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Charles Langlade in the French and Indian War

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CHARLES LANGLADE
IN THE
FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR

by

Paul M. Trap

A Project Report
Submitted to the
Faculty of the Graduate College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the
Degree of Specialist in Arts
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At the time when North America was being torn by conflict for control of the continent, Charles-Michel Mouet de Langlade became one of the most important Indian leaders in the Old Northwest. During the French and Indian War he led parties of Indian warriors in most of the major campaigns of the war, from the first fighting at Pickawillany to the French capitulation at Montreal in 1760. Langlade's Indians were typical of most Indian war-parties, both impairing the French cause by their atrocities and inappropriate actions and providing badly needed support in crucial situations.

This paper describes Langlade's actions during the North American phase of the Seven Years' War and examines the controversy over his possible role in the defeat of General Edward Braddock at Fort Duquesne.
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Paul M. Trap
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CHAPTER I
CHARLES LANGLADE

Throughout history wars and major campaigns have been planned in the world's capitals while the actual conflicts occur at far distances and are fought by men who serve their sovereigns without question or acknowledgement. The French and Indian War, the North American phase of the Seven Years' War, was no exception. While the grand strategy was formulated in London and Paris, the fighting and dying was done thousands of miles away by men loyal to kings they had never seen. Among these men were the Indians leaders who struggled to rally native Americans to fight what was in reality a war between European nations to protect their empires. Although these Indian leaders experienced great adventures and suffered extreme hardships, they have been forgotten in the passage of time. One of the most important of these Indian leaders was a man who lived most of his life near the shores of Lake Michigan—Charles-Michel Mouet de Langlade.

Charles Langlade was born at Michilimackinac in May 1729.¹ His father, Augustin Langlade, was a fur trader and

¹"Register of Baptisms of the Mission of St. Ignac de Michilimacinak," Collections of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin; hereafter referred to as WHC, 19:3.
a member of the minor nobility. Although Charles Langlade was a descendant of some of the most influential Canadian families, his position as a noble was compromised because his mother, Domitilde, was an Ottawa and half-breed nobles were an embarrassment to the French.¹

Langlade became an effective link between his Indian and European heritage in large part because of his mother's brother, the great Ottawa war-chief, Nissowaquet, better known to both the French and the British as La Fourche.²

When Langlade was only ten years old, Pierre-Joseph Celoron de Blainville, the commander at Michilimackinac, asked La Fourche to lead his people in a campaign against the Chickasaw in western Tennesse. La Fourche was reluctant because the Ottawa had already fought in two unsuccessful campaigns against these Indians. When Celoron continued to press the Ottawa chief, La Fourche agreed to withdraw to his lodge and pray for a message from the spirits.³


²Dictionary of Canadian Biography IV, s.v. "Nissowaquet," by David A. Armour.

After a week, La Fourche emerged from his lodge and announced that he would lead his people to war against the Chickasaw, but only if his young nephew would accompany him. Augustin Ianglade reluctantly agreed to allow his son to go and in 1739 the combined French-Indian expedition arrived at Chickasaw Bluffs.¹

The expedition itself was indecisive. The French were unable to penetrate the strong Chickasaw fortress while the Chickasaw were unable to drive away the besieging force or escape.² However, when the Chickasaw agreed to negotiate a peace treaty the Ottawa proclaimed that the expedition was

¹Charles Ianglade's participation in the 1739 Chickasaw campaign must be pieced together through circumstantial evidence. His grandson, Augustin Grignon, relates that Ianglade joined his uncle, La Fourche, on a war party when he was ten years old. Grignon, "Recollections," pp. 198-199. This date and his description of the action fit the Chickasaw campaign. The Michilimackinac Ottawa followed Céloron on the Chickasaw expedition. Louboey to Maurepas, New Orleans, 7 May 1738, Dunbar Rowland and A.G. Sanders, "The French Dominion, 1729-1740," Mississippi Provincial Archives, (Jackson: Mississippi Department of Archives and History, 1927- ), 1:364-366. It is also known that Augustin Ianglade sold supplies to the French and provided gifts for the Indians during this campaign. Supply Memorandums, Archives des Colonies, C11a, 73:263; C11a, 84:261-277; C11a, 83:319; Archives Nationales, Paris. Copies of all the Paris documents cited in this work came from the Public Archives of Canada in Ottawa.

a success and they believed that it was all due to the presence of young Langlade. They felt he was blessed with a special manitou or protecting spirit.¹

Soon after the Ottawa returned from the Chickasaw campaign they moved their village from Michilimackinac to L’Arbre Croche. Langlade strengthened his ties with the Indians by marrying Angelique, a young Indian girl. They had one child, a son, Charles Langlade Jr.² Soon after the start of the French and Indian War, Langlade dissolved this relationship and married Charlotte Bourassa, daughter of prominent Mackinac merchant Rene Bourassa.³ Langlade’s son was sent to Montreal where he was raised and educated.⁴

As Langlade cemented his relationship with the Ottawa he did not forget his ties with the French. His father paid the customary initiation fee and Langlade became a cadet in

¹Grignon, "Recollections," p. 199.
the French marine.¹

Les Compagnies Franches de la Marine was a naval unit, but from 1683 to 1756 it also served as the only regular military unit in Canada. The 1600 marines in Canada were divided into twenty-nine companies. Each company was led by a naval lieutenant who ranked as an infantry captain, two ensigns, and two cadets. Although the men in the marine only enlisted for eight year terms, most of them made the service a career, some serving for as long as thirty years. Pay was low, but the troops were allowed to farm, trade, or hire themselves out as laborers to supplement their incomes. Langlade continued to trade with his father throughout the French and Indian War.²

Although Augustin Langlade had paid the expected initiation fee of one month's salary to get his son into the service,³ the only way the young Langlade could advance was to prove his ability. Unlike many European military units, promotions and commissions could not be purchased in the French marine; they had to be earned. Langlade knew that if he could prove himself and demonstrate his abilities he could

¹"Register of Baptisms," WHC 19:29.


advance to ensign, then to lieutenant, and then hopefully be given a post command. As commander of a post he would have status and the opportunity to earn substantial profits and events were developing in the Ohio Valley which soon provided the young cadet an opportunity to prove himself.

CHAPTER II

THE ATTACK ON PICKAWILLANY

Control of the Ohio Valley was essential to French interests in North America. In addition to the rich trade potential of the valley itself, the Ohio River was a vital link in the main trade and communication route between the two colonial capitals, Quebec and New Orleans. Despite the importance of the area, the French had not fortified the Ohio Valley for they depended upon their Indian alliances and the barrier formed by the Appalachian mountains to keep the British from moving west. In the 1740's the situation changed and the French interests were threatened. During King George's War (War of Austrian Succession), a British naval blockade restricted the flow of supplies to Canada thus creating a shortage of goods for both the fur-trade and Indian gifts, the cornerstones of French Indian diplomacy. At the same time, the advancements of the Industrial Revolution in England lowered the cost of British trade goods. British traders, seeking to exploit their new competitive advantage, trickled into the rich Ohio region by following the old Indian migration routes through the mountains. As the Indians began to react to both the price and availability of English trade goods, the British traders stirred the Indians to break their alliances with the French and turn
against their former allies.¹

The British were successful in encouraging Nicolas (Orontony), a Huron chief living at Sandusky, to organize a conspiracy among a number of tribes to drive out the French. Among his followers were many of the Miami led by a Piankeshaw chief, La Demoiselle (Memeskie). Although the French felt threatened and a few small posts were attacked, the conspiracy collapsed in 1748 following the reinforcement of Detroit and the signing of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle ending King George's War.²

The treaty should have restored peace in North America, but in reality it only led to a period of intrigue which resulted in the French and Indian War. English traders, primarily from Pennsylvania and Virginia, continued to use their economic advantages to expand their trade and develop alliances with Indians who had previously been loyal to the French. They found a willing ally, La Demoiselle, and his


loyalty soon earned him the nickname, "Old Britain".\(^1\)

Although many Indians returned their loyalty to the French following the collapse of the Nicolas Conspiracy, La Demoiselle and his followers feared French retaliation and they moved from Kekionga (Fort Wayne, Indiana) to Tawixtwi (Picqua, Ohio) on Loramies Creek near the Miami River.\(^2\) When they built a stockade on the site, the Miami renamed the village, Pickawillany (Picktown). The site was important for it was at the start of the portage to the St. Mary's River and a number of important trails radiated from this point. Pickawillany grew rapidly as many disaffected Miami tried to move away from French domination.\(^3\)

Following the move to Pickawillany, La Demoiselle asked the Iroquois to help him secure a formal alliance with the


British. At first, the British were skeptical about his intentions thinking he was only trying to obtain British goods while French goods were in short supply, but bowing to Iroquois persuasion, they agreed to meet with the Indians from Ohio and invited them to Philadelphia. The site for the meeting was moved to Lancaster when the Indians heard rumors of a small-pox epidemic in Philadelphia. In July 1748, representatives from Pennsylvania and Virginia met with the Miami and after five days of negotiations a treaty was signed which formally tied the Miami to the British. The Miami were given gifts and the assurance of a steady supply of low-cost English goods. The British, in turn, secured their frontiers, opened a rich new area for British traders, and secured most of the Miami as allies. With this alliance, the British were in a position to effectively threaten the French.¹

The French were aware of the British coup and made moves to regain the Indian's allegiance. In the summer of 1749, Céloron, the former commander of Michilimackinac who had led the Ottawa against the Chickasaw ten years earlier, was or-

dered to visit the Indians of the Ohio Valley and reclaim the area for France. As Céloron traveled down the Ohio the weakness of the French position became apparent. He met British traders and encountered hostility among the Indians. Céloron's party was small and inexperienced, so he had to depend on diplomacy rather than force. Although he made a few mild threats, most of the time he simply pleaded with the Indians to return their loyalty to the French. As he traveled, he buried lead plates claiming the area for France. These plates infuriated the Indians who felt the French were trying to take their lands.¹

On the thirteenth of September, Céloron's party arrived at Pickawillany where they were greeted by La Demoiselle and forty warriors. The British traders fled when they heard of Céloron's approach, leaving only two workers who were ordered to leave. La Demoiselle and the elders of the tribe listened politely as Céloron promised the French would forgive the Miami for their past actions and demanded that they return to their old villages nearer Detroit. For a time it appeared that La Demoiselle might be persuaded. After receiving a sizeable gift, La Demoiselle promised to return to his old

village in the spring; but as Celoron pressed him for a date, a messenger arrived from the other Miami villages and La Demoiselle suddenly became belligerent. Celoron felt his young untried troops might be in danger so he retreated from Pickawillany and returned to Montreal. After he reported on the problems he had encountered, he was sent back to the west to take command of Detroit.

