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Recent Developments of Phenomenological Psychology in the United States and Their Implications for Empirical Inquiry

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PREFACE

The following manuscript represents some of the information and insights I have come upon in a two year long attempt to answer the question "How does phenomenology relate to psychology, both theoretically and empirically?". I have found the relevant literature to be highly technical, often unorganized, and often ambiguously formulated. This essay is my attempt to review the literature in a somewhat organized fashion.

A first problem encountered by many social scientists with little philosophical background is to formulate a clear concept of what the term phenomenology means. The first chapter of this essay deals with the various usages of the term phenomenology in the history of philosophy and in recent American psychology. Also, several common confusions of the term with other terms and their meanings are explored. In general, the first chapter attempts to show what phenomenology is not.

The second chapter of this essay attempts to show what phenomenology has been since Husserl began writing on the topic. Several important variants of his original conception are also explored. This chapter is philosophically oriented and attempts to provide a brief philosophical excursion in order to illuminate the works of the American phenomenological psychologists discussed in the third chapter.
The third chapter is the heart of this essay, and it is with this chapter that I have hoped to make a contribution to the contemporary history of psychology. Nowhere has relatively recent work in phenomenological psychology been classified according to a typology and discussed. The work of the third chapter is to begin that task.

The final chapter presents a brief critical appraisal of the phenomenological psychology discussed in chapter three, focusing on the important implications of Ricoeur's hermeneutical approach for the social sciences in general. When I began this project I assumed that psychology should be either phenomenologically-oriented or empirically-oriented (in the same general sense as the natural sciences are empirical), but that it must be one or the other. Ricoeur's work raises the possibility of a new objectivity, neither strictly phenomenological nor strictly empirical in the natural scientific sense. This unexpected conclusion marks the end of the current project.
ALTERNATIVE USAGES OF THE TERM PHENOMENOLOGY

The first chapter sets forth some important usages of the term "phenomenology" in the history of philosophy, surveys the literature in American psychology purporting to be phenomenological, and extracts a number of different usages of the term phenomenology from this literature in order to contrast them with Husserl's usage of the term. Husserl's conception of phenomenology is not presented until chapter two, but this chapter will function to clear up some of the terminological confusions surrounding phenomenology.

Pre-Husserlian Conceptions of Phenomenology in the History of Philosophy

Etymologically, the term phenomenology is derived from the Greek terms "phainomenon", itself derived from the verb "phainesthal", meaning "to show itself" (Watson, 1970), and "logos", generally translated as "word" or "science". Thus, etymologically phenomenology may be considered the science of things which show themselves. Historically, this core of meaning has been construed in several different ways, and these different ways of construing the term's meaning have had important methodological consequences for both philosophy and psychology.

The term phenomenology itself first appears in 1764 in one of Lambert's works (Spiegelberg, 1965). He gave it the meaning of a theory of illusion and its varieties and it formed the fourth part of a methodology leading to the unveiling of truth.
The second important usage of the term in the history of philosophy comes in Kant's *The Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant intended phenomenology to be a type of negative knowledge, demarcating the validity and limits of sensory knowledge and preparing the way for a metaphysics. Misak and Sexton (1966) claim that Kant's contrast between things themselves and things as they appear (noumena and phenomena), which is sort of a cornerstone in his philosophy, implies a correspondingly central function for phenomenology, since phenomenology is the method by which phenomena may be studied, and since by definition only the phenomena are knowable. Spiegelberg (1965) disputes this claim, however, saying that there is no reason to believe that the distinction between noumena and phenomena in Kant's works has anything to do with his usage of the term phenomenology.

Phenomenology first emerged as an important component of a philosophical system in Hegel's works. For Hegel phenomenology referred neither to illusions nor appearances, but to the stages of knowledge themselves; these stages of knowledge moved from the *naive, everyday* consciousness to the highest development of knowledge in philosophical consciousness. Phenomena were simply what appeared to consciousness in their different modes, but they were taken by Hegel to be Spirit itself, and not simply manifestations of some underlying reality (as phenomena are manifestations of noumena for
Kant). This knowledge of Spirit itself, however, was not an absolute knowledge (as with Hegel's German Idealist predecessors, Fichte and Schelling); rather, it was part of the knowledge of the historically necessary dialectical transformation of Spirit. Following Hegel, von Hartmann (1875, 1878), Hamilton (1858), Lazarus (1886), and Pierce (1902) also used the term phenomenology in their works, but their usages have not proved important in philosophy or psychology (Spiegelberg, 1965).

Brentano and Stumpf are the final figures of importance in the history of philosophy before Husserl emerged as the central figure in what Spiegelberg (1965) has referred to as the phenomenological movement. The works of Brentano and Stumpf stimulated and, to a certain extent, seem to have anticipated some of Husserl's own regarding phenomenology. Both, however, remained detached from the phenomenological movement itself.

Although apparently utilizing the term phenomenology only in some of his unpublished writings, Brentano's influence on Husserl may be estimated from his emphasis on intentionality, his criticisms of the physicalism and physiologism of the late nineteenth century, and his occasional references to "ideal" intuitions (Spiegelberg, 1965). Brentano seems to have used the term phenomenology as synonymous with the term descriptive, and it is true that one variant of Husserl's phenomenology may be labelled descriptive phenomenology.
Both Stumpf and Husserl studied under Brentano at Wurzburg, and Husserl later studied under Stumpf at Halle. Stumpf did not hesitate to use the term phenomenology, but Husserl believed that Stumpf's conception of the term was much narrower than his own insofar as Stumpf's phenomenology did not consider functions or acts, it limited itself to the "raw materials" of intentional acts, and did not pass through a phenomenological reduction. However, as Spiegelberg (1965) points out, there is much common ground between them; both began their studies with unbiased descriptions of immediately given phenomena, both wished to proceed beyond empirical generalizations to the structures as something other than merely psychological structure.

Finally, with Husserl the phenomenological movement may be said to have begun. Husserl's lectures and works stimulated the work of Geiger, Pfander, Reinach, Scheler, Heidegger, Becker, Stein and many others in Germany and Northern Europe during this century's first few decades. It was not until the thirties and forties that French philosophy became aware of phenomenology and, by way of contrast, it was not until the late fifties and sixties of this century that phenomenological philosophy became of any importance in American philosophical circles.
The Literature of American Phenomenological Psychology

Phenomenology has had few spokesmen in American psychology. William James and Gordon Allport are sometimes said to be phenomenologists, but Spiegelberg (1972) considers these two merely as "pacemakers" who opened up psychology in such a way that phenomenology might later make its entrance. Phenomenology is never mentioned in James' works, nor is he often cited by American phenomenological psychologists. Allport was apparently acquainted with phenomenology and existentialism as they developed in Europe, but in his own work he considered these doctrines as only a part of the Leibnizian (as opposed to the Lockean) trend in psychology.

Donald Snygg pioneered phenomenological psychology in the United States with his 1941 article calling for a new phenomenological (or personal) approach to psychology. Snygg believed that behavior is the result of the phenomenological field of the behaving organism. Thus, psychology must concern itself with this phenomenal field and, more specifically, with the phenomenal self within that field if prediction of behavior is ever to become possible. Later collaboration with Combs (who had worked with Rogers) produced the first American psychology text espousing a phenomenological approach, Individual Behavior: A New Frame of Reference for Psychology (1949). Neither the goal of their enterprise -- the prediction of behavior -- nor the actual methods employed -- analogical inference -- may be said to be phenomenological in Husserl's sense.
Rogers' theoretical writings (as presented in Koch, 1959; Wann, 1964) show clearly that he considers his views to be phenomenological in an important way. Rogers' first mention of phenomenology comes in his 1951 volume, Client-Centered Therapy, wherein he maintains with Snygg and Combs that the phenomenal field is of fundamental importance in directing behavior for the individual. The second important influence on Rogers was Gendlin, whose Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning (1962) is subtitled "A Philosophical and Psychological Approach to the Subjective". Gendlin is specified by Rogers as his theoretical ally in formulating a phenomenological approach to psychotherapy and to the problem of the self (Spiegelberg, 1972).

In 1959 Kuenzli edited The Phenomenological Problem, a collection of articles written by Combs, Rogers, MacLeod, Newcomb, and others; probably it best represents the state of phenomenological psychology in the United States during the forties and fifties, since it includes almost all of the classical articles written from a phenomenological perspective in the previous two decades in America. As will be clear shortly, however, it is doubtful that this phenomenological psychology has anything to do with Husserl's phenomenological psychology as developed in Europe.

A well-known volume edited by May, Angel, and Ellenberger, Existence (1958), attempts to present certain aspects of psychotherapy from a phenomenological perspective and includes selections
by the editors, although most of the articles are translations from European writings by Binswanger, von Gebsattel, Minkowski, and others (Spiegelberg, 1972). May, cited by Spiegelberg (1972) as possibly the most influential American existential phenomenologist, thoroughly discusses phenomenology only in his *Love and Will* (1969), and even in this work it is not clear that his conception of intentionality (a central concept for Husserl) is related to Husserl's usage.

Lyons' *Psychology and the Measure of Man: A Phenomenological Approach* is another attempt to apply phenomenological insights to the psychotherapeutic task. This volume contains the first comprehensive bibliography of writings on phenomenological psychology which were available in English. The list runs to 185 items; a recent (1969) estimate by Lyons placed the number close to 1000, but the bulk of these works are translations or commentaries written by European phenomenological psychologists. Kuenzli's volume (1959) also contains a bibliography of nearly 100 items considered relevant to phenomenological psychology; only one of these items, however, reflects Husserl's conception of phenomenology.

During the sixties several phenomenologically-oriented journals (*Journal of Existential Psychiatry*, *The Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry*, and *Existential Psychiatry*) were launched, but their contents are far from strictly phenomenological in orientation or psychological in focus. In 1970 the *Journal of Phenomenological Psychology* began publication; it is the only journal...
exclusively devoted to articles on phenomenological psychology and its relations to the field of psychology in general.

Although often mentioned by "third-force" psychologists such as Maslow, Jourard, Laing and others as part of the third-force (or humanistic) movement, only one recently-published text (Severin, 1973) has an entire chapter dealing with phenomenological and existential psychology; and even this text deals only with a limited group (the Duquesne phenomenological psychologists) of phenomenologists and their writings.

Amongst texts in the history of psychology the situation is no better; only Misiak and Sexton's (1966) text provides as much as a chapter on phenomenological psychology and its history. Fortunately, Spiegelberg's recent (1972) volume, Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry, remedies this gap in the literature of the history of psychology. Nevertheless, Spiegelberg's book does not deal at length with recent developments in American phenomenological psychology, nor does he provide any useful classificatory scheme or critique of them. Hopefully this essay remedies those deficiencies in his work.

