The United States and China: From Noncommunication to Diplomatic Relations

Mary Jeanne Patrick
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THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA: FROM NONCOMMUNICATION TO DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

by

Mary Jeanne Patrick

A Thesis
Submitted to the
Faculty of The Graduate College
in partial fulfillment
of the
Degree of Master of Arts

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After more than two decades of fundamental differences due to lack of direct diplomatic relations, the People's Republic of China and the United States are developing a harmonious working relationship. Friendly relations between these two major nations began to improve in 1972 during President Richard Nixon's visit to China that had been arranged by Henry Kissinger, Assistant for National Security Affairs.

The purpose of this thesis is to show that nations can overcome their negative stereotyped images with one another when their leaders will enter into effective communication.

Chapter I considers the historical aspects of the Sino-American relationship.

Chapter II discusses the American Foreign Policy of containing the People's Republic of China.

Chapter III examines the China policy of the Nixon Presidency.

Chapter IV examines the implementation of the changed China policy during the Ford and Carter administrations.

Chapter V analyzes the benefits of the changed China policy.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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Mary Jeanne Patrick
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During the past century two of the major countries bordering the Pacific, China and the United States, have been involved in wars and rumors of war. Many private citizens of both countries fear another war in this nuclear age. Both Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger shared similar views regarding China. One year prior to being elected President of the United States, Mr. Nixon in an article entitled "Asia After Vietnam" published in the October 1967 issue of Foreign Affairs commented:

We cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of Nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors. . . .

The world cannot be safe until China changes. Our safety depends upon the extent that we can influence events.  

Shortly after being elected President, Mr. Nixon appointed Henry A. Kissinger to be his Assistant for National Security Affairs and by the end of 1973, Secretary of State.

Mr. Kissinger had definite ideas about the importance of China and Asia to American foreign policy:

No region in the world is more dynamic, more diverse, or more complex than Asia. Americans have fought three major wars in Asia. American

---

Prosperity is inextricably linked to the economy of Asia. . .

He further states:

Our security relationship with China is crucial to the global balance of power.²

Both Kissinger and Nixon realized that world events had taken such a turn that the time had come to break through the twenty year freeze of ostracizing the People's Republic of China and deal with that nation on a de facto basis. The myth of monolithic Communism had been abandoned by the American government with the increase of Soviet power. It was apparent to Kissinger and Nixon that China (with one fourth of the world's population) presented a grave threat to world peace if she were not brought back into the family of nations. The many years of nonrecognition coupled with the bitter lessons of Korea and Vietnam forced both men to the realization that the China policy had to be altered radically. They believed that the United States should try to establish effective communication with the leaders of the People's Republic of China. This would further world peace and particularly help protect United States' security interests vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

Nixon and Kissinger had realized their program in regard to China by 1972 by establishing a working relationship with the leaders of mainland China.

²Ibid., p. 417.
The purpose of this thesis is to show that nations can overcome their negative stereotyped images with one another when their leaders will enter into effective communication.

This subject of reciprocal stereotyped images will be discussed in four chapters which are topically arranged.

Chapter I considers the historical aspects of the Sino-American relationship.

Chapter II discusses the American Foreign Policy of containing the People's Republic of China.

Chapter III examines the China policy of the Nixon Presidency.

Chapter IV examines the implementation of the changed China policy during the Ford and Carter administrations.

The Conclusion analyzes the benefits of the changed China Policy.

It is important for the general public, as well as government officials, to be well informed by having thorough knowledge of both sides of a problem before forming an opinion. Public persuasion can play an important part in influencing government policy makers to act in a constructive or destructive manner.

Chinese, as well as Americans, are repeatedly reminded of disturbing past incidents, along with the latest alarming events involving the two nations. Radio and television news flashes, plus newspaper editorials, articles and cartoons are featured daily.

While there is no lack of information, there never has been such a vast amount of technological means for spreading propaganda. It is interesting to observe the omission of vital news that could
be detrimental to the speaker's opinion of the subject matter by listening to different versions of the same news dispatches.

Americans continue to learn from studying United States' history books that their country has always been among the first countries to offer and give assistance to China at the time of famines caused by droughts, floods, and earthquakes.

United States senior citizens, especially those or their families who were contributors to church and club drives that raised money to erect churches, hospitals, schools and colleges in China, find it difficult to understand the hostile attitude of many Chinese people. Far too few Americans are aware of the fact that their country was associated with aggressive European countries along with Japan and Imperial Russia that threatened and almost succeeded in dismembering China and finally reducing that once proud nation to a semicolonial status.

Deep rooted psychological causes of resentment and dislike should be exposed, discussed and corrected if possible.

The purpose of this thesis is to show that nations can overcome their negative stereotyped images with one another when their leaders will enter into effective communication. But this interaction will only take place when all parties concerned believe that effective discussions are in their best interest. Policy makers can better understand and deal with current conditions when they have a background of knowledge regarding the behavior and mistakes of previous United States and Chinese policy makers. It is hoped that present day leaders will deal more effectively with each
other and overcome negative stereotyped images after examining the policy choices of earlier Chinese and American decision makers.
CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL ASPECTS

"Civilizing Mission"—Pauperization of China by the Imperialists Including the United States

In order to understand why China was economically so attractive to the Imperialist nations, we need to first look at her from the geopolitical standpoint. According to the theory of geopolitics the world contains only a limited amount of space and natural resources; all states are involved in a never-ending struggle among themselves to capture what they view as necessary to maintain their living standards. Geopolitics tries to describe the relationship between political and economic geography to foreign policy. By geopolitical expansion in China the Great Powers were attempting to achieve greater national economic security and power for themselves at home. In the nineteenth century these states all vied for control of the territory and commerce of the Chinese continent and tried to secure that interest by use of force.

To have a better understanding of present day conditions in China, it is necessary to briefly glance at early Chinese contact with European imperialist nations beginning in the sixteenth century. Our first attention focuses on Portugal, England, Holland, and Imperial Russia. By the nineteenth century it was all China could do to retain her identity as a legal entity. Both her national
sovereignty and culture were under attack by external and internal agents as represented by the Western powers and domestic revolutionaries. The areas of active interest and appetite of these states included colonial India, the Pacific islands and extended also to a semicolonized China and a still sovereign Japan.

This early Western Imperialism resulted from Europe's Commercial and later Industrial Revolutions. By economic exploitation of underdeveloped nations, the Imperialist nations could extend their prestige, commerce and power throughout the world. Aside from missionary activities, they were especially interested in the Far Eastern natural resources that were waiting to be tapped and greatly needed for their industries.

The civilization of China extends back 4,000 years and is continuous as the world's most ancient surviving state and culture. The Chinese civilization is much older than the European not to mention the United States.

Until the late Middle Ages the Chinese civilization was not demonstrably behind the institutions and technologies developed by the West.

By the end of the seventeenth century the imperialist traders appeared in China in force. English traders were the most numerous, followed by the French, Russians, and Americans. It is interesting to note that all of the Imperialists except Imperial Russia advanced on China from the sea. At this time the Western Power's trading center was located at Canton. In contrast to the Western Powers the Russians exploited the ancient overland caravan trading routes
leading to China. To the British, tea was the most lucrative product of exchange for the profit of the British East India Company.

The extension of this European control in the nineteenth century was made possible by seventeenth century trading companies, the most successful of which were the British East India Company and the Dutch East India Company.

In 1600 the British East India Company was chartered by the English Crown for the purpose of trade with the East Indies. It was required to establish a settlement and maintain order in return for a monopoly over commerce. England later established trade with China through the company's factories there. This company was the spearhead to British trade in China and eventually overtook the Dutch East India Company in importance.

China's Foreign Policy Toward the West Characterized by Isolation, Suspicion, and Ambivalence

China for four thousand years had developed a high level of civilization despite her periodic isolation and her conquests. She became a popular commercial center after a land trading route was opened in Asia during the first century B.C. Moslems were among the first to locate in China's border areas, as they established restaurants and curio shops along the highway. Buddhists monks soon

joined the merchants and traders who traveled by mule and camel caravans. The commercial travelers transacted business and continued on their way. The Buddhists, however, had no intention of leaving China. They were there for the purpose of converting the Chinese people to their religion. It was China's policy to welcome visitors regardless of their mission.

It was not until the later Han period that the sea route around Arabia and across the Indian Ocean was completed. Trading vessels could then anchor at all major ports along the southern coastline of Asia. China's friendly hospitality was well known along the trade routes. People from many countries not only stopped at the trading port to trade or purchase choice articles made of silk or china but remained permanently. The uninvited newcomers included Persians, Tartars, Syrians, Jews, Greeks, Arabs, Orthodox and Nestorian Christians. They enjoyed religious freedom and were permitted to locate wherever they wished.

China's knowledge of not only the arts, but government, political systems, history and religion increased enormously until the sixteenth century.

China's policy of self-isolation

After welcoming unexpected, courteous travelers for many centuries, the Chinese were shocked when they opened the city gates

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to find Portuguese invaders who had come for the double purpose of conquest and religious conversion. The imperialistic invaders were driven from the Canton anchorage and the gates of the city were closed and locked. China's trading port was then established on Whampoa Island. A new policy was introduced which limited trade to the one island port. Diplomatic relations were denied and foreign embassies were no longer welcome. China's opportunity for sharing knowledge with other countries was drastically limited.

The Chinese people gradually lost interest in the outside world and were contented with their own self-sufficiency. This isolation caused them to build up a self-image of superiority. China had existed for over four thousand years. She was self-educated although isolated. She would continue to honor her ancestors who had made their country great and revere China's beloved philosopher Confucius who had taught the Brotherhood of Man: "What I do not wish to have done unto me, I likewise wish not to do unto others."1

China was not prepared for war on land or sea at that time. Her army and navy were weak and weapons outmoded. One hundred years previous to the Portuguese invasion, China had naval supremacy on the southern seas. If her defense had been maintained the Portuguese, Dutch, English plus all of the rest of the previously named imperialistic nations would possibly not have attempted to colonize or take possession of that vast country with its immense population.

Raw materials as well as choice craftsmanship articles could have been purchased or traded without bloodshed.

The Portuguese encounter was one that Chinese scholars have never forgotten. It was the first warning of the terrible imperialist invasion that awaited their country. Beginning at that time foreigners from the Western countries were identified as "foreign devils."^1

The first European to open up a direct exchange of information with China after the Portuguese invasion was Matteo Ricci, a Jesuit missionary, who was also a learned scientist. He reached China in the late sixteenth century. It is important to mention Ricci because he was also a victim of China's isolation policy. Ricci, as the merchants, was restricted to Whampoa Island. There he dressed as the Chinese, learned their language and was eventually permitted to locate on China's mainland where he exchanged knowledge with the Confucian scholars. The Jesuits were later banished from China as they obeyed instructions from the Pope before adhering to Chinese customs and laws. The emperor of China was recognized by the Chinese people as the divine ruler; he would not permit outside dictation. China's gates to the Mainland were closed and locked again.

The Manchu invasion

In 1644 a tribe of barbarians known as the Manchus from

southern Manchuria invaded and conquered China overthrowing the Ming Dynasty. They set up the Ch'ing dynasty and ruled until 1912. During the period of the first three Manchu emperors, K'ang-hsi, Yung Cheng, and Ch'ien-Lung, China reached a degree of power and wealth equal to any previous Chinese dynasty.¹

The first Manchu leaders respected the ancient Chinese political system. They continued to observe and practice the ethics and laws found in the "Shu-Ching" that treats of laws, history and government along with the Confucian Classics and the famous historian Ssu-ma Ch'ien's "Shih-Chi" (Records of the Historian) estimated to have 1,500,000 words. Ssu-ma Ch'ien's work has remained to the present day one of the chief sources of knowledge of China before the Han Dynasty.²

In 1685 Emperor Kang-hsi decided to change China's isolation policy by permitting commerce with the outside world. This change was based on China's military strength and her sense of security. The Emperor ordered all Chinese ports opened for trade. The following year, the British East India Company arrived bag and baggage and established factories in Amoy and Canton. European traders soon arrived in force, a factor that proved to be a devastating blow to the traditional Chinese political system, even though the

"Open Port" policy was rescinded in 1757.

Until about 1800 the Manchu or Ch'ing era was a period of stability but limited creativity. Emperor Ch'ien-Lung (1736-1795) was the last competent Manchu emperor. Toward the end of the aged ruler's reign, however, conditions began to change in China. There was increasing discontent due to growing governmental inefficiency and corruption. China began to lag further behind both in military technology and organization. The Manchus found it difficult to pass the civil entrance examination even though the standard was lowered for them.

First Sino-American contact

After the Revolutionary War, merchants and traders living in the new American Republic, found it difficult to enter the commercial world without a trading agreement or credit. There were no questions asked by the hong merchants of China's trading port located on Whampoa Island. The United States merchants were given permission to anchor their little privateer and unload the cargo of furs, raw cotton and ginseng and take the articles to a display room in a factory. The American's small vessel, the "Empress of China" was packed with tea, silk and chinaware, when ready for the

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Fitzgerald, op. cit., p. 342. "Before 1840 all foreign trade with China was conducted through the Treaty Port of Canton. There government-franchised monopolies known as hongs bargained with representatives of the equally monopolistic British East India Company."
return trip. According to Samuel Shaw, the commercial officer on the little privateer, in his report the voyage totaled "an over-all profit of $30,000." The United States had been able to establish its credit in China. Shaw's account of a conversation with one of China's merchants before leaving seemed to have a prophetic warning:

You are not Englishmen? . . . But you speak English word, and when you first come, I no can tell difference; but now I understand very well. When I speak Englishman his price, he say "so much--take it--let alone." I told him, "no my friend, I give you so much." He look at me--"Go to hell, you damned rascal; what! you come here--set a price my goods?" . . . I see very well you no hap Englishman. All Chinaman very much love your country.

The hong merchant then prophesied:

All men come first time. China very good gentlemen, all same you. I think two three time more you come Canton, you make all same Englishman too.

China's Military Impotence and Weakness

The first opium shipped to China was used for medicinal purposes. When Emperor Yung-cheng issued a decree to prohibit opium traffic, the import was still small amounting to 200 chests (each chest weighed approximately 133 pounds on the average).

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2 loc. cit., p. 5.

3 loc. cit., p. 10.

"The British East India Company began exporting opium grown in India in 1750 and . . . by 1790 the import from India alone reached 4,054 chests."¹ Regardless of repeated imperial decrees prohibiting the importation of opium, the drug was carried to China by private British and Indian traders, as well as by Americans who competed as best they could by buying opium in Turkey. "It was reported that 8 or 10 vessels owned by Americans and operated under the American flag were engaged in the contraband trade in 1849."² Yet the bulk of the trade and the largest percent of profits went to the British. As a result of the drug traffic, China's economy suffered from the loss of silver. Taxes were paid in silver, but the majority of the Chinese were paid in copper and the rate of exchange was not fixed. Opium imports from 1831 to 1836 had produced an estimated loss of 30 million taels of silver to the royal treasury.³

Foreign traders restricted to Whampoa Island found conditions intolerable, especially the British, for whom freedom of trade was a sacred thing. Finally in 1793, Lord George Macartney was sent by King George III to the Manchu court of Chien-lung. The British request to open negotiations to remove trade restrictions and to

¹ibid.


establish an ambassador permanently in Peking were firmly but courteously denied by the court officials. Macartney then caused a disturbance at the court by refusing to kow-tow before the Emperor; he then was ordered to leave China.

The distinguished British lord was impressed by the wealth and luxury of China's elite as well as the poverty among the peasants, but after all similar conditions existed in England as well as other states. Macartney's mission was not fruitless, however, as he verified the reports of China's natural resources. He also noted that China had passed its peak. The nation was weak, the army outmoded and widespread corruption was apparent in all branches of the government. If China's resources could not be obtained peacefully, there were other ways of procuring them.

In 1819, after the British successfully mastered India, they purchased Singapore. Then they quickly advanced in to Malaya, then on to Burma in 1826.

At the time of Lord Macartney's departure from China, King George III was notified that there was no need for further exchange of products as China possessed everything needed and most certainly did not want illegal opium.

Portugal was responsible for bringing the opium drug to China from Goa in 1729.

Opium addiction had spread from members of the gentry class to artisans, merchants, women, Taoist priests and Buddhist monks.

Lin Tse-hsu, later the Imperial commissioner at Canton, warned:
The country will become poorer and poorer and its people weaker and weaker. Eventually not only will there be inadequate funds to support an army, there will be no useful soldiers at all.  

John King Fairbank in his book The United States and China assesses the impact of the opium trade:

In China the opium trade remains a classic symbol of Western commercial imperialism—foreign greed and violence demoralizing and exploiting an inoffensive people.

In 1839 Emperor Tao-kuang finally summoned the court officials to a special meeting at which time Lin Tse-hsu, a high ranking mandarin, was appointed commissioner at Canton. Lin was then authorized to confiscate the enormous stocks of opium that were stored in the British and American sections allotted to them at the Canton port. After forcing their entrance into the specified section, the authorities found over 20,000 chests of opium stored and ready for sale. They publicly destroyed the drug on the Canton beach. Sir Charles Elliot, the British superintendent, promptly notified his Government and convinced them that the Chinese confiscation of their property was unjustified and an insult to the British Crown.

Instead of putting a stop to the smuggling, the Chinese Government had precipitated the Opium War. Chinese consumption of opium continued despite the Opium War which lasted from 1839-1842. By 1842 the Chinese people were purchasing 35,000 chests of the drug a year.

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1 Li, op. cit., pp. 392-393.

2 Rea, op. cit., p. 123.
Superintendent Elliot refused to acknowledge the right of the Chinese to destroy British property and broke off all trade relations. The English merchants were then transferred to Macao. In this policy Elliot was supported by Lord Charles Napier, Chief Superintendent of Trade and the United States consul Peter W. Snow who was stationed in China. "The American merchants were under no control, subject to no law, except that of self-interest and refused to endanger their own position."\(^1\) They adopted a policy of neutrality and signed a bond agreeing to have nothing to do in the future with opium.\(^2\)

After receiving Superintendent Elliot's message, British troop carriers and men-of-war were quickly dispatched from the British colony of Singapore. Without waiting for a formal declaration of war, the British destroyed the Canton forts and started up the coast. The clumsy Chinese war junks were no match for the modern British vessels. The Manchu bannermen who had enjoyed peace for two centuries were not prepared to meet well trained military men fortified with the latest weapons. The Manchu Government did not sue for peace, however, until the city of Nanking was threatened in 1842.

