The Effect of the Ostpolitik on the Opposing Bloc Systems in Europe

Thomas C. Mericle
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THE EFFECT OF THE OSTPOLITIK ON THE
OPPOSING BLOC SYSTEMS IN EUROPE

by

Thomas C. Mericle

A Thesis
Submitted to the
Faculty of The Graduate College
in partial fulfillment
of the
Degree of Master of Arts

Western Michigan University
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Thomas C. Mericle
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEGACY OF DEFEAT: ADENAUER AND THE COLD WAR</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limits of the New Sovereignty</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Political Limitations</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Crises of 1958-1962</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Western Alliances and Attempts at Detente</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the Shadow of &quot;Der Alte&quot;</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adenauer’s Dilemma</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE EVOLUTION OF BONN'S OSTPOLITIK</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Politics and the Grand Coalition</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Launching of the Ostpolitik</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ostpolitik and the Federal Election of 1969</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Brandt Government and New Departures</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievements of the Ostpolitik</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE AMERICAN PRESENCE IN EUROPE</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Policy Prior to Ostpolitik</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaction to the Ostpolitik</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The American Debate Over a European Presence</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The American Dilemma</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE SOVIET DILEMMA OVER OSTPOLITIK</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basis of Post-War Soviet Policy.</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe and the Grand Coalition</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ostpolitik After 1969 and the Soviet Response</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuing Soviet Dilemmas</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOWARD AN ERA OF AMBIGUITY</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Results of Ostpolitik</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towards an Evolution of East-West Cooperation</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX A</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX B</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX C</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX D</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PREFACE

For the first time since the defeat of the Third Reich, Germany, at least the Western part, is again assuming the role of a major participant in international politics. West Germany's foreign policy is no longer simply the extension of the policies of her former occupying powers. This change occurred during a period of general relaxation of the once rigid bipolar confrontation that endured for well over a decade after the end of World War II. The "German problem" now appears to be entering a new, more critical phase, latent with many implications for international equilibrium and the European alliance system.

The reason the German problem is now seen in new perspectives is a result of the changes in the international system of the cold war, which shaped the two German regimes; and the foreign and intra-German policies of the two German states. Changes in the essentially bipolar international system or in German policies have potentially far-reaching implications both for Germany and the international system. In many ways this is because the two German regimes, in the past at least, were not able to create foreign policy, as they were limited by the fact that their very existence was the result of the foreign policy of their conquerors. Both German political systems are the result of the East-West struggle. Not only their foreign policies and respective East-West integration, but also their constitutional, political, economic and social organization were

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determined by the bipolar international environment existing at the end of World War II. Today it is still a fact that Berlin operates under the occupation authority of the four powers, and Western and Soviet troops are stationed on German soil in considerable strength. It is for these reasons that it is impossible to divorce international and domestic factors in German politics.

Germany occupies a unique position in the international system. Of the three divided nations in the world, Germany deserves special attention for a number of reasons. It is on divided German soil that the two hostile systems meet and face each other with a high concentration of military power. Germany was the first nation to be divided and therefore has remained so the longest. Germany is the only divided nation where one part has access to a great city existing as an enclave within the other part. And of most importance is the fact that Germany is the only world power to be divided. Therefore it is in Central Europe, and specifically Germany, where the opposing forces directly face each other, where the stakes are the highest, and where the international balance of power can be most easily upset.

In this situation of critical international balance, exist two German states within one German nation. The domestic and foreign policies of the two German regimes are intricately connected with the international system and dialectically linked with each other. It is within Europe, and especially Germany, where the two systems have erected elaborate and powerful military alliances, each directed solely at the other. The result is that in a divided Germany, where the main components of the opposing military alliances face each other
at close range, external problems affecting either Germany become internal problems to both, and inter-German problems become externalized and of great importance to international stability and the European alliance system.

In 1949, when the Federal Republic came into existence, its "raison d'être" was closely linked to the West's "policy of strength" confrontation with the east. The major points of West German foreign and inter-German policy were a strong identification with the Atlantic community and the policy of strength toward (and subsequent isolation from) Eastern Europe and specifically East Germany. Above all, West German policies were directed toward reunification of Germany within the Western sphere in the near future.

The detente between East and West and the subsequent devolution of the bipolar system in the 1960's had profound repercussions in the Federal Republic and on her policies. In the early 1960's there was a contradiction between Bonn's policies and the attempts by the Western allies to seek a detente with the East. The move toward detente proved irresistible, and despite domestic opposition and misgivings, the West Germans began to revise their policies. It is no accident that the changes in Bonn's policies followed the formation of the Grand Coalition in December 1966. It was the internal threat to West German stability caused by the change in the international system, and by the alteration of Bonn's foreign and inter-German policies (as well as other domestic considerations) that made cooperation between the two major political parties essential.
With the changing international environment and its many ramifications on Germany, it is perhaps somewhat surprising that the Federal Republic has been able to radically modify policies with apparently little domestic turmoil. Bonn no longer stresses the right to speak in the name of all German people, no longer maintains the Hallstein Doctrine, and no longer maintains the legal fictions of the 1937 borders. West Germany has also shelved for the foreseeable future any realistic consideration for a reunified German nation. The Federal Republic has fallen into line with the policy of detente and is even making moves toward normalizing relations with Eastern Europe.

This thesis will address itself to one main issue. What are the implications of Bonn's Ostpolitik on the two leading powers—the United States and the Soviet Union—of the opposing bloc systems facing each other in Europe? The primary focus of the thesis will be on developments within Europe after 1966. In addressing itself on this main issue, there are four sets of questions that will be kept in mind throughout the study. First, what international factors contributed to the evolution of the Ostpolitik? Second, what are the domestic implications and ramifications of this change in Bonn's foreign and inter-German policy? Third, what are the effects on the two opposing systems in Europe as a consequence of Ostpolitik? And finally, what are the present conditions in Europe; and as a result of Ostpolitik, what are the implications of these new developments, and how do they relate to the two systems and to the stability of the international environment?
On December 10, 1971, the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) Willie Brandt was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts toward achieving detente with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The only other German statesman to receive this coveted award was Gustav Stresemann, who forty-five years previously received the award for his contributions to the Treaty of Locarno. Both Brandt and Stresemann had been German Foreign Ministers who had become Chancellor. In 1926 there was a great deal of optimism over the "spirit of Locarno" and today there is a considerable enthusiasm over the results of Brandt's Ostpolitik. Indeed, there are other similarities between the two events. The spirit of Locarno included talks and plans for disarmament that can compare to the SALT negotiations and European Security Conference of today. Of course there are fundamental differences as well. War-torn Germany of 1926 is a far cry from the prosperous and economically powerful Federal Republic of today.

An analysis of Bonn's Ostpolitik, as with an analysis of the Treaty of Locarno must begin with an examination of the historical antecedents of the event. An analysis of Bonn's Ostpolitik without taking into consideration the division of Germany after World War II and the subsequent integration of the two Germanys into opposing socio-economic and political systems would be meaningless. However,
it is not the purpose of this paper to dwell on the historical events leading to the Ostpolitik, but it is necessary to establish the historical context for the current events. Hence, the purpose of this chapter is to provide a cursory examination of West German foreign policy goals since the establishment of the Federal Republic in 1949, and how that policy related to the policies and positions of the two bloc systems in Europe.

Limits of the New Sovereignty

In Europe every major issue of international importance must always take into consideration the historic "German problem." The division of Germany after World War II did not create the problem, but it did greatly exacerbate it. In essence the German problem is: how to contain Germany's power in order to protect her neighbors and still allow for Germany's national expression and security. The danger is in attempting to balance Germany's power with Europe as a whole without resulting in any diplomatic isolation that could result in dangerous frustrations. Following the defeat of Germany in 1945 and the subsequent division of Germany, it fell on the Western Allies and Konrad Adenauer to follow the path toward West German acceptance into the world community as a secure and sovereign state.

The FRG was created by pressures from three different forces: pressure within Germany; the policies of the Western powers; and the realities of the Cold War. These pressures when they were combined produced a political system that owed its very existence and an
inescapable commitment to the West.\textsuperscript{1} When the Adenauer Government took office in the fall of 1949, it inherited a series of problems that would have been staggering even for a well-established government. There were the problems remaining from the past Nazi regime, the problems that developed between the victorious allies immediately after the war, and the problems arising from the extensive internal and external controls imposed upon the Federal Republic's foreign relations.

When the Federal Republic was established in 1949, it was as a non-sovereign state. The FRG's "raison d'etre" was a strong identification and integration in the Atlantic community and a complete endorsement of the "policy of strength" toward the East. This policy meant that Bonn would be isolated from Eastern Europe until the West was victorious and Germany was reunited through a collapse of Communism in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), or in Eastern Europe as a whole.\textsuperscript{2} However, the Federal Republic's position vis-a-vis the Western Allies was increasingly normalized through a succession of acts on the part of the Allies which returned greater portions of sovereignty to the West Germans. Each time Bonn was granted more sovereignty, it was for a specific purpose, within clearly defined areas which even more closely bound the Federal Republic with the West.\textsuperscript{3} The FRG was integrated into the European Coal and Steel

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1}Karl Kaiser, \textit{German Foreign Policy in Transition} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 13.
  \item \textsuperscript{2}ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{3}ibid.
\end{itemize}
community, the Council of Europe, the European Payments Union, and the Western European Union. And with each move, more sovereignty was granted to the Federal Republic. However, the most critical problem faced by West Germany was reserved by the Allies. The Western Allies reserved the right to make all decisions pertaining to Germany's basic national problem and West Germany's relations with the East—the division of Germany and the problem of Berlin.

The Western framework for domestic and foreign policy did provide the Federal Republic with a fair amount of security and the chance to become a respected member of the world community. These conditions were very important for a people whose self-confidence was shaken, and whose link with past achievements was broken. The circumstances of operating within strict limitations within the Western Alliance provided the emotional and physical security that was necessary for West German recovery without having to fend for themselves in the international arena. This condition was quite acceptable to the Western allies who also did not want an independent Federal Republic operating in the tinderbox of Central Europe.

With the Berlin Blockade of 1948–49 and the outbreak of the Korean War during the summer of 1950 the Western allies became more concerned about the building up of defenses against perceived communist aggression. There was increased allied pressure, especially from the United States to rearm the large pool of manpower West Germany represented. The original concept was not of a German Army, but of German units integrated into a European army. During 1951 a number of conferences were held concerning the possibility of rearming Germany.
The West Germans were steadily gaining more freedom of action. In July 1951 the members of the British Commonwealth and France ended the state of war between themselves and Germany, to be followed by the United States in October. In May 1952 the Allies eliminated even more of their rights under the Occupation Statute, when they placed on a contractual basis their previous rights to maintain troops in the Federal Republic. That same month the European Defense Community (EDC) was drafted with the FRG included as an equal partner. However, French objections could not be overcome and finally in 1954 EDC was dropped. The delay in West German rearmament was short and in October 1954, West Germany was admitted to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

With the perceived threat from the Soviet Union and the firm direction of Chancellor Adenauer, the internal disputes over the rearmament of Germany were overcome. The FRG became an equal member of NATO and the United States, France and Great Britain granted full sovereignty to Bonn in May 1955. Except for the right of the victorious allies to maintain troops on German soil and the denial of the right to include West Berlin in its territory, the Federal Republic had become a sovereign state.

When the Federal Republic joined NATO in 1954 the Western allies undertook a formal commitment to promote German reunification. In return the Federal Republic explicitly declared itself dependent on the allies for both national security and national reunification. In treaties and actions, the Federal Republic has furthered national security only with the NATO framework, and has promoted reunification.
only within the broader framework of Western policies toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. While this policy limits the sovereignty of the Federal Republic in a real, if not in a legal sense, it is characteristic of all postwar Europe that all of these nations have to one degree or another surrendered a measure of national sovereignty in order to promote a unified and authentic defense posture.

Domestic Political Limitations

During his first years as Chancellor of the Federal Republic, Konrad Adenauer led a coalition government of his own party, the Christian Democratic Union, combined with the Bavarian counterpart of the Christian Socialist Union (CDU/CSU) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP). The FDP was not always easy to keep in line, especially concerning the policy of rearmament. Kurt Schumaker until his death in 1952 was the able leader of the opposition Social Democratic Party (SPD), and one of the most politically astute leaders in Europe. The 1953 election gave the CDU/CSU a small but absolute majority in the Bundestag and Adenauer through his position as Chancellor and party leader was able to exercise a great deal of influence over policy.

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2 ibid.

matters. Adenauer maintained control over the party and government to such a degree that some Germans, particularly those in opposition, referred to the government as a "Demokrat" meaning "democratic dictatorship."¹

Domestically, Adenauer did not have an easy time on the matter of rearmament. However, he persisted in his policy because he felt that his policy was the only way to achieve the desired goal of West German's complete sovereignty.² After World War II the Germans had been told that they could never maintain an army again. The Basic Law, the constitutional equivalent for the FRG, did not even provide for armed forces. In addition, Germans were tired of war and its awful results. The SPD mounted the strongest opposition to the rearmament policies, seconded by the FDP.

During the years following the establishment of the Federal Republic there was no real internal problem connected with the limited sovereignty allowed Bonn. During the years following the war Germans manifested great emotional exhaustion. There was a feeling of collective guilt for the programs and atrocities carried out in the name of the German people by the Nazis. There was also great economic deprivation. Western Germany suffered a hand to mouth existence during the years 1945 to 1948. And from 1948 to 1960 West Germany was

¹loc. cit., p. 157.

experiencing the "economic miracle" that was to re-establish the war-torn country as one of the leading economic and industrial powers of the world. It is for these reasons that there was a slow emergence of German nationalism, and little dissent over the lack of international freedom allowed to the Bonn Republic. These conditions also partly serve to explain why West German policy toward reunification was passive during the early years, even though reunification was always proclaimed as the most pressing issue in German politics.

Other internal conditions which maintained great influence over the Federal Republic's foreign policy in the years following 1949 were a natural result of German reluctance to accept the consequences of losing the war. More than eighteen million German people had been evacuated to West Germany from their former homes in Prussia, East Prussia, Silesia, Pomerania, Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Many held strong beliefs concerning the return to their former homelands. For more than ten years these people and the many West Germans who supported their beliefs constituted a very substantial and vocal group of people who exercised great influence on the Adenauer government. Their antagonisms toward the Soviet Union and their bitter memories of war-time deprivation made them susceptible to unrealistic plans and pressures concerning a recapture of the lost lands.

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2loc. cit., p. 149.
For years following 1949, there was a multiplicity of refugee and expellee organizations and groups, all competing with each other, and all claiming to represent German citizens within the FRG whose former homes were beyond the Oder-Niessse line.¹ These were highly nationalistic organizations, and their strong and vocal support for all-German policies irritated the Western allies and invited repeated attacks on West German "revanchist" activities from Eastern Europe.

At the end of the war, the refugees and expellees coming from beyond the Oder-Niessse line were not welcomed with open arms by the West Germans. The Federal government was, however, prepared from the beginning to accept these 18 million people and integrate them into West German society. The refugee organizations helped to solve some of the major social and economic problems involved, and the Federal Republic coped with this enormous problem in a relatively short period of time.

First generation refugees and expellees were the most radical and vocal in their desire to return to their lost lands. The second generation, born in the Federal Republic, while maintaining interest in the history, customs and traditions of their parents' birthplaces through the refugee organizations, has little intention of returning to these lost lands if it should become possible. They owe their loyalties to the Federal Republic.

For this reason the political power of these refugee organizations in preventing a normalization of relations with Eastern Europe has steadily declined through the years. Because of their hard line and nationalistic posture these groups found their greatest support within the CDU/CSU; and it is within the CDU/CSU where their influence has remained the longest.

It was not until well into the decade of the 1960's that a West German politician could realistically discuss the possibility of the recognition of Oder-Neise border without committing political suicide. As late as 1970, West German state television networks displayed maps showing the 1937 German borders. Territory east of the Oder-Neise line in Poland and the Soviet Union was referred to as East Germany, with the territory of the GDR referred to as Middle Germany.

Other political groups, particularly the SPD created problems for the ruling majority, the CDU/CSU, by their expression of pacifism. The Federal Republic was still a weak nation whose military and economic strength had not been restored, so the pacifist tendencies of the major opposition party caused problems for Bonn when they had to negotiate with unfriendly governments. The result of these factors weakened the position of the Federal Republic and resulted in even stronger reliance on the Western allies.\(^1\)

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\(^1\)loc. cit., p. 8.
The problem of reunification and German borders

The large refugee organizations operating in the Federal Republic and the deep-seated German desire for reunification placed limitations on the Bonn government and its foreign and inter-German policy. The problems of reunification and the border question are to this day a matter of controversy in the FRG. During the first years of the Federal Republic there was an undisputed desire for reunification even though this desire was not precisely articulated. Although using arms to further reunification was an impossibility, to what extreme of national self-sacrifice the West Germans were willing to endure was unknown. 1 Adenauer believed that if Germany was ever to be reunited and able to assume a major world role, it could only come about through close cooperation with the West. Even if close cooperation resulted in Soviet wrath that would mean long delays before Germany could be united. Schumaker and the SPD were in opposition to this policy. The overriding concern for Schumaker was German reunification, and he felt that offers of friendship toward the Soviet Union would better accomplish the goal. 2

The achievement of reunification was a major national goal for the Federal Republic even though some of Adenauer's policies seemed to be counter productive to this purpose. It was Adenauer's stated belief

1 Hartmann, op. cit., pp. 7-12.
2 Dill, op. cit., p. 446.
that only a reunited Germany within the Western alliance would be a truly viable and independent nation, and that a neutral Germany would be open to "Sovietization." For the other Western allies German reunification was only an indirect goal at best. There is a good argument that can be made that states that the Western allies while verbally supporting the Bonn position realistically believed that German reunification would be a destabilizing influence and could not hope to be achieved in the foreseeable future.

The unsettled question of Germany's borders was of paramount importance not only for the Federal Republic, but also for the Western allies and the Soviet Union. The two world wars of the twentieth century were closely associated with Germany's territorial boundaries. At the end of World War II the Soviet Union annexed traditional German territory around Koenigsberg (now Kaliningrad). The Soviet Union also gave Poland substantial territories from the former German areas of East Prussia, Pomerania, and Silesia in compensation for Polish territory that was annexed by the Soviet Union. Another unsettled question surrounded the Munich Agreements of 1938 which ceded to Germany the Sudeten area of Czechoslovakia. Although the Federal Republic made no claims for this area, the failure of the FRG to disavow the agreement created lasting problems between Bonn and Prague.

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2 Planck, op. cit., p. 17.
The Federal Republic had no part in the creation of the frontier problem, but inherited them as a part of the legacy of the Third Reich's defeat. In the years of the cold war, West German policies were actively supported by the Western allies in rejecting the new border arrangements. The Federal Republic's leaders with allied support consistently refused to accept the Oder-Neisse line as the permanent German border with Poland and insisted on negotiating the eastern frontier only as a part of a final peace treaty with a united Germany.¹

The position of West German leaders on the eastern border pointed to a wide range of relationships within and between the bloc systems. West German claims were supported by the Western allies not so much as an acknowledgement of the validity of these claims, but more as a means of hindering Soviet objectives to the East. The government of the FRG's position on the eastern border caused East European and Soviet leaders to depict West Germany as a revisionist state. There was much more behind this than a simple rejection of Bonn's territorial claims. Nor was this position universally approved in the Eastern bloc. Rumanian leaders desired a more moderate policy toward the Federal Republic. The basis of East European and Soviet propaganda attacks was a desire to protect socialism in Eastern Europe and to combat West German attacks on the sovereignty and legality of the GDR.

¹For a complete and detailed analysis of the territories question in West German foreign policy, see Georg Bluhm, Die Oder-Neisse-Linie, in der deutschen Aussenpolitik, (Freiburg: Vertraghaus, 1963).
Critics of Bonn's policy, both East and West, overlooked the legal points involved and considered that a reunited Germany would seek territorial demands from present European states. The Federal Republic also maintained the principle of self-determination for the German people as a whole. With fifteen percent of the West German population made up of Germans expelled from their former German homelands, the Federal Republic demanded the "right to the homeland" which gave serious concern to the governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia.

The Federal Republic continued to stress the legality of these positions and that the borders of Germany could be altered only through a final peace treaty negotiated with an all-German government. The policies maintained for diplomatic leverage undoubtedly had considerable room for negotiations and compromise. The maintenance of these policies however, fed feelings of genuine anxiety in Eastern and Western Europe about the possibility of a strong, revanchist and demanding unified Germany. The official Bonn policies also provided ample ammunition for communist propaganda attacks on the Federal Republic.

1 Kaiser, op. cit., p. 35.
2 ibid.
The Hallstein Doctrine

During the first decade of the Federal Republic's existence, all of the hard line foreign policies were directed at achieving reunification of Germany as a strong and sovereign nation within the Western Alliance. During this period the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was prevented from any genuinely independent policy because of its continued occupation by the Soviet Union, and by its legal status under the Potsdam Agreement of August 1945. Yet the GDR was succeeding in establishing the appearance of a national identity. In response to this growing world awareness of the emerging East German State, the Federal Republic's Bundestag adopted a resolution in April 1954 "withholding recognition of 'sovereignty' granted to the East German regime," and the three Western Powers later issued statements to the same effect.¹ On September 22, 1955, Dr. Adenauer in a speech before the Bundestag stated "... in the event of recognition of the so-called German Democratic Republic by third parties with whom the Federal Government has official relations, we should consider this as an unfriendly act calculated to intensify the division of Germany."²

This statement was followed up by an official act of the Bundestag on December 9, 1955 that stated that the Federal Republic would break off diplomatic relations with all countries which recognized the GDR, and would refuse to enter into diplomatic relations with any Communist

¹Dulles, op. cit., p. 21.
country except the Soviet Union. This decision later became known as the "Hallstein Doctrine" after Dr. Walter Hallstein then State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry. Foreign Secretary Heinrich von Brentano later in the month underscored the importance of the position when he stated that international recognition of the GDR would transform the reunification problem "... into the task of unifying two different German States."^2

The doctrine was remarkably successful and generally supported by the Allies. All the communist countries with the exception of Yugoslavia recognized the GDR as soon as it was founded, but no non-communist nations established diplomatic contacts with the GDR before 1960, except for Syria in 1956. Before 1967 the Hallstein Doctrine was enforced only three times: (1) In 1956 the Federal Republic recalled its Charge d'Affairs from Syria when the GDR opened a Consulate there. (2) In 1957 the FRG broke off relations with Yugoslavia when that nation recognized East Germany (Diplomatic relations were resumed in January 1968.). (3) The Federal Republic broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1963 when the Castro regime established full diplomatic relations with the GFR. In addition the Federal Republic ended its aid program to the United Arab Republic in 1965 after a visit there by Walter Ulbricht, head of state of the GDR and General Secretary of the GDR Communist Party—the Socialist Unity Party (SED).


In October 1957, the Soviet Union successfully launched the world's first man-made satellite. Of more importance than the orbiting Sputnik was the rocket booster, which indicated that the Soviet Union had the capability of launching a nuclear weapon at high speeds to targets 4,000 miles away.

The American people and their government were quite disturbed. Short-range Jupiter missiles were installed in Italy and Turkey in an attempt to offset longer-range Soviet weapons. Money poured into missile and bomber programs, and "gaps" were suddenly discovered in everything from a technological nature to teaching at pre-school and elementary levels. Officially the Eisenhower Administration tried to downplay Soviet advancements, but the underdeveloped nations of the world were suitably impressed with Soviet advancements since 1917.

In August 1957, the same month that the Soviets had fired their first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), Soviet leaders announced that "Coexistence is not only the absence of war between the two systems, but also peaceful economic competition between them, and concrete cooperation in economic, political and cultural areas."¹ This economic competition would be welcomed by Soviet leaders because the Soviet Union had undergone a 7.1 percent annual rate of growth in their gross national product between 1950 and 1958.²

¹ "The Leninist Course of Peaceful Coexistence," Kommunist, no. 11, November 1957, p. 5.
While the economic growth of the Soviet Union was real, the perceived Soviet lead in ICBM's was not. In 1957, Soviet leadership made a decision to postpone construction of ICBM complexes until development of second and third generation missiles. This meant that Soviet foreign policy would attempt to exploit a false lead in ICBM's.\(^1\) This policy was a dangerous gamble for Khrushchev, and within the next few years it would result in the Cuban Missile Crisis and contribute to a growing Sino-Soviet rift.

With Soviet pronouncements of their strategic superiority, the Chinese leadership urged strong support for "wars of liberation" in the developing areas, wars that they felt could safely be fanned because of the strategic power of the United States being neutralized by the Soviet Union. Naturally Khrushchev refused to cooperate in this policy because he was well aware that his arsenal of ICBM's was considerably more of a "paper tiger" than was the American Strategic Air Command. The break between China and the Soviet Union was also caused by disagreement over Mao's "Great Leap Forward" with its emphasis on forced collectivization, over Khrushchev's emphasis on consumer goods instead of capital goods and military hardware, and over the Soviet leader's insistence on aiding "bourgeois" regimes in the underdeveloped world instead of fomenting revolution.\(^2\)

The perceived Soviet strategic nuclear superiority aided their activity in the underdeveloped world, but it also posed a considerably

\(^{1}\text{ibid.}\)

\(^{2}\text{loc. cit., p. 203.}\)
more direct threat to the status quo in Central Europe. The threat of intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM) and ICBM's was of grave concern to all Western European nations, especially the Federal Republic. This Soviet offensive threat compounded an already embarrassing situation.

The decision to include the Federal Republic into NATO contained many implications that were to last for several years. This decision was the result of the perceived communist threat and it furthered the freeze in relations between East and West as a result of Soviet perceptions of the move. The Paris Agreement, which brought the FRG into NATO, constituted a separate peace between the Western allies and West Germany. It obtained for the Federal Republic support from former enemies, now allies, in the pursuit of policy goals in Eastern Europe. First, the Western allies gave the Federal Republic the full rights of a sovereign nation over its internal and external affairs, and applied the principle of sovereign equality in their relations with Bonn. Second, this acceptance of sovereignty by the Western allies went beyond West Germany's borders and acknowledged Bonn's right to speak in the name of all German people. This implied a joint Western policy of non-recognition toward the German Democratic Republic. The Western powers also advised that no decision could be made concerning the borders of a future Germany except by means of a peace treaty negotiated with a freely elected all-German government. This move legitimized the Bonn claim of the legality of the December 1937
borders, and all Western nations refused to recognize the GDR and the Oder-Neisse line. 1

In return for this commitment on the part of the Western allies, the Federal Republic made its own commitments. 2 The FRG was to provide 500,000 troops for NATO. Unilaterally the Federal Republic made a three-point declaration that it would: (1) conduct its policies in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations; (2) refrain from activities contrary to the defensive policies of the Western Alliance; and (3) never resort to the use of force to achieve its policy of reunification or modification of the existing European borders. 3

After having bargained its military rearmament to regain its sovereignty, West German leaders were not enthusiastic about building and maintaining the appropriate level of conventional forces. 4 The Adenauer government cut service time for draftees, refused to spend its full authorization for arms, and unilaterally reduced manpower force goals from the agreed upon 500,000 to 325,000. Adenauer then began to ask for missiles, artillery capable of carrying nuclear rounds, and fighter-bombers capable of carrying nuclear bombs. The artillery and the fighter-bombers were delivered by the United States over the objections of Great Britain and West Germany's opposition party, the SPD. 5

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1 Planck, op. cit., pp. 6-8.
3 Planck, op. cit., pp. 8,9.
5 Ibid.
Another situation that was creating uncertainty in Europe was the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC), or Common Market, on January 1, 1959. The immediate impact was political as well as economic, for in a stroke of a pen the six member nations, France, West Germany, Italy, the Benelux countries, had decreased their economic dependence upon the United States, tied the Federal Republic firmly within Western Europe, taken their first steps toward possible future political integration, and created a new middle bloc between the United States and the Soviet Union.