Finally, several volumes published in the past eight years should be mentioned. In 1966 Van Kaam published his Existential Foundations of Psychology, and in 1970 Giorgi published Psychology as a Human Science: A Phenomenologically-Based Approach; these two
volumes stand as the most comprehensive and original texts written by American phenomenological psychologists. In 1967 Kockelmans' *Phenomenology* (an anthology with several important articles on phenomenological psychology and an important critical article by Kockelmans) appeared, and in 1973 Natanson edited *Phenomenology and the Social Sciences*, a collection of original writings by well-known phenomenological social scientists. With few important exceptions (those being odd journal articles, monographs and dissertations) the literature noted in this section constitutes American phenomenological psychology. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to unravelling some of the many senses in which the term phenomenology has been used in the literature of American psychology.

Further Confusions About the Meaning and Use of the Term Phenomenology

When European phenomenological philosophers and psychologists refer to phenomenology their referent is most often Husserl's phenomenology. This usage has been honored by American philosophers, but American psychologists have frequently used the term when referring to other conceptions of phenomenology (e.g., phenomenology refers to person-oriented, subject-oriented of Gestalt-psychological approaches to man and his behavior). For the sake of clarity it is important to distinguish Husserl's conception of phenomenology and its meaning (implications, consequences, functions) from these other
views. This final section of the present chapter attempts to distinguish Husserl's conception from several American conceptions by briefly characterizing the views and pointing out Husserl's contrasting stance on phenomenology. The first section of the next chapter will present Husserl's phenomenology at length.

Many of the important sources of terminological confusion have been summarized by Kockelmans (1971). First, it is unfortunately true that many of the issues dealt with in phenomenology are somewhat complicated philosophically. Since most psychologists have had little training in philosophy, it is understandable that fine distinctions held to be of great importance by phenomenologists are considered trivial or puzzling by psychologists without strong backgrounds in philosophy. Further, however, many of the existing secondary sources on phenomenology are both confusing and highly biased in their presentations of phenomenology. Consequently, there is little inducement for most psychologists to involve themselves with phenomenological literature.

Second, the views presented in Kuenzli's volume, The Phenomenological Problem (1959), represent the earliest selection of phenomenologically-oriented articles written for and by psychologists in America. Snygg and Combs, Rogers, MacLeod, Newcomb and other well-known American psychologists who considered some of their work to be phenomenological are represented with selections. Little of Husserl's work had been translated and published in English.
by then, however, so at the least these selections are often not representative of a direct confrontation with Husserl's writings. For example, for Snygg the goal of psychology is the prediction of behavior; Snygg considers his approach phenomenological because he claims that it is the phenomenal field that determines behavior (rather than any distinct set of external stimuli), and adequate prediction of behavior will only come through adequate specification of the individual's phenomenal field. For Husserl, however, the concept of prediction is applicable only to the realm of empirical psychology, and phenomenological psychology is carefully distinguished from empirical psychology.

Rogers' view of phenomenology, as presented in his chapters in Kuenzli (1959), Koch (1959), and Wann (1964), is that phenomenology is a third way of knowing beyond either objective or subjective knowing. The fundamental mode of scientific inquiry seeking phenomenological knowledge is said to be empathic inference. Although Husserl's phenomenology utilizes intuition of essences as one of its methods for obtaining phenomenological knowledge, this method does not involve any attempt to infer the emotional state of another person. Husserl's intuitive method is utilized by the phenomenologist on his own thoughts and feelings in an attempt to get at their essential aspects.

For MacLeod, as for Rogers, phenomenology is simply another mode of scientific inquiry. MacLeod views the understanding and
explanation of human behavior as the fundamental aim of psychology, and phenomenology is useful in providing the "knowledge of acquaintance" that leads to understanding; phenomenology is thus useful in determining what behaviors the psychologist is confronting. In order to answer the questions of why and how these behaviors emerge more "scientific" methods must be used. By 1964 (Wann) MacLeod was referring to phenomenology as a "propaedeutic" to psychology proper, and this is in accord with Husserl's proclamations. His continuing adherence to a Gestalt model of perception based on a naive realism and holding that consciousness is an isomorphic collection of forms is the fundamental point of difference between his view of phenomenology and Husserl's. Nevertheless, of those American psychologists who wrote about phenomenology and psychology in the forties and fifties, MacLeod is clearly closest in conception of phenomenology to Husserl.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, Husserl's own conception of phenomenological psychology is said to have undergone an important transformation later in his career. The precise details of the argument will be presented in detail in the second chapter of this essay; briefly, however, the two interpretations of Husserl's work are: a) that Husserl's conception of the nature of phenomenological psychology did not really change in any fundamental sense between 1925 and 1936, and thus that he continued to believe that phenomenological psychology should occupy a postition intermediate to phenomenological philosophy and empirical psychology, and b) that
Husserl's conception did indeed undergo transformation in that time period, thus necessitating the elimination of any differences proposed in the first interpretation between phenomenological philosophy and phenomenological psychology. This latter interpretation relegates phenomenology to the status of a school or trend more or less dictating that psychology is only valid when done in accord with the insights of phenomenological philosophy.

The second interpretation of Husserl's views is preferred by phenomenological psychologists such as Strasser, Giorgi, and Gurwitsch, while the first interpretation is proposed by Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Buysendijk, and others (cited in Spiegelberg, 1972). To further confuse matters, Marcel, Ricoeur, and Heidegger, among many others (cited in Spiegelberg, 1965), have also developed elaborate phenomenologies differing from Husserl's in important ways. With the single exception of Marcel, though, Husserl's work had first to be confronted. The differences between the various conceptions of phenomenological philosophy and phenomenological psychology stimulated by Husserl's work will be the subject of the second and third chapters of this essay.

Not only is it possible that Husserl presents several overall views on the nature of phenomenology, but it is also true that he mentions a number of stages of the phenomenological endeavor. Kockelmans (1971) has provided a useful summary of the major stages proposed by his interpreters:
1) Direct analysis and description of particular phenomena aiming at maximum intuitive presentation (descriptive phenomenology)

2) Probing these phenomena for typical structures or 'essences' (eidetic phenomenology)

3) Giving attention to the ways in which such phenomena appear (phenomenology of appearances)

4) Studying the processes in which such phenomena become constituted (constitutive phenomenology)

5) Suspending belief in the reality or validity of the phenomena (reductive phenomenology)

6) Phenomenological interpretation designed to unveil otherwise concealed meanings in the phenomena (hermeneutic phenomenology)

(p. 157)

The reduction that takes place during the fifth stage is also referred to as the transcendental reduction.

In the above scheme stages one through five are usually taken to represent Husserl's phenomenological philosophy, while stages one through four plus six represents Heidegger's phenomenology. Those claiming Husserl's view of phenomenological psychology underwent a change during his career restricting psychological research to the first five stages above, while those opposed to this view believe that Husserl's life-long conception of phenomenological psychology is constituted by stages one through four, with a phenomenologico-psychological reduction substituted for the reduction in stage five.
Two points about Kockelmans' distinction should be made. First, according to the interpretation subordinating phenomenological psychology and psychological research to phenomenological philosophy, research in psychology would remain as scientific, objective and empirically rigorous as it now is, only it would rely on phenomenological methods more appropriate to their object, man; man is thus seen as a special object of study, dissimilar to inanimate objects and other forms of life. In short, they adopt what they sometimes refer to as a human scientific (rather than a natural scientific) approach to the study of man's behavior.

A second point about Kockelmans' distinction is that it does not exhaust the logical possibilities for relationships between phenomenological philosophy and empirical psychology. Under one interpretation empirical psychology is merely supplemented with a phenomenological psychology (or descriptive science of man), while under the other interpretation presented empirical psychology as we now know it is completely supplanted by phenomenological psychology. A third logical possibility is that there is some overlap between the aims and methods of phenomenological psychology and empirical psychology, but no usurpation of the others' province. In fact, such a position seems to be represented by the hermeneutical phenomenology of Ricoeur. All three positions will thus be dealt with in the following chapter.
A fourth source of confusion over the meaning of the term phenomenology is the propensity of some psychologists to use the term to refer to either what a person is thinking or feeling at a given time (a usage related to Rogers') or to refer to the methods of the so-called third force movement. It cannot be stressed too strongly that phenomenology is neither necessarily humanistic nor necessarily existential. To be concerned with the proper hierarchy of distinctively human needs (Maslow, 1962) or the ways in which man differs from inanimate objects and other forms of life or the fundamental conflicts and dilemmas of man's existence is not to imply the use of the phenomenological method. In many ways the technical rigor of Husserl's phenomenology resembles Wittgenstein's careful analyses of language (see Ricoeur in Lee and Mandelbaum, 1967) more than it does the often reckless proclamations and analyses of either humanists or existentialists.

The surface similarity of introspection to Husserl's phenomenological method constitutes a fifth source of confusion. According to MacLeod (Wann, 1964), however, the two are similar only insofar as they both concern themselves with the experiences which are the contents of consciousness, while they differ in at least two important respects. First, introspectionism assumes that experience can be reduced to a finite number of sensations and elements, whereas phenomenology makes no such assumption. Second, the introspectionist is concerned with meaning only insofar as it may be reduced to
these sensations or elements, while the phenomenologist is interested in the meanings of the phenomena of consciousness. Thus, although phenomenologists do engage in reductive analysis, their interest is in the fundamental structure of the experience as it is experienced, and not in reducing phenomena to the purported basic elements of a mental chemistry.

Sixth, confusion sometimes results from the visual similarity between the terms phenomenology and phenomenalism. Phenomenalism is an epistemological doctrine contending that the appearances of things are all we can ever know about them. For Husserl things could be known only through their appearances in consciousness, but their essential nature was by no means clear. In order to clarify the essential aspects of things as experienced in their appearances a series of phenomenological reductions must be performed. Thus, for Husserl it is possible to know things in their essence, and not simply in their appearance.

Having now surveyed the use of the term phenomenology in pre-Husserlian history of philosophy and American psychology, and having presented a number of things that phenomenology is not, the way is prepared to say what phenomenology is. The next two chapters attempt to say what phenomenology means in philosophy and psychology, while the fourth chapter attempts an evaluation of its contributions to psychology and its possible future uses.
THREE CONCEPTIONS OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY

This chapter attempts to briefly describe the three phenomenological philosophies underlying the three conceptions of phenomenological psychology which were shown to be logically possible in chapter one (and which will be presented at length in chapter three). All three philosophical conceptions are based on Husserl's phenomenological views; therefore, his views are covered in slightly greater detail than either Merleau-Ponty's (representing an existential phenomenology) or Ricoeur's (representing a hermeneutic phenomenology). Nevertheless, the present treatment of phenomenological philosophy is very sketchy indeed and must be understood solely as an attempt to provide the minimum grounding in phenomenological philosophy necessary to understanding the related conceptions of phenomenological psychology presented in chapter three.

The Source of Phenomenological Philosophy: Husserl's Work

Ricoeur (1967) has said "All of phenomenology is not Husserl, even though he is more or less its center." (p. 3). Today, when we read of phenomenological philosophy, we are reading primarily of Husserl's work or of some reaction to it (Kockelmanns, 1967). Spiegelberg (1965) considers Husserl the origin of the phenomenological movement, and Ricoeur (1967) has described phenomenology as the sum of Husserl's work and those heresies which have issued from it.
Husserl viewed his work as an attempt to formulate a rigorous science of phenomena on an absolutely certain foundation; his work was to be a truly presuppositionless philosophy which returned to the source of all knowledge about the world. This view is a radicalization of Descartes’ attempt to formulate an absolutely inviolate starting point for philosophical reflection in the cogito (or thinking ego). Phenomenology was to be the rigorous science of the foundational conditions for all knowing and knowledge, and the ambitious ultimate goal of phenomenology was absolutely valid knowledge of all things (Kockelmans, 1967).

