Systemic Adaptation: Can the Soviet System Accommodate the “Democratic Movement”?

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SYSTEMIC ADAPTATION: CAN THE SOVIET SYSTEM ACCOMMODATE THE "DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT"?

by

Phillip A. Petersen

A Thesis
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Phillip A. Petersen
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WILL THE U.S.S.R. SURVIVE UNTIL 1984?

The answer to Andrei Amalrik's question of whether the Soviet Union will survive until 1984, may very well be the answer to the question of whether the present system can accommodate that political opposition which calls itself the "Democratic Movement."¹ A growing awareness among elements of Soviet society that Marxism-Leninism has become irrelevant has resulted in tendency conflict between self-preservation and power. For as Amalrik puts it, "in order to remain in power, the regime must change and evolve, but in order to preserve itself, everything must remain unchanged."² He feels that the corruption of the cause has "...reached the sad point where the idea of power is no longer connected with either a doctrine, the personality of a leader or a tradition, but only with power itself."³ The regime, he says, is one of bureaucrats, and is interested only in self-preservation. The "middle-class" or "class of specialists" upon which the Democratic Movement could

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²loc. cit., p. 22.
³ibid.
seemingly base itself in its attempt at rejuvenation or peaceful reconstruction of the political system is believed by him to be too passive. Even the part of the "middle-class" upon which the Democratic Movement presently bases itself is found by him to be "...too weak and too beset by internal contradictions to engage in a real face-to-face struggle with the regime or, in the event of the regime's self-destruction or its collapse as a result of mass disorders, to become a force capable of reorganizing society in a new way."¹ Furthermore, he feels that the "passive discontent" of the masses is not likely to be harnessed by the Democratic Movement because "...the idea of self-government, of equality before the law and of personal freedom—and the responsibility that goes with these—are almost incomprehensible to the Russian people."² As the regime becomes progressively weaker, he sees the destructive movement of the "lower classes" taking "...the form of extremely damaging, violent and irresponsible action once its members realize their relative immunity from punishment."³

¹loc. cit., p. 32.
²loc. cit., p. 33.
³loc. cit., pp. 41-42.
In his analysis of the Soviet system, Amalrik does leave room for the possibility of those representing political authority taking some action which might rejuvenate the system. However, he is convinced that decisive and forthright measures of this sort are not forthcoming. To him, it appears more likely that those representing political authority will merely continue to make the minimal necessary changes so as to stay in power. For "any fundamental change would require such a drastic shake-up in personnel from top to bottom that, understandably, those who personify the regime would never embark on it. To save the regime at the cost of firing themselves would seem to them too exorbitant and unfair a price to pay."  

Yet despite Amalrik's lack of confidence in the ability of those representing political authority to save the system, investigation cannot overlook the "inputs" of the political system—which are regarded by Easton as an essential element of every political system. That is, the form of administration does not preclude the articulation and aggregation of interests

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1 loc. cit., p. 43.

characteristic of all political systems. The top political authority personalities and the apparatchiki are not the sole political actors in the Soviet system. For behind the facade of the monolithic party, struggles that represent more than the simple conflicts of personal ambition take place.

The new version of Soviet politics that slowly began to emerge after the death of Stalin has challenged the concept of the Soviet political system as a totalitarian system in which a single party, itself free of internal conflict, imposes its will on society and on all social groups. Although this cannot be described as genuine pluralism, Skilling feels that it can be regarded as a kind of imperfect monism in which, of the many elements involved, one—the party—is more powerful than all the others but is not omnipotent. For he is convinced that "although decision-making in its final stage still remains in the hands of a relatively small group of leaders at the top of the party hierarchy, there has been...a broadening of group participation in the crucial preliminary stages of policy deliberation

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2 ibid.
and in the subsequent phase of implementation."¹ It is
this group activity which, in articulating policy
expectations, results in "...the emergence of, and
selection from, a series of alternate possible direc­
tions of value allocation--tendencies of articulation--
for Soviet society."² Thus, the articulations of the
Democratic Movement will be influential only to the
extent that they form part of existing tendencies or
lead to the setting up of possible alternate directions
of value allocation for the system.

If the articulations of the Democratic Movement
are examined and found to have generated a conflict of
dominant tendencies of articulation prior to, during,
and after the taking of official decisions, it can be
assumed that they do represent effective variants of
policy. Furthermore, "...fluctuations in value alloca­
tion or in the policy 'line' may be seen as shifts in
the relative influence of conflicting tendencies."

¹Skilling, H. Gordon, "Groups in Soviet Politics:
Some Hypotheses," in Interest Groups in Soviet Poli­
tics, edited by H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn
p. 19.

²Griffiths, Franklyn, "A Tendency Analysis of
Soviet Policy-Making," in Interest Groups in Soviet
Politics, edited by H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn
p. 336.

³loc. cit., p. 361.
Therefore, a tendency analysis of the Soviet political system that demonstrated the possibility of adducing situational variables that would allow accommodation of the Democratic Movement by the political system would increase the likelihood of an affirmative answer to Amalrik's question. The present tendency analysis study examines the Soviet political system for this logical possibility of accommodating the Democratic Movement of which Amalrik writes. The essential question for which an answer was sought is whether the known facts concerning, and the history of, Amalrik's Democratic Movement support his apocalyptic predictions concerning the end of the great Eastern Slav empire or, instead, support a case for the integrative capacity of the Soviet system.

The Procedure for the Analysis

The following tendency analysis of the Soviet system approximates the four stages set forth by Griffiths.\(^1\) Initially there is an exploration of the history and ideational development of the Democratic Movement in the post-Stalin Soviet Union. This includes a search for the presence of uniformities in the articulations of the Democratic Movement and a consideration of underlying variables that might help to

\(^1\)loc. cit., p. 361.
explain the observed propensities of given actors and groups within the Democratic Movement to articulate common or converging expectations of policy. There follows a brief discussion of systemic criticism and the effect of dissent on the Soviet polity as reflected in policy shifts induced by the Democratic Movement. Finally, the possibilities for the development of a pluralistic political system are sought from a look at subsystem interaction and the context of the whole in which interaction must take place. Here situational variables are adduced to project the course of tendency conflict in the political system as a whole and, thereby, aid in the determination of system adaptability. Robert Dahl's\(^1\) seven sets of complex conditions that favor the development of a high level of participation in a highly competitive public contestation environment are utilized to create a suggestive profile of the Soviet Union's potential for polyarchy.

The Soviet dissidents whose articulations and propensities are investigated as constituting the Democratic Movement are those whose philosophical viewpoints support one or another of the three ideologies

upon which Amalrik feels the Democratic Movement is
founded. "They are 'genuine Marxism-Leninism,'
'Christian ideology' and 'liberal ideology.'"¹

"'Genuine Marxism-Leninism' contends that the
regime, having perverted Marxist-Leninist ideology
for its own purposes, does not practice real Marxism-
Leninism, and that in order to cure the ills of..."1

Soviet "...society it is essential to return to the
true principles of that doctrine."² The two repre­
sentatives of "genuine Marxism-Leninism" most widely
known in the West are probably Major-General Peter
Grigorenko and Roy A. Medvedev.

"Supporters of 'Christian ideology' maintain that
the life of society must return to Christian moral
principles, which are interpreted in a somewhat
Slavophile spirit, with a claim for a special role for
Russia."³ It is essential to understand, however, that
what Amalrik calls "Christian ideology" is "...a politi­
cal doctrine and not a religious philosophy or an
ecclesiastical ideology, representatives of which would
be more correctly regarded as members of the Cultural

¹Amalrik, op. cit., p. 11.
²ibid.
³loc. cit., pp. 11-12.
Members of the "Cultural Opposition" do not primarily, or even necessarily, seek fundamental political change. While opposed to what they perceive as intervention in their respective endeavors, they are not directly interested in politics. Often, however, cultural opposition is but the first step on the road to political opposition. Anyway, "Christian ideology" was the inspiration behind the "All-Russian Social-Christian Union for the Liberation of the People" which was based at Leningrad University and, reportedly, had offshoots in Tomsk and Irkutsk.

"Finally, believers in 'liberal ideology' ultimately envisage a transition to a Western kind of democratic society, which would, however, retain the principle of public or governmental ownership of the means of production."

Academician Andrei D. Sakharov, the man some Soviet citizens describe as the "father of the Soviet H-bomb," and Pavel Litvinov,

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1loc. cit., p. 12n.


3Amalrik, op. cit., p. 12.
grandson of the Soviet diplomat who negotiated the
1933 American recognition of the Soviet state, are un­
doubtedly the two best known representatives of "liberal
ideology."
At the turn of the century the democratic movement in Tsarist Russia was relatively small, weak, and detached from the masses. Much of this already tiny minority had either fled or been killed by the conclusion of the Civil War, and the devastating purges of the thirties further decimated its ranks. Little wonder, then, that the handful of those who survived these cataclysms relented to fearful pressures to remain silent. Most recently, however, free-thinking individuals of all ages have come to call for fundamental changes in Soviet society.

The most obvious, and crucial, precondition for this evolution of courage and conscience was the elimination of random mass police terror after Stalin's death. Because the reflex of distrust and deception was not easy to overcome, though, stirrings of dissatisfaction were limited to the cultural sphere, to censorship and other forms of non-political control. Thus, the real preface to current dissident turmoil was written by Nikita Khrushchev in February of 1956. Stalin's death had dealt an incorrigible blow to the Soviet religioesthetic system, but Khrushchev's speech
at the 20th Party Congress dealt the mortal blow to the teleological structure of Soviet society. Skepticism about the basic values of the system began to emerge, and without that all-seeing and all-powerful tyrant legend upon which the whole of socialism had come to depend, a new pattern of regime behavior vis-a-vis society began to develop. Without a Stalin to give commands, the regime became inconsistent, sterile, uninventive, and, therefore, insecure. With only terror as a tool, the regime became the victim of its own needs.

Already in late 1956 militiamen on horseback had to intervene when a meeting held to discuss Vladimir Dudintsev's novel, Not By Bread Alone, turned into a riot.\(^1\) By 1958, Boris Pasternak had been awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature for his novel, Dr. Zhivago. And it was also during this period that Yevgeny Yevtushenko spoke out and became the representative of the younger generation.\(^2\) Yet, these developments were harshly arrested because the regime failed to recognize them as an opportunity to revitalize the system. The

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civic-minded began to doubt the ability of Khrushchev to revive genuine Marxism-Leninism, and turned against him after the crushing of the Hungarian Revolution. For his part, Khrushchev had no intention of allowing anything remotely resembling the Hungarian Petoefi Circle to be formed in the Soviet Union by those who demonstrated their gratitude for his liberalization with ever greater demands. Thus, in the course of 1957 and early 1958 the most revolutionary-minded were arrested and sentenced to long terms in concentration camps.¹

Now the death of Stalin and Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization speech led to conditions more favorable to independent and creative scientific research in the USSR. "For during a quarter of a century every science without exception ran the humiliating and destructive gauntlet of Stalinist power. What Stalinism meant to Soviet scientists is illustrated by the story of the advent to power of a fanatical and incompetent agronomist named Trofim Lysenko through the personal favor of Stalin."² This is how Feuer describes the effect of


Stalin on Soviet science. He says that "every domain of science had its Lysenko, its embittered, jealous mediocrity who, driven by envy of those who had made genuine contributions, contrived to obtain administrative power over them by denouncing them to his fellow mediocrities in the political apparatus."\(^1\) With the relaxation of the ideological shackles, Soviet scientists lost little time in rebuking the political theologians and shelving Marxist ideology.

At the Twenty-Second Party Congress in October, 1961, Khrushchev made a violent attack on his rivals, the so called "anti-Party group" of Molotov, Malenkov, and Voroshilov. In his attack, Khrushchev exploited to the full the theme of the abuses of Stalinism. This new denunciation of the cult of personality produced a "thaw" in cultural life when Khrushchev attempted to gain the support of the liberal intellectuals by relaxing censorship. Yevtushenko was appointed to the editorial board of the magazine Yunost and his poem "The Heirs of Stalin," which was published in Pravda in October of 1962, was of great significance for Khrushchev's political offensive. The poem, recited frequently by Yevtushenko at poets' meetings between the conclusion of the Twenty-Second Congress and when

\(^1\)Ibid.
it finally appeared in print, was a direct attack on the opponents of de-Stalinization:

Mute was the marble.
Mutely glimmered the glass.
Mute stood the soldiers on guard, bronzed by the breeze.

Thin smoke curled above the coffin.
And breath seeped through the chinks
as they bore him out the mausoleum doors.
Slowly the coffin floated, grazing the fixed bayonets.

He also was mute—
he also!
mute and dread.

Grimly clenching his embalmed fists,
only pretending to be dead,
he spied from inside.
In his memory he wished to engrave each of his pallbearers:

young recruits from Ryazan and Kursk,
that afterwards in some way he might find enough
strength for a sortie,
rise from the grave, and reach out to these unreasoning youths.

He was scheming something,
had merely dozed off to rest.

And I, addressing our Government, petition them to double, and triple the soldiers on guard by this slab,
lest Stalin rise again
and, with Stalin, the past.

I don't refer to the past, so holy and glorious,
of Turksib, and Magnitka,
and the flag hoisted over Berlin.
By the past, in this case,
I've in mind the neglect
of the good of the people,
false accusations,
the
arrest
of in-
ocent
men.

We sowed our crops honestly.
Honestly we smelted metal,
and honestly we marched,
falling into the ranks.
But he feared us.
Believing in the great goal,
he judged any odious means
good enough to that great
end.
He was far-sighted.
Skilled in the art of political
strife,
he left many heirs
here on the globe.
I fancy
a telephone installed in that coffin:
Stalin gives directions
to Enver Hoxha.
Where else from that coffin does the cable lead!
No, Stalin has not given in.
He thinks he can
outwit
death.

We bore him out of the mausoleum.
But how, out of Stalin, shall we bear
Stalin's heirs!
Some of his heirs trim roses in retirement
secretly thinking
their discharge is temporary.
Others,
from rostrums, even heap abuse on Stalin
but,
at night,
hanker after the good old days.
No wonder Stalin's heirs seem stricken
with heart attacks these days.
They, once the
stalwarts
detest this time
of empty prison camps
and halls packed with people listening
to poets.
The Party forbids me
to be smug.
"Why bother?"
some urge me—but I can't be quiet.
While the heirs of Stalin walk this earth,
Stalin,
I fancy, still lurks in the mausoleum. ¹

Thus, "...for roughly three years (until the cultural
crackdown of 1963) scarcely a month passed when a young
writer or poet did not publish a work of the imagina-
tion, each bolder in form and substance than the last." ²

When editions of the new literature became unavailable
due to the small size of the printings allowed by the
regime, a rage for public readings of poetry seized the
Soviet Union.

The most spectacular of these readings took
place in November 1962 in Moscow's Luzhniki
Sports Stadium where 14,000 people gathered
to hear Voznesensky, Akhmadulina and Boris
Slutsky. Poetry readings on a more modest
scale had become the principle entertainment
of intellectuals and students in Moscow, and
in provincial towns as well, where poets
went by the truckload. ³

The hopes of this period were perhaps best expressed
by the poet and editor Alexander Tvardovsky: "In art
and literature, as in love, one can lie only for a while;

¹As translated by George Reavey in Half-way to the
Moon: New Writing from Russia, edited by Patricia Blake
and Max Hayward. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books,
1965, pp. 177-180.

²Blake, Patricia, "Introduction," in Half-way to
the Moon, p. viii.

³loc. cit., p. x.
sooner or later comes the time to tell the truth."¹ For in November of 1962 Alexander Solzhenitsyn's novel about one day in the life of an inmate in one of Stalin's forced labor camps, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, was published, with the aid of personal intervention by Khrushchev, in Novyi Mir, a journal which Tvardovsky had sought to make a platform for progressive writing of all kinds. But the massive public response to this "unlacquered" account of the camps raised too many questions concerning the post-Stalin bureaucracy's responsibility for Stalinism. The stirring undoubtedly caused the conservative political-bureaucratic party establishment to panic. Khrushchev, his position undermined by his "adventurism" in the Caribbean and in domestic cultural affairs, attempted to reassert himself as a preservationist of ideological purity by castigating mildly modernist artists during a visit to an exhibition of non-representational art at Moscow's Manezh Hall. By 1963 he was describing domestic literary affairs in the following manner: "It is said that periodicals and publishing houses are being flooded with manuscripts about the life of people in deportation, prisons and camps. This is a very dangerous theme."²

¹ibid.
²ibid.
In conclusion, it can be said that during the period 1953 through 1963 the liberal intelligentsia (democrats) moved from confusion after Stalin's death to overt action, thus creating a model for the future Democratic Movement. As a result of the differences between Stalin's camps, where critics and non-critics alike were imprisoned, and Khrushchev's camps, where genuine critics of the regime were all gathered together as "politicals" and provided an opportunity to work out differences and agree on some future common action, life-long friendships and loyalties which provided channels of information and cooperation were spread all over the Soviet Union. Furthermore, there began to develop a cooperation between the younger dissidents and representatives of the older generation.

