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THE GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1949-1953:
AN ANALYSIS OF SCHUMACHER'S BID FOR MASS SUPPORT

by

Robert L. Gaddis
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my gratitude to Professor Ernest Rossi whose assistance and encouragement greatly aided me in writing this thesis on German politics. Sincere appreciation is also extended to Professors George Klein and David Hansen whose reading of the manuscript along with their expert advice and comments also aided this author. The inadequacies of this manuscript, of course, are the responsibility solely of the author.

Robert L. Gaddis
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Preface

Like most European socialist parties the Social Democratic Party was an offspring of industrialization. The workers' movements which appeared in Germany in the 1860's at first were associations devoted exclusively to education and recreation. They soon acquired a political character and later these political associations formed a political party, referred to as the Social Democratic Party. This party, whose major developments are reviewed in Chapter I, had an erratic history. It was the largest party in the Weimar Republic and came into power, but it was abolished during the Nazi regime. In the post World War II era, the party was confronted with the question whether it could retain and extend its mass movement after years of exile. This attempt to attract the masses failed to attain its full potential and the Social Democratic Party did not achieve its objectives in the early years of the Bonn Republic.

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze why the German Social Democratic Party failed to secure the mass support it believed was necessary in order to become the
governing party and to establish a socialist state. The period from 1946 to 1953 is examined because it is the crucial period in this regard. In order to determine why SPD failed to secure mass support, two entities will be analyzed: (1) the Social Democratic Party itself, and (2) the individual German citizen in his political environment. Consequently, by analyzing these two entities definite conclusions will be formed on the relationship between the two.

The first objective will be to look at the Social Democratic Party and its post-war leader, Kurt Schumacher. Schumacher molded the party according to his political concepts and his position of opposition. Thus by analyzing the party and its leader one should be better able to understand Schumacher's objective of mobilizing the masses in order to win the struggle for power.

The second objective will be to focus on the individual voter in the German political system. In focusing on the individual we will examine his political attitudes and his role in the political system. Such an analysis will help determine whether the masses, based on their political attitudes, were able to give the support that Schumacher
needed in his struggle for power.

This examination shows that instead of the individual being attracted to political movements, he was more concerned with governmental performance or governmental output. In examining governmental performance we will examine the popular priorities concerning governmental output. We will contrast the priorities which faced the individual to the policies advocated by the leader of the SPD, Kurt Schumacher, and the governmental leader, Konrad Adenauer. In doing so we shall determine whether the public agreed with Schumacher's positions or not.

A final chapter analyzes the 1953 federal election, the last significant election of this period. By examining the election we can determine whether the masses responded to the Social Democratic policies and its position of opposition. Thus by analyzing the results of the election we hope to show why the Social Democratic Party failed to mobilize mass support.

Since history is an evolving process which relies on cumulative events it is necessary to review the origins of the Social Democratic Party in order to understand the character of the post-war party. Thus Chapter I will
present a short summary of pre-World War II German history and the beginning of the Social Democratic Party.
Chapter I

Introduction: The Social Democratic Party
and Kurt Schumacher

In 1863 Ferdinand Lassalle founded the General Worker's Association (Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiterverein) or otherwise known as the ADA. Not all worker's movements joined the ADA in 1863. The remaining worker's groups formed their own organization in 1864 called the Union of German Worker's Societies (Verband der Deutschen Arbeitervereine) under the leadership of August Bebel. Bebel in 1868 persuaded the organization to join the Marxist International Worker's Association. This union later dissolved itself and merged in 1875 at Gotha with the ADA to form the Socialist Worker's Party, later renamed the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD). The Gotha unification was compromise for each movement because there existed differences between the two movements in ideology and organization.

The new Socialist movement soon encountered political repression when Chancellor Otto von Bismarck in 1879 dissolved the new organization with his Anti-Socialist Law
which forbid the party to maintain their political organization in Germany. Bismarck's attack on the socialist movement failed to prevent it from expanding. His attack contributed not only to socialist unity but it affected the party in that it shifted party consensus to the left. Later Bismarck was dismissed as Chancellor and the anti-Socialist legislation was allowed to lapse.¹

The first party congresses after the lifting of the anti-Socialist laws were held in 1890 in Halle and in 1891 in Erfurt. As a result of these congresses a program was adopted called the "Erfurterprogramm" which showed the change in party thinking and satisfied the more radical elements within the party. The shift from Lassalle to Marx also further opened an ideological struggle between orthodoxy and reformism. In regard to the Erfurt program Howard Schellenger Jr. states in *The SPD in the Bonn Republic:*

In short, Bismarck's policies had forced the party into illegal activity; illegal activity called for more revolutionary theory

that theory was adopted at the very moment the party was resuming its normal political role. The result was a wide disparity between theory and practice that was to characterize the SPD until 1959. 2

The struggle between the opposing factions within the movement became so bitter than in 1917 the Social Democratic Party split into three parties--the Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD), the Communist Party (KPD), and the Social Democratic Party (SPD). The split was due to ideological disputes and other issues, such as the war effort and support of the government.

The SPD's plans for continuation of the monarchy were shattered when power was given to it as a result of the masses' discontent. Fearing anarchy from the left, the Social Democratic leadership, in order to preserve order, crushed the radical forces of the left. This was accomplished by seeking assistance from the military on the right--The High Command.

The final climax of the 1919 revolution occurred when

the radicals in Berlin rose in defiance. The uprising was in protest over the dismissal of the sympathetic USPD police chief. The insurrection was smashed by an anti-republican force, the Freikorps, which was created by Chancellor Friedrich Ebert in order to quell the disorders.

The history of the Weimar Republic is too detailed to give a recounting of the events here. Instead, what will be presented are important events concerning the Social Democratic Party.

The first election of the National Assembly returned the prorepublican parties with a landslide majority of 85 percent. The Social Democratic Party was the largest single party but had to rely on the bourgeois parties in order to achieve a majority. In fact, the SPD never received a majority mandate during the Weimar Period 1919-1933.³

The Social Democratic Party was responsible for the essential character of the new state in terms of its constitutional features and social and economic life. At that time German parliamentary democracy was the most

advanced in central Europe. The Social Democrats supported the basic features of the constitution and even insisted on provisions such as popular initiative, referendum, and proportional representation. As Lewis J. Edinger states in German Exile Politics, "The Weimar Constitution expressed their faith in liberal democracy and the innate rationality and goodness of man."^4

While pursuing the protection of the new democratic state the Social Democratic Party also pursued the development of major socialist aims, the foremost being the socialization of the means of production. However, the seeds of abandonment of socialization were sown in this period due to the exhaustive condition (from inflation to depression) of the German economy. With the Great Depression in 1928 the Social Democratic leaders enthusiasm for socialization waned and they pursued a laissez-faire economic policy.

The Social Democratic Party shared power in government with coalition parties for approximately five of the fourteen years of the Weimar Republic. During this period

significant internal changes also occurred within the party: (1) Electoral support, though it grew to the million mark in 1932, did not widen and the party was not able to recruit enough young people to replace the aging leadership. (2) The SPD became less of a working class party because many workers were attracted to the Communists. In order to alleviate this shift toward the Communists the SPD tried to attract the lower middle class. (3) The bureaucracy became more conservative and entrenched with officials who were unequal to the tasks which needed to be solved.\(^5\)

Unwillingness to cut unemployment benefits forced the Social Democratic Party to withdraw from the coalition government in 1930. In the Reichstag elections of that year the Communist and the National Socialist parties increased their support to such an extent that no stable majority could be assured; thus President Paul von Hindenburg selected a new chancellor. This new chancellor, Heinrich Bruning, ruled by decree using the emergency powers of Article 48.

\(^5\)Hunt, op. cit., p. IX-X.
The Social Democrats tolerated the Bruning government, considering him the lesser of two evils. As Friedrich Stampfer wrote, "It was no love match for either partner, but a marriage of convenience." In view of the Social Democrats distaste for the antirepublican National Socialists they supported President von Hindenburg in his reelection bid with Adolf Hitler.

One week before the election of 1932 a fire was set to the building of the Reichstag. The government accused the Communists of setting the fire and implicated the SPD as an accomplice. A severe clamp down was placed on the party resulting in dozens of Social Democrats being arrested and the prohibition of all SPD publications. At this time the Nazi's unleashed their propaganda machine against the Social Democrats. In the elections von Hindenburg won, but the National Socialists increased their membership in the Reichstag and became the largest party.

On January 30, 1933 with the appointment of Adolf Hitler to the chancellorship the Social Democratic Party was confronted with a government composed of avowed

6Edinger, op. cit., p. 7.
enemies of the Weimar Republic and its defenders. Hitler soon made it clear that his National Socialists were not going to rule in the Reichstag with a scant majority. Therefore he convened the Reichstag and passed the Enabling Act giving himself dictatorial powers. All parties except the Social Democratic Party were won over by the National Socialists to pass this measure.

Late in the spring of 1933 Hitler dissolved the trade unions and the Social Democratic Party. This was not his first step in persecuting Social Democrats for the Nazis had created a gangland type of environment before it gained control of the government. Even by 1933 Social Democrats sensed that the National Socialists intended to eliminate their party; the Nazi's often referred to the SPD as enemies of the state. In order to save their organization after 1933 party members reacted in four various ways: (1) They emigrated to the United States or other European countries. A typical example of this type of reaction were the members of the party executive who fled abroad in order to fight for the liberation of Germany. (2) Some remained in Germany to be faced with persecution by the Nazis. Kurt Schumacher resembles this type of member for he spent ten
years in concentration camps. (3) Others went underground in opposition to the Nazi regime. (4) A very small number collaborated with the Nazi regime.

Before World War II, the Social Democratic Party was often governed by historic forces. In the postwar period we will see a change, as the personalities of political leaders began to influence the character of the party, and Kurt Schumacher became the dynamic figure.

In the days following the capitulation of the totalitarian system the SPD leadership was grouped in three locations: Hanover, Berlin, and London. In London were the remains of the exiled Executive Committee which was not allowed to return to Germany until 1946. In Berlin, Otto Grotewohl, Helmut Lehmann, Erich Gniffke, Otto Meir, and Gustav Dahrendorf established a Social Democratic Party office which would later claim to be the legal heir of the leadership left behind in Germany. In Hanover was "Buro Schumacher" founded by Kurt Schumacher, the party veteran.7

The first major party struggle occurred in Berlin when the Soviet zone Social Democratic Party (SPD) called for a unified party of the left. This was brought on by pressure from the Communists and Soviet zone authorities. But Schumacher did not recognize the authority of the Berlin "Central Committee" over all four zones and thus proposed that the "Central Committee" represent Social Democracy in the Soviet zone and "Buro Dr. Schumacher" in the three Western zones. Until the four occupational powers made it possible to establish a national congress Schumacher and Grotewohl agreed that Grotewohl and the Social Democrats were to take no further action that would commit the Soviet zone SPD to cooperate with the Communists. However, under pressure from Soviet authorities Grotewohl and the SPD merged with the Communist party to form the SED (Socialist Unity Party).

During the winter of 1945-46 Kurt Schumacher had campaigned against amalgamation with the Communist Party.

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During the winter of 1945-46 Kurt Schumacher had campaigned against amalgamation with the Communist Party. 9

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This campaign became not only the principal vehicle for his drive for power but also his bid for leadership of the nation. In January 1946 SPD leaders formally voted for Schumacher in his opposition to Grotewohl's amalgamation proposals. The public's attention was thus drawn to Schumacher's resistance to fusion with the Communists, and also to his characteristics as a leader who would resist all Soviet efforts to dominate Germany. By May 1946 he had reorganized the SPD zonal parties into a Western interzonal organization and became a symbol of resistance to totalitarianism. Consequently, when the first party convention convened in May of 1946 in Hanover Kurt Schumacher was naturally elected party chairman.  

With his election as SPD party chairman, Kurt Schumacher emerged from the depths of the party as a little known leader to an internationally known and dynamic politician of the post-totalitarian era. To better understand the personality and behavior of this dynamic leader it is necessary to briefly inspect his background.

Kurt Schumacher had served in the Reichstag during

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the Weimar Republic until the SPD was expelled in 1933. On July 6, 1933 he was taken into custody and placed in prison as a Social Democratic agitator. From Berlin and Stuttgart prisons he was transferred to concentration camps where he spent the next ten years of his life. When he was finally released in 1943 he no longer resembled a vigorous man for he was nearly an invalid. This was because not only did he have to suffer the inhumanities of concentration camp life but he also had only one arm, having lost an arm in World War I. This imprisonment reinforced his political beliefs to such an extent that when he was released he felt he had entered a radically new phase of his life. This was a phase which, even though he was gravely ill, was expected to be the concluding and crowning phase when he would obtain ultimate confirmation of his superiority as a political man. Consequently, when he left the concentration camp as an individual he was committed not only to the principles of democratic socialism but to a dedication to put them into practice.¹¹

¹¹Waldemar Ritter, *Kurt Schumacher: Eine Untersuchung*
Schumacher's interpretation of the post-totalitarian era was that this era embarked on a period of political realignment. He saw this era as a struggle for power of political realignment. He saw this era as a struggle for power between those who were working for a peaceful Social Democracy and those who would impose "reaction and pseudo-socialism" on the nation. The former he identified with the Social Democratic movement and, specifically, its leadership, the latter with 'capitalist' and 'feudalist' forces and the Communists. The remnants of the propertied bourgeoisie he described as fighting a desperate struggle in defense of their vested interests against the impoverished multitude. In his opinion Germany was doomed unless Social Democracy soon came to power.

His strategy and tactics for his accession to power were not restricted to a stated party program because he
wanted the freedom to determine party positions himself. His basic interpretation was that a democratic mass party could only have one objective and that was the procurement of complete power in the state. Until this was obtained the party was to remain on the offensive against any obstacles which were preventing it from attaining its goal.\textsuperscript{15}

It (SPD) must refuse to take responsibility for decisions over which it had no control, and agree to cooperate with other groups only if it was in a position to command. If Social Democrats could not obtain the key posts in the nation's life, it was better to refuse responsibility altogether and pursue a consistent opposition policy against those in power, rather than fritter away the party's strength in ineffectual positions.\textsuperscript{16}

Before we analyze Schumacher's strategy it is necessary to examine two developments which greatly influenced this strategy--the establishment of the Bizonal Economic Council and the elections of 1949. Both developments played an important role in shaping Schumacher's struggle for power, In that these developments would place the Social Democratic Party in a policy of opposition to the

\begin{flushright} 
\textsuperscript{15}Edinger, \textit{Kurt Schumacher}, op. cit., p. 88.\\
\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., p. 89. 
\end{flushright}
governing bourgeois parties. Schumacher believed that this policy of opposition would eventually give the party the historical, moral, and intellectual mandate which it deserved.

The first development for Schumacher's strategy concerned the establishment of the Bizonal Economic Council in Frankfurt in 1947. The British and Americans had decided to give German representatives of the Lander (states) the power to regulate economic affairs. This authority was given to the German representatives by creating a Bizonal Economic Council (Wirtschaftsrat). The Council's power to adopt and promulgate ordinances though was subject to the approval of an Anglo-American Bipartite Board. Fifty-two delegates were sent to this council by the state parliaments. The SPD and the Christian Democratic Union Party (CDU) had an even number of delegates and there existed a question whether a coalition would be formed. Many people thought that it would be in the public interest to form such a coalition considering the economic troubles the country was faced with. But Schumacher thought

17Ritter, op. cit., p. 90.
otherwise about the coalition. He distrusted the capitalist and reactionary Western backers who supported the parties of the middle and right. Schumacher perceived that these "revolutionary capitalists" would have trouble in successfully reestablishing a capitalist economy under the prevailing economic conditions. In his policy to obtain power Schumacher demanded that the SPD direct the Bizonal Administration; however, the Christian Democrats refused. Consequently, he decided to let the Christian Democrats assume the blame for their actions which he hoped would result in the disillusionment of the masses. Thus, if the Social Democratic Party was uncompromised it would be certain to profit from the resulting disillusionment. The CDU then merged with the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the German Party (GP) in forming a coalition. 18 The chairman of the SPD pledged the party to a policy of opposition to the bourgeoisie's coalition.

As the Western Occupation Powers indicated their preference for a new German government Schumacher was

18 Ibid., pp. 102-103.
certain that his policy of opposition in the Bizonal Economic Council would insure the attainment of his objective--complete control of the government--in the election of the first West German Parliament. On August 14, 1949 the first election in the newly established German Federal Republic was held. Twenty-four and a half million or 80 percent of the electorate elected deputies to the Bundestag. Only 29.2 percent of the voters supported the Social Democratic Party (SPD) while 31 percent supported the Christian Democratic Union (CDU/CSU) with the rest of the voters turning to the other minor parties. The results of the election were a bitter setback for Schumacher who was certain before the election that he and his party had made a successful bid for power to control the government. Despite this setback, Schumacher intended to carry out the policy of the SPD in order to win the struggle for power. He did this by committing the party to the role of opposition. As he stated after the 1949 election,


20Edinger, op. cit., p. 207.
Table I-I

Popular Vote in the 1949 Federal Election
(by percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB/BHE</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPD</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table I-II

Distribution of Seats in Bundestag in 1949

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB/BHE</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPD</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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21 Data from Pollock, James K. *German Democracy at Work: A Selective Study.*

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"a battle had been lost, but the 'class war' would continue with even greater intensity." He insisted that the loss by the Social Democrats at the polls intensified the class struggle to such an extent that it demanded that the Social Democrats become even more aggressive. "This," he told his fellow Social Democrats, "should give us the strength to see how much can be achieved today if one is really determined to fight, and if this determination also leads one to try to reach the apolitical masses by exercising a natural magnetic influence upon them."