Although phenomenology was to be a rigorous science, it was not meant to be a science in the same sense that physics, chemistry, or any of the other recognized empirical sciences were sciences. Phenomenology was to be a science only insofar as it was to be a systematic, thorough, and fair consideration of the epistemological presuppositions of any empirical science, and its means of attaining this end were to be primarily rational and intuitive, not empirical.

According to Husserl, the empirical sciences are based upon the natural attitude of man as he goes about his business in everyday life. In the natural attitude of man assumes the existence of a real, external world of things which is objectively understandable to him as a thinking and perceiving being; this world is in no way altered by man’s perceiving and thinking about it, according to the assumptions of the natural attitude. This assumed independence of
world and cogito also underlies the claims made by the various empirical sciences that in time they will begin to understand the laws governing their respective subject matters. According to this view, philosophy is demoted to the task of specifying appropriate and inappropriate uses of terms and logic; the philosophical doctrine of logical positivism exemplifies this view of the proper role of philosophy in relation to the empirical sciences.

In contrast, Husserl felt that the above conception of philosophy's role was naive and inappropriate. Philosophy should instead concern itself with a description and analysis of the foundations of the natural attitude in order to clarify the relationship between experience and knowledge of the world; the description and analysis were to be performed upon experience as it was experienced. These descriptions and analyses of experience were to be considered valid only insofar as they employed an intuitive method to the primordial phenomena of consciousness; it is this attempt to rejoin our original layer of experience which accounts for the phenomenologists' slogan, "Back to the things themselves!".

Although we have seen in chapter one that at least six stages have been recognized in Husserl's phenomenological writings, two of these stages appear to have been fundamental to all of Husserl's writings (Kockelmans, 1967). In the eidetic reduction (stage two in the chapter one listing) there is an attempt to move from the facts of consciousness to the general essences of those facts. This
movement is not to be identified with a simple movement from the specific to the general via any inductive procedures; rather,

In the eidetic reduction one proceeds as follows: as a rule, we start with an arbitrarily perceived or fancied individual sample of this or that kind of thing. With the aid of memory, modifications in perception, and especially acts of phantasy, we carefully investigate what changes can be made in the sample without making it cease to be the thing it is. Through the most arbitrary changes, which wholly disregard reality as it is and which therefore are best made in our phantasy, the immutable and necessary complex of characteristics without which the thing cannot be conceived manifest themselves. This 'invariant' arises automatically and passively because the objects of the different acts partly overlap, but this 'preconstituted' and still imperfect identical content must still be seized in an 'actively intuiting grasp'.

(Kockelmans, 1967, p. 31)

The net result of this analysis is to reveal the eidos or essence of the thing.

The second of Husserl's two fundamental stages is the phenomenological reduction (stage five in the chapter one listing). There are three aspects to the phenomenological reduction. First, the phenomenological reduction in its strictest sense involves a "bracketing" of being and of the question of what it means to say that something exists. Second, the phenomenological reduction requires a reduction of our cultural world to our experience of it. Third, the transcendental reduction, in which the experience of the individual subject or cogito is linked with a transcendental ego,
completes the phenomenological reduction. It is this final, transcendent reduction which provides the basis for the valid claim that at least parts of Husserl's philosophy are idealistic.

For Husserl, the experiences examined with the various reductive methods take place in consciousness, and consciousness is always consciousness of something other than itself. The meaning of this statement is that the subject-pole of consciousness always requires an object-pole; without both there can be no consciousness. Yet this is not an espousal of an epistemological realism, since the phenomenon is coconstituted by the act of consciousness by which it is grasped and the object's distinctive mode of presenting itself. Most acts of consciousness, however, are derived acts (from our cultural world) and not primordial acts. Derived acts do not allow us to view things as they are in themselves; rather, such acts present us with an already-sedimented meaning or set of meanings to be taken up by another. The constitutive (the fourth stage in the chapter one listing) or intentional reduction enables us to trace the movement of existence in these primordial phenomena by a successive unveiling of meanings.

In Husserlian phenomenology the concept of intentionality is used to refer to the always already-present orientation of consciousness towards objects. In the natural attitude of everyday life we adopt orientations from our cultures which are complex and objectivistic. In order to penetrate the layers of meaning
confronting us in these derived acts and arrive at the originally lived experiences it is necessary to analyze the series of intention- al acquisitions of meaning overlaying those experiences. These acquired meanings are not conceived of as any less real or important than the primordial meanings, but it is only the primordial phenomena which can reveal the conditions of their possibility; and it is only by an analysis of the conditions of possibility of all primordial phenomena that a transcendental phenomenology revealing the fundamental conditions for all knowing and knowledge can be constructed, according to Husserl.

In an intentional analysis both the noetic (subject) and noem- matic (object) poles of consciousness are examined as they exist in particular acts. In examining the noetic pole of consciousness in perception, for example, we find that objects manifest themselves only in terms of partial profiles; we never perceive or comprehend an object in its entirety. And yet in each of these individual profiles the entire object is intended. The individual profiles are always recognized as profiles of this or that entire object or thing.

The total intended meaning of an act of consciousness is sometimes referred to as a function of the noematic aspect of con- sciousness. The noematic aspect of consciousness creates this total intended meaning via its internal and external horizons.
The external horizon of the perceptual noema is the background of meaning-objects forming a field for the object, while the internal horizon of the perceptual noema is the object as it might be given in its entirety (although never perceived directly in such fashion). No act of consciousness is without its internal and external horizons, whether the act be fundamentally perceptual, cognitive or affective.

A solely descriptive phenomenology avoids the extremes of realism and idealism (Ricoeur, 1967). Descriptive phenomenology (stage one in the previous chapter's listing) does not refer to either an in-itself world of things existing external to the individual and his perception of it or to any pure acts of mind in creating objects by some sort of mental fiat; rather, descriptive phenomenology refers only to the phenomenon itself without imposing any epistemological or ontological biases.

Husserl's ultimate aim, however, was to progress beyond a purely descriptive phenomenology and link the descriptions to accounts of their purported transcendental origins. From the bracketing of the question of being (sometimes referred to as the epoché) Husserl moves to a transcendental reduction implying that the origins of all phenomena lie within a transcendental and all-constituting ego. According to Ricoeur (1967), though,
Transcendental idealism underwent a profound revision after 1929. At first glance the revision is a true revolution which leads phenomenology into the neighborhood of French existential phenomenology. In reality, however, the descriptions of the last period continue those of the preceding period; only the idealistic interpretation of the method is overturned. (pp. 11-12)

The point at issue for phenomenological psychologists is whether this apparent change in Husserl's interests represents a fundamental alteration of his views (more likely to be claimed by existential phenomenologists) or merely a different emphasis (as strict Husserlians are wont to claim). In any case, during this final period of Husserl's career he ceased emphasizing the constitution of phenomena by the cogito and began describing the pre-logical and pre-predicative encounters of ego (or cogito) with the world; his work during this period returns to the domain of perception and is sometimes referred to as his Lebenswelt (life-world) period. It was the work he completed during this final period which has been taken up and elaborated upon by existential phenomenologists, the best known of whom are Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. Heidegger has explicitly repudiated the label of existentialist, claiming that his work is too ontologically oriented to be considered existential. Both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty may legitimately be referred to as existential phenomenologists, although Merleau-Ponty's philosophy will be emphasized in this essay due to the almost
exclusive reliance of American phenomenological psychologists emphasizing an existential interpretation of phenomenology on Merleau-Ponty's work.

Merleau-Ponty's Existential Phenomenology

Merleau-Ponty was trained both as a psychologist and as a philosopher, and his two major works, Phenomenology of Perception (1962) and The Structure of Behavior (1963), reflect this duality of training. The central influence of Merleau-Ponty's work, however, was Husserl's genetic phenomenology (Bannan, 1967). Merleau-Ponty's well-known essay, "What is Phenomenology" (which serves as a preface to the volume on perception), is one of the most eloquent expressions of this genetic phenomenology.

Phenomenology is the study of essences; and according to it, all problems amount to finding definitions of essences: the essence of perception, or the essence of consciousness, for example. But phenomenology is also a philosophy which puts essences back into existence, and does not expect to arrive at an understanding of man and the world from any starting point other than that of their 'facticity'. It is a transcendental philosophy which places in abeyance the assertions arising out of the natural attitude, the better to understand them; but it is also a philosophy for which the world is always 'already there' before reflection begins—as an inalienable presence; and all its efforts are concentrated upon re-achieving a direct and primitive contact with the world, and endowing that contact with philosophical status. It is the search for a
philosophy which shall be a 'rigorous science', but it also offers an account of space, time and the world as we 'live' them. (p. vii)

Thus, Merleau-Ponty adopts an existential interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology, utilizing the writings of Husserl's "genetic" period as a springboard for the development of his own existential analysis. For Merleau-Ponty there is no transcendental ego, and to posit one is to move beyond what experience can tell us; as such, the concept is not legitimate. Also, the complete reduction of any phenomenon to its essence is seen as an impossibility, since all of our perceptual, cognitive and affective experiences are defined by their radical perspectivity.

Merleau-Ponty reacted strongly to Husserl's idealism, as is apparent in statements of this sort: "The world is not what I think, but what I live through." (1945, p. xvii). The relation of our knowledge about the world to the world itself, then, is analogous to the geographical knowledge displayed with maps, charts and tables and its relation to the original experiences of the prairies, rivers, mountains and the like. For Merleau-Ponty, "To return to things themselves is to return to that world which precedes knowledge, of which knowledge always speaks, and in relation to which every scientific schematization is an abstract and derivative sign-language." (1945, p. ix).
Merieau-Ponty distinguishes two types of intentionality in Husserl's works, an intentionality of the act and a functional intentionality; the former constitutes the basis of our voluntary upholding of a position or a judgment, whereas the latter signifies the original meaning-giving operation which defines consciousness. This latter intentionality literally condemns us to meaning, for even 'pure' accidents are given a meaning by its functional intentionality. To understand something, then, becomes a matter of grasping the total intention of an act, the full array of meanings it comprises. In order to understand the total intention of acts and events it is necessary to employ a variety of perspectives simultaneously. If we do so, Merleau-Ponty assures us that we shall find the same structure of being underlying each perspective, and

All these views are true provided that they are not isolated, that we delve deeply into history and reach the unique core of existential meaning which emerges in each perspective...........Reflection even on a doctrine will be complete only if it succeeds in linking up with the doctrine's history and the extraneous explanations of it, and in putting back the causes and meaning of the doctrine in an existential structure.