The Choice of the Court as a Political Instrument

Khrushchev's downfall on 14 October 1964 left the democrats of the Soviet Union confused. They were aware

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1 In "Some Aspects of the History and Ideational Development of the Dissident Movement in the Post-Stalin Soviet Union," Pospielovsky makes a case for the difference between the camps of Stalin and Khrushchev. He is convinced that the camps of the Khrushchev period became "melting pots" of the civic and political elite of the Soviet Union, where animosities and antagonisms between various critics of the regime began to be eradicated.
of the fact that it was Khrushchev who first opened the floodgates of denunciation against Stalin, and yet, disappointment with his promises and fear that he was building a cult of his own personality caused them to feel not overly regretful about Khrushchev's downfall. Furthermore, things like the post-Khrushchev press attacks against Lysenko and conservative playwright A. Sofronov helped quiet the initial misgivings of the democrats. "On November 30 Yevgeni Yevtushenko, Bella Akhmadulina and Rimma Kazakova...gave a poetry reading to some 1800 people in the Moscow Conservatory, the first such large reading by the liberal poets since the events of 1962-63. In late December, 'Poetry Day' saw most of the liberal poets reading to small audiences."\(^1\)

And in the early spring of 1965 "...a new collection of Boris Pasternak's poetry was assigned to the press with an introduction by the devoted Pasternak scholar--Andrei Siniavski."\(^2\)

The most unusual development was the degree to which young intellectuals and students were expressing themselves openly--aggressively showing, as one Soviet writer said, that they were the first Soviet generation "without the habit of fear." On April 14, 1965, a young

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\(^2\)loc. cit., p. 33.
organization of dissident poets, the Smoqisti, marched from Maiakovski Square to the Writers' Union club on Herzen Street, where they stood blocking traffic and reciting their unorthodox verse, to the utter amazement of Union officials who had neither seen nor heard of an unauthorized demonstration of Soviet citizens in Moscow for years. Another remarkable occurrence took place in the spring at a large organized student meeting at Moscow University; a younger speaker who was ostensibly on the platform to condemn "Western bourgeois cynicism" for invoking the statute of limitations on Nazi war criminals in West Germany, shocked his audience by proclaiming that the real cynics were the leaders of the Soviet Union, who had revealed the horrible crimes of the Stalin era but had as yet failed to bring any of the perpetrators to trial.

It was also in the spring of 1965 that the eminent Ilia Ehrenburg, speaking to a group of writers at Moscow's Foreign Literature Library, declared that the time had passed when writers should describe how they suffered under Stalin -- that they should now begin examining the question of "how Stalinism could have happened."¹

These developments, however, were occurring in the partial vacuum created by the turnover in the top leadership. Khrushchev's heirs were more concerned "...with the more pressing problems of tidying up the structural aberrations in the party, reassuring the nation's bureaucrats that they could rule better and more securely without that 'subjectivist' Khrushchev, and mending fences with friends in the Communist movement."² By mid-1965, a conservative cultural policy

¹ibid.

²loc. cit., p. 29.
began to emerge from "...a general effort by the regime
to reassert discipline and respect for authority--most
notably party and police authority--in the society at
large."¹ Action against the democrats being perceived
as necessary because of the breakdown of controls over
the intelligentsia and, as a result, the spread of
dissident activity.

In dealing with recalcitrant members of the intelli-
gentsia, the regime faced a choice of weapons which
ranged from a return to the mass terror of the Stalinist
tradition to a policy of "selective repression." Now
according to some accounts there were indeed "...some
dissidents who were whisked away without the benefit of
the legal procedures that people had come to expect."²
However, the regime had to treat those dissidents whose
reputations among liberal intellectuals abroad and/or
at home was great in a manner which would preclude
hostile reaction abroad and opposition at home. Thus,
the liberal writers Andrei Siniavsky and Yuli Daniel,
whose works, under their respective pen names of Abram
Tertz and Nikolai Arzhak, had for several years been
smuggled out of the country and published through
foreign outlets without the regime's authorization,

¹loc. cit., p. 36.
²Turner, op. cit., p. 118.
were singled out for special treatment. What followed has come to be regarded as the beginning of the Democratic Movement, and the case itself ranks with the death of Stalin and Khrushchev's de-Stalinization speech in its affect on Soviet society.

Siniavsky and Daniel were tried not for publishing works abroad without official permission, but for so-called "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." For as Harvard Law Professor Harold J. Berman has observed:

It is not a crime under Soviet law to send a manuscript abroad for publication without official permission, although it may be a disciplinary offense, punishable by an administrative fine, if the regulations of the organization for which the writer works require the granting of such permission. In Soviet history at least half a dozen other writers have privately sent out manuscripts for publication abroad. A recent example is that of Evgeny Evtushenko's "A Precocious Autobiography." Evtushenko was publicly reprimanded, but there was no suggestion of bringing criminal charges against him.¹

The State prosecuted Siniavsky and Daniel for violations punishable under Section 1 of Article 70 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.). That Article reads as follows:

Agitation or propaganda carried on for the purpose of subverting or weakening Soviet authority or of committing particular, especially dangerous crimes against the state, or circulating for the same purpose slanderous

fabrications which defame the Soviet state and social system, or circulating or preparing or keeping, for the same purpose, literature of such content, shall be punished by deprivation of freedom for a term of six months to seven years, with or without additional exile for a term of two to five years, or exile for a term of two to five years.¹

The language of this provision, entitled "Anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation," is extremely vague in that "anti-Soviet" and "slanderous fabrications which defame the Soviet state and social system" could be construed to include anything political authority chooses.

Curiously enough, the regime appears to have not expected the universal storm of protest which the arrest, trial, and severe sentencing of the two writers aroused. In the West, even the reactions of the Communist Parties were negative.² And although there was no immediate reaction to the Fall 1965 arrest of Siniavsky and Daniel in the Soviet Union due to the regime's delay of its announcement, opposition at home

¹ibid.

²The reaction of H. C. Hermansson (head of the Swedish Communist Party), for example, was: "I maintain that ideas must be fought with ideas and not by the police and courts." (As it appeared in Abraham Brumberg, "Traitors in the Dock," Problems of Communism, March/April, 1966, p. 76.) The reaction of John Gollan, General Secretary of the British Communist Party, was: "Justice should not only be done but should be seen to be done. Unfortunately this cannot be said in the case of this trial." (As it appeared in Brumberg, ibid.) Similar comments appeared in L'Humanite (Paris) and L'Unita (Rome).
finally surfaced in the form of demonstrations which occurred in December. On 5 December 1965 a dissident youth movement named SMOG held a public demonstration in which some 100-200 students and other persons participated.\(^1\) The demonstration had been announced the night before in a leaflet entitled "A Civic Appeal" which was distributed at the University of Moscow.\(^2\)

\(^1\)See Pospielovsky, op. cit., p. 31. See also Gaucher, op. cit., p. 505.

\(^2\)A translation of the leaflet announcing the demonstration follows:

Several months back, two citizens, writers A. Sinyavsky and Yu. Daniel, were arrested by agents of the KGB. In this case there is cause to fear a violation of the law on conducting open court proceedings. It is widely known that any kind of illegality is possible behind closed doors and that the violation of the law on open proceedings is in itself an act of lawlessness. It is incredible that the creativity of writers can constitute a crime against the State.

In the past, the lawlessness of those in authority has cost millions of Soviet citizens their lives and freedom. The bloody past calls us to be watchful of what's going on at the present moment. It is easier to sacrifice the peace of a single day than to suffer for years the effects of tyranny not checked in time.

Citizens have the means to fight the arbitrariness of the courts--by "Open Public Meetings"--during which those gathered together pronounce a solitary slogan "We demand an open hearing for... (followed by the name of the accused) or display corresponding placards. Any cries or slogans which overstep the limits of the strictest interpretation of the law would undoubtedly be harmful and possibly even provocative and must be stopped short by the participants themselves. During the meeting the strictest observation of order is imperative.
Having informed the authorities of the goals of the meeting, at the first demand to disperse, we must do just that.

You are invited to an open public meeting that will be held December 5 at 6 p.m. near the statue of the Poet in the public garden of Pushkin Square.

Bring two others with you who are also concerned about the contents of this address.

The demonstration was followed by another leaflet, a translation of which follows:

December 5, 1965, at Pushkin Square in Moscow there was a demonstration in support of demands for an open hearing in the case of writers A. Sinyavsky and Yu. Daniel.

In violation of the most elementary democratic principles the authorities forcibly broke up the demonstration.

Under the pressure of the authorities the administration of the department of the humanities of Moscow State University carried on an infamous campaign of reprisals against the students, who happened to be in Pushkin Square at the time of the demonstration.

Having made short shrift of the youth by means of servile party-administrative officialdom, the authorities try to cover up the repressive measures they employed. But the ferocity of the servile dogs only emphasizes the disposition of the higher-ups who taught them their tricks.

Answering a question about the arrest of Sinyavsky and Yu. Daniel at a press conference on the occasion of the awarding of the Nobel Prize M. Sholokov said, "It is necessary to write honestly and to look honestly straight in the eyes of the authorities, and not to fight for popularity by publishing in the West...."

This Sholokhov, who has played along with the authorities, into whose eyes does he recommend that we look? Into the eyes of depraved political beasts. In the eyes of the brown-nosing party-administrative careerists or in the eyes of pseudo-official demagogues and charlatans? And it is altogether strange that M. Sholokhov has for so long not been able to discern on the physiognomy of "his" political authorities a pair of gleaming policeman's brass buttons instead
several hundred students of the Gorki Institute of World Literature, in Moscow, where Siniavsky had been teaching, staged a demonstration in behalf of the two arrested writers.\(^1\) Furthermore, by December,

of eyes. And, in our opinion, it's amazing that the Nobel Prize for 1965 was awarded to a man with the thinking capacity of a moralist from a semi-official propaganda team and to that man who can "honestly" look through rose-colored glasses into the inhuman eyes of imposters.

In conjunction with the breaking up of the demonstration and the ensuring repressive measures against youthful students, the question arises: who is responsible for sanctioning these violations of constitutional freedoms? It's obvious—no one! It's obvious the authorities do not consider it really necessary to preserve the proclaimed constitutional freedoms, but on the contrary, are inclined to support acts of outrage against democracy and encourage the manifestation of direct and indirect violence against the individual.

Here it would be appropriate to remember the words of Palmiro Tolyatti from his Memoirs: "The problem that attracts the most attention, --this applies both to the Soviet Union and to other socialist countries--is, however, the problem of overcoming a regime, introduced by Stalin, which restricts and suppresses democracy and personal freedoms."

We call on you to watchfulness and resistance. We call on you to look honestly in the eyes of your conscience and not to choke its natural inclinations in the noose of compromise. We call on you to look into the depths of your very self, and if you see a pitiful swindler, who has already lost his head, but quakes with fear for each hair on that head, then we ask you not to deceive yourself.

\(^1\)Brumberg, op. cit., n. 4, p. 72.
Alexander Ginzburg had already foreseen the strategy of appealing to civil rights in the attempt to win literary freedom. For he wrote a letter to Kosygin concerning Article 19 of the "Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man" (adopted by the United Nations and ratified in 1948 by the Soviet Union), which reads as follows:
"Every person has the right to freedom of opinion and to its free expression; this right includes the freedom of adhering without let or hindrance to one's own opinions, and the freedom to seek, receive and distribute information and ideas by any means whatsoever and independently of state frontiers." In his letter, Ginzburg asks, "Are not these words directly relevant to the case of Sinyavsky and Daniel?" ²

From the first time the Soviet public learned of the arrest of Siniavsky and Daniel (via the article "The Turncoats" by Dmitri Eremen in the January 13, 1966 issue of Izvestia) until the reading of the sentence, the Soviet press cranked out material which demonstrated the two writers as prejudged. The guilt of the two writers, as Ermen viewed it in that first article, was anything but in doubt:

Sinyavsky and Daniel began in a small way: they exchanged honesty for unscrupulousness; literary activity as understood by Soviet people for double-dealing; a sincere attitude to life for nihilism, carping behind people's backs and "picking to pieces" those around them. Once started on these petty tricks they did not stop there. They continued their downward course. In the end they sank so low as to commit crimes against the Soviet system. In so doing they placed themselves beyond the pale of our literature and the community of Soviet people. From petty nastiness to major treachery--this was the course they ran. 1

The liberal intelligentsia reacted to these attacks with letters of protest to the editors of those papers publishing attacks on the two writers, but nothing favorable to either Siniavsky or Daniel was even commented on beyond the simple editorial note in Izvestia saying that the paper received "numerous letters of comment." Izvestia did, however, publish three letters which denounced both Siniavsky and Daniel in violent language.

Despite the unbridled cynicism of the Soviet press, Sinyavsky and Daniel caused others to begin to have difficulties in matters of faith. For whatever concessions Siniavsky and Daniel may have been induced to make during the secret preliminary interrogation, the masterly defense which they conducted on their own behalf left the regime in the position of prohibiting the use of paradoxical ideas and hyperbolic images as artistic

1loc. cit., p. 218.
devices. The two writers denied, again and again, that their intention was political (Soviet jurists and Soviet courts had previously interpreted Article 70 "...to require proof that the accused understood the anti-Soviet character of the utterances he made and desired to cause harm to the Soviet state."¹) rather than artistic—as illustrated, for instance, by the following exchange between the prosecutor, Daniel, and the judge:

**PROSECUTOR:** (reading from the Glavlit report): "In the author's view, the Soviet people blindly follow the party leadership." How would you judge your story in the light of this?

**DANIEL:** I didn't mean to say anything so harsh. To some extent I agree with the idea that the political initiative of the masses...I don't believe in it very much. I consider the masses politically passive.

**PROSECUTOR:** In other words, if a "Public Murder Day" were proclaimed, you would expect everyone simply to rush off to kill as they were told?

**DANIEL:** No, I don't say that in the story. The "Public Murder Day" is a literary device, chosen as a way of studying people's reactions.

**JUDGE:** There is something I want to clear up. Just imagine a communal apartment where Ivanova is having a quarrel with Sidorova. If Ivanova were to write that there is a certain lady who is making life difficult for another lady, then it would be an

¹Berman, op. cit., p. 13.
innuendo, a figure of speech. But if she were to write that Sidova was throwing garbage into her soup, then we would have something like a libel, slander or something else subject to legal proceedings. You were, after all, writing about the Soviet Government, not about ancient Babylon, but about a specific government that proclaimed a "Public Murder Day," and you name the date—August 10, 1960. Is that a device or outright slander?

DANIEL: Let me just use your example. If Ivanova were to write that Sidorova literally flies about on a broomstick or turns herself into an animal, that would be a literary device, not slander. I took an obviously fantastic situation.

JUDGE: But here is what B. Filippov wrote: "Can we say that what Arzhak describes is all that far removed from reality?" So, you see, Daniel, it is not just a literary device, is it?

DANIEL: It is a literary device.¹

And because all their attempts to assert the principle of artistic freedom were frustrated, sixty-three members of the Union of Writers of the U.S.S.R., fearful that the condemnation of writers for the writing of satirical works might create an extremely dangerous precedent, signed a petition shortly after the trial which not only argued this, but also stated that the signers believed that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of

¹Hayward, op. cit., pp. 59-60.
the malicious intent on the part of Siniavsky and Daniel which had been interpreted as being necessary for conviction under Article 70.  

Intellectual Dissent Becomes a Quest for Civil Rights

Even after Siniavsky and Daniel were sentenced to seven and five years hard labor respectively, the democrats continued to fight back. Regarding the Siniavsky-Daniel trial as unjust and public information concerning the trial as inadequate, Alexander Ginzburg edited a collection of documents on the case and Yury Galanskov issued a "samizdat" magazine called Phoenix 1966, which contained an open letter by him harshly condemning Mikhail Sholokhov for siding with the authorities on the Siniavsky-Daniel case.


2The word samizdat (from sam + izdat = self publishing) has come to mean different things to varying observers. Inside the Soviet Union, the element of reproducing and distributing foreign or domestic printed and broadcast material through an underground network appears to be critical. In the West, however, samizdat has generally come to mean any writing from inside the U.S.S.R. which is not publishable there. It includes many themes and subjects, but is only one indication of the ferment which has developed in the Soviet Union. Samizdat is not a synonym for the ferment itself, which is much broader and more complex.
Galanskov, Aleksei Dobrovolsky, Vera Lashkova, and P. Radziyevsky were arrested on January 17-19, 1967. On January 22 a group of about forty democrats demonstrated in Pushkin Square in Moscow, demanding the release of those arrested. The demonstration was broken up by the police and a number of demonstrators arrested. Ginzburg was arrested the day after the demonstration in Pushkin Square and was tried with Galanskov, Dobrovolsky, and Lashkova (Radziyevsky having been released after he gave the KGB the evidence they required). The Pushkin Square demonstrators were tried in February 1967, but the Ginzburg-Galanskov trial did not occur until January 1968.

