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Social Security Privatization: 
An Ideologically Structured Movement

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We document the cumulative change in expressions of support for Social Security's social insurance ideals to privatization, from the late 1970s through 2007. Social Security's basic structure and principles generally were supported by the United States government and in amendments to the original Act of 1935. However, in the 1980s market arguments began to proliferate in government alongside pension privatization projects by international governmental organizations and conservative think tanks. Although in 1983 Commission members concluded "the Social Security system is sound in principle...and...structure," four members wrote a supplemental statement that emphasized market rationalism. By 1994 dissension in Congress was apparent. The history of Social Security privatization reveals an increasing ideological alignment on the political agenda among transnational organizations, financial institutions, conservative think tanks, Congress, Presidents, and the Social Security Commission and Board of Trustees. Our research denotes the ideological alignments that formed the foundation for a politically motivated social movement. 

Keywords: Social Security, privatization, ideology, politics, social movements, social policy, policy analysis, Social Movement Theory 

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Social Security was enacted in 1935 amid political controversy (Amenta, 2006; Domhoff, 1996). Until the passage of the Social Security Act amendments of 1950, Republicans, conservatives and corporate leaders opposed the program, decrying it as burdensome to business, workers, and the state as well as an unfair liability on future generations. Yet, from 1950 through 1995, Congress and presidents generally agreed that the fundamental structure and principles of Social Security should be retained. Consensus politics continued through two periods of Republican majority control over the Democrats in Congress (1953 through 1955 and 1980 through 1986), but dissension began to mount when Republican majorities ruled both houses in 1994. We contend that the dissension is the result of an ideological social movement favoring privatization.

Social movements are social processes wherein actors, linked by dense informal networks and sharing a distinct identity, are engaged in collective action against clearly identified opponents (della Porta & Diani, 2006; Diani & Bison, 2004). Social movement actors include individuals and organizations that engage in sustained resource exchanges with the purpose of achieving common goals, while at the same time remaining autonomous and independent. The actors, based on their shared ideals, collectively resist or promote change in the political, economic and/or cultural status quo. Since the 1960s, social movement scholars have studied four major questions related to structure, culture, resource mobilization and political opportunity: 1) what is the structural context within which the social movement developed; 2) how have the actors defined the social problem and what symbols have they created to substantiate collective action; 3) what were the available resources that made the social movement possible; and 4) what is the interaction between the social movement and the political system.

Questions 2 and 3 above have been analyzed by researchers. Scholars have documented the flow of resources among individuals, foundations, organizations, government institutions, and media in support of conservative (hence market) ideals that include privatization of public programs (e.g. Brock, 2004; Callahan, 1999; Covington, 1997; Krehely, House, & Kernan, 2004; Media Transparency, 2004; Medvetz, 2006; Rich, 2001; Smith, 1991; Stefanicic & Delgado, 1996). Social Security
has been framed by conservative think tanks, members of Congress, and others in conferences, journals, reports, and the media as being insolvent, in crisis, unsustainable, a bad deal for workers, inequitable among generations, and requiring radical reform (Baker & Weisbrot, 1999; Estes, 1991; 2001; Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR), 2005; Lieberman, 2000; Pryce & Santorum, 2005; White, 2003). A key framing tactic has been the strategic redefinition of Social Security "privatization" to "personalization" or "personal accounts," to suggest increased personal ownership and control instead of connoting corporate takeover. The reframing provides opponents of Social Security with a conceptual tag that maintains a semblance of consistency between their ideology and actions for reform. Our research on the existence of a social movement within the Social Security policy domain focuses on: a) investigating the historical context within which the Social Security privatization efforts developed; and b) tracking the interaction between the reform efforts and the political system.

In the first section of the paper we describe our methodology—an historical and legislative content analyses. In the second section we trace the structural context of the Social Security program through a brief background on Social Security Advisory Boards and Councils as well as an abridged history of legislative and executive action from the program's inception in 1935 through 1992. We track the interaction between the reform efforts and the political system in sections three and four. In section three we document the change in political atmosphere in the early 1980s that coincided with the reappearance of long-term solvency issues and the ideological shift toward market rationalism within international and national organizations. Subsequently, we illustrate the political shifts within government through Trustees' reports, Council and Commission recommendations, Congressional hearings, and Presidential positions. We conclude with a discussion of the current status of privatization in national and international organizations, and the legislative and administrative government.