Soon after Celoron's departure, the British trader and Indian agent, George Croghan arrived at Pickawillany. He spent the winter of 1749-1750 trading and helping the Miami rebuild the stockade protecting their growing village. Under Croghan's influence, La Demoiselle urged the neighboring tribes to ally themselves with the British. In the summer of 1750, the French sent another emissary, Jean Coeur, to urge La Demoiselle to live up to his promise to Celoron and return to Kekionga. This time La Demoiselle made his intentions clear; he flatly refused to leave Pickawillany. The French, now aware that stronger action was needed, began to stock the magazine in Detroit as a preparation for war and parties of loyal Indians were sent out to capture British

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traders working in the Ohio Valley.¹

In 1751, activity intensified for all the parties involved with Pickawillany. On February 17, Croghan returned to the village with Andrew Montour and Christopher Gist to begin a new trading season. They helped the Miami strengthen the stockade and just outside the walls they began the construction of a stone storehouse for their goods. On the twenty-first, the Wea and the Piankashaw, branches of the Miami, arrived to meet the British traders and discuss joining the British alliance; but just as talks began, the village was thrown into a panic. A messenger rushed into the stockade with news that 400 Frenchmen and four Ottawa were approaching the village. Things settled down when the messenger acknowledged that he had lied; he just wanted to test the traders reaction. In reality, only four Ottawa chiefs were coming to meet with La Demoiselle.²


When the four chiefs entered the stockade carrying a French flag, they were escorted to the Miami longhouse for a conference. The traders and the representatives of the Wea and Piankashaw were invited to witness the proceedings. After the Ottawa presented La Demoiselle with a gift of tobacco and brandy, they repeated the French message. The French were willing to forgive the Miami for their past indiscretions, but the Miami were to stop trading with the British and return to their former villages on the Maumee. The Ottawa went on to add that this was the last time the French would peacefully ask for their return. When the Ottawa had finished their speech, La Demoiselle told them he had invited the British to trade in his village and he would stay in Pickawillany. If the French were angry and tried to attack his village, the Miami were ready. He did not realize how prophetic he was when he concluded by saying he would die rather than return to his old village. The Wea and Piankashaw, inspired by La Demoiselle's attitude, agreed to sign an alliance with the British traders.¹

The French, frustrated by their failures and now afraid there might be a general Indian uprising, made plans for an attack on Pickawillany, but they were unable to launch a successful assault. Céloron assembled a force of Indians

¹Darlington, Gist's Journals, pp. 51-53.
to join the Canadian militia in an attack upon the Miami. The Indians spent twenty days talking about the problems they might encounter and then refused to move until more French troops joined them. Céloron gave up, sent the Indians home, and began making plans for another expedition for the spring of 1752.¹

The governor of New France, Jacques-Pierre de Taffanel de La Jonquière, was furious over Céloron's inaction and he ordered François Picoté de Belestre to attack La Demoiselle. Belestre gathered a party of Canadian Indians and headed for Ohio, but when they reached Sandusky, most of his force deserted him. Belestre continued on with his remaining followers. When they reached Pickawillany, it was deserted. The Miami had fled when they heard that a French expedition was approaching. Belestre's Indians killed a few Miami stragglers and fearing an ambush, they made a hasty retreat. After Belestre left, the Miami returned and avenged the loss of their tribesmen by killing two French traders.²


Thus at the start of 1752, the French were in a precarious position. Most of the Indians of the Ohio Valley were following La Demoiselle's leadership and allying themselves with the British. They were threatening a general insurrection and the French allies were beginning to waver; even the Potawatomies as far north as St. Joseph had promised not to attack the Miami. French trade and communication were cut off and it was unsafe for any Frenchman to travel in the area. French efforts to coerce La Demoiselle had been ineffective and the Indians were ridiculing French power. Céloron was unable or unwilling to attack as ordered and Bellestre's raid had done more harm than good. Jonquière, fretted and worried about the situation until his health was affected. He resigned his position as governor, but he died before he could be replaced. The situation looked very dark to French officials in both Quebec and Paris, but they were soon to receive help from an unexpected source—Charles Langlade.

Langlade apparently had attended a conference Jonquière

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held with the western Indians in July 1751. During this conference the Indians were given wampum belts urging them to attack the rebellious Miami. It seems the interim leaders of Canada had forgotten about this conference, but Langlade had not. Following Jonquière's orders, Langlade spent the first months of 1752 rallying the Ottawa for the attack, traveling as far as Saginaw Bay to enlist the support of the Ottawa living there. The Indians gathered at Michilimackinac and on the third of June, Langlade and a force of 272 Ottawa began to move south. After four days the party reached Detroit and during a brief stay there about thirty of the Indians deserted, because they heard that many of the Miami had died of small-pox during the previous winter.

On June 21, while most of the Miami warriors were at their summer hunting camps, Langlade and his party, now re-

1 The attack on Pickawillany came as a pleasant but complete surprise to the French officials in Quebec. Bigot to the Minister, Quebec, 26 October 1752, Archives des Colonies, Cilla, 18:175-186, Archives Nationales, Paris. Faber Langlade's commanding officer, must have been aware of Langlade's orders and he signed for his expenses. List of Expenses, 3 June 1752, Archives des Colonies, Cilla, 119:291-316, Archives Nationales, Paris.

duced to 240 Indians and one other unidentified Frenchman, stealthily approached Pickawillany. From the cover of the surrounding forest they watched the activities of the village and at 9:00 a.m. they suddenly rushed from their hiding places and charged the stockade. They caught the Miami by complete surprise. The women working in the cornfields dropped their hoes and joined the traders in a mad rush for the protection of the stockade, but not all of them reached it safely. Thirteen Miami were killed and four women were captured. The blacksmith was wounded and three of the nine British traders were trapped outside the walls.¹ The three traders secured themselves within their strong storehouse where they were well supplied with arms and ammunition. As the attackers positioned themselves around the Miami's fortification, the men inside the walls yelled encouragement to the trapped traders and urged them to fight for their lives.²

But, the three traders refused to defend themselves

¹The nine British subjects at Pickawillany were; James Dovey, Joseph Stevens, John Evans, George Henery, and Owen Nicholson who were captured, Andrew Browne and Alexander Mac Donald were killed, and Thomas Burney and Andrew McBryer who escaped. Deposition of English traders, 2 February 1753, IHC 29:811-812; Goodman ed., Trent's Journal, pp. 86-88.

and as soon as they were promised that their lives would be spared, they surrendered. The traders informed Langlade that there were only twenty men and boys within the stockade. When he heard this news, Langlade carried a truce flag toward the stockade and asked the Miami to parley. He and the Ottawa presented the wampum belts they had received from Jonquière and assured the Miami that they did not want to kill them or the traders. If the Miami would return to their old villages, they could go peacefully. He offered to exchange the women they had captured for the traders. The traders would not be harmed, but their goods would be seized and they would be taken prisoner. The Miami and the traders conferred. La Demoiselle did not want to surrender or give up the traders. The traders reminded him of the Miami's precarious position; they were badly outnumbered and while the fortress was secure, the well had run dry so there was no water to drink. La Demoiselle and the Miami yielded to the traders urging and reluctantly agreed to accept Langlade's terms.¹

The Miami violated their agreement to surrender all of the traders by hiding Thomas Burney and Andrew McBryer, thus saving them from capture, but this was not the only violation of the truce. When the blacksmith emerged from the

stockade, the Ottawa saw that he had been wounded, they rushed upon him, quickly killed him, cut open his chest, tore out his heart, and ate it. Langlade and the Ottawa seized La Demoiselle and dragged him outside the stockade. The residents of Pickawillany, including La Demoiselle's wife and son, Ellonagoa Pyangencha (Autoatwa), were ordered to stand outside the stockade so they could witness what was about to transpire.  

As the Miami watched in horror their chief was killed by the Ottawa. His body was then butchered, boiled, and eaten. Indians occasionally ate portions of a fallen foe's body to show honor or in hopes of gaining the attributes of a respected opponent; but in this instance it appears that La Demoiselle was eaten simply to terrify his people.

Following the murder of La Demoiselle, Langlade and

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2 Ibid.

the Ottawa gathered the traders' supplies, valued at £3000, killed the traders' horses, burned most of the Miami village and left with their British captives. When the raiders departed, Burney and McBryer came out of hiding and quickly left the area, heading back to the British settlements in the east. At Shawneetown, they met Captain William Trent who was traveling to Pickawillany to deliver a gift from the Virginia Assembly.¹

Burney returned to Pickawillany with Trent, but when they arrived, fifteen days after the attack, the village was deserted. The Miami had abandoned the site and most of them had returned to their old villages. Trent and Burney gathered and cleaned a few furs they found scattered in the area and removed the French flag flying over the charred stockade before returning to Shawneetown where they found La Demoiselle's son and widow. They presented the present from the Virginia assembly to La Demoiselle's family and promised that the British would continue to help their tribe.²

¹Indian Speech to Trent and Burney, in Goodman, Trent's Journal, pp. 48-49; Deposition of the English Traders, 2 February 1753, IHC 29:811-812. Burney and McBryer later joined Braddock's expedition against Fort Duquesne. Burney was killed and McBryer was captured. Darlington, Gist's Journals, p. 125n.

²Collender to the Governor, Carlisle, 30 August 1752, Pennsylvania Colonial Records, 5:599-600; Dinwiddie to the Board of Trade, Williamsburg, 10 December 1752, in Goodman, Trent's Journal, pp. 73-81; Goodman, Trent's Journal, pp. 19-92, 97; Anson, Miami, p. 51.
Langlade and his followers brought their prisoners to Detroit and then escorted them to Quebec where the prisoners and booty were presented to the new governor, Ange Duquesne de Menneville. Duquesne could not fail to be impressed at this resolution of a problem he had been ordered to deal with. Duquesne was very complimentary toward Langlade and when reporting Langlade's action to authorities in Paris, he stated; "He is acknowledged here to be very brave, to have much influence on the minds of the Indians, and to be very zealous when ordered to do anything."

Duquesne created some confusion by requesting a pension for Langlade because he was not aware that Langlade was in the service, but Langlade had been a cadet for at least two years. The pension request was not approved, so two years

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1 The prisoners were placed in a dungeon in Quebec until they could be transferred to the prison at La Rochelle in France. They were released on 6 January 1753. Duquesne to the Minister, Quebec, 25 October 1752, WHC 18:128-131; Deposition of the English Traders, 2 February 1753, IHC 29:811-812.

2 Minute of Instructions to Duquesne, April 1752, NYCD 10:242-245; Rouillé to Duquesne, 15 May 1752, IHC 29:627-630; Bigot to the Minister, Quebec, 26 October 1752, Archives des Colonies, Cll.a, 18:175-186, Archives Nationales, Paris.

3 Duquesne to the Minister, Quebec, 25 October 1752, WHC 18:128-131. Duquesne sent Langlade's journal of his expedition to Pickawillany with this letter. Unfortunately, this journal has been lost. WHC 18:128n.

later (1754) Duquesne again wrote the French Ministry stating that since Langlade had not been given a pension, he should be granted a commission as ensign, half-pay. Duquesne argued that Langlade’s relationship with the Indians was valuable and a promotion would help motivate him if his services were needed again. The King agreed and on March 15, 1755, Charles Langlade was promoted to ensign.²

The British, who had depended upon their economic power to secure the allegiance of the Indians of the Ohio Valley, failed to use this power effectively following Langlade’s attack. Both the Pennsylvania and Virginia assemblies voted gifts for the Miami following the fall of Pickawillany,² but these gifts did little to restore the Indian’s confidence. The Pennsylvania gift was held up by Governor James Hamilton, who was afraid the French might seize any gift given to the Miami,³ and the Virginia gift was not presented until 1753; too late to be of any value.⁴ The Miami who had

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¹Duquesne to Machault, 10 October 1754, IHC 29:904-905; Langlade’s Commission, Versailles, 15 March 1755, WHC 18:145.


⁴Dinwiddie to Cresap and Trent, Williamsburg, 10
suffered the force of French military power, felt abandoned by the British and returned to their French allegiance, remaining loyal until New France fell in 1760.¹

Langlade certainly gained acclaim for his attack on Pickawillany, but this action was far more significant than any increase in personal stature. In one swift and telling blow, he stopped the British incursions into French territory, forced the Miami to return to their former homes closer to the French forts, realigned the Indians to the French cause, and set the stage for the "Great War for Empire" in North America. Indeed, it can be argued that the attack on Pickawillany was the first real battle of the French and Indian War. Following Langlade's success, the French tried to solidify their position in the Ohio Valley and constructed a series of new forts. These forts were a threat to the British and in 1755 General Edward Braddock was sent to drive the French from the forks of the Ohio.²

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CHAPTER III

BRADDOCK'S DEFEAT

In the early summer of 1857, Charles Langlade's grandson, Augustin Grignon, then seventy-seven years old, sat with the noted historian, Lyman C. Draper, and retold the stories he had heard from his grandfather.¹ On the whole, this narrative is surprisingly accurate. But, Grignon's description of Langlade's role in Braddock's defeat has created controversy among historians for more than a century. A discussion of Langlade's possible role in the battle along the Monongahela is essential for a complete study of his action's in the French and Indian War.