While the United States had cause to carefully consider the implications of this move, the Soviet leadership could not exactly be enthusiastic over the turn of events either. The success of the EEC and West Germany's possession capable of delivering nuclear payloads raised once again before Soviet leaders the specter of a militarized and economically powerful Germany. On November 10, 1958, Khrushchev began a series of moves which climaxed with Soviet demands that the United States, Great Britain and France withdraw from West Berlin. Berlin would be made into a free-city and would negotiate with East Germany for access rights to the west. Khrushchev threatened that if agreement was not reached within six months, access routes to West Berlin would be unilaterally turned over to the East German regime. The West, with great unanimity rejected these demands and refused to contemplate recognition of the GDR. They further stressed that a turnover of access routes to East Germany, and refusal to allow Western
vehicles access to West Berlin would result in NATO retaliation. The
Soviet response was that this would mean World War III.¹

In focusing on West Berlin, the Soviet leader had pinpointed the
fulcrum that could change the balance of power within Europe. Amer­
ican policy makers feared that a Western evacuation from West Berlin
would shake West German confidence in NATO and perhaps cause a West
German-Soviet deal. However, Khrushchev must have concluded that the
risk was not worth a nuclear exchange, especially with a pronounced
American strategic advantage. Khrushchev denied that he had ever
given the West an ultimatum and modified the six month limit so that
negotiations could be held. In September 1959, Khrushchev visited the
United States and while the "Spirit of Camp David" did not produce
many diplomatic results, it did seem to cool the situation in Berlin,
and plans were made for a summit conference in Geneva the next year.

The Geneva summit conference scheduled for May 1960 did not come
about ostensibly due to the "U-2" affair a day before the conference
was to take place. The real reasons for the failure of the confer­
ence were a growing intransigence over Berlin and the Sino-Soviet
rift. Khrushchev was not concerned about his relationship with Eisen­
hower as the President would soon be leaving office. What was more
important was the growing split with China and the fact that the U-2
flights which had criss-crossed Soviet territory for at least four
years must have shown American intelligence the true status of Soviet

¹loc. cit., p. 213.
ICBM strength. This realization probably influenced the decision to temporarily call off the Berlin crisis while at the same time intensifying threats to America’s allies who allowed U-2 flights to take off and land from their territory. In addition, the hard line taken at Geneva might appease China. Khrushchev also embraced Fidel Castro as a new force in Latin America and he warned the United States not to impose the Monroe Doctrine and attack Cuba.

The November 1960 election in the United States witnessed one of the closest elections in American history. The new President, John F. Kennedy, was immediately beset with extraordinary problems. First, there was the ill-considered decision to go ahead with the American sponsored "Bay of Pigs" invasion of Cuba, originally set up during the last months of the Eisenhower administration. Then in June 1961, Kennedy traveled to Vienna to meet with Khrushchev. Although there was an agreement to stop the growing conflict in Laos, Khrushchev was adamant in his position that the Western allies had to leave West Berlin.¹

Kennedy was naturally concerned about the credibility of the United States after the Bay of Pigs episode, and over press reports that he had been no match for Khrushchev at Vienna. He felt that there could be no discussions with Soviet leaders over Berlin in the face of Soviet threats to turn over access routes to the city to the East Germans.²

¹loc. cit., p. 223.
²Public Papers of the Presidents, Kennedy, 1961, pp. 533-540.
The American President's position exacerbated the Soviet Premier's problems. West Germany was a growing military power, it was extremely attractive to younger technicians and experts living in East Germany. Since the end of World War II, approximately 200,000 people annually moved from East Germany to West Germany. These people were usually the trained experts that the German Democratic Republic literally needed for the state's survival. During the spring and summer of 1961, almost 30,000 people a week were fleeing East Germany for the West.¹ This situation exposed the very weak position of the communist regime in the GDR, which was compounded by the position of West Berlin as a propaganda and espionage center within the communist bloc. Khrushchev also realized that the true Soviet ICBM situation was known in the West. In a national broadcast on July 25, 1961, Kennedy ordered National Reserve troops to active duty, and announced a 25 percent increase in American military strength.²

Soviet and East German response to the situation was dramatic and carefully considered. On August 13, 1961, the Berlin Wall was constructed. The flow of young and skilled workers to the West was reduced to a trickle. The "Wall" was protested by the Western powers, but no real action was taken. The Wall partially sealed the Eastern bloc from Western influence, but it was a colossal monument to the failures and weaknesses of the Soviet system.

¹Statistisches Jahrbuch, 1968 (Statistisches Bundesamt, Bundesrepublik Deutschland), pp. 177-183.

²Public Papers of the Presidents, Kennedy, op. cit.
While the Wall had solved one problem for Khrushchev and SED party leader Walter Ulbricht, Khrushchev was coming under increased domestic attack concerning his strategic nuclear bluff and the Sino-Soviet split.\(^1\) Two weeks after the erection of the Berlin Wall, Khrushchev broke the three-year Soviet-American moratorium on testing nuclear weapons and began testing bombs in the 50 megaton range. This was followed in September 1961 by an American resumption of underground testing.

All of the preceding was a prelude to the most severe crisis which occurred in October 1962. The Cuban Missile Crisis was a confrontation that rechanneled the policies of the United States and the Soviet Union, and affected many facets of world affairs. The roots of the crisis are found in Khrushchev's ICBM policies after 1957 and his attempts at forcing the Western powers from West Berlin.\(^2\) By 1962, the Soviet leader's policies had resulted in an increase of Western power in Germany, and the Soviet Union needed a credible strategic force to neutralize the Western military advantage. In addition, Kennedy's quick military buildup in 1961, blunting Khrushchev's demands, probably hurt his position within the Kremlin.

Khrushchev's attempt to regain his status in the Kremlin, and to regain the initiative in the strategic realm involved the placement of IRBM's and medium bombers on Cuban territory. The attempted covert

\(^1\)LaFeber, op. cit., p. 225.

placement of these weapons in Cuba was discovered by American U-2 flights over Cuba on October 14, 1962. The next two weeks witnessed some of the tensest moments in the world's history. After intense bargaining, Khrushchev agreed to an American demand that the missiles be removed and the crisis was over.

This retreat from direct confrontation with the United States announced a change in Soviet foreign policy to one of peaceful competition between East and West. Even Soviet support of "wars of liberation" became increasingly more conditional. In 1963, the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to stop testing nuclear devices above ground.

The Soviet position, before, during and after the Cuban Missile Crisis greatly angered the Chinese, furthering the rift between the two communist giants to almost a complete break. The aftermath of the crisis did not elevate Khrushchev's status in the Kremlin either. The slight thaw in Soviet-American relations provided opportunities for greater freedom of action by the other Eastern European governments. The peaceful resolution of the crises between 1958 and 1962, together with Khrushchev's relatively weaker position, allowed greater liberalization and intellectual freedom to members of the Soviet bloc. By 1963, it was quite clear to all but the most dogged and doctrinaire anti-communist that a monotheistic communist threat was a thing of the past.
The Western Alliance and Attempts at Detente

By the early 1960's it became evident that the hard line policies followed by the Western alliance during the previous decade simply did not work toward the realization of long term goals. The short range policies of building up the defenses of Western Europe and isolating Eastern Europe, especially the GDR, had been successful, but the possibility of a permanent peace in Europe and a reunified Germany seemed even more distant. The world realities of the 1960's were far different from those of the 1950's. The regime in the GDR was not going to wither away with East Germany falling into the hands of the West.

After the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, the GDR began to be less of a liability to the Soviet Union and more of a definite asset, with strong support of Soviet policies backed up with a considerable and greatly expanding, technical and economic base. The new world realities were different in other respects also. The essentially bipolar world of the 1950's was rapidly eroding into a multipolar world. Emerging poly-centrism was taking hold not only within the Western alliance, but also to a lesser degree within the Warsaw Pact nations. The new decade of East-West relations posed new problems and dilemmas for Federal Republic and the opposing nations on the European scene.

In the Western alliance, it was John F. Kennedy and Charles de Gaulle who began to look for alternate paths to "rapprochement" with the Soviet Union. The commitments made to the FRG in the Paris agreements of 1954 while not openly rejected were largely ignored.
Kennedy's attempts to reopen a dialogue with the Soviet Union were directed at an avoidance of raising controversial political issues and exploring areas of agreement where the superpowers could cooperate.

Kennedy became convinced that the division of Germany would obviously continue barring any radical shift in Soviet policy, and he hoped to defuse the tense German problem by dispensing with certain priorities and legalities. It became quite clear that Kennedy was willing to bargain with almost all of the basic tenets of the FRG's Eastern policy in return for Soviet guarantees on Berlin and a general relaxation of tensions in Central Europe.¹

President de Gaulle's initiatives toward the Soviet Union stressed the division of Germany as being a European problem to be settled by European peoples. In pressing his policies for a European détente, de Gaulle stated that recognition of the Oder-Neisse line and strict limitations on German arms would be prior conditions of any reunification settlement. De Gaulle also omitted the standard reference to one grand peace conference.² De Gaulle's conviction was that the continued German division was unbearable because of the suffering it caused and the political progress it prevented. Not because the danger of war was acute. These unorthodox gestures increased during 1965, to be followed the next year by de Gaulle's visit to Moscow and

¹Planck, op. cit., p. 41.

France's withdrawal from NATO military integration. While these activities placed the whole structure of postwar Western diplomacy into jeopardy, and diminished NATO's effectiveness to a large degree, these same activities again pointed out that the German problem remained the central issue in the East-West conflict.\(^1\)

Soviet policy during this period of transition showed little change from its policies of the previous decade. During this time, however, there were indications that the Soviets were at least altering their views toward the Federal Republic and Western Europe. The Soviet Union abstained from their previous propaganda attacks on the FRG, and also eased the situation concerning Berlin. There also appeared to be a lack of unity in Soviet leadership over what course to take in the European arena after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the successful defense of West Berlin by the allies from 1958 until 1962.\(^2\)

Despite the indecision and lack of initiative by the Soviet Union, the time-worn demands for a settlement of the German problem through a recognition of the GDR and current borders continued. It was felt that a maintenance of these policies would not only protect the GDR, but would keep tensions at a level that could help discourage emerging tendencies toward independence of Soviet authority in Eastern Europe.

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1Planck, op. cit., p. 55.

In the Shadow of "Der Alte"

The changes in the international system of the Cold War had a profound impact on the reunification policy which the Federal Republic had pursued under Konrad Adenauer since 1949. As a result of these conditions every major part of that policy was about to undergo either significant modification or fundamental change. The international forces that sought detente created strong fears in West Germany that the German problem would be bypassed and Germany's division would become final. As the pressure for a relaxation of tensions grew, Western allies viewed Bonn's attempts to keep the German problem in view with less and less sympathy. Even the weaker and more flexible attempts by the Federal Republic to prevent the hardening of the status-quo were perceived by other countries as a hindrance to East-West relations. The erection of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 made it clear that reunification would not come about in the near future, and that united Western policy for that goal would have little success. Domestic critics in the FRG began to ask if the futile policy of isolation toward the GDR was worth the price. These critics argued that a more realistic policy might lead to a creation of more tolerable conditions in East Germany and a liberalization of the regime. The belief that past policies were sterile and would never achieve announced goals began to permeate West German society causing considerable

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1Kaiser, op. cit., p. 77.

2loc. cit., p. 87.
agitation for change. This pressure for new policies was especially strong among youth and intellectual groups.

In the fall of 1963 Adenauer resigned as Chancellor but remained behind the scenes as Chairman of the CDU for three more years. Adenauer was not happy with Ludwig Erhard, his successor as Chancellor, and used his position as party chairman to snipe at Erhard's conduct in office. Adenauer did not believe that Erhard had the right personality to wield the power of chancellor. The prospect of "Der Alte" looming in the background could not have been useful in building Erhard's confidence.

In his continuing position as Chairman of the CDU, Adenauer appointed himself the guardian of national interests. In his early days as Chancellor, Adenauer had attempted to suppress the forces of German nationalism, but now he felt that it was necessary to harness these forces into a fairly recognizable set of political demands. Adenauer felt that in resisting the (as he saw them) vacillating compromises of the Erhard government, he would insure that right wing elements could not wrap themselves in the cloak of protectors of German National interests. But in taking this position, Adenauer was polarizing the attitudes in West Germany between those who advocated the continuation of the old policies and those who advocated exploration for new ones.

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3Ibid.
With this as a backdrop, Ludwig Erhard had a difficult if not impossible task in establishing a working relationship with the Western allies while at the same time exploring for alternative policies toward Eastern Europe. Each of the conditions of the time demanded some sacrifice on the part of the others. The pressures for compromise would demand a more radical orientation of policy than the Erhard government was capable of making. These counterpressures and Erhard's lack of dynamism would plague the government and prevent it from taking an active role in reorienting West German foreign and inter-German policy. These pressures would ultimately destroy the Erhard government and provide for the necessity of the Grand Coalition that would follow.

During this time, the SPD was becoming restive in its role as opposition party, a role that it had played since 1949. As a revisionist Marxist party it had to play lip service to such doctrines as the nationalization of industry, which was quite out of the question in West Germany of that time. The SPD had harped on doctrine and ignored personality. Erich Ollenbauer, Schumacher’s successor, was dull and colorless. Someone new was needed. Accordingly it was announced that while Ollenbauer would remain as Party Chairman, Willie Brandt would be the candidate for Chancellor. (After Ollenbauer's death in 1964, Brandt was elected Party Chairman as well.) The party wanted to take on a new look and offer a new program.

Using the basic program laid down in Bad Godesberg in 1959, the SPD got rid of most of its old Marxist theoretical underpinning. It

1ibid.
dropped its commitment to economic policies based on socialism and a planned economy, and embraced the free market economy and gave qualified acceptance to private ownership of the means of production.\(^1\) The party also dropped its past policies based on social class and economic determination, and dropped its traditional hostility toward established religion. The new image of the SPD was to make it much more attractive to middle class and Catholic working class voters.

In foreign policy statements, the SPD as opposition party, had offered alternatives and criticisms of government policies, but had tended to be halfhearted and frequently undistinguished.\(^2\) In order to mount a successful alternative policy, the SPD had to first free itself from its old routine of opposition and use Adenauer's ideas of European and Atlantic integration and defense before it could come up with innovative alternatives. The landmark of this process was the Bundestag speech of Herbert Wehner in June 1960, in which the previous reservations over Adenauer's foreign policy were dropped and declarations were made as to the SPD's forward looking policies.\(^3\)

Another important reassessment of policy in Germany was Egon Bahr's 1963 proposal for "change through rapprochement."\(^4\) Bahr, as press secretary and consultant to then West Berlin Mayor Willie Brandt,

\(^{1}\)Heidenheimer, op. cit., pp. 82, 83.


\(^{3}\)Ibid.

was the first member of one of West Germany's major political parties (the SPD) to offer a different policy. Bahr concluded that in Germany a policy of all or nothing, free elections or no movement at all, had become meaningless. The idea of overthrowing the GDR was futile because of the vital interests of the Soviet Union. Bahr suggested that regular contacts be set up between the two Germanys, but that these contacts would not mean official recognition. The two German regimes could cooperate in setting up an intra-German office to identify areas of mutual concern where contact and cooperation would be of mutual benefit. The primary purpose of these contacts would be to very gradually improve the living conditions of the people of East Germany. At the same time that these contacts were taking place, the Federal Republic would reduce their pressure on the GDR to make the intra-German contacts more acceptable to the East German leadership.

Bahr's proposals were very controversial at the time and he was severely criticized by official spokesmen of the CDU/CSU and the FDP. But through time his proposals gained greater acceptance and gradually were adopted by one time critics.  

In the public sector, the responsible elites within the Federal Republic gradually began to question official government policies. In increasing numbers they began to accept the proposals as enunciated by Bahr. The press began to take up these arguments and carried on a

heated debate with government spokesmen on Bonn's official policies.¹ Until 1964-65 these ideas had little effect on government policies. After this time, ideas seemed to invade government circles and a subtle reexamination of official policies of all three parties began to take place.

Under Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder, a gradual shift in the Federal Republic's Eastern policy began. Trade missions in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania were opened with the future objective of establishing consular and diplomatic relations. The establishment of these trade missions was strongly opposed by the GDR, with little real effect. Schroeder cautiously began to follow the critics of Bonn's past policies and accepted the idea of not applying the Hallstein Doctrine to Eastern Europe. The rationale for this action was that the Eastern European states were mere satellites of the Soviet Union and therefore could not take independent foreign policy initiatives on their own. These governments were required to maintain full diplomatic relations with the GDR and therefore should not automatically be denied recognition by the FRG. The establishment of diplomatic relations with Rumania was negotiated by Schroeder in 1966, but this was not finalized until the formation of the Grand Coalition.

The development of this new attitude toward the GDR and the rest of Eastern Europe was evidence of the extent to which events of the

¹Many of these ideas were discussed and championed by such West German newspapers and periodicals such as Die Zeit, Der Spiegel, Sudddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Rundschau, Der Monat and Frankfurter Hefte. Many of these articles, and articles by foreign observers are reprinted and examined in Theo Sommer, ed., Denken an Deutschland: Zum Problem der Wiedervereinigung, (Hamburg: Mohr, 1966).
past were being rejected.\textsuperscript{1} There were younger people ascending to positions of power and influence who were not affected by the incidents of the past and they strongly desired normalized relations between East and West. While extolling the past success of the Federal Republic in rebuilding a war-torn country into an economic and industrial giant, they also strongly criticized the failure of past policies in opening paths to the East.\textsuperscript{2}

In spite of the shift in attitude among non-government elites, the new ideas were slow in overcoming the older generation and the political, administrative, economic and psychological obstacles imposed by government bureaucracy. The actions on the part of Walter Ulbricht, and other leaders of the East German regime who refused to promote cultural exchanges and hardened official GDR policy toward the Federal Republic, did not facilitate policy changes in Bonn.\textsuperscript{3} Also there was no united Western policy on what the West Germans should do in restructuring their Eastern policy. De Gaulle insisted on radical West German initiatives toward the East, while the United States and Great Britain feared that premature action on the part of the Federal Republic would move them to unilateral actions. So the Americans and the British, while acknowledging the need for a more active West German policy, retreated to pronouncements that only a strong united Western policy could achieve detente with the East.\textsuperscript{4}

\textsuperscript{1}Dulles, op. cit., pp. 27-29.
\textsuperscript{2}ibid.
\textsuperscript{3}ibid.
\textsuperscript{4}Planck, op. cit., p. 57.
The Erhard Government attempted to keep Western diplomatic activities focused on the German problem. Erhard argued against assigning the reunification problem to the "glacial movements of history," and suggested that a series of multilateral summit meetings interrelated with political, economic and military issues would be the only way to arrive at a settlement of the German problem and European security.\footnote{loc. cit., p. 58.}

In its last major initiative, the peace note of March 1966, the Erhard government endorsed compromise formulae for nonaggression pacts, progress toward a nuclear free zone, and exchanges of military observers with Warsaw Pact nations. All of these were former East German proposals which until that time had been considered unacceptable by the Federal Republic.\footnote{Keesing's Research Report 8, op. cit., pp. 198-206.}

In significant areas the new proposals were the same as previous positions. The Federal Republic did not spell out in advance what major concessions or compromises they would make on military posture. The Federal Republic also refused to recognize the GDR and refused to abandon the legal principle that Germany's borders could only be altered by a final peace conference. They maintained these unrealistic positions on the ground that agreement to them prior to negotiations could be interpreted as currently applicable restrictions. However within this framework there was greater flexibility and promise for conciliation and compromise. There were indications that some measures could be worked out prior to political agreement.
The new policies of the Federal Republic were ambiguous, however, because its objectives were "only removed, not disassociated from" previous policies. Since the Federal Republic still maintained her former policies with regard to the GDR and the borders question, the motives behind the initiative were suspect in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. While the more active Eastern policy under Schroeder was not received well in Eastern Europe, it did have one success in that it announced West German entry into Eastern Europe on an official basis.

The very limited success of Schroeder's policies should not be cited as an early version of the Ostpolitik, but rather as a ground-breaking exercise that paved the way for the revolutionary policies initiated later by the Grand Coalition. The conservative elements in the CDU/CSU still prevented a radical alteration of Bonn's policies regarding the GDR and the borders question. Increasingly however, the Federal Republic had to alter its old policies and to speak and act for itself in the European area. The failure of the Erhard Government and the ruling party of the CDU/CSU to rise to the occasion contributed heavily to its fall in November 1966. It was quite clear that new ways would have to be sought that would overcome the inflexibility and give the Federal Republic freedom of action in international and intra-German affairs.

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1Kaiser, op. cit., p. 87.
Adenauer's Dilemma

During the Adenauer years the Federal Republic was faced with a great dilemma. There was almost unanimous desire on the part of the German people to pursue a policy of reconciliation and cooperation towards Eastern Europe. But on the other hand, the Federal Republic could not be expected to seek diplomatic relations with countries under conditions detrimental to the vital interests of the German people with regard to reunification and self-determination. Short-term interests had to be balanced against long-term requirements of a just and durable peace.¹

This interpretation of the German situation by Adenauer and the CDU/CSU forced the Federal Republic into the position of relying on the Western Allies for moral and physical support. The resultant hard line policies were in tune with the positions maintained by the Western allies during the extreme Cold War years of the 1950's. However, during the early 1960's, the positions of the United States, France, and Great Britain became less rigid and more flexible in dealings with the Soviet Union. The policies of the Federal Republic with their basis in legal and moral principles involving the reunification of the German people were not as easily altered. During the 1950's the Federal Republic was regarded as a bastion of democracy on the forefront

with the struggle against communism. In the 1960's the Federal Republic was regarded as an obstacle impeding progress toward detente. The West German reaction to the new world conditions would have a significant impact on the course of history.
CHAPTER II

THE EVOLUTION OF BONN'S OSTPOLITIK

On January 14, 1970, three months after becoming Chancellor, Willie Brandt stated that he hoped to change the Federal Republic's foreign policy toward Eastern Europe from one of "confrontation to cooperation" and that

Patriotism demands the realization of what is, and the attempt, time after time, to find out what is possible. It demands the courage to recognize reality. Truthfulness calls for the admission that, unfortunately, there can be no thought of an early fundamental change in the partition.1

That is how, in his first report on the State of the Nation, Chancellor Brandt characterized the situation that had arisen in Germany. Reunification, the avowed objective of West German policy, was not drawing any closer, but the rift between East and West Germans was growing deeper from year to year.

The foreign and inter-German policy of the Federal Republic, related as it was to the political situation of the 1950's and intimately associated with the international political environment of the time, had fallen out of line with the political developments in the world and was becoming more and more inconsistent with its objectives

and opportunities. In both parts of Germany, social, economic and political conditions were diverging more and more. The German states were becoming separate entities, and by the mid-1960's no one believed that early reunification was possible.

The international situation had undergone a fundamental change. Even in the 1950's it had become evident that the theoretical claims of the policy of strength confrontation were unrealistic. At the beginning of the 1960's both East and West began the attempt to advance from confrontation to limited cooperation.

The Federal Republic, for its part, refrained from taking realistic initiatives in its foreign and inter-German policy and became increasingly exposed to the dangers of being isolated in foreign politics. Europe, the United States and the Soviet Union were looking through talks for opportunities to reduce tensions, and Germany remained the center of the confrontation. There was no prospect for progress in the solution of the German problem. International support for the Federal Republic's reunification policy diminished.

Bonn's repetition of demands that could not be met made it easy for Communist propagandists to label the Federal Republic as revanchist and demanding, raising fears of German militarism in Eastern Europe. The status of the GDR became stabilized. The danger arose that the Federal Republic would be side-stepped in efforts to achieve detente. If the Federal Republic did not take an active part in these efforts, any achievement of detente by the other powers could be at the expense of the Federal Republic. The Federal Republic found itself
disadvantaged by adhering to legal formulae or doctrine and refusing to adapt its policies to specific requirements.

**Domestic Politics and the Grand Coalition**

The beginnings of the Ostpolitik coincided with the formation of the Grand Coalition government formed in December 1966 between the CDU/CSU and the SPD. The new government was formed because of many factors, both foreign and domestic, but basically it was the result of weariness and stagnation on the part of the ruling CDU/CSU. There was a need for an infusion of new blood and new ideas. There had been a growing sense of "immobilisme" concerning the Erhard government in the Federal Republic.

The crisis that culminated in Erhard's resignation was the result of both foreign and domestic considerations. The Bundestag partnership between the CDU/CSU and the FDP began to show signs of strain. The FDP leadership was disappointed over Erhard's lack of response to the changing international environment, and was also opposed to contemplated tax increases. During this period of flux in the Bonn government, the domestic political climate unfolded into a crisis of its own that was adroitly exploited by the new right-wing National Democratic Party (NDP).

The domestic political confusion in the Federal Republic was a direct result of the foreign political crisis. Since its beginning there had been no obvious, rational alternative for Bonn's foreign policy. The resulting domestic confusion of the 1960's was taken advantage of by the NPD. Only under circumstances of great distress
and governmental confusion could the NPD have been accepted as a possible alternative to the three Bundestag parties.¹

The apparent successes of the NPD in local and state elections in the Federal Republic raised fears within the FRG and throughout the world of the reappearance of a "neo-nazi" party able to gain support on a program of frenzied nationalism. However, it would be incorrect in 1966—or even today—to over exaggerate the importance of the NPD or the growth of national sentiment within the Federal Republic. The appeal of the NPD was not and has never been of sufficient strength to gain the five percent of the vote necessary for Bundestag representation. Since its zenith in 1969 when it garnered 4.3 percent of the vote in the national elections, the NPD has steadily lost ground and has become convulsed with internal squabbles to the point where it no longer is a viable threat. In 1966 it was understood in Bonn that further growth of the NPD depended on the reaction and policies of the leading political parties, as well as to the conditions that had favored its sudden growth.²

By November 1966 both the government party and the opposition party saw the need for a complete reappraisal of the Federal Republic's foreign policy. They had to find a practical alternative to the outdated policies of the past that would not only improve their

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²Ibid.
international credibility, but also inhibit the attractiveness of the NPD. This would require a reexamination of the basic tenets of Bonn's foreign policy since the end of World War II. There would have to be an acceptance of the mood for detente and the appropriate formulation of a new policy toward Eastern Europe and particularly the GDR.

There were other domestic considerations that went into the rationale for the Grand Coalition. West Germany had enjoyed unprecedented prosperity for seventeen years, but the summer of 1966 saw for the first time a serious economic recession. In 1965, there had been some indications of a downturn in the economy after Erhard trimmed the budget and warned of future economic sacrifices. In 1966 there was a decline in production; and an unprecedented rise in unemployment. Also there was strong competition between the government and private industry for scarce capital. The fact was that the government did not have the financial resources needed to meet the commitments of the largest federal budget in the history of the republic.

A financial plan was introduced before the Bundestag that required new taxes and even some changes in the Basic Law which required a two-thirds majority in the Bundestag. This situation created a domestic crisis in the Bonn government because the nation was opposed to any new taxes. The FDP, while liberal in foreign affairs was conservative on domestic matters, and firmly opposed to new taxes. On October 27 the FDP withdrew its members from the coalition government

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1 Dill, op. cit., pp. 468-470.
2 Ibid.
with the CDU/CSU, and the FRG had a minority government for the first time. The CDU/CSU had to form a majority government with either the FDP or the SPD, because a call for new elections would result in further erosion of the majority party due to increased public support for the SPD and a corresponding decrease in support for the CDU/CSU.¹ To facilitate the chances for the forming of a new majority government Erhard resigned on November 2, 1966.

The next few weeks were spent in negotiations between the parties and within the parties on how to arrange the new coalition. On December 1, 1966 the new Grand Coalition was announced. The new Chancellor was the former CSU Minister-President of Baden-Wuerttemberg, Kurt Georg Kiesinger, and the Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister was SPD party leader, Willie Brandt.

Brandt characterized the Grand Coalition as "... neither a marriage of love nor a shotgun marriage, but a question of practical politics."² The Grand Coalition was a necessity in order to establish the radically new policies that were needed in both domestic and foreign affairs. With general agreement between the CDU/CSU and the SPD on the necessary courses of action and with a minimum of official opposition from the small FDP, past policies were beginning to change within the Federal Republic. Within a few weeks new taxes were introduced and a new foreign policy was launched. Both with a minimum of internal upheaval and opposition. The lack of a viable opposition to

¹Ibid.

²Cited by Dill, ibid.
the Grand Coalition, except from the weakened FDP, probably allowed the NDP to gain votes in state elections until 1969, but the growing domestic confidence inspired by the new coalition spelled future defeat for the NDP and the eventual success for the new policies.