The trials resulting from the demonstration in Pushkin Square were different from the Siniavsky-Daniel trial. The Siniavsky-Daniel trial was essentially concerned with literary freedom, but those demonstrating in Pushkin Square were also demanding the revision of Articles 70 and 190 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R. which they regarded as anti-constitutional. This was an important step in the development of the Democratic Movement in that it involved an evolution from a campaign for legality to a demand that the system observe

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its legal foundations. That the Pushkin Square
demonstrators were not the only democrats to express
concern for the institutionalization of civil rights
and greater freedoms of expression,\(^1\) was indicative of
apprehension over signs of Stalin's rehabilitation by
the post-Khrushchev leadership.

Although the trials resulting from the demon­
stration in Pushkin Square were officially described
as "hearings in open court," except for a handful of
relatives of the accused, the "public" consisted of
pre-selected persons. The Soviet press also stated
that the accused had confessed their crimes, yet a
different story was communicated to Western sources by
Pavel Litvinov, the grandson of the late Maxim Litvinov,
who negotiated the 1933 American recognition of Soviet
Russia. Litvinov disclosed that the defendant Vladimir
Bukovsky pleaded not guilty and defended his rights
under the Soviet constitution to demonstrate publicly.
Bukovsky's final statement before receiving the verdict
and sentence include the following:

\(^1\)According to Pospelovsky, op. cit., the com­
poser Shostokovich and the leading scientists Sakharov,
Zeldovich, Astaurov, B. Ginzburg, Knunianits, Migdal,
Leontovich, Tamm, and Engelhardt all signed an appeal
to the R.S.F.S.R. along with other scholars, artists,
and writers. Iesenin-Volpin, he says, sent a separate
letter of protest.
...I have before me the text of our Constitution: "In the interests of the workers and in order to strengthen the Socialist System, the citizens of the USSR are guaranteed by law...freedom to march and to demonstrate in the streets." Why was this article put in? To legalize the demonstrations of October and May Day? But that wasn't necessary -- everybody knows that if the Government has organized a demonstration, nobody is going to break it up. What is the use of freedom to demonstrate "for" if we can't demonstrate "against"? We know that protest demonstrations are a powerful weapon in the hands of the workers and that the right to hold them exists in every democracy. And where is the right denied? Here is Pravda of the 19th of August--a news item from Paris says that May Day demonstrators are being tried in Madrid. They were tried under a new law: it had recently been passed in Spain and it imposes terms of eighteen months to three years in prison for taking part in a demonstration. Note the touching unanimity of Fascist and Soviet law. ...there is no substance in the charge against us, we have not committed any crime. I absolutely don't repent of having organized the demonstration. I believe it has done its job and, when I am free again, I shall organize other demonstrations--always, of course, like this one, in perfect conformity with the law.\(^1\)

Thus, Bukovsky brought the Soviet Government to task for its own unbridled cynicism. His rejection of the Leninist conception of freedom demonstrated that dissent had gone beyond the critique of Stalinism advanced by the Marxist oppositionists of the 1930's. While they regarded Stalinism as a phenomenon not imminent in a single-party state with a totally planned economy,

democrats now came to perceive the phenomenon of Stalinism as grounded in the Soviet system and its ideology.  

It was the Ginzburg-Galanskov trial, however, that resulted in the *samizdat* movement expanding into the loose but recognizable Democratic Movement. Major-General Piotr Grigorenko, who had been a lecturer at Frunze Military Academy in Moscow until he became active in various protest movements and was consequently dismissed and sent to the special psychiatric prison called Serbsky Institute, wrote the members of the Politburo and stated that the

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1 Soviet dissidents have come to reject even Marxism-Leninism. Pospielovskiy, op. cit., states that Chronicle of Current Events No. 12 mentions that in 1969 Major-General Grigorenko told his prison psychiatrist in Moscow that he would no longer appeal for a return to Leninism as he had done earlier. Pospielovskiy goes on to say that friends of Grigorenko and his family confirm that he has been "cured" of Marxism-Leninism. Also, in an interview with Newsweek's Moscow bureau chief Jay Axelbank, Andrei Sakharov stated, "...I have modified my beliefs. I would no longer label myself a socialist. I am not a Marxist-Leninist or a Communist. I would call myself a liberal." (Newsweek, 13 November 1972, p. 55.) Thus, those dissidents who carried on their struggle against Stalinism and neo-Stalinism under the illusory banner of Leninism have come to recognize the bankruptcy of the myth about the democratic spirit and tolerance of "Leninist Legality." See Pospielovskiy, Dimitri, "The Diary of Ekaterina Olitskaia: A Social Revolutionary Recalls the Times of Leninist Terror." Radio Liberty Research Paper No. 39. New York: Radio Liberty Committee, 1970.

International Human Rights Year began in the U.S.S.R. with an unprecedented violation of human rights. At this very time, our motherland has been nailed to a pillory of shame in the eyes of all the world as well as of Communist society. This was done by official representatives of the government through a barbaric trial organized by organs of the KGB.

During the trial of Galanskov, Ginzburg, Dobrovolsky, and Lashkova...I, like many other citizens of Moscow...felt—with unusual bitterness—the injustice and shame this trial was bringing upon our country.¹

Pyotr Yakir, the son of the late Soviet Army Commander Ion Yakir (who was executed in 1937 during the Stalin purges) affixed his signature to the bottom of a letter admonishing "public figures in science, culture, and the arts." The open letter ended with the following two sentences: "Each time you are silent, the way is further paved for another trial. Little by little, because of your silent consent, there may come upon us a new Nineteen Thirty-Seven."²


²As translated in Litvinov, op. cit., p. 246. For a different translation of this letter, see loc. cit., pp. 157-61.
The most famous protest against the Ginzburg-Galanskov trial, of course, was the "Open Letter to World Public Opinion" by Larisa Daniel (wife of Yuli Daniel) and Pavel Litvinov. The following is an excerpt:

We appeal to world public opinion and, in the first place, to Soviet public opinion. We appeal to everyone in whom conscience is alive and who has sufficient courage:

Demand public condemnation of the shameful trial and the punishment of those guilty of perpetrating it!
Demand the release of the accused from arrest!
Demand a new trial in conformity with all legal norms and in the presence of international observers!
Citizens of our country! This trial is a stain on the honor of our state and on the conscience of every one of us. You yourselves elected this court and these judges—demand that they be deprived of the posts that they have abused. Today it is not only the fate of the...accused that is at stake—their trial is no better than the celebrated trials of the 1930's which involved us in so much shame and so much bloodshed that we still have not recovered from them.

We address this appeal to the Western progressive press and ask that it be published and broadcast by radio as soon as possible. We are not sending this request to Soviet newspapers, because that is futile.1

The most important result of the Galanskov-Ginzburg trial, however, was the development of a loose but recognizable civil rights movement with—from April 1968—its own de facto organ, The Chronicle of Current Events.

1As translated in Brumberg, loc. cit., p. 104. For a different translation of this letter, see Litvinov, loc. cit., pp. 225-27.
The material contained in the first issue of The Chronicle revealed the birth of a movement in two senses. For as Reddaway has observed,

first, groups and individuals in such far-flung places as Moscow, Leningrad, Novosibirsk, Latvia, the Ukraine and elsewhere, all—in an unprecedented fashion—made simultaneous and similar protests against a single event in Moscow. Second, these protests then found their way to a central point, were "processed" there, then redistributed as the Chronicle. The different groups thus got to know about each other and new links could more easily be established.

The Chronicle has no forebears in Russian history in that it regards law as a means of securing civil and economic freedom. In providing a platform for any views of generally democratic tendency, it demonstrates a remarkable degree of tolerance and a lack of dogmatism. Concerning its production and distribution, issue No. 5 stated that

the Chronicle is in no sense an illegal publication, and the difficult conditions in which it is produced are created by the peculiar notions about law and freedom of information which, in the course of long years, have become established in certain Soviet organizations. For this reason the Chronicle cannot, like any other journal, give its postal address on the last page. Nevertheless, anybody who is interested in seeing that the Soviet public is informed about what goes on in the country, may easily pass on information to the editors of the Chronicle. Simply tell it to the person from whom you received the Chronicle, and he

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1 Reddaway, op. cit., p. 72.
...will tell the person from whom he received the Chronicle, and so on. But do not try to trace back the whole chain of communication yourself, or else you will be taken for a police informer.¹

The Formal Coordination of Civil Rights Activities

In May of 1969, a group of democrats² organized the Action Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the U.S.S.R. The Action Group addressed several appeals to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, requesting that it investigate the violation of basic human rights in the Soviet Union. Mr. U Thant, however, instructed that all petitions were to be refused, and soon the leading personalities of the Action Group found themselves either in prison camps or prison mental hospitals.

Then in November of 1970, Andrei Sakharov formed, with his physicist colleagues Valery Chalidze and Andrei Tverdokhlebov, a Committee on Human Rights to study problems of human rights and to aid the authorities in

¹loc. cit., p. 54.

²loc. cit., pp. 150-70. Also, see Pospielovsky, "Some Aspects of the History and Ideational Development of the Post-Stalin Soviet Union," pp. 42-43. The fifteen organizers, mostly professional men and women, represented Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Kharkov, and the exiled Crimean Tatars of Central Asia. The Action Group's first protest letter was signed by these members and 39 supporters.
introducing desirable reforms. Thus, when on 10 December 1970 Alexander Solzhenitsyn demonstrated his responsibility toward the U. N. Human Rights Day by agreeing to his election as a corresponding member, there was created a situation in which a formal Soviet dissident organization could boast of including as members both the Soviet Union's foremost writer as well as one of its foremost scientists.

The Committee on Human Rights disseminated its ideas of legality through the journal Social Problems, which was edited by Chalidze. In July of 1970, the Committee addressed an appeal to the 5th World Psychiatric Congress in Mexico, requesting that it investigate the Soviet use of psychiatry for political repression. Again, the West let the Soviet Democrats down; the Psychiatric Congress simply ignored the issue of Soviet abuse of psychiatry.

As detente with the West developed, the pressure on the Democratic Movement increased. Beginning in late 1971, Criminal Case Number 24 was executed by the Committee for State Security with the expressed purpose of preventing The Chronicle of Current Events from continuing publication. Yet, The Chronicle continued publication until October of 1972 (with issue number 27). The August, 1973, conviction of Pyotr I. Yakir and
Victor A. Krasin as authors and distributors of *The Chronicle* and their public recantation in September of 1973 appeared to assure the end of the publication. The Democrats, however, bounced back by creating a new organization, the Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights. Then, Valery Chalidze was allowed to leave the Soviet Union and was stripped of his citizenship after he was abroad in December of 1973. In February of 1974 Solzenitsyn, himself, was forcibly banished from the Soviet Union. The Democrats retorted by resuming publication of *The Chronicle* after an eighteen month suspension. By 17 May 1974 the 28th, 29th, 30th, and 31st issues had made their appearance.

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In contrast to the advocates of conspiratorial action and force who have existed throughout the ideational development of the Democratic Movement in the post-Stalin era, the ideational nature of the Action Group, Committee, Initiative Group, and Chronicle is essentially one of remaining within, and advocating reform of, the legal system. Recently, however, there has been a loss of hope in a peaceful evolution of the system under legalistic social pressure. One sign of this frustration has been the Samizdat publications calling for a more organized and programmatic movement. So, as the majority of Democrats radicalize their thoughts and actions, a new type of organizational structure can be expected. Furthermore, as they increasingly concern themselves with basic popular and progressive platforms more comprehensible for peasants and workers instead of the present abstract ideas of

1 An example of the radicalization might possibly be the 1 November 1973 attempt to hijack a Soviet domestic airliner to Sweden. The attempt was conducted by four youths and involved a ransom variously described as half a million or a million dollars in U.S. currency. See "Soviet Air Minister Oversees Foiling of Hijacking," in The New York Times, November 6, 1973.

human rights, a broader base for the Democratic Movement can be expected to be found.

Uniformity of Demands for Systemic Change

If the Democratic Movement is to be regarded as a true movement, it is essential to fix some of the points at which the various streams of dissent in the Soviet Union come together in order to provide evidence of some sort of corroboration among its many tributaries. These points at which tolerance and cooperation occur are indicative of the fact that various streams of dissent in the Soviet Union are beginning to understand the indivisibility of freedom, thereby transforming themselves into informally allied wings of the Democratic Movement.

Although the friendship of Aleksei Kosterin, the champion of the Crimean Tatars, and General Grigorenko provided an individual link between the Russian democrats and the Crimean Tatars, a February 1968 letter to the Budapest conference of Communist and Workers' Parties provided an important link-up. The letter had been signed by eleven Moscow democrats and one Crimean Tatar from Uzbekistan. It included the following appeal:

1The letter and the names, occupations, and addresses of those signing the appeal are found in A Chronicle of Current Events, Issue No. 1, 30 April 1968, as translated in Reddaway, op. cit., 86-88.
"We also call your attention to the fact of discrimination against small nations and the political persecution of people who are struggling for national equality, all this being particularly clear in the case of the Crimean Tatars."\(^1\)

On the 30th of March 1968, the Orthodox priest Sergei Zheludkov linked Christians to the struggle of the Democratic Movement in a letter to Pavel Litvinov, supporting the "Open Letter to World Public Opinion" by Litvinov and Larissa Daniel.\(^2\) However, perhaps one of the best examples of unity of cause between the mainstream Democratic Movement and religious dissent is the Orthodox writer Anatoly Levitin (pen-name Krasnov).

According to the Chronicle,

during recent years Levitin-Krasnov has... spoken out continually in defense of civil rights, and in defense of people arrested and sentenced on political charges. His

\(^{1}\)loc. cit., p. 87.


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signature stands at the foot of numerous collective protests.... He is a member of the Action Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the Soviet Union. As a publicist he has commented on the arrest of B. V. Talantov and P. G. Grigorenko.¹

The same issue also stated that

soon after Levitin's arrest, a letter began to circulate in samizdat, entitled "To Public Opinion in the Soviet Union and Abroad," signed by thirty-two Soviet citizens.... The letter says that A. E. Levitin "was becoming more and more worried by problems of civil freedom, since freedom is indivisible and there can be no religious freedom if basic human rights are being trampled upon. He was the first religious person in our country in the post-Stalin years to affirm this truth and to raise his voice in defense of civil rights and of those who have fallen victims in the fight for civil freedoms."²

The event generally accepted as the birth of the Democratic Movement in the Ukraine is the protest resulting from the trial and sentencing of twenty Ukrainian intellectuals in 1965-1966. The well-known book by Vyacheslav Chornovil, published in English as The Chornovil Papers, recorded and analyzed the fate of the twenty intellectuals. Another important work was Ivan Dzuba's Internationalism or Russification, which examined and challenged the official policy toward nationalism. Now while the issue of Ukrainian nationalism


²loc. cit., p. 325.
is by no means new, the Democratic Movement in the Ukraine has based its resistance on the liberal Soviet and Ukrainian constitutions. In April of 1968, 139 Ukrainian intellectuals and workers signed a letter addressed to Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny protesting the infringement of the principles of legality and publicity in the Ginzburg-Galanskov trial.\(^1\) That same letter also attacked the conduct of trials in the Ukraine as it stated: "In the Ukraine, where violations of democracy are magnified and aggravated by distortions connected with the national question, the symptoms of Stalinism are being manifested even more overtly and grossly."\(^2\) Thus, the Ukrainian democrats demonstrated not only a knowledge of what was going on in regards to Russian democrats, but also that they felt that the Russian and Ukrainian struggles were in no small way related. Chornovil, furthermore, supported the Moscow-based Action Group by signing its appeals to the United Nations.\(^3\)

The association between the Jewish community of the U.S.S.R. and the liberal intellectuals of the Soviet

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\(^1\)See Reddaway, loc. cit., p. 281. Also, see A Chronicle of Current Events, Issue No. 1, 30 April 1968, as translated by Reddaway, loc. cit., p. 78.

\(^2\)As translated in Reddaway, loc. cit., p. 281.

\(^3\)Reddaway, loc. cit., p. 287.
Union predates the birth of the Democratic Movement. Edward Kuznetsov, one of the Jews who attempted to hijack a Soviet plane to Sweden in 1970, had been a dissenter and associate of Yuri Galanskov as early as 1961. Yevgeny Yevtushenko and Ivan Dzuba, furthermore, had linked the Jewish struggle with that of other Soviet citizens as early as 1966. However, it wasn't until 1968 that Jews began to speak out on civil and human rights. By 1970, Jews had become more militant than any other wing of the Democratic Movement and, despite the fact that many Jewish dissidents' overriding goal has been Israel, there remain those who are actively involved with the mainstream. One example is Boris Tsukerman, who authored a samizdat biography of General Grigorenko and was a legal expert for Sakharov's Human Rights Committee, and another is Julius Telesin, who signed the Action Group's appeals to the United


2See A Chronicle of Current Events, Issue No. 8, 30 June 1969, as translated in Reddaway, loc. cit., p. 136. Also, see Thorne, ibid. Tsukerman was allowed to leave for Israel in January of 1971.
Nations and compiled a samizdat anthology of defiant court speeches by defendants in political trials.¹

The mainstream of the Democratic Movement has from the start attempted to discourage and erode traditional national, ethnic, and religious hostilities. The Chronicle of Current Events, which does not claim to represent a multi-national group nor speak for even the mainstream of the movement, has concerned itself with all national, religious, and ethnic dissent in terms of the U.S. Declaration of Human Rights. In doing so, it has contributed immensely to the discouragement and erosion of these types of traditional hostilities. Furthermore, the membership of the Action Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the U.S.S.R. also indicates that a community of interests are represented: among its original members were two Ukrainians and a Crimean Tatar.² As for the Committee on Human Rights, it has taken up the legal cause of Georgians, Tatars, and Jews, as well as Russians.³

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²See Thorne, op. cit., p. 28.

