United States Foreign Policy in the Middle East with Reference to Zionism, 1945 to Mid-1973

Elizabeth Ann IsHak
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UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
IN THE MIDDLE EAST WITH REFERENCE
TO ZIONISM, 1945 TO MID-1973

by

Elizabeth Ann IsHak

A Thesis
Submitted to the
Faculty of The Graduate College
in partial fulfillment
of the
Degree of Master of Arts

Western Michigan University
Kalamazoo, Michigan
August 1974
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In writing this thesis, I have benefited from the encouragement and advice of Professor Lawrence Ziring. My gratitude goes to Dr. Ziring, as to the many other faculty members in the Department of Political Science from whom I have learned a great deal. They have made my career as a graduate student at Western Michigan University a pleasure as well as a privilege.

Elizabeth Ann IsHak
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

This study focuses upon United States foreign policy toward the Middle East from 1945 to mid-1973 with reference to the American Zionist movement and its role in influencing policy making. This thesis is divided into six chapters, three of which culminate with major conflicts fought in the Middle East during the twenty-eight year period with which the study deals. Each Presidential administration, from Harry Truman's through Richard Nixon's, will be examined in terms of its formulating and handling of American foreign policy in the Middle East. Within the context of Presidential policy making in matters of foreign affairs, the Zionist lobby will be dealt with to determine the degree of its access to and influence upon the decision making process on the executive and legislative branches. When dealing with subject matter that brings the executive branch of government into contact with special interest groups the results are often unclear and the details sketchy especially if matters of national security are involved. Special interest groups and their role within the American Governmental process is a controversial subject. Thus, the lack of available literature from unbiased sources places a limitation on this type of study and does not enable the author to always draw her conclusions from a complete knowledge of the facts.

The originator of the modern Zionist movement was an Austrian Jew named Theodor Herzl who, during the late nineteenth century,
developed the concept of Zionism.\(^1\) Herzl's ideas were contained in a pamphlet called *Der Judenstaat* (The Jewish State) in 1896 which called for the restoration of the ancient Jewish state.\(^2\) Herzl called for a piece of land that Jews from around the world could immigrate to and could be free to settle in without being considered aliens.\(^3\) Assimilation was not called for, but rather rejected on the grounds that it would lead to the eventual extinction of the Jewish culture. He believed that Jewish people from around the world constituted a nation unto themselves. He stated that they only needed land in order to live freely. Furthermore, he believed that Jews could only escape anti-Semitism by establishing a nation-state of their own.

In Basle, Switzerland, on a summer day in 1897 Herzl's ideas resulted in the founding of the World Zionist Organization (WZO).\(^4\) Theodor Herzl presided over it and made it clear that its aims would be the "creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine by public law through colonization of Palestine by Jewish workers, through strengthening Jewish consciousness and through obtaining Government consent where necessary to attain the goals of Zionism."\(^5\) The Basle program, as it became known, provided for a "home" for Jews the world over in

\(^2\)Ibid.
\(^3\)loc. cit., Pp. 204-6.
\(^5\)Ibid.
Palestine which, in reality, was the birth of the idea of a Jewish state.

The Basle program was classified as humanitarian, nationalistic, religious and social—all in varying degrees. However, the Basle program was actually more politically oriented. The Zionist aim was clearly to deal as a group in varying types of political interaction aimed at the eventual establishment of a nation-state as a homeland for "Jewish people."

By 1945 Zionist organizations appeared in many countries throughout the world, including the United States. The first Zionist group that was introduced in America was called the American Federation of Zionists at the turn of the century. In 1917 it was reorganized as the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA) under the directorship of Louis Brandeis, who later became Justice Brandeis of the United States Supreme Court.

Foreign Policy Decision
Making in American Government

The President of the United States has the basic responsibility for making foreign policy decisions. Other branches of government, such as members on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or people on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, have the right to address themselves to matters of foreign policy making yet their statements are not official U.S. Government policy. The Secretary of State does make policy statements, but he is a spokesman for the President and works only with his consent and approval. Others, such as professionals in the
State Department and White House staff members as well as members of Congress, contribute to foreign policy making. Even experts, not involved in the government, are called in at times to give of their knowledge in matters dealing with crucial issues involved in foreign policy making.

Although there is a formal system for the planning of foreign policy, all decisions and the final responsibility for those decisions belongs to the President of the United States. The President, however, is not totally free to make foreign policy decisions. His actions often require the approval of the U.S. Congress, especially in the field of appropriating funds. His appointment of ambassadors abroad need Senate confirmation. The commitments and courses of action set by previous administrations are not easily changed. Freedom of action is limited by several factors:

. . . there is the existence of treaties with other countries. Then there are associations with international organizations, historical friendships, severe time pressures, the inflexibility of the foreign affairs bureaucracy, financial restrictions, and possible conflict between humanitarian motives and national self-interest. Finally intelligence may be inadequate or full of misinformation. 6

The fact remains that the President has the final burden of responsibility even though he relies heavily on a day-to-day basis with the Department of Defense, the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, White House foreign affairs advisors and the Department of State.

The President relies on the State Department for the actual conduct of foreign relations. The Department of State handles all aspects of international political and economic communications and negotiations, and is concerned with the development of treaties and executive agreements. It controls international trade and travel, promotes better understanding through the U.S. Information Agency and operates programs of cultural exchange. Both the Foreign Service diplomatic corps and the consular service are a part of the State Department.

The State Department also acts on behalf of the President in negotiating treaties which must be ratified by two-thirds vote of the Senate. Similar purposes are achieved through the use of "executive agreements," which are formal agreements between heads of state that do not require Senate approval. Extremely important matters are often dealt with in this manner, because there are no defined limitations. Practical limits, one could say, are imposed by public opinion and the need of funding by the U.S. Congress. Still, the President of the United States oversees the workings of the State Department and either approves or disapproves of its actions.

International negotiating is a well known method of policy making with today's fast means of transportation and communication. International negotiating is not often open due to the domestic political pressures or attitudes of other nations, thus making public concessions impossible. It is not always the easiest means of negotiating with another nation and carries its own risks as well as its own advantages. The mediating role of some country not directly
involved in the negotiating must be protected. In open sessions official representatives often feel compelled to make statements for popular consumption at home or for propaganda purposes elsewhere. Advance preparation must be thorough, the representative official must be exceptionally well-informed and cautious not to express the possibility of immediate results.

In the final analysis, whether a government official or a government agency does the policy making and negotiating, they are under the close scrutiny of the President of the United States and do not act alone in foreign policy decision making. The President, although given tremendous powers in the area of foreign policy making by the U.S. Constitution, does not formulate and carry out policies in an environment free from political considerations. The executive branch, as well as the legislative branch, is not sealed off from the influence of pressure groups. Foreign policy is made as a result of many considerations, and one of those considerations is the pressure group which is a part of the American system. The President of the United States may have great powers in the area of foreign policy making, but he must also take full responsibility for the failures resulting in wrong decision making in those areas.

A Brief Introduction to American Foreign Policy in the Middle East

The United States, following World War II, felt uncomfortable in dealing with and formulating new policies involving the Middle East. The U.S. has always wavered in its policy toward the Middle East,
especially in dealing with Arab nations, because the area was alien to them and the Arabs were untrustworthy in their eyes. The leaders of America never quite decided upon a course of policy to follow. Since its new role in the Middle East was established after WW II, America dealt with each new crisis unsure of its objectives and policies. Consistency in a foreign policy course was never developed by any Presidential administration.

Any consistent policy has been difficult to set for a number of reasons. Domestically there was the pro-Israeli interest group made up of both moderate and militant (Zionist) Jews who constantly raised the cry that the United States should carry out a hard-line policy toward Arab nations in order to protect Israel's interests. On the other hand, a group within the U.S. wanted to keep America from isolating Arab nations and, instead, secure their friendship in that critical area of the world. They urged Washington to pursue its own national interests and not be affected by domestic politics which, they felt, hindered its effectiveness in dealing with that part of the world. Europe criticized America for not immediately moving into the area as the colonial powers had. By using its economic and political position in the world, Europeans felt, America could have stabilized the situation there and avoided any turmoil. Finally, the U.S. has been criticized for not having a written agreement with Israel on matters of defense and economic aid. As a result, America has never known its limitations toward Israel specifically and in the Middle East in general. Thus, it has been difficult for the United States to take a definite course of action in the Mideast over the years and follow through in a consistent manner.
The United States has carried out an ever-changing policy toward Arab nations, but not necessarily to protect Israel's interests. Rather, the U.S. sought to contest the growing position of the Soviet Union in the area. The U.S. role in the Middle East has developed since the Truman Doctrine of 1947 when it was the chief defender of all Western interests in the area. Since the 1955 Egyptian arms deal with the East, the U.S. had to assume independent guarantees toward Arab nations under the Eisenhower Doctrine. The Soviet Union, at that point, became a military threat to the West and the rising tide of Arab nationalism changed the scene in the Middle East. Under the Nixon Doctrine, balanced words and continuing diplomatic efforts as well as a policy of providing Israel with financial and military support as a means of deterring Soviet influence there has become the hallmark of present-day U.S. policy in the Middle East.

A Brief Introduction to American Zionism

The American Zionist movement was an outgrowth of the World Zionist Congress held at Basle, Switzerland in 1897. The American Jew was, at first, generally suspicious of the concept of Zionism as originally stated by members who attended the Basle Conference. In the United States, unlike other parts of the world, there was a great deal of freedom for the Jew and cultural assimilation was encouraged. The idea of Zionism was considered an "Old World Movement, scorned
and vilified by those affluent Jews who considered themselves legitimate Americans."\(^7\)

Membership in the Zionist Organization of America during WW I was very insignificant in number, however, with the establishment of the Balfour Declaration on November 2, 1917, the movement grew considerably under the able direction of Louis Brandeis. The Balfour Declaration, initiated by Britain, called for the establishment of a national home in Palestine for Jewish people without endangering the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jews in the area. With the end of WW I a steady decline was noted and the movement was again becoming "bedeviled by internal factionalism and public apathy."\(^8\)

By the late nineteen twenties American Jewish apathy for the ZOA ended. The Palestinian Arab riots in 1929, which were directed at Palestinian Jews, awakened the Jewish community in America to the Jewish plight in Palestine and enabled the international Zionist movement to play on their sympathies. This incident, coupled with the anti-Semitism of the 1930's and the German holocaust of the Jews under Hitler, made American Jews become more united in support of Jews around the world whether they were Zionist-oriented or not. In summary, "the decade of the thirties saw Zionist influence among American Jewry increase at least in part as a result of events which, while beyond the control of the Zionists, were used by them to great advantage."\(^9\)


\(^8\) loc. cit., p. 327.

The mid-nineteen forties demonstrated that Zionist influence with American Jewish groups was significant. During WW II many Jewish men were overseas, yet it could be said that membership in the six largest U.S. Zionist groups increased to over a quarter of a million at that period of history. The executive branch of the international Zionist movement was called the American Zionist Emergency Council (AZEC), which served as a coordinating office for four groups that made up the American movement. They have been identified as ZOA, Mizrachi (Religious Zionists), Paole Zion (Labor Zionists) and Hadassah (Women's ZOA). The AZEC and its purpose for existing was foretold in the following quote:

The Council's function was to act as spokesman for Zionism in the country whose influence might well prove decisive for the future of Palestine. It was essential, therefore, to win the public opinion of America for the Zionist solution. In pursuit of that objective nearly 200 local Emergency Councils were established over the country. Forty state legislatures adopted pro-Zionist resolutions and as many governors sent President Roosevelt a pro-Zionist petition. Leaders of the nation in every sphere... were drawn into a nationwide surge of sympathy.

During WW II American Jewish sympathy with Zionist aims was great, but active support was not what the Zionists had hoped for. In New York City an American Jewish Conference was held in September of 1943 headed by Dr. Stephen Wise, Lewis Lipski, Abba Hillel Silver and Henry Monsky. The purpose of that meeting was cited in the following letter:

10 Halperin, op. cit., p. 327.

American Jewry, which will be required, in large measure to assume the responsibility of representing the interests of our people at the Victory Peace Conference, must be ready to voice the judgment of American Jews along with that of other Jewish communities of free countries with respect to the post-War status of Jews and the upbuilding of Palestine. Every thoughtful Jew interested in the present critical situation with which we are confronted, must be profoundly concerned with the distressing conflicts which threaten to impede concerted action. The purpose of the conference is to bring together the representatives of major national Jewish membership organizations in order that they may consider what steps should be taken to bring about some agreement on the part of the American Jewish community.\(^{12}\)

Thirty-four American Jewish groups were invited to the 1943 conference in New York and all but two came.\(^{13}\) While some of the American Jewish groups were only moderately pro-Zionist, all organizations that were invited supported the resolution adopted at the Conference in 1943 on Palestine which called for the fulfillment of the Balfour Declaration and its promise to reconstruct Palestine as a Jewish Commonwealth. The resolution further stated that restrictions placed on Jewish immigration and settlement in Palestine be dropped so that a Jewish majority be established and a Commonwealth be created.\(^{14}\)

The only two American Jewish organizations which did not attend the conference in New York were the American Jewish Committee (AJC) and the strongly anti-Zionist American Council for Judaism. They did not approve of the resolution on Palestine passed at that meeting in


\(^{13}\)loc. cit., p. 16.

1943. These two groups eventually became the target of a hate campaign by the ZOA magazine *New Palestine*. They were attacked in 1944 in an article which stated that "the insidious propaganda of small and perverse groups tend to create the impression of a non-existent division." Other quotes were made by ZOA members branding the two uncooperative groups as being "relatively small in number" and consisting of "unrepresentative handpicked men." They were thought of as "assimilationists" and not as Jewish "survivalists" and were denounced by all other American Jewish sectors. Within four short years the AJC relented to Zionist pressures and joined its ranks by becoming an influential ally in its later appearances before the United Nations. The American Council for Judaism, however, remained anti-Zionist and free from the outside influence of the ZOA. The winning over of virtually every sector of the American Jewish community indicated that the ZOA, as early as 1943, was working hard to increase the cohesion of that community and making it the major force in securing a future Jewish state in Palestine.

**Modern Nationalism Among Arabs and Jews**

Both Arabs and Jews have been affected by Western influence as they strived for a sense of nationalism and self-determination. The Jews returned to Palestine after being "utterly reshaped by the West," while the Arabs, though colonized by Western powers, have not absorbed Western social and technological spirit and still remain suspicious

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15 Lilienthal, op. cit., p. 16.
of the West.\textsuperscript{16} Israel was looked upon as a representative of the West and Zionism was deemed to be an example of European penetration. Zionism was conceived in Germany and used by American, as well as European, Jewry in establishing the State of Israel. Arab nationalism and unity have been derived from the Europe they have always rejected. In the nineteenth century, European economic and cultural penetration shocked the Arab world into an awareness of its weakness and the need for a new self-conception. Europe provided the Arabs with a model in its own image and emphasized the fact that the Arabic language should be the unifying element among the various peoples in the Middle East. Western nations made Arab nationalism more fanatical by introducing them to their past history and glory.\textsuperscript{17} Finally, it was the West that liberated the Arabs in World War I and put them on the road to independent statehood.

Similarly, Zionism was an outgrowth of Western influence. It was once stated that, "Zionism is a movement of one Jew sending a second Jew to Palestine on a third (American) Jew's money."\textsuperscript{18} Once out of the Nazi holocaust, Jewish history continued toward its goal of creating a new Jewish state. The motivating force behind this course was Zionism, which had its origins in the mind of Austrian born Theodor Herzl.\textsuperscript{19} Jews felt that they had to return to nineteenth-

\textsuperscript{17}loc. cit., Pp. 214-5.
\textsuperscript{19}loc. cit., p. 389.
century Europe to retrieve the ideological strands of Zionism which Jewish leaders used in a design for Jewish survival.

It therefore seems possible to say that both twentieth-century Arab and Jewish nationalists were influenced by Western nations. Both nationalisms do not, however, have the same cohesiveness. The Arab countries are still torn apart by their own internal conflicts, thus weakening the possibility of creating and maintaining a united front. On the other hand, Zionism has established its long time goal—the creation of Israel as a Jewish state—and that achievement strengthened its determination to present a strong, united front.

The Organization of the Study

In this thesis I will analyze United States foreign policy in the Middle East from 1945 to mid-1973 and the impact of Zionism upon American policy in the area. I will focus upon the extent to which the Zionist Organization of America maintained its cohesion and its access to governmental decision makers. Chapters Two and Three of this thesis will deal with events surrounding the period of the birth of Israel and the period of the 1956 Sinai conflict. Each of these periods will be analyzed with the aim of determining American policy toward the area in times of both war and peace and the extent to which Zionism in the U.S. sought to influence policy making. In addition, any changes in the potential effectiveness of the Zionist movement will be noted and the extent to which U.S. governmental decisions paralleled the Zionist program will be indicated. Chapter Three discusses events that led up to the Suez Canal crisis and Zionist
influence upon American policy following the conflict. Chapter Four reviews the Eisenhower Doctrine and events that caused the 1958 invasion of Lebanon and examines the change in U.S. attitudes toward the Middle East during the short-lived Kennedy era. A description of the 1967 Six-Day War concludes the chapter with a brief look at the Johnson administration’s handling of the situation. Chapter Five brings in the recommendations of the United Nations for solving the Mideast conflict. Current activities, including President Nixon's initiatives in the area, are discussed. Chapter Six concludes the body of the thesis with policy stands for future American dealings in the Middle East as well as an analysis of the role of Zionism in United States policy making.
CHAPTER II
THE YEARS OF CREATION AND CONFLICT

Zionist activity and influence was at its peak, from 1945-1948, during the period of the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. In this chapter Zionist activities and their relationship to U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East will be examined in light of events surrounding the birth of Israel.

Great Britain relinquished its Palestine mandate in February, 1947. The problem of Palestine, which centered around the questions of British withdrawal from the area and partition, was handed over to the United Nations on February 14, 1947, by British foreign secretary Bevin. Secretary Bevin announced over the BBC that American Zionists were to blame for America's actions in not trying to solve the Palestine problem. He further stated that the Jewish terrorist attacks upon British posts in Palestine were being ignored by the United States. He claimed that President Truman issued a statement in the fall of 1945 which encouraged unlimited Jewish immigration to Palestine and thus upset the negotiations that he was conducting with Jews and Arabs over Palestine. Perhaps Secretary Bevin was looking for a way out of Britain's troubles in Palestine by blaming the United States for its continuing problems there. However, President Truman


made statements that seemed to aggravate the existing situation and cause bad feelings between America and Great Britain. Bevin made the following comments to his colleagues in Parliament on the subject:

I do not desire to create any ill-feelings with the United States. but I should have been happy if they had remembered that we were the mandatory power and we were carrying out the responsibility.

I think the country and the world ought to know this. I went to the Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, and told him how far I had got (in negotiations with Arabs and Zionists) ... and that I believed we were on the road if only they would leave us alone.

I really must point out that in international affairs I cannot settle things if our problem is made the subject of local elections.

The (October fourth) statement was issued however, and the whole thing was spoiled.\(^3\)

From the time that Britain submitted the problem of Palestine to the U.N. up until the proclamation of the State of Israel, Zionists were actively at work within the United States. Zionist aims at that time have to be examined in detail and the degree to which these aims and U.S. policy toward the Middle East paralleled one another must be covered in this chapter.

The United Nations and the Palestine Partition

The alternatives set before the U.N. concerning Palestine were either a continuation of the mandate or some degree of independence for Palestine as one state or in the form of separate Arab and Jewish states. The British favored a continuation of the mandate. The Arabs

\(^3\)New York Times, (February 26, 1947), 1-5.
sought the termination of the British mandate and sought to have inde-
pendence for a single state of Palestine placed on the Agenda. The
U.S. and Britain opposed the Arab request on the grounds that the
issue should be studied in depth before such a "radical" step could
be taken. The American position requested that a careful and impartial
study by the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP)
be made and that the results be submitted to the Secretary General not
later than September 1, 1947. The American position was endorsed by
the General Assembly on May 1, 1947, and so the numerous meetings
began in earnest as UNSCOP attempted to find answers to the Palestine
question.

The greatest force for mobilizing American opinion for Jewish
statehood was the immigrant ship named Exodus 1947 which landed in
Palestine during the summer of 1947. The fate of that ship with its
men, women and children provided the emotional impact that the Zionist
cause needed to gain unquestioning American support for their aims.
The British seized the ship and sent it back to Europe. Middle East
author Alfred Lilienthal described the events surrounding the seizure
of the Exodus ship in the following paragraph:

Shortly after the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine
(UNSCOP) had arrived in Palestine. . . the case of the SS
Exodus '47 blacked out all other Palestine news. From the
moment this old (renamed) Chesapeake Bay excursion boat had
sailed from the French port of Sete, there was no question of
what would happen. She carried illegal immigrants who would
be intercepted by the British. But the Jewish nationalists
had cagely mounted the props, brought in the players, and
solicited a world audience. If anyone was ultimately sur-
prised, it could only have been the refugees who were being

---

exploited. They at least, were really hoping to gain a haven.5

Dr. Lilienthal further stated that, "there was no movie house in the United States that did not carry a newsreel shot of these distraught faces on that long voyage home."6 The Exodus issue was kept alive by American Zionist groups with speeches and rallies which appeared in various newspapers as late as the latter part of 1947. Dr. Lilienthal concluded that Zionists were more interested in using incidents to popularize their cause than they were in providing an immediate haven for Jewish refugees. The Zionists wanted the sympathy of the world to support their claim for a Jewish state in Palestine, a well known tactic used by other interest groups to gain their goals.

Throughout the months of UNSCOP investigations, the United States remained neutral on the subject of the Palestine question and stated that U.S. policy would not be formulated until after the U.N. report was issued.7 Secretary of Defense Forrestal, in his diary, made clear America's noncommittal position when he wrote:

The President interjected... that he proposed to make no announcements or statements upon the Palestine situation until after the United Nations had made its findings. He said he had stuck his neck out on this delicate question once, and he did not propose to do so again (he referred to his statement about the desirability of the British admitting a hundred thousand Jews, made in the autumn of 1945.)8

6ibid.
An American refusal to commit itself regarding the extent of the Jewish state may have been the reason which caused the Zionists to reconcile themselves to accepting partition while also maintaining the official policy that they remain firm in their demand for all of Palestine.