From the August 1949 election to his death in 1952 Schumacher continued the commitment of the party to the role of opposition. Schumacher opposed any domestic or foreign policy project proposed by the "bourgeois coalition" for he hoped that Adenauer's coalition government would be unable to satisfy the demands made by the masses, again hoping that if the SPD was unassociated with the government's policies it would benefit from the dis-

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22 Edinger, op. cit., p. 208.
23 Ibid., p. 208.
24 Ibid., p. 208.
satisfaction.\textsuperscript{25} Another reason why he opposed Adenauer's policies was Adenauer's restructuring of the Chancellor's role. When the opposition had not been properly consulted he complained, and he also repudiated as unconstitutional every "executive agreement" with the Western powers that the Chancellor did not present to the parliament. In fact, Schumacher's attitude is not surprising since his opposition policy excluded the SPD from the decision making process and compelled the SPD to leave the initiative to the head of the government. The only time Schumacher could criticize the government was when Adenauer presented the policies to the parliament.\textsuperscript{26} In view of this exclusion Schumacher consistently demanded new elections in which the masses could determine whether they opposed or agreed to Adenauer's policies. But Adenauer made it perfectly clear that he was not concerned with the disposition of the masses and had no intention of resigning or agreeing to new elections. So any further attempts by Schumacher to obtain control of the government would have to wait

\textsuperscript{25}Heine, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 93-94.

\textsuperscript{26}Edinger, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 225.
until the 1953 federal election.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 230.}

For the time being the party had to refuse responsibility and pursue an opposition policy against the "bourgeois authoritarians" in power. Time would come, hopefully in 1953, when the SPD's policies would appear as positive and constructive propositions.

Let us center our attention on the strategy Schumacher perceived as essential in the Social Democratic Party's drive for complete power. Schumacher felt that the fight for power required a strongly led, dissatisfied, and militant party that could attract overwhelming mass support and mobilize mass opinion behind its leaders and their goals. "If we Social Democrats have learned anything, from the experiences of the last decades," Schumacher said in Berlin in January 1950, "it is that one cannot simply depend blindly on evolution and progress."\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 89.} To gain the mass support he felt that the masses not only had to re-orient their traditional attitudes but also had to be inspired by appeals to their emotions. Schumacher perceived
that in times of crisis, emotions were the dominant element in men. Thus in his appeal Schumacher went far beyond the traditional means of SPD strength, labor and trade unions. He made an appeal to all whose interests conflicted with the exploiting capitalist class and who would therefore support ideals of Social Democracy—liberty, justice, and tolerance. 29

Schumacher thought that postwar dislocation, economic misery, and foreign intervention in German affairs would "proletarize" the masses in an overwhelming desire for a strong leadership and political movement. The situation demanded, in Schumacher's view, that the Social Democrats offer this desperate multitude a focal point in which to rally as they emerged from socio-economic instability and political apathy in search of a means to escape their condition. It would be the man and the party who would win the struggle for power. The masses were to view him as their champion who would not only do battle for them, but insure that there would be complete submission to

29 Ibid., p. 90.
their demands by their enemies.\textsuperscript{30}

In order to be a true champion or leader of the masses Schumacher perceived one had to identify with their interests and have the determination to obtain power on their behalf. He must also be able to prevent any confusion about the character of the opposing camps and to make certain there was no compromise between the evil forces and the masses. In this line of thinking the evil forces were to be exposed and clearly identified, and battle lines would be drawn in order to prevent these forces from exploiting the masses.\textsuperscript{31}

According to Lewis J. Edinger, Schumacher's perception of his role and strategy as leader of the Social Democratic Party was as follows: "He would be the lion rather than the fox, roaring for all to hear, in the expectation that he could waken and rally the exploited German people, and lead them to victory."\textsuperscript{32}

Schumacher believed that the man and his party who

\textsuperscript{30}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 191-192.

\textsuperscript{31}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 192.

\textsuperscript{32}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 193.
reactivated the masses from their passive state would win the struggle for power. To better understand Schumacher's dilemma in pursuing this goal, in the next chapter we will look at the individual German citizen in his political environment in the postwar period. By doing so we should be able to ascertain whether the individual could be "mobilized" or "reactivated" in his political environment.
Chapter II

The Political Attitudes of Postwar Germany

The political culture of any nation deals with the community's attitudes relating to political issues and objects. These attitudes are comprised of collective beliefs, values and emotions of the individuals.¹ The individual's memories also play an important part in shaping the political culture in that individuals form attitudes and react to contemporary political developments on the basis of personal experiences and transmitted history. For example, the lessons learned from the past provide clues and guidelines for the formation of attitudes about a person's own political roles and goals and those of other actors.² Thus political attitudes are formed to an extent from the individual's political consciousness which has been formed from historical traditions and political


developments which have affected the individual. In order to determine the prevailing postwar political attitudes an analysis of Germany's historical traditions will be dealt with first.

Historical Traditions

The first historical tradition is the German idea of the state. According to this tradition, "the state was the incarnation of the common welfare, and although the state, which stood above the parties, defended the interests of the ruling class it also succeeded in presenting its policies to its subjects as being for the common good." 3

In presenting social welfare to the subjects, the subjects were assured of efficient government by experts of the state. This same idea was still believed by many Germans in their respect for administrators in the postwar period. Combined with this idea of the state was also the concept that the state was the instrument for the protection and order of society. In supporting this idea John H. Herz states that "there is (also) power enough to defend the

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community against threats from abroad, egotistic interest groups, and subversive forces, and finally all this serves to stimulate the higher cultural values of the arts, sciences, and philosophy.\textsuperscript{4}

The second historical tradition deals with the German's respect for order and rules. Respect for order and harmony in society can be seen in the German's interest in an Utopia which knows no conflict of interests. "Germans prefer to deal with people under specific rules. Not used to taking the initiative to settle a public problem in an unregulated situation, many instinctively look for somebody to do it for them."\textsuperscript{5} This tradition, Herz points out, is: "for every foreseeable situation there should be a rule, duly set by some authority with power to enforce it, and obeyed faithfully by the subjects."\textsuperscript{6} A good postwar example of this respect for rules is in the Allied supervision of Germany. Once the occupational authorities had


\textsuperscript{5}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 12.

\textsuperscript{6}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 12.
restored order and laid down regulations it was surprisingly easy for the Allies to command the obedience of the Germans. "The character of German obedience is when it comes to standing up and defending his rights against authorities, the German with 'civil courage' (as Bismarck called it) is the exception."\(^7\) According to Herz this "civil courage" is why democratic institutions in Germany are so rarely imbued with democratic spirit.

An "unpolitical tradition" is the thinking on the part of the public that politics is an area that should be left solely to the politicians. Although the people accepted the democratic system as their form of government their acceptance was purely passive. In regards to Germany, Richard Hiscock states:

> The attitude of the majority towards democratic government is passive rather than positive. The average German accepts the system without having a live democratic consciousness or recognizing his own responsibility as a citizen. The fundamental reason for this attitude is the fact that Germany has again received democracy as a gift rather than as the result of a struggle based on conviction.\(^8\)

\(^7\)Ibid., p. 12.

Historically this unpolitical tradition can be traced as far back as Bismarck. Bismarck's interpretation of the constitution and his treatment of political parties had an effect on the attitude of the people in establishing a democratic tradition. This is explained by Hiscock in the following passage:

Membership of a body (Parliament) with so limited an influence on government was not specially attractive to men of ambition and ability. Patriotic Germans rightly considered that the Emperor and his Chancellor, rather than Parliament, had the main say in the government of the country. The army and the civil service therefore, in that order, got the pick of young Germans from the upper classes and enjoyed much higher social prestige than Parliament. . . . This alone made it difficult to establish a strong parliamentary tradition. Thus in such a society it was not surprising that the average citizen had little sense of political responsibility. Politics were considered to be left to the politicians.9

Two other factors in the twentieth century have strengthened the "unpolitical tradition." The disastrous effects of the Hitler era imbedded in the minds of people the idea that they did not want anything to do with politics. Allied policies on denazification even further strengthened

9Ibid., p. 18.
this attitude for every German was considered responsible for submitting not only to Hitler's rise in power but also the wretchedness and inhumanity that the Nazi regime brought about.

The fourth tradition is the historical tradition of legality: "the tendency to treat political problems as legal problems and to discuss them from a legal point of view." This tradition was practiced in the principle of Rechtsstaat—a state where law prevails. The principle of Rechtsstaat guaranteed the citizen's legal security against executive arbitrariness. This principle is even prevalent in today's society in the solution of political problems by legal means. An example in postwar Germany occurred when politicians let the courts settle political problems, e.g. Schumacher taking the European Defense Treaty to the Federal Constitutional court to make sure it was legal.

In analyzing the concept of Rechtsstaat in German law we find that this concept implied faith in constitutional engineering, and a rather high degree of popular dependence on very explicit and detailed, as well as comprehensive,

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10 Herz, op. cit., p. 15.
authoritative instructions as formal guides to legitimate political behavior. The state is viewed as a higher legal abstraction which is above the political system and society. It (the state) is viewed by the people as the guardian and provider of services for society.  

In addition to the old perception of the state as supreme there was a new perspective in the relationship between state and society. The contemporary view of a state under law implies a contractual relationship between state and citizens based on reciprocal obligations. The society's demands are limited to public over private interest and in return the state insures society that domestic harmony and stability, economic prosperity, and protection from external threats are guaranteed.

How were these historical traditions transmitted in the postwar German Federal Republic political culture? Most of these attitudes were taught in the schools or family, or by cumulative effects of everyday life in which the present generation is taught by the preceding one. However, in postwar Germany sometimes a conscious attempt was

\[11\text{Sontheimer, op. cit., p. 69.}\]
\[12\text{Ibid., p. 70.}\]
made to inculcate a new set of attitudes. Thus the postwar political culture was not a homogenous system, for since 1949 not only did it include democratic norms (to what extent we shall see later) but also historical traditions which since its origin have tended to be superceded by the principles of democracy.

Post-war West German attitudes are thus the outcome of the conflicting influences of events and memories from long-past German history, of recent or current institutions and practices in society and family life, of old and new images and ideas about human relations and politics, and of social and political developments since 1945.

The International Setting of Postwar Germany

The international setting of postwar Germany consisted of the activities of the four occupation powers who pursued policies in accordance with their own image and expectations of the desired future German state. These images and expectations changed as a result of interactions with other powers, changes in the attitudes of the

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14 Ibid.
decision-makers, and feedback reactions within the German political system.

This section will present a brief summary of the postwar international setting. Inherent in this analysis will be an inquiry into how the various occurrences in the international system affected the German individual.

The total defeat of Germany was accompanied by the collapse of its economic and social structure. The after-effects of the heavy bombing were large scale unemployment and housing and food shortages. Occupation authorities also limited economic revival by dismantling industrial and transportation facilities. Due to the collapse of the economy the social strata was proletarized into a broad stratum of workers and a small properties elite.

With the disintegration of the Nazi regime in 1945 the four occupying powers assumed supreme authority with respect to Germany. A Control Council which consisted of the commanders-in-chief of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France was established to decide on questions affecting Germany as a whole. Whereas the commanders in the Control Council were to serve as an interim central government, in their own zones they were to act as
independent administrators. The area of "Greater Berlin" was to be occupied by the Allied Powers and was to be administered by an Inter-Allied Governing Authority, the Kommandatur, under the general direction of the Control Council.

In August 1945 Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States at the Potsdam Conference decided that:

(1) No central government was to be established for the time being except for the establishment of central German agencies in the fields of finance, transport, communications, and foreign trade.

(2) Local governments should be reestablished.

(3) The four D's should be put into effect (demilitarization, decentralization, deindustrialization, and denazification).

(4) There should be a carefully planned subsistence level for the Germans.\(^\text{15}\)

Vast population movements occurred after the war. Some ten million expellees and refugees settled down in the western zones.\(^\text{16}\) The expellees had been moved under the Potsdam Agreement from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the German Democratic Republic territories under Soviet and Polish administration. The refugees had come

\(^{15}\)Michael Freund, *From Cold War to Ostpolitik: Germany and the New Europe*, (London: Oswald Wolff, 1972), p. 16.

\(^{16}\)Hiscocks, *op. cit.*, p. 37.
voluntarily from Central and Eastern Europe or the Soviet zone. The occupying powers first sent them to areas of less population density--the rural areas. Later the able bodied moved to wherever they could find work. A housing shortage existed and many refugees and expellee families had to live together in single family dwelling units. Since the nation had suffered such a heavy loss of life in the war, the influx of refugees and expellees offered the western zones valuable workers many of them highly skilled. This population influx in later years would be counted as one of the contributing factors of economic growth.

The denazification policy of the Potsdam Agreement created a further issue.

The Potsdam Agreement laid down that all members of the Nazi party who had been more than nominal participants in its activities should be removed from public and semi-public office and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings.  

Both the American and British occupation officials made a systematic effort in carrying out the policy of denazification. But soon the responsibilities involved in such

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17Hans Speier and W. Phillips Davison, West German Leadership and Foreign Policy, (Evanston: Row, Peterson, and Co., 1957).
an undertaking became too immense, and therefore in 1946 denazification was handed over to German authorities. At this time two and a half million of the cases were discharged due to amnesties applicable to youth, disabled, and low income groups.

The Germans who were entrusted with denazification experienced a difficult assignment. The more serious cases were postponed while the courts dealt with minor officials and blind followers of the Nazi regime. In the meantime public opinion turned against the policy of denazification. Allied measures such as the Compensation Law of 1949 made the procedure much more lenient. Thus in the end many of the more serious cases escaped punishment and were able to take up important and responsible positions in society and government.

Joint control by the occupation powers soon proved to be impossible due to the conflicting conceptions of the purpose and future of the country. These differing aspirations were the seeds of the divisive forces that were to increase the tensions between the Western powers and the Soviet Union into an East-West confrontation. This confrontation was also due to expansion of Soviet
power and Moscow's apparent plan to gain control of all Germany.

The tensions that developed among the occupation powers was soon reflected in the Control Council and prevented the establishment of provisional administrative departments. In order to assure a coordinated administrative organization the United States and Great Britain on January 1, 1947 decided to fuse their zones into an economic union called "Bizonia."\(^\text{18}\)

As a result of Soviet expansion in Central Europe and increased tensions between the two super powers President Truman committed the United States to global anti-Communism. Communism was to be held in check by granting aid, primarily economic and financial, but also military, to any country seemingly threatened by it.

In the face of the cruel reality of East-West tensions the political perils of abandoning Europe to its weakened condition became vividly apparent. In June 1947 Secretary of State George C. Marshall formulated a plan (European

Recovery Program) to offer substantial aid to European countries on the condition that they propose a concerted plan of reconstruction. This condition was accepted by the Europeans, except the Eastern European countries which were forced to withdraw due to Soviet pressure. The sixteen European member countries founded the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) for the concerted execution of the Marshall Plan. The western zones of Germany were represented in OEEC by their military governors until the Federal Republic was established.

But the Marshall Plan aid did more for the Europeans than give needed aid. As Richard Hiscocks stated, "It provided the basis for hope and sustained effort which was exactly what the German people needed. The psychological stimulus was miraculous and was comparable in effect with the material aid that was sent." ¹⁹

There are three important benefits which the Marshall Plan bestowed upon Germany. The first effect was that the plan provided foreign foodstuffs, raw materials, and machinery, the payment for which was deferred to some

¹⁹Hiscocks, op. cit., p. 41.
later date. 20 "In the first year alone, to the middle of 1949, West Germany received deliveries valued at over 600 million dollars. In total, she received 1.5 billion dollars, or $29 per capita." 21 The second effect was that it established a community of Western European nations with the aim of liberalizing mutual trade. This assignment was regarded by the United States as the only logical way to liberalize European trade relations which heretofore had been protective. The third effect was the administering of counterpart fund credits which were funds disposed of by German agencies under the auspices of the Marshall Plan administration by granting low investment credits continued long beyond the Marshall Plan Period. 22

By the spring of 1948 Western powers had become seriously concerned with Soviet designs in Central Europe. Western policy began to anticipate this need, so in March 1948 Western European nations entered into the Brussels


21 Ibid., p. 238.

22 Ibid., pp. 238-239.
Treaty organization for mutual defense. In June 1948 the Soviet threat in Central Europe was highlighted by the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia.

Having failed to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union the Western authorities issued a decree on June 18, 1948 calling for a currency reform in the western zones. "Its main technical results were the contraction of the money supply through the drastic devaluation of the Reichsmark, and the reorganization of the public and private debt structure." Other results were the collapse of the black market, abolishment of the ration card, and confidence restored in the D-Mark. The foundation for recovery had been laid.