³Sakharov had been, at first, permitted to attend the trials of dissidents. This "privilege" was later revoked, and on 15 February 1971 Committee members
As can be seen, then, the Democratic Movement, though a complex and ramified movement, has discovered that "inasmuch as the Soviet leadership stands in the way of the fulfillment of the diverse specific goals of its components, they all have a common anti-establishment interest and would benefit from democratic rights and freedom."\(^1\) Though distinct from each other, they have articulated systemic changes which would prohibit authorities from avoiding their obligation to observe the basic human rights referred to in the present Soviet constitution. In searching for the presence of uniformities in the articulations of the Democratic Movement, the Radio Liberty Research Department Reference Handbook Number 82, *A Guide to Proposals for Systemic Change in the USSR Offered by Soviet Citizens*,\(^2\) Chalidze and Tvyordokhlebov were summoned to the Department of General Surveillance of the Moscow Procuracy and informed "...that the existence of the Committee... was an infringement of the law...." (*A Chronicle of Current Events*, Issue No. 18, 5 March 1971, translated by Amnesty International Publications, op. cit., p. 128.


can prove to be of immense value. The handbook ascertains and collates some of the demands for political, economic, social, and cultural changes.

**Political demands**

In observing the Democrats' political demands, it is evident that they perceive the necessity for what the American President James Madison called "auxiliary precautions." Owing to the experience of Stalinism, they hope to prevent the government from abusing its power and any one group from manipulating the government and tyrannizing the population. The first step would be the dividing of constitutional authority among legislative, executive, and judicial branches of a national government that would be independent of Communist Party control.¹

Beyond the recognized need for a constitution which serves as a supreme and binding law that both grants and limits powers,² the democrats are agreed that the civil and political rights of man must be guaranteed. For most democrats believe that government by the people is based on the individual's right to question and campaign openly against it and, therefore, advocate

¹loc. cit., pp. 3, 5-7, 10, and 19.
that specific freedoms be guaranteed all citizens by law. For Democrats, a basic charter of liberties should include freedom of religion,¹ the freedom of speech,² the freedom of the press,³ and the right of the people to assemble⁴ and to petition the government for redress of grievances.⁵

Another step by which the Democrats would hope to lessen the risk of monopoly of political power is through a federal form of government.⁶ True federalism would institutionalize the Democrats' suspicion of concentrated power as represented by Moscow. It would also go a long ways toward providing the self-determination that the Soviet nationalities policy has denied. For the colonial aggrandizement of the Russian empire and the Russification policy of the Soviet Union have made federalism crucial to the resolution of the nationalities problem in the Soviet Union.⁷

¹loc. cit., pp. 19, and 41-44.
²loc. cit., p. 19.
³loc. cit., pp. 19, and 49-51.
⁴loc. cit., p. 19.
⁵ibid.
⁶loc. cit., pp. 8-9, and 11.
Perhaps because of the experiences of the Soviet populace and the history of the land which they people, Soviet Democrats would intend for the Supreme Soviet to hold the commanding position in the government of the U.S.S.R. Executive power would be exercised by the Council of Ministers, which would be subjected to the laws of the country as established by the Supreme Soviet. The fear of abuse of executive power is so strong among Soviet Democrats that some have proposed that the judicial branch of government be responsible to the Supreme Soviet for policing the executive branch excesses. The underpinning of the systemic changes, as the Democrats perceive it, would be truly democratic elections based upon a multi-party system.

Economic demands

The Soviet Democrats recognize the validity of the arguments concerning the importance of economic democracy. However, they also recognize the dangers to

1loc. cit., pp. 5-7.
2ibid.
3loc. cit., p. 7.
5von Doemming, op. cit., p. 10.
democracy inherent in a completely centralized system of State ownership. They have advocated, therefore, a three-tiered economy combining public and private ownership. The system proposed calls for the establishment of three types of ownership--public, collective, and private. All would function in free competition with each other, regulated only by supply and demand. National income hopefully becoming distributed more equitably and, thereby, removing some of the vast economic differences between the ruling elite and the ordinary Soviet citizen.

Industrial democracy itself becomes a concern of the Democrats indicating their awareness concerning State capitalism. The Democrats call for true public ownership and industrial democracy. They have also identified the need for re-proletarianizing the trade unions by freeing them from CPSU and government control.

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2 loc. cit., p. 33.
3 ibid.
4 ibid.
5 loc. cit., p. 37.
6 loc. cit., p. 34.
7 loc. cit., p. 35.
so that they might more truly represent their members' interests.¹

Soviet Democrats have also insisted upon the democratization of the agricultural sector.² Their concern here is to increase the independence of the individual collective farm worker, as well as to increase his economic well-being.³ The concept is to stress democratic attitudes in the hope of fostering personal responsibility.

Social demands

Included among the social demands made by Soviet Democrats are the issues of religion, education, women's liberation, and public services. With regard to religion, the Democrats indicate a concern over interference of religious freedom,⁴ and demand the right of all citizens to hold religious and philosophical views without discrimination or persecution.⁵ In education too, the Democrats demand the freedom to investigate,

¹loc. cit., p. 36.
²loc. cit., pp. 38 and 39.
³ibid.
⁴loc. cit., pp. 41-44.
⁵ibid.
research, speak, and write without interference or censorship.¹ Even women's liberation² and public/social services³ advocacy seems to have caught on with at least some Democrats.

Cultural demands

In general, Soviet Democrats demand that the intelligentsia be allowed more freedom.⁴ Censorship is a major concern to the Democrats, and demands range from a limit to censorship to complete abolition. Demands have been made that would guarantee authors' legal rights concerning their creations⁵ and, in order to defend their interests, it has further been advocated that literary and journalistic associations be freed of interference so that they might truly represent their members.⁶

¹loc. cit., pp. 45 and 46.
²loc. cit., p. 47.
³ibid.
⁴loc. cit., pp. 49-51.
⁵loc. cit., p. 50.
⁶ibid.
Political Variables and Converging Expectations

In attempting to discover variables that might explain the observed propensities of given actors and groups within the Democratic Movement to articulate common or converging expectations of democratic reform, the characteristics which Reddaway\(^1\) has described as tolerance\(^2\) and lack of dogmatism\(^3\) appear to be worthy of investigation. The variable "ideology" might be partially defined in terms of the simple qualitative dichotomy of dogmatism and lack of tolerance versus tolerance and lack of dogmatism.

The observed propensities of given actors and groups within the Democratic Movement to articulate common or converging expectation of democratic reform seem most often to occur when the ideological positions of given actors and groups reflect tolerance and a lack of dogmatism. In the nineteenth-century the movements

\(^{1}\)Reddaway, op. cit., p. 24.


\(^{3}\)Webster's, loc. cit., defines dogmatism as a "philosophy which assumes what neither experience nor reason can corroborate."
for systemic change were marked by factionalism, splitting tactics, and personal intolerance. The sharp divergence of the Democratic Movement from this pattern holds true both in inter-personal dealings and in ideas.

The ideological position of The Chronicle of Current Events, from the start, has been one of tolerance and lack of dogmatism. From the first issue The Chronicle has carried the text of article 19 of the United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinion without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.¹

In issue No. 7, The Chronicle takes pains to discredit polemical criticism of differing views.² Even while strongly opposed to a radical anti-democratic program, The Chronicle "will abandon its usual practice of not passing judgement" in order to lecture a mocking criticism of the program on a lack of serious scientific criticism. This has led Reddaway to conclude that two important points emerge concerning The Chronicle's editorial position.

First, the Chronicle's aim is openness, non-secretiveness, freedom of information and expression. All these notions are subsumed

¹Reddaway, op. cit., p. 24.
²As translated, loc. cit., p. 432.
in one Russian word glasnost. Second, the Chronicle is not the organ of any rival to the party, any political "opposition." Indeed the word opposition appears but rarely in its pages, mainly perhaps because the K.G.B. often affects, rightly or wrongly, to see no difference between opposition to a particular action or law and opposition to the whole Soviet system. The Chronicle regards itself as legal because it merely compiles an accurate record of events, and where there is truth there can—legally speaking—be no "libel," "anti-Soviet" or otherwise. It does not incite its readers to anti-Soviet acts, but urges them, usually implicitly, to defend Soviet legality. Certainly, in areas where this legality is ambiguous it adopts a liberal interpretation. Thus it believes in genuinely equal rights for all the nationalities of the U.S.S.R., in real religious freedom for believers..., and in a foreign policy of sincerely peaceful co-existence.... It rejects in general the use of coercion, and notwithstanding the moral absolutism of particular individuals sometimes reflected in its pages, its own ideology is clearly reformist and gradualist in nature. One senses a sceptical view—grounded in Soviet experience—not only of Jacobinism but also of the very concept of revolutionary upheaval.\(^1\)

The ideological position of the Action Group for the Defense of Civil Rights in the Soviet Union, at least with reference to the dichotomy of dogmatism and lack of tolerance versus tolerance and a lack of dogmatism, can be discerned by the group's title. The Action Group's first letter to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, furthermore, unmasked the regime's attempts to utilize the court as a political instrument in the

\(^1\)Reddaway, loc. cit., p. 26.
suppression of ideas.\(^1\) "The letter also refers to 'a particularly inhuman form of persecution: the placing of normal people in psychiatric hospitals for their political convictions.'\(^2\) Thus, tolerance and lack of dogmatism is not only the policy of the Action Group, but also its pursuit.

Sakharov's Human Rights Committee shares essentially the same basic philosophy as the Chronicle of Current Events and the Action Group for the Defense of Civil Rights in the Soviet Union, although it has perhaps been more careful to avoid irritating the authorities. It has attempted to promote understanding and interest in the legal rights of all Soviet citizens. It has also

...noted that the imperfect guarantees of the rights of the mentally ill create a danger of violations of Human Rights being committed with the object of discrediting unorthodox scientific, social, political and philosophical ideas by judging the originators of those ideas to be mentally ill.\(^3\)

The ideological position of the Ukrainian dissident community in general appears to be one of tolerance and

\(^1\) A Chronicle of Current Events, Issue No. 8, 30 June 1969, as translated in Reddaway, loc. cit., pp. 150-151.

\(^2\) ibid.

lack of dogmatism. In an editorial statement from the samizdat journal *Ukrainian Herald*\(^1\) came the statement that "the issuing of the *Chronicle* was welcomed by the Ukrainian reader. The objectivity, extensive volume and relative accuracy of information...must be noted."\(^2\) The *Herald* has also commented on the Human Rights Committee:

In the latter part of 1970 Academician Sakharov, physicists Tverdokhlebov and Chalidze created the Moscow Human Rights Committee—a moderate oppositionary group which is determined to defend the constitutional rights of Soviet citizens. But its relationship to the nationality question in the USSR, to the rights of non-Russian nations and their guarantees of these rights—the Committee did not determine.\(^3\)

Thus, in spite of the reservations of Ukrainian democrats concerning what they perceive to be a lack of programmatic postulates on the subject of national self-determination by Russian democrats, the Ukrainian democrats accept the Russian democrats as their legitimate allies.


\(^{2}\)The *Ukrainian Herald* as translated in Thorne, loc. cit., p. 15.

\(^{3}\)ibid.
Although the Crimean Tatars are only one of several movements of small Soviet minorities struggling for national existence and repatriation to historical homelands, their movement is the one most known in the West. Their goals have significantly broadened to include the attainment of basic human rights. The ideology of the Crimean Tatars, if deduced from their goals, is clearly one of opposition to all forms of discrimination. That their ideological position is one of tolerance and lack of dogmatism is further demonstrated by the support they receive from Russian and Ukrainian dissidents.

As Thorne has pointed out,

an analysis of the Soviet Jewish community's response to the mainstream civil rights movement in Russia is complex. It entails, first of all, three groups: the Jewish democrats, who share in the movement's ideal, the democratization of Russia; the "Zionists," whose main goal is emigration to Israel and who adhere to the belief that the movement of the democrats and their own are two separate entities, and those Soviet Jews who have been in-between--individuals who have contributed

1 Besides the Crimean Tatars, there is the Meskhetian Turks, the Volga Germans, and the Soviet Greeks.


3 Ibid. Also, see Reddaway, op. cit., p. 269.

4 Thorne, op. cit., p. 21.
to both, the democrats' efforts and to the cause of Jewish emigration.

The Jewish participants in the mainstream Democratic Movement include Pyotr Yakir, Pavel Litvinov, and Larrissa Daniel. In the "in-between" group of Jewish dissidents Thorne included Boris Zuckerman, Edward Kuznetsov, and Julius Telesin. All these individuals, as we have seen earlier, are deeply committed to the mainstream Democratic Movement. "Whereas the cause of Israeli emigration has been adopted by the democrats, the response of Soviet Zionists to the latter's activities has been meager, a fact which has aroused resentment on the part of some democrats."¹ Thus, except for the Soviet Zionists, Jewish commitment to an ideology of tolerance and lack of dogmatism is beyond doubt. That is not to say that the ideology of the Soviet Zionists is one of dogmatism and lack of tolerance, but rather that they have avoided the "democratization of the USSR" theme.²

Although all three Soviet Constitutions to date proclaim separation of Church and State, "...the

¹loc. cit., p. 23.

²loc. cit., p. 24. Thorne suggests that perhaps this can be partially explained by the Israeli policy of maintaining that their exists a difference between the issue of Jewish emigration and Soviet internal affairs.
Bolshevik ideology, the fanatical intolerance of Lenin personally towards religion, and the close association of the Orthodox Church with the *ancien régime* all combined to make a live-and-let-live relationship impossible."¹ The State has staged campaigns of militant atheism, and the religious of the USSR, both young and old, have responded with defenses, protest, and counterattacks. The tolerance and lack of dogmatism of Russian Orthodox dissenters can most easily be seen in the works of Anatoly Levitin, Sergei Zheludkov, and Boris Talantov, which stress that freedom is indivisible.² Recent events among Lithuanian Catholics suggest their awareness of the Democratic Movement,³ but as yet they have not recognized any indivisibility between basic human rights and their struggle for religious freedom. This again, like the case of the Soviet Zionists, does not imply that their ideology is

¹Reddaway, op. cit., p. 319.


dogmatic or lacks tolerance. As for the Baptists, it can be of no small significance that Boris Zdorovets, a Baptist from the Donbass, took part in a 1968 political prison camp strike demanding basic rights for all political prisoners. Thus, the ideological positions of believers has not been dogmatic or intolerant.

In the past the main supply of nationalist and national samizdat documents came from the Ukraine as well as from the Jewish-Zionist movement. What has been known of the Russian-language samizdat (not counting the "outsiders" Jewish-Zionist writing calling for mass emigration...) has been predominantly cosmopolitan in character. It seems that Russian samizdat writers have felt responsibility not only for Russian national interests, but for the whole Soviet Union, for the problem of freedom in the whole state.

However, at least two samizdat documents emphasize Russian patriotism. "One document, 'Slovo natsii' (or 'A Nation Speaks') represents an extreme nationalist position with elements of racism; the other document, Veche, represents a modernized version of traditional Russian Slavophilism...." While "A Nation Speaks"

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1 See A Chronicle of Current Events, Issue No. 1, 30 April 1968, as translated in Reddaway, op. cit., pp. 206-207.


3 loc. cit., p. 2.
does insist on tolerance, it contains obviously dogmatic overtones of racism and anti-Semitism as well as the belief that democracy is a state of aging and decay.\textsuperscript{1} Veche, on the other hand, simply argues for the right of Russian dissidents to causes celebres that parallel those of the other nationalities of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{2}

Thus, the ideological positions of the Great Russian nationals do, in some instances, reflect dogmatism and a lack of tolerance.

Certainly, then, the Russian, Ukrainian, Crimean Tatar, Jewish, and religious dissidents have all shown themselves, in general, to occupy an ideological position of tolerance and lack of dogmatism. Yet, there must be some other variables that might help to explain why given actors and groups within the Democratic Movement practice an ideology of tolerance and lack of dogmatism.

