which seems to imply mutual liking and mutual interest in the other. Sullivan's (1953) concept of consensual validation of personal worth in a teenage "chum" relationship (p. 245) expresses such reciprocity, although on a deeper level. Every person needs to be appreciated by others, and the initiation or continuation of interaction is a good indicator of appreciation.

But not every acquaintance qualifies equally well. Homans (1974) gives another "good, practical, working generalization" that fits here. According to this, "persons who interact frequently are apt to be similar in some respect" (p. 64). Plato already considered similarity "fundamental to friendship" (Smith, 1935, p. 34). Duck (1973) asserts that "friendships result from the failure to present negatively evaluated data and the marriage of this criterion with the disclosure of psychological similarity" (p. 31), which means "similarity of structure of construct systems" (p. 54). This assertion is based on Kelly's personal construct theory in psychology. Duck observes that subjects even tend to overestimate their similarity with their friends (p. 71), and he is not sure whether it precedes or follows friendship (p. 74). Similarity "had the effect of increasing the amount of liking felt for a stranger" (p. 71), while friendship was also found to increase perceptions of similarity. To put this in both Sullivan's and Homans' terms, it is most rewarding to have one's self-worth

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validated by someone who is perceived as similar to oneself. This very similarity in itself provides some validation of one's worth.

But similar in what respects? "Complete union on all subjects, human and divine," the mark of true friendship according to Cicero (Hutter, 1978, p. 179), hardly seems feasible or even desirable. Discussing Firth's study (1936a) of brothers in Tikopia, Homans (1950) notes that "association breeds affection," but "only when other things are equal, that is, under certain circumstances" (p. 242). One of these circumstances was rough equality in authority. One could speculate that putting aside unequalities in authority would facilitate friendship when other conditions are met.

Similarity of social status (which led to a comparable degree of esteem) was also found to be an important determinant of interaction in a study of ninth and tenth grade girls in eight New Jersey high schools, conducted by Riley, Cohn, Toby, and Riley (1954) and discussed by Homans (1974, pp. 188-191). "Members of each status receive more interaction from other members of their own status than from any other," Homans writes. "More than this, the nearer any two statuses are to one another, the more interaction the members of one receive from the members of the other." It is to be noted that there was geographical proximity between all the girls, but status became the determinant of interaction. In residential neighborhoods where only persons similar in status are in close proximity, this relationship would naturally be strengthened.
Membership in the same racial and ethnic group is an important facilitator of further contact. Interracial relationships are rare; interethnic friendships are not much more common. In his study of ethnic friendship, Pali3i (1966) found that close and intimate friends tend to be of similar ethnicity (p. 218). This is understandable when one considers the cultural forces of custom and life style— even perceptions of beauty. Friends of one's own culture will validate one's self-worth by authenticating one's looks, tastes, habits, and other inherited or acquired characteristics. It has been observed that where desegregation of schools has been artificially enforced, the black and white children—in spite of proximity—still tend to associate with others of their own race. Very little interracial interaction seems to take place even on the "just friends" level.

This is generally the case even between different ethnic groups, though perhaps to a lesser degree than between races. Immigrant ethnic groups tend to fall into similar social class until upward climbing takes place in the succeeding generations. Therefore, as is commonly observed in sociology, racial and ethnic and social class categories have considerable overlap. It is obvious, however, that in the attraction to one's own group something else beside similarity in class status is at work. In their home country, certain immigrants of the same ethnic group may not care about each other (if they meet), but in their "adopted country" their mutual association becomes rewarding. In a foreign environment, memories of mutual home
--even aside from cultural habits--can be a powerful unifier.

Work situations have not been found conducive to close or intimate friendships (Palisi, 1966), but one would presume that "just friends" relationships typically take place at work. The above discussed status, class, or ethnic distinctions, however, would affect their formation. "In an industrial society, workers of heterogeneous social backgrounds are likely to work together and to come from various parts of the city" (Palisi, 1966, p. 224). This hardly facilitates similarity. Voluntary associations are different in that certain ideology—even certain status—brings the people together in the first place. While "just friends" relationships take place, the similar values and life styles of the people involved will also facilitate deeper friendship in these. The lower classes typically do not belong to voluntary associations—two thirds of the urban workers Dotson (1950) studied did not (pp. 220-230); consequently, they have less opportunities to form friendships.

Perhaps more than any other similarity, the similarity in values—and their derivative, attitudes—determines who become friends. Newcomb (1961) studied the acquaintance process by providing seventeen white male college students "with free living quarters in a house for a semester in return for their participation in his study." Complete strangers in the beginning, these "people were attracted to one another on the basis of similarity of attitudes, and the stronger their attraction, the more they tended to believe themselves to be
in agreement" (Reisman, 1979, p. 85).

Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954) found the similarity of values important. According to them, it is similar values that often bring people together in the first place (e.g. voluntary associations). So even our very first stage, the chance meeting, is often governed by values. Ramey (1976) assumes the same to be true for the intimate networks of the couples that he studies (p. 178). After the people have thus met, "they will find the expression of their compatible values mutually gratifying and will be motivated to seek further contacts with one another," Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954, p. 44) explain. In their study, 100 friendships were formed on the basis of values, as opposed to 40 friendships where values became adjusted to the friendship pattern. "In a somewhat loose language" they concluded that "the values are stronger than the friendships" (p. 45), and "it is not easy to have a warm personal attachment where there is an opposition of values" (p. 33).

Values may also be the decisive factor in the progress of the relationship. Beginning friendships were sometimes broken when partners expressed radically differing values, Lazarsfeld and Merton found (p. 31). In the language of our framework, these friendships did not proceed to the more advanced stages when the participants found their differences. Since continued interaction would seem to call for growth in the relationship and this was inhibited because of differing values, the partners perhaps unconsciously deemed it best to
return to the acquaintance level. Where the friendships were stronger, as apparently in the 40 cases, "the friends, by virtue of their attachment, [were] motivated to modify their values in the service of easing strains on the relationship" (p. 33). One could conclude that in these cases the friendship itself formed the overriding value above the values that differed. The initial interpersonal attraction—for whatever reason—must have been stronger, or the values must have been weaker.

Religious beliefs are perhaps the strongest of all values. Paine (1974) discusses the group fellowship of religious denominations, where friendship may exist within and independent of these structures. He notes:

Alternatively, there exists only something less than friendship for the reason that the members of the group or institution have a relationship with each other only in terms of their dedication to the group; that is, they have chosen the group and not each other, nor must they begin to choose between each other within the group. This might be termed 'inalienable group friendship' (cf. Cohen, 1961) were it not that, for the argument presented, this contains its own contradiction; it is something other than friendship as we have exposited it. (p. 133)

In the framework of this chapter, Paine's "less than friendship" could be the "just friends" relationship, and the group friendship merely a friendly acquaintance of people engaged in a common cause. Reisman (1979) includes classmates, neighbors, church members, and office staff in his associative friendship and concludes: "Associative friendships are the kind that have given friendship a bad name" (p. 23). Presumably this is because of its lack of commitment and continuity. Here, however,
this type of friendship is considered a natural stage in the process, and includes no negative connotations even pertaining to friendships that stay on that level.

Bensman and Lilienfeld (1979) note that friendship is based on personal and psychological affinities. They divide the bases of friendship into two different types: positive bases, which include common values and pure sociability, and negative bases, which include common fate in a hostile environment and common needs to express aspects of self that are not generally permitted in public environment (p. 113). The positive bases have already been discussed above; now a note about the negative bases is in order.

"Necessity is the mother of intimacy," Davis (1973) notes. Being immobilized together, according to him, will necessitate communication which, in turn, will help develop intimacy. And when people are intimate, then they can comfortably be silent together (p. 17). Homans (1950) mentions the "particularly intimate fellowship of shipmates, of fliers who are squadron-mates or crewmates, of partners working underground in a coal mine" (p. 117). It has also been observed (e.g. Simmel, 1955, pp. 17-18, 87-107; Grinker & Spiegel, 1945) that conflict with the external environment brings a group closer together, whether this conflict is with the forces of nature or a common enemy. The existential notion of all humans having a common basic problem, the "human situation" (Fromm, 1955), thus should make all humans intimates (Davis, 1973, p. 213). The fact that it does not shows the inadequacy of a purely existential basis of
friendship.

The other negative basis, expressing aspects of self that are not generally permitted in public, or—to put it simply—commiserating together, is illustrated by an experience reported by Weiss (1973) in his description of the self-help group Parents Without Partners. It was found that friendships among the participants tended to "mitigate, not to dispel, loneliness." One woman expressed it thus: "Sometimes I have the girls over and we talk about how hard it is. Misery loves company, you know" (p. 219). These friendships were found to be of slight value because they were based solely on the negativity of the situation.

One cannot help but compare this with the experience of the psychiatrist, Victor Frankl (see p. 48 in this thesis), whose association with other mountain climbing fans in the concentration camps helped to keep up their spirits. The difference between these two examples is that the first one (PWP) had a negative basis (which could only produce a "friendship of association," the lowest in Reisman's classification) whereas in the second one the participants were able to rise above the most forbidding circumstances that had thrown them together and dwell on a positive note that united them. Instead of sharing misery, they shared hope, thus transforming a negative basis into a positive one.

Whether on positive or negative basis, communication is essential. It can relax the atmosphere and give some pleasure even in commiserating (Davis, 1973, p. 17), but more important-
ly, it facilitates the development or discovery of common values and goals. People sitting next to each other on an airplane may pass their time in quietness (though not without communication), but if the pilot announces a danger, or even a delay, there will soon be verbal communication. The common goal is to get to the destination, the faster the better.

Especially in incidences of disaster, a common goal quickly arises. In a burning building people rush madly to the nearest exit in the hope of survival, and the result is chaos rather than any meaningful communication. When nothing can be done to combat the "enemy" forces and survival depends on fate or providence, there develops an "existential brotherhood" between people who are "held hostage" together. Whether this is a negative or positive basis depends on how it is defined (Frankl and his associates found a positive basis within a negative one), and whether what is formed is friendship at all depends on what happens afterwards. If communication stops when the common problem is over, the relationship was merely an "existential brotherhood" or a "just friends" relationship at the most.

Associative friendships are frequently maintained at that level, according to Reisman (1979). For the lack of progress, one very important explanation is the pattern of discontinuities in American society and the protective function that can be served by keeping people at a distance so depressive feelings can be minimized when relationships have to be disrupted. Such a pattern of mobility runs counter to the ideal of close and lasting friendships, and may actually preclude them, even when shifts are not contemplated. (p. 87)
Just friends relationships, then, are part of life in the industrialized Western society. Although they provide pleasure and fulfil some of the social needs, the more advanced levels of friendship are sorely needed.

Casual Friends

The increased commitment to the relationship in this case is indicated by greater willingness to spend one's resources for the sake of being together. The participants seek each other's company when there is "nothing else to do." When one is in a mood for socializing, casual friends are sought after. No ulterior purpose is needed, being together brings its own reward, "its *raison d'être* is the enjoyment of mutual experiences" (Mills, 1967, p. 129). The relationship is not, however, carried to other spheres of life, formal roles are only temporarily laid aside. Invitations or unexpected visits from casual friends may not always be welcome if the person is pressed for time with something to do that s/he considers more important. This friendship is on the entertainment level, it means choosing each other for a pastime.

If this friendship is not on the reciprocal basis, it can become one of receptivity in Reisman's classification. If one partner is more willing and able to use his or her resources for it than the other, or if one is in greater need of friendship than the other, this imbalance can take place. One of the partners thus may be the major giver—too kind to turn off a "friend" who seeks his or her company. Reisman's friendship
of reciprocity, however, can take place from this level on (and even earlier) through close friends and intimates, according to the degree of affective ties binding the partners together. In the classification of this chapter, if the affective ties are reciprocal, the relationship is reciprocal, regardless of the level of the relationship and the partners' social status or resources.

Casual friendship is still a fairly interchangeable relationship; it cools off when the partners become geographically separated. Although Christmas cards or friendly notes may be exchanged for some time, this generally stops as years go by and no event brings the partners together. It is the "disposable friendship" (Kilpatrick, 1975, p. 9), typical of this age of consumption (Parsons, 1964, p. 190; Riesman, 1950, p. 82), or the "transitory relationship," formed quickly (by skipping stages) and therefore not exclusive and deep (Reisman, 1979, p. 85). One's peers in age, sex, social class, vocation, etc., or the closer ones of the neighbors, are potential casual friends. "At all ages, especially the adult years," according to Bensman and Lilienfeld (1979), "peer groups represent a joint effort on the part of individuals to recapture a sense of intimacy, sociability, or relaxation from the constraints of either the formal requirements or the hostile environment of the public worlds one is forced to live in" (p. 117).

Modern urban life facilitates the formation of casual friendships, but that at the expense of deeper friendships. Casual friendships meet the individuals' social needs to a
greater degree than the "just friends" relationships; yet total openness and lifelong commitment are not required, which makes this friendship adaptable to the needs of the mobile society. This, however, also cuts down on its contribution to the individual. It does not become the "safety valve" that closer friendships are; although in mutual play, formal roles are temporarily laid aside, the relationship often rests on statuses. Professional colleagues may play racquet ball together, but they will not tell each other their innermost thoughts. Some "impression management" still remains, masks are still worn. These are the "differentiated friendships," covering only one aspect of the personality (Simmel, 1950, p. 326). Few of these progress to the close friendship stage, because "life in a metropolis fragments social roles and thereby impedes the sustained personal interaction characteristic of dyadic friends" (Du Bois, 1974, p. 22). Casual friendships need not be dyadic, neither sustained.

There may even be intentional effort to keep friendships on the casual level. Before anyone knew about Erving Goffman, Menninger (1935) wrote about this:

Love is impaired less by the feeling that we are not appreciated than by a dread, more or less dimly felt by everyone, lest others see through our masks, the masks of repression that have been forced upon us by convention and culture. It is this that leads us to shun intimacy, to maintain friendships on a superficial level, to underestimate and fail to appreciate others lest they come to appreciate us too well. (p. 22)

Simmel (1955) considers the possibility that group associations may compensate "for that isolation of the personality which develops out of breaking away from the narrow confines of
earlier circumstances" (p. 163). Bensman and Lilienfeld (1979), however, are not as optimistic:

I may maintain a friendship of limited liabilities, a friendship of minimal intimacy. To the extent to which this is a general condition of all my social relations, I will be a marginal man. Perhaps I may discover relationships of various degrees of intimacy with various others, so that I have distributed the burdens of privacy among a range of others such that I no longer have the overwhelming need for intimacy with many others and can accept relatively casual friendships and acquaintances. But in most of my social relationships I will be partially estranged from my friends and intimates, and in this sense some alienation is a condition of friendship. (p. 157)

This friendship of "limited liabilities" is often maintained also for definite culturally prescribed reasons, as the following example shows.

**Joking Relationship**

There are numerous references to this intriguing pattern of interaction in the anthropological literature. One would assume certain friendliness and familiarity to be the preconditions of it; therefore it would seem characteristic of friendship rather than the mere acquaintance relationship. It appears, however, to be a mechanism employed in the effort to maintain a certain distance. Homans (1950, p. 262) discusses Firth's (1936a) research on the Tikopia and describes how Tikopian brothers often playfully curse one another. This could be a coverup of jealousy and competition that could easily obtain between brothers in such societies. Thus, it may be comparable to what Paine (1974) calls "avoidance behavior" between friends:
What these conventions of 'avoidance' are meant to avoid are (cf. Radcliffe-Brown, 1961) structural and psychological aspects of serious role conflicts. . . . [Friendship] is a relationship in which the strong affective bonds could embarrass, and even challenge . . . sets of rights and obligations that developmentally come before a friendship and are conceived as indispensable to the proper functioning of the society. Stated this way, friendship is the polar opposite of the joking relationship. (p. 121)

Paine goes on to say that friendship is a "luxury" that "cannot be afforded in many structural situations." This unaffordable luxury could be classified as close friendship, because it seems evident that casual friendships do take place even in such societies, between kin if not between nonkin. It would seem plausible, in fact, to count the joking relationship itself as a form of casual friendship, providing a cultural device for avoiding conflicts that growing intimacy might bring. It may help to regulate the growth of the relationship, to keep it at a "safe" level, or to proceed constructively. Also, it may show that one can have only a limited number of close or intimate friends; the rest must be kept at a certain distance. The joking relationship, of course, would not include all joking which colors the communication of even close friends and intimates; rather, it would refer to the relationships where joking is the most intimate behavior. These could range from friendly acquaintances to casual friends. Valuable as humor is, close friendship has something even more valuable to offer.
Close Friends

If associative friendship (just friends) has given friendship a bad name (Reisman, 1979, p. 23), close friendship has given it a good name. This is the ideal friendship portrayed in literature but rarely found in real life, especially beyond the adolescent years. This friendship is characterized by commitment and affection that makes one rearrange some of the other priorities in life. The friendships in Lazarsfeld and Merton's (1954) study that resulted in modifying the partners' values rather than breaking up the relationship may have approached this quality.