The Launching of the Ostpolitik

During the discussions concerning the formation of the Grand Coalition the SPD demanded:

The Federal Government must actively interpose for the normalization of our relations with the neighboring peoples in the East and for reconciliation with them. It must become quite clear about our own room for action with regard to the wielders of power in East Berlin; it must utilize this room for action to the limit.¹

The Government Declaration of the Grand Coalition of December 13, 1966, pointed out new departures for the inter-German policy. Chancellor Kiesinger outlined its principal features:

So far as it lies in our power, we want to prevent the two parts of our nation from drifting apart during the separation... we want less constriction, not more; we want to overcome rifts, not make them deeper. We want, therefore, with all the power at our command, to improve the human, economic and intellectual relations with our fellow countrymen in the other part of Germany.²

In this statement Kiesinger promised to promote detente, and as


a goodwill gesture the terms referring to the GDR as "Middle Germany" or the "Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany" were officially dropped. He called for increased talks and contacts in the areas of economies, cultural exchanges and technical fields. A desire for reconciliation with Poland was expressed. Kiesinger also denounced the Munich Agreements of 1938, but stressed Bonn's responsibilities in protecting the interests of Sudeten Germans.

In this policy statement Kiesinger unequivocally refused to recognize the GDR. However, Kiesinger did make fifteen proposals designed to promote contact between the two Germanys. These were designed to promote greater freedom of travel, broaden trade and credit facilities, joint economic projects and cultural and educational exchanges. Kiesinger also made an important step toward de facto recognition of the East German state by formally recommending that both sides appoint commissioners to discuss ways of easing the lives of all Germans. In a further step toward de facto recognition, the Federal Republic offered to include the GDR in its proposed accords with other European nations for the renunciation of the use of force as a means to further national policy. Brandt stated that "For the German Government, the desire for peace and reconciliation of nations is the first pledge and the basic aim of its foreign policy."

The first steps on the way to a new policy toward the GDR included the exchange of letters between Kiesinger and the Chairman

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1Policy for Germany, op. cit., p. 7.
of the GDR's Council of Ministers, Willie Stoph, in April 1967. At the same time the SPD transmitted messages to the SED Party Congress outlining specific proposals for expanding inter-German relations.\(^1\) During the spring and summer Kiesinger and Stoph exchanged a series of notes which further established Bonn's de facto acceptance of the East German state. Indeed, Kiesinger offered to negotiate on German problems directly with Stoph, in his State of the Nation speech on March 11, 1968, if sufficient progress could be made in preliminary discussions.\(^2\)

During this period the official East German news agency criticized the Bonn proposals on the ground that they contained no indication that the Federal Republic had abandoned its claim to be the sole representative of the German people or of its "intention to annex the GDR." However, Ulbricht did maintain that the West German proposals proved that the two Germanys would have to negotiate—sooner or later—as equal partners on areas of mutual concern. Ulbricht also proposed that Kiesinger and Stoph should meet to discuss steps and to conclude agreements.\(^3\)

The importance of the new West German policy was that it abandoned the concept of "maintained tensions" and the policy of strength, without requiring a quid pro quo from the East Germans. The belief


\(^3\)Keesing's Research Report 8, op. cit., p. 212.
was that each West German move toward normalization would have to be matched by the East European states or they would be forced into the embarrassing position of pursuing alone the policy of "maintained tensions." In this light the normalization of relations with Eastern European states would be a short range objective prior to a final solution of the German question.¹

The new initiatives toward Eastern Europe were promptly and widely denounced by the communist governments of the GDR and Poland. It was feared that no significant concessions were being made and that any normalization would be on the Federal Republic's terms. They maintained that the SPD's presence in the Grand Coalition would not make that much influence on policies because of the inherent conservative nature of the government bureaucracy. These governments also determined that the new policies were designed to weaken the Warsaw Pact and to encourage West German economic inroads into traditional prewar German markets to the east.²

There were three main features of the Grand Coalition's new initiatives toward Eastern Europe. First, an absolute willingness to approach Eastern Europe in a conciliatory spirit in hopes of normalizing relations. Second, a clear determination that these new approaches would be pursued only within the framework of the Western alliance's

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²ibid.
search for detente. And third, the new foreign policy was directed at the East European nations, not toward the Soviet Union.

After the formation of the Grand Coalition the Ostpolitik began to evolve into a "systematic, ambitious and positive policy."\(^1\) However, its short term priorities and objectives were unstructured. Instead of the negative policies of the Adenauer era, the Ostpolitik paralleled the "bridge-building" policies of President Lyndon Johnson. The new policies were not designed as a threat to Soviet interests in Eastern Europe, but to exploit Soviet weaknesses in the area. The ultimate goal was to create conditions that would further German reunification by an avoidance of violence and threats to the existing borders of Central Europe.\(^2\)

The Federal Republic sought to establish direct political and economic contacts with Eastern Europe. It was felt by the Bonn leadership that West German influence would spread in the east and gradually undermine Soviet influence as East European countries gradually looked toward the more attractive West German economy. It was considered that this process would tend to isolate the GDR with the implicit cooperation of the Eastern European states. With the improved relations between the FRG and Eastern Europe, the GDR would be outflanked; and if the German division could not be overcome in the near future, the GDR would at least be forced to abandon its absolute absolute detachment from the Federal Republic. It was believed in the

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\(^2\)loc. cit., p. 211.
Federal Republic that only overt military force by the Soviet Union could deter this peaceful non-violent challenge by the West Germans.¹

The new policy met with considerable interest in Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. These countries displayed some independence from Soviet authority and the authors of the Ostpolitik were able to take advantage of complicated circumstances in Eastern Europe. Barely one month after Kiesinger's initial policy statements negotiations between the Federal Republic and Rumania (initiated during the Erhard administration) culminated in the establishment of full diplomatic relations. In January 1968 full diplomatic relations were established with Yugoslavia and were seriously contemplated by Hungary, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia.

This situation apparently surprised the Soviet leaders and precipitated a major crisis throughout Eastern Europe. On the one side the leaders of Poland and the GDR viewed the West German initiatives as very dangerous and liable to undermine their precarious positions. The Soviet Union was caught in the middle because a firm public stand supporting either side would risk further alienation of the other side and further aggravate the growing rifts in Eastern Europe. The leaders of Poland and East Germany were very much in opposition to the Bonn diplomatic offensives because of their particular circumstances vis-à-vis German territorial claims. On the other side the leaders of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia were genuinely looking

¹ibid.
for a relaxation of tensions and the economic benefits that would result with closer cooeration with the Federal Republic.

During 1967 and 1968 Soviet leaders partially neglected the German problem through preoccupation with events in the Middle East and Czechoslovakia. The Prague crisis was clearly the most serious challenge. In Czechoslovakia the communist ruling elite did not break with communism, but rather brought into serious question the Soviet model for social and economic progress, and the structure of the Warsaw Pact. The Czechoslovaks did not question communism, only the Soviet interpretation of it. If the Czechoslovakian experiment was to continue, the whole structure of the carefully erected and maintained system of security and economic integration of the Soviet Union would come into serious question. The persistence of West German initiatives toward Eastern Europe could only aggravate this condition.

Soviet leaders were forced into defensive action and so sided with Polish and East German opposition to the Ostpolitik on the grounds that Grand Coalition leaders had not renounced its previous policies with regard to the border question and the recognition of the GDR. It became clear that Soviet leaders saw direct relations between the Federal Republic and Eastern Europe as a serious threat not only to Soviet security, but also as a stimulus to ideas for more independence from the Soviet Union by other East European regimes.\(^1\) From 1966 to 1968 there was within Soviet policy "successive inertia, vacillation,

\(^1\)loc. cit., p. 245
warnings, threats, compromise and finally military occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.\textsuperscript{1} As the Warsaw Pact nations cited the activities in Eastern Europe of the Federal Republic as one of the reasons for "protecting" Czechoslovakia, this event for all intents and purposes announced the end of Ostpolitik for the Grand Coalition. The occupation of Czechoslovakia nullified the initial success of the Ostpolitik and the announcement of the Brezhnev Doctrine insured that it could not be resumed in its existing form.

The Soviet theoretical justification for the invasion of Czechoslovakia, known as the Brezhnev Doctrine, was first formulated by S. Kovaler.\textsuperscript{2} It put forth a concept of limited sovereignty among the socialist states of Eastern Europe. Sovereignty within the socialist community could not be understood in the abstract. International law within the Eastern bloc had to be subordinate to the class struggle. In other words, Soviet leaders reserved the right to intervene militarily or otherwise if developments in any socialist country threatened either socialism in that country or the basic interests of other socialist countries. Emphasis was on consolidation in a world situation which threatened the survival of socialism, and it implied the recognition of the reimposition of Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia left the situation very clear. Moscow would decide when a danger existed, and prior consultation within the

\begin{itemize}
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Warsaw Pact would be limited to those members that agreed with Soviet leaders. However, the Czechoslovakian invasion and the announcement of the Brezhnev Doctrine were also an admittance of failure on the part of Soviet leaders. The "allied socialist" invasion of Czechoslovakia had destroyed once and for all the fading myth of monolithic international Communist unity, even in Eastern Europe.¹

The Ostpolitik of the Grand Coalition from 1966 to 1969 actually accomplished very little because it was based on a position of strength vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and was directed at the Soviet Union's allied within the Warsaw Pact. Despite all the goodwill on the German side, it was doomed to failure without active support from the Soviet Union. The attempt to exploit Soviet weaknesses in Eastern Europe was doomed to failure because of Soviet elites' perceptions of their security requirements. West German leaders could not outmaneuver the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe without a Soviet reaction including the forceful exercise of power.

The rationale used by the governments of the Soviet Union, Poland and East Germany rejecting the new Bonn proposals was based upon the "Bucharest Declaration on Strengthening Peace and Security" of July 5, 1966, which stated that prior to any peaceful settlement of Central European problems:

> The interest of peace and security in Europe and in the whole world, like the interests of the German people, demand that the ruling circles of the

¹Kevin Devlin, "The New Crisis in European Communism," Problems of Communism, XVIII, (6), November-December 1968, p. 57
Federal Republic of Germany take into account the actually existing situation in Europe. And this means that they must proceed from the fact of the existence of two German states, renounce their claim for the redrawing of the map of Europe, their claim to the exclusive right to represent the whole of Germany and the attempts to exert pressure on states that recognize the German Democratic Republic, renounce the criminal Munich diktat and recognize that it has been invalid from the very beginning. They must prove in deeds that they are really taking the lessons of history to heart, are putting an end to militarism and revanchism and will pursue a policy of normalizing relations between states and developing cooperation and friendship among peoples.

Within the Grand Coalition it was the CDU/CSU that prohibited formal rejection of these policies, while in fact these policies were being largely ignored. The only real change in the Federal Republic's announced foreign policy was a significant modification of the Hallstein Doctrine. Bonn still maintained the right to speak for all German people, but it had dropped its right of sole representation of all German people. For humanitarian as well as practical reasons the Bonn government had also accepted de facto recognition of the GDR to prevent further deepening of the "nations" division, even though the German "state" would remain divided. Even with the lack of real success the Ostpolitik was greeted with enthusiasm in the Western alliance. There was a near unanimous expression of deep satisfaction

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and optimism that could not be extinguished even with the events in Czechoslovakia.

Ostpolitik and the Federal Election of 1969

In its initial phase of control over the Federal Republic, the new coalition government between the SPD and the FDP which came to power in 1969 made three major decisions: first, it revalued the West German Mark; second, it revoked certain aspects of the Hallstein Doctrine; and third, it decided to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. The new government was thus vigorously pursuing a course toward general detente. In doing so, it has even eliminated from its list of goals the question of reunification, which had been sacrosanct in West German politics since 1949. Although the evolution of West German foreign and inter-German policy had been discernible since 1966, the elimination of the CDU/CSU from the government allowed for greater speed of change. The new coalition government with its small majority in the Bundestag had to develop initiatives that would not identify them with the past policies of the CDU/CSU but would consider the limits to action and change imposed by "the will of the electorate."

During the election campaign of 1969 the principal issues were not of foreign policy, but rather issues of domestic policy. In the Federal Republic there had been a growing interest in domestic and

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welfare policies rather than foreign policy. In 1961 more than half of the population regarded reunification as the number one goal of West German politics. By 1969 educational policy stood at the top, followed by other social welfare questions. The problem of reunification had dropped to number eight on the list of priorities. Almost three-fourths of the campaign issues dealt with questions of economics and welfare.

The reasons for the shift from international to domestic interests on the part of the West Germans is directly linked to the great success of the Federal Republic in establishing all industrial society. The dramatic improvement of the standard of living of the West German people made that new condition the principal issue of their lives. Each new step in economic improvement resulting in greater expectation. The more a person has in the way of security and material benefits the more he has to lose, and the more he wants to preserve and/or improve on what he has. With the tremendous prosperity enjoyed by West Germans in 1969, it is not at all surprising that the list of priorities among people of all West German political parties showed the following rank of issues: (1) economic stability; (2) maintenance of law and order; (3) maintenance and improvement of living standards; (4) arrangement with Eastern Europe; and (5) maintenance of peace.

2Czempiel, op. cit.
As the focus of this thesis is on the foreign and inter-German policies of the Federal Republic, it is important to consider the positions maintained by the three major parties in the area of foreign affairs, even though these positions were not considered as most important by the West German electorate. In the area of foreign policy, all three parties gave priority to the following questions: relations with the GDR involving reunification and recognition; relations with Poland involving the Oder-Neisse border; and relations with the Soviet Union involving European security. Taken as a whole this complex set of relationships with Eastern Europe provided the election campaign the main issues involving foreign policy.

The position of the SPD was defined as cooperation and coordination of policy with the West in finding arrangements with the East. The SPD further proposed strengthening of NATO, the reduction of the number of foreign troops stationed in Europe, renunciation of nuclear weapons and improvement of relations with Eastern Europe. The SPD dropped reunification as a goal and instead offered to negotiate comprehensive agreements with the GDR in order to normalize relations and improve economic and personal contacts.

For the CDU/CSU, maintenance of peace meant the continuation of its traditional policies on self-determination for all German peoples to overcome the division of Germany. The only new aspect was the


willingness to establish contacts with responsible leaders in the other part of Germany and to reduce tensions. As before, priority was given to integration into the West, the alliance with the United States, and cooperation with NATO. No mention was made of detente and the military rather than the political aspects of security were stressed. The party platform only made a brief mention of a European peace settlement. The form of the settlement was not explained but it stated that it would have to take into consideration the claims and considerations of the refugees and expellees whose interests the CDU/CSU claimed to represent.

The platform of the FDP went beyond both the SPD and the CDU/CSU.\(^1\) It proposed to get rid of "political ballast." It renounced the West German claim of sole representation of the German people. The FDP proposed a state treaty with East Germany. Security for West Berlin would be guaranteed by treaty between the two German states and would not rely solely on the guarantees of the four allied powers. The program of the FDP could be regarded as a natural extension of the policies of the Grand Coalition, but in reality it pointed in a different direction. Instead of following the principle of detente within the framework of Western efforts it suggested that the Federal Republic be released "from any one-sided dependence of her alliance partners." The platform suggested that the division of Germany was the result of Soviet and American troop presence on German soil.\(^2\)


\(^2\)ibid.
How did the voters react to these programs? All three parties followed the concept of detente, but they all differed in degree. These differences in party attitudes were put before the electorate that regarded detente as the most important goal of West German foreign policy. This attitude, referred to a policy of dentente in a very general sense. In regard to the Oder-Neisse line, the voters were willing to accept a substantive change of policy. Since 1967 a plurality of West Germans had favored an acceptance of the Oder-Neisse border.

Answers to the Question:
Should We Accept the Oder-Neisse Line?

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Source: Polls of the Institute fuer Demoskopie, op. cit.

With regard to East Germany, the majority of West Germans advocated closer relations and cooperation with the GDR, but not to the point of official recognition or acceptance of the legitimacy of the East Berlin regime. West Germans did not approve of substantial concessions to the GDR. By 1969 few West Germans believed that the Hallstein doctrine should be followed.

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1 Czempel, citing polls of the Institut fuer Socialwissenshaften, op. cit.
2 "Polls of the Institut fuer Demoskopie," op. cit.
3 ibid.
4 ibid.
As has been stated, foreign policy played a minor role in the election campaign of 1969. Of all the foreign policy issues, detente was the most important, and it was advocated by the three major parties in varying degree. The CDU/CSU tied the problem of detente to the solution of the whole German question and came the closest to the nationalistic viewpoint of the NPD. The FDP favored detente as a prerequisite for national freedom of action. The SPD's position on detente did not, with the exception of the Oder-Neisse question, go beyond generalities.

The results of the election showed again that the CDU/CSU was the leading party in the Bundestag. The CDU/CSU lost 1.5 percent from the 1965 election, but still garnered 46.1 percent of the total. As with every election since 1953 the SPD was able to increase its share of the vote total. In 1965 it had 39.3 percent, and in 1969 it had 42.7 percent. The FDP suffered a significant loss of votes that almost cost it its Bundestag representation. The FDP went from 9.5 percent in 1965 to 5.8 percent in 1969.¹

As has been pointed out, domestic issues were the primary focus of the 1969 campaign. But in the area of foreign policy the SPD seemed to reflect most accurately the attitudes of the West German electorate. The SPD program combined an acceptance of the status-quo on the basis of an unequivocal and continued adherence to the Western alliance with an attempt to improve and intensify relations with the GDR, the Soviet

¹Heidenheimer, op. cit., p. 141.
Union and the rest of Eastern Europe. The similarities in the positions maintained by the SPD and the FDP allowed them to form a coalition government with a slight majority over the CDU/CSU.

The Brandt Government and New Departures

The trouble with the Ostpolitik of the Grand Coalition was not that it altered the European situation, but that it failed to do so. In October 1969 when the SPD and FDP formed the new coalition (a twelve vote majority in the Bundestag that later was reduced to six) the restrictions on foreign policy imposed by the CDU/CSU were by and large no longer in effect. Willie Brandt became Chancellor and Walter Scheel, leader of the FDP became Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister. Brandt's new Ostpolitik was now directed at the Soviet Union, not the Eastern European allies, and recognized an awareness that Soviet leaders would not tolerate any change in the political, territorial or military status quo in Central Europe. The invocation of the Brezhnev Doctrine required that the Federal Republic revise the Ostpolitik in accord with Soviet demands.

It is important to note that the new Ostpolitik was more the result of domestic political considerations than it was the result of an evaluation of Soviet policy or the situation in Eastern Europe.

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1SPD Platform, op. cit.

Only an acute international crisis could have prevented the new overtures toward the Soviet Union. The new coalition government in the Federal Republic marked the first time in the history of West Germany that the CDU/CSU was not a part of the government. The historic opposition party—the SPD—had been identified as the junior partner in the Grand Coalition. If the new coalition was to make a name for itself that would differentiate it from past government policies, stabilize its position in regard to public opinion, and also to create conditions for future electoral success, it had to make those advancements in the area of foreign policy. Foreign policy was the one area where the coalition partners most closely agreed, and also where public opinion most favored their position over the position of the CDU/CSU. Thus the area of foreign and inter-German affairs promised to be the most productive area for gaining public support for the slender Bundestag majority.

In general, the Warsaw Pact countries have made eight demands upon the Federal Republic as preconditions for normalizing relations: (1) legal recognition of the GDR; (2) abandonment of the Hallstein Doctrine and the concept of sole representation of Germany; (3) acceptance of the present Central European borders, especially the Oder-Neisse line; (4) abandonment of all claims to possession of nuclear weapons; (5) support of general disarmament proposals; (6) renunciation

of the 1938 Munich Agreement as null and void (ex tunc); (7) recognition of the existence of West Berlin as an independent political entity; and (8) proscription of the "neo-Nazi" NPD. ¹

During the first weeks of the Brandt government new initiatives were launched to probe the realities of these demands and to determine if the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe had altered their stand sufficiently to allow for mutual accommodation. In its first statement of basic principles on October 28, 1969, the new government offered the East German Council of Ministers "fresh discussions on both sides without discrimination at government level which should lead to cooperation contractually agreed."² The past inter-German policies of the Federal Republic were declared a failure. And, parallel with efforts toward a consolidation of the Western alliance, the Brandt-Scheel Government initiated practical steps for detente in the first months of its existence, by:

- Signing the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons—
- Starting talks with the Soviet Union and Poland—
- Initiating discussions with authorities of the GDR leading to talks at the head of government level between the two German states for the first time since each came into existence twenty years before—
- Clarification of the situation of a divided Germany for the rest of the world—


²Policy for Germany, op. cit., p. 9.
Elimination of the Hallstein Doctrine—

Ending of the progressive self-isolation of the Federal Government in the course of efforts by East and West to find new ways for detente.¹

In his initial speech before the Bundestag on October 28, Brandt acknowledged the existence of two German states, but he insisted that the Federal Republic could never accept the GDR as a foreign nation. He proposed that the two German states existed within one German nation and that a special relationship should be formulated to accommodate these unusual circumstances. Brandt also offered to negotiate non-aggression pacts or renunciation-of-force treaties with Eastern European states, including East Germany. These pacts, Brandt stated, would "acknowledge the territorial integrity of the respective partners."²

The new government made other positive moves. Following the renewed East European call for a European Security Conference (ESC) issued by the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers meeting on 30 and 31 October, Bonn gave the strongest endorsement of any Western nation, even though the GDR would participate as an equal and sovereign state. On December 7, 1969, Brandt qualified his previous endorsement of an ESC stressing that the FRG could only attend after there was improvement in relations between the two Germanys. Brandt emphasized that

¹Ibid.
Ultricht and the East Berlin regime were reluctant to negotiate with Bonn.¹

In another major change, the new government renounced the Hallstein Doctrine, and announced that it would no longer oppose recognition of the GDR by third states provided East German leaders made some move toward inter-German cooperation. Yet, as an interim measure during the time when both Germanys were resolving their mutual interests, Bonn would regard premature action by third states as interference and act accordingly (The Federal Republic has not taken any action against the several states that have recognized the GDR).

By November 1969, Brandt had taken several important steps demonstrating the sincerity of the Federal Republic's desire to find accommodation with Eastern Europe. After the Federal Republic signed the Nuclear nonproliferation treaty on November 28, 1969, Soviet leaders indicated their willingness to enter into negotiations with West Germans on a mutual renunciation of force treaty. The first meeting was held on December 7, 1969, and this marked the first time since Adenauer's visit to the Soviet Union in 1955 that West German and Soviet officials were negotiating on the German problem.

Both sides placed a high value on the favorable outcome of the discussions. The West Germans considered a Soviet signature on the treaty would result in a forfeiture of Soviet claims to intervene in West Germany under the "enemy-state" clause of the United Nations

 Charter. Bonn also believed that the treaty would permit the Soviet Union to remove some of her forces from Eastern Europe. Soviet officials considered that the treaty would be a de facto recognition by the Federal Republic of existing borders and of the status quo in Europe.

With the Kremlin's change of attitude toward Bonn's Ostpolitik, the Brandt Government made rapid strides in negotiating with the rest of Eastern Europe. From 1970 to 1973, several important treaties were negotiated between the Federal Republic and Eastern European countries. A cursory examination of the treaties is important in describing the contemporary political conditions of Eastern Europe.

1 Article 53 of the United Nations Charter frees "enforcement action . . . against any enemy state (of World War II) . . . directed against any renewal of aggressive action by that state" from the need of authorization by the Security Council, where the Western nations could veto it. Article 107 of the Charter states that "Nothing in the present charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the governments having responsibility for such action." This same provision was incorporated into the Potsdam Agreement of 1945. In the past, Moscow has brought up these points on occasions of stress between East and West involving West Germany or Berlin. According to Peter H. Merkl in German Foreign Policies, West and East, (Santa Barbara, California: Clio Press, 1974), p. 127, this right of intervention could presumably be construed to refer to the NPD or any other neo-fascist party in West Germany, West Berlin or the Bonn Government itself. In addition, according to Merkl, Soviet leaders have indicated that they would retain this right even after finalization of a renunciation of force treaty.
Achievements of the Ostpolitik

The first real success of the Ostpolitik was the signing of the Treaty of August 12, 1970, with the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{1} This was quickly followed on December 7, 1970 with a treaty with Poland.\textsuperscript{2} These two treaties eliminated territorial claims between the contracting parties, recognized the Oder-Neisse line as the western border of Poland, and also recognized the border between the FRG and the GDR. In separate letters to the governments of France, Great Britain and the United States, the Brandt government advised the allies that the treaty in no way affected the rights of the Four Powers in Germany which derive from the outcome of World War II, the London Agreements of November 14, 1944, and the Quadripartite Declaration of June 5, 1945.\textsuperscript{3} In a separate note, the Polish government agreed to allow ethnic Germans living in Poland the right to emigrate to either German state if they desired to do so.\textsuperscript{4}

The subject of Berlin was taken up again by American and Soviet negotiators in mid-1969. Willy Brandt later indicated that ratification

\textsuperscript{1}The Treaty of August 12, 1970, (Bonn: published by The Press and Information Office of the Federal Republic, 1970) pp. 7-9. For significant portions of the treaty see Appendix B.

\textsuperscript{2}Der Vertrag Zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Volksrepublik Polen, (Bonn: Published by the Press and Information Office of the Federal Republic, 1970) pp. 7-9.

\textsuperscript{3}The Treaty of August 12, 1970, op. cit., pp. 11-13. For significant portions see Appendix B.

\textsuperscript{4}Der Vertrag Zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Volksrepublik Polen, op. cit., pp. 13-15.
of the Moscow Treaty was dependent upon a "satisfactory" solution of the Berlin problem which acknowledged the close ties between the FRG and West Berlin.\(^1\) The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin of September 3, 1971 between France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States was of paramount interest to both Germanys.\(^2\) This four-power agreement attempted to regularize the condition of West Berlin. The special relationship existing between West Berlin and the Federal Republic was acknowledged, but it was specified that the western portion of the city would not be a part of the Federal Republic nor governed by it. While travel and communications between West Berlin and East Germany were to be improved through agreements between the two German states, the right of transit through the GDR to and from West Berlin to West Germany was to be guaranteed by the Soviet Union. The agreement reaffirmed the reserve rights of the four powers concerning Berlin and pledged that none would attempt to change the status quo unilaterally or by threat of force. In addition, the Federal Republic would represent West Berlin on the international scene and the Soviet Union would establish consular activities in West Berlin.

The treaty between the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic of April 26, 1972 was of significant importance. In it, both parties agreed to the sovereignty, independence, autonomy and territorial

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\(^1\)The State of the Nation - 1971, (Bonn: Published by the Press and Information Office of the Federal Republic, 1971) p. 15.

\(^2\)The Berlin Settlement, (Bonn: Published by the Press and Information Office of the Federal Republic, 1972), pp. 7-24. For significant portions of the settlement, see Appendix C.
integrity, the right of self-determination, the protection of human
rights, and non-discrimination in relations between the two German
states. Both German states reaffirmed the inviolability of the exist-
ing border between them, and agreed that neither state could represent
the other in the international sphere. In addition, it was agreed
upon to exchange permanent missions, both would apply for membership
in the United Nations, and form a commission to discuss later arrange-
ments between the two states.¹

Following these successes, the Federal Republic initiated a
treaty with Czechoslovakia normalizing relations between the two
states on June 20, 1973.² Also in a joint declaration of June 29,
1973, the Federal Republic and Rumania agreed to seven treaties
designed to improve and intensify relations between the two countries.³
In the agreement with Czechoslovakia, reference to the 1938 Munich
Agreements ceding the Sudetenland to Germany was regarded by both
parties as "void with regards to mutual relations under the present
treaty." This treaty with Czechoslovakia paved the way for similar
treaties with Hungary and Bulgaria, which would complete Bonn's policy
of reconciliation with Eastern Europe. The key element in the treaties

¹Treaty on the Basis of Relations Between the Federal Republic of
Germany and the German Democratic Republic, (Bonn: Published by the
For significant portions of the treaty see Appendix D.

²"Bonn, Prague Initial Historic Treaty 'Directed to Future'," The

³"Federal Republic, Rumania Agree on Package of Seven New Treaties,"
is the recognition of the territorial status-quo by all partners. The Federal Republic and the three Western powers recognize the existence of the GDR and Bonn agreed that both German states would enter the United Nations. The Federal Republic has recognized the Oder-Niesz line as the German-Polish border. On the other side, Eastern Europe has recognized the special relationship that has developed between the Federal Republic and West Berlin, and the Soviet Union has assumed responsibility for maintenance of free access between West Germany and West Berlin. Neither side has really given up anything. Both sides have only recognized and legalized realities as they exist.