(1945, p. xix)

Within Merleau-Ponty's existential matrix the individual is said to "live" time and space with his embodied consciousness, and to understand himself through his intersubjective participation in his cultural world. Further, time and space are two always-
present orientations of existence towards the world. Merleau-Ponty rejects the classical solutions to the problems of time and space which make of them either objectivized absolutes or mere projections of consciousness. Similarly, he rejects the mind-body dualism prevalent in Western philosophy by asserting that consciousness must be understood as pervading the body and that in no meaningful sense can it be separated from the body it inhabits; this theme in his work is sometimes referred to as the 'lived-body' theme.

Finally, Merleau-Ponty rejects the strict self/other distinction present in Husserl's comprehensive doctrine of the transcendental subjectivity. Rather, according to Merleau-Ponty, we only come to know ourselves in and through others, and they in turn come to know themselves only in and through their participation with us. Thus, for Merleau-Ponty there is a sense in which we are all participants in a single drama of human existence, although it is also true that we adopt individualized ways of living this common drama.

Only a few of the themes in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological philosophy have been dealt with in this section, and those dealt with were chosen because of their fundamental importance to the phenomenological psychology most prevalent in the United States during the past decade. Merleau-Ponty also dealt explicitly with psychological topics, but those writings will be more properly considered in the appropriate section of the following chapter.
Ricoeur's Hermeneutical Phenomenology

Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and Merleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology represent two directions which phenomenology has taken. The recent work of Ricoeur represents a third direction, that of hermeneutical phenomenology. Although as Palmer (1969) has pointed out, the term hermeneutics is used in a number of important senses, a useful synonym for general purposes is "interpretation" and the rules which govern interpretation. Thus, Ricoeur's hermeneutical phenomenology may be understood as an interpretative phenomenology. Heidegger's phenomenology may also be regarded as fundamentally hermeneutical, and it is true that he may lay claim to having been the first hermeneutical phenomenologist, but it is also true that his work has had a consistently ontological focus. Since this ontological focus has not led to the development of any clear-cut phenomenological psychology; and since Heidegger's phenomenological methodology does not admit of any confrontation with the empirical sciences of man, Ricoeur's work has been chosen for detailed consideration in this essay.

From the outset of his career, Ricoeur has shown concern for the proper understanding of the relationship between the objective sciences and the science of phenomenology; thus, in at least one sense his work may be understood as an attempt to accomodate the fact of the success of the various objective sciences (including
the various objective psychologies) to the facticity of the primordial phenomena constituting the stuff of our lived experience.

As Ihde (1971) has demonstrated, Ricoeur's work may be said to have passed through two distinct stages. In his first period Ricoeur embraced a structural phenomenology which was Husserlian in overall emphasis, but without Husserl's emphasis on transcendental subjectivity. Moreover, phenomenology, even in this first period, was not conceived of as capable of providing the whole foundation for understanding how knowledge and experience arise; rather, Ricoeur believed that phenomenology should assume something like a privileged position with regard to other ways of knowing things. Phenomenology was to provide a focus for understanding and explanation which required a variety of counter-foci in order to become complete. Ricoeur's structural phenomenology anticipated his later hermeneutical phenomenology insofar as the human sciences were used to provide a "diagnostic" for phenomenology, and since this interplay required interpretation.

The confrontation of phenomenology with the data of the human sciences proposed by Ricoeur aims at displacing what Ricoeur refers to as the transcendental naivete of phenomenology. Phenomenology, claims Ricoeur, has tended to replace the naivete of the natural attitude with a naivete of its own, the simplistic belief that the ways of knowing must be either coincident or concentric in some sense. Ricoeur asserts that phenomenology cannot subsume all other ways of knowing.
The second period in Ricoeur's career is characterized by a full-blown attempt to understand the methods and implications of interpretation. Ricoeur believes hermeneutics may take either of two courses; it may ally itself with a certain reductive and suspicious character such as displayed by Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, or it may move towards an attempted restoration of the symbols it finds in the various texts examined. At first focusing on the interpretation of symbols (Ricoeur, 1967; Ricoeur, 1970), his recent work has involved him with the entire body of problems and disciplines surrounding language and its uses. His interest in the symbol has become an interest in the word, "that instance of language which mediates between structure and event." (Ihde, 1971, p. 180). In this hermeneutical period of Ricoeur's phenomenological writings linguistic analysis, structural linguistics and ordinary language analysis have provided the counter-foci for his phenomenology. It is this confrontation with the linguistic disciplines which informs his recent attempt to develop a hermeneutical methodology for the social sciences.
RECENT PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY
IN THE UNITED STATES

As described in chapter one, there are three possible logically distinguishable relationships between phenomenological psychology and empirical psychology. The three possible relationships are 1) that phenomenological psychology constitutes an entirely separate discipline from empirical psychology, 2) that phenomenological psychology entirely subsumes the activities of an empirical psychology, and 3) that phenomenological psychology interacts with empirical psychology to a certain extent. These relationships may be derived respectively from Husserl's phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology, and Ricoeur's hermeneutical phenomenology. All three views have also been represented in recent American phenomenological psychology, and this chapter will explore representative work from each of the three points of view in an effort to explicate the meaning and implications of phenomenological psychology for contemporary American empirical psychology and to specify its place in contemporary American psychology as a whole.

Kockelmans' View: Phenomenological Psychology as the Descriptive Science of Man

Kockelmans is the foremost exponent of Husserl's phenomenological philosophy in the United States, although his views on the exact nature of phenomenological psychology diverge somewhat from
Husserl's. Kockelmans follows Husserl in considering phenomenological psychology the descriptive science of man, a discipline utilizing a prioric, eidetic, intuitive and purely descriptive methods in order to unveil the basic structure of psychical acts. Whereas the empirical sciences focus on facts, the descriptive sciences focus on the general and necessary structures to which the facts refer; thus, descriptive sciences are differentiated from empirical sciences. And since the descriptive sciences are to be carried out within the natural attitude they may not be considered philosophical disciplines.

Husserl's original argument was that such descriptive sciences could only be properly called philosophical if they made use of a transcendental reduction, and he proposed that a special phenomenologico-psychological replace this transcendental reduction in the descriptive sciences. But Kockelmans adopts a different point of view which he refers to sometimes as existential phenomenological and sometimes as hermeneutical phenomenological, a point of view he attributes to Heidegger. As we have already seen, though, Heidegger does not fit neatly into either classification. According to this view, philosophy is that discipline which deals with man's function and place within the Whole (the world and its historical development). In this view the descriptive sciences cannot be philosophical because they deal only with a determinate realm of beings in a given aspect of their functioning; for the same reason the empirical sciences cannot be considered philosophical.
Kockelmans' view does not follow directly from Husserl's in several important methodological respects. First, since Kockelmans does not accept Husserl's ideal of philosophy as a presuppositionless science, he has embraced the view that all human phenomena are inescapably historical. Thus, at some level methodology must become hermeneutical. Second, Kockelmans rejects Husserl's transcendental subjectivity on the grounds that any attempt to free the ego from its engagements in the world illegitimately posits the possibility of an escape from existence; again, hermeneutical methodology of some sort is indicated. For Kockelmans, however, this hermeneutical methodology is relevant only at the level of phenomenological psychology, the descriptive discipline attempting to make sense of the findings of the empirical psychologies. For him, then, although the methodology differs somewhat, phenomenological psychology exists in the same relation to empirical psychology as Husserl proposed.

Kockelmans (1971; 1973) believes there are only two conceptions of phenomenological psychology, the view advocating the substitution of descriptive and interpretative methods for those of empirical psychology and his own view that descriptive and interpretative methods are applicable only at a different level than that of empirical psychology. This dichotomy leaves the classification of Ricoeur's position unclear, since Ricoeur's view utilizes hermeneutical methods to bridge the gap between pure phenomenological
psychology and empirical psychology, and not simply as another methodological tool in the arsenal of phenomenological psychology. For this reason, Ricoeur's views are treated separately in this essay.

The crucial issue for Kockelmanns in determining the relationship between the empirical sciences and the descriptive sciences is just what is meant by the expression "empirical science". In Kockelmanns' view, those who believe empirical psychology should be subsumed by phenomenological psychology never deal directly with the question of what it is in particular in empirical methodology and logic that precludes a valid but separate study of man's psychological behavior. We will see when dealing with advocates of this point of view that Kockelmanns' assertions are only partially justified. In any case, Kockelmanns believes that the contemporary philosophy and logic of science provide clarifications of the major issues involved and appropriate guidelines for the characterization of empirical science.

The logic of science is taken to be primarily epistemological and concerned with the logical relationships between statements of results in science. Hempel's deductive-nomic or covering law model of scientific explanation is an example of the application of one such logic. The philosophy of science is taken to be primarily ontological, concerning itself with the actual, ongoing process of science and scientific activity.
In addressing himself to the question of whether the empirical sciences of man are possible when considered from the standpoint of the logic of science, Kockelmans lists the following conditions as exemplary of an empirical science:

1) It approaches its subject matter by formulating hypotheses which must fulfill conditions that are to be further specified.

2) It tests its hypotheses by means of procedures which are guided by criteria whose precise meaning and function are to be further determined.

3) It explains its hypotheses by relating them to laws or lawlike statements in a way which must be articulated in greater detail.

4) It verifies its explanations by using a principle of verification which must fulfill certain conditions that are to be further specified.

5) It follows certain rules in formulating the definitions of its basic concepts. (Kockelmans, 1973, p. 252)

Although these conditions are not said to be necessary and sufficient conditions of an empirical science, they are at least of fundamental importance. According to Kockelmans (Kockelmans, 1973), this list of fundamental conditions shows that there is no apriori reason why man may not be dealt with by the empirical sciences in as effective and systematic a way as other objects are dealt with.
Viewed from the contemporary philosophy of science the term empirical science refers to a type of theoretical knowledge proceeding systematically by using typically empirical methods. Theoretical knowledge is gained by holding oneself in abeyance from the every-day world of activities and things and viewing them in some systematically formal manner. The components of an empirical science from an ontological perspective are listed as follows:

Formalization: the description of things or events with respect to their formal properties

Functionalization: the consideration of phenomena which are already formalized in terms of other formalized phenomena

Quantification: the process by which the relationship between condition and conditioned is described by employing numbers or other mathematical entities

(Kockelman, 1973, p. 254)

Formalization and functionalization both rely on the formulation of rules and laws, while quantification refers to a particularly precise mode of specification of such specification of rules and laws. The application of these three procedures reduces the original entity to ideal form, abstract in relation to the original phenomenon. These three steps comprise the thematization of an object, a process taking a somewhat different form from science to science depending on the properties of the object. Systematic pursuit of this thematization thus proceeds with certain limitations,
the most important of which is that an important part of the meaning of human phenomena may not be dealt with in such sciences. For Kockelmans this limitation on empirical inquiry and explanation indicates that the empirical sciences of man must be completed with descriptive sciences of man whose primary purpose would be to restore the meaning of human phenomena which were necessarily omitted in empirical inquiries.