This is an enduring relationship. The partners are willing to make adjustments in their budget of time or money (i.e. sacrifice other rewards) in order to get together or to stay in touch. When geographical separation is necessary, every effort is made (e.g. letters, telephone calls) to keep the relationship alive. Time, space, and events are not allowed to prevent or stop it. Even "at great physical distance," the partners "may be deeply responsive to the inner reality of each other" (Oden, 1974, p.2). "Through thick and thin," they appreciate and support each other. The classical notion of virtue in friendship may be expressed here. Some instrumental qualities may thus be included, but only in the sense of feeling the friend's needs as one's own. It is never exploitative; the instrumental aspects are rather a result than a prerequisite. Sullivan's (1953, p. 245) "chum"
relationships (i.e. adolescent exclusive friendships), which often result in lifelong attachments (Bensman & Lilienfeld, 1979, p. 139), are examples of this kind of friendship.

Reisman's friendship of reciprocity, the way he describes it, has these qualities and would probably begin here and extend to the intimate category.

This relationship is characterized by total openness and total reciprocity of attachment. Exchange, however, is not "the motive force" of it. "Rather, it is pleasure in the relationship itself, meeting and accepting each other as whole persons, affirming each other's self" (Douvan, 1977, p. 20) and sense of worth. One could argue that this can be an exchange of pleasure, but such argument seems irrelevant. What matters is that each partner's need for open, nondefensive interaction is fulfilled by someone who accepts and appreciates him or her for the unique qualities that make him or her a person. This someone "understands you" and "can explain you to yourself; alternatively, a person is able to see himself in his friend" (Paine, 1974, p. 119; cf. Cooley's "looking-glass self").

Physical intimacies usually begin to take place at this level, although there are cultural variations. Their earlier appearances may be indications of skipping stages or incidences of "pseudo-intimacy." The classification of this stage, however, does not depend on these but on other behavioral and psychological indicators. Physical touch is an integral part of nonverbal communication, which seems to gain importance.
as the relationship progresses. Morris (1971) is very explicit about the individual's need for physical intimacy for the following reason: "In early childhood, before we could speak or write, body contact was a dominant theme. Direct physical interaction with the mother was all important and left its mark" (p. 13). Even earlier, according to Morris, fetal life in the womb with its intimate contact with and dependence on the mother made us accustomed to such intimacy. Whatever the case, touch often communicates what words cannot. Dahms (1972) even suggests that "speech may be one of the most popular distance tools," keeping "others away by relating in terms of roles" (p. 27). By roles Dahms apparently means instrumental or formal roles.

Close friends often seem to be identified with close kin, especially siblings. Certain restrictions on bodily contact therefore seem to be observed in most cases. Johnson (1980) found that among the Machiguenga men and women "intimacy is socially permissible among individuals who are socially close and culturally defined as sexually inaccessible" (p. 362). This category could be defined as close friends. The restrictions on sex may even enhance friendship, according to Simmel (1950):

This entering of the whole undivided ego into the relationship may be more plausible in friendship than in love for the reason that friendship lacks the specific concentration upon one element which love derives from its sensuousness. . . . [Though] for most people, sexual love opens the doors of the total personality more widely than does anything else . . . the preponderance of the erotic bond may suppress . . . the opening up of those reservoirs of the personality that lie outside the erotic sphere. (p. 325)
Ramey (1975, 1976), for one, would disagree, since he considers any restrictions incompatible with close friendship.

At least in the psychological sphere, total openness seems to be characteristic of close friendship. Until this stage, masks are worn and formal roles stand in the way of open communication. Close friendship provides "the opportunity to behave freely, to explore potential aspects of the self, to achieve a new integration without risk of constant evaluation and sanction" (Douvan, 1977, p. 20). "Nonthreateningness" is the unique quality of relationships from here on. Friends at this level need not worry about insulting each other (Klineberg, 1952, p. 221, gives an example). They may visit each other without an invitation or "warning" of their arrival (Davis, 1973, p. 41), and they are always welcome because the other has nothing to hide, nor any need to make an impression. Personal disclosures are exchanged (Levinger, 1977, p. 138) and stay within the relationship (Bensman & Lilienfeld, 1979, p. 148).

Modern urban society tends not to facilitate such friendships. Although face-to-face contacts are increased, time limitations and the mobility pattern work to keep relationships on the casual level (Du Bois, 1974, p. 22; Reisman, 1979, p. 87). Furthermore, not all face-to-face contacts are facilitators of close friendship. Even a repeated contact like working on the same job has been found less than conducive for deeper interpersonal knowing.

When Palisi (1966) considered only working people in his study of friendship, he found that less than fifteen percent
of their close or intimate friends were co-workers. This
seemed to support the findings of other studies "which show
that people are not likely to develop primary friendships
with co-workers since the work situation imposes certain
limitations on relationships," such as formality and compe­
tition. Adding to this the differing social and geographical
backgrounds of urban workers, the conclusion is reached that
"these conditions do not foster the development of primary
relations" (p. 224).

Voluntary associations were a more likely context for
friendships to take place. The lower classes, however, do not
generally belong to voluntary associations; consequently, they
have fewer nonkin friends. Dotson (1950) found that two fifths
of his sample of urban workers (adults) had no nonkin intimate
friends, and two thirds belonged to no voluntary association
(pp. 220-230). Palisi draws the conclusion that the urban
lower class are mainly family and kin centered. Weiss (1973)
reports a telephone survey which also "showed that those who
were poor were especially likely to be lonely" (p. 26).

Leyton's (1974) study of an Irish village supports this
finding of the lack of friendships in lower classes. He ex­
plains that

the constraints placed upon individuals by the kinship
system make it difficult or even impossible for most men
to find intimacy and brotherly love with non-kin after
marriage; for the individual's identity and activities
are totally involved with his family and kindred and he
must enter the realm of secrecy, obligation, and love
which unites kinsmen. For the Elites, however, friend­
ship with non-kin remains an important institution
throughout adulthood. (p. 96).
Exceptions among the Masses are the kinless, who seemed to develop ties with workmates who were similarly deprived. These relationships appeared to take the place of kinship for them, providing "important economic, social, and emotional benefits" (p. 98).

For the Elite, friendships seemed to provide a necessary distance from kin. "By extending their social lives into the realm of friendship, the Elites limit the intrusion of their kinsmen into their economic lives" (Leyton, 1974, p. 102). This is especially true for the social climbers whose relatives have been left behind in a lower class. These friendships, however, were polyadic, public, and low in intimacy for the same reasons that kept the Masses from having friends; i.e. family interests and privacy. The Elite, then, seemed to be somewhat marginal in both their kin relationships and friendships.

Leyton's findings suggest a certain interchangeability between kin and nonkin friends. This supports the idea of friendship as an affective quality that can be found in any relationship, whether kin or nonkin. Viewed this way, it is no "residual cultural category," "supplementing sexual and familial ties" (Ramsoy, 1968, p. 12); rather, friendship as an organizing principle affects the form taken by kinship and neighborhood, and these will be seen to embody, to a certain extent, elements originating with friendship. The centrality of friendship in this setting, as well as the emphasis on voluntary and emergent relations in every sphere, suggests that it is not that friendship is comparable to "fictive kinship" . . . but that in some of its aspects, kinship becomes a kind of "fictive friendship." (Schwartz, 1974, p. 76)
Thus, rather than solely referring to a discreet category of people, friendship is a relational concept, a tool by which voluntary affectual ties between people can be measured. When these ties are between nonkin, it means that personality issues and emotional rewards have been given precedence over expediency or prestige, or economical or other rewards. When these ties are between kin, it means partly the same and partly that the society's prescriptions—when they prescribe close kin relations, which is not always the case—have been followed. Because of greater proximity and more similarity in values, etc., these ties—under favorable conditions—are more apt to develop between kin. One's "loved" kin could, therefore, be classified as close friends.

Especially this is so in the Western society where friendship is not regulated by institutional constraints and "the injunctions of kinship have changed, where they have not lapsed altogether, in a direction that brings them closer to those of friendship" (Paine, 1974, p. 134). Perhaps the best term to calla these collectively would be simply "close relationships," which would refer to "some combination of social, physical, and psychological nearness" in any relationship (Levinger, 1977, p. 138). Another term would be the sociological "primary relationships." In the Western social structure, there is more freedom in the development and expression of affective ties, with little or no minimum expected conduct (Paine, 1974, p. 134).

This freedom is part of urbanization, as an old German saying expresses: "'City air makes men free' (Stadt Luft macht
frei)" (Park, et al., 1967, p. 12). It is not absolute freedom, however. Structural constraints, some of which have been discussed earlier, still hamper the spontaneous development of friendships. Cities are full of strangers. With the high degree of mobility in today's world, a newcomer even in a smaller community often finds the "reservoir of unrelated others" (Naegele, 1958, p. 235) unapproachable for closer association (cf. Weiss, 1973). The freedom has facilitated the move; supposedly it should also facilitate the construction of new relationships, but those with whom the new relationships could be constructed are using their very same freedom to construct relationships with other than the new comers. To join with other strangers easily becomes a negative basis (see p. 137 in this thesis), which has much less potential for a satisfying and enduring relationship. Freedom from old constraints, then, has not become a freedom to building the new, voluntary bonds (cf. Fromm, 1941, p. 37).

This lack of positive freedom may be one reason for the prevalence of loneliness in American society. Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954) asked their subjects in two housing communities to designate their three closest friends, whether or not they lived in the same housing community. "In both communities," they note, "about 10 percent reported that they did not know as many as three persons whom they could properly describe as really close friends" (p. 21).

In a national survey by Bradburn (1969), twenty-six percent of the respondents affirmed that they had felt "very
lonely or remote from other people" during the preceding few weeks (pp. 56-61). Their loneliness had clearly mattered to them enough to prompt the affirmative response, even emphasized by the word very. Weiss (1973) suspects some under-reporting in this sample by "those who considered that a certain amount of loneliness might be normal for their situation" (e.g. the unmarried and the aged). The introspective, sensitive, and candid respondents may have overreported (p. 23), but one can safely conclude that loneliness does affect a sizable proportion of the population. In the traditional society, where kinship --sometimes even friendship-- is normatively controlled, and where mobility is minimal, this may not be the case.

Weiss (1973) distinguishes between two types of loneliness: emotional and social isolation. He discusses at length (e.g. pp. 89-100) the need for a sense of attachment to give the person security and the feeling of being at home. The lack of such an attachment, of a primary relationship, results in emotional isolation, which is probably most severe for those who have lost a partner (e.g. through death or divorce) who hitherto had been an integral part of their lives. Lynch (1977) gives example after example of cases where such sudden termination of a close relationship through death actually resulted in the death of the "survivor."

The loneliness of social isolation (Weiss, 1973), on the other hand, may be experienced even by those who have a satisfactory primary relationship (pp. 145-153). It is the lack of "friends who supply occasional reassurance of worth, or
guidance, or shared interests and activities" (Ramey, 1976, p. 31). A study of depressed women in New Haven, Connecticut (Weissman and Paykel, 1972), illustrates this. Uprooted by a move, these women "internalized their stresses and blamed themselves for their problems" with marriage, family, loneliness, etc. (Weiss, 1973, p. 155). Yet they appeared to be deeply in love with their husbands and vice versa. What they lacked was a social integration provided by friends and relatives in their old home but missing in the new.

Discussing this in his foreword to Weiss' book, Riesman (1973) remarks: "Robert Weiss's material suggests that love is not enough" (p. x). In addition to an intimate, a person apparently needs to have several close friends (which includes relatives), and perhaps casual friends, just friends, and acquaintances. Even if the intimates are rich in the lower categories of friends but have no close friends, loneliness and a feeling of alienation may may result (Weiss, 1973, p. 14). Perhaps even a happy couple needs validation of their worth as whole persons from others who are outside their intimate relationship. Within it, the partners may be merely mirroring each other and alcking feedback from the larger society. Yet the most valuable feedback can be given only by people who know the person without his or her defenses.

It seems logical to assume, then, that all levels of this progression serve an important function. Cheerfulness and happiness are as much cultural values in America as are competence and success. Riesman (1973) notes that this may cause
loners to suffer double: first for their pangs of loneliness and second for their failure to lead the culturally prescribed kind of life (p. xvii). Freud (1949), although believing that friendship is merely "aim-inhibited love," nevertheless recognized its cultural value because "friendships do not entail many of the limitations of genital love—for instance, its exclusiveness" (pp. 71-72). Close friendship, on the other hand, is non-exclusive. It can be extended to several individuals at once, although generally the number remains small. Maslow (1954), among others, has questions about Freud's definition of friendship and cites evidence that tenderness and affection are needed also for other than sexual gratification (p. 248). Apparently, "it is not good for man to be alone"—even with his wife!

Summary

Human beings are inherently social, thus friendship in all its forms is an important aspect of life. In this chapter, friendship has been defined as a voluntary, affective bond between two or more individuals, whether kin or nonkin. When it is the most important bond between these individuals, and when these individuals respond to each other in terms of their unique personal qualities rather than in terms of formal roles, they are called friends. To the degree this takes place, friendship was divided into three categories: just friends, casual friends, and close friends. These categories represent a progressive degree of openness and affective attachment,
culminating in the next major stage of interpersonal relationships: intimacy.

**Intimates**

This is the stage of common identity: two "I's" have become a "we" (Cooley, 1914, p. 23). "Something that was initially not 'me' becomes a part of 'me'" (Raush, 1977, p. 184). It is the culmination of the interpersonal process; the word "friends" is no longer sufficient to describe it. While intimacy as a quality of openness, like friendship as an affective quality, can to some degree be found in all relationships throughout the hierarchy, the category of intimates is characterized by the highest degree of friendship and intimacy. Total intimacy is the ideal interpersonal relationship which friendship can only approximate (Douvan, 1977, p. 18, considers friendship closest to the ideal). That this relationship—in its concrete form—is dyadic and reciprocal seems trite to state explicitly. What the classics wrote about friendship describes well this aspect of intimacy: the two have "but one soul" (Smith, 1935, p. 39). Du Bois' (1974, p. 19) "exclusive friends" would be intimates in this classification.

Levinger, summarizing the articles in the book *Close Relationships* (1977), identifies five components of interpersonal closeness: "(a) frequent interaction (b) between spatially near partners, (c) who share significant common goals, (d) exchange personal disclosures, and (e) care deeply about one another" (p. 138). Palisi (1966) also lists five indicators
of intimacy in a friendship: (a) "likelihood of agreement between friends on social issues," (b) "similarity of interests," (c) "range of topics a person feels free to discuss with friends," (d) "willingness to ask favors of friends," and (e) "willingness to confide in friends about personal matters. An intimate friend is one for whom the respondent answers positively on three or more of the above attributes," he concludes (p. 220).

These two lists approach the topic from different angles, Levinger focusing on the subjective, psychological components, and Palisi on the more objective, sociological, issue-oriented indicators. Both emphasize mutual trust and openness (personal disclosures, confidences).

While the above lists include the main indicators of the degree of intimacy in a relationship, other classifications have been made which describe the various aspects of intimacy or contexts in which it appears. Each of these seems to use somewhat different criteria, including or excluding different aspects. Ramey (1976) suggests that "there are varying degrees of intimacy in different relationships with respect to six components of intimacy: Intellectual, emotional, sexual, social, family, and work" (p. 29). The Clinebells (1970) give twelve types or strata of intimacy (see pp. 31-32 in this thesis). Dahms' (1972) three hierarchical types, intellectual, physical, and emotional intimacy, were extensively discussed in the literature review. While all these are useful classifications, they do not as such fit the theory presented here, neither do they seem to provide a framework in themselves where all re-
relationships would fit. All intimacy is social, as is all interpersonal behavior, and physical expressions of affection were already included in the close friends category. Looking at the complete spectrum of interpersonal behavior will facilitate placing intimacy in context.