A good place to begin to look for variables that might help explain why given actors and groups within the Democratic Movement practice an ideology of tolerance and lack of dogmatism, it seems, would be with the social and geographical background of the actors. The variable of geographical support might run along a

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnote{loc. cit., pp. 6 and 11.}
\footnote{loc. cit., p. 12.}
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continuum from metropolitan, to provincial centers, to rural.\textsuperscript{1} The variables of social support might be measured by a tripartite system of classification utilizing the categories of intelligentsia, workers, and peasants as classes of social composition.\textsuperscript{2}

Amalrik attempted to explore the social background of Democrats by using as a sample 738 signatories of protests against the Ginzburg-Galanskov trial. The results of his sample indicate that, except for 6% workers, the signatories were members of what the Soviets call the intelligentsia.\textsuperscript{3} Since the Ginzburg-Galanskov trial, however, the Democratic Movement seems to have broadened to include more workers and some military people.\textsuperscript{4} Its geographic support too seems to

\textsuperscript{1}It must be recognized that these categories are not exact. For example, although Solzhenitsyn may reside outside of Moscow and spend his summers at his cottage, I would still regard him as a representative of the metropolitan category.

\textsuperscript{2}By the category "intelligentsia," I mean that broad Soviet definition whereby academics, artists, professionals, and students are included.


\textsuperscript{4}See Katz, op. cit., p. 12. Also, see Reddaway, op. cit., p. 23.
include provincial centers as well as the metropolitan areas.¹

In some ways, religious dissidents and those demanding repatriation to historical homelands share common attributes. For these two types of dissent are mostly what Katz² refers to as non-metropolitan and non-intellectual.

Their social base is in the medium sized and small provincial towns and rural areas, mostly in the peripheral lands: in the Baltic area, Western Ukraine, the South, Central Asia, the Caucasus, as well as in the inner parts of Russia itself (Kaluga, Kirov, Pskov). They have a small educated intellectual elite, some of whom live in the big cities. Some of them address themselves to issues beyond their national or religious interests and participate actively in the Democratic dissident movement, providing a link between the various branches of dissent (Levitin, Tsukerman, Telesin, Talantov, Moroz, etc.). But the strength of the national and religious dissent is in its widespread roots in the non-elite social groups. These movements actually have masses of ordinary working people in them and many voluntary grass-roots activists.³

The Tatars and Meskhetians, for example, include almost all of their populations, which consist mostly of peasants and workers.⁴

¹ If only by evidence of the spread of the network of A Chronicle of Current Events.
⁴ loc. cit., p. 20.
The national movements of the Ukrainians, Baltic peoples, and Jews were pioneered mainly by members of their intelligentsia. "Many of their activists are, however, from the working class, and there is sufficient evidence that they enjoy support among large portions of the latter."¹ Among Jews of the lands incorporated into the Soviet Union during World War II and Oriental Jewish communities the dissident movement has as wide a social base as that of the Tatars or Meskhetians.² "It includes craftsmen, workingmen, white-collar workers, and intelligentsia."³ With Soviet Jews proper, the dissident movement includes some leading intellectuals and scientists, while its mass following is unclear.⁴

Great Russian nationalist dissent is, naturally enough, found in central Russia. Its support comes from some Slavophile intellectuals and students. Furthermore,

some observers assert that there are sympathizers with it in the KGB and in the army, and that this strand of dissent is very widespread, though it is not as clearly

¹ibid.
²loc. cit., p. 21.
³ibid.
⁴ibid.
discernible as other movements because little of its materials are available in samizdat which reaches the West.\(^1\)

It is clear, then, that those actors most often addressing themselves to issues beyond the confines of a narrowly defined "self-interest" will fall within the category of intelligentsia. The intelligentsia, by being the link between the various branches of dissent, are a major source of the ideology of tolerance and lack of dogmatism in the Democratic Movement. Those branches of whose numbers consist mostly of intelligentsia, with the exception of the Great Russian nationalists, assume most avidly the practice of an ideology of tolerance and lack of dogmatism. Furthermore, these members of the intelligentsia tend to reside in or near metropolitan and provincial centers. The geographical location of this class is understandable. The isolation brought about by the rural location of the majority of the members of those branches of the Democratic Movement less prone to avidly assume the practice of an ideology of tolerance and lack of dogmatism by less frequently, if ever, addressing themselves to issues beyond a narrowly defined "self-interest," goes a long way toward explaining their behavior. The question remains, however,

\(^1\)loc. cit., p. 23.
as to why these members of the intelligentsia have come to practice an ideology of tolerance and lack of dogmatism.

Certainly the historical experience of the Soviet intelligentsia looms as a large factor in explaining the observed propensities of members of this class to practice an ideology of tolerance and lack of dogmatism. For the tremendous early enthusiasm this class demonstrated for the Revolution plummeted into revulsion and despair\(^1\) with the degeneration of the Revolution into a dogmatic and intolerant order whose foundation was one of reciprocal fear and suspicion. This experience can play no small role in explaining why given actors in the intelligentsia adhere to an ideology of tolerance and lack of dogmatism.

Another variable that might explain the observed propensities of members of the intelligentsia to practice an ideology of tolerance and lack of dogmatism might possibly be the mode of thought inherent in the Soviet intelligentsia. For in stressing the natural sciences, Soviet education has created a philosophical opponent for Soviet ideology. During its maturation period the Soviet Union was able to create pockets of

\(^1\)The suicides of Essenin and Mayakovsky might be examples.
accurate and reasonably detailed information that were sealed off from the rest of the community. This attempt at isolating the practitioners of scientific philosophy was made in order to maximize the use of scientific knowledge in the process of modernization, while at the same time, preventing the scientific elite from developing into a class capable of advancing its own philosophy. However, the more complex Soviet society became, the more increasingly scientific techniques were required for it to remain efficient. Any complex social system, no matter what its political format, requires vast quantities of accurate and substantially detailed information funneled through well marked channels to designated audiences.¹

In this connection it is notable that in the post-Stalin era, Russian statisticians and economists have been vocal in their criticism of some of the earlier statistical methods. Their grounds are not ideological, but simply that distorted statistics produce bad decisions. The bargain being driven between managers and the government in recent years is of the sort: if you want us to make sound decisions, you must give us sound information.²


²Kuhn, ibid.
Yet the greater the implementation of scientific skills, the greater the strength of the very philosophy that denies the existence of speculative philosophy's claim to infallibility in establishing moral directives that claim the impelling objectivity of absolute truth. The information needs of a complex Soviet society also encourages the expression of dissent by ending the isolation that causes the dissident to feel that he is alone in his disaffection. For when the information needs of Soviet society allowed communication to occur, the opportunity to verbalize disaffection presented itself.
POLICY SHIFTS INDUCED BY THE "DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT"

When examples of a modern totalitarian state are given, the three states most often mentioned are Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and the Soviet Union. There are, however, significant differences between the three examples. One of them is that the first two, Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, never survived their founding leaders. So, in reality, the only judgements that can be made concerning the long term survivability of the modern totalitarian state must be made in light of the Soviet experiment. For the Soviet Union, having survived its founding leader by 50 years now, provides us with our first look at a "mature" modern totalitarian state.

The political authority of this "mature" modern totalitarian state is, of course, concerned with the maintenance of political power in order to preserve the political, economic, and social system it created. However, as Barry and Berman\(^1\) have observed, the legal institutions essential to the retention of political

power necessarily create motivation and offer opportunities to challenge that power, at least implicitly. Should the Soviet political authorities seek to avoid such a challenge by operating without law, as was done during the Stalin period, there would be high costs and penalties. For while political terror and fear may have assured survival and the consolidation of power in the first stage and mobilization in the second stage of the creation of the Soviet state, it was becoming counter-productive in the post-mobilization stage.

In the post-mobilization stage, the successful completion of the rational purposes of the state requires the expression of interest articulation to the extent that it relates to those rational purposes. For without the expression of the interests affected by a particular policy proposal, the policy adaptation to particular conditions may be unsuccessful. Thus, it is possible to suppress interest articulation only to the extent that it does not matter whether policy is successful. It has, therefore, been "...suggested as a general theorem that interest will be articulated to the degree that the totalitarian regime pursues rational purposes."¹

Now while other forms of shaping and channeling political behavior have come to play an ever increasing role in the Soviet Union, the strain within the individual citizen to bring his attitudes into consonance with his compliant behavior increased. In essence, the adjustment took one of two forms: "...a change in attitudes producing greater support for the regime, or a change in behavior producing greater manifest dissent or defiance."¹ Under such circumstances of changed attitudes among some citizens and changed behavior among others, the Soviet leadership has often acceded to articulated interests as long as such interests "...operate within a common framework of values, and consequently the demands voiced would not for the most part be disruptive of ideological goals."²

What becomes crucial in the "modern" totalitarian state is the way the interest articulation process is structured. For, as Castles³ has pointed out, at a local level, and more recently at a not so local level, criticism may not be discouraged by political authority.


²Castles, op. cit., p. 121.

³loc. cit., p. 127.
While political authority continues to disapprove of the politics of formal coalitions, tendencies of articulation are vocalized by informal coalitions of interest groups. The concern, therefore, is apparently not that a particular interest that lies within the established framework of values is being articulated, but whether it is being articulated by a formal interest group coalition that may lead to an independent organization structure and leadership possessing the potential for opposition to political authority.

The Institutionalization of Criticism

Institutionalization of criticism within the Soviet framework of values was attempted, as embodied by the idea of a public inspector, by the Bolsheviks soon after the revolution. Although the attempt to widen participation by the people in monitoring the Soviet bureaucracy was to take institutional form as the Commissariat of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection (NK RKI or Rabkrin) and, later, as the joint Central Control Committee and Rabkrin (TsKK-RKI), the party and trade unions, too, created control commissions in an attempt to give their rank-and-file members an opportunity to provide input into the new system.

In 1934, Stalin dissolved the Central Control Committee and Rabkrin, and public inspectors gradually
disappeared. They were replaced by a group of overlapping monitoring agencies that included, among others, the Ministry of State Control, the Ministry of Finance, the State Planning Commission (Gosplan), the Party, and the ultimate monitoring agency, the Ministry of Internal Affairs.¹ Then, in November of 1962, Khrushchev transformed the Commission of State Control by combining it with party and public elements to create the Party-State Committee (Komitet partiinogo-gosudarstvennogo kontrolia). The chief task of this organization, which was replaced by the People's Control Committee (Komitet narodnogo kontrolia, or KNK) in December of 1965, "...is to monitor economic and administrative activities in the Soviet Union—that is, to seek out inefficiency, waste, overstaffing, unresponsiveness to citizens' demands, red-tape, embezzlement, and the host of related ills that beset bureaucracy in all its forms."²

In the 1965 reorganization of the institutionalized public critic, the party component was removed. The new People's Control Committee was, thereby, made solely

²loc. cit., p. 1.
a state agency. "The Chairman of the USSR People's Control Committee is subordinate to central party (and government) organs and no longer wields party authority in his own right."¹ Now while the party role in the new committee has changed, public participation has not. For,

in 1969, the ratio of paid staff members to unpaid, "non-staff," volunteer members of the People's Control Committee was indicated by Deputy-Chairman I. V. Shikin to be one-to-one thousand. He stated that the paid staff membership was just under 7,000 while the combined volunteer force of people's inspectors in Groups and Posts and attached to Committees was nearly 7 million.²

The hierarchy of the present institutionalized form of criticism runs from the USSR People's Control Committee through Committees formed at each territorial level downward, eventually ending with Groups and Posts. According to the People's Control Statute,

People's Control Committees...create sections for branches of the economy, science, and culture, and permanent and temporary commissions.... Workers of these sections and commissions shall be chosen from among the most authoritative and experienced workers, collective farmers, employees, as well as pensioners.... These workers shall fulfill commissions, as a rule, in a social procedure, and when necessary, with the consent of the directors of the appropriate enterprises, collective farms, institutions, organizations,

¹ loc. cit., p. 5.
² ibid.
with release from basic work for a period of up to two weeks per year, retaining the average monthly wage at the place of work. 1

In weighing the importance of the People's Control Committee as a form of institutionalized criticism, it becomes essential first to examine the impact of the ordinary citizen volunteers as opposed to the "paid staff." According to the "Statute on the Agencies of People's Control," the committees at all levels are supposed to arrive at decisions by majority rule. Furthermore, the membership of Groups and Posts, the grass roots of institutionalized criticism, is elected from the most "outstanding and most active" citizens by meetings of collectives, soviets, or of the citizens of population centers.

The second essential task concerning any evaluation of the importance of the People's Control Committee as a form of institutionalized criticism must be an examination of the significance of the role of the Committees in the evolution of the Soviet system. Certainly, the present institutionalized form of criticism provides political authority with information on and surveillance of the system by providing the Soviet citizen with the opportunity to improve his position by

exposing and correcting abuse of his personal interests. From the vantage point of the political authority the present institutionalized form of criticism may require close supervision to prevent criticism of the system from going too far, but institutionalized criticism is also the answer to the growing Soviet need for decentralized control. What it all amounts to is that the political authority hopes to encourage citizens to assume a role of "active involvement" in the monitoring of Soviet society while, at the same time, excluding them from "decision making." The problem for the political authority is that while the party wants the institutionalized critic to be motivated by altruism alone, the critic is most likely to be motivated by personal self-interest. Thus, it seems, that while the institutionalized critic may be pursuing goals of mutual benefit to the system and to himself, the institutionalization of criticism can only add impetus to the proliferation of interest groups. For in exposing and seeking to correct abuse of a personal interest, it is only natural for the critic to seek out others who share the same interest. Here the compartmentalization of specialized skill groups that fragments intelligentsia solidarity and facilitates Party control, also fosters "groupism."
One manner in which the political authority has attempted to handle the requirement of systemic adaptation to the criticism of specialized elites is through the instrument of "cooptation." By drawing representatives of specialized elites into the policy-making machinery, political authority hoped that systemic stability could be increased through an informational input that would not involve a requisite loss of power. Allowing input from the specialized elites concerning their respective areas of endeavor also helps to legitimize the role of the political elite as political authority. With less arbitrary political interference in their endeavors, the specialized elites are confronted with a division of the decision-making process that allocates "political" decisions to the "political specialists" of political authority. In this manner, political authority can increase the legitimacy of its decisions while satisfying some of the informational needs of the system.

While political authority tolerates no direct challenge to its legitimacy and severely restricts the flow of information, the informational requirements of

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systemic adaptability have resulted in a freer flow of information and public debate of policy questions.¹ The advice to the political authority growing out of these debates runs the gamut from insistence upon the maintenance of the status quo to suggestions for transformation as radical as anything in the history of the Soviet state. The political authority thus has become somewhat of a political broker representing the interests of Soviet society as a whole against the competing interest groups that tend to violate the common good.

For policy-making since the removal of Khrushchev from power has been indicative of committee decision-making. Given the prevailing distribution of funds in favor of the heavy-industry and defense sectors, "...Soviet policy in any particular area has remained fairly close to what the relevant segment of the specialized elite could be predicted to favor."²

In contrast to the Khrushchev period, political authority no longer fights major battles with any of the specialized elites. The pressure has been increased, however, against dissidents demanding fundamental systemic change. There are undoubtedly at least two


²loc. cit., p. 33.
reasons for this behavior on the part of political authority. The leading role of political authority as defender of the common good, of course, must be protected in the interests of the common good. Another reason is that it is in deference to the personal interests of the members of the establishment. Undoubtedly, the fact that policy is less often incorporated into clear-cut and undebatable ideology has strengthened the position of political authority with regards to its role in representing the interests of the common good in Soviet society. Thus, flexibility has strengthened its position on those issues political authority perceives as most crucial to its survival—in effect, the very issues addressed by the Democratic Movement.

The Effect of Dissent on the Soviet Polity

The institutional critics have an important contribution to make to systemic stability, but it seems highly unlikely that some of them do not harbor latent, even if still rather amorphous, concepts similar to those held by members of the Democratic Movement. Such "insiders" would have the opportunity to initiate change in the areas the members of the Democratic Movement have demonstrated concern with, for political authority
"...is not 'accessible' to the non-elite in the sense of the latter having any real control over the selection of the former."\(^1\) If fundamental systemic adaptation is to occur "...in any real sense, the adaptation must be from within, although the idea of change and the range of alternatives may come from 'outside' sources."\(^2\) Yet, there can be little doubt that the balance of resources are in favor of the more "conservative" members of political authority. For the interests articulated in the Soviet polity are those most crucial to the survival of the political authority and, therefore, are not ignored. Furthermore, "the political culture links the bureaucratic elite and the 'masses' more closely than it links the dissidents to either."\(^3\)

"Insiders" (like Sakharov) who hold high positions in a specialized elite and have a certain "authority" rooted in the functions they perform are limited to attempting to convince the political authority of the "error of their ways" and making them realize the counterproductiveness of continuing "to do business


\(^2\)ibid.