Kockelmans (1967) does not believe that such a descriptive science presupposes any orientation towards the meaning of the Whole, which is understood as a philosophical question. As such, the descriptive science of psychology need not imply adherence to any particular philosophical position. The rather interesting implication of Kockelmans' claim is that it may be possible to agree on the meaning of human phenomena without agreeing on questions of philosophical importance.

The particular methods advocated for use in the descriptive science of man include the Husserlian methods of free variation and intentional analysis in addition to certain hermeneutical procedures. The precise procedures involved are not given by Kockelmans, nor is there any direct application of Husserlian or hermeneutical procedures to be found in his writings on phenomenological psychology. It is tempting to suggest that Kockelmans' view is a kind of advocacy of the status quo in psychology today, but this would be somewhat of an overstatement. Kockelmans' view may best be understood as an attempt to advocate the creation of a special discipline
(phenomenological psychology) which would restore the meaning to human phenomena investigated by the empirical sciences without usurping any of their territory.

The Duquesne University Phenomenological Psychologists: Phenomenological Psychology As A Framework For Empirical Inquiry

The two texts listed in chapter one of this essay as being the most comprehensive and original attempts to detail the appropriate functioning of phenomenological psychology in the field of psychology as a whole were written by Duquesne University psychologists (Van Kaam, 1966; Giorgi, 1970). The only journal devoting itself to exclusively phenomenological approaches to psychology (Journal of Phenomenological Psychology) was originally published by the Duquesne University Press, and Giorgi is one of its editors; the Duquesne University Press is also one of the largest publishers of books on phenomenological psychology. Finally, for some time now Duquesne University has had the only psychology department in the United States with a comprehensive program in phenomenological psychology. The distinctly existential orientation of the phenomenological psychologists at Duquesne University forms the subject of this section, as represented by the work of Giorgi, Van Kaam, and von Eckartsberg.
A constant question directed at phenomenological psychologists is: how can one do psychological research within a phenomenological frame of reference? In a certain sense, the question is loaded because if the full implications were drawn out, it would be asked as follows: can one from a phenomenological perspective do scientific research as it is currently defined and practiced on psychological phenomena? If one answers yes, then the expectation is that the general procedures and techniques of traditional experimental psychology are being followed and the questioner then wonders why the term phenomenological is necessary and what is so different about it. If one answers no, then the phenomenologist is open to the criticism that he is not being scientific. However, for the phenomenological psychologist the problem is essentially one of communication because for him, the yes answer would mean that from his point of view he would be scientific, but not necessarily in the sense that is currently in vogue. Similarly, the no answer would simply mean that he is not being scientific in the sense in which the questioner probably used the term, but he would not deny being scientific.

(Giorgi, 1967, p. 106)

Giorgi (1965) has summarized his phenomenological orientation to psychology in terms of its approach, method, and content. The aims of the phenomenological approach to psychology include the apprehension of the structure of the phenomena appearing in consciousness, the apprehension of the origins or foundations of the phenomenon, and the apprehension of the radical perspectivity by which the
particular phenomenon shows itself in experience. Methodologically, the phenomenological orientation prescribes the use of intuitive, reflective, and descriptive techniques in order to focus first on what is actually given in experience and only afterwards on the precise specifications of the given which may apply to it in some objectivistic fashion. The content of this phenomenologically-oriented psychology, then, will be the data of experience, the meaning such data has for the subject, and the essence of the phenomenon itself.

Giorgi often refers to his phenomenological orientation to psychology as an example of the human scientific approach to psychology; human scientific approaches are contrasted to natural scientific approaches in a number of ways (Giorgi, 1966). While the natural scientific approach is said to stress experimentation to the virtual exclusion of other research strategies, the human scientific approach stresses the use of appropriate research strategies contingent upon the nature of the phenomenon. Whereas the natural scientific approach stresses the measurement of various quantities of variables and analysis of the subsequently produced data, the human scientific approach relies on assessment of the qualitative nature of the meaning of the situation for the subject via a process of explicitation. Finally, while the natural scientific approach is interested in delimiting the reactions of subjects
so that replications of the experiment may be carried out by independent experimenters, the human scientific approach attempts to understand the essential phenomenon by its varied manifestations in the intentional responses of subjects via a participant observer.

The activities characteristic of the natural scientific approach to the world are possible only on the basis of the scientist's primordial experiences in his life-world. This life-world can be defined as the world as we live it prior to any reflection on it, the world of everyday experience, or the world of our immediate presence to reality (Giorgi, 1970). The significance of the life-world lies in its priority to any objectifications; thus, the life-world is the foundation of all schematizations, scientific or otherwise. Therefore, any scientific formulations which do not take this foundational experience into account have effectively cut themselves off from the source of their meaning, and they must for that reason remain incomplete accounts.

The natural scientific approach is seen as an example and outcome of the natural attitude, which assumes the existence of a world of objects and things pre-existing our experiences of them. The natural attitude is said to conceal the world as phenomenon; thus, "The acts of consciousness by which the world and whatever it contains become accessible to us are lived, but they remain undisclosed, unthematized, and in this sense concealed." (Giorgi, 1970, p. 148).
If the life-world is to become the privileged or central reference point in psychology, then it is essential to understand the phenomena of consciousness and experience which are given in the original contact between man and world; this original contact may best be understood with the aid of the concept of intentionality.

As with other concepts, Giorgi employs Merleau-Ponty's conceptualization of intentionality: "What distinguishes the phenomenological notion of intentionality is the fact that before being posited by knowledge in a specific act of identification, the unity of the world is 'lived' as ready-made or already there." (Giorgi, 1970, p. 157). The intentional relation between man and world is irreducible, since consciousness must always be consciousness of something other than itself, and since we cannot know things without having been conscious of them at one time or another.

Behavior itself may be understood as a manifestation of this original intentional relationship between man and world. Moreover, since the intentional relation is known through the phenomenon of meaning, the primary question which must be put to behavior is not how it may be measured but what it means. Behavior itself may be conceived of as intentional because consciousness itself must, paradoxically, be a body. This is not to say that consciousness and its body are simply identifiable, but it is true that consciousness pervades or inhabits its body.
Again borrowing from Merleau-Ponty's works, Giorgi (1970) claims there are three different levels of structure. These levels are the physical, the vital and the human. For the physical structures equilibrium is sought with regard to the forces of the milieu; such structures are best understood in terms of the stimulus-response bonds involved. For the vital structures stability is achieved with regard to the needs and instincts of the organism; vital structures are most adequately conceptualized in terms of the relevant situation-instinctive reactions. For the human structures stability is achieved through signification; human structures may best be understood in terms of the relation perceived-situation/work. The term work is meant to refer to the variety of activities by which men transform physical and vital nature (Merleau-Ponty, 1963) in creating a cultural world of use-objects and institutions. Giorgi urges that psychology understood as a human science should remain within this third dialectic of structure, making the human order its distinctive subject matter.

Thus, psychology as a human science would develop independently of animal psychology and physiological psychology, among others, although it is possible that the behavior of some primates may be included in this conceptualization of the human order, and the behavior of some human beings (those with genetic abnormalities, the severely and profoundly retarded, etc.) may have to be excluded. Since this human order is fundamentally a symbolic order, this human
science of psychology will necessarily employ reflective methods; to this end, Giorgi has developed his method of explicitation.

For Giorgi, there is an essential difference between the methodology of the natural sciences and that of the human sciences. In the natural sciences an attempt is made to establish some basic unit of analysis; whole units of behavior are then explained in terms of these smaller, more basic units of analysis. In the human sciences, once a unit of analysis is established, that unit is considered to be merely a part of some larger-structured context. In order to understand the meaning of any phenomenon its implicit context or horizon, both internal and external, must be made explicit. The method of explicitation should precede the investigation of any phenomenon in order that the phenomenon's multiple references to its horizons be properly understood. Giorgi's method of explicitation is closely related to Van Kaam's (1966) method of explication; hence, the method will be presented at length in the section of this chapter dealing with Van Kaam's work.

According to the human scientific approach to psychology, each situation of psychological interest is said to have two aspects to it; these aspects are the internal and external perspectives, and although they overlap somewhat they do provide different openings upon a situation. The internal perspective is the privileged position with regard to the experiential aspects of a situation, while the external perspective is the privileged perspective with regard to the behavioral aspects of a situation; both perspectives, however,
are said to have some access to both aspects of any situation. The exceedingly difficult problem of specifying the precise form explanations based on the data derived from these two perspectives must take is not dealt with by Giorgi. Moreover, if the two perspectives are to be considered as dual sources of information, then there must be certain rules regarding the weighting of evidences from the different perspectives and the means of validating rival interpretations of data. Giorgi's work provides no guidelines for solving any of these complex problems.

**Van Kaam's phenomenological psychology:**  
**the existential foundations of psychology**

Van Kaam's view on the relation between phenomenological psychology is exceedingly complex. In a sense, Van Kaam is the most conservative of the three phenomenological psychologists from Duquesne, but it is nevertheless true that phenomenological philosophy and phenomenological psychology provide frameworks within which empirical psychology is to function.

Van Kaam's position is conservative insofar as he believes that all areas currently being investigated in psychology, and all of the perspectives adopted in pursuing these investigations, have something to contribute to our knowledge of man. For Van Kaam, as for Merleau-Ponty, behavior is bodily subjectivity in action (Van Kaam, 1966). All behavior is both intentional and functional; thus, for Van Kaam the proper object for psychology is the intentional-functional behavior of man. The province of phenomenological psychology
is the intentional aspect of behavior, understood as our pre-reflective mode of experiencing the world and others.

The various perspectives (psychoanalytic, learning, introspective, etc.) that have been developed in psychology are referred to as differential psychologies. According to Van Kaam (1966), the differential psychologies are mutually exclusive accounts of particular aspects of man's behavior in terms of a vocabulary of constructs unique to that psychology.

When these differential accounts are coherently and systematically formulated they constitute differential theory. As differential theories emphasize and help explain only particular aspects of man's behavior, however, another discipline is needed to provide some integration of the differential psychological theories; this integrational discipline is referred to as comprehensive psychological theory. Comprehensive psychological theory may also be called anthropological psychology insofar as it attempts to encompass the knowledge gained from numerous disciplines concerned with man (history, economics, anthropology, art, religion, etc.) in order to illuminate man's intentional-functional behavior.

Ultimately, though, comprehensive theoretical psychology has recourse to phenomenological philosophy for its foundational constructs. But since philosophical concepts cannot be strictly demonstrated as necessary in any empirical manner they are treated as hypothetical constructs by the comprehensive theorist. These
foundational constructs are useful to the extent that they allow the comprehensive theorist to make sense of the findings of the various differential psychologies and their respective theories in terms of the everyday activities of man. Paradoxically, although comprehensive theory may in one sense be said to operate at a higher level of abstraction than differential theory, in another sense comprehensive theory aims at being more concrete. Comprehensive theory is more concrete than the differential theories because it attempts to link the various partial profiles of lived behavior provided by differential theories to produce a more complete account of everyday experience. As with Ricoeur, then, the various differential psychologies serve a diagnostic function for phenomenological psychology and for comprehensive theory.