The framework suggested in this chapter for the process of interpersonal knowing has been an attempt to place each level of relationship in its due location on the continuum. Intimacy is the ultimate where the progression ends (see Figure 1, p. 82). This does not mean that intimacy itself is not a process; it certainly is as was demonstrated in the literature review. Within this category one could conceive of various degrees or intensities of intimacy, from the beginning, searching stages where some conflict often appears (oden, 1974, p. 18; Douvan, 1977, p. 26) to the long-range outcome where differences are either ironed out or accepted (Douvan, 1977, p. 26). This, however, is a slow and gradual process "in which confidences and images of one's private self are revealed progressively at deeper and deeper levels" (Bensman & Lilienfeld, 1979, p. 156; cf. Oden, 1974, p. 12). The ultimate is probably never reached, although some couples with a long and happy marriage appear to have reached fairly advanced stages.

Since the process is many-faceted and continuous, it will be difficult to suggest any progressive stages. No natural lines of division suggest themselves as they did in the case of friendship. The stages suggested by some—e.g. Powell's (1969, pp. 54-62) five levels of communication, interpreted by
Wright and Johnson (1978, pp. 24-30) as levels of intimacy—
are actually general stages in interpersonal relationships,
leading to intimacy, rather than stages within intimacy. In
this thesis, intimacy is considered simply as the culmination
of the process of interpersonal knowing, naturally leading to
a new beginning through the people this relationship has
affected.

The subdivisions suggested here are parallel rather than
progressive, although some aspects seem to be more basic than
others. With the various aspects of intimate behavior scattered
in the literature and observed in actual life, and with the
psychological effects of intimacy comparable to other types of
"fusion of self," three categories spontaneously suggest themselves. Although this is an afterthought, these three subdivisions could be conceived of as building on the classical
model of man's three dimensions: body, mind, and soul. While
this model lacks a very important dimension, the social one,
the classification presented here overcomes this deficiency
because the theory itself is about social behavior. It examines
the social aspects of all these dimension, thereby supplying a
context that completes the model. The categories are:

1. Biological intimacy, including physical and sexual
intimacy;

2. Psychological intimacy, including intellectual
and emotional intimacy;

3. Ideological intimacy, including shared purpose
and goal for the mutual life, as well as an "intimate"
commitment to a cause.

These categories incorporate all intimate behavior. The word
"marriage" would accurately depict each one of them, and in its concrete and ideal form it would include all three aspects. While this is the most commonly experienced form of intimacy, here the concept is understood in a more abstract form, with the assumption that any close relationship can become an intimate relationship, and that certain aspects of intimacy can also be experienced with a "cause." While sexual intimacy could be called a biological marriage, an intimate friendship could be called a psychological marriage, and identifying with a "cause" could be called an ideological marriage. The last is beautifully illustrated in the movie The Nun's Story, where the nuns go through a marriage ceremony with white gowns, veils, and all, as they dedicate their lives to the church, thus becoming "Christ's brides."

It is evident here that sexual expression is not considered a necessary part of intimacy; the final definition is mainly on psychological grounds. Observable behavior, however, is an integral part of it for more than one reason. The sight or touch of an intimate is experienced as rewarding (comforting, reassuring) in itself, and especially as a form of communication. Homans does not discuss intimacy, but interaction and affection, according to him (1950, p. 242), are positively correlated. Frequency of interaction, then, as an indicator of affection, could indicate the level of the relationship. Thus, when two individuals begin to spend most of their free time together, being "tuned to the same wavelength," enjoying mutual openness, confidence, and attachment, and when
their being together seems self-evident to both, they have reached intimacy.

Intimates can belong to any one of the four potentially intimate relationships: friends, lovers, spouses, or siblings (Davis, 1973, p. xviii). Parents and children could be included in this list, although such intimacy would be of a different kind unless the parent can actually step to the child's (includes a grown-up "child") "shoes" and see the world through his or her eyes. The age gap and other situations of inequality are not conducive to the "we" feeling which has a peer connotation. It seems that intimacy is enhanced when the partners are not too far apart in age; sharing mutual experiences thus becomes more meaningful. Siblings appear to be good potential psychological intimates. Because of proximity and shared genetic and environmental factors, there is much in common. This, together with the societal norms, may be the reason why siblings generally remain in the close friends category even when they have established families of their own, and even when staying close is not culturally mandated. Spouses are simply included in the network. The other three types of potential intimates, friends, lovers, and spouses, are stages in the acquaintance process of initial strangers. None of these relationships, then, is inherently intimate. It only becomes so when it incorporates the aspects discussed in the literature review.

Figure 2 (p. 161) is a summary of the aspects of intimacy, its open top signifying the never-ending process.
Biological Intimacy

This category, perhaps more than any other, is a form of nonverbal communication. Communication in all its forms could probably be divided into types of communication, both verbal and nonverbal, and the degree of self-disclosure that entails. This mutual self-disclosure and other kinds of intimacy are basic to all types of intimacy. In fact, the whole category could probably be divided into types of communication, mutual openness, confidence (backstage exposed), shared psychological privacy, mutual attachment, exclusiveness, and being together seem self-evident to both intimates.

Biological
-- physical (nonsexual)
-- sexual

Psychological
"tuned to same wavelength"
-- intellectual (cognitive)
-- emotional (affective)

Ideological
-- shared purpose or goal
-- commitment to a cause

Figure 2

Intimacy

"we"

Aspects of Intimacy

common identity

spend most of free time together
mutual openness, confidence (backstage exposed),
shared psychological privacy
mutual attachment, exclusiveness
being together seems self-evident to both
verbal sharing" includes "declarations of liking or loving the other," along with "demonstrations of affection such as hugging and nongenital caressing" (Lewis, 1978, p. 108). To a large extent, one's culture and gender dictates the form these physical intimacies will take. Among men in the Western culture, it is generally confined to a handshake, a pat on the back or an arm around the shoulder, anything more being interpreted as sexual. Women are more free to hug or kiss without sexual connotations. The behavioral, nonverbal communication, whichever form it takes, nevertheless authenticates the verbal. Morris (1971) even considers verbal intimacy only a substitute for physical intimacy by body contact (p. 170). Reisman (1979), however, concludes from a number of studies that "exactly how something is communicated is not especially important. What is communicated and the spirit and attitude with which it is communicated are perhaps more significant variables" (p. 207). Touch is important, but to be most meaningful it must convey a message.

Sexual intimacy, the other subcategory of biological intimacy, is such a large subject in itself that only a brief discussion of it will be attempted here. It is naturally included between intimate spouses; between intimate friends it need not be included (if it is, they would become lovers rather than friends according to Davis' classification); intimate siblings become incestuous if they engage in it. In ideological intimacy, it is interesting to note that sexual orgies are sometimes included in certain types of cult worship. It is, then, tra-
ditionally taken as the culmination of interpersonal knowing, as is indicated by the King James Bible's use of the term: "And Adam knew Eve his wife" (Genesis 4:1). Furthermore, sexual images are used allegorically in the Bible to illustrate God's relationship with His people. Indications are also that the classical theories of friendship (Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus) include a possibility of homosexual relations.

Several modern writers (e.g. Ramey, 1975, 1976; Mazur, 1973) take this view as well, and consequently cannot conceive of intimacy without at least a potential sexual component. No other authority on this topic, however, seems to surpass Freud. Although generally conceiving of sex as a biological drive rather than an expression of tenderness or intimacy, he laments in a footnote how "there is no longer any place in present day civilized life for a simple natural love between two human beings." Freud feels that "the importance of sexuality as a source of pleasurable sensations, i.e. as a means of fulfilling the purpose of life, has perceptibly decreased" (Freud, 1949, p. 76). Apparently this thesis would add to Freud's sorrow since in it sex is not considered the main purpose of life.

Since in this theory, sexual intimacy is only one half of one of the three types of intimacy (equals one sixth of all intimacy), it seems logical to assume that intimacy can take place without it, such as intimacy can take place without ideological grounds, although in a less satisfying form. Intimacy without sexuality relies on what Freud calls sublimation;
the biological drive is converted into other outlets. Erikson's term "generativity" includes the same possibility. The most satisfying intimacy, of course, is the complete relationship where all aspects, including all their subcategories, are present.

**Psychological Intimacy**

This is the most important category. Bensman and Lilienfeld (1977, p. 99), in fact, suggest that "physiological intimacy may become a symbol of or substitute for psychological intimacy." It would seem safe to say that without the psychological component there can be no intimacy. It feeds into the other categories and is an integral part of them.

**Intellectual vs. emotional intimacy**

The intellectual (or cognitive) component is defined by the Clinebells (1970, pp. 37-38; pp. 31-32 in this thesis) as "closeness in the world of ideas." This could also include their "creative intimacy" and--to a certain extent--"aesthetic intimacy," "recreational intimacy," "work intimacy," and "communication intimacy"; this in the sense that similar intellectual capacity and development would lead to similar enjoyment in play or work, and to more meaningful communication. The first three of Palisi's (1966, p. 220; this thesis, p. 156) five indicators of intimacy could also be classified in this category: agreement on social issues, similarity of interests, and range of topics a person feels free to discuss with the friend. Intellectual intimacy thus means "being tuned to each
others wavelength" intellectually (cognitively), whereas emotional intimacy means the same in emotional or affective sense. It appears that the first is a prerequisite for the second, as well as a necessary component in continuing intimacy rather than a lower form of intimacy as Dahms (1972, pp. 20-21), among others, has classified it.

The emotional or affective component is the one generally referred to and upheld in discussions on intimacy, and the rest of this discussion will also focus on it. "Love" is a psychological concept (Davis, 1973, p. xiii), and it is impossible to conceive of real intimacy without love or affection. In fact, it is the lack of it that makes certain demonstrations of intimacy "pseudo-intimacy." In biological intimacy, it is love and caring that is communicated, or given and received, through physical or sexual means. Although "pleasure always operates on the 'demand' side of this relationship (Parsons, 1964, p. 120), its fulfilment depends on the other's willingness to give. In ideological intimacy, furthermore, it is love (even as an emotional attachment to a "cause") that is based on a common ideology. Because of this psychological quality of affection and commitment, which are important components of both love and friendship, it can be said that intimacy without close friendship is pseudo-intimacy, and conversely, any close relationship is potentially an intimate relationship. Because of the high demands of intimacy, however, not many relationships can be carried to that level. Choice depends on the factors discussed earlier, in connection with
friendship. In addition, certain prerequisites must be met for psychological intimacy to develop.

**Prerequisites**

**Capacity.** One of the prerequisites for mature psychological intimacy is a capacity for such sharing and closeness. Du Bois (1974) suggests that an undeveloped personality (due to age or a basic incapacity) is incapable of close friendships, and that, psychologically, close friendships can develop only after an individual has had constructive experience with parents, siblings, and/or peer groups, and after sexual maturation has set in. (p. 26)

This would seem to be even more true of intimate relationships which, then, developmentally belong to adulthood. A child's intimacy is of a different nature and is of interest here only as a preparation for adult intimacy. Relationships in childhood and adolescence, as has been noted, have important bearing on later relationships in life, affecting the capacity for intimacy.

Naturally, then, the capacity for intimacy among adults varies. Whether for inherent reasons or environmental factors during development, some individuals seem to have a greater capacity than others for close interpersonal relationships. This very capacity seems to encourage others to choose them as confidants. But what happens with the affective resources of such persons; will they be depleted? Bensman and Lilienfeld (1979) propose that each new friendship may cause a redistribution of affectual ties among many. "An individual with a great capacity for friendship," they suggest, "may
find that this very talent may constitute an invitation for those in pressing need for intimacy to overburden another whose very capacity has caused him to be already overburdened." This, according to Bensman and Lilienfeld, causes some of those with great capacity to be careful about the redistribution of their resources:

The seeming indifference to the entry into new levels of intimacy by people who have the capacity for doing so may be an attempt to limit the emotional demands upon oneself or to preserve the intimate social relations one already has. (p. 160)

What leads to this may be the fact that the affectually hungry person is unable to give what s/he demands from others. A relationship with such a person does not give the fulfilment and satisfaction of real intimacy to the affectually rich, and may therefore become a mere burden on the giver. Even those rich in affective resources prefer the mutual give and take of an authentic relationship. Apparently some with great affectual capacity become therapists or counselors, and it seems only fair that their "supply" can be purchased by those who are unable to pay in kind. Even the professionals, however, at times find their chosen and fulfilling work emotionally exhausting, and their "intimate" association with clients does not fulfil their own need for intimacy.

If the "hungry" individuals could successfully pair off, everything would be fine, but the very limitations of their affective resources makes this difficult, if not impossible. Forisha (1978) calls a relationship with such an individual an "inauthentic" one, where there seems to be a fixed amount of

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affectonal resources; what is given to another must be taken from oneself, or what is used for oneself must be withheld from another. Referring to May (1969) she notes that "in such a relationship love and power are seen as opposites, . . . and partners find they cannot stand alone but require symbiotic attachment of the partner in order to provide structure and security for their world" (p. 70).

To some degree, Forisha continues, the interpersonal reality in which we all live has these serious limitations. "The roots of symbiotic attachments lie deep in the past in our earliest relationships" (p. 70; cf. Fromm, 1956). In other words, our varying capacity is never perfect, to a certain extent we are all "undeveloped personalities" (in Du Bois' words) because our earliest relationships were not perfect.

Possessiveness may be another characteristic of an "in-authentic relationship." Once the less fortunate has been able to enter into an intimate relationship, s/he may be so much afraid of losing it, or keeps the other in such a demand, that s/he denies the other's freedom and rights as a unique person. Consequently, this has a choking effect. Possessiveness may not, however, need to be dismissed as a bad word. In a healthy fusion of the two, in Raush's (1977) words, "that which I previously considered external to me becomes an integral part of me; and what happens to that 'other' is no longer 'outside' me" (p. 184; cf. Kanter, 1972). When something is a part of me, I possess it, but this "possession" implies full freedom for the other, even encouragement, and a supportive atmosphere.
While the first chokes the other's growth, this enhances the growth of both. Possessiveness in this case (if it can be called that) becomes a greatful acceptance of the other's commitment and the assurance of the exclusiveness of the relationship where "I am his and he is mine." This is part of the trust that seems necessary for real intimacy. There is mutual freedom to expand in all other relationships, including close friends, but each one's ultimate loyalties remain in the mutual bond.

It does not seem, then, that an intimate relationship itself can expand. One example is the affectively rich, loyal, and mutual, adolescent "best-friend" relationship. It can be, and often is, psychological intimacy at its best, preparing the capacity for later intimacies (Sullivan, 1953, p. 246). But when full maturity and—usually—marriage takes place, this same sex friendship becomes secondary, giving way to the primary relationship between lovers or spouses. If, however, the friendship was of a lasting quality, as adolescent friendships can be perhaps more than those of later life, it generally retreats from intimacy to the close friendship stage where it may stay throughout life (Bensman & Lilienfeld, 1979, p. 139). Friends thus become siblings and siblings become friends, all meeting in the category of close friends. It seems, then, that even individuals with great affectual capacity cannot maintain multiple relationships with total intimacy.

Privacy. The idea of an intimate as a confidant was expressed earlier. This implies the sharing of some secret, or
secrets. According to Bensman and Lilienfeld (1979), this secret is a burden that ordinarily causes a sense of isolation from the public and official culture, which rejects the kinds of thoughts, actions, or information contained in the secret. Revealing the secret, then, is a release from the pressure of public opinion. (p. 148)

In short, intimacy is "shared privacy" (p. 156). Yet not all shared privacy is intimacy. Bensman and Lilienfeld mention life in a hospital, army, prison, or even poverty, as examples of "societally imposed intimacy" or "pseudo-intimacy." It could be said, then, that intimacy is shared psychological privacy.

This in itself is a middle-class phenomenon. As Maslow's hierarchy of needs indicates, the lower or more basic needs must be satisfied before the higher needs are realized. "It is quite true that man lives by bread alone—when there is no bread." But "when there is plenty of bread and when his belly is chronically filled," the higher needs begin to raise their heads (Maslow, 1954, p. 83). The same could be said about privacy. Gadlin (1977), in his historical view of intimate relations in the United States, observes that in Colonial America, according to court records, both illicit and marital sexual relations took place "in a bed occupied by more than the lovers." "Privacy was rarely possible indoors, and it makes little sense to speak of 'personal' life in such a context," Gadlin concludes (p. 36; cf. Flaherty, 1972).