\(^3\)loc. cit., p. 50.
as usual."¹ As for "outsiders," their major contribution will probably continue to be in the area of issues and ideas. The continued existence of both groups will be symptomatic of

...the interplay between the growing complexity, or differentiation, of a rapidly modernizing Soviet society, on the one hand, and the persistent reliance by the regime on what have been termed 'command-centralist' modes of integrating the differentiated segments of society in the face of rising demands for autonomy on the part of these segments, on the other.²

Yet, while the efforts of both "insiders" and "outsiders" have not brought about systemic changes, it cannot be said that their efforts have not had their effect on political authority policy.

The political authority campaign against Sakharov for his August 1973 warning to the United States against building detente with the USSR on Soviet terms³ and the banishment of Solzhenitsyn⁴ for his campaign against

¹loc. cit., p. 48.
²loc. cit., p. 49.
political authority policies should be enough to indicate that members of the Democratic Movement are perceived as a threat. The partisan coalition labeled by its members as the Democratic Movement constitutes an opposition at least perceived by political authority as being capable of influencing policy. It is undoubtedly not that political authority fears that members of the Democratic Movement (which it also undoubtedly does not perceive as a movement) will directly induce it to make policy shifts. Rather, the political authority fears that members of the Democratic Movement may induce foreign governments to make policy alterations that will in turn make necessary policy shifts on its part. This fear on the part of political authority may be justified, for the United States Senator Henry M. Jackson has written the following:

Significantly, the economy of the Soviet Union is in desperate straits, and we have been asked to extend to Russia the benefits of our markets on a most-favored-nation basis, of our capital at preferential rates, and of our superlative technology. There are those who argue that we must make these trade concessions in the interest of promoting detente but that we ought not to attach conditions that would, at the same time, promote human rights in the Soviet Union. This is the argument of the Kremlin. It is also, I am pleased to say, an argument that we in the Congress have clearly rejected. The overwhelming support for my East-West Trade and Freedom of Emigration amendment...to make these benefits conditional on free emigration is, in my view, not only the best
hope for the survival and freedom of many brave people, it is a sound and proper way to approach the potential detente.\textsuperscript{1}

The Jewish emigration issue provides another example of how the loose partisan coalition has indirectly (through inducing other governments to induce Soviet policy changes) induced political authority policy shifts.\textsuperscript{2}

In January of 1974 even the press of the People's Republic of China dealt for the first time in detail with domestic opposition to Soviet political authority.\textsuperscript{3}

Apparently, the Democratic Movement has found a resource which is "convertible" into influence. The fact that political authority policy shifts have been induced can be measured both in the number of Soviet Jews

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1}Jackson, Henry M., "First, Human Detente." \textit{The New York Times}, 9 September 1973.
\item \textsuperscript{3}See "China Says Soviet Oppresses People with Police and Camps." \textit{The New York Times}, 9 January 1974, p. 5. In part, the article states the following about a Hsinhua (the official press agency of the PRC) broadcast:
\begin{quote}
The Chinese statement listed numerous strikes, demonstrations and protests by-Soviet workers and national minorities as well as by intellectuals and students in recent years. It mentioned Lithuania, Latvia, the Ukraine and Central Asia among places where non-Russian peoples have expressed dissatisfaction.
\end{quote}
It also said that there had been opposition inside the Soviet Union to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and support for the anti-Government riots in Poland in 1970.
\end{itemize}
allowed to emigrate and by the different manner in which prominent dissidents are handled. As a result of Sakharov's warnings to the West concerning a Soviet government "armed to the teeth," it may be that even Soviet military/foreign policy will have been influenced. All this, of course, is a reflection of the increasing complexity of both Soviet society and the international community of nations.
THE POSSIBILITIES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PLURALISTIC POLITICAL SYSTEM

If the Soviet Union were totally isolated it might be possible for political authority to avoid ever being induced to make policy shifts. However, the Soviet state exists in a world ever becoming more increasingly complex. Systemic adaptation to the demands of this increasingly complex world has resulted in an increasingly complex Soviet state and, as Fagen\(^1\) has pointed out, "as long as complex organization persists, 'the cluster of problems that we group under the heading of 'freedom of expression' will continue to be of political relevance." For every organization is held together by communication,\(^2\) and the more complex the system, the greater the need for accurate and timely information. The cost of overvaluing parochial information\(^3\) (that is, in this case, information produced by non-scientific

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methodology) has proven to be extremely high in a complex system. The accumulation of the accurate and reasonably detailed information required for the functioning of a stable and productive system has necessitated the relaxation of the ideological shackles on creative research based on scientific methodology. Tension between the philosophic systems has been the result.

The history of philosophic systems that are speculative creations of fanciful minds has been described by Reichenbach\(^1\) as "...the story of the errors of men who asked questions they were unable to answer; the answers which they nonetheless gave can be explained only from psychological motives." This is so, says Reichenbach, because the speculative philosopher "...has too often sacrificed truth to the desire to give answers, and clarity to the temptation of speaking in pictures; and his language has lacked the precision which is the scientist's compass in escaping the reefs of error."\(^2\)

"Problems," he says, "are solved not through vague generalities, or picturesque descriptions of the


\(^2\)loc. cit., p. viii.
relations between man and the world, but through technical work.\textsuperscript{1} The technical analysis of the scientist inevitably results in a philosophical conflict between speculative philosophy and science, for science denies the existence of the absolute truth to which speculative philosophy lays claim. The mode of thought characteristic in scientific thought tends to result in a philosophy which cannot be confined and which denies the establishment of moral directives that claim the impelling objectivity of absolute truth. In an ideological setting, the scientific community will, therefore, provide the source of a philosophy that encourages dissidence. Attempts to isolate the scientific community in order to maximize the use of scientific knowledge while preventing the community from developing into a class capable of advancing its own philosophy becomes increasingly impossible as the system grows more complex. In effect, the needs become compounded and the process circular in that in order to function in a stable and productive manner the system requires the accurate and reasonably detailed information generated by the very scientific methodology and research that will lead to a more complex system with even greater accurate and detailed informational needs.

\textsuperscript{1}loc. cit., p. 117.
If the system is not flexible enough to meet informational needs as they increase, economic and technical growth will continue to lag. On the other hand, should the system prove flexible enough for political authority to assume more of the role of an integrative organ and less that of an exploitative class, the speculative philosophical baggage would become less and less a basis for continued dominance of political life by political authority.

The political elite, certainly, is aware of the manifold problems it faces—i.e., the problem posed by lagging economic growth rates and recurrent agricultural crises, the problem of reconciling the practical need to grant greater autonomy to economic managers with the eternal compulsion toward "control," and the problem of comprehending the sources of dissent and the "style" and the actions of ever-more-publicized dissenters.¹

For political authority has attempted to permit non-political policy-making participation by specialized elites in return for their skills and, in general, the members of the specialized elites accept the all pervasive role of political authority in "political" decision-making. The danger to the role of political authority lies in the fact that as the role of ideology in policy-making diminishes, "...these specialized

elites might attempt to trade their skills for some degree of participation in the political policy-making process."¹ Thus, while "hegemonic" political dominance by political authority may become increasingly costly and inefficient as Soviet society becomes ever more sophisticated, it does not follow that the institutional framework must change. Indeed, systemic adaptability may be reflected in the incrementalism of what Hough² calls "institutional pluralism."

According to Hough,³ institutional pluralism would fall "...somewhere in between authoritarianism and classical pluralism." In such a system,

...those who want to effect political change must, with few exceptions, work within the official institutional framework. While any citizen can make appeals or suggestions for incremental change through official channels, the leading political participants will almost always be "establishment" figures....⁴

With the break-down of monolithic political authority, the multiplicity of interests in society would tend to


³ibid.

⁴loc. cit., p. 29.
be represented by temporary alliances of institutional forces functioning within the framework of tolerable political behavior. If input of broader societal forces is reflected by the behavior of these institutional forces, the risk of popular unrest can be reduced. Such a combination of inclusiveness and public contestation would be indicative of a modest step toward polyarchy.

While the attitudes and demands of the Democratic Movement often reflect abstract ideas of human rights, "the masses as a whole do not demand 'legality,' representative institutions, 'freedom,' which to them are unfamiliar and exotic concepts." The masses tend to be more interested in the economic gains that translate into more and better made consumer goods. Having sacrificed for over fifty years in order to build a better future, the Soviet people are beginning to anticipate its arrival. Presently,

their economic demands are modest and are being met—if slowly and with occasional setbacks—so far as housing, consumer goods, and food are concerned. Perhaps, sometime in the not so distant future, they can even look forward to owning a Zhiguli car. In their own terms, they "never had it so good." 

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1 Connor, op. cit., p. 50.
2 Ibid. But there remains unattractive prospects for political authority:

Between 1960 and 1967 consumer disposable incomes rose by 69 percent, but personal savings rose by 148 percent, or at more than twice the
Yet, a consumer revolution would be bound to have its effect on the system. A look at how the automobile alone affected the development of the West should be enough to suggest some of the ramifications of increased consumerism in Soviet society. Furthermore, it cannot be assumed that expectation levels will remain stable.

Should economic and technical growth continue to lag, the discrepancy of the distribution of rewards within the system can only be aggravated. Explanations for the discrepancy that may have originally been perceived have "...been brought to the fore by the natural proclivity of the older, hitherto privileged group to prevent the downward mobility of their children...."\(^1\)

The result is a "...painfully frustrating clash between the ideology-born expectations and the actual life rate. Whereas the Soviet consumer was saving 17 percent of his additional incomes in 1960, by 1967 he was saving 49 percent. Such a high rate of savings is unprecedented in any economy, let alone one with the low per capita income of the U.S.S.R. Obviously, there is a situation of rising unsatisfied consumer demands.


experiences of young people."\(^1\) A new consciousness can be expected to develop particularly among the new industrial proletariat, for there is no reason to assume that a new industrial working class consciousness will not develop and take shape as it did before remnants of the old proletariat were lost in the massive influx of rural elements during the mobilization stage. The new proletarian worker, being brought up in the post-mobilization stage of the development of the Soviet state,

...is ready and able to give more than passing thought to what he has repeatedly been told about his right to rule the country. And if he and his fellows were asked how they would run their factory, local community, or country, they—unlike most of their fathers—would certainly have something to say.\(^2\)

While it can be expected that, as their class consciousness develops, they will first direct their attention to obtaining economic gains, Bauman\(^3\) argues that "...it is fairly certain that they will not miss whatever opportunities present themselves to place their bargaining power on a more constant and secure footing." Political authority, of course, is attempting to forestall the challenge that such a rise of

\(^1\)loc. cit., p. 48.
\(^2\)loc. cit., p. 51.
\(^3\)ibid.
class-consciousness would signify by conducting a "war on poverty" involving a narrowing of the inequalities in income by granting significant raises of the minimum wage.¹

Although "one might be tempted to think that the dichotomous image of society is a relic of Marxism or, more generally, of the conditions of early capitalism and their interpretation,"² the "consciousness" of the institutions and values of industrial democracy and "unionism" would be bound to provoke its re-assertion. For whatever changes may have occurred in the last fifty or so years of the history of the proletariat in the Soviet Union, "...the idea that there is a

¹Hough, op. cit., p. 39. He states that the precise impact of Brezhnev's "war on poverty" will not be clear until Moscow decides to publish fuller income data, but it may well be that the Soviet Union in recent years has seen a shift in income distribution that is quite striking by Western standards, and that the pattern of income distribution in the Soviet Union today is substantially more egalitarian than it is in the advanced Western countries, particularly if income from property is taken into account. In any case, if it is true, as many contend, that the entrenched ruling elite in the Soviet Union has been gaining in power since Khrushchev's fall, at least its allegedly augmented authority does not appear to be reflected in a larger share of the national income.

fundamental division of society into 'haves' and 'have-nots,' 'above' and 'below,' 'them' and 'us' is still a force in the minds of many people.\textsuperscript{1} Despite the new prolitariat's present, and perhaps even future, hesitation "...to draw pronouncedly radical political conclusions from their dichotomous image of society,"\textsuperscript{2} it will remain a threatening manner in which to perceive the system because of its potential to be activated into an ideology of political conflict with which to confront political authority. The "trigger" to such a confrontation would be the point at which the functionaries of political authority become so alienated from the new proletariat that it no longer makes any difference in whose name they claim to function.

Political class conflict, industrial class conflict, regional conflicts, conflicts between town and country, possibly racial conflicts—all are superimposed so as to form a single and all-embracing antagonism. Under these conditions, the intensity of political conflict reaches its maximum.\textsuperscript{3}

The increasingly perceptible contradiction between the nature and consequences of the scientific and technological revolution on the one hand and, on the other, the ideological superstructure brings the system

\textsuperscript{1}ibid.  
\textsuperscript{2}loc. cit., p. 289.  
\textsuperscript{3}loc. cit., p. 316.
to the verge of what Garaudy\(^1\) calls "the crisis in communism." According to Bauman, if the response of political authority

...boils down to little more than another round in a game of musical chairs at the top leadership level, it will likely prove a temporary, makeshift solution that does not satisfy the requirements of the social processes that generated the crisis.\(^2\)

To borrow a phrase from Burton,\(^3\) "...if the goal is peace and stability, conflict must be resolved, and not merely settled." The power relationships and the relevant facts of the crisis are apparently known, but the resolution of the crisis will require more than threats, bargains, and persuasion. For the resolution of the crisis will necessitate greater subsystem interaction and participation in political policy-making.

**Subsystem Interaction and Its Effects**

Undoubtedly, the largest goal-seeking aggregates pursuing coherent common interests in the Soviet


\(^2\)Bauman, op. cit., p. 47.

political system are the occupations, although their activities are generally limited to the issue of "professional autonomy." This is not, however, to dismiss group activity by occupations as insignificant. For while such activity has been infrequent, progress on the goal of "professional autonomy" has tended to make political articulation more acceptable to political authority. Being deemed as a necessity in order to come to terms with the problems of a complex society, this communication between occupations and political authority is bound to be an interaction among conflicting tendencies of articulation, particularly as the social order becomes more complex. What is more, it can be expected that beyond the issue "professional autonomy" internal conflicting tendencies of articulation over issues to be raised with political authority would appear within occupational organizations. Once political articulation has been made legitimate by political authority, it is difficult to restrict. The more the "privilege" is extended, the greater the pressure for participation by those who remain excluded.

Increased participatory activity on the part of members of occupational and institutional aggregates can be expected to take the form of intense and continuous internal struggles over the political articulations
of their respective aggregates. Internal opposition to the "group line," however, need not end with what Griffiths calls "parallel unilateral articulations of virtually atomized individuals." For as Gorgone has stated, "to the precise extent that the political issue which divides them from the majority of their fellow workers crosses the boundaries of other aggregates, the oppositionists will find that they are acting as part of a larger coalition, or tendency of articulation." Indeed, loose associations (such as the Democratic Movement) that cut across occupational and institutional aggregates can be expected to be formed to articulate political demands that members' respective organizations fail to articulate. In essence, then, both within the system and all its units...

...policy on a given issue is likely to be internally contradictory and may be understood as the interaction among conflicting tendencies of articulation prior to, during, and after the taking of official decisions;

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similarly, fluctuations in value allocation or in the policy "line" may be seen as shifts in the relative influence of conflicting tendencies.¹

Thus, any attempt to analyze Soviet policy-making must take a systems approach that takes into consideration political articulation by cross occupational and institutional aggregate groups as well as the aggregates most generally associated with the more traditional group theory as it developed in the West.

Most certainly among those occupation and institutional aggregates whose political articulations will help bring about the preconditions for the development of polyarchy in the Soviet Union are the managers of the consumer goods and light industries, agronomists, and those economists favoring decentralization.²

Should the increased complexity that would result from the satisfaction of their expectations occur, the communications necessary for the functioning of an even more complex system would require more participation and provide greater possibilities of tendency articulation

¹Griffiths, op. cit., p. 361.

conflicts. As Schmidt\(^1\) has pointed out, "for political, strategic, and economic reasons, the Soviet Union is likely to continue its efforts to achieve self-sufficiency in the supply of basic foodstuffs...." In this attempt at agricultural self-sufficiency political authority has followed the controversial "Virgin-Lands Program" with an effort to farm the steppes of northern Russia and Siberia\(^2\) only about one-half year after Solzhenitsyn's recommendation "...to shift the center of the Government's attention and center of national effort (and with it, the center of settlement and the focus of search for the young)...into its Northeast."\(^3\)

Yet whether or not this project is significant in production expansion, decentralization in the form of

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decollectivization is the answer to the inevitably increasingly pronounced lag in Soviet agriculture.

Grave, too, is the second grand dilemma which is already bedeviling the Moscow elite—the growing backwardness in the organization of production and consumption of goods, arising from the widening gap between ever-advancing technology and the obsolete Marxian economic system.¹

These two dilemmas can be overcome only through basic structural reform. "The ideological obstacle to such a reform is the official dogma according to which the kolkhoz—the collective farm—is a basic pillar of the Soviet social system."² In industry and trade, a rigidly centralized economy stifles the enterprise of independent management to the extent that they fail to fulfill the demands of a modern industrialized society. It is the political articulations of the managers of the consumer goods and light industries, agronomists, and those economists favoring decentralization that offer the possibility of such structural reform. It is likely, however, that the implementation of reform in the fields of management and agriculture will have to


be preceded by the implementation of an optimal planning system for the economy that would generate a need for improved economic efficiency, which would require a new system of management and agricultural re-organization. The extreme liberalization of non-planning could not safely occur because of the danger of the centrifugal forces in the Soviet Union that can be seen at "play" in Yugoslavia.