The UNSCOP report was made available to the Secretary General in September of 1947, and consisted of two findings. The majority report recommended that the mandate should end and that there should be two separate states—one Jewish and one Arab, connected by an economic bond. Jerusalem was to be placed under an international trusteeship. The minority report differed from the majority report in that it recommended "an independent federal state in Palestine" comprised of an Arab state and a Jewish state with Jerusalem as the federal capital.\(^9\)

The American Zionist movement approved the majority report and asked that the United States find a solution to the Palestine question in the spirit of the majority report submitted by UNSCOP. However, that plea by the ZOA did not move the U.S. to change its noncommittal stand on the issue. Pressures mounted for U.S. acceptance of the majority report. On September twenty-first, the Republican Congressional leadership was heard from as both House Speaker Joseph W. Martin and Senator Robert Taft issued statements urging acceptance of UNSCOP's report.\(^10\) Pressures on the Truman administration were noted in Secretary Forrestal's diary and recounted here:

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\(^9\) Both the majority and minority reports of UNSCOP are found in ORGA, 2nd session, (1947), Report of the General Assembly Committee on Palestine, (A/364), Annex 1, 42-65.

Postmaster General Hannegan brought up the question of Palestine. He said many people who had contributed to the Democratic campaign fund in 1944 were pressing hard for assurances from the administration of definitive support for the Jewish position in Palestine. The President said that if they would keep quiet he thought everything would be alright, but if they persisted in the endeavor to go beyond the report of the United Nations Commission there was grave danger of wrecking all prospects for settlement. Hannegan tried to press him on this matter but he was adamant.\textsuperscript{11}

In that statement Truman was perhaps trying to establish an "American policy," not a Jewish or Arab one on the Palestine question.

On October 11, 1947, the U.S. representative to the United Nations, Mr. Herschel Johnson, stated America's position on the majority report. He said that the U.S. accepted the majority report with certain modifications. He felt that measures should be taken to assure both Arabs and Jews of equal economic and civil rights. He pledged that the U.S. would assist, through the United Nations, in providing financial assistance to the area.\textsuperscript{12} In the final analysis, American support for partition was stated rather loosely in terms which benefitted Arab as well as Jew. This was done on the advice of the State Department that the U.S. would lose the Middle East to the Soviet Union if the Arabs were antagonized too much.\textsuperscript{13} The State Department, according to various Jewish leaders, had been an enemy of the Zionist movement. Dr. Chaim Weizmann, a Russian Jew who later became the President of Israel, referred to State Department career officials as follows:

\textsuperscript{11}Millis and Duffield, op. cit., p. 323.


They were always behind the scenes, and on the lower level, that we encountered an obstinate, devious and secretive opposition which set at naught the public declarations of American statesmen. And in our efforts to counteract the influence of these behind-the-scenes forces, we were greatly handicapped because we had no foothold there. In effect Chaim Weizmann meant that the Zionist movement lacked access to foreign service officials in the State Department.

On November 25, 1947, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question approved a plan of partition with economic union, but when placed before the U.N. General Assembly the plan fell somewhat short of the two-thirds majority necessary for passage. A prominent American Jew who served on the Zionist U.N. task force in 1947 recalled the endless lobbying in which Zionist envoys were busy in all the capitals of the world in hectic diplomatic effort. He also credited the eventual Zionist success in the U.N. to the support from at least some American delegates. Those he mentioned were Herschel Johnson, General Hilldring and Dean Rusk. The first two (Johnson and Hilldring) he recalled were "extremely friendly to our cause," while the third (Rusk) became "emotionally involved" in the support of the Jewish state. During the General Assembly deliberations Zionist pressures grew. President Truman, in his memoirs, recalled the following:

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17 Ibid.
The facts were that not only were there pressure movements around the United Nations unlike anything that had been seen there before, but that the White House, too, was subjected to a constant barrage. I do not think I ever had as much pressure and propaganda aimed at the White House as I had in this instance. . . some (extreme Zionist) leaders were even suggesting that we pressure sovereign nations into favorable votes in the General Assembly.18

The fact that pressures exerted by Zionists upon key decision makers actually resulted in a Presidential decision to support the Zionist aims by pressuring foreign countries has never been proven. In an article from David Horowitz' new book he alluded to the fact that President Truman played the decisive role in changing the U.N. vote for partition when he said:

As a result of instructions from the President, the State Department embarked on a helpful course of great importance to our interests. . . . The United States exerted the weight of its influence almost at the last hour, and the way the final vote turned out must be ascribed to the fact.19

On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly adopted a resolution approving the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question. The Assembly delegated to the Security Council the function of carrying out the prescribed partition through a United Nations Commission on Palestine made up of members from Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Panama and the Philippines.20 Immediately after the adoption was announced the Zionists turned directly to the task of securing adequate forces:

Within hours of the Assembly decision, Zionist spokesmen began urging that Palestinian Jews be armed by the United States,

18Truman, op. cit., p. 158.


United Nations, or virtually any other source. If this fails then they will ask that the United Nations supply arms to the Hananah. 21

President Truman wrote about the period following the partition vote:

The Jewish pressure on the White House did not diminish in the days following the vote in the U.N. Individuals and groups asked me, usually in rather quarrelsome and emotional ways, to stop the Arabs, to keep the British from supporting the Arabs, to furnish American soldiers, to do this, that, and the other. . . .

As the pressure mounted, I found it necessary to give instructions that I did not want to be approached by any more spokesmen for the extreme Zionist cause. I was even so disturbed that I put off seeing Dr. Chaim Weizmann, who had. . . . asked for an interview with me. 22

However, the Zionists gained the President's ear through his old friend Eddie Jacobson, who intervened in favor of Dr. Weizmann. After Truman's meeting with Jacobson, the President called Dr. Weizmann and said: "You can bank on us; I am for partition." 23

Dean Acheson wrote in his book, Present at Creation, that, "from many years of talk with him I know that Truman's efforts to help the Jewish victims of the Nazis represented a deep conviction, in large part implanted by his close friend and former partner, Eddie Jacobson, a passionate Zionist." 24 That statement made my Dean Acheson has been confirmed with the finding of Eddie Jacobson's diary, a book that detailed meetings, records, changes in Truman's attitudes and listed commitments the President made to Jacobson during the period of Israel's creation. 25 The diary revealed that Truman took a much more

22 Truman, op. cit., p. 160.
partisan role in the Palestine issue than had been previously thought.

In his memoirs Truman denied that there was any behind-the-scenes
White House pressure to deliver votes for the Jews during the
November, 1947, U.N. debate on partition. However, the following
are Mr. Jacobson's telegraphic entries for that period:

Truman fighting entire Cabinet and State Department to put
over Partition.
Nov. 6th—Wash.—Pres. still going all out for Palestine.
Nov. 17th—Again to the White House.
Sat. 22—No vote.
Monday, Nov. 24—No vote.
Tues., 25—French delegation asked for postponement of the
vote (at Truman's request). Was carried by one vote
majority.
Wed., 26—Received call from White House, everything O.K.
Nov. 27—Thanksgiving. Sent two page wire to Truman.
Friday, received call from his secretary not to worry.
Nov. 29th—Mission Accomplished.
Truman alone was responsible for swinging the votes of
several delegations. . . . the margin of victory in the
General Assembly was two votes.

It has long been wondered whether Truman's "instant" act of recognizing
Israel was part of a premeditated plan or just an impulsive gesture.

Jacobson's diary seemed to indicate that after March 18, Truman main-
tained a continuing dialogue with Chaim Weizmann, using Jacobson as an
intermediary. Other diary entries gave accounts of such meetings. It
seemed that President Truman never revealed the exact nature of his
association with Eddie Jacobson, although he never kept secret his
great loyalty and admiration for the man.

The Zionists and their ideas for military preparation in Palestine
were not welcomed by the U.S. Government. On December 5, 1947, the

26 ibid.
State Department placed an embargo on all arms bound for the Middle East and denied passports to all persons who wanted to serve with the armed forces of countries other than the United States.\(^\text{27}\) Despite these efforts, the Palestinian conflict became worse with acts of terrorism committed by both Jew and Arab against each other.

With constant turmoil in Palestine between Jew and Arab, the United States Ambassador to the U.N. reported it was his opinion that partition could not be accomplished under such hostile conditions and called for a temporary end to it.\(^\text{28}\) The Zionists reacted to the change in U.S. policy by stating that they wanted to create a provisional government that would begin administering to the Jewish state immediately, along with a unified military force—the Zionists seemed to be determined, at that point, to go it alone. Days of confusion followed and with only hours before the British mandate on Palestine was to expire, it was announced by a Zionist spokesman that the "provisional government" had declared the independence of the new State of Israel—two hours after the mandate ended the State of Israel came into being.\(^\text{29}\) Within minutes President Truman granted Israel de facto recognition. The President explained his change of mind concerning the Palestine question in the following statement:

> On May 14 I was informed that the Provisional Government of Israel was planning to proclaim a Jewish State at midnight that day, Palestine time, which was when the British mandate came to an end. I had often talked with my advisors. . .

\(^\text{27}\)U.S. Department of State Bulletin, (December 14, 1947), 1197.
\(^\text{28}\)Truman, op. cit., Pp. 164-5.
\(^\text{29}\)Silverberg, op. cit., p. 397.
and it was always understood that eventually we would recognize any responsible government the Jews might set up. Partition was not taking place in exactly the peaceful manner I had hoped, to be sure, but the fact was that the Jews were controlling the area in which their people lived and that they were ready to administer and to defend it. On the other hand, I was well aware that some of the State Department "experts" would want to block recognition of the Jewish State.

Now that the Jews were ready to proclaim the State of Israel, however, I decided to move at once and give American recognition to the new nation. I instructed a number of my staff to communicate my decision to the State Department and prepare it for transmission to Ambassador Austin at the United Nations in New York. About thirty minutes later, my press secretary handed the press the announcement of the de facto recognition of the United States of the provisional government of Israel.  

The strategy behind the Zionist unilateral declaration of the new Jewish state was stated by Dr. Weizmann:

Our only chance now, as in the past, was to create facts, to confront the world with these facts, to build on their foundation. . . . I was convinced that once we had taken destiny into our own hands and established the Republic, the American people would applaud our resolution. . . .

In a real sense the declaration of the State of Israel was a fait accompli, not to the United States, but to the world. It was a fact that Israel existed, it was irreversible and the world was faced with the realization that it had to be dealt with. Chaim Weizmann "confronted the world with these facts," thus the tactics stated above served their purpose. The Arabs living in Palestine at the time the State of Israel was born were not organized enough to declare their own independence. At that particular moment in time they were not

30 Truman, op. cit., p. 166.
31 Weizmann, op. cit., p. 476.
refugees, they were living in what they thought was still Palestine. Perhaps the Arabs underestimated the power of the Zionists who moved so quickly and worked so diligently to achieve their goals. However, it must be said, that the Palestinian Arab was politically naïve and had no knowledge of power-politics. As a result, the State of Israel was created in an atmosphere of hatred and conflict.

With the establishment of the State of Israel, Israeli officials sought legitimacy by outlining to the Secretary General of the United Nations the "legal" basis upon which they had acted. In the same letter, Israel made "application for the admission of the State of Israel for membership in the family of nations." The granting of de facto recognition to Israel by the United States and de jure recognition by the Soviet Union added to the legitimacy of statehood. The Soviet Union was the first country to grant de jure recognition to the State of Israel based on the hope that Israel's presence would provide them with a foothold in the Middle East. The U.S.S.R. perhaps envisioned Israel as an ally and a bastion for socialism in the area. On the heels of America's recognition, many other nations followed suit. Only Great Britain, one of the five permanent members of the U.N.


33de facto recognition is recognition of a new state by the fact of its existence. de jure recognition is recognition of a new state by law, by legality. The methods used by states who want to become members of the United Nations are (1) by applying directly to the Security Council with the sponsorship of one or more member states or (2) by applying directly to the General Assembly with a recommendation from the Security Council. Only Israel and Somaliland were created by the United Nations as States and were admitted as members concurrently citing Briggs, Herbert, The Law of Nations. N.Y.: Appleton-Century Crofts, Inc., 1938. Pp. 125-32.
Security Council, hesitated to recognize Israel. Israel had to protect itself in order to survive those troubled times. For survival they needed adequate military and financial resources. On the first day of Israel's independence Rabbi Goldstein of New York made the first public request for U.S. help when he told his congregation: "The United States should go beyond formal recognition to the point of extending material aid to the infant State..." Other Zionist leaders stated that, "the United States cannot recognize the newborn State of Israel on one day and then on the next abandon it to its fate." A rally was held in Washington, D.C., with heads of various Zionist groups from around the country present, where it was urged that President Truman help in getting economic aid for Israel. Pressures were being felt by the President from prominent Zionists in America as well as from other sectors including unions, professional organizations and private citizens. The Ladies Garment Workers Union announced its million dollar loan and a $220,000 donation to Israel. The Lawyers Committee for Justice in Palestine urged the President to give Israel de jure recognition. Even recognized private citizens such as Eleanor Roosevelt, member of the American delegation to the United Nations, tried to resign in an attempt to display her feelings on the matter.

35 ibid.
38 ibid.
Truman, within weeks, decided to exchange diplomatic representatives with Israel. However, only later, on January 31, 1949, when it became clear that Israel's government would be permanent, was de jure recognition extended.40

**America's Policies Toward Palestine Since World War II**

Prior to World War II, the United States traditionally was not active in Mideast affairs. The U.S. became preoccupied with its own pressing problems of national development. In the Middle East it accepted the growing position of Great Britain and France. That led to a policy of American noninvolvement in the area which was breached only when specific American interests were at stake—as in the dividing up of petroleum resources at the end of WW I.41 Between the two World Wars the United States sought to stay clear of Middle East involvements, by recognizing the French and British positions and carrying on only a limited diplomacy with the emerging Middle East states.

As World War II ended there seemed to be no pressing reason to alter this policy. Great Britain seemed to hold a strong position in the Arab world, both militarily and economically. Thus, there was no reason why the U.S. should not have continued to stay out of Arab affairs, relying on British presence to maintain protection of Western

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40 loc. cit., p. 426.

and American interests. However, it soon became evident that British strength was more apparent than real. The postwar weakness of Great Britain made it difficult to keep its commitments and at the same time meet new challenges. In many Arab countries a new generation of nationalists began to emerge, and for them the British occupier was still the sign of colonialism and suppression.

It was the growth of Soviet activity in the Middle East which forced the United States to assume its new responsibilities in the area. These responsibilities were first undertaken in Iran, Turkey and Greece where Soviet action threatened the most—not in the Arab states. To meet the situation the U.S. took steps in becoming the prime supporter for the defense of Greece and Turkey. Once its traditional aloofness from Middle Eastern affairs was broken, the U.S. was faced with recurring British requests for cooperation. At no point, however, did Britain give up its role in the Middle East; rather America just became a junior partner with Britain, until 1957 when the U.S. first assumed independent guarantees to the Arab world.

It has been stated before that Zionism had a high degree of access to U.S. decision makers following World War II. By 1945, President Truman took steps which he personally believed in and which also benefitted Zionist goals. It was common knowledge that the U.S. State Department had a history of opposing Zionist aims in Palestine and America's involvement in Zionist aims.  

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42loc. cit. p. 4.

43Silverberg, op. cit., p. 402.
once stated about foreign service officers that those, "striped pants boys in the State Department did not care enough about what happened to thousands of displaced persons who were involved." President Truman took the Palestine problem to the Potsdam Conference and tried to convince Britain to lift restrictions on Jewish immigration to Palestine.

On August 31, 1945, he asked Prime Minister Atlee to let more Jewish immigrants into Palestine and told him that "the American people as a whole, firmly believe that immigration into Palestine should not be closed and that a reasonable number of Europe's persecuted Jews should, in accordance with their wishes, be permitted to resettle there."

The policy of the Department of State seemed to have been one of noninvolvement in the Palestine question. An unidentified White House official stated about Truman's support of Jews in Palestine that, "without his constant aid, the result would have been impossible." It seemed that from mid-1945 onward, according to a N.Y. Times staff writer, "President Truman... had personal charge of the Palestine problem in its entirety." On April 30, 1946, President Truman issued the following statement on the recommendations of a committee he had set up to study the Palestine problem:

I am very happy that the request which I made for the immediate admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine has been

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46loc. cit., p. 139.
47New York Times, (May 1, 1946), 12.
unanimously endorsed by the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. The transference of these unfortunate people should now be accomplished with the greatest dispatch... 

I am also pleased that the committee recommends in effect the abrogation of the White Paper of 1939, including existing restrictions on immigration and land acquisition, to permit the further development of the Jewish national home. ...

In addition to these immediate objectives, the report deals with many other questions of language, political parties, and questions of international law which require careful study and which I will take under advisement.  

After reading Truman's statement on the Committee's recommendations, it seemed that he emphasized those aspects of the report which corresponded to issues that he personally believed in and took under advisement those which did not interest him.

During the time that President Truman set up his Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine, Britain adopted its Morrison-Grady Plan which called for the partition of Palestine into autonomous Arab and Jewish states under British trusteeship with British retention of specific powers. The Morrison-Grady Plan, adopted by the British government and highly praised by the U.S. State Department, was strongly opposed by American Zionists. It must be noted here that it was a common practice for the President to go against or completely ignore recommendations made by his State Department. That practice was not, of course, limited exclusively to the Truman administration. President Truman reluctantly refused to approve it because he said that only unrest


would result from it. Under Secretary of State Acheson, in explaining Truman's decision to the British Ambassador, said that due to "the extreme intensity of feeling in centers of Jewish population in this country neither party in Congress would support the program at the present time."51

A review of the Truman administration's stand on the Palestine question was issued by the White House in October, 1946. In that statement the President emphasized his complete support that 100,000 Jews should be allowed to immigrate to Israel and added:

The Jewish Agency proposed a solution to the Palestine problem by means of the creation of a viable Jewish state in control of its own immigration and economic policies in an adequate area of Palestine instead of the whole of Palestine. It proposed furthermore the immediate issuance of certificates for 100,000 Jewish immigrants... from the discussion which has ensued it is my belief that a solution along those lines would command the support of public opinion in the United States.... To such a solution our government could give its support.52

The Morrison-Grady Plan (British) permitted the 100,000 Jewish refugees to be admitted to Palestine, although not until twelve months after implementation of the partition plan.53 The United States was to be responsible for getting them from Europe to Palestine and for feeding them for two months. Furthermore, the U.S. would be expected, under the plan, to financially aid the Palestinian Arabs and establish an

51 loc. cit., 673-4.


economic development program for the entire Arab world. Thus, the Morrison-Grady Plan was, after some hesitation, rejected by Truman and the October 1946 statement was released by the White House in its place.

The October 1946 statement was delivered on the eve of the Jewish holiday Yom Kipper. It was noted in Secretary of Defense Forrestal's diary that "the President was prompted to make the speech by Zionist leader Rabbi (Abba Hillel) Silver...." Margaret Truman Daniels recounted in her book, *Harry S. Truman*, the pressures that the President was up against—"all the way from the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry to the Hebrew Committee of National Liberation to U.S. Senators to even Governor Dewey of New York; he finally wavered and gave in." However, politics, as well as personal feelings, could have played a role at that period in time. The October 4, 1946, statement made by Truman certainly did not hurt the Democratic Party's interests since speeches favorable to the Palestine question were needed before Jewish contributions to the National Committee could be given through Zionist pressure groups. However, it could be said that the immigration of Jews into Palestine was a part of Truman's personal beliefs and convictions even though he did not always approve of the strong armed pressure tactics used by Zionist groups. It was after the statement of October 4, 1946, that Britain decided to turn the Palestine question over to the United Nations in despair.

54 Millis and Duffield, op. cit., p. 309.

In the decisive year of 1947 the Zionist movement made known its position on matters affecting the Palestine question. The important question of a Jewish state in Palestine remained high on a list of priorities, but was modified in wording. By officially demanding all of Palestine (a pledge among themselves) but at the same time indicating a willingness to accept a part of that land (a request to the United Nations), the Zionists were able to keep their options open by leaving open the question of the extent of the Jewish state. By accepting an "adequate" area of Palestine the Zionists demonstrated a reasonableness that contrasted with the intransigence of the Arab states. The Zionists also let the United Nations debate the issue of the extent of the Jewish state, rather than the issue of whether such a state should even exist. The Zionist position on Jewish immigration to Palestine remained the same during 1947, but became more of a means for the movement's objectives rather than an end in itself as the establishment of a Jewish state became more apparent. However, illegal immigration during mid-1947 into Palestine increased which suggested that it was important to the establishment of the Jewish state. Manpower was needed to oppose the British and Arab population in Palestine if a Jewish state was to be formed. Finally, the more Jews that lived in Palestine the better the argument for a Jewish state became.

Zionist Aims

After World War II, with the death of six million Jews in Europe, Zionists decided that their power base must come from within the United States. Not only was there a sizeable number of Jews residing in the
U.S., but they constituted the wealthiest Jewish community in the world. With the death of approximately six million Europeans of the Jewish faith, American Jewry was the only group in a position to take over as leaders of the world Zionist movement. Financially, they could take the lead in supporting Israel and sustaining its existence. At an international Zionist conference held in Basle, Switzerland, December, 1946, it became clear through the words of Chaim Weizmann that the international movement was most influenced by American born Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver. Rabbi Silver was a militantly pro-Zionist leader in America. Following World War II Rabbi Silver travelled throughout the United States giving speeches in the hope of arousing American Jews to join in the cause of Zionism. He was an influential member in the Republican Party and a close associate of Senator Taft, but when President Eisenhower came into office, Rabbi Silver was not able to gain his confidence or his ear.\textsuperscript{56} A description of that Zionist conference in Switzerland can be found in delegate Chaim Weizmann's book:

\begin{quote}
It was a dreadful experience to stand before that assembly and to run one's eye along row after row of delegates, finding among them hardly one of the friendly faces which had adorned past congresses. Polish Jewry was missing; German Jewry was missing. The two main groups represented were the Palestinians and the Americans; between them sat the representatives of the fragments of European Jewry, together with some small delegations from England, the Dominions, and South America. 
\end{quote}

The American group, led by Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, was from the outset the strongest, not so much because of enlarged numbers, or by virtue of inherent strength of delegates, but because of the weakness of the rest.\textsuperscript{57}

Dr. Weizmann was a member of a minority group who encouraged further cooperation with Britain in the attainment of a Jewish homeland. However, Palestinian Jews under the leadership of Mr. Ben-Gurion and the American delegation headed by Rabbi Silver voted to accept nothing but the entirety of Palestine, as well as a complete break with Britain over the matter. As a result, the Weizmann minority group was asked to leave the WZO unless they were willing to accept the majority view. An Arab-Jewish partition of Palestine plan was never to be considered again by the WZO.

The aims of the American Zionist movement had been voiced at a Zionist conference in New York City in 1943. Their plan was titled the "Biltmore Program" which was unanimously accepted at that conference:

The conference urges that the gates of Palestine be opened; that the Jewish Agency be vested with control of immigration into Palestine and with the necessary authority for up-building the country, including the development of its unoccupied and uncultivated land; and that Palestine be established as a Jewish Commonwealth integrated in the structure of the new democratic world.\textsuperscript{58}

By 1944 the American Jewish Conference asked the United Nations for financial and technical assistance for the development of Palestine. In 1946 the principles of the Biltmore Program were again reaffirmed and their aims remained the same. In the past the terms "state" and

\textsuperscript{57}\textit{Weizmann, Chaim}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 442.