Methods

We combined two frameworks to analyze the presence of an ideologically structured social movement for Social Security
reform. Seven tenets from the work of McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) framed our search for mobilization efforts:

1. visible and perceived opportunities for reform (if we perceived an opportunity and the challengers appeared to act upon it, we included it as a visible and perceived opportunity)
2. appropriation of new or pre-existing sites to house reform efforts (the organizations used to challenge support for Social Security as a social insurance program)
3. interactive framing of disputes among challengers and supporters of Social Security, elements of the state, third parties and the media (ideas and values that are used to promote reform and are incorporated into rhetoric, slogans, metaphors, myths, causes, and to define heroes, villains, and victims—previous and future studies)
4. interaction among collective action repertoires that are used as a resource by challengers of the Social Security program
5. episodes of contention that signal mobilization processes and which can be distinguished from routine politics
6. mechanisms in trajectories of contention that produce processes of polarization, including: competition for power, diffusion of information, repression of action or groups, and radical agendas (the expansion of collective action frames such as "crises" to more extreme agendas such as cutting or limiting entitlement programs)
7. mechanisms that bridge ideological divides and deter competition (brokerage) or drive opposing actors together to oppose common threats (radical flank effects)

Our examination of the impact challengers might have had on Social Security was framed by the three-level approach of Edwin Amenta (2006). We asked whether the challengers achieved:

1. a win or concession from supporters of the Social Security program
2. structural reform that provided greater leverage over the political process, such as through legislation, government communications, or positions of power
3. gains in rights of entitlement

To track the development of market rationalism within the Social Security policy domain, we: a) compiled congressional and administrative documents, journal articles, reports on the privatization of public pensions internationally, and documents from think tank websites; b) systematically documented the on-line historical database of the Social Security Administration (SSA) pertaining to legislative action, presidential speeches, and trustee and commission reports; c) perused historical accounts to identify information on Social Security and international pension reform (e.g. Altman, 2005; Amenta, 2006; Andrews, 2006; Ball, 2000; Beland, 2005; Deacon, 2000; Domhoff, 1996; Gill, Packard, & Yermo, 2004; International Monetary Fund, 2005; James, 1994; Light, 1995; Schieber & Shoven, 1999; Skidmore, 1999; World Bank, 2001); d) searched the CQ Weekly on-line database for legislative information and action under the subject heading Social Security; e) attended conferences on public pensions (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 2006) and Social Security (National Academy of Social Insurance, 2006); and f) researched legislative hearings (Svihula & Estes, 2007).

Structural Context

Although market arguments have been part of the legislative debate since Social Security's inception, the social insurance principles and structure of the program have survived many amendments (Kollman & Solomon-Fears, 2001). However, recent expressions supporting privatization have been emanating from the President and Congress. This section denotes the institutions, social relations, social definitions, and axioms that pre-date the privatization efforts.

Advisory Boards and Councils

From its inception in 1935 until 1994, the Social Security program was served by an Advisory Council (Council) composed primarily of non-government members who were
appointed every four years. The members were to represent the public at large in advising government officials on Social Security policy. Under 1994 law, a permanent seven-member advisory board was formed to serve many of the same functions (DeWitt, 2003). In 1939 a Board of Trustees (Board) was established to oversee the Social Security Trust fund. The Board comprises six members (Trustees), four of whom are from the federal government: the Secretary of the Treasury (the managing trustee), the Secretary of the Department of Labor, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Commissioner of Social Security. The other two members are appointed to four year terms by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Trustees' report is politically significant in that it estimates Social Security's short- and long-term finances (Light, 1995; Wayne, 2005a).

The Social Security Program from Inception through 1992

Political consensus in support of Social Security persisted from 1950 until 1994 (Amenta, 2006). Trustees, commissions, presidents and Congress supported the program's basic structure and principles in recommendations and amendments they made to the original Act. Major amendments to the program were expansionist until short-term financing problems appeared in 1977 resulting in increases in the Social Security tax rates as well as the taxable earnings base (Cooper, 2004; DeWitt, 2001). Additionally, a basic flaw in the benefit computation formula was corrected to reduce long-term financing problems.

In December 1977, Congress created a nine-member, bi-partisan National Commission (Commission) on Social Security. It directed the Commission to undertake a "fundamental, long-term, comprehensive consideration for change in the entire Social Security system" and to develop a "policy blueprint for the kind of system that would best serve the Nation in the future" (SSA, 1981, p. 1). After extensive study—including public hearings, meetings with scholars, public opinion polls, and international research—the Commission concluded that the Social Security system was sound in principle and the best of all alternatives for "stable income support, especially in times of economic adversity." Other alternatives would be "too costly or offer insufficient assurance" that workers'
income would be there when they needed it" (1981, pp. 3-4). Even so, in their supplemental statement, members Laxson, MacNaughton, Myers, and Rodgers recommended that the nation should forestall generational conflict by limiting intergenerational transfers that protect citizens against insufficient income and adversity. Conversely, members Cohen, Duskin, and Miller concluded that Social Security was not at the brink of disaster and that the nation could continue to support Social Security because "even with fixed resources, we still have the option of deciding how those resources will be divided among competing uses" (SSA, 1981, p. 20).