The primary purpose of the application of phenomenological methodology is to eliminate the subjectivistic biases and distortions that arise in the various differential psychologies through overemphasizing the importance of the particular profile of behavior developed in their research and theoretical activities. The various empirical methodologies developed by the differential psychologies serve a mediating function between naive accounts of what behavior considered as a whole means and a phenomenological account at a comprehensive theoretical level. Phenomenological procedures serve to correct for the overzealousness of the individual psychologies in attempting to superimpose their own reductionistic descriptions.
and explanations of behavior on the phenomenon of behavior as lived.

Van Kaam views the hierarchy of integrational acts involved in psychology as follows:

spontaneous perceptions; scientific-differential theory and data-gathering in an increasing number of differential psychologies; differential-phenomenological elucidation of the data and judgments found in different psychologies; comprehensive-phenomenological elucidation of the differentially elucidated phenomena of the differential psychologies; integration of the comprehensively elucidated phenomena into the holistic structure of human behavior already developed by comprehensive phenomenology; and finally, comprehensive theory construction on the basis of the available holistic phenomenological structures of human behavior.

(Van Kaam, 1966, p. 284)

If comprehensive psychological theory is to provide the foundation constructs for understanding man's behavior, then it is essential that these constructs be validated with compelling evidence (Van Kaam, 1966); this validation must be existential. According to Van Kaam, there are three basic types of evidence possible in comprehensive psychology. First, there is spontaneous self-evidence, evidence in which the nature and meaning of behavior is perfectly transparent; these evidences derive from our participation in everyday life. Second, there is differential-scientific evidence, evidence derived from spontaneous behavior by means of abstract scientific methods employed by the various differential psychologies to test hypotheses. Third, there is comprehensive-scientific existential
evidence, evidence distinguished by the fact that any attempt to deny it must result, at least implicitly, in a reaffirmation. It is this final type of evidence which provides the compelling evidence for comprehensive psychology's constructs. The fact that man can engage in voluntary behavior is an example of such an existential evidence, since even a denial of the fact must manifest the choice to argue a position. The fact that man can reflect on his life and activities is another such existential evidence.

Within Van Kaam's system two tasks arise for phenomenological psychology. First, a differential phenomenological elucidation (explication) may be carried out on a particular profile of behavior as expounded in a differential psychology; second, a comprehensive phenomenological elucidation may be carried out in order to reinsert the individual phenomenological profiles gained through differential phenomenological elucidations into a more general structure of meanings. Van Kaam (1966) recommends that the two tasks be carried out by different groups of individuals, since the differential phenomenological elucidation will require expert knowledge of the particular differential psychology involved and the comprehensive elucidation will require specialized knowledge of phenomenological philosophy.

Van Kaam has himself performed a differential phenomenological explication on the experience of feeling understood; presumably this concept has been extracted from the differential psychology of client-centered therapy. The aim of explication is to make the implicit
knowledge of experience explicit and formulizable. The method is inductive and attempts to specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for the experience. Phenomenological explication should form the first stage of any empirical inquiry, according to Van Kaam (1966), since an originally different conceptualization of the phenomenon under study must necessarily lead to different considerations of the phenomenon. This particular study is important insofar as it is often cited in phenomenological psychological literature as a classic example of phenomenological research, and since it also reflects Giorgi's method of explicitation.

Van Kaam (1959) begins by making three assumptions. First, he assumes that feeling understood is a common experience. Second, he assumes that his common experience is basically identical from person to person. Third, he assumes that basically identical experience will be expressed in approximately the same manner from person to person.

The phenomenological explication itself is said to occur in six stages: listing and preliminary grouping, reduction, elimination, hypothetical identification, application, and final identification. The order of the operations is not invariant, and the stages sometimes overlap in application. The explication is performed on records of the descriptions of personal experience produced by a random sample of subjects. In Van Kaam's study it was felt that subjects ought to possess the following characteristics:
a. The ability to express themselves with relative ease in the English language.

b. The ability to sense and to express inner feelings and emotions without shame and inhibition.

c. The ability to sense and to express the organic experiences that accompany these feelings.

d. The experience of situations in which the subject felt really understood, preferably at a relatively recent date.

e. A spontaneous interest in his experience on the part of the subject.

f. An atmosphere in which the subject can find the necessary relaxation to enable him to put sufficient time and orderly thought into writing out carefully what was going on within him.

(Van Kaam, 1966, p. 328)

The population chosen as possessing the above characteristics was female high school seniors from an institution with recognized high academic standards. As a check on the representativeness of this group several samples were taken from other populations. Ultimately, 150 female high school seniors in Chicago, 95 male high school seniors from Chicago, 60 female college students from Pittsburgh, and 60 male college students from Pittsburgh comprised the sample total of 365 students.

An hour of school time was set aside for these students to detail personal experiences of really feeling understood; the accounts were in no way identifiable, except by sub-sample. A 20%
sample was drawn from the 365 accounts and three judges performed the actual phenomenological explication. In the first stage the judges listed category descriptions which appeared to them to accurately reflect the content of different sorts of concrete accounts. In the second stage the judges attempted to reduce the original categories to a smaller number of more inclusive categories; the intersubjective agreement of the judges served as the criterion here, as in other stages of the explication. In the third stage any unnecessary elements of the overall description are eliminated by noting whether their elimination detracts from the description of the phenomenon in other cases.

The first hypothetical identification of the phenomenon results from the first three stages; this identification is an attempt to state the components of the entire phenomenon in some tentative fashion. In the fifth stage the hypothetical identification is applied to randomly selected cases from the pool of accounts in order to further eliminate unnecessary elements; at this point a new hypothetical identification is tried out. Finally, in the sixth stage a satisfactory description is agreed upon and a valid phenomenological explication of the phenomenon has been reached. The final description of really feeling understood reached by Van Kaam and his fellow judges follows:
The experience of 'really feeling understood' is a perceptual-emotional Gestalt: A subject, perceiving that a person co-experiences what things mean to the subject and accepts him, feels, initially, relief from experiential loneliness, and, gradually, safe experiential communion with that person and with that which the subject perceives the person to represent. (original slash marks separating components have been removed)

(Van Kaam, 1966, p. 336-7)

According to Van Kaam (1966), the difference between the phenomenological approach and other approaches is not so much the methods employed as the philosophical assumptions, the areas of fundamental concern, the nature of the hypotheses, and the application of the results. Clearly differentiating his position from Giorgi's and von Eckartsberg's and distinguishing himself as the most traditional of the three, Van Kaam claims "there is no difference whatsoever in the technique of experimentation itself, with its functional-operational-statistical mechanics, as employed in phenomenological and other psychologies." (Van Kaam, 1966, p. 339).

**von Eckartsberg's experiential methodology**

Like Giorgi and Van Kaam, von Eckartsberg attempts to develop an approach to the qualitative flow of experience in quasi-empirical fashion, but for von Eckartsberg the methodology is to be more exclusively phenomenological. Von Eckartsberg's position is closely linked to the position of symbolic interactionism in sociology, for
he emphasizes the symbolic nature of the communication and experiential processes in man. Man is seen both as always being shaped by his world and as always shaping that world in return; it is through a three-fold dialectic of externalization, objectivation, and internalization that this reciprocal shaping takes place.

There are three primary experiential methodological principles for von Eckartsberg. First, the method employed in studying human beings must emphasize their uniqueness. Second, the perspective employed must be ecological, emphasizing man in his actual lived relationships with his world; in this sense the methodology should be naturalistic. Third, methodological priority should be granted to those methods which allow explication of the actual experiential structures of the actors. The model for this methodology is to be existential phenomenology, for it has attempted to develop a psychology of experience from the actors point of view, while much of contemporary psychology has concentrated almost exclusively on the observer’s point of view.

Von Eckartsberg (1971) takes an extreme position on the relationship between experience and behavior, contending that behavior is entirely a function of experience. Laboratory experiments involving humans are said to be artificial, creating an authoritarian relationship between subject and experimenter that exists in everyday life only in pathological relationships.
Laboratory research is already artificial to the extent that it studies human phenomena outside of their lived context and interwovenness with the totality of an individual's biography. In the social sciences laboratory results have a fictitious quality in that they are based on artificial circumstances, anonymity, group averages, and manipulation and segmentalized conceptualizations which seldom do justice to the lived quality of human experience.

(von Eckartsberg, 1971, p. 69)

Ideally, the experimenter should not be an operator so much as a transducer, carefully noting what happens in everyday life situations for some individual or group of individuals. The primary function of the researcher should be as a participant-observer, making use of both the self-reports of the subject and his own observations of the subject's behavior. In such an investigation both the observer and the observed may be expected to undergo changes, with the ultimate aim of the inquiry being to increase the observer's understanding of the phenomenon as lived by the observed.

Although behavior is viewed as a function of experience, it is also seen to be necessary to dialogue the observer's viewpoint with the actor's viewpoint in order to fully understand any phenomenon. The term dialogue is thus used in a peculiar manner, for it seems to refer to what others have called the need for interpretation. Von Eckartsberg contends that an individual's actions can only be understood in terms of his own goals and motives; these goals and motives, in turn, are the ones experienced by the actor. It is
unclear from von Eckartsberg's writings exactly how the dialoguing of viewpoints is to occur, or whose viewpoint and which information is to be relied upon in cases where conflicting interpretations are possible.

This last problem noted of von Eckartsberg's work is common to Giorgi, Van Kaam and von Eckartsberg. While phenomenological psychology is to provide a foundation for understanding experience and behavior, and while the method of explication does seem to provide a means of clearly specifying the meaning of common experiences, the fundamental problems of interpretation are not dealt with in any form. As such, although these existentially-oriented phenomenological psychologists differ from Kockelmans insofar as they subordinate empirical inquiry to phenomenological insights, the net effect of this advocacy can be little different. The crucial question is just how the data of empirical inquiry are to be combined with phenomenological insights to produce psychological explanations and understanding. It is to just this question that Ricoeur has addressed his work.

Ricoeur's Hermeneutical Approach to the Social Sciences: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text

If existential phenomenology broke the bounds of Husserl's transcendental idealism in its application of phenomenological procedures to the problems of the lived body, intersubjectivity, and human freedom, Ricoeur's
As Palmer (1969) points out in his book on hermeneutics, there are two relatively distinct traditions in hermeneutical thought. The first tradition relies largely on the methodological insights and programs of Schleiermacher and Dilthey, while the second rests on the works of Heidegger. Modern-day adherents to these two traditions include Hirsch and Betti in the former and Bultmann, Ebeling, Fuchs, and Gadamer in the latter. The central divisive issue is whether objective historical knowledge is even possible, with the first tradition holding that an interpretative yet objective science of the signs of psychical is possible, whereas the second tradition holds that understanding is itself fundamentally historical. But if no act of understanding operates from certain grounds, the no interpretative science can claim to be objective.

Ricoeur's work (1965; 1965; 1967; 1970; 1971) belongs to the first tradition. Ricoeur relies heavily on Hirsch's work, while the framework provided by Dilthey and Schleiermacher is utilized in slightly altered form. While it is true that Ricoeur's comments on methodology in the social sciences are not phenomenological in a strictly Husserlian sense, neither are they empirical in the traditional sense; rather, the social sciences are inescapably interpretative sciences. The social sciences provide objective knowledge
of a special sort, since they deal with the relations of signs within larger systems and not with any "brute" data.