"commonwealth" were used interchangeably, but by late 1946 the ZOA openly resolved to "pursue a firm policy toward the establishment of a 'Jewish State.'"\(^59\)

It seemed obvious that the basic aims of the Zionist movement at the end of World War II were as follows:

1. A Jewish state should be established in Palestine at the earliest possible date.
2. Palestine should be opened to unrestricted Jewish immigration. Any impediments to this immigration, such as the British Paper of 1939, should be removed.
3. The authority and responsibility of the Jewish Agency for Palestine should be increased. Certainly the second and third points hinge on the first. If Jewish immigrants were allowed to enter Palestine without restriction, and if the responsibility of the Jewish Agency was increased then Palestine would have a Jewish majority and in all practicality be a Jewish state regardless of the legal situation.\(^60\)

In 1947, the "legal situation" was that Palestine remain under British mandate as a result of action taken in 1922 by the League of Nations. Zionists felt at that time that Britain, not the Arabs, was the enemy standing in the way of their goals. They wrote in their periodical, New Palestine, that "the British Colonial office with its dark and stubborn adherence... to the exact provision of the White Paper must be overcome."\(^61\) Under the administrative system established by the British in Palestine, self-governing Jewish institutions were permitted to develop, a Jewish Agency was established and Jewish immigration was facilitated. Almost 500,000 new Jewish immigrants had been

\(^{59}\)Lilienthal, op. cit., The Other Side of the Coin, p. 18.


\(^{61}\)Lilienthal, op. cit., The Other Side of the Coin, p. 43.
brought into Palestine by the end of World War II, despite the continued Arab unrest which the British sought to diminish.62 The British gave arms and other equipment to the Jews in Palestine so that they might be prepared for their own defense. Yet the British Government was unable to yield to the Zionist demand that Palestine be made a Jewish state, though it expressed its willingness to accept any reasonable settlement on which both the Zionists and the Arabs would agree. The conflict between uncompromising Jewish Nationalists and the British Administration led, after World War II, to illegal immigration, violence and sabotage.63 The area soon became an armed camp. The Jewish Agency later came to conduct "foreign affairs" with the governments of Palestine and Great Britain and with the League of Nations through agency offices in Jerusalem, London and Geneva. The Jewish Agency had a military arm which became known as the Haganah (defense). They also had civil servants who were well trained working for them. In summary, the Jewish Agency in Palestine was a shadow government and was certainly prepared to take over for an future Jewish government in Palestine.

The Zionist and Arab Lobby
Groups on Capitol Hill

Among lobby groups in Congress, the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) keeps a close watch over the strong ties between

62 Weizmann, op. cit., p. 290.
Israel and the United States.\textsuperscript{64} The AIPAC is supported by non-deductible contributions, it operates on a $200,000 a year budget and represents major Jewish organizations on Capitol Hill.\textsuperscript{65} Registered lobbyists Si Kenan and David Wollack started to work as part of a special interest group called the American Zionist Council (forerunner of the AIPAC) in late 1951.\textsuperscript{66} The committee's principal interests have continuously (1951-1973) been to promote economic development and peace in the Middle East (Israel), and to facilitate the emigration and resettlement of Jews from the Soviet Union. When issues arose concerning the State of Israel, position papers were sent out to Jewish leaders around the country letting them know continuous developments. The committee has maintained extensive files on matters important to Israel, especially material to counter Arab propaganda. The group also drafts speeches and conducts research for persons that request such assistance as well as distributing a weekly newsletter containing factual data on subjects pertaining to the Middle East.

According to Mr. Si Kenan, Congress is basically sympathetic to Israel because the Jewish state has demonstrated self-reliance and does not ask for American manpower to help them fight their wars.\textsuperscript{67} Conservatives regard Israel as a source of strength against communist backed Arab governments and the only bulwark the U.S. has against


\textsuperscript{65}loc. cit., 2129.

\textsuperscript{66}loc. cit., 2129-31.

\textsuperscript{67}ibid.
international communism. Liberals, Mr. Kenan feels, point to Israel as a representation of "the democratic way of life."\(^\text{68}\)

The AIPAC spends a considerable portion of its time countering Arab propaganda which they refer to as the "petro-diplomatic complex" made up of a coalition of oil lobbyists, diplomats and educators with cultural and theological interests in the Arab world.\(^\text{69}\) The committee feels that the pro-Arab lobby will be stronger in the future due to the oil crisis.

Unlike the pro-Israeli lobby in the United States, pro-Arab activity has suffered from a lack of direction. On the local level, a patchwork of organizations have come about over the years to speak out on Arab causes; at the national level, pro-Arab groups, working independently, pursued their own objectives. An explanation for disunity within the Arab-American community resulted from a lack of pro-Arab leadership on the national level, the tendency of middle class and professionals of Arab background to assimilate into American life and the reluctance of Arab-Americans to sacrifice for their cause as American Jews had for Israel.

Historically, there have been no major pro-Arab groups working on Capitol Hill. Dr. M. T. Mehdi founded the Action Committee on American-Arab Relations in 1964.\(^\text{70}\) That group has been thought of as the oldest and most politically active Arab organization. The committee's objectives

\(^{68}\)ibid.

\(^{69}\)Congressional Quarterly, "The Middle East." (April 1974), 54.

\(^{70}\)loc. cit., 53.
centered on changing U.S. policy toward the Middle East, although they have never been officially registered as a lobby group with the clerk of the House of Representatives. Dr. Mehdi believed that lobbying in Congress was a waste of time and changing a country's policies had to begin on the grassroots level. The Action Committee on American-Arab Relations has sent its workers across the country to campaign against politicians they oppose and filed lawsuits and complaints with the Federal Communications Commission about a slanted portrayal of Arabs by the communication media.\(^{71}\)

Dr. Mehdi has conducted the committee's activities on a shoestring. He disclosed that part of his organization's finances come from U.S. petroleum companies and various Quaker and Mennonite religious groups, but not enough to be considered sufficient.\(^{72}\)

Only since 1972 has a group headed by Dr. Peter Tanous, National Association of Arab Americans (NAAA), emerged that promises to persuade Congress to reverse its "over-commitment" to Israel.\(^{73}\) They plan to eventually work as a registered lobby group on Capitol Hill. For years American Arabs were overwhelmed by pro-Israeli sentiment in the U.S. and were also divided among themselves. They have thus decided to stress the political issues involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict—Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories and the question of a Palestinian state on the West Bank. The NAAA hopes to explain

\(^{71}\)loc. cit., 55.

\(^{72}\)ibid.

\(^{73}\)loc. cit., 52.
their position on these issues to the American public. A resolution of the territorial and Palestinian issues is the principal objective of the NAAA lobby. While the leaders of that group do not expect to turn the tide of U.S. opinion in the near future, they are making a real effort to be heard. They believe their success is just a question of politicizing the Arab-American community.

A Washington lobby, primarily concerned with foreign policy, has not been unusual. The old "China lobby," now virtually defunct, existed only to promote the interests of Chiang Kai-shek's Taiwan and to resist any moves by the U.S. to open relations with Communist China. A lobby group in Congress is a part of the United States governmental system and is a legitimate way of expressing positions taken by various members within the American society.

Summary

The private pleas made to Truman by various Zionist and non-Zionist groups turned the future of Israel into a public issue with the coming of the Presidential election of 1948. During the ensuing months of that election year, the proposal for a loan to Israel was taken up and used by various politicians ranging from local officials to Presidential candidates. From August 1948 through the November election, the questions of de jure recognition and a U.S. loan for Israel were treated as political issues as each Presidential candidate vied with the other for the so-called "Jewish vote." To help keep factions within the Democratic Party unified, Truman pledged his full support in favor of the Party's platform on giving Israel de jure
recognition, revising the arms embargo and granting loans whenever they were applied for.\textsuperscript{74} That pledge, made by Truman, demonstrated the extent to which domestic politics as well as emotions became involved in foreign affairs during 1948.

Throughout 1946, 1947 and 1948, the American Zionist movement maintained and extended its influence. Its task was made easier by a favorable American public opinion and a President who felt that the United States owed European Jews a haven after the Nazi holocaust. It could possibly be said that President Truman was not able to see the long range effects arising from placing the welfare of displaced Jewish refugees before political considerations related to the displacement of Palestinian Arabs.

Through organization and perseverance the Zionist movement was able to continually attract allies—both influential American groups and important individuals—who were able to bring some pressure to bear upon governmental officials to influence White House decision making if it was in the national interest to do so. The only split in the movement came in 1946 when moderates opposed militants over the issue of partition. However, a final united front was shown in 1948 with the establishment of the State of Israel, a move that was first legitimized by U.S.S.R. \textit{de jure} recognition and then by U.S. \textit{de facto} recognition. The U.N., in a most unusual move, concurrently voted to create the State of Israel and admit it as a member of the World Body. By late 1948 it appeared that most of their aims had been achieved.

\textsuperscript{74}\textit{New York Times}, (October 25, 1948), 2.
It may be noted, however, that whenever President Truman felt a threat to the American national interest, such as when Zionists asked for arms to protect Palestinian Jews against Arabs, then he took those interests into consideration and formulated policy accordingly—in this case an embargo on all arms bound for the Middle East.

President Truman's October 4, 1946, "Yom Kipper statement" illustrated the extent to which foreign policy could be used as a means of gaining votes during a presidential election year. The extent to which Truman's actions were in harmony with Zionist objectives during the early postwar years must be noted in light of the fact that he actively sought increased Jewish immigration to Palestine while ignoring complaints from British officials who advised him to be more cautious in decisions that would have a long-range effect on Palestine's future. When Britain asked for U.S. cooperation through the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, the President selectively praised Committee recommendations which supported his position and what he personally believed in and "took under advisement" those which did not. During General Assembly talks on the UNSCOP report, the U.S. again lent its assistance to Zionist aims to bring about a Jewish state through partition. Within minutes after Israel declared its statehood, Truman granted de facto recognition, thus further helping Zionists legitimize their claim. The U.S. was only preceded by the U.S.S.R. who granted Israel full de jure recognition. Finally, in January of 1949 a loan was given to Israel in the exact amount asked for by Zionist pressure groups in Washington.
Despite America's friendly relationship with Zionism and Israel, there were times when U.S. policies ran contrary to Zionist objectives. The U.S. Government's embargo on arms to the Middle East and its refusal to issue passports to people who wanted to serve in foreign armies went contrary to Zionist plans to prepare for future hostilities. The State Department was influential in delaying Zionist goals when it proposed a postponement to the partition of Palestine through force or by other means. The State Department did not believe, as pointed out in previous pages, that U.S. interests would be served by a partition plan or by the creation of Israel. The United States was busy rebuilding a devastated Europe under the Marshall Plan and officials in the State Department did not want to become entangled with Mideast problems. At that point in time the Soviet Union had no strong ties with Arab states and only vague designs on establishing a foothold in the Mideast for strategic purposes. As for Moscow's instant recognition of the State of Israel, perhaps it saw the new country as a potential bastion for socialism in the area and future foothold for Soviet interests.

Other differences in U.S.-Zionist policies during that three-year period were only different in degree. American offered de facto recognition to the State of Israel, as opposed to de jure recognition. Refusal to grant Israel immediate help in the form of large loans was only a temporary setback for the Zionists and was later achieved after eight months.

_Acheson, op. cit., p. 591._
In conclusion, it would be correct to state that American policy toward Palestine from 1946-1948 somewhat conformed with Zionist objectives on the whole. It also seems correct to say that President Truman maintained a close watch on America's Palestine policy and, because of his sympathies with their goals that also happened to serve U.S. interests but not always with their tactics, encouraged policies that favored Zionist aims on more than one occasion. It must be noted, however, that the President, shortly after the partition of Palestine, called for the U.N. to set up a temporary trusteeship to end the fighting there. That move brought about a great deal of criticism from the American Zionist community, yet Truman felt it was a necessary step to take due to the fact that the fighting was causing an increasingly tense international situation. President Truman's policies, one could say, were not a mere echo of the Zionist movement but his emotions and the international situation played a decisive role in his final decisions concerning Palestine. It is an interesting footnote to add in conclusion that his actions during that three-year period in history won him the praise and admiration of all American Zionists when on November 28, 1965, the ZOA honored him with their "Theodor Herzl Award."
CHAPTER III

THE YEARS OF NATION-BUILDING
AND POLITICAL UNDERCURRENTS

The American Zionist movement continued to pursue its activities after Israel had been created in the Middle East. The Zionist Organization of America (ZOA), however, needed new objectives to give it purpose for existing. Specific objectives came in the form of, "safeguarding the future of Israel through both cultural and economic links with the American Jewish populations." It was felt by the majority of Zionist leaders in America that it was their responsibility and mission to mobilize all Jews within the United States in support of Israel.

This chapter will be primarily devoted to an analysis of Zionist activities vis-a-vis the United States during the years 1955, 1956 and early 1957, and the Middle East policies which the United States pursued during that period. Chapter Three will point out the extent to which American Middle East policies of the period were in conformity with Zionist aims.

The Years Up to 1954

On May 25, 1950, the United States, France and Great Britain joined in signing the Tripartite Declaration which was designed to stop the spread of communism in the Middle East:

it was declared that both Israel and the Arab countries had the right to arm themselves against internal, as well as external, threatening forces. Second, assurances had to be received by all parties concerned that weapons received would not be used for offensive purposes. Furthermore, it was established that if any violation was made then Great Britain, France and the U.S. would have the power to intervene.²

The Tripartite Declaration was designed not only to prevent Arab-Israeli confrontation, but also to minimize any Soviet penetration into the area as well as retain a measure of influence there.

From 1950 through 1955 American policy toward the Middle East was one of continuing involvement both economically and militarily. During those years many treaties of technical cooperation and assistance were signed with Jordan, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon and Israel. Treaties providing for U.S. economic assistance were signed between the U.S. and Israel, Jordan and Lebanon as well as a military agreement in 1951 between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.³ A year later the same assistance agreement was concluded between the U.S. and Israel. There seemed little doubt that American policy toward the Middle East during the early 1950's was aimed both at promoting cooperation between the states of the region and toward providing an increasing American presence in that vital area in order to prevent, or at least minimize, Soviet penetration. The U.S. also sought the active support of those countries on the side of the West in the cold war struggle against the Soviet bloc.

³loc. cit., 887-8.
The U.S. election of 1952 brought a change in U.S. policy toward the Middle East. President Eisenhower sent Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to Asia and the Middle East to gain firsthand knowledge about those areas. He returned and reported the following:

1. The people of these regions were suspicious not only of the "colonial powers" but also of the U.S. which they thought might act to preserve or restore the old colonial interests of our allies.
2. The Mutual Security Program should be utilized for "contributing advanced technical knowledge."
3. In the Middle East, the "United States should seek to allay the deep resentment against it that has resulted from the creation of Israel."

Mr. Dulles' third conclusion seemed to be a departure from America's previous committed relationship with Israel. It was the first public statement made by a top level American decision maker indicating that the United States might have gone too far in its support of Israel. During the course of his trip Mr. Dulles noted that the Arabs were more fearful of Zionism than of communism. He emphasized that the United States should be impartial in order to win the respect of Israel as well as of Arab countries.

An indication of America's effort to take an impartial stand in the ever-growing Arab-Israeli conflict was noted when the U.S. government joined France and Britain in protesting Israel's armed attack on the Jordanian village of Qibya. The U.S. voted to condemn Israel for blowing up forty buildings where dozens of Arabs were forced at gunpoint

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5. Ibid.
6. SCOR, 8th year (1953), Supplements, Supplement for October, November, December 1953 (S/3109-3111), 6-7.
to remain inside and be blown up. The U.S., in 1953, further condemned Israel for moving its Foreign Office from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in defiance of U.N. intentions to place that city under international trusteeship.

Toward the end of 1953 the American Zionist movement began an attempt to rally its forces. The themes used by the ZOA, of an Israel under attack by its enemies and victimized by a hostile and bungling State Department continued into 1954. After Dulles' report on the Middle East was released, President Eisenhower made it clear to his cabinet and the American people that his administration was not going to conduct foreign policy in a manner that would jeopardize America's national interests. Apparently President Eisenhower felt that United States' "national interests" were jeopardized, especially in the case of Palestine. However, it must be restated here that when a President makes foreign policy, domestic political considerations come into play and are weighted heavily in the final decision making process. No President in United States history has worked and made decisions free from domestic political considerations, including Mr. Eisenhower.

American Foreign Policy Toward The Middle East During the 1950's

The Western attempt to retain a measure of control over the Middle East and to bring peace and stability to that region through controlling

7American Zionist, (November 1953), 1.

the supply of armaments began to crumble in late 1954 when, alarmed by the growing influence of Nasser, France and Israel made a secret arms deal. On February 28, 1955, Israel, using the weapons it obtained from France and the U.S., ordered a raid on Gaza which completely took the Egyptians by surprise and destroyed their military strength in the area. Weeks after the Israeli raid, Egypt made a request for U.S. arms. President Eisenhower noted in his memoirs that Nasser, "apparently alarmed over the ferocity of an Israeli reprisal raid in the Gaza Strip," asked for $27,000,000 in American arms.

The U.S. responded to Nasser’s request for arms in a manner that amounted to a refusal. The conditions which the United States set on selling arms to Egypt were very difficult for Egypt to meet. For example, the U.S. demanded an immediate payment in cash—not in goods or crops such as cotton. Egypt was not able to raise such a large amount of cash in foreign currency to pay the United States. Under those conditions the Egyptian President responded to President Eisenhower with a statement which was interrupted in Washington as blackmail. The President indicated that Egypt may have no other course of action, but to do business with the Soviet Union. When no response came from Washington, Egypt followed through with its plan. The U.S.S.R. eagerly obliged Egypt’s request for arms since it was by no

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11 Thomas, op. cit., p. 125.
means prepared to let such an opportunity for gaining a foothold in the Middle East pass.

A month later Nasser reiterated that he would have preferred Western arms but had turned to the East because the United States placed conditions on arms sales that were not compatible with Egypt's sovereignty. In reality, the price asked by the U.S. was too high for Egypt to pay. The initial American reaction to the Egyptian arms deal with the Soviet Union was one of restraint. Both Secretary of State Dulles and President Eisenhower seemed to agree that the best way to gain Arab support and confidence was to win over the one man in the Arab world who possessed charisma as well as power. There has been no one person in modern times who has held the Arab world together in unity or been its spokesman, but the man who most closely represented that image was Egypt's Gamal Nasser.

President Eisenhower felt that through some common ground with Nasser, cooperation between Arab countries and America could come about. It was true that Nasser had personal ambitions which went beyond his role as a reformer, but it was also true that Western influence seemed to be crumbling in the face of a new pan-Arabism with Nasser as its symbol. Eisenhower, with his ideas of cooperation with Egypt, met strong opposition from within the country. The year 1956 was a time of fierce anti-colonial feeling along with trends toward neutralism not only in the Middle East but in all former colonial areas.

13 ibid.

around the world. Thus, Eisenhower's policy of coming to terms with the most prominent spokesman of that "Third World" movement was felt as a threat by many sectors within American society. Up to that point in history, either a country was in the communist camp or was a member of the democratic western alliance. A middle road attitude was not considered or accepted. It was thought that America had little to gain from Afro-Asian countries by too closely identifying itself with the Middle East policies of neutralism. Consequently, U.S. policy seemed to have been torn between President Eisenhower's desire to pose as the major Western friend of the emerging nations and many American's desire to maintain a strong relationship with its allies upon whose cooperation the future of the West depended.

One of the most far reaching attempts by the United States to come to terms with Nasser followed his request for American financial support to build the Aswan High Dam. President Eisenhower's reaction was much different from Secretary of State Dulles':

Eisenhower had reacted in a spirit true to his unwavering belief that wise statecraft should seek to extend economic influence, rather than impose economic isolation, on the politically doubtful. He accordingly favored answering the Egyptian call. So, less categorically, did Dulles—providing Cairo would pay the price of loosening its bands with Moscow.

It was obvious that Dulles used the Aswan Dam issue as something of a test of Nasser's true inclinations. Dulles used the question of the

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Aswan Dam as a means of separating Nasser from his new Soviet benefactors. Nasser's response to the American offer was to seek to maximize his gains. He let the U.S. government know that the Soviets had made an offer to help him build the Aswan Dam. In response, Dulles also seemed to have repeated his earlier policies. He placed strings on any U.S. financial help to Egypt. Dulles, instead of insisting on cash payments only, used his influence in an effort to lure the Egyptian leader to the West as the price for U.S. aid and domination. Nasser, sensitive to the issue of Western colonialism after just ridding Egypt of British domination, was not prepared to become involved with the United States in the same way. It was questionable as to whether he could have given in to America's demands and still pursue his plan to make Egypt the center of an alliance of Arab, African and Muslim people.17

The U.S. offer to aid Egypt in building the Aswan Dam was also running into difficulty in Congress where there had come into being what Eisenhower called an "anti-Dam coalition" made up of "Senators with pro-Israeli sympathies, and Southerners concerned with the cotton market, and those who were opposed to any kind of assistance to foreign nations other than our own loyal allies."18 One action of that coalition was a letter sent by New York Congressman Emanuel Celler to Secretary of Agriculture Benson on April 25, 1956, and inserted into


the Congressional Record on May 3, 1956. The Representative from Brooklyn directed the attention of the Secretary to "the plight of the extra long staple cotton growers in the United States" and asked that he use his "best effort in alleviating the current conditions which were directly traceable to excessive imports of long staple cotton from Egypt." Congressman Celler continued:

Egypt has acted overall in a manner very hostile to the United States. . . . She asked for our aid in building the Aswan Dam, accepted our offer to do so, and turned her back on the United States to deal even more with Russia. . . .

General Nasser, director of Egypt, has been responsible for the present crisis in the Middle East, due to his acceptance of Red arms. . . .

It does not seem logical nor in the interest of fair play and justice, to continue to appease a nation definitely hostile to the United States and particularly to the detriment of our domestic cotton growers and at the expense of their cotton market.  