In their discussion of poverty as pseudo-intimacy,
Bensman and Lilienfeld (1979) make the following observation:

Urban sophisticates will often envy the healthy extroversion, the vulgar humor, and the insensitivity of the poor, since it seems to them that the poor are not burdened with neuroticism, introversion, and anxiety—all products of an overdeveloped sense of self that is part of the burden of privacy. (p. 95)

Privacy, then, seems to be a prerequisite to intimacy only for the middle and upper classes. Lower class intimacy may have not only different requirements but different types of expression as well. One could, of course, speculate that these are merely adaptations to the prevailing conditions that cannot be helped. Self-disclosures probably take place more openly among the poor, but this does not make the need for them any less important.

Mutual openness and commitment. Bensman and Lilienfeld (1979, p. 93) call intimacy "a safety-valve for the self." It involves the absence of anxiety, which is defined by Reik (1945, p. 171) as one characteristic of love. There is "more and more complete spontaneity, the dropping of defenses, the dropping of roles," and "honesty and self-expression, which at its height is a rare phenomenon" (Maslow, 1954, p. 238). The rarity of such ideal intimacy is confirmed by many others (e.g. Cottrell & Foote, 1952, pp. 199). Maslow (1954) found it to be at least approached by the self-actualizing people he studied. In their intimate relationships, these people were participants in a long process, the quality and satisfactions of which improved with the age of the relationship (p. 239). This involves a commitment by both partners to the nurturing of the relation-
ship, as Sullivan (1953) notes:

Intimacy is that type of situation involving two people which permits validation of all components of personal worth. Validation of personal worth requires a type of relationship which I call collaboration, by which I mean clearly formulated adjustments of one's behavior to the expressed needs of the other person in the pursuit of increasingly identical—that is, more and more nearly mutual—satisfactions, and in maintenance of increasingly similar security operations. (p. 246)

This is a "fulfilling relationship" of two "potent individuals" where both partners are able to transcend themselves and in that transcendence find new "energy and vitality" which neither one had separately (Forisha, 1978, p. 70). While their individualities are preserved and enhanced (Jung, 1957, p. 64); Davis, 1973, p. 320, on Buber), their capacities also, rather than depleted, are enhanced (Fromm, 1941; Maslow, 1954). The "person does not merge totally with anyone, but rather becomes aware, accepts, and confirms the essential difference between himself and others" (Davis, 1973, p. 320, summarizing Buber). The individual identity, while seemingly lost in the common identity, is actually found more fully (Erikson, 1964, p. 128; Oden, 1974, p. 14; Cottrell & Foote, 1952, p. 193).

Paradoxes, then, seem to disappear as the "boundaries between inner and outer have become redefined" (Raush, 1977, p. 184). Or, as Buber (1968) writes: "Thou has no bounds," while "It" is "bounded by others" (p. 44). This is the process-oriented solution which acknowledges limits and yet is open to growth. This "stems from a transcendence of either/or dichotomies, an unwillingness to accept a surface solution" (Forisha, 1978, p. 72). This resolving of dichotomies was one character-
istic Maslow (1954, pp. 232-234) found in his self-actualizing people, and it is an important characteristic of the fulfilling interpersonal relationships that these people are most capable of forming.

Above this personal enrichment, an authentic relationship results in the formation of a "new Gestalt which is more than the sum of its individual members" (Raush, 1977, pp. 172, 184). As a result of mutual commitment, an entity develops which is "almost like a third party in the relationship": a "couple identity" (Strauss, 1974, p. 296), to which the commitment is now directed. In the couples Strauss studied this was the relationship itself. Ramey's (1976) intimate networks had the same commitment. Indications are, however, that even more fulfilment can be experienced when there is a mutual commitment to a cause outside the relationship itself.

**Ideological Intimacy**

This is the shared purpose and goal for the relationship, the existential "meaning." For a definition of the "meaning of meaning," Vander Zanden's (1977, p. 57) summary is helpful:

Generally, social scientists conceive of MEANING as the relatedness of something to all other events or objects with which it is associated in the experience of an individual or group (Kerckhoff, 1964: 418). It is the expression of all the information we have in our memory that is tied or bonded to the symbolic representation of something (Rubenstein, 1973: 31).

In short, it is the quality that makes all life's experiences "fall together." This is important in giving direction and purpose to the relationship; in fact, this purpose can itself
become an "ideological marriage," or a type of intimacy where human relationships are secondary. Several writers (e.g. Fromm, Erikson, Frankl, Kilpatrick) consider such a goal outside the individuals themselves essential for a satisfying relationship. But this demands congruence on three levels, which Raush (1977) finds a rare achievement:

Only at rare moments in our lives with others do we find complete congruence among personal, interpersonal, and societal orientations. At such times, individual roles and status are diffused in the service of an ideal, intimacy is in the sharing of that ideal, and at least some social unit is representative of the ideal. The ideal may be as simple as a new project or a new club, or it may be a religious, political, or social movement. (p. 173).

This is what Erikson (1968) means by generativity, without which there is stagnation:

For the ability to lose oneself in the meeting of bodies and minds leads to a gradual expansion of ego-interest and to a libidinal investment in that which is being generated. Where such enrichment fails altogether, regression to an obsessive need for pseudointimacy takes place, often with a pervading sense of stagnation, boredom, and interpersonal impoverishment. (p. 138)

Generativity, to Erikson (1974), includes both "matured sexuality" and an ultimate purpose outside of it, where the relationship finds its highest fulfilment. Even when generativity means producing children, these children "will have every right to ask why they were chosen to be born," for what purpose or ideals. Generativity can, however, have other types of outlets without offspring. In this case, it means participating otherwise "in the establishment, the guidance, and the enrichment of the living generation and the world it inherits" (pp. 122-123).
No type of generativity, however, can take place without a healthy identity, and no societal concern can come about without socialization. Raush (1977) makes an important observation:

Both personal and societal perspectives have their source in interpersonal face-to-face experience. The process by which interpersonal experience is transformed to a societal orientation is called socialization (cf. Berger and Luckmann, 1967); the process by which interpersonal experience is transformed to a personal orientation is called identity formation (cf. Erikson, 1963). (p. 171)

The relationship of all these, identity, intimacy, and generativity, is clearly expressed by Erikson (1974) in the following statement:

In youth you find out what you care to do and who you care to be—even in changing roles. In young adulthood you learn whom you care to be with—at work and in private life, not only exchanging intimacies, but sharing intimacy. In adulthood, however, you learn to know what and whom you can take care of. (p. 124)

It seems these three elements are all equally important and, while somewhat overlapping, come in the above order. "Chum" relationships—even love relationships—in adolescence, which are the beginning and foundation of intimacy, help the youth to form their identity "by projecting one's diffused ego images on one another and by seeing them thus reflected and gradually clarified" (Erikson, 1950, p. 228; cf. Sullivan's "chums," 1953, p. 246). Yet the role diffusion can become a danger. Erikson (1968) continues: "It is only when identity formation is well on its way that true intimacy—which is really a counterpointing as well as a fusing of identities—is possible" (p. 135). Thus, "often only an attempt to engage
in intimate fellowship and competition or in sexual intimacy fully reveals the latent weakness of identity." Furthermore, "where an assured sense of identity is missing, even friendships and affairs become desperate attempts at delineating the fuzzy outlines of identity by mutual narcissistic mirroring" (p. 167). Erikson (1950) concludes that "it is only as young people emerge from their identity struggles that their egos can master the sixth stage, that of intimacy" (p. 229).

Love relationships are not the only situations where role diffusion takes place. Disturbed by their "inability to settle on an occupational identity," the youth may—"to keep themselves together"—"temporarily overidentify, to the point of apparent complete loss of identity, with the heroes of cliques and crowds" (Erikson, 1950, p. 228). This may lead to a "submission to a person, to a group, to an institution," in an attempt to transcend "the separateness of his individual existence by becoming part of somebody or something bigger than himself" (Fromm, 1955, p. 30). Fromm calls the identity acquired by conformity "an illusory one" (p. 63). The appeal cults have to youth may have something to do with this (cf. Conway and Siegelman, 1978). Such submission is far from the identification with a cause that Erikson equates with generativity, which enables the person to find "the only happiness that is lasting: to increase, by whatever is yours to give, the good will and the higher order in your sector of the world" (Erikson, 1974, p. 124).

Mead (1946) also speaks about the fusion of the "I" and
the "me" that results in a "peculiar sense of exaltation," caused by the fact that "the reaction which one calls out in others is the response which one is making himself" (p. 273). He continues:

In the conception of universal neighborliness there is a certain group of attitudes of kindliness and helpfulness in which the response of one calls out in the other and in himself the same attitude. Hence the fusion of the "I" and the "me" which leads to intense emotional experiences. The wider the social process in which this is involved, the greater is the exaltation, the emotional response, which results. (p. 274)

Especially when this happens in a religious situation, Mead continues (p. 274), "all seem to be lifted into the attitude of accepting everyone as belonging to the same group," which results in a "complete identification of individuals" and their interests. People may even be willing to give themselves completely. "The 'me' is not there to control the 'I'," but "the very attitude aroused in the other stimulates one to do the same thing" (p. 275). This is the basis of a mystical experience, according to Mead.

It has been suggested that intimate relationships in and of themselves are capable of similar mystical experiences. Love is "in the mystical experience of union," according to Fromm (1955, p. 32). Davis (1973) observes "the remarkable resemblance between the social immersion of the individual in an intimacy and the mystic immersion of the individual in the universe" (p. 291). People attempt to find in their "intimate relations the same things the devout attempt to find in the divine," even using the same techniques of approach, ritual, communion (cf. Oden, 1974, p. 43), and commitment. As Oden's
(1974) survey shows, intimacy can indeed produce a feeling of "mystery, timelessness, wholeness," where "one feels a cosmic embrace through the embrace of the other" (p. 10). It would seem logical to conclude from various sources that the greatest emotional and/or transcendental experiences are those where the two, intimacy and a religious experience, can combine. Clinebell and Clinebell (1970), in fact, consider such a combination an essential for a happy marriage.

Perhaps it could be said that the combination of intimacy and a "cause" or a purpose, are essential for any satisfying life. Furthermore, Cooley (1914) asserts that the great ideals themselves are born of intimate relationships. Intimate face-to-face association and cooperation, according to Cooley, are the chief characteristics of primary groups. "They are primary," Cooley explains, "chiefly in that they are fundamental in forming the social nature and ideals of the individual" (p. 23). Cooley continues:

Where do we get our notions of love, freedom, justice, and the like which we are ever applying to social institutions? Not from abstract philosophy, surely, but from the actual life of simple and widespread forms of society, like the family or the playgroup. In these relations mankind realizes itself, gratifies its primary needs, in a fairly satisfactory manner, and from the experience forms standards of what it is to expect from more elaborate association. (p. 32)

It seems to be a two-way street: we need ideals for the most satisfying intimate relationships, and these very ideals are born in these relationships. "It will be found that those systems of larger idealism which are most human and so of most enduring value, are based upon the ideals of primary
groups" (Cooley, 1914, p. 51). Apparently all three types of intimacy, biological, psychological, and ideological, are interdependent and not only necessary for a healthy relationship, but each is a prerequisite for the existence of the other.

**Summary**

Without claiming the title of an authoritative definition, a few lines of summary can be offered. According to the above cited evidence, intimacy is the closest possible voluntary relationship between two individuals, the culmination of the process of interpersonal knowing, yet itself a never ending process. It is characterized by mutual openness, confidence, and affection of enduring quality, validating the personal worth of both partners. Incorporating biological, psychological, and ideological aspects, it results in a oneness in which individual identities are both lost and found, energy both expanded and renewed, and each partner both possessed and set free by the other. In the transcendence of self, it opens new reservoirs of strength and potential, and facilitates ecstatic experiences of mystical nature which, however, are best realized when the relationship itself is transcended in the service of an ideal.

As was concluded earlier from Erikson's writings, sustained intimacy must result in generativity, one form of which is the creation of a new generation. This means that new persons are "thrown" unto the interpersonal scene. We have thus come around
a full circle; the culmination of interpersonal knowing has resulted in new persons to know. Erikson's generativity, however, gives the idea that this new generation need not be literal. If intimacy is mainly a psychological marriage and espousing a "cause" an ideological marriage, then it can be said that there is no productive ("generative") life without marriage. And just as the sexual marriage produces offspring and the psychological marriage new personal potentials, the ideological marriage produces the great ideals of the society, such as democracy, Christianity (Cooley, 1914, p. 32), or the "maintanance of the world" ideal of Hinduism (Erikson, 1974, p. 124). As the three forms of intimacy are necessary for the most fulfilling interpersonal relationships, they also appear to be necessary for the survival of the human race.

Yet neither all individuals nor all ideologies a person encounters can be espoused on the intimate level. There is need for Gemeinschaftsgefühl—a "friendly" identification, sympathy, and affection toward human beings in general—as well as for an "intimate" commitment to a specific cause. Similarly, there is need for the various levels of friendship and acquaintance as well as for intimacy. Very few potentially intimate relationships can be carried to that level, even for practical reasons. Indications are that making the "right" choice is less important than making a choice and staying with it.
CHAPTER IV

SOCIETAL CONTEXT: THE SEARCH FOR INTIMACY

The starting point in this study was intimacy, and the attempt was to place it in context. Now that the theoretical context has been supplied, it will be beneficial to pause a moment longer to consider its societal context. This may explain some of the reasons why intimacy seems to have become especially important in the recent years. Indications are that human beings have always needed intimate relationships; why now seems there to be a craving for them?

Societal Background

Personal versus Impersonal Order

Personal order here refers to the societal organization where the majority of relationships are personal and informal, and impersonal order to the organization that mainly depends on the performance of formal roles. The personal is warm and humanlike, the impersonal is cold and mechanical. This distinction has been made, directly or indirectly, by several theorists, whose theories therefore could be conceived of as...
dichotomous theories of interpersonal relationships.

Tönnies' (1887) ideal types of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft hardly need more discussion. Nearly a century has passed since Tönnies coined the terms, and history has unfolded more advanced development in Gesellschaft than Tönnies could ever have dreamed about. The core of his theory, however, is human relationships. The transformations that have taken place in them have brought intimacy, formerly a taken-for-granted aspect of human life, to attention more explicitly. This made Marwell and Hage (1970) declare: "Intimacy is one of the basic components of Toennies' (1957) distinction between gemeinschaft and gesellschaft" (p. 891).

The same could be said about Durkheim's (1893) mechanical and organic solidarity, a concept based on the increasing division of labor. What follows could be viewed as an elaboration of this concept. While in mechanical solidarity whole persons were performing similar operations, organic solidarity is based on each individual contributing the part that is needed for the efficient operation of the whole. Institutionalization and technology thus have had the unintended effect of pulling people apart. Individuals seem to be needed less and less as whole persons. Almost all relationships are in terms of formal or instrumental roles; without intimacy and close friendship it would be all. This is one reason why Bensman and Lilienfeld (1979) call intimacy "a safety valve for the self" (p. 93). It validates self-worth in a way that fragmented role relationships never can.
Simmel (1950) comments that "complete intimacy becomes probably more and more difficult as differentiation among men increases." He continues:

Except for their earliest years, personalities are perhaps too uniquely individualized to allow full reciprocity of understanding and receptivity, which always, after all, requires much creative imagination and much divination which is oriented only toward the other. It would seem that . . . the modern way of feeling tends more heavily toward differentiated friendships, which cover only one side of the personality, without playing into other aspects of it. (p. 326)

In other words, as was noted earlier, just friends and casual friends are the order of the day in the industrial societies, with fewer and fewer opportunities for close friendship. Intimacy is also threatened by these trends of fragmentation because it requires total openness and involvement of the whole person. These are incompatible with the efficiency of organic solidarity.