All the rest is "ornamental or semantic."\(^1\) The Brandt government has formally announced that it will continue to follow its policy of peaceful attempts for German reunification based on self-determination of all German people, but in reality that goal has been discarded for the foreseeable future. When the treaties were signed the Federal Republic made it clear that the agreements had no effect on the rights and responsibilities of the four victorious powers in Germany. With regard to the Potsdam Agreements on a final solution of the German-Polish border, this was a matter to be negotiated in a final peace treaty with an all-German government. This position created little concern in either Poland or the Soviet Union as it reaffirmed the legal responsibilities of the Soviet Union in the ultimate German solution, which of course implies the Soviet right of veto. The four-

\(^1\)Wolfgang Wagner, op. cit., p. 25.
power agreement on Berlin is indeed a masterpiece of diplomatic jargon. There is nothing in the agreement which states what the agreement covers—all of Berlin or only the western sector—it speaks only of "the relevant area." This language is so vague that each side can interpret it as it wishes. The GDR proclaimed that the agreement recognized that East Berlin was a part of the GDR, something that the agreement does not state, but aspects of this idea are in the agreement. Since 1955, the Soviet Union has given East Germany responsibility for the access routes to West Berlin. In the new agreement a few aspects of the GDR responsibility were removed, but the language was quite inventive in concealing it.¹

With the several treaties and the Berlin Accord, barriers have been overcome that only a few years ago seemed insurmountable. It took almost a complete reversal of former policies by the Federal Republic to provide the impetus for the negotiations. Even the ultimate German goal of reunification was put on the shelf for an indeterminate period of time. Again, however, it must be emphasized that the Ostpolitik would have come to nothing without an active participation on the part of the Soviet Union. What the agreements do is nothing more than recognize the present conditions in Europe. However, some West German critics have stated that the Federal Republic gave up real concessions in the way of legally justifiable positions in return for vague promises about further cooperation, increased trade,

scientific and cultural contacts, as well as an easing of travel restrictions between east and west. ¹ On the surface, the agreements seem to indicate that the Soviet Union got almost all it was asking for. In return for its recognition of the realities of the relationship between the Federal Republic and West Berlin, the Soviet Union gave vague promises for future negotiations on other broad areas. A closer look into the Eastern European situation reveals that this might not be the case in the long run.

Due to the competitive parliamentary system in the FRG, the desire of the CDU/CSU leadership to get back into the government may have forced them into a harder line against Ostpolitik than they might have done otherwise. From the CDU/CSU leadership there are important links to the large and influential Springer newspapers, Die Welt and Bildzeitung which reflected the CDU/CSU hard line against Ostpolitik. However, while opposition to Ostpolitik was much in evidence, public opinion polls showed 79 percent of West Germany's citizens favored the overtures toward the East.²

The domestic implications of the Ostpolitik were very significant. The slender majority of the SPD-FDP coalition was under incessant attack by the CDU/CSU opposition. The radical departure from traditional policies caused some defections from the already slim majority. In a communique issued by the CDU presidium on August 26, 1970,³

¹Merkel, op. cit., pp. 208, 209.
²Polls cited by Merkel, ibid.
the opposition listed their reasons for opposing the treaty with the Soviet Union as follows:

(a) The Germans' right to self-determination was endangered; (b) the determination of frontiers must be reserved for a peace treaty; (c) concrete improvements in inter-German relations—in particular greater freedom of movement for people and ideas—had not as yet been guaranteed; (d) the question of the security of West Berlin and its future remained unclarified and (e) the Government's policy, which was at the basis of the treaty, was threatening the foundations of Western integration and the policy of the Western alliance.

During the spring of 1972 it was uncertain whether the government would obtain the necessary 249 votes in the Bundestag for approval of the treaties' ratification. After the initialing of the treaty with the FRG, the Soviet Union took a number of steps which were generally interpreted as concessions made in the interest of assisting the ratification of the treaties in the Federal Republic.\footnote{"Statement on Questions of the Strengthening of Security and the Development of Peaceful Cooperation in Europe," adopted by the Berlin Conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Member States, December 2, 1970, cited by the Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XXII, (49), January 5, 1971, pp. 2, 3.} Nevertheless, the Soviet clarifications did not fundamentally change the CDU/CSU Opposition's attitude.

The CDU/CSU Opposition, following a decision by the presidium and executive of the CDU, decided on April 24, 1972, to enter a "constructive vote of no confidence" which simultaneously proposed Rainer Barzel as Chancellor. This was the first time in West German history that this move had been attempted. The primary reason for this move
was the Ostpolitik, with finances being a secondary reason. The "constructive vote of no confidence" took place on April 27, and fell short by only two votes of the absolute majority of the necessary 244 votes.

Brandt immediately sought a new understanding with the CDU/CSU leadership regarding ratification of the treaties. But the crisis grew when a Bundestag vote on the budget ended in a 247-247 tie. There were indications that two FDP deputies wanted to abandon the coalition on the treaty issue and also that some CDU deputies wanted to vote for the treaties but were prohibited from doing so by party discipline. A new poll for the Institut fur Demoskopie revealed a clear majority of West German citizens favored speedy ratification of the treaties.¹ The polls also revealed that if an election were to be held at that time, the SPD would receive 49 percent of the vote, the CDU/CSU 45 percent and the FDP only 5 percent.

The message was clear to the CDU/CSU leadership. Either support Ostpolitik or threaten Brandt's slender majority in the Bundestag which would result in new elections that would leave the opposition in an even weaker position. However, there were some CDU/CSU deputies that were firmly opposed to the treaties regardless of the political impact on the parties. To defuse the crisis within the CDU/CSU, the parties' Executive Committees decided to waive party discipline and allow the deputies to vote their conscience. The result was that on

¹Polls cited by Merkl, op. cit., p. 171.
May 17, 1972, the Bundestag approved the Moscow Treaty 248 for, 10 against and 238 abstentions. The Warsaw Treaty was approved by 248 for, 17 against and 231 abstentions.

The erosion of the slim majority in the SPD/FDP coalition over the struggle for the treaties led Barzel to call for the government to resign. It was clear that the government coalition now lacked a majority in the Bundestag and could not get the 1972 budget or any other controversial legislation passed. But, on the other side, the CDU and the CSU were also split over various issues. In September, Willy Brandt, after much hesitation, called for new elections after the FDP announced that it would stay in the government coalition with the SPD. Brandt announced that the election should and would be a vote of confidence over the Ostpolitik.¹

Discussion of the Ostpolitik continued throughout the fall, with the CDU/CSU hoping to take the issue to an election victory in November. During the election campaign, Ostpolitik was far and away the central issue. Government financial policies were also debated, but it is safe to say that the main issue in the electorate’s mind was the Ostpolitik. The SPD and FDP, of course, defended the new policies, with the CDU/CSU arguing that they went too far without gaining significant concessions from Eastern Europe.

The election for the seventh Bundestag was held on November 19, 1972, and climaxed in a decisive victory for the coalition partners.²

¹Merkel, loc. cit., p. 174.
Election results showed that the SPD/FDP coalition would command a 48-seat majority in the new Bundestag, a clear vindication of their foreign policy. For the first time since the founding of the Federal Republic, the SPD, which had taken 46.2 percent of the vote, held a plurality in the Bundestag of 230 seats. The CDU/CSU opposition garnered 44.8 percent of the vote and 224 seats. The FDP with a surprising 8.4 percent of the vote received 42 seats. Clearly the Ostpolitik of Willie Brandt had found favor with the West German people.

The domestic implications of Bonn's Ostpolitik were quite clear in that there was a minimum of turmoil, and widespread public support for the new policies. The international situation was also deeply affected by the Federal Republic's change in policy. The disorder was not so much between the two blocs, whose relationship was more normalized by events, but within each bloc. The veiled result of Ostpolitik was to create pressures within each bloc that would bring into serious question basic functions of the bloc system and in particular the roles of the two super-powers—the Soviet Union and the United States.
CHAPTER III

THE AMERICAN PRESENCE IN EUROPE

From the days of the Berlin airlift to the formation of the Grand Coalition, Western policy toward the Federal Republic was generally well coordinated. It was announced most frequently in connection with Soviet pressure on West Berlin and the maintenance of the Western position there. During those years unofficial opinion underwent a number of changes, but official policy remained consistent. A statement, written to counter the "agreement signed by the Soviet Union and the so-called 'German Democratic Republic' on June 12, 1964," dealing with Berlin and Germany and their "frontiers," reiterated this basic policy position:

The Three Governments (France, Great Britain and the United States) consider that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is the only German government freely and legitimately constituted and therefore entitled to speak for the German people in international affairs. The Three Governments do not recognize the East German regime nor the existence of a state in eastern Germany. As for the provisions related to the "frontiers" of this so-called state, the three Governments reiterate that within Germany there are no frontiers but rather a "demarcation line" and the "sector borders" and that, according to the very agreements to which the agreement of June 12 refers, the final determination of the frontiers of Germany must await a peace settlement for the whole of Germany.

The charges of "revanchism" and "militarism" contained in the agreement of June 12 are without basis. The government of the Federal Republic of
Germany in its statement of October 3, 1954, has renounced the use of force to achieve the reunification of Germany or the modification of the present boundaries of the Federal Republic of Germany. This remains its Policy.

The Three Governments agree that the safe-guarding of peace and security is today more than ever a vital problem for all nations and that a just and peaceful settlement of outstanding problems in Europe is essential to the establishment of lasting peace and security. Such a settlement requires the application in the whole of Germany of the principle of self-determination. This principle is reaffirmed in the United Nations Charter, which the agreement of June 12 itself invokes.¹

This statement could have been written in 1954 as well as 1964. Notwithstanding the intervening attempts by Kennedy and de Gaulle, the policy of the Western Alliance prior to the Grand Coalition was the same in most significant aspects as it was during the Cold War. There was considerable desire for detente in the West, but this could not be matched by new policies. While this desire for detente provided the impetus needed to force a change in West German policy, it was not enough to cause significant changes in Western bloc policy.

Western Policy Prior to Ostpolitik

The basis of Western policy toward Germany is the search for enhanced security. International peace has been the aim behind all measures adopted, whether the theory has been that of confrontation, deterrence, containment, avoidance of miscalculation, mutual security, mutual respect, and the like. The military forces that the three governments have provided for the purpose of detente have their roots in the policies of the Cold War. The Three Governments do not believe that the time has come to withdraw them, or even to consider seriously large-scale reductions in them. They do not believe that the time has come to abandon the principle of the unity and territorial integrity of Germany.

¹U. S. Department of State, Background Notes, Federal Republic of Germany, Department of State Publication No. 7834, updated July 1967, pp. 7, 8.
or capacity for retaliation in various forms. Except in a very minor degree, the policy has not been one of retribution or vengeance—nor has it been a result of benevolence or charity. Its motive has been the determination to stop aggression and prevent war.¹

Initially Western policy was designed to prevent further German aggression. From 1945 to 1948 the actions of the Soviet Union were increasingly interpreted as expansionist and dangerous to Western interests. For the Western powers, especially the United States and Great Britain, the heart of the problem was still the German question. But now Germany, at least the Western three sectors, appeared as a potentially useful partner rather than a defeated enemy to be punished. France on the other hand maintained a punitive policy toward Germany and was not at first receptive to American ideas for inclusion of West Germany in a Western defensive role. The Soviet Union in the new age of atomic and later nuclear weapons was now regarded as the real threat to the peace and security of not only Europe, but the world. In the West this change in public and official attitudes was quite gradual, and did not allow for the admission of the Federal Republic into NATO until 1955. The new attitude took almost ten years to germinate. These ten years were accentuated by periodic Soviet attacks on Berlin.

The years from 1948 to 1959 mark the darkest days of the Cold War, and Western policy took a strong line toward the Soviet Union. Western policy integrated West Germany into Western institutions and organizations, to incorporate the growing strength of the Federal

¹Dulles, op. cit., p. 228.
Republic into the Western alliance. This addition of the Federal Republic to the Western alliance enhanced Bonn's position, not only in the West, but in the rest of the non-communist world as well. With each Western move, the Federal Republic was given more independence and greater international status.

Immediately after World War II, British policy was aimed at the dismantling of German industrial capacity. Beginning with Winston Churchill's famous "Iron Curtain Speech" in 1946, British leaders were more concerned with the Soviet Union's position in Europe than was the United States.\(^1\) However, after 1948, British policy became closely aligned with that of the United States. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden and American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles worked closely together and found a good understanding on joint policy toward the Soviet Union. In all practical working relations in Bonn, Berlin, Washington and London, the Anglo-American cooperation was impressive. British leaders were to follow this course loyally even though public attitudes in Great Britain were still somewhat fearful of future relations with Germany.\(^2\) This evidence of Anglo-American agreement was very important for Western policy. During this period the United States

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and Great Britain usually agreed on the same tactics and pursued the same general goals.¹

Until 1958, French policy suffered from the succession of weak governments that came and went prior to the establishment of the Fifth Republic. As a result French policy was at once more complex and more vacillating than that of the British. In 1958 when de Gaulle became President, he developed new ideas (or at least re-elevated old ones) about the balance of power and the exercise of international leadership. He developed a friendship with Adenauer and tried to tie the Federal Republic closely to France in an attempt to influence West German policies that would be acceptable to him.² However, de Gaulle's actions in taking France out of NATO military integration (while still adhering to the treaty); his holding of unilateral talks with Soviet leaders; and his heavy handed actions in the EEC raised concern about his policies in the FRG.³

De Gaulle's policy was not directed against the United States, even though some believed this, but it did raise difficulties for American policies. The policies of the Federal Republic in not drifting too close to the French position and too far away from the


²Dulles, op. cit., p. 245.

Anglo-American position, greatly aided in keeping the difficulties to a minimum.¹

De Gaulle declared that the solution of European problems was up to Europeans and suggested that the role of the United States (and for that matter, Great Britain) should be reduced.² French policy was thus at variance with original Western policy of cooperation among equals. De Gaulle proposed a Three-Power Directorate of France, Great Britain and the United States to coordinate Western policy as early as October 1958. This proposal was, of course, unacceptable to the United States and Great Britain.³

The effect of France's policy on the Federal Republic is difficult to judge. The Federal Republic needed close relations with all members of the Atlantic Alliance and the growing rift between French and Anglo-American positions was becoming more difficult for Bonn to span. Certainly the potential for trouble was there. But it would have become real only if the Federal Republic, out of weakness, had to make significant concessions to the French.


Both France and Great Britain showed divergences between popular sentiment and stated official positions. This situation made it difficult for Bonn to evaluate their policies. The attitude of the United States was less of a problem. And since the United States was the leader in most policy matters, and because American military power was absolutely necessary for West German security, the American policy of friendship with the Federal Republic was paramount.

During this period the desire of promoting some form of detente with Eastern Europe always ran right up against the German question. Any attempt by Western powers to change policy risked a destruction of the delicate balance of forces believed to be essential to the protection of West Germany's future. Any policy toward the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe that changed the official attitude toward German borders, reunification or recognition of the GDR could have resulted in reactions in the Federal Republic that could seriously weaken the Western alliance.

The period from 1959 to the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 was a time of uncertainty and changing attitudes. After Secretary of State Dulles' death in May 1959, there were a number of changes within the American State Department, and ideas for a softer American policy on the German problem began to emerge. During the Kennedy years there was somewhat of a general breakdown in united Western policy toward the German problem and Eastern Europe. The Kennedy administration

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seemed to be in agreement that past policies were no longer applicable, but made no decision on what path to follow. The Adenauer Government became increasingly convinced that the United States was about to alter its policy on the German problem to a softer line.¹

With the erection of the Berlin Wall and the Cuban Missile Crisis, as well as other Soviet and East German moves on West Berlin, the dilemma retreated for a time to that of a moot point. Western policy again generally united around the time test policies of the Cold War, but with a difference. This official policy was followed, but at the same time other initiatives toward the East were mounted. This time there was a recognition that there had to be changes in Central Europe, especially Germany.² While retreating to the relative security of past policies, the new emphasis was reflected not only in the United States, but also in Britain and France. The new emphasis was that the German problem could not be solved from the old position of strength, but rather from an easing of tensions. This combination of old and new policies was designed to reassure West Germans while still attempting to find paths for cooperation with the Soviet Union. The question was, how far could the Western powers change the emphasis of their policy without causing domestic turmoil in the Federal Republic.³

¹Dulles, op. cit., p. 248.


With the formation of the Grand Coalition in 1966, the West Germans acknowledged the situation and took the vanguard position in attempting to find some accommodation with Eastern Europe.

In 1966, the Western powers were again on the horns of a dilemma. They felt free to encourage the Federal Republic to take initiatives on her own, realizing that if they failed the West as a whole would have to share the results. The West, out of enlightened self-interest as much as because of previous commitments, recognized the futility of past policies and while officially adhering to them urged the Federal Republic to make new initiatives. There were several important factors that comprised this dilemma facing the Western powers which dictated that they allow and even encourage Bonn on to what many interpreted as a unilateral course of action.¹

First, the German problem is deeply complex and requires elaborate strategies to deal with it. The hidden dynamics of a divided Germany, with the built-in escalators dictate an intense awareness of the problems involved. The dedication needed for this problem was absent from the Americans and the British who were devoting their attention and energy to other areas. The United States was becoming deeply involved in Vietnam and Great Britain was engaged in the final dismantling of her Empire east of Suez, as well as coping with domestic difficulties. In addition, Britain was treading a fine line in West

¹The ensuing discussion is based in part on the arguments presented by Karl Kaiser, op. cit., pp. 29-33.
European affairs in an attempt at eventually gaining entry into the EEC. Of the three, only France was giving paramount priority to the problems of Central Europe.

Second, the scope of the tasks made it difficult to create effective and far-sighted strategies. The West faced a series of problems in this regard. It had to encourage Bonn's involvement in the East so that a rapprochement could include the whole of Europe, but at the same time it could not allow for West German isolation that would permit the Soviet Union to exploit its position. The Federal Republic had to maintain its ties with the West while pursuing a unilateral course to the East. When the West acquiesced to this, it was with the recognition that they might have to intervene even if the costs of heavy handed imposition would be high. A healthy aloofness from European affairs, especially by the United States would be desirable, but if this was reduced to passiveness it might lose control of the situation.

Third, there was disunity in the West. Barring unforeseen events that would draw the Western powers together again, it seemed impossible to reach agreement on the basic issues, except on general principles at the lowest common denominator. The success of detente, that required coordination to be achieved, makes further cooperation more difficult because it enables each nation to act in accordance with more traditional or divergent interests. In this respect, both East and West face similar problems. This condition is especially acute with regards to the German problem where the two blocs appear to
reinforce each others actions, both during the Cold War and during detente.1

Finally, with regard to Germany, the West, like the East remembers the past, even if these memories are not as acute as they are in the East. There is no doubt that a reunited and powerful Germany, could be considered a political and economic threat to all European nations East and West. There is still a fear of German nationalism and some conjecture as to the strength of democracy in the Federal Republic. This concern was even more pronounced with the growth of the right-wing NPD.

During the 1960's, the evolution toward detente continued. With the departure of Charles de Gaulle from the center of the European stage came the arrival of Willie Brandt. The Federal Republic began taking a position of leadership of the European nations of the Western alliance. Great Britain ceased being a significant leader in policy formulation, because of several factors. Domestically Great Britain was being wracked with violence in Northern Ireland, and her economic difficulties continued. Of more importance was the fact that Great Britain whose past policies had been closely identified with American policy, was attempting under the Labor government of Harold Wilson to loosen its ties with the United States and attempt to join Europe in the EEC. Even though de Gaulle was gone, French leaders retained significant reservations about Britain's entry. The Wilson government


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attempted with considerable success to maintain a neutral course in Alliance politics. British leaders loosened ties with the United States, without radically altering the traditional Anglo-American relationship. Wilson also played a successful game of aligning London between Bonn and Paris which allowed for her eventual entry into the EEC. This low key performance between the three other NATO powers was necessary for Britain to avoid angering the United States, France, or the Federal Republic; to ensure her entry into the Common Market while retaining close ties with the United States.¹

With this evolution of events, the two foci of the Western Alliance became Washington and Bonn. With the United States outside of the EEC the incipient Ostpolitik was to have a significant effect on America's role in Europe. The whole question as to the structure and function of NATO would be debated on both sides of the Atlantic. All significant intra-alliance politics came to involve the Nixon Administration and its reaction to Brandt's Ostpolitik. Because of the overriding importance of the American reaction to Bonn's new initiatives to the East, the remainder of the chapter will be devoted to the Washington-Bonn intercourse and the dilemma faced by American leaders.

### Reaction to the Ostpolitik

Political treaties between nations are not usually the cause, but rather the reflection of changes on the international scene. There is

no denying that certain fundamental changes were occurring in the Western alliance with regard to Eastern Europe. The obvious change was that in October 1969 the SPD and the FDP formed a coalition which sought to come to some accommodation with the East. This change in government was, of course, the result of forces that had been at work within the Federal Republic for many years. The new Ostpolitik was also a motivating force that reflected changes in the Western alliance while at the same time exerted tremendous effect on the whole of Western Europe and its relationship with the United States.¹

There were four significant trends during this period that both caused and were affected by the new Ostpolitik. First, with the passing of Charles de Gaulle from the international scene, Willie Brandt was slowly but surely rising to take his place as the predominant European statesman in the Western Alliance. Second, the political distance between Western Europe and the United States was expanding. Third, the political distance between Western Europe and the Soviet Union was narrowing. And finally, there was a growing self-awareness on the part of West Europeans.

The widening gap between Western Europe and the United States was a natural reflection of world realities. During the mid to late 1960's, the United States was increasingly involved in the Vietnam War and Middle East situation on the international scene; and domestically involved in assassinations, racial tensions, anti-war demonstrations,

rising crime rates, drugs, inflation, and the environment (not to men-
tion putting man on the moon). There was a natural reduction of
American concern with European problems. With this reduction of
interest, the less Western Europeans felt themselves obliged to stand
behind American policy decisions. The more talk there was in the
United States Congress about reducing the military presence in Europe,
the more Western Europeans looked for alternative ways to promote
their own security. The United States, which after World War II was
an example which Europeans tended to rely upon, ran the risk of
becoming a disturbing example of what might come if past policies and
ideals were maintained.¹

The idea of finding a rapprochement with the Soviet Union is
based on the failure of Cold War policies to inspire any more enthu-
siasm, especially among the young who have no memories of the Berlin
blockade, the East Berlin uprising of 1953 or the Hungarian Revolu-
tion of 1956. The generation attaining the age of majority in the
Federal Republic during the late 1960's no longer feared the Red Army.
Their discontent with Western society reduced the psychological fear
of communism. Also, the slow drift of American interest away from
Europe necessitated that Western European relationships with the
Soviet Union be re-examined.

When Willie Brandt became Chancellor, he found that he had imme-
diately inherited de Gaulle's position as leader on policies for

¹loc. cit., p. 21.
European unity as well as West European policies toward Western Europe. Most Western Europeans considered de Gaulle's policies, based on dominant French power in Europe, a relic of the 19th century. Brandt's policies of an integrated Western policy for Europe was much more popular. He proposed and effected the entry of Great Britain and Norway into the EEC, with prospects for all of Scandinavia entering later. With this climate, however, it would be a mistake to consider that Western Europeans had forever forsaken national aspirations and accepted the status quo in Central Europe as a permanent fixture.

This new atmosphere within the Western Alliance brought about some interesting side-effects as a result of Bonn's Ostpolitik. For the first time in several years there was at least the appearance of serious tension and disagreement between the Federal Republic and its main ally, the United States. The CDU/CSU opposition was accusing the Brandt government of pursuing a reckless policy toward Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union which risked destroying American confidence and jeopardizing West German security. The CDU/CSU sent spokesmen to the United States to warn American audiences, from government agencies to the general public, that Brandt's policies should be curbed. They described alarming projections of how two of the Federal Republic's foreign policy objectives might converge—a "perverted" enlargement of the EEC combined with Ostpolitik—that could cause a radical shift in the European balance by allowing the GDR, Sweden and Yugoslavia to join the EEC.¹

This attack by the CDU/CSU met with some success in the United States, particularly with groups representing the "old guard" such as Dean Acheson, General Lucius Clay and others associated with Cold War policies. Other American leaders were more realistic in their appraisal of the Ostpolitik. The Brandt Government itself made considerable effort to assuage American doubts about the new policy. The work of the Federal Republic's ambassador to the United States was backed up with personal talks between President Nixon's National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger and West German Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt and Brandt's personal adviser Egan Bahr.

Although the differences were acute, there were those observers who interpreted the situation as being far worse than it was. Some observers erroneously believed that Nixon was opposed to the Bonn initiations, but was faced by circumstances to publicly accede to the new policies. There may have been a desire in Washington to slow the pace of events, but there is no evidence that the policies of Brandt were being opposed outright. In fact the Nixon government's attempts at improving detente with the Soviet Union would be aided by the softer West German policy toward Eastern Europe.

The outcome of the American-West German exchanges by the late spring of 1971 was that the American position and the position of the

1 ibid.


Federal Republic appeared to be very close to each other on their respective prospects and implications for Ostpolitik. This was partly because the rate of Bonn's drive for agreements with Eastern Europe, which had appeared dangerously speedy from June to November 1970, had begun to slow down due to several factors, notably the refusal of the Soviet Union and East Germany to make needed concessions on the West Berlin question.  

Also, the Brandt Government had allayed Washington's fears of West European neutralist tendencies as stated by the CDU/CSU opposition. The Brandy Government made itself clear on many occasions that the limitations of the Ostpolitik were a result of the firm basis of the Federal Republic's attachment to NATO and the EEC.

Even though the incipient crisis of confidence between the United States and the Federal Republic never assumed serious proportions, it does offer proof of the widening gap between Western Europe and the United States. No longer was the Federal Republic playing the role of middleman between the United States and France. The Federal Republic was now at the vanguard in European policy making, and it took its own case to the United States for discussion. This was no longer the case of a strongly united bloc deciding joint policy. Here was Willie Brandt, leader of one nation in the alliance explaining to Richard Nixon the acknowledged leader of that alliance what he was going to do, and asking support for actions already initiated. This was also the first


occasion when potentially serious discord between Bonn and Washington was the result of West German diplomatic initiatives.

The American Debate over a European Presence

As has been repeatedly stated, the basis of the Ostpolitik rests on a firm West German commitment to the Western Alliance. Willie Brandt has also repeatedly made it clear that he believes that Ostpolitik cannot be successful without active American support, including the retention of American forces in the Federal Republic and West Berlin. Former Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt made the point even more graphic:

There are many convincing arguments against precipitate or premature American troop withdrawals from Europe. In the first place there is the conventional military argument. U. S. ground troops man one-fourth of the European dividing line; the U. S. Air Force furnishes between 70 and 80 percent of all flying units in the 4th ATAF covering Southern Germany, and about the same percentage of HAWK and NIKE batteries in that area. Were any of them thinned out or pulled out, grievous gaps would be created and the concept of forward defense turned into a shambles. Moreover, substantial U. S. withdrawals would sorely undermine public confidence not only in the reliability of the American commitment but also in the basic feasibility of European defense. An opinion poll recently conducted in West Germany bears this out. Sixty-six percent of those polled - and 79 percent of all Bundeswehr soldiers - felt that without American troops Germany would be overrun in the event of communist aggression. Thus, an American pull-out might indeed cause a psychological

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landslide and impel a despondent Western Europe toward its first major reorientation since the end of World War II.¹

Although Western European allies are generally agreed as to the necessity of maintaining American troops in Western Europe, there is no such agreement within the United States. In questioning what the military presence of the United States should be in Europe, Senator Mike Mansfield has created a debate that opens to question the future role of the United States in European affairs.² During the 1971 monetary crisis, Mansfield proposed in mid-May a cutoff of funds for any American troops stationed in Western Europe in excess of 150,000. This was a reiteration of Mansfield's Senate Resolution 292 that he had introduced on December 1, 1969. The Nixon administration mobilized a remarkable lobbying campaign against it. Nixon was also aided by Leonid Brezhnev, almost simultaneously, who on May 14, proposed talks for mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR).³ These events combined with Nixon's announcement of a breakthrough in the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) temporarily stalled the Mansfield proposal for limiting American bargaining positions.

The debate over the Mansfield resolution raised important questions as to what the long range policy of the United States would be in

¹Helmut Schmidt, op. cit., p. 43.
²Joseph Korbel, op. cit., p. 83.