The last major amendments to the Act occurred in 1983. Legislative changes with the greatest impact on long range financing included: a) covering nonprofit and new federal employees; b) taxing benefits for higher-income recipients; c) shifting COLAs to a calendar-year basis; d) revising the tax rate schedule; e) increasing the tax basis for self-employed individuals; and f) raising the full benefit retirement age from 65 to 67, gradually phasing-in the increase in age over the years 2000 through 2027. President Reagan stated upon signing the amendments that the program "must be preserved," and that the 1983 amendments guaranteed Social Security benefits and reaffirmed the government's commitment to the program (SSA, 1984). The Trustees reported the system was in balance for both the short and long term, with the balance beyond 75 years reflecting a slight surplus (Office of the Actuary, 1983).

It was not until 1988 that the Trustees again estimated that the Social Security program failed to meet the 75-year, long-range test for actuarial balance. In 1991 and 1992 the Trustees, based on a new and more stringent test of financial adequacy, recommended the development of long-term financing options (SSA, 1996a). Yet despite the reappearance of long-term financing issues, President G. H. W. Bush was "not prepared to endorse" changes to the Social Security program. He indicated that the government would stand behind its social contract with its citizens, stating "[W]e have firm Government credit to guarantee the pensions..." (SSA, 1990).

In sum, the Social Security boards and councils were established to represent the public and secure benefits through stable program financing. The amendments through 1983 reaffirmed the government's commitment to guaranteeing stable...
social insurance income for its current and future citizens. Through 1995, trustees, commissions, presidents and Congress supported the program’s social insurance structure and principles, and while some considered privatization and means testing, the majority believed that the program was structurally sound and the best alternative of income support for the United States.

Political Opportunities: The Global and National Shift toward Pension Privatization

Theorists (e.g. Kreisi, 1996; McAdam, 1996; Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 1978) stress the importance of expanding political opportunities as stimulus to collective action. McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) reason that: a) the prospects for collective action are subject to the political context and challengers’ perception of manifest opportunities or threats; and b) the form movements take depends on challengers’ appropriation of sites for mobilization. Within the climate of the Great Depression, President Roosevelt recognized the need for political action. Owners and managers of capital were persuaded to accept government intervention, in the form of pensions and unemployment insurance, with the hope that it would stabilize the social system. The Social Security Act (Act) legislation of 1935 emerged from the efforts of many actors (for further discussion see Amenta, 2006; Domhoff, 1996).

The popularity of government spending to improve the economy (known as Keynesian economics) declined with the stagflation and unemployment of the 1970s (Baker, 2007; Myles, 1984). The post-Keynesian political economy appears to have emboldened economists and others to promote market ideals, including the privatization of public pensions. Milton Freidman, a former Keynesian economist, lectured on the idea of free markets in his visits to Chile and China (Commanding Heights, 2000). President Reagan sent U.S. Treasury Secretary James Baker, III to promote market reforms at the annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB). U.S. think tanks, international organizations, and other witnesses expressed increasing support for privatization at federal hearings (Svihula & Estes, 2007). We elaborate on the
proliferation of market ideals in the following paragraphs.

In the 1980s, the period of Reaganomics and Thatcherism, market rationalism became preeminent in global affairs under the influence of the IMF and the WB (Beland, 2005; Estes, 1991; Estes & Philipson, 2003). This contrasted with the original roles for the international institutions established in 1944 by members of the Bretton Woods Conference. The members had established the WB for reconstruction after World War II, and the IMF for ensuring global economic stability based on recognition that markets fail and collective action is needed at the global level (Committee and the Department of the State, 1950). By the mid-1980s, however, the IMF promoted free market ideals through its criteria for the use of emergency funds and the WB provided loans based on fulfillment of IMF preconditions (Williamson, 2000).

In 1981, Chile, the leader in privatizing public pensions, converted its defined benefit pay-as-you-go scheme to a fully pre-funded personal pension account system run by private fund management. The pension conversion was stimulated by the theories of Milton Friedman and Friedrich von Hayek, faculty at the University of Chicago (Elahi, 1986; Silva, 1991). Their protégés, post-graduates of the University of Chicago School of Economics generally advocated widespread deregulation, privatization, and other free market policies. José Piñera, a Harvard economist trained under the tutelage of Milton Friedman, was the architect of Chile’s pension privatization (Piñera, n.d.). Due to its veto power, the U.S. government was complicit with the IMF and WB in making market reforms a precondition of loans to Chile (Elahi, 1986).