The era of Unequal Treaties began with the Treaty of Nanking that was imposed upon China on August 29, 1842. Winning the Opium War was a very crucial victory for the political and commercial

\(^1\)Dulles, op. cit., p. 21.
\(^2\)Dulles, op. cit., p. 21.
interests for not only England but all Western Imperialists. China had become a semi-colonized nation in its relationship with the Great Powers as a result of these unequal treaties. This state of affairs would continue until World War II.

The Treaty of Nanking called for the opening up of five ports—Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo and Shanghai. It recognized the legal equality of foreign nations with China by permitting consuls to reside in these same cities. Hong Kong was ceded to the British by "Ch'i'shan, a Manchu Solid Yellow Bannerman, hereditary marquis of the first grade... He entered official life on account of birth, rather than through civil service examination..." ¹ Chinese customs duties were limited to five per cent, a provision which protected manufactured imports from abroad and impeded the growth of Chinese industry. The British exacted an indemnity equal to twenty-one million pounds of sterling. As is often the case the lower income citizens had to bear the burden of heavy taxation.

Share and share alike

Alarm was felt in Washington when the Treaty of Nanking was signed. It was feared that Great Britain would secure territorial concessions that would exclude the United States. To guard against this danger a special mission headed by Caleb Cushing was sent to negotiate a treaty with China that would give the United States every right which Great Britain had won from China as a

¹Rea, op. cit., p. 3.
result of the Opium War. Cushing, the first American commissioner to China, was instructed to impress China with America's new policy. This new policy was a complete reversal of the submissive policy of 1784 which had been continued by the American merchants in China right up to 1842 and the conclusion of the Opium War. It warned the Chinese Government "that the United States could not remain in friendly relations with China if greater privileges were granted to any other nationals than to the citizens of the United States."^1 An assortment of Western scientific products were selected that hopefully would be of interest to the emperor and his court.

The Treaty of Wanghia secured all the privileges for the Americans that Great Britain had wrung from China save the cessation of the island of Hong Kong. The new treaty added two new features to the list of demands: a clause that stipulated further concessions that were made to any one country would be shared by all and "extraterritoriality" which granted the Powers jurisdiction over their own citizens while residing in China.

The Americans were now obtaining a bigger share of the economic pie as a result of implied force and diplomacy. It should not be overlooked that the United States and China had maintained a working relationship with each other without the benefit of diplomatic protection from 1784 to 1844. The American Government's new superior attitude in demanding all the privileges that Great Britain had received from China as a result of force was a far cry from

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^1 Dulles, op. cit., p. 25.
America's humble first arrival. It no doubt caused the Chinese to believe: "You make all same Englishmen too."¹

The Manchu Government was convinced that the treaty system forced upon China had been concluded. Surely nothing more could be added to the final treaty that would end all treaties. A number of scholarly Chinese officials did not agree with the Emperor's conclusion. They feared the early treaties were warning signs of future trouble. As they were minority members of the court, little attention was given to their pessimistic analysis. Time has proven that the later Manchu rulers were not capable of sustaining the high level of ability displayed by the first three Manchu leaders. They avoided direct diplomatic contacts with the Western Powers and did not take treaty guarantees seriously.

The treaty system was not really established until the British and French had secured treaties at Tientsin in 1858. . . The new order was not acknowledged until an Anglo-French expedition had occupied Peking itself in 1860. The transition from tribute relations to treaty relations occupied a generation of friction at Canton before 1840, and twenty years of trade, negotiation, and coercion thereafter. . . Although the new treaties were signed as between equal sovereign powers, they were actually quite unequal in that China was placed against her will in a helpless position.²

The interior of China was opened for the Powers after the Treaty of Peking was signed in 1860. International settlements, foreign business and the missionary movements were then established

¹Dulles, op. cit., p. 5.
²Fairbank, John King. The United States and China (New York: The Viking Press, Inc., 1962), p. 120.
Western civilization brought both benefits and drawbacks to China. John King Fairbank in his splendid book *The United States and China* cites:

The opium trade which supplied 10 or 15 percent of the revenue of British India went hand in hand with the Protestant missionary movement which was nourished by the shillings and dimes of devout congregations in the Christian West.

China's Reaction to Western Imperialism

Opium was only one of China's domestic problems resulting from Western Imperialism; thousands of boatsmen and porters employed by the inland transport system were unemployed after China was forced to open her additional ports; Chinese weavers and other craftsmen were ruined by the demand for cheaper articles produced in Western industries; irrigation neglect and produce damage during the conflicts coupled with natural disasters of floods and droughts caused intolerable conditions; terrific indemnities exacted forced unbearably heavy taxes which were paid by small landowners, merchants and artisans. Instead of silver paying for China's choice articles, the Chinese had to use that precious metal for Western imports. The Manchus were blamed by the Chinese for their inability to expel the "foreign devils" and the gradual decay of their country governed by self-seeking, unqualified officials.

The bureaucracy did not seem to realize that the people living in the vast, powerful nation of China were seething with frustration and ready for a rebellion. The leader came in the person of a young village schoolmaster. Hung Hsiu-ch' un, future
head of the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864). Hung's so called Heavenly Kingdom of Peace increased its numbers from the original twenty thousand to over a million followers. By 1853 the rebels had captured Nanking where they established their capital and ruled for eleven years. The Chinese World, an excellent informative book by Richard Yang and Edward J. Lazzerini, lists a number of reasons for the failure of the Taiping Rebellion:

...internal squabbles among the rebel leaders, strategic blunders during later military campaigns, ideological fanaticism that alienated many possible supporters (especially the elite of China), discrepancies between the theory and practice of Taiping life, and the failure to take advantage of early Western sympathy... 

After the defeat of the Taipings in 1864, Anson Burlingame, the United States envoy in China, endeavored to re-establish a friendly relationship with the Manchu administration. Burlingame had China's interest at heart. He believed as did Fen Kwei-fen, a Chinese official, in self-strengthening or positive thinking. Feng's philosophy gave many people the courage to face the problems their country was experiencing, pick up the pieces left to them, and learn Western culture. By strengthening themselves they could strengthen their country. Feng was a conservative that could not quickly toss aside a system of government whose recorded history began in 1154 B.C. with the Chou dynasty. Its prehistoric date is still unknown as archeologists to this day are unearthing well written inscribed stones that reveal names and events that are associated with traditional folk tales and legends.
Restoration Period

China was at peace after the Taiping Rebellion had subsided. The Confucian system was restored. Although Confucius founded no religion, ordained no priests and conducted no religious services, his teachings were virtually a religion to a large number of Chinese people. The Chinese home was considered to be a shrine, the schools functioned as a church and the code of honor was for the individual a guide of living. The highest political offices were opened to the best qualified students.

Feng's Restoration movement was twofold: self-strengthening and self-improvement. Self-strengthening could be achieved by improving China's institutions, modernizing her army and navy.

Self-improvement included learning Western technology, science and how to make greater use of China's economic resources and human talents. These improvements would strengthen the Confucian system that should not be changed.

Lack of interest and inertia on the part of the Manchu officials caused the failure of the reform movement.

Renewal of Western imperialism

As is always the case, an eccentric individual or group will start a riot or condition that will evolve into conflicts and often wars. In 1869-1870 an anti-Christian movement was started that was followed by the Russian occupation in Ili in Sinkiang (1871), the Japanese attack on Formosa (1874), the British

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demand to open Yunnan (1875), and the French invasion of Annam (1884). By 1894 China was not prepared militarily or financially to compete with the unannounced Japanese fleet attack that ended in a humiliating defeat for China.

These incidents resulted in the partition of China by the Powers. The Chinese were not consulted by the imperialists in the partitioning of China into "spheres of influence."

United States Secretary of State John Hay, with the assistance of Great Britain, proclaimed the famous doctrine of the "Open Door." This doctrine called for an end to spheres of influence and equal trade access throughout China.

**Growth of Chinese nationalism**

The Empress Dowager was more than willing to cooperate with the reformers and cater to the Powers when she and her court returned to Peking in 1901.

A series of edicts similar to those suggested by K'ang yu-wei in 1895 were adopted to pacify the reformers. In an effort to re-establish a friendly relationship, the Empress assured the Powers that the rebellion had been a purely domestic conflict.

Economically, the position of China continued to decline. The Powers demanded an indemnity of almost 334 million dollars, a fixed tariff of five percent and a permit to station troops in Peking. The United States remitted her allotment of the indemnity to be used for educational purposes. Chinese exports were greatly
overshadowed by Western imports; heavy industry and railways were backed by imperialist investors.

Since the overseas trade of China was primarily in the hands of foreign banks and the bulk of the nation's resources were mortgaged with imperialist companies, the future did not appear promising for China and its people.

Students returning from foreign universities joined Chinese intellectuals who were demanding a constitutional government that would put an end to the incursions of foreign powers.

One Chinese patriot who was greatly disturbed by the degrading condition of his country was Sun Yat-sen who had been a revolutionary leader for twenty-four years.

Sun was born of a peasant family in 1866. He attended a little village school near Canton until he reached the age of fourteen. Sun then joined his brother, a successful merchant-farmer living in Hawaii. While there he attended a mission school and became a Christian. His instructors encouraged him to continue his education at the Hong Kong Medical College.

At the time Sun arrived at Hong Kong in the 1880s, the island's harbor was filled with over a hundred ships and steamers whose flags represented nations from all over the globe. Tall, strong "sikhs" from India protected the people living in the beautiful city of Victoria. India's "sikhs" had the reputation of being "anti-Chinese." The British in Hong Kong had reason to be well fortified after demanding China's island in 1842, in exchange for the unauthorized opium destroyed by the Chinese government.
officials.

As Sun watched Chinese coolies trudging up the terraced mountainside carrying long poles on their shoulders that were attached to a canvas-covered chair upon which was seated a foreigner, he was quoted as mumbling, "I am a coolie and the son of a coolie."

In his Lecture on China John L. Stoddard paints a vivid word picture of China's unskilled coolies that enables the reader to understand the Revolutionary Movement in China. Taking a trip on an American steamer from Hong Kong to Canton he went down to the deck below and

found a number of Chinamen--most of them were smoking, lying on their backs, their heads supported by a bale of cloth... farther down, packed in the hold like sardines in a box and barricaded from us by an iron grating were more than 1000 Chinese coolies. A sentry heavily armed, stood by the padlocked grating. ...

During his college years in Hong Kong, Sun Yat-sen was fortunate in studying under an excellent professor, Sir James Cantile, who became an understanding friend.

Western missionaries and educators favored the reform movement in China. Sun was inspired by their ideals and institutions. He agreed with their ideas that the ethical training of the Confucian system should be supplemented with scientific knowledge. He did not allow his bitter feelings to interfere with friendships that he had

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with certain foreigners.

After receiving his degree in medicine, Dr. Sun Yat-sen began his career in Macao. Within a short time, he was informed that a Portuguese degree in medicine was required. His response was to abandon his medical career and become an active revolutionary. Sun's experiences convinced him that only the overthrow of the empire and establishment of a republic could save what was left of the once powerful nation of China.

Sun Yat-sen was determined to do everything possible to unseat the inefficient, corrupt Manchu government that had been responsible for the deterioration of cities like Canton. The city had been the proud, intellectual center of China. Wealthy landowners whose tea and silk were in demand provided good schools and selected talented teachers. The civil service examination sheds were still standing that had been erected on sixteen acres of ground. Before the Manchu dynasty had become corrupt, no favoritism or cheating was allowed.

Canton in the late nineteenth century was a far cry from Hong Kong. Dirt-crusted, dilapidated buildings were still standing along the filthy, crowded streets, swarming with half clad individuals. Opium dens and fortune tellers could be seen everywhere. People were trying to forget the horrible condition of their country by seeking a ray of hope for the future. Hatred could be seen on the faces of the Chinese of all ages as they stared with contempt
at foreigners.

In preference to turning to opium or fortune tellers, Sun contacted leaders of the Triad Secret Society, one of the many anti-Manchu groups.

Before the Boxer Rebellion Sun in 1894 had organized his first secret society, the Hsing Chung Hui (Revive China Society). By 1895 he had become a recognized revolutionary leader.

At this early date he appears to have met and received help from a Shanghai merchant, Charles Jones Soong, who had lived in the United States as a child, become a baptized Methodist, and studied theology three years at Vanderbilt University before returning to China. (His daughters married Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek and H. H. Kung, respectively. Their brother was T. V. Soong.)

In 1895 Sun Yat-sen's first revolutionary attempt failed. His secret society had planned to seize the Canton provincial government offices. From this point onwards Dr. Sun was forced to live in exile as there was a price on his head by the Manchu government. Disguised he traveled to Japan, the United States, Europe and Southeast Asia to raise money from overseas Chinese for his secret societies.

Although Sun was not living in China, he was studying political and social theories and constantly trying to improve his revolutionary programs.

In 1905 his completed Revolutionary League was introduced

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1Fairbank, op. cit., p. 151
which formed the dogma of the Kuomintang (National People's Party). It consisted of the Three People's Principles: Nationalism--freeing all China from foreign control; Democracy--overthrowing the Manchu dynasty and replacing it with a democratic political system and People's Livelihood--equalization of land.

After fifteen years of plotting and planning a revolution that would overthrow the weak, corrupt Manchu dynasty, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, founder of the revolutionary movement, was not even in China when the outbreak of the final successful revolt occurred. He was in the United States at that time on a fund raising tour for his revolutionary party. The details were soon flashed throughout the world by the news media:

On the evening of October 10, 1911, an explosion occurred in a house in the Russian concession at Han-K'ou... The police investigated and found that the house was a revolutionary headquarters and an arsenal where grenades were being made. They also found a list of the members of an illegal revolutionary party. This list contained the names of many army officers stationed nearby.1

The secret revolutionary society was not identified. This "double ten" uprising (tenth day of the tenth month) has since been celebrated as the birthday of the Chinese Republic. Sun then returned to China in triumph.

January 1, 1912 Dr. Sun Yat-sen had the honor of being inaugurated Provisional President of the Republic of China. He soon discovered, however, that he had a rival for his newly acquired

office. Yuan Shih-k'ai, the warlord who had betrayed the young emperor, Kwang-hsu, established himself as head of the Chinese government after the death of the Empress Dowager.

Fearing a civil war and more partitioning of the nation, Sun Yat-sen resigned his presidency of the Republic of China in exchange for Yuan's agreement that as President he would live and govern China from the new capital city of Nanking; commit himself to following the constitutional system of government and observe Sun's "Three Principles of the People."

After receiving Yuan's pledge to abide by the demands, Dr. Sun Yat-sen resigned his presidency February 13, 1912.

Henry Pu Yi, at the age of six, abdicated the throne, thus ending the Chinese dynastic system. In the decree issued in the young emperor's name Yuan Shi-k'ai was appointed to organize a republic. On February 14, 1912 Yuan was elected Provisional President by the council of Nanking. Dr. Sun Yat-sen departed for Japan. Yuan became a military dictator. The following year China joined the Western Powers fighting Germany. A large number of Chinese were sent to the Western Front. The new leader did not keep any of his promises and finally dissolved Sun's political party.

Against the opposition of the Kuomintang and without their knowledge Yuan negotiated a large "reorganization loan" from France, Russia, Great Britain, Germany and Japan. With the protection of the army and the recognition of the Powers, there seemed to be nothing to fear. Japan joined the alliance against Germany for the express purpose of acquiring Germany's territorial possessions in
China.

China was alarmed and turned to the United States for assistance. Yuan urged President Woodrow Wilson to make it clear to all nations concerned to refrain from hostilities on China's territory. Japan not only fought on China's soil but took over Germany's concessions as well. By joining the Allies Japan secured valuable bases needed for her products and raw materials.

In January 1915, after China had been practically reduced to a semi-colonial status, Kato, the Prime Minister of Japan, presented Yuan with a paper that listed twenty-one insulting demands. The list included such items as: control of the Manchurian railways and ports by the Japanese; joint Sino-Japanese control over China's iron and steel works, arsenals and mines; and Japanese advisers in financial, military and political affairs.

Protests against the Demands could be heard throughout the nation from all classes of people. Although his inflated ego had been dealt a serious blow, Yuan announced his intention of founding a new dynasty and that his reign as first emperor would take place at that time. The storm of opposition was so intense that the future emperor gave up his goal, retired from political life and died within a short time.

The Warlord period

The government of the Republic of China was first taken over by the Vice President, Lu Yuan-hung who lacked real authority. Within a year the central authority had disappeared and the Chinese
state had practically collapsed. Northern warlords with their personal coolie armies struggled for supremecy. Southern revolutionaries tried to restore the constitutional republic. The puppet government in Peking installed by the warlord in power at the time, was accepted by other nations as the legitimate government in China.

During the warlord era between 1917 to 1928 the Chinese experienced a cultural awakening. The Powers were so involved in World War I that their industries and commerce were neglected temporarily. China took advantage of their loss by rapidly developing new industries in old and new cities.

Employment opportunities opened for a large number of peasants, men, women, and children alike. Family life changed as the majority of the rural population had worked, lived and remained in the same location during their lifetime. With all of its disadvantages including long hours and low wages, it was a broadening experience to become identified as one of a group of people that give allegiance to movements such as strikes, nationalism and Communism.

When America's little trading vessel, the Empress of China, anchored at Whampoa Island, China's only trading port open to foreigners in 1784, the hong merchants who dealt with them were classified in China as third class citizens.

While conducting their business affairs the foreigners were restricted to the island which gave China's merchants an opportunity to observe and study Western business techniques that included speculation and manipulation. By the twentieth century many of these Chinese merchants had come to represent a wealthy, conservative sector of society. Their children were sent overseas to acquire a thorough
Western education in hopes that the younger generation could revive and unify their nation again. In transacting business at the different trading ports, the hong merchants became aware of the patriotic national loyalty foreigners seemed to feel for their individual nations. After the Japanese presented the infamous Twenty-one Demands, the first great student migration occurred at that time. Next to Japan, the largest number of students went to the United States as many took advantage of the United States Boxer indemnity that was returned to China for the promotion of education.

Dr. Hu Shih, a professor at Peking University who had formerly been a student who had studied in the United States, introduced the written form of the everyday vernacular Chinese speech. Literate Chinese could then read and study material written by philosophers including Marx, Kant, Nietzsche, and Dewey which was printed in books, magazines and newspapers.

Another, then unknown, future leader of China, was Mao Tse-tung who was associated with the Peita Library as an assistant librarian.