In mid-July, Dulles informed the Egyptians that the United States was "not now in a position to deal with this matter because we could not predict what action Congress might take and our views on the merit of this matter had somewhat altered." On July 19, 1956, the U.S. issued a statement which cancelled the offer of U.S. aid for the Aswan Dam. The statement to cancel aid seemed to be an attempt to pacify the United States Congress. A week later Dulles wrote to Eisenhower: "If I had not announced our withdrawal when I did, the Congress would

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20Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 32.
certainly have imposed it on us, almost unanimously. As it was, we retained some flexibility.\textsuperscript{21}

In the spring and summer of 1956 world events underwent a change in Israel's favor that brought the Jewish state into the arena of international politics. The French, having failed to make a bargain with Nasser over Algerian independence, began to sell arms to Israel in large quantities on the theory that, "the enemy of an enemy is a friend."\textsuperscript{22} Nasser, seeking to ensure an alternative source of arms, recognized Communist China. Secretary of State Dulles, surprised by Nasser's boldness and pressed by the U.S. Congress, decided to abruptly cancel the United States' offer to help Egypt build the Aswan Dam. Nasser reacted swiftly by nationalizing the Suez Canal in July 1956, and offering to compensate shareholders for their bonds. Future Suez Canal revenues were to be used to help finance the Aswan Dam Project.\textsuperscript{23}

With these actions a showdown seemed inevitable. Israel, afraid of growing attacks by Palestinian guerrillas (fedayeen) based in Egypt and fearing Egyptian-Syrian solidarity with Jordan as a third possible ally, agreed to join France and Britain (major shareholders in the Suez Canal Company) in an invasion of Egypt after the nationalization was declared. Britain and France, the principal shareholders in the Suez Canal Company and the principal users of the waterway, were determined to regain ownership of the Suez Company. While at first

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\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Middle Eastern Affairs}, (August - September, 1956), 298-9.
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\textsuperscript{22} Safran, op. cit., p. 51.
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Washington formally backed its allies, it later realized the danger of a possible East-West confrontation and sought desperately for three months to try to defuse the crisis through diplomatic measures. Most likely British and American oil interests in the area played some role in the United States decision to quickly defuse the situation. With the threat of an all-out war engulfing the entire Middle East, U.S. oil interests, particularly in Iran, had to be protected, which was pointed out to President Eisenhower by the oil lobby in Congress.24 America's oil interests were taken up by U.S. Senators from oil rich states as well as by professional lobbyists hired by U.S. oil companies.

The American Zionist Movement in the 1950's

In the years following the establishment of Israel, the enthusiasm of American Zionism declined. In his book, Protestant-Catholic-Jew, Will Herberg put forth a possible reason for the declining enthusiasm for Zionism on the part of American Jews. He noted that "a new third generation of American Jews came of age in the years following the establishment of Israel: a generation proud of its Jewish identity but thinking of its Jewishness in religious terms."25

The Zionist aim, during the Sinai period, was most clearly seen in its emphasis on the educational, cultural and organizational activities of Israel. That aim became most directly related to the


formation of a United States foreign policy toward the Middle East. During the nineteen fifties the Zionist movement was viewed differently under the Eisenhower administration than under the Truman administration. Because the American Jew was strongly affiliated with the Democratic Party, Zionists were not as influential under the Republican Eisenhower administration. President Truman had personal sympathies for the Zionist cause which at times may have, according to some writers, been influential in his decisions concerning the Palestine question. On the other hand, President Eisenhower never had a close working relationship with the American Jewish community. Also, the Eisenhower administration owed little of its success in the 1952 election to the Jewish vote. During the 1952 election there was a sizeable defection from the Democratic camp over to the Republican side, except from the Jewish sector:

... an analysis of returns from Jewish areas and the results of national surveys show that the Jewish defection was slight indeed with 75% of America's Jews remaining solidly Democratic. So slight in fact that the Jewish vote went so solidly for Stevenson that, in many areas, he did better than had Truman in 1948.  

The Republicans could not "lose" the Jewish vote in 1956 because they never had it. To make the Zionist position within the Eisenhower administration even worse, the movement had actively supported the Democrats in the 1954 congressional elections. Because the Zionists lacked a strong power base within the Republican Party they could not


27 Lilienthal, op. cit., There Goes the Middle East, Pp. 101-6.
expect to have the same degree of influence that they had during the Truman administration. However, President Eisenhower continued to follow America's policy of being Israel's closest ally and largest supplier of economic and military aid. Israeli-American friendship was never really threatened during the Eisenhower administration. Being Israel's ally, and thus maintaining a U.S.-Soviet balance-of-power in the Middle East, was never jeopardized.

Zionist Aims in the 1950's

During the mid-1950's there was an emphasis in Zionist periodicals on the issue of denying U.S. arms to Arab states. On February 2, 1955, it was reported by the New York Times that Israel's government had approached the U.S., Britain and France seeking security guarantees and a part in the Baghdad Pact.28 The Baghdad Pact and its importance in the Eisenhower era will be treated fully in the following chapter. During succeeding months the Zionists grew impatient as the State Department remained impartial to Israel's appeal for a security arrangement with the United States. Public support for an "Israeli security system" was solicited through rallies and endorsements by influential men and women. When these efforts brought no favorable response from Dulles or President Eisenhower, a Zionist spokesman again attributed the difficulty to "anti-Israeli elements" in the State Department.29

In trying to promote a mutual security pact, Israel emphasized that the

pact would be in the U.S. national interest. They assured the American people that by providing security for Israel, they would be "saving the Middle East for democracy." During the mid-1950's Zionists were concerned about America's attitude toward Israel and its future:

An American policy which adds to Arab arms without correspondingly increasing Israel's arms can have only one result—if pursued much longer, it will have destroyed the delicate balance of strength which is the only deterrent to an Arab second round with Israel.31

It may be said that by mid-1950 the American Zionist movement perceived a threat to Israel. Once Egypt agreed to accept arms from Soviet bloc countries, that perceived threat increased and was seen as a destructive force by a weak Israel.

The disagreement between United States policy makers and Israel's leadership regarding the true balance-of-power in the Middle East was reflected in the debate over the issue within the United States. After Nasser's announcement of an arms deal with the East, the ZOA declared that Egypt would use Czech arms to resume military action against Israel. On November 17, 1955, Israel presented the U.S. government with a detailed list of the arms it required: the items totaled $40,000,000.32 The list of influential individuals and groups who voiced their support for arming Israel seemed endless. By March, 1955, ZOA leadership was asking the American public to appeal to President Eisenhower and the State Department in their behalf and individuals

30 American Zionist, (June 1955), 1-4.
31 ibid.
such as Adlai Stevenson, Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Walter Reuther, Harry Truman, Jacob Javits, Mayor Wagner and Hubert Humphrey responded favorably. In a statement made by the influential American Zionist magazine it was evident that pressures were being brought to bear on the U.S. government and its policies toward the Middle East:

Peace in the Middle East is a direct American concern and the American public opinion which earnestly seeks a restoration of bi-partisan foreign policies in all spheres of international tension, will not be easily fobbed off by disingenuous requests that it keep its mouth shut until after November 6 (elections).\textsuperscript{33}

If the executive branch of the government was not accessible to the Zionists they would turn to the U.S. Congress or they would go directly to the American people in order to get across the points they wished to emphasize. A review of President Eisenhower's memoirs during the 1956 period showed that the President was not prepared to yield to highly organized pressures being exerted by the ZOA movement and its supporters in that presidential election year.\textsuperscript{34} Eisenhower stressed that Israel's security depended on the "collective security" of the U.N. rather than on American guarantees of weaponry.\textsuperscript{35}

The earlier attempts to bring about a refusal of American arms to the Arab states was abandoned by the Zionist movement in favor of the alternate method of increasing Israel's military supremacy through securing additional weapons of its own. It must be noted that the 1955 Egyptian-Czech arms deal shattered the limitation on the level of

\textsuperscript{33}\textit{American Zionist}, (February 1956), 2.


\textsuperscript{35}\textit{Safran, op. cit.}, Pp. 49-50.
armaments imposed by the Tripartite Declaration of 1950. Thus, the balance-of-power in the Mideast would shift in favor of the Arabs (backed by the Soviet Union) if Israel was not able to get American arms to counter the situation. The Soviet Union, with its strength in the Arab world marked by the 1955 arms deal, placed America in a somewhat uneasy position in the area.

**The Suez Crisis**

Britain reacted to the nationalization of the Suez Canal by immediately alerting its forces in the Mediterranean and urging that the West begin at once an examination of possible economic, political and military countermeasures. The French reacted emotionally and urged the West to act upon the matter with all its influence and force. The American reaction was supportive but subdued. President Eisenhower felt there was no reason to panic and act hastily. Both the Israelis and the French believed that it was in their common interest to overthrow Nasser, thus ending any further problems in the Middle East instigated by Egypt. Throughout the summer of 1956 the United States sought to act as a neutral mediator in the Suez dispute. While sympathetic toward European allies, Eisenhower believed that a resort to force would be "illegal" and would not be supported by world opinion and international law. He felt that force would not be employed if Nasser proved that his country could operate the Suez Canal and would agree to let ships pass through from countries that Egypt was

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not at war with. Through September, 1956, Britain, France and Israel continued with their military preparations against Egypt. The situation in the Middle East at that time was an example of America's changing role there. At certain points in time, the United States encouraged de-colonization around the world. Examples were India, Pakistan and even Nasser's 1952 revolution to rid Egypt of King Faruq and Western (British) occupation. On the other hand, America was well aware of its strong bond with countries who had colonized under-developed nations for their own gains. The United States did not want to antagonize Britain and France because of common interests. The U.S. built up Europe after World War II and did not want that effort jeopardized in view of a new conflict in the Middle East. America also shared a military bond with Europe in the NATO alliance. Thus the United States, while encouraging anti-colonialism, tried to remain vitally interested in the well-being of Europe. Though both aims seemed in direct contradiction of each other, both were vital to the long-range interests of the United States. The task was to find a means of promoting and maintaining Afro-Asian friendship as well as Allied solidarity.

Not only was President Eisenhower concerned about the future of Western unity, but various American-Zionist groups voiced their concern too. Editorials appeared in various Zionist magazines and contained the following concern:

The certainty of losing our present allies in NATO is not a price America can pay for the uncertain prospects of sharing with Russia in dubious Arab friendship. . . .
The damaging effects of our government's initial reaction—against our closest European allies, Britain and France and our best friend in the Middle East, Israel—must be undone, else... the Free World alliance will collapse.37

As pointed out in a past chapter, such Zionist concern for U.S.-British relations was not present a decade earlier when every effort was made to malign Britain and secure American opposition to its Palestine policies. Fortunately, the Western alliance never collapsed under the strained relations caused by the invasion in October 1956.

The attack on Egyptian territory was rightly timed according to Britain, France and Israel. The Soviet Union was involved in putting down a revolt in Hungary, a revolt for independence and freedom from Soviet domination. France, Britain and Israel became willing allies. Finally, the U.S. was expected to be reluctant in opposing pro-Israeli influence in America during the final days of the 1956 National Election. As it turned out, however, the Soviet Union used the situation to its advantage by exploiting the tripartite invasion of Egypt in order to turn the world's attention away from the repressive measures it was applying in Hungary. The U.S. did not back its Western allies as expected. As a result, Britain and France were not able to carry out their plans with Israel to topple Nasser in the face of a combined U.S.-Soviet threat and opposition from within their own countries. Prime Minister Eden of Britain, never bothered to consult the Parliament before he gave the order for British aircraft to attack Port Said, Egypt. Thus a crisis arose in the British Government which led to Eden's resignation two

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months later. 38 There were other reasons why Britain, France and Israel were not able to succeed in invading Egypt, overthrowing Nasser and reopening the Suez Canal. The invading powers never expected the resistance that the Egyptian population living in Port Said put up against them. That resistance made it impossible for the British to stick to their timetable of seventy-two hours. 39 A seventy-two hour limit had been set by the British, French and Israelis for the complete takeover of Egypt. If the invasion took longer, they felt, it would be difficult to expect opinion back home to be sympathetic. Instead, their plan called for a sudden attack and a fast takeover of Egypt. Before they could be condemned by the superpowers, the job would be completed and they would offer a fait accompli to the world. The resistance they met at Port Said slowed down the implementation of their plan. Another reason why the invasion plan did not succeed was the fact that Nasser blocked the Suez Canal with two ships. 40 The blockade prevented the continued flow of ships through the Suez Canal, thus antagonizing shippers from around the world and turning world opinion against the invaders. The Soviet threat to bomb London, Paris and Tel Aviv if the invading forces did not withdraw added to their inability to carry out their plan. 41 Finally, United States' embarrassment of the whole situation and their siding with the Soviet Union against the invading powers put an end to the plan. America,
under the direction of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, had been negotiating a settlement of the Suez Canal dispute for three long months.\textsuperscript{42} The fact that a sudden attack upon Egypt had taken place with no advance warning or no prior consultation, placed Washington in an awkward position. The United States became, as a result, very indignant with France, Britain and Israel for their roles in the invasion. With pressures brought about by both the Soviet Union and the United States, the crisis came to an end as all British, French and Israeli forces were asked to withdraw from the area.

\textbf{Zionist Influence Upon American Foreign Policy Following the Suez Crisis}

Although the ZOA was not instrumental in the tripartite invasion of Egypt, the political consequences of opposing an Israeli-French-British attack on Egypt did not go unnoticed by the Eisenhower administration. The political effects of Eisenhower's opposition to the Israeli attack was considered by influential Republicans within the party. The President later recalled in his memoirs an instance when consideration was given to the political consequences of his actions:

This night of October 19 some prominent Republicans called on me to say that for the only time in the political campaign they thought I might not win the Election. Their reasoning was simple: the Israelis had committed aggression that could not be condoned. Perhaps it would be necessary for the United States, as a member of the United Nations, to employ our armed forces in strength to drive them back within their borders. . . . With many of our citizens of the eastern seaboard emotionally involved in the Zionist cause, this. . . could possibly bring political defeat. . . . I thought and said that emotion was beclouding their good judgement. In

\textsuperscript{42}loc. cit., p. 368.
any event, their uncertainty would be temporary; the next few days would give us a definite answer.\textsuperscript{43}

The Democrats used the dilemma that the White House faced to their advantage. They generally supported the Zionist position of delaying or not presenting any U.S. action against Israel. The \textit{New York Times}, in one single issue, showed support that existed for Israel's position by quoting many prominent Democrats:

1. Adlai Stevenson called upon Eisenhower to avoid "precipitate military action" which might place the U.S. in company with the U.S.S.R. in conflict "against our democratic allies."\textsuperscript{44}

2. New York Mayor Wagner, accused Eisenhower of bringing on the crisis by "appeasing the Arab dictators."\textsuperscript{45}

3. Estes Kefauver charged that the Republican administration had been "thinking too much about oil and power-politics" rather than about America's "moral commitments."\textsuperscript{46}

4. Emanuel Celler said that Israel had been "constantly rebuffed by the very same strong powers who now seem to condemn her for fighting for her very young life."\textsuperscript{47}

As the 1956 National Election drew to a close, the Zionists and their sympathizers continued to add their voice to the condemnation of the Republican administration.

Another problem facing the United States after the Suez Crisis was the fact that Israel had not been complying with U.N. directives and used stalling tactics when requests were made for immediate

\textsuperscript{43}Eisenhower, op. cit., Vol. II., p. 74.

\textsuperscript{44}\textit{New York Times}, (November 1, 1956), 30.

\textsuperscript{45}ibid.

\textsuperscript{46}loc. cit., 34.

\textsuperscript{47}loc. cit., 77.
withdrawal from Egyptian territory. Thus, President Eisenhower felt that strong measures had to be taken against Israel and that "such a move as cutting off complete assistance would be no hollow gesture due to the fact that American private gifts to Israel were about $40 million a year and sales of Israeli bonds in our country were between $50 and $60 million a year." Not only was Israel getting assistance from American private gifts and the sale of Israeli bonds in the U.S., but they were benefitting from the tax exempt status of the United Jewish Appeal and other charitable Jewish organizations that had ties to Israel. Because Israel depended heavily upon America's loans and arms deals, the Jewish state would suffer greatly if President Eisenhower took steps through the United Nations to prevent it from getting any governmental or private assistance from around the world.

The American Zionist movement sought to immediately counter Eisenhower's effort to impose sanctions against Israel. Support for the Zionist cause came from both Democratic and Republican camps. Senate Republican Minority Leader Knowland, who was a good friend of ZOA President Emmanuel Newmann and actively opposed Eisenhower's policies in the Mideast, was sympathetic with the Zionist cause during the mid-1950's even though he was not a Zionist himself, which illustrated successful access to an extremely influential individual both within the Congress and the Eisenhower administration. In early February 1957, Senate Democratic Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson added his voice

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49Lilienthal, op. cit., There Goes the Middle East, Pp. 229-30.
to those opposing sanctions by championing an anti-sanction resolution by the Senate Democratic Policy Committee. Thus, access to Congress was bipartisan. While Senators Knowland and Johnson, because of their influential positions within the Senate and within their respective Parties, were indeed powerful allies of the Zionists in their efforts to prevent the application of sanctions, they were by no means their only allies. A review of the Congressional Record for February 11, 1957, was indicative of the access the ZOA had to both Republican and Democratic Parties. On that date alone, there were anti-sanction speeches by Senators Ives, Bridges, Kuchel, Clark, Saltonstall, Javits, Wiley, Symington, Humphrey, Smith, Newberger and Douglas. Of the above Senators the number was equally divided between both Republicans and Democrats. The Zionist lobby had done a good job in gathering support in the Congress and in letting their opinions be known, as many other lobby groups on Capitol Hill have done in the past. They felt that Mr. Eisenhower's calling for sanctions against Israel was too strong a step to be taken against America's only ally in the Middle East. The Senators were never direct spokesmen for the Zionist cause, but rather were sympathetic with their views as expressed by themselves personally and in mail from their constituents. Eisenhower recalled a great deal of opposition when a few days later he sought Congressional support for his policy of forcing an Israeli withdrawal by applying sanctions:

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In a special White House conference (on February 20, 1957) with Congressional Leaders of both Parties... politics was in the back of many of the conferee's minds. In 1956 the Republican National Ticket had carried New York by more than one and one-half million votes—the largest margin in the history of the Empire State. But faced with the possibility of having to take a stand for strong American action against Israel, some of those present were more than a little nervous.  

President Eisenhower, unmoved by Congressional pressure against his sanctions upon Israel, stated that the United Nations had no choice but to exert influence upon Israel to comply with the withdrawal resolutions. A short time later the U.S. drafted a resolution which seemed to show how far United States policy had departed from the basic principle made by President Eisenhower during his speech a few days earlier. The U.S. resolution sought to bring about a compromise settlement by taking a stand midway between allowing Israel full freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba and imposing sanctions on the Jewish state. The U.S. resolution was reported to be identical to the Canadian plan (Israel's right to freedom of shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba and for United Nations' administration of the Gaza Strip) with additional clauses specifying a time limit of three to five days for Israeli withdrawal and providing for further action if the deadline was not met.  

The vague wording and lack of an clear-cut penalty provision seemed to indicate that President Eisenhower had come to the realization that both Congressional and public opinion opposition would not permit stronger measures to be employed. The intention behind the U.S. resolution seemed to have provided the United States with a "graceful way

52 Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 186.

out" through which it arrived at an agreement with Israel by submitting to some of Israel's demands while at the same time seeking to appear firm in its opposition to Israeli aggression in order to achieve at least some continued influence in the Arab world. The U.S. resolution never reached the General Assembly of the U.N. because on March 1, 1957, Israel announced its decision to withdraw from occupied areas. However, Israel indicated that even though the Gaza Strip would be under United Nations control, it would not hesitate to act to defend its rights if conditions in the area deteriorated.

The Dulles-Eisenhower policy in the Middle East at that period in history sought both to promote conciliation between the states in that region and to prevent a Soviet penetration by keeping Western influence in the Middle East alive. In order to achieve those results it was necessary to retain some degree of Arab trust. These considerations were among the factors which led the United States to side with the Soviet Union and oppose its closest allies when they chose to attack Egypt.

Summary

The central aim of American policy toward the Middle East was to retain Western influence in the region and forestall communist penetration. Throughout the early 1950's, United States presence in the Middle East increased as numerous treaties were concluded with various states within the region. With the Eisenhower administration there came an effort to improve America's relations with the Arab states, relations which had deteriorated as a result of U.S. support for Israel.
and America's close association with the major imperialist powers of Western Europe. Secretary of State Dulles was not able to change America's tarnished image in the Arab world after his dealings with Egypt's Nasser over financing the Aswan Dam. When the Secretary of State offered Nasser his plan to finance the Dam project and Nasser rejected it, Dulles suddenly moved against him and lost any trust that the Arab world might have had in the United States Government.

The American Zionist movement, by the mid-1950's, had lost some of the enthusiasm which had characterized the group before the establishment of Israel. However, if viewed as a potential interest group, it remained virtually unchanged. While American Jews may not have considered themselves Zionists, their overwhelming support of Israel made them sympathetic to the cause. Thus, most American Jews remained functional members of the Zionist movement. Consequently, both in terms of cohesion and public support, the movement retained a high potential during the Sinai Period. In terms of access to points of decision making, the movement seemed to have lost a little of the potential it possessed during 1947 and 1948. While its access to points within Congress, the Democratic Party and at the state and local governmental levels remained high, its access to points of decision making within the Eisenhower administration seemed to have diminished when compared to that enjoyed during the Truman administration. In the final analysis, the Eisenhower administration seemed to have made a serious attempt to lessen, but not remove, American foreign policy toward the Middle East from the arena of politics. With the outbreak of the 1956 Suez conflict, President Eisenhower had to deal with the
very real possibility of a U.S.-U.S.S.R. confrontation. President
Truman never faced that situation in the Middle East. Thus, President
Eisenhower's first consideration, in terms of defusing the Arab
Israeli conflict, was preventing a nuclear war. The President placed
the international good as his highest priority at that time. President
Eisenhower's first responsibility was to prevent a possible war that
would destroy all societies. Whether he liked it or not, the alter-
natives would be a runaway arms race, constant confrontation with the
Soviet Union in the Middle East and the strong possibility of numerous
setbacks in building a structure of peace for the world.
CHAPTER IV
THE YEARS OF CONFLICT

The Eisenhower administration, although it brought about no basic change in American foreign policy in the Middle East, did take more of an interest in the area than previous administrations due to increased Soviet presence there. At the beginning of President Eisenhower's term in office, Secretary of State Dulles set forth his ideas concerning the problems of Jerusalem and the Arab refugees, and hinted at possible economic solutions.¹ The stress was in terms of economic development as a solution to the refugee problem. Mr. Dulles cited the necessity of solving the boundary problem before any guarantees could be given and indicated a willingness on the part of the United States to participate in the process of working out possible solutions.

The United States was greatly involved in the events that led to the Suez conflict of October-November 1956. Secretary of State Dulles, in his memoirs, remarked that America's action in finally rejecting participation in the Aswan Dam project contributed to the 1956 conflict. The U.S. was particularly concerned with the problem of freedom of passage through the Suez Canal and sought, from the beginning, only a peaceful solution to the complicated problem. The U.S. condemned the Israeli-Anglo-French attack on Egypt and sought the evacuation by Israel of territories occupied both in the Sinai Peninsula and on the

Gaza Strip. America considered the Gulf of Aqaba international waters and that no nation had the right to prevent free and innocent passage in the Gulf.