Since the defeat of General Edward Braddock is one of the best known battles of the French and Indian War it is hardly necessary to detail the events leading to the battle.²


In brief, Braddock was sent to North America with two undermanned regiments to launch a series of attacks on key French posts. Braddock chose to lead the attack on Fort Duquesne himself, but his arrogance and his refusal to listen to the advice of provincial officers accustomed to wilderness warfare retarded his approach to the French fort. After spending thirty-two days marching just 110 miles, he finally neared his destination in early July 1755.

According to the Grignon account, Langlade was at Fort Duquesne with a large party of northwest Indians, raised under orders from Vaudreuil, who had become governor of Canada the previous year. Among the Indians Langlade led to the fort were his uncle, La Fourche, and Pontiac, who became famous following the British victory in Canada. Soon after Langlade's arrival, scouts reported that Braddock's army was just a half-day's march away.¹

On the morning of July 9, Daniel Hyacinthe-Marie Lénnard de Beaujeu, leading all the French who could be spared from the fort, and Langlade, leading the Indians, went out to meet the British as they crossed the Monongahela. The French force secured itself on the edge of the river and

watched as the British reached the river and stopped for lunch. While the British enjoyed their mid-day meal, unaware of the French presence, Langlade pleaded with a reluctant Beaujeu to attack the British while they were resting and before they crossed the river. Beaujeu did not reply, so Langlade assembled the chiefs and urged them to request orders for an immediate attack. When Beaujeu failed to respond to the chiefs, Langlade again begged him to attack at once if he was going to attack at all, for the British were too powerful to be met in open battle--The time to attack was while the British had set their weapons aside to eat! Beaujeu, disheartened by the size of the British force, saw no hope for success, but following the urging of Langlade and the chiefs, he gave the order to attack.¹

When the order to attack was finally given, the Indians acted so quickly and effectively that many of the British officers died with their dinner napkins still tucked into their coats. The French held the upper ground and they were able to shoot down on the hapless British soldiers. Beaujeu was killed in the battle, but the French and Indian losses were small--most of them were killed by falling branches, shot down by British cannons firing over the heads of the attackers.²

¹Ibid.
²Ibid.
After the British were driven back, Langlade kept order on the battlefield. He secured the vast quantity of supplies the British left behind and poured out the liquor carried by the British soldiers. The Indians, unhappy about the destruction of the liquor, had to content themselves with plundering the dead.¹

In his narration, Grignon stated that his grandfather should be hailed as the hero of the French victory and his view was shared by the eminent Canadian historian, Joseph Tassé. After all, Langlade and his Indian companions had convinced a reluctant Beaujeu to attack a resting British force before it crossed the river and Langlade had even prevented any Indian atrocities by destroying the liquor found among the British casualties.²

The British seem to confirm Grignon's position, for De Peyster, Anbury, Burgoyne, and Simcoe all credited Langlade with planning and executing the attack which proved fatal to Braddock and so disastrous to the British.³

¹Ibid.
³Arent Schuyler De Peyster, commander at Michilimackinac during the early years of the Revolution described Langlade as. "A French officer who had been instrumental in defeating General Braddock..." De Peyster, Miscellanies by an Officer, ed., J. Watts De Peyster, (Dumfries, Scotland: C. Munro, 1813), p. 7n.; Anbury in describing the Indians who were about to join Burgoyne's army stated, "They are
While at first glance the evidence supporting the Langlade-Grignon narrative seems impressive, an examination of the accounts of the battle and the official records of the French victory raises serious questions about Langlade's role.¹

The Langlade-Grignon account claims that Langlade planned the attack while he was observing the British while they were eating,² but French records indicate that the plans for an ambush were made during a conference held by Claude-Pierre Pécaudy de Contrecœur, commander at Fort Duquesne, under the direction of a Monsieur St. Luc and one Langlade, both of whom were great partisans of the French last war; the latter was the person who planned and executed, with the nations he is now escorting the defeat of General Braddock." Thomas Anbury, Travels Through the Interior Parts of North America, 2 vols. (Boston: Riverside Press, 1923); also printed as With Burgoyne From Quebec, ed. Sydney Jackman, (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1963), p. 151. Burgoyne described Langlade as "... the very man who projected and executed with these very nations, the defeat of General Braddock." Burgoyne to Germaine, Skanesborough, 11 July 1777, John Burgoyne, A State of the Expedition From Canada, (London: J. Almon, 1780; reprint ed., New York: Arno Press, 1969) Appendix VIII, pp. xxxvi-xxxix. After the Revolutionary War, Simcoe wrote Alexander McKee asking, "Do you know Mr. Langlade of La Baye, who has offered his services to Captain Doyle? He is said to have led the Indians in Braddock's defeat." Simcoe to McKee, 13 August 1794, E.A. Cruickshank, ed., The Correspondence of Lieut Governor John Graves Simcoe, 5 vols. (Toronto: Ontario Historical Society, 1923-1931), 5:103.

¹Most of the significant accounts of the battle are recorded and evaluated in Kopperman, Braddock at the Monongahela, Appendixes A-F, pp. 135-274. In this study many of these documents are cited from earlier sources.

on the night before the battle.¹

The French and Indian² force left Fort Duquesne at eight o'clock on the morning of the ninth under the leadership of Beaujeu, Jean-Daniel Dumas, and Francois-Marie Le Marchand de Lignery. They planned to ambush the British at a site Beaujeu had selected the day before.³

But, it took the French force over four hours to travel from the fort to the site of the planned ambush, only four miles away. This unusually long period of time indicates that there was a problem along the way and contrary to the Langlade-Grignon account, French records indicate that the problem was the reluctance of the Indians to march against the much larger British army. After unsuccessfully pleading with his Indian allies, Beaujeu challenged them by shouting, "I am determined to go out against the enemy.

¹J.C.B., Travels, pp. 82-85; An Account of the Battle of the Monongahela, 9 July 1755, NYCD 10:303-304.

²Among the Indians there was a large war party from Michilimackinac. Contrecœur to Vaudreuil, Fort Duquesne, 14 July 1755, Collection Moreau de Saint-Méry, AC, F³, 14:100-104; Vaudreuil to the Minister, Montreal, 5 August 1755, Collection Moreau de Saint-Méry, AC, F³, 14:112-120, Archives Nationales, Paris; Minutes of the Indian Council, Detroit, 10 September 1761, Johnson Papers-Miscellaneous Documents, Reel C-1221-110, Canadian Archives, Ottawa.

I am certain of victory. What! Will you allow your father to depart alone?" Beaujeu's challenge goaded the Indians into following him. They painted themselves, gathered their weapons, and marched toward the foe.¹

Shortly after noon, the French force approached the site Beaujeu had selected for the ambush, but they were too late. The British had crossed the river and were advancing toward the fort. Beaujeu ordered an immediate attack and led a dramatic charge. Dressed in a fringed hunting shirt and wearing a large silver gorget to show his rank, he ran toward the British with long leaping bounds while waving his hat high above his head--hardly the actions of a reluctant leader.²

The Langlade-Grignon tradition maintains that because of Langlade's urging, Beaujeu agreed to attack while the British were eating and prior to their crossing the river.³ In reality the British would not have stopped for lunch

¹Sargent, Expedition Against Fort Duquesne, p. 223; Montgomery E. Mc Intosh, "Charles Langlade-First Settler of Wisconsin," Parkman Club Publications, 8 (September 1896): 211; Lyman C. Draper, "Historical Notices," WHC 5:115.


because their advance parties were not carrying food. They had started their march at 2:00 a.m. and stopped for breakfast at 9:00 a.m., but only about one man in twenty had anything to eat. Further, all sources, both French and British, agree that the attack took place after the British had crossed the river. Indeed, simple logic would indicate that the river would have formed a barrier between the opposing forces.

At the start of the battle, the British tried to draw their troops into lines, wheeled their cannons into position, and began firing grapeshot. Beaujeu was killed and the Indians, seeing their leader struck down and fearing the cannon fire, drew back. De Lignery rallied the French troops and silenced the cannons. Dumas was then able to bring the Indians back into the battle and position them in a half-moon around the British troops.

The outcome was in doubt for some time as the British fought bravely against an enemy they could not see. But,

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1Journal of Captain Robert Chomley's Batman, in Hamilton, Braddock's Defeat, p. 27.

after four hours, when they had lost all semblance of order and had suffered frightful losses, Braddock, who was mortally wounded, ordered a retreat which rapidly degenerated into a disorganized scramble for safety.¹

Following the British withdrawal, the Indians plundered the dead and contrary to the Langlade-Grignon account, they debauched themselves with British liquor. The western Indians from Detroit and Michilimackinac deserted Fort Duquesne the following day, much to the dismay of Contrecoeur and Dumas who feared another assault.²

French accounts consistently credit Beaujeu, Dumas, and de Lignery with the victory over Braddock.³ Langlade's name is not mentioned in any contemporary French records.⁴


²J.C.B., Travels, pp. 82-85; Contrecoeur, to Vaudreuil, Fort Duquesne, 14 July 1755, Collection Saint-Méry, AC, F³, 14:100-104, Archives Nationales, Paris.

³Ibid.; Vaudreuil to the Minister, Montreal, 5 August 1755, Collection Saint-Méry, AC, F³, 14:112-120, Archives Nationales, Paris; An Account of the Battle of the Monongahela, 9 July 1755, NYCD 10:303-304.

⁴Tassé argued that Langlade did not receive credit for his role in Braddock's defeat because he was a Canadian and the regular French officers were reluctant to give credit to any Canadian. Tassé, "Memoir de Langlade," pp. 130-135. This position is weak. Langlade was given full credit for his action at Pickawillany despite his background. Of the
The British records which credit Langlade with the victory were all written after he had joined the British Indian Service during the Revolutionary War and none of the British writers were present at the battle.

The evidence clearly indicates that Langlade was not the hero of the French victory on the Monongahela, but another question remains: Was he even there?

Following the defeat of Braddock, the French drew up a list of officers present at the battle. The list includes the names of three captains, four lieutenants, six ensigns, and twenty-three cadets, including many Canadians, but the list does not include the name of Charles Langlade, a good indication that he was not present. Langlade had three leading French participants in Braddock's defeat, only Dumas was a recent arrival from France. Both Beaujeu and de Lignery were second-generation Canadian officers, yet they received credit for their actions.


2In 1769, Captain Forbes MacLean, a British officer serving in Montreal, drew up a list of French officers present at Braddock's defeat and wrote it in the inner cover of Lieut. Spendlow's journal, now generally referred to as the Seaman's Journal. Like the earlier lists, this record makes no mention of Langlade. Laws, "R.N. and R.A. in Virginia," p. 205; Journal of Major General Braddock's March, B 3/5, Royal Artillery Institution, London.
just been promoted to ensign, and he was well known among the French officers because of his actions at Pickawillany. If he was leading a party of Indians under orders from Vaudreuil, he certainly would have reported to Contrecœur. Since his name does not appear on the list of officers present at the battle and his description of the event varies so much from the official records, it must be assumed that he was not present at the battle and he probably remained at Michilimackinac during this period.²

It appears that Langlade's supposed role at Fort Duquesne was a complete fabrication. He probably learned of the battle from the Indians who were there, from reports given to the commander at Michilimackinac, Louis Lienard de Beaujeu, brother of the fallen hero of the French victory, and from tales he heard while he served at Fort Duquesne the following year. Langlade may have created this story to impress the British and make himself appear more valuable when he joined their Indian Service, and years later he no doubt used the story to impress his neighbors and family. Grignon acknowledges that his grandfather en-


²Langlade was present at Michilimackinac on 25 May and on 18 August 1755, but there are no known records which indicate his whereabouts between these dates. "Register of Marriages," WHC 18:482.
joiced talking about his escapades, bragging about his ninety-nine battles. As everyone knows, when stories of great adventures are re-told the truth tends to suffer.