China was handicapped at the Paris Conference held in May 1919, as she was represented by two governments, Peking and Canton. Regardless of their divided internal political differences, the two governments had the same foreign policy. The two representatives called for China's release from the unequal treaties forced upon her and the return of territories especially the German concession that was unlawfully seized by the Japanese during World War I. Both speakers asked for China's right to manage its own economy and exert
control over foreign enterprise and to end the humiliating experience whereby China was considered an equal nation.

If China's delegates had hoped for the return of the German concessions, they soon learned that their request was impossible as Lloyd George and Clemenceau and the rest of the Allies had signed a secret pact with Yuan's Peking government agreeing to give all German possessions to Japan. President Wilson was firmly convinced that the League of Nations was the only way to keep the world united and, Japan threatened to resign from the international organization if her demands were not granted.

China considered herself to be one of the Allies and consequently that she deserved recognition and the privilege of participation in the League of Nations policy making. When the shocking news flashes revealed the Allied duplicity, the "National Humiliation" (Twenty-one Demands Day) was advanced to May 4, 1919.

Political parties and secret organizations in China benefited from the spirit of activism. Sun Yat-sen's Nationalist Party, the Kuomintang, was revitalized by hundreds of new members.

Sun's request for recognition and aid was refused at the Washington Conference (1921-22). He was informed that the Western nations recognized the Peking regime as China's legal government.

The turbulent condition in the nation made it necessary to completely reorganize the Kuomintang. In 1921 two Chinese Communist branches were organized, one in Paris which included Chou En-lai as a member and the other in China which had a small membership. Mao Tse-tung was listed as one of the thirteen charter members of the
China branch. Additional funds were needed to maintain the Kuomintang. In 1923 Sun decided to turn to the Soviet Union for assistance as it seemed to be his last resort. He agreed after a period of negotiations to cooperate in organizing a United Front with the Chinese Communist Party. The Soviets in turn agreed to give financial backing and provide political and military advisers to the Kuomintang. In making the agreement Sun insisted that new Communist members would clearly understand that they were joining the Nationalist Kuomintang Party as individuals not as a bloc.

Under the counsel of the Soviets the concepts of anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism were stressed. This caused a great deal of dissension among the wealthy business segment of the Kuomintang.

Before Sun's death in 1925, the United Front was well established in Canton, and the Whampoa Military Academy was organized with Chiang Kai-shek as its military commandant. Sun became a national hero after his death in 1925.

Chiang Kai-shek, a loyal follower of Sun Yat-sen, was well prepared to command the "Northern Expedition" in 1926. At the age of nineteen he had entered China's first military academy located at Paoting near Peking. The following year he went to Japan where he spent four years as a student in the Imperial College at Tokyo. In addition to military tactics his favorite subjects included law, the Confucian classics and the writings of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

Chiang's military career began in 1923 at which time he was sent by Dr. Sun Yat-sen to Moscow for further revolutionary
training. While there Chiang was impressed with the propaganda tactics that could enable a small group of people to sway, manipulate and persuade thousands of people to follow their ideas of government, much the same as secret societies and religious cults. Being a devout Nationalist, Chiang listened to and observed every detail suggested. The Boxer Rebellion, China's first significant national outbreak that brought not only humiliation but despair to the Chinese people, was still fresh in Chiang's mind. He was determined to be one of the "twenty million Boxers," that British official, Sir Robert Hart predicted "would terminate the unequal treaties and repay China's humiliations with interest."

At the time the Northern Expedition was launched Chiang was just as determined in ridding the country of "foreign devils" and spineless Peking warlords who had betrayed China as were other loyal members of the Kuomintang including Communists such as Chou En-lai, Lin Piao, Mao Tse-tung and Wang Ching-wei. Conservatives and Communists alike were all fighting for the same cause.

After Sun's death, Communist activity among the workers and peasants, however, had been increasing so rapidly that conservative elements of the Kuomintang with which Chiang was identified were alarmed. Chiang, as Commander of the Northern Expedition, clamped down controls on the Communists.

Before reaching Shanghai, Chiang was informed that the Left wing of the Kuomintang had established headquarters at Hankow and

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1 Yang, op. cit., p. 41.
that Chou En-lai was on his way to Shanghai to start a rebellion which would involve wealthy supporters of the Nationalist Kuomintang wing. Chiang's troops were immediately ordered to turn violently on their former Communist allies. Chou was one of the few Communist members to escape.

United States' National Interest in China during the 1930s and 1940s

After Chiang Kai-shek's troops swept into Peking, all warlords save one, Chang Tso-Lin, had been eliminated. Japan as well as the Peking warlord had reason to be concerned since Japan's Manchurian areas north of the Great Wall were in danger. Her civil and military leaders had possibly waited too long to take that valuable province whose rich agricultural soil plus raw materials including iron, coal and timber were desperately needed. It was important that immediate action be taken due to Japan's population pressures and the fact that one half of Tokyo's foreign investments were in Manchuria.

September 18, 1931, it was reported that the missing warlord was on his way to Manchuria "... as Chang's train approached Mukden the train was blown up by a bomb and Chang was killed."\(^1\) The Japanese were quick to place the blame on the Chinese who denied the accusation. The "Mukden Incident" provided an excuse for Japan to start a successful invasion of Manchuria. Within a short time the Nationalists were driven south of the Wall, and Japan was in full

\(^1\) Fitzgerald, op. cit., p. 372.
control of Manchuria.

In May 1945 the War in Europe came to an end. The Allies then gave full attention and aid to problems in East Asia. The United States Airforce repaid Japan's Pearl Harbor bombing by dropping the first atom bombs on two of her cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japan then surrendered.

In 1945 Chiang Kai-shek had the honor of representing Nationalist China at the charter meeting of the United Nations. He was the first member of the fifty-one nations to sign the United Nations Charter.

Japan's surrender did not end China's problems. When the final settlement was announced both Nationalist and Communist leaders were present. The Japanese were ordered to surrender only to Chiang Kai-shek. American planes and ships assisted Chiang in transferring his troops. At that time he made the natural decision of protecting the large cities. Mao did not object as he preferred to place his troops in rural districts.

Mao and Chiang had many differences to solve that eventually led to a civil war. To prevent that from happening, President Harry Truman sent General George C. Marshall to China as a mediator. The Conference called for a military truce, but it proved to be a failure. Military clashes began and continued until 1949 when Chiang resigned. A negotiated settlement was refused. In 1949, accompanied by his family, most of his government officials, some 50,000 troops and two and one half million civilians, Chiang withdrew to the island of Taiwan.
Peking's Pro-Soviet Policy

In Peking's Tien-an-men Square on October 1, 1949, Mao Tse-tung proudly proclaimed the People's Republic of China.

Mao waited until December 1949 to pay his respects to Russia's powerful Joseph Stalin and at the same time make economic requests for the new Communist Republic. After nine weeks of perseverance an agreement that was to run for thirty years was signed by Mao and Stalin.

United States' China Policy after the Communist Takeover

The People's Republic came to identify the United States as its chief imperialist enemy. President Harry Truman's policy was one of neutrality that he announced January 5, 1950:

... that the U.S. would not accord military aid to the Nationalist, that it had no predatory design on Formosa or any other Chinese territory, and that it had no desire to obtain special rights or privileges or to establish military bases on the island.

1Latourette, op. cit., pp. 704-705.
CHAPTER II

CONTAINMENT OF COMMUNIST CHINA

Background of Containment

September 12, 1940, United States Ambassador to Japan Joseph C. Grew reported that Japanese militarists were planning an aggressive program of expansion in the Far East. He advised the United States government to take a firm policy to maintain the status quo until the ending of the European War. England would then be free to assist China and the United States in curbing Japanese aggression in China.

To prevent the United States from interfering with her plans for expansion in Asia, Japan aligned herself with the Axis powers fighting in Europe who would be obliged to come to her aid.

After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor the following year, Great Britain and China declared war against Japan and became allies with the United States. The European and Asian wars then merged into a global conflict known as World War II.

The United States and her allies had two major objectives in the war of the Pacific: to subdue Japan and restore China to her status as a great powerful nation. Following their historic meeting aboard a ship in the mid-Atlantic in August, 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill issued a joint
declaration entitled the Atlantic Charter. The declaration "pro-
claimed the principles that were to guide the two countries in their
search for a just peace and a stable world."¹

The Atlantic Charter was accepted and signed by twenty-six
nations at a meeting of the United Nations held in Washington, D.C.
January 1, 1942. The signers pledged
to employ in close cooperation their full military
and economic resources against those members of the
Axis with which they were at war, and to make no
separate peace or armistice with their enemies... There was to be no peace with Japan until she had
been driven out of the conquered territory in China
and southeastern Asia, and her military government
had been wholly defeated by force of arms.²

January 11, 1943, the first steps by Great Britain and the
United States were taken to restore China's rightful place in the
world. A treaty was signed by the Western powers that not only
restored freedom and independence to China but gave her a ray of
hope after a century of humiliation and privation. The treaty re-
leased the Middle Kingdom from the Unequal Treaties that had denied
the Chinese government the privilege of political control over their
nation. In addition to renouncing the extraterritorial rights and
agreeing to the removal of her troops and gunboats from Chinese
rivers, the United States
repealed Chinese exclusion laws, established an
annual Chinese quota, and made it possible for
legally admitted Chinese to become American

¹Olton, Roy and Plano, Jack C. The International Relations

citizens. . . The United States also awarded China one of the five permanent seats in the United Nations Security Council.\

In 1943 President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek met in Cairo at which time they issued an official bulletin demanding the return of all territories that Japan had taken from China including Formosa, the Pescadores, Manchuria, Korea and a number of islands.

Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin met once again near the end of the European War, this time at the Livadia Palace near Yalta in the Crimea.

...February 4 to 11, 1945, the Big Three, after considerable compromise, made important decisions... To later critics, Yalta symbolizes a "sell-out" to--or appeasement of--the Soviets, an example of Roosevelt's coddling of the Communist menace... Although at Yalta Hiss was an adviser on questions of international organization, no evidence exists that he influenced Roosevelt or the results of the conference... 2

At that time Roosevelt and Churchill secretly agreed to give the Soviet Union control over Outer Mongolia and Manchuria providing the Soviets would enter the war against Japan.

After the collapse of Germany in 1945, war was waged against Japan from all directions. The Japanese were driven out of Burma, and land transportation was re-opened between China and India. On


August 6, 1945 an atom bomb was dropped by the United States Air Force on the Japanese city of Hiroshima; two days later a second bomb fell on the city of Nagasaki.

The Soviet Union then carried out her part of the secret Yalta agreement by entering the Pacific war. She followed suit by sending her troops into Manchuria. On August 9, 1945 Japan finally surrendered, and almost immediately, the Soviets took over Manchuria from the Japanese. The Chinese people were startled to learn that the Soviets dismantled many of their Manchurian industries and shipped them to Russia. Fortunately, the Soviets did manage to give some Japanese weapons and ammunition to the Chinese Communists.

The Yalta "betrayal" is only one of the tragic results of the Big Three Meeting.¹

China did not confirm the Yalta agreement until August 1945. The delay could be easily understood.

Russia had continuing rights in the region: the railways were to be operated jointly by Russia and China. Port Arthur was to be a joint naval base for the two powers, and Darien, the chief port, was to be open to all nations. The Russians, in possession of Darien, placed obstacles in the way of opening the port. President Roosevelt had long felt that Russia was entitled to an ice-free port, and that this could best be had through Manchuria.²

In return, the authors of the agreement suggested that the Soviet Union fully recognize Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria and pledge itself not to interfere in China's internal affairs and declare


that whatever support or material assistance it gave China it would be "given fully to the National government as the central government of China."¹

The Japanese surrendered, but the conflict between the Nationalists and Chinese Communists intensified. Both parties endeavored to strengthen their political and military positions by seizing Japanese weapons and ammunition left at the time of the Japanese hasty departure. The Nationalists had the advantage in their competition with the Communists as the Japanese received orders to surrender only to Chiang Kai-shek. American ships and planes were stationed at Peking and Tientsin, not only to guard what was left by the Soviets but to be ready to transport Nationalist troops and government officials.

Ambassador Hurley urged Chiang Kai-shek to send invitations to Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai to come to Chungking for a negotiation meeting. He personally flew to the Communist headquarters at Yenan with the approval of Chiang to establish friendly relations. By early October 1945, the parties had reached what could at least be described as "an agreement to agree." Nationalists and Communists promised to submit their differences to a Political Consultative Council under the chairmanship of Chiang Kai-shek. Both Nationalist and Communist leaders reiterated their desire to avoid civil strife.²

On September 3 Chiang had expressed his intentions of

¹Dulles, op. cit., p. 252.
²Dulles, op. cit., p. 253.
instituting the domestic reforms suggested by the United States: a democratic government planned by Sun Yat-sen; economic reforms relating to "People's Livelihood" and industries. China would have been saved from the tragedy of a civil war if Chiang had carried out these reforms.

Having been born into a high grade gentry family, Chiang surely was aware of the fact that the peasant people, which numbered ninety percent of China's population, were required to bear the burden of higher taxes and enormous interest rates. As head of the Nationalist Party, Chiang turned to the wealthy industrialists, bankers, money lenders, landlords and merchants for financial assistance. Many of them, as in the United States today, flaunted their luxuries before the rest of the populace. Their sons often avoided military conscription. Corruption, inefficiency and nepotism were tolerated among high as well as low government officials. Chiang's government completely lost popularity when "prices doubled sixty-seven times in the two and a half years from early 1946 to late 1948." This unchecked inflation was in large measure due to the lack of budget control on the part of the government. This situation led to increased crime and corruption and resulted in a police state. "Professors were often dismissed, even arrested when they began to criticize the government for its policies. Students similarly inclined were also thrown into jail."^1 Spanier, op. cit., pp. 78-79.  
^2 Spanier, op. cit., pp. 79-80.  
^3 Spanier, op. cit., p. 80.
Service and Davies under pressure

John S. Service and John Paton Davies, United States Foreign Officers stationed in China during World War II and the beginning of the Chinese civil war, expressed criticism of the Chiang Kai-shek regime. Service and Davies prophesied that it would not be difficult for Mao to defeat Chiang in a civil war. Service had been political advisor to General Stilwell before the latter's relief from the China command in October 1944. Ambassador Hurley did not approve of Service's reports to Stilwell and followed through by denouncing the Foreign Service Officer. A Senate investigation followed which revealed no treason on Service's part. In October 1944 Service commented that the Communist revolutionary leadership has improved the political, economic and social status of the peasant. . . As the Japanese cannot defeat these forces of the people, neither can the Kuomintang. . . The Communists are certain to play a large, if not dominant, part in China's future.

In Chungking Chiang persisted with his proposal on the merger of the Nationalist and Communist armies without a real coalition. Hurley continued backing Chiang. The Ambassador came to view his China assignment as one to support Chiang and the Nationalist government not one to mediate the dispute. He believed that the Communists would eventually agree to his terms. An earlier visit to Moscow in August 1944 had convinced him of this line of reasoning. At that time Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov had remarked that the Chinese

Communists "had no relation whatever to Communism" and that the Russians would back Chiang Kai-shek.¹

There were a number of other Americans in China which included representatives of the Army, Office of Strategic Services, and Treasury as well as Foreign Service Officers who were convinced that Mao's followers were agrarian based Communists. They reasoned that if the United States denied Mao assistance that he would seek aid from Moscow. This situation would undoubtedly develop into a strong Soviet-American point of contention. Many of the Foreign Service Officers maintained that the only way to bring about an agreement was to deal with Yenan on an individual basis; this situation would then put more pressure on Chiang. Despite the deteriorating Chinese state of events, Hurley disregarded his staff's advice. When the Kuomintang-Communist negotiations reached an impasse, he accused the Foreign Service Officers of sabotaging his position by encouraging the Communists. He was also able to block any meeting between Mao and Roosevelt.

In February 1945 the final break between Hurley and the Foreign Service Officers took place. At this time Hurley returned to Washington for meetings with Roosevelt. Another crucial element in this whole affair was that the Foreign Service Officers, along with Chiang Kai-shek himself, had not yet been informed that at Yalta Stalin had agreed to Russian entry into the Japanese war. During Hurley's stay in Washington the embassy officers at Chungking

sent a telegram to Washington urging Roosevelt to inform Chiang Kai-shek in definite terms that we are required by military necessity to cooperate with and supply the Communists and other suitable groups who can aid in this war against the Japanese.

Hurley was outraged when he read this telegram; as a result he accused his staff of undermining his efforts in China. The Ambassador asserted that he would obtain an agreement between Mao and Chiang by April. Roosevelt, who was a dying man, gave Hurley strong support for the Kuomintang. The United States State Department was forced to give in to the Ambassador; the majority of the embassy staff including Service and Davies were soon transferred out of China.

Ambassador Hurley abruptly resigned on November 27, 1945 and charged that the career officials had sabotaged his policy by deserting the Nationalists and siding with the Communists. He declared, "A considerable section of our State Department is endeavoring to support Communism generally as well as specifically in China."

In December 1945 President Harry Truman sent General George C. Marshall on the next "Mission to China." In January 1946 the General ordered a cease-fire in hopes of establishing a coalition government. Chiang was determined to drive all Soviet and Chinese Communists from Manchuria. In April General Marshall's cease-fire order came to an abrupt bloody end. General Marshall then resigned.

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President Truman then turned to General Albert C. Wedemeyer for assistance. The "Wedemeyer Mission" reached China in July 1947. General Wedemeyer was convinced that the party leaders, Mao and Chiang, were too far apart to be interested in a coalition government. Communism was an obsession to Chiang Kai-shek. Aside from his military training Chiang was deeply read not only with the Confucian Classics, but law, history and Sun Yat-sen's textbook and writings. He was a revolutionist, but like Sun Yat-sen, not a Communist. He had studied the Soviet system in great depth.

John G. Stoessinger in his excellent book *Nations in Darkness: China, Russia and America* comments:

...there is strong evidence that the origins of the Kuomintang and the Communist party in China were almost the same. Both were conceived in the anti-Western reaction that swept China in the early 1920's.

The author explains

Chiang Kai-shek's political model for the Kuomintang came not from the democratic West but from China's Confucian past...he (Chiang) urged the officers of the Kuomintang to delve into the classics...he declared Confucius' birthday a national holiday...In 1934 Chiang decreed the canonization of Confucius, and the Confucian temple at Kufow became a national shrine.