The Baghdad Pact

On October 13, 1951, the United States, Britain, France and Turkey formally proposed to Egypt the formation of a Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO).\(^2\) The proposal was intended to provide for the needs of containment in the Middle East while ending the hated British occupation. The defense organization, a plan devised by Secretary Dulles, called for the British Suez Canal base to be "internationalized" by being transferred to an alliance made up of initiating powers, Arab states and certain British Commonwealth members.\(^3\) The Egyptian government promptly turned down the proposal, arguing that the termination of British occupation would amount to nothing more than having other countries come in to take the place of the English. Egypt's rejection of MEDO ended any further talk about it. MEDO proved to be a military, political and diplomatic flop, accomplishing nothing in its brief life except to increase general Arab-suspicion and resentment toward the United States. The Middle East Defense Organization was merely an attempt by Dulles to build an anti-Communist wall aimed at keeping Soviet influence out of the area. The next attempt came four years later.

\(^2\)Safran, op. cit., p. 102.

\(^3\)loc. cit., p. 103.
The Baghdad Pact or the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), as it has been known since early 1959, was a basic interest of the Eisenhower administration when dealing with Middle Eastern affairs after Dulles' MEDO proposal failed to be accepted. Soviet-American rivalry in the Middle East reached beyond Israel and the Arab states. In the frontier zone which contained the non-Arab Muslim states of Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Russia began challenging Western influence immediately after World War II. Tension between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. remained high after the creation, on an American and British initiative, of the Baghdad Pact in 1955. Each of the three regional members of the Pact (Turkey, Iran and Pakistan) concluded a bilateral alliance with the United States based on the fear of aggression from the Soviet Union.

The United States signed a mutual assistance agreement with Iraq on April 21, 1954, and approved the Turko-Iraqi Pact of Mutual Co-operation signed at Baghdad on February 24, 1955, despite the misgivings of Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and the Soviet Union. The Arab governments, especially Egypt, felt that such a pact of mutual cooperation should have been initiated by and made up of Arab states exclusively.

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6 Ibid.

The new treaty referred specifically to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter which stated that the Charter would not prevent the right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurred against any Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures against the attack. The treaty was open to any member of the Arab League and to any state actively concerned with the peace and security of the Middle East. There was also an understanding that the treaty would enable Turkey and Iraq to cooperate in resisting aggression and in implementing resolutions of the United Nations relative to Palestine.

While America was happy with the new agreement, the Soviet Union bitterly denounced it and held the forming of military blocs responsible for the tension in the Middle East. On April 15, 1955, the U.S.S.R. warned against the development of a Middle East defense system and denied any threat of aggression on its part. The Soviet Union approved of the neutralist stand taken by Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria and of their opposition to the Turkey-Iraqi treaty and declared that it could not be indifferent to the situation in that area since the creation of military blocs was directly related to its own security. The Baghdad Pact expanded in membership despite Soviet opposition. The United

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Kingdom joined on April 4, 1955, followed by Pakistan in September of that year and Iran shortly after.  

The United States never formally adhered to the Baghdad Pact, even though it was a member in all but name. Because of Egypt's general distrust of the Pact with British and American involvement in it, Secretary of State Dulles felt that the U.S. could refrain from officially joining in the hope that Nasser would eventually agree to participate. After all, the desired advantages of the Baghdad Pact were available to the United States whether they joined or not. In the end, however, U.S. involvement behind it but not in it made the Pact more vulnerable to attack than it might have been if America had officially joined it. Israel feared that the Baghdad Pact would strengthen the Arab position vis-a-vis the Jewish state. Israel knew that the alliance aimed at drawing other Arab countries into it and feared not only the further strengthening of their Arab enemies, but also the cooling of Western (particularly U.S.) attitudes toward them for the sake of attracting Arab membership. Israel's fear of the Pact could have also played a part in Secretary Dulles' decision not to sign the Baghdad Pact. The U.S. sent official observers to the organizational meeting of the Ministerial Council during November 1955, and participated in the establishment of a permanent political and military liaison. Secretary Dulles considered the new Baghdad Pact as part of

11Safran, Pp. 104-5.
12ibid.
13Hurewitz, op. cit., p. 419.
a worldwide warning system against any form of aggression. In the final analysis, the idea was not clearly thought out. The countries were absorbed in their own local rivalries and had their own different preoccupations. This made their cooperation in countering a Soviet threat somewhat difficult. The consequences of these Western attempts to organize a Mideast defense, MEDO and CENTO, provided an opportunity to establish a defense against communist aggression in the area.

The Eisenhower Doctrine

Following the Suez conflict, President Eisenhower presented the Eisenhower Doctrine on the Middle East. As approved in a joint Congressional resolution on March 9, 1957, the President was authorized to "cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations (the Baghdad Pact) in the general area of the Middle East desiring such assistance in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence." The Eisenhower Doctrine was an extension of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 by which, in a special inserted clause, the U.S., France and Britain decided to "provide arms in times of crisis to countries in the Middle East for both their own self-defense and the defense of the area as a whole." Under the Eisenhower Doctrine, the President could undertake military assistance programs with nations in the Middle East and could use $200 million


to implement the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954. The U.S. regarded the integrity of the Middle East important to the American national interest and to world peace. The United States was prepared to use its armed forces to assist any nation or group of nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism. While America's allies in the area welcomed new U.S. interest in the peace and security of the Middle East, only Lebanon and Iraq formally endorsed it. Syria and Jordan refused to even consider it. It may be noted here that by 1955 the Soviet Union joined the ranks of major military donors to Middle East countries, especially to Egypt. Before 1955, Britain, the U.S. and France were the major donors in the area. Consequently, with the shift to Soviet supplying, Western bloc nations felt their interests in the area threatened. United States response to fear of Soviet expansion in the Mideast came in the form of the Eisenhower Doctrine which they felt would limit Russian designs there.

The Middle East Crisis, 1957 - 1958

The year 1957 was critical in the Middle East. As early as February, 1957, the U.S.S.R., then heavily involved in the area, set forth proposals for a four-power declaration to guide big-power policy in the area. The proposal called for:

16Scott, op. cit., 11.

17Howard, op. cit., 89-90.

18Hurewitz, op. cit., Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East, p. 22.
peaceful settlement of all outstanding issues, non-interference in internal affairs and respect for sovereignty and independence, renunciation of all attempts to involve Middle Eastern States in military blocs with great power participation, liquidation of foreign bases and withdrawal of foreign troops, reciprocal refusal to ship arms to Middle Eastern States, and promotion of Middle Eastern economic development without any political, military or other terms incompatible with the dignity and sovereignty of these countries. 19

The United States turned down the Soviet overture, observing that it would deal with the Middle East situation in accordance with the United Nations Charter. 20 The United States stressed that the Eisenhower Doctrine had been designed to promote peace, security, stability and economic development in the Middle East. However, the Soviet Union repeated its position in April, 1957, and stood firm in its belief of the proposal it presented.

At that period in time, the United States was concerned with the sovereignty of Jordan and internal conflicts within Syria. It was no secret that Egypt and Syria were dissatisfied with King Hussein of Jordan because of his soft stand on the Arab-Israeli question and would like to have seen one of the last monarchies in the area toppled. King Hussein was also having internal problems with the unhappy Palestinian segment of his population. By that time, Syria was also experiencing internal strife. There was an unstable political situation in Syria because the dominant Baathist Party was split into segments— one taking a pro-Soviet socialist stand while another representing a pro-


20 loc. cit., 792.
Arab unity position. There were frequent government coups and a great
deal of disunity within army units as to which segment to support and
defend. On April 24, 1957, President Eisenhower announced that "the
preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the
Middle East was vital to the national interest of the United States
and to world peace." President Eisenhower's statement seemed appro-
priate in view of Jordan's King Hussein and his constant cries con-
cerning threats from neighboring Arab countries backed by international
communism. Thus, the United States came to the assistance of Jordan
with both military and economic aid.

By August 1957, the internal situation in Syria seemed to be
getting out of hand and finally culminated in a Syrian charge that the
United States and its intelligence agents were trying to overthrow the
Government in Damascus. Reports from Syria by U.S. Under Secretary
of State Loy Henderson indicated to President Eisenhower that there was
a growing Soviet communist domination there. As a result of that
communique from Under Secretary Henderson, President Eisenhower believed
that he was justified in implementing the Eisenhower Doctrine:

...he authorized acceleration of arms deliveries and economic assistance and hoped that the international com-
munists would not push Syria into any acts of aggression against her neighbors and that the people of Syria would
act to allay the anxiety caused by recent events.

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21Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 191.
22loc. cit., p. 193.
23Safran, op. cit., p. 114.
President Eisenhower reiterated his previous position that he would not hesitate to use either the Eisenhower Doctrine or NATO to protect the Mideast from any outside force threatening the internal stability of nations there.

Another crisis followed in 1958, beginning with the establishment of the short-lived United Arab Republic (Syria and Egypt), and followed by the Jordanian-Iraqi Federation. Civil strife broke out in Lebanon in May 1958, as a result of the Lebanese President's insistence to stay in office in violation of the country's constitution. There was also some evidence of intervention on the domestic Lebanese scene by the U.A.R., especially from across the Syrian border, but also directly from Egypt. While initially the United States did not consider the troubled Lebanese situation as one calling for the implementation of the Eisenhower Doctrine, the problem seemed serious. The United States supported the Lebanese complaint against the United Arab Republic, although it advised the Lebanese Government that its evidence should match its case. It also supported establishment of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon. After an Iraqi coup on July 14, 1958, the United States landed some fifteen thousand troops on Lebanese soil one day later beginning July 15, 1958, and withdrew them three months later on request from the Lebanese Government. With the withdrawal

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of American troops from Lebanon, the 1958 Middle East crisis came to an end.


The Baghdad Pact countries, except Iraq, endorsed the American action in Lebanon on July 15, 1958. From that time until its formal withdrawal, in March 1959, Iraq's adherence to the Pact was only nominal. It must be mentioned here that one day before America landed troops in Lebanon, Iraq experienced a coup. The Iraqi revolution made it possible for a military regime to take over. The new government was headed by General Kassem who immediately denounced the Baghdad Pact, reoriented Iraqi foreign policy toward the U.S.S.R. and proclaimed his country's solidarity with Egypt. Unlike Iraq the United States was taking a more active part in the Baghdad Pact largely because the American Congress, in endorsing the Eisenhower Doctrine, had authorized U.S. participation "in defense efforts with countries" which were seeking to defend themselves in that area. United States collaboration with the Baghdad Pact continued through 1959. Secretary of State Dulles announced that the United States was negotiating agreements with Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. One of the points involved concerning those agreements was the desire for an American security commitment that would

31 Safran, op. cit., p. 73.
32 loc. cit., 884.
protect nations against aggression from non-communist countries, while the Eisenhower Doctrine authorized the United States to use its armed forces to defend those same nations against attack by countries controlled by international communism.

Those developments led to the signature, on March 5, 1959, of three identical agreements with Iran, Pakistan and Turkey.\textsuperscript{34} Under the agreements the United States reaffirmed that it would continue to furnish as much military and economic assistance as needed to preserve their national independence and increase their economic development. America and other parties involved in the 1958 declaration generally agreed to prepare and participate in defense arrangements in the future. Formal membership in the Baghdad Pact was considered by the United States, but it was finally decided that it should remain on only as an official observer.\textsuperscript{35} Secretary of State Christian Herter made it clear that the U.S. gave both its material and moral support since the beginning of the Baghdad Pact and currently was involved in Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) defense planning while supporting its multilateral economic programs. Finally, the bilateral agreements of March 5, 1959, reaffirmed the American determination to continue economic and military aid programs to Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. The United States never formally adhered to CENTO, as the Baghdad Pact became known in 1959, although it was a participant in all matters of substantial significance.

\textsuperscript{34}ibid.

\textsuperscript{35}loc. cit., citing statement by Secretary of State Christian Herter, October 6, 1959, 1024.
By 1959, it seemed clear that the Eisenhower Doctrine had served whatever purpose it may have had. There was little to report concerning action taken under it during 1960, and no action after that year. CENTO became more important for technical and economic cooperation than for military or security purposes.

**Zionist Influence During the Kennedy Era**

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had no dealings with Egypt after the 1956 Suez Crisis. Three years later Secretary of State Dulles resigned his post in the Eisenhower administration, and died soon after he left Washington. Mr. Christian Herter succeeded Dulles as Secretary of State and immediately proceeded "to explore a far more flexible way to establish closer relations between the United States and Egypt." That exploration continued after John F. Kennedy became President of the United States in 1961. Although President Kennedy recognized a strong U.S. commitment to Israel, he never saw that as a barrier to the development of American ties with Egypt. President John Kennedy saw Nasser as a legitimate and important nationalist leader and felt that there was a chance to lure him away from anti-Israeli and pro-Russian attitudes. A policy of friendship was delivered to Cairo by Ambassador John Badeau, who enjoyed extreme popularity in the Arab world.

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36Silverberg, op. cit., p. 520.

37Badeau, op. cit., p. 128.
As the 1960 campaign began, Democrats, particularly Jews, questioned Kennedy's credentials as a liberal. He had not spoken out against Senator Joseph McCarthy's hearings in the early 1950's; he was a Roman Catholic who, it was generally feared, might let the Vatican dictate his policies; and his father was believed by Jews and non-Jews to have been sympathetic to Hitler while serving as President Roosevelt's ambassador to Great Britain. Kennedy realized that he could not win the 1960 election unless he convinced the liberal Democrats that he was worthy of their support. John Kennedy had, in fact, begun his quest for Jewish votes as far back as 1956 when he first started to work toward the 1960 Democratic nomination. Speaking at the annual banquet of Histadrut, the Israeli labor federation, in Baltimore, Maryland, on November 27, 1956, Kennedy declared, "it is time that all the nations of the world, in the Middle East and elsewhere, realize that Israel is here to stay." He reiterated that theme in frequent appearances before other Jewish groups. In February 1959, addressing the Golden Jubilee Banquet of the fraternal order of B'nai Zion in New York, Kennedy praised the "magnificent achievement of the Zionist pioneers," and denied the myth that "Zionism has been the unsettling and fevered infection in the Middle East." Later that year, speaking in Oregon, Kennedy said:

38 Silverberg, op. cit., p. 549.
let us make it clear that we will never turn our back on our steadfast friends in Israel, whose adherence to the democratic way must be admired by all friends of freedom. But let us also make clear throughout the Middle East that we want friendship, not satellites, and we are interested in their prosperity as well as ours. 41

By the summer of 1960 Senator Kennedy still had not succeeded in establishing an identity liberal enough to satisfy Jewish voters. In New York City there was a growing attitude among its liberals that on election day they would stay home because both Kennedy and Nixon were equally unacceptable. An opportunity to make a move toward the Jewish vote came when the Zionist Organization of America invited both Kennedy and Nixon to address its national convention in New York City in August, 1960. 42 Nixon refused the invitation on the advise of his campaign managers, fearing that he would become entangled in a controversial issue which would hurt him in conservative sectors of the country. 43 Kennedy, on the other hand, accepted the ZOA invitation and instructed his aides to write the strongest pro-Israeli speech possible. He addressed the Zionists on August 25, 1960, and in the speech told them of his visit to Palestine in 1929:

...I have seen the neglect and ruin left by centuries of the Ottoman Empire. I returned in 1951, to see the promise of Zionism fulfilled and left with the conviction that, though the United Nations had given international status to Israel, nonetheless Israel had been made a nation by its own efforts. 44

41Silverberg, op. cit., p. 552.
43Ibid.
44Ibid.
Kennedy further criticized Arab leaders who called for Israel's destruction and then attacked the Eisenhower administration—of which Mr. Nixon had been part—for its treatment of Israel. In criticizing former President Eisenhower's treatment of the Middle East problem he was indirectly placing Mr. Nixon in a bad light which, during an election year, was good politics. Senator Kennedy stressed that friendship and support for Israel had not been a partisan matter, but rather a national commitment. Kennedy emphasized that it was the Democratic Party who had always helped the Jewish plight—"it was Woodrow Wilson who prophesied with great wisdom a Jewish homeland; it was Franklin Roosevelt who kept alive the hope of the Jewish redemption in the days of the Nazi terror; and finally it was Harry Truman who first recognized the status of Israel in world affairs." The speech caused a sensation among the Jewish community and phrases were quoted in Democratic leaflets distributed in their neighborhoods. The Jewish voter talked less and less about McCarthyism, the Pope and Ambassador Joseph Kennedy's sympathies.

On Election Day 1960, the Jewish population turned out heavily for Kennedy which helped give him margins of 75 percent, 80 percent and even 90 percent in states such as Illinois and New York. The following quotes add relevance to the fact that the Jewish vote played a role in the 1960 Presidential Election:


46Silverberg, op. cit., p. 559.
Two hard facts stand out from the welter of imponderables in the 1960 Presidential Election: (1) there was probably a Catholic vote of some magnitude; (2) the increase in the votes of Catholics as compared to 1956 was not sufficient in and of itself to ensure Kennedy's victory. He also needed increases in the Democratic votes of Negroes, and particularly Jews which he received.

The Kennedy strategists were aware of the decisive effect the minority group vote was likely to have on the election. Many of the Negroes, Italians, Irish, Poles and especially Jews who had slipped their customary political ties to vote for Eisenhower were concentrated in urban areas which the Democrats had to win in order to stand a chance in the large key states. They received those votes in November and won key states such as Illinois and New York as a result of the large turnout of minorities—most notably Negroes and Jews.

Thus, the Jewish vote was a factor to be seen in the 1960 election. It was traditionally a vote that the Democratic Party did not want to lose to the Republican Party.

During President Kennedy's brief term in office he took a sympathetic position toward Arab nationalism. His friendly relationship with Egypt's Nasser, as cited in Ambassador John Badeau's book, The American Approach to the Arab World, was sharply criticized by American Zionist groups. President Kennedy was impressed by Nasser's industrialization and modernization plans for Egypt and tried to persuade a reluctant U.S. Congress to appropriate foreign aid for Egypt and other declared enemies of Israel. American Jews never accepted Kennedy's argument that promoting good will toward the Arabs would ultimately

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allow the U.S. to exert an influence in the Near East beneficial to Israel. By the autumn of 1963, Kennedy was in political trouble with the Jewish community over his gentle treatment of the Arabs and his apparent coolness toward Israel. With less than a year to go before the 1964 Presidential Election, it was speculated that Kennedy would begin to move toward a stronger position in support of Israel for purposes of winning the Jewish vote. He agreed to speak in New York on December 5, 1963, at the annual dinner of the Friends of the Weizmann Institute, but his assassination in November prevented it.

It was not until 1968, that a secret mission made by President Kennedy's Special Assistant Myr Feldman to Israel in 1961 was made known. He was instructed to pledge American military protection in the event of an attack against Israel along with Hawk Aircraft missiles in return for an Israeli promise not to develop nuclear weapons.\(^{51}\) It appeared that President Kennedy kept up the role of the United States as chief supplier of arms to Israel. However, despite the practical politics involved in protecting Israel and U.S. interests there, John Kennedy was not totally unsympathetic to the Arab cause. He strived to better U.S. relations with the Arab world and promote understanding through his highly-publicized friendship with Egypt's Nasser.

\(^{51}\)Silverberg, op. cit., p. 553.
The Soviet Union, whose influence in the Middle East had diminished during the Kennedy years, reasserted itself in the area. In early 1964, Krushchev promised hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of new military aid to Egypt and Syria. A new and more violent cycle of raids and reprisals began as the Middle East seemed to be drifting toward another war. "Between January 1965, and May 1967, guerrilla raiders trained in Syria carried out 113 acts of sabotage in Israel, killing 11 Israelis and injuring 62." Jordan and Lebanon let guerrillas use their territories as a base, while Egyptian raiders continued to cross into Israel from the Gaza Strip. Israel, on the other hand, was not prepared to go to war because the country was politically unstable and economically drained. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, successor to retired Ben Gurion, angered many of his countrymen by being too mild a leader who sought compromise in every situation. The internal feud among the country's highest leaders left Israel demoralized. Economically, the country suffered inflation as a result of its standard of living rising faster than its output of goods. By 1966 Prime Minister Eshkol found it necessary to deal with the situation by halting the growth of the economy which resulted in a recession that brought


about a wave of bankruptcy and unemployment. Watching Israel's internal difficulties increase through 1966, the Arabs in surrounding countries began to seriously consider that the moment had come to strike out against Israel. However, the Arabs never realized that it was their very existence which served to unite the quarreling Israelis and distract their attention from domestic troubles to external threats.

The process of rebuilding Israel's national morale began with an attack on a Jordanian village which had been harboring Syrian guerrillas as they carried out raids against Israel. The Israeli attack against Jordan was denounced by the United Nations, including the United States. Ambassador Goldberg accused Israel of having authorized "a raid into Jordan, the nature of which and whose consequences in human lives and in destruction far surpass the cumulative total of the various acts of terrorism conducted against the frontiers of Israel." On the other hand, the attack on Jordan did a great deal to bolster Israeli spirits back home. The Arab nations failed to comprehend the extent to which the Jordanian raid had strengthened Israel from within. Instead, convinced that Israel was on the brink of internal collapse, they intensified their acts of aggression in the early months of 1967. Provocation of an all-out war, at that point in time, never seemed to have been either Israel's or Egypt's intention. It was evident that Israel had no plan to invade Syria in 1967. The Soviet Union, however,

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55 loc. cit., p. 78.

56 Yost, op. cit., 660.
saw an opportunity to stir up some trouble by claiming that such an
invasion was imminent. Early in May, Russian officials in Cairo
asserted that Israeli forces were massing along the Syrian border—
perhaps eleven Israeli brigades were there. As it turned out,
Israel had only one small company on the Syrian border to intercept
terrorists. The U.N. truce-supervision teams were unable to find any
trace of the alleged eleven brigades. Nasser of Egypt felt that he
had to get involved because of their defense pact with Syria. Nasser's
prestige in the Arab world had been declining for some time as a result
of accusations in some quarters that he had been soft in dealing with
Israel. In recent years he had withdrawn Egypt from participating in
a wave of terrorism against Israel, leaving Syrian extremists to carry
on alone. Egypt was the only Arab country strong enough to take on
Israel in an all-out war, but it had shown no interest in doing so
lately. Nasser was also feeling pressures at home concerning his pol-
icy of keeping the United Nations Emergency force on Egyptian territory.
As a result of these many pressures, Nasser decided to confuse Israel
by using the supposed Israeli military build-up on the Syrian border as
his pretext. After that decision, Nasser took the following steps:

. . . on May 15th, large numbers of Egyptian troops began
crossing the Suez Canal into the Sinai Peninsula. The next
day Egypt asked the United Nations troops to withdraw from
Sinai—for their own safety, Cairo reported.  