It is unfortunate that Langlade found it necessary to make-up this story for it tarnishes his image and it takes away from the truly significant role he played for the French during their last war in Canada.

With the defeat of Braddock, it was obvious that there would be a major conflict and the French would need the continued assistance of the Indians. On October 15, four months after Braddock's defeat, Herbin ordered Langlade to establish a trading post at the mouth of the Grand River, (Grand Haven, Michigan). Herbin was giving Langlade more than just an opportunity to trade, he was to act as an Indian agent and supervisor over all the traders in the area. He was to make sure the Indians remained loyal and stayed concentrated in the area so they could be assembled quickly when they were needed. He was also to oversee the activities of the other traders to make sure they did not alienate the Indians by cheating them.

The Langlades packed their belongings and the supplies

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2Herbin to Langlade, Michilimackinac, 15 October 1755, WHC 8:211-213.
they needed for the winter and departed for the Grand River. Charlotte sat for hours in their canoe during the voyage of over 200 miles. In late October fall storms developed on Lake Michigan and cold water sprayed into their frail craft during much of the rough journey. The trip was difficult under normal circumstances and to add to her discomfort, Charlotte was more than five months pregnant. She must have been heavy-hearted as she traveled for she knew that her first child would be born in a trader's hut, miles from any help other than the near-by Indians. Charlotte stood the hardships well and in late January 1756, Father Lefranc visited the isolated couple and baptised their baby daughter, Charlotte Catherine.¹

The baby was publicly re-baptised in the church at Michilimackinac when the Langlades returned to the post in April. Three years later, on January 30, 1759, Charlotte gave birth to a second daughter, Louise Domittelle, but this time she stayed in the relative comfort of Michilimackinac.² Charles Langlade saw little of his daughters during their infancy because of his active engagement in the French and Indian War.


²"Register of Baptisms," WHC 19:44, 56.
A SKIRMISH WITH ROBERT ROGERS

Following Braddock's defeat, George Washington wrote Robert Dinwiddie, Virginia's governor, stating: "I tremble at the consequences that this defeat may have on our back settlers." Washington had every reason to be concerned for the Marquis de Vaudreuil, the new governor of Canada, and Dumas planned to use Fort Duquesne as the base for a campaign of terror directed against frontier settlers in Pennsylvania, Virginia, and parts of New England. Langlade soon became a part of these plans.

When Langlade returned to Michilimackinac in the spring of 1756, he joined Louis Legardeur, Chevalier de Repentigny and Louis Herbin, Jr. who were making preparations to join the offensive in the east. In early summer they led a band of 700 Indians from the Michilimackinac area to join the French forces at Fort Duquesne.

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2Eccles, France in America, pp. 184-190; Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, pp. 234-240.

3Herbin to Langlade, Michilimackinac, 15 October 1755, WHC 8:211-213; J.C.B. Travels, p. 88; Abstract of Dispatches From America, Fort Duquesne, August 1756, Pennsylvania Archives-2nd Series, 6:353-359.
Upon their arrival, the Indians were divided into war parties, each under the command of a French officer. The Indians were to attack and plunder frontier farms and settlements, while the officers were to prevent any unnecessary cruelties. The officers' task was impossible for the Indians fought as they had always fought. Everyone was a participant in their eyes and they did not distinguish between civilians and soldiers. These raiding parties became known for their brutality and became the basis for numerous sensational novels which helped to create the image of the blood-thirsty savage.¹

In addition to attacking frontier settlements, Langlade's war party was ordered to reconnoiter Fort Cumberland. The fort was built as a trading post by the Ohio Company and had served as a supply base for Braddock's expedition. Dumas felt the fort was a threat so in August he ordered Langlade to scout the fort and if possible attack and destroy it. The results of this mission were not recorded, but the fort was not destroyed or even attacked.²


²Dumas to Langlade, Fort Duquesne, 9 August 1756, WHC 8:218; Pennsylvania Archives-2nd Series, 6:380; Louis Antoine Bougainville, Adventure in the Wilderness: The Amer-
Although Fort Cumberland remained undisturbed the Indian raids had a major impact; seven hundred English settlers were killed or captured, numerous farms and even three stockaded villages had been destroyed, and farmers abandoned their land and returned to the seacoast. The frontier militia was paralyzed and it became impossible to organize attacks on French positions because the frontiersmen were afraid to leave their homes undefended.¹

In September the Indians and their leaders went to Fort Carillon (Ticonderoga), the new French fortress on Lake Champlain, to meet the new French commander, the Marquis de Montcalm and receive rewards for their services. After a feast and festivities, the western Indians began the long journey home for their winter hunting.²

The Ottawa, the Chippewa, and the Potawatomis had a second audience with Montcalm when they stopped at Montreal as they traveled back to their villages. During this meeting, Montcalm divided the Indians into two parties; one

¹Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, p. 152; Lowdermilk, Cumberland, Maryland, pp. 209-213.
²Bougainville, Adventure, pp. 31-41.
group would return home to hunt and come back in the spring with additional warriors while the second group returned to Carillon with Langlade to help patrol the southern end of Lake Champlain. As 1756 drew to a close, Langlade was in charge of a party scouting the British at forts Edward and William Henry.¹

Langlade and his party were not the only scouts on the southern end of Lake Champlain. In March 1756, the British organized an independent company of Rangers under the leadership of Robert Rogers, a restless New Hampshire farmer who had proven his ability and bravery while serving in Sir Wm. Johnson's 1755 expedition against Ste. Frédéric (Crown Point). By early 1757, Roger's Rangers were popular heroes, not because of the importance of their exploits, but because of the failure of other British actions. Langlade and Rogers met for the first time on a cold rainy day, just a few miles from Carillon.²

The first months of winter had been frustrating for Rogers and his men because they were ordered to stay near


Fort Edward in case of a French attack, but on January 15, they were allowed to move to Fort Wm. Henry and begin to scout the French forts to the north. Upon reaching Fort Wm. Henry, Rogers fitted his men with snowshoes and moved north until they reached a point midway between the French posts, Carillon and Ste. Frédéric, where they set up a camp near the shore of Lake Champlain.¹

While the Rangers were scouting along the shore on the twenty-first they saw a pair of French sleds carrying supplies between the French forts. Rogers ordered Lieutenant John Stark to take half of the Rangers and move ahead of the sleds to cut them off while he took the remaining men and moved to the rear to cut off any chance for escape. As Rogers moved back he saw that the sleds they were about to pounce upon were being followed by eight more sleds. He sent a message to Stark warning him of the situation and ordering him not to attack, but it was too late! When the messenger reached Stark, he and his men were already on the ice moving toward the sleds.²

Since Stark had begun his attack, Rogers had no choice but to join the attack, so he charged the second group of sleds and, of course, they turned and headed back to Carillon as soon as Rogers came into view. Rogers and his men captured three of the sleds and took seven prisoners, but the others escaped and returned to the fort to report the attack. Rogers soon learned from the prisoners how desperate the Rangers' situation really was: A force of 200 Canadians under the command of M. Basserode and forty-five Ottowa led by Langlade had just arrived at Carillon and they were prepared to move at a moments notice.  

Rogers ordered the Rangers to return to their camp and build fires to dry out their weapons. At the same time the French, aroused by the men who returned with the sleds, sent Basserode and Langlade to intercept the Rangers. When the French force located the Rangers they set an ambush. After the Rangers dried their guns, they broke camp and began moving single file through the wet, four foot deep snow. At two o'clock they came down a hill and started passing through a narrow valley, but just as they reached the end of the valley they heard an ominous clicking sound as the French cocked their guns. The volley which followed was only par-  

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1Bougainville, Adventure, pp. 81-82; Rogers, Journal, pp. 39-40; Cuneo, Rogers, pp. 47-48; Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, pp. 307-308; Stark, Memoir, pp. 408-413.
tially effective because the guns of the Indians and the Canadians were wet, but two Rangers were killed and others were wounded. Among the wounded was Rogers himself.¹

Following the aborted volley, the French party charged the Rangers and forced them to retreat to a hill at the end of the valley where large trees offered some protection to the Rangers. Rogers sent out flanking parties which kept the French force from surrounding them. The skirmish continued all afternoon with losses on both sides. When Rogers was wounded again, this time through the hand and wrist so he could not reload his gun, he wanted to order a retreat, but Stark convinced him to wait until nightfall.²

Whenever the gunfire quieted down the French called to Rogers and his men asking them to surrender. At first, they tried intimidation by describing the severe treatment the Rangers would receive if they resisted and emphasized their threats by scalping the men who had fallen during the retreat through the valley. The French also tried flattery, calling Rogers by name and saying it would be a shame for such a brave man to die when he could surrender with the promise of good treatment. Rogers answered that he and his

¹Ibid.
Rangers would fight to the last man if necessary.¹

The Rangers were in an extremely dangerous position. They were pinned down only three miles from Carillon where the French could obtain reinforcements and supplies while the Rangers had no hope for assistance. Their only chance was escape. When night fell, the Rangers gathered their wounded, silently moved off the hill, and slipped away without notice. They walked all night and by 8:00 a.m. they were beyond the last French positions. It was impossible for the wounded to continue and despite the activity of the previous day and the exertion of the all night march, Stark volunteered to continue on to Fort Wm. Henry for help. Later that same day he returned with sleds to carry the wounded.²

After the battle both sides exaggerated enemy losses while minimizing their own. General James Abercrombie, the new British commander, congratulated Rogers when he heard that the Rangers had suffered only fourteen killed and six captured while inflicting 116 casualties upon the French and their Indian allies. At the same time, Montcalm's aide, Louis Antoine de Bougainville happily recorded that the French force had killed forty-two Rangers while losing only

²Bougainville, Adventure, pp. 81-82; Cuneo, Rogers, p. 47.
nine soldiers and one Indian.¹

During and immediately following the engagement, both sides were guilty of atrocities. Before his escape, Rogers ordered the execution of the French prisoners so they could not warn their comrades of the Rangers' movements.² Langlade had to discipline his Indian allies for allowing their women to torture one of the Rangers until he committed suicide by throwing himself into a fire when he could no longer endure the pain.³

Langlade and his Ottawa returned to action around Carillon⁴ while Rogers returned to Albany for treatment of his wounds.⁵ At that time, neither man would have been able to imagine how their paths would cross again.⁶

¹Rogers, Journal, pp. 45-49; Bougainville, Adventure, pp. 81-82.
²Cuneo, Rogers, p. 47.
³The torture of the unidentified Ranger was witnessed by Thomas Brown who later escaped and reported the incident. Cuneo, Rogers, pp. 48-50; 31 January 1757, "Journal de L'Expedition et du Siege de Chougen," Rapport de L'Archiviste de la Province de Quebec, 1923-24, p. 248.
⁵Rogers, Journal, p. 49.
⁶In 1766, Rogers became commander at Michilimackinac and thus also became Langlade's superior. When Rogers was arrested for treason he tried to get La Fourche to free him. Cuneo, Rogers, pp. 191-233.
While on patrol near the British forts, Langlade, like Rogers, tried to capture a sled. From a captured sentry, Langlade learned that a sled carrying a large amount of money, being sent by the paymaster, was expected soon. An ambush was set, but as the sled approached a dog owned by another French officer barked warning the driver of possible danger. He turned around before the French party could reach his sled, but his escort was captured. Langlade ran ahead and jumped on the sled just as the driver cracked his whip and started his escape. Langlade held on as the sled raced back down the trail. When the driver drew his pistol to shoot his unwanted passenger, Langlade seized the weapon. The driver then used his whip to alternately beat his horse and Langlade. Langlade, who had no desire to visit the British post or to continue to endure the driver's beating, jumped off the sled and kept the pistol as a souvenir. After the war, Langlade met the driver in Canada and they had many laughs as they shared their memories of the incident.¹

During the winter, many Indian war parties were sent out from Carillon, but their usefulness was limited. The Indians went where they wanted and frequently raided settlers rather than patrolling military targets. The Indians

¹Grignon states that this incident took place at Fort Duquesne, but since Langlade never spent a winter at Fort Duquesne it must be assumed that the incident took place during the winter of 1756-57, the only one he spent on the field during the war. Grignon, "Recollections," pp. 215-216.
from Carillon, at times, penetrated to within seventy-five miles of Boston, but they were seldom able to inform the French about what was happening at nearby forts.¹

Even when the Indians scouted the British as they were asked, the results often left something to be desired. For example, in June 1757, Langlade led a group of one hundred Indians on a scouting expedition against Fort Edward. They paddled their canoes to the southern tip of Lake George and then walked to the fort where they took four prisoners and gathered six scalps. When the garrison within the fort became aware of the Indians presence they charged from the fort to try to save their fellow soldiers. The undisciplined Indians turned and ran when the first shots were fired. Rather than regroup or reorganize themselves, they fled on foot all the way back to Carillon. It was then that they realized they had left their canoes behind and they had to walk back to get them.²

Following this incident, Langlade went to Montreal to meet his friends who were coming from Michilimackinac.