In his book *China's Destiny* Chiang Kai-shek in no uncertain terms gave the reasons for China's decay and the horrible conditions he inherited upon his assertion of power in 1928. He declared, "The national decay during the last hundred years reached a point unequalled in our history."
United States China policy during World War II demonstrated a lack of balance between military strategy and postwar political goals. By 1944 it was apparent that China would not be a major participant in the Japanese theatre. At this time she did not have the large degree of economic, political and military power of the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain. During the war Roosevelt had several policy choices that he could have implemented regarding China. The first was to increase American military assistance and urge Chiang to carry out the reforms necessary to remain in power. The second alternative was to limit his political expectations for China and reduce United States military activity in the area. Unfortunately the President attempted to pursue both approaches at the same time. He continued dealing with China as if she had great power status while giving more attention to other critical areas of the globe. Roosevelt had followed existing China policy during the clash between Hurley and the China hands.

Why the United States did not recognize the government of the People's Republic of China

In June 1949 Mao Tse-tung stated that he was "leaning to one side." He had chosen the path of socialism in preference to imperialism.\(^1\) American policy makers should not have been shocked because United States China policy had been directed against the Communists since 1945. Mao Tse-tung severely denounced American

intervention in Chinese affairs while Americans in turn believed that China had become a client state of the Soviet Union. According to the Cold War mentality Moscow directed all Communist movements throughout the world. Yet Marshall had maintained that he could find no concrete proof of Soviet intervention in China.

In August 1949 Secretary of State Dean Acheson (who replaced Marshall in January) issued the China White Paper which began with "the Communist regime serves not (Chinese) interests but those of Soviet Russia."¹

The White Paper illustrates that there was little more that the United States could have done to bolster up the Nationalist government as Chiang refused to implement vital domestic reforms.

In December 1949 Chiang left the Chinese mainland with the treasury to Taiwan. The Peoples Republic of China was formally established on October 1, 1949.

Who lost China?

Henry R. Luce, publisher of Time Magazine, along with Republican congressmen and missionaries formed a group known as the China Lobby. They accused President Truman of "losing" China. Senator Styles Bridges and Congressmen Walter Judd led the influential China Lobby. This group supported American military involvement in the Chinese Civil War.

They argued:

If the essence of American foreign policy was the containment of communism without geographical limit, as stated in the Truman Doctrine and the "X" article, why did not the United States intervene in China? If Greece, why not China?¹

Truman and his advisors never really gave a specific response to the preceding question. Their arguments included the ideas that China was too large, that a land war in Asia was out of the question, that Chiang, unlike the Greek government was unmanageable, that the Greek question was an immediate crisis, that there was no evidence of foreign influence in China, and that the costs were out of reach. The Truman Administration continued to uphold its containment doctrine and pointed out that it had done its best to prevent Communism from taking over in China. The critics did not agree with the Administration's assessment of the China situation.

Why the United States failed in China

United States' failure was not due to insufficient aid to the Nationalist government or a lack of concern. The main reason for the United States' defeat in this area of the globe was the fact that American leaders did not realize the power and force of a peasant society that was ripe for a change and the attractiveness that the Communist reform program had among the war weary Chinese people. Unfortunately, the United States did not summon up the courage to admit that supporting the Nationalist government was a policy mistake.

¹Paterson, op. cit., p. 462.
United States China Policy after the Communist Takeover

The United States would not recognize the People's Republic of China after Mao's victory over Chiang for a number of reasons. Sino-American mutual hostility continued to increase.

In June of 1949 the leading elements of the Chinese Communist Party asked American Ambassador J. Leighton Stuart to meet with them to work out a compromise agreement. The Truman Administration refused such a meeting because of the strong opposition from the pro-Chiang "China Lobby." The Communists continued to remind Americans of their imperialist past including military participation in the Boxer Rebellion, support for Japan's seizure of Shantung in 1919, and naval gunboat patrols on Chinese rivers in the 1920s and 1930s. They seized American property and attacked United States citizens. American Consul General at Mukden Angus Ward was held under house arrest from November 1947 to October 1949 at which time he was formally tried, convicted of spying and expelled from China.

Mao's Pro Soviet Policy

From December 1949 through February 1950 Mao remained in Moscow and negotiated with the Soviets a treaty of friendship and alliance. Mao's main concerns were Japan and the American presence in Asia.

The United States perceived that this Sino-Soviet agreement proved that communism was a monolith. The treaty included such items as the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Port Arthur, the
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Port Arthur, the transfer of Soviet interests in railroads to China, Soviet commercial rights in Sinkiang, and recognition of Russian control of Outer Mongolia. Russia gave China very little aid. According to O. Edmund Clubb in *China and Russia: the Great Game*, the Soviet credit to China had narrow limits:

> It provided for a Soviet credit of U.S. $300 million, expendable in equal portions of one fifth annually over a period of five years from January 1, 1950, and repayable with 1 percent interest in ten annual installments beginning "not later than" December 31, 1954, and ending December 31, 1963. The credits would be used for payment of Soviet deliveries of equipment and materials and repayments would be in the form of "raw materials, tea, gold, American dollars."

It was apparent that there was a clash of traditional Sino-Soviet interests. Americans in turn overlooked this underlying split between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Instead United States policy makers emphasized the Sino-Soviet alliance and attacked the treaty as proof of the Soviet conquest of China.

Louis J. Halle, a State Department officer, wrote an article in the *New York Times Magazine* that certain American diplomats were well aware of the "long record of conflict between Mao and Moscow. They were, however, intimidated into silence, or if they tried to speak out their careers and reputations were ruined by accusations of treason."¹ State Department telegrams labeled the government of the People's Republic of China, the "Chi Commis," and reiterated that this regime would not be recognized by the United States.

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This nonrecognition policy placed the United States against the largest, most influential state in Asia, a nation which numbered 650 million people. Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk summed up the rigid American China policy in early 1951:

The Peiping regime may be a colonial Russian government—a Slavic Manchukuo on a large scale. It is not the Government of China. It does not pass the first test. It is not Chinese.

United States Commitment to Taiwan

The United States government has maintained a military and diplomatic commitment to support the Nationalist Chinese government every since the outbreak of World War II, with one six month exception. This brief six month suspension of United States support for the Nationalists came in 1950. President Truman announced on January 5, 1950 that "the United States would not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa." President Truman changed his mind six months later following the outbreak of the Korean War. At this time he ordered the United States' Seventh Fleet to prevent any Communist Chinese attack on Formosa.

Large-scale intervention of the Chinese Communist forces in Korea in November 1950 insured American support of the Nationalist regime. It also brought a resolution in the United Nations General Assembly declaring Peking guilty of aggression. This decision marked

1 Department of State Bulletin, XXIV (May 28, 1951), p. 847.

a turning point in the policy of the United States toward admitting the government of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations. In the first six months of 1949 prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, United States policy on the admission of the Chinese leadership to the United Nations had been based on Dean Acheson's March 8, 1950 statement that the United States would vote to seat the Peking regime in the United Nations while it recognized the Republic of China (Taiwan), but would also refrain from using the veto and would accept the majority decision of the United Nations.

United States Continues to Contain the Peking Regime

During the summer of 1954, the Chinese leadership increased their military pressure on Quemoy, Matsu and the Tachens in retaliation for the negotiation of the United States sponsored Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO). To underscore its support of the Formosa regime the United States on December 2, 1954 signed a mutual security treaty with the Republic of China (Taiwan).

On January 18, 1955 Chinese Communists invaded the offshore island of Ichiang, 210 miles north of Formosa and launched a massive bombardment of the Tachen Islands, eight miles from Ichiang. With a Communist invasion of the Tachens appearing imminent, President Eisenhower, in a special message January 24 to Congress, asked for explicit authority to use American armed forces to protect Formosa, the adjoining Pescadores Islands and "related positions and
The President's request received prompt action in Congress.

During this period of time there had been a deterioration in Soviet-American relations. From the mid-1950's onward Peking disavowed Moscow's concept of "peaceful coexistence" and any movement toward a Sino-American rapprochement. China opposed summit meetings and criticized Kruschev's restraint in not sending troops to Lebanon in 1958 to drive out American soldiers. Communist Chinese leaders were definitely opposed to a Communist detente with the United States in the 1950s. They remembered the history of the Sino-American confrontation: American aid before 1949 to Chiang Kai-shek; Chinese attacks on Americans; Washington's nonrecognition policy; Chinese attacks on American "imperialism"; the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950; American obstruction of Chinese membership in the United Nations; continuing American aid to Chiang; and the Sino-American military clash in Korea.

During the 1950s Chiang reiterated that he planned to return to the mainland. During this period the United States gave Chiang an annual average of over $250 million in economic and military aid. The Seventh Fleet remained in the Formosa Straits, causing the Communists to suggest that this situation was intolerable to them—it was as if China had stationed vessels between Hawaii and the United States. China was almost surrounded by American bases and

\[1 \text{ibid.}\]
armed forces by the late 1950s. These bases and forces extended from Japan to South Korea. In 1957 the United States placed on Taiwan missiles capable of firing nuclear warheads.

The United States also refused economic or cultural contacts with China. American journalists were forbidden to accept China's 1956 invitation to visit the mainland. During the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina Chinese and American diplomats would not greet one another. During the conference Foreign Minister Chou En-lai approached Secretary of State John Foster Dulles intending to shake hands. Dulles refused Chou's approach by turning his back.

In August 1958, the Chinese Communists resumed military operations against the Nationalist-held offshore islands concentrating heavy artillery barrages against Quemoy. As in 1954, tensions mounted rapidly. Dulles flew to Taiwan October 20 for talks with Chiang. The United States and the Nationalists reaffirmed the 1954 treaty and "recognized that under present conditions the defense of the Quemoys together with the Matsus is closely related to the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores."¹ Dulles, in a film interview released by the State Department October 23, 1958, said the United States "was not going to attack or tolerate attacks against the Chinese Communists," but that the United States government would "stand firm" to resist any Chinese Communist attacks.² During Dulles' stay in Taiwan, he persuaded Chiang to reduce his forces deployed on the offshore islands

¹ibid.
²ibid.
by one-third. After the Nationalists did cut back their forces on the islands, the Communists soon scaled down their artillery bombardments to an every-other-day affair of no military significance. Since 1959 there has been little tension in the Taiwan strait, and the Communists have ceased bombardment of the offshore islands.

In the 1960s the United States Seventh Fleet presence in the Taiwan strait was reduced to a two-destroyer patrol which was ended in November 1969. The United States' commitment to Chiang did not diminish even with the culmination of tension in the Taiwan Strait. Under the mutual defense treaty, reinforced by the congressional resolution, the United States continued its massive program of military and economic assistance to Taiwan. With the increase of American involvement in Vietnam the United States continued to build up its forces on Taiwan. Taiwan became a supply, staging and training area for certain United States units used in Vietnam.

Sino-Soviet Dispute

The visible quarrel between the Peoples Republic of China and the Soviet Union began in July 1963 at the time of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

The Chinese maintain that their dispute with the Soviets began with the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet party in February 1956. At this time Kruschev introduced the policies of destalinization and peaceful coexistence.

The Soviets in turn accept 1956 as the starting point of
the Sino-Soviet dispute. They opposed Mao's "cult of personality" and his opposition to their de-Stalinization program.

One could see the new direction in Soviet China policy by 1954-55. But it was not until 1957-1958 that Chinese policy had definitely taken on a leftward direction, both in domestic and foreign affairs. This direction in Chinese policy brought the Soviets and the Chinese into a violent collision course.

The Chinese believe that their revolutionary experience is unique, and that China represents the "oppressed" nations of the underdeveloped world. Mao adapted the Marxian-Lenin theory of proletarian revolution to the needs of China. Liu Shao-ch'i in an address to a Trade Union Conference of Asian and Australian nations on November 23, 1949 claimed that the way of Mao Tse-tung was the only possible way to be followed by the Asian peoples and elsewhere in the underdeveloped world.

The Soviet Union, in contrast to China, feels that a "tradition" has grown up whereby she holds the special, leading position in the world communist movement.

China presents two challenges to Soviet authority: first as a great power and secondly, as an ideological leader. The struggle over these two issues is essentially what the Sino-Soviet dispute is about.

The Chinese claim that the modern revisionists (that is the Soviet Union) have "betrayed Marxism-Leninism, the path of the October Revolution and proletarian internationalism," and that "it
is imperative to oppose modern revisionism in order to keep firmly to the path of the October Revolution."¹ China accuses the modern revisionists of pushing the Soviet Union on the road towards a restoration of capitalism. The Cultural Revolution in China supposedly prevented a Soviet type of restoration towards capitalism in China.

Mao's decision to "lean to one side" in the autumn of 1948 was required by the real politik situation in the world. By 1949 the international situation was in a state of cold war and extreme polarization into opposing blocs. Of course American aid to Chiang during the Chinese Civil War had provoked the Communists. The Chinese Communists had good reason to fear the American policy of "containment of Communism." United States Secretary of State Acheson expressed the hope that "the profound civilization and the democratic individualism of China will reassert themselves and she will throw off the foreign yoke."²

The Chinese Communists felt that the main value of the Sino-Soviet alliance was the military and political backing it offered them. This was vital to the newly established government in Peking. At this early stage of development any new regime is most vulnerable to foreign and domestic attack. The economic aid which China received from the Soviet Union was far less important than the political and military support.

²Acheson, Dean. Letter of Transmittal to the White Paper. United States Relations with China, p. xvi.
Certain items of national interest contained in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance concluded in February 1950—referring to Soviet rights in Manchuria, the status of Outer Mongolia, plus the exploitation of Sinkaing—were not agreeable to China. One can see reiterated again that as far as the Chinese were concerned economic and territorial considerations were second in importance to military and political demands.

The Korean War and the death of Stalin

In 1950 China found it necessary to overcome major economic and social dislocations. During the Korean War there was a great leeway for Sino-Soviet differences. There is evidence that China wanted more Soviet aid during the first year of the war. Also, China demanded that this aid be delivered more rapidly. Other problems included Soviet objection to the worldwide value of "the way of Mao Tse-tung." and disagreement were Soviet rights in Manchuria and the joint stock companies.

As far as the international scene was concerned, the Korean War helped to further isolate China both politically and economically. It was natural that this situation forced China into a closer relationship with the Soviet Union despite sharp Sino-Soviet points of contention.

1954-1955

The best period of Sino-Soviet relations occurred between Stalin's death and the Twentieth Party Congress. China was no longer
overly dependent on the Soviet Union after the Korean War. She had successfully consolidated her power at home and had been successful in causing a stalemate in the Korean War. Stalin's death left Mao as the most legitimate Communist leader.

Because the Chinese wanted to modernize and industrialize their nation on the Soviet model, they continued to seek aid from the Soviet Union. The post Stalin leadership in the Soviet Union which was attempting to establish its legitimacy turned to China for support.

On the world scene China was emerging as an independent would-be great power. Her self-confidence was due to her success in bringing about a stalemate in the Korean War, also order had been established at home, a great deal of economic and political progress achieved, land reform completed and a formal constitution was established in 1954.

Chinese diplomacy was impressive at the 1954 Geneva Conference and the 1955 Bandung Conference. China was no longer isolated from her Asian neighbors; she had established diplomatic relations with many of them. In Asia Chinese influence had come to challenge that of the Soviet Union. The Chinese concluded that their relationship with the Soviets should be one between equals.

The Soviet Union refused to accept China as an equal partner. She preferred to treat China as one of her client states—only different from the other Communist powers by virtue of her size.

China began to intervene in Soviet-European affairs and continued pushing for a leading role in Asia. She did not support
Kruschev's attempts to woo India and other Asian nations after 1955. During Krushchev's 1954 visit to Peking China brought up the status of Outer Mongolia. Soviet pledges of support for the Chinese Communists during the 1954 Taiwan Straits crisis were disappointing. This same situation occurred again during the 1958 Taiwan Straits crisis.

1956-66--Increasing Sino-Soviet Rivalry

There were a number of reasons for the deepening of the Sino-Soviet dispute: (1) conflicts of national interest; (2) opposing ideological positions; (3) differences in the social and economic characteristics of both nations and (4) domestic as well as foreign policy differences. Probably the most important factor in this dispute was the power relationship between the two nations.

China, as well as the majority of newly emerging third world nations, rejected the bipolarization of international relations. Due to China's greater size and potential influence, she became more independent and dangerous to the Soviet Union and the United States. Both superpowers preferred to have China under Soviet influence.

From 1955-57 China stood for the interests of the small nations against "great-power chauvinism." Later she asserted herself more and consequently the smaller nations classified her with the Soviet Union and the United States.

By 1958 China began her own independent nuclear program. She decided to acquire these weapons when the Soviet nuclear guarantee contained in the joint Sino-Soviet Alliance came into
question. The United States had supported Soviet reluctance to
give China nuclear weapons.

Both Russia and China look at the world through an ideological framework. Resolution of differences is difficult to achieve because any area of conflict cannot be treated in isolation. In disputes over ideological issues both China and the Soviet Union find themselves speaking to the world communist movement.

At the Moscow Conference in November 1960 the Chinese openly challenged Soviet ideological leadership. But from 1958 on the Sino-Soviet dispute led to a new polarization of forces. China continued to force the pace of the disagreement.

China's attack on India in 1962 was the turning point in her relationship with both the Soviet Union and the United States. In spite of the war Soviet military aid to India continued. In a statement of October 25, 1962, the Chinese government had pledged its support for the Soviet Union in the Cuban missile crisis. But as soon as the Soviet Union had agreed to withdraw her missiles from Cuba, China immediately denounced the arrangement as an example of the "cowardice" of modern revisionism. Massive rallies were held in China. China's argument that the Soviet Union was guilty of "adventurism" in sending the missiles to Cuba, and of "capitulationism" in withdrawing them greatly angered the Soviet leadership. This criticism, coupled with the Sino-Indian border, caused the Soviet Union to decide to contain Communist China along with the United States.
The idea of Kruschev's "peaceful co-existence" was disgusting to the Chinese. Between 1957 and 1959 China began to see herself as having to go it alone. She also began to see Moscow as a power that would sacrifice her for its own objectives.

In the 1960s practically all engineers, students and experts were withdrawn from China. The sporadic Sino-Soviet meetings held after that time were supposedly to mend the widening breach between the two countries.

In reply to the Chinese charge that Moscow was guilty of "adventurism" and "capitulationism" in the face of "imperialist nuclear blackmail" in the Cuban situation Kruschev, reporting to the Supreme Soviet in December 1962 noted that if imperialism was a "paper tiger" it was equipped with nuclear teeth. He baited Peking with parallels about China's withdrawal from Indian territory and Peking's failure to liberate Hong Kong and Macao. Peking replied sharply. If China's humiliation was to be raised Russia was numbered among the imperialist powers that had forced "unequal treaties" upon China. Peking ended with the warning that China had not yet presented its case.