The Reagan administration viewed IMF preconditions as insufficient and pushed to tighten them (Boughton, 2001). James Baker, III, a key player in the Greenspan Commission and Secretary of the U.S. Treasury, introduced market reforms, including privatization, to the IMF and WB at their 1985 annual meeting in Seoul, Korea (Williamson, 2000). The Baker Plan broadened IMF preconditions to include structural measures aimed at strengthening a nation’s basis for economic growth (Boughton, 2001). The IMF directors gave the official stamp of approval to the Baker Plan on November 13, and on December 2 the WB and IMF issued a joint press release expressing their
“strong support” for the initiative (p. 424). Subsequently, the WB has supported pension privatization, most importantly in a 1994 report, “Averting the Old Age Crisis,” which has been influential worldwide as a blueprint for pension reform. From 1984 through 2004 the WB provided 204 loans to 68 countries that included mandatory, privately managed pension components (Andrews, 2006; James, 1994; World Bank, 2001).

In the U.S., the idea of private accounts did not become prevalent until proponents organized and strategically took the idea into the public policy arena. The movement had roots in a book called Social Security: The Inherent Contradiction, sponsored by the Cato Institute (Cato) and authored by Peter Ferrara (1980), who suggested converting Social Security into private investments. Three years later Cato published an article, “Achieving a ‘Leninist’ Strategy,” co-authored by affiliates of the Heritage Foundation (Heritage) that called for “guerrilla warfare against both the current Social Security system and the coalition that supports it” by creating “a focused political coalition” to isolate and weaken its opponents (Butler & Germanis, 1983, p. 547). The concept debuted nationally when Pierre du Pont, IV (R-Del.) called for private accounts during his 1988 presidential campaign (Birnbaum, 2005). The idea gained support in the financial services industry with William Shipman of State Street Global Advisors, who, after testifying before Congress in 1994, was recruited by Cato to co-chair its Social Security project.

From the 1980s onward supporters of Social Security privatization, such as Peter Ferrara, Barber Conable, Pierre du Pont, and members of conservative think tanks, were prominent in national and international politics and government. Peter Ferrara served in the Reagan administration from 1981 to 1983 and was made associate deputy attorney general by President G. H. W. Bush in 1991. In 2003, Ferrara presented one of the major privatization plans to Congress (Weisman, 2005). Barber Conable, former congressman and member of the 1983 Social Security Commission, became president of the WB in 1986 (Andrews, 2006). Du Pont, who received the acclaim of Milton Friedman, advised President Reagan and Congress and was a consultant to Prime Minister Thatcher (National Center for Policy Analysis, n.d.). Of the five members of the 1994-1996

More recently, six members of the 2001 President’s Commission to Strengthen Social Security were affiliated with conservative think tanks, three with Cato (SSA, 2001). Richard Parsons, Commission Co-chair and CEO of AOL/Time Warner, donated to the Bush-Cheney campaign (Brock, 2004). Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the other Co-chair and Senior Scholar at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, advocated for a complete pay-as-you-go system with substantial benefit cuts and partial privatization. David C. John, Research Fellow at Heritage, has explained the president’s proposals to the public, lawmakers and media and debated Bush’s opponents. Andrew Biggs, Assistant Director of Cato’s Project on Social Security Choice and associate commissioner of the SSA, has accompanied the President in his private accounts quest (Wayne, 2005a). Cato, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), AEI and Heritage are leaders among the think tanks in the U.S. that continue to consistently promote pension privatization through events and publications (for more detail see American Enterprise Institute, 2005; Cato, 2003; Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005; Heritage Foundation, 2005; John, 2003; n.d.; Tanner, 2004).

Changes Within Government

Concurrent with international and national ideological shifts toward neoliberalism and globalization from the early 1980s onward, greater attention was being given to private accounts by members of the Board, Council and Commission, and President G. W. Bush. They utilized Social Security financial forecasts to articulate the need for reform in order to solve the impending “crisis” (Estes, 2001; Light, 1995). In 1993, during
President Clinton’s first term, the Trustees recommended that the 13-member Advisory Council develop recommendations for restoring Social Security’s long-range actuarial balance. Although noting that privatization would require additional adjustments beyond what would be required to achieve system solvency, the Technical Panel to the Council concluded that private accounts deserved additional study (SSA, 1996b).