57 Silverberg, op. cit., p. 564.
58 Yost, op. cit., 662.
59 Churchill, op. cit., p. 89.
Israel displayed little concern over Egypt's May 15th troop movements in the Sinai, believing that it was merely for show. They felt that Egypt, even with its Soviet armaments, was not strong enough to start a war. Foreign military experts felt the same way which might explain America's complete surprise when a war did break out June 5, 1967. When Nasser closed the Strait of Tiran to Israel, that signaled danger. President Johnson was in an uncomfortable position when word came that the Strait of Tiran was closed. He was aware of the extent of the American commitment with regard to Tiran, for he helped to create it as a U.S. Senator in 1957. President Johnson knew that if Israel's existence was seriously threatened, the United States would be expected to intervene to save it. His fears of an East-West confrontation, if the U.S. directly intervened on behalf of Israel, made him play for time while reaffirming America's position to support the political independence and territorial integrity of all nations in the Middle East without really pledging immediate American military backing in case of a direct attack by Egypt on Israel. The Soviet Union, at that crucial point in time, suddenly realized that an outbreak of hostilities might lead directly toward a clash between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., thus the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo urged Nasser not to be the first to open fire. At the same time, the combination of Egyptian belligerence


61 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, "The Public Records of Lyndon B. Johnson on Key Votes of Foreign Policy." (September 1964), Special Issue, 2087.

62 Silverberg, op. cit., p. 570.
and Israeli impatience led the United States into a frantic diplomatic
effort to dissuade Israel from going to war. Nasser had no intention
of opening fire upon Israel. He believed that if Israel gave in,
leaving him in command of the Strait of Tiran, victory was his without
going to war. However, Nasser never really expected Israel to capi-
tulate, but rather to start a war and thus brand itself as an aggressor
before the United Nations and the world.63 At that point Egypt would
be justified, it felt, in using all its force to destroy Israel in
retaliation.

While pressure built up within Israel to go to war, American Jews
mounted a pressure campaign of their own to lead the Johnson adminis-
tration toward a stronger stand in Israel's defense. The tremendous
support for Israel in the United States began almost immediately after
Egypt's blockade of Tiran.64 Statements were not made concerning the
old charge of dual allegiance as thousands of Americans swung into
action on behalf of a foreign state. Congressmen were beseiged with
requests for American military aid to Israel.65 Meetings were held in
hundred of synagogues around the country, as scores of local fund
drives for Israel began. Gentiles were not denouncing American Jews
for their identification with a brave nation being threatened with its
existence. Political conservatives of the far right even spoke out

64 Weyl, Nathaniel, The Jew In American Politics. New Rochelle,
65 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, op. cit., (June 9, 1967),
991.
in favor of Israel, believing that the Jewish state was the Near East's only bulwark against an international communist conspiracy.66

The anti-Zionist Jews of the American Council for Judaism found themselves more isolated than ever during the show of American support for Israel. The Council, though it had fought vigorously against the creation of any Jewish state, had brought itself to accept the existence of Israel in the years since 1948. As Norton Mevinsky, then the Council's executive director, put it shortly after the 1967 War:

... that Jews throughout the world constitute a common grouping is obvious. Those who affirm that they are Jews acknowledge this common grouping by that affirmation. ... American Jews and Israeli Jews are part of the same grouping, a grouping that the great majority of both acknowledge and accept. ... Both should stand ready to help the other appropriately and legitimately.

Thus, the American Council for Judaism came to the realization that it did not want to see the Jews of Israel in peril any more than it wanted to see the Jews of any other part of the world in the same situation. Many members, however, continued to oppose the idea that American Jews owed any allegiance to Israel or that it was their duty to lobby on Israel's behalf with their own government. As the crisis in May 1967 increased, other members of the Council found their emotional involvement with the plight of Israel overwhelming their abstract anti-Zionist beliefs which resulted in an internal split within the American Council for Judaism. Seeing what he viewed as "hysteria" building up among


67 loc. cit., p. 225.
American Jews, the Council's President, Richard Korn, issued a statement in which he urged American Zionists "to cease and desist from perhaps well-meaning but ill-advised efforts to pressure the United States Government into always taking absolute and militant pro-Israel positions." He called upon Israel and Egypt to come to a peaceful solution over the Strait of Tiran. Richard Korn's views were obviously in a minority because American Jews had already pledged millions of dollars for Israel while thousands of young Americans were trying to volunteer for the defense of the Jewish state. The Johnson administration continued to play for time while searching for a diplomatic solution to the crisis.

As tension increased within Israel, a threatening statement was made which declared that Israel would pry the Strait of Tiran open alone without the help of Western allies. Patience was wearing thin in Israel and the Eshkol dovish wait-and-see attitude had lost him more public support during the endless weeks of delay. On May 30, Jordan's King Hussein, fearing for the safety of his small country as an easy Israeli target, signed a mutual defense pact with Egypt's Nasser. As a result of that move of Arab unity, Prime Minister Eshkol yielded in order to save his country by appointing the hawkish Moshe Dayan, the master tactician, as Defense Minister. Now that Dayan was a member of the Israeli Government, it was not a question of whether war would come but rather how soon it would come. During the same

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68 loc. cit., p. 227.
69 Khouri, op. cit., p. 249.
weekend, the United States continued to look for ways to open the Strait of Tiran through diplomatic negotiating as time continued to run out.

A week before the war broke out, on May 14, Egypt put its armed forces on "maximum alert" as combat units proceeded to the Sinai frontline. The Egyptian Government explained to foreign newscasters that those measures were taken in view of reliable information that Israel planned to attack Syria and, as a warning, Egypt wanted to demonstrate that it would be ready to enter battle if Israel attacked first. On May 16, a crucial move was made by Cairo. As the Egyptian troop build-up in Sinai continued, the Egyptian Chief of Staff, General Fawzi, sent a letter to United Nations Emergency Forces commander, General Rikhye, asking him to withdraw immediately the U.N. forces from "the observation points on our frontier." A follow-up letter was sent the next day by Egyptian Foreign Minister Riad to U.N. Secretary General U Thant, making the request official. While Egypt was moving its forces to the Sinai border, Israel, who had previously mobilized some reserve units in response to the Egyptian troop movement, called in more reserves for active duty. Israeli Premier Eshkol renounced any aggressive intentions on the part of Israel and called for the withdrawal of both Egyptian and Israeli forces to their previous positions. During this period the United States was

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70 loc. cit., p. 248.
71 loc. cit., p. 246.
reported to be engaged in efforts to bring Western maritime powers into a scheme of action to contest the Egyptian blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was reported to be sending additional naval units into the Mediterranean area. Finally, on June 5, 1967, the war broke out with an Israeli air strike against Egyptian airfields and several armored thrusts into Egyptian positions in the Gaza Strip and Sinai.  

President Johnson's reaction was shock at Israel's move:

I have always had a deep feeling of sympathy for Israel and its people, gallantly building and defending a modern nation against great odds and against the tragic background of the Jewish experience. I can understand that men might decide to act on their own when hostile forces gather on their frontiers and cut off a major port. Nonetheless, I do not conceal my regret that Israel decided to move when it did.

However, President Johnson held the Arabs accountable for starting the volatile situation by closing Aqaba, asking U.N. troops to leave and assembling its forces on the Israeli border.

The outside world learned of the events of June 5, gradually and painfully. Nearly all early reports came from the Arabs; declaration of war by more than a dozen Arab states and announcements of heavy damage that had been inflicted on Israel. Only later did it become apparent that Israel had begun the hostilities, that the war was over almost as soon as it had begun and that damages inflicted on Israel had been slight. After an announcement had been made to the American


\[75\] loc. cit., p. 297.
public concerning a war breaking out in the Middle East, the U.S.

State Department assured the press that they would remain, "neutral
in thought, word, and deed." Simultaneously, the White House issued
a vague statement which contained hope in bringing about an end to
fighting in the area and asking both Israel and Egypt to support the
U.N. Security Council in doing so. The "neutral in thought, word, and
deed" statement seemed inappropriate at the time to many who were
sympathetic to the Zionist cause and those Americans quickly let the
State Department know about their concern.

**Zionist Reaction to the Six Day War**

Congressmen around the country expressed their outrage and the
outrage of their constituents at the handling of the situation in the
Middle East during the ceasefire period following the fighting:

- Rep. William Ryan of Manhattan, said that he perceived
  a serious danger developing unless the U.S. finds it expedient
  to honor their commitments to Israel.
- Senator Joseph Clark of Pennsylvania, declared that
  the U.S. was morally and legally committed to Israel and
  that we could never be neutral.
- Republican Senator Jacob Javits of New York asked
  that President Johnson restate American policy in his own,
  personal wording.

Hurriedly, Secretary of State Dean Rusk explained to the press that the
U.S. was merely "non-belligerent" and that the word "neutral"—which
is a concept of international law—was not an expression of indifference
because we could never be indifferent in such a matter.

76 Herzberg, Arthur, "Israel and American Jewry." *Commentary*,
(August 1967), 69.

77 *loc. cit.*, 69-71.

78 *loc. cit.*, 71-73.
Shortly after Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara and CIA Director Helms briefed Congressional leaders on the Six Day War, protests were lodged by various Senators claiming that the United States had no policy in the Middle East, but rather one based on waiting and hoping that the Israelis would be able to look after themselves. \(^79\) Such influential people in American politics were not direct spokesmen for various Zionist groups in the U.S. but rather were, "Americans who have allowed themselves to be drawn to the Israeli side by bonds of sympathy and by the impact of the most powerful and efficient foreign policy lobby in American politics."\(^80\) Because of these "bonds of sympathy" many noted figures have been able to eloquently speak out for Israel time and time again, and being heard by large American audiences, are able to influence general public opinion by what they say.

By this time the 1967 War—which seemed to be a grave threat to Israel's existence—had begun to exert its strange grip on the emotions of American Jews, many of whom were never involved in causes for Israel. On June 6, at daybreak, some 2,000 students from various colleges paraded in front of the U.N. carrying signs asking that Israel be preserved.\(^81\) Volunteers swarmed to the Israeli consulate in New York and to offices of the Jewish Agency. Impromptu fund drives got


underway. The reaction to the crisis in the Middle East seemed far more intense and far more widespread than anyone had expected. American Jews who had not leaned toward the Zionist thinking felt they had to do something—if only to give money, to parade or just cry out for justice for Israel.

On the evening of June 7, thousands of Jews began to arrive in Washington on the request of Dr. Joachim Prinz, who headed the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, in order to "mobilize support for vigorous United States action to protect Israel's security and America's own vital interest in the Middle East." The next few days mass demonstrations were held near the White House while smaller Jewish groups called on the President and members of Congress to present their views. At a news conference in another part of Washington D.C., Dr. Norton Mevinsky of the American Council for Judaism told reporters that sponsors of the various rallies "do not speak for all of American Jewry" and termed the rallies "a Zionist show" aimed at "pressuring the government into an inflexible position of being 100 percent behind Israel right or wrong." However, the people at the rallies would not have agreed with Dr. Mevinsky's position. They heard William Wexler, president of the B'nai B'rith (a Jewish fraternal organization founded in Europe in 1843; it has been active in political fact gathering related to Israel and American Zionism only since WW II) tell them, "we are assembled here not as

82 Christian Science Monitor, (June 8, 1967), 2.
83 loc. cit., 2-3.
neutrals—but...as partisans in the great American tradition—to urge our government to act resolutely in support of a sincere, face-to-face, final and enduring peace settlement between Israel and her neighbors."\textsuperscript{84} The gathering also heard Rabbi Israel Miller of the American Zionist Council say, "We meet as Jews to affirm a fact that becomes more and more visible each day—Israel does not stand alone—the Jewish people stand by her side and are bound by ties of faith, fate, history and destiny. The Jewish citizens of our country have responded today—and will respond in the future."\textsuperscript{85}

An organization called America for Democracy in the Middle East, headed by various Zionist groups, sought out signatures of scholars, artists and poets in a full page advertisement in the \textit{New York Times}. The advertisement called upon President Johnson, with the support of Congress and the American people, to act with conviction to secure the survival of Israel and uphold our own honor.\textsuperscript{86} Many of those who were invited to sign were among the strongest opponents of American military action in Vietnam. When asked to support American intervention in the Middle East, they found themselves confused and embarrassed. These "doves for war," as they were labeled by conservative writer William Buckley, included novelist Robert Penn Warren, poet Marianne Moore, critic Lionel Trilling, sociologist Daniel P. Moynihan and economist Robert Heilbroner.\textsuperscript{87} The television media reported on the

\textsuperscript{84}loc. cit., 3.
\textsuperscript{85}ibid.
\textsuperscript{87}ibid.
thousands of rallies held around the country and the nation's major newspapers wrote stories sympathetic to the Israeli cause, thus mobilizing American public opinion in favor of Israel's position and a strong U.S. commitment to that position.88 Before any show of strength by the United States toward Israel could be demonstrated, the war ended six days after it had begun. The American Zionists and their supporters did meet with White House officials to state their position on the Mideast war, but so did a pro-Arab delegation have the same audience.89 It would be impossible to say that the American Zionists had a strong influence upon decisions being made at the White House during those days of crisis for the simple reason that the Six Day War began and ended so abruptly. However, various Zionist groups in the U.S. were able to exploit American public opinion to some degree in favor of a strong stand supporting Israel militarily which was indicated in a Harris poll taken shortly after the outbreak of the June War in 1967.90

**Summary**

While the Eisenhower administration never set forth a well-defined American foreign policy stand in the Middle East, it did take more of an interest in the area than previous administrations had. United States' moves in the Middle East, during the Eisenhower years, were in

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89 Silverberg, op. cit., p. 568.

response to the presence of the Soviet Union there. The U.S. main-
tained a policy of regional security in the Middle East in the form of
the Baghdad Pact. The United States, however, never joined the
Baghdad Pact but became a member in all matters of substantive impor-
tance. It may be observed here that CENTO, as the Baghdad Pact became
known in 1959, was not a workable regional security arrangement for
the Middle East despite its usefulness in the field of economic and
technical cooperation. The Eisenhower Doctrine also became more
important for its help in the area of technical and economic coopera-
tion than for its military or security purposes. The landing of United
States troops on Lebanese soil in 1958 was a move in response to an
outside force (presumably the U.A.R. with Soviet backing) threatening
the internal stability of that nation and America's position in the
area. Landing United States troops was not a change in American
foreign policy toward the Middle East, but rather an instant reaction
to keeping a power-balance secure there.

After the creation of the State of Israel, Zionism was beginning
to become a mature and politically sophisticated force in American
life. It commanded the sympathy, if not the full support, of a major-
ity of American Jews. Important people from all walks of life demon-
strated their support for Israel by being quoted in all major newspapers
across the country, thus having a great deal of influence on the
American public in general. These important people were stimulated
to speak out for Israel not only because they were often close friends
of ZOA officials, but more importantly, because they personally sym-
pathized with the Jewish state and thought of it as the "underdog" in
the Middle East. Zionist influence on White House policy making was not successful. When the Republicans took over in 1952, they sent the usual messages of friendship to various Zionist groups but they felt no political obligation to serve the wishes of the ZOA. American Zionists, who did not want Israel's position compromised, watched as President Eisenhower worked with the Soviet Union to prevent an East-West confrontation when dealing with the explosive Suez crisis in 1956. This process reached its culmination in the Suez Canal crisis of 1956 when President Eisenhower ended the Anglo-French conquest of Egypt and sternly ordered Israel to withdraw from the territory it had seized or face a possible Soviet confrontation over the matter. The belief that American Zionists controlled White House foreign policy on Middle East matters was exposed as a myth during the Eisenhower years in office. The Eisenhower administration's moves in the Middle East were never really a reaction to Zionist demands unless it was in the U.S. interest, but more often were a reaction to Soviet influence in the area.

John Kennedy's election to the Presidency enhanced a cordial relationship between the White House and American Zionist officials. However, during Kennedy's short term of office he satisfied few Zionist demands while attempting to reopen contact with the Arab world. Lyndon Johnson, when he succeeded Kennedy, appeared to show a greater willingness to satisfy the friends of Israel; but at a crucial point in time when Israel needed him, President Johnson's hands were tied by domestic political considerations surrounding the Vietnam conflict. It would be difficult to predict whether he would have backed his
words with deeds if Israel had not brought the 1967 War to an end so soon. After the 1967 War, the U.S. Defense Department concluded that supporting Israel was in America's best interest since the Jewish state had successfully neutralized Soviet arms in the area and thus became America's principal counter to Soviet communism there.

The political power of American Zionism, though at times has been overestimated, exists nevertheless. It was certainly clear that American Zionists, through their energetic and persistent support of the creation and development of Israel, have established a beachhead for Zionism within the American Congress and among the American people. It seemed, however, that the White House, in times of crisis in the Middle East, reacted to Soviet moves and not to Zionist demands if they were not in the interest of the United States. Israel's presence in the Middle East, acting as a deterrent to Soviet influence, was important and used to further American interests there. Thus, ZOA actions in the area of influencing U.S. policy makers to support Israel were recognized as important and oftentimes followed because they happened to be in America's national interest to do so. If ZOA demands were deemed not in America's national interest, they were not considered or used by the administration in power.
CHAPTER V

THE PRESENT STAGE

After the June 1967 War, a shock was felt around the world. There was a feeling of pride in Israel—an admiration bordering on awe. The Arab world, on the other hand, felt humiliated. The Soviet Union, embarrassed by the failure of the Arabs to make efficient use of the military equipment they had supplied them, spoke out against Israeli aggression. The United States, proud of the Israeli victory, came to realize with the rest of the world that the Jewish state was now a power to be reckoned with. Israel became a modern state and very much a part of the twentieth century as a result of the 1967 June War. The surge of nationalism that spread through the streets of Tel Aviv with the 1967 War was felt by both Jews and non-Jews the world over as they read and heard about the lightening war.

The Role of the United Nations in Mideast Post-War Policy Making

When the Six Day War ended there were people, both within the United States government and those working from without, who hoped that there would now be a real chance for an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. Because of deep Arab animosity, the Johnson administration was unable to act as an intermediary after the war. Instead, an approach to peace was sought through direct Soviet-American talks at the highest level. Since the Arab nations still considered Russia an acceptable intermediary, it was hoped that American proposals would find their way to Mideast capitals via Moscow. Also direct talks with the Soviet
Union would lessen dangers of further escalation and big-power confrontation.

The first discussions were held on June 23, 1967, when President Johnson and Premier Kosygin met at Glassboro, New Jersey. The occasion was Kosygin's visit to an emergency session of the General Assembly called to deal with the crisis. The essential differences emerging from Glassboro, and later Soviet-American talks, resulted from Soviet insistence on Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territory as a precondition for further peace efforts. However, the United States considered withdrawal only one aspect of a peace settlement to be achieved as part of an overall agreement involving Arab states guaranteeing Israel's security.

Glassboro set a pattern of relationships between the two powers in which they mutually agreed upon the necessity for their involvement in Middle East peace-making and peace-keeping. Not since the 1956 Suez Crisis had they displayed such agreement as in their joint backing of Security Council resolutions calling for a cease-fire and cessation of all military activities.

Their determination to avoid an East-West confrontation was underscored by mutual support for the November 22, 1967, Security Council resolution 242. A product of intensive discussion and bargaining, the


2loc. cit., 123.

resolution emphasized the non-acceptance of taking territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area could live in security. It called for the following:

Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict. . . termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for the acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. . . freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area. . . a just settlement of the refugee problem. . . (and) measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones. . . to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the states concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement. 4

The Arab countries, with the exception of Syria, accepted the terms of the United Nations resolution 242. 5 Israel voted against accepting it, objecting primarily to point one of the resolution. Israel's position on U.N. Resolution 242 was reiterated again October 28, 1970, in the Christian Science Monitor: "Israel has declared flatly that it will not negotiate Jerusalem, the Golan Heights in Syria, Sharmel Sheikh in Sinai or other strategic border areas." 6 Resolution 242 was finally accepted by Israel in 1972, five years after it was first initiated, for several reasons. The reasons were twofold in nature and could be traced back to both United States' and Israeli internal policies that had undergone a change. The U.S. modified its position in terms of

4 ibid.
5 ibid.
stressing that a peace settlement should begin based on 242, as proposed in the Rogers' Peace Plan. Also, public opinion within Israel became more moderate with the realization that Syrian and Egyptian armies were again resupplied after five years and a real threat again existed. Israel, perhaps, felt isolated in view of a more conciliatory world opinion. In the end, however, Resolution 242 has not been used as the basis for any Mideast peace settlement.

Direct contacts between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. gave them opportunities to discuss arms control. President Johnson proposed that the U.N., "immediately call upon all of its members to report all shipments of military arms into this area and to keep those shipments on file for all the peoples of the world to observe." The United States had suspended all its arms deliveries to Arab countries and to Israel during the 1967 War. However, by July 1967, Secretary of State Dean Rusk told the Senate that American pleas for arms control in the Middle East were ignored by Russia as they proceeded to replace weapons lost in the 1967 War by Egypt, thus United States Phantom jets replaced French Mirages in Israel's air force countering Soviet arms shipments. Arms supplies to Israel became a major issue in domestic politics when many U.S. Congressmen, including several who generally opposed arms shipments abroad, demanded that the Johnson administration provide Israel with weapons that it felt it needed. They were joined by members of the U.S. Department of Defense and the CIA who considered strong

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7Silverberg, op. cit., p. 586.

8U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relation Committee, A Select Chronology and Background Documents Relating to the Middle East, (May, 1969), 242.
post-1967 Israel a far more valuable ally than the Arab states. On October 25, 1967 some forty-eight Skyhawk jets and other military equipment, including thirty-two new Hawk missiles, were released to Israel. In January, 1968, President Johnson reached a secret agreement with Prime Minister Levi Eshkol for the sale of fifty Phantom F-4 jets to Israel. An explanation for the arms deal was stated in the communique:

. . . the President agreed to keep Israel's military defense capability under active and sympathetic examination and review in the light of all relevant factors including shipment of military equipment by others to the area.