"Immediately the Soviet regime accused the Western powers of bringing about the economic and therefore the political partition of Germany by introducing a new currency." Thus on June 23 Soviet military authorities replied with a currency reform in their sector which was to apply to the whole of "Greater Berlin." The Soviet

23 Hanrieder, op. cit., p. 21.

24 Freund, op. cit., p. 27.
authorities also suspended coal and electricity supplies to the western sectors of the city. The following day the western authorities replied that the western mark was legal tender in the western zones of occupation.

The currency dispute also ended what was left of German unity which up to then had still kept going by the control commission. The four military governors who represented the interim government had held Germany loosely together. But on March 20 the last session of the commission took place when the Soviet representative failed to arrange the next meeting.

In March the first restrictions on traffic were introduced by the Soviet authorities. These were to be reinforced in June until the western sector of Berlin was finally sealed off in July 1948. After a brief delay the western powers decided not to abandon the city. The United States chose an airlift in breaking the Soviet blockade. The airlift succeeded in keeping the three western sectors provisioned and a counterblockade of the Soviet zone of Germany was put into force. The Soviet Union conceded that they had lost in their power play for Berlin and in February 1949 negotiations to end the crisis were begun.
On May 5 an agreement was announced which lifted the previously imposed restrictions.25

"With the breaking of the Soviet blockade, American relations with the Russians never resumed the unsatisfactory character of 1945-1948."26 Even the physical separation still remained. The magistrate and the city assembly moved to the Western sectors of Berlin. The Socialist Unity Party (SED) remained in East Berlin to form their own assembly. The Western authorities in the Allied Kommandantura in January 1949 resumed their functions without the Russians.

The currency reform, the Marshall Plan, and the liberation of the German economy from the administrative sector, brought forth an increase in the recovery of the German economy. Economic recovery was responsible for the enduring stability of political conditions in the Federal Republic. Contentment with economic conditions was so widespread that the phrase "no experimentation" became a


26Ibid., p. 214.
successful slogan for candidates to public office. This attitude would severely limit SPD options for a planned and controlled economy. Also inherent in the people's attitudes for the new social and political order was an undercurrent of authoritarianism built on parental authority such as a Hindenburg or a strong Reich under centralized authority.

The United States military presence in postwar Germany was important in that occupation forces were necessary in order to administer the zone, and that military forces represented a bastion towards Communism in the Western zones of Germany and in Western Europe. The United States presence signified that a final solution to the German question concerning a divided Germany had not been reached by the Four Powers and thus the SPD option was severely limited for a "neutral" Germany. The SPD could propose a final solution but in order to be accepted it would have to be accepted by the Four Powers.

On the other hand Adenauer realized the limited alternatives available to a West German state established under the auspices of the Western powers. The occupation powers in creating the new West German state delegated their
authority to the new Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer. Consequently the German public respected the Chancellor's acquired authority. In the following years Adenauer would further become an authoritarian figure which would result in the public obeying and following faithfully Adenauer.27

The East-West tensions and the proximity of Communist totalitarianism joined forces with the establishment of a new political and economic order to produce a shift in opinion to the right.28 Opposition to Communism and the East German collaborators was transferred into anything that was considered left of center. Labor union leaders and the SPD were attacked as "red" by the restored classes.

The SPD was regarded by the public as being an ideological party that derived its inspiration from Marx thus it was truly leftist. Associating its leaders with pictures of Marx was a favorite theme of most cartoonists. In 1953 one of the CDU posters stated, "All the ways of Marxism lead to Moscow" and no explanation was needed. The party


28 Ibid., p. 108.
has also been handicapped by its historical tradition.

While the CDU and the FDP, the German Party, and of course the BHE could all start political life almost from scratch, the Social Democrats were regarded by large sections of the electorate as the old "reds" or Sozis who failed to work their own post Versailles system and then capitulated to Hitler without a shot being fired. 29

Postwar Attitudes to Political System

In this section the state of postwar German attitudes towards politics will be described. The wealth of information that is available to the researcher comes from four available sources of quantitative information on West German public opinion. The military government, and then later the office of the High Commissioner of Germany, started polling civilians shortly after the war. The three other centers of opinion research have developed in Germany when the occupation surveys were taking place. The first is the Institute for Market and Opinion Research (Emnid). The second was founded by a husband-wife team who founded the Institut fur Demoskopie in Allensbach, and the third major center is the Deutsches Institut fur Volksumfagen (DIVO).

The following description of German postwar attitudes made in this paper is based on the DIVO, and the Institut fur Demoskopie and the writer is indebted to these organizations.

The first and most obvious characteristic of postwar political attitudes was its conservative nature. This is evident in the electorate's support of moderate and broad-based policies of the middle, and rejecting the extreme Left and Right. The radical right-wing and refugee groups that had made a significant showing in 1949 began to lose strength in the election of 1953. The political attitude of "no experimentation" was a reflection of the conservatism of the electorate. The great mass of West German voters supported governmental measures provided that the risks were moderate.30

"This conservatism is also reflected in the electorate's

30 In a 1956 study of German youth 79 percent of the respondents reported that they would prefer a secure and low paying job to a less secure but higher paying one and in a similar survey 68 percent of German youth said they would prefer a job with a lower salary and a pension plan than a higher salary and no pension plan. Sidney Verba, Germany: The Remaking of Political Culture in European Political Processes, eds. Henry Albinsky and Lawrence K. Pettit, (Boston, 1968), p. 39.
lack of intensity toward politics. This attitude could be seen in the results of the public's evaluation of Adenauer's performance." The results of the evaluation indicated neither overwhelming support nor strong opposition to Adenauer's performance. The bulk of the electorate fell in between considering his work neither good nor bad.

This lack of intensity toward politics can be further demonstrated by comparing American and British attitudes with West German attitudes toward political participation. In the three democracies when the question (Should the individual be active in local community affairs?) was put to those being interviewed, the Germans were less likely to agree with the viewpoint of active participation in community affairs than the Americans or the British.

Inherent in the new attitudes of the postwar Germany was also a new basis for evaluating the state. Previously the population evaluated the state according to what the people could do for the state, but because of reaction to

31Ibid., p. 39.
32Ibid., pp. 39-40.
33Ibid., p. 39.
the totalitarian experience the state was now judged on the basis of what it could do for the people. As Karl Deutsch states, "The purpose of the state was placed squarely in the realm of the purely pragmatic, becoming the utilitarian servant of the people."  

After the war the services the West Germans deemed to be the state's primary purpose was the job of reconstructing the economy and restoring economic prosperity to the industrial and economic ruins that prevailed. Even after prosperity had been achieved in the late 1950's and early 1960's the West Germans still continued to view the state's functions in terms of its success in maintaining a high level of economic influence. The Germans' support of the Bonn government and their attachment to a democratic government thus had come from the individual's orientation to the state. This orientation was a pragmatic one in which the economic services the state could provide were conceived as essential.

In the Bonn Republic scholars found two types of

34 Deutsch and Nordlinger, op. cit., p. 351.
35 Deutsch and Nordlinger, op. cit., p. 351.
attachment to the system.\textsuperscript{36} The first attachment was the pragmatic even cynical view of politics. The second attachment was the absence of the kind of intense rejection of politics that this pragmatic detachment might engender. This attachment could be characterized as unemotional, for the Germans did not develop during the beginning of the Federal Republic either an emotional commitment to the ideas of the democratic system or a strong attachment to the political system.\textsuperscript{37}

The pragmatic attachment to the political system is diffused throughout half of the population. These pragmatists have been referred to as: "Success Germans," "fellow travelers of democracy," and the "skeptical generation."\textsuperscript{38} They share a common ideology which emphasizes a concern for security and material benefits produced by the government. In describing them let us now look at their

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Verba, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 42.
\item Ibid., p. 42.
\item The hard core of the pragmatists is found in the non-voters (15 percent) and occasional voters and independents (25 percent); they also include most of the 5 to 15 percent who say "undecided" or "don't know" in opinion polls. Deutsch and Nordlinger, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 353.
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common commitments. First, they were concerned with the
government's ability to produce what the people want. If
the government satisfied this requirement they would then
support the government. Since the Adenauer government had
satisfied the economic requirement of the people, they
supported his regime. Second they were interested in
security and respectability. These values seemed to them
to be embodied in the Western way of life and thus the
pragmatists had indicated a preference for the West. As
with economic prosperity they were willing to support
leaders and policies which supported these values of
security and respectability. Third, they were extremely
middle class in outlook. If a politician had a "bourgeois
outlook" *(eine durchaus burgerliche Gesinnung)* the respon-
dents were more willing to vote for him than if a politician
had an "unbourgeois outlook."³⁹ Fourth, they lacked

³⁹ To learn that a politician had a "thoroughly bour-
geois outlook" *(eine durchaus burgerliche Gesinnung)* would
have been a good reason to vote for him among 56 percent
of the respondents to a 1956 poll, and to learn that a
politician's views were "thoroughly unbourgeois" *(unburger-
lich)* would have been a reason to reject him for 79 per-
cent. Only 2 percent of the voters sampled would have
considered a candidate with an "unbourgeois" attitude
worthy of support. Deutsch and Nordlinger, 354-355.
an intense ideological commitment such as to Nazism or Communism. Instead they acquired through the holocaust of intense ideological commitment of the Hitler regime a tempered sober sense of realism. This realism is a commitment to ideas that are within the limits of pragmatism and moderation. Since World War II the West Germans have been concerned with safe politics and adventuristic ones are highly unfavorable.\(^{40}\)

This lack of an intense ideological commitment was apparent in the election results of 1949 and 1953. In the 1949 federal elections the Communists (KPD) received only 6 percent of the votes cast, while in 1953 their number of supporters further decreased to 2 percent of the vote cast. Besides the lack of an internal ideological commitment by the pragmatists there are many other reasons for this distaste of Communism. The main reasons seemed to be: 1) division and occupation of Germany and the ravaging

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\(^{40}\) Only 26 percent of respondents in 1956 favored fighting an atomic war in defense of democratic freedom rather than let Europe fall under Soviet rule; 36 percent said they preferred to avoid war even at this price, and the rest were undecided. Deutsch and Nordlinger, p. 356.
of East Germany by Soviet troops; 2) the millions of anti-communist refugees who spread throughout Western Germany; 3) the rise of economic prosperity.41

The pragmatic and perhaps cynical view of the political system can be best appreciated in Gabriel Almond's and Sidney Verba's study, The Civic Culture. In a comparative context Almond and Verba studied the political attitudes of five nations (United States, United Kingdom, Italy, German Federal Republic, and Mexico). Almond and Verba in their study dealt with two types of political attachment to the political system. "One called the 'output effect' is the level of satisfaction the individual expresses with the specific performance of the government, and the other the 'system affect' is a general and diffuse attachment to the political system as a whole without reference to any particular aspect."42 Since the latter attachment in their theory obviously develops over a longer period of time and is only concerned with an expression of satisfaction to the system as a whole instead of specific

41 Ibid., p. 359.
42 Verba, op. cit., p. 42.
outputs the full use of this type of attachment in this paper will not be presented. What will be used is Almond and Verba's hypothesis concerning output effect. It is their hypothesis that whatever attachment there is to the political system it is mainly a pragmatic one. This is reflected in the individual who believes himself capable of participating within the political system is more satisfied with the system, but his satisfaction tends to be with specific outputs of the system.43

In proving this hypothesis Almond and Verba divided their respondents into three groups based on the extent of their subjective sense of ability to participate in and influence government. This basis is referred to by Almond and Verba as "subjective competence."

44 Almond and Verba devised a scale which rated the respondents according to the rate of their subjective competence. Respondents were placed into six categories ranging from a low score of zero, for those who expressed the least subjective

43 Ibid., p. 42.

competence, to a high score of five, which is a high degree of subjective competence. Those scoring high in subjective competence considered themselves capable of influencing the government while those scoring low felt incapable.

In comparing Germany's subjective competence with the other four democratic countries--U.S., Great Britain, Italy, and Mexico--Almond and Verba derived two conclusions. The first is that Germany, like the other democratic countries, had a greater sense of subjective competence vis-a-vis the local government than the national government. The second conclusion is that in all five countries the proportion that can influence the local government is higher than the proportion expressing national competence. In Germany this difference is the largest of all four countries, for less than a third considered themselves capable of influencing the national government while two-thirds expressed local competence.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 241.}

The question Almond and Verba then raised is: does a citizen's satisfaction with the government increase the more he considers himself able to participate in the
government? In Germany 75 percent of the respondents who scored high in subjective competence reported satisfaction with governmental output in contrast with 62 percent who scored low. In their data they concluded that those respondents who scored high are more likely to express satisfaction with the specific output of the system while those scoring low are less likely. Thus the individual who believes he can participate in decisions is more likely to express satisfaction with the output of the governmental decision-making process.

"According to this hypothesis a mutually beneficial exchange occurs between the individual and the political system." A person who considers himself subjectively competent derives satisfaction in one's ability to participate in the input structure. Thus not only is he highly oriented to his input role for he feels he has a voice in the system, but also he is more likely to consider the outputs of the system more favorable for him, for he has

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46 Ibid., p. 241.
48 Ibid., p. 495.
a voice. "In this way if all else is equal, democratic political systems will be, from the point of view of the participants both more effective (participants will be more satisfied with the output of the system) and more legitimate (participants will generally consider the political system to be the proper one per se)."\(^{49}\)

As for Germany, Almond and Verba's hypothesis showed that German citizens who consider themselves competent to participate in the system tended to be more satisfied with a specific governmental output. "And, in general, though the satisfaction with governmental operations is relatively high, the attachment to the system is lower."\(^{50}\) This is evident in the data collected in searching for the relationship between sense of participation and the expression of national pride. It was found that respondents who consider themselves competent to participate have not led to a greater sense of identification with the political system.\(^{51}\) In summarizing attachment to the German political

\(^{49}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 495.\)

\(^{50}\textit{Edinger, op. cit.}, pp. 165-166.\)

\(^{51}\textit{Verba, op. cit.}, p. 46.\)
system, Almond and Verba state that the attachment to the political system is closely related to the ability of the government to satisfy pragmatic needs.\textsuperscript{52}

Political Participation

We have thus far considered the views of Germans about their political system. This analysis has shown that Germans are concerned with the output and performance of their system but do not have a strong sense of attachment. If we switch from how they view their system to what they perceive as their theoretical role and their actual role in politics we can observe again the apolitical pattern of attachment.

First of all we place the individual German in his theoretical role of participation. The role of the citizen participant in Germany had been characterized by scholars as limited and voluntary form of involvement in the making of policy, rather than in the consequences of public policy. The German participant's role is associated with input activities directed toward the satisfaction of domestic political demands and with the conversion of such demands

\textsuperscript{52}Almond and Verba, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 171.
by authoritative agents into system outputs. However, the interaction between constitutional, legal norms and political orientation has produced a participation structure which provide for various roles, but only to a few political actors. There is a large passive majority with only one role, the vote. On the other hand there is a small minority of political actors involved in public affairs who play the game according to themselves without interference from the bulk of the citizens. This small elite is supported and protected in their roles by cultural norms, legal arrangements, and second string players who mediate between the elite and the masses. The bulk of the citizenry accepts the situation because it does not want to interfere with the roles or disapprove of the elites' normal role and goals.\textsuperscript{53}

Turning from the theoretical perspective of the German participant let us now look at the nature of that participation. Voting participation has been quite high--on the average about 80 percent--ranging between 60 to 90 percent depending on the level of the election. Three out of

\textsuperscript{53}Edinger, op. cit., Politics in Germany: Attitudes and Processes, pp. 165-166.
every four years in local, land, and federal elections the electorate is cast into the participant's role. Local and land elections are considered important from the standpoint of national parties and their leaders because these elections demonstrate the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of their policies or positions. However, Verba feels that the high turnout does not mean a high intensity (high level of effective participation in politics) in voting. The interesting characteristic of the German vote is that even though it is high in frequency, it tends to be relatively low in intensity.

The high frequency of voting coupled with the low involvement in the results, is probably an indicator of the relatively passive view of the vote in Germany. Rather than a means of control by non-elites over elites, it is considered more often to be an obligation to be discharged, a duty.54

In a poll taken on voting reported in The Civic Culture Almond and Verba saw that a sizeable percentage of German citizens stated that voting was one of the obligations they owed to their nation. However, the authors noted that many persons stated that their obligation to

54Verba, op. cit., p. 46.
participate in politics was exhausted by fulfillment of their voting obligation. In their analysis of the German's role in participation Almond and Verba found that the individual views himself as a passive participant in terms of fulfilling one's obligations rather than participating in the decision-making process. This was found in data when participants were asked how they would influence the government. Respondents, 13 percent of them, mentioned working through informal organizations rather than participating in formal groups (5 percent). When asked if they took an active role in the organization most respondents said they did not.