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European affairs. The debate also brought out the basic issues involved in American engagement in Europe. American troop levels are a function of both intra- and inter-alliance bargaining, as well as of special bilateral agreements, and final decisions are usually made in Washington. The structure of these conditions involved in the debate were exposed. The ultimate result of the debate, which has been going on for over fifteen years, will be a decision on how many troops the United States will keep in Europe and why.¹

A reduction in American troops in Europe would be almost irreversible. The issue will be debated repeatedly because conditions in Europe as well as the United States will change and the American political process resists long-term policy decisions. There are five predominantly internal factors that contribute to this condition: (1) the budget cycle; (2) the introduction of new military technology; (3) the system of federal elections; (4) the prerogatives of Congress and the President; and (5) the balance of payments situation.²

Of course these five factors do not by themselves account for the inability of the political system to make long-range policy decisions concerning American presence in Western Europe. Other considerations involve the pattern of events on the international scene, especially relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. This mercurial relationship has been reflected in public confusion over the


United States role in NATO, and has been exacerbated by Western Europe's continued dependence on the American military umbrella.\textsuperscript{1}

The dilemma faced by the United States and Western Europe on this issue gives the general public a false analysis of the situation. It is generally believed by the American public that with the United States having economic difficulty and continental Western Europe, especially the Federal Republic, enjoying unparalleled prosperity, that they should contribute more for their defense.\textsuperscript{2} The situation is much more complex than that. The Soviet Union and the United States have only each other as viable rivals in an international military struggle. The presence of American forces in Western Europe insures their protection and subsequently a nuclear umbrella for Western Europe provided by ICBM silos in North Dakota and Montana. A reduction of American troops and an addition of a like number of West European troops does not add up to the same amount of military presence, due to the uncertainty of protection for Western European troops from those same silos in the United States. The addition of more West European troops to the existing American troop levels would not significantly improve the balance of force either. The end result is that as long as the United States sees Western Europe's security as its own security there is little the Europeans themselves can do to alter the military relationship vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

\textsuperscript{1}ibid.

\textsuperscript{2}This opinion has been repeatedly shown in the past few years by the various public opinion polls taken periodically by the several polling services.
During 1970 the Nixon Administration made an appraisal of the American presence in Western Europe.\(^1\) In November 1970 the National Security Council came up with three main options: (1) maintenance of a force upward of 250,000 as part of a NATO defense capable of repelling a large-scale conventional attack conventionally; (2) reduction to a 150,000 to 200,000 men force capable of limited conventional defense but tailored to respond to massive attack with "clean" battle-field nuclear weapons, and (3) reduction to a force of 50,000 men, which would signify a virtually automatic dependence on nuclear weapons to respond to anything more than a minor border incident.\(^2\)

President Nixon appears to have eliminated both the second and third options for the time being. The reasons for this decision are varied. The unknowns of the Federal Republic's political situation certainly encouraged his conservatism, whether one interprets the maintenance of current forces as support for Ostpolitik or as a reminder for Bonn not to go too far or too fast toward the east.\(^3\) The West Germans and most other West Europeans applied considerable pressure on Nixon to oppose unilateral reductions. Soviet military activity in the Mediterranean Sea and Middle East, as well as suspected construction of a Soviet submarine base in Cuba also probably influenced

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\(^1\)United States Foreign Policy 1969-1970 (Department of State Publication 3575, March 1971).


\(^3\)John Yochelson, op. cit., p. 794.
his decision. Nixon may have felt that a force reduction would be interpreted as a weakening of American will in face of Soviet activities throughout the world.\(^1\) The most important reason, however, was probably a decision not to unilaterally reduce forces prior to SALT and MBFR talks with the Soviet Union.

The Nixon Administration has systematically sought to answer critics of its European and NATO defense policies.\(^2\) The Administration points out that a credible and effective military posture for West Europe requires a full range of conventional and nuclear choices that can only be assured with substantial ground forces. To deter Warsaw Pact aggression the West must have a convincing conventional capability in addition to a strategic nuclear retaliatory capability. American troops, the only NATO troops tied by nationality to the only credible nuclear strike force in the alliance, provide the necessary options and must be present in large numbers.\(^3\) The "Big Lift" concept for deployment of troops cannot be substituted for troops in Western Europe. The Nixon Administration believed that a unilateral


\(^3\) It is not the purpose of this paper to dwell on American defense policy, but there is much disagreement over what size American ground force is necessary to provide a "trip-wire" that would ensure in the eyes of the Soviet Union, an automatic American response in force.
reduction would have three negative effects on American strategic position. (1) The military capabilities of forces in Western Europe would be severely weakened; (2) unilateral reduction would be interpreted as a weakening of political determination to use the deterrent; and (3) the balance of forces outside Western Europe would be disturbed, notably in the Middle East where both superpowers are heavily committed. Unilateral reduction would be tantamount to disengagement.

Arguments based upon national interest shift the emphasis from military to political considerations. It can be reasoned that a withdrawal of American forces from Europe might fatally weaken the Western Alliance and drive Western Europe toward accommodation with the Soviet Union. A unilateral American withdrawal could be interpreted as weakness or disinterest on the part of the United States. Most important, the influence of the United States in shaping the kind of European arrangement consistent with American interests could be sharply reduced. American forces in Western Europe are the most tangible evidence of the United States' stake in Europe and a source of leverage on both East and West.

The American Dilemma

The dilemma faced by American policy makers as a result of Ostpolitik are profound and complicated. There is only one unalterable fact

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in the whole equation. American elites consider that historic, cultural, psychological, economic and military ties with Western Europe are absolutely necessary for the national security of the United States.\footnote{ibid.}

These ties were easy to maintain and control during the Cold War when Europe depended on American economic and military power to rebuild their war torn nations in relative security. Those conditions exist no longer. Western Europe is now an economic and political giant, with much less need for dependence on the United States. The desire for detente and the success of the Federal Republic's Ostpolitik, with the relaxation of tensions, has allowed for more independent action among the Western allies. The officially expressed desire for detente and for negotiations leading toward MBFR by leaders of both the Soviet Union and the United States cannot but further erode the American position and influence in Europe.

If American leaders accede to the demands of domestic critics, which seems fairly likely at some future time, and reduces its military presence in Western Europe, this action would further weaken trans-Atlantic bonds and allow for the broadening of Soviet influence in Western Europe. The Federal Republic cannot significantly increase her military posture to make up for possible American reductions, without destroying the credibility of the Ostpolitik. And certainly leaders in Great Britain and France have shown no interest in increasing their countries' military presence in the Federal Republic. So,
an American military reduction or withdrawal from the Federal Repub-
lic could considerably weaken NATO's ability to conduct a conventional
war in Europe.

An American reduction of forces in Europe could significantly
reduce the influence the United States has on European affairs.
American leaders must believe that the 300,000 American troops in
Western Europe are an important influence on policy decisions of the
other allies. These troops are also a justification for the United
States' prominent position on Western European policy councils.

In a strictly military sense the significant withdrawal of Amer-
ican troops from Western Europe would result in the retreat of America's
forward position back across the Atlantic. A corresponding withdrawal
of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe would still leave the Red Army
on European soil. This would result in a significant conventional
military advantage for the Soviet Union. Also, an American withdrawal
might be interpreted by the Soviet Union as a retreat from European
affairs and a reduction of American will to come to Western Europe's
defense. If the Soviet Union were to question the resolve of the
United States and were to attempt to radically improve her influence
and position in Western Europe, a major crisis would develop. Because
the means for conventional warfare would be unbalanced in favor of the
Soviet Union, a confrontation of force between the United States and
the Soviet Union could result in general nuclear warfare without an
intervening period of conventional war, possibly with tactical nuclear
weapons, where negotiations might still be possible. The question for
American political and military leaders would be, is the destruction
of cities in the United States acceptable in return for thwarting
Soviet advances in Western Europe? Without a significant American
military presence in Western Europe, it seems unlikely that an American
defense of the area in the event of nuclear war would be automatic.

It is assumed that the Nixon administration is desirous of
detente and MBFR, and the Ostpolitik has been the significant event
that has furthered the evolution of conditions that may allow this to
occur. But the dilemma faced by the United States is now even more
acute. How can American leaders actively participate in detente and
maintain their influence on European affairs? How can the United
States reduce its presence in Western Europe and still counter an
increase in Soviet presence and influence in the area? How can the
American military reduce its presence in Western Europe without the
Soviet leaders misinterpreting the motives? And finally, how can the
United States maintain and strengthen its ties and influence with
Western Europe, now an economically and industrially powerful entity,
without maintaining a physical presence in the area? These are pro-
found and complicated questions that will have to be answered. As yet,
with American preoccupation in other areas, there has been no signifi-
cant American policy initiatives, designed to confront this extremely
significant dilemma, loaded with aspects related to the vital security
of the United States and Western Europe, as well as the future condi-
tion of the world.
CHAPTER IV

THE SOVIET DILEMMA OVER OSTPOLITIK

The division of Germany is largely the result of the world's awareness of Germany's strategic position. This recognition was also one of the reasons why the Soviet Union after the end of World War II encouraged the expulsion of Germans living in the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia even though these areas had been settled by Germans as long as seven centuries ago. This action bound Czechoslovakia and Poland even closer to the Soviet Union, while reducing the future threat of German aggression.¹

The strategic position of Germany in Central Europe and Soviet awareness of this position have made German-Soviet relations a major part of the power struggle between East and West since 1917, and especially since 1945. Therefore, the pattern of German-Soviet relations exerts considerable influence on the power relationships existing in the world today, and in turn, the nature of this relationship has a decided effect on German-Soviet relations.

Basis of Post-War Soviet Policy

The first years of West German-Soviet relations can best be described as years of mutual confrontation, hostility, and suspicion. The repeated statements of West German leaders on the dependency of

the FRG upon the Western Alliance for the achievement of security and national reunification through the policy of strength directed at the Soviet Union was of course reacted to with hostility by Eastern Europe. Soviet policy toward the West was characterized by ambiguity: the following of at once an expansionist and consolidationist foreign policy.¹

During the period from 1949 to 1966, the main instrumentalities of Soviet policy toward Europe were trade, technological cooperation, and cultural relations with the policies primarily aimed at limiting the influence and appeal of American based international corporations and West German technology and credits in traditional pre-war German markets in Eastern Europe.² The purpose of this effort was not the communization of Western Europe in the foreseeable future, but to devitalize NATO and attempt to improve the Soviet position in Central Europe by moving Western Europe away from the United States. Within this overall purpose, the central issue was Germany.

Soviet leaders have on occasion kept alive the possibility of encouraging neutralist trends in the Federal Republic as a precondition for successful reunification, but their main effort has been on trying to isolate the FRG by use of a constant barrage of propaganda, hammering away on the themes of "revanchism," "militarism," and the "revival of fascism."³ Although Soviet policies had no success in


²The Soviet Threat to Europe, op. cit., p. 22.

isolating the Federal Republic from either Western Europe or the United States, they were successful in isolating Eastern Europe, especially the GDR, from the West. Soviet pronouncements have constantly reminded Eastern Europe that the Red Army was their protector against the possibility of a resurgent Germany. Armed with Bonn's own pronouncements concerning the border status and non-recognition of East Germany, successive Soviet leaderships used the threat of the West German "bogeyman" as an excuse for maintaining close supervision over Eastern Europe.¹

For the Soviet leaders, any kind of German reunification on other than Soviet terms raised several inter-related problems concerning their own security. These problems include relations with the West and in particular Western Europe; the ability to exercise control over Eastern Europe; its position in the world communist movement; and even the future course of "world revolution." Soviet leaders had to consider that a reunified Germany that was either Western or neutral would result in the devastating loss to the Socialist camp of East Germany. A loss of the GDR in a military sense would mean that Poland would be open to the West, and the northern flank of Czechoslovakia would be exposed. Economically the results would be just as disastrous. The GDR is the second leading industrial nation in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), and the ninth leading industrial nation in the world. With the FRG, which ranks as the

¹ibid.
fourth leading industrial nation in the world, combined with the GDR, a reunified Germany would be a nation of 77 million people and would be the third ranking industrial nation in the world; the undisputed economic giant of Europe outside of the Soviet Union. In a political and ideological sense, a reunited Germany that was either aligned with the West or neutral would be tantamount to a renunciation of orthodox Marxist-Leninist belief, and the substantial loss to the communist camp would be blamed squarely on Soviet leadership.

It was for these reasons that a reunified Germany was an impossible dream in the foreseeable future. The Soviets naturally insisted upon a continuation of the status quo in this regard. Any Soviet policy concerning German unity on other than its own terms, would require concessions from both sides. Concessions that Soviet leaders were not willing to make.

A constant issue promoted by the Soviet government in relations with the Federal Republic has been the effort toward eliminating German claims on the Soviet Union. These claims are the result of East European and Soviet confiscation of former German lands and property, and the expulsion of German nationals from their homelands. Only the Federal Republic, of all member nations of the Western Alliance, has maintained substantial legal and territorial claims against the Soviet Union. In addition, the Soviet military has maintained effective control over the former German capital of Berlin,

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1 This data was obtained from Josef Korbel, Detente in Europe: Real or Imaginary, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 107-139.
and also the other German state. For these reasons, Soviet decision makers have always attempted to limit activities of the Federal Republic in West Berlin, and have always maintained that a reduction of tensions in Central Europe demanded that Bonn recognize not only the altered European borders, but also the legitimacy of the GDR.

During the first fifteen years of its existence, the Adenauer governments insisted that the two primary problems between Bonn and the Soviet Union, reunification and the border question, were separate problems and used the promise of a negotiated territorial agreement as a means toward reunification. But as Zbigniew Brzezinski has noted, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have always treated the two issues as different aspects of one German problem. Therefore the FRG was pursuing what were mutually incompatible goals: reunification and border revision; "the very linkage of the two tended to reinforce the East European stake in keeping Germany divided."¹

On October 3, 1957, in the United Nations General Assembly, Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki proposed an "atom-free" zone in Central Europe.² During a debate on disarmament, Rapacki declared that "if the two German states agree to impose a ban on the production and stockpiling of atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons on their territories, the Polish People's Republic is prepared simultaneously to impose a


²The discussion of the Rapacki Plan was primarily obtained from Keesing's Research Report 8, op. cit., pp. 144-147.
similar ban on its own territory." Subsequently the Czechoslovakian government announced its willingness to agree to such a ban.

From January 28 to February 1, 1958, the "Rapacki Plan" was discussed between Rapacki and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrea Gromyko, with a result that the Soviet government declared its readiness to participate in such a plan. On February 15, 1958, an amplified plan, including Czechoslovakia, was announced in a memorandum in Warsaw. The memorandum was given to the ambassadors of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and to the Charges' d'Affaires of Canada and Denmark. The memorandum was conveyed to the West German government through the Swedish government.

Full agreement to the plan was announced by all interested East European governments and the Soviet government by March 3, 1958. By May 1958, however, the plan was rejected by all NATO countries, with the reason that the plan would severely weaken NATO and place it at a serious disadvantage.

On November 4, 1958, Rapacki announced changes in his plan designed to overcome some objections of the Western powers. There would be two stages in the implementation of the plan. First there would be a ban on the production of nuclear weapons in Poland, Czechoslovakia, the GDR and the FRG at the same time appropriate control measures would be introduced. The second stage would be preceded by talks concerning the reduction of conventional forces. This reduction would be effected simultaneously with the complete denuclearization of the zone and would be subject to appropriate control measures.
Following the announcement of Rapacki's revised plan, the NATO governments again rejected the plan on the grounds, as British Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd stated, "the factor which must govern our view of this matter is whether any plan for disengagement will be acceptable if it changes the balance of military security to the dis-advantage of either side." Thereafter, no further exchanges were to take place between the concerned governments on the Rapacki Plan.

While it is true that the Soviet hierarchy did not fear the military threat of the Federal Republic (except as a component of NATO), it is also true that they did fear Bonn's considerable psychological influence in Eastern Europe, especially the GDR. Although the Soviet policy of attempting to isolate and move the Federal Republic away from the United States and Western Europe was a failure, the Soviet's ability in limiting West German influence in Eastern Europe was a success. It must be stated, however, that Soviet policy was greatly aided by the hard line policies emanating from Bonn.

The first decade of Soviet-West German relations reinforced the bipolar confrontation that existed in Central Europe and a solution to the German problem was no closer in the early 1960's than it had been in 1949.

Eastern Europe and the Grand Coalition

With the formation of the Grand Coalition and the inception of the Ostpolitik, the Soviet government was faced with a serious problem in answering the new overtures from Bonn. The Ostpolitik was not a
direct threat to the Soviet Union, but an indirect threat through the Eastern European allies. During the years of the Grand Coalition, Eastern Europe was no longer as subservient to the Soviet Union as it once had been. The independent actions of communist leaders in Czechoslovakia and Rumania since 1959 were unsettling for the Soviet government. The new West German initiatives were exacerbating these tendencies. Previously Moscow had consistently followed a policy of exaggerating the nature of the West German threat and containing Bonn's influence. Until the government of the Federal Republic adopted a more flexible attitude, Moscow was not forced to reappraise its attitude toward both West Germany and Eastern Europe.¹ In the late 1960's the Soviet Union was unable to react with authority to Bonn's diplomatic opening, and it was Rumania who played a key role in reinterpreting the communist definition of the West German threat and in finding the limits of Soviet tolerance on the German question.²

There is little genuine affection for the Soviet Union or for Russian culture in Eastern Europe, except possibly in Bulgaria.³ Eastern Europeans feel overpowered by the two powers in Eastern and Central Europe—the Russians and the Germans—and only through prudent maneuvering between the two can the smaller nations expand their political options. Rumania enjoys a special position in this regard,

¹Whetten, op. cit., p. 35.
because she has no history of German domination, and few grievances with the Federal Republic. Rumania has a relatively popular regime and is not economically dependent on the Soviet Union. Through the skillful manipulation of the German question, Rumania has pursued a policy that has gradually reduced Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe.  

The Rumanian policy of limited independence was taken up by the Governments of Hungary and Czechoslovakia which caused much concern for Soviet policy makers. The governments of Poland and the GDR were also quite concerned with the turn of events, and the dialogue between Bonn and their allies caused great concern about their being placed into an isolated position in the event of a rapprochement between Bonn, Bucharest, Prague and Budapest. Polish leaders were in favor of a relaxation of tensions, but were fearful of normalized relations with the Federal Republic prior to their acceptance of the current Central European frontiers. With a considerable amount of Polish territory made up of former German territories, this was of genuine concern.

1  Whetten, op. cit., pp. 36-46.


4 Candidate member of the SED Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee Hermann Axen, looking for Polish support, accused the Dubcek regime in Czechoslovakia of furthering these tendencies. "Proletarischer Internationalismus in Unserer Zeit," Neues Deutschland, August 14, 1968. See also Neues Deutschland, February 3, 1967, and Władysław Gomułka's statement that "the establishment of diplomatic
In the GDR the situation was much more complicated. For many years East German leaders considered the very existence of the Federal Republic as a threat. They feared a Soviet Union-Federal Republic bilateral settlement that would leave the GDR out in the cold. The East Germans felt overwhelmed by the West, and so all political decisions take into account the politics and policies of the FRG. The GDR leadership saw that the only way to get out of the West German shadow was by complete disassociation and rejection of the Federal Republic (except trade). The primary goal of East German leaders was to secure their recognition by the FRG. Because East German leaders could not accept West German demands for self-determination for the whole German people they rhetorically rejected unification. As the Federal Republic gradually disassociated itself from the past policies of isolation toward the GDR, this caused an increased inflexibility among East German leadership toward the German question and domestic politics.¹

The constraints imposed upon the "Deutschland-politik" of the East German regime were similar to those imposed on the Federal Republic. Both wanted to widen their freedom of maneuver while at

relations between the German Federal Republic and the Socialist states will not influence the improvement of the climate of Europe even the slightest unless the West German Government radically revises its stand toward fundamental problems concerning the vital interests of the socialist states," from Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish, 1910 GMT, February 8, 1967, cited by Robin A. Remington, op. cit., p. 89.

the same time protecting domestic stability at home and obtaining the support of their principal allies. If however, the problems were the same, they were drastically different in degree of severity. If the FRG was a political dwarf, the GDR was even more so. If domestic considerations were important in West Germany, they were even more important in East Germany. The Pankow regime, for so long completely dependent upon the Soviet Union in the area of foreign affairs, could not attempt to duplicate Bonn's official overtures due to a lack of direct communications with any of the Federal Republic's Western allies. In addition, like all governments in Eastern Europe, the GDR leadership lacked explicit popular legitimation of its rule and depended heavily on Moscow's support for its continuation.¹

While the connection between the level of domestic popularity and Soviet support is a general characteristic of the situation facing most governments in Eastern Europe, the East German regime was faced with specific problems in this regard due to two special circumstances. First, the SED had to concern itself not only with consolidation of its power in East Germany, but also with the very nature of the social and political order as well. To insure that its power was unchallenged it was necessary to build some measure of public support. This unchallenged authority, and establishment of the GDR as a viable socialist state, would insure continued Soviet protection.²


Second, the Pankow regime could not use either of the two means by which other East European governments tried to win consent and support from their peoples: the appeal to nationalism and experimentation with liberalization. The SED was left with only the improvement of living conditions as the only way to stabilize its domestic position.¹

During the 1960's the consolidation of the GDR as a viable political and social entity had progressed tremendously. The erection of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 can be established as a turning point in this regard. This development had important psychological repercussions in both the East and the West.² Western acceptance of the division of Germany; and the rising standard of living in the GDR, made the East German People inclined to make the best of a difficult situation. These conditions also helped to establish a reorientation of thinking in West Germany. But the shift in Bonn's official policy into the Ostpolitik confronted East German leadership with a choice between two equally undesirable alternatives: either opposing the trend toward detente and risk isolation within the Eastern bloc, or else accommodate itself to the new conditions and expose itself to the new conditions and expose itself to Western influences that would tend to erode the power basis of the East German regime.³ These problems remained as the basic dilemma faced by the East German

¹Peter C. Ludz, op. cit., p. 29f.
²Karl E. Birnbaum, op. cit.
leadership during this period. At the same time the GDR was able to exploit its condition to impose certain restrictions on the Soviet Union’s freedom of action.¹ For these reasons, the East German leaders have tried consistently to control the policies of the other Eastern European states toward the Federal Republic by virtue of the GDR’s special interest in the German question.²

During 1970 and 1971 there is evidence that the impending understanding between Bonn and Moscow was leading to a reshuffle at the top of the East German power elite. Developments make it plausible to assume that the final endorsement of Moscow’s Western policy at the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union brought to a head the internal crisis brewing in the GDR, which resulted in Walter Ulbricht’s ouster as First Secretary of the SED in May 1971.³ The changes in East German policy introduced by Ulbricht’s successor, Erich Honecker, indicate that ideology was the base of contention between Ulbricht and Moscow.⁴

The SED under Honecker adopted a stand on the negotiations between the four wartime allies over Berlin that was much closer to Moscow’s position than had been previous East German policy stances. This does

¹Karl E. Birnbaum, op. cit.

²Lawrence L. Whetten, "The Role of East Germany in West German-Soviet Relations," op. cit., p. 516.

³Birnbaum, op. cit., p. 60

not mean that East German policy toward the Federal Republic was less adamant. East German policy followed a line of strict demarcation (Abgrenzung) toward Bonn. ¹ However, this uncompromising position made East German leaders more, not less, susceptible to Soviet pressure. Developments during this period indicate that the more East German leaders insisted on a strict policy of Abgrenzung toward the FRG, the harder it was for them to use their domestic weakness and exposed position to stall agreements between Bonn and Moscow. In addition, the more hostile Pankow's relations were with West Germany, the more limited was their freedom of independent action in the process of East-West relations. Against this background, it is not surprising that Soviet leadership succeeded in eliciting concessions from East German leaders that were necessary for an acceptable agreement with the three Western powers over Berlin.²

Soviet policy, or lack thereof, during the first three years of the Ostpolitik followed from a very complex set of conditions. Soviet leaders were probably influenced by several factors that all projected an image of weakness on their part. These were the humiliation of Israel's victory over Moscow's client Arab states in 1967; the apparent fragmentation of the world communist movement; and the overall malaise existing within the Soviet Union. It became clear that the Soviet Union saw direct relations between the Federal Republic and Eastern Europe as a serious threat not of Soviet security, but as

¹Birnbaum, op. cit., p. 61.
²Ibid.
a stimulus to ideas for more independence from the Soviet Union by East European countries.\textsuperscript{1} For these reasons, plus the positions of the GDR and Poland, Soviet leadership met the initiatives of the Ostpolitik with disapproval, although there were probably sharp divisions within the Politburo on how to counter Bonn's diplomatic offensive.

In the late 1960's, Moscow's chief problem in Eastern Europe was Czechoslovakia. After the shakeup in Communist Party leadership in January 1968, the Czech Regime under Alexander Dubcek sought a radical liberalization of its domestic and economic policies. At first Soviet leadership responded to developments with an almost patterned policy of noninterference in the affairs of a fraternal socialist country.\textsuperscript{2} There was no public regret of Novotny's overthrow, nor was there any overt sign that the "Prague spring" was even discussed at the Warsaw Pact's March 1968 political consultative committee meeting.

However, by the end of March 1968, the Soviet leader's anxiety over the liberalization policies of the Prague government all but ended Moscow's policy of noninterference in Czech affairs. At Dresden, in March 1968 Dubcek attempted to explain to Warsaw Pact leaders post-January developments in Czechoslovakia, but the meeting ended with an attempt to define limits of possible diversity from orthodox

\textsuperscript{1}Aspaturian, op. cit., p. 245.

communist practice.\(^1\) It was a warning by Moscow and the leadership of the GDR that "special attention" had to be paid to West German activity "directed against the interests of East Germany and other socialist countries."

In addition to liberal domestic reforms, the Czech government dropped its anti-West German propaganda and there was a marked increase in the exchange of high level talks between Bonn and Prague. Neither the Soviet nor the East German leaders could afford to have Czechoslovakia recognize the FRG on other but their own terms. The new Czech attitude toward West Germany was not the only problem in this regard. By early spring there were pressures in Czechoslovakia for a change in policy toward Israel. This situation was very distressing to Soviet leaders. Although Rumanian deviations had been marginally acceptable, Soviet leaders had no intention of allowing the Czech experiment with liberalizing trends in both domestic and foreign policy to go unchallenged.\(^2\)

Through the late spring and summer of 1968, Soviet leaders through the front of combined Warsaw Pact maneuvers, placed great political and military pressure on Czech leaders to abandon their program of reforms. Soviet leaders may have had visions, with some justification, of a "Communist Little Entente," composed of Czechoslovakia, Rumania,


\(^2\)Remington, op. cit., p. 97.
and Yugoslavia, directed against Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe.¹

Clearly, Czech leaders had gone beyond the limits of domestic reform and foreign policy deviation acceptable to Soviet leaders and other increasingly threatened East European governments. During 1968, there was within Soviet policy "successive inertia, vacillation, warning, threats, compromise and finally, military occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968."² One of the reasons cited by the Soviet Union for the Warsaw Pact invasion was increased West German influence in Eastern Europe.³ The occupation of Czechoslovakia effectively nullified the initial successes of the Ostpolitik, and the Brezhnev Doctrine insured that it could not be resumed in its existing form. Soviet actions recognized among other things an awareness that the Federal Republic's growing economy and sustained prosperity could be translated into political power which would continue to be influential and attractive in Eastern Europe.

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¹ Remington, loc. cit., pp. 97-105.

² ibid.

Ostpolitik after 1969 and Soviet Responses

It was Soviet policy that prevented constructive change in Central and Eastern Europe. The danger involved was not a Soviet threat to Western Europe, but the deep-seated pressures for change that were at work in Eastern Europe that could not be accommodated by Soviet leaders.\(^1\) It was known that pressures in Eastern Europe were also at work in the Soviet Union, and that these problems were common to all industrial nations. These pressures were manifested in a discontented youth, alienated intellectuals and overcrowded cities. Added to this was the Soviet experience of having almost one-half of its population made up of non-Russian minorities that were becoming restive under the strong centralization that emanated from Moscow.\(^2\) Soviet leaders must have felt that discontent within Eastern Europe could spread easily across borders into the Soviet Union itself. It was an appreciation of these problems that was an underlying basis for Soviet rejection of the Ostpolitik and subsequent invasion of Czechoslovakia. It is also an appreciation of these problems that forged the dilemmas faced by the Soviet Union when a revitalized Ostpolitik was initiated by Willie Brandt, Chancellor of the FRG after the 1969 federal elections.

As with the Ostpolitik of the Grand Coalition, the best West German efforts would have come to nothing without a new Soviet attitude

\(^1\)Owen, op. cit.