After continuing debates in 1962 at various party Congresses polemics were temporarily halted. Bilateral talks were proposed by the Russians and entered into on February 21, 1963. On March 8, 1963 Peking said that the "unequal treaties" imposed on China by tsarist Russia might have to be revised.

Later in May Moscow also proposed talks on the boarder question.
It was at this point that the issue of racism was first raised. Just before the talks opened in Moscow in July the Chinese provocatively aired all their old charges. The Russians replied and added that the Chinese had tried to prevent Russian and European participation at the 1963 Tanganyikan Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference on the grounds that "the whites have nothing to do here." Moscow also rebuked Peking for nonchalance about nuclear war, which China allegedly favored on the grounds that the destruction of the imperialist powers would follow, but that some Chinese would survive. The bilateral talks ended on July 20 without any agreement. The Chinese soon turned down Kruschev's offer to resume economic and technical cooperation charging that Moscow used its economic strength to "bully" and dominate its allies.

Reports started coming in about serious incidents along the Chinese-Soviet border in Sinkiang Province. Kazakhs, Kirghiz, and other national groups live on both sides of that border. Both sides stated that since 1960 some tens of thousands of people had crossed into the Soviet Union. According to the Chinese they were incited and coerced by Soviet agents; according to the Russians, they sought refuge from Chinese maltreatment. The Russians also accused Peking of numerous frontier violations.

As the rift grew the border question became ever more important. In an interview reported in the Japanese press, Mao Tse-tung suggested that the Soviet Union should return the Kurile Islands to Japan; he sensed Soviet vulnerability on the whole question of Soviet frontiers. He also talked of Soviet appropriation of
part of Rumania, Poland, East Germany, Finland and Mongolia. He noted that "a hundred years ago the region east of Baikal became Russian territory and, since then, Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Kamchatka and other places have become territory of the Soviet Union." China, he added, had not yet presented its reckoning for this.

Kruschev responded on September 15. He warned that the frontiers of the Soviet Union were sacred. He then asked what the Chinese were doing in Sinkiang, an area populated by a people ethnically different from the Chinese.

The border issue is vitally important to world peace because should serious hostilities occur (which could very possibly be a nuclear war) the entire world would be affected.

With the fall of Kruschev (1964) Brezhnev and Kosygin tried to patch up the rift with the Chinese but the differences were too great. No agreement was reached.

On October 16, 1964 in Sinkiang, China exploded her first atomic bomb and Chou En-lai appealed for a summit of all countries to disavow the nuclear weapons.

In 1965 the conflict with Moscow reached a new intensity. Anti-Soviet demonstrations in Peking began in March following the alleged suppression in Moscow of a Vietnam rally by Chinese students. Demonstrations continued throughout 1966 and 1967 until almost all students were either expelled or withdrawn. Also in 1965, 47 Chinese scientists working at the Joint Nuclear Research Institute at Dunba returned to Peking. Kosygin did visit Peking in February 1965, and
Mao did send anniversary greetings to Moscow in celebration of the Russian Revolution, but the dispute passed over into the field of international organizations when the Chinese called on the World Federation of Trade Unions at its October Congress in Warsaw to oppose "peaceful co-existence."

By 1965 Mao decided to remove every obstacle that would delay the achievement of his goal of restoring China's hegemony first in Asia and secondly throughout the rest of the world. Still Lenin's promise to China concerning the abrogation of the "unequal treaties" had not been carried out in Soviet actions.

During 1965 the Vietnam War began to escalate. September 3, 1965 China's Defense Minister, Lin Piao, emphasized the role of the developing countries (world countryside) over the world city (developed countries). In other words he restated the Maoist case against the Soviet Union in the context of the Chinese strategic debate over Vietnam. This was a direct threat to Moscow's leadership role in the Communist world.

Beginning in 1966 the Chairman instigated the Cultural Revolution to bolster his domestic authority and therefore to better achieve his objectives. Those who opposed him, Communist or not, were eventually purged. The Chinese Communist Party, Mao's chief institutional opposition, was effectively dealt with by the Red Guards and the military. A military-bureaucratic dictatorship controlled by Mao and his heir to the regime, Lin Piao, was the result of the Cultural Revolution. An important aspect of this was an intense hostility toward the Soviet Union. Lin's orders to the
officers and soldiers in the Chinese People's Liberation Army were always to think and act in accordance with the teachings of Mao.

During the initial Red Guard stage, the Cultural Revolution also extended into Chinese border lands. Inner Mongolian and Sinkiang leaders who occupied important positions as Communists were purged because of being "counter-revolutionary" nationalists.

As the Cultural Revolution mushroomed in 1966, Peking again meddled in the politics of Eastern Europe where a resurgence of nationalism was occurring and where a number of party leaders were maneuvering for greater autonomy. Polemics were exchanged at conferences in Czechoslovakia and Sofia. In June, Chou En-lai visited Albania and Rumania. He praised the Rumanians and encouraged them in their struggle against outside interference. In March 1966 the Chinese and Soviets clashed over Vietnam and borders. A "secret" Soviet letter was leaked to fraternal parties that charged Peking with rejecting joint action in Vietnam, with hindering the transport of Soviet war materials, and with promoting frontier clashes. In December Foreign Minister Chen Yi informed a Brazilian journalist that Moscow had moved troops from Eastern Europe and had built up 13 divisions on the Chinese frontier.

In early 1967 Chinese demonstrations outside the Soviet embassy in Peking were of unprecedented size and duration. Soviet families were manhandled at the Peking airport on their way home. Sharp protests were exchanged, with Peking identifying the Kremlin leaders with Hitler, the Czar and Chiang Kai-shek.
China announced the explosion of her first hydrogen bomb on June 17, 1967.

In 1968 the final defeat of Lin Shao Chi and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia were the focal points of sharp polemics. China was seeking support among friendly Communist nations. She managed to sign up Albania which did not trust the Soviets due to the fact that after World War II Stalin had offered to give their nation to Tito. Chinese behavior during the East European crisis had provoked the Soviet Union. Following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Peking supported the "people" of Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Albania.

Most of the Asian Communist countries disliked Mao because of the Cultural Revolution but they preferred Peking to the Soviets.

Immediately following the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 Mao reinforced China's border regions with more regular troops. China did this after learning of the Brezhnev Doctrine. During 1968 serious tension existed on the Sino-Soviet border region. More and more incidents developed along this boundary. Travel was difficult; people were questioned and baggage searched.

It was reported by the Soviets that conditions in Sinkiang had become so intolerable that more than 60,000 Russians, Uighurs, and Kazakhs, including many anti-Soviet White Russians fled over the frontier into the Soviet Union.

The Ussuri border clash reached the high point in Sino-Soviet rivalry.

Thus by early 1969 Moscow and Peking were suffering the most
deterioration in relations since Mao came to power. From March onward, they charged each other with border violations along the Ussuri River and in other areas. These incidents were used to stir up new waves of anti-Soviet and anti-Chinese feelings, and to prepare each nation for mass military buildups and war scares. On June 18 talks started between the delegations of the Sino-Soviet Frontier Navigation Commission; an agreement was reached on navigation of frontier rivers. But Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated further after the Conference on World Communist Parties in Moscow in June. China was not formally condemned, but in the course of the debates the "Mao clique" was denounced. Nevertheless, Kosygin visited Peking following the funeral of Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi, and large-scale talks were begun in October.

The Chinese, according to Hong Kong reports, do not expect the return of the land. They are, however, seeking Soviet acknowledgement of the Russian imposition of these "unequal treaties."

The Russians, in turn, refuse to yield. They are associating the present "eastern threat" with Mongol incursion of the 13th century. They further reply that Chinese territorial demands are pure chauvinism and the Chinese have repeatedly violated the Sino-Soviet boundaries. They continuously warn that the frontiers of the Soviet Union are sacred and that anyone who dares to violate them will meet with a "resolute rebuff." The war scare of September 1969 has been eased; Moscow and Peking started high-level negotiations in October, but the talks have not modified the position of either side.

The military buildups continue. Thirty or more Soviet
divisions, moved to the Chinese frontier in the summer of 1969, still stand poised in strike positions. In 1967 the Soviets had only 12 or 13 divisions. Of these, it is estimated, only two were full strength divisions. At that time, moreover, there were no Soviet units of any consequence in Outer Mongolia. Today the frontier divisions have been brought up to full strength, are deployed in Outer Mongolia, and are armed with artillery, rockets, aircraft, and all the equipment necessary for waging a conventional or nuclear war. The change in military buildup is striking.

In China, underground air-raid shelters are being built, grain stockpiled, troops moved to border regions, and people, even the youngest school children, are being drilled in protective measures against nuclear war. So intense is the hostility that the Chinese charge they are confronted not with a friendly communist ally, but with a hereditary enemy. They warn their people that Russia has embarked on a policy to destroy China, not only as a communist power but as a nation. The "Ussuri Incident" and incidents following March 2-15, 1969 did not solve the problem of ownership of Chenpoa or Damansky Island.

Therefore, Moscow and Peking stand today much as they did in the 19th century, as traditional enemies. But the situation is much more complex. They are arguing not only over national frontiers but ideologies and conflicting interests as well. With a quarrel that is a mix of nationalism, asymmetrical interests, and ideology, only a change in international politics and hard negotiations by cooperative Chinese and Russian diplomats can bring about the return
of that brief and temporary period of friendship that they enjoyed immediately after World War II.

By the end of 1969 a standoff along the Sino-Soviet border had been achieved. China and the Soviet Union began to engage in more complicated maneuvers against each other with the aim of getting significant political advantages without war. The most important area was so called competitive detente with the United States.

Peking's Opening to the United States

As the weaker party to the Sino-Soviet confrontation, Peking was more anxious than Moscow in bringing about detente with the United States. Competition with Moscow was not the only motive; other reasons included: progress toward the "liberation" of Taiwan through erosion of the American commitment to the Republic of China, and technological contact with the United States. American politics and foreign policy--particularly the Nixon Administration's need for Chinese help in ending the Vietnam War, and for leverage in dealing with the Soviet Union--created some American vulnerabilities and exposed the United States to Chinese manipulation.

Chinese politics created problems for Sino-American detente due to the powerful faction of Maoist radicals who opposed it. This reason helps to explain why the detente was not solid until Lin Piao's fall in September 1971. After that incident detente progressed much more smoothly for about two years, and then again showed signs of strain after the radicals began to reassert themselves in the summer of 1973.
Peking did not expect a military alliance or guarantee from the United States against the Soviet Union; domestic politics and foreign policies of both China and the United States forbade such a commitment. But Peking hoped that the United States would serve as a counterweight to Soviet pressures on China in the form of a Sino-American relationship improved to the point to create in the minds of the Soviet leadership a significant uncertainty about the probable American reaction to a Soviet attack on China. This seems to have been achieved until at least 1973. Also there was the consideration that Peking did not want to permit the Soviet Union to achieve a closer relationship with the United States than China had itself.

The first step was to get President Nixon to come to China.
CHAPTER III

NIXON'S PRESIDENCY AND HIS CHINA POLICY

As an interested private citizen, Richard M. Nixon wrote an article that was published in Foreign Affairs in October, 1967.

We cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of Nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors. . .

The world cannot be safe until China changes. Our safety depends upon the extent that we can influence events.

Richard Nixon's article suggested the best method in meeting the problem would be to use short-range policies that would advance long-range goals. For instance, a short run policy of firm restraint at first toward membership for the People's Republic in the United Nations and suggestions of their entering foreign trade. Acts of this nature would not denote approval of her conduct. Further, Peking should be persuaded, not forced, to accept basic rules of international civility. Mr. Nixon emphasized the importance of persuading the leaders of the People's Republic to have the desire to change from an isolationist position in international relations to that of a renewed interest in the outside world which would satisfy China's imperial ambition and inspire her to find a solution for her domestic problems.
Mr. Nixon at that time was concerned with the safety of the United States. He wrote:

The West faces two prospects in the next decade that create a crisis for the First order. (1) The Soviets may reach nuclear parity with us. (2) China, within 3 to 5 years will have a significant deliverable nuclear capability... China will be outside any nonproliferation treaty—and free if it chooses to scatter its weapons among "liberation" forces anywhere in the world. Our long-range aim should be to pull China back into the family of nations, as a great progressive nation, not as the epicenter of world revolution.

In 1968 President Richard M. Nixon immediately began to put his China Policy into practice.

Communism—any brand or label—is not the subject of this discussion. It is an important factor, however, in the part it plays in the Nixon foreign policy toward China.

John G. Stoessinger in his book entitled Nations in Darkness explains that the long standing conflict between the United States and China refers to two distinct free ideologies which collide without mutual comprehension. He further states:

Reflection shows that neither the American nor the Chinese images tally with the facts. No one dimensional Communist-devil theory showing how American capitalism attacked, betrayed, and exploited the Chinese people will do. Nor is the American self-image of moral superiority any more satisfactory.

The American image of a heroic Chiang between 1936 and 1945 as a leading defender of democracy against communism has provided the basis for most

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United States China policy decisions.¹

By mid-1969 the time was ripe for a fresh United States approach to China. The Cultural Revolution and the 9th Party Congress were over, and the essence of Peking's policy seemed to be stabilization of diplomatic relations at least to the pre-Cultural Revolution level.²

Most important of all, China was under Soviet political and military pressure on account of the Sino-Soviet border dispute and it was probably hoped in Washington that Peking would therefore be more flexible in its attitude toward the United States and conceivably toward Taiwan.³

At Guam in July, 1969, the President had enunciated what became known as the "Nixon Doctrine," which foreshadowed a deciding American commitment to Asia.⁴ Certainly, it meant that in future Vietnam-type situations, America would "look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense."⁵

¹ibid., p. 32.
³ibid.
Ping Pong Diplomacy

Despite the ups and downs of United States' communications with Peking, the general trend on both sides was clearly toward increased contact. On April 30, 1971, Edgar Snow wrote in Life magazine about his December 18, 1970, interview with Mao:

Should rightists like Nixon, who represented the monopoly capitalists, be permitted to come? Mao explained, at present the problems between China and the USA would have to be solved with Nixon. Mao would be happy to talk with him either as a tourist or as President. 1

On April 7, 1971, Peking invited the United States Table Tennis Team, attending a world tournament in Japan, to visit the Mainland. In greeting the table tennis players, Premier Chou En-lai stated that their trip had "opened a new page in the relations of the Chinese and American People." 2

The Nixon Administration's responses included: First, on April 14, 1971, President Nixon announced five measures in a single package to show his pleasure. 3 They were: (1) A relaxation of the 20-year old embargo on United States' trade with the People's Republic of China (a list of items placed on the general license was subsequently made public on June 10, 1971). 4 (2) A pledge to "expedite" visas

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3 Newsweek, April 26, 1971, p. 17.

for Chinese citizens wishing to visit the United States. (3) A relaxation of United States currency controls to permit the People's Republic to pay for imports with dollars and to allow American citizens to send checks to China without first obtaining permission. (4) Permission for American oil companies to sell fuel to ships or planes bound to or from the People's Republic, except for Chinese craft heading to or from North Vietnam, North Korea or Cuba. (5) Authorization for United States ships or planes to carry Chinese cargoes between non-Chinese ports, and for American-owned carriers that operate under foreign flags to visit the People's Republic itself.

Then, on April 16, the Washington Post reported a Nixon remark that he would like to visit Peking during his tenure as the President of the United States. Later, on April 20, it was announced that Peking had accepted the American invitation to send a ping-pong team to visit the United States.¹

Subsequently, an increasing number of American journalists who had in general been barred from the People's Republic since 1949, were admitted. The People's Republic then allowed some American scientists, students, and others to visit. The Department of State announced that visa applications for visitors from the People's Republic would be processed expeditiously under existing visa regulations.

The first official United States visitor to the People's Republic from 1949 to 1971 was Dr. Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's

Assistant for National Security Affairs, who held talks in Peking with Premier Chou En-lai from July 9 to 11, 1971. From Dr. Kissinger's conversations came the joint announcement of President Nixon's forthcoming trip.¹

After the Kissinger mission, President Nixon confirmed that the United States would not abandon Taiwan or its Asian allies, although all of them, especially Japan and of course the Republic of China, had been affected in various ways by recent developments in Sino-American relations. Secretary of State William P. Rogers announced support on August 2, 1971 for "two Chinas" in the United Nations.²

Why the Nixon trip?

To understand why the United States did not seek to establish relations with Peking at an earlier date and why President Nixon was able to move with relative freedom at home at the time he did, one must look largely to American domestic politics. To understand why the President decided to seek improvement in Sino-American relations, one must look largely to his conception of United States national security interests and his view of how the world operates. To understand why the move was made as it was, one must look both to American domestic politics and to the President's style.

¹Communist China, op. cit., p. 3.
²Hinton, op. cit., p. 99.
President Nixon accepts invitation to visit the Republic of China

President Nixon made the following statement to the Nation on television and radio, July 15, 1971:

I have requested this television time tonight to announce a major development in our efforts to build a lasting peace in the world.

As I have pointed out on a number of occasions over the past 3 years, there can be no stable and enduring peace without the participation of the People's Republic of China and its 750 million people. That is why I have undertaken initiatives in several areas to open the door for more normal relations between our two countries.

In pursuance of that goal, I sent Dr. Kissinger, my Assistant for National Security Affairs, to Peking during his recent world tour for the purpose of having talks with Premier Chou En-lai.

... In anticipation of the inevitable speculation which will follow this announcement, I want to put our policy in the clearest possible context. Our action in seeking a new relationship with the People's Republic of China will not be at the expense of our old friends.

It is not directed against any other nation. ... I have taken this action because of my profound conviction that all nations will gain from a reduction of tensions and a better relationship between the U. S. and the People's Republic of China.¹

James Reston wrote an article in the New York Times August 7, 1971, entitled "A View of Nixon from Peking" in which he stated:

President Nixon is handling his relations with this sensitive and highly suspicious capital about as well as anybody could do under the circumstances. He is tiptoeing through a mine field, which extends

¹Communist China, op. cit., p.3.
through Tokyo, Saigon and Hanoi, and could easily be blown up at any point, but so far has been remarkably effective.

The Role of the United States in the Fight to Keep the People's Republic Unrepresented in the United Nations

The United States played a leading role in the struggle to keep the People's Republic out of the United Nations. Without American opposition, the People's Republic would have been admitted to the United Nations long ago. Many countries voted against Peking's representation, or abstained, because of their susceptibility to American influence.¹

It should be remembered that the Republic of China was an original member state of the United Nations and one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. The representation question came about as a result of the Chinese revolution which created two claimants to China's seat—the Republic of China on Taiwan and the People's Republic of China on the mainland.