It was also pointed out that the military strength of both Syria and Egypt at the time of the arms deal did not exceed the prewar level at which they were defeated by Israel: "At the moment [March 1968], the Russians, while they are putting in a great deal of equipment, have not gone above, in many instances, the prewar level." Official negotiations on the Phantom deal began November 7, 1968, and delivery started early 1970, to be completed by mid-1971. The price for this transaction was set at $250-300 million; Israel paid two-thirds in cash, while the remainder was on five year credit. From June 1967 to February 1970, the United States sold Israel some ninety-eight Skyhawks A-4 and fifty Phantom F-4—"though figures are classified and

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12loc. cit., 264.

many have been withheld, it is possible to estimate U.S. arms sales to Israel, directly and through other countries, as somewhere between $2 and $3 billion from 1947 until the 1967 Arab-Israeli War; Phantom and Skyhawk planes sold since 1967 have been worth nearly a billion dollars more.\(^\text{14}\)

As a factor influencing the Phantom deal, the *New York Times* referred to domestic political pressure on the Johnson administration (Democratic Party) in an election year from Zionist organizations and Jewish voters, as well as to Soviet disinterest in arms limitation in the Middle East—as understood by the United States since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August.\(^\text{15}\) The *Christian Science Monitor* also mentioned that, in a twenty-page study, the State Department viewed Arab nationalism as the major force for instability in the Middle East. Consequently, as a result of that instability Soviet exploitation of inter-Arab conflicts and the Arab-Israeli dispute in general increased their influence in the region.\(^\text{16}\) By late 1971, the question had become linked closely with proposals for a diplomatic settlement when Prime Minister Golda Meir and other Israeli officials insisted that America supply Phantoms before they would agree to consider new U.S. proposals for an interim peace with Egypt.\(^\text{17}\) With U.S. military shipments to Israel, the 1967 proposal on keeping an arms file was all but ignored. The major obstacle to maintaining an arms balance

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\(^{15}\) *New York Times*, (October 10, 1968), 3.

\(^{16}\) *Christian Science Monitor*, (November 15, 1968), 7.

\(^{17}\) Silverberg, op. cit., p. 590.
after the June War was a difference between American and Soviet perceptions of what constituted military strength. Israel and the United States measured the balance by the number of aircraft and tanks that were in their arsenal. The Soviet Union and the Arab countries, on the other hand, charged that Israel had superiority through its military infrastructure. Thus, they have been unable to agree on a definition of military balance in the area so no institution such as the United Nations could ever hope to limit the arms race in the Middle East under such conditions of conflict.

**The Rogers' Peace Plan**

Statements about American desires for peace in the Middle East since 1967 and modest Soviet-American cooperation in the U.N. failed to lessen tensions by the time Richard Nixon came to office. The basis of Nixon's new strategy has been an implementation of Security Council Resolution 242, four-power discussions, including Britain and France, and bilateral talks with the Soviet Union.

The continuing dilemma faced by the United States as peace-maker was emphasized by the reaction to the proposals of Secretary of State William Rogers in December 1969. Both Arabs and Israelis suspected Rogers' speeches calling for friendly ties. Arab nations, since the establishment of the State of Israel, have thought of U.S. policy in terms of having a "seesaw effect" in the Middle East. If America goes up with Israel, which Arab countries believe has been the case since

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the Truman administration, then it must go down with the Arabs. Thus, the Arabs have been particularly suspicious of U.S. intentions. Rogers' call for "Israeli withdrawal as envisaged in the U.N. Resolution, "was interpreted by the Arabs as favoring Israel since he did not insist on total withdrawal. 19 Israelis, on the other hand, considered the statement pro-Arab because Rogers did insist that only "substantial" changes in the 1967 frontiers would be acceptable. 20 Israel opposed the proposal to establish "agreed demilitarized zones" and "related security arrangements more reliable than those of the past" because of their suspicion that it implied renewal of a U.N. buffer force separating them from Egypt. Rogers' call for a settlement of the refugee problem "which must take into account (their) desires and aspirations" was seen by Israel as a threat to flood the country with hostile Arabs. The new Arab resistance movements discounted his statement calling for recognition of "the legitimate concerns of the governments in the area" as a restraint on the aspirations to convert all Palestine into a democratic, secular state. 21

Secretary of State Rogers stated that a lasting peace could only be reached if both sides "take into account the interests of others in the area and of the international community." 22 As a result, Israel feared that Secretary Rogers intended to deny them their claim to the whole city of Jerusalem. The Arabs believed the assertion that

20 Ibid.
21 DeOnis, Juan, "The Palestinians Still Foresee Victory Despite 25 Years of Setbacks." Palestine Digest, (June 1973), 2.
22 loc. cit., 3.
"Jerusalem should be a unified city" was too favorable to Israel since it implied rejection of the pre-1967 status. Hopes that the new political situation would break the impasse were frustrated by continuing escalation of the arms race, by the eruption of Palestinian commando guerrilla activities and by renewal of the border warfare.²³ It seemed that only when both ends would go up together at an equal level in the "seesaw effect," would peace and stability be achieved in the area.

Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco convinced Prime Minister Meir and President Nasser to accept a new American initiative in the summer of 1970.²⁴ Both parties were asked to reopen discussions with the U.N. Secretary General's special representative, Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, to be based upon Resolution 242 and to accept a ninety-day cease-fire, but it was immediately threatened by a massive build-up of Russian defense missiles on the Egyptian side of the Suez Canal.²⁵ Both Israel and Egypt refrained from fighting, but Israel initially refused to renew peace talks through Ambassador Jarring until the violations were rectified.

Washington maintained that it had been able, through reliable sources, to assure Israel that there had been no Egyptian violations.²⁶ After Israel accused the U.S. of overlooking certain Egyptian violations, backed by its supporters in Congress, the White House gave in and offered compensation in the form of still another round of large-

²⁵loc. cit., 353.
scale military assistance. As the months went on, ambiguity and reversal in American positions relative to the Middle East situation undermined the confidence of both Israel and Egypt.

After the death of Nasser is September 1970, his successor, Anwar Sadat, twice renewed the cease-fire, but refused to extend it after the spring of 1971. Nonetheless, the Suez remained quiet throughout 1971 as more peace initiatives were offered. Unable to achieve a total settlement, Assistant Secretary Sisco began negotiations to re-open the Suez Canal as a step toward peace. That initiative was never accepted by Sadat. While neither Egypt nor Israel had been satisfied with the American position, both were willing to negotiate through the United States. Israel merely wanted American diplomats to offer their "good offices" to carry proposals from one side of the bargaining table to the other without imposing their own ideas. Egypt, in contrast, wanted the United States to pressure Israel into concessions. Although the United States had been basically mistrusted by Israel and Egypt, it was the only nation which had sufficient power to influence the policies and actions of both powers involved in the conflict.

The Nixon Administration and the Jewish Vote

The 1968 election saw a slight erosion in the political base of American Zionism. Richard Nixon received no more than 17 percent of

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27 loc. cit., 590-1.


the Jewish vote, yet succeeded in winning the Presidency.  
Nixon made the standard gestures toward the American Jewish community in the 1968 campaign, advocating military superiority for Israel and distributing pamphlets showing himself meeting with David Ben-Gurion, Moshe Dayan and Levi Eshkol. The political candidate who was identified the most with American support for Israel in the 1968 election was Robert Kennedy who, in his brief quest for the Democratic nomination, issued a long series of strong statements backing Zionist aspirations. The most conspicuous of these were in Kennedy's television debate with his rival for the nomination, Senator Eugene McCarthy, on Saturday, June 1, 1968. Kennedy received maximum national exposure as he expressed his pro-Israeli position to a viewing audience around the country.

During his early months in office President Nixon took no clear position on the Arab-Israeli conflict, but indications pointed to the fact that his administration would demonstrate less of a "seesaw effect" and more of an even-handed approach toward the Middle East. Though the Kennedy and Johnson administrations had been officially neutral in regard to Near East questions, that neutrality had generally been handled in a way that favored Israel's interests. Republican leaders began speaking of a more even-handed policy toward the Middle East before the 1968 election, which was interpreted by the press as a change in American

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30 Weyl, op. cit., p. 281.
32 loc. cit., p. 275.
foreign policy. Early in 1969, Hugh Hyde, head of Johnston International Publishing Corp., declared, "to express our friendship with the Arabs wouldn't jeopardize our interests in Israel, whereas the appearance of one-sided support of Israel does threaten our influence and investments in the Arab world." Mr. Hyde was a member of an eight-man delegation of businessmen that went to Algeria in search of ways to increase American trade with that country. Another member of the delegation and sometime oil lobbyist, J. B. Sunderland of the American Independent Oil Company, commented, "Many people in this country know only one side of the Middle East question. In fact it is because of Israel that we have lost our good relations with the Arab world." The business community and their lobbyists on Capitol Hill began speaking out in favor of a new effort to improve relations with the Arabs almost as soon as Richard Nixon took office. The pressures of the American balance-of-payments problem may also lead the Nixon government to explore new ways of increasing American trade with the Arabs, thus decreasing Arab resentment of past American foreign policy in the Middle East.

Throughout much of 1969, as the Arab world moved closer toward the Soviet Union, Secretary of State Rogers spoke of four-power talks. The United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France would devise a plan for peace in the area. The idea of four-power talks was regarded by Israel as the first step toward its betrayal and insisted that Near

33Silverberg, op. cit., p. 587.
34loc. cit., p. 588.
Eastern tensions could only be resolved through direct negotiations between Israel and the Arabs and not through the superpowers.  

In the United States the Jewish community denounced the idea of four-power talks. The Board of Governors of B'nai B'rith, at its annual meeting in January, 1970, said that the State Department plan hoped to gain a peace settlement "at the expense of Israel's security and bargaining position." Senator Charles Goodell, a Republican from New York, spoke before an American Jewish Congress rally in early January to accuse Secretary Rogers of "unfairly favoring the Arabs" while on the same day Mayor John Lindsay of New York City warned a ZOA gathering against "the danger of a misguided shift" in American policy toward Israel. The Nixon administration seemed to have been taken off-guard by the response of the American Jewish community. Secretary of State Rogers reiterated that the U.S. would follow a balanced, even-handed policy toward both Arabs and Israelis alike in accordance with the American national interest.

American Jews remained troubled over the Nixon administration's handling of the Mideast situation. Secretary Rogers' reference to "national interests" meant to most Jewish leaders an interest in the oil companies. The fact that a group of businessmen with substantial investments in the Near East had met with President Nixon late in 1969 to discuss the situation—among them David Rockefeller, President of

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37 *ibid*.
38 *ibid*.
Chase Manhattan Bank, who had just come from a meeting with Egypt's Nasser—served to increase the Jewish community's suspicions. Jewish leaders from all over the country were sent to Washington to confer with Secretary Rogers over recent American statements of policy toward the Middle East, which resulted in no concrete proposals. A meeting was held on January 25, 1970, which consisted of twenty-four religious and secular Jewish groups who expressed their deep concern over the Arab-Israeli situation. A message from President Nixon highlighted the Jewish meeting. President Nixon declared to the meeting of Jewish national leaders the following:

...I am aware of the deep concern by American Jews that Israel might become increasingly isolated. However, this idea of isolation is not true as far as the United States is concerned. The United States stands by its friends. Israel is one of its friends. The United States will go so far as to supply military equipment necessary to support the efforts of friendly governments, like Israel's, to defend the safety of their people.

Although the promise of American military aid to Israel was unexpected, the remainder of Nixon's speech stressed a neutral stand that made the American audience uneasy. Tensions between Nixon and the American Jewish community were apparent throughout 1970. Members of that community had little faith in Republicans and felt that the Nixon administration was not likely to do much to help embattled Israel.

It has become clear that American Jews, through their energetic and persistent support of the creation and development of Israel, have


established good offices within the American Congress and received the sympathy and oftentimes the support of the American people. Still, however, when it was not in America's best interest to act in response to ZOA or Israeli wishes, the U.S. executive branch of government has stood its ground and placed the national and international good first.

U.S. Foreign Policy and the Mideast in the Second Nixon Administration

Many people today view the Middle East situation as hopeless. In the nearly six years since the Six Day War, a new and apparently stable order has emerged, an order characterized by the military and technological strength of Israel in a region where the U.S. and the Soviet Union have maintained a detente. American diplomacy was instrumental in achieving an end to the "war of attrition" along the Suez Canal front in July and August of 1970. If the Arab governments did not approve of America's pro-Israeli policy, it was difficult to find evidence of their displeasure. United States trade with the area increased, diplomatic relations with Yemen and Sudan were restored and the U.S. political and commercial presence in the Gulf region continued to expand. As a result, American officials in the Middle East felt that they had avoided, if not prevented, a violent confrontation with the Arab world who was unified in its displeasure of what they considered to be Washington's ideas of even-handedness in the area.

43 Ibid.
In the past year statements out of Washington, which have appeared in many leading newspapers, have indicated that the U.S. would take a new look at the Middle East once Vietnam had receded somewhat from the foreign policy scene. President Nixon has said on more than one occasion that the Middle East was a potentially explosive situation. Shortly after Mr. Nixon had been inaugurated for his second term a series of important visitors, including King Hussein of Jordan and Mrs. Meir from Israel, arrived at the White House to review the situation with him. In greeting King Hussein, President Nixon again expressed concern about the Middle East crisis and hoped that it could be "moved off dead center."

This activity was a sign to many in Washington and around the country that the Nixon administration was about to activate a new Middle East policy. However, since Nixon's second inauguration, no new policy has emerged to change the situation to date. Thus far there has been no alteration in America's passive position, which called for the possibility of an interim Suez Canal settlement through proximity talks between Egypt and Israel. The President's talks in February resulted in a $50 million credit to Israel for purchases of American products. While that amount of money was far less than the $500 million reportedly demanded by Mrs. Meir, it did not diminish the generosity of the Nixon administration toward Israel. Jordanians did not do so well, and the Egyptians received only a Presidential hearing.

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45 Christian Science Monitor, (June 18, 1973), 1.
46 Crawford, Kenneth, "Fulbright Converted?" Newsweek, (September 7, 1970), 34.
The present trend of U.S. relations with the Arab world is not as stable as it may seem. If reopening relations with Sudan is good news, the bad news is symbolized by the murder of American diplomats in Khartoum by the Palestinian Black September group. The Black September movement symbolizes the uneasiness in American-Arab relations. Today the Arab world characterizes U.S. foreign policy in two major ways. First, the Arabs possess the petroleum that the U.S. increasingly needs, not only for various allies but for America, too. Second, some Arabs are so alienated from the U.S. that they have begun to carry out acts of terror against U.S. officials and that terror may be extended to other Americans and American property in the area. This terror may be only a small part of an organized group with a deep hostility that has far-reaching ramifications for what Americans like to term "moderate" Arab regimes and governing elites. Even America's strategic interest in denying the Soviet Union a controlling influence in the area is no longer as serious a problem as it was in the 1950's and 1960's. The Soviets are in the Mideast to stay, but the greater their presence the more they seem to cooperate with the U.S. in minimizing any direct confrontation.

The Nixon Doctrine

President Nixon, on February 25, 1971, sent his second annual foreign policy report to Congress. The 65,000-word message, "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace," expressed

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the Administration's rationale behind its perception of America's changing role in the world and outlined major issues facing the nation in coming years. Worldwide application of the so-called "Nixon Doctrine" remained the keynote of administration policy.

It was stressed that the U.S. would encourage greater participation by all countries in their own development and in their own defense. Partnership, strength and negotiation—major themes in past Presidential speeches—reappeared as cornerstones of the Nixon Doctrine for the 1970's. President Nixon focused on arms control talks with the Soviet Union and on a global partnership that could promote a concept of working for the world's interests or international problems including the environment, the oceans, population control and the exchange of scientific information. The President listed elements that made up the Nixon Doctrine:

... First, the United States will keep all its treaty commitments.

Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.

Third, in cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing manpower for its defense.

The Nixon Doctrine sought to reflect the need for continuity as well as a mandate for change. There were two concurrent challenges stressed in the Doctrine: to carry out a new policy so as to maintain confidence abroad; to define the new policy to the American people and to elicit their support.

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48 ibid.

49 ibid.
In the Middle East there has to be a great effort to draw Soviet policy and American policy into a cooperative state or else a collision could occur that would prove uncontrollable. In the President's analysis of the Middle East situation, within the context of the Nixon Doctrine, he recognized three major dimensions: the Arab-Israeli conflict, intra-Arab differences and the conflict between the interests of the Soviet Union and the United States. Any effort by either major power to secure a dominant position could heighten local disputes, affect Europe's security and increase the danger to world peace. The U.S. does not want a dominant position in the Middle East, nor can others be allowed to establish one. A search for peace in that area of the world remains a top priority according to the Nixon Doctrine.

Throughout the Nixon administration both Soviet arms build-up in the area and U.S. Congressional pressure prompted the administration to approve many deliveries of fighter aircraft to Israel. United States policy of sending Phantom jets, Patton tanks and electronic anti-missile gear to Israel has become more acceptable today (1973) than it was at the time of the Six Day War (1967):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Has the U.S. Been Right in Sending Military Aid to Israel?</th>
<th>1967 %</th>
<th>1973 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Right to Send Aid</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take a Different Course</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Sure</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

50loc. cit., 444-5.


52Harris, op. cit., A-7.
The above Harris poll percentages indicated a pro-Israeli sentiment existing in the United States. Furthermore, it showed American suspicion of the Arab cause (the unknown) and perhaps an underlying hostility toward Arab oil pressures. According to the Harris poll, the American public has become more distrustful of the Soviet Union and their promise to cooperate in a peace settlement which, in turn, may have led to their strong suspicion of Arab countries.

Opinion Research Polls Incorporated took a poll in the autumn of 1972, shortly before the Presidential Election, on public reaction to the Middle East situation and found the following results:

Should the U.S. Exert Little of No Pressure on Israel in Giving in to Arab Demands?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Little or No Pressure</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substantial Pressure</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Should the U.S. Support Israel or the Arabs in the Middle East Crisis?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Israeli</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Arab</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

British author David Ness, who analyzed Opinion Research Poll results, indicated that the American public is overwhelmingly pro-Israeli because of their lack of knowledge of the Arab position. The Israelis have the sympathy and support of the American public. The Government

in Tel Aviv has the ear of a majority of U.S. Congressmen and they, in turn, help to influence American public opinion. He did not, however, believe that American opinion influenced actual White House decision making and negotiating to a great degree unless it was in the national interest to take the position held by the American public.

Whether the future survival of Israel is vital to the security of the United States is a decision made by the President and his advisors in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine, and not by the American public. Whether Arab aggression is threatening enough for the United States to send Israel military and economic assistance is a problem dealt with by President Nixon and top aides, and not by an outpouring of public sympathy. Congressional pressures may at times play a role in the policy making process, especially in the area of voting on or withholding funds. However, final decisions relating to foreign policy are made by the President of the United States.

Summary

During the past five years, the Nixon administration has gained Jewish confidence and support. There have been times when the Nixon administration seemed to be "paying lip service" to an Arab-Israeli settlement within the framework of the United Nations based on Resolution 242. The White House, from 1968 through 1971, gave more economic and military assistance to Israel (some $1.2 billion) than the four preceding Administrations during the previous two decades.\footnote{Ness, op. cit., 10.}
Nixon Middle East strategy of "balanced" words and continued diplomatic efforts, coupled with effective military and financial support for Israel seemed to have paid off in gaining the Jewish vote in the 1972 Presidential Election—a smart tactic for national consumption during an election year. Guaranteeing Israel a continuing margin of technical and military superiority has been, however, entirely consistent with the Nixon Doctrine of avoiding direct U.S. military intervention in local wars. On the other hand, Mr. Nixon has mentioned in many speeches of a "neutral stand" which the United States should take in the Arab-Israeli conflict which has made many Jewish leaders around the country nervous. These statements were possibly used to balance the picture and placate Soviet as well as world opinion—a smart maneuver for international consumption in the face of a potentially explosive situation. On the other hand, the statements could mean a change in future U.S. policy toward the area. As in past Presidential administrations, a long-term, well-defined U.S. foreign policy course toward the Middle East did not exist during the Nixon administration's first four years. The President's second term in office may, however, see a change toward a more even-handed stand in the Middle East.

United States policy in the Arab-Israeli zone has undergone a substantial change in the period since the June War in 1967, particularly when contrasted with the policy followed prior to the conflict. United States involvement and concern has increased, due partially to the ending of the Vietnam War. A settlement, acceptable to both Arab countries and Israel, has not been found despite a greater effort made by Washington in trying to find one. The U.S. has viewed the Middle East
as an area of potential, if not actual, danger. United States and
Soviet presence there warn of the possibility of a nuclear confronta-
tion—a likelihood which President Nixon has continually stressed.
Finally, the President has come to realize that there could be a
link between current economic conditions existing in the U.S. (the
potentiality of future rising gas prices) and United States foreign
policy in the Middle East which might make America's role there even
more important in the future.

It has become increasingly apparent that American-Jewish atti-
tudes have changed since the Six Day War. They have become more
militant concerning United States arming and aiding Israel at any
price, whether it is in America's national interest to do so or not.
United States policy, since the June War, represented a departure
from past policy and placed more of an emphasis on solving the Arab-
Israeli conflict.

The United States has been a major, if not the major, actor in
the Middle East. It has become a principal supplier of sophisticated
military equipment and has increasingly been identified, both by
Israel and the Arab nations, as the major extra-regional power involved in
determining the future course of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Despite
increased interest in the Mideast, U.S. foreign policy toward the
area in the past suggests that America has always relied upon "instant"
decision making policies which, in turn, accounts for its lack in
fully understanding the area, the people and the volatile situation
that exists there.
American policy toward Palestine was often the same as many Zionist aims during and shortly after the birth of Israel. Overriding State Department advisors, President Harry Truman personally encouraged the Zionist goal of immigration to Palestine to the extent that he began to alienate Great Britain as America's closest ally. He accepted Britain's attempt to correct differences through the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. However, when the Body submitted its report, President Truman declared his support of recommendations which he personally believed in. The recommendations which did not interest him, he "took under advisement" and then later rejected.\footnote{Citing Chapter II, p. 33.} Later, the President responded to the Morrison-Grady Plan by taking a position which again seemed to conform with the Zionist program and conflict with the advice of his Secretary of State.

During the Zionist movement's internal conflict regarding acceptance of a Palestine partition, U.S. policy reflected a lack of agreement by carefully avoiding a position on the issue while U.S. officials simultaneously made formal inquiries of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem in order to ascertain the Zionist position on the matter. They followed the acceptance of the UNSCOP majority report by the Zionist
movement and the pressures placed upon the Truman administration to secure American support. After a short delay, the U.S. again came out in support of a position that happened to be favored by Zionist aims. There was, however, a time when Zionist pressures were ignored because American interests were being threatened by Soviet penetration of the Middle East. However, once the UNSCOP majority report was accepted by the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine, and the issue of partition was brought before the General Assembly for resolution, Zionist pressures on the White House increased. Shortly after that, American support for the report was noted.