¹Bougainville, Adventure, p. 108; Casgrain, Journal Montcalm, pp. 216-217.
²Bougainville, Adventure, p. 116.
CHAPTER V

FORT WILLIAM HENRY

When it became apparent that Lord Loudon, commander of the British forces in North America, was going to concentrate his efforts against the great fortress at Louisbourg, Vaudreuil and Montcalm made plans to attack the British forts protecting the New York frontier and, if possible, even threaten Albany. During the winter French emissaries met with Indians throughout the west urging them to join the war against the British. Promises of gifts, rum, and plunder drew over 1800 Indians to Montreal in late June 1757.¹

When Langlade arrived at Montreal following his expedition against Fort Edward, he found that his uncle, La Fourche, was among the Indians who had come down from Michilimackinac with Herbin, the post's commander. Langlade and Herbin were placed under the command of St. Luc de la Corne who was in charge of the Indian forces. Langlade and Herbin each took charge of about half of the 337 Ottawa who came to Montreal.²

¹Bougainville, Adventure, pp. 117-125; Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, pp. 328-330.
²Order of March for the Expedition Against Fort Wil-
On the first of July, Vaudreuil and Montcalm met with the western Indians including those serving under Langlade. Following the customs of Indian diplomacy, the French leaders accepted wampum belts from the Indians and listened to their speeches of loyalty and praise on the first day of the council and on the second day Vaudreuil offered belts to the Indians and explained what the French expected from them. Fort William Henry was to be attacked with the use of artillery. The French would move heavy cannons and mortars to break down the walls while the primary responsibility of the infantry would be to protect and help position the artillery. The Indians were needed to act as the eyes and ears of the army. They were to spread out through the forest to detect any movements and watch for the approach of reinforcements. Whenever possible, the Indians were to capture English soldiers and bring them to the French officers so they could be questioned about the situation within the fort.¹

After Vaudreuil's speech and the festivities which fol-

¹Bougainville, Adventure, pp. 120-121; Edward P. Hamilton, The French and Indian War, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1962), p. 197.
lowed, Langlade led his Ottawa across the St. Lawrence to La Prairie where they portaged to St. Jean on the Richelieu River. On the thirteenth of July they left St. Jean and paddled upstream to Lake Champlain and moved south along the shore until strong southwest winds forced them ashore at Point Scononton, (Cumberland Bay near Plattsburg, New York). They were soon joined by Montcalm, Bougainville and the governor's brother, Rigaud Vaudreuil. Langlade spent the next two days discussing the history of the Ottawa and advising the French officers on how to avoid problems with the western Indians.¹

While Langlade was teaching the French officers how to avoid problems with the Indians, he was having problems with them himself. When his Indian party left St. Jean they were given enough provisions to last a week because there would not be any food available between St. Jean and Carillon. But, the Indians did not ration their supplies and they soon ran out of food. The French could only give them some hard-pressed ship biscuits and even this did not last long. When the winds abated, the hungry Indians paddled all day and even into the night until they reached Carillon where more food was available.²

¹Casgrain, Journal Montcalm, p. 229; Bougainville, Adventure, pp. 125-127.
²Ibid.
When Langlade's party arrived at Carillon on the eighteenth, they learned they would have a two week wait before the French could advance toward Fort Wm. Henry. A siege against any fort created many logistical problems. In addition to artillery and ammunition, an army of 8000 men had to assemble and transport vast quantities of supplies. This took time to organize so Langlade tried to keep his Indians active and out of trouble.

Soon after his arrival at Carillon, Langlade explored along the shore near the fort. He may have heard rumors that the British were in the area trying to win the Indians' allegiance and turn them against the French. As he came near a rocky area along the shore he was unaware of the danger lurking nearby, for hidden in the rocks there was a twenty man British patrol. They had spent two days observing the fort, hoping to ambush a small French detachment. When Langlade stepped within their range, they fired. Fortunately, for Langlade, they missed and quickly withdrew only to be met by a French and Indian party returning from Fort Wm. Henry. Only one of the British soldiers was killed, but as the rest of the Britons filed they left their orders and papers which proved to be useful to the French.  

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1 Hamilton, *French and Indian War*, p. 197.
On the twenty-second, English boats were seen on Lake George, near Carillon. Langlade and Charles Hertel de Chambly were ordered to lead a party of Canadians and Indians to set an ambush. The planned ambush started tragically. Two Indian canoes were sent out to look for approaching English boats, but as they returned, they were fired upon by some French officers who thought the canoes were British boats. An Ottawa chief was killed and another was wounded. Many of the Indians were upset by this incident and returned to Carillon, but Langlade remained with about 250 men and later that day he was reinforced by Lt. Corbière.¹

On the twenty-fourth, more English boats were sighted on the lake. Colonel Parker of the New Jersey Blues was leading a detachment of 350 men in twenty-two boats, two of which were large enough to carry sails. It was Parker's intention to reconnoiter the French fort and if possible take some prisoners. As Parker's party advanced up the lake

it became divided and when the first three boats entered Langlade's ambush they surrendered without firing a shot. Soon three more boats approached and they too surrendered before any shots were fired.\(^1\)

When the main party, the remaining sixteen boats, approached the ambush they were unaware of what happened to their comrades. As the boats came within range, the Indians hidden along the shore fired creating panic and confusion. As the British soldiers tried to turn their boats to escape, the Indians rushed from their hiding places and pursued the boats with their canoes. The sight and sounds of the savage horde so frightened the British that they didn't even try to use their guns to defend themselves. As the Indians drew near to the boats, they dove into the water, swam under the boats, grabbed onto the sides, and capsized them. As the unfortunate soldiers floundered in the water the Indians speared them as if they were fish. Only two of the boats managed to escape and for days the bodies of the victims washed up on the shore.\(^2\)

The French were delighted with the results of the skirmish even though success brought new problems; problems typical of those encountered when using Indian allies. The In-

\(^1\)Ibid; Webb to Barrington, Fort Edward, 17 August 1757, Loudoun Papers, #4245, Huntington Library, San Marino, Calif.

\(^2\)Ibid.
dians held over one hundred and fifty prisoners, and the rum found in the British boats stimulated them to mistreat their prisoners. Three of the prisoners were even eaten while their comrades were forced to watch. The Ottawa wanted to return to Montreal because they felt it would be tempting the Great Spirit to continue to fight after having achieved a victory. Montcalm, who was busy supervising the preparations for the assault, had to stop to meet with the Indians. When the council began all the Indians wanted to talk at the same time; each trying to outshout each other. They tried to tell what they had personally done, what they would do, how they wanted the prisoners treated, or what they expected from the French. When Montcalm finally restored order, the Ottawa promised to stay and all of the Indians promised to give up their prisoners. Late that evening, the Indians changed their minds and decided to keep the prisoners, so at midnight Montcalm had to hold another council to secure the transfer of the prisoners. At the end of the exhausting day, Bougainville, Montcalm's aide, clearly expressed his frustrations: "The Indians...in consequence of their victory have been intolerable. One needs a head of iron to resist it."¹ It must have been a great relief to

see the British prisoners head toward Montreal the next morning under the protection of a French military escort.

As arrangements neared completion, Montcalm called another council. On the twenty-seventh of July, he gave the assembled Indians a huge wampum belt made up of over six thousand beads and again discussed what he expected from them. The Indians responded with promises of unity and cooperation, but when they were obliged to remain in camp, boredom created problems. On the thirtieth, the young men in the camp killed and ate eighteen of the oxen Montcalm had purchased to pull his cannon. On the very next day, the Indians were moved ahead a few miles where they camped and waited for the rest of the army. When the army finally began moving on the first of August, Langlade and his Ottawa helped escort the boats and barges carrying most of the equipment and supplies.¹

Fort Wm. Henry had two major components; the fort itself which was built with gravel walls reinforced with heavy logs and an entrenched camp on a hill just to the east of the fort. Most of the twenty-two hundred defenders were bivouaced in the entrenched camp. When Montcalm arrived on the third he examined both British positions and ordered an

attack on the fort itself, for he felt it would be too dan­
gerous to attempt a direct assault on the entrenched camp.¹

As the attacking army approached Fort Wm. Henry, the
Indians moved on ahead driving the British troops back to
their fortifications and securing the road to Fort Edward
where General Daniel Webb was stationed with sixteen hun­
dred additional troops which could be used to reinforce
the besieged garrison. The Indians surrounded the fort and
fired at the walls with little effect. When his army was
in position, Montcalm asked Lieutenant-Colonel Monro, com­
mander of Fort Wm. Henry to surrender. Montcalm tried to
warn Monro that as the siege progressed he might lose con­
trol of his inhumane allies, but— it was too early to sur­
render. The offer was rejected and siege operations con­
tinued.

As the French army began the methodical process of
digging trenches to move their guns within range of the
fort, the Indians gave little co-operation. They were ex­
pected to scout the area and watch for reinforcements from

¹An Account of the Attack and Taking of Fort William
91-96; Bougainville to Paulmy, Montreal, 19 August 1757,
NYCD 10:605-616; Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, pp. 339-352.