Within the institutional setting, however, primary relationships can take place. Marwell and Hage (1970), in fact, "postulate that organizations primarily built on role relationships without intimacy are brittle and likely to collapse under stress" (p. 892). There is, however, an "adaptive strength" in modern Gesellschaft societies: "in the midst of business, man constructs intimate, gemeinschaft-type relationships with his co-workers" (p. 898; cf. Homans, 1974, pp. 366-367). "In this sense," Davis (1973) observes, "we are all social planners and community organizers. In rebuilding our kleinen-gemeinschaften (micro-communities), we are renewing ourselves" (p. xxi).
This points out the distinction between public and private spheres of action (Simmel, 1950; Goffman, 1959). The public provides the setting for the private. For this reason Paine (1974, pp. 117-137) considers an efficient and dispassionate bureaucracy a precondition to friendship. The peculiar interpersonal structure of friendship (privacy, terminality, unpredictability) "is most clearly marked in this context because it so obviously contrasts with the principles of bureaucratic society as a whole" (Schwartz, 1974, p. 72, summarizing Paine). In the bureaucratic employment world, one's friendships and family relationships are considered a private matter, not of organizational concern. In the traditional society, there was no need for this distinction since work largely took place in the family setting. In this sense, then, almost all life was "private," although there was little real privacy. Consequently, in such a society (Gemeinschaft, mechanical solidarity) the need for private relationships is not felt as it is when nearly all working life is public (Gesellschaft, organic solidarity). Without the bureaucratic structure of formal role relationships there is no need for a refuge to the intimate, private, informal sphere. It is when something is lacking that it becomes especially important (cf. Maslow's hierarchy of needs, 1954).

Redfield's (1965) corresponding ideal types are "moral order" and "technical order." In the precivilized stage, according to him, "intimate communities" were composed of "one kind of people" who had the same essential knowledge, interests,
and experiences, and who practiced the same arts. They had a "strong sense of solidarity," considering themselves as "naturally belonging together" (pp. 7-8). The members of the community were "seen as persons" and "known for individual qualities of personality." The community, thus, was one of kinsmen, "essentially made up of personal relationships." Even nature was personalized and the whole cosmos was "personal and humanlike" (pp. 9-10). Loyalty in relationships was an integral part of it (p. 21). Moral order, then, was a personal order.

"In the folk society," Redfield continues (p. 23), "the moral order is great and the technical order is small." This is gradually reversed as civilization takes place, so that civilization becomes "the antithesis of folk society." Now "impersonal relationships come to take the place of personal relationships; as familial connections come to be modified or supplanted by those of political affiliation or contract" (p. 22). This means that

the bonds that co-ordinate the activities of men in the technical order do not rest on convictions as to the good life; they are not characterized by a foundation in human sentiments; they can exist even without the knowledge of those bound together that they are bound together. The technical order is that order which results from mutual usefulness, from deliberate coercion, or from the mere utilization of the same means. In the technical order men are bound by things, or are themselves things. They are organized by necessity or expediency. (p. 21)

Martin Buber (1968) also expresses this philosophy of technical order succinctly in his meditations: "But this is the exalted melancholy of our fate, that every Thou in our world..."
must become an It." "As soon as the relation has been worked out, or has been permeated with a means, the Thou becomes an object among objects . . . fixed in its size and its limits" (p. 49). This is depersonalization, which is detrimental to identity. Intimate relationships, however, can provide the way out, as Buber concludes: "Through the Thou a man becomes I" (p. 51).

This needs continuity in the relationship, which is more difficult to achieve in a society that is relatively free from cultural constraints. Increased freedom was discussed earlier in connection with close friendship. This impinges as much on the possibility for deep, meaningful intimate relationships. When no relationship is prescribed by the society as necessarily lifelong, and compatibility and individual happiness are overly emphasized, the result may be hopping from one relationship to another in search of the most fulfilling one. Kanter calls this demand for continuing adult growth and change "the discovery of adulthood," and Levinger and Raush (1977) suggest that "such demands might lead us to wonder more at the continuity of intimate relationships than at their dissolution" (p. ix).

Yet the importance of continuity is emphasized even by writers like Mazur (1973). In spite of his overall argument against the traditional, exclusive, monogamous marriage, which he considers "a culturally approved mass neurosis," he holds that "the constancy of this relationship is crucial to our evaluation of who and what we are." According to him,
marriage

merits our care and rebuilding not only because it exists, but because there are enduring values to a one-to-one primary relationship which cannot easily be supplanted. One such value is continuity in relational experience. Even as we learn to love because we are loved, to trust because we are trusted, we continue to actualize our being in relation to a responding other whose responses we understand and respect. (pp. 11-12)

The earlier discussion on freedom (see pp. 150-151) focused on establishing close friendships; here the emphasis is on the difficulty of keeping up the relationship, which is necessary for deep, meaningful intimacy to develop.

Another transformation from personal to impersonal order has taken place in world views. Because of multiple world views, Lenski (1974) observes, "in modern industrial societies world views are not the source of integration they were in the past." This is because science has largely taken the place of religion, and "science alone cannot create one world view and, in fact, explicitly avoids pronouncements on the ultimate nature of reality" (p. 46). Religious movements have been established since the eighteenth century "with the aim of reconciling world views with the new knowledge and thought forms" (p. 390), but such "marriage" of the personal order of religion and the impersonal order of science has apparently not been entirely successful. Since there is no culturally accepted "pronouncement on the ultimate nature of reality," many people are left with an existential angst and turn to interpersonal relationships, especially intimacy, as a source of security, thus attempting to establish their own personal order.
One could compare this to two children running in the woods. When the sun is high and they know their way, their world appears friendly and they skip happily along. But when they realize they are lost and the night is falling, the world becomes frightening and they cling to each other for security and comfort. Such seems to be the case with many insecure people of today. Intimate relationships have become "a refuge --a respite from alienation," but not a strong enough one because "the walls of that refuge often crumble under the weight they bear. The reliance on intimacy itself creates new difficulties" (Levinger & Raush, 1977, p. ix), such as cheap relationships or pseudo-intimacy.

The frantic search for intimacy and the precariousness of counterfeits is aptly described by Hutter (1978):

Modern society is structured in such a way as to induce in the individual a heightening of the need for intimacy while at the same time reducing the possibility for closeness. Isolation, powerlessness, and privalization have made the need for self-confirmation through trust and openness more poignant. A telling example of this increased need is currently the often frantic search for sexual intimacy. People seek sexual encounters at any price. Yet most such encounters are empty exercises in pretended intimacy. They tend to leave the partners utterly dissatisfied and even more alone than they had been before, thereby further increasing the need for intimacy. (pp. 183-184)

Even the most personal relationships are thus becoming impersonal.

To a sensitive person who may want to avoid counterfeits, this need for intimacy may become an acute problem in a new community. Morris (1971) gives an example of a shy, single person, who has left home and lives in an apartment. It is
evident that there are countless such individuals. "Too timid to make friends, they may ultimately prefer death by suicide to prolonged lack of close human contact. Such is the basic need for intimacy" (p. 103), Morris continues. "For intimacy breeds understanding," and most of us want to be understood (p. 104). Understanding provides the "supportive atmosphere" where human beings can actualize their basic potential for growth and constructive activity (Rogers, 1963, pp. 20-21).

For one more example of societal transformations—one that has directed increasing attention to the personal sphere—we must turn to more practical considerations. The standard of living is constantly rising, and countries compete to be on top of the list. The changes in the availability of privacy were noted earlier (p. 163 in this thesis); many other related changes have also taken place. In earlier times, people were kept more busy in the business of making a living. The elite (i.e. citizens) in Athens may have had time to worry intellectually about friendship, the peasants most likely did not. To a large extent, the same may be true today. Industrialization has released time for other pursuits beside earning livelihood. It has also made people more affluent and thus given the opportunities for a "luxury" like personal fulfilment in intimate relationships.

Hierarchy of Needs

Maslow (1954) thoroughly discusses this factor in his
hierarchy of needs. Man is "always desiring something," he writes. When one desire is filled, another pops up. "Wanting anything in itself implies already existing satisfactions of other wants" (p. 69). Physiological needs are "the most prepotent of all needs" (p. 82), but when these are filled, other needs, such as the need for safety, are felt. "Most members of our society who are normal are partially satisfied in all their basic needs and partially unsatisfied in all their basic needs at the same time" (p. 83). Consequently, the hierarchy is that of "relative prepotency," or "decreasing percentages of satisfaction" as one goes up (p. 100).

After physiological and safety needs are satisfied, there will emerge the love and affection and belongingness needs, and the whole cycle ... will repeat itself with this new center. Now the person will feel keenly, as never before, the absence of friends, or a sweetheart, or a wife, or children. He will hunger for affectionate relations with people in general, namely, for a place in his group, and he will strive with great intensity to achieve this goal. He will want to attain such a place more than anything else in the world and may even forget that once, when he was hungry, he sneered at love as unreal or unnecessary or unimportant (p. 89).

After the love needs are filled, there appear needs for esteem, self-actualization, knowledge, and aesthetic experience, in that order (pp. 90-98). Fromm (1941) expresses this same hierarchy in his statement: "Only when man has time and energy left beyond the satisfaction of the primary needs, can culture develop and with it those strivings that attend the phenomena of abundance. Free (spontaneous) acts are always phenomena of abundance" (p. 295). Intimacy could be considered as one ex-
ample of this "phenomena of abundance."

Gratification thus "becomes as important a concept as deprivation in motivation theory, for it releases the organism from the domination of a relatively more physiological need, permitting thereby the emergence of other more social goals" (Maslow, 1954, p. 84). Thus personal needs and desires in themselves are no more the only determinants of behavior; rather, "for the sake of this higher need," people may "put themselves into the position of being deprived in a more basic need" (p. 99). Maslow continues:

People who have been satisfied in their basic needs throughout their lives, particularly in their earliest years, seem to develop exceptional power to withstand present or future thwarting of these needs simply because they have strong, healthy character structure as a result of basic satisfaction. They are the strong people who can easily weather disagreement or opposition, who can swim against the stream of public opinion, and who can stand up for the truth at great personal cost. It is just the ones who have loved and been well loved, and who have had many deep friendships who can hold out against hatred, rejection, or persecution. (p. 100)

In the phrasing of this study, this means that biological and psychological intimacy are prerequisites for ideological intimacy. And the last is important because "if personal fulfillment is pursued to its extreme, it leads to eventual estrangement and emptiness" (Levinger, 1977, p. 160. Relationships themselves no more give complete satisfaction because a higher need, generativity in Erikson's words, has made its appearance. Yet no mild feeling with sympathy with the "less fortunate" will satisfy this need. While Gemeinschaftsfühl may be understood as a "friendly" interest in one's community and the human family in general, ideological intimacy means a deep com-
mitment to a specific cause outside the relationship itself, whether this be one's family or some larger ideal (cf. Frank, 1978).

Search for Intimacy

"Plainly, it is the other-directed person's psychological need, not his political one," Riesman (1950) comments, "that dictates his emphasis on warmth and sincerity" (p. 223). In spite of—or because of—the Western official culture's emphasis on rationality and cool, scientific detachment, this psychological need shows in many different ways. Fromm's (1941) observations are still relevant:

In our society emotions in general are discouraged. While there can be no doubt that any creative thinking—as well as any other creative activity—is inseparably linked with emotion, it has become an ideal to think and to live without emotions. To be 'emotional' has become synonymous with being unsound or unbalanced. By the acceptance of this standard the individual has become greatly weakened; his thinking is impoverished and flattened. On the other hand, since emotions cannot be completely killed, they must have their existence totally apart from the intellectual side of the personality; the result is the cheap and insincere sentimentality with which movies and popular songs feed millions of emotion starved customers. (p. 244)

While things have changed since 1941, making emotions more culturally acceptable, the great variety of substitutes for human intimacy people still resort to is an indication that this hunger is not yet completely satisfied. Pop-singers, for one example, apparently express something which most people have found no other way to express. "Elvis Presley's pledge to love us tender and love us true" (Kilpatrick, 1975, p. 195)
apparently comforted thousands of individuals, as was evident from the crowds that mourned his death.

If popular songs provide some fulfilment of the craving for psychological intimacy, pets provide a culturally accepted--even encouraged--source of physical intimacy. Morris (1971) gives some figures:

In the United States, more than 5,000 million dollars is spent on pets every year. In Britain the annual figure is 100 million pounds. In West Germany it is 600 million Deutsche marks. In France, a few years ago it was 125 million new francs, and estimates already indicate that this figure has by now doubled. (p. 173)

Morris continues by describing the physical intimacies that individuals use between themselves, such as patting the back, stroking the hair, etc., and notes that "clearly we do not get enough, and those thousands of millions of animal caresses are there to prove it. Blocked in our human contacts by our cultural restrictions, we redirect our intimacies towards our adoring pets, our substitutes for love."

It is interesting to note that in the Orient there is neither pet craze nor any "problem" with homosexuality, as was noted earlier. Ideology or intimate family relationships could be cited as possible reasons. According to this explanation, something seems to satisfy the individual basic need for intimacy so that counterfeits are not needed on such a large scale as in the Western society. There is, however, an alternative explanation, which seems plausible especially for the masses. This is the hierarchy of needs discussed above. Pets could be considered as one of the "luxuries" that affluent
culture makes available. When the struggle is to fill the hungry stomachs of human beings, no resources are left to feeding pets, let alone loving them.

Morris, being a zoologist, should be interested in promoting animals, which makes his point about pets the more weighty. In spite of his depiction of them as counterfeits of human intimacy, he still sees some value in the substitute. "Extermination of pets would not automatically make people redirect their affection to humans," he writes; all that would happen is that millions of people, some of them lonely and incapable for a variety of reasons of enjoying any real human intimacies, would be robbed of a major form of tender body contact" (p. 175). Perhaps even intimacy with a pet is better than none; neither does human intimacy have to rule out the additional joy from pets. Pets need not be substitutes (although to many they apparently are); it is a sad statement of the condition of human society when they have to be so on a large scale.

Dahms (1972) points out another substitute for intimacy: the drug culture. In the absence of emotional heights from intimate relationships or ideological sources, the drug culture offers both a primary group to which one can belong and an emotional height from the drug itself. Dahms comments:

While its negative outcomes are deplored by all, the interest in the drug culture also may be an expression of a deeply felt need to belong. In the marijuana subculture many young people express the pleasure of feeling part of a warm, accepting, intimate group" (p. 109)

According to Maslow (1964), achieving a "peak-experience" even
through psychedelic drugs requires "brotherly communion" as the other necessary ingredient (p. 87). This makes one wonder which ingredient is the most important; perhaps the drug's major function is to remove inhibitions and thus help in achieving such "communion."

Closely related to this is the interest in communes, gurus, astrology, and fringe religions or cults. According to Mazur (1973), "there are undoubtedly thousands of communal-type units in the United States, but how many nobody knows. If shared apartments and mini-communes are included, "the number would be in the hundreds of thousands" (p. 70). Most of the communal groups, however, do not stay long together. One possible reason for this, Ramey (1976) suggests, is that "joining a complex living group is analogous to marrying a whole group instead of an individual" (p. 33). New members often do not entirely buy the ideology of the original members. Under these circumstances, it is difficult "to develop a group that can sustain this kind of commitment and cohesion in spite of the pull of the outer society." Furthermore, according to Riesman (1973), "life in a commune does not end problems of loneliness" (p. xii). Relationships can be severed, and the "stickiness" of the group may become unpleasant. As Dahms (1972) concludes, however, "the increasing interest in communal living arrangements is an expression of a need for more intimate interpersonal ties" (p. 110). Total immersion in a group is seen as a facilitator of such ties.

Pertaining to cults, Conway and Siegelman (1980, p. 69)
decline to give any numerical estimates in spite of their extensive survey of the phenomenon. Interviewing a deprogrammer who alone claimed to have deprogrammed fifteen hundred cult members, they estimate that thousands had been deprogrammed up till then. How many people are involved in cults seems to be impossible to estimate even near accurately. According to Rabbi Davis, a noted authority on cults, the reason for their success is the "needs and vulnerability" and the loneliness of today's American youth (Cornell, 1977, p. 22). Immersion in a cult promises relief from this loneliness and lack of the feeling of belonging.

Psychotherapy and encounter and sensitivity groups are also seen by Gordon (1976) "as expressions of desperate attempts to reduce loneliness through marketed relationships" (Reisman, 1979, p. 176). Springing up on the premises of Gestalt psychology, and as a part of the larger Human Potential Movement, the Encounter Group Movement represents an effort to provide a supportive atmosphere to a maximum number of people in minimum time.

The movement began by the founding of the National Training Laboratories at Bethel, Maine, in the late 1940's, but was popularized since the Esalen Institute was established in Big Sur, California. These groups—adults brought together for periods varying from one day to one week—are known by different names, such as T-groups, encounter groups, sensitivity groups, and growth groups (Dahms, 1972, p. 115). Their methods differ and
are also called by various names, such as transpersonal psychology, multiple psychotherapy, or social dynamics (Morris, 1971, p. 239). They are, however, built on the same basic premises; faith in the human potential and confidence in the immediate experience. They also work for the same goals, trust and open communication, removal of facades, and the enrichment of life by fully experiencing the here and now, especially in interpersonal situations. Desexualized body contact is encouraged, and the socialized adult roles are laid aside to give room for more spontaneous, child-like behavior. As Morris (1971) points out, individuals who are "remote and untouching at home" may loose their inhibitions in an encounter group because of the "official, scientific sanction for such acts in the special atmosphere of the centre" (p. 242). There is no fear of ridicule which would be the case at home.