In other data assembled by Almond and Verba to reinforce this conclusion that passivity is found in the nature of the participant's obligations to participate few respondents thought the citizen should take an active role in the community. Instead of an active role most respondents stated that an individual should take a passive role in the community. However, if the individual does

55 Almond and Verba, op. cit., p. 129.
56 Ibid., p. 148 see Table VI.3.
take an active role he tries not to exert influence as a
democratic citizen on the government, but acts in defense
of his rights under the law, i.e. "as a subject of a
Rechtsstaat defending his right under the law—rights in
the establishing of which he did not participate as an
influential citizen."57

Another facet of the perception of the citizen's role
towards government can be seen in his view of bureaucrats.
As I have stated before, most Germans feel that political
participation should be left to the "experts" or profession¬
sional bureaucrats who are not only adept at the game but
also highly skilled. This heavy reliance on administrators
and the limited and intermittent role assignments of the
citizens in the participation structure can be seen in the
two different roles an individual can take part in as a
competent citizen in the political culture. "The first
role is the competent citizen: the competent citizen has
a role in the formation of policy whereby he participates
by demanding that the official comply with his demand.
Thus the individual does play a role in the decision-

57 Edinger, op. cit., p. 49.
making of the polity—an influential role." Almond and Verba refer to this role as political competence. "The second role is the subject individual: the individual who does not assume the role of the above individual but is more aware of his rights under the rules than of participating in the making of the rule." This role is referred to as administrative competence.

In Germany the role that is most frequent is administrative competence. This pattern seems to reflect the political history of Germany where the middle class, as mentioned above, accepted the law and order of the German Rechtsstaat. The power and decision-making of the government rested in the hands of the government officials while the citizens remained competent subjects with no political influence. Even though occupation officials attempted to instill democratic political values into the citizenry so that individuals would assume a more politically competent role, the Germans have reverted to the historical tradition.

58Almond and Verba, op. cit., p. 214.
59Ibid., p. 214.
Postwar Attitudes to Social Democratic Party

The next group of attitudes of the postwar electorate which will be examined are those regarding the Social Democratic Party. Kurt Schumacher, the leader of the Social Democratic Party, expected on the strength of mass support to play the role of militant champion of the masses. This expectation was based on his analysis of past experiences, and on his perception of future socio-economic developments. "Time and again he interpreted postwar political developments in terms of developments in the Weimar era, discovering analogous patterns and anticipating that once again the economically destitute and politically disoriented masses would seek a champion to lead them out of chaos."60

However, the political attitudes described above were highly unfavorable for the role of militant tribune. The masses he sought to mobilize against "exploiters" and "reactionaries" had no taste for conflict but only longed for political security and economic recovery. Their

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reaction to the terrible conditions they faced during the postwar years was to leave the past behind and to achieve as quickly as possible economic and social security for themselves. Most West Germans avoided political involvement and collective political action, and especially did not want to follow a charismatic leader after their last experience with one.\textsuperscript{61}

Attitude surveys as well as studies of overt mass behavior indicated that not only were the masses opposed to Schumacher's perception of their role but also to Schumacher's issues. For the most part the people did not believe in the importance of the class struggle, and did not want to take part in the fight against the "reactionary capitalists." Nor did they see a necessity, as Schumacher did, for a fundamental change in property relations in industry, banking, and large scale agriculture which were to be brought about by nationalization. The considerable support for nationalization in the first few years after the war died away as middle class norms were reinforced by gradual economic recovery.\textsuperscript{62} The main reason why these

\textsuperscript{61}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 236-237.

\textsuperscript{62}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 236-238.
ideas of class struggle and nationalization did not become more popular was because they had become associated in popular memory with economic shortages, austerity, and rationing in the early postwar years.63

Other ideas that Schumacher perceived as essential once he had obtained power were also unpopular to a majority of West Germans. Schumacher's fundamental goals such as a democratic socialist state and socialization of all basic industries were negated by a clear majority of respondents.64 Thus if one looks at this evidence it is easy to ascertain why Schumacher failed to receive the mass support required for his bid to power. Schumacher in some ways resembled a stubborn idealist who was hopelessly fighting to attain his goals in the face of insurmountable opposition.

The masses also associated with the Social Democratic Party the image of representing a single interest--the workers.65 If Schumacher was going to win the support of the masses in the post-totalitarian era he would have to

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63Deutsch and Nordlinger, op. cit., p. 360.
64Edinger, op. cit., pp. 237-238.
represent various interests (a people's party not just one. At this time the majority of West Germans associated themselves with middle class norms rather than workers' norms, and thus the image of a "Worker's Party" would not attract the support of those whose Schumacher needed in his obtainment of power.

The last image of the Social Democratic Party which will be examined is its image in the West German's minds as a party which would be able to complete the reunification of Germany through its reunification policy. Reunification was the party's principal campaign issue in the 1953 election and the "connecting link" to its future society. In an opinion poll taken by Noelle and Neumann in August 1953 the question was asked, "What kind of West German government would, in your opinion, stand a better chance of achieving reunification with the Soviet zone--a CDU or a SPD government?" Twenty-one percent of the respondents stated an SPD government, while 30 percent stated a CDU government. The results show that the respondents did not perceive the SPD as a party which would be able to

reunify the country if put in power. Therefore the SPD's inability to be identified as the reunification party even though special emphasis was placed on the issue in the 1953 federal elections can only be seen as a severe setback to the party. For it was the party not the German electorate which perceived its image as a "reunification party."

Summary

In summary, we can say the political culture of Germany during the period of 1949-1953 was very unfavorable for the role Schumacher wanted to play--the role of champion of the masses. In the above material we have looked at not only contemporary political attitudes just after 1949 but also political traditions which are imbedded in the nation's political culture. In the political culture we have further discovered that the individuals' orientation to the political system can be characterized as being a pragmatic orientation. This is a reversal in intensity if compared with the Weimar and Nazi era of intense commitment to political movements. In the period under consideration, the commitment, as I have stated before,
was a detached, practical, and almost cynical commitment to politics. Therefore, since Schumacher interpreted postwar developments (notably his availability of receiving support for a political movement) on his analysis of past experience, his failure to mobilize mass support was inevitable.

Since we have discovered that the public was more interested in the performance of the system the next chapter will deal with the priorities which the public demanded as governmental output. Along with this aim we will find out whether the public in its priorities agreed with either Adenauer's or Schumacher's positions.
Chapter III
The West German's Priorities

In examining the typical German citizen's relationship to the political environment the German individual's attachment to the political system has been analyzed. From such an analysis it was determined that the German individual's attachment to the political system was mainly a pragmatic one in which his satisfaction tends to be with specific outputs. Chapter III will examine the popular priorities in contrast to outputs of the Adenauer government and positions advocated by the leader of the SPD, Kurt Schumacher. Consequently our objective will be to determine whether the public's priorities agreed with Schumacher's policies or the government's.

The first priority of the people to be discussed is the priority of economic recovery. After the war the German people were confronted with numerous economic problems. These problems resulted from the unconditional surrender and the differing economic policies pursued by the Allied occupation authorities. The general economic conditions were one of stagnation, unemployment, inflation and
starvation. Conditions improved but during the period 1949-1953 all were present except the latter.

It is not one of the aims of this chapter to examine in detail the economic conditions which the German people were confronted with. Instead the chapter will show that what the individual was most concerned about was his individual well-being instead of political issues such as reunification and equality. In order to draw such a conclusion we will look at opinion polls which have been collected from the Institut of Demoskopie headed by Elisabeth Noelle and Erich Peter Neumann.

To find out whether economic problems were the most important problem concerning the German people Noelle and Neumann took opinion surveys in various years asking the question: "Which, in your opinion, is the most important question we in West Germany should at present occupy ourselves with?"¹ The results clearly show that economic problems were the most important problems to the German people in 1951, but as the individual's economic well-being

Table III-I

The Public's Most Important Problem

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reunification</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin Problem</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic problems, wages,</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prices, currency</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preservation of peace,</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East-West detente</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social tasks, domestic</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>problems</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European integration</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armaments, disarmament</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nuclear problems</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Termination of war consequences</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other replies</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not know, no reply</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>114</strong></td>
<td><strong>116</strong></td>
<td><strong>113</strong></td>
<td><strong>113</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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began to improve he tended to focus his attention to the political problem of reunification. As is evident by this table such an occurrence did not take effect until July of 1953. The closeness of the Berlin uprising in June of 1953 could be one of the reasons in this upsurge in concern with reunification.

This shift in attention from one's own economic well-being to reunification was reflected in the individual's improvement in the economy and thus satisfaction of the government's efforts can be best demonstrated by the following opinion surveys. The satisfaction with the economy increased during this period from 1949-1953 is evident in the following poll. The question was asked, "If you compare your position with that of last year, are you better off than a year ago or worse off, or would you say there is no difference?"²

Here we find that the results indicate that from 1951 to 1956 the individual felt that his economic position gradually improved rather than worsened. We also find that there is a substantial increase of people who regard

²Ibid., p. 374.
Table III-II
The Public's Satisfaction with Their Standard of Living

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May 1951</th>
<th>May 1952</th>
<th>April 1953</th>
<th>April 1954</th>
<th>June 1956</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Better off....</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worse off.....</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No difference.</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

by percentage

their economic position as no better than the year before.

Inherent in this increasing economic satisfaction appears to be certain changes in politico-economic beliefs which tend to show that coupled with the increased satisfaction of one's economic position is support for the government's policies. Until 1952 the public had preferred a planned economy but as the free economy improved this feeling had reversed itself.

In the period 1947 to 1953, there is also evidence of the support for the government's economic policies which were contested by the opposition in Land and federal campaigns. The respondents in the following poll were given a choice of two possibilities: one, a planned economy and the other a free economy. The possibilities are:

First, always the same prices, a planned economy in which nothing gets more expensive and nothing gets cheaper, but now and then there is nothing available of a product, or you get it only through connections.

Second, sometimes cheap, sometimes expensive. A free economy in which prices fluctuate. You can therefore buy cheaply sometimes but then again sometimes things are expensive.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>July 1953</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>by percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free economy..........</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned Economy......</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided............</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4Ibid., p. 269.
Although there is evidence of support for the government's policies it does not necessarily follow that as the society began to show evidence of economic improvement that the people became satisfied with the government's role in economic recovery. According to James R. Thayer, "Increasing satisfaction with economic circumstances and a predilection for a free economy does not necessarily mean that the respondents are satisfied with the amount of effort being expended by the government for economic recovery."\(^5\) To test general satisfaction Thayer feels that one should test satisfaction with the amount of government effort. The question he raised was this: "Has the government done enough for economic recovery?"\(^6\)

Table III-IV

Satisfaction with Government's Efforts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>June 1953 by percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enough ..................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not enough .............</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not know ...........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^5\)Ibid., p. 269.

\(^6\)Ibid., p. 269.
In the former case of satisfaction with the economy, as a whole, in contrast to personal income satisfaction, W. Phillips Davison states that, "Satisfaction with the economic progress of the country as a whole does not mean that people as individuals are satisfied with the income they are personally receiving. Their attitude toward their personal economic situation seems to depend much more on what they are able to do with the money."\(^7\) For instance, after the currency reform of 1948 when an economic upsurge had taken effect many people stated that their incomes were not sufficient to meet the expenses as they had before the currency reform. According to the Allied occupation authorities this was the result of people having more expenses with more goods on the market. After this period there was an upsurge in personal economic income which helped most people meet the necessary expenses and also have the opportunity to purchase new goods that were available on the market. This new purchasing power of the consumer resulted from government policies and thus greater

satisfaction with the government's policies towards economic recovery.  

What we have just seen is that the most important problem until 1953 to the German people was their economy. As soon as the country started to show evidence of a gradual economic recovery the people became more satisfied with the government's performance. Along these lines there exists a similar line of reasoning: since the individual accepted the values of economic recovery, leaders and their policies who support these values will thus be accepted by the electorate. For the individual when it comes time to decide on which political leader he wants he will tend to vote for the leader who has the better chance of improving the voter's well-being.

It is interesting to note that the German people's preoccupation with their economic well-being during the period of 1949-1953 corresponds with Almond and Verba's hypothesis. It is their hypothesis that the German individual's attachment to the political system was mainly a pragmatic one in which his satisfaction with the system

8Ibid., pp. 286-287.
tends to be with the system's specific outputs. Thus as the economy improved (or specific outputs were guaranteed) the individual's satisfaction with the system improved.

Schumacher and Economic Recovery

After having shown that economic recovery was the most important problem to the individual in German postwar politics I will now look at the Social Democratic priorities in the political environment. For Kurt Schumacher only by free elections in a reunited Germany could the patriotic, democratic, and socialist champions of the people be brought to power. In order to achieve his objective he opposed any action by the occupation authorities which did not submit to his demands for reunification. Schumacher nor most other political leaders could not see that the division of Germany would last. They regarded the political structures imposed on them as only temporary. This temporary situation would later be replaced with structures that were in accordance with German values and developments. It was during this period of transition to a national government that Schumacher hoped to win the "class struggle" by mobilizing the masses. Guided by
the lessons of the past, he viewed the German environment as one that would be faced by prolonged socio-economic instability and political crisis. These economic conditions were not likely to improve until there were thorough-going reforms by a socialist government. Thus reunification was deemed essential in order for the Socialists to win the support of the masses.⁹

Schumacher was convinced that victory for democratic socialism would be confirmed as the result of the economic policies pursued by the bourgeois parties. Ludwig Erhard's policy of free market capitalism was regarded by Schumacher as a policy which would further deteriorate economic conditions to such an extent that there would exist growing social inequities between the rich and the poor.¹⁰ Since the Social Democratic Party had objected to the economic policy pursued by the bourgeois parties they would profit in the coming elections from the people's discontent. Thus the Social Democratic party based its position on principles of socialism and objected to any proposal based


¹⁰Ibid., p. 204.
on principles of the free market economy.

To Schumacher, Erhard's policy supported Schumacher's perception of postwar German politics.

The impact on the mass of people appeared to support his expectation that they would rapidly become proletarized, and that their economic condition would deteriorate in direct relation to the growing wealth of a small group of aggressive entrepreneurs.\(^{11}\)

With this view that the rich would get richer and the poor poorer Schumacher believed that the bourgeois parties seemed to care only for the aggressive entrepreneurs instead of the sacrificing masses. Outraged by the bourgeois parties' social injustice and irresponsible ineptitude, Schumacher was sure that the mass of people supported his sentiments.\(^{12}\)

As we have seen the individual in the postwar environment failed to emerge from his state of political apathy. Schumacher's offer to the masses to lead them from the depths of political apathy failed, for the primary goal that concerned the individual was his own well-being. In Schumacher's mind the people erred in not following him,

\(^{11}\)Ibid., pp. 204-205.

\(^{12}\)Ibid., p. 205.
but we must remember the conditions the individual had to confront in the postwar environment. First of all, the economy suffered from stagnation, and in 1950 unemployment had risen to 12 percent. Allied controls over production in key industries had kept the reconstruction of German industry from becoming a reality and a support for economic recovery. Homes, jobs, security, and opportunity for individuals and families appeared far more important, and so during this difficult economic period the individual was concerned primarily with economic survival. Schumacher's failure was based on his perception of the conditions which existed in postwar Germany for he felt that under these conditions economic recovery could not be achieved. In order for the masses to recover from these deplorable conditions they were to view him as their champion and thus through his leadership reunification and protection of German national interests could be achieved. Along with the attainment of his objectives would be the restoration of the economy under a socialist government.\(^{13}\)

As we shall see Schumacher's prognosis concerning reunification and economic recovery was considered by the majority of West Germans to be a false prediction. Most West Germans felt that their influence in the Four Power Negotiations over Germany was negligible and thus reunification though desired was unattainable. In view of their apathy toward the political environment their only other desire was the satisfaction of their material wants which would occur only by immediate economic programs.

The Other Priorities--Security and Political Recovery

Besides the priority of economic recovery there existed two other priorities which, though deemed lesser in value, were still considered important by the German people. These two priorities are security and political recovery. These two priorities plus the previous priority, economic recovery, are derived from two social values--personal well-being and respectability. They emerged out of the chaos in the transitional society of postwar Germany and became the dominant social values. During the period of 1949 to 1953 the individual in society pursued tasks mainly to improve his personal well-being. Once the
individual had improved his position he expected respect from others in virtue of his having attained such a position. 14

"The attainment of both personal well-being and respectability came more and more to be associated with conformity to the norms established by the Western occupation powers and by those Germans who enjoyed their favor, such as certain religious and business leaders." 15 During the Weimar days cooperation with the West carried a stigma, but cooperation in the postwar period appeared the way to higher material advancement. During this postwar period ideas and concepts correlating to Western types were also accepted by the German people. Ideas such as a European Union were supported, on the average, by six out of ten respondents. 16 Concepts such as "Western democracy," "Christian principles," and "individual enterprise" had a far greater significance than "nationalism," "patriotism,"

15 Ibid., p. 238.
16 Speier and Davison, op. cit., p. 290.
or "democratic socialism." The German people came to admire these goals as proof of the achievement of respectability and security. Thus in order to attain the political and economic security which they desired they maintained the good will of the Western power who had the greatest ability to do so, the United States. As Lewis J. Edinger states in referring to cooperation with the West in order to attain these two goals, "Proper, political behavior came to mean compliance with the wishes of the foreign and domestic leaders who appeared to have the means to apply both negative and positive sanction--above all compliance with the wishes of United States leaders." This desire on the part of the German people outweighed any dissatisfaction with Western policies. This is especially true in relations with the United States for it was seen as the Western power which had the greatest ability to secure political and economic recovery.

In analyzing the voter's perception of Schumacher's

17 Edinger, op. cit., p. 230.
18 Ibid., p. 238.
19 Ibid., p. 238.
policies toward the goals of security and political recovery a description of both Adenauer's policies and Schumacher's will be presented. This is necessary in order for the reader to understand fully the domestic conflict that existed between the government and opposition. A description of both policies concerning security and political recovery will help us understand the voter's perception of both policies.