The issue of Chinese membership as it appeared each year through 1971 was a matter of credentials, rather than membership.² In 1950 the credentials of the communist regime were flatly rejected. From 1951 through 1960 the American strategy was to seek postponement of this issue. Thus the United States was able to maintain the status quo in the United Nations without forcing governments to commit

²Ibid.
themselves directly on the question of representation. But since 1961 the Assembly addressed itself directly to the central issue and until October 25, 1971 rejected motions to replace the Republic of China delegates with representatives of the Peking government. "Until 1970 the Nationalist government always received a plurality, with the exception of 1965 when the vote was evenly divided at 47 in favor, 47 opposed, and 20 abstaining."¹ (The vote to seat Communist Chinese representatives was 46 to 57 in 1966; 45 to 58 to 17 in 1967; 44 to 58 to 23 in 1968; and 48 to 56 to 21 in 1969.)²

The 1970 vote went in favor of the People's Republic of China by 51 to 49 with 25 abstaining due to a shift of alignments at least partially due to the decision of Canada and Italy to establish diplomatic ties with Peking.³ This did not change the status of Chinese representation because of an Assembly resolution, first adopted in 1961 and reaffirmed in 1970, declaring the matter to be an "important question" requiring a two-thirds majority vote of the Assembly; but nevertheless as long as it was in effect the unseating of the Nationalists was a remote possibility.⁴

At the end of 1970 the American official statements seemed to suggest that the United States China Policy reappraisal had settled on a two Chinas (or one China, one Taiwan) policy in the

¹ibid.
²ibid.
³ibid.
⁴Riggs, op. cit., p. 264.
United Nations; in effect, the United States would concentrate on trying to keep Taipei in the United Nations rather than on trying to keep Peking out.

The urgency of the Taiwan problem was underlined in November 1970 by the majority vote in the United Nations General Assembly in favor of the Albanian resolution, which in previous years called for the expulsion of Taipei and the seating of Peking, even though the vote did not take effect because of the prior passage of the American-sponsored "important question" resolution.

On August 2, 1971 when Secretary of State William P. Rogers announced that the United States would support the seating of Communist China in the United Nations, he said the United States would oppose any efforts to "expel the Republic of China or otherwise deprive it of representation" in the United Nations. He avoided the question of which China should serve on the Security Council, saying only that the United States would abide by the views of the majority of United Nations members on the question.¹

October 18, 1971 Ambassador George Bush addressed the United Nations and reiterated the official United States position supporting membership for both Chinas. He said, "Expelling Chiang Kai'shek's Nationalists could open a Pandora's box inside the world peace organization."² During the twenty year history of the United Nations


no member had ever been expelled or deprived of its seat. He drew
attention to the fact that the Chinese Nationalist member had a most
constructive record with no Charter violations. For it, or a member
of any country large or small, to be expelled solely because certain
other governments questioned its legitimacy would cause the ruination
of the United Nations. He asked, "If the Organization is going to
travel that road, where do we stop? Who can predict what UN member
should be next?"\(^1\) An act of this sort would lead away from uni-
versality, away from realism toward factionalism, recrimination,
and irrelevancy. He emphasized the fact that it would damage the
very fabric of the organization.

President Nixon had started on a definite plan that he
soon discovered would require hard bargaining.

After being informed that the official United States'
position supported United Nations membership for the People's Republic
of China and the Republic of China, Peking replied that they "would
take a seat in the United Nations, only if Nationalist China were
ousted from the United Nations and from the Taiwan Government, as
well."\(^2\)

President Nixon had hoped to develop a friendship with the
People's Republic of China, and at the same time honor the Mutual
Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China,
signed at Washington, D.C. on December 2, 1954. Article II in the

\(^1\)ibid., p. 75.

\(^2\)"UN Seat for Red China." U. S. News and World Report,
August 16, 1971, p. 20.
Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China states:

In order more effectively to achieve the objective to this Treaty, the Parties separately and jointly and by self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and communist subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

At his news conference, President Nixon gave the following reasons for his welcoming Communist China into the United Nations. He stated that he hoped to discover "areas where the United States, which today is the most powerful nation in the world, can find an agreement with the most populous nation in the world, which potentially in the future could become the most powerful nation in the world."

Mr. Nixon was concerned for the safety of the world in 1967. As the President of the United States planning the United States' disengagement from Vietnam, he faced a grave responsibility. If a friendly atmosphere existed, the People's Republic of China might not be inclined to contribute war supplies to North Vietnam. That would assist the United States to leave sooner and hopefully put an end to the war.

Friendship with the People's Republic of China would naturally cause the Soviet Union to realize that she would be faced with a triangular power situation and that she could no longer capitalize on the hostility between the United States and the People's

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2 "UN Seat for Red China," op. cit., p. 21.
Republic.

Ross Terrill, in an article entitled "The 800,000,000: China and the World" in the January, 1972 issue of Atlantic Monthly, gave some very thought provoking explanations as to why he believed that the United States changed its course in the United Nations regarding the issue of Peking's membership.

I do not believe that Kissinger and Chou set the UN issue aside when they met last July—as was often said in the press. Nor that Peking was ready to go ahead with detente regardless of what happened in the UN. I believe that the issue was set aside, after July, because the two sides knew what was going to happen in the UN. . . During the many hours of rather tough talks, the two sides gave each other a statement of intention on the UN issue. Since the talk dealt with votes and agendas in an international organization, each side could state what it would seek, but not guarantee what it would attain.

The distinction was crucial. It permitted two statements of intention to seem an agreement on what would result. The Chinese were satisfied with what they concluded from this diplomacy by indirectness. No sign exists that the U. S. was deeply dissatisfied.

Following this line of reasoning it would seem that the United States indicated to Peking that it would support its seating in the China seat at the United Nations. Secondly, the Americans proposed that should Taipei fight to keep a United Nations place for itself, the United States would support this attempt. Thirdly, the United States said that it did not know whether the attempt to keep Taipei in the United Nations would succeed or not. ¹

¹Terrill, Ross, "The 800,000,000: China and the World." Atlantic Monthly, January, 1972, p. 47.
Secretary of State Rogers' subsequent statement of August 2, 1971 did not mean quite what it said on the printed page.

Yes, the United States will fight to keep a United Nations place for Chiang Kai-shek. But if the United States "does not know" whether this will succeed, and China is sure it won't, the two sides are not as far apart as they seem.}

Washington then came out with a double proposal for the United Nations debate: Peking to have the China seat; a separate, lower place to be salvaged for Taipei in the Assembly. United States' spokesmen assured that though every effort was being made, success for the double proposal could not be guaranteed. By the time Foreign Minister Fukuda of Japan came to Washington in early September "it smelled as if Mr. Rogers were foreshadowing failure and looking around for others to share whatever blame failure might trigger." After President Richard Nixon's and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's words about the danger of a right-wing rampage in America in the event of calamity for United States' fortunes in Asia, "no one should be surprised that Bush was assigned the role of making an elaborate effort to hold a General Assembly seat for Taiwan." The newspaper photographs of Kissinger conferring in Peking as the United Nations voted were more effective than anything Bush said or did in New York.

\[^1\text{ibid.}\]
\[^2\text{ibid.}\]
\[^3\text{loc. cit., p. 48.}\]
"Nixon lost a battle on October 25, 1971 but salvaged a campaign (perhaps two campaigns)."\(^1\) The Pakistani delegate at the United Nations said just after the vote that one big reason for the outcome was Nixon's new China policy.\(^2\) Nixon's China Policy ultimately benefited from the United Nations vote.

Also, as it was suggested in an article entitled "U.N. Seat for Red China" published in *U.S. News and World Report* August 14, 1971:

The U.S. has virtually run out of gas in pursuing its past part of opposing Red China's admission, backing for Peking in the U.N. has been climbing almost without interruption since 1952. . .

Peking had many loyal supporters in the United Nations. In fact the United Nations General Assembly voted overwhelmingly on October 25, 1971 to admit Communist China and to expel the Chinese Nationalist government of Taiwan.\(^3\) The vote, taken at an unexpected evening session, admitted the Peking government to China's seat in the Assembly and the Security Council for the first time in the Communist regime's twenty-two year history. The Assembly action marked the final defeat for the United States in its battle to keep Nationalist China in the United Nations.

The final vote came on a resolution sponsored by Albania and twenty other nations, calling for the seating of Peking as the sole legitimate representative of China and the expulsion of Taiwan.\(^4\)

\(^1\)loc. cit., p. 48.
\(^2\)loc. cit., p. 48.
\(^4\)ibid.
The resolution was adopted 76-35, with 17 absentions. The result was greeted with cheers and jubilation from many of the delegates in the Assembly.

The Assembly earlier had defeated the United States' resolution to declare the expulsion of Taiwan an "important question" requiring a two thirds majority. That vote was 59-55 with 15 abstentions. The United States had predicted victory, and its defeat precipitated the landslide victory for the Albanian resolution.

Official United States' reaction to Taiwan's expulsion

In a statement approved by President Nixon and read to newsmen by Secretary of State Rogers October 26, 1971, the Administration welcomed Communist China's admission to the United Nations as "consistent with the policy of the United States." But said that "at the same time, the United States deeply regrets the action taken by the UN to deprive the Republic of China of representation in that organ." The statement added:

Although we believe that a mistake of major proportions has been made in expelling the Republic of China from the UN, the US realizes the will of the majority of the members has been expressed. We, of course, accept that decision.

1 ibid.
2 ibid.
4 ibid.
He concluded by saying that the United States hoped the United Nations would not be weakened by Taiwan's expulsion.

The Nixon policy toward Taiwan

Thus it can be seen that the Administration made two major diplomatic initiatives concerning Nationalist China.

1. It supported the seating of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations, thereby reversing 20 years of opposition to representation of the Peking regime.

2. It has sought to normalize relations with Peking in a series of moves climaxed by President Nixon's trip to mainland China.¹

Nationalist response

Both these actions drew sharp criticism from Taipei. On July 15, 1971, when President Nixon announced his invitation to visit China, Nationalist Chinese Premier Yen said that the United States had been "deceived by the Chinese Communists."² He further added that improved United States' relations with Communist China "could lead to a tragedy far more serious than that involved in the fall of the Chinese mainland" in 1949.

On August 2, 1971 when Rogers announced that the United States favored admission for Peking in the United Nations but would oppose efforts to expel Nationalist China, the Nationalist Foreign


²ibid.
Ministry asked United Nations member states to uphold its "unquestionable" right to membership in the United Nations. The ministry warned that the United Nations "would surely be confronted with the ever-increasing danger of infiltration, subversion and eventual destruction."\(^1\)

Congressional response to Taiwan's expulsion

Members of the United States Congress, diplomats and lawmakers also lost no time in denouncing the United Nations vote that gave Peking a seat in the organization and expelled Taiwan.

Amendments were introduced to the foreign aid bill calling for big cuts in United States' contributions to the United Nations. Among the senators in favor of the reduction of financial support for the United Nations were Democratic Majority leader Mike Mansfield of Montana and the Republican Minority leader Hugh Scott from Pennsylvania.\(^2\)

"October 29, 1971 the Senate voted to kill the U.S. foreign aid bill program by a vote of 41 to 27."\(^3\)

Democrats and Republicans alike were outspoken after the expulsion of Taiwan.

Senator Russel Long, Democrat from Louisiana, commented "We ought to ask them (United Nations) to move some place where we don't have to admit these hordes of foreign agents into our country to spy

\(^1\)ibid.


\(^3\)ibid.
on us as a part of the U.N. process.\textsuperscript{1}

Senator J. W. Fulbright, Democrat from Arkansas, expressed a somewhat different opinion:

\textit{I do not think what happened should be held against the U. N. as an institution. It was not the individual members who voted against us. Many of them have been giving large sums of money.}\textsuperscript{2}

Senator Barry Goldwater, Republican of Arizona, was quick to demand a United States withdrawal from the United Nations. He added:

\textit{My only regret was that my country had not joined the representative from Taiwan in walking out on a session so farcical that it defies description.}\textsuperscript{3}

Senator Edward Kennedy, Democrat from Massachusetts, said:

\textit{For the first time in nearly a quarter of a century all the major powers of the world are represented in the U.N. . . . It would be a tragedy far greater than the loss of Taiwan for the U. S. to fail to embrace these opportunities.}\textsuperscript{4}

Senator James L. Buckley of New York announced that he was drafting legislation "to delete a provision to the foreign aid authorization, a bill repealing the Formosa Resolution of 1955."

That resolution authorized the President to use armed force to protect Nationalist China against armed attack.\textsuperscript{5}

\textsuperscript{1}"China and the U N: Threats of Retaliation in Congress," op. cit., p. 2217.
\textsuperscript{2}ibid.
\textsuperscript{3}ibid.
\textsuperscript{4}ibid.
\textsuperscript{5}ibid.
The effect of Peking's admission on the United Nations

China's entry brought many changes in the United Nations. The London Times on October 26, 1971 quoted French Defense Minister Michel Debre as saying that the China vote marked the end of the period in which the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, dominated world affairs and could settle international disputes among themselves.

Nationalist China paid its regular budget dues on the basis of the total population of China, mainland as well as Taiwan. At the Nationalist ouster, the representatives of their government walked out owing 30.3 million dollars. They had always paid up their dues even at the last possible moment.

Taiwan's expulsion: A dangerous precedent

United Nations diplomats were concerned by a country of good standing being expelled. If it could happen to Taiwan, it could happen to Israel or in fact any country small or large.

Aside from the angry response from some diplomats, lawmakers, and people which was by no means unanimous, President Nixon was faced with two difficult problems after the Assembly vote that gave the People's Republic the seat in the United Nations that had been occupied by Taiwan. The problems were (1) the Mutual Defense Treaty, a military commitment signed by the United States as well as Taiwan December 2, 1954 and (2) Washington's future diplomatic relations
The critical reaction of many members of both the United States government and the United Nations following the expulsion of Taiwan made it even more difficult for the President's diplomatic dealings with both the Communist regime in China and the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan.

**Background considerations for the February 1972 Sino-American Summit**

Before he was elected vice-president in 1952, Richard M. Nixon graduated from Whittier College, took a law degree from Duke University, served in Congress (1946-1951), and represented California as senator (1951-1953). He was a staunch anti-Communist and was vigorous up to at least 1960 in warning against any pandering to the "international criminals" in Peking. This was his theme in many a speech directed at Senator John F. Kennedy as the two men vied for the presidency.

Loser in the 1960 election, Mr. Nixon turned to law, often traveling in Asia on behalf of clients. It may have changed his views about the Mao Tse-tung regime in Peking. As early as 1967, he was considering a trip to Communist China with the Prime Minister of Newfoundland and Labrador, and writing in *Foreign Affairs* in 1968 that China should not remain forever isolated from American contact.

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Nixon's China trip was an important step in the development of Sino-American relations. Of course at this time neither China nor the United States formally recognized the other. Since 1949 they had been involved in numerous crises. Each labeled the other as an "aggressor"; each had created an image of the other as the monster incapable of rational action. Washington continued diplomatic relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan, which Peking considered a rebellious province.

Many Americans who supported the Nationalists on Taiwan wondered how Nixon with his anti-Communist background could negotiate with the hated Chinese Communists. Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott summed up the feelings of many July 12, 1971 when he commented on ABC's Issues and Answers:

A Republican President...can often do things in foreign policy a Democrat can't, for good reason. Had the Democratic Presidents moved toward this rapprochement with Mainland China, people in this country, led by many Republicans, would still be seeing Communists under the bed and would have raised pluperfect hell.

World politics had undergone a radical change since the 1950s. The trip of 20,395 miles, Nixon said, "will signal the end of a sterile and barren interlude in the relationship between two great peoples." It was unrealistic for the United States not to have formal diplomatic relations with the most populous nation in the world. There were a number of advantages for renewed Sino-American contact after so many years. First, American recognition of China, due to the Sino-Soviet split, would enable the United States to play off the
two Communist giants against one another. And of course the American business community fantasized about the great China market. Because the American economy was in a recession in the early 1970s trade with China was a possible source of relief. Another reason for Nixon's China trip was that China possessed nuclear weapons and was not a member of any international antiproliferation arrangements. Soviet-American nuclear arms control agreements were not complete without Chinese participation. Nixon also hoped that American recognition of China would encourage Peking to reduce its aid to North Vietnam and help to bring about a political settlement.

The China trip would also hopefully benefit Nixon for his bid at reelection in 1972. Also the first presidential primary for 1972 was in March of that year. This would follow close upon the heels of the Nixon trip to China. For a number of years liberal Americans had urged relations with China; Democrats were loud in their praise of the China trip. Nixon, with a proven anti-Communist record, could not be accused by the Republican right of being soft on Communism. Perhaps the most vital reason for Nixon's Peking Trip was the contribution that this trip would make in the Nixon-Kissinger policy of "detente"—the relaxation of international tensions to protect American global interests.

On their part the Chinese had their own reasons for inviting Nixon. They no longer perceived that the United States was the greatest military threat to them. Sino-Soviet relations had seriously worsened since 1968. The Ussuri border incident occurred in March 1969, plus numerous other border skirmishes over the years. Viewing
the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Chinese feared that the same thing could happen to them. The Soviet Union had erected an air base in Mongolia; in response the Chinese had dug air-raid shelters and tunnel networks. It was hoped that the new American connection would strengthen China vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. In addition China viewed rising Japanese power with caution. A Sino-American rapprochement would cause Japan to think twice before attempting to assert hegemony over the People's Republic. Of course it was also possible that a new Sino-Japanese positive relationship would strengthen China in its dealings with the Soviets. Finally, but not least in importance, China wanted the United States out of Taiwan; and she was also interested in trade.

The Nixon Peking Trip

In his excellent book China and the United States What Next? Allen S. Whiting asks: "Was the Nixon trip as historic an event in retrospect as it appeared at the time?" The author later answered this question by saying:

...the 1972 China trip was both symbolic and substantive. The Mao-Nixon handshake communicated a recognition by both leaders that Sino-American relations had moved from nadir of war and near war to near normalcy where interests could converge and compromise be negotiated.

After more than twenty years of noncommunication it would seem doubtful that any Chinese or American would wish to omit that important meeting from the pages of history.

Nixon hoped that friendly diplomatic relations could be established between Peking and the United States and that this policy
would reestablish direct contact. The leaders of the two countries could then reconsider, and hopefully improve bilateral relations.