In 1995, the Secretary of Health and Human Services directed the Council to conduct an extensive review of Social Security and develop recommendations for restoring long-range actuarial balance to the program (SSA, 1995). Because there was minimal political support for increasing payroll taxes, the Council recommended other ways to address the financing issue, including increasing income to the system and changes in benefits. Three different plans, two of which included private accounts, were recommended in January 1997: Maintenance of Benefits, Individual Accounts, and Personal Security Accounts. Five of the 13 members supported carve-out accounts and two members supported add-on accounts. Carve-out accounts would draw from existing payroll tax revenues and would reduce or offset Social Security benefits; whereas add-ons would supplement the program benefits with new revenue streams. This was the first time in the program’s history that consensus was absent among the Council members.

From 1998 forward, the Social Security Trustees continually reported that the Social Security Fund was not in long-term actuarial balance, placing greater emphasis as time passed on the importance of making changes to the program (DeWitt, 2001; SSA, 1996b; n.d.). In their 2003 through 2006 reports, the Trustees also emphasized the need for creative thinking and consideration of the welfare of future generations. In 2005 and 2006 the Trustees’ projected insolvency dates grew closer and the costs to offset the estimated deficit increased (SSA, 2005a, 2006a).

Heightened attention was focused on Social Security reform during the Clinton Administration when Republicans gained control of both houses of Congress. President Clinton did not support privatization of Social Security via carve-out accounts. In his 1998 State of the Union address, he emphasized the importance of addressing the solvency of the
Social Security program by stating that the budget surplus should be used to "Save Social Security First" (SSA, 1998a). That February, President Clinton unofficially launched the year-long process of discussing the future of Social Security at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. In April, President Clinton participated in the first of his national forums on Social Security co-hosted by AARP and the Concord Coalition (Office of the Press Secretary, 1998). In the midst of the forums, the CSIS National Commission on Retirement Policy (1998) issued a report that recommended, among other changes, diverting 2% of Social Security payroll taxes into individual savings accounts. On December 8 and 9, 1998, President Clinton convened participants in Washington, D.C. at the first-ever White House Conference on Social Security to discuss the program's long-range financing (SSA, 1999). Approximately 270 guests were invited and over 100 submitted statements, many in support of privatization. In his January 1999 State of the Union Address, President Clinton presented his proposal, which included government investment of 12% of the trust fund surpluses into the stock market to create universal savings accounts as add-ons to Social Security benefits. Hoping to increase retirees' standard of living and boost the national economy, President Clinton signed the Senior Citizens' Freedom to Work Act of 2000, which eliminated the retirement earnings test for beneficiaries at or above the normal retirement age.

During George W. Bush's presidential campaign in 2000, he proposed allowing 2% of Social Security payroll taxes to be diverted into voluntary private accounts. President Bush promised to reform Social Security in his inaugural address, and in the middle of his first year as president he formed the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security to study Social Security reform. For the first time since the program's inception, Commission members were appointed based on their acceptance of a president's injunction to include private accounts in their recommendations (SSA, 2001). On December 11, 2001 the Commission recommended three possible scenarios on how Social Security's long-range financing might be addressed (President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security, 2001). Largely because of the strong preference of the commission appointees for carve-out accounts, which would
destabilize Social Security finances faster than predicted under current law, the three plans they recommended have received little recognition.

President Bush again promoted privatization through his national agenda after his 2004 reelection (2004a). He has continuously advanced private accounts through multiple venues including radio addresses, the Department of Treasury fact sheets, conversations with the public, SSA personnel appointments, changes to telephone messages, publications, and benefit statements (Bush, 2004b; Office of Public Affairs, 2004; Office of the Press Secretary, 2005; Pear, 2005; SSA, 2004, 2005b). The Minority Staff Special Investigations Division (SID) of the House of Representatives investigated the SSA's alteration of public communications in support of President Bush's Social Security privatization proposals (Minority Staff Special Investigations Division Committee on Government Reform, 2005). The documents revealed that the SSA "markedly changed its communications to the public over the last four years...Public assurances that the Social Security system faces 'no immediate crisis' [were] eliminated from agency presentations, and descriptions of the role Social Security plays in keeping seniors 'out of poverty' [were] dropped." The agency now repeatedly warns that Social Security is "unsustainable" and "underfinanced" and "must change" (p. 3). The SID also found that the SSA's primary strategic goal of educating the public about the program was replaced in 2003 by a new objective to use public communication to "support reforms" to Social Security (Minority Staff Special Investigations Division Committee on Government Reform, 2005, p. 2). In 2005, the communication plan states that a key "message" is "Social Security's long-term financing problems are serious and need to be addressed soon" (p. 3).