Adenauer's Concept of Security

The concept of security, as envisioned by Adenauer, relied on the integration of the German Federal Republic into a Western European Union. This aim would furthermore tie the structure and direction of German society to the cultural and political traditions of the Western European Community. Being tied to the West in such a way would hopefully forestall the recurrence of a Nazi or any other totalitarian system of Soviet domination of East and West Germany.20 As Wolfram F. Hanrieder further points out

regarding Adenauer's objective:

This (Adenauer's European Community objective) was to be achieved by making Germany an equal and respected partner of the Western powers and by forging a fundamental and lasting reconciliation with France. In the larger context of world politics, and especially for the purpose of meeting the Communist challenges to the power of the United States in the framework of an Atlantic Alliance.\textsuperscript{21}

To gain this objective Adenauer was willing to risk the possibility that reunification might be possibly deferred and Soviet threats against the Federal Republic would increase.

Another motive for the reason to bind the German Federal Republic (GFR) to the Western European Community, especially in terms of remilitarization, is in the offer to exchange active support for an end to allied controls and the termination of existing limitations on the sovereignty of the Federal Republic. With the granting of its legal independence Adenauer assured the Western powers the new state would participate in an integrative Western Europe. But this sovereignty was a special kind because Adenauer wished to restore the West German

\textsuperscript{21}Ibid, p. 95.
sovereignty through contractual agreements in integrative European organizations.\textsuperscript{22} The price which Adenauer agreed to pay to gain the Federal Republic's sovereignty was the creation of a national military force integrated in a Western European defense establishment. As Adenauer's official biographer noted, Adenauer thought the price of a German military contribution was worth the goal of equality and sovereignty.\textsuperscript{23}

As the result of the cold war polarization of tensions Adenauer used rearmament as a political tool in achieving his foreign policy goals. By 1949 after several years of Cold War tensions both camps had consolidated their spheres of influence considerably. The Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948, the establishment of the Cominform, and Soviet control over Eastern European states had consolidated the East European bloc to such an extent that the response from the West was that there existed a real and immediate Soviet military threat. The Berlin Blockade in 1948 had already shown the need to be prepared

\textsuperscript{22}Ibid., p. 50.

\textsuperscript{23}Paul Weymar, \textit{Adenauer: His Official Biography},
militarily for encounters in which the Soviet Union would be willing to use physical strength. With the outbreak of the Korean War in June, 1950, the West thought that there existed the possibility of Soviet aggression in other portions of the world, especially Germany. To Western leaders, especially to President Truman, the West's inferior strength was evident along the European Iron Curtain. In order to restore the military and political balance of power which was deemed essential for a viable Western defense the rearmament of West Germany, in the Western power's point of view, was considered essential.  

Adenauer and Rearmament

Adenauer, however, did not immediately view rearmament as a crucial instrument. Given his aspirations for the socio-political, cultural, and economic development of German society he had agreed to follow Western policy which had been "the complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany and the elimination of all German industry that could be used for military production."  

24 Hanrieder, op. cit., p. 38.

25 Karl W. Deutsch and Lewis J. Edinger, Germany...
For five years official Western policy in Germany conformed to this principle proclaimed by the "Big Three" at Potsdam in 1945. Adenauer's approval of disarmament and demilitarization was based only on his principle of cooperation with the Western powers. In view of this situation with the occupying powers Adenauer declared that his government was determined to maintain the demilitarization of the Federal territory and to prevent the recreation of armed forces of any kind.

However, Chancellor Adenauer appears to have had strong mental reservations in making this declaration and almost immediately proceeded to suggest to the Western allies a German military contribution for the defense of Western Europe against Soviet attack, in exchange for partial or complete lifting of allied controls over German affairs imposed by the Occupation Statute of 1949.\textsuperscript{26}

In Dec. 1949 Adenauer stated that Germany should contribute to the defense of Europe.\textsuperscript{27} This statement brought forth a


\textsuperscript{26}Ibid., p. 162.

\textsuperscript{27}Weymar, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 309-310.
large amount of criticism by the opposition and the public, but Adenauer was not only launching a trial balloon to the public but also to other Western leaders.28

In his argument for a German defense contribution Adenauer maintained that the role of the Federal Republic could be one of a trusted ally who would play a crucial role in a possible future conflict between the NATO powers and the Soviet Union. He also cited the growing Soviet troop concentrations in the Soviet zone and in Eastern European countries suggesting that the force goals from the Lisbon conference which had not been met could be shored up by the Federal Republic forces; and finally he stated that the Western powers needed the loyal support of the people of the German Federal Republic who would be willing to help with their resources to repel an attack from the East.29

28Deutsch and Edinger, op. cit., p. 162.

29C.G.D. Onslow, "West German Armament," World Politics III-4 (July 1951), p. 453. At a 1952 meeting held in Lisbon the NATO powers decided on the number of conventional forces which would reinforce the tactical nuclear threat. The force goals mentioned above were a total of 96 divisions, 25 to 30 being battle ready.
Adenauer's arguments for a German military contribution to the defense of Western Europe against Communist attack were given support by the North Korean attack on South Korea in 1950. Particularly the United States felt that this was a warning that either the Soviet Union or its East German satellite, which had a people's militia of some 50,000 to 80,000 trained soldiers, might invade the Federal Republic. The forces in Western Europe were weakened by the Korean conflict because various elements of the Allied defense were diverted to Korea. This weakened position left West Germany, Adenauer felt, exposed to Communist attack.

As a result of this in August, 1950, he suggested to the Western Allies the formation of a "special force of German volunteers" as the same size and strength as the "peoples militia" in the Eastern zone. He coupled this appeal with the renewed suggestion that the Federal Republic might make a sizeable contribution to a European army in return for an end to allied controls and complete equality within such a defense arrangement.

On the urging of the United States government British and French government leaders were asked to agree to the

30Deutsch and Edinger, op. cit., p. 163.
31Ibid., p. 164.
inclusion of ten German divisions in the NATO forces in Europe. The French refused to accept such an idea for it would mean accepting the creation of an independent German army. Overall the Western powers (excluding France) at this point felt that there should be a rearming of West Germany in the context of a Western defense system. The Western powers viewed rearmament of the German Federal Republic not only as a means by which a viable defense system could be maintained but through rearmament the security and political recovery of the GFR in the Western camp could be guaranteed. In order for the GFR to complete such an agreement it was restored to full sovereignty, which had been limited by the Occupation Statute. Germany then agreed to sign the contractual agreement binding its sovereignty to the integrative Western defense system.\(^32\)

The problem which faced many members of NATO, however, was how the West German contingents were to be included in the Western defense establishment. This is where the psychological attitude of the Allies towards the Germans played an important role--the French continued to regard

\(^{32}\)Hanrieder, op. cit., pp. 82-83.
the Germans with suspicion and were very apprehensive about the rearmament of the GFR. Consequently, France proposed the Pleven Plan for the establishment of a European Defense Community.

The Pleven Plan called for the integration of national contingents which would not only extend European integration but reassure the Americans that Europeans were aware of the need for a European defense system. The German contingents were to be less than a division and totally integrated into this supranational army. This Pleven Plan for a European Defense Community (ECD), however, was not based on how the West Germans could contribute to a Western defense system but more on France's fear of a revival of German revanchism and militarism. Such a conclusion can be raised if one looks at the results of the negotiations --twelve German divisions within a European national army but the Federal Republic would not become a true member of NATO, only a defacto member, since EDC would become part of NATO and NATO would be extended to cover EDC territory.

On May 27, 1952 the EDC treaty was signed by the Federal Republic, Italy, France, and the Benelux countries.
Chancellor Adenauer was displeased with the treaty in that he thought the Western statesmen could have found a better solution to the Federal Republic's integration into the Western defense system. But the rearmament of the GFR was the connecting piece for achieving his policy goals of security, political, and economic recovery, and supposedly reunification.

In the following years Adenauer's rearmament plan was a highly contested issue in the German Bundestag until the spring of 1953 when it was ratified. Ratification was due mainly to the majority Adenauer maintained with his coalition parties over the "strong" opposition of the Social Democrats.

The Social Democratic Party and Rearmament

The Social Democratic Party was vigorously opposed to rearmament for it knew what the consequences would be if this foreign policy project was put into effect. The many heated debates that arose out of the Bundestag derived from each side's insight that this project would not only have fundamental implications for domestic policy but also the future course of German society. The SPD objections to rearmament in a Western defense system relied

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on four major points:

1) It would render unification more difficult, if not impossible, by attaching West Germany too closely to one of the Cold War camps, 2) it would increase world tensions and antagonize the Soviet Union without substantially improving the Western defense posture, 3) it was dangerous for the fledgling German democracy because it would bring to the fore militarist elements and other objectionable remnants of the old order, and finally, 4) it paved the way to Germany's integration in a Western European group that threatened to split free Europe and showed conservative-clerical tendencies.33

Though the SPD objected to rearmament according to Adenauer's plan, it did not reject the idea of a German defense contribution. To Schumacher the problem with Adenauer's approach was the timing of German rearmament and the conditions in which Germany would rearm. In 1950 Dr. Schumacher explained that the issue was not between rearmament and pacifism, but the conditions under which rearmament would be adopted.34

33Ibid., pp. 101-102.

The conditions under which Germany should be rearmed were as follows: (1) Germany should be a free and equal partner of the Allies. Here the SPD stated that if Germany was to become part of a European defense force but not NATO it would result in the reduction of German military contingents to the status of foreign legionnaires.\(^{35}\) The Socialists also opposed rearmament without full sovereignty. They felt that by virtue of the occupation the Western powers had undertaken the responsibility for Germany's defense. Their reasoning was since "the rights of occupation necessarily implied obligations of defense and as long as West Germany had not regained full sovereignty they were unwilling to concede that Germany should contribute to the Western defense effort.\(^{36}\) (2) West Germany should not be used as a front line area in the defense of Western Europe. The SPD stated here that the EDC did not guarantee Germany's security in view of unsettled political conditions


\(^{36}\)Hanrieder, *op. cit.*, p. 102.
in Western Europe. Instead it raised the somber prospect of an application of scorched earth tactics being used in the German area in the event of an Allied withdrawal.  

(3) Acceptance of the EDC would bring a danger to the new democracy in restoring the old military elite. Thus Schumacher demanded new elections before any action was taken on this issue. It was argued by the SPD leadership that because "democracy means decisions on vital national questions by the people" any attempt to deprive the people of such rights constituted a threat to democracy. Schumacher stated that the EDC constituted a threat to the principles of democracy. He felt that to leave decisions on questions of vital national interests to a "foreigner," i.e., the Supreme Commander of NATO, was anti-democratic. Thus the internationalism inherent in the projected EDC was held by the SPD to be incompatible with requirements of popular sovereignty.

The Dortmund Conference of the SPD of 1952 defined

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more precisely the SPD's conditions for agreeing to rearma-
ment. They were:

1) That no effort be made to set up a
European security system within the framework
of the United Nations.

2) That the efforts to achieve German
reunification be just as strongly continued.

3) That the treaties requiring military
obligations of the Federal Republic could be
dissolved by the Federal government if these
were found to hinder the reunification of
Germany and such treaties should not be bind-
ing on a future government of a reunited
Germany.

4) That all participants are equal and
receive equal treatment so far as defense
measures are concerned. 40

Inconsistencies in SPD's Policy

The SPD's vociferous position towards reararmament con-
tained many ambiguities or inconsistencies which in turn
were exploited by its opponents as being inadequate
positions on foreign policy projects. Wolfram F. Han-
rieder in West German Foreign Policy 1949-1963 states these
inconsistencies. The first ambiguous position deals with
SPD's objections to a second class status for Germany in
a European defense arrangement. Hanrieder feels that "by

40 Childs, op. cit., p. 119.
constantly reiterating their objections to a second class status for Germany in a European defense arrangement, the Socialists intimidated that they were willing to consent to rearmament if only German sovereignty and equality were restored in the process."\(^4\) This position, if Hanrieder is correct, merely echoed the government's long standing policy and strengthened Adenauer's hand in both domestic and international politics.\(^5\)

The second ambiguous position, according to Hanrieder's point of view, basically can be narrowed down to the difference in interpreting the Soviet threat. As Hanrieder states, "While the Socialists showed a keen appreciation of power when it came to pointing out that the Soviet Union could not be expecting to consent to unification on Western terms, they constantly denied the importance of a West German military contribution to the Western defense effort."\(^6\) The SPD position was focused on the neutralization of a united democratic socialist state in the

\(^4\) Hanrieder, *op. cit.*, p. 104.
framework of a European collective security system. This assumption was based on the perception that the Soviet Union would willingly permit the unification of Germany on the basis of democratic principles. Thus the Socialists' interpretation of the Soviet "treat" or "menace" is quite different from the conservative thinking of the Christian Democrats. Even though both the SPD and the CDU/CSU assumed that the Soviet Union's ambition was world domination, the CDU and Adenauer saw the threat more as a military threat while the Social Democrats were more aware of the ideological, social, and economic nature of the challenge. While Adenauer was a protagonist of Politik der Starke or negotiating from a position of military strength the SPD on the other hand felt that the West might outflank itself by neglecting the economic and social conditions.44 In the 1948 defense statement by the SPD Kurt Schumacher declared: "The most effective political defense against totalitarianism is the introduction of progressive social and political parties in West Germany."45 Schumacher's

44Childs, op. cit., p. 118.
position did recognize the military aspect of the Soviet confrontation with the West but to a greater extent emphasized the social-political and economic aspect of this confrontation.

The position held by the Socialists was not very convincing considering the political reality pictured at this time. These were: (1) The German people were extremely afraid of the Soviet Union and thus looked to the United States, the most powerful nation in the West for support; (2) the Western powers adamantly insisted on West German rearmament; and (3) the extreme unwillingness of the Soviet Union to seek a democratic united Germany. As Hanrieder points out while the West was insisting on rearmament the Socialists were tirelessly stressing its damaging effect on the chances for reunification.

The third and final ambiguous position held by the Social Democrats according to Hanrieder was their inefficient attitude on defense matters. According to Hanrieder, "The Socialists seemed oblivious to military-strategic calculations, and throughout the debate on rearmament their criticism had a somewhat shrill unreal quality. They casted the government as a willing dupe of
the Western powers, and posed rather simplistically as the only champions of unification.\textsuperscript{46} Hanrieder is correct in pointing out the "unreal quality" of the SPD criticism. A contradiction which primarily stands out in their defense thinking is the view that the military forces best capable of defending the existing state should be rejected because they are militarists. The mode of thought in the Social Democratic camp at this time was still Marxist and thus the image of the West and Adenauer and his supporters were perceived as the petty bourgeois capitalists in the class struggle. Also inherent in their attitude was their belief that only the Social Democrats represented the true interests of the German people.

Social Democrat's Position on Rearmament and Public Opinion

The people's reaction to Schumacher's and the SPD's position on rearmament will be determined by the use of data available in public opinion polls. These data show that most Germans opposed the decision to create a national military establishment. The reason why they viewed

\textsuperscript{46}Hanrieder, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 104.
rearmament without enthusiasm resulted from the sobering experiences of World War II and Allied Occupation policies which helped eradicate physical and psychological remnants of militarism.

Within five years, however, the Western powers and the Adenauer government announced the decision to rearm and to integrate into a Western defense system. This quick change was viewed with a great deal of cynicism. As the military encounter between East and West came closer in the minds of the Germans to being reality this unenthusiastic, this cynical spirit was channelled into a popular political slogan referred to as "ohne mich"--without me. 47

As an issue, rearmament ranked high on the list of chief concerns for the individual. "It did not compare in urgency with reunification and economic questions but several polls have indicated that rearmament was one of the most pressing problems." 48 About 40 percent of the population in 1950 and 1951 opposed rearmament, and in a survey taken in January, 1953 almost 80 percent of respondents


48Speier and Davison, op. cit., p. 294.
agreed with the SPD that the decision to rearm should have been subject to a plebiscite. In a poll taken by Noelle and Newmann in March 1953 the question was asked, "Are you in favor of or against our making a military contribution within the framework of the EDC?" 

Table III-V
Public Opinion on Rearmament in 1953

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In favor</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These data seem to indicate that the climate of opinion, the cynicism and lack of enthusiasm towards rearmament, could have provided the Socialists with political opportunities which might have led to greater support. Throughout the period (1950-1953), polls always recorded more opponents than supporters of any German troop contribution to a Western European defense force, but the levels of both support and

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49 Hanrieder, op. cit., p. 105.

50 Noelle and Neumann, op. cit., p. 436.
opposition usually remained below those for or against an independent German army. 51

"But the objections to rearmament although widespread, were constantly counteracted by practical considerations." 52

The government, especially in the electoral campaign of 1953, stressed that rearmament was the prerequisite for these practical considerations--political and economic recovery.