²Ibid.; Bougainville, Adventure, pp. 163-169; Montcalm
to Loudoun, Fort George, 9 August 1757, Loudoun Papers, #4182,
Huntington Library, San Marino, Calif.
Fort Edward, but it was more interesting to hang around the fort watching the soldiers advance the artillery. They also laid in the fort's garden shooting at the walls which did little more than waste ammunition. On August 5, Montcalm called another council and again asked the Indians to scout the area and look for British reinforcements. When the Indians finally did go on patrol, they disrupted work on the trenches with a false report that a large number of British troops were advancing toward the fort.¹

However, despite the fact the Indians usually did not follow orders, they did capture an important messenger, a courier carrying a letter from Webb to Monro. The letter was to inform Monro that Webb would not send any reinforcements and Monro could feel free to surrender with whatever terms he could obtain. Montcalm chose to hold the letter until its message would carry more impact.²

The French trenches moved forward rapidly and on the sixth of August the cannonade began. Montcalm used this

¹Bougainville, Adventure, pp. 163-169; Bougainville to Paulmy, Montreal, 19 August 1757, NYCD 10:605-616; An Account of the Attack and Taking of Fort William Henry, Report of the Public Archives of Canada-1929, Appendix-A, Montcalm Correspondence, pp. 91-96.

occasion to send Webb's letter and again ask Monro to surrender. The British position was deplorable; they were badly outnumbered, the French cannons were in position and ready to breach the walls, two British sorties had been attempted with heavy losses and no success, all seventeen of their large cannons had burst or been disabled, over three hundred men were killed or wounded, and the casemates were rapidly filling with men suffering with small-pox. When Monro received Webb's letter and learned there was no hope for relief, he had little choice and on the ninth he ordered the raising of a white flag.¹

The British agreed to surrender the fort, but since the French did not wish to be burdened with two thousand prisoners, they offered to send the British troops to Fort Edward with a protecting escort. Montcalm did not sign the capitulation agreement until he called another Indian council and explained the terms of the agreement. When the Indians promised to abide by the terms of the truce, Montcalm signed it and the British soldiers were moved from the fort.²


²Ibid.; Bougainville, Adventure, p. 170; Bougainville to Paulmy, Montreal, 19 August 1757, NYCD 10:605-616; Montcalm to Loudoun, Fort George, Loudoun Papers, #4182, Huntington Library, San Marino, California.
After all the British soldiers were transferred to the entrenched camp, the Indians entered the fort and pillaged everything that remained. After the fortress was sacked the Indians moved on to the entrenched camp and despite the presence of a French guard, they entered and continued to pillage.¹ Order was finally restored at nine in the evening after the Indians left the entrenched camp. Things did not augur well for the British, who were to march to Fort Edward the following day. The French officers met with the prisoners, arranged for their escort, and warned the British to destroy all of their intoxicants.²

On the morning of the tenth, the British allowed fear to overcome reason and began to march before their escort was ready. The Indians began to assemble around them. The Abnakis, a domesticated tribe from Maine who felt the British had mistreated them, began to sing a death song and then attacked the rear of the column. The British panicked and began running in all directions, discarding their possessions as they fled. Their fear encouraged the rest of the

¹ Bougainville to Paulmy, Montreal, 19 August 1757, NYCD 10:605-616.
Indians to join in the attack. As the Indians' interest turned from pillage to blood, a massacre ensued and soon bodies were strewn about the area. The British added to their problems when they attempted to appease the Indians by offering them the rum which they carried in their canteens despite warnings to the contrary.\(^1\) The French officers bravely attempted to restore order and stop the blood bath, but the Canadians and the Indian leaders encouraged the Indians to continue, hoping they could later buy the Indians' spoils at low prices.\(^2\)

Before order was restored about fifty of the British were killed and five to six hundred more were captured. Montcalm recaptured or ransomed as many of the Indians' 


prisoners as possible, but nearly two hundred were taken to Montreal when the Indians deserted the French camp. After the Indians left, Montcalm's troops escorted the remaining prisoners to Fort Edward without incident. Montcalm was unwilling to launch an attack on Fort Edward without the Indians, so when they deserted, he broke off the campaign, burned Fort Wm. Henry, and withdrew to Carillon.¹

There is no known documentary evidence to verify Langlade's role during the massacre at Fort Wm. Henry. It is certain, however, that Langlade was at the fort as an Indian leader, his Ottawa followers were involved in the massacre, and the Indian leaders encouraged the Indians to commit atrocities so they could profit from the spoils.

When the Indians, including Langlade's Ottawa, arrived in Montreal, Vaudreuil tried to ransom the prisoners by offering two kegs of brandy for each captive the Indians relinquished. The price did not satisfy the Indians so they held on to their hostages and purchased liquor with the money they received from their plunder. The liquor encouraged additional cruelties. On the fifteenth of August, they shocked everyone by killing a prisoner where the entire city could see, then boiled his body, and forced the victim's

companions to eat the meat.¹

When Langlade’s Ottawa had been in the Montreal area for nearly a month, they had undoubtedly worn out their welcome and some of them were showing signs of the great scourge of the western Indians--smallpox. As August came to a close, Vaudreuil ordered Langlade to take his charges back to Michilimackinac. The Indians were finally induced to give up their remaining captives and they held their farewell audiences with the governor. Each warrior was rewarded for his services and gifts were presented for their villages. Langlade was promoted to second in command at Michilimackinac as a reward for his services.² After being in the field for more than a year it was time to go home.

The destruction of Fort Wm. Henry and the defense of Louisburg by the navy made 1757 a successful year for the French, but it was to be the last successful year of this war. The tide began to turn when William Pitt came into power in June 1757. He re-organized and breathed new life into the British military. Although the first British of-

¹Bougainville, Adventure, pp. 174-175.
²Ibid.; An Account of the Attack and Taking of Fort William Henry, Report of the Public Archives of Canada-1929, Appendix-A, Montcalm Correspondence, pp. 91-96; Bougainville to Paulmy, Montreal, 19 August 1757, NYCD 10:605-616; Montcalm to Paulmy, Montreal, 18 April 1758, NYCD 10:698-700; Vaudreuil to Langlade, Montreal, September 1757, WHC 8:213.
fensive of 1758, James Abercromby's attack on Carillon, was thwarted by Montcalm, every other offensive was a success. On July 26, Jeffery Amherst took Louisbourg at the mouth of the St. Lawrence and on August 27, John Bradstreet's forces conquered Fort Frontenac at the opposite end of that great river. James Grant's foolhardy attack against Fort Duquesnes was repulsed on September 14, but in late November, the fort was destroyed because the French felt they could not withstand an assault by the army led by John Forbes. When 1758 ended, the British controlled both ends of the St. Lawrence and the newly constructed Fort Pitt increased their influence in the Ohio Valley. The had been unable to take control of Lake Champlain, but that too would fall into their hands early in 1759.¹

The reasons for the French failures in 1758 included corruption in government, conflicts between Montcalm and Vaudreuil, the low quality of reinforcements, poor discipline, crop failures, and shortages of supplies.² Another important reason was the loss of their Indian allies. The


Indians undoubtedly would have been willing to rejoin the French army, but they were suffering from the ravages of smallpox.

The epidemic was a result of the Indians actions at Fort Wm. Henry. Some of the soldiers the Indians killed or captured during the massacre were infected with the disease and much of the plunder was contaminated. The Indians had entered the hospital tents and the casemates to scalp the soldiers who were too ill to join their comrades. Their insatiable greed for scalps had even driven them to dig up the graves just outside the stockade to scalp the corpses of the soldiers who had died of the disease before the siege began.¹

It is not at all surprising that the Indians began to show signs of smallpox before they returned to the Old Northwest² and when they reached their homes, the disease spread rapidly. The baptismal record at Michilimackinac is a somber narration of the ravages of the epidemic. In October, the Indians began seeking the promise of eternal life before their temporal life ended and in most cases the newly bap-

¹Pouchot, Memoir, p. 91; Kellogg, French Régime, pp. 432-433; Among the bodies dug up at Fort Wm. Henry was that of Richard Rogers, brother of the leader of the Rangers. Rogers, Journal.

²Montcalm to Paulmy, Montreal, 18 April 1758, NYCd 10: 698-700; Bougainville, Adventure, pp. 193, 204.

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tized died within days of receiving the sacrament. The French were happy to note that the Indians blamed their illness on the British and their own failure to follow French orders, but the epidemic virtually eliminated the Indians as a fighting force in 1758. When the French assembled at Carillon to attack Fort Wm. Henry in 1757, they had eight thousand Indian allies, but when Montcalm defended the post in 1758, he had only sixteen warriors to help him.

The smallpox epidemic eliminated the need for Langlade's services as an Indian leader, so he remained in the west in 1758. Both Grignon and de Peyster state that Langlade was at Carillon and Fort Duquesne to help defend these posts from British attacks, but an examination of the few available

1 French Minister to Vaudreuil and Bigot, Versailles, 23 September 1758, WHC 18:204-205; Bougainville, Adventure, p. 204; A young slave of Charles Langlade was one of those baptized at this time. Register of Baptisms, WHC 19:50-52; Langlade's half-sister, Anne, was one of the victims of this epidemic. Register of Internments, WHC 19:145.


3 Montcalm to Paulmy, Montreal, 18 April 1758, NYCD 10: 698-700.


able records indicates otherwise. Abercromby attacked Car­
illon on the eighth of July, but on the second, Langlade
was at Michilimackinac attending the baptism of the son of
Antoine le Telliers.¹ With the primitive transportation of
that day, Langlade would have been unable to reach Carillon
in time for the battle, and after Montcalm successfully re­
sisted Abercromby's attack, he complained that he had very
few Indians to assist his army.² During the action at Fort
Duquesne, Langlade was at Michilimackinac worrying about his
failing corn crop and making preparations to move to his
winter quarters on the Grand River.³

Langlade's plans to winter on the Grand were cut short
by the birth of his second daughter, Louise Domitelle.⁴ He
spent most of the winter at Michilimackinac and by spring
the restless warrior was ready for action.

¹“Register of Baptisms,” WHC 19:54.
²Montcalm to Marshall de Belle Isle, Carillon, 12 July
1758, NYCD 10:732.
³du Jaunay to Langlade, St. Ignace, 24 September 1758,
WHC 8:214.
⁴“Register of Baptisms,” WHC 19:56.
CHAPTER VI

QUEBEC AND THE PLAINS OF ABRAHAM

In 1759, the French would need all the help they could get and fortunately, the smallpox epidemic had run its tragic course and Langlade again assumed his role as a leader of Indian war-parties. He remained at Michilimackinac until mid-April gathering Indians and then moved east with over one thousand warriors to help defend Quebec.¹

An examination of this war-party gives an indication of the influence Langlade had with the Indians. The war-party included some Menominee who had raided the French settlement at La Baye, (Green Bay, Wisconsin), in early 1758. During the raid they had killed some French settlers and plundered the magazine. The Menominee knew they would be punished for this action, but they were still willing to follow Langlade. When the party arrived at Montreal, a council was held with Vaudreuil. Vaudreuil ordered the execution of the two Indians who had led the raid and at his command the Indians immediately slew their two comrades.

Following the execution of the two Menominee, Langlade's party left Montreal and moved downstream to Quebec.¹

As Langlade and his companions were moving downstream, a British force under the command of Major General James Wolfe was moving upstream—for the French, the moment of crisis was at hand! Wolfe's invasion force was the primary element in Pitt's grand strategy to eliminate the French presence in Canada.

While the British maintained a holding action in Europe which contained the French army and diverted their attention from America, Pitt planned a three point attack to strike at the heart of New France. Jeffery Amherst, commander-in-chief in America was sent up the Lake Champlain invasion route to put pressure on Montreal while General John Prideaux was ordered to cut the Ohio Valley from the St. Lawrence by taking Fort Niagara. But, the most important action of the 1759 campaign was Wolfe's amphibious assault on Quebec.²

On the first of June, Wolfe left Louisbourg with a force of 8,500 well-trained regulars supported by Vice-Admiral Charles Saunders's 13,500 sailors and marines.

¹Pouchot, Memoir, pp. 104, 143, 159; Disturbance at Green Bay, WHC 18:203-204; Casgrain, Journal Montcalm, p.518.
²C.P. Stacey, Quebec, 1759, (New York: St. Martin's, 1959), pp. 1-3; Eccles, France in America, p. 198.
The British fleet of forty-nine ships and one hundred transports moved up the St. Lawrence without opposition and on the twenty-eighth they landed on the Isle of Orleans, just east of Quebec. Two days later, Wolfe's men took control of Point Lévis on the south shore of the St. Lawrence, directly across from Quebec. Wolfe positioned his artillery here to bombard the city. He began to probe for a weakness in the French defenses and tried to find a way to draw Montcalm into an openfield battle.

On the ninth of July, the British crossed the St. Lawrence and established a camp on the east side of the Montmorency. When the British took this position, Montcalm refused to attack for he felt the British presence there offered no immediate threat. He is reported to have said; "Let him amuse himself where he is. If we drive him off he may go to some place where he can do us harm." This attitude frustrated Langlade and his Indian followers and caused the French to misuse opportunities to inflict serious damage to the British army.

When the British landed on the east side of the Montmorency, Langlade and his Indians were stationed in the same area serving under François-Gaston de Duc de Lévis and Louis

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1Stacey, Quebec, 1759, pp. 51-61.
2Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, pp. 496-497.
Legardeur de Repentigny. With the exception of the events of July 26, there are no known documents which specifically mention Langlade's actions during this period. However, it is safe to assume that he and his Indian followers were actively involved in the harrassment of the British camp on the Montmorency.