Alteration of public communication on Social Security is not limited to the SSA. For example, a Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Fact Sheet declares, "This Administration embraces the need for new ideas. The creation of personal accounts is critical to ensure Social Security's sustainability." Additionally, the chairs of the House and Senate Republican Conferences developed a 103-page guide in January, 2005 to educate Republicans on how to promote private accounts in Social Security (Pryce & Santorum,
Some have claimed that President Bush's agenda for Social Security is dead (Barshay & Wayne, 2005). Although privatization was first on the agenda for Mr. Bush at the beginning of his second term, voters disagreed with the president's agenda, Democrats rejected it, and Republicans were split on the idea (NBC News Polling the Nations, 2004; Wayne, 2006a). Yet without advance comment or consulting Congress, President Bush inserted estimated expenditures to fund Social Security private accounts in his 2007 budget, and while Congress was on recess in 2006 he reappointed two public trustees (John L. Palmer and Thomas R. Saving) [Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2006; Office of the Press Secretary, 2007; Schor, 2007; Wayne, 2005c, 2006b]. The appointees are known to support Social Security privatization. Palmer and Saving contributed to the 2006 Board report that predicted Social Security insolvency a year earlier than in the 2005 report, and two years earlier than in the 2004 report. The 2006 Board report contains the same assumptions as the 2005 report (Baker, 2006; Munnell, 2006). However, in the both the 2005 and 2006 reports the Board assumed that productivity growth and the pace of annual immigration would be much slower than in earlier actuarial assumptions and in other government agencies' projections, such as those of the Congressional Budget Office and Office of Management and Budget (Baker, 2006). The changed assumptions produce a reduction in the years of full solvency. The insolvency date is important, as Board and Commission predictions have influenced the perceived necessity for and direction of Social Security reform, as well as acted as a political shield for Congress (Light, 1995; Wayne, 2005c). Moreover, David C. John has advised the Trustees that they could issue a special public report explaining why Social Security reform is necessary (2003).

Congressional policymakers have been actively pursuing private accounts from 1993 onward. As shown in Figure 1, most witnesses invited by Congress to federal hearings on Social Security reform between January 1, 1993 and December 31, 2003 supported private accounts (Svihula, 2005). Think tank members represented the majority of the witnesses, and international organizations included Watson Wyatt, State Street, and WB (Svihula & Estes, 2007).
The SSA web site lists 26 Social Security proposals addressing the program’s long-term solvency from August 2001 through March 2006 (2006b). Just four of the 26 proposals did not include some form of carve-out accounts; one of the four involved progressive indexing of benefits based on income. The proposals supporting individual accounts include that of Rep. Sam Johnson (R-Texas), who had conceptualized the formation of the Cato Institute (Wayne, 2005d). The proposals have heightened discussion on private accounts. While none have been passed into law, Jim McCrery (former Republican Chairman Subcommittee on Social Security, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives) predicted that Social Security reform would appear on the Congressional agenda after the 2006 elections and Grover Norquist (GOP strategist) predicted that “W accounts” will emerge after G. W. Bush has left the presidency (Barshay & Wayne, 2005; Marshall, 2006).

In summary, political opportunities for Social Security privatization commenced internationally through a global network of U.S. policymakers (see Table 1). While Social Security privatization was refuted in the U.S. through the 1980s, the free market theories of Milton Friedman were employed to press the Chilean authorities to fully privatize their
public pension scheme. With the support of President Reagan’s administration and under the leadership of Treasury Secretary James Baker, III, transnational governmental organizations (IMF and WB) promoted and enforced pension privatization in a number of countries through their funding policies. Welcomed by the Republican majority, international proponents of Social Security privatization (e.g. James, Peterson, Piñera, Scheiber, Shipman) became prominent in national politics and government alongside members of conservative think tanks such as Cato, CSIS, AEI and Heritage (e.g. Biggs, Feldstein, Ferrara, John, Tanner) [Svihula & Estes, 2007]. With the Republicans in control of Congress since 1994 and a Republican president inaugurated in 2001, proponents of privatization became more deeply entrenched throughout the president’s administration, in the SSA, and in the Social Security commissions and board of trustees. President G. W. Bush has placed Social Security reform high on his national agenda. Political mediation continues through linkages with the transnational financial services industry through the relentless promotion of writings, conferences, and media content produced by conservative think tanks and by access to and influence on the federal issue agenda through legislative hearings.