\(^2\)Ibid.
on the problem. There were many compelling reasons for the Kremlin not to respond to Bonn's initiatives. A Soviet-Federal Republic agreement could weaken the position of the SED leadership in the GDR. The weakness of the East German position was emphasized by the tremendous reception accorded Brandt by the East German people during his conference with Willi Stoph, Premier of the GDR, in Erfurt on March 19, 1970. Also, Soviet recognition of the Ostpolitik would elevate the FRG in international stature and give political weight to its already considerable economic strength. Soviet leaders must have been aware that in order to obtain concessions from the Federal Republic on recognition of the GDR and existing borders, they would also have to make some concessions on Berlin, the easing of tensions between the two Germanys, and allow economic opportunities for the FRG in Eastern Europe. The primary consideration faced by the Soviet Union, however, had to be the realization that an acceptance of the status quo by the FRG would weaken the Soviet position in the area. A relaxation of tensions and increased contacts would stimulate those groups in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union interested in increased liberalizations. Also an acceptance by Bonn of present conditions in Central Europe would undermine the Soviet rational of the West German bogeyman—a pretext used for maintaining tight controls over Eastern Europe.

There were however, at the same juncture, impelling counter-vailing forces that made Soviet leaders respond in a positive fashion to the new diplomatic offers from the FRG. The grounds for this change in Soviet attitude are much more difficult to determine than in the West German case, and in part one is driven to conjecture. There was probably an attitude that the Soviet policy of the 1960's with regard to Berlin, the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Czechoslovakian experience had been counter-productive.\(^1\) That policy had showed that there was no point in putting the West under pressure. Czechoslovakia showed that if the Soviet Union did not allow some change in Eastern Europe it would have to maintain her position by force of military arms alone. There were many other reasons why the Soviets entered negotiations with the Federal Republic as well. Willie Brandt indicated four reasons why he believed that the Soviet Union altered their policies:\(^2\) (1) a fear of china, (2) desire for economic and technological contacts with the West, (3) need for a "modus vivendi" with the United States, and (4) a realization after Prague in 1968 that they had to participate with their allies in efforts toward detente with the West, or they would be left behind. This was especially true when the FRG recognized existing borders and Poland joined the ranks of the other Eastern European countries advocating

\(^1\) Wagner, op. cit., p. 23.

negotiations with Bonn. ¹ This left only the GDR as a East European government opposed to this action; and, due to their dependence on the Soviet Union their objections could be safely ignored as there was no other country able to give the GDR the support needed.²

Soviet fears of the People's Republic of China were genuine, especially after the Ussuri River incident of March 1969.³ The Ussuri River area of the border between the Soviet Union and China has been an arena of conflict between the Russians and Chinese for centuries, with both sides claiming territory under Soviet control on the east bank of the Ussuri. While the outbreak of fighting between the two sides in March 1969 focused world attention on the growing ideological and political conflict between the two Communist giants, this was only a sharper incident in a stream of incidents between 1960 and 1969.

Each side blames the other, but evidence, even from China's own propaganda films, indicates that the Chinese have been the provocators with highly disciplined Soviet border guards showing remarkable restraint. The first two battles of March 2 and March 4, 1969 were victories for the Chinese. The March 15 and March 16 clash, after


The Soviets moved up heavy missile units, was both a Soviet reprisal and a warning. The warning was clear: more border clashes would result in heavy Soviet retaliation. After this show of force incidents have died down in the Ussuri area.

It is difficult to say what reasons lie behind Chinese provocations in the area. It seems safe to say that the orders emanated from high in the Chinese hierarchy and are indicative of more than a Chinese claim on Soviet territory. The clashes are a result of the ideological breakup between the two nations and are symptomatic of the deep tension and conflict over political and revolutionary goals of the two communist states.

However, Moscow's attempt at substituting China for West Germany as the external threat requiring constant attention from the Warsaw Pact nations, was difficult for the Eastern European nations to accept. Germany was a traditional threat that all East Europeans, leaders and people alike, understood. China was not. Germany was also a much closer threat to Eastern Europe than was Asiatic China. China was also a socialist country while West Germany was not only capitalist, but traditionally portrayed in communist propaganda as fascist.

It must have been considered by Soviet leaders that an East-West recognition of the status quo in Europe would allow the Soviets to concentrate on the defense of their extensive border with China. In

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1 Robin A. Remington, op. cit., p. 175.
addition, Soviet leaders perhaps concluded that in acceding to the
demands of other East European leaders desiring a normalization of
relations with the Federal Republic, it would reduce Soviet-East
European tensions and decrease Chinese influence in the area. Perhaps
there would even develop a stronger East European commitment for Soviet
policies with regard to China.

The need for increased economic and technological contacts with
the West was also a powerful inducement for Soviet leaders to accept
the Ostpolitik. The Soviets have always been against the expanding
EEC, but this has not prevented them from increasing their trade with
individual Common Market countries, especially the Federal Republic.
Soviet trade with the FRG grew from $281 million in 1965 to $400
million in 1968; East European trade with the Federal Republic
increased from $1,003 million to $6,010 million during those same
years. Trade between the two Germanys has been continuing for years
and there appears to be little or no relationship between amount of
trade and political developments.

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1 Joseph Korbel, op. cit., p. 115.

2 Compiled from Office Statistique des Communautes Europeanes,
Bloc Oriental 6, 1969, number 6, p. 25.
### West German Trade with East Germany

<table>
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<th>Exports</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
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Source: Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, *Trade of NATO Countries with Communist Countries*, compilation from Research Memoranda, 1960-1969.

The economic advantage in this trade is far greater for Eastern Europe, which is greatly in need of finished Western products and advanced Western technology, especially in the areas of electronics and computers. Recent statements by Soviet leaders reveal a fear of economic and technological backwardness, and even Soviet sources indicate that their economic growth rate has been leveling off. There is a growing conviction in the Soviet Union that only an infusion of Western technology and capital will get the momentum back.¹

Another reason for the change in Soviet policy is involved in the reality of Western Europe and Japan becoming major power centers,

rivaling the United States within the Western alliance.\(^1\) This rise in influence and power implies greater independence from the United States. Since this represents a weakening of American influence and position within NATO, Soviet leaders have a real interest in assisting that trend. The logical policy would be to play down Cold War issues and emphasize tensions between the United States and Japan, and between the United States and Western Europe.

For these several reasons, and perhaps others yet unknown, the Soviet Union began to change its attitude toward the Ostpolitik. There was probably some division among Soviet leadership about the new policy, and perhaps that division still exists.\(^2\) However, the majority must have reached a decision based on a realization that the Soviet Union was over committed due to the European situation, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the need to strengthen its defenses against China. Added to these commitments were the domestic demands for raising the standard of living and an increase of consumer supplies. It must have been considered that the Soviet Union must limit its objectives somewhere and this could best be done in Europe. Past experience had shown that in that area force would not work. Also, by relaxing its stance, Moscow could further its own economic development. This change in Soviet attitude would also have a strategic affect of at once lessening American influence in Western Europe.


\(^2\) Wagner, op. cit., p. 23.
while at the same time reducing a basic Soviet-American disagreement that has prevented closer cooperation between the two superpowers.

Continuing Soviet Dilemmas

Since the signing of the treaties and the four-power Berlin accord, there has been a noticeable hardening of positions by the Soviet and the other East European governments. In the first round of negotiations between the East and West Germans, the GDR attempted to halt some of the progress which was agreed to by the four powers.\(^1\) For example, the GDR tried to negotiate with the Federal Republic over West German access to West Berlin, and negotiate with West Berlin over West Berlin's access to West Germany, a clear violation of the four-power agreement which recognizes the Federal Republic's right to represent West Berlin in external affairs. In addition, the East Germans are cutting short a program for the reuniting of divided families, and are setting up new bureaucratic obstacles hindering freedom of travel between the two Germanys. Other Soviet allies are also fostering an increasingly hard line toward the FRG. Poland, for example, reneged on their agreement to repatriate thousands of ethnic Germans.\(^2\)

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\(^1\)For a discussion of these events see the New York Times, issues February 16, 1973, p. 3; February 19, 1973, p. 1; March 9, 1973, p. 9; and April 1, 1973, p. 24.

The Kremlin also used an increasingly hard line in East-West relations. A line that on the surface indicates that the Soviets wanted to take advantage of their success in the four-power accords, and dash Western hopes for a genuine detente in Europe that would reduce the military and ideological confrontation. In February, 1973, 34 states met in Helsinki, Finland, to resume talks on an agenda for the Conference on European Security and Cooperation. The Soviet Union had advocated this conference for years, but was blocked primarily by objections from the United States. At the Helsinki meeting, the Soviets rejected Western efforts for an increased atmosphere of trust and cooperation, and also rejected Western efforts for an increased flow of people and ideas between East and West. The proposals put forth by the Soviet Union, while appearing at first glance to be little more than a repetition of worthy principles, actually contained several provisions that would require a Western recognition of the Brezhnev Doctrine and a destruction of the EEC. In regards to the proposed talks on MBFR agreed to by President Nixon and Party Secretary Brezhnev during Nixon's trip to Moscow in the spring of 1972, the Soviets demanded that all interested European parties should take part, thus in effect killing any chances for MBFR in Europe for

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the present. In addition, the Soviet Union has pushed a harder line at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

The new Soviet hard line is not only occurring in the international arena, but to an even greater degree is occurring on the domestic scene. While the Soviet Union is negotiating the new agreements on trade and technology with the West, they are also increasing their domestic ideological propaganda. This propaganda is designed to prevent liberalizing tendencies that could result from increased western contacts. While this domestic crackdown is occurring throughout Eastern Europe, it is Soviet leaders who are leading the way with a drive on personal freedom and intellectual activity. East German leaders are of course in complete accord with this activity and are attempting to keep contacts with West Germany as sterile as possible. The leaders of Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria are also stepping up the ideological training of their people and the repression of dissidents.

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In Poland and Hungary where some limited liberalization is under way, the talk of crackdowns is mostly just that, talk, and is probably aimed at impressing the Soviet Union.¹

While much has been said about the risks to the West involved with the Ostpolitik, much less has been said about the risks for the Soviet Union. The major point is that the more detente opens the door to cooperation between East and West, the more freedom of action must be granted to Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union. If for no other reason than this negates the rationale of a West German revanchist bogeyman. Also, when commercial, scientific and cultural contacts are increased, other western ideas can no longer be stopped at the border. The more contact, the more ideas of liberalism will spread in Eastern Europe. With its positive response to Ostpolitik, the Soviet Union accepted the risk of increased pressure for liberalization and the loosening of East European ties with the Soviet Union. While short run gains appear to favor the Soviet Union, a long range result of detente appears to place the greater risk with the Soviet Union.

The increasingly hard line of the Soviet Union has been characterized by some as an offensive diplomatic threat designed to

capture additional gains from the results of Ostpolitik. In reality these moves are defensive in nature designed to protect Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, and protect the Soviet Union itself from divergent influences. The need for increased trade and technical exchanges is far greater for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe than it is for the West. In order to obtain this needed exchange with a minimum of risk for domestic stability, the Soviet Union has put a clamp on the people and is rejecting other Western efforts for increased contacts in other areas.

On the political and military front there seems to be no Soviet desire for a MBFR in Europe at the present time. Soviet leaders must realize that the American army's presence in the FRG is becoming increasingly untenable due to congressional opposition in the United States, and also because of increased domestic opposition in the FRG. Soviet initiatives in the area of MBFR could be met with great enthusiasm by the West with little strategic costs for the Soviet Union. If one rejects aggressive intent, one can only assume that continued Soviet military presence in non-Soviet Eastern Europe is primarily for the maintenance of Soviet control in the area and has little or nothing to do with a Western military threat. In the European military sphere, the East has a decided advantage in conventional capabilities vis-a-vis the West. Soviet forces are by far the major component of the Warsaw Pact, and if there was a MBFR these same forces, while on Soviet territory, would still be in Europe. A United States withdrawal from Europe would cause the opposite—the main fighting force of NATO would be across the Atlantic Ocean. There has
only been a start within NATO of West European military cooperation—Eurogroup. On the strategic level it would obviously be to the advantage of the Soviet Union to allow MBFR, but Soviet leaders must so far believe that the situation in Eastern Europe will not allow this.

In the event of a unilateral withdrawal of American forces from the FRG, due to several possible events, this would make the Soviet military presence to the east difficult to justify. In recent months there seems to be a playing down of the Brezhnev Doctrine by Soviet leaders. They can feel safe in doing this with Soviet forces throughout most of Eastern Europe. This could indicate that Soviet leaders have little faith in the credibility of unilateral Soviet military intervention in Eastern Europe launched from Soviet soil. With Chinese threats being less intense at the present time, perhaps Soviet leaders believe that they can play the waiting game. But this lack of initiative can only hurt the Soviet Union in the long run. A continued Soviet hard line on MBFR can cause a corresponding Western reaction and a reduction in trade and credits by the West. This Soviet position becomes increasingly destructive to Soviet long range interests.

Soviet foreign policy in Europe has become devoid of initiative, strictly reactive to the situation in Eastern and Western Europe; and the resulting dilemmas faced by the Soviet government have resulted

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in almost complete immobilism in the Soviet leadership. It appears
now that after the initial successes of Ostpolitik, that the Soviet
reaction is, and will continue to be, a gradual shift toward retrench-
ment. Some authors,¹ have described this problem as a crisis of
major proportions affecting the very structure of the Soviet system.
Soviet foreign policy is closely linked to the internal situation (as
with any state), but perhaps less so than with a democratic state.
In the Soviet Union there is increased demand for continued economic
growth and the increased availability of consumer goods. There is
also a growth of local nationalism not only in Eastern Europe, but
also within Soviet borders.² This dilemma has caused a probable split
among Soviet leaders as to what direction to take and has resulted in
a "neo-isolation" for the present that prohibits a dynamic foreign
policy.

In line with this problem is the idea of communist unity, which
has been a crucial component of Soviet power and an integral part of
Soviet thinking for many years. Aside from the Warsaw Pact and its
institutions, there is no formal organization of the "Soviet Common-
wealth," and the preservation of communist unity calls for a far

¹Vladimir Petrov, "Soviet Foreign Policy and the Collapse of
Communist Unity," Modern Age, XV, (41), Fall 1971, pp. 338-349.

²For a comprehensive analysis of the Soviet Unions nationalities
problem see Lev E. Dobriansky, "Russification in Political-Economic
Demography," Ukrainian Quarterly, 28, Autumn 1972, pp. 236-246. See
also the same issue of Ukrainian Quarterly for "Nations, People,
Humanity," pp. 247-265. In addition see Ivan Sleka, "Will the Soviet
Union Survive until 1984?", Central European Federalist, 20, July to
greater degree of Soviet influence in communist capitals than any capitalist power would dream of exercising among its client states.\(^1\) Again, the dilemma resulting from Ostpolitik and Western attempts at detente would be to introduce ideas and conditions that would further erode Soviet conceptions of communist unity.

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\(^1\)Vladimir Petrov, op. cit., p. 346.
CHAPTER V

TOWARD AN ERA OF AMBIGUITY

All eras are transitional, but the one that has just dawned seems to be more transitional and ambiguous than most. There is a general feeling that the post-war period of mutual hostility and confrontation has come to an end. However, there is no clear sense of what the future holds. There have been several new departures in the relations between East and West, but as yet there is no clear indication where they will lead.

During the period of the Ostpolitik many claimed it the era of negotiations, and indeed, even now there are three sets of extremely important negotiations in progress:

1. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), between the Soviet Union and the United States;

2. The European Security Conference (ESC) between members of NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and European neutrals which include possibilities for Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Europe;

3. The diplomatic efforts between Middle Eastern nations at the prodding of the two Superpowers, which are aimed at creating a durable peace for the area.

These three sets of negotiations are technically separate, however, politically they are very closely interrelated. They all substantially affect immediate and future East-West relations; and all have a major impact on the affairs of Europe. The outcome of these
negotiations will determine the future pattern of detente and the form of security arrangements in Europe.

The central problem underlying these negotiations between East and West, and also within the Eastern and Western blocs, is the future of Europe, and the role of the two superpowers in that future. Taken in a larger context, it involves the whole structure of the international system as it has evolved in the Northern Hemisphere since the end of World War II. How the system will evolve depends primarily on the actions and positions of the United States and the Soviet Union, and for Europeans at least, there seems to be three possible alternatives: (1) the bloc systems, under the influence of preponderant American and Soviet power, could develop into a condominium arrangement; (2) the pattern of Soviet and American dominance in Europe could crumble—symmetrically, if the Europeans are fortunate, or asymmetrically on the American side, to the ill fortune of Europeans; or (3) will the superpowers engage in a limited rapprochement while still providing a framework within which the two halves of Europe will continue to evolve and eventually bridge the gap between themselves.¹

These questions would be difficult if not impossible to answer in the best of circumstances, but in the present era with its major uncertainties, prediction is impossible and even analysis becomes a risky business. The best that one can do is attempt to discern the

¹This argument is based upon a similar discussion presented by Theo Sommer, "Detente and Security - The Options," The Atlantic Community Quarterly, IX, (1), Spring 1971, pp. 34-49.
major factors operating to influence events, present some of the
broad problems likely to be encountered, and describe some of the
more probable situations likely to be met during the next decade.

The Results of Ostpolitik

Speculation about future East-West relations in Europe must
begin with a brief assessment about what has been achieved. The
major underlying factor of the package of treaties and agreements
resulting from the negotiations of 1970-1972 was that they represented
a compromise implying genuine accommodation. The essential "quid
pro quo" between East and West involved the mutual abandonment of
political postures that had challenged the stability of social and
political structures on the other side, during the East-West struggle.
Since these positions had been used by each side for the manipulation
of threat perceptions, their elimination showed the growing confidence
of ruling elites that force could not be used to impose a preferred
settlement.

The continued evolution of mutual trust that is absolutely
necessary for sustained cooperation is not only dependent upon the
military and political positions of the superpowers, but is also
dependent upon their independent assessment of the options of their
potential opponents and the way these are likely to be affected by
international trends. Also, the potentialities opening up in East-
West relations may well depend on the way the ruling elites view the
effect of the recent agreements on the domestic scene, and how these
constraints and opportunities can influence their future policy choices.
While it is impossible to ascertain these views with any degree of precision, some reasonable assumptions may be derived from the present situation.

The past fifteen years of relations between East and West in Europe indicates that the detente is real, although with strict limitations as to its nature and scope. The durability of the detente is unknown, and must stand the test of history. History has shown that certain events that appeared at the time to be a success actually contributed to later breakdowns in the international system. Only time will show whether this detente will lead eventually to a peaceful settlement of conflicting issues between East and West, or if detente will unleash forces that could have a future effect not envisioned by statesmen of today.

The atmosphere of detente and the effects of Ostpolitik have had not inconsiderable results. Europe of the 1970's is significantly different from the Europe of the 1950's. The partition of the continent is less rigid today. Trade between the two blocs has grown considerably and cultural contacts have expanded. There are limitations of course. Detente and the Ostpolitik have had little effect as yet on the conflicting ideological, political and socio-economic systems that face each other in Central Europe, and the future of detente is subservient to vicissitudes and political considerations of statesmen in both blocs.

However, fundamental changes have taken place. Negotiations have taken the place of confrontation, and the major conflicts and issues between East and West that have endured since 1945 are on the way
toward settlement. West German leaders have normalized relations with most of the governments of Eastern Europe, and are attempting to find an accommodation with the GDR. West Berlin now has official ties with the FRG, and her status is guaranteed under the four power agreement, which also guarantees Western military presence in the city.

There is little value to be gained in drawing up a balance sheet on the gains and losses concerning the results of Bonn's Ostpolitik. The leaders of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have gained everything they have been asking for over twenty years—with the exception that West Germany has not given full recognition to East Germany and West Berlin's ties with the West have not been broken but reinforced. The West, and in particular the Federal Republic, for their part have been able to reduce tensions surrounding West Berlin, and the hope, slim as it may be, of a United Germany in the future had not been destroyed.

Many critics believe that the West, especially West Germany, paid too high a price in the way of legally defensible positions for only a promise of future Soviet and East European concessions. But it appears evident that given Soviet intransigence there was no other way to achieve detente. And if what is desired is detente, one should not look at the tally of losses and gains today, but look beyond present achievements and up the rocky road to the possibility of a higher plane of cooperation between the two blocs.
However, if the spirit of detente is to lead to a greater cooperation in the future, this pursuit demands careful coordination in the West. If past Soviet policy is any guide, and it should be, it is only natural to expect that Soviet leaders will continue to probe any path that will weaken the West and eliminate the American presence in Western Europe. Soviet leadership will seek to miss no opportunity to use detente to strengthen its own position and to exploit to the fullest any indication of weakness in the West.

On the other hand, the West has no single policy toward the East with regards to detente, and the success of detente requires a balanced relationship between East and West. In the view of West German Foreign Minister, Walter Scheel, "the dialogue of detente can only really begin, can only continue, on the basis of a stable relationship of power between East and West."¹ To Scheel, ties with the United States are essential for this balance, and the continued American military presence in Western Europe is necessary for world security and peace.

But as detente in Europe progressed, the European members of the Western Alliance might see an opportunity to foster their individual interests, the thrust of which could weaken NATO. British entry into the EEC may encourage that trend. The economic integration and the potential of political cohesion in Western Europe, may create an entity strong enough to rival the United States in the Western Alliance,

and the Soviet Union in Europe. Thus, the development of an integrated Western Europe might concern Soviet leaders, the result of which could tend to deepen the division of Europe and could be counter-productive to detente.¹ This could result in a vicious circle that in a weak Western Europe offers Soviet leadership an opportunity for exploiting detente which could also deepen Europe's division.

In the Federal Republic the division of Germany is accepted, but this division does not mean that there must be constant hostility or that the differences should become deeper. Internal developments within both East and West Germany may be such as to either estrange them further or to bring them closer together. Policies adopted by either side may be such as to widen the gulf or bridge it.

However, the acceptance of Ostpolitik on the part of West Germans was more than the acquiescence on their part to the status quo. Ostpolitik was accepted because of the promise of normalized relations with the East, especially the GDR, as much as for the promise of security resulting from an easing of tensions. The future acceptance of detente by the West German people depends on some positive response from Soviet and East European leaders on an easing of restrictions and a fulfillment of the Soviet promise to aid in the normalization of relations between East and West, especially between the two German states. Failure to do this could result in the Bonn government, regardless of which party was in power, being forced by domestic

¹Joseph Korbel, op. cit., pp. 249, 150.
considerations to re-evaluate its position as a result of Ostpolitik. A hardening of West German public and official position with regard to detente would place the whole structure of East-West understanding into jeopardy. Chancellor Brandt has often stated that West Germany's security and detente go hand in hand. A breakdown in detente could lead to a sense of betrayal and insecurity in the Federal Republic that would have a chilling effect on the whole structure of East-West relations.

During their determined struggle against ratification of the package of treaties, the CDU/CSU leaders' most significant, if not the most influential, argument pointed to the conflict between further European integration and detente with the East.¹ With the oft stated position by West German leaders that the FRG's policies toward the East are based upon a secure position within NATO and a sound economic position within the EEC, this point was significant. The standard response from the Brandt government was that "Westpolitik" was keeping pace with Ostpolitik, and that Bonn's policies enjoyed widespread support among the Western Allies.² And indeed, Bonn's efforts in expanding the EEC which were rewarded by the inclusion of Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark, made it difficult for critics to claim that no progress was being made toward European integration.

The formation of the huge trading bloc of 250 million people, with political ambitions, will not be without its drawbacks. As

¹Peter H. Merkl, op. cit., p. 178.
Willie Brandt pointed out in a 1972 article, the economic partnership between the United States and the EEC appears to be headed for more competition and occasional conflict after many years of profitable cooperation. Yet there is nothing inevitable about the development of rivalry and he suggested, in fact, that "it would be desirable to give organic form to the economic dialogue between the U. S. and the Common Market." Recurrent economic and monetary crises have already resulted in trans-Atlantic consultations. The enlarged EEC can afford to interact with the United States with less fear that the greatly increased volume of American trade and capital will "take over Europe."

At the same time that Western Europe feels its burgeoning economic strength, and there may be more intense economic competition ahead between Europe and America, the military levels between Europe and the United States has been widening. Western Europe is less able and less willing to be independent of the United States in defense today than it was five years ago. The EEC members of NATO have formed Euro-group, launched a program to reinforce European defense, and pledged additional funds for their common defense. But they are not as yet prepared to replace American troops in Europe with their nuclear and strategic deterrent power. Because of this consideration, it appears that the Western alliance will continue to maintain a fairly well coordinated defense posture. The critical question to be

answered is whether the American people and government will be willing to allow Western Europe to have their cake and eat it too. Is the United States government willing to undergo the negative aspects of economic competition with the EEC while still maintaining the largest burden of supplying their defense?

In the case of the Soviet Union, it is obvious that its potential for generating tension in Central Europe, especially in and around Berlin, has not been significantly reduced. But, Moscow's freedom of action has been reduced. This is primarily due to the basic nature of the American-Soviet detente, or as some have described it, a partnership of adversaries. If this partnership is to continue, there is a requirement that a certain amount of consistency and predictability be manifested toward each other. Furthermore, by virtue of its very existence, the Four Power Agreement on Berlin makes it difficult for Moscow to generate a crisis in Berlin—the West's most vulnerable position—since to do so would involve violating an international treaty of major significance, resulting in certain Western retaliation in some form.

Another important consequence of the East-West Agreements is to allow Moscow, for the first time, to concentrate on the stabilization of conditions in Eastern Europe without simultaneously presenting a challenge to the West. As long as the Federal Republic did not accept the status quo in Europe the Soviet Union was forced to establish a close link between its two major foreign policy goals in Europe,
consolidation in the East and fragmentation in the West. Only by breaking up the "Washington-Bonn" arrangement could the Soviet Union hope to eliminate the threat to Eastern Europe that was purported to stem from the combination of a dissatisfied West Germany backed up by the nuclear power of the United States. Once the Federal Republic accepted the status quo in Europe—although with an admitted view to changing them peacefully in the long run—the Soviet leadership had the opportunity of separating its two major European policy goals. The Soviet Union now has the opportunity of following a status quo policy in Eastern Europe, while at the same time following a status quo plus policy in Western Europe without directly threatening Western institutions.

Another important consequence of the past negotiations, already referred to, is the elimination of the West German bogeyman as an instrument of Soviet policy at home and in Eastern Europe. In their attempt to consolidate their position in Eastern Europe, the Soviets may find, that as a result of East-West agreements, that although they still have the power of negative definition, that is, Moscow can say what is not an acceptable model of socialism, it will become increasingly more difficult for Soviet leadership to retain control over what is permissible within the context of the leadership role of the Communist Party. Already Albania and to some extent the GDR have demonstrated the problems raised by communist states which differ from

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1 Karl E. Birnbaum, op. cit., p. 93.

2 Robin A. Remington, op. cit., p. 176.
Moscow on the side of dogmatism rather than reform. And Rumania and Czechoslovakia have demonstrated the problems to the Soviet Union raised by reformist tendencies in communist states.

In studying coalition politics it is important not to forget that the increased number of players always subtly modifies the game. Despite wide areas of accepted agreement, each member state of the communist alliance has a difference of emphasis in the wide spectrum of interests. And within the Warsaw Pact there seems to be a growing understanding in both Moscow and the other East European capitals that compromise is preferable to open conflict.\(^1\) Therefore it is certainly likely that under these circumstances the evolution of politics in the Eastern European area will have a significant effect on the power and position of the Soviet Union in that area.

The official recognition of the Central European status quo achieved in 1972 cleared the way for multilateral negotiations on the limitation of forces and armaments in Europe as well as on the extension of East-West trade and cooperation. This in turn provided an occasion and a reason for intensified consultations and closer coordination of policy on East-West issues within both military alliances in Europe and the states belonging to, or seeking to become, members of the EEC.

For the United States the most important aspect of the East-West package deal was undoubtedly the fact that it reduced the likelihood

\(^{1}\)ibid.
of a major international crisis and, ultimately, an armed confrontation in one of the most hotly contested areas in international politics. While this reduction of tension may eventually enable Washington to reduce its military forces in Europe, it is important to note the fact that the Four Power Agreement on Berlin tends to stabilize the position of the United States in Berlin specifically and in Europe generally.\footnote{Martin Kriele, "Können die Berlin Sicherer Leben? Zehn Thesen zum Rahmenabkommen der Vier Mächte," \textit{Die Zeit}, February 18, 1972, p. 18.}

However, the results of East-West detente have allowed other Western European nations to pursue more independent foreign policies. There is a distinct lack of coordination and objectives not only between the United States and Western Europe, but also between the various members of the Western Europe community. The "Year of Europe" proclaimed by American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, failed to materialize. Western policy in regards to the Middle East crisis has been noted more for its differences than for its similarities. Great Britain is having second thoughts over its entry into the Common Market, and there appears to be a significant degree of disunity over long range goals among other members of the EEC, notably the two continental powers, France and West Germany.