The Indians' harrassment began as soon as the first British troops landed on the north side of the St. Lawrence. When the French noticed the approach of the English landing parties, Lévis moved forward with 600 soldiers and 100 Indians. He asked Vaudreuil for orders to attack, but when none were forthcoming, he ordered his force to halt. The Indians were too far ahead to hear his command and they charged ahead. As soon as they came within range of the landing party, they fired three volleys killing forty-five of the British soldiers and then quickly retreated. Early the next day, Captain Joseph Gorham's rangers were sent out to protect a body of workmen who were gathering wood for


fascines. Twelve of the rangers were killed when the Indians attacked and the workmen were so frightened it was hard to get them to return to the woods. On the seventeenth, a British scouting party spotted three Canadians running through the woods. They gave chase, but soon found themselves in an Indian ambush. The Indians captured a number of prisoners whom they brought back to the French camp for questioning.

The harassment by the Indians was costly, but it did not deter Wolfe's search for a way to attack the French positions across the Montmorency. Rumors of a ford above the Montomrency Falls raised hopes that he could launch an attack behind the Beauport lines. On the twenty-sixth, Wolfe personally led a two thousand man scouting party to search for the river crossing. As the British slowly moved through the forest cover along the river they were totally unaware that they were being watched by Charles Langlade and four hundred Indians.


3"A Journal of the Expedition up the River St. Lawrence."
As Langlade and his Indians lay hidden in the woods, it quickly became apparent that they would need help; there were just too many British soldiers for them to attack alone. Langlade rushed to Lévis's headquarters, about two miles away, and reported that he and his Indians had surrounded a large British unit. If Lévis would send Repentigny's Canadian militia to reinforce the Indians, the British force could be destroyed.¹

Lévis was reluctant to act without orders from either Vaudreuil or Montcalm, but his aides realized the potential of the opportunity which had presented itself and argued on Langlade's behalf. They were sure the French would be successful; the Indians had the British surrounded, the fight would take place in the woods which would be to the advantage of the Canadians and the Indians, and the French could send additional reinforcements if necessary. Even in the unlikely event that the attack failed, French control of the ford would allow them to retreat safely and cut off any

British advance. Despite the logic of these arguments, Lévis was afraid to take the initiative and sent Langlade back to tell the Indians not to expect any help from the militia.¹

Langlade walked back and gave the Indian chiefs Lévis's response. At their insistence, he returned to Lévis's camp and again pleaded for help. This time Lévis wrote a note to Repentigny saying he could join Langlade, if he was sure of success. Repentigny was not willing to make a decision that Lévis was afraid to make so he sent a note back to Lévis asking for a definitive order. Finally, Lévis decided to go to the ford and evaluate the situation himself. As he approached the crossing, he heard gun-fire—It was now too late, the opportunity was lost.²

Langlade's Indians had been hidden in the woods for five hours within a few feet of the British soldiers while the French pondered their moves. Finally the Indians lost patience and fired a volley at the British. The soldiers panicked and ran. When their officers rallied them, they counter-attacked and the Indians quickly retreated across the river.³

¹Ibid.
²Ibid.
³"Extract of a Journal," NYCD 10:1028; Johnstone,
Although Langlade and his Indians killed forty British soldiers, they had been in a position to do far more damage. They could have destroyed a large part of the British army and some of its best officers, including James Wolfe himself. The failure to take advantage of the situation had a depressing effect upon the French. An unidentified officer wrote; "The entire army regretted the loss of so fine an opportunity." Two weeks later, on August 11, the French planned an attack on the British camp, but the frustrated Ottawa refused to co-operate and cross the river to join the action.

While it would be interesting to speculate about what could have happened if Langlade and his Indians had been reinforced, the action above the falls of the Montmorency did affect Wolfe's plans and the progress of the campaign. Following the skirmish, Wolfe abandoned any plans to try a crossing above the falls. Just five days later, on July


1Ibid.


3Ibid.

31, he launched an amphibious attack on the left side of the Beauport lines. He also planned a co-ordinated attack on the right side by having two brigades cross the Montmorency at a ford below the falls. The attack on the right never materialized because a rising tide made it too dangerous to cross below the falls. The amphibious landing on the left proved to be a disaster; it started late, the landing ships ran aground too far from the shore, the landing parties wildly charged the French lines without any sense of order and they were thrown back with heavy losses. If the British could have crossed above the falls, they might have been able to divide the French defenders, thus improving the chances for a successful landing. If the British could have secured a position within the Beauport lines it would have forced Montcalm to meet the British in an open field battle.

Nothing more is known of Langlade and his followers until September 13. That, of course, was the fateful day when Wolfe finally drew Montcalm into an open field battle. The British had successfully moved a major portion of their fleet above Quebec and on the night of the twelfth, British ships slowly floated down the river until they reached a point just above the city. British soldiers disembarked

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1Stacey, Quebec, 1759, pp. 76-80; Hibbert, Wolfe at Quebec, pp. 89.
along the narrow shore of the St. Lawrence and silently made their way up a path to the Plains of Abraham. When the French awoke the next morning they were shocked to find over four thousand British soldiers facing the city.¹

Montcalm still had many options, but he chose the worst of them and attacked the well-trained British lines without even waiting for reinforcements from Vaudreuil or Bougainville.² There are many reasons for the French defeat that day, but those reasons do not include a lack of co-operation or valor on the part of Langlade and his Indian companions.

Langlade, the Indians, and most of the militia took cover in the trees and bushes on the front and left flank of the British army. From the protection of this cover they threw a telling fire at the assembled troops. Although the British soldiers absorbed terrible losses they kept their ranks and held their fire until the French regulars approached.³ During the battle Langlade fought bravely and later Amable De Gere, one of his companions described Langlade's behavior during the battle:

¹Eccles, France in America, pp. 202-205; Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, pp. 541-547; Stacey, Quebec, 1759, pp. 120-155.
²Ibid.
³Townshend to Pitt, Quebec, 20 September 1759, "Siege of Quebec," Report on the Canadian Archives-1898, pp. 6-8.
... he never saw so perfectly cool and fearless a
man on the field of battle ... when his gun barrel
had got so hot, from repeated and rapid discharges,
that he took occasion to stop a little while that it
might cool, when he would draw his pipe from his
pouch, cut his tobacco, fill his pipe, take a piece
of punkwood, and strike fire with his steel and flint,
and light and smoke his pipe, and all with as much
sang froid as at his own fireside; and having cooled
his gun and refreshed himself, would resume his place,
and play well his part in the battle.¹

Despite the bravery of Langlade and his companions,
the order and discipline of the British regulars prevailed
and the tide of the battle soon became apparent. The French
lines filled, in part, by Canadians unaccustomed to open
field warfare soon broke rank and started to run away from
the advancing British army. The actual battle lasted only
a few minutes. When the British started to pursue the flee­
ing French, they had to pass near the woods where the French
irregulars, including Langlade and his Indians, were hiding.
The fire from the trees stopped the British advance long
enough to allow the French to safely cross the bridges on
the St. Charles River and return to their camp at Beauport.²

During the short battle both sides lost their com-

¹Grignon states that he was not sure if De Gere was
describing his grandfather's actions at Braddock's defeat,
the defense of Ticonderoga, or on the Plains of Abraham.
The first two possibilities can be eliminated for Langlade
was not present at either of these battles. Grignon,
"Recollections," p. 218.

²Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, pp. 541-547; Stacey,
Quebec, 1759; pp. 149-152.
manders and more than six hundred men. Most of the British casualties, including James Wolfe, were caused by the flanking fire of the French irregulars. The deaths of Wolfe and Montcalm are well-known, but of far more personal concern to Langlade were the deaths of his two half-brothers, Daniel and Jean-Baptiste Villeneuve.

After the battle the British held only the Plains of Abraham and their position was far from secure. But much to the chagrin of Langlade and most of the Canadians, Jean Baptiste-Nicolas-Roch de Ramezay, commander of the city of Quebec, surrendered to James Murray, the new British commander. Langlade wanted to continue fighting and he felt the surrender of the city was the result of a bribe, an assumption that was unfounded, but easy to make when the corruption in government was so well known. Langlade remained with the army, serving under Levis, until November when he returned to Michilimackinac.

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1Stacey, Quebec, 1759, pp. 149-152.
3Eccles, France in America, p. 205.
CHAPTER VII
DEFEAT

The French and Indian War did not end with the fall of Quebec. Its loss had weakened the French position in North America, but there was still a chance for success and the French in Canada tried to make the most of it.

Langlade returned to Montreal in April 1760 and after taking care of some personal business, he joined Lévis expedition against Quebec. As soon as the ice began to break, Lévis loaded all the men and equipment he could muster onto his few remaining ships and sailed down the St. Lawrence. On the twenty-sixth of April, the French force landed at Ste. Foy, about five miles above Quebec, where Lévis established his headquarters as he organized an assault to retake the former French capital.

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1Langlade registered his marriage contract on 18 April 1760. WHC 18:135-140.

2While there is no positive evidence to prove that Langlade went to Quebec with Lévis, it is safe to assume that he did. Lévis took every available man with him and that is the place where the services of Langlade and his Indians would have been most useful. Tasse, "Memoir de Langlade," p. 146; Stacey, Quebec, 1759, p. 163.


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The British garrison had spent a hard winter in Quebec. They had been unprepared for the cold and when they tried to gather wood in the near-by forests, they were attacked by bands of militia and Indians. Food was scarce and almost every soldier showed signs of scurvy. Of Murray's seven thousand troops, only three thousand were fit for duty, but when Lévis appeared, Murray repeated Montcalm's error and moved from the protection of the city to attack the French army.¹

Murray's move allowed the French a final taste of victory. The British were quickly driven back to the gates of Quebec and Lévis laid siege to the city. The French force did not have the men or artillery needed to force the walls so their only hope was reinforcement from France. Both armies eagerly waited for the arrival of ships from Europe and prayed that the first ships would bring help for them rather than their opponent. In mid-May, British ships were seen sailing up the St. Lawrence. It was all over. Lévis was forced to raise the siege and the entire French army, including Langlade, began a long slow retreat toward Montreal and eventual surrender.²

²Ibid.
When Langlade reached Montreal on the sixteenth of June, he learned he had received a commission. In February, Louis XV, king of France, promoted Langlade to lieutenant, half-pay, in the *troupes de la marine*, or the colonial regulars.\(^1\) This was a great honor, for promotions in the *troupes de la marine*, could only come by demonstrating ability and valor.\(^2\)

Promotions are wonderful, but troops not promotions, were needed to check the British advance and Louis XV had decided to stop sending soldiers to America. As the British army pressed onward toward Montreal, the French force shrunk as the militia deserted and many Indians defected, but Langlade and his Indians remained loyal. On August 17, they were sent to help reinforce Francois-Charles de Bourlamaque.\(^3\) When the British reached Trois Rivières, (Three Rivers), Bourlamaque was unable to offer any resistance. The French force retreated along the banks of the St. Lawrence as the British ships slowly, but steadily moved upstream. When the British reached the outskirts of Montreal, retreat was no longer possible and Lévis army, now reduced

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\(^1\)Langlade’s commission, *WHC* 8:214-215.