Judy has stated that "the positions of any Soviet economist can be predicted with considerable accuracy if information is available on his age, his organization of primary affiliation, and his degree of mathematical proficiency." He has found clusterings of liberal opinion at the enterprise and sovnarkhoz levels of industrial management and at laboratories and institutes of the various academies of science outside of the Institute of Economics of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Now while many of the younger economists accept the basic tenets of Marxian macro-sociological theory, they hold classical Soviet political economy


2loc. cit., p. 240.
in deepest scorn. They seek to influence policy by elaborating various policy options in an attempt to "...convince their colleagues, other specialist elites, and public opinion through 'debates' carried on through the medium of public meetings and the press." With the older and more conservative economists occupying many important positions of power, the younger mathematical economists must take a slow, and deliberate, evolutionary approach. Recent attempts at economic reform "...represent compromises laboriously produced from sharp contending positions expounded by competing groups of economists." The incomparably greater capacity of the mathematical economists to define complex economic situations in a logical manner heightens their ability to influence policy. For the mathematical economists are the only economists who can offer political authority the expert advice that has been made necessary by the complexity and functional specialization of the economy. While political authority has no intention of abandoning the central

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1 loc. cit., p. 250.
2 loc. cit., p. 248.
3 ibid.
4 ibid.
5 loc. cit., p. 249.
planning system that is basic to the state-controlled economy, it is interested in achieving a more balanced and orderly growth of the Soviet economy. Such a thing would require a model of economic growth that would shift from "ultra-industrialization" to "...a more nearly balanced model, in which greater attention would be given to agriculture and consumer needs." Unfortunately, in light of the specter of lost employment and resultant hardship for the bureaucrats involved, staunch bureaucratic resistance has been brought on.

Despite the recognition that "...economic reform is becoming an increasingly important factor in the development of the U.S.S.R.'s national economy," the hesitancy of political authority to violate the immediate interests of the bureaucracy has resulted in setbacks for the reform cause. For in its attempt to pacify the bureaucracy by mollifying economic reform, political authority has created reform attempts so complex that they have "...led instead to greater 'bureaucratization

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of economic life' and 'creeping recentralization.'\(^1\) Thus, the impact of needed practical reform has been significantly reduced "merely by doing what comes naturally to large, entrenched bureaucracies anywhere when they are threatened with change--that is, procrastinating, assimilating, complicating, and regulating."\(^2\) The response by political authority is likely to continue to be "bland exhortation and low-key tinkering with organization and reform...."\(^3\) Yet, the pressures for economic reform that have led to the so far ill-fated reforms are only bound to grow as a result of failures to make significant gains in resolving the problems besetting the economy. According to Dodge,\(^4\)


\(^2\) loc. cit., p. 37.


there seems to be little doubt that the main reason for rapid Soviet growth in the past has been the ability of the regime with a little carrot and much stick to mobilize and to put to work the various factors of production: labor, capital, and natural resources.

From this, he concludes that

now that reserves of labor in agriculture and among women have been drawn down; now that the best land and natural resources are more fully utilized; now that increases in the capital stock, both fixed and human, are more difficult to achieve; and now that technological advance is less easy as the technological frontier is approached in more sectors, the Soviet Union must find economic growth at past rates more difficult to achieve.¹

The political authority desire for a more balanced and orderly growth of the Soviet economy must, therefore, turn to the increased efficiency to be obtained through decentralization and improvement of the central planning that would remain. Except for the assistance obtained from Western technology, only in this manner can the Soviet economy sustain the continued growth that will guarantee the increased complexity that requires the communication or interaction of conflicting tendencies of articulation. The alternative is to continue to walk an allocation tightrope between the heavy-industry and defense sectors and the rising expectations of the new proletariat over the chasm of a further decline in productivity and growth rate.

¹loc. cit., pp. 71-72.
Another process that is complicating subsystem interaction is what might be termed a "bureaucratic generation conflict." For while the "old guard" bureaucracy struggles to hold the line against the reformers, it is simultaneously being attacked by those who joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union after Stalin's death. The reason for the attack, of course, is that "...while twenty years is a sufficient period of time to underscore the erosion of the administrative skills of the old guard--which were meager from the onset--it is not long enough for them to have grown too old to cling to the positions awarded..."\(^1\) during the period when careers were built over the bodies of colleagues who perished. "Since 1952 the average age of the Central Committee has increased at each congress; renewal has not kept pace with the passage of time nor involved enough sufficiently younger men."\(^2\) Now while both bureaucratic generations are confronted by the technically-trained occupational aggregates demanding a larger role in decision making, they also find the

\(^1\) Bauman, op. cit., pp. 48-49.

\(^2\) Daniels, Robert V., "Participatory Bureaucracy and the Soviet Political System," in Analysis of the USSR's 24th Party Congress and 9th Five-Year Plan, op. cit., p. 79.
old guard's dogmatic ideology and the new guard's more pragmatic and flexible approach to the increasing complexity of industrialization and the modernization process places them on different sides of the barricade. Yet despite their self-identification with the cause of technical rationality, the new guard must be mindful not to undermine "...the traditional legitimizing foundations on which the authority of rulers over experts has hitherto rested, thus rendering themselves vulnerable to the challenge of the latter."¹ The fact that their turn to rule will come is as certain as the eventual passing of the old guard. The more important question is how the channels of participatory bureaucracy may reflect and accommodate the currents of new opinion among the intelligentsia and the Democratic Movement as a whole.²

The effect of subsystem interaction to date has been "...to serve as a fairly effective channel for the transmission of all manner of ideas and desires from below upwards."³ However, the increasing complexity of industrialization and the modernization process that has

¹Bauman, op. cit., p. 49.
²Daniels, op. cit., p. 79.
³loc. cit., p. 78.
made necessary the obtaining of accurate information has resulted in responsiveness to interests from below. A pattern of increased vulnerability of top political authority personalities has emerged since the death of Stalin. As Daniels\(^1\) has pointed out, "...Khrushchev's career with his near-defeat in 1957, his evident difficulties after 1960, and his ultimate demise at the hands of his own bureaucratic subordinates, demonstrates the growing vulnerability of the top leadership vis-a-vis the Central Committee." Most certainly, Hough\(^2\) is correct when he concludes that "...it is hard to believe --barring a major crisis--that a General Secretary will soon choose to challenge the fundamental interests of as many different institutional groups as Khrushchev did." Yet, deference on the part of political authority to the political articulations of institutionalized groups does not imply tolerance for the articulations of a loose cross aggregate coalition like the Democratic Movement that can be perceived as vocalizing demands that are disruptive of ideological goals. For the disruptive (as perceived by political authority and the more conservative elements that presently control

\(^1\)ibid.

\(^2\)Hough, op. cit., p. 44.
political articulations of occupational and institutional aggregates) results of the behavior of members of the Democratic Movement when they control an institutionalized tool of political articulation is clear from the turmoil created by the late Alexander Tvardovsky while he was editor of Novyi Mir. Furthermore, the Democratic Movement presents the threat of providing the "linkage" between institutionalized interest groups should institutionalized tools of political articulation be seized by Democrats. Such a "linkage" could lead to a formal coalition with its patterned interaction, "official" spokesmen, etc. It is this cross fertilization of institutional aggregates that is the key to the formation of formal coalitions. Thus, it will be the outcome of cross fertilization between the institutionalized groups and the resultant formation of formal cross aggregate coalitions that will determine the course of the tendency conflict over systemic adaptability and the possibilities for the development of a pluralistic political system.

The Course of Tendency Conflict

As Burton\(^1\) has suggested, "movements seeking social reform...need to be examined in the context of the whole

of the relationships involved...." Thus, in order to determine whether the Soviet political system can accommodate the formal "institutionalization" of the cross aggregate coalition that has called itself the "Democratic Movement," an analysis of the whole environment of the system in which systemic adaptability is being sought is the best approach. For the success or failure of cross fertilization between institutionalized groups will be determined to a great extent by the environment in which it must take place. Most certainly, "the most powerful recent analysis of the general conditions under which a nation can transform itself into a democracy is Robert Dahl's *Polyarchy.*" Polyarchy, according to Dahl, exists when there is a high level of participation in a highly competitive public contestation environment, and he identifies seven sets of complex conditions (see Table I) that favor the development of these two parameters. Although the variables are imprecise and measurement is difficult, a suggestive profile of the Soviet Union's potential for polyarchy may be created.

### Table I

Dahl's "Conditions Favoring Polyarchy"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Most favorable to polyarchy</th>
<th>Least favorable to polyarchy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. Historical sequences</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Competition precedes inclusiveness</td>
<td>Inclusiveness precedes competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Shortcut: from closed hegemony to inclusive polyarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II. The socioeconomic order:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Access to</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Violence</td>
<td>Dispersed or neutralized</td>
<td>Monopolized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Socio-economic sanctions</td>
<td>Dispersed or neutralized</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Type of economy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Agrarian</td>
<td>Free farmers</td>
<td>Traditional peasant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Commercial-industrial</td>
<td>Decentralized direction</td>
<td>Centralized direction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>III. The level of socioeconomic development</strong></td>
<td>High: GNP per capita over about $700-800</td>
<td>Low: GNP per capita under about $100-200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IV. Equalities and inequalities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Objective</td>
<td>Low, or Parity and dispersed inequalities</td>
<td>High: Cumulative and extreme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Subjective: relative deprivation</td>
<td>Low or decreasing</td>
<td>High or increasing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>V. Subcultural pluralism</th>
<th>Most favorable to polyarchy</th>
<th>Least favorable to polyarchy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Amount</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. If marked or high</td>
<td>None a majority</td>
<td>One a majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None regional</td>
<td>Some regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None indefinitely out of</td>
<td>Some permanently in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>government</td>
<td>opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mutual guarantees</td>
<td>No mutual guarantees</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| VI. Domination by a foreign power | Weak or temporary | Strong and persistent |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VII. Beliefs of political activists</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Institutions of polyarchy are legitimate</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Only unilateral authority is legitimate</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Polyarchy is effective in solving major problems</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Trust in others</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Political relationships are: strictly competitive</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strictly cooperative</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cooperative-competitive</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Compromise necessary and desirable</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Historical sequences

As Dahl points out, "in the future as in the past...stable polyarchies and near-polyarchies are more likely to result from rather slow evolutionary processes than from the revolutionary overthrow of existing hegemonies."¹ The Soviet historical experience follows Dahl's prediction concerning short-cuts to polyarchy. For the Bolshevik Revolution saddled the Soviet regime with so many serious conflicts over legitimacy that regression toward hegemonic rule was assured. The evolution that had been taking place previous to the end of Tsarist Russia and the short shock experience of democracy in 1917 had not successfully created a system of mutual guarantees. Therefore, because the rules of the political game were ambiguous, the legitimacy of competitive politics was weak, and the Bolsheviks not entirely confident that it was safe to tolerate their opposition or allies, the costs of suppression were not perceived as being inordinately high. While Soviet political authority has not denied the legitimacy of popular participation in government and has, therefore, granted the citizens of the Soviet Union

the right to vote in nominal elections, it continues to deny the right of opposition in "elections." With inclusiveness preceding competition in this manner, progress toward public contestation is likely to be complex and time consuming because of the difficulty of working out a system of mutual security under the conditions of universal suffrage and mass politics.¹

The Soviet Union, therefore, would rank extremely low, or not very favorably for the development of polyarchy, on the condition of historical sequences (see Figure I, Condition I).

The socioeconomic order

"The likelihood that a government will tolerate an opposition increases as the resources available to the government for suppression decline relative to the resources of an opposition."² As Connor³ has so correctly concluded,

¹loc. cit., p. 39. The role of the Soviet legal profession in advocating the values of law which transcend any given political, economic, or social system is critical for the development of mutual security.

²loc. cit., p. 48.

³Connor, op. cit., p. 51.
FIGURE I
AN IMPRESSIONISTIC PROFILE OF THE SOVIET UNION'S "PROPENSITY FOR POLYARCHY"
...while resources and skills may now be more widely distributed in the USSR than ever before and quite possibly the maintenance of centralistic, "hegemonic" political control is becoming more costly and inefficient as the society itself becomes more "advanced," nevertheless the balance of resources today still seems to favor the maintenance of a hegemonic system.

Because "the likelihood that a government will tolerate an opposition increases with a reduction in the capacity of the government to use violence or socioeconomic sanctions to suppress oppositions"\(^1\) however, such occurrences as the inadequacy and uncooperativeness of both militia (local police) and military during the 1962 riot in Novocherkassk\(^2\) raises the issue of neutralized coercive resources. Yet the fact that political authority was able to successfully employ motorized units of the KGB against its opposition was indicative of the fact that it continued to monopolize violence. Furthermore, through such tools as the labor booklet system\(^3\) political authority also continues to monopolize socioeconomic sanctions. Thus the Soviet political

\(^1\)Dahl, op. cit., p. 49.


system ranks extremely low, or very unfavorably for the development of polyarchy, on the conditions of access to violence and socioeconomic sanctions. For both are monopolized by political authority, and seldom are even temporarily neutralized (see Figure I, Condition II A).

The modern Soviet state can trace its historical past to a traditional peasant society characteristically associated with a hegemonic political authority. The norms of extreme inequalities in land distribution and instruments of coercion which were reinforced by norms favoring inequalities of class resulted in the extreme inequalities of political resources which, in turn, resulted in a hegemonic political system that by virtue of a centrally dominated social order reinforced the extreme inequalities.¹ The fact that the social order remained highly centralized and, therefore, the political system hegemonic after the creation of the Soviet state only assured the centralized direction of the economy by political authority. Thus, the traditional peasant agrarian background and the centralized direction of the commercial-industrial economy means that the Soviet political system falls into two more "least favorable to polyarchy" category conditions (see Figure I, Condition II B).

¹Dahl, op. cit., p. 49.
The level of socioeconomic development

Although an advanced economy does not create all the conditions required for a pluralistic social order, it does create many of the conditions required. It requires for its performance the distribution of the very political resources and skills that threaten hegemonies by generating demands for a pluralistic social order. The greater the pluralism of the social order, the greater the demands for political liberalization in the form of competitive politics. Thus, Dahl finds a distinct correlation between a high level of socioeconomic development and the transformation of a hegemonic regime into a polyarchy. Already in 1957 the Soviet GNP per capita had neared the threshold Dahl's data indicated as beyond which any further increases would not affect the chances for the development of competitive politics or polyarchy. Since then the growth of the Soviet GNP per capita has moved the Soviet Union beyond that threshold (see Figure I, Condition III).

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1loc. cit., pp. 76-80.
2loc. cit., p. 69.
3Cohn, op. cit., p. 13. The 1967 Soviet GNP per capita of $1552 (up from $600 in 1957) placed the Soviet Union fifth behind the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom.
Equalities and inequalities

The industrialization undergone by the traditional peasant society in the Soviet Union transformed "...a system of cumulative inequalities into a system of greater parity with respect to some key resources...."¹ A greater parity in the distribution of resources and dispersed political inequalities have been the result of the reallocation of rewards and privileges as the Soviet system approached a high level of industrialization. For the cumulation and extreme inequalities in political resources of its traditional peasant society past have been reduced and Brezhnev's "war on poverty" continues to narrow those inequalities affected by income.² Yet perceived differences remain, and represent a potential threat to political authority. While favorable comparisons are made with the past, far more salient and relevant may be the new proletariat's dichotomous image of society. Though an individual by nature may compare himself or his specific group to others not very distant, socially speaking, the ideology-born expectations of the new proletariat are that there should be no others very distant. Inequality,

¹Dahl, op. cit., p. 87.
then, is not particularly high, although perceptions of a dual system (one for the elite of the CPSU and one for non-Party members) may be increasing (see Figure I, Condition IV).

**Subcultural pluralism**

That subcultural pluralism often places a dangerous strain on the tolerance and mutual security required for a system of public contestation seems hardly open to doubt. Polyarchy in particular is more frequently found in relatively homogeneous countries than in countries with a great amount of subcultural pluralism.¹

Dahl suggests four differences that give rise to durable subcultures: religion, language, race, or ethnic groups, and region.² The development of polyarchy in the Soviet Union is handicapped by all four differences. While atheism is the state "religion," "...observers estimate that there are between 50 and 70 million Soviet citizens who adhere to some degree to a religious faith."³ There are over 100 different languages spoken in the Soviet Union⁴ and "more than 170 separate ethnic

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¹Dahl, op. cit., p. 108.
²loc. cit., p. 106.
groups live within the borders of the U.S.S.R."¹ Furthermore, the fact that the Soviet Union stretches from the Pripyat Marshes near the Polish border to the Pacific Ocean and from the Arctic to Asia should be enough in itself to indicate that it also suffers from regionalism. Thus, the Soviet Union would have to be considered as suffering from a high amount of subcultural pluralism (see Figure I, Condition VI).