Thus the practical and immediate requirements of economic reconstruction, the desire for an adequate standard of living after years of deprivation, the gains promised in return for collaborating with the Western powers--in short, the recognition that the government's policy showed a way to stability, recovery, and international "respectability"--made opposition to rearmament an essentially emotional issue that had to face a daily test against expediency and the hope for normalcy. 53

Even though public opinion polls from November 1950 to June 1956 showed an increase in support for rearmament there still existed a substantial opposition. The problem with this opposition was that, first, it lacked an effective political representation at the seat of power in the

52 Hanrieder, op. cit., p. 106.
53 Ibid., p. 106.
Bundestag, and, second, this opposition was so dispersed that it was impossible to coordinate it.\(^54\)

In summation of the effect of domestic public opinion one point is remarkably clear. Adenauer's negotiations with the Western Powers demonstrated the independence of German foreign policy decision makers from the influence of domestic public opinion.\(^55\) Foreign policy makers had a great deal of leeway as far as domestic opinion is concerned because of the political tradition of relying on experts. If the opposition had been more serious in terms of influence in the decision-making process, Adenauer's independence would have been severely limited in his negotiations with the West.

Adenauer and Reunification

While rearmament was the essential connecting piece for Adenauer's foreign policy goal of Western European integration, the SPD believed that rearmament was fundamentally incompatible with its major foreign policy goal


\(^55\)Deutsch and Edinger, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 177.
of reunification. Under the Adenauer government the goal of reunification was pursued through a policy of strength. Unification he felt could not be achieved until the German Federal Republic had integrated into the Western Alliance. In aligning itself with the Western the GFR would possess with the help of the Western powers the required strength to achieve unification of the divided Germany. Unification would be achieved by pursuing a "policy of strength" with the help of the West in forcing the Soviet Union to release its hold over the Soviet zone of Germany. To Adenauer "rearmament" would be the link in which the Federal Republic would increase the leverage of its position. This increased position would create conditions which would make unification possible.

Adenauer also acknowledged that German unity depended in the last analysis upon agreement of the leaders of both Cold War blocs—the Soviet Union and the United States.

Chancellor Adenauer and his supporters have taken the position that the best means of obtaining such an agreement consists in inducing the Western leaders—and United

56Hanrieder, op. cit., p. 126.
States leaders in particular--to adopt this German national objectives as their own, and to treat it as more important than any other United States interest that might conceivably be served by an American-Soviet settlement on other issues. 57

However, to gain Western support, Adenauer believed that the GFR should convince the Western leaders of Germany's commitment to the Western alliance. The only means he saw applicable in earning support for his goal was by taking the leadership in the movement for a European union. Through these means the Chancellor hoped to convince the leaders of the world that Germany posed no threat to the world and that any settlement of differences between the East and West would have to include the unification of Germany.

Adenauer's "policy of strength" was thought by many to be a contradiction in goals. How could one reunify Germany as well as regain former German territories if one integrated into the Western alliance with rearmament as a consequence of integration? This is especially the case if one acknowledges that in the last analysis agreement of both super powers is essential in order for reunification

57Deutsch and Edinger, op. cit., p. 180.
to take place. This is the debate which raged between government and opposition in the Bundestag over foreign policy goals, and also within Adenauer's own party, the CDU.

The SPD and Reunification

The contradiction of reunification and rearment was the major theme which the SPD stressed in its appeal for the voter's support. The Social Democratic Party from 1949 to the middle 1950's consequently ran a single issue campaign of reunification. The single-mindedness of the SPD's commitment provided the cue to all of their responses to foreign policy questions, and the Socialists in effect staked the political future of their party on the outcome of the domestic debate on unification and rearment.

There existed three principal reasons why the Socialists preoccupied themselves with this determined quest for reunification. First, the SPD party before 1933 had drawn considerable support from the Protestant and Prussia areas of northern and eastern Germany. As a result of the

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58 Hanrieder, op. cit., p. 129.
59 Ibid., p. 129.
60 Ibid., p. 100.
division of Germany many SPD observers and officials felt that the severance of traditional bases of political strength considerably weakened the party. Second, a large number of SPD members originally came from east of the Elbe or had relatives and friends there. These ties produced a greater concern in the SPD for their compatriots' fate than in other parties. Third, the Socialists rejected the prospect of a Western European Union. They had little hope that the principles of democratic socialism would survive in a WEU advocated by Adenauer. The SPD in turn proposed a central European collective security system that would foster a relaxation of tensions by lifting Germany from the grasp of both Cold War camps.

The Socialists fear of participating in Adenauer's grand scheme of a formation of a European Union, which the Socialists perceived was chiefly Catholic ultramontanist, was strengthened by historical experiences. In the Weimar period the extreme right had accused the SPD of being too

\(^{61}\) Ibid., p. 100.

\(^{62}\) Ibid., pp. 100-101.

\(^{63}\) Ibid., p. 100.
"internationalist." In order to prevent such an attack in the postwar period the leaders of the SPD adopted an attitude coined by Alfred Grosser--"preventive nationalism." This preventive nationalism led to a highly critical attitude toward the occupying powers and the conciliatory integrationalist program of Konrad Adenauer.

In their quest for a united Germany the Social Democrats felt that German national interests would be better served if ties forged by Adenauer with the West were loosened in order to diminish Soviet opposition to reunification. The severance of military bonds would especially diminish Soviet opposition to reunification because otherwise the Social Democrats felt the Soviet leaders would fear a resurgent military power allied to the West. Because both super powers were security conscious, suspecting a reunited Germany would join their opponent's bloc, the Socialists felt a reunited Germany should be established in a European collective security system. In this security system Germany could not align to either bloc and thus would be a

neutralized, unified country.

The Socialists did agree with the CDU and Adenauer that unification should be achieved only through peaceful means and the only acceptable political order was a democracy. The SPD, however, did not agree with Adenauer's policy of strength, and furthermore chastised the government for its inability to present proposals and for letting opportunities for negotiations pass by. The SPD assumed that when the Soviet Union presented a proposal it was always acting in good faith. Because of this belief the SPD frequently accused the Adenauer government of having no interest in reunification.

Adenauer rejected the SPD means to secure the goal of reunification and he remained steadfast on his policy of strength.

He felt that the Federal Republic simply could not afford to engage in such an uncertain political adventure. Western support would have been lacking; he was afraid of a rekindling German nationalism and neutrality did not appear to be a feasible alternative to his policy of firm integration to the West.65

Public Opinion and Reunification

Most West Germans regarded unification as the single most important problem concerning their foreign policy. But in contrast to the immediate economic and political benefits of the government's pro-Western policy, the question of unification took on increasingly abstract dimensions. Although most economic and political groups professed their commitment to reunification the issue had no effective political representation. The electorate became aware that in the international system unification was incompatible with political and economic recovery. West Germans were asked to choose between security and unification, or between existing political and economic life and unification, or loss of democratic freedoms for unification. The further the West Germans progressed in their new state politically and economically the harder it was to pursue a policy of reunification.

As Wolfram F. Hanrieder states:

66 Hanrieder, op. cit., p. 130.
67 Ibid., p. 129.
68 Ibid., p. 129.
Even if a large number of West Germans had been willing to choose a determined pursuit of unification, the daily realities of political and economic life worked against it. In addition to suffering because of the forbidding circumstances of the international system, the cause of unification was undergoing a constant process of attrition on the domestic political scene.69

The first poll which will be presented shows that most West Germans eventually believed that the country would be reunified. They knew it would not occur immediately but as the international tensions over Germany lessened they foresaw the possibility of such an action being taken.70

Note in this survey that a growing number of respondents were confident that reunification is inevitable. In 1954 one-half of the respondents believed that peaceful reunification would take place within a few years.

The lack of agreement between the Socialists and the Christian Democrats on the priority of foreign policy goals is reflected in public opinion surveys. Confronted with the question of what would be more important, security from the Russians or unification of Germany, we find that one-half wanted security while one-third were for

69Ibid., p. 130.
70Ibid., p. 130.
Table III-VI

The Possibility of Reunification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jan. 1952</th>
<th>Feb. 1954</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>by percentage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In my opinion Germany will be reunited by peaceful means within the next 12 months........</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think it is very likely that we shall be reunited with the Soviet zone by peaceful means, but it will probably take years</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel there is no prospect of Germany being reunited by peaceful means.......................</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other or no reply.......................</td>
<td>5/100</td>
<td>9/100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

unification and the rest undecided. This is evident in the following survey question: "What, if you had to decide, what would be more important to you--safety from the Russians or the unity of Germany?"\(^{72}\)

A breakdown by party preference of response to this

\(^{71}\)Noelle and Neumann, *op. cit.*, p. 461.

\(^{72}\)Ibid., p. 462.
question presented the pattern shown in Table III-VIII.\textsuperscript{73}

Table III-VII

Unity or Security?
by percentage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>July 1952</th>
<th>July 1953</th>
<th>October 1954</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Safety</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table III-VIII

Unity of Security--By Parties
by percentage

Parties of Voters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>More Important</th>
<th>CDU</th>
<th>FDP</th>
<th>SPD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security vis-a-vis Russia</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity of Germany</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided, don't know</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{73}Hanrieder, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 260.
The "balance" within the SPD supporters (that is, the equal division of opinion) underlines the dilemma the party faced in the ranking of priorities by the reunification party. This "balance" will be explored in the following chapter.

In surveying attitudes towards the sacrificing of other concerns for reunification, Hans Speier and W. Phillips Davison found that even though most West Germans are in favor of reunification (nine out of ten) relatively few were willing to sacrifice their form of government, their economic system, their peaceful existence or their security. Most people were willing to pay some price in order to achieve reunification, but few were willing to pay what they felt was an exorbitant price. These exorbitant prices were: (1) taking the East German leaders into an all-German government; (2) adopting the East German economic system; (3) communism winning a substantial influence in a reunited Germany; and (4) West Germany renouncing her claim to the Eastern territories. West Germans only asked that the price for reunification be within reason and the price should not compromise or endanger their current system which maintained prosperity.
and their freedom. Thus the security-reunification dilemma was only a dilemma for the Social Democrats, but to the majority of the people it was no dilemma at all for unification would not be chosen because an exorbitant price was asked for it.

Adenauer's preference for the Western powers especially for the United States was not immediately accepted by the public because of the bitter impressions made by the Western powers during the first few years of the occupation policy. Later, because of American help in economic recovery such as the currency reform, and Marshall Plan aid there was a change in the public attitude. There existed also another basis for the Western preference--fear of the Soviet Union.

As is evident in the following public opinion surveys most respondents indicated a preference for the West based on the fear of the Soviet Union. First, an illustration in the following poll showed that in most disagreements

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74 Speier and Davison, op. cit., pp. 191-192.

75 Henry J. Kellermann, "Party Leaders and Foreign Policy" in West German Leadership and Foreign Policy, by W. Phillips Davison and Hans Speier, p. 66.
between East and West most people sided with the West. 76
DIVO asked: "Which country was more often right in East-
West disputes, America or Russia?" 50 percent stated America;
3 percent stated Russia; and 30 percent expressed neither
or expressed no opinion. 77
The fear of the Soviet Union was coupled with the ex-
ppectation that war would break out and that Germany would
be attacked. Thus the German individual felt that in
order to allay his fears of Soviet attack the Federal Re-
public should align itself with the West. 78 The following
data indicated this preference for the West and fear of
the Soviets. DIVO found that "since 1948 a majority of
respondents have almost always opposed withdrawal of
Western military forces from Germany (unless some other
military guarantee were given) because of fear of the
Soviets." 79 In 1952 when asked if they felt threatened by

76 Speier and Davison, Trends in West German Public
77 Ibid., p. 287.
78 Ibid., p. 280.
79 Ibid., p. 280.
the Russians two-thirds stated they felt threatened, while only 15 percent said they did not. With this fear of the Soviets was also the fear of war. From 1946-1949, 50 percent of the population expected a world war to break within ten years. This fear rose even higher at the outbreak of the Korean War. What war would mean to each individual if it came was reflected in the following poll taken in 1954: (1) two-thirds of the West German respondents thought if war came they would be threatened, and (2) 1 out of 10 mentioned atomic war as something he was most worried about.

In 1952 and 1953, the United States was the most popular of the occupation powers. Friendship with the U.S. was one of the accepted aims of German foreign policy. "Political leaders who a few years earlier would have thought twice before associating themselves with American policy now felt free to express solidarity with and gratitude to the United States in public as well as private." 82

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80 Ibid., p. 280.
81 Ibid., p. 280.
82 Kellermann, op. cit., p. 66.
statement reflected the attitude and actions of most Christian Democrats and Free Democrats. On the other hand, the Social Democratic Party viewed the Americans and their policy towards West Germany as weighted in support of Adenauer's party since the CDU policy was for greater ties to the West. SPD leaders never fully dropped their guard in dealing with American officials and continued to suspect the Americans for: (1) a bias towards the upper middle class, industry and the bureaucracy; (2) the support of reactionary forces in order to gain support for the United States rearmament policy, which was at the expense of the lower and middle class.83

Though the SPD leaders may have misperceived true American intentions their suspicion that American policy was weighted in favor of the Christian Democrats is correct. For in 1953 prior to the German federal elections U.S. officials, notably John Foster Dulles, issued statements to the German public that there would be grave consequences if Adenauer was not re-elected. In spite of this sympathetic stance toward the CDU/CSU a modus vivendi was

83Ibid., p. 61.
achieved between SPD and United States representatives after the election of 1953. These pro-Adenauer statements will be further described in the following chapter when we discuss the election of 1953.

Summary

Let us now summarize the main points of the preceding analysis concerning the West German parties and the public's priorities. In the first section we analyzed the most important problem concerning the German people during 1949-1953--their economy. In looking at opinion surveys during this period we noted that (1) the individual felt that his economic position gradually improved rather than worsened; (2) as the government showed evidence of gradual economic recovery the people became more satisfied with its policies and efforts in solving the problem; and (3) when the individual's economic well-being began to improve he tended to focus his attention on political problems such as reunification. This section showed that the most important problem, or first priority for the German people, was their economic revitalization. Only until evidence was shown of economic recovery did the people shift their
attention to political problems.

Schumacher's prognosis of the economic condition of the new West German state was that it would be faced by prolonged instability. The economic policies pursued by the governing bourgeois parties would deteriorate economic conditions to such an extent that the Social Democratic Party would profit from the people's discontent. Thus the only foreseeable solution for the economic chaos would be the restoration of a socialist government under Schumacher's leadership. As time elapsed, this prognosis became increasingly invalid.

After the first priority, economic recovery, there existed two other priorities, security and political recovery. Even though these priorities were deemed lesser in value they were still considered important by the German people. The task of this section was to analyze Schumacher's and Adenauer's policies toward the goals of security and political recovery. Consequently by assessing the public's attitudes toward these goals we determined whether the West German public agreed or disagreed with Schumacher's policies.

The conclusions derived by analyzing Adenauer's and
Schumacher's concepts of political recovery and security were (1) that both parties had different conceptual images concerning the two priorities, security and political recovery; (2) that each party's concepts were perceived by the opposing party to be in direct contradiction with its concepts; (3) the public was presented with not only a choice concerning the two policies but with a choice of what social order would prevail in the Federal Republic; and (4) although most West Germans professed a commitment to Schumacher's foreign policy goal (reunification) they were not willing to sacrifice their security or their peaceful existence in order to attain it. The people were aware that Adenauer's foreign policy was making progress—especially in the areas of economic and political recovery, and in order for the success in these areas to continue, Adenauer's concepts had to be accepted by the public.
Chapter IV
The Election of 1953

In this chapter the Social Democratic Party's attempt to obtain control of the government in the election of 1953 will be analyzed. For the Social Democratic Party the 1953 election was a test of the party's strategy of opposition. They hoped that the voter would perceive the SPD as a political force which was trying to prevent the adoption of measures in the Bundestag which it believed were fatal to the nation.

The first objective of this chapter is to analyze why the party, in view of Schumacher's death and his replacement by Erich Ollenhauer saw a need for a restatement of the party's basic policies for the coming 1953 federal elections. The second objective will be to give a brief description of the international and domestic events which occurred and influenced not only the SPD's positions but also the outcome of the election. The third objective will be to look at the consequences of the 1953 election campaign. In analyzing the outcome the major emphasis will
be in the analysis of the reasons for the defeat of the SPD.

The SPD after Schumacher's Death

Events occurred during this election year which influenced the current of opinion either toward the coalition government or to its opposition. The first major event which affected the Social Democratic Party was the death of its leader, Kurt Schumacher, on August 20, 1952. In another party there may have existed a succession crisis and the possibility that party policy would move in a new direction. But in the SPD as a result of Schumacher's monocratic leadership the party lacked the flexibility demanded by this new situation. There still existed individuals who were outspoken toward different directions in party policy such as Ernst Reuter, Wilhelm Kaisen and Paul Loebe, but the commitment to Schumacher's strategy still prevailed. Thus there was no succession crisis, and no new line in policy after Schumacher's death.