In his essay (1971) directed to the question of the proper subject matter and methodology for the social sciences, Ricoeur makes two claims. First, he claims that the object of the social sciences, which he takes to be meaningfully-oriented behavior, may be said to be similar to the object of textual analysis. Second, the social sciences may use the model of textual analysis as a paradigm for its own methodology. Ricoeur's lengthy arguments are only briefly summarized here.

In support of his first claim Ricoeur proposes a distinction between the linguistics of discourse and the linguistics of language. Whereas the sign is the basic unit of language, the sentence must be considered the basic unit of discourse. Ricoeur goes on to describe four basic traits of language and their contrasting actualizations in written and spoken language in preparing to demonstrate the analogy between written language and records of meaningful action.

First, while in living speech discourse is ephemeral, in writing discourse is fixed. But what is fixed is not the event of living speech itself; it is the event as speech or language which is fixed. Phenomenologically, we may say it is the noema of speaking that is inscribed. Citing the work of Austin (1962), Searle (1969), and Kenny (1963), Ricoeur describes the speech act itself as composed
of a hierarchy of subordinate acts on three levels: the locutionary, the illocutionary, and the perlocutionary. The locutionary act is the act of saying, the illocutionary act what we do in saying something, and the perlocutionary act what we do by saying something. All three, in decreasing order of importance, are subject to this noematic inscription.

Second, while in spoken discourse the speaker's intention and the meaning of the speech can be identical, in written discourse the author's intention and the text's meaning cease to coincide. Intonation, gestures, mimicry, and other nonverbal and paralinguistic cues which are present in living speech to "rescue" the speaker's meaning are not present in written discourse.

Third, while in spoken discourse the reference is ostensive, in written discourse the reference is non-ostensive. In living speech it is the immediate situation which serves as the referent, while in writing the referent is a world projected by the text, and not any particular situation.

Fourth, while spoken discourse is addressed to someone in particular, written discourse is for anyone and everyone who can read. Two remarks may be made about this situation. First, although it is true that this non-addressed aspect of the text yields less information in one sense, in another important sense meaning is saved via this inscription. And these four traits taken together show that while written discourse alienates the meaning from an original
context of intention, the saying as said transcends the situation and is preserved with the possibility that the intention may be reconstructed.

Ricoeur now claims that these four traits may also be applied to the distinction between immediate action and action considered as a fixed text. Action is likened to an utterance and is said to possess inner traits similar to those of the speech act. Action as event and the meaning of an action are said to be separable in the same way that spoken language and written language are separable.

Following Kenny (1963), Ricoeur claims that action has the structure of a locutionary act, possessing an identifiable propositional content. The verbs of action are said to constitute a particular sort of predicate which are irreducible to either sets of relations or to any other predicates. An important trait of these action verbs is their variable polydicy. A further analysis of everyday language shows that it is possible to distinguish between actions proper, states, and performances as well as the formal and material objects of actions. Such a capacity for the inscription or fixation of action makes possible the interpretation of the noematic structure of action.

Action also possesses illocutionary traits resembling those of the speech act. A typology of action following Austin's (1962) list of performatives and based on certain constitutive rules as described by Searle (1969) may be developed. This model follows Weber's
notion of the ideal type and would attempt to isolate the essential conditions under which a given action counts as an instance of a performative. A remaining problem, however, is just what is indicated by the implicit claim that actions are readable in the same way that written discourse is readable. What is there to be read?

Most actions simply occur and then remain as memories, if at all. Other actions, however, may be said to leave their mark or trace in history. This imprint on social time is usually in the form of documents of actions, although informal analogues of these records exist in persons' reputations. In a sense, then, human actions may be said to become institutions, since their meaning no longer necessarily coincides with the intentions of the actors. Following Winch (1958), Ricoeur argues that the appropriate object for the social sciences is rule-governed behavior. Since a behavior is meaningful only if it can be said of that action that it represents the application of a rule, and since it is also true that we all engage in meaningful behavior without being able to explain the criteria used to apply the rules by which we orient our behavior, it follows that we cannot use the ability of the actor to rationalize his behavior as an absolute indicator that his behavior is or is not meaningful.

Wittgenstein (1953) has pointed out that there are two important aspects to the concept of a rule. One, it is necessary that it be possible to distinguish a right way and a wrong way of performing
the action for it to exemplify a rule. Two, the actor must be cap-
able of understanding what it is to apply a given rule in order for
that rule to apply to his action. Thus, the meaning (noema) and the
intention (noesis) of an action may or may not overlap; however, if
they do not overlap, then some special explanation will be called for
to account for the non-coincidence of the two.

In comparing the third trait of the relevance and importance
of written discourse and spoken discourse with performed and recorded
action, Ricoeur urges that the meaning of events exceeds or trans-
cends its original social context in such a way that it may be re-
enacted in new settings. As such, any event may be said both to
mirror its conditions of production and to open up or disclose a
meaning in general for the world.

Finally, human action may be considered as an open work. By
this is meant simply that the judges of any action are not limited
to the event’s contemporaries, but that this task extends to all of
the future itself. The general meaning of an event or action can
thus not be settled once and for all, since future judges may fresh-
ly interpret actions in light of new evidence. In the same way
that a text is open to anyone who can read, an action and its record
are open to the “reader”.

In summary, the text is characterized by the fixation of mean-
ings, dissociation from the mental intentions of the author, display
of non-ostensive references, and universal range of addresses;
taken together, these four traits constitute the objectivity of the text. This objectivity remains wholly within the sphere of signs, and not of facts as understood in the natural sciences on the model of brute data (data not subject to any interpretation), and it is within this sphere of signs that the resulting possibilities of understanding and explanation develop.

For Ricoeur there must be a dialectical exchange between explanation and understanding. The ultimate aim of these procedures is to understand the actor(s) better than he can understand himself. Just as a text requires careful examination and reflection in order to explain and understand it properly, so also do the inscriptions of action require a reading. It is in the application of the paradigm of reading to social science methodology that Ricoeur's work marks an advance in hermeneutical theory.

The dialectical exchange between explanation and understanding may be considered as operating both from understanding to explanation and from explanation to understanding. In moving from understanding to explanation Ricoeur insists that the aim is not to rejoin the author (or actor) through a kind of empathic intuition. Rather, understanding a text must be understood as a process of making guesses and applying validational procedures to these guesses. Drawing from Hirsch's (1967) work, Ricoeur claims that there are no rules for making good guesses, but there are rules for validating or invalidating the guesses.
Texts must be considered as wholes composed of parts; the whole of a text will appear as a hierarchy of topics, primary and subordinate. Reconstructing a text is a circular enterprise, in a sense, since we cannot know the meaning of the whole without knowing the meaning of the parts and, likewise, we cannot know the meaning of the parts without knowing the meaning of the whole. This exchange represents the hermeneutical circle in interpretation, although for Ricoeur the circle is not a vicious one.

Since texts may not be considered as linear accumulations of sentences, the particular structure of the text cannot be derived from that of the sentences. But this means that any text is open to a variety of interpretations. As such, validational procedures are argumentative in nature (much like juridical procedures) and call for a logic of subjective probability rather than a logic of empirical verification. The circle of interpretation is not vicious in this case because there are both procedures of validation and procedures of invalidation. The procedures of invalidation would develop criteria of falsifiability similar to those developed by Popper (1959). Criteria of validation may be developed from the logic of subjective probability, although Ricoeur does not deal with this point in any detail.

As a consequence of applying these validational procedures it can be seen that a text will appear as a field of limited possible constructions, since determinations of the relative superiority or
non-applicability of interpretations can be developed. Insofar as human action shares the features of the text, it too is a field of limited possible constructions. Arguing for or against the various possible interpretations will take the form of providing answers to the various "what" questions that are asked of the text in terms of the reasons "why" they were engaged in.

Understanding will be the result of properly (or at least plausibly) explaining why an action was engaged in in terms of the desirability characters (wants and beliefs deemed relevant) involved. Arguments over interpretations of meaningful behavior are then arguments about the reasons for actions, and not about the causes of actions. The goal of interpretation is to provide a coherent account of action which explains the motivational basis of action as a result of some set of desirability-characters.

When the dialectic is considered as it moves from explanation to understanding it receives a new meaning, since we must proceed in this case from the referential function of the text. As written discourse is non-ostensive, two approaches are possible. First, the text may be treated as totally nonreferential and worldless; this approach is exemplified by the various schools of literary criticism. Second, the potential non-ostensive references of the text may be actualized in and by the reader's personal appropriation of the text.
The structuralist treatment of a text relies on the abstraction of systems from processes. Since it is always possible to abstract systems from processes (as linguists and semiologists have shown) and to relate these systems to other units in the same system, such an approach may also be applied to psychological phenomena; Piaget has applied such an approach to the study of cognitive development in children.

Structural analysis may be seen as a necessary step in explaining a text, but it operates effectively only by repressing any referential function. In order to make sense of a phenomenon it is necessary to re-unite the structural analysis with the world that it refers to. In serving this function as a mediating step between naive and critical interpretation a structural analysis helps in revealing the depth-semantics of a text (i.e., what the text is really about).

It is the role of structural analysis in our explanatory procedures which prevents any simple identification of the act of understanding with pure intuition or some mystical grasping of a foreign life and its movement. Insofar as all social phenomena may be said to have a semiological character, structural analysis becomes both possible and necessary for all social phenomena. There is a grasping of the depth-semantics of the text which serves as an intermediate step in the act of interpreting a text. Finally, there must be an act of personal appropriation of all that our reading of a text
has revealed. This final act of personal appropriation does not render all interpretation equally subjective, since it will only be authentic on the condition that the preceding explanatory and validational procedures are taken into account. The hermeneutical circle, then, must be taken as the ideal for interpretation rather than its anathema, since the hermeneutical circle now refers to the correlation between explanation and understanding.
A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FIELD OF PSYCHOLOGY

To speak of psychology as a diversified field is an understatement. A field which contains the different standard interests of experimental psychology, learning, motivation, and discrimination experiments, cognitive psychology, personality theory, social psychology, clinical psychology, developmental psychology, psycholinguistics—and lots more, obviously cannot be reduced to a single formula. *(Taylor, 1973, p. 70)*

From the earliest days of the experimental pioneers, man's stipulation that psychology be adequate to science outweighed his commitment that it be adequate to man. *(Koch, 1971, p. 684)*

The most fundamental points of similarity between the phenomenological psychologists considered in the previous chapter are their emphasis on man as an object different from the object of the natural sciences insofar as this object interprets both his own world and his own actions within that world, their emphasis on man as a creature capable of voluntary (free) action, their emphasis on the reflective capacities of man, their emphasis on consciousness as embodied, and their emphasis on the necessity of employing phenomenological methods in psychology in order to capture the entire meaning of a phenomenon.