Now according to Dahl, "at least three conditions seem to be essential if a country with considerable subcultural pluralism is to maintain its conflicts at a low enough level to sustain a polyarchy:"² no ethnic, religious, or regional subculture can be denied the opportunity to participate in governing;³ a high level of security must be perceived by the various subcultures;⁴ and polyarchy must be perceived of as being effective.⁵ With the Russian majority dominating the Union in such a manner as to provoke charges of "Russification," there exists little security for the various

²Dahl, op. cit., p. 114.
³loc. cit., p. 115.
⁴loc. cit., p. 118.
⁵loc. cit., p. 119.
subcultures. Furthermore, while the Democratic Movement has in many ways indicated faith in polyarchy, those occupying the leadership positions of political authority most certainly do not consider polyarchy as a viable solution to the subculture problem. For some of the subcultural groups by nature of their stance on independence are permanently in opposition (see Figure I, Condition V 2).

**Domination by a foreign power**

As Dahl comments, "the destiny of a country is never wholly in the hands of its own people. In some cases, domination imposed by people from outside the country can be so decisive as to override the effects of...other conditions...."^1^ Now while there were other setbacks for the development of Russia, the hardest came in the thirteenth century and lasted well over 200 years. "This shock was the invasion in force of the Mongols, or Tatars."^2^ Most certainly, no one can deny that the Tatar invasion had its impact on the growth of traditional peasant agrarian institutions, if only to

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^1^ loc. cit., p. 189.

accentuate certain aspects of this evolution. It must be concluded, therefore, that the strong and persistent Tatar domination of the historical predecessor of the Soviet Union was a highly unfavorable factor for the development of polyarchy (see Figure I, Condition VI).

**Beliefs of political activists**

Undoubtedly, Dahl is correct when he says that "...the greater the belief within a given country in the legitimacy of the institutions of polyarchy, the greater the chances for polyarchy." Furthermore, "as with other beliefs, the views of activists and leaders are likely to be more crucial than those of other people." For regardless of how other factors fit the conditions that are either more or less favorable for the development of polyarchy, "...the beliefs of the political activists are a key stage in the complex processes by which historical sequences or subcultural cleavages, for example, are converted into support for one kind of regime or another." Thus, the beliefs of the political activists are the forces which shape the

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1 Dahl, op. cit., p. 129.
2 loc. cit., p. 131.
3 loc. cit., p. 124.
objective conditions for or against change and, if for change, the direction of change.

There can be little doubt that the Soviet people perceive the contradictions of the Soviet system as a conflict between "the people" and those leaders who abuse the people's trust. Whether or not a polyarchy could be built on their perception of "collectivity of interest" can probably be judged upon their emphasis on the collective interest of "the people" rather than the legitimacy of a polyarchy that is inclusive of those who favor public contestation. The crux of the matter lies "...in the obsession and categorical conviction in the rightness of one's own ideal which leads first to intolerance and then to reprisals against those who think differently."¹ From 1917 to the present the building of socialism has been conducted according to a "Party line" and those of a different mind have suffered the despotism of violence and persecution. Duty to the "truth" as defined by "need" during the struggle to build socialism would have undoubtedly changed little but the names of the builders of the cause for which the

struggle has been endured, no matter what group of protagonists had come to represent political authority. The members of the Democratic Movement, most certainly, represent a divergence from the fanatical idealists who gave, and continue to give, themselves completely to their narrow group and its perception of the "road to socialism." Still, other than the Democrats, both "the people" as a whole and those who represent political authority have not been converted to any great extent to a belief in the legitimacy of polyarchy. The attitude of the Democrats, however, can perhaps be thought of as the necessary preface to the general development of such beliefs (see Figure I, Condition VII 1).

"The idea is highly plausible, certainly, that beliefs about the nature of authority relationships between government and the governed are crucial to the chances for the emergence of different kinds of regimes."¹ The fact that the Soviet people have been historically, and are presently so, "socialized" to a concept of obedience to a central source of authority, precludes any serious conceptualization of a political pattern of contestation. Their whole political culture experience, despite the war waged against religion by

¹Dahl, op. cit., p. 141.
political authority and the propaganda concerning the equality of women, remains essentially one of authoritarian relationships. Despite the progress made since the death of Stalin and the development of the Democrat's rejection, in general the representatives of political authority perceive to a great extent that only unilateral authority is legitimate (see Figure I, Condition VII 2).

Despite the socialization of Soviet citizens to the belief that their government is highly effective, the rising expectations of the Soviet consumer are beginning to create questions that the belief is increasingly less effectively containing. Furthermore, the growth of the belief that the government is chronically ineffective has become more significant because of adherents that the belief is obtaining among not only Democrats on the outside of political authority, but also because of such insiders as a substantial number of economists and others. They perceive that the system requires basic changes and/or outside assistance.

This is said to have led to the basic policy decision about 1970 to turn increasingly westward, particularly to the United States, for the vast amounts of new technology and investment needed to make up the lag and convert the Soviet economy into a more modern and efficient mechanism. To insure that the new Soviet-United States relationship will not be a transitory thaw but a long-term linkage, the Russians have been seeking to commit American
industrialists to deals extending over periods of 20 and 30 years or more. These long-range commitments are designed to give the Soviet Union enough time to make up its present lag behind the West.\textsuperscript{1}

Many of the Democrats, particularly the scientists like Sakharov, recognize that outside assistance will not be sufficient until there are basic changes in the system as well. Certainly, most of those who represent political authority are hoping that the outside assistance will be sufficient. Some changes, however, have already taken place.

In an effort to introduce greater flexibility and efficiency into the planning and management of the economy, the Soviet Union has already been relying on Western practices, although the basic system of state control remains, of course, unchanged. In a management reform now in progress, the control of industry is being focused to a large extent in a new network of Government corporations that will have a greater voice in research and development and in the promotion of export products. In economic planning, too, the Government has thrown its support increasingly to a new generation of economists who have been using Western planning tools and development techniques in forecasting a more balanced growth of the Soviet economy.\textsuperscript{2}

Thus, it can be said that an increasing number of political activists have come to support a more polyarchical


\textsuperscript{2} ibid.
means by which to resolve problems. In that respect polyarchy is increasingly more accepted as an effective way in which to solve at least some problems (see Figure I, Condition VII 3).

Quite certainly, "public contestation requires a good deal of trust in one's opponents: they may be opponents, but they are not implacable enemies."¹ This requirement for the development of polyarchy has been lacking at least since the founding of the Soviet state, and probably earlier. For at least since 1917 the opponents of whoever was the leadership of those representing political authority have been portrayed as "enemies." In the past, even the opposition was divided into different groups which often perceived each other as enemies. While this mutual distrust still exists between political authority and its opponents, a greater degree of trust has developed in other relationships. Greater trust within the Party is exemplified by the fact that the losers of internal Party struggles are no longer executed, but rather are allowed to retire or step down for reasons of poor health. The Democratic Movement itself represents the greatest stride of mutual trust in Soviet history, or even in the

¹Dahl, op. cit., p. 152.
history of the Russian empire. It can only be concluded, then, that the development of trust in others has made highly significant progress since the death of Stalin (see Figure I, Condition VII 4).

As Dahl points out, "trust is obviously related... to the capacities of people for engaging freely and easily in cooperative actions" and "...extreme beliefs in either strict competition or strict cooperation probably generate an unfavorable environment for polyarchy...." While the opposition to political authority has historically viewed objective situations in the either/or perspective, the members of the Democratic Movement view their relationship with each other and with political authority in a cooperative-competitive perspective. "Conflict, competition, and cooperation are all viewed as normal aspects of social relationships which contribute to a healthy, vigorous, progressive society." As mentioned, even the harshness of internal Party conflict has been tempered during the two decades since the death of Stalin. Like the development of trust in the Soviet Union, the development of the

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2 loc. cit., p. 160.
3 loc. cit., p. 155.
political activist's belief that political relationships should be cooperative-competitive rather than strictly cooperative or strictly competitive is a highly significant prerequisite to the spread of this perspective among the political activists throughout the system (see Figure I, Condition VII 5).

As trust and cooperative action are related, so are cooperation and compromise. For quite naturally, cooperation would be rather difficult without compromise. Indeed, compromise is the cooperation born of trust. Yet compromise is the result of mutual concessions, and political authority has compromised its positions rather infrequently. It does not recognize compromise as necessary or desirable. While the realities of objective situations have occasionally resulted in the compromise of political authority positions, these constituted what were perceived to be temporary expediencies rather than surrender of a position. However, internal Party conflict has, since the death of Stalin, found compromise both necessary and desirable. Also, compromise is part of the philosophy of the Democratic Movement. As regards the relationship between the Democratic Movement and political authority, though, political authority has not yet found compromise to be necessary and many Democrats have concluded that
compromise is less possible than they originally perceived. Thus, while since Stalin's death there has been greater acceptance of the necessity and desirability of compromise within groups, due to the behavior of political authority there has been little compromise between political authority and its opposition (see Figure I, Condition VII 6).

The implications for change

If the chance that the Soviet Union will be governed by a regime in which opportunities for public contestation are available to the great bulk of the population depends on Dahl's seven sets of conditions, then there can be little doubt that it is highly unlikely that such a regime will come to power in the near future. Yet it is equally evident that since the death of Stalin the Soviet environment reflects conditions more favorable to polyarchy. Dahl himself recognizes that

in a full hegemony the first step may be nothing more or less than some kind of understanding that in conflicts within the ruling groups the losers will not be punished by death or imprisonment, exile, or total destitution. In this respect the change in the USSR from Stalin's hegemony to the post-Stalinist system was a profound step toward liberalization.1

1loc. cit., p. 218.
In fact, developments pointing to the evolution toward polyarchy in the Soviet Union reflect highly significant charges that have taken place over the last twenty years. In particular, the policy of "co-optation" of specialists from various fields has contributed to the fractionalization of political authority. Although they work within the official institutional framework, these "co-opted" experts often lobby for support for their respective specialties. The process has evolved to the point where many members of the apparatus actually appear to perceive their role as representing whatever responsibility they have been assigned or have assumed.\(^1\) This development might be considered a preface for intra-Party democracy, which would be a major step in the direction of polyarchy.

It is the pace of this change that concerns Andrei Amalrik. For to Amalrik,\(^2\) the ability of the Soviet system to adapt and survive will depend upon the speed with which the "middle class" or the "class of


specialists" can manage to reorganize society. While the process of the development of conditions favoring polyarchy should probably not take the centuries that were required in Great Britain, for example, rationally they must be estimated to be "considerably more than a generation away." However, highly uncertain trains of events (the "accidents" or "nonaccidents" of history) must always be regarded as the unpredictable element rendering all things vulnerable to change. World-wide, perhaps the most predictable unpredictable force for change in the last two decades has been the general phenomenon of army take-overs. As Reddaway has pointed out, traditions of direct military intervention in politics are weak in Russia. Nevertheless,

it is appropriate that we should be alert to changes in political-military relations as a force for change in Soviet society, particularly if the political leadership proves inept or divided and allows the Zhukov syndrome of 1957 to become the norm of the Soviet system.

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1 Dahl, op. cit., p. 45.


A cross-group alignment phenomenon in which "...some of the political and military leaders find themselves in opposition to other political and military leaders"\(^1\) has already been a factor in changes that have left the Soviet system altered.\(^2\) "Moreover, specific foreign policy and domestic issues may bring shifting alignments of political and military leaders at any given time, depending on the issue under discussion in Moscow."\(^3\)

**The Soviet military as a force for change**

While there may exist several factors which have potential as stimulants for direct Soviet military intervention in politics, defeat in war and economic deterioration are two that relate directly to Amalrik's fears. Welch and Smith\(^4\) have suggested that "defeat in war, particularly if accompanied by a belief that the

\(^1\) loc. cit., p. 23.

\(^2\) Khrushchev's rise to power with the help of the military and the development of its role in decision-making which has culminated in the rise of Marshal Grechko to full membership in the Politburo serves as an example of how the power position of the CPSU has changed.

\(^3\) Thomas, op. cit., p. 23.

government failed to give the armed forces sufficient support, increases the likelihood of military intervention." They have also suggested that "the likelihood of military intervention rises with a perceived deterioration of economic conditions, especially if accompanied by a belief that the government cannot resolve or is responsible for, this deterioration."^1 Amalrik has raised the specter of defeat in war (or the inability to obtain victory) and economic deterioration operating in tandem to produce horrors shadowing both the 1905-07 and the 1917-20 Russian revolutions. The vehicle for such a cataclysm would be a protracted and exhausting military conflict with the People's Republic of China.

Most certainly, the inability of the Soviet Union and China to subjugate their divergent national interests bodes ill for the possibility of a peaceful resolution of the two nations' differences. The Soviet Union wants the People's Republic of China back behind the Great Wall and, in the long run, that is not likely. China wants the Soviet Union back in Europe and, of course, the USSR rejects that. The danger not only remains, however, but grows as China's strength grows.

In attempting to come to terms with the Chinese threat, the Soviets have explored various avenues. The range extends from contemplation of a pre-emptive strike \(^1\) to encouraging Soviet farmers to settle the agricultural lands along the Chinese border, \(^2\) and even includes a somewhat humorous linguistic maneuver of giving Russian names to nine towns that previously bore names of Chinese origin in an attempt to remove evidence that the region was once Chinese. \(^3\) All such solutions, though, could only be short term. Unless the Soviets eventually satisfy China's territorial claims, the Soviet Union will probably have to defend her territories militarily. However, regardless of the Soviets' ability to defend their Asian possessions, such a conflict would be bound to have devastating effects on the Soviet economy. It is at this very point where Amalrik fears that the combined weight of military defeat or stalemate and economic deterioration will result in


upheaval, that military political activity could be expected to reach its peak. Such activity might involve simple "refusal to protect the government from violence..."\(^{1}\) or could involve "overt rebellion, using armed violence...."\(^{2}\) Whatever political activity the military selected as its initial tool, it could be expected that responsibility for restoring order would ultimately rest with them if the power and influence of the government and its security forces are undermined to the extent of being either neutralized or destroyed.

The resultant military regime would be either reformist, guardian, or some sort of combination.

The essence of military guardianship, present in all its various forms, is the overwhelming value placed by the armed forces on political stability and order or on their own corporate interests. This is not to say that the guardian role necessarily opposes all social change, but merely that the officers consider change to be of secondary importance and require that it take place through a gradual and orderly process. Military guardians are, above all, "law and order" men. Their loyalty is owed to the national interest as they themselves define it....\(^{3}\)


\(^{2}\)ibid.

\(^{3}\)Smith and Welch, Jr., op. cit., p. 67.
While it is more likely that the praetorian regime would be of the guardian type, it can be expected that the early idealistic and simplistic command decision approach to problem solving will soon prove to be no more effective than the dispossessed government. Thus, unless key civilian sectors agree to cooperate with the military (preferably, to support it) the military will find its capacity to govern effectively simply evaporates. Civil disobedience and general noncooperation with military rule may lead to a breakdown of vital governmental functions and widespread disruption of the network of social and economic transactions on which modern societies depend.¹

What is more, as the military becomes increasingly technology oriented it will increasingly have more in common with Amalrik's "class of specialists."² This could very easily result in a more reformist military regime. Their claim to the mantle of authority would thus become bound up with the general movement for reform.

Projections for the Future

What can be concluded from this investigation into the adaptability of the Soviet system is that one should

¹loc. cit., p. 63.

expect more of the same, at least until that "highly uncertain train of events" pulls into the station. The most vociferous members of the Democratic Movement can expect to be removed from the political scene by one means or another whenever it is deemed cost effective. If a dissenter is well known in the West, he might be "allowed" to leave the Soviet Union. Whatever "punishment" he will receive will depend upon a hodgepodge of things ranging from the international situation to the feelings of some local Party hack. Yet political activity on the part of Democrats should not be expected to cease. For while such activity might assume a lower profile, as long as the objective situation remains unaltered dissident activity will be fomented. The situation might, perhaps, be pictured in the mind as the wave action on a rock formation on a seashore. Each wave of dissent, separated by periods of repression and stagnation, will be stronger partly because of the experience provided by the continuity between generations of protesters.¹

The Soviet Union of today is, perhaps not radically, but all the same, fundamentally different from the way it was twenty years ago. The leadership presently

representing political authority is in a "holding pattern." When they pass or are removed from the political scene it can be expected that the "socialist system" will remain but that the new leadership will increasingly find it possible to accommodate the Democratic Movement and, therefore, formal institutionalized coalitions. It cannot be assumed that the industrial revolution and the economically necessitated communications revolution will not affect the Soviet Union as much as they have affected the West. The question remains as to whether there is time for such an evolution before some "accident of history" radically alters the course of events.
A LIST OF WORKS CITED