\(^3\)Vaudreuil to Lévis, Montreal, 13 August 1760, *WHC* 18:219.
to two thousand men, was no match for the British. As August ended, it was apparent that French control of Canada was also about to end.¹

On September third, Langlade was called to Vaudreuil's headquarters and issued new orders. Within the French camp there were two companies made up of deserters from the Royal American Regiment, a unit the British recruited from foreign immigrants in the middle-colonies. Rather than allow these men to face military punishment when the French surrendered, Vaudreuil ordered Langlade to escort them west and help them find guides to lead them to New Orleans. In addition, Langlade was to keep his Indians out of mischief as he led them back to Michilimackinac. He was to assure the Indians that, even if the French surrendered, they would return—a belief that would prove troublesome for the British.²

Just five days after Langlade left Montreal, Vaudreuil sent a messenger after him with another letter. It was all over. Langlade had worked hard, fought bravely, and suffered the loss of family and friends, all to no avail. His heart was heavy as he completed his duties and carried the sad

¹Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, pp. 568-604; Eccles, France in America, pp. 206-208; Thwaites, France in America, pp. 255-259.

news of defeat to Beaujeu at Michilimackinac.¹

When Langlade arrived at Michilimackinac with news of the capitulation, Beaujeu became determined not to suffer the humiliation of surrender and made plans to move the garrison to New Orleans and then on to France. Langlade was forced to make a difficult decision: Should he go to France with the rest of the soldiers or remain in Canada? Vaudreuil was expecting Langlade to come to France² and he had made many sacrifices to earn a commission which would mean little to the British. But, he had never been in France and he didn't know how he would be accepted there, for although he was a nobleman, he was also a métis. The terms of the treaty were fair so if he stayed he could retain his property, he would have all the rights of an Englishman, and he could continue worshiping as a Catholic without harassment.³ In the end, it was easier to give up allegiance to a king he had never seen than to give up his home and his friends. He decided to stay in Canada and accept the authority of the British.⁴ But, his emotions were

¹Vaudreuil to Langlade, Montreal, 9 September 1760, WHC 8:215-217; Grignon, "Recollections," pp. 219-220.
²Ibid.
no doubt mixed when Beaujeu and the garrison left in October, leaving him in command until the British arrived.¹

Langlade had a long wait before the British arrived. In September 1760, Amherst sent Rogers west with two companies of rangers to take control of Detroit and Michilimackinac. He did not arrive at Detroit until November 29. After he formally took control of that fort, Rogers tried to move north to Michilimackinac, but it was late in the year and the lakes began to freeze making travel impractical. He returned to Fort Pitt leaving Detroit under the command of Donald Campbell.²

¹Beaujeu left the fort late in the season and he was forced to spend the winter among the Sauk and Fox. It is ironic that these early enemies of the French provided shelter for the last French soldiers from Canada. Beaujeu remained in Illinois until 1768 when he returned to Quebec. He volunteered to help the British during the American invasion of Quebec in 1775. He became a militia officer and he was captured by the American rebels. D'Abbadie to the Minister, New Orleans, 9 August 1764, WHC 18:221-222; Amherst to Johnson, Albany, 21 June 1761, Johnson Papers, C-1221, 6:39, Canadian Archives, Ottawa; Minister to Kerlec, Versailles, 25 January 1762, Archives des Colonies, Reel F-321, MGl, Series B, 114:171-172, Archives Nationales, Paris; Vaudreuil to Beaujeu, Montreal, 9 September 1760, MPHC 19:28-29; Donald Chaput, "Treason or Loyalty? Frontier French in the American Revolution," Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society, 71 (November 1978):245-246.

The Indians were dependent upon the French for ammunition to hunt, but when Beaujeu left Michilimackinac, he took most of the powder with him, so there was little to give to the Indians who had spent the summer in the east and now had to hunt for their families. When the British failed to arrive with badly needed powder, starvation became a real possibility and the Indians became restless and talked of going south to attack Detroit. Langlade persuaded them to remain peaceful and sent a delegation of Indians to meet with the British at Detroit. Campbell was also short of supplies, but when the Indians explained their dire need, he gave them all the powder he could spare.¹

Campbell did not send a party up to Michilimackinac in the spring of 1763 because he could not spare any men from the garrison at Detroit. He may also have been concerned about the reception a small British force would receive from Langlade, despite the fact that Father du Juanay had reassured the British that they would have a peaceful reception and that Langlade was waiting for their arrival and would

not resist the British takeover.¹

In September 1761, a large British force arrived in Detroit led by three notable officers; Sir William Johnson, George Croghan, and Captain Henry Gladwin. Johnson and Croghan were to meet with the Indians while Gladwin came to relieve Campbell. While the Indian negotiations proceeded, Gladwin sent Captain Henry Balfour and three hundred men of the 60th and 80th regiments to take control of the northern posts.²

Balfour arrived at Michilimackinac on September 28, over a year after Vaudreuil surrendered.³ Michilimackinac was the last manned French fort to be surrendered as part of Vaudreuil's capitulation.⁴ When Langlade lowered the

¹Du Jaunay to St Pé, St. Ingnace, 7 May 1761, Sullivan, Johnson Papers, 3:412-416.


³Ibid. When the British arrived, Langlade was ordered to tell the residents of the fort to surrender all their weapons. Leslye to Langlade, Michilimackinac, 30 September 1761, Ayers Collection, Newberry Library, Chicago. It seems highly unlikely that the residents of this frontier post would give up their weapons and there is no evidence that this order was carried out.

⁴The forts in the Illinois country were not taken over by the British until 1765. They were not part of the capitulation because they were part of Louisiana, not Canada. They were given to the British in the Treaty of Paris, 1763 which ended the Seven Year's War, a world-wide conflict. Dunbar, Michigan, pp. 116-119.
fleur-de-lis and Balfour raised the Union Jack, they in effect ended the French and Indian War. Thus, Langlade had helped bring on the war with his attack on Pickawillany and now he helped close the conflict with the surrender of Michilimackinac.
CHAPTER VIII

EPILOGUE

Langlade had little difficulty adjusting to British authority and during Pontiac's Conspiracy, he proved his loyalty to the new regime. When he heard rumors of the Indian uprising he tried to warn George Etherington, commander of Michilimackinac. Etherington refused to heed the repeated warnings and was caught off guard when the Chippewa attacked the fort during a game of baggittaway or lacross. Following the attack, Langlade went to the Chippewa camp and freed Etherington and William Leslye who were tied to the stake ready to be sacrificed.

Langlade and his Indian relatives protected the lives of the British survivors and saw to it that they were safely carried to Montreal. When the British left the area, Langelade and his Indian relatives protected the lives of the British survivors and saw to it that they were safely carried to Montreal.

1 Grignon, "Recollections,"


3 Alexander Henry, Travels and Adventures in Canada and the Indian Territories, (New York: I. Riley, 1908; reprint ed., Rutland, VT.: Charles E. Tutle, 1969), pp. 77-78 Henry was very critical of Langelade because Langelade refused to hazard the safety of his family to provide refuge to Henry. James Gorrell, "Gorrell's Journal," 14 June 1763, WHC 1:39; Gage to Johnson, Montreal, 12 August 1763, Johnson Papers,
glade was again given command of Michilimackinac. 1

Langlade moved to Green Bay before the British returned to the Old Northwest. He traded there with his father while continuing to maintain his post at the mouth of the Grand. 2 The Langlades became the patriarchs of the tiny frontier settlement and they have become popularly, though inaccurately, called the "Fathers of Wisconsin". 3

When the American Revolution began, Langlade became an agent in the British Indian Service. 4 He led Indian war-

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1 Etherington to Langlade, Michilimackinac, 10 June 1763, WHC 18:253.


4 The exact date when Langlade entered the Indian Service is not known, but it was probably in July 1775 when Langlade was at Michilimackinac to obtain supplies. De Peyster, who would have been aware of the new positions created by the reorganization of the Indian Department in January 1775, no doubt used this occasion to recruit Langlade. Plan for the Future Management of Indian Affairs, Quebec, 3 January 1775, The Report of the Bureau of Archives for the Province of
parties for the British much as he had for the French. Langlade arrived in Montreal too late to help drive out the Americans in 1776, but he played an important role in John Burgoyne's ill-fated expedition in 1777. Although many Indians deserted following Burgoyne's reaction to the death of Jane McCrea, Langlade's Ottawa stayed loyal until after the battle at Bennington.

In the fall of 1778, Langlade was called upon to raise a war-party to help Henry Hamilton. He was unsuccessful because the Indians had gone to their winter hunting camps. He tried again in the spring of 1779 only to learn of Hamilton's capture by George Rogers Clark. Clark not only

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Ontario-1906, pp. 52-57; de Peyster to Langlade, Michilimackinac, 19 July 1775, WHC 8:220; de Peyster, Miscellanies, p. 7;
1de Peyster to Langlade, Michilimackinac, 4 July 1776, WHC 18:355-356; Grignon, "Recollections," p. 235; de Peyster to Carleton, 6 June 1777, WHC 7:407; Carleton to de Peyster, off Point au Fer, 6 October 1776, MPH 10:270; Butler to Langlade, Fort Erie, 16 November 1776, WHC 18:356.
3de Peyster to Langlade, Michilimackinac, 27 October 1779, MPH 8:466-467; de Peyster to Haldimand, Michilimackinac, 7 October 1778, 24 October 1778, 19 January 1779, 13 May 1779, WHC 11:97-129.

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captured Hamilton, he also captured the loyalty of Langlade's old friend, Godfrey de Linctot. Linctot and Langlade became involved in an intense struggle for the Indians' allegiance. Langlade and his nephew, Charles Gautier de Verville, generously distributed gifts to maintain the Indians' support.\(^1\)

When the Spanish joined the American cause, Langlade became involved in Patrick Sinclair's grand scheme to capture Pancour, (St. Louis, Missouri). Langlade led a party of Indians down the Illinois River and burned Linctot's fort at Le Pey.\(^2\) They continued on down the river toward the Spanish town, but Emmanuel Hesse attacked without waiting for Langlade. Langlade arrived just in time to be chased back to Chicago by Linctot's horsemen.\(^2\)


\(^2\)de Peyster to Haldimand, Michilimackinac, 20 November 1779, MPHC 10:372-373; Sinclair to Haldimand, Michilimackinac, 29 May 1780, WHC 11:151-152; Instructions to Charles Langlade by the British commander for the campaign of 1780, Langlade File 1780, Archives Division, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisc.

\(^3\)Navarro to Galvez, New Orleans, 12 August 1780, WHC 18:406-408; Grignon, "Recollections," pp. 231-233; Navarro
The St. Louis expedition was Langlade's last major campaign. Late in 1780, Langlade was named captain of the militia at Green Bay and he stayed there for the remainder of the war.\(^1\) The treaty which ended the war had no real impact on Langlade for the British were able to keep the Americans from taking effective control of the Old Northwest during Langlade's lifetime.

Langlade discontinued his trade on the Grand River after he and his nephew were caught embezzling goods from the new British storehouse on Mackinac Island. Although Gautier was dismissed from the Indian service, Langlade retained his position until the end of his life because of his influence with the western Indians.\(^2\)

In the late 1790's, Langlade began to feel the weight of age and limited his activities. His son-in-law, Pierre Grignon, took over his trading enterprises and Langlade spent more time wandering around the village, visiting with the old voyageurs, reliving the past and the ninety-nine

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\(^1\)Haldimand to Sinclair, Quebec, 10 August 1780, WHC 11:150; Grignon, "Recollections," p. 234.

\(^2\)Doyle to England, Michilimackinac, 2 February 1793, MPHC 12:42; Dundas to Dorchester, Whitehall, 5 July 1794, MPHC 24:665-667.
battles he had fought.\(^1\)

In January 1802, Langlade became ill and within two weeks, the man of war died in peace.\(^2\)

\(^1\)Grignon, "Recollections," pp. 234-235.

\(^2\)There are no records which give the exact date of Langlade's death. Augustin Grignon states his grandfather died in January 1800, however Langlade was still involved in Indian affairs later that year and he helped settle the estate of Amable Roy in March 1801. Langlade probably died in January or February 1802 for in May of that year his wife was signing her name as Widow Langlade. Grignon, "Recollections," p. 235; Order to inventory goods of Amable Roy, La Baye, 21 March 1801, Grignon, Lawe, and Prolier Papers, 60:5, Wis Mss B, Archives Division, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisc.; Widow Langlade to Adhemar, La Baye, 8 May 1802, WHC 19:300.
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