Since, as was previously mentioned, the German problem has historically been the focal point for both Central Europe and Europe as a whole, and since a combination of instability and high stakes continues to characterize the inter-German situation, developments in this area are likely to continue to be the focal point of East-West relations in Europe.
It is important to recognize that the accommodation with the GDR achieved in 1972 represents an irreversible fact in the eyes of virtually all responsible politicians in the Federal Republic. It can therefore be assumed with relative confidence that whatever party makes up future West German governments, their assessment of the situation and the requirements and opportunities for future policy goals will take the new conditions as a basis for future policy. Also, the East-West detente will probably be of growing concern to Bonn, because of the interdependence of domestic pressures and external opportunities, especially if there is a continued lack of cohesion in Western policy as a result of detente.

The agreements reached by the Federal Republic during the negotiations of 1970-1972 were unbalanced insofar as the irreversible West German acceptance of the territorial and political status quo in Europe was traded against Soviet assurances which can be repealed (although at a substantial cost) and "prospects" for improved relations with Eastern Europe that may not materialize. The very nature of this situation will probably generate continued domestic pressure on the Bonn government (whichever party is in office) to secure its part of the quid pro quo, particularly in terms of further inter-German normalization. The Federal Republic, more than any other party to the agreements, has a vested interest in viewing them in dynamic terms, as a beginning of a process of normalization between East and West,

\[\text{\small 1ibid.}\]
rather than agreements designed only to recognize the existing territorial and political status quo.

While it is assumed that the above considerations will be applicable to any future West German government regardless of which political party is as its head, there is some difference in how these conditions can affect the two main political parties. With the CDU/CSU identified closely with past policies of hostility and confrontation their leaders' main problem is to win and keep confidence among East European leaders. The CDU/CSU leadership seems to be confronted with the task of convincing Eastern European leaders that they accept the arrangements that have been made, and to attempt to establish contacts for communication with East European leaders in order to build up a minimum of mutual trust.

The same conditions faced by the SPD, and also to the FDP, have resulted in somewhat different results. The SPD embarked on the policy of rapprochement between the two German states well aware of the potential risk for destabilization of the domestic situation on both sides, but particularly in the GDR. The 1972 election results in the Federal Republic generally eliminated this problem for West Germany, but the situation in Erfurt in March 1970, only increased the visibility of East Germany's potential for instability. The position of the GDR is that the policy of the SPD implies a willingness to acquiesce in the consolidation of the existing political system in East Germany, and that this is necessary for a freer communication between the two German states. This is a serious problem to the SPD, which is particularly vulnerable to the charge of being soft on
communism. The SPD must at once not openly proclaim the consolidation of the East German regime, while at the same time being able to convey a reassuring message to the Pankow government. The SPD must also insure that there is no misinterpretation about the distinction of Social Democracy and Communism in the Federal Republic so as to open them to charges of exposing West Germany to communist subversion.  

The viability of the East German political system has historically been based on the assumption of a hostile relationship with the Federal Republic, and a relentless battle against the ties between West Germany and West Berlin. The main reasons for this stand result from the differences characterizing the power relationships between the two German states with regard both to their material resources and the amount of popular support which their respective governments have been able to mobilize. The FRG and the GDR belong to completely different socio-economic systems and military alliances, but the bonds of common nationality, constitute a framework within which both governments must operate. In this context the East German side is by far the weaker of the two.

The East-West agreements largely thwarted East German attempts to invalidate the common framework of inter-German politics. This trend towards separation of the two German states has been halted, and the Pankow regime was induced by Eastern European and Soviet

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1This argument was actually used by CDU-CSU leaders when they argued against the Ostpolitik. See, for example, Gerhard Schroeder, "Nein Zu den Ostverträgen," Die Zeit, February 4, 1972, p. 2.
pressure to agree to a limited opening to the West. This set of circumstances is likely to determine the views of the SED leadership regarding East-West relations both on the pace of future East-West attempts at detente and the problem of consolidating its own domestic base of support. Only if there is progress in the latter area—possibly as a result of international recognition abroad and successful economic performance at home—and if future development of the Soviet-West German relations provides a continued incentive, from Moscow, for the SED leaders to be cooperative, will a controlled opening toward the West appear to East German leaders to be both possible and necessary.

Towards an Evolution of East-West Cooperation

At the end of 1972 Europe was on the first step of a new stage in East-West negotiations. While the past few years had been characterized by bilateral negotiations between the various European states, both East and West, the impending era will probably be characterized by an increase in multi-lateral negotiations. The preceding analysis attempted to identify some of the crucial factors that will underlie these negotiations. On the basis of the findings it now is possible to formulate certain requirements that will have to be met if the evolution of East-West cooperation is to continue.

It is assumed that the major interest of the United States and the Soviet Union in maintaining their "partnership of adversaries" will require them to adopt political and military postures aimed at reducing tension in Central Europe. The most important policy
requirement that will have to be met, not only by the superpowers, but also by the other states of Eastern and Western Europe in order to engage in mutually advantageous collaboration, involves "stability" and "balance" in the relationship. This means that in order for cooperation to work, there will be a need to insure that for those states involved in the process that there will be no disadvantages, but rather, equal advantages to be derived from the process.

Cooperation between the states of Eastern and Western Europe cannot avoid increased contacts, both governmental and personal, and greater mutual interdependence. At the same time it allows each side greater opportunities for exerting influence on the other side, while making each side more vulnerable to the other. In the present European context this situation is greatly influenced by a number of highly asymmetrical conditions. The following are of significant importance:

**Western Europe**

1. Pluralistic social and political systems; relatively stable domestic legitimacy of governing elites.

2. Decentralization of political power, less on national than on alliance level.

3. Superiority on many levels in terms of economic performance as well as scientific and technical advancement.

**Eastern Europe**

1. Ideological and social uniformity; varying degrees of domestic legitimacy of governing elites.

2. Centralized political power in individual countries and to some degree ultimately by the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

3. Demonstrated need for investment capital and advanced western technology.
Western Europe

4. Considerable regional and sub-regional integration without United States participation, but with considerable involvement of American based multinational corporations.

Eastern Europe

4. Little or no sub-regional integration, geographic proximity of Soviet Union insures effective influence in all regional and sub-regional discussions.¹

With these asymmetrical conditions given, what are the most sensitive problems that must be taken into account if the evolution of East-West cooperation is to continue and benefit not only Europe, but the world as a whole?

The Soviet Union as one of the two superpowers, and with a solid territorial position in Europe, so far has exerted effective control over its own allies. With this effective control over a politically and geographically diffuse group of nations, the Soviet Union enjoys a potential inroad for manipulating intra-Western differences, particularly rivalries between London, Paris and Bonn. On the world scene the Soviet Union seems to be well placed to accentuate differences between Japan, Western Europe and the United States. This factor is of special importance in a period of extended East-West cooperation, since the pluralistic nature of Western societies makes them susceptible to influence on several levels.²

¹The characteristics presented here do not apply to conditions in Spain, Portugal, Greece, or Yugoslavia. These states are marginal exceptions to the overall European framework. Information for this model was developed from Stanley Hoffmann, "Thoughts on European Security," Proceedings of the Twenty-first Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, Sinaia, Romania, August 26 to 31, 1971, p. 230; and Karl E. Birnbaum, op. cit., pp. 97-99.

Conversely, the Western societies, because of their pluralistic nature, have a wide variety of ways in which to exert influence on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In an era of intensified East-West contacts, the introduction of pluralist ideas is most difficult to stop, and when they are combined with the economic and technological superiority of the West, there is a danger that they could erode the power basis of the East European elites, and thus jeopardize the balance needed in the continuing East-West rapprochement. This problem is especially acute in inter-German relations.

As long as the Soviet Union maintains its claim that it is the final arbiter of the collective interests in Eastern Europe, the threat imposed by the introduction of liberal ideas; the extension of multi-lateral cooperation between East and West that may widen the scope for independent action of East European states, may be perceived by the Soviet Union as a threat to its vital interests. It is then very possible that at some point in the future, Soviet leaders might perceive the "balance" as being disturbed in that they might consider that the impact of Western contacts with Eastern Europe, and the pace of change in East-West relations may have gotten out of their control.

If these points are valid, a number of conclusions can be derived from them. Close political ties between the United States and Western Europe seems to be a basic ingredient in future East-West negotiations. In spite of recent demonstrations of the limited political utility of military power in the nuclear age, Western European leaders would probably feel rather uncomfortable if serious uncertainties
over the American commitment to the defense of Western Europe developed. There seems to be a real need for continuing and conclusive American demonstrations of a continuing commitment in the affairs of Europe. With regard to this point, the Four Power Agreement on Berlin, which places the American presence in Central Europe on a contractual basis, is certainly a plus. In addition, close cooperation is needed between the United States and Western Europe in order to minimize the Soviet potential for making inroads in the Western Alliance. If there is to be an increased unity of Western policies and goals, it requires that the United States supply responsible leadership that can provide a sense of direction and confidence not only to the governments of the Western Alliance, but also to the various peoples as well.

Since a rapid Soviet-West German rapprochement would create a situation of dynamic interaction on both sides, latent with considerable risk, it seems that these two countries negotiations will be viewed very carefully by all interested governments. Any attempt by the Soviet Union to draw the Federal Republic away from the Western Alliance would make its own position in Eastern Europe more vulnerable. And any attempt by the United States to tighten its bilateral ties with Bonn, would be viewed elsewhere as an attempt to rebuild cold war structures to the detriment of closer East-West cooperation. Only active West German participation in West European political and

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economic integration could eliminate this type of threat to the stability of East-West relations.

This analysis now comes full circle. The development of East-West relations meets its greatest test when consideration of relations between the two German states is undertaken. This is the area that has been, and will continue to be the most difficult and the most potentially destabilizing not only to Central Europe but the world as a whole. To the extent that the German Democratic Republic has agreed to the expansion of cooperation with West Germany, it has emphasized those areas where they can keep personal contacts between the people of the two Germanys at a minimum. This position, which is unlikely to change soon, should nevertheless allow for significant development and intensification of relations between the two German states.

Until recently the climate of mutual hostility and confrontation, coupled with the overall inferiority of the GDR prevented "competitive cooperation" between the two German states. However the situation is changing. The self-confidence of the leadership and the people of the GDR seems to have been enhanced of late. This development should continue with more impressive showings by the GDR. So competitive cooperation between the two German states is possible, but it will require additional trust on both sides and an agreed "modus vivendi" over the situation in Berlin. Since the development of inter-German relations is the focal point of East-West rapprochement, the successful management of these problems is not only of German interest, but also of European and world interest.


APPENDIX A

POPULAR VOTE IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS, 1949-72
(as Percentage of Votes Cast)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>CDU/CSU</th>
<th>SPD</th>
<th>FDP</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage of Turnout: 78.5  86.0  87.8  87.7  86.9  86.8  91.1

APPENDIX B

TREATY BETWEEN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

The High Contracting Parties

Anxious to contribute to strengthening peace and security
in Europe and the world,

Convinced that peaceful co-operation among States on the
basis of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations complies with the ardent desire of nations and
the general interests of international peace,

Appreciating the fact that the agreed measures previously
implemented by them, in particular the conclusion of the
Agreement of 13 September 1955 on the Establishment of Diplo-
matic Relations, have created favourable conditions for new
important steps destined to develop further and to strengthen
their mutual relations,

Desiring to lend expression, in the form of a treaty, to
their determination to improve and extend co-operation between
them, including economic relations as well as scientific,
technological and cultural contacts, in the interest of both
States,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics consider it an important objective of their
policies to maintain international peace and achieve detente.

They affirm their endeavour to further the normalization
of the situation in Europe and the development of peaceful
relations among all European States, and in so doing proceed
from the actual situation existing in this region.

166
Article 2

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall in their mutual relations as well as in matters of ensuring European and international security be guided by the purposes and principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. Accordingly they shall settle their disputes exclusively by peaceful means and undertake to refrain from the threat or use of force, pursuant to Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, in any matters affecting security in Europe or international security as well as in their mutual relations.

Article 3

In accordance with the foregoing purposes and principles the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics share the realization that peace can only be maintained in Europe if nobody disturbs the present frontiers.

— They undertake to respect without restriction the territorial integrity of all States in Europe within their present frontiers;
— they declare that they have no territorial claims against anybody nor will assert such claims in the future;
— they regard today and shall in future regard the frontiers of all States in Europe as inviolable such as they are on the date of signature of the present Treaty, including the Oder-Neisse line which forms the western frontier of the People's Republic of Poland and the frontier between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic.

Article 4

The present Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall not affect any bilateral or multilateral treaties or arrangements previously concluded by them.

Article 5

The present Treaty is subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the date of exchange of the instruments of ratification which shall take place in Bonn.
Done at Moscow on 12 August 1970 in two originals, each in the German and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Federal Republic of Germany
Willy Brandt
Walter Scheel

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Alexei N. Kosygin
Andrei A. Gromyko

LETTER ON GERMAN UNITY

On the occasion of the signing of the Treaty, the Federal Government handed over in the Soviet Foreign Ministry the following letter:

Dear Mr. Minister

In connection with today’s signature of the Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has the honour to state that this Treaty does not conflict with the political objective of the Federal Republic of Germany to work for a state of peace in Europe in which the German nation will recover its unity in free self-determination.

I assure you, Mr. Minister, of my highest esteem.

Walter Scheel

TEXT OF NOTES SENT TO THE EMBASSIES OF FRANCE, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES IN MOSCOW

On August 7, 1970, before the initialling of the Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Verbal Notes to the same effect were handed to the Ambassadors of the Three Western Powers in Moscow.

The following is the text of the Verbal Note of the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Embassy of the United States of America:

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Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Moscow August 7, 1970

The Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany greets the Embassy of the United States of America and has the honour on behalf of its Government to hand over the following Note with the request that its contents be brought to the notice of the Government of the United States by the most rapid channels:

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has the honour, in connection with the imminent signing of a Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to communicate the following:

The Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs has, in the context of the negotiations, set forth the Federal Government’s position as regards the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers with regard to Germany as a whole and Berlin.

Since a peace settlement is still outstanding, both sides proceeded on the understanding that the proposed Treaty does not affect the rights and responsibilities of the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America.

The Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs has in this connection declared to the Soviet Foreign Minister on 6 August 1970:

"The question of the rights of the Four Powers is in no way connected with the Treaty which the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics intend to conclude, and will not be affected by it."

The Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics thereupon made the following declaration:

"The question of the rights of the Four Powers was not the subject of negotiations with the Federal Republic of Germany. "The Soviet Government proceeded on the understanding that this question should not be discussed. "Nor will the question of the rights of the Four powers be affected by the Treaty which the U.S.S.R. and the Federal Republic of Germany intend to conclude. This is the position of the Soviet Government regarding this question."
The Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the United States the assurance of its high consideration.

Notes to the same effect were sent to the French Embassy in Moscow and to the Embassy of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Moscow.

THE NOTES OF THE WESTERN POWERS

The Governments of the Three Western Powers have likewise passed Notes to the same effect to the Federal Government on August 11, 1970, in Bonn as reply. The following is the text of the Note of the Government of the United States of America:

Embassy of the United States of America
Bonn-Bad Godesberg

The Government of the United States of America has the honour of informing the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany that it has received the following note transmitted by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on 7th of August, 1970:

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has the honour, in connection with the imminent signing of a Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to communicate the following:

The Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs has, in the context of the negotiations, set forth the Federal Government's position as regards the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers with regard to Germany as a whole and Berlin.

Since a peace settlement is still outstanding, both sides proceeded on the understanding that the proposed Treaty does not affect the rights and responsibilities of the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America.

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"The question of the rights of the Four Powers was not the subject of negotiations with the Federal Republic of Germany.

"The Soviet Government proceeded on the understanding that this question should not be discussed.

"Nor will the question of the rights of the Four Powers be affected by the Treaty which the U.S.S.R. and the Federal Republic of Germany intend to conclude. This is the position of the Soviet Government regarding this question."

The Government of the United States takes full cognizance of this Note, including the declarations made by the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as part of the negotiations prior to the initialling of the treaty which is to be concluded between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union.

For its part, the Government of the United States also considers that the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers for Berlin and Germany as a whole which derive from the outcome of the Second World War and which are reflected in the London Agreement of November 14, 1944, and in the Quadripartite Declaration of June 5, 1945, and in other wartime and postwar agreements, are not and cannot be affected by a bilateral treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, including the present treaty.

BAHR PAPER

1

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics consider it an important objective of their policies to maintain international peace and achieve detente.

They affirm their endeavour to further the normalization of the situation in Europe and in doing so to proceed from the
actual situation existing in this region and the development of peaceful relations on this basis among all European States.

2

In their mutual relations as well as in matters of ensuring European and international security, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be guided by the purposes and principles embodied in the statutes of the United Nations.

   Accordingly, they will settle their disputes exclusively by peaceful means and undertake to refrain from the threat or use of force in any matters affecting security in Europe or internationally as well as in their mutual relations pursuant to Article 2 of the statutes of the United Nations.

3

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union share the realization that peace in Europe can be maintained only if no one disturbs the present frontiers.

   They undertake to respect without restriction the territorial integrity of all States in Europe within their present frontiers.

   They declare they have no territorial claims against anybody, nor will assert such claims in the future.

   They regard today and shall in future regard the frontiers of all States in Europe as inviolable such as they are on the date of signature of this agreement, including the Oder-Neisse Line, which forms the western frontier of the People's Republic of Poland, and the frontier between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic.

4

The agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall not affect the bilateral or multilateral treaties and agreements previously concluded by the two sides.

5

Agreement exists between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that the agreement on . . . (the official designation of the agreement to be inserted) to be concluded by them and
and corresponding agreements (treaties) of the Federal Republic of Germany with other socialist countries, in particular agreements (treaties) with the German Democratic Republic (see 6), the People's Republic of Poland and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (see 8) form a homogeneous whole.

6

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany declares its preparedness to conclude an agreement with the Government of the German Democratic Republic that shall have the same binding force, usual between States, as other agreements the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic conclude with third countries. Accordingly, it will frame its relations with the German Democratic Republic on the basis of full equality of status, non-discrimination, respect for the independence and autonomy of both States in matters concerning their internal competency within their respective frontiers.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany proceeds on the premise that the relations of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany with third States will develop on this basis, in accordance with which neither of the two States can represent the other abroad or act on its behalf.

7

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declare their preparedness, in the course of the detente in Europe and in the interest of the improvement of the relations among the European countries, in particular the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, to take steps resulting from their appropriate status to support the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic to the Organization of the United Nations and its specialized agencies.

8

Agreement exists between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that the issues connected with the invalidation of the Munich Agreement are to be settled in negotiations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in a form acceptable to both sides.
The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in the interest of both sides and the strengthening of peace in Europe, will continue to develop the economic, scientific, technological, cultural and other relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics welcome the plan of a conference on matters concerning the strengthening of security and cooperation in Europe and will do everything that depends on them for its preparation and successful prosecution.

APPENDIX C

QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT ON BERLIN

The Governments of the United States of America, the French Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Represented by their Ambassadors, who held a series of meetings in the building formerly occupied by the Allied Control Council in the American Sector of Berlin, Acting on the basis of their quadripartite rights and responsibilities, and of the corresponding wartime and post-war agreements and decisions of the Four Powers, which are not affected, Taking into account the existing situation in the relevant area, Guided by the desire to contribute to practical improvements of the situation, Without prejudice to their legal positions, Have agreed on the following:

Part I: General provisions

1 The four Governments will strive to promote the elimination of tension and the prevention of complications in the relevant area.

2 The four Governments, taking into account their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, agree that there shall be no use or threat of force in the area and that disputes shall be settled solely by peaceful means.

3 The four Governments will mutually respect their individual and joint rights and responsibilities, which remain unchanged.

4 The four Governments agree that, irrespective of the differences in legal views, the situation which has developed in the area, and as it is defined in this Agreement as well as in the other agreements referred to in this Agreement, shall not be changed unilaterally.

Part II: Provisions relating to the Western Sectors of Berlin

A The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares that transit traffic by road, rail and waterways
through the territory of the German Democratic Republic of civilian persons and goods between the Western Sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany will be unimpeded; that such traffic will be facilitated so as to take place in the most simple and expeditious manner; and that it will receive preferential treatment.

Detailed arrangements concerning this civilian traffic, as set forth in Annex I, will be agreed by the competent German authorities.

B The Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America declare that the ties between the Western Sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany will be maintained and developed, taking into account that these Sectors continue not to be a constituent part of the Federal Republic of Germany and not to be governed by it.

Detailed arrangements concerning the relationship between the Western Sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany are set forth in Annex II.

C The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares that communications between the Western Sectors of Berlin and areas bordering on these Sectors and those areas of the German Democratic Republic which do not border on these Sectors will be improved. Permanent residents of the Western Sectors of Berlin will be able to travel to and visit such areas for compassionate, family, religious, cultural or commercial reasons, or as tourists, under conditions comparable to those applying to other persons entering these areas.

The problems of the small enclaves, including Steinstuecken, and of other small areas may be solved by exchange of territory.

Detailed arrangements concerning travel, communications and the exchange of territory, as set forth in Annex III, will be agreed by the competent German authorities.

D Representation abroad of the interests of the Western Sectors of Berlin and consular activities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the Western Sectors of Berlin can be exercised as set forth in Annex IV.

Part III: Final provisions

This Quadripartite Agreement will enter into force on the date specified in a Final Quadripartite Protocol to be concluded
when the measures envisaged in Part II of this Quadripartite Agreement and in its Annexes have been agreed.

Done at the building formerly occupied by the Allied Control Council in the American Sector of Berlin this 3rd day of September 1971, in four originals, each in the English, French and Russian languages, all texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:

Kenneth Rush

For the Government of the French Republic:

Jean Sauvagnargues

For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Pyotr A. Abrasimov

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

Roger Jackling

Annex I

Communication From the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with reference to Part II(A) of the Quadripartite Agreement of this date and after consultation and agreement with the Government of the German Democratic Republic, has the honor to inform the Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America that:

1 Transit traffic by road, rail and waterways through the territory of the German Democratic Republic of civilian persons and goods between the Western Sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany will be facilitated and unimpeded. It will receive the most simple, expeditious and preferential treatment provided by international practice.

2 Accordingly,

(a) Conveyances sealed before departure may be used for the transport of civilian goods by road, rail and
waterways between the Western Sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany. Inspection procedures will be limited to the inspection of seals and accompanying documents.

(b) With regard to conveyances which cannot be sealed, such as open trucks, inspection procedures will be limited to the inspection of accompanying documents. In special cases where there is sufficient reason to suspect that unsealed conveyances contain either material intended for dissemination along the designated routes or persons or material put on board along these routes, the content of unsealed conveyances may be inspected. Procedures for dealing with such cases will be agreed by the competent German authorities.

(c) Through trains and buses may be used for travel between the Western Sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany. Inspection procedures will not include any formalities other than identification of persons.

(d) Persons identified as through travellers using individual vehicles between the Western Sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany on routes designated for through traffic will be able to proceed to their destinations without paying individual tolls and fees for the use of the transit routes. Procedures applied for such travellers shall not involve delay. The travellers, their vehicles and personal baggage will not be subject to search, detention or exclusion from use of the designated routes, except in special cases, as may be agreed by the competent German authorities, where there is sufficient reason to suspect that misuse of the transit routes is intended for purposes not related to direct travel to and from the Western Sectors of Berlin and contrary to generally applicable regulations concerning public order.

(e) Appropriate compensation for fees and tolls and for other costs related to traffic on the communication routes between the Western Sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany, including the maintenance of adequate routes, facilities and installations used for such traffic, may be made in the form of an annual lump sum paid to the German Democratic Republic by the Federal Republic of Germany.

3 Arrangements implementing and supplementing the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 above will be agreed by the competent German authorities.
Annex II

Communication from the Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

The Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, with reference to Part II (B) of the Quadripartite Agreement of this date and after consultation with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, have the honor to inform the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that:

1. They declare, in the exercise of their rights and responsibilities, that the ties between the Western Sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany will be maintained and developed, taking into account that these Sectors continue not to be a constituent part of the Federal Republic of Germany and not to be governed by it. The provisions of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the Constitution operative in the Western Sectors of Berlin which contradict the above have been suspended and continue not to be in effect.

2. The Federal President, the Federal Government, the Bundesversammlung, the Bundestag, and the Bundesrat and the Bundestag, including their Committees and Fraktionen, as well as other state bodies of the Federal Republic of Germany will not perform in the Western Sectors of Berlin constitutional or official acts which contradict the provisions of paragraph 1.

3. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany will be represented in the Western Sectors of Berlin to the authorities of the three Governments and to the Senat by a permanent liaison agency.

Annex III

Communication from the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with reference to Part II(C) of the Quadripartite Agreement of this date and after consultation and agreement with the Government of the German Democratic Republic, has the honor to inform the Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America that:
1 Communications between the Western Sectors of Berlin and areas bordering on these Sectors and those areas of the German Democratic Republic which do not border on these Sectors will be improved.

2 Permanent residents of the Western Sectors of Berlin will be able to travel to and visit such areas for compassionate, family, religious, cultural or commercial reasons, or as tourists, under conditions comparable to those applying to other persons entering these areas. In order to facilitate visits and travel, as described above, by permanent residents of the Western Sectors of Berlin, additional crossing points will be opened.

3 The problems of the small enclaves, including Steinstuecken, and of other small areas may be solved by exchange of territory.

4 Telephonic, telegraphic, transport and other external communications of the Western Sectors of Berlin will be expanded.

5 Arrangements implementing and supplementing the provisions of paragraphs 1 to 4 above will be agreed by the competent German authorities.

Annex IV

A Communication from the Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

The Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, with reference to Part II(D) of the Quadripartite Agreement of this date and after consultation with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, have the honor to inform the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that:

1 The Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America maintain their rights and responsibilities relating to the representation abroad of the interests of the Western Sectors of Berlin and their permanent residents, including those rights and responsibilities concerning matters of security and status, both in international organizations and in relations with other countries.

2 Without prejudice to the above and provided that matters of security and status are not affected, they have agreed that:
(a) The Federal Republic of Germany may perform consular services for permanent residents of the Western Sectors of Berlin.

(b) In accordance with established procedures, international agreements and arrangements entered into by the Federal Republic of Germany may be extended to the Western Sectors of Berlin provided that the extension of such agreements and arrangements is specified in each case.

(c) The Federal Republic of Germany may represent the interests of the Western Sectors of Berlin in international organizations and international conferences.

(d) Permanent residents of the Western Sectors of Berlin may participate jointly with participants from the Federal Republic of Germany in international exchanges and exhibitions. Meetings of international organizations and international conferences as well as exhibitions with international participation may be held in the Western Sectors of Berlin. Invitations will be issued by the Senat or jointly by the Federal Republic of Germany and the Senat.

3 The three Governments authorize the establishment of a Consulate General of the USSR in the Western Sectors of Berlin accredited to the appropriate authorities of the three Governments in accordance with the usual procedures applied in those Sectors, for the purpose of performing consular services, subject to provisions set forth in a separate document of this date.

B. Communication From the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with reference to Part II(D) of the Quadripartite Agreement of this date and to the communication of the Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America with regard to the representation abroad of the interests of the Western Sectors of Berlin and their permanent residents, has the honor to inform the Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America that:

1 The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics takes note of the fact that the three Governments maintain their rights and responsibilities relating to the representation abroad of the interests of the Western Sectors of Berlin and their permanent residents, including those rights and responsibilities concerning matters of security and status, both in
international organizations and in relations with other countries.

2 Provided that matters of security and status are not affected, for its part it will raise no objection to:

(a) the performance by the Federal Republic of Germany of consular services for permanent residents of the Western Sectors of Berlin;
(b) in accordance with established procedures, the extension to the Western Sectors of Berlin of international agreements and arrangements entered into by the Federal Republic of Germany provided that the extension of such agreements and arrangements is specified in each case;
(c) the representation of the interests of the Western Sectors of Berlin by the Federal Republic of Germany in international organizations and international conferences;
(d) the participation jointly with participants from the Federal Republic of Germany of permanent residents of the Western Sectors of Berlin in international exchanges and exhibitions, or the holding in those Sectors of meetings of international organizations and international conferences as well as exhibitions with international participation, taking into account that invitations will be issued by the Senat or jointly by the Federal Republic of Germany and the Senat.

3 The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics takes note of the fact that the three Governments have given their consent to the establishment of a Consulate General of the USSR in the Western Sectors of Berlin. It will be accredited to the appropriate authorities of the three Governments, for purposes and subject to provisions described in their communication and as set forth in a separate document of this date.