During the post-war years Schumacher was associated with a group of individuals who worked in close cooperation with him. They quickly became known as Schumacher's lieutenants. His successor, Erich Ollenhauer, who was
Schumacher's deputy, came from this group. Erich Ollenhauer was born on March 27, 1901. For eighteen years he was editor of the Magdeburg newspaper, the People's Voice. His first important position in the SPD was as secretary in the executive committee of the Socialist Worker's Youth Community. From 1933 to his death he was a member of the executive board of the SPD. In 1933 he was one of the members of the executive committee designated to emigrate in view of the changing political scene, and in May he and a few other chief SPD members emigrated to Prague. When Hitler overtook Czechoslovakia these SPD leaders then fled to Paris. When Paris became unsafe they escaped to London where they sat out the rest of the war. In 1946, Ollenhauer and his fellow SPD emigrees were allowed to return to Germany to help reorganize the SPD. He quickly became Schumacher's deputy and later was elected vice-chairman.¹

When Schumacher died, Ollenhauer as vice chairman was the logical successor. He was suitable to the majority of members not only because he would not change the direction

the party was moving, but also because he believed in the principles laid down by the former party leader. Thus on December 29, 1952 in the Dortmund Party Congress, approximately four months after Kurt Schumacher's death, Erich Ollenhauer was elected by his party members to succeed him.

As chairman Ollenhauer proved to be a faithful executor of Schumacher's policies, and for almost a decade held the party to the rigid opposition course which Schumacher had established in 1947. But even though he remained steadfast in his belief in Schumacher's policies the style of the party changed abruptly. While Schumacher was a fiery orator whose uncompromising political fights were derived from his self perception as champion of the masses, Ollenhauer lacked the fire and sharpness and set himself more as an honest party official. Thus the old international and pacifistic tendencies of the party functionaries won a stronger influence in the ranks of the SPD.

The Dortmund Party Congress in which Ollenhauer was elected chairman is notable in that in preparation for the 1953 elections, which were a little less than a year away, the party leaders decided to issue an
"Aktionsprogramm." This "Aktionsprogramm" listed the demands that formed the basic policies of the party.2

The demands for a program had been raised in previous conventions but Schumacher had insisted that the time for a new program was not ripe since the party was in a stage of transition where new programs would be senseless. As the result of Schumacher's death the party congress felt that a restatement of the party's basic policies was necessary for the coming elections of 1953. This "Aktionsprogramm" differed from other party programs in that it was a temporary substitute for the Grundsatzprogramm, "which would later provide the more basic analysis on which these demands would presumably be founded."3

The "Aktionsprogramm," however, did not provide for a new direction in policy away from Schumacher's policies. It was just a restatement of Schumacher's policies and nothing else. Douglas Chalmers in his book, The Social Democratic Party of Germany, refers to the "Aktionsprogramm"


3Ibid., p. 57.
as containing no startling proposition and was filled with value language in so far as it discussed important questions. Chalmers further states:

It bears the marks of the period in which it was written--disappointment that the workings of change had forced the party into opposition, but optimistic enough about the future (based on the tide of opposition to the Adenauer regime that had swept the country in 1950-51 as a reaction to the government's tentative steps toward rearmament) to maintain aggressively that it had been right all along.

There was little debate on the 1952 "Aktionsprogramme" either during or prior to the party convention itself. The "Aktionsprogramm" was a project mostly drawn up by party experts and was rarely absorbed by most party members. "The manner of drawing up the program evoked numerous complaints about the party's reliance on 'experts' who usurped the members right to make party decisions." The reason for these complaints stemmed from the length of the program, which was sixty pages and included an explanatory handbook.

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4 Ibid., p. 57.
5 Ibid., p. 58.
6 Ibid., p. 58.
Before we examine the events of the election campaign of 1953 let us examine both the SPD's and the CDU's election programs. These programs are usually composed at an election congress and then introduced to the public as the introduction to their campaign. Whereas the SPD followed such a pattern the CDU under Adenauer relied on the Chancellor's choice of issues he wished to focus on. In April Adenauer had already decided what his program would be. It was based on three simple points: prosperity, security, and no experiments.

Prosperity could be spelled out in detail; industrial and agricultural output doubled in three years, nearly half a million new homes being built each year, new jobs provided for two and half million refugees, a strong currency and rising living standards. Security was represented by the growing friendship with the Western democracies, and the Federal Republic's prospective place in the European Defense Community. "No experiments" was a useful slogan, and Adenauer judged the psychology of the electorate correctly. Things were going well for the man in the street, and he knew it. 7

In the campaign of 1953 after almost four years of fundamental opposition to Adenauer's program the Social

Democratic Party felt that the deciding issue was whether the electorate wanted rearmament or reunification. Though other divergencies of opinion existed between Social Democrats and Christian Democrats, the rearmament-reunification issue was an issue which would either aid or hurt them.

Events influenced SPD members into thinking that unification was imminent. "Stalin's death, the Berlin riots of June 17, 1953, and other intra-party struggles in the Soviet Union strengthened the belief of some SPD leaders that the time for negotiation and unification had actually arrived." Furthermore the attack against the European Defense Treaty had begun in 1952. If this treaty was passed, Adenauer's adhesion to the West would be completed and the chance that reunification would become reality would be more unlikely.

The Social Democrats had long believed that a united Germany might put them in a position where they would be a majority party. This would be brought about with the support of a Socialist Berlin and a "Red Saxony." The

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SPD alleged that this was the reason for Adenauer's personal opposition to reunification. "This taunt nettled the Chancellor, for which he then stated that, 'I would rather have a united Germany with an SPD government than a rump Western Germany with a CDU coalition.' In other speeches Adenauer stated that any proposals such as the SPD's for a neutral united Germany were unacceptable. Unification would only be on his own terms.

Although the Social Democrats agreed to exploit the rearmament-reunification issue, party leaders did not agree that this was the principal issue of the election. Some members did not object to rearmament, and this made the party appear to be divided. A group of Socialists--Max Bauer, mayor of Hamburg, August Zinn from Hesse, Ernst Reuter, mayor of Berlin--were in favor of rearmament in a Western European Union. Under the leadership of Wilhelm Kaisen, mayor of Bremen, they organized the "German

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10Ibid., p. 189.

11Ibid., p. 189.
section of the socialist movement for the United States of Europe," which came out in support of the European Defense Treaty.

The SPD members who did object to rearmament were the radical, neutralist elements who wanted a neutral, united Germany aligned to neither the East or West. In their line of reasoning German national interest must be first of all protected and this interest was achieved through reunification. Thus there arose within the party a principal controversy whether the SPD opposed rearmament, and consequently the party seemed to voters to be at once both "neutralist" and pro-rearmament.

Another important aspect must be further considered, which was the contrast between Schumacher's and Ollenhauer's leadership styles. Under Schumacher's monocratic leadership critical outbursts by an individual brought forth not only denials by the party leadership of such a position, but also censure from the decision-making apparatus of the party's leadership. Since Ollenhauer was not able to retain Schumacher's firm grip in the party, important issues led to controversy within the party, and the party displayed a disunited image to the electorate.
The Campaign of 1953

In examining the 1953 election campaign from the dissolution of the second Bundestag on July 12, 1953 to election day September 6, 1953 a number of occurrences both inside and outside of the Federal Republic had an indirect or direct effect on the election.

The following occurrences were independent of the German political party initiatives: (1) the influence of the occupation powers, notably the United States intervention in the electoral contest, (2) the worker's uprising on the 17th of June in the Soviet zone in Berlin, and (3) the note exchange between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies dealing with the possibility of German reunification.

The first of these events to some degree concerned the influence of the occupation powers. The United States, which had supported Adenauer's plan for Western European integration through the policy of rearmament, was not about to lose the man who would make German integration possible. If Adenauer did lose the election the United States not only felt that it would lose one of its most adherent supporters of its policies but also would be confronted with a policy which directly opposed United States policy.
In order to improve the chance that Adenauer would continue as Chancellor, various interventions into the campaign were undertaken by the United States.¹²

Since the Social Democrats argued that the major issue of the election was either unification or rearmament, the United States replied along these lines. The purpose of American policy was to show the voter the improbability of SPD policy achieving reunification.

The first United States intervention was initiated by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' letter to Adenauer stating that the Four Power Conference concerning the German question would be moved to later in the fall when the foreign policy course would be official and independent of the Bundestag election. The Chancellor could now state that a Four Power Conference over Germany could not take place until he was returned to power. This letter was a definite campaign aid to Adenauer and it appeared to the voter that through Adenauer's help and with the Western

powers unification would be possible.\textsuperscript{13}

The next four occurrences deal also with United States intervention into the election campaign in order to improve Adenauer's chances in remaining Chancellor. The first intervention was when the United States offered food to the Soviet zone, which was immediately refused by the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{14} The Social Democratic Party stated that this intervention was more election aid to the Adenauer government. The second intervention was a letter from President Eisenhower stating that the possibility of a reunified Germany must be preceded by a European defense establishment, especially in view of the preceding event of June 17th, the Berlin uprising.\textsuperscript{15} The Third American intervention in

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{13}Ibid., p. 125.
  \item \textsuperscript{15}"Der Friede Kann nicht durch Schwache erhalten werden. Brief des Präsidenten der USA Dwight Eisenhower am Bundeskanzler Adenauer," in Bulletin, No. 140 v. 28, July 1953, p.1181ff.
\end{itemize}
order to influence the campaign was the resolution voiced by the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate on July 2, 1953. The resolution was in response to the Berlin uprising of June 17th. The resolution demanded justice and respect for the reunification of Germany and resistance against the communist tyranny. This resolution, as one senator stated, was to be psychologically helpful and to be used for Adenauer's coming election test. The final event which clearly showed the theme of America's election aid was the press conference of Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, on September 3, 1953, three days before the election. He stated that only by reelecting Chancellor Adenauer was there the possibility that the country might be reunified.

An event which was independent of the German electoral contest but directly influenced the campaign was the worker's


uprising in Berlin on June 17, 1953. The workers rose in defiance of the East German government and were not controllable by the people's police. For order to be re-
stored Soviet tanks were called in to quell the disorder. This uprising not only brought forth orations from politi-
cal leaders stressing the need for unification but it also showed the West German citizen the hopelessness of the Soviet zone residents' political situation.\textsuperscript{19}

The uprising affected the West German voters in two ways: (1) the voter decided which party's policy was the best for reunification; and (2) the voter tested the economic and political condition of the Soviet zone and compared them with his own position.\textsuperscript{20} As for most SPD members the June 17th uprising signaled that the time for negotiation and unification had arrived.

Another set of occurrences which took place in the election campaign was the transmission of notes between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union concerning the possibility of a Four Power Conference to discuss the

\textsuperscript{19}Hirsch-Weber, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 140-143.

\textsuperscript{20}Ibid., p. 140.
German question. From July 10, 1953 to September 2, 1953 notes were exchanged between the United States government and the government of the Soviet Union. Each note carried with it conditions in which a reunified Germany could be brought about.

The German political parties gave different interpretations to the notes. The Christian Democrats felt that the Soviet Union definitely wanted to influence the electoral contest. If the Soviet Union's proposals would be accepted a united Germany would be a neutral country, which in time would soon be Soviet dominated. The SPD rejected the Soviet notes stating that only through the Four Power Conference could a decision whether to reunite Germany be decided, and that free elections must supercede the formation of an all-German government. 21 The note exchange between the Super Powers undoubtedly influenced the election indirectly, but its influence was small since both German parties rejected the Soviet maneuvers.

Foreign policy was without a doubt the most important controlling issue of the campaign. The government and the

21 Ibid., pp. 131-140.
opposition in the years from 1949 to 1953 represented two opposing conceptions of foreign policy. The government and its coalition parties had represented western integration and economic recovery through the use of important programs such as the Schuman Plan and the European Defense Plan. The aims of this policy was to integrate the German Federal Republic into the Western European democracies.

The SPD represented an opposing opinion, stating that one must first recognize the threat to peace caused by a divided Germany. In order to attain security for Germany one must not impede the possibilities for a unifying Germany in freedom and peace. The party stood in opposition to the treaties for the GFR's integration into a Western European Union. It believed that western integration would make the problem of reunification unsolvable since the agreement of both Super Powers was needed. The SPD knew that unification also had widespread appeal thus their campaign strategy was mapped out on the basis of "unification" versus the government's integration or "negotiation (with the Russians) before rearmament."

The CDU campaign strategy was to convince the electorate on: (1) the confusion inherent in the SPD party over its
foreign policy goals; (2) the undesirability of the SPD goals if put into effect, and (3) the proximity of these aims with other socialist goals such as the Socialist Union Party.

Results of the 1953 Election

The election took place on September 6, 1953 and by the next morning it became clear that the German people had overwhelmingy endorsed Adenauer and his policies.

In the election 33,120,940 persons were qualified to vote. This is about 1,900,000 or 6.1 percent more qualified voters than in the 1949 election. A total of 28,479,550 qualified voters actually voted, or nearly 4 million more voters than in the 1949 election. The voting percentage was 86.0 percent compared with 78.5 percent in 1949.22

In the 1949 election the CDU had received 7.36 million votes or 31.0 percent of the electorate. In the 1953 election the CDU received even more 12.43 million votes for 45.2 percent of the electorate.23 The 1953 CDU/CSU election victory also enabled the Christian Democrats to

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22 Pollock, op. cit., pp. 97-98.

23 Ibid., pp. 97-98.
win a clear majority of 244 out of 487 Bundestag seats without the aid of their former coalition partners FDP and the DP.

Table IV-1

Total Popular vote in the 1953 Federal Election\(^\text{24}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>1949</th>
<th>1953</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>45.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB/BHE</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPD</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The SPD results also increased. In the 1949 elections the SPD received approximately 7 million votes or 29.2 percent of the electorate. In the 1953 elections the SPD gained 1 million new voters but only 28.8 percent of the electorate. The SPD increased their number of seats in the Bundestag from 131 to 151.\(^\text{25}\)

There are probably many reasons why the Social Democratic Party failed to obtain a sizeable proportion of

\(^{24}\text{Pollock, op. cit.}\)

\(^{25}\text{Ibid., pp. 97-98.}\)
the votes. One can never know the psychological motivation why a voter votes the way he does, but at least a researcher can analyze the environment and provide his own conclusion to the SPD problem in 1953. It appears from opinion poll data and the outcome of the 1953 election that the Social Democratic Party failed to present an alternative policy which appealed to the voter's fundamental attitudes.

The voter differed with the SPD on four policy issues. First, economic recovery, where the voter generally felt that the economy and his standard of living had improved in the last four years. Evidence of this improvement was cited by the government party in the economic figures on production, exports, employment, standard of living and housing. A majority of voters after years of misery, unemployment, and hunger did not accept the Social Democratic Party's thesis that Adenauer's new prosperity had created social injustice between the rich and the poor.

Second, voters were in favor of western orientation particularly in the Federal Republic's relationship to the United States in guaranteeing peace from a position of strength. "The electorate desired a strong partner for
Germany; security considerations of the average voter demanded protection of a weak country by a sympathetic and strong ally.\(^\text{26}\)

Third, even though the people desired reunification, they were not willing to sacrifice their security and recent progress for unification. Most voters understood that Adenauer's "policy of strength" based reunification on the strength flowing from the European Defense Community, Western European integration, and a firm alliance with the United States. The SPD tried in vain in the 1953 election campaign to show the dangers inherent in Adenauer's policy of strength.

The fourth factor can be seen in the governing party's leader--the voter attraction to the personality of Adenauer as Chancellor. During the election campaign it became quite clear that Adenauer was the central figure in the campaign. The people's impression with the personality of Adenauer can be seen in a poll taken in September, 1952, asking which individual would one like to see as the head of the next government. Question: "Assuming that in the next

\(^{26}\text{Ibid.}, p. 173.\)
election it were not possible to vote for parties, but only for individuals: Here is a list with twelve names. Who would you most like to see at the head of government?"27

Table IV-III

Most Popular for Chancellor by Percentage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>CDU/CSU</th>
<th>SPD</th>
<th>FDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Konrad Adenauer</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theodor Heuss</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erich Ollenhauer</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlo Schmid</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ernst Reuter</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ernst Remer</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hermann Ehlers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franz Blucher</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karl Arnold</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helene Wessel</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waldemar Kraft</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H-Ch. Seebohm</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None of them</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doesn't matter</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

100 100 100 100 100 100

Ollenhauer to most Germans was more a party functionary than a leader. "Deprived of their leader, they (the SPD), were reduced to putting the face of a dead man on their

election posters.\textsuperscript{28} Adenauer however was the embodiment of both success and authority.

In his negotiations with the Western Powers he had gained great success. He had restored Germany to a position of respectability in the world. Under his leadership, if not his direction, the German economic miracle was taking shape. And his authoritarian rule in Bonn provided that Father Figure which the Germans instinctively respect and obey. He was sure that his combination of success and authority would prove irresistible.\textsuperscript{29}

Thus the voter's attraction to Adenauer's personality in terms of success and authority was a significant deterrent to the SPD in their bid to become the governing party.

The Social Democratic Party has traditionally represented the interests of the working class, and in the image of the people it is the party of the working class. Besides working class support it has also received considerable support in the salaried middle class.\textsuperscript{30}

In the 1953 federal election the SPD's support in

\begin{footnotes}

\textsuperscript{29}Charles Wighton, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 189.

\end{footnotes}
reference to the composition of the party was: (1) A greater percentage of men than women, (2) The party drew considerable support from the working and salaried middle class, (3) The party was especially strong in cities with sizeable Protestant and Catholic voters, (4) The party was strong in metropolitan areas rather than rural farming areas, and (5) The younger and middle aged people were more inclined to be a SPD voter than the older age groups. 