Innovative techniques to bring about this spontaneity and trust seemed to become a high fashion since the Esalen Institute was established. These include rubbing, stroking, holding, hugging, sometimes verbal or even physical conflict, falling on the arms of the group, and carrying one another in the arms; all geared to achieving an intense interpersonal experience. The goal is mutual trust and openness. Rogers (1970) describes one member of such a group sobbing as he was opening up to his pain and problems. Another group member said to him: "I've never before felt a real physical hurt in me from the pain of another. I feel completely with you." Rogers concludes by a statement: "This is a basic encounter" (p. 33).
Not all encounters, however, come about as smoothly. The encounter philosophy also encourages conflict for the purpose of getting at the core of each person. Moustakas (1972) reports one such experience of open conflict in an encounter group, after which he and his partner achieved total openness and mutual appreciation and respect. He concludes: "until this encounter, we had never really known one another. Painful as it was, the experience had the ring of truth, the ring of something real." It was a "confrontation alive with meaning" (p. 65).

In his extensive treatment of the topic, Back (1972) describes the reasons for its emergence. "The experiences provided by sensitivity training fit well with some of the trends of the decade," representing "an almost conscious departure from traditional middle-class values or the values of a technological society." It became "part of a new radical outlook," especially attracting "members of the wealthy middle class who did not find complete happiness with affluence, and were looking for more meaning in life than the satisfaction of primary needs could give" (pp. 230-231).

Consequently, Back perceives "religious undertones" in the Encounter Group Movement (p. 3). He views participation in such groups as "a pilgrimage," providing the emotional aspects and controls of a religious ritual (p. 19). According to Back, "science can function in the same way as the more traditional theories of magic, religion, and ideology" (p. 24), and the authority of science is often accepted by people who
reject religion (p. 25). Drawing from both sources, science and religion (p. 26), the movement seeks to provide "another foundation for the mystical experience and ritualistic expression man seems to need" (p. 205; cf. Oden, 1974, p. 43 on interpersonal "communion" and Conway and Siegelman, 1980, pp. 54-55 on the cult-like qualities of encounter techniques).

Kilpatrick (1975) describes the phenomenal growth of the movement. "By 1970, there were some 220 institutions throughout the United States devoted in full or in part to training people in the ways of growth" (p. 50). According to him, the movement has spread to Europe, Australia, Southeast Asia, Africa, and South America. This in itself is an indication that the movement must have responded to a felt need that was not satisfied by the existing culture (Cameron, 1966, p. 10). Back (1972) calls this felt need the "external approach" to social movements (p. 19), and explains that sensitivity training as a social movement is a reaction to strains in modern life, especially in the United States. It satisfies needs generated by novel conditions that the traditional institutions, especially religion, cannot fill. Sensitivity training may be more a symptom of what ails society than a cure for its ills. (p. 46)

A sizable part of this ailment appears to be a perceived lack of intimacy. People go to encounter groups "because they are urgently seeking some way of finding a return to intimacy," at least to get a "maintenance dose" of it (Morris, 1971, p. 240). The benefits of this method, however, are questioned by many. Back (1972) calls the relationships generated in encounter groups "commercial relationships" which have "in-
tensity without permanence" (p. 214). He also notes the
dangers involved. There have actually been psychiatric casu­
alties, and many more disappointed feelings. The participants
often found that their real, everyday life did not improve any;
in fact, it perhaps felt worse because of the new expectations
created by the encounter experience. Moustakas (1972) also
questions the "realness" and "authenticity" of what takes place,
when the group is made up of strangers and when these strangers
are told by the trainer to embrace, or to be nonverbally joyous
with others. The supposed openness and freedom, furthermore,
has often turned into "manipulating and staging maneuvers" (pp.
76-78).

Other critics point to the short duration of the relation­
ship. Oden (1974, p. 12) asserts that there is no instant inti­
macy, and Howard (1970) concurs. She travelled for a year from
one encounter group to another and observed that none of the
people she encountered came to be really important to her or
she to them. She concludes that her friendships "take a year,
sometimes several, to ripen," and is "not persuaded that be­
havioral science can hasten this process" (p. 246). Kilpatrick
(1975) is sure that this movement provides no basis for lasting
relationships; in fact, it undermines intimacy since it is
"dedicated not to community but to self-growth." What community
the weekend encounter group has is "perceived chiefly as a
vehicle for massaging individual egos." Also, the freedom to
move out of a relationship as well as into it is not conducive
to true intimacy, according to Kilpatrick. It lacks "the
emotional investment that a lasting relationship requires" (pp. 11-16).

In the most recent years, the movement seems to have somewhat declined or taken new forms, but not without leaving an effect on the society. Writing at the height of the movement, Morris (1971) considers it "an eloquent proof of the burning need that exists in our modern society for a revision of our ideas concerning body contact and intimacy" (p. 239). He goes on to say that if the encounter movement can release us from our inhibitions concerning bodily contact, it will have made a valuable contribution (p. 243). Perhaps to a certain extent the movement has succeeded in this. One contribution it definitely seems to have made is to popularize the word "intimacy," which now seems to be one of the most fashionable words. In that sense, then, the movement may have created the need to which it apparently responded, as Magaro (1978, p. 170) notes about mental health professions.

Whatever the case, countless individuals appear to be looking for ways to express and satisfy their need for intimate contact and feeling of belonging. Pop-singers, pets, drugs, communes, cults, and encounter groups have all been tried and found wanting. It appears that only sustained close and intimate human relationships can satisfy this need.

Implications for Mental Health

Occasional references to the apparent connection between friendship and mental health have been made throughout this
thesis; here a general, although brief, overview is attempted, particularly pertaining to intimacy. All authorities seem to agree on the importance of intimate relationships for the healthy functioning of the individual. This is especially emphasized in developmental psychology, and through individual development the influence reaches the social structure as well. Parsons (1964) discusses the importance of love in the development of personality. Even the primary meaning of specific gratifications "derives from their relation to the paramount goal of securing or maximizing love." He goes on to interpret Freud by saying "that only when the need for love has been established as the paramount goal of the personality can a genuine ego be present" (p. 90). Erikson (1968) forecasts problems later in life when intimate relationships with others or one's own inner resources are not accomplished in late adolescence or early adulthood. When this is the case, the person may settle for highly stereotyped interpersonal relations and come to retain a deep sense of isolation. If the times favor an impersonal kind of interpersonal pattern, a man can go far, very far, in life and yet harbor a severe character problem doubly painful because he will never feel really himself, although everyone says he is "somebody." (pp. 135-136)

Tournier (1962) reiterates this same need: "No one can develop freely in this world and find full life without feeling understood by at least one person" (p. 29). Total understanding of another person—as much as this is possible—would of course mean intimacy. Jung (1957) considers the inherent human weakness an indication for the need of intimacy. "The perfect has no need of the other, but weakness has," he writes (pp. 116-
Although humanistic psychologists (e.g. Maslow, Rogers) would somewhat disagree with Jung in that they emphasize strength and potential rather than weakness, all of them would agree that intimate relationships are of paramount importance because it is in them that the individual's strength and potential is realized.

Cottrell and Foote (1952) concentrate in their discussion on shared meanings. Without shared meanings, they explain, difficulties arise, which "can only be cleared up by validating our meanings against those in more general usage" (p. 199). Furthermore,

If he is to develop a self-system which will give him a sufficient degree of competence for coping with his interpersonal environment, he must know as far as possible what others expect of him, must know who he is and what he is capable of, what the effects of his actions are in the appraisal of himself by these others. (p. 199)

"To obtain such information," Cottrell and Foote continue, "one needs to talk freely and fully with a significant but uncensorious other" (p. 200). According to the classification of this study, close friends and intimates can serve this function. When it comes to validation of one's personal worth (Sullivan's phrase), this can only be facilitated "when we can talk without fear with intimates of similar experience" (Cottrell & Foote, 1952, p. 199). Such perfect intimacies are few, which, of course, makes them all the more desired.

According to Duck (1973), levels of interpersonal relationships have implications for mental illness. "If one is justified in the assumption that psychological construing is
necessary for the generation and continuation of personal relationships," he suggests, "then this should be where mental illness might sometimes be founded" (p. 151). Relating this to social stratification suggests a possible connection. Mental illness has been found to be more prevalent in the lower classes (Hollingshead and Redlich, 1958), and it is attributed to factors like labeling (Scheff, 1974). Lower classes have also been found to be more friendless (e.g. Leyton, 1974, p. 96; Dotson, 1950, pp. 220-230; Weiss, 1973, p. 26). On the other hand, the friendlessness of the psychiatric population has been observed by many (e.g. Beers, 1945, pp. 175, 251; Cohen, 1961, p. 352; Leyton, 1974). Whether this is a cause or an effect, it appears to be connected with the occurrence of mental illness. Especially in cases where kinship ties are broken or the kin geographically separated, this connection between the poor and the friendless and mental illness may be worth looking into. Perhaps friendlessness partially contributes to labelling, if not to the etiology of mental illness as such.

Maslow (1954) also observes that "practically all theorists of psychopathology have stressed thwarting of the love needs as basic in the picture of maladjustment" (p. 90). Other things being equal, "psychological health comes from being loved rather than from being deprived of love" (p. 240). Good human relationships, then, are psychotherapeutic, and Maslow advocates the encouragement and facilitation of these by professionals (pp. 320-321).
Such relationships are especially needed in today's urban life, since the frenzy of urban living creates stress, and stress breeds anxiety and feeling of insecurity. Intimacy calms these feelings, and so, paradoxically, the more we are forced to keep apart, the more we need to make body contact. If our loved ones are loving enough, then the supply of intimacy they offer will suffice, and we can go out to face the world at arm's length. (Morris, 1971, p. 145)

But what happens without close bonds? Morris asks. His answer is professional intimacy, or "professional touchers." The "therapeutic touch" has, in fact, been found health promoting even in physical terms (e.g. Krieger, 1975; Lynch, 1977). Krieger found hemoglobin levels raised by the simple act of touching. Presumably, this works through the psychological sphere where the primary benefit will be felt.

Especially for the psychological "touch" or "stroking," many resort to the professional providers of such services. Psychotherapy is considered by many (e.g. Oden, 1974) as "surrogate intimacy." Oden observes that "much of what is called 'therapeutic effectiveness' may actually be better described as an attempt to provide a relationship that will stimulate the conditions of intimacy." He goes on to list the characteristics emphasized in Rogerian therapy: "empathy, nonpossessive warmth, congruence, self-disclosure, unconditional positive regard, openness, genuineness, and contractual clarity." Thus, "therapeutic effectiveness, regardless of theoretical orientation, is essentially a surrogate intimacy, a substitute that is needed when the real thing is not there."
It is an example of intimacy without friendship. Real inti-
macy, which includes friendship, goes further, continuing
where therapy stops with the fee's worth. "Therapy is basi-
cally a skeletal image of intimacy that has become profes­sion­

These supplementary relationships "may function as a
refuge or retreat, an escape from the tensions and pressures
of daily life," Weiss (1973) comments. "Friends are fine in
response to crisis, but they become exhausted by chronic dis­
tress"; therefore, supplementary relationships may be more
responsive to chronic distress, according to Weiss (p. 195).
This implies a bit different focus than the equation of psy­
chotherapy with friendship, as is often done. On the scale
of friendship presented in this thesis, psychotherapy as an
institutional service would belong to the friendly acquaint­
tance category, since it is receptive and in terms of clinical roles,
not mutual choice between persons. It does, however, provide
intimacy, heightening the therapeutic aspects of an intimate
relationship while not providing continuity and mutual openness.
Furthermore, a person with chronic distress needs the services
of a professional because the distress implies that something
is already wrong. The positive psychological effect of friend­
ship would seem to be of best use as a preventive measure;
other things being equal, a person with fulfilling close and
intimate relationships thus would hardly have need for a pro­
fessional "toucher," or a receptacle where to pour out his or
her feelings of unhappiness.
Schofield (1964) considers these unhappiness problems to be the major part of mental illness which, in turn, he considers as "our nation's paramount health problem" (p. 4). He recommends both increasing professional therapists and reducing the demand for professional friendship by encouraging "an intelligently humane social climate" (p. 3). There will never be enough professionals, he asserts, and one could add that the availability of professionals to the poor who are unable to pay is another serious problem. The most promising procedure even in psychotherapy, according to Schofield, "is a conversation which has therapeutic intent and occurs in a relationship of friendship" (p. 2)—at least approaching friendship as closely as possible. Human understanding is the most important aspect, since "deprivations of love are not remediable by offers of capsules" (p. 84). Perhaps if the little problems are taken care of by the "therapeutic conversation" between friends and intimates, there would be less need for the "therapeutic conversation" in a doctor's or counselor's office to take care of bigger problems. This notion refers to the "problems of living" type of mental disorders, and implies no intention to nullify other etiologies of mental illness.

As for the availability of such intimate relationships, Dahms (1972) maintains that

if people really embraced the need they have for intimacy almost any two persons could establish and maintain such a relationship. . . . If two persons really needed each other for survival, they would invest the time and energy required to establish some form of higher order intimacy as a life support system. Small requirements
of personal taste would soon be dropped and the large benefits of the relationship would be paramount. (p. 50)

Dahms' entire book is an appeal for such intimacy, as he spells out in the preface:

The thesis of this book is that an enlightened commitment to constructive human relationships at all levels of the social system is not a sentimental preoccupation. It is an overlooked requirement for individual and collective survival which is as essential to life as food, water, and sleep. Without some degree of emotional intimacy, we will kill each other. Tragically, we seem to need a 'reason' to reach out to each other. Survival is a good reason. (n. p.)

The craving for intimate relationships, then, is real and is felt deeply by thousands, if not millions, of individuals. Modern Western society has not only pulled individuals apart, separating them into instrumental roles; it has also pulled individuals apart from each other. Lonely and comfortless, many seek substitutes in less than satisfactory ways. It is a sign of progress when there is time and other resources available for fulfilling the affective needs of individuals. In the context of freedom, however, this does not seem to happen automatically; it needs specific attention. It is only when the institutional, organized life has this "adaptive strength" that progress in every aspect--including mental health--can take place.
CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Interpersonal relationships are receiving increasing attention, and rightly so. The "antagonistic cooperation" (Sumner, 1960, p. 32) of the present human society does not seem to satisfy all interpersonal needs. While pure exchange and even sheer force may be needed, health and happiness demand a more positive base for at least some of human interaction. Affective relationships can provide such a base; there is therefore probably nothing more important than the promotion of genuine human relationships at all levels. What in times past has more or less taken care of itself now seems to require explicit attention; such is the unintended side-effect on individuals of the great universalistic gains attained by the society.

Testing the Theory

It is the justification of this study that understanding human relationships is an important step toward improving them. So far, this understanding is sketchy at best. While the theo-
ry proposed here by no means claims complete understanding—such would be a presumptuous claim indeed—it may not be presumptuous to claim a small contribution toward understanding. To support this claim, the main characteristics of a useful sociological theory will be reviewed, followed by an attempt to show that the proposed theory can at least approach meeting them. Pharisaism is probably part of theorizing; "each of us," according to Merton (1968, p. 68), is "perpetually vulnerable" to it. Perhaps this preliminary test will help to detect any possible pride while—it is hoped—justifying at least some of the claims.

The major characteristics of a useful sociological theory were discussed and listed in the first chapter concentrating on two approaches: Merton's structural-functional "middle-range" theory and Glaser and Strauss' phenomenological "grounded theory." To aid in the following discussion, the two lists are summarized below side by side.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Middle-range theory</th>
<th>Grounded theory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) &quot;limited sets of assumptions from which specific hypotheses are logically derived and confirmed by empirical investigation&quot;</td>
<td>(1) &quot;enable prediction and explanation of behavior&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) not separate but &quot;consolidated into wider networks of theory&quot;</td>
<td>(2) &quot;useful in theoretical advance&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) &quot;sufficiently abstract to deal with differing spheres of social behavior . . .&quot;</td>
<td>(3) &quot;usable in practical applications . . . understanding and some control&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
transcend sheer description or empirical generalization

(4) "cuts across the distinction between microsociological problems ... and macro-sociological problems"

(5) Total systems of theory "represent general theoretical orientations" rather than rigorous and tight-knit systems

(6) "consonant with a variety of systems of sociological thought"

(7) "in direct line of continuity with the work of classical theoretical formulations"

(8) "involves the specification of ignorance. ... recognizes what must still be learned ... addresses itself to those problems that might now be clarified in the light of available knowledge"

When Glaser and Strauss' (1967) two major requirements of a theory, parsimony of variables and scope of applicability (pp. 110-111), are added to their list, it includes all the aspects listed by Merton.