Agreed minute I

It is understood that permanent residents of the Western Sectors of Berlin shall, in order to receive at appropriate Soviet offices visas for entry into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, present:
(a) a passport stamped "Issued in accordance with the Quadripartite Agreement of September 3, 1971";
(b) an identity card or other appropriately drawn up document confirming that the person requesting the visa is a permanent resident of the Western Sectors of Berlin and containing the bearer's full address and a personal photograph.
During his stay in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a permanent resident of the Western Sectors of Berlin who has received a visa in this way may carry both documents or either of them, as he chooses. The visa issued by a Soviet office will serve as the basis for entry into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the passport or identity card will serve as the basis for consular services in accordance with the Quadripartite Agreement during the stay of that person in the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The above-mentioned stamp will appear in all passports used by permanent residents of the Western Sectors of Berlin for journeys to such countries as may require it.

Agreed minute II

Provision is hereby made for the establishment of a Consulate General of the USSR in the Western Sectors of Berlin. It is understood that the details concerning this Consulate General will include the following. The Consulate General will be accredited to the appropriate authorities of the three Governments in accordance with the usual procedures applying in those Sectors. Applicable Allied and German legislation and regulations will apply to the Consulate General. The activities of the Consulate General will be of a consular character and will not include political functions or any matters related to quadripartite rights or responsibilities.

The Three Governments are willing to authorize an increase in Soviet commercial activities in the Western Sectors of Berlin as described below. It is understood that pertinent Allied and German legislation and regulations will apply to these activities. This authorization will be extended indefinitely, subject to compliance with the provisions outlined herein. Adequate provision for consultation will be made. This increase will include establishment of an "Office of Soviet Foreign Trade Associations in the Western Sectors of Berlin" with commercial status, authorized to buy and sell on behalf of foreign trade associations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Socuzpushnina, Prodintorg and Novoexport may each establish a bonded warehouse in the Western Sectors of Berlin to provide storage and display for their goods. The activities of the Intourist office in the British Sector of Berlin may be expanded to include the sale of tickets and vouchers for travel and tours in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other countries. An office of Aeroflot may be established for the sale of passenger tickets and air freight services.
The assignment of personnel to the Consulate General and to permitted Soviet commercial organizations will be subject to agreement with the appropriate authorities of the three Governments. The number of such personnel will not exceed twenty Soviet nationals in the Consulate General; twenty in the office of the Soviet Foreign Trade Associations; one each in the bonded warehouses; six in the Intourist office; and five in the Aérofлот office. The personnel of the Consulate General and of permitted Soviet commercial organizations and their dependents may reside in the Western Sectors of Berlin upon individual authorization.

The property of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at Lietzenburgerstrasse 11 and at Am Sandwerder 1 may be used for purposes to be agreed between appropriate representatives of the three Governments and of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Details of implementation of the measures above and a time schedule for carrying them out will be agreed between the four Ambassadors in the period between the signature of the Quadripartite Agreement and the signature of the Final Quadripartite Protocol envisaged in that Agreement.

Exchange of notes

NOTE FROM THE THREE AMBASSADORS TO THE AMBASSADOR OF THE U.S.S.R.

The Ambassadors of the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America have the honor, with reference to the statements contained in Annex II of the Quadripartite Agreement to be signed on this date concerning the relationship between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Western Sectors of Berlin, to inform the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of their intention to send to the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany immediately following signature of the Quadripartite Agreement a letter containing clarifications and interpretations which represent the understanding of their Governments of the statements contained in Annex II of the Quadripartite Agreement. A copy of the letter to be sent to the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany is attached to this Note.

The Ambassadors avail themselves of this opportunity to renew to the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the assurances of their highest consideration.

Jean Sauvagnargues
Roger Jackling
Kenneth Rush

September 3, 1971
ATTACHMENT TO THREE-POWER NOTE

His Excellency
The Chancellor of the
Federal Republic of Germany,
Bonn.

Your Excellency: With reference to the Quadripartite Agreement signed on September 3, 1971, our Governments wish by this letter to inform the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany of the following clarifications and interpretations of the statements contained in Annex II, which was the subject of consultation with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany during the quadripartite negotiations.

These clarifications and interpretations represent the understanding of our Governments of this part of the Quadripartite Agreement, as follows:

a. The phrase in Paragraph 2 of Annex II of the Quadripartite Agreement which reads: "... will not perform in the Western Sectors of Berlin constitutional or official acts which contradict the provisions of Paragraph 1" shall be interpreted to mean acts in exercise of direct state authority over the Western Sectors of Berlin.

b. Meetings of the Bundesversammlung will not take place and plenary sessions of the Bundesrat and the Bundestag will continue not to take place in the Western Sectors of Berlin. Single committees of the Bundesrat and the Bundestag may meet in the Western Sectors of Berlin in connection with maintaining and developing the ties between those Sectors and the Federal Republic of Germany. In the case of Fraktionen, meetings will not be held simultaneously.

c. The liaison agency of the Federal Government in the Western Sectors of Berlin includes departments charged with liaison functions in their respective fields.

d. Established procedures concerning the applicability to the Western Sectors of Berlin of legislation of the Federal Republic of Germany shall remain unchanged.

e. The term "state bodies" in Paragraph 2 of Annex II shall be interpreted to mean: the Federal President, the Federal Chancellor, the Federal Cabinet, the Federal Ministers and Ministries, and the branch offices of those Ministries, the Bundesrat and the Bundestag, and all Federal courts.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of our highest esteem.
For the Government of the French Republic:
For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
For the Government of the United States of America:

REPLY FROM THE AMBASSADOR OF THE U.S.S.R.

Translation

The Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has the honor to acknowledge receipt of the note of the Ambassadors of the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, dated September 3, 1971, and takes cognizance of the communication of the three Ambassadors.

The Ambassador avails himself of this opportunity to renew to the Ambassadors of the French Republic, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America the assurance of his very high consideration.

Pyotr A. Abrasimov


France-U.S.-U.K. Letter to the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

His Excellency
The Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Bonn

Your Excellency: We have the honor by means of this letter to convey to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany the text of the Quadripartite Agreement signed this day in Berlin. The Quadripartite Agreement was concluded by the Four Powers in the exercise of their rights and responsibilities with respect to Berlin.

We note that, pursuant to the terms of the Agreement and of the Final Quadripartite Protocol which ultimately will bring it into force, the text of which has been agreed, these rights and responsibilities are not affected and remain unchanged. Our Governments will continue, as heretofore, to exercise
supreme authority in the Western Sectors of Berlin, within
the framework of the Four Power responsibility which we
share for Berlin as a whole.

In accordance with Part II(A) of the Quadripartite Agree-
ment, arrangements implementing and supplementing the pro-
visions relating to civilian traffic will be agreed by the
competent German authorities. Part III of the Quadripartite
Agreement provides that the Agreement will enter into force
on a date to be specified in a Final Quadripartite Protocol
which will be concluded when the arrangements envisaged
between the competent German authorities have been agreed.
It is the request of our Governments that the envisaged nego-
tiations now take place between authorities of the Federal
Republic of Germany, also acting on behalf of the Senat, and
authorities of the German Democratic Republic.

Part II(B) and (D) and Annexes II and IV of the Quadri-
partite Agreement relate to the relationship between the
Western Sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic. In this
connection, the following are recalled inter alia:
the communications of the three Western Military Gover-
nors to the Parliamentary Council of 2 March, 22 April and
12 May, 1949,
the letter of the three High Commissioners to the Federal
Chancellor concerning the exercise of the reserved Allied
rights relating to Berlin of 26 May 1952 in the version of the
letter I. of 23 October 1954,
the Aide Memoire of the three Governments of 18 April
1967 concerning the decision of the Federal Constitutional
Court of 20 January 1966 in the Niekisch case.

Our Governments take this occasion to state, in exercise
of the rights and responsibilities relating to Berlin, which
they retained in Article 2 of the Convention on Relations
between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany
of 26 May 1952 as amended October 23, 1954, that Part II(B)
(D) and Annexes II and IV of the Quadripartite Agreement con-
cerning the relationship between the Federal Republic of
Germany and the Western Sectors of Berlin accord with the
position in the above mentioned documents, which remains
unchanged.

With regard to the existing ties between the Federal
Republic and the Western Sectors of Berlin, it is the firm
intention of our Governments that, as stated in Part II(B)(1)
of the Quadripartite Agreement, these ties will be maintained
and developed in accordance with the letter from the three
High Commissioners to the Federal Chancellor on the exercise

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of our highest esteem.

For the Government of the French Republic:

Jean Sauvagnargues

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

Roger Jackling

For the Government of the United States of America:

Kenneth Rush

Communication From Allied Kommandatura to the Governing Mayor of Berlin

BKC/L (71)1 DATED SEPTEMBER 3

The Allied Kommandatura refers to the Quadripartite Agreement signed on September 3 in Berlin.

Part II(C) and Annex III, Paragraph 5, of the Quadripartite Agreement provide that arrangements implementing and supplementing the provisions relating to travel, communications and the exchange of territory will be agreed by the competent German authorities. Part IV of the Quadripartite Agreement provides that the Agreement will enter into force on a date to be specified in a Final Quadripartite Protocol which will be concluded when the arrangements envisaged between the competent German authorities have been agreed.

The Senat of Berlin is hereby authorized and requested to conduct appropriate negotiations on the subjects covered in Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 in Annex III.

Draft Protocol on Entry into Force

FINAL QUADRIPARTITE PROTOCOL

The Governments of the United States of America, the French Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,  

Having in mind Part II of the Quadripartite Agreement  
of September 3, 1971, and taking note with satisfaction of the  
fact that the agreements and arrangements mentioned below  
have been concluded,  

Have agreed on the following:

1 The four Governments, by virtue of this Protocol  
bring into force the Quadripartite Agreement, which like this  
Protocol, does not affect quadripartite agreements or deci-
sions previously concluded or reached.

2 The four Governments proceed on the basis that the  
agreements and arrangements concluded between the competent  
German authorities (list of agreements and arrangements) shall  
enter into force simultaneously with the Quadripartite  
Agreement.

3 The Quadripartite Agreement and the consequent agree-
ments and arrangements of the competent German authorities  
referred to in this Protocol settle important issues examined  
in the course of the negotiations and shall remain in force  
together.

4 In the event of a difficulty in the application of  
the Quadripartite Agreement or any of the above mentioned agree-
ments or arrangements which any of the four Governments con-
siders serious, or in the event of non-implementation of any  
part thereof, that Government will have the right to draw  
the attention of the other three Governments to the provisions  
of the Quadripartite Agreement and this Protocol and to con-
duct the requisite quadripartite consultations in order to  
ensure the observance of the commitments undertaken and to bring  
the situation into conformity with the Quadripartite Agreement  
and this Protocol.

5 This Protocol enters into force on the date of signature.

Done at the building formerly occupied by the Allied Control  
Council in the American Sector of Berlin this ........ day of  
.............. 1971, in four originals, each in the English,  
French and Russian languages, all texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
For the Government of the French Republic:
For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and  
Northern Ireland:

Source: The Department of State Bulletin, LXV, (1683),  
September 27, 1971, pp. 218-325.
APPENDIX D

TREATY ON THE BASIS OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

The High Contracting Parties,
Conscious of their responsibility for the preservation of peace,
Anxious to render a contribution to detente and security in Europe,
Aware that the inviolability of frontiers and respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all States in Europe within their present frontiers are a basic condition for peace,
Recognizing that therefore the two German States have to refrain from the threat or use of force in their relations,
Proceeding from the historical facts and without prejudice to the different views of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Germany Democratic Republic on fundamental questions, including the national question,
Desirous to create the conditions for co-operation between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic for the benefit of the people in the two German States,
Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic shall develop normal, good-neighbourly relations with each other on the basis of equal rights.

Article 2

The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic will be guided by the aims and principles laid down in the United Nations Charter, especially those of the sovereign equality of all States, respect for their independence, autonomy and territorial integrity, the right or self-determination, the protection of human rights, and non-discrimination.

Article 3

In conformity with the United Nations Charter the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic shall
settle any disputes between them exclusively by peaceful means and refrain from the threat or use of force.

They reaffirm the inviolability now and in the future of the frontier existing between them and undertake fully to respect each other's territorial integrity.

Article 4

The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic proceed on the assumption that neither of the two States can represent the other in the international sphere or act on its behalf.

Article 5

The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic shall promote peaceful relations between the European States and contribute to security and co-operation in Europe.

They shall support efforts to reduce forces and arms in Europe without allowing disadvantages to arise for the security of those concerned.

The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic shall support, with the aim of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, efforts serving international security to achieve armaments limitation and disarmament, especially with regard to nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

Article 6

The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic proceed on the principle that the sovereign jurisdiction of each of the two States is confined to its own territory. They respect each other's independence and autonomy in their internal and external affairs.

Article 7

The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic declare their readiness to regulate practical and humanitarian questions in the process of normalization of their relations. They shall conclude agreements with a view to developing and promoting on the basis of the present Treaty and for their mutual benefit co-operation in the fields of economics, science and technology, transport, judicial relations, posts and telecommunications, health, culture, sport,
environmental protection, and in other fields. The details have been agreed in the Supplementary Protocol.

Article 8

The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic shall exchange Permanent Missions. They shall be established at the respective Government's seat.

Practical questions relating to the establishment of the Missions shall be dealt with separately.

Article 9

The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic agree that the present Treaty shall not affect the bilateral and multilateral international treaties and agreements already concluded by them or relating to them.

Article 10

The present Treaty shall be subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the day after the exchange of notes to that effect.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the plenipotentiaries of the High Contracting Parties have signed this Treaty.

DONE at ......................... on ....................... 1972, in duplicate in the German language.

For the Federal Republic of Germany

For the German Democratic Republic

SUPPLEMENTARY PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY ON THE BASIS OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

I

Re Article 3

The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic have agreed to form a Commission composed of agents of the Governments of the two States. They will review and, where necessary, renew or supplement the marking of the frontier existing between the two States and draw up the
necessary documentation on the course of the frontier. In the same way the Commission will contribute to regulating other problems connected with the course of the frontier, e.g. water management, energy supply and the prevention of damage.

The Commission shall commence its work after the signing of the Treaty.

II

Re Article 7

1 Trade between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic shall be developed on the basis of the existing agreements.

The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic shall conclude long-term agreements with a view to promoting the continued development of their economic relations, adapting outdated arrangements, and improving the structure of trade.

2 The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic proclaim their intention to develop co-operation in the fields of science and technology for their mutual benefit and to conclude the necessary treaties for this purpose.

3 The co-operation in the field of traffic which began with the Treaty of 26 May 1972 shall be widened and intensified.

4 The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic declare their readiness to regulate their judicial relations as simply and expeditiously as possible by treaty in the interests of those seeking justice, especially in the fields of civil and criminal law.

5 The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic agree to conclude an agreement on posts and telecommunications on the basis of the Constitution of the Universal Postal Union and the International Telecommunication Convention. They will notify the Universal Postal Union (UPU) and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) of the conclusion of that agreement.

The existing agreements and the procedures beneficial to both sides will be incorporated in that agreement.
6 The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic declare their interest in co-operation in the field of health. They agree that the appropriate treaty shall also regulate the exchange of medicaments as well as the treatment of patients in special clinics and sanatoria as far as practicable.

7 The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic intend to develop their cultural co-operation. To this end they shall enter into negotiations on the conclusion of intergovernmental agreements.

8 The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic reaffirm their preparedness to assist the appropriate sports organizations, after the Treaty has been signed, in bringing about arrangements for the promotion of relations in the field of sport.

9 Agreements are to be concluded between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic in the field of environmental protection in order to help prevent hazards and harm to each other.

10 The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic will conduct negotiations with a view to enhancing the acquisition of each other's books, periodicals, radio and television productions.

11 The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic shall, in the interest of the people concerned, enter into negotiations to regulate non-commercial payment and clearing procedures. In this connexion they shall, in their mutual interest, give priority to the early conclusion of agreements on social grounds.

PROTOCOL NOTE

Owing to the different legal positions with regard to questions of property and assets these matters could not be regulated by the Treaty.

EXTENSION OF AGREEMENTS AND ARRANGEMENTS TO BERLIN (WEST); REPRESENTATION OF INTERESTS OF BERLIN (WEST)

Identical Statement by both Parties on signing the Treaty:
"It is agreed that the extension to Berlin (West) of agreements and arrangements envisaged in the Supplementary Protocol to Article 7 may be agreed in each individual case in conformity with the Quadripartite Agreement of 3 September 1971.

The Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany in the German Democratic Republic shall, in conformity with the Quadripartite Agreement of 3 September 1971, represent the interests of Berlin (West).

Arrangements between the German Democratic Republic and the Senate shall remain unaffected."

POLITICAL CONSULTATION

Identical Statement by both Parties on signing the Treaty:

"The two Governments have agreed to consult each other in the process of the normalization of relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic on questions of mutual interest, in particular on those important for the safeguarding of peace in Europe."

CORRESPONDENCE ON AN APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP
IN THE UNITED NATIONS

The Federal Chancellery
The State Secretary

Bonn,

To the
State Secretary to the
Council of Ministers of
the German Democratic Republic,
Dr. Michael Kohl

Berlin

Dear Herr Kohl,

I have the honour to inform you of the following:

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has noted that the Government of the German Democratic Republic initiates the necessary steps in conformity with domestic
legislation to acquire membership of the United Nations Organization.

The two Governments will inform each other of the date on which the application will be made.

Yours faithfully,

(Signed: Egon Bahr)

State Secretary to the Council of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic Berlin,

To the State Secretary in the Chancellery of the Federal Republic of Germany,

Herr Egon Bahr,

Bonn

Dear Herr Bahr,

I have the honour to inform you of the following:

The Government of the German Democratic Republic has noted that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany initiates the necessary steps in conformity with domestic legislation to acquire membership of the United Nations Organization.

The two Governments will inform each other of the date on which the application will be made.

Yours faithfully,

(Signed: Dr. Michael Kohl)
The Federal Chancellery
The State Secretary

Bonn,

To the
State Secretary to the
Council of Ministers
of the German Democratic Republic,

Dr. Michael Kohl,
Berlin

Dear Herr Kohl,

I have the honour to inform you that the German Federal Foreign Office will today transmit in notes to the Ambassadors of the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America to the Federal Republic of Germany the following text:

"The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, with reference to Article 9 of the Treaty on the basis of relations, dated __________, affirm that rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers and the corresponding, related Quadripartite agreements, decisions and practices cannot be affected by this Treaty."

Yours faithfully,  
(Signed: Egon Bahr)

State Secretary to the
Council of Ministers of
the German Democratic Republic

Berlin,

To the
State Secretary in the
Chancellery of the
Federal Republic of Germany,
Herr Egon Bahr,
Bonn

Dear Herr Bahr,

I have the honour to inform you that the Ministry of External Affairs will today transmit in a note to the Ambassador of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics to the German Democratic Republic the following text:

"The German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, with reference to Article 9 of the Treaty on the basis of relations, dated ..........., affirm that the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers and the corresponding, related Quadripartite agreements, decisions and practices cannot be affected by this Treaty."

Yours faithfully,

(Signed: Dr. Michael Kohl)

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correspondence on the re-uniting of families, facilitation of travel, and improvements in non-commercial goods traffic

The State Secretary to the Council of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic

Berlin,

State Secretary in the Federal Chancellery of the Federal Republic of Germany,

Herr Egon Bahr,
Bonn

Dear Herr Bahr,

On the occasion of the signing today of the Treaty on the Basis of Relations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, I have the honour to inform you of the following:
The Government of the German Democratic Republic will in the process of the normalization of relations and after the entry into force of the Treaty take steps to regulate matters in the following fields:

1. The solution of problems resulting from the separation of families.

2. Further to the exchange of letters of 26 May 1972, measures for the further improvement of border-crossing travel and visitor traffic, including tourism.

3. Improvement of non-commercial goods traffic between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany:
   - Further measures to facilitate border-crossing traffic in gift parcels and packages;
   - further facilities for travellers to carry non-commercial goods in border-crossing travel and visitor traffic;
   - corresponding review of existing import and export regulations;
   - simplification of procedures to obtain permits for the removal of personal and household effects and for hereditaments.

Yours faithfully,

(Signed: Dr. Michael Kohl).

The Federal Chancellery
The State Secretary

Bonn,

To the
State Secretary to the
Council of Ministers
of the German Democratic Republic,

Dr. Michael Kohl

Berlin

Dear Herr Kohl,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of today's date, which reads as follows:
"On the occasion of the signing today of the Treaty on the Basis of Relations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, I have the honour to inform you of the following:

The Government of the German Democratic Republic will in the process of the normalisation of relations and after the entry into force of the Treaty take steps to regulate matters in the following fields:

1. The solution of problems resulting from the separation of families.

2. Further to the exchange of letters of 26 May 1972, measures for the further improvement of border-crossing travel and visitor traffic, including tourism.

3. Improvement of non-commercial goods traffic between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany:
   - Further measures to facilitate border-crossing traffic in gift parcels and packages;
   - Further facilities for travellers to carry non-commercial goods in border-crossing travel and visitor traffic;
   - Corresponding review of existing import and export regulations;
   - Simplification of procedures to obtain permits for the removal of personal and household effects and for hereditaments."

Yours faithfully,

(Signed: Egon Bahr)

CORRESPONDENCE ON WORKING POSSIBILITIES FOR JOURNALISTS

The Federal Chancellery
The State Secretary

Bonn,

To the
State Secretary to the
Council of Ministers
of the German Democratic Republic,
Dr. Michael Kohl,
Berlin

Dear Herr Kohl,

I have the honour, on behalf of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, to inform you of the following regarding the possibilities for journalists from the German Democratic Republic to work in the Federal Republic of Germany:

The Federal Republic of Germany shall within the framework of its applicable legislation accord journalists from the German Democratic Republic and their assistants the right to engage in their professional activities and freely to acquire and report information. It will enable journalists to carry on their activities as travelling correspondents and, on the basis of reciprocity, to take up residence and engage in their professional activities as permanent correspondents, in each case on condition that their professional activities remain within the limits of the law.

For permanent correspondents the following assurances are given:
- They will be entitled to the same treatment as correspondents from other states;
- They will be entitled, after their professional establishment, to enter and leave the country at any time using any of the customary means of transport;
- They will be able to work and move about freely in the Federal Republic of Germany and to communicate without delay news, opinions and commentaries;
- They will be allowed to use the news transmission media normally available to the public;
- They will be entitled to obtain any official information generally accessible to the public and the publishing media as well as information from the authorized persons and authorities;
- They will be entitled to carry with them equipment, materials and documents required for the personal exercise of their profession.

Journalists working as permanent correspondents of the German Democratic Republic in the Federal Republic of Germany will be required:
- to be accredited or established in accordance with the applicable modalities in the Federal Republic of Germany;
- to observe regulations and ordinances issued in the interest
of security, crime prevention, protection of public health and of the rights and liberties of others.

Journalists within the meaning of this communication are persons who are regularly and professionally concerned as reporters, photographers, camera-men or technicians of the press, radio, television or of a news film company of the German Democratic Republic with obtaining, receiving or passing on information including opinions and commentaries for daily or periodical publications, press agencies, radio and television companies or news film companies of the German Democratic Republic.

Yours faithfully,

(Signed: Egon Bahr)

The State Secretary
to the Council of Ministers
of the German Democratic Republic

Berlin,

State Secretary in the
Federal Chancellery
of the Federal Republic of Germany,

Herr Egon Bahr,

Bonn

Dear Herr Bahr,

I have the honour, on behalf of the Government of the German Democratic Republic, to inform you of the following regarding the possibilities for journalists from the Federal Republic of Germany to work in the German Democratic Republic:

The German Democratic Republic shall within the framework of its applicable legislation accord journalists from the Federal Republic of Germany and their assistants the right to engage in their professional activities and freely to acquire and report information. It will enable journalists to carry on their activities as travelling correspondents and, on the basis of reciprocity, to take up residence and engage in their professional activities as permanent correspondents, in each case on condition that their professional activities remain within the limits of the law.
For permanent correspondents the following assurances are given:

—They will be entitled to the same treatment as correspondents from other states;
—They will be entitled, after their professional establishment, to enter and leave the country at any time using any of the customary means of transport;
—They will be able to work and move about freely in the German Democratic Republic and to communicate without delay news, opinions and commentaries;
—They will be allowed to use the news transmission media normally available to the public;
—They will be entitled to obtain any official information generally accessible to the public and the publishing media as well as information from the authorized persons and authorities;
—They will be entitled to carry with them the equipment, materials and documents required for the personal exercise of their profession.

Journalists working as permanent correspondents of the Federal Republic of Germany in the German Democratic Republic will be required:
—to be accredited or established with the applicable modalities in the German Democratic Republic;
—to observe regulations and ordinances issued in the interest of security, crime prevention, protection of public health and of the rights and liberties of others.

Journalists within the meaning of this communication are persons who are regularly and professionally concerned as reporters, photographers, camera-men or technicians of the press, radio, television or of a news film company of the Federal Republic of Germany with obtaining, receiving or passing on information including opinions and commentaries for daily or periodical publications, press agencies, radio and television companies or news film companies of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Yours faithfully,

(Signed: Dr. Michael Kohl)
CORRESPONDENCE ON THE OPENING OF FOUR NEW BORDER CROSSINGS

The State Secretary to
the Council of Ministers
of the German Democratic Republic

Berlin,

State Secretary in the
Federal Chancellery of
the Federal Republic of Germany,
Herr Egon Bahr,

Bonn

Dear Herr Bahr,

I have the honour to inform you of the following:

The German Democratic Republic will, at the time of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Basis of Relations, open the following road crossing points on the frontier with the Federal Republic of Germany for passenger traffic:

—Salzwedel
—Worbis
—Heiningen
—Eisfeld

Please convey this information to your Government

Yours faithfully,

(Signed: Dr. Michael Kohl)

The Federal Chancellery
The State Secretary

Bonn,

To the
State Secretary to the
Council of Ministers
of the German Democratic Republic,

Dr. Michael Kohl,

Berlin
Dear Herr Kohl,

With reference to your letters of ............, I have the honour to inform you of the following:

The Federal Republic of Germany will, at the time of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Basis of Relations, open the following crossing points for passenger traffic to correspond to the road frontier crossing points which you have communicated to me:

—Uelzen
—Duderstadt
—Bad Neustadt (Saale)
—Coburg

Yours faithfully,

(Signed: Egon Bahr)

APPROVAL BY THE CABINET OF RESULTS OF THE TREATY NEGOTIATIONS

State Secretary Conrad Ahlers (Press and Information Office) announces that the Cabinet on November 7 approved the negotiation results with the GDR and has taken positive cognizance of the draft of the text for the Treaty on the Basis of the Relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic as well as the accompanying documents.

State Secretary Egon Bahr (Chancellery) has been empowered to initial the treaty upon the proposal of the Federal Minister for Intra-German Relations. The initialing of the treaty will ensue shortly.

CORRESPONDENCE ON POSTAL SERVICES AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS

The State Secretary to the Council of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic

Berlin,
State Secretary in the
Chancellery of the
Federal Republic of Germany,

Herr Egon Bahr,

Bonn

Dear Herr Bahr,

I have the honour to inform you of the following:

The Government of the German Democratic Republic and
the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany agree to
enter into negotiations on a posts and telecommunications
agreement after the initialling of the Treaty on the Basis
of Relations between the German Democratic Republic and the
Federal Republic of Germany. Until the conclusion of such
an agreement the existing agreements and procedures shall
continue to apply.

In view of the necessity of both States having equal
membership of the Universal Postal Union (UPU) and the
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the Government
of the German Democratic Republic wishes to inform the
Government of the Federal Republic of Germany that the
German Democratic Republic will, after the commencement of
negotiations, take the necessary steps to obtain membership.

Yours faithfully,

(Signed: Dr. Michael Kohl)

The Federal Chancellery
The State Secretary

Bonn,

To the
State Secretary to the Council
of Ministers of the
German Democratic Republic,

Dr. Michael Kohl

Berlin,
Dear Herr Kohl,

I have the honour to inform you of the following:

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the German Democratic Republic agree to enter into negotiations on a posts and telecommunications agreement after the initialling of the Treaty on the Basis of Relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. Until the conclusion of such an agreement the existing agreements and procedures shall continue to apply.

In view of the necessity of both States having equal membership of the Universal Postal Union (UPU) and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany takes note of the fact that the German Democratic Republic will, after the commencement of negotiations, take the necessary steps to obtain membership.

Yours faithfully,

(Signed: Egon Bahr)

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