Two areas of research would enhance our ability to predict the direction of ideological social movements and be a great contribution to fields such as the politics of aging, policy analysis, political sociology and political science: a) an historical exegesis of the reframing, or “keying” (Goffman, 1974), associated with the terminology for reform (e.g. privatization, private accounts, individual accounts, personal accounts) could signal ideological alignments; and b) a longitudinal network analysis of the actors, their ideologies and resources could clarify how dominant interests in the Social Security policy domain are able to use their power and relationships to influence policy options.

Discussion

We contend that the Social Security reform efforts are a substantial component of an ideological social movement. The decade that comprised the late 1970s through the late 1980s brought about a shift in political and economic consciousness.
Table 1. An historical account of ideological action among actors that favors Social Security privatization and connotes a politically motivated social movement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Actor(s)</th>
<th>Action(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>4 SS Commissioners</td>
<td>Supplemental statements emphasize market values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Milton Friedman</td>
<td>Free market speech in Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Chicago Boys/ Piñera</td>
<td>Hold key positions in Chilean government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Cato/Ferrara</td>
<td><em>Social Security: The Inherent Contradiction</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>IMF/WB/US</td>
<td>Complicit in Chilean restructure based on market ideals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Ferrara</td>
<td>Serves in Reagan administration through 1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>José Piñera</td>
<td>Creates Chile pension privatization scheme, continues to promote pension privatization to countries worldwide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>SS Commissioners</td>
<td>Dissent on recommendations based on market values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Pierre du Pont</td>
<td>Advises Reagan/Thatcher, acclaimed by Milton Friedman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Cato/Heritage</td>
<td>Leninist Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Reagan/Baker, III</td>
<td>Greater structural reforms/privatization from IMF/WB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>IMF/WB</td>
<td>Support Baker plan for loans based on structural reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Conable</td>
<td>Former congressman/SS Commissioner becomes WB president</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Pierre duPont</td>
<td>Runs for president on platform of private accounts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>SS Trustees/Council</td>
<td>Estimate long-term insolvency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Ferrara</td>
<td>Associate Deputy Attorney General to President G. H. W. Bush</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>Invite largely pro-privatizers to testify in federal legislative hearings on reform through 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Shipman/State Street</td>
<td>Testifies before Congress; leads Cato’s Social Security Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>James/WB</td>
<td><em>Averting the Old Age Crisis</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Tech Panel to SS Council</td>
<td>Considers investing trust funds in the stock market and private accounts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Secretary of HHS</td>
<td>Recommends Advisory Council perform extensive review of Social Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Trustees</td>
<td>Reports have consistently estimated long-term insolvency through 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Actor(s)</td>
<td>Action(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>SS Council</td>
<td>First time in history consensus is absent—3 proposals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>5 SS Council members</td>
<td>Support private accounts, affiliated with Cato, Watson Wyatt, and AEI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Trustees</td>
<td>Through 2004, estimated date of insolvency moves further into future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Clinton</td>
<td>“Save Social Security First,” year-long forums, promotes investing 12% of trust fund in stock market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Publishes statement supporting 2% of payroll taxes into private accounts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Clinton</td>
<td>First White House Conference on Social Security; many proposals for private accounts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>G. W. Bush</td>
<td>Runs on platform of private accounts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Cato</td>
<td>Hosts privatizing Social Security conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Bush</td>
<td>President’s Commission—all members must support private accounts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Cato’s Tanner/Biggs</td>
<td>Hold 4 luncheon seminars on Social Security reform on the Hill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>John/Heritage</td>
<td>2003 agenda supports private accounts and advises using SSA mailings to promote reform as well as using public Trustees to issue special report on why reform is necessary, explains private accounts to public, lawmakers, media for Bush</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>SSA</td>
<td>Primary goal for educating public emphasizes Social Security problems are serious and require immediate reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Cato’s Tanner</td>
<td>Writes 6.2% solution to reform Social Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Treasury</td>
<td>Public affairs fact sheet indicates private accounts are critical for Social Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Bush</td>
<td>Presidential agenda 2004 places privatization of SS as priority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Biggs/Cato SS Choice</td>
<td>Appointed by Bush to Associate Commissioner of SSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Blahous</td>
<td>Assistant to President for Economic Policy leads Bush Social Security agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>CSIS/Concord Coalition</td>
<td>Co-sponsor conference on Social Security reform in Washington, D.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>AEI</td>
<td>Holds conference on Social Security in support of private accounts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>SSA</td>
<td>In apparent support for Bush agenda, changes public communication to reflect need for SS reform and private accounts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>House Special Investigation Division (SID)</td>
<td>Notes changes in SSA public communications</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While dissension on Social Security’s long-term financing appeared as early as 1977, it took the substantial efforts of the conservative neoliberals to build the political momentum necessary to shift the institutional structures of government. Ideologically structured action (Zald, 2000) around the financing of Social Security has been seen in the activities of Mr. Bush, his administration, and Congress. Moreover, the Trustees’ estimation of earlier dates for Social Security insolvency is consistent with the market ideology.