The newly elected President's pre-election doctrine and slogan had been "No more Vietnams" and an "honorable" peace in Vietnam. He promised, if elected, to put an end to the longest war in which Americans had been involved. When the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson Administrations committed the United States to the defense of South Vietnam they did not realize the determination and strength of North Vietnam, nor that the United States participation in the war would take the lives of over 56,000 American men. The United States taxpayers continue to pay over $200 billion in veterans benefits.

After being elected to the Presidency, Nixon immediately began his campaign to end the war in Vietnam and to terminate American involvement in the area as rapidly as possible. Among other proposals and steps he offered were: a program for the mutual withdrawal of American and North Vietnamese troops; a ceasefire; a change of battlefield orders from "maximum pressure" on the enemy to "protective reaction" in order to lower the casualty rate; a number of sizeable troop withdrawals amounting to 110,000 by early 1970, at which time a further reduction of 150,000 by the spring of 1971 was announced (the over-all rate being 12,000 per month) a speeding up of the "Vietnamization" program, that is, the training of South Vietnamese forces to take over an increasingly larger share of the fighting. Hanoi and the Viet Cong believed that if they waited long enough American opinion would weary of the war and that they would win in
the conflict. Still determined to liberate the United States from its military involvement in Vietnam, Nixon decided to request an interview with Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the People's Republic of China. The President hoped that Mao would convince North Vietnam to cooperate in ending the hopeless struggle.

July 15, 1971, President Nixon had announced that he would visit Peking in early 1972 "to seek the normalization of relations between the Peoples Republic of China and the United States of America." The meeting had been arranged by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger at a secret meeting.

February 21, 1972 President and Mrs. Nixon arrived at Peking. Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China stood waiting at the foot of the stairs of the Nixon plane "Spirit of '76." After shaking of hands with the President and Mrs. Nixon, Chou welcomed Kissinger as "Old friend." The customary speeches were omitted but the People's Liberation Army Band honored both nations with the American National Anthem, the Star Spangled Banner and the Chinese Anthem March of the Volunteers.

The ice was broken and the leading characters were on their way to Peking.

A short time after arriving at the guest house, the President, Premier Chou En-lai and Henry Kissinger met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung. They were warmly received and talked earnestly for an hour.

The Americans were dinner guests in the Great Hall of the People that evening. The following day the leaders from the two countries met to establish harmonious relations. The rapprochement
in Sino-American relations achieved at that time was considered by Robert G. Sutter in his excellent book *China-Watch* to mark "the most important breakthrough in modern Chinese foreign policy."

The factors discussed at the first meeting were of concern to both parties though obviously for different reasons. The "question of Taiwan" was no doubt one of the most difficult problems to solve. It was finally acceptable to the leaders of the People's Republic and the United States to agree "that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of it."

The United States pledged to ultimately withdraw its military troops from that location.

Reducing the dangers of a major military conflict between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union was next on the agenda. Since 1959 the Soviets and the Chinese have engaged in border hostilities. China still fears a Soviet strike on her nuclear installations and missile sites. Normalizing Sino-American relations, strengthening alliances, and preparedness were the suggestions given to meet the problem.

Nixon did not hesitate in asking the Chinese leaders for suggestions and aid in extricating the United States from its military involvement in Vietnam. He hoped that they would encourage a peaceful settlement to the conflict.

*The Shanghai Communiqué*

On February 27, 1972 after much Sino-American disagreement, a joint communiqué was issued. The essence of the document pointed
out that the Chinese and the Americans had agreed to disagree. The
Communique contained three main sections: one that stated agreed
positions, another presented the Chinese positions, the other
explained the American positions.

Dealing with the general principles to govern bilateral
Sino-American relations, the two sides agreed: There was to be
further progress toward "normalization" (which was not defined),
including an expansion of scientific and cultural exchange and
trade. Sino-American relations were to be based on the "five
principles of peaceful coexistence" (these principles were not
labeled as such). The two parties agreed to remain in contact with
each other.

The Chinese maintained that Taiwan was the "crucial question
obstructing the normalization of relations" between the People's
Republic of China and the United States. The Chinese also stressed
that Taiwan was a province of China and that no one could legitimately
interfere with its "liberation"; that American troops and bases
must be withdrawn from the island (no time limit was specified); and
that no separate status of any kind for Taiwan was permissible. The
American side stated that it did not "challenge" this position, which
it attributed to all Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait,
that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of it. The United
States pushed for a peaceful settlement on the two parties involved.
She made its military withdrawal conditional on China's good behavior
not only in the Taiwan Strait but in the rest of Asia, as well as on
the general growth of international stability in the region.
The communiqué also dealt with a number of third states. The Americans stated that they wanted peace in Asia, with "social progress for all peoples... free of outside pressure or intervention." The communiqué stressed that these words applied to Vietnam, from which the United States planned to withdraw after a negotiated settlement. The United States furthermore would maintain friendly relations with South Korea and Japan. The Chinese stated that they would continue to support "the struggles of all oppressed people" against large nations which attempt to "bully" the small. All foreign troops should be withdrawn from Asia, especially Vietnam. Both parties agreed that "neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of nations to establish such hegemony." This last provision was directed at the Soviet Union.

Finally both sides called for increased cultural and commercial contacts. On the seventh day of his China trip, February 28, 1972, Nixon commented that "this was the week that changed the world."

The following is an excerpt from the President's Speech on his Return Home, February 28, 1972.

When I announced this trip last July, I described it as a journey for peace. In the last thirty years Americans have in three different wars gone off in the hundreds of thousands to fight and some to die, in Asia and in the Pacific.

One of the central motives behind my journey to China was to prevent that from happening a fourth time to another generation of Americans.
We have demonstrated that nations with very deep and fundamental differences can learn to discuss those differences calmly, rationally, and frankly without compromising their principles. This is the basis of a structure for peace where we can talk about differences rather than fight about them.

The primary goal of this trip was to reestablish communication with the People's Republic of China after a generation of hostility. We achieved that goal!

But peace, peace is too urgent to wait for centuries. We must seize the moment to move toward that goal now, and this is what we have done on this journey.1

The shock waves from this new Sino-American meeting were felt in Tokyo, Taipei, Saigon, New Delhi and Moscow.

The Peking summit and the Shanghai Communique did not change the world, as Nixon had stated, but these events had established the foundation for eventual Sino-American diplomatic relations. Yet the fact that the trip took place at all and that the Chinese received Nixon with courtesy and respect cannot be disregarded. Also the Chinese permitted more Westerners to see more of China in a shorter period of time than would have been permitted prior to the Nixon visit. On the American side Nixon came up with a formula involving terms of reference regarding Taiwan different than in the past which made it possible to define a limited agreement with China after twenty years of hostility and confrontation. This event ended the decade of stalemate in Chinese-American relations. Real communication was initiated with China.

According to an article entitled "Foreign Relations" in the Far Eastern Economic Review 1971 Yearbook:

Nixon's long standing game plan for drawing China onto the world stage, like similar and related moves by de Gaulle and Trudeau, and others, were motivated largely by internal politics, for a settlement in Indochina and a belief that Peking could be helpful in that regard if it would, as well as by the need for leverage to offset the growing military threat of Russia and the economic threat of Japan.

Regarding continued United States' involvement in Southeast Asia J. W. Fulbright, then Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations in the United States Senate stated:

... may I say that I personally feel that our continuing involvement in Southeast Asia is the most serious threat to the survival of our Constitutional system of which we have been so proud. ...

I feel that we are very gravely threatened by disillusionment on the part of many people about the validity of our basic society. ...

After signing the Shanghai Communique, Peking and the United States began a period of testing and exploring. Bilateral trade markedly increased. "Contrary to the conservative forecasts of experts, trade soared from $100 million in 1972 to $800 million in 1973 and reached $934 million in 1974."  

Liaison offices were established in both Peking and Washington. These offices provided a direct means of communication between the

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1"China and the U. S.: Today and Yesterday," Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 92nd Congress, February 7 and 8, 1972, p. 7.


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two states. Confidential talks at the highest level between Mao and Kissinger continued until the resignation of Richard M. Nixon in 1974.

Nixon-Kissinger policy of detente

During the Nixon Presidency from 1969-1974 the Cold War was limited through a policy of detente with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. This was a radical change from the traditional United States' policy of containing Communism which had originated during the administration of Harry Truman and had been pursued by succeeding presidents through the Johnson years. Americans finally realized from hard bitter experience that monolithic Communism no longer existed—if it ever had in the first place. The multipolar world was the new reality. Detente was the current American policy of containing nationalism and revolution. It was the keystone of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger's (national security affairs adviser, 1969-1973, and secretary of state, 1973-1977) foreign policy.

Dr. Kissinger interpreted the configuration of world affairs, . . . there were five power centers: Russia, America, China, Japan, the Common Market nations of Western Europe. Each had a responsibility to keep order in its region and not to intrude in areas dominated by the others. In this way, small nations could no longer play off one great power against another and could not count on outside help. In essence, the scheme presumed to grant the United States more freedom and flexibility in its diplomacy. . . . This five way balance of power would also permit the United States to contain both Russia and China at the same time by having them contain each other. The Sino-Soviet split was a reality Americans now recognized and welcomed. Detente was also a cheaper way of pursuing the containment doctrine; it did not require as many interventions or weapons
Kissinger goes on to emphasize that peace in Asia is crucial to global peace and that the balance of power in Asia is fluid. The focal point of the power struggle in Asia is not only between East and West but between the two major communist powers also. The United States' security relationship with China is crucial for the global balance of power.

The process of détente could thus not be complete unless the United States developed a working relationship with the People's Republic of China. The foundation for diplomatic relations between the United States and the People's Republic in January 1979 was laid by the implementation of the Nixon-Kissinger concept of détente.

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CHAPTER IV

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHANGED CHINA POLICY

The purpose of this chapter is to examine how the United States China policy has been implemented during the Ford and Carter administrations. The changed China policy was officially carried out in January 1979 when the United States and the People's Republic of China established full diplomatic relations with each other--some critics would say that this event took place thirty years too late.

The Ford Years 1974-1976

Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Premier Chou En-lai gave every indication that they admired President Nixon who had travelled 20,395 miles and humbled himself by asking advice and assistance for his country from leaders of an unfriendly nation. Nixon quoted Chairman Mao on television:

So many deeds cry out to be done and always urgently. The world rolls on. Time passes. Seize the day. Seize the hour. We will build a bridge across 16,000 miles and 22 years of hostility.¹

It is now important to address ourselves to the question of why Ford and Kissinger failed to fully implement the new China

policy by establishing diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. The Ford/Kissinger China policy was in essence a do nothing approach to China. Why would Kissinger, who along with former President Nixon had set the foundation for eventual diplomatic relations with the People's Republic, and Ford fail to complete the process toward diplomatic relations between the two nations?

Four months after the Nixon visit to Peking and the formal signing of the Shanghai Communiqué, former House Majority Leader Hale Boggs and House Minority Leader Gerald Ford of the United States House of Representatives were sent on a Mission to the People's Republic of China. Their Joint Report to the Speaker of the House of Representatives says:

Dear Mr. Speaker: Transmitted herewith is a report of our recent journey to the People's Republic of China. Nearly one quarter of all mankind is Chinese. Together our populations total more than 1 billion individuals. Yet, over nearly 23 years, we risked potentially dangerous misunderstandings as our nations became ever more isolated one from the other. We hope... in particular, that our journey will contribute in a small way to a normalization of US relations with China.  

After signing the Shanghai Communiqué with President Nixon, Chairman Mao Tse-tung anticipated an early visit from Nixon's successor Gerald R. Ford. After waiting much longer than expected, the leaders of the People's Republic were shocked and angry when they learned through the news media that a Ford-Brezhnev summit meeting

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1 ibid.
was being held at Vladivostok. The preference shown the Soviets, plus the location, a former Chinese territory, caused Mao to wonder just how far Kissinger's friendship went. After all, Kissinger had been the one who had made arrangements for the Nixon meeting.

It was not until one year later that President Ford met with the leaders of the People's Republic of China. The United States had been experiencing a difficult time in its foreign affairs. In the spring of 1975 the United States supported Indochinese regimes of South Vietnam and Cambodia collapsed. The leadership crisis stemming from the Watergate scandal and economic recession had obviously caused Ford's long delay in paying respects to Peking.

The People's Republic of China no doubt had expected the United States to eventually withdraw from Vietnam, but the precipitous American departure had serious consequences for them regarding Taiwan.

The American defeats in Vietnam caused the Chinese leaders to cast some doubt on promises of the Shanghai Communique—they had expected the United States to serve as a military guarantee for the People's Republic against the Soviets. This new situation following the American withdrawal from Indochina altered the Chinese leaderships' perception of the balance of power. They did not look with favor on American withdrawal from the region at that particular time.

The Chinese were not prepared to alter the relationship with Washington, but were worried over the friendship that seemed evident between the United States and the Soviet Union along with the weakened condition of the Americans. They also resented Ford's dismissal of
Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger whom they considered to be a friend of China.

It was not until December 1, 1975 that the Fords arrived in China. "Little seems to have been accomplished. President Ford supposedly spent some of his time in Peking working on his budget." After the departure of the President's party, Vice Premier Teng was said to have remarked that they had witnessed a new style of negotiations, "not even a communique."

On his return trip to the United States the President stopped briefly at Indonesia, the Philippines and Hawaii where he announced his Pacific Doctrine which reaffirmed the desire of the United States to "normalize" Sino-American relations.

Lack of interest in promoting a friendly relationship between the two countries was obvious at the time. George Bush, head of the United States Liaison Office in Peking, was called home in December 1975 to become Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. There was no replacement made in the Peking Liaison office until March 1976 when President Ford announced his choice of Thomas S. Green.

The Carter Administration

The 1976 Presidential campaign was described by the outstanding columnist James Reston as "The Great Nondebate."

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2ibid.
The 1976 election of Jimmy Carter over Republican candidate Gerald Ford did not signal significant changes in American Foreign policy.

A few of the Carter campaign pledges to the American people were: "nonmilitary solutions to international problems; cut back U.S. arms sales abroad which had totaled $20 billion in 1976; curb the covert activities of the CIA; cooperate with Congress; reduce secrecy in the making of foreign policy.

One hour before President Carter delivered his television announcement December 15, 1978 regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China, he calmly met with Congressional leaders and informed them that a Joint Communique had been signed by the People's Republic of China and the United States of America and that they would recognize each other January 1, 1979. At that time they would exchange ambassadors and establish embassies March 6, 1979. He explained that the announcement meant that the United States would withdraw its recognition of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and would terminate its mutual defense treaty with that nation at the end of 1979.

Article 10 of the Mutual Defense Treaty emphasizes that either party can terminate the pact with one year's notice. The United States would then withdraw its remaining 753 noncombat troops from Taiwan.2

Normalization—and the expanded commercial and cultural relations that it will bring—will contribute to the well-being of our own nation, to

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our national interest and it will enhance the stability of Asia.  

If a bomb had suddenly exploded in the room the members of Congress could not have been more startled nor surprised. They were aware of this pending explosive issue but took for granted that the President would consult with them before changing the state of the Taiwan treaty. Some conservative members decided to block the termination of the Taiwan defense treaty by introducing a joint resolution condemning Carter's action and nullifying the termination of the treaty. Representative Lester L. Wolff, Democrat, New York, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs commented on the manner in which the termination was transacted. He warned the congressional members that it "raises serious concerns that we have returned to the era of secret agreements concluded primarily for the purpose of avoiding rigorous debate in Congress on the merits of the issues involved."2

Senator Alan Cranston, Democrat, California, the Democratic Whip, along with other Senate liberals praised Carter and joined Cranston, who said: "Carter's courageous decision is a positive step forward to world peace."3 Jan Kalicki, foreign affairs aide to Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Democrat, Massachusetts, expressed the opinion after reading an amendment that resulted after a series of compromises. "This simply says that the President should consult

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1 Ibid.
2 Loc. cit., p. 3490.
3 Ibid.
with Congress. Who can be against that?"¹

Senate Minority Leader Howard H. Baker, Jr., Republican, Tennessee, opposed the treaty. He requested the postponement of the cancellation of the Taiwan defense treaty until Congress could consider that action. "Time must be given for Congress to deal with such an important foreign policy matter," he said.²

Representative Robert E. Bauman, Republican, Maryland, and other members of the American Conservative Union decided to introduce a joint resolution condemning Carter's action and nullifying the termination of the treaty although the resolution would be vetoed by President Carter if passed by the House and Senate. Congressman Bauman responded to a remark that suggested that most Americans were indifferent to the problem by saying, "I think this is a lot more emotional than most people realize. This is the first time we've thrown an ally out the window."³

Senator Barry Goldwater, Republican, Arizona, was determined to let the court decide the constitutionality of the defense treaty and joint communique. Administration and State Department officials, however, did not agree with Senator Goldwater.

President Jimmy Carter defiantly insisted: "My constitutional responsibility in establishing relationships with foreign countries is clear and cannot be successfully challenged in court."⁴

¹ibid.
²ibid.
³ibid.
⁴ibid.
The evening of December 15, 1978 was one that President Jimmy Carter will no doubt long remember. He left the Congressmen and at 9 P.M. spoke from the Oval Office at the White House. The address was broadcast live on radio and television (see Appendix A).

Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing was given a royal welcome when he arrived in Washington. The usual two audiences at the most with the President were increased to three. The Vice Premier, Mrs. Teng and party were entertained at a banquet. Among the guests were former President Gerald Ford, Henry Kissinger and Richard M. Nixon who had made possible the obvious friendly relationship seen by television viewers throughout the world.

A jet was placed at the Vice Premier's disposal to take him wherever he wished in the United States. Among some of the vital places of interest that he toured were: farms, coal mining regions, oil exploration areas and machine plants (See Appendix B).

William V. Roth, Jr., United States Senator from Delaware, speaking on the subject "New Perspectives on Our Relations with China and the Soviet Union," February 1, 1979 said:

Today, in the midst of Chinese Vice President Teng Hsiao-p'ing's visit to the United States, I believe there is a need for some sober and realistic thinking—thinking about China, about China's relations with the United States, and about the triangular relationship between China, the Soviet Union, and the United States.

The events in China are fast moving and very exciting. . .normalization is an accomplished fact. It should not be reversed. I have supported
normalization of relations with Peking although on different terms.