The two sources will be considered simultaneously in the following discussion, incorporating Merton's into Glaser and Strauss'--since the latter offers fewer and more inclusive categories.

**Explain and Predict**

The first attribute in both lists has to do with the value of the theory in the explanation and prediction of behavior.
Assumptions and hypotheses as well as their confirmation are parts of this function. Furthermore, explanation and prediction can be thought of as going together: explanation implies finding a causal factor and that same cause can be assumed to have the same effect in the future as it had in the particular problem under study.

**Degrees of friendship**

For the first example of explanation we will consider the confusion and debate over the concept of psychotherapy as friendship. While Schofield, Rogers, and many others affirm this identification, Reisman and Yamokoski (1974), as was noted pp. 33-34 in this thesis), refute it. The relationship of these two types of friendly relations, however, becomes clear with the proposed theory. While in it psychotherapy would not be viewed as friendship per se (being a professional service), in its ideal form it can incorporate some of the intimate aspects of good friendship which the client can thus "purchase." Schofield's title, *Psychotherapy: The Purchase of Friendship* (1964), is thus very accurate but includes an intentional irony, since everyone knows that real friendship cannot be purchased. An individual without close or intimate friendship, then, would be apt to "purchase" a service that can incorporate some of the qualities of friendship that casual friendship does not have.

The progressive framework of this theory could yield additional clarity on the results of another research. This is a valuable piece of research done by two authorities noted for
their "methodological sophistication" (Phillips, 1971, pp. xii, 4, about Lazarsfeld) in quantitative data. Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954) carried out a "substantive and methodological analysis" of friendship as a social process in two housing communities (see pp. 134-135 in this thesis). "The substantive case in point," the authors explain, "is that of the social processes involved in the formation, maintenance, and disruption of friendship; the methodological concern is to identify the logical framework of variables presupposed by a substantive analysis of these processes" (p. 19). The methodologically meticulous research undoubtedly reaches its objective and gives a valuable contribution to the study of social processes as well as to the study of friendship. A clear identification of various degrees of friendship, however, would have explained some of the implicit questions.

For example, one of the aims was "to identify the networks of intimate social relationships in these communities" (p. 21). Consequently, Hilltowners and Craftowners were asked to designate their "three closest friends." This implies the identification of close friendship with intimacy; the two terms are thus used interchangeably. While this served the purpose for the particular study, it could not give clear guidelines to someone who wanted to study friendship and intimacy (perhaps compare them). Ramey (1975, 1976) studied intimate networks in which intimacy included sexual openness; the "three closest friends" Lazarsfeld and Merton asked their subjects to name did not appear to be of this nature. The Encounter Group Move-
ment supplied intimacy to a large number of people; why did so many people find it meaningless and still crave for intimacy? Clearly, the concepts need clarification.

What is more important, however, is the omission of various degrees of friendship throughout the study, although several indirect references to them are given; e.g. "various types of friends" (p. 57), "movement of pairs from one state to another" (p. 59), and "degree of homophily" (pp. 23, 62-63), the last simply meaning attraction between the same kind (e.g. race, age) as compared to attraction between different kinds of people. The identification of a trichotomy (friends, non-friends, and neutral, p. 51), is a step toward affective degrees in a relationship, but a total continuum with many more identifiable stages would have clarified more of the findings.

Values and intimacy

One example of such possible clarification is the finding that differing values caused some beginning friendships to be "nipped in the bud" (p. 31), which may be interpreted that the potential of the relationship did not reach beyond beyond just friends or casual friends. This, of course, is simply another way of looking at the matter--focusing on the friends rather than on the values--but it does have explanatory--even predictive--value. In other words, rather than saying that pairs with differing values cannot maintain friendship, or that values appear stronger than friendships (p. 45), it can be said that such pairs cannot proceed beyond the level of casual friends. This, of course, is suggested by the statement:
"It is not easy to have a warm personal attachment where there is an opposition of values" (p. 33). A less "warm" association, e.g. just friends or casual friends, would seem possible.

The presently proposed theory helps to clarify this point in another way as well. According to the dramaturgical theory of social behavior, individuals are continually engaged in conscious self-manipulation, or putting up fronts, as Goffman (1959) would have it. Others, however, consider this to be the case only with public behavior. In private relationships, such as friendship and intimacy, individuals at least subjectively feel that their behavior is genuine (cf. Bensman & Lilienfeld, 1979). Furthermore, individuals are found to have striking differences in the extent to which they engage in impression management (Snyder, 1974). It is this "authentic" behavior that the anthropological and humanistic psychological sources quoted in this thesis refer to with words like "role-free" behavior (i.e. free of formal roles) or "total self" (i.e. one's unique self rather than a certain instrumental part of it). Goffman (1959) also allows for such "free" behavior in his concept of the "backstage," the cluttered and disorganized part of the individual's behavior which is carefully concealed from the "audience." Goffman's "backstage" appears to fit Davis' (1973) description of a person's "real" or "idling" self which is "enjoyably effortless to put forth, yet so dangerously vulnerable." It is the region that "needs the least psychological energy to present . . . and the most
to protect" (p. 308). Therefore, according to the theory proposed here, close friendship and intimacy provide a retreat to this sphere from the psychologically tiring "frontstage" behavior.

Values, however, present another dimension to this picture. To associate with an individual who has different basic values from one's own would call for intentional impression management. With continued association, the natural growth potential of the relationship would call for the relationship to advance. This, however, would call for more open communication, the license to enter each other's "backstage." This would expose the differing values (which is the reason for conflict in intimacy). When values come forward, maintaining a "front" becomes difficult if not impossible. The total openness required of close friendship and intimacy (i.e. exposing the "backstage is incompatible with intentional impression management, although social conditioning still—unwittingly—affects the relationship. Thus, even if authentic behavior is merely an illusion, it is still subjectively important and a person would like to "relax" this way with those closest to him or her. When values differ, this relaxing is not possible without conflict.

With the differing values exposed, there are basically two ways to go: modify the values or end the relationship. Which way is chosen depends on the strength of the values or the strength of the interpersonal attraction, or both. As was discussed on pp. 134-135 in this thesis, Lazarsfeld and
Merton (1954, pp. 31-45) found that 100 friendships were formed on the basis of values, whereas in 40 friendships the values became modified to the friendship. Assuming that the strength of the values rather than the strength of the interpersonal attraction made the difference and remembering that close friendship requires opening up the "backstage," this finding can be expressed in two bivariate tables. Table 2 shows the combined effect of strong values and openness on the mainenance or growth of friendship.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Similar values</th>
<th>Different values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;front&quot; only</td>
<td>relationship maintained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;back&quot;</td>
<td>relationship grows</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When "front" is maintained, values do not enter the picture. Thus, Lazarsfeld and Merton's subjects could begin a friendship (just friends, casual friends) even with different values. Opening the "backstage" when closer friendship was approached exposed the strong values and caused the relationship to end.

Table 3 shows the growth of the relationship in the second case where 40 friendships caused the modification of values.
Here values remain relatively unimportant even when the back­stage is exposed, hence the relationship need not end. From these examples, the following hypothesis can be derived.

**Hypothesis 1:**

In case of weak or similar values, there is a direct relationship between openness and intimacy; in case of strong differing values, there is an inverse relationship between openness and intimacy.

**Operational definitions:**

Openness: exposing "backstage"; i.e. verbalizing one's thoughts.

Intimacy: common identity, "we" feeling.

For a related example, we will consider the case discussed on p. 97 where a couple deliberately maintains their relationship on the acquaintance level in order to avoid a split. Growing intimacy would bring an unsolvable conflict, whether in terms of personality clash or radically differing values. When the conflict comes from differing values, the relationship is essentially the same as in Table 2. In Table
the term "conflict potential" is used in place of similar or different values.

**Table 4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage exposed</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Level of relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;front&quot; only</td>
<td>relationship maintained</td>
<td>relationship maintained</td>
<td>lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;back&quot;</td>
<td>relationship maintained</td>
<td>relationship ends</td>
<td>higher</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, when the conflict potential of the relationship is high, the relationship can be maintained if it is kept on the acquaintance level. Intimacy would end the relationship. With low conflict potential (similar values), the relationship can be maintained at any level, but it will most likely grow. The following hypothesis expresses this relationship.

**Hypothesis 2:**

Other things being equal, there is an inverse relationship between conflict potential and the degree of intimacy in a relationship.

**Operational definitions:**

**Conflict potential:** unsolvable conflict when thoughts are verbalized.

**Intimacy:** common identity, "we" feeling.

This hypothesis could perhaps be stated more specifically to include the fact that in this case, when intimacy is not reachable, the couple cannot resort to close friendship or even the lower forms of friendship. Living together implies intimacy; when this fails, the couple must maintain a distance.
to keep some sort of relationship. Acquaintance is the only possible way to do it.

Levels of relationships

Combining the proposed theory with Parsons' (1951) "pattern variables" opens up a way to operationalize the varying levels of relationships. While pattern variables were briefly discussed earlier (pp. 112-113 in this thesis), they are presented below in tabular form, each forming a continuum between contrasting orientations on which each relationship can be placed.

Table 5
Pattern Variables
(Parsons, 1951)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formal</th>
<th>Informal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Instrumental</td>
<td>Expressive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impersonal</td>
<td>Personal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affectively neutral</td>
<td>.................Affective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collectivity oriented</td>
<td>.............Individual oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalistic</td>
<td>.................Particularistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement based</td>
<td>.................Ascription based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific</td>
<td>.....................Diffuse</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Strangers Mere Acquaintances | Friendly | Just | Casual | Close | Intimates
acquaintances | friends |     |        |       |

Operational definitions:

Acquaintances: All pattern variables to the left of the center.

Friendly acqu.: At least one pattern variable to the right of the center.

Just friends: At least two pattern variables to the right of the center.
Casual friends: At least three pattern variables to the right of the center.

Close friends: At least four pattern variables to the right of the center.

Intimates: All pattern variables to the right of the center.

Those suggest minimum requirements. The position of each variable within the left or right half of the continuum would indicate further, more exact measurements of the level of the relationship.

Several hypotheses can be derived from relationships between variables in light of the above operationalizations. As was noted earlier in connection with the *Gemeinschaftsgefühl* (p. 120 in this thesis), friendship is the prerequisite for this feeling of warmth and genuine interest in others. When a person's affective needs have been and are amply fulfilled, that person is the most prepared to have an affective orientation toward others. This leads to the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 3:**

Other things being equal, there is a direct relationship between the degree of intimacy in a person's close and intimate relationships and the degree of affectivity in his or her other relationships.

**Operational definitions:**

Degree of intimacy: position of all five variables on the right end of the continuum (extreme right for all = 100 percent intimacy).

Degree of affectivity: position of all five variables on the continuum between the two extremes (affectivity increases toward the right).

Considering urban mobility patterns, the situation is becoming fairly common where a person resides in one community...
and works in another. Although, according to the above hypothesis, such a person may project general warmth in his or her community of employment, the fact that s/he is not a resident of that community precludes building close relationships there. This may contribute to the general impersonality of the community of employment.

Hypothesis 4:

Other things being equal, there is a direct relationship between the level of impersonality in a community and the number of employees whose permanent residence is elsewhere.

Operational definition:

Level of impersonality: percentage of impersonal, formal, and instrumental role relationships (left half of the continuum) as compared to personal, informal, and expressive relationships (right half of the continuum).

The "bedroom communities" where such employees reside have their own typical atmosphere which is hardly more conducive to close relationships. These, again, may be sought from elsewhere. Thus in a mobile community, relational networks do not coincide with geographical divisions, as is well known.

Intimacy and romantic love

Romantic love is here equated with sexual intimacy which --not like the other forms of intimacy--belongs exclusively to this type of relationship. While physical and emotional intimacy also have a part in romantic love, they are included in other types of intimacy as well. Sexual intimacy is thus the distinguishing characteristic of romantic love.

The relationship between romantic love and other forms of intimacy leads to some interesting hypotheses. As was noted
earlier (p. 160) in this thesis), siblings are good potential intimates because of proximity and shared genetic and environmental factors, which would lead to similar values, etc. It seems, however, that the incest taboo or the law of the land are not the only reasons for the fact that siblings do not generally fall in love or marry each other. The children in Israeli kibbutzim who grow together as siblings generally do not intermarry (Bettelheim, 1969), although there is no taboo or law against such marriages. Apparently too close proximity, while facilitating friendship and physical, psychological, and ideological intimacy, is not conducive to sexual intimacy which has a romantic component. Romance seems to breed on the attraction of the unfamiliar or strange. Perhaps this is one way in which "the desire for new experience"—the first of Thomas and Znaniecki's basic human wishes (Coser, 1971, p. 513)—is expressed.

Hypothesis 5:

Other things being equal, there is a direct relationship between proximity or familiarity and non-sexual intimacy, but an inverse relationship between proximity or familiarity and romantic love.

Operational definitions:

Proximity or familiarity: close association over a long period of time, as with siblings.

Romantic love: sexual intimacy.

In reverse, it could be speculated that successful marriages combine the romantic aspect with other types of intimacy. A relationship based solely on the romantic aspect cannot last.
For a second hypothesis pertaining to this relationship between sexual and nonsexual intimacy, male homosexuality provides a case. As was noted earlier, homosexuality is relatively rare in the Orient, whereas in the Western society it is becoming common. At the same time, in Oriental societies intimate nonsexual friendship between males is culturally acceptable. This was the case also in Western societies at earlier times, but not at this time.

**Hypothesis 6:**

Cultural acceptance of homosexuality being equal, there is an inverse relationship between cultural acceptance of physical intimacy between males and the prevalence of male homosexuality.

**Operational definitions:**

- **Cultural acceptance:** percentage of those who approve.
- **Physical intimacy:** nonsexual bodily contact (touching, caressing, hugging, kissing).
- **Prevalence:** total number of cases at any given time.
- **Male homosexuality:** number of adult males (18 and over) whose primary sexual activity is with other males.

The friendship of David and Jonathan in the Old Testament is considered by the gay community as an example of a homosexual relationship. This is because of David's words upon hearing of the death of Jonathan: "Your love to me was more wonderful than the love of women" (2 Samuel 1:26). Considering the three aspects of intimacy, however, suggests another explanation.

It should be noted that David's heterosexual adventures may be an indication against his homosexuality. Whatever the case,
David "loved" many women, and had several wives and concubines. Considering the position of women in those days, it is doubtful that they were considered capable of equal sharing of confidences that psychological intimacy indicates. David's relationships with them may thus have been mostly physical and sexual intimacy, whereas with Jonathan he seems to have experienced psychological and ideological intimacy. This may have been the major reason for his praise of Jonathan's love as "more wonderful than the love of women." His relationships with his women, furthermore, were polyadic, whereas that with Jonathan was dyadic.

The same reason could largely also be behind the Greek classics' praise of friendship, since their marital relationships—though not necessarily polygamous—may not have been intimate on the psychological and ideological level. It could thus be speculated that intimacy with one's spouse on all three levels would rule out polygamy as well as a need for another intimate relationship. More cross-cultural research on marriage and other intimate relationships could clarify this point.

Hypothesis 7:

Other things being equal, there is an inverse relationship between the number of monogamous marriages that have total intimacy and the prevalence of polygamy or extra-marital relationships.

Operational definitions:

Total intimacy: including biological, psychological, and ideological intimacy with their subcategories.

Prevalence: total number of cases at any given time.
Ideological vs. interpersonal intimacy

The different aspects of intimacy can yield more hypotheses, especially when the relationship between ideological and interpersonal intimacy is considered. It seems tempting to hypothesize that without intimate relationships, mental health cannot be maintained. Yet history abounds with examples of successful, creative individuals who apparently lived without intimate relationships. The answer is clear when one considers the fact that these individuals lived for something. Whether shut in a monastery or tramping the road, they were devoted to a cause: they had ideological intimacy.