President Truman's sympathies with Zionist aims was not without limitation. Following the partition decision, "he permitted the State Department to comply with a U.N. appeal by placing an embargo on all arms bound for the Middle East," and then "he denied passports to Americans who wished to serve with armed forces not under the United States government." More significantly, he made no effort to comply with Zionist demands for a United Nations force to impose the partition plan. Instead, he allowed the State Department to forestall such an action, by taking the position that the Security Council had no power to act because the Palestine issue did not constitute a threat to international peace. Then, when it became apparent that partition could not be achieved peacefully, the State Department recommended that the Security Council suspend the plan to partition Palestine and call a special session of the General Assembly to consider setting up a

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temporary U.N. trusteeship in that land. By permitting the State Department to engage in such tactics, the President was undoubtedly responding to an increasingly tense international situation. American policy seemed to be reacting to an increasingly hostile Soviet Union as the U.S. sought to deny Russia its historic aim of gaining a foothold in the Middle East. The Soviet Union had always wished to gain access to the Middle East for economic, strategic and ideological reasons. Economically, Russia realized the tremendous oil potential existing there—if they controlled the Middle East today, they would control 65% of the total oil wealth in the world today. The Mideast was also a potentially good market for Soviet products. Strategically, if the Soviet Union controlled the Mideast they would control important routes that would act as gateways to the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Russia had always desired the warm waters of the Mediterranean to give them military superiority. Ideologically, through the process of acculturation, Russia also hoped to win the Arab nations over to the Soviet communist camp.

The President's willingness to accept State Department advice regarding Palestine ended when, immediately following the establishment of the State of Israel, he complied with the written request of Chaim Weizmann by granting the new state immediate de facto recognition. President Truman felt that it was in America's interest to recognize Israel despite protests to the contrary from the State Department that the U.S. should wait before granting formal recognition. The following day, various influential Zionists demanded that the United States request the U.N. Security Council to declare the situation in Palestine
a threat to the peace; the U.S. reversed its previous policy by fulfilling that request within hours. Whether it was in America's best interest to make such a move was again questioned by the State Department.

Shortly afterward came a further request from Zionist leaders that the U.S. help provide economic and political aid which the State of Israel would need in the critical months that lay ahead. It was during that period that President Truman was asked to arrange a hundred million dollar loan to Israel. Within weeks the plea for such a loan was publicly taken up by various Zionists and was accompanied by a demand that the U.S. grant full de jure recognition to Israel. Both the Democratic and Republican parties came out quickly to endorse both Zionist demands, making them political issues in a political election year.

President Truman's policies for 1946-1948 somewhat conformed with Zionist aims. The President definitely felt a personal and emotional commitment to the establishment, and later to the welfare, of the State of Israel. He favored the aims, on more than one occasion, of his Zionist friends even though he did not always agree with the tactics they used for attaining those aims. President Truman apparently felt, during those years, that it was in the interest of the United States to develop strong ties with Israel as a means of deterring Soviet influence in the area.

During the Eisenhower administration more of an interest was taken in matters relating to the Middle East, perhaps as a reaction to Soviet influence there. Mr. Eisenhower, however, sought also to lessen Arab resentment against the American Government that had begun during the
Truman era. The U.S. hoped to promote a defense organization that would act as a deterrent to Soviet expansion and thus needed the trust of Arab countries to accomplish it. The United States had to assume a position of greater neutrality in the area in terms of both the diplomatic and financial support that it was giving to Israel if a defense organization was to be established and succeed.

Following the establishment of Israel, the Zionist movement assumed the roles of both organizing and directing support for Israel. However, the ZOA in the United States found that they did not have the sympathetic ear of President Eisenhower who, rather, tried to react more independently from interest groups when formulating his foreign policy. The President and his strong Secretary of State made it their policy to react more to Soviet moves in the Middle East and not to Zionist demands on the domestic scene.

During late 1953 and 1954, the Zionist movement sought to discredit what it alleged to be the State Department's faltering policy in the Middle East and to oppose U.S. efforts to arm Arab states. However, the movement met opposition from the State Department as well as from Secretary of State Dulles, backed by a President who was determined to avoid a direct East-West confrontation by creating alliances in the area.

As 1954 drew to a close, the Zionist movement began to de-emphasize its efforts in bringing a halt to arming and creating defense organizations with Arab states in favor of an increased effort to secure American arms for Israel, along with an American guarantee of Israel's security.
through a mutual security agreement. Both Zionist objectives were not considered by the Administration which allowed the State Department to place the requests under consideration, never to be acted upon. Zionist efforts during the mid-1950's to start a campaign in support of such a security pact were numerous and impressive, but brought no favorable response from the Eisenhower administration. When Egypt purchased large quantities of arms from the East in the autumn of 1955, they became Russian military clients and the West's monopoly on a modern weapon market in the Middle East was destroyed. Changing Soviet policies in the Mideast put the United States on guard. No longer did the Soviet Union insist on aiding "progressive" countries only, but rather began to stress neutralism as a stand which the newly emerging nations should take. "By the end of 1955, there were twelve states in the Middle East who had close relations with the East, compared with only five a decade earlier, and six out of the twelve new states were situated in the Arab-Israeli zone." Thus, the number of independent Arab states multiplied as Soviet influence there increased. As a result, the United States began to view the Middle East as an area of the world where a possible East-West confrontation could take place.

Both President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had a preoccupation with the development of a military deterrent to Soviet penetration in the Middle East and to an American effort to replace declining British influence there. It was recognized that America's effort to achieve such ends would be diminished to the extent that it would continue to be identified with imperialist powers or with

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*Kurewitz, op. cit., Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East, p. 10.*
what the Arabs held to be the transplanted European "settler state" of Israel. Similarly, Eisenhower and Dulles appeared to have been convinced that such ends could be promoted through efforts to identify the United States with the anti-imperialists aspirations of Third World nations. As they sought such an American role in the Middle East, they recognized the advantage of enlisting the support of Gamal Nasser who was the one man in the Arab world who could assure or deny American success. Consequently, American efforts to secure Nasser's cooperation and support continued after Nasser concluded an agreement for Czech arms in the autumn of 1955. An American policy of cooperation with Egypt's Nasser lasted for many months. In mid-1956 Egyptian-American relations became strained. When Secretary Dulles offered Nasser his plan to finance the Aswan High Dam project and Nasser rejected it, Dulles turned against him and thus any chance for a mutual trust between the two countries was lost.

Following Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal in July, 1956, America's policy was to restrain Israel, Britain and France. As Eisenhower and Dulles sought to mediate the growing Middle East dispute, they came under attack from the American Zionist movement which sought American support for NATO allies and for Israel. Following the Sinai invasion, Zionists again tried to gather support for Israel, France and Britain. However, Eisenhower honored his intention of helping any victim of aggression by bringing the matter before the United Nations and by vigorously supporting its demand for the withdrawal of British, French and Israeli forces from Egyptian territory. More importantly Soviet pressure was building, thus causing Washington to quickly defuse
the situation on the threat of Russian intervention. By following that policy, President Eisenhower placed American national interests before domestic political interest groups (the Zionist lobby and the Anti-Dam coalition in Congress). With Eisenhower's victory in the 1956 Presidential Election, Zionist efforts to counter his policies, in the field of Mideast relations, continued through propaganda directed both at the American public and at the American Congress.

As Israel delayed in-withdrawing its troops from Egyptian soil, the battle shifted from the military to the political arena. Simultaneously, the American Zionist movement sought to mobilize public as well as Congressional opposition to the continuing efforts of the White House to bring about an Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian territory. ZOA access to influential members of Congress from both the Republican and Democratic parties seemed evident in the Congressional Record for February 11, 1957, and their support for Israel was overwhelming. Within weeks, President Eisenhower's policy of applying sanctions against Israel in protest of their failure to withdraw from Egyptian land was changed to a resolution which sought to bring about a compromise settlement somewhere between imposing sanctions and allowing freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba. The explanation given for the compromise was that President Eisenhower had come to the realization that Congressional and public opinion opposition would not permit stronger measures (applying sanctions with no alternative) to be employed. It seemed that Zionist pressures played a role in changing President Eisenhower's original policy of applying sanctions against Israel.

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4Citing Chapter III, p. 71.
When in January, 1957, Israel announced its intention of remaining within the Gaza Strip, it soon became apparent that Congressional support for Eisenhower's Middle East policy had seriously eroded. However, both from within the United Nations and from without, President Eisenhower continued to apply pressures upon Israel.

President Eisenhower was unable to gain the public and Congressional support necessary for the application of sanctions. The Congress, which was within its Constitutional rights, refused to support the President's policy and took the stand that the action was too harsh. However, Mr. Eisenhower stood firmly upon his demand that Israel comply with U.N. resolutions by withdrawing from all the territory conquered during the Sinai Campaign. Once he was not able to get Israel's cooperation through the application of sanctions, he seemed determined to get that cooperation through promises of future American support for the State of Israel which were made during secret negotiations. Among those promises were U.S. support for the continued presence of the U.N.E.F. in Sinai and the Gaza Strip, a U.S. declaration that it regarded the Gulf of Aqaba as an international waterway and a strong hint of U.S. support (no written agreement) in the event of further hostilities.

Although the Eisenhower era never established a well-defined American foreign policy stand in the Middle East it did, however, take more of an interest in the area if only as a result of growing Soviet influence there. Eisenhower's policy of regional security was manifested in the form of the Baghdad Pact. The U.S. was involved in matters related to the Baghdad Pact, but never formally joined it. CENTO, as the Baghdad Pact became known in 1959, was more important for its
technical and economic successes than for its military accomplishments. The Eisenhower Doctrine, rather than acting as a deterrent to communism in the Middle East, was more important in the areas of technical and economic cooperation than in security matters. The landing of American troops on Lebanese soil in 1958 was a move in response to outside forces (the Soviet Union and Egypt) that threatened both the stability of Lebanon and the weak position of the United States in the area. While the landing of U.S. troops in Lebanon reinforced the President's determination to preserve the independence and integrity of a nation as put forth in the Eisenhower Doctrine, it was not a change in American foreign policy toward the Middle East but rather an instant reaction to keeping a Soviet-American power-balance secure there.

John Kennedy used the American Jewish community to get himself elected to the Presidency in 1960 by taking a strong stand in support of Israel.\(^5\) After the 1960 election, however, he decided to use his "good offices" in an attempt to better U.S. relations with Egypt and other Arab countries. President Kennedy tried to understand Arab attitudes and policies in the hope that it would ultimately enable the U.S. to exert some influence beneficial to an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. However, despite his friendly relations with Arab countries, Kennedy, like all other practical U.S. politicians, sought to strengthen his image among Jewish voters with an eye on the 1964 Presidential Election. Some years after his death in 1963, it was discovered that the President had agreed to deliver a large supply of "Hawk aircraft missiles in return for an Israeli promise not to develop nuclear weapons."\(^6\) Thus,

\(^5\)Citing speeches in Chapter IV, Bp. 89, 90, 91.

\(^6\)Citing Chapter IV, p. 93.
the United States continued to retain its position as chief supplier of
arms to Israel under the Kennedy administration as well as retaining
good relations with Egypt and other Arab countries—a smart policy
stand for the President of the United States to maintain as a peace
maker. The three considerations of maintaining world peace by limiting
nuclear capabilities, keeping a balance-of-power in the area by remaining
friendly toward Arab countries as well as supplying arms to Israel and
campaigning to win a Presidential Election in 1964 marked United States
foreign policy in the Middle East during the Kennedy era.

When Lyndon Johnson succeeded Kennedy, American Jews around the
country felt more at ease since Johnson's past voting record clearly
indicated his strong support for the State of Israel. The Arab nations
feared Johnson's reputation, and out of that fear a strong belligerent
climate developed again between Arab countries and the United States.
Relations became tense and any thought of talks concerning the Arab-
Israeli conflict disappeared with the end of the Kennedy administration.
Border incidents increased during that period, and as peace talks in
the United Nations completely broke down an impending war seemed to be
inevitable. Israel was having internal, governmental problems and the
hawks within the country believed that a war would act as a unifying
factor at that point in time. Egypt's Nasser, on the other hand, had
to face the fact that his prestige in the Arab world was on the line
and that domestic pressures were accusing him of not taking a hard-line
when dealing with Israel in the face of border violations. In the United
States President Johnson was dealing with the greatest problem of his

7 Citing Chapter IV, p. 97.
Administration—the commitment of American troops and aid to South Vietnam. He was almost totally preoccupied with the Vietnam War and had no intention of committing the U.S. in another part of the world. President Johnson made vague speeches concerning the protection of all countries in the Mideast area, but made no U.S. military commitment. He emphasized behind-the-scenes diplomatic negotiating and United Nations intervention. Because the 1967 Six Day War was so short in duration, President Johnson was not faced with the decision of possibly sending in American troops to aid Israel. American public opinion was overwhelmingly with the winning Israeli army and perhaps pressures from individuals or from the Zionist lobby could have been brought to bear on President Johnson to take a hard-line position, not conducive to promoting a peace settlement, if the conflict had not ended so abruptly.

During Richard Nixon’s first term in office he had to deal with a different Israel. As a result of the Six Day War Israel became a modern state overnight and Jews in America felt a spirit of nationalism that linked them and their allegiance to that Jewish state as never before. President Nixon, as did Lyndon Johnson before him, emphasized diplomatic negotiation and strong U.N. participation in settling the conflict. The Rogers’ Peace Plan, which stressed as one of its points the acceptance of U.N. Resolution 242 by all parties involved as a prelude to any kind of peace settlement, pointed out President Nixon’s willingness to settle the conflict through the United Nations. Nixon stressed the concept of developing a closer relationship with all countries in the area, particularly with the more militant Arab nations whom America had failed to understand and deal with in the past. However, in early 1970, after
Secretary of State Rogers mentioned the possibility of "four-power talks" in solving the Mideast problem, the tide changed and the Nixon administration was suddenly caught off-guard by a tremendous amount of hostility directed at them by the Jewish community. American Jews felt that Nixon would betray them and impose a settlement on Israel which would jeopardize its security and future bargaining position in the area. Nixon's relations with the American Jewish community, throughout much of his first term in office, were uneasy and tense. However, while demonstrating a new "even-handed" position, President Nixon "gave more economic and military assistance to Israel (some $1.2 billion) than the four preceding Administrations during the previous two decades." American aid to Jordan was minimal and the remaining Arab countries received only an audience and promises of aid. His policy of continued diplomacy, with financial and military aid to Israel seemed to have won him the Jewish vote in 1972. To keep Jewish support within his camp, President Nixon further promised Israel a continuing margin of technical superiority in the Mideast without directly committing American troops. These policies seemed to represent the Nixon Doctrine and the role it has played in the Arab Israeli question.

American Jewish attitudes have changed since the Six Day War. The Zionist lobby in Congress stepped-up its activities in order to gain and keep the support of as many Congressmen as possible. Arming and aiding Israel, regardless of America's national interests, has become more intensified in the minds of American Zionists throughout the country.

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8Citing Chapter IV, p. 131.
The Middle East situation poses possibly the greatest foreign policy problem to be dealt with in the future. There remains deep division of opinion throughout the United States as well as around the world. Two powerfully vested interests which Americans have in the area insure the fact that pressures will continue in the future: pro-Israeli sentiment and oil. Significant though the emotional Arab-Israeli issue is, more is involved in the Middle East problem from an American standpoint. The crisis revolves around financial and strategic questions, with definite global impact. Some of the world's most powerful business conglomerates are deeply involved, including giants of American industry and finance. An ideological power-struggle is also involved between the capitalist bloc led by the United States and the communist bloc led by the Soviet Union. "The major interests involved in the Middle East dispute, each attempting in various ways and degrees to influence U.S. policy, include Zionists, Arab governments, Arab refugees from Palestine, U.S. oil companies, various multi-national business interests, the Soviet Union, American military planners and religious interest groups."\(^9\)

The files of the Justice Department's Foreign Agents Registration section are filled with printed material that represents only a small percentage of the overall output of propaganda circulated among American citizens and public officials by various interest groups. With both direct lobbying in Congress and mass lobbying at the grassroots level, the effect is felt by senators in both major political parties who take an active interest in Israel's security.

American foreign policy in the Middle East aims at supporting Israel with arms to maintain a balance-of-power to offset Soviet arming of militant Arab countries and at the same time, seeks to maintain open relations with Arab nations that are rich with oil and strategically important to U.S. interests. The U.S. Defense Department plays an active role in determining American foreign policy in the Middle East. The Defense Department makes its position clear concerning what type of military stand the U.S. should pursue in the area. The guiding aims, the Defense Department maintains, should be, (1) to establish a military force adequate enough to reassure our allies and other governments that the U.S. will be present in the area at all times and, (2) to deter the Soviets from adventurous moves by maintaining a clear naval and air superiority in the Mediterranean Sea. The U.S. Defense Department wants to keep America's position in the Middle East strong and a balance-of-power between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. maintained. Its methods to insure those goals emphasize keeping track of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean, using the Mideast as a testing ground for the effectiveness of U.S. weapons and working out a highly specialized system of exchange of intelligence information between the U.S. and its Israeli ally. The U.S. State Department also stresses the need for American involvement in the area as a means of maintaining a balance-of-power and protecting its interests there. However, the State Department believes that American influence can be strengthened in the region through an emphasis in methods such a personal diplomacy

\[10\] Horewitz, op. cit., p. 206.
moves, stepped-up economic investing by U.S. companies and through cultural exchange programs. That does not mean, however, that the State Department rules out a limited U.S. military presence there. The goals of both the Defense Department and the State Department are fundamentally the same, but their emphasis on methods used to achieve those American goals in the Middle East differ. Following America's four major objectives in the Middle East—assuring Israel's survival, protecting our economic interests, containing Soviet influence and avoiding a U.S.-Soviet confrontation—is the complicated dilemma of assuring a lasting peace that will keep American officials attempting a balancing act in international power politics for years to come.

These policies are subject to political currents within the United States. The political currents of the land (public opinion) are represented by elected officials as well as by organized interest groups. By using an interest group to support a view held by millions of American citizens, the Zionist movement is simply "playing the game of politics" by rules that are used by everyone. If, however, the aims of various Zionist lobby groups in the U.S. Congress appear to be against the American national interest as deemed by groups either sympathetic to the Arab cause (National Association of Arab Americans) or neutral (the Quaker-oriented American Friends of the Middle East), then it is their responsibility to provide countering views by "playing the game" in the same manner.

Throughout the periods dealt with in this study there was present within the United States a widespread feeling of sympathy and support for the State of Israel. United States policy in the Middle East has
never really remained constant during the past twenty-eight years, despite America's close relationship with Israel. America has continuously maintained its close ties with Israel and has remained the major supplier of arms to the Jewish state since its birth in 1948. However, the United States has also formulated its foreign policy moves in the area only in times of crisis, and in times when Soviet presence there seemed to be a great threat. American actions in the Middle East were usually reactions to Russian or Arab-backed moves. U.S. foreign policy never seemed geared to anticipate pending crises there.

It was impossible to prove with certainty that United States' policies toward the Middle East were arrived at as a result of direct Zionist influence. It did, however, seem reasonable to conclude that if Zionism was not the creator of public opinion, it often acted as a force for mobilizing public support, channeling it into decision-making centers within the Government, and thereby promoting it. Both the ZOA and the Zionist lobby group on Capitol Hill seemed to use events in history rather than create them, to achieve their aims. That has been a legitimate method of political action in the past and will continue to be used to the advantage of all special interest groups within the United States governmental process. It may be said in the final analysis that the Zionist Organization of America exercised a continuing influence, which was at times accepted and at other times rejected, concerning the development of United States foreign policy in the Middle East during the periods dealt with in this study.
The Potential of the American Zionist Movement

Throughout the period that this study deals with, the Zionist movement within the United States maintained a large and favorably inclined public on the issue of United States support for Israel. From its base within the American Jewish community, the movement expanded its influence to the extent that large segments of the Gentile majority were also included within the Zionist cause. In its efforts to secure and retain that Gentile majority, it continuously maintained influential groups and individuals as its allies.

The American Jewish community and its enthusiasm for Zionism seemed to decline somewhat between the establishment of Israel and the Sinai period. However, after the 1967 War an even greater spirit of patriotism was felt by Jews around the world toward Israel and a pledge for its existence was strengthened. From 1948 up to the present, American Jews have generally remained overwhelmingly sympathetic toward Israel and supported it both politically and financially. It therefore may be said that the vast majority of American Jews have been "functional Zionists" in the sense that they supported the Zionist program either as formal members or as sympathizers. Its strength never really lay in its formal membership, but rather in its command of two symbols which elicited the support of the Jewish community: Zionism came to symbolize an identification with Jewish life and to serve as the most direct link between American Jewry and the State of Israel which it supported.

While the American Zionist movement often appeared to be fragmented in the sense that its formal membership had been dispersed throughout
Various interest groups within the Jewish community, it remained more cohesive than it seemed. The policies of Israel consistently influenced the stand that American Zionists took. If the policies of Israel conflicted with United States' policies, the American Zionist community was often expected to condemn the Washington view and support the Tel Aviv position. However, it must be stated that not the entire American population of Jewish persuasion favored Israeli policy over U.S. policy stands in the Middle East.

Throughout the period that this study covered, American Zionist access was regularly achieved in both the Democratic and Republican parties, in Congress and on state and local government levels. The one agency of government that Zionist influence could not always influence was the State Department. Within the U.S. State Department there was a consistent lack of harmony between its proposed policies and the aims of the Zionist program. Chaim Weizmann seemed to have been referring to the Zionist movement's lack of access to the State Department when he noted that, "we were greatly handicapped because we had no foothold there."11 Other Zionist leaders regularly condemned the State Department for its opposition to Zionist aims. Once recommendations made by the State Department concerning Middle East policy reached the Congress or the upper levels of the executive branch, Zionists concentrated their efforts upon modifying those recommendations.

In conclusion, the future strength of the Zionist Organization of America and the Zionist interest group (AIPAC) that functions within

11 Citing Chapter II, p. 22.
the United States Congress will remain vocal and able to continue to exploit events to their benefit. They may, in the future, be challenged by interest groups who are pro-Arab (NAAA) or groups that want both sides of the dispute heard in terms of what is best for the U.S. national interest (AFME). However, Zionist strength and influence will continue to be felt in areas where support can be counted on such as in the U.S. Congress and among the general public. Future United States foreign policy in the Middle East will be influenced by Zionist aims as long as it is in the interest of the U.S. to be so influenced. Finally, American foreign policy will be formulated, more often than not, on the basis of Soviet presence in the area and on economic considerations that affect the United States and its allies. During the past twenty-eight years, it seemed to be in America's national interest to support Israel and be its most important ally. That strong relationship was an effective deterrent to Soviet expansion in the area. However, in the future America may discover that it is not in its national interest to support Israel as strongly as it had in the past due to changing economic factors in terms of a greater need for Arab oil. A changing American policy could also come about as a renewed awareness of the fact that a great potential for an American-Soviet confrontation still exists, which could be triggered by another Arab-Israeli war where the Arab countries (backed by Russia) demonstrate to Israel (and the U.S.) that they are a power to be reckoned with. Thus, the ZOA in America will lose some degree of its influence if these circumstances come about.
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