The Christian Democratic Union, CDU--operating in Bavaria as the Christian Social Union, CSU--is a departure from the traditional German parties. "Instead of following the traditional pattern of parties in Germany and becoming closely identified with some particular ideology, religious group, or economic interest group the CDU/CSU had attracted heterogenous elements from the voters in the name of its 'Christian principles.'" It is therefore a multi-interest, interconfessional, "Christian" party which identifies with no single class or stratum.


In the 1949 and 1953 elections the CDU received the votes of a broad cross section of the German population. It was stronger than the Social Democratic Party in virtually every voter category. "With both sexes, with all levels of educational attainment, with all age groups, with all income groups, with most occupation groups, and with both Catholics and Protestants the CDU was preferred."33

The general trends of support in the 1953 election in reference to the composition of the party were: (1) A greater percentage of women than men. (2) The younger and older age groups were more inclined than the middle age groups, (3) The party drew its major strength of support from predominantly Catholic areas, (4) The party was especially strong in rural farming areas, (5) In terms of support from occupational groups the housewives were the largest group followed by the pensioners and retired persons with farmers forming the third largest, (6) "non-natives (expellees, refugees) were a definite minority in all parties except of course in the Bloc of the Homeless and Disenfranchised (GB/BHE): in the CDU, they account

33Pollock, op. cit., p. 41.
for 16 percent." and (7) approximately 15 percent was represented by white collar workers, businessmen, and skilled and semiskilled labor groups.

The relatively large gains by the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) is related to the following points. First, a factor related to the CDU increase in percentage of votes was the corresponding losses of the extremist parties of the Left and Right—not a single seat was won by the extreme parties of the Left and Right. Evidence in survey data showed that the CDU benefited more from the losses of the extreme right than the Social Democratic Party from the Communists. 35

Out of the original ten parties six were still represented in the Bundestag in 1953. This result was a clear indication that the formation of splinter groups, as in the Weimar Republic, was not being repeated. The electoral system also contributed to this result, in that a party needed 5 percent of the total vote to gain any seats.

Second, a greater number of expellees and refugees

34Ibid., p. 43.

joined the ranks of the CDU party. The influx was the result of the refugees and expellees closely identifying with the status quo and the desire for their spokesman to have a greater influence in the decision-making process of government.

Third, religion was found to determine the political orientation of the worker. Religious affiliation seriously affected the appeal of the Catholic worker to the SPD. Catholic workers identified more with the CDU as a result of its "Christian principles" than to the SPD, the traditional "working class" party. Even closer church identification (indicated by church attendance) tended to hurt the Social Democratic Party. Protestant workers who regularly attended church had a greater chance of voting for the CDU than the SPD. 36

In the 1953 federal election 68 percent of the SPD support came from the working class, but only 49 percent of that class gave it their support. 37 As is evident by these data the party was unable to mobilize its main

36Linz Storch De Gracia, op. cit., p. 267.
37Ibid., p. 59.
potential base of support. This dilemma was created by the strength of religious loyalties in the German working class. In addition to this dilemma the success of the BHE party (7 percent of the working class vote) was a further weakening factor. Thus the failure to mobilize more than half of its traditional basis of support is one of the factors in why the SPD failed to extend its mass support.

Fourth, the increase in voter participation indirectly benefited the CDU total vote. A substantial flow of new voters such as the young adults, the aged, and the new refugees and expellees, were voting for the first time—an estimated 2.8 million new voters and in addition 1.2 million older persons became qualified to vote in the period since 1949. The increase in the percentage of qualified voters also rose from 78.5 percent in 1949 to 86.0 percent in 1953. This rise in percentage produced 4 million more new voters in the 1953 election.38

Fifth, the Social Democratic Party failed to gather support from the middle class. Adenauer's new prosperity

Pollock, op. cit., pp. 97-98.
program which greatly aided this class was sufficient for most members to vote CDU. Integration into the Western camp and the middle class fear of socialism aliened this class further from the SPD camp.

In their study of the 1953 election Hirsch-Weber and Schutz concluded why the Socialists did not pass over the 30 percent hurdle in total votes and why the Christian Democrats increased their percentage of total votes. They presume the electorate to be composed of two blocs--a bourgeois and a socialist bloc. Situated in the bourgeois bloc is a large body of voters who did not commit themselves until the election. These noncommitted voters were mobile only in the bourgeois bloc and did not cross over into the socialist bloc. Thus the socialist bloc was a permanent minority structure. The Social Democratic Party's success would be achieved only when it could gain the confidence of the bourgeois bloc.39

Subsequent elections seem to indicate that as the SPD abandoned doctrinaire socialism and pro-Western leaders came into popular vote for the party rose correspondingly.

In the election of 1957 the Social Democratic Party managed to hurdle over the 30 percent barrier by receiving a majority of votes--50.2 percent. As a result of the three election defeats the SPD party leaders felt that not only did they need a new leader who could attract a greater share of the popular vote but also a program which would be accepted by the majority of voters.

Table IV-III

Voting in the Federal Elections 1949-1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>CDU/CSU</th>
<th>SPD</th>
<th>FDP</th>
<th>Other Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1959 the SPD adopted the Bad Godesberg program which drastically reformed the party from its traditional leftist orientation to a party of the center. The Godesberg program called for an end to constant opposition to the government's policies and the acceptance of middle

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class goals such as free enterprise and Western integration. In subsequent elections the change in the party program and new leadership, i.e., Willy Brandt, forced the middle class and others of the bourgeois bloc to reanalyze their relationship with the SPD. This is evident in the SPD's popular vote which rose steadily throughout the following years.

In summary, the 1953 election was a test for the SPD in that it determined whether the party's strategy of opposition had been successful. The party hoped that the voter would recognize the SPD as a thriving political force whose interests were with the masses.

In analyzing the 1953 election three main topics were discussed: (1) the presentation of the party's policies before the campaign, (2) the international and domestic events which occurred and influenced the outcome of the election, and (3) the reasons why the SPD was defeated in the 1953 election.

In examining the party's preparation for the campaign the party saw a need for a restatement of the party's basic policies for the 1953 election. This restatement of basic policies was the result of Kurt Schumacher's death and the
divergencies of opinion over the rearmament-reunification issue existed within the party.

The degree in which international and domestic events influenced the outcome of the election was not determined. Instead these occurrences were described to the extent in which they aided the SPD party or Chancellor Adenauer. The two most notable occurrences, the American interventions and the Berlin Uprising, greatly aided Adenauer's chances in remaining Chancellor.

The conclusions derived from why the SPD was defeated were: (1) The voter differed with the SPD on four policy issues--economy, relationship to the West, reunification and rearmament, (2) The voters were attracted to the personality of Adenauer, (3) The SPD was unable to mobilize its main potential base of support--the working class, and (4) The SPD failed to gather further support notably from the middle class and new voters.
Chapter V

Conclusions

The task of this thesis has been to examine the failure of the SPD to become a governing party in the period of Schumacher's leadership. The party's failure to attain this goal was illustrated in the 1953 federal elections. This election is important in that Kurt Schumacher's party, which had been placed in opposition since 1947, now had a chance to win the support of the masses and thus the election. In seeking his goal of mass support of the traditional "working class" and reach the whole electorate. Once the party had obtained power through the masses' support, the party would again be able to apply the principles of democratic socialism in the political system.

The SPD failed to secure the necessary percentage of the popular support in order to win at the polls. The party was basically a prewar party living in the postwar generation. In so doing it appeared dogmatic, idealistic, and Marxist. The following analysis by Charles Wrighton
describes how the leadership forced the party into such a situation.

Under Schumacher's leadership, the SPD followed a reactive strategy based on anachronistic perspectives. Schumacher's obsession with the mistakes of the past led him to try to make Social Democracy play the part he believed it should have played in the Weimar Republic. The perspective was reinforced by a determinist view of postwar political developments derived from Marxist theory. As a result, he committed the party to a policy that restricted its movements at every level of political action. It is impossible to guess what would have happened in different circumstances. However, it seems fair to conclude that a more flexible outlook and strategy would have made the SPD much more successful in combating the forces that opposed its acquisition of power. Schumacher's behavior in the larger political context, and that of his submissive leader's proclaimed goals.1

This restriction of movements at every political level, as Wighton describes, originated in the postwar environment in 1948. From 1948 to 1949 Schumacher was in opposition. After having lost the election in 1949 he went into opposition again until his death when Ollenhauer took over. Because the SPD leadership established a policy of "de facto rejection" of all government policies a viable alternative

was not presented to the public. As a result of this the party failed to: (1) change the image of the party as a party of pure negation to a party with viable alternatives; (2) focus campaign efforts on viable alternatives; (3) force a new direction in which leaders would appear pragmatic; and (4) change its "deciding" campaign issue, reunification, to one which was higher in the voters' priorities.

For the SPD the 1953 federal election determined whether the former leader's policies and position of opposition had been the correct line to follow. Schumacher's position was to establish himself and his party in an uncompromising position with the policies of Adenauer's coalition government. As the opposition party its role was not one of negation but to keep German politics in a state of flux so the path would be open for future changes. The future changes were the eventuality that the policies of democratic socialism would be supported by the parliament. Schumacher's task was to show the masses that an uncompromised leadership stood ready to guide them to a better future. Schumacher felt that the bourgeois capitalists seemed unlikely to improve the economic condition of the masses.
and their proletarization would soon lead them to react against occupation and exploitation. As a result of this ineptitude by the bourgeois coalition Schumacher was convinced the masses would turn against the bourgeois coalition in the 1953 election.

Schumacher's interpretation of the post-totalitarian setting was influenced by what he perceived as parallels with events in the Weimar Republic. Schumacher referred increasingly in his later years to his perception of past analogous situations. The subject that he frequently considered relevant to the postwar setting was the behavior of the masses and the elites in the Weimar era. He hated the capitalist and reactionary ruling elites whom he felt were responsible for the destruction of the Weimar Republic. Schumacher perceived that these groups would try again to manipulate the masses under the guise of democratic practices and patriotic sentiments. It was Schumacher's goal as "champion of the masses" to expose these elites. The problem with this strategy was that these elites recovered along with the economy.²

²Ibid., pp. 80-81.
Schumacher also interpreted the economic conditions in West Germany as being similar to the crisis years of the Weimar Republic. On the basis of Marxist economics and memories of the past he distrusted the evidence of economic recovery. Thus strategies in policy could have been redefined if Schumacher had not interpreted the postwar setting with past situations.³

The period of 1949-1953 is important in that the opposition and the governing party based their positions on issues which were perceived as "connecting links" to their future societies. Reunification to the Social Democratic Party envisioned a democratic socialist state while the Christian Democratic Union preferred a policy of rearmament which envisioned a capitalist state aligned with the Western powers. In order to activate this preference for a future society either the governing coalition or the opposition would be put into power through the support of the masses. The results of the 1953 election, however, showed that the electorate preferred the policies of the governing party to the policies of the opposition. Thus

³Ibid., p. 82.
the SPD's attempts at securing power to build a united Germany which was democratic and socialist were unsuccessful.

To understand why Schumacher and his party were unable to receive the support of the masses is a problem which I have attempted to analyze in this thesis. In so doing I have viewed two entities—the individual voter and the SPD party—in trying to find whether there exists any significant relationship between the two. If such a relationship did exist then the mass support policy as perceived by Schumacher may have been successful in the 1953 election. My approach in attempting to discern the relationship between the two entities relied on the thesis that in order for an individual to correspond or identify with a party a correlation of ideas or images with that party must exist. The ideas or images of the party are transmitted to the individual by its principal actors, and their policies, or by the individual's political consciousness which is formed from past and present attitudes towards the political environment, its actors, and the individual's own role in the political system.

In Chapter II the past and present attitudes towards
the political environment, its actors, and the individual's own role in the political system were analyzed. In this analysis I found that public attitudes toward the political environment were inadequate for Schumacher's concept of mobilizing the masses in the post-totalitarian era. One area which clearly demonstrates this is the individual's role in the political system. In the Federal Republic if a citizen takes an active role in government he acts not as a democratic citizen actively attempting to exert political influence but rather as a subject defending his rights under the law. Thus if Schumacher sought an active support of the masses it would not lead to political power but to the masses defending their rights under the law.

In Chapter II I presented Almond and Verba's theory of attachment to the political system to further prove the hypothesis that public attitudes were inadequate for Schumacher's concept of mobilizing the masses. In their study they analyzed two types of attachment, one was "output affect" and the other was "system affect." It is their hypothesis that whatever attachment there is to the West German political system it is mainly a pragmatic one. This is closely related to the ability of the government to
satisfy the pragmatic needs of the people. This study showed that in the German political culture the orientation to the political system was highly unfavorable for Schumacher's concept of mobilizing the masses.

In Chapter II the prevailing postwar attitudes were also found to be determined by the international setting of postwar Germany. The increased tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union were viewed with dismay for the public knew that without joint control of occupied Germany the prospects of a unified Germany would be entirely unthinkable. As East-West tensions increased the West Germans began to prefer Western policies and programs which contributed to the new political, social, and economic order. However, as West Germany was absorbed into the Western camp the separation of the two Germanies became more firm. But to the West German individual only when the new order was fully established in terms of his economic self sufficiency did he turn to the goal of a unified Germany.

In Chapter III the Social Democratic Party's principal actors and their policies during the first parliamentary session, (1949-1953), were examined. It was shown that
inherent in the party's ability to correspond with the public or vice versa were: (1) the party's policies, (2) its public image, (3) its leaders, and (4) various incidents which affected the party. It was shown that the individual's positions on issues such as economic recovery, security, and political recovery were more aligned to Adenauer's policies than Schumacher's and the SPD's. In fact these issues further coalesced the support of a substantial part of the public with the governing party, as is evident in opinion data and in the 1953 federal election. For example, economic recovery, which contributed to the improvement of the individual's well-being, was more important to the individual than the prospect of an SPD government reunifying Germany under Soviet domination or Soviet influence. The typical citizen's reasoning was that as his economic position improved he should not sacrifice newly acquired capital and security in order to place himself in an insecure and unpredictable environment. Thus the chance that the individual would sacrifice his newly acquired gains in the Federal Republic for Schumacher's and the SPD's reunification policy appeared remote.

The SPD's image also played a role in the inability

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of the public to correspond or identify with the party. The image of the SPD, as presented in Chapter II, was viewed by a substantial portion of the public in terms (Marxist, Leftist, dogmatic, idealist, and Communist) that were dissimilar to a vast majority of the public's attitudes.

The party also appeared as a party in "constant opposition" lacking no viable alternative policy. Since its first defeat at the polls the SPD had opposed almost every policy presented by the Adenauer government. By this action the SPD had positioned its policy in direct confrontation with the governing party. This confrontation developed two popular stereotypes of the party: (1) the SPD lacked an effective means to voice their own policy because of outright rejection of Adenauer's policies, and (2) the SPD did not have the capability to effectively govern the country.

Inherent in the party's image is the image the party leader displays to the public for the party. As we have seen in Chapters I and II, Kurt Schumacher appeared to the public as a fighting opposition leader who believed in the principles of democratic socialism. But the admiration of his leadership was only within the Social Democratic
Party's camp while outside he was viewed as a demagogic Marxist leader who opposed policies which were essential to the newly established country's survival.

In 1952, a year before the second Bundestag election, Kurt Schumacher died. His successor, Erich Ollenhauer, was a leader who was more of a party functionary rather than a symbolic, dynamic leader. His inability to control his party on the policy of rearmament showed the electorate the new leader's weakness in wielding power within party ranks as compared to the Chancellor or to Kurt Schumacher. This probably led to doubts that Ollenhauer could wield the power and authority, and manage the country as effectively as Chancellor Adenauer.

Ollenhauer's rival, Chancellor Adenauer, displayed and used his authority and power to produce policy projects which were essential to his perception of the Federal Republic's stature and position in the world. As the Federal Republic's respectability and economic position increased in the world the voters displayed their confidence in his policies. This was evident in the 1953 election.

The final factors which influenced the SPD's image are the various incidents which either occurred before or
during the election campaign of 1953. It is impossible to determine the extent to which these incidents influenced the election or not, but it is indeed correct to state that popular preconceptions of party policy were most likely strengthened by these incidents. An example of such an incident was the worker's uprising on the 17th of June in Berlin. As a result of this incident many analysts felt there emerged two consequences to the SPD policy image: (1) the Socialists plan for reunification appeared to be idealistic in its attitudes toward Soviet negotiation on reunification, and (2) the West Germans better appreciated their economic and political security established by Adenauer and the Western powers and were less willing to sacrifice their positions.

In conclusion, Schumacher failed to achieve his goal of mobilizing the masses as a means to gain power. Instead the masses reacted negatively to Schumacher, his policies, and his party. The masses that Schumacher sought to mobilize had no taste for conflict and longed for a period of stability and "quiescence" after the disastrous effects of a totalitarian regime. Their goal was not democratic socialism but the achievement of social and economic security.
as fast as possible. What Otto Kirchheimer refers to as a "trend toward privatization, a turning of interests and a concentration on private affairs" made most West Germans' activity in politics one of non-involvement.4

As Lewis J. Edinger states in reference to the political mood being highly unlikely for Schumacher's goal. "They were quite content to let a small, active political elite do their fighting for them, an outlook that was diametrically opposed to Schumacher's perception of their role in relation to his own and that of his opponents."5

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4Ibid., p. 237.
5Ibid., p. 237.
Bibliography