The point here is that human mind must be preoccupied with something. Maslow’s hierarchy of needs provides an illustration. A person who is hungry does not worry about loneliness, his or her mind is preoccupied with physical survival. Such person’s "intimacy" is with dear life. The same can be said about situations of danger. When the mind is fully preoccupied with an overriding value, other needs are less likely to be strongly felt.

In prolonged situations, however, a person is likely to look around to see what others are doing. Here the concept of relative deprivation enters the picture. This means that "people take the standards of significant others as a basis for self- appraisal and evaluation" (Merton, 1968, p. 40). In Riesman’s (1950) words, they become "other-directed." Because of mass media, more people are affected by relative deprivation today because they compare themselves to the culturally accepted
ideal portrayed in the media—however rare that may be in real life. The main standard of evaluation, however, is one's peers or "significant others."

Riesman's (1950) last category is peer-direction, which he perceives as the prevalent motivation of today. The different types of intimacy can illuminate this concept as well. In the inner-directed days, people had ideological intimacy, which kept interpersonal intimacy in the background. Other-direction, and finally, peer-direction, brought human relations to vogue, eventually making interpersonal intimacy an end in itself. This will give us another hypothesis.

**Hypothesis 8:**

Other things being equal, there is an inverse relationship between the prevalence of ideological intimacy and the felt need for interpersonal intimacy in a society.

Operational definitions:

- **Prevalence:** number of people having ideological intimacy.
- **Ideological intimacy:** identification with a cause.
- **Felt need:** prevalence and extent of social movements attempting to supply intimacy.
- **Interpersonal intimacy:** common identity with another person.

Since exclusive interpersonal intimacy eventually leads to oblivion of the society (Slater, 1963), ideological intimacy, or what Erikson (1950) calls generativity, seem essential for societal progress as well as for the most fulfilling interpersonal relationships. Furthermore, since the great ideals of the society are born of intimate relationships (Cooley, 1914, p. 32), the following hypothesis can be derived:
Hypothesis 9:

There is a direct relationship between the prevalence of spontaneous intimate relationships in a society and the prevalence of integrating and enduring ideals.

Operational definitions:

Prevalence: number or percentage of cases at any given time.

Spontaneous intimate relationships: not artificially induced.

Integrating and enduring ideals: those that give direction and purpose to the society and last beyond the founding generation.

Another form of ideological intimacy is what Erikson (1974, p. 122) calls generativity. This means a shared purpose or goal, through which and in the interest of which the relationship can grow. In the marital dyad the offspring provides such growing and which also guards against selfishness, as any parent knows. One could speculate that the couples who deliberately remain childless, which seems to be becoming more acceptable, will need another "cause" which can be considered their "adopted child."

Without such generativity, Erikson warns, there will be stagnation. Slater (1963, p. 359) considers a permanent dyadic withdrawal an impossibility and such couples as oriented toward death. Combining Erikson's thought with Slater's stagnation becomes the death of a relationship. This gives another hypothesis.

Hypothesis 10:

Other things being equal, there is a direct relationship between mutual commitment to a cause in intimacy and the durability and growth of the relationship.
Operational definitions:

A cause: something outside the relationship itself toward which the partners direct their combined energies and which give meaning to the relationship (see p. 173 for a definition of meaning).

Durability of relationship: continuation "for better or for worse."

Growth of the relationship: a progressive degree of intimacy, "the longer it lasts the sweeter it grows."

The search for intimacy

It was noted in the literature review (pp. 34-35) that while strangers are generally not trusted, in some instances individuals seem to enjoy confiding in strangers. As if the very remoteness and lack of involvement of such strangers in one's personal life creates certain confidence in that the secret will not leak out to one's acquaintances. It was also noted (pp. 70-71, this thesis) that the aged seem to be most willing "to act out the private and the intimate in public," even boasting in their mutual revelation of sins (Bensman and Lilienfeld, 1979, pp. 144-145).

In all these instances, there is a common element. The stranger (or acquaintance) is conceived of as a receptacle into which to spill out one's private feelings or problems, much the same way as one would open up to a therapist. It is one-sided openness and—as in case of therapy—may be an indication that the person lacks intimate relationships. This confiding thus becomes a substitute for real intimacy, providing a "maintenance dose" (Morris, 1971, p. 240) to help the person survive in the non-intimate world. A collection of such experiences
can thus provide some of the benefits of intimacy while avoiding the cost of having to listen to another, as would be the case in real friendship.

Hypothesis II:

There is a direct relationship between lack of intimacy in one's private life and the need to confide to a non-intimate (whether a stranger or a therapist).

Operational definitions:

Lack of intimacy: no common identity or "we" feeling with anyone.

Non-intimate: a stranger, acquaintance or a professional to whom one opens up.

Another instance of such confession is the encounter ideology discussed above. While this may be mutual, it is artificially induced, and therefore may be even less beneficial than the one-sided but spontaneous confiding in strangers. It appears, furthermore, that when intimacy (like happiness) is thus explicitly sought after, it becomes elusive. An example from a theory of social movements will illustrate this.

Adapting Merton's term "manifest and latent functions," King (1956, pp. 112-117) notes that social movements have manifest and latent consequences. One latent consequence, according to him, is intimacy. Applying this to our theory of intimacy will lead to an interesting proposition:

When explicit emphasis on intimacy as an end in itself (a manifest function) increases, success in achieving enduring and satisfying intimacy (manifest consequence) decreases. Conversely, when another manifest function received primary emphasis, enduring and satisfying intimacy is achieved as a latent consequence.

In the language used above, this will yield the following
hypothesis.

**Hypothesis 12:**

Other things being equal, there is an inverse relationship between intimacy as a manifest function and its achievement as a consequence.

**Operational definitions:**

- **Intimacy (satisfying and enduring):** a subjective feeling of interpersonal fulfilment that extends beyond individual encounters.

- **Manifest function:** the expressed purpose and goal of the movement that receives explicit attention.

- **Consequence:** what the movement produced in the people who participated in it.

The history of the Encounter Group Movement, discussed earlier, seems to bear out this proposition. Furthermore, it was noted that close friendships are formed more often in voluntary associations than in other types of encounters. This means that friendship or intimacy is a latent consequence of the mutual involvement in the "cause"; in short, ideological intimacy.

These examples probably suffice to show the explanatory and predictive value of the proposed theory. We will now turn to the other characteristics that Merton and Glaser and Strauss list as essential for a theory (see pp. 209–210 in this thesis).

**Useful in Theoretical Advance**

Merton's points 2, 6, and 7 (pp. 209–210, this thesis) are included in this concept. According to these, a middle range theory should not remain separate but be within the framework
outlined by Simmel, and fits within the total framework of symbolic interactionism. It can also provide a continuation to the acquaintance process in Homans' social exchange framework, and Erving Goffman's voluminous documentation appears consonant with it. Although Merton's points imply the unquestioning faith in classical theory that Glasser and Strauss criticize, the theory proposed here appears to meet also this criterion.

Usable in Practical Applications

Merton's points 3 and 4 deal with application. The first one of these expresses a concern for sufficient abstraction to enable the theory's application to different spheres of behavior and social structure, transcending mere description and empirical generalization. Glaser and Strauss (1967, p. 237) include this concept in their requirement for generality in application. This implies that common elements are found in diverse social situations, which thus are brought within the same conceptual framework. The fact that marriage and family relationships, as well as many other role relationships (e.g. therapist-client), fit within this theory would seem to fulfil this requirement.

Glaser and Strauss (1967) list four interrelated properties in the applicability of a theory. One of them, *generality*, was discussed above. Their first requisite is that the theory should "fit the substantive area in which it will be used." The second is that "it must be readily *understandable* by laymen.
concerned with this area," and the last that "it must allow the used partial control over the structure and process of daily situations as they change through time" (p. 237). The proposed theory appears to be able to meet all these requirements when put into practice.

Merton's point number 4 is a very important quality of a middle-range theory, accomplishing what neither macro nor micro theories can: cutting across the whole range of social behavior, from small groups (which includes dyads) to social movements and organizations. The proposed theory is well suited for all these applications since friendship and intimacy are considered as concepts that need not be limited to dyads. Gemeinschaftsgefühl would thus be considered a friendship on the abstract level, corresponding to ideological intimacy which is the moving force in social movements (even if only the leaders have it). This aspect of a theory serves an integrating function.

Provide a Perspective on Behavior

This perspective is to be a "stance to be taken toward data" (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p. 3), the "something" that one would look for in the data. Merton's point 5, while referring to general rather than middle-range theories, is somewhat related. Such a perspective on behavior could be viewed as a "general theoretical orientation." In the present theory, of course, this would be the affective quality, the non-
instrumental and non-normative aspect of any relationship.

Guide Research

The theory should "provide a style" for research "on particular areas of behavior." Any type of research will be suitable to provide data for this theory, but quantitative methods would seem less suitable than qualitative methods. Perhaps unobtrusive observation (in addition to personal experience and library sources) would best yield the non-reactive quality that would be required for the most accurate assessment of affective inter-personal relationships (cf. Webb, et al., 1966). Furthermore, the categories provided will facilitate operational definitions for even quantitative data. The best results would be yielded by a combination of as many different methods as possible.

Merton's last point, 8, is the requirement that is the easiest to meet. No one can claim perfection with a theory, much less a beginner. Much empirical (and other) research is needed to verify several of the points presented in this theory. These spots are generally signified by a word like "speculate," and there is no point to list them all here. For recommendations for further study (which this attribute of theory seems to call for), it would be presumptuous to suggest that others will care to labor in order to verify this theory. Rather, others can direct their research according to their interests; then findings can no doubt be incorporated into this framework and will help verify this theory. The spots where more data

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are specifically needed will provide enough life work for this researcher.

If this theory is not a scoop into the core of what interpersonal relationships are all about, it at least seems to be a reaching in that direction. It is hoped that the sketchy knowledge of interpersonal behavior—especially its affective side—will be a little less sketchy as a result of it.

Epilogue

"All real living is meeting" and every meeting is a potential relationship. Yet two individuals have not fully met until they have done so informally as persons. "The primary word I-Thou can be spoken only with the whole being," never through an agency or means, for "Every means is an obstacle. Only when every means has collapsed does the meeting come about." These statements by Buber (1968, p. 46) aptly describe the need for intimate interpersonal relationships.

This study has attempted to trace the process of such interpersonal meeting. While in many cases the process is only conceptual or metaphorical (e.g. in case of family relationships), it is literal in an increasing number of cases. In today's urban mobile community, new strangers are "thrown together" daily. For many, having any close or intimate relationships depends on the cultivation of these encounters. Rogers (1968) is optimistic about their potential:

I believe there will be possibilities for the rapid development of closeness between and among persons, a closeness which is not artificial, but is real and deep,
and which will be well suited to our increasing mobility of living. Temporary relationships will be able to achieve the richness and meaning which heretofore have been associated only with lifelong attachments (pp. 268-269).

Other sources cited in this paper would disagree on the sufficiency of temporary relationships, emphasizing the importance of continuity. Perhaps the answer, again, is compromise. The actualization of one's freedom, or the demands imposed on one by the mobile society, often necessitate the severing of old ties; the same freedom, however, and the same opportunity for geographical mobility, can be put to use in keeping relationships intact. With modern transportation and communication systems, even an intimate relationship can be maintained—if necessity demands—while residing in separate communities. The second alternative is to refuse such a move. Much depends on how valuable the relationship is to the partners. This is one example of the "increasing responsibility given to the individual concerning the nature of his bond with another" (Paine, 1974, p. 14).

There are basically two problems that should be reviewed in this context. One is the apparent tension between the institutional, public order and one's personal loyalties; the other is the general impersonality that seems to result from mobility and institutional roles.

There is no question that organizational efficiency and personal, affective loyalties are in a tension. Any formal consequences of affective relationships are viewed by some as to "seriously endanger the modus operandi of bureaucracy--
its rationality, objectivity, and efficiency" (Schwartz, 1974, p. 73; cf. Weber, 1947). To view this from the other angle, "any claim for the fulfilment of the instrumental or political obligations may be seen as contrary to the pure elements of friendship." Neither of the twain, then seems to be willing to meet. "Only when they shade off into 'acquaintance' can these tensions disappear" (Eisenstadt, 1974, p. 142). Affective relationships are thus forced to "occupy a subsidiary position" in the bureaucratic organization, performing "such secondary functions as 'tension management'" (Schwartz, 1974, p. 73; cf. Bales, 1950). Thus worrying about private relationships would not concern the organization; being "friendly" to colleagues and subordinates would be enough.

In the name of organizational loyalty, an executive would thus move when requested to do so. To refuse a move in order to please his wife would mean to hurt himself professionally and—if he is highly valuable—to hurt his corporation's interests. Personal loyalty would have to give way to organizational loyalty, which would leave the man with two options: move with his reluctant wife and try his best to maintain a happy marriage with an unhappy wife (cf. Weiss, 1973, p. 155), or move by himself and maintain his marital relationship with weekend visits and telephone calls. Many professional couples, in fact, have lately resorted to the latter because of the demands of not only the husband's, but also the wife's profession.
This leads to the second, the more societal, problem; the possibility that maintaining one's close and intimate relationships in one community while residing in another may contribute to the impersonality of the community where one lives and works. One would thus treat the people in daily association with only superficial interest and attention; a fact already widely observable. One's acquaintances and casual friends would thus be through work, and presumably there would be little interest in cultivating these relationships since one's affective ties are with individuals in other communities. Furthermore, institutional life demands the maintaining of instrumental roles which can be seen as impersonal association.

Role relationships, however, need not be entirely impersonal. False personalization, in fact, may make them more so than when status differences are openly recognized and respected. Perhaps Erikson's (1968, p. 168) "distantiation," the counterpart of intimacy, has something to do with this. While it not need be a "readiness to repudiate, ignore, or destroy" the other, it can be a readiness to accept a certain distance. Just as "hostility is a closer relationship than indifference" (Oden, 1974, p. 18), openly accepted status difference implies a closer relationship than a falsely covered one, and a recognized distance a "closer" relationship than artificial closeness. Being close to some means being distant from others. Nothing is gained by institutional pseudo-intimacy.

Maintaining close and intimate relationships elsewhere need not rule out friendship per se in the community where one
works. Such a philosophy would imply a fixed amount of affectional resources (Forisha, 1978, p. 70), as was discussed earlier (pp. 167-168, in this thesis). Indications are that most individuals are capable of many warm relationships—although they need not be intimate; the reason for impersonality at work and private life may be more a routine the person has grown accustomed to, or a fear of invading the other's privacy, as well as the false personalization discussed above. Yet openness can be cultivated and each even passing relationship given undivided attention. Perhaps casual friendships can have all the warmth Rogers advocates.

They cannot, however, rule out the need for enduring close and intimate relationships, ones with history and future. Even if the partners are geographically separated, the maintenance of such relationships will enhance one's capacity for general warmth, enriching the passing encounters in daily life. Warm casual friendships, in turn, may enhance one's happiness in the intimate relationship which, then, can reside on a more positive basis than "commiserating." Each, rather than threatening the other, can thus enhance the other. That this is not only possible but desirable seems evident.

Viewed this way, friendship is the affective quality of any relationship. When it is the most important binding force between individuals, these individuals are called friends. When it is carried to its ultimate where a common identity is formed, the partners have become intimates. Similarly, intimacy is a quality of openness that can be found in various
degrees in relationships ranging from strangers to intimates. In the category of intimates, this quality is combined with the highest degree of friendship. Consequently, there is no real intimacy without friendship, nor warm, personal relationship of any kind without some element of friendship. Perhaps the classics were right in their view of friendship as "a unifying cosmic force" (Smith, 1935, p. 7). According to Aristotle, all social relationships grow out of friendship (Smith, 1935, p. 1). Parsons gives an example of this when he considers one of the central aspects of friendship, loyalty, as "the primitive precursor of solidarity" (cited in Douvan, 1977, p. 17).

Indications are (the encounter movement is one) that "Americans are dissatisfied with the depth of their human contacts" (Douvan, 1977, p. 30). There is a hunger for the real, authentic, and deep. To satisfy this hunger, however, one need not travel to a weekend marathon encounter session, or pay the fee to hire a professional "friend." There is no lack of people. Bell Telephone Company's helpful hint, "Reach out and touch someone!", can be put to practice not only audibly or manually but, most importantly, by the psychological "touch" that so many seem to miss.
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