Senator Roth agreed that it was time to meet and discuss matters of importance to both China and the United States, but he criticized the President's lack of consideration for our Chinese Nationalist friends and allies. Cooperation with Congress and the promise to reduce secrecy in the making of foreign policy were two of President Jimmy Carter's campaign pledges during the 1976 election. Other allies of the United States were no doubt perturbed and wondered if their commitments could be counted upon.

Many American merchants and industrialists were concentrating on the huge potential market of over 900,000,000 prospective buyers. It was China's trading port doors that opened for the United States and made it possible for the new Republic to enter the commercial world in 1784. Long before the Manchus' invasion China had been visited by traders from the known world as she had the reputation of being the "Hub of Civilization."

Evolving Sino-American Relations

After former President Nixon opened the door to Sino-American relations in 1972, the council was established in 1973 to promote trade between China and the United States. It works closely with the China Council for the promotion of International Trade, its counterpart in China.

Normalization of relations between China and the United States have greatly improved since former Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal's mission to China in March 1979. His mission was to set up a framework for expanded economic relations and financial arrangements.

Two obstacles to effective Sino-American relations were discussed: settlement of claims for American property confiscated after the Communists seized power in China; and failure of the United States to accord China most-favored-nation status for its exports to this country.

Secretary Blumenthal and his eleven-man team negotiated for nine days to establish a groundwork for a wide-ranging trade agreement between the two nations. The purpose of the mission was achieved. A joint economic committee was in place, and one particularly troublesome barrier to Sino-American trade had been removed after three decades of dispute, the two sides agreed to a settlement of claims seized by the Communists. Among the companies were Exxon Corporation, International Telephone and Telegraph, and General Electric Company.

As in the period of imperialism in China, the United States has been late in arriving. Merchants from the former "Powers" including Great Britain, France, Japan and West Germany, have a head-start in trade. But now the United States and China have better communication trade will catch up with the American competitors.

But for all the apparent success of the Blumenthal Mission, financial experts predict that it will take many years to develop
the potential of that market. An article entitled "China: Really A Bonanza for U. S. Business" (U. S. News and World Report, January 8, 1979) outlines all that can be realistically expected in the next few years.


A sizeable increase in the two-way flow of technicians, business people, officials and students between the United States and China.

A speedup in some of China's top priority development programs especially in oil and agriculture.

Vice Premier Teng's goal, however, is to transform China into a modern industrial nation by the year 2000. Peking has drawn up a domestic development program—as a housewife would a budget—that calls for spending a definite amount. Modernization includes agriculture, industry, defense and science. Being well supplied with natural resources which include tungsten, iron, antimony, coal, petroleum, and main industries of steel, electricities, machinery, oil and coal, Premier Teng may achieve his dream. One resource could go far with China's economy—that is oil. It is estimated by Harrison that "China will attain a production of 400 million tons of oil, about 8 million barrels a day by 1990 through the exploitation of existing fields and the still untapped eastern China Sea resources."^1

The Peking government is quietly making progress toward the status of a major nuclear power. Naturally its presumed objective is to possess as soon as possible deterrent against its potential nuclear enemy the Soviet Union.

There is no way that the many huge air-raid shelters in China can be concealed. They are dug under cities and in the remote rural districts. Drew Middleton describes the system of tunnels in his informative book, *Duel of the Giants*. At least half a million workers in China's factories, shops and farms devote or have given time to create these unbelievable ventilated shelters. Due to a lack of modern machinery, the workers used shovels, picks, primary tools and wheelbarrows. The shelters contain water reservoirs, storage compartments for grain and rice. They are divided into sections for first aid, schools, dormatories and even barberships. An enormous militia has been and continues to be trained to defend the shelters.

Chinese naval activity has sharply increased along with the army. "Military spending is now estimated at 9 to 10 per cent of the gross national product."

The United States army, navy and other armed services after a long period of waiting are finally receiving the weapons they sought. Tanks and surface-to-air missiles will be arriving in the 1980s. It is improbable that the United States government would leave China insecure in these turbulent times, by sharing their military supplies with another nation.

In the event of a Sino-Soviet war, the impact on the United

1 loc. cit., p. 16.
States would be tremendous, especially without full protection. Drew Middleton comments, "History will ask the questions. America will have to answer them."

Vice President Walter Mondale's late August 1979 official visit to China strengthened the United States' relationship with Peking. Before leaving Peking he gave the leaders of the People's Republic of China a parting gift, an attractive political and economic package.

The major elements:

- An implicit U.S. warning to Russia, Peking's ideological foe that any attempt to weaken or isolate China contradicts basic American interests.
- An exchange of visits early next year between President Carter and Chinese Communist Party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng.
- A pledge by the Carter administration to arrange 2 billion dollars in American commercial credits to accelerate trade, plus an offer of technological help to build hydroelectric plants.  

Included in his campaign pledges President Carter "indicating that he was influenced by lessons from the past, pledged he would seek nonmilitary solutions to international problems." Even so, his "nonmilitary solutions" add to the United States taxpayers a staggering burden. Many do not complain, however, as long as it does not take the lives of American youth.

At a meeting with the United States Senators during his Washington visit in January 1979, Vice Premier Teng suggested and encouraged a strong presence of the United States in Asia. A number

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of senators were not impressed after the United States made such huge miscalculations with Japan, Israel and Iran. The Vice Premier also assured his listeners that Peking looked forward to a peaceful readjustment with Taiwan, whose "realities would be fully respected."\(^1\)

\(^1\)Roth, op. cit., p. 324.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The President of the United States, Richard M. Nixon, and Chairman Mao Tse-tung met in Peking February 27, 1972 and decided to lay aside past hostilities and put forth every effort to cooperate for the security of their nations. It was obvious to both leaders that this step was in the interest of both countries. On January 1, 1979 the two governments finally established diplomatic relations.

During the 1960s the Chinese leadership was inward looking regarding foreign policy. In the 1970s Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai and their successors Hua Kuo-feng and Teng Hsiao-ping have attempted to normalize the People's Republic of China after the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. The People's Republic of China is no longer the "sick man of Asia." The intense Sino-Soviet border clashes of the 1960s which culminated in the March 1969 border incidents precipitated the Sino-American rapprochement. China began to see that the world balance of power—particularly the situation in Asia—was changing. The Chinese regime saw that the United States was reducing its commitments in Asia; specifically the American withdrawal from Vietnam which was completed by 1973.

For China 1976 was another watershed year. In January Chou En-lai died; Hua Kuo-feng was appointed Premier in February;
Mao died in September followed in October by Hua being formally accepted as Party Chairman and the so called "Gang of Four" purged.

Under the guidance of Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping the People's Republic is pursuing the goal of modernization with the final targets set for the year 2000. In pursuit of this goal we need to understand what modernization in China entails. First, there is a need for increased consumer goods. Secondly, there is a concern for national security. Chinese radicals feel that the first priority should be to sort out social and political problems; whereas the pragmatists, represented by Teng Hsiao-ping, advocate establishing a solid economic base before dealing with social problems.

The question to which we need to address ourselves concerns: Is China's program of modernization attempting too much too fast? Some experts feel that this proposed growth will be too much for the Chinese society to absorb. Personally, I would advocate a more incremental approach for China.

China's foreign policy today is more open than Mao's China of the 1960s; China is indeed joining the world family of nations, and she is becoming a more cooperative partner in the community of nations. During the early 1979 invasion of Vietnam, China was reasserting herself as a regional Asian power.

We cannot overlook that for over one hundred years--from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century--China was a passive entity in international relations. Mao, upon assuming power in 1949, began to reestablish control over China's territory and borders.
In 1971 the Sino-American relationship became a reality beginning with the Ping Pong diplomacy in 1971 followed in February 1972 with Nixon's China trip. During the 1970s Americans began to travel in increasing numbers to the Mainland. On December 15, 1978 President Carter announced that the United States would establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. The haste with which Carter extended diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic, without first consulting with such allies as Japan or Taiwan regarding the new state of affairs, was harmful to the world's perception of American reliability as an ally. Early in 1979 Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping visited the United States to help secure and expand the new Sino-American relationship. It should be remembered that during the 1960s, due to the Vietnam War, the United States and China were on a dangerous collision course. The 1969 border incidents put the Soviet and Chinese relationship on an equally precarious basis.

How can the United States deal with China in terms of big power relations? She must either balance the Soviet Union and China or lean toward China.

The Chinese leadership must take into account while pursuing policy objectives its people's desire and need of personal security and the urgent requirement for economic development.

With the establishment of diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States, the two states had gone from detente to full diplomatic relations.

The Chinese considerations included the following reasons:
First, the government of the People's Republic of China was concerned with the security of their nation in relation to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The leadership believed that they were being encircled by the Soviets on the north and India on the west. Secondly, they had political motives for pursuing a new relationship with the United States. Their political plans complemented their economic needs for development. In order to achieve their goals of modernization, they needed the technological and financial assistance which the Soviet Union was no longer willing to grant them. Their aims were rendered somewhat contradictory by their desire for establishing correct relations with the West while working for the isolation of Taiwan.

The United States policy makers had a number of incentives for desiring a better relationship with the People's Republic of China because:

The first consideration of United States policy leaders involved security and diplomatic factors. There are many centers of power in the world today; the United States could use the additional leverage that China would provide in balancing the Soviet Union. United States policy makers could not overlook that the Sino-Soviet split had a profound effect on the world balance of power. A second consideration was economics. American business desired the penetration of the China market.

The United States leadership desires on the evidence a relatively stable East Asia for the next decade. The United States
policy makers do not need to choose at this juncture between a Chinese or Soviet relationship. The United States must balance relations with both Communist powers. As far as trade is concerned, the China market is not a great bonanza. Normalization of relations between the People's Republic and the United States has made it possible for the United States to pursue a more equidistant foreign policy in its dealing with the two Communist giants.

The Chinese government must consider how they may obtain western technology without importing Western institutions. When Western ideas and technology are introduced into developing nations, the traditional social and value systems are disrupted. According to *Newsweek* February 5, 1979 the average yearly industrial wage in China is $360.00 per year compared to the Soviet Union with $3,000.00 and the United States $13,400.00. It can be seen that China has a long way to go before it catches up with either of the two superpowers. In terms of economic development China must keep ahead of her population growth. The objective of the Chinese leadership might be to obtain as great benefits from Taiwan as they have received from Hong Kong.

From the security viewpoint the Teng-Hua leadership realizes that their nation is much weaker than both the United States and the Soviet Union. This alone justifies the Sino-American rapprochement in their view.

We must also take into consideration the way in which the two nations perceive each other. Historically, Sino-American
relations have alternated between love and hate. Neither side has understood the other, and this tension goes back to the nineteenth century. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger who played such an important part at the historical detente meeting in 1972 was quoted in the Washington Post in 1973, "No matter what happens in the United States, friendship with the People's Republic of China is one of the constant factors of American foreign policy."¹ Let us hope that he is correct.

Future political relationships change in both nations, and political relationships and policies often differ. American diplomacy should endeavor to establish friendly relations whenever possible. Leaders meet, discuss problems, make concessions and often form a friendship as in the case of Chairman Mao Tse-tung and President Nixon.

It is possible to do too much too fast to help developing nations as was the case in Iran. Nations differ the same as individuals. One may not understand or like another civilization, or person, but that does not mean they have to change it.

Today there is a new spirit in China. China's universities are now open to the arts as well as to vocations. Entrance examinations are required, and the most talented instructors are selected. China has great natural resources, and is in need of financial and technical assistance to develop them. Hopefully, it will be given

by the United States as well as Western Europe and Japan. The exploitation of China's oil alone could change the world balance of that greatly needed resource.

The harmonious progress in relations between the United States and the People's Republic could change. The Chinese leaders believe that the United States government is too preoccupied with the Soviets and banks too much on the idea of safeguarding the Soviet-American detente.

Sino-American cooperation may continue to have a narrow base. If the balance of power were to change substantially, it is likely that American and Chinese concerns would also change.

If American strength should decline, under Soviet pressure the Peking leadership might be forced to turn to the Soviet Union.

Fear of the Soviet leadership is also an important motivating force for the Chinese regime to maintain close relations with the United States. If the Soviets were to moderate their policy along the Sino-Soviet border, the Peking leaders might find less need for close relations with the United States. There are few ties that actually hold the two nations together—the Sino-American cooperation is based on strategic grounds.

Regardless of new leadership in China or the Soviet Union, both nations respect strength and power, and these two qualities must form the basis of United States policy.

National leaders will overlook their stereotyped images of other states when necessity demands it. This was the case in
the relationship between the People's Republic of China and the United States. The leadership of these two states have advanced from a state of noncommunication to a working relationship of diplomatic relations.
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President Carter began by saying:

Good evening.

I would like to read a joint communique which is being simultaneously issued in Peking at this very moment by leaders of the People's Republic of China.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, JANUARY 1, 1979

The United States of America and the People's Republic of China have agreed to recognize each other and to establish diplomatic relations as of January 1, 1979.

The United States recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

The United States of America and the People's Republic of China reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communique of 1972 and emphasize once again that:

... both sides wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict. . . .

Members of the news media were waiting impatiently in the briefing room at the White House to begin the question and answer ordeal. The President began by saying:

... I believe this to be an extremely important moment in the history of our nation. It's something that I and my two predecessors have sought avidly. . . . Only since

the last few weeks has there been an increasing demonstration to us that Premier Hua and Vice Premier Teng have been ready to normalize relations. I think the interests of Taiwan have been adequately protected. One of the briefers will explain the details to you. . .

I will be preparing myself adequately for the visit of Premier Teng. We invited him on one day, he accepted the next day without delay and I think he's looking forward to this trip with a great deal of anticipation and pleasure.

I have talked personally this evening with Prime Minister Ohira (of Japan). Early this morning we notified the officials in Taiwan. . .I think that one of the greatest benefits that will be derived is the continuation of strong trade, cultural relationships with Taiwan, the people of Taiwan and a new vista for prosperous trade relationships with almost a billion people in the People's Republic of China. . .

Q. "How did the Congressional leaders take it?"

Pres. "With mixed response. Some of the congressional leaders who were there have long been very strong personal friends of the officials in Taiwan. They are not as thoroughly familiar with the officials in the People's Republic of China."

Q. "Mr. President, you said the response to your speech would be 'massive' applause throughout the Nation. What do you think the response to your speech will be in Taiwan?"

Pres. "I doubt if there will be massive applause in Taiwan, but we are going to do everything we can to assure the Taiwanese . . .that the well-being of the people of Taiwan will not be damaged.

"To answer the other question, I don't think this will have any adverse effect at all on the SALT negotiations, as an independent matter. And I think that the Soviets . . .have been expecting this development. They were not surprised. We have kept them informed recently."\


2 ibid.
APPENDIX B

Before his departure for Washington, the Vice Premier of the People's Republic took time out to grant *Time*, Inc., Editor in Chief Hedley Donovan and Marsha Clark, *Time*'s Hong Kong bureau chief, an interview. The meeting took place in the Sinkiang Room of the Great Hall of the People on Peking's T'ien An Men Square.

Teng began by stating:

"his main message to President Carter: that Sino-American rapprochement should be turned into an explicit anti-Soviet alliance. Stressing Sino-America ties, Ten argued that the two nations share a common destiny and should unite with other countries against the Soviet Union. He said that the Soviet activities around the Mediterranean littoral, in Africa and in Asia should cause concern to all nations. He derided the value of the proposed SALT II treaty between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and demonstrated an acute historical grasp of East-West disarmament negotiations."

When asked, "... how do you assess the significance of your trip and what do you hope to accomplish?"

His answer was:

"The significance is mainly reflected in the normalization of relations between China and the U.S. (because I am) going there this time as one of China's leaders will, of course, be of benefit. Particularly at the present time, the world is quite untranquil and we are faced with a lot of problems. Not only during this visit but in the future as well, it will be beneficial to have the leaders

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of the U.S. and China frequently contact each other and exchange views. As for the significance of normalization between China and the U.S. there has been much talk about it already, but you cannot afford to underestimate the significance of this event. One aspect of it is the development of relations between the two countries, but what is ever more important is from the point of view of global strategy.

Teng was then asked "hegemony" is a word that your government has frequently used with reference to the Soviet Union's policy. The Soviet Union has about 7% of the world's population and 10% of its production. How do you assess Soviet policies today, and what opportunities do you see in the new Sino-American relationship for countering those policies? What does hegemony actually mean?

Teng answered by referring to "The Open Letter" that was published in the New York Times warning that the Soviets were "heading for superiority, not parity in the military arena." He said,

"I suppose that you have already read the letter of 170 retired American generals and admirals. I have read it myself and I very much approve of that letter. Those generals have already retired but they are concerned and that means that the situation is indeed not tranquil... The Soviet military budget takes up around 20% of the gross national product. What does one do with all these things? With no war going on it has increased its standing army in three years from 3 million men to 4 million men. What does one do that for?... We've already been through two world wars and both have been started by small incidents. Such things often develop independent of one's will, perhaps even independent of the will of the present Soviet leaders."

The subject of hegemonism was finally concluded with:

"Global hegemonism means that you want to control the whole world (and) there is no scruple at using war as a step to achieving hegemonism. But it would first try to attain its aims by intervention, sowing discord,
or, as they say in Europe, by means of Finlandization. But in the final analysis it would use military force and that would be World War III."

The Vice Premier of China was drawn to reports that

"President Carter, Secretary of State Vance and various members of Congress do not agree with the retired generals. They think it possible to have good relations with the Soviet Union and China at the same time."

Teng merely commented:

"It is only possible for each individual to express his point of view of global strategy and international politics, even where there was no normalization between China and the U.S., what we are faced with is stark reality. Reality cannot be changed by any person's subjective views."

The subject was then changed to "How will the new relationship between China and the U.S. help with your Four Modernizations Campaign?" Teng answered:

"We believe the normalization of relations will enable us to obtain much scientific and technological know how from the point of view of the U.S. ... We lost a whole generation as regards education, including science and technology. ... From the broader perspective of global politics it will have even greater benefits. We do indeed have an ambitious goal."

Then came the touchy question: "Do you expect Taiwan to be reunified with the P.R.C. within ten years."

"... I hope it will be realized this year, but that is probably being too impatient.... Our policy and principles for reunification are very fair and reasonable. We will respect the realities on Taiwan, and the Taiwanese authorities as a local government and will retain their rights and powers, but it must be within the context of one China. That means that they can maintain a certain amount of their own armed forces. As for trade with foreign countries, they can continue. They may also maintain their present system and continue leading their own way of life. ... We demand of them only that there will be no two Chinas and that patriots all belong to the same family.

That sounds well for the present leadership. Will the new policy directions be changed with future regimes?