Yet, it appears that the political alignment for and against privatization may be shifting. The influence of the IMF in Latin America and middle income countries has collapsed (Weisbrot, 2006). Chile’s President Bachelet has begun to reform the country’s private pension scheme beginning with free health care to individuals over 60 years of age and adding a national public safety net to the Social Security program (Sentido.tv Americas, 2006).
Latin America has experienced an unprecedented long-term economic growth failure over the last quarter-century while implementing market policies advocated by the IMF and World Bank (Weisbrot, 2007). A number of Latin American countries recently rejected these policies and have elected governments with an explicit mandate to change economic policy. This year, the governments of Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Colombia have decided to form a new “Banco del Sur” as an alternative to the IMF, World Bank, and allied institutions.

In the U.S., a liberal coalition called Americans United for Change banded together in 2006 to defeat the president’s attempts at Social Security privatization (Young, 2007). The coalition continues its efforts in the fight against the privatization of Medicare. Whereas throughout most of the 1990s and early 2000s, Republicans staunchly supported private accounts and Democrats were split on the reform option, currently the reverse is true (Wayne, 2005a; Wayne & Tollefson, 2007). By the end of 2006, all top Democrats had signed the “Golden Promise,” a pledge against Social Security privatization initiated by Nancy Pelosi and Harry Reid (Graham, 2006).

The struggle is sure to continue as challengers, including the president, his administration and political appointees, continue their unabated framing of Social Security as “bankrupt,” “unsustainable,” and in “crisis.” In September 2006, a group called For Our Grandchildren reacted to the “Golden Promise” by asking each member of Congress to sign a pledge that they would require that all reform options (including privatization) be placed on the table (Koffler, 2006). Undaunted by his defeat in 2006, Mr. Bush placed private carve-out accounts in the 2008 federal budgets and appointed Andrew Biggs to deputy commissioner of the SSA during a congressional recess (Office of the Press Secretary, 2007; Schor, 2007). Almost every elected Democrat and many Republicans had rejected Bush’s plan to create private accounts and strongly opposed the appointment. Max Baucus, Senate Finance Committee Chairman, stated that the appointment of Biggs, due to his support of Bush’s plan, has dimmed any chance of real reform. In the future, perhaps the ideological divide will be broken by a savvy policy entrepreneur or an advocacy coalition. Through early November of
2007, candidates were mostly quiet about Social Security reform on the presidential campaign trail, focusing instead on health care. However, over the Veterans' Day weekend, Republican candidate Fred Thompson and Democratic candidates Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama began to debate the issue publicly (Sahadi, 2007). Thompson proposes personal accounts funded by additional individual payroll taxes government matched 2.5 to 1 through general revenues. Clinton anticipates first ending the practice of borrowing from the Social Security trust fund and then appointing a bipartisan commission. Obama backs raising the income ceiling on payroll taxes.

Finally, within the SSA, efforts toward shifting the social insurance program to private accounts continue (SSA, 2007). SSA sponsored the Retirement Research Consortium in 2003 at $5.0 million or more per year through 2007. The RRC has three goals: 1) conducting research and evaluation; 2) disseminating information on retirement research and 3) training scholars and practitioners. The RRC has held events at which speakers and presenters have promoted personal accounts. At a conference this year, Andrew Biggs and Sylvester Schieber were the two invited guest speakers. Sylvester Schieber, a partner with the financial consulting firm of Watson-Wyatt Worldwide, was appointed last fall by Mr. Bush to the Chairmanship of the Social Security Advisory Board. Additionally, one of the greatest objections to personal accounts has been the shift of risk from the government to the individual. At an RRC conference a year ago, five papers were presented on the possibility of reducing the amount of individual risk associated with the introduction of private accounts into Social Security.

In conclusion, Social Security is important to U.S. citizens. They support it unequivocally, to the point of consenting to additional taxes to sustain the program. Conversely, citizens do not favor the individual risk associated with personal accounts in Social Security. There is a great need for an accurate depiction of Social Security's status to be brought into national debate. Market rationalists are prominent in the presidential administration, the Social Security Administration, the Department of Treasury, the Board of Trustees, and witnesses invited to congressional hearings on Social Security reform. Moreover, they have penetrated research institutions previously perceived as unbiased. In the event of a conservative
majority in Congress and/or the election of another conservative president, it is likely that the legislative ambush seen with the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 will recur in Social Security reform in the form of private accounts.

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References