The most fundamental points of dissimilarity between the phenomenological psychologists are the degree to which phenomenological psychology is to complement or subsume empirical psychology, the
degree to which certain traditional concepts such as "law", "cause", "theory", "hypothesis" and the like are applicable at all to the study of man, and the degree to which they specify the rules and methods of the interpretation which must mediate the claims of the two types of data produced in order to develop a single, coherent account of action.

Although the primary purpose of this essay is to demarcate the relationship between phenomenological psychology and empirical psychology as viewed by recent American phenomenological psychologists, a few critical remarks must be made. For all three basic types of phenomenological psychology the fundamental status of phenomenological psychology is clear: phenomenological psychology is to be a technical discipline utilizing the various phenomenological reductions specified by Husserl (with the exception of the transcendental reduction) in order to demonstrate the structures and dimensions of man's intentionality.

Kockelmans emphasizes the basically complementary relationship between phenomenological psychology and empirical psychology, whereas the existentially-oriented phenomenological psychologists from Duquesne emphasize the subsumptive relationship between phenomenological psychology and empirical psychology. For both of these views, however, there remain only two types of knowledge, phenomenological and empirical.
Ricoeur believes there are three disciplines to be related: phenomenological psychology, the social sciences, and the natural sciences. Empirical knowledge, as discussed by the first two views above, is said to result from verification of observation; and

Verification must be grounded ultimately in the acquisition of brute data. By 'brute data' I mean here and throughout data whose validity cannot be questioned by offering another interpretation or reading, data whose credibility cannot be founded or undermined by further reasoning. If such a difference of interpretation can arise over given data, then it must be possible to structure the argument so as to distinguish the basic, brute data from the inferences made on the basis of them.

(Taylor, 1971, p. 8)

For Ricoeur, however, such verification is not possible when dealing with the social behavior of man, since social behavior may be said to reflect the ideas a man has about what he is doing and what he is trying to do. If we always knew exactly what we were doing and what we were trying to do, however, another type of verification would be possible, that of self-report of intentions and motives. This type of verification is rendered inadequate by the possibility that men may lie about what they are doing or they may not know exactly what they are doing or why they are doing it. In Ricoeur's works (1970; 1971) this problem is resolved in favor of validational procedures.

Thus, Ricoeur contrasts the social sciences with the empirical sciences, the former operating with validational procedures and
being interpretative (or hermeneutical) sciences and the latter operating with verification procedures and being non-interpretative sciences. Koch (1971) has also seen the need for a distinction of this sort:

Many legitimate and important domains of psychological study, then, cannot be called 'science' in any significant sense, and continued application of this misleading metaphor can only vitiate, distort or pervert research effort......To persist in the use of this highly charged metaphor is to shackle these fields of study with exceedingly unrealistic expectations concerning generality limits of the anticipated findings, predictive specificity and confidence levels, feasible research and data processing strategies, and modes of conceptual ordering.

(p. 694)

As Taylor (1971) has pointed out, such interpretative sciences cannot be judged against the criteria of the empirical sciences; in particular, the interpretative sciences cannot be judged according to their predictive capacity.

Prediction in the interpretative sciences differs from prediction in the empirical sciences in three ways (Taylor, 1971). First, it is impossible to delineate a closed system of psychological events; this is sometimes referred to as the open system dilemma. Second, a science based on validation does not achieve the degree of precision in measurement that sciences based on verification (and brute data) can achieve. Third, and most fundamentally, hard prediction is impossible in the interpretative sciences because their
object is voluntary behavior, and voluntary behavior is behavior to
which there is an alternative; as such, man may decide he is doing
something wrong, or that he needs a change, or that he has not been
looking at things in the right way, or that he does not want to be
predictable, and such a decision and the resulting actions may
well not be predictable. This is not to deny that prediction of
behavior is sometimes possible—for it is—but it is to say that
prediction will have a different status in the interpretative sci-
ences.

Far from relying on a set of calculations depending upon ac-
curate specification of fundamental laws governing objects, as in
the empirical sciences, prediction of behavior must rely upon what
can only be called insight and luck. As Taylor (1971) says,

hard prediction...just makes one a laughing
stock. Really to be able to predict the fu-
ture would be to have explicated so clearly
the human condition that one would already
have pre-empted all cultural innovation and
transformation. This is hardly in the bounds
of the possible.

(Taylor, p. 50)

There do not appear to be any complete works devoted to ex-
plicitly drawing out the implications of the hermeneutical model for
psychology. There are, however, several articles (Taylor, 1973;
Mischel, 1973) and at least one book (Roche, 1973) which offer a
number of useful suggestions for such an attempt.
Taylor (1973) has suggested that there are at least three sorts of study in the field of psychology as it is presently constituted. A first type of study is said to be psycho-physically oriented (including physiological psychology, sensation and perception, genetics, etc.) and relies upon the classical model of science, which assumes the existence of certain "brute" data; it is the existence of these brute data which allows the psycho-physical studies to rely wholly upon the verification of observations via unanimous intersubjective agreement. In Taylor's scheme the psycho-physical studies are said to be concerned with the infrastructures of our various competencies.

A second type of study is concerned with the actual structures of our competencies. Formal examples of such structural study include Chomsky's transformational grammar in the field of psycholinguistics and Piaget's stages of cognitive development in the field of developmental psychology. The third and final type of study presented by Taylor concentrates on fully-motivated behavior or performance. The studies in this area focus on the actual use of competencies towards particular ends. It is in this final area of study within psychology that the hermeneutical model is appropriate.

Thus, hermeneutics is applicable only to a segment of the work done in psychology. Moreover, studies in the infrastructural and structural domains must be taken into account in any attempt to explain fully-motivated action. The data from these two domains can be used to formulate expectancies of probabilities regarding the
likelihood that various explanations apply to a particular action or series of actions.

Mischel (1973) has suggested a cognitive social learning approach to the study of personality which admits at least three legitimate and distinct perspectives. First, for personologists interested in factors in the individual's environment which may be altered to produce changes in performance it may be useful to focus on topics such as "stimulus control", "reinforcement control" and the like. Examples of such studies within this perspective include operant conditioning, respondent conditioning, and social learning.

Second, for personologists interested in how the external conditions produce their effects it may be useful to concentrate attention on certain person variables. Among such variables Mischel lists "cognitive and behavioral construction competencies, encoding strategies and personal constructs, behavior-outcome and stimulus-outcome expectancies, subjective stimulus values, and self-regulatory systems and plans" (p. 252).

Third, for personologists interested in the individual's experiences it may be useful to focus on the phenomenological impact of external conditions on the thoughts, feelings, and other subjective (but communicable) states of experience. Which of these three perspectives is most useful will depend upon the particular intentions of the psychologist.
Roche (1973) has carefully and thoroughly compared phenomenological philosophy (primarily Husserl's and Merleau-Ponty's) with conceptual analysis (as it has been developed in England) regarding the way in which they deal with certain systems of psychology and with certain issues in the field of psychological explanation and understanding. Interestingly, Roche concludes that the two share two fundamental assumptions, those of a personalistic ontology and experiential empiricism. In the previous chapter we saw that Ricoeur was attempting to provide a linguistic phenomenology which would lend itself to some use in the social sciences.

By personalistic ontology Roche means that both phenomenology and conceptual analysis assume the existence of entities called persons, and that these entities have the attributes of being embodied, temporal, intentional and social. By experiential empiricism Roche assumes that both phenomenology and conceptual analysis repudiate the strict forms of mind-body dualisms which lead to distinctions between public and private events and obscure the essential unity of experience and action. Experiential empiricism may be taken to refer to Ricoeur's conception of the social sciences.

Roche identifies the two above assumptions as the fundamental assumptions of humanistic philosophy, noting that these assumptions are in keeping with the common sense of most actors. Man is conceived of as a skill-user (or competent entity) who uses physical realities as instruments for his projects and actions, both uses and
is used by his surrounding social structures, and relates to other men in a variety of ways. Further, man is conceived of as capable of self-knowledge, and this self-knowledge is communicable.

The study of personality may now be reconceived in the following ways. The object of personality study is meaningfully-oriented (rule-governed) behavior or action performed by individuals. Meaningfully-oriented behavior may be conceived as a text which is open for interpretations, but which is not suitable for either behavioristic or mentalistic reductionisms. Meaningfully-oriented behavior will always be based on certain bodily infrastructures and certain mental and social structures. These infrastructures constitute Taylor's psycho-physical domain of study, while the mental structures are represented by Mischel's person variables; both behavioristic psychology and phenomenological psychology remain legitimate studies, with an integrity of their own, but their function in personality study is subordinated to the interpretative process as a whole.

The social structures in our world represent institutions and organizations of various sorts which exert a more or less coercive or channelizing influence on our lives. Their reality is other than purely physical, but their existence may not be doubted without a reductionism of some sort which strips actions of their social referent.

The actual process of interpretation in personality study will follow Ricoeur's suggestions as presented in the last chapter. In
the figure of the dialectic between explanation and understanding which moves from explanation to understanding Mischel's person variables considered as structures of personality will provide the focus of attention; in the figure moving from understanding to explanation our informed guesses as to the meaning and correct interpretation of the action texts will rely on the data of behavioristic psychology and phenomenological psychology (or the external conditions of behavior and their phenomenological impact, as Mischel puts it). Providing an interpretation of a particular action text will consist of answering the various what questions asked of the text in terms of the reasons why the actions were engaged in.

One possible distressing implication of the hermeneutical model as applied in personality study is that no single theory of personality can be accepted as applying indifferently to all action texts. The study of personality as a historical discipline (which is implied by the hermeneutical model) relegates theory to the role of attempting to provide a coherent account of a particular text or series of texts; in this role theory is none other than what has been referred to in this essay as interpretation. As such, the study of personality theory becomes the study of rules and methods of interpretation rather than an exploration of the various theories which have attempted to account for the actions of all men in terms of some specific set of drives, needs, goals or characteristics.
As long as phenomenological psychology is conceived of as a discipline relating only to psychology as a natural science (and based on the classical model of science), either one psychology must be viewed as superior to the other (as in the existential phenomenological view) or the relationship between the two must remain ambiguous (as in Kockelmans' view). It is only when both psychologies may be subordinated to an impartial interpretative process that each can be conceived of as occupying unambiguous and equally legitimate positions in psychology as a whole and personality in particular; such a view is represented by Ricoeur's work, although the implications for psychology have not been made explicit in this way by him.

In retrospect, both Rogers and MacLeod may be viewed as forerunners of this point of view regarding the proper functioning and status of a phenomenological psychology. Although their views are not strictly in accord with Husserl's, neither is Ricoeur's. For both Rogers and MacLeod phenomenological psychology is simply another perspective in the science of psychology, neither strictly objective nor strictly subjective. Although glimpsing the truth about the legitimacy of phenomenological psychology, however, neither Rogers nor MacLeod attempted to carefully explicate the features of this way of knowing; nor did either of them grasp that the process of interpretation could provide a new methodology for psychology or that the model of hermeneutics could suggest a new type of objectivity.
in the social sciences as a whole. This final chapter has attempted to show the sense, coherence, and implications of such a "new objectivity" for the study of personality.
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